

INTRODUCTION:

The Hijaz, which was under Ottoman rule from 1517 until the end of the Empire possessed great importance both in the Islamic world in general and in the Ottoman Empire as the holy lands of Islam were placed there. The *Emirs* of Mecca, who were descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and enjoyed great reverence for their lineage and their spiritual identity throughout the Islamic world, had since the 10th century held in their custody the administration of the Hijaz and the organization of the Hajj pilgrimage that brought Muslims from all over the world together every year. By taking control of the Bedouin tribes, the *Emirs* created the greatest political authority in the Hijaz. The Emirate of Mecca continued its existence within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, and this lasted until 1919, when the post of *Emir* of Mecca, and the institution of *Emaret* along with the post, were abolished with the command of the Ottoman Sultan.

This continuous rule by the Ottomans and the *Emirs* of Mecca was to be broken only in the beginning of the 19th Century with the invasion of the Wahhabis and the following domination of Mehmed Ali Pasha, with the Hijaz reverting back to Ottoman control only in 1841. At this time, the Ottoman state engaged in an administrative restructuring in the Hijaz, and the Hijaz was organized as a *Vilayet*. Under these conditions, the situation arose that in the Hijaz there came to be two parallel political and administrative bodies sharing authority side by side, the Emirate of Mecca and the Governorship of Hijaz.

The period after 1840 is commonly accepted as the last phase of Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. The recognition of 1840 as a starting point of a different period is based on the end of Egyptian rule there and on the assumption that the Ottoman restoration

brought with it an attempt on the part of the Ottoman Empire to establish a more direct rule in Hijaz, differentiating this period from the previous ones. Before making such a periodization, one would have to question how the Egyptian rule in Hijaz affected its later development in terms of its socio-economic and political structure or in terms of its position within the Ottoman Empire. Is Egyptian rule determinative in any sense that after it a new period begins? On the other hand one should also question the grounds under the supposition that the beginning of a new period after 1840 in Hijaz was largely because this date coincided roughly with the declaration of the *Tanzimat*. Due to its particular socio-economic structure, the Hijaz was not among the places where the *Tanzimat* reforms in terms of the administration of lands and collection of taxes applied. Thus in the strict sense of these reforms, the meaning of 1840 for Hijaz as beginning of a new period might be questionable. In fact, the administrative restructuring which the Ottoman Empire established in Hijaz took place in a later period. However it is not possible to attempt to answer all of these questions within the scope of this study. Thus this study follows the common tendency with regard to the periodization of the Hijazi history in the respective literature by limiting itself with the 1840-1908 period, yet the emphasis will be on the period coincides with the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II.

This study examines how the *Emaret* as an institution the roots of which reached pre-Ottoman times was integrated into the imperial system after the second half of the 19th century. While also looking at the relationship between the *Vilayet* and the *Emaret*, this thesis examines also the attitude of the Ottoman central government towards the Emirs. While doing this, I will reconsider the separation of central and local political elites, moving from the binary opposition posed between *Emir* and *Vali*.

In the studies on the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and especially in the explanation of the relation between the center and these distant provinces, the subject of local notable families gaining strength in the 18th and 19th centuries and their possessing more political power is an element of some weight. The Shihab *emirs* of Lebanon, the 'Azms in Damascus and the Jalilis in Mosul are examples of such rising provincial notable families. Elite families, as a unit of analysis, provide a theoretical framework in Ottoman provincial studies. As it is stated by Margaret Meriwether "the social order of premodern and early modern Islamic society was anchored by an urban elite that occupied the top stratum of local society and acted as mediators between the local population and the government".¹ Meriwether describes this elite, usually called the notables, as being an intricate part of Islamic urban society and its evolution being closely linked with the evolution and functioning of the city in Islamic society, existing as an identifiable group as early as the ninth century the role and composition of this elite varied over time and from one region to another. So did its relationship with the state. As mediators between imperial, often alien, regimes and local society, these elites are seen to have ensured the stability of civil society in the face of chronic political instability between the Abbasid and the Ottoman Empires as well as again in later periods of Ottoman history.²

In the 18th and 19th century one sees the formation of a rising urban provincial elite who get involved in the Ottoman administrative apparatus in the provinces. This had to do with changes in the financial military basis of the Empire. From the advent of the Ottoman State, its administration had been viewed in military terms, and the provincial governors were military officers whose primary responsibility was not

¹ Margaret Lee Meriwether, *The Kin who Count Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999) p.31.

² *ibid.*, p.31.

only to maintain order in their provinces but also to provide troops from among the feudal cavalrymen for service of the empire.³ With the beginning of the 17th century, a major process of transformation took place with the decline of this feudal military system. The change in warfare technologies and tactics resulted in an increase in the weight of salaried troops. The *timar* system was gradually replaced by a cash-based tax-farming mechanism, which supplied the financial requirements of the central government and the new army. Local notable families were largely engaged in this financial system, and by the 18th century they started to attain administrative positions in the provinces.⁴

This rising power of the local notable families in the provinces is interpreted in different ways in Ottoman historiography. Some see this process as a sign of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. According to this view, the Empire was losing control of its area as those provincials were carving out autonomous spheres of influence or areas of control.⁵

Yet there are also scholars who see this process not as a loss of control by the Empire, but as a dynamic change in the mechanism of control. Albert Hourani's influential article set a convenient model for studying provincial elites' role in the Empire, calling the model "the politics of notables". Hourani defines notables as "those who can play a certain political role as intermediaries between government

³ Ruth Roded, "Ottoman Service as a Vehicle for the Rise of New Upstarts Among the Urban Elite Families of Syria in the Last Decades of Ottoman Rule," in *Studies in Islamic Society: Contributions in Memory of Gabriel R. Baer* (Haifa: 1984) p.64.

⁴ *ibid.*, p.65 and Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within* (eds. I. Pappe and M. Ma'oz) (London: 1997) p.154.

⁵ John Voll, "Old Ulema Families and Ottoman Influence in Eighteenth Century Damascus," *American Journal of Arabic Studies* III (1975) p.48.

and people, and- within certain limits- as leaders of the urban population”.⁵
According to this model, the political influence of the notables rests on two factors: on the one hand they must possess access to authority and be able to speak for society at the ruler’s court; on the other hand, they must have some special power of their own, whatever its form or origin, which is not dependent on the ruler and which gives them a position of accepted and natural authority. Notables are the intermediaries that political authority needs because of this natural position of leadership they have in their localities, and for this reason title and access to power is granted to them. Having said this, local notables need to walk a fine line in order not to lose their role as intermediaries. If they become a simple instrument of the central government, they would lose their local legitimacy. On the other hand, if they became too strong supporters of local interests, they could lose their access to the power of the central state.⁷

It can be observed that, in Hourani’s model, central and local elites are seen as conceptually different. Central and local points of view are assumed to be the opposite of each other in this model. Thus, the politics of notables comes to be a model in which these provincial urban elites, not becoming the propagators of a very local or very imperial discourse, try to increase their own authority in an intermediate zone in which they could act without alienating either side. In this sense, the focus of the politics of notables model is more on local notables, and this may cause the relationship between center and periphery to be interpreted in a single dimensional manner.

⁶ Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (eds.: Polk and Chambers) (Chicago: 1968) p.48.

⁷*ibid.*, p.46.

Ehud Toledano on the other hand, explains the relationship between imperial power and local notables in the 18th and 19th centuries in two parallel processes which he calls Ottomanization and localization.⁸ According to Toledano, interaction between the local elites and the Ottomans had an inclusive nature, meaning that Ottomans opened the way for local elites to be integrated into the governing elite.⁹ The Ottoman elite consisted of office-holders. For a man to have elite status, he had to have a position in the upper ranks of the Sultan's service. An office could be used to acquire wealth but a wealthy person without an office in government did not belong to the Ottoman power elite. In the Ottoman Empire, power and honor emanated from the sovereign. They were embodied in the elaborate structure of his government, and were reflected in the titles and income that he conferred. Thus the symbols of Sultanic rule such as the *ber'at* (Imperial diploma) and the *nişan* (decoration) were related to the conferring power-elite status.¹⁰

On the one hand, as Toledano puts it, members of wealthy families and urban notables achieved Ottoman elite status by entering the administration, by acquiring education in the imperial system and being trained for government posts. On the other side of the equation, Ottoman officials, soldiers and administrators gradually developed local interests, joined the local economy and married local women. From this dual process of Ottomanization and localization, the Ottoman-local elites emerged in the 18th and 19th century. In this way the ranks of the elite is expanded to include local groups but at the same time this process elaborated what constituted

⁸ Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research", p.148.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp.149-150.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.151.

elite culture. Ottoman-local elite cultures came to be a mixture of imperial and local elements.¹¹

While conceptually very insightful, these theoretical frameworks were formed taking as example notable families in Arab lands such as Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. The Hijaz is not thought of in this context. Indeed, the Hijaz was an exceptional province of the Ottoman Empire. First of all, it had no economic contribution to the Empire, and it was a financial burden. Yet, due to the presence of the holy lands and the Hajj, it had great ideological value. As a noticeable focus of power, the *Emirs* of Mecca were different from the notable families of other Arab provinces. First of all, since the economy of the Hijaz was not agriculturally based, and since there was no *mâlikâne* system, there was no land based class of notables. The cream of Hijazi society, the *sharifs* got their legitimacy through their lineage. Secondly, although the source of the power and authority of the *Emirs* of Mecca were the Ottomans, the source of their legitimacy pre-dated the Ottomans. Thus, the *Emirs*' taking their place among Ottoman elites can not be explained through the *mâlikâne-kapı* system which we see in other provinces in the 18th century.

Even though Toledano's theoretical framework has at its center the establishment of the *mâlikâne-kapı* system, and even though no such system exists in the Hijaz, the inclusivist approach that Toledano puts forward consists a framework for this research. The concept of a dual process of Ottomanization and localization, in the sense that it indicates that integration was a two way avenue in the context of the Empire, inspires this author to question the assumed binary opposition between centralizing elites of the 19th century and local reactionary *foci* of power which oppose this.

¹¹*ibid.*, p. 155.

All secondary sources that tell the history of the Hijaz say that after 1840 the Ottoman state tried to establish a more direct and more centralized rule in the Hijaz, and that in the process of doing this it wanted to limit the power of the *Emaret*. They all put forward that, as both the administrative structure the Ottomans established here and the *Vali* at the head of this administrative structure and the *Emir* were in a position of authority in the Hijaz at the same time, and as their respective zones of jurisdiction had not been defined strictly, there rose a situation of dual government in the Hijaz. The story continues that the Ottoman central government, from the middle of the 19th century on, in accordance with the *Tanzimat* reforms, undertook the application of some reforms in the Hijaz, and this was opposed by the local power, the Emirate. In this sense, the 19th century in the history of the Hijaz is narrated as a conflict between the *Valis* who are the implementers of the central interests of the Ottomans and the centralizing reforms of the period and the *Emirs* who are the representatives and defenders of local interests.

Most of this secondary literature, in devising their narrative, utilize consular reports and European travel accounts as their sources material. No doubt, when these sources are used by themselves, they fall short of giving a perception of the Hijaz within the imperial context, and reflect only a one dimensional picture of the story. The study of Ottoman archival documents on the area and period, as will be done in this study, blurs the definite distinction between central and local, extending the range in which an actor can be local and central at the same time. Such an archival study allows us to see that the political developments in the provinces are as much determined by the personal and immediate power struggles of the political actors in the provinces as much as they are the product of long term imperial policies and ideology.

In order to support a detailed reading and argumentation from archival sources, this study has an extended evaluation of the historical background and conditions in which one should contextualize the sources about this less familiar corner of the Ottoman Empire. Chapter one of the thesis will acquaint the reader with the geography and society of the Hijaz. It will look at the very different climatic and geographic qualities of the Hijaz, at its population and economy. One can see these contextual qualities to have a great role in the historical development of the Hijaz, and these qualities can be thought of as differentiating it from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The chapter will explain how the lack of adequate climatic and geographic conditions prevented the development of a land based social class in the Hijaz, and how the fact that a great part of the population are nomads, how the economy relies to a great extent on the annual Hajj pilgrimage and international trade, and how the presence of the *sharifs* who occupy a place of great importance in the Hijaz all make it a province substantially different from all other Ottoman provinces.

The second chapter will look at the origins of the Emirate of Mecca and trace the political power and level of political autonomy or dependence of this institution through its history until what has been called its last phase. As the Emirate, as a political entity, predated Ottoman rule in the area, seeing it within the context of its historical development will help us better understand its position under Ottoman rule in the 19th century. For this reason, the foundation of the Emirate of Mecca and the identity of the *sharifs* who are the ruling family will be examined.

It will be argued that the Emirate's later ability to continue its autonomy under Ottoman rule is, in a way, the result of the special position and influence the *sharifs* had in both Hijazi society and also traditionally over the Islamic world. Thus, it is in order to understand this position and influence that the chapter looks at the

roots of the legitimacy the *sharifs* had. Through a brief look at the development of pre-Islamic Hijaz, it will be observed that the *sharifs*, coming from the *Hashimi* branch of the *Qoraish* tribe enjoyed influence in the Hijaz not just as the descendants of the Prophet but because they had even more rooted local ties, as the protectors of the *Harem* and the organizer of the Hajj since before the rise of Islam.

The study will continue to look at how and under what historical conjuncture the Emirate of Mecca was founded as an independent principality. How the Emirate consolidated its authority will be seen and its relations with other Islamic powers before the Ottomans will be observed, and thus there will be a brief look at how rulers before the Ottomans who were trying to become dominant in the Islamic world managed their relations with the holy lands in order to reinforce their sovereignty. This will be beneficial in the evaluation of the Hijaz's position under Ottoman rule and the relations of the Empire and the Emirate. This point is better understood when one considers that the policy the Ottomans adopted in the holy lands is, for the most part, not innovative but instead historically continuous. Further this chapter will look at the Ottoman acquisition of the Hijaz, after their defeat of the Mamluks and the acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty by the Emirate. It will see how Ottoman authority was established in the Hijaz and how the Emirate fit into this system, and note the legitimization and prestige the Ottoman Sultan had through the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and their protector, and also note the duties he assumed. The second chapter is concluded with a brief mention of the Wahhabi invasion and the subsequent rule of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt as a period in which Ottoman sovereignty and the authority of the *Emirs* was suspended temporarily.

The third chapter will consider the historical background – contextually, structurally and in terms of events – in which the final chapter's discussion of

relations of power in the Hijaz took place. This chapter will first consider the factors that contributed to shape Ottoman rule in the Hijaz in the actual period of this study. It will especially concentrate on the question of the caliphate and religious legitimization of Ottoman rule, which was intricately linked with the holy lands, and for which the *sharifs* of Mecca were a potential rival due to their *Qoraishi* descent. Secondly the chapter will look at how the increasing British interest in the Hijaz made the Ottoman government more suspicious about the possible British interference with the affairs of Hijaz and their possible maneuvering with the *Emirs* against the Ottoman Sultan, leading a desire on the part of the Ottomans to gain more control in the area and check the activities of the *Emirs*.

This discussion of why the Ottoman administration of the Hijaz was to be shaped the way it was will be followed by a detailed descriptive section on exactly how the administration of the Hijaz was, including its evolution throughout Ottoman rule in the area. The section is one that is crucial in contextualizing the discussion of the way local power was practiced, which is what we are going to engage in chapter four. Apart from relating to the discussion on ‘dual government’ in the province and the question of Ottoman centralization which are so dominant in the secondary literature on late Ottoman Hijaz, the section outlines the political structures in which the subject matter relations took place, and it also gives a detailed description of the way in which the social and economic structures in the Hijaz related to the political structure.

The third chapter will conclude with a section which reviews more closely the history of the province in the period after the reestablishment of Ottoman sovereignty in the area. The focus in this more chronologically descriptive section will be on the practice of local authority by the offices of *Vilayet* and *Emaret*, but it

will also try to place the Hijaz in a greater imperial context. Again, the author sees this to consist a factual basis, introducing events and personalities, for the further discussion of the actual power relations in the Hijaz in chapter four.

Chapter four of this study will be a source-based and analytical one, inquiring into the way political power was shared or contested in the Hijaz. Moving from ample references to the subject in Ottoman archival sources, it will try to analyze the relations between political actors in the area through a closer reading of relevant documents. The chapter will take this up in three parts. The first section will discuss the relations between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* in terms of instances of conflict the two *foci* of power had, the second will question in what way these two offices and their holders cooperated, and the third section will look at how the *Emirs* of Mecca and the central Ottoman state related to each other.

The chapter will try to view this issue of political power in the Hijaz not just within the context of who it belongs to locally. The issues raised in previous chapters about Ottoman centralization will be considered. The question of dual government as put forward by secondary literature and in the sense of seeing the Emirate as a focus of autonomous power will be reconsidered against what we can see in terms of its power and relations in archival sources. The chapter will also take up the important issues of foreign influence in the holy lands, what it meant to the Ottomans and how the *Emirs* related to this and it will consider this also in relation to issues of local and imperial power and sovereignty. By doing this and utilizing Ottoman sources which are ignored in many studies of the Emirate, I hope to introduce to the study of the Hijaz and of the Emirate of Mecca in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a perspective which is lacking in much of the literature on the subject. I hope to interpret the area in the context of the Empire rather than in abstraction and to

evaluate the power held by the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* in the Hijaz in the multiplicity of ways they were practiced, rather than a single conflict between local and central power.

CHAPTER I

THE GEOGRAPHY, POPULATION AND ECONOMY OF THE HIJAZ IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES:

In order to understand the position of power held by the *Emirs* of Mecca and follow the local political events encircling them, we must first acquaint ourselves with their physical surroundings and its human geography. Hijaz is the part of western Arabia stretching from the Gulf of Aqaba in the north to near Qunfudha in the south and from the Red Sea in the west to the edge of the high plateau of Nejd in the east. Hijaz contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The word “*hijāz*” in Arabic means “the barrier” and its meaning comes from the mountain ranges running through this province from Aqaba in the north to southern Yemen and separating low lands in the west from the high plateau of Nejd in the east. Beyond these general lines, no precise geographical boundaries can be set for the Hijaz.¹²

In the language of its resident, especially when the holy land is thought of, the term “Hijaz” is not used in reference to such a wide geography. Instead, the northern limit becomes the line drawn inland from the Red Sea coast, just south of Wejh to Al-‘Ula and across the step-desert to the northernmost point of the Harrat Kheiber. Median and its hinterland are not included.¹³

The political boundaries of the Hijaz are also unstable and they are not applied so wide. Under Ottoman rule, the core of the Hijaz was defined as the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Their ports of Jidda and Yenbu‘ and their outlying dependencies such as Taif, Tabuk and Rabigh were also included. Throughout most

¹² Saleh Muhammed Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914: Ottoman Vali, The Sharif of Mecca and the Growth of British Influence,” Ph.D. diss. (Univ. of Leeds, 1974) p.14.

¹³ David George Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook* (Cambridge and Naples: Oelander Press, 1917) p.11.

of the nineteenth century the northernmost place where Hijaz effectively began was not Aqaba but Al-‘Ula, where the *Emirs* of Mecca usually welcomed the pilgrimage caravans. Aqaba was under the control of Egypt or Damascus in different periods. In the south, the extension of the Ottoman and *Sharifian* control fluctuated according to the power of local princes in Âsir and Yemen. The southern limit of Hijaz extends usually to Lith, and sometimes to Qunfudha. In the east, political boundaries of the Hijaz *vilayet* was never pushed east of the Kheiber oasis. Parts of the western coast of the Red Sea such as Suakin and Massawa were governed from the Hijaz, but they were not part of the Hijaz in terms of politics or social life.¹⁴

The physical environment and climatic conditions were decisive in shaping the life in the Hijaz. Extreme heat, humidity, the acute lack of precipitation, the continuous coral reefs on the coastal strip, the steep volcanic mountains presented a constant challenge for the people of the area. Much of the Hijaz population was concentrated on the Tihama region, which is the coastal plain in the west, especially in the region of Jidda and east of it, and to a lesser extent near Medina. The population increased as one traveled from north to south.¹⁵

The inhabitants of the Hijaz included historically, and in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, settled people and nomads. Mecca, Medina and Jidda were the larger cities. Most of the population of these cities were non-Arab Muslims. Among them, there were Bukharis, Javanese, Indians, Afghans and other people from Central Asia. The remaining Arab population consisted of native Arabs, Yemenis, Hadramis, Syrians and Maghribis.¹⁶ Other important cities were Taif

¹⁴ William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: the Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984) pp.10-12.

¹⁵ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p. 17.

¹⁶ C.Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka, In the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1931) p.3.

which was the summer capital; Yenbu‘ which is the port for Medina and Al-Wejh, the importance of which came from its being situated on the pilgrimage route to Egypt.¹⁷

Not surprisingly given its climatic conditions, the Hijaz did not have an agriculturally based economy. Because of the scarcity of rainfall, agriculture was possible only in limited areas. Wadi Fatima, the district around Taif, and between Mecca and Jidda were productive places. There were small oases such as Kheiber, Tayma, Al-‘Ula and Yenbu‘ in which dates, vegetables and fruits were cultivated.¹⁸ Most of the settlers of the oases were semi-nomads. They engaged in agriculture and bred sheep goats and camels.¹⁹

Without any question, the backbone of the Hijazi economy was the annual pilgrimage and the transit trade which accelerated during the pilgrimage season. The presence of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina and the annual pilgrimage, the Hajj, made Hijaz a unique province for the Ottoman Empire as well. Each year pilgrims from all parts of the Muslim world poured into the holy cities. Many of the townspeople especially in Mecca and Medina secured their daily living solely upon the proceeds of the pilgrimage. They worked as pilgrimage guides, camel brokers, provided accommodation to the pilgrims, distributed the Zamzam water, or undertook many other services related to the Hajj procession.²⁰ Many people were employed for the upkeep of the *Harem* buildings (the two holy mosques) and for

¹⁷ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.32.

¹⁸ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.18.

¹⁹ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.17.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p.19.

religious services such as sweepers, candle-cleaners, doorkeepers, servants and preachers and prayer leaders.²¹

The most numerous occupation was that of pilgrim guides, namely *mutavvifs*. Hijazis had in time developed a regular organization for maintaining and increasing the supply of pilgrims. During the period we are concerned with here, sources state that in the early months of the year, agents were busy in all parts of the Muslim world, preaching the necessity of pilgrimage and offering (on commission) to arrange the journey, to provide for lodging in Hijaz and to guide the pilgrims through the obligatory ceremonies.²² *Mutavvifs* were organized as a guild and they had a sheikh who is appointed by the *Emir* of Mecca. Each *mutavvif* put his services at the disposal of the pilgrims of a particular nation, whose language he spoke and with whose customs he was familiar.²³ There were *mutavvifs* for the Turks, Egyptians, Maghribis, Indians, Javanese and other Muslim pilgrim groups. Each of these formed a small guild among themselves under their respective sheikhs.²⁴ These guides served as translators, did all the necessary arrangements for accommodation, transportation and purchasing of other needs of a pilgrim, showed the pilgrims what to do in all stations of the procession and recited the necessary prayers during the rituals.²⁵ Beside what he got from the pilgrims he served, the *mutavvif* acquired a commission from each of the transactions that he made in the name of the pilgrim.²⁶

²¹ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.52.

²² Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook*, p.76.

²³ Hurgronje, *Mekka, In the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century*, p.24.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p.27.

²⁵ Ali Ibrahim Kholaf, "The Hijaz *Vilayet*, 1869-1908: The Sharifate, The Hajj, and the Bedouins of the Hijaz", Ph.D. diss. (University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1986) p.92.

²⁶ Hurgronje, *Mekka, In the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century*, p.25.

Another source of income for the Hijazis was financial subventions given by the government and religious alms (*sadaka - sadaqa*) which came from every part of the Muslim world. The first to send a subvention to the Hijaz was the Abbasid Caliph, al-Muqtadir in the first half of the tenth century. His successors, and afterwards other Caliphs and Sultans, continued to send financial subventions to the holy cities.²⁷ Under Ottoman rule, Hijaz continued to receive what it formerly got from Egypt under the Mamluks, and also a new subvention in kind that amounted to 7,000 *ardebs* of wheat was introduced.²⁸ A considerable sum of money called *surre* was sent yearly by the Porte to the holy cities. This included pensions for the residents and needy people of the *Haremeyn* – the two holy cities; pensions and gifts for the various officials working in the Holy Mosques and Governors of the *Haremeyn*; and also, important for us to underline, money and gifts for the *Sharifian* family.²⁹ “About every Meccan who has any sort of post, from *müftî* down to mosque sweeper gets a yearly order on the government chest”, one of our sources says.³⁰

As we said, besides government subsidies there were alms and presents coming from every part of the Muslim world. Very many pious endowment (*vakıf – waqf*) properties were donated to the upkeep of the *Harem* buildings and for distribution of alms among the poor in Mecca and Medina. However it should be noted that inhabitants of towns and villages of the Hijaz other than Mecca and

²⁷ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.21.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p.21.

²⁹ Mustafa Güler, *Osmanlı Devlet’inde Haremeyn Vakıfları, XVI.-XVII. Yüzyıllar* (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2002) pp.182-196.

³⁰ Hurgronje, *Mekka, In the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century*, p.173.

Medina did not have those privileges assigned to and enjoyed by the two the holy cities.³¹

Another basis of the Hijazi economy was trade. The vast majority of the merchant community was non-Arab in origin, among them Indians, Turks, Javanese and Bukharis were leading. Arab merchants were residents consisting of Hadramis, Egyptians and Syrians.³² Trade flourished during the pilgrimage season. The types of merchandise were limited mainly to those required by pilgrims. The Hijaz has very few natural products and they were consumed locally; merchandise of every kind had to be imported from the outside. The export of the Hijaz were mainly henna, hides, dates, Zamzam water, balsam of Mecca, mother of pearl, skins and gum.³³ Pilgrims were the chief consumers of local products. Imported products came from nearly every part of the world. Imports flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³⁴

The main center of Hijazi trade was Jidda. It became the most noteworthy port on the coast of Red Sea.³⁵ In normal times, it maintained a regular volume of commerce, not only with other Arabian ports and with the Persian Gulf, but also with India, Egypt, Africa, and Great Britain and southern Europe.³⁶ Jiddan trade was so considerable that lines of English steamers called regularly. Many European merchants and agents resided in Jidda.³⁷ Custom duties collected at the Jidda port

³¹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.24.

³² *ibid.*, p.25.

³³ *ibid.*, p.25.

³⁴ *ibid.*, p.26.

³⁵ Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook*, p.78.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.78.

³⁷ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.27.

were a very important source of revenue which was divided between the *Vali* and the *Emir* of Mecca. Transit trade through Jidda was divided into two branches, the Yemen coffee trade and the Indian trade.³⁸ Ships from India discharged cargos of cotton, silk, spices, and gems in Jidda where custom duties were collected before transshipping the goods to Suez and the Mediterranean countries.³⁹ However, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 hurt the trade of Jidda severely. As the number of steamships in the Red Sea increased and as these could go to smaller ports more easily, Jidda's role as an entrepot for transshipment of goods decreased.⁴⁰

Mecca was less important as a trading center than Jidda. Meccan trade flourished mainly during the pilgrimage season since traders from all around the Muslim world brought their merchandise to Mecca at this time.⁴¹ Medina was in third place after Jidda and Mecca in terms of trade. Here, there was an active provision trade with the neighboring Bedouins.⁴² Apart from these centers, there were other small trading towns on the Red Sea coast such as Yenbu', which had a considerable transit trade, and also Al-Wejh.⁴³

Most of the population of the Hijaz was not settled and was constituted by nomads and semi-nomads making a livelihood from stock-breeding; particularly raising camels and camel products. If we include the Âsir tribes, there were probably about 400,000 people in the tribes. The larger tribes were the *Harb*, *Juhaynah*,

³⁸ Kholaiif, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.26.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p.22.

⁴⁰ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.95.

⁴¹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.29.

⁴² *ibid.*, p.31.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p.31.

Huwaytat, 'Utaybah, Thaqif, Ghamid, and Mutayr.⁴⁴ Unity within the Bedouin tribes (especially within the larger ones) was relatively loose. Sub-sections considered themselves free to go their own ways and only in the face of an outside threat might the whole tribe unite temporarily under the command of its chief.⁴⁵

Most of the tribes were engaged in animal husbandry but there were semi-sedentary groups who were settled in small villages or oases and who cultivated the land. *Beni Nasri, Beni Thaqif, Beni Sa'd and Beni Malik* were almost entirely settled and engaged in agriculture.⁴⁶ Some of the Bedouin groups provided services during the pilgrimage season. One such tribe was *Beni Malik* tribe who provided porters in Jidda, Mecca and Taif.⁴⁷

The annual pilgrimage traffic had an important place in the economic life of the Bedouin tribes as well as the town dwellers. Bedouins hired their camels to pilgrims between Jidda and Mecca or between Mecca and Medina. However, the rates of hire were determined by the *Emir* of Mecca who also received a tax on each camel to be hired from the Bedouins. Thus the amount of money tribes could earn was highly reduced.⁴⁸

Bedouin tribes who lived and controlled the lands, where the pilgrim caravans passed through also received protection money and grain from the Ottoman government on the condition that they refrain from attacking and molesting the pilgrims.⁴⁹ These subventions were first granted to tribes by Mehmed Ali Pasha as *de*

⁴⁴ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.31. For a detailed study of tribes see: Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook*, pp.35-47.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.17 and Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.30.

⁴⁶ Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook*, p.44.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p.46.

⁴⁸ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p. 35.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p.36.

facto ruler, and later, Egypt continued to deliver grain and money to them on behalf of the Ottoman government. However, what they received as subventions was also reduced by half since the *Emir* of Mecca, who was supposed to distribute the money and grain to the Bedouin tribes, kept a large amount of it for himself. Sometimes, the *Vali* tended not to pay their subventions in order to punish the tribes for their insubordinate behaviour, and this caused great revolts and insecurity on the pilgrimage roads.⁵⁰

At the end of the 1880's, Egyptian pilgrimage caravans who brought the allowances of the tribes preferred the Sea route to that of land, decreasing the tribes' income.⁵¹ After the opening of the Hijaz Railway, the Ottoman government tried to stop giving protection money to the Bedouins, but this led the tribes near Medina to revolt. Thus the Ottoman government resumed paying money in order to protect the railway line, just as they did to protect the caravans.⁵²

Public safety on the roads was hard to establish and maintain. Travelers and the pilgrims were often murdered and robbed by the brigands and at times Bedouins even threatened towns. The town dwellers and nomads regarded each other with disdain and suspicion. The Bedouins of the Hijaz remained to be the masters of the roads until the end of Ottoman rule in the Hijaz.⁵³ Outside the cities and towns, Ottoman authority was weak. The Ottoman government tended to reward friendly chieftains with medals and robes of honor and encourage them to participate in

⁵⁰ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", pp.137-138.

⁵¹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.37.

⁵² *ibid.*, p.37.

⁵³ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", pp.133-134.

government and send their children to government schools as a way of extending their loyalty.⁵⁴

Apart from nomadic tribes, merchants of various nationality, government officials and imperial armed forces, numerous *mücavirs* (people who left their countries in order to live in the two holy cities and spend their time worshipping.), there was another group of people who constituted an important part of Hijazi society. These were called the *ashraf* (*eşrâf*, singular: *sharif* - *şerif*) who were the descendants of Hassan, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammed. There are said to be twenty-one clans of this descent scattered over Arabia, of which fifteen lived wholly or in part in the Hijaz or northwest Âsır, and chiefly in and near Mecca.

Throughout the nineteenth century the *Emirs* of Mecca have been from two of these clans, namely the *Abadilah* (*Dhawi-'Awn*) and the *Dhawi Zayd*. The *Shenabrah* clan was also related to the *Abadilah* and lived south of Mecca. The *Dhawi-Surur* clan was the descendants of the *Sharif* Surur who held the Emirate in the eighteenth century. They became entirely nomadic. Another branch, the *Dhawi Berekat* used to live in Wadi Fatimah; and at the beginning of the twentieth century, they organized themselves in Âsır as a tribe. The *Dhawi Hasan* were also organized as a tribe in northwestern Âsır. Other *ashraf* clans were *Al-Hiraz*, *Dhawi-'Abd al-Karim*, *Al-Hurith*, *Al-Menema*, *Dhawi Jizan*, *Dhawi-Judallah*, *Al-Manadil*, *Dhawi-Ibrahim*, *Dhawi-'Amr*. Most of these however did not grow to hold actual political importance.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, pp.34-35. also in Suraiya Faruqi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar, 1517-1638* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995). pp.71-72.

⁵⁵ Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook*, pp.42-43.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE EMIRATE OF MECCA AND THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ UNTIL THE RESTORATION OF OTTOMAN RULE

The Foundation of the Emirate of Mecca, the Coming to Power of the *Sharifs* and its Brief History until the Ottoman Conquest:

The political, economic and social structure of the nineteenth century *Vilayet* of Hijaz had its roots in centuries of development. In order to understand the position of the Emirate of Mecca in its relations with the rest of the Hijaz and with imperial authorities, the prestige and legitimacy of *Sharifian* family in the eyes of the Islamic community, both local and transnational, and the extent and limits of the Emirate's authority which was usually defined with reference to a long lasting tradition, it is necessary to look at the early history of Mecca and the foundation of the Emirate.

The importance of Mecca as a center of trade and a site for pilgrimage goes back into the pre-Islamic times and the foundation of the city of Mecca was itself related to the foundation of the *Harem*, the sanctuary, there. According to later Muslim legend related by the Arab author Al-Azraki among others, Ibrahim, in accordance with the God's order, settled his wife Hajer and his son Ismail near a well called Zamzam. Then, a caravan of the *Beni-Jurham* tribe coming from the south and who were descendants of Qahtan in Yemen settled in the same place, with their permission. *Beni-Jurham* gave a bride from among themselves to Ismail. Later on, Ibrahim returned from Damascus and said that he would build a house to God in order to please Him. Ibrahim and his son built the house of God there and made the

first *tawaf*, its ritual circumambulation.⁵⁶ The building was called Ka'ba since it was a cube (Arabic: 'ka'aba; Greek: 'kubos').⁵⁷

The Arabic legend reflects the meeting of the monotheistic Ishmailites and the pagan tribes of the south (Yemen) such as *Beni-Jurham* in Mecca. The monotheistic religion of Ibrahim took root for a time but was subsequently replaced by Paganism of the tribes coming and going from the south. However, the Ka'ba remained as a sanctuary. Visiting tribesmen, passing travelers and caravaneers all found there or left there something of their own cult until Mecca became a pantheon. *The Beni-Jurham* who became the guardians of the sanctuary were displaced first by the *Khozaa* tribe and they in turn were displaced by the *Kinana* clan of the *Qoraish* tribe at around 400 C.E.⁵⁸

Qossay ibn Kilab ibn Murra who was called *Al-Mujamma'* ("the unifier") achieved rulership of the sanctuary and united the *Qoraish* tribe. Until the time of Qossay, it had been long customary for people to leave the sanctuary at sundown. Nobody dared to live there or made a permanent residence in the sacred place. Qossay persuaded his clan to build houses around Ka'ba and to live in the sacred area with the aim of strengthening the *Qoraish* possession of the *Harem*. Thus the city of Mecca was founded around the sanctuary. Qossay of *Qoraish* also took various rights related to the *Harem* into his own hands, and thus he institutionalized the various offices related to the upkeep of *Harem* and the organization of the pilgrimage there.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Eb'ul-Velid Muhammed el-Ezraki, *Kabe ve Mekke Tarihi* (İstanbul: Feyiz Yayınları, 1980) (trans. Y.Vehbi Yavuz) pp. 43-55.

⁵⁷ Gerald De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca* (London: Harrap, 1951) p.36.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p.36.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, pp.38-39.

In the middle of the fifth century there had been a new move of the south Arabian tribes towards the central Arabian lands. Merchants of south Arabia and Aden had lost their monopoly over the Indian trade as middlemen, due to the expansion of Roman shipping into the Red Sea. Consequently, the center of trade shifted from Yemen to central Arabia. Mecca became the center of a lively caravan trade.⁶⁰

After the death of Qossay, monopoly over the various rights related to the *Harem* was broken, and his heritage was divided between his descendants and other notables of the *Qoraish*. Some branches of the family devoted themselves to the guardianship of the *Harem*. Some had gained the right to supply the pilgrims as well as being involved in organizing the caravans abroad like the branch of Amr-Hashim who had obtained the right of watering and feeding the pilgrims and who was the great grand father of the prophet Muhammed. Others completely specialized on caravan trade and became famous bankers such as the offspring of Abd al-Shams (the brother of Amr-Hashim) who was the ancestor of the later Umayyad dynasty. In the mean time, the right to hold the keys of the Ka'ba passed into the hands of the Shayba family who have kept this right throughout centuries.⁶¹

Prophet Muhammed was born in 571 C.E. and he was in the fifth generation down from Qossay. The rise of Islam and the establishment of an Islamic state changed the faith of the central Arabian lands. The Ka'ba was transformed from a tribal pagan shrine into the center of a world religion. Mecca as a whole became a sanctuary, and also a city forbidden for all but Muslims. Soon the whole peninsula had been conquered for Islam and the ever-increasing armies of Muslims started to expand northward and westward towards the lands of Byzantine and Persian empires.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p.28.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, p.41.

The imperial expansion passed beyond the control of Mecca and Medina and the seat of the Caliphs gravitated first to Damascus, and then Baghdad. Although Mecca and Medina kept their prestigious position as the holy cities, the political power laid somewhere else and the rulership of Mecca itself was of secondary importance.

Prophet Muhammed had appointed one Attab ibn Usaid ibn Abi al-As to be his governor in Mecca. Attab was succeeded by various other members of the same branch of the *Hashimi* family, appointed by the Caliphs.⁶² When the Umayyad established their Caliphate at Damascus, they started to appoint individuals from their own clan as governors of Mecca. Thus the *Hashimi* branch of *Qoraish* who had hereditary rights in the administration and the guardianship of the sanctuary lost their temporal power in Mecca.⁶³

During the Abbasid Caliphate, the governor of Mecca was appointed from among the Abbasi branch of the *Qoraish*. At the beginning of the tenth century the unity of the Islamic caliphate was broken. The Abbasid empire was suffering from the rise of powerful dynasties at its outskirts. In North Africa and then Cairo, the Fatimid Caliphate rose to power; in the Yemen the Abbasid governor declared independence and in western Arabia the Qarmatians strengthened their position. In 929 C.E. Qarmatians ravaged the holy city and took the Black Stone (*Hajar al-Aswad*) from its place on Ka'ba and kept it for twenty years.⁶⁴

The decay of the Abbasid Caliphate left Mecca more and more to itself, and to the influence of rival dynasties. Caliphs in Baghdad and in Egypt and the ruler of Yemen struggled with each other in order to gain supreme influence over the holy cities. The *emirs* of Baghdad and Egyptian pilgrim caravans fought outside Mecca

⁶² *ibid.*, p.47.

⁶³ *ibid.*, pp.50-51.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p.58.

for the privilege of entering first, and thus of being accepted as the representative of the dominant party.⁶⁵ Whose name was read in the *hutba* sermon before the Friday prayer, who was to send the *kiswa*, covering, of the Ka'ba or who was to repair or embellish the *Harem* buildings were issues of rivalry since these constituted basis of legitimacy for different dynasties who desired to be the sole authority in the Islamic world.⁶⁶ Fatimid or Abbasid caliphs in different times secured these privileges by money and grain subventions or by using force, there was no permanence.

Out of this chaos was born the Emirate of Mecca as a relatively independent principality. After the Qarmatians returned the Black Stone back to its place in Ka'ba in 951, Jafar ibn Muhammad al-Hassani who had came to Mecca with the Fatimid pilgrim caravan from Egypt, conquered Mecca and raised an army of Bedouins against the Abbasid Caliph. Fatimids encouraged and supported him as a move against their Abbasid rival.⁶⁷ The Al-Hassani dynasty founded by Jafar ended in 1061 when their last *Emir* Abdulfutuh died without an heir. The ruler of Yemen, in order to solve the subsequent turmoil, raised Muhammed ibn Jafar ibn-Muhammed as *Emir*. He was one of the descendants of Hassan, son of Ali.⁶⁸ The rule of this family, called as *Beni-Fulayta*, lasted until 1200 when Qitada, the lord of Yenbu' and sixteenth descendant of 'Ali and Fatima, captured Mecca and establish his rule as the *Emir* of Mecca.⁶⁹ Many of the secondary sources written on the history of the Hijaz, regard this event as the formal foundation of the Emirate that continued into our period.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p.58.

⁶⁶ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.30.

⁶⁷ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.59.

⁶⁸ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1972) p.4.

⁶⁹ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.68.

The ambitious *Emir* Qitada desired to rule all central and southern Arabia independently. To this end, he raised an army, built and garrisoned a port at Yenbu‘, subdued Taif, and extended his rule as far south as Hali. However, the *Emirate* of Mecca had never managed to be independent in the sense that it always had to recognize the suzerainty of protector states.⁷⁰ Mecca was continually exposed to outside influences by whoever was or aspired to be the most powerful sovereign in the Islamic world. Even during the Abbasid Caliphate, Fatimids of Egypt had gained the upper hand in the Hijaz. In 1064, the Fatimids stopped sending supplies to the Hijaz for the reason that instead of their name, the Abbasid caliph’s name had been read in the *hutba*.⁷¹ The holy cities of the Hijaz had in the eyes of the rulers of Egypt formed part of Egyptian dominions. During his reign, Salahaddin removed the capitation tax on pilgrims imposed by the *emirs* and money was minted in his name.⁷² The rulers of Egypt also installed whoever they pleased as *Emir* of Mecca. Salahaddin placed the Hijaz in the orbit of Egypt, where he and his descendants, the Ayyubids, ruled until the middle of the thirteenth century.⁷³ The Ayyubids gradually lost power to the Mamluks. After the destruction of Baghdad by the Ilkhan Mongols, which ended Abbasid rule, Egyptian domination on the Hijaz remained unchallenged. The Mamluk Sultan Baybars took the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1269 and as a symbol of his sovereignty in the holy places, he brought a *kiswa*, for the Ka’ba. This continued to be replaced each year from Cairo up to the early twentieth century.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Kholaiif, “The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908”, p.54.

⁷¹ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.61.

⁷² *ibid.*, p.63.

⁷³ Kholaiif, “The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908”, p.20.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.21.

In the Mamluk period the domination of Egypt over the Hijaz increased to an utmost extent, bringing with it the institutionalization of some practices and relations which were later followed by the Ottomans as well. *Emir* Barakat I received a *hil'at*, a robe of honor, from Egypt in 1425. From this time onward *hil'ats* began to signify a public warrant of deputed authority, without which the *Emir* would hardly be considered as fully competent.⁷⁵ In Barakat's reign, for the first time, a regular garrison of fifty cavalymen was sent from Egypt to Mecca, and their commanders, while officially executing the *Emir's* orders, in reality achieved an independent position. Again it was during his reign that the presence of Mamluk governors became regularly accepted. Egypt started to receive as much as half of the revenues of the Jidda customs, the rest belonging to the *Emir*. The reign of Barakat and his successors was marked by the increasing political influence of Egypt. On the other hand, by this time the prestige and sacred position of the *Sharifs* as *Emirs* of Mecca was fully established.⁷⁶

At this point, a brief diversion into the lineage of the *sharifs* who come from the Prophet's line will help us understand the prestige they enjoy in the Hijaz and in the Islamic world in general. The descendents of Hassan and al-Husayn, the grandchildren of Muhammad from the marriage of his son in law and niece 'Ali bin Abi-Talib and the Prophet's daughter Fatima are called *sharifs* and *sayyids*.⁷⁷ Lexicographically, *sharif* means distinguished, eminent, illustrious and high-born.⁷⁸ *Sharif*, which is an expression that was used in pre-Islamic Arab society for free men and tribal patriarch who had a claim to higher status due to having original ancestry,

⁷⁵ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.106.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p.107.

⁷⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirler.*, p.5.

⁷⁸ H. Wehr, "Sh-R-F," in *Arabic-English Dictionary* (Ithaca, N.Y: SLS, 1994) (4th ed.)

was also used at this time as a title for the ten individuals who performed the ten very distinguished tasks at the Ka‘ba.⁷⁹ In the Islamic period, those who were seen most worthy of being *sharifs*, and those who were distinguished in terms of ancestral distinction and lineage were those from the line of the Prophet. In this context, the term *sharif* was used for the family of the Prophet, the *ehl-i beyt* for the Ottomans, in the larger sense, and for the descendents of his grandchildren Hassan and al-Husayn in a narrower sense.⁸⁰

The first use of the word in this sense is in the Fatimid period. The Fatimid Caliphs forbid the use of the title for anyone who did not come from the lineage of Hassan and al-Husayn. Later, it became convention to use *sharif* for those who came from the line of Hassan and *sayyid* for those who came from the line of al-Husayn.⁸¹

The Hassani *Sharifs* gained strength in Mecca in the 10th century, and after the retreat of the Qarmatians in 950, sovereignty in the region fell into the hands of the *Sharifs*. The House of Jafer bin Muhammed al-Hassani, and the consequent *Beni-Fulayta* and the *Beni Qitade* who came to power in 1200 were all descendents of Hassan and his sons, and were from the *Qoraish*, Muhammed’s tribe, and from the *Hashimi* line of this, descending from ‘Amr Hashim. In this sense, from the 13th century on *shurefa* means the nobles living in Mecca or in other capitals who come from this ruling family. *Al-Sharif*, in the singular, means the *Qoraishi* ruler of Mecca or the “Grand *Sharif*”.⁸²

Much more important than the *Sharifs* having respect all over the Islamic world because of their lineage, as the administrators of the holy lands and as the guardians of

⁷⁹ Murat Sarıcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Nakibü’l-Eşraflık Müessesesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003) p.3.

⁸⁰ Rüya Kılıç, *Osmanlı’da Seyyidler ve Şerifler* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005) p.23.

⁸¹ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, p.5.

⁸² De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, pp.64-65.

the Ka'ba, the Mecca *Emirs* gained a distinguished status in the eyes of Islamic states. Apart from the office or the Prophetic lineage, the importance of the *Hashimis* in Mecca also dates back to pre-Islamic times. The *Hashimis* were in charge of the duties pertaining to the organization of the pilgrimage. The Umayyads, another very privileged family of Mecca had prospered with trade, and was in competition with the *Hashimis*,⁸³ and this continued even after the Prophet, with the struggle over the caliphate. When 'Ali and Hassan were killed by the Umayyad family and the descendents of 'Ali's line were exiled from Mecca, together with discontent from Umayyad rule, this served to increase the spiritual authority of the descendents of 'Ali whose right seemed to be taken away from their hands in the view of the population.⁸⁴

Thus, the legitimacy and the source of the spiritual authority of the *Emirs* of Mecca can be found both in pre-Islamic Meccan society, and in developments in Islamic history.

This having been said, as explained above, the consolidation of the Emirate was a parallel development with Egypt increasing its domination over the Hijaz, and in a way institutionalizing it. The role of such a heritage should not be forgotten in relations with Mecca in the period that starts with the Ottoman state taking Hijaz under its domination.

Hijaz under the Ottoman rule:

Sultan Selim I of the Ottomans took Syria and Palestine from the Mamluks in 1516 in the Battle of Mercidabık (Marj Dabik). In 1517'in Ridaniye, he defeated

⁸³ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.40.

⁸⁴ Kılıç, *Osmanlı'da Seyyidler ve Şerifler*, p.45.

the Mamluks decisively, taking Egypt and ending the Mamluk state. The acceptance of his rule in Mecca and Medina, who were under Mamluk suzerainty followed this, and the *Emir* at the time Berekat ibn Muhammed Haseni sent his 12 year old son *Şerif* Ebu-Numey to Egypt and presented his respect to the Ottoman Sultan, along with the key to Mecca.⁸⁵

The Meccan *Emirs* did not have much of a choice when the Ottomans took Egypt and Syria. The provisioning of Mecca depended nearly completely on the grain that was to come from Egypt. On top of this, the Portuguese threat in the Red Sea could only be countered with the presence of the Ottoman fleet there. Under these conditions, the Hijaz had no choice other than submitting to Ottoman rule.⁸⁶ When the *sharifs* of Mecca accepted Ottoman sovereignty in 1517, the latter confirmed them in their position as rulers of the Hijaz. What the Sultan did ask for was the mentioning his name in the *hutba*, the safeguarding of the Hajj caravans and the demonstration of the *Emir*'s loyalty.⁸⁷

Şerif Ebu Numey returned to Mecca with many gifts, and took also the Imperial Patent (*Menşûr*) bestowing the *Emaret* to his father. A salary was allocated to the *Emir* of Mecca from the Egyptian Treasury. Two hundred thousand pieces of gold and a lot of provision was sent by the Sultan to be distributed to the people of Mecca and Medina, and these were taken by *Emir* Muslihuddin as the first *Surre Emîni*, the guardian of the sum of money sent annually by the Sultan, along with two judges (*kâdî*) from Egypt, all under orders to take it to its place and distribute it.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.17.

⁸⁶ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.163.

⁸⁷ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", pp.45-46.

⁸⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.18.

The Ottoman Sultan strengthened his legitimacy as a ruler of the Islamic *'umma* by incorporating the Hijaz into the Empire and assuming the title of *Hâdimü'l-Haremeyni 'ş-Şerifeyn*, Custodian of the Two Holy Cities. Thus possession of the Hijaz enhanced the Ottoman Sultan's status and made him the greatest Islamic ruler of his time, but this also carried with it a number of heavy responsibilities. Among them, the most important ones were the protection of the holy land, the maintaining of the security of the pilgrimage routes to the holy cities and the providing of the security and well being of the pilgrims during their travel and stay in the holy land.⁸⁹ The Ottoman Sultan tried to fulfill these obligations with the *Mahmil-i Şerif*, the Imperial Litter which carried the Sultan's yearly offering for sacred use in Mecca and Medina and thus sent annually, the sending of the cover of the Ka'ba, as well as the *Surre* which was sent to the *şerifs* and the people of Mecca and Medina and the building and maintaining of the two holy mosques and cities; and thus not compromise his legitimacy and prestige as the ruler of Muslims.

Two Hajj caravans were sent from Ottoman lands to the Hijaz every year, and a lot of importance was given to these by the state. The first of these was the convoy that was called the Damascene *Mahmil*, and it parted from Damascus, and the second was called the Egyptian *Mahmil* and it parted from Cairo. Most of the time, the *Vali* of Damascus was appointed as *Emirü'l-hac*. The Damascene *Mahmil* was greeted personally by the *Emir* of Mecca in the locality called Al-'Ula, and continued their route from there on under the protection of the *Emir*. The Damascene and the Egyptian convoys met at Medina or at the place called Rabigh.⁹⁰ This whole

⁸⁹ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.24.

⁹⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, pp.57-59.

procedure about the Hajj convoys that the Ottomans continued had taken shape under the Mamluks.⁹¹

The provisioning of the Hijaz also had symbolic importance for the Ottomans. At first, the Ottomans did not change the system the Mamluks set up in the Hijaz much, regarding this either. They tried to match the most illustrious of the Mamluk Sultans and to pass them as far as the generosity shown to the pilgrims and the residents of the Hijaz. This was an important source of legitimacy, after all.⁹² The Hijaz was exempt from *timar*, *zeamet*, *emanet* and *mukata'a* land grants, but also taxes. Consequently, no taxes were collected from the population of Mecca.⁹³

Initially, the Ottomans administered the Hijaz under the Governorship of Egypt. They acted about the Mecca *Emirs* taking the opinion of the Governor of Egypt, as well as that of the Governor of Damascus who was also the *Emirü'l-hac* into account.⁹⁴ The *Emirs* were appointed by the Sultan taking into consideration the choice of the *şerifs* as well as the opinions of the *Valis* of Egypt, Damascus and Jidda (after it came into being), as well as that of the *Kâdî* of Mecca.⁹⁵

A document of appointment, either a *Be'rat* or a *Menşûr-ı Emâret* was sent to the newly appointed *Emir* of Mecca; also outlining duties and giving advice.⁹⁶ A sable fur was sent with the appointment, designated to the rank of *Vezir*, and sometimes also a sword.⁹⁷ In the *hutbas*, the name of the *Emir* followed that of the

⁹¹ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.35.

⁹² *ibid.*, p.82.

⁹³ A.Vehbi Ecer, "Osmanlı Döneminde Mekke'nin Yönetimi", in *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990-1993) p.1436.

⁹⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrerme Emirleri*, p.18.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p.19. and also in Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.47.

⁹⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrerme Emirleri*, p.19.

⁹⁷ Ecer, "Osmanlı Döneminde Mekke'nin Yönetimi", p.1434.

Sultan. The rank of the *Emir* was one rank higher than that of *Vezir*. When an *Emir* of Mecca came to the audience of the Sultan, the Sultan stood in respect to the ancestry of the *Emir*.⁹⁸

Apart from the money sent to the *Emirs* with the *Surre*, an additional sum called an *Atiyye-i Hümayûn* directly from the Sultan's privy chest was presented to them. As in the Mamluk period, half of the revenue of the Jidda customs also went to the *Emirs*.⁹⁹ Further, it was tradition to give the *Emirs* of Mecca upon their being removed from office a compensation, said to be for living expenses, named *baha* designated from the Egyptian revenue. Residence was given to the *Emirs* or members of their family who came to İstanbul or those ordered to reside elsewhere, and salaries were assigned to them and their entourage¹⁰⁰

The duties expected from the *Emirs* in the *menşûrs* sent to them were these: The administration of the Bedouin tribes, preventing robbery, providing the safe completion of the Hajj by protecting the pilgrims from the tribes, the distribution of the annually sent *surre*s as ordered, providing the security of the roads, fairly distributing the provisions that arrive from Egypt, and acting justly and not oppressing anyone.¹⁰¹

The Wahhabi Occupation and Mehmed Ali Pasha's Rule:

The traditional power structure in the Hijaz was to see a disturbance with the Wahhabi invasion of the region in the very early 19th century. The period saw the

⁹⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.22.

⁹⁹ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.173.

¹⁰⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.24.

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, p.26.

lack of Ottoman rule, with the Sultan's name not even being read in the *hutba*, or the rule of the *Emirs* for long series of years. The question whether or not this period influenced the Ottoman state to attribute increased attention to the province after this credible challenge to Ottoman hold of the holy lands may itself be a question for further inquiry. The following section discusses this transitional period in the History of the Hijaz under the Ottomans.

The Wahhabis started to be a threat on the Hijaz from the 1750's onwards. They had risen as a religious movement in Dira'iyya in the Nejd in 1744-45. With the tribal notable family of Su'ud co-opting their cause, they emerged as a political force to be taken seriously. They had had continuous attempts to embark on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but each time it was turned back by the *Emirs*. At the time of Galib, the *Emir* had even started raids against them. There was no sympathy for their doctrine in the cities of the Hijaz and the *Müftî* of Mecca had pronounced them heretics.¹⁰² Even when faced with the aid in defense of the governors of surrounding provinces, they were able to take the two holy cities in 1801.¹⁰³ There had been no direct support from the Porte despite the *Emir*'s repetitive requests against the Wahhabi disruption of the pilgrimage roots; in fact the central government was more concerned with a French threat from the Red Sea after Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt.¹⁰⁴ This prevented the Ottomans from taking adequate action against the Wahhabi capture of Mecca and Medina, in violation of a peace treaty they had signed just two years ago.¹⁰⁵ Despite the fact that *Şerif* Galib and *Şerif* Pasha the *Vali* of

¹⁰² De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p. 181. However, the Wahhabis enjoyed support from the Bedouin tribes after their arrival. See: *ibid.*, pp. 193-194.

¹⁰³ Zekeriya Kurşun, Osmanlı Dönemi in "Hicaz," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* vol. 17 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988-) p.438.

¹⁰⁴ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, pp. 182-183.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 184.

Jidda took Mecca back, it was decisively recaptured by the Wahhabis in 1806.¹⁰⁶

This, of course, was a heavy blow to Ottoman legitimacy as protectors of the Holy Cities.¹⁰⁷

The Wahhabis, with their radical puritanical doctrine, changed the whole ceremonial and religious fabric of Mecca. They forbid the mention of the Sultan's name in the Friday sermon.¹⁰⁸ All the higher officials who had confession in one of the four *madhabs*, schools of Islamic jurisprudence, were dismissed. Instead, Wahhabis and their supporters were brought to their posts.¹⁰⁹ Al-‘Amr further adds that this was all part of an order issued by Ibn Su‘ud, the leader of the Wahhabi army, in early 1807. In it, he also ordered all pilgrims and the soldiers belonging to the *Emir* out of Mecca, expelling them from Arabia. However, *Şerif* Galib was able to hold on to his post. After having had a brief retreat to Jidda, he had surrendered and was allowed to keep the *Emaret* but with no actual power,¹¹⁰ losing probably even the symbolic power and personal trust of the Bedouins he had retained during his fight.¹¹¹

The Wahhabis looted the area and threatened the security of the pilgrimage routes. There are reports that Ibn Su‘ud wrote to İstanbul, warning the Sultan that pilgrim caravans would not be allowed into Mecca if they are accompanied by trumpets and drums, which were to the Wahhabis religious innovations;¹¹² but we

¹⁰⁶ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, pp. 48-49. Kurşun, “Hicaz”, p.438.

¹⁰⁷ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.131.

¹⁰⁸ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, pp.186-187.

¹⁰⁹ Kurşun, “Hicaz”, p.438.

¹¹⁰ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.49.

¹¹¹ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.188.

¹¹² Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.50.

can also say that they were also ceremony around the Sultan whose authority they wanted to push out. The Sultan, as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the Asylum of the Caliphate on the other hand, was obliged to free the holy cities from the hands of these ‘heretics’. In face of all this, we can see *Şerif* Galib asking for the help from the Sultan, also warning him against the danger posed by the Wahhabis to Syria.¹¹³

The Wahhabi threat was not to be ousted out of the Hijaz until 1818, when Mehmed Ali Pasha the now Governor of Egypt was able to succeed in final victory. He was ordered by the Sultan to do this in 1809-1810.¹¹⁴ He took the task seriously, dispatching his sons for the task. First Tosun Pasha lead the army in 1811 and occupied Medina in 1812 and Mecca in 1813. After his death İbrahim Pasha, who had accompanied Mehmed Ali’s personal visit to the Hijaz in 1814, took over and chased the Wahhabis into the Nejd.¹¹⁵ Upon the news of the victory Mahmud II appointed İbrahim Pasha to the post of Governor of Jidda and of the Habeş province, and to the *Şeyhü’l-haremlık* of Mecca.¹¹⁶ He was to nominally rule the Hijaz on behalf of the Ottomans from 1811 to 1840.¹¹⁷

Egypt had always had an influence over the Hijaz. With Mehmed Ali Pasha’s recapture, this came to be practiced more directly again, after over a century of influence by other forces and influence by all governors in the vicinity. The Sultan’s

¹¹³ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.49.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.50. Al-‘Amr quotes El-Batrik to argue that this was also to do two deeds at once, hoping that Mehmed Ali would exhaust his resources, but there is no proof. De Gaury also mentions a prior order of the Sultan in 1804, which was not executed by Mehmed Ali Pasha. See: De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.189.

¹¹⁵ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.52.

¹¹⁶ Kurşun, “Hicaz”, p.438. De Gaury, unaware of the document from the Ottoman Archives Kurşun uses, misses this point. However, it is noteworthy that the Jidda customs revenue still went to the Egyptian treasury. See below, p.40.

¹¹⁷ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.131.

bestowing the post of governorship to İbrahim Pasha is seen by Kurşun as indication that the province was, in a way, now given to the jurisdiction of Egypt. However, İbrahim Pasha did not reside in the region, he was the commander of the Egyptian armies, and the administration of the region was entrusted to his commanders.¹¹⁸

The first thing Mehmed Ali did upon his arrival in the Hijaz was to change the *Emir* of Mecca. Galib was deposed and exiled to Egypt and then to Selânik.¹¹⁹ He was not found cooperative enough during the campaigns, and had eventually rebelled against Egyptian dominance.¹²⁰ The fact that Mehmed Ali was the one deciding on the *Emir* rather than the central government shows how much control he had in the Hijaz. Instead of Galib, Yahya bin Surur was appointed as *Emir*. This was a person known for his assistance and thus stronger loyalty to Mehmed Ali. He was also not the first candidate for the job, his elder brother Abdullah was more senior, but he had good relations with the Porte and at the same time wanted to strengthen the *Emaret*. Appointing *Şerif* Yahya meant keeping the office weak and tying it closer to Mehmed Ali Pasha.¹²¹

Under Mehmed Ali's Egypt, the administration of the Hijaz did not see much change. The post of commander was given to those close to him; İbrahim Pasha's appointment as Governor did not affect this as he did not stay in the Hijaz. The only significant note is that the share the *Emir* took from the Jidda customs was abrogated, and it was given wholly to the Egyptian Treasury.¹²² However, politics in the Hijaz

¹¹⁸ Kurşun, "Hicaz", p.438.

¹¹⁹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.52.

¹²⁰ De-Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, pp. 203-204.

¹²¹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.52. De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p. 209.

¹²² Kurşun, "Hicaz", p.438. De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, pp. 233-234.

were not to be calm for Mehmed Ali at such a chaotic period. Even the *Emir* he appointed, *Şerif* Yahya, rebelled against Mehmed Ali's authority. He killed Mehmed Ali's cousin and then fled to join the Bedouin tribes.¹²³ After his revolt was suppressed by forces sent from Egypt in 1827, the *Emaret* was taken from the hands of his family of *Dhawi-Zayd* from which all the *Emirs* of Mecca since 1718 were chosen, against the advice of Mehmed Ali's own commander in the Hijaz, and it was given to Muhammed ibn Abdulmu'in ibn 'Awn (İbn Avn) from the *Dhawi-'Awn* family. As with the replacement of Galib with Yahya, this time too the decision was Mehmed Ali's, and the fact that the Sultan sent him a *ferman* with a blank space to fill for the appointment proves the extraordinary authority he had.¹²⁴

There were rebellions against the incompetent rule of officials from Egypt, especially among the tribes who they could not manage well. But the most serious rebellion came from among the military troops stationed there. Under the leadership of Arnavud Mehmed Ağa, Turkish and Albanian troops who did not receive their pay rebelled in 1832. Arnavud Mehmed Ağa declared himself *Vali* of Hijaz, and marched on Mecca. The rebellion was suppressed, but the conduct had not received a negative reaction from the Porte. There was disturbance over the autonomy practiced by the Governor of Egypt. Mehmed Ali deployed more troops in the Hijaz and safely held it until 1840 when the province reverted back to the Porte's control. During this last period of Mehmed Ali's rule, we also see relations between him and the *Emir* worsen. Muhammed bin 'Avn did not turn out to fulfill a passive role either,¹²⁵ he wanted to extend his influence over the tribes of Âsır, and had arguments with

¹²³ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.52. There is no indication of his actual cause of rebellion. Rebelling against the cutting of an important source of income seems viable.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, p.52. and Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.131.

¹²⁵ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*. p.p. 241-242.

Ahmed Pasha, Mehmed Ali's commander in the Hijaz. They were both recalled to Egypt in 1836,¹²⁶ and the Hijaz was actually to be left with no acting *Emir* until 1840, being governed by Mehmed Ali Pasha's secular appointees from Egypt.¹²⁷

Mehmed Ali had to pull out from the Hijaz according to the settlement imposed by the convention of London which the British government concluded with Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1840. Under the threat of the Anglo-Austrian Fleet he had to accept evacuating Hijaz along with the Syrian provinces. In return he had hereditary control over Egypt. Egyptians left Hijaz in 1841 and *Sharif* Muhammed ibn Avn was actually sent back to coordinate the pull-out.¹²⁸ Osman Pasha, the *Şeyhü'l-harem* of Medina, a man of the center, was appointed to the Governorship of the Hijaz. The borders of the province were redefined better, and further military deployment to the region was attempted; but this time from the center.¹²⁹ The *Emaret* was restored again, and the province was again under Ottoman control.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.53. and De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.242.

¹²⁷ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.132.

¹²⁸ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p. 242.

¹²⁹ Kurşun, "Hicaz". p.438. Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.53.

¹³⁰ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.132.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF OTTOMAN HIJAZ IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY:

Factors that Affected Ottoman Rule in the Hijaz after 1840:

The argument has already been made that the land of Hijaz was always unique in the sense that its holy lands gave it a revered and valued status for dominant dynasties throughout Islamic history. Yet we can still observe that, with the second half of the 19th century, the maintaining of sovereignty and control over the Hijaz acquired a further importance for the Ottomans. In the following section, the factors that increased the importance of the Hijaz and which caused the Ottomans to acquire more direct control of the province will be discussed.

This period saw the Hijaz influenced by the administrative reforms that the whole Empire was going through, even if with somewhat different adaptations in accordance with its sacred qualities. The province also became more and more integrated into the greater world politics of the 19th century. Both in the Hijaz itself, and in debates in the greater Islamic world concerning the holy lands and the caliphate, political attitudes now were shaped in a large extent according to perceptions about the House of Osman's fulfilling its responsibilities towards Muslims and also about the perceived bad influence of novelties of foreign origin in the land.

The Ottoman state did not ignore this situation. The administrative structure of the Hijaz was reformed but not all reforms in the rest of the Empire were implemented here, and religious obligations of the ruler and his imagery were

underlined strongly. Similarly, Ottoman sovereignty over the province was to receive outside challenge with the same vocabulary of legitimacy. For this reason, we must consider two subjects of inquiry, the caliphate and the basic reason and points of the strong British challenge to Ottoman rule in the Hijaz, including how the issue of the caliphate was integrated into this, how the *sharifs* were put forward as an alternative to the Ottomans in this post, and also how the issue of Muslims of foreign citizenship posed a challenge for the Ottoman state. The following section introduces the issue of the Ottoman Caliphate, and British policy as they relate to the Hijaz.

The Ottoman Caliphate, Its Historical Development and Its Significance in the 19th Century:

Caliphate, in its simplest terms, indicated in its original sense succession to the Prophet. It was there as an issue since right after his death, and it always had questions of definition and entitlement around it. The meaning and power of the term changed through Islamic history, and there was no agreed upon formulation of who was to hold the Caliphate.¹³¹ Initially the duty of the Caliph was to pursue events set in motion at the time of the Prophet and to put into practice regulations according to the Kur'an and *sunna*. Although not an elected office, the initial position of the caliph was one that indicated him receiving his mandate through the support of the community. Dynastic succession was to come with Umayyad caliphate, being promoted through panegyrist and through *hadith*, and with this the prior proclamation of allegiance by the believers was to lose its importance.¹³²

¹³¹ Dominique Sourdel, The History of the Institution of the Caliphate in "Khalifa" in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (2nd Edition) Electronic Edition.

¹³² *ibid.*

The idea that the caliphate should belong to the family of the Prophet had also been around since the earliest days of the institutions, with many factions gathering around the idea. However, we see the idea being incorporated into the official political discourse only with the Abbasids' (who were a branch of the *Hashimi*) rise to power in the 8th century, in order to legitimize their revolution against the Umayyad, who were more distant family. The Caliph's role in ceremonial and in leading campaigns into non-Muslim lands also became a part of the responsibilities of the office in this period. The Caliph also had judicial responsibilities which he delegated, but he remained as the place of last resort.¹³³

The 9th and 10th centuries saw the Abbasid Caliphs designate more and more authority to their *wazirs* in administrative affairs. The 10th century saw greater authority being designated, seeing the development of the "grand amirate" as the institution which practiced political authority, to be replaced in the following century by the actual development of the system of sultanate under the Seljuks, and the actual mandating of political authority to a body other than the caliphate. At the same time, esoteric qualities were attributed to the Caliph under restoration attempts. It was also during this period that the Umayyad Caliphate of Andalusia rose, ending the unity of the institution.¹³⁴

The Abbasid hold of the little power they had left was to end under the so called "shadow caliphs" of Cairo under the Mamluks. These were descendents of a claimed member of the Abbasid family, who took refuge with the Mamluks after the Mongol sack of Baghdad and the killing of the last Abbasid caliph Al-Musta'sim in 1258. The institution under the Mamluks served the simple purpose of rendering legitimacy to the Mamluk rulers, his powers being delegated fully to the Sultan. The

¹³³ *ibid.*

¹³⁴ *ibid.*

divine origin of caliphal power was emphasized, and obedience to him was declared as the source of legitimacy throughout different Muslim polities, many including the early Ottomans seeking investiture from him.¹³⁵

Yet his recognition was not universal. Many rulers, including the Seljuks of Rûm, actually started using the title *halifa* without its full implication as the actual leader of the whole *'umma*. This new usage was later also adopted by the Ottomans and was used in a way to indicate Ottoman entitlement to rule through military success and service to the faith, and thus sovereignty by divine right; a completely different usage than that of the early caliphate. Selim I's taking of Egypt in 1512 actually changed the regularly used title from "*Halife*" to "Asylum of the Caliphate", the *Hilâfet-penâh*, but the connotation was still the same. This change however should not be related to the Abbasid descendents there handing over their heritage, as by this time, Ottoman recognition of their title and significance is questionable. By this time, even the legitimacy of the past Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs had widely fallen into question, and the Sunni position (including that of Hanafi *madhab* adopted by the Ottomans) had come to be that the genuine caliphate had ceased to exist after the first four caliphs.¹³⁶

Thus by the 15th century, the authority of the "shadow caliph" in Cairo was derogated anyway. The holder of this post, Al-Mutawakkil, was thus not treated with a notable reverence when Selim took over Egypt. The late 18th century fiction that the caliphate was transferred to Selim I by him in a ceremony was thus not an issue at the period.¹³⁷ The Ottoman caliphate was based on Lütfi Pasha's definition in the

¹³⁵ *ibid.*

¹³⁶ *ibid.*

¹³⁷ *ibid.*

16th century with regard to their ability to support the institution. The *Qoraish* descent was outlined as not being necessary for the office in his writings that were to inspire Cevded Pasha's views on the issue in the 19th century.¹³⁸

The title was never used in its absolute by the early modern Ottoman Sultans, and references to the caliphate were not to resemble its original sense. Yet, the title *Hâdimü'l-Haremeyn* was acquired by Selim from the Mamluks, and it was used in its full sense. Similarly, at this time other rulers, such as the Mughals were making references to the caliphate in a way similar to the Ottomans;¹³⁹ and this can be seen to have prepared a sensitivity towards the title among the population in India, which as we will see was an influential phenomenon in our later period.

There were vague references to responsibility over the community, but perhaps the first notable instance of the rise of the caliphate in the sense in which it gained relevance in modern times was to be seen in the Treaty of KüçükKaynarca in 1774. Here, Abdülhamid I was presented as “*imam* of the believers, and the Caliph of those who profess to divine unity”, underlining his right to the protectorship of the Muslim population of the Russian Empire in reciprocity with Catherine the Great's protectorship of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottomans. In an attempt to justify the Sultan's protectorship of Muslim populations that had come under Christian rule, the language was made to resemble more the original function of the caliphate as leader of the community. This point was challenged by the Russians, but it remained a constantly used diplomatic tool in Ottoman hands in dealing with European

¹³⁸ Azmi Özcan, Osmanlı Dönemi in “Hilafet” in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* vol. 17 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988-) pp.547-548.

¹³⁹ Sourdel, “Khalifa”

powers.¹⁴⁰ Yet it can also be seen to revive questions related to this old meaning of the term, including questions of who was entitled to the caliphate.

After the treaty, the Ottoman state continued to frequently use the grounds of caliphate as a medium of dialogue with non-Ottoman subject Muslims, and a way to have influence over them. This role also served for legitimization purposes at home.¹⁴¹ The emphasis of the caliphate at this period may also be thought of as a way to supplement the legitimacy lost with the Ottoman state no longer functioning as effectively in terms of political and military power.¹⁴² We can see the Ottomans claiming rights to protect Muslim populations from North Africa to Eastern Central Asia in the late 18th and early 19th century, especially increasing in importance with the increase of colonization. Rulers who wrote to the Ottoman Sultan at this time informing their submission to him and asking for help were often written back saying that it was unnecessary to proclaim allegiance, as the Sultan was already the place where all Muslims should seek refuge as the Caliph and the *Hâdimü'l-Haremeyn*.¹⁴³

The idea of caliphate in Ottoman practice was to see a change in its constitution with the *Tanzimat*. With the Tanzimat proclamation of citizenship rights and their extension to Muslim and non-Muslim elements in the population, the Sultan's identity as the Sultan and the Caliph effectively saw a split, as one encompassed all citizens, and the other encompassed only Muslims, and even those

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.* Azmi Özcan is more skeptical about the novelty of this usage. He claims that this definition of the office was never lost. For him, the importance here is only the recognition of the Ottoman caliphate. He puts forward that many 17th and 18th century Muslim rulers asked for refuge in the Ottomans as proof. See: Özcan, "Hilafet", p.546.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.546.

¹⁴² Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) p.47.

¹⁴³ Özcan, "Hilafet", p.547.

who were not citizens.¹⁴⁴ The situation was clearly defined on these lines in the constitution of 1876, relegating the Sultan's authority abroad as caliph only to spiritual authority;¹⁴⁵ but also important, outlining it as spiritual authority. The post-1908 period was to bring a further step, initially labeling the caliphate as a mere entrustment by the people, and thus saying that the people had rights over the caliphate rather than the Caliph they appointed over them. Yet reaction from within and without was to change things back to giving more importance to the caliphate.¹⁴⁶ In practice, the relegation of authority abroad as caliph only to spiritual authority hardly ever was the case anyway, extending help and intervention on these grounds.¹⁴⁷ The trust in the power of the caliphate to gather support among foreign Muslims was so great that, after the success in rallying support for the Tripoli and the Balkan wars, the Ottoman government entered the First World War counting on Muslim support from the colonies.¹⁴⁸

Especially Abdülhamid II made extensive use of the caliphal title in an agenda of protecting the unity of his subjects and domain and resisting increasing foreign pressure. The fact that this was the zenith of European colonialism, with many Muslims living under colonial domination led him to the conclusion that he had to rely on Muslims in the Ottoman lands and abroad in his attempts at political perseverance. This was also the period when pan-Islamism was on the rise with figures such as Jamaladdin Afghani being quite influential. The promotion of the

¹⁴⁴ Özcan, "Hilafet", p.547. According to Özcan, this implied the transfer of the political authority of the Caliph to the Sultan, but it was not to be a problem yet, because they were both collected in the same person.

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.547.

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p.548.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p.547.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.549.

identity of Caliph by Abdülhamid fit the picture, and it acquired an important role both internally and internationally.¹⁴⁹ How much this new imagery has corresponded with actual political reality, however, has been a question of scholarly inquiry.¹⁵⁰

New legitimacy was given by Cevded Pasha to the Ottoman caliphate, who put emphasis on the manifestation of divine will, on being inherited from predecessors, on political and military power to serve the upholding of God's name, as well as on the acceptance and allegiance of the *'ulemâ*, officials and the people.¹⁵¹ This was all in accordance with the Hanafi position that the Caliph did not have to be from the *Qoraish*, as long as he was a strong able bodied leader who protected the Muslims and upheld the law.¹⁵² It is interesting to see that the same points were countered as the argument against the Ottoman caliphate by especially the British, arguing that the Ottoman Sultans were not worthy of the title most importantly because they did not have the right lineage, they were not *Qoraish*. In addition, the claim of the Ottomans to the caliphate were underlined as being new and not accepted by the whole of the Muslim world, and the Ottomans were shown as acquiring the post not through allegiance but through force. The argument continued in newspapers and through financial help until the end of the Empire,¹⁵³ as well as

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p.547.

¹⁵⁰ See: Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, p. 43. Deringil concludes: "The Problem with the Hamidian Ottoman state was that increased Islamic symbolism and reliance on the caliphate as the 'exemplary centre linking earthly and celestial hierarchies' was an inadequate substitute for real power."

¹⁵¹ Özcan, "Hilafet", p.547.

¹⁵² Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, p.48. Deringil says this was also the reason behind Ottoman adoption of the *madhab* as the official one.

¹⁵³ Özcan, "Hilafet", p.548.

with more overt attempts especially by Abdülhamid II to extend the political power of the caliphate.¹⁵⁴

However, this was not solely a state sponsored political effort for any party. It was also a genuine political question that gathered attention. Notable authors such as Sir James Redhouse can thus be seen as arguing sympathetically to the Ottoman caliphate,¹⁵⁵ just as there were Muslim authors who argued against it. Thus, there was a constant feeling by the Ottoman government that the Ottoman caliphate was under threat from the Muslims living under colonial rule,¹⁵⁶ whom they were trying to mobilize for their cause. Thus we see Muslims of French citizenship being suspect in the Hijaz,¹⁵⁷ and this was even more so for those under British rule, with a great fear of British intrigue, especially in this distant and vulnerable province.¹⁵⁸ Their acquisition of property was definitely an issue the government was wary about,¹⁵⁹ and so the Hijaz was singled out as a province where foreigners cannot acquire property even after the 1867 amendment to the land law.¹⁶⁰ Further, the Ottoman foreign ministry was actively engaged in following the debate over the caliphate that was going on abroad, and even issuing refutations as with the case of an article published in the *Punjab Times*.¹⁶¹

We see one more such case of active engagement by the Ottoman government in the debates over the caliphate, and the means through which these

¹⁵⁴ Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.55.

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.54.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.55.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p.61.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p.56.

¹⁶⁰ See below, pp. 57-58.

¹⁶¹ BOA, Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A. HUS), 211/65, 1305.C.22 (6 Mart 1888).

were done, with a case that relates directly to the *Emirs* of Mecca. This is a document dated 25 August 1905, we sent by the Ottoman Consul in Tbilisi and presented to the Office of the *Sadrâzam* by the Foreign Minister. It presents the translation of an article that was published in a Georgian Newspaper in Tbilisi and the translation of the response to it. This “damned” and “ill-thinking” (*melânet-kârâne* and *bed-hâh*) article is published in the *Tifliski Listos*; it pertains to the caliphate and is written on the occasion of the death of the *Emir* of Mecca Avnürrefik. The publication of the article is explained to be the doing of a Mehmed Ağa, who had previously been publishing a Turkish language newspaper called the *Şark-ı Rûsî*, which was submitted to the *Sadrâzam* from time to time. The author of the document says that he had “a person by the name of Reşid Bey İsmailof” write a refutation and discussion of the article. This can be taken as an example of how the Ottoman propaganda machine for the caliphate operated, incorporating local Muslims, and influencing local debate on the issue.

The article itself informs of the death of the *Emir*, and then explains his role, administering the Bedouins, to be important in this holy land, as well as explaining briefly that the Ottoman Sultan held the caliphate out of right through its strength, but that now this power was depleting, and foreigners were being influential over affairs of his state. It says that the caliphate of the Sultan is being doubted even in the Muslim world, and it proposes that the whole Muslim world is questioning how his caliphate could be justified in the face of his lack of descent from the Prophet, and Muslims are inclined towards recognizing the *Emir* of Mecca as Caliph. The article concludes that this is something very much to the benefit of the British, and that it is not too far ahead that the next *Emir* will declare his caliphate.

The response piece encouraged by the Ottoman state acknowledges the significance of the *Emirs*, and also that there was the question of whether or not he will declare himself Caliph in the face of the troubles in Yemen. Yet it makes a firm claim that the Ottomans had been delivered the caliphate from the Abbasid Caliphs of Egypt, and that not only this, they were also delivered the holy relics. The response argues that these are still in safe keeping, and that in order for the *Emir* to become Caliph, he would have to bring an end to the authority of the Ottomans, and that this is beyond his power and any such attempt would surely result in unfortunate events. Thus, the response concludes abruptly, it is not all that significant a consideration for the Caliph to be a descendant of the prophet, as “none of the former caliphs (i.e.: the four initial Caliphs?) or the Umayyad caliphs were descendants of the Prophet.”¹⁶² Apart from showing Ottoman engagement in these debates abroad, both the article itself and the Ottoman-supported response show how relevant the Emirs of Mecca were to the whole issue of Ottoman caliphal legitimacy, how dangerous a potential they had and thus had to be respected but kept under check, and how the whole debate was argued through the position of the history of the caliphate and its legitimacy that is discussed above.

In the Hijaz, the Hajj also was an extremely important place and time for Ottoman propaganda attempts for their cause. Every year during Hajj two ceremonial tents were erected between Arafat and Mina, signifying the Sultan’s presence and visually confirming his sovereignty as Caliph, Sultan and *Hâdimü’l-Haremeyn*. His annual Hajj message was read from the tent at Mina.¹⁶³ The most notable candidate in the British counter argument, on the other hand, were the *Şerifs* of Mecca,¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² BOA, Y.A. HUS, 492/9, 1323.C.23 (24 Ağustos 1905).

¹⁶³ Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, p.33.

although others such as Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha were supported when a viable claim to the caliphate and the protectorship of the two holy cities was voiced.¹⁶⁵ These claims of the Khedive also found support in Egyptian newspapers, and this caused worry in İstanbul. It was found inappropriate for the Khedive to show tolerance to such calls. The *Sadaret* wanted an investigation and possibly the closing of the concerned *El-Ceziretü'l-Mısırıyye* newspaper, and it was suggested that newspapers from this autonomous province, which were somewhat ignored, should be observed more closely.¹⁶⁶

The Hijaz also had the official name of *Gevher-i İklîk-i Hilafet-i Seniyye* (The Jewel in the Crown of the Exalted Caliphate).¹⁶⁷ It was intricately linked to the legitimacy of their caliphate in the Ottoman mind of the period. Both through the Hajj and display of power and propaganda and through the lineage of the *şerifs*, the caliphate was a matter that affected the Hijaz deeply throughout the last half century of the Empire, eventually ending in the rebellion of *Şerif Hüseyin*.¹⁶⁸

British Influence in the Hijaz and Outside Challenge to the Ottoman System:

In secondary literature dealing with the subject, British presence in the Hijaz is reported to be much more influential than any other Western power's,¹⁶⁹ and it is also represented in Ottoman archival sources we have seen as being so. Although

¹⁶⁴ Özcan, "Hilafet", p.548.

¹⁶⁵ Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, pp.58-59.

¹⁶⁶ BOA, Y.A.HUS, 224/3, 1306.Ş.1 (2 Nisan 1889).

¹⁶⁷ Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, p.57.

¹⁶⁸ Özcan, "Hilafet", p.549.

¹⁶⁹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.169.

British interests in this part of the Ottoman Empire had existed for a long time with the Yemen and Red Sea trade, two points in the first half of the 19th century seem to have increased the importance given by Britain to the Hijaz. One of these is Napoleon's invasion of Egypt at the onset of the century, and the continuing French influence there which was a risk in the eyes of the British.¹⁷⁰ The other is related to Britain's taking possession of its Indian Empire, increasing the significance the holy sites of Islam had for them. With no less than 1500 Indian Muslims living there, and with the Hajj being a grounds for political activity, Britain decided to have a greater presence in the Hijaz.¹⁷¹ The significance of the Hijaz for Britain's overseas empire increased even more after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Yet at the same time, this also affected Ottoman effectiveness in the region, enabling troops to be quickly dispatched there by sea and making the area easier to control directly.

Britain's relations here went on at a multiplicity of levels. Trade was a main component. After all, the British Consul in Jidda was appointed by the East India Company, even though he was responsible to the Foreign Office.¹⁷² The trade interests at stake were considerable; British trade had risen especially after the opening of the new water way and the commercial growth of the Jidda port.¹⁷³ This was a trend that had continued since the signing of the 1838 trade treaty which opened the Empire up to British trade at a previously unseen level.¹⁷⁴ The treaties following 1838 had led to the establishment of a growing number of European trading houses in the Hijaz that competed with the local merchants, and the aftermath

¹⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p.170.

¹⁷¹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", pp.171-172.

¹⁷² *ibid.*, pp.188.

¹⁷³ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.38.

¹⁷⁴ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", pp.175.

of the Crimean War had increased the influence ‘and at times the arrogance’ of the Europeans in Jidda.¹⁷⁵ By the first decade of the 20th century, as much of a quarter of the imports of the Jidda port were reported to be from British possessions.¹⁷⁶

Yet relations were much more complicated than strong commercial presence or strictly commercial dominance. As early as the 1880’s, there was talk of British occupation of the Hijaz with the support of the *şerifs*.¹⁷⁷ This would have both increased their prestige in the eyes of their Muslim subjects and reduced the legitimacy of the the Sultan as the leader of Muslim peoples.¹⁷⁸ The protection of subjects who were there on the pilgrimage was also an issue repetatively raised by the British.¹⁷⁹

Any claim for protector status on behalf of Britain was strongly opposed by the Ottoman state. The Hijaz was the one province that rights of protection that were assured by the 1838 treaty were not applied; but the argument for this was tricky. In correspondence from the central government to the *Vilayet* on 30 September 1861, we see a case that demonstrates exactly how the Porte tried to handle the matter. In this document, it was explained that some people who came and dwelled in the Hijaz for pious purposes (*mücâvirs*) were going under foreign country protectorship, and that this was causing objectionable events. After the subject had been taken up in the Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Mahsûs-ı Vükelâ*), the following answer was reached: “As the two holy cities are sacred grounds, we can not permit foreign protectorship to be recognized there; yet as the concerned individuals are Indian and Javanese which are under British rule, not recognizing their citizenship at all would be impossible in terms of international law. Therefore there should be attempts to seek

¹⁷⁵ Kholaiif, “The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908”, p.37.

¹⁷⁶ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.176.

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, pp.172-173.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p.174.

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p.177.

ways to overcome the difficulties this will cause through amenable means.” It was thus asked that it should be explained to the concerned people that all matters are seen in courts in Mecca and Medina, and as there are no mixed law courts in these cities, everything relating to the procedures and cases of these *mucâvirs* will be handled according to the *sheri‘a*, and that no protectorship will be accepted.¹⁸⁰

Yet foreign subjects were there, and it was not only simple assertion of influence that the British or other powers were concerned with; things such as raising ferry costs were matters considered.¹⁸¹ Further, the issue of maintaining sanitary and healthy conditions for Muslims from their empires was a very important concern for Britain and other European powers. Especially after the cholera outbreaks starting in 1831 and the unsuccessful Ottoman response, disease became a concern about the Hajj.¹⁸² The sanitary conference held in İstanbul in 1865 tried to impose higher standards, but there was understanding among the British that this was dangerous territory, and initially, they tried to respect and not interfere in the Muslim pilgrimage despite calls to do so by their consul in Jidda.¹⁸³ Yet, quarantine stations were built and expanded by the British and Egyptians after the 1870’s, and this was regarded as an intervention into an internal Ottoman issue by the Porte.¹⁸⁴ Apart from the Ottoman government’s balanced agenda for not giving up control, the people of the Hijaz saw foreign quarantine stations as intervention into the Muslim

¹⁸⁰ BOA, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Umum Vilayet Yazışmaları (A. MKT. UM), 511/80, 1278.R.25 (30 Eylül 1861).

¹⁸¹ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.179.

¹⁸² Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, pp.64-66.

¹⁸³ *ibid.*, p.66.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p. 69.

pilgrimage, and resisted these efforts which separated towns and which they saw as worsening conditions.¹⁸⁵

The Ottoman reaction to the challenge of influence through an argument of presence of subjects in the Hijaz was to attempt to control the numbers and status of British subjects in the province. More strict passport regulations were introduced.¹⁸⁶ When we consider that the *Tanzimat* citizenship laws stated that anyone who could not prove foreign nationality was considered an Ottoman subject, this can be seen as an attempt to stop confusion with the British over subjects and their protection under treaties.¹⁸⁷ The British however made multiple levels of claims, from challenging the Sultan's caliphate to claiming that Britain should appoint the *Emir*, as it ruled over four times as many Muslims as the Ottomans.¹⁸⁸ The Ottoman choice of appointment was not always favorable to the British, as with *Emir Abdülmuttalib*, and in this case, the Consul in Jidda outlined this as the Porte's specific agenda to guard the Hijaz against British interests.¹⁸⁹

Ottoman correspondence from the Hijaz also reflects concern about British intrigue there. A letter of Ahmed İzzet Pasha's from 1882 is a case in point. The *Vali* writes to the Porte reporting rumors of British plans to incite events in the Hijaz, and then to intervene in order to protect its many subjects who reside there. We see in the *Vali's* words and fears, that the Ottoman government was indeed concerned for the province because of its vulnerable yet extremely important status as the direction of worship of all Muslims. His impression is that the British are also aware of this, and

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁸⁶ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.173.

¹⁸⁷ Davison, "Tanzimat".

¹⁸⁸ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.177.

¹⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p.181.

the reason they want to ‘intervene’ there is so that they could “halt the dissemination of the authority and influence of His Highness the Caliph from here to all corners of the Muslim world”.¹⁹⁰

Another issue of concern was the sale of land in the Hijaz to foreigners. Unlike elsewhere in the Empire, this was prohibited even after the *Tanzimat* laws, and violation of this prohibition was followed with concern. Thus, in 1881, explanation was requested from the *Emir* in face of complaints on the sale of land to foreigners, from among the *Emir*’s lands and others. A reply was received signed by both *Emir* Abdülmuttalib and *Vali* İzzet Pasha. It stated that under the previous *Emir* some Indians and Javanese had indeed been sold some land, but that afterwards this was not permitted. The *Emir* also backs his position further by saying that, even though there was a request to expand the foreign graveyard in Jidda under the previous Governor during his tenure, he had strongly opposed it.¹⁹¹ Much later, in a separate document, one that comes from the Embassy in Paris, we see that *Emir* Avnürrefik was selling land that belongs to the provinces of Hijaz and Yemen to the British.¹⁹²

Not all concern for British influence in the Hijaz had to be so big and so dramatic. Especially Abdülhamid II was precautionous about any potential British influence. A memorandum from his Chief Secretary Süreyya Pasha to Abdülhamid expresses concern over the visit of an Egyptian *Şeyh* Osman Merguni who was apparently a supporter of the British.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ BOA, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Mühimme Odası (A. MKT. MHM), 487/1, 1299.Ş.3 (19 Haziran 1882).

¹⁹¹ BOA, Yıldız Esas Evrakı (Y. EE), 88/67, 1298.M.11 (14 Aralık 1880).

¹⁹² BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Elçilik ve Şehbenderlik Tahrirâtı (Y. PRK. EŞA), 36/62, 1318.C.3 (28 Eylül 1900).

¹⁹³ BOA, İrade Dahiliye (İ. DH), 98997, 1309.C.19 (20 Ocak 1892).

Indeed concern over British intervention in the Hijaz was not limited to the government. A newspaper article presented to the Sultan points out the possibility of the British inciting the *Emir* to claim the caliphate, and intervening on his behalf with naval and monetary support. The article goes on to argue that for this reason, the Porte should not upset the British too much, even if it is good to have better relations with Russia.¹⁹⁴

Emaret-i Mekke-i Mükerrerme and Vilayet of Hijaz: Administrative Structure:

Nearly all works on the Hijaz, in referring to the period that starts with Mehmed Ali Pasha's withdrawal from the Hijaz and which is phrased the last phase of the Emirate, make mention of the Ottoman state's wish to administer the Hijaz more directly and with less intermediaries. The observation is made that with the system the Ottomans tried to instate in the Hijaz after the *Tanzimat*, a dual government was set, and that all problems in the administration of the province in the 19th century are a result of this. Before inquiring into the nature of the relationship between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* in the coming chapter, in this chapter, we examine the structures of these two political institutions that are named the Emirate of Mecca and the Governorship of the Hijaz Province.

When the Ottomans became dominant in the Hijaz in 1517, Jidda was established as a *sancak* (provincial subdivision) under the authority of *Beylerbeyi* (military and administrative Governor General) of Egypt. Just as the Mamluks sent a *sancakbeyi* to Jidda, the Ottomans too appointed a *sancakbeyi* there to administer the military forces and control the Jidda customs. The Governor of Egypt had an upper

¹⁹⁴ BOA, Y.A. HUS 195/97, 1304.M.21 (20 Ekim 1886).

hand and influence in terms of the administrative and financial issues related to the Hijaz itself. As Jidda developed to become an important center of trade, and as the presence and influence of Europeans there increased, the Ottoman government turned Jidda into a *beylerbeyilik* itself. In the eighteenth century it was attached to the *eyalet* of Habeş and governors of the rank of *vezir* started to be appointed here. As the Habeş province was not a *valilik* that was administered through *iltizâm* grants of revenue farming, and as there was no prebendal arrangements of *timar* or *zeâmet* in the province, it was given to a *vali* for a three year term as a *mâlikâne*, conveying conditional and time-limited usufruct. After its combination with Jidda, the province gained importance, and the *Valis* were assigned salaries from the Jidda custom revenues.¹⁹⁵

In 1871, after the removal from office of *Vali* Hurşid Pasha, the position of the Jidda *Vali* was briefly abolished and the *mutasarrıflık* of Jidda was installed in its place. This reorganization lasted only one year, and the *Valilik* was brought back the following year. In 1882 under Abdülhamid II, the name Hijaz *Vilayeti* was started to be used instead of the Jidda Governorship.¹⁹⁶ In brief, apart from the *Emirs* of Mecca, administration in the Hijaz was first at the hands of the Governor of Egypt and then the Governors of Jidda. With the transformation of the Jidda *Vilayet* into the Hijaz *Vilayet* and with the Governor starting to reside in Mecca, the *Vilayet* in a way took the Emirate into its jurisdiction. The condition that is dubbed dual government is this.

The Province of Hijaz included all the area from the border of the Province of Damascus, south of Ma'an, down to the northern limit of the Province of Yemen, south of Lith. Under the *Vilayet* of Hijaz, there were four *kazas*: Yenbu', Rabigh,

¹⁹⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.27.

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p.27.

Jidda and Lith.¹⁹⁷ The *Vali* was the head of the Hijaz administration. He resided at Mecca and spent the summer in Taif. The post of *vali* was usually given to a high ranking officer of the Ottoman army. There was a rapid turnover of the post. From 1858 to 1877, there were nine *valis*.¹⁹⁸ The *Vali* had wide judicial powers and he was also in control of the Ottoman garrisons in Hijaz. Until 1910, all the *kâ'immakâms* (District or Deputy Governors), the *müdirs* (administrators) and the *Muhafiz* of Medina (warden of the Medina fortress, or simply Guardian of Medina) were under the direct supervision of the *Vali*. Since 1864 the *valis* bore the title of the *Şeyhü'l-harem* of Mecca (the Chief Attendant to the Meccan *Harem*) as well as that of governor. *Vali* Mehmed Vecihi had also been appointed *Şeyhü'l-harem* of Medina, and he was the only *vali* in the nineteenth century to hold all three posts simultaneously.¹⁹⁹ However the *valis*' power to appoint was limited to lower ranking officials. Higher ranking ones such as *kâ'immakâms*, *muhâfiz* and *kâdîs* were directly appointed from İstanbul.²⁰⁰

After the *Vali*, the *kâ'immakâms*, the Guardian of Medina and the *Şeyhü'l-harems* of Mecca and Medina were important administrative officials. In 1910, Medina was separated from the Province of Hijaz. Until then, the *Muhafiz* was under the authority of the *Vali*. The *Muhafiz* of Medina was chosen among the high ranking army officers and sometimes he was given the title of *Şeyhü'l-harem* as well.

The administrative authority of the *kâ'immakâm* of Jidda depended more or less on the *Vali*'s weakness or strength. Their selection had been formerly made by the *Vali*, but after the incident of the Jidda massacres, the *Kâ'immakâm* was started

¹⁹⁷ Hogarth, *Hejaz Before World War I: A Handbook*, p.47.

¹⁹⁸ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.164.

¹⁹⁹ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.165.

²⁰⁰ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", pp.74-75.

to be selected directly by İstanbul as a guarantee of his increased independence, responsibility and prestige. However this arrangement did not last long. The *Vali* was dismissed in 1861, so was the *Kâ'immakâm* of Jidda. The new *Kâ'immakâm* was chosen by the new *Vali*.²⁰¹ After 1861, *valis* continued to play a decisive role in the appointment of the *kâ'immakâms*.

After the *Vali* and the *Kâ'immakâm* of Jidda, the most prestigious position in the Ottoman administration was the *Şeyhü'l-harem* of Medina. In the 16th century, the post was bestowed sometimes to members of the *'ulemâ*, but its occupants were also chosen from among the eunuchs who were charged with serving the tomb of the Prophet. The appointment of these eunuch *ağas*, their being dismissed and the establishing of discipline among them was the duty of the *Şeyhü'l-harem*. Attending to cases against these *ağas* was also an important part of the post.²⁰² From 1701 on, instead of the *Dârü's-sa'âde ağas*, experienced *vezirs* were started to be appointed as *Şeyhü'l-harem*.²⁰³

The Medina *Şeyhü'l-harem* was often changed. Between 1858 and 1877 there were eleven of them. Most of them served at the same time as the *Muhâfız* of Medina. The Medina *Şeyhü'l-harem* included in his entourage military forces for the protection of Medina.²⁰⁴ In the selection and appointment of the *Şeyhü'l-harem*, a council constituted by the *kâdî*, *müftîs*, the head of the preachers, the *Nâkibü'l-Eşrâf*, and some of the *şerifs* met and signed a petition recommending someone as the new holder of the post. The petition was sent to İstanbul and then the appointment was

²⁰¹ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.149.

²⁰² Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.170. Yet it was technically impossible for the *şeyhü'l-harems* who were not *'ulemâ* to function as *kâdîs*, so they could only remove those *ağas* who cause problems from their offices.

²⁰³ Ecer, "Osmanlı Döneminde Mekke'nin Yönetimi", p.1436.

²⁰⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.27.

made directly from the capital. Sometimes the appointee was not the person whom the council recommended, at other times, the recommendation of the council was followed in the process.²⁰⁵

The *Şeyhü'l-harem* of Mecca was formally merged with the Governorship of the Hijaz after 1864. In addition to the civil and police powers sometimes exercised by the *Şeyhü'l-harem*, either in his own role or as governor, his responsibilities were supervising and administering the complex of buildings, offices and the storehouses associated with the *Harem*.²⁰⁶ The *Harem* workers were organized with a sheikh for each of the various occupations. The appointment of the *şeyhs* had to be approved by the Ottoman government.²⁰⁷ Some of the religious officials were also dependent for appointment, salaries and promotion upon the Ottoman government. Officials in the religious sphere such as instructors in *medreses* and *vakıf* officials were also dependent for appointment, salaries and promotion on the Ottoman government.²⁰⁸ More than two thousand persons worked at both *Harems*, and since the Ottoman government controlled their employment, this created a major source of influence for the central government.²⁰⁹ The *Şeyhü'l-haremlik*, which was formerly bestowed upon '*ulemâ*' being given in the 19th century to the office of the Governor of the Hijaz also gave them the opportunity to hold some sort of a religious authority and influence, and balanced their stance in face of the religious authority held by the *Emir* of Mecca.

²⁰⁵ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.166.

²⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p.50.

²⁰⁷ *ibid.*, p.52.

²⁰⁸ Carl Max Korpeter, "How the Ottomans Governed the Arabs: The Observations Recorded by Evliya Chelebi in 1672," in *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata, Istituto Universitario Orientale Seminario di Studi Asiatici XIX* (Napels: 1982) p.332.

²⁰⁹ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.56.

The Mecca and Medina *kâdîs* were other important officials who were appointed from the center and who represented the Sultan's rule in the Hijaz. Selim I had given an annual sum of five thousand gold pieces from the Jidda customs to the first Ottoman *kâdî* he appointed to Mecca. Apart from this, it was customary for both the Mecca and Medina *Kâdîs* to receive wheat and further payment with the Egyptian *Surre*.²¹⁰

As administrative officials, the *kâdîs* both administered the *shari'a* and provided information to the center about the matters of the Hijaz and the behavior of the *Şerîfs* of Mecca.²¹¹ The *Kâdîs* of Mecca had direct contact with the *Şeyhü'l-islâm*.²¹² Due to its distance to the center, and due to its lack of significant judicial income, Mecca was not a very preferred post. From the 17th century on, those who fulfilled their obligation as *Kâdî* of Mecca were appointed to the İstanbul *Kâdîliği*, or at least given the rank. Thus, the post was tried to be made more attractive.²¹³ The same way, until 1723, the Medina *Kâdîs* were chosen from those who achieved the rank of Süleymâniye *Müderresliği*, a notable rank, from then on the bar was raised even higher to having held the *Bilâd-ı Selâse* (Üsküdar, Galata and Eyüp) *Kâdîlıks*.²¹⁴ Thus, the Chief Judges of Mecca and Medina occupied high positions in the Ottoman legal system.

There were in Mecca courts of the Hanafî, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Maliki schools of jurisprudence. Since the Hanafî school was the official one in the Ottoman

²¹⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.62.

²¹¹ Ecer, "Osmanlı Döneminde Mekke'nin Yönetimi", p.1436.

²¹² Mohammed Borg, "The Hejaz under Ottoman Rule, a Study of Some Sources Relating to That" (*sic.*), in *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990-1993) p.1440.

²¹³ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.62. Also in Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.5. and p.168.

²¹⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.63. And also in Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.168.

Empire, the Hanafî court was called the *Mahkeme-i Kübrâ*, the Greater Court. In important cases, the judges of the other three *madhabs* referred the cases to the Hanafî judge, and they also deposited their registers with him.²¹⁵ The *Kâdî* of Mecca supervised all criminal and police cases in Mecca as well as those involving personal status. He had deputies in Jidda, Taif, Rabigh, Lith and Qunfudha.²¹⁶ The Medinan *Kâdî* had deputies in Yenbu‘, Wejh, Diba and Kheiber. Deputy judges of the Meccan and Medinan *Kâdî* were selected from local Hijazis until 1895. After that date, they were appointed directly from among the graduates of the religious legal schools of İstanbul. In murder cases, a trial by *kâdî* was followed by a review by a council of officials and notables including prominent merchants, a *müftî*, the *Nâkibü’s-sa’âdet*, the *Emir*, and the *Vali*.²¹⁷

There were other religious authorities besides the *kâdîs* of the *Haremeyn* such as *müftîs*, the *şeyhü’l-‘ulemâs* who were the head of all of the men of religion in each town,²¹⁸ and *Nâkibü’l-eşrâf* and *Nâkibü’s-sa’âdet*. According to Ochsenwald, *müftîs* were appointed directly by İstanbul for Mecca and Medina. As in other parts of the Empire, in this position sons tended to follow fathers, and *müftîs* held their offices for long terms. Families such as Barzanjis and Sarrajs were examples of such long tenure.²¹⁹ However, Butrus Abu-Manneh states that it was one of the prerogatives of the *Emirs* of Mecca to appoint the *müftîs* of the four schools and the *Nâkibü’l-eşrâf*

²¹⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.63.

²¹⁶ Borg, “The Hejaz under Ottoman Rule, a Study of Some Sources Relating to That” (*sic.*), p. 1440. Another report simply puts it as he nominated the *kâdî* of Jidda and received two thirds of his fees. (See: Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.86.) Different arrangements may have been in question at different times.

²¹⁷ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.86.

²¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.53. Sometimes the *şeyhü’l-‘ulemâ* and *müftî* were combined in the hand of the same person.

²¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.52.

through whom he controlled the *'ulemâ* of the city.²²⁰ We too run into this later claim being made by the *Emir* in our documents, claiming upon the *Vâli*'s dismissing of the *Müftî* that the appointment of the *Müftî* had been in his prerogative since old times.²²¹ However in a separate document from August 1894, we can also see that the *Vâli* Ahmed Ratib and the *Emir* wrote to the Porte and wanted the Shafii *Müftî* of Medina *Seyyid* Cafer Berzenci Efendi removed from office and recalled to İstanbul.²²²

The Ottomans established an armed presence in the Hijaz to maintain their authority in the province. They established large garrisons in the big towns as well as in small ones and sea ports along the Red Sea coast. The imperial military forces in the Hijaz were able to maintain Ottoman authority and sovereignty in the towns and villages, but not very often in the countryside. The providing of security on the roads was one constant preoccupation of Ottoman authorities. The armed forces in the Hijaz was relatively small in comparison with the other *eyalets* such as Yemen.²²³ When Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt had control in the area, he had a garrison of 20,000 men in the Hijaz. Under the Ottomans the total of all the regular army units seldom reached as high as 8,000.²²⁴ There was much desertion.²²⁵ Most of the armed forces were concentrated on the big towns and ports: in the south around Mecca, Jidda and Taif and in the north around Medina.²²⁶ Mecca had the largest contingent

²²⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," *Asian and African Studies* 9 (1973) p.4.

²²¹ BOA, Y.A.HUS, 196/33, 1304.S.8 (6 Kasım 1886).

²²² BOA, Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat (Y. MTV), 102/28, 1312.S.5 (7 Ağustos 1894).

²²³ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.94.

²²⁴ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.154.

²²⁵ Kurşun, "Hicaz", p.438.

²²⁶ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p. 94.

of troops, both because of its religious importance and because it had no walls.

The size of the Mecca garrison was increased during the pilgrimage season when outlying detachments from Taif and Jidda were brought to the city.

The Ottoman armed forces were divided into regulars and irregulars. After the reoccupation of the Hijaz by the Ottomans in 1840, the Ottoman armed forces here were constituted to a great extent by the irregular forces. Following the opening of the Suez Canal, there was a gradual trend to replace them with regular forces. The Ottoman regular force in Hijaz Province was constituted as a *fırka*, division, and was attached to the 7th Army in the Yemen. The predominant section of the regulars was infantry. The scarcity of cavalry caused a major problem when the armed forces tried to fight against the highly mobile nomads.²²⁷

The irregular forces included the ordinary *zabtiye* or gendarmerie who were stationed in the towns and whose function was to keep order in these towns. Another force was *ukail*. This was a force mounted on camels and employed around Medina and the Yenbu‘ road. They acted as cavalry guards and messengers; some of them served in the pilgrimage route forts north of Medina. They were paid and rationed by the Ottoman government. They all came from the district of Qasim in Central Arabia and were controlled by the commander of the Ottoman army in the Hijaz.²²⁸

The *Vali*, in addition to his civil powers, was the commander of the whole of the troops in the Hijaz. On a few exceptional occasions, persons other than the *Vali* were appointed as the commander of the army in the Hijaz. In 1881 when İzzet Pasha was the *Vali*, Osman Pasha was the commander of the army and in 1887 Safvet Pasha was appointed *Vali* and Ahmed Pasha commander of the army. After 1910, when Medina was separated from the Hijaz Province, the forces of Medina were

²²⁷ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.155.

²²⁸ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, pp.98-99.

under the command of the *Muhâfiz* of Medina.²²⁹ The main elements of the regular troops in the Hijaz were Turks and Arabs who were recruited from Syria. There were no Hijazi troops, since the whole province was exempt from conscription.²³⁰

The sources of revenue for the *Vilayet* to provide for the administration of the province and for the maintaining of the military garrisons were customs collected at the Red Sea ports, direct subsidies to the local government from İstanbul and food sent by Cairo and İstanbul. Local revenues were always inadequate to cover the local expenditures. The Hijaz was necessarily dependent upon external subsidies to maintain its government.²³¹ The primary local source of revenue was the custom revenue which came from the ports of Jidda,²³² Suakin and Massava. After the separation of the customs of the ports of Yemen from Hijazi administration, there was a drop in revenues. Another important source of local revenue was the tribute paid by Nejd to the Hijaz in recognition of nominal Ottoman sovereignty. Also there were *zekat* (canonical charity paid by Muslims) receipts, which constituted only a small part of the total local revenue.²³³

Egypt sent a large amount of subsidies in kind and money on behalf of the Ottomans since the beginning of Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. After the Ottomans reoccupied the Hijaz in 1840, Egypt continued to send the annual money and grain contributions, although with a small reduction. Every year 20,000 purses from the

²²⁹ *ibid.*, p.99.

²³⁰ *ibid.*, p.102.

²³¹ William Ochenwald, "The Financial Basis of Otoman Rule in the Hijaz, 1840-1877," in *Religion Economy and State in Ottoman-Arab History* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1998) p.25.

²³² Half of the Jidda customs was belong to the *Emir*.

²³³ Ochsenwald, "The Financial Basis of the Ottoman Rule in the Hijaz", p. 28.

Egyptian tribute to İstanbul were used at the direction of the central government for the purchase of grain for the Hijaz.²³⁴

İstanbul annually sent the *Surre* money to the Hijaz. The sources of *Surre* funds were primarily the central government's Treasury and the *Evkâf* Treasury. These sources were supplemented by funds from the sultan's private purse and the Treasury of the *Haremeyn*. Also there were drafts written on the Province of Syria by the provincial treasury of that *vilayet* from its own revenues. The *Surre* brought part of the yearly influx of cash money needed desperately in the Hijaz.²³⁵

The need for cash led the *valis* to borrow money from local merchants. Only the largest of merchants could undertake the risks of providing credits because of the long delays in payment. Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim was the chief merchant of Jidda in the 1850s. He became the chief banker for the Hijaz and lent the provincial government large amounts of money. Yusuf Banaja was another merchant who provided loans for the provincial government.²³⁶

The government expenditure can be divided into three major categories. The largest one was food, including the cost of transporting the grain. Most of the food went to the recipients of pensions, government employees, the military and the Bedouins. A second area of expenditures was the cash salaries of government employees,²³⁷ pensions to religious notables and money for the *Emir* and for the Bedouins. Thirdly, the expenditure on bureaucracy and the payments of irregular soldiers was something the *Vilayet* had to pay for.²³⁸

²³⁴ *ibid.*, p.30.

²³⁵ William Ochsenwald, "The Otoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886," in *Religion Economy and State in Ottoman-Arab History* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1998) p.47.

²³⁶ Ochsenwald , "The Financial Basis of the Ottoman Rule in the Hijaz", p. 29.

²³⁷ The total number of employees of the Hijazi government, excluding the police, was about 170.

Expenditures reveal major activities that provincial government in the Hijaz was involved with. Most importantly, the safeguarding of the pilgrimage and the carrying out of its ritual requirements were among the major undertakings of the *Vali*. Money was spent for moving grain to Mecca and Medina for the pilgrims and the necessary military escort for the protection of the pilgrims. In addition to that, some money was diverted for the reconstruction of the *Harem* buildings.²³⁹

In the late nineteenth century, certain important administrative reforms were engaged in its provinces by the Ottoman Empire. Administrative change in Hijaz Province following the Provincial Reform Law in 1864 and the administrative divisions of the Hijaz into a new-style *vilayet* began in 1868 and ended only in 1873.²⁴⁰ In the 1860's some attempts were made to apply general reforms to the province. It was attempted to build an administrative building in Mecca called the Mecidiye after Sultan Abdülmecid. However, the construction of the building was delayed because of the lack of funds and could not be finished until the time of Sultan Abdülhamid.²⁴¹

In the late 1860s a commission was sent to the Hijaz to reorganize the administration of the province according to the law of 1864. During the following decades, administrative reforms were introduced to the Hijaz. Hijaz was reorganized as a *vilayet* in 1872 according to the *Vilayet* Law of 1864. The province was divided into *sancaks*, *kazas* and *nahiyes*. Mecca became the center of the *vilayet* with Medina and Jidda as *sancaks*.

²³⁸ Ochsenwald, "The Financial Basis of the Ottoman rule in the Hijaz", p. 31.

²³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁴⁰ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.167.

²⁴¹ Al-'Amr, "The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914", p.70.

Administrative consuls were set up in the three large towns of Mecca, Medina and Jidda. Municipal administration was established in these large towns. The police force was reorganized and a naval division was founded at Jidda. Custom houses were placed in nearly every small port on the Red Sea coast of the Hijaz. Postal and telegraph management was established and telegraph lines linking the three major towns with each other and linking Hijaz to Yemen and Syria were put up.²⁴²

Further changes were related to the status of Medina and Yemen. The influence and legal status of religious law was also to see redefinition. The civil and financial matters of administration in Medina was transferred into the hands of the Governor of Medina from the *Şeyhü'l-harem* who remained functioning on religious matters and things related to the *Harem* itself. However, these two positions were soon combined in the same person as they were before. Finally in 1910 Medina was separated from the Hijaz *Vilayet*. It was decided that a civil criminal court was to be established while application of religious law was to continue simultaneously. Yemen gained a separate administration but Qunfudha, Lith and parts of Âsir remained in the Hijaz *Vilayet*.²⁴³

We can not say that the reforms of the *Tanzimat* in its more legal sense were applied in the Hijaz. No doubt, at the level of the whole Empire, the most novel part of these reforms was the acceptance of the equality of non-Muslims with Muslims. In the Hijaz, where there were no non-Muslim subjects, the *Tanzimat* did not result in the same effects as it did in other Arab provinces where there were various religious communities. Yet, this having been said, the applications that arose with the nineteenth century reforms and especially after the Crimean War, that were a result

²⁴² Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, pp.71-72.

²⁴³ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, pp. 168-169.

of Western influence and also pressure on the Ottoman state, were present in the Hijaz. What affected the Hijaz most among these was the establishment of the quarantine organizations and the banning of the slave trade. The process also served to increase the number and presence of European states and their representative consuls in the Hijaz, and this was bringing an increasing reaction from the local population.

Yet the greatest effect of the nineteenth century reforms in the Hijaz was the foundation of a new Hijaz Province on the lines of the new Province Law to be set up with Mecca as its center. The replacement of the Governor of Jidda with a *Vilayet* the jurisdiction of which encompassed the whole of the Hijaz, and, in a way, the falling of the Emirate within these bounds, provided for the loss of his near autonomy by the *Emir*, and thus for the structural grounds for the conflict that ensued between *Emir* and *Vali* for the rest of the 19th century.

Hijaz did not have an autonomous status like Egypt or Lebanon. Yet, we can safely mention the *Emirs* of Mecca as having a say in the administration of the Hijaz along side the governors. The Mecca Emirate, which had since the 10th century held the administration of the Holy cities and thus reigned in the Hijaz, preserved its unique status under Ottoman rule also. The *Emirs* of Mecca had temporal and religious authority in the Hijaz, and their legitimacy went to times that preceded Ottoman rule there. The *Emir's* religious authority rested on reverence for their descent – not for innate divine qualities in their persons, or supposed esoteric knowledge – and also on respect for those who are entrusted with holy functions by this right. He had a great influence over the Bedouins tribes.

Yet, the *Emirs* operated within the constraint of the Ottoman polity and its culture and themselves became to some extent Ottomanized in language and style of

life.²⁴⁴ Even though the person who was to be *Emir* was determined by the family of *şerifs*, he still needed to be approved by the Sultan and the *ber'at*, an Imperial Warrant or patent of privileges that indicated his appointment had to be sent to him. There are actually *Emirs* who had to give up their post in a short time because they were not approved by the Sultan. The *Emirs* of Mecca had gained a quite distinguished place in the hierarchy of protocol, being a rank above *vezirs*; and with the salaries and the ranks that were reserved for them, they were in a sense Ottoman officials. After the *Tanzimat*, they were all to gain the rank and title of Pasha.²⁴⁵

The *Emirs* of Mecca had their own administrative departments, their own prisons, budgets and courts. The *Emir* resided at Mecca and Taif in the summer and he had *kâ'immakâms* in the large towns. The entourage of the *Emirs* included five or six hundred people consisting of his body guards (*muhâfız efrad*), clerical staff (*kalem hey'etleri*), and gentlemen of his court (*dîvân efendileri*) who were his personal secretaries and directors of correspondence (*kalem-i mahsûs* and *tahrîrât müdürleri*). At the end of the 19th century, there was tied to the *Emirlik dîvân efendisi*, Turkish and Arabic language secretaries, secretaries of accounts and of the storehouses, his *imam*, doctor, the director of the affairs of the Emirate (*Emâret mudîr-i umûru*), the first among the *şerifs* (*şürefa mukaddemi*) and also the head head-gear bearer (*kavas başı*) and the standard-bearer (*sancakdâr*), the stable master (*mirâhor*), the head of the camel brokers, the guide to guests (*mihmândar*), the *mehter* band and their head for ceremony and other attendants such as his holder of the umbrella. Again at these dates, the *Emir* had two *aide-de-camps* (*yâver-i harb*) one of the rank of major and the other that of captain and two sergeants attending to

²⁴⁴ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.6.

²⁴⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, p.146.

him who were given from the regular army.²⁴⁶ This was a significant notable court, of almost royal organization.

Apart from the regular and irregular armed forces in the vilayet of Hijaz, the *Emir* was allowed a force of his own to be used for local purposes. The *Emir*'s soldiers consisted of “*bîşe*” and “*baverdî*” troops. *Bîşes* were recruited from Wadi Bisha, in Âsır, from freed slaves and from among blacks in the Hijaz and they were commanded by a major of their own. The *Bîşes*' headquarter was in Mecca and their function was escorting the caravans, especially those between Jidda and Mecca and between Mecca and Taif. They were also the personal bodyguards of the *Emir*. The *Bîşes* were paid by and were under the direct command of the *Emirs*.²⁴⁷ The *Bavardî* were the musketeers of the *Emir* and were used to keep security in the town along with the Ottoman soldiers and police forces. They could arrest people and send them to the *Emir*'s prison, independent from the Ottoman government's law enforcement.²⁴⁸

The *Emir* was able to recruit to his service tribes with whom he was on good terms. The family of the *şerifs* had their allies among the Bedouins, and they gave monetary assistance to the Bedouins; thus in this way they were able to call upon them when necessary.²⁴⁹ Even though the Ottomans had no conscription in the Hijaz, the *Emir* could conscribe who ever he wanted into his service. The military forces the *Emalet* needed in the event of having to repress a tribal uprising were also supplied by the *Vilayet*, and these were temporarily given under the command of the *Emir*.

²⁴⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, pp.29-30.

²⁴⁷ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.158.

²⁴⁸ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.254.

²⁴⁹ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.166.

Apart from the large subsidies coming from the Ottoman government (the *Emir's* salaries and allowances amounted to £20,000),²⁵⁰ the *Emirs* of Mecca had various sources of revenue and they were involved in agricultural and commercial activities as well. One of their major sources of revenue was custom duties, especially those from the Jidda customs. The *Emirs* had been given half of the revenue coming from the Jidda customs duties. This originated in 1542, when the Portuguese attacked the port, and when the *Emir* was given half the revenues of the customs as a reward for his support to the Ottomans with his own forces.²⁵¹

They were very wary about holding on to this privilege. The transit trade through Jidda was divided into two main branches: the Yemen coffee trade and the Indian trade. All vessels bound for Egypt were made to stop at Jidda and pay duty there. In the eighteenth century, Ali Bey al-Kabir, the Mamluk Bey in Ottoman Egypt, in order to strengthen his position and establish his independence in Egypt had tried to redirect the South-East Asia trade from the Cape route to the more ancient route through the Red Sea and Egypt. He therefore granted special privileges and protection to British merchants who would arrive at Suez. Fearing that he would lose the revenue from the Indian trade, *Emir Sürûr* called upon the Porte to intervene in this situation. Consequently, the old prohibition on Christian ships to sail beyond Jidda was reintroduced. In fact, not only Christian, but Muslim ships too were forbidden from sailing beyond Jidda.²⁵² Custom duties were a very important source

²⁵⁰ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.113.

²⁵¹ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, p.23.

²⁵² M. Abir, “The Arab Rebellion of Amir Ghalib of Mecca, 1788-1813,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 7/2 (1971) p.190.

of revenue for the *Emirs* and they did everything in their powers to make Jidda an emporium for the Indian trade to hold on to or increase their revenue.²⁵³

The transportation of the pilgrims was another one of the major sources of income for the *Emirs*. Transportation rates were usually fixed by the *Emirs*, with the result that they benefited greatly at the expense of the pilgrims.²⁵⁴ The *Emir* received a great part of what the Bedouins gained in the name of a tax, in exchange for hiring their camels to be used by the pilgrims. Also there were taxes on sacrificial camels and sheep which were sold in Mecca during the Hajj season.²⁵⁵

Besides this, the most numerous occupational group in the Hijaz were the pilgrim guides who were appointed by the *Emir*. Pilgrim guides organized the whole trip, accommodation and other things for a pilgrim who could afford hiring one. Pilgrim guides paid certain amount money to the *Emir* for each of the pilgrims they served. By means of controlling the pilgrim guides and fixing the transportation rates, the *Emir* created a monopoly over the transportation of pilgrims. The sea journey usually was quicker and less expensive than traveling by land. On several occasions, *Emirs* forced pilgrims go by land, since he collected special fees from pilgrims traveling by land.²⁵⁶

Apart from custom duties and taxes on transportation, there were other taxes levied by the *Emir*. It was not until 1832 that taxes were imposed in the Hijaz in any form. In this year, *Emir* Muhammed bin 'Avn introduced a system of taxation. According to this system, there was a tax of seven percent on camels and cattle, ten percent on cultivated land without irrigation and eight percent on cultivated land with

²⁵³ John Lewis Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia , Comprehending an Account of Those Territories in Hadjaz which the Mohammedans Regard as Sacred* (London: H. Colburn, 1829). p.19.

²⁵⁴ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.23.

²⁵⁵ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.60.

²⁵⁶ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.105.

irrigation. The income of these taxes was later shared by local Ottoman authorities, and it was divided as follow: 35 percent was left to the *Emir*, 33 percent to the Ottoman authorities, and the remainder to the *emirs* of the districts, collectors, and clerks. The payment of this tax depended solely on the goodwill of the Bedouins towards the *Emir*. In the following years 1872, 1874 and 1882 several taxes were introduced such as those on fisheries, on mother of pearl, on loaded camels between Jidda, Mecca, Taif and Medina, the weighing tax, the slaughter house tax and the duties on stamps, salt and alcohol.²⁵⁷

Further, in the last decade of the 18th century, the *Emirs* of Mecca were heavily engaged in the commercial activities in the Red Sea themselves. The *Emir* owned large ships which traded with India in addition to many smaller vessels engaged in the coffee trade with Yemen. Thus the *Emir* was in direct competition with the local merchants, sometimes oppressing them with heavy duties. If the *Emir* could not sell the coffee or Indian goods imported on his own account immediately, he distributed the cargos of his ships among the native merchants of the Hijaz at the current market-price and in quantities proportional to the supposed property of each merchant, and they were thus coerced into becoming a purchaser with cash. This position enabled him to exert a tremendous influence on the entire merchant class of the Hijaz.²⁵⁸

In Wadi Fatimah, the richer cultivators were *şerifs* who were closely related to the ruling clan of Mecca. The *Emirs* of Mecca themselves owned lands in the Taif region and in Wadi Fatimah.²⁵⁹ Taif was the summer capital. Most of the gardens, many nearby villages and the larger homes were owned by Meccan *şerifs*.

²⁵⁷ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.78.

²⁵⁸ Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp.21-22.

There was noticeable ethnic diversity among the townspeople, even in the context of a multi ethnic empire, due to transient pilgrims and *mūcavirs*. It has been claimed that the Emir had little to fear politically from such a fragmented urban community.²⁶⁰ Neither, did the Hijaz possess a landowning class or a peasantry engaged in the production of agricultural commodities.²⁶¹ The state of agriculture in the Hijaz was very poor. Society was dominated by *şerifs*, officeholders, large-scale importers of goods, pilgrim guides and those who receiving pensions from the government. These were the more wealthy members of the society rather than agricultural landlords. However, the mentioned ethnic diversity of the commercial elite meant that they did not form a common front to wrest local political power from the *Emirs* of Mecca.²⁶² Wealth was subject to confiscation by the *Emir*.²⁶³

The greatest task the Ottoman central administration expected from the *Emirs* was their providing of conditions in which the pilgrims could perform their Hajj obligation without any trouble. Most important for this was their providing the security of the pilgrimage caravans and the order of the roads, their preventing the outbreak of disease and taking measures in matters such as the provisioning and the safety of the pilgrims. The *Emirs* were held, to summarize, at least equally responsible with the Governors in the successful completion of the Hajj. The *Emir* of Mecca greeted the Damascene and Egyptian convoys outside of Mecca, and from here on, the convoys were under his protectorship. The orderly distribution of the *surre* which was sent from İstanbul was also conducted under the supervision of the

²⁵⁹ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.19.

²⁶⁰ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.4.

²⁶¹ *ibid.*, p.IV.

²⁶² Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.92.

²⁶³ *ibid.*, p.21.

Emir of Mecca along with the *kâdî* of Mecca and the *Şeyhü'l-harem*.²⁶⁴ We can also see that the *Emirs* had a say in determining the route the pilgrimage convoys were to take. Even though the *Emîrü'l-hac*, who was the commander of the convoy, was the one responsible in the determination of this route, the safe reaching of the pilgrims to their destination and, also very importantly, the safe reaching of the Imperial Litter (*Mahmil-i Şerif*) and gifts,²⁶⁵ they had often fallen into disagreement with the *Emir* of Mecca about the issue, showing the extent of the authority of the latter.²⁶⁶

The security of the roads and the safety of the pilgrims depended first and foremost on the taking of the Bedouin tribes under control. The forces the Ottoman government could maintain in the Hijaz were able to provide security in the cities and ports, but the subduing of the Bedouin tribes was not easy. The Ottoman government distributed monetary and food assistance to the Bedouins in the areas the Hajj convoys passed through, under the name '*Urbân Suresi* and it regularly honored the Bedouin chiefs in an attempt to keep the roads under control. However, the most important duty at this point fell with the *Emir* of Mecca. These Bedouins were not very favorable to any sort of authority but they were traditionally subject to

²⁶⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.41. Also in Güler, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Haremeyn Vakıfları, XVI.-XVII. Yüzyıllar*, p.197.

²⁶⁵ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, pp.63-64.

²⁶⁶ BOA, Y. MTV, 313/94, 1327.M.2 (24 Ocak 1909). We find an example of this as late as 1909. The *Emir* says that the convoy that was going to Medina turned back from its way at five hours distance to Medina. He says that the reason was shown to be the troubles around Medina. He complains that although there has been so much effort exerted for the providing of safety and security and although the Hajj was performed without witnessing any big incident, Abdurrahman Bey, the Guardian of the Procession of the Hajj (*Mevkeb-i Hacc-ı Şerif Muhâfızı*), showing as excuse an incident too insignificant to compare to the attacks of the previous years, and deeming the Mecca-Medina road completely unsafe, and has insisted that the Procession of the Hajj be sent to Medina by sea. The sending of the Procession of the Hajj to the Al-Wejh pier from Jidda, and its transportation from there to Al-'Ula by camel, and its transportation from there to Medina with train is going to be very difficult, and the possibility that the *Harb* Bedouins will attack and harm Medina or the railroad is going to increase, as they are going to understand that their provisions (*mürettebât*) will be cut as the convoy will no longer run through their lands.

the influence of the *Emir* and even in some cases to his control.²⁶⁷ By ancient custom and tradition, the Bedouins in the zone from Mada'in to Qunfudha were nominally under the control of the *Emir* of Mecca. Thus, a key element in any sort of reconciliation of the tribes to Ottoman rule was the *Emirate* of Mecca. The *Emirs* were held responsible by the Ottoman center for the behavior of the tribes, and as a result of this, the *Emirs* acted as intermediaries between tribes and government. This was done through many channels. One was the marriage of the *Emirs* or their relatives to the daughters of tribal chiefs. The *Emirs* also appointed agents to deal with the tribes. Usually the *Emirs* could gain temporary allies from among the tribes.²⁶⁸ The religious prestige of the *Emir* of Mecca also contributed in allowing him to mediate between the Ottoman government and the tribes.²⁶⁹

The *Emirs* of Mecca had besides their temporal authority, religious authority and a wide range of prerogatives in this area. The chief religious officials in the Hijaz were the *Emir* and the *Kâdî* of Mecca. Next in importance were the two *Şeyhü'l-harems* in Mecca and Medina.²⁷⁰ This title of Servant of the *Harem* was awarded by the *Emir* of Mecca. The title of *Hâdimü'l-haremeyn* (Custodian of the two Harems), on the other hand, was proudly borne by the Sultan himself.²⁷¹ There were potential rivals to the *Emirs* of Mecca to lead the descendants of the prophet living in the Hijaz. These were the *Nâkibü'l-eşraf* and *Nâkibü's-saadet*. There was a *nâkibü's-saadet* in Mecca and *Emir* of Mecca headed the *şerifs* there.²⁷²

²⁶⁷ Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)", p.2.

²⁶⁸ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.35.

²⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p.36.

²⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p.50.

²⁷¹ *ibid.*, p.52.

²⁷² *ibid.*, p.53.

In dividing the legal cases between the *Emir* and the *Kâdî*, Bedouin disputes and all cases involving *şerifs*, were to be resolved by the *Emir*. All other individuals besides nomads and *şerifs* were supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman court system.²⁷³ Even though the *Vali* was the highest administrative official in the Hijaz *Vilayet* after its formulation in the post Mehmed Ali Pasha period, the *Emir* of Mecca was not relegated to a position where he would be subordinate to the *Vali*. Thus, as political entities, we must not think of the *Emaret* as a subdivision of the *Vilayet*. In 19th century Hijaz, it was rather the case that the two had an uneasy parallel coexistence and sometimes intersection. While ruling over the same geography, they divided authority in a complex way, and this meant a continuous negotiation, conflict or cooperation existing between them.

The Hijaz between 1840 and 1908:

In the previous section we tried to explain the administrative structure and development of the Hijaz, and touch upon the way local authority was shared. This section will try to build upon that and it will review the history of the province in the period after the reestablishment of Ottoman sovereignty in the area. Although we will also make an attempt here to place the Hijaz in a larger Ottoman context, the focus will be the practice of local authority by the offices of *Vilayet* and *Emaret*, and our hope is that this will consist a factual basis for our further discussion of the actual power relations in the Hijaz in our next chapter.

Muhammed ibn ‘Avn who had been held in Cairo until the time of the Egyptian retreat from Hijaz, returned to Mecca and the Emirate was restored again

²⁷³ *ibid.*, p.84.

under Ottoman control.²⁷⁴ In 1840, the former Medina *Şeyhü'l-harem* Osman Pasha was appointed *Vali* and Ahmed İzzet Pasha became *Kâ'immakâm* and *Şeyhü'l-harem* of Mecca.²⁷⁵ The first years of this period were relatively tranquil, the division of labor between *Vali* and *Emir* worked well and Hajj seasons were handled without major problems. The *Vali* controlled the army and the customs of Jidda; the *Emir* was in charge of the tribes and the administration of the towns. In 1844 they were both held responsible for the security of roads and the administration of the holy cities.²⁷⁶ Despite all this, there were financial problems of the *vilayet*. In 1844 some of the leaders of the *Harb* tribe revolted, for they did not receive their payments. *Vali* Osman Pasha first paid their money, then killed the revolting Bedouin leaders. Subsequently, the *Harb* tribe rose against the Ottomans and they calmed down only after the *Emir*'s mediation, with great difficulty.²⁷⁷ *Emir* Muhammed 'Avn had had excellent relations with the *Harb* tribe, and this stroke by the *Vali* was a blow to his prestige, and it caused a coolness in his relations with him.²⁷⁸

Vali Osman Pasha, if he had not died in 1845, was about to be dismissed because of his attitude in his dealing with the Bedouin tribes and his failure in other disturbances in Âsır. The new *Vali* was Şerif Pasha who was the *Şeyhü'l-harem* and the governor of Medina. At this time the Grand *Vezir* thought about changing the

²⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.132.

²⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p.133.

²⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p.133.

²⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p.134.

²⁷⁸ De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.246.

Emir too but deciding that it would be too much of a change, he postponed this move.²⁷⁹

Emir Muhammed ibn ‘Avn was dismissed and sent to İstanbul only in 1851, largely because of the intrigue made by *Şerif* Abdülmuttalib ibn Galib, leader of the rival *Dhawi-Zayd* clan, who had been in İstanbul. *Emir* Muhammed had persecuted the sons of the late *Emir* Yahya from the *Dhawi-Zayd* in Mecca. He had also sent Ali ibn Galib to Egypt in exile.²⁸⁰ Abdülmuttalib ibn Galib became *Emir* of Mecca on 4 July 1851. At the same time, the *Vali*’s headquarter was transferred from Jidda to Mecca.²⁸¹

During the first Emirate of Abdülmuttalib ibn Galib, after the Crimean War, the European influence and pressures in Hijaz increased. As the Ottoman government had to appease the European demands, the *Emir* accused *Vali* Kâmil Pasha who was appointed in 1853 as being pro-Christian. One of the many issues that resulted in conflict between *Vali* and *Emir* was related to Bedouin affairs. The *Emir* had executed some of the Bedouins without the approval of the Sultan. Another problem was that soldiers and government employees had not been paid for months because of the lack of money in the treasury. *Vali* Kâmil Pasha claimed that this was because the *Emir* illegally took large amount of money from the treasury. On the other hand, the *Emir* was propagating against the government on the basis that they are pro-Christians. Finally, the *Emir* was found involved in the murder of İshak Efendi, *Nâkibü’s-sa’dât* of Mecca.²⁸²

²⁷⁹ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.135.

²⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p.136.

²⁸¹ Kholaf, “The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908”, p.33.

²⁸² Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.137.

The period between 1855 and 1858 was marked by rebellions motivated by the increasing public hatred felt towards the rising position of the European protégés in the Hijaz and European innovations, and their involvement in Hijazi affairs. As in the uprisings and massacres of Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, riots and fights occurred in the Hijaz. The commercial treaty of 1838 led to the establishment of a growing number of European trading houses in the Hijaz that competed with the local merchants, and the aftermath of the Crimean War increased the influence, and at times the arrogance, of the Europeans in the Jidda.²⁸³ Especially after British rule was firmly established in India, Arab Muslims resented the Christian nations who gave their subjects, such as Indian Muslims living in the Hijaz, advantages in tariff treatment, access to consuls who protected them from the rapacious local government and the international security which permitted them large scale credit arrangements.²⁸⁴ Resentment against Christians increased during 1850's even though the Britain and France were the allies of the Ottomans against the Russians during the Crimean War.²⁸⁵

Immediate reason for this turmoil in 1855 was the government's attempt to abolish the slave trade in the Hijaz. Hijaz was part of the African slave trade. Most slaves were imported after being kidnapped or purchased in Africa and transported across the Red Sea. The slaves who reached Jidda were bought by pilgrims, native Hijazis or the administrator of the *Harem*.²⁸⁶ It is important to consider that owning slaves was not opposed by the Muslim religion in order to understand the Hijazi frustration, even though the prophet Muhammed had recommended mercy, justice

²⁸³ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.37.

²⁸⁴ Ochsenwald, "Muslim-European Conflict in the Hijaz," in *Religion Economy and State in Ottoman-Arab History* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1998) p.77.

²⁸⁵ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.35.

²⁸⁶ Ochsenwald, "Muslim-European Conflict in the Hijaz", p.82.

and charity towards slaves. Manumission was accepted as a positive moral act but the institution of slavery itself was seen as natural.²⁸⁷ European powers, especially Great Britain, sought to abolish the slave trade and pressured the Ottoman government to take action against the slave trade in the Hijaz.²⁸⁸ Thus, abolishment of the slave trade was understood by the Hijazis as an anti-Islamic innovation. When the *Vali* ordered the public reading of the order closing slave markets and forbidding the imports of slaves, *Emir Abdülmuttalib* used this general resentment against the anti-slave trade decree as a pretext for rebellion, since he knew that he was soon to be dismissed. In collaboration with the Jidda merchants, the *Emir* pressured the Meccan *‘ulemâ* to declare the government’s abolishment decree void in terms of the holy law. Large scale protests occurred in 1855, and fighting in Mecca took place between rioters and the Ottoman garrison and police. The houses of Ottoman officials were sacked.²⁸⁹ In the end, *Emir Abdülmuttalib*’s dismissal was declared. The *Emir* declared himself a rebel and escaped to Taif.²⁹⁰

Muhammed ibn ‘Avn became *Emir* of Mecca for a second term. His deputy commanded the Ottoman armed forces against the Bedouins of Abdülmuttalib. Only in 1856 after seven months of rebellion Abdülmuttalib was captured and brought to Mecca.²⁹¹ He was then taken to Selânîk.²⁹² However *Emir* Muhammed ibn ‘Avn was elderly and his son Abdullah was still in İstanbul; his other son Ali, acting as the deputy *Emir*, was inexperienced. The Hajj in 1857 was a failure since *Şerif* Ali led

²⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p.81.

²⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p.81.

²⁸⁹ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.138.

²⁹⁰ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”, p.58.

²⁹¹ Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.139.

²⁹² De Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p.249.

the pilgrims to take a longer and drier route to Medina. Moreover, Bedouins and the Medinans were in a fierce fight because of a blood-feud; neither the *Vali* nor the deputy *Emir* took the necessary actions. In 1857 Nâmîk Pasha was appointed as the new *Vali*.²⁹³ However, the waters had not calmed in the Hijaz and another storm was approaching.

On 15 June 1858, a massacre of Europeans and European protégés occurred in Jidda. Twenty-two people were murdered, including the British Vice-Consul and the French Consul and his wife. This time, the reason was related to the contested nationality of a ship in Jidda harbor. It was a British ship but one of the two owners of the ship was an Ottoman citizen and wanted to fly the Ottoman flag. The case was decided by the *Kâdî* in favor of Ottoman ownership. However, the British Vice-Consul rejected this decision and declared that the ship had been confiscated, thus lowered the Ottoman flag and raised the British one. On that night, the incident erupted. *Vali* Nâmîk Pasha who was in Mecca dealing with the Hajj preparations hastened to Jidda and ordered investigations. Immediately, Ottoman troops were sent from İstanbul.²⁹⁴

In the mean time, the British captain Pullen of the *Cyclops* started to press the *Vali* and the *Emir* for the execution of the murderers. The *Vali* and the *Emir* declared that they could not act without the approval and orders of the Sultan; thus they were going to wait the Ottoman forces on their way. Pullen started to bombard the Jidda harbor. The pilgrims who were on the way back to Jidda from Mecca were shocked.

²⁹³ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.140.

²⁹⁴ Ochsenwald, "The Jidda Massacre of 1858," in *Religion Economy and State in Ottoman-Arab History* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1998) pp.98-99.

With the arrival of the orders from İstanbul, Pullen accepted to end the bombardment.²⁹⁵

Three separate investigations were conducted in Jidda in order to find out the instigators. Participants of these investigatory counsels were the *Kâ'immakâm* of Jidda, the *Kâdî*, *Nâkibü's-sa'dat*, the chief Ottoman merchant of Jidda and some other leading merchants of the city. At the end of the investigations sixteen people, mostly from the lower class of Jidda society, were convicted and arrested.²⁹⁶ However, the British Ambassador was not satisfied with the result, he thought that the incident had been planned and the instigators were the Jiddan notables. As the British threatened to turn their naval forces on Jidda, the Ottoman government had to found another commission including British and French members and administration independent from the Hijaz *vilayet*.²⁹⁷ Finally in 1859, it was concluded that the massacre was a planned action and leaders behind the scene were the *Kâdî*, *nâkibü's-sa'dat*, the leader of the Hadrami community, the *muhtesib* and the *kâ'immakâm*. The *muhtesib* and the Hadrami leader were executed; others were sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to İstanbul.²⁹⁸

Vali Nâmık Pasha was replaced by *Ali Pasha* in 1859 but he spent most of his time in Mecca rather than Jidda.²⁹⁹ He was dismissed in 1861. In the mean time, *Şerif Abdullah ibn Muhammed* had arrived in Mecca as the new *Emir* in 1858. *Emir Abdullah* was a student of the Qur'an, Islamic law and hadith. He knew Arabic, Turkish and Persian. He had been living in İstanbul, serving in the Judiciary Council

²⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p.102.

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p.105.

²⁹⁷ *ibid.*, p.106.

²⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p.107.

²⁹⁹ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.149.

(*Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*) and he was the first *Emir* who had been given the rank of *vezir*.³⁰⁰ Also in 1868 The Decoration of the Ottoman Order (*Nişan-ı Osmani*) was given to Abdullah Pasha, the *Emir* of Mecca and Muammer Pasha who was then the Governor of the Hijaz and they were honored.³⁰¹ Abdullah ibn Muhammed ruled from 1858 until his death in 1877.

On the death of this *Emir* of Mecca a new set of appointments took place in the Hijaz. Abdullah's brother Hüseyin, who was a member of the Council of State, was recommended by the *Vali* of Hijaz as the new *Emir* and approved by the Sultan. A new *Vali*, Hâlet Pasha, was appointed. *Şerif* Hüseyin Pasha was the third son of the *Emir* Muhammed ibn 'Avn. When his brother became *Emir* of Mecca, he had been taken to İstanbul and appointed to the Council of State with rank of *vezir*. He also served in the Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükelâ*) and became the chairman of the Administrative Office of the Council of State (*Şûrâ-yı Devlet Mülkiye Dâ'iresi*).³⁰² His rule in the Hijaz was relatively quite and lasted three years. The only exception to this relatively uneventful rule is some reports indicating his cooperation with the British and his willingness to help them in solving their difficulties with Afghanistan using his religious influence.³⁰³ He was assassinated by an Afghan in 1880, in Jidda.

Once again, there rose a need to select an *Emir*. However, this time it was very controversial. *Emir* Hüseyin had the reputation of being in favor of the British. Thus, Sultan Abdülhamid II preferred ousting the *Dhawi-'Awn* clan of the *Hashimis*, to which Hüseyin belonged, because of their pro-British tendency. Moreover, the 'Awn family had had the support of the *Tanzimat* leaders. Sultan Abdülhamid II

³⁰⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, p.138.

³⁰¹ BOA, İ.DH 40795, 1285.N.8 (22 Aralık 1868).

³⁰² Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emirleri*, p.138.

³⁰³ Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.38.

appointed Abdülmuttalib ibn Galib to the Emirate from the *Dhawi-Zayd* clan.

Upon this, the *Vali* of Hijaz actually asked the British Consul to oppose the choice of Abdülmuttalib. The British consul did write to the ambassador in İstanbul, since he himself was worried about the anti-British tendency of the new *Emir*.³⁰⁴ In spite of all these oppositions, *Şerif* Abdülmuttalib returned to the Hijaz as the *Emir* of Mecca for a second time.

Vali Nâşid Pasha who had not managed to prevent Abdülmuttalib's appointment in the first place was uncooperative and refused to lend troops to the *Emir* to suppress Bedouin attacks.³⁰⁵ The *Emir* declared that if the *Vali* was not dismissed, he would resign. Soon, *Vali* Nâşid Pasha was replaced with Safvet Pasha. However, the problems with the *Vali* and the *Emir* did not end. Abdülmuttalib had both enemies and followers in the Hijaz. If we are to generalize, the *Vali*, the foreign consuls, some of the Jidda merchants and members of the *Dhawi-Zayd* clan were in the opposition. Newly appointed Hamidian Ottoman officials were initially pro-*Emir*. Increases in civil rank, medals and robes of honor were obtained from İstanbul for the *Emir*'s friends, followers and Bedouin allies.³⁰⁶

Soon, some of the Meccan notables and the sheikhs of the Bedouin tribes started to express their opposition against the *Emir* by sending complaints to the Porte. In 1881 some prominent *şerifs* reported that their lands and homes were being appropriated by the *Emaret*, and were complaining that, although they had submitted their complaints and submissions many times before, no answer was given to them on the issue. Despite the fact that they descend from the clean lineage of the Prophet, and that they are slaves and oppressed subjects (*mazlum teba'a*) of the Sultan,

³⁰⁴ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.180.

³⁰⁵ *ibid.*, p.180.

³⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p.181.

nothing resulted from the requests they made for the prevention of the *Emir* and the entourage around him from carrying out such oppression and injustices.

Because of these oppressive and unlawful acts of the *Emaret*, many prominent people among the population had now taken the political protection of foreign powers. Some among the *şerifs* had also informed that, if this course of things continues, they will also go under foreign protection.³⁰⁷

In another subjection (*arıza*) from 1882, the sheikhs of the Bedouin tribes voice their complaints about *Emir* Abdülmuttalib. These sheikhs from a branch of the 'Utaybah tribe, although they had since old times lived under the flag of the Ottoman state, had fallen in hardship since Abdülmuttalib bin Galib became *Emir* in Mecca. The *Emir*, with his men who he leashed out on them, had appropriated their property and imprisoned their people. If anyone of them went to Taif or to Mecca, his camel and his property were taken and he was imprisoned. The Bedouin sheikhs say that their children are left hungry and they are in destitute because of this. They explained that they are obedient to the government and the imperial soldiers, and they had never opposed them, yet that this situation is pushing them towards mutiny. The sheikhs were warning that if the *Emir* is to continue in this approach of his towards the Bedouin tribes, then they all will revolt.³⁰⁸

After a year, Safvet Pasha was dismissed and replaced by Ahmed İzzet Pasha. Osman Nuri was appointed as the commander of the troops. After another six months Osman Nuri became *Vali* in 1882. The Emirate of Abdülmuttalib was marked by the failure to maintain the security on the pilgrimage and the commercial routes. The attacks on the Jidda-Mecca road, the fights between the Bedouin tribes and outbreak

³⁰⁷ BOA, Yıldız Perakende Umum Vilayetler Tahrirâtı (Y. PRK. UM), 4/49, 1298.L.13 (7 Eylül 1881).

³⁰⁸ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 5/44, Z.1299 (Kasım 1882).

of several cholera epidemics put the *Vali* and the *Emir* to face a lot of trouble in 1880's.³⁰⁹

When Osman Nuri became *Vali*, he wanted to consolidate his power as to limit the *Emir*'s authority and jurisdiction. The *Vali* wanted the *Emir* to give up contact with the nomads, and all judicial and appointative powers, leaving him only with the organization of the pilgrimage. According to Ochsenwald, Sultan Abdülhamid approved this radical change. Meanwhile, rumors were spreading about the *Emir*'s cooperation with the British. It was related that the *Emir* had ambitions for the Caliphate and that he was secretly communicating with the British. İstanbul did not ignore these rumors,³¹⁰ but it was still *Vali* Osman Pasha who dismissed and arrested *Emir* Abdülmuttalib with a fake *ferman* in 1882. Abdülmuttalib was kept under surveillance first in Taif and then in Mecca where he died in 1886.³¹¹

Vali Osman Nuri favored Abd-ilâh ibn Muhammed ibn 'Avn. He brought him to the Emirate after ousting Abdülmuttalib. However, the Sultan did not approve Abd-ilâh's *Emaret* and instead, appointed his brother Avnürrefik.³¹² Abd-ilâh was taken to İstanbul and given the rank of *vezir*. He served in the Council of State. Naturally, *Vali* Osman Pasha was disappointed to see his candidate removed in favor of another who was imposed upon him. This laid the basis of dissent between the *Vali* and this new *Emir* at the first place. At the beginning, *Emir* Avnürrefik accepted the powerful position of *Vali* Osman Pasha and his own nominal authority which was allowed to him. Osman Pasha became the dominant figure in the affairs of the Hijaz.

³⁰⁹ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.182.

³¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.182.

³¹¹ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emirleri*, p.133.

³¹² Kholaf, "The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908", p.40.

In 1883 the Bedouins of the *Harb* tribe started to attack caravans, villages and telegraph poles for the reason that they did not receive their payments and allowances. There was fighting in the streets of Mecca and the people of Jidda feared that a general revolt could take place. The *Emir* led a detachment of the Ottoman regulars and Bedouins from the '*Utaybah* tribe,³¹³ and fought against the *Harb*, forcing them to stop their actions. Payments were resumed to the tribes and the *Harb* prisoners were released. During the resolution of the crisis with the Bedouins, *Vali* Osman Pasha remained passive and let the *Emir* use his influence over the tribes to quell the disturbances. However, later the *vali* used the disturbances as a pretext for dismissing some officials of the Hijaz administration. At the head of those who were ousted came the *Kâ'immakâm* of Jidda and Ömer Nâsîf who was the assistant (*mu'âvin*) of *Emir* Avnürrefik. Nâsîf was accused of instigating a rebellion among the Bedouins and he was taken to prison.³¹⁴

The *Vali* continued to strengthen his position by ousting his rivals. In 1885 the *Kâ'immakâm* of Jidda, Said Fehmi Pasha who secretly sent his complaint about the *Vali* to the Porte was arrested and dismissed. The Arab guards of the *Emir* were replaced by the Ottoman soldiers and reduced in number. The *Vali* also restricted the judicial authority of the *Emir*.³¹⁵

By 1886, the relations between *Vali* and *Emir* were further strained and the conflict between the two climbed to such a point that *Emir* Avnürrefik declared that the *Vali* had usurped most of the hereditary prerogatives of the *Emaret* and he left

³¹³ There had long been a rivalry among the two major Bedouin tribes of the Hijaz (namely between the '*Utaybah* and the *Harb*) which the *Emirs* exploited according to the existing situation.

³¹⁴ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.187.

³¹⁵ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.189.

Mecca for Medina with all of his retinues and household. The *Emir* stated that he would not return to Mecca unless *Vali* Osman Pasha was dismissed immediately.

Meanwhile, petitions were sent by the notables of the Hijaz accusing the *Vali* for his illegal acts. Ahmed Esad, one of the prominent religious advisers of the Sultan who was also the father-in-law of the *Emir* exerted his influence in favor of Avnürrefik.³¹⁶ Consequently, Osman Pasha was moved to Aleppo, and the previous *Vali* of Aleppo, Cemil Pasha replaced him in Hijaz. It did not take too long for Cemil Pasha to resign on the excuse of his bad health. He was succeeded by Safvet Pasha.³¹⁷

In 1892 Osman Nuri became the *Vali* of Hijaz for a second term but he was dismissed in the same year. Between 1886 and 1895, there were seven *valis* in the Hijaz.³¹⁸ Although *valis* came and went in short intervals, the conflict between *Vilayet* and *Emaret* failed to end. At the center of the problems laid the issue of determining the separate jurisdictions of each of the authorities in the Hijaz. The *Emir* argued that the *Vali* interfered with the appointment of certain officials which was believed to be a right traditionally belonging to the Emirate. Meanwhile, the rivalry between *Emir* Avnürrefik and his nephews Ali and Hüseyin arose. *Şerif* Ali

³¹⁶ Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)", p.18.

³¹⁷ According to the chronology of *Valis* given in Al-‘Amr’s study, after Osman Nuri was removed in 1886, Cemil Pasha became *vali*. He follows that in 1887, on the advice of Cemil Pasha, Osman Nuri was appointed *vali* for a second time, and served until 1892. Al-‘Amr relates that the British Consul Jago’s account is that Safvet Pasha followed Cemil Pasha, yet that Consul Richards’ account says that Osman Pasha was appointed *vali* because Cemil Pasha proposed him. According to Al-‘Amr’s interpretation, even if Safvet Pasha was appointed first, upon Cemil Pasha’s advice, the Sultan changed his mind and appointed Osman Pasha. Yet, we know from our study of Ottoman documents that the *Vali* of the Hijaz was changed seven times between 1887 and 1895. These sources allow us to assert that after Cemil Pasha was excused from this office, Safvet, Nafiz and İsmail Hakkı Pashas served as *Vali* for short periods. [see: BOA, Yıldız Perakende Mabeyn Başkitabeti (Y. PRK. BŞK), 24/54, 1309.Ca.11 (13 Aralık 1891) and BOA, Yıldız Perakende Adliye ve Mezahip Nezareti Maruzatı (Y. PRK. AZN), 11/52, 1312.L.10 (6 Nisan 1895).]. Osman Nuri Pasha became *vali* again only in 1892, and served for a short term of six months. The tenure of Ahmed Ratib Pasha who followed him was not continuous either; he was removed in 1894 and Hasan Hilmi Pasha was appointed instead [see: BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 32/2, 1312.Za.9 (4 Mayıs 1895)], but in 1895 Ahmed Ratib was appointed as *Vali* again.

³¹⁸ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.191.

and *Şerif* Hüseyin claimed that they were threatened by *Emir* Avnürrefik,³¹⁹ and wrote to the Sultan requesting his protection.³²⁰ An investigatory mission was sent to explore the causes of the problems within the *Sharifian* family. Ahmed Ratıb Pasha arrived in the Hijaz at the head of this mission. The crisis situation was warred off by means of sending Hüseyin to İstanbul and dismissing *Vali* Osman Pasha on the reason that he encouraged Ali to rebel.

Ahmed Ratıb Pasha was appointed as Acting Governor of the Hijaz until when he became *Vali* with the rank of *Müşir* in 1893. Ahmed Ratıb Pasha was said to be the most passive one among the series of *valis* after 1840. He was on good terms with the *Emir* and was not unhappy to follow the *Emir*'s suit. On the other hand, there occurred wide protests and complaints about the actions and behavior of the *Emir* among the *Sharifian* family, Bedouin tribes and the notables of the Hijaz. Avnürrefik succeeded in quelling this opposition and expelled complainants from the Hijaz. *Emir* Avnürrefik gradually managed to consolidate his powers and positions. He restored his authority over the matters regarding the Bedouins which was lost in the time of *Vali* Osman Pasha and he supervised the day-to-day administration of the *vilayet*. *Emir* Avnürrefik remained in his office until he died in July 1905.

Even the crisis situation that occurred in 1895 did not put the *Emir*'s position in danger. In 1905 the British Vice-Consul Dr. Abdurrazzack was murdered in the midst of the popular reaction against the health measures including a ban on drinking the Zamzam water, taken during the cholera outbreak. Quarantine facilities, and especially disinfecting machines, were destroyed in Mecca by Meccans and Bedouins who saw these as the real reason of the disease. In Jidda, disinfecting

³¹⁹ BOA, Y.PRK. BŞK, 28/71, 1310.Ca.24 (16 Ekim 1892).

³²⁰ BOA, Y.PRK. BŞK, 28/29, 1310.R.1310 (15 Kasım 1892).

machines were torn apart by the Bukharan pilgrims.³²¹ The murder of Dr. Abdurrazzack was protested by the foreign community and the British Ambassador pressured the *Vali* and the *Emir* for the execution of the attackers. Some members of the *Harb* tribe were accused of being guilty about the incident. However, the Ambassador believed that *Emir* Avnürrefik was somehow involved in the murder. At that point the Sultan defended the *Emir*, saying that it would be impossible for *Emir* to do something like that, as he himself was the chief maintainer of the law and order in the Hijaz. In the end nothing much was done; The *Vali* and *Emir* remained in their seats. Upon the death of the *Emir* Avnürrefik, Vali Ahmed Ratib Pasha appointed Ali Pasha, the nephew of Avnürrefik as Acting *Emir* temporarily. The Sultan did approve the *Vali*'s choice with respect to the new *Emir*. Consequently Şerif Ali was appointed as the new *Emir*. In 1908, after the reestablishment of constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire, both *Vali* Ahmed Ratib Pasha and *Emir* Ali were dismissed.

³²¹ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.p.196-197.

CHAPTER IV

OTTOMAN RULE AND RELATIONS OF POWER IN HIJAZ: 1840-1908:

The Nature of the Dual Government in Hijaz in the Nineteenth Century:

Nearly all studies that consider the political history of the Hijaz under Ottoman rule point out that until the Wahhabi invasion of the Hijaz, Ottoman rule was nominal, that true power lay with the *Emirs* of Mecca, that the only indication that the Hijaz was under Ottoman rule was the Ottoman Pasha in Jidda and the Guardian of Medina. According to these sources, the Ottoman government had not imposed any specific regulation in the Hijaz. The important thing for the Ottomans was to hold the holy places in their hand, to provide that the Hajj takes place without any problems, and thus to gain legitimacy as the custodian and protector of the holy places. The Bedouins needed to be controlled for the security of the Hajj and the holy places; and this could only be provided by the *Emirs*. In this sense, the Ottomans needed the *Emirs*, and as one source says, for the Ottomans, the Emirate was a “necessary evil that prevented them from making the Hijaz into an ordinary *vilayet* or province”.³²² The *Emirs*, on the other hand, needed the assistance that the Ottomans sent, and thus were forced to accept the Ottoman presence in the area, yet striving to increase their power with every opportunity and naturally resisting this foreign domination. True sovereignty had stayed in the hands of the *Emirs*.

Again, according to the view many secondary sources ascribe to, upon the reestablishment of Ottoman sovereignty in the Hijaz after 1840, in a way that was different from its previous methods, the Ottoman state chose to set up a rule with

³²² Hourgronje quoted in Kholaiif, “The Hijaz Vilayet, 1869-1908”, p.4.

much less intermediaries and a much more centralized one, and for this reason, tried to limit the power of the *Emirs*. As the *Vali* who was appointed from the center was a rival authority against the *Emirs*, and as the jurisdictions and areas of responsibility of the *Emir* and the *Vali* were not determined, a “dual government” had arisen in the Hijaz. All the problems throughout the nineteenth century were because of this duality in government. In this abstraction, while the *Vali* was the representative of the centralized interests of the Ottomans in the Hijaz, the *Emir* of Mecca were the defenders of local interests. The *Emirs* were gradually gaining strength in face of the weakness of the *Valis*. In the end, apart for certain periods, the *Emirs* protected their autonomy, and the centralizing policy of the Ottomans was not successful, and it could not limit the activities of the *Emirs*. At the end of it all, the *Emirs* were to become the flag-bearers of Arab nationalism and declare their independence.

Yet, as we have seen in our previous chapters, the Emirate of Mecca, since its inception and as dictated by its structure, was of the inclination to live under the protective umbrella of whoever was the stronger political force in the Islamic world. Apart from the fact that the Emirate had not in any phase during its existence lived independent of foreign intervention, the initial strengthening of the Emirate and its completion of the consolidation of its power coincides with the period when the Mamluks in Egypt were reinforcing their hold over the Hijaz and institutionalizing it. The Ottomans, for their part, had largely continued this institutionalized relationship. If the Emirate was indeed cherishing its own authority and was taking the support of Ottoman power behind it to protect this authority, it should also be said that, structurally, it was not an institution that would see this arrangement as being strange.

When, in the 19th century, other dynasties arose in rivalry with the *şerifs* of Mecca to establish their domination in the Hijaz (the Idrisis in Âsır, the Sa‘udis and the Rashidis in the Nejd), undoubtedly the use of the military and administrative means of the Ottoman Empire provided an advantage for the *Emirs* in regional struggles. At other instances, the *Emirs* commanded Ottoman forces, and the Ottoman Empire had strengthened its rule in Âsır and in Yemen with the agency of the *Emirs*. The determination of who among the different branches of the *şerif* family, or even individuals from the same branch, struggling with each other to acquire the Emirate, was to become *Emir* was also dependent on Ottoman preference and support.

Thus, taking all this into consideration, the relation between the Ottoman state and the Emirate should not be seen as one of tension, but rather as one of negotiation and of dialogue. As Faroqhi also indicates, it would be naïve to claim that there was no attempt at political integration in pre-industrial empires, and that these stood solely relying on military power. The Ottomans held a rather small military force in the Hijaz. But besides this, a system that integrated the various sections of society (the *şerifs*, the residents of the two holy cities, the Bedouin) into the state was formed.³²³ According to Faroqhi, the Ottomans, even when they were at the apex of their power in the 16th century, had not claimed that the Governors would do whatever they deem necessary in the Hijaz, and had accepted the rule of the *Emirs* in a part of the region with minimal foreign intervention.³²⁴

Further, this integration was not limited to the Hijaz. It must not be forgotten that part of the family of *şerifs*, who were a family of notables, lived in İstanbul,

³²³ Faroqhi, *Hacılar ve Sultanlar*, p.200.

³²⁴ *ibid.*, pp.165-166.

particularly in the 19th century, attending school there and being employed in central organs of government such as the Council of State.

What we can see from the communication of the *Emaret* with the center is also that there was a dialogue between the *Emaret* and the center. Tension, for its part, was not with the Ottoman center, but it was between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet*, which was yet another local office. In a sense, the conflict and power struggle in the 19th century Hijaz was not between center and periphery, but between two separate locals. In a sense, it was a dual local government. The two officials both of which were appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, both of whose duties were outlined in the Imperial Warrants (*ber'at*) that were awarded them, were both held responsible for the organization of the Hajj to which the Ottomans ascribed so much ceremonial value.

According to Al-‘Amr, the *Emir* had a special religious position as the descendant of the prophet but he was also a civil ruler alongside the Ottoman *Vali*. However, the *Emir* was different from the Ottoman *Vali* in the sense that he acted on his own initiative without referring to the Porte or seeking its approval. He also differed from the *Vali* in his having greater influence, most of the time, amongst the inhabitants of the Hijaz and the Bedouin tribes.³²⁵ Yet what we understand from Ottoman documents is that the *Emirs* were responsible of their actions at least as much as the *Valis* were. They had to answer to the capital. In their correspondence, both parties relate events as if striving to prove the justness of their actions, and complain about each other. At the end, the office which was to determine and provide justice was again the Ottoman Sultan. The *Emir* can not be seen as the sole representative of all local interests against the *Vali*. We see that the Bedouins and the

³²⁵ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”. p.111.

Sharifian family from time to time wanted support from the *Vali* against the *Emir* and sought refuge in the mercy of the Sultan.

The *Vilayet* on the other hand, as much as it was an institution of the center, and as much as administratively and ideologically it was tied to the center, had complex relations with the local milieu. This is clearly evident in the actions and efforts of Osman Nuri Pasha, which were seemingly to impose the authority of the state, but in practice were separate from the center, mixed in with local interests and/or defending the authority and interests of the center in a way in conflict with the policy of the central government.

Saying that the Ottomans never imposed specific regulations on the Emirate would also be an equally distorted representation. The Ottoman state had first of all outlined a large frame in which the *Emirs* could function. Yet it did not allow them to digress this frame, going beyond their bounds and declaring a hereditary dynasty just as the Khedives had done. The Ottoman Sultan personally chose and appointed the *Emirs*. The areas of responsibility of the *Emir* and the *Vali* were determined, even if they remained somewhat abstruse in certain ways. The administration of the Bedouins and of the *şerifs* were the two areas the *Emir* was traditionally charged with. The *Vali*, on the other hand, was charged more prevalent than anything else, with the administration of the customs of Jidda and with the command of the military forces. The supervision of the Hajj and the general providing of safety and security were duties that were expected from both parties.

It is true that with the turn of the 19th century, since Napoleon and in the same way with the wider context of Ottoman power, the political developments around the Hijaz made the strengthening of central administration in the Hijaz more necessary

and more possible. The gradual change in the administrative structure of the Hijaz consist proof for this.

In the last phase of this administrative centralization, when a Hijaz *Vilayet* is formed, and when the administrative center of this *Vilayet* is determined to be Mecca, the *Vilayet* was now indeed infringing upon the previously independent turf of the *Emaret*, and this was not completely outside the will of the central government. The idea that there should be brought some sort of a check against the power of the *Emaret* in the Hijaz was part of the policy of the central government. Yet our perception from the correspondence of the center, especially to the *Vilayet* which was after all its agent in this policy, is that this was not done in the rather simplistic, authoritarian and coarse way it is portrayed in much of the secondary literature on the issue, but the will was to rather do it in a more diplomatic manner, maintaining the old policy of negotiation and mutual dependence. To go back to our Osman Nuri Pasha example, the conflict that arises between Osman Nuri and the center over the policy he follows in the Hijaz backs this statement. Osman Nuri Pasha was criticized for his hasty and heavy handed methods and his stance openly opposing the *Emir*, not paying due respect.

The expectation of the center was a Governor who could skillfully use more diplomatic and more traditional channels of negotiation, and this is very present in the correspondence sent from there. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government appointed as *Vali* to the Hijaz high ranking officers who had especially gained experience in the region. The center, while giving repetitive directions on that the *Emir* and the *Vali* should work in cooperation and harmony, was telling the *Valis* on the one hand to respect the traditional authority of the

Emaret and the *Emirs*, on the other hand that it wanted them to keep a certain distance to the *Emirs* and keep them away from affairs of the *vilayet*.

Similarly, we see the Ottoman central government apparatus itself to be acting very diplomatically towards the *Emirs* as well. Investigations were conducted about officials who had voiced allegations or complaints about the *Emirs*, or who had paid disrespect to the *Emir's* person or his lineage, and these people were punished. However, their allegations and complaints were not completely disregarded, and there was a request, usually made from the *Vali*, for the investigation of these in a quiet manner. In the 19th century, the movements of the *Emirs* were under close surveillance by the center, and especially their establishing communications and relations with representatives of foreign states were seen as being suspicious.

If we are to look at the nature of the relationship between the *Emaret* and *Vilayet* in the nineteenth century closely, we can see that this relation was as much about cooperation as it was about conflict. It is possible to find in Ottoman archival documents, many clues pertaining to the causes of the conflict that grew between the *Vali* and the *Emir*, to how they both justify their positions, and to the attitude and the policy of the center. Below, we will try to discuss these categorically and in a source based style.

Conflict Between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet*:

In this section, we are going to attempt to give a chronological narrative of the institutional conflict that the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* had, concentrating principally on the tenures of the *Emirs* Avnürrefik and Abdülmuttalib, as, these two both had very long tenures and also as the conflict they both had with the many Governors that

circulated through this period are well reflected in archival sources. We will especially try to compare their position with the that of Osman Nuri Pasha, who had served as *Vali* during both their *emarets*, and who is related in secondary sources to be a *vali* who successfully pursued a policy of curbing the power of the *Emaret* and who is seen as the single energetic *Vali* who was able to establish Ottoman government against the power of the *Emaret* in the Hijaz in the 19th century. Here, we will try to understand how much his policies were actually determined by the central government, and how much the *Vali* acted on a personal agenda, and we will look into the character of his involvement in local power struggles.

Although the relations of the imperial center with the *Emaret* will be taken into more extensive consideration in a separate section, we will here also dwell on the Ottoman government's attitude towards this conflict. We can see from the communication sent from the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* to the center what arguments were voiced as the sources behind the conflict between the two, and we can see with what language each party defended their position. In the responses, we can see, although more limited, clues of the attitude the center adopted in resolving this conflict.

On 20 September 1851 when *Şerif* Muhammad bin 'Avn was dismissed from the *Emaret* of Mecca, *Şerif* Abdülmuttalib was appointed in his place. In order to prevent the turmoil that occurred previously, Mustafa Reşid Pasha states in the document concerning this event that it is being thought that "the prior condition of the *Emaret* be put into a delimited state" (*Emâret'in ahvâl-ı sâbıkasının bir sûret-i mahdûdeye konulması*) and that "an exalted order has been issued with the further limiting of the office" (*daha etraflı tahdid-i me'muriyet ile emr-i âlî verildiğini*).³²⁶

³²⁶ BOA, A. MKT. MHM, 36/83, 1267.Za.24 (20 Eylül 1851).

The new *Emir* Abdülmuttalib had already arrived in Mecca in March of 1851,³²⁷ the Porte hoping to start the implementation of this new policy with him.

However it did not take too long for relations between *Emir* and *Vali* to be deteriorated and they started to make accusations against each other. In 8 March 1853, we encounter a document on account of that *Emir* Abdülmuttalib, ever since his arrival in Mecca, had made great efforts in order to maintain the security of roads and repulse attacks from Âsir. He claimed that he had managed to establish law and order everywhere in the Hijaz. However, as the *Emir* related, the Governor of Jidda, Âgâh Pasha did not help him in any way. Even further, ever since the *Emir*'s arrival in the Hijaz, he had not hesitated to make things difficult for the *Emir* and to prevent him from doing his duty. The *Emir* thought that the Governor did not even perform the duties which he claimed were his own responsibility properly, and left them in a state of chaos. According to the *Emir*, the lack of cash in the Jidda treasury was also because of the mismanagement, corruption and bribery of the *Vali*. *Emir* Abdülmuttalib, while hesitating to disclose all the details regarding these, says that he has previously asked the capital for an official to audit this terrible situation the Hijaz is in, but that he was not able to get an answer.³²⁸ However, Âgâh Pasha had already been removed from the *Vilayet* of Jidda when the *Emir* wrote these complaints. In accusing Âgâh Pasha, the *Emir* was actually trying to disown the accusations of Kâmil Pasha, who was the current *Vali*. It is interesting to note that the primary complaint of the *Emir* is that the *Vali* was not performing his responsibilities that belonged to him and his reluctance to cooperate with himself in the administration of the Hijaz. We can infer from all this that, even if the rules were not clearly outlined, there was some idea of a division of labor between the *Emir* and the

³²⁷ BOA, İ. DH, 14778, 1267.Ca.1 (4 Mart 1851).

³²⁸ BOA, İ. DH, 16684, 1269.Ca.27 (8 Mart 1853).

Vali in the Hijaz. Yet still, the expression used by the *Emir* that “the *Vali* is not performing responsibilities *which he claims belong to him*” leads us to understand that this division of labor was still contested grounds.

Until 1855, the problems between the Governor and the *Emir* were at a climb. The increase in the number of complaints about the *Emir*, and the mixing of his name in incidents of corruption lead to the center to think seriously about changing the *Emir*. In a document from 1855, we read that the Chief of the Descendents of the Prophet in Mecca (*Mekke Nâkibü's-sa'dâtı*) *Seyyid İshak Efendi* came to İstanbul six or seven years prior to that date, and brought a legal claim against *Emir Abdülmuttalib* over the issue of a mansion. They were brought together in the Council of Justice (*Meclis-i Vâlâ*). According to *Seyyid İshak Efendi's* son, from that date onwards, the *Emir* had fostered animosity towards his father, and a year ago, he had relieved him of his post as the *Nâkib*. He had not stopped at this, but had gone on to send his men, have *Seyyid İshak* beaten and then imprisoned in the Taif castle. Three days later *Seyyid İshak Efendi's* body came out of the prison. Even if *Abdülmuttalib* claimed that he died because his time came, the son claimed that his father was killed, and that the *Emir's* oppression and injustice is known to everyone in Mecca. Prior to this, he had had İzzet Pasha, the Governor of Jidda shot; but fortunately İzzet Pasha escaped without being wounded although some of his soldiers were martyred. The *Emir*, he says, had many oppressed people unjustly killed just like these.³²⁹

In a document dated 18 July 1855 we see that the Ottoman central government had been informed about the death of *Seyyid İshak Efendi* by way of the complaints of his son, *Seyyid Muhammad*. This incident, along with other complaints from

³²⁹ BOA, İ. DH, 20169, 1271.Za.3 (18 Temmuz 1855).

Mecca brought the issue of changing the Emir of Mecca into consideration once again. While making a call to keep in mind the existence of many rumors of unjust events such as the *Nakibü'l-eşrâf* affair took place in Mecca, it is also stated that the conflict between the Governor and the *Emir* is preventing the assurance of safety and security in these Holy Lands.

It is further stated that efforts at resolving the said disputes did not yield any result. We read in the document that it was decided first of all to send a high ranking military official to the Hijaz. The injustice and corruption in the Hijaz as well as the matter of the killing of *Seyyid İshak Efendi* was to be investigated. Especially, a secret meeting was to be arranged with the Governor, and according to the information obtained here, it is requested that a decision should be reached on the matter of replacing the *Emir* after consultation with the *Şeyhü'l-islam* and the Minister of War (*Ser-asker* Pasha). In such an event, it is stated that Abdülmuttalib should be immediately summoned to İstanbul, and Muhammed bin Avn, who had in the past administered well, should be sent to Mecca. However, it is advised his sons should stay in İstanbul to be employed in government bureaus (*mehamm-ı seniyye'ye kesb-i vukûf etmek üzere*).³³⁰ A short while after these events, when *Emir* Abdülmuttalib understood he was to be dismissed, he caused a public revolt on the excuse of the abolition of the slave trade, and escaped to Taif. The *Emir* after he was finally caught was first sent to Selânik and then to İstanbul.

Upon the death of *Emir* Hüseyin in 1880, Abdülmuttalib was once again appointed as *Emir* of Mecca. However, in his second term of office, he continued to have problems with the *Valis*. As he had previously done with Naşid Pasha, *Emir* Abdülmuttalib was able to get Safvet Pasha dismissed as well. On 27 November

³³⁰BOA, İ. DH, 20169, 1271.Za.3 (18 Temmuz 1855).

1881 it was ordered that while the former *vali* of Tripoli, İzzet Pasha is appointed in his place, the affairs of the *vilayet* are delegated to *Ferik* Osman Pasha in Jidda until his arrival. Safvet Pasha was still in Mecca, and in a telegraph he sent to the Porte, he stated that even after news reached of his dismissal, Abdülmuttalib continued to generate many rumors and disrespectful words about himself and about the Council of Ministers (*Heyet-i Vükelâ-yı Fihâm*)³³¹

Neither was the disorder in the Hijaz improved after the arrival of İzzet Pasha as the Governor of the province. This time, it is possible not only to mention the tension between the *Vali* and the *Emir*, but even more so, we can mention the conflict between *Ferik* Osman Pasha and the *Vali*. *Ferik* Osman Pasha sent a series of complaints and submissions to the capital about the conditions in the Hijaz, but was not able to receive a reply for any one of them. In his communication dated 9 March 1882, he expresses regret for not receiving replies, and explains that he does not have the courage to relate the situation in Mecca in all its detail, as he can not be sure of how the submissions he sends are being perceived in the capital. Butrus Abu-Manneh argues that Osman Nuri Pasha had the full support of the Sultan and that he started to put into action Sultan's policy of curtailing the powers of the *Emir*.³³² If it was so, then why was he so hesitant to explain the real situation in the Hijaz and why was he not sure of the reaction his policies received in the capital? According to *Ferik* Osman Nuri, the condition of the Hijaz at his present time was lamentable. He sees Ahmed İzzet Pasha's arrival and his disturbance of the functioning of local administrative apparatus as the reason behind this. Osman Nuri states that when he himself came to Mecca, he saw it as duty upon himself to limit the freedom of action of the *Emaret* as much as possible.

³³¹ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 169/10, 1299.M.5 (27 Kasım 1881).

³³² Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)", pp.10-11.

The policy Osman Pasha followed in the Hijaz was indeed to limit the sphere of authority of the *Emir* and to keep him under pressure. According to his statement, this was also the wish of notables in the Hijaz. This was because, although the *Emir* had been a respected and powerful person among the *şerifs* before he came to Mecca, he had during his tenure as *Emir* been unjust to many people and gained their resentment. Thus, the people and leaders of the Hijaz preferred to disassociate themselves with him and go under the protection and justice of the local government. Ahmed İzzet Pasha, on the other hand, had from the moment he arrived, shown the *Emir* proximity and devotion beyond the respect that is due the *Emir* of Mecca; and thus he had spoiled him even more than before. The point was that, due to the lack of authority and the cowardice of the new *Vali*, the *Emir* had regained his old power and authority which Osman Nuri was able to curb. The Mecca *Emaret* had returned to its unjust ways. For example, where as the post of Deputy to the *Emir* (*Emaret Kâ'imakâmlığı*) had been annulled with Osman Nuri's pressure, the post had now been reinstated, and a person famous for his cruelty, *Şerif* Ali Server, had been given to the office. The *Ferik* states that where as he had at his time been able to repel such cruel and evil people who had gathered around the *Emir* and were interfering in the duties of the *Emaret*, now each one of them act like a government on their own and tyrannize the people.

It can be understood that not only the relatives and supporters of the *Emir*, but also officials of the *vilayet* such as the Financial Commissar-General (*Defterdar*) and the Director of the *Harem* (*Harem-i Şerif Müdürü*) had also been from among the trusted men of the *Emir*. Osman Nuri suggested that there was no ground for legitimacy for the presence of the *Emir* in the Hijaz, as neither the population and the Bedouins, nor the notables wanted him. To a large extent, the power the *Emirate* held

in the Hijaz was indeed through its usurpation of the *vilayet*'s tools of government. According to *Ferik* Osman Pasha, the only thing preventing the well-establishment of the Sultan's government in the Hijaz was the *Emir*. Yet, the *Emir* had to position himself according to the Governor's stance. Thus, what was needed for matters to be in order in the Hijaz was, according to Osman Nuri Pasha, the appointment of a strong and loyal *vali*. "The security of the Medina road can be provided only then, and only then can peace be achieved with the Bedouin tribes and they can pay taxes" was the claim. Osman Nuri thought that by doing this, the Hijaz province will be able to pay for its costs and "the rule of the blessed justice of His Highness the Caliph" (*Halife Hazretleri'nin hukuk-ı mukaddese-i hükümetleri*) may be instated in this most important point in the Arabian peninsula in a short time.³³³

Osman Nuri did not openly pronounce that he wished to get rid of the *Emaret* in the Hijaz, but he clearly stated that he aimed to curb the powers of the *Emir*. It seems that the *Vali* did not help him for this end by showing a milder attitude. Osman Nuri felt the need to defend what he did while he saw as his duty to limit *Emir*'s power. He legitimized his actions by claiming that the *Emir* had already lost his basis of legitimate authority in the Hijaz, since he was a tyrant and nobody supported him. Instead, he himself was the one who was trying to provide the right justice which the people needed. It can be inferred also that he did not indeed believe the presence of the *Emaret* in Hijaz was of any good, because of the fact that they were actually powerless if not for the backing of Ottoman forces. Thus, at least, the *Emir*'s existence had to be symbolic if it was not to be abolished all together.

It can also be inferred from this document that the *Vilayet* was not a solid front against the *Emaret* as the way it is represented in some of the secondary literature.

³³³ BOA, Y. EE, 78/31, 1299.R.17 (9 Mart 1882).

Instead, it seems that members of the *Vilayet* administration had established some local bonds of interest with the *Emir*. Moreover at this particular moment, not a dual government, but a three headed one can be of issue: The *Ferik* as the head of the military forces, the *Vali* who was the highest administrative official in the Hijaz, and the *Emir* with his control of the Bedouins and his traditional authority over the Hajj.

The views of *Vali* Ahmed İzzet Pasha on the situation in the Hijaz, on the other hand, were different. In a document dated 19 of June 1882, Ahmed İzzet Pasha, after having been in the Hijaz for just over a year – mentioning that government there is “two headed” and that rumors and conflict is at an exacerbated level there – says that this condition prepares the grounds that “evil-doing” (foreign) powers are looking for.

He argues that as the Hijaz is the place towards which all Muslims pray, the power and influence of the Caliph is to spread from there to the whole Muslim world. Such a condition will not escape the attention of the British. Especially with so many settled pilgrims (*mücâvir*) from India in the two Holy Cities, it is apparent, İzzet Pasha claims, that the English are waiting for an opportunity to incite an internal matter and interfere in the region.

Ahmed İzzet Pasha defends his position saying that, taking all these under consideration, he pursued a policy that was necessitated by the conditions, and that he was able to provide safety and security through establishing peace between Bedouin tribes. He complains that there ensues a conflict between the *Emir* and *Ferik* Osman Pasha. As one of them is the chief of the *şerifs* and the Bedouins, and the other is the commander of the military forces, the hostility and conflict between them is not appropriate in view of the rank they hold and the importance of the conditions they face. He says no matter how much he has tried to reconcile the *Ferik* and the

Emir, he has not been able to succeed at it.³³⁴ As we understand from this, *Vali* Ahmed İzzet Pasha underlines the importance of providing security and an unproblematic rule in the Hijaz for the legitimacy and the continuation of the Ottoman caliphate. At the same time, he thinks that in order to prevent situations that would be grounds for foreign intervention, more elastic and mild policies should be followed.

The relations between the authorities that were present in the Hijaz was approaching a breaking point. In June 1882, when *Emir* Abdülmuttalib Efendi asks to be excused from the post of *Emir* and requests permission to reside from then on in Medina, *Ferik* Osman Nuri Pasha, still the Division Commander of the Hijaz and at that time in Taif, wrote to the central government saying that it will be fitting to accept Abdülmuttalib's resignation, yet it is necessary that he should not be allowed to reside in Medina. The real purpose behind this wish of the *Emir* was said to be to unite there with the forces of İbnürreşid, and to come from there to Mecca and Jidda to declare that he was under British protection. According to the *Ferik*, even though the *Emir* is unlikely to be able to realize such a wish of his, it will nevertheless be well-placed to be precautionous and not give him such an opportunity.³³⁵

In the end, on September 1882, according to Uzunçarşılı's account, *Emir* Abdülmuttalib was dismissed from the *Emaret* by Osman Nuri with a forged Imperial edict (*ferman*) and with his palace in Taif was occupied and he was imprisoned first here and then in his palace in Mecca.³³⁶ In a letter of complaint that *Şerif* Abdülmuttalib wrote to the Sultan in April 1883, he was saying that aside from being imprisoned, he was not allowed even to visit the Ka'ba, and that those who

³³⁴ BOA, A. MKT. MHM, 487/1, 1299.Ş.3 (19 Haziran 1882).

³³⁵ BOA, Yıldız Perakende Askeri Maruzat (Y. PRK. ASK), 13/33, 1299.Ş.9 (25 Haziran 1882).

³³⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerrerme Emirleri*, pp. 133-134

came to pay their respects for her deceased daughter were not allowed to see him, that he was being insulted. The order that came upon this, stated that no disrespect should be done to the former *Emir*, that he should not be held back from visiting the Holy Mosque and that besides his being well guarded, he should be shown leniency.³³⁷

Osman Nuri had succeeded in eliminating his rivals in the Hijaz. Abdülmuttalib was removed from office and was living a life of imprisonment in his palace. *Vali* Ahmed İzzet had also been taken from his post. Osman Nuri Pasha was now both the Governor of Hijaz and at the same time the commander of the military forces positioned there. The *Vali* continued his old policy of restricting the power of the Emirate under the new *Emir* Avnürrefik also. According to the report of the Deputy Governor of Hijaz Province, Said Fehmi, whom Osman Nuri was successful in removing from office through complaints to the center, in a ciphered telegraph of his to the Porte dated 10 December 1883, Avnürrefik Pasha and *Vali* Osman Pasha had thoughts that were completely against each other. This was mostly due to Osman Pasha's hasty actions. It was claimed that the *Vali* had a hasty nature beyond any purpose, and rather than responding to the conditions, he had the tendency and the wish to threaten the population and distance them and thus worsen and exaggerate situations. He is reported to have left all the important affairs of the *Vilayet* to the Secretary (*Mektubcu*) Fikri Efendi. Even if the secret behind this is unknown, it is clear to Said Fehmi that there is trouble there because *Mektubcu* Fikri Efendi serves his own interests. It is noted that it is possible to prevent the inciting of the tribes from outside, only through government officials acting justly and righteously, and in

³³⁷ BOA, İ. DH, 70433, 1300.C.16 (24 Nisan 1883).

a united and cooperative way. The current conflict between the *Emir* and the *Vali* prevented this.³³⁸

Not only had it not taken long for the relations between *Emir* Avnürrefik and *Vali* Osman Nuri Pashas to sour, but also the conflict between them also brought itself to the attention of the central government with repetitive telegraphs they sent complaining. On a document dated 7 October 1885, *Emir* Avnürrefik writes that Governor Osman Pasha, in a circle where many dignitaries are present, said to *Şerif* Ali Mehdi, the *Emir's* deputy: "You have seen what sort of treatment the likes of yourself receive; he is currently residing in his residence. If you desire so, I can do the same for you as well." Thus the *Emir* complained that the *Vali* was threatening him with treating him in the same manner he treated the former *Emir* Abdülmuttalib and that he insulted him. Avnürrefik, who said that he no longer had the strength to endure such threats and insults, expressed that, as he knew His Highness the Caliph also will have no consent for the condition he finds himself under; he seeks refuge in the asylum of the Sultan.³³⁹ With a style that is often seen in complaints that the *Emirs* sent about the *Valis* or about other Ottoman officials, in Avnürrefik's letter too we see him complaining of disrespect to his spiritual authority and to his lineage. He takes refuge from the *Vali* in the Caliphate, which is the asylum of all Muslims in the face of oppression. In face of such situations, we see the center often warning governors and officials to respect the *Emaret*, or even punishing them. While Osman Nuri was threatening Avnürrefik with getting him dismissed and imprisoning him as he did with the former *Emir* Abdülmuttalib, was actually failing to make a distinction between the two fractions of the *Sharifian* family who were constantly at a rivalry

³³⁸ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 6/34, 1301.S.9 (10 Aralık 1883).

³³⁹ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 7/101, 1302.Z.27 (7 Ekim 1885).

and a state of animosity against each other. However, according to the *Vilayet* under Osman Nuri Pasha, the *Emirs* should have known their place.

In December 1885, the conflict between *Emir* Avnürrefik and *Vali* Osman Pasha had elevated to the point where both parties started to make accusations against each other by sending complaints to the Porte. Those letters were heard in the Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükelâ*). It was agreed that it is extremely improper and dangerous for persons in such critical and important positions not to cooperate with each other in such a bad time. Thus it is ordered that they had to put an end to their differences and reach an agreement. As a result the *Emir* and the *Vali* had to accept the fact that they had to reconcile, and in a joint telegraph they sent to the Porte, they stated that they were going to act as if all the past events had not happened.³⁴⁰ It appears that the conflict between the *Emir* and the *Vali* was formulated by the center to be not a structural but a personal problem. It was constantly underlined that, no matter what happens, administrators especially in a place as sensitive as the Hijaz and at a time when there was caution against foreign intervention, should appear in cooperation, at least on the outside.

Although the crises situation between Osman Pasha and Avnürrefik was circumvented in this manner, threatening both parties that they were to be held responsible for a possible unrest in the Hijaz if they did not cooperate and if they continued their mutual charges and complaints, the Porte did not totally disregard those accusations. Especially those Avnürrefik made against Osman Pasha received careful consideration. In one of the concerned letters here, the *Emir* of Mecca Avnürrefik bin Muhammed Avn states that the *vali*'s behavior towards him and the

³⁴⁰ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 186/64, 1303.Ra.15 (22 Aralık 1885): “Fi kanun-ı evvel sene 301 tarihli telgrafname-yi sami- yi sadaret-penahilerinin mutazammın olduğu irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i padişahi mucibince ihtilaf-ı vâkî ke’en lem yekun hükmüne konularak dua-yı füzunî-yi ömr ü şevket-i zillullahinin tekrar olunmakta bulunduğu muaruzdur. Osman, Avnürrefik”

Şerif family was rude and improper towards the position of the family as the heirs of the Prophet. Also, the *Vali* was oppressive and severe in his rule. It appears that the port found these complaints about the *Vali* quite alarming and decided to pay attention to them.³⁴¹

The *Vali*'s and the *Emir*'s interests clashed in both of their desires to be the sole authority in Hijaz. In order to achieve this end, they had to transgress each other's sphere of power, disregarding easily the old established ways of doing things. On the other hand they both did not hesitate to blame each other for all the wrongdoings in the Hijaz, claiming that the other did not fulfill his responsibilities. While accusing their adversary, in a way, at the same time they were reifying their respective spheres of power and authority.

One such example occurred in August 1886, when some of the Bedouin tribes attacked the Jidda road and robbed the pilgrims. According to the *Vali*, although the *Emir* pretended to hold responsibility for the safety and comfort of the pilgrims, he prevented the establishing of a caravan to Medina, and thus let the tribesmen attack and kill the Muslims on the road. *Emir* Avnürrefik, in a letter he sent to the Porte on 16 August 1886 complains that, since Osman Pasha had not given provisions to the tribes entitled to provide camels for the pilgrims, they did not bring the necessary camels. Thus it was not possible to make a caravan to go to Medina. The *Vali* had not given the tribes' provisions on the grounds that there was no grain in the storehouses. The *Emir* thought that, in such situations, the previous *valis* somehow provided money for the tribes for maintaining the security of the roads. Even if it was true that there was lack of grain in the storehouses, there was cash in the treasury and he could have paid them money. The *Vali* also made a discount in allowances of the tribes;

³⁴¹ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 187/154, 1303.R.28 (3 Şubat 1886).

this being contrary to the orders of His Highness. Finally it was related by the *Emir* that Osman Nuri Pasha used harsh measures against some camel brokers affiliated to the *Af* and *Hafz* tribes who were two of the *Harb* tribes. Those camel brokers whose herds were killed unlawfully on the Jidda road by the order of *Vali* attacked the pilgrims and took their camels and possessions in order to take revenge.³⁴²

The security of the Hajj and of towns in the Hijaz depended on a symbiotic relationship and cooperation with the Bedouins. The *Emir* of Mecca could bring these tribes under control, not always resorting to force, instead making use of relations of kinship or religious and local influence. The attempts of *Valis* to discipline the tribes through use of force did not always yield favorable results and sometimes jeopardized security in the province. As with this example, it was crucial for both the *Vali* and *Emir* to fulfill their responsibilities in cooperation in order to provide the safety of the roads for pilgrims. It seemed that, despite the recurrent budget deficits, it was very important for the *Vali* to acquire and distribute the provisions of the Bedouins. On the other hand, the organization of the caravans of pilgrims and the providing of security for them with soldiers fell to the *Emir*.

One of the major complaints of the *Emir* was that the *Vilayet* interfered into the administrative and legal jurisdiction which the *Emaret* had been enjoyed traditionally (*min el-kadim*). In such cases *vali* defended his position claiming that because of the *Emir*'s incompetence and his abuse of power, the good name of the Sultan was hurt and in order to prevent this happening, he was working for.

The fact that the orders which the central government sent to the Hijaz were inconsistent further aggravated this confusion in terms of the allocation of power in

³⁴² BOA, Y. A. HUS, 194-2/55, 1303.Z.6 (5 Eylül 1886).

the province. One such example can be seen in a document dated 1886.

Traditionally it was accepted that the cases involving the Bedouins and members of the *Sharifian* family were to be trialed by the *Emaret*. When some of the *şürefa* and Bedouins applied to the government, seeking refuge in the justice of the imperial government and for the correction of the wrongs done to them, an order dated 19 November 1882 was sent both to the *Vilayet* of the Hijaz and the *Emaret* by the Office of the Grand *Vezir* (*Sadaret*). It says that, as a result of the communication between the *Sadaret* and Ministry of Justice (*Adliye Nezareti*), it was decided that there is no *shar'î* or legal reason that necessitates preventing someone who requests adjudication from being heard. Thus, with the acceptance of Ministry of the Interior (*Dahiliye Nezareti*), it was ordered that such cases could be held in the courts of *Şer'îyye* and *İcrâ'îyye*.

However, the *Emir* of Mecca regarded this decision as intervention in his jurisdiction by the *Vilayet* and protested by stating that this interference could resulted in many dangers. On 17 June 1886, the *Sadaret* sent another order to the *Vilayet*, which prevented it from involvement in the holding of these trials of Bedouins and the *şürefa*. We see *Vali* Osman Pasha defending himself, stating that he had not interfered with the affairs of the *Emaret*, but followed the orders previously sent by the central government with respect to the *şürefa* and Bedouins who opposed the misconducts of the *Emir* and declared that they too were Ottoman subjects and thus requested the justice of the government. The *Vali* claimed that what he was trying to do was to maintain law and order in the Hijaz. However, he says, as this does not suit the interests of the *Emir*, he is protesting.³⁴³

³⁴³ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 194-2/55, 1303.Z.6 (5 Eylül 1886).

In September 1886 Grand Vezir (*Sadrâzâm*) Kâmil Pasha wrote that the problems and disagreement between the *Vali* and the *Emir* had been continuing in the Hijaz. The possible troubles this situation could cause made it urgent to resolve the disagreement between the two authorities. Although, the Porte had previously rebuked them for this end, and thus had caused an uneasy agreement to form between them, this agreement did not last long. As in the case of the problems in the Jidda road, they held each other responsible for all the problems in the Hijaz.³⁴⁴

Apart from this, they accused each other of not showing a will to reconcile. Upon the orders that were sent from the capital asking for the *Emir* and the *Vali* to reconcile, the *Emir* wrote back with his explanation. In his letter dated 16 September 1886, the *Emir* claims that he called the Governor to meet in the Ka'abe, yet the *Vali* did not respond; and furthermore, that he did not join the processions in Mina on the anniversary of the coronation. He reports that, despite the fact that peace was made many times prior to this, the *Vali* did not keep to it. The *Emir* was requesting permission be given, out of respect for his ancestor the Prophet, for him to come to İstanbul in order to submit all these in person, after the Hajj convoy is sent off.³⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the *Vali* was complaining that the *Emir* did not respond to his invitation to get together in the government office (*da'ire-i hükûmet*) and was refuting the *Emir*'s accusations.³⁴⁶

According to Kâmil Pasha, the *Vali* was constantly trying to limit the *Emaret*'s privileged position. The *Emir*, on the other hand, wanted to protect this privileged position of his *Emaret* that had existed for so long (*mine'l-kadîm*) and was trying to cause the *Vali*'s downfall. *Sadrâzâm* Kâmil Pasha stated that the real reason behind

³⁴⁴ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 194-2/55, 1303.Z.6 (5 Eylül 1886).

³⁴⁵ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 194-2/88, 1303.Z.17 (16 Eylül 1886).

³⁴⁶ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 194-2/110, 1303.Z.19 (18 Eylül 1886).

this conflict between the *Vali* and the *Emir* was constituted by the motives of contested control we mentioned above. He was sure that, although as the *Vali* claimed, the *Emir's* wish and tendency for being independent and separate might be true, there could be more thoughtful and prudent ways of precaution against the *Emir*. In such a situation, the *Vali's* actions were overtly contrary to law and unacceptable. The *Vali's* attitude would have adverse effects on both *şerifs* and the tribes in the Hijaz.

Continuation of conflict and misconduct in the Hijaz, a place towards which all the Muslim turn their face, a place which is so important for the Muslims all around world, was not only dangerous and improper but it was also a sin. Thus, Kâmil Pasha concluded that it was necessary to change one of them in order to put an end to this situation.³⁴⁷ Sadrazam Kâmil Pasha's words lead us to believe that the harsh attitude of *Vali* Osman Nuri was criticized in the center. The *Vali's* policy was towards trying to take over the *Emir's* power in the Hijaz on the claim that if it is not prevented, the *Emir* will revolt for independence. For the central government, even in the case that there was a matter of truth in the claims, open challenge to the *Emir* and illegal practices such as those of the Governor's would only serve to provoke the *şerifs* and Bedouins and incite them against Ottoman rule. Thus, the Ottoman government believed that in a place as sensitive as the Hijaz, the *Emirs* should be taken under control with a much more concealed and diplomatic approach. Osman Nuri was far from displaying such an approach.

In October 1886, the *Emir* of Mecca Avnürrefik sent another letter to the Porte, mentioning the negative effect of the disagreements between the *Vali* and himself on

³⁴⁷ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 194-2/55, 1303.Z.6 (5 Eylül 1886).

the administration of the Hijaz, and asked for the Porte to take action. The style of the letter and his complaints against *Vali* Osman Pasha are worth quoting here:

“It was previously presented that, due to the illegal actions and oppressive behavior of Osman Pasha, agreeing with him is not possible in any way, and despite the fact that we have had conflict and patience and negotiation (*musalaha*) with him that is beyond human endurance, he has later annulled all [that was gained], and as long as this person stays in the Hijaz the will of the *Vilayet* and the *şerifs*, Bedouins, people and pilgrims will remain vehement, and desirable conditions will not be realized. In the current state of affairs, the execution of whatever is contingent is expected from your Imperial justice and compassion.... in order to save the people from oppression, to relieve the weak from responsibility and to gain blessings for Your Highness.”³⁴⁸

The *Emir* wanted Osman Pasha’s dismissal.³⁴⁹ The disagreement between *Emir* Avnürrefik and the *Vali* had other dimensions as well.

In another letter, Avnürrefik sent to the Porte, this one in the October of the same year, he explains where the basis of the enmity between the *Vali* and himself lies. According to the *Emir*, previously *Vali* Osman Pasha enticed his brother Abdullah Pasha by means of various promises in order to draw him on his side and make him *Emir* of Mecca instead. Since the Sultan did not approve the *emaret* of Abdullah Pasha, and instead appointed Avnürrefik Pasha as the *Emir* of Mecca, Osman Pasha’s whole plan collapsed. Thus, Avnürrefik states that since the time of his arrival in Mecca as the new *Emir*, Osman Pasha had displayed hostile behavior towards him. He had tried to make him look bad in the eyes of the central government, blaming him of false accusations. The *Emir*’s complaints against the

³⁴⁸ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 196/32, 1304.M.15 (14 Ekim 1886): “Hicaz Valisi Osman Paşa’nın umur-ı gayr-ı meşrua ve muamele-i gaddaranesinden dolayı hiçbir vechle ba’dema müşarünileyhle imticaz mümkün olamayacağı ve defeatle takat-i beşeriyenin haricinde kendisiyle mudara ve sabr ve musalaha edilmiş ise de der-akab nakz eylediği ve bu zat hicaz’da durdukca irade-i vilayet ve şürefa ve urban ve ahali ve hüccac daima müzebzeb bir halde kalacağı ve ber-vech-i dil-hah ali umurun cereyan edemeyeceği arz olunmuş idi. Şu halde ahaliyi zulmundan ve acizlerini mesuliyetden kurtarmak ve zat-ı şahaneye hayr dua kazandırmak her neye mütevakkıf ise bir an evvel icrası adalet ve merhamet-i Padişahi ve hamiyet ve mürüvvat-i fehmet-penahilerinden bekleniyor.”

³⁴⁹ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 196/32, 1304.M.15 (14 Ekim 1886).

Vali does not end here. Osman Pasha did not show respect to the *şerifs*. He threatened the officials and suppressed the notables in the Hijaz. Avnürrefik clearly stated and summed up that he could not make an agreement or alliance with such a person whose cruelty and betraying nature were known by everybody in the province.³⁵⁰

Avnürrefik, then went to Medina and refused to go back to Mecca until the *Vali* was dismissed. Some of the Meccan '*ulemâ*' who had accompanied the *Emir* were immediately dismissed by the *Vali*. Among them was the Maliki *Müftî* in Mecca. The *Vali* also attempted to dismiss the *Re'îsü'l-'ulemâ* (Chief of the religious scholars/officials), the Shafii *Müftî*, the *Nâkibü's-sa'âdet* and the *Şeyhu'l-hutebâ* (Chief Preacher) and some other officials. The *Emir* stated that the *Müftî*'s and others' dismissals was not only totally unfounded and wrong but also that for a long time to dismiss any *müftî* in Mecca had been a right which belong to the *Emaret*. Thus the *Emir*'s argument was that the *Vali*'s action transgressed the limits of his jurisdiction. The *Emir* wanted the *Müftî* to continue in his office and the prevention of the dismissals of the above mentioned officials. Upon the *Emir*'s letter, the Porte ordered Lütü Efendi, a member of the Council of State (*Şûrâ-yı Devlet*) and Müfid Bey, First Deputy to the Receiver-General of Provincial Correspondence Addressed to the Imperial *Divan* (*Âmedî-yi Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn Birinci Mu'âvini*), to investigate the situation.³⁵¹

Lütü Efendi and Müfid Bey, who had now been sent to the Hijaz to investigate the causes of the conflict between Avnürrefik and Osman Nuri Pasha, the now former Governor of Hijaz had prepared an explanatory document dated 17 May 1887 with their findings. According to this, proof for some of the various complaints that

³⁵⁰ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 196/97, 1304.M.27 (26 Ekim 1886).

³⁵¹ BOA, Y. A. HUS, 196/33, 1304.S.8 (6 Kasım 1886)

the *Emir* had voiced in his telegrams and letters could not be found. There was no reason for the Pasha to stand trial for these. These subjects were outlined in this particular order. 1) Intervention to matters concerning the *Emaret* and inappropriate behavior towards some tribal sheikhs and their representatives. 2) The Deputy *Emir* (*Emaret Kâ'immakâmı*) *Şerif* Ali Efendi being publicly threatened. 3) The inciting of the tribes and the taking of this opportunity to cut off their dues (*mürettebât*) in order to teach them their place. 4) The removal from office of the Maliki *Müftî Şeyh* Mehmed Efendi done against procedure. 5) The writing of a ciphered telegram ordering that the *Emir* should be arrested if he goes out of his route via land or sea, while coming from Medina to Jidda.

Yet concerning some other subjects, the *Vali* was confirmed to be responsible. These were: 1) The freeing of some murderers and vagabonds from the *Vilayet* prison. 2) Causing insecurity in the sending and receiving of postage, and thus forcing the *Emir* to use other means. 3) The refusal of the demand to appear before a court by three *şerifs* who were beaten by the assistant functionary (*mülâzım*) Ali Ağa outside of Jidda. 4) His lack of listening to the demands for justice by a person who reached to Mecca after he and his brother were attacked by soldiers on the route from Jidda and his brother was killed. 5) The imprisonment without trial of *Şerif* Ali Serveri Efendi, the deputy to the former *Emir*, for two years and the cutting off of his dues (*mürettebât*), and the causing of events to erupt in the roads to Jidda and Taif. 6) The torturing of *Şerif* Bereket and his slave on the road to Jidda and their being killed.³⁵²

Apart from these, we can read that it was decided that all extra taxes that were imposed on the pilgrims and others under Osman Pasha's governorship, besides the

³⁵²BOA, Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (DH. MKT), 1420/79, 1304.Ş.23 (17 Mayıs 1887).

one called “*tahrîciye*” traditionally taken from the camel brokers, should be lifted. The sending of the registers of all these new taxes and of the *tahrîciye* to the Porte is requested and it is also asked that it should be determined when and why the one *riyal* per person that was taken from the pilgrims, the ten *kuruş* taken at the docks and the money taken under the name passport tax was taken. It was seen also that the tax taken by the municipality from boxes and salted fish in the Jidda port on top of the tax and customs that is paid, was too much and it was decided that it should be lifted.

It was decided that the eight *kuruş* which was imposed by the *Vali* Osman Nuri and that was taken from each pilgrim who was going to Yenbu‘ after the conclusion of the pilgrimage as boat charge and municipal tax should be eliminated.³⁵³ Another document lets us understand that the tax Osman Nuri levied was arbitrary and should be abolished because there is no such entry among the revenue which was organized by the *Vilayet* for the municipalities.³⁵⁴

Apart from these, the report by Lütfi Efendi and Müfid Bey points to some other important issues concerning the Hijaz and mentions certain measures that could be taken. Lütfi Efendi and Müfid Bey state that foreign consulates intervene in local government with the pretences to protect the legal rights of pilgrims of Indian and other foreign citizenship. It was underlined that the Hijaz is an exceptional province in some regards, and that the issue of protecting the lives and property of those who came here to perform their obligatory Hajj concerned the Sultan’s government. As the interventions of the consuls were found harmful materially as well as in spirit, it was stated that this should be prevented. In a show of concern for the local population and for the keeping of peace, it was stated that the timely and complete

³⁵³ BOA, DH. MKT, 1441/70, 1304.Z.3 (23 Ağustos 1887).

³⁵⁴ BOA, DH. MKT, 1454/6, 1305.M.23 (11 Ekim 1887).

distribution of dues (*mürettebât*) to be given to the tribes and their sheikhs is a responsibility that should be fulfilled by the *Vilayet*.³⁵⁵

Most importantly concerning this episode, upon Müfid Bey's report, the issue of separating the duties of the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* was being debated.³⁵⁶ If the duties of these two offices were to be separated soon, it was said that the conflict and disagreement that traditionally stood between them would disappear.³⁵⁷ In short, it was thought that if there was a clearer and stricter prescription on who is to do what in the Hijaz, the *Vali* and the *Emir* then could not intervene in each other's spheres. This having been said, there was no very solid measure being taken on this matter.

At other times, the animosity between the *Emir* and the *Vali* was related to the relations being negatively influenced by other parties. In 1887 some lower officials were exiled from the Hijaz to Anatolia with charge of inciting animosity between *Vali* and *Emir*, until they were excused and returned to their original place of work. Among such examples, in October 1887, we can see that a person named *Hafız Emin* from among the prayer-callers in the Holy Mosque and a local of the Hijaz, was exiled to Amasya with the charge that he damaged the relations between the two dignitaries. He was, however, able to receive a pardon from the Sultan, and it was decided for him to return back to his job.³⁵⁸

Also, two people, Ömer Zahid and Yahya Defterdar, both preachers in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina, were accused of provoking hostility between the *Vali*

³⁵⁵ BOA, DH. MKT, 1420/79, 1304.Ş.23 (17 Mayıs 1887).

³⁵⁶ BOA, DH. MKT, 1420/79, 1304.Ş.23 (17 Mayıs 1887).

³⁵⁷ BOA, DH. MKT, 1446/14, 1304.Z.22 (11 Eylül 1887).

³⁵⁸ BOA, DH. MKT, 1452/81, 1305.M.16 (4 Ekim 1887).

and the *Emir*, and were exiled to Damascus. These people too, were pardoned by the Sultan in 1887, and they also were allowed to return to their posts.³⁵⁹

Vali Osman Nuri Pasha was dismissed in 1886 and appointed to the *vilayet* of Aleppo. Then he returned to the Hijaz as *vali* for a second term in the summer of 1892. However it did not take long before he was dismissed again and sent to Damascus because of the disputes between him and Avnürrefik maintaining themselves and problems recurrent in the Hijaz.

The dispute between *Vali* and *Emir* ended up, as it did in Osman Nuri's first term in that office, with the break of communication between the two since the *Emir* retreated to Taif and refused to return to Mecca. In a ciphered message dated 4 October 1892, Osman Nuri Pasha, the governor of the Hijaz, writes to the Yıldız Palace that the Chief Secretary of the Province (*Vilayet Mektupçusu*) and Ömer Nasif Efendi (the *Emir's* agent) who went to Taif to see the *Emir* had seen him and returned. The *Emir* had informed Osman Nuri that he will not return to Mecca if Osman Nuri Pasha continues to openly interfere in the affairs of the *Emaret*. According to the *Vali*, he had found the affairs of the province completely out of control when he came to office. There was continuous robbery on the Jidda road and at night, in Mecca. The *Vali* had changed certain *muhtesibs* (police officers/market assessors), hygiene officials (*tenzifat memurları*), and district chiefs (*mahalle şeyhleri*), and had reassigned the road guards on the Jidda road who had previously been withdrawn. All this was being perceived by the *Emir* of Mecca as interfering with the affairs of the *Emaret*. He wanted the *Vali* not to interfere in such things, and concern himself with paying salaries and handing out provisions, which was his duty.

³⁵⁹ BOA, DH. MKT, 1450/49, 1305.M.6 (24 Eylül 1887).

The *Emir*, who indicated that the conflict between them could be resolved if the Governor holds his activity in the Hijaz restricted to these, added that he would immediately return to Mecca if that would be the case. Osman Nuri Pasha would not accept this situation; according to the *Emir*'s proposal, there was really not much need for a *vali* in Hijaz. Asking "why then has the *Emir* not taken these measures himself?", the *Vali* claimed that the *Emir*'s real goal was not to provide safety and security in the Hijaz, but on the contrary, to incite trouble. Osman Nuri Pasha was also complaining of the provocations and ill-doings of the *Defterdâr* and the Commander in Taif, claiming that they prevented any agreement being reached with the *Emir*.³⁶⁰ In fact it was true that by means of appointing district chiefs, *muhtesibs* and *şeyhs* of guilds, the *Emir* of Mecca had an overwhelming influence on the social life of the city. That was the reason why the *Vali* had changed these officials, in order to curb the power of the *Emir* in the Hijaz. By doing this, *Vali* Osman Nuri Pasha had clearly transgressed the traditional jurisdiction of the *Emir*.

This conflict between the *Emir* and the *Vali* had been known by the Porte for some time. On 4 October 1892, orders were sent to both of them, warning them to end their discrepancies and cooperate with each other.³⁶¹ The occurrence of some disturbance in the Holy Mosque at this point, shifted the central government to take decisions that were much more effective than just reprehending the *Vali* and *Emir* to be in cooperation with one another. On 7 October 1892, in a ciphered letter he wrote to the Palace, *Vali* Osman Nuri Pasha gave details of the events that took place in the Holy Mosque. When a group from the common rabble (*ayak takımı*) started firing shots in the mosque in the early hours of the morning, the worshipers had fled the

³⁶⁰ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 25/59, 1310.Ra.23 (15 Ekim 1892).

³⁶¹ BOA, İrade Hususi (İ. HUS), 70, 1310.Ra.13 (4 Ekim 1892) and see also BOA, Cavid Baysun Evrakı (HSD. CB), 2/81, 1310.Ra.14 (5 Ekim 1892).

scene. While those among the shooters who were caught were being questioned, three to five hundred men started marching (*hücum*) towards the *Vali's* residence shouting. Calling attention to that among those who marched on the *Vali's* residence were many men of the *Emir*, and to that although so many shots were fired in the Holy Mosque, nobody was hurt, the *Vali* wrote that these two events were things the *Emir* devised in order to threaten him. As the continuation of such a condition would not be auspicious for the state, the *Vali* asked for either himself or the *Emir* to be taken from their office.

In following correspondence from 10 October 1892, with the conflict between the *Emir* and the *Vali* ensuing, with the *Emir* going to Taif and refusing to return to Mecca, and most recently, with arms going off inside the Holy Mosque, the necessity of a change of authority in the Hijaz was on the table. In his communiqué written to the Sultan, Süreyya Pasha, his Chief Secretary, summarized the events and was making the observation that the duties of the Mecca *Emaret* and the Hijaz Governorship were not clearly defined. Due to this lack of definition in spheres of jurisdiction, among the *valis* that were appointed to the Hijaz, those who did counter the wishes of the *Emir* and prevented him from interfering in affairs of the *Vilayet*, were not liked by the *Emir* and complaints were made against them. On the other hand, those who did not appreciate the necessities of the duties of government and left authority completely to the *Emir* for the sake of personal interest were made content by the *Emaret*. Such a condition was unacceptable in terms of upholding the rights of the government. Süreyya Pasha indicated that the definition of the duties of the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* had great importance then and for the future. Until the definition of these duties was achieved, the attitude the Governor will have was critical. Because, at once, they had to prevent the *Emir* from interfering with matters

of government but yet had to avoid situations which will disturb the sensitivities of the *Emaret* and avoid disrespect and follow a gentle and cautious policy. Süreyya Pasha was suggesting that Rauf Pasha, the Governor of Syria, could be brought to the post as a person capable of pursuing such a policy.³⁶² Süreyya Pasha's observations show that the situation in the Hijaz was analyzed very aptly by the center. At this date, more structural solutions had come to be seen as necessary in order to resolve the issues that cause problems between the *Vali* and *Emir*, yet until the time when the boundary between the authority of the two are outlined better and this is achieved, a *vali* who could implement a policy of diplomacy in the Hijaz had to be appointed.

Especially, the rabble that broke out in the *Harem* was the last drop. The Porte warned both the *Emir* and the *Vilayet* in a very strong language. At this point when the decision was made to change the Governor of the Hijaz, and when who the new *vali* might be was being discussed, there were ciphered messages sent to both the *Emir* and the *Vali* from the Palace, and it was explained to them that, as it has been understood that they were not able to reconcile the differences between them, some measures are under consideration. In the meanwhile, they were ordered certainly to prevent events like those which took place in the Holy Mosque from happening again. In a separate ciphered message sent to the Hijaz Commander, he was asked to investigate who was responsible for and the causes of the incident in the Holy Mosque. In the ciphered messages sent to all three parties dated 12 September, it was said that, in the days to come, a committee will be sent to the Hijaz for investigation, and there was an admonition that an entente between the *Emir* and the *Vali* should be sustained until then and no unacceptable situation should be allowed to develop in the Hijaz.

³⁶² BOA, Y. PRK.UM, 25/59, 1310.Ra.23 (15 Ekim 1892).

After the events in the *Harem* and the Porte's new and stronger language, *Vali* Osman Nuri can be seen as writing back and explaining that he actually wants to be in cooperation with the *Emir* in all issues in the Hijaz. Yet, he explains that he was forced to act alone, because he was not able to receive replies to the letters he sent the *Emir* on various subjects of administration. In his reply to the communication from İstanbul urging cooperation, dated 15 October, Osman Pasha indicated that he will not have any action that will be outside of the Sultan's will. He wrote that he was working to provide safety and security in the Hijaz and to find an agreement with the *Emir*, but he had no opportunity to see the *Emir* in person. He added that people from the common rabble in Mecca sent signed and unsigned reports to the *Emir*, and thus pushed him into unsubstantiated worry, preventing them from a face to face meeting and agreement. *Vali* Osman Pasha says that he has no other wish but to do the work that needs to be done in the Hijaz discussing and agreeing on it with the *Emir*, but for this, the *Emir* needs to return to Mecca as soon as possible.³⁶³

According to the central government's point of view, the special place and the importance of the Hijaz in the Empire made it especially urgent to take action to prevent the repetition of some improper occurrences. In the face of uprisings in Yemen in 1891, it was very important to resolve the conflict between the two authorities in Hijaz. For this end, Takiyuddin Pasha (previous the Governor of Baghdad) and Ahmed Ratıb Pasha were immediately sent to Mecca in November 1892 in order to investigate the situation and decide which one of the two parties was right in his complaints.³⁶⁴

Consequently, the controversy between the *vilayet* and the *Emaret* in Hijaz in 1892 was resolved when the Porte once again dismissed Osman Pasha and appointed

³⁶³ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 25/59, 1310.Ra.23 (15 Ekim 1892).

³⁶⁴ BOA, İ. HUS, 75, 1310.R.26 (16 Kasım 1892).

Ahmed Ratib Pasha as the Acting Governor. Takiyuddin Pasha who had been sent along with him to investigate the situation in the Hijaz and the conflict between the *Vali* and the *Emir*, was ordered to stay in Mecca for sometime in order to help Ahmed Ratib Pasha in putting things in order in the Hijaz.³⁶⁵

Although the conflict between the Governor and the *Emir* ended in December 1892 with the removal of *Vali* Osman Pasha from office for a second time, the troubles in the Hijaz had not calmed yet. According to the information given by the Acting Governor, Ahmed Ratib Pasha, the scribe Mehmed Emin Usayli Efendi and the Arabic language scribe Mehmed Ali were sent to İzmir, with the reason that they caused conflict between the former governor and the *Emir*. The intention was outlined as providing order in the Hijaz. Although our sources do not indicate how these people were trying to cause conflict between the *Vali* and the *Emir* and why, it is possible for us to think that these people were sent away as a gesture to calm the *Emir*. After all, the former *Vali* Osman Pasha continuously interfered in the affairs of the *Emir*, and the central government understood that this was the real cause for the conflict between them, and thus the *Vali* had been dismissed from his office.

Still, the central government was not blind to the fact that the *Emir* also interfered in the affairs of the *Vilayet*, and hoped to extend his sphere of authority by doing so. In the document sent to the Acting Governor Ahmed Ratib Pasha and Takiyyuddin Pasha, dated 14 December 1892, it informed that “as the duties of the *Emaret* are appointed and delimited with an Exalted Warrant, if the said *Emir* should act in a disapproved manner outside of the bounds of this warrant, as in times *Şerif* Abdülmuttalib had done”, then no leniency should be will towards this.³⁶⁶ The

³⁶⁵ BOA, İ. HUS, 86, 1310.Ca.23 (13 Aralık 1892).

³⁶⁶ BOA, Y. PRK. BŞK, 28/71, 1310.Ca.24 (14 Aralık 1892).

warrant here is the *ber'at* given to the *Emir* on his appointment, and no better defined distinction was formed yet.

We can see Osman Nuri's name mixed up in some schemes against the Emirate of Mecca, even after his removal from the office of *Vali* in Hijaz. The incident of a telegram sent in opposition to the *Emir* of Mecca which unfolded in 1893, shows that Osman Nuri did not simply apply the policies of the central government in the Hijaz, and that he actually had his personal agenda behind some of his actions. In June 1893 two camel brokers were assaulted because they were against the *Emir* of Mecca, and they complained to the *Vilayet*. The Acting Governor Ahmed Ratib Pasha and Takıyyuddin Pasha wrote that these people, with the encouragement of the former *Vali*, had sent a telegram hostile to His Excellency the *Emir*. The Pashas expressed that, as these are ill-doers who need to be punished, they are indeed pleased with what happened. According to the two Pashas, these people were encouraged by the telegram director who was a supporter of the former *Vali*. The telegraph director had been suspended previously when he was in Erzurum, Sivas and Yemen, for damaging relations between the population and the central government, and he had finally got to the Hijaz and had become the director of the central office there. The two Pashas wanted the dismissal of this telegraph director and the appointment of someone else from the capital.³⁶⁷

Furthermore, this was not the first time either. Previously, Osman Nuri, after he had been removed from the Hijaz and appointed to Aleppo in 1887, still had tried to influence Hijazi politics through the agency of the telegraph director. We encounter similar clues in a document dated 27 March 1887. In this document we find an account of the relation between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* from the removal from

³⁶⁷ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 27/100, Z.1310 (Haziran 1893).

office of Abdülmuttalib to the removal of Osman Nuri Pasha in 1887. According to the long narrative of this particular document, Safvet Pasha had pursued a personal policy of making *Şerif* Abdullah become *Emir* instead of *Şerif* Abdülmuttalib; but not having succeeded, he was removed from office. İzzet Pasha who had become Governor after him was also removed after a short time. İzzet Pasha's governorship coincides with the period when Osman Nuri Pasha was *ferîk* and commander. As *Şerif* Abdullah Pasha was extremely successful in attracting *Ferîk* Osman Nuri Pasha to his side, he could not get along with İzzet Pasha. Upon complaints from both these parties, İzzet Pasha was removed from office.³⁶⁸

The document continues explaining that when Osman Nuri Pasha was promoted to the rank of *vezir* and appointed *Vali*, and thus when his power and influence came to its highest level, people close to *Şerif* Abdullah approached him, and tried to force Abdülmuttalib out of office and they were successful when Abdülmuttalib was removed from office and Abdullah was effectively made *Emir*. But, with the apt decision of the Sultan, the *Emalet* was bestowed not upon Abdullah Pasha but on *Şerif* Avn Pasha. *Şerif* Abdullah had been deposed a month after he assumed the post, and was forced to the capital. Yet, in accordance with the deal they had with Osman Pasha, Osman Pasha did everything he could for the *Emalet* to be given back to *Şerif* Abdullah. In the process, he gathered around him a great deal of corrupt officials who only served their own interest, and these men gathered considerable fortunes. Consequently, Osman Pasha was removed from his post. The same party gathered around Cemil Pasha, who had come to Mecca from Aleppo. It was claimed that worse disrespect than what was shown to the *Emalet* at the time of Osman Pasha was now going to occur under Cemil Pasha. It was feared that if Cemil

³⁶⁸ BOA, Y. MTV, 26/15, 1304.B.15 (27 Mart 1887).

Pasha acquired the office of Commander, then he would do worse injustice and oppression than Osman Pasha had done.³⁶⁹

It is easily discernible from all this that the *Valis* in Hijaz were acting more locally, and rather than being simple representatives and agents of the policies and interests of the central government, they had become party to the power struggle in the *Sharifian* family. They took sides in the struggle among different branches of the family or different candidates for the Emirate. In this regard, the choice of the *Valis* did not always correspond to the choice of the center.

In the same document, a further claim was made that Osman Pasha communicated with Cemil Pasha through different channels. The reason behind this was that Osman Pasha continued his policies on Abdullah Pasha. If a more experienced officer had been appointed to the Hijaz at the time, instead of Osman Pasha, it is said these conditions would not have developed. The ongoing corruption could, however, be abated if the *Defterdar* who was an instrument of evil, the postal and telegraph chief Rıza Efendi who misuses his office and the Central Command Colonel (*Erkân-ı Harbiye Mîr-alayı*) Sadık Bey who acquired great wealth through using the revenue of the Ayn Zübeyde Commission and all the construction and real-estate transactions in Mecca for personal gain were all to be removed and if their accounts were to be checked.³⁷⁰

It is clear to the author of this document that there is an alliance between Cemil and Osman Pashas. Since Cemil Pasha came to Mecca, he says, he contacted Osman Pasha in Aleppo several times through telegram, even though they have no political relation. It is claimed that it should be possible to obtain copies of these telegrams

³⁶⁹ BOA, Y. MTV, 26/15, 1304.B.15 (27 Mart 1887).

³⁷⁰ BOA, Y. MTV, 26/15, 1304.B.15 (27 Mart 1887).

from the Aleppo or the local telegram offices, yet the misuse of office by Rıza Efendi, the postal and telegram chief prevents this, as he destroyed all evidence.³⁷¹

As Osman Pasha promoted malevolent people and used them for his own purposes, this weak morality also spread through the soldiers as well. It is claimed that Osman Pasha sent orders with the corrupt officer Bekir Bey, *kâ'immakâm* of the 54th division, who had since then been brought to İstanbul, that even when on watch, soldiers whose watch is over should leave their guns and leave. Cemil Pasha is also reported to have told commanders to give leave so that soldiers can leave. Their actions had allowed soldiers to leave their places; and 45 soldiers had gone into the *Harem* while armed, and they did not leave despite all insistence.³⁷²

The argument is finalized: Any corruption or oppression that takes place in somewhere like Aleppo would only touch private interest, it would not hurt the state in a great way. Unlike this, Hijaz Province, as the point towards which the whole Muslim world prays, is a place on which foreign states have their eye set. Thus, such corruption and oppression here can cause problems that would be very difficult to resolve.³⁷³ This final part of the document clearly reflects the sensitive and unique position of the *Vilayet* of Hijaz for the Ottoman Empire. Especially in the late 19th century, any problem that could take place in the Hijaz had the potential of being a major concern for the Empire in its relation with the European powers.

If we are to turn back to 1893, at this date Ahmed Ratib Pasha had become the Hijaz *Vali* and Commander. In his correspondence to the Palace about the conditions of the Hijaz, dated 28 March 1893, he was informing that there is no

³⁷¹ BOA, Y. MTV, 26/15, 1304.B.15 (27 Mart 1887).

³⁷² BOA, Y. MTV, 26/15, 1304.B.15 (27 Mart 1887).

³⁷³ BOA, Y. MTV, 26/15, 1304.B.15 (27 Mart 1887).

condition or action going on in the area against the imperial will, and that the safety of the Mecca and Jidda road is secured. The *Vali*'s words:

“In terms of government, the route I have taken here is completely against the route taken by Osman Pasha. Since his route was always against that of His Excellency the *Emir*'s and always against the people, mine is completely against his.”³⁷⁴

are more proof that Osman Nuri's policy in the Hijaz did not find approval in the center.

We see the position *Vali* Ahmed Ratıb takes towards the *Emaret* from these words of his:

“And about His Excellency the *Emir*; he is not in any way crafty, he is loyal to our Sultan. In the very same way I have submitted, he too is loyal to His Imperial Majesty. There could not be a better *Şerif* than this. I do not let him get involved in matters of government, since the day I came to Mecca, and he does not object to this at all.”³⁷⁵

Secondary sources relate that Ahmed Ratıb Pasha got along well with the *Emir*, and that he adopted a secondary position by him. It was may be because of this that he managed to stay as the Governor until 1908. Despite all this, it can not be said that his relations with the *Emir* was without troubles. Ahmed Ratıb Pasha wrote in 17 August 1895 that, while maintaining the administration and laws of the government, he was also trying to have good relations with the *Emir* as ordered by the Sultan. He knew that the *Emir* would prefer to see Feyzi Pasha, the Governor of Yemen, as governor in Hijaz, and that he had close relations and assisted Feyzi Pasha. Ahmed

³⁷⁴ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 26/73, 1310.N.10 (28 Mart 1893): “Hükümetce burada ittihaz ettiğim meslek Osman Paşa'nın mesleğine bütün bütün mugayyirdir. Zira, onun mesleği daimü'l-evkat Şerif Hazretleri'nin aleyhinde ve ahaliye zulm eylemek mesleği olduğu için benim mesleğim bunun tam gayridir.”

³⁷⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.UM, 26/73, 1310.N.10 (28 Mart 1893) : “Burada Şerif Hazretlerine gelince, kendisi cin fikirli değildir, Padişahımız'a sadıktır. Ol dahi arz eylediğim vech üzere Şevket-me'ab Efendimiz ve devlete sadıktır. Bundan iyi bir şerif olamaz. Mekke-i Mükerrerme'ye geldiğim günden beri hükümet işlerine hiç müdahale ettirmiyorum ve kendisi de hiç ses çıkarmıyor.”

Ratib Pasha relates that the *Emir* had engaged in some action in bringing Feyzi Pasha in his place. Specifically, he reports that the Sweeper to the Mosques at Medina and Mecca (*Ferâşet-i Şerîfe Vekîli*) Ahmed Esad Efendi's personal secretary had come from Taif to Jidda in order to go to the capital with some excuse and that the *Emir* had given him a series of documents for the appointment of Feyzi Pasha as the Governor of Hijaz, and that Esad Efendi had this man taken from Mecca in a rush.³⁷⁶ Ahmed Ratib Pasha suspected that the *Emir* was busy with some conspiracies to bring Feyzi Pasha who was governor in Yemen in his place. He further suspected that Ahmed Esad Efendi, one of the religious advisors of the Sultan, was involved in these plans.

We find another indication of the relation between the *Emir* and the *Vali* of Yemen in a telegram sent by Mustafa Sıdkı, adjutant of the regiment (*alay emîni*) in Yemen, from there to the capital on 13 August 1895. He wrote that Ahmed Feyzi, the Governor of Yemen, and the *Emir* of Mecca had together established a secret alliance with the British state, and that Ahmed Sıra'î Pasha, the Municipal Chief of Hudeybe was with them in this matter, and that they were in an attempt to revolt against the state. The secretary (*ser-kâtib*) Tahsin says in the communication he sent to the Yıldız Palace regarding the issue that the matter will be investigated with Ahmed Ratib Pasha, the *Vali* and Commander of Hijaz.³⁷⁷

In the documents we have discussed above, we saw how the *Emir* and the *Vali* in the Hijaz reflect the conflict between them to the center. It should not be doubted that the sources of their struggle with each other are many; yet, the claims they use in order to shake each other's grounds for legitimacy and to cause the other party to lose the favor of the center are similar. One very prominent argument used

³⁷⁶ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 32/87, 1313.S.25 (17 Ağustos 1895).

³⁷⁷ BOA, İ. HUS, 118, 1313.S.21 (13 Ağustos 1895).

commonly is that their jurisdiction is being transgressed. The *Emirs* argued that rights and privileges that had long belonged to them were being taken away, the *Valis* complained of the *Emirs* interfering in matters of the *Vilayet*. Both complained that the other party did not perform the duties that fell upon them, and claimed that he did not cooperate. From this last point, we can infer that in this “dual government” in the Hijaz, the areas over which the *Emir* and the *Vali* had jurisdiction were actually defined, even if vaguely. The problem lay in the transgression of these jurisdictional boundaries in some matters, and their becoming disputed.

Even if the Ottoman central government was convinced that the conflict between these local authorities could be solved through the better definition of the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the *Emir* and the *Vali*, we don't see it take significant measures for this. In the face of the conflict, we see the center writing repetitively to warn the *Vilayet* and the *Emaret* for them to seek cooperation and govern in coordination through consultation with each other. Against these warnings of the central government, the *Emir* and the *Vali* made peace a couple of times, but these did not last long and they continued to send complaints against each other. At this point, the center sent high ranking officers to the Hijaz in order to investigate the situation. The last resolve was to change the *Vali* or the *Emir*, and at this point we see that it was more often than not the *Vali* who was replaced.

Cooperation between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet*:

Seeing the relation between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet* always as one of tension, would not be sufficient to explain the complex relations between the social and political actors in the Hijaz. Especially, since the organization of the Hajj, which

is the source of all livelihood in the Hijaz, is in the hands of the *Emir*, it is natural that the *Emir* was at the center of all economic activity here. Due to the great authority the *Emir* had in terms of appointments and organization related to the Hajj, *Mutavvif* guides and camel brokers, and merchants such as those involved in shipping and other areas related to the pilgrimage, had gathered around him. But since such a network would not function smoothly without the will of the other holder of civil and military authority in the Hijaz, who was the *Vali*, we see that the *Emir* was very often successful in integrating the *Vali* into this network. The acquiring of local economic gain by the *Vali* was not something new for the Ottoman practice of governorship; historically a *vali* was never a civil servant cut-off from local economic dynamics, getting paid solely by the center to perform a well-defined set of administrative functions. His involvement at this local level should not surprise us.

A large part of this social network of economic gain around the *Emir* was a very extended and even monopolistic shipping pool. It involved all the economic interests of all classes and sorts of people in the Hijaz, and it demonstrates how the economic life of the province was centered around the *Emir* and his organization of the Hajj. The shipping consortium coordinated by the *valis* and the *Emirs* as well as the limiting of competition among pilgrim guides and brokers were all examples of the interaction between the ruling elite, including the *Vali* and the *Emir*, with the merchant class.³⁷⁸ In 1883 a shipping pool was formed that set the prices of transporting pilgrims and divided resulting profits among its members. The founders of the pool included the Consul of the Netherlands and the Jidda agent for the Ocean Steamship Company. This group promised to pay the *Emir* for every pilgrim they

³⁷⁸ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.101.

transported to the Straits of Malacca and Java. In return, the *Emir* ruled that the pilgrim guides should be Ottoman citizens, over whom he could use enough pressure to orient the pilgrims according to the requests of the pool.

The *Emir* also was able to stop the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jidda if they did not book passage with members of this shipping pool. The pilgrim brokers and the camel brokers would not guide or transport these pilgrims. As a result, ticket prices doubled. Extra profit was allocated among the *Emir*, guides and camel brokers and the individual members of the pool.

This arrangement lasted until 1888 when the *Emir* attempted to extend the pool's monopoly on shipping Javanese and Malayan pilgrims to those pilgrims going to India. The chief *mutavvif* was instructed that no Indian pilgrim could leave Mecca for Jidda without having already booked in Mecca his return passage to India with a member of the pool. Accordingly, the ticket price rose as much as 60 percent. However, *Vali Nâfiz Pasha* and one of the members of the previous arrangement were left out in this new scheme. The *Vali* attempted to abolish the shipping pool; but he could not manage to do this since he was dismissed, thanks to the *Emir*'s friends in *İstanbul*. The Indian pool was constituted to include the *Emir*, *Ömer Nasif* (his agent, *mu'âvin*) and *Abdullah Benaja*, the agent of Ocean Steamship Company. *Ömer Nasif* and *Abdullah Benaja* were the members of the two most prominent Ottoman Muslim merchant families of the Hijaz, namely, the Banajas and the Nasifs. The Nasifs were the agents of the *Emir* in Jidda. *Ömer Nasif* had become the *Emir*'s agent in 1873. He was a member of the administrative council. In 1882 he was honored by the Sultan. *Ferik Osman Pasha* wrote to the palace in 1882 informing that there has been a request to increase the grade of the civil rank *Ömer Nasif Efendi*, the director-general of the *Emirate* for Jidda from the second grade of the first rank to

the first grade of the first rank. Ömer Nasif was the most prominent among the Ottoman merchants in Jidda. As he was also previously in charge of the affairs of Şerif Abdullah Pasha and helped greatly those soldiers and officials who came to and went away from Jidda, the *Ferik* saw his promotion to be in order.³⁷⁹

However, the same Ömer Nasif was accused by Said Fehmi, the Deputy Governor to the Hijaz (*Vilâyet Kâ'immakâmı*) in 1883 for inciting the tribesmen and creating tensions between the people of Jidda and foreign nationals.³⁸⁰ He was then arrested and condemned to fifteen years in prison and was transferred to the capital but managed to receive an imperial pardon with the help of his protector Ahmed Esad Efendi in İstanbul.³⁸¹ Ahmed Esad, who held the post of *Feraşet-i Şerife Vekili* (Sweeper of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina) was one of the notable Arab dignitaries around Sultan Abdülhamid. His post entailed residence in İstanbul, giving him an opportunity to exercise influence as an intermediary between central government and Hijazis.³⁸² He was a notable from Medina and was said to be influential among the tribes of the northern Hijaz. Sultan Abdülhamid trusted him with a number of sensitive and confidential missions to Egypt during and after the Egyptian crisis of 1881-1882.³⁸³ He was influential, and we also see Ahmed Esad Efendi's involvement in other interesting cases in Hijaz. As for the Abdullah Banaja, he was one of the major merchants in Jidda and he loaned large amounts of money to the provincial government and employed agents in İstanbul and Cairo.³⁸⁴

³⁷⁹ BOA, Y. PRK. ASK, 10/44, 1299.S.21 (12 Ocak 1882).

³⁸⁰ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 6/34, 1301.S.9 (10 Aralık 1883).

³⁸¹ BOA, Yıldız Perakende Arzuhal ve Jurnaller (Y. PRK. AZJ), 16/13, 1307.Ra.13 (8 Kasım 1889).

³⁸² Tufan Buzpınar, "Abdulhamid II, Islam and the Arabs: The Cases of Syria and the Hijaz (1878-1882)," Ph.D. Diss. (Manchester University, 1991) p. 102.

³⁸³ *ibid.*, p.103.

As we said, at times the *Vali* was part of the shipping pool, too. In 1893

Vali Hasan Hilmi Pasha rejected the oppositions of the British Consul with respect to the monopoly of shipping and keeping Indian pilgrims behind, until they buy tickets from the shipping pool. The *Vali* responded to complaints by saying that the pool was now customary, and therefore allowable. He sent presents and bribes to officials in İstanbul, in order to make them overlook the pool. Hasan Hilmi's chief protector in İstanbul who was also a friend of the *Emir*, was a chamberlain of the Sultan. Using these connections the *Vali* and *Emir* managed to keep their arrangements untouched even against the pressures exerted by the British Ambassador on the Grand *Vezir*.³⁸⁵

We see another case of how this same group of merchants in the Hijaz makes use of the authority of the *Vilayet* and the Emaret in order to eliminate any other person who opposes their vested interests in the incident of Musa Bağdadi. In 1887 Musa Bağdadi, a notable merchant and holder of a medal of the second rank (*rutbe-i sâniye*) who was involved with trade in Jidda, had become the target of his personal enemies, the Emir of Mecca and the Governor of the Hijaz, and he was imprisoned in Jidda and then exiled to Baghdad. Musa Bağdadi relates in his personal complaint that *Kâ'immakâm* Tevfik Pasha and Ömer Nasif were involved in his imprisonment and exile. Moreover, he complains that his sons who were in Mecca were imprisoned, and that Ömer Nasif Efendi had come and tormented them at will and made them sign and seal some fake deeds.³⁸⁶ We do not know why Musa Bağdadi gained the personal enmity of the *Emir* and the *Vali*. But the fact that Ömer Nasif is also involved in this, and that he imprisons Bağdadi's sons and makes them sign documents makes us think that Musa Bağdadi was not wanted in the Hijaz by the

³⁸⁴ BOA, Y. MTV, 290/112, 1324.Ş.29 (17 Ekim 1906).

³⁸⁵ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.103.

³⁸⁶ BOA, Y. MTV, 27/58, 1304.Za.26 (15 Ağustos 1887).

monopolistic alliance between the *Emaret*, *Vilayet* and Ottoman Muslim merchants in the Hijaz.

In the same document the Imperial *Aid de Camp* (*Yaver-i Ekrem*) Ahmed/Hamdi Bey relates that he personally witnessed when he was the Governor of Hijaz, the *Emir* distanced certain important people and notables in the Hijaz from the imperial government through various ill treatments and actions, as he did in the case of Musa Bağdadi. Ahmed Bey says that he later advised Safvet Pasha who became governor about these attitudes of the *Emir* and told him to prevent such things.

Musa Bağdadi was exiled to Baghdad when he was paying five hundred *kuruş* in customs tax every year and being beneficial to the state treasury. Again, according to the information from *Şeyh Abdülkadir Ahir* from among the teachers of the *Harem* (*Harem-i Şerif müderrislerinden*), an individual named Ahmed Fakih from among the *imams* of the *Harem* was exiled to Egypt, and in the same manner, about fifteen *şerifs* were exiled to various places. It is reported that many notables and *şerifs* who saw this became scared and wary of the situation and escaped to India.

It is said in the document that, as every year in the Hajj season, it is apparent that Muslims from all over the world who come and congregate in Mecca and as these all will witness the government and mercy of the Exalted Caliphate (*Hilafet-i Seniyye*), it is a hazardous situation, internally and externally, for the notables of such a holy land not to have security of life and property and for them to be insulted. Thus, it is stated, the *Vali* and the *Emir* should not be allowed any longer to penalize anyone without trial and contrary to just reason. On a separate note, reference is made to the cooperation and corruption of the Governor and the *Emir* that we

addressed above. It is said that the excessive raise in the camel and steamboat fees for many pilgrims coming from India and Java that has been going on for some years have to be stopped and their being robbed by the *Emir* and Governor through the agency of sheikhs of pilgrim guides should be prevented.³⁸⁷

The translation of an article that appeared in the Indian newspaper called *Şemsü'l-İhbar*, concerning the oppression and injustices done to Indian pilgrims by the *Emir* along with camel brokers and quarantine officials was submitted to the Sultan. It gives us an idea about the Indian perspective on how the political authorities in the Hijaz secured a profitable business through Hajj at the expense of the pilgrims. It also indicates, however, that the center was not irrelevant to what was going on in the Hijaz, especially when it hurt claims to a role of Caliph. The article says that: People around His Highness Abdülhamid Han, the *Padişah* of the Islamic world, who influence him and who are against religion and state, do not submit report that do not concern their personal interests to His Highness. So the Sultan is not aware of the difficulties that pilgrims in Mecca and Medina continue to endure.³⁸⁸

According to the article, first of all, the camel fee that is forcefully taken from the pilgrims is excessive, and this is disregarded by the local government (meaning *Vilayet*). The camel brokers are tied to the will of the *Emir* anyway, and the chief of the Indian Pilgrims (*Şeyhü'l-hunûd*), the tribal chiefs and the pilgrimage guides (*mutavvif ve deliller*) are all the *Emir*'s men, and they all serve his interest in all issues. The money and property appropriated from the pilgrims is shared among these men. The poor pilgrims are left having to rent camels through the agency of

³⁸⁷ BOA, Y. MTV, 27/58, 1304.Za.26 (15 Ağustos 1887).

³⁸⁸ BOA, Yıldız Perakende Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği (Y. PRK. TKM), 28/68, 1310.Z.29 (14 Temmuz 1893).

these men, for fifty to sixty *riyals* per camel. Out of this, only twenty stays with the camel broker, and the rest is shared among the *Emir* and his men.³⁸⁹

Secondly, the person who is to be chief of the Indian Pilgrims (*Şeyhü'l-hunûd*), is appointed by the *Emir*, but convention states that this post should be given to an émigré (*muhâcir*) from India. Yet, the current *Şeyhü'l-hunûd* is an Egyptian slave, and he does not understand the language and customs of Indians.³⁹⁰ This person, who takes bribes and robs Muslims, cheats pilgrims who do not speak Arabic out of their money, and on top of this, as mandated by the regulations enacted by the *Emir*, he takes a *riyal* from each pilgrim. Further, the property left behind by the pilgrims who die far away from their homes and their families is taken to the house of the *Emir*. When these are requested by the family, many difficulties are raised, and after expenses and deductions, nothing is left from among their money and valuables, only their clothes are returned. Thirdly, the *Emir* issues certain permit papers, and takes five *riyals* in exchange. Anyone without a permit is arrested. Fourthly, the quarantine centers that are set up in Kamran and Jidda are operated like prisons and torture houses. The quarantine officials, in many ways, rob the pilgrims and they do not let them go unless they extort money.³⁹¹

The policy adopted by the Ottoman government in the face of such pieces that appeared in Indian newspapers about how Indian pilgrims are being charged excessive prices and how they are subject to various injustices and in face of complaints from the British Embassy, was one that supported the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet*. The Ottoman government believed that foreigners were on the watch out for

³⁸⁹ BOA, Y. PRK. TKM, 28/68, 1310.Z.29 (14 Temmuz 1893). Also see: BOA, Y. PRK. AZN, 11/52, 1312.L.10 (6 Nisan 1895).

³⁹⁰ BOA, Y. PRK. TKM, 28/68, 1310.Z.29 (14 Temmuz 1893). Also see: BOA, Y. PRK. AZN, 11/52, 1312.L.10 (6 Nisan 1895).

³⁹¹ BOA, Y. PRK. TKM, 28/68, 1310.Z.29 (14 Temmuz 1893).

an opportunity to intervene in the issues of the Hijaz, by putting such complaints forward as excuse. For the Ottoman state, the intervention of foreigners in the Hijaz was unacceptable, as it was “evident that the work of the administration of the holy land of Hijaz, which was the place of origin of Islam could not ever be compared to the considerations put forward by foreign states citing certain Imperial provinces”,³⁹² and it was necessary to prevent even the slightest intervention in the Hijaz.

Neither was the government of the point of view that the policy applications that the pilgrims faced in the Hijaz were all unjust. According to the government, since there was no agriculture or industry in the Hijaz, the population had to live for a year on whatever they could earn guiding the pilgrims, providing accommodation and provisions for them as well as on the charity that the pilgrims gave them. As the money they gained through selling merchandise or through rent was a mutually consented and agreed contract between the parties, it was not the place of the government to intervene in this. Moreover, the government could certainly not engage in action such as the prohibition of alms (*zakat*), as that would mean, in practice, to prevent the people from performing their canonical duties.³⁹³

In a document dated 7 November 1889, we find hints that the network in the Hijaz that we make mention of and which also extends into İstanbul, going much beyond its transportation monopoly serves some political purposes as well. One person from among the *şerifs* of Mecca (whose name was admittedly illegible for us in the document), when he came to İstanbul on personal business, wanted to give information about the conditions of Mecca. According to his account, *Emir*

³⁹² “Neht-i İslamiyet olan kit’a-ı mübareke-i Hicaziye umur-ı idaresi hakkında duvel-i ecnebiyece bir takım mutala’at dermeyan kılınan bazı vilayat-ı Şahaneye asla mukayyes olmadığı bedihidir”

³⁹³ BOA, Y. EE, 5/59, 1323.R.9 (13 Haziran 1905).

Avnürrefik has strayed into certain ill-thoughts, contrary to the will of the imperial government. He has had correspondence with Britain through the English translator in Jidda, a man of Jewish origin by the name Yusuf Kudsi; and has started buying guns and ammunition. Further, he states that Safvet Pasha overlooked the actions of the *Emir*.³⁹⁴

The account says that the person who had established an alliance between Safvet Pasha and the *Emaret* was Ömer Nasif. The *Emir* got hold of about two thousand Martini rifles, with the aid of the Englishman Finder Calis (?), Egypt's agent in Jidda the Frenchman Nicola Mederos (?), *Seyyid* Abdülmuhsin Efendi who is Ahmed Esad Efendi's son, and Abdullah Benaji and Ömer Nasif. These guns and ammunitions were unloaded at an unused pier at two hours distance from Jidda in the direction of Yemen, and were brought secretly to the office of the *Emir* on camels, with the assistance of the Bedouin sheikh Hamid bin Şehvan Es-Salibi and his men.³⁹⁵

The *şerif* making the claims reports that the *Emir* had also forced him to participate in these secret affairs, and when he did not yield, had become angry and forced him to resign and at the end, dismissed him. The *Emir* had not stopped at that, and had had him imprisoned in the *Emaret* office for a long time. Yet when his brothers warned the *Vali* many times that they will complain of this unfounded imprisonment to the Sultan, he was released. The *Emir* had even wanted the execution of this person, because he was afraid of his secret dealings being reported.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁴ BOA, Y. PRK. AZJ, 16/13, 1307.Ra.13 (8 Kasım 1889).

³⁹⁵ BOA, Y. PRK. AZJ, 16/13, 1307.Ra.13 (8 Kasım 1889).

³⁹⁶ BOA, Y. PRK. AZJ, 16/13, 1307.Ra.13 (8 Kasım 1889).

Relations between the *Emaret* and the Imperial Center:

Above, we discussed, looking at the nature of the relationship between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet*, how the *foci* of power operate in the Hijaz and how they cooperate in the context of local interests. Here, we will dwell on the relations of the central government with the *şerifs* and its attitudes towards the *şerifs*, who were a notable family who held authority in the Hijaz, even if they had to share it with the *Vali*. Many of our secondary sources assert that Ottoman rule did not bring any specific organization to the *Emaret* of Mecca. Yet, in the relations of the Ottoman state with the *Emaret*, and in the place the Ottoman center assigned to the *Emaret* as a part of the Empire, there were actually boundaries that it would not allow to be transgressed. The Ottoman center had outlined a wide frame in which the *Emirs* could act in, and in this, there was first of all the expectations from the *şerifs* regarding the organization of the Hajj and the control of the Bedouins as duties entrusted to the *Emaret*, and most important of all, the recognition of Ottoman sovereignty and Caliphate.

This was the way in which the *şerifs* as a notable family whose presence and legitimacy in the area were accepted, whose presence dated to times prior to Ottoman rule and who dominated the social and economic life in the Hijaz, and furthermore, who had a spiritual identity to which the Ottomans showed respect were integrated into the Ottoman imperial system. Yet the frame the Ottomans had outlined in their relations with the *Emaret* of Mecca also were an expression of the fact that sovereignty, when all is said and done, belonged to the Ottoman Sultan.

The first condition of the boundaries of authority which the *Emirs* could not transgress was that the *Emirs* were not permitted to transform themselves into a hereditary dynasty, as with the examples of the Khedives of Egypt. We see that the *Emirs* of Mecca at times tried to assure that the *Emaret* will be passed on to their sons after them. *Emir* Muhammed ibn ‘Avn, for example, did everything in order to secure his son Abdullah’s position as the subsequent *Emir* of Mecca; Abdullah was sent to İstanbul, and he led the pilgrim caravans from Mecca to Medina and acted as the Deputy Governor of Mecca.³⁹⁷

Yet in the period of our study, especially *Emir* Avnürrefik entertained the wish to become a dynasty. The complaints that were sent to İstanbul about the *Emir* alleged that *Emir* Avnürrefik was saying openly that the *Emaret* should be given to him in a hereditary manner where it will pass from father to son, or that the *Emaret* should be abolished and an autonomous administration (*idare-i muhtare*) should be established in its place.³⁹⁸ The *Emir* had also made his wishes for his son to succeed him in the post known to the center. In a letter written by *Emir* Avnürrefik to the Sultan through the palace secretariat, dated 21 May 1894, the *Emir* shows his gratitude for his presence at the post which he has by now occupied for 12 years. After praising the Sultan and his favors to him, praising Abdülhamid as the Caliph and the leader of the believers, expressing his loyalty and telling that he makes great effort to have the name of the Sultan read out in the holy places (as a sign of his sovereignty), Avnürrefik asks for something out of the ordinary. He proposes his son Şerif Muhammed Abdulaziz Bey should be allowed as to take over his humble post as deputy.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁷ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.134.

³⁹⁸ BOA, Y. PRK. AZJ, 16/13, 1307.Ra.13 (8 Kasım 1889).

The attitude of the Palace in this regard was clearly stated in a strict tone.

It points out that the matter was considered directly by the Sultan, and that the Sultan also inquired into the *Emir's* service with dignitaries, and found it to be praiseworthy. The document, with this imposing yet respectful tone, quickly moves to point out that *Emir's* sons and progeny (*ahfâd ü evlâd-ı Emâret-penâhîleri*) would share a part of the Emirate in accordance with their worthiness, yet that the *Emaret* resembles no other office, and that its being changed into a hereditary position would be against the *shari'a* and against the *ber'at* that appoints the *Emir* in the first place.⁴⁰⁰

Thus, it is tacitly reminded that it is the Sultan's prerogative to chose the *Emir*. But, at the same time we see the Palace affirm that the *şerifs* as a family hold this particular sovereignty as it is from this family that the Sultan chooses and the *Emir's* progeny would have a part in the institution. In a respectful but also firm fashion, the fact that the response was the Sultan's personal reasoning is underlined at length.⁴⁰¹

Another document summarizes the attitude the Ottoman center had towards the choosing and the deposing of the *Emirs*. As the state was not restricted to any particular principle of succession such as inheritance or seniority or any other distinctive condition, it was sovereign to appoint the most convenient and competent one from among the *şerifs*, whoever he may be. But since the *şerifs* numbered many, it was deemed permissible for those from among the young who are appropriate for

³⁹⁹ BOA, Y. MTV, 96/22, 1311.Za.17 (21 Mayıs 1894).

⁴⁰⁰ BOA, A. MKT. UM, 20/14, 1266.Ş.15 (26 June 1850).

⁴⁰¹ BOA, A. MKT. UM, 20/14, 1266.Ş.15 (26 June 1850).

the position to be prepared for it in the meanwhile.⁴⁰² In this way, the holder of sovereignty was the Ottoman Sultan who decided who will be the *Emir*, who deputized authority to him and who was able to depose him when necessary.

Another one of the limits we mention appears with the command of the military forces in the Hijaz. The most important duty of the *Vilayet* which was also the greatest source of its authority was that it held the command of the Ottoman forces in the Hijaz. The *Emir* had his own military force, consisting of mercenaries financed by the *Emaret*, and functioning both as a police force and as the *Emir's* personal body guard. The *Emir* was held as responsible as the *Vali* for the providing of security in the Hijaz. In face of revolts of Bedouin tribes, the *Emir* responded in command of Ottoman regular forces along with the forces he gathered from rival tribes.

Moreover, the Ottoman government obtained the help of the *Emirs* of Mecca in their regional campaigns. In 1849, *Emir* Muhammed ibn 'Avn helped in the reconquest of coastal Yemen. He influenced the Âsiri tribe to cooperate with Ottoman forces. Again, *Emir* Muhammed was successful in his campaign against the Sa'udis; he secured the Sa'udi recognition of Ottoman sovereignty and their payment of tribute.⁴⁰³ A policy of expansionism in the Red Sea was adopted by the Ottomans since expansion elsewhere did not exist, and there was the threat of European powers. The *Emirs* of Mecca helped Ottomans in this matter. In 1864-1865 *Emir* Abdullah commanded in person a mixed Ottoman-Bedouin force and successfully reclaimed northern Âsır. In the 1870's, all of Âsır and Yemen was absorbed. In

⁴⁰² BOA, Yıldız Perakende Müfettişlik ve Komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y. PRK. MK), 4/42,1306.Ra.23 (27 Kasım 1888): "Devlet Şeriflerin azl ü nasbında evladiyet ve ekberiyet gibi bir riayet-i silsileye veyahud sair suretle vıkaye-i şerait-i mutemayizeye mecbur ve ol babda bir kayd ile mukayyed olmadıgından şürefadan en ehven ve işe gelen kangısı ise anın nasbında muhtardır. Şürefa ise pek çok olduğundan küçüklerden münasiplerinin makam-ı mezkur için bir yandan ihzar buyrulması dahi variddir.

⁴⁰³ Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p.135.

central Arabia, the *Emir* of Mecca helped Ottomans to check the power of the Sa‘udis. In northern Hijaz, Rashidis were brought under control by means of the *Emir*.⁴⁰⁴

After 1909, a new power arose in Âsir. The Idrisis, under the leadership of Muhammed al-Idrisi, increasingly became powerful in Âsir, and this resulted in the submission of two powerful tribes of *Ghamid* and *Zahran* who had previously been under the jurisdiction of the *Emirs* of Mecca. Also, al-Idrisi attempted to collect taxes in Lith which had always been part of the Hijaz.⁴⁰⁵ Idrisi emerged as a powerful rival to the *Emir* of Mecca within the region; on the other hand he had revolted against the Ottomans as well. Ottoman forces were sent as reinforcement to the *Emir* of Mecca, and this helped him in his fight against the Idrisis.⁴⁰⁶ The *Emir* was by fighting a rebellious power in the area who opposed Ottoman sovereignty, and thus helping the stabilization of Ottoman sovereignty in the area.

Yet, the Ottoman government had allowed military forces to be under the command of the *Emir* only temporarily, and had refused any absolute command of his over Ottoman forces. The command of military forces in the Hijaz was authority that belonged to the *Vali*. We see how the Ottoman center explains this principle in one exemplary document. When the *Emir* of Mecca requested that the camel and horse cavalry gendarmerie within the province should be under his orders, saying that he was already making use of these gendarmes who came with the Âsir mobilization as auxiliary troops, and that the current condition necessitated that these troops should be under his orders, the Ministry of War did not find it appropriate for

⁴⁰⁴ *ibid.*, pp.160-162.

⁴⁰⁵ Al-‘Amr, “The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914”. p.150.

⁴⁰⁶ BOA, Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi (DH. MUI), 1-9/48, 1328.R.20 (1 Mayıs 1910).

the gendarmes to be under the absolute control of the *Emir*. The answer that was given followed that governors are responsible for providing the safety and security of places they are stationed, and otherwise, they are held responsible. If the authority and power of the *Vali*, who is the greatest administrative official in the Hijaz, is removed over the local gendarmes, this will contradict the principle of responsibility. Furthermore, if the special circumstances of the Hijaz are to be considered, this situation calls for attention. The *Emir* of Mecca can make use of the gendarmes as auxiliary forces whenever he wants, as in the Âsır case. With all these reasons, the *Emir* was not allowed to establish an absolute authority over the gendarmes.⁴⁰⁷

Another point that deserves our attention in terms of the Ottoman attitude towards the *Emaret*, and in general towards the *şerifs* of Mecca, is the deep respect that is shown this family due to their ancestry. The center repeatedly cautioned *valis* to act towards the *şerifs* and their leader the *Emir* in the framework of a definite respect and reverence. This was because they held a position much different from other local notable families throughout the Empire who were charged with authority in a variety of ways, as the *şerifs* had a much different spiritual identity. We can understand how a special respect had to be shown to the *şerifs* from an example where the *Vali* of Jidda had to negotiate a disagreement between *şerifs*. In 1850 Abdullah Pasha, son of *Emir* Muhammed ibn ‘Avn attacked with soldiers the residence of *Şerif* Hasan in Taif, the son of the former *Emir* Yahya, and as he was in a conduct that would hurt honor, *Şerif* Hasan and his brother made a complaint of this to the Sultan. The Governor of Jidda appreciated that what Abdullah Pasha had done was unjust and unbecoming. Yet still, as all these individuals come from a fine line, rather than bringing the matter to court, it would be more appropriate to mediate

⁴⁰⁷BOA, Dahiliye İdari Kısım Belgeleri (DH. ID), 138-2/142, 1330.C.19 (5 Haziran 1912).

for peace between them. As *Şerif* Hasan had gone to Egypt after all that happened, the *Vali* went after him for this purpose, and convinced him to return to Mecca with himself. Peace was made between Abdullah Pasha and *Şerif* Hasan in Mecca, and the incident was thus concluded.⁴⁰⁸

The *Emirs* of Mecca were not reluctant in complaining of *Valis* and lesser officials they had problems with to the Sultan, and asking for their replacement. Many times, the *Emirs* were able to realize such demands. We run into incidents where the officials who were matter of complaint were removed to some place in Anatolia for a while, and then returned back to their posts after a short while. Disciplinary action was taken especially about officials who were claimed to be disrespectful towards the *Emir* or who offended him. One such case in a document dated 9 January 1876 says that *Emir* Abdullah had complained to the Grand *Vezir*'s Office about the former Guardian of the Medina Fortress (*Medine Muhâfizi*) Mehmed Pasha. He is said to have been disrespectful to him. After handing over the guard, Mehmed Pasha had come to Mecca in order to perform the Hajj; yet he had not visited the *Emir* in Mecca, nor in Arafat or in Mina. He had even not gone to the *Vali* Pasha. Thinking that Mehmed Pasha's cold reply "I have not gone because I did not want to become a huge burden" (*vâdî-yi ta'cîz olmak istemediğimden gitmedim*) to the aid which the *Emir* sent might indicate some sense of having been offended, the *Emir* says he wanted to restore relations and please him. Yet, the *Emir* reports that upon the investigation that he conducted, he found out that Mehmed Pasha had said some inappropriate words about him.

The answer sent to *Emir* Abdullah on 11 January 1876 stated that Mehmed Pasha would be questioned upon his arrival in İstanbul as he had not shown

⁴⁰⁸ BOA, İ. DH, 12033, 1266.Ra.16 (30 Ocak 1850).

completely all the endless respect due the Household of Prophetic lineage, and caused lamentation on the part of the *Emir* by this disrespect.⁴⁰⁹

An even more interesting example was the incident of a group of officials who had had certain complaints about the *Emir* and had telegraphed the capital about this being removed from office. On 19 October 1909, a telegram was sent from Jidda to the Ministry of the Interior by the *Kâ'immakâm* (District Governor) Şefik, in the name of the officers there. In the telegram, it was stated that Şerif Hüseyin, the *Emir* of Mecca was engaged in acts that pushed the limits of lawfulness, and it was said that he had to be replaced. In the communiqué that the Ministry of the Interior wrote to the Ministry of War, it is said that, in the face of his noble lineage, the *Emir* found respect, dignity and rank all over the Islamic lands, and especially in the Arabian Peninsula. It continued that such a disrespect coming from an officer writing in the name of officers will cause very bad effects in the Hijaz. Therefore, it is demanded in the document that legal procedure be started against those whose names are on the telegram.

As a result of the ensuing investigation, it was decided that the Gunner Lieutenant Major (*Topçu Kolağası*) Hurşid Efendi, who had also previously been involved in similar dealings in Medina and who had been removed from there, Şefik Bey the District Governor, and the Lieutenant Major Doctor Sadık Efendi were to be recalled to İstanbul to be court-martialed. In addition, the removal from the Hijaz of the Police Commissar Refik Efendi, who was found as an accomplice in the event, was decided.⁴¹⁰ He was indeed recalled and court-martialed, and upon the decision

⁴⁰⁹BOA, A. MKT. MHM, 479/68, 1293.M.16 (11 Şubat 1876): “Hanedan-ı celilül-ünvanı siyadet-penahilerine aid ve labüd olan ihtiramatın tamamî-i ifasına riayet bais-i saadet iken müşarünileyhin ol vech ile hakk-ı ali-i haşimanelerinde göstermiş olduğu vaz’ u hareket layıksız bulunup taraf-ı aciziye dahi bais-i telehhüf olmasıyla dersaadet’e vusulünde hakkında tevbihat-ı lazime icrasına müsaraat olunacağı”

here, it was found inappropriate for him to be employed in Mecca any longer, and it was decided that he was to be sent somewhere in Anatolia.⁴¹¹

In the document sent from the General Command (*Erkân-ı Harbiye Dairesi*) to the Ministry of the Interior, it is said that it is natural for litigation to have taken place against the police commissar. It is said however, that the complaints expressed in the telegram sent by the officers was indeed alarming enough to raise attention.⁴¹² Thus, we see that the Ottoman central government saw the sending of a telegram of such a tone about the *Emir* as disrespect to his spiritual identity and his lineage and penalized the senders. Yet at the same time, it did not disregard the content of the complaints. The respect shown to the *Emirs* due to their lineage and due to their function as the organizers of the Hajj, was in a way a necessary outgrowth of the post-*Tanzimat* Ottoman ideology, where the Ottomanism of the Tanzimat had left its place to a predominantly Islamic Ottoman identity and ideology.⁴¹³ This had given the *Emirs* a status in hierarchy, which the status of any other notable family in the Empire could not compare to.

All this rank the Ottomans had bestowed upon the *Emirs*, the respect and privileged treatment they showed to their spiritual identity, and all the power that was delegated to them, did not change the point that sovereignty belonged in the Hijaz, as a last word, with the Ottoman Sultan. What was expected from the *Emirs* was the acceptance of this sovereignty with all its symbolic indications. In a ciphered message which Acting Governor Emin Bey wrote to the Ministry of the Interior on

⁴¹⁰ BOA, DH. MUI, 12-3/19, 1328.R.19 (19 Nisan 1910).

⁴¹¹ BOA, Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti (DH. EUM. MH), 15/12, 1328.R.9 (20 Nisan 1910).

⁴¹² BOA, DH. MUI, 12-3/19, 12-3/19, 1328.R.19 (19 Nisan 1910).

⁴¹³ See above: section entitled: The Ottoman Caliphate, Its Historical Development and Its Significance in the 19th Century in Chapter II. See also: Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains*, p.47.

28 April 1910, he reports that the *Emir* of Mecca and his entourage were not present at the congratulation meeting, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sultan's accession, that is customarily held in the government office, and they had sufficed casually with only having the *Müftî* say a prayer. According to the Acting *Vali*, Commander Abdullah Pasha had also ignored this act of the *Emir* and had sided with him. The Ministry of the Interior, upon this news, wrote to the Ministry of War, and asked for the issue to be investigated clandestinely with Abdullah Pasha.⁴¹⁴

In such a symbolic relation, the *Emir's* not participating in the accession anniversary ceremonies of the Sultan in the expected way may have been interpreted as his not accepting the Sultan's sovereignty or as disrespect. There were *Emirs*, during the long history of the *Emaret* under Ottoman rule, who rose against the orders of the center and rebelled, and in this sense who did not accept the Ottoman claim of sovereignty. But the *Sharifian* family's maintaining the Sultan as the highest judge in the rivalry they continued among themselves in the Hijaz and their taking refuge in his justice in general, shows their submission to the Sultan's sovereignty and also shows that this notable family was integrated in the Ottoman system.

Some prominent *şerifs* in 1881, saying that their lands were appropriated by the *Emir* of Mecca had petitioned the Sultan "in request of the removal of these oppressions and for Imperial justice, as they themselves are oppressed and saddened subjects from the clean lineage of the Prophet and are prayers for is Highness our Lord"⁴¹⁵ In 1892, *Emir* Avnürrefik's nephews *Şerif* Ali and *Şerif* Hüseyin, saying that the *Emir* had threatened them sought refuge from the Sultan writing "our condition has been hurt due to the *Emir's* actions. We are of the descendants of the Prophet of

⁴¹⁴ BOA, DH. MUI, 90/41, 1328.R.17 (28 Nisan 1910).

⁴¹⁵ BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 4/49, 1298.L.13 (7 Eylül 1881): "kendileri nesl-i pak-i cenab-ı peygamberîden ve veli-nimet-i bi-minnetimiz efendimiz hazretlerinin daiyanından ve mazlum ve makdur tebalarından bulunduklarından bahisle ol babda ref'-i mezalim ve adalet-i seniyyeyi istirhamen"

God who are prayers for His Highness the Sultan, the Asylum of the Caliphate; we have no power to endure any longer, come to our aid.”⁴¹⁶

In considering the Ottoman attitude towards the *Emaret*, let us finally consider thoughts on the abolition of the *Emaret*. Some Ottoman bureaucrats had at times seriously proposed to abolish the *Emaret* in the Hijaz in order to get rid of the many problems it caused there. Yet, we see that the Sultan, as the holder of Ottoman sovereignty and thus as the possessor of Islamic legitimacy and that of the post of caliphate and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, never attempted such an undertaking which would wholly disturb the balance of affairs in the Hijaz and the holy places.

We know about how Osman Nuri, during his *vilayet*, sent memoranda that related how the *Emaret* had to be threatened Osman Nuri was mentioning the limiting of powers in the hand of the *Emaret* to such a degree that this would mean that all power would lie in the hands of the *Vali* and the *Emir* would only hold a symbolic status as a high dignitary.⁴¹⁷

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, the Extraordinary Commissar for Egypt, went further than this, and wanted the *Emaret* to be completely abolished. In a communication he sent to the palace on 27.November.1888, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha starts by saying that he feels it his responsibility and a part of his loyalty to let the Sultan know about some important matters which, although are not part of his official assignment, had come to his attention. He says that he became informed about the affairs of the Hijaz through the agency of pilgrims, as a part of the pilgrims pass through Egypt on their way to and from the Hajj. According to the reports he

⁴¹⁶ BOA, Y. PRK. BŞK, 28/29, 1310.R.24 (15 Kasım 1892): “Emirin hareketinden halimiz muzdaribdir, biz Resulullah’ın Zat-ı Humayun-i Cenab-i Hilafet-penahilerine mevdu’ evlad ü ahfadındaniz. Tahammule iktidarımız kalmadı, imdadımıza yetişin”

⁴¹⁷ Abu-Manneh, “Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)”, p.11.

has received, there are many misuses of office in the Hijaz under the administration of *Emir* Avnürrefik Pasha. According to Ahmed Muhtar Pasha the Hijaz *Vali* no longer had any influence or dignity left, and as he acted under the influence of some people with vested interests that are on the side of the *Emir*, local government was in a state of complete chaos. He was sure that, if the fact of the matter is looked into, it would be understood that the rumors have truth to them, even if they turn out to be exaggerated slightly.⁴¹⁸

Ahmed Muhtar Pasha goes on to relate the impressions he gained of the *şerifs*, when some of them were ordered to his assistance when he was conducting a military campaign in Yemen. According to him, the *şerifs* did not have much authority over the population and the tribes due to their noble line or their being *şerifs*. As harm came rather than benefit from deeds done by the *şerifs*, he made an effort at not asking any service from any of them. According to Muhtar Pasha, if the *şerifs* have any effectiveness over the Bedouins and the people in the Hijaz, this is only because they reflect the sovereignty of the imperial government on the people; and if they were to be severed of this power, they would not have so much power as an ordinary Arab sheikh. Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was saying that this observation of his was backed by three years of experience. According to him, it would be as harmful to enlarge the authority of the *Emir* in the Hijaz as it would be beneficial to supplement the influence of the *Vali*. The Pasha continued relating that the clever, able and experienced ones among the *şerifs* are more dangerous than the naive ones inclined towards Sufism, yet that the actions of those who are really talentless also hurt the state.⁴¹⁹ In yet another document written by the Palace in 1905, we see that Ahmed Muhtar Pasha had in various dates sent multiple reports to the palace, all of

⁴¹⁸ BOA, Y. PRK. MK, 4/42, 1306.Ra.23 (27 Kasım 1888).

⁴¹⁹ BOA, Y. PRK. MK, 4/42, 1306.Ra.23 (27 Kasım 1888).

which were read by the Sultan. In all of these, briefly, he claimed that there is a lot of harm in keeping one of the *şerifs* as *Emir* in the Hijaz, and we see that he proposed the *Emir* of Mecca should be brought to İstanbul, and the government of the Hijaz should be given fully to the *Vali*.⁴²⁰

Cevded Pasha, as an experienced statesman, was asked his opinion during the reading of one of these letters of Muhtar Pasha at the audience of the Sultan. He pointed out that not only will this not have any use, but it would also be harmful, saying that it would not be appropriate in any way to take the authority of the *Emirs* who had long held it in the Hijaz, and to give it entirely to the *Vali*. Muhtar Pasha's view on the abolition of the *Emalet* was interpreted at the center as his being under the influence of the advice of some foreigners.⁴²¹

The *Emalet* was not abolished even during the Arab Revolt under *Şerif* Hüseyin in 1916. *Şerif* Ali Haydar Pasha was brought to the *Emalet* instead of *Şerif* Hüseyin. When *Emir* Ali Haydar set out for the Hijaz under conditions of war, he could only make it to Medina. He returned after a while, when he could not reach Mecca, waiting in Lebanon until the war ended. In an imperial command dated 8.May.1919, the *Emalet* of Mecca was abolished with these words: "As it has been the avenue for the occurrence of certain events against the conventions of state, the title of *Emir* of Mecca which is currently held by *Şerif* Ali Haydar Pasha has been abolished, and past practice has been deemed inexistent. The Office of the Grand *Vezir* is charged with the execution of this Imperial Command."⁴²²

⁴²⁰ BOA, Y. EE, 5/59, 1323.R.9 (13 Haziran 1905).

⁴²¹ BOA, Y. EE, 5/59, 1323.R.9 (13 Haziran 1905).

⁴²² BOA, Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları (MV), 250/161, 1337.Ş.8 (8 Mayıs 1919): "An'anât-ı devlete muhalif bazı muhaddesatın şekli-i tabiisine irca'ı mültezim olduğuna binaen şerif ali haydar paşa uhdesinde bulunan emir-i mekke unvanı ref' ve muamele-i sabıka kain-i lem yekun add edilmiştir. Bu irade-i seniyyenin icrasına sadaret memurdur."

CONCLUSION:

In this study, I examined the Emirate of Mecca, and how it was integrated into a greater Ottoman system in the second half of the 19th century. Looking at the relations between the Emirate and the Governorship of the Hijaz, I tried to understand the policy and attitude of the Ottoman central government towards the Emirate.

Hijaz was a unique province for the Ottoman Empire in many respects. The presence of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina and the annual pilgrimage, the Hajj meant it held a very important place for the Empire. Due to its geographic and climatic conditions the Hijaz did not have an agriculturally based economy and a landowning class or a peasantry engaged in the production of agricultural commodities. Also, the considerable ethnic and social diversity of the townspeople due to the presence of pilgrims and *mücâvir* émigrés led to a fragmented urban community. The fact that most of the population of the Hijaz was constituted by nomadic tribes was another determining factor in the sociopolitical structure of the Hijaz. The *ashraf* who were the descendants of Hassan, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammed were the notable families and the wealthiest members of Hijazi society. During the nineteenth century, among this ruling family, the *Emirs* of Mecca were from two of the family's many clans, namely the *Dhawi-'Awn* and the *Dhawi Zayd*.

The Hijaz was peripheral with respect to the military and financial well-being of the state; the holy cities were exempt from tax and the whole province was exempt from conscription. Instead the Hijaz was dependent upon large financial subsidies from the Ottoman government. However, the religious prestige of possession of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was valuable to the Ottoman dynasty.

The political, economic and social structure of the nineteenth century

Vilayet of Hijaz had its roots in centuries of development. The Emirate of Mecca as a political entity is rooted in early Islamic history. Thus, the sources of prestige and legitimacy of the ruling *Sharifian* family was not dependent on the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the Emirs of Mecca as local notables were different from other urban provincial notables which arose in the 18th and 19th century Arab provinces.

The Meccan *Emirs* had respect all over the Islamic world because of their lineage, as the administrators of the holy lands and as the guardians of the Ka'ba. Even before the advent of Islam, the *Hashimis* (the clan from which the prophetic lineage came from) were in charge of the duties pertaining to the organization of the pilgrimage. Thus, the legitimacy and the source of the spiritual authority of the *Emirs* of Mecca can be found both in pre-Islamic Meccan society, and in developments in Islamic history.

In evaluating the position of the Hijaz under Ottoman rule and the relations of the Empire and the Emirate, it is important to see the Emirate in its historical development. Looking at the historical conditions in which the Emirate was born and at the nature of its relations with other Islamic powers before the Ottomans who were trying to become dominant in the Islamic world, and how these managed their relations with the holy lands in order to reinforce their sovereignty, will clearly reveal that the Emirate never achieved a complete independence in the sense that it was politically and economically dependent on the subventions sent from powerful Islamic dynasties. The Emirate achieved its consolidation in a parallel development with Egypt increasing its domination over the Hijaz, and in a way institutionalizing it. For the most part, the policies the Ottomans adopted in the holy lands are not innovations but instead pose historical continuity. Thus, unlike the presumption that

informs much of the secondary literature on our subject, their being under Ottoman imperial hegemony and their being integrating into the Ottoman imperial administrative system in the Hijaz was not an anomaly that had to be thrown off for the Emirs of Mecca.

When the *Emirs* of Mecca accepted Ottoman sovereignty in 1517, the latter confirmed their position as rulers of the Hijaz. What the Sultan did ask for the mentioning of his name in the *hutba*, the safeguarding of the Hajj caravans and the demonstration of the *Emir's* loyalty. Emirate as an institution and *Emirs* as the holders of administrative power in the holy cities were kept under the Ottoman system and in a way they were Ottomanized. The *Emir* was entitled to a salary and a rank in the Ottoman official hierarchy and his duties and responsibilities were determined with an official imperial warrant. Thus in this sense, the *Emir* was not much different from the other administrative governors sent to the provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Although the legitimacy of their local authority come from pre-Ottoman sources, the actual use of this authority and its limits were dependent on imperial recognition and permission under the Ottoman imperial system.

The *Emirs* of Mecca were recognized as the sole leaders of the *Sharifian* family and the Bedouin tribes in the Hijaz and they were held responsible for controlling and maintaining the submission of the Bedouins and of the *sharifs*. The *Emirs* were entitled to the redistribution of the resources coming from the imperial government (in the form of *surre* and subventions) to the other segments of Hijazi society and thus they became the notable intermediaries between the imperial government and the Hijazi society. Their traditional role in the organization of the Hajj was also maintained under this imperial system, and this too added to their influence and importance.

The Wahhabi invasion and Mehmed Ali Pasha's following rule in the Hijaz suspended the Ottoman sovereignty and the rule of the *Emirs* in Mecca temporarily. However neither Wahhabi nor Egyptian rule did bring major and long lasting changes in the administration or the socio-economic fabric of the Hijaz. The Emirs regained their authority in the hijaz following the restoration of the Ottoman rule.

There were contextual factors which led to the increasing importance of the Hijaz for the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. With the Ottoman Sultans underlining the title of Caliph more strongly, in order to solidify legitimacy in a changing empire, to provide an identity that appeals to the subjects from an increasingly Muslim population, and in order to claim the role of protector of Muslims outside the Empire, their hold and justice in the holy lands of Islam had gained further importance. At the same time, in a context where the right of the Ottoman Sultans to the caliphate was being debated, the *Emirs* of Mecca were being put forward as a candidate to the caliphate of all Muslims instead of the Ottoman Sultans. Thus the *Emirs* of Mecca became relevant to the whole issue of Ottoman caliphal legitimacy and were recognized as a potential hazard which had to be respected but kept under check. It became more important than previously to integrate and control the *Emirs* of Mecca.

In a related manner, Britain's Indian colony increased the significance the holy sites of Islam had for them. With no less than 1500 Indian Muslims living there, and with the Hajj being a grounds for political activity, Britain decided to have a greater presence in the Hijaz. The significance of the Hijaz for Britain's overseas empire increased even more after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Moreover there was the issue of relations with the Ottoman court and the possibility of the

British inciting the *Emir* to claim the caliphate, and intervening on his behalf with naval and monetary support.

All of these factors which increased the importance of the Hijaz, resulted in the central government's attempt to establish a more direct administrative apparatus in the Hijaz. The administrative reorganization ended up making Hijaz a *vilayet* with the *Vali* appointed in Mecca along with the *Emirs*. The administrative structure in the Hijaz founded after 1840 is called "dual government" in the secondary literature and is also seen as a way to curb the power of the Emirs. It is also stated that, since the respective powers and jurisdictions of *Emaret* and *Vilayet* were not defined and differentiated, the political history of the Hijaz after 1840 was one of continuous struggle and tension between the *Emir* and the *Vali*.

The analysis of the administrative structures of these two political entities, *Vilayet* and *Emaret*, shows us that even though the *Vali* was the highest administrative official in the Hijaz *Vilayet*, after reformulation of government in the Hijaz in the post-Mehmed Ali Pasha period, the *Emir* of Mecca was not relegated to a position where he would be subordinate to the *Vali*. Thus, as political entities, we must not think of the *Emaret* as a subdivision of the *Vilayet*, or as being under its jurisdiction, no matter what sort of centralization is related to have gone on. In 19th century Hijaz, it was rather the case that the two had an uneasy parallel coexistence and sometimes intersection. However it was not the fact that their areas of jurisdictions were not defined in any way. While ruling over the same geography, they divided authority in a complex, but sometimes unclear way and this meant that a continuous negotiation, conflict as well as cooperation exist between them.

The tension between the *Emaret* and *Vilayet* is usually interpreted as the tension between the Ottoman imperial government and the local forces, with *Vali*

being the sole representative and spearhead of imperial interests and policies in the region. However, we see that the *Vilayet* got localized as much as the *Emirs* were Ottomanized. The *Vilayet*, as much as it was an institution of the center, and as much as administratively and ideologically it was tied to the center, had complex relations with the local milieu. Both the *Vali* and other officials in the *vilayet* administration got involved from time to time in the local power struggle among the rival factions of the ruling *Sharifian* family. They also developed local economic ties with the Ottoman Muslim merchants in the Hijaz. Thus, the tension, for its part, was between the *Emaret* and the *Vilayet*, as local authorities, over the allocation of resources and power. The policies of the *Valis* in the Hijaz do not necessarily reflect the imperial policies towards the Hijaz, but they might have taken place within the context of the personal rivalries and power struggles of the political actors in the Hijaz.

It was also the case that the *Emir* and the *Vali* engaged in a cooperative relation. This was clearly seen in the involvement of *Vali* in taking advantage of monopolistic networks of economic gain jointly with the Emir and some of the influential members of the Hijazi merchant class. The struggle was against other rivals to power and access to economic gain in the Hijaz such as European protégés or consuls, and in this way it did not contradict with the official ideology of keeping Ottoman dominance in the Hijaz either.

As far as the relations between the imperial center and the Emirate are concerned, the Ottoman Empire integrated the Emirate into its system of rule by giving them room for movement and capacity for local action without much intervention. By delegating power to the *Emirs* with respect to issues such as the organization of the Hajj, maintenance of security on the roads, control of the Bedouins; and by using them as it used notables elsewhere and making them the

intermediary between the Empire and Hijazi society the Ottoman state allowed the Emirs to practice a wide range of power and influence in the province. The *Emirs* of Mecca were, for the state, the legitimate local power in an area where there were other rising regional powers. Their authority received the Empire's recognition and in a way was backed by the authority of the central state. The *Emirs*, in return, helped the Ottoman state to expand Ottoman sovereignty in the region by engaging in the campaigns of regional stability and expansion. In this sense, they were as imperial as they were local, and their power was intricately tied to that of the Ottoman state in the Hijaz and the Arabian Peninsula.

However, the power and the zone of action and influence of the *Emirs* were not without boundaries. The Ottomans had outlined a wide frame in which the *Emirs* could act in, but did not allow them to transgress certain boundaries. The Ottoman central state did not allow dynastic succession of *Emirs* and did not give Ottoman armed forces under the permanent control of the *Emir*, even though the *Emirs* could use Ottoman forces temporarily in their struggles against Bedouins or in regional campaigns. At the end of the day, the Ottomans expected from the *Emirs* submission to their sovereignty; the *Emirs* were functionaries in the Hijaz, no matter how rooted they were and how much actual authority they had. They were not sovereign. Even though authority of the office was inalienably linked to the family through tradition, it was still in the authority of the Sultan to appoint any *sharif* he wished to the *Emaret* or even to abolish the office all together.

In the context of the second half of the 19th century when it becomes more important than before for the Ottomans to hold the holy cities, or when there arises a chance that these lands may be lost, it is true that the Ottomans tended towards a more direct rule in the Hijaz. Thus, the idea that there should be some sort of a check

against the power of the *Emaret* in the Hijaz was part of the policy of the central government. Yet our perception from the correspondence of the center, especially to the *Vilayet* which was after all its agent in this policy despite the fact that it was also localized, is that this was not done in the rather simplistic, authoritarian and coarse way it is portrayed in much of the secondary literature. It had more to do with diplomacy, through a more diplomatic *Vali*, maintaining the old policy of negotiation and mutual dependence. This policy was to last until the very end of the Empire, even until after the Arab revolt, and the Empire was to show due reverence to this rather special and very useful but dangerous local notable family and office, while at the same time showing great vigilance to keep their power at check.

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Appendices:**Y.PRK.UM 7/101** 1302.Z.27 (7 Ekim 1885)

Mābeyn-i Hümāyūn-ı Cenāb-ı Mülūkāne Baş Kitābet-i Celilesi'ne

Devletlü Efendim Hazretleri

Hicāz Vālisi Devletlü Osmān Paşa Hazretleri'nin nezdinde dünki Pazarertesi günü MİR-livā Sa'ādetlü Ömer Paşa ve MİR-alay İzzetlü Mehmed Lütفی Bey ve Harem-i Şerīf Müdürü İzzetlü Nazīf Efendi ve Mütercim İzzetlü Abdu'r-rahmān Efendi ve Yāverān-ı Hazret-i Şehriyārī'den olub şu aralık burada bulunan Binbaşı Rif'ātlü Mehmed Efendi ve Ümerā-yı Mısıriyye'den üteveffa Ebū-Cebel İsmā'il Hakkı Paşa-zāde Muharrem Bey ve Şürefā-yı Kirām'dan Vādi-i Fātıma Me'mūru Şerīf Ahmed Efendi ve Leys Me'mūru Şerīf Hüseyin Efendi hāzır oldukları hālde 'urbān mürettebātından tebeyyün eden zimmetinin anbar kuyūduna tatbīk olunması için yāver-i mahsūsa terfikan Vālī-yi müşārün-ileyhe göndermiş olduğum Mūsā Efendi hakkında vukū'undan şikāyet etmiş olduğu tekdīr ve tevbihāt-ı dā'iyānem müşārün-ileyhin ekser hālinde mu'tād edildiği hiddet ve tehevvrünü tehyic etmesiyle o aralık bi'l-i'cāb müşārün-ileyhe tereddüd etmiş olan kām-makāmımız Şerīf 'Ali Mehdi Efendi'ye hitāben ve alenen "emsāliniz hakkında ne yolda mu'āmele olunduğunu gördüğünüz el'ān hānesinde ikāmet etmekdedir ister iseniz sizi de ānın gibi yaparım" diyerek Devletlü Siyādetlu Abdū'l-muttalib Efendi Hazretleri hakkındaki mu'āmelesini dā'ileri hakkında dahī icrā'ya beyān-ı iktidār ve cevher-i nāmus-ı dā'iyānemi alenen pāy-māl ve düçār-ı inkisār eylemiştir. Böyle bir cem'-i gāfir içinde tehdīdāt-ı 'aleniyye ile Vālī-yi müşārün-ileyhin bir takım kelimāt-ı nāmus-şikenānede bulunması dā'ilerince tahammül edilemeyecek bir hāl-i esef-iştimāl olduğu gibi buna Velī'ü'n-nīmet-i 'Āzām Efendimiz Hazretleri'nin dahī riza-yı merāhim-irtifā-yı Hilāfet-penāhīleri kā'il ve rāzı olamayacağını kaviyyen bildiğimden artık ikmāl-i nāmus-ı dā'iyānemi Zāt-ı Merāhim-simāt-ı Hazret-i Pādişāhī'den kemāl-i tazarru' ve inhāl ile isti'dā eylediğimin arzı ile ol bābda kerāmet-efzā-yı sūnūh ü sudūr buyrulacak irāde-i mekārīm-ade-i Cenāb-ı Hilāfet-penāhī'nin taraf-ı dā'iyāneme tebliğine ibzāl-i himem-i 'aliyye-i Āsāfānelerini bi'l-hassā recā ederim. Ol bābda 'emr ü fermān Hazret-i men lehu'l-'emrindir.

Fi 27 Zü'l-hicce Sene 302

‘Avnü’r-refik .

ZİRDE imzaları muharrer ‘urbân meşâyihi tarafından makâm-ı vilâyete ba’s ü irsâl olunan ‘arîzanın tercümesidir.

Selâm ve du‘âdan sonra işbu ‘arîzamızın Zât-ı ‘Âlî-yi Vilâyet-penâhileri’ne ba’s ü takdîm olunmasına sebep şudur ki hakikat-i hâlimize vâkıf olmanızdır. Şöyle ki bizler ‘Uteybe kabîlesi şu‘besinden olup cümlemiz devlet re‘âyâsından ve ‘uhdesine vedî‘a kılınmış olanların cümlesinden ve itâ‘at ve inkiyâd üzere olarak Devlet-i ‘Aliyye sancağı himâyesinde min kadîmü’z-zamân yaşamakta iken Şerîf Abdü’l-muttalîb bin Gâlib Emîr-i Mekke olup geldikde üzerimize bir takım nâsı tâlik itmiştir ki bütün mâlımızı ‘ekl ve ricâlimizi habs ü tevkîf eylemişlerdir. Zîrâ her kangımız Mekke’ye veyâ Tâ’if’e gelse mâlını nehb ve devesini zabt ve kendüyi habs ederler ve bizlerse fukarâ-yı ‘urbândan olup bi-gayr-ı hakk mâlımızın nehb olunması sebebiyle evlâd ü i’yâllerimiz açlıktan helâk oldular ve müşârün-ileyhin hakkımızda vukû‘ bulmakta olan şu mu‘âmele-i gaddarânesi isyâna bizleri mecbûr eylemiştir. Lâkin hükûmete ve asâkir-i Şâhâne’ye mekes-i itâ‘at ve inkiyâd üzere olup ‘emirlerine aslâ muhâlefetimiz yoktur. Binâ’en-aleyh bizleri ma‘zûr tutmanızı kaviyyen me‘mûl ederiz ve gerek Mekke’de ve gerek Ta’if’de bizlerin ve sâ’ir ‘urbânın müşârün-ileyhden çektiğimiz felaket cümlelerinin malum ve meşhûdu olup hiç kimesne inkâr edemez ve böyle bilâ-mû‘ceb gözümüz bakarak mâlımız gasb olunsun ve ele geçen adamlarımız habs ü tevkîf edilsin buna sabr ü tahammül olunur veyâ tâkât getirilir mi. İşte hakikat-i hâlimize vâkıf olduktan sonra bir takım ashâb-ı a‘razın ifâdeleri üzerine taraf-ı Devletleri’nden hakkımızda hışm ü gazâb olunmamasını temennî eyleriz. Ve bunun üzerine taraf-ı devletlerinden hakkımızda bir güne sû’-i kast murâd olunur ise hasbin-Allahu ve ni‘me’l-vekîl demekden başka çâremiz yoktur ve bir de müşârün-ileyh tarafından ‘urbân hakkında vuku‘a gelmekte olan şu hâl-i esef-iştîmâl devâm eder ise kabâ’il-i ‘urbânın kâffesi isyâna tasaddî edeceklerini şimdiden ihtâr ederiz. Çünkü mâlları gasb olunub adamları habs ü tevkîf edilenler müşârün-ileyhe gelib tazallum eyledikde derhâl habse ilkâ’ olunub akçe vermedikce tahlîsi girîbân edilemiyor. Devlet-i ‘Aliyyenin ‘uhdesine mevdû‘ bir takım aceze hakkında gerek müşârün-ileyh ve gerek adamları tarafından vukû‘a gelmekte olan enva’-ı ta‘addiyâtın ne esbâb üzerine idüğü taraf-ı Devletleri’nden tahkîk ü tefîş buyurularak makrûn-ı sıhhat idüğü tahakkuk eyledikde i‘câb ü iktizâsının icrâ’sı bâbında

Mutlik ibn ‘Amayır ve Rubuş-Şeyābin

Cābir ibn Halīl ve kāffetü’ş-şey’e Ehlü’ş-Şām

Rāciḥ ibn ‘Amr ve kāffetü’l-‘Ammāre

Rāki’ ibn Şāhir ve Seyyab ibn Şeddār ve kāffetü’l-le hüma Rakkā’

Sebbit ibn Sāfi ve kāffü’s-Suğyān

Hamde’z-Ziyāni ve kāffeti’z-Zibetü’r-Rūki’

Hıttā-i Hicāziye'nin ahvāl-i hāzırası

Cihān-ı Siyāsetde Deryā-yı 'Āzām 'Umman-ı Hikmet Velī-Nīmet-i Bī-Minnetimiz Efendimiz'in ittihāz buyuracakları hüsn-i tedbīr her türlü ıslahāta kāfil bulunduğ u derkārdir. Kāffe-i istihbārāt ve mesmu'āt-ı kemterānemi 'arz etmemek münāfi-yi 'ubūdiyyet ve sadākat olduktan başka Allahü 'Azīmü's-şān Celle-Celāluhu Hazretleri'ne karşı dahī mes'ul olacağından ber- vech-i āfī 'arz-ı hāle cesāret eyledim. Hıttā-i Hicāziye'de bulunduğ um az bir zamān içinde yirmi sene ikāmet etmiş olanlardan daha ziyāde ahvāl-i mahalliyenin hakāyık ü dakāyıkına kesb-i vukūf eylemiş olduğ umdan ma'lūmāt-ı mütehassıla-ı kemterānem derecesine ahvāl-i mahalliyeyi tahkīk ile hakīkatı meydana çıkarmak ve söylemek Emīr-i Mekke Şerif 'Avnü'r-refīk Paşa ol havālide bulundukca kābil olamayacağı 'umūr-ı zarūriyedendir.

İcrā'-yı ıslahāt ve tahkikāt için hıttā-i mezkūreye i'zāmları mutasavver olan zevāt şimdiden iki sūretle düçār-ı tereddüd olmuşlardır. Birisi Mābeyn-i Hümāyun-ı Cenāb-ı Mülūkāneleri'ne mensüb olanlar tarafından müşārün-ileyh fevke'l-āde iltizām ve sahābet eylediğ i cihetle 'aleyhinde bulunamayacakları diğ eri ahāl-i Mekke taht-ı tehdīdde bulunduğ undan kimseden essahh bir ma'lūmāt alamayacakları gibi akçe ve hedāye ile itma'an ittifāk hāsıl olamayacağı mes'elesidir ki bir netice hāsıl edemeyeceklerini mahremlerine söylemekdedirler.

Hıttā-i mezkūrede musallahaten te'sisi iktizā eden hayrāt ve müberrad 'ale'l-husūs meskūn olan 'urbān ve 'aşā'irin dā'ire-i medeniyete idhāl i için 'ulemādan münāsib zevātın me'mūr edilmesi ve mektebler te'sisi ve sāl ir levāzım-ı ihtiyāciye ne gibi şeyler olduğ u ve siyāseten ne sūretle devām-ı āsāyiş ve revābıt-ı inzibātiye ve tedābir-i sāl ire icrā' kılınmak iktizā edeceğ i mukaddemā 'arz ü takdīm kılınan levāyih-i kemterānemde 'arz olunmuş idi. El-yevm devām eden feryād ü figān ve şikāyātın esbāb-ı mū'cibesi müşārün-ileyh Avnü'r-refīk Paşa'nın teşvīkāt-ı hāriciyeye kapılarak bir mes'ele-i müdāhale çıkarmak için iltizām eylediğ i harekāt-ı gayr-ı meşrū'asıdır. Zīrā müşārün-ileyh her istediğ ini icrā' etmek emeliyle hükümet-i mahalliyenin nüfūz ü müdāhalātını kesr ü men' ile hıttā-i Hicāziye'nin kendi yedd-i

iktidārında bulunduğunu ‘umūma i’lān ve icrā’-ı tehdīdātda bulunarak zulm ü ta‘addiyātdan herkes havf ü ihtirāz edip kimse ağzını açamıyor.

Ehl-i Mekke’den ‘ulemā ü sulehā ve ekābir birer tarafa sıvışıp ihtifā etmekde ve hattā aktār-ı cihānda emsālī bulunmayan sāhib-i zūhd ü takvā ‘ulemā-yı ‘āmilinden yirmi seneden beri Hanefī Müftülüğünde bulunan du‘āsına muhtāc olduğumuz eş-Şeyh Abdu’r-rahman Sirāc Hazretleri’ne hilāf-ı şer‘-i şerīf hususātda teklīf eylediği şeyleri ‘adem-i kabūl ve i’tā eylediği mebalīğ redd eylediğinden dolayı bi’t-tehdīd cebren isti‘fā ettirib yetmiş yaşında olduğu halde zindān gibi bir oda içerisinde dışarı çıkartmayıp ihtilātdan men‘ etmiştir. Şu hāl hıttā-ı Hicāziye ahālisini fevke’l-āde dil-hān ve mahzūn eylemiştir. Cebren ve tehdīden isti‘fā ettirmek maddesini Vālī-yi Sābık Rātīb Paşa’nın dahī bilmesi lāzım gelir. Müftilik hizmetine ahlak-ı mezmūme ashābından ve İngilizlere taraf-dārlik ile müştēhīr gāyet cāhil bir Mısırlıyı ta’yīn ettiği gibi hüsn-i hidemāt ü sadākati musaddak bulunan Hindlilerin Şeyhū’l-Hunūdu ya’nī müdür-i ‘umūrları olan zāt ile Cāvalıların delīllerini bi-lā-sebeb ‘azl ederek tervīc-i merāmı için kendi mensūbātından ve ahvāl-i mechūle ashābından Mısırlı iki zātı delīl ta’yīn eylemiştir. Delīllerin cümlesinden bi-gayr-ı hakkın mebalīğ-i külliye ‘ahz ü taleb ve muhālefet edenleri ‘azl ü tebyīd ve itlāf ettirmekde kat’an ihtirāz etmeyüb her sene Medine-i Münevvereye develerin ücret-i nakliyesi yirmibeş riyāl iken geçen sene kırkbeş riyāle kadar çıkarıb otuziki riyālını Paşa-i mumā-ileyh alub kūsūr oniki riyālī devecilere kaldığına kana‘at etmeyerek develer ile su taşıtmak ve sa’ir hidemāt-ı angaryada bulundurmak misillü ahvāl-i feryād u figānlarını āsumāna çıkarmaktadır. Avnū’r-refīk Paşa amca-zādesi Şerīf bin Numay gibi mübārek bir zātı bi-gayr-i hakkın müddet-i medīde habs ü tevkīf eylemesi şiddet-i zulm ve merhametsizliğine delil olunuyor. Hükümet-i Seniyyeleri’ne hizmet eden ve ‘umūmun hüsn-i teveccühüne mazhar olan rü’esā-yı aşā’irin vücūdlarını mahv etmek için diğēr aşā’iri teşvīk ve tergīb ile telef-i nefse cūret eylemek ve hatta sīnīn-i vefineden beri Mekke-i Mūkerreme havālisinde ‘ale’l-husūs Cidde ile Mekke arasındaki tarīk üzerinde ‘emniyet-i ‘umūmiyeyi muhāfaza ve te’mīn ile idāme-i asayīşe hizmet eden Şerīf Server nām zātı müşārūn-ileyh kendü kölesi vāsıtasıyla Vādī-yi Nu‘mān nām mahalde itlāf ettirdiği mütevattirdir. Şerīf-i müşārūn-ileyhin maksad-ı esāsından birisinde bir takım bedeviler ile ‘akd-ı iştirāk ederek hüccāc ü tüccārān kāfilelerini soymak ve gasb-ı emval ile celb-i menfa‘at eylemek ve bu sūretle aşā’irin fikir ve ahlāklarını ifsād edib āsāyiş-i ‘umūmiyeyi muhill

göstermekden ibâret olmasına ve mücerred İngiltere müdâhalâtını celb ve diğer ecnebilere tasdik ettirmek için Hind ve Tunus ve Cezâyir ve Cāva ahâlilerini tazyîk ve Bedevîler vâsıtasıyla emvâllerini gasb ettirmek misillü zulm ve i'tisâfât Hindistân ve Londra mecâlis , mehâfilinde bir mes'ele hâlini iktisâb eylemiştir.

'Ayn-ı Zübeyde sularının ta'mîrâtına karşılık olmak üzere Vâlî-yi sâbık 'Osmân Paşa'nın Şeyh Mahmûd nâm mahallde enva'-ı eşcâr-ı müsemmire ve sâ'ireyi müştemil yaptırmış olduğu bağçeden senevî 2000 riyâl kadar vâridât 'ahzı melhûz iken mezkûr bağçeyi Şerîf-i müşârûn-ileyh tahrîb ve mahv ederek mahall-i mezkûre cereyân eden suyu kendi bağçesine hasr edib bu suretle hem su yolları masârifâtı karşılığı mahv ve hem de ahâliyi susuzluktan şikâyâta mecbûr etmiştir. Şerîf-i müşârûn-ileyhin kâ'im-makâm-ı 'umûru bulunan zât tarafından belde-i mübâreke ahâlisi haklarında irtikâb olunan mezâlim kulüb-ı Müslimînin tahammül edemeyeceği derecesinde tākāt-güdâz bulunduğu gibi Tâ'if'de inşa'a ettirdiği cesîm konak ve bağçeler ve kuyular hafırî ameliyâtına dahî angarya olarak ahâliyi bölük bölük sevk ile çalışdırmakda olması 'umûmun te'essüfüne mu'cib olmuştur. Şerîf-i müşârûn-ileyh Mısır'dan celb ettiği Hristiyân hizmetci kadınlarını hânesinde istihdâm etmesi beyne'l-ahâli enva'-ı kıyl ü kâle sebebiyet vermektedir müşârûn-ileyh henüz işlememiş bir kaç aylık ma'âşâtını peşinen aldığı cihetle ehl-i mürtezikânın â'idâtı verilemeyüb bir takım fukarâ ü muhtâcîn ile ashâb-ı mutalibîn sızlanmakda bulundukları mu'riz-i şikâyet de Defter-dâr Şâkir Efendi tarafından haber verilmiştir. Vâlî-yi cedîd müşârûn-ileyhin harekâtından tevahhuş ile mustağrak-ı hayret bir halde kalub hiçbir iş göremeyeceği peyderpey almakda olduğum ma'lûmâtla te'eyyüd etmiştir.

Şerîf-i müşârûn-ileyh hükûmet-i seniyyelerine 'â'id kâffe-i kuvvet ü iktidârını yedd-i idâresine alarak aşâ'ir ve 'urbânî gasb-ı envâl ve yağma-gîrliğe teşvîk eylediğinden dolayı kendisine bend ve ehl-i Mekke ile hüccâc haklarında icrâ'-ı zulm ü ta'addî ederek feryâd etdirib hükûmet-i seniyyelerinin kuvvetsizliğinden bahisle kendisini 'umûma müraca'at-gâh ittihâz ettirmiştir. Hattâ huzûr-ı Beyt-i Hüdâ'da evkât-i hamsede e'imme ve 'umûm cema'at gördükleri mezâlim ve harekât-ı gayr-ı meşrû'adan dolayı müşârûn-ileyhin oradan kaldırılmasını kemâl-i teferru'âtla ağlayarak du'â etmekde bulundukları ma'lûmdur. Mekke-i Mükerrreme'de gerek ahval-i hâzıra ve gerek hafıyye hakkında Şerîf-i müşârûn-ileyhin tehdîd ve

mezâliminde havf ü ihtirâz etdikleri cihetle hiçbir ferd ihbâr-ı vukû'ata cesâret edemiyeceğinden icrâ'-ı tahkîkât kâbil olamayacağı âşikârdır. Şurası cây-ı dikkat ve câlib-i ehemmiyetdir ki Şerîf-i müşârûn-ileyh hükümet-i seniyyelerine 'â'id kuvvet ve iktidârı eline geçirib 'umûm hüccâc ve aşâ'ir ve kabâ'ile hükümet-i 'Osmniyeleri olmadığı ve âsâyişin muhtell bulunduğunu i'lân ve ahâli hakkındaki mezâlim ve harekât-ı nâ-meşrû'anın rey' ü icâzet-i seniyye-i Cenâb-ı Hilâfet-penâhîleri'yle vuku' bulunduğunu i'lân ve halkın nefretini câlib hâlâtı tervîc eylemesi ve İbnü'r-Reşîd kabîlesiyle muhâbere etmesi ve iktidâr-ı nakdîsi fevkinde olarak mücerred bekâ-yı me'mûriyeti içün beher mâh Dersa'âdetlerine bin beş yüz lira göndermesi ve Mısırîlerden müftî ve Hindlilere Şeyhü'l-Hunûd ve delîl ta'yîn eylemesi ve ecnebîlerin şikâyetine be's olacak şeylere meydân verilmesi ve İngiliz Konsolosu'nun ta'lîmâtına göre hareketle Mısırîler ile hafıyyen ittifâk ve te'âtî-yi muhabbet eylemesi ve'l-hâsıl hıttâ-ı Hicâziye'de emniyet-i 'umûmiyeyi münselîb göstermek 'ulemâ ü fuzelâ ve asdikâyı te'dîb ü tehdîd etmek husûsâtı netâyici güzel ma'na ile tefsîr olunacağı âşikârdır. Ahvâl-i ma'rûzaya nazaran hıttâ-i mezkûrede âsâyişin idâmesi ve ârzu-yı 'Âlî-cenâb-ı Cihân-bânîleri dâ'iresinde sûret-i meşrû'ada tanzîm ü ıslâhı ve mugayyir-i rızâ-yı 'âlî hâlâtın men'i hakkında levâiyih-i hâtır-ı kemterîye vârid olan pek küçük ve kolay tedbîr varsa da ma'rûzat-ı kemterânem bir güne garaz ve maksada mahmûl olur mütâla'asıyla bu cihetinin 'arz ü ifâdesine cesâret edemediğim muhât-ı 'ilm-i 'Âlî-cenâb-ı Cihân-bânîleri buyruldukda fermân Zât-ı Akdes-i Hazret-i Hilâfet-penâh Efendimiz'indir.

25 Mart sene 311.

Dersa'âdet İsti'nâf Müdde-i 'Umûmîsi Baş Mu'âvini el-Hâc köleleri İsmâ'il Hakkı bin Mustafâ.

(1)

Rütbe-i sāniyeyi hā'iz tüccār-ı mu'tebereden olub Ciddede ticāretle meşgūl bulunan Mūsā Bağdādī Efendi'nin Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emīri ile Hicāz Vālisi'nin 'ārāz-ı şahsiyyelerine hedef olarak nusūretle Bağdada nefv ve tarib olunduğu ve ne yolda hakkında gadr u cefā vukū' bulduğu tafsilātına ve sûret-i mütesāviyede 'umūm teba'a vezir-i dasitān-ı Zıllu'l-lāhileri'ne şāyān olan avātıf ve merāhim-i seniyye-i mülūkānlerine mazhariyeti istirhāmına dā'ir mumā-ileyh Mūsā Bağdādī kullarından mevrūd bir kıt'ā tahrīrāt 'arz ü takdīm kılındı. Emīr-i müşārün-ileyh kulları bir takım mu'teberān ve eşrāfı envā'-ı mu'āmele-i b'āride ile tahkīr ve Hükümet-i Seniyye'den tebrīd ve tenfir etmekde olduğu Hicāz vilāyeti Vāliliği'nde bulunduğum hengāmda gördüm. Ve sāye-i kudret-vāye-i Mülūk-dārīlerinde önünü almağa muvaffak oldum. Mu'ahharan vālī ta'yīn buyrulan Safvet Paşa kullarıyla birleşib Emīr-i müşārün-ileyhin ma'lūm olan ahvālını kendisine tevḫīm ile böyle şeylere meydān vermemesini tenbīh etmiş idim. Mu'ahharan gerek mumā-ileyh Mūsā Bağdādī gibi senede beş yüz guruş kadar gümrük resmi t'āsıyla hazīne-i devlete nef ve fā'idesi olan bir tüccārı Bağdada ve gerek Harem-i Şerīf e'immesinden olan Ahmed Fakīh nāmında bir dā'īlerini dahī Mısır'a ve buna mümāsıl onbeş kadar mütehayyirān ve şürefāyı öteye beriye nefy ü tarib etmelerinden sā'ir mū'teberān ve mütehayyizān ürkerek bir hayli zevāt Hindistana savuştukları Harem-i Şerīf müderrislerinden Şeyh Abdu'l-lah Ākir tarafından haber veriliyor. Mekke-i Mükerrreme gibi matma'-ı enzār-ı İslāmiyān olan bir bak'ā-i mübārekede dā'imā herkes taltīf ve tesrīl ile Zāt-ı Melāyik-sīmāt-ı Hilāfet-penāhileri'ne dāvāt-ı hayriyye isticlābı ehemm ü elzem ve çünkü her sene mevsīm-i Hāc'da aktār-ı 'ālemden Mekke-i Mükerrreme'de tecemmū' eden binlerce nüfūs-ı İslāmiyye orada Hilāfet-i Seniyye'nin eser-i hükümet ve merhametini müşāhade edecekleri bedīhī ve müsellemler olmasına nazaran mu'teberān ve eşrāfın hilaf-ı marzī-yi 'Ālī mu'āmele-i nā-becā görüb māl ve nāmuslarından emīn olamamaları dāhilen ne kadar muzırr ise hāricen dahī ol derece mu'ceb-i sū-i te'sīr bir çok mu'āmelāt ve müdāhalātı intāc etmesi melhūz olduğundan buralarına mahall kalmamak üzere bunların 'afvı ve bundan böyle bi-lā-muhākeme ne Emīr-i Mekke ve ne de Vālī kimseye bu makūle bed-mu'āmele edememesi ve birkaç seneden beri Cāva ve Hindistān'dan gelen külliyetlü hüccāc-ı İslāmiyenin deve ve vapur

'ücretlerine para zammıyla ve diğer sûretlerle şeyhleri vâsıtalariyle ahrâr ile bunları birkaç seneden beri Emîr-i müşârün-ileyh ve vâlî soymak gibi mugâyır-ı rızâyı 'Âli olan bir hâli irtikâbla Merkez-i Hilâfet'e karşı inhirâf-ı kalbiyelerine meydân verilmekte olmasıyla böyle şeylere kat'â cesâret edememeleri esbâbının istikmâliyle cümleye te'mînat verilmesini makâm-ı akdes-i Saltanat-ı Seniyyeleri'ne olan kemâl-i sıdk ü 'ubûdiyyetim sâ'ikasıyla hasbeten li'l-lah 'arz eylerim. Her ne vechle emr ü fermân-ı ma'delet-'unvan-ı Zı'l-lullâhîleri mevhebet-efzâ-yı sünûh ü sudûr buyrulur ise isâbet ve kerâmet onda olacağı muhât-ı 'ilm-i 'âlî buyruldukda ol bâbda ve kâtibe-i ahvâlde irâde ve fermân Hazret-i Veliyü'l-'emr ve'l-ihsân Efendimiz Hazretlerindir.

26 Zü'l-kâde 304 ve 4 Ağustos 303

Yâver-i Ekrem kulları Ahmed/ Hamdi (?)

Bağdād'da ikāmetim hakkında Mekke-i Mükerreme Emāret-i Celīlesiyle Hicāz Vilāyet-i Celīlesin'den verilen emr üzerine Mekke'den Cidde'ye bir gece içine muvakkaten gönderildim vusūlümüzde berāberimiz bulunan me'mūr-ı 'ācizlerini çarşı ve pazarı gezdirilerek ehlen belediyeye irā'e ve kesr-i nāmusuma dahī çarşı içerisinde kıyām olduğu gibi Cidde hapishānesine gönderilerek odanın birisine idhāl ve hiçbir kimsenin girmemesine cümlesi gayret eyledikleri gibi günün birisinde kā'immakām Tevfīk Paşa ile Ömer Nāsif hükümetde oldukları hālde çākerlerini taleb eylediler ve yanlarına gidildi. Kayıkla hareket etmeyeceğime beyān ve ifade eylediler ve Sadāret-i 'Uzmā'dan mevrūd telgrafnāmede 'ācizlerinin Cidde'ce olan işlerimin tesviyesi için bir müddet-i ma'lūme i'tāsıyla tahliye-i sebīlimi emr ü irade buyrulmuş iken kā'immakām-ı müşārün-ileyh ile Ömer Nāsif birlikte oldukları hālde işlerim kaç günde hitām ve kaç gün müddet i'tā olunacağını ifādesini emir buyurduklarında onbeş gün müddet i'tāsını istirhām eyledim ise müddet-i mezbūreye rızā gösterilmeyerek beş gün ruhsat i'tā eyledikleri cihetle mezkūr beş günde işlerim hitām bulamayacağını 'arz eyleyerek kabūlü yoluna gidemediklerinden dolayı hapis-hāneye iade eylediler ve Ramazān-ı Şerīfin 24. gecesini sa'at yedi raddelerinde balıkçılar kayıklarından ve beş tonilatoluk olduğu halde 'ācizlerini irkāben ve Cidde ahālīsinden ve Ömer Nāsif'in tarafdaranından İbrāhim Cidde'yi me'mūr eylediler ve meşrūbāt-ı ācizī için bir hasırlı ma'-i lezīzin 'ahzı ve hademelerimizden birisini 'ahz ve kayığa götürülmesini merkūm İbrāhim Cidde kabūl etmeyerek sa'at-i mezbūrede Kunfuda'ya müteveccihen hareket olunmuştur. Eğerçi Cidde'den Hudeyde'den vapurla hareket olunmuş olaydı üç günde muvassalāt olacak iken şu vāki' olan 'ārāz üzerine kayıkla hareketimiz bütün bütün kesr-i nāmusumuza mū'ceb olduğu cihetle Kunfuda'ya vusūlümüzde merkūm İbrāhim Cidde'nin marul-'arz ufak kayıkla ve Kunfuda'da bulunan Cevr ve Germine kayığına 'ācizlerini irkāben Hudeyde'ye otuz günde güç halle vürudlar türlü meşakkatle muvāsalat olduğu günde ma'ıyyet-i 'ācizīde bulunan zabtiye çavuşu Ahmed Çavuş üzerime tüfenk ile endaht ederek min-tarafı'l-lah tüfenkten çıkan kurşun 'ācizlerine isābet etmeyerek havaya gitmesi cihetle der-hāl kayığın harābiyetiyle çavuşun şu derecede vāki' olan 'ārāz ve nefsanīyetini bā-müzekkere Hudeyde Mutasarrıflığın 'arz eyledim. Hudeyde Mutasarrıflığın'dan der-hāl Limān Re'isi ve Ehl-i Hudeyde'nin kayığa gitmeleriyle keşfiyāt-ı lāzımenin icrāsını emr ü

irāde buyrulmuşdur. (?) emr ü irāde üzerine Liman Re'îsi ve Ehl-i Hudeyde kayığa gelerek keşf ve mu'āyenelerinde kayığın bütün bütün harab ve Basra'ya dahî hareket edemeyeceğini ba-mazbata suret-i kat'îyyede Hudeyde Mutasarrıflığı'na ifāde eyledikleri üzerine kayığın ve bu günlerde havalanın muhālefetleri cihetiyle ancak Hudeyde ve sâ'ire mahallerden gelen kayıkların cümlesi havalanın tehvîninde ve 20 Zilkade 304 tarihinde hareket edebilecekleri cihetle hükümet-i mahalliyeden dahi 'ācizlerini kayıktan indirerek Hükümet-i Seniyye'nin bir mahalline koydular bu hususda havalanın tehevvinünde hareket ve 'azîmet edileceği ma'-te'essüf 'arz eylerim ve Hudeyde'den Basra'ya kadar vapurla hareket-i 'ābidanemin onbeş günde muvāsalat olunacak idi lâkin Hicāz Vilāyet Vālîsi'yle Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emāret-i Celîlesi'nden verilen evāmîrle vākî' olan irāz ve nefsāniyetlerine mebnî kayıkla Basra'ya hareket edilmesi ve kayık-ı mezkurla Hudeyde'den Basra'ya ancak dört māhda muvassalat edilebileceğinden lutfen ve merhameten 'ācizlerine şu vākî' olan gadr ü zulümden halāsım hakkında mufassalan olarak me'ālî ma'delet-i Hazret-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'ye 'arz ile Dersa'ādet'ime mehākime-i 'ubeydānemin icrası zımnında celbim hakkında lâzım gelen evāmîr-nāmelerin 'ahzıyla Cidde'de Hicāz Vilāyet-i Celîlesi Mektubcusu olub el-yevm Cidde Mutasarrıflığı'nda istihdām olunmakda olan sa'a,ādetlü 'Ārifî Bey-efendi Hazretleri'ne irsālî kemāl-i ehemmiyetle istirhām eylerim ve Zāt-ı 'Ālî-yi Hidîv-i 'Āzāmîleri Mekke-i Mükerrreme'de iken Emāret-i Celîlenin huzur-ı sāmîlerinde vermiş olduğu te'mînāt üzerine bi'l-'akis hakk-ı 'ubeydānemde icrā eylediğine rızā-yi ālî-yi ma'delet-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye ve Zāt-ı Velî-nîmetleri dahî rızā göstermeyeceği indi 'ubeydānemde ma'lûm ve müsellemler olduğunu beyân eylerim ve bu kerre lehü'l-hamd Zāt-ı 'Ālî-i Velîü'n-nî'āmîleri Yāver-i Ekrem-i Hazret-i Şehinşāhi ta'yîn buyrulduğunuza dahî ma'-ateşekkür tebrîke 'arz ederim. Ve husûs-ı mezbûrun dahî Der-sa'ādet'de bulunan makāmât-ı 'aliyyeye Zāt-ı 'Ālî-yi Velîü'n-nîmetlerinden mürāca'atla i'ādemin tebşîrâtını istirhām ederim zîrâ Cidde'ce hânelerimiz kapalı ve emvâllerimiz çürümekte olduğu gibi mahdûmlarıma dahî olan hakārâtdan başka mumâ-ileyhimâları Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emāret-i Celîlesinden ve kendi hânesinden hapis ve türlü türlü enva'-ı ezâ ve cefâdan ma'adâ ayaklarına demir zincir vaz' olunduğu ve madde-i mezbûrenin vuku'unda dahi Ömer Nasif Efendi Mekke-i Mükerrreme'de olub mahdûmların mahbûs oldukları mahallerine gelib kendilerine istediği gibi ezâ ü cefâ eylediği ve yedlerinden dahî bir takım mebālîği hâvi sahte senedât 'ahzıyla temhîr ettirdiği ve böyle istedikleri gibi senedât 'ahzıyla bâdehü

ikāme-i dāva eyledikleri hālde kabūl olunamayacağı nizāmı iktizāsından iken aslā nizāmāt-ı seniyyeye ri'āyet edilmeyerek bu makūle işlere cesāret eylediği ve mahdūmlarım her nasılsa hapisten tahliye ettirilerek Cidde'ye vusūllerinde her biri bir tarafa firār eyledikleri ve şu sahte olarak Ömer Nasif Efendi tarafından mahdūmlarımın üzerine yapılan senedāt ileride ibraz olub da dāvāya kıyām olunacak ise aslā kabūl olunmaması hakkında Hicāz Vilāyet Vālisi'yle Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emāret-i Celīlesi'ne 'icāb eden makāmātdan iktizā eden evāmir-nāmelerin isti'sālî ile izzetlü 'Ārifî Bey-efendi'ye emr ve irsāliyle şu felāket-i mezbūreden dahî 'ācizleriyle evlādlarımın halāsımızla Cidde'ye i'ādelerimizi 'Atabe-i Devletleri'ne dehāletle recā ve iltimās ederim. Ol bābda ve her hālde emr ü fermān Hazret-i men lehu'l-Emr'indir.

Temmuz 303

Kulları Mūsā Bağdādi.

Y.A.HUS 196/97 1304.M.27 (26 Ekim 1886)

(1)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret

Husūsiye 1

Hicāz Vālisinin ahvāl ü harekātından şikāyeti ve ol bābda ba‘zı ifādātı hāvī Emāret-i Celīle-i Mekke-i Mükerrermeden vārid olan iki kıt’a telgraf-nāme manzūr-ı ‘ālī buyrulmak üzere ‘arz ü takdīm kılındı efendim.

Fi 23 Safer sene 304 ve fi 9 Teşrîn-i Sānī sene 302.

Sadr-‘āzām Kāmil.

(2)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret-i ‘Uzmā Telgraf Odası

aded 1

Emāret-i Mekke-i Mükerrermeden huzūr-ı sāmī-yi Cenāb-ı Sadāret-penāhiye meb’us telgraf-nāmenin halli.

Ma’lūmdur ki Vālī Paşanın bundan evvel ne va‘ad ve ne ‘ahd ve tama’a mebnī’ ise birāder-i ‘acizi Abdu’l-lah Paşayı iğfāl edecek beyinlerinden cereyān eden mevadd ü meva’id üzerine her nasılsa hadd be hadd Emīr-i Mekke etmiş idi. Bādehu karīha-ı Hilāfet-penāhiden dā‘īleri ta’yīn olunup Mekke’ye gelince Vālī Paşanın kurduğu dolap ve desa’is bozularak bu tevcīh-i Şāhāneden ziyādesiyle mu‘abber ve mükedder olarak o günden berü ila-yevmuna haza dā‘īlerine nefsāniyet bağlayarak türlü türlü iftirāta teşebbüs ve enva’-ı bühtānla itāle-i lisān ve vazı’-ı esāsı bî-cünyan ve husūsiyle şürefāyı tahkīr ‘ulemaya terzīl ‘ayānı tahvīf me’mūrīni tehdīd ederek ve’l-hāsıl bu havālī-yi mukaddesede mü’esses esās-ı bidat ü dalālet mütefekkir celb-i menfa‘at mā‘il ve evhusu ve habāsetle sā‘i-i bi’l-fesād ve hıyānet doğrusu vücūdu muzırr-ı dīn ü devlet ve millet bir cinayetkar-ı gaddār ve irtikāb ve hıyāneti mahalle ve pazarda āşikār olmağla bundan böyle bu zātla imtizāc ve ittifāk-ı husūle pezīrden hāric icrā-yı icāb-ı adālet ve hakkāniyet-i padişāhiye muhavveldir. Ol bābda. Fi 14 Teşrin-i Evvel Sene 302 ve 6 Teşrin-i Sani Sene 302 Beyrūt’a Vusūlü 8 Teşrîn-i Sani sene 302 odaya vürüdü.

Avnü’r-refīk.

(3)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret-i ‘Uzmā Telgraf Odası

aded 1

Emāret-i Mekke-i Mükerrermeden huzūr-ı Sāmī-yi Cenāb-ı Sadāret-penāhīye meb’ūs telgraf-nāmenin halli.

Vālī Paşa yine hakk-ı dā’īyanemde iftirā‘ata başlayarak zecren mazbatalar tanzim ettirmiş olduğu işitilmiştir. Müfterīnin cezāsı ‘adālet-i seniyyeye havāle kılınmıştır. Fermān fi 26 Teşrīn-i Evvel sene 302 Beyrut’a vusulü 7 Teşrin-i Sānī sene 302 odaya vürüdü 8 Teşrīn-i Sānī sene 302.

Avnü’r-refik.

Y.A.HUS 196/33 1304.S.8 (6 Kasım 1886)

(1)

Bâb-ı ‘Âlî Dâ’ire-i Sadâret

Husûsiyye 7

Mekke-i Mükerrreme Mâlikî Müftisini kendisiyle berâber Medîne-i Münevvere’ye gelmesinden dolayı Vâlî Paşa tarafından ‘azl ve sâ’ir bâzı me’mûrînin dahî ‘azline teşebbüs edildiğinden ve mumâ-ileyhimin ‘azli makâm-ı Emârete â’id bulunduğundan bahisle müftî-i mumâ-ileyhin kemākān ibkâsı ve me’mûrîni sâ’irenin de ‘azl olunmaması husûsunun îcâb edenlere tebliği ifâdesine dâ’ir Emîr-i Mekke Paşa Hazretleri’nden alınan telgrafname manzûr-ı ‘âli buyrulmak üzere ‘arz ü takdîm kılınmış ve bu maddenin tahkîki dahî Lûtfî Efendi ve Müfid Beyefendi hazerâtının ta’lîmâtına derc olunmuştur Efendim.

Fî 8 Safer sene 304 ve fî 25 Teşrîn-i Evvel sene 302.

Sadr-‘Âzâm Kâmil.

(2)

Bâb-ı ‘Âlî Dâ’ire-i Sadâret-i ‘Uzmâ Telgraf Odası

adet 7

Medîne-i Münevvere’de bulunan Şerîf Hazretleri’nden makâm-ı celîl-i Sadâret-penâhiye meb’ûs telgrafnâmenin halli.

Mekke-i Mükerrreme’nin Mâlikî Müftisi Şeyh Muhammedî’nin sâ’ir şürefâ ve ‘ulemâ ile berâber dâ’îlerinin mâ’iyetinde ziyâret için hasbe’l-lüzûm Medîne-i Münevvere’ye gelmelerinden dolayı Vâlî Paşa gazablanarak bi-gayr-ı hakk ‘azl eylediği ve sâ’ir me’mûrînin dahî ‘azilleri için teşebbüsâtta bulunduğu istihbâr kılınmıştır. Müftî-i mumâ-ileyh salâh-ı hâl ile mevsûf dâ’iyân-ı sadâkat-nişân-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyyeden olup bilâ sebep ‘azli rızâ-yı Bâri ve Şehriyâriye muhâlif olduğu misillü dâ’iyânın ‘azli öteden beri makâm-ı Emârete â’id bulunduğu cihetle müftî-i mumâ-ileyhin mekân-ı me’mûriyetinde ibkâsı ve Re’îsü’l-‘ulemâ ve Şâfi’î Müftisi ve Nâkibü’s-sa’dât ve Şeyhü’l-hütebâ ve Şeyhü’l-mutavvîfîn ile sâ’ir me’mûrînin ‘azl itmemeleri için Makâm-ı Meşhate ne vech ve Vâlî Paşa’ya irâde-i kat’iyyenin fermân buyrulması bâbında. Fî 17 Muharrem sene 304. posta ile Beyrût’a vusûlü fî 24 Teşrîn-i evvel sene 302.

Y.A.HUS 196/32 1304.M.15 (14 Ekim 1886)

(1)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret

Husūsiye

Hicāz Vālisi ile beynlerinde hāsıl olan tezād ve ihtilāfın maslahatca olan te’sirātından bahisle tedābir-i lāzımenin bir an evvel ittihāz ve icrāsı ifādesine dā’ir Emīr-i Mekke Paşa Hazretleri’nden alınan telgraf-nāme manzūr-ı ‘Ālī buyrulmak üzere ‘arz ü takdīm kılındı Efendim.

Fī 8 Safer sene 1304 fī 25 Teşrīn-i evvel sene 1302

(2)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret-i ‘Uzmā Telgraf Odası

‘adet 6

Mekke-i Mükerreme Emāret-i Celīlesinden huzūr-ı sāmi-i Cenab-ı Sadāret-penāhi’ye meb’ūs telgraf-nāmenin halli.

Hicāz Vālisi ‘Osmān Paşa’nın ‘umūr-ı gayr-ı meşru‘a ve mu‘amele-i gaddarānesinden dolayı hiçbir vechle ba’dema müşārün-ileyhle imticāz mümkin olamayacağı ve defe‘atle tākāt-i beşeriyenin hāricinde kendisiyle mudāra ve sabr ve musālaha edilmiş ise de der-‘akeb nakz eylediği ve bu zāt Hicāz’da durdukca irāde-i Vilāyet ve şürefā ve ‘urbān ve ahāli ve hüccāc dā’imā müzebzip bir hālde kalacağı ve ber-vech-i dil-hāh ‘ālī umurun cereyān edemeyeceği ‘arz olunmuş idi. Şu hālde ahāliyi zulmünden ve ‘ācizlerini mes’ūliyetden kurtarmak ve Zāt-ı Şāhāne’ye hayr du‘ā kazandırmak her neye mütevakıf ise bir an evvel icrāsı adālet ü merhamet-i Pādişāhi ve hamiyet ü mürüvvet-i Fehāmet-penāhilerinden bekleniyor. Ol bābda. Fī 15 Muharrem sene 304, 8 Teşrīn-i evvel sene 302 Cidde’ye vusūlü, 24 Teşrin-i evvel sene 302 posta ile Beyrūt’a vusūlü.

Avnū’r-refik.

Y.A.HUS 194-2/110 1303.Z.19 (18 Eylül 1886)

(1)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret

Husūsiye 10

Emīr-i Mekke-i Mükerrreme ile Hicāz Vilāyeti Vālisi beynindeki mebānīnin izālesiyle ifā-yı vazīfeye ihtimām olunması hakkında bā-irāde-i seniyye-i Cenāb-ı Hilāfet-penāhi sebk eden iş’āra cevāben vilāyet-i mezkūre vāliliğinden alınan telgraf-nāme dahī ‘arz ü takdīm kılındı. Me’ālinden müstebān olduğu üzre Vālī-yi Müşārün-ileyh dā’ire-i hükūmetde birleşilmesi hakkındaki dāvete Emīr Hazretleri’nin muvafakāt etmediğini beyān etmekde ve Emīr-i müşārün-ileyh dahī telgraf-nāme-i ma’rūzunda muharrer olduğu üzre Vālī Paşa’nın mülākāt hakkında vukū‘ bulan dāveti kabūl etmediği gibi Cūlūs-ı Hümāyun’a müsādif olan yevm-i mes’ūdda ve nāme-i hümāyunun resm-i kıra’atinde dahī gelmediğini ihbār eylemekde idüğü cihetlet müşārün-ileyhimā beynindeki mübāyebetin izālesi kābil olamayacağı anlaşılmasına ve Emīr-i müşārün-ileyh Hazretleri mevkib-i Hacc’ın ihrācından sonra muvakkaten Der-sa‘ādete azīmetine müsā‘ade-i seniyye’nin şāyān buyrulmasını dahī recā eylemesine nazaran emr ü fermān-ı isābet-beyān-ı Hazret-i Hilāfet-penāhī her ne vechle şeref-müte‘allik buyrulursa hükm-i celīli icrā olunur Efendim. Fi 19 Zü’lhicce sene 303 ve fi 6 Eylül sene 302.

Sadr-‘āzām Kāmil.

(2)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret-i ‘Uzmā Telgraf Odası

Hicāz Vilāyetinden huzūr-ı sāmi-i Cenāb-ı Sadāret-penāhīye meb’ūs telgraf-nāmenin halli.

Şerīf Hazretleriyle olan ihtilāfın mahv ü izālesiyle rızā-yı ‘āli-i Velī-nimet-i bī-Minnetihi Tevfik hareket-i lüzūmuna mü’ekked 27 Ağustos 302 tarihinde tebliğ buyrulan ve emr ü fermān-ı hümāyun-ı Pādişāhīnin farīza-i zimmet olan infāz-ı ahkāmı zımnında zāta olmayan ve nām-ı pādişāhiye menbūs ve hükūmete mahsūs olan Hamīdiye Dā’iresi’ne çakerleri ile hey’etin vakt-ı ictimā’ından evvel müşārün-ileyhin teşrīfleri bu kerre de bā-tezkire huzūr-ı Beyt-i Mu‘azzama’da birleşilerek hükūmet dā’iresine gelinmesi bi’l-vāsita recā olunduğu hālde güyā çakerleri sulhu ‘adem-i kabūlde bulunduğuma dā’ir sened i’tāsı teklīf olunması ve şimdiye kadar bir cevāb-ı resmī ‘ahz olunmadığı ve ma’-hāza taraf-ı çakerīde vazīfe-i me’mūriyetce rızā-yı ‘āli dā’iresine hareketde kusūr edilmeyeceği ma’rūzdur. Fi 4 Eylül sene 302.

‘Osmān.

Bâb-ı ‘Âlî Dâ’ire-i Sadâret Husûsiyye

Ma‘lûm-ı ‘âli buyrulduğı üzere Mekke-i Mükerrreme Emâret-i Celîlesi ile Hicâz Vâlîliği arasında bir müddetden beri husûle gelen mübâdenetden dolayı her birinin birer vesîle ile yek diğeri ‘aleyhinde vâki‘ olan şikâyat ve iş‘ârâtı tevâlî ve te‘âkib etmekde ve bu hâlin mesâlih-i devletce olacak mazarrât ve te’sîri cihetiyle def‘ ü ıslâhı mertebe-i vücûbda olduğundan geçende şeref-efza-yı sünûh ü sudûr buyrulan irâde-i seniyye-i Cenâb-ı Hilâfet-penâhi hükm-i celîline tevîfkan icrâ kılınan vesâyâ üzerine sûreta beyinlerinde bir i’tilâf hâsıl olarak derbâr-ı şevket-karâra dahî bu bâbda i’tâ-yı te’mînât olunmuş ise de i’tilâf-ı vâki‘in sûret-i hakîkîyede tekarrür edememesi hasbiyle beynehümâda yeniden münâfesâd ve münâkaşât başlamış ve ibtidâ’ları taraf-ı Emâret’den Vâlî ‘aleyhinde muhterizâne lîsân kullanılmakda olduğu hâlde bir müddet sonra yine ‘alenen müsâvî-yi ahvâlinden bahs olunmakda bulunmuş olduğu misillu bu kerre Cidde yolunda vukû‘a gelen harekât-ı i’tisâb-kârânenin sebebiyeti açıktan açığa yek digere ‘atf ü isnâd edilmekde olduğundan ve iş‘ârâtı vâki‘adan istidlâl olduğuna göre tarafeyn beyinde ‘asıl bâ’is-i şikâyet ve münâfered olan madde Vâlî Paşa Hazretleri’nin Emâret-i müşârün-ileyhanın imtiyâzını nez’ etmek ve Şerîf Hazretleri ise Emâret-i Celîle’nin mine’l-kadîm hâ’iz olduğu nüfûz ve haysiyyeti muhâfazaten Emâretin kesr-i nüfûzu kasdında bulunan Vâlî Paşa’yı mesnedinden düşürmek emelinde bulunmakdan ibâret olub Vâlî Paşa tarafından yazıldığı gibi Şerîf Hazretleri’nin teferrüd ve istiklâle meyl ü arzûsu teslîm olunsa dahî bir sûret-i müdebbirâne ve ihtiyâtkârânede hareketle buna mukabele etmenin imkânı mevcûd olduğu hâlde Vâlî Paşa Cânibinden böyle sûret-i ‘aleniyyede naks-ı hukûku mu’cîb ahvâl ve tedâbire teşebbüs olunması bi’t-tabî‘î diğere tarafca kabûl olunamayacağı gibi şürefâ ve ‘urbân beyinde dahî sū-i te’sîri mu’cîb olub her yerde ve ‘ale’l-husûs kible-gâh-ı kâffe-i Müslimîn olan belde-i mübâreke ve tayyibede bu misillu i’tişâşâtın devâmı min-küllî’l-vücûh câ’iz ve merzî olamayacağından müşârün-ileyhümâdan birinin tebdîlî taht-ı vücûb ve elzemiyyetde görünmüş ise de yine her ne vechle emr ü fermân-ı kerâmet-beyân-ı Hazret-i Pâdişâhî şeref-müte‘allik buyrulursa mantûk-ı münîfine tevîk-i hareket olunacağıının

Hāk-pāy-ı Hümāyūn-ı Hilāfet-penāhiye ‘arzı men‘ūt-ı himmet-i Devletleri bulunmuş ve evrāk-ı mevcūde manzūr-ı ‘ālī buyrulmak üzere leffen takdīm edilmiştir efendim.

Fi 6 Zü’lhicce sene 302 ve fi 24 Ağustos ve sene 302.

Sadr-‘āzām Kāmil.

1303.3.16.

(1)

Emāret-i Mekke-i Mükerrreme ile Hicāz vilāyeti Vāliliği beyninde hāsıl olan tezadd üzerine yek diğeri ‘aleyhinde şikāyeti hāvi Emāret ve vilāyet-i müşārün-ileyhümādan başka başka gelüb manzūr-ı ‘ālī buyrulan telgraf-nāmelerden bahisle ol bābda şeref-sudūr olan irādāt-ı hikmet-gāyāt-ı Cenāb-ı Hilāfet-penāhiyi mübelliğ tezkire-i husūsī-yi ‘ātufileri melfūfātı ve bu maddeye dā’ir emāret-i müşārün-ileyhādān gelen beş kıt’a tahrīrāt ile meclis-i mahsūs-ı vükelāda lede’l-kıra’e hulāsa-i iş’ārāt-ı beynehümāda hāsıl olan tezāddı mü’eyyed olub vākı’ā irāde ü fermān buyurulduğı üzere böyle gā’ileleri bir zamānda ve öyle mühīm bir mevkīde bulunan iki büyük me’mūrun yek diğeri ‘aleyhine kıyām etmesi cā’iz ve münāsib olmayacağından kendilerine vesāya ve teblīgāt-ı lāzıme icrāsı kararlaştırılarak taraf-ı Senāverīden ol vech ile müşārün-ileyhümāya başka başka telgraflar yazılmışdı. Anın üzerine ihtilāf-ı vakı’ ke’en lem yekūn hükmüne konularak du‘ā-yı füzūnī-yi şevket ü iclāl-i zillu’llahinin tekrār okunmakda bulunduğı ifādesine dā’ir Emāret ve Vilāyet-i müşārün-ileyhümādan gelen müşterek telgraf-nāme-i manzūr-ı ‘ālī buyrulamak üzere leffen ‘arz ü takdīm kılındı Efendim. Fi 16 Rebi’ü’levvel 303 ve fi 11 Kannun-ı evvel 301.

Kāmil.

(2)

Bāb-ı ‘Ālī Dā’ire-i Sadāret-i ‘Uzmā

Telgrf Odası

Emāret-i Celīle-i Mekke-i mükerrreme ile Hicāz vilāyetinden müştereken Makām-ı Celīl-i Sadāret-penāhi’ye telgraf-nāme halli.

Fi Kanūn-ı evvel sene 301 tarihli telgraf-nāme-yi sāmi- yi Sadāret-penāhīlerinin mutazammın olduğu irāde-i seniyye-i Hazret-i Pādişāhī mü’cibince ihtilāf-ı vākī’ ke’en lem yekūn hükmüne konularak du‘ā-yı füzūnī-yi ‘ömr ü şevket-i Zillu’llahi’nin tekrār olunmakta bulunduğı ma’rūzdur. Fi 10 Kanūn-ı evvel sene 301.

Avnü’r-refīk

‘Osmān

HSD.CB 2/81 1305.M.16 (4 Ekim 1887)

23 Eylül sene 308 tārīhli telgraf-nāme-i Sāmī' nin hallidir.

Zāt-ı Devletleriyle Emāret-i Celīle arasında ba'zı mertebe ihtilāf ü beynūnet mevcūd idüğü mervī ve şū hal ise bir takım 'āmal-ı mahsūsa ashābından tertīb-i cūyānesi eserinden neş'et etmiş olacağı bedihī olarak mevki'in husūsiyet ve mukaddesiyetine nazaran mübāyenet-i vakı'ānın devāmı kat'an cā'iz olmayacağından şemiyye-i zimām-dānī-yi devletleri 'icābınca Emīr-i müşārün-ileyh ile hüsn-i vifāk ve imtizāc husūlū esbābından istikmālī ile her hāl ü kārda marzı-i 'āliye tevfk-i mu'amele ve hareket edilmesi bā-irāde-i seniyye tavsiye olunur. Emir-i müşārün-ileyhe de bu yolda icrā-yı vesāye edilmiştir.

Devletlü Efendim Hazretleri

Mekke-i Mükerreme Emâreti'nin tebeddülünden dolayı oralarca ba'zı mutala'ât ve tebligâtı mutazammın vârid olan tahrirât-ı behiyyeleri me'âl ve mezâyâsı rehîn-i 'ilm-i Hulûs-verî oldukdan sonra 'Atabe-i 'Ulyâ-yı Şevket-ihtivâ-yı Cenâb-ı Şehinşâhi'ye dahî 'arz ü takdîm ile manzûr-ı dakâyık-nuşûr-ı Hazret-i Şehriyârî buyrulmuştur. Li'l-lâhü'l-hamd sâye-i Şevket-vâye-i Hazret-i Mülûkâne'de Memâlik-i Mahrûsa-ı Cenâb-ı Pâdişâhî'nin her bir tarafında te'sîs buyrulmuş olan 'usûl-i 'adliyyenin havâlî-yi mübâreke-i Hicâziyye'de dahî hüsn-i te'kîd ve takrîri emrine taraf-ı vâlâlarından buyrulmakda olduğu sarf-ı himmet misillu devletlü siyâdetlü Şerîf 'Abdû'lmuttalîb Efendi Hazretleri'nin taraf-ı eşref-i Hazret-i Hilâfet-penâhîden bizzat iktibâs-ı envâr-ı terbiyet-i ma'delet eylemesi cihetiyle bu bâbda Zât-ı Vâlâlarıyla birlikte sarf-ı mesâ'i ve himmet edeceğine sıfat-ı zâtiyesi emniyet-bahş olacağına ve Emâret'in ahâvâl-i sâbıkasının bir sûret-i mahdûdeye konulması buraca dahî mütâlâ'a olunarak daha etrâflı tahdîd-i me'mûriyet ile emr-i 'âlî verildiğinden başka oraya vusûlünü müte'âkiben kendisine irsâli tasavvur olunan ta'lîmât dahî der-dest-i tanzîm olub bunun sûreti dahî taraf-ı vâlâlarına gönderileceğine binâ'en artık bunların üzerine oralarca matlûb olan hüsn-i hâlin husûlü kaviyyen ümîd olunub tebeddül-i emâret maddesi fi'l-hakîka iş'âr-ı müşârün-ileyh vechle havâlî-i Hicâziye'ce 'umûr-ı müşkîleden olduğu hâlde bi's-suhûle hüsn-i husûlü kâtibe-i ahvâlde meşhûd-ı dîde-i iftihârımız olan muvaffakiyet-i celîle-i Hazret-i Zî'l-lu'l-lahî'nin eser-i 'âlîsi ve bu yolda kullandıkları lisân ve tedâbir-i hâkimaneleri semere-i mü'essiresi olarak bu bâbda görülen mesa'i ve himmet-i düstûrâneleri cümleden makbûl ve şâyân-ı takdîr-i 'âlî olduğunu tebşîr ile berâber bâdemâ dahî fetânet ve revîyyet-i zâtiye ve kâmile-i düstûrâneleri üzre umûr-ı mevkûle-i müşîrânelerinde ibrâz-ı mü'essir mehâm-dâni ve fetanet-şî'âriyye sarf-ı himmet buyurmaları matlûb-ı 'âlî idüğü ifâdesiyle cevâb-nâme-i senâveri terkîm kılındı.

Mustafâ Reşîd

24 Za 67.

The *Emirs* of Mecca and the Ottoman Government of Hijaz, 1840-1908

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ABSTRACT

The *Emirs* of Mecca and the Ottoman Government of Hijaz, 1840-1908

by

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This thesis is a study of the *Emirs* of Mecca as local notables of a distinguished lineage that differentiated them from notables elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It concentrates on the relations of power the *Emaret* of Mecca had with the Ottoman government and on the rule of the Hijaz, and especially their relations with the *Vilayet* with which the *Emirs* had to share local power. The thesis, taking Ottoman archival sources as its principle source, questions the nature of the relationship between the two institutions, looking into the aspects of conflict and cooperation between them as *foci* of local power.

The thesis also underlines the importance the Hijaz held for the Ottoman Empire in this era of heightened awareness over Islamic sources of legitimacy and in the face of foreign challenge to this legitimacy and its rule in the Hijaz. The study engages in a discussion of how the Emirate was incorporated into the Ottoman system of rule, and the policies and attitudes of the imperial center towards the Emirate, showing reverence and making use of its local power and influence, but at the same time trying to keep local power under check. The thesis, overall, argues that

the relation between the Emirate and the Ottoman state was not a simple conflict between a local centrifugal force and a centralizing imperial state, but one that included integration and the negotiation of power in a relationship with more than just one dimension.

KISA ÖZET

Mekke Emirleri ve Hicaz'da Osmanlı İdaresi, 1840-1908

Nurtaç Numan

Bu tez sahip oldukları mümtaz soyla 19. yüzılın sonu ve 20. yüzılın başlarında imparatorluğun diğır yerlerindeki yerel ileri gelenlerden ayrılan Mekke Emirleri hakkında bir çalışmadır. Daha ziyade Mekke Emareti'nin Osmanlı hükümetiyle olan ilişkileri, Hicaz'daki idare, ve özellikle de Emirler'in yerel gücü paylaşmak zorunda kaldıkları Vilayet ile ilişkileri üzerinde durulmaktadır. Osmanlı arşiv kaynaklarının temel kaynak olarak kullanıldığı tezde, bu iki kurumun ilişkilerinin doğası incelenmiş ve bu yerel güç odakları arasındaki ilişkinin çatışma ve işbirliği unsurlarına bakılmıştır.

Bu tez aynı zamanda Osmanlı imparatorluğu için İslami meşruiyetin öneminin arttığı ve yabancı güçlerin bu meşruiyete ve İmparatorluğun Hicaz'daki hakimiyetine karşı meydan okuduğu bu devrede Hicaz'ın artan önemine değinir. Çalışma Emaret'in nasıl Osmanlı idari sistemine dahil kılındığına ve İmparatorluk merkezinin Emaret'e nasıl bir siyaset ve tavırla yaklaştığına değinir. Osmanlı devletinin bir yandan neseblerinden dolayı hürmet edip yerel güç ve tesirinden yararlanırken, diğır yandan Emaret'in gücünü nasıl kontrol altında tutmaya çalıştığını gösterir. Altı çizilmeye çalışan nokta, bu dönemde Emaret ile Osmanlı

devletinin arasındaki ilişkinin yerel, adem-i merkeziyetçi bir güç ile merkeziyetçi bir imparatorluk gücü arasındaki basit bir çatışmadan ibaret olmadığı, bunun daha ziyade entegrasyon ve müzakereye dayanan çok boyutlu bir ilişki olduğudur.

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