

TR
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTE
EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT

EUROPEAN UNION’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS

Master Thesis

Efsun elik

İstanbul - 2005

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Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Armağan E. Çakır

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ÖZET

Bu yüksek lisans çalışmasının amacı, Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) kriz yönetimi yeteneklerini, bu alandaki sorunlar ve olasılıklara atıfta bulunarak analiz etmektir. Çalışmanın temel argümanı, Avrupa Birliği'nin kriz yönetimi operasyonlarını gerçekleştirmek için önemli araçlara ve yeteneklere sahip olduğudur. Bunun yanı sıra, Avrupa Birliği önemli bir küresel güç olma yolunda gerekli olan potansiyele ve iradeye de sahiptir. Çalışma temel argümanını desteklemek için örnek olaylardaki, özellikle Avrupa Birliği'nin Balkanlarda gerçekleştirdiği kriz yönetimi operasyonlarındaki, AB'nin askeri ve sivil kriz yönetimi yeteneklerini inceleyerek bütünlükçü bir çerçeve ve mukayeseli bir tahlil oluşturmaya çabalamaktadır.

Birinci bölüm, kriz yönetiminin farklı görünüşlerini değerlendirerek, tezin teorik çerçevesini çizmektedir. İkinci bölümde, Avrupa'da Soğuk Savaş sonrasında kriz yönetiminin gelişimi açıklanmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde, AB'nin kriz yönetimi araçları ve yetenekleri incelenmektedir. Dördüncü bölümde, AB'nin Bosna ve Hersek ile Eski Yugoslav Makedonya Cumhuriyeti'nde gerçekleştirdiği kriz yönetimi operasyonları, bu tezin ana argümanını desteklemek üzere incelenmektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin bir kriz yönetimi sistemi geliştirme yolundaki sorunları ve bu sorunlarla başa çıkabilmek için önerilen yollar beşinci bölümde tartışılmaktadır. Çalışma, AB'nin, eksiklerine rağmen, kısa sayılabilecek bir sürede kriz yönetimi alanında önemli bir aktör olarak ortaya çıktığı sonucuna varmaktadır. AB misyonları, Birliğin kriz yönetimi operasyonlarını yürütebilecek yeteneğe sahip olduğunu göstermiş ve gerçekçi beklentiler ile AB bayrağı altında askeri ve sivil kuvvetlerin konuşlandırılmasını sağlayacak olası senaryoların geliştirilmesini mümkün kılmıştır.

ABSTRACT

This study aims at analyzing the capabilities of European Union's crisis management, with particular reference to its problems and prospects. The main argument of the study is that the European Union (EU) has considerable means and capabilities to conduct crisis management operations, and it also has the potential and the will to become an important global actor. In order to support the main argument of this study, the study seeks to build a comprehensive framework and a comparative analysis by examining European Union's military and civilian crisis management capabilities in test cases, particularly in European Union's crisis management operations conducted in the Balkans region.

The first chapter sets the theoretical framework of this study; evaluating the different aspects of crisis management. In the second chapter, the evolution of crisis management in the post-Cold War era in Europe is explained. In third chapter, the capabilities and instruments of the European Union's crisis management are examined. In the fourth chapter, European Union's crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are scrutinized to evaluate the European Union's crisis management capability, in an effort to support the main argument of the study. The problems of the EU in developing a crisis management system and suggesting ways to deal with them are discussed in the fifth chapter. The study reaches the conclusion that despite its shortcomings the EU has successfully emerged as an important actor in the field of crisis management in a quite short time. The EU-led missions show the Union's ability to conduct crisis management operations and make the case for developing realistic expectations and potential scenarios for the deployment of military and civilian forces under the EU flag.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACE	Allied Command Force
AET	Agency Establishment Team
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces South Europe
ARRC	Allied Command European Rapid Reaction Corps
AWACS	Advanced Warning and Command Aircrafts
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control and Communications
C3I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization
CESDP/ESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy/European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COREPER	Permanent Representatives Committee
CPU	Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DG	Directorate-General
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	European Political Community

ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Forces
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to WEU
FIGHT	Fight Against Human Trafficking
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreements
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
GNP	Gross National Product
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
HQ	Headquarters
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MOC	Major Organized Crime
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRF	NATO Response Force

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PCG	Policy Coordination Group
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
RELEX	Relations Extérieures
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
PSC	Political and Security Committee (COPS in French)
SAA	Stabilization and Associations Agreements
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SBS	State Border Service
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SG/HR	Secretary-General/High Representative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIPA	State Information and Protection Agency
SITCEN	Situation Centre
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNPROFOR	UN Protection/Protective Force
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group
WE	Western Union
WEU	Western European Union

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INTRODUCTION

Europe had to deal with conflicts and instabilities in the twentieth century. The continent faced two destructive world wars and a Cold War, where peace was achieved only at the price of the continuous threat of a possible third war. In the Cold War, a division of two ideological fronts dominated the international relations. These fronts created two military alliances: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and The Warsaw Pact. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the unification of Germany in October 1990, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and the dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe, marked the end of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has changed. The previous emphasis on the military component of security has decreased, armed forces have been reduced and restructured, and defence budgets have declined. Perceptions about what meant by security, and the nature of the challenges to security have widened since the end of 1980s. Security is now generally interpreted as meaning more than stability or non-war. It has become clear that security is indivisible in the sense that internal and external security issues are related to each other. A state cannot project security without itself being secure. Since 1989 events in Europe have forced us to reassess the concept of security, and that has brought three points into sharp focus, says Lunn (1993: 52-52):

- First, that the long-term solutions to causes of instability and insecurity in Europe today lie outside the military sphere – in areas such as trade, investment and environmental assistance.
- Second, that the military component of security has been reduced but it has not disappeared.
- Third, that security in Europe is now indivisible. This emphasizes the need for collective action. No single country can realistically achieve security based on unilateral advantage: the insecurity of one country affects the security of its neighbors.

Security has always depended on a variety of factors such as the threat of external aggression and domestic stability. Today Europe faces new challenges such as ethnic and nationalist conflicts, migration, international terrorism, environmental degradation, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of organized crime, the smuggling of arms, drugs. In the post-Cold war era, security is the ability to cope with immediate crises, and for the longer term to reduce, where possible, the drivers and causes of instability, addressing fundamental causes, and security also involves having and being prepared to use some effective military forces (Hopkinson, 2001).

The scope of the new security agenda evokes the questions of how European security should be organized, in which institutional framework, and covering which area. It becomes obvious that no single organization is equipped to deal with the mosaic of problems affecting security in Europe. In this new security environment, in order to tackle the new security challenges, Europe has to develop a fundamentally new security system. This system should include political, economic and military changes, and provide a flexible and secure framework for permanent peace. International organizations, especially NATO, Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU), have to adapt themselves to the post Cold War conditions in order to develop a comprehensive security system for Europe.

From its inception as the European Community (EC), the EU has been regarded as a project for bringing peace to Europe. Starting in the 1940s, significant efforts were made to create a lasting security, economic and political infrastructure in Western Europe. Institutions that were created at that time, from the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to the Council of Europe and from NATO to the European Coal and Steel Community and finally the EU, form an indispensable framework of stability. Although the idea of a European security and defence policy was not invented at the end of the Cold War, it was given new life with the break down of bipolarity in Europe. The new security agenda was seen to provide the EU with the opportunity to forge a role for itself as the key security agent in Europe (Sjursen, 1998: 95). Lenzi (1999) contends that many dramatic developments (maybe decisively the Kosovo crisis) contribute to push the EU to the fore on the security stage.

Western European Union had been regarded as a crisis management organization in the post-war era. It became the defence arm of the European Union with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. In order to help Europe to develop a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and to provide a balanced partnership between the North America and the European member countries of the Alliance, NATO initiated the concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). European Security and Defence Identity has served both as an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures, and as an important element of the development of the European Union's security and defence policy. The parallel processes of the development of an ESDI in NATO and an ESDP in the EU have been carried forward on the basis of the European Union's Treaties, declarations made by Western European Union and the European Union, and decisions taken by the Alliance at the summits, as well as NATO Ministerial meetings.

As a result of the Kosovo crisis, which escalated in 1998, the European Union member states had agreed to expand the Common Foreign and Security Policy to include a defence aspect, thus giving birth to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This new policy was outlined in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 European Council meetings in Helsinki and Cologne, which marked the demise of WEU as it was decided that the EU would take on the crisis management tasks of the WEU by the end of 2000. The ESDP represents an aim to combine all civilian and military instruments in order to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises.

The European Union has adopted a Headline Goal to strengthen its civilian and military crisis response capabilities. In this direction, the European Union has been developing a review mechanism to sustain the implementation of this goal, and has enhanced its institutional capacity by establishing permanent political and military staffs in Brussels. These efforts help to strengthen the European Union's capacity to manage low-intensity crises, which have dominated the post-Cold War security environment. If the European Security and Defence Policy can successfully be carried through, the European Union will emerge as an important actor in the field of crisis management. European Security and Defence Policy will be the main framework for carrying out humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, collectively known as the Petersberg Tasks.

The basic argument of this study is that the EU has considerable means and capabilities to conduct crisis management operations, and it also has the potential and the will to become an important global actor. However, the effective use of these capabilities and success of the operations depend on factors such as political will, cohesion and coordination. The EU is aware these factors and aims to deal with its shortcomings, and to improve its capabilities, especially the military ones. Actually, the EU is making good progresses in both areas of military and civilian capabilities. The EU can resort to a whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations with the enhancement and application of military and civilian crisis response tools. Therefore, it can be asserted that these measures will enable the Union to become an important international crisis management actor. In order to support the main argument of this study, the study seeks to build a comprehensive framework and a comparative analysis by examining EU's military and civilian crisis management capabilities in test cases, particularly in EU's crisis management operations conducted in the Balkans region. In other words, the strengths and weaknesses of EU's crisis management capabilities, and overall EU's status in crisis management field are examined through the practices of EU in the Balkans region

The central focus of the study is the European Union's crisis management capabilities, with particular reference to problems and prospects of this capability. Chapter one of the study examines the mechanisms and procedures of crisis management. A theoretical approach to conflict leads one to identify three dimensions, which can also be expressed as chronological phases of the definition conflict. Thus, the first chapter of the study seeks to conceptualize these dimensions, which are conflict prevention, crisis (and / or conflict) management, and conflict resolution. One has to bring all the dimensions together in order to tackle crises and to provide security in Europe.

Chapter two portrayed an overall historical background of crisis management in Europe under the auspices of WEU, NATO and the EU. Chapter three examines the capabilities and instruments of the European Union's crisis management as the role of the European Union on the international scene depends in great measure on the quality and efficiency of its instruments.

Chapter four is devoted to analyze the EU-led missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to evaluate the European Union's crisis management capability. The European Union has started to take on crisis management operations on the ground since January 2003. The European Union engaged in four missions in 2003; The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia Herzegovina, which represents the European Union's first civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP; the Concordia mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is the first military crisis management operation; the Proxima mission, which is a follow on civilian crisis management mission to Concordia in FYROM; and the Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is the first military operation outside Europe and, unlike the other missions, does not rely on NATO assistance. Balkans can be considered as a testing ground for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy. The EU also engaged in another operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004.

An assessment of the EU's efforts to develop a comprehensive and formidable security system in order to tackle the new threats, discussed in previous chapters, is made in the fifth section. The problems of the EU in developing a crisis management system are analyzed in the fifth section to put forth the institutional, political, material and leadership shortcomings and suggesting ways to deal with them.

I. CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENTIATION

There is a proliferation of terms regarding the management, prevention and settlement of violent conflicts: preventive diplomacy, preventive action, crisis prevention, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace making, peace building, conflict management and crisis management. Some definitions of these terms overlap with each other, and sometimes the same term can mean different activities (Smith, 2003: 155). For example, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union use different terminology and definitions. “Peace enforcement” for the UN means “peace making” for the EU (military action to maintain to or restore international peace), while “peace making” for the UN means diplomatic and other non-military measures to resolve conflict. In this study, the terms of conflict and crisis, and crisis management and crisis response are used interchangeably in order to avoid any confusion over the terminology.

A theoretical approach to conflict leads one to identify three dimensions, which can also be expressed as chronological phases. One has to bring all the dimensions together in order to tackle crises and to provide security. Hill (2001: 330) clarifies these phases as:

“Conflict prevention looks to prevent violent trials of strength even from breaking out, and is necessarily a long-term project, although it may require urgent interventions at the last minute; *conflict* (and/or *crisis*) management is directed towards escalation once conflict has begun, and has been a familiar part of conventional strategic thought since 1962 – it is a short-term, firefighting operation; *conflict resolution* is concerned with trying to re-establish peace, preferably on a permanent basis, after the failure of prevention and management strategies. It is largely a matter of the medium term.”

On the other hand, Missiroli defines conflict prevention and crisis management as follows:

“(...) Conflict prevention is seen as encompassing a wide array of instruments (political, economic and military) as well as of types of actions related to the various causes (structural, proximate and occasional) of a given crisis. In turn *crisis management* proper is seen as more contingency-oriented and short term, and may imply a more direct use of military means (peace-enforcement and peace-keeping) and ‘negative’ diplomacy (sanctions, embargoes, freezing of relations). As such, crisis

management entails crisis assessment, crisis response and termination, and post-crisis rehabilitation or peace-building (which, in turn, may become a tool to prevent the recurrence of the same conflict in the future).” Missiroli (2001a: 186)

The main aim of this chapter is to define these three concepts. First, it attempts to explain the concept of “conflict prevention”, which is usually defined as a long-term project will be explained. Secondly, the concept of “conflict resolution”, which is often termed as a medium-term project is discussed. Finally, the concept of “crisis management”, which is frequently categorized as a short-term project is analyzed. The central focus of this study is the EU’s crisis management capability. Therefore, the concept of crisis management is discussed in more detail when compared to the other two concepts.

1.1. The concept of conflict prevention

Conflict prevention¹ meant to prevent nuclear war between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union by a strategy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. The Cold War did not reduce all violent conflicts, but frequently conflicts became theatres of US-Soviet competition. The United Nations tried to defuse crises and resolve conflicts, and thus prevent or limit superpower involvement, through the quiet diplomacy of its Secretary Generals and peacekeeping, but these efforts were not publicized as conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy.²

Several conflicts ended with the end of the Cold War, but new ones broke out, frequently within states. A revived UN tried to resolve many conflicts. However, these conflicts led to significant casualties, which urged the international community to take action before those conflicts broke out. Furthermore, dealing with these conflicts was expensive. As Smith (2003: 149) points out:

¹ Initially the European Union’s preferred term was “preventive diplomacy”, but now the EU is using the term “conflict prevention”. The European Commission’s definition of conflict prevention is limited to actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and / or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. The Commission’s terminology evolved in 2001, as it grouped both long-term (which it called the projection of stability) and short-term (quick reaction to nascent conflicts) efforts under the general rubric of conflict prevention. The Council defines the term “conflict prevention” as targeting the trigger factors and root causes of violent conflicts. The Council’s definition of conflict prevention encompasses both short-term and long-term efforts (Smith, 2003: 156-157).

² This paragraph is a summary of information taken from Smith (2003: 149).

“For example, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia cost over \$1 billion a year from 1993 to 1995, and the lives of 120 soldiers; EU member states paid a large part of this cost. The estimated cost in 1996 of the NATO Implementation Force, which enforced the Dayton peace agreement, was \$5 billion. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees spent \$1 billion between 1991 and 1996 on emergency assistance. And this of course leaves out of the costs of the conflict for the people of the former Yugoslavia and neighboring states, of housing Yugoslav refugees in host countries, of lost trade and of reconstruction.”

The costs of conflicts led the considerations of how to prevent them from breaking out in the first place. Therefore, attention was paid to conflict prevention, especially after the end of the Cold War. Many international organizations indicate a widespread consensus that conflicts can and should be prevented. According to the United Nations³:

“Conflict prevention is intended to prevent human suffering and act as an alternative to costly politico-military operations to resolve conflicts after they have broken out. Although preventive diplomacy is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, and is still the primary political measure for preventing and resolving conflicts, the United Nations’ experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that can have a useful preventive effect, including: preventive deployment; preventive disarmament; development projects in the context of a prevention strategy and humanitarian action. These can involve, with the consent of the Government or Governments concerned, a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights and economic and social development. Conflict prevention is one of the primary obligations of Member States set forth in the UN Charter.

Preventive action refers to measures to prevent disputes from arising, to resolve them before they escalate into conflicts or to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur. Preventive diplomacy, in particular, may take the form of mediation, conciliation or negotiation. Early warning is an essential component of prevention, and the United Nations carefully monitors political and other developments around the world to detect threats to international peace and security, (...).”

Almost all present-day disputes and conflicts are multidimensional (Rotfeld, 1997: 66). They include political, military, economic, legal, cultural and humanitarian aspects and subjects including those of religion, language, and minority rights (Rotfeld, 1997: 66). Preventive diplomacy should not be limited to one of those aspects but rather should take into account a broad spectrum of issues (Rotfeld, 1997: 66). The UN also takes into consideration the concept of structural prevention in the context of conflict prevention. Poverty, socio-economic inequalities, weak institutions, the absence of good governance,

³ http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm.

violations of human rights can provide the conditions that lead to conflict. Measures, which are taken to address the wide range of long-term institutional, political and development activities, belong to structural prevention and support national efforts in addressing the root causes of potential conflict situations.

1.2. The concept of conflict resolution

Conflict and violence within societies, and conflict between them over territories and resources, are part of history. Traditional and conventional knowledge have held that such differing and antisocial behaviors are to be controlled and prevented by education, backed by punitive action. At the international level, aggressive behaviors are to be contained by power balances and by international institutions. Such controls have not been highly effective at any stage. Violence has become out of control with the new technologies used in conflicts at both national and international levels. As Burton (1996: 1) remarks:

“Empirical evidence suggests that a great deal of conflict and violence is provoked by such circumstances as childhood environments, the absence of job opportunities, insecurities experienced because of a minority status, resource deprivations, and post colonial boundaries that cut through ethnic communities. To the extent that this is so the remedy must be to deal with these problems at their source by whatever structural changes are required, thereby resolving specific problems and preventing others from occurring. Such problem-solving and problem-avoidance policies would have to take into account all behavioral, cultural, institutional, and environmental circumstances.”

There are disputes over contending interests in many social relationships. These may be settled by discussion, but they are more likely to require mediation by a neutral party. Processes include arbitration, adjudication, negotiation, mediation and combinations of these. Whenever compromise is willingly acceptable, disputes can be settled without further deterioration in relationships. Conflicts are struggles between opposing forces, implying that the issues are more serious than those relating to disputes. The dispute settlement processes have been applied to all situations with no conceptual distinction made between the nature of disputes and conflicts. The dispute settlement processes include bargaining and negotiation, and also some degree of persuasion and coercion. Parties may feel that they have no option but to accept outcomes for some reasons such as, the stronger bargaining power of the other side, the legal norms being applied within the

mediation process, the costs of taking the matter further by court action. But, in many cases problems recur after there is a settlement. As Burton (1996: 8) states:

“Experience has thus drawn attention to differences between “disputes,” which can be settled by compromise, and “conflicts,” which involve issues on which there cannot be compromise. At all social levels, from family to the international, there are problems in social relationships that involve emotions and deep-seated needs in respect of which there can be no compromise. Such conflicts must be *resolved*, rather than *settled*. The dispute-settlement processes are inappropriate. Analytical processes are required that uncover the sources of the problem and deal with them accordingly.”

Burton further adds:

“Resolution within a power frame has the connotation of determination or firmness. Resolving has the connotation of bringing an argument to an end. Conflict resolution has a quite different meaning. It implies problem solving by deeply analytical means. No element of coercion is implied. The implication is that all parties to the conflict freely agree once they have redefined and reperceived relationships, and once they have done their costing, that is once they have examined and taken into account all the relevant elements of relationships.”⁴ (Burton, 1996: 40)

Conflict resolution is a widely and commonly used and a popular term in current international relations literature. Conflict resolution as a social science began to emerge in 1956, with the foundation of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. A significant literature on “Conflict Analysis and Resolution” evolved during the late 1970s. According to this literature, resolution was seen possible, not through goodwill and an altered value system, but by a realistic analysis of situations and an assessment of the costs and consequences of policies. According to Burton (1996: 4-5):

“Conflict analysis first sought the explanation for the failure of traditional power elite and deterrent strategies. To do so there had to be examinations of conflicts at all social levels – family, ethnic, industrial and international. The research processes included bringing parties to benefit from the exercise. Accordingly, the research process was modified to become a conflict resolving process. A decade or so later sources of conflict were becoming clearer. Teaching centers and institutes for “Conflict Analysis and Resolution” were established. Perhaps the most significant discovery made during this period was that the goals that could not be compromised were shared common human

⁴ Interestingly the European Commission defines the term as “actions undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict”, which does not match this definition.

aspirations. There were “human needs”⁵ of identity and recognition that kept surfacing, leading to behaviors that could be violent as, for example, the pursuit of secession by minorities, and of independence by colonial peoples. Being inherent these needs were shared needs. Once they were mutually recognized by the parties concerned in a particular conflict, and once it was realized that no relative power position could eliminate the problem, viable options were eagerly explored.”

Problem solving approach is generally termed as conflict resolution approach. As Ayman (1998: 170) indicates, conflict resolution, or problem solving has a special meaning. Hence, conflict resolution means a kind of implementation through an analytical framework. It is designed to assist conflicting parties acknowledge their behaviors, and correctly calculate the results of those behaviors.

1.3. The concept of crisis management

Although military-security crises have been pervasive in the twentieth century and were present in all historical eras, crisis was only recognized in the 1960s as a distinct phenomenon in world politics. While several international relations analysts have devoted many years of effort to gain a better “understanding of crisis behavior”, the others have attempted to develop a “theory of crisis behavior” that might yield systematic knowledge of for the study of crisis and for crisis management⁶ and resolution (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997: 479). According to Brecher (1993: 500):

“Interstate crisis is a distinct source of disruption in the politics among the nations. It is, at the same time, closely related to conflict and war, for all are integral parts of international conflict. In terms of conflict space, war is a subset of crisis; that is, all wars are subsumed in crises, but not all crises involve violence, let alone full-scale war; in fact, half do not. Crises are not spasmodic but, rather, definable, recurrent events. They erupt in pre-war, intra-war and post-war settings. And they occur within or outside a protracted conflict between states.”

⁵ It is the notion of human needs that separates power theories from conflict resolution theory. Traditionally, it has been accepted that there are human needs for food and shelter, and that persons will struggle to have these needs satisfied.

⁶ The European Commission is using the term conflict management. Conflict management is defined as “actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts”. The Council is using the term crisis management, with a slightly different definition. In their definition: Crisis management addresses acute phases of conflicts, supporting efforts to end violence.

Brecher (1993: 501) also notes that an interstate crisis clarifies in a logical sequence, in four pairs of phase and period: onset/pre-crisis, escalation/crisis, de-escalation/end crisis, and impact/post-crisis. Onset identifies the initial phase of an international crisis (Brecher, 1993: 25). Escalation denotes much more intense disruption than onset and a qualitative increase in the possibility of military hostilities (Brecher, 1993: 26). De-escalation is the counterpart of escalation, that is, the winding-down of a crisis (Brecher, 1993: 26). Impact designates the phase following crisis termination, that is, the counterpart of post-crisis or beyond crisis at the actor level of analysis (Brecher, 1993: 27). Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1997: 482) define the concept of crisis management as follows:

“Crisis management, (...) is the ability of one of the parties, by credibly threatening escalation, to deter its adversary from escalation and to produce a crisis de-escalation outcome in accord with its interests. This does not mean, however, that a crisis ends only when one adversary party capitulates or backs away. A crisis may also be resolved through a process in which both contestants exercise restraints and seek a face-saving path of mutual retreat or a compromise that transforms the situation without being incompatible with the irreducible interests of either. Nor does it mean that there is universal agreement among theorists concerned with crisis behavior about the dual relationship between military power and escalation dominance, or between deterrence capabilities and crisis management.”

States use various crisis management techniques (CMTs) to cope with crises. As Brecher (1993: 36) notes:

“These range from *negotiation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication (pacific techniques)*, to *non-military pressure, non-violent acts*, and ultimately, to *indirect and direct violence*: Violent behavior generates more acute value threat, fear and mistrust among adversaries than does negotiation, mediation or other pacific CMTs. More intense violence creates more disruption than do minor clashes. And when adversaries resort to war, the ensuing legacy beyond a crisis will be higher tension. Whichever technique of crisis management is used, the content of escalation, deescalation and impact will be affected.”

Almost all instabilities, whether they occur at the level of the international system or its subsystems, are closely related with the interests of more than one actor. Therefore, in the case of getting rid of instabilities, a great number of actors engage in solution programmes (Dedeoğlu, 2003: 18). Various different actors like one or more security organizations, one or more leader states directly interested in stability, states that are not

related with any security organization, other international organizations, non-government organizations, pressure and interest groups and civil organizations come together to solve instabilities, and they constitute the parties of any crisis management (Dedeoğlu, 2003: 18).

States, which can resort to the use of force, also take the concept of crisis management into consideration in the cases of general, regional or sub-regional crisis. According to Dedeoğlu, the concept of “crisis management” means a multinational intervention against instability. States are developing their multinational operational capabilities, and their leadership capabilities for the purposes of conducting these types of operations. They try to develop modern technology, and to reduce their error percentage in target determination for such purposes. States are also developing their rapid and coordinated decision-making capability. Crisis management is mostly known as finding a political solution in the shadow of a deterrent military power. Therefore, initially a deterrent power is essential for crisis management. This power depends on overseas presence and force projection. This type of multinational force configurations is mostly preferred because they provide the participating states with the opportunity to reduce their military spending. Multinational force configurations also provide international legitimacy.⁷

In general terms, crisis management can be defined as providing consultation and aid service in security and political subjects in the crisis areas. Crisis management, which foresees practical cooperation in emergency situations within the framework of humanitarian objectives, enforces specific political and/or military construction. Actors, which engage in cooperation for crisis management purposes, reorganize their operational, planning and combat capabilities, political-military structures. This harmonization process takes various forms due to the nature of crisis, and the type and capabilities of the participating actors (Dedeoğlu, 2003: 222).

⁷ This paragraph is a summary of information taken from Dedeoğlu (2003: 219).

1.3.1. The phases of crisis management

Crisis management is a broad political term. This term encompasses gradual and various operations. Although the legal definitions foresee no clear-cut differentiations among the categories of crisis management, it is possible to differentiate and enlist such categories as follows⁸:

- **Preventive diplomacy:** This constitutes the first phase of crisis management, which denotes the diplomatic initiatives that serve to prevent any outbreak of crisis. It refers to the full range of methods described in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter – viz. negotiation, mediation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means – when applied before a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. Early preventive diplomacy involves the provision of skilled assistance through good offices, mediation and the like in order to resolve disputes well before outbreak into armed conflict. Late preventive diplomacy refers to attempts to convince parties to cease when such outbreaks seem imminent (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001: 5). The diplomatic initiatives can contain: disarmament of the crisis area, launching at humanitarian aid activities, providing a political dialogue for the adversary governments, providing economic and social development plans, carrying out mediation initiatives, and proposing programmes, which aim to support democratic structures.
- **Preventive deployment:** This is the deployment of operational forces (military or police, and, possibly civilian, personnel) possessing sufficient deterrent capabilities with the intention of preventing a dispute (or, in some cases, emerging threat) escalating into armed conflict. Such deployment could occur on one side of a border only at the request of the state feeling threatened, or on both sides of the border at the request of both parties.

⁸ The phases of crisis management are differentiated and enlisted in various ways in various sources (e.g. Dedeoğlu, 2003: 219-221; ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001: 5-6). Because there is no obvious differentiation in this subject, the categorization is made by using a mixture of different categorizations.

- **Peace making:** Peace making operations (including the use of military forces in order to end a violent conflict) take place if the outbreak of any conflict was not prevented by means of diplomatic initiatives or preventive deployment.⁹ These operations include all types of operations carried out by NATO, the UN and EU's rapid reaction forces to end violent conflicts immediately. The activities of "Peace Force" units settled between the conflicting parties; NATO's Kosovo Operation (Operation Allied Force) and activities of Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can be considered as the examples of this kind of operations. In peace making operations military assets can also be used besides diplomatic, economic and political assets because such operations may contain peace enforcement (Dedeoğlu, 2003: 220). Peace enforcement can be considered as a different type of category, which can be considered under peace making.
 - **Peace enforcement:** This is the threat or use of military force, in pursuit of peaceful objectives, in response to conflicts or other major security crises. Peace enforcement operations are undertaken under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish buffer zone or to enforce a cease-fire or to enforce the terms specified in the mandate.
- **Peacekeeping:** It is the phase and the policy comprising of the period after the ending of the dispute between the conflicting parties by means of settling it. Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all parties to a conflict in order to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement. This involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian, personnel to assist in the

⁹ The United Nations' definition of peace making is different. Peace making covers diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanction. As with the preventive action, the United Nations can often play a role if the parties to the dispute agree that it should do so. Peace making thus excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity, which is referred as "peace enforcement" in the UN jargon. Peace making has at least two distinct chronological dimensions. Initial peace making efforts will usually be aimed at the immediate goals of cessation of hostilities, and stabilization of the situation on the ground; subsequent efforts – which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a peacekeeping mission – might rather be aimed at securing a durable political settlement (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001: 5).

implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict. As Last (2003: 1) notes, peacekeeping is not a 20th century phenomenon. The word has religious origins and associations since the 16th century. The word peacekeeper entered in political discourse in 1886. The concepts of peacekeeping, peace making and peace building became embedded and differentiated since the end of the Cold War (Last, 2003: 1-2). Dedeoğlu (2003: 221) defines peacekeeping as, “It means “de facto” establishment of peace.” Peacekeeping operations have a broad scope. Peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of the UN Peace Force activities include establishing reconciling mechanisms for the relationship between conflicting parties, preventing an outbreak of conflict among societies, preventing the parties from resorting military power, enforcing the parties to act in conformity with the international law, and, finally, taking military measures if necessary. Peacekeeping operations may also encompass humanitarian and refugee aid. According to the NATO Briefing (2003: 6):

“Peacekeeping has changed greatly since the end of the Cold War. In the process, it has become a more complex, comprehensive and dangerous activity. Today, the classical task of serving as a “neutral” buffer between consenting parties has evolved into operations geared towards managing political, economic and social change, often under different circumstances.

Operational planning and conflict management strategies need to take into account the changing dynamics of peacekeeping. In many cases, it is neither possible nor desirable to seek to re-establish the situation that existed before conflict. Instead, the parties need help to build a new society.”

- **Peace building:** Peace building denotes the phase, in which operations to establish permanent peace in the areas where the peace making and peacekeeping operations have been carried out. It is the longest phase, which indicates establishing a legal and “de jure” peace status in the crisis area. In addition to indicating inter-state partnership, peace building activities also denote inter-organizational cooperation. Moreover, nowadays, no single organization takes the sole responsibility in peace building operations, but they cooperate with each other (Dedeoğlu, 2003: 221). Peace building refers to all external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, and includes all activities and programmes designed to support and strengthen these transitions. Peace building covers actions, which

support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to set and strengthen political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures, which can play a role in consolidating peace, advance a sense of confidence and well being, and support economic reconstruction. These efforts range from demilitarization to the building up of national institutions. According to NATO Briefing (2003: 6):

“In many current conflicts, the very nature of the state is at issue. As a result, the international community finds itself called upon to reform dysfunctional institutions, including the state administration, the legal system and even the local media. In addition to the military aspect, many other activities have become integral parts of a peace-building operation. Only, a careful, well-planned and coordinated combination of civilian and military measures can create the conditions for long-term, self-sustaining stability and peace.”

However, the phases of crisis management cannot always be carried out in this order in a certain crisis. For example, when the diplomatic process starts to work for a new arrangement after a cease-fire, military engagement among the conflicting parties may break out again. Therefore, peace building and peacekeeping operations are usually carried out simultaneously.

1.3.2. The assets and capabilities of crisis management

The way of dealing with a crisis depends on its nature, scale and seriousness. Depending on these features, different assets and capabilities can be used in crisis management operations. The required assets and capabilities in a crisis management operation can be listed as follows¹⁰:

- **Flexibility and mobility:** The flexible use and timely deployment of forces is dependent on effective support arrangements based upon the best use of available resources. It requires a high degree of operational flexibility and complementary levels of mobility, and places a premium on achieving effective interoperability,

¹⁰ Assets and capabilities of crisis management are enlisted in various ways in different sources (e.g. Okman, 2001: 158; Haine, 2004: 44-45). Therefore, by means of putting these categorizations together, the above categorization is made.

standardization, logistic support, and command, control and communications. Future support arrangements must clearly be adopted to ensure the initial movement, the support in transit, the containment of combat power and the possible redeployment of back up forces.

There are two forms of mobility: strategic and tactical mobility. Strategic mobility is defined as the capability to deploy and sustain military forces. It is the capability of a force to move readily in advance of engagement with a hostile force. Strategic mobility is the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support in a timely and effective manner over continental or intercontinental distances, and when the time comes, to bring them back (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002: 7). This transport can take place between theatres (inter-theatre) or between regions (inter-regional). Tactical mobility is distinct from strategic mobility in that the latter refers to long haul or inter-theatre transport, while the former concerns mostly shorter distance or in-theatre capability (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002: 7). Strategic mobility does not only refer to the ability to field forces and equipment quickly but also to the ability to sustain such troops and equipment over distance and time (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002: 7).

- **Deployability:** Deployability is the ability to deploy forces quickly where they are needed. Deployability encompasses two elements: readiness and strategic mobility. Readiness refers to the time when, following a decision on the forces required, a unit can be made ready to perform its assigned tasks, but it does not include transit time to the area of operations. Strategic mobility refers to transit time or the ability to relocate one's forces and equipment to a desired area of operations. Both elements are critical in terms of their impact on deployability targets, because it is no use having forces at very high readiness if one cannot move them in theatre (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002: 5 [her footnote 11]).
- **Sustainability:** Sustainability is the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations. Sustainability refers to the ability of a force to maintain necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.

- **Command and control:** Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of a mission.
- **Survivability:** Survivability is the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats.
- **Interoperability:** Interoperability is the ability to achieve coordination between forces and use them interchangeably. The forces are compatible with each other to enable forces from different countries, with different language and structures, to work effectively together.
- **Logistics:** Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics deal with design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition or construction; maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support. As Heisbourg (2000b: 86) notes, logistics also include enhanced interoperability through increased standardization of material and procedures, and the implementation of common standards, with special emphasis on medical interoperability.

Concluding Remarks:

As it can be seen in the theoretical framework depicted in this chapter, there is no clear agreement on the definition of the concepts of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and crisis management. This chapter aimed at clarifying the distinction between these terms in order to provide a sound basis for the analysis of EU's crisis management activities. The following section involves an assessment of how the concept of crisis management has evolved in the European Union.

II. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

For more than 50 years, the states of Western Europe have been involved in a process of cooperation and integration with varying degrees of success. This period witnessed dramatic changes in the international system, especially in the international security structure. During the Cold War, the structure of the international system was bipolar. The east-west rivalry was the dominant context of European security, dividing the continent into two sharply separate social, political, economic and military systems (Buzan et. al, 1990: 57-58). Therefore threats to security were clearly defined and the means and strategies to maintain security were also common to the Europeans. European security was maintained through the North Atlantic Alliance with significant United States military guarantee against the Soviet Bloc. However the end of the Cold War paved the way for reconsideration of the meaning of security and the transformation of the global security structure.

The Western European states started to widen security understanding and structure towards Eastern Europe, the Balkans and former Soviet Countries. The end of the Cold War has opened up the prospect of including the states of what were formerly Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the integration process. The political and economic transformation of Europe led the EU to take more responsibility and act as a leading actor in this process. It has developed a CFSP and an ESDP. It has effectively engaged in various crisis management operations since 2003. Nevertheless, despite its active involvement in European security affairs the EU still faces problems with regard to achieving an undisputed and unified CFSP and ESDP.

This chapter aims to explain the evolution of crisis management in the post-Cold War era in Europe, and is divided into four main sections. A brief history of European security is discussed in the first section, and then, the establishment of an ESDI in the light of the transformation process of NATO and WEU is analyzed in the second section. The developments leading to the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy are scrutinized in the third section and current developments in the European Union in this regard are discussed in the last section.

2.1. European security

Security and defence played an important role at the beginning of European integration. One can even say that the story of European integration began with defence. The Treaties of Dunkirk (1947), and especially of Brussels (1948), were primarily geared to the establishment of a security community, which would make any further prospect of war unthinkable. After the Second World War, the idea of defending Europe only by Europeans themselves initially led to the Dunkirk Treaty concluded between France and England on 4 March in 1947. In addition, in response to the threat of the “division of Europe” into antagonist blocs, which became evident by Berlin Blockade and Prague Revolt in 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed among Benelux countries, France and England, whereby they set up Western Union (WU) on 17 March in 1948. Under the Treaty, the signatories pledged to give all military and other aid in their power to any of their member who was subjected to an armed attack in Europe.

Among the main objectives of the Western Union were to prevent German rearmament; to support US involvement in European security; and to prevent increasing Soviet political and military expansion throughout Europe. However, after the establishment of NATO, WU lost its function as a defence organization for Europe. In 1950, WU’s the military board, comprised of ministers of General Staff of the member states, and the Western Europe Permanent Supreme Command were merged with Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which was established in the NATO’s military command structure.

In the early 1950s, the project of a European Defence Community (EDC) was launched for three reasons: first, to establish a peace structure through military integration among Western European states after two world wars; secondly, to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat; and thirdly, to obtain Western Europe an active role in world politics. But the demands of sovereignty and the complexity of European security problems, including early German rearmament and the need for a transatlantic alliance, ruined the first attempt of defence integration, the European Defence Community, and the treaty of EDC became dead letter in 1954.

After the failure of the EDC, European integration became primarily an economic affair in the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC). To fill the gap in European security, which was left open by the failed EDC, the Western Union of 1948 was updated and transformed into Western European Union by the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954. According to Duke (1996: 168), “The WEU emerged at a time of previous crisis and indecision in European security.” Western European Union performed two functions: first, providing guaranteed control over Germany’s rearmament; second, enabling Germany to integrate into some form of defence arrangement in a manner acceptable to Germans, British and French (Duke, 1996: 168). During the Cold War, security and defence were organized within NATO, and WEU.

2.2. Western European Union and NATO process (The European Security and Defence Identity)

WEU was not seen as an effective and credible defence organization, because it remained in NATO’s shadow, fulfilling a symbolic and potential role. Nevertheless WEU was used by Britain as a political platform, in which she could discuss foreign policy with other European powers before Britain’s accession to the European Community (EC) in 1973. With the accession of Britain to the EC, WEU lost much of its political platform function. After three decades as a so-called Sleeping Beauty, the WEU gained new impetus in the first half of the 1980s. As it is pointed out by Wilson (1998:53), “WEU remained a dormant institution until, in preparation for the Single European Act, in the Rome Declaration of 27 October 1984, it stated that it would ‘make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between member states in the field of security policy’.” In 1988, WEU conducted its first military operation, which was dispatching mine-sweepers to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Then, it participated in the naval blockade of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, and also started to help to enforce sanctions on Yugoslavia both along the Danube and in the Adriatic Sea in 1992.

WEU agreed to undertake military missions upon EU request in 1991-92. WEU also began to build its capabilities in the form of a defence planning cell, satellite-interpretation centre and situation centre to carry out these missions (Gordon, 1997: 258). The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, as concluded by the heads of state and

government in December 1991 and as it came into force on 1 November 1993, gave WEU a very particular role in the process of European integration (Jopp, 1997:154-155). The article J.4 (2) of the Maastricht Treaty states that, “The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union, which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements” (see in Appendix II). The tasks with defence applications were outlined as: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; crisis management, including peace making; implementation of UN/OSCE resolutions and decisions (Duke, 1994:234).

During the Cold War, European defence was synonymous with Atlantic defence. The United States provided the ultimate guarantee against the Soviet threat. NATO, based on collective defence among its members and deterrence of its enemy, was the cornerstone of European security. Under this security umbrella, European integration grew from the single market to monetary union. With the end of Soviet threat, NATO lost its fundamental security guarantor role, while the Union had to share more responsibility for its security in a rapidly changing world. If NATO was to remain a relevant defence organization, it had to make fundamental adjustments to address the new security environment. As Haine (2004:131) puts it, the most significant among these necessary changes was modifying the EU-NATO relationship.

By early 1990s, it seemed that the time had come for a rebalancing of the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic. Soon it became clear that the EU member states also had to take concrete steps for their common security and defence. They started a process designed to provide an actual European military capability without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities of NATO.

2.2.1. From Petersberg Declaration to Berlin Plus Agreement

At their 19 June 1992 meeting at the Petersberg Castle outside Bonn, WEU leaders agreed to strengthen the WEU’s operational role, in accordance with the decisions taken at

Maastricht. In June 1992 WEU gave itself a formal new dimension and strengthened its operational role through the Petersberg Declaration, which states that:

“In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the Member states of the WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Member States have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU’s operational role” (Petersberg Declaration, 1992, Section II. Para.1).

Under the WEU’s authority, the declaration stated that the military units of member countries could be used for crisis management ranging from low-intensity missions to tasks of combat forces in crisis management. The Petersberg Declaration listed possible tasks (now commonly referred to as “Petersberg Tasks”): humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As Gordon (1997:259) notes, “Participation in such missions would still be voluntary, but now there was an explicit agreement that the WEU would plan for, and possibly undertake, missions that went well beyond its original defence commitment.” The Petersberg Declaration, which moved the WEU to Brussels, created the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre, and initiated the process of earmarking FAWEU (Forces Answerable to WEU) for operations. In addition, the organization was expanded to include Associate Members and Observers. The Petersberg Declaration also created a “Forum for Consultation” to bring interested countries from the former Warsaw Pact into a dialogue with WEU countries (Kay, 1998: 129).

As Duke (1994:237) argues, the Petersberg Declaration aimed to answer some of the drawbacks of WEU. The declaration stressed the interdependent nature of the European security architecture. The declaration also emphasized that WEU, together with the European Union, was ready to play a full part in building Europe’s security architecture. The integral role of WEU in the Maastricht process that led to the establishment of the European Union and the need for close working relations with the Atlantic Alliance were stressed at several points in the declaration. It was also agreed that WEU members could not invoke the military assistance clause of the revised Brussels Treaty (1954) against a NATO member, nor could Article of the North Atlantic Treaty be invoked against a WEU member. As Duke (1994:238) states:

“All members agreed to make available to military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks under the authority of the WEU. Decisions to use military forces answerable to the WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the UN Charter. The military units will be drawn from the forces with a NATO mission, but only after consultation with NATO.”

The transformation of NATO, on the other hand, began at the London meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5-6 July 1990. NATO's New Strategic Concept was announced at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome in November 1991. The New Strategic Concept declared NATO's primacy in Europe's defence. It also encouraged the development of a European Security Identity, which would have an important role to play in enhancing the ability of Allies to work together in the common defence. While NATO prepared for the Rome Summit, Europe was engaged in a parallel process, drafting the Treaty on European Union to be signed at Maastricht. As Kay (1998: 125) notes, “The European leaders endowed the EU with a Common Foreign and Security Policy based on an evolutionary construction of an ESDI. There was an consensus among the Europeans on the need for an ESDI.”

German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterand announced the creation of a Franco-German Corps on 21 May 1992. The Eurocorps¹¹, as it became known, enlarged an existing Franco-German brigade to a corps-level unit of 35.000 troops. The North Atlantic Council, SACEUR and the Chiefs of Staff of the states participating in the Eurocorps reached an agreement about the coordination of the Eurocorps with NATO on 21 January 1993. Under this agreement Eurocorps forces are “double-hatted”; that is, they may be assigned either to NATO or to national authorities within the WEU framework. Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain subsequently joined the Eurocorps, which became operational on 30 November 1995.

In late 1993, the US insisted to formulate a proposal to realign NATO's operational functions because of the failure of the US and Europe to deal with the early years of the Balkan crisis. Washington realized that NATO could not survive if its sole military purpose was to deal with Article 5 missions. Indeed, there might be occasions when the US

¹¹ Its role would be centred upon crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian action rather than straightforward deterrence.

might decline to participate directly in a non-Article 5 NATO mission. The Clinton administration thus recommended a reorganization of NATO command structures based on Combined Joint Forces (CJTF) that would permit the creation of an ESDI that was separable but not separate from NATO.

The ESDI was effectively pronounced in the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. To back up the development of such an identity with adequate military capability, the “Combined Joint Task Forces”¹² concept was introduced. At their 1994 summit, NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed the launching of the European Union as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. They also welcomed the close and growing cooperation between the Alliance and Western European Union, achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementary and transparency. They gave their approval to European attempts to develop “separable but not separate” defence capabilities through the WEU. According to Schake (2002:15), “Behind that approval lay the US proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), that would allow NATO allies to work in smaller, variable coalitions that drew on NATO assets. The US thought that by agreeing to second NATO assets to other organizations for specific missions, it would prevent competition and duplication between NATO and Europeans.” The CJTF referred to “separable but not separate” forces from NATO that would allow some allies to use NATO assets in crisis situations. Cebeci (2000:19) indicates that, this would provide the Allies with the necessary flexibility for conducting operations, and it would also encourage the coalitions of willing to take on the task.

NATO agreed on the basic principles of Combined Joint Task Forces at its 3 June 1996 meeting in Berlin. Endorsing the development of ESDI within NATO, the ministers welcomed the completion of the CJTF concept, directed the Military Committee to make recommendations for its implementation, and established a Policy Coordination Group (PCG) to link political oversight from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to the viewpoints developed in the Military Committee. NATO established three principles to guide its adaptation: the development of the ESDI within NATO; performing its traditional mission

¹² A CJTF can be described as: a multinational, multi-service, task-tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited duration peace operations beyond Alliance borders, under the control of either NATO’s integrated military structure or the WEU.

of collective defence and adopting flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances; preserving the transatlantic link (Kay, 1998: 138).

The Berlin Summit allowed the WEU to use NATO assets in situations where some other Allies would not be willing to act. The use of NATO assets would not be automatic, but would be available upon consensus within the Alliance. The Berlin Summit also repeated and confirmed the emphasis given to the development of an ESDI within Alliance. Operational and political links were established between NATO and WEU at the summit. According to these arrangements, they would consult regularly on the development of an ESDI at their twice-yearly meetings. The Permanent Councils of NATO and WEU were charged with implementation. In short, WEU would be able to use NATO assets when NATO did not choose to take part in the operation, and NATO would decide on the assets, which would be used by WEU.

“At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers decided that the ESDI should be built within NATO, as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the Alliance. This would enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance. It would allow them to act themselves as required and would simultaneously reinforce the transatlantic partnership. Taking the full advantage of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, the strengthened European identity would be based on sound military principles supported by appropriate military planning, and would permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.” (NATO Handbook, 2001: 100)

In short, the Berlin Summit of June 1996 created the possibility that the WEU might become a militarily effective organization. It might be able to respond at least to some of the limited range of agreed Petersberg tasks. The agreements also endorsed the essential links across the Atlantic, and also there was an implicit concept of “NATO first” (Hunter, 2002:18), which meant that NATO would be the first resort in dealing with the crises. The Berlin agreement tried to solve the practical problems of transferring NATO assets to WEU. As Schake (2002:16) clarifies, “Specifically, the Berlin Agreements committed NATO states to provide assured access to NATO planning staffs and advanced warning and command aircraft (AWACS), and covered the procedures for transferring political control of them to the WEU.” However, unfortunately, the Berlin agreement did not solve the practical problems of transferring NATO assets to WEU. Moreover, they did

not resolve the fundamental problem of assured access: how to guarantee the availability of scarce assets that the US needs for fighting wars and managing crisis globally, for European crisis management. Although the Berlin agreement offered WEU assured access to NATO assets, WEU would also need access to US assets in order to use them effectively. In order to resolve these issues, the WEU states began to press Washington for a “Berlin Plus”¹³ agreement to guarantee a broader range of NATO support (Schake, 2002:16).

2.2.2. The way to Berlin Plus Agreement

NATO Allies adopted the New Strategic Concept and introduced the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington Summit of April 1999. The Allies declared their readiness to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the WEU and also the EU (due to the provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam) to collective assets and capabilities for operation, in which the Alliance as a whole would not be engaged militarily. The Allies also recommended the Europeans to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication. As Hunter (2002:53) points out, “The key focus was at the NATO’s Washington Summit in April 1999, where the allies “acknowledged” the EU’s “resolve”, post-St. Malo, “to have the capacity for *autonomous action* so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the alliance as a whole is not engaged.” The European Security and Defence Identity was to be developed within NATO, but in close cooperation within WEU and the EU. The Washington Summit launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to improve the defence capabilities, to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations of Alliance missions. NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative identified the well-known deficiencies in the areas of mobility, intelligence, headquarters infrastructure and deployment, air and sea projection. It pointed the shortcomings of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). DCI aims in particular to improve alliance capabilities in the following areas:

¹³ The Term “Berlin Plus” is a reference to the fact that the 1996 meeting where NATO foreign ministers agreed to create a European Security and Defence Identity, and make Alliance assets available for the purpose took place in Berlin. The Berlin Plus arrangements seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and comprise four elements. These are: assured access to NATO operational planning; the presumption of availability to the European Union of NATO capabilities and common assets; NATO European command options for EU-led operations, including developing the European role of NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); and adaptation of the NATO defence planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations (NATO Briefing, 2003: 5).

- “Mobility and deployability”: the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside alliance territory.
- “Sustainability”: the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations.
- “Effective engagement”: the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity.
- “Survivability”: the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats.
- “Interoperable communications”: command, control, and information systems that are compatible with each other, to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.

In April 1999, NATO also modified the 1996 Berlin Agreement in order to meet the new willingness of the EU, instead of WEU, to become an autonomous actor in conducting the Petersberg tasks. The Allies agreed these provisions provided for assured access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to the military planning of EU-led operations; the principle of the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities; and common assets for use in EU-led operations. This modified bargain, the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreement, prepared the ground for cooperation between NATO and EU.

As Haine (2004:137) indicates, there were two issues related to the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement. The first was the question of NATO primacy versus EU autonomy. The United States made clear that it would not allow a separate planning infrastructure in the EU: as a coordinator, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) would cover operations decided by the EU, even if they did not use NATO assets (Haine, 2004: 137). The second problem was related to the non-EU European members of NATO and the question of discrimination (Haine, 2004: 138). This was not only an American concern but also a Turkish concern. Turkey had rejected the Berlin Plus agreement. Despite the reassurance and the possibility of future Union membership agreed at Helsinki, Ankara considered itself excluded from the decision-making process of the ESDP. At the NATO ministerial meeting on 14-15 December 2000, Turkey declared that it would block Berlin Plus. As certain European governments wanted all European crisis

operations to be subject to a final agreement on Berlin Plus, European Security and Defence Policy de facto became dependent on the Turkish approval. An overall agreement could not be possible because the principle that nothing is decided until everything has been decided (Haine, 2004: 139). Thus a constructive relationship between the two organizations was not put into practice. The final settlement on the Berlin Plus agreement had to wait until December 2002.

The Berlin Plus agreement was eventually finalized in December 2002, in the wake of the radical change that had occurred the month before. Turkey lifted up its veto on the Berlin Plus agreement. As a result, the Union has gained access to NATO capabilities. The Brussels agreement of 16 December 2002 thus opened the way for a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO with in crisis management. Completed on 11 March 2003, the implementation of permanent arrangements, notably the agreement on classified information, allowed the EU to take over Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia on 31 March 2003.

2.3. From European Security and Defence Identity to European Security and Defence Policy

Since St. Malo, the European Union has been progressively developing a European Security and Defence Policy. Its goal is to develop military and civil resources to enable the Union to prevent conflicts, when needed-independently and to carry out crisis management operations within the framework of the Petersberg tasks. The European Union's intention to create a European rapid reaction force for crisis management operations, and to set up the appropriate decision-making structures indicate the Union's new determination to become a serious security actor. As Solana (2004:5) states:

“When I took up my post five years ago, no one would have dared to bet that the Union would soon have direct responsibility in crisis management, have a military committee and military staff, be responsible for military operations, have an armaments agency, a solidarity clause and, above all, a common vision of the threats we face and appropriate responses to them – in other words a genuinely European strategy. However, these are now tangible realities in the European Union.”

The idea of a common European defence was first mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Afterwards, a common security and defence policy had constituted an

important point of discussion between the Atlanticist, Europeanist, and the neutral members of the EU, especially during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 1996. Nonetheless, a compromise was soon achieved among the members of the Union in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which created new structures for CFSP. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the member states agreed (Art. 17) that the Common Foreign and Security Policy “shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to common defence, should the European Council so decide...”. The Treaty reaffirms the role of security policy and therefore strengthens the relationship between the EU and WEU. Generally, the CFSP is “covering all aspects of foreign and security policy”(Art.11), including “the matters with defence implications” (Art.13). For that purpose, the EU could now “avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions” that have either defence implications or are related to crisis management according to the Petersberg tasks, which were explicitly included in the Treaty (Art. 17). As Cebeci (1999: 12) contends, “The Treaty of Amsterdam gave the CFSP a new scope and a wider framework, to include Petersberg missions and take steps towards a common defence policy, and thus to open the way for the possibility of WEU’s future integration in the EU (Article 17).” According to Cebeci (2002: 149-150):

“The EU Member States could not agree to integrate WEU in the EU, however, they established a stronger link between the two organizations. Accordingly, the EU would avail itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on Petersberg tasks and in such cases the European Council would establish the guidelines (Article 17.3). This provision was significant in the sense that it had put WEU in a subordinate position with regard to the cases where the EU will avail itself of WEU.”

A separate Amsterdam Declaration of the WEU members specified the inter-institutional relationship further. The Declaration underlined the link between WEU and NATO. As a European pillar within the Alliance, WEU would be actively involved in NATO defence and military planning as well as in crisis management (see in Appendix IV). According to Schneckener (2002:13), “The WEU was more and more transformed into a security agency under the umbrella and guidance of the EU.”

The most important innovation was indeed the establishment of a High Representative for the CFSP, nominated for a five-year term (Art. 18), who would also act

as the Secretary General of the Council administration. Article 26 of the Treaty stated that The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR): “shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties”. Duke (2000:144) notes, “The introduction of the role of the High Representative could both provide a more coherent voice for Europe and could introduce the idea of a spokesperson for the EU on CFSP issues, especially in crisis management.”

Another internal reform concerned the role of the Political Committee, composed of the Political Directors of the Member States and the Commission, which usually prepares the CFSP decisions of the General Affairs Council. According to the Treaty (Art. 25), the Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy, contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions, and monitor the implementation of agreed policies.

The Amsterdam Treaty established a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (now called the Policy Unit) within the Council Secretariat. It reports to the Secretary General (High Representative), and also works with the Commission to ensure consistency with EU’s trade and development policies. Its mandate includes monitoring, analysis and assessment of international developments and events, including early warning on potential crises. It also drafts, upon the Council’s request or on its own initiative, policy options, which may contain recommendations and strategies for presentation to the Council under the responsibility of the Presidency (see in Appendix V).

The debate on a common defence policy of the European Union has a new impetus in the latter half of 1998 when a significant change of British policy led to the Franco – British Declaration on European Defence in St. Malo. Britain and France issued a Joint Declaration on European defence at their bilateral meeting in St. Malo on 3-4 December 1998. The Heads of State and government of both countries agreed on the following:

“ It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing

of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range activity set out in Title V of the Treaty on European Union.

To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the alliance as a whole is not engaged the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means.” (Rutten, 2001: 8-9)

The St. Malo declaration is accepted as the founding act of ESDP. According to Howorth (2001: 769) the St. Malo symbolizes three dramatic changes in European security policy and policy-making: it saw the unblocking of an effective 50-year UK veto on discussion of defence matters within the institutions of the EEC/EC/EU; it marked UK acceptance of the urgency and of the legitimacy of an EU security capacity at both political and military levels; and it opened up the prospect of the EU emerging as a security actor in its own right, with autonomous capacity to take decisions (politically) and to implement them (militarily). The language used at the St. Malo declaration represents a compromise as it can be read as a turning point in London’s approach to Europe as much as a French concession to Atlantic legitimacy. The Franco-British couple have been at the heart of all European security and defence developments in the period between the end of the Cold War and St. Malo. These two countries are, after all, the two most significant military powers in Europe. Since St. Malo, they have tightly been in the “driving-seat” of the CESDP, and “co-sponsoring” almost very major initiative (Howorth, 2000b: 387). As Haine (2004: 43) asserts, “The core of the compromise lay in the effort made to improve the European’s military capabilities and their intention to take on crisis management operations in the framework of the Petersberg missions.”

The decisions reached at St. Malo formed the basis for the European Security and Defence Policy, and were endorsed by the European Council in Vienna in December 1998. The British-French initiative paved the way for the decisions taken at the European Council in Cologne (June 1999), where the member states agreed to integrate the WEU functions into the EU, and stated that by the end of 2000 “the WEU as an organization

would have completed its purpose”. This statement openly announced the demise of WEU as an organization by the end of the year 2000.¹⁴ As Cameron (1999:79) notes, “The Cologne European Council of 3-4 June 1999 marked a decisive step forward in the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.” The Cologne Summit opened the door for new structures and instruments in crisis management, including military ones. The Declaration of the Cologne European Council on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence states:

“In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined the Treaty on European Union, the “Petersberg tasks”. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of UN Charter.” (Rutten, 2001:41)

Obviously, the EU needed a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning to achieve its goals and to decide and conduct EU-led Petersberg operations effectively. The Cologne Presidency Report outlined five points to address these problems:

- Regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers
- A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with political/military expertise
- An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee
- An EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre
- Other institutions such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies

¹⁴ The Alliance between the ten full members of WEU would remain the foundation of the collective defence of its member states. Therefore, the collective defence guarantee (Article V) of the Modified Brussels Treaty (1954) would not be affected by this demise. The neutral status of some of the EU members would not be affected either, since the EU would only take on the non-Article V functions of WEU that it mostly performed in the area of crisis management, and thus, Petersberg tasks.

The member states also nominated the then NATO Secretary General and former Spanish Foreign Minister, Javier Solana as the first High Representative for the CFSP. Solana took up his new post in October 1999. Since then, the EU has been gradually moving toward the establishment of its own crisis management capability. In Cologne Summit, the Council pledged to develop an effective EU-led crisis management capacity in which all EU members, both NATO and non-allied countries, would participate on an equal footing. The new force would perform the so-called Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. This commitment triggered a rapid and preparatory process that concluded in a plan, adopted by the European Council in December 1999, in Helsinki, to establish a European readiness force of 50.000-60.000 troops by 2003.

The Helsinki European Council underlined EU's determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions, and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. The Helsinki European Council set the Headline Goal. The aim was to put forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions at the Union's disposal. The Helsinki European Council Presidency Progress Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence states:

“To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding, in operations to up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50.000-60.000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.

Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, (...).” (Rutten, 2001: 85)

Furthermore, the European Council adopted measures relevant to Union involvement in all phases and aspects of crisis management. The following new permanent political and military bodies would be established within the Council¹⁵:

- A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC, more often referred to by French abbreviation COPS) in Brussels would be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC would deal all aspects of the CFSP, including ESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC would exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures would be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC would also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.
- The Military Committee would be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The Military Committee would meet at the level of Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee would give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the Military Committee would attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.
- The Military Staff within the Council structures would provide military expertise and support to the CEDSP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff would perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg Tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

At the Helsinki European Council, the member states also made it clear that creation of rapid reaction forces process would not imply the creation of a European army. The objective was only set up a pool of national units on which the EU could draw if the Council decided unanimously to use military force in response to an international crisis. Making these assets available in concrete crisis situations would require a further case-by-case decision at the national level.

¹⁵ The information given here is a summary of information taken from Hunter (2002: 65-66).

ESDP was further developed under the Portuguese and French presidencies based on the decisions taken in Cologne and Helsinki. The Santa Maria da Feira European Council on 19-20 June encouraged EU candidates and the non-EU European members of NATO to contribute to improving Europe's capabilities and to EU military crisis management. Member states also committed themselves at Feira to strengthening the Union's civilian crisis management capabilities. Therefore, a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was created, which paralleled the Military Committee under the Political Security Committee, at Feira. They agreed on an Action Plan in the areas of police cooperation, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. According to Feira Presidency Conclusions, this Action Plan foresaw the creation, by 2003 of a pool of 5.000 police officers, of 1,000 would be deployable within 30 days, 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts, assessment teams to be dispatched within 3-7 hours, as well as intervention teams consisting of up to 2.000 people for deployment at short notice, able to assist humanitarian actions through emergency operations (Rutten, 2001: 126).

As Schmitt (2004:92) notes, "In parallel, member states continued to elaborate the military Headline Goal. Under the leadership of the so-called Headline Goal Task Force, national experts in defence planning established a generic capabilities list. This list outlined 144 capabilities under seven categories.¹⁶ In autumn 2000, the list was finalized and approved as the Helsinki Headline Catalogue."

Based on these findings, member states then specified the assets they were able to contribute the Headline Goal Force. At the Capabilities Commitment Conference, held in Brussels on 20-21 November 2000, they committed themselves, on a voluntary basis, to making national contributions corresponding to the rapid reaction capabilities identified to attain the headline goal. These commitments were set in the so-called Headline Force Catalogue. The contributions of member states constitute a pool of more than 100.000 persons, and approximately 400 combat aircrafts and 100 naval vessels. In addition to this, EU candidate countries committed forces and capabilities to the so-called Headline Goal Plus (Rutten, 2001:160).

¹⁶ Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Deployability and Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, Sustainability and Logistics, General Support.

According to Duke (2001b: 24), the progress made on the Common European Security and Defence Policy was one of the successful outcomes of the French Presidency and the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference. The institutional changes decided at Cologne, elaborated at Helsinki and finalized at Santa Maria da Feira were agreed at the Nice meeting of the European Council in December 2000. Under the Nice provisions, Article 25 TEU replaces the Political Committee with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which shall ‘monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP, and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative.’ Furthermore the Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. The PSC was a standing body and was rapidly becoming the point of reference for ESDP. The EUMC (EU Military Committee) and EUMS (EU Military Staff) provide the necessary structures for situation assessment and the military direction of the EU’s crisis management operations. The PSC, EUMC and EUMS also provide the link to the national force packages assembled under the guidance of the Helsinki Headline Goals as well as the parallel structures for NATO military and civil officials to liaise with (Duke, 2001a: 160).

The new Treaty¹⁷ gave the PSC the key role in crisis management (Article 25 TEU), in other words, it created the legal basis for crisis management by also including the term itself in the TEU for the first time. As Missiroli (2001a: 193) points out:

“The Nice Presidency Report describes in some detail both the general goals and specific instruments for what it calls an overall crisis management and conflict prevention capability in support the objectives of CFSP. The report maintains that the EU is set to assume the crisis management function of the WEU as well as its own responsibilities in the sphere of conflict prevention. It also stresses the need to respond more effectively and coherently to requests from leading organizations without any unnecessary duplication, to ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management.”

As mentioned above, the Petersberg tasks are integrated into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The missions assigned to EU military forces are currently described in Article 17.2 of the TEU. This Article will remain the legal description until the entry into

¹⁷ The Nice Treaty, which was agreed at Nice European Council in December 2000, was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force in February 2003.

force of the Constitutional Treaty, following its ratification process. Article 17 of the Nice Treaty states:

Article 17

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. (Rutten, 2001:209)

As Ortega (2004:74) notes, the words “from humanitarian tasks to peacemaking” are taken from the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. The three types of missions conceptualized at Petersberg cover a complete range of possible military measures, from the most modest to the most robust. The member states sometimes debated on whether to focus on the lower or the higher spectrum of the Petersberg missions, the Helsinki Headline Goal made it clear that the aim was to put at the Union’s disposal forces capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks. On the other hand, it was obvious to everyone that territorial defence was excluded from those tasks. Subsequent European Councils helped to shape the EU military dimension, but no one tried to change the description of missions enshrined in the words of Article 17.2 until mid-2002.

It was also decided to create autonomous agencies that would incorporate within the EU the WEU structures dealing with ESDP, i.e. the Satellite Centre in Torrejon and the Institute for Security Studies in the Nice Treaty. A Situation Centre (SITCEN) was also created at the Council Secretariat to fulfill the monitoring function assigned to new politico-military bodies.

Enhanced cooperation, as legitimized since Amsterdam for other policy fields of the EU, had not been recognized as a guiding concept of CFSP and ESDP. In the Nice agreement, the concept has been tolerated within CFSP framework excluding the ESDP (Rummel, 2002: 459). Enhanced cooperation method would permit the coming together of operative member states (the able and willing) to a closer cooperation in order to reach a higher level of reliability in crisis management. Nice signaled determination of member states to make the necessary efforts to improve their operational capabilities further, focusing on command and control, intelligence and strategic air and naval transport capabilities, based on the results of the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000. The Nice Council meeting stressed cooperation especially on the principles for consultation, cooperation and transparency with NATO and the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin Plus). The EU member states clearly drew a distinction between situations where NATO assets and capabilities would be involved or not. In the former instance, operational planning would be carried out by the alliances' planning bodies, but for autonomous EU operation it would be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters. In the former case, non-EU European allies would be involved in planning according to NATO procedures. However in the latter case these non-EU allies would be invited to take part (Hunter, 2002:110-111).

A comparative analysis of both the Headline Goal and the Force Catalogue revealed considerable shortfalls in national commitments, varying widely in importance, nature, operational implications and the possible ways to amend them. At the first Capability Improvement Conference in November 2001, EU defence ministers agreed on the so-called European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) to address these shortfalls and to improve European crisis management capabilities. The ECAP process has been guided by four core principles¹⁸:

- Increased effectiveness of EU military capability efforts
- A bottom-up approach to EU defence cooperation, relying on voluntary national commitments
- Coordination between member states and cooperation with NATO
- Public support through ECAP's transparency and visibility.

¹⁸ The listed principles above are a summary of information taken from Schmitt (2004: 92) and Duke (2002: 5).

The ECAP exercise, which began in February 2002, set up series of panels headed by one or two member states responsible for coordinating work. Since then, a new Capabilities Conference was held in May 2003 in order to ask for more national commitments or launch specific programmes to address shortfalls. The conclusions of the European Council meeting at Laeken on 14-15 December 2001 stated that the Union was capable of conducting some crisis management operations then. In other words, the ESDP was proclaimed operational at the Laeken Council. Despite the fact that the Berlin Plus debate was not result, in its Laeken declaration, the EU stated that great progress had been made since Cologne and Helsinki.

While the EU members were reluctant to debate about the purpose of EU military forces, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and their consequences led to such a debate during the first half 2002. Following military action in Afghanistan, the Spanish Presidency insisted that the fight against terrorism should be introduced into the Treaty on European Union along with the existing Petersberg missions. Other EU members were not convinced to include such a mission, either for practical or legal reasons. Therefore, as Ortega (2004:76) stresses, a middle way was found at the Seville European Council of June 2002. The declaration stressed the EU's determination to fight against terrorism and indicated that both CFSP and ESDP means could be used to that end.

The extraordinary European Council of 21 September stated that the EU would fight against terrorism in all its forms and that the fight against terrorism would be a priority objective of the European Union. Thus, ESDP could not ignore this new strategic objective. At the June 2002 European Council in Seville, it was decided to increase the Union's involvement in the fight against terrorism through a coordinated, interdisciplinary approach 'embracing all Union policies, including by developing the CFSP and by making the ESDP operational'. It was recalled that 'the CFSP, including the ESDP, can play an important role in countering this threat to security.' The Petersberg missions were thus expanded.

The adoption of the Seville Declaration on terrorism in June 2002 was only a small step in the reformulation of the description of the mission of the EU forces. An absolute

reform of the text was initiated later in 2002 within the discussion of a draft Constitutional Treaty at the European Convention. According to the new draft Article:

Article III-210 (ex Article 17 TEU) of the draft Constitutional Treaty

“1. The tasks referred to in Article I-40 (1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Ortega, 2004:79)

2.4. Recent developments on the ESDP

A series of developments in the recent years show that a considerable amount and attention and effort are paid to the project of a coherent ESDP. The adoption of a European Security Strategy (ESS), significant provisions enshrined in the Constitution as well as the decision on the Headline Goal 2010 are significant steps taken in this respect. In this section, these three developments are analyzed for an assessment of the ESDP effectiveness.

2.4.1. The European Security Strategy

After the agreement on Berlin Plus in December 2002, the European Council at Brussels on 12 December 2003 marked the end of the process begun in Helsinki, although further work would be necessary to meet the European force goals. The Heads of States and Government at the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’, which was prepared by Javier Solana. The Security Strategy provides guidelines for the future development of CFSP and ESDP.

European Security Strategy outlines a comprehensive strategic framework, which will surely influence the formulation of any European foreign and security policy in the years to come. It can be assumed that European Security Strategy is an important element in understanding the purpose and missions of EU military forces. Ortega (2004: 82-83) identifies three important aspects connected with the definition of EU missions:

- The ESS underlines the need to react rapidly to potential threats and challenges.

- The ESS points out that EU military operations will normally be carried out hand in hand with humanitarian and civilian missions. It acknowledges that a greater degree of consistency and coordination between European civilian and military instruments is needed.
- The ESS acknowledges that many of the missions of EU forces will be undertaken in cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance.

In ESS, the EU laid out a foreign policy framework based on effective multilateralism and preventive engagement to bring stability and prosperity to its neighborhood, while recognizing the necessity of the use of force in certain situations. The ESS can be regarded as the policy document, which guides the Union's international security strategy. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU finally has a brief document that offers a coherent assessment of today's security threats and Europe's policy responses with the ESS.

2.4.2. Towards a European Constitution

In addition to the ESS, the Constitutional Treaty, which was adopted on 29 October 2004, and is in the process of a thorny ratification nowadays, is an important element in understanding the purpose and missions of EU military forces. Although there will be a complex ratification process in all 25 member states before entering into force (a tentative date could be 2007), the enlarged Union now has a Constitutional Treaty that simplifies and replaces the previous treaties. The significant provisions in the Constitutional Treaty relating to the common security and defence policy can be regarded as Article I-41 and Article I-43 (see in Appendix VI).

A new definition of the missions of EU military forces is contained in the Constitutional Treaty. Article I-41 (1) of the Treaty states that the common security and defence policy could provide the Union with the operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. Hence, the Union might use these assets on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. According to Ortega, the description of EU forces' missions is adequate for three reasons: it contains sufficiently broad terms encompassing all possible operations; it does not refer to any

particular geographical zone; and the description stresses respect for principles of the UN Charter (2004: 79-80).

Article I-41 (7) of the Constitutional Treaty states that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, (...)”. The introduction of a military assistance clause in the event of an armed attack or an aggression against EU members might involve another type of mission for EU forces in the future.

The Constitutional Treaty also enables the member states to launch structured cooperation in the field of defence. Article I-41 (6) of the Constitutional Treaty states that “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish “permanent structured cooperation” within the Union framework”. It can be asserted that the permanent structured cooperation, if implemented, can offer a valuable framework in which to change the dynamics of European defence. The article on permanent structured cooperation may provide the EU a politically fruitful opportunity and flexibility in the field of CFSP/ESDP, whereby it would efficiently and rapidly put the policy initiatives by the members so desired, because permanent structured cooperation can be established through qualified majority voting.

The Constitutional Treaty introduced the so –called “solidarity clause”¹⁹ to strengthen internal cohesion and the member states’ determination to integrate further (Article I-43). The clause affirms that the EU and its member states would act jointly in spirit of solidarity in the event of a member state being the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. Accordingly, the Union would mobilize all the instruments

¹⁹ After the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the European Council held in Brussels on 25 March 2004 declared that “the European Council welcomes the political commitment of the Member States and of the acceding states, taken as of now, to act jointly against terrorist acts, in the spirit of the Solidarity Clause contained in Article 42 of the Draft Constitution for Europe”. (see in Declaration on Combating Terrorism, March 2004, accessed through: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf) Therefore it can be asserted that the provisions on the solidarity clause have found their place in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism and thus any rejection of the Constitutional Treaty would not necessarily harm its implementation. The demand by the French to adopt measures to implement the solidarity clause after the attacks in London on 7 July 2005, also show that the solidarity clause can be implemented without the adoption of the Constitution.

at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states, to prevent the terrorist threat and assist a member state in its territory.

The solidarity clause is mostly regarded as a necessity to counter the threat of terrorism. The EU creates new joint structures for preventing military conflicts. The solidarity clause has been supported by the foundation of the European Defense Agency (EDA), the creation of crisis management forces, and, most recently, the development of rapid response combat units. Measures on terrorism are not yet under the crisis management activities. However, by means of the future practices based on arrangements and provisions accepted with the solidarity clause, the EU could develop a doctrinal approach on terrorism, whereby the efficient and flexible ways to fight against terrorism can be improved. Therefore, the measures on terrorism might be included in EU's crisis management operations, and then could broaden the scope of the ESDP.

2.4.3. The way towards Headline Goal 2010

The completion of the Helsinki Headline Goal Process and the adoption of the European Security Strategy set the scene for the preparation of a new Headline Goal 2010. As Schmitt (2004:98) points out, "The challenge for the years to come will be to compete the Helsinki process and to adapt the development of European capabilities to the strategic environment outlined in the European Security Strategy. The first Headline Goal was to a large degree determined by the war in Kosovo; the second has to take into account new, unconventional threats."

One of the main shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal Process is the lack of highly mobile specialized forces at a high state of readiness and able to carry out missions in difficult areas. Following a Franco-British initiative, in February 2004, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) presented the so-called "battle group" concept (which will be discussed in the next chapter) to tackle this shortfall. Two months later, in April 2004, EU defence ministers approved the trilateral proposal, turning it into a European initiative.

At their meeting in Brussels on 29 April 2003, Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg proposed the setting up of autonomous military headquarters for planning and conducting EU operations without resort to NATO

assets. This proposal was criticized by some member states as a politically damaging and unnecessary duplication of national and NATO capabilities, which the EU could use to conduct an operation. At the end of November 2003, a compromise was found between France, Germany and the United Kingdom that was then officially endorsed by the European Council in December. According to the new proposal, a small EU cell would be established at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to improve the preparations of EU operations having resort to NATO assets under the Berlin Plus arrangements. At the same time, NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS would be defined to ensure transparency between the EU and NATO.

Furthermore, another cell with civil-military components would be established within the EUMS in order to enhance the capacity of the latter to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. The main option for the conduct of autonomous EU military operations would remain national headquarters, which could be “multinationalised” for that purpose (Schmitt, 2004: 99). However, in many circumstances, the Council might decide to draw on the collective capacity of the EUMS, in particular where a joint civil-military response is required and where no national Headquarters (HQ) has been identified. In this case, the civil-military cell at the EUMS would have the responsibility for setting up a separate operations center under a designated commander for this particular operation (Schmitt, 2004: 99).

Another crucial development is the establishment a European Defence Agency. Actually, the creation of a European Defence Agency has been on the European defence agenda for more than ten years. Therefore, the idea is not new. NATO and other Europe bodies, such as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), have tried for decades to encourage governments to work together more closely in acquiring and developing tanks, ships and aircrafts. But the member states have failed to do so. Governments have traditionally cooperated in armaments projects only on an ad hoc basis.

In June 2003, the European Council at Thessaloniki tasked the appropriate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary actions towards creating, in the course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, armaments and acquisition (Schmitt, 2004: 100). Few weeks after the summit, the Council established an ad hoc Preparation Group to develop a basic concept for the Agency's

organization and missions. The Group presented its findings in a report in mid- November. The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) endorsed this report as the basis for the next steps (Schmitt, 2004: 100). According to the report, the Agency will aim at as follows (Schmitt, 2004: 100):

- developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management;
- promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation;
- contributing to identifying and, if necessary, implementing policies and measures aimed at strengthening the European Defence Industrial Base;
- promoting, in liaison with the Commission where appropriate, research aimed at fulfilling future defence and security capabilities requirements.

In February 2004, an Agency Establishment Team (AET) was set up to prepare conditions for the operational setting up and working of the Agency. In particular AET took forward work on the financial, legal and administrative aspects of Agency's creation and specified missions. Based on the final report of the AET, RELEX (Relations Extérieures) counselors and Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) worked out a Joint action on the establishment of a European Defence Agency, which the GAERC adopted in mid-June. Based on this founding document, the Agency will be established with a staff of 25 by the end of 2004, and then gradually be built up to the total of around 80 in 2005. The agency will not form part of any existing EU institution, although it will be headed by the EU's SG/HR, Javier Solana.

The new Headline Goal can facilitate the ESS to implement more concrete military objectives focusing on interoperability, sustainability and deployability using a qualitative approach. The new Headline Goal can be regarded as a methodology and concrete objectives, which allows the member states and the EU to have the necessary timescale to adopt a more dynamic approach and to adopt their plans accordingly.

Concluding Remarks:

Security has played an important role in the European history. Just as NATO provided European security by means of collective defence during the Cold War, crisis management activities became the cornerstone of the post-Cold War global structure. By

adopting itself into the new global structure and embodying crisis management activities, the EU aims to become more powerful politically besides its economic power in the international arena. This chapter attempted to explain the evolution of crisis management in the post-Cold War era with reference to three most important security and defence organizations in Europe (NATO, WEU and the EU). It has also laid down the evolution of the ESDP within this framework. The next chapter aims to deal with the capabilities and instruments of the European Union's crisis management.

III. EU CAPABILITIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Security institutions have undergone a major structural transformation after the dissolution of the unique political and strategic environment of the Cold War. Crisis management is the cornerstone of the new international security system. Most operational efforts of NATO, WEU, and the EU (since Cologne or St. Malo) have shifted away from collective defence towards this kind of activity. On the one hand, European Multinational Forces, the Rapid Reaction Force, Civilian Crisis Management Mechanism, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit can be considered as the capabilities of crisis management. On the other hand, humanitarian assistance, common positions, joint actions, common strategies, political dialogue and diplomacy, sanctions, and observation and fact-finding missions can be considered as the instruments of crisis management. In this chapter, various tools and capabilities of the Union's crisis management are defined in detail.

3.1. Common positions, joint actions and common strategies

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced common positions and joint actions (Article J.2 and Article J.3). While the former is a necessarily precondition for arriving at a common policy, the latter aims to translate this policy into action. Joint actions have a more specific scope and respond to concrete situations; their objectives, their duration and the means necessary for implementation are usually defined. Article J.3 states that, "The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for this implementation" (see in Appendix II). Generally, both common positions and joint actions had to be decided by consensus. When it came to the implementation of an agreed joint action, exceptions were possible, in other words, qualified majority voting was allowed.

Since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) came into operation on 1 November 1993, the EU has agreed a number of joint actions including monitoring elections and supporting democracy in Russia, South Africa, Palestine, Nigeria, Congo; the provision of humanitarian assistance in former Yugoslavia and establishing an administration for Mostar; supporting the Middle East Peace Process including the sending of a special envoy; lobbying jointly for the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); promoting the Stability Pact to tackle problems concerned with borders/minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (Cameron, 1999:44). The EU also launched the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

In addition to these actions, a number of common positions have been adopted on former Yugoslavia (e.g. bans on exports, flights, and investments), Libya, Sudan, Haiti, Rwanda, Ukraine, Burundi, Angola, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Cuba, Albania, Sierre Leone and Belarus. Furthermore, there have been common positions on the grouping of diplomatic missions, on biological and chemical weapons, on the prevention of conflicts; and decisions regarding the functioning and financing of CFSP, communications in the CFSP, political dialogue communications and a code of conduct on arms exports (Cameron, 1999:43)

The Treaty of Amsterdam, based on a French proposal, added a new instrument, the so-called common strategies, to CFSP/ESDP. According to Article 13 of the TEU, the European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common. This involves establishing objectives, duration, and the means to be made available for implementation of a strategy. In this respect, White (2001:162) assumes, “A significant feature of this instrument from a common European foreign policy perspective is that it is intended to be an improved mechanism for ensuring consistency across the range of external policies.” A common strategy is considered as a general framework for achieving specified goals, which can be implemented by joint actions and common positions. The concept of joint actions are further elaborated in order to make it more flexible towards changing situations, and to ensure the commitments of the member states (Article 14). The Cologne European Council adopted the first common strategy on the future relations between the EU and Russia, in June 1999.

Common strategies, joint actions and common positions can be analyzed as legal instruments of the European Union's CFSP (Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the TEU). As Sole (2003:41) expresses:

“The Treaty of the European Union states that joint actions address specific situations where operational action by the EU is considered necessary, and common positions define the EU's approach to a particular matter. Decisions to make use of instruments tend to be either common positions or joint actions. Joint actions, for example, include sending election observers to third countries, while common positions, for example, announce economic sanctions. The Member States are to ensure that their policies conform to common positions and are to be bound to follow joint actions, (...). As far as common strategies are concerned, their main is to set objectives for and increase the effectiveness of EU actions through enhancing the overall coherence of the Union's policy towards a region. Their activation depends on the adoption of joint actions and common positions.”

3.2. European Multinational Forces

German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterand announced the creation of a Franco-German Corps on 21 May 1992. Its role would be centred upon crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian action rather than straightforward deterrence. The Eurocorps, as it became known, are currently drawn from five member states: France, Germany, Belgium (June 1993), Spain (July 1994), and Luxembourg (August 1995), and it has a strength of 60.000 troops. The North Atlantic Council, the SACEUR and the Chiefs of Staff of the states participating in the Eurocorps reached an agreement about coordination of the Eurocorps with NATO on 21 January 1993. Under this agreement Eurocorps forces are “double-hatted”; that is, they may be assigned either to NATO or to national authorities within the WEU framework. Eurocorps became operational on 30 November 1995. Important exercises to practice interoperability, operational procedures and force projection have been concluded successfully. Eurocorps took command of KFOR (Kosovo Force) on 18 April 2000.

France, Italy and Spain signed the founding documents for the creation of a European (Rapid Deployment) Force (EUROFOR), and a European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) at WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon in May 1995. At this meeting,

Portugal officially requested to join both forces and was included to the documents through a protocol²⁰. WEU framework had the priority of using both forces, but they could also be used in the framework of NATO (logically under AFSOUTH (Allied Forces South Europe) or integrated within ARRC (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) or the Eurocorps. EUROFOR is a large, multinational force of four brigades with units available on call, with different modules selected on ad-hoc basis. Its headquarters became operational in November 1996, and at that time Greece officially applied to join. EUROFOR itself became operational in June 1998. EUROMARFOR is a pre-structured, non-permanent force; the composition and structure depend on its mission. It has no permanent structures or HQ but it comes under the rotating command of one of the participating states. It became operational in May 1997.

WEU could also make use of detachable NATO forces, headquarters structures, logistics, collective Command and Control (C2) systems and specialized assets such as communication systems, through the “Combined Joint Task Forces”²¹ concept. This concept was endorsed at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994. The concept was completed at the NATO Berlin Summit in June 1996. At the informal NATO meeting in Bergen on 25-26 September 1996, it was decided that a double-hat Deputy SACEUR (who is always a European) as commander of Europe-only operations, who would oversee cooperation between WEU and NATO and make plans for possible European/WEU operations that include CJTF. The first joint NATO-WEU CJTF exercise (CIMEX/CRISEX) took place from 21 February to 1 March 2000.

A further important force is the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). ARRC was created at the NATO Rome Summit in November 1991. The ARRC forms the land component of the ACE rapid reaction forces within the NATO 1991

²⁰ Portugal contributes an airborne brigade to EUROFOR, and has an observer status in EUROMARFOR.

²¹ The CJTF concerns short-term, quick reaction, multinational (combined) and multi-service (joint) contingency elements within NATO that could be detached for certain missions and placed under the political control and strategic direction of WEU on the basis of an ad hoc North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision, should NATO choose not to participate in an operation. Elements can be drawn from Regional Command North (Brunssum, the Netherlands) and RC South (Naples, Italy). A modular approach has been adopted for CJTF HQs based on nuclei or core staffs and modules (Modular Approach: Nucleus + Augmentation Modules + Support Modules). CJTF will operate under NATO SOPs (Standing Operation Procedures) and STANAGs (Standardization Agreements) (Heisbourg, 2000b: 78 [his footnote 30]).

Strategic Concept. As the framework nation²², the United Kingdom always provides the Commander of the ARRC. Despite all these multinational force structures, there are still debates about their effectiveness and efficiency of these structures because of the difficulties in coordination and cooperation among the forces. In conclusion one can claim that most European national forces represent little more than political symbolism and paper forces.

3.3. The Rapid Reaction Force

In 1990s, the Balkan wars demonstrated the need to create independent crisis management capabilities for the European Union. Therefore, as Sole (2003:56) notes, “Since 1999, the EU has been developing new military instruments that should increase the Union’s coercive capacity and allow for greater participation by the Union in international conflicts.” The first official reform came at the Franco-British meeting at St. Malo in December 1998, where Britain for the first time decided to participate in the development of a defence policy within the Union capable of autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. So that the EU could take action when the whole of NATO was not engaged, the Union had to be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analyzing situation, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication.

At the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999, the EU member states set themselves a capability target known as the Headline Goal, largely based on the dominant role of the IFOR (Implementation Force) deployed by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It required EU member states to be able to deploy 50.000-60.000 troops within 60 days, to be sustainable for one year, starting in January 2003. These forces would have the capability of conducting the entire range of Petersberg Tasks. The EU-led force, the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), was to be assembled in response to a crisis and would last only for the duration of the crisis. The member states would decide

²² The concept of framework nation, better known as ‘lead nation’, has wide applicability in the United Nations and in other international organizations that face difficulties with collective action problems. In military practice, the lead nation concept allows for a speedier setting up for an operation by using a national headquarters, while at the same time emphasizing the multinational nature of the operation by ensuring broad coalition representation on the lead nation headquarters staff.

whether, when, and how to contribute troops. There are varieties of missions, which can be foreseen for European Rapid Reaction Force. Missiroli (2003a: 30) identifies two types of operations that ERRF can conduct:

- 1- Single corps-sized crisis management tasks, while retaining enough assets to conduct a small-scale operation such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
- 2- Long-term operation at less than maximum level of effort, while conducting another operation of a limited duration.

As Smith (2003:167) notes, “The EU’s rapid reaction force is supposed to enable it to ‘play its role fully on the international stage’ and carry out the ‘full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in EU treaty, the Petersberg tasks’.” The EU replaced NATO’s peacekeeping mission in FYROM in early 2003, provided a stabilization force for the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-2003, and took over the operation of SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia at the end of 2004.

The Union has set up its institutional structures in order to be able to act more effectively in defence and security since the St. Malo Declaration. As mentioned above, the Union has set itself an ambitious headline goal – the ability to deploy an army corps to fulfill Petersberg tasks. But the target date of 2003 was not met. At the October 2003 informal meeting of EU defence ministers, Javier Solana implicitly acknowledged that the likely deadline would be Headline Goal 2010 (European defence, 2004:12).

As mentioned in the second chapter, the EU presented “the battle group” concept in 2004. According to the concept, the battle groups (or tactical groups) of 1,500 troops including appropriate supporting elements, should be ready for the deployment within 15 days. They should be capable of high-intensity operations. In order to be deployed within 15 days, battle groups will need to be fully manned, equipped and trained. At the same time, member states offering battle groups must also identify and allocate sufficient strategic lift assets to ensure deployment within 15 days.

These forces will be designed specifically, but not exclusively, to be used in response to request from the UN. The aim is to establish 2-3 high-readiness battle groups by 2005, and 7-9 groups by 2007. Battle groups could be formed by one nation alone, by a

lead nation with other nations contributing to niche capabilities, or by a multinational solution if countries are unable to contribute a full battle group alone. In any case, they should meet the criteria of military effectiveness, deployability and readiness (Schmitt, 2004: 98-99).

3.4. Civilian Crisis Management Mechanism

At the beginning of the debate on the ESDP, countries such as the United Kingdom and France were only interested in the military and defence aspects, while the Scandinavian EU members especially feared the militarization of the EU and asked for the introduction of a civil force (Sole, 2003:60). The Finnish Presidency argued that the EU needed to develop a non-military rapid response capability in its report to the Helsinki European Council. In May 2000 the Council set up a committee for the civilian aspects of crisis management. In June 2000, the Feira European Council identified policing, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civil administration and civil protection as the four priority areas, in which the Union intends to enhance capabilities for use in operations led by the UN, OSCE or the EU itself. Therefore, the EU agreed to set up the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management²³, which was formally established by a Council decision of 22 May 2000. The Committee held its first meeting on 16 June 2000.

Police tasks: The Feira European Council established first concrete target for civilian crisis response, when member states committed themselves to provide 5.000 police officers, 1.000 of them to be deployable within 30 days, for international missions, by 2003. Appendix 4 of Annex 1 Presidency conclusions of the Santa Maria da Feira European Council states:

“Recognizing the central role of police in international crisis management operations, and the increasing need for police officers for such operations, EU Member States undertake to strengthen their capability to provide police officers for international police operations to which they voluntarily decide to contribute. Member States’ contributions will take account of their own particular arrangements for national policing and the type of police expertise which they can provide.

²³ CIVCOM reports formally to COREPER, but receives guidance from the PSC and provides information to the PSC.

Strengthening their capabilities in phases, EU Member States should, as a final objective, be able to provide up to 5.000 police officers to international missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations. The current total deployment of EU Member States is approximately 3.300 persons.” (Rutten, 2001: 136)

The member states decided that the deployable police force should be able to implement operations and missions of police advice, training and monitoring as well as executive policing. Police operations could be launched to prevent the outbreak of conflicts, to restore law and order in immediate post-conflict situations, and to support local police (Sole, 2003:61). In May 2001, a Police Unit²⁴ was created within the Council Secretariat, which would be headed by a police officer and include 6-7 experts. Unlike the Military Staff, is not a self-standing body (Hansen, 2004:176). In June 2001, the Göteborg Council approved more specific requirements for the planning and conduct of police operations. These included a planned police ministers summit for resolution of strategic planning issues, development of draft status of forces agreements, to provide legal cover for deployment, development of command and control procedures, enhancement of interoperability, and financing arrangements (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001:31). On 1 January 2003, the EU Police Mission replaced the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its main tasks consisted of a broad approach with activities addressing the whole range of rule of law aspects; including institutions building programmes and police activities, which should be mutually supportive and reinforcing.

Strengthening the rule of law: This related to assistance with reorganizing judicial and penal systems. As Sole (2003: 61-62) points out:

“First, strengthening the rule of law is necessary to ensure that the achievements of successful policing are supported by appropriate and well-functioning judicial and penal institutions (courts and prisons). Second, an international police presence also facilitates institution building and rule of law. Reinforcing the rule of law in third countries requires EU Member States to establish a capacity to deploy judges, prosecutors and other legal and penal experts to post-conflict settings and requires the EU to support the reconstruction of courts and prisons and the recruitment of local personnel in the legal and penal fields.”

²⁴ The Police Unit’s task is to plan and conduct police operations, including integrated planning and coordination, situation assessment, preparation of exercises, and preparation of legal frameworks and rules.

The Civilian Committee established a database designed to record member states' ability to make available specialist judicial and penal staff. The Göteborg Council called on member states to be ready by 2003 to be able to deploy up to 200 officials (prosecutors, judges and correctional staff), and for this capability to include a rapid response group of rule specialists, who can deploy on 30 days notice to provide early planning on rule of law support. The EU has a rule of law mission in Georgia.

Strengthening of civilian administration: The aspect of civilian crisis management was meant to contribute to the overall goal of institution building after crisis. It also dispatches experts to third countries to assist in reorganizing administrative systems and training local personnel. CIVCOM is engaged in exchanging information on the selection, training and deployment of civilian administration experts. The Göteborg Council committed the EU to establish a pool of experts in general administration, social services and infrastructure functions, which can perform training, monitoring or executive functions. The EU has assigned the task of administering the Bosnian city of Mostar under the terms of the February 1994 Washington agreement (which created the Bosnian Federation and ended hostilities between Bosnians Muslims and Croats). The EU's mission was to create the conditions for the reunification of the city by overcoming the division between Muslims and Croats. The EU's administration lasted from July 1994 to July 1996.

Civil Protection: As Sole (2003:62) defines, the concept of civil protection refers to actions in the wake of a natural disaster, search and rescue capabilities deployed as part of disaster relief operations. At the Göteborg Council, civil protection was defined as the provision of assistance to humanitarian actors in covering the immediate survival and protection needs of affected populations. This would include search and rescue, construction of refugee camps and systems communications and the provision of other types of logistical support (Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, Annex III). Göteborg Council also approved new targets, which would be coordinated by CIVCOM: a pool of up to 100 experts, who are on 24-hour call, and can be part of assessments teams of ten people each and who can be dispatched within three to four hours; a Civil Protection intervention team of up to 2000 people who can deploy at short notice; and supplementary resources from component services of NGOs, that can be deployed within two weeks (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001:32).

3.5. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism

The Helsinki Council of December 1999 stressed the importance of non-military crisis management capabilities, in addition to the development of new military capabilities in the form of the Rapid Reaction Force, to assume the responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. In 2001, with a view to increasing the flexibility and balance of civilian and military assets in crisis situations, a Council Regulation established the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) as a civilian counterpart to the Rapid Reaction Force.

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is a relatively recent addition to the EU's crisis management toolbox. Based on Article 308 TEU, RRM was launched by the External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten in February 2001. The Mechanism was created to allow the European Commission to dispatch Community funds rapidly in case of an emergency. It is a "fast-disbursing" funding mechanism designed to provide quick-impact stabilizers to help reduce the economic consequences of violent crisis and thus facilitate crisis management (ICG Issues Briefing Paper, 2002: 11). As Bainbridge (2002: 443) defines, "The RRM is intended to make Union's response to non-military emergencies 'rapid, efficient and flexible'." This mechanism is designed to provide rapid civilian stabilization of crises while plans for long-term assistance and reconstruction are underway. Its purpose is to enable the EU policies to re-establish or safeguard the normal conditions that underpin existing EU policies and programmes, including assistance and cooperation to third countries (NGO Voice Briefing Paper, 2004: 3).

The Unit for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (CPU) of DG (Directorate-General) External Relations within the Commission manages the RRM. The RRM can act in six months after a crisis erupts, and its scope may include human rights work, election monitoring, institution building, media support, border management, humanitarian missions, police training and the provision of police equipment, rehabilitation, pacification, reconstruction, civil emergency assistance, resettlement and mediation. The RRM may be deployed either at the request of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or autonomously. The RRM was first used in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2001. It was concerned with the houses destroyed or damaged by the fighting in the areas of Tetovo and Skopska

Crna Gora. In October 2001, the Commission adopted a decision to finance a Confidence Building Program for the FYROM, including the use of RRM funds (Piana, 2002: 215).

3.6. The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU)

As provided for in a declaration attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (now called the Policy Unit) was established within the Council Secretariat. It reports to the Secretary General / High Representative, and also works with the Commission to ensure coherence with EU's trade and development policies. Its mandate can be defined as follows (Sole, 2003: 51):

- Monitoring and analyzing developments in the areas relevant to CFSP;
- Providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP should focus in the future;
- Providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have a significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises;
- Producing policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.

To assist the PPEWU in its tasks of monitoring developments, and providing early warning assessments, the Policy Unit established a Situation Centre. The Policy Unit's crisis analysis department is officially called the Situation Centre or Crisis Cell. The SITCEN is a joint civilian-military crisis management center formed by members of the Policy Unit together with the EUMC. In a crisis management situation the SITCEN supports the PSC and the EUMC directly. Moreover, the SITCEN is set up to maintain contact with the situation centers in the NATO, the OSCE and the UN (Erhart, 2002: 45). The Situation Centre receives information the Satellite Imaging Centre at Torrejon, Spain, which used to provide information to WEU. The Situation Centre is to support the Union's decision-making by providing material resulting from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data, including aerial imagery. With this mission the SITCEN can provide information to the Union, the member states, the Commission, third states and international organizations in support of the following activities (Sole, 2003: 52):

- General security surveillance;
- Petersberg tasks;
- Treaty verification;
- Arms and proliferation control;
- Maritime surveillance;
- Environmental monitoring (including both natural and man-induced disasters).

3.7. EU Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian aid often becomes EU's first substantial source of financing in the regions concerned after a crisis has broken out. Due to the absence of other instruments, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) is often being called to finance post-conflict programmes outside the remit of emergency aid. ECHO was set up within the European Commission in 1991 to make the provisions of humanitarian aid more efficient, especially by improving coordination with relief agencies and by enabling the European Union to respond more quickly to calls for emergency aid. ECHO became fully operational in 1993. It was initially given the task of providing only non-food humanitarian aid solely in emergencies. This mandate expanded to include emergency food aid in 1994 (Sole, 2003: 36).

ECHO has been the EU's main body to act in emergency situations since 1992. ECHO is a service of the European Commission, which provides apolitical emergency relief and humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters or armed conflicts in countries outside the EU. ECHO relief is administered to victims of natural or man-made crises solely on the basis of need and level of distress, without political discrimination, employing the principles of neutrality and impartiality in assisting all victims of emergencies in conformity with international law. ECHO also carries out feasibility studies for humanitarian operations; monitors humanitarian projects, and sets up coordination arrangements. It trains specialists in disaster relief and provides other technical assistance. ECHO implements its mandate through Framework Partnership Agreements (FPA) with international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (ICG Issues Report No 2: 2001:23).

At the beginning of 2001, the new Europe Aid Cooperation Office was created to handle the greater part of the aid and assistance projects. The main function of EuropeAid is to merge short and long-term crisis management measures more efficiently. EuropeAid does not deal with the short-term humanitarian assistance, which is task of the ECHO.

3.8. Political dialogue and diplomacy

The European Union carries political dialogue with a large number of countries or groups of countries on questions of international policy. It has more than 45.000 diplomats; over 150 states have established diplomatic missions to the EU in Brussels; and 180 Commission delegations have been set up in third countries and at international organization headquarters. Article 20 of the TEU states:

“The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.”(See in Appendix III)

Meetings take place at all levels: heads of state, ministers, political directors, senior officials and experts. The European Union can be represented at them by the Presidency (assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP), by the High Representative alone at the request of the Presidency, or by the Troika, or by the member states’ delegates and the Commission representatives.

Declarations make political dialogue official by giving public expression to a European Union position, request or expectation towards a third country or an international issue. This instrument makes it possible to react very quickly to affairs and state the Union’s point of view. There are two types of declarations: a declaration by the EU, in which the Council meets and adopts a position, and a declaration by the Presidency on the behalf of the EU, in which the Council does not meet (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001:39). Demarches differ from the declarations in that they are confidential and are undertaken towards third countries by the Presidency or the Troika on behalf of the European Union.

Their purpose is usually to resolve the matters relating to human rights, democracy or humanitarian action with the state in question (Sole, 2003:43).

It can be said that within political dialogue, in relation to mediation and negotiation, the Special Representatives are core EU's instruments for peace making and post-conflict peace building. They play a fundamental role in ensuring the coordination of the UN and other international organizations with EU policies, keeping the EU institutions and member states informed, and assisting in harmonizing diverging positions among EU member states and in developing EU strategies (Sole, 2003:44). The Amsterdam Treaty standardized the practice allowing the Council to appoint Special Representatives with a mandate on particular issues. The Council, through a joint action, draws clear lines of responsibility and limits the coordination and consistency of the mandate of the Special Representatives of the European Union external action in the area. Since their main aim is to contribute to the implementation of the Union's policy in a specific location, they are responsible for an important number of tasks that they fulfill as diplomats and mediators. The Special Representatives are responsible for political dialogue and diplomacy between the EU and the country concerned, as well as for ensuring the continuation of the EU presence in the region.

3.9. Sanctions

Sanctions are one of the EU's main instruments to pressure countries to defuse crises or adopt a certain course of action. As Sole (2003:48) notes, "Whether applied selectively or comprehensively, sanctions constitute the EU's most important instrument of crisis management currently available." The EU has usually imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions after a violent conflict has already erupted. Since the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the Union has the capacity to impose joint diplomatic sanctions, such as by withdrawing ambassadors, expelling military personnel in third country representations, suspending high-level contacts, suspending official visits, imposing visa restrictions or selective travel bans. Diplomatic sanctions (adopted through a common position) also concern restrictive measures preventing persons related to certain conflicts from entering into or traveling through the territories of the member states, except when the trip is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, and from attending

intergovernmental meetings where a political dialogue that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law is being conducted. Sometimes the EU also encourages third states to adopt restrictive measures similar to those adopted in its own common position.

Apart from diplomatic sanctions, the EU's economic weight makes the application of commercial and economic sanctions possible. These sanctions are different from the "suspension mechanisms"²⁵ included in agreements or cooperation programmes. The Maastricht Treaty codified the procedures imposing them. Article 301 provided for the interruption or reduction of economic relations with third countries following a common position or joint action adopted unanimously to that effect in the CFSP. Article 301 covered all economic relations, not just trade (restrictions on imports and/or exports) and the provision of services. The Council is also allowed to impose sanctions with respect to capital movements and payments under article 60. These financial measures are often targeted to punish specific individuals by freezing their personal funds abroad. In addition to sanctions, arms embargoes, as a non-military instrument of a crisis management, are often used to stop the flow of arms to conflict areas. The motivation for arms embargoes is often more humanitarian than punitive. They are often associated with explicitly coercive measures such as economic sanctions (Sole, 2003:49-50).

3.10. Observation and fact-finding missions

As Sole (2003:47) defines, "The primary objective of the observation and fact-finding missions is to contribute through its activities (information gathering and analysis), in line with instructions from the Secretary General/High Representative and the Council, to an effective formulation of the European Union policy towards a specific area. The mission is tasked primarily by the Secretary General/High Representative, but the Council may also initiate specific tasking in coordination with the SG/HR and in consultation with the Commission." Observation missions have three features that help them to control outbreaks of violence. Last (2003: 2) lists these features as follows: "First, they have

²⁵ On 29 May 1995, the Council agreed that all agreements with third countries would contain a suspension mechanism, enabling the Community to react in the event of violations of essential elements of the agreements, particularly human rights and democratic principles. From that moment on, the Community had the means to condition, delay or sanction the signature of an agreement with a third country until the fulfillment of political criteria.

diplomatic status, which allow them free movement and wide powers of enquiry. Second, they are deployed in multinational teams, which remove the perception of national bias and help their information to build toward an international consensus on action. Most important perhaps, observer missions typically have a dual mandate, to monitor and assist.” Monitoring missions are mostly post-conflict peace building instruments with the primary objective of contributing to the effective formulation of the EU policy towards one area.

The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is the current form of a predecessor established by the EC (ECMM) in 1991 to report on political, economic and humanitarian developments in the former Yugoslavia (including Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Albania. In December, the Council approved a change of name to EUMM, and clarified its reporting and funding arrangements (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001: 28). According to Sole (2003: 47), the EUMM for the Western Balkans has been the most important mission led by the EU. The particular focus of the EUMM is to monitor political and security developments, as well as border monitoring, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns, and to contribute through its activities to early warning and confidence building measures. The EUMM, which reports to the Council through the SG/HR, must also coordinate its activities with the relevant international organizations in the western Balkans. The European Union has also supported UN and OSCE missions, mostly through financial support in the form of grants.

Concluding Remarks:

In this chapter, the instruments and capabilities of EU’s crisis management are analyzed. It appears that the EU actually has considerable means and capabilities to conduct crisis management operations. However, the effective use of these capabilities and success of the operations depend on a multitude of factors such as political will; cohesion; coordination. In the following chapter, how these factors affect the conduct of European Union’s crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are examined.

IV. CASE STUDIES OF EUROPEAN UNION'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

The war in former Yugoslavia brought the terms “Balkans” and “Balkanization”²⁶ back into common use. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these terms had become synonymous with political ethnic conflicts, violence and the fragmentation of states in the west. As Simic (2001:17) remarks, “At the time that the end of the bipolar division of Europe indicated the possibility of a new and peaceful order, the wars of the Yugoslav succession ‘brought wars to Europe’, showing the inability of the international community to ensure peace in a continent that was no longer threatened by conflicting military and political alliances, but by crises and ethnic conflicts in former socialist countries.”

As mentioned before, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Laeken on 14-15 December 2001 stated that the Union was now capable of conducting some crisis management operations. In other words, the ESDP was proclaimed operational at the Laeken European Council. A few days after the Laeken European Council, High Representative Javier Solana tabled a proposal to put ESDP to the test, arguing that this was the best way to find out whether it was truly operational (ICG Issues Briefing Paper, 2002: 8). He suggested two relatively modest operations in areas of strategic importance to the EU: an EU police force in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take over from the UN International Police Task Force, whose mandate ran out in January 2003, and an EU military force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to take over from NATO's Operation Amber Fox, whose mandate was subject to renewal every three months.

The Balkan countries, because of their geographical proximity to one another and EU member states, and their potential membership in the EU in the future, represent globally a contentious area for the EU member states. Therefore, it can be said that it is the

²⁶ The term refers to division of a place or country in several small political units, often unfriendly to one another. The term Balkanization comes from the name Balkan Peninsula, which was divided into smaller nations in the early twentieth century. As defined by James Der Derian, Balkanization is generally understood to be the break-up of larger political units into smaller, mutually hostile states, which are exploited or manipulated by more powerful neighbors. (James Der Derian. (1991). “S/N: International Theory, Balkanization and the New World Order”. *Millennium*, 20(3): 485-506, quote on 488; cited here from Ole Weaver. (1995). “Securitization and Desecuritization”. In Ronnie D. Lipshutz (Ed.), *On Security*. New York: Colombia University Press).

only area in the world, where there is an actual European foreign policy (Piana, 2002: 216). Triantanphyllou (2002:65) points out that the Balkans is a two edged challenge for the European Union: On the one hand, the Balkans represents Europe's backyard and hence, the need for Europe to manage it is critical, and on the other hand, the Balkans is the principal testing ground of the European Union's crisis management capability. At the same time, the EU represents the only feasible option for the states of the Balkans if the region is to escape its recent past and its retarded development (Triantanphyllou, 2002:65). On the ground, the EU is very active through a series of Community programmes (especially CARDS²⁷) and other instruments, most importantly the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA)²⁸ in the Balkan region

4.1. The test cases of EU missions

The European Union is almost new in the field of peace support operations. The ambition and the commitment to engage the European Union as such in crisis management operations were first formulated at the Cologne European Council of June 1999, which marks the initiation of the European Security and Defence Policy as a distinctive part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. If one omits the monitoring missions and crisis exercises, 2003 marks the year that ESDP became operational. In parallel to all these, the European Union launched its first crisis management operations (first civilian and first military) on the ground in the Balkans. The European Union engaged in four missions in 2003; The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, which represents the European Union's first civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP; the Concordia mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is the first military crisis management operation; the Proxima mission, which is a follow on civilian

²⁷ The CARDS programme (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) is the main channel for European Union aid to the countries of South East Europe under the Stabilization and Association (SAP) process. It was established under Regulation 2666/00 on 5 December 2000.

²⁸ The creation of the SAA dates back to April 1997, when the EU General Affairs Council adopted a Regional Approach towards the Western Balkans, establishing political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the FYROM. In 1999, the Commission proposed the creation of a Stabilization and Association Process for these five countries. The SAP provided a new framework for the development of relations between these countries and the EU. For the first time, it offered those countries a prospect of EU integration, based on a progressive approach adapted to the situation of each country. The SAP offers major motives, but also sets political and economic conditions, including the need for regional cooperation, respect of fundamental rights and respect for ethnic minorities. In order to develop a closer relationship with the EU, these countries have to adjust their political, economic and institutional development to the values and models underpinning the EU: democracy, respect for human rights and a market economy.

crisis management mission to Concordia in FYROM; and the Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is the first military operation outside Europe and, unlike the other missions, does not rely on NATO assistance. The EU also engaged in another operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004; Operation Althea, which is be the largest operation in size ever launched by the EU. As mentioned above, the Balkans can be considered as a testing ground for the ESDP. This chapter aims at analyzing the EU-led missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in FYROM with a view to evaluating the European Union's crisis management capability.

4.1.1. The EU missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As mentioned above, the European Union launched two missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUPM and Althea. The EUPM represents the European Union's first civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP, and it can be regarded as a milestone for the Union's crisis management activities. Therefore, the EUPM will be the major subject that will be discussed in this section.

4.1.1.1. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM)

War erupted in Bosnia following the breakdown of Yugoslavia in 1992. It was brought to an end after three years with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995. The Dayton Peace Accord establishes Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multiethnic state with two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Republika Srpska. From than on, the UN's International Police Task Force maintained local stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The General Affairs Council meeting on 18-19 February 2002 announced the EU's readiness to deploy a EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to take over from the UN International Police Task Force in January 2003. While the mission officially began in 2003, the EUPM Planning Team had been in the region for more than eight months to plan the transition from the IPTF, which had been deployed there for seven years.

Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002 established the European Union Police Mission as the follow-up to the UN-led International Police Task Force in Bosnia

and Herzegovina. Security Council Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002 authorized the transfer of international policing from the UN to the EU. On 4 October 2002, the EU signed an agreement with the Bosnian authorities that defined the conditions and terms of the EUPM. According to the Mission Statement for the EUPM:

“The European Union Police Mission, supported by the European Commission’s institution building programmes, should, as part of a broader rule of law approach, aim, in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace²⁹, establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia and Herzegovina ownership in accordance with best European and international practices, and thereby raising current BiH police standards.” (PPIO Review 2003, 2003:6)

The inaugural EU civilian crisis management operation was the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it began in January 2003 and was set to run through 2005. It took over the functions of the previous UN mission there while expanding its rule of law tasks and responsibilities. Initially, EUPM worked, under the security umbrella of the NATO-led military forces in BiH (SFOR), to build and mentor the national BiH police and rule of law institutions. By the end of 2004, the EU took over the mission of SFOR in BiH. Therefore, EUPM is now working under the security umbrella of the European Union.

Launched on 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents the EU’s first civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. The aim of EUPM, as Missiroli (2003c: 12) defines, is to support the local authorities in training their police forces to the highest European and international standards through monitoring, mentoring and inspecting the management and operating of the police. As Lindstrom (2004:112) states:

“In total 495 police officers and 59 additional staff are currently assigned to establish local law enforcement capabilities and contribute to stability in the region through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. Approximately 80 per cent of the police officers come from EU member states and 20 per cent from other countries participating in the mission.”

²⁹ Representatives of three warring parties signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (GFAP) in Paris on 14 December 1995. One of the annexes to the peace agreement includes the State constitution and lays out a complex political system consisting of various levels of government and check on power.

Table 1: Personnel participating in the EUPM, as of January 2004

	The European Union				Third States		
	Police	Civilians	Total		Police	Civilians	Total
Austria	5	3	8	Bulgaria	3	2	5
Belgium	6	5	11	Canada	7	0	7
Denmark	13	0	13	Cyprus	6	0	6
Finland	13	5	18	Czech Republic	6	0	6
France	85	3	88	Estonia	2	0	2
Germany	76	6	82	Hungary	5	0	5
Greece	12	0	12	Iceland	1	1	2
Ireland	3	3	6	Latvia	4	0	4
Italy	51	6	57	Lithuania	2	0	2
Luxembourg	2	1	3	Norway	6	1	7
Netherlands	32	3	35	Poland	12	0	12
Portugal	8	2	10	Romania	9	0	9
Spain	20	6	26	Russia	3	0	3
Sweden	15	1	16	Slovakia	6	0	6
United Kingdom	55	9	64	Slovenia	4	0	4
				Switzerland	4	0	4
				Turkey	14	2	16
				Ukraine	5	0	5
Total	396	53	449	Total	99	6	105

Source: Lindstrom, 2004: 113.

The aim of EUPM is to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with the best European and international practice. EUPM is based on a management approach. The EUPM aims to ensure that the domestic policing structures, put in place by IPTF, are functioning effectively by monitoring, mentoring and inspecting managerial and operational capacities of the BiH police. In addition to this work, the EUPM Police Commissioner has identified two key issues to be addressed by EUPM: ensuring that the BiH police provide a secure environment for returnees, and enabling the BiH police to tackle organized crime and corruption. The specific objectives of European Union Police Mission as stated in PPIO Review (2003: 6) are:

- The development of police independence and accountability by:
 - o Depoliticising the police,
 - o Strengthening the Directors of Police/Police Commissioners,
 - o Monitoring performance of these officials,
 - o Promoting transparency.

- The fight against organized crime and corruption by:
 - o Carrying out a joint strategy with the Office of the High Representative,
 - o Supporting the Local Police (LP) in operational capacities,
 - o Strengthening the investigative capacity of the Local Police,
 - o Supporting the establishment of a State level police agency (SIPA).
- The financial viability and sustainability of the Local Police by:
 - o Supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of Local Police,
 - o Auditing local police, with a focus on affordability,
 - o Supporting efforts to bring about more regular and more harmonized salary payments for police officers.
- Institution and capacity building by;
 - o Generating management capacity,
 - o Supervising the creation of local recruitment and promotion procedures,
 - o Consolidating State level agencies: the State Border Service (SBS) and the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA).

To achieve these missions, the EUPM implements seven core programmes: five thematic and two institutional. The thematic programmes cover Public Order and Security, Crime Policing, Criminal Justice, Internal Affairs, and Police Administration. The two institutional programmes cover the State Border Service and the State Information Protection Agency. All programmes are implemented within the framework of co-location, with EUPM officers at HQ managing the strategic aspects of each programme: training, logistical support and planning. The seven key programmes can be listed as follows³⁰:

1- The Crime Police Programme: The goal of this programme is to improve the current standard of policing through reform and restructuring of the local police agencies. Specifically, the aim is to develop modern, sustainable, professional, and multiethnic police force that is trained, equipped and able to assume full responsibility and to independently uphold law enforcement. Within this programme, two special projects have

³⁰ The listed seven key programmes here is a summary of information taken from Lindstrom (2004: 114-115) and PPIO Review (2003: 7).

been implemented: Fight against Major Organized Crime (MOC) and Fight against Human Trafficking (FIGHT).

2- The Criminal Justice Programme: The goal of the programme is to establish a modern, equipped, self-sustaining, professional and multiethnic Court Police, able to establish a coordinated relationship between the police and the judiciary. One aspect of this relationship is training local police on reporting criminal matters and presenting these to the prosecutor.

3- The Internal Affairs Programme: The goal of the programme is to generate a reliable and transparent internal control system for all law enforcement agencies based on best international practice. Efforts include bringing law enforcement agencies in line with international human rights standards and democratic policing principles, as well as establishing disciplinary mechanisms to strengthen public confidence. The programme is in charge of development of all necessary procedures and tools to manage disciplinary and criminal cases involving police officers.

4- The Police Administration Programme: The goal of the programme is to establish a properly functioning police administration, providing police forces with the support they require. The aim is to leave behind a sustainable multiethnic police administration that fulfils the basic European standards for democratic administration, financial credibility and transparent practices.

5- The Public Order and Security Programme: The goal of the programme is to strengthen police capacities to prevent and address escalating civil disorders or any major confrontation between ethnic groups. The safety of returnees is also covered in this programme. The programme is in charge of advancing the abilities of Uniform Police, Traffic Units, Support Units and Anti-terrorist Units, as well as crime prevention.

6- State Border Service (SBS) Programme: The desired end state is to leave in place under BiH ownership sufficient capacity to achieve a modern, properly trained and equipped, self-sustaining, professional and multi-ethnic Law Enforcement Agency at State level to control BiH borders. The goal of the programme is to consolidate the SBS and SIPA as part of an integrated law enforcement system with responsibility over state

borders, able to independently uphold law within its jurisdiction according to international democratic standards.

7- The State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) Programme: The general and the desired end state are to leave in place under BiH ownership sufficient capacity to achieve a modern, properly trained and equipped, self-sustaining, professional and multi-ethnic Law Enforcement Agency at State level to co-ordinate all crime fighting police capabilities. The goal of this programme is to build capacity within SIPA, which will be the primary state-level agency in charge of facilitating cooperation and coordination between police services.

The European Union Police Mission, whose headquarters are located in Sarajevo, is divided into three departments, namely Operations, Planning and Development, as well as Administration and Support Services. Kevin Bartholomew Carty, Police Commissioner³¹ of the EUPM manages the operations in Sarajevo. An additional twenty-four monitoring units are co-located in various Bosnia and Herzegovina police structures. All EUPM activities (Operations, Planning and Development, Administration and Support Services) are managed in close coordination with the EU/UN Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Ashdown (Lindstrom, 2004:113).

The Police Commissioner is in operational command of the mission. He reports to the Secretary General/High Representative through the EU Special Representative (EUSR), who is also the High Representative to BiH. The Political and Security Committee exercises political control and strategic direction of the mission. EUPM officers are co-located with officers at medium and senior levels of the BiH police. The monitoring units are deployed in police forces at the level of the state, the entities, Brcko District – a demilitarized area under international supervision-, the cantons (of the Federation) and the Public Security Centres (in the Republika Srpska)³². Co-located officers act as mentors to their BiH colleagues and monitor their work within the context of

³¹ Sven Frederiksen was the first Head of Mission/Police Commissioner (HM/PC) for the EUPM. Sven Frederiksen passed away after a coronary seizure in the morning of 26th of January 2004. After his death, on 1 March 2004, Assistant Commissioner Carty was appointed as HM/PC for the EUPM.

³² BiH is composed of two entities, the federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska and the separately administered Brcko District.

EUPM's seven core programmes. The work of these officers is supported by two mobile inspection teams, which can be moved around the country as and when required.³³

The EUPM has a mandate for three years (until 31 December 2005). According to the authorizing Joint Action, the anticipated costs of the operation included EUR14 million for start up costs in 2002 and EUR1.7 million for start up in 2003, to be financed out of the general budget of the European Union (Community budget). An additional EUR38 million for annual operations is shared by participating member states (approximately EUR18 million) and the overall Community budget (approximately EUR20 million). The Council set EUR17.5 million for operational costs in 2004 to be financed from the general budget of the European Union on 8 December 2003 (Lindstrom, 2004: 15-116).

Table 2: EUPM – Costs

Start-up costs for 2002 (€)	Annual Running Costs for 2003-2005 (€)	
14 000 000 (+ 1 700 000 for 2003)	Per diems	17 000 000
	Travel costs	1 000 000
	Operational running costs	11 000 000
	Local staff	4 000 000
	International civilian staff	5 000 000
	Total	38 000 000

Source: Missiroli, 2003c:13.

4.1.1.2. Operation Althea

Following the Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004, the EU launched the military operation Althea on 2 December 2004, following the decision by NATO at the Istanbul summit in June 2004 to conclude the SFOR³⁴ (the NATO-led Stabilization Force) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 25 November, the EU Council adopted the decision to launch the operation following on from the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council

³³ This paragraph is a summary of information taken from Mace (2003: 3) and PPIO Review 2003 (2003: 13).

³⁴ SFOR succeeded the NATO-led implementation Force or IFOR at the end of 1996. IFOR was deployed in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1031, transferring responsibility for military operations in Bosnia from UNPROFOR (United Nations Protective Force) to NATO and mandating IFOR to oversee the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord.

Resolution 1575 on 22 November that enables the EU to launch Operation Althea on 2 December.

Similar to SFOR, EUFOR (the force implementing Operation Althea) has the core commitment to guarantee constant compliance with Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton Peace Accord. Lynch and Missiroli (2004: 6-7) define the key objectives of Althea as follows:

- To provide deterrence, continued compliance within the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the Dayton Peace Accord (General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH).
- To contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate, required achieving core tasks in the Office of the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).

The EU force is also supposed to support, within its means and capabilities, at the efforts of High Representative Paddy Ashdown and of the international community, in fields such as fight against organized crime and the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement.

General John Reith (UK), Deputy Supreme Commander Europe, has been appointed EU Operation Commander and Major General A. David Leakey (UK) has been chosen as EU Force Commander. In terms of chains of command, the Council of the European Union takes basic decisions on the operation, and is assisted by the SG/HR. The PSC exercises political control and ensures the strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council. In turn, the EUMC monitors its proper implementation.

Operation Althea is carried out according to the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO. Consultation takes place with NATO on the application of the Berlin Plus agreements, and the PSC and the Chairman of the EUMC update NATO on the progress of Althea.

Common costs for the operation are administered by the ATHENA³⁵ mechanism, by which contributions come from the member states on a GDP (Gross Domestic Product)-based key. The financial reference for the common costs stands at EUR71.7 million. Personnel and other cost items are referenced according to a “costs lie where they fall” basis.

Operation Althea is the largest in size ever launched by the EU, with 7.000 troops from almost all member states and a large member number of third countries. According to Lynch and Missiroli (2004: 7-8):

“Operation *Althea* marks a new step in the development of ESDP in terms of size and ambition. It also confirms the rising role of the EU as a primary European security provider, with ever more responsibility in particular for responsibility in the Western Balkans. The contrast with European policy a decade ago, in 1994, could not be greater: EU member states are united and pursue common policy objectives. At the same time, one should note two challenges facing the operation. The first is that of credibility – in terms of being willing and able to back words with actions – and the second of is that of coherence – in terms of the ability to weave Althea into the EU’s wider objectives in BiH, including the EUPM operation underway since 2003.”

4.1.2. The EU missions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

As mentioned above the European Union launched two missions in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Concordia and Proxima. Concordia represents the EU’s first military crisis management operation, and it can be considered as another milestone for the Union’s crisis management activities. Therefore, the Concordia will be the major subject that will be discussed in this section.

³⁵ As of 1 March 2004, the EU has a permanent mechanism for handling the common costs of the EU’s missions. Known as Athena, it facilitates future financing of the missions by increasing the flexibility and speed in managing the financing of joint costs, regardless of the urgency or the complexity of the mission at hand.

4.1.2.1. The Concordia mission

Macedonia has been on the international agenda since its independence in September 1991, due to both regional and domestic problems. First, the dissolution of Yugoslavia led to various civil wars, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the danger of violence spreading also to Macedonia. Second, Macedonia faced the internal challenge of its multiethnic society, since the state consists of a Slav-Macedonian majority, a large Albanian community and other small minorities. Violence broke out in the country, when ethnic Albanian extremists challenged government authorities in order to make it grant the ethnic Albanian community more rights. In Macedonia, between February and August 2001, an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian extremists (UÇK)³⁶ and the Macedonian army escalated step by step from small-scale local violence in the Macedonian-Kosovo border region up to the edge of a complete civil war. The conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians was settled with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001. On the request of the FYROM President Boris Trajkovski, NATO conducted three operations in the country:

Operation Essential Harvest: This was a 30-day mission, which began on 27 August 2001 and finished on 26 September. Its aim was to disarm ethnic Albanian insurgents on a voluntary basis. Approximately 3.500 NATO troops, with logistical support, were sent to the country. The operation resulted in the collection of nearly 4.000 weapons and several hundred thousand more other items, including mines and explosives.

Operation Amber Fox: The mandate for this operation was to protect the EU and OSCE civilian monitors, who oversaw and helped create conditions for implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, signed between Macedonia's principal political parties on 13 August 2001 (with considerable mediation by the EU, US and NATO). The operation started on 27 September 2001, comprising some 700 NATO troops, together with 300 NATO troops that were already based in the country. It was terminated on 15 December 2002.

Operation Allied Harmony: This was a follow on mission that started on 16 December 2002. It had two aims: to provide support for the international monitors and to assist the

³⁶ While the name UÇK in Kosovo referred to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia used the same abbreviation for the National Liberation Army (LNA).

government in taking ownership of security throughout the country. It was terminated on 31 March 2003 and, on the same day; the EU took over the responsibility for the mission with Operation Concordia.

The EU launched the Concordia mission, its first military operation, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 March 2003. It was initiated at the request of Macedonian President Trajkovski and the UN Security Council.³⁷ Concordia was a follow-on mission to the NATO-led Operation Allied Harmony. EU forces took over NATO's Operation Allied Harmony with the aim of contributing to the furthering of a stable, secure environment in FYROM and ensuring the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. All EU member states except Ireland and Denmark and 14 non-member states have contributed forces - approximately 350 lightly armed military personnel - to the mission. The EU force, with France acting as the framework nation, patrolled the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of Macedonia that border Albania, Serbia and Kosovo (Missiroli, 2003b: 498). The framework responsibilities were transferred from France to EUFOR on 30 September 2003. This arrangement was maintained until the termination of the mission on 15 December 2003 (Lindstrom, 2004:117).

³⁷ Upon the request, the UN took the decision (the UN Security Council Resolution 1371 (2001)), on 26 September 2001 and EU Council adopted the Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP on 27 January 2003. Macedonian authorities invited the EU to replace NATO Operation Allied Harmony on 17 January 2003.

Table 3: Concordia – Participating personnel by country (357 overall)

EU Members	Personnel
Austria	11
Belgium	26
Finland	9
France	145
Germany	26
Greece	21
Italy	27
Luxembourg	1
Netherlands	3
Portugal	6
Spain	16
Sweden	14
United Kingdom	3

Third Countries	Personnel
Bulgaria	2
Canada	1
Czech Republic	2
Estonia	1
Hungary	2
Iceland	1
Latvia	2
Lithuania	1
Norway	5
Poland	17
Romania	3
Slovenia	1
Slovakia	1
Turkey	10

Source: Missiroli, 2003c: 14.

Mostly in the areas of potential instability and ethnic tension, the mission of Operation Concordia was to provide a visible military presence in order to support stability and confidence building. Concordia also supported international community monitors and coordinated the Macedonian authorities, local leaders, inhabitants and international organizations (Peace Operations Factsheet Series, 2004: 3). Lindstrom (2004: 118) lists the objectives of Concordia as follows:

“In the field, soldiers were organized into 22 light field liaison teams traveling in non-armoured vehicles. Their tasks included patrolling, reconnaissance, surveillance, situational awareness reporting and liaison activities. Troop support was provided through eight heavy field liaison terms

with access to wheeled armoured vehicles and helicopters. Additional support for *Concordia* forces included a helicopter detachment with light reconnaissance and MEDEVAC helicopters, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability and a medical evacuation team.”

Unlike the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Concordia* relied not only on assets of the EU member states, but also on planning and logistical support from NATO. The Union drew on NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangement. The whole chain of command remained under the political and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation, after consultation between two organizations. In that framework, the Operation Commander reported to the EU bodies only. NATO was informed of developments in the situation by the appropriate bodies, in particular the Political and Security Committee and the Chairman of the Staff.

The EU operation headquarters was located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe in Belgium, with three regional headquarters in Skopje, Kumanovo and Tetovo. The regional elements included 22 light field liaison teams, 8 heavy field liaison teams, and support elements (air component, medical evacuation team, and explosive ordnance disposal team). German Admiral Rainer Feist (*Concordia* Operation Commander and NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) managed the mission. French General Pierre Maral (31 March 2003-1 October) and Portuguese Major General Luis Nelson Ferreira Dos Santos (1 October-15 December 2003) from EUROFOR held the position of Force Commander on the ground. They all worked in close coordination with the EU’s Special Representative in FYROM, the Belgian diplomat Alexis Brouhns. NATO also continued to have a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative in Skopje to coordinate “transition and continuity” (Peace Operations Factsheet Series, 2004: 3). Thus, in addition to being the EU’s first military operation, *Concordia* also represented the first use of a strategic EU-NATO partnership for crisis management that was made possible by the long-awaited bilateral Berlin Plus agreement of December 2002 (Missiroli, 2003b: 498).

As for financing, *Concordia* was initially expected to last six months with common costs of EUR4.7 million and other expenditures to be financed by participating countries. The six-month budget was later raised to EUR6.2 million. Unlike the EUPM, participating states were asked to pay both their individual operational costs, as well as a percentage of

the common costs – this time including, upon unanimous decision, barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole – through an ad hoc so-called “financial mechanism” based on the GDP scale. Specifically, participating EU member states bore 84.5 per cent of the common costs. As for the non-EU participants (third countries), another ad hoc mechanism was created that takes into account their GDP but adjusts it by setting a minimum (2 per cent) and a maximum (25 per cent) share, bore the remaining 15.5 per cent of the common costs (Missiroli, 2003c: 15).

Table 4: Concordia – Costs

EU participating states	Cover their relevant ‘individual’ costs plus 84.5 per cent of the ‘common’ costs according to the GDP scale
Participating ‘third’ countries	Cover their relevant ‘individual’ costs plus 15.5 per cent of the ‘common’ costs according to an ad hoc key
‘Common’ costs (total)	EUR 6.2 million

Source: Missiroli, 2003c: 15.

Table 5: Concordia - Participating third 'countries' relative contribution to the total 'common' costs

Third countries	Relative GDP share (per cent)	Contribution (EU)	Relative share (per cent)
Bulgaria	0.91	139 220	2
Canada	48.47	240 250	25
Czech Republic	4.04	52 001	5
Estonia	0.38	19 220	2
Hungary	3.72	47 944	5
Iceland	0.54	19 220	2
Latvia	0.54	19 220	2
Lithuania	0.84	19 220	2
Norway	11.85	152 592	16
Poland	12.50	160 982	17
Romania	2.84	36 603	4
Slovakia	1.47	19 220	2
Slovenia	1.35	19 220	2
Turkey	10.56	136 088	14
Total	100.00	961 000	100

Source: Missiroli, 2003c: 15.

4.1.2.2. The Proxima mission

After a request from Macedonian authorities, a European Union Council decision on 21 July 2003 extended the mandate of Concordia until 15 December 2003. Finally, Concordia has been succeeded by the EU police operation in the region called EUPOL Proxima. Proxima was launched on 15 December 2003 on the basis of the Council Joint Action 2003/CFSP of 29 September 2003. It followed on an invitation from Branko Crvenkovski, the Prime Minister of FYROM, to the EU through SG/HR Javier Solana.

Proxima is not a military mission, but is rather conducted as a year long police mission³⁸, in which 200 EU police experts monitor, mentor and advise the country's police to help fight against organized crime and promote policing standards. Proxima showed the EU's capacity to change mission parameters from a military to a police mission. As a police mission, Proxima addresses criminal activity rather than military activity and it does not operate under Berlin Plus. Proxima includes 200 EU personnel, counting both uniformed police and civilian advisors.

³⁸ After a request from Macedonian authorities, a Council decision on 11 October 2004 extended the EUPOL Proxima mandate until 14 December 2005.

The broad objective of Proxima is to maintain an environment that facilitates implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. As Lindstrom (2004: 121-122) states the police force is charged with as follows:

- Consolidating law and order, including the fight against organized crime.
- Implementing comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the Interior, including the police.
- Promoting integrated border management, including the creation of a border police.
- Building confidence within the population for local police efforts.
- Enhancing cooperation with neighboring states in the areas of policing.

It comprises of a headquarters in Skopje, where operations are managed by Police Commissioner Jürgen Scholz³⁹, and closely coordinated with the EU Special Representative in the region, Ambassador Michael Sahlin, an advisory unit within the Ministry of Interior and, at the regional and local level, personnel positioned at police centers in Skopje, Tetova, Kumanovo, Gostivar and Ohrid regions (Lindstrom, 2004: 121). The EU police advisors fulfill tasks such as aiding in crime investigations, overall police training and evaluation, border management and policing, and police reform.

EU police officers, wearing their national uniforms with EU armbands, are currently deployed in the capital Skopje and in areas where ethnic Albanians live, such as Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar and Ohrid (Lindstrom, 2004: 122). In cooperation with the local police, Proxima advised and monitored the security for the Macedonian presidential elections, which was held on 28 April 2004. Currently at an operational strength of 170 personnel, Proxima continues to aid in local police and rule of law institution building (Peace Operations Factsheet Series, 2004: 5).

The member states that contribute police officers and other staff bear related costs, including salaries, benefits, and travel expenses to and from the region. Other costs are financed out of the EU budget. The total cost of the mission amounts to EUR 15 million for the first year, including start-up costs of EUR 7.5 million (Lynch and Missiroli, 2004: 4).

³⁹ Belgian Chief Commissioner Bart d'Hooge was the first Head of Mission for the Operation Proxima. Brigadier General Jürgen Scholz has been appointed Head of Mission/Police Commissioner as of 15 December 2004 for the extended EUPOL Proxima mission.

4.2. Lessons learnt from the test cases

The European Union operations since 2003 represented a major breakthrough for ESDP, particularly for crisis management capability of the Union. For the first time, the Union actively engaged in security affairs, covering a variety of tasks that extend from policing tasks to military intervention. As Missiroli (2003b: 500) remarks, “The missions show that the EU is capable of reacting to ongoing or emerging humanitarian/security crises and to contribute to peace enforcement, reconstruction and stabilization.”

The EUPM and Concordia operations in BiH and FYROM respectively were examples of where the EU had taken over responsibilities from other international organizations, in order to increase its commitment to security in its periphery. According to Missiroli (2003c: 16), “Both EUPM and *Concordia* were planned and launched with the explicit intention of a) giving, at last, a tangibly operational dimension to ESDP, b) testing the arrangements adopted so far, and c) creating precedents and learning lessons with a view to future and presumably larger missions.”

The EUPM is a relatively small and manageable operation that enjoys political support. Member states have had the advantage of a long-lead time in which to prepare and to act on the model of the IPTF mission. The mission is also relatively inexpensive and uncontroversial. Therefore, the decision-making process has been relatively smooth and rapid. Within a few weeks, member states established new command structures and modalities for internal co-ordination⁴⁰, the involvement of third parties and financing. Still, member states made it apparent that these arrangements should not be seen as model setting and would not provide a guide for future operations. Larger and more complex operations such as Althea will likely face greater logistical, political and financial obstacles. It is ill fated that current decisions on EUPM could not establish compact principles to guide future negotiations (Woodbridge, 2002:3). On the other hand, the Concordia Operation is usually described as a “test run” for future EU operations. According to Vincze:⁴¹

⁴⁰ An informal Joint Coordination Group in Sarajevo and an informal Task Force in Brussels are also planned to assist horizontal co-ordination of EUPM and Commission activities. In Sarajevo this will include representatives of the EUPM and of the Commission’s Delegation and will co-ordinate the planning and implementation of complementary projects.

⁴¹ Hajnalka Vincze. Beyond symbolism: the EU’s first military operation in its context. www.weltpolitik.net/texte/policy/concordia/beyond_symbolism.

“In fact, by putting into practice ESDP procedures and mechanisms that previously had only existed on paper, the mission in Macedonia will undoubtedly serve as a depth experience and a future point of reference, not exclusively with regard to the same type of undertakings, but also for improving ESDP’s *modus operandi* in general. In this respect, the arrangements concerning third state contributors or the financing mechanism of the operation are particularly revealing, just like the questions raised by European Parliament members on the subject of democratic oversight and accountability are supposed to remain an important element of future debates.”

The operations, in particular Concordia, were important test cases for the Union’s ability to apply some of the security policy instruments it visualized under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. Although limited in scope and time, the engagements were the first practical demonstration of the EU’s security and defence dimension. While the operations represent a confidence for the crisis management capability of the Union, they have also confirmed a number of challenges that previously remained at the theoretical level. These challenges are crosscutting; in other words, they affect the dimensions in all missions to varying degrees. Lindstrom (2004: 122) lists these challenges as follows: operational, financial, and planning.

Operationally speaking, communications and sustainability can be considered as two aspects of operational challenges. During the EU Police Mission in Sarajevo, limited communications capabilities were identified as significant drawback. During the first months of operation, there was a lack of secure communication within the chain of command. At one point, communications along the chain of command was limited to one GSM line and one e-mail connection. On the other hand, while engaging in non-permissive environment, sustainability often becomes a critical factor. Sustainability includes many dimensions, ranging from simple tasks such as ensuring adequate purified water supplies to the more complex such as adequate force projection capabilities.⁴²

While, the EU engaged in a number of missions throughout 2003, the issue of mission financing climbed high on the political agenda. The use of different funding mechanisms complicated the efficient performance of the Union’s crisis management operation. As Lindstrom (2004: 124-125) remarks, “With each financing mechanism targeted to serve a specific mission, no economies of scale or synergies were achieved in

⁴² This paragraph is a summary of information taken from Lindstrom (2004: 123-124).

terms of management and efficiency.” Funding levels were often around figures that tended to undervalue the true costs of an operation. As Lindstrom (2004: 125) clarifies:

“For example, *Concordia* showed that the deployment phase of an operation usually represents a significant proportion of its overall cost. In the case of EUPM, cost calculations relied heavily on calculations made during the short-term fact-finding missions. These estimates were based on the UN’s IPTF experience and did not take into account the implications of a different mandate, size and organization of the EUPM mission. Given these and other underestimates, calls have been made to increase first calls for contributions by 30 per cent of the reference amount.”

The planning phases prior to an operation are critical for success. While many have a tendency to associate planning with operational requirements, the planning process is continuing and has a number of dimensions. As Lindstrom (2004: 126) defines, successful mission planning entails adequate preparation in areas such as assets requirements, financial planning, procurement, mission objectives, contingency planning and collaboration with third countries and with international organizations. In the recent EU operations, some weak points stand out. In the area of procurement, recent EU missions have shown difficulties in forming efficient procurement procedures. For example, during the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, delays in setting up the EUPM Planning Team meant the application of the standard procurement rules had to be modified. In this case, the European Commission made a decision to simplify the procedures as much as possible. The EUPM can also be used as an example to determine the flaws in the area of planning support. In EUPM, the General Secretariat lacked the capacity to provide the Planning Team in Sarajevo with sufficient backup and support. Specific gaps within the Secretariat included lack of specialized expertise, small police planning capability, limited secure communications channels and limited personnel resources (Lindstrom, 2004: 127).

Missiroli also sees the coherence issue as a challenge for the crisis management operations. As he (2003c: 16) states: “EUPM is purely civilian, *Concordia* purely military. However, it is likely that future ESDP operations will be rather ‘mixed’. This is also in line with the Union’s ambition to become a fully-fledged international actor endowed with the whole gamut of policy tools required for crisis management.” Missiroli (2003c: 16) also claims that when the EU took over the mission of SFOR, the Union found itself in at charge of a large mixed operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From a functional and as

well as a financial viewpoint, Althea will raise the question of the necessary coherence between different budgetary sources and operating modalities.

All these problems require adjustments to the existing rules and procedures for financing future EU-led crisis management operations. At the same time, it is vital to remember that EU missions have remained limited in scope and depended heavily on the leadership, commitment and interests of major EU member states. Moreover, significant command and control capability shortfalls among member states show that any complex, high-end operation will have to rely on NATO support. While the Concordia mission successfully implements the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO, the long-term relationship between the two organizations remained to be fully defined.

Concluding Remarks:

Although the missions analyzed in this chapter, as mentioned above, may be limited in scope and depended heavily on the leadership, commitment and interests of major EU member states, one must not miss the point that the EU, by means of crisis management operations, has shown its motivation to become an important actor in crisis management. This is not restricted only in theory, but the EU has, despite its shortcomings, the capacity to put it into practice. These operations show the EU's ability to conduct crisis management operations and make the case for developing realistic expectations and potential scenarios for the deployment of military and civilian forces under the EU flag.

Crisis management operations, carried out in the Balkans, are sound experiences for the EU's future operations under the framework of the Petersberg missions. One might safely state that learning the right lessons and implementing effective changes are critical to the success of any mission. Just as NATO's missions in the Balkans promoted an experience for assessing the flexibility, readiness and mobility capabilities of its forces, and a practice for high-intensity combat missions, after the end of Cold War. The EU will also benefit from its experiences in these regions in its future operations. It can be said that a similar evaluation can be valid for the EU in its operations. The experience gained and lessons learned from the operations analyzed in this chapter, will increase the success of the EU its possible large-scale operations in future.

The EU has successfully proved its ambition and competence to become an important actor in the field of crisis management in the international arena through the operations it has carried out until now. The EU is now gradually ready to conduct large-scale operations. Other international actors are also conscious of this reality as much as the EU itself. For instance, Operation Concordia was reviewed to be a preparation for a large-scale operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transfer of the SFOR mission to the EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina is assumed as the evidence to the fact that the existence of a strong NATO is no longer needed and the military capability of the EU has developed enough to solve the problems in its backyard.

V. AN ASSESSMENT OF EU'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT

“As a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. (...) The increasing convergence of European interests and strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security in building a better world. (...) This is a world of new dangers but also new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and helping realize the opportunities. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.” (Solana, 2003: 4-21)

The ESDP signifies a fundamental shift away from the civilian nature of the EU, and a considerable change in its institutional relationship with NATO. It represents an aspiration to combine all civilian and military instruments in order to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises. With the enhancement and concentration of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to use a whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations. According to Rynning (2001: 92), “The ESDP and the full integration of military and civilian components in EU planning represent a coronation of the move towards an active, comprehensive, and ambitious crisis management policy.”

“It is clear, even from its ‘Petersberg’ definition, that security as now defined in Europe is not just about the avoidance of war and violence by the application of military instruments. It embraces a societal and even individual dimension. It covers economic, environmental, criminal, humanitarian and human right issues, as well as those of the illegitimate use of violence.” (Deighton, 2002: 727)

It can be argued that EU's crisis management policy aims to combine the civilian and military instruments with the purpose of responding to a various degrees of crises. With the Union's dual civilian and military approach, the EU could cope with crises with more effect and success than any other international body, and the ESDP could well become the trademark for the European crisis management of the twenty first century (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 279-280).

In Missiroli's (2004: 58) view, "The European security and defence *policy* is primarily identified with 'crisis management' as enshrined in Art. 17.2 and Art. 25 cons. TEU (...). At any rate, EU 'crisis management' is not limited to the military dimension but also encompasses a specifically civilian one." Putting up the necessary military means for crisis management – that is mobilizing the resources that are essential to meeting the European Union's own expectations and ambitions – is likely to become the crucial issue for the ESDP in the months and years to come (Missiroli, 2003a: 5).

The crisis situations are never identical to one another. Therefore, each crisis demands a high degree of flexibility and adaptability. Most of the capabilities to be mobilized belong to the EU member states, and this requires a combination of willingness and ability on their part to put such capabilities at the disposal of the Union, especially since there is no legal obligation to do so. Another crucial point is that the evolving character of ESDP is relatively a new phenomenon when it is compared to other EU common policies or NATO. Six years after its inauguration, the ESDP is still a policy in the making and work in progress, with regard to its internal procedures and resources as much as to its ultimate goals. As Missiroli (2004: 66) expresses:

"One has to bear in mind that: (a) EU-led operations only began in January 2003, on a small scale and with limited duration; (b) the EU's own training and exercise policy is still fledgling, at best; (c) procedures are still relatively untested; and (d) 'lessons-learned' evaluations have just started. It is therefore extremely difficult to draw up a reliable flow-chart for the launch and conduct a 'typical' ESDP operation."

5.1. Shortcomings of EU's crisis management

Despite some political and technical developments, the ESDP project faces several problems that will influence and determine its capability and practicability.

1) Unclear scope and priorities of Petersberg tasks: There has been no clear agreement over the scope and priorities of the Petersberg tasks. It is in the interpretation and the implementation of the Petersberg tasks that the absence of a common European strategic vision becomes all too apparent. The scope of the Petersberg missions is not interpreted in the same way across the EU. There is generally a broad consensus over the low-end

missions, for most of the necessary resources – including those related to non-military crisis management – are already available both across the member states and in Brussels (Missiroli, 2003a: 9). By contrast, high-end missions are more controversial and their understanding seems differently nuanced in the member states (Missiroli, 2003: 9). Differences do not necessarily lie in the amount of military forces involved on the ground – although air power varies significantly – but rather in the description and the mandate of the envisaged missions (Missiroli, 2003: 9).

In Heisbourg's (2000a: 7) view, what is most striking is not the scope of explicit disagreement but, rather, the lack of open determination of the extent of European interests and ambitions. According to Heisbourg, there are two issues with regard to an open definition of the Petersberg tasks. First, the outer limits for each of the Petersberg tasks require definition (Heisbourg, 2000a: 7). It is important in order to limit future misunderstandings that the EU partners are clear as to what is, at least potentially, the scope of each of the three Petersberg tasks (Heisbourg, 2000a: 7). The second issue is to set the priorities as to the type of force-projection operation the EU members wish able to contribute to (Heisbourg, 2000a: 7).

There is also no distinction between the high-level and low-level of the Petersberg tasks. Keukeleire (2001: 96) proposes to make a distinction between the policy-making issues of the Petersberg tasks both at the higher and lower level, and to create a restricted crisis management mechanism at both levels in order to develop effective strategies for crisis management as well as the mechanisms for implementing them. According to Keukeleire (2001: 96-97):

“A distinction can be made between, on the one hand, policy-making concerning diplomatic CFSP-issues and ‘military’ CESDP-issues at the low level of the Petersburg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks and peacekeeping tasks) and, on the other hand, policy-making on ‘military’ CESDP-issues at the highest level of the Petersburg tasks (tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking).⁴³ (...) On the one hand, the option of a restricted crisis management mechanism for tackling effectively the most difficult and high-risk crisis management tasks at the higher level of the Petersburg tasks is important or the success of the EU involvement at the lower level of the Petersburg tasks as well as for increasing the general status and efficiency of the EU as an

⁴³The distinction between both is not always that clear. For instance, rescue and peacekeeping operations sometimes require the involvement of combat forces (Keukeleire, 2001: 96[his footnote 56]).

international actor. Formal arrangements for crisis management will enhance the credibility and efficiency of the EU in fulfilling humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping tasks and in general diplomatic negotiations and mediations of the EU. Other external actors in a crisis will be conscious that the EU, if necessary, has the capacity to pass towards a higher level of crisis management, which will increase their inclination to take seriously initiatives of the EU. On the other hand, strengthening the efficiency of the EU as a diplomatic actor and as an operational actor at the lower level of the Petersburg tasks can help the EU to avoid an escalation of a crisis or conflict and avoid the need for the EU to pass to much more risky crisis management operations.”

2) Mismatch between the EU's forces and missions: The Union must avoid the mismatches between its forces and missions. Due to the lack of a clear mandate and the incomplete understanding of the missions, a mismatch between forces and missions has become a common failure in many post-Cold War peace operations. This is actually a general problem in all crisis management operations as can be seen in the UN Operation in Somalia (1993). The operation proved to be a failure because of the lack of knowledge about the differences among the different types of peace operations. Therefore, it is important to determine, from the beginning, the category to which an operation belongs, and how the rules of engagement will change with the nature of the mandate. In order to avoid such problems, as Garther (2001: 144-145) recommends, the rules of the engagement have to be formulated clearly; the conditions governing when and how troops may use force must be clear; the use of force must be proportional to the humanitarian issue at hand; the level of risk must be reasonable; the operations must be limited in duration; and there can be no open-ended commitments.

3) Problem of lack of assets and dependence on NATO (US): Whether or not the European Union is able to develop into a unified and effective foreign and security policy actor is important, not only for those Europeans seeking to enhance their own influence on the world stage but for the structure of world politics itself (Gordon, 1997/98: 75). Creating a truly effective common European foreign and security policy would mean giving the EU the military power to back up its diplomatic and economic initiatives (Gordon, 1997/98: 89). The new NATO arrangements are designed to help Europeans evade these capabilities constraint (intelligence satellites, floating communications headquarters, mobile logistics, and transport craft) by making NATO and US assets available to EU. Thus the EU should not need its own independent assets, but can borrow NATO's. One should not forget, however, that NATO has very few assets of its own to lend the EU. Most of the forces are

nationally controlled – simply “earmarked” for NATO use if the national capital gives the go-ahead (Gordon, 1997: 264). The only assets actually owned by NATO itself are an air defence system; some command and control, and communication assets (which are mostly fixed, and therefore of little use for outside interventions); oil pipelines; a system of bunkers and shelters; and about three dozen airborne warning and control systems (Gordon, 1997/98:94). What the Europeans would need in order to conduct anything but small-scale and nearby interventions are not NATO assets but American ones – long-range heavy transport aircraft, air refueling capabilities, and satellite intelligence systems (Gordon, 1997: 264). The very capabilities the Europeans need but do not have, NATO, as such, does not have either (Gordon, 1997/98: 94). One shall remember the fact that while United States can hesitate to lend its own assets in the Union’s large-scale operations, it will not probably create any problem in the case of small-scale operations.

The factor that lies behind the dependence of the EU forces on NATO, in general, and on US, in particular, in its crisis response operations should not be forgotten. As Yost (2003: 84) remarks, the problem is that the Cold War scenario of a major NATO-Warsaw Pact war called for most NATO European military establishments to fight in place rather than project troops or firepower at great distance. By contrast, the United States defence establishment built and improved fleets of large air transport aircraft, air-to-air refueling tankers, carrier-battle groups, amphibious ships and other mobility assets relevant to transoceanic power and expeditionary operations. The Americans also put more into logistic support than most of the other allies, who were generally even less prepared for prolonged operations than the United States (Yost, 2003:84). During the Cold War, NATO’s European troops were expected to defend their nations against a Warsaw Pact assault. The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops were expected to come to them. Therefore, several European allies have adapted slowly to the new circumstances and requirements; they have continued conscription and Cold War force structures, training and procurement patterns, with comparatively little investment in mobility or logistic support (Yost, 2003:84).

One might actually claim that most of the European militaries are still overstaffed and under-equipped for modern operations. EU members depend on NATO command and control and American assistance in sophisticated intelligence, air transportation, logistics and power projection capability to undertake crisis response operations, including the more

demanding possibilities of peace enforcement.⁴⁴ European militaries must rationalize, restructure and specialize to prepare a common military crisis management capacity (Moens, 2003: 27).

4) Need for an increase in European assets, capabilities and defence sector reforms:

As mentioned before, the dependency on US assets makes it obvious that the EU needs to enhance its assets and capabilities in the realm of security and defence. Europe lacks capabilities, particularly concerning strategic lift, communications and logistics. Obstacles that have hampered the ESDP are unrealistic high expectations, inexperience and, in most cases, armed forces that have not been thoroughly restructured since the Cold War. If the EU is serious about becoming a global actor, its major priority should be restructuring its defence industry and armed forces. Without that, the ESDP will have limited in value. Nevertheless, arming and equipping such forces would not be cheap. The reality is that European defence budgets have been in decline for some time, and there seems little prospect of significant short-term increases. As Menon (2003: 204) asserts, “A truly “autonomous” ESDP – that is, one that is not reliant on American military hardware – would necessitate the West Europeans equipping themselves not only with the requisite forces, but also with the means to transport them and provide them with accurate intelligence.”

One should also remember the fact that the quality of European forces is important as quantity. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the European deficiencies. As it cannot be predicted where and in what circumstances a European force will be deployed, the crisis response task requires a power projection capability or an expeditionary force. Flexibility through modularity, interoperability, sustainability, strategic and tactical mobility and firepower are key characteristics of such a force. But very few European countries possess armed forces with power projection capabilities. Only the British, the French and the Dutch, despite the budget cuts and downsizing, have managed to restructure their armed forces, and have power projection capabilities. Germany in particular faces major challenges, with one of the largest armed forces in Europe. Heisbourg (2000b: 87) suggests that a definition of capability goals is required with regard to European deficiencies.

⁴⁴ For example, electronic attack capabilities constitute one of the most significant areas of continuing European dependence on the US military forces, because such capabilities are essential to conduct air operations with minimal losses (Yost, 2003: 90).

Heisbourg (2000b: 87) also recommends that the highest priority is to set capability goals on strategic transport, intelligence gathering and C3 (Command, Control and Communications). Indeed, these goals have to be fully matching with the overall capabilities included in the headline goal. The shortfalls in a number of key areas can be listed as:⁴⁵

- **Deployability:** The Union cannot deploy or land forces and cannot sustain them, due to the shortage of committed, deployable, combat-ready forces. Certain missions, such as the evacuation of civilians, will call for a high state of readiness, days other than weeks. Although member states have approximately 1.8 million persons under arms, they can deploy only 10-15 per cent of these forces for missions abroad, because most of them rely primarily on conscripts and still focus on territorial defence. Given the necessity to rotate forces in the course of an operation (1/3 on deployment, 1/3 training, 1/3 rest), this can create problems for sustaining long-term and/or high-intensity operations. Therefore, deployability should be increased.
- **Mobility:** Europe also lacks the means to transport its troops and equipment to distant places. In recent years improvements have been made, in particular for strategic sealift capabilities, and several member states are engaged in acquisition programmes to boost their airlift capabilities (A400M). Commercial options such as leasing and chartering can also help to close this gap. However, it will take time and further investment to provide the transport means that a global role for the EU would imply.
- **Sustainability:** Once deployed abroad, troops need logistic support to stay there. Depending on the distance and the duration of the deployment, this can imply an enormous logistic challenge, requiring a broad spectrum of capabilities such as transport and medical support. Above this, the limited number of deployable forces reduces the EU's ability to sustain military operations abroad.
- **Effective engagement:** In particular in a hostile environment, a broad spectrum of capabilities is required to make military engagement on the ground effective. These capabilities include precision-guided weapons, offensive electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences, etc. Again, European forces are short of these assets.

⁴⁵ The listed shortcomings above are a summary of information taken from Schmitt (2004: 95-96) and European defence (2004: 100-110).

- **C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance):** C4ISR includes a broad set of key enabling capabilities for modern warfare and represents the core elements of the Revolution in Military Affairs. At the same time, it constitutes a major shortfall in most member states. Some capabilities exist, in certain areas and to various degrees, at the national level and/or in NATO, but not in the collective framework of ESDP. Drawing on national assets can create severe problems of interoperability, and the use of NATO capabilities can imply time-consuming political negotiations, which would slow down any EU crisis management response. Even if there is no need to copy the US model of network centric warfare, European nations will have to make a considerable effort in this field, individually and collectively, if they are to increase the effectiveness of their armed forces, and ensure a minimum of interoperability with the US forces.
- **Force packaging and force transformation:** The Union has no agreed system for force packaging, which severely restricts deployability and sustainability. A European Rapid Reaction Force would include land, air and sea components. For the conduct of operations, national units will be brought together in specially made force packages on ad hoc basis. Out-of-area warfare and new roles and missions, such as counter-insurgency and counter terrorism requires, require a new doctrinal approach and new training methods. However, the Union has no conceptual approach to force transformation.
- **Headquarters:** The European Union cannot provide the operational framework for large-scale operations. Although there are sufficient deployable headquarters to conduct military operations, there are technical shortfalls when it comes to operations in distant places. To enhance deployability and sustainability, a standing strategic headquarter is deemed necessary. If the EU is to be a serious military actor, it will need assets of whose availability it can be assured. That will mean either having its own or having a guaranteed right to use NATO HQs⁴⁶, shedding the personnel from non-EU or non-participating countries for EU operations.

As Vlachos-Dengler (2002: 37) mentions, there is a valid concern that Europe's strategic lift capability is not sufficient to meet its global commitments. European nations

⁴⁶ NATO has not agreed to give the EU assured access to common Alliance-held assets such as the CJTF HQ (Terriff, 2003, 46).

may no longer be capable of deploying their forces to the areas they need to in the numbers or frame essential for success. Although several European nations have made improvements to their airlift and sealift capabilities since the end of the Cold War, they still lack the ability to deploy large amounts of equipment and personnel beyond national borders. Europeans also lack an organic airlift capability, since all their transport aircraft come from the United States or other foreign countries. Recently, the decision-makers have recognized their weaknesses and have taken some steps to remedy them, such as European nations are building their own A400M air-lifter, and the United Kingdom is building six roll-on roll-off ferries to add its sea capability. Several options are available to EU nations to tackle this shortfall. Vlachos-Dengler (2002: 3) recommends some of these options as follows:

“In addition to existing programmes, they can cover the shortfalls in their lift capabilities by continuing to use a combination of conventional options. These include leasing and off-the-shelf procurement of foreign military lift assets, as well as short-term leasing, chartering and requisitioning of (mostly) commercial lift assets.

In the long term, however, European nations need to significantly improve their own airlift and sealift capabilities and build additional ones. The most affordable long-term solution to European lift deficiencies is one that involves the pooling and integration of national resources. This would allow for more efficient use of military funds and more effective use of limited capability. A multinational mobility centre, such as a proposed European Transport Command, could manage this European pool of lift assets and coordinate all European transport needs as well as the acquisition of additional lift capability.”

5) Decreasing defence budgets: The defence budgets on which European states operate are too small to permit them the luxury of duplicating the same models of military organization and operation that exist in NATO. Similarly, the dependence of European military forces on US assets like airlift, secure communications, precision strike forces, theater reconnaissance and strategic intelligence is simply too great for the EU to overcome without major budget increases. In order to operate without depending on US capabilities, the EU will need to develop an identifiably different approach to warfare from that practiced by the United States (Schake, 2003: 117).

Given the budget constraints, if the EU is serious about building a force that is capable of operating without US support, it will need to experiment with new ways of

carrying out military tasks it cannot afford to duplicate. EU members may have to give up some national autonomy. They will certainly need to pool resources to buy the necessary equipment and systems. And they will integrate their forces multinationally, to a far degree than is already done in NATO. The EU will need to learn to prepare for military operations in ways different from NATO or the United States (Schake, 2003: 117-118). Schacke (2003: 118) explains the EU's operation methods as follows:

“The US approach to war emphasizes advances in technology that reduce the risk to military personnel, and consequently the political cost to leaders of engaging in a war. The technologies range from mundane innovations like night-vision goggles, to exotic developments such as miniature robotics for intelligence collection. The EU will be operating without many of these risk-reducing technologies. As a result, EU political leaders will have two options: either greater tolerance for risk when choosing to use military force in crises, or an extraordinary amount of creativity to keep risks manageable when intervening with force. In either case, the internal dynamic of autonomous EU military action will encourage the development of a unique EU approach to warfare.”

According to Schake (2002: 19; 2003: 119), if the EU wants to avoid unnecessary duplication, improve its capacity to act autonomously, and stimulate support in the United States, it needs to choose areas of duplication that would reduce the burden on over-extended US assets. In particular, it should focus on strategic lift, intelligence, reconnaissance, strike capabilities, mid-air refueling and research, development and procurement. Schake refers this kind of duplication as “constructive duplication”.

6) Problems with the quantity of troops: There are also problems related the so-called “headline goal”. Regarding to Helsinki decisions, there are many unanswered questions. Firstly, in so far as the number of 50.000-60.000 troops includes support and logistics units, it is doubtful whether this force would be adequate for all Petersberg tasks. Heisbourg (2000b: 80) recommends the following composition of armed forces:

- One-third logistics (in the pre-deployment phase logistics could be as high as 50 per cent).
- One-third combat support forces.
- One-third combat forces.

Since the Helsinki Council decision indicates that the number mentioned includes both logistic units and combat support units, only 20.000 combat forces may be available.

Such a fighting force could not be deployed for the most demanding Petersberg tasks. For relatively large scale sustained combat operations, the EU might need 50.000 to 60.000 combat forces. This would thus require a headline goal of 150.000-180.000 troops.

Secondly, there are the issues raised by the requirement of sustainability. Member states should be able to sustain their contribution for one year; they are likely to replace their units after a six-month deployment. If the 60.000 headline goal were to include all the relevant support troops, there would be a requirement for a pool of at least 180.000 soldiers, shared roughly equally between: forces on operations; forces withdrawn from operations and in training; forces in training and ready to move. Most member states, however, are not in a position to provide replacements for units that have suffered heavy losses. Given the nature of contemporary conflicts, it should also be mentioned that a one-year sustainability period might be too low. The real world might require more than the number of active forces mentioned in the headline goal (Heisbourg, 2000b: 81). Therefore, sustainability should be improved. The international standard for sustainability requirement is three years, with troop rotation after six months and a gap of one year between periods of duty (European defence, 2004: 101). Consequently, for each unit deployed two should be in reserve (European Defence, 2004: 101). The present Helsinki catalogue does not provide for replacement forces. The headline goals should also be developed regarding air forces and navies. One should not forget that the most demanding Petersberg tasks would include power projection and sea control.⁴⁷

During the second Capabilities Commitment Conference on military capabilities held in Brussels in May 2003, defence ministers declared that “based on the Forces contributed to the Helsinki Force Catalogue 2003 (...) the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg Tasks, limited and constrained by the recognized shortfalls. These limitations and/or constraints are on deployment time and high

⁴⁷ As defined by Heisbourg (2000b: 83), power projection consists of a triad that comprises strike, land attack and amphibious operations, which in broad terms require three modules: an aircraft carrier module, a land attack module, and a strategic module, all with their own support and escort forces; and sea control includes the protection of sea lines of communication, blockades and embargo operations, which requires submarines and surface combatants with an air surveillance capability and support ships. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious operations are designed and conducted primarily to: prosecute further combat operations; obtain a site for an advanced naval, land or airbase; deny use of an area or facilities to the enemy; and fix enemy forces and attention, providing opportunities for other combat operations. This type of operations can also be mounted to render ports usable (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002: 16 [her footnotes 59 and 60]).

risk may arise at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular when conducting concurrent operations.”⁴⁸ In other words, much has been achieved but a lot remains to be done, if the EU is to fulfill its ambition of being able to conduct the most demanding Petersberg tasks.

One might argue that the Union’s crisis management capacity to wage and win wars in most demanding high-intensity combat operations is very limited. In such cases the Union lacks capabilities and must therefore rely heavily on external factors. Moreover, operations in hostile environments carry the risk of casualties, and they demand capabilities that enhance soldier’s protection and decrease collateral damage. The Union does not have sufficient capabilities of these types. In the more demanding Petersberg missions, this lack of capabilities decreases the chances of success, while raising the costs to unacceptable levels (European defence, 2004: 99). Since risks are inherent in any war-fighting operation, the ability to reduce these risks would help military planners and civilian decision-makers to make a better cost-benefit calculation (European defence, 2004: 100). Overall, the shortfalls can disqualify the EU in carrying out large-scale, sustained, out-of-area combat operations (European defence, 2004: 100).

7) Financial challenges: The ESDP also faces financial challenges. According to Duke (2002:2), as the “capabilities-expectations” gap⁴⁹ was noted in the Union’s CFSP, the development of the ESDP is now facing the emergence of a parallel “rhetoric-resources” gap in crisis management. He stresses that the progressive development EU’s crisis management capabilities has woken up the question of how to finance these new aspects of EU’s activities, and currently the EU faces a rhetoric-resources gap whereby the political statements and aspirations exceed the resources available for crisis management operations, most notably those involving the use of force (2002:2). He also argues that a failure to address the rhetoric-resources gap will undermine EU crisis management efforts, as well as the effectiveness of the Union as an actor on the international stage (2002:2).

⁴⁸ Declarations on EU military capabilities. May 2003. Accessed through: ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20EU%20Military%20Capabilities%20-%20May%202003.pdf

⁴⁹ According to Hill (1998: 23), the gap between capabilities and expectations is seen as the significant difference, which had come about between the myriad hopes and demands of the EU as an international actor, and its relatively limited ability to deliver. The gap is seen as potentially dangerous because it can lead to debates over false possibilities within the EU and between the Union and external supplicants. It will also be likely to produce a disproportionate degree of disillusion and resentment when hopes are inevitably dashed. All this will divert energies from other projects, which may be more realistically pursued.

Each of the Union's crisis management operations has its own financial coverage through an ad hoc mechanism that is normally included in the Joint Action. Its modalities vary according to whether the operation is military or civilian. In fact, Art. 28 TEU states that while "administrative" expenditure is to be charged to the common EU budget, "operational" expenditure for military operations is to be charged to the member states according to the GDP scale or any other key the Council decides to adopt unanimously. In practice, this means that civilian operations can be financed mainly through the EU budget, while military ones are paid for mainly by the participating states according to the rule whereby "costs lie where they fall". The per diems of the national personnel seconded to the operation are normally covered by their respective administrations. The use of different funding mechanisms has complicated the efficient conduct of ESDP military operations. Therefore, experience gained with the first EU-led operations in 2003-2004 showed the need to adopt rules more in line with the EU traditions and practice, and the issue of financing took a big step forward on 22 September 2003, when the Council decided that the EU needed a mechanism for managing the common costs of military operations of any scale, complexity or urgency. As of 1 March 2004, the EU has a permanent mechanism for handling the common costs of the EU's missions. Known as Athena, it will facilitate future financing of missions by increasing the flexibility and speed in managing the financing of joint tasks.

Athena will be managed by a Special Committee composed of representatives from each of the participating member states (all EU members except Denmark). This Special Committee will approve all budgets to finance the common costs of an operation. Its decisions will be binding and have to be unanimous. Among the common costs to be covered by Athena are (Lindstrom, 2004: 126):

- Incremental costs for deployable or fixed headquarters for EU-led operations.
- Transport costs to and from theatres of operation; transport costs within area of operations with the exception of per diems.
- Administrative costs, including communications, locally hired personnel, maintenance costs, public information, representation and hospitality.
- Accommodation and infrastructure costs.
- Incremental costs incurred to support the force as a whole.

- Incremental costs associated with the use of NATO common assets and capabilities made available for EU-led operations.

While Athena is an improvement over the former and ad hoc system, it still has some shortcomings. The unanimous decision-making process within the Special Committee may slow or hamper the financing process if a participating state decides to block a decision.

8) Problems with unified action within the ESDP: The initiation and development of the ESDP has rather been a challenging task. First, defence and security have traditionally been excluded from the European project. Therefore, the EU has had to develop its structures, procedures and mechanisms for the ESDP. Second, the ESDP is organized on a purely intergovernmental basis, with 25 sovereign states taking all decisions by unanimity. Under these circumstances, decision-making is complex in particular in the area of defence, where member states are traditionally reluctant to surrender national choices.⁵⁰

Despite the fact that enlargement has usually been regarded as a security policy itself, it actually represents a challenge for the ESDP. The new members (Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) of the EU and the two candidate countries (Bulgaria and Romania) from Central Europe reacted late and defensively to the launch of ESDP in 1999, when they were candidates for the EU membership. On the one hand, they hardly understood its rationale, feared that it could undermine NATO's internal cohesion, and also feared that it could drive the Americans out of Europe. On the other hand, some of them suspected that involvement in ESDP might become an alternative to NATO membership. For those, who were already fully-fledged NATO members, the key issue was particularly the establishment of a clearly defined relationship between the EU and the Alliance. In many ways, and with varying emphasis, Warsaw, Prague and Budapest considered ESDP acceptable only as ESDI within (or under

⁵⁰ According to Missiroli (2001b: 15), "In the absence of any specific and binding Treaty provision as much as of any tangible *acquis sécuritaire* to rely on – and in the light of the challenges and expectations that European security will presumably have to face up to over the next months and years – this may well be the main (if not only) way to proceed in the desired direction with a 'benign' attitude. Indeed it would be a tragic irony if what is increasingly regarded as the comparative advantage and perhaps the greatest asset of the EU as an international actor – namely, the pluri-functional nature, the unique variety and the virtual completeness of the policy instruments and resources it can resort to – turned into a source of division and liability."

the supervision of) NATO. Over time, however, such attitudes have evolved towards a warmer acceptance of the ESDP.⁵¹

In spite of their relatively short record of freedom of action (and, for some, independence) on the international scene, over the past years all ten Central European countries have been increasingly engaged in crisis management operations mostly in the Western Balkans. Although their contributions have been limited in absolute numbers and restricted in their functions, they have proved their willingness and ability to participate and perform in Petersberg type of operations. Those countries participation' in NATO-led or EU-led missions is seen as a "driving factor" towards some sort of "role specialization" (Missiroli, 2002a: 60). Such specialization is making virtue out of necessity: financial, technical and human resources are scarce and have to be concentrated and focused on viable objectives (Missiroli, 2002a: 60). This role specialization could also help to pool the assets, capabilities and forces of the member states. This could imply the allocation of specific functional roles to certain member states. Role specialization should not be limited to military capabilities, because some member states may prefer to develop civilian capabilities.

9) Shortcomings related to "double-hatted" forces: Significant developments have also taken place in the Atlantic framework. The NATO Response Force (NRF), first proposed at the NATO Prague summit, was envisaged as a force for the most challenging missions consisting of an air component capable of carrying out 200 combat air sorties a day, a brigade-sized land force component and a maritime component up to the level of NATO's standing naval forces. The force could consist of up to 21.000 personnel drawn from the pool of European high-readiness forces. It would be capable of fighting together at 7-30 days notice anywhere in the world.

The NRF represents a valuable opportunity to introduce new doctrinal concepts and techniques for European forces. However, since both it and the ERF draw the same, limited pool of deployable forces, it is apparent that most of the EU's most capable troops will be "double-hatted" (i.e. answerable to both NATO and the EU). Consequently, the controversy about the organization responsible for the running an operation could arise. If

⁵¹ This paragraph is a summary of information taken from Missiroli (2002a: 58-59).

one operation has priority over another, there would be a problem as to whether NATO or the EU was in charge of it (European defence, 2004: 62).

5.2. Ways to deal with the shortcomings

Reforms for dealing with these shortfalls are in hand but they need time. Even if the political will exists, the complexity of the challenges slows down the speed of the reforms. The restructuring of armed forces is almost inevitably slow and weighty, because it requires important financial investment, runs against deeply rooted traditions and mentalities, and may raise serious social and economic problems. At the same time, military equipment has extremely long procurement and life-cycles. And one must consider the fact that the assets and technologies that are used in low-intensity and high-intensity conflicts are different. For example, high technology forces, which are crucial for the high-intensity conflicts, are not essential for soft security and peacekeeping missions, and not very helpful for them. The requirements of advanced technology simply do not translate well into low-intensity conflicts, and may even be counterproductive in some cases (Garther, 2001: 141). A good soldier is not necessarily a good peacekeeper (Garther, 2001: 141). Therefore, the EU has to be careful when improving its crisis management capabilities.

There are several ways of correcting the deficiencies in the Union's capabilities. Briefly put, the approach can be bottom-up or top-down. With a bottom-up approach, the members of the Union make the key decisions and keep sovereign control of management of their defence capabilities. This approach has so far characterized the process of developing categories inside the ESDP. To be effective it requires close coordination. In the top-down approach, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the Union is considered to be a defence entity to which member states contribute, taking into account the Union's interests decided either collectively or by a supranational authority. Genuine role specialization requires top-down approach, while other initiatives to achieve more efficient defence spending could be bottom-up. A top-down approach requires collective and/or supranational policies and a functioning defence planning mechanism. Given present political realities within the Union, it is assumed that member states will, at least for the foreseeable future, favor bottom-up initiatives to achieve greater efficiency. However, both approaches require a common understanding on what the Union's ESDP should aim at.

Both approaches also require investment and adequate budgets. It is well known that Europe does not do very well in that respect.⁵²

Autonomous action by the EU, through the ESDP, requires military leadership, planning and practice, all of which already exist within NATO. The necessary duplication of these assets will take some time. An efficient and competitive European arms industry is essential, not only on economic grounds, but also more importantly for autonomous action. The conceptual development of the European armed forces will be strongly determined by technological possibilities. The scope for military action by the EU will be dependent on the quality of this equipment. Depending on the level of technological ability, the EU can exert influence on political and military goals of its member states in ad hoc coalitions or in the Alliance. In this sense, the EU will have to determine which of the industrial capabilities it views as strategic, and will therefore want to provide itself, and in which fields it can tolerate industrial dependence (Rummel, 2002: 465). This ability is unimaginable without a common European armament and arms industry policy (Rummel, 2002: 465). Creation of the EDA will enable the EU to overcome these problems. By means of promoting defence capabilities development, armaments cooperation among the members, the creation of the European defence, technological and industrial base and defence equipment market, and research and technology; the EDA can play a crucial role in the sustainability of the EU's security and defence policy.

EU's defence capabilities are not inconsiderable, but EU's real strength lies in the areas of development and humanitarian aid, reconstruction, conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU and US have much to benefit from working together on many issues. There is a discussion about the limitation of the tasks for European defence to crisis management (non-Article 5 missions), reserving for NATO the first responsibility for collective defence (Article 5). This could reinforce the idea of role specialization. Although this kind of approach might be considered as beneficial for saving resources and reducing military costs, it might undermine the integrative logic of the development of ESDP, leaving the Union as a "nested" organization within NATO (Deighton, 2002: 734).

One might actually say that there is a general belief that soft security issues will be accomplished by Europe, and hard security issues will be dealt with NATO and US. The

⁵² This paragraph is a summary of information taken from European defence (2004: 116-117).

Europeans and Americans will have to share burdens, risks and responsibilities in non-Article 5 areas, and European states will have to improve their ability to contribute militarily to the protection of common interests. But there must be an appropriate division of labor between Europeans and Americans, some sort of “selective engagement”. While, the European forces and capabilities are designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief than for the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances, (for the EU to conduct autonomous smaller-scale operations without deployment of NATO assets and capabilities), the United States will continue to project forces in high-intensity conflicts (Gartner, 2001: 141). Therefore, in practice European states should concentrate on the soft security and small-scale or civilian crisis response operations. Their participation in combat is unlikely to be decisive (Gartner, 2001:143-144).

Hence, there is an ongoing discussion about if the Europeans have to make a choice between two types of forces in crisis management missions: peacekeeping forces, which are massive, strategic and permanent or rapid reaction forces, which are more light, and flexible (Solana, 2004:7). As Solana (2004: 7) puts it into words, “Must we set aside the big battalions of peacekeepers in favour of more rapid and more mobile intervention groups? The answer of course is no, if only because those two type of force can constitute the two stages of the same military intervention.”

There is a general agreement that the EU is not yet in a position to engage in high-intensity combat missions, but opinions differ as to what such eventual readiness would entail (Howorth, 2003: 229). According to Howorth (2003: 229):

“Those who compare the EU force to U.S. military capacity suggest that the ERRF may need ten more years before being ready for high-intensity combat. Others argue that the European force could engage in high-intensity combat much sooner by choosing to engage hostilities in a different way. For instance, one of the much-discussed “gaps” which the EU is currently aiming to fill is in SEAD (suppression of enemy air defences). The U.S. system is high-tech and very expensive. But the EU could choose not to use such a system and to rely on pilot skills and risk-taking to achieve the same results. In other words, the *significant* questions about military capacity have to do with *the style* of military engagement envisaged. On this, there has been all too little discussion. It has become a truism to suggest that, whereas after Vietnam the United States vowed to fight wars at a distance with high technology weapons and, ideally, “zero deaths”, the Europeans were more prepared to settle for lower-technology equipment – and to take casualties.”

European Union has to develop effective strategies for crisis management as well as the mechanisms for implementing them. If the EU wishes to be able to run effective military operations, its members need to enhance their military capabilities. EU members have to spend more on defence or spend better to improve their military capabilities. As Missiroli (2002b) mentions, “Europeans spend much less than Americans on defence but are quite ready to engage in crisis management in so far as it entails a strong commitment to peace-building especially (not exclusively) in their immediate neighborhood. Their political, financial and military presence in the Balkans (...) is a good case in point.” The Europeans need to spend more money on military equipment, particularly communication and information-gathering systems (such as airborne surveillance and satellites). Gordon (2000: 4) contends that the greatest obstacle to an effective European security policy has not been an inability to decide, but rather a lack of means to act. As Schacke, Blanch-Laine and Grant (1999:26) point out, member states have to rethink their priorities and redesign their forces to make them more flexible, deployable, sustainable and mobile. Two of their near-term proposals for modifying European forces are (1999: 26):

- Force reductions: Forces geared to territorial defence could be greatly reduced. Reducing personnel should free up fund for other, more urgent military priorities.
- Professionalising armed forces: Most European countries have failed to invest in the equipment and training that would enable them to project power effectively, as Britain and France can do. Germany, Italy and Spain have much work to do in professionalising and restructuring their military forces. An improvement in the rapid reaction capacity of these three countries would give a crucial boost to Europe’s defence capabilities.

As mentioned above, if the EU wishes to be able to run effective military operations, its members need to enhance their military capabilities. EU members have to spend more on defence or spend better to improve their military capabilities, but this is not an easy task. As Missiroli (2003a: 8) mentions, “On the ‘What for’ of defence spending, however, opinions and visions still differ – and sometimes diverge – inside the EU.”

Howorth (2000a: 69) asserts that it is really not difficult for the Europeans to agree on the short-term and even medium-term steps forward on the ESDP. The problems will emerge once discussion begins on the longer-term implications: what is the strategic objective; how far do different countries wish to take this project; what sorts of weapon

systems should the EU be procuring for 2015 and 2030; what are the more global implications for relations between the two sides of the Alliance? (Howorth, 2000a: 69-70) Indeed, decisions on the restructuring of the Alliance over the next five years will need to be predicated on an accurate guess as to what sort of world we are likely to be living in thirty years from now (Howorth, 2000a: 70).

If the EU wants to carry out the ESDP successfully, and to emerge itself as an important actor in the field of crisis management, it should not undermine some major issues. First, the Union has to face up to complexity in the international system in the post-Cold War era (Solana, 2004: 7). Europe is still facing security threats and challenges, which are more complex and also more unpredictable. Starting from the Union's interests and the potential threats to those interests, a detailed strategic concept should define which are the precise objectives of the ESDP within the general task of crisis management; which types of situations the ESDP is to prevent or resolve; within which geographical area; which instruments can be put to use; under which circumstances, to achieve these objectives (Biscop, 2002: 472-473). The EU acknowledged the necessity of constructing a European strategy for active and all-encompassing security policy. Hence, the Union determined the global challenges and key threats to its security environment and determined its strategic objectives to cope with them by means of concluding the ESS. As the ESS is the first strategy paper in EU's history, there can be some shortcomings with its interpretation and also with its implementation, but it is possible that the EU will be able to take the necessary measures and make necessary amendments to adapt its security strategy to the new circumstances.

Secondly, one should not forget that "coherence is key to all success" (Solana, 2004: 8). ESS stresses the urgency and necessity of strengthening the coherence between the military and civilian means of external action, between the development policy and security policy, between the actions of the Commission, the Council and the member states, between diplomacy and defence, between the role of the Union and that of other competent international organizations in various matters (Solana, 2003: 19-20). Since the blurring of the distinction between internal and external security, and the connected impulse towards better coordination between the correspondent policy fields, are among the fundamental structural changes in international relations, developing institutional

“cross-pillar coordination” for the purposes of crisis management is crucial for an effective ESDP (Pastore, 2001:1-6).

Thirdly, in order to have an effective policy-making system, a reasonable balance should be found between European nations and institutions. One cannot deny the fact that nation states remain unavoidable actors in the world. It is also certain that by acting alone, one nation cannot deal with most of the regional crises or world problems. The new security challenges call for cooperation and collaboration in Europe. Therefore, the member states should overcome the controversial views among them, and try to put aside their national policies in order to strengthen a common European Security and Defence Policy. European nations can achieve this through its institutions. According to Solana (2004: 9):

“The development of the European Security Strategy has already enabled new methods to be tested – neither majority, nor intergovernmental – for constructing a political consensus within the Union. The added value of the new institutions provided for the Constitutional Treaty is also that they can help this European general interest to emerge: by virtue of his capacity to listen and take initiatives, the post of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will play a crucial role here, as will the provisions for flexibility and enhanced cooperation on defence.”

Fourthly, knowing the fact that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable, there should be a special concern about this issue. Acting together, the EU and the United States can constitute a formidable force in the world. As Solana (2003: 20) states, “Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.” Despite the aims of the Union, one also should not forget that “the United States wants a stronger European contribution to NATO, but not a strategic rival” (Teunissen 1999: 336).

It is actually in the fundamental interest of the United States that the Europeans should be able to take over crisis management credibly and effectively in cases where it does not want to be involved militarily. The United States, however, has both hopes and concerns about the ESDP. The United States hopes that the ESDP: will relieve the United States of some of the defence burden in Europe; will provide the additional capabilities for responses to security concerns beyond Europe; will diminish the European resentment of the US dominance in the Alliance; will remove the final barriers to French reintegration into NATO’s command structure; will force European neutral states to acknowledge their

responsibility for security and remove barriers to their making fully-fledged contributions, including acceptance of NATO memberships; will strengthen NATO (Sloan, 2001: 40-42). Sloan also mentions the concerns of the US over the ESDP as: it will produce rhetoric, promises and institutions but no additional capabilities; will lead the European nations to duplicate NATO (US) systems; will defeat the purpose of NATO's efforts to build a ESDI within the framework of the Alliance; it will create artificial divisions and distinctions among NATO allies, undermining NATO's cohesion; it will become a neo-Gaullist means for Europe to differentiate its foreign policies from that of the United States; it will increase transatlantic trade and industrial tensions by supporting development of a fortress Europe mentality in defence procurement (Sloan, 2001: 43-47).

Garther (2001: 144-145) and Vayrynen (2001:1) propose some guiding principles for the future EU's crisis management operations as follows:

- A participation in military operations is contingent on the European's interests and/or on the promotion of international law and international principles.
- Whenever possible the EU should seek a mandate for its military operations from the UN Security Council or the OSCE and possibly even become a regional organization with the UN Charter. The mandate has to have clear political and military objectives that are both reasonable and attainable.
- It has to be a multinational operation. It should be based on international solidarity and a fair distribution of responsibilities, burdens and risks.

Gnessotto (2000) also proposes guiding principles for meeting the challenges that EU may face in the coming years. Depending on the subject at issue, Gnesotto states some of them as follows:

- Cooperation essential, subordination unacceptable: the establishing of relations between the Union and NATO will without doubt be one of the most delicate issues to be settled for the maintenance of transatlantic harmony. The Union cannot see its status reduced to that of NATO subcontractor any more than the Alliance can be treated as a secondary organization in matters of European security.
- Discrimination prohibited, differentiation legitimate: since all the European countries are involved in the future of the continent, all must be able to participate in the European Union's military activities. But because the Union is at the same

time something other than a crisis management organization, associating the NATO non-EU members with the EU's common defence policy will be difficult to manage according to the military criteria alone.

- No defence without a CFSP: all the armies in the world and all conceivable institutional arrangements would be of dubious effectiveness in the absence of a true common foreign policy that allowed them to be used.

All these need to be taken into account when assessing the success of EU's crisis management activities. Considerable achievements have been made, and constant attempts are being made to make further improvements. Nevertheless, six years after Cologne, the Union has for the first time in its history proactively engaged in security affairs, covering tasks that range from policing to military intervention. The ESDP has always continued to be a mixture of fear and hope (Haine, 2004: 53). After 2003, however, there is a noticeable lessening of rhetoric and a new pragmatism is now emerging that allows greater optimism (Haine, 2004: 53). According to Haine (2004: 53), "Defence is now one of the most promising areas for cooperation." Haine (2004: 53) also contends that the ESDP operations are likely to increase in two theatres in the near future. The first is a theatre of necessity in Balkans (Haine, 2004: 53). The tragedy of Sarajevo was the major reason behind the ESDP. Therefore, the operations in Bosnia and the peaceful reconstruction of Sarajevo will be evidence of its credibility. The second is a theatre of choice (Haine, 2004: 53). Building on the success of Operation Artemis, the Union can become a more responsible and autonomous actor not only in Africa, but also in other parts of the world. Broadening the scope of the ESDP will be a real sign of its maturity (Haine, 2004: 53).

Despite the obstacles given above, the EU aims to bring the variety of differing national security and defence policies come together in the ESDP framework. The differing traditions of the participating nations may be seen as an obstacle for the ESDP; however, this may serve as chance for the EU to become a different kind of global actor and crisis manager from those, which already exist. For example, the Nordic nations have brought to the fore the civilian aspects of crisis management as an integral and inseparable part of successful crisis management. As Howorth (2000a: 87) remarks, "(...) the distinctiveness of the CESDP will be the fine balance which will be achieved between the 'hard' and 'soft' ends of the spectrum of security implementation. That in itself will

constitute a unique, consensual European approach to the future of foreign and security policy.”

Concluding remarks:

It is apparent that in a very real sense, the EU has so much to gain from making a success of ESDP, and so much to lose from failure. Although, it is clear that the ESDP has some way to go before it fulfills all the expectations of its creators, the EU is making good progress in both areas of military and civilian crisis management capabilities. Within the framework of the EU Rapid Reaction Force, the first of the planned 13 battle groups have been created. The setting of the European Defence Agency will help to get better value for money in defence procurement and increase the amount of usable military capabilities, which European governments have at their disposal. The civilian-military cooperation to a new operational level through the creation of a civilian-military cell is also an important and distinctive step for the EU. It can be contended that these measures will enable the Union to increase its crisis management capabilities so that it can successfully address the complex, many-sided security crises of the 21st century.

CONCLUSION

It is certain that peace, security and stability that emerged after the end of Cold War are not equally shared by all states. Specifically, the west European states have made dramatic reductions in their military power and defence expenditures after the communist threat had disappeared, and they have gathered the opportunity to invest more on their already developed economies, social security, education; in other words on their people's comfort and welfare. However, the end of overlaying impact of the Cold War deeply affected other parts of the European continent, especially the Balkans, which had not experienced any actual conflict for nearly half a century. Furthermore, as the balance of terror based on nuclear weapons lost its effectiveness, "limited conventional conflict fields" found suitable ground, which was fed by international and regional contradictions (Davutoğlu, 2001: 291).

The fight against the problems that threatens the security of states makes effective struggle and cooperation necessary. It can be argued that true security and stability has not been achieved effectively despite all efforts. In the post-Cold War era, NATO and the EU seem to be the most important actors to fight against the present threats. Nevertheless, there is also the risk that these organizations may duplicate each other's tasks and end up in unnecessary rivalry. It has become very critical to prevent, unnecessary duplication and competition between these two organizations in their activities and policies.

The nature of the new threats that emerged after the end of the Cold War has necessitated rapid, flexible and continuous engagement. Therefore, crisis management has become more important and effective in comparison with measures of collective defence. Throughout this study, the capabilities of European Union's crisis management, with particular reference to its problems and prospects, are examined. Different aspects of crisis management are evaluated in a theoretical framework. The introduction and the development of concept of crisis management in the EU, and the capabilities and instruments of crisis management, which the EU has, are put forward in this study, as crisis management activities has become the cornerstone of the post-Cold War global structure, and the EU, by adapting itself into the new global structure and embodying crisis

management activities, aims to become a powerful political actor in the international stage. European Union's crisis management operations, which are analyzed in the study, have demonstrated EU's enthusiasm and ability to become an important actor in the field of security. It can be claimed that today the European foreign policy can be regarded as not only talk but also action, as today more than 7.000 European troops are operating under the EU flag just in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other operations are taking place in South Caucasus, Africa and elsewhere.

EU's crisis management project aims to combine all civilian and military instruments in order to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises. The design of the crisis management toolbox of the Union is flexible, and with the enhancement and concentration of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to resort to a whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations, and to apply a comprehensive approach to crisis management. The EU is a unique international body, and with the help of its dual military and civilian approach, it can cope with crises better than other international bodies. It can be argued that EU's military crisis management capabilities are not negligible, but the real strength of the EU lies in the civilian crisis management capabilities. One should not forget the fact that the EU is well positioned to promote the long-term conditions for peace, by fighting with the root causes of conflicts and contributing to stability. In the recent years the Union has done a quite successful job of spreading peace, prosperity and democracy throughout the European continent. The EU now aims to extend this zone of peace, by promoting security beyond its borders and constructing an international order based on human rights and international law.

There is no doubt that the EU aims to become a global actor. Therefore, it is gradually developing proactive policies and strategies instead of reactive ones, and step-by-step, a more capable and coherent European foreign policy is taking shape. It should be noted that the EU showed its capacity and willingness that it could successfully, manage the lower spectrum of the Petersberg missions, despite some shortcomings, but there would be still much to be done when dealing with the high-intensity crises. Crisis management in the future will call for smaller multinational forces with the flexibility to respond to contingencies over a wide geographical area. Increasing regional ethnic conflicts

necessitate the EU forces to be organized as a coalition of member states and ready to be used in high-intensity conflicts, to be prepared in a more planned and flexible manner, far beyond the missions and qualities of the stable peacekeepers. One should not forget the fact that the military arm of the EU will remain in the hands of independent nation-states, and thus it cannot be like those militaries under the unified command of one state. Therefore, the ERRF is not to be a standing army, but rather based on the concept that pre-designated national forces will be brought together when necessary, that is, when military crisis response is desired.

Despite the fact that the EU has the ability to take common decisions and carry out common activities and that it has been trying to widen its common decisions and areas of action by means of “structured cooperation”, “enhanced cooperation” or “solidarity clause” practices, there has not been such a particular plan in the EU that set up a common, all-European army or constitute a European Defence Union (as in the case of EDC). The EU has been putting great effort in producing common policies, developing its own defence industry through the institutions such as EDA, formulating ways to enhance cooperation in civil and military crisis management, trying to pool its sources, and finally increasing the number of the projects such as A 400M and Eurofighter. However, it seems difficult to expect the EU to establish an all-European army in the medium runs based on common defence, which involves Article V guarantee. Therefore, it seems highly possible that NATO will remain as the guarantor of collective defence, in other words Article V, in Europe for quite a long time.

The Constitutional Treaty itself in general and its provisions on ESDP in particular, can be regarded as crucial steps for the future of the Union, but basically putting those constitutional arrangements into practice is more vital. The Constitutional provisions on the ESDP taken together with the ESS imply a change in the Union’s traditional approach to security. The constitutional process of the EU was accelerated after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (on 11 March 2004) as it found its place in the Constitution with the concept of “a single Europe against terrorism”. However the rejection of the constitution by the referendums held in two of the founding members, namely France (on 29 May 2005) and Holland (on 1 June 2005), has led to pessimism about the future of Europe. The crisis over the constitution has led to great arguments within the Union and may even lead a process in which the Union will question its structures and existence as a whole. Furthermore, the

constitutional crisis and disagreements over the EU budget during the Brussels European Council on 16-17 June 2005 may be considered as signs of new problems for the future of the EU but they are all recent developments and any speculative judgment based on these developments cannot be analytical and scientific.

The EU is a serious and powerful organization and has been able to preserve its existence despite the conjectural crises throughout its history. It is essential here to indicate that the EU Constitution is not “*de jure*” put aside though its rejection in the referendums held in two member states has definitely weakened its prospects. It has already been stated in the last European Council that the voting process will continue but only will be slower. An important fact to be pointed out is that the EU has been able to put the ESDP Articles in the constitution into practice by a series of EU Council decisions. The articles on EDA and the solidarity clause have been put into practice through this way. In addition, EU can take decisions and make arrangements in the field of crisis management, specifically on capacity improving without basing them on the constitution. Hence, it can be stated that the crisis over the constitution will not hamper the ESDP project of the Union considerably. However, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty may harm the efforts of the Union to develop effective common policies, which will constitute disadvantages for the ESDP in a longer term. At this point, it can also be assumed that the terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005 in the UK may pave the way for a new optimistic period for the constitutional process of the EU. Threat of terrorism may lead the member states to act more closely with each other despite their economic and political problems and may play a crucial role in strengthening the political union. It should not be forgotten that crises could play important roles in strengthening solidarity among the states.

In the post-Cold War period, it can be assumed that the EU has successfully adopted itself to the new security environment through a transformation process by which it aims to strengthen its own structures and build new ones. Policies, which were taboos during the Cold War in Europe such as security and defence, are no longer regarded as such. The EU, with the ESDP, has shown a great incentive to become an important global and regional actor. With the help of its political and economic power it has gradually gained a remarkable status and power in the international arena. Moreover the EU has successfully emerged as an important actor in the field of crisis management in a quite short time.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX-I

WEU Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration

Bonn, 19 June 1992

(Part II only)

II. On Strengthening WEU's operational role

1. In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the Member States of WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Member States have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational role.
2. WEU Member States declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of the WEU.
3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of Member States in accordance with national constitutions.
4. Apart from the contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5⁵³ of the Washington Treaty and Article V⁵⁴ of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU Member States, acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for:
 - humanitarian and rescue tasks;
 - peacekeeping tasks;

⁵³ The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

⁵⁴ If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies.
 6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU Member States, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organized on a multinational and multi-service basis.
 7. All WEU Member States will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.
 8. WEU Member States intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.
 9. A Planning Cell will be established on 1 October 1992, subject to practical considerations, under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building in Brussels. The Planning Cell will be responsible for:
 - preparing the contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices;
 - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected – keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.
 10. The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the Planning Cell.

APPENDIX-II

Title V of the Treaty of Maastricht

Provisions on a common and foreign security policy

Article J

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions.

Article J.1

1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:
 - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
 - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
 - to promote international cooperation;
 - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. The Union shall pursue these objectives:
 - by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2;
 - by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint actions in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in the international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article J.2

1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform on the common positions.
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those that do take part shall uphold the common positions.

Article J.3

The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by foreign and security policy shall be following:

1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such an action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least fifty-four votes in favor, cast by at least eight members.
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures, which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing in a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council, which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence.
2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union, which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in the Article J.3.
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of a closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of

this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then;

Article J.5

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organizations and international conferences.
3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the presidency shall be assisted if needs be by the previous and next Members, to hold the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks.
4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States, which are also the members of the United Nations Security Council, will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States, which are the permanent members of the Security Council, will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Article J.6

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article J.7

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the

Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article J.8

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).
3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
4. In the cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article J.9

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article J.10

On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4, the Conference, which is convened to that effect, shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy.

Article J.11

1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure, which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions, shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities. The Council may also:
 - Either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise is to be charged to the budget of the European Communities; in that event, the budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be applicable;
 - Or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the Member States, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided.

APPENDIX-III

Title V of the Treaty of Amsterdam

Provisions on a common foreign and security policy

Article 11

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be.
 - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
 - to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
 - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
 - to promote international cooperation;
 - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in the international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article 12

The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:

- defining the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
- deciding on common strategies;
- adopting joint actions;
- adopting common positions;

- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

Article 13

1. The European Council shall define the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be available by the Union and the Member States.
3. The Council shall take decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.

The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.

The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

Article 14

1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.
2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if

necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures, which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.

6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing in a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council, which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article 15

The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

Article 16

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

Article 17

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in the case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the

adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union, which have defence implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on equal footing and decision-taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of a closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

Article 18

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organizations and international conferences.
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.
5. The Council may, whenever it deems necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.

Article 19

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those that do take part shall uphold the common positions.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States, which are also the Members of the United Nations Security Council, will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States, which are the permanent Members of the Security Council, will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Article 20

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to

international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article 21

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article 22

1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
2. In the cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

Article 23

1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoptions of such decisions.
2. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the Members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with the Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decisions shall not be adopted.

3. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:

- When adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy;
- When adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by qualified majority, request that the matter referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favor, cast by at least 10 members.

This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.

Article 24

When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more Member States or international organizations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may authorize the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to them

The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI.

Article 25

Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article 26

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.

Article 27

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article 28

1. Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163, 191a and 217 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure, which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions, shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from the operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.
4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities.

APPENDIX-IV

Treaty of Amsterdam: Declaration relating to the Western European Union

‘DECLARATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WITH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE’

INTRODUCTION

The Western European Union (WEU) Member States agreed at Maastricht in 1991 on the need to develop a genuine European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and to assume a greater European responsibility for defence matters. In the light of the Treaty of Amsterdam, they reaffirm the importance of the continuing and strengthening these efforts. WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union (EU) providing the Union with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of Petersberg tasks and is essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Paris Declaration and with the decisions taken by NATO ministers in Berlin.

Today the WEU Council brings together all the Member States of the European Union and all the European Members of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with their respective status. The Council also brings together those States with the Central and Eastern European States linked to the European Union by Association Agreement and that are applications for accession to both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. WEU is thus establishing itself a genuine framework for dialogue and cooperation among Europeans on wider European security and defence issues.

The European Union shall draw up, together with the Western European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them, within a year from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

WEU's RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION: ACCOMPANYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

In the 'Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance' of 10 December 1991, WEU Member States set as their objective 'to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union'.

They today reaffirm this aim as developed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

When the Union avails itself of WEU, WEU will elaborate and implementing decisions and actions of the EU, which have defence implications. In elaborating and implementing decisions and actions of the EU for which the Union avails itself of WEU, WEU will act consistently with guidelines established by the European Council.

WEU supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union.

WEU confirms that when the European Union avails itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in tasks in question in accordance with Article 17(3) of the Treaty on European Union.

WEU will develop the role of the Observers in WEU in line with provisions contained in Article 17(3) and will adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States of the EU contributing to the tasks undertaken by WEU at the request of the EU to participate fully and on equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

Consistent with the Protocol on Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, WEU shall draw up, together with the European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them. In this regard, a range of measures, on some which work is already in hand in WEU, can be taken forward now, such as:

- arrangements for improving the coordination of the consultation and decision-making processes of the respective Organizations, in particular in crisis situations;
- holding joint meetings of the relevant bodies of the two Organizations;
- harmonization as much as possible of the sequence of the Presidencies of WEU and the EU, as well as the administrative rules and practices of the two Organizations;
- close coordination of the work of the staff of the Secretariat-General of the WEU and the General-Secretariat of the Council of the EU, including through the exchange and secondment of personnel;
- arrangements to allow the relevant bodies of the EU, including its Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, to draw on the resources of WEU's Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre;
- cooperation in the field of armaments, as appropriate, within the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), as the European forum for armaments cooperation, the EU and WEU in the context of rationalization of the European armaments market and the establishment of a European Armaments Agency;
- practical arrangements for ensuring cooperation with the European Commission reflecting its role in the CFSP as defined in the revised Treaty on European Union;
- improved security arrangements with the European Union.

RELATIONS BETWEEN WEU AND NATO IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ESDI WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The Atlantic Alliance continues to be the basis of collective defence under the North Atlantic Treaty. It remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the framework in which they agree on policies bearing on their security and defence commitments under the Washington Treaty. The Alliance has embarked on a process of adaptation and reform so that it can more effectively carry out the full range of missions. This process is aimed at strengthening and renewing the transatlantic partnership, including building an ESDI within the Alliance.

WEU is an essential element of the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and will accordingly continue its efforts to strengthen institutional and practical cooperation with NATO.

In addition to its support for the common defence enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, WEU takes an active role in conflict prevention and crisis management as provided for in the Petersberg Declaration. In this context, WEU undertakes to perform its role to the full, respecting the full transparency and complementarity between the two Organizations.

WEU affirms that this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and will permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

To this end, WEU will develop its cooperation with NATO, in particular in the following fields:

- mechanisms for consultation between WEU and NATO in the context of a crisis;
- WEU's active involvement in the NATO's defence planning process;
- operational links between WEU and NATO for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations using NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of WEU, including:
 - military planning, conducted by NATO in coordination with WEU, and exercises;
 - a framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities;
 - liaison between WEU and NATO in the context of European command arrangements.

This operation will continue to evolve, also taking account of the adaptation of the Alliance.

WEU's OPERATIONAL ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESDI

WEU will develop its role as the European politico-military body for crisis management, by using the assets and capabilities made available by WEU nations on a national or multinational basis, and having recourse, when appropriate, to NATO's assets and capabilities under arrangements being worked out. In this context, WEU will also support the UN and OSCE in their crisis management tasks.

WEU will contribute, in the framework of Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, to the progressive framing of a common defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

To this end, WEU will take forward work in the following fields:

- WEU has developed crisis management mechanisms and procedures, which will be updated as WEU gains experience through exercises and operations. The implementation of Petersberg missions calls for flexible modes of action geared to the diversity of crisis situations and making optimum use of the available capabilities including through recourse to a national headquarters, which might be one provided by a framework nation, or to a multinational headquarters answerable to WEU or to NATO assets and capabilities;
- WEU has already worked out Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy, which is the initial contribution on the objectives, scope, and means of a common European defence policy.
- WEU will continue this work on the basis in particular of the Paris Declaration and taking account of the relevant elements of the decisions of WEU and NATO summits and ministerial meetings since Birmingham. It will focus on the following fields:
 - definition of principles for the use of armed forces of the WEU States for WEU Petersberg operations in pursuit of a common European security interests;
 - organization of operational means for Petersberg tasks, such as generic and contingency planning and exercising, preparation and interoperability of forces, including through participation in the NATO defence planning process, as appropriate;

- o strategic mobility on the basis of its current work;
 - o defence intelligence, through the Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre;
- WEU has adopted many measures to strengthen its operational role (Planning Cell, Situation Centre, Satellite Centre). The improvement of the functioning of the military components at WEU Headquarters and the establishment, under the Council's authority, of a military committee will represent a further enhancement of structures which are important for the successful preparation and conduct of WEU operations; with the aim of opening participation in all its operations to Associate Members and Observer States to participate fully in accordance with their status in all operations undertaken by WEU;
- WEU recalls that Associate Members take part on the same basis as full members in operations to which they contribute, as well as in relevant exercises and planning. WEU will also examine the question of participation of the Observers as fully as possible in accordance with their status in planning and decision-taking within WEU in all operations to which they contribute;
- WEU will, in consultation where appropriate with the relevant bodies examine the possibilities for maximum participation in its activities by Associate Members and Observer States in accordance with their status. It will address in particular activities in the fields of armaments, space and military studies;
- WEU will examine how to strengthen the Associate Partners' participation in an increasing number of activities.

APPENDIX-V

Amsterdam Declaration on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

The Conference agrees that:

1. A policy planning and early warning unit shall be established in the General Secretariat of the council under the responsibility of its Secretary-General, High Representative for the CFSP. Appropriate cooperation shall be established with the Commission in order to ensure full coherence with the Union's external economic and development policies.
2. The tasks of the unit shall include the following:
 - monitoring and analyzing developments in the areas relevant to CFSP;
 - providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP should focus in the future;
 - providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises;
 - producing, at the request of either the Council and the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.

The Unit shall consist of personnel drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU.

Any Member State or the Commission may make any suggestions to the unit for work to be undertaken.

Member States and the Commission shall assist the policy planning process by providing the fullest extent possible, relevant information, including confidential information.

APPENDIX-VI

Chapter II of the Constitutional Treaty

Specific Provisions⁵⁵

Article I-40

Specific provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy

- 1- The European Union shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence among Member States' actions.
- 2- The European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests and determine the objectives of its common foreign security policy. The Council shall frame this policy within the framework of the strategic guidelines established by the European Council and in accordance with Part III.
- 3- The European Council and the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions.
- 4- The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Member States, using national and Union resources.
- 5- Member States should consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any foreign and security policy issue which is of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the

⁵⁵ http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/protoc8_en.htm.

Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.

- 6- European decisions relating to the common foreign and security policy shall be adopted by the European Council and the Council unanimously, except in the cases referred to in Part III. The European Council and the Council shall act on a initiative from a Member State, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or on a proposal by from that Minister with the Commission's support. Europeans laws and framework laws shall be excluded.
- 7- The European Council may, unanimously, adopt a European decision authorizing the Council to act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in Part III.
- 8- The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy. It shall be kept informed of how it evolves.

Article I-41

Specific provisions relating to the common security and defence policy

- 1- The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
- 2- The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in the case recommend

to the member states the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member states, it shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

- 3- Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States, which together establish multinational forces, may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. An Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

- 4- European decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or an initiative from a member state. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

- 5- The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article III-310.
 - 6- Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish "permanent structured cooperation" within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article III-312. It shall not affect the provisions of Article III-309.
 - 7- If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
- Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States that are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.
- 8- The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common security and defence policy. It shall be kept informed of how it evolves.

Article I-43

Solidarity clause

- 1- The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

- a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
 - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
 - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist act;
 - b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of natural or man-made disaster.
- 2- The detailed arrangements for implementing this Article are set out in Article III-329.

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