This thesis examines the practice of confiscation in the Ottoman
Empire during the long-eighteenth century. It investigates what enabled,
guided and motivated the sovereign to confiscate the property of
elites, and how and to what extent this occurred. The contribution of
this thesis is twofold. First, it provides the first systematic analysis of
the practice of confiscation in the Ottoman Empire, highlighting the
basis of selectivity in its application. Second, it contributes to a broader
line of literature by analysing the drivers, informal constraints and persistence
of historical state predation. One of the strengths of the thesis
is its combination of theory and a rich variety of archival evidence, using
both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The thesis finds that
müsadere was a selective institution targeting mainly office-holders
and private tax contractors. However, some were less likely to face or
more capable of avoiding confiscation than others mainly due to factors
related to time and location of confiscation, the bargaining position of
the wealth-holder and the attributes of their wealth. Although confiscation
was costly and time-consuming to enforce, the sultans were
continuously interested in it because of its political and redistributive
functions such as monitoring the behaviour of their agents and protecting
their share in the fiscal revenue from fiscal intermediaries. They
had power to do so primarily because of many disincentives of collective
action among the targets of confiscation. Through the study of this
practice, this thesis shows how an early modern monarch, who was
not formally constrained, could and did confiscate the elite property in
a time of crisis. |