

A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS ON BALANCING:
THE IMPACT OF US WAR ON TERROR ON CHINA AND RUSSIA

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Ankara
January 2012

My Dear Family, Everything I do is for you
To Ayser, Mehmet İhsan and Kerim Altuğ Sarı

To My Dear Husband Ekrem

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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ANKARA

January 2012

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ABSTRACT

A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS ON BALANCING: THE IMPACT OF US WAR ON TERROR ON CHINA AND RUSSIA

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January 2012

This dissertation provides a constructivist analysis of balancing under unipolarity by examining the question of how the US war on terror has influenced China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the United States. To answer this question, this dissertation looks at how China's and Russia's security understandings have evolved as a result of their bilateral relations with the US and US security practices in international relations since the end of the Cold War. It points out that China's and Russia's interactions with the US have produced micro-cultures in which rivalry over international status and insecurity have become dominant. The dissertation argues that China's and Russia's reactions to the US war on terror were shaped by their security understandings. It states that after a temporary betterment of relations with the US, both states' concerns about their status in international relations were intensified after US unilateralism in the Iraq war. In addition, the dissertation points out that unipolarity exists in a Lockean culture at macro-structural level in which the US has the primary status empowering it to shape the norms of international relations. It stresses that as China and Russia want to play a role in the rule-making process and management of the international order, they are concerned by US status as the system-maker. The dissertation concludes that China and Russia might balance against the US due to the insecurities produced at macro and micro-structural levels.

Keywords: Unipolarity, Balancing, Constructivism, the U.S., China, Russia.

ÖZET

DENGELEME ÜZERİNE İNŞACI BİR ANALİZ: AMERİKA’NIN TERÖRLE SAVAŞININ ÇİN VE RUSYA ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ

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Bu tez ABD’nin terörle savaşının Çin’in ve Rusya’nın ABD’ye karşı dengeleme eğilimlerini nasıl etkilediğini araştırmayı ve tekkutuplu dünyada dengeleme eğilimleri üzerine inşacı bir analiz yapmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla tez, öncelikle Soğuk Savaş’ın sonundan bu yana Çin’in ve Rusya’nın güvenlik anlayışlarının ABD’nin kendileriyle ikili ilişkileri ve uluslararası alandaki politikaları neticesinde nasıl değiştiğini incelemektedir. Tezde, Çin’in ve Rusya’nın ABD ile etkileşimlerinden güvensizlik ve rekabete dayalı mikro-sosyal yapılar üretildiğine işaret edilmektedir. Tez, ABD’nin Irak’a tektaraflı savaş açmasının Çin’in ve Rusya’nın uluslararası ilişkilerdeki statülerine dair kaygılarını arttırdığını savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, tezde, tekkutupluluğun Locke’çu makro yapıda varolduğu ve bu yapıda ABD’nin uluslararası ilişkilerin temel normlarını şekillendirebilmesini sağlayan birincil statüye sahip olduğu dile getirilmektedir. Tez, Çin’in ve Rusya’nın uluslararası ilişkilerin kuralıyapım sürecinde ve yönetiminde yer almak istemeleri sebebiyle ABD’nin sistem kurucu rolünden rahatsız olduklarına işaret etmektedir. Makro ve mikro yapıda üretilen ve ABD’nin terörle savaşı süresince izlediği politikalarla pekiştirilen güvensizlik unsurlarına dayanarak, tez Çin’in ve Rusya’nın ABD’yi dengeleme eğilimlerinin kuvvetlendiği sonucuna varmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tekkutupluluk, Dengeleme, İnşacılık, ABD, Çin, Rusya.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Aim and Relevance of the Study

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a constructivist analysis on balancing under unipolarity. The major question that it seeks to answer is how the US war on terror has influenced China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the US with reference to constructivist theory.¹ Balancing has been a central theme of the Realist literature in International Relations. Second-tier powers' tendency to balance against the US, the unipole, has been predominantly discussed with reference to the assumptions of Realist theories of International Relations.² The Realist

¹ Constructivism is not one unified theory. It has variants that are defined as conventional and critical constructivism. This chapter focuses on Wendt's constructivism due to its systemic level of analysis. See, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Cambridge (UK), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a detailed discussion on two variants of constructivism; See, Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 181-186. Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2002): 49-72. Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81. Christian Reus-Smit, "Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4, no. 3 (2002): 487-509. Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2001), 209-230. Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2000): 73-101.

² On the significance of balance of power; see, Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001). Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006). Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed.

literature on balancing against the unipole is often centered on either Kenneth Waltz's balance of power theory³ or Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory⁴. According to a Waltzian approach, states tend to balance against a state with preponderant power. Balancing is an effect of distribution of power and it recurs under anarchy. Therefore, under unipolarity, proponents of Waltzian balance of power theory have predicted that unipolarity would not last long because the unipole would be balanced by great powers. Waltian approach, on the other hand, challenges the proposition that states engage in balancing to avoid domination by a stronger power and suggests that states form balancing coalitions against a threatening power. Therefore, as practices shape threat perception, according to Waltian approach, balancing is an effect of practices, not of distribution of power. In this regard, balance of threat scholars argued that balancing would form if the great powers perceived threat from the practices of the US.

Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, constructivism has started to challenge the understandings provided by mainstream International Relations (IR) theories and has offered alternative understandings to the puzzles that the mainstream IR theories deal with.⁵ For example, Lapid has argued, "culture's ship returned" to the discipline of IR.⁶ One of the most significant scholars who made possible what

(Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979). T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004). Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 44-79.

³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

⁵ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 171.

⁶ Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, (Critical Perspectives on World Politics) (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3-20.

has been called a “sociological”⁷ or “constructivist”⁸ turn in IR is Alexander Wendt. As Copeland observes, in a series of influential articles, Alexander Wendt has provided “one of the most sophisticated and hard hitting constructivist critiques of structural realism”.⁹ *Social Theory of International Politics*¹⁰ has been Wendt’s first book-length critique of structural realists who draw inspiration from Kenneth Waltz’s seminal book of *Theory of International Politics*¹¹. In addition, with the book, Wendt introduces his “unique brand of constructivism,”¹² clarifies its central claims, and presents a structural and social analysis of international politics.

In his seminal works, Wendt challenges the core neorealist assumption that the self-help corollary to anarchy generates an inherently competitive dynamic among states. He argues that “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due process, not structure.”¹³ Therefore, Wendt maintains that balancing, which is a practice of power politics, is a product of states’ interactions, not “an essential feature of anarchy”.¹⁴ In this regard, Wendt argues that in order to be able to predict states’ behaviors, including balancing, it is necessary to know whether states are friends or foes because the knowledge of how states perceive one another affects their security interests and the character of their interactions under

⁷ Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2000): 147-182.

⁸ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324-348.

⁹ Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," in *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, ed. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, (the New International Relations) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 1.

¹⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

¹¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹² Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," 1.

¹³ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 394.

¹⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 395.
Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 76.

anarchy.¹⁵ Therefore, between Waltzian balance of power theory and Waltian balance of threat theory, Wendt supports the Waltian approach's main argument that states balance against threats, "threats being socially constructed".¹⁶

However, although Wendt's work offers constructivist understandings about anarchy, balance of power, balance of threat, the relationship between agents and structure, his works are predominantly about "meta-theoretical matters".¹⁷ As his critics argue, while Wendt provides "one of the most abstract" theoretical discussions about international politics, he offers little discussion about "actual empirics or politics".¹⁸ Building on Wendt's theoretical discussion, in the light of a gap in the literature on the subject, the main ambition of this dissertation is to provide a constructivist analysis of balancing under unipolarity by focusing on the impact of the US war on terror on China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the US.

Second, by way of contributing to the gap in the literature regarding a constructivist analysis on balancing under unipolarity, the thesis aims to affirm Wendt's statement that "Realism does not have a monopoly on the ugly and brutal side of international life".¹⁹ Third, the dissertation contributes to the literature by pointing out the evolution of the debate on unipolarity and balancing in the Realist literature and by providing a categorization of the Realist literature showing its evolution. Fourth, the dissertation situates constructivism in the debate on balancing under unipolarity and highlights that between balance of power and balance of threat theories, constructivism sides with the latter's arguments due to its emphasis on threat perception and practices. In addition, the study seeks to underline that if China

¹⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396.

¹⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396.

¹⁷ Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, "Preface," in *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, ed. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, (the New International Relations) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), xvii.

¹⁸ Guzzini and Leander, "Preface," xvii.

¹⁹ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 76.

and Russia decide to balance against the US it will be as a result of their interactions and the social structure of international relations, not solely due to distribution of power. Besides, it endeavors to contribute to the scholarly literature on balancing dynamics that may emerge between China, Russia, and the US because the implications of balancing processes are immense for international relations as the Cold War once was.

Furthermore, the dissertation provides how China's and Russia's security understandings have evolved in relation to the United States' foreign policy practices since the end of the Cold War. Rather than solely comparing states' material power, the dissertation suggests that social factors such as threat perception, great power identity and search for status are crucial factors to be considered while discussing states' tendency to balance. Additionally, by way of contextualizing the US War on terror in China and Russia's security understanding under unipolarity, the thesis seeks to explore the long-term implications of the US war on terror on the aforementioned countries. This, as opposed to discussing the war on terror as short periods of cooperation or conflict in China-US and Russia-US bilateral relations. Consequently, underlying the roles of interactions in producing balancing tendencies, it aims to pose a normative challenge²⁰ to the Realist approach, which presents balancing as a seemingly natural result of the distribution of power. It underscores that balancing is an effect of distribution of ideas at macro structural level and a social construction generated by states' practices at micro structural level.

²⁰ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 74. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 375.

1.2. Theoretical Underpinnings, Approach and Methodology

This dissertation aims to provide a structural analysis of balancing under unipolarity based on Wendtian constructivism. Wendt's understanding of constructivism suggests that international structure is not only made of a distribution of capabilities but also of social relationships. Wendt maintains that social structures have three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices.²¹ To begin with, social structures are defined, in part, by shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge and they constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, which can be cooperative or conflictual. Second, social structures are made of material resources which only acquire meaning for state action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. Wendt emphasizes that one cannot explain the effects of material capabilities without presuppositions about structures of shared knowledge, which vary and are not reducible to capabilities. Also, Wendt underlines that constructivism is compatible with changes in material power affecting social relations as long as the effects of material change can be shown to presuppose deeper social relations.²² Third, Wendt states that social structures exist, not in actors' heads or in their material capabilities, but in their practices. He emphasizes that social structures exist only in a process like the Cold War, which was a structure of shared knowledge that governed great powers' relations for forty years and ended once great powers stopped acting on this basis. Therefore, in a social structural analysis, practices or processes by which social structures are produced and instantiated are central. As Wendt concisely states, "History matters".²³

²¹ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 76.

²² Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 74.

²³ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 77.

The dissertation also underlines that although in *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt prioritizes “third image”²⁴ theorizing and focuses on cultures or logics of anarchy as macro-structures, the distinctiveness of Wendt’s approach to structure stems from his recognition of the “duality of structure” as macro- and micro- (interaction)level structures.²⁵ According to this, macro structures are based on “collective knowledge,” that is defined as “knowledge structures held by groups which generate macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time”.²⁶ As defined by Wendt, macro structures are logics of anarchy, defined as Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian logics, and each logic tends to produce different tendencies in terms of state balancing behaviors.

In addition, Wendt identifies the micro-structural (interaction) level as a distinct level of analysis due to the importance of interactions in producing and instantiating collective knowledge.²⁷ In Wendt’s conceptualization, macro structures need micro-structural foundations because “macro-level structures are only produced and reproduced by practices and interactions at the micro-level.”²⁸ In other words, the micro-structural level of analysis is “useful for explaining why one world happens rather than another”.²⁹ Therefore, Wendt accepts micro-foundational analysis as a part of systemic theorizing as opposed to the Waltzian approach that neglects the interaction level to escape reductionism.³⁰ Asking “how a theory of international politics could explain a systemic tendency like balancing without being able to explain foreign policy behavior *at all*,” Wendt emphasizes that interaction

²⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (Topical Studies in International Relations) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 159-187.

²⁵ Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International-Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 142-156.

²⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 161.

²⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 99.

²⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 150.

²⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 154.

³⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 99.

level has an “inherently systemic dimension”.³¹ As Wendt defines balancing as a multiply realizable tendency, which means it is an outcome that can be reached through different causes at different social structural levels. Accepting balancing as a multiply realizable outcome, the dissertation looks at knowledge structures that may lead China and Russia to balance against the US at macro- and micro- structural levels.³²

The dissertation looks at what Lockean macro structure under the current unipolar system suggests for China and Russia’s balancing tendencies against the US. However, the dissertation puts more emphasis on the interaction level because it primarily seeks to identify knowledge structures produced and reproduced by interactions of the US and China and the US and Russia since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it looks at the history of US interactions with China and Russia. As Reus-Smit argues, in order to study how micro social structures are produced and reproduced by interactions under unipolarity, it “cut[s] into a social order at a particular time, [identifies] the agents and social structures, and then trace[s] how they condition one another over time.”³³ Therefore, due to the inextricably linked nature of history and the study of mutually constitutive practices, this dissertation adopts a historical approach to study micro-social structures of US-China and US-Russia relations under unipolarity.

In addition, as this dissertation emphasizes social structures, it does not focus on how China and Russia are positioned vis-à-vis the US in terms of material distribution of power. It rather looks at how China and Russia are positioned vis-à-

³¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 149.

³² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 246-308.

³³ Christian Reus-Smit, "Reading History through Constructivist Eyes," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2008): 397. On ‘historical turn’ and constructivism; also See, Michael Barnett, "Historical Sociology and Constructivism: An Enstranged Past, a Federated Future?," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge (UK), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 99-119.

vis the US in terms of distribution of ideas. In this regard, it does not only define current unipolarity as a structural condition in which the US has the predominant position in terms of distribution of capabilities³⁴ but also defines it as a structural condition in which the US has primary status³⁵ in terms of shaping the rules by which relations among nations work. It accepts unipolarity as a “change in material power affecting social relations”³⁶ as the US practices, enabled by its power, creates social relations that cannot be reduced to the US’ domination. In addition, the dissertation does not focus on China and Russia because of their material capabilities but rather highlights their self-perception of being great powers that are willing to play a role in shaping international relations in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, it positions the US vis-à-vis China and Russia in terms of their status, which is a function of their self-perceived identity as the unipole and the great powers. Expressed differently, the dissertation positions the US’ unipolar identity vis-à-vis China’s and Russia’s great power identities because while the first is capable of shaping the rules by which international relations is conducted and the latter are willing to assume special rights and roles in the governance of international relations since the end of the Cold War.

In this framework, as case studies, the dissertation focuses on Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization; the US’s national security strategy in the wake of the September 11 attacks; and China and Russia’s security understandings under unipolarity. It relies on both primary and secondary resources. For primary resources, in the chapter concerning the US war on terror, it examines the Bush administration’s national security documents *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* in 2002, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in 2003, *National*

³⁴ G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 4-10.

³⁵ William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 30.

³⁶ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73-74.

Security Strategy in 2006 and *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in 2006. In the China case, it focuses on China's white papers on national defense, from the official introduction of its "New Security Concept" in 1998 to 2008, the declarations made by China's presidents, ambassadors, and spokespersons on the subjects discussed, and articles and commentaries appearing on the subjects under consideration in *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China. Likewise, in the Russia case, it looks at Russia's official documents entitled *Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept, and Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* since the end of the Cold War and benefits from the declarations made by Russian presidents, foreign ministries, ambassadors and spokespersons on the subjects covered.

1.3. Organization of the Study

In order to answer the question of how the US war on terror has influenced China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the US with reference to constructivist theory, the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter One introduces the research question, discusses the relevance and aims of the study, and provides the theoretical underpinnings, approach, and methodology of the dissertation. In addition, it presents the general framework of the study.

Chapter Two focuses on Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization and its impact on formation of US foreign and security policy in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The chapter begins by providing a brief history of Al Qaeda and shows how the organization evolved into a transnational terrorist network that is independent in terms of decision making and self-sufficient in terms of financing its

cause. It describes Al Qaeda's transnational nature with reference to its political-religious claims, its networked organizational structure and its financial capacity. It underlines that Al Qaeda's adaptation to globalization, which is characterized by the use of information and communication technologies, facilitated its political, organizational, and financial transnationalization. The chapter concludes by arguing that counterterrorism strategy against transnational terrorist organizations requires a network of coalitions responding to challenges posed by the terrorist network.

Chapter Three provides an account of US national security and counterterrorism strategies designed under the Bush administration in the wake of the September 11 attacks. It gives a detailed account of the US's definition of the terrorist threat and its counterterrorism strategy. The Chapter focuses on two documents, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* in 2002 and *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in 2003 because they introduce the principles of what is known as the Bush Doctrine. It underlines that 'sovereign responsibility' as a central theme that shapes the US counterterrorism strategy and the US's determination to act unilaterally and preemptively to guarantee states fulfill their sovereign responsibilities. The chapter evaluates US primacy as the facilitator of the Bush doctrine and discusses the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars as practices of the US war on terror. It concludes by arguing that although both wars are the practices of the US war on terror, both had different impacts on the perception of the US's image as a unipole.

Chapter Four analyzes the impact of the US war on terror on China's security understanding looking at China's white papers on national security. It underlines that China's national security strategy has three major components: preserving China's national integrity; sustaining its economic development; and attaining a great power

status in international relations. As China considers the international security environment a major factor in shaping its success to achieve its objectives, the Chapter emphasizes China's willingness to shape international order based on a "thick" conceptualization of sovereignty. It argues that China has evaluated US security practices within the framework of the US war on terror in terms of the implications for China's vision of international relations and its status. The Chapter concludes that although the war on Afghanistan has resulted in an improvement of US-China bilateral relations, the Iraq war has revived China's insecurities and increased its calls for multilateralism and multipolarity in international relations.

Chapter Five evaluates the impact of the US war on terror on Russia's security understanding looking at Russia's national security documents. It underlines that similar to China, Russia wants to preserve its political unity, restore its economic power and regain its great power status and it considers international security environment, thereby, US practices as the major determinants for achieving its goals. Contextualizing Russia's insecurities in relation to certain security practices of the US, the Chapter argues that despite temporary betterment of relations with the US, in the wake of the Iraq war, Russia's insecurities, defined in terms of its status in international relations, have increased and its calls for multilateralism and multipolarity as a structure that will guarantee its great power status and interests have intensified.

Chapter Six analyzes how arguments on balancing under unipolarity have evolved in the Realist literature. It starts with underlining that with the end of the Cold War, the debate on balancing against the US is grounded on two bedrock Realist theories: Waltz's balance of power and Walt's balance of threat theories. Later, it looks at the flow of the debate on unipolarity and balancing in the Realist

literature in the unipolar era and points out four stages: the denial of unipolarity with the predictions of multipolarity, the acceptance of unipolarity as a temporary condition and questioning its stability and durability, the ‘great puzzle’ and soft balancing as a middle ground approach between balance of power and balance of threat, and the recognition of unipolarity as a distinct structural configuration. The Chapter points out that the recognition of unipolarity as a defining feature of international structure in the Realist literature is a recent development. It concludes that the discussions on durability and stability of unipolarity have eventually relied on more balance of threat arguments than balance of power. More significantly, it highlights that since there is no balancing against the US, Realist scholars have started to revise their arguments, reconceptualizing balancing, and incorporating ‘social’ variables into their theories in order to sustain their arguments.

Chapter Seven aims to bring a constructivist analysis to balancing and unipolarity and discuss whether China and Russia will balance against the US. The Chapter begins with looking at Wendt’s conceptualization of structure and highlights that Wendtian constructivism recognizes two kinds of structures: macro- and micro-level structures. The Chapter underlines that balancing is a multiply realizable outcome under self-help structures that might be present at both macro and micro structures. Looking at Wendt’s analysis of logics of anarchy, the Chapter emphasizes that at the macro-structural level balancing is an outcome of distribution of ideas rather than distribution of capabilities. Later, the Chapter focuses on the construction process of self-help understanding at the micro-structural level and argues that the analysis of social construction processes of self-help provides a deeper understanding about states’ tendency to balance against threat. It can be surmised that balancing occurs (i) if states behave towards each other based on the role structures of rivalry

or enmity at the macro-structural level and (ii) if states perceive threat from one another at the micro-structural level. The Chapter proceeds with discussing the social structure of unipolarity at the macro-structural level.

Chapter Seven further argues that unipolarity exists in a Lockean social structure in which most of the states, especially China and Russia, act on the basis of rivalry. The Chapter maintains that under unipolarity rivalry can be defined in terms of having self-regarding conceptions of status among the leading powers; therefore, it concludes that it can be expected that China and Russia will engage in balancing strategies due to status-competition. At the micro-structural level, the Chapter focuses on how a self-regarding conceptualization of status has been produced and sustained with reference to the discussions provided in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. Therefore, looking at micro-structural dynamics, Chapter Seven states that if shared knowledge about micro-social structures between the US and China and Russia does not change, China and Russia will tend to engage balancing strategies against the US. Consequently, the Chapter concludes that as macro and micro structural social factors generating balancing tendencies merge, it is likely that China and Russia will engage in balancing behavior against the US.

Chapter Eight provides an overall summary of the conclusions drawn from the dissertation. It concludes by stating that balancing is not a natural and inevitable outcome of distribution of power in the system. As argued in Chapter Seven, it is balancing an outcome of self-regarding and competitive social structures produced at macro and micro levels. As it is the practices that produces and reproduces structures, the dissertation argues that under unipolarity, the US is capable of shaping social structures in a direction that it wants especially at micro-structural level. Therefore, the dissertation concludes by emphasizing that the US may escape from

creating a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' by changing its self-regarding conception of security and unilateral security practices.

CHAPTER II

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: AL QAEDA

2.1. Introduction

Terrorist movements appear within a political context and aim to change the political status quo in favor of their allegedly just political causes. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda, defined as the first example of transnational terrorist organizations³⁷, aimed to challenge to the US-led international political and economic order especially considering the impact of the US policies in the Middle East. As Walt stated the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon caused “the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy” and made a “global war on terror” the most significant item of the US security agenda.³⁸ This chapter aims to discuss the components of Al Qaeda’s power toward providing a basis for evaluating the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy until 2008. The chapter begins with a brief analysis of how Al Qaeda transformed itself from an international to transnational terrorist organization. Later, it describes Al Qaeda’s transnational nature with reference to its political-religious claims, its networked organizational structure and its financial capacity. It underlines that Al Qaeda’s

³⁷ David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History* 100, no. 650 (2001): 419.

³⁸ Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001): 56.

adaptation to exploit information and communication technologies for political, organizational, and financial purposes have facilitated its transnationalization. The chapter concludes by arguing that counterterrorism strategy against transnational terrorism requires a network of coalitions responding to challenges posed by the terrorist network.

2.2. Evolution of Al Qaeda

Transnational terrorism is regarded as the latest wave or generation of terrorism.³⁹ The most distinctive characteristics of transnational terrorist organizations, when compared to the former waves of terrorist organizations, are their independence and self-sufficiency. Transnational terrorist organizations are independent because they are able to make decisions independently without being ordered by a sponsor-state. They are self-sufficient because they are able to raise their own resources without sponsor-states that provide sanctuary, money, weapons etc. As suggested by the generational approach to terrorism, transnational terrorist organizations develop self-sufficiency and independence by accumulating resources and learning from the experiences of their predecessors.⁴⁰ As the first major representative of generation of transnational terrorist organization, Al Qaeda is

³⁹ These waves are defined as the anarchist wave of the 1890s, the anti-colonial wave of the period after World War II, the leftist wave of the 1970s, and the religious wave of today. Peter Mascini, "Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 4 (2006): 343-357; Richard M. Pearlstein, *Fatal Future?: Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder*, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 3; Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," 419.

⁴⁰ Pearlstein, *Fatal Future?: Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder*, 3; Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," 419.

considered to be a model for transformation of terrorist organizations from an international to a transnational terrorist organization.⁴¹

International terrorist organizations carry out terrorist actions so that they can cause ramifications by transcending national boundaries through using perpetrators from different nationalities, attacking locations in other states, or victimizing people from different nationalities.⁴² Although the ramifications of international terrorist organizations' actions aim to transcend the borders of the state they actually target, the political objectives of international terrorist organizations are usually domestic. In another words, international organizations use their international capacity to achieve domestic political goals. The purpose in internationalizing their terror is to get more public support and create more publicity for their political cause such as establishing a new state. Unlike transnational terrorist organizations, international terrorist organizations are highly dependent upon sponsor-states. They are not self sufficient in terms of capabilities and are not independent in terms of decision making and political agenda setting as transnational terrorist organizations are.

In its initial phases, Al Qaeda also was not a self-sufficient and an independent organization. It gained these features gradually by exploiting

⁴¹ Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1999): 145-148. John Richard Thackrah, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence* (London, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 27-33. Brian M. Jenkins, "Defense against Terrorism," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 5 (1986): 776. Wayman C. Mullins, *A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses*, 2nd ed. (Springfield, Ill., U.S.A.: C.C. Thomas, 1997), 35. Nand Kishore and Indian Council of Social Science Research., *International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict: A Study of Strategy and Tactics*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1989), 49-129. Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?*, ICT Papers (Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1998). Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 74.

⁴² Enders and Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," 145-148. Thackrah, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27-33. Jenkins, "Defense against Terrorism," 776. Mullins, *A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses*, 35. Kishore and Indian Council of Social Science Research., *International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict: A Study of Strategy and Tactics*, 49-129. Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?* Jenkins, "International Terrorism," 74.

opportunities provided by superpower and regional rivalry over Afghanistan during the Cold War era. To begin with, it was the US that preferred to get involved in the region by proxy means such as supporting dissident groups like the *mujahedeen* under the pressure of a nuclear war to counter the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan.⁴³ In addition to the U.S. which aimed to counter the U.S.S.R. in the context of the Cold War, Pakistan supported extreme religious dissidents considering its own power position in the context of regional rivalry in Southeast Asia. As Ahmed stated, Pakistan's objectives in supporting the *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan were to counter Afghan claims on Pakistan's Pashtun majority areas, to gain access to oil and gas recourses of Central Asia via Afghan territory, to undermine Iran's influence on Southwest and Central Asia, to gain strategic depth against India, and to recruit Afghan religious extremists as well as Taliban-trained Kashmiri and Pakistani militants for the insurgency in Kashmir.⁴⁴

Sharing a common goal and pursuing their global and regional interests, the U.S. and Pakistan granted financial, military and political support to the *mujahedeen* who also received training in the camps at Pakistan. It was also stated that during this period, the CIA recruited thousands of religious extremists from the Middle East and North Africa including Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.⁴⁵ Moreover, in order to provide economic support, the *mujahedeen's* production and sale of opium to finance their *jihad* against the Soviets was tolerated. In line with their supporters' expectations, the *mujahedeen*, one of which was Usama bin Laden, played a significant role in bringing about the Soviets' withdrawal from

⁴³ Donna M. Schlagheck, "The Superpowers, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism," in *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York, NY: St. Martin's, 1990), 170.

⁴⁴ Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia - September 11 and Beyond," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001): 86.

⁴⁵ Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia - September 11 and Beyond," 81.

Afghanistan in 1989. After this long war, a period of power struggle in Afghanistan ended in favor of Talibans.

In 1989, the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan was a victory for the US. However, the US was not the only beneficiary of the superpowers' proxy war over Afghanistan. In 2001, it became clear that the *mujahedeen* also benefitted much from the global rivalry and security competition. They gained state of the art weapons, millions of dollars and invaluable training and operational experience. In addition to these direct benefits, the *mujahedeen* group established the core cadre of Al Qaeda and laid the foundation of its international network, gathering recruits from different nationalities. Most importantly, Al Qaeda established its sanctuary in Afghanistan, where they were able to their organizational capabilities. Having Afghanistan as a sanctuary, it became easier for Al Qaeda to make extensive trainings and planning, to collect financial support, to recruit new members and make propaganda.⁴⁶ Afghanistan became the base where Al Qaeda had the opportunity to multiply its strength, establish its web of organizations and consolidate its political ideology.⁴⁷ In Hoffman's words, serving as a safe haven, Afghanistan functioned as a force multiplier.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Angel Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 2 vols. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006), 62.

⁴⁷ Having consolidated its power militarily, financially, organizationally and politically around a core cadre, transnational terrorist organizations also become able to exploit other permissive conditions that emerge due to the lack of capability or political will and authority within states. Democratic regimes and states that are incapable of using their sovereign rights over their territory are also among the permissive domestic operating grounds for terrorism. Daniel Byman, "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism," *Survival* 47, no. 4 (Winter 2005-06): 118. Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 2 (2005): 278. Enders and Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," 145-167. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates," *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2002): 145-165. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 1 (1998): 155-164. Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 3 (1993): 317-329.

⁴⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 15.

This section briefly discussed how Al Qaeda exploited international conditions and found itself a sanctuary to excel its organizational capacity. The following section will look at components of Al Qaeda power, which turned it into a self-sufficient and independent terrorist organization with a transnational character. This section will focus on Al Qaeda's transnational political cause that attracted its human capital, globally networked organizational structure that connected international sympathizers, recruits and supporters and transnational financial network that provided weapons for the attacks. The last but not least, this section will discuss how Al Qaeda's capacity to adapt to globalization characterized with the effective use of information and communication technologies played a crucial factor in facilitating Al Qaeda's political, economic and propaganda processes.⁴⁹

2.3. Transnational Political Cause

Making a political claim is existential for terrorist organizations because terrorists gather their operatives, sympathizers, supporters and audience using attractive political promises. The political cause underlying these promises provides a reason for existence, a means to explain the past, to rationalize the present, and to elucidate the future.⁵⁰ Since ancient times, terrorists claimed that they opposed a repressor authority and asked for justice.⁵¹ Mostly, their opponents were

⁴⁹ Fiona B. Adamson, "International Terrorism, Nonstate Actors, and Transnational Political Mobilization," in *International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Social Science Research Council (US), (Contemporary Security Studies) (London, New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁵⁰ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 9.

⁵¹ Sedgwick states that in their earlier stages, all radical ideologies, anyhow, shares commonalities. Almost all radical ideologies, irrespective of what they stand *for*, have opposition *against* three main things. These are apathy (which might be defined as a failure to support the radical group in question), the existing regime, and collaborating elite, usually the bourgeoisie. Mark Sedgwick, "Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 2 (2007): 100. Cindy C. Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 22. Walter Laqueur, "The Futility of Terrorism," in *International Terrorism: Characteristics,*

governments of the same nationality and their political cause only appealed to their own nationals. These terrorist organizations were defined as domestic terrorist organizations in terms of their political claims.

However, terrorist organizations that have political claims appealing for people from different nationalities are transnational in character. Terrorism experts observed that terrorist organizations with radicalized religious and political claims tend to attract larger operatives, sympathizers, supporters and audience in the 21st century terror.⁵² Religions such as Islam and Christianity are transnational. Believers of a religion may live in different states as majorities or minorities. Radicalized claims of terrorists may attract people of the same faith who live within different nation states. Also, radicalized religious and political ideologies provide terrorist groups a new identity and replace their former allegiances. Religious-political ideology serves terrorists as 'software' to rationalize the sacrifices they make by promises of rewards in afterlife.⁵³ In addition, radicalizing their political cause with religion, terrorists close the possibility of negotiation with their adversaries as they tend to perceive the world as 'us vs. them'. Moreover, as a function of the absolute worldview of friend and enemy, victims are not regarded as innocents but blasphemous people, and attacking them becomes a justifiable act. In short, as Kimball states, making religious claims justify the end, enable the holy war, make sure blind obedience, provide absolute truth claims and promise ideal times to rationalize terrorism.⁵⁴

Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York, NY: St. Martin's, 1990), 69-73. Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 32.

⁵² Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," 419. Pearlstein, *Fatal Future?: Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder*, 3.

⁵³ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, xvi.

⁵⁴ Charles Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil*, 1st ed. (San Francisco, Calif.: HarperSanFrancisco, 2002), 46. cited in Amritha Venkatraman, "Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 3 (2007): 231.

Fundamentalists all over the world act and perceive themselves to be ‘true’ believers and practitioners their belief.⁵⁵ Therefore, Islamic fundamentalists, who narrowed Islam down to a political ideology that combine religion with politics, do not use Islam to legitimize their political actions.⁵⁶ On the contrary, like all fundamentalists, they perceive themselves to be ‘true’ believers and practitioners of Islam. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalist see no contradiction between their conviction and political actions, on the contrary, they accuse their co-religionists of apostasy, infidelity and treachery.⁵⁷ The truth claims of religious terrorists allow them to use “religious structures and doctrines almost like weapons” for their political movements.⁵⁸ As a result of these staunch religious convictions, religious fundamentalists tend to see themselves as God’s agents on Earth.

Al Qaeda’s political ideology was shaped by the ideologues whose Islamic ideas were regarded as representing ‘true Islam’. Hassan pointed out that in every statement, Al Qaeda cited verses from the Qur’an, quoted from the Prophet’s traditions and provided opinions of classical Muslim scholars in order to make it clear that it was striving for Islam and its ideas represented true Islam.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Al Qaeda continuously used *fatwa* (religious rulings) of various Muslim scholars without showing any hesitation to phrase its opinion as if *fatwa* for the Muslim *umma*. Ideas such as: “armed *jihad* is the only means to change the current fate of the Muslims, Muslims should be in constant war against non-Muslims until they obtain glory for Islam, Muslims are obligated to reestablish the Caliphate, killing oneself is

⁵⁵ Pearlstein, *Fatal Future?: Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder*, 44.

⁵⁶ Pearlstein, *Fatal Future?: Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder*, 44.

⁵⁷ Christina Hellmich and Amanda J. Redig, "The Question Is When: The Ideology of Al Qaeda and the Reality of Bioterrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 5 (2007): 378.

⁵⁸ Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil*, 41-32-70. cited in Venkatraman, "Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations," 231.

⁵⁹ Muhammad H. Hassan, "Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist Ideology," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 6 (2006): 563.

not suicidal but an act of martyrdom and the ultimate way is to sacrifice for the religion, and that Allah the Great will not neglect one who strives for the glory of His religion” were presented in the cloth of *fatwas* or they were presented to the global *umma* as *ijtihad* of classical Muslim scholars.⁶⁰

Ideologues who became influential in defining and justifying political cause were Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Abd Al-Salam Faraj, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Usama bin Laden.⁶¹ To begin with, Ibn Taymiyya was considered as the one who laid the foundations for the extremist fundamentalism in the twentieth century.⁶² In 1996, when Usama bin Laden declared war against America, he referred to Ibn Taymiyya by saying that

The right answer is to follow what have been [sic] decided by the people of knowledge, as was said by Ibn Taymiyya (Allah's mercy upon him): people of Islam should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main ‘Kufr’ who is controlling the countries of the Islamic world, even to bear the lesser damage to get rid of the major one, that is the great Kufr.⁶³

Taymiyya’s thoughts about state and religion reflect Al Qaeda’s ideal type of government to be established in the world. According to this, the only proper government was one that was ruled by the *Shari’ah*. A ruler (or individual) who did

⁶⁰ Hassan, "Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist Ideology," 563.

⁶¹ “Usama Bin Laden and other Islamist terrorist leaders draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within one stream of Islam (a minority tradition), from at least Ibn Taymiyya, through the founders of Wahhabis, through the Muslim Brotherhood, to Sayyid Qutb. That stream is motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion, thus distorting both . . . It is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground—not even respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.” "The 9/11 Commission Report," (Washington, D.C.: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁶² Michael Doran, "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 178.

⁶³ Bin Laden argues that: The right answer is to follow what have been [sic] decided by the people of knowledge, as was said by Ibn Taymiyya (Allah's mercy upon him): “people of Islam should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main ‘Kufr’ who is controlling the countries of the Islamic world, even to bear the lesser damage to get rid of the major one, that is the great Kufr.” Usama bin Laden, "Bin Laden's Fatwa: Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," *PBS NewsHour* (August, 1996). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed 02/01/2012).

not apply (or live by) the *Shari'ah* was in fact an infidel, apostate, or kafir.⁶⁴ He also suggested that *jihad* was as crucial as the 'five pillars' of Islam and that the defense of the *umma* against apostates was an individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims.⁶⁵ Benjamin and Simon argued that by suggesting that *jihad* was no longer a collective duty, but rather an individual duty, Ibn Taymiyya provided a useful recruiting device for many radical Islamic groups.⁶⁶ Also, Taymiyya's emphasis on raising the spiritual value of *jihad* to the level of the five pillars contributed to terrorists' beliefs that their battle was for the sake of Allah.

Qutb translated the logic of Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts regarding apostasy into a comprehensive perspective on the problems of the Islamic states in contemporary world during the 1960s.⁶⁷ He provided the underpinnings of violent resistance to existing regimes, which were defined as regimes claiming to be Muslim but whose practice of Islamic rule was imperfect. He stated that the world was in the state of sin, ignorance and moral darkness as it was before the Prophet Muhammad's arrival in the *jahilliya* age. Qutb called for the creation of a violent revolutionary vanguard to wage *jihad* and restore Islam, to end egoism, exploitation of man by man, petty class hierarchies and other alleged ills of liberal democracy.⁶⁸

Faraj's work, entitled *The Neglected Duty*, underlined two themes:⁶⁹ First, *jihad* or armed struggle against moderate Muslims, apostates, and infidels has been

⁶⁴ Elizabeth A. Barre, "The Shaykh of Islam: The Legacy of Ibn Taymiyya in 20th Century Political Islam," in *Florida State University Department of Religion Graduate Symposium* (Unpublished Paper, April 2005).

⁶⁵ Barre, "The Shaykh of Islam: The Legacy of Ibn Taymiyya in 20th Century Political Islam."

⁶⁶ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003), 48.

⁶⁷ Doran, "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics," 180. See also Venkatraman, "Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations," 240. Benjamin and Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America*, 42-59.

⁶⁸ Interestingly, these thoughts are parallel with the arguments of socialism. For this reason some state that this is "Leninism in Islamist dress." Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 11.

⁶⁹ Pearlstein, *Fatal Future?: Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder*, 49-55.

neglected by the ulama (leading Muslim scholars) and Muslims. Second, a united Islamic world ruled by *Shari'ah* must be established, which has been a neglected duty by the Muslims. He called all Muslims for the establishment of the rule of Allah on this Earth and if this obligation could not be fulfilled without war, he said, then war was an obligation. Before achieving this goal, he regarded the purification and revitalization of existing Muslim societies as the primary goal because any weakness in war would harm the primary goal. Therefore, apostates and infidels were the initial targets before waging *jihad* on external infidels. According to Faraj, any strategies and tactics that were suitable for the fewest losses and easiest means possible were permitted. The killings of children of the enemies were allowed if needed and justifiable for the act. He promised an eventual victory to Muslims regardless of the size and strength of their opponents.

Al Qaeda's leader Usama bin Laden and his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed their political objectives in line with global *jihad* and targets in clear terms as to overthrow Arab rulers that did not adhere to the Islamic *Shari'ah* rules and in the meantime as to attack targets of the Jewish-Crusader alliance who were supported by the corrupt internal system.⁷⁰ Thus, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri postulated a simultaneous *jihad* against internal and external enemies. The external target of Al Qaeda was America and its allies. Internal targets were all Muslim governments that did not follow al-Qaeda's path of Islam. They targeted the US because if they succeed, the defeat of the internal 'apostates' regimes would be easier if 'crusaders and Zionists' did not support them. They suggested guerilla warfare and other 'asymmetric' ways of struggle as appropriate strategies because these strategies

⁷⁰ Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 4 (2005): 276-277. Hellmich and Redig, "The Question Is When: The Ideology of Al Qaeda and the Reality of Bioterrorism," 382.

were able to defeat even the largest and most sophisticated armed forces, as it was proved in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in Vietnam against the U.S armed forces.⁷¹ Similar to aforementioned ideologists, Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri also believed that they would eventually succeed in transforming the world in line of their fundamentalist vision because Allah was on their side.⁷²

In the 1998 fatwa, Usama bin Laden openly declared that it was the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans (including civilians) and US allies, and plunder their money whenever and wherever there was an opportunity on the basis of three reasons.⁷³ First, bin Laden claimed that the United States has been “occupying the holiest places of the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples”.⁷⁴ Second, referring to the First Gulf War, he stated that the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’ was the responsible for the devastated situation of the Iraqi people and blamed the alliance of the desire to further massacre Iraqi people with the prolonged blockade imposed after the war. Third, he claimed the United States aimed to serve “Jews’ petty state and diverted attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there.” Laden claimed that the alliance’s eagerness to destroy Iraq and its endeavor to

⁷¹ Hoffman states that under the caption of “Guerilla Warfare is the Most Powerful Weapon Muslims have, and it is The Best Method to Continue Conflict with the Crusader Enemy,” terrorists read and distribute history lessons to rally jihadist for renewed battle. “With guerilla warfare,” the statement explained, the Americans were defeated in Vietnam and the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan. This is the method that expelled the direct Crusader colonialism from most of the Muslim lands, with Algeria the most well known. We still see how this method stopped Jewish immigration to Palestine, and caused reverse immigration of Jews from Palestine. The successful attempts of dealing defeat to invaders using guerilla warfare were many, and we will not expound on them. However, these attempts have proven that the most effective method for the materially weak against the strong is guerrilla warfare.” Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27, no. 6 (2004): 555. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 13.

⁷² Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response,” *Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper* no. 84 (October 2005): 13-14.

⁷³ Usama bin Laden, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa: Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”.

⁷⁴ Usama bin Laden, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa: Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”.

fragment all the states of the region such Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into fragmented and weak statelets proved the “alliance’s” desire to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Arab Peninsula.

Al Qaeda not only held the United States responsible for economic, political and military backwardness but also social and moral corruption of Muslim societies. Thus, he defined the United States as ‘the Great Satan’ who was the major obstacle against the foundation of a new world in accordance with Allah’s order.⁷⁵ Al Qaeda specifically considered the dissemination of secularization, consumerism, democratization, the growth of market economy and Westernization as offensive to the basis of Islamic society.⁷⁶ Al Qaeda criticized the United States as an imperialist, assimilator, hegemonic, arrogant and corrupt power due to its overwhelming role as the purveyor of Western culture and values.⁷⁷ The attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon were symbolic in the sense that they represented the liberal economic and political system backed by the American military power.⁷⁸ In his statement referring to the September 11 attacks, Laden stated that the United States was attacked because of its crimes committed against Muslims, the American occupation of Islam’s holiest places, devastation of Iraq, and its support of the Jewish state.⁷⁹ He claimed that the attacks were defensive since Muslims have been exploited,

⁷⁵ Usama bin Laden, "Bin Laden's Fatwa: Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places".

⁷⁶ Audrey K. Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2002): 45; Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁷⁷ Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," 45; Ian O. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 97-102.

⁷⁸ Sibel Özbudun, "Modern Dünyadaki Cadı Avı," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 17; M. V. Rasmussen, "A Parallel Globalization of Terror": 9-11, Security and Globalization," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 3 (2002): 338; Immanuel Wallerstein, "11 Eylül 2001, Niçin?," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 268.

⁷⁹ Ivan Leudar, Victoria Marsland, and Jiří Nekvapil, "On Membership Categorization: 'Us', 'Them' and 'Doing Violence' in Political Discourse," *Discourse & Society* 15, no. 2-3 (2004): 258-262.

oppressed and victimized over the years; therefore, the U.S. deserved to be attacked as the leader and the major backer of the morally corrupt international system.

The leader of Al Qaeda thus contextualized local and regional conflicts as part of a global *jihad* and depicted the world in terms of a stark and ultimately irreconcilable dichotomy between the Muslims and the U.S and its foreign and domestic allies.⁸⁰ In October 2001, bin Laden stated that “these events [September 11 attacks] have divided the whole world into two sides: the side of the believers and the side of infidels.”⁸¹ Again, he called every Muslim to rush to make his religion victorious. It was also made clear that the global *jihad* was waged against the enemies of Islam, both internal and external, residing throughout the world. Therefore, the global *jihad* was not confined to a defined territory. Rather, wherever the enemies were present that was defined as the theater of fundamentalists’ war. And, it was duty of the every Muslim to attack and harm their enemies whenever and wherever possible by all means. Thereby, global *jihad* was transnationalized, calling for allies and recruits beyond borders.

To sum up, a political cause is crucial for terrorist organizations because combining its political cause with religion provides terrorist organizations with transnational human resources, which reflects in recruitment, sponsorship and operational capabilities of the terrorist organization. Al Qaeda’s radical political ideology and its political aims served as its grand strategy that it appealed to like-minded individuals and organizations so that they could establish the rule of Allah on

⁸⁰ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 8-10.

⁸¹ Walid Phares and Robert G. Rabil, "The Neglected Duty: Terrorism's Justification," *National Interest* (May 5, 2004). <http://nationalinterest.org/node/2649> (accessed 02/01/2012).

Earth. In line with its strategy, Al Qaeda's political religious claims served to be 'the base', as its name suggested, for the global *jihadist* movement.⁸²

2.4. Transnational Organizational Structure

Having an attractive political-religious ideology is not enough to bring operational effectiveness. Therefore, organizational structure is as important as the attraction of political-religious causes. Differently from the previous generations of terrorist organizations, transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda do not have hierarchical structures. They have loosely connected, non-hierarchical, and flexible structures.⁸³ They are adaptive to changes and are able to capitalize on the talents of all members of the organization.⁸⁴ Instead of one man leadership commanding from defined headquarters, transnational terrorist organizations are decentralized.⁸⁵ Combined with an overarching ideology, transnational terrorist organizations are the sum of loosely connected and geographically dispersed networks. These dispersed groups communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in the interconnected manner without a precise central command and control.⁸⁶

Flexibility of structuring has important implications for transnational terrorist organizations. To begin with, survival is the guiding principle for all terrorist organizations and it highly depends on maintaining secret membership and

⁸² Wilkinson, "International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response," 13. Yassin Musharbash, "The Future of Terrorism: What Al-Qaida Really Wants," *Spiegel Online International* (August 12, 2005). <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,369448,00.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁸³ John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 49.

⁸⁴ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, 49.

⁸⁵ Chris Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 3 (2005): 237-252. Brian Jenkins, "The New Age of Terrorism" in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. David G. Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 122-124.

⁸⁶ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, 51.

operational security.⁸⁷ Loosely connected terrorist organizations have less risk of infiltration. Organizational damage is expected to be lesser than hierarchically organized groups in case of betrayal.⁸⁸ Second, since transnational terrorist organizations lack a central authority, smaller groups are also empowered in deciding to hold an attack. With more power left to their discretion, smaller units may undertake deadly attacks to prove themselves. Third, networked terrorist organizations can easily defeat geographical obstacles for operation because such organizations are able to work within an alliance system due to shared ideology, beliefs and political cause. Fourth, in the absence of a hierarchic command structure, younger recruits are motivated by showing their individual talents and creativity in order to prove their commitment to the cause.⁸⁹ Fifth, each unit is able to gather support and financial help, which would contribute to overall capability of the terrorist network. Finally, due to the flow of information within the terrorist network, terrorists learn from each other and adapt to new conditions. Thereby, transnational terrorism has become deadlier and more widespread over the years.

Al Qaeda's organizational structure has been a contested issue. Some experts argue that Al Qaeda has never been a hierarchical organization with monolithic leadership and central control while some others claimed that the organization had clear-cut structure, hierarchy, and command and control mechanisms.⁹⁰ Despite the differences of opinion on its organizational structure, it has been widely accepted that the organization acted in a rational manner weighing ends and means like other political units and it considered alternative organizational approaches that are best for

⁸⁷ Brian M. Jenkins and Rand Corporation., *Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 3.

⁸⁸ Jenkins, "The New Age of Terrorism " 123.

⁸⁹ Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects."

⁹⁰ Wilkinson, "International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response," 13. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 27.

its survival.⁹¹ Therefore, even though the organization had a hierarchic organizational structure initially, as Rabasa argued, in the end, with a strategic choice, it preferred to become a networked organization to benefit from abovementioned advantages before September 11.⁹²

Cruickshank and Hage argued that the idea of transforming Al Qaeda from a vulnerable hierarchical organization to a resilient decentralized movement predated the 9/11 attacks.⁹³ According to their research, the architect of Al Qaeda's post 9/11 organizational strategy was Abu Musab al Suri, whose real name was Mustafa Setmariam Nasar. The authors maintained that the 'new Al Qaeda' or 'Al Qaeda 2.0' or 'Al Qaeda the movement' was not only a spontaneous evolution but also an intelligent project. Cruickshank and Hage said that Setmariam's most important strategic concept was "individual terrorism" which, as he argued, needed to replace hierarchical terrorism.⁹⁴ In Setmariam's view, individual terrorism was attractive for young Muslims, who did not want to participate in secret and hierarchical organizations. He suggested new recruits to form their own brigades without exceeding ten members and to work directly with their own brigades. He encouraged the recruits to make "wonderful individual initiatives" and claim responsibility for terrorist actions including those that they did not do, so that new recruits could be attracted and integrated to the global *jihad*.⁹⁵ The authors argued that both Laden and al-Zawahiri acted in line with these suggestions and that eventually Al Qaeda turned into a decentralized and networked organization, which vastly encouraged 'individual initiative'.

⁹¹ Doran, "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics," 177-190.

⁹² Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 23-25.

⁹³ Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 1 (2007): 1-14.

⁹⁴ Cruickshank and Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda," 1-14.

⁹⁵ Cruickshank and Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda," 1-14.

Dishman, on the other hand, argued that Al Qaeda did not choose but was pushed to become networked and dispersed organization due to severe counterterrorism measures against the organization in the post-September 11 environment. He argued that the organization was harmed especially after Operation Enduring Freedom and the battle of Tora Bora.⁹⁶ Although Al Qaeda was still capable of undertaking attacks in Afghanistan, the US military presence in Afghanistan severely harmed the organization's hierarchical structure by killing its core members and professional operatives in Afghanistan after September 11.⁹⁷ The most significant step that struck the organization's hierarchical structure, if there were any, was the killing of Usama bin Laden in 2011. However, it was even before the killing of Laden that experts stated that communication links between Al Qaeda's central committee and its operatives were disrupted, bin Laden's direct control and influence over the operations were severely decreased.⁹⁸ Therefore, before his death, Usama bin Laden was considered more as an "inspirational leader" who encouraged his followers to conduct attacks rather than an 'acting leader' who directly provided funding, gave orders, or planned operations.⁹⁹ Hoffmann argued that Al Qaeda became more an idea than an organization since 9/11.¹⁰⁰ He noted that as a less tangible transnational movement, it might be more convenient to call Laden's Al Qaeda as a 'base' or foundation because it inspired many smaller terrorist groups.

Experts argued that inspired and glued by Al Qaeda's ideology, a global network emerged and it was composed of cells and affiliates in over 60 countries

⁹⁶ Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," 244.

⁹⁷ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 30. See also most wanted terrorists list on official web site of the Federal Bureau of Investigation http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists.

⁹⁸ Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," 244.

⁹⁹ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, 1st ed. (New York: Ecco, 2003), 148-165. cited in Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," 243.

¹⁰⁰ Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," 552.

from four continents.¹⁰¹ Al Qaeda with its worldwide web of affiliates and cells became the most dispersed leaderless terrorist organization of history. This network has been described as ‘a global *jihadist* ‘nebula’ which holds together its affiliates by bonds of varying degrees of intensity, and collectively seeks to harm the U.S., the West and apostate governments in the Muslim world’.¹⁰² For instance, Egyptian Islamic *Jihad*, the Afghan Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and Saudi Islamic extremists were listed among the organizations that openly allied themselves with Al Qaeda.¹⁰³ Hoffmann argued that Al Qaeda’s success in networking depended on its success in exploiting local causes and realigning its parochial interests with its transnational, pan-Islamist ideology.¹⁰⁴

Owing to its transnational network structure, Al Qaeda became more capable of conducting global *jihad* both internally and externally at one time. Using local operatives, the organization could reach a wider audience, supporters and most importantly to new recruits from all around the world. States like France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom also had a small but determined presence of Al Qaeda.¹⁰⁵ In a study from 1993 to 2004, it was concluded that 41 percent of terrorist operatives were from European and North American nationalities, and 35 of 375 (9 percent) operatives were converts to Islam out of 16 percent were U.S citizens, 10

¹⁰¹ Wilkinson, "International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response," 13. Paul Hastert, "Al Qaeda and Iran: Friends or Foes, or Somewhere in Between?," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 4 (2007): 329. Peter Bergen, "The Bin Laden Trial: What Did We Learn?," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 6 (2001): 429.

¹⁰² Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 77.

¹⁰³ Al- Itihaad al-Islami (Somalia), Dhamat Houmet dawa Salafia (Algeria), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (Pakistan/Kashmir), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e Muhammed (Pakistan/Kashmir), Laskar-e-Jhangvi (Pakistan), Laskar-e-Taliba (Pakistan/Kashmir) are among the some affiliate groups of Al Qaeda. See Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 79. Matthew A. Levitt, "The Role of Charities and NGOs in the Financing of Terrorist Activities," in *U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance*(2:30 p.m., August 1, 2002). http://banking.senate.gov/02_08hr/080102/levitt.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹⁰⁴ Hoffman, states that Al Qaeda’s interest to Iraq appears to be for the reason of exploiting local suffering and connecting these sufferings to the cause of global jihad. Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," 553-556.

¹⁰⁵ Wilkinson, "International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response," 13.

percent French and 6 percent were British.¹⁰⁶ This also showed that Al Qaeda eased its way of penetration into the United States and its allies using counter-profile operatives such as converts, women and Caucasian-looking people.¹⁰⁷ The high profile of European and North American operatives created vulnerability for the U.S. and its European allies because of no visa policy.¹⁰⁸

For instance, the perpetrators of the London bombings of 2005 were “self-starters” who had ideological affinity with the original Al Qaeda network but operated without institutionalized training or recruitment.¹⁰⁹ The perpetrators preferred global *umma* to their national identities and shared the sufferings of their ‘Muslim sisters and brothers’. They considered civilians in democratic countries justifiable targets since they shared responsibility for the acts of their governments. These four self-radicalized and self-activated men undertook the London attacks by means of the internet. In addition to connecting small cells and radical groups, Al Qaeda’s ideology encourages individuals participate in global *jihad* by committing suicide bombing for instance. As Pape argued, suicide bombing attacks were rational acts that were closely related to the political cause of an organization rather than

¹⁰⁶ Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 4 (2006): 508-511. Mascini, "Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?," 348.

¹⁰⁷ Leiken and Brooke, "The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration," 511. See for the arguments relating to the use of women in Jihad and critique of under/misrepresentations or the role of women in jihad in media and academic writings. David Cook, "Women Fighting in Jihad?," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 5 (2005): 375-384. Brigitte L. Nacos, "The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 5 (2005): 435-451. Katharina Von Knop, "The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 5 (2007): 397-414.

¹⁰⁸ Robert S. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2005): 120-135.

¹⁰⁹ Aidan Kirby, "The London Bombers as "Self-Starters": A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 5 (2007): 415-428. Scott also argues that new and vibrant Jihadist market is emerging, which is decentralized, self-organizing, and self-adjusting. The cells are often spontaneously formed and self mobilizing with few direct physical contacts to other cells. The radicalization that is realized by interaction with the Jihadist community is highly influenced by the use of the internet. Scott Atran, "A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, Wmds, and "Virtual Jihad")," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 292.

irrational individual self-destruction.¹¹⁰ In that sense, suicide-bombing attacks can be considered in the relation to the ideological network of Al Qaeda.¹¹¹

Thus, the dispersed networking of Al Qaeda's operatives within states at different regions constituted one of the most important tenets of Al Qaeda's description as a transnational terrorist organization. By means of this global network, the organization has become able to conduct deathly operations with minimum cost and defeat the disadvantage of geographical distance from its enemies. Its dispersed nature of the operatives reduced the organizational difficulties in recruiting and undertaking operations.

2.5. Transnational Financial of Network

Terrorist organizations' ability to act more efficiently and effectively is closely linked to their financial capabilities.¹¹² The bigger the financial resources that they have, the bigger terrorist operations they can conduct. As stated before, transnational terrorist organizations are self-sufficient as opposed to international terrorist organizations that rely on state-sponsors. Benefiting from the attraction of their political ideology and transnational organizational structure, they raise and use funds from different recourses pursuing diverse methods and rely on their own resources to survive, travel, communicate, obtain equipment, and conduct attacks.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 2.

¹¹¹ Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 2. Due to the strategic considerations, it has been stated that Al Qaeda also plans to recruit woman suicide bombers since they are hard to detect and have better chance than their male comrades. Von Knop, "The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women," 411.

¹¹² Matthew A. Levitt, "The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism," *MERIA Journal* 6, no. 4 (Dec., 2002): 1.

¹¹³ William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, *Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force*, Council on Foreign Relations: Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing., (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).

As opposed to the general belief that Usama bin Laden was the chief financier of the organization, Rabasa argued that Al Qaeda's financial power stemmed from money that was being raised at the grassroots level.¹¹⁴ The CIA has estimated that it cost Al Qaeda approximately \$30 million a year to sustain itself during the period preceding the September 11 attacks and it could rely only on Laden's support.¹¹⁵ If this considerable amount of money was collected from grassroots, then Al Qaeda must have a really powerful and organized financial network. Fundraising was considered as one of the most important sources that Al Qaeda exploited people for money. US sources argued that the network that helped with the financing of the *mujahedeen* extended to all corners of the world from the Persian Gulf States to Europe and even to the United States.¹¹⁶ Charities, nongovernmental organizations, mosques, websites, fundraisers, intermediaries, facilitators, banks, and other financial institutions were exploited for raising funds for Al Qaeda.¹¹⁷

Al Qaeda has used its religious identity for reaching the religious diaspora and calling the global *umma* for financial support. In addition to the contributions of wealthy supporters, small amounts of donations collected from individuals in charities make huge amount of money.¹¹⁸ While some people knowingly donate to

¹¹⁴ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 57.

¹¹⁵ Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," *Strategic Insights* 4, no. 1 (2005): 1. See, The 9/11 Commission Report. and John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille, "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing," *Staff Report to the Commission* (2004). http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹¹⁶ Wechsler and Wolosky, *Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force*, 7-9.

¹¹⁷ Shawn T. Flanigan, "Charity as Resistance: Connections between Charity, Contentious Politics, and Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 7 (2006): 641-655. Wechsler and Wolosky, *Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force*, 8. Atran, "A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, Wmds, and "Virtual Jihad")," 291.

¹¹⁸ Levitt states that a few wealthy individuals are able to sponsor much terror. For example, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hasnawi, the Saudi national and bin Laden money man, sent the September 11 hijackers operational funds and received at least \$15,000 in unspent funds before leaving the UAE for Pakistan on September 11. According to U.S. officials, Yasin al-Qadi, a prominent Jeddah businessman and the head of the Muwafaq Foundation, has supported a variety of terrorist groups from al-Qaeda to Hamas. According to U.S. court documents, in 1992 al-Qadi provided \$27,000 to U.S.-based Hamas leader

charity organizations linked to Al Qaeda, some consider that they support a humanitarian cause. As Comra stated there were more than 50 international and local charities related to funding the organization.¹¹⁹ Experts mentioned *Zakat* as a commonly exploited way of collecting money for the organization.¹²⁰ *Zakat* is a regular charitable donation as a part of religious obligation that asks all competent Muslims to give at least 3 percent of their income to the people in need. *Zakat* provides cash and is usually given to trusted organizations or community leaders to be distributed for the purpose. However, this widely unregulated, seldom audited and mostly undocumented transfer of money creates a financial resource that is open to exploitation.¹²¹

In addition to charities, seemingly legal activities in infrastructure, mining, banking and agricultural sectors were mentioned among Al Qaeda's economic activities.¹²² Illegal and criminal activities that Al Qaeda extensively benefited from were counted as the poppy and opium trade, drug-trafficking, gemstone smuggling especially diamond and gold, human smuggling, counterfeiting of American dollars, audiovisual material, perfumes, and brand clothing.¹²³ Nevertheless, the most

Muhammad Salah and lent \$820,000 to a Hamas front organization in Chicago, the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI). Levitt.

¹¹⁹ He maintains that many of these charities are, or were associated with some of the major Islamic umbrella organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, including, but certainly not limited to, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Benevolence International Foundation, the al Haramian Islamic Foundation, Blessed Relief (Muwafaq) Foundation, and the Rabita Trust. Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups," 1.

¹²⁰ Wechsler and Wolosky, *Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force*, 7. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 57. Mascini, "Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?," 349.

¹²¹ In bin Laden's own words: "We expect attacks that would target Afghanistan as a Muslim nation...and all Muslims should support it. Muslims and Muslim merchants in particular should give their *zakat* and their money in support of this state...where followers of Islam can embrace the Prophet of God." Interview, "World's Most Wanted Terrorist: An Interview with Usama Bin Laden " *ABC News Online* (January 2, 1999). <http://cryptome.org/jya/bin-laden-abc.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹²² Steve Kiser, "Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructure," *Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation* Pardee Rand Graduate School, (2005).

¹²³ Chris argues that the breakdown of hierarchical structures in illicit organizations is creating new opportunities for criminals and terrorists to collaborate because networked organizational structure has given criminals and terrorists greater independence to conduct common operations while escaping the

innovative method to raise funds came through the use of the internet. According to the *2003 National Money Laundering Strategy*, terrorists used the Internet “to direct solicitation for the organization itself; exploit charitable organizations by soliciting in that guise; perpetrate on-line crime, such as identity and credit card theft; to organize and implement other fund-raising activities.”¹²⁴ Known methods that Al Qaeda used for transferring the money included the global financing system, Islamic banking system and couriers who physically carry large amounts of cash, diamond, gold and other valuables.¹²⁵

One significant implication of the financial independence for terrorist networks is that financially independent small cells and affiliate groups become able to realize their own plans for the sake of global *jihad*. Also, it was argued that especially after the counterterrorism measures taken in the wake of the September 11 attacks, international transactions were targeted more than domestic transactions might have contributed to the increase in domestic financial activities due to the lesser risk.¹²⁶ Kiser called this tendency “localization of terror” because terrorist activities relied on more local groups and their resources since the September 11 attacks.¹²⁷ For instance, the 2004 Madrid attack was undertaken by the Spanish cell of Al Qaeda organization recruited from the local mosques and largely funded

leadership control and restriction. Forced to find their own funding resources, fraudulent documents, transportation and safe houses, terrorists and criminal actors are forced to act together. This collaboration sometimes may result in the emergence of hybrid organizations who engage in terror and crime. Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," 238-246. Kiser, "Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructure," 96-100. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 57-62. Mascini, "Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?," 349-351.

¹²⁴ Kiser, "Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructure," 56. Also; See, United States Dept. of the Treasury. and Dept. of Justice., "2003 National Money Laundering Strategy ". <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/js10102js1010.pdf> (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹²⁵ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 58.

¹²⁶ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 60.

¹²⁷ Kiser, "Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructure," 105.

through the sale of drugs.¹²⁸ Given that it is not easy to organize internationally orchestrated and spectacular attacks, some scholars argued that financially independent and local terrorist activities might be the new strategic trend for terrorists.¹²⁹

2.6. Transnational Information and Communication Network

Communication, coordination, and the conduct of terrorist campaign is the major difficulty in loosely connected and geographically dispersed networks. Coordinated and efficient operation of transnational terrorist organizations require a capacity for constant information and communication flows within the loosely connected and geographically dispersed units.¹³⁰ The need for constant information and communication flows is facilitated by the latest information and communication technologies such as World Wide Web sites, electronic mail, computer conferencing, mobile phones, digital cameras, web cameras, and fax machines and so on. Especially, increases in the speed of communication, dramatic reductions in the costs of the communication, expansion of bandwidth and integration of communication

¹²⁸ Some Islamic militants are deeply involved in drug trafficking. They see drug trafficking as another strategy to harm the enemy and raise money from their enemy's sufferings. By this way, they think that they harm their enemy twice since they use the money for organization of terrorist attacks. A terrorist's words reflect their position with regard to dual benefit from the crime: "We are making these drugs for Satan America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill them with drugs." According to one law enforcement officials investigating the Madrid bombings' stated that one of the suspect bombers justified drug trafficking if it was for Islam seeing it as a part of Jihad. Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," 247. Kiser, "Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructure," 106. Al Goodman, "Spain: Terror Cell 'Neutralized'," *CNN.com* (April 14, 2004). <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/14/spain.terror/index.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹²⁹ Javier Jordan, "Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 3 (2005): 169–191. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 60.

¹³⁰ John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, ed. Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 52.

with computing technologies have enabled transnational terrorist organizations to reach their highly dispersed constituents.¹³¹

Communication technologies have always been significant for terrorist organizations since terrorists' violent actions aim to communicate with a wider audience.¹³² In other words, terrorists make propaganda by deed and they need communication technologies to publicize their actions.¹³³ Researches on media and terrorism indicate that the media enables terrorists to reach a wider audience and magnify the enormity of terrorists' actions by creating an 'echo effect'.¹³⁴ It is maintained that the more terrorists' actions are dreadful and frightening, the more they secure coverage, the more terrorists are encouraged to undertake dramatic and destructively lethal actions so that they can achieve the same effect every time. However, the message that terrorists want to transfer via most media vehicles such as television channels, newspapers and weekly magazines have been mediated and filtered, so they looked for independent ways of communication with their audience.

The internet provided transnational terrorist organizations with unmediated and unfiltered opportunity not only for communicating with the outside world but also communication within the group members, thereby enabling coordination with their operatives and affiliates. As Tsfaty and Weimann have stated "the network of

¹³¹ Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism," 52.

¹³² Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: The Other World War," in *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York, NY: St. Martin's, 1990), 35. Jenkins, "International Terrorism," 73-78.

¹³³ Paul Wilkinson, "British Perspectives on Terrorism - Introduction," *Terrorism* 5, no. 1-2 (1981): 12. Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, 1st American ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 59. Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 387.

¹³⁴ Dissemination of the beheadings using the Internet and television networks is a strategy that terrorists use hoping that it would not only terrify the enemy but also enhance the terrorists' legitimacy in their own claimed constituencies. Pete Lentini and Muhammad Bakashmar, "Jihadist Beheading: A Convergence of Technology, Theology, and Teleology?," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 4 (2007): 305. Yariv Tsfaty and Gabriel Weimann, "www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25, no. 5 (2002): 317-332. Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," 320. Omer Yousif Elagab, *International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism* (London: Cavendish Pub., 1995), 4. Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," 13.

computer-mediated communication is ideal for terrorists-as communicators because it is decentralized, it cannot be subjected to control or restriction, it is not censored, and it allows access to anyone who wants it.”¹³⁵ Terrorists made use of the internet as a forum in which they could present their views, publications, communiqués and actions and justifications. As Hoffman stated, using the internet as a forum, terrorists were able to challenge states’ monopoly over the mass communication of terrorist message.¹³⁶

Transnational terrorist organizations’ creativity in benefiting from the internet also challenged state sovereignty. Hoffman pointed out that the internet provided terrorists with a virtual sanctuary by ‘providing an effective, expeditious and anonymous means through which the movement can continue to communicate with its fighters, followers, sympathizers and supporters world-wide.’¹³⁷ Similarly, Tsfat and Weimann supported the idea that internet became the virtual sanctuary and argued that the internet became the “virtual state” which terrorist organizations’ used for distributing their propaganda, communicating with ‘virtual *ummah*’¹³⁸, and even executing virtual attacks.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Tsfat and Weimann, "www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet," 317–332. See also report by Weimann the Internet is in many ways an ideal arena for activity by terrorist organizations. Most notably, it offers easy access; little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control; potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world; anonymity of communication; fast flow of information; inexpensive development and maintenance of a web presence; a multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video and to allow users to download films, songs, books, posters, and so forth); and the ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a source for stories. Gabriel Weimann, "www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet," (United States Institute of Peace: Special Report, March 2004). <http://www.usip.org/publications/wwwterrornet-how-modern-terrorism-uses-internet> (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹³⁶ Bruce Hoffman, "The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists," in *Testimony presented to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on May 4, 2006* (RAND Corporation, May 2006). http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf (accessed 02/01/2012).

¹³⁷ Hoffman. Timothy L. Thomas, "Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of 'Cyberplanning'," *Parameters* 33, no. 1 (2003): 121.

¹³⁸ Mascini, "Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?," 351.

¹³⁹ Tsfat and Weimann, "www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet," 318.

In this regard, it can be argued that the internet as a virtual sanctuary fulfilled the functions of an actual sanctuary for terrorist organizations. Actual sanctuaries provided terrorists with opportunities to command and control recruits, train and plan operations, and collect financial help within a defined geographic area.¹⁴⁰ Under virtual sanctuary of the internet, terrorists were able to undertake all of these activities on a global scale. Hofmann stated that formerly terrorists acquired the capabilities, such as training, access to weapons and operational knowledge, through training undertaken in camps run either by terrorist organizations and/or in concert with state sponsors. However, today the internet provide terrorists with the same opportunities that were provided by actual sanctuaries. In short, the internet became the new safe haven of terrorist networks.¹⁴¹

The importance of the internet presence has been so widely appreciated by terrorists that almost all terrorist organizations have their own websites.¹⁴² According to Weimann, the internet served eight different purposes: Psychological Warfare, Publicity and Propaganda, Data Mining, Fundraising, Recruitment and Mobilization, Networking, Sharing Information and Planning and Coordination.¹⁴³ Al Qaeda was considered as the terrorist organization that succeeded to use the internet with at most efficiency defined with reference to the purposes mentioned above.¹⁴⁴

By including media and publicity as one of the four operational committees under its consultative committee, known as the shura majlis, Al Qaeda's leadership

¹⁴⁰ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 62.

¹⁴¹ Hoffman.

¹⁴² Michele Zanini and Sean J.A. Edwards, "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age," in *Networks and Networks: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 43.

¹⁴³ Weimann.

¹⁴⁴ Hoffman.

showed that they grasped the importance of communication.¹⁴⁵ Rabasa mentioned the presence of around 4000 websites making propaganda for jihad and argued that the enormity of Al Qaeda's internet presence supported the idea that the internet was very crucial for the organization.¹⁴⁶ For instance, in these websites, Al Qaeda conducted psychological warfare by providing its audience with access to prerecorded videotapes, audiotapes, CD-ROMs, DVDs, photographs, and announcements. It made announcements of an impending attack on US targets, which aimed to create a widespread sense of insecurity among the audience within the U.S. and throughout the world. These websites constantly used the images of the destruction of the World Trade Center. In addition, the websites were exploited for providing publication that propagandized the purposes of Al Qaeda and justified its violent actions.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, the internet provided the terrorists a digital freely available information pool. Following the internet, terrorists were able to find out significant amount of information regarding their targets such as transportation facilities, nuclear power plants, public buildings, airports, and ports, and even about up to date counterterrorism measures.¹⁴⁸ They also received updated information about developing counterterrorism measures. Hoffmann stated that research on Al Qaeda affiliated websites exposed that *jihadist* chatters constantly monitored America,

¹⁴⁵ Other committees are military, finance and business, and fatwas and Islamic studies. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 29.

¹⁴⁶ Around 4000 websites exist in cyberspace making propaganda of global jihad. Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 18.

¹⁴⁷ Jenkins and Rand Corporation., *Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy*, 24. Weimann.

¹⁴⁸ Minji Daniels, "Online Islamic Organizations and Measuring Web Effectiveness," *Unpublished Master Thesis* Naval Post-Graduate School, (December 2004): 12. Weimann, states that one captured Al Qaeda computer contained engineering and structural features of a dam, which had been downloaded from the Internet and which would enable Al Qaeda engineers and planners to simulate catastrophic failures. In other captured computers, U.S. investigators found evidence that Al Qaeda operators spent time on sites that offer software and programming instructions for the digital switches that run power, water, transportation, and communications grids. Weimann.

studied and weighed reactions to intelligence gathered on them and adapted their own plans accordingly.¹⁴⁹ He cited the message, “If we know the importance of the information for the enemy, even if it is a small piece of information, then we can understand how important are the information that we know,” that appeared in a *jihadist* website to underline the importance of information for terrorists as well.¹⁵⁰

Search engines, e-mail distribution lists, and chat rooms and discussion groups are among the data collection tools that terrorists can benefit from. For instance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, speaking on January 15, 2003, stated that an Al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan told its readers that “using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.”¹⁵¹ Besides legal information collection methods, terrorists are capable of devising hacking stratagems, sabotaging networks, and developing codes and creating and spreading viruses thereby targeting and circumventing governmental websites.¹⁵²

As it was stated in the former section, Al Qaeda’s financial strength heavily depended on donations from foundations, charities, nongovernmental organizations, and other financial institutions that used websites and cyber chat rooms and forums. For instance, the US government froze the activities of three seemingly legal charity organizations operating within the borders of the United States, based on the evidence that they funneled their money to Al Qaeda.¹⁵³ In addition, the internet was used for establishing networks by finding and mobilizing recruits. Social capital is

¹⁴⁹ Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," 556.

¹⁵⁰ Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," 556.

¹⁵¹ Cited in Weimann.

¹⁵² The website operated by the Muslim Hackers Club (a group that U.S. security agencies believe aims to develop software tools with which to launch cyber attacks) has featured links to U.S. sites that purport to disclose sensitive information such as code names and radio frequencies used by the U.S. Secret Service. Weimann.

¹⁵³ Weimann.

the premium asset for terrorist organizations.¹⁵⁴ The more the terrorist organization has recruits, the more capable it is because as Jenkins states the quantity of terrorists translates into quality.¹⁵⁵ It was argued that for recruitment, Al Qaeda captured information about the users who browsed their websites and contacted those who seemed most interested in its cause or well suited to its operational purposes.¹⁵⁶ Online chat rooms and cyber-cafes, electronic bulletin boards and user nets (issue-specific chat rooms and bulletins) served as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits. In some cases, it was mentioned that potential terrorists contacted terrorist cells via the internet to be active members. The internet became also a place for sharing information and training the recruits. Using facilities in the internet, they searched for how to build chemical and explosive weapons, prepare homemade poisons, poisonous gases and other deadly materials.¹⁵⁷ By the use of internet, terrorists were able to share their violent 'software'¹⁵⁸ and 'know-how',¹⁵⁹ online instead of sharing them in actual camps and safe havens as it used to be.

The internet enabled terrorist organizations function as a loosely knit network defeating geographical restraints. The internet provided the opportunity for exchanging messages almost instantly, with the minimum cost and maximum accuracy. Using the internet, terrorist organizations were able to connect with not only their group members but also other groups.¹⁶⁰ Networked as such, terrorists were able to plan and coordinate their activities almost in real time. As findings

¹⁵⁴ Rebecca Goolsby, "Combating Terrorist Networks: An Evolutionary Approach," *Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory* 12, no. 1 (2006): 8.

¹⁵⁵ Philip B. Heymann, "Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001): 54. Jenkins and Rand Corporation., *Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy*, 4.

¹⁵⁶ Daniels, "Online Islamic Organizations and Measuring Web Effectiveness," 13.

¹⁵⁷ Weimann.

¹⁵⁸ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 8.

¹⁵⁹ Ian O. Lesser and others, *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), 96.

¹⁶⁰ Gabriel Weimann, "Virtual Disputes: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Debates," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 7 (2006): 623-639.

suggest, Al Qaeda managed the plan 9/11 attacks by means of encrypted messages that were posted in an area of a website protected by a password and by assuring anonymity using the internet in public places to send emails.¹⁶¹ For instance, the eighteen terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks read Mohammed Attar's simple message: "The semester begins in three more weeks. We have obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering."¹⁶² Consequently, Al Qaeda's adaptation to information and communication technologies facilitated transnationalization.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter discussed Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization. It argued that Al Qaeda's religious-political causes functioned as the base and attracted co-religious from international audience. It stated Al Qaeda's cause as ending the presence of the United States and its allies in the Muslim lands as it considered the US policies as the major source of economic, political, social problems of the Muslims. It also aimed to change the regimes in the Muslim world as they cooperated with the United States and wanted to establish a large *shariah* state as the solution. Al Qaeda's transnational political-religious claim attracted geographically dispersed group of people and created networks that shared the same ideal. The larger Al Qaeda's network became the larger financial resources it possessed. Therefore, it was able to organize massive terrorist attacks such as September 11. It was underlined that Al Qaeda's adaptation to the use of communication and

¹⁶¹ The 9/11 Commission Report.

¹⁶² Thomas, "Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of 'Cyberplanning'," 119. Weimann.

information technologies played the major role in its transnationalization. Briefly, the chapter defined Al Qaeda as a stateless, self-sufficient and independent organization which had capability to conduct operations internationally.

“Know your enemy” is one of the most accepted maxims in warfare as it enables one to produce the best counterstrategy against the enemy. Having defined the components of Al Qaeda’s power, the chapter concludes that countering Al Qaeda requires the use of a mixture of military, political, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial instruments.¹⁶³ As Al Qaeda is a transnational organization, these counterterrorism strategies should also be pursued at national and international levels. Therefore, international cooperation is crucial to fighting against Al Qaeda’s network.¹⁶⁴ Also, as Rabasa states “ideology is the center of gravity” of the global jihadist terror network; therefore, the major part of the strategy against the organization should focus on countering and discrediting terrorists’ political causes.¹⁶⁵ The second move against the organization should be to localize terrorist groups by breaking the links among the network,¹⁶⁶ which can be achieved by cooperating with the local governments or forcing them to deny physical or virtual sanctuary for terrorists. Also, a powerful strategy against Al Qaeda must focus on denying terrorists from seemingly legal and illegal sources of finance at national and international level. The last but not the least, as the organization adapted to the use of information and communication technologies, especially the internet, and facilitated its ideological, organizational and financial capacity, a counterterrorism strategy against the network also should find methods, albeit they will be limited, to control the flow of information, communication, propaganda and finance through these

¹⁶³ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 159. David Omand, "Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy," *Survival (London)* 47, no. 4 (2005): 109.

¹⁶⁴ Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy," 65.

¹⁶⁵ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 161.

¹⁶⁶ Rabasa, *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 161.

means. In conclusion, countering the Al Qaeda network requires multi-national and multi-layered approach.

CHAPTER III

US COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

3.1. Introduction

Before the September 11 attacks took place, national security priorities of the Bush administration were defined to ensure America's military preeminence, to promote liberal economic and political order, to renew international relationships with allies and friends to share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity and freedom, to focus on relationships with big powers, particularly Russia and China, and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes supporting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction.¹⁶⁷ However, after the September 11 attacks, "business-as-usual approach" to foreign policy vanished and war on terror started to dominate US foreign policy agenda.¹⁶⁸ Counterterrorism became the prism through which the Bush administration saw international relations. This chapter aims to give a detailed account of two US national strategy documents that subsequently provided US definition of the terrorist threat and counterterrorism strategy. These documents are the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* in 2002¹⁶⁹ and

¹⁶⁷ Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (2000): 45-47.

¹⁶⁸ Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy," 56.

¹⁶⁹ President George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002) (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002).

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2003.¹⁷⁰ Although the Bush administration publicized two more documents in 2006, *National Security Strategy* and *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the focus will be on the national strategy documents in 2003, which summarized what was called as the Bush Doctrine and provided the major principles of the Bush administration. The Chapter underlines the US primacy as the facilitator of the Bush doctrine and discusses the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as practices of US war on terror. Finally, the Chapter concludes by arguing that although Afghanistan and Iraq wars were part of the same war and legitimate from the perspective of the United States, the lack of authorization from the UN Security Council in the Iraq war caused a legitimacy problem for the U.S war on terror.

3.2. National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002

In his speech on 14 September 2001 President George W. Bush declared that the conflict began on the timing and terms of others and declared that the United States was “at war against terrorists of global reach”.¹⁷¹ *National Security Strategy* in 2002 (*NSS 2002*) stated the enemy was terrorism, which was defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocent people. It was clearly stated in *NSS 2002* that terror could be justified by no grievances and that the United States would make no concession to terrorists’ demands and would fight against those who knowingly harbored and provided aid to terrorists. The United States declared that terrorists and their supporters would be fought without distinction. More specifically, the document put the priority of the Bush administration as to

¹⁷⁰ President George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003) (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003).

¹⁷¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 5.

disrupt and destroy “terrorist organizations of global reach” and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. By achieving these, the Bush administration aimed to disable terrorists’ ability to plan and operate.¹⁷²

On the military response to terrorists, *NSS 2002* declared that the United States would take continuous and direct action against terrorists and their supporters by using all elements of its national and international power. The immediate focus was defined as those “terrorist organizations of global reach” and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempted to gain or use weapons of mass destruction or their precursors. In order to defend itself, the United States declared its intention to identify and destroy the threat before it reaches the borders of the United States. Although it was said that the United States would strive to enlist the support of the international community, there was a firm statement indicating that the United States would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, the United States would exercise its right of self-defense by acting preemptively against terrorists.¹⁷³ The Bush administration declared that it adopted the view that the best defense was good offense.¹⁷⁴ It clearly stated the United States’ determination to stop further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. The Bush administration showed that it was willing to act unilaterally and preemptively when states did not cooperate to fulfill their “sovereign responsibilities”.¹⁷⁵

Another military issue that the document dealt with was prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and terrorists. The document stated

¹⁷² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 6.

¹⁷³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 5-6.

¹⁷⁴ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 5-6.

¹⁷⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 6.

that the international security environment has undergone profound transformation and unlike the Cold War, strategy of deterrence would not be sufficient to respond to rogue states and terrorists.¹⁷⁶ It argued that rogue states and terrorists were determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction and to target the world's strongest.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, these new enemies were classified as imminent threats to the security of the United States and its allies and as more dangerous compared to the Soviet Union. The document said that even though uncertainty remained as to the time and place of the enemy's attack, the threat was imminent and unavoidable.¹⁷⁸ Stating that the enemy cannot be deterred, the threat was imminent and the magnitude of the potential harm was high, the United States declared its decision to adopt preemptive strategy and advocated it as a right of self-defense. The United States announced that it would weigh the consequences of its actions and proceed by building better integrated intelligence capabilities for receiving timely and accurate information on the threat; coordinating closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threat; and transforming its military forces for increased ability to conduct rapid and precise operations with decisive results. Finally, *NSS 2002* advocated that preemptive action would be used for protection of the United States and its allies and actions would be clear, the force would be measured and the cause would be just.¹⁷⁹

In addition to the military war, the Bush administration waged “a ‘war of ideas’ to win the battle against international terrorism.”¹⁸⁰ The ‘war of ideas’ included: using the full influence of the United States to make clear that all acts of terrorism were illegitimate like slavery, piracy or genocide so that no respectable

¹⁷⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 14.

¹⁷⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 14.

¹⁷⁸ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 15.

¹⁷⁹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 16.

¹⁸⁰ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 6.

government would condone or support terrorism; ensuring support to moderate and modern governments especially in the Muslim world so that conditions and ideologies that promoted terrorism did not find fertile ground; diminishing conditions that spawn terrorism by the help of the international community; using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle hopes and aspirations of freedom in societies living under the rule of sponsors of terrorism.¹⁸¹

NSS 2002 did not mention international cooperation as the major strategy against terrorists. In the document, the Bush administration stated that it would ‘encourage’ its regional partners to adopt a coordinated effort to isolate and localize terrorists.¹⁸² The United States promised that it would provide military, law enforcement, political, financial tools to the state that helped to localize terrorists. The major issue mentioned as a subject of cooperation in *NSS 2002* became counterterrorism strategies in the financial field. It stated the United States’ intention to work together with allies in disrupting financing terrorism. In this framework, *NSS 2002* announced that the United States would continue to work together with allies to identify and blockade sources of funding, freeze terrorists’ assets, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from terrorists’ exploitation and prevent terrorists from using alternative financial networks. The document underlined that the success of financial counterterrorism depended on cumulative action across all geographic regions and demanded cooperation.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 6.

¹⁸² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 6.

¹⁸³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 6.

On military cooperation, the United States stated its need for support from allies and friends but while leading the campaign against terrorism, it also declared its intention to forge new, productive international relationships and to redefine existing ones in ways that met the challenges of the century. In other words, the United States stated that it would reorganize its relations with other states considering their contributions to the US war against the global terrorist network. *NSS 2002* declared that the United States would consult regional organizations and states' cooperation wherever possible. The United States implied that it would not rely on regional or international organizations such as NATO and the UN but on coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements to confront transnational threats.¹⁸⁴

However, the United States declared its intention to work with the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other countries to rebuild Afghanistan.¹⁸⁵ Also, the United States considered cooperating with other states to defuse regional conflicts. It called on other states to cooperate engaging in critical regional disputes to prevent their escalation and minimize human suffering.¹⁸⁶ In an interconnected world, regional conflicts are considered risky because these conflicts may deteriorate relationships between the major power and cause humanitarian sufferings. The document stated that the United States had finite political, economic, and military resources to meet its global priorities; therefore, *NSS 2002* underlined that US engagement in the regional conflicts would be defined based on its strategic priorities.

¹⁸⁴ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 11.

¹⁸⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 7.

¹⁸⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 9.

NSS 2002 document showed that how the September 11 attacks redefined US foreign policy priorities. The document portrayed transnational terrorists and their sponsors as the new enemy. It introduced the United States' new military doctrine that was preemptive war. The Bush administration clearly stated that it would not allow disagreements to obscure its determination to secure its interests and values, if necessary it would act alone to perform requirements of its unique responsibilities.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, it implied that the United States would not rely on its previous alliances but it would rather prefer new partnerships or coalitions of the willing in countering terrorism. The document also underlined that the United States expected all states to act responsibly and willingly in fighting against terrorists. If they acted otherwise, the United States implied that they would bear the cost and would be punished. The emphasis on preemptive war and the linkage assumed between the rogue states, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction informed about the upcoming war on Iraq.

3.3. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT 2003) was introduced in February 2003. The document aimed to announce the United States' resolution to defeat the enemy, its definition of terrorist threat, its strategic intent, goals and objectives of US counterterrorism strategy. *NSCT 2003* started with a quote from President Bush who said the US would not rest until terrorist groups of global reach were found, stopped and defeated. Repeating the US determination to pursue global terrorists, the document stated that the terrorist threat was directed to the US, its allies and civilized society, to the idea of freedom and way of life. It defined the war as taking place between freedom and fear. It clearly stated that the enemy was

¹⁸⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 31.

terrorism, which defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. *NSCT 2003* cautiously noted that the threat was not one person, single political regime, or a religion.¹⁸⁸

The document underlined that the struggle against international terrorism was different from any other struggles that the US faced before. For this reason, *NSCT 2003* argued that success would not solely or primarily rely on the use of military power. It stated that the United States would use every instrument of its national power including diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence and military. In parallel with *NSS 2002*, it underlined the United States' determination to destroy the enemy, win the "war of ideas" and strengthen its security at home and abroad. For this purpose, the document underlined that it would pursue a preemptive strategy to identify and defuse threats before they reached US borders. Following the principles of *NSS 2002*, the document stated that the Bush administration would search support from the international community. However, *NSCT 2003* also underlined that the United States would primarily rely on its own power, fighting against the enemy and if necessary it would not hesitate to act alone to exercise its right to self-defense. In this regard, echoing *NSS 2002*, the document stated that the United States would forge new international relationships and would redefine existing ones in terms that suited to the transnational challenges of the 21st century.¹⁸⁹

In addition to reiterating US determination to act alone and preemptively, *NSCT 2003* more clearly stated that the US administration considered democracy promotion as a counterterrorism strategy. The document put emphasis that the fight

¹⁸⁸ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 1.

¹⁸⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 2.

against terrorists was about defending fundamental democratic values of the United States and its way of life. *NSCT 2003* stated that the United States sought to integrate nations and peoples into mutually beneficial democratic relationships that would protect them from forces of disorder and violence. It put that the Bush administration would promote democracy as a counterterrorism strategy considering that it would help to promote a freer, prosperous and secure world. The document ended the introduction by stating that the US fight against terrorism would help foster an international environment where democratic interests were secure and the values of liberty were respected around the world.¹⁹⁰

3.3.1. Defining the Nature of the Terrorist Threat

The first section of *NSCT 2003* was dedicated to the analysis of the common characteristics of terrorists to understand the weaknesses and strengths of its enemies.¹⁹¹ The document stated that despite diversity in motive, sophistication and strength, terrorists shared a basic structure which was depicted in a pyramid figure. According to this, from bottom to top, the structure of terror consisted of underlying conditions, the international environment, states, organization, and leadership.¹⁹² Underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife were put at the base because terrorists exploited these real or manufactured conditions to justify their actions and expand their support. One layer above underlying conditions, *NSCT 2003* put the international environment because it defined the boundaries within which terrorists planned their strategies. It was argued that although freer and open orders provided terrorists access to safe havens,

¹⁹⁰ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 3.

¹⁹¹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 5.

¹⁹² George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 6.

capabilities and other support, access alone was not sufficient for terrorists because they needed an actual physical base to operate.

Therefore, *NSCT 2003* put states above international environment. It argued whether through ignorance, inability or intent states still supported terrorists and provided sanctuary -both physical (e.g., safe houses or training grounds) and virtual bases (e.g., reliable communication and financial networks)- where terrorists needed to plan, organize, train and conduct their operations. Once the terrorist organization had a safe operating environment, the document argued, it found ground to solidify and expand.¹⁹³ On the top of the pyramid, *NSCT 2003* put the terrorist leadership because it provided overall direction and strategy that linked all these factors and brought life into a terrorist campaign. Leadership was defined as the catalyst for terrorist action. However, the document noted that for some terrorist organizations while the loss of the leadership could result in collapse, some organizations could become more resilient by changing the leadership or adapting and morphing into decentralized, leaderless, autonomous cells. This kind of threat was considered as a greater challenge to the United States.¹⁹⁴

In addition to the analysis of the structure of terror, *NSCT 2003* underlined the changing nature of terrorism. It stated that the terrorists' evolved by adapting to the advances in transnational communication, travel and commerce and turned the advances of the 20th century into destructive capabilities. It mentioned Al Qaeda as an example of how terrorist networks twisted the benefits and conveniences of the open, integrated and modernized world to serve its terrorist purposes. *NSCT 2003* defined Al Qaeda as a multinational enterprise with its operations in more than 60 countries. It gave examples regarding how Al Qaeda used communication

¹⁹³ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 6.

¹⁹⁴ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 7.

technologies to coordinate its global activities and recruits, used the banking system to transfer funds for terrorism, made propaganda in the media or exploited freedom of travel. Furthermore, exploiting the opportunities provided by global environment, the document pointed out terrorists became more self-sufficient in terms of their financing through illegal means.

NSCT 2003 also highlighted the interconnected nature of terrorist organizations and Al Qaeda. It defined terrorist threat as a flexible, a transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups. It argued terrorists worked together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, and planning and undertaking attacks.¹⁹⁵ As a less direct way of connection among terrorists, the document mentioned presence of cooperation among terrorist networks for promoting the same ideological agenda or reinforcing a favorable image for one another. Due to their interconnectivity, the document underlined, terrorist groups became more resilient and diffuse today; therefore, it characterized interconnectivity as the force-multiplier.¹⁹⁶

Finally, in its analysis of the terrorist threat, *NSCT 2003* underlined that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed direct and serious threat to the security of the United States and the international community. It argued that terrorists' tendency to use WMD increased significantly during the past decade. The document also noted that the availability of critical technologies, the willingness of some scientists and others (implying rogue states) to cooperate with terrorists and the ease of intercontinental transportation facilitated it for terrorists to acquire, manufacture, deploy and initiate a WMD attack against the United States. Reminding domestic and

¹⁹⁵ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 8.

¹⁹⁶ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 8.

international community that Usama bin Laden defined acquiring WMD as a “religious duty,” *NSCT 2003* defined the acquisition of WMD as a clear and present threat to US security and stated its intention to prevent the danger.¹⁹⁷

3.3.2. US Statement of Strategic Intent and Design of Counter Strategy

Having defined the characteristics of its enemy, the US administration announced its strategic intent to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and its friends and allies, and to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support terrorists. *NSCT 2003* declared that the United States would accomplish the task by taking action on four fronts. The four front strategy called 4D strategy composed of *defeating* terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, command and control, and communications, material support and finances; *denying* sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; *diminishing* the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; *defending* US citizens and interests at home and abroad.¹⁹⁸

To begin with, the first tenet of the 4D strategy called for defeating transnational terrorist organizations through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence and other instruments of US power. *NSCT 2003* stated that the United States would use all of its resources, including its ability to marshal and sustain international coalitions, to defeat terrorist networks and prevent them from establishing new organizations. The

¹⁹⁷ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 9-10.

¹⁹⁸ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 11-12.

document underscored that the United States and its partners would target individuals, state sponsors, transnational networks that enabled terrorists' activities. *NSCT 2003* declared that the United States would identify, locate and destroy terrorists and terrorist organizations.¹⁹⁹ It stated that the United States would not wait for terrorists to attack and then respond. Rather, it would act preemptively to disrupt and degrade terrorists' ability to act and compel supporters of terrorists to cease and desist. Under section on defeating strategy, the document mentioned preventing terrorists from acquiring WMDs as the highest priority.

The second front of the National Strategy was denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary that enabled terrorists to exist, gain strength, train, plan and execute their attack. The document stated that the United States would hold accountable those who harbored terrorists in the past and present and accused those states of acting like accomplices who provided shelter for criminals. *NSCT 2003* stated that it was the responsibilities of all states to fulfill their obligations to combat terrorism both in their borders and internationally. It declared that the United States would provide assistance to weak states that were willing to combat terrorism but did not have the capacity to do so. However, it strongly emphasized that the United States would not tolerate when states proved reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and provide sanctuary to terrorists. Underlining that states' responsibilities as sovereigns, the United States declared that it would adopt a "zero tolerance"²⁰⁰ policy and would act in cooperation with willing and able states (friends and allies), or if necessary, would take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 16-18.

²⁰⁰ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 18.

²⁰¹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 21-22.

The third component of the 4D Strategy was diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. The document stated that this component was made up of collective efforts to diminish conditions that terrorists could exploit. It was argued that although poverty, deprivation, social fractions, unresolved regional conflicts did not justify the use of terror, many terrorist organizations exploit them for their own advantage. *NSCT 2003* stated that ongoing US efforts to solve regional disputes, foster economic, social and economic development, market based economies, good governance, the rule of law did not necessarily focus on counterterrorism but contributed to the campaign by addressing underlying conditions that terrorists exploited. Additionally, the document emphasized that diminishing these conditions required the United States and its allies to win the “war of ideas,” to support democracy and promote economic freedom.²⁰² As it stated in *NSS 2002*, the United States stated that it did not propose to undertake this task alone because it has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every corner of the world. Reminding to domestic and international addressees that the threat of terrorism was a common threat to all states, it called for international cooperation to strengthen weak states and prevent the reemergence of terrorism.²⁰³

The fourth tenet of the National Strategy encompassed defending US sovereignty, territory, and its national interests at home and abroad. This included both physical and cyber protection of the United States, its population, property and interests as well as its democratic principles. Different from the previous strategies, the fourth strategy heavily focused on continuous law enforcement and intelligence collecting measures. *NSCT 2003* underlined that to reduce the vulnerability of US personnel, critical infrastructure, and its other interests, the United States needed to

²⁰² George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 23.

²⁰³ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)*, 23.

develop a coordinated and focused effort from the federal, state, and local governments, the private sector and individuals. In this framework, *NSCT 2003* declared that it would implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security; integrate intelligence gathered from different agencies in a single place; enhance security of critical infrastructures; develop measures to protect US citizens abroad; and ensure an integrated incident management capability.

Overall, *NSCT 2003* provided a detailed account of how the United States defined the nature of the threat and its counter strategy. It recognized networked and transnational nature of terrorist organizations. Yet, it stated that states still played a major role in providing physical or virtual sanctuary to terrorists. It categorized states as willing and able states, weak states, reluctant states and unwilling states depending on their approaches to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities and to cooperate with the United States. The document underlined that the United States adopted “zero-tolerance” strategy against those who opposed to fulfill the obligations of their sovereignty. As with *NSS 2002*, *NSCT 2003* also declared US determination to act alone, if necessary preemptively. Despite its determination to act unilaterally and preemptively, the United States invited other states to cooperate on issues such as eliminating the underlying causes that terrorist exploited or supporting “war of ideas” to promote democratic values and economic freedom. Finally, although *NSCT 2003* defined 4D strategy, both *NSS* and *NSCT* documents underlined the crucial role that democracy would play in eliminating the underlying causes that terrorists exploited.

However, the emphasis on the “war of ideas” and democracy as “the antidote to the ideology of terrorism” became the most significant themes that *NSS 2006*²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ President George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2006) (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006).

and *NSCT 2006*²⁰⁵ documents underlined. *NSS 2006* mentioned the “genius of democracy” in countering factors that the US administration defined as causing terrorism.²⁰⁶ These factors were defined as political alienation, grievances that could be blamed on others, sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and ideology that justified murder. It argued that democracy can defeat terrorism in the long-run by offering people change to shape their own future, by bringing the rule of law, the habit of advancing interests by compromise and the peaceful resolution of disputes, by providing ground for freedom of speech, independent media and market place of ideas and by offering respect for human dignity that abhorred the deliberate killings of innocents. The document stated that democracy was the “opposite of terrorist tyranny” and it is a long-term solution to be empowered in time. “To create the space and time for the long-term solution to take root,” *NSS 2006* stated that the United States would follow four strategies in the short-term.²⁰⁷ These short-term strategies were to prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occurred; deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation; deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states and denying the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.

Similarly, *NSCT 2006* clearly defined “advancing effective democracy” as the primary long-term solution for the winning the war on terror and the “battle of ideas”. The document showed that the Bush administration adopted democracy promotion as a counterterrorism strategy. *NSCT 2006* stated that effective democracies honored and upheld basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press and that democracies were

²⁰⁵ President George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2006).

²⁰⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006)*, 10.

²⁰⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006)*, 11.

responsive to their citizens. *NSCT 2006* underscored that “effective democracies” exercised “effective sovereignty” and maintained order within their own borders, addressed causes of conflict peacefully, protected independent and impartial systems of justice, punished crime, embraced the rule of law, and resisted corruption.²⁰⁸ The document stated that “effective democracies” were a “long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism today” and “this is [was] the battle of ideas”.²⁰⁹ As a conclusion, from *NSC 2002* and *NSCT 2003* to *NSCT 2006*, with increasing emphasis on democratization, the US 4D strategy eventually became 5D strategy.

3.4. US Primacy as Foundation of the Bush Doctrine and the Practices of 5D Strategy

Describing the United States’ international strategy, *NSS 2002* started by underlining that the United States possessed “unprecedented” and “unequaled” strength and influence in the world.²¹⁰ As Barry Posen put it, the United States possessed “the command of the commons,” that has unquestionable military dominance over the sea, air and space.²¹¹ The implication of this power preponderance in terms of the Bush administrations’ counterterrorism was that the United States could act alone and/or preemptively, if necessary, without needing other states’ capabilities. As “the only state capable of projecting military power globally”,²¹² the United States could afford not having support of its allies and friends. It also did not need help from international organizations such as NATO to fight against a threat. Therefore, although the United States declared that

²⁰⁸ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006), 9.

²⁰⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006), 9.

²¹⁰ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 1.

²¹¹ Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony,” *International Security* 28, no. 1 (2003): 5-46.

²¹² Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” 8.

international cooperation was necessary to fight against terrorism, the Bush administration stated that it would act alone, “if necessary,” which if not supported by others, it would form “coalitions of the willing” to fight against terrorism.²¹³ Therefore, the underpinning of the Bush administration’s unilateralism and its willingness to act as the leader of “coalitions of the willing” was US primacy.

The first front of the war on terror was Afghanistan. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States received a very broad based support from the international community, states, and international organizations. On September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which recognized the United States’ inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and declared such terrorist acts as threat to peace and international security.²¹⁴ Similarly, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history. The North Atlantic Council stated that

The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.²¹⁵

Invoking Article 5, many NATO members expected that the United States would conduct military response against Al Qaeda under NATO or that it would coordinate its actions with the integrated military structure and political institutions

²¹³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 11.

²¹⁴ UN Security Council, "Condemnation of 11 September Attacks against the United States," *S/RES/1368 (2001)* (September 12, 2001). <http://www.un.org/Docs/ctc/resolutions.shtml> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²¹⁵ NATO, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council," *Press Release 124* (September 12, 2001). <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

of NATO.²¹⁶ This expectation was stated in NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson's conversation with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Lord Robertson stated that

invoking Article 5 would be a useful statement of political backing, that it would help the United States build an instant anti-terror coalition based in part on the moral authority behind Article 5, and that it would be a deterrent - in that whoever was responsible for the attack would know they had taken on not just the United States, but also the greatest military alliance in the world.²¹⁷

However, the Bush administration considered NATO's support mostly as a political and moral support.²¹⁸ On October 7, 2001, the United States started military operations together with Britain, Australia and the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan without NATO states' contribution to the mission. As De Nevers stated, the United States' exclusion of NATO from the initial phases of Afghanistan reflected President Bush's desire to avoid allies from dictating how the war would be fought as well as the preference of some in the Pentagon²¹⁹ to avoid searching for consensus on strategy.²²⁰ US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld summarized the Bush administration's approach on coalitions saying that the mission determined the coalition and not *vice versa*.²²¹ As Rhodes put it, from the Bush administration's perspective, "America's sovereign responsibilities superseded its commitment to

²¹⁶ Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 7.

²¹⁷ James Kitfield, "NATO Metamorphosis," *National Journal* (1975) 34, no. 6 (2002): 376–380. Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*, 6.

²¹⁸ Suzanne Daley, "For First Time, NATO Invokes Pact with U.S", New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/international/europe/13EURO.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²¹⁹ For instance, the Bush administration's head of the Defense Policy Board at the Pentagon stated that "It's wonderful to have the support of our friends and allies, but our foremost consideration has to be to protect this country and not take a vote among others as to how we should do it." G. John Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," *Survival* 43, no. 4 (2001): 27.

²²⁰ Renée de Nevers, "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007): 49.

²²¹ Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 3 (2003): 374.

international institutions.”²²² Nevertheless, NATO’s involvement in the Afghanistan War began in subsequent weeks when NATO agreed to assist the US-led coalition with providing intelligence, helping to defend states that were participating in the Afghanistan War, and allowing overflight rights.²²³ Although NATO’s attempt to lead the war on terror failed, the Bush administration’s coalition composed of individual states and NATO, which was in line with the administration’s strategy to be the unbounded leader.

The preemptive war doctrine has widely been accepted as the cornerstone of the Bush doctrine.²²⁴ Although the national strategy documents defined the terrorist threat as a network, it strongly emphasized the role of states in providing sanctuary to terrorists. Therefore, the United States adopted sovereign responsibility approach and demanded all states to fulfill their responsibilities to fight against terrorists. The document defined states that might help terrorists to acquire a WMD capability as the major and imminent threat to US security. In Jervis’ words, under the Bush administration, combating terrorism and limiting WMD proliferation went hand in hand.²²⁵ Therefore, in line with its “zero-tolerance” policy towards states that the United States suspected supporting terrorists to acquire WMD, the United States accused Iraq of supporting terrorists and developing WMD.

In September 2002, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly and argued that Saddam Hussein violated international law by his continuous attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, by supporting terrorism and by suppressing the

²²² Edward Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda," *Survival* 45, no. 1 (2003): 136.

²²³ de Nevers, "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era," 37.

²²⁴ Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," 374. Robert Jervis, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," *Political Science Quarterly* 120, no. 3 (2005): 351-378. John L. Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy*, no. 133 (2002): 50-57. John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2005): 2. Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," 27.

²²⁵ Jervis, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," 354.

Iraqi people.²²⁶ At this speech President Bush also made it clear that the United States would stand against this threat alone and act unilaterally. On October 25, the United States proposed a resolution that formally demanded authorization for war against Iraq. Rather than giving authorization for war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441²²⁷, which declared that it found Iraq in “material breach” of previous resolutions, demanded a new inspections regime and warned Iraq of “serious consequences” if it failed to disarm.²²⁸

On February 5 when US Secretary of State, Colin Powell addressed the United Nations Security Council, he stated that the United States was informed that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorists.²²⁹ He also argued that the United States had strong evidence for both cases to present for to the Security Council and demanded a UN Security Council resolution that allowed US military action on Iraq. However, on February 14, the inspectors reported to the UN Security Council that, they could not find evidence of WMD in Iraq although they noted there remained many unaccounted items. After ten days, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain proposed a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the section dealing with the threats to international peace and security) that would declare Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity to fulfill the demands of Resolution 1441. On 14 February, President Bush said that if the UN Security Council did not authorize use of force against Iraq, it would be an

²²⁶ "Text of Bush Iraq Speech to U.N.," *CBSNews* (February 11, 2009).

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/12/national/main521781.shtml> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²²⁷ "Full Text: UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq," *The Guardian* (December 20, 2002). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/dec/20/iraq.foreignpolicy2> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²²⁸ Michael J. Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 3 (2003): 17.

²²⁹ Editorial, "Transcript of Powell's UN Presentation," *CNN.com* (February 6, 2003). <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/index.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

“ineffective, irrelevant debating society.”²³⁰ However, US efforts failed to convince France, Germany, Russia and China to pass the resolution because these states proposed that inspectors needed more time in Iraq.

On 28 February, the Bush administration declared that it would not only seek disarmament but also regime change in Iraq.²³¹ On March 7, President Bush stated that the United States had been negotiating with the UN Security Council members but if its efforts to pass a resolution failed, the United States would act because the United States “really” did not need the United Nations’ approval to act on its own security.²³² In the same speech, President Bush stated that he wanted to work with the UN and wanted the UN to be “effective,” “robust” and “capable body” and he repeated that the United States did not “need anybody’s permission”.²³³ Consequently, on 22 March 2003, despite opposition, the United States declared war on Iraq without the authorization of UN Security Council. The US-led coalition started Operation Iraqi Freedom “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people”.²³⁴ The United States’ efforts to get a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the war showed that the Bush administration wanted to work *with* the UN but not *through* it. It preferred to lead the members of the UN Security Council rather than being restricted by them.

²³⁰ Maura Reynolds and Paul Richter, "Bush Says U.N. Must Act or Be 'Irrelevant'," *Los Angeles Times* (February 14, 2003). <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/14/world/fg-iraq14> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²³¹ Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, "George W. Bush: 'Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer'," *American Presidency Project* (February 28, 2003). <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=61047> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²³² "Bush on Iraq: We Don't Need Permission," *newsmax.com* (March 7, 2003). <http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/7/95754.shtml> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²³³ Cited in G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment," *Survival* 46, no. 1 (2004): 9.

²³⁴ President George W. Bush, "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom," (March 22, 2003). <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter focused on two US national security documents, which summarized the Bush Doctrine, in order to understand the US definition of the terrorist threat, its counterterrorism strategy and practices. The national security documents defined the enemy as terrorism, which was defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocent people and declared fighting against “terrorist organizations of global reach” with desire to acquire WMD as the primary security objective of the Bush administration. The documents recognized the flexible, transnational networked structure of the threat that was facilitated by modern information and communication technologies. However, the Bush administration put emphasis on states as major structures within which terrorist organizations survived. Therefore, the documents repeatedly underlined concepts like “effective sovereignty,” and “sovereign responsibility”. Effective sovereignty referred to states’ ability to govern their territories, maintain control over within their borders. Sovereign responsibility referred to states’ willingness to act in accordance with international law, norms and rules. In the context of the war on terror, the Bush administration underlined states’ responsibility to combat terrorism. Based on the concepts of effective sovereignty and sovereign responsibility, the Bush administration categorized states as ‘willing and able states’, ‘weak states’, ‘reluctant states’ and ‘unwilling states’. The Bush administration declared that it had ‘zero-tolerance’ towards states that do not fulfill their sovereign responsibilities in combating the terrorist threat and stated its determination to act unilaterally and preemptively, if necessary.

The documents stated that the US war on terror was composed of two parts: “battle of arms” and “battle of ideas”. However, the Bush administration heavily

focused on “the battle of arms” both in theory and practice. From 2002 to 2006, all national strategy documents elaborated on “the battle of arms,” which was named 4D strategy. The four front strategy composed of *defeating* terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, command and control, and communications, material support and finances; *denying* sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; *diminishing* the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; *defending* US citizens and interests at home and abroad. In addition, the success in “battle of arms” was prioritized because it was considered as the foundation of the success in “battle of ideas,” which the Bush administration considered to attain in the long-term. Although the 2002 national strategy documents mentioned “struggle over ideas” or “war of ideas,” the most systematic and detailed discussion on the concept of “battle of ideas” emerged in the 2006 national strategy documents. Although the initial documents stated the United States would promote democracy due to its merits for providing a better future, the national strategy documents of 2006 discussed democracy promotion as the most significant component of the war of ideas and defined democracy as “the antidote to the ideology of terrorism”. The increasing emphasis on the ideational aspect of the war on terror might be considered as a development that took place in parallel with the Bush administration’s military successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Finally, the chapter underlined the preemptive war doctrine, the United States’ willingness to form and lead “coalitions of the willing” and its determination to act unilaterally, if necessary, as the crucial components of the Bush doctrine and discussed the US primacy as the underpinning force behind these preferences. In discussion of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, it argued that although the Bush administration looked for international cooperation, it did not want to be constrained

by international organizations or suffer from coordinating actions with others. The Bush administration wanted to lead coalitions of the willing states and preferred to work *with*, not *through*, international organizations. Enabled by its primacy, both in Afghanistan and Iraq cases the United States was able to lead the operations. Although the both wars were practices of the US war on terror, the US war on Iraq lacked authorization from the UN Security Council and support of the great powers that had granted legitimacy to the Afghanistan war. However, both wars received different reactions from the international community and great powers and had different impacts on how the United States was perceived. The following two chapters will focus on how China and Russia evaluates the US war on terror by contextualizing their perception of the US primacy since the end of the Cold War.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA'S SECURITY UNDERSTANDING AND THE US WAR ON TERROR

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyze the impact of the US war on terror on China's security understanding. For this purpose, it begins by looking at China's security understanding since the first introduction of its New Security Concept in 1998. Contextualizing the introduction of the New Security Concept, it underlines the link between the evolution of China's security understanding in the post-Cold War era and the United States' security practices. It underscores that China's security strategy is based on preserving China's national integrity, sustaining its economic development and attaining great power status in international politics. In line with this strategy, it suggests that China continues to pursue a strategy of non-confrontation with the United States except the issues of direct national security such as Taiwan. It argues that the introduction of the New Security Concept is designed to promote an international order based on a 'thick' conceptualization of sovereignty and non-intervention and an enhanced role for the UN and the UN Security Council. China's purpose in promoting such an international order is to delegitimize the US-led international order, to protect itself from any form of intervention by the United States and to achieve great power status for itself.

The Chapter looks at China's reaction to the US war on Afghanistan in 2001 and on Iraq in 2003 as aspects of the US war on terror. It argues that in line with its security understanding, China approaches counterterrorism as an international problem that should be dealt within the framework of the UN and its Security Council under the presence of clear evidence. In this regard, the Chapter maintains that China's support to US war on Afghanistan relies on its evaluation of the war as a legitimate act. Likewise, China's opposition to the Iraq war relies on its evaluation of the United States' motivation and preemptive doctrine as illegitimate. Therefore, the Chapter suggests that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars had opposite impacts on China's evaluation of the international security environment, of the United States and of itself as a respected great power. It underlines that despite the betterment of the cordial relations after the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war enhanced China's insecurities regarding its status in international relations under the US primacy and resurrected China's perception of the United States as hegemon. The chapter concludes that since the end of the Cold War, the US security practices shaped China's security understanding and threatened China's status as a great power. From China's perspective, the Iraq war will not be the last instance of US hegemonism and multipolarization is the only order that will prevent US hegemonism and assure China's status as a great power. However, having recognized that multipolarity will not arrive soon, China's reaction to the United States shows that it will also be satisfied with unipolarity with multilateral characteristics in the near future but in the long run China will prefer to balance US power by power.

4.2. China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy: The New Security Concept

Until the official introduction of the New Security Concept in 1998, China's national security strategy was defined by the Chinese leadership. Deng Xiaoping, who was China's President from 1978 to 1992 and the successor to Mao Zedong, has been very influential in shaping China's security strategy. Chinese President Deng Xiaoping suggested that China should follow a strategy based on "peace and development".²³⁵ The Chinese leader's strategy was based on the fact that China's development required international peace and China's peaceful relations with other states. In line with the "peace and development" strategy, China focused on its economic development and sought good relations with others, including capitalist states and the United States. China's peace and development strategy has been the prevailing approach since 1978 and Jiang Zemin, who acted as China's President from 1993 to 2003, also adhered to peace and development as China's foreign policy objectives. These objectives were based on promoting cooperation and avoiding confrontation to create a permissive environment for China's development. In this regard, it should be noted that China's New Security Concept is not a break from China's past strategy; on the contrary, it builds on the peace and development strategy.

The international security environment underwent a process of transition with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War international political landscape has been defined by unipolarity and US preponderance. Like most states in the early 1990s, China adjusted its national and international policies according to its evaluation of the emerging international

²³⁵ Denny Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance," *Survival* 45, no. 3 (2003): 65.

environment led by the United States and started to formulate a new security concept.²³⁶ Towards the end of the 1990s, Chinese political leaders started to talk about a new security concept at presidential meetings, international conferences and in public addresses. For instance, the need for a new security concept was underlined at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)'s Regional Forum in March 1997; at a summit between President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yelstin in April 1997 and in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's speech at the 30th anniversary celebration of ASEAN in December 1997.²³⁷ However, the most authoritative and mature announcement of the Concept was made in China's White Paper on National Defense in 1998.²³⁸

China argued that its New Security Concept was an alternative security understanding that aimed to negate the "Cold War mentality" that was based on zero-sum thinking. According to China, this mentality manifested itself in international relations with the presence of hegemonism and power politics. As China defined it, the best examples of the Cold War mentality in international relations in the post-Cold War era were the enlargement of military blocks, the strengthening of military alliances, the use of military advantages for powerful states' military and economic interests and the infringement of sovereignty. China argued that for the establishment of lasting peace it was imperative to abandon this power-oriented logic and cultivate a new concept that enabled alternative means of seeking and safeguarding security.

²³⁶ Wu Baiyi, "The Chinese Security Concept and Its Historical Evolution," *The Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 27 (2001): 278. Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, "Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era: Three Images of the United States," *Asian Survey* 32, no. 10 (1992): 902-917.

²³⁷ For a discussion on ASEAN's role in dealing with intra-regional security problems see; Kai He, "Does ASEAN Matter? International Relations Theories, Institutional Realism, and ASEAN," *Asian Security* 2, no. 3 (2006): 189-214.

²³⁸ "China's National Defense in 1998," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China* (July 1998). <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

According to the New Security Concept, the major themes of the new era were defined as peace and development, which China argued should be promoted by following certain principles regarding politics, economics and the military. China defined the political principles that should govern international relations in the new era as follows: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful existence. Briefly, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were characterized as the political basis of global and regional security. Furthermore, China underscored the right of each state to choose its own social system, development strategy and regime without being subject to political or military interference in any way or under any pretext.

In the realms of economy, China emphasized the need for mutually beneficial cooperation, which required countries to open markets to each other and eliminate unequal and discriminatory policies in economic and trade relations. It called for seeking common prosperity by assuring the gradual reduction of the development gap between countries. In addition, China underlined that success of national economies was not sufficient in the new era; states must strengthen regional and global economic cooperation. It argued that the recognition of economic globalization and interdependence would encourage states to create a stable and secure economic environment.

On military disputes, the New Security Concept maintained that dialogue and cooperation should be the foundation of mutual understanding and trust and invited states to employ peaceful means to settle international divergences and disputes. China noted that it had firmly pursued a national defense policy that was defensive in

nature and suggested other states also adopt defensive strategies, with the goal of peaceful international relations.

In an editorial piece in the People's Liberation Army's publication, *China Defense Daily* (Zhongguo Guofang Bao), the requirements of the above-mentioned principles were drawn more specifically and directly: The political body and system of a state cannot be changed by another state. Encroachment on a state's sovereignty and its unification cannot be tolerated. No state shall intrude into the internal affairs of another state. In international affairs, all states, big or small, poor or rich, strong or weak, are equal. The big and strong states should not be allowed to dominate the small and weak. The "superpowers" should be prevented from "ordering" other countries around, pursuing power politics and "imposing" their values on others.²³⁹

On economic security, the New Security Concept outlined the following principles: The economic security of a state must not be infringed upon or threatened. Economic relations among states should be based on equality, cooperation and common development. Economic sanctions should not be allowed as retaliation against one another and they should not be used in order to obtain political gains and advantage. Economic and trade relations should be based on the principles of mutual benefit; most-favored-nation status and entry to the World Trade Organization should not be used as "cards" to put pressure on another state and disrupt its economic development. Finally, economic competition should be undertaken in accordance with international rules and regulations. Problems, frictions and differences among parties should be solved through dialogue based on equality and consultation.

²³⁹ Li Qinggong and Wei Wei, "The World Needs a New Security Concept," *Jiefangjun Bao* 24(1997). <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/china/jiefangjun-new-security-971224.htm> (accessed 22/06/2008).

On military security issues, the New Security Concept allowed states to strengthen their armies, develop armaments and reform their military organizations because the mission of military forces is to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, to resist foreign aggression and to protect a country's unification. However, states' military policies and strategies should be defensive in nature; states should avoid conflicts and wars and prevent crises. If conflicts do occur, de-escalation measures should be implemented. In addition, military forces should be used in non-traditional areas such as dealing with terrorism and drug trafficking and participating in rescue missions and humanitarian aid efforts. Moreover, it was underlined that not all states should be allowed to pursue the doctrine of military interference and resort to military force at every turn. Further, international military cooperation and arms trading should not target a third party.

China's New Security Concept relied on the 'old' and established principles of international relations such as inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-intervention and equality of states. Therefore, building on China's peace and development strategy, the New Security Concept was supposed to be 'new' for the United States and it was promoted by China to shape the United States' security practices. The introduction of these principles as 'new' indicated China's discontent with the emerging norms of international relations in the post-Cold War era. As the United States was the major force behind these norms, the introduction of the New Security Concept became an expression of China's discontent with the US-led order which would threaten China's national security interests defined in terms of its rising to the status of a great power.

4.2.1. Understanding China's Security Concerns: US Hegemony and National Vulnerabilities

In order to better understand the underlying reasons for China's introduction of the New Security Concept, it is necessary to look at the strategic context of China-US relations. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China-US relations reached its lowest ebb. This was because of the economic, military, and political sanctions applied by the United States and its major allies following the bloody events of June 4, 1989 at Tiananmen Square.²⁴⁰ Hirshberg states that the Tiananmen Square massacre led China to be perceived as an "evil and oppressive state like the Soviet Union" and created a harsh contrast with the good, freedom loving, and democratic US.²⁴¹ Since then, China felt the influence of the issue of human rights in its relations with the United States. The United States made human rights a part of bilateral relations with China and used it as political leverage to affect improvements. Renewal of the Most-Favored-Nation status with the United States, and membership to the World Trade Organization were linked to the human rights violations until the Clinton administration which gave up the linkage strategy in 1994 with an executive order.²⁴²

The Clinton administration officially changed the linkage policy with an executive order since the administration thought that China was significant for US economic, political and security interests.²⁴³ However, the change of the linkage policy did not practically change the fact that human rights became an important part

²⁴⁰ Zhang Wenpu, "Improving China-United States Relations," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (1991): 182.

²⁴¹ Matthew S. Hirshberg, "Consistency and Change in American Perceptions of China," *Political Behavior* 15, no. 3 (1993): 251.

²⁴² Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, "United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1999): 187.

²⁴³ David M. Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage," *China Quarterly*, no. 139 (1994): 597-621.

of the diplomatic exchanges between China and the United States. The only change was on the emphasis. In fact, at the time, President Clinton thought that more trade with China would lead to more cooperation and create more opportunity for intense and constant dialogue on human rights issues.²⁴⁴

However, China's concerns about the US intervention in China's domestic affairs and its strategy to constrain China's rise as a great power were intensified due to discussions about "China threat theory"²⁴⁵ in the US political and scholarly environment. After the end of bipolar era, the prevailing view in China regarding the future of the international structure that multipolarity would emerge eventually and with its rising power China would be one of the poles in this new multipolar structure.²⁴⁶ However, the proponents of the "China threat theory" argued that an increasingly powerful China would most likely to destabilize regional and global security in the near future.²⁴⁷ Therefore, they suggested that the United States should contain China in military, economic and diplomatic terms.²⁴⁸ For instance, Krauthammer argued that the United States should strive to contain China by building and maintaining a security agreement, working to undermine the communist party regime and prompting political liberalization in support of political dissidents,

²⁴⁴ President Bill Clinton, "Press Conference of the President," *Office of the Press Secretary, The White House* (May 26, 1994). <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-26-president-in-press-conference-on-china-mfn-status.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁴⁵ Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 8 (1996): 758-771.

²⁴⁶ Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), 9-12.

²⁴⁷ Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments," 758.

²⁴⁸ Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149-168. Chengxin Pan, "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," *Alternatives* 29, no. 3 (2004): 307-311.

publicly criticizing China's human rights abuses, and opposing Beijing's efforts to accumulate international prestige.²⁴⁹

Such policy recommendations strengthened the Chinese idea that the United States still pursued a Cold War mentality and replaced China with the USSR. China considered the United States' imposition on betterment of human rights issues for economic, political and military affairs as violation of its sovereignty and intervention in China's domestic affairs. China considered that in order to contain Beijing's rise as a great power in the post-Cold War international relations, the United States exploited humanitarian issues and would intervene in domestic affairs. In other words, in China's view, US containment strategy was based on violating China's sovereignty. In addition, Chinese leaders argued that the United States was using the "China threat" arguments to enhance its position in the Asia-Pacific region and to create justifications for increasing its military spending and maintaining US hegemony.²⁵⁰ Therefore, China perceived threat from the United States to status as a great power and China became a firm defender of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Chinese leaders defended the central authority of the state within its borders and the ultimate right of the state authority in conducting its domestic and international affairs excluding any other actor.²⁵¹ According to this notion, state authority is free and independent to stipulate its own national system and form of government, and the form of legally sanctioned use of force. China did not want any state, group of states or an international organization, especially the ones in which it did not have veto power, to develop a supranational authority that could disregard

²⁴⁹ Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China," *Time*, July 31, 1995, 72. Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments," 758-771.

²⁵⁰ Pan, "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," 307-311. Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival Source," *International Security* 22, no. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998): 36-73.

²⁵¹ Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," *Survival* 42, no. 3 (2000): 42-43.

the rights of state authority emanating from the principle of sovereignty.²⁵² China's strict adherence to the concept of sovereignty aimed to serve China's protection by enhancing its legitimacy, preventing it from external interference, and criticism for its domestic policies.

Being treated as a major rival by the United States, China's evaluation of the US security practices was influenced by its perception of the United States as a hegemon that wanted to constrain China as a major power in the post-Cold War international relations. Desiring to be one of the poles in the multipolar structure, China wanted to prevent itself from any 'hegemonic' intervention that might hinder its growth as a major power. Therefore, promoting its conception of sovereignty and preventing interventions into states' domestic affairs for humanitarian reasons became two significant components of China's strategy to rise as a great power. After the demise of the Soviet Union and dismemberment of Yugoslavia, preserving its political unity became a major security concern for China and a precondition of having a great power status in international relations. However, it had vulnerabilities that might have been exploited to intervene in China's domestic affairs.²⁵³

China's political vulnerabilities were separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. China's sensitivity did not stem from the capacity of these forces to be independent or the possibility of military intervention against China due to its abuse of human rights. The reason of China's concern was the US foreign policy strategy linking human rights issues with security and economic relations.²⁵⁴ China considered the linkage policy as a violation of its sovereignty and as an attempt to

²⁵² Gill and Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," 43.

²⁵³ Peter Van Ness, "Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan Are Not Balancing US Unipolar Power," *International Relations of Asia-Pacific* 2, no. 1 (2002): 141.

²⁵⁴ Apodaca and Stohl, "United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance," 187. Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage," 597-621.

degrade its status as a great power. China stated its position on the linkage strategy in its 1991 White Paper on Human Rights by stating that the United States used human rights issues to “sell its own values, ideology, political standards and mode of development” and interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries, hurting their sovereignty and dignity.²⁵⁵ Having experienced this process with the United States, China was concerned about its recurrence because it still had human rights problems.

However, Taiwan’s independence was the most pressing security issue threatening China’s political integrity and it could be a source of US military intervention. China had been frustrated by the United States’ cordial relations with Taiwan and considered the United States’ economic, political and military ties with Taiwan as intervention in China’s domestic affairs, violating its sovereign rights. When the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to the region to show its position against China’s military exercises that aimed to deter Taiwan from pushing for independence in 1996, a major crisis broke out between two powers.²⁵⁶ Following that crisis, the US decision to increase its arms sales to Taiwan and include Taiwan’s security in its strategic planning for the region further increased China’s sensitivities about the US containment strategy.²⁵⁷ Considering that strict adherence to the principle of China’s version of sovereignty would preserve China’s national security and its position as a great power, Beijing became a firm defender of the principle of sovereignty. It perceived violations of sovereignty as the reflections of US hegemony

²⁵⁵ "White Paper on Human Rights in China (1991)," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China* (November 1991). <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁵⁶ Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait - Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US-China Relations," *International Security* 27, no. 2 (2002): 48.

²⁵⁷ "China's National Defense in 1998".

and threat to its security defined in terms of its great power status in the post-Cold War era.

Due to the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and China's status in the post-Cold War era, the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo deeply influenced China's perception of the United States as a hegemon. In Chinese use of the term, hegemon meant a country that employs force to control and contain others - thus interfering in others' domestic affairs.²⁵⁸ After the Kosovo operation, China started to define the United States as a hegemon. China opposed the Kosovo operation and criticized the United States for acting without direct authorization from the UN Security Council. China had not had a positive approach towards NATO because it was a Cold War institution and represented persistent Cold-War mentality. In addition, when the US led-NATO forces bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo operation, China's reactions to NATO intensified. In a commentary published on *People's Daily*, the missile attack on the Chinese Embassy was regarded as "barbaric atrocities committed by the United States" that "have fully laid bare the hegemonist ferocious features and the imperialist nature of aggression."²⁵⁹ The article stated that the armed intervention was not an isolated and accidental phenomenon but a step up towards the implementation of US global strategy seeking hegemony and the major indication of US "hegemonism".

This article described "US hegemonism" as a new trend in international relations and criticized the United States on five grounds. The article accused the United States of "poking its nose everywhere into the affairs of other countries," and

²⁵⁸ Susan L. Craig, "Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats," (Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007). <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=765>.

²⁵⁹ This is the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and reflects the position of the Chinese government. "On New Development of US Hegemonism" 1999-05-27, *People's Daily*

violating the United Nations Charter as well as international law and international conventions relying on its mighty economic, technological and military strength. The commentary stated that the use of NATO in operations against Yugoslavia outside of its traditional defense area created a dangerous precedent for intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state and the intervention was an implementation of US hegemonic strategy. It pointed that the military alliances of the United States in the West (NATO) and in the East (with Japan) were institutions that were facilitating “US hegemonism” and helping it to build up a US-led global security system. Together with Kosovo, the article specifically mentioned the renewal of the Japan-US defense cooperation, the presence of 100,000 stationed troops in the Asia-Pacific region, US-Japanese initiative for developing the war zone missile defense system (TMD) and building up a missile defense system as reflections of “US hegemonism”. It pointed to the United States’ increasing military investment and developing high-tech weaponry which were indications of US determination to guarantee its absolute superiority in the military area.

The article charged the United States of attempting to guide the international economic new order, and establishing its status as “global overlord” in the economic, trade, science, technology and finance fields. In addition to indicating “US hegemonism”, the commentary stated that the United States launched a new Cold War against the socialist countries and the third world. It argued that the United States disliked China’s adherence to the socialist road and did not want to see China developing into a powerful country. It maintained that the United States aimed to contain socialist countries’ development in political and economic terms. Moreover, the United States was criticized for its interference in the internal affairs of developing countries under the banner of freedom, democracy, and human rights and

for attempting to act as the “human rights judge” and “conducting trials” of developing countries. The article severely criticized the United States and its allies for posing challenges to the widely recognized norms of international law, creating new theories for pushing “hegemonism” and legalizing their “hegemonist” acts under the “signboard of human rights and humanitarianism.”

The commentary published in the media organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party further stated its ‘anti-hegemonic’ sentiments by arguing that the US was “imperialist by nature” and that “US hegemonism” was rooted in domestic and international as well as political and economic factors. It accused “the US ruling clique” for its ambition to maintain the unique status of the United States as “the overlord”. The article argued that “US hegemonism” and power politics were the root causes of the threat to world peace and stability. However, it stated that the United States would not be able to dominate the world, expand its political and economic spheres of influence, and push through neo-colonialism in the post-Cold War era.

Following the NATO operation on Kosovo, another opinion piece published in the *People’s Daily* was entitled “Let History Be a Mirror to Modern Hegemonism”.²⁶⁰ In this article the United States and its allies were compared with the Third Reich and Hitler due to their claimed similarities in pursuing hegemony. It was stated that both “hegemonists” searched for world dominance, made military expenditure and expanded their armed forces, built military alliances and blocs. It

²⁶⁰ Observer Commentary., "Let History Be a Mirror to Modern Hegemonism," *People's Daily (Opinion)* (June 22, 1999). http://www.people.com.cn/english/199906/22/enc_19990622001044_TopNews.html (accessed 02/01/2012). Michael Pillsbury, "China's Perceptions of the USA: The View from Open Sources," *The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/chinperc.pdf (accessed 02/01/2012). David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," *International Security* 24, no. 3 (1999): 78.

further stated that both “hegemonists” wanted to replace the global international organization with military alliances and committed war crimes. The United States was accused of contributing to other nations’ racial problems to sow national discord and bring about their dismemberment because it had sophisticated military force enabling it to do “what it pleased to do.”²⁶¹

In addition to anti-hegemonic statements in commentaries of *People’s Daily* after the Kosovo operation, the Chinese military’s view on US strategic posture and global behavior were similar. In a study on the Chinese military’s view on US strategic posture, it was found that numerous Chinese officials and military analysts defined the United States as a hegemonic and expansionist power with the ambition of global and regional domination.²⁶² According to the study, the intensity of US criticism and attacks increased in the wake of the Kosovo operation.²⁶³ The study found out that the members of People’s Liberation Army considered that the United States was in quest for global hegemony because it dominated international trade and financial systems, started an ideological crusade to enlarge democracies and to subvert states that oppose US foreign policy. They believed that the US led humanitarian interventions, sent US military peacekeeping forces overseas and strengthened its old and new military alliances and defense partnerships for its hegemonic purposes. Additionally, with its increased willingness to use military coercion in pursuit of political and economic goals, its direct military intervention in regional conflicts, its determination to press for arms control regimes on weaker

²⁶¹ In a public protest image depicted in BBC news, a group of Chinese gathered for protesting the bombing of China’s Belgrade Embassy hold placards with the acronym of NATO as Nazis and Terrorists Organization. “China Demands Embassy Attack Inquiry,” *BBC News Online* (May 11, 1999). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/341334.stm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁶² Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security,” 61.

²⁶³ Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security,” 62.

states and its domination and manipulation of regional multilateral security organizations, the United States manifested its search for global hegemony.

In this regard, the United States was defined by hegemonism in China. Except for the Taiwan case, China did not consider a military confrontation with the United States. Its strategy to fight against US hegemonism was based on denouncing the United States as hegemon and delegitimizing its practices by indicating that they violated established rules and norms of international law. The New Security Concept became the foundation of China's anti-hegemonic struggle and the concept became its tool to promote an alternative vision against the US-led order, both of which relied on different conceptions of sovereignty.

4.2.2. China's Official Evaluation on International Security Environment in 2000

The influence of the concern about the US hegemony can be seen in China's official national defense strategy published in 2000. China's National Defense in 2000 is the first white paper after the introduction of the New Security Concept and the Kosovo operation.²⁶⁴ It provides an overall evaluation of how China sees its own security and the international security environment. It also describes the international order that China envisioned for the post-Cold War era. China's 2000 document started by repeating that "the profound international changes in the international system" required the "discard of the Cold War mentality,...the development of a new security concept and a new international political, economic and security order". It stated that for China, peace and security could be guaranteed "only by establishing a

²⁶⁴ "China's National Defense in 2000," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China* (September 2000). http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17524.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

fair and reasonable new international order” in the post-Cold War era. In the document, China underlined that, developing countries that have great potential for growth could promote a “fair and reasonable new international order” as followers of “peace and development”. Obviously, China saw itself as the major candidate for establishing this new order.

The 2000 White Paper pointed to “the relaxation in the international security environment” after the end of the Cold War. According to China, the major powers both cooperated and checked each other’s power. It defined relations among great powers as “complicated” because of “many interwoven contradictions and frictions”. It argued that factors contributing to instability and uncertainty in world affairs were on the increase; therefore, international relations were defined as being “far from peaceful”. In China’s view, there was serious disequilibrium in the distribution of power among states. Although China pointed to the momentum of multipolarity and economic globalization, it underlined that the “old, unfair and irrational international political and economic order” was continuing without any significant change. It argued that “hegemony and power politics” still existed and were developing further. China called for international disputes to be solved by dialogue, consultation and negotiation conducted through the principle of equality.

China’s evaluations of the general state of international security and the great powers’ relations were reflected in its position on the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo in 1999.²⁶⁵ China criticized the Kosovo operation by stating that NATO

²⁶⁵ For the impact of the Kosovo operation on China see: Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," 597-621. Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 3 (2001): 350-357. For reflections of China’s reaction to the Kosovo operation on media see, "China Demands Embassy Attack Inquiry". Observer Commentary., "Let History Be a Mirror to Modern Hegemonism". Observer Commentary., "On New Development of US Hegemonism," *People's Daily (Opinion)* (May 27, 1999). http://www.people.com.cn/english/199905/27/enc_990527001007_Opinion.html (accessed 02/01/2012).

attacks against “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” by-passed the UN Security Council and resulted in “an extremely negative impact” on the international situation and relations between countries. It criticized “certain big powers” for pursuing “neo-interventionism”, a “neo-gunboat policy” and “neo-economic colonialism” and for “damaging [the] sovereignty, independence and developmental interests of many states”. According to China, those “certain big powers” seriously challenged the authority and role of the United Nations in handling international and regional security affairs by using “humanitarianism” and “human rights” to resort to the use of or threat of force. It accused those states as being in “flagrant violation” of the UN Charter and other universally recognized principles governing international relations.

In addition, the document criticized the United States for its policies in the Asia-Pacific region. It stated that the efforts of a “certain country” to develop and introduce the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems were undermining the international community’s efforts to promote the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and disarmament.²⁶⁶ Additionally, it stated its uneasiness with the United States’ decision to strengthen its military presence and bilateral military alliances in the region. The United States’ relationship with Taiwan was China’s most crucial security concern. China held the United States responsible for instilling the “arrogance of the separatist forces in Taiwan”. China viewed three US policies in particular as seriously undermining its sovereignty and security and jeopardizing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. These are, the sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan; the US Congress’

²⁶⁶ China reacted to the US-Japan agreement (signed on August 16, 1999) to conduct research on theater missile defense (TMD) systems in East Asia because the system would destabilize strategic equations in the region. Kori J. Urayama, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan," *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (2000): 599-621.

decision to pass the “so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act”; and US efforts to incorporate Taiwan into the TMD system.

China strongly emphasized that the settlement of the Taiwan issue was “entirely an internal affair”. For this reason, it frequently stated that it opposed “any country” selling arms to Taiwan, entering into a military alliance with it in any form or any kind of interference in the Taiwan issue. Although the document emphasized the “defensive” nature of its national defense strategy, it openly stated that China would resort to the most “drastic measures possible”, including “the use of force” to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and achieve “the great cause of reunification”. It stated that it would use force if Taiwan separated from China, if Taiwan were invaded or occupied or if it refused the peaceful settlement attempts of the Chinese government. Moreover, China reiterated its “absolute determination, confidence, ability and means” to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity without “tolerating, condoning or remaining indifferent” to the realization of any “scheme” to divide its homeland.

The 2000 White Paper underscored China’s priorities to protect its sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and to ensure a peaceful international and regional environment for its modernization and development strategy. However, it pointed out that “the existing and increasingly developing hegemonism and power politics imperil[ed] China’s reunification”. For this reason, China declared its intention to enhance its ability to defend its security priorities. China declared that it would not seek alliance with any state or block of states but would invest in science, technology and industry to increase its “self-reliance”. However, despite the earlier-noted desire to modernize its military, China stated that it would subordinate national defense to economic construction to achieve their coordinated development. In this

regard, economic development was declared to be at the center of China's national strategy unless its sovereignty and unity were endangered. Finally, as rebuttal to prospective criticisms and China-threat arguments, the document made "solemn pledge[s]...never to seek hegemony" and that its development and power would pose "no threat to anyone".

4.3. The Strategic Context Just Before September 11, 2001: The EP-3E Plane Crisis

As discussed above, China already had fears concerning the projection of US power before the Bush administration came to power in 2001. However, the Bush administration's approach to China intensified China's concerns and fears even more. In an article in the *Foreign Affairs*, then US national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice defined China as a "strategic competitor" and "revisionist" power that needs to be contained.²⁶⁷ She stated that China posed a security threat and that the United States needed to contain China using economic interdependence, US military power, and good relations with allies in the region. She reminded China that the United States was a part of the equation when dealing with Taiwan. Apart from regional security concerns, Rice argued that with its record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, China posed an obvious security problem to the United States. Rice stated that China would do what it could to enhance its position, and even steal nuclear secrets for this purpose. In this article, Rice gave a clear sign that the 'China threat' thesis would prevail at least in the next four years under the Bush administration.

²⁶⁷ Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," 4.

The vision of the new US administration did not promise a better future for China-US bilateral relations. China and the Bush administration had their first crisis on April 1, 2001, when an American EP-3E surveillance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet. As a result of the incident the US plane entered and landed at a Chinese air field and the Chinese military pilot died. From the Chinese point of view, the US plane intruded upon China's territorial airspace, encroached upon China's sovereignty in violation of international law, the provisions of relevant laws of China as well as the bilateral consensus that parties reached on May, 2000. China regarded the act as a threat to its national security and demanded that the United States take full responsibility for the incident along with issuing an official apology to the Chinese people.²⁶⁸

Following the incident, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stressed China's consistent position that state-to-state relations, including China-US relations, must be based on such basic norms governing international relations as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.²⁶⁹ The Chinese minister asked the United States to strictly abide with international law and refrain from harming bilateral relations, which would not serve the interests of either country or the world at large.

The United States stated that US pilot did not violate China's sovereignty and the incident took place over international waters because the Chinese pilot flew too close to the US airplane. The United States resisted demands for an apology since

²⁶⁸ "US Side Must Take Full Responsibility for Incident: Foreign Minister," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001; "Chinese Fighter Bumped by US Military Surveillance Plane," *People's Daily*, April 03, 2001, "China Demands Official Apology from US," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; Edward Slingerland, Eric . M. Blanchard, and Lyn Boyd-Judson, "Collision with China: Conceptual Metaphor Analysis, Somatic Marking, and the EP-3 Incident," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 1 (2007): 51, 53–77.

²⁶⁹ "US Side Must Take Full Responsibility for Incident: Foreign Minister,," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001. "Wife of Missing Chinese Pilot Accuses US of Indifference to Life Thursday," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001,

there was no fault and demanded access to the plane and crew. In an opinion piece in *People's Daily*, American politicians were severely criticized for having bad manners, being self-centered, and overtly disregarding foreign people and foreign sovereignty.²⁷⁰ It was stated that the United States did not learn from history, and abandonment of the Clinton administration's agreement with China to work for a constructive partnership, and these provocative actions indicated the Bush administration's failure in appreciating the lessons of history. The newspaper published articles criticizing US hegemony and the continuation of US intelligence activities over China since the Cold War.²⁷¹ The newspaper also gave place to news that stated other states' criticism of the United States for the incident to support its position. For instance, one of the news stories that appeared in the aftermath of the incident reported that Russia acknowledged that US planes spied on the Far East on a daily basis therefore the collision was not a surprise for the Russian defense community.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ "Commentary: Crisis Benefits None," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001.

²⁷¹ "Spying on China Is Not New," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Saudi Arabia Newspaper Criticizes US for Spy Activities on China," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Mexican Public Denounces US Hegemonist Act," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Domineering Action and Hegemonic Logic," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "US Should Bear Full Responsibility for Plane Collision: Overseas Chinese," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Panama Accuses US of Meddling in Internal Affairs," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Madagascar Tribune Condemns US for Plane Collision," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001.

²⁷² "Russia Says US Planes Spy on It on Daily Basis," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Powell Expresses Regret for Loss of Life Chinese Pilot," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "People of Missing Chinese Pilot's Hometown Concerned about Him," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "US Hegemony Condemned in Macao," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "CPF Denounces US Hegemonist Act," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Mother of Missing Chinese Pilot Hopes for His Safe Return," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "US Loses Legal Ground on Aircraft Issue: Legal Daily," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "I Am Proud of My Son"- Father of Missing Chinese Pilot," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "US Fully Responsible for Air Collision: Witness," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Chinese People Continue to Condemn US Hegemonist Act," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001, "10 Fighter Jets Chase Away 5 US Spy Planes," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "US Regret Statement a Positive Step: FM spokesman," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "Thailand Newspaper Urges US to Change Hegemonist Attitude," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "US Uses Cold War Language in Spy Plane Incident, Castro Says," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "CPF Denounces US Hegemonist Act," *People's Daily*, April 05, 2001; "Overseas Chinese in Mongolia Condemn US Hegemonist Act," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "Jiang Zemin: Crew Safe and Sound, US Arrogant Conduct Unacceptable," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "Canadian PM Criticizes Bush's Attitude in Standoff with China," *People's Daily*, April 06, 2001; "Malaysian PM Laments US Spying on China," *People's*

The articles in *People's Daily*, starting from the day of the collision, constantly accused the United States of hegemonism, disregarding international law and bilateral China-US agreements, violating China's sovereignty, and disrespecting basic rules of humanitarianism and human rights violations of which the United States often criticized China. On April 11, 2001, the US Ambassador to China gave a letter to the Chinese Foreign Minister stating that President Bush and Secretary of

Daily, Friday, April 06, 2001; *People's Daily*, "China Demands Official Apology from US," April 06, 2001; "China, US Working Overtime to End Standoff," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "US Diplomats to Meet Spy Plane Crew for the Third Time," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Missing Chinese Pilot's Wife Writes to Bush," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "My Husband Is still Alive: Missing Pilot's Wife," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Gloomy Birthday for Missing Pilot," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "US Must Bear All Responsibility for Collision: Law Expert," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "US Again Urged to Apologize over Plane Collision," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "US Spy Plane Incident Not Isolated Case: Cuban Daily," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "New Zealanders of Chinese Origin Condemn US Hegemonist Act," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Chinese Americans Denounce US Arrogance in Spy Plane Incident," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Chinese Americans Denounce US Arrogance in Spy Plane Incident," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Russia Says US Planes Keep Active Spying on Borders," *People's Daily*, April 07, 2001; "Pakistan Supports China's Stand Over Plane Collision Incident," *People's Daily*, April 08, 2001; "Son of Pilot Wants to See Father," *People's Daily*, April 08, 2001; "Tunisian Paper Condemns US Hegemony over Plane Collision," *People's Daily*, April 08, 2001; "US Must Apologize to China for Air Collision: Iranian Daily," *People's Daily*, April 08, 2001; *People's Daily*, "Chinese Continue Slamming US Hegemonism," April 09, 2001; "Chinese People Continue to Condemn US Hegemonic Act," *People's Daily* April 09, 2001; "US Spy Plane's Aggressive Tricks Told," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "Iraqi Daily Condemns US Hegemony over Plane Collision," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "American Scholar Lambastes US Approach on Collision Incident," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "Chinese Defense Minister: US Must Apologize," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "Australian Newspaper Says US Should Apologize to China," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "Overseas Chinese Residing in Togo Denounce US Hegemonism," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "Bush Sending Letter to Chinese Pilot's Wife," *People's Daily*, April 09, 2001; "US Hegemony Condemned in Cambodia," *People's Daily*, April 10, 2001; *People's Daily*, "US Discuss Settlement of Plane Collision," April 10, 2001; "Missing Pilot's Wife Well Cared for," *People's Daily*, April 10, 2001; "US Diplomats Meet Spy Plane Crew for Fourth Time," *People's Daily*, April 10, 2001; "Nigeria Condolences Loss of Chinese Pilot," *People's Daily*, April 10, 2001; "Chinese Cambodians Denounce US Arrogance in Spy Plane Incident," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001; "FM Spokesman on Letter From US Saying 'Very Sorry'," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001; "Spokesperson on the Letter from the US Government Saying 'Very Sorry' to the Chinese People (Q&A)," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001; "US Side Must Take Full Responsibility for Incident: Foreign Minister," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001; "US Says 'Very Sorry', 24 People to Leave China," *People's Daily*, April 11, 2001; *People's Daily*, "Chinese People Indignant at US Hegemonic Act," April 11, 2001; "Search for Missing Pilot Continues," *People's Daily*, April 11, 2001; "China to Award Model Workers," April 11, 2001; "US Diplomats Meet Spy Plane Crew for Fifth Time," *People's Daily*, April 11, 2001; "The Side Making Mistake in Collision Apologize: Laos," *People's Daily*, April 11, 2001; "Thai Chinese Condemn US Hegemonism, Support Chinese, Stand," *People's Daily*, April 11, 2001; "US Newspaper Raps Washington's Handling of Flight Collision," *People's Daily*, April 11, 2001; "US Spy Plane Did Violate China's Airspace: Powell," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001; "Turn Patriotic Enthusiasm into Strength to Build a Powerful Nation: Commentary," *People's Daily*, April 12, 2001.

State Colin Powell were regretful of the loss of the Chinese pilot and were “very sorry” for entering China’s airspace and landing without verbal clearance.²⁷³

After the ‘very sorry’ message from the United States, in an opinion piece entitled “Turn Patriotic Enthusiasm into Strength to Build a Powerful Nation: Commentary” on *People’s Daily*, China’s evaluation of the outcome of the situation appeared.²⁷⁴ They stated that they carried out a justified, advantageous and restrained struggle against US hegemonism with the support of the international community. The Communist Party of China’s Central Committee with Jiang Zemin was praised for its success in handling the complicated situation, as the crisis was solved with effective diplomatic negotiations and public strategies of relations. The article depicted this success as an initial victory in China’s struggle against hegemony and unipolarity. It was stated that China advocated justice and feared no powers and the Chinese people won the anti-hegemonism struggle by support from the international community. Consequently, before the September 11 attacks, the incident increased China’s insecurities and enhanced its perception of the United States as the hegemon.

4.4. China’s Reaction to the September 11 Attacks

Before the September 11 attacks, China was concerned that “China threat theory” would prevail under the newly elected Bush administration and that the new administration would pursue strategies that would risk China’s security. Nevertheless, September 11 attacks changed the priorities of the Bush administration and it focused on fighting against ‘the terrorist network of global reach’. For the purpose of fighting the terrorist network, President Bush declared that the United

²⁷³ “US Letter to China Says “Very Sorry” for Incident,” *People’s Daily*, April 12, 2001.

²⁷⁴ “Turn Patriotic Enthusiasm into Strength to Build a Powerful Nation: Commentary,” *People’s Daily*, April 12, 2001.

States was at war and invited “every nation, in every region” to support the US war on terror or to accept consequences.²⁷⁵ Although President Bush gave an ultimatum to the states to push them supporting the United States, the same ultimatum provided some states with an opportunity to position themselves with the United States in the war on terror. Moreover, the US administration stated its willingness to reconsider its existing relations with the former and prospective adversaries in light of the United States’ new security considerations. As stated in the NSS 2002, the United States declared that it aimed to forge new, productive international relationships and to redefine existing ones in ways that met the challenges of the century.²⁷⁶ Also, NSCT 2003 repeated the United States’ willingness to reconsider its relations with the major powers by stating that the United States would take the opportunity provided by the absence of great power rivalry and leave past differences behind to recast its relations with the great powers.²⁷⁷

China welcomed the US proposal to leave past differences behind and recast relations against the threat of terrorism and showed its willingness work within this new framework. Likewise the majority of the leaders in the world, just after the September 11 attacks, Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed his deep sympathy and condolences to the US government and people and stated that his government condemned and opposed, as always, all violent activities by terrorists.²⁷⁸ After the first support message to the United States, China clarified its position in the war on terror. On September 12, 2001, the permanent representative of China to the UN, Ambassador Wang Yingfan stated that international terrorism was an open challenge

²⁷⁵ President George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," (September 20, 2001). http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0016.shtm (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁷⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002).

²⁷⁷ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 20.

²⁷⁸ President of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin, "President Jiang Zemin Expressed Condolences to President Bush," (September 11, 2001). <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3712/t19003.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

to the international community.²⁷⁹ Therefore, China would support the United Nations to strengthen its work on preventing and combating terrorism and approve continued cooperation among the member states in a concrete effort to implement anti-terrorist conventions and bring the perpetrators of terrorism to justice. He also underlined that the United Nations and the UN Security Council should play its due role in dealing with international terrorism as the primary responsible organ for maintaining international peace and stability. As stated in the Ambassador's speech, China wanted the fight against international terrorism to be guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other well-established norms of international law.

The Ambassador's statement not only clarified China's approach to terrorism clear but also declared the terms of China's involvement in the fight against terrorism. According to the statement, China would attend international cooperation on terrorism within the framework of the United Nations Charter and the established norms of international law. In China's view, if every state complied with the international anti-terrorism agreements and the UN Security Council resolutions, then international cooperation would be successful. Therefore, in China's view, by way of doing its part in compliance with the agreements, it would be fighting terrorism actively.²⁸⁰ For China, accepting the UN and the UN Security Council as the only international arbiter and enforcer of the international rules and norms, China made a very diplomatic maneuver. China gave the message that it would not be part of an international action organized outside of the United Nations and invited the

²⁷⁹ Permanent Representative of China to the UN. Ambassador Wang Yingfan, "Statement at the Security Council on the September 11th Terrorist Attacks on the United States," (September 12, 2001). <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/counterterrorism/t26901.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁸⁰ Ambassador Wang Yingfan, "Statement at the Security Council on the September 11th Terrorist Attacks on the United States".

United States to act within the realm of the United Nations and its Security Council. Thereby, China hinted that it would not support US unilateral use of force and would not be part of the US-led military coalitions.²⁸¹

In line with this position, when a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman was asked whether China would support the United States and NATO using force against Afghanistan without the approval of the UN or a vote of support by the Security Council, he responded by underlining three specific points. First, the spokesman stated that China always opposed all sorts of terrorism and supported attacks on terrorists. Second, the attacks on terrorist should be built upon valid evidence; the action should have clear targets and should be taken without harming innocent civilians. Third, the action should follow the UN Charter and it should help strengthen the role of the UN and its Security Council. After noting these principles, the spokesman declared that China was ready to discuss any proposals at the Security Council that would be conducive to the fight against terrorism.²⁸²

4.4.1. China's Cooperation with the US on Counterterrorism

The expectations of the United States in terms of China's support were not very high. After a meeting between the foreign ministers of China and the US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that China was an influential state in the region with knowledge and information that might be helpful to the United States.²⁸³

²⁸¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China. H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, "Statement at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly," (November 11, 2001). <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/fk/t28933.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁸² Zhu Bangzao (Spokesman) . "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China - Press Conference " (September 18, 2001). <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/2510/2511/t14746.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁸³ "Secretary Colin L. Powell Remarks with Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan after Their Meeting 2:00 PM; September 21, 2001," (September 21, 2001). http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/state_dept_brief007.asp (accessed 02/01/2012).

When he was specifically asked whether China expressed its explicit support for US military action, Powell stated they did not get into any details of a military component, nor did he ask the Chinese Government what their reaction might be, nor did they suggest to him any participation. Powell underlined that the United States considered a complete campaign which would involve finances, information, intelligence, law enforcement, and possibly a military component and implied that the United States would be satisfied with China's support in these aspects of the US war on terror. As expected by the United States, China provided support to the United States at the UN Security Council, it cooperated on intelligence matters and it acted as diplomatic facilitator in convincing Central Asian states for the US military presence and taking part in convincing North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons. It should be underlined that China's cooperation with the US war on Afghanistan and its support at the UN Security Council was driven by its perception of the war as a legitimate self-defensive act.

To begin with, although China was not one of the states that took an active part in the US-led coalition of the willing states' operation on Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, China supported the war. It supported the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 that recognized the United States' right of self-defense and use of force against Afghanistan.²⁸⁴ In addition, China supported all counterterrorism resolutions passed in the UN. After the initiation of the Afghanistan war, Chinese President Jiang Zemin briefly stated that military strikes should be targeted at specific objectives so as to avoid hurting innocent civilians.²⁸⁵ In addition to its support in the UN, as expected by the United States, China provided intelligence to

²⁸⁴ UN Security Council., "Condemnation of 11 September Attacks against the United States".

²⁸⁵ "Chinese, US Presidents Talk over Phone Monday, " People's Daily, October 08, 2001., http://english.people.com.cn/english/200110/08/eng20011008_81787.html

the US administration and acted as a diplomatic facilitator for US presence in Central Asia.

After the Afghanistan war began, President Zemin and President Bush met on October 19, 2001 for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, President Bush stated China's firm commitment to cooperate in intelligence matters and in interdicting the financing of terrorist organizations.²⁸⁶ In line with its commitments, China enacted domestic regulations to address terrorist financing. As a result of bilateral diplomatic exchanges to discuss the financial and economic dimension of anti-terrorism campaigns, a Financial Counter-Terrorism Working Group was founded between the two states.²⁸⁷ As a result of these exchanges, China supported the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which was designed by the United States to increase the screening of container cargo entering the United States for weapons of mass destruction.²⁸⁸ According to CSI, US custom inspectors would be stationed at the world's top 20 ports that shipped to the United States and they would check the cargo with the local agents before it left for America. Three of the world's top 20 ports are under China's control. By agreeing to control port trade from Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen, China agreed to control two-thirds of its total port trade.²⁸⁹ The opening of the first

²⁸⁶ "US, China Stand against Terrorism Remarks by President: Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability," (October 19, 2001). <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011019-4.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁸⁷ Shirley A. Kan, "US-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy," *CRS Report for Congress* (January 6, 2010). <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33001.pdf> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁸⁸ "China Joins the US in Container Security Initiative," *US Department of Homeland Security* (October 25, 2002). http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/legacy/2002/102002/china_joins_csi_1025.xml (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁸⁹ David M. Lampton and Richard D. Ewing, *The U.S.-China Relationship Facing International Security Crises* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2003), 8.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) liaison office in China was agreed to as a result of the decision for cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement.²⁹⁰

Besides this, China provided crucial diplomatic support to the US war on terrorism in Central Asia. The major phase of the US war on terror was the destruction of al Qaeda camps and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. For military strikes the United States needed close military bases in the region. Therefore, the support of Central Asian states like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was critical for the conduct of operations. In addition to Central Asian states, Pakistan was another key player in the region due to both its borders with Afghanistan and the intimate links between Pakistani intelligence services and warlords and extremists in Afghanistan.²⁹¹

China had good relations with both Pakistan and the Central Asian states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China's relations with the Central Asian states evolved and had economic, political, and military dimensions. Considering China's strategic importance as a great power, Central Asian states also wanted to establish good relations with China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization²⁹² represents the importance that both China and Central Asian states attach to good relations in the region. Despite China's fear of geostrategic encirclement and the importance of the region for China's economic, political, and military interest, China did not oppose US military presence in Central Asia for the operation in Afghanistan in the initial phases of the US counterterrorism campaign. In other words, by not

²⁹⁰ "US Opens FBI Office in Its Beijing Embassy," (October 25, 2002). <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/sggg/fyrth/t34936.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁹¹ Brahma Chellaney, "Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia - the Lessons of History," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001): 106.

²⁹² The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in order to develop good neighborliness and friendly relations, to fight against common threats such as terrorism, extremism and smuggling.

opposing the US presence in the region, China provided a permissive geostrategic environment for the United States.

Likewise, China and Pakistan had long shared economic, political, military ties, including transfer of technology for development of weapons of mass destruction to Pakistan. China's support for the US war on terror and its active encouragement of Pakistan in supporting the United States provided a very valuable contribution to Washington.²⁹³ In his visit to China, General Musharraf stated that "the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy is its close association and relationship with China."²⁹⁴ Chinese President Zemin stated that China supports the role that Pakistan plays in Afghanistan and that it understands and supports the decision Pakistan has made in light of its national interests and the current situation.²⁹⁵ Even though China did not participate in the war in Afghanistan militarily, the accord between China and the United States on the war on terror and their expectations from Pakistan provided military advantages to the United States.

By not putting Pakistan or the Central Asian states in a position to choose between the United States and Beijing, China not only escaped risking its relations with the United States but also reduced the diplomatic cost of US operations in the region. In addition, China took part in dissuading North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. As stated before, the Bush administration considered the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the gravest danger to the United States national security and wanted to prevent the acquisition of WMD by

²⁹³ "Chinese, Pakistani Presidents Hold Talks," *People's Daily*, December 21, 2001.

²⁹⁴ Anthony Kuhn, "Pakistan Reaffirms Its Close Relations with China," *Los Angeles Times* (December 21, 2001). <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/dec/21/news/mn-17005> (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁹⁵ "President Jiang Zemin Holds Talks with Visiting Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf," (June 16, 2004). <http://nl.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/fdkbzy/t138588.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

terrorists.²⁹⁶ For this purpose, the Bush administration's primary strategy was to dissuade states that it defined as "rogue states" or "the axis of evil" from having any transaction with terrorists related to WMD.²⁹⁷ In this context, North Korea, Iran and Iraq were the major targets of the US non-proliferation strategy.

Before the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration criticized China for transferring missile and chemical weapons technology to these states.²⁹⁸ In the post September 11 environment, however, China pursued more reassuring strategy on non-proliferation strategy and showed open cooperation with the United States. To begin with, China took substantial domestic steps to enhance the security of nuclear materials, increase the security of its nuclear facilities, and improve its management of control of radioactive sources.²⁹⁹ In addition to the domestic regulations, China underlined the importance of international agreements and its membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty to promote participation in international non-proliferation agreements and to give diplomatic support to the non-proliferation regime.³⁰⁰

China also supported US non-proliferation strategy within the context of the war on terror in its international relations. China actively took part in dealings with

²⁹⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 13. President George W. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point United States Military Academy " (June 1, 2002). www.usma.edu/class/2002/2002_graduation_speech.html (accessed 02/01/2012).

²⁹⁷ President George W. Bush, "The President's State of the Union Address," *The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C.*, (January 29, 2002). <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (accessed 02/01/2012). Colin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (2004): 22-34.

²⁹⁸ David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," *Survival* 42, no. 1 (2000): 112. Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance," 67. Adam Ward, "China and America: Trouble Ahead?," *Survival* 45, no. 3 (2003): 47-50.

²⁹⁹ "China's National Defense in 2002," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China* (December 2002). <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012). Yunhua Zou, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A View from China," *Nonproliferation Review* 13, no. 2 (July 2006): 253-273.

³⁰⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China., "China's Non-Proliferation and Export Control Laws and Regulations (1980-2007) " <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/fksflfg/t141341.htm>.

North Korea. It played an active diplomatic role in the crisis between the United States and North Korea, which arose in 2002 when North Korea declared its uranium-enrichment program, withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reactivated its nuclear facilities frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Bush administration stood for a hard line policy against North Korea. President Bush stated that "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens."³⁰¹ The Bush administration believed that North Korea was more susceptible to diplomatic pressure than Iraq because it was dependent on outside assistance. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that the North Koreans were desperately in need of help from the outside. The United States had leverage on North Korea that it did not have on Iraq.³⁰² In his meeting with the Chinese President in 2003, President Bush said that the Chinese had a lot of influence over North Korea and probably in many ways more than the United States had.³⁰³

The leverage that the US administration thought China had over North Korea was Korean dependency on China's food, energy, and economy. The United States also put international pressure on North Korea and emphasized that North Korea risked the security of the other states in the region. In this regard, the United States called for a multilateral approach.³⁰⁴ Considering its own national interest such as: achieving denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, maintaining peace and stability in the region, and preventing the United States from unilateral involvement in the

³⁰¹ George W. Bush, "The President's State of the Union Address".

³⁰² Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, "Policies Diverge on 2 in 'Axis of Evil'," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2002.

³⁰³ President George W. Bush, "President Bush's Meeting with Chinese President: Background Press Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on the President's Meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao," (June 1, 2003). <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030601-4.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁰⁴ "US Urges Asia to Press N Korea," *BBC News* (May 31, 2003). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2952206.stm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

region, China played a major role in responding to US insistence upon Asian countries to jointly put pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear plans so that the crisis can be resolved peacefully.³⁰⁵ After the United States showed its determination to act preemptively to prevent the use and development of weapons of mass destruction with the war on Iraq, China decided to play a more active role in convincing North Korea. In April 2003, China initiated a series of multilateral talks.³⁰⁶ China constantly stated that it favored peaceful resolution of the situation and made diplomatic effort to prevent the United States from using military methods to halt North Korea's sales of weapons of mass destruction and other controlled items.³⁰⁷ As expressed by Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department at the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Liu Jieyi, China considered military action against North Korea as "an attempt to shoot a mosquito with a cannon, which would cause worse collateral damage and would miss the mosquito."³⁰⁸

4.4.2. China and US National Missile Defense System

In the wake of September 11 attacks, the Bush administration declared that it would build a National Missile Defense system. China reacted to the decision of the

³⁰⁵ Kong Quan (Spokesperson). "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China - Press Conference " (June 10, 2003). <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/2510/2511/t14746.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁰⁶ The first of the talks was held among China, the US, and North Korea. Even though, the talk proved unproductive, a six party talk was hosted by Beijing in August 2003 with participation of the People's Republic of China; the Republic of Korea (South Korea); the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); the United States of America; the Russian Federation; and Japan. After the fourth round of talks, North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan. Sean McCormack (Spokesman) . "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing," (September 19, 2005). <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/northkorea/state/53490.pdf> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁰⁷ Wang Yi, "Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Six-Party Beijing Talks," *A Joint Interview by Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily, CCTV, CRI and China Daily* (August 26, 2003). <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/cjkk/cjjblc/jhhwx/t85353.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁰⁸ John Pomfret, "China Wary of Weapons Searches: Country Won't Be Transit Point for N. Korean Arms," *Washington Post* (August 23, 2003). <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A34407-2003Aug22?language=printer> (accessed 02/01/2012).

Bush administration to withdraw from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and build a National Missile Defense (NMD) system as a necessity for defending the United States against terrorist attacks because China evaluated US decisions on the ABM treaty and NMD as actions having a negative impact on international arms control and the disarmament processes as well as on the global strategic balance.³⁰⁹ President Zemin evaluated the development of a NMD system as an attempt to ‘harm security interests of any side on related affairs’ and US strategy for seeking global supremacy.³¹⁰ Despite US efforts to ensure China that the NMD system would not target China, China’s concerns over the issue remained unchanged even after the September 11 attacks.³¹¹

On September 11, 2001 when the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman was asked “Don’t you think the NMD under studies is of no use after the happening of the terrorist attacks?” the spokesman stated that China’s stand on NMD was explicit and remained unchanged.³¹² Presenting the Chinese view on the use of the NMD system on terrorists, the opinion piece published in the organ of the Chinese Communist Party argued that the conception of NMD was to protect the United States from threats from outside of the territory of the United States or in outer space but the occurrence of the September 11 incident has proved that NMD could not

³⁰⁹ President George W. Bush, "President Discusses National Missile Defense," (December 13, 2001). <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html> (accessed 02/01/2012). "China Against US NMD System," *People's Daily*, December 04, 2001. http://english.people.com.cn/200112/04/eng20011204_85942.shtml, "FM Spokeswoman: China Concerned over US Planned Withdrawal from ABM," *People's Daily*, December 14, 2001, http://english.people.com.cn/200112/13/eng20011213_86618.shtml

³¹⁰ *People's Daily*, "China Willing to Open Dialogues with US on NMD: FM Spokesman," September 04, 2001 http://english.people.com.cn/english/200109/04/eng20010904_79342.html

³¹¹ "Rice to Visit China to Brief US's Stand on NMD," *People's Daily*, September 03, 2001. http://english.people.com.cn/english/200109/03/eng20010903_79184.html,

³¹² "China's NMD Stand Not Changed: FM Spokesman," *People's Daily*, September 14, 2001. http://english.people.com.cn/200109/14/eng20010914_80230.html

completely be put into use for the realization of these purposes.³¹³ Also, as Friedberg mentioned, Chinese scholars and observers also expressed the view that the use of airplanes as weapons of mass destruction demonstrated the futility of building expensive high technology defenses against ballistic missiles and the missile defense system would be the least cost-effective way to attain security for the United States.³¹⁴ By emphasizing the uselessness of the NMD against terrorists and rogue states, China expressed that it found US argument on the necessity of the NMD system as a defense project against terrorists and rogue states groundless. However, knowing the Bush administration's sensitivity on nuclear weapons and terrorism, China did not want to risk improving relations with the United States and itself by opposing the United States.

4.5. China's Gains from the Cooperation with the United States

In the China-US counterterrorism cooperation, the United States was not the only benefiting party. China also benefited from its cooperation with the United States against the terrorists.³¹⁵ The most practical gain for China was that it was able to align its counterterrorism strategy with the US campaign and had the US fight against the Taliban that China accused of supporting Uyghur separatists. Before the betterment of relations with the United States, China was constantly being criticized by the United States due to its treatment of Uyghur extremists. After the September 11 attacks, China started to emphasize that it opposed all sorts of terrorism and that

³¹³ "Opinion: Terrorist Attack on US: Turning-Point in Post-Cold War Pattern," *People's Daily*, September 17, 2001. http://english.people.com.cn/english/200109/14/eng20010914_80248.html

³¹⁴ Aaron L. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations," *Survival* 44, no. 1 (2002): 38.

³¹⁵ On US-China relations after September 11 see; Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," 97-115. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations," 33-50. Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance," 57-78. Ward, "China and America: Trouble Ahead?," 35-56.

there should be no double standards in cracking down on all kind of terrorism.³¹⁶ In other words, it wanted the United States not to criticize China for its counterterrorism strategy at home. Although after his meeting with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that there would be no *quid pro quo* for Chinese support³¹⁷ or later President George W. Bush stated that the war on terror must never be an excuse to persecute minorities,³¹⁸ the US criticisms against China declined.³¹⁹

In the meantime, Chinese authorities argued that Uyghur ‘terrorists’ had transnational links and were connected to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Their attempts in persuading the US to identify the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization succeeded in August 2002.³²⁰ Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly defended the US decision concerning ETIM because ETIM’s link to Al Qaeda was based on evidence and ETIM used violence against civilians. Kelly argued that this move was “not as a concession to the PRC.”³²¹ In addition to accepting ETIM as a terrorist organization, as a result of the betterment of the relations with China, the United States supported China’s membership to the World Trade Organization and China eventually became a member of WTO in 2002. Moreover, the Bush administration started to waive some of the sanctions imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Crackdown, which related to the export of defense

³¹⁶ Zhu Bangzao (Spokesman) . "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China - Press Conference ".

³¹⁷ "Secretary Colin L. Powell Remarks with Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan after Their Meeting 2:00 PM; September 21, 2001".

³¹⁸ "US, China Stand against Terrorism Remarks by President: Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability".

³¹⁹ Rosemary Foot, "Bush, China and Human Rights," *Survival* 45, no. 2 (2003): 180.

³²⁰ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002," (United States Department of State, April 2003). <http://www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/crt/2002/pdf/> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³²¹ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, "US-East Asia Policy: Three Aspects: Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center," (December 11, 2002). <http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0212b&L=dosdo&P=978> (accessed 02/01/2012).

articles and services, crime control equipment, and satellites to China.³²² The United States also resumed military to military contacts with the People's Liberation Army and held defense consultative talks with China.³²³

Nevertheless, the most significant gain for China became the betterment of its relations with the United States. The US-China cooperation strengthened China's role as a great power as the United States asked China to play a larger role dealings with Central Asian states, Pakistan, and North Korea. From China's perspective, the Bush administration respected China's status as a great power and considered China as an asset to establish and maintain international peace and security rather than following the "China threat" line. During its cooperation with the United States on Afghanistan, China considered that it was treated as a great power and its interests were respected. The betterment of relations with the United States reflected on China's evaluation of international security and its perspective was document in *White Paper on China's National Defense* in 2002.

4.6. China's Official Evaluation on International Security Environment in 2002

As stated in the previous chapter, China evaluates its own security in relation to the international security environment and the security practices of the United States. Likewise similar documents, the 2002 White Paper on China's National Defense³²⁴ provided China's evaluation of its national security in the international security environment led by the United States. The document began by reiterating the significance of peace and cooperation for development and progress and

³²² Kan, "US-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy".

³²³ Kan, "US-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy".

³²⁴ "China's National Defense in 2002".

underlined that China would endeavor to cultivate the New Security Concept. It stated China's determination to act as a "staunch force to create an international environment defined [by] peace, stability and security". It declared that China would pursue "the policy of peaceful development", an "independent foreign policy of peace" and a "defensive" national defense policy to secure national and international security. Thereby, China underlined that its rise should not be considered as threat to a international security.

On international security, the document mentioned the presence of "the profound changes towards multipolarization and economic globalization" that had taken place in the past two years. It noted the presence of "fierce competition among major powers" to increase their capabilities. In this regard, it defined economic development, scientific and technological progress and increasing "comprehensive national power" as "strategic trends" in international relations.³²⁵ The 2002 White Paper put special emphasis on "the extensive applications of new and high technologies" in the military field and argued that these applications created a "new serious disequilibrium" in "the balance of military power".³²⁶ According to the Chinese leadership, the military technological gap constituted a serious challenge to developing countries' efforts to safeguard their sovereignty and security.

The paper further characterized the international environment as having increasing "uncertainties impeding peace and development" and "far from being tranquil". It repeated the contention that "the major powers, while cooperating with

³²⁵Comprehensive national power is Chinese concept that takes all political, economic, military, scientific, historical and societal factors into consideration in determining a nations' strength. Comprehensive national power is about survival, development and international influence. Therefore, it is different from Western definition of national power, which basically emphasizes economic, military and political factors. Li Changjiu, "Commentary: Augmenting Comprehensive National Strength, Safeguarding World Peace," *People's Daily*, June 30, 1999.

³²⁶ "China's NMD Stand Not Changed: FM Spokesman," *People's Daily*, September 14, 2001; "Rice to Visit China to Brief US's Stand on NMD," *People's Daily*, September 3, 2001.

and seeking support from each other, are nonetheless checking on and competing with each other” and criticized the “old”, “undemocratic”, “unfair” and “irrational international political and economic order” in which “new manifestations of hegemonism and power politics” were present. However, it acknowledged that the major powers had “stepped up their coordination and cooperation” since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It noted that a new world war was “unlikely in the foreseeable future” but that non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, transnational crimes, environmental degradation and drug trafficking increasingly posed threats to international security.

Under the influence of the September 11 attacks and the international security environment, the 2002 paper specifically defined terrorism as the “real threat to both global and regional security” and stated that China opposed “all forms of terrorism, separatism and extremism”. On counterterrorism, China delicately stated its concerns while stressing the importance of “international cooperation, dialogue and consultation in [the] fight against terrorism” rather than US unilateralist tendencies. In addition, it underscored that efforts against terrorism must eradicate both the “root causes” and the “symptoms” and should rely on “conclusive evidence” and “clear targets”. In addition to a military solution, China demanded a comprehensive approach, including the solution of the development problem, narrowing the North-South gap and ending regional conflicts.

Furthermore, it underlined that any action taken against terrorism must be aligned with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter as well as the universally acknowledged norms of international law. In this regard, China believed that the UN and its Security Council should lead all actions so that their long-term implications did not damage global peace and security. Finally, it warned that the fight against

terrorism should not be confused with a fight against a specific nation or religion. In addition, the paper noted that there should not be “dual standards” in fighting terrorism; all states must condemn terrorist attacks regardless of whom they are directed against and regardless of the form they appear. In addition, China outlined its cooperative efforts, especially within the framework of the UN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to fight against terrorism. China also took the opportunity to emphasize its role in passing and implementing a series of resolutions and conventions on anti-terrorism. Pointing to its contributions, China underscored its image as a responsible major power in the context of the global war on terror.³²⁷

4.7. China and the Iraq War

China pursued a very careful opposition to the United States on Iraq. Before the United States took action against Iraq, China underlined diplomatic efforts to solve the Iraq problem within the framework of the United Nations.³²⁸ On October 2002 in Texas, President Bush and President Zemin discussed the Iraq issue and Bush stated that he urged President Zemin to support a new Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq to fully disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction.³²⁹ On November 8, 2002, China supported the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which stated that Iraq will face “serious consequences” if inspections were not permitted.

³²⁷ Alistair Millar, "Implementing the UN General Assembly's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Security* 3, no. 3 (2007): 181-203.

³²⁸ "China's Stance and Diplomatic Effort to Solve Iraq Issue," (March 3, 2003). <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/ljzg/zgwjzc/t85882.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³²⁹ President George W. Bush, "President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea: Remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Press Conference," (October 25, 2002). <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021025.html> (accessed 02/01/2012). "US Welcomes New UN Resolution: Bush," *People Daily* (February 07, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200302/07/eng20030207_111305.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

However, after voting for the resolution, China, Russia and France made a joint declaration stating that the resolution “excludes any automaticity in the use of force.”³³⁰ The Chinese government summed up its stance on the Iraq issue in four points: First, it would support political solution of the Iraq issue within the framework of the United Nations and would use all means possible to avoid war. Second, it would support strengthening of the UN arms inspectors in Iraq to implement the UN Resolution 1441. Third, it would call Iraq to fully and strictly comply with the relevant UN resolutions and honor its promises of not possessing any weapons of mass destruction. Finally, it emphasized that sovereignty, independence, and integrity of territories of Iraq should be respected.

On February, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations Security Council and stated that the United States was informed about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, involvement in terrorism and violation of UNSC Resolution 1441 and other resolutions and repeated the US demand for a final Security Council resolution for the use of force against Iraq.³³¹ China’s answer to the United States call for a new Security Council resolution was stated in Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Vice-President Hu Jintao’s meetings with US Secretary of State Colin Powell during his visit to China February 23-24, 2003.³³² In these meetings, the Chinese side emphasized that along with most of the members of the international community, China believed the priority at the current stage should be

³³⁰ "Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China, France and the Russian Federation," *Iraq/UNSCR 1441* (November 8, 2002). <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Iraq-UNSCR-1441-Joint-statement-by.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³³¹ Colin Powell, "Iraq: Denial and Deception," *US Secretary of State Addresses the U.N. Security Council* (February 5, 2003).

³³² "China's Stance and Diplomatic Effort to Solve Iraq Issue". "Chinese Vice-President on Sino-US Relations," *Xinhua News Agency* (February 24, 2003). <http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/56596.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012). "Chinese Fm, US Secretary of State Meet on Dprk, Iraq Issues," *People Daily* (February 24, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200302/24/eng20030224_112207.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

the continuation of arms inspection in Iraq to find out the truth, rather than working on a new UN resolution on Iraq.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin had bilateral contacts with heads of Russia, France and Germany, whose positions also did not change after a presentation of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Security Council. China, along with other states opposing the use of force against Iraq, underlined the responsibility to take every step to avoid war and should jointly maintain the credit and authority of the United Nations. All agreed on the issue of arms inspection in Iraq and on the need for urging Iraq to further explain and clarify the questions raised by the inspectors.³³³ In March 2003, Russia, France, and Germany made another joint statement saying that inspections were producing positive results and they would not “allow a draft resolution authorizing the use of force to go through.”³³⁴ China also joined the other three powers’ joint statement and supported their position. However, the United States acted with the coalition of the willing states and initiated war on 20 March, 2003 without the authorization of the UN Security Council.

4.7.1. China’s Reaction to the Iraq War

China adroitly managed the diplomatic process before the Iraq War started on 20 March 2003 and let European states take the lead in the opposition against the United States. On the day of the military operation against Iraq, the Foreign Ministry of China issued a statement which said the United States and other countries had

³³³ "Russia's Position on Iraq Unchanged after Powell's Speech," *People Daily* (February 07, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200302/07/eng20030207_111273.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012). "France Says Position on Iraq Unchanged," *Xinhua News Agency* (February 7, 2003). <http://china.org.cn/english/international/55136.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³³⁴ "Iraq - Joint Statement by Russia, Germany and France," (March 5, 2003). <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Iraq-Joint-statement-by-Russia.html> (accessed 02/01/2012). "China's Stance and Diplomatic Effort to Solve Iraq Issue".

launched the operation bypassing the UN Security Council.³³⁵ The Chinese government underlined the efforts it made for political settlement of the Iraq issue within the UN framework, urging the Iraqi government to fully and earnestly implement Security Council resolutions and called for respect to Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity by the international community, which refers to the United States and allies. China argued that Security Council Resolution 1441 was an important basis for political settlement and it was a widely held view in the international community that the strict implementation of Resolution 1441 could deny Iraq weapons of mass destruction through peaceful means.

It can be inferred from the statement that China regarded the war on Iraq as an unnecessary war. In the statement, China stated that its position in international disputes was to search for settlement through peaceful means and reject the use or threat of force.³³⁶ China called together the relevant countries to stop military action and return to the right path of seeking a political solution to the Iraq question. China raised its concerns regarding the war in three aspects.³³⁷ First, China was concerned because the operation was waged disregarding most of the countries and bypassing the United Nations Security Council. Second, China was concerned about the humanitarian consequences of the war on the Iraqi people and the profound influence military action might bring to regional and global peace. Third, China stressed the importance of maintaining the unity and authority of the UN Security Council in resolving the Iraq issue.

³³⁵ "Chinese Fm Issues Statement on Iraq Question," *People Daily* (March 20, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/20/eng20030320_113662.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

³³⁶ "China Strongly Calls for Immediate Stop of Military Actions against Iraq," *People Daily* (March 20, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/20/eng20030320_113636.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

³³⁷ "China Strongly Calls for Immediate Stop of Military Actions against Iraq".

Besides official statements, Chinese views on the Iraq war were reflected in commentaries which appeared in *People's Daily*. The paper wrote that the real reasons behind the Bush administration's starting the war against "so-called" security threats in a preemptive way were the US desire to maintain its superpower status, to ensure US control over the oil supplies, and to attract votes in upcoming presidential elections. It was pointed out that although the United States started the war in the name of anti-terrorism, there was not sufficient reason to support the unilateral US military action. It was stated that the United States has not provided any hard evidence to prove Iraq's collaboration with Al Qaeda and proof that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks. Also, it was stated that the majority of the states did not believe that Iraq posed a military threat to the world. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, the war on Iraq was an extension of US global strategy searching for military and ideological domination.³³⁸

The commentary also argued that the war did not have legitimacy or moral strength because it was started without the approval of the UN and the international community. The article underlined that the United States' disregard of the strong voice of objection was the objective evidence of the existence of power politics in present day international relations. It suggested that major powers' opposition to the Iraq war mirrored the multipolar tendency's containment of unilateralism and its limitations. The commentary pointed out that although the war had a regional character, it could cause uncertainties about the future of the world.

Another opinion piece published in the *People's Daily* marked March 20, 2003 as the day when international law was replaced by bombs in dealing with

³³⁸ "Oil and Votes, Two Factors Fueling the War: Analysis," *People Daily* (March 26, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/21/eng20030321_113703.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

regional and global conflicts.³³⁹ It argued that the war shattered confidence in justice and international law and lacked legitimacy. It underlined that US action created a precedent for the settlement of international conflicts in the future and made international law the first casualty of the war. It stated that President Bush's authority over the international community caused the invasion of a sovereign country and created clear breach of UN and international law. The article further argued that the United States has challenged the efforts made in the past half century to create an effective international structure and replace perpetual war with peace. The article maintained that if attempts for such international structure would be abandoned, nations would need to depend on their security and military might, which implied that the United States was forcing other states to engage in power politics and arms race.

A week later, *People's Daily* commented that the Iraqi war would not only change the destiny of the country but also had a profound impact upon the world order and the international status of the United States.³⁴⁰ The article posed the idea that with the US war on Iraq the authority of the United Nations was weakened. The article argued that the United States' failure to show a clear link between terrorists and Iraq led the United States to confront the major states, including China, Russia, and its Cold War allies like France and Germany. The commentary stated that the Iraq war was an example of the United States' desire to control and dominate international relations, which according to the article would bring "American issue" into the agenda of the world.

³³⁹ "International Law First Casualty of US Action," *People Daily* (March 26, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/21/eng20030321_113688.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁴⁰ "Iraqi War Has Potential to Reshape World Order," *People Daily* (March 26, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/26/eng20030326_114017.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

In addition to the commentaries published in *People's Daily*, the articles in the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, which was established to provide the Central Government with policy recommendations, dealt with the 'American issue' and evaluated the meaning and implications of the Iraq war for China in particular and for the international system in general.³⁴¹ The articles published in the Institute's journal evaluated the US war on Iraq as an expression of the deep-seated US strategic scheme for strengthening US predominance and creating favorable conditions to establish a new unipolar world under its domination.³⁴² It was argued that implementing the preemptive war doctrine on Iraq, the United States violated the relevant UN resolutions and put the authority of the UN in danger. More importantly, it violated the fundamental principles of the UN Charter such as respect for the sovereign equality of all UN members, the principle of settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, it was argued that the United States endangered international peace, security and justice.³⁴³

The publications of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs defined the regime change in Iraq as an example of US hegemony. They argued that imposing democracy was a part of US grand strategy for the establishment of a new political and economic order of its design. It was argued that, as illustrated by the example of Iraq, small and weak nations could no longer master their own destiny and feel secure. Small and weak states would need to follow US prescriptions. It was stated that the United States was acting as a "world cop" and as an "international

³⁴¹ The general purposes of CPIFA at its inception were to study foreign policies and international issues and provide the Central Government with suggestions on foreign policy.

³⁴² Sheng Qiang, "Three Major Strategic Objectives Pursued at Present by the US as Revealed from the Iraq War," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, no. 68 (June 2003).

³⁴³ Zhang Zhiming, "Promoting Democracy in International Relations," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, no. 68 (November 2005).

dictator”.³⁴⁴ They suggested that international peace did not depend on the increase of the democratic states in the system as the Bush administration advocated. Instead, they suggested that peace would come by democratizing international relations that was under unipolar hegemony.

In addition, Zhiming argued that the US war on Iraq aimed to harm its rivals’ economic and military development, which was again a part of the US grand strategy based on preserving its dominance. The articles in the journal of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs underlined that with the Iraq War, the equilibrium among great powers was threatened because by dominating Iraq, the United States gained the advantage over the oil resources in the Middle East. In this context, the increased presence of the United States in Central Asia, which was defined as the rising star of oil resources, started to be evaluated in relation to the United States’ domination of Iraqi oil. This created a deep security concern in China, whose grand strategy was based on peace and development. As understood from the articles, the war on Iraq was also an American attempt to hinder China’s rise and prevent multipolarization of international relations.

However, Chinese scholars writing for the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs argued that the Iraq war played a significant role in accelerating the process of multipolarization despite the United States’ efforts to prevent it. Liu Baolai, former ambassador of China to the United Arab Emirates and Jordan and current Secretary General of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, stated that the struggle among great powers in the region was a miniature version of international rivalry.³⁴⁵ He suggested that the divide between the United States and

³⁴⁴ Zhiming, "Promoting Democracy in International Relations."

³⁴⁵ Liu Baolai, "Impact of the Iraq War on the Middle East Situation," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, no. 68 (November 2005).

France, Germany, Russia and China should be considered as a sign of emerging multipolarization of international relations and a push for multilateralism against the United States.³⁴⁶ Consequently, it can be argued that China's evaluation of the US war on Iraq within the framework of its war on terror China to intensify its perception of the United States as hegemon and increased China's insecurities regarding its status in international relations under unipolarity.

4.7.2. China's Official Evaluation on International Security Environment in 2004

Written after the Iraqi War, the 2004 white paper on China's National Defense³⁴⁷ raised issues that were very much influenced by China's reaction to and evaluation of the war. The document started by pointing to the simultaneous existence of opportunities for and challenges to peace and development. The opening statements reflected the spirit of the New Security Concept and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It argued that "unless diverse civilizations, social systems, and development models live together harmoniously, trust each other and engage in cooperation", international opportunities could not be taken advantage of and challenges could not be overcome. As before, China implied that international cooperation, peace and stability relied on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

China's evaluations of the international security environment of the previous two years focused on the impact of the Iraqi War.³⁴⁸ The 2004 document pointed to the increase of factors contributing to "uncertainty, instability and insecurity" in

³⁴⁶ Baolai, "Impact of the Iraq War on the Middle East Situation." Yang Danpin and Jiang Liangguo, "Impacts of Iraq War on World Pattern," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, no. 68 (November 2005).

³⁴⁷ "China's National Defense in 2004," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China* (December 2004). <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁴⁸ "Iraqi War Has Potential to Reshape World Order".

international relations. The document stated that “multipolarization and economic globalization” were deepening despite “twists and turns”. It noted “new and profound changes” in the balance of power among the major global players; the major powers were “in the process of realignment” and involved “in the redistribution of interests”. In this context, it underscored the necessity for developing countries to promote a “multipolar world” and “democratized international relations” and repeated its call for the establishment of a “fair and rational” new international political and economic order. Moreover, the paper claimed that “hegemonism and unilateralism gained new ground” in the struggle for “strategic points, strategic resources, and strategic dominance”. In this regard, it stated that “the Iraqi War has exerted a “far-reaching influence on the international and regional security situations”.

Compared to previous documents, which emphasized economic factors, the 2004 document emphasized the role of military factors in international configuration and national security. It noted that the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was now worldwide and that forms of war were changing; in addition to traditional confrontations on the battlefield, it mentioned “asymmetrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations” as new methods. It noted that the major powers were readjusting their security and military strategies by developing high-tech weaponry, military equipment and new military doctrines. It argued that this tendency further increased the military imbalance among states, which in turn made military power in protecting national security more compelling. Although China did not name the United States specifically, it implied its discomfort with the practice of a preemptive war doctrine and the high-tech warfare capability in the Iraqi War.

The 2004 document addressed the intertwined nature of traditional and non-traditional security issues, stating that geopolitical, ethnic, religious and other conflicts interacted with political and economic contradictions and resulted in local wars and armed conflicts. Highlighting the growing danger that stemmed from the combination of traditional and non-traditional threats, the document put more emphasis on the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as “major factors affecting the international security situation”. China stated that issues such as “terrorism and WMD,” “radioactive weapons” and “observance of international treaties on disarmament and arms control and non-proliferation” should be discussed and settled within the multilateral arms control framework. China’s request for the use of multilateral efforts on the non-proliferation issue was a diplomatic move to prevent the repetition of the experience of the Iraqi War in the North Korean³⁴⁹ or Iranian³⁵⁰ cases.

China addressed the prolonged existence of unipolarity vis-à-vis multipolarity among the major factors that influenced its security. Referring to Taiwan’s independence, China declared its determination to safeguard its national sovereignty and security “no matter how the international situation may evolve, and what difficulties it may encounter”. However, it underlined that China’s rise should not create “concerns” because it only relied on its own capabilities for development. Implying that it was not pursuing balancing strategies, China restated that its rise posed “no obstacle or threat to any one”. It repeated that its increased power would

³⁴⁹ On North Korea’s demilitarization; See, Andrew Scobell, “Making Sense of North Korea: Pyongyang and Comparative Communism,” *Asian Security* 1, no. 3 (2005): 245-266. On North Korea’s relations with the US; See, Dong Sun Lee, “US Preventive War against North Korea,” *Asian Security* 2, no. 1 (2006): 1-23. Robert Scalapino, “North Korea - Challenge for the Major Powers,” *Asian Security* 3, no. 1 (2007): 2-11.

³⁵⁰ On China’s role in the Iranian Nuclear Program; See, Nicolo Nourafchan, “Constructive Partner or Menacing Threat? Analyzing China’s Role in the Iranian Nuclear Program,” *Asian Security* 6, no. 1 (2010): 28-50.

be an asset to the international environment and it would “never go for expansion” or “ever seek hegemony”. China underlined that it needed a peaceful international environment for its development and that it would act to enhance international peace and stability. It pledged to follow an “independent foreign policy of peace” and a “national defense policy of [a] defensive nature” to contribute to peace, development and international cooperation.

4.8. China-US Relations after the Iraq War

In the wake of the Iraq War, the Bush administration made diplomatic efforts to gain major powers’ support in the UN Security Council for Iraq’s reconstruction. Despite its opposition to the war, China cooperated with the United States on passing UN Security Council resolutions such as 1472 on adjusting the oil for food project, 1783 on lifting UN sanctions on Iraq, 1500 on welcoming the Iraqi Governing Council, 1511 on Iraqi postwar reconstruction, and 1546 on the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government.³⁵¹ Like other members of the UN Security Council, China welcomed the US decision to act within the United Nations’ multilateral framework. However, the Bush administration demanded more cooperation from China on international affairs and invited China to be a “responsible stake holder in international affairs”.³⁵²

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who delivered the speech inviting China to be a responsible stakeholder, stated that it would be easier to handle the

³⁵¹ UN Security Council resolutions 1472, 1783, 1500, 1511 and 1546 available on <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>

³⁵² International Goldman Sachs Group. Robert B. Zoellick, "From the Shanghai Communiqué to 'Responsible Stakeholder'," *Remarks at "The China Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond"* Peterson Institute (May 2, 2007). <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=733> (accessed 02/01/2012).

wide range of global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and poverty if the United States and China cooperated. Deputy Secretary of State urged China to suggest that it should adjust its foreign policy to “less focus on national interests and more on sustaining peaceful prosperity,” contribute to reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq and further cooperate in applying greater pressure on Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear programs. He also stated that China should refrain from maneuvers towards a “predominance of power” in Asia and “openly explain its military priorities, doctrines and intentions.”³⁵³ Despite Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s criticisms, the speech was well-received in China and considered as an invitation from “the biggest developed nation” to “the world’s biggest developing nation”.³⁵⁴ China evaluated the introduction of the “stakeholder” concept as a sign of the changing mentality of the Bush administration, which previously defined China as a “strategic competitor.”

This rapprochement reflected on China’s evaluation of the international environment in its white paper on national defense document in 2006. Like others, this document started by reiterating China’s dedication to peace and development. In order to refute views that saw China’s military strategy and modernization as a potential threat,³⁵⁵ China stated that it was pursuing a path of “peaceful

³⁵³ Richard Baum, "Zoellick's Roadmap and the Future of US-China Relations," *NBR Analysis* 16, no. 4 (2005): 18-19.

³⁵⁴ "New Vocabulary Ushers China-US Relations into Global Scenarios," *People Daily* (December 22, 2005). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_229941.html (accessed 02/01/2012). "Zoellick: 'Stakeholder' Concept Offers New Direction," *China Daily* (January 25, 2006). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/09usofficials/2009-05/22/content_7932826.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁵⁵ China reacted to the publication of the Pentagon’s *Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China* because the report stated China’s military modernization was “ambitious” and its motivations were “unknown.” See, Office of the Secretary of Defense., *Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2005)* (Washington, D.C., July 2005), 13-14. In addition, the document answered Former Secretary Rumsfeld who in his speech to the Asian Security Conference in Singapore defined China’s military buildup as “a concern,” because China was not really facing any threats that would justify its military modernization. The document intended to answer Rumsfeld’s remark by underlining China’s peaceful intentions and

development” and building close ties with the rest of the world as “never seen before”.³⁵⁶ It strongly maintained that China’s fundamental national interests and the common interests of the world were complementary. In this regard, China endorsed its national defense strategy and military modernization as part of mutually enforcing processes of national and global security. Hence, the document repeated that it would not “engage in [an] arms race” or “pose a military threat to any other state”. The document strongly emphasized its persistent efforts in following a peaceful development strategy, fostering a cooperative relationship based on mutual benefit and promoting common security in a multilateral international framework.³⁵⁷

In evaluating the previous two years in the international security environment, China stated that although uncertainties and destabilizing factors existed, there were more opportunities than challenges. The world was at a “critical stage, moving toward multipolarity”. The relations among the major powers proceeded mainly on the basis of the balance-of-power dynamic; but there were also notable coordination and “practical cooperation” efforts. The 2006 paper noted that China expected progress in addressing serious imbalances in the international strategic alignment; there had been increasing dialogue on traditional security issues as well as a higher level of cooperation on non-traditional security issues. It also noted increasing multilateralism and the strengthened status of the UN in

defining its ‘legitimate’ security concerns. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld’s Remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,” (June 04, 2005). <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3216> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁵⁶ For repercussions of the Pentagon’s report in Chinese state-owned Chinese media, see Xin Benjian, “Pentagon’s ‘China Threat’ Paranoia,” *People’s Daily*, July 22, 2005; “The Pentagon plays up ‘China threat theory,’” *People’s Daily*, 27 June 2005; “Why does US preach ‘China military threat’?” *People’s Daily*, June 15, 2005; *People’s Daily*, “For what does US over-estimate China’s military power?” *People’s Daily*, May 28, 2005.

³⁵⁷ Gilbert Rozman, “Post Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional Institutions in Northeast Asia,” *The Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 66 (2010): 605-620.

international affairs. In this atmosphere, China viewed a world war or major confrontation between great powers as “avoidable for foreseeable future”.

On traditional security affairs, the document still cited the presence of “hegemonism and power politics” as key factors in international relations. Nevertheless, in the overall evaluation, the paper noted a broadened international security agenda, including issues in the social, energy, natural resources, finance and information spheres. It highlighted the presence of comprehensive, diverse and complex security threats and pointed to the intermingled nature of political, economic and security problems with geographical, ethnic and religious conflicts. More specifically, it called attention to non-traditional security threats such as local unrest, the impact of economic globalization on international terrorism, natural disasters, international crime and environmental degradation. In particular, it emphasized military competition based on “informationization”, which meant the production and application of information and communication technologies (ICT) in all spheres, including industry, education, culture and agriculture.

The 2006 White Paper also focused on the “complexities” in the Asia-Pacific region. First, it defined the situation regarding the non-proliferation of WMD as “grave and complex” in general. It warned that the international non-proliferation regime faced major challenges because of “the practices of a small number of countries that have intensified their military alliances and resorted to force or threats of force in international affairs”. It specifically stated that North Korea’s nuclear weapon test made the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia more challenging. Among regional “complexities”, China highlighted that “new strategic alignments” among the major countries brought “new changes in the hotspots in the region”. The paper stated that the United States was enhancing its military capability

in the area and expressed China's discomfort with the strengthening of US-Japan military ties.³⁵⁸ It reiterated its position on Taiwan's independence by defining it as "a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territory" and as a threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. China criticized the US policies because although the United States had stated it would adhere to the "one China" policy, it continued to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan and strengthen military ties with it.³⁵⁹

The most significant event in 2008 influencing international relations was the US mortgage crisis. Therefore, the 2008 White Paper on China's National Defense³⁶⁰ placed more emphasis on economic integration between China and the rest of the world than previous documents had and stated that the success of China's economy played a crucial role in making China an important member of the international system.³⁶¹ It underlined that US mortgage crisis had a "snowball impact" on

³⁵⁸ On the development of a joint US-Japan theater missile defense system on regional security; See, Jonathan Monten, "Theater Missile Defense and Japanese Nuclear Weapons," *Asian Security* 1, no. 3 (2005): 285-303. On the future of China-Japan relations; See, Yinan He, "Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry? Commerce, Realpolitik, and War Memory in Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations," *Asian Security* 4, no. 2 (2008): 162-197.

³⁵⁹ The mentioning of the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective" in the US-Japan Security Statement in 2005 increased China's security concerns. Charles Snyder, "US, Japan Reaffirm Pledge on Taiwan," *Taipei Times* (May 03, 2006). <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/05/03/2003305851> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁶⁰ Information Office of the State Council, "China's National Defense in 2008," *Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China* (January 2009). http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁶¹ For scholarly discussion on whether China's economic success under authoritarian political system can replace the Western model of modernization; See, Suisheng Zhao, "The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?," *The Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (2010): 419-436. Barry Naughton, "China's Distinctive System: Can It Be a Model for Others?," *The Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (2010): 437-460. Scott Kennedy, "The Myth of the Beijing Consensus," *The Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (2010): 461-477. Also see, Tony Karon, "Why China Does Capitalism Better Than the US," *Time World* (January 20, 2011). <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2043235,00.html#ixzz1isunHipG> (accessed 02/01/2012). Fukuyama stated that "President Hu Jintao's rare state visit to Washington this week comes at a time when many Chinese see their weathering of the financial crisis as a vindication of their own system, and the beginning of an era in which US-style liberal ideas will no longer be dominant. State-owned enterprises are back in vogue, and were the chosen mechanism through which Beijing administered its massive stimulus. The automatic admiration for all things American that many Chinese once felt has given way to a much more nuanced and critical view of US weaknesses – verging, for some, on contempt. It is thus not surprising that polls suggest far more Chinese think their

international finance. In this regard, China once again underlined the interconnectedness of opportunities and risks in the global economy. The document underlined that China could neither develop in isolation from the rest of the world nor could the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China. Taking economic interconnectedness as its starting point, China stressed that it would pursue a path of peaceful development, carrying out reforms, modernization and opening-up strategies.³⁶² As before, China stated that it would follow an independent foreign policy and a national defense policy based on protecting its territory and its people and building a harmonious world with other states.

On the international security situation, the document first stressed the increased momentum of “economic globalization and multipolarization”. It defined industrialization and informationization as the major forces of economic globalization, economic interdependence and interaction among states. The document noted that “the rise and decline of international strategic forces accelerated” and the major powers continued to both cooperate and check one another’s power. Regarding the balance of power dynamics, China pointed out “the rise of a group of new states among the developing states”, which implied the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (known as BRICS). Because of this change, China predicted profound readjustments, such as multipolarization, in the international system. In addition, the document highlighted the increase of common

country is going in the right direction than their American counterparts.” Francis Fukuyama, “US Democracy Has Little to Teach China,” *Financial Times* (January 17, 2011). <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb6af6e8-2272-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Qi26D983> (accessed 02/01/2012).

³⁶² Reviewing the past decade of media and specialists’ assessments regarding China’s rise and its implications for US leadership in Asia, Sutter argued that media and specialist started to bring more comprehensive and balanced assessments about China’s rise and decline in the US leadership. See, Robert Sutter, “Assessing China’s Rise and US Leadership in Asia—Growing Maturity and Balance,” *The Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 65 (2010): 591-604.

interests in the field of security, which enhanced the prospects of international cooperation.

Despite the emphasis on the positive dynamics of the international security environment, China also underlined multiple difficulties and challenges, stating that the struggle to dominate strategic resources and locations increased with hegemonism and power politics. In the 2008 document, China reiterated the increasing influence of military security elements in international relations due to international competition in comprehensive national power based on informationization and the RMA. The document underlined how, influenced by the US National Missile Defense system, strategic nuclear forces, military astronautics, missile defense systems and global and battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance gained strategic priority in “some” powers’ (implying the United States) efforts to strengthen their military capacities.

In this framework, it highlighted how “some” developing countries (implying North Korea and Iran) were making efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and increase their military power. In the final analysis, China warned against the emerging specter of a regional arms race and defined such tendencies as a serious threat to international peace, arms control and non-proliferation regime. Moreover, it emphasized that international uncertainties and destabilizing factors had had a negative impact on China’s national security and development. It pointed again to the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan, citing them as a threat to China’s national security and regional stability. In the end, China reiterated that it would adhere to the New Security Concept and continued to pledge that it would “never seek hegemony and engage in military expansion, no matter how developed it becomes”.

4.9. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the impact of the US war on terror on China's security understanding. For this purpose, it initially focused on the evolution of China's security understanding by primarily looking at China's white papers on its national defense from 1998 to 2008. It underlined that China's security understanding has centered on three major issues: preserving China's national integrity and domestic stability, sustaining its economic development, and gaining a prestigious international status. In this regard, it underscored that China pursued an international strategy based on safeguarding a peaceful international environment so that it could improve its national economic, political, social and military fields. In China's security understanding the idea that the state of the international environment was connected to the future of China prevailed. Therefore, the chapter emphasized that the evolution of China's security understanding relied on the international environment as much as it did on national conditions. In this regard, it concluded that China's security understanding was comprised of its evaluations of international events in terms of their implications on China's political unity, economic development and global status.

In this regard, the chapter maintained that the US primacy as the most significant factor in shaping China's security understanding and evaluations of international relations. It discussed US primacy as the underlying cause of China's insecurities, that failed to preserve its national unity, lagging behind in economic development and being prevented from gaining great power status. In this context, the chapter evaluated that the introduction of the New Security Concept as an attempt to promote an international order that would rely on principles in line with China's security interests. The international order that China promoted as an alternative to

the US-led order relied on the principles of a very ‘thick’ conceptualization of sovereignty. That is, as defined by China, all states were equal regardless of their size of their power and no state by no means should intervene in other’s domestic affairs, violate its territorial integrity and engage in aggression. Also, China advocated that in case of the breach of international peace, the decision to intervene should be taken under the authority of the UN and its Security Council. In this regard, it was concluded that China introduced and promoted the New Security Concept as a part of its strategy to contain the United States by delegitimizing its practices that in China’s view violated the principles of the concept. It discussed the US military cooperation with Taiwan and Japan, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the US criticisms on China’s human rights records and its stance on China’s membership in the World Trade Organization as cases in which China’s perception of the United States as hegemon was instantiated and China denounced the United States for acting as an hegemon.

Having explained China’s security understanding, the chapter explained China’s reaction to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which were the most significant part of the US war on terror conducted under the Bush administration. It underlined that China’s approach to counterterrorism was shaped in accordance with its security understanding, which demanded the US fight against terrorist networks to be conducted under the authority of the UN and its Security Council. Agreeing on the legitimacy of the war on Afghanistan, China supported the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the war and did not oppose the United States’ decision to operate war with a coalition of the willing states. The Chapter underlined that the betterment of the relations with the United States influenced China’s evaluation of international relations and its position vis-à-vis the United States positively. China

considered its great power status was respected and recognized by the United States; thereby, international relations got closer towards multipolarity.

Looking at China's reaction to the Iraq War, it was argued that the US decision to wage a preemptive war on Iraq without waiting for a UN Security Council resolution revived China's fears about the United States. It was stated that China considered the Iraq war as an unnecessary and illegitimate war and it evaluated the war as part of the US strategy to preserve its primacy and hinder the rise of great powers, thereby, prevent multipolarization of the international structure. It maintained that the war increased China's sense of being contained militarily, politically and economically by the United States. From the United States' disregard of other powers' concerns before waging the war, its bypass the UN Security Council to the expected results of the war, every step of the war was considered as a direct threat to China's great power status and related interests. It was underpinned that as a response to these developments, China's stance against hegemonism and power politics intensified and the country showed its dissatisfaction with the US-led global order, calling for a democratized, fair and rational new order.

However, the Chapter maintained that China's complaints and dissatisfaction with the US-led order decreased when the United States cooperated or consulted with China and thus changed its evaluations of the international security environment. The Chapter showed that improved relations with the United States after the 9/11 attacks, the responsible stakeholder speech or the financial crisis of 2008 led China to focus on cooperation in the international security environment. Although China never gave up its demand for a multipolar order, changes in China's evaluation of international security environment and the United States showed that China's major concern has not been mainly US preponderance. China's major concerns under unipolarity have

been the United States' self-interested and unilateral practices, which meant the US disregard for the UN Security Council and China's great power status and interests. The UN Security Council in which great power assumed special roles and responsibilities regarding the international system represented China's ideal international order was represented. Therefore, it can be suggested that if the United States acts within the framework of the UN Security Council then China's perception of threat regarding its status might decrease. The decreased perception of threat is expected to result in decreased demands for democratized and fair international relations. China might put less interest in pursuing costly strategies of balancing the United States because unipolarity with multilateralism in practice means multipolarity for China.

CHAPTER V

RUSSIA'S SECURITY UNDERSTANDING AND THE US WAR ON TERROR

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of the US war on terror on Russia's security understanding. For this purpose, the initial part of the Chapter discusses the formation of Russia's security understanding by analyzing the Russian Federation's national security and foreign and military policy documents since 1993, when the Russian Federation published its first national security document. Looking at these documents, it shows how Russia's security objectives, interests and vulnerabilities are intertwined with its perception of its status vis-à-vis the United States. The Chapter underlines that similar to China, Russia's national security strategy relies on preserving Russia's national integrity, recovering its economic development and regaining its great power status in international relations. It shows that since the end of the Cold War, how certain security practices of the United States such as encouraging NATO enlargement, the Kosovo operation, and undermining of the arms control regime pose threats to Russia's great power status.

Later, the Chapter focuses on Russia's reaction to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as major phases of the US war on terror. It underlines that Russia's reaction to Afghanistan differs from its reaction to the Iraq War. The Chapter maintains that the

Iraq war enhanced Russia's insecurities and its perception of the United States as a hegemonic state. The Chapter underscores that Russia is disturbed by US unilateralism, which in Russia's view took place when the United States bypassed the UN Security Council and disregarded Russia's status and interests as a great power. The Chapter maintains that the Iraq war revived Russia's insecurities originating from losing its superpower status vis-à-vis the United States. Finally, the Chapter concludes that while the US cooperation and multilateralism in the Afghanistan war had a positive impact on Russia's evaluation of the state of international relations, US unilateralism in the Iraq War had the opposite effect on Russia and enhanced its perception of threat from US primacy. It points out that although Russia's relations with the United States got better in the wake of the Iraq war, Russia's experience suggests that international institutions or other states cannot hinder the United States from acting unilaterally. In other words, Russia learned that multilateralism in a unipolar world is a temporary state at the discretion of the United States. Therefore, although it seems that Russia will accommodate US multilateralism in the near future, it is likely that Russia might take steps in realizing multilateral international relations by forming a multipolar structure.

5.2. Russia's Security Understanding after the End of the Cold War

5.2.1. Formation of Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vulnerabilities and the US

At the end of the Cold War, the United States remained the sole superpower and its grand strategy was designed to preserve its dominant position in the system. Russia, on the other hand, lost its superpower position and started the new era with a multifaceted domestic crisis. Struggling to accommodate the rapid and dramatic changes in the domestic and international realms, Russia sought to form a new foreign policy that would help to recover its domestic weaknesses and its international status. Under the pressure of economic, political, and social domestic problems, Russia's foreign policy mainly concentrated on foreign economic relations with the West.³⁶³

Considering economic recovery as the most significant factor in Russia's overall improvement, Russia started to prioritize political and economic integration with the West, particularly the United States. The first post-Soviet Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev became the founder of Russia's Western-oriented strategy and stressed that in the new era, Russia would define its foreign policy based on national interest rather than international class interests.³⁶⁴ He talked of Russia as a 'normal great power' and stated that Russia's national interest lied in cooperation with the West, not in confrontation.³⁶⁵ He classified the developed Western countries as Russia's natural allies and argued that Russia should integrate into the ranks of other

³⁶³ Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign-Policy Alternatives," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 7.

³⁶⁴ Sangtu Ko, "Change of US-Russia Relations after the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," *Global Economic Review* 31, no. 2 (2002).

³⁶⁵ Thomas Ambrosio, "From Balancer to Ally? Russo-American Relations in the Wake of 11 September," *Contemporary Security Policy* 24, no. 2 (August 2003): 4. Richard Sakwa, "'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics," *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2008): 241–267.

nations by adopting the same system of principles such as individual rights, a free market economy and democracy.³⁶⁶

These objectives led Russia to dedicate special attention to its relations with the United States in the new era because Russian foreign policymakers saw the United States as a point of reference on the road to democracy and a free market economy.³⁶⁷ In the article entitled 'A Transformed Russia in a Transformed World', Foreign Minister Kozyrev defined the Cold War era as an artificially developed confrontation with the United States and stated that he did not see any reason that would prevent both states from developing fruitful relations in the future.³⁶⁸ The Foreign Minister showed his determination to build better relations with the United States in the post-Cold War era stating that Russia did not believe the idea that the United States would dictate its will on Russia as the sole superpower. He criticized such thinking arguing that it would lead to the recurrence of old stereotypes. Kozyrev stated that Russia did not threaten anyone and believed that no developed democratic civil society could pose a threat to Russia.³⁶⁹

In the early 1990s, as the Foreign Minister Kozyrev argued Russia remained a 'normal great power'³⁷⁰ and that it perceived a benign international environment that would allow Moscow to concentrate on its domestic agenda. Kozyrev gave priority to Russia's participation in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which later became the World Trade

³⁶⁶ Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 3 (1994): 59-71. also cited in Andrei P. Tsygankov, "New Challenges for Putin's Foreign Policy," *Orbis (Philadelphia)* 50, no. 1 (2007): 154.

³⁶⁷ Tom Casier, "Putin's Policy Towards the West: Reflections on the Nature of Russian Foreign Policy," *International Politics* 43, no. 3 (2006): 396.

³⁶⁸ Thomas Ambrosio, "The Non-Material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the Transformation of Russian Security Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy* 27, no. 2 (2006): 267.

³⁶⁹ Ambrosio, "The Non-Material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the Transformation of Russian Security Policy," 267.

³⁷⁰ Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992): 59-71.

Organization and establishing close relations with the G-7 and then the European Community.³⁷¹ Russia's search for integration to the international organizations was part of Moscow's search for economic help from the Western institutions and showed its willingness to be an open market economy and a democratic state. The linkage between Russian integration strategy and its domestic recovery plans showed the 'domestic' orientation of Russia's foreign policy.³⁷²

However, in 1991, Russian foreign policy became subject to very severe criticism in domestic politics because Russia acted together with the West against the Serbs after the collapse of Yugoslavia.³⁷³ Russia's clear position in the UN Security Council on reinforcing the arms embargo against Yugoslavia, its support for the deployment for peacekeeping forces in Croatia, its open criticisms against Serbian attacks on Croatia and finally the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in mid-February 1992 increased domestic criticism against President Yeltsin and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.³⁷⁴ Critics argued that Russia had betrayed its Slavic brothers and its geopolitical interests for the sake of a Western oriented foreign policy understanding.³⁷⁵

This process triggered a debate on Russia's national interests and its foreign policy orientation. According to Andranik Migranyan, who is an influential foreign policy thinker, the foreign policy strategy designed to follow the West disregarded Russia's national interests and formulated its foreign policy aims and national

³⁷¹ Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign-Policy Alternatives," 19.

³⁷² Eugene B. Rumer, "Chapter One: A Foreign Policy in Transition," *Adelphi papers* 47, no. 390 (2007): 14.

³⁷³ Ambrosio, "The Non-Material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the Transformation of Russian Security Policy," 267.

³⁷⁴ Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, "Democratization and Foreign Policy Change: The Case of the Russian Federation," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 64.

³⁷⁵ Ambrosio, "The Non-Material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the Transformation of Russian Security Policy," 271.

interests distinctly.³⁷⁶ Similarly, Alexei Arbatov, another major foreign policy scholar who supported Kozyrev together with Migranyan until the split over foreign policy, criticized Kozyrev's foreign policy for having four major deficiencies. According to Arbatov, Kozyrev's foreign policy did not define national interests and priorities and failed to recognize that Russia's priority was to build its relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union, and not with the West or the United States. He argued that Kozyrev's foreign policy created the impression that Russia constantly gave unilateral concessions to the West without any tangible political and security gains. Moreover, he argued that Kozyrev's foreign policy approach did not really rely on substantial support from the domestic constituency.³⁷⁷

As the criticisms against Russian pro-Western foreign policy increased, Russian foreign policymakers gave in to those who underlined that Russia has been a great power and an independent actor in international relations. By the end of 1993, the dominant voice in Russian foreign policy became those who argued that Russia should act according to its interests.³⁷⁸ The first *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* was written under the influence of this group and the document underlined that it was vital that Russia's foreign policy be guided by fundamental interests not by ideological stances.³⁷⁹ According to the document, the essence of Russian foreign policy was determined by the following priorities:

- the use of political means to ensure Russia's security in all dimensions, including sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, strengthening of stability along the Russian borders, in the regions closest to home and in the world as a whole;

³⁷⁶ Cited in Ambrosio, "The Non-Material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the Transformation of Russian Security Policy," 270.

³⁷⁷ Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign-Policy Alternatives," 19-26.

³⁷⁸ Margot Light, "In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology," *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 19, no. 3 (2003): 45.

³⁷⁹ Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities* (New York: CEU Press, 2005), 31.

- protection of the rights, dignity and well-being of the Russian citizens; ensuring favorable external conditions for strengthening democratic reforms by promoting civil society;
- mobilizing the financial and technological support to build an efficient market economy, developing Russian manufacturers' competitiveness and securing their interests in the world markets by assisting the resolution of internal social problems;
- building relations with the CIS states and other countries of the near abroad on an equal basis, and maintaining the strategic course toward partnership and allied relations with states that helped Russia solve its problems;
- securing its role as a great power within the global balance of influence, in such multilateral processes as regulation of the global economy and international affairs.³⁸⁰

Having defined its priorities, the document provided the assessment of post Cold War international relations and discussed Russia's place in a changing world. The document underlined that the end of the Cold War would not in itself bring about stabilization of the world in which Russia still saw its military and status as important factors both resolving and escalating the conflict. The interaction of the conditions created after the dissolution of the bipolar order and the newly emerging power centers were defined as the most significant condition that would shape the post-Cold War order. As argued in the document, the leading powers or groups of powers would tend to rearrange the political structure of global affairs and make efforts to secure their own sphere of influence even by means of using power. Russia underlined regional integration similar to Europe and argued that this regional integration would create 'polycentrism' of world politics (the US, Western Europe, Japan, and states claiming the roles of regional leaders). This 'polycentrism' was expected to create a struggle with the present order as the United States had ambitions to maintain its predominance.³⁸¹

³⁸⁰ Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 31.

³⁸¹ Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 29.

In addition to forecasting an international order based on power competition, the document also underlined the fact that the end of the Cold War brought about the end of ideological struggles and created new opportunities for constructive relations at the global level. It signified the importance of international cooperation within the UN and other organizations. Russia argued that protection of Russia's interests through economic, diplomatic, military and other means would constitute the foundation of its foreign policy and it would pursue equal partnership with its neighbors and the leading democratic and economically developed nations. According to the document, the basic condition for partnership was defined as the promotion of its interests not its ideology.

The international environment was defined with elements of conflict and cooperation and Russia argued that its geopolitical situation dictated the need to conduct an active, pragmatic, and balanced policy in many areas. Russia underlined that its revival depended on the success of its ability to answer intermingled problems in national and international spheres. First and foremost, the document stated that the crisis in the former republics of the USSR posed security problems due to their direct impact on Russia's security. Referring to the Central Asian states' rapprochement with Turkey, Russia stated that some states were seeking to rely on the nations close to them in ethno-social, religious, economic respects, including those states that historically competed with Russia for influence in the region. In order to deal with this geopolitical environment, Russia declared its intention to assert the principles of international law such as respect for minority rights and establishing neighborly relations through persuasion or even power in extreme cases. Russia also argued that Eastern and Central European states were searching for a new place in international relations and were attempting to draw the West into Russia's

spheres by striving to be members of the Western institutions like NATO. Russia pointed out the importance of continuation of their relations with Russia for their recovery from economic and social crisis.

In addition to the ‘near abroad,’ Russia underlined that its relations with the United States would remain at the top of Russia’s foreign policy due to the status and weight of the United States.³⁸² It was argued that development of full-fledged relations with the United States would help Russia facilitate the creation of a favorable environment necessary for conducting internal economic reforms. The document mentioned both sides’ intention to enhance cooperation. However, it also warned against the domestic tendencies in the United States favoring isolationism and attempting to preserve the unilateral advantages in the process of disarmament such as having the ABM treaty revised on their terms. Russia declared its intention to promote steady relations with the United States, with a view to strategic partnership and eventually to an alliance. Russia also openly stated its decision to oppose the United States relapsing into a policy of imperial ambitions or its attempt to become the ‘sole superpower’. Russia underlined that there were no antagonistic disagreements in bilateral relations and despite the presence of controversies, they would not lead to a confrontation as both sides’ long term national interests dictated such a “realist course of policy”.³⁸³

Russia gave importance to economic cooperation with the United States as it would help the successful implementation of reforms and promote favorable economic conditions for Russia’s foreign trade without getting involved in trade and economic war with the world’s leading economic centers. Russia also asked for US support at international negotiations on the USSR’s foreign debts, on the elimination

³⁸² Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 27.

³⁸³ Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 27.

of discriminatory restrictions on Russia, and requested US cooperation in scientific and technological spheres. In addition to this, Russia stated that it would make efforts to develop a joint strategy to open up its markets and would strive to seek the US administration's support for Russia within the G-7 group.

In addition to its expectations from bilateral relations in the field of economy, Russia stated the importance of bilateral relations in the sphere of security. Russia emphasized the importance of cooperation at the level of military planning and military construction. Also, it stated that Russia was ready to resolve problems such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and to join peacekeeping operations in an integrated effort with the United States. In addition, Russia declared that its top priority was to acknowledge that Russia was the engine for market reform and the guarantor of democratization within the post-Soviet space. Therefore, the United States should see Russia as the main actor in the region while actively involved in resolving conflicts and protecting human rights in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic states.

Being prudent on the political implication of the relations with the United States, Russia stated that it was important that the expansion of bilateral interaction and development of partnership should not undermine Russia's independent role. The document underlined that Russia's interests must be protected and its priorities taken into account in bilateral relations. Escaping from direct reference to relations with the United States, Russia noted that it did not regard any state *a priori* as hostile or friendly; instead, it underlined that it would establish relations with nations whose cooperation with Russia might be instrumental in resolving Russia's problems and developing Russia's long-term interests.³⁸⁴ Russia made it clear that its cooperation

³⁸⁴ Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 31.

was permanent as long as it served its interests and international status. Russia also answered to domestic criticisms on its cooperation with the United States by stating that its cooperation could not be characterized as ‘payment’ for economic help.³⁸⁵

Overall, as revealed in the *Foreign Policy Concept* of 1993, Russia’s vulnerabilities stemmed from its declined international status and the huge power gap with the United States, which at the same time played a definitive role in shaping its foreign policy priorities and principles in the post-Cold War era. Russia saw cooperation with the West and good relations with the United States as a part of its strategy to overcome its vulnerabilities and revive its domestic and international position. However, Russia’s need for international cooperation did not undermine its demands to be respected as an equal partner whose concerns and interests should be taken into account in international affairs, especially regarding the ‘near abroad.’ NATO enlargement, the Kosovo and Chechnya wars became crucial reference points for Russia to test its new partners on whether they would take into account Russia’s concerns and interests.

5.2.2. NATO Enlargement

NATO’s decision to expand the organization towards the former Soviet area has been a significant issue in Russia’s bilateral relations with the United States. In the 1997 Military doctrine, Russia identified “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security” amongst “the basic existing and potential sources of military danger.”³⁸⁶ NATO expansion was perceived as the exploitation of Russia’s weakness and

³⁸⁵ Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 31.

³⁸⁶ Melville and Shackleina, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, 107.

concessions for the interests of the West.³⁸⁷ Also, Russia opposed NATO enlargement based on the arguments that it would damage Russia's economic, political, and military interests and would isolate Russia by forming a European defense organization without Moscow.³⁸⁸ Despite Russia's opposition and the lively political and academic debates on the implications of NATO's enlargement for the region, the decision for NATO enlargement was declared in January 1994 at the Brussels Summit.³⁸⁹ This decision was supported by the idea that NATO enlargement would promote stability and democracy in East and Central Europe.³⁹⁰

Seeing that it would not be able prevent NATO's enlargement, Russia focused on brokering a special agreement that would be commensurate with its great power status and would provide it with privileged consultation rights in NATO's future actions in its regions.³⁹¹ Russia had already started to negotiate for a special status with NATO when a crisis erupted after NATO's threat to use force against the Serbs to protect Bosnia.³⁹² Assuming its national interest coincided with the Serbs, Russia had strived to prevent NATO action and played a significant role in

³⁸⁷ Fergus Carr and Paul Flenley, "NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 15, no. 2 (1999): 2, 96.

³⁸⁸ Martin A. Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?*, 1st ed., (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) (London, New York: Routledge, 2006).

³⁸⁹ The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival* 37, no. 1 (1995): 34–52. Michael MccGwire, "NATO Expansion: 'A Policy Error of Historic Importance'," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 23–42. John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement," *Survival* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 145–151.

³⁹⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed : The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 164. Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (2001): 49. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Electing to Fight: Emerging Democracies and International Instability," in *NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Aurel Braun, (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series) (New York: Routledge, 2008). MccGwire, "NATO Expansion: 'A Policy Error of Historic Importance'," 24.

³⁹¹ Martin A. Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination? NATO-Russia Relations, 1991–2002," *European Security* 11, no. 4 (2002): 61.

³⁹² Jim Headley, "Sarajevo, February 1994: The First Russia-NATO Crisis of the Post-Cold War Era," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 209–227.

convincing the Serbs to withdraw their weapons away from Sarajevo, which was declared a safe area by the UN. However, Russia's efforts only delayed NATO's operation against the Serbs until July 1995. The fact that NATO members did not give an advance warning to Russia caused the NATO members to think that Russia would break off its relations with NATO. However, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that Russia was interested in developing serious relations with NATO so that surprises and unilateral measures, especially military ones, could be ruled out in those zones where NATO and Russia would have to cooperate closely.³⁹³

After a long diplomatic processes, NATO and Russia agreed on the Individual Partnership Programme within the Partnership for Peace, known as the '16+1' formula, in May 1995. In the 16+1 formula, Russia was promised greater and more embedded consultation rights with NATO and its members. More significantly, NATO members took a political decision not to proceed with enlargement until the Russian parliamentary and presidential elections, which were scheduled for December 1995 and June 1996.³⁹⁴ In the wake of these elections, in 1996, Yevgeny Primakov, who was known as a foreign policy hawk, replaced Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

This change brought about significant implications for Russian foreign policy because Primakov's dominance in Russian foreign policy-making consolidated the positions of those who advocated an independent foreign policy commensurate with Russia's great power status.³⁹⁵ Primakov's foreign policy followed three main principles: to pursue Russia's national interests, to restore Russia's position as a great

³⁹³ Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?*, 61.

³⁹⁴ Carr and Flenley, "NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations," 2, 92. Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?*, 66.

³⁹⁵ Ambrosio, "From Balancer to Ally? Russo-American Relations in the Wake of 11 September," 6.

power and to promote a multipolar system.³⁹⁶ In line with these principles, Primakov argued for the need to develop a more equal relationship with the United States in which Russia's interests would be respected and the United States would be constrained from acting unilaterally.³⁹⁷ Not surprisingly, Primakov's policy demands toward NATO reflected these principles.

Along these lines, Primakov made three demands that would protect Russia's interests and prevent Russia's compromise to NATO enlargement.³⁹⁸ First, NATO should not install nuclear weapons or support infrastructure on the territory of the new members. Second, the eastward movement of NATO military infrastructure should be kept at a minimum, or preferably should not take place at all. Third, Russia demanded that NATO should rule out an enlargement policy towards the Baltic States or any other former Soviet countries. NATO responded to Russia's demands and made the political pledge that NATO would not change its nuclear posture and assured that it did not have the intention, plan, or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.³⁹⁹ With this assurance, Russia-NATO relations found a political ground to institutionalize their relations with the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation'.

The fact that the Founding Act did not grant a veto right to Russia led the Russian government to be severely criticized.⁴⁰⁰ Critics stated that the West treated

³⁹⁶ Casier, "Putin's Policy Towards the West: Reflections on the Nature of Russian Foreign Policy," 387.

³⁹⁷ Thomas Ambrosio, *Challenging America's Global Preeminence : Russia's Quest for Multipolarity* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 67.

³⁹⁸ Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?*, 68.

³⁹⁹ McGwire, "NATO Expansion: 'A Policy Error of Historic Importance'," 40. Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?*, 69.

⁴⁰⁰ Smith, *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?*, 73. Carr and Flenley, "NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations," 100-102.

Russia as a defeated power and shown its place by not granting it a veto power over NATO's decision and convicting Russia to follow the decisions taken without its consent, as it was the case with the G-7 and EU. It was argued that the Russia-NATO Council did not provide an effective mechanism for European security. It was argued that the Founding Act and its mechanisms created a false image that Russia's interests and concerns had been respected along with Russia's great power status.

Russia's governmental perception of the Founding Act was positive.⁴⁰¹ Russia considered the signature of the Act provided it with a moral ground for defending its interests and showed that NATO respected Russia's rational security concerns. Besides, in Russia's view the Founding Act provided a structure for cooperation by establishing a permanent council for discussion of the problems on the basis of consensus. In the agreement, both sides agreed to respect the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining peace and security, to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. Therefore, even though Russia did not get a veto right gave it a sense of control over NATO's use of force as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a veto right.⁴⁰²

In the wake of the NATO enlargement process, in 1997, Russia publicized its first *National Security Concept* where it formulated the most important guidelines, principles constituting the foundation of the Russian Federation's national

⁴⁰¹ Carr and Flenley, "NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The Founding Act on Mutual Relations," 100-102.

⁴⁰² "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France," (May 27, 1997). http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

security.⁴⁰³ The document stated the main goals of the Russian Federation were to consolidate Russia's position as a great power and one of the influential centers of the emergent multipolar world. In the document defined international developments that had a direct and negative impact on Russia's national security. These threats were the lack of progress in developing a universal and comprehensive security model for Europe, NATO's eastward expansion, and the lack of effectiveness in the existing peacekeeping and security mechanisms.

In spite of these negative developments, Russia's evaluation of its international situation in the 1997 document was not pessimistic because of the development of new relations with major powers. A peaceful and cooperative foreign policy line with major powers like the United States, European Union, China, Japan and India was crucial for Russia's domestic recovery. For this purpose, Russia regarded the absence of an immediate military threat as an opportunity so that it could redistribute its resources to deal with the domestic problems. However, although Russia regarded the situation as an opportunity, the document put emphasis on the principle of equality and national interest in cooperation with the major powers. As the agreement with NATO did not harm Russia's sense of equality and preserved its interests, Russia's evaluation of international affairs focused on preservation of peaceful international relations for improving its domestic conditions.

⁴⁰³ Jakub Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concept 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis," *European Security* 9, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 73-91.

5.2.3. The Kosovo and Chechnya Wars and Their Impact on Russia's Millennium Doctrines

In 1999, when NATO made an operation on Kosovo without the authorization of the UN, Russia accused NATO of violating the conditions of the Founding Act. Russia argued that in the Founding Act both sides pledged to respect the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining peace and security and refraining from the threat or use of force against each other and against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. Russia claimed that this pledge was broken by the NATO operation and led Russia to lose its sense of control over NATO's use of force as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a veto right. The unsanctioned Kosovo operation showed that partnership with NATO had a different meaning for either side and the Founding Act did not grant any right to Russia to influence the decisions of the Alliance.⁴⁰⁴

After the operation, NATO-Russia relations were severely damaged. Russia broke up its relations with NATO, suspended its participation in the Founding Act and Partnership for Peace, withdrew its military mission from Brussels, ended the talks on the establishment of a NATO military mission in Moscow and demanded that the NATO information representative leave Moscow.⁴⁰⁵ Moreover, Russia's perception of the United States and NATO was reshaped as it was in the Cold War and brought the United States and NATO back to Russia's security agenda. Since then, Russia's relations with the United States and NATO carried the baggage of the Kosovo experience.

⁴⁰⁴ Oksana Antonenko, "Russia, NATO, and European Security after Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999-2000): 130.

⁴⁰⁵ Viktor Gobarev, "Russia-NATO Relations after the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12, no. 3 (1999): 6.

NATO's use of force without the authorization of the UN Security Council had significant implications for Russia's evaluation of the post Cold War international structure. In the post bipolar structure, Russia supported multilateral and multipolar international relations and promoted an increased role for the UN and its Security Council. It also argued for an increased role for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than a NATO-centric European security system.⁴⁰⁶ As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member of the OSCE, Russia regarded these organizations as a platform where it could assert its influence on decision-making as a great power. With the unauthorized Kosovo operation, Russia felt that NATO did not only ignore the UN as an international organization but also disregarded its own status and interests as a great power. It also showed that the international security structure that Russia envisioned to be multilateral and multipolar in the post Cold War era would not be realized soon.

NATO's military operation on Kosovo made Russia's international and domestic weaknesses more noticeable. Russia regarded Kosovo as a domestic affair of Yugoslavia and argued that the use of force for humanitarian reasons would set a dangerous precedent in international affairs. Russia, as China did, defined the use of force for humanitarian reasons as a violation of international law and the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and equality in international relations.⁴⁰⁷ Russia focused on the separatist nature of the conflict rather than its human aspect because

⁴⁰⁶ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, eds., *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2009), 218-270.

⁴⁰⁷ Adam Roberts, "Nato's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 104.

Russia's interpretations of the situation in Kosovo were heavily influenced by the situation in Chechnya.⁴⁰⁸

The roots of the Russia-Chechen conflict dates back to 1991 when Chechen leader Dzhokav Dudayev declared independence from the Russian Federation. The Russian military conducted air and ground operations on Chechnya and barely achieved preventing Chechen independence. In Chechnya, Russia's excessive use of force against its own citizens and territory and the human rights violations in the massive military operations became subject to international criticism.⁴⁰⁹ Kozyrev, then Russian foreign minister, later admitted the disastrous consequence of the military operation on Chechnya and acknowledged that the Russian government was not prepared to deal with this situation.⁴¹⁰ The experience of military and political weakness in dealing with Chechnya pushed the new Prime Minister Putin to take a harsher stance on Chechen forces who raided Dagestan in late 1999.

In late 1999, Russia again started a large-scale military operation on Chechen forces. Putin advocated his stance against the Chechen forces by stating that Chechen forces were not self-taught fighters but well trained international saboteurs who had far-reaching plans including igniting political tensions and destabilizing Russia.⁴¹¹ In addition, in defense of his policies Putin put forward that Chechens were not only separatists but also extremists and international terrorists who aimed to seize hold of the Caucasus and establish a caliphate.⁴¹² Despite Russia's explanations, its massive military operation on Chechnya again received a large amount of criticism from the

⁴⁰⁸ Antonenko, "Russia, NATO, and European Security after Kosovo," 132.

⁴⁰⁹ Eric Heinze, "The Chechen Exception: Rethinking Russia's Human Rights Policy," *Politics* 22, no. 2 (2002): 88.

⁴¹⁰ Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace," *Foreign Policy*, no. 99 (1995): 6.

⁴¹¹ Cited in Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, "Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS," *European Security* 14, no. 3 (September 2005): 389.

⁴¹² Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at Meeting with Representatives of Chechen Public," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin* (November 10, 2002). <http://reliefweb.int/node/113335> (accessed 02/01/2012).

West, including the United States. These criticisms increased Russia's concerns over NATO's enlargement into the area which Russia called the 'near abroad' and its out of area operations for humanitarian reasons.⁴¹³

Given the international context and its domestic vulnerabilities, Russia's political and military establishment feared that Kosovo might be a model for NATO intervention in the conflicts within the former Soviet territory or even Russia itself.⁴¹⁴ In this case, Russia feared that its massive military operation on Chechnya could be used as an excuse for an intervention into Russia.⁴¹⁵ Under such circumstances, in the face of NATO's state of the art military capabilities and the operational power of its air and land forces, Russia's conventional military power might not be enough to protect Russia's territorial integrity.⁴¹⁶ In this sense, the Kosovo operation created self-awareness in Russia regarding the gap between its diplomatic and military capabilities and its claim to be a great power in the post Cold War era.

The impact of the Kosovo operation has been so profound on Russia that for the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russian strategists started to make war scenarios featuring a NATO invasion.⁴¹⁷ More significantly, seen in the same light, Kosovo and Chechnya changed Russia's threat perception and triggered Russia to revise its *National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine*. These documents reflected significant changes in Russia's threat assessment and its perception of international relations since the Kosovo operation.

⁴¹³ Stephen Blank, *Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2000).

⁴¹⁴ Antonenko, "Russia, NATO, and European Security after Kosovo," 132.

⁴¹⁵ Wilhelmsen and Flikke, "Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS," 389.

⁴¹⁶ William D. Jackson, "Encircled Again: Russia's Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World," *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 3 (2002): 382.

⁴¹⁷ Stephen J. Blank, "An Ambivalent War: Russia's War on Terrorism," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 132.

5.3. Russia's Evaluation of International Relations

Russia's evaluation of international relations changed with the 2000 *National Security Concept* document. While in a 1997 document the world was 'characterized by more pronounced tendencies leading to the formation of a multi-polar world', in the 2000 document, the situation in the world was defined by the presence of 'two mutually exclusive trends' and a 'dynamic transformation of system of international relations'.⁴¹⁸ In the first trend, Russia underlined the presence of a significant number of states with their strengthened economic and political positions and their integrative approaches for the multilateral management of international processes. On the other hand, the second trend was characterized by 'the attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community under the US leadership.' In addition, it was argued that this structure was designed for 'unilateral solutions (including military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law.'⁴¹⁹

Referring to the Kosovo case, the document emphasized that the second trend based on domination of the international system under the leadership of the United States became more evident in the international system at the beginning of the twentieth-first century.⁴²⁰ While mentioning the presence of new challenges and threats in the new era, the document specifically underlined the growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure under the economic and power

⁴¹⁸ "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)," (January 2000). <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴¹⁹ "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)".

⁴²⁰ "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)," (June 2000). <http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/1EC8DC08180306614325699C003B5FF0?OpenDocument> (accessed 02/01/2012).

domination of the United States. Reflecting its uneasiness with the NATO operations, the document offered the argument that the fact that the principal international security problems were being placed on western institutions and forums of limited composition weakened the role of the UN Security Council. Criticizing the military methods used in Kosovo, Russia argued that the use of force by bypassing the existing international legal mechanisms would not remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other contradictions causing conflicts; on the contrary, they would only undermine the foundation of law and order. Furthermore, Russia warned against the use of the unilateral strategy because it could destabilize the international situation and provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and religious strife.⁴²¹

In the *National Security Concept* document, Russia argued that the establishment of a unipolar structure, the increasing trend of unilateralism and the use of force in international relations posed a threat to international order. Against this unipolar order, Russia advocated multipolarity. As it stated in the *Foreign Policy Concept*, Russia believed that the multipolar structure would really reflect the diversity of interests and the structure of current international relations. The use of mechanisms of collective resolution of significant international problems, the prioritization of international law and the democratization of international relations were characterized as the mechanisms. It was argued that these mechanisms would guarantee respect for mutual interests and would lead to multipolarity as the most effective and reliable international power configuration. Believing in the strength of multipolarity, Russia stated that it would ‘facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world.’

⁴²¹ "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)".

5.4. Russia's Threat Definition

Russia's security documents did not designate a specific state or group of states as an adversary. Rather Russia referred to international situations, tendencies, and events that it considered threats to its security. Following this principle, the 2000 *National Security Concept* pointed out the presence of attempts by a group of states to 'weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways' such as to ignore Russia's interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations.⁴²² In Russia's view, these attempts were planned to hinder Russia's rise as an influential power center in the multipolar world and prevent it from exercising its national interests by weakening its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Asia Pacific.

In addition to perception of threat concerning its international status, Russia listed eight fundamental threats in the international sphere. According to the document,

- Desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the UN and the OSCE;
- the danger of a weakening of Russia's political and economic and military influence in the world;
- the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion;
- the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders;
- proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles;
- the weakening of integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states and
- territorial claims on Russia

⁴²² "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)".

were regarded as the international factors bearing threats to Russia's security.⁴²³

In conformity with the *National Security Concept*, Russia's *Military Doctrine* also included a list of factors that played a destabilizing factor in Russia's military-political situation.⁴²⁴ According to the *National Security Concept*,

- weakening of the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily the United Nations and the OSCE);
- the utilization of military force as a means of humanitarian intervention without authorization by the UN Security Council;
- circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law for that purpose;
- the violation of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament;
- the utilization of technologies and utilization of means of information for aggressive purposes;
- the activities of extremist nationalists, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations and structures;
- the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and weapons and drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities

were regarded as factors threatening Russia's military-political situation.

Besides these destabilizing factors, Russia's *Military Doctrine* gave a specific list of international threats for Russia's security. According to the list, external threats to Russia's security are as follows:

- territorial claims against the Russian Federation and interference in the Russian Federation's internal affairs
- attempts to ignore Russia's interest in resolving international security problems and to oppose its rise as one of the influential centers in a multipolar world
- the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian Federation's state borders and the borders of its allies
- the creation of groups of forces leading to violation of existing balance of forces, adjacent to Russian borders and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining their territories

⁴²³ "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)".

⁴²⁴ "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)". "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2000)," (April 2000). http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00?print (accessed 02/01/2012).

- expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation's military security
- the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the territory of friendly states close to the Russian Federation
- the creation, equipping and training on the other states' territories of armed formations and groups with a view to transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies
- attacks (armed provocations) on Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on installations and facilities on the Russian Federation's state border, the border of its allies or the high seas
- undermining the arms-control agreements
- dissemination of hostile information damaging the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies
- discrimination and suppression of the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian citizens in the foreign states and
- international terrorism.

Moreover, all of these official documents made specific references to the threat of terrorism as both a domestic and international threat against the security of Russia. Terrorism was defined as a threat to Russia's territorial integrity and domestic stability. In these documents, the federal government was given full authority to deal with terrorism irrespective of where acts of terrorism damaging to the Russian Federation were conceived or carried out. The *Foreign Policy Concept* stated that it was the duty of every state to protect its citizens against terrorist encroachments, to prevent any activity on its territory aimed at organizing such acts against its citizens and interests of other countries and not to provide asylum to terrorists. In other words, Russia called states for having "responsible sovereignty, "as the US did in its US counterterrorism strategy after September 11. The *National Security Concept* and *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* underlined the transnational character of the terrorist threat. Moreover, the documents stated that terrorism in a transnational nature has been posing a threat to Russia' security as well as international stability and for this reason, Russia called for international cooperation with increased effectiveness and urgent action.

To sum up, the documents show that the Kosovo operation profoundly influenced Russia's evaluation of international relations and its position in the new system. In this new framework, although Russia did not specifically mention a name of an adversary, the most significant threats were related to US dominance and projection of its power in the international realm. The fact that the humanitarian aspect of the Chechnya issue, which was defined as a separatist and terrorist threat, captured attention from the United States and the West increased Russia's sensitivities regarding humanitarian intervention. As the threat of intervention was accompanied with the weakness of its conventional and nuclear capabilities, Russia's insecurities increased. Russia evaluated NATO's enlargement, its military operations without authorization of the UN Security Council, the US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and build a National Missile Defense system as examples of US unilateralism and the search for hegemony in the post-Cold War era. As a descendant superpower with a claim to recover and ascend to the status of a great power in a multipolar world, Russia evaluated these policies as part of a bigger strategy that aimed to hinder Russia's rise as a great power in the new era.

5.5. Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy Strategy

Russia stated that in the new international structure, it would draw upon “a realist strategy” was based on the “observance of a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining its foreign policy objectives.”⁴²⁵ As stated in its *Foreign Policy Concept*, Russia would use its politico-diplomatic, military, economic, financial and cultural means to solve foreign policy issues. *Foreign Policy Concept* stated that it would concentrate on foreign policy issues if they had real significance for Russia’s national interests and would contribute to Russia’s power position in the international arena. Russia stated that in diversity and complexity of the international crisis, it would evaluate these crises in accordance with Russia’s foreign policy priorities. These were defined as the creation of favorable international conditions for protecting Russia’s territorial integrity, economic recovery and assuring the rise of Russia as a great power in the multipolar world.

Russia declared that forming a new international order based on the principles of justice, mutual respect and mutually advantageous cooperation and consolidating the role of the UN and its Security Council were its foreign policy priorities. Second, Russia called for the decrease of the role of power in international relations and declared its intention to comply with its commitment on arms reduction. In line with this principle, Russia criticized the use of force in violation of the UN Charter and the introduction of concepts like “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” to justify unilateral use of force. Instead, Russia called for a strict observance of the norms of international law under the authority of the UN. Third, Russia focused on international economic relations with the aim of creating favorable external conditions for the development of its economy and assuring its integration in

⁴²⁵ "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)".

the world economic system. Protection of the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad became another priority for Russian foreign policy. In addition, Russia defined communication with the international community about its position on major international problems and form a positive perception of Russia abroad as a foreign policy priority.

In addition to these, Russia has given specific attention to developing its regional relations. Priority was given to improvement of relations with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which Russia called the 'near abroad'. Russia emphasized that it attached a special importance to relations with the CIS and the development of cooperation in military-political and security areas, especially in combating terrorism and extremism in the region. Russia also stated that it would dedicate serious emphasis to developing economic cooperation with the CIS including creation of a free trade zone and the joint and rational use of natural resources.

Regarding its relations with European states, Russia emphasized that it was its traditional foreign policy interest to develop good relations with European states. Moscow especially pointed out that the main aim of the Russian foreign policy in Europe was to promote the creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation. Since Russia found NATO an exclusionary organization creating new division lines in Europe, it declared its interest in creating the development of a multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Referring to NATO's enlargement and its Kosovo operation, Russia stated that it would reject the restrictions on the functions of the OSCE in the post-Soviet space and the Balkans.

On relations with NATO, Russia stated that it was open to constructive interaction with NATO within the framework of the Founding Act and highlighted that the intensity of cooperation with NATO would depend on its compliance with the key clauses of the agreement. These clauses were on the non-use or threat of force, non-deployment of conventional armed forces and nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members, as Primakov had demanded earlier. It was stated that Russia retained its negative attitude towards NATO expansion. Moreover, the document maintained that NATO's political and military guidelines did not coincide with the interests of Russia and occasionally directly contradicted them. The main concern in this regard was NATO's new strategic concept, which did not exclude the use of force in the out-of-area of the Washington Treaty without UN Security Council authorization. The document emphasized that the continuity of Russia's relations with NATO was possible only if it was based on due respect for the interests of both sides and an unconditional fulfillment of obligations assumed.

Regarding its relations with the United States, Russia declared its intention to make efforts to overcome the present problems in bilateral relations and maintain, then, the ten-year old infrastructure of bilateral cooperation. Russia stated that despite the presence of serious, in some cases, fundamental differences, the Russian-American interaction was the necessary condition for the betterment of the international situation and the achievement of global strategic stability. Russia underlined mutual interest in disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as prevention and settlement of more dangerous regional conflicts.

Finally, Russia emphasized that it would develop its relations with states in the Asia-Pacific region and would participate in regional organizations like the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Five, in whose foundation Russia played an active role with China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan (which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Russia stated that it would develop further relations with states including India, Pakistan, and Iran. In addition, Russia underlined the protracted conflict in Afghanistan as a threat to its national security and the security of the southern CIS's borders. In the face of a terrorist and extremist threat, as Russia then defined it as such, it declared its intention to support consistent effort for achieving a long lasting and a fair political settlement in Afghanistan and interdicting the exportation of terrorism and extremism from there.

Consequently, after losing its superpower status, Russia started to redefine its foreign policy principles. Its declined power status and the huge power gap with the United States became the major factors that shaped the process of forming grand strategy and the contours of its foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia engaged in international problems and crises in which it tested its power position. At the end, Russia was not able to protect its interests as easily as it did as a superpower. Having recognized international constraints in a unipolar world and its own restricted capacity, Moscow aimed to regain its status as a great power in international relations and facilitate the establishment of a multipolar world system to protect its interests. However, the recognition of the fact that its capabilities were not commensurate with these interrelated purposes led Russia to focus on its internal situation and it designed a foreign policy strategy that mainly focused on bolstering

its internal development, which would enhance its international power position in turn.

As Russia's territorial integrity and economic development became indivisible parts of its international relations, creating the international conditions that would protect its territorial integrity and economic recovery became Russia's primary foreign policy objectives. In order to ensure a peaceful international environment and escape from confrontation with dominant powers, Moscow adopted a strategy of taking international problems to the UN Security Council. While showing its opposition to unilateralism, it paid attention to refraining from state-to-state direct confrontation. This strategy of non-confrontation especially became a part of Russia-US relations. Seeing good relations with the United States as the foundation of a peaceful international relations and its internal recovery, Russia refrained from following a confrontational strategy against the United States as China did. The strategy of non-confrontation, especially with the United States became a fundamental foreign policy principle in Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and shaped Russia's reaction to the US war on terror.

5.6. Russia's Approach and Reaction to the US War on Terror

5.6.1. Russia's Approach to the US war on Afghanistan

The threat of transnational terrorism was already on the security agenda of the Russian Federation due to the ongoing conflict with Chechnya. Russia defined the war in Chechnya as a war on international terrorism and stated that with its

transnational nature Chechen terrorism threatened international stability.⁴²⁶ The Bush administration did not agree with Russia's claims about the transnational nature of the terrorist threat. On the contrary, the US administration evaluated the war in Chechnya as "a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence"⁴²⁷ not as a threat of international terrorism. However, after the September 11 attacks carried the threat of terrorism to the top of the US security agenda, terrorism became the common strategic interest in US-Russia bilateral relations.

In 2000, Russia had already defined Afghanistan as a real threat to its security and to the security of the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States because Afghanistan exported terrorism and extremism by supporting Chechen fighters. Russia's earlier calls for international cooperation for fighting against terrorism originating from Afghanistan were answered by the United States after September 11, 2001. Russia immediately declared its support for the United States and promised cooperation on several issues. According to this, Russia would share intelligence with the United States, open its airspace for flights providing humanitarian aid, cooperate with Russia's Central Asian allies to provide similar kind of airspace access to US flights, participate in international search and rescue efforts, and increase its direct humanitarian aid and military assistance to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁶ Vladimir Rukavishnikov, "Choices for Russia: Preserving Inherited Geopolitics through Emergent Global and European Realities," in *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*, ed. Roger E. Kanet, (Studies in Central and Eastern Europe) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 56. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Stephen Welch, "Russia and the United States after 9/11," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 1-2 (2005): 284.

⁴²⁷ Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," 8.

⁴²⁸ James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 313. Kari Roberts, "Empire Envy: Russia-US Relations Post 9/11," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 2. Jill Dougherty, "9/11 a 'Turning Point' for Putin," *CNNWorld* (September 10, 2002).

Considering its sensitivities on the presence of US troops in its neighborhood, Russia's support to the United States and NATO presence in Central Asia showed that Russia followed a pragmatic approach under the circumstances.⁴²⁹ On September 20, 2001, President Bush gave an ultimatum to Afghanistan to hand over the leaders of Al Qaeda. In this sense, the US decision to start a military operation on Afghanistan was clear. The United States gave another ultimatum to the world with his "you are either with us or against us" speech. The costs of non-cooperation would be high while the benefits of cooperation also appeared to be high.

These benefits can be highlighted as the following; first, cooperation with the United States was in conformity with Russia's interests, as good relations would allow Russia to pursue its development strategy in a non-confrontational international environment. Second, the United States would clean Afghanistan from the terrorists who had connection with Chechen forces, which would help Russia protect its territorial integrity.⁴³⁰ In addition, the US success in Afghanistan would provide Russia with a stable regional environment and strengthen its position in the region. Third, Russia's alignment with the United States was expected to enhance its integration with the West in economic and political terms. Another benefit that Russia expected from its integration with the West was to enhance Moscow's reputation as a responsible great power, which would provide Russia an elevation in its international status since the end of the Cold War.⁴³¹ It was also expected that the betterment of relations with the United States was to bring a spillover impact on

http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-10/world/ar911.russia.putin_1_russian-president-vladimir-putin-dmitri-trenin-moscow-carnegie-center?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴²⁹ Graeme P. Herd and Ella Akerman, "Russian Strategic Realignment and the Post-Post-Cold War Era?," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002): 303.

⁴³⁰ Sergei Kortunov, "Russian-American Partnership: A Chance to Open a New Page?," *International Affairs* 48, no. 3 (2002): 32.

⁴³¹ Herd Herd and Akerman, "Russian Strategic Realignment and the Post-Post-Cold War Era?," 363.

contentious issues like NATO enlargement, the ABM Treaty, and Russia's war on terror in Chechnya.

Russia's cooperative strategy was in conformity with its security interests and the principles that it advocated for the conduct of international relations. As many states in the world, Russia also perceived the US war on Afghanistan as a legitimate action in defense of its security against terrorism. As a state that long before argued for the necessity of international cooperation and a multilateral solution to the threat of international terrorism, it was clear that Russia would support a multilateral solution to international terrorism. In this sense, the US decision to reestablish its relations with major powers including Russia and China and to fight against the common threat of international terrorism created an image of the United States pursuing multilateral politics.⁴³² The Russian and American Presidents declared that they were achieving a new strategic relationship and the era when the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat had ended.⁴³³ They stated that both states were partners and they would cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration. They declared their determination to act collectively to counter global challenges and help bring about resolution of regional conflicts in cooperation.

Cooperation against the terrorist threat in Afghanistan and US multilateralism during the process enhanced Russia's interests and its self-image as a great power. Because the United States took Russia's interests and concerns into account and the betterment of relations with the United States was considered as the start of a new era in bilateral relations, Russia's evaluation of the international situation was

⁴³² Peter Rutland, "The September Bombings: A Turning Point in US-Russian Relations?," *International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2002): 289.

⁴³³ "Joint Declaration on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia," (May 24, 2002). <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/US-Russia/A%20Official%20Docs/text.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

influenced positively. Under the influence of good relations with the United States, Russia's handling of issues such as NATO enlargement and the ABM treaty, were which were previously defined as fundamental threats to Russia's security, changed.

5.6.2. NATO Enlargement after 9/11

Russia's cooperation with the US against terrorism also affected its relationship with NATO. On September 12, 2001, when NATO members invoked the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty against the threat of terrorism, NATO's character as an international defense organization changed into a collective security organization.⁴³⁴ As NATO's call for a unified approach against terrorism coincided with Russia's political interests on the issue, Russia did not oppose NATO's decision to activate Article 5. On the same day of NATO's declaration, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council declared that they were united in their anger and indignation at the barbaric attacks on the United States and underlined the need for comprehensive and coordinated action to respond to the common threat of terrorism.⁴³⁵ This rapprochement was followed by the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002.⁴³⁶ The Council defined Russia's status as an equal partner in security issues of common interest. Although Russia was not given a right to veto as was the case in the Founding Act of 1997, the Council was declared as a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action. It was declared that the Council would work on the principle of consensus and continuous political dialogue in security issues.

⁴³⁴ Philip Gordon, "NATO after 11 September," *Survival* 43, no. 4 (2001): 89-106.

⁴³⁵ NATO, "NATO-Russia Forging a New Relationship," (October 29, 2002). <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/b020528e.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴³⁶ NATO, "NATO-Russia Forging a New Relationship".

Russia evaluated the creation of the new NATO-Russia Council as a good example of the change in the security environment and argued that the Council underscored Russia's importance in responding to contemporary threats.⁴³⁷ In this political atmosphere, Russia prioritized the fight against terrorism and downgraded its tone of criticism in two issues of contention against the United States. After the September 11 attacks, NATO's enlargement gained more forceful US support because the solidarity that NATO members showed reminded the Bush administration and NATO members of the importance of having stable and strong partners who could contribute to common goals.⁴³⁸ Russia reacted to the strong momentum behind enlargement with a balanced strategy that showed its prioritization of its relations with the United States despite its opposition to enlargement.⁴³⁹ President Putin argued that NATO's enlargement was a mistake given Russia posed no threat to the applicant states.⁴⁴⁰ Also, he emphasized that NATO enlargement would not be a "tragedy" but it would neither improve the security of the new members or the organization itself.⁴⁴¹ President Putin stated that Russia might reconsider its opposition to enlargement if NATO became more of a political than military organization.⁴⁴² Furthermore, to everyone's surprise, President

⁴³⁷ Alexander Vershbow, "US-Russia Relations: Opportunities and Challenges in 2003," (Perm, Russia: Bureau of International Information Programs, February 27, 2003). <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/March/20030306163226jthomas@pd.state.gov0.0325281.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴³⁸ Gordon, "NATO after 11 September," 89-106.

⁴³⁹ "Putin Softens Stance on NATO," *Moscow Times* (October 4, 2001). <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-softens-stance-on-nato/251182.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁴⁰ "Russia and NATO to Seal New Era of Cooperation," *Reuters News Service* (May 27, 2002). <http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Russia-and-NATO-to-seal-new-era-of-cooperation-2089069.php> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁴¹ Marcus Warren, "Putin Lets NATO 'Recruit' in Baltic," *The Telegraph* (June 25, 2002). <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1398379/Putin-lets-Nato-recruit-in-Baltic.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁴² Terry Terriff and others, "'One in, All In?' NATO's Next Enlargement," *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002): 717.

Putin declared that Russia might consider itself to be included in NATO as a second-best option, after the first option of seeing NATO disappear.

5.6.3. The ABM Treaty after 9/11

Recognizing the fact that NATO enlargement was an irreversible process, Russia did not risk its political reputation as it did in Kosovo. Instead, it proceeded pragmatically by accommodating to the situation and prioritizing its relations with the United States over NATO enlargement. Russia followed the same strategy on US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Foreign Minister Ivanov bluntly stated that evaluating possible consequences for Russia's foreign policy and the situation in the world as a whole, Russia's relations with the United States was of utmost significance.⁴⁴³ He pointed out that the risk of sliding into confrontation with the United States was avoided during the complex period of negotiations on the ABM Treaty. Ivanov emphasized that the protection of the constructive air of partnership enabled Russia to continue joint efforts in the fight against terrorism beyond Afghanistan.

Russia's adoption of a 'realistic' and pragmatic course in its relations with the United States and its alliance in the war on terror prepared ground for Russia's negotiation with the United States and promoted its interests in the end. Despite the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia and the United States drew up a Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), which provided a prospect of reducing strategic offensive potentials by almost two-thirds.⁴⁴⁴ In addition, the

⁴⁴³ Alexander A. Belkin, "US-Russian Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 17, no. 1 (2004): 18.

⁴⁴⁴ Rumer, "Chapter One: A Foreign Policy in Transition," 20. Also; See, "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT): Text of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian

United States supported G-7 states contributing \$20 billion over ten years to nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet republics.⁴⁴⁵

5.7. Russia and the Iraq War

In the 'axis of evil' speech, Bush had identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as regimes that posed a threat to US and global security.⁴⁴⁶ In late 2002, the Bush administration focused on Iraq as the most serious threat to its security and President Bush took the issue to the international platform in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. President Bush gave the message that the United States was prepared to act militarily against Iraq without the United Nations if the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would fail to honor previous commitments to disarm and allow inspectors inside Iraq.⁴⁴⁷

Russian leadership regarded making such a "black list" of states as a remnant of Cold War thinking, which caused tension in international relations and was not helpful in bringing solutions to the problems.⁴⁴⁸ Iraq was a significant country for Russia both due to Iraq's eight billion dollar debt to Russia and the seizure of Iraqi oil resources could harm Russia's economic stability. Moreover, Russia was estimating that the war would be counterproductive, as the occupation would trigger severe reaction from the Islamic community. As a state with a large Muslim

Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions," *Arms Control Association* (May 24, 2002). <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/sort> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁴⁵ Stephen Dalziel, "Analysis: Russia's Place in G8," *BBC News* (June 27, 2002). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2069587.stm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁴⁶ George W. Bush, "The President's State of the Union Address".

⁴⁴⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002).

⁴⁴⁸ Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Russian President Vladimir Putin Interview to the Wall Street Journal," *The Wall Street Journal* (February 11, 2002). http://www.czech.mid.ru/press-rel/14022002_en.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

population, the likelihood of a strong reaction from Muslims increased Russia's concerns regarding the Iraq war.

Moreover, Russia opposed a US declaration to act unilaterally and preemptively against Iraq based on international law. President Putin stated that the use of force in international relations was legal if taken by the international community within the UN framework and by a decision of the UN Security Council. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov repeatedly declared Russia's opposition to unilateral use of force against Iraq as such action would violate international law and undermine the authority of the UN Security Council.⁴⁴⁹ Instead of unilateralism, Russia underlined the need for international cooperation in Iraq and demanded UN inspectors to restart their work. It also suggested that the use of force should be considered as an option only if prohibited weapons were found during the inspections.⁴⁵⁰

On November 8, 2002, the United States succeeded to pass UN Security Council Resolution 1441 after severe diplomatic negotiations especially with France, Germany, China and Russia.⁴⁵¹ In this resolution, the parties agreed that Iraq was in material breach of its disarmament obligations and decided to give Baghdad a final opportunity to meet these obligations through an enhanced inspections regime. The resolution called upon Iraq to provide a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and missiles. It was also stated that in the event of Iraq's further material breach the

⁴⁴⁹ "Ask Russian Foreign Minister," *BBC News* (March 5, 2003). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/2802121.stm (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁵⁰ Mark MacKinnon, "Putin Warns Bush against Unilateral Action on Iraq," *Toronto Globe & Mail*, November 23, 2002.

⁴⁵¹ "Full Text: UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq".

Council would reconvene and assess the situation, which would bring serious consequences for Iraq.

Despite its rigorous message to Iraq, a joint statement by China, France, and Russia made it clear that “serious consequences” did not mean that the UN Security Council authorized the use of force against Iraq.⁴⁵² These states declared that Resolution 1441 excluded “any automaticity in the use of force” and clearly showed that the United States needed to pass a second resolution if it was to declare war on Iraq. In compliance with the resolutions, the inspections were made and the inspectors could not find evidence indicating that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. However, the United States disregarded the reports stating that they were ‘falsified’.⁴⁵³

In search of a second resolution, in February 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a presentation to the UN and argued that Saddam Hussein hid weapons of mass destruction, defied the terms of previous international agreements, and certainly had connection with Al Qaeda terrorists.⁴⁵⁴ Powell stated that due to its nexus with terrorists, Iraq became an imminent threat for US security in the post-September 11 world. Based on the evidence he presented, Powell called upon the international community to act against the present threat so as to avoid confronting an even more frightening future. The United States made diplomatic efforts to convince the UN Security Council for a second resolution authorizing the use of

⁴⁵² "Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China, France and the Russian Federation".

⁴⁵³ Condoleezza Rice, "Why We Know Iraq Is Lying (Op/Ed)," *New York Times* (Jan. 23, 2003). <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/opinion/why-we-know-iraq-is-lying.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁵⁴ "Transcript of Powell's U.N. Presentation," *CNN.com* (February 6, 2003). <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/index.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

force against Iraq. On March 5, Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Russia declared that they would block any resolution authorizing the use of force.⁴⁵⁵

Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov also repeated Russia's position on the use of force against Iraq individually and declared that the report to the UN Security Council reflected substantial progress in Iraq's compliance with Resolution 1441.⁴⁵⁶ Based on the report, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that Russia opposed any new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq and favored a long term monitoring service to make sure that Iraq would not rebuild weapons of mass destruction even after the completion of international inspections. The Russian Foreign Ministry also stated that the consequences of a possible US military action against Iraq would be very negative and would endanger international stability resulting in the following consequences: an upsurge of radicalism, economic destabilization, and threatening the cohesion of the anti-terrorist coalition.⁴⁵⁷

On 17 March 2003, President Bush addressed the nation and gave a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq and the United States started military conflict upon their refusal to comply with the ultimatum.⁴⁵⁸ President Bush declared that as some permanent members of the Security Council publicly announced that they would veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. He evaluated these statements as an indication of that the UN Security Council could

⁴⁵⁵ UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 5 March 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2003/253 (March 5, 2003). <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C00BA18B56C76BAF85256CE20056898F> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁵⁶ Mark Smith, "A Russian Chronology: January-March 2003," (April 2003). <http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/russian-chronologies>.

⁴⁵⁷ Smith.

⁴⁵⁸ President George W. Bush, "Bush: 'Leave Iraq within 48 Hours'," *CNN.com* (March 18, 2003). <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.iqr.bush.transcript/> (accessed 02/01/2012).

not live up to its responsibilities. Therefore, the United States declared that it would use its 'sovereign authority' to use force for its national security.

Russian President Putin expressed his regret for the ultimatum on the use of military force against Iraq.⁴⁵⁹ Breaking his silence for weeks on the Iraq subject after the ultimatum, President Putin said that any development would be a mistake, which would bring the toughest consequences, leading to victims and destabilization of the international situation as a whole.⁴⁶⁰ Russia emphasized that the US military operation was to be carried out in defiance of international public opinion, international principles and standards of international law and the UN Charter.⁴⁶¹

Moreover, Putin defined the war as "unjustifiable and unnecessary" because Iraq did not pose a threat to any state due to its military and economic weakness after decades of blockades.⁴⁶² Russia regarded the US war on Iraq as a serious violation of international law and accused the United States of harming the authority of the UN Security Council. Putin warned that the war was an attempt to replace international law with the 'the law of the fist.'⁴⁶³ Putin described international relations under "the fist-law" as one in which the powerful were always right, were entitled to do anything and were not restricted by anything in the choice of means to achieve its aims. The implications of this approach, as Putin stated, would bring about the violation of the basic principles of international law, the principle of inviolability of

⁴⁵⁹ "World Leaders Give Mixed Reaction to U.S. Ultimatum," *PBS NewsHour* (March 18, 2003). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/reax_03-18-03.html (accessed 02/01/2012). David Malone, *The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 201.

⁴⁶⁰ Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Putin: War Would Endanger World Security," *Associated Press* (March 17, 2003). <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81236,00.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁶¹ "Russia, China, France Blast Opening of Iraq War," *PBS NewsHour* (March 20, 2003). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/worldreaction_3-20.html (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁶² Smith.

⁴⁶³ Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Statement by President Putin on Iraq at a Kremlin Meeting," (March 20, 2003). <http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/7b840a710d91637343256cef004aa0e5?OpenDocument> (accessed 02/01/2012).

state sovereignty and worse, not a single country in the world would feel itself secure again. For these reasons, Putin insisted that military operations should be stopped without any delay and the UN Security Council should be given the primary role for this purpose.

To sum up, Russia opposed the US war on Iraq in principle and wanted to deal with the crisis within the framework of the UN Security Council. Moscow put a lot of diplomatic effort behind preventing the war but as it was the case in Kosovo, Russia's efforts failed. However, this time Russia was together with other major powers including France, Germany and China. As Russia let the European partners of the United States lead the process as China had, it shared the burden of opposing the United States and divided the cost of opposition. Due to Russia's choice for collective opposition, Russia-US relations did not suffer from severe damage in the wake of the war. The pursuit of collective opposition strategy showed that the Putin administration preserved its fundamental foreign policy principle and refrained from direct confrontation with the United States.

5.8. The Impact of the Iraq War on US-Russia Relations

Russia's opposition to the Iraq war created a tension in bilateral relations and this tension was intensified by a series of events. To begin with, a week later after the start of the war, the United States accused Russia of providing Iraq with war equipment in violation of UN sanctions and claimed that US forces were facing weapons provided by Russia.⁴⁶⁴ According to US claims, in violation of UN sanctions, Russia supplied anti-tank missiles, devices for jamming satellite guidance

⁴⁶⁴ Liza Porteus, "Russian Dealers Provide Iraq with Supplies, Electronics", FOXNews, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81917,00.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

signals and night-vision goggles. Russian leadership denied US claims and stated that US claims were investigated and were determined to be baseless.⁴⁶⁵ The Russian administration underlined that Russia has strictly fulfilled its international obligations and had not supplied any equipment, including military, to Iraq in violation of the sanctions regimes.⁴⁶⁶ Though it did not convince the US side, Russian leadership argued that they did not rule out the possibility that Russian equipment might have been sent via persons interested in creating a political scandal because all of the former Soviet republics and the Middle Eastern customers possessed Russian equipment.

In addition to US claims on equipment supply to Iraq, a few days later Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that he had given the order to Russian fighter planes to track an American U-2 plane flying near Russia's southern borders.⁴⁶⁷ Georgian and US authorities stated that they coordinated the flights for gathering data for counterterrorism purposes. Russian officials replied that it was not possible to detect terrorists from U-2 planes but the true purpose was to gather information about strategically important locations and objectives within Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry defined the U-2 incident as a "return to Cold War practices."

⁴⁶⁵ Sergey Yugov, "Russia Rejects Illegal Arms Deliveries to Iraq," *Pravda.ru* (March 24, 2003). <http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/24-03-2003/47576-0/> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁶⁶ David Rennie, "US and Russia in Row over Illegal Arms Exports," *The Telegraph* (March 25, 2003). <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1425632/US-and-Russia-in-row-over-illegal-arms-exports.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁶⁷ Giorgi Kandelaki, "U2 Spy Flights over Georgia Help Raise US-Russian Tension," *Eurasianet.org* (March 26, 2003). <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032703.shtml> (accessed 02/01/2012).

On March 28, 2003, Putin stated that the Iraq war was surpassing the boundaries of a local conflict.⁴⁶⁸ He defined the situation as “the most significant crisis since the end of the Cold War” because the war threatened global stability by undermining the foundations of international law. Although Russia strongly criticized the U.S. for its use of force on Iraq, Russian leadership emphasized that its disagreement with the U.S. would not damage the ties between the two countries because the character of partnership with the U.S. gave Russia a basis to continue an open dialogue with the United States.⁴⁶⁹ Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov also underlined that despite the differences over Iraq, the U.S. and Russia remained partners, not adversaries.⁴⁷⁰ The Russian Foreign Minister added that Russia and the U.S. were partners in war against terrorism and Russia acted together with France and Germany in order to warn their partners against making a mistake. Russia’s decision to oppose but not to confront the U.S. on the Iraq war clearly showed that “America is more important than Iraq” for Russia, as Putin had said.⁴⁷¹

President Putin made a more conciliatory declaration on April 3, 2003 and stated that Russia consistently called for a peaceful settlement of the Iraqi problem; however, given the situation, for political and economic reasons, Russia was not interested in seeing a US defeat in Iraq.⁴⁷² He added that Russia was interested in bringing the matter back to a UN platform for the benefit of the parties involved. On April 6, the Russian embassy convoy leaving Iraq was caught in the crossfire while

⁴⁶⁸ "Putin: Iraq Most Serious Crisis since Cold War," *Moscow Times* (March 31, 2003). <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-iraq-most-serious-crisis-since-cold-war/239461.html#ixzz1ivC5tGGJ> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁶⁹ "Putin: Iraq Most Serious Crisis since Cold War".

⁴⁷⁰ "Ask Russian Foreign Minister". Smith.

⁴⁷¹ Belkin, "US-Russian Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign," 20.

⁴⁷² "Putin Says Russia Not Interested in Seeing a US Defeat in Iraq," *BBC Monitoring* (April 3, 2003). <http://www.cdi.org/russia/251-7.cfm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

US forces attacked Iraqi troops.⁴⁷³ As a result of the attack, several Russian diplomats were injured. After the attack, Colin Powell contacted his counterpart and expressed his deepest regrets.⁴⁷⁴ The issue was discussed during the visit of US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to Moscow “in a calm and non-emotional manner” and both sides agreed to continue political dialogue despite differences over Iraq.⁴⁷⁵

Repairing the bilateral relationship was also important for the Bush administration. It was widely quoted in spring 2003 that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she would follow "Punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia," as a strategy for dealing with European allies who did not back the United States over the Iraq War.⁴⁷⁶ As the military conflict in the Iraq war ended, the new issue appeared on the US agenda was the reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S. stated that the best way other states could contribute to Iraq's reconstruction would be by forgiving Iraq's debts.⁴⁷⁷ As Iraq had \$100 billion in debt, \$8 billion of which was owed to Russia for weapons purchased during the Iran-Iraq war, US demands for forgiving Iraq's debts were not welcomed. When the question was posed to Russian President Putin, he replied by asking why Iraq should not pay back its loans while

⁴⁷³ "Russian Convoy Fired on in Iraq," *CNN.com* (April 7, 2003). <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/06/sprj.iqrussian.convoy.attacked/> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁷⁴ "Officials Investigate Shooting Attack on Russian Convoy," *PBS NewsHour* (April 7, 2003). <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/convoy.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁷⁵ Andrew Cohen, "Front Page: Iraq, April 8, 2003," *CBS News* (April 8, 2003). <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/convoy.html> (accessed 02/01/2012). Galia Golan, "Russia and the Iraq War: Was Putin's Policy a Failure?," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 37, no. 4 (2004): 448.

⁴⁷⁶ Jonathan Beale, "Can Rice's Trip Close Rift with Europe?," *BBC News* (February 3, 2005). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4231895.stm> (accessed 02/01/2012). Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush's Tutor and Disciple -Condoleezza Rice," *New York Times* (November 17, 2004). <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/17/politics/17rice.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁷⁷ David Sanger and Douglas Jehl, "Bush Asks Europe to Forgive Iraq Debt," *Reuters* (December 12, 2003). <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/11/1071125590331.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

Russia was still paying back old Soviet debts.⁴⁷⁸ However, Putin stated that he was willing to discuss the matter at the meeting of the Paris Club.⁴⁷⁹

While Iraq's debt was being discussed, President Bush announced that he wanted a new UN Security Council resolution to lift sanctions against Iraq as a move to facilitate the sale of Iraqi oil and finance reconstruction.⁴⁸⁰ The meaning of this new resolution would be the end of the Oil for Food regime in favor of open competition for oil contracts. As a beneficiary of the Oil for Food regime, Russia would be disadvantaged in the new competitive regime and lose its established advantages in Iraq. The US demand for a new Security Council Resolution provided Russia with political leverage over the discussions of Iraq's debt and Russia's participation in the reconstruction of Iraq.⁴⁸¹

Russia and the U.S. made progress in bilateral relations while negotiations proceeded on Iraq's debt and reconstruction. Soon after the negotiations, the U.S. included three Chechen groups in the State Department's list of terrorist organizations, which was welcomed by the Russian side.⁴⁸² The US Secretary of State Colin Powell took steps to convince Russia about the new UN Security Council resolution and paid a visit to Moscow. After his visit, Powell stated that the U.S.

⁴⁷⁸ Peronet Despeignes and Steven Komarow, "Nations Discuss Reducing Iraq Debt," *USA TODAY* (December 15, 2003). http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-12-15-iraq-debt-usat_x.htm (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁷⁹ Mark N. Katz, "Playing the Angles: Russian Diplomacy before and During the War in Iraq," *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 3 (2003): 49. The Paris Club is an informal group that is composed of the eighteen major international creditor states, who gather on occasion collectively reduce or reschedule official debts owed to them by poor and developing countries.

⁴⁸⁰ Sanger and Jehl, "Bush Asks Europe to Forgive Iraq Debt". John King, "Bush Appoints Baker Envoy on Iraqi Debt," *CNN.com* (December 5, 2003). <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/05/sprj.nilaw.baker.appointment/> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁸¹ David Filipov, "Moscow Would Write Off Billions in Iraqi Debt for Oil Company Access," *Boston Globe* (December 23, 2003). http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-12-23/news/17524007_1_oil-fields-billion-debt-russian-oil-companies (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁸² Spokesman. Richard Boucher, "Three Chechen Groups Designated as Terrorists," *US Department of State* (February 28, 2003). <http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2003/February/20030228152333treceveur@pd.state.gov0.6110911.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

would consider suspending sanctions rather than lifting them and added that he was sure that the new Iraqi government would take into account its obligations to the Russian Federation.⁴⁸³

Just a week later, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1483 with the votes of five permanent members.⁴⁸⁴ The resolution affirmed that the United States and the United Kingdom were occupying powers, which implied that the US and UK occupied Iraq without UN authorization.⁴⁸⁵ The resolution removed all trade sanctions with the exception of those related to weapons. The resolution expanded the Oil for Food regime for six more months and called for the UN and the occupying authority along with the Iraqi representatives to review and fulfill previously approved important contracts. Also, in line with the demands of Russia, France and Germany, the resolution acknowledged the role of the UN in the reconstruction of Iraq. The six-month delay and the decision to leave the debt issue to a further date meant Russia's participation in Iraq's reconstruction as opposed to the US decision that previously had been taken to bar Russia, Germany, and France from reconstruction of Iraq.⁴⁸⁶ In July 2003, the Paris Club rescheduled Iraq's debts and in December 2003, Russia decided to forgive about two-thirds of Iraq's \$8 billion debt, in exchange for the Iraqi Governing Council's signal that Moscow could revive its oil contracts that had been in place under Saddam Hussein.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸³ Nick Paton Walsh, "Powell Strikes Deal with Russia on Debt," *The Guardian* (May 15, 2003). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/16/iraq.russia> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁸⁴ UN Security Council, "The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait," *Security Council Resolution 1483* (2003) (May 22, 2003). http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁸⁵ Malone, *The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005*, 205.

⁴⁸⁶ Douglas Jehl, "A Region Inflamed: The Reconstruction; Pentagon Bars Three Nations from Iraq Bids," *New York Times* (December 10, 2003).

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/10/international/middleeast/10DIPL.html?pagewanted=2> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁸⁷ Erin E. Arvedlund, "Russia Offers to Forgive 65% of Iraq's Debt," *New York Times* (December 22, 2003). <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/22/international/europe/22CND-RUSS.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

On his visit to St. Petersburg, President Bush expressed his appreciation for Russia's agreement for the new resolution and stated that this experience made bilateral relations stronger, not weaker.⁴⁸⁸ President Bush added that the United States and Russia would show the world that friends could disagree, move beyond disagreement and work in a very constructive way to maintain peace. President Bush also expressed US commitment regarding missile defense cooperation, abrogation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and assistance for WTO membership.⁴⁸⁹

Speaking in the same tone, President Putin also stated that they were aware of questions on whether relations between the two states would withstand the test of time and they reiterated their resolve to continue their strategic partnership for the benefit of both nations and the entire world. He emphasized that the fundamentals between Russia and the United States turned out to be stronger than the forces and events that tested it. In addition to the decision for strengthening their bilateral cooperation in the economy, the Presidents agreed to continue their efforts to enhance international stability, fight against terrorism, and ensure better strategic stability. Although there was little success in realizing President Bush's commitments, Russia's objective of preserving relations with the United States was achieved and bilateral relations were restored. Support from the United States to Russia after the Beslan hostage crisis, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of hostages due to Russia's use of gas, showed that US-Russia cooperation on the war on terror remained intact.

⁴⁸⁸ "President Bush, Russian President Putin Sign Treaty of Moscow," *Press Availability with President Bush and President Putin* (June 1, 2003). <http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/Official%20Documents/U.S.%20Government/White%20House/1162003111001AM.html> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁸⁹ The Amendment withdraws a nation from the most favoured nation treatment because it violates or seriously restricts its citizens' rights to migration. The Amendment was imposed in 1974 toward the USSR because it prevented Jews from migration.

5.8.1. The Impact of the Iraq War on Russia's Perception of International Relations

After losing its superpower status, Russia had wanted a multipolar world against the establishment of a unipolar structure and strategy of unilateralism.⁴⁹⁰ Russia presented itself as a leading country with the capacity to influence the formation of the new world order and declared its determination to take an active part in achieving a multipolar world that would reflect diversity of interests. Along these lines, Russia considered respect for mutual interests as the foundation of a stable world order. When the United States called for leaving past differences behind and reestablishing its relations with the major powers against the threat of terrorism, major powers including Russia got the impression that the United States would conduct the war on terror within a multilateralist approach.⁴⁹¹ Therefore, in Russia's view, cooperation of the United States with major powers on Afghanistan was the practice of US multilateralism in the unipolar world.

The cost of non-cooperation, common interests, and the just cause of war and international support to the US war on Afghanistan have facilitated major powers' cooperation with the United States and created a political atmosphere for US multilateralism. Like in China's case, in Russia's case too, the cause of the United States was justified, the risk of non-cooperation was high and common interests were abundant. The common threat of terrorism came from Afghanistan united both Russia and the United States, and triggered the foundation of better relations between

⁴⁹⁰ "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)".

⁴⁹¹ "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Counterterrorism Cooperation," (May 24, 2002). <http://www.in.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/dfe9a9a6bb8e0d4443256bc3005201fb?OpenDocument> (accessed 02/01/2012). Stewart M. Powell, "War Warms Hopes for Bush-Putin Summit / Russia, US in Best Alliance since Wwii," *Hearst News* (November 11, 2001). http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-11-11/news/17625379_1_bushes-texas-russian-president-vladimir-putin-personal-diplomacy (accessed 02/01/2012).

the two states. US multilateralism in the war on Afghanistan had contributed to Russia's perception of international relations as more democratic and its self-image as a great power.

However, Russia's perception of multilateral international relations was harmed by the US decision to act unilaterally against Iraq without the UN Security Council authorization. In Russia's view, since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has the central role in the formation of a multilateral international order as it reflected the distribution of power in the emerging multipolar world.⁴⁹² Russia believed that international security matters should be managed by the collective leadership of the permanent members of the Security Council with their veto rights. The Security Council was founded to provide joint solutions for complex security issues and prevent problems between major powers due to clashes of interests through their veto power. The fact that the United States acted against three of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, China, and Russia) and Germany, and bypassed the Security Council to avoid being vetoed was perceived as a major violation.

US disregard for other major powers' interest brought the call for multipolarity and democratization of international relations back to Russian leadership's political discourse. On May 2003, together with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, Putin advocated establishing a multipolar, just, and democratic international order based on accepted international norms and called for solving the

⁴⁹² Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Russian Concepts of National Security," in *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past*, ed. Robert Legvold (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 327. Andrei Zagorski, "Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy Approaches," in *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 46-58.

Iraq crisis within the framework of the UN.⁴⁹³ Both states delivered a 'Joint Statement on the International Order of the 21st Century' in 2005 and argued that despite the presence of unilateralism and power politics, a multipolar world was irreversible.⁴⁹⁴ In this joint statement, both powers underlined the importance of the multilateral approach to counterterrorism and warned against double standards and the use of counterterrorism as a pretext for other purposes.

Russia's perception that the United States was using counterterrorism as a pretext for the seizure of Iraq's oil reserves and the US criticisms on Russia's counterterrorism strategy on different grounds caused Moscow to reevaluate the US war on terror. Russia took political steps to remind the U.S. that its interests in the near abroad, which it defined as its natural sphere of influence, should not be understated. Russia had supported the US military presence on the condition and with expectation that US military bases would be shut down as soon as the war in Afghanistan was won.⁴⁹⁵ As the US presence took longer, Russia, acting together with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, called for the closure of US military bases in Central Asia in 2005.⁴⁹⁶ Russia's support to the SCO declaration that demanded the US-led anti-terrorist coalition to set a deadline for the

⁴⁹³ "China, Russia Advocate Multi-Polarized International Order," *People Daily* (May 28, 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/28/eng20030528_117353.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012). "China, Russia Call for Restoration of Stability in Iraq," *People Daily* (28 May 2003). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/28/eng20030528_117345.shtml (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁹⁴ "Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Major International Issues," (May 23, 2008). <http://lt.china-embassy.org/eng/xwtd/t465821.htm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁹⁵ Ambrosio, "From Balancer to Ally? Russo-American Relations in the Wake of 11 September," 10.

⁴⁹⁶ "U.S. In 'Pointless' Campaign in Iraq, Putin Says: Russian President Suggests Oil Was a Key Factor in American Invasion," *msnbc.com* (October 18, 2007). http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21356785/ns/world_news-europe (accessed 02/01/2012). "Putin Calls on U.S. To Set Pullout Date in Iraq," *CNNWorld* (October 18, 2007). http://articles.cnn.com/2007-10-18/world/putin.iraq_1_russian-president-vladimir-putin-iraqi-government-iraqi-leadership?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 02/01/2012). "Putin Says Iraq War Encouraged Terror," *USA TODAY* (February 27, 2004). http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-02-27-russia-iraq_x.htm?csp=34 (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁴⁹⁶ John Chan, "Russia and China Call for Closure of US Bases in Central Asia," (July 30, 2005). <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jul2005/base-j30.shtml> (accessed 02/01/2012).

temporary use of military bases in the region was a diplomatic move showing Russia's uneasiness about the presence of the United States in its region.⁴⁹⁷ Russia's agreement with Kyrgyzstan to double the number of its troops at the airbase at Kant was also a move to indicate its presence and influence in the region as a great power.

In 2007, Putin delivered a speech at an international conference on international security in Munich where he strongly criticized the existing structure of the international system.⁴⁹⁸ The President opposed the definition of the current international system as unipolar because the world was not under the authority of one sovereign or master. Unipolarity, he stated, was neither acceptable nor possible in today's world because the military, economic, and political resources of one power would not suffice. After opposing the definition of the world as unipolar, Putin characterized the international system as unilateral and containing illegitimate actions that have not brought any solutions but instead created tragedies. Furthermore, alluding to the US use of force in Iraq, Putin pointed out the "hyper" use of military force in international relations plunged the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.

Moreover, Putin stated that the U.S. has overstepped its national boundaries everywhere and has been imposing its economic, political, cultural policies on other nations. He criticized the U.S. for disregarding the basic principles of international law and he argued that it became impossible to find a political solution to problems because they were solved according to US political expediency, based on the current political climate. Criticizing US dominance, Russia emphasized that no one felt safe

⁴⁹⁷ Chan, "Russia and China Call for Closure of US Bases in Central Asia".

⁴⁹⁸ Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Speech at the 43rd Conference on Security Policy," *AIR FORCE Magazine* (February 10, 2007). <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2007/April%202007/0407keeperfull.pdf> (accessed 02/01/2012).

under the current state of global security because no one could depend upon the protection of international law anymore. He further argued that US dominance inevitably encouraged a number of states to acquire weapons of mass destruction. After making remarkably powerful statements, Putin called for thinking about the structure of global security in the decisive moment that states reached. On the new structure of international relations, underlining the increasing economic power of Russia, Brazil, India and China, the BRIC countries, Putin emphasized that the economic potential of the new power centers would inevitably convert their economic power into political influence and would strengthen multipolarity.

The 2008 *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* also reflected Putin's criticisms on the state of international relations.⁴⁹⁹ According to the document, unilateral strategy led to destabilization of the international situation, created tensions through an arms race, intensified interstate differences, triggered ethnic and religious strife, and endangered the security of other states by fueling tensions in inter-civilizational relations. The document repeated the former documents' emphasis on the role of the UN as a mechanism of multilateralism and the development of a new international structure. Russia underlined the adequacy of Article 51 and stated that it was not subject to revision for the use of force in self-defense in the face of existing threats to peace and security such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The document explicitly stated that Russia was interested in US actions to be based on the principles and norms of international law as written in the UN Charter.

⁴⁹⁹ "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2008)," (12 July 2008). <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cddb> (accessed 02/01/2012).

Although the document underlined Russia's substantial role in the development of a new architecture of international relations and argued that the differences between Russia's domestic and external means for ensuring its national interest and security were gradually disappearing, the document did not mention Russia's aim to advance the establishment of a multipolar world as it did in previous documents. Multipolarity was referred to only once in the document and it has been defined as an emerging development in international relations that should not be addressed exclusively within the framework of Russia-US relations.

The absence of an official call for multipolarity and democratic international relations in the document can be considered as a result of Russia's non-confrontational strategy with the United States. Implying its relations with the United States, the document also openly stated that Russia would not get involved in a costly confrontation that would be destructive for its economy and internal development. Russia underlined the vast opportunities of having stable bilateral relations with the United States and pointed out the importance of its bilateral relations for global stability and for its security. Despite differences, Russia's call for the development of a joint culture for resolving differences through pragmatism and respect for mutual interests and its intention to transform Russian-US relations into strategic partnership showed its intentions to smooth its relations with the United States. The pursuit of a non-confrontational strategy and Russian pragmatism in international affairs have been an implication of Russian foreign policy that served as a major asset for its steady national development and its status in global affairs.

5.9. Conclusion

Having ceased to be one of the superpowers, Russia suffered a sudden status decline by the end of the Cold War. While undergoing economic and political transformation, Russia needed to reposition its status in the new international structure, which required redefinition of its grand strategy and formulation of the basic principles of its foreign policy. In the new era, the protection of its territorial integrity, assuring its internal development, especially economic recovery and revival of its great power status in the international arena became the foundation of its grand strategy. As these three factors were interdependent, their realization was also dependent on the state of international relations. In other words, Russia's success in protecting its territorial integrity, its economic recovery, and its revival as a great power depended on not only Russia's domestic performance but also international factors that mainly defined how the United States exerted its predominant power in international relations and on its relations with Russia. Having recognized this fact, Russia developed the foreign policy principle of avoiding direct confrontation with the United States on international matters. Despite Russia's engagement in international crises like the Kosovo operation and NATO enlargement, it preferred to express its opposition through diplomatic means rather than using Cold War-like military language. The decline of status from being one of the superpowers to a 'normal' power in international relations had a remarkable effect on Russia's foreign policy strategy. In a unipolar world, Russia's foreign policy was designed to preserve peaceful international relations for its internal development. To achieve this goal, Russia pursued a pragmatic foreign policy, and established good relations with the U.S. In this context, Russia's foreign policy has been one of the major instruments for its national development and of increasing its status in the system.

The US war on terror provided Russia with a great opportunity to develop better relations with the United States. The US approach to the threat of terrorism as a matter of international cooperation, its search for support from the other major powers in the system, and the tragedy of the September 11 attack, and the connection of Russia's own terrorism with Afghanistan eased Russia-US cooperation in the earlier stages of the US war on terror. International cooperation against the threat of terrorism became a matter of mutual interest between Russia and the United States. Also, this cooperation was triggered by the calculation that Russia would be worse off if it was excluded from the US global campaign against terrorism which was going to take place in Russia's neighborhood. By taking an active part in the US war on terror, Russia had an opportunity to act together with the US-led coalition and escaped international isolation, as was the case in former international problems.

The war on Afghanistan and the US-led global campaign on the terrorist threat were in conformity with Russia's conditions for cooperation. It was developed on the basis of equality, mutual respect for interests and mutual benefit. These conditions of international cooperation were the definition of multilateralism, which Russia regarded as the foundation of a multipolar world. Since the end of the bipolar world, Russia declared its intention to make an active effort for the development of a multipolar system reflecting the diversity of interests in international relations. The period with the US war on terror and the United States' ostensible multilateralism strengthened Russia's perception of itself as a great power even if the structure was not going towards multipolarity.

Russia regarded the UN and its Security Council as the most crucial mechanism where a diversity of interests were represented. For this reason, like China, it supported the UN as the backbone of international relations as it fit the

requirements of the emerging multipolar system at best. Therefore, Russia evaluated bypassing the UN and its Security Council not only as a threat to the current world order but also to its status as a great power and to the emerging multipolar system. A decade after the Kosovo war, the US unilateral and preemptive war on Iraq revived Russia's criticism of US predominance. Russia saw the war on Iraq as part of a deliberate US effort to weaken the UN, to lower the role of sovereign states as a fundamental element of international relations and to divide states with different rights and responsibilities so that it could preserve its dominant position in world affairs.

By the end of the Iraq War, despite its strong opposition together with other major powers, Russia found a way to settle its relations with the United States as it did after the Kosovo War. In this sense, the Iraq War did not change the main principle of Russia's foreign policy on preserving the peacefulness of its international relations. However, the war changed Russia's expectation that US multilateralism would remain a part of international relations and multilateralism would enhance the emergence of the multipolar world. Contrary to Russia's expectations, the turn of US politics from multilateralism to unilateralism after the Iraq war taught Russia the lesson that multilateralism in a unipolar world would always be at the discretion of the United States and long-lasting multilateralism could be guaranteed only in a multipolar system. Therefore, Russia's call for multipolarity increased as its desire to be one of the poles.

CHAPTER VI

BALANCING IN A UNIPOLAR STRUCTURE: THE REALIST LITERATURE

6.1. Introduction

Before employing a constructivist analysis to the prospects of balancing under unipolarity, this Chapter aims to analyze how arguments on balancing in a unipolar structure have evolved in the Realist literature. Since the end of the Cold War, Realist scholars have debated balancing against the U.S. The literature on balancing against the United States has predicated on either balance of power or balance of threat theory. For this reason, the Chapter begins with a brief overview of both theories' major assumptions. Second, it focuses on prominent Realist scholars' works who have written on balancing and unipolarity to show how they treat both concepts since the advent of the unipolar era. Looking at the flow of the arguments in the studies under review, it categorizes the evolution of the debate on balancing under unipolarity into four stages as follows: (i) the denial of unipolarity with the predictions of multipolarity; (ii) the acceptance of unipolarity as a temporary condition and questioning its stability and durability; (iii) the 'great puzzle' and soft balancing as a middle ground approach between balance of power and balance of threat; and (iv) the recognition of unipolarity as a distinct structural configuration. The chapter draws several conclusions from this analysis. First, it concludes that in

twenty-two years, scholars have eventually recognized unipolarity as a distinct distribution of power that might create different outcomes than what might be expected under bipolarity and multipolarity. Second, despite recognizing its distinctiveness, similar to the previous scholarship on polarity, these analyses focused on the material structure of international politics and discussed durability and stability of unipolarity in relation to material conditions. Third, the absence of hard balancing under unipolarity has pushed scholars to lean towards soft balancing and balance of threat arguments by incorporating ‘social’ variables rather than balance of power arguments with the ‘material’ factors.

6.2. An Overview on the Foundations of Balancing: Balance of Power and Balance of Threat Theories

6.2.1. Balance of Power Theory

Balance of power theory has been the bedrock of Realist theory.⁵⁰⁰ According to Waltz, “if there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it”.⁵⁰¹ The theory is predicated on the notion that states are unitary actors and seek to survive in the anarchic international system. States seek power, in whose absence they can lose their security and risk their survival. Hence, the anarchic structure of the international system compels states to maximize their power and the competition for power is an intrinsic part of international relations under anarchy. States strive to increase their relative gains. Under these systemic constraints, a state that attains hegemony will gain security for itself but

⁵⁰⁰ On the significance of balance of power; See, Carr and Cox, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*.

⁵⁰¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 62.

will threaten the security of others. Therefore, the theory predicts that if/when a state or a coalition of states becomes dominant in the system, others will pursue balancing strategies. In a competitive system, faced with the risk of domination and elimination, weaker states can use external resources and combine their forces with others' to form balancing coalitions. These states can also rely on their internal resources by strengthening their economic, military and political power resources. Using external or internal, or both, balancing strategies, states endeavor to establish balance of power and countervail the hegemonic state or coalition in the system. Thus, it is predicted by Realist scholars that states will engage in balancing behavior. States will have a strong tendency to establish balance of power, and if disturbed, they will restore it. As Waltz says, "balances of power recurrently form."⁵⁰² Briefly, the Realist theory predicts that balancing of hegemonic power is inevitable, as the lesser states will always be insecure by the accumulation of power in one hand under anarchy.

6.2.2. Balance of Threat Theory

Stephen Walt challenges the main assumption of balance of power theory, which proposes that states form alliances to balance in order to avoid domination by stronger powers.⁵⁰³ Opposing the definition of balancing behavior solely in terms of power, Walt suggests that it is more accurate to say that balancing behavior is formed as a response to threatening power. Although Walt accepts the distribution of power as an extremely important factor in defining threat, he also includes a variety of

⁵⁰² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 128.

⁵⁰³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 5. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 3-43.

factors such as geographic proximity, offensive power and perceived intentions.⁵⁰⁴ For Walt, “states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.”⁵⁰⁵ According to Walt, even states with modest capability can be the object of balancing if they are perceived as aggressive. Walt underscores that perceptions of intent play a very crucial role in the formation of balancing behavior. The more a state is perceived as expansionist or aggressive, the more likely others will balance it. Hence, “intentions, not power, are crucial.”⁵⁰⁶ The implication of balance of threat theory is that whether or not states will balance against a dominant state depends on the behavior of the strong state. If a dominant state demonstrates restraint and benevolence in its behavior, it is not perceived as aggressive or expansionist.⁵⁰⁷ Thereby, a dominant state can prevent the formation of balancing following a prudent foreign policy. In other words, balancing is not inevitable under anarchy on the condition that weaker actors perceive the power of hegemonic power as benign. In the following section, the Chapter will indicate how the debate on balancing under unipolarity in the Realist has evolved from balance of power theory to balance of threat theory.

⁵⁰⁴ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 9.

⁵⁰⁵ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 12.

⁵⁰⁶ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 14.

⁵⁰⁷ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 14.

6.3. The Evolution of Balancing Debate in Realist Literature in the “Unipolar Age”

6.3.1. The First Stage: Dominance of Balance of Power Thinking and Denial of Unipolarity with Predictions of Multipolarity

The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union brought a major question about the future structure of the international system. As balancing has been a major subject for balance of power theory, it responded to the radical change in international relations. One of the most influential attempts in this regard was John Mearsheimer’s article entitled “Back to the Future.” In his 1990 article, John Mearsheimer argued that the bipolar structure would be replaced by a multipolar structure. He predicted that the prospects for major crisis, even war in Europe, were becoming increasingly likely.⁵⁰⁸ According to his predictions, Europe without superpowers would be more prone to violence and it would be “back to the future” in the next decades. Mearsheimer argued that the departure of superpowers from Europe would transform Europe from a bipolar to multipolar system in which Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and despite its decline the Soviet Union, would play a major role. This multi-power system, as he reasoned, would suffer from the problems common to all multipolar systems and would be prone to instability. This was because, in multipolar systems, the high number of actors increase the possibilities of conflict due to miscalculations of relative power and made deterrence more difficult.⁵⁰⁹

In his discussion of the future of the international structure and prospects of peace and war, Mearsheimer discussed the virtues of bipolarity over multipolarity

⁵⁰⁸ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 5-56.

⁵⁰⁹ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 14.

because these were “two principal arrangements of power possible among states.”⁵¹⁰ Although Mearsheimer mentioned hegemony in a footnote as the third possible distribution, he did not see hegemony as relevant in discussions of the post-Cold War international system.⁵¹¹ He stated that hegemonic systems were defined by the presence of only one major power. Under hegemony, he argued the less powerful states could not challenge the major power and would act in accordance with its dictates. Therefore, he suggested every state in the system would strive for hegemony because no challenger could pose a serious threat to a hegemon. In other words, a hegemon was rewarded by abundant security. Although it was desirable for states to be a hegemon, Mearsheimer noted that hegemony was rarely achieved in the system because power was usually evenly distributed among the states that had strong incentives to balance an aspiring hegemon. He considered hegemony a part of the European state system and argued that as it has never characterized the European state system since the seventeenth century, “there is no prospect of hegemony in the foreseeable future”.⁵¹² He concluded that hegemony was not relevant to assessing the prospects for peace in Europe. Therefore, he excluded the United States’ primacy from the discussions of hegemony.⁵¹³

Kenneth Waltz wrote an article on “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” in 1993.⁵¹⁴ In this article, Waltz argued that international order operated within the same fundamental power patterns and defined the decline of the Soviet Union as a part of “the drama of the modern history”, which consisted of the rise and fall of great powers for more than three hundred years.⁵¹⁵ In his evaluation of the

⁵¹⁰ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 13.

⁵¹¹ See footnote 15 in Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 13.

⁵¹² See footnote 15 in Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 14.

⁵¹³ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," 55.

⁵¹⁴ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 44-79.

⁵¹⁵ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 44.

effect of Russia's decline on the structure of international politics, he stated that bipolarity endured, but in an altered state. Bipolarity continued because militarily Russia could take care of itself and no other great powers have yet emerged.⁵¹⁶ Furthermore, although Waltz stated that bipolarity endured, he noted that some of the implications of bipolarity, such as balancing, have changed because in the absence of Soviet power, the United States has remained unchecked by any other country or coalition of countries.⁵¹⁷

Based on the overwhelming power position of the United States, he reiterated that balance of power was a recurring, not a particular or ephemeral condition, and predicted that other states would act, alone or in concert, would bring American power into balance. The most powerful candidates for balancing were Japan and Germany, both of which were eventually expected to stop being a "structural anomaly".⁵¹⁸ According to Waltz, Germany and Japan would grow accustomed to their great power roles because they had to coexist and interact with other great powers. In this regard, China would push Japan and Russia would make Germany be 'normal' great powers. Similar to Mearsheimer, Waltz also predicted a multipolar system because "even if the powerful state's intentions are wholly benign, less powerful states will, from their different historical experiences, geographic locations, and economic interests, interpret events differently and often prefer different policies."⁵¹⁹ Therefore, based on the expectations of balance of power theory with respect to hegemony, Waltz concluded that the US preponderant power would lead to balance. Waltz further stated that balancing against the U.S. was in fact already taking place. Overall, it was a common expectation that US dominance would not

⁵¹⁶ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 52.

⁵¹⁷ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 52.

⁵¹⁸ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 66.

⁵¹⁹ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 74.

last long because other states would eventually counterbalance against the United States.

6.3.2. The Second Stage: Accepting Unipolarity as a Temporary Condition and Discussions on its Stability and Durability

In contrast to Waltz and Mearsheimer who refrained from classifying the international system as unipolar, Christopher Layne stated that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the international system was transformed from bipolarity to unipolarity.⁵²⁰ In his 1993 article entitled “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” Layne defined a unipolar system as “one in which a single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it.”⁵²¹ The article criticized US post-Cold War strategy based on perpetuating unipolarity and warned policymakers that the “unipolar moment” was an “illusion.”⁵²² Based on neorealist theory, Layne argued that “the ‘unipolar moment’ was just a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity between 2000-2010.”⁵²³ Building on the Realist premise that states balance against hegemons, he predicted that even if the United States sought to perpetuate its preeminence by benevolence rather than coercion, it would be balanced.

Like other Realist scholars, Layne argued that systemic pressure would impel eligible states, such as Japan, to become great powers and balance against the U.S.

⁵²⁰ Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 5-51.

⁵²¹ See footnote 2 in Layne, Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 5.

⁵²² Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 6-7. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1991): 23-33.

⁵²³ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 7.

He argued that unipolar systems contained seeds of their own destruction because hegemon's preponderant power created conditions for the emergence of new great powers whose entry into the system would erode the most powerful states' preeminence and relative power. Unbalanced distribution of capabilities in a unipolar system was a systemic condition that would impel states to balance the U.S. As the security dilemma was dominant in a unipolar system, what worried others would be the hegemon's power, not its intentions.⁵²⁴ Security would be scarce for other states under unipolarity. Others would not share U.S. self-perception as a benign hegemon. This difference of perception on US hegemony would trigger balancing.⁵²⁵ Hence, he asserted that balancing could not be prevented by the 'benign' power as balance of threat theory foresaw. Arguing that unipolarity would not be durable, he called for a new grand strategy that was founded on managing the transition period from unipolarity to multipolarity and advancing American interests in the multipolar world as an offshore balancer.⁵²⁶

Similarly, in a 1997 article, Kenneth Waltz has stated that even though it did not appear so quickly "multipolarity is developing before our eyes: to all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in accordance with the balancing imperative."⁵²⁷ He underscored that according to structural theory, unipolarity was the least stable of international configurations because neither the dominant power could behave with moderation, restraint, and forbearance nor could the other countries agree with the dominant power who thinks of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world.⁵²⁸

⁵²⁴ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 14.

⁵²⁵ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 46.

⁵²⁶ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 8.

⁵²⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (1997): 915.

⁵²⁸ Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 916.

Hence, Waltz argued that the preponderant power of the United States would be balanced because it would always be a potential danger to others. The powerful state, he argued, would sometimes act in ways that “appear” arbitrary and high handed to others who would be uncomfortable due to the unfair treatment that they “believed” they were receiving.⁵²⁹ As implied in this statement, Waltz also implicitly assumed that perceptions regarding the intentions of the dominant state would play a significant role in triggering other states’ intention to balance against the United States. Hence, Waltz concluded that the unipolar system would not be durable.

Later in 2000, in his seminal article entitled “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” Waltz contributed to the discussion on unipolarity and balancing and repeated that balancing would take place “not today but tomorrow.”⁵³⁰ He repeated key propositions of Realist theory: international relations reflected the distribution of capabilities; balance of power recurred; and disrupted balance would be restored. Remembering the key propositions of balance of power theory, he reiterated that balancing was inevitable in the system. In the article, Waltz accepted that “upon the demise of the Soviet Union, the international political system became unipolar.”⁵³¹ Yet, he argued that “in the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least durable of international configurations.”⁵³² According to Waltz, there were two basic reasons. One was the dominant power would weaken in the long run because it took on too many overseas tasks. Second, the preponderant power of the dominant state would worry weaker states about their future even though the dominant state behaved with moderation and restraint. Hence, states would follow internal balancing

⁵²⁹ Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 916.

⁵³⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 27.

⁵³¹ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 27.

⁵³² Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 27.

or external balancing strategies, or both, “to bring international distribution of power into balance”.⁵³³

In the article, Waltz elaborated on potential candidates for becoming great powers that would restore balance of power. According to Waltz, the European Union or Germany-led coalition, China, Japan and Russia were the most powerful candidates. The prospect of the EU to emerge as a balancer depended on achieving unity on foreign and military policy, which “has less hope of doing so now.”⁵³⁴ On Japan and Germany, Waltz expected them to respond to structural imperatives rather than resisting them. He argued that “the all-but-inevitable movement from unipolarity to multipolarity is taking place not in Europe but in Asia.”⁵³⁵ He considered China a major candidate for balancing due to its steady rising power on the condition that it remained politically united and competent. He argued China’s military and economic capability would cause Japan to be a ‘normal’ great power rather than a “structural anomaly.”⁵³⁶

Moreover, while on the one hand he argued inevitability for balancing in the unipolar system, on other hand he said “balancing, of course, is not universal and omnipresent” because a dominant power could suppress balancing or governments might or might not decide to balance.⁵³⁷ In the final parts of the article, he emphasized conditions that could trigger and facilitate balancing against the United States. According to Waltz, the United States failed to learn from history and it has repeated past mistakes by extending its influence over what used to be entrusted to

⁵³³ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 28.

⁵³⁴ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 31.

⁵³⁵ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 32.

⁵³⁶ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 34.

⁵³⁷ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 37.

the defeated powers.⁵³⁸ He argued that although China and Russia have many areas of conflict, the United States' policies would push them together, which might trigger a balancing coalition. He stated alienating Russia by expanding NATO and alienating China by telling its leaders how to rule their country were policies that "only an overwhelmingly powerful country could afford, and only a foolish one be tempted, to follow. The United States cannot prevent a new balance of power from forming. *It can hasten its coming as it has been earnestly doing.*"⁵³⁹ It should be noted that agreeing that US practices could trigger or facilitate the fastening of balancing Waltz also used threat perception as an auxiliary variable to predict balancing against the United States. Also, correcting his earlier estimations about multipolarity, he said that "though it may be emerging slowly in our perspective, in historical perspectives, it will come in the blink of an eye."⁵⁴⁰ Finally, both Layne and Waltz claimed that the United States would be balanced due to the balance of power dynamics in international relations regardless of its practices or perceptions of others.

Nevertheless, scholars with balance of threat leanings argued that unipolarity was a durable configuration of power if the United States did not threaten other states' security. To begin with, Michael Mastanduno's article entitled "Preserving the Unipolar Moment" discussed US grand strategy after the Cold War in the light of balance of power and balance of threat theories.⁵⁴¹ In the article, Mastanduno focused on the implications of a unipolar structure on the behavior of the state situated at the top of the international hierarchy rather than focusing on great powers'

⁵³⁸ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 38.

⁵³⁹ Italics is added by the author. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 38.

⁵⁴⁰ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 30.

⁵⁴¹ Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 49-88.

behaviors against the dominant state in the unipolar system.⁵⁴² He maintained that the United States' behavior was not consistent with expectations of balance of power theory, according to which the best strategy for the United States was to accept inevitability of multipolarity and to be an offshore balancer.⁵⁴³ Instead of preparing for multipolarity by disentangling itself from its Cold War commitments, Mastanduno argued that the United States acted against the expectations of balance of power theory. The United States' engagement in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, the United States' efforts to integrate China and Russia into the present order and its enduring relations with Japan and Germany were contrary to the expectations of the balance of power theory.

In his analysis of post-Cold War US foreign policy, in line with balance of threat theory, Mastanduno suggested that the U.S. should rely on multilateralism in international affairs in order to maintain its predominant position and prevent balancing. Mastanduno argued that because the policy of multilateralism would convince other states that their preferences also mattered and would reassure them that the U.S. would not coerce or dictate its wishes on the others, other states would not tend to balance against the U.S.⁵⁴⁴ However, the intention of potential challengers would be dependent on whether the U.S. would follow policies of accommodation and reassurance.⁵⁴⁵ In other words, the behavior of the U.S. would be defined by the intentions of potential challengers, who might be either status quo or revisionist powers. According to these assumptions, the U.S. might follow policies of

⁵⁴² Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 55.

⁵⁴³ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 45-51.

⁵⁴⁴ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 61.

⁵⁴⁵ He uses Morgenthau's definition of status quo power, who is satisfied with the existing distribution of power, and imperialist or revisionist power, who seeks to change the governing rules and distribution of powers in the system. Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 42-51.

accommodation and reassurance towards status quo powers while a policy of coercion, even military action, against revisionist states that were committed to upset the existing international order.⁵⁴⁶ He also mentioned undecided states towards which the United States was expected to pursue a policy of engagement and integration.⁵⁴⁷

In his evaluation of the status of potential challengers, Mastanduno stated that in the current international system, the U.S. was not challenged by any state or coalition of states with the intention to balance the United States and destabilize the current order.⁵⁴⁸ Instead, he put forward that there were two groups of potential challengers. In one group, there was Japan and Germany, who were satisfied with the international situation and followed a pro status quo foreign policy behavior. In the other group, there was Russia and China who “sit on the fence, with foreign policy intentions and aspirations more uncertain.”⁵⁴⁹ Based on the categorization and expectations, he concluded that Japan and Germany would continue to support the current order. On Russia, he stated that although Moscow has pursued coercive and interventionist policies, especially in the near abroad and wanted to influence the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, this must be considered a search for “prestige and an effort to restore its great power status as a regional power.” Hence, Russia’s behavior should not be considered a balancing strategy. Similarly, China’s rapid growth, international discontent and history of humiliation made it a likely candidate for being a revisionist state. Mastanduno characterized China as a state with “the

⁵⁴⁶ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 61.

⁵⁴⁷ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 63.

⁵⁴⁸ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 63.

⁵⁴⁹ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 63.

potential for a destabilizing combination of capabilities and intentions.”⁵⁵⁰ Yet, he has argued that China’s “revisionist challenge is not inevitable” because it wanted to be a responsible great power and has not tried to organize a balancing coalition against the United States.

Based on the analysis, Mastanduno argued that since the post-Cold War era, US security strategy has confirmed the predictions of balance of threat theory. The United States has reassured Japan and Germany with security arrangements and convinced them to remain status quo powers without their own military capabilities. Towards “undecided powers,” he argued the United States reacted cautiously and encouraged Russia and China to be part of the existing international order. He emphasized that the United States did not take advantage of Russia’s lost prestige, its economic and political instability, and its internal security problems. Mastanduno stated that the United States’ policy towards Chechnya, Russia’s acceptance to attend G7 summits, and its support to Russia’s access to IMF loans were proof of the US strategy to steer Russia away from being a revisionist power. The only issue that was not wholly compatible with the strategy as Mastanduno stated was the expansion of NATO, which could have been made “Russia-friendly” with better political formulas.⁵⁵¹

As Mastanduno argued, the US strategy towards China was compatible with the balance of threat theory since the U.S. stressed an engagement and integration rather than containment under the Clinton administration. He quoted Clinton administration’s Assistant Defense Secretary Nye who has said “it is wrong to portray China as an enemy. Nor is there reason to believe China must be an enemy in

⁵⁵⁰ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 66.

⁵⁵¹ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 71.

the future.... A containment strategy would be difficult to reverse. Enmity would become a self-fulfilling prophecy".⁵⁵² Hence, the U.S. has focused on strategies that would facilitate China's integration into the system and turn it into a status quo power. Mastanduno emphasized that the key element of the US approach has been closer defense and security cooperation with China. The granting of most-favored-nation status despite China's bad human rights record, China's participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its participation in high-level international dialogues were considered proof of the US engagement strategy.

As opposed to Layne, Mastanduno suggested that the U.S. should pursue engagement strategy rather than being an offshore balancer while expecting multipolarity. He concluded that "whether or not the transition to a new international order will be prolonged will depend on, at least in part, on the skill and resourcefulness of US foreign policy officials."⁵⁵³ The United States must constrain itself although it was not constrained by other great powers in order to escape from the temptations of power. In order to prolong the "unipolar moment," it should not pursue unilateral strategy, dictate its policies, preach its virtues or impose its values.⁵⁵⁴ Mastanduno highlighted multilateralism as a key element for the United States while exercising its power with legitimacy. He stated that multilateral decision making processes were "key instruments of statecraft-indeed, of *realpolitik*-for a dominant state that is seeking, in a unipolar setting, to convince other states to

⁵⁵² Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 4 (1995): 94. Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 71.

⁵⁵³ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 88.

⁵⁵⁴ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 88.

cooperate with it rather than to balance against it.”⁵⁵⁵ Therefore, Mastanduno conditioned balancing on perceptions of others about the US and US practices and interactions with others.

In 1999, Wohlforth also challenged what he has called “the emerging conventional wisdom” that ‘unipolarity is an ‘illusion,’ a ‘moment,’ that ‘will not last long,’ or is already ‘giving way to multipolarity.’⁵⁵⁶ In his discussion on “stability of a unipolar world,” he advanced three propositions undermining “the conventional wisdom” that defined unipolarity as unstable and conflict-prone distribution of power. Accordingly, the system was certainly unipolar. This was because the United States enjoyed a large margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or even, all other great powers combined. In addition, the leading position of the United States relied on the decisive preponderance of power in all the underlying components of power including economic, military, technological and geopolitical.⁵⁵⁷

Second, he argued that the current unipolar system was peaceful because the raw power advantage of the United States removed two significant sources of conflict seen in the previous systems: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system and uncertainty in balance of power politics among the major states. The fact that no other state could prevail over the United States in a war and could risk being the prime enemy of the United States increased the probability of a

⁵⁵⁵ Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 73.

⁵⁵⁶ For the phrases about the duration of unipolarity, Wohlforth quotes Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," *International Security* 23, no. 2 (1998): 41; Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," *The National Interest*, no. 56 (1999): 73-81; Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise."; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War." and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 914. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 7.

⁵⁵⁷ Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 7.

peaceful system. Also, he underlined that according to balance of power theory “smaller is better,”⁵⁵⁸ hence, he concluded “one pole is the best” because unipolarity minimized uncertainty.⁵⁵⁹ According to Wohlforth, unipolarity “is the least war prone of all structures.”⁵⁶⁰ Third, he put forward that the current state of unipolarity was also durable. He stated “it is already a decade old, *if Washington plays its cards right*, it may last as long as bipolarity.”⁵⁶¹ Also, Wohlforth underlined that the United States was an offshore power separated by two oceans from other major powers, which helped Washington to retain its superiority over the others. According to Wohlforth, neither of the candidate balancers that were Japan, China, Germany and Russia had the same geographical advantage as the U.S. had. Therefore, the United States’ position as the unipole was strengthened due to its geography. He suggested that these continental powers had to counterbalance each other before they created a balance against the United States.

Wohlforth highlighted that the distribution of capabilities was unprecedented and “we are living the modern world’s first unipolar system,” hence, unipolarity was not a “moment” but “a deeply embedded material condition” with a “potential to last for many decades.”⁵⁶² He criticized scholars who hastened to declare the demise of unipolarity by conflating the power trends with existing relationships.⁵⁶³ Hence, as he put it, this conflation led scholars to suggest policymakers to get prepared for multipolarity. Instead, he argues, scholars should focus on understanding unipolarity

⁵⁵⁸ Wohlforth discusses the stability of unipolarity based on Waltz’s arguments regarding stability of bipolarity in comparison to multipolarity and follows the same logic drawing the conclusion. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 25. Chapter 9 in Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus* 93, no. 3 (1964): 881–901.

⁵⁵⁹ Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 25.

⁵⁶⁰ Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 24.

⁵⁶¹ Italics is added by the author. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 8.

⁵⁶² Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 37.

⁵⁶³ Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 37.

“right” and “should do more to advertise the attractions of unipolarity”⁵⁶⁴ because it was prone to peace and “it will last several more decades at least.”⁵⁶⁵ On balancing, different from other scholars, Wohlforth put forward that united Europe, rising Japan or China may not be the chief engines of the end of unipolarity as it was not the rise of a great power that ended bipolarity.⁵⁶⁶ As Wohlforth put it “the current concentration of power in the United States is unprecedentedly clear and comprehensive, states are likely to share the expectation that counterbalancing will be a costly and doomed venture.”⁵⁶⁷ Therefore, Wohlforth concluded that unipolarity should be promoted as a stable and durable structure because it promised stability if it endured.

6.3.3. The Third Stage: The ‘Great Puzzle’ and Soft Balancing as a Middle Ground between Balance of Power and Balance of Threat Arguments

Despite predictions and expectations since the end of the Cold War, there was little or no empirical evidence of balancing against the United States. The absence of balancing became a ‘great puzzle’ to be explained by Realists who were ‘waiting for balancing’ and have been asking “why the world is not pushing back.”⁵⁶⁸ Soft balancing arguments emerged as a response to the perplexing situation regarding the absence of balancing against the United States because both balance of power theory and balance of threat theory failed to explain why great powers did not pursue balancing strategy against the United States. It was obvious that the United States

⁵⁶⁴ Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 41.

⁵⁶⁵ Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 39.

⁵⁶⁶ Rather he suggests that the US policies that deny the existence of unipolar structure and refuse to face its modest costs. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 41.

⁵⁶⁷ Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 39.

⁵⁶⁸ Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 109-139.

was still the most powerful state in terms of capabilities and its unilateral preemptive military actions against states seeking weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorism was not welcomed by other powers.⁵⁶⁹ Therefore, combining balance of power and balance of threat theories' assumptions, soft balancing, scholars reconceptualized balancing. They argued that hard-balancing was not a viable option against the United States and great powers still needed to restrain the United States for non-existential threats; therefore, they pursued soft-balancing strategies that were missed by both balance of power and balance of threat theories.

Therefore, referring to the puzzle, T.V. Paul pointed out the need for "broadening" the concept of balance of power.⁵⁷⁰ Paul argued that the traditional conception of balance of power failed to capture the security behavior of states fully because of its dichotomous approach to balancing. According to this dichotomous approach, states either balanced or not and there were no in-between categories. Highlighting that dichotomous approach missed the in-between categories of states' security behaviors, Paul argued that states pursued tacit and indirect means other than open arms buildup and alliance formation to balance a powerful state or one threatening their security.⁵⁷¹ Hence, Paul proposed that instead of focusing on military buildup as balancing strategy, which limited the usefulness and flexibility of balance of power theory, the indirect methods that major powers used for constraining and checking the hegemon should be analyzed for better understanding

⁵⁶⁹ T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 47.

⁵⁷⁰ T. V. Paul, "Introduction," in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 3.

⁵⁷¹ Paul, "Introduction," 13.

of balancing.⁵⁷² He argued if the concept was broadened, it would be possible to detect balancing strategies used against the United States.

In the age of US primacy, as Paul argued, soft balancing was a more attractive way to temper the aggressive behavior of the United States as compared to hard balancing.⁵⁷³ The conditions that encouraged soft balancing were categorized as follows: first, it was obviously a low-cost activity considering the huge power differential between the United States and other powers. Second, the United States did not pose a threat to the sovereign existence of major powers. There was no fear of being conquered by the hegemon. Third, the United States was the engine of economic globalization and preserving economic ties were crucial for emerging great powers. Fourth, the United States was a valuable asset as a security provider in Europe and Asia; therefore, strategies of free riding and buck-passing were applicable only if they had good relations with the United States. Fifth, it was difficult to transfer economic wealth into military capabilities. Last, the United States could easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts were not overt or they were not direct military challenges. According to the argument, being immune to the direct hegemonic threat, major powers preferred to maximize the benefits provided by the hegemon and minimize the risks by using soft balancing strategies.

Soft balancing strategies are defined as follows: it involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances and occurs when states generally developed ententes or limited security understandings to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising

⁵⁷² He categorizes balancing as hard balancing, soft balancing and asymmetric balancing. According to this, hard balancing is defined as a strategy pursued by states under intense international competition. In pursuit of hard balancing, states adopt strategies to build up and renew their military capabilities as well as creating and maintaining formal alliances to match the capabilities of their adversaries. This definition refers to what Waltz respectively calls internal and external balancing. Paul, "Introduction," 3; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 47.

⁵⁷³ Paul, "Introduction," 16; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 55-59.

power.⁵⁷⁴ Limited arms buildup, *ad hoc* cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions were practices of soft balancing, which could be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition was intense and the powerful state was threatening.⁵⁷⁵ In his 2005 article, Paul highlighted the limited, tacit, or indirect character of soft balancing strategies that were largely pursued through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions short of formal bilateral and multilateral military alliances.⁵⁷⁶ Here, the emphasis was on the institutional and diplomatic strategies like diplomatic coalitions or ententes as forms of soft balancing to balance a powerful state or a rising or potentially threatening power.⁵⁷⁷ For instance, the veto power that the great powers hold in the UN Security Council was considered a pivotal tool for soft balancing strategy because UN approval was a central mechanism to grant legitimacy to US policies in the international sphere.

According to Paul, in the post-September 11 era, the major powers became increasingly worried about US grand strategy as they perceived it as “offensive and quasi-imperial.”⁵⁷⁸ The adoption of preemptive and preventive war doctrine under the Bush administration, though directed against ‘rogue states,’ was considered a challenge to the norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty. As opposed to Afghanistan, which was regarded as a common problem and not even a legitimate government for all major powers, the major powers, like China, Russia, France, and Germany, did not support the US war on Iraq because of their concerns about US hegemony characterized with military adventurism and expansionism. Paul argued

⁵⁷⁴ For counterarguments against soft balancing; See, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 72–108; Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," 109–139.

⁵⁷⁵ Paul, "Introduction," 3.

⁵⁷⁶ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 58.

⁵⁷⁷ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 58.

⁵⁷⁸ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 58.

that the major powers utilized soft balancing strategies in order to challenge the legitimacy of the US interventionist policies.⁵⁷⁹ Here, Paul argued that the great powers preferred to deny US legitimacy as a soft balancing strategy and by denying legitimacy, which worked as a facilitator, they aimed at affecting the success of the post-intervention peacekeeping and stabilization process. Despite the fact that soft balancing efforts through the UN Security Council failed, and the US invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein, according to Paul, it was the soft balancing strategies, which enabled the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the return of partial sovereignty to the Iraqi government, the end of occupation by the end of 2004, and free elections in January 2005.⁵⁸⁰

However, Paul argued that if the US offensive extended to other states beyond Iraq and it did not agree with major powers on the future of Iraq, then major powers' concerns would increase, which could result in the search for hard balancing strategies against the United States. Hence, Paul concluded that hard balancing was "very much tied to the security and foreign policies of the hegemonic state. If the United States pursues its foreign policy in less threatening ways, it can avoid the rise of hard-balancing coalitions."⁵⁸¹ Therefore, in Paul's view balancing against the United States was not an automatic process as balance of power theory suggested. If the United States abstained from challenging "sensitive areas" such as violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the United States could restrain its power, then great powers would not consider balancing. Yet, if the United States pursued an "empire building" strategy, it would be perceived as a "revisionist" state altering

⁵⁷⁹ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 59.

⁵⁸⁰ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 70.

⁵⁸¹ Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 71.

international order, which would trigger a hard-balancing coalition either formed regionally or globally.⁵⁸²

Similar to Paul, Robert Pape discussed “soft balancing against the United States” and challenged the arguments that the raw power advantage over the major powers prevented them from balancing against the United States.⁵⁸³ In the article, Pape criticized the Bush administration’s national security strategy because aggressive unilateralism changed the long enjoyed reputation for benign intent and gave other major powers reason to be concerned about the intentions of the United States.⁵⁸⁴ According to Pape, the distinctiveness of the unipolar system stemmed from the fact that the system was defined by the only superpower that could not be balanced by any other single state in the system. However, he highlighted the fact that the unipolar system was a balance of power system; therefore, the unipolar leader was still subject to the possibility of balancing by most or all of the second ranked powers acting in concert.⁵⁸⁵ Pape noted that the perceived intentions of the leading state could incite the major powers to contain the leading state’s further expansion or even to seek a shift in distribution of power back toward multipolarity.⁵⁸⁶

Pape argued that “in a unipolar system, states balance against threats, defined by the power and aggressive intentions of the revisionist state.”⁵⁸⁷ In addition to the significance of direct threats, he underlined the significance of indirect threats in shaping states’ balancing behavior because concerns over *indirect* threats were likely

⁵⁸² Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 71.

⁵⁸³ Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (2005): 9; Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 7-8.

⁵⁸⁴ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 9.

⁵⁸⁵ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 11.

⁵⁸⁶ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 13.

⁵⁸⁷ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 17.

to be greater in unipolar systems.⁵⁸⁸ A threat of indirect harm could occur when military actions of the leading power undermined the security of others, even if unintentionally, as the US war on terror reduced the security of some other states. In addition, an indirect threat could emerge if the leading state tended to be a global hegemon and became capable of harmful actions, like reinterpreting the rules of international relations in line with its own interest, exploiting international economic resources for relative gain, conquering states and imposing imperial rule on others.⁵⁸⁹ In the process of evaluating indirect threats, as Pape argued, the major powers' perception regarding the intentions of the leading state mattered and could lead great powers to oppose military actions by the leading state, even if they were not threatened directly.

However, Pape underlined that "balancing against a sole superpower such as the United States will have a logic of its own, one perhaps not wholly unique, but one that is nonetheless distinctive to the condition of unipolarity."⁵⁹⁰ According to this, the logic of balancing under unipolarity suggests external balancing as the only option because none of the major powers could balance the leading state by themselves.⁵⁹¹ Yet, the risk against collective action was the coordination problem they might face in the process of balancing.⁵⁹² Pape suggested that soft balancing was a viable strategy for the great powers to solve coordination problems because it helps the major powers in the process of converging expectations for collective action.⁵⁹³

⁵⁸⁸ Italics is added by the author. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 13.

⁵⁸⁹ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 13.

⁵⁹⁰ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 40-41.

⁵⁹¹ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 15.

⁵⁹² On game of coordination; See, Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

⁵⁹³ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 17.

According to Pape, balancing was simply about equalizing the capabilities in a competition between the strong and the weak.⁵⁹⁴ Balancing states took action in order to make it hard for a strong state to use its military advantage against the others, to deter the strong from attacking others and to decrease its prospects of success in war. Hence, the goal of hard balancing was to change balance of power in favor of the weak by contributing military capabilities through measures such as military buildup, forming alliances or transferring military technology to an ally. Similarly, Pape suggested that states could also seek to pursue soft balancing to equalize the odds because balancing involved the utilization of tools that made it hard for the superior state to use its military capabilities without directly confronting the unipole with one's own forces.⁵⁹⁵ According to this, soft balancing could be made through mechanisms including territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a hard balancing coalition.⁵⁹⁶ As Pape states, "although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state."⁵⁹⁷

Soft balancing should not be ignored as an ineffective strategy even though it might fail to stop the United States from conquering a 'rogue' state or from pursuing nuclear buildup.⁵⁹⁸ It could have significant long-term consequences for US security such as increasing military cost, inciting transfers of military technology or encouraging great powers to become ambitious actors. Most importantly, Pape warned balance of power theorists who tend to dismiss the importance of soft balancing by reminding them that it could eventually evolve into hard balancing.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁴ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 36.

⁵⁹⁵ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 36.

⁵⁹⁶ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 36-43.

⁵⁹⁷ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 36.

⁵⁹⁸ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 41.

⁵⁹⁹ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 42.

According to Pape, soft balancing against the United States started due to the Bush administration's unilateralist security policies and arrogant use of force in the international arena.⁶⁰⁰ However, he has also underlined that "balancing against the superpower is not destiny" because great powers are "reacting to concerns over US intentions not US capabilities."⁶⁰¹ Hence, it was possible for the United States to mend fences if it changed the preemptive war doctrine, engaged in multilateral solutions for international security problems such as Iran's nuclear program, and strengthened international institutions especially the UN Security Council. Briefly, Pape concluded that the United States should restore its image as "a benevolent superpower" in order to prevent both soft and hard balancing strategies to be pursued by the great powers in a unipolar age.⁶⁰² Thereby, as Pape suggested, the United States could assure its position as the unipole. Soft balancing arguments combined the basic assumptions of Waltz's balance of power theory and Walt's balance of threat theory in order to explain great power behaviors under unipolarity and provided policy options for the unipole on how to prevent balancing against its primacy.⁶⁰³

Finally, in 2006 Christopher Layne wrote an article entitled "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited" in which he accepted that "the Waltzians were wrong" in their expectations that following the end of Cold War, hard balancing against the United States would quickly form and would cause international distribution of power to revert to multipolarity.⁶⁰⁴ He argued that the Waltzians, including himself, failed to see that the second-tier major powers would face both pressure to align with the

⁶⁰⁰ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 45.

⁶⁰¹ Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 45.

⁶⁰² Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 45.

⁶⁰³ Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 76.

⁶⁰⁴ Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 10.

United States and to balance against it. The Waltzians also failed to foresee all potential counterbalancers had internal problems constraining their capabilities. In addition, Layne stated that the Waltzians underestimated the geopolitical vacuum left by the demise of the Soviet Union, and there were no other capable states to fill that vacuum. Most significantly, he argued that the Waltzians did not understand that “balancing against an extant hegemon would be more difficult than countering a rising one”.⁶⁰⁵

Therefore, in his article, although Layne agreed with soft balancing scholars that the balancing concept failed to explain states’ behaviors, he proposed an alternative concept of balancing, which he defined as “leash-slipping.”⁶⁰⁶ He argued that methods of balancing failed, especially soft balancing methods, and that these efforts failed to create new constellations of power in the system, did not mean that there has not been any attempt to balance against the U.S. Therefore, he argued that intentions driving states’ strategies and the outcomes of these policies should be considered differently. According to this, “leash-slipping” was a strategy of acquiring capabilities to act independent of the United States in the realm of security so that they could slip free of the hegemon’s leash-like grip and could gain the leverage needed to compel the United States to respect their security interests.⁶⁰⁷ Layne distinguished leash-slipping strategy from hard balancing by arguing that states would adopt a leash-slipping strategy not because they feared a direct threat to their security but because they were concerned about the adverse effects of the

⁶⁰⁵ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 10.

⁶⁰⁶ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 3.

⁶⁰⁷ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 30.

United States' rise on their general position, both political and economic, in the international arena.⁶⁰⁸

Leash-slipping strategy, he argued, was motivated by the concerns that the powerful state could cause in the future, not necessarily war. In this context, as examples of leash-slipping, he gave President Charles de Gaulle's challenge to the United States in the early 1960s and the EU's decision to develop European Security and Defense Policy in 1999. However, Layne failed to discuss how the United States failed its allies by its unilateral conduct of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and took decisions risking European security. Therefore, he did not discuss that France did not aim to balance the U.S. but the Soviets by developing independent capability from the U.S. Similarly, he did not consider the role of ethnic-violence that emerged after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the Balkans in shaping the European leaders' ideas to develop a competent force. In other words, he did not recognize that the ESDP did not aim to balance the United States. On the contrary, it aimed to utilize the EU in the military sphere so that it could prevent recurring ethnic-cleansing in its backyard without waiting for US support.⁶⁰⁹

Layne argued that successful leash-slipping strategies might result in the creation of new poles and restore multipolarity by bringing about the end of US unipolarity. Nevertheless, Layne's argument was more in line with balance of threat arguments than balance of power arguments because leash-slipping strategies were the result of states' perceptions of threats originating from the US power and practices. As Layne said, leash-slipping was not a traditional balancing strategy

⁶⁰⁸ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 30. Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 180.

⁶⁰⁹ Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," 179-213. Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2005), 129.

applied to counter a direct existential threat from the United States but a “form of insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a *predatory and menacing fashion*.”⁶¹⁰ Therefore, although Layne followed balance of power reasoning in predicting that balance of power would form eventually,⁶¹¹ he claimed it would take place by 2030, his reasoning regarding leash-slipping went parallel with balance of threat theory.

Accordingly, in his policy recommendations to the United States, Layne suggested that “to *reduce the fear of US power*, the United States *must accept some reduction in its relative hard power* by adopting a multipolar --and essentially unilateral-- offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers.”⁶¹² He further suggested that the United States must limit its “extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology”⁶¹³ as he claimed the United States did not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Therefore, similar to the soft-balancing arguments relying on balance of threat assumptions, Layne has suggested that the United States “must practice *self-restraint* (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy)”.⁶¹⁴ Ironically, Layne’s suggestion of “military and ideological self-restraint” as the best grand strategy for the United States could be considered a step further from balance of threat arguments

⁶¹⁰ Italics is added by the author. Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 30.

⁶¹¹ In footnote 10 in his article, Layne said, “Balance of power theory is good at predicting that power balances eventually will form whenever too much power is concentrated in the hands of a single great power, but it cannot predict how long it will take for this to happen.” Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 10, 39.

⁶¹² Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 40.

⁶¹³ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 40.

⁶¹⁴ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," 40.

to Wendtian constructivism which suggested “self-restraint” as an active cause of systemic change.⁶¹⁵

Finally, Stephen Walt contributed to the discussion on balancing against the United States in his 2005 book entitled *Taming American Power* in which he discussed global responses to US primacy. Walt argued that balancing against the United States has been muted because other states perceived US *intentions* as “comparatively benign, at least until recently.”⁶¹⁶ Walt stated that other major powers have not seen the United States as an aggressive country seeking to conquer and dominate the large sections of the globe as the European Great Powers did in the zenith of their imperial time.⁶¹⁷ On the contrary, Walt argued the United States acted as an ‘offshore balancer’ most of the time and interfered in Eurasian affairs with reluctance. For this reason, the United States had good relations with allies at Europe and Asia. Therefore, most states had little reason to believe that the United States might try to conquer them.

However, Walt underlined that the Bush administration followed an assertive foreign policy by challenging international institutions and initiating the use of force in order to alter the status quo in its favor.⁶¹⁸ Walt argued that great powers responded to the United States by soft balancing strategies instead of forming formal alliances. He underlined that as soft balancing strategies are sought to obtain better outcomes within the existing balance of power rather than seeking or expecting to change the overall distribution of capabilities, great powers will tend to pursue soft balancing strategies against the United States. He defined soft balancing in the current era of U.S. dominance as “the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in

⁶¹⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 357-363.

⁶¹⁶ Italics in the original. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 124.

⁶¹⁷ Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 125.

⁶¹⁸ Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 125.

order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences-outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support”.⁶¹⁹

In addition, Walt pointed that successful soft balancing was self-reinforcing. This meant that the more states that were worried about U.S. power and U.S. policy and the more obvious and deeply rooted their concerns were, the more willingness for soft balancing would be.⁶²⁰ Like Pape and Paul, Walt stated that soft balancing could prepare the ground for fundamental challenges to be formed against the United States. Therefore, Walt suggested that the United States should not act in a way to fuel global concerns about its power and should refrain from harming others’ interests. He argued that if the United States continued to support perception that it was dangerous and need to be checked through concerted efforts, and if the number of soft-balancers increased, then there might be greater possibility of forming of hard or soft balancing coalitions. Walt said although the United States was still distance from a “tipping point,” it should not discount the possibility of a counterbalancing coalition entirely. As conclusion, Walt stated that the United States should pay more attention to others’ perception of its intentions.⁶²¹

6.3.4. The Fourth Stage: Recognizing Unipolarity as a Distinctive Structural Condition in “Twenty Years”

Two decades later after the demise of the Soviet Union and the advent of unipolarity, Realist scholars began to examine the nature and implications of unipolarity as a “distinctive distribution of capabilities among states in the

⁶¹⁹ Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 125.

⁶²⁰ Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 130.

⁶²¹ Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, 132.

contemporary global system”⁶²² rather than discussing it as a “transitory”⁶²³ condition. Based on the previous literature defining polarity,⁶²⁴ Realist scholars defined the term unipolarity as a system in which structure was characterized by the fact that only one state met the criteria of being a pole.⁶²⁵ Hence, unipole was a state, that commanded an especially large share of resources or capabilities and excelled on others in all the component elements of state capability.⁶²⁶ Having agreed on the distinctiveness of unipolarity, scholars started to question whether and in what ways unipolarity affected patterns of international relations to create outcomes that were different from those that might take place under the conditions of bipolarity or multipolarity.⁶²⁷ They underlined the need for revisiting questions about how international distribution of capabilities shaped, encouraged, and constrained states’ behavior. In addition, they highlighted the need for making sense of the new world by questioning how many traditional ideas about international politics could be carried over into the new world.⁶²⁸ In this framework, they underlined the need to “rethink conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance of power, the meaning of alliance partnerships, the logic of international economic

⁶²² Michael Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: US Power and the International Political Economy," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 121. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 3.

⁶²³ Christopher Layne, "The Waning of US Hegemony-Myth or Reality? A Review Essay," *International Security* 34, no. 1 (2009): 149.

⁶²⁴ On polarity see Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (Huntington, N.Y.: R. E. Krieger Pub. Co., 1975). Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁶²⁵ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 4.

⁶²⁶ Components of power are conventionally defined as size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capacity, military power, and organizational and institutional competence. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131.

⁶²⁷ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 3. Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 155-187. Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 58-85.

⁶²⁸ Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 194. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 27.

cooperation, the relationship between power and legitimacy and the behavior of satisfied and revisionist states.”⁶²⁹

Discussions of how international distribution of power were likely to influence the behaviors of states primarily focused on questions like how the unipole state tended to behave, what the actions of the other states would be, and the characteristics of unipolarity.⁶³⁰ To begin with the question of how the unipole behaved, Realist scholars agreed that the unipole was least affected by structural constraints. It had greater freedom of action. Therefore, Realist scholars concurred that the unipole tended to manage and shape the international system along the lines of its own preferences.⁶³¹ Challenging the assumption that the leading state in the international system was bound to be satisfied whereas rising or subordinate states tend to be revisionist,⁶³² Robert Jervis argued that under unipolarity the leading state had powerful structural incentives to be revisionist.⁶³³ In Mastanduno’s expression, the unipole was a “both system maker and privilege taker” both in the fields of international security and economy.⁶³⁴ In security affairs, for instance, it had greater ability to choose among different alliance partners and it would not rely on a particular alliance network.⁶³⁵ Unipole state could endorse *ad hoc* “coalitions of the willing” with states that had ideological affinity or that demonstrate clear willingness

⁶²⁹ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 194. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 4.

⁶³⁰ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 10.

⁶³¹ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 99-100. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207-209. Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon, "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home," 155-187.

⁶³² Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 189-200.

⁶³³ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 200. Also see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 200.

⁶³⁴ Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: US Power and the International Political Economy," 121-154. Also see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 209.

⁶³⁵ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 97.

to follow its lead.⁶³⁶ In other words, as there was no power or counterbalancing coalition to check the power of the unipole, the unipole was free to engage or disengage in world affairs and to act as it suited according to its preferences.

The discussion on the behavior of secondary states concentrated on the prospects of balancing against the unipole. Realist scholars like Jervis, Walt, Posen, Brooks and Wohlforth put forward that unipole's dominant power position created greater obstacles for secondary states therefore it was hard for them to form counterhegemonic balancing as prescribed by the balance of power theory.⁶³⁷ However, Jervis noted that while balance of power reasoning suggested that states would form counterbalancing coalitions in the face of a "*potential* hegemon," it did not mention what to expect under "established" unipolarity.⁶³⁸ Similarly, Brooks and Wohlforth has argued that once a state attained dominance "it has passed a threshold, and the effect of increasing power is reversed: the stronger the leading state and the more entrenched its dominance, the more unlikely and thus less constraining are counterbalancing dynamics."⁶³⁹ Agreeing with the balance of power theorists, Walt explained the difficulty in forming traditional counterbalancing coalitions by underlining the need for a larger coalition to balance the unipole, which entailed larger transaction costs and overwhelming problems of collective action.⁶⁴⁰

Reinterpreting balance of threat theory under unipolarity, Walt argued that balancing against the unipole would be possible if members of the countervailing

⁶³⁶ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 95.

⁶³⁷ Brooks and Wohlforth, *World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, 13. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207-211. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 95-103. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony," 5-46.

⁶³⁸ Italics in the original text. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207.

⁶³⁹ Brooks and Wohlforth, *World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, 23, 35.

⁶⁴⁰ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 97.

coalition were clearly and equally threatened by the unipolar power.⁶⁴¹ However, if the unipole was geographically distant from the potential balancers (and posed less threat to them) and if it was not perceived to have aggressive intentions (that was defined as absence of eagerness to conquer potential balancers), then the prospects of hard balancing coalitions were unlikely under unipolarity.⁶⁴² Walt added that if states did not perceive an imminent threat from the unipole's power, they would want to incur the costs of balancing such as military spending, loss of autonomy and punishment by the unipole.⁶⁴³ Therefore, they would not form a balancing coalition against the unipole.

Similarly, in his discussion of balancing under unipolarity, Jervis highlighted that balance of power dynamics arose in the context of use, threat and fear of force.⁶⁴⁴ Therefore, he suggested, the incentives to balance against the unipole would be much less when candidate balancers did not have fear of invasion or intervention upon their sovereignty.⁶⁴⁵ According to Jervis, because "the leading states now [except Russia and China] form a *security community*," the prospects of forming a counterbalancing coalition against the unipole state were less likely.⁶⁴⁶ Also, both Jervis and Walt agreed that as a unipole did not have omnipotent authority to affect the interests and preferences of others, lesser states might want to influence the unipole or constrain its behavior.⁶⁴⁷ In such circumstances, they argued states might engage in soft balancing strategies against the unipole because soft balancing strategies are the most viable options under power disparity and might obtain better

⁶⁴¹ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 97.

⁶⁴² Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 103.

⁶⁴³ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 103.

⁶⁴⁴ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207.

⁶⁴⁵ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207.

⁶⁴⁶ Italics added. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 201, 207.

⁶⁴⁷ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 3-8. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 190-191.

outcomes under certain conditions.⁶⁴⁸ Both Walt and Jervis accepted that soft balancing efforts, even if they failed, were significant because they showed the unipole that others were threatened by the unipole's behavior and preferences.⁶⁴⁹ In this regard, they also agreed with earlier soft balancing scholars who argued that balancing has a changed role under unipolarity and soft strategies were directed to the specific policies of the unipole rather than the overall distribution of power in the system.⁶⁵⁰

On the durability of unipolarity, Realist scholars concurred that the duration of unipolarity would primarily depend on developments in the capabilities and behaviors of the unipole and other major powers.⁶⁵¹ Although they acknowledged that the evolution of relative capabilities could play a significant role in defining how long unipolarity might last, Realist scholars argued once unipolarity was established, it was the behavior of the unipole that mattered the most under unipolarity.⁶⁵² A unipole's behaviors could be reinforcing or self-defeating. The unipole's behaviors might convince the others that its power was benign and it would not threaten others' interests. Or, it could do otherwise. In this regard, Jervis and Walt specifically underlined the significance of attraction and persuasion in preserving the unipole's primacy.⁶⁵³ Jervis argued that the distribution of soft power⁶⁵⁴ correlated with the distribution of material power and the unipole should benefit from its primacy in

⁶⁴⁸ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104.

⁶⁴⁹ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 208. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104.

⁶⁵⁰ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104.

⁶⁵¹ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 21-23.

⁶⁵² Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 23.

⁶⁵³ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 120. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 211.

⁶⁵⁴ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-171. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 94-109. Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (2009): 160-163.

both promoting benign power perception and increasing its legitimacy and credibility while shaping the future of international relations.⁶⁵⁵

Linking how other states would behave against the unipole with how other states would perceive the behaviors of the unipole, these scholars implied that how other states would perceive the characteristics of unipolarity was crucial in terms of defining terms of balancing and the durability of unipolarity. On the characteristics of unipolarity, it was accepted that specific characteristics and dynamics of a unipolar system were by definition dependent on who the unipole was and how it behaved. In this context, it was argued that domestic characteristics of the unipole state such as its regime type or the characteristics of its political leaders also mattered more in unipolar systems than in others.⁶⁵⁶ Hence, they underlined that under unipolarity, the line between domestic and foreign policy was blurred as the unipole's behavior in both spheres would eventually have system-wide implications. Jervis pointed out the link between the characteristics of the unipole and unipolarity by asking, "How might the system function if the unipole were Nazi Germany, Stalin's USSR or (Brezhnev's), or a traditional autocracy? Or if it were the United States in a different era? There would surely be major differences."⁶⁵⁷ Challenging the major structural Realist claim that any unipole would behave as the United States has done, Jervis underscored the fact that regime and leadership characteristics were crucial under unipolarity more than in other structures because of the weakness of external restraints.⁶⁵⁸

⁶⁵⁵ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 192, 211.

⁶⁵⁶ Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon, "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home," 155-187. Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 87. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 188.

⁶⁵⁷ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 188.

⁶⁵⁸ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 204.

In this regard, the characteristics of current unipolarity were defined by the characteristics and the behaviors of the United States. One significant implication of this relationship was that the behavior of the unipole was equally important, if not more important than, the structural factors to incite balancing behavior from the others. The United States might use its primacy to dampen security competition by reassuring other states and it could reduce and remove conditions of military rivalry and war or it might pursue revisionist policies that would increase competition by heightening the insecurity of others and prompt conditions of individual or collective balancing against its primacy.⁶⁵⁹ Jervis stated that balance of power dynamics arise in the context of use, threat, and fear of force and as major powers formed a “security community,” except Russia and China, they did not fear that the United States would invade or greatly diminish their sovereignty.⁶⁶⁰ In the final analysis, under unipolarity, it was the behavior of the unipole, not its power, which played a significant role in defining the threat perceptions and the feeling of in/security. Therefore, there became a common understanding that under unipolarity, great powers’ tendencies to balance would be shaped not by material structural imperatives but by social factors such as threat perception and sense of insecurity.

Finally, based on these assumptions that durability of the unipolar system relied on the behavior of the unipole, Realist scholars concurred that the durability of the current unipolar system would be based on the behavior of the United States.⁶⁶¹ The absence of balancing and the behavior of the secondary states under the US unipolarity were explained by a combination of balance of power and balance of threat arguments. Due to the power disparity, secondary states would be less willing

⁶⁵⁹ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 24. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207.

⁶⁶⁰ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 207, 201.

⁶⁶¹ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 24.

to form a counterbalancing power against the United States unless they perceived an existential threat from the United States.⁶⁶² However, Realist scholars noted that although the second-tier states had disagreements with the United States, they did not perceive an existential threat from the United States. On the contrary, the second-tier states still perceived the United States as a benign unipole because it provided system wide benefits by fighting against common threats like transnational terrorism, acting like a regional and global balancer, and regulating the global economic system.⁶⁶³ In other words, despite its revisionist policies, the rising powers enjoyed the status quo guaranteed by the United States.⁶⁶⁴ Therefore, as long as the United States could manage its perception as the benign unipole, it would be less likely that it would face attempts of hard balancing. Yet, the second-tier states might consult soft balancing strategies in order to change or restrain the United States' behavior, which was not regarded as challenging the United States' predominant structural position.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed how unipolarity and balancing were treated in the Realist literature since the end of the Cold War. It emphasized that Realist scholars discussed unipolarity and balancing with reference to two bedrock Realist theories: balance of power and balance of threat. Looking at the arguments since the end of the Cold War, it concluded that the Realist literature's arguments regarding unipolarity and expectations regarding balancing have evolved in parallel with the absence of balancing against the United States. Therefore, in order to show how the

⁶⁶² Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 201. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 114.

⁶⁶³ Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: US Power and the International Political Economy," 153. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 211. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 108-114.

⁶⁶⁴ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 3 (2005): 509-524.

Realist literature responded to the end of bipolarity, it categorized arguments on unipolarity and balancing into four stages. In stage one, the Chapter showed that prominent Realist scholars Waltz and Mearsheimer did not recognize unipolarity as a distinct distribution of power and expected the emergence of multipolar structure soon after the demise of the Soviet Union.

In the second stage, the emergence of a new discussion on stability and durability of the unipolar system was discussed by Realist scholars. Scholars of balance of power like Waltz and Layne acknowledged unipolarity as an “illusion” or a temporary state for international structure to be replaced with multipolarity under systemic constraints. Both scholars argued that even if the United States acted as a benign power the others would perceive threats from its practices and tend to balance against it. However, Waltz’s argument that U.S. practices could hasten balancing rested on threat perception as an auxiliary variable. Nevertheless, scholars with balance of threat approaches, such as Mastanduno and Wohlforth promoted the idea that unipolarity was a stable structure and the duration of unipolarity would be defined by the practices of the United States. They argued that if the United States pursued multilateralism and reassured others that it would not coerce or dictate its wishes on them, great powers would not attempt to balance against the United States as they perceived threat from the behaviors of the unipole.

In the third stage, the Chapter argued that soft balancing emerged as a middle ground approach that reconciled balance of power and balance of threat arguments. Soft balancers reconceptualized balancing in the face of the ‘great puzzle’ about the absence of balancing against the United States. According to this, they argued that great powers would not be able to balance US power by hard balancing strategies. However, they noted that great powers also did not need to balance US power in hard

balancing terms because they did not perceive an existential direct threat to their security. They argued that US unilateralism posed an indirect threat to great powers' interests; therefore, they needed to check and balance US security practices not its power. In this regard, they argued through means of cutting diplomatic, economic, and military support to US practices, great powers pursued strategies of soft balancing against the United States and aimed to decrease the legitimacy of the United States as the unipole, as well as its practices. Soft-balancing scholars suggested that the United States should refrain from challenging other powers' security interests and pursue multilateralism not to be perceived as a revisionist power who wanted to alter the international order. They concluded that if the United States could avoid being perceived as a revisionist power, it could prevent formation of balancing coalitions against its primacy.

In the fourth stage, the debate was centered more on the distinctive character of unipolarity and its implications for international relations. Realist scholars under review in this section underlined the need for rethinking conventional concepts and understandings such as balance of power and great power behavior because they assumed states, including the unipole itself, were expected to behave differently under unipolarity. The general theoretical discussion on unipolarity was made with reference to current unipolarity because they argued it was hard to generalize about current unipolarity without considering the identity, preferences and behavior of the United States as the unipole. They defined unipolarity as the structure in which the unipole was constrained by structural imperatives the least. Therefore, they suggested that the characteristics of unipolarity were closely linked to the identity, preferences and practices of the unipole. In other words, they agreed that the United States and its practices had a major impact on how unipolarity would be defined. In

this context, these scholars supported earlier scholars who argued that great powers' tendency to balance against the United States would be shaped by how great powers perceived the United States' practices. If the unipole pursued revisionist strategies contradicting security interests of other great powers, then they would perceive threats and have an increased sense of structural insecurity. Therefore, if great powers perceived threats from US practices, they would pursue balancing strategies against the revisionist unipole. However, as Realist scholars argued, since the unipole had primacy in the "command of commons,"⁶⁶⁵ rather than hard balancing strategies, soft strategies were a more viable option for great powers. Accordingly, the arguments of the fourth stage also lined with balance of threat arguments rather than balance of power arguments as states were expected to behave differently under unipolarity than other distributions of power.

As a result, it is possible to draw several major conclusions from Realist scholars' discussion on balancing and unipolarity. First, it is possible to argue that Realist arguments leaned more towards balance of threat theory rather than balance of power as unipolarity endured and became accepted as a distinctive configuration of power. Second, Realist scholars all discussed balancing under unipolarity with reference to the identity and practices of the unipole, not only with reference to the distribution of power. Third, as balance of threat arguments prevailed in balancing under unipolarity, threat perception became the major explanatory variable rather than being an auxiliary one and it replaced the distribution of power. Fourth, in addition to the use of social variables⁶⁶⁶ like identity and threat perceptions, some Realist scholars also used concepts like security communities and soft power to

⁶⁶⁵ Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony," 5-46.

⁶⁶⁶ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 79. Also, for a comprehensive discussion on degeneration of Realist research program See, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1999), 5-55.

explain why some states would not balance against the United States. Fifth, some also suggested that the United States' practices defined characteristics of unipolarity but they did not discuss how these practices influenced the social structure of unipolarity even though they implied that the United States could turn the international structure into either a competitive or cooperative one by changing others' perception about its legitimacy. Therefore, based on these conclusions, the following chapter is going to focus on the analysis of balancing under constructivism as it promises a better explanation for balancing and offers a framework to discuss China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the United States.

CHAPTER VII

BALANCING AND UNIPOLARITY UNDER CONSTRUCTIVISM

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter provided an overview of the evolution of discussions about unipolarity in the Realist literature and expectations about balancing, and related these discussions with balance of power and balance of threat theories. Relating the concepts of hard balancing with balance of power theory and soft balancing with balance of threat theory, it showed that soft-balancing arguments gained more credibility in time because of the absence of hard balancing. Nevertheless, the most significant conclusion that the previous chapter brought to the fore was the tendency of Realist scholars, who often rely on social rather than material variables, to empower their arguments on balancing under unipolarity. Alternatively, this chapter aims to provide a constructivist⁶⁶⁷ reading on unipolarity and balancing and to analyze the potential for Chinese and Russian balancing against the United States within this framework.

⁶⁶⁷ Constructivism is not a single unified theory. It has variants that are defined as conventional and critical constructivism. This chapter focuses on Wendt's constructivism due to its systemic level of analysis. See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 391-425. For a detailed discussion on two variants of constructivism; See, Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 181-186. Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," 49-72. Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 71. Reus-Smit, "Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School," 487-509. Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," 209-230. Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge," 73-101.

For this purpose, this chapter begins by looking at the conceptualization of structure in Wendtian constructivism and highlights that Wendtian constructivism recognizes two kinds of structures: macro- and micro-level structures. It further argues that balancing is a multiply realizable outcome that might be produced under self-help cultures that might be present both at macro and micro-level structures. Second, it discusses balancing at the macro structural level and argues that balancing is an outcome of the distribution of ideas rather than distribution of capabilities. Third, it analyzes balancing at the micro-structural level and argues that the construction process of self-help understanding provides a deeper understanding about states' tendency to balance against threat. Fourth, it discusses unipolarity under constructivism and proceeds to further elaborate upon the social structure of unipolarity at the macro-structural level and China's and Russia's tendencies to balance against the United States. It develops the argument that under unipolarity rivalry is defined in terms of having self-regarding conceptions of status among the leading powers under discussion and concludes that status-competition might tend to generate tendencies to balance against the United States. In addition, it focuses on how self-regarding conceptualizations of status have been produced and instantiated in the interactions of the United States, China and Russia at micro-structural level and how balancing is made possible under micro-social structures. Finally, the chapter concludes that if shared knowledge about micro-social structures between the United States, China, and Russia do not change, China and Russia will tend to engage balancing strategies against the United States.

7.2. Constructivism and Structure

Constructivist theory is a ‘theory of interaction’ about the power of practices to produce and reproduce social structures.⁶⁶⁸ Wendt’s theoretical approach is widely acknowledged by his conceptualization of structure as a social phenomenon rather than a material one as compared to Waltz’s conception of structure. His focus on culture as a social structure is considered the most significant value-added to constructivism. However, the distinctiveness of Wendt’s conceptualization of structure also stems from his recognition of the “duality of structure” as macro- and micro-level structures.⁶⁶⁹ According to this, macro structures are based on “collective knowledge” that is defined as “knowledge structures held by groups which generate macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time.”⁶⁷⁰ In Wendt’s theorizing macro structure corresponds to the culture of anarchy, which can have a Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian logic.

Wendt defines the micro-structural (interaction) level as a distinct level of analysis.⁶⁷¹ Rather than abolishing the interaction level to escape reductionism as is done in Waltzian systemic theorizing, Wendt considers the interaction level of analysis significant. Wendt states that as collective knowledge cannot exist or can have an effect apart from the beliefs of actors interacting at the micro-level, macro-structures cannot exist or can have an effect different from actors’ interactions at the micro-level.⁶⁷² In Wendt’s words, “macro structures need micro-structural foundations” as “macro-level structures are only produced and reproduced by

⁶⁶⁸ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 196.

⁶⁶⁹ Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International-Relations Theory,” 361. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 142-156.

⁶⁷⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 162.

⁶⁷¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 99.

⁶⁷² Italics are in the original. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 162.

practices and interaction structures at the micro level.”⁶⁷³ Therefore, micro-structural foundations “should be part of systemic theorizing.”⁶⁷⁴ Asking “how a theory of international politics could explain a systemic tendency like balancing without being able to explain foreign policy behavior *at all*,” Wendt points out that interaction level has an “inherently systemic dimension.”⁶⁷⁵ Therefore, he argues that the micro-structural level of analysis should be part of systemic analysis of international relations because it is also “useful for explaining why one world happens rather than another.”⁶⁷⁶

Micro-structures are based on “common knowledge” that is defined as “actor’s beliefs about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences and beliefs as well as about states of the external world.”⁶⁷⁷ It should be noted that these beliefs do not need to be true but just believed to be true. Common knowledge requires each actor to believe that others believe in the same knowledge to be common and it exists at the interaction level.⁶⁷⁸ For instance, specific cultural forms such as norms, rules, institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws are made of common knowledge. As Wendt argues, common knowledge is analytically neutral between conflict and cooperation; hence, it is not solely relevant to explaining cooperative relations.⁶⁷⁹ In contrast to macro-structural analysis, micro-structures reflect the world from the agents’ perspective. As Wendt states there are “as many micro-structures in the state system as there are interaction complexes among states.”⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 150.

⁶⁷⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 150.

⁶⁷⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 149.

⁶⁷⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 154.

⁶⁷⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 159.

⁶⁷⁸ Common knowledge is both subjective and intersubjective. It is subjective because the beliefs are in the heads of the actors. It is intersubjective because actors confront a social fact that cannot be individually wished away. Therefore, it is neither a unit-level or macro-level phenomenon; it’s firmly an interaction level phenomenon. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 160.

⁶⁷⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 160.

⁶⁸⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 147.

Although interaction level micro-level structural theories explicate outcomes by reference to the relationships between a system's parts, micro-structural analyses are not reducible to the actor's attributes because what matters is how actors interact.⁶⁸¹

Nevertheless, as a system-theorist, Wendt prioritizes macro-level social structural analysis due to his research interest and defines macro-structure as “an end in itself because of multiple realizability.”⁶⁸² Multiple realizability means that the same outcome can be realized under various conditions.⁶⁸³ The same outcome can be explained by bringing too many different micro-structural level combinations together; however, as Wendt argues, doing so may result in not only supply of irrelevant details but also loss of some causal mechanisms that only exist in a macro-level, even if they depend on instantiations at the micro-level for their operation.⁶⁸⁴ In order to analyze macro-level social regularities in international relations, Wendt prefers to focus on macro-level social structures and the ‘multiply realizabilities’ under these structures. Despite his preference of macro- over micro-structure, Wendt accepts that both structural levels of analyses provide different contributions to the understanding of international relations. According to Wendt, “each logic of anarchy is multiply realizable”⁶⁸⁵ and the same outcome can be reached through different causes. Based on this assumption, for instance, Wendt defines balancing as a multiply realizable tendency, whose realizability depends on characteristics of a given anarchy. Looking at macro-level social structural changes, Wendt predicts probable tendencies such as war, power politics or balancing for states. Therefore, I will start with looking at balancing as “multiply realizable” tendency under three

⁶⁸¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 148.

⁶⁸² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 154.

⁶⁸³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 254.

⁶⁸⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 154-156.

⁶⁸⁵ Using the concept of internalization, Wendt explains how Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures become possible. Each culture can be realized either by coercion, self-interest or legitimacy. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 246-308.

cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures, at the macro-structural level and illustrate that balancing is a multiply realizable outcome if there is a self-help culture.

7.3. Constructivism, Macro-Structure and Balance of Power

Constructivism shares the following core Realist assumptions: international politics is anarchic; states cannot be certain about others' intentions; they wish to survive and are rational.⁶⁸⁶ In addition, it shares the importance of systemic or third image theorizing while accepting states as the units of analysis. However, as a structural theory of the international system, constructivism challenges the basic assumptions of Waltz's balance of power theory that structure is defined by the distribution of material capabilities and state action is influenced by structure (anarchy and the distribution of power). It rather argues that the structure is made of social relationships and state action is not solely influenced by structure (anarchy and the distribution of power) but the process (interaction and learning) and institutions.⁶⁸⁷ In other words, according to constructivists, structure is defined by "the distribution of ideas"⁶⁸⁸ rather than only by the distribution of power.

Distribution of ideas, which are shared by the actors, makes up the part of social structure known as culture.⁶⁸⁹ Constructivism argues that the shared ideas or culture is the social structure of a system. Wendt argues that the most important structures in which states are embedded are social structures, not material ones, because ideas determine the meaning and content of power, interests, and the

⁶⁸⁶ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 7.

⁶⁸⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 391.

⁶⁸⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 309.

⁶⁸⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 309.

strategies by which states pursue their interests. Without shared meanings, “anarchic systems cannot have a structure or logic”⁶⁹⁰ and “anarchy is nothing and nothings cannot be structures.”⁶⁹¹ Therefore, anarchy must have a culture or “logic”⁶⁹² to be able to explain states’ behaviors. Without logic, anarchy cannot have a “causal power”⁶⁹³ on its own to explain states’ foreign policy posture.

Wendt suggests that anarchy can have at least three cultures with distinct logics, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, based on what kind of roles- respectively enemy, rival, and friend- dominate the system.⁶⁹⁴ Role structure is central for any cultural form because each role implies a distinct posture or orientation of the self toward the other with respect to the use of violence.⁶⁹⁵ Enemies act as threatening adversaries that have no limits in their violence against each other; rivals are competitors who are willing to use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other; and friends are allies who do not consider the use of violence a legitimate way to solve their disputes toward each other but use against a common threat.⁶⁹⁶ Therefore, three different logics of anarchy imply different foreign policy posture and behavior.⁶⁹⁷ Challenging Waltz’s assumption of anarchy which has the only one logic, which is self-help, Wendt offers that balancing as a product of power politics is not “infinitely realizable”⁶⁹⁸ because the social structure of anarchy might generate conditions preventing or enhancing the possibilities of such tendencies.

⁶⁹⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 309.

⁶⁹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 309.

⁶⁹² Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural Realism*, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

⁶⁹³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 246.

⁶⁹⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 247.

⁶⁹⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 258.

⁶⁹⁶ Here, it should be noted that roles represents structural positions, not actors’ beliefs. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 259.

⁶⁹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 157.

⁶⁹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 156.

Therefore, in the following section, balancing will be discussed in relation to the three cultures of anarchy.⁶⁹⁹

7.3.1. The Hobbesian Culture and Balancing

The role relationship governing the relationship of the self and the other with respect to use of violence in Hobbesian culture is enmity.⁷⁰⁰ In this culture, enemies are constituted by representations of the other as an actor, who does not recognize the right of self to exist as an independent entity and who will use limitless violence toward self. In other words, in Hobbesian culture, where the principle is based on “kill or be killed,” states’ survival (sovereignty) is always at risk. Under the pressure of ‘to be killed,’ as Wendt argues, states respond to enemies by acting like deep revisionists themselves because they will try to destroy the enemy or conquer them. They will be making decisions for the short-term assuming the worst-case. Negative possibilities, rather than probabilities, will dominate their thinking and there will be a reduced likelihood for reciprocating any cooperative moves made by the enemy. Also, relative military capabilities will be central and military power plays the key role in assuring survival. Since the enemy’s revisionist intentions are “known” to the state, looking at the enemy’s capabilities, it makes predictions about its enemy’s behavior such as when it is going to be ready to attack. Therefore, the state, even if it has status quo interests, will start to arm itself as the threat of enemy forces it to behave “as if” it is a revisionist state.⁷⁰¹ Finally, under the Hobbesian culture, if

⁶⁹⁹ On logic of anarchy, also see how Buzan et al discuss the relationship between the structure of the state and the structure of the system and argue the structure of the state influences the logic of anarchy. Buzan, Jones, and Little, *The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural Realism*.

⁷⁰⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 259-263.

⁷⁰¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 262.

states are actually in a state of war, they have no limits on violence because self-restraint will create disadvantage against the enemy.

Compared to Waltz's self-help, as Wendt suggests, the logic of Hobbesian anarchy operates on the "true" self-help system⁷⁰² in which actors cannot count on each other, survival depends solely on one's military power and the increases in one's military power is against the other's security. States have to seek power for their security. In the Hobbesian culture, security is definitely competitive, a zero-sum affair and security dilemmas are acute. One tendency that this structure generates for states is endemic warfare. In other words, as Waltz states, war may "at any moment occur."⁷⁰³ However, only those who are adapted to warfare can survive while those who are militarily too weak to compete get eliminated within the system. The territories and capabilities of the weak will be owned by the strong, there will be a tendency toward a concentration of power, or may be a tendency toward empire-building. In such a system, balancing will be an option for the states that are "powerful enough to avoid elimination."⁷⁰⁴ In order to escape elimination, states balance each other but balance of power is not sustainable for a long time because of the tendency toward power consolidation to be dominant in the long-run. Also, as the Hobbesian system tends to take all of its members into the conflict, neutrality, with the exception of geographical isolation, will not be an option for states. Alliances will form but they will not last long because states who are allies will distrust each other.⁷⁰⁵ Therefore, it is more preferable that states rely on their own capabilities, which Waltz defines as internal balancing,⁷⁰⁶ rather than relying on others.

⁷⁰² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 265.

⁷⁰³ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, 232..

⁷⁰⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 266.

⁷⁰⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 408.

⁷⁰⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 168.

In sum, in Hobbesian culture, states do not only have a shared understanding of other states who are enemies, who threaten their life and liberty but also of how to deal with enemies such as waging war, communicating threat, arranging surrenders, and balance of power. Therefore, power politics or *realpolitik* behaviors are results of the social structure defined by relations of enmity. It is the Hobbesian culture that generates practices of power politics. As Wendt argues, “power politics and self-help are not just behavioral regularities but shared understandings about ‘how things are done.’”⁷⁰⁷ Therefore, as opposed to Waltz’s materialist explanation, Wendt explains balancing as a practice of power politics by reference to perception of self and other and in a fundamentally social sense.⁷⁰⁸

7.3.2. The Lockean Culture and Balancing

The role structure of the Lockean culture is rivalry. Like in Hobbesian culture, rivals are constituted by the representations about self and other with respect to violence, but these representations are not as threatening as the ones in the Hobbesian culture.⁷⁰⁹ Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty as a right and therefore they do not try to conquer or dominate each other. However, although rivals recognize each other’s right to live and to have ‘property,’ their relationship is free from the use of violence in disputes. In other words, Lockean culture is not free from conflicts, but just ‘deaths;’ therefore, territorial revisions can take place as long as they leave enough property to live to the defeated state. As Wendt states, as opposed to “the kill or be killed logic”

⁷⁰⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 268.

⁷⁰⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 263.

⁷⁰⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 279.

of the Hobbesian culture, the Lockean culture is governed by “the live and let live logic.”⁷¹⁰

The distinguishing feature of the Lockean culture is the right to sovereignty.⁷¹¹ According to Wendt, sovereignty is an intrinsic quality of states but it becomes a “right” when it is recognized by the other states. Emphasizing that rights are social capacities that are granted to actors by other actors’ permission to do certain things, Wendt argues that in international relations, the fact that a weak state can enjoy its sovereignty as a right shows that the constitutive feature of having a right as a self-limitation.⁷¹² In other words, if the powerful states do not restrain themselves from using unlimited violence against the weak, or act as a “status quo” power, then it will not be possible for the weak to enjoy its sovereignty as a right. Therefore, sovereignty an institution that is shared by many states, which relies on the shared expectation that states will not end each others’ existence and independence. The implication of the right to sovereignty is that even though it is possible to use force against each other for the settlement of disputes, states are limited by the shared understanding that they will not ‘kill’ each other.

Limits for the level of violence against rivals in the Lockean culture has significant implications for state’s foreign policies.⁷¹³ According to Wendt, the most significant implication is that whatever conflicts states may have, they have to act in favor of the status quo, that is defined by respecting others’ sovereignty. The other implication is that the nature of rational behavior for rivals is different from that towards enemies. Rational behavior for enemies is to act on the basis of risk-aversion, a short time horizon, and relative power. However, thanks to the institution

⁷¹⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 279.

⁷¹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 280.

⁷¹² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 280.

⁷¹³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 282.

of sovereignty, security is less “scarce,” which makes risks fewer, future and absolute gains more important. States’ concerns for security are not eliminated under rivalry but the fact that “death” is not an option reduces anxiety about security. Therefore, rivals act on the principle of reciprocation. They may cooperate or fight. In this context, although relative military power is still important, the meaning of military power is different for rivals. In Hobbesian world, relative military capability dominates the thinking about security; however, in Lockean system it is not a priority because threats are not existential and allies can be more easily trusted when one does not have efficient capabilities. Finally, even if disputes among rivals may go to war, the role of enemy and rival make a big difference in terms of their behavior.

According to these, there are four general tendencies that can be observed in international relations under Lockean anarchy.⁷¹⁴ The first tendency is warfare, which is a simultaneously accepted and constrained norm of international relations. Wars are not for conquest but to restore the status quo. The second is the relatively stable membership within the system. The low death rate over time, provided by right to sovereignty, as Wendt argues, is “the strongest evidence for a structural difference between Lockean and Hobbesian anarchy.”⁷¹⁵ In Lockean world, the weak are protected by the restraint of the strong, not by the survival of the fittest. In other words, the survival of the weak relies on social not material factors. The third is that neutrality and non-alignment is a recognized status as there is no threat of revisionism and states can solve their differences through non-violent means.

The fourth tendency for states under the Lockean culture is to balance power.⁷¹⁶ As opposed to Waltz’s argument that balancing is an effect of anarchy,

⁷¹⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 283.

⁷¹⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 283.

⁷¹⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

Wendt suggests under Lockean anarchy, balance of power is an effect of the mutual recognition of sovereignty.⁷¹⁷ In Hobbesian anarchy, balancing is a survival strategy due to the lack of mutual recognition of sovereignty. Therefore, under Hobbesian anarchy, states have to maximize their power either on their own or by engaging in temporary alliances to balance the threat. However, in Lockean anarchy, as states think that others recognize their sovereignty, relative changes in distribution of power do not pose a threat to states' survival,⁷¹⁸ which decrease the pressure to balance and maximize one's power against the other either by its own capabilities or through alliance formation. In this regard, reducing the tendency toward concentration of power, the institution of sovereignty "arrests"⁷¹⁹ the need for balancing. However, Wendt argues that balancing can become "a relatively stable source of order with respect to the many non-existential issues that may remain sources of violent conflict."⁷²⁰ In other words, in Lockean anarchy, as states do not need balancing as the "essential" means to guarantee their survival, balancing becomes a "basis for order in the first place."⁷²¹ However, this is not to deny that balancing also provides guarantee against loss of sovereignty when states are threatened by unbalanced distribution of power.⁷²²

According to Wendt, in Lockean system, most of the states comply with norms such as respecting others' sovereignty and do not even consider the costs and benefits of violating such norms.⁷²³ This is because states consider norms as legitimate and identify themselves with them and voluntarily comply with the rules. Therefore, under Lockean anarchy, by accepting the institution of sovereignty, states

⁷¹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

⁷¹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

⁷¹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

⁷²⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

⁷²¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284-285.

⁷²² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

⁷²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 124.

are pro status quo. As opposed to revisionist states that have the desire to conquer others, seize part of others' territory, and or change the rules of the game in the Hobbesian order, the states of Lockean order have no interest in conquering other states, redrawing boundaries, or changing the rules of the international system.⁷²⁴ However, it should be underlined that Lockean culture is only present among states that mutually recognize each other and only their relations are immune from the 'kill or be killed logic.' In other words, states follow pro status quo strategies towards the states they recognize as sovereigns.

Therefore, it the institution of sovereignty that provides "the terms of individuality"⁷²⁵ to states. In another words, only those states whose sovereignty is recognized by others are entitled to have rights granted by the institution of sovereignty such as immunity from 'being killed.' States whose sovereignty is not recognized or challenged because they do not fulfill a certain 'standard of civilization'⁷²⁶ can be exposed to violence because Lockean logic does not apply in their relations with states with sovereign rights. The standards that define what counts as a legitimate state have changed historically; however, in the contemporary world, being a "nation-state,"⁷²⁷ having the institutions of a "modern" state, being a "capitalist" and "democratic," increasingly refraining from committing genocide, or

⁷²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 125.

⁷²⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 291.

⁷²⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 292. On 'Standard of Civilization'; See, Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Yongjin Zhang, "China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of 'Civilization'," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 3-16. Shogo Suzuki, "Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2005): 137-164. Pinar Bilgin, "The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (2008): 593-614..

⁷²⁷ On historical evolution of sovereignty and nation-state; See, J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International-Relations," *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 107-130. Connie L. McNeely, *Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action*, (Contributions in Sociology) (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 2-6..

violating human rights can be considered a legitimate state type.⁷²⁸ The states whose sovereignty is not recognized or challenged due to their failure to fulfill these 'standards' might be considered "outsiders" as opposed to those who internalize Lockean culture, develop a common social identity.⁷²⁹ This common identity, Wendt says, matters because it facilitates collective action against outsiders; when the group is threatened, members of the group act together to defend the group.⁷³⁰ Wendt notes that under Lockean culture, an act against the outsider and coming to each other's aid is rudimentary because collective action takes place only when the actual survival of a member is endangered by a rogue state, for instance.⁷³¹ The threat will manifest the collective identity of the group and lead to rudimentary balancing against the common threat; however, as Wendt notes, under Lockean anarchy, states are on their own for fights within their group as they are still rivals.

Accordingly, individualizing states by defining the criterion of membership, Wendt underscores two significant conclusions;⁷³² first, it is Lockean culture that constitutes the 'self-help' system not anarchy. Second, security is provided by mutual recognition not solely by national power. The principle of sovereignty constitutes self-help system by regulating states' relations with the principle of limited use of violence and performs a passive form of "other-help" by restraining the powerful from eliminating the weak states.⁷³³ Thereby, the weak can sustain their presence and can be part of the self-help system. In this Lockean self-help system, states only need balancing against each other to solve non-existential threats and to solve 'wrong-doers' against the order. Nevertheless, as Wendt points out, it is ironically the states

⁷²⁸ Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?," *International Affairs* 74, no. 1 (1998): 1-24..

⁷²⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 293.

⁷³⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 294.

⁷³¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 294.

⁷³² Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 412.

⁷³³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 296.

with the greatest national resources, known as great powers, which have the hardest time in internalizing the principle of sovereignty, attempt to violate small powers' sovereignty.⁷³⁴ However, as Lockean culture also constitutes "other-help" systems, that is established among states that agreed on the standards of membership against the states acting against that order, both wrong-doers and outsiders might be balanced collectively.⁷³⁵ As a result, Lockean culture makes balancing a more feasible policy option for powerful states or the collective self when threatened by outsiders or order-breakers.

Consequently, Wendt underlines that "anarchy portrayed by Waltz is actually a Lockean rather than Hobbesian system."⁷³⁶ This is because Waltz's analogy to markets presuppose institutions that guarantee actors do not kill each other, his emphasis on balancing, his observation that the death rate of modern states is low, and his assumption that states are security seekers rather than power seekers are all associated with a system in which self-restraint is dominant rather than 'the war of all against all' logic. The Lockean culture is taken for granted as "background knowledge"⁷³⁷ in Waltz's theory and as Wendt says, this culture is "a condition of possibility for the truth of Neorealism."⁷³⁸ Therefore, it is the culture of 'self-help' that puts balancing as a policy option to states' decision tree not solely the distribution of powers.

⁷³⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 415.

⁷³⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 414.

⁷³⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 285.

⁷³⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 286.

⁷³⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 285.

7.3.3. The Kantian Culture and Balancing

Friendship is a defining role structure of the Kantian culture.⁷³⁹ The role structure of friendship generates two expectations for states. First, states will settle their disputes without war or the threat of war, which is the rule of non-violence. Second, states will fight as a team if the security of either is threatened by a third party, which is the rule of mutual aid. However, Wendt notes three points about the principles of friendship.⁷⁴⁰ First, these two rules are independent and equally necessary because friendship exists when states expect each other to observe both rules. Second, friendship is concerned with national security only, and it does not need to extend to other issue areas. Third, most importantly, friendship is temporally open-ended, which differentiates friends from ‘allies’ whose relations are temporary and may eventually turn into a warlike situation.

The two rules of friendship produce the macro-level logic and tendencies that are related with “pluralistic security communities” and “collective security.”⁷⁴¹ In explaining how friendship creates a different logic between states, Wendt relies on the seminal work of Karl Deutsch and his associates on pluralistic security community.⁷⁴² In their study, a pluralistic security community is defined as a system of states (states not having amalgamated their sovereignty and hence are pluralistic) in which “there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways.”⁷⁴³ In

⁷³⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 298.

⁷⁴⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 298.

⁷⁴¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 299.

⁷⁴² On ‘Security Communities’; See, Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, (Publications of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁷⁴³ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 5.

pluralistic security communities, it is the shared knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts rather than a Leviathan that keeps states away from using force against one another.⁷⁴⁴ Although Wendt concurs that war is always a possibility between states in Kantian culture, the shared knowledge of friendship makes war an issue of probability, not possibility, because war is not considered a legitimate way of solving disputes.⁷⁴⁵ With the shared knowledge of friendship, the members of the pluralistic security community do not expect a threat to their survival from one another. Hence, security is not scarce; insecurity is not prevalent; and uncertainty is not dominant in the pluralistic security communities. In other words, it is not a self-help system. Therefore, the logic that generates tendency to balance is absent from the relations of the states in the pluralistic security communities.

Moreover, as Wendt argues, in Kantian culture, the shared knowledge of friendship constitutes a collective security community or a team.⁷⁴⁶ In collective security communities, states do not support self-interested security policies because as the members of the group, they identify with each other, see each other's security as being their own and develop collective definitions of self-interest. In other words, they develop a "collective identity" and thereby a "collective security" understanding as they identify their security with one another.⁷⁴⁷ The difference between the pluralistic security communities and collective security community is, as Wendt puts it, the latter is more about how states with the shared knowledge of friendship tend to behave toward outsiders (that is defined as non-members or previous members who

⁷⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 299. Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 2 (1997): 258.

⁷⁴⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 300.

⁷⁴⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 300.

⁷⁴⁷ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994): 386.

have abandoned the norms of the group).⁷⁴⁸ In contrast to alliances formed under self-help systems on a temporary basis to ward off a specific threat, in collective security systems, states make commitments for multilateral action for “non-specific threats,”⁷⁴⁹ “no matter by whom, when, or whether they might be threatened.”⁷⁵⁰ Hence, in terms of balancing, members of collective security systems are always ready to balance against the future threats posed by outsiders.

In this context, as the collective security system relies on the commitment that the members of the group will use their individual capabilities for one another, they do not tend to see the increments in capabilities of friends as a source of insecurity. On the contrary, they consider the rising power of the friend as an asset to both their individual and group’s security.⁷⁵¹ As Wendt states, the shared knowledge of friendship changes the meaning of relative military power and the logic of relationships both amongst friends and friends and outsider.⁷⁵² As opposed to the understanding that defines anything short of global membership as a balance of power system, universal membership is not necessary for a Kantian culture as it may exist in the sub-regional context.⁷⁵³ The multiple reliability of Kantian culture makes balancing against outsiders a possibility. Since balancing is a product of self-help that is either competitive as in Hobbesian culture or individualistic as in Lockean

⁷⁴⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 300.

⁷⁴⁹ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 386.

⁷⁵⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 301.

⁷⁵¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 301.

⁷⁵² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 301.

⁷⁵³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 301. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New Directions in World Politics) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-397. Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 357-387. Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," 249-277.

culture,⁷⁵⁴ it is possible to see balancing tendencies in Kantian culture in relation to friends relationship with outsiders.

To sum up, in light of systemic constructivist theory, this section of the Chapter discussed three different cultures of anarchy in relation to the concept of balancing and showed how Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian cultures make balancing a probability for states. It is shown that balancing is probable under each system. However, the probability of balancing is higher in Hobbesian culture because states' relationships are governed by the role structure of enmity, which generates intense self-help dynamics. Under Hobbesian culture, although alliances are possible, they are not likely to last long as each state is enemy to one another. Therefore, they have to rely on mostly their own capabilities to balance the threat against their security. In Lockean culture, the probability of balancing is not as high as Hobbesian culture because of the shared knowledge of rivalry. Thanks to the institution of sovereignty and the established norms of conflict resolution, states do not fear losing their survival as they are able to solve disputes by other means. However, balancing is still a viable option against 'wrong-doers,' which are part of the system but had violated the sovereignty of others and most likely the great powers, or against the outsiders, which are not recognized as the part of the culture. Therefore, under Lockean anarchy both individual and collective balancing is probable. Under Kantian culture, as the role structure is friendship, states do not fear one another; they identify their individual security interests with one another and build collective identity. Hence, they do not consider balancing as an option with their relations with one another. However, if the Kantian culture is present at a regional level, then Kantian group of states acts collectively against the threat. Therefore, under Kantian culture, unless it

⁷⁵⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 400.

is universal, states only balance collectively as the threat is posed to all. This section of the Chapter was about how states' tendency to balance change with reference to changes in the distribution of ideas, not distribution of power and it concluded that balancing is made probable when self-help logic is shared knowledge. Therefore, this discussion was at the macro-structural level and it did not discuss how self-help logic was produced and sustained. The next section of the Chapter will focus on how self-help logic is produced and instantiated and made balancing possible at the micro structural level. It will relate micro structural discussion with the balance of threat theory. The following section of the Chapter will maintain that constructivism sides with balance of threat theory rather than the balance of power in explaining balancing. However, it will argue that constructivism provides a deeper understanding on how threats and threat complexes are socially constructed than the balance of threat theory.

7.4. Constructivism, Micro-Structure and Balance of Threat

This section will focus on how constructivism explains the construction process of self-help logic and will relate constructivist logic with the balance of threat theory. Searching for "the Origins of Alliances," Stephen Walt refined Waltz's balance of power theory by arguing that states balance against power is "seriously flawed" because states balance against the most threatening power.⁷⁵⁵ According to Walt, the aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and aggressive/offensive intentions are the factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose.⁷⁵⁶ States that combine aggregate power with geographic proximity, offensive military

⁷⁵⁵ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 4. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 17.

⁷⁵⁶ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 8-13.

power and offensive intentions pose the greatest threat and are perceived as the greatest threat. However, when considered individually, except states with aggressive/offensive intentions, Walt argued neither factors is sufficient to trigger balancing by themselves.⁷⁵⁷ As states with aggressive/expansionist intentions pose a certain threat, they, even those with modest power, provoke others to balance.⁷⁵⁸ Therefore, it is the perception or presence of threat that determines states' balancing tendencies.

In addition to the sources of threat that generate balancing tendency, Walt discussed ideological solidarity as "at best a secondary explanation for alliances".⁷⁵⁹ Ideological solidarity exists between states sharing political, cultural or other traits and it "appears in the rhetoric of statesmen seeking to justify alignment with one side or opposition to another."⁷⁶⁰ Walt explained "the logic behind" the "belief" that states with similar ideological traits are inclined to align with one other as such: First, aligning with similar states, one may consider itself as defending its own political principles. Walt argued, for statesmen who consider their own system as inherently good, protecting states with a similar system must be considered good as well. Second, he advances his argument stating that states with similar characteristics may fear each other less, because they will not imagine an inherently "good" attacking another "good" state. Third, such an alignment may enhance the legitimacy of a weak regime as it will demonstrate that it is part of "a large popular movement." Fourth, the ideology itself may instruct its proponents to bring about alignment "as Marxism-Leninism explicitly does."⁷⁶¹ Acknowledging the importance of ideology in forming alliances, he also presumed a relationship between identity (individual or

⁷⁵⁷ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 13.

⁷⁵⁸ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 13.

⁷⁵⁹ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 19.

⁷⁶⁰ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 19.

⁷⁶¹ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 20.

collective) and threat perceptions of states; thereby, a relationship between identity and balancing tendencies of states.⁷⁶²

As such, as Barnett argued, Walt's balance of threat theory "fails to give ideational factors their proper due" because of its commitment to Realism and materialism.⁷⁶³ Nevertheless, in many constructivist scholars' view, balance of threat theory is considered "one of the mainstream accounts most susceptible to a constructivist alternative".⁷⁶⁴ Discussing degeneration of Realist theory, Legro and Moravcsik argue that even though Walt explicitly labels his theory as a progressive and parsimonious revision of Waltz' theory,⁷⁶⁵ demonstrating that "perceived state intentions" as the primary purpose of alliances and treating ideology as an alternative explanation, Walt appropriates "nonrealist causal mechanisms" from constructivist theory.⁷⁶⁶ Similarly, Katzenstein states, "Walt's threat theory is not a minor modification of Neorealism but a substantial departure from it" because the theory's emphasis on threat perception shifts Walt's analysis from material to ideational factors.⁷⁶⁷ In addition, Katzenstein also notes that Walt's emphasis on aggressive intentions distance balance of threat theory from being a systemic theory.

⁷⁶² On balancing and identity see, Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New Directions in World Politics) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 28. Michael Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New Directions in World Politics) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 401-404.

⁷⁶³ Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," 406.

⁷⁶⁴ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 187. Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," 361-368. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," 401-404. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," 27-28. Katzenstein, Wendt, and L., "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 63. and Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 78. Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," 65.

⁷⁶⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, viii, 5, 21, 263-265.

⁷⁶⁶ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 37-38.

⁷⁶⁷ Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," 27-28.

Wendt's primary focus was Waltz's theory rather than Walt's balance of threat theory. However, while arguing that Waltz's structure by itself cannot explain states' behavior and showing how three different cultures of anarchy make some state actions more or probable, Wendt describes each of these social structures as "threat complexes, in terms of which states define (some of their identities and interest)."⁷⁶⁸ According to Wendt, Waltz's theory by itself cannot say "whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties or status quo powers, and so on."⁷⁶⁹ On the other hand, Walt's theory can predict how states will act because it relies on the perception of threats that are "being socially constructed,"⁷⁷⁰ and has an implicit assumption about "the structure of identities and interests in the system."⁷⁷¹ Therefore, between balance of power and balance of threat theories, Wendt views the latter as more plausible.

As discussed in the previous section, Wendt expects states to act differently towards one another under different "threat complexes." According to this, while states tend to perceive more threat from one another's aggregate power under "thick" and "deep"⁷⁷² threat complexes and tend to make balancing behaviors probable, they might not perceive threat and balance under 'thin' threat complexes. In fact, while arguing states' aggregate power cannot be a source of balancing by itself, Walt raises a similar point by stating that one's aggregate power can be threatening as well as rewarding because "states with great power have the capacity either to punish

⁷⁶⁸ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 389.

⁷⁶⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396.

⁷⁷⁰ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396. On social construction of threat; See, Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, "Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of 'the Cuban Problem', 1960-1994," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (1996): 361. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," 400-432. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Kivanç Coş and Pınar Bilgin, "Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the 'Soviet Other' in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919-1945," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 1 (2010): 43-60.

⁷⁷¹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396.

⁷⁷² Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 387.

enemies or reward friends.”⁷⁷³ In constructivist reading, it can be argued that Walt concurs that states’ power has different meaning depending on the structure of identities and interests.

To illustrate the constructivist argument, Hopf argues that the distribution of power in the wake of World War II fails to explain why European states did not balance against the United States but instead the Soviet Union.⁷⁷⁴ As Hopf argues, European powers would have balanced against the United States rather than the Soviet Union if it was the distribution of power that affected their balancing tendencies. Rather, the issue was not distribution of power for them but how threatening they came to understand Soviet military capabilities to be, along with geographical proximity while viewing US power as protective. Likewise, Wendt’s example of how five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening than five North Korean nuclear weapons because the British are friends but the North Koreans are not, shows that material sources only acquire meaning for states through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.⁷⁷⁵ Accordingly, following Wendt’s reasoning that “amity and enmity is a function of shared understanding,”⁷⁷⁶ we can deduce that threat perception is also a function of amity and enmity.

The most promising link between Wendt’s constructivism and balance of threat is established in Wendt’s interaction level discussion regarding the construction of self-help, whose ‘depth’ and ‘thickness’ determines the actions of states in ‘threat complexes.’ Evidently, Wendt’s purpose for disentangling the

⁷⁷³ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 10.

⁷⁷⁴ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 187.

⁷⁷⁵ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73.

⁷⁷⁶ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 397.

concept of self-help is to show that self-interested conceptions of security are not a constitutive part of anarchy, as Waltz claimed. However, while explaining how self-help and competitive power politics are causally produced by processes of interaction between states, Wendt's emphasis on the role of "predation"⁷⁷⁷ or aggressiveness as "the efficient cause generating a self-help system in conjunction with anarchy as a permissive cause"⁷⁷⁸ illuminates the strong connection between Wendt's constructivism and balance of threat theory.

In the analysis of the construction of a self-help system at the micro-structural level, Wendt relies on "first and second image determinants;" therefore, this analysis relies on states' practices at the micro-structural level.⁷⁷⁹ It is the history of interaction/practices that constitutes meanings, identities and interests.⁷⁸⁰ As Wendt shortly states "history matters"⁷⁸¹ as a world without history is a "world without shared ideas."⁷⁸² Therefore, it is a world without meaning, identities, and interests. According to Wendt, self-help is "one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy."⁷⁸³ It is an institution which causally arises out of states' interaction.⁷⁸⁴ Deconstructing self-help as a process of identity-formation under anarchy, Wendt explains how self-regarding ideas about security are made possible by the interaction of states referring to "the key efficient cause-predation".⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁷⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

⁷⁷⁸ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 407.

⁷⁷⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 396.

⁷⁸⁰ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 401.

⁷⁸¹ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 77.

⁷⁸² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 249.

⁷⁸³ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 399.

⁷⁸⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 403.

⁷⁸⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

Wendt holds that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then sustained in response to how actors are treated by significant others.⁷⁸⁶ In the process of identity formation under anarchy, Wendt assumes, states are concerned primarily with the preservation or “security” of the self.⁷⁸⁷ Also, the process of identity formation functions on “the principle of ‘reflected appraisals’ or ‘mirroring’ because actors tend to see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see or ‘appraise’ them, in the mirror of others’ representations of the self”.⁷⁸⁸ In other words, according to Wendt, the identity formation process relies on how self “mirrors” itself in “the practices of significant others over time” as “the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization.”⁷⁸⁹ According to this, for instance, if the other treats the self as if it were an enemy, then due to the mirror effect it would likely to internalize its role identity in relation to the other.⁷⁹⁰ Nevertheless, Wendt notes that “*not all others are equally significant*” and “*power and dependency relations*” may play a significant role in affecting the process of identity construction.⁷⁹¹

Emphasizing the crucial role of practices on identity formation, Wendt underscores the importance of the first encounter. This is because states cannot have conceptions of self and other, hence, security interests, apart from their “first encounter” with each other.⁷⁹² Before the first encounter there are no shared ideas, meanings, identity and interests.⁷⁹³ The first encounter is crucial to Wendt’s theorizing because it explains how two actors- Ego and Alter- might behave in a

⁷⁸⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁷⁸⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 399.

⁷⁸⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁷⁸⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

⁷⁹⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁷⁹¹ Italics is added by the author. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁷⁹² Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 401-402.

⁷⁹³ Therefore, Wendt criticizes Waltz’s theory for assuming ‘too early’ that “political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coactions of the self-regarding units.” Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 249. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 91.

world devoid of shared ideas. Assuming that each actor wants to survive and has certain material capabilities but neither has any command of power, conquest, and glory and has no history of security or insecurity, Wendt argues that actors make decisions on the basis of “*probabilities*,” that are produced by *interaction* or actors’ *practices*, not on the basis of “the worst-case possibilities”.⁷⁹⁴

In the first encounter, Ego makes gestures, such as laying down its arms or attacking so that Alter actor makes inferences or attribution about the signals⁷⁹⁵ and responds to Ego. In the process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a “social act” and starts the process of creating intersubjective meanings.⁷⁹⁶ Each signal, gesture and interaction adds to the pool of knowledge about each other and reinforces particular concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction. More specifically, by treating the other as if it is supposed to respond a certain way, Alter and Ego eventually learn ideas that generate those responses and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will then to reproduce them in their following interactions.⁷⁹⁷ Here, the logic is “self-fulfilling prophecy”⁷⁹⁸ and the mechanism at play is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors holding certain ideas about each other, while discouraging them from holding others. If these interactions were repeated long enough, these “reciprocal typifications” generate and instantiate relatively stable social concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake.⁷⁹⁹

Hence, in the process of identity construction, Alter and Ego mutually adjust to representations of self and other conveyed in each other’s practices, their ideas

⁷⁹⁴ Italics are added. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

⁷⁹⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

⁷⁹⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

⁷⁹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁷⁹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁷⁹⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

about who they are and what they want.⁸⁰⁰ In other words, both Ego and Alter are the objects of perceptions. As Wendt states, “Ego’s ideas about the Alter, right or wrong, are not passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego, but actively and constantly constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego.”⁸⁰¹ Through its representational practices Ego says to Alter that ‘it is an X’ (hegemon, great power, balancer, rival) and I expect you to act like an X and I will act toward you as if you were an X. Therefore, in this extent who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who Ego thinks Alter is and the same applies to Ego. These active and constant perceptions about each other become meaningful or real when each makes practices to confirm them, as the construction process of self-help suggests.

The model of identity formation described above applies to both competitive and cooperative institutions. As a social construction, self-help security systems, either competitive or individualistic, evolve from the cycles of interaction in which each actor acts on the basis that the other is a threat to the self and is creating expectations that the other should not be trusted.⁸⁰² Wendt argues that competitive or egoistic identities are caused by such insecurity because assuming the other as threatening, the self ‘mirrors’ such behavior in its conception of the self’s relationship with that other.⁸⁰³ Wendt illustrates how egoist conceptions of security emerge at micro-structural level with an ego and Alter example. The key is how Ego and Alter represent themselves at the first encounter as this will determine the logic of their micro-structure. If Ego casts that Alter is taking advantage of Ego for its own needs and takes the role of egoist, then it will not take Alter’s security needs into account. If Alter recognizes Ego’s selfish perspective, then it will also adopt an

⁸⁰⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 334.

⁸⁰¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 334.

⁸⁰² Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

⁸⁰³ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 407.

egoist identity because its security needs are not respected, recognized and met. Eventually, their relations turn into one of power politics. As Wendt states, the self-fulfilling prophecy is that, thinking like 'Realists', states teach one another to act and be like one another.⁸⁰⁴

In a further examination of how a system ends up with self-regarding identities, Wendt highlights the role of "predation" as the efficient cause generating a self-help system in conjunction with anarchy as a permissive cause.⁸⁰⁵ The aggressive behavior of predator, forces other states to engage in power politics because failure to do so may be costly in terms of their survival. Although the possibility of predation does not mean that it can happen anytime, once a predator emerges, it conditions the process of identity formation in a certain way. At this point, Wendt agrees with Realists that predation will force the Alter to respond in terms of power politics.⁸⁰⁶ However, in an anarchy of two, the effect of predation on the social structure is certain; it definitely changes the structure into a competitive self-help system. Yet, in an anarchy of many, if predation occurs right after the first encounter in the state of nature, it will force others with whom it contacts to defend themselves. Under such condition, defense will take place first individually and then collectively if the others also perceive a common threat.

Therefore, predation may facilitate the formation of collective identity. Yet, if the structure of the world is defined by maximum insecurity in which potential allies distrust each other, then collective action against the predator will be a problem and the emergence of a defensive alliance will be seriously inhibited.⁸⁰⁷ Even if a coalition is established against a common threat, it will be more likely that an

⁸⁰⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁸⁰⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 407.

⁸⁰⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 403.

⁸⁰⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 259-279.

alliance of insecure allies will dissolve once the predator is removed. Or, under the presence of a collective identity system in which states define security of the self with the other, the answer to the predator, even if it attacks only one member, will be collective.⁸⁰⁸ In this context, if the group achieves defeating the predator, then the collective identity of the group will be enhanced. Yet, if its predator is strong enough, then the predator and the collective will become two actors whose relations will be dominated by *realpolitik* dynamics.⁸⁰⁹

In an anarchy of many, the timing of the emergence of predation to the history of identity-formation in the community is crucial because it affects whether predation will be balanced collectively or individually.⁸¹⁰ In an anarchy of two or many, predation tends to generate “threat complexes” or structures of insecurity, that might be either competitive or individualistic. Although it depends on the timing of predation with respect to the social structure whether predator will face collective or individual balancing, it is certain that predation is punished and balanced by others in the system. Predation plays a key role in construction and perpetuation of security dilemmas, uncertainty, distrust, and the roles of enmity and rivalry. Also, it has a key role in construction of states’ identities and interests as self-regarding entities that perceive threat from one another. In other words, predation facilitates the social construction of threats and creates meanings that will shape the perceptions of states regarding one another. Predation triggers perceptions of threat, which leads to balancing at the micro-structural level.⁸¹¹ Consequently, in the discussion of the role that predation plays in the construction of a self-help system, Wendt develops a constructivist argument on behalf of balance of threat theory by arguing that states

⁸⁰⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 297-307.

⁸⁰⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 408.

⁸¹⁰ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 407.

⁸¹¹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 400.

balance against threat and not power. Also, discussing balancing as a tendency produced under different macro structures of anarchy and as a result of self-regarding practices of states at the micro-structure, Wendt's theoretical approach shows that balancing is "multiply realizable."⁸¹²

7.5. Constructivism and Unipolarity

Wendt's most significant move against Waltz's theory is to say that international structure is a social rather than material phenomenon. Therefore, Wendt's conception of structure relies on the distribution of ideas/interests while Waltz's conception rests on the concept of distribution of power. Distribution of power refers to the extent to which material capabilities are concentrated in the system or the positioning of states with accumulation of power vis-à-vis each other.⁸¹³ Furthermore, distribution of power refers to the concept of polarity in Waltz's theory. The concept of polarity or distribution of power is central in Waltz's theory as the theory is capable of making predictions about states' tendency to balance by evaluating variations in polarity.⁸¹⁴ As Wendt states, it is the only "dimension that constitutes variation in international structure and thereby generates varying outcomes".⁸¹⁵

Therefore, as Wendt's structure is social, it is not surprising that in his analysis distribution of power is not the central concept. Nevertheless, although Wendt's theory has not elaborated on the concept of polarity, this does not mean that

⁸¹² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 152.

⁸¹³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 97-99.

⁸¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40, no. 02 (1988): 241. See Waltz's discussion of polarity as distribution of power in Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 5-41. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 913-917. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International-Politics," 44-79.

⁸¹⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 99.

constructivist theory denies the significance of distribution of power in international relations. In Wendt's conceptualization, social structures include material resources.⁸¹⁶ As expressed by Wendt, his argument is "not ideas are not all the way down" but the meaning of power is largely a function of ideas because material resources only acquire meaning through the structure of shared knowledge in which they exist.⁸¹⁷ Wendt states that the distribution of power matters, but how it matters depends on the meaning it has for actors as he exemplifies "Bipolarity among friends is one thing, among enemies quite another."⁸¹⁸ As it is the social structure that constitutes identities and interests and defines expectations of behavior or constitutes threats, for Wendt, "material forces are secondary, significant insofar as they are constituted with particular meanings for actors."⁸¹⁹

In contrast to Waltz's emphasis on polarity as the material condition having a causal role explaining states' behavior, for Wendt, "material polarity" matters to the extent that the knowledge structure indicates whether poles are friends, rivals or enemies.⁸²⁰ Wendt suggests that when Neorealists offer multipolarity as an explanation for war, it is necessary to inquire into the social practices that constitute the poles as enemies rather than friends.⁸²¹ According to Wendt, Waltz's structure presumes a Lockean social structure in which actors identify each other as rivals, the norm of sovereignty is shared knowledge and actors use limited violence against each other.⁸²² Therefore, inquiring into these practices is significant because, as Wendt argues, it unleashes the social aspect of "ostensibly material" explanations

⁸¹⁶ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73.

⁸¹⁷ Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73.

⁸¹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 107.

⁸¹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 24.

⁸²⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 24.

⁸²¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 135.

⁸²² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 135.

and shows the presupposed social structure that makes particular state action such as war or balancing possible.⁸²³

In spite of the absence of a direct discussion of polarity in Wendt's works, the discussions regarding distribution of power and "material polarity"⁸²⁴ imply that Wendt has a conception of 'social polarity.' It can be argued that Wendt's conception of polarity relies on how states with aggregated power define their social identities vis-à-vis each other.⁸²⁵ In other words, polarity refers to the distribution of role positions in a social structure. If the states with great capabilities define the terms of their relations in conflictual terms, then social polarity exists. For instance, Wendt defined "the Cold War" itself "as a social structure in virtue of which the United States and the USSR had certain identities"⁸²⁶ and they carried out certain practices constructing polarity. It is for this reason that as opposed to neorealist analysis, for Wendt what is central is not the bipolar configuration of power but the 'bipolar configuration of identities' while discussing post-World War II international relations.

It is for this reason that Wendt defines the end of the Cold War in 1989 as a structural change rather than the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.⁸²⁷ On a social definition of structure, he says, "the concept of structural change refers to changes in cultures-like the end of the Cold War in 1989- and not to changes in material polarity-like the end of bipolarity in 1991."⁸²⁸ According to Wendt, the Cold War was a "relatively stable cultural structure" that was in place because the United

⁸²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 135.

⁸²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 24.

⁸²⁵ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 386.

⁸²⁶ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 386-387. For a similar argument see, Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996): 275-318.

⁸²⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 20, 108, 314.

⁸²⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 20.

States and the Soviets had a shared understanding that they were enemies, which helped to constitute their identities and interests in any given situation, that they in turn acted in a way to confirm to the other that they were a threat and reproduced the Cold War.⁸²⁹ This culture stopped existing when the Soviets under the leadership of Gorbachev critically self-reflected (that is also defined as reflexivity) on its role reproducing the Cold War.⁸³⁰ Therefore, defining structural change based on the distribution of capabilities or as a change of the number of poles from “bi-to multi- or unipolarity” is a “superficial definition of structural change”⁸³¹ because such a definition neglects “the fact that Great Power behavior changed dramatically after 1989 but not after 1991.”⁸³²

Wendt states that constructivism is “compatible with changes in material power affecting social relations as long as those effects can be shown to presuppose still deeper social relations”.⁸³³ As Realist scholars, Wendt also accepts that the structure of international relations changed after the end of the Cold War and it became unipolar.⁸³⁴ However, although Wendt’s theoretical approach recognizes unipolarity as a material condition of international politics in the post Cold War era, constructivists do not elaborate on the logic and character of the international system that is organized around unipolarity. Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of discussion on logic of unipolarity in the constructivist literature, constructivism provides a guideline for how US security practices and its relations with significant others such as China and Russia are influencing the social structure of unipolarity.

⁸²⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 187.

⁸³⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 76. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 215-247.

⁸³¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 314.

⁸³² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 314.

⁸³³ Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 73.

⁸³⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 314.

7.5.1. Logic of Unipolarity and Balancing at Macro-Structural Level

Unipolarity is a system in which there is only one state commanding large resources and excelling in all the components of state capability, such as population, territory, economic resources, military power and organizational competence.⁸³⁵ However, defining unipolarity as a distinctive distribution of power alone tells little about the character of the relations among states because in a unipolar system much is determined by the identity and practices of the unipole, which in turn constructs the social fabric of unipolarity.⁸³⁶ Therefore, from the constructivist theory's perspective, the identity of the unipole and its practices are central for the discussion of unipolarity, including its logic. This point is also accepted by Realist scholars such as Jervis who stated that

the strongest structuralist claim would be that any unipole would behave as the US has. This is unlikely. Clearly, the current world would be very different if it had been the US and Western Europe rather than the USSR that had collapsed. Indeed regime and leadership characteristics are likely to matter more in unipolarity than in other systems because of the weakness of external restraints.⁸³⁷

Finnemore, a constructivist scholar, makes a similar argument that "one would expect a US unipolar system to look different from a Nazi unipolar system or a Soviet one" because each of these three powers would use their preponderant power for different purposes.⁸³⁸

⁸³⁵ Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 4.

⁸³⁶ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 59.

⁸³⁷ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 204.

⁸³⁸ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 201. Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 59.

In addition to the importance of a unipole's identity in the discussion of the logic of unipolarity, the timing of a particular power's preponderance also matters.⁸³⁹ As Finnemore highlights, US unipolarity in the twenty-first century would look very different from the Roman world or the Holy Roman Empire.⁸⁴⁰ This is because of the fact that social structures of norms concerning sovereignty, self-determination, border-rigidity, intervention etc. have changed over time and created vastly different dynamics across time in terms of states' expectations from another and states' behaviors towards each other.⁸⁴¹ The effect of the timing of unipolarity can be illustrated by restructuring Wendt's example regarding the impact of culture on behavior and identity of material in two cultures.⁸⁴² According to the example, in one culture, material dominance is recognized by subordinate states as constituting certain rights and responsibilities on the part of dominant states, and in the other example it does not. In this case, two unipole states engage in the same dominance behavior in the two cultures. They give military aid to weak states, forbid them from allying with other Great Powers, and intervene in their domestic politics and so on. In one system, the behavior of the unipole will be constituted and perceived as "interference," in the other as "assistance," in one as "illegitimate" in the other as "legitimate."⁸⁴³ Therefore, in one system balancing will be an option while in the other bandwagoning. In other words, a culture in which the unipole inhabits is crucial as it defines meanings and the terms of legitimacy that other states will evaluate the unipole's behavior.

⁸³⁹ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 59.

⁸⁴⁰ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 59.

⁸⁴¹ Reus-Smit, "Reading History through Constructivist Eyes," 408. Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): 393-399.

⁸⁴² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 176.

⁸⁴³ For another example on the concept of sovereignty after the Peace of Augsburg; See, Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 287.

Wendt describes Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures as three distinct cultures with distinct logics and tendencies and argues that “all three have been instantiated at different times and places in international history.”⁸⁴⁴ Yet, these three cultures also correspond to the past, the present and the future in his theorizing. Wendt deals with Hobbesian culture that existed in the past when “kill or be killed logic” was predominant as it was the case with the Huns against the Romans, the Mongols against medieval Europeans and Europeans against non-Europeans.⁸⁴⁵ Hobbesian culture was “replaced” by Lockean culture.⁸⁴⁶ The latter is defined as “the basis for what we today take to ‘commonsense’ about international politics” thanks to the role of structure of rivalry and the institution of sovereignty.⁸⁴⁷ Wendt not only characterizes the current international culture as a Lockean one but also argues that the structure defined by Waltz and other Realists “is a Lockean culture.”⁸⁴⁸ Kantian culture, on the other hand, represents the ‘ultimate and desired’ culture for the future because it will “broaden the limited identification in the Lockean culture into the fuller identification of the Kantian culture.”⁸⁴⁹ For Wendt, transformation of the Lockean culture into a Kantian culture will solve the problems faced due to the lack of collective identity in the international system today.⁸⁵⁰

Although these three cultures correspond to different time periods in the history of the international system, Wendt’s conceptualization of structure as macro- and micro- structures opens up the prospect for the coexistence of different logics at the same period. For instance, Wendt states that at least the last three hundred

⁸⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 257.

⁸⁴⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 267.

⁸⁴⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 279.

⁸⁴⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 279.

⁸⁴⁸ Wendt says “A Lockean culture, in short, is a condition of possibility for the truth of Neorealism.” Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 285.

⁸⁴⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 339. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 391.

⁸⁵⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 339.

centuries of the international system have been a Lockean one⁸⁵¹ and treats the Cold War as a micro-culture that existed between the superpowers. Also, under the same Lockean culture, Wendt points to the presence of a Kantian culture saying that “the North Atlantic states and arguably many others, seem to go well beyond a Lockean culture.”⁸⁵² Although Kantian culture is not ‘universal’, it should be recognized as it exists “within relatively autonomous regional sub-systems or security complexes.”⁸⁵³ Therefore, he explains the coexistence of Kantian culture under the Lockean macro structure on the grounds that it is too “restrictive” to not classify one culture as it is just because it does not have “global membership.”⁸⁵⁴

Hence, the macro structure of the current unipolarity is a Lockean one. As stated in the previous section, in the Lockean system, the dominant role structure is rivalry. Thanks to the institution of sovereignty, states have a ‘right’ to survive⁸⁵⁵ and do not expect to be killed by neither the unipole nor each other. Sovereignty as a right is crucial for Lockean culture because it rests on the fact that the powerful states grant the weaker states’ a right to be sovereigns by self-limiting their capacity to ‘kill’ the weak. Under unipolarity, while the unipole has a capacity to “kill” weak states and establish its hegemony, it recognizes the rights of weaker states to survive. It restrains itself and usually acts as a ‘status quo’ power.⁸⁵⁶ Thereby, it becomes possible for the weak to enjoy their sovereignty as an intrinsic quality. The most significant implication for a unipole’s self-restraint for the weaker states is that security is less scarce for them because there is less risk of death if their sovereignty is recognized by the unipole.

⁸⁵¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 297.

⁸⁵² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 297.

⁸⁵³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 301.

⁸⁵⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 301.

⁸⁵⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 280.

⁸⁵⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 280.

The fact that it is hard to restrain the unipole from using violence, the unipole's recognition of one's sovereign rights is crucial. This recognition is the central mechanism that holds the unipole from violating one's sovereignty. In other words, sovereignty is the mechanism of self-restraint for a unipole. For instance, Wendt asks why the United States does not conquer the Bahamas and suggests that the Bahamas Problem illustrates that the United States perceives the norms as legitimate. Therefore, the Bahamas, as a party to those norms, has a right to live and prosper and the U.S. would not even think of violation.⁸⁵⁷ As the Bahamas Problem suggests the United States' respect for the institution of sovereignty does not stem from coercion or self-interest as there is no power to coerce the most powerful state if it wants to act on the basis of self-interest. The unipole has internalized respecting the norm of sovereignty as the legitimate form of behavior and its behaviors are heavily biased towards the status quo. Therefore, under Lockean culture, as the weaker states are not threatened by the practices or the intentions of the unipole, balancing is not likely to emerge as a tendency for the weak against the unipole.

However, it should be noted that Lockean culture is not immune to disputes or the use of force. Although the unipole restrains itself from using unlimited violence against the weak or acts as a 'status quo' power, this can only create the expectation that the unipole will not end a state's existence or independence. It does not mean that the unipole will not use force for the settlement of disputes. The unipole tends to use force against only *some* states that are not qualified as 'proper' or 'acceptable' sovereigns according to the unipole's categorization. As stated in the section on Lockean culture, types of identities that are recognized as a legitimate

⁸⁵⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 289.

state have changed historically.⁸⁵⁸ Under unipolarity, the criteria which determine what type of identities will be recognized as legitimate are mostly being defined by the United States (and its friends) as was done by Christian European monarchies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁸⁵⁹ It would not be wrong to suggest that with the end of the Cold War, nation-states that are democratic, capitalist, modern, respectful human rights, are recognized as ‘desired’ members that are acceptable to the United States and the Western European international community.⁸⁶⁰

In addition to these qualifications, the United States started to define sovereignty with responsibility in the wake of the September 11 attacks.⁸⁶¹ According to *Nation Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in 2003, “States that have sovereign rights also have sovereign responsibilities”.⁸⁶² In its counterterrorism strategy documents, the Bush administration categorized states based on whether they fulfill their responsibilities fighting against terrorism or not. According to this, states that (i) brutalize their own people and squander their own national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; (ii) display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; (iii) are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; (iv) sponsor terrorism around the globe; and (v) reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it

⁸⁵⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 292.

⁸⁵⁹ On ‘Standard of Civilization’; See, Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society*. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Zhang, "China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of 'Civilization'," 3-16. Suzuki, "Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society," 137-164. Bilgin, "The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey," 593-614.

⁸⁶⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 293.

⁸⁶¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 6. George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 18, 21.

⁸⁶² George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 18.

stands were defined as irresponsible or rogue states.⁸⁶³ In addition to rogue states, there are also “weak states” that lack the capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities.⁸⁶⁴ These states, for instance, lack the legal framework, law enforcement, training, technical capabilities, intelligence, military capabilities for effective control over their territory. The third category is the “willing and able states”⁸⁶⁵ that fulfill their sovereign responsibilities and cooperate with the United States against terrorists. Among these states, there were old ‘friends’ like Western European states or China and Russia who were “recasting” their relations with the United States due to their cooperation on terror.⁸⁶⁶

The implication of this categorization on the United States’ use of force became obvious when it waged war against Afghanistan and Iraq, which from the United States perspective willingly refrained from fulfilling their “sovereign responsibilities.”⁸⁶⁷ Therefore, it was not only US military capability that enabled war on Afghanistan and Iraq but also the categorization of these states as ‘irresponsible sovereigns’ that made war possible against them.⁸⁶⁸ In fact, it should be reiterated that US use of force against both states did not ‘kill’ Afghanistan and Iraq in the sense that both preserved their borders and were being reconstituted under local governments. In other words, from a Wendtian perspective, the United States acted according to basic principle of the Lockean culture that was not to ‘kill’ others. The implication of the unipole’s categorization and its tendency towards the use of

⁸⁶³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 18.

⁸⁶⁴ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 21.

⁸⁶⁵ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 21.

⁸⁶⁶ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003), 20.

⁸⁶⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 6.

⁸⁶⁸ Pınar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, "Historicising Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2002): 55-80. Pınar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton, "Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security," in *State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects*, ed. Daniel Lambach and Tobias Debiel (Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2007), 7-26.

violence in terms of balancing is that as states that are categorized as ‘responsible sovereigns,’ either weak or able, are excluded from the unipole’s zone of violence, other states’ need for balancing against the United States is ‘arrested.’⁸⁶⁹ They do not need to fear the use of violence from the unipole because their survival is guaranteed by the unipole’s conceptualization of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, it is not to deny that under Lockean unipolarity, balancing is still an option for states when they consider the unipole acting against the ‘order’ and is perceived as threatening it. As Wendt suggests, in Lockean culture, balancing is not the “essential” means to guarantee states’ survival but a “basis for order in the first place.”⁸⁷⁰ Under unipolarity, conventional balancing may not be an option for guaranteeing survival against the unipole, unless the threatened state or its allies have nuclear deterrence capacity because, as Walt suggests, the opportunities for conventional balancing are limited against the unipole’s preponderant power.⁸⁷¹ However, even though its preponderant power gives it larger room to act alone, the unipole exists in a social structure. In the current system, it exists in a Lockean culture and it is expected that the unipole act in terms of the established norms of Lockean culture. As Finnemore states, in contemporary international relations conformity with international norms and law is influential in determining which actors and actions are legitimate and the unipole needs legitimacy in the eyes of others.⁸⁷² This is because the unipole needs to have a successful and stable order “to persist and prosper.”⁸⁷³ Therefore, if the norms that the unipole promotes contradict

⁸⁶⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284.

⁸⁷⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 284-285.

⁸⁷¹ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 100-103.

⁸⁷² Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 62.

⁸⁷³ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 62. On role of legitimacy in international relations; See, Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 393-399. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of*

existing norms or its practices are considered illegitimate and threatening in the existing social structure, then states may perceive threat to the order that they advocate and tend to balance against the unipole.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that states' threat perception might be influenced by the preexisting micro-structures between the unipole and the significant others. For instance, if the unipole's practices are evaluated by a group of states that have developed a micro structure based on collective identification, then this group of states will tend to favor the unipole's practices and consider them as legitimate.⁸⁷⁴ As Wendt argues, states achieve a "collective identity," a "we-feeling," "common in-group identity," and "loyalty" form security communities.⁸⁷⁵ Security communities are based on the idea that members of a security community will not consider the use of force against each other as they have a common conception of security and identity and act collectively against a threat to one's security. Therefore, sharing a common conception of security and identity, members of a security community are expected to achieve agreement on the norms of the order, which in the contemporary world can be considered a promotion of human rights, democracy, free market economy etc. Due to the fact that "mere perception of being in a group is sufficient to generate in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination,"⁸⁷⁶ in-group states tend to see each other's practices as legitimate as they agree on the norms on which one's practices are evaluated. In this regard, the dominant behavioral tendency

Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 15.

⁸⁷⁴ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 387.

⁸⁷⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 305.

⁸⁷⁶ Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 387. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 35.

in a “properly” functioning security community will be one of multilateralism and collective action against the threat rather than balancing.⁸⁷⁷

Robert Jervis, as a Realist scholar, concurs with Wendt that the current international system is distinguished by the presence of a security community among leading states, which are the United States, Western Europe either as a unit or as individual states, and Japan.⁸⁷⁸ Considering the role of the United States in the construction of the West as a community along the lines of its identity during the Cold War era,⁸⁷⁹ it is no accident that current systemic rules that the security community holds the promotion of human rights, democracy, open markets, free trade and recently ‘responsible’ sovereignty exist.⁸⁸⁰ It might be for this reason that although there were the many instances in which the United States used force in international relations since the end of the Cold War, when the members of the security community cooperated with the United States and considered US actions as legitimate. For instance, the US led humanitarian interventions in the unipolar era were supported by the security community rather than being considered illegitimate or threatening. Naturally, these practices did not create a consideration of balancing against the United States. The exception that the security community did not fully support the United States was the Iraq War in 2003 because the United States ‘partially’ failed to legitimize the causes of war against Iraq in the eyes of some

⁸⁷⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 300.

⁸⁷⁸ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 201.

⁸⁷⁹ Nye, "Soft Power," 153-171. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," 94-109. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," 160-163. Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 95-129. Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).

⁸⁸⁰ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 69.

major actors of the security community like France and Germany while it had the support of Britain and the ‘new Europe.’⁸⁸¹

However, if the preexisting micro-structure is one that has a deep rooted conception of self-help, then the unipole’s practices and the norms that it introduces will not be subject to ‘in-group favoritism’. As the micro-structure is based on rivalry, it will not allow for common identification with the unipole. For instance, under current international relations, as Jervis states, China and Russia are the two powers that are not members of the security community of the leading states.⁸⁸² The micro-structure that both states share with the unipole rests on the role structure of rivalry, which is being recovered from the conception of enmity since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, they do not have a collective identification with the United States in the realm of security and do not consider a threat directed to the unipole as one that is directed to their own security. For this reason, their cooperation and support to the unipole rests on the conception of self-interest. If the practices and norms of the unipole coincide with the interest of these states, then the unipole’s practices and norms are considered legitimate. If the unipole’s practices and norms contradicts the norms that China and Russia support, then US practices are considered illegitimate and threatening. For instance, as discussed in previous chapters, the international order that China and Russia envision rests on a different conception of sovereignty than the one supported by the United States. Therefore, they tend to perceive US practices as contradictory to the ‘established’ order from their perspective and the United States as a hegemon with “revisionist”⁸⁸³ intentions,

⁸⁸¹ US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that France and Germany were “old Europe”. Although Old Europe opposed US war against Iraq, Rumsfeld stated that a vast number of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe were supporting the US. "Outrage at 'Old Europe' Remarks," *BBC News* (January 23, 2003). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm> (accessed 02/01/2012).

⁸⁸² Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 201.

⁸⁸³ Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 204.

which in turn enhance their threat perception and increase their tendency to balance against the unipole.

As an overall assessment regarding the macro structure of unipolarity and balancing, it can be concluded that sovereignty is still the key determinant of the Lockean culture. Under unipolarity, it is a major factor that enables self-restraint. However, the terms of sovereignty are more open to individual interpretation of the unipole and those states that do not hold up to the unipole's standards are susceptible to the unipole's use of violence. The legitimacy of the unipole's criteria and practices in the eyes of the significant others, determines the prospects of balancing against the unipole. In Wendt's words, "Not all others are significant."⁸⁸⁴ Under unipolarity, only states with great economic, political, military capabilities, especially the ones with nuclear power are significant as they are able to protect themselves and have the potential to balance against the United States. However, under the current international system, some of the states under this category have developed a security community, a micro-structure, with the United States and they share common perspectives regarding the norms of international relations. Therefore, they tend to see the US practices as legitimate and do not consider balancing against it.

China and Russia are not members of the security community and rivalry is the governing principle of their relations with the United States. Rivalry entails a self-regarding definition of security, which needs to be defined not only as the preservation of material well-being but also as the preservation of China's and Russia's great power status. From China's and Russia's perspective, unipolarity represents a "status"⁸⁸⁵ that enables the United States to be a "system-maker" rather

⁸⁸⁴ The existence of nuclear powers is a distinguishing character of the current unipolar era, as Jervis argues. Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 201.

⁸⁸⁵ Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 28-57.

than being a “rule-taker” and to act as an ‘exceptional’ power as if it was exempted from the established rules of international relations.⁸⁸⁶ However, having the self-image of great powers, Russia and China have their own visions regarding the future of international order and do not want to be rule-takers. Evaluating the United States on the basis of their competing visions, China and Russia have not considered the US practices as ‘legitimate’ and have perceived US prominence as a threat to the realization of their versions of international order. Therefore, China and Russia have developed a self-regarding conception of status vis-à-vis the United States’ status because US unipolarity has declined China’s and Russia’s status as great powers who wanted to be part of system-making.⁸⁸⁷ It can be argued that this status-competition over system-making tends to produce balancing tendencies in terms of China and Russia.

As Finnemore states, “the willingness of others to recognize legitimacy of a unipole’s action and defer its wishes or judgments shapes the character of the order that will emerge.”⁸⁸⁸ Therefore, the more the United States successfully promotes its principles and justifies its actions through principles that are acceptable to the ‘significant others,’ the more it is granted legitimacy or even collective identification by leading states including China and Russia. The more legitimacy the United States has, the lesser the tendency to balance against another state, at the macro structural level will be. This implies that unless there is conciliation between the United States and China and Russia on their roles as great powers/system-makers and on the terms of international order starting with sovereignty, there will be a “status-

⁸⁸⁶ Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: US Power and the International Political Economy," 121-154.

⁸⁸⁷ Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 30.

⁸⁸⁸ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 62.

competition’’⁸⁸⁹ rather than collective identification and legitimacy. Briefly, it can be concluded that if China’s and Russia’s definitions of their status vis-à-vis the United States remains in self-regarding terms, it is likely that they might engage in balancing against the United States.

7.5.2. Logic of Unipolarity and Balancing at the Micro-Structural Level (China, Russia)

Balancing in constructivism, as discussed above, is a multiple realizable outcome under different social macro-structures in which self-help logic prevails. The previous section highlighted rivalry as the governing role structure of the macro-structure of contemporary international relations and defined it in terms of having a self-regarding conception of status among leading states in the system. Therefore, the section concluded that the self-regarding conceptualization of security, defined in term of preserving one’s status, tended to create balancing tendencies at the macro-structural level. This section of the Chapter aims to show how self-regarding conceptions of status have become possible between the United States and China and Russia since the end of the Cold War and rendered balancing against the United States possible thanks to the dynamics at the micro-structural level.

Before going into the case of how interactions between the United States and China and Russia have produced a micro-structure that relies on self-help culture, it is necessary to remember how identity formation process takes place at the micro-structural level. Micro-structure is the level of interaction in which states’ practices constitute common meanings (cooperative, competitive or conflictive), identities and

⁸⁸⁹ Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 30.

interests.⁸⁹⁰ As Wendt states, the process of identity formation at the micro-structural level functions on “the principle of ‘reflected appraisals’ or ‘mirroring,’ which means actors tend to see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see or ‘appraise’ them in the mirror of others’ representations of the self.”⁸⁹¹ Therefore, identity formation process relies on how self “mirrors” itself in “the practices of significant others over time” as “the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization.”⁸⁹² For instance, if the ‘significant other’⁸⁹³ treats the self as if it were an enemy, then due to the mirror effect it would be likely to internalize its role-identity in relation to the other.⁸⁹⁴

In Wendt’s model regarding the process of identity construction, the ‘first encounter’ plays a significant role because states’ conception of self and other, thus, their security interests are constituted by their first encounter with each other.⁸⁹⁵ The ‘first encounter’ is the basis for shared ideas, meanings, identity and interests.⁸⁹⁶ The process of identity formation relies on a process of signaling, interpreting and responding, which starts the process of creating common knowledge.⁸⁹⁷ Each signal, gesture and interaction adds to the pool of knowledge about each other and reinforces particular concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in interaction.⁸⁹⁸ In other words, by treating the other as if it is supposed to respond in a certain way, ego

⁸⁹⁰ Micro-structures can be defined with common knowledge of cooperative (security communities such as European Union), competitive, and conflictive (threat complexes as one between the US and USSR during the Cold War era). Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 401.

⁸⁹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁸⁹² Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.

⁸⁹³ As Wendt notes “not all others are equally significant” and “power and dependency relations” may play significant role in affecting the process of identity construction. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁸⁹⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 327.

⁸⁹⁵ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 401-402.

⁸⁹⁶ Therefore, Wendt criticizes Waltz’s theory for assuming ‘too early’ that “political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coactions of the self-regarding units.” Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 249. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 91.

⁸⁹⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

⁸⁹⁸ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

and Alter eventually learn ideas that generate those responses and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in their following interactions.⁸⁹⁹ If interactions are repeated long enough, these “reciprocal typifications” generate and instantiate relatively stable social concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake.⁹⁰⁰

In the process of identity construction, Alter and Ego mutually adjust to the representations of self and other conveyed in each other’s practices, their ideas about who they are and what they want.⁹⁰¹ In other words, both Ego and Alter become the objects of perception because as Wendt states, “Ego’s ideas about the Alter, right or wrong, are not passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego, but actively and constantly constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego.”⁹⁰² Through its representational practices, Ego alters conceptions such as: ‘it is an X’ (hegemon, great power, balancer, rival), and I expect you to act like an X, and I will act toward you as if you were an X. Therefore, who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who Ego thinks Alter is and the same applies to Ego. These active and constant perceptions about each other become meaningful or real when each tries to confirm them.

The end of the Cold War brought a micro-structural change in international relations and as an unprecedented configuration of power unipolarity emerged as a ‘first encounter’ for states in the system. Unipolarity defined by US preponderance was devoid of meaning in the sense that there was an uncertainty about how the United States would use its preponderant power in its relations with significant others. Expressed in constructivist terminology, there was no common knowledge

⁸⁹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁹⁰⁰ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

⁹⁰¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 334.

⁹⁰² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 334.

defining the relationship between the United States and China and Russia as ‘the significant others.’ Social micro-structure of unipolarity was without the “history of interactions.”⁹⁰³ However, since the end of the Cold War, interactions between the unipole and the significant others has produced meanings and ‘reciprocal typifications’ that could be explained with reference to Wendt’s ‘principle of mirroring’.

In the process of role-identity construction, the U.S. and China mutually adjusted to representations of self and other conveyed in each other’s practices. They cast their ideas about who they were and what they wanted looking at each other’s practices.⁹⁰⁴ In other words, both the United States and China become the objects of each others’ perceptions. Rephrasing Wendt, the United States’ ideas about China, right or wrong, were not passive perceptions of something that existed independent of the United States, but actively and constantly constitutive of China’s role vis-à-vis the United States.⁹⁰⁵ Likewise, China’s ideas about the United States, right or wrong, were not passive perceptions of something that existed independent of China, but actively and constantly constitutive of the United States’ role vis-à-vis the China. Through its representational practices the United States said to China that ‘China was ‘a rival and potential balancer’ and it expected China to act like a rival and potential balancer and it would act toward China as if China were ‘a rival or potential balancer’. Similarly, in its representational practices China said to the United States that ‘the United States was a ‘hegemon’ and it expected the United States to act like a ‘hegemon’ and it acted toward the United States as if the United States were a ‘hegemon’. Therefore, in this context, who the United States was, in this interaction,

⁹⁰³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁹⁰⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 334.

⁹⁰⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 334.

depended on who China thought the United States was and the same applies to China. These active and constant perceptions about each other became meaningful or real when each acted to confirm them since the end of the Cold War.

In the case of the US-China micro-structure, China's aspiration to grow as an economic and military power and its desire to be recognized as a great power in world affairs were considered as competitive policies directed against US primacy. As a result of the perceived 'China threat,' China started to consider itself as 'peer competitor' as a 'major rival'. Expecting China to act as a potential balancer, the United States acted against China as if Beijing really wanted to balance against the United States and perceived China's economic rise, its military modernization or regional security policies as acts of balancing itself. On the other hand, as discussed in the Chapter IV in detail, China considered the United States a hegemon. China expected the U.S. to contain China's economic, political and military rise and perceived the United States security presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States relations with Taiwan, its stance on the Taiwan Straits in the 1996 crisis, and the 2001 spy plane incident as direct threats to its security and rise as a global power. Both actors acted on the bases that the other was a rival (in some cases as a threat) to the self and trusted source of mistrust.⁹⁰⁶ Cycles of interaction resulted in the construction of a self-help micro-structure, in which both states considered one another as an egoist who took advantage of the other for its own needs.

In the case of the US-Russia micro-structure, after losing its 'identity parity' with the United States, Russia expected that the United States would act as a hegemon and treat Russia as a 'junior partner' rather than a 'great power.' Expecting the United States to act as a hegemon that would not respect Russia's status and

⁹⁰⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 405.

security needs, Moscow started to act against the United States as if it aimed to prevent restoring Russia's power position and take advantage of its existing problems to its own advantage. On the other hand, despite its declined power position, the United States considered Russia a 'regional great power' aiming to restore its previous position in the post-Soviet sphere of influence and expected Russia to act as it would search for regional hegemony and acted toward Moscow as if it was a regional hegemon. As discussed in the chapter on Russia, the United States' political, military and economic relations with the former Soviet Republics, its support for the enlargement of NATO, and its retreat from the AMB treaty took place under the effect of 'mirroring.' These cycles of interaction between the United States and Russia produced a micro structure based on a self-help culture in which both actors defined one another as egoists, failing to respect one's security needs.

In addition to China's and Russia's interactions with the United States as causes of self-help micro-social structure, the United States' threat or use of force in other parts of the world affected the content of US-Russia and US-China micro-structures. Wendt defines "predation" as the efficient cause generating a self-help system either at the micro or at micro-level.⁹⁰⁷ Although China and Russia were not directly subject to US predation, the fact that the United States could use force unilaterally enhanced the sense of insecurity and increased their possibility of engaging in power politics. Both the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo in 1999 and the Iraq War in 2003 intensified both states' sense of insecurity. From China's perspective, the impact of the Kosovo operation on China's sense of insecurity became very remarkable because the Kosovo operation was the first serious encounter with the U.S. as the unipole at the end of the Cold War. When the US air-

⁹⁰⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 407.

forces ‘accidentally’ bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo operation, the security of China’s identity as a great power was seriously damaged. Also, because the operation took place without UN authorization, China considered the operation illegitimate because it undermined the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining peace and security.

From Russia’s perspective, the Kosovo operation was a breach of the Founding Act because Russia had assumed the United States should have consulted first with Russia before starting the operation. Similarly, Russia also protested that the operation took place without authorization of the UN Security Council. From both powers’ perspective, the UN Security Council represented institutionalization of their status as great powers with special responsibilities to shape the international order and preserve peace and security.⁹⁰⁸ Therefore, the bypass of the UN Security Council showed that the United States tended to assume “special responsibilities” on its own, while disregarding the status of China and Russia as great powers.

From the perspective of China and Russia, having the status of number one, the United States used its primacy to challenge China’s and Russia’s role-identities as ‘great powers; it did not respect their “special rights” stemming from their status and it disregarded their security needs and interests.⁹⁰⁹ They were denied a major role in shaping international events, which they had expected through relying on their self-image as great powers. In this regard, the Kosovo operation represented a significant case for instantiation of self-help as common knowledge for micro-social structures of the US-China and the US-Russia relationship.

⁹⁰⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 118. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131. Both scholars emphasize the special systemic responsibilities of the great powers.

⁹⁰⁹ On ‘status competition’ See, Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 28-57. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," *International Security* 34, no. 4 (2010): 63-95.

China's and Russia's perceptions of the United States as egoist were enhanced during the US 'war on terror' under the Bush administration. When the United States founded military bases in Central Asia, although China and Russia seemed to facilitate the process initially, they did not want these military bases to be permanent. As great powers, both China and Russia considered Central Asia as their 'spheres of influence' and great powers were supposed to "respect one another's spheres of influence."⁹¹⁰ In this regard, US presence in Central Asia was considered interference in their regional dominance and a challenge to their status. US unilateralism in the Iraq War in 2003 became the latest significant international incident that marked the United States as an egoist who did not respect, recognize, and help to meet China's and Russia's security needs.

Moreover, both China's and Russia's conception of 'great power-ness' entails that great powers should not interfere in each other's spheres of influence, which also means that they are not supposed to meddle in each others' domestic affairs. As discussed in the relevant chapters, both China and Russia have a "thick" notion of sovereignty which is equated with the principle of non-interference into domestic political affairs in absolute terms.⁹¹¹ Although both powers adapted to the neo-liberal economic principles endorsed by Western financial institutions such as the IMF or the WTO, they do not accept any criticism about human rights, transparency, and democracy promotion, etc.⁹¹² Therefore, when the United States criticized China for human rights violations in Tibet and in the Xinjiang region, conditioned economic relations on the improvements on human rights after the Tiananmen Square incident, linked China's entrance to the WTO organization with human rights, or supported

⁹¹⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 200.

⁹¹¹ Gill and Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," 41-59. Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁹¹² Larson and Shevchenko, "Status Seekers Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," 84.

Taiwan's independence, it not only interfered in China's domestic affairs but also challenged its great power identity. Similarly, the United States' criticisms about democracy, transparency, good governance, political freedoms, and human rights led Russia to advance a "sovereign democracy" concept, which meant Russia would determine its own path to democracy without any normative and political pressures.⁹¹³ Both states perceived criticisms about their domestic politics as infringements on their sovereignty, and on their status as great powers expecting to be treated on equal footing by the United States.

Nevertheless, the initial phases of the war on terror under the Bush administration resulted in betterment of bilateral relations between the US-China and the US-Russia. The United States agreed to fight against the common threat of terrorism, albeit they had different terrorists in mind, both China and Russia supported the war on Afghanistan. Moreover, both powers agreed on the presence of US military bases in Central Asia temporarily. However, the issue-specific improvement of relations were not sustained enough to break the cycles of 'typifications' in which the United States was defined as 'hegemon' from the perspective of China and Russia. On the contrary, since the end of the Cold War, thanks to their individual experiences with the United States and the United States' security practices in international affairs, China and Russia learned that their great power identity, therefore their related security interests, would be respected, recognized, and met if the United States found their great power status as a valuable asset to achieve its own security interests and needs. They were treated as great

⁹¹³ Larson and Shevchenko, "Status Seekers Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," 84. Pami Aalto, "Russia's Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International Societies," *International Relations* 21, no. 4 (2007): 462.

powers so long as they agreed to support US policies as it was the case in the installation of military bases in Central Asia.

Therefore, in spite of the evidence of cooperative behavior, their history of interactions with the United States created a “reduced status”⁹¹⁴ problem for China and Russia as the United States took advantage of its prime status at their expense. As Wendt stated, although the possibility of predation did not mean that it could happen anytime, once predation emerged, it conditioned the process of identity formation in a certain way and generated *realpolitik* tendencies. Under unipolarity, the possibility that the United States could use predation unilaterally without considering China’s and Russia’s security needs increased both states’ concerns about their status in international relations. Facing the problem of “reduced status,” both Russia and China constantly called for multipolarity/multilateralism because multipolarity implied a “flat hierarchy” in terms of status, which meant equal global status with equal rights and responsibilities.⁹¹⁵ The calls for multipolarity/multilateralism have signified both states’ intentions to challenge US primacy and their tendency to balance against the United States.

Looking at China’s and Russia’s balancing behavior since the end of the Cold War, it could be observed that both powers did not pursue hard balancing strategies which focused on the overall balance of power and sought to form a countervailing coalition to check US power regardless of the policies it pursued.⁹¹⁶ In contrast, they pursued internal balancing strategies that meant to build up their power to match their status as great powers as material capabilities were crucial to acquire the status. Also, they engaged in soft balancing that accepted the current balance of power in

⁹¹⁴ Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 51.

⁹¹⁵ Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 40.

⁹¹⁶ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104.

principle, but sought to obtain better outcomes within the given situation by coordinating diplomatic efforts so that they could prevent the United States from taking actions against their preferences which they considered as more legitimate.⁹¹⁷ As it was the case in the Iraq War in 2003, as Walt argued, China and Russia together with other powers united their positions and denied “the United States the legitimacy it sought,”⁹¹⁸ Although a soft balancing strategy proved to have limited capacity to stop the unipole, as Finnemore stated, attacks on legitimacy were important as they were “weapons of the weak.”⁹¹⁹ These attacks on the legitimacy of the unipole had the capacity to undercut the credibility and integrity of the unipole and enable alternative political visions to be attractive to the other states, which might push the unipole to abandon selfish strategies. The United States’ inclusion of Russia and China and other opposing states into the post-war reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and passing the authority to the UN could be considered belated success of soft balancing strategies against the United States.

Taken as a whole, this section explained that the United States and China and Russia formed their role-identities mirroring themselves in the practices of one another over time. They produced ‘reciprocal typifications’ as hegemon and rival/balancer and acted on the basis of these typifications. Their typifications were instantiated by their security practices, which resulted in construction of self-help micro-structures between US-China and US-Russia relations. The Chapter was also underlined that the US predation against other states in the system played a key role in the construction of self-help micro-structures between the United States and China and Russia. The Chapter underscored that US predation against other powers, as it

⁹¹⁷ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 104. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 7-45. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," 46-71.

⁹¹⁸ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 105.

⁹¹⁹ Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked up to Be," 66.

was in the cases of the Kosovo operation (1999) and the Iraq War (2003), did not pose a threat to neither China's nor Russia's individual survival but to the survival of their great power status and interests. US predation against the other states affected the threat perception of China and Russia and perpetuated egoist security identities. Therefore, this section of the Chapter concluded that as the bilateral interactions between the United States with China and Russia produced a culture of self-help in individualistic terms, China and Russia were likely to engage in strategies to balance against the United States, relying on the history of their interactions, unless the cycle that produced egoist understanding of security was broken by constant cooperative interactions.

7.6. Conclusion

Chapter VII analyzed the question of whether China and Russia will balance against unipolarity defined by the US preponderance by relying on constructivist theory. For this purpose, first it underscored the distinctive understanding of structure in constructivism that relied on recognition of macro- and micro-level structures and discussed balancing as a multiple realizable tendency at both levels. At the macro-structural level, based on the central argument that the macro-structure of international relations was made of social rather than material factors, the Chapter underscored that balancing was made possible by the distribution of ideas (culture) rather than distribution of capabilities. The Chapter further showed that balancing was a multiple realizable tendency under different cultures of anarchy. It pointed out that balancing was an effect of self-help security understanding rather than being an effect of distribution capabilities. Therefore, the Chapter challenged balance of power theory on the grounds that states' tendency to balance depended on social rather than material factors.

Second, the Chapter focused on micro-structural level analysis as a distinct level of analysis and focused on how self-help was constructed as a result of states' interactions. Highlighting the role of predation in the construction of self-regarding identities under the "mirroring" effect, the Chapter argued that constructivism would take the side of balance of threat, being socially constructed, against the balance of power theory. In this regard, the Chapter underlined that perceptions of threat constructed by states' interactions and balancing was made possible by insecurities produced at the micro-structural level. Therefore, the Chapter pointed out that balancing could be an effect of micro-structure, which showed its multiple realizability and need for looking at the micro-structural level of analysis.

Third, the Chapter discussed unipolarity as a distinct configuration of power that could be analyzed with reference to constructivism because the theory is compatible with changes in material power affecting social relations. The Chapter highlighted that the concept of polarity at the macro- structural level was defined by a “positional picture”⁹²⁰ of identities rather than capabilities and defined polarity as a social construction based on role-identities of enmity or rivalry. The Chapter noted that despite the distinctiveness of unipolarity as a material condition was recognized, the logic of unipolarity was not elaborated on from the perspective of constructivism. Therefore, based on the theoretical framework and tools provided by the theory, it was argued that unipolarity had understandings at the macro and micro-structural levels and they would play a role in shaping China’s and Russia’s tendency to balance against the United States.

Fourth, Chapter VII also elaborated on the logic of unipolarity at the macro-structural level and underscored that from the constructivist perspective, the identity of the unipole and the timing of unipolarity were significant in defining the social structure of unipolarity. The Chapter underlined that current unipolarity had a Lockean culture at the macro-level; therefore, it argued that under unipolarity, the survival of states did not depend on their individual capacity to defend themselves, except nuclear states, but on the self-restraint of the unipole based on the principle of sovereignty. However, it noted that as Lockean culture did not eliminate use of force in international relations, it was possible to observe the unipole using force against other states by changing the terms of sovereignty. The Chapter argued that since the end of the Cold War, the United States focused on ‘responsible sovereignty’ and especially after the September 11 attacks the concept of ‘responsible sovereignty’

⁹²⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 99.

played a significant role in the United States' legitimization of war against other states. In this context, the Chapter underlined rivalry as the governing principle of relations between the United States, China, and Russia and defined rivalry in terms of status-competition based on competing visions of international order. Therefore, it concluded that China and Russia tended to perceive threat from the United States' status as the system-maker and would have a tendency to balance against the United States.

In addition, Chapter VII analyzed how self-regarding conceptions of status were constructed and instantiated as a result of the interactions of the United States with China and Russia and how these micro-structural dynamics rendered balancing against the United States possible. It described how self-regarding conceptions of status were produced with reference to Wendt's model of identity construction that was based on the principle of mirroring. It argued that both considering each other as a threat to their own status and acting as if the other really challenged its status, all three powers actively engaged in constructing certain identities vis-à-vis each other. As a result of these interactions, while China and Russia concluded that the United States was a self-interested hegemon, the United States concluded Russia and China were potential rivals and challengers. The Chapter highlighted that the United States' unilateral predations that did not take into account Russia's and China's great power status played a major role in the perception of the United States as an egoist hegemon. Especially after the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo in 1999 and the US preemptive war on Iraq in 2003, China and Russia perceived serious threats against their status as great powers. Facing the 'reduced-status' problem, both powers perceived threats from the United States' status as the unipole and started to define their status in self-regarding terms vis-à-vis the United States. Both states

started to demand multipolarity or multilateralism, both of which in practice meant flat hierarchical order in terms of status. Finally, the Chapter concluded that status-competition generated by definition of role-identities in self-regarding terms might lead China and Russia to engage in balancing against the United States; however, given that material balancing was not a viable option, the Chapter suggested that soft balancing strategies, which were based on denying legitimacy, would be central in China's and Russia's balancing efforts against the United States.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation provided a constructivist analysis of balancing under unipolarity by examining the question of how the US war on terror has influenced China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the United States. In Chapter II, the study began with describing Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization and contributed to the literature by combining studies on Al Qaeda and transnational terrorism. The Chapter underlined that the organization's power stemmed from its political-religious claim attracting international audience, its networked structure connecting recruits, operatives, supporters and sympathizers and its financial capacity enabling to act as an independent entity while making decisions and conducting operations. The Chapter emphasized that Al Qaeda's capacity to exploit information and communication technologies for enhancing its political, organizational, and financial resources facilitated its transnationalization. Having described the nature of threat and the components of its power, the Chapter concluded that counterterrorism strategy against Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization required a network of counterterrorism coalitions at the international level so that it could address all aspects that enable the threat to be transnational.

In Chapter III, the dissertation presented the US administration's definition of threat and counterterrorism strategies focusing on its key national security and

counterterrorism strategy documents. The chapter contributed to the literature by highlighting how the Bush administration's concept of responsible sovereignty enabled the US war Afghanistan and Iraq. Chapter III pointed out that similar to the scholarly literature on transnational terrorism and Al Qaeda the US administration also defined the terrorist threat as a 'stateless global network'. Nevertheless, the US counterterrorism strategy was based on dealing with states that 'whether through ignorance, inability or intent' supported terrorists and provided physical or virtual sanctuary. Chapter III underlined that due to its state-oriented approach, the Bush administration asked states to fulfill their 'sovereign responsibilities' and categorized states as willing and able states, weak states, reluctant states and unwilling states looking at their willingness and capacity to act as responsible sovereigns. The Chapter highlighted the concept of 'sovereign responsibility' as one of the central themes of the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy. Chapter III argued that the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq were rendered possible by the Bush administration's 'zero tolerance' strategy against states failing to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities.

In this regard, the Bush administration's preemptive war doctrine and its unilateralism relied on the administration's determination to punish those states failing to act responsibly and cooperate with the United States. In addition, Chapter III underlined that in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Bush administration justified its causes of war on the basis that these states did not act responsibly and preferred to act together with 'coalitions of the willing states' rather than being formally restricted by any form of alliance and international organizations. The Chapter stressed that only in the Afghanistan case, the great powers in the UN Security Council agreed with the United States on the grounds that Afghanistan failed to act

as responsible state in fighting against terrorists and they showed their support by authorizing the war in the UN Security Council. The Chapter stated that although the Iraq war was part of the US war on terror, neither the causes of the war nor the method by which it was carried out were considered as legitimate by majority of great powers in the UN Security Council. Therefore, Chapter III concluded that the great powers were concerned with the United States' violation of other states' sovereignty but with the United States' defining the terms of violating one's sovereignty without waiting consent of the great powers in the UN Security Council.

In Chapter IV, the dissertation analyzed the evolution of China's security understanding in relation to the United States' practices since the end of the Cold War to contextualize China's reaction to the US war on terror and discussed the impact of the US war on terror upon China's security understanding. The Chapter contributed to literature by providing China's security understanding since the end of the Cold War era and by analyzing its national security documents. More significantly, it contributed to the IR literature by using the analysis of security understanding to examine China's balancing tendencies as an alternative to power-based approaches. Analyzing China's national defense policy papers, the study underscored that China's security understanding based on preserving its national integrity, sustaining its economic development, and attaining a great power status in international relations. Chapter IV also pointed out that in China's security understanding the achievement of Beijing's goals was strongly connected to the state of international relations in general and its relations with the United States in particular. Therefore, Chapter IV of the study highlighted China's international relations based on safeguarding peace and pursuing non-confrontational relations especially with the United States so that international security events would not

intervene in China's economic, political, military affairs. In other words, China's security understanding is comprised of its evaluations of international events in terms of their implications on China's political unity, economic development and global status. In this context, it was stressed that the United States' practices were the most significant factors in shaping China's security understanding because they could harm Chinese national unity, hinder its economic development and prevent China from gaining great power status. It was also stated that China became very concerned about the US-led international order in which humanitarian interventions started to be accepted as a norm in international relations and the United States promoted democracy by linking the United States economic, political and military support to one's record on human rights issues.

Chapter IV evaluated the introduction of China's New Security Concept as a strategy to promote an alternative vision of international order which would support China's security interests without directly confronting the United States. Chapter IV also underlined that as China needed non-intervention in its domestic affairs to achieve its national goals, the central theme that China's New Security Concept relied on was the inviolability of sovereignty. According to China's conceptualization of sovereignty, all states were equal regardless of their power and no state should intervene in other's domestic affairs, violate others' territorial integrity and engage in acts of aggression. Nevertheless, it was noted that China did not oppose violations of sovereignty and interventions if the decision was taken under the authority of the UN and its Security Council, in which China held a great power status with a veto power. Therefore, it was stressed that visioning a multipolar international order, from China's perspective, the UN Security Council was the most significant institution because it recognized the distinguished role given to the great

powers for management of international affairs and China's status as a great power. It was emphasized that when the US security practices bypassed the UN Security Council, as it did in the Kosovo operation in 1999, China perceived a direct threat to its security defined in terms of its great power status in international relations. Chapter IV also underlined that especially after the Kosovo operation in 1999, China started to define the United States as 'hegemon' as it considered that the United States abused its power to promote its own vision of international order and its own domestic values violating the established norms of international relations.

Giving the fundamentals of China's security understanding and defining its vulnerabilities in relation to the United States in the post-Cold War international order, Chapter Four analyzed China's reaction to the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the war on Iraq in 2003, which were two major stages of the US war on terror. The chapter underlined that China's approach to counterterrorism strategy was in line with its security understanding, according to which China demanded the United States to act under the authority of the UN and its Security Council. The Chapter maintained that China agreed on the legitimacy of the war on Afghanistan because it also considered Afghanistan provided support to terrorists and acted irresponsibly, which brought China's support to the United States in the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the war and its silence against the US-led coalition of the willing states conducting the war outside of the UN umbrella. The study also laid emphasis on the fact that China's support to the United States after the shocking terrorist attacks brought an opportunity for the betterment of the bilateral relations, which both states enjoyed. It was stated that as a result of the betterment of the bilateral relations, China's evaluations regarding the state of the international relations and its own position vis-à-vis the United States were affected positively.

China's perception was affected by the United States' approach to China because it benefited from China's help in critical issues like encouraging Central Asian states to allow the United States military presence and Pakistan to support the United States. The Chapter maintained that being treated as if it was the United States' on equal footing, China considered the process as a positive sign that showed that the United States respected China's concerns and recognized its great power status in international affairs.

However, Chapter IV showed that the impact of the Iraq War on China's security understanding reversed the positive environment that the cooperative relations caused after the September 11 attacks and the Afghanistan war. The study maintained that the US decision to wage a preemptive war on Iraq without waiting for a UN Security Council resolution brought back China's fears about US hegemonism. It was argued that the deep impact of the Iraq war on China's security understanding was not because China considered Iraq as a central part of its national security in the traditional sense. The Iraq war had a strong impact on China's security understanding because the US decision to wage a preemptive war bypassing the UN Security Council was considered a threat to the UN Security Council in which great powers assumed equal responsibility in the management of international affairs. As China considered the UN as a symbol of the multipolar order and China's great power status, the Iraq war threatened China's security. As stated in the chapter, China declared the Iraq war as an unnecessary and illegitimate war. In China's view the war was waged because the United States was ambitious to preserve its hegemony, hinder the rise of great powers and thereby prevent multipolarization of the international structure. Having considered the Iraq war as a move against multipolarization, China perceived the war as part of the United States' military,

political and economic containment strategy against itself. Therefore, the Chapter accentuated that the Iraq war increased China's sensitivities regarding 'US hegemonism' and the US-led international order and led it to call for a 'democratized', 'fair' and 'rational' 'new' international order.

Finally, looking at China's relations with the United States after the Iraq war, Chapter IV maintained that China's complaints and dissatisfaction about the US-led order decreased when the United States cooperated with or consulted China and thus changed its evaluations of the international security environment positively. It showed that improved relations with the United States after the 9/11 attacks, the 'responsible stakeholder speech' or the financial crisis of 2008 led China to focus on cooperation in the international security environment. Although the changes in China's evaluation of the United States and international security environment showed that Beijing's major concern was mainly the US practices, the United States' self-interested and unilateral practices in the unipolar era shaped China's understanding of the US preponderance and eventually made US power a security concern for China. Looking at China's sensitivity regarding the US security practices carried out by disregarding the UN Security Council, which represented China's ideal international order where it assumed managerial rights and responsibilities about the international order and it acted as a great power, the chapter concluded that gaining a great power status has been a central security concern for China. Therefore, it was suggested that China might follow strategies to establish multipolarity or increase its demands for multilateral unipolarity depending on its threat perception shaped by the United States' practices.

In Chapter Five, the dissertation focused on Russia's security understanding in relation to the United States' practices since the end of the Cold War to

contextualize Russia's reaction to the United States war on terror and discussed the impact of the US war on terror on Russia's security understanding. In this Chapter, the dissertation contributed to the literature by providing Russia's security understanding since the end of the Cold War with reference to its national security documents. The Chapter of the dissertation also made contribution to the literature by analyzing Russia's security understanding as a factor that might shape its tendency to balance against the US. Analyzing the Russian Federation's national security policy papers since 1993, the Chapter maintained that Russia's national security goals were to preserve its national integrity, recover its economic development and regain great power status in international relations. It stated that in Russia's perspective, Moscow's success in protecting its territorial integrity, economic recovery and revival as a great power depended on not only Russia's domestic performance but also on international factors that were mainly defined by how the United States exerted its predominant power in international relations and on its relations with Russia.

Having shown how certain security practices of the United States such as NATO enlargement, the Kosovo operation and undermining of the arms control regime posed threat to Russia's great power status since the end of the Cold War era, the chapter underlined how preserving its great power status vis-à-vis the United States was a vital national security interest for Russia. Chapter V also stressed that due to its vulnerability against the United States, Russia's foreign policy strategy was based on avoiding direct confrontation with the United States on international matters and preserving peaceful international relations for its internal development. In this context, it was argued that Russia's foreign policy has become one of the most

significant instruments to achieve its national development and increase its status in the system.

Giving the fundamentals of Russia's security understanding and defining its vulnerabilities in relation to the United States in the post-Cold War international order, Chapter V looked at Russia's reaction to the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the war on Iraq in 2003. Chapter V underlined that Russia's approach to the US counterterrorism strategy was in line with Russia's national security objectives and its foreign policy strategy. The Chapter stressed that as Russia had defined transnational terrorism as a threat to international security, the United States' call for international cooperation in fighting against the threat of terrorism was considered as an opportunity to develop better relations with the United States. It was maintained that Russia considered the US-Russia cooperation after the September 11 attacks was taking place based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, interest and benefit. It was underlined that the cooperation with the United States on these grounds led Russia to perceive the United States as a multilateral power and itself as a great power on the same footing within the United States. In this regard, it was argued that the initial phase of the US war on terror enhanced Russia's expectations towards a multipolar world order organized with the principles of multilateralism.

However, Chapter V of the study showed that the US war on Iraq changed Russia's evaluations of the United States and the state of international relations in which it had assumed itself an equal partner to the United States while managing international affairs. Like China, Russia also considered the UN and the UN Security Council as the most crucial international institutions where a diversity of interests were represented and great powers assumed managerial roles regarding the international affairs, Moscow envisaged the United States' bypass of the UN and the

UN Security Council before the Iraq war as a threat to the idea of multilateral international order and its status as a great power. It was also argued that Russia considered the US war on Iraq as another threat to the emerging multipolar order in which it assumed a great power status. Chapter V stated that Russia saw the war on Iraq as part of a deliberate US effort to weaken the UN, to lower the role of sovereign states as a fundamental element of international relations and to divide states with different rights and responsibilities so that the United States could preserve its dominant position in world affairs. In Chapter V, the study underscored that the United States' unilateral and preemptive war on Iraq revived Russia's criticism of the United States predominance and created a similar impact on Russia's security understanding that the Kosovo operation made. Although Russia and the United States settled their bilateral relations, from Russia's perspective, the lesson learned from the Iraq war was that multilateralism in a unipolar world would always be at the discretion of the United States and long-lasting multilateralism could be guaranteed only in a multipolar system. Therefore, the Chapter underlined that Russia's call for multipolarity increased together with its desire to be one of the poles after the US war on terror. Finally, Chapter V concluded that the United States' practices shaped Russia's security understanding and constructed a meaning structure in which not only the United States' practices but also its power eventually became a major security concern for Russia.

In Chapter VI, the dissertation looked at Realist discussions on balancing under unipolarity. In this Chapter of the dissertation contributed to literature by making a categorization of the Realist literature by way of looking at the evolution of the Realist arguments in the face of absence of balancing against the US since the end of the Cold War. The Chapter underscored that since the end of the Cold War,

the Realist literature on balancing against the United States has predicated on either the Waltzian balance of power or Waltian balance of threat theory. Chapter VI maintained that the Realist scholars' arguments regarding balancing in the unipolar structure evolved in relation to the fact that there has been no balancing against the United States. Looking at the flow of arguments in the studies under review, the Chapter divided the Realist literature's discussions on balancing and unipolarity into four stages as follows: (i) the denial of unipolarity with the predictions of multipolarity; (ii) the acceptance of unipolarity as a temporary condition and questioning its stability and durability; (iii) the 'great puzzle' and the emergence of soft balancing as a middle ground approach between balance of power and balance of threat; and (iv) the recognition of unipolarity as a distinct structural configuration.

The Chapter underlined that at stage one although prominent balance of power scholars such as Waltz and Mearsheimer predicted balancing to emerge against the United States and estimated a multipolar structure to be formed soon after the demise of the USSR, their expectations failed. Under the absence of balancing against the United States, it was stated that the second stage of discussions on balancing and unipolarity centered on the stability and durability of unipolar system. The Chapter underlined that balance of power scholars such as Waltz and Layne started to define unipolarity as an 'illusion' and as a 'temporary state of international relations' to be replaced by multipolarity under systemic constraints. On the other hand, the Chapter pointed that balance of threat scholars such as Mastanduno and Wohlforth promoted the idea that unipolarity would be a stable structure and its duration would be defined by the United States' practices. The Chapter stated that balance of threat scholars encouraged the United States to pursue multilateralism, and to reassure other great powers that it would not coerce or dictate its wishes on

others. Chapter VI of the study underlined that balance of threat scholars maintained that if the great powers did not perceive threats from the United States then they would not balance against it and unipolarity would last as a stable system.

In light of the absence in balancing against the United States after the Iraq war, Chapter VI of the dissertation pointed out the third stage in the Realist literature. The Chapter underlined the emergence of soft balancing as a middle ground approach that reconciled balance of power and balance of threat arguments in the literature. Chapter VI stated that in the face of the great puzzle about the absence of balancing strategies against the United States, led scholars to reconceptualize balancing in a way to see great powers' attempts to restrict the United States by using strategies other than engaging in military/hard balancing strategies. The Chapter highlighted that soft balancers relied on the assumption that the great powers would not be able to balance the United States militarily and even though they perceived threats from the US practices, such as its unilateralism in the Iraq war, the threat has not been existential for the great powers' security. Therefore, the soft balancers argued that they did not need to balance against US power but to restrict the United States through means of cutting diplomatic, economic, and military support and delegitimizing its practices. Chapter VI of the study stressed that like balance of threat scholars, soft balancers also suggested that the United States refrain from challenging other powers' security interests and pursue multilateralism so as not to be perceived as a revisionist state that wanted to change the international order. Chapter VI also stated that soft balancers shared the balance of threat scholars' argument that avoiding to be perceived as a revisionist power, the United States could prevent the great powers to form balancing coalitions and preserve its primacy.

The dissertation highlighted that in the fourth stage, Realist scholars started to focus on the distinctive character of unipolarity and the implications of the unipolar structure for international relations. Chapter VI stressed that Realist scholars reviewed in this section stated the need for rethinking conventional concepts and understandings such as balance of power and great powers' behaviors because they agreed that under unipolarity states, including the unipole itself, would behave differently. It was underlined that Realist scholars emphasized the general theoretical discussions on unipolarity needed to be made with reference to the current unipolarity at hand and that it was hard to discuss unipolarity without considering the identity, preferences and practices of the United States as the unipole. Chapter VI of the study underlined that these scholars agreed that the unipole was constrained by structural imperatives the least and the characteristics of unipolarity were closely linked to the identity of the unipole. Therefore, having argued that the identity of the unipole was crucial, they agreed that US identity and its practices would have a major impact on how the current unipolarity would be.

The study showed that the Realist scholars discussed in the fourth stage also maintained that great powers' tendency to balance against the United States would be shaped by how they perceived US practices. The chapter pointed out that in line with the balance of threat scholars and soft balancers, they argued that if the unipole pursued revisionist strategies contradicting security interests of other great powers, then they would perceive threats due to the increased sense of structural insecurity and they would balance against the unipole. The meaning of general theorizing in terms of the current unipolarity was that great powers would pursue balancing strategies against the United States if they perceive threat from the US practices. It was emphasized that these scholars considered soft balancing strategies as a more

viable option for great powers than hard balancing strategies and sided with the balance of threat stream of the Realist theory rather than the balance of power line.

Chapter VI drew the following general conclusions. First, it underlined that Realist arguments started to lean more towards the balance of threat theory rather than balance of power as unipolarity endured and became accepted as a distinctive configuration of power. Second, the Chapter stressed that Realist scholars discussed balancing under unipolarity with reference to the identity and practices of the unipole, not only with reference to the distribution of power. Third, the Chapter stressed that as balance of threat arguments prevailed while estimating balancing under unipolarity, threat perception became the major explanatory variable rather than being an auxiliary one. Fourth, in addition to the use of social variables like identity and threat perceptions, the Chapter also pointed that Realist scholars like Jervis and Walt also used concepts like ‘security communities’ and ‘soft power’ to explain why some states would not balance against the United States. Fifth, the Chapter emphasized that although Realist scholars suggested that the US practices would define the characteristics of unipolarity and argued that the US could turn the international structure into either a competitive or cooperative one by changing others’ perception about its legitimacy, they failed to name what they meant by the characteristics of unipolarity is the social structure of unipolarity. Therefore, the Chapter highlighted the evolution of the Realist literature in the face of the absence of balancing under unipolarity. The Chapter maintained that the Realist scholars appropriated social variables in order to explain absence of balancing against the US and underlined the significance of the identity, perception and practices while predicting second tier states’ tendency to balance against the US. Chapter VII also

concluded the Realist literature evolved in line with the balance of threat theory rather than the balance of power theory.

In Chapter VII, the dissertation contributed to the literature by providing a constructivist analysis on balancing and unipolarity and by exploring the potential for Chinese and Russian balancing against the United States within this framework. The Chapter began by highlighting two kinds of structures in Wendtian constructivism: macro and micro (interaction) level structures and discussed balancing as a multiply realizable outcome that might be produced under self-help cultures at micro and macro levels. Chapter VII showed that balancing at macro structural level was an outcome of the distribution of ideas rather than distribution of capabilities and balancing was an effect of cultures in which states produced self-regarding and competitive role structures and acted on the assumption that the others were rivals or enemies. The Chapter showed how balancing was a multiply realizable outcome under Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures according to Wendtian constructivism. Chapter VII argued that Wendt's constructivism challenged balance of power theory arguing that balancing occurs as a result of systemic insecurities produced and sustained by states' practices.

Having shown balancing as a macro-structural tendency, Chapter VII emphasized the significance of micro-structural level in production and reproduction of tendencies that generate balancing. The Chapter looked at Wendt's model in which he described the production process of self-help system based on states' interactions. It highlighted the role of predation in the construction of self-regarding identities under the 'mirroring' effect. Due to the role of predation in Wendt's model about the production process of self-help culture at micro-structural level, Chapter VII of the study situated Wendtian constructivism on the side of Walt's balance of

threat theory, threats being socially constructed. In this regard, Chapter VII stressed that perceptions of threat were constructed by states' interactions and balancing was made possible by insecurities produced at the micro-structural level. Therefore, the Chapter underlined the significance of looking at micro-structural level while discussing the likelihood of balancing rather than considering it just an implication of distribution of power.

Having provided a constructivist framework on balancing at two different structural levels, Chapter VII discussed unipolarity as a distinct configuration of power with reference to constructivism because it had a deep impact on the social relations of states. The Chapter highlighted that the concept of polarity at the macro-structural level could be defined by a "positional picture"⁹²¹ of identities rather than capabilities and characterized polarity as a social construction based on role-identities of enmity or rivalry. It was noted that although Wendt's theory recognized the distinctiveness of unipolarity as a material condition, it did not elaborate on the logic of unipolarity. Therefore, based on the theoretical framework and tools provided by Wendt, the dissertation argued that unipolarity had cultures at the macro and micro-structural levels and they would play a role in shaping China's and Russia's tendency to balance against the United States.

Later, Chapter VII of the dissertation elaborated on the logic of unipolarity at the macro-structural level and underscored that from the constructivist perspective, the identity of the unipole and the timing of unipolarity were significant in defining the social structure of unipolarity. The Chapter underlined that current unipolarity existed in a Lockean culture at the macro-level; therefore, it argued that under unipolarity, survival of states did not depend on their individual capacity to defend

⁹²¹Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 99.

themselves against the unipole, except nuclear states, but on the self-restraint of the unipole that internalized the principle of sovereignty. However, Chapter VII noted that as Lockean culture did not eliminate use of force in international relations, it was possible to observe the unipole while using force against other states by changing the terms of sovereignty. The Chapter argued that since the end of the Cold War, the United States focused on 'responsible sovereignty' and especially after the September 11 attacks and the concept of 'responsible sovereignty' played a significant role in the United States' legitimization of war against other states. Chapter VII underlined rivalry as the governing principle of international relations as it has been governing the US-China and the US-Russia relations. The study defined rivalry in terms of status-competition based on competing visions of the international order. Therefore, the Chapter concluded that China and Russia tended to perceive threats from the United States' unipole status as the system-maker and might have a tendency to balance against the United States.

In Chapter VII, the dissertation analyzed how self-regarding conceptions of status were constructed and instantiated as a result of the interactions of the United States with China and Russia and how these micro-structural dynamics produced insecurities on behalf of China and Russia by rendering balancing against the United States possible. The Chapter described how self-regarding conceptions of status were produced with reference to Wendt's model of identity construction that was based on the principle of mirroring. Chapter VII argued that considering each other as a threat to their own status and acting as if the other really challenged its status, all three powers actively engaged in constructing certain identities vis-à-vis each other. As a result of the interactions, while China and Russia concluded that the United States was a self-interested hegemon, the United States concluded Russia and China were

potential rivals and challengers. The Chapter highlighted that the United States' unilateral predations that did not take into account Russia's and China's great power status played a major role in the perception of the United States as an egoist hegemon. The Chapter stressed that especially after the US-led NATO operation on Kosovo in 1999 and the US preemptive war on Iraq in 2003, China and Russia perceived serious threats against their status as great powers.

Facing the 'reduced-status' problem, both powers perceived threats from the United States' status as the unipole and started to define their status in self-regarding terms vis-à-vis the United States. Both states started to demand multipolarity or multilateralism, both of which in practice meant "flat hierarchical order" in terms of status. Lastly, Chapter VII concluded that there were macro and micro level conditions that tend to generate balancing behaviors against the United States. The Chapter underlined that status-competition generated by definition of role-identities in self-regarding terms tend to lead China and Russia to engage in balancing against the United States. However, given that material balancing was not a viable option, it was suggested that soft balancing strategies, which were based on denying legitimacy, would be central in China's and Russia's balancing efforts against the United States.

In conclusion, based on Wendtian constructivism, the dissertation argued that balancing is not a natural and inevitable outcome of the distribution of power in the system but it is an effect of social structures both at macro and micro level. Social structures consist of "the stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions and identities"⁹²² or common knowledge held by the members of the

⁹²² Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, (Critical Perspectives on World Politics) (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 49.

system, who produce and reproduce common knowledge by their practices. During the production process of common knowledge, actors engaging in interaction try to get the others to see things in the way they see and they reward behaviors that support their definition of the situation and punish those that do not.⁹²³ As suggested by Wendt, power relations play a crucial role in determining the direction in which distribution of knowledge will unfold.⁹²⁴ In this context, Wendt defines power as the key determinant for reward and punishment system to work efficiently⁹²⁵ and shape the nature of social structure. In other words, although social structures are produced and reproduced by the practices of all states in the system, “not all others are ‘significant’ others”⁹²⁶ and the practices of states with great capabilities are prone to have more impact on the social structure of the international system. Relying on Wendt’s assumption that states “where there is an imbalance of relevant material capability social act will tend to evolve in the direction favored by the more powerful,”⁹²⁷ the dissertation concludes by arguing that under unipolarity, the United States is capable of shaping social structure of international relations more than any other state in the system and is able to create its own ‘prophecy’ by means of its own security practices that shape all states’ security understandings.

⁹²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁹²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁹²⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁹²⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

⁹²⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

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