

UNVEILING KANT'S
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

MELSEN TUNCA İŞERİ

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2011

UNVEILING KANT'S
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
OF THE CATEGORIES

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Philosophy

by
Melsen Tunca İşeri

Boğaziçi University
2011

Thesis Abstract

Melsen Tunca İşeri, “Unveiling Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories”

Kant attempts to establish a correlation between the unity of self-consciousness and the experience of an objectively valid world in the “Transcendental Deduction” of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For this purpose, he plots a sophisticated proof which contains sub-arguments and several aspects. This study focuses in the extended analysis of the central argument exposed in the first half of the “Transcendental Deduction” of the second edition. Some of the argumentation strategies adopted by Kant and the interpretations of the prominent commentators corresponding to these approaches are compared. For the ease of the analysis, the content of the argument is disassembled into main and side components. Detailed explanations are provided for each of these components. Although they receive relatively less attention of scholars, in this study the side features are considered to have significant contributions to the overall comprehension of the deduction. I suggest that concerning them in the relevant interpretations will help to get a better insight of the text. Some additional supportive accounts are also supplied for Henry Allison’s ‘reciprocity’ reading of the deduction.

Tez Özeti

Melsen Tunca İşeri, “Kant’ın Kategorilerin Transandantal Dedüksiyonu’nun İrdelenmesi”

Salt Aklın Eleştirisi’nin merkezinde yer alan “Transandantal Dedüksiyon” bölümünde Kant, kendi kendinin bilincinin birliği ile deneyimin nesnelliği arasında geçerli bir ilişki kurmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçla geliştirdiği sav, birçok bileşeni bir arada ele alması nedeniyle oldukça karmaşık bir yapıdadır ve farklı şekillerde yorumlanmaktadır. Bu tez çalışması, ikinci basımdaki dedüksiyonun ilk bölümünün irdelenmesini kapsamaktadır. Söz konusu savı oluşturan ana ve yan öğeler ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiş ve felsefe yazınında göreceli olarak daha az dikkat çeken yan öğelerin Kant’ın dedüksiyonunun doğru olarak anlaşılmasına sağladıkları katkılar değerlendirilmiştir. Ayrıca Henry Allison’ın ‘karşılıklılık’ yorumunu destekleyecek çıkarımlar ve metinsel bulgular ortaya konulmuştur.

They imagine that they will someday find a more mighty
and immortal and all sustaining Atlas, and they do not think that
anything is really bound and held together by goodness or moral obligation.

Platon, Phaedo, 99c

CONTENTS

PREFACE	vii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY	5
Kant's Terminology	5
The Influence of Previous Philosophers	11
CHAPTER III. THE ARGUMENTATION IN THE B-DEDUCTION	16
Proof Structure of the B-Deduction	16
The Content of the Argument	20
CHAPTER IV. MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE ARGUMENT	25
Transcendental Apperception	26
The Role of Synthesis	31
The Ground of Combination	34
Presupposition of the Numerical Identity of the Self	36
Representation of Objects	43
Empirical Apperception	48
Judgment is Synthesis	52
CHAPTER V. SIDE COMPONENTS OF THE ARGUMENT	57
Two Senses of Unity	58
Unconsciousness Representations	60
Both Analytic and Synthetic	61
Kant's Sense of Objectivity	64
Intuitive Understanding	67
Where is 'I'?	69
The Role of Imagination	72
CHAPTER VI. REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF OF THE B-DEDUCTION ...	74
Review of the Argument	76
Contributions of the Side Arguments	81
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY	91

PREFACE

One of the prime motives of Kant's critical project is to explain the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgments. Hence, justification of *a priori* synthetic judgments has significance in his philosophical framework. In general terms, the "Transcendental Deduction" is a study of the relationship between understanding and sensibility. The collaboration of these faculties lays the foundation of synthetic judgments and our knowledge of objects. Perhaps this is the reason why this chapter is regarded as central to the *Critique of Pure Reason* by many scholars whereas its value together with Kant's degree of success in providing a satisfactory account has been repeatedly questioned by some others.

Philosophers from different schools (analytic or continental, metaphysical or naturalist) generally have consensus at least on the task of the "Transcendental Deduction": The categories of understanding derived in the "Metaphysical Deduction" are *a priori* conditions of possible experience while their legitimate application is limited to objects of experience. Hence one of the motives in generating such a deduction is to determine the domain and the limits of the valid applications of categories. Kant starts with the notion of apperception and continues with trying to connect the fact that different representations belong to one consciousness and the categories are used in judgments.

In the preface to the first edition, Kant claims that no other investigation costs more labor than his acquainting the "Transcendental Deduction" [A xvi]. Furthermore he spent extra effort by totally rewriting the argument in the second edition in a sophisticated manner. His manner in writing demands a curious reader to correctly fill in the blanks, which Kant leaves intentionally I guess, otherwise the meaning of the section remains obscure. As H. J. Paton claims, there are complexities in following his reasoning:

Crossing the Great Arabian Desert can scarcely be a more exhausting task than is the attempt to master the windings and twisting of the Transcendental Deduction. Nevertheless, as we look back upon the way which we have traversed under Kant's guidance, we may perhaps conclude that some of the difficulty is of the sort to be found in reading the description of a game which we have never played.¹

The core argument of the "Transcendental Deduction" is highly condensed. The difficulty in comprehending the content of this chapter perhaps arises from Kant's close style in this section. He sets the plot of the argument by melting complex notions in each other and proceeds by dealing all of them together. Thus, to disintegrate the meshed lines of reasoning and isolate one argument at a time requires effort.

I believe, with this dense text, Kant tries his best to convey the philosophical background of the account. But what is the best way for narrating such a deeply abstract topic which is in the frontline of colliding philosophical troops? He seems to choose each word with great attention and puts nothing more than necessary. In contrast to Kant's general diffuse and verbose writing style, the language and the plot of the B-Deduction is compact, short and dry. In most of his works, he generally discusses the subject matter back and forth in details. However, his writing attitude in the B-Deduction appears to be in the opposite way. I find him declaring accounts which beforehand has been evaluated and decided, rather than discussing them extensively in front of the readers. He omits several of the intermediate steps and does not involve in explaining some crucial points. Accordingly, I find the B-Deduction to resemble, not a desert, but to an iceberg which has a smaller portion floating on water. In my view, a philosopher's job is to explore the unseen part of it.

¹ H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, 1936, reprinted (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 547.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The philosophical promise and agenda of *Critique of Pure Reason* is not to inquire about the original characteristics of reality as it is in itself. Instead Kant prefers to elaborate a method by which he can explain the contributions of the mind to experience. He improved this method by working on justifications completely independent of any sensory experience. On the other hand the application of these justifications is accepted as correct only when concepts operate on a given manifold of intuition, either its empirical or pure. He employs this method as the main tool of his transcendental philosophy. While Kant develops the phases of his monumental project, he also sustains in forming a specific model of the mind. Since his thoughts of the mind are generally side features of his accounts on other topics, it needs extra effort to depict as whole the pieces of his philosophy of mind within his other philosophical theories and it is almost impossible to isolate it from many different concerns of him.

The whole spirit of the “Transcendental Deduction” is in coherence with Kant’s overall transcendental philosophy. Regarding his complete philosophical system, Kant’s intention in supplying such a transcendental argument is to show that an objectively valid experience requires the legitimate applicability of *a priori* concepts whose source is the understanding of the subject. In the second edition of the Deduction², he strives to connect apperception with the representations of objects and through this with judgment and finally to categories.

² To avoid confusion, ‘Deduction’ is capitalized throughout this thesis when referring to the chapter and lowercase will be used in referring to the deduction as a noun.

He designed a complex argument which consists of several aspects flowing all together in an entangled manner. Kant tries to find a way to establish that the objective empirical experience requires the employment of the *a priori* concepts of the faculty of understanding. But while progressing towards his goal, he dwells in something which seems to be irrelevant at first sight: He focuses spotlights on the notion of self-consciousness. Although his concern is the legitimacy of the natural sciences, he begins the “Transcendental Deduction” with a very different sort of picture and he first deals with the nature of self-consciousness.

The aim of this thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of the core argument exposed in the “Transcendental Deduction” of the B edition. The works of prominent Kant commentators available in the literature are surveyed, i.e., Peter Strawson, H. J. Paton, Jonathan Bennet, Dieter Henrich, Paul Guyer, Karl Ameriks, Eckart Förster, Wolfgang Carl, Beatrice Longuenesse, Henry Allison, Patricia Kitcher, Andrew Brook, Michel Meyer and Derk Pereboom. Some of their interpretations are consistent while others are conflicting with each other. At the final cut in order to draw a well defined frame, not all the critiques of mentioned philosophers are included in this study. I choose to quote and reflect only the portions of the works which have influenced me most. My understanding of the B-Deduction³ is guided, shaped and blended with the accounts of Henry Allison, Patricia Kitcher, Peter Strawson and Derk Pereboom, although their readings definitely cannot be accepted to be in total consistency. Hence, with the content of this study I try to supply a commentary to the main and side components of the argument of the “Transcendental Deduction” which covers the selected ideas of these Kantian Scholars, as well as my own views. Among them, my

³‘B-Deduction’ is used when referring to the “Transcendental Deduction” chapter of the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*.

reading of B-Deduction best matches with Henry Allison's. Accordingly, I extensively include the ideas from his influential book *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* and his article "Reflections on the B-Deduction."

It is a convention to divide the text of B-Deduction into two main parts for the ease of the analysis: The first half extends over §§ 15-20 and the second §§ 21-26. Both in the middle and at the end of the chapter Kant seems to reach conclusions which do not seem to differ from each other. In §20 he concludes that "the manifold in a given intuition necessarily stands under categories" [B 143] and in §26 "the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience". [B 143] This can be taken as an attempt to offer two distinct proofs for the same result or two parts which are meant to serve as two stages in a single proof.

Kant scholars do not have consensus on this specific topic, but they seem to be in agreement that there are apparently two primary divisions in the B-Deduction. It seems that Kant planned the first part to concern with the relation between the categories and the manifold of sensible intuition in general. With a nuance in the point of view, he restates the argument and in the second part his main concern is the relation of the categories to the manifold of human sensible intuition. Since human intuition or sensibility is a species of intuition or sensibility, I agree with the suggestion that the first half contains a broader claim than the second half and deals with discursive cognition through understanding in general.

The scope of this study is limited exclusively to the first part of the deduction of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. §§15-20 [B 129-143] will be explained, analyzed and criticized in details. Certain passages from other chapters, i.e., metaphysical deduction [B 92–116], analogies, paralogisms, amphiboly of concepts , etc. are referred when textual support is needed. For holding a more focused discussion,

this study does not involve in the text of §§21-27 of the B-Deduction and do not argue the less streamlined argument in the first edition as well.

Some commentators consider Kant not to have provided a sufficient rationale in B-Deduction to acquire the identity of the subject from the unity of consciousness while others find him standing in this position with certainty. In this study, I argue Kant's strategies concerning the problem of the identical self and compare the approaches of different interpreters. In addition, I separate the content of the first half as main and side components of the core argument and discuss the contributions of the side elements to the explanation of the main theme.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY

Kant's Terminology

I would like to summarize some definitions, distinctions and restrictions belonging to Kant's terminology of his philosophical system which I find as to be the key features lying in the background of the "Transcendental Deduction."

Sensibility and Understanding

In contrast to previously dominant views of various traditions i.e., empiricist and rationalist, Kant's whole philosophical structure depends on the presupposition of a sharp distinction between the passive and active faculties of the mind.

Kant believes that cognition arises from two fundamental sources and these are the passive mode of receptivity and active mode of spontaneity. Sensibility and understanding are the faculties of mind corresponding to receptivity and spontaneity respectively. These faculties are irreducible to one another and neither of them is to be preferred to the other.

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. (...) Further, these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic. [B 75-76]⁴

⁴ All references to *Critique of Pure Reason* are in standard A/B pagination and from I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer. Press, 1998).

Without sensibility no object would be given to us and without understanding none would be thought. According to Kant they constitute the elements of cognition. Hence neither concepts without a corresponding intuition, nor any given intuition without concepts can yield any cognition.

Intuitions and concepts are either pure or empirical. They are pure if no sensation is mixed into the representation and they are empirical if sensation is contained. Pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general. Pure intuitions or concepts are possible *a priori*, while empirical ones *a posteriori*. Space and time are pure forms of intuition while our concepts of understanding are mere forms of thought.

According to Kant human intuition can never be other than sensible and contain only the way in which we are affected by objects. On the other hand, he defines understanding as the faculty of cognition through concepts. [B 94] He also describes understanding as the faculty for judging. [B 95] Sensibility and understanding allow the possibility of experience of objects only when they operate together. In other words sensibility and understanding can determine the cognition of an object only in combination. If we have intuitions without concepts or concepts without intuitions, we cannot relate given representations to any determinate object. [B 313-314]

Sensibility is the faculty of intuitions (*Anschauungen*) and contains the sensory states that empiricists believe to be the sole ground of knowledge while the faculty of understanding involves in the concepts of a discursive intellectual. Kant criticizes the followers of Empiricist School for ignoring this second active capacity of human mind and considering all concepts of understanding as faint derivations from the impressions of sensibility. On the other hand, the philosophers of rationalist tradition misguided by a

similar mistake, but in the opposite direction when they believe that having sensations are only confused aspirations towards conceptual thought.

Pure concepts of the understanding do not borrow from experience but they are solely for the employment in possible experience, as Kant stresses in the passage below,

Thinking is the action of relating given intuitions to an object. If the manner of this intuition is not given in any way, then the object is merely transcendental, and the concept of the understanding has none other than a transcendental use, namely the unity of thought of a manifold in general. Now through a pure category, in which abstraction is made from any condition of sensible intuition as the only one that is possible for us, no object is determined, rather only the thought of an object in general is expressed (...) [B 304]

As Kant states, all concepts, however a priori they may be, should be related to intuitions of possible experience. The understanding should not accomplish *a priori* anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience. Which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience and understanding should never overstep the limits of perception, within which alone objects are given to us.

Preliminary Assumptions of the Transcendental Deduction

In accordance with his philosophical frame before he starts a deduction of categories, Kant's fundamental preliminary assumptions can be summarized as follows:

- i. There are two radically distinct faculties of the mind for any cognition, understanding and sensibility.
- ii. There are pure concepts of the understanding and they reflect the cognitive structure of the mind.
- iii. A concept of understanding can be legitimated only if it can be related to what is intuitively given.

- iv. Understanding imposes its own order on the given intuition and their employment in collaboration is necessary for the empirical cognition whereas the given sensible intuition cannot give any kind of order to itself.
- v. (From iv) Human understanding is unavoidably discursive.

Correct Application of Categories

The categories as a priori concepts of the understanding are not grounded on sensibility. They contain merely the logical capacity for unifying the manifold of intuitions in a consciousness. The pure categories are without formal conditions of sensibility and they can also be employed transcendently. However, they should not be employed for any transcendent usage.

Empirical intuition without thinking through categories cannot achieve cognition of any object because through mere intuition nothing at all is thought. Sensibility does not correlate a representation to any object alone in contrast to understanding which can still think without a given intuition. As Kant states in the quotation below, even though all intuition is isolated, the form of thinking remains and this form is the mode of determining a possible object for the manifold of intuitions.

Hence to this extent the categories extend further than sensible intuition, since they think objects in general without seeing to the particular manner (of sensibility) in which they might be given. But they do not thereby determine a greater sphere of objects, since one cannot assume that such objects can be given without presupposing that another kind of intuition than the sensible kind is possible, which, however, we are by no means justified in doing. [B 309-311]

As Kant notifies here, if nothing is given in the manifold of intuitions, no object or not even the pure forms of intuition as space and time, then any act of combination done by understanding remains empty and it is not a justified application. [B 305-308]

Thing in Itself and Noumenon

In the last part of the analytic section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, before passing to the dialectic division, Kant contrasts *noumenon* with certain objects of appearances as *phaenomenon*. He describes *noumenon* both with its positive and negative senses. An understanding of *noumenon* in positive sense involves an object of a non-sensible intuition. According to Kant, this will be a special kind of intuition which he names as the intellectual intuition. In the negative conception of *noumenon*, Kant understands a thing which is not an object of our sensible intuition, but an abstraction from the manner of our intuition of it. He prefers this second sense of *noumenon* because in his account there is no way that we can achieve any act of understanding of the *noumenon* in the positive sense.

The understanding accordingly bounds sensibility without thereby expanding its own field, and in warning sensibility not to presume to reach for things in themselves but solely for appearances it thinks of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance (thus not itself appearance), and that cannot be thought of either as magnitude or as reality or as substance, etc. (since these concepts always require sensible forms in which they determine an object); it therefore remains completely unknown whether such an object is to be encountered within or without us, whether it would be cancelled out along with sensibility or whether it would remain even if we took sensibility away. If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition and leave open a space that we can fill up neither through possible experience nor through the pure understanding. [B 344-345]

Although it is not quite clear in other places of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, whether the thing in itself is also a *noumenon* or not for Kant, he links these two terms in the passage above which is from the “Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection” *Noumenon* must be taken as referring to a thing that is not to be thought as an object of the senses but rather as a ‘thing in itself’ solely through pure understanding.

The concepts of understanding are the mere forms of thought for our intuition. Therefore the concept of a *noumenon* only draws a boundary for limiting the region of sensibility. For Kant this concept is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition. Kant calls the things to which sensibility does not reach as *noumena* for indicating cognitions cannot extend their domain to everything that the understanding thinks.

In the end, however, we have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty for us, i.e., we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside of the field of sensibility could be given, and about which the understanding could be employed assertorically. [B 310-311]

If the mind slips into illusions (*Schein*) of having an object corresponding to its thought although none is received by sensibility, then this means the understanding is transcending the limits of experience. The purpose of the “Transcendental Dialectic” part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to portray which paralogisms and antinomies are the consequences of independent employments of understanding. If the understanding is to be capable of being employed independently, still thoughts must be correlated to objects. Even though those objects are devoid of any empirical reality and consequently they should be accepted as mere *noumena*.

The Influence of Previous Philosophers

In the “Transcendental Deduction” the influence of some prominent thinkers can be observed clearly. We can easily identify the influence of prior philosophers even though Kant does not spell out their names throughout the section, i.e., Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Locke and Hume. The famous ‘argument from above’ of §16 reveals plainly with whom Kant is struggling with. In a small textual content condensed into less than three paragraphs, Kant strives to comprise the superior elements of the previous accounts on self-consciousness of Descartes, Leibniz and Hume while excluding their weaknesses. According to me, he also demands from the reader to witness his achievement in reaching beyond the visions of these three thinkers on this particular concern.

Descartes is referred to apparently with the prominent role given to ‘I think’ in the section. Kant refers back to Leibniz by adopting his term ‘apperception’ although he uses this word with different connotations. Finally it is easily realized that he is replying to Hume’s notorious bundle of impressions in the sentences about the “multicolored and diverse self as the numerous representations”. [B 134]

Kant’s stance in the Deduction regarding knowledge of ourselves and objects is in harmony with his general view of knowledge. He follows the third way of steering between the restrictions of empiricism and the excesses of rationalism.

Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitized the concepts of understanding (...) interpreted them as nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection. Instead of seeking two entirely different sources of representation in the understanding and the sensibility, which could judge about things with objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men holds on only to one of them, which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves, while the other does nothing but confuse or order the representations of the first. [B 327]

Kant praises his transcendental system because of saving him from tending towards fatal fallacies. Leibniz lacks such a transcendental theme and misunderstands the cognition as being the inner constitution of things by comparing all objects only with the understanding and the abstract formal concepts of its thinking. He makes all his comparisons through concepts and finds no other differences than those through which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from each other. He did not regard as original the conditions of sensible intuition, which bring about their own distinctions. Sensibility was only a confused kind of representation for Leibniz and not a special source of representations.

Kant thinks that rational psychologists fail to notice how their cognitive theories exceed the limits of our mind's real capacity. His rejection of the mind as a substance in the paralogisms is an essential element of his efforts against metaphysical speculations about the mind or soul. In the "Refutation of Idealism" he deals with various types of idealisms.

Idealism (I mean material idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or else false and impossible; the former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable; the latter is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if one regards space as a property that is to pertain to the things in themselves; for then it, along with everything for which it serves as a condition, is a non-entity. The ground for this idealism, however, has been undercut by us in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Problematic idealism which does not assert anything about this, but rather professes only our incapacity for proving an existence outside us from our own by means of immediate experience, is rational and appropriate for a thorough philosophical manner of thought, allowing, namely, no decisive judgment until a sufficient proof has been found. The proof that is demanded must therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagination of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience. [B 274- 275]

Cartesian skeptics who cannot found experience of objects to our empirical experience are subject to other lines of attack from Kant. Kant refers to Descartes' idealism as problematic in the above passage from the "Refutation of Idealism" where he compares his transcendental idealism with other types of idealism. In the "Transcendental Deduction" he starts to combat with the problematic idealism by correlating the unity of self-consciousness and representations of objects.

Kant refuses considering the mind as a Leibnizean monad, however he neither admits the Humean account that the self represents a fiction, nor the Lockean account that knowledge of our existence derives from inner sense. Empiricist skepticism which admits that we can have contingent knowledge about the world but denies our categorical knowledge of necessary truths about the world is also Kant's target of attack in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Leibniz on Apperception

Kant adopts Leibniz's term 'apperception' and places it in the heart of his "Transcendental Deduction."

In contemporary usage in cognitive science the term 'apperception' usually connotes introspection, conscious thought or the consciousness of internal states; in contrast to perception which is stimulated by the external world. It is used to refer to the reflection on one's own self or consciousness of the self who is the subject of these states. In apperception the self is aware of itself as being a unity and as possessing the power to act. This term is first named by Leibniz and afterward it is used in the literature of philosophy of mind as well as psychology, cognitive science and other related disciplines.

Leibniz makes a distinction between perception and apperception. In his account, perception is the internal state of the monad representing external things while apperception is consciousness or the reflexive knowledge of this internal state itself and which is not given to all souls nor at all times to the same soul.⁵

Leibniz uses this term within the metaphysical structure of his philosophy and contemplates that all monads have perception. However, only a special kind of monad, 'rational soul' has also apperception. Leibniz thinks that causal interaction with other substances is required for a simple substance to alter and the succession of mental states should not be understood as the unfolding of a monad's 'principle of life'. To some extent I find Kant standing in a similar view with Leibniz at this point about the interaction and alterations without including such entities as monads in his philosophy.

Hume's Stream of Consciousness

In the "Transcendental Deduction", we may observe Kant struggling with associationist theories of the empiricist philosophers i.e., Locke and Hume. Especially Hume's model of self as a heap or bundle of diverse impressions appears to be so dominant on Kant's accounts on self-consciousness. Kant agrees with Hume in many points but at the same time opposes to him on very crucial aspects. He designs B-Deduction in order to contain the required explanation about the reliability of apperception against associationism.

Hume does not find a theory of experience demands *a priori* concepts, instead he believes that the source of any cognition is perception. He sorts a hierarchy for sensations grounded by perception: impressions and ideas. Impressions are directly received through

⁵ G.W. Leibniz, *Principles of Nature and of Grace*, 1714, Section 4.

perception and they are relatively stronger when compared to the ideas which are faint derivations of impressions. Ideas take part in thoughts and can operate in collaboration with memory as well as mere imagination. Dispositions for thinking arise from frequent association in our experience, consequently ideas are ordered by associations. The mental order of the subject who is receiving these impressions passively is not imposed on the perceptions. Besides, the subject is nothing but a collection of succeeding perceptions of a perpetual flux and the identity we ascribe to the subject is fictitious.

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.⁶

Humean theory lacks the sufficient explanation for the identity of the subject who is exposed to these dispersed impressions which are wholly distinct from one another and sharing no common element. Hume thinks that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct perceptions and through introspection he cannot find any inner unchanging core to himself but rather, always observes himself in the middle of a stream of consciousness.

Kant has the same opinion with Hume that the senses furnish no evidence for a self or for the relation of representations to a self but he finds other grounds for holding that different representations must belong to a continuing self. In fact, Kant approaches this seemingly indestructible opinion with a surprising tactic and plans to enter the castle of the skeptic through the back door. He claims that empirical cognition is possible only if the principle of transcendental unity of apperception is presupposed. I shall explain this presupposition interpretation in details in the next chapters.

⁶ D. Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, 1739, Book 1, Part 4, Section 6.

CHAPTER III

THE ARGUMENTATION IN THE B-DEDUCTION

Proof Structure of the B-Deduction

To deduce means to carry something forth to something else, in Latin. Deduction is originally a term used in logic. It refers to the logical procedure through which the conclusion is derived from its premises and their formal correlation. This procedure only applies to propositions, i.e., the premises and the conclusion are all propositions.

Therefore a deduction can be taken as a syllogistic proof.

Deduction is also legal term referring to an argument intended to provide a justification for the legitimacy of a property claim or when there is a legal dispute because of conflicting claims of opposing parties. In these situations, if the court case is opened, the challenged must supply a deduction. This happens in philosophy when an account is challenged by an opponent.

In the frame of Kant's transcendental philosophy, a deduction is an argument intended to provide a justification for the legitimacy of a concept which demonstrates the employment of that concept is proper.

It is indeed plausible that Kant finds himself in the need of a transcendental deduction of the categories in order to turn down skeptic challenges⁷, i.e. the doubt for reasons to be in possession of *a priori* knowledge of objects. This is the aim of the "Transcendental Analytic". Nevertheless there is another peculiarity that the "Transcendental Dialectic" concerns: Impossible deductions. If the claim of the

⁷ D. Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique," in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* (California: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 38

knowledge transcends the limits of experience, then it cannot be justified. In this case the challenged party cannot present a deduction and must withdraw its declaration.

The “Transcendental Deduction”, is in “Analytic” division and Kant does not seem to believe this deduction is impossible, although it is a quite hard mission. His attitude towards the deduction he is dealing with is generally in the juristic sense but he also makes effort to deliver an argument which bears a syllogistic proof structure.

Therefore this argument can be said to be an attempt to provide both explanation and validation simultaneously. Henrich comments on this point in the below passage.

In state of doubt about the rightfulness of our claim to be in the possession of genuine knowledge, it seeks to discover and to examine the real origin of our claim and with that the source of its legitimacy. But doesn't this confuse and blur the distinction between explanation and validation, between the question of right and the question of fact, to which Kant assigns such importance throughout the opening paragraphs of his first deduction? In response to this question we can observe that the distinction between the two questions (of right and of fact) cannot be drawn in such a way that only the question of fact remains concerned with the origins of our knowledge. Both questions require an understanding of the origin, but each in its particular way.⁸

In the B-Deduction Kant follows an outline of a streamlined derivation. He starts with notifying that the self-consciousness of the subject can be the common ground of all the representations of a given manifold and consequently allows for the representation of objects. Then he states that the representations brought under the unity of self-consciousness by the act of synthesis done by the faculty of understanding, by making use of his previous inferences in “Metaphysical Deduction”. All thought is rule-governed in accordance with the categories. Thus the representations of objects must be in accordance with the categories and yields to a conclusion that categories are necessary aspects of any

⁸ Ibid., p. 35.

possible experience. This argumentation has been underestimated or misunderstood by many Kant scholars in the past, but recent studies have started to reveal its obscurity.

The proof structure of the B-Deduction is an example of Kant's employment of argumentation strategies. According to Karl Ameriks, Kant begins this deduction with a controversial assumption about the possibility of experience or empirical knowledge. Ameriks evaluates the argument structure of the "Transcendental Deduction" as being 'regressive, but progressive'.⁹ In his account Kant moves from this relatively strong premise to a stronger conclusion that the synthetic *a priori* principles dictated by the pure concepts of the understanding are necessary conditions of such experience.

By contrast, in our day it (Transcendental Deduction) has been thought to contain the germ of a powerful transcendental argument that, starting from some supposedly non-controversial premise about self-consciousness or the self-ascription of experience, arrives at substantive, anti-skeptical conclusions regarding the objectivity of experience, without any of the excess baggage of transcendental idealism or transcendental psychology.¹⁰

Differing from Ameriks, Allison believes Kant to start up with a modest premise and moves on to exhibit an account about the way of human mind works. Then, Kant attempts to demonstrate this particular mental processing is a necessary condition for the truth of the initial premise. Here, his strategy involves employing two premises; the first one concerns self-consciousness, the second one representations of objective features of empirical experience. Next Kant moves on showing the categories' crucial role in our mental processing. Kant does not concentrate on the applicability of individual categories. He leaves that specific mission to the "Analytic of Principles" chapter of the

⁹ K. Ameriks, "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," *Kant Studien* 69 (1978), pp. 273-287.

¹⁰ H. E. Allison, "Reflections on the B-Deduction," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* XXV (1986), pp. 1-15.

Critique of Pure Reason. He prefers to present general considerations supporting the applicability of categories to objects of experience. I find Allison's view more plausible on this specific issue, besides I think that we should be aware of Kant's position on the representations of objects can be said to yield a paradox which I shall discuss in the later chapters.

The A and B Versions of the Deduction

In the A edition version of the "Transcendental Deduction", the 'threefold synthesis' has a fundamental role which exhibits the requirement of three types of synthesis for objective cognition:

- i. The synthesis of apprehension in intuition
- ii. The synthesis of reproduction in a representation of imagination
- iii. The synthesis of recognition in a concept

The disappearance of the threefold synthesis in the B-Deduction can be accepted as an indication of a change in Kant's thinking concerning synthesis. The accounts on synthesis have different implications in two editions. In my view, the later version relies on the analytic-synthetic convertibility which is one of the presumptions of B-Deduction.

Another feature of the first edition is Kant's expressions of the transcendental object = x, which can only be thought as a mere thing in itself and is incapable of being expressed in words. It can be just thought without any other determination and it is no more than an object by anticipation. Kant ceases to use such a language of transcendental objects in the later version of the Deduction.

A major difference between the A and B versions is the treatment of imagination's role in the deductive scenario. The significance of imagination can be observed in the A

version whereas it is started to be explicated not in the first but in the second half of the B-Deduction. The function of imagination is similar in both editions but the emphasis is much less in the B version. The capacity of synthesis was shared between three faculties in the earlier version of the Deduction, whereas Kant prefers to give the faculty of understanding the exclusive license of three kinds of synthesis in the B-Deduction. Hence, it can be said that the degree of the importance of the imagination's role is declined and understanding's role is increased in the second edition.

Two deductions also vary because of the suppression of the subjective deduction in the later version. In the A version, besides the objective one about the conditions of experience, the subjective deduction is extensively discussed where Kant considers the experience as the unity of sensory intuition and analytically regresses from this experience to the elements contained in this unity.¹¹ Synthesis is required to bring about subjects and predicates together with the help of copula. This third synthesis occurs at the level of imagination. Imagination unites subject and predicate in the structure of a judgment and subsumes the unity of the perceived manifold under a concept which will be joined to the predicate into a judgment.

The Content of the Argument

§ 20 is a section where Kant summarizes and brings to a close the first half including §§15-20 of the "Transcendental Deduction". He juxtaposes the propositions he has discussed in the previous sections of the B-Deduction and he treats these as to be premises of a syllogistic argument. Next he adds a new proposition previously derived

¹¹ M. Meyer, "Why did Kant write two versions of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories?" *Synthese* 47 (1983), no 3, pp. 357-383.

in § 13. And he finalizes the first part of the B-Deduction by affirming that the manifold of given intuition necessarily stands under categories. The whole text of § 20 is quoted below:

The manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily belongs under the original synthetic unity of apperception, since through this alone is the unity of the intuition possible (§ 17). That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19). Therefore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them (§ 13). Thus the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under categories. [B 143]

The syllogistic plot of the argument can be stated as follows:

Premise 1 (inference from § 17): The unity of the intuition is possible only if the given manifold of sensible intuition necessarily belongs to the original synthetic unity of apperception.

Premise 2 (inference from § 19): The manifold of representations, as far as they are given in one empirical intuition, is brought under the unity of apperception by the activity of the understanding which is the logical function of judgments.

Premise 2.a The manifold of a given empirical intuition is brought to a consciousness by means of the logical functions for judgment. (inference from § 19)


Premise 2.b The manifold of a given empirical intuition is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment. (inference from § 19)

Premise 3 (inference from § 13): The categories are the logical functions for judging.

Conclusion (inference from Premise 1, 2b, 3): The manifold in a given intuition necessarily stands under categories.

Nothing is new in this section, but Kant recaps what he argues in the previous sections with little modifications. The heading of § 20 also signifies the resultant statement: “All sensible intuition stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness”. [B 143] Kant believes the conclusion to follow from the premises without a problem in this argument. According to me, the proof seems to be plausible in logical terms. So I assume in this chapter that the conclusion is following from the premises. But the content of the premises and their relations with each other need further investigation. In the subsequent chapters of this study the components of the argument will be analyzed.

Outline of the Argument of the First Half of the B-Deduction



There are three fundamental steps in this argument and Kant also refers back to §13 in order to use explanations about the relation of categories and logical functions. At the

beginning he introduces important notions and tries to give accurate descriptions in order to employ these contents in the argument.

After informing the reader about the importance of apperception and its unity, Kant moves forward with the first step by correlating this unity with the objects. The manifold of representations given in a sensible intuition must be synthesized under single self-consciousness in order to form a whole. Yet an object cannot ground a representation of combination by itself alone. Because its representation to the subject is nothing but just a second order representation formed by the combination of representations given in a manifold of intuitions in the concept of that object. This representation of an object requires the unity of consciousness, because it is synthesized under the unity of consciousness.

In the second step of the argument, Kant exhibits that it is an activity of understanding to bring the manifold of given intuitions under a single self-consciousness. Understanding achieves this activity by operating through the logical forms of judgment. As long as logical functions of judgments are able to apply the manifold of given intuitions which have been brought under one self-consciousness, an object as an individuated whole can be cognized.

In the third step, Kant recalls from the outset of the B-Deduction (§13) that the logical functions of judgment are the categories under the condition of applying to a combined manifold of representations to form a perceptible whole.

Kant derives the intended conclusion as the last step. The manifold of given representations stand under the categories in order to be cognized as a perceptible whole by the subject who simultaneously (or already) combined this manifold of given representations under one self-consciousness. Hence it is impossible to have cognition of objects without the employment of one or more forms of categories. They are the

logical functions of judgments when they operate on representations. They are necessary elements of cognition.

Towards the end of the B-Deduction (§26), Kant will refer to categories as concepts imposing *a priori* laws to appearances and therefore to nature (§26) which is sum of all appearances. Therefore it will be clarified that the categories and the logical functions of judgments are not equivalent in all circumstances. They can be accepted to be on a par only when the categories apply to a given manifold of sensible intuition. Thus it can be derived that it is possible to have judgments in which logical functions do not employed in the uniting of a given manifold of sensible intuition. Kant discusses such an employment in details in the dialectic division of the *Critique of Pure Reason* where he mentions the illegitimate constitutive usage on the ideas of pure reason, i.e., soul, world and God, which he considers to yield into illusions. The below quotation is about this misuseage.

Reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the understanding and by means of it to reason's own empirical use, hence it does not create any concepts (of objects) but only orders them and gives them that unity which they can have in their greatest possible extension, i.e. (that means) in relation to the totality of series; the understanding does not look to this totality at all, but only to the connection through which series of conditions always come about according to concepts. Thus reason really has as object only the understanding and its purposive application and just as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts, so reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the understanding's actions, which are otherwise concerned only with distributive unity. [B 672]

A judgment such as 'my soul is immortal,' which Kant believes to be true on the basis of practical, not theoretical reason. This and the similar ones are not judgments that the logical functions are applied to sensible intuitions in the creation of objects. Thus, they are not judgments whose truth can be known. They can only be thought.

CHAPTER IV

MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE ARGUMENT

In this chapter, I will successively discuss the main components of the core argument of the first half of B-Deduction. I will follow the order of their appearance in the argument. I call them as ‘main components’ because they literally take place in the deductive argument which is already exposed with its three premises and conclusion in the previous chapter of this thesis. In my view the main components of the core argument of the B-Deduction are:

- i. Transcendental apperception
- ii. Synthesizing as a compiler
- iii. The ground of combination
- iv. Presupposition of the numerical identity of the subject
- v. Representations of objects
- vi. Empirical apperception
- vii. Judgment is synthesis

Most of the Kant commentators merge these topics and explain them under a few headings. I will focus on one of these features at a time and try to analyze that philosophical issue in isolation. I supply the accounts of the commentators generally when I believe that I agree with that commentator on that specific subject matter. I also discuss my own ideas corresponding to each individual component. After the disintegrative analysis that will be held in this chapter, in the chapter VI of this thesis, I try to give my own reflections and take steps towards a reconstruction of the argument to some extent.

Transcendental Apperception

Kant adopts Leibniz's term apperception and gives it a central role in the "Transcendental Deduction" of both editions. In Kant's modification apperception does not merely purport as being conscious of one's own internal states. He distinguishes between empirical apperception and the transcendental apperception. In his account, empirical apperception which amounts to introspection is entirely contingent and has subjective validity, while the transcendental unity of apperception enables objective cognition by combining *a priori* concepts and intuitions.

Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception. [A 107]

According to Kant, apperception is an act of spontaneity or can be regarded as created by the acts of spontaneity and certainly does not originate from sensibility. Understanding as the active faculty of human mind is relating representations to the subject who has those representations and it is the ground of connections among elements in cognition. Kant thinks transcendental apperception results from the activity of the faculty of understanding. The unity of consciousness is founded by the connectedness of our representations and this connection is generated by the activity of the mind.

Starting with § 16, Kant presents the transcendental apperception, its unity and the way this unity allows the possibility of objectively valid experience. From the information that he gives in § 16 about the apperception, the characteristics of it can be derived out. In his account this term is designating the self-consciousness in a certain

sense and grounds the relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which the manifold is to be encountered.

But this representation is an act of spontaneity i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it the pure apperception in order to distinguish it from the empirical one, or also the original apperception, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of *a priori* cognition from it." [B 132]

It is also the apprehension of a representation as one's own. Apperception is original because:

- i. It is a capacity of the act of synthesizing which enables the representation 'I think'.
- ii. It accompanies all other representations and cannot be accompanied by any further representation
- iii. Unity of apperception is transcendental and hence there is a possibility of *a priori* cognition from this transcendental unity.
- iv. The unity of empirical apperception is dependent upon pure apperception.

Whether apperception is a possibility or a necessity is the question under discussion. Kant seems assured when he declares apperception is one and the same in all consciousness.

An interpretation of this sentence may suggest that once apperception is achieved, it is one and the same throughout all consciousness. But its employment may not be a necessary fact. In regard to all these features, I describe apperception as a capacity of the synthesizing acts that enables a possibility of being consciousness of the representation 'I think' which is related to a single self-consciousness in a given manifold of intuitions.

There are two important conditions for the manifold of intuitions to have a possibility to be cognized. They are given to us only if the manifold of sensibility stands under the formal conditions of space and time and they are thought only if the manifold of intuition stands under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. All the manifold representations of intuition stand under the first principle insofar as they are given to us, and under the second insofar as they must be capable of being combined in one consciousness; for without that nothing could be thought or cognized through them, since the given representations would not have in common the act of apperception, I think, and thereby would not be grasped together in a self consciousness. [B 136 -137]

In the “Transcendental Aesthetic”, Kant has already argued that all intuition in relation to sensibility that is possible for the manifold of sensibility must stand under the formal conditions of space and time. This is the first principle for the manifold of representations given to us. Additionally they must be capable of being combined in one consciousness, otherwise nothing could be thought or cognized through them. The given representations must be grasped together in a single self consciousness.

And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is the understanding itself. [B134n]

Kant grants this principle of synthetic unity with a supreme rank. This principle involves that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to the condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations. The condition under which a manifold of representations can be united in a single consciousness is my

ascribing different representations as belonging to myself. If my representations are to function in cognition, they should be able to conform the condition that they must be ‘something to me’. In his well-known book *Bounds of Sense* Peter Strawson states that the satisfaction of this condition seems to be dependent on the synthesizing activities of the mind.

But since these synthesizing activities do not yield any kind of self-knowledge or self-awareness other than that which ordinary empirical self-consciousness supplies, it seems that we may have to look for the explanation of the possibility of self-ascription of experiences in the nature of the outcome of the synthesizing activities rather than in any special awareness of those activities themselves or of the powers exercised in performing them. Perhaps that very connectedness of experiences, under concepts of the objective, which synthesis is held to produce, is itself the (...) the fundamental condition - under which alone self-ascription of experiences is possible.¹²

Patricia Kitcher, who advocates the transcendental psychology theory, is not in total agreement with Strawson on this specific issue. She believes that Kant is referring to a faculty with apperception, but a faculty of a special sort. Other faculties would be different manifestations of that single faculty and this explains why the various non-fundamental cognitive faculties work so well together. She observes that with ‘unity of transcendental apperception’ Kant indicates four different sorts of things:¹³

- i. A unity or coordination of the various cognitive faculties that is necessary for cognition.
- ii. The principle that diverse mental states must be able to be represented as combined in one single I that thinks, which is necessary for cognition.

¹² P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 1966, (Reprinted by Routledge, 2006) pp. 95-96.

¹³ P. Kitcher, “Kant’s Philosophy of the Cognitive Mind” in *Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. by P. Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 193.

- iii. The connections among mental states produced by the synthesizing activities of the faculties that are necessary for cognition of objects and ourselves.
- iv. The creative powers that must be involved in cognition whether or not those powers reside in basic substances.

According to Kitcher, Kant repeatedly uses apperception as interchangeable with self-consciousness, e.g. [B 139], but this usage is misleading.

If we understand ‘self-consciousness’ in one of its normal senses – as a ‘consciousness’ or ‘awareness’ of a ‘self’ – then it cannot be equated with Kantian ‘apperception.’ As we have seen, Kant came to distinguish ‘apperception’ from the faculty by which we are aware of inner happenings, ‘inner sense.’ Further, he explicitly denied that we are aware of a self through inner sense. (...) apperceptive self-consciousness might be understood as a consciousness of the activity of synthesizing, as a number of texts suggest, or it might be understood as the recognition that various cognitive states must be understood as states of a single cognizer.¹⁴

In his book *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, Henry Allison has interpreted the “Transcendental Deduction” in another way. In his theory, the ‘I think’ is itself the thought of what is common to all conceptualization. This is what makes it in all consciousness one and the same. Accordingly, the identical ‘I think’ must be considered in abstraction from all its content. It is nothing more than the ‘logical act’.

It follows from this that the doctrine of apperception is neither a bit of introspective psychology nor an idealistic ontological thesis concerning the manner in which the mind ‘creates’ the phenomenal world by imposing its forms upon the given sensible data. It is rather a formal model or schema for the analysis of the understanding and its ‘logical’ activities. As such, it specifies the conditions to which all my representations must conform, if they are to function in cognition, that is, to be ‘something to me,’ cognitively speaking. Correlatively, the theory of synthesis implied by this doctrine is an analytical account of the mode of operation of the model.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

¹⁵ H. E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 172.

The awareness of this act means the consciousness of synthesis, and consequently the consciousness of the form of thinking. Allison believes that apperception is just a formal position and the unity of apperception which is indicated by the representation of 'I think' is nothing but just a point of view, a kind of perspective.

The Role of Synthesis

After introducing apperception Kant continues §16 by juxtaposing important accounts about the nature of synthesis, its relation to the numerical identity of the subject, and bringing all representations under one consciousness.

Namely, this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is by itself dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject. The latter relation therefore does not yet come about by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but rather by my adding one representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis. Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself. [B 133-134]

In this key passage Kant has two important claims about synthesis:

- i. The consciousness of the identity of the 'I think' contains a synthesis.
- ii. The consciousness of the identity of the 'I think' is possible only through a consciousness of this synthesis.

Kant states that the combination process of the representations is essential for obtaining the unity of consciousness and is achieved by the active participation of the mind which is the faculty of understanding. The process of producing unity through the combination is the act

of synthesis. As stated by P. Strawson, Kant puts together the consciousness of the identity of the self with the consciousness of the power of combination.

Our consciousness of the identity of ourselves is fundamentally nothing but our consciousness of this power of synthesis, or combination, and of its exercise. I can count a given representation as mine solely because I have combined or synthesized it with others.¹⁶

Relation of different representations to the identity of the subject is founded by not consciousness of the activity of synthesizing or combining but by the consciousness of the power of doing so. In fact there is textual support for this reading in the second half of the B-Deduction: “I exist as an intelligence that is merely conscious of its faculty of combination.” [B 158]

Kant strictly highlights that the identity of the ‘I think’ accompanying various representations contains a synthesis. A subject cannot think its own identity with respect to distinct representations if they are not brought into a synthetic unity. In order to think this identity of the ‘I think’, it must unify the distinct representations in a single consciousness. Does it work in the opposite direction too? Does every act of unification of representations in a single consciousness produce an actual consciousness of the identity of the ‘I think’? Kant does not mention this. Perhaps it is irrelevant at this stage of the argument, since all that is required is the unification which gives way to the possibility of such self-consciousness. Besides, his strategy requires the argument to flow in the first direction.

There appears a difficulty about the account of synthesis which derives from the synonymous meanings of the word ‘synthesis’:

- i. Synthesis refers to the act itself.
- ii. Synthesis refers to the product of the act

¹⁶ Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p. 94.

Some commentators such as Strawson are in favor of the first, while others such as Kitcher accept the second view and find that if Kant means the act with synthesis serious problems may arise. Kitcher believes that ‘synthesis watching’ is not a plausible idea, nor is possible to be achieved by a normal agent.¹⁷ According to Kitcher, Kant’s apperception is a mind-generated principle governing syntheses or coordination of faculties, but something that is achieved through the activity of synthesizing representations. In this sense, apperception indicates the connection or connectability of different representations through acts of synthesis in the representation of a continuing subject.¹⁸ In the second item, synthesis refers to the product of the act¹⁹ phrase may also have different senses.

Henry Allison suggests that Kant uses the term synthesis in order to imply both meanings. He finds the two major problems of interpreting the synthesis as the act although a certain consciousness of the act of synthesis is an unavoidable feature of Kant's doctrine of apperception. These two problems are:²⁰

First there is the question of its compatibility with what Kant says elsewhere. For example, in §15 he refers in passing to ‘all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not,’ which suggests that Kant denies that all such acts necessarily involve a consciousness of the act. Second taken as a psychological thesis, the claim that the mind must be conscious of its acts of synthesis seems wildly implausible.

According to me Allison’s position on this topic is conflicting with his overall picture of the B-Deduction when he claims that certain consciousness of the act of synthesis is unavoidable and by synthesis we should understand meanings. If the unity of the

¹⁷ P. Kitcher, *Kant’s Transcendental Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 126-127.

¹⁸ Kitcher, “Kant’s Philosophy of the Cognitive Mind,” p. 191.

¹⁹ The product of the act can be taken as a judgment such as ‘these representations belong to me’ or it may be the consciousness some unity.

²⁰ Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 170.

consciousness is taken as a unity in the qualitative sense like the unity of a thought, there is no way for the subject to disintegrate it further. As Kant states at the beginning of the B-Deduction, the unity of self-consciousness is both analytic and synthetic. He also mentions that analysis always presupposes a beforehand synthesis. When these accounts are considered, it can be concluded that the subject cannot be aware of any synthesizing process before the outcome of this act as the unity of its own consciousness is achieved, an account that I shall discuss in the next chapters.

The Ground of Combination

In the previous chapters of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has explained in details the characteristics and functions of the faculty of sensibility through which the mind is aware of impressions while passively receiving and without acting upon them. Kant starts the B-Deduction with the heading “The Possibility of a Combination in General”. With this heading and the content of § 15 he draws attention to a fact which is perhaps ignored by Berkeley and Hume that in the normal course of events the mind is very active.

The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity, and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation without being anything other than the way in which the subject is affected. [B 129]

The mind plays an active as well as passive role. It connects, arranges, classifies and mixes the representations while passively receiving impressions or sensations. The forms of time and space contribute passively to this process, since the outcome in the case of human beings is being conscious of such spatial and temporal wholes like apples, houses

and stars. Instead of discrete and unrelated sets of impressions scattered around in space and time like red, round, shiny, etc.

In Kant's account, being combined is not an embedded property in the object, but rather the subject performs this combination act. Hence it is done by the active faculty of the mind. Among other representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself by self-activity. The ground of combination does not lie in the objects. The combination of a given manifold can never come to us through the senses. We cannot have representation of a combination coming from the object without having previously combined it ourselves. Kant continues to tell his opinions about the ground of a combination of a manifold of representations.

Yet the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility (...) We can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves and among representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity. [B 130]

Kant thinks that, the representation of combination is not given through objects but can only be carried out by the subject and states that combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. [B 131] He adds that this unity is not the quantitative categorical unity but rather, it is qualitative and it has a higher rank than the categories. As Kant explains the role of synthesis, the ground of the combination turns out to be the combining act of the understanding which is nothing further than bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception. But this ground still does not guarantee that the representations will always achieved to be united as the representations of whole objects. Wolfgang Carl draws attention to this problem in the below quotation.

Kant takes for granted that we have perceptions. Perceptions are conscious representations that refer to appearances. Perceptions as conscious representations, belong to the unity of a thinking subject and are related to that subject according to the functions of apperception. What follows from the fact that my perceptions are related in this way to my thinking self? It does not follow that the perceptions and their objects, the appearances, are related to each other in a certain way. The unity of the subject to which all perceptions belong does not give any unity to the perceptions themselves or their objects. They may be totally unrelated to each other, although they all belong to one thinking subject.²¹

Perhaps what Kant has in his mind for this problem is the support coming from the state of affairs. What is obvious in the text is Kant cannot find the source of combination in the sensations received. For manifold of an empirical or non-empirical intuition is received, combination is achieved by the understanding. It is done by the active part of the mind. There is a representation for a combined object but it seems to be a second order representation. A second order representation is not a representation directly intuited in a given manifold of intuitions, but rather it is accumulated after the operation of the understanding upon these representations. It is a representation of a combined object which is united by the understanding through the categories.

Presupposition of the Numerical Identity of the Self

In both versions of the “Transcendental Deduction”, Kant can be interpreted to imply that empirical cognition is possible only if the principle of transcendental unity of apperception is presupposed. This presupposition is assuming all the separate

²¹ W. Carl “Kant’s First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories,” in *Kant’s Transcendental Deductions*, Edited by E. Förster, (California: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 15.

states which are sensed through inner sense belonging to a single enduring self which arise through the spontaneous activities of the mind.

That which should necessarily be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought of as such through empirical data. There must be a condition that precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible, which should make such a transcendental presupposition valid. [A 107]

The emphasis on the phrase 'I think' which seems to be borrowed from Descartes is a dominant figure in the content of §16. This has perhaps led some commentators such as Henrich and Guyer to argue that Kant is standing in a 'Cartesian certainty.'²²

However others, such as Ameriks and Allison, comment Kant's strategy as making use of carefully selected presuppositions in the development of a 'regressive, but progressive' proof structure.²³

In neither of the Deductions, Kant mentions 'Cartesian certainty' nor criticizes plainly the people who are in favor of such a stance. 'Cartesian certainty' is a philosophical perspective viewed by Descartes after discarding all beliefs which are not absolutely certain from his belief repertoire and then attempting to maintain what can be known for sure. 'Cogito, ergo sum' appeared to be his first certainty. The adaptation of 'Cartesian certainty' to the argument in the B-Deduction concerns the numerical identity of the thinking subject. This idea is thought to be very clear in Descartes' theory, where the thinking and existing 'I' is regarded as a substance that the thinker is intimately conscious and constantly aware of in itself.

According to the adaptation of 'Cartesian certainty' in the argument of B-Deduction, the mind has a priori knowledge of its own numerical identity over time and

²² P. Guyer, "Kant's Tactics in the Transcendental Deduction," *Essays on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Edited by J.N. Mohanty (Oklahoma:University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), pp. 157-199.

²³ Allison, "Reflections on the B-Deduction," p.5.

this knowledge requires a synthesis correlated to the categories. Conversely, interpretations in favor of the presuppositions read Kant as to start with undeniable possibilities rather than controversial certainties. With an undeniable possibility it is meant a basic fact which has a plain probability at least in theory. On the other hand ‘Cartesian certainty’ concerning the numerical identity of the subject can be accepted as an example of a controversial certainty since there are serious philosophical attacks against this opinion. But the opposing views are not the major problem here. In my account, whether Kant really intends to make use of such a strategy is the subject matter. For the purpose of revealing this issue, I will focus on analyzing the original text and try to get an insight of the Kantian position. After that I will try to recognize which approach sounds more plausible for the position.

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition. Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. [B 132]

Kant emphasizes words like ‘can’ and ‘be able’. His preference of modal clauses when he constructs the crucial sentences should not be neglected. In fact these modal clauses can be admitted as implications for his making an assumption about having ‘one’ consciousness. As it is noticed in the above quotation, Kant mentions ‘I think’ together with modal clauses. Here is another example: “(...) because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and...” [B 132]

Kant writes neither ‘I combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness’ nor ‘I think accompanies’ but rather, he prefers modal expressions like ‘I can combine’ or ‘I think must be able to accompany’. This nuance in his language

may be regarded as an indication for a choice of presupposition strategy instead of ‘Cartesian certainty’ to be at work. Allison draws attention to a similar viewpoint in his article “Reflections on the B-Deduction” where he argues against the liability of the ‘Cartesian certainty’ approach.²⁴ He criticizes Henrich’s and Guyer’s accounts on this particular issue and prefers to give an alternative explanation for the argument in the B-Deduction. He defends that Kant structures his proof on a presupposition, rather than ‘Cartesian certainty’ as Henrich and Guyer claims. Allison finds Kant noticing the capacity or potential to combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness and then presupposing this potential to be actual. The employment of this capacity must be regarded as a mere possibility but it turns out to be a necessity as Kant ingeniously develops the argument. Allison thinks that this ‘necessity of a possibility’ is of being conscious of an identical ‘I think’ with respect to each of my representations insofar as they collectively constitute a single complex thought.²⁵

We are conscious *a priori* of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. For in me they can represent something only insofar as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. [A116]

Allison comments the clue for his presupposition thesis is slender in the original text. Unfortunately the key referential passage needs further adaptation because it is from the first edition of Transcendental Deduction and Allison himself complains about the ambiguity of this quotation. Here are Allison’s own expressions on the ambiguity of this passage:

²⁴ Allison, “Reflections on the B-Deduction,” p.12.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

(...) the ambiguity concerns what we are supposed to be conscious of a priori. The Henrich-Guyer interpretation, which focuses on the initial clause of the first sentence, takes it to be our numerical identity. On this reading, then, the main premise of the Deduction is that there is a 'Cartesian certainty' of this identity "in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge." It would seem to be at least as plausible, however, to take the sentence to be claiming that what we are conscious of a priori is not our numerical identity, but rather the 'fact' that this identity must be presupposed as a 'necessary condition of the possibility of all representations.' Certainly, this is suggested by the as-clause, as well as by the following sentence, which is merely a parenthetical clause in the German text. It is also in accord with the main thrust of the apperception principle in the B-Deduction (...) ²⁶

The usage of modal clauses in the [B 132-134] requires further evaluation and can be accepted as hints that Allison could not find in the B-Deduction and hence had to refer to first edition while reflecting on the second.

Identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains synthesis of the representations. The empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject. Accompanying each representation with consciousness is not enough to obtain the identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition. It is possible to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations with itself, only if a manifold of given representations can be combined in one consciousness.

Once Kant presumes the fact about his capacity to combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, he continues the argument by following a path towards the constitution of an identical self. In the quotation below we can observe Kant's efforts for this purpose.

²⁶ Ibid.

The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein, and although it is itself not yet the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it still presupposes the possibility of the latter, i.e., only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations; for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse self as I have representations of which I am conscious. Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions as given *a priori*, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all my determinate thinking. Combination does not lie in the objects, however, and cannot as it were be borrowed from them through perception and by that means first taken up into the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception, which principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition. [B 134-135]

Let's start discussing this very important passage from the last sentence. Combination does not lie in the objects. In § 15 Kant has already discussed that the combination of a given manifold can never come to us through the senses. Saying 'these representations given in intuition all belong to me' is the same with 'I can unite them in a single self-consciousness.' But the former proposition presupposes the latter. Only because I can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness, I call them as mine. If I cannot comprehend them in one consciousness, I may be a diverse self just like my empirical consciousnesses of all my representations. But I am not such a diverse self. I observe myself not as a multicolored and scattered self as the representations which I am conscious of. Hume was surprised when he found nothing to hold his impressions together. On the other hand, Kant is grounding on a fact which is shared by common sense and he will secure this by linking his cognitions of objects. He has previously stated that the combination does not lie in the object. Combination of the manifold of representations is done by the understanding not by the perception. The source of this combination is the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception. Combination can only be achieved by the

unity of apperception. Yet he finds himself cognizing objects. Cognizing any object is possible only if a manifold of given representations are synthesized in one consciousness.

This last action, as he described before, is the unity of apperception. Therefore the possibility of combining a manifold of given representations in one consciousness is actualized by the subject of those intuitions. Hence apperception presupposed to be a possibility at the outset of the argument turns out to be a necessity. Kant continues the section with a paragraph beginning with the expression ‘the necessary unity of apperception’ so we can say that he confirms the actuality of the presupposed case.

The tautology on which Kant bases his declaration that no such experience is possible is the tautology that experiences or representations belonging to a single consciousness must satisfy the conditions of belonging to single consciousness.²⁷

Strawson does not mention about any presupposition of the numerical identity, but in the quotation above, he finds Kant’s approach tautological. If we admit that Kant has utilized a presupposition strategy concerning the numerical identity of the subject, the expression that Strawson paraphrases from the original text can be modified as ‘representations presupposed to belong to a single consciousness must satisfy the conditions of belonging to a single consciousness’ and this version sounds better than a severe tautology.

²⁷ Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p. 92.

Representation of Objects

The common understanding for an experience to count as an objectively valid experience is its having genuine relations with independently existing objects. This is usually what we understand by objectivity of experience. However, we receive only subjective perceptions which may or may not come from the objects of an objective world. It sounds plausible for many philosophers that we are just aware of sensible representations corresponding to appearances and not independently existing objects. Baring this in mind, Kant intends to escape from a perspective which gets close to Berkeleyan idealism as he clearly mentions in the *Prolegomena*.

Kant aims in the “Transcendental Deduction” to obtain, at least a minimal warranty of the objectively valid experience. For this purpose he plots the argument in order to connect unity of apperception firstly with the representation of objects, secondly with judgments, and finally with categories. In each paragraph of the first half of B-Deduction we can observe the steps of his progress towards this goal.

In §17 Kant takes a maneuver and literally interlocks the synthetic unity of apperception and the representation of objects to each other. He sets a reciprocity relation between the two, neither can be possible without the other. Thus, the unity of apperception and the representation of objects as two sides of a reciprocal relation, are connected necessarily. In his account the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of a unified object are reciprocals. He establishes this crucial linkage in a few sentences in a very compact manner:

Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object. An object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on which even the possibility of the understanding rests. [B 137]

The relation of given representations to an object contains the cognitions provided by the understanding.

Kant defines what an object is explicitly: In the concept of an object, the manifold of a given intuition is united. In § 16 the proposition, ‘all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them’, is exhibited. Bearing these two claims in mind, a reader can apprehend the importance of the unity of consciousness in this deduction. Kant believes that, it constitutes the relation of representations to an object alone and provides the possibility of cognition. Therefore he concludes that the objective validity of representations depends on the unity of consciousness.

Kant thinks that unity of self-consciousness is the ground of any other knowledge. It is even before the cognition of space. Space as a mere form of outer sensible intuition, supplies the manifold of intuition and hence enables possible cognition from it. In order to know anything in space, combination of the given manifold is needed. This combination act is at the same time the unity of consciousness in the concept of that object cognized in space. As a consequence the unity of consciousness is unavoidable for our cognition of objects. It is one of the necessary conditions of the possibility of the knowledge of objects. Kant’s setting the unity of consciousness as the objective condition of cognition is an irrefutable consequence of

the ideas he has presented in the first sections of B-Deduction. It is a proposition following the accounts explained in §§ 15-16. In those sections he has stated that objects are brought into being and sustained in being by the act of synthesizing. Their being represented as objects is nothing other than their being held together under the unity of consciousness. Thus synthetic unity of consciousness is required for the cognition of an object. Furthermore every intuition must stand under the synthetic unity of consciousness in order to become an object for the subject.

With these consequences holding in hands, Kant starts to display a reciprocal relation between the synthetic combinations of both the object and subject. In other words, he implies the mutual dependency of the cognized and the cognizer. If there is no given manifold of intuitions, then there will be nothing to synthesize. Without this synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness. If it is the case that it is not united in one consciousness, the intuitions cannot be ascribed belonging to an identical subject. I need the concept of an object to unite my consciousness upon, otherwise I will not have unified representations. Kant also emphasizes that I am given no intuition for the bare 'I'. Hence if there is no concept of an object for the diverse representations to unite upon, I shall have nothing that I can call as myself.

Knowledge or grasp of objects is nothing but the knowledge of the synthesizing of impressions into wholes. Cognition of an object is achieved only by a conceptual unification and here Kant defines understanding as the faculty of cognition. Understanding applies to pure forms of intuition as well as empirical intuitions. But for the cognition of objects, understanding must operate on a manifold of empirical intuitions and attain unification of this manifold under a concept.

Kant thinks that the manifold of a given intuition is united in the concept of an object. This account allows Kant to correlate the unity of consciousness with the

representation of objects. Up to here every stage sounds plausible in the flow of the argument. As the next step, Kant makes a maneuver and takes an unavoidable and necessary condition as the same with an objective condition. According to Kant, this bond is vital to such a degree that the unity of consciousness alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object and hence their objective validity. Of course he has to maintain certainty if he wants to establish a real connection between the unity of consciousness and the categories. But he seems to have a big jump here in the flow of the argument. If we have a closer look, we may detect that the logical steps of the argumentation lacks the sufficiency condition. Since he has provided the necessity this may be accepted as a legitimate move, but the objective validity of the categories is the main concern in this part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Hence we must be careful about the exact description of the objective validity that we are searching for.

Kant has already exhibited in § 16 that all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Therefore in his account the unity of consciousness is obviously a necessary condition for the representation of an object. However does this necessity guarantee that unity of consciousness is also a sufficient condition for the representation of an object? Kant seems to be confident of such sufficiency when he claims that unity of consciousness alone constitutes the relations of representation to an object. [B 137] He wants to correlate these two and as the argument progresses the necessary condition is already satisfied. On the other hand he does not give satisfactory explanation in order to convince the reader of the realization of sufficiency condition in this relation. Perhaps he finds enough sufficiency in the account of § 18 where he distinguishes between an objective and a subjective unity of consciousness and he compares the objectivity of unity of apperception with the subjective nature of unity of empirical consciousness.

Allison believes Kant is justifying both directions of the argument. Unity of apperception entails the representation of objects and the representation of objects entails the unity of apperception. Although Allison is aware of the appearing non-sequitur, his interpretation is such that the unity of apperception is not only a necessary but also sufficient condition for the representation of objects. He tries to avoid this non sequitur in three ways by keeping in mind the operative meaning of object.²⁸

- i. It follows from the principle of apperception not merely that the synthetic unity of representations under a concept of an object is impossible apart from the unity of apperception but also, that the latter is impossible apart from the former. The principle affirms reciprocity between the unity of apperception and the synthetic unity of representations.
- ii. As the identification of apperception with the understanding indicates, this synthetic unity can be attained only by the unification of representations under the concept of an object.
- iii. To unify representations in this way is just to relate them to an object, it follows that relation to an object is likewise a necessary condition of the unity of apperception, which makes the latter a sufficient condition of the former.

Conversely there are other commentators such as Derk Pereboom, who do not find satisfactory support for the assertion on this specific issue and think that Kant's confident progress towards a flawless deduction must be reevaluated.

²⁸ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 174.

The unity of apperception, and more precisely, the synthesis that explains our consciousness of the identity of the subject, is only a necessary condition for the representation of objects, and, moreover, a condition which Kant proposes in §17, and only aims to demonstrate in §§18–20.²⁹

According to me, in the logical frame of his deductive argument Kant has displayed the necessity of the union of representations to stand under a single consciousness.

However an account about the sufficiency condition, which will at the end grant objectivity to this union, we need to question whether the argument lacks it or not. In the frame of the deductive proof, he has several presumptions. He takes for granted that we have some representations and as progresses, he puts in the picture based on common sense that he has representations of objects as individuated wholes. With these bearing in mind we can say that Kant is waiting the outer states of affairs to support his given representations in certain ways.³⁰

Empirical Apperception

In §18, Kant states his comments about the empirical apperception. At first sight it maybe thought that he is opening a parenthesis within the flow of the main argument. But positing the role of empirical apperception is among the requirements in reaching the ultimate goal of “Transcendental Deduction”. Therefore it cannot be taken as an account which stands beside the streamlined main argument, but rather a complementary part of it.

²⁹ D. Pereboom, “Kant’s Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions,” *A Companion to Kant*, edited by G. Bird, (Hong Kong: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), p. 159.

³⁰ See the passage starting with the example of cinnabar [A 100-101].

The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception. [A 107]

In order to move on towards a proof, Kant has to eliminate the opposing possibilities of empirical apperception. Hence in §18, Kant provides a supplementary step of his proof. Some commentators stress the importance of possible objections arising from the notion of empirical apperception. Accordingly Strawson claims that:

The point is a familiar one in all discussions of personal identity, though neither here, by Kant, nor elsewhere, by Hume, is it made with its full force. The problem would not be solved if the ‘determinations’ of our inner state were not ‘always changing’, if some, say, were constant or relatively so; they would still be states of ourselves. The point is that to refer simply to the fact of empirical self-awareness (awareness of one’s inner states as such) is not to solve the problem but to state it. What we are in quest of is precisely the fundamental ground of the possibility of empirical self-ascription of diverse states of consciousness on the part of a consciousness capable of knowledge of its own identity throughout its changing (or its constant) determinations.³¹

Empirical consciousness of the manifold of representations can be in a simultaneous or a successive manner depending on the circumstances. According to Kant the empirical consciousness depends on conditions which are independent from it. He finds himself being conscious of some temporal circumstances. But the unity of this type of consciousness is through association of the representations. Thus it is accepted as contingent in Kant’s terminology. He states this unity of empirical consciousness itself concerns an appearance, so it is a second order representation. It is a representation of the unity of empirical, more specifically temporal representations.

However, time is a pure form of intuition. Kant has already discussed in § 16 that any intuition of a given manifold must stand under the original unity of

³¹ Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p.93.

consciousness in order to become a representation belonging to the subject. There is a necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one 'I think'. If understanding is carrying out a pure synthesis concerning a pure intuition of time, this synthesis is necessarily related to the unity of apperception. Consequently the unity of apperception grounds *a priori* the empirical synthesis. Here we can see that Kant treats a necessary relation to be equivalent with an *a priori* relation. Or in other words if a relation is necessary it is also *a priori* in Kant's account. In fact he generally takes something to be *a priori* if it is necessary and universal. But here he does not mention about universality but just necessity. Perhaps we have to assume that he is discussing understanding in a general sense, not only human type of understanding. But in the second part of the Deduction he will focus specifically on the possible experience of human species. Similarly he takes something contingent to be subjective.³² He seems to treat subjectivity as being not objective in the sense of not being universal and necessary.

Whether I can become empirically consciousness of the manifold as simultaneous or successive depends on the circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of self consciousness, through association of the representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is entirely contingent. The pure form of intuition in time, on the contrary, merely as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold stands under the original unity of consciousness, solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one I think, thus through the pure synthesis of the understanding, which grounds *a priori* the empirical synthesis. The unity alone is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, which we are not assessing here, and which is also derived only from the former, under the given conditions in concreto, has merely subjective validity. One person combines the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with something else; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, with regard to that which is given, necessarily and universally valid." [B 139-140]

³² F.C. White, *Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction* (Vermont: Avebury, 1996), p. 63.

Kant contrasts the objective validity of the original unity of apperception with the subjective validity of the empirical unity of apperception. He mentions that empirical unity of apperception is derived from the original one. He does not use the word 'transcendental' in this section as an adjective belonging to the unity of apperception. But we know from the previous sections that he is referring to the transcendental unity of apperception when he uses the term 'original unity of apperception' for a type which is necessarily and universally valid. If we remember the first appearance of the adjective 'original' in the Deduction, it is used for indicating apperception's being origin of the representation 'I think'. Now we learn that it is the origin of the empirical consciousness as well. As an example of the subjectivity of the empirical consciousness, Kant remarks about the various ways of associating words with things. Different people may have different psychological links with the same word. It depends on their past experiences, circumstances, personalities, etc. As with the principles that must be involved in cognition of objects through concepts, Kant tries to affirm that the senses are not the ground of the transcendental apperception.

Empirical consciousness also has a unity but its combination is contingent. Contents of the unity of empirical consciousness are related through association, i.e., smoke is associated with fire, words are associated with certain meanings. These associations depend on circumstances, which are not necessary. Some impressions coexist in time, some follow others. Awareness of these correlations repeatedly may strengthen the association, because knowledge of them is derived from past experiences. Associations observed and remembered by one self, do not necessarily coincide with those observed and remembered by another person. Here we can see that Kant is implying the subject in two different senses. First is the formal representation of

apperception and second the object of inner sense experiencing a stream of empirical consciousnesses.

Kant does not mention the subject as the object of outer sense, i.e., my body. Nor he talks about the agent of rational psychology as a simple substance that persists through time in the rational doctrine of the soul which he criticizes ingeniously in the paralogisms, but employed in his practical philosophy. We can say that in general Kant refers to 'I' in four different ways but in the B-Deduction he is just engaged with just two senses of 'I'.

Judgment is Synthesis

Kant already has derived the categories from the logical forms of judgment in the scope of the "Metaphysical Deduction" [B 91–116], just before he starts the "Transcendental Deduction". But he does not provide a deep discussion on the formal structure of a judgment, until he turns back to the topic in §19:

I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgment in general: it is, they say, the representation of a relation between two concepts. Without quarreling here about what is mistaken in this explanation, that in any case it fits only categorical but not hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (which later two do not contain a relation of concepts but of judgments themselves) (though from this error in logic many troublesome consequences have arisen), I remark only that it is not here determined wherein this relation consists. [B 140-141]

In this paragraph Kant is concerned about a crucial but misunderstood issue: judgments. Logicians in Kant's time define judgments as ways of expressing relations between concepts. But Kant finds this definition unsatisfactory because it does not apply to all types, i.e., hypothetical and disjunctive ones. Some judgments are representations of

relations between two judgments. Furthermore this definition does not reflect any information about the characteristics of the relation represented by a judgment which Kant finds extremely important.

If, however, I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish that relation, as something belonging to the understanding, from the relation in accordance with laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), then I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. [B 141]

Kant gives his own definition of a judgment. A judgment is the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.

This is the first place in the B-Deduction Kant mentions imagination (in any sense, productive or reproductive). He strictly distinguishes the relations belonging to the understanding from the relations belonging to the reproductive imagination. Those relations which are in accordance with the laws of reproductive imagination have subjective validity.

That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For this word designates the relation of the representations to the original apperception and its necessary unity, even if the judgment itself is empirical hence contingent, e.g., "Bodies are heavy." By that to be sure, I do not mean to say that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, i.e., in accordance with principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, which principles are derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, i.e., a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say "If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight," but not "It, the body, is heavy," which would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object i.e., regardless of any difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception (however often as that might be repeated). [B 142]

Reproductive imagination is also performing a synthesis, but its exercise remains as subjective association as opposed to the objective activity of the understanding.

Here Kant closely focuses on a judgment and finds out that the copula in a judgment is an indication of the relation between the representations and the unity of original apperception. This unity is necessary, even though the judgment is contingent because of its empirical content. Hence a copula is serving to discern the objective unity of given representations from the subjective ones.³³ Kant continues his explanations with an example of a judgment: Bodies are heavy. He adds that he does not mean that the representation of a 'body' necessarily belongs to the concept of 'being heavy' in the given manifold of intuition, but rather they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions. In other words necessity does not lie in the empirical association of these two distinct representations. Necessity applies to the act of synthesis in the unity of consciousness which correlates them. Laws of association are not necessary as we can see Kant being in total agreement with Hume that they carry merely subjective validity. On the other hand the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception is necessary according to Kant's account in §16 and the possibility of cognitions of representations can only be derived from this unity. If we have cognitions of objects as individuated wholes, then they must necessarily be under the necessary unity of apperception. Perhaps it is this double necessity which convinces him to believe in the confirmation of the objective validity of the relation in a judgment. But a careful reader will not miss the underlying presumptions. However these are not transparent in Kant's pronounced sentences so every interpreter derives her own scenario from the text. In my reading, Kant finds the objectivity in the

³³ See also for detailed explanations: Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, translated by C. T. Wolfe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 59-69.

interdependent nature of the relation between the cognized and its cognizer. In other words, the curious correlation between the object and the subject is the foundation of the objective experience: They are just like two sides of the same coin. Original apperception necessarily needs the manifold of intuition in order to get united through the synthesis of the representations. If there is no representation to synthesize there is no act of synthesizing, hence no unity of self-consciousness, consequently no self. Although empirical consciousnesses of individual representations are possible without being related to a united self-consciousness, they cannot be accepted as objective. Therefore there is an absolute connection between the original apperception and an objective empirical experience.

Kant continues to support his objectivity thesis from another point of view with a different and more usual approach. Combination of representations in the concept of an object achieved by the unity of apperception is an objective judgment because it is independent from the conditions of the subject.³⁴ This is a more common usage of objectivity, and it is different from the definition of objectivity he sticks in most of the section. But he limits this supportive new account only with a single sentence and does not explain it in details.

Another inconsistency seems to be present in Kant's own example of subjectively valid representations: 'If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight.' He gives this example just after he contrasts two ways of relating representations. When representations are related with judgments the relations are objectively valid. When the relations of the representations are in accordance with the laws of association they are subjective as it is the case in his example. But this sentence which is subjectively valid

³⁴ White, *Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction*, p. 60.

is obviously a judgment too, so it is supposed to be objective in Kant's account. If it is a judgment it requires the employment of the understanding, and even the categories. Kant changes this firm position in the *Prolegomena* and admits that there may be subjective judgments of perception as well as objective judgments of experience. But in this section he is dealing with judgments which make use of categories and his main concern is to show that employment of the categories designates objectivity. He also sets a link that judgments are objective if their logical functions are categories. All judgments contain logical functions like subject and predicate. Kant seems to mean that these functions turn out to be categories when they apply to the given manifold of intuition. Summing up Kant's conclusion in this section is that in judgments the understanding employs the categories for bringing the manifold of given intuitions under the unity of apperception. This activity constructs the objective world in his account. But this objectivity seems to be closer in meaning what we contemporarily understand from the term 'inter-subjective'. I will discuss, Kant's sense of objectivity in the next chapters of this thesis.

CHAPTER V

SIDE COMPONENTS OF THE ARGUMENT

Along with the main elements of the argument there exist some more accounts within the context of the “Transcendental Deduction” which seem to be minor points at first sight. Getting a full comprehension of the core argument, its immediately appearing components and their relations with each other demand philosophical labor and take most of the efforts. This may be the reason of the relatively less interest that these side features receive. However their accurate articulation together with the main components may allow a better insight of the “Transcendental Deduction” which is ascribed as an impenetrable text by many scholars.

In my division these side elements include:

- i. Two senses of unity
- ii. Unconscious representations
- iii. Both analytic and synthetic
- iv. Kant’s sense of objectivity
- v. Intuitive understanding
- vi. Where is ‘I’?
- vii. The role of imagination

In this chapter I will discuss the side accounts of the B-Deduction. Investigation of whether these aspects provide any supportive account for the deductive argument will be the subject matter of the next chapter.

Two Senses of Unity

In scope of the “Transcendental Deduction”, Kant distinguishes between two senses of unity as qualitative and quantitative. According to him the representation of the combined objects as wholes cannot arise from the combination coming from the object but rather, combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. Therefore this cannot be taken as the categorical unity because all categories are grounded on logical functions in judgments. However in this combination the unity of the given concepts is already thought. Hence like all other categories, the category of unity already presupposes combination. The ground of this qualitative unity must be more fundamental. Because this combination itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments. Therefore this type of combination is the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use.

But in addition to the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, the concept of combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of combination possible. This unity; which precedes all concepts of combination a priori is not the former category of unity; for all categories are grounded on logical functions in judgments but in these combination thus the unity of given concepts, is already thought. The category therefore already presupposes combination. We must therefore seek this unity (as qualitative, § 12) someplace higher, namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use. [B 131]

After Kant presents the table of judgments and categories in the “Metaphysical Deduction”, he mentions the importance of qualitative unity. According to him this type of unity should not be accepted as one of the categories but rather, something

above them. Since, in the employment of all categories this unity is already presupposed.

In every cognition of an object there is, namely, unity of the concept, which one can call qualitative unity insofar as by that only the unity of the comprehension of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a fable. [B 114]

With the examples of a play, speech and fable, Kant opens a very important discussion about the unity of thought. He also tells this topic in the “Paralogism of Simplicity” and attempts to exhibit that a complex thought cannot be thought by more than one subject. On this point he also criticizes the belief in the real simplicity of the thinking subject because of this logical unity of thought is a corrupted way of reasoning. The unity of the thinking subject should not necessarily indicate it is absolutely simple i.e., is not an aggregate of many but rather, it should be taken as holding a logical simplicity.

For because the representations that are divided among different beings (e.g., the individual words of a verse) never constitute a whole thought (a verse), the thought can never inhere in a composite as such. [A 352]

Each of the individual representations which together constitute a single complex thought can be distributed amongst various thinking subjects, but the thought itself could not be. The wholeness of the thought must be ascribed to a single subject. Each individual piece of a complex thought must be ascribable to an identical thinking subject. Furthermore it must be possible for this thinker to be aware of its identity.³⁵

I believe that in the B-Deduction, Kant is making use of both senses of the unity. The unity of self-consciousness is qualitative, like the unity of a thought. However the representations must be able to be combined under a single consciousness

³⁵ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 165.

which amounts to one subject. In the last sentence ‘one’ which founds the numerical identity of the subject appears to be a quantitative term. Here the employment of ‘one’ can be accepted as a quantitative unity of the thinker. I will discuss this transition from the qualitative to quantitative unity in “Chapter VI” of this thesis.

Unconsciousness Representations

A careful reader will rise a question after reading the certain sentences of the “Transcendental Deduction” where Kant mentions about his unconsciousness representations in two places. He has already stated that ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all his representations. Hence ‘I think’ must be able to accompany his unconsciousness representations either. This proposition sounds peculiar and should need further evaluation. Perhaps what he has in his mind is Leibniz’s example where he states that he is conscious of ocean’s total sound even though he is unconscious of sounds of individual waves.

For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must yet necessarily be in accord with the condition under which alone they can stand together in a universal self consciousness, because otherwise they would not throughout belong to me. (...) for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination whether we are conscious of it or not (...) [B 132]

Some commentators, such as Allison and Pereboom, remark that Kant is conflicting with his own claims where he states ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all representations in order them to be count as belonging to the same subject. It is for sure,

Kant has no idea about the subconscious reflections of the modern psychoanalysis theory, but can we say that he has an insight? Moreover, why does he mention these unconscious representations within the content of these certain affirmations of discursive understanding? Even if he has an insight of the importance of subconscious mental activity, how does this contribute to the overall theme of the “Transcendental Deduction?” According to me, further evaluation is needed. Hence, I will try to supply some remarks in the next chapter of this thesis.

Both Analytic and Synthetic

In § 16 Kant repeats twice that the unity of transcendental apperception is analytic. Moreover in § 17, he mentions again about the analyticity of a related proposition. These three quotations below are from passages where Kant claims about analyticity.

Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself i.e. the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one. [B 133]

Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an analytical proposition, yet it declares as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which that thoroughgoing identity of self consciousness could not be thought. [B 135]

This last proposition is, as we said, itself analytic, although to be sure, it makes synthetic unity into the condition of all thinking; for it says nothing more than that all my representations in any given intuition must stand under the condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and thus can grasp them together, as synthetically combined in an apperception, through the general expression I think. [B 138]

Kant concludes that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes a synthetic unity. At first sight all this expression sounds to be peculiar and perhaps this is the reason why many commentators ignore these passages and leave them without providing further interpretation. Conversely some scholars consider these sentences as to be hints in order to reveal the obscurity of the Deduction, such as Allison, while some others, such as Guyer evaluate them as reflecting Kant's confusion about his own argumentative strategy. In fact this last comment is not totally groundless because in the A-Deduction Kant plainly confirms the principle of the unity of apperception to be synthetic. [A 117n] Conversely, Kant seems to be confident about the analyticity of the principle in the second edition and he repeats it elsewhere.

That the I of apperception, consequently in every thought, is a single thing that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and hence a logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking, and is consequently an analytic proposition; but that does not signify that the thinking I is a simple substance, which would be a synthetic proposition. [B 407-408]

Here Kant highlights the analytic principle of unity of apperception as the ground of all thought. He draws attention to this point about the indivisibility of a thought when he mentions the pieces of a verse thought by different people do not yield into a whole verse. The standard part-whole relations do not seem to work when the qualitative unity is the case rather than quantitative unity. The parts of a thought which are separate from each other cannot summed up as to be equal with a whole thought.

One way of explaining this analytic-synthetic dilemma, is taking the unity of apperception analytical, simply because of its being identical with itself in each 'I think' which accompanies distinct representations. At the same time the transcendental unity of apperception is synthetic because it is produced by the synthesis of representations in one consciousness. Beforehand there are only empirical consciousnesses unrelated to

the identity of the subject. But the subject has a capacity to combine them in one consciousness. Whenever this capacity is actualized, unity of apperception is achieved and the presupposed identity of the subject is the case. Yet putting in sentences is displaying the analytic nature of the proposition. If we remember the Kantian standard for any proposition in order to be named as analytic is the predicate's containing the concept within itself. So at least structurally this principle is analytic. But how can it be both analytic and synthetic at the same time?

Simply put, this principle states that the components of a complex thought must be connected in such a way as to allow for the possibility of their ascription to a single thinking subject, which entails that they constitute a synthetic unity.³⁶

Allison defends the contribution of the analyticity principle with two supportive accounts:³⁷

- i. The 'I think' itself is the thought which is common to all conceptualization and makes it in all consciousness one and the same. The identical bare representation 'I' can be the form or prototype of the analytic unity that pertains to all general concepts. This analytic unity is considered in abstraction from all content.
- ii. The act of becoming aware of this identical I think is the form of the act of reflection through which the mind comprehends the identity in difference in the formation of general concepts. It is nothing more than the 'logical act' considered in abstraction from all content. The consciousness of this act is the consciousness of synthesis and consequently the consciousness of the form of thinking.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 164.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 167.

Kant's Sense of Objectivity

There is something curious in Kant's employment of the word 'objective' in both versions of the Deduction whereas the strangeness under consideration is not quite the same in the previous and latter editions. He seems to prefer one of the two choices provided by the paradox of the object in the two editions of the "Transcendental Deduction".

Either the object is given to intuition, and since to have an object means, for a subject, to have knowledge of that object, that implies that there is knowledge at the level of sensibility(...) Or something else than the object is given to intuition, a something which can be designated by an X. In this case, the understanding constitutes the object according to its own formal rules, and goes therefore beyond the sensible. It merely yields analytic judgments [A258-B314] whereas they are considered as synthetic because of their relatedness to an object.³⁸

A reader must be careful about what Kant implies when he utters 'object', because it appears to have different connotations from what we understand in the ordinary sense, such as 'independently existing entities in spatio-temporal order.'

The word object is used by Kant at least four senses. It is used for the thing as it is in itself, and for the thing as it appears to us; or, in more technical language, it is used for the thing-in-itself and for the phenomenal object. Furthermore the phenomenal object is itself composed of a matter given to sense and a form imposed by thought; and each of these is called by Kant the object, the former the intermediate object, or the object as appearance, the latter the object in general. Hence he is capable of saying that the object is not known, and that the object must be known; and again that the object is given to us apart from thought, and that there is no object apart from thought. (...) Yet it is obvious that such verbal contradictions may take place without any confusion in the mind of the writer. He expects us to judge from the context which particular sense of object is meant.³⁹

According to usual conception of objectivity, objects should have some common attributes which might be physical, but could also be mental. The transcendental unity of apperception

³⁸ Meyer, "Why did Kant write two versions of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories?" p. 359-360.

³⁹ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, p. 51.

is achieved when the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. Without a concept of the object, the manifold of given intuition will not be united. Hence, the transcendental unity of apperception will not take place. Kant recognizes the transcendental unity of apperception as objective according to this account. It is objective in the sense that it is necessarily related to a concept of the object upon which the manifold of given intuition is united.

The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called objective on that account, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a combination. [B 139]

Here Kant appears to be correlating necessity with objectivity while holding on the other hand contingency with subjectivity. However these cannot be accepted as direct correlations. Perhaps he means that if something is necessarily related to an object then it is objective. Therefore only the transcendental unity of consciousness can be accepted as objective in such a relation. The point and reasoning in this account does not seem to be satisfactory. Kant's line of reasoning should be unfolded.

Allison considers the epistemic force of the apperception principle. To claim that the synthetic unity of consciousness is 'an objective condition of all cognition' is equal to claiming that it is an 'objectivating' condition. Kant finds this unity not as something that he himself needs in order to cognize an object, but rather something under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for him.

Most of the scholars such as Pereboom, are aware of the difficulties arise from the unusual sense of objectivity. Pereboom states that, "In his (Kant's) idealist view, the objects of experience result from this mental processing, and it is due to the role that the

categories have in this processing that they correctly apply to these objects.”⁴⁰ However others insist to take Kant’s promise of objectivity in the regular sense. Guyer writes that; “Here we should read ‘object’ in the broad sense of ‘objective feature of reality’, a feature whose existence and nature is independent of how it is perceived.”⁴¹ Strawson also finds Kant initially premising that experience necessarily includes awareness of objects conceived as distinct from particular subjective states of awareness of them and from particular representations or experiences.⁴²

In other parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant seems to leave aside his cautious and restricted approach towards objectivity and seems to be relaxed about the existence of other outsider things as being sure of his own consciousness. For example in the “Refutation of Idealism” he writes; “The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.” [B 276] Perhaps it can be inferred that he has different senses of this particular issue in his mind serving to different aspects of his entire philosophical system.

Strawson finds Kant's treatment of objectivity to be under a strict limitation to the extent that it can be assumed as a handicap.⁴³ He distinguishes between the strong and weak senses of objectivity in Kant’s accounts.

- i. Understanding objects in the strong sense: Space of objects conceived of as existing independently of our experiences of awareness of them.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ D. Pereboom, “Self-Understanding in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction,” *Synthese* 103, 1995, p. 10.

⁴¹ P. Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 11-24.

⁴² Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p. 89.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

- ii. Understanding objects in weak sense (since Kant puts it blandly in B 75): The form of the thought of an object in general.⁴⁵

In Strawson's reading Kant's main premise for a sense of objectivity is a feature of any intelligible experience which relies on the unity of consciousness.

He (Kant) nowhere depends upon, or even refers to, the factor on which Wittgenstein, for example, insists so strongly: the social character of our concepts, the links between thought and speech, speech and communication, communication and social communities. (...) they must at least allow for the point that another name for the objective is the public.⁴⁶

Strawson believes that such a conception of objectivity should be supported with supplementary accounts, such as the inter-subjective characteristic of objective experience.

Intuitive Understanding

In Kant's theory, the synthetic unity of consciousness is an objective condition of all cognition and without this synthesis the manifold is not united in one consciousness. Thus every intuition must stand under this unity in order to become an object for the subject. However, Kant mentions that he is aware of some special cases to which this principle will not be applicable. There may be distinct kinds of understanding which may yield restrictions for this general claim, such as for an understanding which has given nothing in the manifold corresponding to the representation of 'I am'.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 73.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 151.

This principle, however, is not a principle for every possible understanding, but only for one through whose pure apperception in the representation I am nothing manifold is given at all. That understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition would at the same time be given, an understanding through whose representation the objects of this representation would at the same time exist, would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness, which the human understanding, which merely thinks, but does not intuit, does require. But for the human understanding it is unavoidably the first principle, so that the human understanding cannot even form for itself the least concept of another possible understanding, either one that would intuit itself or one that, while possessing a sensible intuition, would possess one of a different kind than one grounded in space and time. [B 138]

If we imagine about another kind of understanding which is different from the faculty of understanding of humans, we may guess the problems that will be encountered. An understanding which through its self-consciousness can supply to itself the manifold of intuition would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness. This is an understanding through whose representation the objects of the representation may at the same time exist. Conversely this synthesizing act is necessary for humans because it is the only way human understanding operates. Human understanding does not intuit, rather it thinks and we cannot form the least conception of other possible types of understandings such as itself is intuitive or of any that may possess an underlying mode of sensible intuition which is different in kind from that in time and space. An understanding which creates objects by itself would have a consciousness of itself without the need for synthesizing representations correlated to outer sources.

Where is 'I'?

Kant hasn't got any good news about 'ourselves'. His *Critique of Pure Reason* turns out to be a negative book about most of our expectations on the attributions such as immateriality, immortality, etc. of the soul. We can observe this critical approach especially in the paralogisms of both editions which are located in the negative dialectic part. Even in the analytic division of the book, where he has generally a positive mode, there are serious implications about the tricky border between the safe and illegitimate reigns of human knowledge.

It would be a great, or indeed the only stumbling block to our critique, if it were possible to prove a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, ... For in this way we would have taken a step beyond the sensible world, entering into the field of noumena (...) For the proposition 'Every thinking being as such is a simple substance' is a synthetic proposition a priori, first because it goes beyond the concept that grounds it by adding the way of existing to thinking in general and second because it adds to that concept a predicate (simplicity) that cannot be given in any experience whatever. [B 409]

Perhaps because of the hard decision which at the end should embrace the flaws of the chosen and excludes the merits of the other, throughout his works Kant wavers between the view that the transcendental self is a kind of perspective and the view that it is a distinct *noumenal* thing.

In the context of the B-Deduction Kant accepts that 'I' lacks the correspondent manifold of intuitions, but he follows a strategy to overcome this problem. The operative assumption throughout the B-Deduction is that we are dealing with a mind for which the manifold must be given with a discursive rather than an intuitive intellect. The problem is to explain how such an intellect can represent to itself its content as combined and achieve to constitute a synthetic unity.

For through the I, as a simple representation, nothing manifold is given; it can only be given in the intuition, which is distinct from it, and thought through combination in a consciousness. [B 135]

Kant thinks that in the representation 'I' nothing corresponds to a given manifold of intuition while the synthetic unity of consciousness is indispensable and hence the primary principle of the human understanding. According to Kitcher one way of interpreting Kant's notion of self is by taking it as having capacities.

On Kant's view, all we sense through inner sense are our states; the conception of various states as all belonging to a single, ongoing self arises through the spontaneous activities of our faculties. So he would not regard the self as a 'construct' – something that is believed to exist but does not – anymore than he would take a dagger or gravity to be a construct. Rather, the self, with its various passive and active capacities, is what constructs knowledge out of the sensory information it receives. To put the point somewhat paradoxically, Kant maintained that the self partially constructs cognitions of the world and of itself, but that the resulting cognitions are cognitions of objects, not of mere constructs, mere objects of belief.⁴⁷

Through inner sense we perceive our states, but not our selves. Kant agrees with Hume on this particular account that what is actually given to the mind is a mere bundle of impressions or even a chaos of sensation. Kant seems to be in consensus with Hume about the absence of any given impression of a substratum self either, but these agreements do not prevent him criticizing the inadequacies of the empiricist beliefs. The major benefit of apperceptive self-consciousness is Kant's attribution to it a capacity to combine all distinct representations under a single consciousness, but still we have no conception of whatever performs these synthesizing acts.⁴⁸ Once again Kant has a negative answer to this question. In the second analogy Kant argues that being in such

⁴⁷ Kitcher, "Kant's Philosophy of the Cognitive Mind," p. 199.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 189.

an expectation of a causal force when we observe an act, and consequently attributing to this causal force a performer what is made of some kind of material or immaterial substance is the same with standing in a chain of errors. In the scope of “Transcendental Deduction” Kant only states that this combination is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining *a priori*.

Thus through the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general not least is won in regard to the cognition of myself as object. The logical exposition of thinking in general is falsely held to be a metaphysical determination of the object. [B 409]

In the B-Deduction Kant does not prefer to use ‘transcendental object’ phrase of the first version. Nonetheless, he posits the transcendental unity of the apperception to be a logical place holder. It does not warrant that the ‘I’ is a substance or there is something in the empirical world to which the word ‘I’ applies. Kant thinks that deriving substantial unity from the purely formal unity of apperception is an example of erroneous reasoning, since the later can easily leads in other feeble accounts like the simplicity, indestructibility, immortality, etc. “Thus the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking them, obtain a concept of itself as an object of the categories” [B 422]

There are passages in the *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant is holding the opinion that ‘I’ is just an intellectual representation; “The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self activity of a thinking subject.” [B278]

‘I am’ is the logical act which precedes all representations of the object; it is a verbum by which I posit myself. I exist in space and time thoroughly determine my existence in space and time as appearance according to the formal conditions for the connection of the manifold of intuition; I am both an outer and inner object of myself. ⁴⁹ [22:85]

⁴⁹ I. Kant, *Opus Postumum*, Ed. by Eckart Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), p.187.

However, he has other remarkable accounts on 'I' elsewhere , i.e., "Selbstsetzungslehre." of the *Opus Postumum* as illustrated in the passage given above.

The Role of Imagination

In the first half of the B-Deduction, Kant mentions the faculty of imagination only once in §19, where he is defining the synthesis achieved in a judgment. Imagination is essential to judging, since it unites concepts and intuitions in a judgment.

If, however, I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish that relation, as something belonging to the understanding, from the relation in accordance with laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), then I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. [B 141]

In the second half, Kant refers to the transcendental synthesis of imagination in § 24 and explains its role in his deductive scenario. According to him, this is a figurative synthesis and productive imagination enables the mind to have a representation of the object when the object is not even given in intuition. [B 151] On the other hand the faculty of imagination may be reproductive as well when it is in accordance with the principle of association. This type of imagination is due to empirical laws and therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of *a priori* cognition. In that sense Kant thinks that reproductive imagination belongs to transcendental psychology while productive imagination is an account of transcendental philosophy. [B 152] Imagination is capable of yielding the object *a priori* by combining the concept of an object and its intuition. The understanding, which is the faculty of judgment, owes its objective employment to

imagination. Hence it can be said that in the generation of objective experience the exercise of transcendental faculty of imagination is required.

If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being were not changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the longest day the land were covered now with fruits, now with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red; or if a certain word were attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one and the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place. [A100-101]

An object is recalled independently of the various ways in which it is given to the senses through the faculty of imagination. Whenever the object is given under varying aspect, it is recalled to the mind as this particular object through one of its abiding properties. The faculty of imagination is analytically deduced as the supreme condition of experience, and consequently of the objects of experience. [B 197]

CHAPTER VI

REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF OF THE B-DEDUCTION

Considering the previously exposed elements of the Kantian philosophy and the argument of the “Transcendental Deduction” is necessary in order to realize the meaning of the story behind it, but not enough as Strawson mentions in the paragraph below.

(...) though the Transcendental Deduction is indeed an argument, it is not only an argument. It is also an explanation, a description, a story. To understand its role as a story, we must consider again all those elements of the Kantian model which we eschew in our austerer interpretation... We must think about objects in accordance with the categories because so much is demanded by the constitution of our faculty of understanding. If this is so, it is indeed true that no further proof is required that only by means of the categories an object can be thought. But something else may well seem to be required - viz. an explanation. We have before us the materials of a transcendental drama; and we wish to know how the drama is played out.⁵⁰

I believe that within the scope of the B-Deduction, all the points Kant touches on must be in some way or another serving to the rationale of the chapter. Since Kant chooses to mention these ideas in a text where he totally reconstruct and rewrote with a very compact manner, then we should not exclude them in our interpretations.

As summarized in Chapter III of this study, Kant has provided all the premises of the central argument within the first five sections §§ 15-19 and in section §20 he has reached to his first intended conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction. In the plot of the argumentation, he introduces novel conceptions, i.e., transcendental and empirical apperceptions, while he redefines some previous notions, i.e., synthesis, object, judgment. If the entangled elements are isolated, then the flow of the main argument can

⁵⁰ Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p. 86.

be pursued straightforwardly due to its streamlined proof structure. Beside the primary accounts, Kant also has posited some remarks and side features which can be regarded as to be parenthetical.

Commentators prefer to concentrate on the central argument and its essential elements including apperception, synthesis, objectivity, judgment. Getting a comprehensive grasp of ‘what really happens?’ in the “Transcendental Deduction” takes most of the efforts. If an outline of the central theme is to be extracted from the dense script, it is better not to add side accounts in the picture because they may distract us from focusing our attention. Perhaps this is the reason why these sides receive relatively less interest from most of the Kant scholars. The side accounts are generally evaluated within the discussion of the main argument with small comments or they are ignored or totally omitted. Allison states that Kant’s claim about the unity of apperception’s both being analytic and synthetic is either neglected or misunderstood by most of the commentators. But Allison admits he owes his interpretation of ‘reciprocity’ to the unfolding of this analyticity claims which were found as Kant’s confusion by Guyer.⁵¹

Following Allison, I suggest that the consideration of them in the explanation of the first half of the B-Deduction with an indiscriminative attitude will be beneficial to get a better insight of the text.

In my division these side accounts contain: A precaution for the process of analysis presupposing synthesis, two remarks on unconscious representations and nature of human understanding, a tactic about presupposition of the numerical identity of the self, his neglect of the faculty of imagination, a reminder from §12 about the qualitative sense of unity, two controversial claims about the analyticity of the synthetic unity and

⁵¹ Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 165.

empty intuition of the representation ‘I’, and Kant’s strange sense of objectivity which can only be discerned in between the literal lines of the Transcendental Deduction. I observe that some of the side components of the “Transcendental Deduction” are supporting each other. For example the claim ‘analysis presupposes synthesis’ supports analyticity accounts. Consideration of the qualitative and quantitative senses of unity also supports the analyticity claims while it also underlines Kant’s peculiar understanding of objectivity. Remarks about non-intuitive understanding and unconsciousness representations increase our level of insight about Kant’s conception of the ‘self.’

First, I will try to retell the story of the B-Deduction, as I understand it, relying on Allison’s reciprocity reading, but taking it one step further. In this version of the argument I am not going to discuss again the definitions of all the components, since they are already given earlier in this thesis. Secondly, I will give further explanations including the roles of side arguments and focus on how the consideration of the side arguments may feed or change the story of the “Transcendental Deduction.”

Review of the Argument

According to me, Kant starts the B-Deduction with a simple fact: I have some representations. However, he has robust assumptions of his own philosophical model as the background which is discussed in Chapter II of this study, such as the radical distinction between the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant takes for granted his presumptions and states that this manifold of representations is received only by sensibility. There must be some variations which affects sensibility because it is a

passive faculty of mind. Sensations can be caused either by proximal (inner) or distal (outer) variations. Here Kant supposes those variations which can cause sensations in me are emanating from a source without noticing whether it is an outer or inner source and he calls that source as object. In other words manifold of representations is received by sensibility when this faculty is affected with the variations caused by a presupposed (inner or outer) object.

Kant continues again with a basic fact which is reflecting common sense: Once representations are received, they are all accompanied by 'I think,' otherwise they would not be mine. When a representation is accompanied by 'I think,' then I am empirically consciousness of that representation. But the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject. [B 133] Empirical consciousnesses may not be related to each other either. Kant agrees with Hume that there is nothing to hold them together. However Kant believes in a capacity which allows a possibility to combine representations in a single consciousness. He mentions this possibility when he says:

Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself (...) [B 133]

In the "Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General", Kant states that:

1. Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts) is possible.
2. That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is actual.
3. That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with general conditions of experience is (exists) necessary. [B 265-266]

I believe Kant employs these postulates in this argument where he wants to answer the ultimate skeptic such as Hume, who cannot find any ground relating the diverse

representations to an identical self. Furthermore Kant gives an answer while he is residing within the discourse of empirical thinking, since these are the postulates of empirical thinking in general. Kant designs his strategy to put the argument in such a way that it fits to the postulates.

Possibility: According to Kant, there is a possibility that I have capacity or potential to combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness among other possibilities. Let's consider other possibilities. The first possibility is already suggested by Hume: I cannot combine the representations such that I am similar to an unbounded bundle of empirical consciousnesses as numerous as the representations I have. Secondly, it may be also the case that I combine the representations in more than one consciousness, because of mental illnesses, drug abuse, brain surgery⁵², etc. This amounts to saying that each consciousness holds a portion of a given manifold of representations.

All these possibilities, even though they are peculiar cases, agree with the formal conditions of experience, i.e., they are in accordance with the intuitions and concepts. Thus, they can be said to be possible.

Actuality: Combination does not lie in the object because in Kant's account combination is an act of the understanding through its synthesizing actions. The combination of a manifold can never come to us through the senses. We can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves. It is the only representation which is not given through objects but can be executed by the subject itself. [B 130] Kant thinks that combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold, [B 131] therefore this synthetic unity precedes the concept of

⁵² See for special medical cases: Thomas Nagel, "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness," *Synthese* 22 (May, 1971), pp.396-413

combination which is the categorical unity. This unity is not quantitative, rather it is qualitative. This qualitative unity arises by the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the manifold of given representations under transcendental unity of apperception. Hence, the source of this combination is the transcendental unity of apperception.

‘These representations given in intuition all belong to me’ presuppose the case that ‘I can unite them in a single self-consciousness.’

I have representations of objects as combined. I can cognize whole, individual objects. This is an actual case. The fact that I have representations of combined whole objects is an indication of their being united in a single self-consciousness. Cognition of an object is possible only if this condition is satisfied: A manifold of given representations are synthesized in one consciousness. A possibility which is connected with the material conditions of experience is actual.

I have experiences of cognized objects. Thus the possibility of combining a manifold of given representations in one consciousness is actual.

Necessity: Kant’s assumption of our potential for combining manifold of given representations in one consciousness opens the way to the possibility of this status which can be observed as being the actual case at least in the cognition of objects. A possibility which has a determined connection with the actual, in accordance with general conditions of experience, is necessary. Therefore we can say that Kant pursues a possibility until it turns out to be a necessity. This ‘necessity of a possibility’ is of being conscious of an identical ‘I think’ with respect to representations which are given in a manifold of representations.

As Kant moves to the next step of the argument, he starts to evaluate the process of combination from the other side. Cognition consists in the determinate

relation of given representations to an object. In the concept of an object, the manifold of intuitions is united. The representation of an object as an individuated whole is another representation of the unity of manifold of intuitions. The cognition of an object requires the synthetic unity of consciousness, since its representation as unified is synthesized under it. Thus the synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition because every intuition must stand under this unity in order to become an object for me. [B 138] On the other hand if the manifold of intuitions is not given, there will be nothing to synthesize and there will not be a unity of consciousness formed by the synthesis of the representations. In order to have synthetic unity of consciousness, a manifold of intuitions must be given. Without this synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness. [B 138] Therefore the relation between the cognition of an object and synthetic unity of consciousness is reciprocal. Both parties depend on the other necessarily. Kant finds this necessary correlation to be the ground of objectively valid cognition.

Kant progresses to next stage. Understanding brings the manifold of given intuitions under a single self-consciousness by acting with the logical forms of judgment which are categories which are the logical functions of judgments. Manifold of given intuitions is brought under self-consciousness through the act of synthesizing, when understanding applies a category on representations. A judgment is nothing but combining cognitions by means of categories. Therefore Kant attains the conclusion that the manifold of given representations must stand under the categories in order to be cognized. The cognition of objects will not be possible without the employment of one or more forms of categories. They are unavoidable elements of cognition. Employment of categories is necessary for the experience of objects which provides the objective validity of empirical experience.

Contributions of the Side Arguments

Lastly, I would like to present some suggestions for the contributions of the side components to the core argument of the “Transcendental Deduction.” According to me, Kant’s early remark about the impossibility of the dissolution has very important precautions. He states this precaution in the quote below.

(...) we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves and among representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity. One can here easily see that this action must originally be unitary and equally valid for all combination, and that the dissolution (analysis) that seems to be its opposite, in fact always presupposes it; for where the understanding has not previously combined anything, neither can it dissolve anything, for only through it can something have been given to the power of representation as combined. [B 130]

Here, Kant is warning the reader before getting involved in fruitless efforts to hold further analysis for the two synthetic features that he is going to state in §§16-17.

These are the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception and the synthetic structure formed by the intimate reciprocity relation between this unity and the representation of an object. Kant has noted analyticity claims for the synthetic unity of consciousness. Here we can see that Kant’s account about the analyticity is not an arbitrary claim, in contrast to the belief of some commentators. It is an indispensable part of the story which lies in the background of the “Transcendental Deduction.” It is hard to express this story appropriately because it contains ideas which are at the very limit of our own comprehensive capabilities. The best expression is again from Kant but within another

context of one of his letters to Beck: “We must compose if we are to represent anything as composed (even space and time)”⁵³

Transcendental unity of consciousness is a unity in the qualitative sense. [B 131] As Kant considers in §12, qualitative unity is neither a concept, nor a category. It precedes all the concepts of understanding. It is the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence the possibility of the understanding even in its logical use. [B 131] Therefore synthesizing a manifold of representations under one consciousness is a combination in the qualitative sense which is similar to the combination of different components of a thought under a single complex thought. It is a necessity for the different thought pieces to be thought by one thinker in order to form a single complex thought. On the other hand, it is not necessary that all the pieces thought by one thinker will necessarily yield a single complex thought.

The qualitative unity of self-consciousness has also reflexive⁵⁴ characteristics similar to the case of a thinker who is thinking about herself, i.e., ‘I am the thinker of this thought’. As soon as the thinker is able to think the complete thought, the case that she is thinking a single thought is in actuality and necessarily she appears to be a single thinker. Here the word single implies qualitative unity when considering the unity of the thought but has quantitative connotations when it is used for the thinker. Because the categorical unity designates the identity of a thinker who is thinking the pieces of a

⁵³ I. Kant, *Correspondence*, trans. by A. Zweig, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 515:482.

⁵⁴ Bertrand Russell gives an example for the property of reflexiveness in his book *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*:

“One of the most striking instances of a “reflexion” is Royce’s illustration of the map: he imagines it decided to make a map of England upon a part of the surface of England. A map, if it is accurate, has a perfect one-one correspondence with its original; thus our map, which is part, is in one-one relation with the whole, and must contain the same number of points as the whole, which must therefore be a reflexive number. Royce is interested in the fact that the map, if it is correct, must contain a map of the map, which must in turn contain a map of the map of the map, and so on ad infinitum.”

complex thought as a single thought. Kant clearly states that 'I think' accompanies all the representations. However for the bare representation 'I' we have given nothing in the intuition. We can see why this process is totally a logical operation and the 'I' is a logical place holder. Without referring to this place holder we are not be able to think any complex thought. A transformation from the qualitative unity to quantitative categorical unity is held when we assign a quantitative unity to the synthetic unity of consciousness although it is qualitative in nature. As soon as the representations are synthesized in one consciousness, its qualitative unity becomes another representation and consequently it appears to be an object of understanding on which the understanding can apply its concepts and categories. We can observe that at this point Kant switches to 'ein' which can be translated both as 'one' or 'a' instead of just mentioning unity.

The employment of the categorical unity regarding to this second order representation of the unity of consciousness is not a paralogism in my view as long as a numerical identity with respect to any representations which it could ever possess is not attributed to the subject. Nevertheless, when the qualitative unity of thought and its thinker is replaced by the thinker's quantitative oneness as an individual, the proposition turns out to be a mere paralogism.

Because application of quantitative unity does not imply that the synthetic unity of consciousness displays necessarily simple characteristic. It stands for an abstraction for the logical employment. It is a unity which cannot be analyzed furthermore. No dissolution is possible for some synthetic structures as Kant mentions at the beginning of the B-Deduction. The synthetic unity of consciousness is such a structure and this is the reason why it is also analytic.

That is, although apperception is necessary for cognition, cognition of objects is also necessary for the unity of apperception! We may seem to have a hopeless chicken and egg problem. For, it is not just that ‘apperception’ in the sense of ‘coordination’ or ‘principle’ is necessary for cognition. ‘Apperception’ in the sense of ‘connection’ or ‘connectability’ is also necessary for cognition.⁵⁵

As Kitcher mentions the analogy of chicken-egg problem above, there is another synthetic structure in the Deduction for which any further analysis cannot be held. It is the reciprocal couple composed of the unity of consciousness and the representations of an object. The synthetic unity of consciousness carries out the act of synthesis over these representations. On the other hand, the representations must be standing all together under this unity in order to become an object for me. Without these representations there is no unity of consciousness of the subject and without synthetic unity of consciousness there is no representation of an object as an individuated whole. Allison states that; “Assuming that it is analytic that a single complex thought requires a single thinking subject (it takes one to have one), this principle is likewise analytic.”⁵⁶

“It takes one to have one.” In my view, the qualitative unity of consciousness achieved by the synthesis of representations is reflected and consequently conveyed to the representations of an object in the quantitative sense. Since manifold of given intuitions are united in the concept of an object, the categorical unity is employed in this combination. The combination does not lie in the object. The representations supposed to form an object are combined by synthesizing activities of me. The representation of the object is not totally independent of my self-consciousness as far as my capacity of combining a manifold of given intuitions under one self-consciousness is actual.

⁵⁵ Kitcher, “Kant’s Philosophy of the Cognitive Mind,” p. 191.

⁵⁶ Allison, “Reflections on the B-Deduction,” p.13.

The conditions for relating given representation of an object is nothing other than the representation of the subject. The self is the origin of all objects – both the origin and the pragmatic instance of them. The unity of the thinking subject accounts for this identification of the unity of the thinking subject accounts for this identification of the unity of representations of an object with that of the perceptions that belong to one thinking subject. The conditions a priori under which a given representation can refer to an object can be discovered in the subject. This object can be represented according to the relations of the subject and is nothing but the subjective representation itself, but generalized because I am the original of all objects.⁵⁷

As implied in the Carl's passage above, immediately after I can cognize an object as an individuated whole, I can be conscious of myself as a single cognizer as well.⁵⁸ I am one because I have a qualitative unity of consciousness. The object is one because I am one and conversely, I am one because I am able to cognize the object as being one. Oneness is assigned to the object and whatever I unite my self-consciousness upon is one.

Therefore the most fundamental application of the concept of oneness is carried out only when there is a dual structure of the cognized and the cognizer. It sounds controversial, but the oneness arises from the object-subject dichotomy or the presupposed distinction between the determined and determiner. In other words oneness is founded by a binary structure. But if remember that the relation between the cognition of an object and synthetic unity of consciousness is reciprocal and both parties depend on the other necessarily, then we can take one step further and say that they are not ultimately independent from each other. Here we can observe the effects of Kant's strange sense of objectivity. What Kant understands by objectivity may not be about distinguished, individuated objects. In the usual understanding of objectively valid

⁵⁷ Carl, "Kant's First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories," p. 16.

⁵⁸ See for a similar view: White, "Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction," p. 53.

experience, objects are accepted to be distinguished from ourselves as individuated wholes. However Kant thinks this is an analytic proposition. He does not mention it in the Deduction but in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason” of second edition:

I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs) - this is equally an analytic proposition; for other things are those that I think of as distinguished from me. But I do not thereby know at all whether this consciousness of myself would even be possible without things outside me through which representations are given to me, and thus whether I could exist merely as a thinking being (without being a human being). [B 409]

If unity of consciousness relies on the synthesis of representations of objects, and if the representations must be standing under one consciousness in order to form an object, than we cannot say that they are thoroughly distinguished from each other. If they are not independent from each other, it is always possible the representations are of an inner object. Throughout the Deduction he is trying to display the objective validity of the experience of objects which he later describes to be not distinguished from the subject.

As one of the side accounts he argues in the B-Deduction is the non-discursive ways of understanding which involves in intuiting itself, rather than thinking itself. This may yield an understanding, in which through self-consciousness all of the manifold would at the same time be given such that it can intuit itself directly. But Kant finds this not to be the case for human understanding because it can only think and must seek the intuition in the senses. [B 135] I believe he mentions this issue for blocking one of the major objections against his deduction since, in accordance with the design, it is successful only if there is a distinction between the faculties of mind as non-conceptual intuiting and discursive understanding. Moreover it is also a must in the scope of the deduction scenario that no intuition should be available for the subject to intuit itself. If the mind is not dealing with the representations supposed to emanate from outer objects,

then it is a possible situation that it is compiling merely inner representations of itself, a position which can be accepted as a type of idealism. Similarly Strawson thinks that Kant may not be so apart from other types of idealism, as he believes he is: "... in the end, to bear with unequal weight on bodies and states of consciousness. Kant, as transcendental idealist, is closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges."⁵⁹

Although Kant mentions about unconscious representations in order to answer plausible questions on this topic, I believe this account also serves for enhancing our insights about his understanding of transcendental apperception. The unity of self-consciousness is such a powerful capacity that it does not only synthesize the representations which we are conscious of but rather, it may extend over unconscious representations too. Once the transcendental unity of apperception is achieved, it may include representations whether we are conscious of them or not. Thus it is much deeper than we can be conscious of. This view sophisticates Kant's understanding of 'self', since he describes a 'self' which is similar to the structure of an onion which consists of mere layers and no kernel.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p. 22.

⁶⁰ Henrik Ibsen uses this analogy in order to portray the 'self' composed of only various layers and nothing else in *Peer Gynt* Script, Act V, Sc.5.

[Peer Gynt addresses the onion]

I'm going to peel you now, my good Peer!
You won't escape either by begging or howling.
[Takes an onion and pulls off layer after layer.]
...
What an enormous number of sheaths!
Isn't the kernel soon coming to light?
I'm blessed if it is! To the innermost centre,
It's nothing but sheaths - each smaller and smaller -
Nature is witty!

...

Peer Gynt: Tell me, then where was my real self?

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Kant has made every effort in the “Transcendental Deduction” to substantiate the objectivity of his world while presuming no more than his point of view on it. The egocentric theme of the ‘Copernican Revolution’ of Kant’s transcendental method lies in the background of the whole *Critique of Pure Reason*, even though nowhere else but in this chapter, it is made with its full force. The essence of this approach is hidden in taking the right standpoint when asking philosophical questions. Any possible experience must bear the traces of cognizer’s perspective in some way or other. According to me, the aspects of self-consciousness captured under the transcendental unity of apperception allow the ‘I’ to be a perspective upon the empirical world but does not grant it necessarily to be a part of it.

However, the transcendental unity of apperception portrays this point of view at least in a minimal sense. The aim of the “Transcendental Deduction” is to demonstrate that capacity to say ‘I’ is possible only in having objectively valid experience. Kant posits the transcendental unity of apperception as being one of the necessary conditions of cognition which is high above the categories and all concepts of the understanding.

The scope of this study is limited to sections §§15-20, the first half of the B-Deduction where Kant sets the plot of a complicated but streamlined argument towards his goal. First, I review the related philosophical works and Kant’s systematical terminology. Next, I analyze the proof structure of the argument. In order to pursue the flow of this central argument more easily, I prefer to divide the content of the text under

two headings, i.e., the main and side accounts. After a literature survey, I observe that these side accounts or problems can be accepted to have been neglected or misunderstood by most of the Kant commentators, while Henry Allison appears to be one of the pioneers in the contemporary Kant scholarship for drawing attention on the importance of some.

In this study, I try to supply extra textual supports for Allison's interpretation of the B-Deduction. I think that Kant's employment of modal clauses and the verb 'presuppose' in his literal expressions should be traced more carefully. They may be accepted to give hints for his employment of the presupposition strategy about the identity of the subject throughout the diverse representations it has in the cognition of an object or in the thinking of a thought. Additionally, I find that Kant is making use of the "Postulates of the Empirical Doctrine" which enable transition from the actuality of a possibility to the status of necessity. I suggest much may be inferred from Kant's application of these postulates of empirical thinking in the extent of such a transcendental deduction, hence it requires further evaluation.

Allison underlines Kant's emphasis on the analyticity of the synthetic unity of apperception. Together with this account, there are other claims which appear to be just small remarks or exposition of a problematic within the passage which I believe that they should be taken into consideration, since they may turn out to be powerful tools, i.e., treating the unity of the apperception as a unity in the qualitative sense immediately gives insight of a deeper interpretation. In my division these side accounts which also include statements about unconscious representations, reflect Kant's understandings of 'objectivity' and 'self'. Moreover, they help in revealing the set of premises as the conditions of Kant's philosophical path which runs on the sharp blade of the rationalist and empiricist traditions lies beneath all his opinions.

Finally, I think these side accounts are key features which enable a more penetrated readings of the “Transcendental Deduction.” A comprehensive evaluation of all the side accounts together with the main elements of its content will help to uncover the obscurity on this central passage of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and allow an improved comprehension of its content. I believe it will be much better if we ‘listen’ to every word of Kant, if we would like to hear his real story.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, H. E.. "Reflections on the B-Deduction," *Southern Journal of Philosophy XXV* (1986), pp. 1-15.
- Allison, H. E.. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Ameriks, K.. "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," *Kant Studien 69* (1978), pp. 273-287.
- Carl, W.. "Kant's First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories," in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions*, Edited by E. Förster. California: Stanford University Press, 1989.
- Guyer, P.. "Kant's Tactics in the Transcendental Deduction." In *Essays on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, edited by J.N. Mohanty. Oklahoma:University of Oklahoma Press, 1982.
- Guyer, P.. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*.New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987.
- Henrich, D.. "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique," In *Kant's Transcendental Deductions*. California: Stanford University Press, 1989.
- Hume, D.. *Treatise on Human Nature*. Book 1, 1739.
- Ibsen, H.. *Peer Gynt* Script. Act V, Sc. 5.
- Kant, I.. *Correspondence*, translated by A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,1999.
- Kant, I.. *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Press, 1998.
- Kant, I.. *Opus Postumum*, edited by Eckart Förster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Kitcher, P.. *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Kitcher, P.. "Kant's Philosophy of the Cognitive Mind" in *Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, edited by Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Leibniz, G.W.. *Principles of Nature and of Grace*. 1714.

- Longuenesse, B.. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, translated by C. T. Wolfe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Meyer, M.. "Why did Kant write two versions of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories?" *Synthese* 47, no. 3, 1983, pp. 357-383.
- Nagel, T.. "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness," *Synthese* 22, 1971, pp. 396-413.
- Paton, H. J.. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*. 1936. Reprinted, London: Routledge, 2002.
- Pereboom, D.. "Self-Understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction," *Synthese* 103, 1995, pp. 1-24.
- Pereboom, D.. "Kant's Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions," In *A Companion to Kant*, edited by Graham Bird. Hong Kong: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006.
- Russell, B.. *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. 1919. Reprinted London:Spokesman, 2006.
- Strawson, P. F.. *The Bounds of Sense*. 1966. Reprinted, London: Routledge, 2006.
- White, F.C.. *Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction*. Vermont: Avebury, 1996.