

İSTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND POLITICS:
A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE ROLE OF WESTERN ART IN POLITICS**

**M.A. Thesis by
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Programme : Political Studies

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**SANAT FELSEFESİ VE POLİTİKA:
BATI SANATI'NIN POLİTİKA'DAKİ ROLÜ
ÜZERİNE KAPSAMLI BİR ARAŞTIRMA**

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FOREWORD

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Damla Dönmez

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND POLITICS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF WESTERN ART IN POLITICS

SUMMARY

It is an indubitable fact that both Art and Politics are the necessary conditions of being human. Moreover, they are the necessary conditions of each other. Wherever Art requires Politics, Politics requires Art. Although both of the relationship is worth to be analyzed, in this thesis one pole of this is going to be taken into consideration, why Politics to require Art. Art plays an important role in Politics for various reasons. First, it brings communication; second, it devaluates and revaluates it and lastly it brings freedom. Art becomes the laughter of Politics like a revolution. Whatever the role laughter takes in life, Art functions the same in Politics.

In order to understand this relationship, first the meaning of life is sought and consequently after a conceptual analysis of it, then the place of Politics and Art are situated which answers why humans to need them. The purpose of life could be nothing but to live and living could be described only with its wellness. Hence, “living well” is accomplished via the existence of Art and Politics. Therefore, consequently what Art to be is defined. Art is experience, dialogue and festival.

As a result of these definitive properties, Art brings communication, devaluation, revaluation and lastly freedom. Art becomes what sets the political arena to survive for the process of living well. Art regenerates, renovates and revives it in accordance with the principle of becoming. Art becomes the laughter of Politics and this is exemplified in the example of Carnival, a primitive form of contemporary theater, in which the Fool and the Madman are used as laughter motifs where the role of Art in Politics is witnessed best.

SANAT FELSEFESİ VE POLİTİKA: BATI SANATI'NIN POLİTİKA'DAKİ ROLÜ ÜZERİNE KAPSAMLI BİR ARAŞTIRMA

ÖZET

Sanat ve Politika'nın her birinin insan olmanın gerekli koşullarından biri olduğu kuşku duyulmaz bir gerçektir. Ayrıca, bu iki disiplinin her biri bir diğ erinin de gerekli koşuludur. Sanat Politika'ya ihtiyaç duyarken, Politika da Sanat'a ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Her ne kadar, karş ılıklı her iki iliş ki de incelenmeye değ er olsa da bu tezde bu ilişkinin bir kutbu ile ilgilenilecektir; Politika'nın neden Sanata ihtiyaç duyduğ una. Sanat, Politika üzerinde pek çok sebepten önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Birincil olarak Sanat toplumdaki iletiş imi güçlendirir, Politika'nın değ erlerini yıkar ve onu yeniden tanımlar ve son olarak da Sanat, Politika'ya özgürlük getirir. Sanat, tıpkı bir devrim gibi Politika'nın kahkahası görevini görür. Kahkaha hayatta ne rol oynuyorsa, Sanat da Politika da aynı işlevi görür.

Bu ilişkiyi daha iyi anlayabilmek için, öncelikle hayatın anlamının ne olduğ u sorgulanacaktır. Onun kapsamlı bir analizinden sonra, insanların Sanat'a ve Politika'ya neden ihtiyaç duyduğ unun cevabını verecek olan, her ikisinin yaşamdaki yeri belirlenecektir. Buna göre, yaşamın anlamı yaşamaktan öte bir şey olmamaktır ve yaşamak da ancak iyi olarak nitelendirildiğ inde yaşamak olarak adlandırılabilir. Bu sebeple, "iyi yaşamak" Sanat ve Politika'nın varoluş u ile sağlanabilir. Bu yüzden, hemen ardından Sanat'ın ne olduğ u sorusunun tanımlanması gerekir. Sanat; deneyim, diyalog ve festivaldir.

Tüm bu tanımlayıcı özelliklerin sonucu olarak, Sanat iletiş imi ve özgürlüğ ü getirir. Politika'nın değ erlerini yıkar ve ona yeni değ erler üretir. Politik arenanın "iyi yaşama" sürecinde varlığını devam ettirmesini sağlar. Onu, oluşma ilkesine uyumlu olarak, yeniden üretir, canlandırır ve tazeler. Sanat, Politika'nın kahkahası olur ve bu da modern tiyatronun ilkel hali olan Karnaval temasıyla son bölümde örneklendirilmektedir. Karnaval'da kullanılan Soyтары ve Deli imgelerinin de kahkaha motifleri olarak kullanılış ının incelenmesi ile Sanat'ın Politika'daki rolü daha iyi algılanabilecektir.

1. INTRODUCTION

What is the role of Art in Politics? Why do we need it? What is that delicate but necessary relationship that each has with one another? These basic questions would be tried to be answered throughout this thesis.

Art is without doubt one of the major activities of human beings that make each of us human, truly human. It is one of the most distinguishing aspects of humanity from the other living beings. Only we have the imaginative power of creating and producing things that symbolizes and represents the world around us, and “what goes on within our heads” (Spivey, 2005, p. 13). It is the creation process, the only realm, where man is able to produce things into existence from non-existence. Humans make Art and without doubt, Art makes us humans (Spivey, 2005, p. 1).

However, why do we do it? Why do we tell stories, paint and draw what we realize or imagine, why do we sing and compose songs and why do we share all these with one another and connect with the environment? The existence of Art in human nature dates back to pre-historic times. Archeological studies and discoveries still display various drawings from numerous sites from the world as the caves of Lascaux and Peche Merle in France, Altamira in Spain etc. indicate (ibid.). However, in Arnhem Land, Australia a very rare and interesting artwork is witnessed made by the pre-historic humans. This artwork shows a red hand image painted on a rock surface. Its date is not known, but this very old hand drawing indicates to a very important feature of why humans made Art: “hands cannot be represented without hands” (Spivey, 2005, p. 8), or likewise a painting from a more recent age indicates, in the *Anatomical Lecture of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp*, Rembrandt paints a surgeon with an emphasis on his hands, “hands cannot dissect without hands” (ibid.). Art is what lets us understand ourselves; it becomes our consciousness and our meaning. By means of Art, human being “observes himself, makes himself present to his imagination and thought” (Hegel, 1976, p. 400). It opens the door to the realization of the self. It becomes our representation and our reflection. In Schopenhauer’s own words (2006), life without Art “will be like making one’s toilet without a mirror” (p. 28) or in Gadamer’s (1986):

Play of Art is not a realm that helps us to forget ourselves. But rather, it is s a mirror that through the centuries constantly arises anew and in which we catch sight of ourselves in a way that is often unexpected or unfamiliar what we are, what we might be and what we are about.
(p. 130)

Therefore, it is an indubitable fact that Art is a very necessary condition of being human.

Moreover, likewise Art, there is another distinctive feature of human beings, which is intrinsic to their nature: Politics. Many philosophers starting from the Antiques to the contemporaries had acknowledged this. The one of the most well known is to reside in Aristotle (2001) that humans are political by nature, they are *zoon politikon* (1253a4). According to him, humans are distinctive from any other “gregarious animal” because they are able to act, speak and judge. As a political animal, one would find itself in a community with the ability of judging action as good and bad, beautiful or not. This also includes the social nature of human beings. Again, as Aristotle (2001) asserts no human being could exist without a community, if he does he would be either “a God or a beast” (1253a10, 27).

Hence, the Greek classic antiquity agreed that the highest form of human life was the one spent in a polis (Arendt, 2006, p. 63) and wherever the man goes, he inevitably becomes a polis (Arendt, 1958, p. 198). In addition, in Latin the word “to live” had always overlapped with the idiom “*hominess esse*, to be in the company of men”, meaning that no human being could exist apart from his companies and even the life of the saints is emphasized to be a life shared and lived with other men (Arendt, 2006, p. 73). Hence, Politics is a distinctive and distinguishing factor of being human. It is our nature.

Then, the purpose of this thesis would be to link these two necessary conditions of being human to each other. What is this relationship between Art and Politics? What kinds of effects do these two integral and inseparable parts of being human have on each other?

It is an indubitable fact that an analysis between Art and Politics with one another would be a very interesting and important work. Although each relationship on one another would be worth to be interrogated, however a reduction on the scope of the question is requisite to be made. Since this would require a very detailed and long work, one part of it would be handled through this thesis: the role of Art in Politics;

why it to be an important and indispensable factor for Politics and what affects to bring on it.

Many of the philosophers had discussed this relationship between Art and Politics through the history. It has been asserted even that Politics is an Art itself. As Arendt (1958) asserts, even Democritus and Plato acknowledges Politics to be a *techne*, a type of Art because of its similarity to the activities of healing and navigation, in which the end-product lies in the excellence of the performance of the actor, like a dancer or a play-actor (p. 207). The product becomes the performing art itself.

This attribution and link of Politics to Art had been debated generally in Antiques. According to them Politics was a performative act, in which like flute-playing or dancing would require virtuosity in the performance. Hence, since the performance Arts' accomplishments lies not in the end product but rather in the precise action, performance of that action at that immediate moment, Politics is defined as a performing Art (Arendt, 2006, p. 152). Then, the excellence of it is defined by the actions. It has been also asserted that the realm of actions is the realm of Politics. In addition, for an action to be an action, it should be nothing but free. Hence, as Arendt (2006) remarks "the *raison d'être* of Politics is freedom and its field of experience is action" (p. 152). What "acts" is what in the truest sense "exists" (McCumber, 1989, p. 49) and freedom is action's *sine qua non*. Action is the beginning, everything starts with action, to be born is even an action. Hence, with the creation of man, the principle of beginning also come into being which also means that the principle of freedom is created even man was not created (Arendt, 1958, p. 176). Freedom is what makes an action to be an action; an action is what makes Politics, and Politics is what makes a man to be truly man.

Therefore, throughout this thesis, Art to bring freedom into Politics will be argued. Moreover, it will be asserted that Art will devalue, revalue the meanings and bring communication by being itself a language. Art will act in Politics like laughter acts in life. Its role in Politics would be compared to the functions of laughter.

In order to reach that conclusion and analyze it however, some preliminary and primordial facts would be interrogated first. Hence, to reveal the relationship between Art and Politics, primarily the meaning of life will be searched. It is an indubitable fact that all the concepts, theories, deeds and disciplines in life have

arisen with respect to the meaning that we attribute to it. Without an interrogation of what life is and what meaning we attribute to it, a discussion regarding the relationship between Art and Politics would be hollow and insubstantial.

Therefore, the first chapter would evolve around the question what the meaning of life to be, why we to live, what meaning it to forsake. Then on, the place of Art and Politics in life will be situated, why we to need them and as what. Thus, I argue that life has no meaning beyond itself. It is like a play that is a non-purposeful act, played for the sake of its pleasure and joy. It is like a performing art as well which to gain its excellence from its performance to be well. Hence, the only purpose of life could be to be “lived well”. Art and Politics would be defined as the sub-plays of this main play, life, and be its necessary elements for living well to come into existence.

Consequently, what Art to be and what its outcomes are in Politics would be analyzed. In the third chapter, Art would be defined as experience, dialogue and festival. On this issue, it would be an experience because it would attribute the properties of play as well. It will not have any purpose for any utility but rather would take its existence from its own self, as an end in itself. In addition, the interaction between the human beings and their environments would be reflected upon it as an experience. It would not head for any destination but itself would be the journey. Second, Art would be dialogue. Dialogues are communication processes, they are eternal dialectics that seek to find the truth not by means of finding it readymade in the head of someone or somewhere but rather seek to produce and form it in the process’ outcome. The truth forever abides in an open ended, unfinalized third position outside the speaker and the listener. It cannot be found “readymade” in somebody’s mind (Bakhtin, 1996, pp. 139, 150). Hence the artist or the spectator never is the truth but rather the interaction between them becomes. Hence, Art exists in the categories of the not-yet-existing; being means being in the process of becoming between the artist and the spectator, between the spectator and the artwork and between the artwork and the artist. Lastly, Art will be denoted as festival where time resides in an autonomous realm and universality is reached where people encounter one another with joy and freedom.

In the fourth chapter, with respect to the existence of Art and its afore-mentioned characteristics the effects of it in Politics would be analyzed. What would be asserted would be that it to bring communication, act as a critique and devaluate its meanings,

consequently reevaluate them with the prior knowledge of them to be deteriorated next, and lastly bring freedom. However, an important notification is needed to be made here because Art will not seek to bring these outcomes with an intention but rather these would come out as a result of its existence's natural effects. It should be just like the essence of experience that Art to be an accumulation of movements to form a final completion by itself, without an intentional effort and hustle. The conclusion or the function would not be a separate and independent thing, but the consummation of movements.

One of the first would be communication; Art is a kind of language and language is the indispensable form of communication. Hence, Art will enable the subjects of the polis to communicate, beware of each other and come into an agreement. Second, Art will devalue and revalue the meanings in Politics. It will act as a critique, form new ones and then criticize them again, in a vicious circle. The role of Art in this way will be best explained by the devaluation of meanings in the world like the way critical history will do itself of, as Nietzsche and Foucault would signify. It will act like a critique, devalue and destroy the meanings of the existence for the proper functioning of becoming to come into place. Hence, lastly it will bring the freedom. This freedom would be both in the sense of emancipation and political. However, it should not be forgotten that as Arendt (2006) remarks without the utterance of an external freedom, no word about inner freedom could be made (p. 147). The social being of man makes one beware of his outer freedom before the inner one.

Hence, in the last chapter the role of Art in Politics would be compared to laughter. It will be argued that Art is the laughter of Politics. Likewise laughter, it criticizes and devalues the norms; likewise laughter, it lets the subjects to communicate and have an interaction with one another and likewise laughter, it brings freedom. Therefore, utilization of laughter in Art would also intensify and strengthen these above-mentioned outcomes. And the best example of this would be given from Carnival, which to be the source of contemporary theater with a slight distinction where the actor, writer and the spectator to be the folk itself and fused into one another and consequently the motifs of laughter used in Art for the proof of these effects will be given as the Fool and the Madman.

2. WHAT IS LIFE?

2.1 The Question of the Meaning of Life

Mankind has always been on the interrogation of life itself. What is it? What value should it forsake? Is there a meaning lying intrinsic to it or something ahead of it? What conditions does the human existence take inside? What is the essence of being? Or is there any essence at all? Could I denote it with solely as “absurd” or something with “utility”? What was “Being-in-this-world”? What was Existence? What was life and/or why was there life and/or how was to live that life? For years the authors and philosophers of every various thought has interrogated life as a primary step in order to lead to other notions. All of them had tried to find the meaning of life, or at least asked if there a meaning of life is at all. The answers had varied from the ancients to the contemporaries, but the question had never ceased hounding them.

Therefore, the question of the meaning of life had shaped and gave rise to many other disciplines in life and caused the man to ask who he is and what he does. The main questions of philosophy asking, “What the human-being is, how far he can know, and how he should live” had resulted in interpreting being as an ethical, political and aesthetic entity in the question of the meaning of life. Due to that, in order to clarify these concepts and find their meanings and reasons for their existence, the initial question to handle will be nothing but life. The question of the meaning of life, with the background interrogations of being and human condition will be tried to be resolved.

In order to start with a clear conception of this interrogation, we can begin with one of the most famous allegories of the concept. Although the story is an ancient eastern story with an anonymous origin, who carries to our age is Tolstoy. Tolstoy (2000) depicts in his book *My Confessions* the allegory of a traveler running from a beast. “Long ago has been told the eastern story about the traveler who in the steppe is overtaken by an infuriated beast” (p. 12). In order to save himself, this traveler jumps into a waterless well. However, at the bottom of this well there is a dragon waiting for him with his jaws open. Just at that time, the “unfortunate man” sees a twig of a

wild bush and holds onto it, but in seconds he sees two mice as well, nibbling the twig endlessly; one white, one black as well as some drops of honey on the leaves of the bush. Since the mice would make him fall to the jaws of the dragon inevitably, the traveler finds the only solution to spend his last moments as good as possible and starts licking the honey drops.

Now, in the analysis, it would not be a surprising fact to claim that the two mice would signify the day and night, as black and white and the unfortunate traveler will be jumping into the well of “life” which in the end he would inevitably face his ultimate end; death as the dragon (p. 13). Everybody would be asking what all these will mean. As Tolstoy poses, after a while, the honey will stop giving pleasure and the “fame, prosperity or acquaintances” would not suffice. Then the question will be asked once more, why all this fanfare? Why to live and live for what? Where is the meaning, if there is any?

2.2 The Question of Being

The first issue to handle for the clarification of the all above-mentioned mayhem would indubitably come from the question of being. What is being? Many philosophers through the ages from the antiques to the contemporaries have tried to answer this question with varying answers. The main distinctive factor for the answers to the question of being was the varying notions of its purpose: either to have it as an external, or in other words as teleologically or as an interior purpose, intrinsically. On the one hand there laid the clamors of the teleological arguments such as Plato’s, that this being was nothing but shadows of the fire and the reality, the sun was out there in the realm of ideas and on the other hand that attributing a purpose to living is meaningless like the existentialists claim, it is absurd. In order to grasp better, let’s take a look briefly what they were discussing.

For Plato (2001), the world that we see and live is composed of “illusions”, like the prisoners in a cave chained with their backs to the door and their eyes on the wall, what we see is just the shadows of various entities that are played in front of a fire by a puppeteer behind us. The reality is out of the cave where there is the Sun and the Ideal forms of entities (514b-516b). As could be seen, what Plato asserts is that Reality is not in this world; regarding this life as “the real” will be believing in illusions. Likewise Plato’s view of reality, the teachings of monotheistic religions

had denoted life with extrinsic properties as well. It is a widely known concept that, theologically, this life is lived for “the other life”. There is a heaven and a hell waiting for each human being with respect to their sins and innocence in this world. Living is again with a teleological content; it is for “some other world after death”.

As well as the extensive purposeful life explanations, there also exist the intrinsic claims of purposes. The defenders of intrinsic purposes assert that life does not have any meaning beyond itself. For them, being could have been explained only with the concept of being itself. And that is exactly what I would be in support of. However, how to reach that thesis will be exactly from the pole of teleological to the deontological. What I mean by this could be depicted best by Aristotle. Aristotle with his explanations regarding the being of living things clarifies all the questions that have been suspended prior to the question of being and living respectively.

According to Aristotle (1984), the existence of an object can find its meaning with respect to its function, in a teleological way. He asserts that, the identity of each thing can be defined according to its “*ergon*”, the function, purpose or with its characteristic activity. This can be objectified with respect to each concrete item that we value around us (199a4-8). Consequently, he asks what the “*ergon*” of living things is. What is the function of living beings? He answers this enigmatic question with an inspiring answer. For him, living beings are things with a special kind of form. Their function is to maintain and reproduce themselves, “their being is to live” (415b12). It has a form that could have been named as “self-maintaining” (415b15). Therefore, with a teleological initiation of questioning, because of the special condition of living beings, he comes to respond it with intrinsic purposes. A living thing becomes its own end, its “*ergon*” or function becomes maintaining and “producing another like itself” (415a28) And all the design that it is made of, the organs, instincts and natural activities are for the sake of this end.

The way Aristotle replies to the question of being with an intrinsic answer, almost a millennium later, a similar answer is given to the question of being by Martin Heidegger. Heidegger (1973) has given a one-word reply to the question: *Dasein*, meaning “Being-in-the-World”. He asserts that *Dasein* does not mean anything except “simply being there”. He asserts that there is no more comprehension rather than living’s fundamental ontology, “the disclosedness of being to its essential character”. For him, being should not be taken in sub-concepts but rather as a whole.

“Dasein’s existential spatiality which would determine its “location” would be grounded in Being-in-the-world” (p. 176). The world can be defined within the world and by the world. Being-in-the-world will be clarified through its sole self. Moreover, he asserts that the characteristic of Dasein is “throwness” to this world. Indeed, one finds himself “there” by the fact of “being delivered over”. Dasein finds itself always before itself, “not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has” (ibid.).

Another reply to the question of being comes from Sartre (1993). His utterance is solely: “existence precedes the essence” (p. 63). Therefore, starting the interrogation of life with a foreword is erroneous. “Existence is simply to be there” (p. 60) or if one existed, he existed all the way. Since humans would understand their existence only in their own terms, then remembering the first allegory would be efficient: the eastern traveler running from an infuriated beast and jumping into the well. The mistake of allegory is easy not to be overlooked: man jumping *into the well*. But is this really so? Do we choose to *dwell into the life* or rather do we *find ourselves in the life* ? The answer will be finding oneself *in the life* , existing *in the world* , with nothing else preceding it. Then, existence would not be a kind of thing to be grasped from a distance; but it would just occupy one, conquer and overcome above the one, “weighing heavily on the heart like a great motionless beast” and being, nothing else more (Sartre, 1993, p. 64).

Richard Taylor (2000) gives one of the best explanations regarding the same quest. He mentions that the larva of a certain cicada burrows itself underneath the earth for seventeen years. And when the seventeen years is over, he comes to the surface of the earth lies eggs and dies next. What is more is this process continues “season after season” without an end: the cicada burrows himself for seventeen years, comes on earth, lies eggs and dies, then again the new borns burrow themselves for seventeen years, come on earth, lie eggs and die next. This becomes an eternal cycle whose purpose raises questions.

Not only this but also, he gives the example of the birds who would fly along the entire globe each year just to make sure that the others would follow the same path again and again (p. 171). If life could be compared to a ship on which everything to exist, it could have been defined only by its state of being tossed to each side by

every wave and wind, “a ship heading for no port and no harbor, with no rudder, no compass, no pilot, just simply floating for a time” (Taylor, 2000, p. 136).

Then, these entire explanations lead one linger on the idea of life to have no meaning beyond itself. Since humans exist in a world where everything is given and nothing is explained, maybe the search of a value or of metaphysics would be to be devoid of any other meaning (Camus, 1991, p. 135). What else would be left to the humans rather than defining it by his own living conditions? As Camus (1991) puts it, man would know and would not know the meaning and sometimes it would be impossible just how to know it because humans are able to understand only in human terms (p. 51). Therefore, an exterior purpose to the question of being is not satisfactory, because existence devotes its meaning by its own.

2.2.1 The peculiarities of being

The phrases of “the existence to denote its meaning on its own” and “understanding in human terms” lead us to the concept of “absurdity”. If it could be recalled, “absurdity” is a term that had been used by Camus (1991) to signify the peculiarity of existence. According to him, the most suitable example for the peculiarity of this Being-in-the-world can be derived from the Myth of Sisyphus. The Myth proposes the meaningless effort of Sisyphus who had been condemned by the Gods, to push up a stone to the summit of a mountain. However, as each time he manages to bring it to the summit, the stone starts to fall down to the other side and the burden of Sisyphus repeats itself over and over; always bringing the stone back to the summit with not an instant of ending. To the Gods, without doubt, “futile and hopeless labor” had been maintained to be the most dreadful punishment that could be given (p. 119). That would be the reason why Camus would make a simile of this myth to the question of being that the life is nothing but a “hopeless and futile labor”; trying to bring the rock back to the top without a stop, incessantly, aimlessly.

However, as Camus (1991) asserts there is just one way out from this vicious circle which is nothing but “consciousness”. It could be only with the self-consciousness of Sisyphus over his actions that he could be rescued from his ultimate punishment. Each instant, with the consciousness of his suffering, he would mark in his mind not to reach the end, but to keep on pushing, since there would be no “ultimate ends” but just the struggle itself. He to gain his superiority over his fate will come with that.

The time for Sisyphus to become stronger than his rock as well as being the hero of his myth will be with the rising of his consciousness, since each tragedy would begin with the consciousness of the protagonist (p. 121).

That would be why not all the existences of every entity on earth would be absurd; for example either the life of a mouse or an orbit of the moon to be absurd could be asked. Although they do not involve any strivings or aims as well, it is seen clear-cut that they both lack a type of self-consciousness or self-transcendence which would enable them to see that they are just a mouse or an orbit (Nagel, 1993, p. 96). Self-realization is the one that makes humans beware of their properties of existence, giving answers to the question of being. A self-conscious Sisyphus pushing up a stone just with the value of effort, although knowing that the rock would never stand on top would endow one to imagine him happy, for real happy (Camus, 1991, p.123).

In short, it could be deduced above that the absurd would be the incompatibility of man with the world. It could even be observed in the “seriousness” of men with their lives as well as having the “perpetual possibility” of it to be demolished at the forthcoming second. It is the incompatible contradiction of arbitrariness and steadiness (Nagel, 1993, p. 88) or in other words, “it is the confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world; the irrational, the absurd and the human nostalgia are born out of their encounter” (Camus, 1991, p. 28).

As a consequence of absurdity, another peculiarity of being would rise which is called; the vanity of existence. For many thinkers, the greatest consequence of existence’s vanity is boredom. The infinite nature of Time and Space with the contrast nature of human’s finitude is revealed most evident through these (Schopenhauer, 2006, p. 11). As Schopenhauer (2006) poses in better words, the meaningless and worthless characteristics of life and its vanity is evidenced with nothing better than the reality of boredom, the occupation of nothing (p. 13).

Boredom could be generally resembled to one pole of human life. If life is taken as a pendulum, the human existence would swing back and forth between boredom and pain (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 312). Likewise, in the example of The Myth of Sisyphus, it is not a misjudging action to regard the deed of Sisyphus as a picture of infinite boredom: doing the same activity over and over again. The previous contemplation of life with the characteristics of pointlessness is now endowed with

the attribution of eternal absence (Taylor, 2000, p. 173). Nevertheless, the linkage between the consciousness and boredom should not be overlooked. Contrary to the function of absurdity, consciousness of boredom renders it to get closer to vanity. It is a form of suffering only possible in conscious beings: a consciousness deriving from nothing but time itself. Therefore, the next title concerning the question of being will be its parameters as time, space and mortality.

2.2.2 The parameters of being

Humans are indubitably conditioned by the parameters of time and space. Time as being the basic signifier of human condition is told over and over through the ages. It has been named as the naughty kid of the universe, the most ephemeral one or has been regarded as the fourth dimension reminding the limits of life incessantly, with no slightest stop but always on the image of running. The flow of time marks the reality of nature to be illusory and ever-fleeting. As Schopenhauer (2006) declares “time continually presses upon us, never lets us take breath, but always comes after, like a taskmaster with a whip” (p. 11). When it feels to stop, then the unfortunate misery of boredom starts, marking the humanity to be nothing but a toy of time, itself.

In other words, the question of being is like a rundown from the slope of a hill, one indubitably falls on the occasion of a halt; or it is like a planet, which crushes to its sun at the verge of a cease. “Unrest is the mark of existence” (ibid.). Hence, time is the great illusion in which each second is the death of its father’s existence. It is the ever passing moment into meaninglessness with an illusory fact. All beginning starts in time, which does not comprise of any beginning at all (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 31).

And consequently, just like time another important parameter of existence is Space. It is without doubt that humans comprehend and interpret their existence with respect to their coordinates, regarding the amount of place that they take place. For Schopenhauer (1969), space is the other principle of sufficient reason (p. 7). Since everything exists simultaneously in space and time, everything proceeds from causes or motives, maintaining a relative existence.

Moreover, the biggest truism or maybe the only truism that man confronts rather than knows from the first second on the world is that he is mortal. In the end of

everything, one knows that there is only death and nothing else beyond it (Camus, 1991, p. 89). If one aims to seek the objective and concrete aim of life, then it would be nothing but dying (Dienstag, 2006, p. 46). However, could it be true? Could the idea of a dragon waiting at the end of the well be the only end of living? Hence, the mortality of man will determine a necessary amount of the question of the meaning of life.

2.3 Life as Becoming

Taking all these in view, then the notion of being stands as a problematic concept. If an end to be looked for is aimless, if the purpose rests in itself but nothing beyond, then the activity of living could not be a progress but rather a process. Therefore as Arendt (1958) denotes “in the place of the concept of being, we now find the concept of process” (p. 304). This results not only just because of being and inferentially living to be a process but all also because of nature to be a process itself (Arendt, 2006, p. 62). Hence, this process property of being will be denoted with “Becoming”.

This is also justified by the claim of this whole process to be a chaos. Because then, the next question will be if there is disorder and derangement as rule, how can one stand still? Or rather as Schopenhauer (2006) poses, how can an acrobat on a rope where nothing is to endure and in a whirlpool of change could keep erect all time? Can it dwell where, “continual becoming and never being is the sole form of existence” (p. 12)? If the whole process is a process with no ultimate end, nothing but the term of Kant’s “the purposiveness with no purpose” suits more than anything else. In order to comprehend better, the subsequent analysis is going to dwell on this.

2.3.1 Life: purposivity without purpose

According to Kant (2000), the notion of “purposiveness” can be defined by finality, “*forma finalis*”. Purposiveness would be the property of having been produced according to a concept (p. 67). Life is indubitably produced according to a concept, but what this concept is hidden or is not cognizable by the capacities of men since his existence is defined by the spatial-temporal boundary. Burnham (2000) interprets the purposiveness as “the property of having or appearing to have a purpose” (p. 31). It

includes the aim of having a purpose but does not indicate or seek for an objective, definite or external purpose.

On the other hand, purpose means the end. “It contains the ground of the actuality of the object” (Kant, 2000, p. 18). However, according to Kant, the nature does not entail the attribution of a clear and exterior purpose but rather shows itself like an artwork for which the flowers, rocks or oceans could be given as an example, how and for what to be produced to be known not. Nevertheless, this purposiveness of nature can be a profound experience. There is no objective or determinate purpose, and if there is, it is not cognizable (ibid.).

The concept of “process” entails directly the “purposiveness.” A process is without an end and without a beginning. It should not be defined by linearity, but rather with circularity. Hence, the understanding of time also changes. If there is no “telos” of life, if everything acts on the condition of becoming and everything acts in the form of a circle, then there is no first time or last time but only links or series. This notion is best explained by the metaphor of globe. Remembering the disputes about the nature of globe either to be flat like a tray or circular like a sphere; one should remember that the globe is sphere, it does not have an end or a beginning. If someone sails around the globe, starting from London, although leaving it behind, London will always be ahead of him (Sorabji, 2006, p. 318). Just like it, time should also be conceived like a sphere. There exists no sense of distinction between past and future. Sorabji (2006) recites about Alcmaeon, the philosopher of the 5th century who made a remark that since a circle has no beginning; people could have been immortal; because they could join their beginning to their end (p. 328). Therefore, this circularity of time changes the meaning of life. That is why an absurd life or a story would start and end with the same events, echoing in Camus (1991) “the last pages of a book will already be contained in the first pages of it” (p. 11).

Similarly, the notion of circular time will also be headed upon “mortality” which seems as “the end of existence” literally. It is clear that with the notion of becoming, none of the living beings will be same in old age as they used to be in their youth and in their future. It would exactly be the way as old and wise Heraclitus had said “no one would step into the same river twice”. Hence, with time so many deaths are undergone at each second. As Seneca utters if every moment is the death of its previous state, is there any need of a fear for some time happen which do happen

every day? The problem lies on the existence of a fear for one, single death. Death would not be the single and only one, but just the last one (Url-1). As a result of all these remarks, it becomes evident that all individual substances are in flux and motion, letting go some parts of theirs and receiving others coming from elsewhere. The verses of Heraclitus; “The death of fire to become the birth of air, and the death of air to become the birth of fire” is a good proof of this principle of life (Url-2).

Moreover, the numbers and quantities are also other examples for Becoming. All of them never remain same but always get different. There is always coming and going and hence, there is always change. The process is becoming. As Plato (1997) utters in *Theaetetus*:

What is really true is this: the things of which we naturally say that they *are*, are in process of coming to be, as the result of movement and change and blending with one another. We are wrong when we say they *are*, since nothing ever is, but everything is coming to be. (152e)

Then, it is not a surprising notion to declare all things to be “offspring of flow and change” (ibid.). As Plutarch recites the truth lies in the declaration of a custom that life works on the basis of creation and destruction rather than growth and diminution (Url-3).

So, the question of being is eliminated by the concept of becoming, by the process of alteration, which is the absurdity of losing each moment while living in each moment. Not to anticipate anyone to stay still or be a single person but become many; as Plutarch poses:

No one abides, no one is; we that come into being are many, while matter is driven around, and then glides away, about some one appearance and a common mould. Else how is it, if we remain the same, that the things in which we find pleasure now are different from those of a former time; that we love, hate, admire, and censure different things; that our words are different and our feelings; that our look, our bodily form, our intellect are not the same now as then? (Url-2)

2.3.2 Life by just living

Therefore, a search of life with a significant and ultimate end would be frivolous. There is no ultimate meaning in existence (Schlick, 1993, p. 129); rather the life will solely derive its meaning and comprehension from life itself. For Vassaf (1997), the life will compose of one, unique aim: “to live till the end” (p.60). As long as it is overwhelmed by the shadows of purposes, life is totally devoid of meaning. Hence, it

could be asserted that life's aim should be regarded as an aim unto itself, a purpose in itself, but as nothing else.

A human being can gather all his energy of living, all the necessary realities and meanings of nature and life from the point of living. He will no more ask whether living is an activity to be worth or to have a value with compared to the worms and birds, but will simply live, in the manner that his nature will be to live. According to Schopenhauer (2006), the great philosopher of pessimism, this is just "the will to live" (p. 21); life to have a value in itself; to be worthwhile just by living. He claims (2006) "your existence is the universal will to live" (p. 21). Therefore, the notion of existence to be linked with "the will to live" is not a contradiction but is rather compliance.

With reminiscences to Schopenhauer, it is noteworthy; to follow the discussion with one of his most influenced reader, Nietzsche (2009), to declare that the secret of pain will reside just in becoming (p. 54) and no causalities or purposes regarding the art of life will exist. For him, everything is merely the consequences of chances, in chaotic sense, such as to be no one to command, no one to obey and no one to trespass and the existing things are never infinite and stable but always on the version of a change, always "in flux". As a matter of fact, his idea of "being in flux" affects his ideas regarding the time causing him to assert in Zarathustra: "Everything passes away, therefore everything deserves to pass away" (Nietzsche, 1976, p. 252). The one would have to let the time pass away without lingering on the realities of later or yesterday but just "today".

The whole reality or truth would lie in the present. In a life with a characteristic of absurd, the living ones would have to suffice with the apartness of time. They need to reject the "regrets" and be incapable of looking at portraits (Camus, 1991, p. 72). The only solace for the living beings would be making the present as the supreme object of life, embracing the life as being itself, as an end in itself, just on the moment. Then, the best psychological effort in order to cope with would be to live in the present, and not in the future (Sorabji, 2006, p. 319). The best example, according to many authorities, of the actualization of "present" comes from the great narration of Don Quixote. According to Dienstag, Don Quixote is like a freelance wanderer who changes and accommodates whatever comes wrong into his way and goes on with the following motto "Do now what must be done now and do here what must be

done here” (2006, p. 151). In short, if one starts to search for the forever it would not be in anywhere else but in the present.

2.4 Life as Play

Taking all these facts into view, if a human race liberated from all tormenting purposes, all oppressive cares is needed (Schlick, 1993, p. 133), if the spatio-temporal dependency of human condition will not reveal any kind of life meaningful rather than the present existence, how can one accentuate it? It is no doubt that a life dealt with distant goals of all times will lose all its creation power (Schlick, 1993, p. 135), therefore another question emerges to be replied: how can we put becoming in process and take the “present” as our sole reality without ultimate purposes but purposiveness? This is the key point for the ongoing discussion. And the reply would be a single unique word: life to be regarded as “play”¹. Life taken as play would entail all the above mentioned ideas because of its own definition. It would cause it to seek no ultimate end but fulfill it with purposiveness of having no purposes. There would be just now, and no dependency of time and space. The well-being of the living ones would accentuate with its free and joyful action. The spatio-temporal determinations of man will be surpassed within the ephemeral rules and limits. In order to comprehend the notion better; it is better to seek thoroughly into the concept.

2.4.1. The concept of play

Play...What is a play? What are the basic elements that a play composes of? It is not a hard question to clarify regarding the above-mentioned ideas so far. Play is the free, purposeless action including its purpose in itself. One of the most significant factors of it is to be an occupation restricted to the limits of time and space and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy and consciousness (Huizinga, 2010, p. 50). The play creates a safe and free sphere between the boundaries of human condition, the space and time. It indicates an ephemeral exit for the absurd existence of human condition in the highest and most continuous way. However, for a world existing in a web of determinist relations with respect to time and space, play is completely

¹ Although this proper noun called “play” could have some similarities with the noun “game”, game is a form of play. Games are generally the type of plays, which do include competition and rivalry, but play introduces a more general theme.

“superabundant”, meaning the unnecessary one (Huizinga, 2010, p. 20) In other words, the play is a superabundant entity “with no purpose” but is a necessary condition of life by its “purposiveness”.

A comprehensive analysis of play has been made by Huizinga (2010) in his work *Homo Ludens*. *Homo Ludens* literally means “Man the Player” or the “Playing Man”. According to Huizinga play is the core element “in” culture, attention that there is an emphasis on the proposition, it is not “of” but “in”. That is the reason why the translator had also tried to give the title of the book as *Homo Ludens: The Play Element in Culture*. The reason is play is not a sign of culture but rather culture itself has been established with the characteristics of play (foreword, unnumbered page). It is more ancient than culture itself (p. 1). “Culture does not come *from* play like a babe detaching itself from the womb: it arises in and as play, and never leaves it” (p. 173).

2.4.2 The reason for life to be play

If life is to have no other end rather than the whole thing being the end, taken as a process rather than a progress, then it would be the best comparison as mentioned above to simile it to “the play”. However, one should pay attention to the view that although the play looks like a cutoff and relaxation from life, it is not an exceptional and separate aspect of it. This has been a complete incomprehension because play accompanies and completes the life as whole; it becomes a part of it (Huizinga, 2010, p. 26). Moreover, play as Huizinga (2010) maintains, is an activity that is done “seriously”. You have to obey the rules of the play or otherwise you will be out of it. Therefore, the misconception of “seriousness” to be the opposite of play needs to be disregarded and the contrary of it should be perceived as “non-play” (p. 69).

One of the basic compliance of play with life would be its purposiveness without having purposes. As has been mentioned previously play is a non-purposeful activity. This idea of “purposiveness without purposes” also complies with the absurdity of life that entails the notion to have no value rather than itself. It is important to remember that the absurd is carried as long the absence of hope, a continual rejection and a conscious dissatisfaction is implied. The absurd is in accordance with the view of life as play, since the absurdity of life does not look for anything else beyond it. A life with people bustling around eagerly as if to live on world forever, but with the

reality that mortality is to be always on the tip of the nose is enrolled with the highly intrinsic attributes of absurdity and is directly the essential characteristics of play.

Hence, if life and its meaning are comprehended with respect to the notion of a play, it is no doubt that we will be in need of rules, players and entities to play. In order to be in life and set the purpose of living, as Aristotle mentions, enactment of living characteristics and carrying it onto the other generations, then some instruments to play is needed in order to play well. This “wellness” is highly an important element for the play. Because as Huizinga (2010) declares play does not have any other purpose rather than its own being “as being a play” (p. 50) and as Arendt (2006) interprets the words of Aristotle, “being for living creatures” becomes life and “being-forever” corresponds “to procreation” (p. 41), then what will set the notion of “playing as playing”, or “living as living”? This will indubitably be judged for the aforementioned actions to be actualized with respect to their properness and their well actualizations. Living will be living when it is done “well” just like the play will be a play when it is played with respect to its rules, conditions and for its sake, when it is played “well”. Right at this point, a concept of Aristotle is highly significant to mark in order to clarify the notion of “wellness”. He (2001) declares that what makes life choice worthy is maintained by the term “eudaimonia” (1097b2). Although this term has been translated into English generally as “happiness”, what I would like to take it in use will be more with respect to its etymological sense which I believe offers a deeper interpretation for the reader. “Eudaimonia” consists of two Greek words: “eu” and “daimon”. Whereas, “eu” would mean “well being”, “daimon” is translated generally as “spirit”. Therefore, the translation will literally mean “well being of the spirit”, or as some authorities take into use as “living well” (Nehamas, 2000, p. 67). Therefore, in order to answer the question of being as becoming and Life as Play, it is a necessary condition that we need to take this as clue that will set a play to be a play and life as life. As Dewey asserts; the truism of “life is life” is distinguished as “a continuing activity as long as it is life at all” with its “wellness” (Dewey, 1930, p. 135).

Naturally, in order for this “well being” or “living well” to come into existence, some other mediums are needed as instruments of life. They will enable the spirit to flourish by making the absurdity and vanity of existence more bearable, by letting the consciousness to prevail and determinations of space-time to break. These

instruments which will evoke “eudaimonia” into presence would be “Art” and “Politics” respectively. Life as the main form of play would compose of these mentioned sub-plays. They will enable life to be life with the principle of Becoming, deriving from and meddling with the concepts of “production” and “action”. They will be the necessary conditions of “eudonomia”, as well as forming their own play-spheres by means of letting the each other to survive.

2.5 The Sub-Plays of “Living Well”: Art and Politics

The concept of play as well as being the essence of life has been claimed to accompany and be a part of life. That is why, in the enactment of the “well being of the spirit”, Art and Politics also comply with the idea of having their foundations in play. These constitutions as well as being parts of culture will give meaning to this meaningless world via having intrinsic properties of play. Furthermore, as a necessary condition of living well, not only mankind will be in need of them both, but also each, as Art and Politics, would necessitate one another reciprocally. One would always find a part of Politics in Art and Art in Politics. Whereas Art would comprise of Politics in itself, Politics would require Art for itself. Although it could have been an intriguing and exciting research to seek both of the relationships with one another, what I would try to display for the rest of the thesis would be the need for Art in Politics; in other words, the primordial and indispensable element of “art of politics” to be in the “politics of art” for the “the art of living”.

The link between Art and Politics will be taken up from the basic steps and this will come from Ancient Greece. In the Antique age, there had been a distinction and a relationship between these two realms as well. Art had derived generally from the word, *poiesis*, which to mean poetry in today’s world and the realm of politics had been deeply interrelated with the word *praxis*, action.

Nowadays, the words *poiesis* and *praxis* have come to mean almost the same thing in the contemporary language. However, when their etymological roots are searched deep down and how they to be used in Ancient Greece, we will come to understand these two indispensable parts of life to be dissimilar to each other. As Agamben (1999) asserts the categories of judgment dealing with the reality and the struggle of the comprehension of life and nature makes a clear distinction between each. Whereas *poiesis* will mean “to pro-duce” deriving from the verb “poiein”, in the

sense of “bringing into being”; *praxis* will derive from the verb “prattein” meaning “to do” in the sense of “acting” (p. 69). *Poiesis* will refer more to the experience of creating something, bringing into light that has not existed before, the non-being into being; and the object of *praxis* will be action (p. 74), “it will be the idea of will finding its immediate expression” (ibid.). In short, *poiesis*, will refer more to Art, the area of creation and *praxis* will refer more to Politics, the area of action. However, in order to grasp them better with respect to life and their necessity in “eudaimonia”, living well, it is important to search them thorough with more circumspection.

2.5.1 Politics as action

In Greek, the word *praxis* means “to act” and it is also the root of the word “practical” in the usage of the contemporary world (Burnham, 2000, p. 13). What does to act means or what is an action? And what is the link to Politics? “To act” in its most general sense, as Arendt (1958) asserts, means “to take an initiative”, to start or “to set something in motion”. For her, an action is the beginning of this life, “new coming and beginning by virtue of birth” (p. 176). In other words, in order to start living, keep on living, endure living, one is left with nothing but action. It is the “necessity” of men or the human plight. By evoking and calling into action humans are formed as “living beings” (ibid.). Likewise, *On the Soul*, Aristotle (1984) also maintains that the movement, the ability of a living being to be a living being comes from *praxis*, from action (405b34, 406a1). To act will mean to make a change in the world, whenever someone acts something happens and is altered in the world (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 95); the principle of becoming, the entity of world as being in flux is reflected, and living is maintained.

It has been asserted that life could have a meaning only with respect to its own being. A life could have its value from living itself. And this living poses itself in the principle of Becoming. Hence, what is meant is that this principle of Becoming could be maintained only with action. Becoming is defined only by action (Bernstein, 2009, p.141). The one who acts could reach the spirit of living which is to be a process, a creation and destruction at every second. Man lives well only when he acts. Man is what he does. As mentioned before, even the start of life, the act of being born, is an action itself. Life begins with action. Hence, action could be what makes a human being to be human being. Man is active by nature. What is meant in

here “by nature” is that action is the necessary condition of being a man. It is his distinctiveness and authenticity. He is the one who have values in life as bad and good, beautiful and ugly, and with respect to judging he is the one who is acting. Hence, this is a three-nodded circle which follows one another respectively in the consequent destinations: speaking, judging and acting. And this is what forms the man, as Aristotle (2001) asserts in *Politics*, to be naturally a political animal, *zoon politikon*:

It is clear why a human being is more of a political animal than a bee or any other gregarious animal...No animal has speech except a human being. A voice is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful...for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust. For it is peculiar to human beings, in comparison to other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city-state. (1253a8-18)

Following the traces of Greek tradition, also Arendt declares that “wherever you go, you will be a polis”. This means that the necessity of action and speech creates a space due to the actor of the world in anytime and anywhere (Arendt, 1958, p. 198). As Arendt adds as well, a life which to be devoid of action will be “dead to the world” since this is a world where no “Man” lives but “men” live. Hence, the political being of man will come hand in hand with action and its ability of being social. Moreover, also Heidegger asserts that Dasein has an important property which is called “Mit-Sein”: to exist with. Man exists with his species; he is a social being. This is also depicted best by Aristotle. He (2001) asserts that the one who would not need a community to live with, who would not be in need of a society; the one who is “self-sufficient” will not be a man, but rather “a beast or a God” (1253a27-30). He is also by nature a social animal. As Arendt also confirms this idea, in the above mentioned verses, action is the sole activity that “corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact of men, not Man live on earth and inhabits the world” (Arendt, 1958, p. 7). This lies in the fact that without others, an action will not have any meaning at all. Human beings exist in the society and form the society by means of their actions (McCumber, 1989, p. 243).

Therefore, *Politics* sets the distinction of human beings for living well as one mode of play. “The political realm will originate with respect to the direct relationship of action “the shaping of words and deeds” (Arendt, 1958, p. 198). The way to live well will come by means of *praxis* and with *zoon politikon* respectively. The distinction of

human beings will be their specialty of constituting their being into becoming, as Arendt (1958) would assert life will gain its meaning by “*vita activa*”: life in action (p. 3). To act as good or bad and just or unjust and be able to judge either these actions to be good or bad and just or unjust will set the nature of man, his political being. That would be his distinctiveness from the other living beings, hand in hand with his sociability.

However, in order to act, one indispensable element has not been mentioned so far, which stands as the primordial part of it: freedom. In order to act, or in order to act properly and well, an action would necessitate nothing but freedom within itself. It is not a far-fetched idea to assert that human beings are condemned to choice and action (Korsgaard, 2009, p.1) which is also emphasized by the verses of Sartre (2003) “humans” to be “condemned to freedom” (p. 462). They have no other option but to choose in every second and act in accordance with their choice. Freedom, as prior to action, is necessary (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, “the necessity of choosing and acting is not only causal, logical or rational, but it is our plight; it is the simple inexorable fact of human condition” (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 2). Hence, in order for the action to come into existence, in order for one to say “that one has lived well” freedom would be the necessary element. Although there had been a wide discussion of what freedom is in the history of ideas, what I would try to conceptualize would be discrepant than an analysis of freedom. And rather, what I would strive to discover will be how we will be able to gain freedom in our actions. As it could be deciphered above, there is a strong relationship between, action and freedom, and successively between freedom and living well. And the answer will be encountered by the analysis of the impression of Art over Politics, or in Antique origins, *poiesis* over *praxis*.

2.5.2 Art as *poiesis*

As has been defined above *poiesis* is the production, bringing the non-being into being, the creation, it is what the term “poetry” derives from in Antiques and in today's usage more generally as “Art”. As Aristotle (2001) asserts between the things that have been both made and done, there is a differentiation and a distinction. “Whereas art is the matter of making, acting is not” (1140a16). However, there is an important fact that, *poiesis* includes a meaning in the sense of “pro-duction” and

making, more as “mode of truth revealing” in Greek life, like “unveiling” (Agamben, 1999, p. 69), making the unsayable to be sayable and letting the “openness” to be residing. It is the bringing of “truth”, “aletheia” in the Greek sense, referring “to be able to say what to mean”, having integrity and correspondence with the meant and the uttered one (Gadamer, 1986, p. 108).

Therefore, *poiesis* has a higher position in contrast to *praxis* (Agamben, 1999, p. 69), because it has the property of bringing truth into light by having “openness” which would enable it to evoke the necessary element of action, freedom, to come into existence. Therefore, there is a clear distinction between production and action although they would form the basics conditions of “living well” and do require each other for their own existence. Art will reside in a more realm of universals where the existence of Politics will owe a lot to it.

2.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, for the necessities of living well, the basic notions to be handled will be Art and Politics. Although, both of these two notions would have a remarkable impact on each other, the necessity of Art in Politics would be taken into consideration. An analysis of this relationship will not only prove the importance of Art for Politics, but also let one to reach the notion of “living-well”. Hence, if living is the celebration of festival of existence (Schlick, 1993, p. 135), nothing suits more to this festival rather than Art. Schiller (1982) defines this characteristic of art as “living-form” (p. 100, 107).

Moreover, it is not a coincidental fact that Art is a form of play like life itself; as Camus (1991) asserts the elusive feeling of absurdity to be related to the different worlds of intelligence, “of the art of living or of art itself” (p. 12). Not only because Art will have the property of “purposiveness without purpose” with its experience character and existing as a becoming process with its dialogic nature but also acting as a festival with play’s joyful and free property. Therefore, the next step would be the verbalization of Art, as a form of play which would consist of the characteristics of experience, dialogue and festival for the establishment of freedom in Politics and respectively for living well.

3. WHAT IS ART?

In order to display why Art is an indispensable element for life and circularly to Politics, it is necessary to seek what we mean by art. It is an indubitable fact that Art and Politics are necessary conditions of “living well”. But before attempting to give the precise relation, it is important to clarify what is meant by Art and what its role is in life. Therefore, the first inquisition will be the definitive properties of Art before jumping into its role; what it and mean to be: “What is Art?” or to put it in a hermeneutical way “What do I mean by Art?”

As has been maintained before, art is initially and primordially a form of play, deriving its reason from being a form of life. The first and most significant explanation regarding this play connection comes from Schiller. He (1982) makes the comparison of life to Art via the phrase of “living-form” (p. 107). For him, the human nature composes of two conflicting drives; which are to be first as “sense” and second as “form”. In order to hinder this contradiction, he asserts that Art comes to rescue the humanity with its property of “play-drive” (Spiel-trieb). It is no doubt that this phrase would form the core of aesthetics and art. Whereas the object of the sense drive to be “life”, the object of the form drive would be “form”, hence the object of the play-drive would be “living-form” (Schiller, 1982, p. 100). Then, the first definitive element of Art would be reached as play-drive. But what could play-drive mean then? Being a play-drive would comprise of three basic notions, and hence Art would be defined with respect to three main characteristics through this research; first as being “purposiveness without purpose”, meaning art is experience, second as a mode of expression and communication, meaning art is dialogue and third being the social, free and joyful activity, meaning art is festival.

3.1 Art as Experience

3.1.1 The concept of experience

If art is to be realized solely as a “mere experience” (Burnham, 2000, p. 73), then experience as one of the key-leading words to define will be the first concept to be

analyzed with priority. And the first question would be what an experience is. It is an indubitable fact that human beings exist in an environment. However, this existence in the environment as Dewey (1980) maintains, occurs not only “in it”, but also “because of it”. As mentioned before, living beings are space and time determined beings. They exist and actualize their functions through the interactions of their surrounding conditions. No living being can be withdrawn within the limits of its epidermis, but rather “its subcutaneous organs will be means of connection with what lies beyond its bodily frame” (p. 14). At each instant, the living being is aware that it needs to undergo through various circumstances. It is no doubt that it would adjust, defense and accommodate. It will be under the threat of surrounding dangers and each instant it will be in need of exterior materials for various requirements. In short, “the carrier and destiny of a living being will be bound up with its interchanges with its environment, not external but in the most intimate way” (Dewey, 1980, p. 13).

Experience is a continuous and ceaseless activity of the living creature since as long as the living being keeps his touch with his exterior conditions, till death, experience continues (Dewey, 1980, p. 35). As a matter of fact, one needs to be aware that experience does not have an end rather than itself, moreover it cannot be realized as one, total being but rather made up of parts which each are to be singular in each form. Each experience has its own beginning and end. Just like the notion of life that has been explained so far; “it is no uniform uninterrupted march or flow. It is a thing of histories, each with its own plot, its own inception and movement toward its close, each having its own particular rhythmic movement” (Dewey, 1980, p. 35).

Each experience will be a process or to put it backwards each process will be an experience. In order to grasp more thoroughly, one could imagine a stone which is to be rolling down a slope, for example the stone of Sisyphus, which at the same time would make one understand the myth better as well. This stone which is to be sent to roll down to the edge of the slope could have been seen as if it is aiming to reach this end, to the ground floor where it will rest at the end. However, the might that has pushed it downwards, the events that had taken place in the meantime of rolling down, such as the conditions causing the retardation or acceleration of its movement; the objects that would cause it to act or feel in some precise way would compose the whole process, the journey itself. The final coming of rest would be nothing rather than the “culmination of continuous moments and movements” (Dewey, 1980, p.

39). The meaning of journey will be defined more concrete as the accumulation of moments of moving, rather than the arrival of a definite point. That would be why; the experience, the reciprocal relation of stone and its environment would have an aesthetic quality, regarded as an aspect of art.

3.1.2 Art and its experience character

The means and ends distinction confuse the living beings' minds in various forms and times. Just like the example of the experience of the stone, Art is the purposiveness with no purpose. It is an experience, an end in itself. In order to remind once more, what is meant by purposiveness is "finality". And what may finality mean is not to have an external purpose for some kind of utility but rather, have its purpose in itself, without any interest, but for its perfection. It might have been composed of a purpose but the cognoscibility of it is a question, or in other words it has the potentiality but that is just potentiality.

In the condition of a student to pass the exam, the external and intrinsic operations distinctions could be evidenced with clarity. The one who would study in order to pass would take it as "purpose", but the one studying in order to learn would activate the whole process as "purposiveness". The end of passing the exam would result from the activity of learning; it would be a natural outcome, without being a direct intention. However, to study in order to pass would compose of an intention to reach that end. Then, the key word, to the "purposiveness" of artwork, would be the lack of "intention" prior to it. Kant (2000) claims that the beautiful is needed to be grasped as purposive, without an objective or determinate purpose (p. 187). For example, a poem displays some kind of order within itself, but does not indicate to any possible explanation of what it is to be. Therefore, it would be regarded as to be purposive without definite purpose. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is the same with life. In life, there are things that seem to be designed according to a principle, but the reason behind and how is not known. That is why life is also an artwork. Although its purpose is not cognizable, it is a great experience (Kant, 2000, pp. 36, 68, 90).

This is also similar for journey; the distinction between the delight of journey just with the intention of moving and seeing will be clear enough compared to getting somewhere definite (Dewey, 1980, p. 198). In the first, the means and ends coalesce; they are embedded into each other and occur because of each other. However, in the

latter the direction is one-sided; it has the intention of reaching somewhere definite, just like a linear arrow rather than a circle forming a whole. According to Dewey, this linearity, the externality of means and ends is something non-aesthetic whereas the coalescence of means and ends like an *ouroboros*² is aesthetic.

Due to these facts, intentions on their own will not be sufficient to determine the outcome of aesthetic judgments. Fine art would extend beyond any kind of intentions: it will have a “life of its own” (Burnham, 2000, p. 70). With its character of experience, it will distinguish itself from science. Moreover, Art also needs to be perceived separate from labor or craft. Whereas craft is made more for money, Art is made for the mere activity of creating itself. It is a process, an end in itself and that sets it free from any interest of other existing products. Art is nothing but free and skillful making. As Kant (2000) utters: “it is an occupation that is pleasant in itself” and craft would be “attractive on account of its effect” (p. 184).

This is the distinction of Art and craft. The question between an artwork and a craft had prepossessed the realm of aesthetics. As Collingwood asserts the difference lies in the means and ends distinction. A craftwork like a wooden table made by a carpenter would differentiate from a table with artistic qualification with the idea of utility, to have a purpose rather than purposiveness. A craftwork would be executed for the sake of some other end, either for money, for reputation, for decoration or for any kind of usage. However, an artwork would be lacking that direct purpose relation, in it “the means and ends would coalesce” as Dewey (1980) maintains (p. 198). It will be for the sake of itself with no prior intention preceding it. However, if it brings some ends as a result of its existence, like the way studying to bring the success of the exam as a natural outcome, it will be a separate discussion to make. But still it will lack the direct intention and be defined as an experience, having a life of its own.

Art as an experience and above-mentioned idea of “having a life of its own” will be witnessed best in the creation process of the artist. An engraver, painter or a writer are in the process of completing their work day by day, part by part. Each previous part would form the next one; it would be a continuous process, interrelated with one

² An *ouroboros* is an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or a dragon eating its own tail. *Ouroboros* often represents self-reflexivity or cyclicity, especially in the sense of something constantly re-creating itself, the eternal return, and other things perceived as cycles that begin anew as soon as they come to an end.

another. “The form of the whole would be present in every member.” The artist would need to go back and sum up what he had done before and by taking reference from his background would form his successive steps (Dewey, 1980, p. 56). The linkage between the past, producing the present would make it form what would be called future next (Dewey, 1980, p. 18).

Therefore, with Art it is without doubt that life would be endorsed more like an experience. Since art would act as a simile of life, it would bring forth the idea of living for the living itself with its peculiarity of being an experience, both for the “doer” and the “undergoer”; the artist and the spectator. Moreover, both of these two agents would interact with their existing environments and try to give meanings to it. However, the two definite agents as artist and spectator show Art’s another definitive property, the dialogue. Since Nietzsche (1967) maintains that “the existence of the world could be justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon” (p. 22), this justification requires various subjects for the formation of meanings which takes us to study the characteristic of dialogue.

3.2 Art as Dialogue

3.2.1 The concept of dialogue

The second characteristic of Art would be its nature as dialogue. However, before attributing the definitive property of dialogue to Art and starting an analysis of its relationship, it is more beneficent to start an analysis of “dialogue” solely, with priority. What is a dialogue? What do we mean by it? The first and foremost peculiarity of dialogues are that them to be precisely acts of communication, with a plurality of actors and participants (Hirschkop, 1999, p. 3). Indubitably, the fundamental example about dialogues is Socrates. The stylistic conversations held by Plato in the utterances of Socrates are easy to remember that the method which to be used was nothing but dialogic interaction.

As it is inferred from the dialogues of Socrates, a dialogue is conducted at least within two persons. It is actuated not to persuade the opponent but to find the reality which had been obstructed from the view. Socrates as playing the “midwife” is a good explanation for this. He would not present himself “as the all-knowing philosopher with complete knowledge of the narrated events” but rather tries to intact

a process in which knowledge would be achieved through human interaction (Bowery, 2007, p. 99). Since this world in which the living beings inhabit is composed of change and flux, since there is nothing except becoming in a meaningless background, the dialogues of Socrates use “logos to find a way through the labyrinth” (Kuperus, 2007, p. 207). As a matter of fact, this would require, as Bakhtin claims, the exchanging of the subjects; “the interaction and interdependence of various consciousnesses” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 36). In the dialogue the positions are appropriated by one another. Both the listener and speaker are willing to “change their positions, relocate themselves”, in order to make a dialogue possible. Openness would be the first basic essential of the dialogue. The listener and speaker alter *topos*, the relation becomes bidirectional (Kuperus, 2007, pp. 194-6).

Mikhail Bakhtin maintains that the concept “dialogue” can be grasped best in accordance with the thesis of Einstein in physics. What Einstein’s thesis in physics was “one body’s motion has meaning only in relation to another body”. Motion has only a relative meaning (Holquist, 2002, p. 20). Projecting onto the concept of dialogue, all the bodies in physical, political and conceptual circumstances do have meaning by means of each other, or in other words meaning is obtained between and among bodies, “its meaning is relative in relation between the bodies” (Holquist, 2002, p. 21). Dialogue is a means of testing one’s own and other’s ideas, in which some circumstances occur as the opposition of others’ ideas, and in which circumstances as the taking part with others to create new ideas (Zappen, 2004, p. 18). It is like a journey, not to reach a goal but “a path which has to be created while it has been taken, an endeavor closely resembling sailing through the ocean which is never the same” (Kuperus, 2007, p. 207). The dialogue would be done for the sake of interaction, of producing new values, for learning and teaching mutually. The utterances of the speaking subjects would be incessantly and continuously exchanged, upsetting the traditional relationship which has been differentiated as the listener and the speaker, the writer and the reader, or in short as the artwork’s producer and the spectator (Zappen, 2004, p. 6).

As it could be comprehended above the structure of dialogue would compromise that the participants of the dialogue to be actors and authors simultaneously (Hirschkop, 1999, p. 227), not solely as an event of communication but also as a birth giving to the true understanding of its nature. Since every meaningful experience would be the

traces of a dialogical experience (Hirschkop, 1999, p. 3), it would venture to contest the speaker's word with a "counter-word" (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 35). Speech would be defined as a multi-personal activity that to be in necessity of the other's active response fundamentally (Zappen, 2004, p. 43). Therefore, destruction of the opponent would at the same time destruct "the dialogical sphere where the word lives" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 150).

Dialogue, would be like creating a path while taking the way on the path. It would compose of "finding ways (poroi), finding non-ways (aporias), and finding new ways". The creation and discovery of new ways out of the old and established ones would rise with the accompaniment of "others" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 133). Just like Socrates who is not only the resourceful one to others but also in need of the company of others. Inferentially, dialogue is the communicative interaction that would come onto one to find his way by means of others. Therefore, the importance of "other" is an indispensable element of dialogue. That is why the structure of dialogue should be distinguished from the structure of rhetoric painstakingly. Unlike rhetoric, dialogue would be the property of a proper conversation, the true character of a healthy communication. It will be the opposite of "monologue". The "other" would be needed in it, since the other would be capable of seeing what one cannot see by itself. Due to that, association of oneself with people that are dissimilar to him would be the advice of Bakhtin: "Saturate a self in otherness and surround it with difference: That is how it will find its own freely constituted way" (Emerson, 2000, p. 19).

As a matter of fact, the purpose of dialogue will be distinguished as the revelation of the potentials that had been hidden from the spirit of time. Via the provocation of specific answers, they will be activated. In the end, the antagonism against monologue and the eagerness toward "openness and incompleteness, becoming rather than being, the created rather than given, the unfinished rather than the finished" would be eventuated (Zappen, 2004, p. 40).

3.2.2 Art and its dialogic character

After the analysis of the concept of dialogue, then why Art to be a dialogue could be clarified. Just like dialogue itself, Art requires multi-numbered subjects, the "undergoers" and the "doers": the author and the reader, the actor and the spectator,

or backwards: the artist and the work. As well as a dialogue, in the same process, it requires and invites the other's answers, provoking him to contribute to the same subject, either by opposing or by joining. The result would be like the outcome of a dialogical process: as the valuation, devaluation and/or revaluation of matters. This also indicates to Art's linkage to truth. By means of dialogue, truth is found not inside the head of one, as a readymade possession but is rather "born between the people collectively as a search of truth, in the process of dialogic interaction" (Patterson, 1985, p. 135) and this is deeply linked to the truth bringing function of Art as Gadamer (1986) asserts as well, to *aletheia*. In Ancient times, Art had been entrenched tremendously with *aletheia*, which had meant literally "openness" in the contemporary language. It meant being able to say what to mean (p. 108). As a result, unlike the official monologism, which suffices the possession of ready-made truths, Art with the attribution of dialogue introducer looks for an emergent truth through a collective search. Rather than holding the stability and firmness as the truth, it is sought by means of an interaction in the process of dialogic collectivity. Because as Bakhtin (1996) utters one would look for a word that is not his own, a word that is more than one's self is (p. 149). Therefore, the dialogic interaction of Art will be analyzed in three sub-branches: between the artist and his work; between the artist and the spectator; and lastly between the spectator and the work.

The first and most significant dialogic relationship of Art would be between the artist and his work. This would also match with the idea of Art as an experience. In other words, the experience of Art would also be dialogic in nature. It is no dubious fact that the artist would put himself into a dialogic interaction with his work by the creation process. As well as the constitutions of the artistic work, the artist would through the process be constituted as well, which would cause all the process to be an experience. The act of producing through the intended process would enroll one in the immediate experience of perceiving which has qualities of a spontaneous and uncontrolled activity. The artist would transform into a perceiver, and the perceiver into an artist reciprocally through the process of artistic production (Dewey, 1980, p. 48) What is "done" and "undergone" will work in a reciprocal relationship with one another, both with cumulative and continuous instrumentality to each other (Dewey, 1980, p. 50) In the creation process of the artist, the experience process of Art would

change and transform himself. As well as creating the work of art, the work of art would create the artist. In the words of Nietzsche (1967);

As the genius in the act of artistic creation coalesces with this primordial artist of the world...like the weird image of the fairy tale which can turn its eyes at will and behold itself; he will be at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator. (p. 52)

Successively, Art's dialogic interaction would be witnessed in the changing positions of author and reader, or artist and the spectator. Since dialogue is a process where the listener turns into a speaker at an instant, and the speaker to a listener; the same would be seen for the artist and the spectator as well. That would be the reason why Art will compose of producers and perceivers, both of which will at the first instant during the creation of the work be unified in the artist solely, even the artist himself would not only be a creator, but also the first audience for his work (Carroll, 199, p. 69). That is why, an artwork to be devoid of spectators is impossible, after all that would not be Art at all. The dialogic interaction between the spectator and the author is an evident communication. The artist gets a feedback for his experience of the work via the spectators. They contribute to the same artistic process.

And lastly, as well as having the interaction between the author and the spectator, the spectator and the artwork do also get into a dialogic relationship. And this relationship does exist dialogically with respect to its own context-boundness. What is meant is not that the interaction between the spectators and the artwork would give each other meaning at their confrontation, but rather as well as that encounter, each encounter with the confrontation would reveal different meanings with respect to their past experiences.

This idea of context-boundness forms various other dialogic interactions with the spectator. Since each envioning condition structures its living organisms, then it is an accurate claim that upon the alteration of each envioning condition, either to be social, political or economical; the meaning of each existence will undergo such a transformation. According to Gadamer (2004), each understanding is interpretation and each interpretation is understanding (p. 312) and the meaning is context-bounded. However although it is true that meaning is context-bounded, one should not forget that context is boundless (Shusterman, 2000, p. 89). That is why; the process of mutation of meanings given upon the world never sees a limit. A work of art will create its own meaning according to the experience of each spectator. The

process between the spectators and the work of art would change according to the “relatively stable art product and the organism and its environing factors” (Shusterman, 2000, p. 134). Due to that; even for the same person it would not be twice alike. As his/her experience and environing conditions alter, the meanings to be derived would alter. Even for the artist, the same dialogic interaction will comply. After the process, each time s/he to look at his creation, s/he will see something different. The meaning would get into a dialogic interaction depending on his different days, hours and different stages of his development. Interpretation of the work will be the production of it, and that would be where the dialogue to lie.

As a matter of fact, talking about a work of art, signifying the world, to be a stable and finished entity would be fallacious. Rather, as Adorno (1999) puts it, the works of art will be in flux, never “fixed and definitive in itself but something in motion”, changing their processual quality within the dialogical interaction of their environing and historical conditions (p. 178). Because understanding would be an active process, each encounter with the artwork for the spectator will require some active structuring with respect to their context. The artwork will not be “a piece of parchment, of marble, of canvas...to remain self-identical throughout the ages” but rather it will live only through the dialogic interaction with the spectators with respect to their individualized experiences. Art will not be a passive mirroring process but rather somewhat to be recreated every time with respect to the dialogue of aesthetic experiences (Shusterman, 2000, p. 31).

To sum up, utterance of an artwork to be fixed entities is needed to be out of the question, rather they need to be discerned as “relatively constant” creations, which would differ depending on the social and linguistic practices and get constituted and reconstituted with respect to the traditions and sensations they are served (Shusterman, 2000, p. 94). An artwork with a particular and never-changing meaning will exactly be a non-definitive aspect of it. Art with its dialogic nature would create and produce meanings variously within the dialogic interaction of space and time both with its spectators, artists and created works. As McCumber (1989) construes “every work of Art will be a dialogue with everyone who confronts it” (p. 66).

3.3 Art as Festival

The subsequent characterization of Art will be its property as festival. Gadamer (1986) maintained that one of the most significant characteristics of art will be its property of being a social activity which would enable the subjects of the society to unite (p. 39). Moreover, he (1986) asserted the festivals surmount the boundness of human temporality and let the mankind to reach unison of both past and future, letting the mankind to rest in an “autonomous” time (p. 42). Having impressions from him, the next issue to be analyzed will be how art to be characterized by the concept of festival. Festivals as well as being social interactions, as sub-branches of play, are described as composites of joyfulness and freedom. Hence, what will be located consequently will be the properties of art in clear detail as being the social, joyful and free activity. However, in order to comprehend it more thoroughly, what is meant by festival is needed to be clarified in detail which would enable it to link with Art in a more elaborative and explanatory way afterwards.

3.3.1 The concept of festival

First and foremost would be the need of a clarification for the concept of festival. What does festival mean in contemporary English language? According to the Dictionary of Oxford, a festival has two various meanings; the first is it to be “a day or a period of celebration, typically for religious reasons” and the second is it to be “an organized series of concerts, plays, typically held annually in the same place” (Url-4). The significant and major points of these definitions would be its existence in definite and concrete periods, meaning to take place at the same day, month and place of each year with recurring attributions and second to have religious backgrounds.

Moreover, when we seek the same concept in its etymological senses, we encounter with not contradictory facts of these definitions but rather as highly descriptive elements of them. It has been asserted that the word festival derives from the Latin word “festum” meaning festival and holiday in English. And this word “festum” derives from the word “festa”, meaning “feast” in English and “fete” in French. In the online etymology dictionary, it has been maintained that “festum” had been common in usage around 1200 A.D. (Url-8). It has been used for the religious rejoicing anniversaries characterized after the period of fasting, which would include

the big feasts, meaning bunch of foods and drinks to be served for a magnitude of people. Since the majority of people would celebrate the process of *fasting* with *feasting* afterwards, the word “festa” had also come to be used as a descriptive adjective meaning “joyful and merry” and the word “feria” meaning “holiday”, having similarities with “celebration”. Taking all these facts into view, then we come to grasp that festival refers to a collective activity. In order for something to be a festival more than one person is needed. Second, since it has been a ritual activity especially in the Middle Ages, it would include a precise duration of time, a definitive temporality and third it would designate a merry, joyful and free atmosphere. It would be the time of gathering for celebration, with gayness and freedom.

The first attribution is that festival is a social entity. It comprises of a communion, a multitudinous people to exist in the same place. As Gadamer (1986) puts into words it is “an experience of community and represents community in its most perfect form” (p. 39). It is arranged for the whole members of the society, meaning everyone is invited to participate. Therefore, when someone cannot be a part of it, him to be setting himself apart from the community is perceived (ibid.). The peculiarity of festivals would be its power of uniting everyone, with its social character. In it no one would be separated but rather gathered together. What the common reason to unite will not signify an importance, but rather just coming together will matter (Gadamer, 1986, p. 40). The aim will be only participation in the same activity, in the same wholeness. Festival will be an experience for the whole community of sharing, participation, gathering and rejoicing.

The second characteristics of festival will be its existence in definite periods and repetition of it in each year as if to exist eternally. However, what Gadamer (1986) asserts is that not with the arrival of time, does festival start, but rather with the starting of the festival the time suspends. According to him, the festival fulfills every moment in its duration with its overwhelmingness of eternity and a-temporality, “the time only becomes festive with the arrival of the festival” (p. 42). It had been asserted that time is a burden on the shoulders of humanity. Time, as a parameter of existence forms a crucial part of the vanity and absurdity of human existence and “boredom” suspends over the heads of mankind with its threatening grimace. Its “featureless and repetitive flow” forms nothing but a suffering. And not only

boredom makes it but also its contrary, the incessant bustling of time smirks with a menacing face. As well as the overabundance of it, time to time, we happen to be lacking of time. Hence, we need only the presence and these will be enabled by festival.

“The festive occasion possesses its own sort of temporality” says Gadamer (1986, p. 58); with the presentation of festival, the time is interrupted and is raised to a “*nunc stans* of an elevated presence in which past and present becomes one in the act of remembrance” (ibid.). A gap of an escape for the humanity from its absurd and pathetic condition is let free and the possibility of feeling and perceiving the existence of eternity and universality is introduced. That is indubitably the same reason for festivals to have ancient roots in cultic and ritualistic roots because “the manifestation of God is an absolute presence in which the remembrance of the past and the present moment coincides in an instantaneous unity” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 59). Each human being with the ability of cultic creation exists in the present tense of time, disrupting the continuity. That would be why the necessary spirit of festive celebration will be “creation and elevation into a transformed state of being” (ibid.). The usual flow of time, the everyday existence of human beings will be ruptured by festival in which a universal communion is to be reached in the form of celebration with an inclusion of joy and freedom but nothing else.

3.3.2 Art and its festive character

As well as festival, Art is also a communal activity. According to Gadamer (1986) this resemblance of Art to festival is “no accident”. The reason for this is that likewise the celebration of festivals, the human beings gather together by means of Art. This resides not only in the meeting of them at the same location but also acknowledging the same ideas and imaginations in agreement. All the individualistic and private experiences are gathered and encountered in a collectivity (p. 40). Art is without doubt a public phenomenon. As it has been examined under the title dialogue it requires both spectators and the artists. It exists in a social context. The artistic creation is a form of sharing the expressions and emotions between the subjects. For example, a poem will not bear a meaning only because it will express some individual traces of emotions, but also in an aesthetic form it will contribute to the generality of things, by being a form of participation in a whole (Adorno, 2000, p.

213). “The essence of the beautiful” will be “to have a certain standing in the public eye” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 50).

Furthermore, Art lets the human beings exist in an “autonomous” time likewise festival. This process is in such a way that by the infusion of the artwork, the one goes beyond himself. The roots of festival in ritualistic and religious practices should be remembered and resembled to Art in order to clarify this notion. It is without doubt that, Art has some roots with ritualistic practices. The arousal of theater as an example could be given. Theater had come into being with the worshipping rituals of Dionysus in Ancient Greece. Greek theater as well as being a celebration was having a sacred character. Indubitably, it was a festival and indubitably is Art.

An English writer has defined Art “as the imaginative expression of energy, which through technical concretion of feeling and perception” tends to reconcile the individual with the universal by exciting “impersonal emotion” in him. The formation of objects prior to the energies and the occurrences of the world set the experience to be something “universal” in nature (Dewey, 1980, p. 185). Hence, it could be deduced that Art is the power for “remaking of the experience of the community in the direction of greater order and unity” (Dewey, 1980, p. 81). This without doubt renders the world in commonness with social bondage by making it to be more tolerable for our presence and makes our existence more to be “endowed with permanence” (Hegel, 1976, p. 399).

Moreover, Art as a form of play and festival respectively do include the attributions of “joy and freedom”. The word *ludens* in Latin, signifying “the playing one” is needed to be remembered to derive from the word *ludus*, meaning literally “joyful and free” (Huizinga, 2010, p. 103). It is no surprising fact that Art is equated with joy. If play is the joyful activity enabling one to get delight and pleasure from the activity itself, then Art as festival would be attributed naturally with the same one. Kant defines Art as the activity in which no purpose is sought as an end, but do gives pleasure in its being. For him, pleasure is a sign of our being in the presence of beauty and pleasure is the feeling of an enhancement for life (Kant, 2000, p. 48-53). That would be the basic definitive character of aesthetic judgment and as a matter of fact beautiful. That would be why beautiful to be something “which pleases in the mere act of judging it” (Kant, 2000, p. 187) and as Burnham (2000) adds this “in the mere experience of it” (p. 42). If aesthetic judgment consists of only being for its

own sake and “pleasing in the mere experience of it”, what could it mean rather than its perceived joy taken at that instant? The mentioning of “joy” regarding the property of Art is encountered in Nietzsche’s writings too. Likewise the pleasure emphasis of Kant, Nietzsche (1967) mentions that the Greek theater is born out of the encounter of “the joyous necessity of the dream experience” of Apollo, and Dionysus, another Greek deity, who to be “the most intimate one by the analogy of intoxication” as well as the potent of spring with the penetration of “all nature with joy” (pp. 35-7). The reason for this penetration of “all nature with joy” will be an answer to the meaninglessness of life. The aimless life will be abided with the aid of Art. We will need “Art and nothing but Art not to die of the truth.” That would be the reason why the world could “only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon” but nothing else (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 52).

As well as being the joyous process, Art is also the “free activity” like festival. Uttering in Kant’s words (2000), it is nothing but the disinterested, non-purposive and non-conceptual delight in the beautiful, setting the faculties of understanding and imagination to act simultaneously in a free play (pp. 200-203) Art is the freedom of nature. The creative power of life displays its face via the free peculiarity of it. As an example, Art as the joyful and free action can be traced up in the masked balls or carnivals where each “plays” another’s self. All the accustomed characters would be out of the play-venue and the easiness of being the “other” will rise in the same place with the background of joy. Everyone will have the ability to be everyone, with the mirthful laughter that would enable each to be out of himself. A childish burst of fun, a holy ritual or mystical imagination would penetrate in the masked ball with the ability of changing selfhoods. Then, everyone will be some-other-one (Huizinga, 2010, p. 31). The name of Nietzsche’s book “*Gay Science*” is another example of Art’s joyful and free property. Nietzsche had borrowed this name from the Provincial troubadours who are titled as the first modern poets of modern Europe. And this so-called “*Gay Science*” is their poetry’s name. Their poetry bearing the word “gayness” not only stands as a form of Art representing a unity of joyfulness and dalliance but also freedom (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 6).

3.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, what Art is has been tried to be determined in this chapter. And the conclusion had been it to have the properties of experience, dialogue and festival. However, before reaching to that conclusion, the main descriptive entity on Art had been it to be play. This had been defined for various reasons. The first and foremost reason was for the artwork not to have a utilitarian purpose, in Kantian terms to have purposiveness but no purposes, otherwise what could have been the distinguishing factor between a craftsman and an artist? Art had been the free, joyful, purposeless action that had enabled man to be man, wholly man. The creative power of life had been enacted into this sub-branch of life, into this “divine ease of play”, as Nietzsche (1992) says in *Beyond Good and Evil*, “A man’s maturity consists in having found again the seriousness one had as a child at play” (p. 273).

As a result, Art is an experience, in which like life itself there is no destination but is itself a journey. It is the purposive activity with no purposes. It is a dialogue which is to be a form of play, where questions and answers keep going, where meaning and understanding never cease but re-create their own selves as long as the interaction to endure. And lastly, it is a festival where the community is its necessary condition and time and space is broken. Art is the free and joyful activity.

What had been argued with this chapter was not to bar and limit Art in a closed loop, but rather enable it to be defined for its importance in Politics which would finally lead us to “eudaimonia”, for living to be living as mentioned in the first chapter. And although these characteristics set it to have no determinate function with an intention prior to its undergoing, they surely bring some natural effects as a result. These natural outcomes indubitably set the place of Art in Politics and respectively to living well. Hence, those to be analyzed would without doubt create a better comprehension for the reader. Therefore, what all these properties would result in and reveal will require a more detailed work with circumspect and due to that, what the properties of Art to bring as natural outcomes or in short what Art to do will be introspected in the next chapter.

4. WHAT DOES ART DO?

This purposive creation that we have been so far talking called Art, without aiming to bring ends intentionally, lacking having the intentional purposes; however comes out to bring some natural effects as a result of its existence. These natural effects not only enables it to revitalize its autonomous realm as an independent entity detached from any causal relations of ultimate ends/uses, but also causes various indispensable and substantial outcomes to prevail. These outcomes will indubitably be precious as diamond. Although the definitive properties of Art as experience, dialogue and festival upholds these outcomes, the way they contribute to occur in a complex web of reciprocal, mutual interrelations. These outcomes exist not only for the mere sake of each defined property, but as a result of all, forming a whole and an integration within each other. In short, what I argue is that Art as an experience, dialogue and festival will bring communication, devaluation and revaluation in Politics as a result of its existence. And as a result of all these, the main outcome will be freedom in actions. Hence, what would be done successively will be the analysis of these outcomes.

4.1 Communication

One of the first outcomes of Art will be reinforcement of the communication ways between the agents. It is an indubitable fact that the sensations, emotions and thoughts which have been experienced are gathered and conveyed by means of artworks. Art is the channel for the lead and display of expressions. Especially the experience character of it causes emotions and sensations to emerge and the dialogue character to express and convey them. Consequently, the festival character necessitates the concept of society as an intrinsic property. Hence, with respect to these properties alternatively, an artwork enables the networks of communication to be deepened and strengthened. Through the artworks, the emotions are shared, as well as thoughts, imaginations and ideas. Hence, the medium of Art as a way of expressing the inner self to the receptions of the outer world is a necessary issue for

its ability of being a communication enhancer. In order to clarify it more, let's have a detailed look into the concept.

4.1.1 From experience to expression

The expressive function of Art had come into view as an opposition to the traditional definitive categories that had been made before. These traditional attempts take their roots surely from the Antiques. The preliminary notion attributed by them to Art was “mimesis”, or in English; imitation. Plato (2001), in his *Republic* has banned Art as being a dangerous thing, and abolished it from his world of Ideas because of this mimesis property (598b). According to him, the imitation of reality and this attitude detached the beings from the true forms of reality and left them in a deceived and illusionary world. Art had interested the lowest parts of the soul (605b). Therefore, what he defended was to “banish” it out of the city rather than promoting its practice and glorifying (607b). Following Plato, his student Aristotle (1941) tried to save Art from the Platonic mimetic preoccupation and asserted “tragedy” to imitate the universal by and man to be (1451b5-8).

However, although the ideas of Aristotle had reigned in the philosophy of Art for many years, it was interrogated consequently by many thinkers that Art to be more than mimesis. According to Collingwood, Art did not denote life solely by its basic essence of mimesis, but rather expressed the emotions, ideas and thoughts. And according to Dewey, it was an experience in the existence of the formerly held stable values of life. What Dewey (1980) had maintained was if Art was just a mimesis, then a scare-crow would have been a great work because of its instrumentality by resembling and representing the most real one as an appearance in the deterrence of crows from the field. The measure of artistic ability based on the ability of painting a peach with a fly that would make one “brush the fly off” will not be illuminating enough (p. 201).

Therefore, the concept expression had come to play a significant role in the having and being of an experience. If living beings interact with the environment and have relations with this environment in the simplest way, then the sensations raised reciprocally outbursts themselves and reveal the impulses and the energies contained in them by expression. Artworks mediate between life and meanings in order to propagate valuations being molded by experience through the outburst of expression.

Various emotional discharges are activated into attitudes and meanings and by their transformation; the subject becomes aware of his thoughts and emotions. He evaluates and gives meanings, he becomes conscious. As Dewey (1980) puts into words: “What is kindled must either burn itself out, turning to ashes, or must press itself out in material that changes the latter from crude metal into a refined product” (p. 65). Therefore, Colingwood (1970) asserts that artworks are for the invention of emotions and feelings, what they do are to express. It is like a journey into one’s body and soul (p. 215).

4.1.2 From expression to communication

However, what has been in importance for us does not cease with this citation. Rather, it starts right at this point that artworks desire to share this expressive input with its environment, with its surroundings. As it has been stated above, this activity of expression is a double sided medallion. It will also have the attributions of a dialogue. Emotional discharges playing role will be necessary for expression but not a sufficient one (Dewey, 1934, p. 61). What we need to see is beyond, otherwise why could art be defined as dialogue? Dialogue requires interlocutors in relationship to the speaking ones. It is a multitudinous subject process. As a result, this expression discharged into the artwork will not be satisfied to stay still, but will seek to communicate and share itself with other subjects. No one will be called an artist without the desire of sharing his work with some audience. Artist can only be the one who is in need of his creation to be recognized and valued. That will mark his difference from an improviser who would not need an audience as a matter of fact way, or an amateur painter who would believe that his works are not deserved to be called creations yet (Parker, 1970, p. 71). As McCumber (1989) interprets the works of Hegel and Heidegger, he would confirm that an artwork lacking an audience will not be an artwork, but rather “the work of art” will “intrinsically be a communal and a communicative activity” (p. 137).

DeWitt H. Parker (1970) asserts that if a tyrant has banned any kind of artwork, like a book, a painting, or a play or a film, to be spoken or written, in any kind of way to be communicated with other fellows, the end of artistic creation and enjoyment will come. This outcome of Art as communication is a natural desire to understand each other because none of us can dream the same dream but can see the “same pattern of

colors or hear the same harmonies and melodies” (Parker, 1970, p. 69). It will no more be a festival, an experience or a dialogue. Artwork without the property of sociability will lose its function in the society. Art will gain its value from its communicability. In a world of total “privacy and silence”, surely it would not survive (Parker, 1970, p. 70). Art requires logos and due to that brings communication.

As a result, it can be deduced that artworks create communicability. This is also what Kant (2000) asserts in his second peculiarity of aesthetic judgments. He declares that aesthetic judgments demand universability. For example, when we see a painting, we do not say “this painting is being pleasurable to me” but we rather say “this painting is beautiful” (pp. 56,57). Judgments that are made regarding Art, regarding the beautiful, do claim “as if” to be an objective property. With aesthetical judgments, one seems to judge not only for himself but for everyone (Kant, 2000, p. 159). Therefore, it is important to declare that aesthetic judgments require “agreement”. And this agreement demand will be the core of artworks raising the communicability between the subjects. Because this universality claim will make me share my ideas with others, with the aim of reaching a middle point, enabling each one struggle to listen and understand the other one.

4.2 Harmony: Unity in Variety

Moreover, due to the communicative function of art, another relevant outcome will prevail among the society as a crucial and highly precious entity: the harmony or in other words, the unity in variety. In order to clarify it, it is better to keep on the interrogation with the proposals of Kant. What Kant defines with respect to the above-mentioned argument is a term called “common sense”. For him, this so-called “common sense” is a being which to be a type of shared sense, “common to all”. He says:

...Under the *sensus communis* we must include the Idea of a sense “common to all”, i.e. a faculty of judgment, which in its reflection takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of all other phenomena in thought; in order “as it were” to compare its judgment with the collective Reason of humanity. (Kant, 2000, p. 170)

It is indeed supported fiercely that making an aesthetic judgment would demand a collectivity in which the idea of beautiful is needed to be shared with others.

However, beyond this argument something more crucial is stated. We, as human beings with “sensus communis” will not only end in communicating with each other by sharing our judgments and coming to agreements but also will recognize other beings and ourselves as part of a whole which we are a member of. In other words, the common sense will not only let us share our ideas, but let our minds to be widened, to be able to think thoroughly and stand at a point which to be “universal” (ibid.). This transmission of thoughts, ideas and feelings will serve as a means of union among men. The expression will not suffice to be only for the sake of expression but would reveal a more purposive truth behind. As Tolstoy would say Art will not be an expression of men’s external emotions or just the production of pleasure but rather it would mediate in the process of unification by binding the living being in a universality of similar feelings which are to be “indispensable for the life and well-being of individual and humanity” (p. 750); Orhan Pamuk explains because there is a childish, hopeful belief that people resemble one another. “When a writer shuts himself up in a room for years on end, with this gesture he suggests a single humanity, a world without a center” (Url-6).

Indubitably, the festive character of Art plays a significant role in this. Since it is “an experience of community and represents community in its most perfect form”, Art is meant for everyone and accentuated for the sake of coming together (Gadamer, 1986, pp. 39, 40). Therefore, it would be an uplifting event not only because it will take the participants from their usual and mundane lives but rather will elevate them into a communion which is to be described as universal (Gadamer, 1986, p. 58). In Gadamer’s own words “vital essence of festive celebration” will be “creation and elevation into a transformed state of being” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 59) and this elevation would be with the idea of recognition. This interaction of subjects in the festival, or rather to say the experience of an artwork will gather them together just like the characteristics of festival and let them cknowledge each other and discern each commonality with the help of its dialogical character. As Hegel (1977) asserts in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*’s 666th section:

This utterance is not a one-sided affair, which would establish his disparity with the other; on the contrary, he gives himself utterance solely on account of him having seen his identity with the other; he on his side, given expression to their common identity in his confession, and gives utterance to it for the reason that language is the existence of Spirit as an immediate Self. He therefore expects that the other will contribute his part to his existence. (p. 405)

Meaning that in each artwork the consciousness of all the receivers and doers will be recognized, each isolation as singular entities will be unified in the realm of generals. This unification will be the magnitude of Art (Tolstoy, 1970, p. 753). Then, what can be said for Art to bring rather than the harmony? This universal gathering, this festive character, this recognition of each other will bring nothing but the harmony of the community. Since Art is a social activity, since it requires a collectivity what it will bring in the end will be nothing but the unity in variety, the harmony. As Plato (2001) would also say, a good orchestra will be determined by the ability of various notes and instruments to be in congruence, whereas an incessant repeat of the same note will just be a cacophony (443d-444a). Dewey (1980) explains this idea of “unity in variety” with a remarkable example. He asserts that various articles could exist in a box, various figures in a single painting and various documents in one pocket. However, the great importance of all this concomitance will be “the realization” of each “through interacting parts of their respective energies” (p. 161). The diversity of existence will be supported with it. In short, Art will be the home of diversity (Camus, 1991, p. 116).

4.3 Devaluation

Art, as well as having a communicative outcome enabling the harmony to prevail will also work as a critique in life and inferentially in Politics. With its property of play and respectively experience, it will intimately be related to the establishment of life and create “aporias” by asking questions with its dialogic interaction. However, before attempting to show how it does these, it is important to display previously what a critique is, and how it can be described. At this issue, the function of Art will be compared to the role of critical history. Thus, artworks just like the way history works in the criticality of existence, by devaluating meanings eternally and criticizing the established and stable truths, will let the becoming process of life to prevail.

Living beings exist in this environment as historical entities; they are the parameters of time and space. This also means that they are transformed through time by the medium of social and political factors. Therefore, in order to give meaning to the present, to take life as play; the past could be used as torchlight in order to enlighten the pave on which the foot is about to step. However, the notion of “giving meaning

to the present” should be taken with circumspection. As Foucault (1984) says, we would need the history not to shape the present the way we want, but rather to understand the way how it is (p. 178). Therefore, in order to comprehend the criticality of history, the ideas of Nietzsche, following Foucault, will be used to situate Art in Politics and as a matter of fact in life.

For Nietzsche (1980), no knowledge which to destroy life can be sovereign, because any “knowledge presupposing life” (p. intro) will indubitably destroy itself as well. The nature of man as a historical being substantiates the greatest part of this argument. What is meant by “historical” at this point could be described best by its opposite as Nietzsche calls “unhistorical”. The unhistorical living beings are with no doubt the animals. If one stares into them, they would stare back with no intention, because the moment it will start to ponder, it will forget the next moment that he had pondered and subsequently he will even forget that he had even forgotten that he had forgotten that he had pondered. This would form the “unhistorical” state of nature whereas on the contrary the human beings will be the “historical” ones. Although Nietzsche (1980) asserts that both unhistoricity and historicity are both vital for a healthy being, for culture and people, the timing of these two is the crucial part of life. The ability of remembering and forgetting at the right time, meaning to experience historically and unhistorically, is the key-point of doing history for the sake of life (pp. 9, 10). In addition, this is maintained without doubt by the “critique” attribution of history. The critical history will be the handiest instrument for the vanity of human being’s existence, for the liberation of all whom to be destined to the conditionality of time and space. This means that with critical history everything can be in the status of a condemnation, because every past deserves to be condemned and interrogated with care (Nietzsche, 1980, p. 21). This would be the same with Art, the way meaning to be derived from the hands of history, each deed and action will be in the service of Art to be judged and reasoned. The criticality of history would let one take each part of past under diagnosis, taking every inch of it to be reprobated. Similarly, Art would devaluate every bit of life with the sharp edge of its axe. Both would be dangerous processes, they both would be “namely dangerous for life itself”, but both would encourage and cause men to be “honest” (Nietzsche, 1980, p. 29).

In other words, Art will be bestowed as a genealogist in Nietzschean terms. A genealogist, according to this view would force himself to try to discover the basic drives, needs and motivations of a view in the world. He would try to find the mainstream reasons of resulting social conditions and moral judgments out. He would try to convey light upon the disguised and concealed facts, the subdued and restrained realities as well as the neglected and forgotten formations; this would be “a reading, decoding and interpretation of hidden meanings” (Bauer, 1999, pp. 51-2). Moreover, just like it, the primordial essence of Art will compose of not changing the erroneous and flawed with the accurate ones, but rather giving alternative interpretations that will “eventually be replaced by other interpretations” (Bauer, 1999, p. 57).

Hence, the critical history or in other words, the genealogist, will be requisite for the impetus of annihilation as well as the promotion of new with its “negativity”. In critical history, one should be aware that whatever the new action is, it will indubitably be replenished by some other action. A victory would be overwhelmed by some other victory. There would never be so-called an absolute first one, since every second one will come from some other first one (Bauer, 1999, p. 53). The circularity of time will be everywhere, like an *ouroboros*: a long snake tail, tailing one another. Therefore, the critical history and genealogy would spawn “action, creation and protest against oppression”. What is believed to be static would be overflowed in the existence of a flux (Bauer, 1999, p. 54), an incessant movement of interpretations will be destroyed not only “in” the society but also “of” the society.

The concept of Foucault’s “archeology” lies in equivalence with the “genealogy” of Nietzsche. He also maintains that archeology seeks not to embellish the past for the living beings of the future but rather searches the triggering points of “ruptures” and “thresholds” in the constitution of history of mankind. The inquiry via the documents; are not embedded as tracks that had to be followed to reach the intentional, initiative acts of the ones who created them, but rather as “monuments” (Gutting, 1995, p. 231). Moreover, the interview that he had enacted with Roulet signifies the role of his critical history by saying that “how-that-which-is has-not-always-been” is the one that has been searched. What we are looking for is “why-and-how-that-which-is-might-no-longer-be-that-which-is” (Foucault, 1988, p. 36). That would be the reason why, to the “superhistorical”, meaning the exact timing of

things, will be placed at a higher place above the concepts of “historical” and “unhistorical”. This will endow Art with the same outcome: criticizing, granting life with proliferation of generation, reclaiming against the fixity and immobility (Nietzsche, 1980, p. 23). Rather than the displacement of fallacious to the truthful, the replacement would be among various interpretations, with the formation of alternative meanings, each being topsy-turvy without trying to find the “one”, but rather to gather the plurality of things in wholeness; just like the role of philosophy to change each error with a new one (Bauer, 1999, p. 42). Art should be entitled as the highest task of human beings, because it is the devaluation of all values (Agamben, 1999, p. 85). This will be one of the most crucial impacts of Art in Politics.

4.3.1 Art as critique

Arthur Danto (1986) mentions, in his essay *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* that Yeats had written after the death of Ireland’s famous poet Auden, Ireland “still to have her madness and her weather because poetry had made nothing to happen”; meaning that Art failed its ability to change the society meaning its political stance. Moreover, he added that the verses written by Auden that Art through the thirties did not help to save any Jew:

Artists and politicians would get along better at a time of crisis like the present, the latter would only realize that the political history of the world would have been the same if not a poem had been written, nor a picture painted, nor a bar of music composed. (p. 2)

But the question raised by Danto (1986) is worth some, if Art is so innocuous and meek as such, then why is there so much mayhem that it to be something dangerous? If Art does not change anything, if the poems stand “only for slaughtered patriots, making nothing relevant happen,” but “simply memorializing, enshrining, spiritualizing, constituting a kind of cenotaph to house the fading memories, about at the level of a religious ceremony” then why would all people through these times maintain Art as something highly threatening, censoring and trying to abolish it out of the society (p. 4)? He replies in acute explanations; representation of Art as something that in its nature can make nothing happen is not so much a view opposed to the view that Art is dangerous: “it is a way of responding to the sensed danger of Art by treating it metaphysically as though there were nothing to be afraid of” (ibid.). Art will criticize and devalue the ongoing Politics. Each decision, each act held by the power structures would be apt to change via Art. That would be the cause of

tantrum for it to be something insignificant, that it to stay in itself as being solely *l'art pour l'art*. It would be the defensive attack “to the sensed danger of Art that had been perceived” (ibid.).

This explains the reason behind the banning of all the plays of Beckett by the Greek military junta, although not a blatant word of politics had been uttered in them. This also explains the reason of Picasso’s reply as “No, you did it!” to a German soldier with a postcard of his painting “Guernica” asking if he to do it. (ibid.). In conclusion, to enlighten the circumstances that had been ongoing, to change them with new values, Art will outcry the socially critical dimensions of existence (Adorno, 2000, p. 254). “The overflowing energy of the pregnant future” will proliferate with the aid of Art which would “desire for destruction, change and becoming.” It would be the Dionysus of Nietzsche bearing in mind the obligatory force of destruction for the existing entities, “with the soul of an anarchist” (Agamben, 1999, p. 85). It will devalue it and act as its critique.

4.4 Revaluation

Consequently, following the demolition of existing values, Art will bring new values in the lieu of destroyed ones. It will revalue the devaluated life, with the background notion of even these newly made revaluations to be devaluated in time, within its own criticality. Art will not fulfill the vanity of existence “with purposes”, but at least to such a degree it will make it more bearable, by fulfilling the principle of becoming. However, as above mentioned these all will be natural outcomes, without being aware of being a function, with the same “purposiveness” of life as well. If a conclusion is to be reached, it should be just like the essence of experience that Art to be an accumulation of movements to form a final completion by itself, without an intentional effort and hustle. The “conclusion” or the “function” would not be a separate and independent thing; “but the consummation of movements” (Dewey, 1980, p. 38).

It has been asserted previously that, in the world everything is conditioned and dependent upon other things. Each smallest entity is in interaction with its outer environment and everything is in the form of a “dynamic quanta”, associating and relating each one’s essence with other “quanta” (Shusterman, 2000, p. 72). The living being is in dialogue with the outer circumstances, always on the verge of

moving, changing, and transforming; or as it has been maintained previously, it is in accordance with the principle of life; becoming. Therefore, the subsequent outcome of Art in Politics with respect to being an experience, dialogue and festival will be its ability to change and reevaluate the meanings that have been devaluated by itself in the former step. “The tremendous task and dignity of Art” will be its ability “to create everything anew and give birth to life” (Nietzsche, 2009, p. 103).

This is defined by Dewey (1980) with the concept of “rhythm”. For him, Art is the rhythm of life. He asserts that all interactions in life act in the principle of rhythm and rhythms, for him, are nothing but the “whirling flux of changes. There is ebb and flow, systole and diastole; it is the ordered change” (p. 16). Over the borders of destruction, the devaluation; then comes proliferation, revaluation. Out of the old rhythms, new ones are born. Each death follows a new birth, each autumn brings a new spring. This is the same with “the waves of the sea” to come and back and forth, or with “the ripples of the sand” to be to and fro (Dewey, 1980, p. 16) This shows that it is not a coincidence to see that the word rhythm would mean “flow” in Greek, in the case of water. It is what gives an artwork to be it is (Agamben, 1999, p. 98). Moreover, Gadamer (1986) also emphasizes that play is “the repetition of the same action”, and this repetition has its purpose in itself, which makes us take pleasure in watching (p. 22). Rhythm is life and life is play. Hence, rhythm is play as well as Art is. Art is the one demolishing the meanings and restoring back in the successive second, “in flow”, continuing in an eternal process with the next and the next-next second.

This destruction and production process of Art is executed by both of its doer and undergoer subjects, by both of the spectators and the artists. Art as dialogue recreates new interpretations with incessant energy, on the path of avoiding dogmatisms and systematizations. Likewise the way philosophy works, by replacing one error with another, Art undergoes the same experience with its dialogic character in Politics, because “explanation of the world as all or nothing will be just mythologies” (Bauer, 1999, p. 42). If world were to be acknowledged as an ended and finished product, then there would not be reason why such change and transformation or the idea of becoming would play so much role. “Where there is stability and rest, there would be no becoming; where there would be no traces of suspense and crisis, there would be no opportunities for resolution; where everything

would be complete, there would be no fulfillment” (Dewey, 1980, p. 17). Therefore, Art will be the factor playing the protagonist’s role in Politics as the combination and resolution of this chaos, causing the process of becoming to actuate itself.

4.5 Freedom

As the accumulation of all these outcomes and properties, the significant result of Art in Politics will be the establishment of freedom. Although, the concept freedom is a complex and a widely discussed issue, what is meant by freedom as an outcome of Art will have two senses; first as an ontological property with respect to world and human condition, as an emancipation from the space-time determinacy, by being a more “will-less” subject and second as a political factor in the sense of liberty which would reveal its face between the relationships of the subjects having reflections on their actions and speeches. Surely, the first type would also have an inferential relationship to political stance since the political freedom will also be related to the meaning of life and to the human condition. It would enable the realm of Politics to be free in itself and let eudaimonia to be acquired.

4.5.1 Freedom as Emancipation

The reminiscence of Schiller (1982) with the verses “Man is wholly man when he is playing” is important to start (p. 107). Art under the branch of play was analyzed as having the properties of freedom and joyfulness. As Kant (2000) utters Art becomes the “free play of imagination” (p. 64) in which “the choices and results” were getting undetermined (Buckley, 2003, p. 192). This “free imagination of play” was brought by means of Art’s festival and dialogue properties as well as being a mode of interaction, enabling the aesthetic enjoyment of cognitive faculties and the emancipation of subject to be “out of himself”. Hence this “interaction will reveal” conspicuously “the manifestation of aesthetic freedom” (McCumber, 1989, p. 270) and it will be the strength to cope with the finite of Being, the absurdity and the vanity of existence. One will be able to bear this meaningless condition by the introduction of ephemeral values with the aid of devaluation and revaluation. In order for each of us to be able to gaze “into the eye of the world boldly” and withhold this human condition, every artwork will play a part in the acquisition of this inner freedom (Dienstag, 2006, pp. 148-152). Since Art will give humanity the

joy and freedom, the terrible destructiveness of existence as well as the cruelty of nature will be more tolerated (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 59).

Furthermore, McCumber (1989) explains this ability of Art by its characteristics to be able to take the person out of his usual everyday life and put in a different one (p. 143). This interaction of one, both as a spectator and an artist, will elevate the subject and produce temporarily an escape, a gap to breath, from the determinations and necessitations of life and society (McCumber, 1989, p. 91). This will be the principle of aesthetic freedom. Existence will be bearable only by means of taking it as “an aesthetic phenomenon” (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 52).

The relationships of humans with the world as parameters of time, space and mortality had been analyzed previously. This was what gave the way to boredom, absurdity and vanity of existence to rise hand in hand. Hence, Art becomes the medium for one to stand. It is the absurd reply of life. The most evident case of this can be shown from theater which requires artists to play their roles in three hours and then lets it rest for the eternity to remember. Artists let themselves to be nothing or several, under the mask of “others” in three hours. Becoming other people, experiencing in difference marks not only set them as absurd creatures, but also makes them live an “absurd fate which might charm and attract a lucid heart.” Their world becomes the ever passing as well as them to be called the most ephemeral (Camus, 1991, p. 77). As Camus (1991) asserts just like the lover and the adventurer, the actor becomes the signifier of the absurd and the incongruous, in which nothing but the consciousness of the limits are displayed. Therefore, in this universe Art becomes the sole chance of “keeping the consciousness and fixing the adventures” (p. 94). Creating and producing are living double times. The actor, the conqueror, and all absurd men seek to mime, repeat and re-create what had been given to their hands. “All existence for a man turned away from the eternal is but a vast mime under the mask of the absurd. Creation is the great mime” (ibid.).

Moreover, the interaction with art objects gives also emancipation in the “exercises of mind”. With Art one is reconciled with oneself (McCumber, 1989, p. 84). This is the promotion of the “will-less” subject in Schopenhauer’s words. The suffering that had been on the shoulders of the person because of his passionate nature is harmonized. This is explained by Schopenhauer (1976), that all suffering with respect to Being and all the questions about the meaning of life rise with respect to

the deficient nature of man (p. 459). When he wishes something, the fulfillment of that wish never makes him satisfied. There is always an inexhaustible desire to want more and more. Hence, what Art will do will be to bring this volitional freedom. With Art, one will be “raised up from a consciousness of pure will-less, timeless, subject of knowledge, independent of all relations. He will be above himself, his person, his will and all will-in that case” (Schopenhauer, 1976, p. 461). Emancipation from his will, which would come out as a result of his passions, wishes and cares will be resolved by means of the creation process of Art, as being an experience and dialogue, as being an interaction of play. That is why, likewise Aristotle, for Schopenhauer (1976), Art will behave like philosophy. The only distinction will be the *actualiter and explicite*, in Art the appearance of truth will be contained *virtualiter and implicite*; it will help to gain the inner freedom (p. 452). Therefore, Art will bring emancipation and will be in relation to philosophy “as wine to grapes” (Schopenhauer, 1976, p. 452).

However, the ontological prospect of freedom which is gained as emancipation from the worldly chains is inefficient without the utterance of a political freedom; because as Arendt (2006) asserts, it is not the inner freedom that we first discern as an intercourse with ourselves but rather the one in the intercourse with others (p. 147). According to her, a struggle within the will comes after the realization of an outer freedom because the company of other men is what one realizes first as Being-in-this-world, the “Mit-Sein” in Heideggerian terms, and the notion of a freedom first is acquired with respect to them. The political nature of man handles a more thorough and general realm of the talk of freedom. Because, according to her, the debate of political freedom, how man is with respect to his outer organisms and conditions are what man’s primary encounter is. Freedom requires “the company of other men who were in the same state, and it needs a common public space to meet them, a politically organized world”, where actions and words to play role (Arendt, 2006, p. 147). Hence, this social nature of man, this political being of him sets the political freedom to enclose and precede the debate of emancipation in truth. As a result, consequently what Art brings as an outcome, freedom in the sense of liberation, has more of a position of priority and significance. It is what renders the freedom in the sense of emancipation to come into being as well. Therefore, although this would be

the last section of the discussion, freedom as liberty should be regarded as one of the most crucial points of the thesis with respect to the role of Art in Politics.

4.5.2 Freedom as Liberty

Since human beings exist in a social context the political structures that they form in order to live is indispensable. The iteration of Arendt “wherever you go, you will be a polis” is a proof of this. However, the question that hounds the mankind is “Why would anyone obey anyone else?” in these political structures, “Why would an individual obey other individuals?” (Berlin, 2003, p. 1), this would be the arousal of freedom discussions to start and the function of Art in it to be analyzed.

As we have mentioned before, “not to act is not to be a human being”. Action is choosing, which refers to a selection between various options (Berlin, 2003, p. 32) and since acting is the necessary condition of becoming, renouncing freedom would mean renouncing living. And renouncing living would mean renouncing to be a man. As Rousseau (1987) declares *On the Social Contract*, this renunciation contradicts with the very nature of man.

“Renouncing one’s liberty is renouncing one’s dignity as a man, the rights of humanity and even its duties. There is no possible compensation for anyone who renounces everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man. Removing all liberty from his will is tantamount to removing all morality from his actions.” (pp. 144, 145)

Freedom is the very basic component of living well. As a result, the next question will be what freedom to be in the political sense. Isaiah Berlin asserts one of the most impressive analysis on this concept. He declares that there are two basic types of freedom in the political arena. The first is called negative freedom whose meaning could be inferred from its name: the coercion, the deterrence of the individual from the abilities that he is able to do. In Berlin’s own words: “negative freedom means liberty from; absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always recognizable, frontier” (Berlin, 2002, p. 174). It deals with the area in which a person or a group of persons are obstructed and interfered by other persons (Berlin, 2002, p.169). For example, when the populace is ruled by the arbitrary decisions and powers of a tyrant, one cannot talk about any kind of freedom which consists of being able to do what one desires. There would be obstacles and interferences, and that would be the case of negative freedom.

The other type is called Positive Freedom. Positive Freedom in contrary to the definitive explanations of negative one, deals more with the enhancement of the individual in his options, selections. It asks more the question of what or who will form the determinations of a certain human being “to be this rather than that?” As Berlin (2002) asserts they are two different areas although they seem to look similar (p.169). Positive freedom deals more with the question of being a subject, rather than an object. The one who is in the control of actions, the individual who owns his decisions should produce his own self with respect to his own actions. The authenticity by means of a “doer-deciding” rather than being “decided-for” is what is searched in positive freedom. The one who is executing his own decisions will be his own master, not taking orders from the external world but within himself, he would be able “to be somebody, rather than being nobody.” He will constitute his own self (Berlin, 2002, p. 178).

It is no far-fetched idea that these two types of freedom owe a great debt to the creation process: *poiesis*. Art by means of producing, bringing the non-beings into light would let both positive and negative freedom to reside. Not only would the communication process let each individual to gain a positive sense of freedom but also by means of criticizing and reevaluating, the coercions and interference, in the sense of negativity that had been acted upon the individuals would be uplifted. Art as experience, dialogue and festival would let each one to have a sphere of his own to constitute himself. Because Art will establish harmony by introducing universals to the individuals, it will be over the structures of the world which to separate, differentiate and define the living beings. There will be no kind of distinction with respect to any race, color, gender or status. Art will liberate the spirit from “the content and forms of finitude” (McCumber, 1989, p. 68). Therefore, Art will have the ability to lift the men from its existing political structures and introduce to a more universal realm.

Also, since Art would have the outcome of devaluation, indubitably it would also have the ability of showing the defects of each political structure and show an alternate picture for each authoritarian or non-free sphere. However, this should not be understood as McCumber (1989) asserts that “Art is allowed to make its critique of the state” but rather as above mentioned “critique is essential to Art” (p. 104), or in Hegel terms Art does not only carry a potentiality of being critical of political

structures but rather “inherently” it is critical to the nature of state (McCumber, 1989, p. 305). Therefore, with respect to its devaluation and revaluation outcomes, the coercions that had been placed upon would be uplifted as well as the options to choose and create one's own self to be introduced. Hence, the political structures of men, in his every mode of being will be fulfilled and nourished.

However, this power of Art above Politics could have been endangered by Politics as a result of a threat to itself. Its speaking mouth can be tried to be closed up. But one should heed that a regime devastating the very language of its people will destroy its own self as well. The principle of life as becoming, as change and transformation to be neglected will bring the same political structures commence to get closed up communities which would end in perishing and rotting of each, because what would happen in the end would be the abolishment of action and respectively abolishment of itself, the Politics. Therefore, each productive, creative process will enable each action to have the proper property of being an action, coming from free-will. The coming into existence, the living for living would necessitate freedom in actions, and this would result by the autonomous condition of Art over Politics. As Adorno (1999) asserts it would be the critique of its society by means of its negativity and this could be achieved by means of its autonomy (pp. 255, 256).

This freedom bringer property of production over action has also been described and analyzed by Marx. According to Marx, the realm of *praxis*, action is also nourished by *poiesis*, the production. Production is what sets the human beings as a species-being (Marx, 2001, p. 974). He claims that man's being lies in production. Production itself sets the action free, because while producing and creating, man also creates and produces himself. As he utters, production is “sensuous human activity” in which man transforms and reflects his vital activity, being a man, into a means for his existence through it.

“Not only he practically and theoretically makes his own species as well as that of other things his objects, but also...in that as present and living species he considers himself to be a universal and consequently free being.” (Marx, 2001, p. 973)

Hence, wherever action constitutes him to be a distinctive individual as a species-being, production sets him to be capable of a species. That is why; when production is disabled or crooked, alienation starts. Alienation is the externalization of man himself from himself, it is the loss of control over his own body, own consciousness.

As Marx utters (2001) in alienation not only nature from man is externalized and distanced but also man from himself, from his “life activity” and species is also differentiated. Production would let the freedom of man over his own self to be gained (p. 974). This freedom would also reign over all his life activity; both in the sense of his species-life and in relation to their relationship with one another.

In conclusion, Art will stand above Politics by means of being a more harmonious sphere in which contrary to political sphere there will not be a conflict of wills but rather reorganization of contents and this will be “more thoroughly and more “truer” than the finite domain of Politics” (McCumber, 1989, p. 304). And as a result by means of it, Politics which to be the nature of human beings, as Aristotle asserts, would revive and revitalize. By “nature”, the necessary condition of being man is meant in which action is to be the central theme. Man is what he does. And as long as he is free to act, he is wholly man, he is truly playing. Therefore the intrinsic property of Politics, as action, whose existence comes hand in hand with freedom, is enabled and set possible by means of Art. Without Art, the play-sphere of Politics collapses. The existence of Politics, in accordance with the principle of life as becoming is maintained by Art who brings freedom in actions. Hence, Politics is created, designed, regulated, revived and revitalized by means of Art. In short, the necessary play element of life survives.

4.6 Conclusion

To sum up, what had been tried to be maintained though this chapter was that Art to bring some natural outcomes as a result of its existence in life and these results to reveal the link between the two plays of life, Art and Politics. Art, as a result of being an experience, dialogue and festival would render the communication between the subjects and cause harmony in which the differences are all to be recognized that a unity in variety is to be reached. As well as bringing the harmony in the society, Art will also have the ability of criticizing and devaluating the values of the society and act as a destructive force and successively bring out new lives from the old ones by means of its revaluating force from the demolished values. And lastly, as a result of all these outcomes and properties Art will bring freedom in Politics necessary to live well.

However, in order to understand these notions better, a reduction in the scope of analysis is requisite as a successive step. Hence, what will be held in the next chapter will be to exemplify this situation of Art in Politics with a comparison and a specification. I argue that this role of Art to political arena can be resembled to the role of laughter in life. Laughter is one of the best suitable examples for the outcomes of bringing freedom in the political arena, being a social activity and a dialogue in life. Art acts the way laughter acts in life. Therefore, in order to see these outcomes in clear designations, I suggest that the usage of laughter in Art also intensifies and strengthens the aforementioned outcomes. Due to that, for all these outcomes and properties of Art to be proved in the process of living well and for politics to revive, in the subsequent chapter the motif of Carnival will be searched, which would be regarded as one of the basic forms of theater hand in hand with politics where laughter is utilized in the motifs of “Fool” and “Madman”. Therefore, Art’s outcomes, strengthening their mode of being in laughter, will be analyzed in the example of Carnival where the motifs of Fool and Madman as the above mentioned outcomes’ representations are used to establish its link with Politics for living well.

5. ART: THE LAUGHTER OF POLITICS

With the clear explanations of what Art is and its effects are to the link of Politics, it is important to see these outcomes in detail. Due to that, what will be attempted to be displayed at the next level will be to support these outcomes and properties of Art with specific and more elaborative examples. And the main argument that had been going so far what Art to do in Politics will be resembled to the role of laughter in life. Art will be the laughter of Politics. Whereas man cannot live without laughing, Politics cannot live without Art. Whereas man will not be man without laughing, Politics will not be Politics without Art. Therefore, as well as acting as if to be similar and analogous, laughter and Art take each other into use in order to affect and take aback the mankind in various forms of order. Hence, the usage of laughter in Art will also intensify and strengthen these outcomes to prevail. Politics will revive by means of Art especially when it takes the laughter as its weapon.

However, in order to tackle the issue more elaborative and thorough, a reduction in the scope of the analysis is crucial. Hence; Carnival, as the most intimate relationship of Art and Politics walking hand in hand with the weapon of laughter, will be interrogated for proving best the functions of Art as communication, devaluation in social life norms and attribution of new meanings by revaluation, and in the end as bringing freedom. Carnival will be the mixture of Art with Politics. It will not only display the properties of Art as festival, dialogue and experience but also intensify and magnify the outcomes of Art by its usage of laughter as a weapon in the motifs of Fool and Madness.

As a result, by referencing to the idea of bringing freedom, communication, devaluation and revaluation; first laughter will be analyzed to show in which respect it is more choice worthy to select it as Art's best designator and following Carnival as the source of theater in which The Fool and The Madman are used as means of laughter will be taken into consideration. Hence, before moving along the first and crucial point would be to clarify the characteristics and properties of laughter as well as its philosophical and political implications and effects are in life similar to Art's.

5.1 The Laughter

According to Dante, laughter is a “special gift of Heaven” (Buckley, 2003, p. 196) given to humanity. It not only enables us to abide this world but also lets us acquire the knowledge of “how to live well” (Buckley, 2003, p. 71). Hence, the reference to the “well being of the spirit” through laughter is a crucial fact not to overlook. Then, what could be this properties of laughter that will not only have resemblance to Art in Politics but also taken as a means for the intensification and strengthening of its outcomes?

The first fundamental property of laughter is its peculiarity to be unique to mankind. Laughter is a specific characteristic of being human, humans are the only living organisms that are able to laugh; they are “Animal Ridens”, the “laughing animals” (Bakhtin, 2005, p.96). Moreover, Bakhtin (2005) asserts that a baby becomes human when s/he laughs (p. 97). However, this distinctiveness of humans lies not in the fact of showing the sole reaction of laughter, but rather showing it in a rational way, as a result of judgment, action and speech. Because as it has been investigated, some of the advanced mammals, like monkeys, are capable of showing traces of laughter. But this trace of laughter arises without a self-conscious background, but rather in a primitive way. Monkeys laugh when they are tickled, but tickling exists as a result of neural impulse. Hence, there will be no aesthetical aspect. On the contrary, laughing to a joke or an anecdote will be an aesthetic experience (Bergson, 2006, p. 16). Moreover, Bergson (2006) claims that only things that are completely specific to humans do attract laughter. An appearance could be beautiful, elegant, noble, meaningless or ugly, but will never be risible. We laugh at an animal or a man because we find something specific to being human. If we result in laughing to a hat, this would not be because of its material to be either rug or straw but because the form given to it comes from humans (p. 11). In short, this will be the reason for Rabelais (2009) to write in the introductory verses of *Gargantua* as follows: “A laughing book is preferable to a crying one, because laughter makes a human to be human” (p. 3).

Second, laughter occurs as result of incompatible or incongruous matters that do seem to oppose each other. It is the exposure of incongruity (Bergson, 2006, p. 105). It is seen as a reaction to the incongruous and incoherent entities. Moreover,

Schopenhauer (1969) also declares that laughter stems from “a suddenly perceived incongruity between a concept and the real objects” that had existed in relation to them (p. 58). It is the “contingency of existence” (Arnold, 2009, p. 1). Then, what do we mean by this, “incoherence”, or “contingency”? The human condition with respect to world has been defined previously as absurd. The human existence as if to live forever with respect to its ambitions, desires and wishes without doubt contradicts with its finite existence. It is incongruent. Therefore, laughter arises as a potent weapon and reply to cope with this fact. It is the natural outcome of our absurd existence and the abidance for its burden and vanity.

Hence, likewise Art, laughter will help to bring the emancipation from this absurdity. It will be the freedom of human condition from the chains of space and time. As the verse of poet indicates; “us as the pathetic puppets whose control is in the hands of the fate” will be relieved by means of laughter (Bergson, 2006, p. 47). Also as Bakhtin asserts (2005), in order to resist to the mishaps of world and fate, there will be no other strong way to take. “This mighty enemy paralyzes under the mask of laughter, even the blind chance drawbacks if I can dare to laugh at; this world deserves nothing but laughter” (p. 66). Therefore, laughter will be a precious weapon for us to battle against this contingency and incongruity of existence. The verses of Schopenhauer (2006) depict this best: “How we laugh as they bustle about so eagerly, and struggle with one another in such tiny place” (p. 13).

As well as having the question of being in itself as an answer, laughter also enables the possibility of “a mutual recognition for common humanity” (Willett, 2008, p. 75). Each shiny age of humanity in the world history would begin when the victories of laughter, joke, satire and irony to reign (Ünsal, 2006, p. 13). The reason lies in the fact of laughter to be a social activity. This means that laughter occurs in a social context. It requires a reflection; one cannot take the taste of laughter by himself, in other words “one never laughs alone” (Willett, 2008, p. 84). In a preaching where everybody was in tears, a guy was standing alone with an austere face. When it was asked why he was not crying, he had answered as follows: “I am a stranger in this neighborhood” (Bergson, 2006, p. 13).

According to Bergson (2006), this is totally the same for laughter; the amount of laughter in a theater would proportionate to the amount of people watching it (ibid.). Hence, likewise Art, sociability of laughter strengthens the bonds of community. In

reminiscences to Kant that common sense is what lets us to reach an agreement; Buckley (2003) asserts that laughter becomes our common sense in life (p. 136). And this can be evidenced in nowhere better than in a festival where people would exhilarate by the existence of being together (Buckley, 2003, p. 188). Laughter's transmitting essence is also discerned in the natural desire of a joke in order to be shared with others. "Few pleasures are communal than shared laughter, when we read a play at home, we merely smile but at the theater we laugh aloud" (Buckley, 2003, p. 18). As a result, it can be deduced that laughter exists in a social context as well as strengthening this social bondages with the ones who to be their actors. As Bergson (2006) adds as well, it is the "signal for how to live well" (p. 64)

Consequently, laughter exists in the characteristics of playfulness which would be joyfulness and freedom in detailed. One of the first reasons for joyfulness to be a property of laughter is a clear-cut fact that when there is laughter, there is gayness, hilarity and joy. Laughter exists when there is joy, and when there is joy, laughter exists. This is indubitably a reciprocal relationship. For instance, if a bitter author does not smile himself, then no one reading his works will smile as well. Therefore, whatever his writings will be, he will never achieve to write a satire or an irony; "without joyfulness as a property of playfulness, laughter will not be laughter at all" (Buckley, 2003, p. 49). Furthermore, Kant (2000) also asserts that laughter is a pleasurable activity. It is the cheerfulness that lets the body to keep on working, by "bringing about an equilibrium of the vital powers" in it (p. 224).

Furthermore, as well as having joyfulness as its intrinsic property, freedom is also a necessary condition of playfulness. One cannot laugh when he is not free. This has many descriptions from various disciplines. In psychoanalysis, Freud (1998) defined laughter as the release of psychic energies that has been constrained in the body and in the mind, as a display of "free discharge" (p. 179). The energies contained in the body would form one get stressed with tension and consequently laughter will set the release which would enable him to gain his control again. Not only Freud's description dwells around tension and relaxation as a way of freedom evoker, but also Bergson's idea of life too. According to him, life works on the principle of tension and relaxation. And laughter is the social regulatory force over this life's working principal. Laughter with its power represses all the distinctions occurring on the surface of the society as a result of mechanical rigidity and softens them

(Bergson, 2006, p. 18). It helps to establish a free connection between the parts, forming a healthy whole just like Art is for Politics.

Moreover, Bergson (2006) asserts that there are two kinds of societies: open ones and the closed ones. The first of these two, the open society takes becoming as his motto. It will always be on the verge of changing, letting the ones choose what they want and need. They will be “organic and fluid”. On the other hand, a closed society will be with the motto of being. They will obstruct the change, stay “mechanical and strife”, never call for questioning and freedom, rather abolish them altogether and as a result, obstruct laughter to enter (pp. 26, 27). Therefore, an open society with the virtue of laughter would be able to “subvert the power” (Buckley, 2003, p. 165), and bring freedom. This outcome of laughter as “consciousness of power” in Nietzschean terms is significant to pay attention (Willett, 2008, p. 13). Because, with this property laughter becomes a weapon to fight against power structures and bring liberty. It will introduce new ways of thinking, imagination and feeling; the negative freedom will be converted into social equality and solidarity (Willett, 2008, p. 134).

As a matter of fact, the power relationships will also be toppled over via laughter. Laughter will indubitably take the power structures as their butt because it will take sides according to the principle of incoherence and tension as above mentioned. However as a result, the power structures could try to ban laughter from the society and omit its freedom. They could fear from its power (Buckley, 2003, p. 199). Because laughter will cause each power institution to be out of its status, it can make them “worldly” again (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 48). For example, in the times of Stalin, it is an indubitable fact that laughter had been excluded strictly out of the society. Stalin’s arbitrary and mechanical power setting him a perfect tyrant, however, caused the weapon of laughter to get more powerful. As he had feared more of laughter, more of ridicule had been made of him (Buckley, 2003, p. 172). Moreover, as Willett (2008) asserts for most of the men of ideas, laughter as the basic and crucial property of freedom has been what all the authoritarian figures in history have been lacking in (p. 71). And that would be the reason for Art to utilize laughter in order to intensify and strengthen its outcomes in Politics. That would be why it would be the laughter of Politics.

Hence, laughter would dissipate all the ties and obstructions that have been established in the individual and in the society as a way of bringing the truth out. It

will be the courageous one who will look at the king and say that he is naked. Foucault (2001) examines this ability of “courage of telling the truth” under the word of *parrhesia*. Parrhesia has been a Greek word, and used generally in Ancient Greece for the ones who can speak truly with courage. It would literally mean “truthiness” (p. 10). It will indicate the ones who will be able to speak up just for the sake of truth, even with the risk of dying. Therefore, the ones who will be able to laugh will have the ability of parrhesia. The man of humor will be the courageous one. He will continue his struggle hilariously, always “with a jest on his lips”, whereas the grim and the frightened not being able to laugh, staying “detached and sardonic” (Buckley, 2003, p. 61). Laughter will let us reach “aletheia”, the truth, like Art, by “helping to see things as they really are” (Buckley, 2003, p. 177). This courage of laughter would in the end, help the society fight with fear. Any kind of fear will be overcome by the medium of laughter. Since fear will be the radical display of narrow-minded, dumb seriousness; laughter will be the best reply to resolve and bring the atmosphere of freedom (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 75). A world freed from fear will come by means of laughter which will sublimate all the consciousness of false seriousness from dogmatism and mind-boggling ideas and emotions (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 167).

This property of laughter as boldness and truthiness will also bring the similar outcomes of Art as mentioned beforehand such as criticality with devaluation and bringing new meanings with revaluation. Criticality is the first to mention. Laughter by bringing the merry truth of life from the agonizing and violent lies of fear (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 201) will criticize and change the norms of society. It will indicate them and outnumber them. An example can be given from the Gorilla Girls who use outrageous wit to protest sexism and racism. As Willett exposes these Gorilla Girls put on gorilla heads and produce Art posters which write upon:

The Guerilla Girls think the world needs a new weapon: The Estrogen Bomb. Drop it on Washington and the guys in government will throw down their guns, hug each other and say it was their entire fault and finally start to work on human rights, education, healthcare and an end to world poverty. Got left over estrogen pills? Send them to Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC, 20500, USA. (Willett, 2008, p. 116)

As well as this criticality, laughter also has the power to change and alter the circumstances with its power of revaluation like Art. It is the power for the renewal and regeneration of life (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 70). The alterability, the softness, the

becoming will prevail with the virtue of laughter. It will soften the stable, mechanic and conventional entities and present them to the continuous movement of transformation and dynamism (Bergson, 2006, p. 71). The example could be given from the distinction between a comedy and a tragedy: whereas the protagonist in the tragedy does not change his conduct throughout the play with the background consciousness of how audience to consider this attitude, a risible element will try to change that attitude at the time of consciousness of his risibility. For example, if Harpagon had known that we have been laughing at him, he would definitely try to change his stinginess; at least he would pretend that he was not (Bergson, 2006, p. 17). Laughter would bring the renewal, the change, the infinite principle of life, becoming into life. That is why, for Bakhtin (2005), laughter will be the affirmative, creative and renovating avowal of the meaning of life (p. 99).

That is why; Art will be the laughter of Politics. It will interrupt the “aching ambitions” of the motives of power by criticizing and showing its defects (Buckley, 2003, p. 172). And by means of its usage in it, the cruel hierarchical orders will be toppled over. The balances of power will be altered and new perspectives will be introduced. The traditional social power structures will be regenerated and reformed (Willett, 2008, p. 5). As well as entertaining it will enlighten (Willett, 2008, p. 117). It will be the weapon of freedom in the hands of humanity (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 121). As a result of having such unique wisdom to itself then what can be left for the rest of the mankind rather than use it to intensify the whole mentioned outcomes? As Nietzsche (1967) mandates:

No! You ought to learn the art of this world comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh, my young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then, perhaps, as laughers, you may someday dispatch all metaphysical comfort to the devil metaphysics in front... This crown of laughter, the rose-wreath crown: I crown myself with this crown; I pronounced holy my laughter... To you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter I have pronounced holy: you higher man, learn to laugh! (pp. 26, 27)

5.2 The Carnival

In order to see how communication, devaluation, revaluation and freedom initiation will rise with the properties of experience, dialogue and festival of Art, Carnival is the best example to see how laughter to be utilized in Art. It could be taken as the best type of example to see the deep impact of Art in Politics. Carnival is indubitably

a form of Art, it is the source of theater where in difference; the spectator, actor and the director is fused into one another. It is the theater of the folk itself. In Carnival, the experience of festival is in the form of dialogue in which the most powerful weapon is laughter. Therefore, with respect to the aforementioned concepts, the discussion will be intensified and witnessed best in the example of Carnival.

Starting with the usual first question: What is a Carnival? How come we realize that it suits best to our discussion? Why is it a form of Art? And why we can see the best impact of Art in Politics with it? The reply to these questions owes a great debt to Mikhail Bakhtin, who had formed a great analysis of *Gargantua* as a prototype of folk culture and Carnival in his work, *Rabelais and His World*. He interrogates the atmosphere of Middle Ages with the notion of Carnival, giving birth to illuminating times of Renaissance. Hence, following his footsteps, Carnival will be enlightened in the successive explanations.

So, the first question, why is Carnival a form of Art? Can we call it an experience, a dialogue and a festival? In order to see these let's start a deep interrogation. First of all, Carnival can be taken into consideration as the fore coming tradition of Greek theater. However, there is a slight difference between each that as mentioned in Carnival, the spectator, Artist and director is fused into a whole. The play is written while acting and while acting it is simultaneously and spontaneously played. The actors, directors and writers of Carnival become the populace of the respective "polis" and this takes us to the festival character of Carnival. Just like the formation of Greek theater, which to be in the honor of the God Dionysus, Carnival does also have ritualistic roots, festive characteristics. As Plato (1997) mentions in *Laws*:

The gods took pity on human race; born to suffer as it was, and gave it relief in the form of religious festivals to serve as periods of rest from its labors. They gave us as fellow revelers the Muses, with Apollo their leader, and Dionysus, so that men might restore their way of life sharing feasts with Gods. (653d)

This shows that theater was in the form of ritualistic festivals in the age of Antiques. The Muses and Apollo is no doubt the signs of artistic experience which to be believed where the inspirations to come. However, this ritualistic background of Dionysus with respect to Greeks had shifted remarkably with the rise of Roman Empire. The Roman Empire had banned Dionysus from the public arena and introduced a new festival instead of it: Saturnalia. Saturnalia was the major festival

of Romans where the spring equinox shifting to the winter solstice was celebrated. It meant the freedom of the seasons (Wiles, 1998, p. 62). There were big feasts, where everybody was in total permission the way they liked to act and behave. In it not only the slaves were treated as equals, but also “drinking, noise and games and dice, appointing of kings and feasting of slaves, singing naked, clapping of frenzied hands and an occasional ducking of corked faces in icy water” were permitted (Url-8). After a while, following this tradition, the celebrations of Saturnalia had transformed into “Mardi Gras” (Fat Tuesday) in the Middle Ages, in which just before the austerities of Ash Wednesday, feasts were held in the name of Carnival (literally meaning “farewell to the flesh”) all along the Europe (Buckley, 2003, p. 35). These celebrations were indubitably under the form of play; joyful and free, taking its purpose from itself; there was no ultimate purpose but only the experience.

Hence, when it is analyzed it is seen that Carnival is solely an experience. It is the interaction of one subject with its outer circumstances, with the organisms and the envioning conditions. It suits wholly to the definitive property of Art to be the purposive activity, where only the process is at stake. The way Artistic experience requires no utilization; these celebrations were not having any ultimate uses as well. They were for their own sake, revealing the interaction of each with his envioning conditions and organisms. Just like Art, they were reactions and expressions to the changes in the surroundings. Carnival had a life of its own.

Moreover, as well as being an experience and festival, Carnival has a community as its players where listeners and speakers were transposed and reversed into one another autonomously, like the way dialogue is. In Carnival, there is great communication, where change and dialectics to be insurmountable. The basic example for the dialogic nature of Carnival is given by its antagonistic position to “official culture”. Bakhtin (1996) declares that “authoritative discourse” or “monologic discourse” is a one sided word that claims absolute truths (p. 134). On the other hand, Carnival enables the openness and incompleteness where there is always movement. It is “open to other words”. It is open to Others (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 143). The “multidirectional discourse” of Carnival is indubitably a dialogue where “the ambivalent and subversive language of the marketplace, simultaneously debasing and renewing, revealing and hiding, selling and entertaining” exist (Elliot, 1999, p. 131). Therefore, with respect to the properties of dialogue, Carnival is a

“cosmic openness” where “nothing is fixed but everything is in a state of becoming” (Elliot, 1999, p. 130). Carnival is dialogue and respectively Carnival is Art.

Now, after a brief history of the birth of Carnival and why it is a form of Art, it is important to outline what the entities would a Carnival compose of. What would be done in it and what would come as a result of it with respect to Politics? The fundamental characteristic of Carnival is its mode of being as duration for turning everything upside down. In Carnival the rule of the play is to invert and transpose all the rules of the mundane world. In it all the casual norms will be toppled over: the identities, genders, statuses and etc...It will signify the destruction of an old world and a birth of new world. The celebrations would be for the sake of a beginning, a new year, a new spring or a new kingdom, in accordance with the principle of becoming. Hence, just like the way nature transforms, the people and their values will be changed and transposed; the men will wear women clothes whereas women will put on the men's ones, the undergarments will be worn on top and the usual garments under (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 443). This transposition would be in every aspect of life, even the images of excreta and urines will be legitimate, likewise the designation and transposition of all the lower parts of body. In Carnival, the upper will be lower and the lower will be upper, the black will be white and the white will be black, wisdom will be folly and folly will be wisdom, slaves will be masters and masters will be slaves... Hence, all these transposition will destroy, devalue and revalue and renew subsequently (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 177).

Bakhtin (2005) mentions about the Frankfurt Festival, as a type of Carnival, which will show great examples for the above mentioned issues. As he recounts, in the Frankfurt Festival, all the hierarchic differences, degrees and statuses were suspended and the atmosphere was dominated with the gay laughter of Carnavalesque celebration. This was a theater with political implications without lights. The differences between the elite and the common were removed for a while and everybody had got closer to each other (pp. 273, 274). It was the symbol for the absurdity of life, establishing a connection with actions, by devaluing and revaluating, by bringing freedom.

Moreover, Carnival would not only bring devaluation and revaluation but also would establish harmony by means of bringing communication. The whole population, all “demos”, would be invited to Carnival. There will be no exception; no

one will be excluded out of the crowd. The folk by means of Carnival would come into contact with each other in the marketplaces or through the streets. However, this encounter would not only allow the individual to meet the person that he has commonalities but also with the ones that he would not come face to face in usual times, his differences. He will not only get into an interaction with his “Reflections” but also with his “Others”. This would be the result of Carnival’s dialogic property. The interaction they would form would not be denoted anymore as the accumulation of individuals but would rather form an entity different from the addition of parts; it would be an organism. The ones who would be scattering hither and there with confusion in other times would now transform into a creature with solidarity, as one soul controlled by one body. This would be the “demos” in integrity. The individual would feel himself as an integral part of collectivity, a member of this demos-body. And this would indicate not only to the outcome of Carnival’s communication intensification but also to its ability of bringing harmony and unity (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 283).

And lastly, Carnival would bring the principle of “becoming” to the world. It would be the free and joyful type of play, the hilarity, mirth and gaiety to preside in each moment of its presence. It will be the “mirth that prolongth life, and causeth health” adding that its “mirth will recreate our spirits and voideth pensiveness” (Wiles, 1998, p. 63). However, as well as “recreating our spirits” and “prolonging our life”, the Carnival would also act as a way of bringing freedom and transforming power structures. It will hand us a new way to look at the world. As Bakhtin (1984) indicates, “the Carnival sense of the world will possess a mighty life-creating and transforming power” and the world as a result would acquire an “indestructible vitality” (p. 107). It will be the critique of social norms. With the transposition of all norms, the bondages keeping each in chains would be lifted and an inclination of freedom would be sensed. The ones superior in power will be interrogated and criticized by the lower who would have the power of laughter in their hands: “their superiority is false” they would claim, that “what we have is genuine” (Buckley, 2003, p. 37).

In conclusion, Carnival is the festival of people who gives this gift to themselves. Their own selves are the host of this invitation as well as being the guests. It is the source of theater having roots from Greek Ancient ritualistic ceremonies of

Dionysus. However, in this form of Art, the ones who to act are also the ones who to write as well as being the ones who to watch (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 277). There is just participation of an interaction with the elements of experience, dialogue and festival. It is the sign of “eudaimonia”, since in each Carnival every living being gathers and acknowledges the purposiveness of life in the participation of playful celebration, in which the time-space determination of human condition is broken and the principle of life as becoming is internalized. Moreover, with the transposing character of Carnival, the meanings attributed to the world are also toppled over. It celebrates the “revival and renewal like a jubilee, where past fetters will be broken and fresh starts to be made” (Buckley, 2003, p. 35). It destroys for the sake of existence. The structures of power become upside down, it degrades them all. Carnival as a form of Art with the instrument of laughter “seeks to degrade those in authority covering them with excellent, whipping them and exposing their failings” (Buckley, 2003, p. 36). It establishes the rules of living for *praxis* by setting free the consciousness of humanity (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 303). Hence, as well as being a form of Art it also becomes a political act (Willett, 2008, p. 134) and that shows why each Politics comprise of Art and Art, of Politics.

Hence, Carnival shows why Art is the laughter of Politics. As the source of contemporary world’s theater, Carnival takes the entire populace as its actors, playwrights and directors and its most powerful weapon becomes the laughter again. Hence, Art’s functions in Politics is evidenced most as well as being intensified and strengthened by means of Carnival and its use of laughter. The Artistic form of Carnival takes into use the weapon of laughter for the political implications that had been above mentioned. Moreover, as well as Carnival these are also witnessed in the concepts of Fool and Madman. The Carnival Laughter displays its face and its potency via these motifs. Hence, Art attributes freedom and intensifies the devaluation and revaluation process by means of these motifs. Now, what these motifs are needed to be analyzed in detail.

5.3 The Fool

The concept “Fool” is the symbol for the usage of laughter in theater, and respectively in Art, where the intensified affects of Art and laughter’s fusion is presented outmost in devaluation, revaluation and establishment of political freedom.

Fools of the theater, the most significant to be traced in Renaissance are the figures that are able to think and say freely whatever they have in mind. They are the ones who can criticize their masters with bitter satire and interpret the world and its structures with their own class views. That is why they will be the best fellows of their masters (Ünsal, 2006, p. 13).

However, before moving along to the functions of Fools as means of laughter in Carnivals and in other respective Art forms, the genealogy of the word “Fool” is important to trace in order to clarify the concept better. Before the Christ, what had been given to them as a name was “delikeliktan”; meaning “the ones who play”. This name comes not as a coincidence to our way, since the semblance of play and Art has been mentioned before. Hence, the reason for us to take Fools as the best example resides in this existential fact; them to be “players” (Ünsal, 2006, p. 20).

The major characteristics of Fools will be their irrationality and antagonistic conduct to the expected norms of their time. They will be the kings of the lower class, or generally of the lower world. Each king would be assisted with a Fool. That is why in chess, just next to the king and queen there would be the “the fous”. Although in English, they had been translated as “bishops” what their original name in Latin and still in French would be “fous” meaning; the Fools (Ünsal, 2006, p. 33). Fools would be the eyes, ears and voices of their Kings. The entire world will be governed under the command of Fools. Especially the times of Renaissance is marked as their time. Even as Foucault (2007) says for those times, some aristocratic societies had employed some men as to be “Fools” whose words are taken of no importance on the surface but in deep down to have the truth (p. 222).

They carried an unusual irrationality in contrast to their times’ accepted norms. Who to be the most irrational would be perceived as the most rational (ibid.). The irrationality would comprise of a Rationality that the common world would not compose of. The ability daring to be irrational would indicate how wise a Fool would be, since only a wise man will be able to “get irrational in such a right way, in such a right time and in such a right amount” (Ünsal, 2006, p. 44). In an absurd world as such, the Fools would be the kings and the things they signify would be acknowledged as wisdom because nobody but them will be aware of their foolishness (Ünsal, 2006, p. 34).

Furthermore, the Fool will display the existential absurdity of men and his determinacy by the parameters of space and time. The tragic fate of men hand in hand with the internal necessities of life will be reflected in an inverted way via their weapon of laughter. They will sum up the apples with the pears (Ünsal, 2006, p. 19). The concept of Fool and its role can be exemplified best in Shakespearean plays who are regarded as the best examples of Renaissance literature. The Fools in Shakespeare's plays always symbolize the discourse, the rationality, the truth and the irony of the populace in contrast to the words and deeds of their masters (Ünsal, 2006, p. 43). In his plays, the Fool becomes the one who tells out the naked truths and reflects each vice back to the executing ones, like a mirror (Ünsal, 2006, p. 39). The parrhesian property of laughter is evidenced best in him. He is the symbol of honesty and truthiness. Therefore, today whoever conflicts with his truthiness raises our laughter, since each takes a part in becoming a Fool (Ünsal, 2006, p. 13).

Therefore, as it could be recognized above, Fool is the Other of the Kingdom's dialogue. It uses the weapon of laughter to indicate this Otherness. Since it is the freedom in itself, without doubt it paves the way to liberty in the society. The communication and respectively harmony and unity are established by the risible voice of him. The Fool, as well as being irrational and absurd, will at the same time be a spirit; a spirit to be comprised of both everything and nothing. It is "the mysterious, undefined human spirit which approaches the perfectness of chaos" (Ünsal, 2006, p. 30).

Moreover, in the Middle Ages and following in Renaissance, there even had been a festival in the name of Fools: The Feast of Fools. As a type of Carnival, in it the Fools were used as means of laughter to indicate the lower classes' and the populace norms' to be higher. The Kings and the Fools were transposed. They were picked by the votes of the folk and were ridiculed by the folk itself. The Fool first came in the costumes of a King and the populace had ridiculed him at the most and finally the King which to be battered and sworn at had been taken out of the stage. This was the safety valve of the populace as Bakhtin would refer (2005, p. 224). As a matter of fact, when narrow churchmen tried to end the medieval feast of Fools, "the theological faculty of Sorbonne" defended it with passion:

We do this ...in order that folly which is second nature man to man and seems to be inborn may at least once a year have free outlet, otherwise if we failed to remove to bring and let in air, we would burst. (Buckley, 2003, p. 35)

5.4 The Madman

The concept of Madness is also used widely as a medium of Laughter just like Fool in Carnivals and in the subsequent forms of theater. Madness is a motif of laughter used by Art to indicate to another form of rationality which to be a mode of communication and dialogue as well as devaluation, revaluation and freedom bringing as an outcome in Politics. The similarity between the two words Fool and Mad is conspicuous enough not to overlook. Although these two would have two different words as Fool and Mad in English, in French having its roots from Latin, they are signified by means of a single word “fou”. “Fou” means both Mad and Fool in French (Ünsal, 2006, p. 26). Therefore, likewise Fool, Madness also signifies the superiority of an inverted world where the norms of the Other are to be the master. It necessitates one to look and perceive the world with different eyes. As Bakhtin utters, madness is the gay laughter of “official rationality, official truth and official reality”, it is the ridicule of this narrow-minded seriousness. It is nothing but “festive” (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 67). As well as enabling an escape from the false truth of world by means of authorizing an independent viewpoint (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 77), it also becomes the wisdom of this world. Madness is wisdom and wisdom is madness respectively. The Madman laughs heartily to the greed and power love of “serious people” and see them as the “real mad” ones (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 392). Hence, when one starts to interrogate Madness as a motif of laughter in Carnivals and successively in the subsequent theater pieces, what he to see would be its role as being the courageous one with the virtue of parrhesia as well as being the Other in the process of dialogue in which the question of truth to be sought.

The first characteristic of Madness as a weapon of laughter in Art was its mode of being in Otherness. This Otherness was the main factor for a dialogue to exist. Madman was taken just like Fools to be the Other of dialogue. It was “an index” for the endurance of the dialectic, as Hegel (1990) proposes, for “the contradiction and negation” (pp. 124, 126). The dialectical process in order for the becoming process to continue is requisite and dialogue is nothing but this so-called eternal dialectics.

Hence, Madman should not be called “insane” in these Art forms as ones lacking reason but rather should be regarded as ones who to oppose and contradict “that official reason”, by taking the place of Other (Güven, 2005, p. 37). The negation of one will lie in his madness, or in other words in his Other. Therefore, the possibility of a dialogue, the expression of truth in an eternal self-formation through (dia) uttering (legein) (Güven, 2005, p. 96) requires madness as its necessary condition, because without the Other no such thing as dialogue would exist.

Hence, as a respective and subsequent outcome, Madman would be handling the parrhesian activity in which truths that are to be forbidden are uttered. He is the courageous one, the innocent child who can tell that the king is naked. The most famous usage of this can be witnessed in the *Gay Science* of Nietzsche (1974) where the Madman is the one who is able to tell that the God is dead.

Have you not heard of the Madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!” As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? Emigrated? Thus they yelled and laughed...The Madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with eyes. “Whither is God?” he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him-you and I. All of us are his murderers.” (p. 181)

Therefore, it could be maintained that madness also deals with the question of truth and of becoming. By means of being the Other in the dialogical process, it establishes what has been rejected what could have been overlooked by the stable and rigid eyes of the world. That is why Socrates also links madness in *Phaedrus* with a philosophical activity. As to him and to Greeks, the Madman is the special one who is gifted by Apollo (Plato, 1997, 265c). His words are in a way related to prophetic activity. They are able to see what the “normal” ones are not able to. They are the seers who to see the future with open eyes as Socrates says “madness as a gift of the God, the ones who tell the future, thereby weaving insanity into prophecy” (Plato, 1997, 244b-c).

Also as Foucault (2007) asserts in the Middle Ages what the madmen were entitled was to have the “Great Secret”, concealing inside the difficult, esoteric knowledge of God, the truth. The words of Madman were interpreted as the secret messages of God that are delivered (p. 222). Madmen were the resemblances of the irresponsible truth that came into speech into which the God’s secret words were embodied. Hence, the

words of the mad likewise the Fools were believed to have strange powers, reveal some hidden truth, predict the future, reveal what the wise were not able to perceive. Likewise the Fool, the Madman was considered to have a rationality in irrationality.

In conclusion, both Fool and Madman would be the Kings of Carnival, which designates the source of theater with the usage of laughter. They will be the Other of the dialectical process in order for devaluation and revaluation to take place. They will be necessary elements not only as the subjects of dialogue, but also as the mediums of laughter and respectively freedom. They will ridicule every entity of the common, causal world for the becoming process to exist. Even in *Gargantua*, the ridicule of Rabelais with the word “philosophy” is important to demonstrate this claim. He declares that the etymology of philosophy is “fin-folie”, coming from the word “fou”, the Fool (Bakhtin, 2005, p. 460). As a result, the concepts of “Fool” and “Madman” will act as freedom bringers in Politics because as Nietzsche (1974) explains the rational and the irrational will be interrelated to each other, because “logic will come into existence out of illogic” (p. 171) and restoring their “dignity would be nothing other than restoring the dignity of the world in which we live” (Bauer, 1999, p. 7).

5.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the absurd joy would immanently be the freedom of creation. Laughter would save man, and through laughter: Art! Art will indubitably be the experience of existence and dialogue of living. Moreover, laughter in Art would keep one from crying, would endure the absurdity of living and would resolve the enmities obstructing. Art as the “affirmation of life” would render this existence bearable,

Instead of giving the humor being a clue to way in which life might be despised and the body repudiated, will give the human beings a clue as to a way in which life might be embraced, and the body seen as a sphere of joy. (Nussbaum, 1998, p. 60)

In short, what had been tried to be tackled in this last chapter was to prove Art to be the laughter of Politics by means of criticizing and renewing it. It will not only let the society to have a communication with each other but also let Politics to be free. And this freedom in Politics, this renovation and incessant criticism and creation by means of devaluations and revaluations would enable the eudaimonia to subsist. Since Politics would be the necessary condition of life, by means of its healthiness,

life would be “lived well”. Hence, the power of Art in Politics would be resembled to the role of laughter in life and its outcomes would be intensified and strengthened by means of it. This would be seen best in the example of Carnival, which to be the source of theater where the concepts of Fool and Madman are used as weapons of laughter.

6. CONCLUSION

This thesis which seeks the role of Art in Politics starts with the question of life initially. It is an indubitable fact that all the questions, all the notions and all the disciplines that we define and tackle do take their roots and have a meaning only with respect to life. The concepts and terms that we search into have their inceptions in the question of life and the meaning endowed to it. Therefore, in order to understand the relationship between Art and Politics, what one necessitates is to make the interrogation of life, what it to be and what value it to forsake, primarily and primordially. Hence, before moving along, the initial interrogation would be around the question of life indispensably.

So, what is life? Is there a meaning of it? If there is one, what is it? Is it something external to it or internal? In short, why do we live? These questions have never ceased hounding the mankind as far as he knows himself. Man, as a conscious being, has tried to find the meaning of life throughout the history, for what he to exist. The answers had been given from various viewpoints. For some, this life was lived for another life, it to be solely an illusion, that the reality was “out there” and for some, this life had no meaning beyond itself, that it had its meaning in itself, it was just “Being-in-this-world”. So, life to have no meaning beyond itself has been argued, because when one starts putting the question of “why” one sees that there is no end. Each “why” triggers a successive one and the ultimate why lacks of an answer. The chain of justification is never fulfilled and each value lies vane and absurd. The meaning of life is found not of it, but in it. The point of living is living. Therefore, what I argue is that this life should be regarded as a play. Play is an activity which finds its purpose in itself. It is not played for some external appeal there is no “why” of a play. One plays for the sake of playing; only the joy and freedom felt in it is its definitive property.

Taking these into consideration, if life and its meaning are comprehended with respect to the notion of play, it is no doubt that life is in need of rules, players and

entities to play. That is when the play comes out to be a good and a proper play, on the occasion of it to be played well. This “wellness” is highly an important element of playing and projecting it onto life, the notion of living. Playing is playing and living is living when they are done well. The concept of Aristotle is highly significant to mark in order to clarify the notion of “wellness”. He declares that what makes life choice worthy is maintained by the term “eudaimonia”. As “eu” refers to “well being”, “daimon” refers to “spirit”; as a result, eudaimonia is “well being of the spirit” or in other words it is “living well”.

Naturally, in order for this “well being” or “living well” to come into existence, some other mediums are needed. These instruments, as the sub-plays of life are Art and Politics respectively. They, deriving from and meddling with the concepts of “production” and “action”, let the eudaimonia to subsist. However, this results not only by means of their unique existence but also with respect to each other. Because each of these above-mentioned play-spheres does require one another for their selves’ survival, there is an interdependent and relative relationship between each other; whereas Art requires Politics, Politics necessitates Art. But, what the main theme of this research would be the relationship from Art to Politics. Why Art is to be a necessary element for Politics? The answer is first because Art enables the communication in the society, second because it acts as a critique in the political sphere and devaluates and revaluates the meanings that have been imposed upon and resultantly it brings freedom. In short, it lets the Politics to revive and regenerate itself with the principle of becoming and enable its play-sphere not to collapse.

However, in order to reach those functions of Art, a note-worthy preliminary step would be to define what Art is. The purpose of this definition would not be to enclose Art in a restricted area but rather enable it to be grasped more in a concrete way for realizing what its affects to be in Politics. Hence, these defining characteristics of Art are experience, dialogue and festival.

One of the first is Art as experience. It is an indubitable fact that humans exist with an interaction with the environment. Since life is nothing but the totality of living energies interrelating with each other, living animals are present in all times and places in an interaction with other organisms and environmental conditions. This close connection of them play a very crucial role. The organism stays in close contact with his surroundings which causes the creation of experiences. It indicates active

and alert commerce with the world, rather than being closed up within one's own self. Hence, Art fuses these outgoing and incoming energies in the living beings by the very same relation of undergoing and doing and this renders it to be an experience. The act of producing just for the sake of producing and having a pleasure in it, without the goal of having a destination, but taking the whole creation process as a journey becomes the first characteristic of it. Art becomes an experience, an end in itself, or in Kant's words "purposiveness without purpose". It is not matched with a prior cause and the means and ends unite.

Second, Art is defined as a dialogue. Dialogue is a communication process which requires the exchanging of the subjects and calls for the Other to see one's own self. It is a mode of interaction that enables the search of truth; a social act, in which the mode of interaction rests on ceaseless questions and answers. Likewise, in Art both of the artists, spectators and artworks get into dialogic interaction. Each forms a reciprocal relationship with one another. This could be either between the artist and the artwork; or between the spectator and the artist; or between the artwork and the spectator. Every work of art becomes a dialogue with everyone who to confront and the encounter with the artwork becomes a kind of rich conversation. Therefore, the interpretation or the understanding relevant to it never sees a caesura. It itself becomes. Hence, the interaction between the artwork and the artist, between the spectator and the artwork and lastly between the artist and the spectator always becomes a dialogue, a conversation in which the speaker and the listener alter positions continuously and incessantly.

Third, Art is defined as a festival because of its social and universal nature. The festivals are the gatherings of rejoicing deriving from the word "festum", in which big feasts are presented to the whole community to take part. With the arrival of it, the time suspends and the humanity reaches an autonomous time. Hence, Art due to its social nature and play property as being the joyful and free activity is attributed best with the notion of festival. It is the bondage of the social, the encounter where more than one is needed and where no one is excluded. It is "ludus", the "free and the joyful" one, in which like festival people rejoice and participate in an all encompassing world. It is the experience with which people who to contribute do break the chains of time and space.

As a result, Art with respect to its experience, dialogue and festive character renders precious outcomes of communication, harmony, devaluation and revaluation to preside as well as the freedom to reign in Politics. The first notion to analyze is its communicative power. Art, acting as if demanding universal notions, lets the subjects reach to an agreement, try to listen and understand each other. It strengthens bonds of communication in the society between the agents. Surely, the dialogic and festive character of Art plays a crucial role in the maintenance of this outcome. The dialogic character enables the dialectical process never to end, and the festive brings each one to be in contact with each other in the wholeness. Hence, the consequent outcome becomes harmony. Due to Art, the subjects meet at a universal level in which being man plays the most significant role. Art calls to our common sense where “a world without a center” is hoped.

And the consequent outcome is the critical role of Art in life and inferentially in Politics. This is compared to the role of history that had been defined especially by Nietzsche and Foucault. What these philosophers had maintained was that history to be taken as the inquisitor who asks questions and criticizes. It works like a genealogist or like an archeologist and likewise, Art is denoted with the same function. It devaluates the norms that had been endowed upon, it criticizes what had been done by each subject, by each society, by each power structure. This is signified mainly by Adorno, that Art to have an autonomous realm in order to be distant to the falsity and corruptness of the society. Art cannot be social just with its aspect of being a material in the society, deriving its material and origin from the society as an experience and source data but also as standing against the society, against its political conditions. That would be when Art to be endowed with autonomous essentiality, in the circumstances of its integration with oppositions, pure and uncompromised, with a critique of dialectics and logic.

Art keeps on living as long as it resists this so called existence. As long as its rejection against the stability and firmness continues, its role as a “genealogist” endures; its dynamic component being in opposition to society inside the society keeps on. As well as situating life as an experience, a process, and giving way to the expressions of existence through its dialogical structure, Art calls into being the expression of unsayable, to that which cannot be formulated by discursive language.

It brings out the expression of the Other and acts as the anti-thesis of authoritative discourse.

Consequently, the next function of Art becomes revaluation. As a consequent step of its devaluative process, Art comes to regenerate and form new meanings for the ones that had been omitted by itself in the political arena. It brings new worlds, new meanings in accordance with the principle of becoming. It does not only regenerate and revive but also enable this process to be an infinite dialogue. Hence, all the values that have been revaluated carry the potential of being destroyed in the successive attempt. No stability and rigidity exists, but rather the way life is, everything in Politics moves in a flux, in a never-ending transformation and alteration, in becoming. The transformation, the interaction, the creation; the becoming essence of world is attained by Art.

As a result, the freedom reigns. This freedom comes both as an emancipation from the bondages of human condition and as a type of liberty in the society. Humans are indubitably conditioned by the parameters of time and space, they are puppets under these bondages and since universality is introduced by Art, these bonds are broken through the aesthetical experience; human beings who to be bound and determined by the reality of life and is set free only through Art. That was the reason for one to grasp life as a play. Although Art was taken as an illusion for many thinkers, this was actually for to reach the reality. As illusion derives from the word *in lusio* meaning “in the play”; it is no doubt that man becomes able to live only by the illusions of Art. Since Art is a play, the way play is able to get in thorough all dimensions of social life, into all classes, races and levels; Art is the mode of freedom. The forms of play becomes the forms of freedom and through Art a realm of freedom is presented.

Consequently, liberty both in the negative and positive terms reigns in the society. The actions, the realm of *praxis* are set free by means of Art. It is an indubitable fact that freedom is the necessary element of politics. Freedom is the actual reason of men to live together in any political organization. Without it, political life becomes meaningless. The *raison d’etre* of politics is freedom and its field of experience is action. This goes hand in hand with the social nature of man, because to utter a freedom in the political sense, what we mean is nothing but the freedom of a subject with respect to the other subjects. Hence, social nature of man is what renders the freedom to be a necessary element of political nature of man. Without the company

of other men who are in a parallel status in a common public space in which each free man to introduce and present his actions, the mention of freedom is null. In short, this comes by means of Art. Art with its festive character sets each subject at the same level and addresses each without any differentiation of race, age, gender or any power-structured hierarchy. It brings freedom. "To make people free is the aim of Art, therefore Art for me is the science of freedom" says Joseph Beuys³ as a proof of this argument (Url-7). Hence, Art calls upon more philosophic truth.

Taking all these into consideration, the role of Art in Politics is resembled to the role of laughter in life. The way laughter works in life, Artworks like that in Politics. Moreover, by the utilization of laughter in itself, Art intensifies and strengthens all its above-mentioned outcomes. In order to see these in more detail, it is beneficent to search it into examples. Therefore, Carnival as the source of contemporary theater can be given as a form of Art in which all these Political outcomes to be seen most conspicuously. And consequently, the motifs of laughter used in it as the Fool and the Madman are good examples to show how the utilization of laughter in Art will intensify and strengthen these outcomes.

One of the first to analyze is Carnival. Carnival is a spontaneous activity where the actors, spectators and writers are fused into a one. Each actor is his own play's writer, own play's director and spectator. And it is indubitably a form of Art. First of all, it is an experience since it is an end in itself. It does not seek for any other end rather than itself. It is the expression of the interactions with one's environing conditions and organisms. Second, it is a dialogue where subjects are transposed into each other, where incessant communication is upheld through (dia) uttering (legein). There is no dead end, but always a movement, an openness where each time a possibility for a new word is existent. In it, by means of laughter and excess the seriousness and the hierarchies of "official" life are altered and the authoritative language and values gives way to a diversity of Others' voices. Moreover, it is the festival of the populace where time suspends and solidarity is reached. There is no exclusion, but everybody is welcome.

³ Joseph Beuys (1921-1986) is a German artist who had brought the motto "everyone is an artist" into discourse and provoked the administrators of his art school by refusing to limit the numbers of students enrolling on the course he thought.

As a result, Carnival is the place where *praxis* reigns; it is the time of actions themselves with spontaneity to determine what the theory can never establish. It is the freedom of the populace where the bonds are loosened and a gap for breathing is maintained. The values are criticized, destroyed and demolished. What used to be white is black, what used to be a slave is a master and what used to be the lower is the upper. It is a world upside down, a world whose values are transposed and inverted. It is the creation of the new from the old, where creation, renovation and regeneration reside. The stability and rigidity are altered into a constant possibility of change. It is the play of becoming.

And consequently the laughter weapons of Carnival to interrogate are the Fool and the Madman. The Fool is the Dionysus of the Nietzsche; it is the anarchist soul, in whose face the satire and ridicule is faced with a rational irrationality. He is the Other likewise the Madman who not to be the Insane one, but rather the Other voice of the dialogue, who to show the things that are not seen by the common eyes, who to have a “power of vision” within his “irrationality”. Their irrationality comprises of a rationality that the common world does not compose of. What their power and uniqueness is the ability to dare to be irrational in such a right way, in such a right time and in such a right amount. They are the Kings of the Carnival who are necessary for the dialectical process to continue as well as the courageous ones who are the ones spitting out the whole truth with the entity of parrhesia and bringing freedom. The Madman and Fool are requisite and crucial elements of living and understanding. They criticize and devalue, they are the tools of transformation and freedom.

In short, Politics necessitates Art. For its play-sphere not to collapse, for it to continue its existence with replenishment, regeneration and renovation, Art is needed, because Art is the relation with the world as well as being the contestation against the world; it is spirit organizing the world. Hence, that is the link to live well, to “the well being of the spirit” and a play to be a proper play.

Art is the laughter of Politics. It is both the devaluator and the revaluator and freedom bringer of it. It is its revolution. It is what makes a human to be a human and a life worth to be lived, very well lived.

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