TO LIVE WITH OR NOT TO LIVE WITH?

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Beraber yaşamak ya da beraber yaşamamak?

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<u>Özet</u>

Kıbrıs adasının ikiye bölünmüşlüğü yıllardır sürmekte ve Kıbrıs sorunu da uluslararası arenanın en uzun süreli çözülemeyen meselelerinden biri haline gelmiştir. 2004 yılında Annan Planı reddedildikten sonra, Kıbrıs sorununa en uygun çözümün bulunması için Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nde büyük bir tartışma başlamıştır. İki toplumlu, iki bölgeli bir federasyon altında yeniden birleşme, ortak onay alması muhtemel bir çözümün temeli olarak gözükmektedir. Araştırma yöntemlerinden odak gruplarını kullanmak, bana Kıbrıs Rum gençliğinin Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne ilişkin bakış açısı hakkında yeteri kadar ipucu verdi. Tez, üç ayrı bölüme ayrılmıştır: milliyetçiliğin zaman içinde Kıbrıs'taki etkisini, Annan Planı'nı ve benim deneklerimin onu algılayışını, ve son olarak da odak gruplarının bahsettiği, hem durumu nasıl analiz ettiklerini hem de Kıbrıs Rum gençlerinin hislerini anlatan, altı çizilmesi gereken önemli faktörleri ifade ediyorum.

<u>Abstract</u>

Cyprus remains for decades divided and the Cyprus conflict is one of the longest standing unresolved issues of the international community. After the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, there is a big discussion in the Republic of Cyprus regarding the suitable solution for the Cyprus dispute. Reunification under the Bi-Communal, Bi-Zonal Federation appears to be the only base of a solution that seems ultimately capable of common acceptance. Using the research method of the focus groups, the participants gave me enough clues about the Greek-Cypriot youth's perspective for the solution in Cyprus. This thesis is divided in three different parts: the effect of nationalism in Cyprus through the years, the Annan Plan and my informants' perception about it and in the end, I have stated various factors which were mentioned in the focus groups and they are quite important to be highlighted, as they analyze the situation but also the feelings of the Greek-Cypriot youngsters today!

To my lovely family and friends

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Abbreviation

ADIK	Fighting Democratic Party (AΔHK)
AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People (AKEΛ)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTP	Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi)
CYMAR	Cyprus Market Research Ltd
DIKO	Democratic Party (ΔHKO)
DISI	Democratic Rally (ΔHΣY)
EDEK	European Socialist Party (EΔEK)
EDI	United Democrats (EΔH)
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
KADEM	Kalite Araştırma Danışmanlık ve Eğitim Merkezi
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	New Horizons (NE.O)
PASOK	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
PIO	Public Information Office

TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati)
TRNC	Turkish Republic of North Cyprus
UBP	National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi)
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Chapter 1

Introduction

Do the Greek-Cypriots youth honestly want to find a solution regarding the Cyprus dispute? Can be the "otherness" an obstacle for the reconciliation of the island under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation?

On 24th April 2004, Cypriots lost their chance to change the future. The UN plan (Annan Plan) was rejected by Greek-Cypriots to the extent of 76% while the Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan by 65%. Ever since the failure of the referendum, various analysts, professors and journalists tried to find the reason for the results on both sides; why Greek-Cypriots chose to vote "No" to the Annan plan and why Turkish-Cypriots approved the plan; whether the Greek-Cypriots' "No" vote was a rational decision based on their evaluation after reading the Plan or whether they have been misled into voting "No" by their political parties. Six years after the Annan Plan no one asked Cypriots what they really wanted.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand the dispositions of Greek-Cypriot youngsters with the prospects of reconciliation and co-existence based on the focus groups. The truth is hidden beyond the Greek-Cypriot's result to the Annan plan. The Greek-Cypriots vote should be seen as a "No" to the reformations of the Annan Plan or to the concept of re-unification. This study focus on the new generation's intentions: people who are around twenty five years of age. In my opinion, this group is interesting for two reasons. First of all, these people have no personal experiences from the war in 1974. They were born and grew up in a divided island. This division seems to be a reality for them. They have grown up around older people who were

repeating their stories. Surrounded by these stories of the "others[1]", subconsciously they have been affected from their words.

Focusing on the new generation of the island, the study cannot be representative of the intentions of Greek-Cypriots. The aim of my thesis is to represent just the Greek-Cypriot youth's way of thinking. As it seems, it is a significant field which worthy of being analyzed. Not only because of the importance of the group but also because it will show finally at least what Greek-Cypriot youth want. I have chosen this subject because as a member of this group, discussing with people of my age, I do not have a clear idea what is the most "desirable" solution.

Trapped in the midst of this complicated idea of a solution, my thesis is based on the following understanding:

- How prepared the Greek-Cypriot youth is, to approve any solution regarding the Cyprus dispute?

In this evaluation, I have attempted to find an answer to this question. The text that will follow is based on the results which have been taken by the research method of the focus groups.

In order to achieve this and understand their beliefs, I analyzed the simple question above into further small questions:

- Are the Greek-Cypriots familiar with the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal, Federation terminology?

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[1] This term is used from Prof. Niyazi Kizilyurek's book: "the deadlock of nationalism".

- To what extent do Greek-Cypriot youth agree to the solution based on the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation?

- Have the Greek-Cypriot youth read and understood the Annan Plan?

- Do they want any improvements or are all the endeavors for nothing?

- What is the new generation's perception about Turkish-Cypriots?

In order to find responses to those questions, I decided to use the research method of focus groups (qualitative research). Utilizing the results with this kind of research, I sought to explain their attitude, as it concerns the acceptance of a future solution and consequently the co-existence with the Turkish-Cypriots. Following these guidelines I have prepared the questions that I would like to ask in the focus groups in order to get an answer to the questions (Appendix 1). My purpose is to show that even if thirty six years have passed since the military intervention/invasion in 1974, according to my focus groups' results, it seems that youth did not change mentality and it is faithful to its ancestors.

In order to understand how the Cyprus dispute had begun, a historical flashback is necessary to be illustrated. So, in the second part of this chapter I will highlight the historical background of the Cyprus problem, starting from the period when Cyprus was a colony of the United Kingdom, the EOKA struggle in 1955 and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Under which circumstances United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece had signed the Zurich and London Agreement. I will try to show how some not so vital incidents led to that tragedy of 1974. What were the real reasons, excuses and the results of the military intervention/invasion. Then I will describe the first negotiations in 1977 and the progress of the negotiations until the

Annan Plan, the changes that happened between 1977 and 2004, and the reason that UNFICYP is still trying to help Cypriot leaders to compromise for a better future of the island.

As my thesis is based on the results from the focus groups that I have done, the second chapter analyzes the methodology that was followed. In order to understand how the Greek-Cypriot youth think, I preferred to use the qualitative research method using the focus groups. In this chapter, the whole procedure of the focus groups is described, from the first step until the findings: what was the reason which I decided to utilize this method, how I decided to choose my sample and how I got the results.

The third chapter deals with the historical and political effects of Nationalism in Cyprus. After some nationalistic ideas which were reported in the focus groups, a particular historical background of nationalism (from the early 1950s until nowadays) but also the changes that have been done in people's mind could not be missed. In the beginning, I will present the changes of nationalism through different periods and the types of nationalism that was raised during those periods. After that, I thought that it was necessary to illustrate Greek-Cypriots youth's perception about Turkish-Cypriots. The term of "the other" and how this effected a generation who actually did not have any relationship with "the other". Moreover, the nationalistic outcome through education will be explained, as education plays a major role to flourishing nationalism.

The forth chapter is referring to the Annan Plan. Annan Plan was the first attempt for reconciliation. It will always be a main point at the Cyprus history. In my focus groups there was a set of questions regarding the Annan Plan. The answers that I have got were various. The chapter starts with the definition of the term Bi-zonal,

Bi-communal Federation and how the new generation understand this terminology. The results of the Plan and how they have been formed are included. I will continue explaining a lot of factors that were noticed in the focus groups which actually affected their vote; the role of the political parties, the influence of Tassos Papadopoulos' speech to the Greek-Cypriots souls, mass media.

The fifth chapter is the chapter which actually gives you an idea about youth's perception about politics and the Cyprus question. The structure of this chapter is based on the answers and the comments of the participants of the focus groups that I have found quite remarkable. Considering the multiple beliefs of my informants, I am trying to discover with my thesis if youth are ready to accept a solution. It is described how important the factor of time is for concluding to a solution, the economical differences between the two communities and how this dissimilarity changed people's perception of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, how the youth feels about the fact that Cyprus joined the European Union and its consequences. As the elections in the North part of Cyprus were one week before my focus groups, I found it appropriate also to ask them what their feelings were about Eroglu and Talat. So, their ideas about Turkish-Cypriot leadership are included in this chapter.

In the last chapter, I will try to summarize the opinion of the Greek-Cypriot's youth who participated to the focus groups about the reconciliation. The answer to my questions will be presented here comparing the data between the focus groups. I am afraid that the results can surprise a lot of people, Cypriots or not. This chapter will give the chance to the reader to have a synopsis of what the new generation thinks about the problem of the Republic of Cyprus.

The sources that have been used are primarily Greek books, articles and newspapers that focus on these factors. Nevertheless, the historical background has been covered by international books as well. Also I have tried to compare my data with other surveys in order to have a better picture of the new generation's intentions. The reason that I mostly use Greek references is because the subject is so specific that you cannot easily find resources anywhere else. It has to be mentioned that the quotes have been translated by the author.

Historical Background

In order to understand the creation of the Cyprus question and the involvement of Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom to the problem, the reference to the historical background will start from 1878. For more than three hundred years, Cyprus was under the rule of Ottoman Empire. On 4th of June 1878 though, Turkey and Britain signed a secret treaty in Istanbul which if there was any attempt from Russia against the Sultan, UK had to support him. As a return, the Sultan agreed for Cyprus to be under British rule and administration (Lamprou, 2008: 20).

According to J. Joseph, the history of Cyprus can be dived in three different periods:

1) The colonial period until the proclamation of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

2) From 1960 to 1974. The treaties that have been signed for the foundation of Cyprus, the functionality of the constitution of the new state, the internal conflict between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, EOKA B' actions, the Greek coup d'état and the Turkish military intervention/invasion.

3) After 1974 to the present. The dominant element of that period has been the de facto division of the island and the continuing military occupation of the north part of Cyprus by Turkey. Furthermore, it will describe the attempt of a foundation of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", the endeavors for a solution, the negotiations, the Annan Plan but also the accession in the European Union.

<u>The colonial period until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus</u>

When Cyprus became a British colony, Greek-Cypriots were glad about this great, unexpected change. They considered that the new masters would be better than the oppressors Turks, as they were Christians as well. From the beginning, Greek-Cypriots believed that there was hope that the British would resign from their privilege on Cyprus and they would help Cyprus to unify with Greece (Enosis), as they have done also with the "Seven Islands". However, these hopes did not correspond to the truth. Seven Islands had immiscible Greek population and there were near to Greece. In contrast, Cyprus had a respectable Turkish minority and it was much closer to Turkey then Greece (Lamprou, 2008: 21).

After Turkey joined the World War I next to the Central Power (Germany, Austria), UK considered the secret treaty in Istanbul invalid and Cyprus became an official British colony in 1914. Greek-Cypriots still believed that this was positive progress as UK could never refer to Turkish privilege on Cyprus. Once again, Cypriots realized what was going on with the most difficult way: neither with the Treaty of Serves in 1920, nor the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Cyprus became a Greek territory.

In 1931, Greek-Cypriots rose against the British rule, claiming for national release and a formation of a new constitution. Then, UK realized that they had to change the constitution not in favor of Cypriots but because of the flexibility that there was to the previous one. So, they removed the 1882' constitution and they enforced a new colonial dictatorship.

Greek-Cypriots even if they were in bad circumstances never stopped to wish for Enosis (Unification) with motherland Greece. Greek-Cypriots followed the motto "Nothing less than Enosis". The left party AKEL tried to mobilize people in order to collect signatures supporting the memorandum which clarified the desire of Greek-Cypriots for Enosis and send it to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Cypriot Church decided to make her own plebiscite. The plebiscite started on 15th of November 1950 and it was finished on 20th of November. 95.7% of Greek-Cypriots signed the petition for Enosis with Greece. The paradox of this memorandum was that the AKEL expected Turkish-Cypriots to sign it as well. In fact, Unification with Greece automatically would constrain Turkish-Cypriots to leave the island. So, as much as the Greek-Cypriots were fighting for Enosis, the affiliation between Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots was becoming stronger.

After the end of the wars, Britain was trying to keep her last colony and consequently its effect with the Middle East. In 1950, after the Archbishop Makarios B's death, Makarios C' took his place. A clever man, just thirty seven years old, the new archbishop Makarios the third, was ready to try everything in order to succeed unification. The plans of Britain started to go under when Makarios set aim of his life was the unification with Greece, ignoring the rules of international policy and the Cold War. Therefore, he wanted to resort to United Nations but Cyprus at that time was not an independent state so the resort to the UN had to be presented from Greece. After two World Wars, Greece could not even help itself, how was it possible to help Cyprus? As the, that time president of Greece, G. Papandreou said to the mayor of Nicosia T. Dervi: "Greece now is breathing with two different lungs, a British one and

an American lung. It would not risk it to suffer from asphyxia just because of the Cyprus situation[2]" (Lamprou, 2008: 34).

On 1st of April 1955, Greek-Cypriots started the liberating struggle against the British colonials. EOKA was a Greek-Cypriot nationalist military organization, fighting against the British rule for self-determination and in the end for Enosis with Greece. The Leaders of this organization were the archbishop Makarios and George Grivas. EOKA's struggle was characterized as one of the most pure and heroic fights of the Greek nation in general. Although, it has to be mentioned that I strongly disagree with Sabahattin Ismail,'s characterization about EOKA. He described it as a terrorist organization, something that in my opinion is definitely incorrect. In 1959 the EOKA's struggle was ended with the London and Zürich Agreements. They assigned Makarios to be the President and Dr. Kucuk the Vice-President of the new state. On 13th of December 1969 the first official presidential elections took place and Makarios won the elections over 66% of the Greek-Cypriot population.

From the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 to the Turkish military intervention/ invasion in 1974

Cyprus became an independent state on 16th of August 1960, when Turkey, Greece and UK signed the Zürich and London agreements. Yet, the official celebration of the Republic of Cyprus is on 1st of October. These agreements consisted of a new constitution and three other treaties: the Treaty of Guarantor, the

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[2] "Η Ελλάς αναπνέει με δύο ξένους πνεύμονας, τον ένα αγγλικόν και τον άλλον αμερικάνικον. Δεν μπορεί εξαιτίας του Κυπριακού να κινδυνεύσει να πάθη ασφυξία."

Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (PIO, 2008:39). The Greek-Cypriot community but also Turkish-Cypriot community did not actually participate in the process of editing the treaties or even the Constitution. In fact, the people who were more affected from the treaties did not have the opportunity to vote for them. According to B. Ecevit, "it was the first time in history that three countries agreed to create a forth state in order to continue their friendship" (Kiziyurek, 2009: 89). Nevertheless, the Treaty of Guarantee was very important. Under this treaty, signed by the UK, Turkey and Greece but also by the two communities, both Enosis and Partition (Taksim) were banned.

However, even if the Republic of Cyprus was founded and became an independent state none of the two communities were ready to abide by the new constitution. In particular, the archbishop Makarios declared that the Republic was the beginning to succeed Enosis (Kakoulli, 2003: 50). Under these circumstances, it was not difficult for a new conflict to arise. According to S. Sonyel, in some cases independence had even magnified the old disputes. Soon, the Greek-Cypriot President Makarios, and the Turkish-Cyrpiot Vice-President Dr. Fazil Kucuk, along with the ethnically constituted Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, began to disagree on a number of issues, such as the establishment of an army, the distribution of the civil service posts between the Greeks and Turks on a 70:30 ratio, the levying of income tax, the question of separate Turkish municipalities, and other problems (Sonyel, 2003: 18). It was obvious that the constitution was a good theoretical attempt of balancing both communities' interests but as it seemed, in practice it was completely different. As De Smith noticed, the Constitution of Cyprus probably is the most inflexible constitution of the world. It is definitely the most

detailed and the most complicated. It is weighted with caveats and counteracting, procedures and substantial guarantees, reservations and prohibitions (Aimilianides, 2003: 10).

As the constitution could not work properly, the years after that pre-signify a lot of problems between the two communities. As Clerides characterizes the period from January to December 1963: "Preparation of the tempest" (Clerides, 1988: 210). Makarios, as a president of the country realized that it was necessary the constitution to be changed. So, he presented to Dr. F. Kucuk "the Thirteen Amendements". In Makarios' view, these amendments were required to the Republic in order to work fairly. But in fact, these amendments were again turning Turkish-Cypriots to a minority. How was it possible, Turkish-Cypriots, an equal community to the Greek-Cypriots, to accept a change like this? So, Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots rejected Makarios' proposal. In the name of a regular function of the constitution a new phase had started. However, it seems that also the Turkish-Cypriot community did not support the Republic of Cyprus as their desire for partition was also banned. For instance, Denktas, enforced the "from Turk to Turk" policy to the Turkish-Cypriot community. This policy had forbidden any kind of dealings with the Greek-Cypriots. It has to be mentioned that if someone would not take this policy seriously and keep associating with Greek-Cypriots, then he could be imprisoned. In the end, they had withdrawn from all the governmental ministries and offices.

There is a rumor that the UK had been informed about those amendments. But there is no reason to clarify it if in the beginning the British encouraged Makarios to change the constitution with the thirteen amendments and later they just tricked him. It is cleared that Makarios' point of view was not how to improve the Zurich and

London Agreements but how to overthrow the treaties and consequently to achieve Enosis (Kakoullis, 2003: 66).

From 1963 to 1967, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots were fighting in order to show their power. It started on 21st of December 1963. Intercommunal clashes started at 2.30 am and continued until 30th of December. These conflicts were stopped temporarily, after creating the "Green Line". The term "Green Line" refers to the cease-fire line that divides Nicosia into two, the North and the South. It is called "Green Line" because Major-General Peter Young (a predecessor of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) had drawn the line on the map with a green pencil. In 26th of December 1963, Makarios and Glaukos Clerides from the Greek-Cypriot community, but also Dr. Fazil Kucuk and Rauf Denktas from the Turkish-Cypriot community signed the agreement of the "Green Line". According to that agreement, the "Green Line" was something temporary but in the end it became the most comprehensible element of dichotomy.

Within the limits of this dissertation, the incidents will not be illustrated in every detail between the two communities in those five years, as it was a bloodshed period for both communities. In March 1963 though, the Peacekeeping Forces of United Nations took place in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Their assessment was to block any endeavor against the other community but as it seemed from the beginning of their establishment, they could not stop the conflict between the two communities. Their role was as an observer instead of an organization which can convince Cypriots that they have to stop fighting each other.

In 1967 (21st of April) the junta, under the command of Dictator George Papadopoulos, seized the power with a coup d'état in Greece. With the help of the

junta in Athens, George Grivas created the EOKA B' organization to bring back the ideology of the Enosis which Archbishop Makarios seemed to avoid. EOKA B' can be referred to as a terrorist organization in the European civilized countries. It is connected to assassinations of Greek-Cypriots from the left party AKEL and Turkish-Cypriots citizens. At the same time, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization), a similar paramilitary organization which actually founded in 1957, started being more active after the appearance of EOKA B'. EOKA'B aim was Enosis with Greek and TMT's aim was partition of Cyprus. TMT is connected to the killings of left-wing Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots as well.

According to M. Drousiotis, EOKA B' was under dissolution just a little bit before the coup in Cyprus. So its members unanimously decided that the coup d'état should wait for the right time. Nevertheless, Ioannides[3] declined EOKA B' decision and he ordered to continue the implementation of their desire: the overthrow of Makarios (Drousiotis, 2003: 392).

On 15th of July 1974, the Greek junta succeeded in organizing a military coup in Cyprus with the approval of Demetris Ioannides. Their plan was still to overthrow Makarios as a President. In his place they present Nikos Sampson as the Dictator of Cyprus. To Turkey, Sampson's elevation to power signalled the possibility of Enosis again and therefore, Ankara prepared for a military solution to the problem immediately.

The most important result of EOKA B's actions was the military intervention/ invasion of Turkey in Cyprus. In the name of the safety of Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey

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[3] In 1973, Dictator Demetris Ioannides took the place of George Papadopoulos.

took advantage of the situation and Turkish forces began landing on Cyprus five days after the coup d'état (20th July 1974). According to the statement issued by B. Ecevit announcing that the Turkish armed forces were engaged in a peace operation in Cyprus "to end decades of strife provoked by extremist and irredentist elements" (Sonyel, 2003: 347). United Nations were calling to cease-fire. In the end, the endeavor of Turkey to occupy Cyprus led to the subsequent de facto division of the island. Makarios, as he confessed to the journalist Oriana Falatsi: "I could not imagine that the junta would be so foolish to order a coup against me without concerning the consequences. And I mean the Turkish invasion" (Lamprou, 2008: 466). Turkey did not find a resistance to occupy a part of the island, as no one was expecting it. Actually, even after the Turkish attacks, the AED[4] had confirmed to the Greek-Cypriots that it was just a Turkish military training activity (Lamprou, 2008: 523).

Meanwhile, Turkey's military intervention/invasion caused the collapse of the junta in Greece and Ioannides was replaced by Constantinos Caramanlis. Nikos Sampson was also replaced by Glaukos Clerides in Cyprus.

Turkey used as an excuse the Treaty of Guarantee to interfere with Cyprus. According to the article IV of the treaty:

"In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

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[4] Greek Armed Forces Command.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the tree guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty".

Turkey claimed that their reaction was a result of the inability to protect Turkish-Cypriots and to reinstate the status quo. According to Coufoudakis though, Turkish-Cypriots had never been in danger during the coup d'état (2008: 202). In fact, more leftists Greek-Cypriots had been killed than Turkish Cypriots during the coup.

Greece did not help Cyprus at all. While Turks were occupying the Cypriot territory, Greece was worried that if there was visible and obvious military help to the Cypriots, a new Greek-Turkish conflict could begin. A war between two allied countries of NATO should be avoided, considering that the attack of Turkey was against a territory which did not belong to the Greek dominion (Lamprou, 2008: 560).

Finally, the Security Council of the UN was ready to publish the resolution against the Greek coup d'état in Cyprus on 20th of July 1974. Because of the tragic events of that date, the Security Council in the end referred to the coup d'état but to the occupation by Turkey as well. According to the Resolution 353/1974 (Appendix 4):

§1 Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

§2 Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

§3 Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above;

§4 Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the Present of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;

It has to be mentioned though, that they were pushing Turkey to a cease-fire even before this publication. The Secretary-General of UN, the Secretary-General of NATO, France which was at the head of the European Economic Community and Germany sent their messages Turkey to cease-fire immediately. Those who were pushing Turkey to cease-fire, they were also those who were worrying about a new Greek-Turkish episode, instead of the disaster that the military intervention/invasion would cause to Cyprus (Lamprou, 2008: 572).

The Resolution 353/1974 of the Security Council at the fifth paragraph declared that Greece, Turkey and UK must enter into negotiations without delay in order to restore peace on the island. On 25th July 1974, the Guarantor Powers has participated to the Geneva Gathering. Even before the end of the Geneva Conference, a second phase of the Turkish military intervention/invasion was a reality. On 14th of August the Turkish forces began the new operation. After three days, there was a cease-fire again. But the resistance of Greek-Cypriots to the Turks was non-existent, so they actually gained more than they had wished for.

The results of the whole operation of Turkey were the occupation of the 36.2% of the Cyprus territory, the 3% of the Buffer Zone and 165.000-180.000 Greek-

Cypriots refugees. Beyond the economical collapse of Cyprus, the worst part was the fact that three thousand people have been killed and one thousand four hundred nineteenth Greek-Cypriots are still missing persons (PIO, 2008: 44).

The point is that after the second phase of the military intervention/invasion, Turkey could not evoke that excuse of Turkish-Cypriots safety. In 23rd of July, as it is referred above, the junta collapsed and the dictators were replaced by new presidents and the constitutional principles started to be restored in Cyprus. Turkey could claim the Turkish-Cypriots' rights during the first phase of the operation but it cannot be accepted in any pretext as it concerned the second phase. From a diplomatic point of view, Turkey made a big mistake which led to its isolation from the other countries (Kizilyurek, 2009: 192).

After 1974 to the present situation

After the Turkish occupation of the Northern part of Cyprus, negotiations started between the two communities. It is remarkable that the agreement between Denktas and Makarios in 1977, who actually signed the guidelines for the solution of the Cyprus problem which had to be based on the independent, Bi-communal Federation. There is a big argument if in that document Makarios and Denktas signed for the Bi-zonal solution. But it will be analyzed better in the forth chapter.

Makarios died in 1977. Spyros Kuprianou, with no other candidates, was nominated as the new president of the Republic of Cyprus. In 1979, there was another agreement between Denktas and Kuprianou who had confirmed the guidelines from Denktas and Makarios agreement in 1977.

Denktas, one of the most powerful and charismatic leaders in Cyprus, realized that there was not any progress to the Cyprus dispute, on 15th of November 1983 purported to create an independent state in Northern Cyprus. His ambition was to establish the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The Republic of Cyprus reacted immediately. It resorted to the Security Council asking for a withdrawal of one-sided declaration for independency of the TRNC (Joseph, 2000:123) According to the Security Council's resolution 541/1983 (Appendix 5)

"Considering therefore that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus"

The Security Council also calls upon all the states to respect the Republic of Cyprus and to not recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. Denktas endeavor proved unsuccessful.

After the rejection of the foundation of "TRNC", the Cypriot leaders from both sides negotiated for a better compromise but nothing was actually agreed. Different leaders became presidents but there was not any significant change that has to be mentioned. Every time, while they were negotiating and it seemed that they would find a solution, in the end one of the two sides was rejecting it.

The next turning-point was in the summer of 1996. It was the worst post-1974 flare-ups of violence which occurred on the ceasefire line that divides the Greek and Turkish areas of Cyprus (Bryant, 2004: 217). A Cypriot Motorcycle league organized an international protest against the division of the island. They started their trip from Germany and their aim was to cross the "Green-Line" and arrive to Kerinia (Girne). However, the Turkish armies warned that they would shoot anyone who would pass

the check-points. In the end, there were a lot of inter-communal conflicts in the buffer zone. Tasos Isaak was killed as he was trying to unbraid the barbwire. On the day of Isaak's funeral, his cousin, Solomos Solomou, entered the Green-Line and he tried to remove the Turkish flag. While he was trying to get the flag, someone shot him five times. It has to be mentioned that this "peaceful" demonstration could be watched live on the TV. As Waldemar Rokoszewski noticed, there were the worst inter-communal conflicts after 1974 and he supported that bloodshed was avoided because of the existence of the UNFICYP (Raptis, 2005).

The first steps of the Cyprus accession into the EU started in 1990. According to the Commission, there were no insurmountable problems existing as far as the Cyprus economy was concerned but undoubtedly the division of the island was seen as a substantial obstacle to the EU accession (Dodd, 1999: 175). In 1996, 31st of March, Cyprus opened the accession negotiations to join EU. However, there were many reservations among member states over admitting Cyprus. In the beginning, EU declared that Cyprus would only be allowed to join if it reached a peace agreement. The EU eventually cancelled this condition (Etingoff, 2006: 73). So, in 1999, in Helsinki, they signed that the resolve of the Cyprus dispute will not affect its accession to the EU. On 16th of April 2003, Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty of the EU in Athens and it became an official member of the EU on 1st of May 2004.

In 2002, Kofi Annan, the new Secretary-General of UN proposed the Annan Plan No. 1 to the two communities for a solution. The Annan Plan was a United Nations' proposal to settle the Cyprus dispute and establish the United Cyprus Republic. Before 2004, the Secretary General submitted three different plans.

Nevertheless, for every plan there was an article or a point that one of the two communities could not accept.

Since 2003, there was tremendous progress. Denktas changed his policy and he allowed the entrance of Greek-Cypriots to the occupied part. The opening of the buffer zone gave the opportunity for interchange. In order to cross the check-points though, Greek-Cypriots had to show their passport and get a temporary visa. The fact though that more than a million people had crossed the "borders" over five months illustrates that people have the curiosity and the will to have a relationship with the other side. But the failure at referendum of the Annan Plan, which will be described below, indicates that contact does not automatically or necessarily produce reconciliation (Bryant, 2004: 249).

The most crucial year in the post-1974 period is definitely in 2004. On 24th of April, the fifth Annan Plan was given as a referendum to the two communities. According to the 5th Annan Plan, Cyprus will transform to a Bi-Zonal, Bi-communal Federation state. Despite of the Turkish-Cypriots' acceptance of the plan, more than 75% of Greek-Cypriots voted "No". Because of Greek-Cypriot's rejection, UN felt that they have been tricked from Tassos Papadopoulos and consequently from the Greek-Cypriots so they abandoned any kind of efforts to resolve the dispute.

It was planned that Cyprus one week after the Annan Plan (1st May) will join the EU. After the Annan Plan though, there was a rumor that the rejection of the plan will cost Cyprus the accession to the EU. In the end, nothing of those rumors came true and from that time Cyprus became a full member of the EU.

Meanwhile, in 2008, presidents from both sides have changed: Dimitris Christofias from the left party (AKEL) and Mehmet Ali Talat from the left party as well (CTP). It was the first time that left parties were in charge in Cyprus. So the UNFICYP wanted to take advantage of the new change, so the negotiations started again under the UN's shield. After two years, it seems that there is no progress. None of the communities were ready to change things.

Unfortunately, on April 2010, TRNC had elections and a new president is in charge now. Dervis Eroglu belongs to the nationalist party UBP and he is the ancestor of Rauf Denkta's party. Before the elections, he announced that he would stop the negotiations. However, Turkey wants to join the EU, so it seems that did not let him doing whatever he wants. The negotiations are still in progress. No one can predict the results. The fact that one of the leaders is from the nationalistic part make the things much worse.

Today, fifty years after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, it is still inquired how Cypriots can be reunited. Politically speaking, the scenario of finding an appropriate solution for both sides does not seem to be optimistic, especially after the Eroglu's election. However, as long as Turkey wants to join the EU, there is a chance for reconciliation. The Annan Plan was the first plan which had been given to the citizens of Cyprus as a referendum. Six years after this endeavor, people are more familiar about the kind of solution that will be accepted. In fact, as concerns Greek-Cypriots, the Annan Plan was a concession that Turkish-Cypriots will remain into the island. I think that the post-Annan plan period had worked effectively. Both sides are preparing themselves for a solution. Hopefully, Cypriots would not miss again the opportunity of a settlement that will lead to a United Cyprus.

Chapter 2

Methodology

In this chapter I will explain the research design which had been used to find the answer to my research question: how prepared the Greek-Cypriot youth is, to approve any solution regarding the Cyprus dispute. In other words, I want to find out the intentions of the most important part of the population: the new generation. There are significant reasons why I have chosen youth to be the focus of this study. First of all, in my opinion, the new generation is the future of any state but oft times no one cares about their opinion. Also this group did not have any memories about the tragic events in 1974, so I believe it will show how they perceive this dispute. In addition, the fact that I also belong to this group, gave me the chance to be aware of this position. It has to be mentioned that this research will investigate only the Greek-Cypriot youth's way of thinking.

Methodologically, this study is based on a qualitative research method. Qualitative research involves an in depth understanding of human behavior. It is an interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry, including the topics to be covered but not a set of questions that must be asked with particular words and in a particular order (Babbie, 2007: 306). This exploratory research utilized focus groups to gather data about the subject.

Focus groups are basically group interviews, although not in the sense of an alternation between a researcher's question and the research participant's responses. Instead, the reliance is on interaction within the group, based on topics that are supplied by the researcher who typically takes the role of moderator (Morgan, 1997:

2). The goal of a focus group is to obtain behaviors, perceptions, bias, feelings and attitudes about a selected topic. This method had been preferred as it was the only one which could give me in-depth analysis. Compared to individual interviews, focus groups can give a multiplicity of views very quickly. Questionnaires though were too "cold" to understand their real feelings and also it is easier to give as an answer something that they do not believe just in order to say something better than what he/she thinks. Having six to eight people discuss the Cyprus issue at the same time, it was predictable that they would come to confrontation with others and in the end they would explain what they feel and why they have these opinions.

In the beginning, a pilot study using the structured interview and the focus group process was field-tested with some Greek-Cypriots' youth who were living in Istanbul in that period. The pilot study consisted of five people (four female and one male). Based on their answers, there were some modifications to the questions in order for participants of the focus groups to understand better what I wanted to ask and avoid any confusion. In addition, according to their answers, some questions were added as I was expecting them to refer to other events but it seemed that it was not clear what was needed to be referred.

Focus Groups must: 1) use homogeneous strangers as participants, 2) rely on a relatively structured interview, 3) have six to eight participants per group and 4) have a total of three to five groups per project (Morgan, 1997: 34). Participants though were chosen by using the snowball sample method. In snowball sampling, the researcher collects data on the few members of the target population, and then asks those individuals to provide information needed to locate other members of that population whom they happen to know (Babbie, 2007: 185). So, calling people who

live/left to a different country (i.e. in Unite Kingdom, in Greece or in Cyprus) gave me the opportunity to have samples with different background.

As the nature of my research was a small scale study, using participants who may know each other was not a problem since none of the questions needed "sensitive" answers. So, I do believe that all the participants who may know each other would feel comfortable discussing any subject in front of everyone. They seemed to feel more comfortable and able to talk about the Cyprus problem because of the small number of the groups. In fact, sometimes I realized that they were giving more information that was asked for (i.e. what they have voted to the Annan Plan) and when I was telling them that it was not necessary to say it, they insisted that they wanted to share it with us. By having an inside perspective, it was easier for participants to trust me and share information with me without any reservation.

In the focus groups, the role of the moderator (in this case mine) has to be able to control the audience. I never realize how difficult it would be, before my small experience. Especially as the first group was six men with a just one girl but also because I had the stress being the first time, it was difficult to control them, so sometimes the answers were not corresponding to some questions. Then, I realized that I have to ask them to stop when it was necessary or when they were giving the answer of another question. The nature of the focus group research is like that and you cannot expect what will happen. The moderator has to be ready to control any case that will arise.

Participants who indicated a willingness to participate in a focus group were called and reminded three days and one day before of their focus group meeting. Focus Groups took place on April 6, 7, 9, 10 and 16 in Larnaca (Republic of Cyprus).

The participants were arranged into groups according to their characteristics (Appendix -1). I have chosen for the groups to be divided regarding their refugee status, their affiliation to a political party and their age. In particular, the first group was consisted of youngsters with one or both refugees' parents. There were two groups regarding the political views which were separated individually by both wings: left parties (AKEL, EDEK) and right parties (DISI, DIKO). As it concerns the age dimension, most of the participants were around twenty-five years old. The last group though was consisted of people around twenty-eight years old.   In my opinion socio-economic status, educational levels and sex of the participant appeared to play little or no role in shaping preferences for a solution. Nevertheless, the groups had been organized in a way that also differs according to those variables which could be analyzed if needed.

Five Focus Groups, involving a total of thirty seven male and female participants were organized at my place in order for people to feel more comfortable. Focus Groups discussion happened at different hours as some of the participants had to work, so the time of the discussions modulated according to their request. Also I had chosen the discussion to be in the Cypriot dialect and not in Greek, but also not even in formal speech, it will give the chance for the participants to answer the questions directly, without thinking of the appropriate words that may have to use for the focus groups.

Each focus group began with a brief introduction explaining that the focus groups were the method that was preferred to assist my dissertation for my MA program. Also there was an explanation of the method of focus groups, as most of the participants were not familiar with this kind of research. Eighteen open-ended

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questions were presented to each focus group one at a time. In this kind of questions, the participants had the time to express their feelings about the possibility of a solution. The question was read aloud and the participants had the opportunity to ask for clarifications if they were not sure what they had to answer. Moreover, it was emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers. The aim of the focus group was to listen to their perspective on that matter regarding their characteristics. Participants had to understand that there was no correct answer. Any answer was more than welcome.

The eighteen questions were developed and pilot tested. Sample of the questions has been included in the appendices in the original and translated form (Appendix -2 and 3). I avoid selecting questions which had a necessary historical background because, as it will be described below, there is a lack of Cyprus history at schools. All the questions were related to the post-Annan Plan period where almost all the participants were old enough to understand what happened. Sessions typically took about 90 to 180 minutes without a break because then it would be difficult for participants to concentrate on the subject again as some of the questions were chain questions.

An Mp3 voice recorder was used to record each focus group interview. All the members of the group have been recorded with their verbal consent. The purpose of the recording was to increase the accuracy of the data collection but mostly it was better for me to concentrate on my participant's answers instead of worrying about taking notes. The Mp3 data has been transcribed. Full transcriptions were made of the conversations of the focus groups interviews. I have written the transcription in the Greek language but at the same time I have not paraphrased anything. So, if I thought

that the phrase could not give 100% the same meaning in Greek, I chose to write it as it was recorded, in the Cypriot language. No participant name was used which maintained the confidentially of the participants information.

The results of the focus groups were analyzed through a sorting process to identify common themes. In order to familiarize myself with the data, an intensive reading of the transcript was necessary. Collecting information from my participants' answers gave me the chance to create different themes. These themes were mainly based on the repeating answers of the focus groups. I am glad that after this method, a lot of opinions have been written down. The quotes were then analyzed and reviewed within their themes so there were ready to be used in the proportional chapter. It has to be clarified that the results are just a sample of what my participants gave me as an answer and in any case, it cannot be generalized.

Ethical considerations for focus groups are almost the same with all the other methods of social research. For instance, participants must inform about the purpose and uses of their contribution. In the case of focus group there is only one extra ethical issue to be considered: handling of sensitive material and confidentiality given. Participants also need to be encouraged to keep confidential the whole dialogue that they will contribute. As it is referred above, I followed the guidelines to avoid having any ethical issues in my research method.

The results of my focus groups will be presented in the following chapters. It has to be referred that I have encoded the characteristics of each participant in order to avoid using all its characteristics in the text. A full description is given in Appendix.

Chapter 3

Understanding the historical/political effects of Nationalism in Cyprus

Nationalism within both communities was and still is the mainstay regarding the Cyprus dispute. Cypriots were too proud of their motherlands and consequently it was impossible to realize that their behavior/actions were actually against of their own country. The worst result of that nationalism though, was that Cypriots could not accept «the others». The otherness between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots was really strong as an idea to change people's mentality.

A conflict, as a social phenomenon, appears when two interactive groups have uncompromising intentions (Joseph, 2000: 24). Even before the creation of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots were fighting for various reasons. The differences in religion, language and history also did not contribute living together peacefully.

Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots can be distinguished by their national characteristics; Greek-Cypriots can speak Greek, they are Christian Orthodox and they are identified with the Greek nation and Greek culture. Turkish-Cypriots can speak Turkish, they are Muslims and they are identified with the Turkish nation and the Turkish culture respectively. Therefore, both communities have completely opposite viewpoints concerning the political future of the island, the differences wide and varied.

In order to understand the effects of nationalism in Cyprus, I will basically divide it into four phases: before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, from the establishment until the invasion/intervention, after intervention and from the 90's

until today. Within every period a different problem has evolved. The only common point is the revival nationalism on every incident.

3.1.1 Before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

Nationalism in Cyprus was not a new phenomenon. Its roots were evident even before the independence of Cyprus. As was mentioned previously, Cyprus was a British colony (1878–1959). The British were trying to hold fast to their last colony in Middle East. They did not realize the power of nationalism in Cyprus and how much it can inspire Cypriots.

Greek-Cypriots from the beginning wanted unification (Enosis) with Greece. The island of Cyprus was historically connected with Greece so the Greek-Cypriots were ready to try anything in order to succeed Enosis. The fact that there was also a Turkish minority on the island never puzzled Greek-Cypriots and that was the crucial point of Greek-Cypriots: accepting Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the same island. Nationalism was so deeply ingrained in Greek-Cypriot hearts therefore it was impossible to realize and accept anything else other than Enosis. But when there is an action there is always a corresponding reaction: the question of Enosis made Turkish-Cypriots recoiled and it was at time that they realized the difference between themselves and Greek-Cypriots, was not only religion but it was based on something far more complicated (Litsas, 2000: 7).

The British governors of Cyprus believed that the troubles stirred up by a nascent nationalism were created by the political leaders and that the average Cypriot would not, under other circumstances, be concerned with such matters, occupied as he supposedly was with his own quotidian affairs (Bryant, 2004: 163). They had ignored

the main force of people's mentality. Thus, the EOKA's struggle against the British colony was somehow predictable.

It is true that before the end of WW II, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were living together harmoniously. Ploutis Servas presented the history of Cyprus as being one of peaceful coexistence between the two communities, with a "short parenthesis" of intercommunal strife, driven by the interests of the colonial power (Loizides, 2007: 172-189). Nevertheless education, economic development and the British colonial practices can be considered responsible for transforming the two communities against each other. The colonization, as it happened everywhere, was based on the separation of the communities and the ultimate aim was to discourage a common patriotism (Moudouros, 2010: 13).

As Greek-Cypriots were watching the British colony lose all its colonial bases in 1950, they started to consider that Enosis (Unification) with Greece will be the best solution for them. People were ready to sacrifice their own lives in order to achieve Enosis. On the other hand, the British colony perceived that it was losing its power on the island so they set their policy of "Divide and Rule". At that point Turkish-Cypriot's nationalism started to take place. The colonials took advantage of the situation and they put Turkish-Cypriots on critical positions in the government i.e. policemen, for their own interest (Theofilou, 2010: 162), so they turned them against Greek-Cypriots and vice versa. It is not coincidental that more of Turkish-Cypriots did not fight against the British rule.

The answer of Enosis for Turkish Cypriots was "Cyprus is Turkish"[5]. It was a reaction against the Greek-Cypriot demand about unification with Greece. As both

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[5] "Kıbrıs Türk'tür"

sides nationalism was trying to get form, Turkish-Cypriots' slogan was replaced by "Taksim (partition) or Death" which illustrates actually the desire of both communities to be united with their motherlands. Turkish-Cypriots wanted dichotomy of the island based on their nations. There is no doubt that the Cyprus issue arose from the conflict between two nationalisms and was absolutely increased with the involvement of the British rule.

In 1955, Greek-Cypriots started fighting against the colonials. EOKA's aim was only and nothing less than Enosis with Greece. It has to be clarified that the struggle was not about increased rights of Greek-Cypriots but for union with their motherland Greece, for which all of their history had been prepared. Hence, freedom meant Enosis, because freedom was the realization of an already imagined, inevitable future (Bryant, 2004: 166).

3.1.2 1960 – 1974

On 1st October 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was founded. As it can be assumed, independency was not Cypriots' plan. None of the communities wanted to be independent. It was an agreement between the involved parties; Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom. Cyprus once again was an object within their hands.

No one was ready to accept this solution. According to J. Joseph, it was impossible to expect Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots to act as Cypriots. Even if with great deal of effort it was very difficult for them to discard their motherlands. So the Republic of Cyprus never validated ideologically from both sides. Especially for Greek-Cypriots the independence of Cyprus in 1960 was just a temporary situation in order to succeed Enosis. But also Turkish-Cypriots believed that the establishment of the independent Cyprus was a transitional period to achieve Taksim (Joseph, 2000:

77). As Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot élite believed Turkish-Cypriots are Cypriots who can live peacefully at the island as long as their behavior does not block Enosis (Kizilyurek, 1999: 39-41).

In 1963 Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot relations were intense. The starting point was when Makarios decided to illustrate the "13 points" to Dr. Kucuk. There was a proportional distribution of power according to the population as Greek-Cypriots were considering Turkish-Cypriots as a minority on the island. Consequently Turkish-Cypriots did not accept the fact that they were treated this way, so the tension within communities arose. Between 1963 and 1967 the bi-communal incidents could not be controlled by authorities. TMT and EOKA'B made their existence more obvious to Cypriots. A lot of deaths and disasters took place during that period but neither was ready to give peace a chance. Nationalism once again was the outright winner.

In 1967 junta was in power in Greece. When junta decided to appear in Cyprus too, the bi-communal conflict was at its zenith. The aim of the coup d'état was to get rid of Makarios as president and try to accomplish the beloved Enosis. Turkey, as one of the Guarantor powers and also as the most affected part of the island, reacted to the Greek junta with a military intervention/invasion and occupied the 37% of the island. The Turkish government found as an excuse that the Greek coup d'état was actually one step to unification which was prohibited by the Republic of Cyprus' constitution. According to the Turkish explanation, the nationalistic behavior of junta was a straightforward threat to the Turkish-Cypriot community of the island (Joseph, 2000: 118).

1974 was also the end of an era that has since never returned. As a result of the military intervention/invasion, there was a forced shift of the communities and since

that time Turkish-Cypriots live on the Northern part of the island and Greek-Cypriots to the South.

3.1.3 After 1974

1974 was certainly the worst period the history of Cyprus, not only for Greek-Cypriots but Turkish-Cypriots as well. People were not ready for the new change; they had to realize that both parties were the losers. The obsession of Enosis or Taksim led to a divided island. Now the obstacles were not only the both sides of nationalism but the de facto separation of the communities.

The latest phase had to face the truth: that the situation was new and unexpected. Greek-Cypriots had to accept the defeat and the consequences of it: the loss of their houses, the death of their loved ones and relatives, the division of the island and the obligatory conception of a new life in unfamiliar places. Contemporaneously Turkish-Cypriots had to accept the new facts as well, but furthermore, the settlers and the embargo because of the intervention/invasion. After 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot community was completely depended on Turkey in all fields, from education up to and including the economy.

Nevertheless, a new form of nationalism had developed. On Greek-Cypriots' side, the motherland was the cause of the Turkish military intervention/invasion and on Turkish-Cypriots' side, they had to count on Turkey 100%. However, my thesis will be to concentrate on Greek-Cypriots' nationalism.

After 1974 Greek-Cypriots realized that they actually were "Cypriots". It was really a comedy of errors that Greek-Cypriots, in order to feel like Cypriots, had to lose part of their island. The biggest result of the Turkish military intervention/invasion though was the temporary jostle of Greek-Cypriots' nationalism

and the rise of the ideology of Cypriotism (Mauratsas, 1998: 81). It is not a coincidence that before 1974 the date of the independence was not celebrated at all and now it is considered as one of the most important dates of Cypriot history. It was about the same time also that the Greek flag was replaced by the Cypriot flag (Mauratsas, 1998: 82). The differences between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism will be illustrated in the next sub-chapter.

In 1983, Rauf Denktas tried to legalize TRNC as it was described above. His request was rejected and since then Turkish-Cypriots officially are depended only on Turkey. Even if from this dependence follows safety, it can be recognized that Turkish-Cypriots have been alienated from the outside world and consequently this mirrors a lack of independence and recognized identity (Joseph, 2000: 248).

However, Cypriotism did not last as it should. The main reason that Greek-Cypriots' nationalism was pushed to a rebirth, was the victory of a new party in Greece called PASOK in 1981 (Mauratsas, 1998: 100). It was a sign that their motherland had been changed and it is not the same Greece that betrayed its own "child". It was the first time since the episode of 1974, when once again the Greek flag flew in Cyprus.

New generations grew in that environment; Greek-Cypriots were divided between the Greek nationalism and Cyrpiotism and Turkish-Cypriots the Turkish nationalism and the Cypriot proportionate nationalism. As ex-president Rauf Denktas said "there are no Turkish-Cypriots, no Greek-Cypriots and no Cypriots. Do not even dare to ask if we are Cypriots! We would take this as an insult. Why? Because in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey."(Kizilyurek, 1999: 102)

The result should not surprise anyone: in the end the biggest enemy of Cyprus was their own nationalistic folk. The new generation is living separately. They do not

have any relation between "the others". How can nationalism be destroyed when there is no change in a situation?

It was a shock in evidence when the participants in the focus groups used: "Greece – Cyprus – Enosis" and "Turk is good only if he is dead"[6]. It was a creation of more than sixty years hence. Several generations have developed with this mindset. A lot of people have been fanaticized and they share the same mentality with previous generations. It is amazing to see that the youth have been patronized more or less by nationalism.

In 2003, since the crossing points were opened, it was the first time after 1974 when Cypriots could have any connection with the other side. As Rebecca Bryant illustrates, "Recent contacts between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots show that there are many bonds of friendship and neighborliness that have survived the violence provoked by nationalist politics and the separation of decades" (Bryant, 2004: 249). The first experience was too optimistic.

According to my research findings and as one of my participants (B-OG)[7] quoted that he does not consider Turkish-Cypriots as his enemies. It is the whole culture; the history of their country that he believes to be his enemy[8]. As he pointed out, politics are something completely different from the everyday life and people can realize it at a point.

1974 was certainly a tragic year for both communities and in 2004, with the rejected referendum of Annan Plan came the next tragedy. Cypriots had to face up to

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[6] "Ελλάς-Κύπρος-Ένωση" και "Τούρκος καλός, μόνο νεκρός"

[7] All through the text, the participants' characteristics will be used as they were coded (Appendix 1) instead of full analysis.

[8] "δεν θεωρώ συγκεκριμένα τον Τουρκοκύπριο εχθρό μου. Είναι τον όλο πολιτισμό, την όλη ιστορία της χώρας που τον θεωρώ εχθρό μου".

the truth. But when your mind has been indoctrinated with nationalistic ideas so many years, it is difficult to accept anything else other than that indoctrination. It was a vital momentum that Cypriots found unable to accept. As one of my informants (Δ-NR) noticed that it was difficult to erase the idea of "Turks get out from Cyprus" and directly to say "Yes" to the referendum". [9] None of the parties of the island had prepared their citizens to accept a solution alike this. The new generation was just manipulated from the people who lived throughout these fact forming times. The fear against the other, the hate against people who believed in something different and the lack of trust to Turkish-Cypriots made them suspicious.

The combination of those feelings and the division of the island led to the isolation of the two communities. The new generation until 2004, had not a clue how Turkish-Cypriots were. In particular, in every group processed there was always one member, who was illustrated that before 2004 if someone was asking him to describe Turkish-Cypriots, they described them as aliens and devils. It was shocking after 2004 when they realized that they are humans as we all are[10].

In my own research there were some exceptions in the groups where parents did not raise them with nationalistic ideas. So there were some people who admitted that they feel Turkish-Cypriots are exactly like themselves and they prefer to speak with a liberal Turkish-Cypriot instead of a Greek-Cypriot who is a fanatic or belongs to the

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[9] "Δεν γίνεται από το έξω οι Τούρκοι από την Κύπρο στο πάμε στο δημοψήφισμα».

[10] "αυτοί οι άνθρωποι που ήταν στο μυαλό μου σαν εξωγήινοι, τελικά είναι άνθρωποι".

"ήταν κανονικοί άνθρωποι".

"είναι κανονικοί άνθρωποι μου έκανε τρομερή εντύπωση".

"εγώ παραξενεύτηκα όταν κατάλαβα ότι είναι ακριβώς τα ίδια πλάσματα μαζί μας".

extreme right wing[11]. It was impressive that the only people who stated phrases like this belonged to the left parties. In addition, my first focus group which consisted of young Cypriots with one or both parents refugees, agreed that it would be better in Cyprus if the ethnic origin would not be a criterion of trustworthiness. The new generation is trying to change with difficulty due to years of brainwashing.

3.1.4 Greek-Cypriot Nationalism Vs Cypriotism

As my thesis focuses on Greek-Cypriot intentions, I will clarify the differences between the Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism in order to understand the ideologies and the political actions that came up later.

According to Kaisar Mauratsas, Cypriotism is a political ideology which places Cyprus in the position of a Greek nation. It denies any relation with the Greek nationality by definition and supports that Cyprus has its own characteristics which makes it completely different and independent from the motherland (1998: 85-90).

Cypriotism failed to become a credible alternative to dominant nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century. For one thing, Leftists suffered repression from both: the British colonial authorities and the dominant ethnocentric Church (Loizides, 2007: 172-189). Cypriotism nevertheless made its appearances dynamically after the tragic events in 1974. It was a reaction to the Greek-Cypriot nationalism and their desire for Enosis. Cypriotists never refuse their Greek ethnicity or the cultural origin of the island. It has to be mentioned that there was a development of Cypriotism in the Northern part of the island as well.

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[11] "προτιμώ να κάνω παρέα με Τουρκοκύπριο που να έχει φιλελεύθερο μυαλό παρά με ένα Ελληνοκύπριο φανατισμένο ακροδεξιό."

As I perceived the ideology in my focus groups has not changed. Almost thirty years after this reaction the main focus of the ideology was highlighted from one of my focus groups' participants. He (E-F) said the most characteristic phrase of Cypriotism: "Cyprus belongs to Cypriots and Cypriots must be able to make decisions on their own[12]".

According to the "Cyprus 2015" survey, when Greek-Cypriots were asked how they feel about their nationality, it appears that they split into two categories: the ones who believe that they are in the same level Greeks and Cypriots and the other category who believe that they are more Cypriot than Greek. Although, there is not big difference as the percentages are 45% and 29% respectively. Interestingly only 1% answer that they feel more Greek than Cypriot. However, it seems from the "Youth in Cyprus" survey, that a definite resultant factor shows the new generation is more confident about its nationality. 48% of youth identifies itself as a Cypriot, another 17% identifies itself as more Cypriot than Greek and 28% identifies itself as equally Cypriot and Greek. The results show that there is an obvious trend towards the new generation's feelings that their heritage is truly Cypriot.

Nowadays, the clash between the ideology of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism corresponds to the political argument between the two biggest political parties of the Republic of Cyprus; the left party AKEL and the right party DISI (ΔΗΣΥ). Paradoxically in 2004 DISI was the only political party which supported the Annan Plan. Specifically at the end of Tassos Papadopoulos' speech on 7th of April 2004, individuals were celebrating the historical "NO" of the president by waving the

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[12] "η Κύπρος ανήκει στους Κύπριους και οι Κύπριοι πρέπει να αποφασίζουν".

Cypriot flag at the president's palace. This show of flags confirmed the complicated existence of Cypriotism.

On the other hand, Greek-Cypriot nationalism began in the early 1920's. The aim of that group was nothing less than Enosis with Greece. The conservation of the group, the obsession of unification and their disability to realize the new facts were the main reasons after which the military intervention/invasion could not find any support from the people. However the failure of Cypriotism to take advantage of the new facts led to the coexistence of both groups in Greek-Cypriot community.

It is not a coincidence that even in the focus groups, young people were obviously divided. The right-wing's members followed the idea of Enosis, any signs of tolerance to and also the denial towards Turkish-Cypriots (one of the most nationalist's announced ones state that if there were elections to throw out conquerors from the island, she wants them to leave in order to keep alive Hellenism and "our" history[13]). Unlike the leftists who are entirely contrary to them. They believe that they are anti-nationalists, they seek for a relation with Turkish-Cypriots and their aim is the reunification of the citizens of Cyprus. Finally it seems neither both recognize common characteristics, the most important of these being consistent nationalism and intolerance.

3.2.1 "The other"

In Cyprus, territorial self-determination is a principle cause of the conflict. In addition to this, the cultural features of the two separate nations legitimize the exclusion of the opposite collective (Innes, 2008). "The other" is a term that Prof.

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[13] "αν είχε εκλογές στο να φύγουν οι κατακτητές της Κύπρου, να φύγουνε! Για να διατηρήσουμε τον ελληνισμό και την ιστορία μας"

Niyazi Kizilyurek used in his book in order to show the tension of Cypriots to distinguish themselves from the other community. The existence of the "other" legalizes the group of "we". In that group there are only heroes who support their national land (1999: 121). The idea of "the other" is based on the extent of tolerance in both communities.

Living more than 35 years apart can create an anxiety against the people who are staying in the other part of the island. People who feel insecure will act in a way to produce fear, bias and nationalism. In this case, a person with those elements can become more fanatical and conservative and dedicates himself to conservation of language, tradition and its culture. As a female (Θ-NR) stated at the focus group "when you do not live with someone, you are afraid of them. Your mentality is not changing"[14].

As the years are passing, it is becoming more complicated for the two communities to be intergraded. After the geographical division of Cyprus and the permanent separation of the communities, national identities of each community are becoming stronger, creating actually two completely different nationalities that happen to live next to each other. According to Süleyman Demirel[15] Cyprus is a geographical, social and economic entity which cannot be divided (Cumhuriyet, 1989). Cypriots do not yet understand these words

My research showed that some people, even from the new generation, do not want to have any relationship with the other side. I could not believe that there was at least one person in every focus group who preferred "the other to live there while we

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[14] *"άμα δεν ζεις με κάποιον, τον φοβάσαι. Δεν αλλάζει η νοοτροπία σου."*

[15] Ex-president of Turkey.

continue to live here[16]". This phrase described the bias of Greek-Cypriot youth as regards to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Nevertheless, a female member from my groups (Z-R), who actually studied in Turkey, declared that her experience of living with Turks and Turkish Cypriots, who supposedly are the worst enemies for Greek-Cypriots, made her realize that she can reside normally with these people and that they are so similar and yet this they do not understand[17]. It appears that even if they had grown separately, the Cypriot's mentality would still be unchanged.

What is quite noticeable in these interpretations of a single event is that official Greek-Cypriots line portrays Turks, as the eternal enemy generally drawing no clear-cut distinction between Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots (Bryant, 2004: 224). In my research, many times members of the focus groups needed the others to clarify if they are talking about Turks or Turkish-Cypriots. Generally the leftists were agreed that there is a big difference between Turks and Turkish-Cypriots but the rightists believe that there is no difference between either. Paradoxically, a somehow open-minded female from the left party (E-L) said that "intrinsically Turks and Turkish-Cypriots are one and the same. They have the identical way of thinking. They are fanatic Muslims".[18] It was also reported from a male (B-OG) that: "I grew up with the expression "Turk is your enemy'. My grandmother was always telling me a Turk is a Turk. There is no such thing as a Turkish Cypriot. A Turk is always a Turk".[19]

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[16] "τζίνοι ποτζί, εμείς ποδά"

[17] "πήγα κι έζησα με τους Τούρκους, τους Τουρκοκύπριους, που οι Τούρκοι είναι ο φόβος μας ο μεγάλος, και κατάλαβα ότι μπορώ να ζήσω μια χαρά με αυτούς τους ανθρώπους και ότι είμαστε τόσο κοντά και δεν το ξέρουμε".

[18] "βαθιά είναι το ίδιο πράγμα ο Τούρκος και ο Τουρκοκύπριος. Έχουν την ίδια σκέψη. Είναι μουσουλμάνοι φανατικοί".

[19] "εγώ μεγάλωσα με αυτή τη λέξη ο Τούρκος είναι εχθρός σου. Κι η γιαγιά μου, μου λέει ο τούρκος είναι Τούρκος. Δεν έχει Τουρκοκύπριος. Ο Τούρκος είναι πάντα Τούρκος."

According to another survey called "Youth in Cyprus" the vast majority (86%) of Greek-Cypriots seem to feel that Cyprus is somehow "theirs". This percentage confirms Greek-Cypriot's angle that they have been the "original" inhabitants of the island traceable from 3,000 years ago, which makes them the real natives, with historical or natural rights to the land.

It is heart wrenching when such a tiny country cannot recognize "the other". Greek-Cypriots forget that the group they do not accept also consists of humans such as them. It is time to get rid of the bias and make a concerted effort to leave the past behind, making them truly worthy of their destiny.

"I am a Turk and you are a Greek, and I am one in a race and so too you are"[20]. Even if the song was written about the relation between Turks and Greeks, the main point is the same: both sides are people and they had to be treated as that. Cypriots must realize that the solution can be found peacefully, with some political changes and the most important the growth of a consensus mentality. In this sense, a member of the focus groups (Δ-NR) stated that if you cohabit with "the other" and you break the myth of he is a Turkish-Cypriot, he is Greek-Cypriot, he is Turk, you come up with the human subject: if he is a good person or not[21]".

3.2.2 "Pseudo-state"

Pseudo- is the prefix that Greek-Cypriots use when they want to say something regarding "the others". This prefix shows that Greek-Cypriots do not accept the

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[20] " Τούρκος εγώ κι εσύ Ρωμιός, κι εγώ λαός κι εσύ λαός". Lyrics from the song: "Mes tou Vosporou Ta Stena" by George Dalaras.

[21] "άμα συμβιώσεις λίγο με τον άλλο και καταρρίψεις αυτό το μύθο είναι Τουρκοκύπριος, είναι Ελληνοκύπριος, είναι Τούρκος, καταλήγεις στο θέμα ανθρώπου. Αν είναι καλός ή όχι".

Turkish-Cypriots. Calling everything which is related to the North by using the prefix pseudo does not mean that automatically annul exists. The fact that the TRNC is legally invalid[22] does not make Turkish-Cypriots also "pseudo people". They also live in Cyprus and this is a reality.

At my focus groups, there was a question about the presidential elections of TRNC. When I was asking about the pseudo-elections, there was always someone who was asking why I have used the word pseudo. On the other hand, when I was saying only elections, there was someone else who clarified that these were pseudo-elections. There was an interesting conversation about the prefix pseudo at the "Non-Refugees focus group. In fact, one of the participants mentioned that the President Christofias wished Talat good luck in the elections. He argued about Christofias' action because as he said how can you wish good luck to someone if you do not recognize them?

The rejection of the rapprochement leads to the rejection of the existence of Turkish-Cypriots as well. There is no doubt that there is a necessity for an effective endeavor towards co-existence between the two communities. The latest survey illustrated that seven years after the Crossing points opened, only 6% of Greek-Cypriots have Turkish-Cypriot friends, unlike the latter who said they have already made friends with Greek-Cypriots (Youth in Cyprus, 2009: 121). As Kaisar Mauratsas clarifies, it cannot be illustrated as a rapprochement while for the most Greek-Cypriots, at least in the new generation, it was actually the first approach (Mauratsas, 1998: 196). Where there is a will, there is a way. Every Cypriot has to try at least to succeed unity through the otherness.

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[22] According to the declaration of the Security Council (Appendix 5).

3.2.3 The value of neighbour

The real meaning of neighborhood is significant. Through the use of neighbourhoud it becomes evident of the real intention of both communities to have any kind of a relationship. The feeling and the relation that can be raised between neighbours is something unconceivable, something that can help Cypriots to change. The fact that Cyprus is a small island, the relationships between people function well as a small community. That means that in Cyprus still there is a more human relationship between people, something that is lost in big cities.

Living next door to someone, who is more or less different to you, is like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, you are getting into an "obligatory" relation, which you like because you have the opportunity to come across new people and consequently new cultures. On the other hand, at the same time this obligatory relationship can be like a noose around your neck. Even if you do not want it, you have to accept it and if you are not ready to accept something like that then there is a possibility of problems arising.

According to my results from the focus groups, one of my participants (A-R) noticed that she had to speak with her neighbour and this is what she wanted to avoid; not having any kind of a relationship because if they are living next to her, it is unavoidable that they become friends[23]. It has to be clarified that the power of the relationship between neighbours was not clear before my focus groups. It was obvious to me that no matter who is your neighbour, you will have the relationship that you want to have. No one will force you to communicate or not communicate with your neighbour.

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[23] "θα πρέπει να του μιλώ κι εγώ αυτό θέλω να αποφύγω. Να μην έχω σχέση μαζί τους γιατί αν ζει δίπλα σου, θέλεις ή δεν θέλεις, θα φιλέψεις μαζί του".

There has been intensive research about "neighbours" at the "Building trust" survey (2006: 4-13). Willingness to have Turkish-Cypriot neighbours remains at quite high levels, 62-63%. However, the youth are ambivalent. 50% of the 18-34 years old still favour co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots. In both communities women tend to be less in favour of co-existence than men. It is interesting because women in general are more apathetic about the Cyprus question. Also it could be thought that it is easier for women to have a relationship with their Turkish-Cypriot women neighbours. On the issue of refugee status, in both communities it is the refugees who have been turning away from co-existence. This is probably related to the dispute over property, which directly affects most refugees from both communities.

In contrast, in "Cyprus 2015" survey's results, over 50% would not mind if they will have Turkish-Cypriot neighbours (2009: 5). At the same time another survey took place but this one concerns only the youth's opinion (2009: 116-117). Approximately 25% of Greek-Cypriots would only feel "positive or very positive" having a Turkish-Cypriot neighbor. In order to understand the motives behind their negative answers, they have been asked which the main reason for their answers was. As it comes out, the primary reason was their ingrained belief that Turkish-Cypriot are their enemies (50%) while the second most cited reason was the difference in religion (38%).

Can this be the final solution? An obligatory relationship which in the future will evolve to a great relation? A lot of members illustrated in the groups that if they could have the chance to meet Turkish-Cypriots, maybe they will realize the similarity of both communities. In particular, as an open-minded young male (Γ-F)

said: the whole creation of propaganda can be demolished automatically, just with a meeting and dialogue. For the people who are prepared to accept it at least.[24]

There is never any preparation for people to live together. Without the basic, everyday life's relation, any kind of a political solution will be a disaster for the island. If Greek-Cypriots recognize the importance of a neighborhood and the whole idea behind it (tolerance, respect, appreciation) then possibly it will be easier to bring about peace. Furthermore, it is known that people have nothing to separate and if they think rationally they will understand that it is a political game and governments generally are guilty of the most problematic situations. Nationalism was also one of their actions in order for governments to manipulate the people.

3.3   Education

In a case such as Cyprus where dual nationalism resides, the problems could not be omitted from education, especially the history education. Besides, the easiest route of fanaticism is through history and it occurs in both cases; Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. From the early years of the 20th century, while Cyprus was a colonial outpost of the British, nationalism through education was strong.

What Greek-Cypriots saw as a primordial inheritance, British administrators saw as the overt efforts of schoolteachers to "inflame the minds of the pupils against the other races resident on the island" as a directly political attempt to disturb the status quo (Bryant, 2004: 143). Nevertheless, Britain did not want to meddle with the education at least during that period. Although in 1935, the government had attempted to set intercommunal standards for education, hoping to quell the rising fervor of

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[24] *"Όλο το οικοδόμημα της προπαγάνδας μπορεί να γκρεμιστεί έτσι αυτόματα με μια συνάντηση και ένα διάλογο. Τουλάχιστον σε άνθρωπο που είναι έτοιμος να το δεχτεί"*.

nationalism both by elimination of symbols and subjects of nationalist histories and by economic growth anticipated as a consequence of increased numbers of university graduates (Bryant, 2004: 160). As it can be assumed, their attempt had failed completely. The "de-Hellenization" became a rallying point and students revolted against it (Innes, 2008: 17).

The "ethnic work" of education as Maratheftis has commented, during the British period it was simple: it was to instill in students the love of Greece and the desire of Enosis. And in this work the school had the cooperation of almost all the community, except for the few Anglophiles (Maratheftis, 1992). In this sense the new generation was affected to become more nationalist through education.

However, it was not so difficult to raise the idea of Enosis to the students, as the analytical system was exactly the same as the Greek system. It has to be mentioned though, that they still studying from the same books. In addition to this, there was a motive to enhance the Greek consciousness at the schools so in every classroom there were symbols that would reflect to young Greek souls: the prohibition of Greek Maps which included Cyprus, pictures of the Greek royal family or other Greek personalities, the teaching of the Greek national anthem, the celebration of Greek independence day, the use of the Greek flag and the use generally of anything which use the blue and white colors of Greece (Bryant, 2004, Kiziyurek, 1999). Once someone had learned these things to be normal, it should not be a surprise that when EOKA's struggle started, the young generation was ready to fight for the Greek ideals. As Bryant argues: while their parents hesitated to join the fight, the young generation held no such qualm (2004: 156). There is no doubt that the new generation was the most powerful weapon in the hands of the EOKA.

After many years, things have still not changed. The educational system in the Republic of Cyprus remains almost the same. Even nowadays nationalism is very high if you observe all the surveys that have been done concerning this issue. It is clear that everyone in my focus groups realizes that the way that he/she was taught makes him/her a nationalistic. Specifically a member (Γ-R) stated: for instance about the 1821 battle, from the time you are in the kindergarten you participate in the performances of the battle, then you are in the elementary school and I still remember when there was the tree celebration day, where students plant trees, and at their speech during the tree celebration they ended the talk with a speech about the invasion. This was brainwashing. What about 1955-59? There are so many Greek-Cypriot fighters but no one remember to refer to some of the Turkish-Cypriots who gave their help[25].

There is a necessity to publish and use the new Cypriot books. Most of the old ones have been printed after 1974 and as it can be assumed they were written in a way that shows the anger and the sorrow of Greek-Cypriots. The rewriting of the books and the beatification of history in a way that actually hides again the reality would be a wrong doing within the communities. The correct and objective illustration of the historical past of Cyprus, the recognition of wrong decisions from both sides but also the creation of a common identity for a hopeful future of the island are some of the elements that will help the new generation of Cyprus to live without the wrong decisions of their ancestors (Litsas: 9).

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[25] "για παράδειγμα το 1821, ξεκινάς από το νηπιαγωγείο να κάνεις αναπαραστάσεις, φτάνεις στο δημοτικό, ακόμη θυμάμαι συγκεκριμένο περιστατικό που κάναμε τη γιορτή του Δέντρου και στη γιορτή του Δέντρου έφτασαν να μας μιλούν για την εισβολή. Είναι πλύση εγκεφάλου. 1955-1959. Έχουμε τόσους Ελληνοκύπριους ήρωες αλλά κανένας δεν θυμάται να αναφερθεί ότι υπήρχαν και Τουρκοκύπριοι που βοήθησαν".

Simultaneously, as is reported in my research, there is the impression that if education is adjusted accordingly, all the Cypriots can live together harmoniously[26]. Similar phrases have been expressed like: "I believe that we can live together if we are educated without bias" and if for the next ten years we are educated correctly, it will be better in the long-term.

As a survey presents in an elementary school, xenophobia and racism are the winners, according to the feelings of Greek-Cypriots for the foreigners in general. The results are impressing. 55.4% of the participants answered that nationality is a main criterion to create friendship with the other (Phileleutheros, 2 June 2010). When a country is so conservative and close-minded, these results are unavoidable. The changes on the pages of the history books do not mean that there will be a manipulation of the history. It will be an attempt to remove adjectives like "barbarian, gypsy and mucky" which do not need to be in the books. The ex-president of TRNC Talat noticed the necessity of changing the way history was portrayed regarding how the Cyprus issue was written in the history books. Similar efforts have been made in the North regarding their history books.

Imagine a teacher getting into the classroom. It is early in the morning and he is saying: "my children, today is a special and unique day. It is a day that some years before we could not even imagine that from now on our country will be reunited… everything around us is changing: now we can talk about hope, cooperation, forgiveness and friendship instead of war, hate and revenge. The barbwire left behind and we have a democratic federal state. Do you know what that means? We have to

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[26] " αν ρυθμιστεί με τέτοιο τρόπο η παιδεία νομίζω ότι μπορούμε να ζήσουμε αρμονικά".

"θεωρώ ότι με την σωστή παιδεία, μπορούμε να ζήσουμε μαζί".

"αν για τα επόμενα 10 χρόνια κάναμε σωστή εκπαιδευτική θα ήταν πολύ καλύτερα".

learn that everyone is a citizen of the reunited federal country (Trimikliniotis, 31 January 2010: 13).

When there is "hope" and "fantasy" there is also the strength to change the situation and which pushes forward the history of the island (Trimikliniotis, 31 January 2010: 13). Now the only part that is left is the citizens of the island having to accept a solution like this, because, as many attempts will be done, without an effective participation from the people, nothing can be changed.

Chapter 4

The Annan Plan

The Annan Plan was the first comprehensive approach to treating almost all aspects of life in the proposed Bi-zonal and Bi-communal Cyprus. It was named in recognition of the person who actually devised the plan, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.

Although the Annan Plan was first submitted in November 2002 as a "basis for an agreement on a comprehensive settlement", it had been revised several times. The final version of the plan was presented to both communities on 31st of March 2004, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland.

On 24th April, a referendum had been held in Cyprus over the plan for the reunification of the island. The new country was to be a federation of the two communities. Unfortunately, the Annan Plan had been rejected by the overwhelming majority of Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriots, in contrast, accepted the plan by a majority of 64%.

The following text firstly will analyze the real meaning of the terms Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation but also how that the members of the focus groups perceived this terminology. Then, the explanation of the main factors of the rejection of the Annan Plan is followed as the participants of my focus groups agreed to. In the end, there is a particular section describing what were the reasons that Greek-Cypriot voted "No" to the Annan Plan.

4.1 The meaning of the terms Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation

In order to understand the idea of the Annan Plan, the meaning must be clarified of the three terms of which the articles of the plan were based. Unfortunately a clear meaning of those three words arose after the Annan Plan (a female of the interviewed groups (E-OG) stated that the Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation is just one term: you have to use these words together always). Even if there was an intention to explain these words, there was not enough time and the politicians preferred not to spend time to explain them, as a result the Cypriots were kept in the dark.

Returning to the definitions, it has to be illustrated that there is a literal and a political meaning of the words. It appears that sometimes these words come to mean something different to the original meaning. So, when you are checking the words in the dictionary (Pampiniotis, 1998 ed.):

- Bi-communal: it consists of two communities.
- Bi-zonal: it consists of two (geographical) zones or intends the existence of two zones.
- Federation: the unification of more than one, independent and autonomous states in order to create a single statehood, international personality and to have a common constitution and internal law.

The new President Christofias in collaboration with PIO published a document with a title "Cyprus and the federation" (Public Information Office, 2010). A lot of people have criticized it negatively but it should not be overlooked that it was the first attempt to inform people officially. According to this document the term bi-communal as it is, also determined by the UN, means that both communities will participate efficiently at the political institutions and at the decisions of the central authority. This is not a new definition, as exactly the same term was written at the 1960's constitution

of Cyprus. Now, the only part that is missing is to what extent they will participate. With concern to the term bi-zonal, it is obvious that there will be two different areas with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot administration respectively. Every state of the federation will be run from the respective community.

However, the first two words were the easy part. The big problem starts from the meaning of federation and what kind of federation will be functional in Cyprus. A federal state is a composite state which consists of at least two districts and each state has its own self dominating (legislation, executive, assembly) and they act directly under the jurisdiction which is conceded by the constitution. Some basics characteristics are that the sovereign state is only the central power and it is the only one which will be recognized internationally. Moreover, there is a distinction between the jurisdiction of the state and the two zonal communities.

It has to be clarified that there is a huge argument about the time that the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation was accepted as a base for a solution. In 1977 Denktas and Makarios agreed that all negotiations will be based on four general principles (Dodd, 2002: 24):

1] We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.

2] The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

3] Questions of principles (sic) like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

4] The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard for the bi-communal character of the State.

Few people argue about the existence and the truth within that document. But, because no one knows, I will take as given what most of the history books have written. The unique agreement of Makarios and Denktas in 1977 illustrated the bi-communal federation. The argument comes with the explanation of bi-zonal. They did not exactly use the word bi-zonal, but, if someone analyzes the second and fourth paragraph, he will realize the meaning of bi-zonal. Although the correct question is if the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation was signed more than 30 years ago, why Cypriots and especially Greek-Cypriots argue about it and why they did not start the negotiations based on that high-level agreement of 1977?

In my own research, the answers about the knowledge of the terms are not satisfying. Most of my participants in the focus groups did not know anything about the terms, or even if they understood some points, they did not care for this resolution. Actually, one of my informants (H-OG) pointed out that neither of the people who are using these terms has understood the exact plan[27]. These expressions were repeated time and again; 1) "I do not even know if all I have told you is correct[28]" and 2) "I have heard these words before but I did not understand their exact meaning[29]". It is not a coincidence that all the other surveys have the same findings with mine.

Nevertheless, the people from the focus groups who were more informed than the others tried to explain in their words what bi-zonal and bi-communal meant and

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[27] "ούτε καν εκείνοι που το χρησιμοποιούν δεν ξέρουν τί είναι".

[28] "δεν ξέρω κι αν αυτό που είπα είναι καν σωστό".

[29] "Έχω ξανακούσει αυτές τις λέξεις αλλά δεν έχω ελέγξει την ακριβή τους έννοια".

also to explain federation. The ugly truth is that even if they tried to do that, when I was trying to clarify their answer and asking them something more specific they got confused and they were unable to distinguish the differences. For instance, a lot of times the participants told me two different zones and two different communities. When it was asked what was the difference they could not understand the difference of zones and communities. They did not even understand the difference between federation and confederation and which of these two will take place in Cyprus.

Another important issue is that many times people from my focus groups complained that after so many years they have become tired from the Cyprus dispute so they stopped researching anything related to the problem. It is really unacceptable when young people use expressions such as this. Youth is supposedly the new generation of the country that will eventually form the future.

Instead of this, in "Can the Cyprus problem be resolved" Survey the "18-24 age" group tend to "I know the plan a little" or "I do not know the plan at all". Moreover, it is very impressive that all the Greek-Cypriots, of every age, do not want to have a solution such as this. I do not know if it is due to the fact that most of them do not know anything about the subject but the results still remain impressive. In a general survey of the organization "Cyprus 2015" results show that Greek-Cypriots do not reject the federation however nor do they accept it. The survey about "Youth in Cyprus" published by University of Lefkosia in co-operation with KADEM, gives you an idea about the political situation within a Cypriots' mind. Only 6% supported that the best solution for Cyprus is to become a federation.

As it was referred in another survey published by the newspaper Simerini, most of the citizens of Cyprus declare that they do not know how a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation can function in Cyprus. Even if there was an endeavor to try explaining the

terms, they do not know how it will eventually work. This result points out the failure of the government and the political parties to inform and enlighten what it is exactly instead of declarations and more conversations about the reason why they have to support it (Ploutarxos, 15 November 2009: 2). The lack of good information could explain a satisfactory percentage of this rejection. As another informant from the group of non refugees' parents stated that the result of 76% rejection also has something to do with the plan as a plan and not because of the ignorance of the people[30].

In conclusion, there is great confusion about everything; that Greek-Cypriots know regarding the solution, whether the terms are clear in their minds and if they know what they really want. With everything such a mess, how could the Annan Plan possibly be accepted?

4.2.1 The predictable results

After six years from the strong "No" of Greek-Cypriots to the Annan-Plan, it is certain that a combination of a lot of reasons was responsible for this rejection. As it was analyzed above, the ignorance and the unwillingness towards the plan was strong enough to make people turn down the attempts of the UN. But the Greek-Cypriot political parties could not stay without responsibility for the Annan Plan because it might be the main reason for the rejection.

A young male (A-NR) quoted that if someone observes the Annan Plan's result, with a more rational perspective, is like mathematics: if you sum up each party's percentages then you will get the 76%. "The president whose party is 15% said No,

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[30] "είναι δυνατό να υπήρχε 76% μόνο που τη πληροφόρηση που το αρνήθηκαν? Πρέπει να υπήρχαν κάποια λάθος στοιχεία στο σχέδιο".

AKEL with 30% also supported No, then EDEK with 10% and if you count also some people from DISI who did not follow the "Yes" of their party then…[31]".

However it is better that the political parties' decision about the Annan Plan is analyzed step by step. What was the reason that they finally decided to reject the plan? There was big interest also in the background stories and the explanation of each party about their decisions. It has to be clarified that the speech of Tassos Papadopoulos, President of Cyprus at that time, was to be analyzed below in a different sub-chapter.

So, let's start from AKEL which actually is the most interesting because of the last moment shift in their decision. In the beginning there was a tendency to vote "Yes" in the Annan Plan. But after the speech of Tassos Papadopoulos, the current president and after a two day meeting, they published some points which should be accepted from the Political Office on 14th of April 2004. Some of them totally disagreed with the President's speech and that the Annan plan had also positive elements which in due course were to promise peaceful existence of the communities. Nevertheless, in the end, they wanted to postpone the referendum for some months in order to present the Annan Plan in a better way otherwise they would not support the approval of the plan (Perikleous, 2007: 607-608). There is no need for someone to read it twice in order to value that in this document the last paragraph actually reverses all those proceeding it. As was written in Phileleutheros newspaper Turkey had an additional reason to reject the postponement of the plan because it seemed it

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[31] "είπε ο Πρόεδρος που το κόμμα του είχε το 15% όχι. Είπε το ΑΚΕΛ που το κόμμα του είχε το 30%. Η ΕΔΕΚ που είχε το 10%, κι ο Συναγερμός (ΔΗΣΥ) παρόλο που είπε Ναι είδες ένα μεγάλο ποσοστό του να υποστηρίζει το Όχι"

was in its own interest if Greek-Cypriots in the end say "No" (Stulianou, 14 April 2004).

The elections were on the way and Christofias could not ignore the negative tendency of leftists but also Greek-Cypriots in general. In order to prepare Greek-Cypriots about his political party's shift, he started declaring that the aim of the postponement was to succeed with better conditions of the plan. In the end, AKEL announced its negative decision. Although as Christofias said: "We are saying "No" now because in the end we want to give a "cementate" Yes". The importance of this phrase is shown from the fact that it was referred verbatim by one of my participants (A-F).

The intentions of the other political parties were less interesting as they decided from the beginning what they wanted to vote and they remained stable in their views. EDEK, the socialist party followed AKEL's way. The president of the political party, Giannakis Omirou, wanted to support "Yes" to the Annan Plan but the founder and ex-president of the party Vasos Lissaridis insisted to reject the plan. During that hat period the European socialist parties tried to advice Giannaki Omirou by saying "Yes" to the plan is the correct solution. As Mrs. Rote said, now that there is a real possibility for a solution, try to take advantage of this opportunity (Taramounta, 8 April 2004). Unfortunately, in the end, Giannakis Omirou could not disregard Lussaridis' alienated opinion. He stayed faithful to the shadow of his political party's founder (Perikleous, 2007: 621).

Concerning the DIKO, the political party of that time, there is no reason to examine it further at the moment as there will be a special sub-chapter about its leader's decisions below. As was expected the members of the party followed their leaders and president of the Republic of Cyprus' decisions.

Other small political parties like NEO, Ecologists and ADIK without any hesitation supported "No" and followed the president's decision. Analytically, NEO relied upon its national and anti-federation positions; it was not so difficult to say "No" to the Annan Plan unanimously. Ecologists reject the Anan Plan from the beginning and not even for a second did they change their minds. That was a disaster for their party as the other European Ecologists believed that "No" was a nationalistic position, so the Cypriot party was alienated from other Ecologists in the European parliament. Regarding ADIK, without any political or ideological background it stood with the "No" camp.

The only parties that supported "Yes" were DISI and EDI. DISI is a right party, which actually is the second biggest political party in Cyprus. Nikos Anastasiadis, the leader of the party, had to face up to the rejection tendency in its own party. Glaukos Klerides, founder of the rally and ex-president of Cyprus, determined his opinion and made the people of his party understand that the Annan Plan is a solution, with disadvantages but, it can function if there is a political will (Phileleutheros 8 April 2004). Similarly, Nikos Anastasiadis, the President of the party, ignored the political cost of his decision, but also with the support of Klerides, he chose to vote "Yes" to the Annan Plan. As was predictable, the 77,6% of the DISI's members supported his decision. Unfortunately this percentage was not so clear to the people so DISI was split within the referendum and after the referendum a lot of people seceded from the party. Similarly EDI, the small party of ex-president Giorgos Vasiliou, arranged itself within the "Yes" camp. In Vasiliou's view, the Annan Plan was not the ideal; it had weaknesses but it led to the reunification of the island. "No" meant extension of the status quo and a possibility for a dichotomy (Phileleutheros 8 April 2004).

The point is that no one was surprised with the 76% voting down the Annan Plan; no one could predict that every three of four -Greek-Cypriots would vote "No". The rejection was certain. Once again most of the political parties preferred to follow the president's decision and also to avoid any political cost during the situation. It was the safest solution for them. DISI has to be congratulated as it was the only one from the four biggest parties in Cyprus, which did not consider the reaction and the political cost.

4.2.2 Tassos Papadopoulos' speech

"Greek Cypriot People

I took over a state internationally recognized. I will not give back a "community" without the right to speak internationally and searching for a guardian[32]"

In my research, all the informants in the focus groups agreed that President Papadopoulos' speech was one of the main reasons that Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan. As it seems, Tassos Papadopoulos, with or without intention, manipulated public opinion. This sub-chapter would not be examined if "No" was the correct or incorrect answer to the plan, but how his speech affected Greek-Cypriots opinion. Certainly his speech was fuelled by emotion. He knew that by using words and expressions which could reflect upon everyone's heart, he would mislead their opinions and achieve the results that he so desired. From the beginning Tassos Papadopoulos was against the plan because of his perception of politics. It is a fact that the ex-president had rejected all the plans from 1959 (Drousiotis, 10 April 2004: 2). The only plan he had accepted

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[32] Παρέλαβα Κράτος διεθνώς αναγνωρισμένο. Δεν θα παραδώσω «κοινότητα» χωρίς δικαίωμα λόγου διεθνώς και σε αναζήτηση κηδεμόνα.

was to negotiate the Annan plan and as it appeared it was not an honest response as was obvious from his speech.

During the speech, Papadopoulos illustrated only the negative points of the Plan. As he said: "it is not the right time to analyze the Annan Plan" (RIK 7 April 2004). Unfortunately Papadopoulos' words were unacceptable to say the least. He described the "United Republic of Cyprus" as the worst thing that could happen. But if it was so bad, what was he thinking when he was negotiating the plan?

The main problem throughout was not only the inaccurate things that he said during his speech. The worst part was in the last minutes of the speech whilst crying; he was trying to convince everyone to reject the plan. It is believed that he truly felt the responsibility of his actions and its consequences until all the other parties supported "Yes" but the tears cannot go unmentioned. In my opinion, the accompanying tears were used to "impress", to make Greek-Cypriots disapprove the whole situation. The result was the prospective; after Papadopoulos' speech some of the political parties changed their idea about it and they decided to follow the president's point of view. Besides it was thought that President Papadopoulos was the most qualified regarding the Annan Plan as he was the negotiator. So in the end, he affected the political parties, the way he affected his people. His mission was completed successfully!

4.2.3 Mass Media

Certainly mass media has been the main informant regarding the Annan Plan. Media undoubtedly manipulated Cypriots minds and specifically the journalists had been divided into two categories: the one which preferred to say "Yes" to the Annan Plan and the few who were against it.

One of the problems was as the President Papadopoulos named: "the case of the ambient atmosphere". He accused some people of taking a lot of money from the USA in order to support the Annan plan. After the plan there was a big argument about it. Why did Cypriots accept money from USA? Why USA gave money and so on. Eventually it became the extension of nationalism, but this time with a different name. Journalists, political analysts and professors from Cypriot Universities supported the Annan Plan fanatically but their attempts did not convince Cypriots to follow their opinion. They were trying to inspire ordinary people about the advantages, taking as allies the Anglo-Americans. As Americans admit that no matter how much money they gave, they failed to promote that which the people of Cyprus did not want (Drousiotis, 11 November 2005: 37). After the strong "No" of 76%, they did not give up. They are continuing to try to convince Cypriots about the good intentions of Anglo-Americans regarding the solution to the Cyprus problem (Tzioni, 21 August 2009: 10).

According to my findings, one of my participants (A-F) stated that when someone was reading Phileleutheros newspaper, there was propaganda over "No", and when some other was reading Politis newspaper there was propaganda to say "Yes".[33] Also it was reported by a male (H-OG) that everyone was saying whatever he liked in that "stupid box" that we call a TV. Perhaps it was not a good decision to televise the Annan Plan. Various politicians were behaving like actors and they were giving their performances without correct knowledge of the situation and they also

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[33] "διάβαζες Φιλελεύθερο έκανε προπαγάνδα υπέρ του Όχι, διάβαζες Πολίτη, προπαγάνδα υπέρ του Ναι".

were disagreeing with each other and between their parties.[34] Throughout that period some of the television channels were trying to illustrate the opinion of a minority as a majority's opinion. As one of the older informants of the groups stated

Media has become the 4th power of any country. It can be useful to a point but during that time, it proved to be ill-informed. As Chalikiopoulos found on the internet: "from the time that TV became a mean of massive persuasion, there is no need for a dictatorship" (Chalikiopoulos, 12 July 2010: 13). All journalists cannot be blamed. Some of them still continue with their job trying to do their best to inform the people. But as Media becomes such a powerful weapon, journalists must double check their information before it can be officially released.

These days, there are new efforts towards a solution between the two communities. It is a fact that now it is more difficult than 2004. Nevertheless, the two communities still cooperate. UN reported that for the first time in history, there is an honest political endeavor from both sides. Instead of this, media refers to crisis, dispute, and the worst scenario is that they buried the new plan even before it had started (Drousiotis, 7 May 2008). When Media acts like this, then the new plan before birth has been rejected!

There is no time to terrify Cypriots. Media (and the people behind media) have to realize their true power and start using it in order to find a solution instead of only taking interest in some "big" people who prefer Cyprus to continue to be divided concerning the Annan Plan. Cypriots do not pay attention to the media anymore. After the accusation during an ambient atmosphere from the President of Cyprus, there is no

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[34] "ο καθένας έλεγε ότι ήθελε στο χαζοκούτι που το λένε τηλεόραση. Είναι ο πιο λάθος τρόπος να μεταδοθεί το σχέδιο Ανάν. Πήγαιναν όπως τους ηθοποιούς διάφοροι πολιτικοί και έκαναν την δική τους παράσταση χωρίς να γνωρίζουν. Διαφωνούσαν όλοι μεταξύ τους και μεταξύ των κομμάτων".

credible sign remaining for the current media powers. If the citizens take seriously what they hear from the politicians and the media, one way leads to desperation and the other to the disappearance of a focused community looking towards the future (Dionusiou, 4 October 2009: 3).

4.3   Greek-Cypriot Rejection

As it referred in the introduction, over 75% of the population of the Republic of Cyprus rejected the plan. In order to understand this massive rejection (almost three of four Greek-Cypriots), the reason must be analyzed why the Greek-Cypriots decided to vote "No" to the Annan Plan.

It is difficult to explain Cypriot reaction because after the gallop poll, it seemed that they were not too honest about their vote. According to the results of that gallop poll, 75% voted "No" because the Annan Plan did not assure Cypriot's safety. Another 5% voted "No" considering the economical cost after the plan, 7% was influenced from Tassos Papadopoulos' speech and 13% prefer to live separately with Turkish-Cypriots (Perikleous, 2007: 658). There are too many doubts about the outcome of this gallop poll, because if the only problem was the guaranteed security of Cyprus that meant that the districts next to the crossing-points or near the "Green Line" would have voted "No" to the Annan plan. Instead of this, the areas near the internal "borders" seem that they were supporters of "Yes". So, it seems that Greek-Cypriots did not admit at the gallop polls what the real reason of their rejection was. They were trying to give the impression that they arrived at their decisions by themselves and that was the motive of their vote.

The Annan plan was bringing about big questions to Greek-Cypriot's mind. No explanation was ever given regarding at least the important articles of the plan. As ex-president Clerides said: "the plan has some points that we do not like but at least we know what is about. If we will say "No" we will be at the escarpment from where we do not know its depth" (Poludoras, Paraschos, March 2010).

But did the Greek-Cypriots say "No" to the Annan Plan or to the co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots? This is a crucial question because if Greek-Cypriots said "No" to the content of the Annan Plan, it means that there is the intention for reconciliation. Otherwise, if they had voted "No" because they do not believe that they can live together harmoniously, then there is no point trying to negotiate anything in order to succeed a better agreement with Turkish-Cypriots. In addition, if Greek-Cypriots knew why they voted "No", then it would be pointless to hope that with more time or with more analysis of the Plan their vote would change into a "Yes".

At my focus groups, everyone agreed that the UN Plan was a complex and multi-faceted legal document. Although, a male (E-F) admitted that if the groundwork of a system is complicated then there will be potential problems as well[35]. The size of the Plan (more than 9,000 pages) could not ensure the functionality that could be presented to the plan. People were not naive. They realized that this plan would cause a lot of reactions. Under this situation, it is rational for Greek-Cypriots to avoid getting into trouble.

Choleras has analyzed Greek-Cypriots' reaction better. According to his research Greek-Cypriot's mass rejection based on four main reasons (2004):

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[35] *"Όταν η βάση πολιτεύματος είναι πολύπλοκη τότε μπορεί να υπάρχουν και πιθανά προβλήματα".*

1) The distrust with Turkey. The benefits accepting the plan would be materialized only if Turkey wanted to show goodwill. No one could guarantee to Greek-Cypriots that Turkey would keep to that agreement.

2) Economical reasons. According to the Annan Plan Greek-Cypriots would pay for the development in the North. That directly means Greek-Cypriots will pay (literally) the sequence of the military intervention/invasion.

3) The disability of the supporters of the Plan to convince Greek-Cypriots. Despite all of their endeavors, in the end, they just threaten people about what will happen if they do not vote "Yes". In particular, Kasoulides, a famous politician of DISI and an extreme supporter of the Annan Plan was threatening that if Greek-Cypriots reject the plan, an Asia Minor Catastrophe will eventuate.

4) Self-preserving instinct of Greek-Cypriots. It is a power that cannot be explained. The experiences, the struggles, the resistances but also an admirable survival are part of their lives and all together compose the "magic" of their characters.

The truth lies somewhere between the reasons that have been described above. Certainly, the awareness and the size of the Plan were quite enough to make the Greek-Cypriots to reject it. Moreover, the fact that the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU was one week after the referendum, made their decision easier as it was believed that Cyprus could claim a better agreement when it is full member of the EU.

Chapter 5

Prospects of reconciliation

In 1974, after the military intervention/invasion from Turkey onto the island, Cyprus was divided into two parts: the northern where Turkish-Cypriots live and to the south, the Republic of Cyprus. For more than 30 years politicians from different parties and the leaders of the communities have been trying to find a solution which will be fair for both sides.

Various factors led to this deadlock. The problem is that after so many years, people stop being interested in any kind of a solution. They got used to the present situation somehow and they do not care to change anything that will help the two communities live together. And here is the crucial question: Do Cypriots still want to find a solution? As my thesis is based on the young generation's opinion I will focus on the problem under this perception. The young generation wants a change in life for a better future or do they prefer the whole situation as it is right now? To check if there is an intention for a solution, it has to be analyzed via different factors about Cyprus. If someone wants to understand the underlying logic, s/he has to read between the lines. No one will say directly what is going on and how it can be resolved. Also no one political will admit something that will cause detriment to his career and to his life overall.

If the new solution can skip this problem, then there is a small chance for Cypriots to realize the best solution for their own country. People have to decide immediately because this inactivity is detrimental to all of us and especially the young people who will be forced to accept a situation in which they were never involved.

This chapter is based on four main parameters, as they were perceived in the focus groups: the politicians and their political games, the factor of time, the situation of the Greek-Cypriots after the results of the military intervention/invasion and finally, the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

5.1.1 The role of leadership

Z-F: "Denktas is the most charismatic leader in Cyprus"[36].

A-F: "Cypriot is too weak to diverge from his/her political house"[37].

Θ-NR: "We are the future and I believe that we must make our decisions by ourselves. We have to find out if our party still represents our ideology and not if our ideology falls into the party's ideology".[38]

The political parties and the President of a country determine the political arena. Without a comprehensible picture of their duty but also their responsibility, it is too difficult to bring about the expected results. The mistakes are unavoidable without a clear target regarding the interests of the country. According to the politician's behavior, the fate of a nation is endangered so any offhandedness is not allowed.[39] It is tragic however, throughout the Cyprus issue that the same politicians from '60s remain in charge of

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[36] "Ο Ντενκτάς είναι ο πιο χαρισματικός ηγέτης στην Κύπρο".

[37] "Ο Κύπριος είναι πολύ αδύναμος να αποκλίνει της κομματικής του στέγης".

[38] "Εμείς που είμαστε το μέλλον πιστεύω ότι πρέπει να παίρνουμε τις αποφάσεις μας μόνοι μας και να δούμε κατά πόσο το κόμμα πλέον είναι στις ιδεολογίες τις δικές μας και όχι εμείς αν είμαστε στις ιδεολογίες του κόμματος".

[39] Vasos, Lissarides, "Των οικιών ημών εμπιπραμένων...", Simerini, 22 February 2004.

Cyprus. When will Greek-Cypriots realize that there is a necessity for new people to get involved in politics?

According to Mauratsas, necessary changes and reforms can be expected only through the actions of some charismatic leaders who will not hesitate to oppose and eventually to defeat the mentality at a political cost (1998: 208). President Christofias, following the same path of his predecessors, has never dared to escape from the attitude of the "nice guy" towards the Great Powers and Turkey as well. He did not estimate the situation as he should have and in the end he made one-sided withdrawals -the acceptance of 50.000 settlers and the rotating presidency- [40] in order to prove to the world that there is a will to resolve the Cyprus question, expecting Talat to do the same. However, Talat never offered anything such as Christofias' "gift".

In my research, the results from the focus groups illustrated that this charismatic Greek-Cypriot leader has not yet been found. Actually, when the participants were asked for their opinion about the leaders in Cyprus, their answer was impressing, as most of them agreed with the Z-F's statement above. Denktas seems to be the most skillful politician in Cyprus. Furthermore, it appears that the youth (except those from the left party) at the focus groups believes that president Christofias cannot change too many things as the leaders from both communities are just "puppets"[41] who are trying to satisfy the biggest interests in general. Nevertheless, concerning the negotiations and the possibility of a solution, Christofias' handling is accepted from the majority of Greek-Cypriots, 54%[42] (Ploutarxos, 2009). The same results were released after the "Cyprus 2015" survey.

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[40] Savvas, Iakovides, "Από τους ευσεβείς πόθους στην διάψευση των μύθων", Apopsi, March 2010.

[41] This characterization was given by some of my informants from different focus groups.

[42] Giorgos, Ploutarxos, "Οι πολίτες απορρίπτουν τη διζωνική, δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία", Simerini, 15 November 2009.

As my focus groups' participants illustrated, a lot of Greek-Cypriots were waiting their political party's position with the plan, in order to decide what they really wanted. As A-F declared above, Cypriots always vote the same political party no matter what. They do not have the power to judge their political party's actions. If they cannot vote what is the best for their country, then Cypriots have to stop complaining about their future.

Under these circumstances, politicians must realize that their position is both a wish and a curse simultaneously. It is like a bomb in their hands, which can bring disaster after a small mistake. They must follow the direction which can raise new opportunities to the Cyprus dispute. This can be achieved if present politicians recognized their wrong diplomacy, take all the responsibility and retire from politics.

According to Charalampous, Turks seem to know exactly what they really want and they claim it in any way, unlike Greek-Cypriots who agree on other things, they want to mean something else and in the end they negotiate for something completely different. After so many years, they have no idea what they really want. They have been trained to say all the time that they want a solution, like parrots, thinking that they hide their real desire which is partition[43]. Instead of trying to find a solution, Greek-Cypriots are rejecting any kind of a plan as they do not know what they want and what can satisfy them. Asking partition as a solution is the proof of Greek-Cypriots' disappointment. A survey shows that the majority of the latter recommend solutions which do not seem to be supported from any political party since the politicians do not know what kind of a solution they seek (Ploutarchos, 2009).

Another important issue is the "Plan B" in both communities' agenda. If you compare them, then it is not too difficult to understand that Turkey had thought the possibility that

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[43] Loukas, Charalampous, "Η διχοτόμηση που βολεύει", Politis, 4 October 2009.

negotiations would fail again so they were prepared for any developments concerning Cyprus. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hüseyin Özgürgün sustained that the Turkish-Cypriots will not negotiate forever. They will seek the recognition of TRNC in turn.[44]

On the other hand the Greek-Cypriot leaders did not realize that they had to discover a "Plan B" just in case. According to a statement of President Christofias one month ago, he said that there is only one scenario, only a "Plan A" and this is the solution of the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, all the other parties warn the president; there is a necessity of a "Plan B". What must happen in order for President Christofias to realize that his policy is out of reach? As Anastasiadis pronounced "when you notice the tail of a snake, you do not need to see the whole of it to understand that sometime you run a risk of the consequences because of your disregard.[45]

It has to be a clear direction for what they want in order to get people to support it. It is incumbent upon the cooperation of AKEL and DISI. They have to tell the truth to the Greek-Cypriots, they have to explain what Bi-zonal, and Bi-communal Federation means and generally they have to prepare them for accepting the co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots. Otherwise, they are also abetting the failure of the new settlement.[46] The same idea was supported by a participant from the "Leftist" focus group. If at least the two biggest political parties agree about the kind of the solution that they want, then they would convince people. If they do not agree, they will divide their voters and ultimately Greek-Cypriots will say "No" again to the next plan. The leaders and also their supporters must raise a "federal atmosphere". They have to learn how to act as a nation with common interest and fight for the same target.

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[44] Anna, Andreou, "Αποκαλυπτικός ο ΥΠΕΞ για τις προθέσεις της Τ/κ πλευράς", Politis, 23 May 2009.

[45] APE, "Αναστασιάδης: τα ΗΕ έχουν σχέδιο Β για το Κυπριακό?", Simerini, 21 June 2010.

[46] Loizos, Paphitis, "Τώρα μπορούμε να ελπίζουμε?", Politis, 30 May 2010.

It is observed from the focus groups that a large proportion of the new generations remain faithful to their political party. When some critical questions were asked, they had given the expected answers that their parties supported. In a small country such as Cyprus, sometimes to follow their party's decisions is unavoidable. The solution is behind the words of the Θ-NR's statement above; Cypriots have to change mentality and start voting the politicians who will work for the best of their country and not for their own. The phrase of Θ-NR describes perfectly what must be changed in politics. If people stop following their political party's opinion when they do not agree, then the political parties will get the point and they will try to recall their ideology. When people realize it as soon as possible, then politics will be changed for the better.

5.1.2 The fear of political parties

> *Z-F: "There is not any person who will take this responsibility because he will*
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> *be characterized as a traitor"* [47].

> *B-OG: "Politicians, who dare to change something, cannot win the elections*
>
> *easily after that"* [48].

If the citizens of a country (i.e. Cyprus) do not know what they want, their politicians are even worse since sometimes they maintain opposite opinions from their offered persuasions. The political cost of any kind of a solution will be vast. Specifically, the Greek-Cypriot politicians cannot risk their career concerning the Cyprus question as they will be responsible for the consequences.

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[47] "Δεν υπάρχει άνθρωπος" που θα το πάρει πάνω του γιατί θα χαρακτηριστεί προδότης".

[48] "Πολιτικοί που τολμούν δεν κερδίζουν εύκολα εκλογές".

In my research, the comments made by the participants are really interesting. As the young male's (Z-F) statement above, it is difficult for a politician to take this crucial decision by himself as he might be characterized as a traitor. Also, another issue which raised by the B-OG's declaration above, is that politicians realize the real dimension of the consequences to their career, if in the end they will set up a plan that the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus are not ready to accept. If a politician decides to choose the best for his own country (which means changing tactic regarding the solution), maybe it is too risky, if he is interested to win the elections and being active member to politics as well.

It is decided that every time a solution must be given to both communities at a referendum simultaneously. At least under these circumstances, the political leaders will not take the responsibility of the solution and at the same time they will blame the citizens of Cyprus for the result. In fact, it is easier to share the responsibility of the referendum, instead of being a brave politician and making radical decisions. For instance, AKEL was in favor of "Yes" to the Annan Plan in the beginning. However, when it was in danger of losing its supporters because of its vote, it changed its view 180 degrees and in the end its final answer was "No" with the excuse "We are saying "No" now in order to straighten out the future for a "Yes" vote".

A solution (any solution) will have the proportional results. Unfortunately politicians are afraid of the political cost so they prefer to stay as they are, without any change. As it is referred also above, a "charismatic" leader is the one who can enforce his opinion and convince the people to trust him about his decisions. He is the one who will act as a good politician and decide the future of Cyprus without thinking of the political cost.

President Christofias was called the "President of the solution". People believed to his power and voted for him in 2008. The shock will be huge for AKEL after the collapse of the political consensus in federation of which he was the biggest supporter for years

(Perikleous, May 2010). He does not have the will but also he is not brave enough to make decisions and to give a new vision to the Greek-Cypriots. Contrary to this, he is continuously saying that if he will not resolve the Cyprus dispute he will not run as a candidate for the next elections in 2013. No one cares about the elections and the truth is that no one asked him what will happen to his political career until 2013. Politicians must understand that it does not make any difference to the population who will be in charge. After 40 years of the establishment of Republic of Cyprus, all the big political parties had a president of their own party at least once. Now, there is no excuse from any party about their actions. It is obvious that the fear of the political cost is stronger than the desire of finding a solution. When politicians stop acting in their own interests, the Cyprus issue will be easier to be resolved.

5.1.3 Eroglu instead of Talat

"It is like we return to the model of Denktas; we hate him but he was clearly an enemy. With Talat, it was somehow ambiguous" [49].

"If Eroglu wins the elections, dichotomy will come easier" [50].

"Undoubtedly, Denktas was the worst negotiator. Eroglu or Talat, are both serving the interests of Turkey on Cyprus" [51].

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[49] "Είναι σαν να επιστρέφουμε στο πρότυπο Ντενκτάς. Τον μισούσαμε αλλά είχαμε ένα καθαρά εχθρό. Ενώ με τον Ταλάτ είναι κάπως διφορούμενο".

[50] "Αν ο Έρογλου βγει, θα έρθει μια ώρα γρηγορότερα η διχοτόμηση".

[51] "Αδιαμφισβήτητα ο Ντενκτάς ήταν ο πιο σκληρός διαπραγματευτής. Έρογλου ή Ταλάτ, και οι δύο εξυπηρετούν τα συμφέροντα της Τουρκίας".

The reason that the negotiations started again after the rejection of Annan Plan in 2004 was the change of the political leadership in both communities. For the first time, AKEL in the Republic of Cyprus and CTP in the north, both from the left parties, were in charge. Everyone could understand that it was a new phase and that they had to take advantage of that opportunity. The positive mood would not last forever.

On 18 April 2010, Dervis Eroglu from the UBP party won the elections by 50.38% against Mehmet Ali Talat by 42.85% (April 2010:1). His election closed a failed period of the socialist party to make the difference. It seems that TRNC came back to normal, as it was before 2003 with Rauf Denktas. CTP failed due to the high expectations of the Republican Party to resolve the problem, lift the embargo and lead to an economical improvement. According to Ahmet Sözen it was just the correction of a "political anomaly" which was created as a result of major changes. The Right Party took back the reins in the north and the Republican Party returned to the well-known role of opposition.[52]

There are three scenarios to compare with the policy that Eroglu will decide to follow[53]:

1) He will terminate the negotiations and he will begin the process for separation of the communities. This evolution will transform the TRNC to a district of Turkey and of course Turkey's accession process will end.

2) Turkey will force Eroglu to follow the policy of Ankara and continue the negotiations from the point that Talat left off

3) In Cyprus, except from the two communities, Turkey, Greece, EU the Security Council will activate.

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[52] Antonis, Poludoras, "Από τον Φαζίλ Κουτσιούκ στον Ντερβίς Έρογλου", Kathimerini, 26 April 2010.

[53] Anna, Andreou, "Ο Έρογλου μπορεί να εκπλήξει πολλούς", Politis, 25 April 2010.

In Turkey, the prevailing view about leadership in TRNC is that nobody can resist Ankara's policy, not even Eroglu. Turkey will force Eroglu to toe Ankara's line and work effectively within the political, economic and above all military dependence on TRNC by motherland Turkey (Iakovou, 2010).

According to my focus groups, the same opinion predominates within Greek-Cypriot youth as they realize that Eroglu is nationalist and he has a hardcore angle about the Cyprus problem but in the end Turkey defines the policy that Eroglu must follow. As it seems from the statements above, it is obvious that whoever is the president of TRNC -Eroglu or Talat- nothing can be changed. The only factor which is open to discussion is the time that dichotomy/taksim will be a fact in the island.

Nevertheless, some of the women of the groups have stated that they do not know Eroglu (whereas the focus groups had been done one week before the elections). It is remarkable that they did not even want to learn about him. They think that this is has nothing to do with their living! Also the members of the group affiliated with the left party supported Talat instead of Eroglu as they believed that the collaboration between Christofias and Talat could bring about a solution on the island.

However, the results from the "Cyprus 2015" survey (one year ago) illustrates that nor was Mehmet Ali Talat acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots, as 76% answered that they do not trust Talat regarding the Cyprus dispute. This answer proves the initial point of view that has been described above: the weight of the solution is in the hands of Turkey and not in any other politician. The only problem that will be raised is that the change of the leadership of TRNC will delay the process of finding a solution in Cyprus.

According to the last statement about the negotiations, it seems that there is a positive atmosphere from both sides' leaders. Despite the predictions before the elections about Eroglu's actions, it seems that already Eroglu has adapted Ankara's political line. He

agreed that he will continue the negotiations from the point that Talat left it. At the same time he declared that he must fill in the contents of this parameter based on the interests of TRNC and Turkey.[54] Automatically this statement cancels the meaning of the former one. The intentions of Eroglu appear different from his statements. Simultaneously he knows that any wrong decisions in comparison with the uncompromising attitude which characterizes him will cost Turkey membership to the EU. Time will clarify what his real purpose is. It is too early to refer to the results of the Eroglu's election.

Eroglu or Talat, the main point is just one: a new failure to find a solution that achieves the cohabitation of the two communities under the same roof will reopen with the most obvious way the file with alternative's option.[55]

5.2.1 "Time is the worst enemy"

> *H-OG "Only the property issue remains unresolved. All the other problems*
>
> *have been resolved over time"*[56].

> *A-OG: "if the negotiations continue for another ten or twenty years, the new*
>
> *generation will not care, so dichotomy will be a necessarily solution"*[57].

> *B-L: "Now my current life is great. I do not want to change anything. If there is*
>
> *a possibility to have a solution, I will accept it only if it will not affect my life*
>
> *dramatically"*[58].

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[54] Aristos, Aristotelous, "Διαφαινόμενη στρατηγική Έρογλου στο Κυπριακό", Haraugi, 7 August 2010.

[55] Antonis, Poludoras, "Το τέλος του δρόμου στην αναζήτηση ομοσπονδιακής λύσης", Kathimerini, 5 May 2010.

[56] "το μόνο πρόβλημα που υπάρχει είναι το περιουσιακό. Όλα τα υπόλοιπα λύθηκαν με τα χρόνια".

[57] " αν συνεχιστούν οι διαπραγματεύσεις ακόμη 10-20 χρόνια, η νέα γενιά δεν ενδιαφέρεται άρα η διχοτόμηση θα είναι μια λύση ανάγκης".

E-L: "If a dichotomy is what we are in this period in my opinion, I do not have any problem"[59].

There is a common perception that the passage of time created new facts, mostly negative, on both sides. After 1974, Cypriots were trying to accept the new situation of the island; Turkish Cypriots had to get use to the isolation and the full dependence from Turkey and Greek Cypriots to accept that from now on they have to live in a divided country and they would rule only half part of it.

Time probably is the most basic factor which reflects on the Cyprus dispute. As Prof. Mpitsakis referred when there was a chance to resolve the problem between governments (including the Greek one) let the time pass over and as a result the de facto dichotomy of the island came about.[60] Nowadays, the Republic of Cyprus is only responsible for the future of the country. However the Cyprus problem will be resolved when Cyprus and Turkey utilize the benefit of time. It has to be noted that Turkey took advantage of all the chances it had, unlike the Republic of Cyprus[61] which just preferred to convince the international community that they were the victims of the story. As ex-president Vasileiou illustrated "our experience shows while we had the right on our side, it seems that the passage of time was working against us and not in our favor.[62]

Almost all the members of my focus groups agreed that a lot of time has been wasted. New generations realize this deadlock which brought about a dichotomy/taksim

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[58] "αυτή τη στιγμή είμαι μια χαρά και δεν θέλω να αλλάζει η ζωή μου. Αν είναι να βρεθεί μια λύση αλλά δεν θα με επηρεάζει δραματικά, ας βρεθεί".

[59] "Αν η διχοτόμηση είναι το τί ζούμε αυτή τη στιγμή, κατά εμένα δεν έχω κανένα πρόβλημα".

[60] Eutixis, Mpitsakis, "Εθνικισμός και ενδοτισμός: μια πάγια αντίφαση", Eleutherotupia, 28 December 2007.

[61] Ouranios, Ioannides, "Η ειδοποιός διαφορά", Simerini, 24 January 2010.

[62] Giorgos, Vasileiou, "Απάντηση στο διάγγελμα του Τ. Παπαδόπουλου", Hmerisia, 18 April 2004.

and the problem is not only the fact that a lot of time has been spent, but it is wasted without any result. The problem is that under these circumstances TRNC will be recognized as a legal regime and then, the plan of Turkey even before the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus would be completed: taksim!

In this sense, time is absolutely connected with the partition of Cyprus. It seems that this situation is really convenient for some people. Otherwise it cannot be explained how thirty six years have passed without any progress. Status quo was a temporary solution which came to be practical and permanent for everyone: Greek Cypriots control the Greek part even if it is the half of the island, with the impression that they are fighting for the other half part and Turkey and Turkish Cypriots finally create a homogenous population and they obtain the control of the 1/3 of the island.[63] Although the best scenario had been described by Dionusiou objectively; first of all Greek-Cypriots have to stay united. They want a solution! They want a good solution and if someone has to reject it, let Turkey do that.[64]

Furthermore, some members of the focus groups admitted that only the property problem remains unresolved. All other problems have been resolved over time. According to the A-OG's statement above, if there will not be any progress for the next ten or twenty years, dichotomy/taksim would be the only solution that can be provided. All the answers in the focus groups show that dichotomy/taksim is more popular instead of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. All the surveys, including my focus groups illustrate that the present situation is the most acceptable. Especially, Greek Cypriots cannot realize yet that the status quo is against their interest and that they have to work towards a better future. It has to be mentioned that in a survey in 2004 by Alexandros Lordos, a large majority of the

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[63] Makarios, Drousiotis, "Το στάτους κβο σε κρίσιμη κατάσταση", Politis, 29 November 2009.

[64] Dionusis, Dionusiou, "Το Κυπριακό μας βολεύει", Politis, 6 June 2010.

Greek-Cypriots (69% approximately) were clearly opposed to the prospect of a two-state solution. Nevertheless, while the older Greek Cypriots are clearly opposed to a Two-State solution, among the youth there is a strong tendency towards the acceptance of an agreed partition. Only 6 years after that survey, the survey by "Cyprus 2015" organization shows that the new generation has a tendency to say "No" to a future plan but on the other hand they reject the possibility of a permanent status quo or dichotomy.

Based on my research, my informants affiliated with the left party cannot accept dichotomy/taksim as a solution. At the same time, all the other members (older, from the right parties, with or without refugees' parents) seem to prefer the situation as it is right now and they do not mind that it will become a dichotomy. The fear of change is diffused within their hearts. A research after 2004 made by the journalist L. Charalampous turn out that the majority of Greek-Cypriots prefer a dichotomy because is the most suitable solution for them. They do not want any other solution because they are afraid that a change will reflect unfavorably on their personal interests.[65] B-L's statement illustrates exactly what is described above: the solution that she only accepts, it will be the one which can promise no changes to her current life.

Simultaneously, time has another outcome: the first generation of refugees who lived at the occupied Cyprus has stronger feelings to return to their villages. As it concerns the second and the third generation probably the desire of going back will be blunt as the experienced memories will actually be covered by the narrative knowledge and the transfer experienced (Lillikas, 2008: 94). The new generation has no connections with the occupied land in the north. It is like a different country to them. The only things that connect them to the place are the memories from their parents or grand-parents, nothing more.

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[65] Loukas, Charalampous, "Η διχοτόμηση που βολεύει", Politis, 4 October 2009.

To conclude, Cypriots must accept that the status quo is not a solution. The continuity of the dispute means automatically the loss of the other half of the island permanently. Ideas such as E-L's statement above have to be erased. What Cypriots have now, cannot be compared with dichotomy/taksim. The results of dichotomy will be obvious in both sides. A conciliatory federal solution will be the only possibility to stop dichotomy which unavoidably, after some years, will change the date of the population also converting Cypriots to a minority.[66]

People start to act prudently when they run out of any other possibility. In Cyprus, some of the politicians and journalists seem to still believe there is time to act like this. They did not realize that there are no other opportunities. Time is very valuable and the international community has become exhausted from this dispute. Even the politicians of this country are tired. Comments from the focus groups such as: "I do not care"[67], "they will make us out to be desperate and in the end we will prefer a dichotomy"[68], "I got bored from the Cyprus problem[69]" describe clearly the intention of Greek Cypriot youngsters in my focus groups. So, Cypriots in general have to think seriously what is the best solution for them. This problem has to end and it has to end with the desirable effect.

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[66] Menelaos, Avraam, "Ένωση, Ανεξαρτησία, Διχοτόμηση", Kathimerini, 6 December 2009.

[67] "Δεν με ενδιαφέρει".

[68] "Θα μας κάνουν να αγανακτήσουμε και να θέλουμε στο τέλος διχοτόμηση".

[69] "Βαρέθηκα το Κυπριακό".

5.2.2 A great opportunity had been missed or a better solution will come?

> *E-F: "We have just been released from an opportunity of a dysfunctional*
>
> *state"* [70].
>
> *B-R: "An opportunity had been missed and it will be released some*
>
> *years later, as it happened also with the Gali ideas* [71].
>
> *E-OG: "The Annan Plan was about compromises that we are not ready*
>
> *to accept"* [72].

As the years are passing by, the question remains the same: was the last plan the greatest opportunity for the island? There was a rumor that the Annan Plan would be the last effort for a solution where the UN will be involved. As it seems, six years later, that was just a rumor. They are still in Cyprus and they are trying to help the two communities find an agreement.

Looking at the results from my focus groups most of my informants (except some from the group of the right party and the group of older people which appeared to be more nationalists) agreed that an opportunity had been missed in 2004. The argument was if the Annan Plan was our greatest opportunity for a solution or as E-F characterized it, it was an opportunity of a dysfunctional state.

Furthermore, according to B-R's statement above, the given opportunity will be released again later, probably with a different name, but still based on the Annan Plan, as it

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[70] "γλυτώσαμε από μια ευκαιρία κάποιου δυσλειτουργικού νέου κράτους".

[71] "χάθηκε μια ευκαιρία και αυτό το πράγμα όπως είπαν για τις ιδέες Γκάλι, το ίδιο πράγμα θα φτάσουν να λένε και για το σχέδιο Ανάν".

[72] "Το σχέδιο Ανάν ήταν θέμα υποχωρήσεων που εμείς δεν ήμασταν έτοιμοι να δεχτούμε".

happened with the Gali ideas. The 5th Annan Plan has a lot of disadvantages but admittedly it was a plan that can accomplish some of the needs of Cypriots.

Nowadays, the expression "every new plan is worse than the last one[73]" has become like a political movement. Presently, no one believes that the leader of the Republic of Cyprus can find a solution that will satisfy most of the citizens of this country. As one of my participants (E-OG) quoted the Annan Plan was about compromises that Cypriots are not ready to accept. However, there are some optimistic who believe that a better plan will come soon. But is it that ideal which led us 36 years without a solution? Sometimes it may sounds utopian for a result Greek-Cypriots must reject any kind of a plan which does not fall within their guidelines. It is all about compromises. How many compromises you are ready to accept?

If the leaders could determine their opinion, it might be easier for the people to decide what they really want because if they do not know what they want, it will be difficult to understand what plan is an opportunity or a tragedy. Nothing can be decided the way it was. History will show if the Annan Plan was a plan that can leave Cypriots happy and satisfied that they received what they so desired.

The only good thing from the missed opportunity was that for the first time Cypriots started behaving as one. A chance has been lost but Cypriots are still there waiting at the table. If there is a will, they can persuade a better future for this little island. A simple solution may be found only when the people support all of these efforts.

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[73] "κάθε σχέδιο και χειρότερο".

5.3.1 Unequal development of the communities

Z-R: "If I was for twenty-five years in an embargo, I would want also a

solution to be found, to feel free again" [74].

A-R: "They are gypsies because their houses are fit to drop but at the

same time every house has a satellite" [75].

E-F: "It gave me the impression that they are really underdeveloped" [76].

Differences between the two communities were created even before the Republic of Cyprus. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim elite of the island worked in agriculture unlike the "Christians" who were using commerce (Kizilyurek, 1999: 83). As a result, Greek-Cypriots in 1960's they were wealthy unlike Turkish-Cypriots who could not play an important role within the economy of Cyprus.

However, in order to be objective, it has to be clarified that the big distinction between the communities came after 1974. Two different people, two different parts are living in the same island but as it turns out that they grew up under completely dissimilar conditions and incidents. Greek Cypriots have to accept the consequences of the war and Turkish Cypriots the embargo.

In my research, a lot of times, some of the participants criticized the Turkish-Cypriot's way of living. Adjectives like "gypsy" and "mucky" could not be avoided in the discussion. They cannot or they do not want to understand that the last 25 years, Turkish-Cypriots are under the embargo. They cannot import or export anything. The Z-R's statement illustrates clearly the reason that Turkish-Cypriots wanted the Annan Plan to be

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[74] "Αν ήμουν κι εγώ 25 χρόνια σε εμπάργκο, θα ήθελα κι εγώ να βρεθεί μια λύση, να είμαι ελεύθερος".

[75] "Είναι γύφτοι γιατί τα σπίτια τους είναι ετοιμόρροπα αλλά έχουν δορυφορικές όλα τα σπίτια".

[76] "Μου δημιούργησε την εντύπωση ότι πράγματι είναι λίγο πίσω από τον κόσμο".

accepted. The twenty five years under the embargo are enough to make Turkish-Cypriots to prefer any solution of the Cyprus problem. They want to feel free again. Nevertheless, some of my participants wanted to highlight the Turkish-Cypriot "dirtiness". According to A-R's statement above, they are gypsies because their houses are fit to drop but at the same time every house has a satellite. Almost the same comment has been stated by E-F. He was shocked because the animals were in the house. Even his grandfather 30-40 years ago did not have the animals in the house. This picture made him to believe that they are really underdeveloped.

As Mintsis described the two communities are like day and night. The Republic of Cyprus controls only the south part of the island. It is distinguished by national homogeneity, a democratic political system, respect for human rights and a developed economy. On the other hand, in the North there is not a national and cultural homogeneity, not even a democratic political system. Actually there is an active role of Turkey in their politics. In addition, it appears that there is violation of human rights and an underdeveloped economy of which 100% mirrors that of Turkey. It has to be mentioned again that after the military intervention/ invasion the international community decided TRNC to be in an embargo but it was not the only reason which made the situation much harder for Turkish-Cypriots' economy (2006: 46-47).

Undoubtedly, today the differences are even bigger than before. Greek-Cypriots managed to handle the bad effects of the war and they got back on their feet. At the same time Turkish-Cypriots have been appeased, as the motherland Turkey takes care of them. In fact, the opening of the crossing points in 2003 was a source of a salvation to the north. People started to have contact with "the other" and start hoping for a better future. This has been proven also to the Annan Plan, as they had voted for more than 65% of the TRNC's popular "Yes vote". Now, there is a booming economy, and the situation has been

improved. Tassos Papadopoulos repeatedly was saying that they need about ten years to reach the economy of the Republic of Cyprus.[77] The ugly truth is that they have already accomplished the proportional economy, and they have done the substructure in order to achieve further development in the future i.e. casinos, five star hotels, since basically the economy of Cyprus is based on the tourism.

As concerns the population, there was a big change in the north. After 1974, Turkey followed a program of settlement in the occupied land and as a result Turkish Cypriots have become a minority in their own part. According to the government census, Turkish Cypriots before 1974 were 120.000, namely 18% of the population. Logically today the population should have been 180-200.000, instead of that the population in the north is estimated to be 300.000 (Lillikas: 2008: 56). According to Serdar Denktas, the settlers are double arithmetically from Turkish-Cypriots (9 July 2010). They have been a minority and the worst part is that now the settlers can vote, so they are the ones who can do whatever their want. Turkish-Cypriot's opinion cannot be heard. Now the benefits of the settlers rule in TRNC's political system.

These are the life-time experiences that the youth were receiving the last few years. Greek-Cypriots do not care about politics as they have an assured future and Turkish Cypriots want to collaborate with Greek-Cypriots in order to get their lives back. Certainly, there is a necessity for a change in both communities' mentality if they really want to find a solution. From time to time the economy of Cyprus can change as it is not as stable as the other countries. This case has to puzzle each Cypriot who feels comfortable with the present situation.

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[77] Giagkos, Mikellides, "Ιδού η Ρόδος, ιδού και το πήδημα", Politis, 15 May 2010.

5.3.2 Wealth of Greek-Cypriots

Γ-F: "They gave us money and the wealth caused us considerable

impairment to our social and political matters"[78].

The Republic of Cyprus has made a miraculous and remarkably fast recovery from the turmoil that rocked the country during the 1970s (Etincoff, 2006: 31). The economic miracle of the Republic of Cyprus can be explained under theories of social psychology. It is rational that people, who are in danger of their survival from another more powerful country, build a kind of "psychology defence" which has a resultant express economical improvement in order to balance the asymmetric threat from the powerful enemy (Mintsis, 2006: 20).

The truth is that Greek-Cypriots worked hard to change the situation. It would be impossible though, without taking financial assistance from external factors. After the endless annotations about "the ambient atmosphere", it arose that Cyprus was taking money from USA in order to cover the expenses for refugees, hospitals and development projects.[79] Even under these circumstances, it cannot be denied that Greek Cypriots worked hard to change their futures.

However, reaching 2010, it seems that the new generation has its future under control and ceased to deal with the Cyprus dispute. As Γ-F statement above, the wealth of the Greek-Cypriot part caused impairment to the society. The percentages of the youth's abstinence in politics are really high and it is about time to reconsider. They inherited a world without ethics and in the end the only thing that it is really matters is money. It seems they became educated people without an opinion, without beliefs, without any

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[78] "Μας έδωσαν χρήματα και η ευημερία έφερε αδιαφορία στα κοινωνικά και κοινωνικά ζητήματα".

[79] Makarios, Drousiotis, "Μαύρα δολάριο ή μαύρη προπαγάνδα?", Politis, 10 August 2008.

standards. The only thing which they believe, if they believe in anything, is money. People admire the rich and the powerful and at the same time mock the poor and the weak.[80]

Cyprus dispute is not a problem for the youth. As it seems from the focus groups, they are not interested about the problem of their country. They have better things to do rather the solution that it must be found. They have been raised so well and in the end they forgot that half a part of their country is occupied. Any kind of a solution does not make any difference to them. In the short-term, they do not have anything to earn from a new situation. This status is confirmed also from CYMAR, KADEM's survey which shows that Greek-Cypriots youth are less enthusiastic about a settlement than their parents, insofar as the future is "already open to them" while they do not experience their parents' nostalgia about lost villages and properties (2006). A solution will change the system and probably they will get into useless trouble. That is another reason why the new generation prefers a dichotomy. Leaving things as they are right now will not affect their lives.

The ancestors of Greek-Cypriots wanted to forget the bad outcome of the war. They set up the society in a way that they can erase the memories of 1974 and move forward. However, there was an unexpected result. Wealth and happiness filled the hearts of young people and now there is no place for any worries. There is no need for something new which can change and actually disturb their lives. Melina Merkouri[81], a great Greek politician declared that culture is as important as the military defence.[82] In Cyprus, who can anyone understand that statement when the only thing that matters is how to gain more money?

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[80] Giagkos, Mikellides, "Οι θλιβερές επιλογές", Politis, 13 September 2009.

[81] The first female Minister for Culture.

[82] Panikkos, Chrusanthou, "Το μόνο πράγμα που μπορούμε να πουλήσουμε είναι η καρδιά μας", Eleutherotupia, 6 September 2006.

The direct connection between money and solution can be described when someone asks if Greek-Cypriots want a solution. Some romantic minority will answer with their hand on the heart that they want a solution as soon as possible. All the others, with their hands in their pockets will do the financial balance sheet before they will make their decisions (Dionusiou, 6 June 2010: 4). A possible solution will be achieved when people stop referring to that as an economical problem to which Cypriots have to find the appropriate solution. And if the older people cannot change, it is time for the new generation to seize the opportunity (Carpe Diem) and to create new conditions of their lives.

5.3.3 Unfortunate by their own responsibilities

Γ-R "All these years they are focusing on who was responsible instead of

who would find a solution"[83].

Under the framework of finding a fair solution, it would be more correct for each party to think over its responsibility about the Cyprus dispute. Greek-Cypriots grew up with the feeling of injustice and all these years they were trying to convince the international community that the responsibility for the tragedy of 1974 lay with Turkey and its aims. They wanted to appear to the international community as angels who they did not do anything wrong and they are completely innocent as with concerns to the Turkish military intervention/invasion.

Nobody has been taught that in a situation like this, both parts are responsible, directly or indirectly. Hiding behind the results of the occupation does not automatically means that the junta or the coup d'état are not responsible as well. It was a period (with

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[83] "Επικέντρωσαν μας τόσα χρόνια στο ποιός φταίει. Όχι στο ποιός θα βρει την λύση".

unpleasant consequences) where everyone was trying to ensure its benefits with Cyprus. Now is not the right time to be silent. It is time to take responsibility. It is time to tell the truth without evasion.[84] Someone has to clarify to the public the facts which led to a divided Cyprus. That probably will cost him or his party but at least he will gain respect from the citizens of Cyprus. It is not a coincidence that in 60 years of the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, there is not one politician who admitted fault and accepted the responsibility for his actions. Instead of this, the same politicians are ruling the island without remorse.

A leftist participant in the focus groups (Γ-F) reminded the group the necessity of misidentification with Nikos Kazantzakis[85]' words:

> *"You have to love the responsibility. You have to say that your duty is to save*
>
> *the world by yourself. If it will not rescue, I will be the only one who is*
>
> *responsible."[86]*

Nevertheless, at schools Greek-Cypriots have been taught with texts which actually rehearse facts from the Asia Minor Catastrophe's period and the enmity between the two countries, texts that described Turks as an unquestioning nation who are only responsible for the Cyprus issue.

Although, the results from the Cyprus 2015' survey are encouraging it appears that Greek-Cypriots are accepting that both communities have made mistakes in the past. 49% declared that this statement is absolutely correct and another 38% answered that they somehow agree. The 4% who disagree completely probably consist of the nationalists who

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[84] Christos, Georgiou, "Χρίστος Στυλιανίδης: Στήνεται σκηνικό διχασμού του λαού", Politis, 20 September 2009.

[85] One of the most important and most translated Greek writer and philosopher of the 20th century.

[86] "Να αγαπάς την ευθύνη. Να λες εγώ μονάχος μου έχω χρέος να σώσω τη γη. Άμα δεν σωθεί εγώ θα φταίω". Νίκος Καζαντζάκης.

do not accept and blame regarding the situation. It is about time Cypriots took off the blinkers in order to compromise the mistakes that each community has made.

As the young boy reminded to the group Kazantzakis' words, Γ-R realized that for all these years they are focusing on who was responsible instead of who would find a solution. Blaming "the other" has to be stopped and use this energy to achieve a better possible solution for the island.

5.4   The accession of Cyprus to the European Union

B-F "It is better to belong to a big union instead of fighting alone for its

rights"[87]

H-NR "They made him believe that he was safe whereas in his opinion it is a

feigned security that is theirs"[88].

The European Union represents the most powerful endeavor of the European nations for development, reconciliation and progress. The European Union is a continent with many different traditions and languages but with shared values such as democracy, freedom and social justice; cherished values well known to North Americans. Indeed, the European Union motto is "United in Diversity" (Etingoff, 2006:9).

Cyprus officially applied for membership to the EU in 1990. However, EU was not sure if the accession of Cyprus was a good choice, mostly because of the Cyprus question. Europeans had strong reservations among member states over admitting Cyprus because they did not want any state to join the EU with serious unresolved political problems.[89]

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[87] "Καλύτερα να ανήκεις σε ένα μεγάλο οργανισμό παρά μια πέτρα μόνη της στη Μεσόγειο".

[88] "Μας έκαναν να πιστεύουμε ότι έχουμε ασφάλεια ενώ στην πραγματικότητα κατά τη γνώμη τη δική μου έχουμε μια εικονική ασφάλεια".

[89] Philippos, Savvides, "Η Κύπρος από τους Αδέσμευτους στην Ε.Ε", To Vima, 11 May 2007.

According to Loizides, EU engagement in Cyprus has been based on the expectations that Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots on the one hand, and Greece and Greek-Cypriots on the other, would cooperate in reaching a settlement, without one side being held hostage by the intransigence of the other. Although, it was extremely important, a settlement was not a precondition for admitting Cyprus into the EU (2002: 429-442). Yet, it is not a coincidence, that the time that the Annan Plan was thought to be accepted, the Secretary-General proclaimed that intention and all the other who did not want Cyprus to join the EU. The aim of this "timing" was obviously a way of pressure towards the Greek-Cypriot part in order to accept the plan (Aimiliades et al, 2003:149).

Finally on 1ˢᵗ of May 2004 Cyprus joined EU without any problem. The dominant rumor, that Cyprus would not join the EU if it would not find a solution seemed to be incorrect. The fake dilemma of "solution and accession or no solution-no accession" proved that it was also a check-mate in the game of politics. Despite all of these intrigues, Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan but eventually the rejection did not reflect the accession to the EU.

The fact that Cyprus became a full member of the EU is characterized as the biggest political achievement of the governments of Nicosia and Athens since the catastrophe in 1974. However the atmosphere is not so optimistic for Turkey's ambitious desire to join the EU. It appears that Turkey and its allies are more important to Europe instead of the problematic Cyprus issue. The EU had been founded in order to create a positive spirit among the countries after the wars. Even if they were trying too hard, it was too difficult for each country to forget its interests and act as a real union. The predisposition of the EU to continue punishing Cyprus about the rejection of the Annan plan in 2004 is reflected in many ways. It is ready to find a way to resolve the dispute without concern for the cost.

The point of the EU is that every little state has equal rights with the bigger ones. Although, Cyprus realizes that even if it is an equal member, it cannot act by itself alone. For instance, as President Christofias noticed if Cyprus, or even Greece, used a veto against Turkey's accession then the only thing that they would accomplish is the opposition of the other 25 members (Sofokleous, 2009). The only way out of this deadlock is for Cyprus to start making allies within the EU. The developing partnerships within the European Union will give her the chance to balance the British interests with her own.

Before the accession of Cyprus to the EU, a lot of scenarios had been reported about the benefits that Cyprus would obtain. Six years after the accession, it is not clear to the people the benefits that they would gain after becoming members of the EU. Nevertheless, it is of concern that Cyprus, as a full member of the EU, will be helped in order to find a solution for the Cyprus dispute. The most important though is the safety that the EU can offer, now that Cyprus is signed as European territory. Any foreign intervention in the territory of Cyprus will be considered interference on European soil. The power that Cyprus earned from joining the EU and also the start of Turkey's negotiations to join the EU brought forward a path to assist the efforts to resolve the Cyprus question.

According to my research, when the participants of the focus groups were asked in what extent they feel secure as European citizens, almost all the participants in the focus groups have given the same answer; they feel more secure because if Turkey wants to interfere again, it has to think it twice.[90] It is also obvious that the females in the groups are expressing their feelings in favour of EU intensely unlike the most of the men who agreed with B-F's statement above. He believes that it is better to be a member of a big union instead of being alone and trying to survive by yourself. The answer of H-NR which is

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[90] "Αν μη τι άλλο η Τουρκία θα σκεφτεί διπλά αν θα επέμβει ή αν θα κάνει οτιδήποτε στην Κύπρο ξανά".

illustrated above was also astonishing. He noticed that joining the EU, it would be safer but in the end, there is only a feigned security.

Furthermore, the leftist's men of the groups seemed that they did not ever feel that they were in danger, so they cannot think of the EU's benefits. It has to be mentioned that the left party AKEL was against the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

According to the survey by UNFICYP, Cypriots were asked the same question. 49% of Greek-Cypriots answered "somewhat secure" and another 29% feel very secure. In addition, the latest survey "Youth in Cyprus" illustrated 63% of Greek-Cypriots either agree or strongly agree that the overall Cyprus' accession to the EU is a positive step for its people. At the same time Greek-Cypriots seemed to be skeptical as to whether or not the EU represented the guarantee of lasting peace.

"It is better to be like Ireland instead of Iceland"[91] (Papademetriou, 2009). This is the prevailing motto in Brussels about Cyprus. The bankruptcy in Iceland showed the power of belonging to an organization like EU and EMU. It appears that the economical crisis all over the world would have radical effects in Cyprus if it did not enter the EMU as well.

As already noted, EU has the power and the means to support Cypriots to find a solution. Nothing can be done though, if the direct interested parts will not help the situation, especially the Republic of Cyprus which is a full and equal member of the EU. The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 in conjunction with Turkey's own European ambitions created new dimensions to the Cyprus questions (Theophanous, 2009) and the leadership has to take advantage of this new opportunity. Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots must evaluate the accession of Cyprus correctly and take the last chance. They have to "find" a common European future in order to resolve the problem. It is

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[91] "Καλύτερα να είσαι Ιρλανδία παρά Ισλανδία".

obvious that only under the EU's umbrella can a solution be found. The two communities

must collaborate in order to coexist peacefully in a United European state.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis is to understand the youth's dispositions or preparedness for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. In order to explain their intentions, I tried to analyze their way of thinking, through a great deal of factors, according to their answers in my focus groups. The idea for this topic arose when I was accepted for the MA in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. Many times I found myself having to explain to my friends the reasons why I have chosen to study here in Istanbul. At that time I realized that the Greek-Cypriot youth is not as open-minded as I had previously thought it to be. It was a dangerous challenge for me to achieve writing this thesis with that title because is actually included me as an informant.

Using the focus groups as a research method, I achieve results from their beliefs regarding the Cyprus dispute. Though understanding their feelings and at times their somewhat pessimistic viewpoints towards reconciliation, I gained worthy research material for my thesis.

The new generation grew up in a divided island. The de facto division helped for the creation of nationalism. It is not a mere coincidence that most people in the focus groups declared that they were expecting the Turkish-Cypriots to look like aliens.

It is significant that the form of nationalism in the new generation of Greek-Cypriots follows the differences of the two biggest political parties AKEL and DISI: youth who are affiliated with the right party support the Greek ideals unlike the youth

who are affiliated with the left party who support the Republic of Cyprus – discarding anything that is Greek.

Nevertheless, it is still a puzzle to the Greek-Cypriot community that there are some people who believe and want Turkish-Cypriots on the island. Greek-Cypriots have never accepted the existence of Turkish-Cypriots to live on the island. In 1963 the conflict started from the fact that the Greek-Cypriots believed that Turkish-Cypriots were a minority and that they did not deserve to have equal rights with them. In 2010, it seems that there are some single cases which still refuse the Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Although it is not possible to make a generalization still what appears from my focus groups gives us clues for further research.

First of all, Cypriots have to accept the whole situation with the advantages and disadvantages if they want to create the feeling of tolerance. My findings showed that young from the left parties have been prepared more than the others concerning the co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots. Besides, AKEL was the first party which used the motto: "Turkish-Cypriots are our brothers[92]".

Unfortunately, Greek-Cypriot's ancestors took care of ingraining their hearts with enmity against the Turkish-Cypriots. Sometimes people cannot understand the difference between Turk and Turkish-Cypriot, not even the youth. I think that the new generation is pretending that it cannot see the truth but at the same time it argues about the prefix "pseudo" that Greek-Cypriots use when they want to refer to something in the North. Yet, it is not clear because during the focus groups there were

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[92] "Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι είναι αδέρφια μας."

people who asked me to stop using "pseudo" and at the same time some others who expected me to correct the word by using it.

How can you be open-minded when the only thing that you are learning at school is how barbaric the Turks were to your predecessors? Almost all the groups illustrated that all of them, directly or indirectly, have been affected from the stories that they had been taught at school. There is a necessity for all the books to be changed as soon as possible. It has to be re-written again, without changing history. The facts can be described objectively and the books can be referred to Greek-Cypriot's mistakes as well. Greek-Cypriots cannot be the victims all the time however there are errors on both sides.

Most of the problems between the two communities can be resolved practically. For instance, if you have a Turkish-Cypriot as a neighbour, you will have a relationship with him, whether it be a typical or an atypical relationship. Only one person announced that she did not want to have a Turkish-Cypriot neighbour because she purposefully wanted to avoid any kind of a relationship with a Turkish-Cypriot. This statement should be changed. I also agreed with the people who believed that the idea of "the others" can be demolished after a meeting and a dialogue with the opposite side. There are nationalists within both communities. The point is to put these voices in a margin and not the opposite.

Beyond the rejection of the Annan Plan, a lot of characteristics of Greek-Cypriots can be found. A Plan with almost ten thousand pages has to be problematic. Moreover, the new generation seems to be confused about the Annan Plan. A big percentage of participants from the focus groups did not know the meaning of a Bi-

zonal, Bi-communal Federation. The fact that there was not sufficient information is true but the superfluous number of pages of the plan cannot be ignored.

It is of importance to note the comment made by the A-NR about the predictable results of the Annan Plan. He illustrated that the proportion of the people who reject the plan was the same proportion of the political parties which supported to vote "No". I have to confess that I had not thought about the results from that point of view until after hearing his comment. I knew that Greek-Cypriots at every age follow their political parties. However I assumed that in a crucial decision such as this that every person would decide according to his/her criteria. As it seems no one voted rationally. They just followed their political parties' decision. Even if some of them had doubts unfortunately Tassos Papadopoulos' speech convinced everybody that they had to reject the plan.

The role of Mass Media in Cyprus was and still is powerful. The problem is that nowadays the media does not so much inform its audiences about the news, but they produce news. The difference between those is that in the first case they just describe the event as it is but in the second, they modulate the news according to their own interests.

As Z-NR stated, the Annan Plan was an opportunity which was missed but it was unfavorable opportunity so it does not matter that it had been missed. I want a better solution and I believe that something better will come[93]. It is realized that now it is more difficult with Christofias and Eroglu in charge but probably the UN will push both sides to agree on a solution. However, there will not be a great number of

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[93] "Μια ευκαιρία χάθηκε αλλά την βλέπω σαν δυσμενή ευκαιρία άρα δεν πειράζει που χάθηκε. Θέλω κάτι καλύτερο και πιστεύω ότι θα έρθει κάτι καλύτερο".

changes. It cannot be expected to be in full favour of the Greek-Cypriot community. As A-OG clarifies it is to what extent you are ready to compromise. Unfortunately, Greek-Cypriots believe that compromise looks and feels like surrender.

As it was analyzing the data from my focus groups, I focused on different factors which my informants verified the Greek-Cypriot's behavior. First of all, once again was that Cypriots cannot decide about their future without following their political house's belief. The new generation can understand that they have to eliminate this dependency with the political party but on the other hand it seems that they are also just following their political leaders' opinion.

Another problem is that the politicians will never risk their careers over the Cyprus question. They know that it needs only one wrong action to change them to bad politicians. The Cyprus dispute is like a double-edged sword: it can easily take the politicians to the top but it is even more easily able to destroy them.

The worst enemy of the problem however is the fight against time. Time has brought with it a great deal of problems as it makes for a permanent de facto division between the two communities. The new generation has been raised in that situation. If it is to continue like then, then the youth will be interested to change the facts so that a dichotomy will be the only solution. Young people have accepted the Cyprus problem for what it is and they do not care to do anything to change it. Unfortunately the well being of the Greek-Cypriot community did not help the Greek-Cypriot youth to understand that they have more things to gain if the island is not divided into two.

No one has learnt how to take responsibility. Both sides have made a lot of mistakes. If the Greek-Cypriot youth cannot compromise with their own mistakes

then it is useless to try to reconcile with Turkish-Cypriots. It is time to stop blaming "the others" for the present situation. Greek-Cypriots are as much responsible as "the others" regarding the Cyprus dispute.

The accession of Cyprus to the EU, while it was expected that it will change the situation, my data showed that they do not believe that the EU will help Cyprus to find a solution. Nothing has been changed from 2004. Nevertheless, most people in the groups and especially the females highlighted that the EU is not the NATO but it is still an organization which can offer help should it be needed.

During the focus groups we did not skip a discussion about the difference between Talat and Eroglu. Some of them did not know who Eroglu was (the focus groups took place one week before the elections). The participants, who knew about Eroglu, illustrated that Eroglu is more nationalist so it would be more difficult to agree with Christofias for a solution. But Ankara is the main factor. If Turkey joins the EU, it would not try anything that would cause the rejection of a future plan.

The results of my own research showed that there are not big differences between the participants in the focus groups except from those who are affiliated by their political view. Greek-Cypriot youths have to understand that the Cyprus problem cannot be resolved by only one person or one political party. Every angle of the dispute is a national issue. There is a necessity for a collective claim with the intention of a desirable solution in the end.

The last of my focus groups did not have any specific characteristic excepting that the participants were older than the others. Their points of view were black and white but also far more nationalistic. I cannot give an explanation for this but I can

only assume that as someone uses informants older than the previous generations, the fanaticism and the nationalism will be expressed strongly and with far more vehemence.

In addition, when I decided how the groups were to be divided, I did not think that the dimension of gender would be important. One of the findings that I did not focus in depth but it is important for future research is gender, as in my focus groups the females have chosen not to care about the political functions. They did not wish to have a voice in the political sphere or to share the views of hundreds of others for the betterment of the community. They only wanted to express their thoughts and feelings when it came to everyday issues in general.

According to my focus groups, Greek-Cypriot youth feel powerless to make any changes toward the Cyprus question. They seem to forget that small actions can bring about major changes to the world. They just have to take advantage of the opportunities and to become a driving force in building bridges between the two communities which, although live separately still have a lot of common bonds. As the Greek-Cypriot new generation begins to communicate with each other, the acceptance of the co-existence will be a natural and healthy progression into the future.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Participants Profile by Group

Participant Information			
Groups	Age (years old)	Sex (**F**emale/**M**ale)	Occupation
1 - F			
A	23	M	Student
B	24	M	Unemployed
Γ	24	M	Student
Δ	23	F	Student
E	26	M	Lawyer
Z	24	M	Student
H	25	M	Student
2 - R			
A	23	F	Student
B	23	M	Student
Γ	25	M	Hostess
Δ	24	F	Speech Therapist
E	25	F	Student
Z	26	F	Student
H	24	F	Stewardess
Θ	24	F	Student
3 - L			
A	25	M	Student
B	24	F	Student
Γ	24	M	Unemployed

Δ	25	M	Trainer
E	27	F	Accountant
Z	26	M	Teacher
H	24	M	Student
4 - NR			
A	21	M	Student
B	22	M	Student
Γ	23	F	Land Estimator
Δ	25	M	Student
E	24	M	Shop Assistant
Z	24	M	Estate agent
H	24	M	Private Employee
Θ	23	F	Student
5 - OG			
A	29	F	Teacher
B	27	M	Musician
Γ	28	M	Private Employee
Δ	28	M	Accountant
E	29	F	Lawyer
Z	28	F	Chemical Engineer
H	28	M	Civil Engineer
Total : 37			

Group 1 – F = Participants with refugee parents

Group 2 – R = Participants affiliated to the Right parties (i.e. DISI and DIKO)

Group 3 – L = Participants affiliated to the Left parties (i.e. AKEL and EDEK)

Group 4 – NR = Participants with not refugee's parents

Group 5 – OG = Participants older than the others (average 28) without any specific characteristics

Appendix 2: Focus group's questions (in Greek)

1. Καθημερινά ακούμε στις ειδήσεις ότι η λύση του Κυπριακού θα είναι βασισμένη στη διζωνική, δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία. Σε ποιό βαθμό γνωρίζετε τις έννοιες αυτές; Έχετε υπόψη τι σημαίνει η κάθε μία ξεχωριστά;

2. Αν είχες να διαλέξεις μεταξύ διζωνικής, δικοινοτικής ομοσπονδίας ή διχοτόμηση, τί θα προτιμούσες;

3. Μετά την ένταξη της Κύπρου στην Ε.Ε, νοιώθεις ότι έχει αλλάξει κάτι; Για παράδειγμα αισθάνεσαι πιο ασφαλής; ότι κάποιος θα σε προστατεύσει ενάντια στους Τ/Κ και κατ' επέκταση την Τουρκία;

4. Σ' αρέσει η πολιτική κατάσταση της Κύπρου έτσι όπως είναι σήμερα;(Στάσιμη, μοιρασμένη στα 2)

5. Σας ενδιαφέρει να βρεθεί λύση στο Κυπριακό;

6. Πιστεύεις ότι μπορούμε να ζήσουμε αρμονικά μετά από ένα σχέδιο λύσης; (Κάτω από ποιές συνθήκες;)

7. Πιστεύεις ότι οι ηγέτες των 2 κοινοτήτων μπορούν να βρουν λύση (ή οι διαπραγματεύσεις ρίχνουν στάκτη στα μάτια μας;)

8. Βάσει σημερινών δεδομένων τί θα απαντούσατε σε ένα μελλοντικό ανάλογο σχέδιο λύσης; Ποιά θα ήταν τα κριτήρια που θα παίρνατε την οποιαδήποτε απάντηση;

9. Ποιά πιστεύετε θα είναι η αντίδραση των Ε/Κ σε ένα οποιονδήποτε επόμενο σχέδιο; (Υπάρχει η θέληση να λυθεί;)

10. Έχετε διαβάσει ποτέ το σχέδιο Ανάν ή έστω μέρος αυτού; Ποιά είναι τα συμπεράσματά σας;

11. Υπάρχει κάποιο ιδιαίτερο σημείο που πιστεύεις ότι το σχέδιο Ανάν ήταν προβληματικό και λόγω αυτού απορρίφθηκε ή θεωρείς ότι όλο το σχέδιο ήταν ένα χάος;

12. Ποιός θεωρείτε ήταν ο κυριότερος λόγος που το σχέδιο Ανάν απορρίφθηκε με πάνω από 75% από την Ε/Κ κοινότητα;

13. Μετά από 6 χρόνια ποιά είναι τα σχόλια σας για το σχέδιο Ανάν; Χάσαμε μια μεγάλη ευκαιρία επίλυσης του Κυπριακού;

14. Θεωρείς ότι οι Τ/Κ θέλουν να βρεθεί λύση μεταξύ των δύο κοινοτήτων;

15. Έχεις μιλήσει/συναντηθεί ποτέ με Τ/Κ; Ποιά ήταν τα συναισθήματά σου; (ένιωσες έστω και μια στιγμή ότι είναι ο εχθρός σου;)

16. Πιστεύεις ότι μπορείς να ζήσεις μαζί με τους Τ/Κ;Να υπάρξει αμοιβαία εμπιστοσύνη;

17. Έχεις επισκεφθεί ποτέ τα κατεχόμενα; Αν ναι, τί εντυπώσεις σου έμειναν κι αν όχι για ποιό λόγο δεν τα επισκέφθηκες ακόμη;

18. Στις 18 Απριλίου είναι οι εκλογές των Τ/Κ. Σε ποιό βαθμό πιστεύεις ότι επηρεάζεται η Ε/Κ πλευρά αν ο Έρογλου (υποψήφιος του εθνικιστικού κόμματος)κερδίσει τις εκλογές;

Appendix 3: Focus Group's questions (translated in English)

1. Every day we hear on the news that the solution of the Cyprus problem will be based on the Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation. To what extend are you familiar with these concepts? Do you have in mind what does each one separately means?

2. If you had to choose between Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation or dichotomy, what would you prefer?

3. After the accession of Cyprus in the EU, do you feel that something has changed? For example, do you fell more secure that someone will protect you against the Turkish-Cypriots and in projection Turkey?

4. Do you like the political situation of Cyprus as it is today? (Stagnant, divided in two parts)

5. Are you interested for a solution to be found to the Cyprus problem?

6. Do you believe that we can live harmonically after a plan for the solution? (Under what circumstances?)

7. Do you believe that the leaders of both communities can find a solution? Or do the negotiations throw ash in our eyes?

8. Based on today's facts, what would you vote for a future appropriate plan to be the solution of Cyprus? What would be your criteria which you would consider for any decision?

9. Which do you believe, will be the reaction of the Greek-Cypriots to any next plan? (is there a strong demand for a solution?)

10. Have you ever read the Annan Plan or any part of it? What is your conclusion?

11. Is there any specific point that you believe that the Annan Plan was problematic and it is for this reason that it was rejected? Or do you consider that the whole plan was a mess?

12. Which do you consider that was the main reason for which the Annan Plan was rejected with more than 75% of the Greek-Cypriot community?

13. After six years, what are your comments about the Annan Plan? did we really loose a great chance for the solution of the Cyprus problem?

14. Do you consider that the Turkish-Cypriots want a solution to be found between the two communities?

15. Have you ever spoken/met with a Turkish-Cypriot? What were your feelings? (Did you feel at any moment that s/he is your enemy?)

16. Do you believe that you can live together with the Turkish-Cypriot? Can be created a mutual trust?

17. Did you ever visit the occupied areas? If Yes, what was your impression and if not what was the reason that you did not visit it until now?

18. On 18th April the elections of Turkish-Cypriots will take place. To what extend do you believe that the elections affect the Greek-Cypriot side, if Mr. Eroglu (candidate of the Nationalistic Party) wins the elections?

Appendix 4: Resolution 353/1974.

Adopted by the Security Council

20th July 1974

<u>The Security Council</u>,

<u>Having</u> considered the report of the Secretary-General, at its 1779th meeting, about the recent developments in Cyprus,

<u>Having</u> heard the statement of the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the statements of the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other Member States,

<u>Noting</u> also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

<u>Deeply</u> deploring the outbreak of violence and the continuing bloodshed,

<u>Gravely</u> concerned about the situation which has led to a serious threat to international peace and security, and which has created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area,

<u>Equally</u> concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreements,

<u>Conscious</u> of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. <u>Calls upon</u> all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

2. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

3. Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above;

4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;

5. Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government of Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;

6. Calls upon all parties to co-operate fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus to enable it to carry out its mandate;

7. Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1781st meeting

Appendix 5: Resolution 541/1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus,

Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,

Considering therefore that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming its resolutions 365(1974) and 367(1975),

Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem, based on the mission of good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,

Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,

1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;

2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal;

3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365(1974) and 367(1975);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;

5. Calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices;

6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;

7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus;

8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

Adopted at the 2500th meeting by 13 votes to 1 against (Pakistan) with 1 abstention (Jordan).