



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**The Process of Securitization of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria by the
Bulgarian Communist Party: The Case of the Revival Process in the Era
of Late Socialism**

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
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ABSTRACT

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The image of the “other” and the process of the threat construction in Bulgarian politics in the Communist period with a focus on the Bulgarian Turks were analyzed in the thesis via using the Copenhagen school's concept of Securitization. As this approach was constructed based on the Western political reality, the Communist Party in Bulgaria, stepping on the constructed by the pre-Communist period perception of “us” – the ethnic Bulgarians, and “them” – the ethnic Turks, conducted the Securitization process. Even though the Communist regime tried to construct supra-ethnic Bulgarian national identity and unite all of the ethnic groups without bearing ethnic features.

Initially, the Bulgarian state was considering that its Muslim population is going to emigrate eventually to the Ottoman Empire and in the future to the Republic of Turkey. The policy undertaken by the Bulgarian Communist government tried to integrate/assimilate its minorities by enhancing their educational level and modernization. However, in the first years of the Communist period, the Bulgarian Turkish identity got enhanced rapidly especially through their significantly increased educational level and economic status. Considering the international developments in Cyprus and the Islamic Revolution in Iran made the Bulgarian Communist party reconsider its national security strategy.

The Securitization of the ethnic Turks via imposing the perception that there were people among the Bulgarian Turks that were Turkish state's agents constructed the perception of the threat among the Bulgarian Society and due to the closed character of the Bulgarian Political reality during the Socialist period the Party-State was the only securitizing actor which was able to construct with the perception of threat among the Bulgarian state and society. That undertaken policy made Sofia isolated

and paved the way towards the post-Communist transitional period and put the country on the verge of an ethnic conflict.

Keywords

Securitization; Bulgarian Turks; National Threat; BCP; National Communism



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BAS	Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party
CC of BCP	The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. was conveying only several times per year and formally accepts the decisions taken by the Politburo. Officially CC consisted of Plenum, Politburo, Secretariat and auxiliary apparatus;
CDDAABCSSIBNAF	The Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Forces;
CPU	Committee of Progress and Union
CS	Copenhagen School
CST	Critical Securitization Theory
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
FF (Fatherland Front)	A Political union, which took political power after the coup of the 9 th of October 1944. Comprised of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Zveno movement, a wing of Nikola Petkov's Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers Party. BCP, however, had the whole political power and due to that in the text, FF and BCP are used as synonyms;
IMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
IMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – a powerful organization active mostly in the territory of Macedonia;
OFS	Ottoman Freedom Society
RC	Regional Committee
SS	State Security - The Bulgarian National Intelligence service during the BCP's period;

GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS

Bulgarian Exarchate	That was the name of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church between 1872 and the restoration of the Bulgarian Patriarchate in 1953
Chief Mufti	The head of the Islamic community in a Balkan state (in the thesis – in Bulgarian state)
Mufti	An Islamic scholar who can interpret the Islamic law (Sharia)
Politburo of BCP	It is the highest collective institution of BCP. It was comprised of 10 members conveying several times per month. It was taking the most important decisions.
Waqf	It is a religious endowment in Islam, which generally donating/devoting a building or plot of land for Muslim religious purposes

“Ей... Значи да не беше зъл комунист Тодор Живков би бил национален герой. И
още повече, че това което е започнал щеше да бъде
завършено!”

“If only Todor Zhivkov were not an evil Communist, he could have been a national
hero. Moreover, the things he had started would have
been finished!¹”



¹ A comment under the video in youtube of Todor Zhivkov's historical speech from 29th of May 1989

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims at explaining the concept of the Bulgarian state's security, with a focus on the Late Socialism period from the perspective of the Copenhagen school's Critical Securitization theory.

Accordingly, this chapter intends to provide an excessive literature review on the stages of the Bulgarian nationalism's development and how it affected the Bulgarian minority policy since the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria in 1878 and the construction of the concepts "us" and "them". They were perceived as remainings and an embodiment of the Ottoman Empire's rule and were perceived as culturally more backward from the ethnic Bulgarians. Afterward, in the specific conditions during the BCP's rule (1944-1989), the Securitization of the ethnic Turks was taking place. The periods of Internationalism and Communist Nationalism are scrutinized. Further on goes through the BCP's policy towards the Pomaks and the ethnic Turks as showing the different stages of its minority policy thoroughly. The ideological legitimization of the Muslim names' change to Bulgarian/Slavic ones in the period of late Socialism is emphasized in the text as a pivotal part of the Securitization process's development.

In the theory part of this chapter, the Critical security studies, securitization theory, and its components – Speech act and the Securitization process are shown. After focusing theoretically on the concept of National Security, stepping on the Copenhagen school's Securitization approach, the case study is going to be analyzed.

Through using this theoretical framework, this thesis tries to examine the Bulgarian Communist Party's minority policy, the creation of the "other", and the construction of security threats in the period of the Late Socialism towards mainly the Bulgarian Turks². The case study of the thesis is the Revival process conducted by the

² Both of these terms are problematic. Currently in Bulgaria the term "Bulgarian Turks" is mostly used, and because of this it is used also in this thesis, ethnic Turks is used as its synonym. The term "Pomak", even though having negative connotation and considered in Bulgaria as a discriminative term, it has been used in huge amount of Western studies on the Bulgarian ethnic policy.

Bulgarian authorities between 1984 and 1985 and the so-called “Big excursion” in the middle of 1989. It analyses the construction of a threat by indicating the BCP’s minority policy’s line of development. In the late Socialism in Bulgaria, the securitization policy was possible due to the administratively highly centralized state, the control over the intelligentsia, the control over the media, and the Bulgarian nationalism, which helped for the successful securitization process among the masses.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

The Establishment of the Bulgarian state is the peak point in the long process of Bulgarian ethnogenesis. This political act officially marked the construction of the nation. The modern Bulgarian state was established later than the national states of Serbia and Greece. Due to that, its national identity was constructed while opposing them.

The Bulgarian nation was constructed, emphasizing its differences from the surrounding communities. To enhance its perception of identity, it created the concept of “us” and “them” (the other) not only on a macro - international level but also on a micro-level - national level, in Bulgarian society. The attempt to create one homogenous Bulgarian nation was based on its ethnocentric nationalist perspective. This goal had its reflection on Sofia’s policy, which was trying different approaches to achieve this covenantal goal.

Going through different periods and different policies undertaken by the Bulgarian authorities, the Muslim minority question with emphasizing on the ethnic Turkish minority has become a pivotal issue in maintaining state security. Following the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, the Bulgarian Muslim minorities were perceived as a potential threat to the state’s societal identity and territorial integrity. Sofia considered the Muslim population, emphasizing the Bulgarian Turks as a possible Trojan horse of the Turkish state.

Between 1944 and 1956, the central concept of BCP was Communist Internationalism. However, after the death of Stalin and the following thaw³ in the USSR's foreign policy created the base for a more individual course of development by the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Because of the perplex mixture of historical events, the concept of Communist nationalism emerged. Later on, by using its monopoly upon the media and the published materials, BCP constructed a specific discourse towards the Muslim population in Bulgaria and eventually securitized it. The discourse was different respectively for the Bulgarian Muslims and the Bulgarian Turks.

Taking into account those historical circumstances regarding the Critical Securitization theory of Copenhagen school and the historical development of the Bulgarian state and Bulgarian nationalism, the research questions are: Why and how the BCP perceived the ethnic Turkish population as a possible security threat and later on securitized it?

Trying to answer the latter question, discourse analysis of the BCP political elite's main speeches and BCP's official documents is being conducted. The used Critical Securitization theory of the Copenhagen school is based on Western liberal democracies. The idea is to show how it can be used to analyze the process of constructing a threat in a country that was ruled by the totalitarian regime of the Bulgarian Communist Party⁴ (Ignatow, 2013, pp. 21-59).

Hypothesis

Can the Securitization theory as being part of the Critical Security Studies be used for analyzing the construction of a threat and the legitimization of the extraordinary measures taken by the institutions of the authority? The securitization theory can be used also for the illiberal regimes and can show how exactly the Securitization process is identical to the regimes that are liberal. However for the Bulgarian Communist regime the process was easily conducted as the BCP hold the control

³ Destalinization and a limited liberalization of the society and the politics of the countries in the Warsaw Pact

⁴ More about the problem to analyze processes in the East Socialist states through using the Western created concepts and comprehensions see **Ignatov, A. *Psichologiya na Komunizma*, Nov Balgarski Universitet, Sofia, 2013** (originally written in German with the title **Ignatow, A *Psihologie des Kommunismus*, Iohanes Bergmans Verlag München (Germany), 1985**)

upon all the informational sources and all the power institutions that molded the perceptions of the Bulgarian society. The process of Securitization in Bulgaria between 1944 and 1989 was conducted with its ebbs and flows and had and still has its repercussions.

The creation of a security threat has taken a pivotal part of the Critical security studies' expertise. Primarily it is the focal point of the Securitization theory. This thesis sets a goal to examine the process of the Securitization of the ethnic Turks' issue in Bulgaria as perceiving them as a potential threat to the Bulgarian national and societal security during the Socialist period 1944 - 1989. The analysis undertakes the assumption that the concepts of identity and security are not only having its objective features but are moreover a social construct.

During the whole political development since 1878, based on the evolution of Bulgarian nationalism, the authorities perceived the Muslims living in Bulgaria as Ottoman Empire's "remaining" and its embodiment and considered them as detrimental for Bulgaria's modern development. Based on the perception of Bulgarian ethnicity, BCP securitizes the Bulgarian Muslims gradually, as its zenith is the so-called "Revival process". During the rule of BCP, the latter was the Bulgarian state's and society's embodiment. Because of this situation, societal security and state security were overlapping and intertwined.

The Securitization process was kept inside of the BCP's political elite and became "open" to the public in the late 70s and especially during the Revival process in the mid-80s and its aftermath. The political elite controlled the whole media sphere, and the course of "scientific" development, a successful securitization was constructed by the BCP's propaganda machine through undertaking the dominant historical discourse. Bulgarian state considered its Muslim population as a depiction of an archaic culture that should be amended, transformed, and later on united with the modern Bulgarian Socialist society to reach Modernity - Communism. Respectively, the political elite back then perceived the Muslim population⁵ as a potential threat to the Bulgarian society, to the Bulgarian modern national identity. Several of the so-

⁵ Read as Pomaks and ethnic Turks

called “Revived” Bulgarians⁶ wrote books for the detrimental effect caused by the religious and cultural backwardness of the Muslim population. Several scientists from BAS decided to develop their careers by following strictly the Party line. This meant to provide evidence that the Pomak population had Bulgarian ethnic roots with the idea to divide them from the ethnic Turks and to constrain their “Turkification”. The “ethnic Bulgarian” root of the ethnic Turks was “scientifically” proved as well in the 80s and they got included in the Bulgarian narod.

Bulgarian authorities considered the ethnic Turks as not only a threat to the Bulgarian national identity but moreover as a possible threat to the state sovereignty, as possible Turkish state’s “Trojan horse”. This stance became gradually strengthened as the ethnic Turks slowly developed their national identity and became a pivotal part of the Bulgarian economy.

The Securitization course was undertaken due to the failure of the integration/assimilation attempt in the first years of the BCP regime. The enhancement of the ethnic Turkish cultural and the educational level /which was in the Turkish language until the late 50s/ led to the emergence of the Turkish intellectual elite and the strengthening of the Turkish national identity. The following emigrational waves didn’t provide the result BCP was expecting and the following Turkish operation in Cyprus and the Islamic Revolution in Iran strengthened the threat perception among the Bulgarian Communist elite.

In the middle of the 80s, the official stance was that in Bulgaria there was no Turkish population. The stance was developed through the “evidence” provided by several close to BCP academicians and strengthened by researches, novels, and scientific articles written in the late 70s and mainly the 80s. Right after the so-called “Revival process”, a movie called “Time of Violence” was broadcasted, which was a depiction of the party line. Moreover, due to the global political development and the decline of the Communist regimes and facing an existential threat, BCP undertook the Nationalism and the concept of a threat constructed by the textbooks that had been at a dormant stage.

BCP, stepping on the concept of a threat securitized the ethnic Turkish issue to reach higher public legitimization among the Bulgarian society in the late 80s at the peak of

⁶ Ethnic Turks and Pomaks with changed names to Bulgarian-Slavic ones that became part of the BCP’s political elite and choose to detach their professional development with the Communist Party;

the assimilation project. The people that did not accept the “righteous” Party’s policy and wanted to emigrate to Turkey were depicted as enemies of the Bulgarian Socialist nation. In it, there should not be any ethnic difference, as all the people should have to be united in the common goal – constructing a Socialist society without different ethnicities inside of it.

The successful securitization by BCP became evident at the end of the regime and right after the regime’s change in late 1989. The strong lingering effect among the ethnic Bulgarians after the Revival process led to organized massive protests against the return of the ethnic Turks’ names and a requirement of a Referendum to be held on this question.



CHAPTER 1: SECURITIZATION THEORY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION

1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW

The thesis explores the different policies of the Bulgarian state towards its Muslim minority focusing on the ethnic Turks. To achieve this the different phases of constructing the concepts “us” and “them” (the others) and the development of the discourse have been scrutinized. In the first chapter, the theory of the Critical Security approach – Copenhagen school is explored thoroughly.

For the securitization process to be analyzed, initially, the process of emerging and construction of the Bulgarian nation and nationalism should be scrutinized. Ethnic belonging is based on the feeling of shared kinship, historical experience, common language, religion, and traditions. Those shared features comprise and create the group’s belonging, the so-called ethnicity (Todorova M. , 1992). The construction of nationalism happens out of the complicated existence of ethnic belonging and statehood (Todorova M. , 2010). The stages of the construction are scientific interest, national agitation, and the massive national movement (Todorova M. , 2010). The nations are created in one perplex common social condition and the existence of a homogenous and central supported high culture uphold by the masses and by the political elite (Gellner, 2008). The nationalism and the language factor are dividing the communities. This division concludes into the creation of the perception of “us” and “them” (Muller, 2008).

The perception of “otherness” emerges from the complicated development of the nationhood. The Copenhagen school states that there are three elements of the national security which is closely linked with the perception of threat – the physical base - the territory and the people living on it, the institutions governing the territory, and the idea of the state, which provides the legitimacy among the population (Buzan, 1991). The territory is perceived as a way to determine ethnic self-determination and the ethnic state’s sovereignty and due to that, it is linked emotionally with the population. Its putative split is considered as putting in danger the very existence of the state and the nation (Pearson, 1983). In the Bulgarian case, the religion and the language were distinguishing traits for the ethnic and later on the national identity (Pearson, 1983, p. 27).

The vast majority of the ethnic Turks came to the territory of contemporary Bulgaria from the middle of Anatolia as part of the official Ottoman Empire's policy (Zheliaskova, 1990). The demographic situation in comparison before the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria was extremely diverse as the ethnic Bulgarian population numbered close to even with the Muslim population (Todorova M., 2010). Later on, the Muslim population increased after the Balkan wars (1912-1913) as the newly added territories were populated mainly by Muslims (Zelengora, 2013).

Initially, the Bulgarian state acted cautiously towards its Muslim population as Sofia perceived the Orthodox Slavic population in Macedonia as a reciprocal to it (Mirkova A. M., 2009). Due to that, the Muslim population had huge religious and administrative rights until the Balkan wars (Methodieva, 2014). Meanwhile, the base for the future securitization was created as there was an ongoing process of Orientalist discourse's construction toward the Muslim population (Methodieva, 2014).

During the Balkan Wars, the Pomak community got its religion changed violently during the first assimilation campaign (Ivanova, 2002). After the First World War, there was a softening policy towards the minorities, as the new Government needed to gain legitimacy (Ivanova, 2002). Meanwhile, several treaties and agreements were signed and framed the future bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey, and respectively the situation of the ethnic Turkish population in Bulgaria (Şimşir B., 2012). However, the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the spread of Kemalist ideas and Turkish nationalism were perceived as a national security threat to the Bulgarian state (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 473). Due to that, Sofia's policy was leaning on the international and the bilateral (Bulgarian – Turkish) treaties and agreements to preserve the rights of the minorities, which meant to curb the pervasion of Kemalist ideas among its Turkish population (Gruev, 1999). Considering the threat by the Kemalism, Sofia took a position of implicit approval of the "ignorance" among the ethnic Turks as the educated ones might become a future national security threat (Mancheva, 2001). Sofia prosecuted and closely monitored all the organizations that were considered as Kemalists and were propagating the spread of Turkish nationalism. In the 30s, the ruling political organization "Zveno" emphasized on the nationhood, based on the common lingual and territorial belonging. The national language was chosen as a unifier of the nation and marked

the scope of the nation's space (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008), and due to that, the language was accepted as the unifier of the Bulgarian nation and the Pomak population was included in it. The fellowship "Rodina"⁷, created in Smolyan in 1937, was trying to integrate the Pomaks into the Bulgarian society. The fellowship laid the fundamentals for the future Bulgarian minority policy – initially towards the Pomaks and later towards the ethnic Turks (Karamandzhukov & Hristov, 1995).

In 1944 there was a regime change in Bulgaria as BCP took over political power. Bulgaria, since the very beginning of its establishment, perceived its Muslim population as the "other" (Curtis, 1992). This concept during the Socialist period became more rigid as the state was trying to modernize itself with massive temps. To achieve this, it wanted to remove the cultural remaining of the Ottoman Empire as the religious piousness and the conservative customs (Neuburger, 1997).

In the first years of the new regime, the state tried to gain legitimacy and supported the rights and freedoms of Muslim Minorities (Ivanova, 2002). However, during this time, the regime was going between the official rhetoric's "Internationalism" and the so-called "Proletarian patriotism" (Marinov, 2009). Just one year after the change of the regime, Georgi Dimitrov states that ethnic Turks can become a threat to national security (Ivanov, M., Yalamov, I, 1998). He considered them as not able to be part of the Socialist society's construction process (Ivanova, 2002).

The Successor of Georgi Dimitrov, Valko Chervenkov, who was a devoted Stalinist, enhanced the process of constructing the "ideal" society. BCP considered the Bulgarian Turks as a potential problem as being of different ethnicity and started preparing for the future deportation from 1949-1951. The most prominent leaders of this community were set to leave the country (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). During this wave, 155 000 people, mostly ethnic Turks, left until the Republic of Turkey closed its borders (Borden, 2020). Right after the emigration wave, BCP started the process of "Bulgarization" as was trying to abrupt the "Turkification"⁸ of the Pomaks population. The Pomak population received passports, and some of them changed their names voluntarily. These people accused the rest of underdevelopment and religious

⁷ Homeland (translated from Bulgarian)

⁸ Self-perception as ethnic Turks;

fanaticism. Those accusations are going to be used in the future change of the Pomaks' names (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 64-66).

Slowly the methods used by fellowship "Rodina" were reused at the end of the 50s initially upon the Smolyan's Pomaks and were taken as an example for the future Revival process (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). By BCP's instruction, BAS was assigned to find evidence of the Pomaks' ethnic Bulgarian origin (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 82). BCP tried to include the ethnic Turkish population that decided to stay in Bulgaria after the emigration wave into the society (Ivanov, M., Yalamov, I, 1998). BCP supported the development of Bulgarian Turk's culture. Moreover, they received quotas for higher education for their educational level to be improved and to be used later by BCP (Borden, 2020). BCP's strategy was first to indoctrinate the ethnic Turks ideologically and after that to remove the language as a dividing factor among the ethnic groups. The Turkish schools from 1958 got united with the Bulgarian ones, and the Bulgarian language was imposed as the only one used for teaching in the high school (Borden, 2020). BCP's political elite considered the need for new "janissary corps" similar to the Ottoman Empire's one (Ivanova, 2002, p. 80).

Meanwhile, BCP started huge investments into the mixed regions to earn the support of the ethnic Turkish and Pomak's population (Stoyanov V. , 1998, pp. 133-134). The policy of expropriation of the land and the assimilation led to the enhanced desire of emigration among the ethnic Turks (Şimşir B. , 1988, p. 246). Sofia took advantage of the new emigration wave between 1969 until 1978 to "remove" those people that are not supporting the goal of Socialism and are inclined to support the Turkish "bourgeois" nationalism (Marinov, 2009). During this time the Brezhnev's thesis of "unitary Soviet folk" was taken by Zhivkov as "unitary Bulgarian Socialist folk". He stated that there is an assimilation of the Bulgarian nationality and the Turkish nationality, and the national differences will be eradicated and heading to the Socialist and Communist society (Zhivkov T. , 1976). The Plenum of CC of BCP in February 1974 about the ideological questions discusses the ideological-political inclusion of the population of Turkish origin (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 119). Here the base for the Securitization was constructed. BCP emphasized the atheistic perception and the traditional and religious customs (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 120). The construction of the security threat started after the decisions taken at this Plenum. BAS published "proofs" of the undertaken "Turkification" of the Bulgarians

during the Ottoman Empire (Detchev S. , 2019). As BCP “scientifically” proved the Pomak population’s Bulgarian ethnic roots, the change of their names was performed. The historical justice had to be achieved according to the official propaganda (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 124-144).

In the Bulgarian case, Communism and Nationalism made an ideological symbiosis to reach modernization (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014). The monolith Party-state creates a monolith nation (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014, p. 483), and Communism as an ideology is strengthening the intolerance and rejects the social compromise (Brzezinski, Winter 1989/90). Moreover, the Marxists and nationalists do share a concern for the people’s alienation from their state of being; both are historicist and evolutionary in their conceptions (Smith A. , 1979). The Communist nationalism was disguised in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric (Todorova M. , 2010).

Historically the processes of ethnicity, nationalism, and the following Communist nationalism’s construction can be comprehended as a historical continuum (Todorova M. , 2010). Since the very beginning of the Communist rule⁹, the national state faced hardship to coexist with the Communist internationalism’s idea of constructing a society based on class consciousness (Todorova M. , 2010). The closed borders were in favor of the later on the undertaken phenomenon of Communist nationalism. The state became the hegemon of creating the nationalist identity, and the discourses of national history were easily comprehended by the population as the Party had a monopoly upon the media (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014, p. 487). BCP securitized the Bulgarian Turks while using the Marxist discourse which was in favor of the legitimization of the assimilation process in the mid80s (Ignatow, 2013, p. 228).

According to the official propaganda during the BCP’s rule, the Party was the logical historical development, the creator of the magnificent future society. During this period, inevitably the national identity was further developed (Dechev, 2010). This development provides the base for future successful securitization. From the mid-70s, the BCP’s propaganda emphasized heavily the stance that religion was an “obstacle” for the Communist education of the masses (Iliev, 1980). Moreover, among the Bulgarian Muslims, religion was perceived as a fertile base for developing

⁹ Read 09.09.1944

nationalism (Iliev, 1980, p. 30). According to the official propaganda, the archaic perceptions of ethnical originality, nationalism, and religious fanaticism impede the inclusion of the Bulgarian Turks to join the process of constructing Socialism and the unification of the Bulgarian working class (Tahirov, 1979). The organizations before the Socialist period (1944) were depicted as a core of spreading Turkish nationalism. There was an ongoing process of dissolvment of the ethnic groups into one magnificent Socialist society (Zhivkov T. , 1976, pp. 95-110). During the late 70s and 80s, BCP's propaganda constructed the face of the enemy – Panturkists and Panislamists. Allegedly they were working for discrediting Socialism (Tahirov, 1979, p. 37). The common interest in obtaining the Communist society was depicted as being in favor of all the ethnic groups in Bulgaria (Tahirov, 1979, p. 26).

The people who were against that process were depicted as being against that common goal. They were set to leave the country as being “deluded by the Pan Turkish and Pan Islamic propaganda” (Tahirov, 1979, p. 61). According to the BCP's documents, the Party wanted to deport around 200 – 300 thousand ethnic Turks, as was afraid of a possible Cyprus scenario in Bulgaria or possible future Turkish autonomy as the birth rates of that population were way higher than the ethnic Bulgarians (Institut za Izsledvane na Integratsiyata, 2003). At the beginning of 1985, Todor Zhivkov stated, that there were no Turks in Bulgaria, all of them were assimilated Bulgarians during the Ottoman Empire (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 137). A considerable amount of children's books, documentaries, and movies were broadcasted on the topic of the Turkish “slavery,” referring to the Ottoman period (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). This nationalistic view of the Ottoman period strengthened the perception of looming security threat and the perception of “otherness” among the ethnic Bulgarians (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008). Due to the BCP's propaganda, the ethnic Bulgarians considered the ethnic Turks' (the “reborn” Bulgarians') leaving as a betrayal of their homeland and have been taking advantage of the privileges the Bulgarian state had been providing them (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). Todor Zhivkov stated that in Bulgaria, there were active “directors of an anti-Bulgarian campaign,” and foreign forces were instigating tension among some groups of the Bulgarian population (Zhivkov, T., May 1989). After the change of the political regime, there were massive rallies by the ethnic Bulgarians trying to stop the Bulgarian Muslim's

names return. Some of the slogans they used were “Not to allow the Pan Turkism” and “Turks in Turkey” (Detchev S. , 2019).

1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.2.1. Definition of Security

The concept of security is fundamentally debated, as are the concepts of power and freedom. It leads to theoretical debates and unsolvable discussions on the exact meaning of it as the other mentioned concepts (Buzan, 1991, p. 7). Barry Buzan states that “security is a pursuit of freedom from threats.” According to Ole Wæver, “the concept of security had been subjected to little reflection in comparison with how much and how strongly it had been used (Lipschutz, 1998)”.

Considering the historical emergence of the term “security,” it is not among the “traditional” concepts as sovereignty, war, and state. Terms as “interests” and “war” have been used to hold the same meaning as “security” in the past. When it became part of the international relations’ discourse, it took a pivotal place of it among the rest of those mentioned above “traditional” concepts (Wæver O. , 1989).

1.2.2. Definition of State and National Security

One of the first definitions of the state is the one provided by Max Weber. According to him, the state is a human community, which has acquired and obtains the monopoly over legitimate violence upon particular territory (Weber, 2016). According to neo-Marxist Gramscian perception of the state’s power is not only material but also an ideological one (Bourne, 2014, p. 72).

National security is the synonym of the sovereign state’s security as it is the primary provider of protection for its citizens. It provides this by complicated relations among its main features: authority, legitimacy, violence, community, and territory. Internal security of the state is being provided based on the rule of law and the “gradual professionalization of policing (Bourne, 2014, p. 71)”.

There are several main features of the state, respectively: sovereignty, the resemblance of the national community among its borders, territory, and the use of legitimate force.

The main one is sovereignty, which is absolute and individual as no other subject can claim sovereignty upon a territory on which already there is an actor who has claimed it. This state's main feature comes with no rights of intervening in the politics and the territory of the sovereign (Bourne, 2014, p. 73). According to the American professor of IR Stephen Krasner, there are four levels of sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). The first and fundamental one for this thesis is the international legal sovereignty, which represents equality among all the states and their legal recognition inside of the international system that they are independent.

The second feature of the state is the resemblance of the national community among its borders. The modern state is a representative of the predominant ethnic and religious community among the territory; it imposes its authority. "Nation and nationalism relate to an invented identity of a community of people sharing some cultural commonality among themselves and some differences with "foreign others (Bourne, 2014, p. 74)". So the nation-state is the representative of the predominant socio-political community. "Security and insecurity are constitutive of states and nations as a form of the political community (Bourne, 2014, p. 74)".

The territory is the third feature, which depicts the state as a political subject, which is exercising its sovereignty upon particular territory, not upon people¹⁰. The territory of the state is one of the fundamentals of its sovereignty and authority (Bourne, 2014, p. 75). The fourth and last feature depicts the state as the only political subject that is having the legitimate right to impose and use force on that very territory (Weber, 2016). Charles Tilly argues that the state is becoming more consolidated territorially, with more centralized sovereignty and monopolizing the violence, enhancing its military just because it desires to prevail upon the rest of the states (Bourne, 2014, p. 75).

¹⁰ The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 created the new political reality. That is how the political life - a struggle between several authorities and identities which were overlapping as the sovereign kings and queens were trying to impose its authority upon a specific territory as the church and local lords. Even this perception to be problematic, it shows how important is the transition of the object of power to be imposed upon;

The state has created itself as the total subject of political power, authority, sovereignty, and creator of security. Andrew Linklater states that there is the “totalizing project of the state (Linklater, 1998, p. 27)” according to which the state gradually claimed its legitimacy to be the main actor on the four major features of the modern state.

The state acquires security while imposing its policies by using its state agencies inside of its territory. The state obtains social control through the possibility of threatening the possible deviations with penalties and sanctions. Police as being one of the central institutions which are fundamental for the state currently is dealing with terrorism, during a situation of a protest or unrest to maintain social order and is also imposing political repression (Bourne, 2014, p. 78). The problem that has been shown by several thinkers representing different views on whether and how much the policing practices are protecting or producing the social order.

Surveillance is the most crucial part of providing security, and its primary goal is to gather information to reach preemptive action towards emerging threats (Lyon, 2001, pp. 1-8). The political elite is highly dependent on the information gathered by the surveillance to reach control of the administrative processes. Since the power is dispersed and the insecurity cannot be eliminated, then the risks¹¹ and the threats¹² position the surveillance at a more “pivotal” part of the state security.

Buzan is underlining another security dilemma by using the concepts of vulnerability and threats. It is the debate within the scope of national security. What should be the focus of the national security strategy - to reduce the external threats to the state or the internal vulnerabilities? Which means it should be more outward or inward orientated (Stone, 2009, p. 7). According to him, the best possible security strategy is by combining the inward and outward policy.

¹¹ Relations of the probability and harm arising from an event, such as crime and terrorism; taken from Bourne, M., 2014 pp. 80

¹² Related to the possible intentions undertaken by the enemies taken from Ibid pp. 80

1.2.3. Critical Security Studies and National security

1.2.3.1. Introduction

Security studies started as an independent field of study. However, shortly after, it became part of International Relations as its sub-field. Critical studies, on the other hand, emerged throughout the intellectual debate, which was trying to analyze the complicated concept of Security.

The debates right after the end of the Second World War were focused on how to protect the state effectively against external and internal threats (Wæver O. , 1989, p. 18). According to the Traditional rationalist approach to Security¹³, threats to national security are posed by other states. To deal with those threats, a military response is needed. The critical concept emerged through the process of deepening and widening the concept of security of the traditional approach.

1.2.3.2. Deepening and Widening Approaches of the National Security

With the period of detente¹⁴ and the oil crises in the 70s, the scholars focused on the other threats which can affect national security (Camilli, 2016). The mutual annihilation was not that palpable as it used to be, and due to that, the concept of national security was theoretically enriched. Two processes emerged: The process of widening, which means the expansion of the number of threats as being not solely military-based, and the process of deepening – considers the expansion of the referent objects¹⁵ besides the state.

1.2.3.2.1. Widening Approach

¹³ More information: Bourne, Mike, . Understanding Security, 2014, pp. 27-50

¹⁴ The period of improved relations between USA and USSR starting in 1971

¹⁵ Check the Units of Securitization on p. 25

Richard Ullman considers the view of Arnold Wolfers as taking under account the state as being the only threat to security as creating insecurity (Wolfers, 1952, pp. 481-484). Because of this overfocusing, it can lead to overlooking of other threats, which is problematic (Camilli, 2016, p. 17). According to him, that sequence of events that threaten for some time the quality of life of people of the state or significantly threatens the diminishment of the number of choices applicable to the state's government or nongovernment organizations of subjects can be perceived as a threat (Ullman, 1983, p. 133).

The scholar continued and continue including the range of threats that were not considered by the first wave as economy, energy, and environmental issues – shortage of energy supply, and natural catastrophes, inter-state wars, blockades and boycotts, and internal rebellions (Ullman, 1983, p. 134). Threats were considered of two kinds – external¹⁶ and internal¹⁷ (Camilli, 2016, p. 18).

With a link to this, Barry Buzan defines security as the pursuit of freedom from threat. The state, pursues this goal by strengthening its security while using two approaches. The first is by preventing threats, and the second is by reducing the level of insecurity (Camilli, 2016). David Baldwin undertakes the perception of the core values of Wolfers - political independence and territorial integrity - and what happens when they are under threat (Baldwin, 1997). With time the focus is on preserving the values, not on the existence or the absence of threats to them. So security can be acquired even though a threat/threat to them does exist.

1.2.3.2.2. Deepening Approach

The “deepeners” state that there are more referent objects which must be secured, not only the core values. The three-stage pyramid of security made by Buzan is showing one of the possible ways to spread the security to all those objects at an individual level, the state level, and the international system level (Buzan, 1991).

¹⁶ Example: Nuclear confrontation with USSR and dependency on authoritarian providers

¹⁷ Example: Improving the energy security base – improving the renewable energy, combating water pollution

The early theorists who were working on the theory of national security (Wolfers, Morgenthau) – the Realists - considered the other states as the only possible security threats. As was emphasized, the international situation back then was predisposed to this kind of perception. This concept emerges from the early realists – Thomas Hobbs and Machiavelli (Baldwin, 1997, p. 18). The point of constructing the state was overcoming the widespread threats. Due to that traditional perception, on the state's territory, there are no security issues. Every threat is coming from “outside”, from another state.

However, this perception is getting amended because of the change in the political and historical processes. The new approach is that the state has to provide security from internal and external threats. Alternatively, the threat can come from an organization within the borders of the state, as groups fighting for independence, change of the political regime, or criminal groups. Those states can lead to intra-state conflict, which can develop into civil war.

1.2.3.3. Copenhagen School

Ole Wæver states that the concept of security should be amended to include human security (individual and collective one). Human security can be affected in many ways as “economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights (Wæver O. , 1995)”. However, without halting the excessive broadening of the concept, it turns into “a synonym of everything that is politically good and desirable... it encompasses the whole social and political agenda (Wæver O. , 1995)”.

According to him, the problem is insufficient literature, no philosophy, and the absence of a tradition of security in non-state terms. The critical approach considers whether other threats and referent objects to be included in the definition of security based on the theory of national security. Those new approaches borrow the definition of security from the traditional concept, which has been significantly extended. Security is continuously affected by the complicated developments at the individual and global levels, but Wæver does not consider that the terms individual and global securities are problematic. Moreover, according to him, the concept of security refers solely to the state (Wæver O. , 1995).

1.2.3.4. Securitization Theory

The radical transformation of the political reality after the end of the Cold War leads to a reconfiguration of the political power structure, and due to that, new security issues emerged on the horizon of the whole security pyramid. Brand new security challenges and risks and threats became part of the redefining process of the security conceptualization. The idea of the link between identity and security took a fundamental part of social science researches during that period.

Ole Wæver constructed the concept of Securitization. According to him, one issue can be constructed and afterward perceived as a threat. This process is called “securitization.” An issue becomes a security problem when the elites are declaring it as one (Wæver O. , 1993). According to Barry Buzan, security has social aspects, and also it is being constructed by people or societies or through the process of Securitization of one threat. He is undertaking a constructivist approach analyzing how the primary referent - the state – can be attacked on every single aspect to its security. Moreover, under security, he means the one on the individual and societal level, right to the state level (Stone, 2009, p. 2).

1.2.3.4.1. Units of Securitization

There are three units in the process of Securitization. The first unit is the referent objects. They comprise all the things that their survival is threatened with, and they have a legitimate right to continue existing. The second unit is the securitizing actors who are having the legitimate right to declare an issue as an existential threat to the referent object. Furthermore, the third unit is functional actors. Those are the actors who are interested in whether an issue is going to be perceived as an existential threat or not (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, p. 36).

For referent objects can be pointed out traditionally the state as being the holder of sovereignty and the nation as a personification of the identity. To understand which referent object of security is successfully determined the historical process and the size of the referent object should be analyzed. According to their size, they can be divided into macro, middle, and micro-scale. The referent objects from micro and

macro sizes have not been establishing legitimacy successfully. An example of a micro-scale are the individuals and the macro one the whole humankind or the whole humanity in the face of the international working class. According to the historical process, the successfully securitized referent objects are located at the middle scale. Those are the so-called “limited collectivities” (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998) – states and the nations. Securitizing them leads to strengthening their self-awareness as “we-feeling”.

Because they involve reference to a “we”, they are social constructs operative in the interaction among people. The main criterion of this type of referent is that it forms an interpretative community - it is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events. The referent is a social context with the dignity of a “state of judgment (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, p. 40)”.

The second unit which resembles the *securitizing actor* is a depiction of “someone, or a group, who performs the speech act (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, p. 40)”. According to *Buzan*, the most common ones are political leaders, governments, bureaucracies, pressure groups, and lobbyists. Nevertheless, the very assumption of what is the securitizing actor remains problematic. Sometimes the *securitizing actor* and the *referent object* are the same. However, more frequently, the security actors are expressing themselves as defenders of something valuable for the audience as the security of the state, nation, civilization (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, pp. 40-41).

1.2.3.4.2. Societal Security

Barry Buzan introduced the concept of societal security as one sector of his five-dimensional approach to the security theory with political, military, economic, and environmental security (Buzan, 1991). Society is one of those five sectors that the state can be threatened.

According to Ole Wæver the concept of “societal security” is linked to the ability of one society to be able to “persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats...sustainability, within acceptable conditions for

evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom (Wæver O. , 1993, p. 23) “. He argues that there is a duality of state and societal security. It became a referent object of security for the societal sector. Wæver made the division of state security, which is concerned about the threats to its sovereignty and the societal security deals with threats to the society’s identities (Wæver O. , 1993).

Two approaches analyze societal security. They divide each other by the comprehension of whether the identity is pre-given or it is a constructed concept. The traditional approaches consider the identity as pre-given, and concerning the security, it has negative features as a source of insecurity. After the end of the Cold War, with the development of critical ways of analyzing security, the concept of construction of both – the identity and the security became more interrelated concepts. Furthermore, due to this development, the identity was considered as a source of security. Critical approaches started comprehending the identity in broader terms – of the dynamics of “self” and “other” of “we” and “they” (Bilgin, 2010).

Here the Copenhagen School played a pivotal part during that period. Identity has been perceived as a referent object of security by the concept of societal security (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, pp. 119-120) presented by the *Copenhagen School*. According to it, society means a group or community which bears the perception of identity (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, pp. 119-120). Another representative of the Copenhagen school, Wæver, states that society is a gathering of institutions that are connected with the perception of shared identity (Wæver O. , 1993, p. 21). The feeling of belonging among the individuals and the self-perception of the communities define the society (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, p. 119). So, if the identity is under threat, respectively, the very existence of the state is facing an existential threat (Buzan, B., & Wæver, O., 1997, p. 242). In a case that there is a threat to the existence as a community, then the societal insecurity exists. Societal security reflects on the community’s ability to protect its main features like language and culture - its identity (Olesker, 2014). Societal security is also valid for the minorities as some repressive actions are taken against their expression of identity through the use of their language, traditions, names (Wæver O. , 1993).

Copenhagen School, by positioning the society as a referent object of the security policy, emphasizes on how the state is not able to survive without its sovereignty, so the society is not able to survive in a case of losing its identity (Wæver O. , 1993). To provide a conceptual background of how the threats to societal security might lead to intergroup conflict, the concept of Securitization¹⁸ was introduced. According to this approach, the securitizing actor constructs a security threat by using speech acts¹⁹. With them, the actors aim at convincing the people that this issue deserves to be considered as an existential threat to a certain referent object. If the securitization process is successful, then the political actor gains legitimization for his actions and consequently could undertake some extraordinary measures to handle the security threat (Wæver O. , 1995). In that case, the securitizing actor (the political elite) recreates and reimposes the fundament of the political system – the hierarchical conditions and sustains the power position.

The political elite shapes the political reality and creates an extraordinary political order as choosing the security threat subjectively through a process of Securitization. Due to the “securitization” choice, the nature of the Securitization theory is a decisionist (Williams, 2003, p. 518). For the process to be successful, the targeted group of the speech act should accept the threat and that an extraordinary measure has to be taken (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, p. 17;31;34). The period of establishing a response to the threat is named the mobilization stage (Floyd, 2010, pp. 52-54).

Security is being a concept and a word (Floyd, 2010, p. 1). On the other hand, the security problem is something that is having the possibility of undermining the state's political order—insecurity roots from a mixture of threats to security and vulnerabilities (Wæver O. , 1989, p. 26). The level of significance of a threat is linked to the possible effect on the self-determination and state sovereignty (Wæver O. , 1989). The biggest threat is the one that threatens the very existence of the state. All other threats are becoming from secondary importance since, in a case, the state ceases to exist, then all other threats to the state are going to lose its relevance. In

¹⁸ Securitization theory was introduced in 1991 by Barry Buzan and later was further developed by Ole Wæver in his article *Securitization and Desecuritization* 1995 and the concept was elaborated by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaab de Wilde with the study *Security, a New Framework for Analysis* (1998). Some other scholars have contributed to the development and the theoretical enrichment of the concept as Roe (2004) and Aradau (2004)

¹⁹ Securitizing actors are mainly political figures

this sense, the utterance of security threat becomes one, and what is not referred to as a matter of security is not considered as a security threat (Lipschutz, 1998, p. 214).

1.2.3.4.3. Speech Act as Part of the Securitization Theory

As Ole Wæver states, “the word security is the act, the utterance is the primary act (Wæver O. , 1989, p. 1)”. The political elite decides which issue to be perceived as a threat to security. It is a state constructed concept as the state has the legitimacy to deal with the threats on its sovereignty. Later on, Ole Wæver described security simply as a speech act (Wæver O. , 1989).

When the state defines some particular development as being a security problem, then it claims exclusive rights. Security as a concept is detached from the concept of sovereignty. The state has the aim to sustain the stability and security among its borders. However, the political power holders can use this for their specific purposes. The ruling political elites are constantly using the securitization of a problem as a tool to impose control over it (Wæver O. , 1995).

To hurtle the future development of a specific threat, securitization is taking a pivotal part of the national security. In a case when there is increasing social unrest, then the state must acquire a higher level of legitimacy to avoid escalation of dissident movements and to obtain and potentially use a sufficient amount of force (Wæver O. , 1989, p. 6).

The speech act is a new approach that was established by John L. Austin. Firstly he differentiated between two terms: Constatives and Performatives. He perceives Constatives as a traditional way of stating a description of something which is being independent of the statement. According to his first theory, then the statement can be perceived as being true or false. On the other hand, performative statements are having a “performative utterance” effect. It is not only an expression but also can be any linguistic expression, which is expressed in a specific moment, and appropriate context creates effect into reality and is accomplishing the creation of a contract (Austin, 1975, p. 6).

All the statements were perceived as speech acts and Austin differs them in three dimensions. The first one is the so-called locutionary, which pertains to the statements about solely saying something about something and is among the limitations of being true or false. The second one is the perlocutionary dimension is about the “effect on someone made to do something,” and the third one is the pure speech act dimension, as is described by J.L. Austin (Wæver O. , 1989, p. 42). The latter is the illocutionary dimension (Austin, 1975, p. 6).

A statement from the illocutionary dimension is used to define some specific case as being part of a specific category. In this case, this is the security or national security as being more specific. The state, as a securitizing actor, can depict an issue as a threat. Moreover, to be successful, it uses all the possible means to combat it. In that situation, the state, as the center of power, is potentially put into question (Austin, 1975).

The illocutionary dimension of the statement is used to create a “case-study.” However, the perlocutionary effect is intertwined with the outcome. So said the case created by the illocutionary is placing a threat towards the security. The perlocutionary effect as a second stage shows how this created security threat is going to be apprehended by the society. Whether the depiction is going to be accepted is a real test to the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state as being the creator of security (Wæver O. , 1989).

The speech act might be successful because of its possibility to fail. The dilemma is “the invocation of “security” is only possible because it invokes the image of what would happen if it does not work (Wæver O. , 1989)”. Moreover, the Securitization can narrow the field of its application (Wæver O. , 1995).

Buzan states that the speech act is just the first step of the Securitization of an issue. If the people, the audience undertakes it, perceiving it as being righteous, so then the securitization process has been completed successfully. He states that every single process of Securitization contains three steps. The first one is the announcement of the existence of an existential threat. Second is that due to its announcement, the emergency actions are legitimately undertaken. Moreover, the third step is the effect on the relations by escaping from the constricting role of the rules. In that way, the

securitized threat is perceiving the issue as an exceptional way of politics (Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J., 1998, pp. 25-6).

1.3. GAPS

Securitization as a theory is a top-down framework that analyses how the political elite (the top) chooses, and through speech, act constructs the security threats to the state. The approach used in this thesis has its critics and here they are going to be shown.

There are critics to the Securitization theory as accusing it of being narrow as by Matt McDonald (2008), Balzacq (2005), Williams (2003), Aradau (2004), and others. First, it is stated that the acceptance of security threat is defined narrowly as it has been perceived to be done only by the dominant political leaders through their speech acts. This limits the focus only on the leaders that possess legitimacy to speak on behalf of some institution or the state.

The critics to the second wave (deepeners and wideners) coming from scholars as Stephen Walt and David Baldwin emphasize the problem of perceiving “everything” as a threat or as a referent object. This perception leads to loss of focus, “defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of those important questions (Walt, June, 1991, p. 213)”. According to David Baldwin, “redefining security has recently become something of a cottage industry (Baldwin, 1997).” Moreover, he continues, as underlining that the process of deepening and widening is not focusing on the concept, as they should do (Baldwin, 1997, p. 1).

Second, the process of Securitization is mainly focused on the speech act. How exactly one threat is gradually constructed over time is not analyzed profoundly. The third is that “the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats” to security (McDonald, 2008). Securitization becomes part of reality, only when there is the existence of danger and threat. All this defines the process of Securitization and the whole security politics as intrinsically a reactionary and negative. Besides this, the Securitization theory has been criticized for its focus on the macro-level approach for

the speech act and does not analyze the practices of security (McDonald, 2008, p. 568). Another shortcoming of the Securitization theory is that it is created on the base of liberal constitutional democracy and liberal standards.

There is a theoretical conflict about this Societal Security approach, which is mainly between the Copenhagen school's representatives (Buzan and Wæver) and McSweeney. According to the latter, not the collective identity should be studied, but the "identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, manipulating or affirming response to the demand – at times urgent, mostly absent - for a collective image (McSweeney, 1999, pp. 77-78)." McSweeney states that the identities are nothing but a discourse, but for the Copenhagen school identity is an existing thing, a concept that is real (Bilgin, 2010, p. 86).

1.4. METHODOLOGY

Through using the Critical Security Studies' framework and particularly the Securitization theory, the construction of security threat, this thesis aims to show how the Bulgarian state created the perception of the ethnic Turks as a potential threat to the national security. Pivotal historical events that are having a significant impact that leads to the ebb and flows of the Securitization process should be scrutinized in the historical background of the issue and the pivotal historical development during the Cold war, which are directly reflecting the Bulgarian perception of security.

For analyzing the process of constructing a security threat or an identity in the thesis is conducted a discursive analysis of the General Secretary of BCP – Todor Zhivkov's speeches and official Plenums of CC of BCP's documents, Party's official propaganda, and Archives from the Socialist period. This approach aims at showing how specific nouns or "things" are depicted in a particular way or specific features are being attached to their definition. Particularly the thesis analyzes how the BCP attempted to justify its policy towards the Bulgarian Muslims and Turks.

The main methods for this analysis are literature review and discourse analysis. In order, the context of the issue to be presented; this thesis analyzes Constitutions, bilateral international agreements, international treaties, policy documents, and

academic literature. In line with this, a discourse analysis of the securitization process of the Bulgarian Muslim minority by the BCP's political elite has been conducted. The thesis examines the emerging of the Bulgarian nation, the creation, and strengthening of the perception "we" (Bulgarians) and "they" (Pomaks and ethnic Turks) respectively the historical background of the Bulgarian minority policy and how it was shaped to reach the events from the 80s. During this analysis, the role of important events and issues is presented as the Balkan Wars and the creation of the Turkish Republic; during the Cold war period April's Plenum of BCP when and why the Communist Nationalism replaced the concept of Internationalism.

The construction of the security threat is analyzed using the Securitization theory approach. The political elite tries to accomplish a persuasion to the audience of the security definition. When this persuasion process is successful, it becomes a "truth", and the concept of security gains legitimacy. The change of the discourse is going to be shown by analyzing the BCP's minority policy. As the case study is the Revival process, the focus is going to be the minority policy of Bulgaria right after 1944, after April's Plenum of BCP in 1956, and the gradual replacement of the Internationalism as a concept. The Turkish military operation in Cyprus in 1973 is a huge benchmark for the Bulgarian security policy and the Securitization process of the Bulgarian Turkish minority. Here discourse analyzes the speeches of Todor Zhivkov after 1973, especially the one in 1981 is conducted. The Revival process is the main result of the Securitization policy of the Bulgarian authorities.

In the analysis of primary sources as Bulgarian Constitutions, BCP's archives, and BCP's official newspaper "Rabotnichesko Delo" are used. Besides them, the secondary sources consist of materials in Bulgarian, English, Turkish and Russian languages and provide of a wide spectrum of views on the analyzed issue.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BULGARIAN MINORITY POLICY BEFORE THE BCP'S REGIME

2.1. INTRODUCTION

There are considerations that Turkic groups were habituating in the Balkans before the Ottoman conquest (Karpát, K., Boztemur R., 2004, p. 386). Other stances are stating that the Turkic tribes were resettled by the Byzantine authorities to create a buffer zone between themselves and the Latin and Slav raids (Dayıoğlu, 2005, p. 56).

The widely accepted stance is that the origin of the Turks living in Bulgaria is the territory of contemporary Turkey and, more specifically, mid-Anatolia (Zheliaskova, 1990). Their resettlement was an official Ottoman Empire's policy that started in the middle of the fourteenth century. With this kind of policy, the Empire aimed at achieving a religious balance in the Balkans (Eminov, 1997, p. 77). The resettlement of Turkic groups during the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan was aiming at achieving security – to hold strategic corridors and secure the key cities (Acaroğlu, 2007, p. 35). Due to that the vast majority of the Turks living in contemporary Bulgaria are ancestors of the immigrants from Anatolia that settled down in 14th and 15th century (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 348).

In Bulgaria, the ethnic Turks live mainly in condensed communities in north-east regions of Dobrudzha and the Ludogorie (Deli Orman) and the territories adjacent to the border with the Republic Turkey on the Arda river basin around the biggest cities over there Kardzhali and Haskovo. They are the largest Muslim minority in Bulgaria. The Pomaks are the second largest and live mostly in the south-west (Pirin region) and Rhodope region, which means mainly South of Bulgaria. They are speaking the Bulgarian language, and their religion is Islam (Karpát, 1990, pp. 43-44).

Since the establishment of the Bulgarian state, the Muslim population was associated with the period of the Ottoman Empire's rule. Furthermore, the ethnic Turks later were linked with the newly-established Republic of Turkey, which undertook the role of being their “mother-country²⁰” after the Ottoman Empire. This cultural and

²⁰ “Anavatan” in Turkish

religious difference from the ethnic Bulgarians strengthened the perception and recalled the memory of the previous oppression. The process of interpretation of the “other” and the process of developing of the Bulgarian nationalism shaped the course of the Bulgarian policy toward the Muslim (Pomak and Turkish) minorities.

There has been differentiating policy toward the Muslim minorities²¹ in Bulgaria since the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria in 1878 until the Communist regime. Several moments are pivotal for the course of the Bulgarian state’s minority policy during this period. Those are the Unification of Principality of Bulgaria with East Rumelia in 1885; the Independence announced unilaterally by Bulgaria in 1908, the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913, First World War, and the date 09.09.1944 on which BCP (Bulgarian Communist Party) took the political power in Bulgaria.

Sofia conducted differing policies because of the complicated and rapidly shifting domestic and international political situation. The first assimilation attempt took place during the Bulgarian occupation during the Balkan wars of the Rhodope region, a huge part of Thrace and Pirin Macedonia. It was led by the Bulgarian church and by the IMRO (BMPO) upon the Pomak population over there (Ivanova, 2002). The process was named “The Baptism”²². That process created the model of the future assimilation practices undertaken by the Bulgarian state (Karpat, 1990, pp. 43-44). The change of their religion was shown as a one-sided voluntary act of the newly added Muslim population to the Bulgarian State. The back then Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Bulgaria Ivan Geshov announced that the state is standing behind the “struggle of the Cross against the Crescent (Karpat, 1990, pp. 43-44)”.

During the period between the wars (First World War – Second World War), there was no concrete policy toward the Bulgarian Muslim population. Since the beginning of the 20th century, state nationalism has tried to accomplish the goal of ethnical homogeneity and territorially united state and nation (Trifonov, 1993). The late 30s and the beginning of the 40s period were famous as the “inclusion” of the Pomak’s population.

²¹ Here I am talking about the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) and the Bulgarian Turks. Being aware of the problematization of those terms as the term “Pomak” is having negative connotation among the Bulgarian society as a perception of otherness. However in the thesis am going to use the officially accepted by the Bulgarian state terms: Bulgarian Muslims for the people that are Muslims and are speaking Bulgarian and Bulgarian Turks that are Muslims and are speaking Turkish, as the term Pomak is used as a synonym of Bulgarian Muslim.

²² In Bulgarian - Krastilkata

The policy towards minorities was shifting between attempts of integration and assimilation. A shift to harsher policy has been taken after “Zveno” took the political power in 1934. A lot of names of villages and cities that were still with their Ottoman names got changed to Bulgarian ones. Because of the still lingering turmoil and hatred from the violent assimilation process during the Balkan Wars, “Zveno” took a stance of supporting the emigration of those Bulgarian Muslims and Bulgarian Turks who want to leave the country. The goal of “Zveno” was to “lose” the most radical and devoted people, who obstacle the integration of those groups into the Bulgarian society. The plan was to be sent ethnic Bulgarians to the mixed regions with the idea of Turkish nationalistic influence to be curbed (Ministry of Interior, pp. 107-109).

That shifting policy is strengthening the perception among the Bulgarian Muslim population as the state is a hostile factor for the community. Sofia could not achieve the integration of that community, and this led to one lingering perplex issue, which later on the Communist regime inherited. The previously conducted ethnic policy by the “bourgeois” Governments was reputed; however, later on, it was ideologically resurrected and conducted again by the Communist regime. Gradually Bulgarian Turks were part of the integrational/assimilational strategy starting gradually from the late 50s until the zenith of the assimilation processes with the so-called “Revival process” starting in 1984 (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

2.2. MAIN FEATURES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BULGARIAN NATIONALISM

For the process of creating the perceptions of “us” and “them” to be explained, the complicated process of emergence of the ethnical belonging and the creation of Bulgarian nationalism should be analyzed.

The ethnical belonging is one of the aspects in the self-determination of the people – binding due to the shared ideology, or a belief based on the feeling of kinship and shared historical experience, common language, religion, and customs that often are invented. That makes the ethnical belonging one complicated entity. All those shared features should be perceived as a dominant factor for the group’s belonging – to

ethnicity (Todorova M. , 1992). According to the social anthropologist, Fredrik Barth the ethnic groups are categories for association and identification (Barth, 1998).

The process of construction of the nationalism as a new consciousness and ideology is one complicated fusion between the ethnic belonging with the statehood. Ethnicity and nationalism are not covering the same “territory” even though the nationalism emerges out of one ethnic core. At least this is the process in Western Europe as it has continually existing dynastic states. However, the process in the Balkans differs from this pattern (Todorova M. , 2010, p. 36).

The rise of nationalism is based on the tendencies of modernity (Gellner, 2008). The military rivalry among the states leads to a search for more resources and faster economic development. To reach the latter, one language should be in use in the state, and respectively in the educational process. This process meanwhile leads to conflicts linked to the use of solely one language (Gellner, 2008). The people using the same language perceived each other as different from other communities and started a struggle for taking the political and economic power to establish and rule a country by themselves. By linking the ethnic-based nation and the state leads to subordination and submission of the other nationalities living in that state. The majority has the power to provide or restrict their rights (Muller, 2008). This process of „concordance” between the state and its ethnic-based nation leads to voluntary migration of the minorities, forced deportation or transfer of population, and in some cases, leads to genocide (Muller, 2008).

The development of the Bulgarian ethnicity started approximately in the middle of the 18th century until 1878. Respectively, the development of the Bulgarian nationalism started from the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria in 1878. Using the approach developed by the Czech historian and political theorist Miroslav Hroch²³ and implying it on the Bulgarian national development's case, there are three stages in that process²⁴. The first one is the stage of scientific interest. During it, several Bulgarian people's histories were written from the middle of the 18th until the 20s of the 19th century. The most influential is the one of *Paisus of Hilendar*. The first books

²³ More info: Hroch, Miroslav. Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

²⁴ Taken from the Maria Todorova's thesis on the development of Bulgarian national self-perception

in spoken Bulgarian were published in that period. An urge appeared for a separation of the already existing Bulgarian-Greek schools and a creation of solely Bulgarian ones starting from the 20s of the 19th century.

The second one is the stage of national agitation. During that period, patriots are mobilized outside of the elite's circle. National agitation is the period of the so-called period of national awakening and revolution struggle as it is famous in the traditional Bulgarian historiography. This period consists of three traditional characteristics: movement for religious independence, a movement for the emancipation of the education, and a movement for political and national independence (Crampton, 1987). The first two movements are continuing more or less until the Crimea War (1853 – 1856).

The third stage is one of the massive national movements. In the 60s and the 70s, gradually emerged massive movement in two areas – independent church struggles and the struggle for political liberation. The church struggles were a depiction of a political issue rather than a religious one. The conflict among Bulgarians and Greeks roots from the process of the nascence of the Bulgarian ethnical consciousness and the conducted policy of the emerging Greek national state. In 1870 the independent Bulgarian Exarchate got established. This act is creating the religious division as a fundamental factor in the construction of the Bulgarian ethnicity. The political movement succeeded after April's rebellion in 1876 and the following Russo-Turkish War with the treaty of San Stefano and the Berlin congress as Bulgaria became Principality (Todorova M. , 2010).

Nationalism is a kind of patriotism that becomes widespread and dominant in certain conditions which are preponderating in the modern world - the last three-four centuries (Gellner, 2008, p. 138). The philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner states that the nation is created in complicated common social conditions under which there are created standardized homogenous and central supported high cultures which are not supported solely by the elite groups, but also by the masses. From this kind of historical development, under the influence of the standard educational process creates the perception of shared culture. This entity is the only one that the people are voluntarily identifying themselves with. According to him, only under these conditions, the nations can be defined as a will and as a culture (Gellner,

2008). The ethnic groups are transforming themselves into national states as a result of the triple revolution in the West – in the area of the division of labor, control upon the administration, and the cultural coordination (Smith A. D., 1986).

2.3. THE CREATION OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE “OTHER” AND THE PERCEPTION OF A THREAT

Mainly the Bulgarian nationalism is, by nature, a defensive one. It is because the neighboring states' nationalism was in a further phase of development than the Bulgarian one. This defensive position can be grasped by reading the Paisius of Hilendar's “Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya²⁵”. There the strong defensive pathos with the sense of humiliation and an inferiority complex intertwined with pride of glorious past (Hilendarski, 1972, p. 41).

The other main feature of Bulgarian nationalism is the language. It roots from the period even before the establishment of the state. The Bulgarian nation was juxtaposed to the Greek and Turkish ones, and the language was used as a dividing factor even before the religious one. The movement for establishing a national literary language emerged in the first half of the 19th century (Todorova M. , 2010).

The desire to take over the possession of the land that was a property of the Bulgarian Turks and Bulgarian Muslims intertwined with the nation-building process. Moreover, it was part of the consolidation of the Muslims living in Bulgaria into a minority community. Anna Mirkova states that the process of taking over the land started with the Tanzimat and the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, which was encouraging the ownership of individuals. Later the process of gaining control upon a land became a political question. Owning the land that was into the hands of Muslims was perceived as advancing and strengthening the perception of sovereignty among them (Mirkova A. , 2017, pp. 123-227).

The rise of the Bulgarian nationalism can be divided into three timely separated periods: The first one is the period of state nationalism and the idea of national unification (1878 – 1918), the second one is the crisis of nationalism, the revisionism

²⁵ From old Bulgarian - Slavic-Bulgarian History

(1918 - 1944) and the third is the Communism and Communist nationalism (1944 – 1989) (Todorova M. , 2010).

According to Barry Buzan (Buzan, 1991, pp. 65-66), there are three elements of the nation and the national security: the physical base – which is the territory and the people living on it which are in relatively unified form; the institutions of the state which are governing the physical base and the idea of the state which is providing the needed legitimacy among the people.

There is a link between territory and nationalism. Since the dynastic and religious loyalty lost the level of influence, nationalism with the process of sacralization of the territory provided a new way of political legitimization. The territory is a way to provide ethnic self-determination. The territory, which is a product of historical coincidence, is a depiction of the patriotic commitment, which is linked emotionally to the vast majority of the population. The national state's territory is perceived as an organic entity in which a possible division jeopardizes the very existence of the state and the nation (Pearson, 1983, pp. 20-21).

The territory is a fundamental part of the nationalism because it is an essential fundament of the nation-creation process. In order, one nation to be recognized as an existing one it needs a territory. The religion took the role of nationalism's final stronghold as it is in the Bulgarian case at the beginning of the Bulgarian nation's construction. The Bulgarian scenario is specific because the Bulgarian ethnic group had to distinguish itself from the rest of the Slavic and Muslim population. This happened while a complicated process of nation-building in parallel with the presence of religious (Islam) and national threat (Ottoman Empire). That development created rigid cooperation in the form of resistance among the local Bulgarian church (Bulgarian Exarchate) and the bearers of the nationalism – bourgeoisie (Pearson, 1983, p. 23). The first schools constructing the national identity were the ones linked to religion. The priests were self-proclaimed defenders of the national-consciousness (Pearson, 1983, p. 23). With the establishment of the modern state, it took the position of the church as the leading subject defending the nation.

Besides the religion, the language was a distinguishing trait for ethnic and later on national identity. It is part of the promotion of the monolith identity's construction with the establishment of a linguistic homogeneity on a particular territory that the nation is

located. That created the perception of identity among other states and the Bulgarian population (Pearson, 1983, p. 27).

Because of the use of different languages and different religion, those minority groups were not perceived as part of the Bulgarian nation. The policy towards Bulgarian Muslims and the Bulgarian Turks differed as, towards both of them, there was conducted assimilation policy with higher or lower intensity due to different factors (Muller, 2008). The undertaken policy differed due to the different levels of “otherness” of those two groups (Ivanova, 2002, p. 12”).

The widespread ethnonationalism among the Balkans and particularly in Bulgaria rooted in the perception that every nation should have its state and that every state must comprise members of only one nation. The members of that nation are linked to each other by the subjective as they comprise one broad family and are linked with their blood relations. While this subjective belief leads to the perception that there are “others”.

2.4. THE BULGARIAN STATE’S MINORITY POLICY BETWEEN 1878 AND THE END OF THE SECOND BALKAN WAR (1913)

The Principality of Bulgaria was established in 1878 with the Berlin treaty as an aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-78. Its territory was the Ottoman Danube vilayet which comprised of the old Ottoman sanjaks’ territories: Sofia, Vidin, Rusçuk (Ruse), Tirnova (Veliko Tarnovo), and Varna. With the same treaty, East Rumelia was established and comprised of Plovdiv’s (Filibe) and Sliven’s (İslimye) vilayets. In 1885 Principality of Bulgaria united with East Rumelia. With the next enlargement of the Bulgarian territory, which was after the end of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), it increased its territory, taking parts of the Rhodope region and West Thrace as before the enlargement the population over there in its vast majority was Muslim (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 25).

2.4.1. The Muslims in Bulgaria and the Change in their Population

The Bulgarian nation is defined mostly with language unity. Officially the separate Bulgarian millet was recognized in 1870 under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate. In this way, Bulgarian ethnic borders were defined, and this was one serious step to political independence. Ottoman empire recognized the Bulgarian millet as a part of the Orthodox community. However, it had developed ethnic self-awareness opposing the Greeks based on the difference in the language. The position of the language become focal in the future development of Bulgarian's nationalism as that is why there was a difference in the perception of the Bulgarian political elites toward the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) and the Bulgarian Turks. The first minority group does not know Turkish, and that is why they were considered as Bulgarians, as a part of the Bulgarian nation (Todorova M. , 2010).

Before the eruption of the Russo-Turkish war 1877-1878, the population of the later established Principality of Bulgaria state was ethnically very diverse. In the whole Tuna (Danube) vilayet from 1.233.500 non-Muslims, there were 1.130.000 Bulgarian, and juxtaposing this number, the Muslim population was around 1.120.000 (Alp, 1990, p. 3). Later on, officially, the Muslims that were living in Bulgaria in 1910 were 602 072. In Dobrudzha itself, the Muslims were 166 565, as there was one of the territories with a majority of a Muslim population.

According to the documents in 1911 (before the eruption of the Balkan wars), the Muslim population in the territories that became part of Bulgaria afterward was 327 732 (Zelengora, 2013). According to the Turkish sources, the Muslim population was around 90% Turkish, and the rest were Pomaks as they were perceived as Turks as well (Alp, 1990, p. 1). After the Second Balkan War²⁶ and the First World War in 1920, their number was 216 634, as the difference is 111 098 people (Alp, 1990, p. 1). The vast majority of those people decided to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire. In 1920 when Dobrudzha is not part of Bulgaria anymore, the total number of Muslims living in Bulgaria was 474 100. Since the Muslims from the new territories were 216

²⁶ More information about the emigrational movements and the policy of Bulgaria towards its Muslim population during the Balkan Wars see: Höpken, W. (2018). 'Modern Wars' and 'Backward Societies'. The Balkan Wars in the History of 20th Century European Warfare. In Boeckh, K.; Rutar, S.; (Eds.) The Wars of Yesterday: The Balkan Wars and the Emergence of Modern Military Conflict, 1912-13. New York, 2018, pp. 19 – 90.

634, then the overall Muslim population in Bulgaria became 690 734. However, the Muslim population from the old territory of Bulgaria got increased with 38 584 Muslims, which marks an increase of 8.86% in those ten years. It has to be taken under an account that the Muslims in Bulgaria did not take part in the Balkan Wars as they were freed of duty (Zelengora, 2013).

According to the statistics that are providing information from the next years in 1926, the Muslim population was 789 296 (14.4% from the whole population). Out of that number, the Bulgarian Turkish population numbered 577 555. In 1934 the Bulgarian Turks numbered 618 268, and the whole Muslim population was 821.298. It comprised 13.5% of the whole population (Alp, 1990, p. 1).

Considering the Muslims' emigration starting from 1883, five years after the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria in the scope of 6 months, 250 thousand Turks left Bulgaria as this is an example of the so-called by Roger Brubaker "postimperial migration (Brubejkar, 2004, p. 167)". There was another wave due to the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and East Rumelia in 1885 as was again part of that type of migration. The Turkish intelligentsia (as architects, army officers, and teachers) almost entirely left Bulgaria. The people that stayed were the mainly illiterate ones who were mostly farm workers. During the Russo-Turkish war from 1877-78, for example, with the Russian army's invasion was in advance, the Bulgarians were taking over the Turkish/Muslim homes. During the invasion, an enormous amount of mosques, schools, and homes were demolished. In the years until 1886, most of the Turkish teachers left Bulgaria, and this is going to be a problem reflecting the ethnic policy of Bulgaria in the next years. More than 1500 medreses (Muslim theological school) and Turkish schools were demolished (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 44). The Turkish population that stayed inside of the borders of Bulgaria was mainly uneducated and did not have the resources to influence the Bulgarian state. Regularly there are reported cases of conducted assaults toward the Bulgarian Turks' villages to make them emigrate and *to seize their property afterward* (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 44) as it was a movement for imposing sovereignty upon that newly joined territories to the Bulgarian Principality.

In 1900 the Muslim population in Bulgaria was approximately 600 000 people, as that was 15% of the whole population in Bulgaria back then. Several restricting factors

were constraining the Bulgarian state from taking harsher policies of assimilation towards its Muslims. Bulgaria up until 1908 was official “an autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire (Berlin treaty, 1878) /Article 1/”. Moreover, the newly established modern Bulgarian state should consider its policy by taking into account the conditions of the Berlin treaty. One of the most perplexing issues was one of its Muslim population. Firstly the Orthodox Slavic population, mainly in Macedonia and the Muslim in Bulgaria, was perceived as reciprocal for the Bulgarian political elite (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 470). However, there was an emerging problem as, on the one hand, enhancing the political and individual civil rights provides the higher possibility of political mobilization, which can prompt requests for political autonomy. On the other hand, this maintains the possibility of future separation (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 470).

The good treatment of the Bulgarian Muslim population provided leverage in the hands of the Bulgarian political elite, and this led to strengthening the position of the Bulgarian Exarchate. It was one of the leading institutions that were enhancing the Bulgarian influence in Macedonia. The headquarters of the Exarchate remained in Istanbul until the turmoil created during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) ceased (Methodieva, 2014, p. 227).

Indeed many privileges were provided by the Bulgarian state to its Muslim population. They not only had the freedom of religion, but also, according to the Bulgarian legislation, they also had the right “to administer their internal religious affairs, to elect muftis, and maintain connections with the spiritual authorities in Istanbul (Methodieva, 2014, p. 227).” Moreover, they were able to skip military service by paying a fee. Like the rest of the minority schools, the Muslim schools were private ones, and they were the only private schools that could receive state funding (Methodieva, 2014, p. 227). The politicians in Bulgaria were taking advantage of this undertaken policy as depicting the state as a tolerant and modern one. That conducted policy was showing the Bulgarian supreme culture, which provides that much freedom to its minorities. Berlin treaty (articles 4 and 5) (Berlin treaty, 1878) and the Bulgarian Constitution (Articles 9 and 12) (Bulgarian Grand National Assembly, 1879) provided legislative freedom of the minorities. The discrimination based on nationality or religion was prohibited. The freedom of religion established and guaranteed the future existence of equal political and civil rights for all citizens of Bulgaria, regardless of their religion

or nationality. Despite that, the Bulgarian state was often interfering in the process of electing municipal Muftis.

However, the Bulgarian state was demolishing mosques and graveyards while justifying its actions by enforcing new urban plans. Those actions created a dubious perception of the Bulgarian tolerant culture. Moreover, there were growing cases of verbal and physical violence towards the Muslim population in Bulgaria. Among those examples were the acts against Muslim sacred places, cemeteries, and schools such as throwing pieces of pork at them. The conducted violence is also a response to the suffering of their kin (Slavic Orthodox population) that was still under Ottoman rule, especially during and after the subdue of the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising (Ivanova, 2002, p. 34). The public outrage towards the Ottoman Empire was directed at the Muslim population of Bulgaria (Methodieva, 2014, p. 233) .

Meanwhile, there was an ongoing process of creation of orientalist discourse towards the Muslims living in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. This discourse resembled the colonial powers' one but with its distinctive features. The Bulgarians perceived themselves due to that superior and, via its policy, were having a civilizational mission. That higher culture of the Bulgarians was aiming to provide a significant effect on the Muslim population. Here the base of the future secularization was constructed. Gradually there was an emerging image of the Muslims as a religious fanatic and were unable to live in a modern cultured country (Methodieva, 2014, p. 228). Bulgaria state continued providing rights and freedoms to its Muslim population to create a positive image of itself among the European powers and earn some prerogatives, as a support for the future territorial enlargement toward Macedonia. Moreover was trying to show the cultural backwardness of the Ottoman Empire by emphasizing its policy toward its Slavic Orthodox population (Methodieva, 2014, p. 228).

2.4.2. The Role of the Bulgarian – Turkish Bilateral Relations into the Bulgarian Minority Policy

After the colossal devastation, the massive influx of refugees, and international and Bulgarian turmoil after the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie uprisings (1903) Ottoman Empire

did not have a choice but to accept the Mürzsteg reform program²⁷, which should be implemented under Russian and Austria-Hungarian supervision. That made the relations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire tightened. Even though they signed a friendship treaty, they continued blaming each other for not being compliant with the reform program of the program (Methodieva, 2014, p. 222).

Meanwhile, there were continually emerging rumors of Sofia's mistreatment of its Muslim population. This information created additional tension in Macedonia and enhanced the hostile treatment of the Macedonian Muslims towards the "Slavophone Christians"²⁸.

2.4.2.1. Bulgarian State's Attempt to the Integration of its Minority with Identity Policy

To overcome this international image and to cool down the tensions in Macedonia, Bulgaria undertook a project of creating a brochure aiming to show that the Muslim population in Bulgaria had a good and peaceful life (Methodieva, 2014, p. 224). In that brochure, it could be read about the beautiful life of the Muslim population in Bulgaria, and also a new theory of the origin of the Bulgarian Turks.

It also underscored the ethnic bonds between Turks and Bulgarians. Nevertheless, contrary to what might have been anticipated from a Bulgarian-backed enterprise, the booklet stressed the Bulgarians' Turkish character linking it to the Turkic Bulgars who founded the first Bulgarian state in the seventh century.

(Methodieva, 2014, p. 225)

Besides this, the brochure stated that the Turkish speaking Muslims in Bulgaria are simply descendants of those Turkic Bulgarians who had converted to Islam. It was underlined that they have not come to Bulgarian's territories after the Ottoman conquest. However, their identity re-emerged through the contacts with the Ottomans through the language and their ethnicity traits. Even though that process, the author of the brochure emphasizes the continuum of their affinity towards their Christian

²⁷ More info: Akhund, N. *Stabilizing a Crisis and the Mürzsteg Agreement of 1903: International Efforts to Bring Peace to Macedonia*, Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 3 (2014): pp. 587–608

²⁸ Term taken from Milena Metodieva, which aims at describing the orthodox population in Macedonia which was an object of the foreign policy of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece with the goal to enlarge its territory

brothers (Methodieva, 2014, p. 236). However, the brochure was not published due to the Governmental change in Bulgaria.

The propaganda in the brochure explains extensively those that Bulgarian Muslims learned Turkish right after the Ottoman Empire decided to send and settle the Turkic speaking population to the Balkans. That was the pivotal development in which the Muslims living in Bulgaria remerged and strengthened their identity and learned Turkish. The modern Bulgarian state is liberal and tolerant because of this close ethnic connection between Turks and Bulgarians (Methodieva, 2014, p. 236).

Bulgarian state's tolerance was shown in the booklet, mainly by providing statistical information about the Muslim religious and cultural institutions, and its leaders and emphasized on their parliamentary representation. Moreover, Muslim religious education existed in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian state wanted to parry the prevailing perception among the Ottoman Empire and the European states of the mistreatment of Bulgaria's Muslim population. For example, the information provided occasionally by the Bulgarian press as acts of violence of Bulgarians toward Muslims was stated as wrongly interpreted, and Sofia reprimanded the press of distorting the real situation as it is frequently just a verbal spat between neighbors (Methodieva, 2014, p. 238).

Even though the brochure was not published, it shows how the treatment of the Muslims in Bulgaria was a hugely politicized and how the newly emerging theories about the origins of the Muslims living in Bulgaria fit or adjust themselves to the Bulgarian national narratives. It shows the close coordinated work between the Bulgarian authorities and the Young Turks movement (Methodieva, 2014, p. 226). The propaganda booklet supports the provided information by using authentic documents (Bulgarian constitution and the Berlin treaty) simply by distorting the facts as successful propaganda does²⁹. To strengthen the perception of the existing ethnic bond between the Turks and Bulgarians as a fundamental part of the nation-building process, the Turkic theory of the Bulgar's origin was used. However, this theory was widely not accepted by the ethnic Bulgarians. It was the most supported among the

²⁹ For more information about the propaganda and how a successful propaganda is being created – Jacques Ellul, "Propaganda: The formation of Men's attitudes" Retrieved from: https://monoskop.org/images/4/44/Ellul_Jacques_Propaganda_The_Formation_of_Mens_Attitudes.pdf

academic establishment in Europe and Bulgaria at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, this hypothesis of the non-Slavic origin of the Bulgarians did not gain support among the Bulgarians. The popular perception about the Pomaks (Bulgarian Muslims) was the heir of the forced Bulgarians to change their religion to Islam during the Ottoman period (Ivanova, 2002, p. 46).

2.4.2.2. Young Turks and the Bulgarian State - The Emergence of the Security Threat

A group of medical students in Istanbul created an organization called the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889. The organization was against the sultan Abdülhamid's rule (1876-1909) and was uniting several groups united by this common goal. As the Ottoman authorities exposed the organization in 1894-95 massive number of its supporters fled to the neighboring countries (as Western Europe and Egypt, which was occupied by Great Britain). Most of those people stayed in exile until the revolution in 1908 as they operated from there. Before the revolution erupted, in 1902, CUP went through a crisis that ended up with a division into the organization. The more radical members created the Committee of Progress and Union in 1906 (CPU) in Paris. To become stronger politically, it found an ally into the face of the Ottoman Freedom Society (OFS) as those two organizations established a union in 1907. The newly created organization was the one that performed the revolution in 1908. They tried hard to enhance their network in Macedonia as the territory is going to be crucial in future political development. At that time, Bulgaria was the dominant center of the political activity of the Young Turks. The organization's members operating inside of Bulgaria were Turkish migrants and Bulgarian Muslims (Methodieva, 2014, p. 246).

This open cooperation between the Young Turks and the Bulgarian state at the beginning of the 20th century is not surprising. They had a common opponent – the Istanbul government. However, it was palpable to perceive that they were not considering each other as long term allies. Bulgaria was considering territorial extension toward Macedonia and Thrace. On the other side, Young Turks desired to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire's territory (Methodieva, 2014, p. 246).

Despite the cooperation between the two sides, the Young Turks were executing activities that were contrary to the Bulgarian interests. There were two crucial points on which the two sides had a conflict. Young Turks were always expressing concern about the way the Bulgarian state treated its Muslim population. The second one is that they were against the Bulgarian territorial aspirations towards Macedonia. Those views Young Turks have expressed in their publications abroad and Bulgaria. While the organization was becoming more influential in Bulgarian territory, this process inevitably affected the Muslim population. It established a movement for cultural reform and political mobilization among Bulgaria's Muslims. This movement made the Bulgarian authorities uneasy as, according to them, Young Turks' stances might instigate rebellious behavior among the Bulgarian Muslims. Because of this and also that Young Turk's political future was not sure, Bulgaria sided with the regime of Abdulhamid the Second when the Revolution erupted in 1908 (Methodieva, 2014, p. 246). The Bulgarian political elite was using the Young Turks as bargaining leverage in the bilateral relations Bulgaria – Ottoman Empire.

For example, in 1896 Ottoman Empire officially recognized Ferdinand (1887-1918) as Bulgarian prince, and the next year, it provided permission for the establishment of three Bulgarian bishoprics in Macedonia and besides that permitted opening of Bulgarian trade agencies in the European part of the Ottoman Empire. As an expression of gratitude Stoilov's cabinet restrained the activities of the Young Turk's organization due to Ottoman requests for doing so. However, it has never eradicated it to continue using the organization for leverage while negotiating with the Ottoman Empire (Methodieva, 2014, p. 247).

2.4.2.3. The Bilateral Relations between the Unilateral Announcement of the Bulgarian Independence and the Balkan Wars

Unilaterally Bulgaria announces its independence on 22.09.1908, and this is starting a new chapter of the policy towards its Muslim population. Primary specifics of the beginning of that period are that the Balkan states were preparing themselves for the future Balkan wars and the Young Turks revolution was about to start.

On 19.04.1909, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed the Istanbul protocol with which the latter recognized the Bulgarian Independence. Besides the recognition, there was a new accord between the two states. Bulgarian kingdom took a

responsibility to respect and secure its minority's rights and freedoms. Moreover, it took the responsibility to provide enough money for Turkish schools. Besides this, the Mufti was attached to the located in Istanbul's Seyhülislam³⁰ (Methodieva, 2014, p. 259).

According to the signed Protocol and accord, the Bulgarian Muftiate was the organization of the Bulgarian Turk's minority and was regulated both by Bulgarian and Ottoman Empire's side. The Turkish schools in Bulgaria were under the supervision of the Muftiate. According to the additional protocol, its members were going to be elected among the muftis living in Bulgaria. The institution is going to be the bridge between the Bulgarian Ministry of Confessional Affairs and the Ottoman Empire's Şeyhülislam (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 482). In 1909 (the same year), the Bulgarian Government accepted a new law for the national education with which the state control upon the minority's schools got increased (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 482)³¹.

On the 29th of September 1913, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty after the Second Balkan War. It emphasized on the Turkish minority and the status of the Bulgarian Mufti. According to the seventh article of the treaty, the Turks, living on the territories that became part of Bulgaria have the opportunity to acquire Ottoman citizenship in the scope of four years. The ones who decide to undertake this step were obliged to leave Bulgaria in the scope of 4 years (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 485).

In the eighth article of the treaty, the word Muslim was used instead of Turk. The Muslim minority in Bulgaria was pronounced as equal to Bulgarians, having the same political and religious rights. Their traditions and customs should be treated with respect. According to the immovable property of the Muslims who decide to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire can rent it out. They can let the third person take care of it as well. The property of the religious institutions was their private property, and this had to be respected by the Bulgarian state (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 485).

Besides the peace treaty, there was a second additional agreement. It was regulating the Bulgarian Muftiate. Its Chief is going to take the role of intermediating institution

³⁰ The Grand Mufti's title during the Ottoman Empire from 14th to 20th century

³¹ Закон за Народното Просveshtenie, Darzhaven vestnik; Закон за Народното Просвещение, Държавен Вестник 05.03.1909, No. 49

between the Bulgarian Ministry of Confessional Affairs, located in Istanbul Şeihülislam, and the Bulgarian muftis.

The change of the role was possible due to the more detailed provided provisions of the head of the Mufti from the ones described in the Istanbul protocol from 1909. For example, according to the schools, the muftis can inspect the commission of the Bulgarian Turk's schools and observe the activity of the educational institutions. Moreover, the Muftiate can take steps for new schools to be opened. The expenses for building them are going to be covered by the Bulgarian state. Moreover, the wages of the Turkish teachers are going to be paid by Sofia. The primary language in those schools is going to be Turkish. However, the Bulgarian language was planned to be taught as well (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 487).

The Bulgarian state was obligated to recognize the legal entity of the Bulgarian Turk's community. The government was not going to impose its will and meddle into the policy of the Muslim foundations. Bulgarian state did not have the right to expropriate any foundation's mosque, graveyard, and charitable organization's properties without paying a fee. In a case a building which is a Muslim's foundation's (waqf's) property was expropriated, a land with the same value should be provided in return, and also the state should give the cash price of the building (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 487). This peace treaty and convention (agreement) are a development of the Istanbul protocol from 1909. The position between the two countries after the two Balkan wars became different because Bulgaria was the defeated one.

2.5. CRISIS OF THE NATIONALISM: REVISIONISM 1918 – 1944

According to the international treaty framework that created the image of the Bulgarian Muslims' population (Pomaks and Turks), they were perceived as one homogenous group to the Bulgarian Ministry of Confessional Affairs. On the other side, the first Bulgarian Constitution provided religious freedoms, political rights, and equality before the law equal to every Bulgarian citizen despite ethnic or religious belonging. That created the issue of group rights defense on the international level and the individual rights defense on the state-level (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 472).

Already in the 1890s, Young Turks activists had started questioning the central place of the Muslim Confessional Councils as a representative of the Muslim collective identification. They were criticizing the Ottoman political elite for conducting a policy for maintaining the Ottoman Islamic culture and heritage in the Bulgarian state. By doing so, the Turkish-speaking Muslims in Bulgaria were at a lower level of development compared to the ethnic Bulgarian (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 472).

Bulgaria is facing two national catastrophes after the Second Balkan War (1913) and the First World War (1918). It did not succeed in expanding its territory toward Macedonia, as this was its primary focus. Sofia's irredentist idea roots from the depicted with the Treaty of San Stefano's territory of the Bulgarian state. Bulgaria faced a massive economic crisis and a wave of social problems due to the considerable amount of immigrants from the neighboring countries. This makes the Neuilly Peace Treaty in 1919 as what was the Treaty of Versailles for Germany (Todorova M. , 2010).

As a repercussion of this historical development was a "humiliating" nationalism. Once again an identity discourse of the Bulgarian nation was used this time to justify the union with Germany during the First World War. The Huns' theory of the Bulgarian ethnogenesis opposed the Slavic one (Todorova M. , 2010).

2.5.1. The Rule of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 1919 – 1923

The Kingdom of Bulgaria³² was on the losing side at the end of the First World War. As an aftermath of the war, Bulgaria was in a political crisis which led to the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union of Aleksandar Stamboliyski's rule. Bulgarian Turks were able to live more peacefully in this period and celebrate even broader rights. There were two main reasons for this change of policy towards Bulgaria's Muslim minorities: the development of international legislation in their defense and the power struggle in

³² Which was established on 5 October 1908 as before that Bulgaria was Principality;

Bulgarian politics. Almost all of the Bulgarian Turks/Muslims were farmers. Due to that, in order Stamboliyski to secure its political power, his party undertook a softer policy toward them (Ivanova, 2002, p. 19).

Prime Minister Stamboliyski signed the Neuilly Peace Treaty on 27.11.1919. It consisted of nine articles as the fourth one was primarily about the protection of the Bulgarian minorities' rights. The Bulgarian government accepted the signed treaty as having the legitimacy and legality as the Bulgarian Constitution. Moreover, the Bulgarian minorities were under the protection by the League of Nations, and their rights and freedoms could not be breached */Article 57/* (Treaty of Neuilly, 1919). Turkish population, as the most populous minority in Bulgaria, was having the highest priority.

According to the treaty, the members of the Bulgarian minorities can become civil servants, have all the rights to follow their religion, to use their native language. They had the right to establish social, charitable, religious, and educational organizations, had the right to be their leader and to use their language in doing so. All those organizations are going to be financially supported by the Bulgarian state */Article 54-55/* (Treaty of Neuilly, 1919). They have all the right to follow their religion and to establish their organizations unless this did not bring damage to any Bulgarian */Article 53/* (Treaty of Neuilly, 1919).

Besides the Neuilly peace treaty, evidence about the change of the minority policy is the new Law for Education (21 July 1921). According to it, the Bulgarian Turks have broader freedom in choosing their teachers, the teaching of Bulgarian is removed, and the Bulgarian state took the commitment to provide financial help in building Turkish schools. However, the books used in the schools should be printed in Bulgaria, and the ones imported from Ottoman Empire were not accepted as legitimate for use in the educational process as they had chauvinist ideas (Ivanova, 2002, p. 21).

Later on, Turkey – Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship was signed at the capital of the newly established Turkish Republic - Angora on the 18th of October, 1925. This treaty is an aftermath of the Lausanne agreement of 23.07.1923. With this treaty, both Bulgaria and Turkey accept all the text that is concerning the minority's rights. That treaty is everlasting, and in a case minority's rights are being limited or breached, the

other state has the right to require cessation of the conducted policy (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 479).

On the same day, when the Bilateral Treaty of Friendship was signed, a Residence Agreement was signed as well. According to the first article, Turkish citizens have the right to settle in Bulgaria and the opposite. The citizens of the two states can visit the other country freely (Şimşir B. , 2012, pp. 491 - 492). An essential part of the Agreement is that the two states are accepting that Bulgarian Turks and the Turkish Bulgarians can freely decide to migrate and that the state is going to provide all the necessary procedures to make the process go fluently. If they decide to migrate, they can take all the movable property with them, and they have a period of 2 years to sell their immovable property. If this does not happen into the scope of the provided period, the real estate is going to be liquidated by the state (Şimşir B. , 2012).

On the other hand, the nationalistic inclination of the Young Turks' movement was vexing the Bulgarian state authorities. However, Sofia was using the movement as leverage against the Ottoman Empire. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, this fear increased rapidly on the base of Turkish nationalism and Kemalist (Mirkova A. M., 2009). This fear made the Bulgarian authorities strengthen the ethnic Turk's conservative identity or, at least to make them potentially unfaithful Young Turks. Those Bulgarian Muslims that stated that were supporting the preservation of the Ottoman Islamic culture under the patronage of the Bulgarian state were perceived as being less threatening to the national sovereignty. Therefore Sofia perceived the processes in the Republic of Turkey and its following spread of Young Turks' ideas across the Muslims living in Bulgaria as a treat to its national security (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 473).

The emigration process became more accessible and more regulated for the first time between the two countries after the legislative change. After the agreement, there was a constant flow of migrants towards Turkey as, since 1930 on each year, there were between 15 and 20 thousand migrants. However, after the change of the regime in Bulgaria in 1944, that Agreement ceased its application. Between 1935 and 1940, exactly 95.494 Turks emigrated. However, their overall number did not diminish because the birth rate was high. On 07.09.1940, South Dobrudzha was returned to Bulgaria with the Treaty of Craiova between Romania and Bulgaria. In

that territory, there was a substantial ethnic Turkish population, which numbered 65.437 and in addition to that there were 3.958 Tatars. As South Dobrudzha joined the territory of Bulgaria, the overall Turkish population numbered around 705 000, and the overall Muslim population increased to 910 thousand (Ivanova, 2002, p. 27).

2.5.2. Development of the Cultural and Social Organizations of the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks and Turks)

2.5.2.1. The Situation of the Turkish Schools

After the unification between Bulgaria and East Rumelia in 1885, the situation with the Turkish schools took a different direction. New schools got opened, and according to the statistics, the highest number of schools was in Shumen, Varna, Razgrad, Ruse, and Silistra. It is because, during the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the Russian army did not enter into that region (South Dobrudzha). Due to that, the majority of the Turkish schools in over there were preserved (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 45).

Bulgarian state created private schools with the law for “Official and Private Schools” in 1884 to present more extensive rights for the minorities. However, the funding has been different³³ according to the minority group (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 49). Despite that, different languages were able to be used while teaching in those private schools, Bulgarian language, Bulgarian history, and geography were obligatory subjects.

According to the Bulgarian statistic between the years 1894 and 1910, there were active around 1300 Turkish schools as the number of the teachers was around 1500, and the number of the students started with 72 582 and dropped to 63 033. In the school years 1921/22, there were 1 713 schools, and 2 113 teachers were working at them with 60 540 students. At 1923/24 the numbers were as follow: 1 688 / 2 350 / 77 559 and in the next year where there is available statistic is during the Socialist

³³ For example, for the 1894/95 school year for the Tatar schools, the amount of the state funding has been 144 leva (the lowest amount of money provided by the state), for the Armenian schools the amount provided was 2.946 leva. For the Jewish schools, it was 5.074 leva

period 1949/1950 school year as the overall number of schools was decreased to 1 199, the number of teachers increased to 3 037, and the number of students reached 100 276 people (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 32).

2.5.2.2. Muftiate

The Muftiate is one of the oldest organizations of the Bulgarian Muslims. This institution was dealing with the huge specter of duties as organizing and observing the imams working at the mosques, besides this was organizing and observing their work into the towns. At last, it was the institution which was executing the sharia law.

The Berlin Treaty and the first Bulgarian Constitution provided freedoms of religion and denomination to the minorities. Like that, the Bulgarian Muftiate continued existing in the new political reality. However, significant institutional changes were made. On 02.07.1880, with a new decree (*ukaz*) made by the Bulgarian Prince, the system of “*kadilik*” was removed, and the duties of the judges (*kadi*) were transferred to the muftis. That means that the muftis were not going to handle only religious issues, but also judicial ones. The system was as follows: the muftis were going to be elected by the local Muslim community (*cemaat*), and afterward, they were appointed by the Bulgarian state. They were going to take a wage from the latter (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 77). Despite the rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian Muftiate secured by the Berlin Treaty and the first Bulgarian Constitution, the Bulgarian state soon after started imposing its political will as removing from position one mufti and assigning another one as this was the situation in Rusçuk (Ruse) (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 77).

In the following years, the Bulgarian Government was trying to put the Muftiate under its control by appointing the muftis working at it. The idea was to counter the influence of Turkey and Atatürk’s ideas. For example, in the school year 1928/29 in the Turkish schools, the education started with using the new Latinized alphabet that was returned to the Ottoman script. The use of the Muftiate by the Bulgarian political elite in the 30s became more evident. The reason for this was an attempt to counter the development of Kemalism and Turkish nationalism among the Bulgarian Turks and to curb the process of Turkization of the Bulgarian Muslims. This process was

enhanced by some of the 150 influential people that the new regime of Atatürk banished (Şimşir B. , 2012, pp. 85-86).

2.5.2.3. The First Bulgarian Turk's National Congress Conveyed in 1929

On that congress, the problem with the Muftiate was discussed extensively. Moreover, the Bulgarian state policy was criticized as the state was inflicting pressure on the election process for Muftiate members. A new way of electing members of the Muftiate was presented. However, the Bulgarian state continued using the Muslim institution as a way to accomplish its state goals (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 85). This policy is especially valid for the new political Communist regime³⁴ as it used the same methods with a more substantial imposing effect (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 86).

2.5.2.4. Union of the Turkish Teachers (Türk Öğretmenler Birliği)

During the period of the Principality of Bulgaria (1878-1909), the system of the Turkish schools was relatively disorganized. Every single school has been organizing itself, and there was no existing standardized school program for all the Turkish schools. The idea of this union came out of the Young Turks. Some of those people went to Bulgaria and started working there. Meanwhile, several Turkish newspapers were published, and at the beginning of the 20th century, half of them were a platform of or were a member of the movement Young Turks/Jön Turkler (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 108).

The Union of the Turkish teachers was established in 1906 during a congress at Shumen as it started conveying in different cities as in 1907 at Ruse (Rusçuk) and 1908 in Varna. During the congresses, the Union was trying to solve all kinds of questions as creating a unified school program for the whole Principality of Bulgaria,

³⁴ The new regime was using the members of the Mufti as a tool to spread its propaganda and to impede the spread of the pro-Turkish ideas. Sofia's Mufti together with the rest of the regional muftis during the rule of BCP, is helping the Bulgarian institutions during the process of changing the Muslim-Turkic names into Slavic ones

the preparation of the school books, and their content. After the Bulgarian independence in 1908, it started operating in whole Bulgaria. In 1928 it changed its name into Türk Muallimler Cemiyeti. It started spreading the ideas of the Atatürk in the schools trying to provide education similar to the one in the Republic of Turkey. During the congress at Lom in 1928, a decision for a transition to the new Turkish alphabet was taken. After the congress in Ruse in 1933, the union was closed by the Bulgarian authorities because of fears of the Kemalism's spread (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 111).

2.5.2.5. Turkish Sports Union/Association "Turan"

Several pro-Kemalist organizations were established after the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913. Besides that considerable amount of Turkish Youth sports clubs got created after the Turkish War of Independence, the signing of the Lozan treaty, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic – all of them in the period 1923-1924 (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 111).

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, they proceeded to unite and create the organization "Turan" (Gruev, 1999, p. 220)³⁵. At the end of 1925, Kemalist groups started conducting political trips from Turkey to Bulgaria with the purpose of scouting and enhancing the organizational activity. A secret committee was established in the border with Bulgaria at Edirne, which allegedly was aiming at obtaining the Rhodope region as a long-term goal (Gruev, 1999, p. 220).

The "Turan" youth received an education in the direction to be a staunch supporter of Atatürk's principles. There was a special uniform for the members of the union, and it was similar to the uniform imposed by Atatürk in 1925. The union became that widespread that was establishing branches in the villages as well. It was supported by a massive amount of "Kemalist" newspapers, and some wealthy Turkish communities started supporting the "Turan" Union financially. That is how it developed rapidly and spread around the whole county's territory and was having its

³⁵ Gruev, Michail, "Balgariite miusiulmani i kemalistkoto dvizhenie v Rodopite" (Bulgarian Muslims and the Kemalist Movement in the Rhodope Region), *Moderniiat Istorik: vaobrazhenie, informiranost, pokoleniia* (The Modern Historian: Imagination, Knowledge, Generations), Sofia: IK Daniela Ubenova, p. 220

propaganda literature, newspapers, and even reading halls (Şimşir B. , 2012, pp. 113-117). It was focusing not only on the physical development of the youth but also on their education. The Union was trying to follow the development of Turkey's Atatürk youth.

Sofia's Mufti was taking antagonistic positions to the Kemalist actions. In 1931 the Chief Mufti accused the board of the Turkish school in Kardzhali of being an instrument of the Turkish government (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 474). That position was overlapping with the Bulgarian political elite, which was considering the Kemalist activities as disrespectful and even rejection of Bulgarian national sovereignty. Kemalist supporters and opponents had a problem with two main educational concerns – the substitution of the Arabic transcript with Latinized one and whether there should be religious teaching and whether the Western educational program should be undertaken (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 474).

The Turkish Republic was financing the Bulgarian Kemalist organizations. The association called "Trakya," which was a Bulgarian nationalist one became suspicious about the Turan Union's activities and goals. Bulgarian state became distrustful as well as in 1932 did not permit the year congress to be held in Kardzhali as the vast majority of its population is comprised of ethnic Turks and is located in the vicinity with Turkey. As an aftermath of this perception of threat to national security, the Bulgarian state closed it down in 1934. Before its closing down, Turan Union had 95 branches and 5000 active members across Bulgaria (Şimşir B. , 2012, pp. 119-120).

Several years later, in 1939, the chief of the Lom Township police wrote a pivotal report that shows the specific aim of educating the Muslims. It was to create an "obedient and loyal citizens, suffused with a feeling of fidelity and attachment to our state (Ivanova, 2002)". This policy meant that Muslims are receiving freedom choosing their curricula as far as they were becoming loyal citizens of Bulgaria and were observed by the Chief Mufti.

On the 19th of May 1934, the right-wing nationalistic organization "Zveno" took over the political power with a coup d'état. Its rule resembled the authoritarian style of the ruling of the parties in Germany and Italy during that period. "Zveno" changed the names of several places that were inhabited mostly by Turks and also changed the

names of several locations that were still in Turkish (Sabev, 2012, p. 125). In the sphere of culture until 1934, there was a substantial Turkish state's influence among the Muslim population in Bulgaria. Turkey was sending a considerable amount of books, magazines, and newspapers to Bulgaria. The publishment of the local Turkish newspapers was stopped by "Zveno". Moreover, the Bulgarian authorities forbade the import of books and magazines from the Republic of Turkey.

In the 30s, the state was conducting scrutinizing research on the materials published in the periodicals of all minorities in Bulgaria. In the case of the ethnic Turks, they have been divided into the categories Kemalists (Young Turks), Old Turk, and independent ones. The ones that were Kemalist and were implying the need for strengthening of the Turkish national identity were sometimes sanctioned and always under monitoring. For example, the Turkish newspaper *İstikbal* was charged with anti-state activities as was propagating for the union of the Bulgarian Turkish youth – to look to the future and to become one nation (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 476). That shows that the activities of political mobilization, which is not part of the religious-administrative framework, were perceived as a threat to national sovereignty by the Bulgarian state (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 476).

During the conducted changes of the new Government, the Bulgarian state nationalism becomes fully-fledged as the population on the state's territory became a nation based and united mainly on the usage of the national language - Bulgarian (Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 43). During its rule, "Zveno" desired to impose effective control upon the whole population to secure its loyalty. It emphasizes on the perception of a nation, based on the common lingual and territorial belonging. During its rule, the state and the political elite recreated the national history, literature, traditions, symbols, and mythology, and as doing so, created a personalized image of the homeland into the mass consciousness (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

The European countries have conducted this kind of policy before Bulgaria undertook it. Bulgarian Muslims were considered as being a demographic resource for the future blossoming of the nation. Due to that perception in the 30s, there has been a rapid change of the Turkish names of regions, geographic objects, and inhabited places. That kind of policy has been conducted because of implying the role of the

national language as a unifier of the nation and marks the scope of the nation's space (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

Before doing so, the Ministry of Foreign and Confessional Affairs and the so-called "Old Turks" tried to oppose the movement of the Kemalists in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian state in the face of the Ministry and the Chief Mufti accused the Young Turks' organization (in this case, the organization *Shefkat* in Vidin) of misusing money by supporting a curriculum that is against the Muslim traditions and the interests of the Muslim population living in Bulgaria (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 477). The idea was Bulgarian state to create an image of itself as a Turkish speaking Muslim identity's defender. Due to that, the Bulgarian state was afraid that a well-educated national minority might be a threat to the state. This fear led to an implicit approval for the state of "ignorance" among the ethnic Turks (Mancheva, 2001). By this conducted policy, the Kingdom of Bulgaria securitized the Kemalist organizations, which led to the ban of the organization "Turan" and several other Turkish nationalistic organizations (Stoyanov V. , 1998, p. 84). The Latinized Turkish alphabet was removed from the schools in 1934. However, it was implied again in 1938, which followed with the prosecution of Kemalists in Bulgaria.

The people that we are accepting the authority of the Bulgarian Chief Mufti has been perceived as a good Muslim and a loyal Bulgarian citizen. All other organizations that deviated from this trend were depicted as serving the interests that are hostile to the interests of the Bulgarian Muslim population (Mirkova A. M., 2009, p. 479).

2.6. BULGARIAN MUSLIM CULTURAL-EDUCATIONAL AND CHARITABLE FELLOWSHIP "RODINA"³⁶

The fellowship (movement) Rodina is taking a pivotal part in the relations between the Bulgarian state and the Pomak's Community. It was a logical consequence of the latter's desire to integrate and gradually to become part of the political life in the country. During the period between the First and the Second World War, the movement established itself as a parallel to the Kemalist modernization movement in Turkey. It was perceived as being an alternative to the movements of the "old Turks."

³⁶ Translated from Bulgarian: Motherland

That tendency started developing in the 30s among the emerging Pomaks' young intellectuals that were trying to integrate themselves into the Bulgarian macro community. Because of that intention, the developing base consciousness as being a member of the Bulgarian nation started (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

The real activity of the movement Rodina starts after the coup 19.05.1934. The new government of "Zveno" started immense structural transformations into the whole political system. Respectively, this led to a different policy towards the Bulgarian Muslims. This development became possible because of the state's policy of renovating and uniting the Bulgarian's tribe. The other factor is the removal of the disintegrated IMRO's leftovers of the Thracian organization as a significant actor in those regions (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

Officially the fellowship "Rodina" got established on 03.05.1937 in Smolyan with a leader Arif Beyski (Kamen Bolyarov). Before the official establishment of the organization, the leader had a speech on the need for national consciousness and the cultural modernization of his fellow Muslims (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008). According to the charter of the organization, it aims at achieving closer cooperation among Bulgarian Muslims and Bulgarian Christians. The main goals of the organization were evocation and development of the national feeling, cultivation of love toward the state and the kin, and to protect from any foreign propaganda and influence (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

State fully supported the fellowships' organization, however not openly. It is evident in the two directions of this process. For example, the organization chooses for its patron the St. George's day because it is a holy day for both Christians and Muslims. Right before the official establishment of the first branch of "Rodina" in Smolyan, there was a theater performance, and the public was, for the first time, comprised not only by men (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008). On a local level, "Bulgarian" became a synonym of progress. Rodina successfully followed the national strategy created by the Direction of Public Renovation and Direction of National Propaganda. For example, the secretary of the Fellowship Petar Marinov was assigned by the state as Smolyan's inspector (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

Smolyan's Muftiate was separated from the main Muftiate in Sofia and received the status of the Supreme Spiritual Institution of the Bulgarian Muslims/Pomaks. In order,

the conservative cleric to be overcome, imams and muftis have been elected only from the people close to "Rodina." Since 1940 there has been a campaign for using Bulgarian inside of the mosques (Mihailov, 1992, pp. 138-143). Moreover, the state administration in that region was taken gradually by people close to the fellowship. The membership became a requirement for an appointment at work in the region (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

In 1938 for the first time, there was a policy of changing the Muslims' traditional clothing. When not successful, the fellowship was looking for the state's support and was not stopping itself from using violence. Gradually the question of changing the Muslim names was starting to take place, as the leader of the organization supports the idea of the newborn babies to be named not with Muslim names. He gives an example in 1941 when he names his newborn daughter Malinka³⁷.

By this policy, "Rodina" tried to overcome the fears from the violent Christianization from 1912-1913. The main idea of the fellowship is "Bulgarization" without "Christianization" (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008). Bulgarian state made legislative amendments and accomplished the change of the Muslim Pomak's names in the Smolyan region (Darzhaven vestnik, 1942).

In 1940 the Smolyan's organization was taking under account the political trends and took Communists as members of the fellowship. However, one year later, most of them left the organization because of the methods used by "Rodina." Smolyan's communists stated out loud that is not supporting the policy of the fellowship, which played a pivotal role in the new regime's legitimacy among the Bulgarian Muslims. There were Communist guerilla fighters that were openly defending the Bulgarian Muslims' right to wear traditional clothes and to use their Turkic-Arabic names (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

³⁷ Druzhiba "Rodina" i vazrozhdenskoto dvizhenie v Rodopa (1937 – 1947), Dokumenti. Sastavil Hr. Hristov, A. Karamandzakov, Rodopski Sbornik Volume 7, Sofia., 1995, p. 3002
Дружба „Родина“ и възрожденското движение в Родопска (1937 – 1947). Документи. Съст. Хр. Христов, А. Караманджуков. – Родопски сборник, т. 7, С., 1995, с. 302.

2.7. CONCLUSION

During the period of its establishment until the taking over of the political power by BCP, Bulgaria was trying to create its minority policy's strategy. This strategy was influenced by the process of ethnogenesis and the construction of the Bulgarian nation. The ethnocentric nationalism through a perplex process created the perceptions of "us" and "them". The Bulgarian political elite perceived the Muslim population in Bulgaria as an underdeveloped culturally remaining community from the Ottoman Empire's period.

The policy toward the Bulgarian Muslims until the end of the Second Balkan War was cautious due to the Bulgarian irredentist intentions and the legislation which provided to the minorities rights and freedoms. However, during this time, Bulgaria was using the Young Turks' organization to gain leverage upon the Ottoman Empire. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Bulgarian authorities became more uneasy as the Young Turk's organizations in Bulgaria became more powerful and had higher legitimacy among the Bulgarian Turks. Bulgaria was using the legislation to keep this population as more traditional as possible. This policy rooted in the fear of a rise in Turkish nationalism among the Bulgarian Turks. This conducted policy was against the propagated policy of modernization of the Young Turks' supporters.

Meanwhile, among the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks), an institution named "Rodina" emerged. It was the symbol of the Bulgarian state policy and the intention of the Pomak's community to be integrated into the Bulgarian society. This organization had

mostly a local effect, which shows the differences among the micro-communities among the Bulgarian minorities.

CHAPTER 3: BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY REGIME'S MINORITY POLICY. SECURITIZATION OF THE ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY'S ISSUE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

During the period of BCP's rule, especially in late Socialism, the perception of the Bulgarian Turks as the Ottoman Empire's heirs and representatives of its political dominance upon the contemporary Bulgarian territory became more emphasized (Mahon, 1:2, 1999, p. 149). In the period after 1944, gradually FF was feeling uneasy with the Bulgarian Muslim population and especially with the ethnic Turks. The newly fledging political elite perceived them as a possible infiltrator of the West from the "Capitalist" country like Turkey (Stoyanov D. , 2020). Respectively, Turkey during that period was perceived as highly hostile to the Communist ideology and the People's Republic of Bulgaria. This perception of an enemy existence among the Bulgarian Turks (Stoyanov D. , 2020) was used mainly during the late Socialism period³⁸ as a reason for the so-called Revival process (1984 – 1989).

The first period (1944-1956) of the policy towards Bulgarian minorities is the so-called Communist Internationalism. During that period, the newly fledgling regime was trying to gain political legitimacy. Moreover, the new political elite did believe that the Muslim population could be integrated into the developing Bulgarian Socialist society. Concurrently the Stalinist approach was implemented as the ethnic and cultural features of the Turkish minority, and the cultural and religious features of the Pomaks

³⁸ Starting from approximately 1975 until 1989

were considered as traits of backwardness and as not comparable with the Communist ideology. During this period the Turkish language was not considered as a problem and many Turkish schools were functioning as using the vernacular. However, Muslims' rights were gradually constrained as the new regime started obtaining the needed political legitimacy and started considering the previous embarked minority policy as being contra-productive.

During the following period³⁹, starting with the April's Plenum of CC of BCP in 1956 and Todor Zhivkov's taking over the political power marks the beginning of a new period in the Bulgarian minority policy. After the death of Stalin, the Warsaw pact countries were led to embark on more individual courses of Socialistic development.

The concept of Internationalism was intertwined gradually with the concept of Socialist patriotism⁴⁰ (used in the official BCP's discourse) or the so-called Communist Nationalism (in the academia). During this period, the idea of an ethnically homogenous Bulgarian nation started gaining openly support. The policy undertaken by the Bulgarian state was a mixture of coercive inclusion into the Bulgarian macro-society, forms of coercive modernization and assimilation, and in several periods motivated emigration policy. The idea was to make the people that were not successful or were not willing to be integrated/assimilated to emigrate.

This chapter aims at analyzing the BCP's securitization policy towards the ethnic Turkish minority's issue. The analysis is trying to show why the perception and, respectively, the policy conducted towards the two biggest Muslim minorities (Pomaks and ethnic Turks) in Bulgaria was different and was having a different time frame. Moreover, the threat perception towards the empowering ethnic Turks' community was intertwined with the conducted policy towards the Pomaks.

The Bulgarian authorities initially undertook the integration/assimilation policy toward the Pomaks. Subsequently, using the outcome and the results from it, the same procedure was repeated toward the Bulgarian Turks. Initially, the BCP's political elite conceptualized the threat concept and securitized it among itself, and after that, in

³⁹ From 1956 until the end of BCP's rule in 1989 (however the transition between the periods is not abrupt one);

⁴⁰ Here the discourse development is intertwined as the Internationalism and the Social patriotism were coexisting. For example the Todor Zhivkov's speech from third of March 1978;

the late Socialism period, gradually the image of the threat was shared with the Bulgarian society. This process was possible due to the concepts and myths created in the Bulgarian textbooks which enhanced the everlasting perception of “us” and “them”. Moreover, BCP’s propaganda machine strengthened and legitimized those concepts by producing a massive amount of books and “historical” documents and documentaries. The nationalistic wave was undertaken by the regime as the transitional period was approaching and the country was on the verge of a huge political crisis. The fear of the regime’s very existence reflected on the propaganda with the final attempt for legitimization and achieving a massive public mobilization.

Some analyzers are indicating the ideologically identical traits between Communist and the Fascist ideology⁴¹. Especially in the late Socialist/Communist period (the period of the Real Socialism), the ideology is transforming as having fascistic traits according to Assen Ignatow. According to him the nationalistic turn of the BCP took place as it was losing the Bulgarian youth, and to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy it pushed through the nationalistic stance (Ignatow, 2013, pp. 224-233).

The integration policy which transformed gradually to assimilation took place due to the perception that the Bulgarian Muslim population was culturally backward and reactionary. The following concept that the Bulgarian nation was ethnically homogenous one led to the denial of the very existence of all minorities. The quote depicting this perception is the utterance: “We have no Turks!” (Ivanova, 2002, p. 151). The longest ruling minister of interior of Bulgaria Dimitar Stoyanov (1973-1988) later on argues that there was plenty of evidence supporting the stance that there is a Muslim population in Bulgaria, but not an ethnic Turkish one (Stoyanov D. , 2020).

3.2. BCP’S POLICY TOWARD THE BULGARIAN MUSLIMS POPULATION (POMAKS⁴² AND TURKS) 1944 – 1956

Balkans have been orientalized in the sense of the “Eastern other” by the West as using Edward Said’s approach (Said, 1979). Mary Neuberger provides information

⁴¹ See Arend, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism, A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1951

⁴² Once again said “Pomak” is a disputable term. The official stance is Bulgarian Mohammedans, but in the Bulgarian Encyclopedia (1974) they were uttered as Islamized Bulgarians (Konstantinov Y. , 1992, p. 82)

through using cultural studies on how the orientalization affected the process of Bulgarian national identity construction. She states that the Bulgarian identity had a hybrid character, as being European and semi-Oriental at the same time. Newly established Bulgarian state and nation aimed at removing the cultural remaining from the Ottoman Empire (Neuburger, 1997). Moreover, the struggle and hardship which entails the urge for development and modernization have been excellently described by one of the most famous Bulgarian writers Aleko Konstantinov at the end of the 19th century (Konstantinov A. , 2015).

This political trend continued during the new regime of BCP as well as it wanted to obtain abrupt pervading modernization. During that period the religious practice was perceived as a symbol of backwardness and as not contributing to Bulgaria's modernization. There was also intrinsic turmoil emerging from the perception that the presence of lingering Muslim culture was keeping Bulgaria in the Ottoman sphere of influence which hinders it from the persuaded modernization (Osterman, 2014, p. 7).

The ethnic Turkish population in Bulgaria historically ended up in the national borders of Bulgaria after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This population was an object of differing approaches from the Bulgarian state⁴³ and had the Ottoman Empire first and later on the Republic of Turkey as an "external national home state" (Brubejkar, 2004, pp. 105 - 125). Besides that during the Cold War, Bulgaria was in a more peculiar geopolitical position than the other Warsaw Pact countries. Bulgaria was the only country not bordering with the USSR⁴⁴. The neighbors Greece and Turkey⁴⁵ were the ones that Bulgaria used to have severe conflicts with in the past. The proximity with them and their military might was the primary strategic and security concern (Curtis, 1992).

For the first twelve years of its rule, the Bulgarian Communist party leaned on the Marxist ideology and its concept of Internationalism, the so-called "Proletarian patriotism" in Bulgaria. On the rhetorical level, the class interests were perceived as more important than the nation's interests, as those interests were subordinate to the World Proletarian Revolution. This is visible from the Bulgarian state's policy towards

⁴³ Check on Chapter 2

⁴⁴ Albania leaves the Warsaw act in 1968

⁴⁵ Both of them became NATO members in 1952

the Bulgarian Muslims and especially ethnic Turks, who were enjoying a considerable amount of freedoms and rights at the beginning of FF's rule. During that period, a temporary tactical union was established between the Muslim conservatism and the new regime in order the "bourgeois nationalism" and "Great Bulgarian chauvinism" to be refuted (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 58-68). However, at the same time, BCP undertook gradually several features of the state's minority policy from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In the 60s on, this nationalistic rehabilitation became gradually fully-fledged as a policy against the Pomaks' and the ethnic Turks' conservatism (Marinov, 2009, p. 479).

3.2.1. New Regime's Minority's Perception and its Minority Approach

The archives from the end of 1945 show that the new regime considered the Bulgarian Turks as had settled down during the "Turkish" advance into the Bulgarian lands in the 14th century. To strengthen the fledgling Ottoman rule in the Balkans they habituated the main strategic points. Allegedly they were securing the Ottoman state by conducting Islamization of the local population and providing benefits to the latter. Moreover, this population was depicted as follows: "The Turkish minority with its variety is a colorful mixture of crossbred Turks and Slavs" (Ministry of Interior, December 1945, p. 32). At the beginning of FF's rule, according to the documents, the Party perceived Turkey as having aspirations towards the South-eastern part of Bulgaria. To obtain it, Turkey counted on the ethnic Turks and the Pomaks in that region. Due to that the Bulgarian authorities perceived constraining Turkish intelligence as the most important Bulgarian mission in the Balkans. (Ministry of Interior, December 1945, p. 33)

The continuity of the Kemalist ideas' spread among the Bulgarian Turks is visible from the period before and after 1944. It was stated that Turkey immediately after the Second World War had increased its propaganda among their "brothers" in Bulgaria and hoped in some moment to use them as a fifth column (Ministry of Interior, December 1945, p. 33). However, since the Ankara's agreement from 1925 and its implication constructed the future Bulgarian minority policy and Bulgaria – Turkey's bilateral relations. Even though the emigration of ethnic Turks was scheduled as

being “freely conducted”, it was regulated and was constantly affected by the political development between Sofia and Ankara.

Intrinsically Ankara and Sofia were facing covenantal dilemmas. Respectively Turkey’s one was whether to have a significant influential minority in Bulgaria under its protection or to provoke a social-economic turmoil through supporting massive emigrational wave. Bulgaria’s dilemma was whether to encourage emigration as trying to release the “social” valve and respectively decrease the inner-state tension and also destabilize Turkey (Avramov, 2016, p. 33). During the Communist period, Bulgaria wanted to “export” Communist ideology and via that to destabilize Turkey. The other side of the dilemma was undertaking a harsher policy towards the national identity and civil rights as this option become more applicable (Avramov, 2016, p. 33) after Stalin’s death in 1953. This expectation of emigration since 1925 gradually became an intrinsic feature of the ethnic Turks and has its reflections on their behavior. During the Communist period, however, this lingering desire to leave Bulgaria was considered as being prompted solely by the Turkish state (Avramov, 2016, p. 33).

At the beginning of 1945, Georgi Dimitrov⁴⁶ from Moscow stated:

For the national minorities – full scope of rights, however with the Turks - cautiously. They should be equal... However, as Turks, they should not represent any specific Turkish national movement, because, in this way, **conditions for Turkish agency in the state are going to be created**. Furthermore, we want to push Turkey out of Europe, to go back to Asia. We are against the Turkish nationalists. The Bulgarian language should be mandatory at Turkish schools (text in bold made by me – I.I.)

(Ivanov, M., Yalamov, I, 1998, p. 575).

According to the Constitution promulgated in 1947, all Bulgarian citizens were equal before the law, as there was no privilege based on nationality, origin, and religion; all the cases of religion, race, and national hatred were punishable by the law. It ensured freedom of religion. The national minorities had the right to study their native

⁴⁶ One of most influential Communist figures in Bulgaria. Worldwide famous for his defense against the Nazi accusations during the Reichstag Fire trial of 1933. He became prime minister of Bulgaria after the regime change in 1944. Played pivotal role in the formation of Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919, later member of the executive committee of the Comintern (Communist International) in 1921, between 1935 and 1943 he was the secretary-general of the Comintern’s executive committee source: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georgi-Mikhailovich-Dimitrov>

language and to develop their national culture; as studying the Bulgarian language was mandatory. Moreover, the establishment of and the membership in an organization that was against the Bulgarian nation's rights and freedoms, that imperils the state's sovereignty and the national independence or those that are advocating fascist or anti-democratic ideology or were favoring the imperialistic aggression were strictly prohibited (FF, 1947).

According to a report from 30th of June 1947 the Turkish population, numbering around 700 000 people was stated to had been under the strong and constant Turkish propaganda for years. Turkish minority was perceived as a potential future security threat in a case it indulged in the aforementioned Turkish state's policy. The whole state apparatus had to consider finding a solution for the "Turkish question" in Bulgaria (Ministry of Interior, December 1945, pp. 39-42). Meanwhile, Turkey was depicted as a hostile country that constantly worked against Bulgaria, Slavic solidarity, and the newly emerging democracies. The Turkish propaganda was focused on strengthening the hatred towards the Bulgarian narod⁴⁷ and the new Political regime (Ministerstvo na voynata Generalen Shtab 1947, pp. 32-34). Kemal Atatürk's phrase was quoted as an embodiment of the Turkish approach towards Bulgaria:

Particularly important and fruitful for new Turkey is the fact that the Turkish intelligence policy in Bulgaria is undividable from the Turkish minority and the emigratory policy of the latter

(Ministerstvo na voynata Generalen Shtab 1947, p. 44)

In 1947 the Bulgarian Ministry of War analyzed the situation of the minorities emphasizing the Turkish minority. By scrutinizing the ethnic situation one of the main goals in front of the newly fledged regime was depicted as the question "of the material and cultural rise of the Turkish population and its inclusion in the Bulgarian *narod* for constructing bright future of the People's Republic" (Ministerstvo na voynata Generalen Shtab 1947, p. 103). According to an analysis conducted in 1947, there were several scenarios for the Turkish minority's emigration. According to the first

⁴⁷ In the text the original term in Bulgarian is used. As the "nation" pertained to the bourgeois past and the Capitalist states, during the Communist period BCP used the term "narod" which could be translated as folk or people. While using "narod" BCP's regime attempted to emphasize on its internationalistic stance.

one, part of that population was expected to emigrate by itself; the second one expected a significant part of it to leave illegally towards Turkey and the third scenario was a small part of it to be driven out by the Bulgarian government. Whatever scenario was going to take place, the bulk of that population was expected to stay in Bulgaria whatever policy was going to be undertaken. Furthermore, the fundament of all future approaches was initiated with that analyze – the emigration must not be coercive and the Turkish population must be supported to develop itself culturally and materially aiming at reaching the ethnic Bulgarian population's development. Moreover, it was stated that at that point no national awareness among the Turkish population in Bulgaria was evident (Ministerstvo na voynata Generalen Shtab 1947, p. 103)

The population that decided to stay in Bulgaria was expected to abandon the Kemalism and the "Great-Turkish aspirations" and undertake the Communist values. Moreover was stated that there was no tendency of that population towards national differentiation. The integration could be achieved by showing to that population that the modernization activities were from their interest. (Ministerstvo na voynata Generalen Shtab 1947, pp. 103 - 104; 109 - 111). The regime before 1944 was accused of not undertaking the needed measures to solve the Turkish minority issue. According to the archives in 1946 the ethnic Turkish population numbered 675.989 and respectively Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) - 128.940 (Ministry of Interior 30 March 1950, p. 117).

3.2.2. Political Development – Domestic and International

The relations between Sofia and Ankara were having their ebb and flows. This was based on the lingering perception of the Republic of Turkey as the Ottoman Empire's successor. Moreover, it was a state with traditionally hostile relations with Russia and the Soviet Union. This additionally provided specific tinge during the Cold War's Bulgarian-Turkish bilateral relations. This international situation created the perception among the Bulgarian political elite that the Turkish minority was a possible perilous Republic of Turkey's "Trojan horse" (Marinov, 2009). In the period 1947-48, the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey rapidly deteriorated as Ankara

became gradually under Western influence. Several border incidents between the two countries led to a diplomatic crisis (Marinov, 2009). The Turkish population in Bulgaria was perceived as needed to be modernized and integrated into the Bulgarian macro society in order, not to be used by Ankara and to activate its potential of being a fully-fledged security threat. Respectively the emigration was always considered as a cheaper and easier option to deal with the possible deteriorating ethnic situation.

One of the first developments that made the Bulgarian authorities dubious was the Pomaks' and Turks' attitude during the Civil war's period in Greece. Allegedly there was a letter sent by a group of Pomaks to the Greek, British, and US governments depicting Bulgarian governance as a tyrannical yoke. There they stated that Pomaks were racially Turks and to escape from "Bulgarianization", they requested to emigrate to Turkey. That development enhanced BCP fears that the vast majority of the Pomak population ethnically identify themselves as Turks (Neuburger, 2004, p. 66). Moreover, as was stated back in 1945 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

We cannot sacrifice the interests of Bulgarian democracy for one Turkish minority... If we give rights to various reactionary people then we will make a weapon out of them

(Neuburger, 2004, p. 67)

During a closed Plenum of the CC of BCP at the beginning of 1948, Georgi Dimitrov stated that there was a huge problem - on the southern Bulgarian border there was a population from the non-Bulgarian origin, and it was a lingering problem for Bulgaria. He continued as "In front of us, as a Party and a Government, stands the question to find a way to remove it from there and to settle our Bulgarian population" (Ivanova, 2002, p. 62). BCP took decision N65, which was a deportation plan of the ethnic Turks as, according to the BCP's political elite - was not able to be integrated (Ivanova, 2002, p. 62). Moreover, a considerable percentage of the Pomak population living in the Rhodope region was resettled by the Bulgarian authorities to the Central and Northern Bulgaria (Stoyanov V. , 1998, pp. 105-106). Moreover, in 1948 a Muftiate solely for the Pomaks was created and placed in Smolyan. The idea was to increase the gap between the Pomaks and the ethnic Turks and to hurtle the process of Turkification (Neuburger, 2004, p. 64)

3.2.3. Valko Chervenkov's Minority Policy (1949-1956)

The successor of Georgi Dimitrov - Valko Chervenkov, was a devoted Stalinist. He perceived the minority's issues as a problem that should be solved as soon as possible. The regime was attempting to integrate all the minorities in one Bulgarian Communist narod⁴⁸.

Mainly the ethnic Turkish population was set to leave the country as being perceived ethnically different from the Bulgarians. The idea was to deport as much as possible from this population and especially the ones that Turkey was not willing to accept, to be deported to North Bulgaria (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 5). Meanwhile, BCP planned to resettle ethnic Bulgarians to the South-East to make ethnic balance and to fill in the economy gaps (Ivanov, M., Yalamov, I, 1998, pp. 579-580). The primary goal was to reduce the ethnic Turkish population in order not to be able to play an independent role in the country (Ivanova, 2002, p. 62) and to become a fully-fledged National security threat. The most prominent community leaders and the most educated Bulgarian Turks were set to be deported first (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 129).

BCP's political elite in the period of newly fledging Cold War and the confrontation West-East revived the intrinsic national security's perception before 1944. Ethnic Turks were considered hostile to the Bulgarian state group which could not be rectified and the national security was going to be enhanced via sending them to Turkey. The fear of the Turkification of the rest of the Muslim population in Bulgaria also took a fundamental part in preparing the emigration deal with Turkey (Avramov, 2016, p. 37).

As an outcome of this Chervenkov's endeavor, Bulgaria and Turkey reached an emigration agreement, and in the scope of three years (1949-1951), around 250,000 applications for visas were filed. That huge amount of people was eager to emigrate mainly due to the BCP's expropriation policy as most of the Muslim population was still agricultural. The Bulgarian authorities forged the required documents to enable higher emigration percentage among the ethnic Turks (Poulton, 1993, pp. 118-119).

⁴⁸ According to the Marxist theory, the socialist citizens can have different nationalities.

Moreover, the state registered more than 100 000 Pomaks, Tatars, and Gypsies as “Turks” which shows the broad scope of the undertaken policy (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 239). Since then, the state’s perception toward the Pomaks abruptly shifted towards stating that they were part of the Bulgarian nation. BCP started considering the Pomaks as having ethnic Bulgarian roots and it assigned a mission to BAS for finding evidence for strengthening this stance (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 82). This approach shows the gradual revival of the previously conducted fellowship Rodina’s policy. This different approach aimed at setting a demarcation line between the ethnic Turks and the Pomaks (Ivanova, 2002). Pomaks were considered as highly giving in to the reactionary forces so this tendency had to be uprooted (Ministry of Interior, July 1952, p. 150).

CC of BCP on the 18th of August 1949 gave the green light to the emigration. Just before the emigrational wave started in summer 1950 the Bulgarian intelligence showed itself as against another future emigration as the ones that leave despise Bulgaria and are ready to fight against it in the future and Bulgaria loses labor power and provides it to Turkey (Avramov, 2016, p. 44). Due to that, there was no other emigrational wave for approximately 20 years as the state tried to integrate them through rising of their economic and cultural level.

Eventually, the Turkish state introduced a tight visa regime and closed its borders stating that it is not able to accept that massive influx of people (Borden, 2020). As a result of the emigration, 155 000 Muslims left Bulgaria (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 239). The ones that decided to stay were granted with a significant level of cultural autonomy as education in vernacular was encouraged by the state. This was a step towards integrating them into the “transnational communist society on the Soviet model” (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 5). However the course of development was not how it was expected and ethnic Turk’s identity got gradually strengthened in terms of language, religion, and attitude towards Turkey. Meanwhile, ethnic Turks steadily became part of the Bulgarian economy system, and as they became more economically developed they were more tend to develop their own identity (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 6). BCP perceived this development as a huge failure in several years and abruptly shifted its approach.

Communist political elite since the very beginning of its rule was divided by its approach towards the ethnic Turks – state security or economic development. The first emigrational wave created strife between Sofia and Ankara as the latter was considered as having the leverage upon the first one as it was able to steer better the process. For example, Turkey preferred to accept ethnic Turks from North-eastern Bulgaria, better educated, and professionally more developed (Avramov, 2016, p. 45). This Turkish leverage upon the process also had its reverberations on the future BCP's stances.

After the resettlement, in 1953, BCP started the process of passportization of the Pomaks (Ministry of Interior, 27 December 1952). Approximately 80 thousand people received passports in which they were recorded as ethnic Macedonians in South-West Bulgaria. A considerable part of the Pomaks wanted to define themselves as ethnic Turks as were afraid of being "Bulgarianized" (Ministry of Interior, 31th of January 1953, p. 160). However Bulgarian authorities were trying to halt their "Turkification" tendency as the state needed workforce. During this process of passportization, some Pomaks decided to change their names to Bulgarian ones. Those people considered the rest as underdeveloped and showing traits of religious fanaticism because they were not following their example. Those two stances were going to be used for the future Pomaks' and ethnic Turks' name changing process's justification (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 64-66).

3.3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM 1956 UNTIL 1974 - FEBRUARY'S PLENUM OF CC OF BCP FOR IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

Todor Zhivkov took over the political power at the April's Plenum of CC of BCP in 1956. After he went through overcoming the first obstacles to concentrate the political power into his hands he was able to change the course of the party's minority policy (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, pp. 132-134). Soon after April's Plenum, the new party line was to propagate the danger of the minorities' ethnic identity's enhancement that differed from the majority's one. Those fears were intensified by the increase of the Turks' ethnic awareness. Moreover, in the 60s and the 70s, the Party became more vigilant and timid about the tendency that Pomaks and Roma communities became more

inclined to identify themselves ethnically as Turks. That development would increase the possibility of social alienation and the tendency of political-administrative separatism. Respectively that meant a threat to the state's sovereignty (Mutafchieva, 1995, p. 33). Due to that, the concept shifted from constructing a Socialist Turkish population as part of the "transitional communist society" on the Soviet model to its integration into a *narod* in which the Communist was going to be nothing else but Bulgarian" (Tsoneva, 2005, p. 8).

During the next Plenum in October 1958, the Party accepts the thesis: "Party's work among the Turkish population." The pivotal part of the document was the fight against the "display of nationalism and religious fanaticism". BCP reconsidered the conducted policy towards the Turkish minority as enhancing their ethnocultural identity as a possible tendency towards complete cultural alienation (Volkova, 2016, p. 33). The new course comprised of a plan of merging the Turkish schools with the Bulgarian ones and making the Turkish language an elective subject. Moreover, the educational process in high schools had to become solely in Bulgarian (Marinov, 2009, p. 29). Furthermore, the periodicals in Turkish were significantly decreased as gradually became bilingual – in Turkish and in Bulgarian (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 113). Those people that were against the newly taken measures were accused of being Turkish bourgeois nationalists (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 332-343). The idea behind those measures was the construction of a new socialist consciousness by increasing the living standard of the Bulgarian Muslim population. That was planned to be obtained by uprooting the Muslims' cultural backwardness and integrating them more into the Socialist economy (Neuburger, 2004, p. 69). As Petar Krastev uttered, BCP shifted gradually its minority policy from the "tolerant disintegration" of the ethnic Turks' cultural identity towards their "intolerant integration" (Avramov, 2016, p. 34).

There were fears among the Communist elite about integrating the newly fledging Pomak and Turkish intelligentsia into the Party's structures:

We are investing a lot of resources into the education of the Turkish population for the creation of an intelligentsia among them but **whom will they serve: the People's Republic of Bulgaria or Reactionary Turkey?** ... Many with higher education who became teachers are painfully nationalistic, part of the „**fifth column of Turkey**“ (text in bold indicated by me – I.I.)

(Neuburger, 2004, p. 72)

Since 1958 the Turkish population was no longer perceived as a Turkish national minority (Ivanov, 1997, p. 56). Moreover, since 1959-1960 the state started suppressing the religion and the traditions of the Muslim minorities as that approach was undertaken towards the Christian majority as well. Mosques were closed; the clergy was rapidly reduced and was gradually recruited by SS. At the same time, there was an ongoing vast amount of investments in the ethnically mixed regions aiming at decreasing the social turmoil. In 1961 the number of Turkish newspapers and magazines was drastically decreased (Stoyanov V. , 1998, pp. 133-134).

3.3.1. BCP's Minority Policy between Integration and Assimilation Prompted by the "Enemy Mania"⁴⁹

After Todor Zhivkov strengthened its position as a BCP's leader in the 60s, BCP took the path to the "real Socialism"⁵⁰. The ideological framework became amended as the pre-BCP's "traditional" nationalism got gradually undertaken as being disguised in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 27). Due to that BCP undertook the so-called "cultural revolution". This meant a whole palette of measures got undertaken through which the lifestyle's – "bit"⁵¹ modernization and the eradication of all possible macro-societal differences for obtaining the goal of constructing a classless atheistic society. That included struggle with the so-called "religious fanaticism and chauvinism" instigated by "hostile element" (Ministry of Interior, 10th of November 1959, p. 259). The modernization policy was conducted in the form of changing the Muslim population's clothing as there were acts of cutting the women's shalwars and igniting men's tarbooshes (Ministry of Interior, November 1959). As possible "hostile elements" were perceived the Turkish citizens visiting Bulgaria, Bulgarian citizens visiting the Republic of Turkey, and the Turkish diplomatic representatives (Ministry of Interior, 1965, p. 496). BCP considered the threat of enhancing the nationalistic feelings among the ethnic Turks as the main goal of the Turkish intelligence. By achieving this Ankara allegedly aimed to increase their level

⁴⁹ Term taken by the famous Bulgarian writer and dissident Georgi Markov

⁵⁰ Real Socialism is used to define the political reality reached through the hegemony of the Communist ideology

⁵¹ In Bulgarian the word is "bit" which means: "the way of living"/"the lifestyle"

of alienation from BCP's policy and to maintain lingering emigrational turmoil among them and respectively destabilize Bulgaria. Besides the aforementioned goals, there was the gathering of military and political information (Ministry of Interior, 1965, p. 496).

Moreover, the Muslims in Bulgaria were not happy with the expropriation of their lands as it led respectively to their deteriorating economic situation (Ministry of Interior, December 1959, p. 284). Due to the conducted policy, a huge amount of the Bulgarian Muslim population wanted to leave the country. Moreover, another part of the considered hostile elements – emigrants from Bulgaria living in Turkey, were sending letters to their relatives depicting Turkey as “anavatan” – motherland (Ministry of Interior, December 1959, p. 281). This was perceived by the Bulgarian authorities as a Turkish state's plan to further destabilize Bulgaria by prompting the aforementioned emigrational turmoil and subsequently carry out an attack against the Communist ideology and the Bulgarian Socialist economy.

Furthermore, Bulgarian authorities considered that the Turkish intelligence had been creating hostile elements among the ethnic Turkish clergy and the newly fledging ethnic Turkish intelligentsia. Moreover, allegedly there were attempts at creating groups of youngsters and teachers to commit treason. That development was anticipated as another kind of undertaken attack by the hostile elements - against the modernization campaign embarked by BCP in the 50s (Ministry of Interior, December 1959, p. 305).

This modernization goal was linked to the BCP's self-perception of its civilizing and progressive nature and mission (Neuburger, 2004, p. 56). That modernization policy was perceived as mandatory as until the beginning of the 60s, 2/3 of the ethnic Turks were still considering themselves as religious, 95% of the youth was getting married in Muslim traditional way and 99% of the children were circumcised (Maeva, 2017, p. 96).

In 1962 the Politburo of BCP accepted the “Measures against the Turkish self-identification” of Gypsies, Tatars, and Bulgarians professing Mohammedan religion (read Pomaks) (Ministry of Interior, December 1945, pp. 336-338). With those measures, the Bulgarian authorities took steps for encouraging and enhancing the

Bulgarian consciousness among the non-Turkish Muslims (Helsinki Watch Report, 1986, pp. 69-70). By undertaking those measures Bulgarian authorities tried to divide even more the rest of the Muslim population from the ethnic Turks and interrupt the considered lingering process of “Turkification”. As a new emigration process was about to take place, BCP did not want to provide opportunities to the rest of the Muslim population to declare themselves as ethnic Turks and respectively apply for a visa. Due to that, the attempt of changing Pomaks’ names got conducted in the 60s, however not successfully⁵². The CC of BCP had to intervene and restore Pomaks’ names, stating that the decision was taken solely on the Local Committee’s level (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 81-85). As an aftermath BCP increased the amount of economic investments and launched new projects at the mixed regions to soften the social tension, decrease the intention of emigration, and reduce the level of social isolation of that population (Biuksenshiuts, 2000).

According to the requirements of the “Measures” policy against the Turkification and for their national awareness to be strengthened a massive amount of religious and Turkish nationalistic literature was confiscated. To enhance the negative image of Turkey, Bulgarian authorities let the ones that came back after emigrating to Turkey in the 50s to see their relatives and were depicting negatively Turkey’s economic situation to stay more in Bulgaria. The situation on a local level as in the Blagoevgrad region, the struggle against the alleged Turkification was depicted as toiling due to the intrinsic “religious fanaticism” and the Turkish nationalism among the local Muslim population (Ministry of Interior, 1962). The general situation in Bulgaria was documented after the measures were conducted as the “reactionary” parts of the Bulgarian Muslims (Gypsies and Tatars) were agitating for the Turkification. Moreover, that population was considered to be prompted by the Turkish “reactionary and chauvinistic” propaganda to act accordingly (Ministry of Interior, 1962, p. 440).

Turkish population was considered mainly as linked to the religious fanaticism and nationalistic movements which led to the antibulgarian propaganda, developing of the emigrational tendencies, and a base for the Turkish state’s meddling into the Bulgarian inner state’s affairs (Avramov, 2016, p. 55). In the 60s once again the idea of prompting emigration “as this population is the most underdeveloped part of the

⁵² For the Gypsies and Tatars was successful, however not for the Pomaks (at that point)

Bulgarian “narod” respectively Ankara’s opportunity to influence was going to decrease significantly (Avramov, 2016, p. 56). Moreover the goal of removing the term “Turkish minority” from the public sphere since the early 50s was due to that – to preclude the “right” of Ankara to be a defender of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (Avramov, 2016, p. 56). In the report of the foreign minister in 1964 Ivan Bashev for the first time the fear of possible future autonomy of the ethnic Turkish regions was uttered (Avramov, 2016, p. 57).

Meanwhile at the beginning of March 1964 CC of BCP conveyed to discuss the question of the Muslim population in Bulgaria. The main presentation was made by the director of the directorate “Propaganda and agitation”. He was talking about the need for a widespread movement against the archaic lifestyle/bit, religious fanaticism, and the need for a change of the Arabic-Muslim names (Diulgerov, 2000, p. 27). Concurrently, Rabotnichesko Delo officially showed the change of the image of fellowship “Rodina” as the latter was depicted as not a “fascist” organization anymore, but as a “bourgeoisie-nationalistic” organization (Rabotnichesko Delo, 1964)

3.3.2. Softening the BCP’s Minority Approach

After the unsuccessful change of the Pomaks’ names in Blagoevgrad’s region (South-west Bulgaria) in 1964, followed not only a period of softer policy towards them but also toward the Bulgarian Turks. The concerns from the Bulgarian authorities got increased as during the riots in the Blagoevgrad’s villages the Pomaks were shouting “Here it will never going to become Bulgarian”; “Long life to Turkey”; “Death to Bulgaria” and that they were never going to become Bulgarians. During the “mutiny” a flag with a crescent was spotted. Submachine guns were found among the Muslim population (Ministry of Interior, April 1964, p. 410). For example, in the village Ribnovo, Blagoevgrad’s region, the population over there stated that the village was Turkish (Ministry of Interior, April 1964, p. 411). That enhanced the fear of losing the sovereignty on the territory or not having the ability to impose it everywhere. After the protests were subdued, according to secret agents placed in the Pomak’s villages the locals stated that they were ready to rise in revolt once again if needed. They stated

that the authorities wanted to change their names and by doing that to take away their religion and their Turkish nationality. There is reported strong hatred towards Bulgaria even though the state-supported those regions to get modernized. However the outcome was that that population became more religious, traditional, and the desire to emigrate increased significantly (Ministry of Interior,. 1964; M, f. 2, op. 3, a. e. 99, l. 1-9, p. 422).

The Pomaks wanted to declare themselves as Turks as that was going to provide them the ability to emigrate. The blame for enhancing the Turkish spirit among the Pomaks was put not only on the religious leaders and the old religious fanaticism but also on the newly emerged Muslim intelligentsia created after 1944. Several of its members stated that Pomaks were Turks (Ministry of Interior,. 1964; M, f. 2, op. 3, a. e. 99, l. 1-9, p. 423). To keep the development of the Pomaks' intelligentsia detached to the concepts of BCP, the latter took the decision only the reliable people's sons to be sent to university and ethnic Bulgarians to be accountable for their "right" development (Ministry of Interior,. 1964; M, f. 2, op. 3, a. e. 99, l. 1-9, p. 429).

There was a connection between the BCP's softening policy and the thaw period between the USSR and the Republic of Turkey (Marinov, 2009, p. 30). The number of Turkish newspapers and magazines increased once again, radio broadcasting in Turkish increased, and the Turkish folklore began developing once again. Moreover more ethnic Turks became part of the BCP's structure (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 343-347). The 60s period showed the BCP's minority policy as an ebb and flow. However, the mainline was clear – to suppress the religion for the whole Bulgarian society and to enhance the process of modernization in every sphere of life. This policy led to the situation in which Muslim women were gradually emancipated which led to a change in their professional status. This was also due to the improved opportunities in the mixed regions based on the increased literacy level (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, pp. 132-134).

In February and June 1969, the CC of BCP adopts once again the decisions of "improving the work among the Turkish population" to achieve its "cultural rise". That time the integration/assimilation line was described as "accelerating the natural process" of "overcoming the ethnic differences". The mechanisms of this "natural" and "progressive" process were: emboldening the cohabitation and work of ethnic

Bulgarians and ethnic Turks; the encouragement of the mixed marriages between Turkish women and Bulgarian men, improving the educational infrastructure at the mixed regions (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, pp. 137-138). At the same time, the policy of reducing the Turkish population by emigration was once again undertaken. Mostly because of the reports from the late 60s noted the illegal organizations' proliferation in the predominantly Muslim provinces. Allegedly there were Party members inside those organizations (Neuburger, 2004, p. 71).

The international development affected Sofia's minority policy as well. The course of destalinization undertaken by Leonid Brezhnev made the Bulgarian authorities return to the Leninist perception towards the minorities. According to the latter for the needs of the economic turnover, all of the nationalities living in one country should learn and speak the language of the majority (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). It was stated that the Bulgarian National question should be solved by the American model – everyone should be Bulgarian and there were no minorities (Ministry of Interior, May 1965).

The process of lingual unification was undertaken also due to the enhanced process of industrialization. Moreover, industries like factories that were close to the cities required a workforce. Furthermore, BCP propaganda's term "unitary Socialist nation" got implemented and slowly the Bulgarian authorities undertook a course of further modernization of the Pomak's and ethnic Turk's identities (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 40). This widespread materialistic culture however was perceived not only as an act of modernization but as having ethnic traits by the minorities in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 35).

Meanwhile, the Bulgarian state constructed dormitories and boarding schools for the Turkish and Pomak's students. In the late 70s, 1/3 of all Turkish students were in the scope of those institutions. The idea was to enhance the integration policy by separating the Muslim children from their families, as the latter were considered as affecting their modern/Communist upbringing (Tahirov, 1970, pp. 57-62).

The political elite educated during the Communist regime gradually took over the crucial political positions. This was one of the factors that led to an increased level of distrust and the suspicion in the strengthening positions of the "Turkish bourgeois nationalism" (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 376-378). The construction of Turkish intelligentsia

through the Turkish educational system since the mid40s was perceived even more as a huge mistake as one of the highest-ranking Communist personnel Pencho Kubadinski uttered in 1967:

Our biggest mistake is that during the past few years we created a Turkish intelligentsia, which became the carrier of Turkish nationalism among the Turkish population

(Neuburger, 2004, p. 72)

Respectively the educational process in Turkish was gradually and eventually completely removed in the mid70s. This change happened after February's Plenum of BCP for the Ideological questions in 1974. In 1975, 46.7% of the ethnic Turks selected Bulgarian as the language of communication. In 1956 the situation was completely different as just 8.1% gave the same answer (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). However, still, the use of Turkish in public was perceived as a threat to the identity of the Bulgarian society and the state's sovereignty (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, pp. 355-356).

Due to the enhanced policy of integration and modernization the period of 70s partially successfully constructed features of "supra-ethnic" Bulgarian culture among the different ethnic groups in Bulgaria. That common culture was based on common clothing, popular media, and food habits (Bates, 1994, p. 210).

3.3.3. The Emigration 1969 – 1978

Due to the BCP's integration/assimilation policy undertaken between the two migration waves (1951 – 1969) and the continuing policy of expropriation increased the emigration intentions among the ethnic Turks. Moreover, approximately 70 000 ethnic Turks were prepared and waiting to leave the country when the Republic of Turkey closed its borders abruptly in 1951 (Şimşir B. , 1988, p. 246). Respectively the emigration wave in 1949 - 1951 separated a considerable amount of families. The idea behind the emigration waves was to find a way to stabilize the ethnonational model and to strengthen the positions of the regime (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 118).

Until January 1964, 380 000 people applied for a visa to emigrate to Turkey (Şimşir B. , 1988, p. 211). At the same time Bulgaria had undertaken diplomatic initiatives to pave the way for the next emigration wave since 1956. During a long process of negotiating eventually at the beginning of 1968, a new emigrational agreement was bilaterally signed. It regulated the emigration of those Bulgarian citizens from Turkish origin whose close relatives had emigrated to Turkey until 1952 (Şimşir B. , 1988, p. 255). Into the agreement, a considerable amount of family relationships were covered. The emigration was scheduled every year between April and November and to finish until 1978. Approximately 130 000 Bulgarian Turks emigrated to Turkey during that period (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). BCP perceived this emigration wave once again as an opportunity to release those people that were not dedicated to the “cause of the Socialism” and were inclined to “support” the Turkish “bourgeois” nationalism (Marinov, 2009).

3.3.4. Constitution of 1971 and the Change of the Minority Policy towards Hasher Approach

Bulgarian authorities realized that the conducted policy until that point had not provided the desired result. The ethnic Turks still followed their traditions and practiced their religious customs. Besides this, the emigration did not provide the required result as the Turkish population was still around 9% of the whole population. Due to that, BCP started to be concerned about the demographic future of the country (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 119-120).

The shift into the perception became officially noticeable with the Constitution of 1971 took a marginalization approach towards the Bulgarian minorities. There was no reference to the term ethnic minorities as they were depicted as “citizens of non-Bulgarian origins”. According to article 45, point 7, the citizens from the non-Bulgarian origin, besides the mandatory learning of the Bulgarian language, have the right to study their vernacular as well. Again according to article 52, organizations, whose activity was against the sovereignty, territorial unity, and the unity of the nation; organizations that were inciting religious, ethnic, national, or race feud; that were violating the rights and freedoms of the citizens; furthermore, the organizations that

were advocating fascist ideology and were trying to accomplish their goals through violence were banned. Moreover, citizens had the right to practice and to make religious or atheistic propaganda (BCP, 1971).

In 1971 Brezhnev formulated the thesis of “unitary Soviet folk/*narod*” which provided the green light about the reciprocal thesis “unitary Bulgarian Socialist *narod*” (Stoyanov V. , 1998, p. 143). Todor Zhivkov uttered it in this way:

We are performing **“assimilation” of the Bulgarian people and the Turkish people** – of all the nationalities we have in our country. This is the policy of **gradual obliteration of the national differences**... it is a historical question (text in bold made by me – I. I.)

(Zhivkov T. , 1976, p. 18)

The securitization process inside the BCP’s political elite and concept of threat were strengthened once again by a document written by several Pomaks who immigrated to Osmaniye, Bakirköy - Turkey. They had established “Council for Rhodope Turks’ culture and solidarity” and wrote a booklet titled - “The essence of the last Turkish blood bath in Rhodope”. They stated that the Pomak population was Turkish by the origin and that the Turkish population in Bulgaria was 2 million. Pomaks were depicted as pure Turkish elements as sharply differing from the rest of the Balkan ethnic groups. However, the most important stance that was emphasized was that Pomaks had been and were going to be a Bulgarian enemy (Ministry of Interior, April 1973).

3.3.5. The Education of the Bulgarian Turks – Integration via Ideological Indoctrination 1944-1974

The Government’s approach before the regime change in 1944 was to keep the Bulgarian Muslims and the ethnic Turks in a state of illiteracy in order not to be created an ethnic Turkish intelligentsia which was about to jeopardize the state security. The concept was that this population was going to emigrate sooner or later and until it happens to be done everything possible not to become a fully-fledged security threat⁵³. Sofia undertook this approach taking into consideration the

⁵³ For more information – Second Chapter

perception of ethnic Turks as possible Ankara's leverage and an opportunity for the latter to impose influence.

Due to that, this population was in a more traditional and more pious state than the ethnic Bulgarians. However, this state of the Muslims interfered with the BCP's intention of trying to transform the whole Bulgarian society profoundly. The low level of education impeded the impulses of modernization, and the religious devotedness hindered the inculcation of the new ideology and value system (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). Moreover, BCP used the improvement of the educational system for gaining higher support among the masses and an opportunity to gain some prerogatives in the future peace negotiations after the Second World War. Due to amendments to the Education law in 1946 all Turkish schools and their property were expropriated. In that way, the Turkish community lost control of its educational institutions (Eminov, 1989, p. 5). Moreover, BCP created and imposed a standardized curriculum upon all educational institutions. Besides the ideological indoctrination, it continued providing the pre-Communist regime interpretation of Bulgarian history. Ottoman rule was defined as Turkish yoke - a long period of oppression. Moreover, the Turks were depicted as a "bloodthirsty, brutal savages with no redeeming qualities (Eminov, 1989, p. 7)". The idea behind that most probably was to construct a sharp dividing line between the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria from the Turks in Turkey. By this attempt, BCP tried to enhance the process of integration into the first period of its rule.

The illiteracy level among the Bulgarian Turks before the Second World War was around 80%. From the early 50s on Bulgarian authorities tried to eradicate the illiteracy level. After the first wave of emigration, the Communist propaganda depicted the Turkish minority as an equal partner in achieving the construction of the magnificent Socialist state and society (Neuburger, 2004, p. 56). BCP juxtaposed the new regime's achievements to the previous "monarch-fascist" one's minority policy. The Turkish minority had schools in which the educational process was in the Turkish language. Those schools were used for an ideological indoctrination by BCP as well as with the purpose of social inclusion in the Bulgarian macro society. Moreover, the Turkish minority had the right of having its newspapers, Turkish libraries were built, and Turkish theaters got established (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 312-324). The idea was BCP to construct bilingual intelligentsia that had undertaken the secular socialist line

and to reconstruct gradually the traditional pious and conservative Muslim identity of their community (Eminov, 1983, pp. 139-144). Due to that in 1952, the section of Turkish philology was established in Sofia's university (Volkova, 2016, p. 33).

In 1955 an important development took place. Pomaks, Tatars, and Gypsies weren't allowed to register themselves as Turks in order not to have an opportunity of taking part in the future emigration process. Moreover, in 1958 the authorities constrained the use of Turkish and hurtled the opportunity of non-ethnic Turks to study it (Bates, 1994, p. 207). Those restrictions were imposed as an attempt to curb even further the tendency of self-identification as Turks and to impede the Turkification among Pomaks and Muslim Gypsies.

Due to the emerging fear of Turkish separatism towards the end of the 50s, the policy started gradually shifting (Volkova, 2016, p. 33). The attempt of the Muslims' integration was perceived as not successful. Due to that in the 1957/58 school year, the last year to exist separately from the Bulgarian schools, there were active 1156 Turkish primary schools with more than 104 000 students (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). At the end of the 50s, they merged with the Bulgarian schools, and soon after, the teaching in the Turkish language ceased existing (Mahon, 1:2, 1999). The Turkish students that were studying at university were still an insignificant amount. Due to that in 1957, the Bulgarian authorities introduced quotas for the Pomaks and the Turks in the higher education institutions (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 111).

The main aim of educating minorities in their native language was to make them aware of the new regime's ideology and to raise the living standard of the minorities which were in their vast majority agrarian population. However, with the rise of the atheistic worldview and by developing the Turkish culture there was another outcome – the strengthening of the ethnic Turks' Turkish national identity (Tsoneva, 2005). Before that, that population had a predominantly Muslim identity (Neuburger, 2004, p. 63). After one generation, the integration process into the Bulgarian culture started through using only Bulgarian language in the schools. Respectively the goal was first to make an ideological indoctrination and, after that, stepping on the common ideology to complete the process by unifying the language (Borden, 2020). The state authorities were carefully observing the admission process in the Sofia University's Department of Turkish Philology. The idea was to recruit the most prominent and

well-educated members of the Turkish minority into SS. The idea was to control tightly the Turkish elite's professional development (Listuck, 1980)⁵⁴.

Meanwhile, an insignificant number from the Muslim population was part of the military's elite. This shows the constant "us-them" vigilant perception as the security in the sense of "us" has to be provided (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 111). Moreover, until the end of the Socialist period constantly vast majority of the army's so-called Construction Corps⁵⁵ were comprised of Pomaks, Turks, and Gypsies. Ethnic Bulgarians were assigned mainly to the Bulgarian Army – the combat units. Due to that, the military elite was comprised mainly of ethnic Bulgarians (Konstantinov Y. , 1992, p. 84). Even the Muslims that were accepted in the combat units were not placed in the areas adjacent to Turkey. This created turmoil among the minority groups as they weren't entrusted as being able to defend Bulgaria (Ministry of Interior, 1963, p. 406).

The "homogenization" process started with the removal of the Turkish language as a subject in the 1973-1974 school year. The development of the Turkish culture had ceased as the Turkish theaters merged with the state (Bulgarian) ones (Marinov, 2009, p. 31). The Plenum of the CC of BCP about the ideological questions in February 1974 explained about the "ideological-political inclusion of the population with Turkish origin" as emphasizing on the adaptation of the atheistic perception towards the traditional and religious customs.

3.4. THE COMMUNIST NATIONALISM AND THE GRADUAL PUBLIC SECURITIZATION PROCESS OF THE ETHNIC TURKS' MINORITY ISSUE

Communist ideology spread rapidly after the end of the Second World War. It was trying to give an answer to the Western hegemony and to be its challenge and alternative. Both Nationalism and Communism tried to provide answers to that challenge and were used as a tool for reaching modernization. Those two created an

⁵⁴ So called "cooptation" of the Turkish intelligentsia in Lustick's terms – See Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*, (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1980, mentioned by Borden, M

⁵⁵ Stroitelni voyski/Строителни войски

ideological symbiosis to reach specific goals. Seemingly differing from each other, they do share some common features (Marinov, 2009). This similarity was uttered by Adam Smith as:

Marxists and nationalists can be seen to share a concern for man's alienation and his reintegration and return to his authentic state of being. Both ideologies adhere throughout to a holistic, naturalistic, and libertarian view of man and his destiny. Both are also profoundly historicist and evolutionary in their conceptions and outlook.

(Smith A. , 1979, p. 126).

Communism perceived itself as an ideology that is against the Chauvinism and Nationalism. Even though it officially tried to implement the concept of internationalism, it gradually undertook nationalistic positions. That's the situation in Bulgaria as well (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014, p. 482). Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that Communism is fostering the nationalistic tensions. It enhances the intolerance, rejecting the social compromise, throughout its political culture. Due to that Communist ideology is strengthening the intolerant nationalism (Brzezinski, Winter 1989/90). Katherine Verdery states that the monolith Party-state produces a monolith nation (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014, p. 483). The Nationalism from the post-Stalinist period is known as the terminology "National Communism" in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania, and as Communist Nationalism in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014, p. 484).

3.4.1. The Nationalistic Discourse Development during the Socialist Period

Benedict Anderson defines a nation as an imagined political community united by shared shallow historical belief popularized by the elites and by doing so it constructs the sense of antiquity. As being different in a sense of religion, ethnicity, and language, the nation is being depicted as a community of unity and kinship. Moreover, the state is perceived as a depiction of that national identity. The ethnic communities were constructed on the concept of shared past – a whole palette of myths and common historical development (Anderson, 1991). Due to that, the threat to state sovereignty takes a fundamental part of the national discourse. Moreover, the nationalistic ideology is used to justify the policy of highly centralized states and

provides a huge local response in a case of ethnic political mobilization (Bates, 1994, p. 203).

Bulgarian nationalism as the rest of Eastern European Nationalisms can be characterized as an ethnic one. It is based on the common “ethnie” – a common culture based on features like language, religion, and customs. On the other hand, the other kind of nationalism - the civic one is based on the shared legitimate legislative rules of the political and institutional community (Smith A. , 1991, pp. 19-28).

The Communist regime tried to create fundamentals of a civic nationalism by constructing class identity. The class identity however on theory emerges out of the “materialistic” spheres – production and exchange. On the other hand, the political identities lean on participation in a political community. This participation is based and derives from the religious and ethnic identities that form social interaction. The class identity faced hardship in trying to suppress and disregard the ethnic, religious, and political identities (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 345). BCP attempted to integrate gradually and at some specific periods to assimilate Bulgaria’s Muslim population. Through succeeding in this endeavor BCP wanted to construct a common national identity. The idea was through this the chance of ethnic mobilization to be significantly reduced and the threat to the Bulgarian national security to be reduced drastically (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 346).

This goal was hardly achievable as the Bulgarian nation was constructed on the concept of “other” and meanwhile constructing ethnocultural demarcation lines between ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks. The national building process was conceptualized on intrinsically anti-Turkish discourse as depicting initially Ottoman Empire and later on Turkey as the ancient and eternal hostile political subject (Neuburger, 1997, p. 1).

Due to that BCP faced hardship in constructing a classless society based on shared values like justice and solidarity by giving up the traditional values and traditions (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 345; 347). Moreover, the creation of Socialist society was based constantly on the values of the Bulgarian ethnos. It was perceived as the holder of modernity which was a reflection on its “civilizational” self-perception

(Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 345) and Bulgarianness became synonymous with Europeanness and Socialist progress (Neuburger, 2004, p. 75).

In the literature, the Communist Nationalism is presented as a depiction of an instrument through which the regime gained legitimacy. A doctrinal similarity between the Communism and the Nationalism is also palpable, as taking under account the use of populism, collectivization, belief in a “bright future”, and the tactics for mass mobilization. Besides this, the conflict between the Bulgarian and Moscow’s Communist elite led to a more individually inclined approach (Marinov, 2009).

However, the Communist totalitarian regime typically is perceived as antinationalistic and internationalistic taking into consideration its ideological fundamentals. However, this perception is partially accurate and is linked mainly to the period between the establishment of the regime and April’s plenum of CC of BCP in 1956. The internationalistic ideology was gradually intertwined with the Communist nationalism. This Communist version of nationalism was disguised in Marxist-Leninist terms (Todorova M. , 2010).

After the death of Stalin and the following April’s plenum of BCP, the Bulgarian Communism regime already had several Communist Nationalistic features (Marinov, 2009). The latter took some elements of the Marxist doctrine, and in that way, it tried to legitimate its new approach (Marinov, 2009).

The national state conflicted conceptually with the idea of the Communist Internationalism’s construct of a society based first and foremost on the role of class consciousness. There has been a constant conflict between the two discourses, and also apparently a struggle in how exactly the nationalistic discourse to be uttered. This is evident right until undertaking the actions of the “Revival process” as there was still the conflict between the Communist and the Nationalistic discourses respectively represented by the high-ranking Communists Stoyan Mihailov and Georgi Dzhagarov (Aleksandrieva, L; Kiuranov, D, 2019). The first one stated that changing the names would lead to massive negative ramifications and also underlined that the Communist theory is against the change of names. The second one emphasized the ideological interpretation of history which provided legitimization of the future process due to the allegedly previously assimilated by the Ottoman

Empire ethnic Bulgarians. The discourse of Dzhagarov prevails eventually because in the mid80s the pronationalistic part of the Bulgarian political elite had become stronger (Aleksandrieva, L; Kiuranov, D, 2019, pp. 74-79).

This shows the lack of consensus inside the political elite which hesitantly undertook the nationalistic concept defended by the academicians (Detchev S. , 2019). This crystallized in the middle of the 60s as a reemerging interest toward the intellectual heritage from the pre-Second World War period became gradually evident. This paved the way in the 70s towards a republishing of a considerable amount of literature based on folk psychology written before the Second World War (Marinov, 2009).

There is a discussion about why the Communism undertook the Nationalistic stances and “rebranded” itself as the ideological fusion Communist Nationalism (Vardery, 1991, p. 314). According to a particular stance the process of ethnicity and afterward the nation’s construction, and later on the Communist Nationalism’s emergence are part of an almost uninterrupted process of a historical continuum from the 18th until the end of the 20th century in Eastern Europe (Todorova M. , 2010).

The international political situation has to be taken into account to understand that shift. In the Cold war’s reality, the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria were perceived as a possible hostile population, a representative of a Capitalist state on its territory which can be used for the destabilization of the Communist regime in Bulgaria. Moreover, over time the enemy was seen gradually in everything (Avramov, 2016, p. 71).

3.4.2. The Development of Historiography and Undertaking its Discourse by the Party’s Propaganda. The Political Development during the Period of Late Socialism.

At the end of the 50s versions of the “Turkish yoke/slavery” that were famous in the period right after the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria were widespread. Those versions legitimized the assimilation policy undertaken in 1912 and 1913 (Detchev S. , 2019). During the Communist period, the start was taken in 1958 with the collectanea “From the past of Bulgarian Muslims in the Rhodope” in which the main theme was the coercive Islamization in that region (Ivanova, 2002, p. 69). In the

early 60s, the textbook „Rhodopa – the Bulgarian stronghold” by the historian Petar Petrov was published. It included myths of a couple of mass Islamization processes (Detchev S. , 2019). That concept was implemented in the textbook History of Bulgaria in 1961. There the resettlement policy of the Ottoman Empire was mentioned, however, it was emphasized on the assimilation policy upon the Christian population. The resettlement was depicted as “Turkish colonization in the Bulgarian lands”. Soon later the work “Assimilation policy of the Turkish invaders” was published in 1962. It provided “authentic” documents on the Turkification and the Islamization between the 15th and 19th centuries (Detchev S. , 2019).

The main goals of that initial propaganda were to show that there was a centralized and planned policy for the eradication of the Bulgarian people and that policy was undertaken by the Ottoman political elite’s conducted violence and terror. During the conducted policy allegedly some villages were burned down because they didn’t want to convert to Islam (Detchev S. , 2019). The future movie “Time of Violence” was based on the book “Time of Parting”. The latter, before being published, went through a review by the aforementioned Petar Petrov and took information from “original” sources about the past Islamization (Zheliaskova, 2015). The perception that the Muslim population in Bulgaria was Islamized and the ethnic Turks were assimilated ethnic Bulgarians played a pivotal part in the official propaganda to pave the path for integrating that population on the macro-level (Zheliaskova, 2015).

In the 70s as the process of changing the names of the Pomaks was ongoing, Hristo Gandev, another historian, wrote that 75% of the Turkish population from the cities and 25% of the Turks in the villages were having Bulgarian origin (Detchev S. , 2019). Moreover, between 1970 and 1974 Petar Petrov had a course in the History Faculty called “Assimilation policy of the Turkish invaders XV-XVIII” (Detchev S. , 2019).

3.4.3. Undertaking the Academic Stances and the Path to Fully-fledged Communist Nationalism in Bulgaria

In 1961 CC of BCP’s department of “Agitation and propaganda” sent away to all of the local Committees of the Party and to all of the Ministries information stating that

cases of Turkification among the Pomaks, Tatars, and Gypsies were taking place. The party instructed BAS to explore the issue and to analyze that population's origin (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 44). BCP undertook a policy of separating ethnic Turks from the other minorities in Bulgaria. Communist party's covenantal goal was to include the latter into the "Bulgarian Socialist nation". The policy of inclusion led to the assimilation through renaming that population (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 97). Bulgarian Communist political elite wanted to show its modernization ability by proving that Bulgaria and its society were becoming more modernized. However, this development wasn't perceived only as industrialization but also as an attempt of eradicating every single symbol of the Ottoman past. The Bulgarian Communist elite undertook this policy as Pomaks were perceived as a representation of the Bulgarian-Turkish hybrid from the past and this was perceived as absolutely incomparable with the image of the Bulgarian modern self-image (Neuburger, 2004, p. 75).

In the 70s there was an accelerated scientific approach for finding evidence that first, the Pomaks and later on the depicted as the "Turkish speaking" population had ethnic Bulgarian origin. In this way BCP perceived the question as a domestic issue, trying to halt possible future intervention from the Turkish side (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 128-154). Three years before the start of the Revival process, the securitization of the Turkish minority's issue was ongoing with huge force. It officially started with the celebrations of "1300 years Bulgaria" and continues with a massive amount of articles, books depicting the Turks⁵⁶ as the eternal enemy and enslaver. The rapid increase in nationalism was reached by further developing the information retrieved from the textbooks. In this sense, nationalism can be depicted as being in a dormant state as being constantly kept through the school textbooks. The Muslim religious traditions and the ethnic Turks customs were depicted as not comparable with the modernity and the Socialist ideology. Furthermore, there was another concept that was trying to be developed and imposed – the concept that everyone was Bulgarian due to the common origin (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 154-190).

Gradually the BCP's perception of a possible threat emerging from the Bulgarian Turkish minority increased. That can be explained with the perplex mixture of the

⁵⁶ Read Turkish population that is outside Bulgaria

international situation, the striving for the construction of the Socialist reality, and the regime's extreme vigilance in exposing the "enemy". Part of the ethnic Turks was considered as a threat to territorial integrity, respectively the state's sovereignty and the Bulgarian modern societal identity, as heading towards the Communist society (Ivanova, 2002). Because of this perception of threat, BCP undertook the course of integrating the Turkish minority into the "modern" Bulgarian society in order not to be used by Turkey as its fifth column. On one side was the idea of "increasing the Turkish population's living standard", the increasing of the literacy level, and their inclusion into the idea of "Socialistic patriotism". However, on the other hand, BCP undertook the idea of integration and afterward assimilation by using the methods and experience gained until that point. The idea of possible future emigration was taken under account once again (Angelov, 2008, pp. 19-20).

In the Todor Zhivkov's speech during the 100 years commemoration of the Treaty of San Stefano on 3th of March 1978, he mixed the Internationalistic and the Nationalistic discourses. The class struggle in Bulgaria was explained through the devotion of the Bulgarian folk/narod struggle against the foreign and internal enemies, for social progress, justice and freedom, and human life (Zhivkov T. , 1981, pp. 4:16-4:29).

Bulgarian nationalism transformed itself from an irredentist one until the end of the Second World into a status quo's nationalism during the rule of BCP (Todorova M. , 2010). This development is clearly uttered by the BCP's leader in the aforementioned speech: "There is nothing more valuable than the peace, the mutual understanding, and the good neighborly relations...directly connected to the internationalism (Zhivkov T. , 1981, pp. 9:13 - 9:39)". One distinctive feature of the Bulgarian narod was uttered as the combination of patriotism with internationalism (Todorova M. , 2010), and Zhivkov continues:

Our rebels did not fight against the Turkish nation, a considerable amount of Bulgarians have fought for the freedom and independence for the neighboring countries as they have done for their own. Thousands of Armenians came to Bulgaria and made it their own country. Because of the struggle of the Bulgarian narod, the Bulgarian Jews were saved.

(Zhivkov T. , 1981, pp. 7:04 - 8:12)

In Bulgaria, the most robust nationalism was pointing inward, especially in the 60s and the 70s among the intelligentsia - historians and writers. The Communist political elite gradually started supporting them. The rehabilitation of the massive amount of Bulgarian medieval rulers was perceived as an attempt to fight against the spread of national nihilism. This practice was more than welcome for the BCP as it legitimized its policy throughout constructing the perception of past centralized Bulgarian state with influential rulers who were used for a role model (Todorova M. , 2010).

BCP politically reaffirmed the triune theory of the Bulgarians' ethnogenesis out of Thracians, Slavs, and proto-Bulgarians as showing the Bulgarian nation being created in the 9th century. Furthermore, Bulgaria was depicted as being created as a state of one nationality. This theory rendered the perception that there were no ethnic or other minorities in unitary Bulgaria. Respectively the Revival process was the zenith of the nationalistic and modernizing line of the BCP's policy (Todorova M. , 2010).

The gradual transition from internationalism towards nationalism in the late Socialist period is due to the closed borders and the more individual course of developing Socialism. The national state became hegemon upon creating the national identity. Cross-border contacts were limited and with low intensity. Due to that, the Communist Nationalism became a more self-sufficient phenomenon. The development of nationalism inside of the closed borders took a crucial part of the people's unimpeded comprehension of the national history's imposed perception (Daskalov, R., Mishova, D., 2014, p. 487). During the BCP's regime's Communist ideology had been perceived as the national development's logical continuity. Furthermore, it had been perceived as the final point of long-lasting seeking national freedom and social equality. The national identity was developed even more through the "construction" or the development of national cuisine, national traditions, national dress, and national architecture (Dechev, 2010). Those creations were implemented into the nation's self-perception.

3.4.4. The official BCP's discourse

The official propaganda from the late Socialist period emphasized on the increase in Bulgarian Turk's living standard however religion had a lingering impact on them. This was perceived as an obstacle for their Communist education (Iliev, 1980, pp. 5-6) and societal realization. According to a BCP's report:

...into its base, the religion is continuing to be a hurdle for the righteous Communist education of the masses, while keeping a not small amount of people under its influence, to decrease their ideological consciousness and political activity

(Iliev, 1980, p. 6)

Due to that, the formation of a scientific-atheistic perception took a fundamental place in the BCP's policy. However, religion was perceived as an intrinsic feature of ethnic Turk's culture (Iliev, 1980, pp. 7-8). "Communist ideology states that the human is the creator of reality; however Islam preaches that the men belong to God". Due to that the religious and the Communist "ideologies" were considered as completely antagonistic, as the first one - idealistic and the second one - materialistic (Iliev, 1980, pp. 19-30). Moreover, BCP considered the Muslim religion as a fertile base for developing Turkish nationalism among the Bulgarian Muslim population (Iliev, 1980, p. 30).

The vast majority of the ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria right after the FF took over the political power were villagers and according to the party documents, only 5000 of them were part of the working class. BCP's stance was that their low cultural and educational levels and the domestic conservatism led to the crucial position religion took in their life (Iliev, 1980, pp. 40-43). Ali Iliev underlined that the high level of religiousness was not an ethnic characteristic of the Bulgarian Turks, but was an aftermath of their cultural and economic state in the pre-Socialist period (Iliev, 1980, p. 43).

According to the official propaganda, the policy toward the Bulgarian Turks tried to enhance the process of establishing the social, ideological, and morally-political unity of the whole Bulgarian narod. The manifestation of the archaic perceptions of ethnical originality, nationalism, and religious fanaticism was perceived as impeding

the Bulgarian Turks' development on the road of Socialism and the process of unifying the Bulgarian working class (Tahirov, 1979, p. 5). The previously conducted Bulgarian state's policy before 1944 was accused of enhancing Bulgarian chauvinism which led to ethnic isolation, national hatred, and alienation among ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks (Tahirov, 1978, pp. 3-9). The Kemalist organizations during the "bourgeois" period (read pre-Socialist period) were depicted as trying to enhance the nationalistic feelings among the Bulgarian Turks. Their role allegedly was to achieve the Turkish nationalistic ideal (Tahirov, 1979, p. 14). That approach is identical to the uttered "bourgeois" stance in the period before 1944. Shukri Tahirov⁵⁷ depicts the role of Socialism as constructing the class identity via overcoming the differences among religions and ethnic groups:

The more the interests of the different social groups are becoming drawn together and are merging with the fundamental interests of the working class – the more the social, ideological, and moral-political unity of the Socialistic society will be fostered.

(Tahirov, 1979, p. 17)

According to Shukri Tahirov, the Panturkists and Panislamists stated that there was an ongoing process of "Bulgarianization" by BCP. However, he refuted those allegations arguing that BCP perceived the Turkish population as a fundamental part of the Bulgarian *narod* which strived for obtaining Socialism and Communism. This tendency makes gradually the Bulgarian Turks equal to the ethnic Bulgarians by taking part in the Socialist society (Tahirov, 1979, p. 22). The aim was all the ethnic groups' common features to be developed and the different ones to be dissolved (Tahirov, 1979, p. 24). This process was depicted as "accelerated construction of unitary Bulgarian nation (Ivanova, 2002, p. 134)". *Todor Zhivkov* depicted it:

We are conducting assimilation of the Bulgarian narod and the Turkish narod – of all the people/narod in our state. This is a policy of gradual obliteration of the differences among all the people/narod in our state... this is a historical process

(Zhivkov T. , 1976, pp. 95-110)

⁵⁷ Additional information about his political development Zafer, Z., Chernokozhev, V., Kogato mi otnaha imeto "Vazroditelna protses" prez 70-te i 80-te godini na XX vek v Literaturata na Miusiumanskite obshtnosti Antologia, Iztok Zapad Sofia, 2015, pp. 137-143

The official propaganda depicted the emergence of the first Bulgarian state in 681 as a major event “in the age of disintegration of the slave-owning system (Markovski, 1981, p. 62)”. In that way, the Bulgarian state “inherited and continued further the immortal ancient heritage – Thracian, Thracian-Hellenic and Thracian-Roman culture” (Markovski, 1981, p. 62).

The consolidation of the Bulgarian state was accompanied by the process of consolidation of one of the first “stable and lasting” historical communities in European history – the Bulgarian nation (Markovski, 1981, pp. 11-14). It was depicted as heralding the emergence of a new civilization (Markovski, 1981, pp. 16-18). Bulgarian *narod*, despite being under Ottoman rule, not only survived as a nation but took part in the struggle against the “obscurantism” – the Ottoman Empire’s oppressive system (Markovski, 1981, pp. 23-27). Afterward, the historical development of the Bulgarian nation that went through the process of Bulgarian “bourgeois nation”, the national revival and its zenith - the April Uprising of 1876 were taking a key position in the world development when the liberalism and the “revolutionary democratism” were under test (Markovski, 1981, pp. 27-36). Moreover, in the 80s of the 20th century, Bulgaria started its 14th-century existence carrying with itself the “historical heritage” and being in the dynamic of its present (Markovski, 1981, pp. 60-62).

When the ethnic Turks got completely included in the Bulgarian working class a new social-ethnic community was going to be created. The common goal of reaching Communist society was going to enhance the unification of all the ethnic groups in Bulgaria (Tahirov, 1979, p. 26). The process was not uttered as assimilation because it is a bourgeois concept linked to the exploitation classes. Respectively the social process during Socialism could be depicted as a process of unification and inclusion of all the workers (Tahirov, 1979, p. 35).

3.4.5. The Perception of the Threat – BCP’s Propaganda

During BCP’s rule, the Party was identified with the State and the people. The modernization was an aim that the whole society was depicted as striving for. The concept of a future modern Bulgarian reality was jeopardized by the aforementioned

semi-Oriental identity which was linked to the Muslim population. According to the concept “societal security concerns, the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threat” (Wæver O. , 1993, p. 23) link to the Bulgarian example can be described as a threat to accomplishing the desired future modern Bulgarian Socialist society. So the future society was perceived as being under threat in identity terms.

Wæver's concept of state security is perceived as a duality of state and societal security. The state faces a threat to its sovereignty and the society faces a threat to its identity. Respectively about the social sector the society is a referent object (Wæver O. , 1993). Since the People's Republic of Bulgaria was a totalitarian state, BCP constructed the image of itself as a personification of the society's identity and the state's sovereignty. Respectively the threats to societal security were perceived as a threat to the state's sovereignty and visa versa.

Societal security deals with threats to societal identity and societal cohesion. There are threats to the social identity as extremism/nationalism; moreover, there are threats to different aspects of the social identity as to cultural identity, religious identity, the threat to the language, and threats to the historical discourse. As threats to society's cohesion are considered respectively: change of the demographic patterns, separatism, regionalism, and change of the family and household patterns (Chifu, I., Nantoi, O., Sushko, O.,, 2008). Furthermore, according to the Copenhagen school, a response to a threatened society is the strengthening of its social identity. This takes place by strengthening the social cohesion and its distinctiveness and by ensuring that the society reproduces effectively (Wæver O. , 1993, p. 191). The attempts for social inclusion, integration, and eventually assimilation can be perceived as strengthening the existing “Socialist” identity. The imposition of the Socialist culture became part of the security policy.

Respectively there was also a societal security speech act into the BCP's discourse. The ethnic Turks were considered as an embodiment of a religiously conservative society with archaic traditions that are not comparable with the modern Socialist society that was in a process of construction (Tahirov, 1979). The successful securitization of the societal identity takes place when the identity is clearly defined

as what it is and what it is not. By doing so the perception of the “other” as a foreign threat is being constructed (Williams, 2003, p. 520).

Bulgaria, as most of the Balkan countries, through considering its deeply rooted national stereotypes perceived a minority issue as a threat to its national security. The intrinsic concept is that of the unity - a nation that is not united and homogenous is going to disappear or be left behind into the race for development. The “others” (they) are considered as potential aggressors and are constantly looking for an opportunity to attack. Due to historical reasons, this was the perception towards Turkey – as an aggressor (Konstantinov Y. , 1992, p. 75). The Turkish operation in Northern Cyprus in 1974 strengthened the sense of a threat. With this kind of policy, Bulgaria considered Turkey as departing from the Kemalist principles and was seen more clearly as a potential aggressor (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 12). Respectively this enhanced the fear of the “reactionary” Turkish nationalism. After the Revolution in Iran in 1979 was added additionally the threat of the Islamic fundamentalism’s spread (Neuburger, 2004, p. 71). Over time the Communist regime became extremely vigilant in its “enemy mania” (Markov, 2013).

Therefore the Communist propaganda machine uttered the threat as Panturkists and Panislamists. An example of a depiction of the Communist regime’s threat perception is the literature of Shukri Tahirov⁵⁸. He is representative of those new “yenichar” that had been mentioned in BCP’s documents (Ivanova, 2002, p. 80). The “justification” of the name-changing campaign was the stance that some illegal organizations – the aforementioned Panturkists and Panislamists in Bulgaria -that were formed by Turkey were preparing the future annexation to Turkey of huge territories of Bulgaria mainly the Razgrad and Kardzhali regions (Grouev, 1996, p. 10).

According to Shukri Tahirov, the groups spreading Panturkish and Panislamic ideologies in Bulgaria were the reactionary bourgeois and the Islamic clergy. They were jeopardizing the construction of a brand new society, which was going to be above the ethnic and religious differences of the various groups comprising the Bulgarian “narod” (Tahirov, 1979, p. 37). Allegedly the undertaken policy of the Panturkism and Panislamism aimed at achieving two goals – constraining the active

⁵⁸ Also known with his Bulgarian name - Orlin Zagorov

involvement of the Bulgarian Turks into the construction of Socialism and Communism and to discredit the Socialism in the eyes of the World (Tahirov, 1979).

The threat's perception was depicted as the Pan Turkism. Allegedly, according to it, all Turkish/Turkic ethnic groups must be united in one state, as the unifying factor is the Turkish language. Tahirov pointed out the threat as Ziya Gökalp's concept (Tahirov, 1979, p. 26) of Islamic-Turkish civilization's creation. According to Ziya Gökalp, every ethnic Turk must enhance its Turkish consciousness formed by the common language, religion, and morals. Moreover, three principles must be followed – Turkization, Islamization, and Modernization (Tahirov, 1979, p. 49). While the ethnic Turks emphasize the different culture and traditions from the Bulgarians, this leads to strengthening the Turkish national awareness. The latter respectively leads to a decrease in the possibility of enhancing their Communist awareness (Tahirov, 1979, p. 61).

BCP's propaganda depicted Bulgaria as a democratic state, which had provided constantly the opportunity to its "deluded by the Pan Turkish and Pan Islamist propaganda" citizens to leave the country (Tahirov, 1979, p. 61). However, allegedly Pan Turkists created the false perception that Bulgaria deports its Turkish population. Moreover, a lot of those Bulgarian Turks that had emigrated eventually tried to return to Bulgaria (Tahirov, 1979, p. 62).

Furthermore, the policy towards the traditional Bulgarian Turk's clothing was juxtaposed with the Atatürk's modernization reforms (Tahirov, 1979, pp. 63-64). The threat perception was enhanced by the stance that American anti-Communism supported and exploited the Pan Islamism to achieve its own goals (Tahirov, 1979, pp. 67-68). Tahirov stated that Pan Islamic views were supported by a small part of the Bulgarian Turkish population. This support was based on old-fashioned religious fanaticism and some conservative perceptions (Tahirov, 1979, pp. 68-69).

The ethnic assimilation was depicted as a normal part of the historical process. However, this policy differed from the assimilation conducted in the bourgeois states. Into the process of ethnic assimilation, the more culturally developed nation dissolves inside of itself the smaller ethnic groups. Those groups were trying to integrate themselves as well. Moreover, the Bulgarian nation was depicted as a monolith and

almost monoethnic one. Bulgarian people's integration took place between the Bulgarian nation-ethos and the ethnic groups of the Bulgarian Turks and the gypsies (Hadzhinikolov, 1980, pp. 29-34).

The Bulgarian political elite's fundamental fear was of a possible Cyprus scenario in southeast Bulgaria and also of the ethnic Turkish minority's high birth rate (Crampton, 1987, p. 205). Besides that the emergence of the local Turkish elite led allegedly to a request of several Turkish leaders for the autonomy of the regions with ethnic Turkish majority aiming at preserving their ethnic identity (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004).

3.4.6. Propaganda in the textbooks

The school and the army can be considered as the institutions that construct the national identity (Todorova M. , 1995). Textbooks are compared to the previous story-tellers. Especially textbooks do hand down information from the older generation to the younger while considering what kind of information must be conveyed. It is knowledge about their culture and foreign societies (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998). Textbooks are the universal source that has an official legitimate omnipresent ability to provide a universal and approved version of the information that must be comprehended from the young generation (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998).

Textbooks were used by BCP to gain legitimacy and convince the people that the Party was the righteous one and worked for defending and protecting all people's interests (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998, p. 61). This discourse was undertaken to juxtapose the realistic present and the possible present aiming at prevailing upon the rest of the political subjects struggling for political power especially in the '40s (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998, p. 62). In the first textbook created during the new regime in 1946 for example the *narod* was depicted as comprising of "progressive elements" (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998, p. 62). During the Second World War, FF and the Soviet Union were depicted as the saviors of Bulgaria from extinction. With time this concept got strengthened and imposed as "the Party knows best" and that it is the defender of the state and the people's interests. (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998, p. 64).

Moreover, in 1946's textbook Ottoman Empire, respectively Republic of Turkey was described as the foreigner, the other in a sense of ethnicity, race, religion, and culture. Moreover, Bulgarian ethnicity was depicted as the bearer of the uniqueness of the Bulgarian language, race, and traditions (Dimitrova, 3(1), 2003, p. 64). The transition towards the construction of a new identity was undertaken. The Bulgarian was uttered as a citizen and as a patriot and its fundamental identity was the service of its nation and hatred towards its enemies (Dimitrova, 3(1), 2003, p. 65). However, in the 1982's textbook, the conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the Balkan countries were depicted as an outcome of the growth of capitalism and the national markets, not as ethnic or cultural differences (Dimitrova, S., & Kaytchev, N., 1998, p. 65). This shows that even having the base for nationalistic mobilization at a dormant stage BCP didn't have openly pro-Revival process positions and didn't want to ignite nationalistic tensions. The vast part of the legitimization of the Revival process took place after the change of the names. In the mid80s a Scientific-coordination council was established which was linked to SS and Sofia University. Its main goal was to support the research on the Christian population's situation in the Ottoman Empire XV – XVIII century and to provide legitimization of the back then ongoing Revival process (CDDAABCSSIBNAF, 2013, p. 9).

Miumiun Isov analyzed the material in the textbooks from 1955, 1966, and 1973. The mainline was the depiction of the process of Islamization as an intrinsic part of the religion of Islam. Its religious and ideological doctrine was depicted as intrinsically aggressive towards Christians. In the 80s the textbooks stated that Islam was coercively imposed. Ottoman period was described as a constant looming danger of physical extinction among the Bulgarians, but also from losing its national identity. The devshirme was reiterated and emphasized as taking a pivotal part during the Ottoman Empire period. This way of interpreting history led to the construction of intrinsic unacceptance towards Islam as a religion and antipathy towards its followers – the Turks. This line was used not only for the Bulgarians but also was aiming at the Bulgarian Muslim population. The goal was to make the Pomaks and the ethnic Turks head toward undertaking the modern atheistic lifestyle. Moreover, the ethnic Turks were considered as the ultimate "other" as they differ not only by religion but by their native language as well. Due to that, they were depicted as bearers of religious fanaticism. As a result, the constructed image of the Ottoman Empire's period and

Islam redounded upon the Christian majority's mainly apathetic stance towards the BCP's assimilation policy in the 80s (Isoy, 2005). The decision about embarking the "Revival process" was legitimized by the lingering unchanged Bulgarian "Revival" nationalism (Aleksandrieva, L; Kiuranov, D, 2019, p. 69).

Several writers and scientists that choose to work closely with the Party tried to prove the Bulgarian ethnic origin of Bulgaria's Muslim population. This happened through publishing reports and ethnogenetic works on the "Turkification" of part of the ethnic Bulgarians during the Ottoman rule⁵⁹. Moreover, the research stated that there were several ethnic groups in Bulgaria back then. However, all of them had been violently Islamized Bulgarians, remaining groups from the Proto-Bulgarians and some related to the Turkic tribes. The rest of the Muslim population was due to the Ottoman Empire's policy to send its enemies to Bulgaria, or they were groups that sought asylum in some past period. Those pro-BCP scientists stated that the Turkish speaking groups were called Turks only by inertia. That is how the statement that there were no Turks in Bulgaria was defended – with "historical" and "scientific" evidence (Ivanova, 2002, p. 158).

The statement that not only the Pomaks but also the Turkish speaking population was having Bulgarian roots attempted to justify the future assimilation policy and the return to their original identity. According to their stances, due to the historical development, that population got "denationalized." The return of their names was considered as restoring historical justice. The first step towards the future "Revival" process was taken in 1975 when along with the Pomaks in Smolyan's region some ethnic Turks got their names changed as well. Back then, this was justified with the stance that they were descendants of mixed marriages with the surrounding Bulgarian Muslims' population (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 124-144). According to BCP, that population was under a strong Turkification process as was living among Turkish speakers and in a Muslim sphere. Because of this development, they had lost their Bulgarian national consciousness. The ones that stood against the name-changing

⁵⁹ One example of this "scientific" work Petrov Petar, . По следите на насилието. Документи и материали за помохамеданчваниата, Sofia: Nauka I izkustvo, 1972 (preizdado v prerabotena I razshirena versia prez 1987 g.); Petrov, Petar, . По следите на насилието. Документи и материали за помохамеданчвания и потурчвания, София: Наука и изкуство, 1972 (preizdado v prerabotena i razshirena versia prez 1987 г.)

campaign were considered as local nationalists and religious fanatics (Ministry of Interior, May 1983, pp. 949-950).

Meanwhile, the pressure upon the Muslims was getting higher. Their traditions were prosecuted; the construction of mosques was prohibited and the administrative pressure got strengthened⁶⁰. In that way, approximately 50 000 people had their names changed. Among them were all of the Pomaks that, in some way, had escaped from the previous assimilation wave in the 70s. Besides that, at the beginning of 1984, Bulgarian authorities forbade the use of Turkish language in public as substantial fines were imposed in a case of violation (Marinov, 2009).

3.5. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE LATE SOCIALISM

3.5.1. Change of the Pomaks' names and the ideological preparation for the Revival process

According to BCP's major party officials, during the Pomaks' name change process even the "Turkophiles" and "fanatics" changed their names (Diulgerov, 2000, p. 31). The process was depicted as a "national awareness" and prevalence upon the "Turkophiles" and "fanaticized elements" (Diulgerov, 2000, pp. 49-51).

In the mixed regions the process was depicted as nationwide and respectively the acts of resistance as anti-Bulgarian actions. BCP's propaganda created the base for direct and indirect inclusion of the Christian Bulgarians into the process. Later on, a similar approach was going to be undertaken towards the ethnic Turks. Respectively this made the Pomaks more inclined to close their community and not to accept modernization's imposition to a higher extent (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 52).

The Pomak names' change in 1970-1974 was legitimized by the official propaganda's concept of the alleged Ottoman Empire's Islamization policy in the Balkan Peninsula.

⁶⁰ In order a person to be appointed at work, he/she had to have a Bulgarian name. Moreover, it was a requirement for anyone who wanted to take a higher position in the party's hierarchy and even in a case someone wanted to buy an apartment.

While pointing out the goal as a “unified Socialist nation” that process was perceived as a remedy for the Ottoman Empire’s heritage. The official propaganda states that this was a process of “recovering the historical justice” (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 64). In that way, the Bulgarian Communist elite intruded that Pomaks and Christian Bulgarians had been living together and once again they “became” together (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 64).

In the 70s a new policy promoted by the daughter of Todor Zhivkov – Liudmila Zhivkova got embarked. It aimed at reviving the Bulgarian glorious cultural and historical past which was aiming to show the cultural uniqueness and ethnic homogeneity of Bulgaria. However, the main goal was to handle the identity crises Bulgaria was facing and to improve the BCP’s legitimacy (Tsoneva, 2005, p. 9).

After the Plenum of CC of BCP in February 1974, a more nationalistic course was taken. Aleksandar Lilov⁶¹ stated that the official propaganda rhetoric was not obtaining the needed mobilization effect and respectively – the political legitimacy, due to that it required reformation. The focus shifted gradually from the class to the nation/*narod*. This change became palpable as the so-called “patriotic education” emerged. The latter aimed at enhancing the so needed social support to the regime. The atheistic propaganda got strengthened and was considered a pivotal part of the influence upon the conservative Muslim society (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 85). In the official BCP’s media – *Rabotnichesko Delo*, the decision for enhancing the Communist education of the Bulgarians with Muslim denomination was depicted as an act of opposing the reactionary propaganda which allegedly tried to alienate those people from Socialism and to deter their national and societal consciousness (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, 1974). Moreover, documents from the aforementioned Plenum show that a decision for increasing the level of the inclusion of the population of ethnic Turkish origin was taken (Ivanova, 2002, pp. 133-134). With this decision, the implemented policy toward the Pomaks started to be implemented upon the ethnic Turks. The concept of the creation of a “unified Socialistic Bulgarian nation” was also in use. The legitimization of the “Revival process” was ongoing (Stoyanov V. , 1998) in order the escape from the “normal” politics to take place. Meanwhile, there were

⁶¹ The second person after Todor Zhivkov in the 70s and early 80s

several scientists from BAS who were against the official political line. They were tightly monitored and some of them detained (Ministry of Interior, 1982).

Todor Zhivkov stated that Patriotism was becoming not only love towards the homeland but particularly love towards the Socialist homeland – the People's Republic of Bulgaria. This unity among the ethnic groups inside of the Bulgarian society created a representation of this "new" patriotism (Zhivkov T. , 1976, p. 110). However very symptomatic is the statistic showing that in 1978 only 27 093 ethnic Turks were members of BCP, as it had more than 800 000 members (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 122). Moreover, the highest political position that an ethnic Turkish Communists obtained during the whole Communist regime was District Party Committee Chairmen (Mahon, 1:2, 1999, p. 156). Even those that were Party members were often scolded about their lack of satisfactory level of Socialist consciousness. Moreover, they were considered to be a potential reactionary element, and on the other side the ethnic Bulgarians even without being Party members were considered as a regular society's member (Mahon, 1:2, 1999, p. 156).

The official propaganda got strengthened. The Ottoman's/Turkish "yoke's" alleged assimilation process was depicted as an attempt to divide the Bulgarian people/narod through imposing foreign religion and national consciousness. The Pomaks were perceived as an outcome of this assimilation process as were partly and the Bulgarian Turks were shown as completely assimilated. Respectively the historical justice had to be recovered. This perception was strengthened by the concept of the Bulgarian nation's trinity – Thracians, Proto-Bulgarians, and Slavs (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 171).

Moreover, the Ottoman Empire's period was uttered as a clash between Christianity and Islam. Muslims were depicted as bearers of one primitive civilization that strived to prevail during the aforementioned period. This perception led to the emergence of nationalistic tendencies. According to the propaganda the ethnic Turks were considered as being part of the Ottoman Empire's "colonization" policy. During and after the Russo-Turkish war the people that left the territory of Bulgaria were depicted as to be far more than the people that had migrated previously from Anatolia (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 176).

Despite the propaganda line imposed by the BCP's elite, a few scientists linked their career with spreading the propaganda for the Revival process (Detchev S. , 2019, p. 40). The period of the 80s is pivotal for the development of the Bulgarian Ottoman studies' scientists even though they had to confine themselves to the "revival" discourse. Moreover, some historians were openly opposing the Revival process especially in 1988-1989. An example of this is the "School of the young historians" in Primorsko, East Bulgaria. (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 173).

With the beginning of the 80s, BCP's position became more rigid. The international situation was perceived as tensed and that all the reactionary forces were getting united. Turkey was considered as becoming a more active imperialist state in the Balkans and the Middle East. According to the Bulgarian intelligence to impose influence, Turkey had established organizations which were comprised of the most reactionary Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks emigrants and also MIT members. One of those organizations was considered to be the "Association for culture and solidarity for Rhodope and Danube Turks" (Ministry of Interior, May 1980).

Moreover, it was reported that the Turkish authorities tried to recruit Bulgarian citizens visiting Turkey (Ministry of Interior, May 1980). Allegedly, according to the Bulgarian intelligence, the aforementioned association members had been planning terrorist attacks against the Bulgarian diplomatic missions and on Bulgarian territory (Ministry of Interior, May 1980, p. 806). MIT was considered as attempting to impose influence in Bulgaria through the association. Through fostering the emigrational turmoil among the ethnic Turks and inciting their nationalistic feelings, Ankara allegedly was trying to "undermine the moral-political unity of the Bulgarian narod and to impede Muslim population's inclusion in the construction of Socialism" (Ministry of Interior, May 1980, p. 809). Furthermore, Sofia was expecting the Republic of Turkey's proposition of the administrative autonomy of the areas predominantly habituated by ethnic Turks (Ministry of Interior,. February 1982, p. 829).

Due to that development BCP amended its minority policy. The term Bulgarian Turks was in use at all the radio broadcasts, newspapers, and official documents. The focus gradually inclined more to the complicated ethnic origin of that population. Moreover, the main focus was put on the origin as determining the identity and its appurtenance. The goal was to emphasize more on the alleged Islamization policies

during the Ottoman Empire rather than its resettlement policy (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 125).

Furthermore, in the early 80s, the discussions on the next step of the plan for a unified Bulgarian nation got undertaken. In 1980 the ethnic Turks numbered more than in 1946 (Stoyanov V. , 1998, pp. 235-241). Moreover, they were expected in the future to number more than 1 million, which meant according to the predictions above 10% of the whole population in 2001 (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 141). According to another party analyze only the natural growth of that population had emigrated through the years (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 119).

In 1982 one of the main ideological leaders of BCP Georgi Dzhagarov stated in a report that the ethnic differences should be overcome and those conditions are making the ethnic Turks encapsulated in their community and made them a “reserve of the international reactionary forces and a base of the activity against the Bulgarian state’s security” (Avramov, 2016, p. 78). A course towards national unity was taken as this process was underlined as nationalism which is different from the ethnic nationalism as it undertakes the unification process of all the ethnic groups – Bulgarian, Turkish, and Jewish. There were propositions for achieving this as introducing quotas for the minorities into the factories; overcoming the religious and national appurtenance; removal of the division between Bulgarians and non-Bulgarians. Gradually the construction of the concept of the common origin was undertaken. The goal was to divide the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria from the historical communities as the Ottoman Turks. The main idea was to differentiate them from the intrinsic historical construct of the Turkish conquerors and suppressors (Avramov, 2016, p. 79).

In 1983, the Ministry of Interior stated that in Turkey was established a commission for defending the ethnic Turks who were being assimilated. Sofia once again perceived this development as an Ankara’s attempt to strengthen its destabilizing attempt upon the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. That policy aimed allegedly at enhancing the emigration frenzy among the ethnic Turks which would lead to economic ramifications for the Socialist Republic (Ministry of Interior,. (after) March 1983, p. 940).

Moreover, a new demographic policy got undertaken aiming at decreasing the high ethnic Turk's birthrate. The natural growth of this population in the late 70s was almost three times higher than the ethnic Bulgarians' one (Ivanova, 2002, p. 155). A decision was taken stating that the Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks must be depicted as having Bulgarian ethnic origin into the textbooks (Ivanova, 2002, p. 157).

3.5.2. Revival process (1984-1989)

According to Veselin Dimitrov, the traditional theories cannot explain why BCP undertook the Nationalistic line as the Bulgarian situation is a specific one. He argues that focusing on the state as the main actor in constructing nationalistic politics can provide a higher level of understanding. According to him the rise of nationalism can be explained through the failure of the alternative undertaken policies (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 3). Until the zenith of the Revival process there were different kind of attempts to solve the issue – bilateral agreements between Bulgaria and Ottoman Empire/Turkey; forced emigration; integration on the base of constructing a transnational communist society through undermining the ethnic division inside of the society; total control upon the ethnic issues by the Bulgarian majority. Veselin Dimitrov states that nationalism was undertaken gradually in the 70s and especially in the 80s as an attempt to handle two negative developments. First was the decrease of the Communist regime's political legitimacy and second was to handle the failure of the economic and political reforms in the 60s (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 9). Moreover Turkish minority, through strengthening its identity and economic position in the Bulgarian state once again enhanced the dormant intrinsic fear of losing state sovereignty as ethnic Turks were considered as representatives of the “formerly dominant minority” (Mahon, 1:2, 1999).

Just before the zenith⁶² of the Revival process to be reached at the end of 1984, BCP's Politburo discusses the report “For the further union and inclusion of the Bulgarian Turks towards the work of Socialism and the policy of BCP”. In it, Zhivkov stated that the ethnic Turkish population was way too huge and the attempts of its

⁶² Here was used the term “zenith” according to the BCP's official propaganda. The Revival process was depicted as the final phase of the Bulgarian Revival stated gradually approximately at the end of XVII century

destabilization (from foreign forces) were going to continue in the future. Dimitar Stoyanov⁶³ gave examples of the slogans for autonomy, the Turkish flags on the mosques, and the calls for gatherings of weapons (Ivanova, 2002, p. 171). Petar Dulgerov⁶⁴ stated:

...before, among the Pomaks there has been a strong Turkish agency, however not any-more. The **Bulgarian nation is the bearer of the progress, of the culture and civilization.** It has to devour and assimilate the others inside of itself. We are not talking about assimilation; however, we are heading towards it... (text in bold made by me – I.I.)

(Ivanova, 2002, p. 172)

After the change of the Pomaks' names, the Bulgarian Turks got socially more alienated and were more inclined to support the Turkish nationalistic discourse as there was information that in the 60s and the 70s illegal groups were spreading anonymous pro-Turkish materials (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 383-384). Nevertheless, the decision for the Revival process was a surprise for the whole Bulgarian population, regardless of its ethnic origin (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 131).

Moreover, on the 30th of August 1984 almost at the same time, two explosions erupted at a station in Plovdiv and Varna's airport. They took place on the very same day when Todor Zhivkov planned to visit those cities (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 105). In March 1985 close to Sofia another explosion took place in a crowded railway wagon which led to several victims, among which several infants. Bulgarian authorities suspected that ethnic Turks – Turkish nationalists (Ministry on Interior., September, 1984, pp. 989-990) - were behind this attack. Eventually, four ethnic Turks were detained and three of them received capital punishment. The terrorist attacks led to strengthening BCP's position and its perception that part of the ethnic Turks was a threat to the national security and a real Ankara's "fifth colony" (Stoyanov V. , 1998, p. 162). The society understood later about those terrorist attacks; even though the information was in a form of rumors, it increased even further the social tension (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 138-139). Moreover in 1985 Zhivkov publicly stated that there were no Turks in Bulgaria (Neuburger, 1997, p. 6).

⁶³ A member of the CC of BCP and the minister of interior between 1973 – 1988, one of the leaders and the masterminds of the Revival process

⁶⁴ A prominent member of the CC of BCP

Before the official order for undertaking the Revival process was uttered, the process started at the beginning of November as the army reserves were mobilized. The target group was expecting the state to take coercive measures taking into account the mobilization and being aware of the official policy of National Revival (Avramov, 2016, p. 99).

The official order for taking actions the “Revival process” came from the Minister of Interior – Dimitar Stoyanov, on the 10th of December 1984 (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 135-136). At the end of 1984, the massive change of ethnic Turks’ names started in Kardzhali and finished in February 1985 (Amnesty International, 1986, p. 7). The method was the same as with the Pomaks – surrounding the village or the town by both the police and the military. For just three months, the names of over 800 000 ethnic Turks got changed (Marinov, 2009, p. 33). On a session of CC of BCP on 28.01.1985 was stated that change of the names had been completed and the Revival Process officially “started”. Its main goal was to revive the Bulgarian national consciousness of the people with changed names and to include them into the Bulgarian nation (Asenov, 1996, p. 94). The assimilation campaign was carried out in a vacuum atmosphere of complete state-controlled media and state apparatus (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 344).

Until the 14th of January, 550 000 people were “revived” and had returned to their Bulgarian roots (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). Once again as a similar procedure happened toward the Pomaks, the CC of BCP was not taking direct part of the Revival process as the names’ change was made by the BCP’s local committees. The procedure had to be the same in the Ludogorie region (Deliorman) which consists of Razgrad, Shumen, and Targovishte municipalities. Most probably the local BCP’s elite opposed the Revival process at that very moment (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 106). The official propaganda depicted the process as a feast, symbolizing the liberation from Turkish slavery/yoke (Ivanova, 2002). The North-east part of Bulgaria was eventually “revived” and minister of interior Dimitar Stoyanov stated on 11th of February 1985 that the process has been completed and the “revived” people numbered 822 588 (Avramov, 2016, p. 110).

Publicly the act was named “Revival process” by the BCP’s Secretary Georgi Atanasov, stating on 18th of January 1985, that the campaign was “a historical act,

with which the last scar of the Turkish yoke was removed from our nation,” and the change of the names was “restoration of the Bulgarian names (Angelov, 2008, pp. 160-171)”. The state media did not spread any “inappropriate” information on the Revival process. The campaign was depicted as a completely voluntary act of the local population (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 10). Meanwhile, BCP stopped the last survived magazines, newspapers, and radio broadcasts in Turkish.

Todor Zhivkov stated that the time for undertaking those actions was suitable as Turkey was busy dealing with the conflict with Greece and had domestic instability as the conflict with the Kurds was at its culmination. Even vague by whom the decision for the Revival process might have been taken solely by Zhivkov. Niko lahiel, one of the few high ranking personals close to Zhivkov, stated that BCP's leader perceived this particular time as suitable for solving the problem that can jeopardize Bulgaria's security in the future. Moreover, Zhivkov thought that it might be harder for his heir to consulate enough power to embark on something Zhivkov was able to (Yahiel, 1997). Due to that, the General Secretary might have taken personal responsibility at that moment for the Revival process (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 14). This opinion can be supported by the last time Politburo conveyed before January 1985. During the meeting, Politburo discussed the policy towards the ethnic Turks and the decision was to continue the policy of gradual integration/assimilation undertaken since the late 50s (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 14). Besides that Todor Zhivkov personally and BCP's elite wanted to construct the image of the BCP as the only political subject that succeeded in accomplishing national unity since 1878 (Dainov, 2004).

At CC of BCP's closed meeting, Todor Zhivkov stated that the Bulgarian Turks were assimilated during the Ottoman Empire period ethnic Bulgarians. In the mid80s he uttered that there was a direct threat to Bulgarian national security as those people were located at the bordering territories, and in the case of a future war, they hold an extremely strategic position (Ivanova, 2002). During a meeting with the President of the Turkish Republic Kenan Evren on the 11th of January about the ongoing Revival Process, Todor Zhivkov stated that the process was about the Bulgarian Muslims that regularly change their names (Şimşir B. , 2012, p. 390).

Despite the radical policy of changing the names in 1984-1985, the system of coexistence was preserved as in the mixed regions normally the people were using

among each other their original names. In those regions, there is an overlapping of tradition and the perception of “us” and “them”. In Rhodopes in 1987 started performing the act of „fraternization“ (pobratimiavane) among the Pomaks, ethnic Turks, and Bulgarian Christians. This act was undertaken for the common ethnic root to be emphasized and its perception to be strengthened (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 154-156).

Meanwhile, the vast majority of the Bulgarian society wasn't aware of the state's minority policy right up to 1985 when the massive propaganda started and the news showed how the “new” Bulgarians were taking their passports with their new names (Traianova, 1991, pp. 1:34-3:18). However, the people that rejected their names to be changed faced problems with receiving their pension, wage, health services and had restrictions on the ability to travel and even faced imprisonment and exile (Bates, 1994, p. 209).

The BCP's approach towards the Turkish minority had huge repercussions in the whole social system. The perception of the “other” became rigid despite the existence of the “neighborhood” or “komushuluk” system⁶⁵ (Lubanska, 2015, pp. 55-96)”. This stereotyping got strengthened through the construction of the image of Ottomans/Turks, the Ottoman Empire, and the Turkish Republic. This information was interpreted through textbooks, documentaries, and novels. They were used to legitimize the Revival process and created the base for rapid increase into the nationalistic feelings at the end of the BCP's regime (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 157). For example in 1985 an exhibition titled “Anti-Bulgarian Turkish propaganda” was held in Shumen's museum. All students' attendance was mandatory. The goal was to prove that in the region there was neither Turkish nor Muslim presence (Bates, 1994, pp. 216-217).

The use of the Turkish language was criminalized as wearing of shalwars and the circumcision. Voluntary workers' groups were created and were patrolling around the cities and the participation in them was mandatory in a case a person applies for a job, applies for a BCP's membership, for young teachers, and so on. Those groups were helping the police in sustaining the public order (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 160). In the shops, posters were showing the prohibition of the use of the Turkish

⁶⁵ The centuries long cultural overlapping constructed through the historical process on a local level

language. Moreover, books in Turkish were gathered from libraries and private homes. The change in the geographical objects' names from Turkish to Bulgarian took place as well (Stoyanov V. , 1998, p. 198).

Due to the Revival process and the deviation from the normality between the end of 1984 and the end of 1989 created a sense of hostility, a sense of betrayal, and alienation among the ethnic groups living in the mixed regions. This was also the policy of the party and prohibited the travels out and in the mixed regions, jammed the radio, and restricted the telephone communications (Bates, 1994, p. 212).

During the Revival process, the concept of mononational state was legitimized through the overlapping of the concepts nationhood and ethnicity. It was stated that ethnic origin is linked to the Bulgarian nation which was formed out of the ethnocultural heritage of one nationality – the Bulgarian one (Maeva, 2006, p. 40). That's how the ethnic palette was removed from consideration and the whole nation was identified with the dominant Bulgarian ethnos. The Revival process was considered as having corrective meaning, but also important social and national-perspective inclination as it created amendments into the way of life, the culture, and the political views, and enhanced the social inclusion of the “revived” people (Mizov, 1988, pp. 166-167). Moreover, it had ethnic-consolidation function among the attempted to be culturally and ethnically assimilated part of the Bulgarian *narod* (Maeva, 2006, pp. 40-41).

The changing discourse of the used minority's exonyms was a reflection of BCP's attempt to put the attempted legitimization of the Revival process in action. Bulgarian Turks were called “citizens with restored names”; “Islamized Bulgarians” and “Bulgarians having a different level of development of patriotic consciousness and religious beliefs”. The latter emphasized the different levels of attachment to the Bulgarian state (Maeva, 2006, p. 41). After The Revival process was conducted and BAS was assigned to legitimize the undertaken policy. It tried to purify the Bulgarian language from any kind of similarities with the Turkish language or any remnants that resemble the Ottoman past. Besides that huge effort was made for finding evidence of Muslim participation in the struggle against the Ottoman rule and against the alleged “Fascist” regime before 1944 (State Security,. January 1987, p. 131).

In 1985 five intellectuals as among them was the future leader of MRF formed a secret organization aiming at enhancing the Turkish awareness among the ethnic Turkish educational and religious elite (Özgür, 1999). Into the organization chart is written by Ahmet Dogan was called for “unarmed war” against the BCP’s conducted policy (Özgür, 1999, pp. 77-81).

Because of the undertaken policy, BCP faced a huge loss of legitimacy among the Bulgarian minorities. Ahmet Dogan stated that the issue was not that much about the names, but about the Muslim population’s social security. Bulgarian state could not guarantee equal participation in all the social spheres and this restricted the possibilities of successful social inclusion of the Muslim minorities. This made a huge amount of people leave for Turkey, taking the risk of the hardship of the adaptation into the new social reality (Tsoneva, 2005). The perceived societal security threat to the ethnic Bulgarian majority respectively created a situation of connected vessels. It created the base for enhancing their identity perception as they started acting together defending their common interests (Tsoneva, 2005, p. 12).

3.5.3. The Revival process’ discourse into the BCP’s documents

At the beginning of 1985, Georgi Atanasov in his addressing to the first secretaries of the Local Committees depicted the Revival process as “a historical act with which the last scar from the Turkish yoke upon our people was removed and new conditions were created for the national unity and to its moral-political cohesion’s enhancement” (Atanasov, G., 18th of January 1985). Moreover, it was uttered as “one profoundly progressive process which aimed at achieving the affirmation of the Bulgarian Socialist patriotic consciousness among those people that in some periods in the past had been alienated from the pure Bulgarian national spirit”. This act was uttered as a revolutionary one which makes a huge hit upon the Turkish bourgeois nationalism which aims at undermining the Bulgarian consciousness of some people (Atanasov, G., 18th of January 1985). Moreover was considered as accelerating the process of those people’s conservative lifestyle (bit), nationalistic and religious remnants’ eradication. Besides this the Revival process was uttered as an act of international importance – it curbs the influence of reactionary Turkey, USA, and

NATO upon this population and constrains their attempt to destabilize Bulgaria (Atanasov, G., 18th of January 1985, pp. 9-10).

On the 12th of March 1988 during a Politburo's meeting, the creation of theses on the Revival process was discussed. They were going to be the main ideological, historical, and ethnographical justification of the policy undertaken by BCP in the middle of the 80s as BAS was about to publish. The covenant goal was the overcoming of the Turkish nationalism's elements and the strengthening of the Bulgarian Socialist national awareness. How it can be achieved was considered through a provision of historical evidence and thus an affirmation of mass consciousness of the common Bulgarian ethnic origin. In order, this stance to be provided with a rigid justification, the whole state system got mobilized⁶⁶. A lot of local researches were "conducted", scientific conferences were conveyed and analyses were published for the conducted policy to be justified (Petrov, 1986); (Stefanov, 1988). The idea behind the Revival process was by showing the historical "truth", the "deluded" Turks to be united with their brothers in the common Socialist and national identities (Neuburger, 2004, p. 76).

In June 1989 the Politburo of CC of BCP conveyed with all of the first secretaries of BCP's regional committees, the minister of foreign affairs, and other highest-ranking political officials. This meeting took place just before Turkey opened its borders and the so-called "Big excursion" officially started. According to the archive, Todor Zhivkov stated that with his speech on the National TV and radio he confused the organizers of the ethnic Turks' rallies (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, 2003). The situation was depicted as a necessary one and the emigration was considered as more than welcome for the sake of Bulgarian national security. A decision was taken officially no one from BCP to talk about deportation and Sofia not to negotiate with Ankara for a bilateral agreement concerning "the deportation" (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, 2003, p. 87).

Moreover officially no one was going to talk about the alleged Bulgarian origin of the ethnic Turkish population anymore. The official line was to be stated that not every Muslim in Bulgaria was an ethnic Turk (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, p. 87).

⁶⁶ TsDA f. 1B, op. 68, a.e. 3388, l. 231 – 240 Protocol № 35 ot zasедanie na Politburo na CC na BCP ot mart 1988 g.: Razglezhdane na proekt za tezisi po "Vazroditelnia protses"

Moreover, a decision was taken that the school programs had to emphasize more on Socialist patriotism. The latter, depicted as fundamentally nationalistic, was aimed to be strengthened by enhancing the unity of the Bulgarian *narod* (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, p. 90). Moreover, the past was considered as taking an important part in describing the evolution which led to obtaining Marxism (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, p. 121). As uttered, later on, nationalism was used to invigorate the process of society's reconstruction; for the solidification of the people and the unity of the nation; for the BCP's authority rise and strengthening of its leading role (Politburo of CC of BCP, June 1989, p. 141).

A rally was organized by BCP in front of the Turkish consulate. It was depicted as massive and enthusiastic due to the increase of the patriotic feelings among the Christian Bulgarian population. Besides this, the local Party apparatus (300 people) of Kazanlak, Stara Zagora, and Dimitrovgrad was indicated as armed (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, p. 102). Todor Zhivkov stated that groups of young people that had completed their military service had to be organized aiming at sustaining the public order (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, 2003, p. 120).

In BCP's documents, the ethnic Turks were depicted as a population whose national consciousness had become vague through the historical process. They had been assimilated in the linguistic sense by the Ottoman conqueror and became a population with deviated and suppressed Bulgarian consciousness. In the 80s the terms Bulgarians with Turkish names (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 163-164) and Turkish-speaking Bulgarians were put in more frequent usage (State Security, January 1987).

3.5.4. The international situation and the "Great Excursion" (1989)

Gradually huge political changes took place. Bulgarian economy rapidly declined as the level of foreign debt increased to 2 billion dollars for a short period in 1986 (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 16). The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and the announcement of the Perestroika in May 1985 and the political transition process in Poland and Hungary created huge reverberations in the whole Eastern Block. That

meant that in a case of civil tensions in Bulgaria, BCP had to bear the brunt of its minority policy alone. Besides, Bulgaria faced harsh international criticism as it carried out the Revival process mostly without any international support. Because of this situation, the stance that the Muslims in Bulgaria were changing their names voluntarily became pivotal for Zhivkov's regime. Those developments created a sense of existential fear in BCP⁶⁷. Due to that, the emigration of the ethnic Turks was accelerated and the so-called "Big excursion" took place in May 1989.

Meanwhile, Bulgarian authorities banned the wearing of traditional clothes (Amnesty International, 1986, p. 8). Furthermore, the use of Turkish was prohibited in public (Helsinki Watch, 1986) and the control upon the religious circumcision became extremely tightened (Helsinki Watch, 1986, p. 36). Due to that development in early 1985, Turkey proposed the signing of another bilateral emigration agreement however Bulgaria declined this proposition (Şimşir B. , 1990).

During that period the Bulgarian radio was broadcasting a special program „Broadcasts about abroad" to oppose the "Voice of Turkey". Novels and movies with "revival" content were created and played on the national television. The topics covered were the Revival process, the Bulgarian narod's struggle for preservation against the assimilation policy conducted by the Ottoman Empire; the Islamization of the Bulgarians (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008).

3.5.5. The Emerging Civil Society and the Revival Process

As an aftermath of political liberalization, several dissident groups⁶⁸ got established in Bulgaria. Besides their political stances, they were expressing support towards the ethnic Turks' minority rights. The program of Independent association for human rights⁶⁹ contained the requirement of coexistence and respect towards religious

⁶⁷ This paragraph came out of an information provided to me by prof. at BAS Nonka Bogomilova. The discussions with her were fundamental for steering my thoughts while working on the thesis;

⁶⁸ Nezavisimo druzhestvo za pravata na choveka (Independent association for human rights); Ekoglasnost; Komitet 273; Klubat za zashtita na preustroistvoto i glasnostta (The Club for protection of the reconstruction and the publicity) and others

⁶⁹ Nezavisimo druzhestvo za pravata na choveka

communities and the healing of Muslims' wounds caused by the Bulgarian authorities (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 177). Besides that those organizations helped the Turkish minority by forming its requirements, planning its protest activities, and writing their declarations to the international human rights organizations (Institut za Izsledvane na Integratsiyata, 2003, pp. 36, 51, 53-54, 103). For the part of the Bulgarian intelligentsia's support at the end of the BCP's rule and immediately after that, ethnic Turks expressed their gratitude to Konstantin Trenchev, Blaga Dimitrova, Radoi Ralin, Rumen Vodenicharov, and Zhelio Zhelev "that in our hardest times they provided support and defended us. We will never forget them! (Traianova, 1991, pp. 23:20 - 23:45) ".

In the spring of 1989, some ethnic Turks announced hunger strikes, and massive protests took place. Due to that tensions intensified and clashes took place between the Bulgarian authorities and the protesters. Those clashes ended up with several casualties from both sides, however with more among the ethnic Turks. The violence during the protests was not only in the village regions but also in the towns with an ethnically mixed population (Institut za Izsledvane na Integratsiyata, 2003, pp. 59, 94-95).

In the mixed regions, the protesters had more close contact with the dissident organizations. One of the most active and with a huge number of ethnic Turkish members was The Independent association for human rights (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 180). Meanwhile, ethnic Turks had created their organizations as the most famous human rights association was the Democratic league for the human rights defense which was established in November 1988 by Mustafa Ömer, Sabri İskender, and Ali Ormanli. The organization was adhering to its requirements for retrieval of the minority rights to the Bulgarian Constitution and the international legislation (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 454-458).

Bulgarian authorities undertook the policy of deporting the protests' leaders (Institut za Izsledvane na Integratsiyata, 2003, pp. 69, 86). However, the protests did not cease and even came out with political requirements as restraining the repressions and Muslim representation in the CC of BCP (as those representatives were going to be elected by the Muslims population itself) (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 181-182).

Meanwhile, the tension between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey increased that much that it reached a state of propaganda and diplomatic war. Meanwhile, BCP legitimized the securitization policy of the Turkish threat pointing at the "Panturkism," interference into the domestic affairs, and justified the Revival process with the historical evidence of the "Bulgarian roots" of the Turkish-speaking population (Angelov, 2008, pp. 346-366). A considerable amount of children's books were republished and referred to the Ottoman Empire's period as Turkish "slavery".

BCP attempted to legitimize its minority policy by using the Bulgarian historiography's "original" documents from the Bulgarian national Revival period. On the base of those documents more than 20 documentaries were created. For example, the movie "Time of Violence" was finished at the end of 1987 and Todor Zhivkov ordered to be shown with priority in the ethnically mixed regions (Todorova M. , 2003). However, the movie was widely shown after the regime's change in the 90s. Most probably BCP's political elite was afraid of igniting additional ethnic tension among Bulgarians and Turks (Todorova M. , 2003).

There is a distinctive moment in the BCP's propaganda "war" in constructing Turkey's image. BCP tried to undermine the legitimacy of Ankara's accusations of the BCP's minority policy since it showed signs of not coping in a good manner with its Kurdish minority. The movies of Yilmaz Güney "Yol" and "Sürü"⁷⁰ were played on national television to show the human rights infringement in Turkey. The goal was showing an image of Turkey close to the one that BCP desired to construct. Those movies were shown with the original Turkish audio with subtitles in Bulgarian on the National television which can be considered as an extreme precedent (Elenkov, 2008, pp. 298-299).

The idea of prompting the emigration was discussed in the mid-March in the sphere of Bulgarian intelligence and the idea has been discussed with the minister of interior. This idea gained more support as the international situation was radically shifting and the fear of the future was lurking (Avramov, 2016, p. 125). The Communist regime considered an emigration wave which would lead to a mass influx of people. Some of

⁷⁰ Respectively from 1982 and 1978

them are not going to stay over there and will see that they are not welcomed in Turkey (Avramov, 2016, p. 126).

Massive protests of the Turkish minority took place against the prohibition of using Turkish in public and due to the change of their names in May 1989. One year before that Todor Zhivkov states that some Turkish families from the bordering area with Turkey should be resettled. Later on, the new passports law got accepted which created a state of panic among the Bulgarian Turks as they perceived this development as a step towards their expulsion. According to the new law, the Bulgarian authorities were able to issue passports from the beginning of September. Moreover, there was a special article that provided the authorities with the extraordinary opportunity to issue permissions for leaving the country⁷¹.

On the 29th of May 1989, Todor Zhivkov appeared on the National television and radio and made a statement having the slogan “The Unity of the Bulgarian Nation is a Concern and Fate of Every Citizen of Our Dear Fatherland”. In it, he appealed to Turkey to open its borders and to let in those Bulgarian citizens that “want to stay or live there (Zhivkov, T., May 1989)”. This was the speech act made by the leader of BCP:

...there is **social tension instigated by foreign forces among some groups of the population** in some specific regions...**the directors of the anti-Bulgarian campaign** undertook the question of emigration stating that Turkey is ready to accept all Bulgarian Muslims who want to emigrate... (text in bold made by me – I.I.)

(Zhivkov, T., May 1989, p. 38)

The discourse of his speech was emphasizing that even though new cities were constructed, new people were created, and still they were not undertaking the official ideology and the imposed modernity. The role of Socialism was underlined as “Due to the victory of the Socialism and our Socialist state the Muslim population is taken from the darkness and the state of lawlessness that the Ottoman Empire had doomed it. Capitalist Bulgaria couldn’t achieve it! (Zhivkov, T., May 1989)”. The People’s Republic of Bulgaria is depicted as a homeland of everyone, those born and whose ancestors were buried here. Zhivkov spoke about a waged anti-Bulgarian campaign by some circles in Turkey as this was depicted as a violation of the sovereignty of one sovereign state (Zhivkov, T., May 1989).

⁷¹ Darzhaven vestnik; Държавен вестник No. 38, 19.5.1989, стр. 1-2.

The propaganda undertook more nationalistic rhetoric while aiming at reaching higher social mobilization. Massive rallies and manifestations were organized for expressing support towards the Government right after Todor Zhivkov's speech on the 29th of May 1989. During the rallies, there were slogans and posters against Turkey's allegedly conducted policy and the national betrayal of the dissident organizations (Institut za Izsledvane na Integratsiyata, 2003, pp. 45-49) (Traianova, 1991). After Zhivkov's announcement, ethnic Bulgarians were sent to replace the emigrating Turks and help with the harvest which baffled them rather than provided a nationalistic reaction (Dimitrov, 2000, p. 17). The highly tense political situation in Bulgaria, the fear of the other prompted by the BCP's policy based on the intrinsic lingering hostile approach towards the ethnic Turks led to the "silent" support of the regime's actions from the Bulgarian masses. This shows that the nationalistic card in some specific situations can be used extremely easily (Avramov, 2016, p. 131). Moreover, there were no significant protests against the assimilation campaign by the Bulgarians (Grouev, 1996, p. 10).

The CC of BCP thought that whatever Turkey undertook was going to lose. In a case that Turkey didn't open its borders, it was going to be accused of not accepting those people that Ankara stated to be ethnic Turks. In a case of the Muslims leave and afterward decide to return to Bulgaria they were going to be warmly welcomed and reassured that no one had told them to go, that they were Bulgarians (Politburo of the CC of BCP, 6th of June 1989, pp. 67-68).

On 3th of June, Turkey opened its border which was in unison with the BCP's goal huge emigration to take place on the base of the law without a signed convention between Bulgaria and Turkey (Dalekova, M.,. 7th of June 1989, p. 87). Georgi Yordanov uttered the goal as:

We cannot say whether there will be 200 or 100 thousand that are going to emigrate to Turkey but our state has an interest in a bit of blood to outflow. That is not clean has to outflow because as it was understood huge part of the rallies' organizers have spent time in camps, in prisons. Those people are fanaticized and cannot be rectified... when those people leave we are going to lean on the people that stay and the situation is going to normalize gradually

(Politburo of the CC of BCP, 6th of June 1989, p. 71)

As an aftermath of the borders' opening among the ethnic Turks occurred huge emigrational frenzy. That rush was more than welcome for BCP as *Todor Zhivkov* stated: "the aim is 200-300 thousand people from that population to emigrate" because otherwise after 15 years Bulgaria is going to cease existing or is going to be second Cyprus (Dalekova, M., 7th of June 1989, pp. 86-87)". However Bulgarian state was not prepared for the massive emigration wave and the economic repercussions as an aftermath of the emigration. Over 10% of the labor force headed towards leaving the country (Bates, 1994, p. 216).

Ethnic Turks didn't know for how long the opportunity for emigrating was going to last. According to the Helsinki Watch's reports⁷², most of the emigrants had taken part in the protests or had previously expressed their intention on emigrating (Biuksenshiuts, 2000). The migration in 1989 marked the zenith of the monoethnic Bulgarian state's construction process. It had been continuing with the ebb and flows since the Principality of Bulgaria in 1878 (Bates, 1994, p. 201). Meanwhile, BCP undertook the same policy of the previous governments to try to "deport" the people that were involved into some kind of protests against the regime and the Revival process and meanwhile try even coercively constraining from emigrating the educated ones that haven't protested against the regime's policy (Maeva, 2006, pp. 46-48).

During the emigration, ethnic Bulgarians who were living in the ethnically mixed regions, mainly in the areas adjacent to Turkey, cheered the emigration of the ethnic Turks. This happened because of the "monocultural nationalist propaganda" which was constructing an image of the "others" and the perception among the Bulgarians about that "other" as unfairly economically prospering (Bates, 1994, p. 216). Moreover, during that period state-organized massive rallies were held in the biggest Bulgarian cities with slogans "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians" and "Death to the Enemy" (Mahon, 1:2, 1999, p. 159).

As a result of the educational curriculum and the rising nationalistic rhetoric, ethnic nationalism among the Bulgarians was on a rise. The outcome of the BCP's

⁷² Private non-governmental organization established in 1978, which was designed to monitor the former Soviet Union's compliance with the 1975 *Helsinki Accords* (it is a document signed by all European countries except Andorra and Albania in effort to improve the relations between the two sides of the "Iron wall" during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Finland. The Accords didn't have a binding force because did not have a status of a treaty

propaganda was the enhancement of the “in-group ethnic cohesion and the increase in the between-group ethnic distance (Nedelcheva, 1996)”. The BCP’s propagated ethnic nationalism increased the social tension and put the ethnic Turks in a frenzied state which made them emigrate (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 361). During the zenith of the Revival process 1984-1989, the number of killed ethnic Turks during the demonstrations was approximately 160, and the ethnic Turks imprisoned in concentration camps - 1200 (Sharlanov, D., Ganev, V., Hannah Arendt Center in Sofia, 24-26 February 2010, p. 7). As Tom Gallagher utters it, nationalism “...remained a key form of mobilizing in societies with collapsing institutions and was the only collective appeal which the masses have responded to with any degree of enthusiasm during the Communist era (Gallagher, 2012)”.

According to sociological research conducted in the summer of 1989 on the emigrants’ motives to leave stood out the fear of their physical survival; the activities of Pan Turkish organizations, the coercive actions by the Bulgarian authorities and the pressure for emigration; the massive turmoil and emigrational wave; social isolation anxiety and concern about the future (Maeva, 2006, p. 50). Neriman Hacisalihoğlu⁷³ stated that the main reason for emigration was the names’ change (TRTA vaz, 2015).

3.5.6. Propaganda in the Rabotnichesko Delo (Labor’s deed) and the aftermath of the Revival process

Bulgarian Communist Party faced a huge problem as a part of the emigrants decided to return soon after they emigrated to Turkey. During that period the Communist political elite tried to resettle those coming back to overcome the previously creation of a compact ethnic minority population in one place (Ivanov, 2014). This policy was not different from the inner state resettlement policy undertaken by the Communist regime in the late 40s (Avramov, 2016, p. 604). The main focus was on directing the migrating ethnic Turks to north-west Bulgaria (Avramov, 2016, p. 607) as the population over there was in its vast majority ethnically Bulgarian. The migration

⁷³ Currently she is an academician based in Istanbul and was among the people that left Bulgaria during the so called “Big excursion”

could not be halted as those people had Bulgarian citizenship. According to the archive documents, there was a strong negative opinion about the returning ethnic Turks. Before Turkey closed its border on 21th of August 1989, according to a research conducted in June, the ethnic Bulgarians from the mixed regions refute the possible return of the ethnic Turks. The opinion was not to let their return considering the economic plan and afterward to doom the state's future (Avramov, 2016, p. 605).

Using the specific political language in Bulgaria from 1989, the goal of BCP was to enhance the Bulgarian patriotism and the anti-Turkish tendencies among the traditional Bulgarian population (read people with traditional Bulgarian names) and to achieve the decomposition of the patriarchal relations among the descendent of the Islamized in the past Bulgarian citizens (Avramov, 2016, p. 609). The aforementioned resettlement policy was considered to be achieved in three ways – through using the police, through propaganda, or economic pressure. The economic way was undertaken as perceived as the most applicable (Avramov, 2016, p. 612). An interesting aspect of the Party's strategy (as the vast majority of the ethnic Turks had prepared themselves for leaving the country) was the intention of developing a plan of functioning economy without the Muslim population (Avramov, 2016, p. 615).

Until the end of October, the returned people reached 47 000 and the vast majority were from the Haskovo region - 81% of the migrants. They were depicted as a new social group that was tackled with hostility, mistrust, and imposing of guilt on both sides – the ethnic Bulgarians and the ethnic Turks who decided to stay in Turkey (Avramov, 2016, p. 625). Moreover, the vast majority of the people had a problem finding a job as they were alienated from their previous work collectives and the local community (Avramov, 2016, p. 627). As an evidence of the speech act's success is the announcement in September 1989 of several factories that were going to stall their producing process in a case of "revived" people got reappointed (Avramov, 2016, p. 628).

The BCP's propaganda was published on its official tribune "Rabotnichesko Delo". The information about Turkey's social and minority issues took a predominant part of it. An interesting fact is that Amnesty International reports were used to attack Turkey. Some of the titles were: "Prosecution of Christians"; "In the spirit of PanTurkism"; "Flagrant violation of the democracy" (about the prosecution of the Turkish

Communists); “Why does Turkey interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors” (Rabotnichesko Delo, June - October 1989). The ferocious “Sultan-yatağan culture”, the Pan Turkism, and the Turkish fanatical nationalism took a pivotal part of the official propaganda until the BCP regime’s very end (Rabotnichesko Delo, September 1989).

Eventually on the 21st of August 1989 Turkey closed its borders. This led the official propaganda to undertake the fulcrums provided by Pencho Kubadinski⁷⁴ that whatever happened, Bulgaria was going to prevail upon Turkey. There were two lines into the propaganda – depicting Turkey as not willing to accept this population and the comprehension of this population as being Bulgarian (Rabotnichesko Delo, August - October 1989). Moreover, due to the economic crisis which started to feel more real towards the end of 1989, the ethnic Turks were depicted as traitors (Çelik, 2009), because of which Bulgaria faced economic hardship (Rabotnichesko Delo, 16 August 1989). The imputing of guilt among the ones that had decided to return ethnic Turks was the main goal for the Rabotnichesko Delo in September 1989 (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, pp. 192-193). The image the Bulgarian people being a victim of allegedly Ottoman/Turkish assimilation policy got strengthened. The back then chairman of BAS, Angel Balevski stated that no other narod had been through such attempted “annihilation” process maybe except American Indians and the Armenians (Baleski, 1989).

The reasons behind this return were the hardships they faced while trying to find a job and not being able to adjust themselves to the new culture and social-economical context. The Bulgarian authorities stated that those people were returning because they had realized which country was their true motherland and had recognized their Bulgarian ethnic origin (Marinov, 2009). The emigration had huge economic repercussions as the Bulgarian Turks left in the middle of the harvest season. Due to that the Bulgarian society, being exposed to the state’s propaganda consider the Bulgarian Turks as committed national treason (Biuksenshiuts, 2000, p. 183).

On the 10th of November 1989, the removal of Todor Zhivkov from the position of the General Secretary was symbolic of the political regime’s change and the failure of the assimilation process. Between 3th of June and 21th of August 1989 approximately

⁷⁴ One of the ideological leaders of the Revival process

360 000 people (and besides that 400 000 more have applied for a passport) left Bulgaria. Out of those 360 000, 40 000 returned before the regime's change. Until the end of 1990 more than 150, 000 decided to return (Gruev, M., Kalionski, A., 2008, p. 193).



4. CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzes the process of Bulgarian identity and nationalism's emergence and development and at through this shows the process of construction of the concept of the "other". Under the "other" in the Bulgarian political development is emphasized in different extend on the so-called Bulgarian Muslims/Pomaks and ethnic Turks. As the Pomaks do not know Turkish they have been perceived to a higher extent as Bulgarians juxtaposing to the ethnic Turks who are not only Muslims but use the Turkish language as a language for corresponding among each other.

Securitization is a theory created to analyze the construction of a threat in the Western liberal systems; however, in a totalitarian Communist regime, the process was having distinctive traits. As the BCP's regime was imposing huge control upon the media and the power structures and respectively it had the ultimate power to mold and additionally forge the perceptions of the Bulgarian society.

During the Socialist totalitarian regime in Bulgaria, BCP was the depiction of both the state sovereignty and of the societal identity (Ignatow, 2013, pp. 38-46). The threats to the sovereignty or the societal identity were considered as a threat to the state and the BCP's regime itself. The Socialist period can be depicted as a period of implementing two differing from each other minority policies. Initially, BCP implemented the Communist ideology's concept of Internationalism and the gradual integration/assimilation of the Bulgarian minorities. Later on, it undertook the following concept of Socialist patriotism or the so-called Communist Nationalism in the late Socialism period which led to the Revival Process in the 80s.

During the first years of the Socialist regime, BCP tried to implement a pure form of internationalism and to construct a civic nationalism while using as a base the shared class identity. The problem was that shared identity based on the materialistic sphere is hardly achievable and sustainable. The political identity in which the nationality faced huge obstacles as the construction of the political community derives from the religious and ethnic identities that do form the inner community social interactions. Imposing a form of class identity meant suppressing and disregarding ethnic, religious, and political identities (Bojkov, 6:3, 2004, p. 345). BCP reconsidered this approach due to the strengthening of the Turkish ethnic identity and the lingering fear

of the Republic of Turkey's using it as a "fifth column". The possibility of the successfully conducted process of Securitization of the Turkish minority issue has been always existent in a dormant state in Bulgarian society. The reason for this is the Bulgarian nationalism's development that emerged during the period in which the ethnic nationalism and the ethnic-based state was the prevalent political concept. Moreover, during the Socialist period, especially from the 70s on as the ethnic Turkish population improved significantly its economic position the fear of losing the state sovereignty was reignited as they were considered as representatives of the "formerly dominant minority" (Mahon, 1:2, 1999).

The perplex and intertwined history of the ethnic issues in the Balkans affected the nation and state-building processes. Furthermore, it affected the perception of a threat to security to the highest extent. Security threats are defined as internal and external and sometimes they can overlap as it happened especially during the rule of BCP. The gradual shifting from Communist Internationalism to Communist Nationalism took place with the pivotal Plenums of BCP in 1956 and 1974 showed the course of Securitization development of the Bulgarian Turkish issue. This process reached its zenith between 1984 and 1989 as the so-called Revival Process. This Securitization process took place due to the existence of a huge palette of factors as the not successful integration/assimilation of the ethnic Turks as it was expected between 1944 – 1956; the emigrational waves that did not accomplish the success BCP expected; the slow cultural modernization and the strengthened national awareness of the ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria; and their gradually obtained fundamental place in the Bulgarian economy. Moreover, there were other political reasons as the gradual decline of the BCP's legitimacy; the Cyprus operation conducted by the Republic of Turkey, and the establishment of the Iranian Islamic Republic. All those reasons created the fundament of the Securitization process.

During the totalitarian regime of BCP 1944 – 1989, the Turkish minority had been perceived as a potential threat from which Turkey and the "West" were able to take advantage of. According to the BCP's propaganda, Turkey was creating organizations inside Bulgaria and wanted to take the territories with ethnic Turkish majority and to unite it eventually with Turkey. Allegedly there were hostile elements - Turkish citizens visiting Bulgaria, Bulgarian citizens visiting the Republic of Turkey,

and the Turkish diplomatic representatives (Ministry of Interior, 1965, p. 496) who were interfering with Bulgaria's politics. The aim for BCP was the eradication of the "religious fanaticism and chauvinism" instigated by those elements (Ministry of Interior, 10th of November 1959, p. 259). BCP comprehended that the pivotal goal of Turkish intelligence in Bulgaria was to enhance the national consciousness among the Bulgarian Turkish population. To deal with that threat BCP was investing a huge amount of resources to keep the ethnic Turks economically satisfied and developing. This approach had to diminish the possibility of their inclination to the Turkish nationalistic propaganda. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the official BCP propaganda was to divide the Turkish population in Bulgaria from the one in the Republic of Turkey (Avramov, 2016, p. 79).

Reports from the late 60s noted the illegal organizations' proliferation in the predominantly Muslim provinces. Allegedly there were Party members inside those organizations (Neuburger, 2004, p. 71). The change of the Pomaks' names in the 60s and the 70s made the ethnic Turkish population more alienated and became more tend to support the Turkish nationalistic view (Yalamov, 2002, pp. 383-384). As it is uttered by the high ranking Communist Pencho Kubadinski in 1967:

Our biggest mistake is that during the past few years we created a Turkish intelligentsia, which became the carrier of Turkish nationalism among the Turkish population

(Neuburger, 2004, p. 72)

Before that, that population had a predominantly Muslim identity (Neuburger, 2004, p. 63) due to the conducted policy of the pre-1944 governments. The "emigration" was used by the Bulgarian Communist regime as a "valve" to let those fully-fledged ethnically Turks who tended to support the "bourgeois" Turkish nationalism and were not supporting the "cause of Socialism" leave the country. After the ones that were considered prone to supporting the Republic of Turkey left the idea was to perform:

...an "assimilation" of the Bulgarian people and the Turkish people – of all the nationalities we have in our country. This is the policy of **gradual obliteration of the national differences**... it is a historical question...(bolded by me - I.I.)

(Zhivkov T. , 1976, p. 18)

The image that BCP wanted to create was by using the old nationalistic propaganda to construct two different images of the ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria and the Turks living in Turkey. By underlining on that difference it wanted to emphasize the construction of the Bulgarian Communist nation. This is how BCP considered eradicating the Ottoman past and wanted to achieve the modernization and the national cohesion of the Bulgarian state.

The threat was uttered as “religious fanaticism”, “Panislamism” and “Turkish bourgeois nationalism” or “Panturkism” especially after the crucial political developments from the 70s – the Turkish intervention in Cyprus (1974) and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). The threat perception was enhanced by the stance that American anti-Communism supported and exploited the Pan Islamism to achieve its own goals (Tahirov, 1979, pp. 67-68). Tahirov stated that Pan Islamic views were supported by a small part of the Bulgarian Turkish population based on old-fashioned religious fanaticism and some conservative perceptions (Tahirov, 1979, pp. 68-69).

The securitization of the Turkish minority issue was a reflection of the intrinsic fear of extinction of many of the Eastern European societies. In the Bulgarian case, this fear reflects on the myth of the constant suffering during the Ottoman Empire which attempted to destroy the Bulgarian nation. The existence of Pomaks and Turks in Bulgaria was considered as evidence of this partially successful campaign.

This was perceived as an obstacle for the modernization of the Bulgarian state and society (Neuburger, 2004). And when it becomes a question of the nation’s existence (Isoy, 2005), especially being an intrinsic feature of the Bulgarian society the securitization was successful. Ethnic Turks were perceived as a potential threat and actually as a fledgling one since they strengthened their identity and also became more and more crucial for the Bulgarian economy. The speech act of Todor Zhivkov put the Bulgarian society in a state of turmoil and the developments during and after the regime change shows the successfully conducted Securitization process.

The inner elite Securitization during the Communist regime can be followed to the very beginning of the newly-fledgling regime as was shared with the public gradually since the 70s as it reached the peak point in 1989. As a speech act constructing the threat can be perceived the speech of Todor Zhivkov at the end of May 1989 which

made possible the huge emigrational influx towards Turkey in the following months. Respectively there was also a societal security speech act into the BCP's discourse. The ethnic Turks were considered as an embodiment of a religiously conservative society with archaic traditions that are not comparable with the modern Socialist society that was in a process of construction (Tahirov, 1979). The successful securitization of the societal identity takes place when the identity is clearly defined as what it is and what it is not. By doing so the perception of the "other" as a foreign threat is becoming constructed (Williams, 2003, p. 520):

Referent objects	Threats	Securitizing actor
Bulgarian state	Capitalist Republic of Turkey	Bulgarian Communist Party
	Pan Turkism/Pan Islamism	
Bulgarian Socialist societal identity	Religious fanaticism	
	Archaic lifestyle	

The Revival process is a depiction of the zenith of the BCP's minority policy. It is a personification of its desire for total integration, eventually assimilation, and ends up with the attempted "forced" emigration of the ethnic Turks. Furthermore, the exodus of a huge part of that population is a depiction of the failure of the previously conducted policy and an attempted eternal resolution of the Bulgarian "National question" (Avramov, 2016, p. 73). Officially the goal behind the Revival process was to show the historical truth to the deviated from it deluded Turks and eventually to be united with their brothers on the common Socialist identity (Neuburger, 2004, p. 76).

Movies as "Time of Parting" and the whole amount of other propaganda materials were focused on showing what the historical "reality" was and to reignite and enhance the historical perception of the Turks from the Republic of Turkey as equal to the Ottomans that once again are trying to "eradicate" the Bulgarian nation by constructing turmoil in the Bulgarian society. Sofia wanted to show that once again

there is an ongoing Islamization and Turkization of part of the Bulgarian population and it was a spat between countries from the opposite sides during the Cold War.

During the huge emigration in 1989, despite that there were Bulgarians that were against the BCP policy, the majority of them living, especially the ones in the adjacent territories to Turkey cheered the emigration. This happened due to the “monocultural national propaganda” and the perception among the Bulgarians about the unfairly economically prospering “other” (Bates, 1994, p. 216). Moreover, during that period state-organized massive rallies were held in the biggest Bulgarian cities with slogans “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians” and “Death to the Enemy” (Mahon, 1:2, 1999, p. 159). Moreover, due to the economic crisis which started to feel more real towards the end of 1989, the ethnic Turks were depicted as traitors (Çelik, 2009), because of which Bulgaria faced economic hardship (Rabotnichesko Delo, 16 August 1989).

The successfully conducted Securitization of the ethnic Turkish issue became evident by the several massive rallies by the ethnic Bulgarians who were chanting against the return of the Muslim/Turkish names right after the regime change. In Razgrad was announced the establishment of the Razgrad Republic which would be opposing the alleged annexation of that region by Turkey. The Revival process was depicted by the BCP propaganda as the zenith of the reobtaining attempt of the national unity in Bulgaria – unity which was allegedly taken away by the Ottoman Empire and Turkey wants to accomplish what its predecessor could not.

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