Monitoring Migration, Governing Borders in the Aegean Sea: An Ethnographic Study of Practices, Subjectivities, and Narratives

by

Sibel Karadağ

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science and International Relations

KOÇ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

October, 2020

Monitoring Migration, Governing Borders in the Aegean Sea: An Ethnographic Study of Practices, Subjectivities, and Narratives

Koç University

Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a doctoral dissertation by

Sibel Karadağ

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by the final
examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

Prof. Ahmet İçduygu

Prof. Bahar Rumelili

Assoc. Prof. A. Didem Danış Şenyüz

Asst. Prof. Beste İşleyen

Prof. William Walters

Date: 30.10.2020

Statement of Authorship

This dissertation contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. It is affirmed by the candidate that, to the best of her knowledge, the dissertation contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

The author acknowledges that copyright of published works contained within this thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of those works.

Sibel Karadağ

To Esat Can Ünübol and to those
who lost their lives on their way to an equal world

ABSTRACT

Monitoring Migration, Governing Borders in the Aegean Sea: An Ethnographic Study of Practices, Subjectivities and Narratives

Sibel Karadağ

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Relations

October, 2020

This dissertation, by taking into account unauthorized migration as a constitutive force, aims to deconstruct the political space of the Aegean Sea through unveiling multiplicity of actors, practices, and discourses in two countries located on both sides of the sea, Greece and Turkey. The research particularly covers the post-2015 period in which the massive movement of refugees from Turkey into Europe has shaped and transformed the Aegean border space and accordingly the governance of mobility in an intensified manner. This study indicates that the ever-increasingly militarized border habitus results in the ambiguity of roles and actions among military and humanitarian actors while it blurs civilian and military spaces and rationales in border governance. Building on the conceptual basis of security-humanitarian nexus, the research firstly demonstrates that Turkish border practitioners utilize the narratives of humanitarian norms and professional capacity in order to challenge the "superior" position of their European counterparts. Secondly, a minimalist and managerial humanitarian imagination of "saving lives" blurs the military and civilian space in the sea that provides Greek military actors with political technology to degrade rescue humanitarians. Thirdly, due to the distinctive geophysicality of the Aegean Sea, the mode of border governance turns into a *politics of interception in the name of rescue* through which various military techniques are legitimized. The mixed methods approach of the study is based on a triumvirate: participant observation (in Search and Rescue operations), semi/open-structured interviews, and policy/discourse analysis in 2015-2018.

ÖZETÇE

Ege Denizi'nde Göçün Kontrolü, Sınırın Yönetimi: Pratiklerin, Öznelliklerin ve Anlatıların Etnografik Analizi

Sibel Karadağ

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, Doktora

Ekim 2020

Bu tez, düzensiz göçü sınırların kurucu bir öğesi olarak varsayarak, Ege Denizi'ndeki siyasal alanın inşasını, denizin iki yakasında bulunan Yunanistan ve Türkiye'deki çeşitli aktörler, pratikler ve söylemler üzerinden inceler. Araştırma, Ege Denizi sınır yönetimini oldukça dönüştüren 2015 yılındaki Türkiye'den Avrupa'ya olan kitlesel göç hareketi sonrası dönemi kapsar. Bu çalışma, askeri personelin ve insani yardım aktörlerinin aynı sınır habitusu içerisinde iç içe geçen muğlak rol ve eylemlerinin sonucu olarak sınırın gittikçe daha da askerileşen yapısının altını çizer. Güvenlik-ehvenişer siyaseti ekseninde şekillenen bu kavramsal çerçeve içerisinde, birincil olarak Türkiyeli aktörlerin ahlaki norm ve profesyonellik söylemlerini, "üstün" konumdaki Avrupalı "öteki"ye karşı bir strateji olarak nasıl araçsallaştırdığı incelenir. İkinci olarak, kurtarma faaliyetinin asgari ve yönetimsel bir tahayyüle dayanması sebebiyle Yunanistan'da askeri aktörlerin tam da aynı referansları kullanarak sivil aktörlere karşı nasıl ahlaki hiyerarşiler kurmaya çalıştıkları gösterilir. Üçüncü olarak, bu araştırmada, Ege Denizi'nin kendine özgü jeopolitik yapısı nedeniyle farklılaşan sınır pratiklerinin karakteri ve meşrulaştırma araçları incelenir. Bu tez araştırması, 2015-2018 yılları arasında yapılan katılımcı gözlem, yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler ve politika/söylem analizine dayalı karma bir metoda dayanır.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation, like any intellectual work, is shaped and inspired by an intellectual legacy consisting of myriad of scholars and philosophers who have been sine qua non for me to think, to formulate and to write. In addition to those who inspired this dissertation, there were those who accompanied and guided me throughout this journey. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Ahmet İçduygu, who theoretically and practically laid the ground for this work to flourish. I am grateful for his support and encouragement that I always felt. Bahar Rumelili was one of the few people who have been there for me since the beginning of my doctoral studies whose intellectual guidance, insightful comments and emotional support made this work materialized. Didem Danış's expertise in sociology and her vast experience in the field along with her solidarist and empowering attitude helped me through the final stages of the dissertation. I also would like to thank my external committee members. Beste İşleyen's support, encouragement, intellectual guidance and intuitive feedbacks were considerably valuable. Having William Walters in my committee whose works substantially inspired and shaped the theoretical grounds of this dissertation, was a unique opportunity for me. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Seyla Benhabib, one of the greatest philosophers alive, for her generous support and guidance during my time at Yale University. Joining her intellectual community was an unequalled experience for me.

I am grateful to the Turkish Fulbright Commission for generously supporting my research with a visiting fellowship at Yale University. I also thank to the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Koç University for the fieldwork grant.

Many thanks to various scholars and colleagues, who were kind enough to read, listen and discuss different parts of this dissertation in numerous conferences and workshops which greatly helped me to improve and disseminate my work. At first, I have been always grateful for the efforts of my previous supervisor and a long-standing supporter since my master's degree, Işık Özel. I also thank to Kim Rygiel, Debbie Lisle, Nora El Qadim, Polly Pallister-Wilkins, Can Mutlu, Claudia Aradau, Didier Fassin, and Ann Stoler. My special thanks to Achille Mbembe who extensively contributed to the theoretical background of the dissertation over the course of the discussions we had in New York. The distinguished community at Yale University made a great contribution to this work both theoretically and emotionally. To the people who became dear friends

and colleagues in New Haven, I am truly grateful. I also thank to all people at MiReKoc to whom I worked with for years, including Ayşen Üstübici and Damla Bayraktar.

Throughout my field research in Lesbos, I was lucky enough to build incomparable friendships and to have immense support. Special thanks to Pieter Wittenberg, Omar Alshakal, Ioanna Zourzouvili, Marine Samaha, Sonia Van Hee, Marianna Petkova, Vangellis Stylianou, Vikki McCraw, Fatos Lazari, Ihab Abassi, Farshad Shamgholi and to all other volunteers in Skala Sikamineas whom I worked with and shared a lifetime experience. Without their help and support, this field would not have been possible. Every moment I spent in Skala Sikamineas will be dear to me throughout my life.

I would like to thank all my interviewees both in Lesbos and Turkey for their collaboration whose contributions shaped my work. Many thanks to all my friends who practically supported me at different times of my field research.

Throughout the years of my Ph.D. I felt the unparalleled support of my dearest friends at the most difficult moments. Most of all, I am grateful to Esra Öztürk who was always there for me at any time in any situation with her incredible patience and effort. Mehmet Fahrettin Biçici to whom I owe a lot was my sole supporter for years. I always felt fortunate to witness the birth and flourish of Moda Sahnesi together with my dearest friends, Bengi Günay and Kemal Aydoğan. It has been a second home all through my work with its amazing community. I cannot imagine how my years at Koç University would be like without the support and solidarity of Tuğçe Şatana. She has always been irreplaceable. Special thanks to my partner, Doruk Tatar, for all his self-sacrificing, immensely contributive, hope-inspiring and nourishing efforts at which each time I felt exceedingly lucky to have him.

Finally, there are not enough words of appreciation to thank my family for their love, support and patience. This dissertation was born in the middle of very hard times, in global, national, and personal terms. During this time, the courage, struggle and resilience of refugees were my one and only source of inspiration. I dedicate this dissertation to those who lost their lives at borderlands, on their way to an equaled world, and to my dearest Esat Can Ünübol who lived this incredibly hard life so gently.

Author's note:

Chapter 2 was published in the journal of *Comparative Migration Studies*:

Karadağ, S. (2019). Extraterritoriality of European Borders to Turkey: an implementation perspective of counteractive strategies. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 7(12).

Chapter 3 was published in the journal of *Geopolitics* in its shorter and revised version:

Karadağ, S. (2020). The Moral Battle in the Aegean Sea. In *(Im)moral Borders in Practice*. *Geopolitics*.

Chapter 4 is work in progress at its final stage before submission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Amnesty International
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CRSS	Coastal Radar Surveillance System
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Union Fingerprint Database
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
HCG	Hellenic Coast Guard
HDP	People's Democratic Party
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NAP	The National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
POA	ProActiva Open Arms
R4R	Refugee for Refugees
ROC	Regional Operational Center
SAR	Search and Rescue
SIS	Schengen Information System
TCG	Turkish Coast Guard
TVV	Thermovision Van
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VLR	Visa Liberalisation Roadmap
VMS	Vessel Monitoring System
WWII	World War Two

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Over the years since the WWII, the numbers of displaced population have gradually increased worldwide. For millions of displaced people, escaping from persecution, violence and human rights violations, simultaneously means beginning of another deadly journey. Especially the last decade received growing awareness in the media and policy circles with the images of hundreds in shipwrecks; thousands climbing over barbed-wire fences, and thousands more contained in refugee camps (Benhabib, 2020). Drastically increasing numbers of death have been filling the pages of reports. In the past decade, more than half of the deaths at the borders globally occurred at the edges of the European Union. Within the Aegean context, the year of 2015 symbolizes a crystallization of decades-long historical and political developments. In the summer of 2015, approximately one million people[1] moved from Turkey to Europe at the time in which long-standing issue of migration and border policy became global news.

This study, by taking into account migration as a constitutive force, asks a central question as the following: *How has migration and border governance in the Aegean Sea been governed since the refugee movement of 2015?* The study deconstructs the political space of the Aegean Sea through unveiling multiplicity of actors, practices and discourses in the two countries located on both sides of the sea, namely Greece and Turkey. To do so, the work utilizes the epistemological, conceptual and methodological shift within the field of migration and border studies in the last decades, in which borders are conceptualized as spaces of constant conflict, encounter, contestation and negotiation. The particular attention of this work is to unpack the process of constant

[1] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179

reformulation, reallocation and spatialization of border politics on the both sides of the Aegean Sea. Concomitantly, the research analyzes the resonances of wider scale European border regime within the context of Turkey and the Aegean Sea in the post-2015 period.

Starting with 2000s, the flourished narrative of "globalization" symbolizing the "borderless" Europe in 1990s has gradually turned to widespread language of "crisis" that needs to be managed and combatted, shaping the techniques and practices of migration and border management. Since the 1990s, the borders of the EU have not been eliminated, but simply moved to different locations, namely to its external boundaries. Especially since September 11 2001, the conjunction of migration and security has started to profoundly impact politics and society. Migration, previously being highly inflected with politics of labor or post-national citizenship, has since been subordinated to a discourse of security and "invasion". This shift has given rise to a new border regime dominated by ever-increasing surveillance mechanisms equipped with remote systems, high-tech radars, large-scale databases, codes and algorithms as well as heavily militarized techniques. New border agencies, such as European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) and numerous private security companies entered in this conjunction, quickly becoming powerful and well-funded by million euros. Especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, this new border regime has created a highly contentious space at the EU external frontiers, mainly in the Mediterranean Sea that has been witnessing the images of overcrowded vessels, shipwrecks and dead bodies going along with scenes of rescue boats and missions. For the Aegean Sea, the year of 2015 was a historical moment due to the crystallization of a long-lasting migratory movement from Turkey to Europe.

In the last decade, a new epistemic community focusing on migration and borders has emerged in an interdisciplinary manner. With the aim of deconstructing the established repertoires in the migration and border studies, the nature of contemporary borders have been theorized with a certain matrix of references and keywords: "dispersed", "proliferated", "itinerant", "deterritorialized" and "mobile" (Balibar, 2004; Newman, 2006; Rumford, 2006; Walters, 2004; 2006; Bialasiewicz, 2008; 2012; Weizman 2007; Casas-Cortes et al., 2015; Zaiotti, 2016; Perera 2016; Watkins, 2017). The dispersion and proliferation of borders also exemplify transnational infrastructure of border

management that operates beyond territorial limits of sovereign states. Many calls this transnational work of states as "externalization" pointing at stretched border management practices via bilateral or multilateral agreements, transnational military operations and institutions, data and information sharing and construction of transcarceral spaces such as detention and deportation centers. Given the fact that border management never begins or ends at the territorial limits of sovereigns, especially in the last decade, the illegalized and clandestine migration has become a constitutive force in shaping and producing this transnational border management. It blurs the imagined geographic binary and unveils the extraterritorial forms of sovereignty that shifts spatial practices of border management along the way where migrants are. Being part of this conceptual and epistemological shift in the field of migration and borders, the EU's border politics have been discussed in terms of outsourcing border control to its neighboring countries (Zaiotti, 2007; Jones and Clark, 2008; Lavenex, 2008; Vaughan Williams, 2009; Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011; Casas-Cortes et al., 2011; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Andersson, 2014; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Cuttitta, 2018).

While global developments and technology enable global migratory movements, territorial presence maintains to be the basis for the "entitlement to human and citizens' rights" (Benhabib, 2020). By critically putting the 1951 Convention on the table, Seyla Benhabib (2020) describes this current global phenomenon as a dual movement referring to deterritorialization and territorialization at once. She attracts attention to a paradox at which contemporary deterritorialization tactics of the states seems to be a way emerged to reinvent territorial sovereignty (Behhabib, 2020). In the twenty-first century, the body of a displaced person has become the main symptom of this irony.

The proliferation and dispersion of border space with heavily militarized techniques has simultaneously brought in multiplication of actors. It should be considered that neither the clandestine routes towards Europe nor the involvement of various actors in this geography is entirely new (İçduygu, 2020; Watson, 2015). However, the last decade has been witnessing the involvement of non-governmental organizations, international bodies and private individuals in the border space with a reference to suffering, care, rescue and international norms. This is what William Walters (2011) coined as the "humanitarian border" exercised by non-state actors in the border spaces. Non-state

bodies operating on the rescue boats have started to share same habitus with the armed forces on the sea. The militarized border habitus eventually results in the ambiguity between roles and actions among military and humanitarian actors. This results in blurring civilian and military spaces as well as humanitarian and security rationales. Seemingly paradoxical engagement between securitization and humanitarian rationales and practices at the external frontiers of the EU has become a subject of analysis for many studies in the recent years (Vaughan Williams, 2015; Pallister Wilkins, 2015; Stierl 2018; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018; İşleyen, 2018). Accounting for how security-humanitarian nexus operates within the externalized European border spaces, the existing literature mostly focuses on the Central Mediterranean space and West-African or North African territories (Andersson, 2014; Collyer and King, 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Stierl, 2017; Cuttitta, 2018).

Though the security-humanitarian nexus at the external frontiers of the EU has recently gained considerable attention, the *modus operandi* on both sides of the Aegean Sea has not yet received much attention. On the other hand, especially within the realms of political science and international relations, the issue of migration and borders, centered on the series of events following the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016, has become one of the hot topics. However, despite this great interest, the scholarship has been limited to the analysis of high-level diplomatic relations that examines formal and explicit rules and practices. This work fills this gap within both literatures by providing in-depth and multidimensional analysis of the security-humanitarian assemblage in the border governance between Greece and Turkey that has started to manifest itself especially since 2015. My objective here is to capture both the spatial configuration of Aegean Sea as a European external border space in general and its particular forms/modes of operation in Greece and Turkey.

The study gives a great deal of emphasis on tacit and informal knowledges, set of practices, strategies, tactics and positions of embodied agents as well as subjective understandings of these practices. The research particularly covers the post-2015 period in which the massive movement of refugees from Turkey into Europe has shaped and transformed the Aegean border space and accordingly governance of mobility in an intensified manner.

My work is based on a three-year long ethnographic field research conducted in 2015-2018, which is quite rare in the field of border studies. While "practice turn" (Salter and Mutlu, 2012) in security and border studies that observes daily practice of actors and their relations has started to gain more attention recently, this study goes beyond that and adopts ethnographic analysis in which I worked and shared the same habitus with border officials, namely those from Frontex and Hellenic Coast Guard, and non-state rescue humanitarians in Lesbos, thanks to the opportunity of partaking in Search and Rescue operations as a volunteer.

In this dissertation, I adopt multi-sited approach (Marcus, 1995) with the aim of capturing the dynamics on both sides of the Aegean Sea. Since a refugee boat in its clandestine journey serves as a material site connecting the land and the sea, an analysis of the operations of the border governance calls forth a form of research design approaching the ever-shifting constellations conflicts and negotiations in the border space. In line with this aim, the study adopts mixed methods approach combining participant observation, interviews, and policy/discourse analysis in multiple sites in Greece (Lesbos) and Turkey.

The three-year long fieldwork has not only given me insight into the habitus of relevant actors but also provided significant material to capture the variance over the period since 2015. I started my multi-sited fieldwork in the summer of 2015 in Izmir, at the time when the big refugee movement occurred. In 2016, right after the EU-Turkey Statement, I revisited the site again and conducted interviews. In 2017, I continued my fieldwork on the Greek side in Lesbos, which has been the "*hotspot*" of migration governance since 2015. I worked as a volunteer in Search and Rescue operations in one of rescue NGOs operating in Skala Sikamineas located on the northern shore of the island. I was daily involved in the practices of "spotting", "boat exercise" (patrolling), "landing" (transfer of people from the boat and providing emergency aid), and "running the temporary camp". I completed my field in the summer of 2018 by traveling across the whole Aegean shore in Turkey (from Çanakkale to Muğla) and conducting interviews with Turkish coast guards in four different sites of security zones, namely Küçükkkuyu, Dikili, Çeşme, Bodrum. The same year, I also revisited Lesbos for the last time and continued my volunteering work in Skala Sikamineas.

To sum up, the mixed methods approach of the study is based on a triumvirate: multi-sited ethnographic research design, semi and open structured interviews, and policy/discourse analysis. In addition to the ethnographic field briefly mentioned above and to be explored in the following sections, throughout my fieldwork in 2015-2018, I conducted 84 interviews in Greece and Turkey in total. The spectrum of my informants is as follows: border actors in the Aegean Sea (Frontex, Hellenic and Turkish coast guards), customs officers, NGOs in search and rescue operations, state-led organizations in border governance, high-level EU bodies, and international organizations operating in the border governance, non-governmental organizations, municipalities and grassroot initiatives.

1.1 Research Questions and Theoretical Contributions

This study answers a broad question on the *nature* of post-2015 migration and border governance in the Aegean Sea while linking the question to the wider scale of European migration and border regime "outsourcing" the governmental technologies to its periphery by creating a transnational infrastructure of border operations. In short:

> *What is the nature of migration and border governance in the Aegean Sea since the refugee movement of 2015?*
>
> *How has the European border regime manifested itself within the context of the Aegean Sea and accordingly Greece and Turkey?*

In order to answer to these two broad questions, the work utilizes the "security-humanitarian nexus" as a key border management tool describing the general character of European border regime in the last decade. Accordingly, the study asks:

> *How has entanglement of security and humanitarianism been practiced within the context of the Aegean Sea and accordingly Greece and Turkey?*

With the aim of providing material grounds for this abstract description, I explore materialized manifestations of the security-humanitarian nexus in multidimensional approach by mapping multi-scale intersections, encounters, and interpenetrations within this transnational border space. Respectively, each article in the study is centered on how this nexus is manifested, internalized, and operationalized at multiple levels:

(i) in between Europe and its periphery (Turkey)

(ii) between military and rescue humanitarians

(iii) between the actions of interception and rescue on the space of Aegean Sea

These three levels intersect on the main broad argument of this study: the inherently intertwined logics of security and humanitarianism pave the way for the *moralization of border politics* in which certain agents or actions seek to create moral hierarchies vis-a-via their counterparts within the setting of the Aegean Sea. The existing literature so far presents a blurred terrain in terms of security and humanitarian actions and positions in the border space. This study takes a step further and claims that certain agents, European or non-European, strategically use this blurred terrain for their own advantage in order to produce hierarchies and counter strategies reflected in the governance of borders.

Firstly, the study indicates that Turkish border practitioners self-project themselves as the true holders of humanitarian criteria vis-à-vis its violent European counterparts. They reverse the dependency relationship and put themselves at a superior position regarding their humanitarian norms and professional capacity. Thus, they challenge the presupposed omnipotent role of the EU and accordingly the traditional narrative of "externalization". While doing that, they capture the narrative of humanitarianism, traditionally a Euro-centered discourse.

Secondly, in Greece, the minimalist humanitarian imagination of "saving lives" gets easily coopted by Greek border practitioners who use this tool to degrade rescue humanitarians. Thus, they utilize the role and capacity of narrow and managerial humanitarian imagination in relation to "amateur" humanitarians.

Thirdly, due to the distinctive geophysicality of the Aegean Sea, the mode of border governance turns into a politics of *interception in the name of rescue* through which military techniques of interception both in Greece and Turkey are legitimized under the banner of rescue. The action of rescue itself becomes coopted in a way that masks multiple techniques of violence enacted on refugee boats on the watery world of the Aegean Sea.

In all, the three chapters of the dissertation unpack the composition of border governance in the Aegean Sea at different levels. They all demonstrate the different aspects of *moralized political space* on the blurred terrain of security-humanitarian entanglement that manifest themselves as prominent migration management tools since 2015 in the Aegean Sea.

1.2 The Trajectory of the EU Border Regime: On the way to Security-Humanitarian Nexus

In this section of Introduction, I pay attention to the trajectory of European migration and border governance that brings us to 2015. To do so, I will summarize the major critical junctures within the European border politics by utilizing the policy/text analysis.

Securitizing migration

With the goal of facilitating European space for free movement of people, good, and capital, the European Union has obtained significant legal competences since the 1990s. Internal opening of borders and the creation of "Schengenland" has led to new fears and new walls, consequently to the prioritization of the Union's external borders in the era of post-Cold War. Inda (2006) defines dominant new fears in the form of three global wars: the war on drugs, the war on terror and the war on "illegal" migration. Within the political discourse of the European Union, starting with the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs in 1992, migration has been viewed in conjunction with "terrorist threats" or "organized crime" while "common interest" (Maastricht Treaty, Title VI) has become the management of excluding the new "Other". The inadequacy in coherence and consistency between member states was tried to be further formalized by the form of partial communitarisation introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. By creating an "area of freedom, security and justice", the illustration of Europe has obtained the utterance of "us" and "them" dichotomy, which provided a legitimate atmosphere for further exclusionary mechanisms concerning the "others" of the "Union citizens", namely the "illegal" migrants. The creation of a "security continuum" regarding the narrative of migration has been widely discussed within the well-known scholarship on securitization (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998; Bigo, 1994; Huysmans, 2000).

A shift towards a comprehensive border management at the EU level was adopted by Dublin Convention in 1990 that came into force in 1999. The Convention states that the country of first arrival in the EU would be responsible for the examination of asylum applications. The objective of the Convention was the elimination of "asylum shopping" or "orbiting" of asylum seekers referring to those applying for more than one country until being grated with statue (Geddes, 2000). With the Convention, all responsibility of asylum procedures pushed to the EU members situated at the external borders of the Union. It was the original establishment of the current Dublin system that is still the defining factor for the policies that foresee the containment of refugees in the islands of bordering EU states.

Throughout the 1990s, the securitization of migration issue was put into practice via the technologies of Schengen Information System (SIS), which is a wide repository of data made up of a central database (C-SIS) and a network of national SIS (N-SIS) transmitting the data to the central one (see also Broeder, 2007). Likewise, EURODAC has been introduced as a common Automated Fingerprint Identification System collecting and transmitting the database composed of fingerprints of people. EUROPOL (European Police Office) has been responsible to improve the effectiveness and cooperation among the involving authorities in intelligence and information exchange. Hence, the 1990s witnessed the construction and further proliferation of securitization discourse in European migration and border management incorporated with high-tech infrastructure (Walters, 2002; Andreas, 2000; Geddes, 1999; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Neal, 2009).

9/11: Digital Firewall

In the aftermath of 9/11, the focus on the migratory flows has gained much more emphasis with control-oriented, managerial methods combining with further reinforcement of surveillance, militarization, and identification technologies. The already existing security-migration continuum has been intensified by managerial vocabulary, which has broadened the range of policy tools for 'better' management of the external borders. Following the Madrid bombings on March, the year of 2004 has become pivotal in terms of management techniques and administrative innovation. In

October 2004, The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was established with the aim of technically and operationally assisting the member states as well as developing research for control and surveillance of the external borders[2]. Operational cooperation has started to be incorporated into apparatuses of iris scanning, facial recognition, bone-age checking, fingerprinting, and biometrical scanning in addition to watch towers, satellites, GPS, unmanned aerial vehicles and radar detection systems. The period of post-9/11 witnessed a sharp increase in technologization and militarization of the external borders.

A new strategy: Outsourcing border governance

The first strategy was the "exportation" of migration control instruments to future member states in which the enlargement of the CEEC in 2004 represents such incorporation process (Lavanex and Uçarer, 2003; Boswell, 2003). The second strategy with the technique of "externalization" was to deepen the cooperation with third countries by facilitating the return of asylum seekers and unauthorized migrants via readmission agreements (Boswell, 2003). The externalization of border controls has been initiated primarily in 2002 in the Seville Council meeting where the common administration of migratory flows and collaboration in the "combat illegal immigration" with third countries was decided (Seville Meeting, 2002)[3]. It was later formalized in 2004 in the Hague Program under the heading of "external dimension of asylum and immigration" by specifying the "reinforcement of partnerships with third countries to tackle illegal immigration better" and the "establishment of a common policy to expel and return illegal immigrants to their countries of origin" (Hague Program, November 2004).

Regarding the outsourcing of border governance to third countries, the years of 2004 and 2005 were pivotal. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 aimed to "share advantages of the 2004 enlargement of the EU by fostering stability, security, and prosperity among all parties" (van Houtum, 2010). This was a significant attempt in

[2] FRONTEX 'mission Statement' available at: http://www.FRONTEX.europa.eu/more_about_FRONTEX/
[3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13

the creation of transnational space of bordering infrastructure that aspires to extend operations of sovereignty. The EU's border externalization to non-EU spaces differs from the enlargement process since it outsources the migration and border monitoring without the "carrot" of European candidacy. It refers targeted partnerships with neighboring or third countries to actively cooperate on the border management in return for financial assistance, facilitation of trade, and visa liberalization in some cases.

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2005 has carried this trend to a further point. It intended to expand the functioning and the perimeters of border management far beyond the 'the EU's outer borders, reaching over the countries of origin, transit and destination. The governmental logic of mobile borders enacted in spaces "where migrant is" was initiated with the GAMM project:

> The Global Approach to Migration (GAM) brings together migration, external relations and development policy to address migration in an integrated, comprehensive and balanced way in partnership with third countries. It comprises the whole migration agenda, including legal and illegal migration, combating trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, strengthening protection for refugees, enhancing migrant rights and harnessing the positive links that exist between migration and development. It is underscored by the fundamental principles of partnership, solidarity and shared responsibility and uses the concept of 'migratory routes' to develop and implement policy" (European Commission, 2007)[4].

Transnational space of border infrastructure has been implemented through proliferation of border fences, human capacity, watch towers, detention and deportation centers, and surveillance and detection technology; and exercised by various actors, including member states, neighboring states, third countries, security organizations, and international organizations in order to implement the circulation effectively. This transnational border infrastructure comprises integration measures, bilateral agreements, "managing remittance investment, setting up migration recruitment and skills matching

[4] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/global-approach-migration_en

centers in transit and origin countries, patrolling along migration routes with EU forces, purchasing border control technology for neighboring countries, and setting up migration research centers in different countries" (Casas et al., 2010:80). Dispersed, proliferated and transportable borders become materialized in routes "where migrant is" in this extended space of EU sovereignty.

Tough but humane: Response to 2011 Arab Spring

Since the large-scale migratory journeys in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the European border has turned into a space of emergency responses to "refugee crisis" together with scenes of rescue. In this context, the ENP and GAMM were revised for them to be more responsive to these new circumstances. Under this revision, the novelty was the so-called "more for more" principle that illustrates both the increase of collaboration with third countries and the emergence of humanitarian discourse:

> "The protection of the human rights of migrants is a cross-cutting priority in the EU's cooperation with third countries. This is reflected in the numerous projects carried out under the GAMM focusing on protecting migrants, including children and vulnerable groups like asylum seekers, from abuse and human rights violations such as trafficking in human beings, and empowering them through effective integration policies and promoting access to basic services such as healthcare" (EU Commission, 2014)[5].

In the 6th biannual report in 2014, the Commission used the word of "rescue" for the first time in reporting European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) operations:

> "During the reporting period, for the very first time the satellite images obtained in the framework of EUROSUR cooperation enabled to save the lives of migrants. On 16-17 September, the satellite imagery obtained through EUROSUR framework with support of an FP7 project, enabled to locate and rescue a migrant rubber boat in the Mediterranean with 38 people on board, including eight women and three children that has spent three days in an open

[5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0096

> sea and was drifting outside the area where search and rescue activity for the boat was ongoing originally."[6]

In the last annual, this time it was the Frontex operations that were framed with juxtaposition of "border surveillance" and "rescue capacity": "In addition to the ongoing Frontex joint operations — Triton (hosted by Italy) and Poseidon Sea (hosted by Greece), to which the financial allocation has been tripled to enable reinforcing their surveillance and rescue capacity"[7].

In the years of 2014 and 2015 when the European external borders witnessed drastic increase in the refugee movement as well as in the number of deaths, the discourse of "rescue" and "saving lives" has started to be placed in numerous EU documents:

> "Saving lives and preventing human tragedies have been and will always be one of the main priorities of the European Union's work in managing the refugee crisis. To this end, EU Naval Operations in the Mediterranean Sea work to save lives at sea, strengthen border control and disrupt the business model of traffickers and human smugglers. Since 2015, EU operations in the Mediterranean have contributed to saving more than 400.000 people; disabled 303 vessels used by criminal networks and transferred 89 suspected smugglers and traffickers to Italian authorities" (FRONTEX Factsheet, 4 October 2016)[8]

In a nutshell, the history of European border regime in the last four decades has witnessed a series of governmental logics aiming to control the journeys of "unwanted" populations. Regarding the case of Turkey and the Aegean Sea, the year of 2015 represents a critical juncture in terms of the proliferation of border controls and high-tech surveillance as well as the multiplication of actors in the border governance, which paved way for the formation of security-humanitarian entanglement manifested in two sovereigns in different ways.

---

[6] Sixth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 31 October 2014 https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/elibrary/documents/policies/bordersandvisas/schengen/docs/sixth_biannual_report_on_the_functioning_of_the_schengen_area_en.pdf

[7] Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May – 10 December 2015 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1485258921711&uri=CELEX:52015DC0675

[8] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/20161006/eu_operations_in_the_mediterranean_sea_en.pdf

1.3 Specialties of Turkey and the Aegean Sea

Over the past three decades, Turkey has been a crucial geography for clandestine migration to reach Europe (İçduygu and Yükseker, 2012; İçduygu, 2020). With the country's geographical proximity to conflict-ridden countries and also to the gates of Europe, the migratory movement from Turkey to Europe has been a long-standing phenomenon. Between 1980 and 2010, more than a half million displaced people attempted to further their clandestine journeys to Europe through Turkey (İçduygu and Yükseker, 2012)[9]. The year of 2015 was a boiling point of this long-lasting trend in which approximately one million displaced people hit European territories in a quite short period of time. It has been named as "refugee crisis" in policy circles and received an immediate response from European bodies that has been implemented under the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016.

Within the trajectory of European migration and border regime, Turkey represents an interesting case in terms of the relations with the EU. It is a long-standing candidate country that has had fluctuated relations with the EU so far. When the EU-Turkey Statement was signed in 2016 as an immediate response to the "refugee crisis" occurred on the European shores, Turkey has still been a candidate country with its contentious history with the EU. Accordingly, the Statement was neither a part of the straightforward enlargement process nor an ENP agreement with a neighboring country. As it was signed under the heading of "European Agenda on Migration", the statement displays an *ENP-like accession partnership*, which is completely unique, inherently contradictory, and even impossible to finalize. As explored in detail in the Chapter 2, the Statement contains the characteristic "rewards" of bilateral agreements such as financial aid and visa liberalization that the EU offers to its neighboring countries. However, the Statement also refers to the opening of chapters of accession negotiations, including the ones on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, which were highly improbable given the increasingly authoritarian trend that Turkey has taken. Thus, by taking the unique position of Turkey into account within the wider European externalization project, the study extends the Eurocentric gaze towards non-European geographies and explores how Turkey has become a constitutive force in shaping and transforming the

[9] The migratory movements from Turkey to Europe have been historically mixed flows in which the state-led and bureaucratic categorizations of "refugee", "asylum seeker" and "irregular migrant" get blurred and overlap.

European migration politics by strategically using her geopolitical capital in migration diplomacy.

The study additionally considers the unique geophysicality of the Aegean maritime space. Although the recent studies focusing on maritime policing in the Central Mediterranean successfully investigates the web of discourses and practices, they pay less attention to the maritime configuration of the Aegean, which has distinctive material features shaping the political landscape. As examined more thoroughly in Chapter 4, the juridical distribution of the maritime space of the Aegean is shaped by its extremely complicated insular geography and proximity of territorial waters. Due to the proximity (around six miles), there is no high sea in between the area of northern Greek islands and Turkish shores. Respectively, the *principle of midline is* used as the territorial partition between Greece and Turkey. While the proximity, the lower volume of the sea, and the lack of SAR zones shape the nature of clandestine migration in this area, these geophysical features simultaneously shape the interpretation and manifestation of certain bordering technologies in the maritime governance. This study pays particular attention to the unique geophysicality of the Aegean and thereby techniques of border governance situated within this social field.

1.4 Research Strategy: Etnography in the Study of Borders

In this doctoral research, I adopted an ethnographic research design, which is still quite exceptional within the scholarship on borders. Though fieldwork and "practice turn" (Salter and Mutlu, 2012) as a method have gained considerable attention within the critical security studies in the last decades, participant observation, that is living in the particular social field and sharing the same *habitus*, is still quite rare. In order to collect comprehensive and insightful ethnographic data, I built my research method on a triangle: participant observation, semi and open structured interviews, and discourse/policy analysis.

Mixed methods approach enables the researcher to reach beyond the narrow understanding of the border spaces since these fields are constructed by set of complex relations, subjectivities, and in a given social field. The production of subjectivities embedded within a certain social field involves complex relations that might be

competitive, cooperative, hegemonic or transversal (Salter, 2012). These various aspects of micro-politics mostly occur in the hidden and tacit domains that cannot be captured by formal and institutional knowledge. The "practice turn" in international political sociology (Bigo and Walker, 2007), seeks to capture that tacit knowledge by placing a great deal of emphasis on practices, discourses, web of connections and various forms of symbolic, social and cultural capital manifested within the *habitus.* In order to transcend the formal positions and discourses of actors, the interviews are incorporated into participant observation in order to unpack the *habitus*; to analyze subjective understandings of the actors and also to get a sense of the objective structure of the field as well as the actual practices on the ground.

Benefiting the specific advantages of the "practice turn", this study goes beyond and adopts multi-sited ethnographic field research. These advantages can be categorized along the following lines: (i) ability to intervene the border space and to reach its particular agents, (ii) opportunity to closely analyze the habitus of actors at different sites together with their internalized dispositions and subjectivities, (iii) ability to mapping out the actual practices implemented by the agents in their daily routine, and (iv) strengthening the self-reflexivity about the power relations in the field.

In addition to the ethnographic field in 2015-2018, I conducted open and semi-structured interviews with 84 actors in Greece and Turkey (see detailed list of informants in the Appendix). 54 of these interviews were conducted with armed forces operating in Lesbos and Turkey. The remaining 30 interviews were conducted with rescue humanitarians, high-level EU bodies, state-led organizations, customs officers, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, municipalities and grassroot initiatives/solidarities. Tens of daily interviews and conversations that I had with displaced people during search and rescue operations and their stay in the temporary camp are not included within the total number of interviews.

The next section involves detailed anecdotes and the chronology of this three-year long fieldwork.

1.5 Chronology of the Fieldwork

In August and September 2015, coinciding with my proposal defense, the huge refugee movement occurred from Turkey to Greece, and 856,723 people crossed the Aegean Sea according to the UNHCR accounts records. The events burst onto the international news through a series of shocking images. The photograph of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi's dead body lying face down in the sand on a Turkish shore was the most shocking one and received the most attention from the global media.

I started my fieldwork at the time of this movement with a short trip to Izmir in September 2015 where I saw thousands of Syrians were waiting and sleeping on the sidewalks. Being one of the key zones of departure on the way towards Greece, Izmir witnessed a massive movement in the summer of 2015. The streets in the city center, especially the districts of Konak and Basmane, were full of displaced people in desperate conditions, numerous street vendors explicitly selling life jackets and plastic boats, and numbers of local initiators outspokenly negotiating for the deals of border crossing. Within this three-week long preliminary fieldwork, I visited the most crowded neighborhoods in Izmir on daily basis by wandering around and having small conversations with the displaced people on the streets, civil society members providing aid for people, and local craftsmen and fishermen as initiators. The preliminary fieldwork provided me with considerable insights about how I should proceed afterwards. This critical juncture of 2015 summer was significant in the sense that the large movement of Syrians paved the way for the establishment of a new era in migration and border management in many respects.

Firstly, more than 150 boats were crossing the Aegean Sea from different shores of Turkey during this period. As one of my interlocutors, a customs officer, noted it was "a total turmoil" and complete chaos in which nobody was able to distinguish who was doing what. Secondly, the explicit actions of initiators on the streets were another interesting detail. The local community, including hotel owners, taxi, bus and truck drivers, craftsmen and street vendors, and residents, was actively taking part in the actions of smuggling without being intercepted by state authorities. It was a time when the border industry flourished significantly. Finally, with respect to the actions of border security, summer 2015 represents the non-action of Turkish Coast Guard that did not

even attempt to prevent the movement, which subsequently pushed the EU to take immediate diplomatic action.

The EU-Turkey Statement was finalized on March 18, 2016 after a series of negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Its first operationalization with the returns of 202 refugees was implemented on April 4 in Dikili, Izmir. I started the second round of my fieldwork on that week by observing the return procedures and the actors involved. The security zone at the port of Dikili was entirely militarized, and Frontex members handed refugees over to the DGMM (Directorate General of Migration Management) officials to be put in the removal center. During the fieldwork, I had the chance to make short interviews with activists, journalists, NGO members, and local residents in Dikili. The detailed notes, photographs, new contacts, small conversations and observations that I gathered during this stage of fieldwork gave me an unequalled opportunity to walk into – even to "infiltrate" – the field, introduce myself, approach people, and to earn the trust of my informants in the field. The experience heavily helped me to prepare the grounds for the next round, which took place four months into the signing of the Statement and right after the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Figure 1-1: Security zone at the port of Dikili during the first returns from Lesbos, Dikili, Izmir.

Photograph by Author, taken on April 4, 2016.

In July and August 2016, I revisited Izmir and conducted my official semi-structured interviews with the Turkish Coast Guard (15 interviews), customs officers (4 interviews), police officer (1 interview), personnel of municipality in Dikili (2 interviews), and members of IOM (2 interviews). I had 4 additional interviews with non-governmental actors and solidarity groups (please see Appendix).

Considering the difficulty to gain access to the coast guards, I started my interviews with the municipality personnel, who were quite accessible and welcoming. The two informants in the municipality facilitated me to establish a network with coast guards. Relying on their introductions, I managed to enter the security zone and pursued my interviews with the coast guard team at the port. At the outset, they were relatively skeptical, but gradually opened up and became unexpectedly talkative while explaining their roles and operations, challenges they face, daily practices and the meanings attached to their missions. Interviews took the form of semi-structured questions with two essential aims: (i) to capture a detailed picture of their actual daily practices in border management and (ii) to encapsulate their tacit and informal knowledge and internalized subjectivity dispositions vis-à-vis their Greek and European counterparts. Being a woman worked as an advantage for entering the "social universe" of coast guards (Bigo, 2014) insofar as they were readily talkative and hospitable – serving tea throughout the interviews. During the interviews, the head of the coast guard team invited two IOM members, who were the only non-state actors with permission to enter the security zone during the "landing" procedures.

In 2017, from September to November, I decided to start my participant observation in order to conduct a much deeper analysis of the *habitus*. It was known that Lesbos has been the main hotspot in the Aegean Sea receiving thousands of arrivals since 2015. During my desktop research, I discovered Skala Sikamineas, a village in the northern Lesbos, to be the main site of disembarkation in the island. I contacted to the search and rescue NGOs operating in Skala and applied to be a volunteer. After receiving their positive response, I had to apply for Schengen visa in order to enter the EU. The application process took several weeks and considerable effort to prepare required documents. Moreover, Schengen visa is generally given for three months to grad students from Turkey, therefore I had to renew my application each time I visit Lesbos.

Departure from Ayvalık to Mytilini (Lesbos) by ferry, passing through the same space at which refugees take the risks of death in their clandestine journeys on rubber boats, was a self-reflexive moment unveiling my privileged position as a researcher/volunteer. In Skala Sikamineas, the small village in the northern edge of Lesbos, there were four small NGOs taking part in the operations of search and rescue: Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, Lighthouse, ProActiva Open Arms (POA) and Refugee for Refugees (R4R). POA and Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara had their small rescue boats operating in collaboration with Hellenic Coast Guard and Frontex in the Aegean Sea.

Figure 1-2: The port of Skala Sikamineas where "landing" procedures are pursued, Skala Sikamineas, Lesbos.

Photograph by Author, 2017.

All rescue NGOs in Skala had been founded during the refugee movement of 2015. Lighthouse and R4R had only land crews responsible for the disembarkation process that humanitarians call "landing" at the port in addition to the spotting and running of the temporary camp in the village. Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara was the only one with both boat and land crews, conducting larger-scale operation in comparison to others. Besides the rescue NGOs, IsraAID was the only medical NGO that often had only one personnel – a local nurse – in Skala. All NGOs in Skala had been founded during the refugee movement of 2015.



Figure 1-3: "Landing" procedures on both sides of the Aegean Sea.

[Figure by Author]

The "landing" process usually takes place as follows: when a boat is intercepted on Greek territorial waters, the people on the dingy are transported to Frontex or HCG boats to be brought to the port in Skala for disembarkation. In cases where assistance is needed during rescue on the sea, HCG gives permission to POA or Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara to approach the dingy. When the boat full of displaced people reaches the port, the land crew of NGOs takes the responsibility of transferring people and their belongings from the boat, providing first aid if necessary and attending to their immediate needs. This process of "landing" is always pursued with the efforts of the abovementioned NGOs whereas HCG, the port police or Frontex members never take part in, but just monitor the process by holding their guns with a straight face and a flow of commands.

Figure 1-4: “Landing” operation in Skala Sikamineas, Lesbos.

Photograph by Author, 2017.

From September to November 2017, I worked as a volunteer of R4R which was founded by a Syrian refugee who crossed the Aegean Sea by swimming between Bodrum and Kos Island for 14 hours in 2014. During these three months I worked the night shifts (since boats usually come by night) and conducted my research in daytime. My position had interesting implications in the field. I was the first Turkish volunteer in Skala in search and rescue operations since 2015. Secondly, I was the first researcher simultaneously working as a volunteer in search and rescue. In my first week, my Turkish citizenship triggered the skepticism of Hellenic coast guards and the port police in the island, so they investigated my background and motivation of being there. My coordinator in R4R told me, the port police asked him directly whether I was a spy reporting the situation and practices in the field in Lesbos to the Turkish authorities. It took more than one week to introduce myself to border officials, to gain their trust, to immerse myself in the field of practice, and to convince them that my motivation of being there, which was volunteering and nothing else.

Figure 1-5: The boats of Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara and ProActiva are leaving the port to approach the refugee boat on the sea, Skala Sikamineas.

Photograph by Author, 2017.

In time, skepticism caused by my Turkish background gave way to advantages in many respects. Among the search and rescue crew there was no one speaking Arabic, Farsi or Kurdish, except my coordinator who was Syrian. So, speaking Turkish suddenly became an advantage to communicate with refugees since children and young people in the boats could generally speak the language. I had gradually become a translator managing the communication between border security/rescue NGOs and people on the boats. But this situation came with several side effects. When the boat approached to the port, I was speaking in Turkish to ask whether there were injuries or people having severe health issues. Yet, hearing Turkish made the people on the boat think that they had not been able to cross the border and been intercepted on the Turkish territorial waters. After discovering this impact on the people, I began with the following announcement: "You are on Greek waters and in an island of Greece. I am a Turkish volunteer here and please tell me if you have any health concerns".

Secondly, my Turkish background and knowledge about the field in Turkey extended my presence and responsibilities in the island. HCG, UNHCR officials and port police invited me to join the identification and documentation procedure at the port following

the provision of first aid. During that, one of the young people (generally a man) from the boat was chosen, and I was the one translating his responses to the Hellenic post police. This process continued in the temporary camp ran by NGOs the control of UNHCR. Additionally, at times when a refugee boat approached Lesbos shores by escaping from border surveillance, Frontex and HCG together with NGO crews launched an operation to search and catch these people in the island. I was the first one chosen to take part in these operations again due to my mother-tongue. As a result, I was present in various sites of border and mobility management in the island, practices on the sea as well as the ones practiced on the land. I had the chance of witnessing numerous types of mobility governing practices, ranging from a three-hour car journey with Frontex personnel to investigation procedures during the identification process. This provided me with a unique opportunity of observing the deep well of specific relations that comprise competition and domination, dispositions, beliefs, snapshot of technologies, norms, and practices in the field. I managed to capture the *habitus* in a nuanced manner on account of the daily anecdotes and conversations during the operations, and the social life that I had with border officials and humanitarians for weeks at numerous places of action.

Figure 1-6: I was on my shift in the Spotting point in Skala Sikamineas, 2017.

Figure 1-7: I was in the kitchen preparing dinner for refugees in the temporary camp Stage2, Skala Sikamineas, 2017.

I concluded my first volunteering process by making official interviews with Portuguese Frontex personnel and Hellenic Coast Guard which took more than a month to achieve permission. Due to the personal relations that I built during the operations as well as the daily life, the head of the Frontex team in Lesbos faithfully supported me to have permission from the Head of Press Office of Frontex in Warsaw. After a series of mail circulation that took considerable amount of time and energy, the press office in Warsaw accepted my request on the condition of removing certain questions from the list, particularly the ones asking opinions of Frontex personnel about the issues of the EU-Turkey Statement and the EU border regime in general. The Head of Press rather requested to answer these opinion-based questions by the spokespersons in Warsaw via email. In sum, I had to remove five questions from my questionnaire and arranged the meeting with the head of the team in Lesbos. It was an interesting experience since the attitude of the personnel was different in relation to our encounter during the operations at the port. They were in their civilian clothes in a hotel meeting room with their drinks at hand while constantly smiling, making jokes, and having casual conversation. Additionally, they were much more welcoming and polite. It seemed that my position in their eyes was transformed from a volunteer to a researcher that calls for respect. After

conducting taped interviews with the whole team (7 people), I left the hotel and passed through the well-known hill called known as the “graveyard” in Molyvos, nearby the luxurious hotel that Frontex personnel stayed in. The hill contained thousands of lifejackets and other clothing left by refugees.

Figure 1-8: Hill known as “graveyard”, Molyvos, Lesbos.

Photograph by Author, 2017.

In the final stage of my fieldwork from July to September in 2018, I revisited both sites in Lesbos and Turkey. In Turkey, I visited the coast guard zones along the Aegean coastline, from Küçükkuyu to Bodrum. To do that, I needed to ask for permission from the Head of Coast Guard in Ankara. Thanks to the efforts of my supervisor, I managed to gain access to visit these security zones and conduct interviews. In total, I had 29 interviews with Turkish coast guards. During these interviews, the head of the Coast Guard Command, who was in charge of the migration issue, was always present. He was appointed from Ankara to accompany me and monitor the interviews. Additionally, the head of the Regional Operational Center, governing the whole coastline of the Aegean was with us during the interviews. In the same summer, I visited Lesbos for the last time and easily rejoined the operations of search and rescue in Skala due to my already established close network with rescue humanitarians.

I finalized my fieldwork in September 2018.

1.6 Summary of Chapters

Following three chapters of the dissertation explore different manifestations of security-humanitarian assemblage and its rationales within the context of Greece and Turkey located on the both sides of the Aegean Sea.

Chapter 2 investigates how the EU produces remoteness in migration and border governance through development of transnational policy instruments and operations within the case of Turkey. Diversifying from the existing literature, the study decolonizes the European border externalization project by focusing on the subjectivity of Turkish border officials in their daily discourses and practices. The study describes the reflections of high-level diplomacy between the EU and Turkey on the actual discourses and acts of border guards operating in the field. Although the policy circles centered on "migration diplomacy" (İçduygu and Üstübici, 2014) have become a hot agenda recently, the academic studies mostly focus on the policy-level analysis and formal/institutional knowledge. This study rather provides a tacit and informal knowledge about the process through a nuanced and empirical analysis of how Turkish border guards interpret, internalize or challenge the border externalization policies of the EU. It explains how onshore and offshore mechanisms of the externalization process are implemented or challenged by the border actors, and how border narratives and local politics are produced by those actors in the actual sites. The study indicates that European externalization process does not only move outwards from the European center and then become implemented by the "passive" periphery. On the contrary, the geopolitical subjectivity of being "gatekeeper" provides Turkey to have a constitutive role in shaping and determining framework and nature of the externalization process. Turkish border officials strategically reverse the disposition of their European "others" and build narratives around three manners: the politics of condemnation; the ad hoc nature of border practices freeing them from accountability; and strategies of superiority. In result, Turkish border officials attempt to reverse the dependency relationship between them and European counterparts. In result, their morally superior self-projection goes hand in hand with the operational capacity of the Turkish armed forces, as opposed to the humanitarian and operational desperateness of the European "other". The empirical data of the chapter is based on the fieldwork conducted in Izmir in 2016.

The chapter was published in the journal of *Comparative Migration Studies* (7:12) in 2019.

Chapter 3 critically examines the reflections of security-humanitarian rationales in Greek island of Lesbos. The study analyzes the everyday practices of border officials and rescue humanitarians in Lesbos via an ethnographic research design. It investigates the actual border practices adopted by both military and humanitarian actors as well as subjectivities, competitive relations, manifestations of power and production of border narratives. The study indicates that rescue humanitarians in search and rescue humanitarians in Lesbos obtain a *minimalist approach to humanitarianism* which is built on an "emergency imagination" aiming prevention of deaths at sea and the provision of basic needs within a limited temporality. In this narrow imagination, security acts of controlling (spotting, patrolling, catching etc.) migration becomes legitimized and incorporated into the provision of basic needs. Within this blurred rationales of security-humanitarian assemblage, a moral battle between military actors (Hellenic coast guards and Frontex personnel) and humanitarians occurs. Military actors strategically capitalize on this depoliticized space and deploy simple moral sentiments of humanitarianism and professionalism in order to establish hierarchies in relation to humanitarians. They project themselves as the "real humanitarian professionals" in the Aegean Sea, the ones "saving lives" and providing basic needs in a much more professional manner compared to the "amateur" humanitarians. As a result, the chapter demonstrates that a narrow and managerial humanitarian imagination does not only lay the grounds for blurred civilian-military space, but also prepares opportune circumstances for the military agents to capture and coopt the rhetoric to degrade humanitarians. The empirical data of the chapter is based on the ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Lesbos in 2017-2018. A shorter version of the chapter was published in the journal of *Geopolitics* in April 2020.

Chapter 4 focuses on the spatio-political analysis of the Aegean Sea by paying particular attention to the border practices in this distinctive sea space. The chapter provides an extensive empirical analysis of the sovereign practices and technologies adopted by the border agents on the both sides of the Aegean Sea. In unpacking the web of practices, the chapter utilizes the term of "wet ontology" (Steinberg and Peters, 2015) as an analytical tool foregrounding the materiality of the sea in shaping certain practices.

The chapter focuses on the contextualized geophysicality of the Aegean Sea by which spatial distribution, maritime jurisdiction and mode of operandi are shaped accordingly. It is indicated that due to the particular maritime jurisdiction of the Aegean, the meaning of search and rescue (SAR) gains only situational connotation rather than a geographical one. This results in the consideration of every migrant boat as ipso facto "in distress" that needs to be searched and rescued. This narrative is utilized by the military actors in the way to legitimize their military techniques of interception as a rescue mission. The chapter indicates that systematic violence is produced through the politics of *interception in the name of rescue* in the Aegean context, as opposed to the politics of evading, abandonment and nonaction in the Central Mediterranean. In analyzing the web of practices in the Aegean context, the chapter provides detailed analysis of the spatio-political configuration of the maritime space together with different organizational and operational composition of the border agents across two territorial waters: the Turkish coast guards in the Turkish territorial waters; and the Hellenic coast guards, Frontex personnel and rescue NGOs in the Greek waters. The chapter is under final preparation stage to be submitted in a journal.

1.7. References

Andersson, R. (2014). *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Andreas, P. (2000). *Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

Balibar, E. (2004). *We, the people of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Benhabib, S. (2020). The End of the 1951 Refugee Convention? Dilemmas of Sovereignty, Territoriality, and Human Rights. Jus Cogens, 2(1), 75-100.

Bigo, D. (1994). The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly Developing Area of Police Intervention'. In Anderson, M. and den Boer, M. (Eds), *Policing Across National Boundaries* (pp. 161–73). London: Pinter.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2008). The uncertain state(s) of Europe?. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 15(1), 71–82.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2012). Off-shoring and out-sourcing the borders of Europe: Libya and EU border work in the Mediterranean. *Geopolitics*, 17(4), 843–866.

Bigo, D. & Walker, R.B.J. (2007). International, Political, Sociology. *International Political Sociology*, 1(1), 1–5.

Boswell, C. (2003). The 'external dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy. *International Affairs*, 79(3), 619-638.

Buzan, B., Waewer, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Casas-Cortes, M, Cobarrubias, S, Pickles, J. (2010). Stretching borders beyond sovereign territories? Mapping EU and Spain's border externalization policies. *Geopolítica(s*), 2(1), 71–90.

Casas-Cortes M, Cobarrubias S, De Genova N, Garelli G, Grappi G, Heller C, Hess S, Kasparek B, Mezzadra S, Neilson B, Peano I, Pezzani L, Pickles J, Rahola F, Riedner L, Scheel S & Tazzioli, M. (2015). New keywords: Migration and borders. *Cultural Studies*, 29 (1), 55–87.

Cuttitta, P. (2018). Delocalization, humanitarianism, and human rights: The Mediterranean border between exclusion and inclusion. *Antipode,* 50(3), 783–803.

Cuttitta, P. (2018). Repoliticization through search and rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and migration management in the Central Mediterranean. *Geopolitics*, 23(3), 632–60.

Garelli, G. & Tazzioli, M. (2017). *Tunisia as a Revolutionized Space of Migration*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Garelli, G. & Tazzioli, M. (2017). Warfare on the logistics of migrant movement. *Open Democracy,* June 16, 2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/glenda-garelli-martina-tazzioli/warfare-on-logistics-of-migrant-movement

Geddes, A. (1999). *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migratio. *Journal of Common Market Studie*s, 38(5), 751-77.

Inda, J.I. (2006). *Targeting Immigrant: Government, Technology, and Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

İçduygu, A. (2020). Decentring migrant smuggling: reflections on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.*

İçduygu, A., & Yükseker, D. (2012). Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Re-presentation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon. *Population, Space and Place,*18 (4), 441–456.

İçduygu, A., & Üstübici, A. (2014). Negotiating mobility, debating borders: Migration diplomacy in Turkey-EU relations. In H.Schwenken, S. Russ, & S. Ruβ-Sattar (Eds.), *New border and citizenship politics*, (pp. 44–59). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

İşleyen, B. (2018). Transit mobility governance in Turkey. *Political Geography*, 62, 23–32.

Jones, A., & Clark, J. (2008). Europeanization and discourse building: The European commission, European narratives and European Neighbourhood policy. *Geopolitics*, 13(3), 545–571.

Kostakopoulou, T. (2000). The 'Protective Union': Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(3), 497-518.

Lavenex, S. (2008). A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: Integration beyond conditionality?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(6), 938–955.

Lavenex, S. & Ucarer, E. (eds) (2003). *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration.* Lanham, MD: Lexington.

Marcus, G. (1995). Ethnography In/of the World System: the Emergency of Multi Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24, 95–117.

Neal, A. (2009). Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The origins of FRONTEX. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47(2), 333-356.

Newman, D. (2006). Borders and bordering: Towards an inter-disciplinary dialogue. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 171–186.

Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015). The humanitarian politics of European border policing: Frontex and border police in Evros. *International Political Sociology*, 9(1), 53–69.

Perera, S. (2016). Grim design: Australia's Pacific black sites. *Cultural Anthropology*, Hot Spots website. https://culanth.org/fieldsights/901-grim-design-australia-s-pacific-blacksites

Rumford, C. (2006). Theorizing borders. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 155–169.

Salter, M.B. & Mutlu, C.E. (2012). *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies*. Routledge: London and New York.

Steinberg, P. & Peters, K. (2015). Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: Giving depth to volume through oceanic thinking. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 33(2), 247–264.

Stierl, M. (2018). A fleet of Mediterranean border humanitarians. *Antipode*, 50(3), 704–24.

Van Houtum, H. (2010). Human blacklisting: the global apartheid of the EU's external border regime. *Environment and Planning D: Space and Society*, 28, 957-976.

Van Houtum, H., & Boedeltje, F. (2011). Questioning the EU's neighbourhood geopolitics: Introduction to a special section. *Geopolitics*, 16(1), 121–129.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009). *Border politics: The limits of sovereign power*. Edinburgh University Press.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015). *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical security and Beyond*. Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press.

Walters, W. (2002). Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 20, 564-80.

Walters, W. (2004). The frontiers of the European Union: A geostrategic perspective. *Geopolitics*, 9(3), 674–698.

Walters, W. (2006). Border/control. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 187–203.

Walters, William (2011). Foucault and frontiers: notes on the birth of the humanitarian border. In Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S. & Lemke, T. (Eds), *Governmentality: Current issues and Future Challenges* (pp.138–64). Abingdon: Routledge.

Watkins, J. (2017). Bordering borderscapes: Australia's use of humanitarian aid and border security support to immobilise asylum seekers. *Geopolitics*, 22(4), 958–983.

Watson, S. (2015). The Criminalization of Human and Humanitarian Smuggling. *Migration, Mobility, & Displacement*, 1 (1), 39–53.

Weizman, E. (2007). *Hollow land: Israel's architecture of occupation*. Verso books.

Zaiotti, R (Ed) (2016). *Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America, and the Spread of "Remote Control" Practices*. New York: Routledge.

Zaiotti, R. (2007). Of friends and fences: Europe's neighbourhood policy and the 'gated community syndrome. *Journal of European Integration*, 29(2), 143–162.

Chapter 2

EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF EUROPEAN BORDERS TO TURKEY: AN IMPLEMENTATION PERSPECTIVE OF COUNTERACTIVE STRATEGIES

2.1 Abstract

This article seeks to "decolonize" the externalization project of European borders by focusing on the subjectivity of Turkey as being a long-standing candidate country, seeking to be a "regional power" in the Middle East and increasingly moving into undemocratic rule. The study suggests that externalization project of European borders does not only move outwards from the European center, and then straightforwardly get implemented by the passive "others". The case of Turkey epitomizes that the "others" are geopolitical subjects with their counter-discourses and strategies as well as their co-constitutive roles in shaping the very framework of the process. The study adopts an implementation perspective with the aim of providing nuanced local details about how Turkish border guards act, interpret, internalize or challenge the border externalization policies.

2.2 Introduction

The "Europeanization" of migration and border policies, which began with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, has become part of the European Union (EU) conditionality process in which candidate countries have been obliged to incorporate their mobility and border control mechanisms to the Schengen *acquis* (Lavenex and Ucarer, 2003; Boswell 2003; Lavenex 2006). Following the enlargement in 2004 that produced new external borders, a new rationale was adopted under so-called "Wider Europe" doctrine (European Commission, 2004). The main objective of this new policy design was to extend the influence of the EU's jurisdiction over neighboring non-EU countries with the aim of "reinforcement of partnerships with third countries to tackle illegal immigrant better" (Hague Program, 2004) and achievement of "greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation" (European Commission, 2004). The creation of new spaces of intervention for Europe in its "Neighbourhoods" has sparked scholarly interest in the critical examination of the geopolitical strategies of the "*European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP)* (Zaiotti, 2007; Lavanex, 2008; Jones and Clark, 2008; Bialasizewicz et.al., 2009; Scott, 2005; 2009; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; Celata and Colletti, 2015). The creation of new spaces of intervention in third countries goes hand in hand with the reconfiguration of spatiality in border management, which is based on a "bordering exercise" along "migratory routes" (Bialasiewicz et.al., 2009). This re-spatialization of border practices has become more mobile, itinerant and dispersed, receiving considerable scholarly attention in critical security and border studies (Rumford, 2006; Newman, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Casas-Cortes et al., 2011; 2013; 2016).

The existing literature on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the EU draws significant attention to the asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship between the European "center" and its "periphery," particularly the center's strategies of constructing, defining, categorizing, ordering and subjugating the neighbors it desires (Zaiotti, 2007; Jones and Clark, 2008; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Casas-Cortes et al., 2016). Some scholars delineate the process as "a new colonial mechanism" in the post-Westphalian world order (e.g., Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011). However, much less attention has been given to literature that "decolonize" (El Qadim, 2013) the study of border externalization in which the "others",

that is, countries outside Europe, are not considered only as mere objects of pre-defined policies but geopolitical subjects standing in an asymmetrical relationship to EU countries.

In this regard, Turkey presents an interesting case – a candidate country whose ambitious foreign policy is moving away from Europe with the motivation of being a "regional actor" in the Middle East under increasingly authoritarian rule. The main questions this article seeks to answer in this respect are twofold: What are the characteristics of the European externalization project in Turkey and how does Turkey's subjective understanding of its geopolitical position shape this project? The so-called "EU-Turkey deal", signed with a long-standing candidate country in the midst of an attempted coup and state of emergency, represents neither a part of a straightforward enlargement process nor an ENP agreement with a neighboring country. It resembles *an ENP-like accession partnership* which is inherently contradictory and impossible to finalize. On the one hand, it initially aimed to "reward" Turkey through the provision of financial aid and visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, similar to other neighboring countries; on the other hand, it is intertwined with the opening of chapters for accession negotiations, including one specifying Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, which is incompatible with ever increasingly authoritarian Turkey.

By taking the *sui generis* positon of the Turkish case into account, this article is based on a study of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, linking it to the wider literature on the "externalization" of European borders and to critical border and security studies. Numerous studies on the "EU-ization" of the Turkish migration and border regime and its accession negotiations emphasize the historical, political, legal and international aspects of the topic (İçduygu, 2007; 2011; Kirişçi, 2003; Biehl, 2009; Özçürümez and Şenses, 2011; Paçacı-Elitok, 2013; İçduygu and Üstübici, 2014). This study goes beyond high-level policy analysis, particularly focusing on the EU-Turkey Statement and utilizing fieldwork-based research with the aim of capturing policy implementations by border practitioners on the ground. In addition to examining political statements and policy documents, the article provides an empirical analysis of the practices, beliefs and actions of Turkish border practitioners.

Adopting an implementation perspective provides nuanced local details about how practitioners act, interpret, internalize or challenge the policies in everyday practices (Cote-Baucher et al., 2014). With this motivation, the paper aims to demonstrate the interplay between diplomatic relations during the negotiations and the practices of Turkish border guards in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. Empirical data was gathered through fieldwork conducted from April through August 2016 – from the implementation period of the Statement and reaching the fourth month of data collection right after the attempted coup in Turkey – in various districts of İzmir; a city located at Turkey's Aegean coast which was at the heart of the refugee movement from Turkey heading to Europe in 2015 and the site for deportations from Greece as part of the Statement. During the fieldwork, I conducted semi- and unstructured interviews with the Turkish Coast Guard team (Interviews 1 to 15) and customs officers (Interviews 16 to 19)[i], in addition to police officers, personnel of municipalities, members of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which works with the Turkish Coast Guard in emergency aid. Along with the interviews with border practitioners, I also did close encounter with people who attempted to cross borders, were "intercepted" or pushed-backed. Since this paper aims to particularly focus on the controlling strategies and justification mechanisms of border practitioners, the testimonies of border-crossers would be subject of future study. Since Coast Guard holds the core authority in Turkish-Greek sea border security and receives less scholarly attention, the main focus here will be on how the Turkish Coast Guard members act, give meaning to their actions, perceive "Europe" and adopt counter-strategies, struggles and competition in their practices.[ii]

The main arguments the study suggests are threefold. Firstly, in the European "externalization" process, the subjectivity of being a "gatekeeper" provides Turkey a bargaining leverage that translates into the strategies of superiority of a candidate country heading toward authoritarian rule. Secondly, similar perceptions against Europe are internalized by Turkish border guards; and their counter-discourses and strategies are mainly shaped around three areas: the politics of condemnation, the ad hoc nature of border practices – resulting in an antagonistic relationship – and the strategies of superiority as governing technologies. Thirdly, the case of Turkey does not only

indicate the non-monochromatic, differentiated nature of the externalization project but also the constitutive role of the "other" in shaping the framework of the process.

2.3 Theorizing "Externalization": The Spatiality of Temporality of European Borders

The critical studies on security and borders attempt to theorize contemporary borders by stressing their reformulation, reallocation and re-spatialization, which have become increasingly dispersed, mobile and deterritorialized, operating within and beyond the geopolitical limits of sovereign territories (Balibar, 2004; Bialasiewicz, 2008; 2012; Bialasiewicz et al., 2009; Casas-Cortes et al., 2011; 2013; 2016; Coleman, 2007; Newman, 2006; Rumford, 2006; 2008; Walters, 2004; 2006; Weizman, 2007; 2011). The nature of contemporary borders exemplifies a way of what Weizman (2007) describes as "transportable" and "deployable" imaginaries of border politics being performed inside societies as well as in other states' territories, particularly "where [the] migrant is" (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016, p. 232). These "transportable" border politics manifest in the exportation of migration policies, citizenship and entry regulations, new techniques of mobility control and new surveillance mechanisms to third countries (Bialasiewicz et al., 2009).

These "transportable" strategies, which create new spaces of intervention for Europe, result in an asymmetrical relationship between the Europe and its neighbors which have has been widely discussed within the context of the "center" position of Europe governing its "periphery" via pre-defined policies of conditionality (Jones, 2006; Zaiotti, 2007; Lavanex, 2008; Bialasiewicz, 2008; 2012; Bialasiewicz et al., 2009; Jones and Clark, 2008; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; Casas-Cortes et al., 2011; 2013; 2016). The "other" has to willingly transform itself, adapting European values and ways of doing in order to become European but not actually European. The diffusion of non-negotiable and pre-determined European principles to third countries in similar conditionality logics of enlargement has been mostly referred to as the "Europeanization" of Europe's "neighbourhood" (Lavenex, 2008; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011; Jones and Clark, 2008; Bialasiewicz, 2008; Jones, 2006). It implies an extended jurisdiction of the EU that brings a "(b)ordering order" to the "chaotic" outside (Bialasiewicz et.al., 2009; Jones and Clark,

2008). Neighbors are not seen as equal partners in this "close" cooperation and integration, rather they are obliged to adapt in order to qualify as part of the "ring of friends" or become privileged partners (Zaiotti, 2007; van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011). The mechanism of conditionality determines who will be a "friend" and who will be designated a "non-friend" or "foreign." Bilateral Action Plans lay out the criteria to be followed and evaluate the progress of implementation via country reports. This asymmetric relationship between the European "center" and its "periphery," establishes a hierarchy of otherness and contextualized as part of the postcolonial, neo-colonial or neo-imperial nature of the European project (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011; Scott, 2005; 2009; Giaccaria and Minca, 2011). This "neighbourhood" is not constituted through the use of "hard power" but rather through policy transfers, the diffusion of certain narratives, norms, practices and ways of doing and discursive construction of the "other" that needs a teacher (Bialasiewicz et al., 2009).

Besides the spatial reconfiguration of borders as explained above, Walters (2004, p.679) touches on their temporality by utilizing the term *geostrategy* to describe a "particular way of organizing the space of border" under specific "political programs, objectives and ambitions," which is built on certain historical, contextualized repertoires in different geographies. He aims to capture the multiplicity and plurality at work in the construction of Europe's frontier zones. Therefore, he lists four different geostrategies of Europe: *networked (non)border; march; colonial frontier;* and *limes*. *Networked (non)border* refers to the removal of "dividing" lines within the Schengen area through the ways in which controls have been managed via transnational networks of policing. *March* implies a zone between powers, a buffer zone protecting and insulating the interior as in the case of Central and Eastern European countries (Walters, 2004, p. 683). The complexity of the EU's frontiers also contains asymmetric power relations, with the imperial logic of assimilation and pacification entailing disruption of "settled regional, economic and geopolitical relations". These areas are called the *colonial frontier*, in which "the center is acknowledged repository and arbitrator of what is proper," as in the cases of Poland and Hungary (Walters, 2004, p. 688). Finally *limes*, as the fourth geostrategy, refer to "an edge, fringe or limit," which has materialized in today's Mediterranean frontier.

Walter's contribution not only captures the plurality of contemporary border-making, but also highlights the temporality of borders, reactivating certain historical, pre-modern forms in particular geographies based on their specific historical and political context. Walters acknowledges that this categorization is not a "totalising description" in which the "EU's frontiers fully conform to these images" (2004, p. 679). Besides lack of fully conformance to these mentioned categories in Turkish case, the particular focus here is that Walter's valuable attempt to broaden the conceptualizations of European border-making does not encapsulate the geostrategy of the "other". In a similar vein as Walters (2004), numerous scholars aim to avoid totalizing and deterministic readings of the "externalization" project and underline the dynamic and complicated character of imperial logic with different geostrategies in place to different degrees over the eastern, northern and southern neighborhood (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011). Capturing the differentiated, multiple, incomplete and dynamic "geopolitical subjectivity" or *geostrategy* of Europe (Walters, 2004; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011) is a notable contribution. However, less attention has been given to the *geostrategy* or subjectivity of the "other." Hence this study goes beyond the desire to capture diversification and focuses on the geopolitical subjectivity of Turkey, with its political ambition of reversing the passive role of the "gatekeeper" and utilizing its bargaining power to transform the framework of the "externalization" project at both the high-level of diplomatic relations and the "street-level" (Cote-Boucher et al., 2014) of border practitioners.

2.4 The Case of Turkey: The Trajectory of the EU-Turkey Statement

Situating my fieldwork within the historical and political developments in Turkey is necessary in order to unpack the interplay between policies and their implementation. The policy negotiations on migration and border management between the EU and Turkey opened when Turkey was officially declared a candidate country in 1999 (İçduygu, 2007). The Accession Partnership Document of 2001, prepared by the European Commission, set out the principles of the EU *acquis* regarding visa regulations, the asylum system, anti-trafficking policies and the enhancement of administrative and technological capacities of border management (Kirişçi, 2003; Biehl, 2009). Accordingly, Turkey introduced visa requirements in 2002 for six Gulf countries[iii] and added an additional 13 countries[iv] in 2003 to the list of those subject to

the visa requirements (İçduygu, 2007). In the same vein, Turkey renewed the citizenship law and the law on work permits, as well as amending the Penal Code by signing the Palermo Protocol in order to fulfill the provisions regarding anti-trafficking and transnational organized crime (İçduygu, 2007). The National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration (NAP) in 2005 and the National Harmonization Program of 2008 have accelerated migration and border control mechanisms through the intensification of repatriation and deportation centers, the addition of sophisticated equipment (e.g., projectors, binoculars, thermal cameras, barbed wires and watch towers), the enhancement of inspection and information facilities and biometric technologies, and the training of border guards and liaison officers (İçduygu and Aksel, 2012). Chapter 24 of the EU *acqui*s covers the administrative and technological capacity for data management, information exchange, training of the police force and implementation of detention and reception centers. All of these political, legal and institutional transformations, in which "migration diplomacy" (İçduygu and Üstübici, 2014) has become the major subject of relations, have been referred as the "Europeanization" of Turkish migration and border management and extensively elaborated on within the literature (İçduygu, 2007; 2011; İçduygu and Üstübici, 2014; Özçürümez and Şenses, 2011).

From 2009 onwards, Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy approach at enhancing collaboration and economic, political and social relations with neighboring countries, has become one of the pivotal drivers influencing "Europeanization" process (FEUTURE, 2018). This foreign policy approach redirected its focus toward the Middle East and Africa by poisoning itself as an influential, "humanitarian" "regional order" has started to contradict with EU's migration and border policies with respect to the adoption of a liberal visa policy towards neighboring countries (FEUTURE, 2018). This was followed by the lifting of visa requirements for citizens of various third countries that have been categorized within the negative list of the EU.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey announced an "open door policy" for Syrians fleeing from the war and adopted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 2014, providing the legal basis for a "temporary protection regime" for Syrians. This went hand in hand with the moralist discourse in foreign policy presenting itself as a "moral actor" in the region as oppose to

the crimes of Syrian government against humanity (Demirtas-Bagdonas, 2014). The adoption of "morally superior" self-image in the foreign policy coincides with the Gezi Park protests, the rise of authoritarian rule and a considerable increase in human rights violations in domestic politics, which have complicated relations with Europe.

When migrants' dead bodies on Turkish shores received the attention of international media in 2015, the Turkish government Tayyip Erdoğan started using discourse condemning Europe for "abandoning Syrian refugees to their fate and making the Mediterranean a cemetery" BBC Türkçe, 2015). Simultaneously, when Turkish security forces halted the movement of approximately 3,000 migrants in the city of Edirne in 2015, it was portrayed as a "success" of Turkey in the media, a message highlighting Turkey's indispensable role in "gatekeeping" for Schengenland (Hürriyet, 2015). The reaction of Turkish government to this "humanitarian crisis" contains a rhetoric of Turkey's irreplaceable role in "gatekeeping", but also an adoption of moral sentiments legitimizing Turkey's morally superior self-projection via-a-via inhumane defensive approach of Europe:

> "The humanitarian crisis that is unfolding day by day is a test of our humanity as well as our morality. It is high time for Europe to look at the mirror, be honest about what it sees in the reflection, to stop procrastinating and start assuming more than its fair share of the burden…Turkey cannot succeed alone. EU members must shoulder their responsibility, show humility, be more open and adopt a humane stance in the face of this real humanitarian tragedy unfolding on its doorstep. The convenient reflex of putting the onus on Turkey, adopting a purely defensive approach with wholesale security measures and building walls to create a Christian "fortress Europe" may be attractive to those who have understood nothing about European history, but it will not work" (Ahmet Davutoğlu, Guardian, 2015).

The politics of condemnation coincide with the bargaining tool of being a "gatekeeper" to Europe, which has translated into a kind of "superior" position of Turkey in diplomatic relations. Despite the "emergency" call of Europe against the "unfavourable circumstances" of the mass movement, Turkey insisted on prolonging the period of negotiations in order to force the EU to agree to Turkey's strategic priorities (Euractiv,

2015). Firstly, the EU had to commit to provide "substantial and concrete new funds outside the IPA (Instrument for the Pre-Accession Assistance) funds" reaching €6 billion and to support "Turkey in meeting the requirement of the 'Visa Liberalisation Dialogue' and reinvigorating the long-stalled accession process" (European Commission, 2015). On numerous occasions, Erdoğan attempted to illustrate the indispensable dependency of the EU on Turkey's cooperation in managing the migratory movement, even utilizing explicit threats such as "opening the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and put[ing] the refugees on buses" (Guardian, February 12, 2016) if the funding was not increased to €6 billion and new negotiation chapters not opened.

Secondly, since the "urgency" of the "migration deal" was the top priority of the EU, the EU officials had to accept a delay in the release of the European Commission's Annual Progress Report, from the scheduled date of October 14 to November 10 at "Erdoğan's request" (Financial Times, 2015). The intention of the delay was not to negatively influence the "successes" of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government during the election campaign of November 1. Once the elections were over, with the AKP regaining a parliamentary majority, the Commission's Annual Progress report announced that Turkey had reached its lowest point in meeting the Copenhagen criteria (European Commission, 2015). Despite lowest records, "a mutually beneficial relationship" on migration and border management were praised.

Thirdly, the EU chose to remain silent about the de-democratization process under the leadership of Erdoğan; binding commitments on human rights, the rule of law and democracy were almost completely left out of the agenda. The intense migratory movement in the summer of 2015 and the EU's efforts to manage it occurred during the same time as significant deteriorations in relations between Turkey and its Kurdish population; the Kurdish peace process was abandoned, the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) was increasingly marginalized, armed conflict intensified in south-eastern, overwhelmingly Kurdish cities – resulting in high numbers of civilian deaths and the forced displacement of Kurdish populations – and all peace defenders in the country were criminalized. Despite these human right violations, which have been followed by the deterioration of the rule of law and the collapse of institutions in Turkey especially in the aftermath of the coup-attempt, the EU could not utilize its role of a

"strong mentor and guide" or its "civilian," "normative" power (as it pronounce itself) toward its candidate country (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011). The EU's only concern was to stop migratory movement "immediately" by "temporary and extraordinary measures" (EU-Turkey Statement, 2016).

At the summit of November 29, both parties agreed to "re-energizing" the accession process "which will bring order into migratory flows and help to stem irregular migration" through the measures of "active cooperation on migrants, preventing travel to Turkey, ensuring application of established bilateral readmission provisions and swiftly returning migrants who are not in need of international protection to their countries of origin" (EU-Turkey Meeting Statement, 2016). In return, the fulfillment of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap (VLR) would be accelerated, Chapter 17 (Energy, Economic and Monetary Policy) would be opened, the High Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation would be launched, and preparatory steps for upgrading the Customs Union could be launched towards the end of 2016. When five headings of blocks addressed in the VLR, including the full application of readmission agreements are actualized, the EU has committed to lifting the visa requirements for travel in the Schengen zone. However, with the inclusion of visa liberalization in the picture, the process has become more paradoxical. Since the VLR, which was signed before the process of the Statement, requires certain accomplishment in fundamental rights, there seemed to be no sign of the political will in Turkey to achieve it. However, despite these discrepancies and impossibility of actualizing certain legal provisions due to the de-democratization process in Turkey, the final agreement was reached on March 18, 2016. These discrepancies and questionable legal provisions also enable ad hoc nature of practices without any principle accountability, which will be discussed in the next section.

2.5 An Implementation Perspective: Border Practices in İzmir

The routes from Turkey into Europe, which encompass the land routes to Greece and Bulgaria and the sea route to the Greek islands, have long been used by migrants. Until 2010, the sea route to Greece was the major channel for migrants (Amnesty International [AI], 2015). In 2010, the main route shifted to Greece's land border, due to increased surveillance at the sea border by the Greek Coast Guard in collaboration with

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (AI, 2015). Once mobility shifted to the Greek land border, Greece launched Operation Aspida (Shield) across the Evros borderland in 2012, deploying additional police officers and constructing additional fences (AI, 2015). Border strengthening measures across Evros led to a shift of migratory flows toward the Greek islands and Bulgaria that shaped the direction of the refugee movement in the summer of 2015.

Its nearness makes İzmir one of the key zones of departure on the way towards Greece, having witnessed an intense migratory movement in the summer of 2015. It is also the location of returns from Greece as a part of the Statement, receiving notable media attention during the first week of the operation in April 2016. When I was there, during the first week of returns, it was full of Turkish officials from the Directorate-General of Migration Management (DGMM) and the Department of Border Management, police and customs officers, as well as journalists, activists, civil society members and residents. It was a hotbed of contention. On the one side there were activists and members of NGOs criticizing the "deal"; on the other side there were large numbers of residents, who had held a protest two days previously to proclaim that "they do not want a refugee camp", watching as deportees were put on buses to be transported to another city.

There is definitely a need to differentiate the period leading up to the Statement from that following it. Right after the Statement, both Turkish and Greek authorities have strengthened and multiplied patrolling activities, accompanied by Frontex and NATO operations deployed in the Aegean Sea, with enhanced surveillance activities. In explaining the situation in 2015, a customs officer stated "Last year was entirely turmoil. It was completely a chaos I would say. No one seemed to be interested in the crossings. Turkish Coast Guard members were saying that it was not their duty; it was the concern of the other side who had to find a way to solve the problem" (Interview 16, April 2016).

The role of the coast guard is pivotal in border control because they hold the core competency. In collaboration with Frontex and NATO, coast guards on both sides of the border (Turkey and Greece) hold the nucleus authorization in protecting the borders of the specific country, practicing the principles of the action plans, intercepting migrants

on boats and conducting returns. When they are asked to define their daily routine, the answers are mostly articulated in the ordinary language of certain tasks combined with their "honorable role". At the level of operational management of the Turkish Coast Guard, the practical regime of justification indicates a pattern similar to Bigo's (2014) description, in which managers frame their tasks as an imperative, not a coercive action. They "stop the boats," since they are "just law enforcement officers". But they frame and legitimize their jobs as "very significant" in which their "only motivation for enduring these appalling conditions is saving people's lives" (Interviews 1, August 2016). Their framing as a border guard encapsulates the paradox of guarding a territory while protecting people in need of rescue and evokes the stimulating discussions on the "intimately linked" (Ticktin, 2005) nature of humanitarianism and policing (Aradau, 2004; Fassin, 2012; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). In that sense, the frame of "patrolling" goes hand in hand with the "warnings" of migrants who are in need of help:

> We take action when we receive a warning. In situations of distress, migrants call 158 or they send a location via WhatsApp; almost all of them have GPS. Sometimes our sensitive citizens report when they encounter a group of people getting prepared to cross. In addition to warnings, we do regular patrolling. Similarly, on the other side, the Greek Coast Guard and NATO warships also patrol and they report incidents to us. (Interview 1, August 2016)

However, in the case of Turkey, the moral sentiments attached to the discourses and daily practices of Coast Guard members are rooted in the politics of condemnation against Europe. My fieldwork indicated that there are three interrelated essential points that need to be explored, around which counter discourses and strategies of border practitioners are shaped: the politics of condemnation linked to self-exculpatory moral sentiments; the informal, ad hoc nature of practices; and the strategies of superiority.

(i) Politics of condemnation

The constitution of the European "neighbourhoods" through policy transfers, the diffusion of certain norms, narratives and ways of doing has been critically addressed within the literature (Jones and Clark, 2008; Bialasiewicz, 2008; 2012; Zaiotti, 2007; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011). In this asymmetrical relationship, the "other" is obliged to adopt certain pre-determined European principles in order to qualify as a part

of the "ring of friends" and a privileged partner (Zaiotti, 2007; van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011). The mechanism of conditionality categorically and hierarchically designates who is a "candidate," "non-candidate," "potential member," "friend" or remains "foreign" (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011). However, the case of Turkey demonstrates that the "other" also utilizes the strategies of adverse naming and condemnation attached to moral sentiments.

Firstly, inconsistent with the financial aid received under the deal for border control, the Turkish Coast Guard complain about their inadequate capacity and accuse the EU of not meeting its obligations despite its promises. I need to highlight a detail here; discontentedness was only voiced by team members when the head of the team left the port. Most of the informal knowledge, especially regarding the lack of capacity or practices of other departments, was gained in the absence of the head of the team. This nuance highlights both internal heterogeneity among Coast Guard members based on their hierarchical position and the competitive social relations even within the same "social universe" (Bigo, 2014), providing a kind of reflexive account. As one member noted:

> "There are lots of obstacles. The equipment is inadequate. Sometimes we cannot sleep for 30 hours and then join rescue operations. Nothing actually changed after the deal with respect to our capacity and equipment" (Interviews 14 and 15, August 2016).

In the rhetoric used by Coast Guard members, both Europe and Greece are often referred to as the "other side," putting the entire burden on Turkey's shoulders without fulfilling their promises (Interviews 10, 11 and 15, August 2016).

Secondly, Coast Guard members deploy narratives analogous to the Turkish government's, in which they utilize moral sentiments making Europe responsible for this "humanitarian crisis." It becomes a way to dissociate them from criticism. The "other" becomes Europe, "putting the lives of migrants at risk" and it thereby becomes "the duty of the Turkish Coast Guard [members] to take the responsibility of saving lives for the sake of humanity" (Interviews 3-15, August 2016). One was keen to display his criticism of European policies by stressing that he was "sorry about this desperateness" and that it was "all Europe's fault [for] making the Aegean a cemetery"

(Interview 14, August 2016). Here both political leaders and practitioners of border policing utilize identical narratives, in which moral sentiments become the major tool for blaming Europe and identifying themselves as morally superior, as if Turkey plays no role in human rights violations at the borders. When I asked about various criticisms voiced by non-governmental organizations[v] due to "push-backs" at the Aegean Sea, one responded: "We never do push-backs. When we detect a boat we just intercept. But we do not have any idea about the other side. They call us and we leave the port for the operation" (Interview 8, August 2016).

(ii) The ad hoc nature of border policing: "A game of ping-pong"

The agreed-upon final version of the Statement, full of discrepancies and questionable legal provisions, [vi] was to be "immediately" implemented by "temporary and extraordinary measures," which in return highlights the ad hoc nature of practices without any principle of accountability (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016). In addition to the fuzzy legal basis which provides maneuvering space to border practitioners, the territorial and jurisdictional expansion of "borderwork" (Rumford, 2006) necessitates the reformulation and re-spatialization of border practices through the ways in which borders become more mobile, "itinerant" and dispersed (Rumford, 2006; 2008; Newman, 2006; Agnew, 2003; Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Casas-Cortes et al., 2016). However, the spatiality of borders needs to be theorized together with the temporality of border practices. In explaining the impermanence of border policing, a Coast Guard member stated:

> "Our job is not one of those that are routinized and planned. You have to keep up with new dynamics and emergencies. The routes for and the ways of crossing are always changing and you have to adapt yourself all the time. Also every incident has its own specific circumstances. There is always a risk of witnessing unexpected things at the border, which frequently necessitates finding a suitable solution at the time of the incident." (Interview 1, August 2016)

The ad hoc border practices, in conjunction with the fuzzy legal basis of the Statement, pave the way for a maneuvering space in which the lack of a concrete distribution of

roles between the Turkish and Greek Coast Guards sometimes causes an unstable and antagonistic relationship between the two, an arbitrary use of violence without any principle of accountability (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016) as well as fertile ground for the narrative of condemnation as discussed above. As a customs officer put it in an interestingly self-reflexive manner, "The relationship between the Turkish and European border guards looks like a ping-pong match. Each side tries to pass the responsibility to another at the level of practice." (Interview 19, August 2016).

The extemporary character of border practices was intensified due to the political context of Turkey, especially over the last few years. In the third month of the Statement, Turkey witnessed a coup attempt on July 15 and a "state of emergency" began which lasted until July 18, 2018. More than 125,000 people have been made redundant or suspended from the military, civil service, or judiciary, about 36,000 people have been jailed, 140 media outlets and 29 publishing houses have been shut down, more than 2,500 journalists and media workers have become unemployed, and 148 journalists have been detained (Reuters, 2016; Human Rights Watch Report in DW, 2016). Since July 2016, the total number of academics and university administrative personnel who have been dismissed has reached 5,583 (Committee of Concerned Scientists, 2017). In this period, Erdoğan repeatedly reiterated his intention to reinstate the death penalty. Within the context of increasing deterioration of Turkish democracy since the failed coup attempt, migratory movements to Greece started to reactivate in August and September 2016 (Third Commission Report on Progress, 2016). According to the Commission's Progress Report on Turkey, 22,636 crossings from Turkey to Greece occurred between April and September, 2016 (AI, 2017). The discourse used by state officials has further strained relations with the EU. Erdoğan criticized the EU officials for not adequately condemning the attempt. On the other hand, the EU has stated that there would be total abandonment of the deal in the event the death penalty was reinstated (Guardian, July 18, 2016).

When I was conducting fieldwork in August 2016, the tension among Coast Guard members and police officers was apparent: "Everyone feels uneasy here after the coup. There were lots of Coast Guard members and police officers discharged from their position or put into jail. Hence, there is a lacuna at the moment. Everyone is walking on eggshells" (Interview 11, August 2016). The sharp changes in the staff of the military

and police department that are organized hierarchically further intensified the ad hoc nature of border practicing in the current Turkish context.

(iii) The strategies of superiority

Despite their complaints about the lack of capacity, and political fluctuations and their impacts on the chain of command within the military, the Turkish Coast Guard members were keen on displaying their superiority vis-a-via the "other side." Being "one of the best in the world," "they cannot imagine what would be the situation of Europe in the case of their absence" (Interviews 1-5, 8 and 11-15, August 2016). In their perception, the morally superior self-projection of the Turkish Coast Guard goes hand in hand with its "superior operational capacity" compared to the relatively incompetent European side.

> "…Our burden is much heavier. The other side generally expects us to handle everything. Actually, they should thank us. We not only guard our border but also theirs. Their security also depends on us. Turkey's burden is quite heavy in this regard." (Interview 14, August 2016).

This indicates that being a "gatekeeper" is perceived in two paradoxical ways: firstly, it is a heavy burden on Turkish border guards imposed by a Europe that is "taking the skilled ones and sending the vagabonds back [to Turkey]" (Interview 15, August 2016); secondly, it becomes capital that demonstrates Turkey's "superior operational capacity" that the "security of Europe is dependent on" (Interviews 11-15, August 2016). In that sense, seemingly paradoxical politics of condemnation and superiority are entangled as a governing strategy in order to determine their position vis-a-via Europe.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

The case of the EU-Turkey Statement indicates that the "externalization" of European borders neither operates in a fully collaborative way nor simply moves outward from the European center. Both diplomatic relations in high-level politics and interviews with Turkish border practitioners demonstrate this tension, indicating that taking the geopolitical subjectivity of the "other" into account is pivotal in order to capture the dynamics of European "externalization." The strategies of politics of condemnation and the superiority of being a "gatekeeper" have enabled Turkey's attempts in order to

reverse the dependency relationship. It seems that the politics of condemnation and superiority as counter strategy have been internalized by border practitioners consonantly with the discourse of Turkish politicians. They tend to blame Europe for their increasing workload and inadequate equipment, but also simultaneously state their "superior" position in stopping the migratory movement that the "security of Europe is dependent on". It goes hand in hand with the discourse of morally superior self-projection of Turkish Coast Guard who are "deeply sorry" about this desperateness produced by European policies as if they have not a share in. The legally fuzzy and practically ad hoc nature of the Statement provides the appropriate circumstances to allow maneuvering, escape accountability and create antagonistic relations. In that sense, even insightful attempts that avoid a deterministic approach to border "externalization" by highlighting its variety of forms are not adequate conceptualizations in the case of Turkey. The ambivalent and even contradictory nature of the "EU-Turkey deal" (as an *ENP-like accession partnership*) allows Turkey to counteract the EU, utilizing its self-oriented geopolitical strategies, covering its authoritarian rule with the power of "migration diplomacy" (İçduygu and Üstübici, 2014), blaming the EU for its non-humanitarian practices and thereby transforming the very identity of the European "externalization" project. Turkey -a candidate country pursuing to be a "regional actor" in the Middle East, swiftly moving away from democratic reforms achieved in the negotiation process, reaching its highest records in the violations of human rights, and becoming an authoritarian regime - is a noteworthy case in order to indicate the pivotal role of this "migration diplomacy" in transforming and shaping the character of the EU.

This study does not neglect either the hegemonic position (even "neo-colonial") of Europe over its neighbors via externalization of migration and border engineering or the tacit collaboration between the EU and Turkey in policing mobility (see İşleyen's (2018) recent work on Turkey). Instead, by providing new material on Turkey, it aims to contribute to the attempts at "decolonizing" the process by considering the counter strategies of the "other" as a geopolitical subject and by preventing the conceptualization of "the Europe" as an omnipotent actor in its sphere of influence. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that all of these strategies utilized by border practitioners and Turkish politicians do not entail the empowerment of migrants (Baban,

Ilcan and Rygiel, 2017). On the contrary, as the political games become more heated between the two sides, the strategical engineering of the mobility has much influence on migrants with respect to more hazardous and precarious circumstances.

2.7 References

Agnew, J. (2003). *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics*, London and New York: Routledge.

Amnesty International. (2017). *Greece: A Blue Print for Despair. Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey Deal.* February 14, 2017.

Amnesty International. (2015). *Europe's Gatekeeper: Unlawful Detention and Deportation of Refugees from Turkey*. December 16, 2015.

Aradau, C. (2004). The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitization of Human Trafficking. Millennium, 33(2), 251-278.

Baban, F., Ilcan, S., & Rygiel, K. (2017). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: pathways to precarity, differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(1), 41-57.

Balibar, E. (2004). We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

BBC Türkçe (2015). Avrupa Her Ölen Mültecinin Vebaline Ortaktır. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/09/150903_erdogan

Bialasiewicz, L. (2008). The uncertain state(s) of Europe? *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 15(1), 71-82.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2012). Off-shoring and out-sourcing the borders of Europe: Libya and EU border work in the Mediterranean. *Geopolitics*, 17(4), 843-866.

Bialasiewicz, L., Dahlman, C., Apuzzo, G. M., Ciuta, F., Jones, A., Rumford, C., Wodak, R., Anderson, J., & Ingram, A. (2009). Interventions in the new political geographies of the European 'neighborhood'. *Political Geography*, 28(2), 79-89.

Biehl, K. (2009). Migration 'securitization' and its everyday implications: an examination of Turkish asylum policy and practice. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute.

Bigo, D. (2014). The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/navy – border guards/police – database analyst. Security Dialogue, 45(3), 209-225.

Boedeltje, F., & Van Houtum, H. (2011). Introduction to a special section and Brussels is speaking: The adverse speech geo-politics of the European Union towards its neighbours. Geopolitics, 16(1), 121-145.

Boswell, C. (2003). The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy. *International Affairs*, 79 (3). 619-638.

Browning, S. C., & Joenniemi, P. (2008). Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy. European Journal of International Relations, 14(3), 519-551.

Coleman, M. (2007). Immigration geopolitics beyond the Mexico-US border. Antipode, 39(1), 54-76.

Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., & Pickles, J. (2016). 'Good neighbours make good fences': Seahorce operations, border externality and extra-territoriality. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 23(3), 231-251.

Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., & Pickles, J. (2013). Re-bordering the neighbourhood: Europe's emerging geographies of non-accession integration. European Urban and Regional Studies, 20(1), 37-58.

Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., & Pickles, J. (2011). Stretching Borders Beyond Sovereign Territories? Mapping EU and Spain's Border Externalization Policies. Geopolitica(s), 2(1), 71-90.

Celata, F., & Coletti, R. (eds) (2015). Neighbourhood Policy and the Construction of the European External Borders. GeoJournal Library.

Committee of Concerned Scientists (2017). Over 5,500 Academics Dismissed from Positions in Turkey since Rule of Law Suspended. http://concernedscientists.org/2017/01/over-5500-academics-arrested-in-turkey-since-rule-of-law-suspended/

Cote-Boucher, K., Infantino, F., & Salter, M. (2014). Border security as practice: An agenda for research. Security Dialogue, 45(3), 195-208.

Davutoğlu, A. (2015). Turkey cannot deal with the refugee crisis alone. EU nations need to help. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/09/turkey-refugee-crisis-christian-fortress-europe

Demirtas-Bagdonas, Ö. (2014). Reading Turkey's Foreign Policy on Syria: The AKP's Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of Grandeur. *Turkish Studies*, 15(1), 139–155.

Deutsche Welle at a glance (2016). Human Rights Watch: Turkey silencing media in post-coup purge. http://www.dw.com/en/human-rights-watch-turkey-silencing-media-in-post-coup-purge/a-36788601

El Qadim, N. (2014). Postcolonial challenges to migration control: French-Moroccan cooperation practices on forced returns. Security Dialogue, 45(3), 242-261.

EurActiv (2017). Turkey says may cancel migrant readmission deal after Greece ruling. http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/turkey-says-may-cancel-migrant-readmission-deal-after-greece-ruling/

European Commission (2016). Press release. Relocation and Resettlement: Positive trend continues, but more efforts needed. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2435_en.htm

European Council (2015). Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey. EU-Turkey Statement. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/

Fassin, D. (2012). Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Trans. Rachel Gomme. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

FEUTURE (2018). Asylum Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations: Between Cooperation and Conflict. file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/FEUTURE_Online_Paper_No_18_%20%20Asylum%20policy%20and%20the%20future%20of%20Turkey-EU%20Relations%20(1).pdf

Financial Times (2015). EU sidelines critical Turkey report as it seeks migration deal. https://www.ft.com/content/1b4044b8-7415-11e5-bdb1-e6e4767162cc

Giaccarica, P., & Minca, C. (2011). The Mediterranean alternative. Progress in Human Geography, 35(3), 345-365.

Guardian (2016). Turkish President Threatens to Send Millions of Syrian Refugeees to EU. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/turkish-president-threatens-to-send-millions-of-syrian-refugees-to-eu

Guardian (2016). Europe and US Urge Turkey to respect rule of law after failed coup.

Gumrukcu, T. & Tattersall, N. (2016). From soldiers to midwives, Turkey dismisses 15,000 more after coup bid. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-layoffs-idUSKBN13H0A9

Gürsel, K. (2016). EU-Turkey refugee deal gives Erdogan case of ‘political amnesia’.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-european-union-refugee-deal-in-jeopardy.html

HarekAct (2016).“We are prisoners, although we just wanted to seek asylum in Europe” http://harekact.bordermonitoring.eu/2016/06/19/we-are-prisoners-although-we-just-wanted-to-seek-asylum-in-europe/

Hurriyet Daily News (2015). Merkel shifts Eu-Turkey stance upon migrant crisis. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/merkel-shifts-eu-turkey-stance-upon-migrant-crisis.aspx?pageID=238&nID=90028&NewsCatID=510

Hürriyet (2015). Edirne’ye Doğru Yürüyen Suriyeliler Durduruldu. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/edirneye-dogru-yuruyen-suriyeliler-durduruldu-30111027

İçduygu, A. (2011). The irregular migration control between the EU and Turkey: is it possible to block it with a readmission agreement? EU-US Immigration Systems 2011/14. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole, European University Institute.

İçduygu, A. (2007). The politics of irregular migratory flows in the maditerranean basin: Economy, mobility and ‘illegality’. Mediterranean Politics, 12(2), 141-161.

İçduygu, A., & Aksel, B. D. (2012). Irregular Migration in Turkey. International Organization for Migration.

İçduygu, A., & Üstübici, A. (2014). Negotiating mobility, debating Borders: Migration diplomacy in Turkey-EU relations. In: H. Schwenken, S. Russ & S. Ruβ-Sattar (Eds), New border and citizenship politics. (pp. 44-59). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

İşleyen, B. (2018). Transit mobility governance in Turkey. Political Geography, 62, 23-32.

Jones, A. (2006). Narrative-based production of stage spaces for international region building: Europeanization and the Mediterranean. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96(2), 415-431.

Jones, A., & Clark, J. (2008). Europeanization and discourse building: The European Commission, European narratives and European Neighbourhood Policy. Geopolitics, 13(3), 545-571.

Kirişçi, K. (2003). The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European-Turkish Relations. Turkish Studies, 4(1), 79-106.

Lavanex, S. (2008). A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond conditionality? Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6), 938-955.

Lavanex, S. (2006) Shifting up and out: the foreign policy of European immigration control. *West European Politics,* 29(2), 329–350.

Lavenex, S. & Ucarer, E. M. (2003). *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration*, Lanham MD: Lexington Books.

Newman, D. (2006). Borders and Bordering: Towards an Inter-Disciplinary Dialogue. *European Journal of Social Theory,* 9(2), 171-186.

Özçürümez, S., & Şenses, N. (2011). Europeanization and Turkey: Studying irregular migration policy. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13(2), 233-248.

Paçacı-Elitok, S. (2013). Turkey's prospective EU membership from a migration perspective: Two steps forward, one step back? Perceptions, 18(3), 1-11.

Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015). The humanitarian politics of European border policing: Frontex and border police in Evros. International Political Sociology, 9(1), 53-69.

Rumford, C. (2008). Introduction: citizens and borderwork in Europe. *Space and Polity,* 12 (1), 1-12.

Rumford, C. (2006). Theorizing Borders. *European Journal of Social Theory,* 9 (2), 155-169.

Scott, J. W. (2009). Bordering and Ordering The European Neighbourhood: A Critical Perspective on EU Territoriality and Geopolitics. Trames Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 13(63/58), 232-247.

Scott, J. W. (2005). The EU and 'Wider Europe': Toward an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation? Geopolitics, 10(3), 429-454.

Ticktin, M. (2005). Policing and Humanitarianism in France: Immigration and the Turn to Law as State of Exception. Interventions, 7(3), 347-368.

Van Houtum, H., & Boedeltje, F. (2011). Questioning the EU's Neighbourhood Geopolitics: Introduction to a Special Section. Geopolitics, 16(1), 121-129.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009). *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power*. Edinburgh University Press.

Walters, W. (2006). Border/control. European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2), 187-203.

Walters, W. (2004). The frontiers of the European Union: A geostrategic perspective. Geopolitics, 9(3), 674-698.

Weizman, E. (2011). The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. London: Verso Books.

Weizman, E. (2007). *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*. Verso Books.

Zaiotti, R. (2007). Of friends and fences: Europe's Neighbourhood Policy and the 'gated community syndrome'. Journal of European Integration, 29(2), 143-162.

Chapter 3

THE MORAL BATTLE IN THE AEGEAN SEA

Minimalist Humanitarianism and Its Capture by the Border Officials

3.1 Abstract

The article aims to push existing debates in critical border and migration studies over the featuring of humanitarianism and security in everyday practices of border management in the Aegean Sea. The article provides embodied situated empirical analysis of the Aegean Sea based on an ethnographic research conducted in 2015-2018. The article argues that the materialization of the "humanitarian border" in the Aegean Sea has resulted in a minimalist approach to humanitarianism obtained by the rescue humanitarians that is shaped around the rhetoric of "saving lives" and provision of basic needs. This minimalist perception has been easily embraced by the armed forces who seek to self-present themselves as the "real professional humanitarians" and establish moral hierarchies in relation to rescue humanitarians. By unpacking the fault lines of this moral battle in the Aegean Sea, the article provides insights into the discussions on contemporary humanitarianism and border governance.

3.2 Introduction

In the night of August 2018, we, as the volunteers in rescue operations in the northern shore of the island of Lesbos received a call from Hellenic coast guards (HCG) on WhatsApp by stating: "Twenty two migrants are detected in Efthalou [the northern shore of Lesbos] and stopped while they were walking on the roads. Get prepared and approach to the location". When we arrived at the specified location with three cars, there were twenty two people, sitting on the sidewalk in their wet clothes, and looking around with scared eyes. Frontex personnel was standing next to them, holding his gun and occasionally yelling in English in a definitive manner: "Don't move, be quite". As it happens most of the time, nobody understood English. One of the Greek port police asked me to learn details about the journey of the migrant group and how they ended up on the roads of Efthalou. Throughout my fieldwork, my Turkish helped me to be the translator between migrants on the boat and border officials/humanitarians in Lesbos. As I learned from the younger member of the group, they were Afghans left the Turkish shores ten hours ago, reached to the northern shores of Lesbos, got off the boat by themselves and started walking in the island: "We were twenty four at the beginning, but two middle-aged men decided to leave the group and went another direction. I have no idea where they are now." When I translated the information to the port police and Frontex personnel, the call for the "emergency situation" was given and all of us (including HCG, Frontex, member of UNHCR, and rescue humanitarians) started to search and "rescue" these two lost men in the northern island for more than three hours. Finally, we found them in an open restaurant while they were eating their orders. They were taken to the transit camp in our village to be transferred to the main camp of Moria in the next morning. At the end of that night, both armed forces and rescue humanitarians called these series of actions as "rescue operation".

This anecdote from my ethnographic research does not exhibit an exceptional incident happened in the island of Lesbos, rather it is the part of the everyday practices and routine in border management. The story is remarkable in the ways in which it reveals the ambivalent nature of humanitarianism and security as well as blurred subject positions of military and non-state actors. In the aftermath of the huge refugee movement from Turkey to Greece in 2015, the island of Lesbos has become the major

site in the Aegean Sea in terms of hosting both thousands of refugees who crossed the sea border and also non-governmental organizations getting involved in the search and rescue operations. The involvement of rescue humanitarians in these contested spaces needs a critical interrogation due to the changing nature of the borders and border enforcement today. The Mediterranean in particular has become the subject of increasingly militarized but also humanitarianized forms of border management which has been receiving scholarly attention in the last years (Cuttitta, 2017; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Stierl, 2017). However, the modus of operandi in the Aegean Sea, involving the analysis of various subjectivities of actors, their relations and practices in the border management has not been able to have that much attention yet, which is the main concern of this article.

This paper enquires into current practices of "humanitarian border" (Walters, 2011) at the Aegean Sea in particular. In the contemporary world, we witness proliferation and complexification of the borders in which a variety of actors are entangled in defining and performing their character or what Rumford (2006) has called "borderwork" (Balibar, 2002; Amoore, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Borders have become materialized in increasingly diffused manner (Bialasiewicz, 2012), involving a plethora of actors, discourses and technologies, and creating a "military-humanitarian nexus" (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017). By unpacking the discourses, practices and imaginaries of military and non-state humanitarian actors involved in the maritime interventions at the Aegean Sea, this article asks: How do these rescue humanitarians, as being the members of non-governmental organizations at sea border, conceive of and rationalize humanitarianism? How do military actors, including Hellenic/Turkish coast guards and Frontex members, utilize and justify their positions as "humanitarian actors" at the sea border? And finally, how does the distinction between humanitarianism and security become so blurred at the sea border of the Aegean? In other words, how does the notion of "humanitarian border" become materialized within the circumstances of the Aegean Sea?

The article provides specific circumstances of the Aegean space as a "humanitarian border", indicating embodied situated practices of the military-humanitarian assemblage in this particular site in order to enrich the understanding of multiple forms of

humanitarian imaginations and expressions at the border zones. It aims to discuss certain forms in the production of moral hierarchies shaped around the geopolitical and spatial configurations of the Aegean Sea – a geographical border space between two sovereigns, Greece and Turkey that share a rough history. The main argument of the piece is that the spatial configuration of the Aegean Sea and related practices of rescue enable particular justification strategies for border militaries to utilize moral sentiments and the rhetoric of professionalism in order to seek to establish moral hierarchies along "humaneness" and "real professionalism" in relation to non-state humanitarians. Hence, the article goes beyond the existing criticism of humanitarian action which discusses the dual role of humanitarian actors – care and control, and argues that a minimalist perception of humanitarianism at the sea border has resulted in a cooptation by the armed forces who self-present themselves as the "real humanitarian professionals" in relation to the "amateur" rescue humanitarians. Border militaries use the same narrative obtained by the humanitarians to establish moral and professional hierarchies in relation to them. The study is based on an ethnographic research on both sides of the Aegean Sea in 2015-2018. The fieldwork included participant observation in a local, nongovernmental search and rescue organization in northern Lesbos, Skala Sikamineas, as well as interviews with the following actors: Frontex members, Hellenic and Turkish coast guards, and rescue NGOs involved in various time periods in Lesbos (Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, Lighthouse Relief, Refugee4Reguees, ERCI, ProActiva Open Arms, Sea-Watch, and IsraAid).

First section of this article briefly explores the critical reading of contemporary humanitarianism since 1970s and the notion of "humanitarian government" as the modus operandi of the contemporary political life. Second section turns to the concept of "humanitarian border" as a space in which moral sentiments have recently become the pivotal vein of the border management. The third section examines the articulation of humanitarianism within the Aegean context; and unpacks the minimalist perception of rescue humanitarians shaped around the "emergency imaginary" and managerial urgent response. The last section focuses on the narratives of border officials in terms of how they embrace and utilize this minimalist perception in order to establish moral and professional hierarchies in relation to humanitarians.

3.3 Unpackaging humanitarian ethos and its ambivalent nature

The word of "humanity" has two connotations semantically distinguished in English and German. Menschlichkeit or "mankind" means entirety of men and women distinguished from other living beings. Humanitat or "humaneness" means sympathy one feels for one's fellows, particularly for those who are suffering. According to Fassin (2012), the first describes the idea of human species in common; the second denotes a moral sentiment with respect to human beings, resting on the extension of compassionate and benevolent emotion and action. Hence, humanity, in its double meaning, implies that all human lives are equally sacred and all sufferings deserve to be relived. Humanitarianism involves a challenge of writing a coherent narrative while recognizing its meandering history and different strands that are constituted and reworked by various configurations of ethos, principles, relationships and practices. The studies historicizing humanitarianism in its modern formation go back to the late 18th and early 19th centuries when the rise of industrialization and capitalism, ideas of modernization and Enlightenment with their "universal" and "progressive" moral imperative, and modern philanthropy equipped with the technologies of science and rationalization shaped its meaning, scope and scale (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010). Humanitarianism as being embedded in a Western sociodicy emerges as a form of reason and also an art of government throughout the modernity; concomitantly its ethos is rooted within theological imagination of life and sacredness. As Hannah Arendt calls it:

> "The reason why life asserted itself as the ultimate point of reference in the modern age and has remained the highest good of a Christian society whose fundamental belief in the sacred-ness of life has survived, and has even remained completely unshaken by, secularization and the general decline of the Christian faith" (1958, p. 313-320).

Taking its ethos from Christian world in terms of both sacralization of life and the valorization of suffering – likewise other traditions of compassion and charity, from Islam to Buddhism - humanitarianism historically is oriented towards a respect for the human life and alleviation of human suffering that feeds the Western morality.

Significant during the second part of the 20th century was the enshrinement of humanitarianism in international law. This emerged within the context of World War II and increasing emphasis on humanitarian protection under the auspices of the United Nations. 1949 Geneva Conventions set the standards of treatment under the circumstances of armed conflict including the treatment of prisoners and those injured in warfare as well as the civilians (Squire, 2015). Humanitarianism enshrined in law in that period has again the basis of its benevolent commitment to the alleviation of suffering for the sake of common humanity.

This long and meandering history witnessed a dramatic increase in the presence of non-governmental and transnational humanitarianism since 1970s and especially since the end of Cold War. The structural changes and profound transformations since then, including proliferation of decolonization and national liberation movements (in Southeast Asia, Central and Southern Africa as wells as in Eastern Europe), growing conflicts and civil wars, increasing inequality between Global South and North; and huge numbers of displaced populations, paved the way for a rhetoric of "crisis" that needs humanitarian assistance in the geographies of military interventions, conflicts, diseases and disasters (Calhoun, 2010; Weizman, 2011; Fassin, 2012). Concomitantly, it was the time when the socialist imagination was waning, welfare state was declining in the Global North and neoliberal globalization was ascending (Fassin 2007; Ticktin, 2014). This reflects what Mark Duffield (2007) refers to as increasing linkages between security and development issues such as peacebuilding missions in which state, military and non-governmental humanitarian actors share the same habitus. Barnett (2013) calls the period of post-1980s as "liberal humanitarianism" as a third stage of development in the genealogy of humanitarianism, following the "imperial humanitarianism" of colonial age and "neo-humanitarianism" of the age of Cold War. This new period since 1980s-1990s, has concomitantly gave birth to a doctrine of interventionism, sanctioned by the 2005 World Summit of the UN as the "responsibility to protect" principle (Fassin 2012), serving as a justification for the military interventions. These interventions, as Duffield (2007) noted, have paved way for new assemblages of international humanitarian actors and military actors being involved in the same habitus of peacekeeping missions especially in the geographies of Global South and East.

The broader transformation occurred in 1980s and 90s, reconfiguring the political map of the world, has a wide political implications as critical scholars have highlighted in the recent decades. The transformation has also influenced the rhetoric. The increasing scientific literature of compassion, relating to suffering, misfortune, trauma, poverty and exclusion has gone hand in hand with the proliferation of measures, statistics and initiatives designed to aid the vulnerable populations. For Fassin (2012), this resembles an art of government, the "humanitarian government", to manage and govern the populations facing the conditions of inequality, violence and suffering. The moral sentiment attached to any practice, has become a major source especially in the last two decades, defining, framing and legitimizing the discourses and actions. This is the new predominant political and social discourse in research programs, scientific publications, and public sphere as well as in media and civil society:

> "Inequality is replaced by exclusion; domination is transformed into misfortune, injustice is articulated as suffering, violence is expressed in terms of trauma. While the old vocabulary of social critique has certainly not entirely disappeared, the new lexicon of moral sentiments tends to mask it in a process of semantic sedimentation that has perceptible effects both in public action and in individual practices…The translation of social reality into the new language of compassion is thus mirrored by a sort of epistemological, but also emotional, conversion of researchers and intellectuals to this approach to society, more sensitive to the subjectivity of agents and to the experiences of pain and affliction." (Fassin, 2012, p.6)

The politics of compassion involves a remarkable ontological paradox in itself, that Claude Lefort (1986) calls as the "tragedy of modern condition": the language of compassion focuses on the vulnerable populations implying a politics of inequality; simultaneously it is the recognition of others as fellows implying a politics of solidarity. The tension between inequality and solidarity, alluding to a relation of domination and equality, is constitutive of all humanitarian imaginations that inherently need asymmetrical relationship (Halttunen, 1995; Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Fassin, 2012). For some, the compassion is exercised in the public sphere, illustrating a pornographic engagement with pain and suffering (Halttunen, 1995), that always "directed from

above to below, from more powerful to the weaker, fragile and vulnerable" who are generally constituted as victims of "overwhelming fate" (Fassin, 2012, p. 4). Within this constructed picture, the "right of the receiver" turns into the "obligation of the giver" in order to ameliorate the situations of pain and suffering (ibid). Hence, the politics of compassion is indicative of a "complex ontology of inequality" (Fassin, 2007, p. 519) which differentiates the value of human lives in hierarchical manner. There are lives that can be narrated in the first person, and those that are voiceless and only narratable through third-person. Lisa Malkki (1996) in this regard could be considered as a leading scholar, critically investigating how humanitarianism renders refugees as "speechless emissaries" and the objects of knowledge and management. This also contributes to a process of depoliticisation of refugees living in the refugee camps (Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015; Nyers, 2006).

Especially in the last two decades, studies utilizing Foucault's (see Foucault, 2009) terms such as "biopolitics" or "governmentality" have tried to indicate how power operates within the technologies of governing, defining, controlling, but concomitantly caring and "normalizing" the populations, where the security of the population is only possible through monitoring, controlling, but also destroying the diseased, intolerable, and dangerous (Agier, 2011; Feldman and Ticktin, 2010; Feldman, 2009; Feher et al., 2007; Doty, 2006; Huysmans et al., 2006; Collier, Lakoff and Rabinow, 2004; Aradau, 2004; Pandolfi, 2003; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Thus, humanitarian action is depicted as a form of biopolitics which involves compassion, repression and economy of power as well as the knowledge production based on the gathering of demographic, statistical, tabulated data and rates. In that sense, a biopolitical reading of humanitarianism provides noteworthy accounts in order to critically conceptualize the technologies of the lingua franca of compassion embedded in the liberal forms of social regulation. Within this "humanitarian government", the moral sentiments "oscillate between a politics of pity and policies of control" (Fassin, 2007, p. 365), and universal claims on humanity inherently contain ideas of fear and insecurity. The question of care and control is an issue that Claudia Aradau (2004) focuses upon in the case of trafficked women. Trafficked women are engaged both as a security threat and also a humanitarian concern, both as illegal migrants and victims, both as people who are a risk and also at risk. As a result, there is no clear distinction

between securitization of trafficked women and the politics of compassion; rather these two logics are at work in duality. Ticktin (2005) argues that humanitarianism and policing are two sides of the same coin, "intimately linked, with policing often accompanied by a gesture toward the humane, and toward the ethical, where force is justified in the name of peace and right". Within this symbiotic relationship, "there is no care without control" for Agier (2011, p.4-5) who develops an analysis of the management of refugee camps. As he noted, the humanitarian action involves the mutuality of care of vulnerable subjects and the punishment of "undesirables". These critical investigations of humanitarian action diversely focus on implications in various contexts, carried out by all sorts of actors, towards multiple ends. What happens when humanitarianism is practiced specifically at the states' territorial edges? In addition to the dual logic of humanitarianism, which is the intertwinement of the politics of care and control, an extra layer of guarding a territorially bounded space comes into the picture: "the humanitarian border".

3.4 Military humanitarian assemblage of the border zones

The existing critical scholarship investigating its inherently asymmetrical nature of humanitarian action (Halttunen, 1995; Malkki, 1996; Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Fassin, 2012) or its duality – care and policing (see Agier, 2011; Feldman and Ticktin, 2010; Feldman, 2009; Feher et al., 2007; Doty, 2006; Huysmans et al., 2006; Collier, Lakoff and Rabinow, 2004; Aradau, 2004; Pandolfi, 2003; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), generally focus on the unequal subject formation of the humanitarian actor and the "speechless emissaries" who needs care. Some critical scholars even go further by suggesting that the politics taken under the name of humanity are, as Hardt and Negri (2000) asserted, "frontline force of imperial intervention" or in gentler sense, a hijacked ambition with unintended consequences (Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010). Hence, the questions of being hijacked, coopted or captured by the official strategies of policing and control are not new concerns (Walters, 2011). However, it would be rash to assume that it is always the case; there are numerous sites and actors contesting the existing dominant framework in the history in different geographies and spaces of action. Additionally, it is highly related with the specific humanitarian action and its operationalized space. Rather than definitive

arguments on the meaning and practices of humanitarianism, the historicity of the phenomena is noteworthy in the sense of recognizing timely dynamic and fluid nature of the world in which humanitarian action operates (Feldman and Ticktin, 2010).

As more people claim to speak in the name of "humanity", it becomes even harder to capture the different motivations, imaginations, subjectivities and practices. Simultaneously, it gets more difficult to unpack power hierarchies and their complex relationship. As Mark Duffield (2007) noted, in war zones and conflict areas, sharing the same habitus leads to a complex relationship between humanitarian actors and the military. The edges of the states, geographical border zones, represent a similar site in which a variety of military technologies and practices come into being for the border security. The fortification of borders, in the extreme forms of militarization and securitization together with digitalized surveillance mechanism is a world-wide general trend today. However, the border zones do not only witness the militarization and dehumanization practices. Concomitantly, they host "a novel development within the history of borders and border-making", which is the reinvention of border zone as space of "humanitarian government" (Walters, 2011). Williams Walters (2011) designates this novelty as "humanitarian border". The notion of "humanitarian border" complicates the linear narrative of the increasing militarization and surveillance of the borders today. However, it is not a universal phenomenon manifested all around the world; it has quite specific circumstances being operationalized differently in various geographies.

More than a decade now, the external borders of EUrope is a space of loss and suffering, witnessing the shipwrecks, washed ashore bodies and deaths of thousands of people. There is an increasing scholarly attention investigating the circumstances of the Mediterranean particularly in which this deadly space is produced and materialized (Stierl, 2017; Albahari, 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Van Houtum, 2010; Weber and Pickering, 2011). The military-humanitarian assemblage of the European borders adopt "a humanitarian approach to border security [that] at once encompasses both the discourse of control and that of migrant agency" as Vaughan-Williams (2015, p.9) suggested, in which humanitarianism and security operate not as contradictory but as deeply intertwined logics. This entangled assemblage includes border enforcement of particular countries and humanitarian rescue operations actualized by non-governmental

organizations. However, this "military-humanitarian nexus" (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017) is not a smooth collaboration between actors, rather it is a contested and continuously reproduced assemblage.

Despite its conceptual capacity and creativity, the existing literature on the notion of "humanitarian border" and the military-humanitarian assemblage within this space is not adequate in providing empirical and situated analysis embodied in particular border sites. This article aims to fill this gap by exploring who are the actors within this assemblage and how they perceive, imagine and perform humanitarian and security actions under the specific circumstances of the Aegean Sea.

3.5 Minimalist perception of rescue humanitarians in Lesbos

In Lesbos, the search and rescue operations are performed under the authority of Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG). European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, operates in collaboration with the HCG by doing patrolling, interception and rescue. There are two disembarkation locations in the island at the moment: the capital city of Mytilene and the village of Skala Sikamineas in the north. The northern village of Skala Sikamineas is the only site where rescue NGOs have been present since 2015 and are still actively working both on land and on sea. While there were a large number of NGOs having boats in the Aegean in 2015-2016 (including ProActiva Open Arms, MSF, ERCI etc.), in the aftermath of the so-called "EU-Turkey deal", the number decreased to four NGOs in the village during the time of my fieldwork: Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, Lighthouse Relief, Refugee4Refugees (R4R) and Israid. In 2017, during the time I was volunteer in R4R, the team of ProActiva who had a boat decided to finalize their operations in the island due to the increasing restrictions of the HCG. In the absence of ProActiva, Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara has become the last remaining rescue NGO having a boat and operating on the Aegean Sea with their boat team, only with the permission of the HCG. These four NGOs in the north have land teams that have a distribution system among themselves responsible for the various actions: spotting (watching the sea on the top of the hills via telescope and binoculars), landing (post-rescue medical care, first aid, and provision of rescue blanket at the port) and running of

the UNCHR transit camp called as State 2. These listed routine practices demonstrate the blurred distinction between the humanitarian and security actions for rescue NGOs.

For the action of spotting, each NGO has a distributed schedule to be ready in pairs at the several locations on the top of the hills in the north. Volunteers are supposed to watch the sea from the hill in order to spot if there is any migrant boat on the Greek territorial waters. They use telescope and small binoculars to detect the small rubber dingies on the sea. At one time of my initial schedules of spotting in 2017, my coordinator was trying to teach me the significant clues in order to detect a migrant boat at night. It was an interesting moment since the conversation seemed to me the one that could be hardly differentiated from the security rhetoric. When volunteers observe any suspicious situation on the sea, they are obliged to give immediate information to the HCG via the walkie-talkie that is used to communicate. By NGOs, the action of spotting is perceived as the part of rescue by which they detect the boats that are in distress at sea:

> "We monitor the sea 24 hours a day during the night and during the day. A plastic dingy, overcrowded, being run by amateur driver, is by default in distress at sea. From the time it leaves from the Turkish shore, it is in distress" (Lighthouse Relief, August 2018).

Although this quote aptly indicates the concerns for the rescue of the people on the boat, at the practice level, unfortunately it has unintended consequences. The time volunteers inform the HCG about any suspicious situation occurred at the sea, the border guards have the authority in terms of how they will deal with the situation. Not exceptionally as we know from the field, after they are informed, they might push back the dingy towards Turkish territorial waters and respectively rescue humanitarians might be unwillingly involved in this process. There beside, the action of spotting sometimes corresponds with the detection of migrants who already got off from the boat and started freely walking on the hills of the island. As in the case of the anecdote I provided at the beginning of the article, the practices of spotting exhibit a totally grey area in which the practices of rescue and border security get completely blurred. When I asked about how their practices are different than the armed forces, the volunteer responded: "we are very much not a border force", but then he added: "they are incredibly well funded, they

have technology to spot from the land and also from the sea. But nevertheless it is surprising that there are numbers of dingies that they do not spot but we spot with the two hundred dollars telescope" (Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, August 2018). This quote reflects how the humanitarian action in the sea border goes beyond the dual logic of care and policing, and turns into an untended part of border security.

When a boat is detected on the Greek territorial waters via spotting of NGOs or radar technology of border guards, the closest patrolling boat (HCG or Frontex) intercepts the dingy, transfers all people aboard and brings them to the northern port of Skala Sikamineas. In the cases in which they need extra boat for the transfer of the people, the HCG calls the boat team of Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, shares the exact coordinates of the dingy with the boat team and asks for assistance. "So, our boat crew is on land, on call and can launch in five minutes at any time the HCG call us" said the member of Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara while he was also mentioning that in many occasions they have been denied to launch:

> "I am thinking about one specific case where a smuggler dropped, a speed boat dropped people near Korakas [in the northern shore]; we haven't launched on the beach. Look, we could be there in 10 minutes. The HCG denied us for the permission of launch. And about 40 minutes later we saw HCG was there. So, in that half an hour of climbing which these people were firstly in the water and then on the rocks; it could have been a tragedy. So there is something where we are continuing to try the sort of deal with, to push against to say "look, this is crazy, we are here and we are very happy willing to collaborate with you, why not use us?" (Refugee Rescue, 2018).

As the quote indicates, the relationship between rescue humanitarians and the armed forces is not a smooth one. It exhibits what Garelli and Tazzioli (2017) refers as "military-humanitarian nexus" in which the relationship between the actors is not a smooth collaboration, rather a continuously negotiated and reproduced one. However, rescue humanitarians need to pursue a diplomatic attitude in their relationship with the border guards in order to maintain their operation in the island. They have had to accept the restrictions on the time of patrolling during a day, the limitations from launching and also self-censorship before publicizing what they witness on the field: "we could

blow everything up, we could have conflicts, we could blog everything we witness here, but we have to be here and stay here" as the volunteer noted (Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, August 2018). Although individually they have criticism on governmental border policies of the EUrope, they have to privilege an attitude of prudence, impartiality and a managerial-technocratic vision of the border, in which the main aim becomes how to reduce the casualties and harm at sea by improving spotting and SAR practices and how better prevent people from attempting to cross, whereby their humanitarian vision again converges with its securitization.

In addition to spotting practices, the rescue NGOs perform the post-rescue processes of landing at the port that includes the immediate medical care for the people on the boat, first-aid and provision of rescue blanket to prevent hypothermia. Similar to the act of rescue on the sea, these practices need to be operationalized in quite urgent manner in order to prevent the risk of death. In return, the humanitarian vision for rescue humanitarians is shaped around the aim of "saving lives" and prevention of death within this limited temporality. The critical scholarship on contemporary humanitarian imagination suggests that since 1970s, we witness a loss in humanitarian vision to obtain a long-term transformative capacity to denounce and change the social and political order which was generally the case in the earlier period of 20th century (Feldman and Ticktin, 2010; Fassin, 2012; Weizman, 2011; Redfield, 2013). Since then, the term "emergency" and the rhetoric of "urgency" have started to dominate the language. The "crises", which are indeed a result of enduring sequences of historical and political events, have been portrayed as unconnected, groundless, unpredictable phenomena suddenly bursting onto the scene. This "emergency imaginary" (Calhoun, 2010) necessitates an "urgent" response in the form of humanitarian assistance driven by a narrow affective grammar. Within this affective language, systematic inequality in contemporary political and social life gets reduced to individual suffering; the structural violence becomes particular instances of trauma; and concern for global justice and equality turns to affective responses of victims (Agier, 2011; Feldman and Ticktin, 2010). This narrow affective grammar goes hand in hand with the professionalization of humanitarianism. With a highly valued staff, speaking of "beneficiaries", cultivating "clients" and donors, making use of their "brand", aspiring to increase their "efficiency", "operational capacity" and managerial governance mechanisms, professionalism has

become the predominant character of humanitarian organizations (Ophir, 2010). Scholarship on critical humanitarianism sheds light on the career aspirations of neoliberal discourse as "management" and "efficiency" in their language; the technical and quantitative knowledge in which numbering, counting, documenting and statistics have become lingua franca of the "experts" (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Feldman, 2007; Malkki, 2015; Redfield, 2013).

These general characters of contemporary humanitarian vision materialize in the circumstances of the Aegean Sea border in its barest meaning that I call as minimalist humanitarianism. Although the general picture mentioned above portraying the contemporary nature of humanitarianism provides noteworthy insights to obtain critical reading of the phenomena, the particular acts, spaces and temporalities where the humanitarian action is enacted determine its nuanced features. In that sense, the humanitarian actors performing search and rescue operations in the maritime space have their distinctive daily routine shaping their imagination and position. Due to the spatial configuration of the sea border and accordingly rescuing people on the boat, they are further limited by the fact that rescue on the sea and post-rescue processes at the port require even-more immediate action resulting in a minimalist perception. Within this temporal emergency, the humanitarianism is perceived in its barest meaning that is shaped around the rhetoric of "saving lives" and the temporal provision of the basic needs to prevent the death. Hence, under the circumstances of the humanitarian border of the Aegean Sea, the "emergency imaginary" reaches its margins in the sense of urgent response to the people who have high risk of death at the sea. This results in the conditions in which already narrow affective grammar to approach its extreme version.

When volunteers are asked how they differentiate themselves from the border guards and how they define their humanitarian engagement in the island, they are generally keen on emphasizing their civilian role vis-a-via "militaries holding guns in the boat" (Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara, 2017). They discursively frame their primary aim to be the prevention of "potential harm" and "the protection of refugees and the provision of assistance to bring them safely to the shore" in addition to "the provision of blanket, food, clothes and first aid". The vision of humanitarianism in search and rescue operations, by putting the rhetoric of "saving lives" on the top of the agenda, avoiding

confrontations and political evaluations, represents a "depoliticized space" (Cuttitta, 2017) where the term "emergency" and the rhetoric of moral urgency start to dominate the language in extreme ways. The "emergency imaginary" becomes even more prevalent for rescue humanitarians in Lesbos. As a result of the life-threatening nature of border-crossing requiring an immediate action, a discourse denouncing structural roots or politicizing the issue becomes much more difficult to produce (Cuttitta, 2018). The saving of lives and the prevention of death become the absolute priority and humanitarian testimony and witnessing gets reduced to the numbers of deaths or "saved" lives by humanitarians. Within this imagination, the migrants on the boat are perceived as "speechless emissaries" as Malkki (1996) aptly stated, who are in need of rescue by the Western humanitarians and whose lives are worthy little more than basic preservation (Redfield, 2005; Walters, 2011). The subjectivity of rescue humanitarians having its basis on the saving these speechless people on the boat comes together with the narrative of managerialism, expertise and operational capacity (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Feldman, 2007; Ophir, 2010; Malkki, 2015; Redfield, 2013). Especially the most trained and experienced coordinators of the NGOs are generally keen on displaying the professional capacity of their NGOs in addition to mentioning their trainings, past experiences and competence in the fields of rescue and medical care. On the contrary, the young volunteers who generally consider their presence in Lesbos as a "life-time experience" mostly express their emotions for the suffering. These manifestations of minimalist humanitarianism obtained by rescue NGOs in Lesbos portray an extreme version of a narrow affective grammar of compassion intertwined with the rhetoric of rescue capacity counting the "saved lives". In the next section, it will be discussed how this minimalist approach to humanitarianism at the sea border gets easily profited and embraced by the armed forces to give humanitarians a dose of their own medicine.

3.6 Armies of Compassion: Capturing the Rhetoric, Degrading the Humanitarians

The barest meaning of humanitarianism in search and rescue operations, shaped around the rhetoric of "saving lives", prevention of death and the provision of basic needs temporally, has become the major discourse and practice of border management. As a result, it opens up considerably thick political field of participation where subjectivities

of different actors have increasingly become obscured. The emergency imaginary in the humanitarian action and affective urgent response to the "victims" are completely embraced and utilized by the military actors in the border management. Increasingly today, this minimalist humanitarianism based on saving lives and temporal provision of basic needs, has become coopted by the border guards at sea in the Aegean. The spatial configuration of the sea border not only shapes the character and discourse of humanitarian action, but also enables particular justification and assimilation strategies for the armed forces via the practice of rescue. Additionally, it has particular spatio-temporal characteristics in the modes of operation where the politics of death and the politics of life get more complicated. The sea as an unaccountable and undetectable space and the disappearance of bodies within that space make the act of killing and the operation of any sort of power to become entangled with the practice of rescue. In that respect, Walters' (2011) emphasis on the quite specific circumstances of different geographies of humanitarian border needs to be considered. Within the circumstances of the Aegean Sea, armed forces in Greece and Turkey, not just discursively, but also practically become the ones who intercept, stop, and push/pull back people on the dingies for the sake of border security, and then the ones who rescue them. Both the discourse and practice of rescue, saving lives and provision of basic needs serve as tools to justify and give space of maneuver for border officials to cover the practices of security and control. The minimalist humanitarian vision obtained by the rescue humanitarians gets easily threw on by the armed forces that portray themselves as "life saviors" at sea. When they are asked to define their primary mission, the answer is mostly "protecting lives". Both Frontex members and the Hellenic/Turkish coast guards specifically mention the unique, humane and fulfilling nature of their job, which is saving lives, in a very similar manner to rescue humanitarians:

> Our first mission here is saving lives, of course. Rescue is the most significant part of our job. You see lives at risk and put all your effort to rescue them under very hard circumstances. Hence, our job is incredibly hard but at the same time quite fulfilling emotionally in terms of saving lives" (Frontex member, October 2017)

Another Frontex member insistently displays moral sentiments by stressing that they "save and protect lives" and also "provide food, clothes, rescue blankets and whatever needed to help those poor babies, children and women", that are the "only motivation for enduring effortful conditions". The politics of compassion in the border management, in terms of how it is understood, interpreted, utilized and enacted by the armed forces, generally tends to create a dichotomy between tricked migrants and criminal smugglers: "we help migrants and stop smugglers who are dangerous for these people" (Frontex member, October 2017). However, everybody on the field is quite aware that there is no clear-cut distinction between migrants and smugglers at the practice level. On the contrary, dingies are mostly driven by the youngest member of the group on the boat without any physical presence of the facilitators. Facilitators are usually active in the determination of the exact location at night on Turkish shores; they first visit the potential sites by car individually and then select the most isolated site to inflate the boat (TCG, 2018). After this approximately fifteen-minute-long period, they teach driving to the youngest one within the group and then leave the place. On the other hand, a large number of migrant testimonies during the post-rescue processes on the field have indicated, contrary to common perception, majority of migrants' trajectories are organized collectively based on a shared knowledge. Despite these facts on the field, armed forces are generally keen on to adopt the rhetoric of "catching bad guys" (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015), which neatly encapsulates the dichotomy of at risk and a risk in border policing (Aradau, 2004). However, at the same time, the "oscillation between a politics of pity and the policies of control", in Fassin's perspective, gains another layer: guarding a territorially bounded space. The ideas of fear and insecurity triggered by "a risk" subject as placed in the general discussions on humanitarianism, involves the layer of border security in this case. Hence, the emphasis on the dichotomy of innocence and criminality is remarkable within the discourse of armed forces. The migrants are considered as "tricked victims" whose lives are endangered only by smugglers. Operational imperative to catch the smugglers is portrayed as the only aim and practice of border security in the Aegean without any reference to the drastically militarized surface of the sea together with routine push/pull backs. The necessity to disrupt the smuggling networks does not operate separately from search and rescue missions or migrant interceptions; rather these three aims intersect each other in the production of humanitarian border. Interestingly, this moral horizon of innocence has been easily

taken by the rescue humanitarians. "Innocent victim" deserves to be saved; bad guys need to be detected. When one builds her language around the notion of innocence, it brings its necessary other which is guilt. Henceforth, the category of "the lives to be saved" becomes quite slippery around the language of innocence. The search for innocence qualifies who deserves compassion and who does not; whose story deserves narration to be told and whose not. Concomitantly, this predominant language easily turns against to humanitarians as we witness recently. They find themselves being accused of "facilitating" the entry and of "helping" the smugglers who are designated as the guilty party. The politics of compassion obtained by the armed forces within this "humanitarian border" of the Aegean needs this slippery distinction between the "innocent" and the "criminal" in order to operate entangled logics of humanitarianism and border security.

The minimalist humanitarian imagination has not only been coopted by the armed forces, it has been also used to establish moral and professional hierarchies in order to degrade rescue humanitarians. In order to produce these hierarchies, border officials use narratives of professionalism and expertise similar to those used by rescue humanitarians. They adopt same business language of "good professionals" and "operational capacity" and expertise in rescue operations where they represent themselves as "real experts" having particular training in rescue operations and first-aid. They portray themselves as having technical knowledge compared to the "unprofessional, voluntary-based, and unskilled" rescue humanitarians (Frontex member, October 2017). Hence, the rhetoric of professionalization interestingly contributes to a competition among military forces and non-state humanitarians regarding rescue operations. The question becomes not only the blurred separation within the military-humanitarian assemblages as discussed by the existing scholarship (Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2017; Stierl, 2017), but also the degradation of humanitarian acts by the same rhetoric they deploy:

> "Last year they were quite unorganized. Their approach was not ethical. When we had a dingy, they were jumping into the sea in a rush and trying to take photos and videos of refugees. But, this year they become much more organized and professional, they learned how to do search and rescue. They help us in search and rescue, also in providing clothes and food. We are here for the same

> purpose and doing the same job: helping refugees" (Frontex member, October 2017).

The language used by both Frontex personnel and Hellenic coast guards in the interviews demonstrates how they consider and frame their position in relation to humanitarians. They consider that they all humanitarian actors in the Aegean, but at the same time, armed forces are "real professionals" in contrast to the "amateurs" (Hellenic Coast Guard, October 2017). As Hellenic Coast Guard stated, they [the coast guards] are the ones who "teach the techniques of rescue to the volunteers who are unfortunately very unprofessional and overly emotional" (HCG, October 2017). They have professional capacity to "moderate" their own emotions as opposed to "overly emotional amateurs". The unprofessionalism of "amateurs" often ends up with: "jumping into the sea in a rush, putting migrants' lives in danger and trying to take photos and videos which is not ethnical approach" as Frontex personnel noted. Within this interesting dynamics of humanitarian border of the Aegean Sea, the armed forces become the subjects who not only situate themselves as humanitarians, but also criticize rescue humanitarians based on ethical and professional concerns and seek to establish moral hierarchies. This exhibits how minimalist humanitarian imagination of the rescue NGOs gets easily occupied, profited and manipulated by the border officials in order to create hierarchies, to self-present themselves as "professional humanitarians", and to justify and consolidate their "morally superior" position vis-à-vis non-state humanitarians.

On the Turkish side, the moral battle is pursued against the European "other". The politics of border-making in Turkey has a different character compared to its European counterpart due to the highly centralized governance without any involvement of non-state actors in the border space. The only actors who have permission to enter the military security zone are the members of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However, the IOM's role is primarily financial, covering the expenses of the basic needs of water, and rescue blankets, etc., as opposed to being directly involved in the practices of rescue, landing and documenting. In contrast to the Greek side, Turkish coast guards are the only actors operating on the Aegean Sea without a witness of a non-state actor. Therefore, since they do not allow non-state humanitarians in their sphere of

action, they are highly keen on displaying their morally and professionally superior position in relation to the European "other" – Frontex members and the Hellenic coast guards (Karadağ, 2019). The affective frame they adopt usually refers to the "benevolent nature of Turkish identity" compared to the "rigorous policies" of the counterpart (TCG, September 2018):

> For example, when you look at the statistics of deaths in the Central Mediterranean Sea, you will understand the unique role of Turkish Coast Guards. We are different you know, we are full of compassion as Turks. This is why the number of deaths is much lower on the Aegean Sea (TCG, September 2018).

During the same interviews, members of the TCG also detailed the specific military tactics used in order to intercept a moving dingy heading towards the Greek islands. Although they frequently repeated that they never shoot at people, but deploy "methods of soft power" to intercept, all these tactics of interception have high potential to sink the dingy. After listing these techniques of interception for the border security, they insist on the particular difficulty of their job, which is completely different from that of European border officials. One of them stated: "preventing the ones exiting the shores is much more difficult than the prevention of entry" (TCG, September 2018). Hence, this requires a "professional superiority" where "Turkish coast guards are the best in the world". Some even go so far as to warn Frontex patrols in an uncoordinated way. When Frontex vessels do not follow "the proper coordinates" in patrolling by coming very close to the Turkish border, they usually create "a pull factor for migrants" which is defined by the Turkish border officials as "the magnet effect" (TCG, September 2018). As opposed to the involvement of multiple actors causing such unintended consequences on the Greek side, they depict themselves as a fully centralized, professional and coordinated force, as well as a benevolent one.

3.7 Conclusion

This article has shed light on the modes of actuality of "humanitarian border" within the increasingly militarized context of the Aegean Sea. By providing empirical analysis

based on the three-year long ethnographic study on the both sides of the Aegean Sea, the article unpacks the military-humanitarian assemblage and provides particular insights from both sides of the Aegean Sea: its specific actors, subjectivities and relations; manifestations of power and production of narratives. Borders are one of the distinctive sites today where the imagination, narrative and practices of security and humanitarianism become considerably blurred and obscured. More particularly, the configurations of sea border, hosting thousands of deaths, extreme surveillance as well as rescue operations, result in even-more obscured web of discourses and practices.

First, the article has shown that humanitarians being involved in the search and rescue operations in Lesbos obtain a minimalist approach to humanitarianism that is based on an emergency imagination in its margins shaped around the prevention of death at sea and the provision of basic needs within highly limited temporality. Within this minimalist imagination at the sea border, they find themselves providing operational support and legitimation to the border regime via the practices of spotting and patrolling. Even further, they depict these practices as their operational and managerial capacity. The framework of rescue becomes quite thick field where the acts of spotting, searching or catching can be easily considered as humanitarian and professional acts that just need to be incorporated into the provision of rescue blankets or water thereafter.

Second, the article has suggested that within the circumstances of the Aegean space, the manifestation of minimalist humanitarianism does not only contribute to a depoliticized space; it also results in a moral battle occurring between border guards and humanitarians. It has shown how moral manifestations in border politics are not exclusively the purview of humanitarians, but also deployed by border guards. Armed forces has easily coopted and utilized the barest meaning of humanitarianism to cover increasing military and surveillance mechanisms. They even go further than simple deployment, but also use these moral sentiments and the rhetoric of professionalism to establish moral hierarchies in relation to humanitarians. As being the “real humanitarian professionals” in the Aegean Sea, the ones saving lives and providing basic needs in much more professional manner than “amateur” professionals, they seek to degrade humanitarians by the same narrative they deploy. When “saving lives”, temporal emergency and managerialism become key features of the humanitarian imagination

today, it inevitably prepared opportune circumstances to be occupied, coopted and manipulated by the military actors.

Ultimately, we always return to the question of where to draw the line and how to mark the edges of discourses, frames and also practices. How does a political dissent can be formulated from within “humanitarian government” seeking to reach structural, global and ecological justice? Can humanitarian acts and actors de-contextualize and challenge the dominant framings of border regime? Is a “new humanitarianism” (Rajaram 2002) possible being able to solve its asymmetrical nature via the politics of solidarity? These are definitely urgent but arduous questions.

3.8 References

Agier, M. (2011). *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Albahari, M. (2015). *Crimes of Peace: Mediterranean Migrations at the World's Deadliest Border*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Amoore, L. (2006). Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror. *Political Geography* , 25(3), 336–351.

Aradau, C. (2004). The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking. *Millenniu*m, 33 (2), 251–278.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The Human Condition*. The University of Chicago Press.

Balibar, É. (2002). *Politics and the Other Scene*. London: Verso

Barnett, M. (2013). *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barnett, M., & Weiss,T. G. (2008). *Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power and ethics*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2012). Off-shoring and out-sourcing the borders of EUrope: Libya and EU border work in the Mediterranean. *Geopolitics* 17(4), 843–866.

Calhoun, C. (2010). The idea of emergency: Humanitarian action and global (dis)order. In Fassin, D. & Pandolfi, M. (Eds.), Contemporary states of emergency: The politics of military and humanitarian interventions (pp. 29–58). New York: Zone Books.

Collier, S. J., Lakoff, A. & Rabinow,P. (2004). Biosecurity: Towards an Anthropology of the Contemporary. *Anthropology Today*i 20 (5), 3–7.

Cuttitta, P. (2018). Inclusion and Exclusion in the Fragmented Space of the Sea. Actors, Territories and Legal Regimes between Libya and Italy. In Burroughs, E. & Williams, K. (Eds.), *Contemporary Boat Migration: Data, Geopolitics and Discourses* (pp. 75-94). Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham.

Cuttitta, P. (2017). Repoliticization through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean. *Geopolitics* 23(3),632-660.

Doty, R.L.. (2006). Fronteras Compasivas and the Ethics of Unconditional Hospitality. *Millennium,* 35 (1), 53–74.

Duffield, M. (2007). *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fassin, D. (2012). *Humanitarian Reason*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fassin, D. (2007). Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life. *Public Culture* 19(3), 499–520.

Fassin, D. & M. Pandolfi. (2010). *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*. New York: Zone Books.

Feher, M., Krikorian, G. & McKee, Y. (Eds.) (2007). *Nongovernmental Politics*. New York: Zone Books.

Feldman, I. (2009). Gaza's Humanitarianism Problem. *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 38 (3), 22–37.

Feldman, I. (2007). Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice and Political Identification in Gaza. *Cultural Anthropology*, 22(1), 129-169.

Feldman, I. & Ticktin, M. (2010). *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ferguson, J. & Gupta, A. (2002). Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. *Journal of American Ethnological Society,* 29(4), 981-1002.

Foucault, M. (2009). *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Coll_ege de France 1977–1978*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Garelli, G. & Tazzioli, M. (2017). Humanitarian War against Migrant Smugglers at Sea. *Antipode,* 50(3), 685-703.

Halttunen, K. (1995). Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture. *The American Historical Review,* 100(2), 303–334.

Hardt, M. & A. Negri. (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huysmans, J., Dobson, A. & Prokhovrik, R. (Eds.) (2006). *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Ilcan, S. & Rygiel, K. (2015). Resiliency Humanitarianism: Reconstituting Refugee Populations, Camp Spaces, and Refugee Subjects. *International Political Sociology,* 9(4).

Keck, M.L. & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University Press.

Lefort, C. (1986). *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism.* MIT Press.

Malkki, L. (2015). *The Need to Help*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Malkki, L. (1996). Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism and Dehistoricisation. *Cultural Anthropology,* 11(3), 377–404.

Nyers, P. (2006). *Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency.* London: Routledge.

Ophir, A. (2005). *The Order of Evils: Toward an Ontology of Morals*. New York: Zone Books

Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015). The humanitarian politics of European border policing: Frontex and border police in Evros. *International Political Sociology*, 9(1), 53–69.

Rajaram, P.K. (2002). Humanitarianism and representations of the refugee. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 15(3), 247–264.

Redfield, P. (2013). *Life in crisis: The ethical journey of doctors without borders*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Redfield, P. (2005). Doctors, Borders and Ethics of Crisis. *Anthropology News*, 46(6).

Rumford, C. (2006). Theorizing borders. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(2), 155–169.

Squire, V. (2015). *Post/Humanitarian Border Po9litics between Mexico and the US: People, Places, Things*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Stierl, M. (2017). A Fleet of Mediterranean Border Humanitarians. *Antipode*, 50(3), 704-724.

Ticktin, M. (2014). Transnational Humanitarianism. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 43, 273-89.

Ticktin, M. (2005). Policing and Humanitarianism in France: Immigration and the Turn to Law as State of Exception. *Interventions*, 7 (3), 347–368.

Van Houtum, H. (2010). Human blacklisting: The global apartheid of the EU's external border regime. *Environment and Planning D*, 28(6), 957–976.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015). *Europe's Border Crisis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walters, W. (2011). Foucault and frontiers: Notes on the birth of the humanitarian border. In Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S. & Lemke, T. (Eds.), *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges* (pp. 138–164). New York: Routledge.

Weber, L. & Pickering, S. (2011). *Globalization and Borders. Death at the Global Frontier*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Weizman, E. (2011). *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence From Arendt to Gaza*. London: Verso.

Chapter 4

RECONFIGURING SOVEREIGNTY ON THE WAVES OF THE AEGEAN SEA: INTERCEPTION IN THE NAME OF RESCUE

4.1 Abstract

The article provides an extensive empirical analysis of sovereign practices monitoring and controlling the clandestine migration in the Aegean Sea. By utilizing the notion of "wet ontology" that refers to the distinctive materiality of the sea shaping the nature of the modus operandi, the study analyzes the web of discourses, actual practices and technologies constituting the political space of the Aegean Sea. The article argues that the contextualized "wet ontology" of the Aegean Sea lays the ground for the production of certain governing tool for armed forces to legitimize their military actions of interceptions as a rescue mission. The strategy of *intercept first and then rescue* as a moderated violence is produced and materialized in different manners in Turkey and Greece. In the article, firstly the contextualized "wet ontology" of the Aegean Sea will be elaborated together with its spatial and juridical configuration that lead to particular power projections. Then, these particular power projections and interception techniques will be empirically discussed within the contexts of Turkey and Greece. The empirical data of the study is based on an ethnographic research design conducted in 2015-2018 in Greece and Turkey.

4.2 Introduction

In the last decades, the advances in the surveillance and military technologies, radar and drone systems, state vessels, and other smart border technologies have created a new representation of the Mediterranean where a battle against a moving migrant boat identifies the certain forms of European order in contemporary political life. Yet, the sea becomes a contested space of multiple and overlapping sovereigns; a space of which European externalized border politics are enacted and expanded, and certain forms of violence and hierarchies are projected mostly centered on migrant bodies. The Mediterranean Sea has vividly turned into a *deathworld* (Mbembe, 2003) as a result of European migration and bordering policies.

The existing scholarship on borders provides significant insight into the ways how systemic violence of migration policies is resulted in such border fatalities via the practices that "govern through death" in various contexts in the world (Fekete, 2003; Urrera, 2004; Weber, 2010; Weber and Pickering, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum, 2014; Doty, 2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Jones, 2015; Squire, 2016; Cuttitta and Last, 2020). In the particular Mediterranean context, there is a recent body of work critically examines the conditions in which the Central Mediterranean Sea becomes "a deadly liquid" (Heller and Pezzani, 2014) as a result the of the systematic practices in which state authorities do not respond to the distress cases of migrant boats despite they are detected. The "left-to-die boat" case of Forensic Oceanography project indicates how migrants are usually left unassisted when they are in distress and left to merciless of waves and winds of the Central Mediterranean (Heller and Pezzani, 2012). The studies critically investigating how the deadly space of the Central Mediterranean is produced share the idea of structural violence of the current border regime through politics of irresponsibility, abandonment and nonaction (Heller and Pezzani, 2014; 2016; Stierl, 2016; Casas-Cortes et al., 2017; Cuttitta, 2018; Davies et al., 2017; Cuttitta and Last, 2020). Concomitantly, they acknowledge the unpredictable outcomes as a result of fragmented spatialities, juridical regimes and multiple actors with diverse political motivations in this highly complex maritime space (Heller and Pezzani, 2014; Cuttitta, 2018; Cuttitta and Last, 2020). The space of Mediterranean thus has been transformed into a space of loss as the consequence of the strategies of delaying, deferring or

denying of rescue operations. The ambiguous and conflictual spatialities and jurisdiction among multiple states in the Central Mediterranean context underpin the conditions of abandonment where authorities purposely evade and defer their responsibilities to take an action in rescue missions.

This article contributes to these literatures by paying particular attention to the specificities of bordering practices in the Aegean Sea which has a distinctive characteristic of governance that has been received no attention. The key aim of this article is to provide an extensive empirical analysis of the conditions under which sovereign practices controlling the clandestine migration emerge across the Aegean Sea. The current web of discourses, practices and technologies constituting the space of the Aegean Sea is the main concern of this paper. Particularly, the article focuses on the strategies and assertion of heterogonous sovereignties that attempt to monitor, identify and prevent the clandestine migration in this semi-closed geography. The geophysicality of the Aegean Sea which is quite different from the Central Mediterranean context shapes the juridical architecture of the maritime territories as well as the very practices of control and mobility. In the absence of high seas and geographical SAR zones in the route of migrant journeys from Turkey to Greek islands, the meaning of search and rescue (SAR) gains only situational connotation rather than a geographical one. Every migrant boat is considered ipso facto "in distress" that needs to be searched and rescued. Although the politics evading, deferring and delaying the responsibility of rescue action is still at work in the Aegean, the main mode of governance is rather multiple techniques of interception which is legitimized as a rescue mission both in Turkey and Greece. Hence, the form of violence exercised through "killing without touching" (Heller and Pezzani, 2014) in the context of Central Mediterranean turns into a politics of "*interception in the name of rescue*" in the Aegean context.

The concept of "wet ontology", as thinking from the sea/ocean and its world of fluidity, necessitates unpacking the different configurations of maritime subjects and objects moving across, folding into and emerging out of water "in unrecognized and unanticipated ways" (Steinberg and Peters, 2015, p. 261). In unpacking the web of practices, the article foregrounds the very *presence* of the sea as a contested liquid space shaping the politics of control and mobility. Hence, I consider not only how different

forms and technologies control the clandestine migration, but also how geophysicality of the sea shapes certain modes of violence and justification as well as politics of clandestineness and escape. In developing such an analysis, the article utilizes the notion of "wet ontology" (Steinberg and Peters, 2015) which is an analytical tool highlighting the distinctive materiality of the sea that generates a new understanding of political possibilities and limitations. The world of water, its fluidity, verticality, volume, depth and liquidity, creates distinct forms for the governing, resisting and projection of power (Steinberg and Peters, 2015). In operationalizing the concept, I further attach the contextualized geophysicality of the Aegean Sea by which the spatial distribution, jurisdiction and mode of governance is shaped accordingly.

The article draws upon ethnographic research carried out for three years (2015-2018) across two sites of the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Greece (Lesbos). The fieldwork includes participant observation in search and rescue operations in a local NGO in the northern Lesbos (Skala Sikamineas), in addition to the interviews with the actors exercise in the Aegean Sea: Hellenic and Turkish coast guards, Frontex personnel and rescue NGOs. The ethnographic research enables the article to move beyond the discourses and self-projections of actors in the interviews in a possible way of "rehearsed talking points" (Kuus, 2013), and to capture the actual practices in the field. The paper will proceed as follows: first, the notion of "wet ontology" will be elaborated and contextualized within the geophysicality of the Aegean Sea, with the aim of unpacking the spatial and juridical configuration: the *nomos* of the Aegean. Second, the modes of governance and surveillance techniques in Turkey and Greece will be empirically elaborated, along with the sovereign actors, their "social universes" (Bigo, 2014) and everyday practices. The paper then moves to the circumstances in which the strategy of "*intercept first and then rescue"* as a moderated violence is produced and materialized in the Aegean Sea.

4.3 Wet Ontology and the Nomos of the Aegean Sea

The disassociation between land and sea, as land is appropriate to be demarcated, owned, spatially distributed, and cultivated as opposed to the infinite, untamable, unproductive, unfixable and empty character of sea, has a long history embedded in

Western consciousness. In his foundational 1609 text Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist and early legal thinker, characterizes the sea as incomprehensible, liquid and fluid that cannot be possessed as solid lands and "can be added to the goods of no nation" (2004, p. 34). Therefore, it should be a common use, *free sea* to all as inter or transnational free space between bounded sovereigns. In the similar vein, for Carl Schmitt, *nomos*, which is an original "appropriation, distribution, production" of space that is fundamental for the establishment of every juridical and social order, is rooted in land (2003 [1950], 324). For him, line in the soil epitomizes the material foundation of the order peculiar to the land. Contrary to the land, the sea is imagined as free and without a character; it has "no limits, no boundaries, no consecrated sites, no sacred orientations, no law and no property" (2003, 42-43). Grotius' and Schmitt's vision of "free sea", as empty void, a non-territory, ahistorical and lawless space, implicates the very basis of the ideological apparatus of European conquest and colonial expansion from seventeenth century onwards, as widely discussed within the postcolonial ocean studies (Bose, 2009; Benton, 2009; Gilroy, 1993; Lewis, 1999; Rediker, 2007; Mawani, 2018).

Counter to the idealization of the sea as empty void, the advances in navigation and marine technology have been vital in the expansion of new European global and spatial order for centuries. Accordingly, a moving ship is key technology and vital agent of imperial power where racial hierarchies and regimes of violence were projected and implemented in the history, while also engendering encounter, resistance and contestation (Mawani, 2018). Viewed from the moving ship, oceans and seas appear as contested juridical space where the ships make possible the transport of European settlers and slaves, forced laborers and migrants as well as the expansion and contestation of new European global and spatial order.

In contemporary border politics, a moving migrant boat unveils these contested juridical spaces and sovereignties. Advances in marine technology are needed not for the "discovery" of the new lands in this century, but for a fight against the undesirables on the boats today. Thinking with the sea, by foregrounding the very presence of its liquid materiality, verticality and temporality, provides an intervention to reimagine and reconceptualize the practices of sovereignty and politics of mobility. The concept of

"wet ontology" as introduced by Steinberg and Peters (2015) generates an alternate understanding of projection and materialization of power because the watery world is a space of "fluidity, volume, emergence, depth and liquidity" which contributes to a different political landscape. The "wet" politics emerges from its materiality, signaling the impacts of it on the art of governance. Since it is a space that is "indisputably voluminous, stubbornly material and unmistakably undergoing continual reformation", it has particular political possibilities and limitations shaped by its instability, randomness and constant dynamism (Steinberg and Peters, 2015, p. 248). As opposed to Schmittian "empty void", sea as a method offers a new understanding of *nomos* in which the "appropriation, distribution, production" of the sea space reveal the overlapping, competing and complex legalities and practices. As Heller and Pezzani (2014) explores in the case of Central Mediterranean, the maritime space results in "a form of unbundled and spatially variegated sovereignty" in which complex and overlapping juridical spaces are constructed (p. 661). This aptly exhibits the wet politics of the Mediterranean Sea where the distribution and partition of the space as well as the acts of sovereignty become much more complex, fluid and elastic.

The current juridification of sea by dissecting its surface and volume is mainly codified by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention describes jurisdictional zones and the degrees of control of states. Territorial waters are part of the national territories that extend up to twelve nautical miles which fall under full sovereignty of coastal states. The Convention also determines the international waters (known as high seas) where no state can exercise its full sovereignty and jurisdiction. High seas stand "free for all states and reserved for peaceful purposes" within which rights and obligations of each actor are defined by international law. The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue establishes Search and Rescue (SAR) zones across the high seas, each one falling under the particular coastal state to have a legal responsibility to coordinate rescue operations. Hence, within SAR zones, vessels have the duty to assist rescue operations for the people in distress under the coordination of particular coastal states. The modus operandi of high seas where conflicting state jurisdictions, "uncertain sovereignties" (Cuttitta, 2018), different interpretations and claims, and ambiguous spatialities create "a patchy legal space", is an image of "unbundled sovereignty" leading to standoffs in

taking responsibility in rescue operations (Heller and Pezzani, 2014). The Central Mediterranean is a case in point regarding its dense traffic with its SAR regions in the high seas. In addition to the delimitation ambiguities of SAR zones, states use different versions of SAR conventions (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Aalberts, 2010). This "patchy legal space" has been strategically exploited by the sovereigns in order to evade and defer the responsibility in rescue operations as well as to avoid disembarkation in their territorial waters (Pezzani and Heller, 2014). Likewise, commercial vessels and cargo ships do not want to be involved in the rescue operations due to the heavy economic burden, and for this reason, they try to escape from automated vessel tracking data (automatic identification system, AIS) through switching off their signal. States' unwillingness to accept disembarkation of migrants in their territories, and even their accusations against seafarers and rescue humanitarians because of facilitating the "illegal" migration, leads to further reluctance on civilian actors (Tazzioli, 2016). As a consequence, migrants are left alone in the middle of the Central Mediterranean, to grim winds and waves of the sea and to slow death imposed by the "systemic violence that kills without touching" working via politics of non-assistance and irresponsibility (Heller and Pezzani, 2014; 2016; Cuttitta, 2018).

While the notion of "wet ontology" offers a creative perspective to reimagine and reconceptualize the projection and materialization of power, it needs to be embedded in the certain geographies and their specific geophysicality. In the article, I seek to provide a *contextualized wet ontology* of the Aegean which acknowledges the impact of the geophysicality of the particular sea in shaping the political landscape. The scope of the surface, insular geography and proximity of territorial waters have determining impact on the art of governance and the juridical distribution of the space. Aegean Sea is a unique semi-closed geography with its extremely complicated insular dispersion. There are numerous insular features scattered throughout the small geography of the Aegean where some of them are islands whereas some are small islets and rocks. On the contrary of the geophysicality of the Central Mediterranean, there is no high sea between the Greek islands targeted by the migrants (Lesbos, Samos, Kos and Chios) and Turkish coasts due to the proximity of islands (around six miles) to Turkey. Since Turkey is not party to 1982 Law of the Sea, two sovereigns adopt the *principle of midline* in practice for the territorial partition. First, due to the lower volume of the sea

and the proximity, clandestine migrant boats and patrol vessels are smaller compared to the Central Mediterranean. Second, proximate two territorial waters (Turkey and Lesbos) are distributed based on the principle of equal division with the lack of geographical SAR zones. Third, in the absence of SAR zones, the meaning of SAR gains a *situational connotation* rather than being a particular zone which will be elaborated in the next parts of the paper. These characteristics of geophysicality of the sea have a role in the interpretation and manifestation of certain technologies in the maritime governance, as they have in the case of strategies of clandestine journey. Hence, the wet ontology of the sea, shaped by these specificities, gains various forms in different geographies.



Figure 4-1: The spatial configuration of the Aegean Sea and principle of midline.

[Figure created by Author]

In the Aegean, two sovereigns divide the maritime areas between Turkey and Lesbos based on the "principle of equal division" via an imaginary midline partitioning the maritime space approximately equal. The absence of high seas between Lesbos and Turkish coasts is one of the features of this particular geophysicality of the Aegean Sea, distinguishing it from pretty multitudinous and complex international space the Central Mediterranean involves. Although the operation of imaginary line is quite elastic and

often transgressed by the two sovereigns in practice, yet in the Aegean, jurisdictional claims over the policing of illegalized migrants among all other maritime issues have two major state parties rather than multiple. The actors operating for the governance of migration across these two territorial partitions are less manifold compared to the Central Mediterranean: the Turkish coast guards in the Turkish territorial waters who are the only authority; and the Hellenic coast guards, EU border agency Frontex personnel and rescue NGOs in the Greek waters. NATO warships have only observatory mission as a deterrent in the Aegean Sea who operate on the both sides of the territorial waters, inspecting migrant boats and facilitating coordination between Turkish and Greek (and the EU) border officials (Turkish Coast Guard, September 2018). However, NATO warships as naval forces are not physically suitable to actively operate in the insular circumstances of the Aegean Sea since it is needed to have smaller speed boats in order to intercept the migrant boats as well as to do rescue operations. On the two opposing sites of the imaginary midline, Turkey and Greece have their specificities in border practices. Their modes of governance vary based on the organizational composition of the border actors, surveillance mechanisms and different subject positions of these actors.

4.3.1 Overcentralized composition of monitoring: Turkey

Following the massive refugee movement from Turkey to Europe in 2015, *Operation Aegean Hope* was launched by the TCG in the Aegean Sea in May 2015, which is still in operation (TCG, September 2018). The number of speed boats has been increased; the frequency of patrolling has been raised, and supportive air mobile and floating equipment have been enhanced in order to control the clandestine migration. The year of 2016 also witnessed a coup attempt in Turkey in July, four months after the Statement, in the sequel of which the whole organization body of coast guard command has been changed. As of 25 July 2016, Turkish Coast Guard Command has been directly affiliated to the Ministry of Interior as a general armed law enforcement force. Soon after this structural transfer, Aegean Sea Region Command has been established in 2016 whose Regional Operational Center (ROC) is in İzmir, controlling and directing the whole Aegean coastline of Turkey from Çanakkale to Muğla. The establishment of the operational center governing the whole coastline represents the initiation of an

overcentralized governing technology in the border management in Turkey. As TCG explains:

> The operational center can observe the whole map of the Aegean. The data of mobile radars enable to scan the whole horizon along the whole length of the Aegean coastline. The operational coordinator at the center designates the schedule of patrolling and rescue operations. The center directs us when there is a case and says the exact coordination that we shall target. The ROC monitors the whole schedule, location and coordination of coast guard boats in the Aegean. When there is an order from the center, the particular closest unit approaches to the case in 5 minutes (TCG, September 2018).

As the statement of the coast guard clearly indicates, the ROC stands as the major monitoring and directing body responsible for the whole western coastline of Turkey since 2016. The infrastructure of the entire surveillance system in the Aegean is connected to the main center. The maritime traffic of registered vessels is controlled via live automated vessel-tracking data captured by satellite receivers. Hence, commercial cargo ships or fishing boats have to switch on their automated identification system (AIS) or fishing vessel monitoring system (VMS) when they are at sea in order to be identified. Within this dense maritime traffic, a vessel without a light and switched-on AIS or VMS generally denotes a migrant rubber boat that needs to be intercepted. To capture the better vision of the Aegean, the coastal districts are additionally equipped with mobile radars which are vans with thermovision cameras scanning the horizon, sorting out the "bad guys" from "good" ones in this dense traffic. Considering the information overload including all sorts of vessels in the Aegean, thermovision vans (TVV) are equipped with automated technological apparatuses; an algorithm automatically detects "anomalies" and "threats" out of the huge quantity of maritime data. Through scanning the surface of the sea, the algorithm is designed to detect "moving things" unregistered and without light.

This entire surveillance system, data from satellite receivers and the imagery generated by the TVVs in various coastal districts is gathered in the Regional Operation Center (ROC) in İzmir. The ROC does not only have the whole vision of the Aegean coastline,

it also has the centralized authority in scheduling the patrolling shifts and coordinates of coast guards. This indicates the vertical governance in the operations of coast guards who follow the orders and schedule of the ROC. When a dingy leaves the Turkish coasts and gets detected by the radar algorithms visualized and gathered in the operational center, the commander first verify the exact coordination of the dingy and then gives order to the responsible unit to act and approach the dingy. In the case of distress and emergency call from the people on the boat, again the coordination of the emergency hotline is operated by the main center:

> Aegean Sea Region Command coordinates the operation of emergency hotline of 158. The operational center responds to the calls and takes the information from the informant through necessary detailed questions regarding the case because there are numerous false or manipulative notices. Based on the evaluation and location interrogation by the operational center, then coast guard boats are sent to the area (Turkish Coast Guard, September 2018).

Figure 4-2: Turkish shores across the Aegean Sea, the ROC and "Landing" process. The fieldwork is conducted at the coast guard units in Küçükkuyu, Dikili, Çeşme and Bodrum.

[Figure created by Author]

The affiliation to the Ministry of Interior enabled structural changes in the organization body of the TCG. Since 2016, it has started to become all-encompassing unit in the border management in the Aegean. The special unit as law enforcement support teams is established under the head of TCG operating as port police. Additionally, three sea stations have been constructed in Bodrum, Küçükkuyu and Çevlik, where all documentation and identification procedures of migrants as well as criminal cases of smugglers are done, through which TCG aims to "monitor the whole process both on the sea and land smoothly" (Turkish Coast Guard, September 2018). Before these structural changes, coast guards, police and gendarmeries had division of labor among themselves in the processes operationalized on the sea and land. Since 2016, TCG seeks to be the only body in the border management in the Aegean together with its vertical composition. This resembles what Bigo (2014) calls as competitive relations among

different "social universes" of the organizational bodies. "Things will be handled easily by this way" as TCG member describes. This all-encompassing role concomitantly excludes any involvement of non-state actor in the borderzone. The members of International Organization for Migration (IOM) are the only ones who have permission to enter the military security zone if a case occurs. However, they are not allowed to be involved in the practices of patrolling, rescue, landing (provision of first aid and basic needs) and documentation; they just cover the expenses of the basic needs distributed at the port. Any witness of a non-state actor in the Turkish border space is thus impossible.

Despite the technological apparatuses of policing and all-encompassing operational composition of the TCG, the Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean is still far from to be comprehensible. The small geography of the Aegean and proximity of the opposing coasts are still not adequate to capture the clandestine migration and to prevent "patchy surveillance" (Heller and Pezzani, 2014). The wet ontology of the sea, with its waves, winds and currents, disrupts the resolution of mobile radars. Similarly, since migrants start their journeys at night, the capacity of radar sensing is limited in the dark to detect "anomalies". As TCG member noted, "the sea is different you know, you cannot build a stone wall" and "a migrant boat usually burst onto the scene". However, despite its impossibility to actualize, the ambition to totally grasp this wet space is still at work. The TCG members mentioned the new project called Coastal Radar Surveillance System (CRSS) that has started to be materialized as of 2019 by Havelsan in order to compensate the incomplete capacity of TVVs. This encompassing project aims to provide sophisticated radar coverage of the coasts and territorial waters by gathering maritime picture from coastal radars, drones, unmanned aerial vehicles and electro-optical sensors. The project of CRSS has the aim of getting "totalizing panoptic view" (Heller and Pezzani 2014, p. 667) and "vigilant visualities" (Amoore, 2007) of the Aegean in the near future. In order to enhance the efficiency of reconnaissance, the assemblage of this surveillance technologies and data are shared between institutions via COAST-NET system which is the network for the collection and communication of received data. When Turkish coast guards explained the higher capacity of the new project, he wanted to add again that "it is all done with national resources, not with the EU budget" (Turkish Coast Guard, September 2018). This deliberately emphasized detail is part of the general rhetoric of TCG who are always keen on displaying their

"superior operational capacity" (Karadağ, 2019) vis-à-vis the European "other". In their projection, their vertical composition and all-encompassing organizational unit are indicative of their superiority as opposed the multitudinous and "jumbled" environment in Greece.

However, on the Greek side, the exceedingly hierarchical operation of Turkey is perceived as a tool that provides her a diplomatic leverage in releasing migrants at any time they want: "When there is a political tension between Turkey and the EU/Greece, then the situation is suddenly increasing in the Aegean" (Hellenic Coast Guard, 2017).

4.3.2 Multiple actors in Lesbos

"We closely cooperate with Frontex. They help in patrolling since we must have almost all hours of patrolling in which we are not enough" said the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) that is followed by his further explanation about their upper position:

> "In each Frontex boat, we have a Greek liaison officer, this is the law because they are not in their countries, and they do not have enforcement power. So, the Greek liaison officer gives them the enforcement power and he is the connection officer. We just make patrolling plan and they follow it" (Hellenic coast guard, October 2017).



Figure 4-3: Skala Sikamineas, Korakas Lighthouse and Efthalou as the main hotspots in the northern Lesbos. Skala Sikamineas is the only disembarkation point in the island. The visual illustrates thermos vehicles vans (TVVs) as mobile radars placed on the numerous hills in Lesbos.

[Figure created by Author]

The HCG and Frontex boats share the shifts in patrolling covering the space between the coasts of Lesbos and the imaginary midline. Their schedule is planned by the headquarters in Mytilene, but each patrolling boat at the sea has the autonomy to take an action in search and rescue operations. As it will be explored in detail in the next part, the patrolling boats aim to detect every dingy when it passes the midline and enters into the waters of Greece. They "either rescue them when there is a problem or they just escort them to bring them to the shore" as HCG explains. Since patrolling means "to be on the sea; trying to detect the boat, target, escort and rescue", both HCG and Frontex boats have that authority. When a boat is spotted, the closest patrolling boat (HCG or Frontex) approaches to the dingy and stop it via various techniques. After interception, they transfer migrants to their own patrolling boats and bring them to the shores of

Lesbos to disembark. There are two locations of disembarkation in Lesbos: Mytilene (the capital) and Skala Sikamineas in the north. When the patrolling boat that carries migrants approaches to the port, the land crew of the NGOs stand as ready for the first aid, provision of basic needs (rescue blankets to prevent hypothermia, water etc.) and safely transfer of migrants to the UNHCR buses to be taken to the temporary camp in Skala Sikamineas. The whole process which is called as "landing" is carried out by the land crews of the rescue NGOs with their own budget. During each landing case that I was involved in as a volunteer in Skala Sikamineas for two years, the Greek port police, the HCG and Frontex members were just waiting with their guns and inspecting the whole process without taking any action. They often intervene in with succinct words, a strict voice and educational manner to discipline the migrants (and occasionally volunteers) in this process of emergency. While rescue NGOs are the only subjects handling the whole process at the port, they do not receive that much authorization at the sea. "We appreciate their help, but we are not colleagues" said HCG when he was explaining their "proper" relation with the NGOs that has been established in the post-2016 period with certain restrictions. After the year of 2015, "which was a total mess with tens of NGO boats on the sea" for the HCG, there was an "uncontrollable situation" at which "they did whatever they wanted to do on the sea". This has not been the case since 2016 (HCG, October 2017). At the time of my fieldwork, there were two small NGO boats in Skala Sikamineas at the beginning; then it decreased to one today which is the boat of Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara.

On the Greek side, unlike the Turkish case, the surveillance apparatus is not deployed by a centralized body as in the instance of the ROC. Although the headquarters are in charge of scheduling the patrolling shifts and monitoring the division of labor between HCG and Frontex, the data gathered from radar systems is shared directly with the boat at work. On the contrary of Turkey, the board on the patrolling boats has a direct communication with the crew in the thermovision vans (TVVs) that are situated on the top of the several hills in Lesbos (Frontex personnel, October 2017). When an "anomaly" is spotted on the screen, they share the coordinates with the closest patrolling boat to take an action.

4.4 Intercepting in the Name of Rescue: A Moderated Violence

During one of the landings we were carrying out in Skala Sikamineas in 2017, one Afghan migrant who was totally wet and taken from the boat said: "They first sink our boat and then rescued us". This ostensibly paradoxical symbiosis in this sentence displays the mode of governance in the Aegean. As opposed to the common knowledge in the public, the proximity between islands and Turkish shores, and relatively less fatal nature of the sea enables most of the dingies to reach the European shores safely in the Aegean. Throughout my volunteering period in Lesbos, we witnessed numerous cases in which a dingy was able to safely reach the shores of Lesbos without being detected. The geophysicality embedded into its wet ontology has several consequences in the Aegean. First, due to the lower volume of the sea, the clandestine migration is pursued by smaller rubber dingies carrying approximately 20-30 people. Accordingly, the patrolling boats of border officials are small speed boats sophisticated in rapid maneuvers. Second, lack of geographical SAR zones contributes to an understanding in which the meaning of SAR has a situational connotation rather than a geographical zone. The interpretation of "distress" has a common view shared by almost all actors in the Aegean Sea, not just by rescue humanitarians. Due to the circumstances of unseaworthy and overcrowded migrant boats, every dingy has ipso facto "potential of danger" which "needs to be searched and rescued" (Frontex, 2017). The HCG describes de facto meaning of SAR in the Aegean as such:

> SAR is when the boats are in danger and there is a potential of danger. Sometimes they are not in the sea but they are still in danger. This is also SAR. Classical SAR is when they call us and we detect them; they say where the danger is and we search for them. But even if they do not call us, they are still in danger (HCG, 2017)

This extensive interpretation of the notion of "distress" has a reverse situation in the Aegean compared to the Central Mediterranean (Cuttitta, 2018; 2020). The moment a dingy leaves the Turkish shores, people on the boat are considered as the ones in danger and the ones who need rescue. Considering all migrant boats to be in distress concomitantly prepares the conditions in which the term of "interception" is used to

refer to the search and rescue in the Aegean. Definitely this interpretation has a humanitarian concern in itself; however at the practice level, it simultaneously prepares the grounds where the practices of interception gain certain mode of justification for the armed forces under the name of rescue.

As opposite to the conditions of the Central Mediterranean, the potential of a safe journey for a clandestine migration in the Aegean Sea is much higher. Considering the proximity, when people get on a dingy on the Turkish shores, they can see the lights of the opposite shore in Lesbos because of which they aim to constantly move further on the sea unless they reach those lights. Since they have no idea about the imaginary line between two territories, they cannot realize whether they transgress the geographical borderline or not. Contrary to the common perception, dingies do not involve smugglers inside; one of the migrants on the boat has the responsibility of controlling the engine and they generally have a progressively shared knowledge of "go ahead" until reaching the opposite shore. Hence, with the desire to reach the European shores undetected, they try to escape when they encounter a boat of border police without having any information of where exactly they are and whom they are subjected to. As a result, a clandestine dingy in the Aegean Sea generally tries to run away from any boat of border officials on the each side unless they face a risk of death.

When the dingy is spotted on the sea, a battle on the waves starts in the Aegean between the dingy that wants to escape and the speed boats of border officials aiming to intercept. On the both sides, Turkey and Greece, the various techniques of interception is the major strategy to control the clandestine migration. In Turkey, the techniques are operationalized with the aim of interception, taking people onboard and pulling them back. When dingy passes the imaginary line and enters the Greek territorial waters, people on the boat usually have no idea whom they are subjected to; they are afraid from being caught and sent back, and thereby they desire to keep going until they reach the Greek shores. In Greek side, the techniques of the interception are used with the aims of capturing people on the boat, taking them onboard and accordingly being able to force them to the camps in Lesbos. Otherwise, people on the dingy would approach to the desolate shores of Lesbos; wander in the island as "unruly" subjects without being controlled and confined into the camps. During my fieldwork in Lesbos, we witnessed

numerous cases where the dingies approached to the shores without being detected, and hit the roads until they got reported by the locals or caught by the police.

"Intercept first and then rescue"

The techniques of interception vary in ad hoc nature. First one is operationalized via a special rope which they call as *stopping apparatus*. They throw the rope in order to encircle the engine of the dingy, to take out the fuel hose by the hook and to deactivate the boat. *Technique of maneuver* is the second method of interception. Since migrant boats have very slow-speed on the sea, speed boats of the coast guards can easily pass them and "through clinging to the dingy and pulling it from the front", they manage to stop them (TCG, 2018). *The technique of waves* is another strategy, in which border officials create waves on the sea in order to pull or push back the dingies. The *technique of jumping* is another common one to intercept the moving dingy, as a Frontex personnel noted, one official from the patrolling boat "jumps into the dingy, stops the engine" and then they "start picking them up to their boats". All of these techniques are part of the routine management in the Aegean, both in Turkish and Greek territorial waters. On Turkish waters, they are conducted in order to prevent the crossings and pull the boats back; whereas on Greek waters, the aim is to capture the people on the boat to control them and to avoid their free arrival to the shores of the island. As a consequence of this battle on the waves, dingies often gets drown or some people fall into the sea; then the border officials rescue the ones in the sea, take people onboard and name this whole situation as a rescue.

"First we make announcement in three languages; Turkish, English and Arabic. Africans usually stop with the announcement. But, Syrians do not. And the most resistant ones are Afghans. They never stop" said TCG when he was explaining the difficulties of their job, and he went on:

> "Since they have been living for a long time here, they know our mercy very well. That's why they take advantage of our pity and do not stop. They know that we will not hurt them. Although they give us a very rough time, our personnel is quite patient. Since they usually do not stop with the announcement, we then use our techniques to stop the boat in a very soft and gentle way. Our

> crew is very patient although they give us a rough time. But at the end of the day, they know that we will provide them food, clothes etc." (TCG, 2018).

The rhetoric of "very soft and gentle way" evokes what Weizman (2011; see also Ignatieff, 2004 and Ophir, 2005) refers as "lesser evil", the violence in its "moderation and minimization" that is proportionally calculated, balanced and managed in order to be publicly justified necessary act. This "tolerated sin" functions as a "necro-economy" in which brutal measures are restrained in a utilitarian fashion in order to make them more easily tolerated, naturalized and accepted. The strategy of "*intercept first and then rescue*" as a proportioned violence, prepares the necessary conditions for this necro-economy and its justification in the Aegean. By this way, the spatial control of territorial water is managed; lethal consequences of interception techniques are moderated; and finally constant search for legitimacy and moral superiority is accomplished. When coast guards share the details of interception, they were always keen to display moral sentiments as well as to repeatedly mention that they never endanger their lives: "But we do this with the method of soft power of course, without putting them in danger. Through interception techniques, we transform the prevention of an illegal action into a lifesaving operation" (TCG, 2018). This explicit legitimization narrative is obtained by the HCG/Frontex in a different manner in Lesbos:

> "When they enter Greek territorial waters, they usually do not stop. I don't know may be they think we are Turkish coast guards who will take them back. We make announcements to stop them, but they do not speak English and they do not understand. They want to reach to the shores, but first, their boats are not secure, and second they have no idea that the shores are full of risky rocks and they will damage their boat. So, you have to stop them before they reach the rocks. In that case, we jump into the boats and stop the engine. Mostly there is wave on the sea and the boat gets water inside. But it is the only way and it is for their safety" (Frontex personnel, 2017).

On the contrary of this narrative, during my ethnography, I have not witnessed a case of injury or death occurred at the rocks of the shores. But there were numerous cases in which migrants approached to the shores and started walking on the roads until they are

detained in the northern villages of the island. They need to be intercepted and transferred in the sea with the aim of their confinement in the camps. However, in the narrative built around their safety and rescue, the migrant on the boat is considered as subject who is "illegal" transgressor needed to be intercepted, confined or drown, but at the same time, who is "innocent victim" exploited by the smugglers and ipso facto in distress to be rescued. This particular subject-position of the migrant on the boat, being constantly oscillating between the "criminal border crosser" and "innocent and tricked victim in danger" is part of this mode of governance. This oscillation is part of the broader dynamics of "humanitarian reason" as Fassin (2012) describes in which humanitarianism and policing (or care and control) are "intimately linked" (Ticktin 2005) to one another and the subject formation of the subaltern is considered both *at risk* and *a risk* (Aradau, 2004). Contributing to the existing literature covering a range of analysis focused on different spaces and different actors performing humanitarian action (see Malkki, 1996; Doty, 2006; Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Agier, 2011; Fassin, 2012; Feldman and Ticktin, 2010; Walters, 2011; Redfield, 2013; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Squire, 2015), the practices of interceptions in the name of rescue in the Aegean case indicate how necropower (Mbembe, 2019) of these techniques get both actually moderated and justified by the border guards via the act of rescue. This rationale of justification does not only involve the politics of denial and evasion from culpability for border deaths as a product of "tough and deadly conditions" of the sea (see Doty, 2011); it also involves politics of displacement of culpability (Squire, 2016) passed over to the migrant on the boat who is ignorant and shortsighted without being able to recognize the dangers of the sea. "They have no idea that the shores are full of risky rocks" as in the same vein that they are incapable of recognizing the distress situations when they do not stop. Thus, it is the responsibility of the border guards to stop the moving dingy at any time on the sea for "their safety". Concomitantly, the resistance and the agency of migrants on the boat who "never stop" are reduced to their ignorance. The narrative adopted by the border officials indicates how the mode of border management on the sea is skillful in technical and material embodiment of inception, spatial control, confinement, violence and also rescue.

Battle around the midline

While techniques of interception are practiced pointwise in Turkey and Greece, the space of imaginary midline aptly represents the crystallization of "wet politics". This space of encounter witnesses a dense battle between speed boats of the coast guards of two sovereign states and migrant boats. With daily acts of push/pull backs, the midline is generally transgressed by the boats of coast guards of Turkey and Greece. The space of midline additionally becomes a kind of laboratory to observe the contentious cooperation between the border officials of two sovereigns. Although it is quite apt to argue that border is *jointly administered* (Longo, 2017) by the neighboring countries as a co-bordering logic today, it is always a contentious one. Particularly in the case of Turkey and Greece who have a notably rough history, and that of contemporary political circumstances of the EU-Turkish relations, this cooperation appears as even more contested example. It comes to the surface clearly during the interviews while both sides are keen to blame each other due to various reasons. For TCG, they are the "benevolent" and "professional" one as opposed to the "harsh" and "jumbled" operations of the Greek side (TCG, September 2018). For Greek border officials, Turkish side is a huge mystery. During our daily encounter in search and rescue operations in my ethnography, each time Greek officials kept asking questions about the operations in Turkey. They generally think that Turkish officials are intendedly letting the boats pass and they have a close connection with the facilitators. The dispute between border officials of two countries reflects on the field via ad hoc practices of passing the responsibility to another one at sea when it comes to the acts of violence, non-assistance or pull/push backs.

Technique of maneuver is frequently used by the HCG and Frontex to push back the boats when they are approaching to the imaginary line between two territorial waters. Especially Frontex patrolling boats usually prefer to stay close to the geographical midline in the Aegean which enables them to immediately respond to the situations where the migrant boat is about to cross the line. Through various maneuvering acts, they aim to push the dingy back to the Turkish territorial waters and prevent its entry to European space. It is used on Turkish side with the aim of interception and pulling the boat back to Turkish shores. The coast guard teams of two countries have a communication among themselves "sometimes directly boat by boat or sometimes by central level" (HCG, October 2017). In cases Greek forces detect a dingy which is about

to pass the line, they inform TCG to approach and take the boat back (HCG, October 2017). However, rescue NGOs operating at Aegean Sea witness daily transgression of the borderline as opposed to the discourses of the coast guards. While the member of one rescue NGO was showing me the video shot by them on the boat, he was exploring the event which is not exceptional though in the Aegean:

> Last week, we had an event again. NATO warship informed the TCG by saying that approach to the dingy in Greek waters that already passed the line. TCG entered the Greek waters about one km inside. We were there and watching at the same moment. We called HCG [here you see on the video], but they never answered on the radio. TCG took all the people on the boat and pull-backed to Turkey. HCG was waiting for TCG to enter the Greek waters and to take the refugees back to Turkey basically. Only after that, they responded our call and said "oh we do not know, we do not have any idea". They do not want to deal with all dingies, so they do not give importance to whether TCG enters or not" (Kept anonymous, 2017).

In addition to the daily transgression of the line, Greek push backs around the midline are the most common and systematic acts in the Aegean Sea that is witnessed and reported by the rescue humanitarians (see the reports of Alarm Phone). Despite numerous public videos and migrant and NGO testimonies that I witnessed during my ethnography, coast guards, as might be expected, never accept the accusations of push backs. The narrative of situational condition of SAR in which the migrant boat is considered ipso facto "in distress", is again profited by the border officials to justify their acts of transgression with aim of pull/push backs: "in cases when we have SAR incident in Turkish territorial waters, we take orders from our HQ, and after cooperation with TCG, we can enter their waters" (HCG, October 2017). Here again, in everyday practices of border management, the "incident of SAR" is not limited to the cases of shipwrecks or drowning; on ad hoc bases, it is utilized for the acts of pull/push backs and also of transgression of the territorial waters.

4.5 Conclusion

The specificity of the Aegean Sea has a distinctive character of border governance which has been empirically explored by this article by focusing on the discourses and practices of border actors of two sovereigns: Turkey and Greece. Within this contextualized wet ontology, the article aimed to unpack the web of narratives, acts and technologies monitoring the clandestine migration and constituting the space of the Aegean. The wet ontology of the sea in general and the particular geophysicality of the Aegean – the proximity, lack of SAR zone, lower volume of sea, smaller dingies and patrolling speed boats – shape the politics of control and acts of violence.

First, the article analyzed the spatial partition, *the nomos* of the Aegean Sea by two sovereigns that is shaped around the principle of midline. The sovereign actors, border guards, in each country have their specific organizational structure and "social universe" producing this space. They both adopt proliferated surveillance technologies in order to establish "a totalizing panoptic view"; but nevertheless it is hard to argue that they can accomplish that goal on the wet ontology of the Aegean. While Turkey operates in highly vertical organizational composition of the maritime management to combat against the clandestine migration, Greece tries to pursue border management via local communication of multiple actors, including Frontex personnel and limited access of rescue humanitarians.

Second, the article has shown that the meaning of SAR gains only situational connotation in the Aegean in which every migrant boat is considered "in distress" that needs to be searched and rescued. This theoretically humanitarian consideration is profited by the border officials in order to practice multiple techniques of interception that are legitimized in the name of rescue. Hence, on the contrary to the common politics in the Central Mediterranean where evading, deferring and delaying of SAR responsibility are used as the ways of "prevention through deterrence" (Doty, 2011), the main mode of governance in the Aegean Sea is rather based on the politics of *interception in the name of the rescue*. Everyday battle occurs with the techniques of interceptions on the waves of the Aegean; evidence is erased with the bodies disappearing in the depth of the sea; and the ones who are still alive are depicted as the

rescued ones. The wet ontology of the sea and accordingly the practice of rescue inevitably provide a special opportunity for the justification of the interception techniques aiming to handle spatial control and border security. The act of rescue is profited by the armed forces to intercept or pull/push back the dingies as a strategy of moderated violence. Since the accountability and evidence is hard to achieve on the waves of the sea, rescue becomes a *thick* field providing a wide spectrum of maneuver for the armed forces to justify this systematic violence.

The notion of "wet ontology" that is utilized in this article, foregrounding the materiality of the sea, generates a rich perspective to reconfigure the materialization of power. Despite all of the sophisticated surveillance mechanisms today, the waves do not allow to totally comprehend the space; migrants are still "bursting onto the scene". But concomitantly, the same waves provide circumstances of justification mechanisms for the armed forces where the act of rescue becomes a strategic tool for a moderated violence of border security. For both politics of control and mobility, the watery world (Anderson and Peters 2014) of the sea has particular possibilities and limitations. The concept also exhibits the overlapping, competing and complex acts of sovereign actors on the waves, transgressing the territorial demarcations on daily basis. In today's world, a moving migrant boat represents a vital agent to uncloak these contested spaces and sovereignties, as well as the regimes of violence and resistance.

4.6 References

Agier, M. (2011). *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government*. Trans David Fernbach. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Amoore, L. (2007). Vigilant visualities: The watchful politics of the war on terror. *Security Dialogue,* 38(2), 215–32.

Anderson, J. & Kimberley, P. (Eds) (2014). *Water Worlds: Human Geographies of the Ocean*. London/New York: Routledge.

Aradau, C. (2004). The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking. *Millennium*, 33 (2), 251–278.

Barnett, M. & Weiss, T. G. (2008). *Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power and ethics.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Benton, L. (2009). *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bigo, D. (2014). The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/navy – border guards/ police – database analyst. *Security Dialogue,* 45(3),209–225.

Bose, S. (2009). *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Casas-Corters, M., Cobarrubias, S., Heller, C. & Pezzani, L. (2017). Clashing Cartographies, Migrating Maps: The Politics of Mobility at the External Borders of E.U.Rope. *ACME,* 16(1), 1–33.

Cuttitta, P. (2018). Inclusion and Exclusion in the Fragmented Space of the Sea. Actors, Territories and Legal Regimes between Libya and Italy. In Burroughs, E. & Williams,

K. (Eds.), *Contemporary Boat Migration: Data, Geopolitics and Discourses*, (pp. 75-94). Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham.

Cuttitta, P. & Last, T. (2020). *Border Deaths: Causes, Dynamics and Consequences of Migration-related Mortality*. Amsterdam University Press.

Davies, T., Isakjee, A. & Dhesi, S. (2017). Violent inaction: the necropolitical experience of refugees in Europe. *Antipode*, 49(5), 1263–84.

Doty, R.L. (2011). Bare life: Border-crossing deaths and spaces of moral alibi. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 29(4), 599–612.

Fassin, D. (2012). *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*. Trans Rachel Gomme Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Feldman, I. & Ticktin, M. (Eds.) (2010). *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Fekete, L. (2003). Death at the Border – Who Is to Blame? *European Race Bulletin*, (44), 2-4.

Ferrer-Gallardo, X. & Vab Houtum, H. (2014). The Not so Collateral Damage Politics of Deadly EU Border Control. *Acme: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*, 13(2), 295-304.

Gilroy, P. (1993). *The Black Atlantic.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Grotius, H. (2004). *The Free Sea.* Trans Richard Hakluyt. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Heller, C. & Pezzani, L. (2012). Forensic oceanography: *Left-To-Die* boat case. Available at: http://migrantsatsea.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/forensic-oceanography-report-11april20121.pdf

Heller, C. & Pezzani, L. (2014). Liquid traces: Investigating the Deaths of Migrants at the EU's maritime frontier. In Weizman, E. (Ed.), *Fronsis. The Architecture of Public Truth* (pp. 656-684) Berlin: Sternberg Press.

Ignatieff, M. (2004). *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Karadağ, S. (2019). Extraterritoriality of European borders to Turkey: an implementation perspective of counteractive strategies. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 7(12), 1-16.

Kuus, M. (2013). Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Sceptical Intervention. *Geopolitics,*18 (1), 115–131.

Jones, R. (2015). The Mediterranean: international region and deadly border. *Nordia*, 44(4), 37-42.

Lewis, M. W. (1999). Dividing the Ocean Sea. *Geographical Review*, 8(2), 188–214.

Longo, M. (2017). *The politics of Borders*. Cambridge University Press.

Malkki, L. (1996). Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism and Dehistoricisation. *Cultural Anthropology*, 11(3), 377–404.

Mawani, R. (2018). *Across Oceans of Law: The Komagata Maru and Jurisdiction in the Time of Empire*. Duke University Press.

Mbembe, A. (2019). *Necropolitics*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Ophir, A. (2005). *The Order of Evils: Toward an Ontology of Morals*. Trans Rela Mazali and Havi Carel, New York: Zone Books.

Schmitt, C. (2003). *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europacum*. Telos, New York.

Steinberg, P. & Peters, K. (2015). Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: Giving depth to volume through oceanic thinking. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 33(2), 247–264.

Squire, V. (2016). Governing migration through death in Europe and the US: Identification, burial and the crisis of modern humanism. *European Journal of International Relations, 23(3),* 1-20.

Squire, V. (2015). *Post/Humanitarian Border Po9litics between Mexico and the US: People, Places, Things*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Stierl, M. (2016). A sea of struggle–activist border interventions in the Mediterranean Sea. *Citizenship Studies*, 20(5), 561–578.

Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015). The humanitarian politics of European border policing: Frontex and border police in Evros. *International Political Sociology*, 9(1), 53–69.

Redfield, P. (2013). *Life in crisis: The ethical journey of doctors without borders*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rediker, M. (2007). *The Slave Ship: A Human History*. New York: Viking.

Tazzioli, M. (2016). Eurosur, Humanitarian Visibility, and (Nearly) Real-time Mapping in the Mediterranean. *ACME,* 15(3), 561–579.

Ticktin, M. (2005). Policing and Humanitarianism in France: Immigration and the Turn to Law as State of Exception. *Interventions*, 7 (3), 347–368.

Urrera, L.A. (2004). *The Devil's Highway: A True Story*. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015). *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walters, W. (2011). Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Humanitarian Border. In Bröckling, U., Krasman, S. & Lemke, T. (Eds.), *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges*, New York, NY: Routledge.

Weber, L. & Pickering, S. (2011). *Globalization and Borders. Death at the Global Frontier*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Weizman, E. (2011). *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence From Arendt to Gaza*. London: Verso.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The main question of the dissertation was: What is the nature of migration and border governance in the Aegean Sea since the refugee movement of 2015? This question required a thorough analysis of the dynamics of border governance on both sides of the Aegean Sea, namely Greece and Turkey, while it was also linked to the broader scale of the EU's governmental techniques particularly in the last decade. Accordingly, the study asked: How has the European border regime manifested itself within the context of the Aegean Sea? This study provided contextualized and nuanced analysis of the border governance between Greece and Turkey. Situated within the wider European governmentality, the border space of the Aegean Sea has its own geopolitical and relational configuration.

The migratory movements from Turkey to Europe are long-lasting phenomena having historical and structural background. Since the 1990s, Turkey has been a transit zone for displaced populations aiming to reach Europe. Concomitantly, the issue of migration governance has become a determining factor in the relationship with the EU in her long-standing candidacy. Within this decades-long history, the year of 2015 represents a boiling point that witnessed a movement of approximately one million displaced people towards Europe in couple of months. This historical moment has transformed the border space of the Aegean Sea as well as the border governance of two sovereigns. Multiple actors have started to be involved; surveillance technologies have been proliferated; humanitarian narrative has become the leading banner; and thus, entanglement of

security and humanitarianism has become the dominant character of the migration management.

The study demonstrated the materialized manifestations of this entanglement embedded within the social field of the Aegean. By virtue of the ethnographic research design adopted, the study unpacked the web of narratives, practices and complex relations that monitor the migration and constitute the space of the Aegean. The tacit and informal knowledge of both Greece (Lesbos) and Turkey have been provided at multiple levels in each chapter.

The main argument of this dissertation crosscutting the three chapters has been that since 2015 the Aegean Sea has witnessed an intensified form of security-humanitarian entanglement at multiple levels in border governance. This created a highly blurred ground upon which subjectivities and meanings of certain acts are formed. This nebulous space has not only been resulted by the intertwined logics of security and humanitarianism but also has created the conditions for the *moralization of political space* in which certain moral hierarchies and strategies are generated. For instance, Turkey profits from the narrative built on the humanitarian norms and operational capacity that has generally been predicated upon a Euro–centered geography. Similarly, militaries embrace the narrative of rescue humanitarians while degrading them morally and project themselves as the side with a better operational capacity. Furthermore, the military acts of interception have become legitimized as the acts of rescue. In all, presupposed dispositions of certain acts and actors have become reversed, manipulated and coopted, which has become the major management tool in the Aegean.

Each chapter in the dissertation analyzed different dimensions of this moral hierarchies produced at the border space: (i) How does Turkey respond to the European externalized border politics at micro-level? Accordingly, how is security-humanitarian nexus internalized and operationalized by Turkish border actors vis-à-vis their European counterparts? (ii) How does this nexus manifest itself between the military and the humanitarian actors in Greece? (iii) How are certain military actions legitimized in the name of rescue?

In Chapter 2, the geopolitical subjectivity of Turkey and thereby subjectivity of Turkish border actors have been taken into account while analyzing the wider European externalization project. It has been indicated that border externalization process has not simply moved outward from the European center towards its periphery. The process is not only contentious, but also witnesses strategic tactics of Turkey reversing the dependency relationship. By highlighting the significance of disengagement from a Eurocentric gaze, the chapter explored how seemingly Western-born narrative of humanitarian ethos has been captured by the Turkish border actors in order to project themselves as morally and operationally superior in relation to their European counterparts. With the case of Turkey, the chapter emphasized the constitutive role of the periphery in the migration governance challenging the general narrative within the externalization literature.

In Chapter 3, the relationship between military and rescue humanitarians in Lesbos was the focus. Since 2015, Lesbos has witnessed the proliferation of actors within the border space. Especially in the summer 2015, there were hundreds of NGOs operating in the Aegean Sea without working in order. By 2016, with the EU-Turkey Statement, the number of rescue NGOs decreased and the Hellenic Coast Guard has taken back the full authority of border governance. However, despite the drop in their numbers, the military started to work with NGOs in search and rescue operations. This chapter analyzed how this "work" has been materialized in their daily life. The analysis confirms the existing literature that describes two intertwined processes of security-humanitarian nexus: military forces performing humanitarian tasks and humanitarians performing security tasks. However, the argument of this chapter went beyond than that and explored how a minimalist and emergency-based humanitarian narrative was easily embraced by the military that attempted to present itself as the true bearers of humanitarianism.

In Chapter 4, the maritime composition of the Aegean Sea received particular attention together with its unique "wet ontology". The Aegean Sea has certain maritime configuration that differentiates it from the Central Mediterranean. The chapter explored the implications that derive from the lower volume of the sea and geophysical proximity of two territorial lands. In that, migration journeys have been pursued by small rubber dingies while they were controlled by border officials also with small speed boats

equipped with the capacity of rapid maneuver on the sea. Given the lack of SAR zone between Lesbos and Turkish shores, the meaning of "distress" obtains a situational connotation in which every refugee boat is *ipso facto* "potential of danger" that needs to be searched and rescued. This "necessity" turns into the adoption of military interception techniques in the name of rescue. The chapter unpacked the governing logic of *interception in the name of rescue* both in Greek and Turkish territorial waters in their embedded organizational structure. The chapter shed light on how the act of rescue was coopted by armed forces through intercepting or pulling/pushing back the refugee boats as a strategy of moderated violence.

5.1 Further Discussions

In this section, I would like to mention further comments that can be derived from the research, which has provided me with deep insights about the field but have not been explicitly articulated within the existing three chapters.

Firstly, the research indicated that in the aftermath of the EU-Turkey Statement, the whole organizational body of the coast guards has been changed in a strictly top down and centralized fashion. The Turkish Coast Guard Command was tied to the Ministry of Interior as a general armed law enforcement force and this development brought about two intertwined results: the operational structure has become overcentralized and the decision-making procedure has been completely subjected to the political agenda. One regional center – the Regional Operational Center (ROC) – directing the whole Aegean coastline has become the main unit without permitting any local-based, autonomous action. Every coast guard unit along the Aegean coastline must receive permission from the ROC before taking any action in border governance. Even the acts of rescue need to be approved by the center for them to be operationalized. And because the body is now affiliated to the Ministry of Interior, the border decisions have been highly in synch with the government's political agenda. This organizational shift has provided Turkish government with an unequalled opportunity to govern the Aegean coastline by means of *ad hoc* based practices, which can be applied immediately. In parallel with daily political agenda and foreign policy, the border control could be entirely suspended or could be intensified on day-to-day basis. The whole organizational shift since 2016 has

provided operational grounds to make the border governance highly influenced by the daily political agenda. My own experience as well as the fluctuations in the statistics indicates that the numbers of arrivals in Greece increase whenever there is a political conflict between Turkey and the EU – or a crisis in Turkey's domestic or foreign politics.

Secondly, as opposed to Turkish case, there are multiple actors involved in the border practice in Greek territorial waters as explored in Chapter 4. The relationship between the Greek military and rescue NGOs has been already mentioned. In addition to that, the research also demonstrated a variance within the relationship between Hellenic Coast Guard and Frontex teams. Throughout my fieldwork, I had the chance to observe and work with two different Frontex teams: Portuguese and Bulgarian. Based on my own experience as well as the interviews with HCG, it could be argued that the nationality of the Frontex personnel relatively affects the collaboration in border governance in the Aegean Sea. While the organizational habits of Mediterranean countries (Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek) represent similar features in border practice, Frontex teams from other European members contributes to certain operational challenges. HCG experiences various conflicts especially with the teams from Scandinavian and Central and Eastern European countries. Although HCG aims to keep its central authority in the Aegean, in the daily routine, Frontex personnel might transcend the limits of their operational authority that creates tension.

Thirdly, the study has captured the variance in the time process in 2015-2018. While there was an extremely chaotic environment in the summer of 2015 since the Turkish border actors did not take any action to stop the mobility. This has changed drastically with the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 while the operational structure in Turkey, as mentioned above, has been completely transformed. In Greece, the numbers of rescue NGOs decreased and the space of operation of the rest has been limited day by day. HCG retook the central authority and started to force the rescue humanitarians to be fully subjected to their commands. First, the time schedule of boat exercises on the sea has been rearranged. While NGOs were free to be present on the sea in 2016, their time period has been gradually constrained from 2017 onwards. More specifically, their operations on the boat have become limited to two-hours in a day and determined by the

HCG. These limitations were adopted under the narrative of "regulating the amateurs" insofar as in the eyes of the military, the rescue humanitarians represent a profile that performs "artistic and useless" actions that aim self-promotion and higher donation. Notwithstanding this negative depiction, HCG simultaneously needs the assistance and support of humanitarians in search and rescue operations. As a solution, HCG has allowed their presence but in a limited area of operation while using the accusation of "doing smuggling" as discursive weapon against possible resistance coming from rescue humanitarians. Although the wide network of smugglers/facilitators, including local fishermen, taxi and bus drivers, personnel of municipalities, and even personnel of armed forces, is generally known in local areas, it is strategically used as a discursive weapon by the authorities.

5.2 Contributions of the Study

In this section, I would like to briefly summarize the theoretical and methodological contributions of the study to the existing scholarship. To begin with, this research is an attempt to investigate border governance "on the ground". Ethnographic research design in the field of border studies is still quite rare since it is quite difficult to enter military zones. However, the involvement of humanitarians in the Aegean border space since 2015 provided me with the possibility to enter this field. Thus, the multi-sited ethnographic research design came with two pivotal opportunities: (i) ability to capture the tacit and informal knowledge that is not possible to have with conducted interviews and outsider observation; (ii) ability to capture the variance between different sites and time periods that is not possible to have through a research conducted in a shorter period of time.

By virtue of its research design, the study contributes to the existing scholarship on the EU-Turkey relations. Since 2015, the migration governance has become the major diplomacy between the two actors shaping their political agenda. However, the studies within this scholarship usually adopt an analysis of formal and institutional developments regarding the border governance both in Greece and Turkey. By providing material manifestations on the ground, the study opens the black box of a complex web of relations within the border space of the Aegean Sea.

The material grounds of the research indicating how security-humanitarian entanglement is manifested provide significant contribution to the scholarship in the critical security and border studies. Although this entanglement has been the subject of numerous studies within the field, studies unpacking the daily routine military and humanitarian actors in both the European and non-European geographies are still quite rare. Thus, the study does not only explore the manifestations of security-humanitarian nexus in a European geography in a nuanced way but it also extends the central focus towards a non-European geography and manages to disengage from the Eurocentric gaze. Furthermore, among non-European geographies standing at the external frontiers of the EU, Turkey has been the country that has received the least attention within the critical border scholarship. Therefore, my work provides theoretical, geographical, and methodological contributions to the existing literature with regards to the cases of Greece and Turkey.

The maritime configuration of the Aegean Sea has distinctive features that have fruitful potential to contribute to the studies particularly focus on maritime border policing. With respect to the European border regime, the scholarship mostly pays attention to the maritime space of the Central Mediterranean. The politics of border regime creating "a deadly space" through politics of irresponsibility, abandonment, and nonaction in the Central Mediterranean translates into the strategy of military interceptions in the name of rescue in the Aegean Sea. Thus, the form of maritime politics in the Aegean adds a new dynamic of governance strategy into the existing conceptualizations.

5.3 Avenues for Further Research

While capturing the dynamics between 2015 and 2018, this research does not examine the still ongoing process from 2019 onwards. Since last year, a right-wing government was formed in Greece and a set of policies have started to be implemented in Lesbos. Synchronously, in February 2019, Turkey announced that she opened her borders with Greece because of the EU's lack of efforts in sharing the burden. After the announcement of the government, thousands of people started to gather at the Greek-Turkish land border while others attempted to cross the Aegean Sea by boat. The videos

of refugees getting in plastic boats were broadcasted live on mainstream TV channels. It was even possible to witness live interviews with smugglers, who proudly explain their operations on the same TV channels.

The announcement triggered the anti-refugee reactions in Lesbos and the local community –the first I have seen – started to use violence against refugees and the NGOs on the island. In the following weeks, locals burned the temporary camp in Skala which I worked throughout my field. As a consequence of the drastic increase of tension in Lesbos, numerous NGOs had to stop operating. Likewise, in Skala Sikamineas, the only active rescue NGO, Refugee Rescue/MoChara, announced that they stopped their operations and left the island. The catastrophic atmosphere was furthered with the burning of Moria, the main camp in Lesbos hosting more than 13 thousand refugees. As a response to spread of Covid-19 pandemic within the camp and the concomitant non-action of authorities, the refugees started a fire and burned the whole infrastructure of Moria to indicate their resistance. Considering all these recent developments in Greece and Turkey, there is an urgent necessity to examine the current dynamics in border governance. I hope this dissertation will provide a worthwhile ground for the studies about this region in the upcoming years.

Appendix

List of Interviewees with their affiliations

2016 Turkey	
Dikili Turkish Coast Guard Team	15
Dikili Customs Officers	4
Dikili IOM	2
Izmir ASAM	1
The Association Bridging Peoples	1
Kapılar İnitiative Basmane	2
Municipality of Dikili	2
Police Officer in Dikili	1

2017 Greece (Lesbos)	
FRONTEX personnel (Portuguese)	7
Hellenic Coast Guard Mytilene	2
ProActiva Open Arms	3
Watch the Med	1
Sea Watch	1
ERCI	1
Refugee for Refugees	1

2018 Greece (Lesbos)	
Refugee Rescue/Mo Chara	**1**
Lighthouse Relief	**1**
IsraAID	**1**
MSF Mytilene	**2**
UNHCR	**1**
2018 Turkey	
Dikili Coast Guard Team	**11**
Çeşme Coast Guard Team	**8**
Bodrum Coast Guard Team	**7**
Küçükkuyu Coast Guard Team	**3**
MSF Istanbul	**1**
DGMM Izmir	**2**
DGMM Ankara	**1**
EU Delegation of Turkey	**1**
TOTAL	**84**