BAŞKENT UNIVERSITY
EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE MOBILIZATION OF THE AL-NAHDA MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA (1981-2010)

A Ph.D. DISSERTATION

BY

HALİL ATİLLA SİVRİKAYA

ANKARA – 2023

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BAŞKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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ABSTRACT

THE MOBILIZATION OF THE AL-NAHDA MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA (1981-2010)

Sivrikaya, Halil Atilla
Doctor of Philosophy, Political Science
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The research question of this dissertation is how best to explain the nonviolent mobilization of the al-Nahda in Tunisia during a three-decade state repression between 1981 and 2010. This study examines why and how the al-Nahda emerged; founded a political party, created distinct goals different from contemporary Islamist movements in Tunisia, and showed remarkable moderation, pragmatism and flexibility in its preferences of alliance, strategies and policies, involving alliance with the secular groups facing regime repression.

This dissertation analyzes the al-Nahda in accordance with the Social Movement Theory, and in this context, applies the Political Process Model (PPM) advanced mainly by Sidney George Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. The answer to the research question hence lies in uncovering the changing and transforming factors, which are political opportunity structures, organizational dynamics and framing processes, at both international and national levels of the political domain as well as the movement. Process tracing method is also essential to underline these factors at different periods of the movement, which form the strategy of its political engagement.

This dissertation contributes to literature by examining mobilization of an Islamist movement in a non-Western semi-authoritarian political setting by applying the PPM. Drawing on the al-Nahda case, this dissertation argues that an Islamist movement can survive and mobilize its base through moderation despite a heavy state repression.

Keywords: al-Nahda Movement (*Harakat al-Nahda*), Tunisia, Social Movement Theory, Political Process Model, Islamist Movements, State Repression, Resilience of Movement

ÖZET

TUNUS'TA EN-NAHDA HAREKETİ'NİN MOBİLİZASYONU (1981-2010)

Sivrikaya, Halil Atilla
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi
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Bu tezin araştırma sorusu, 1981 ile 2010 yılları arasında otuz yıl süren devlet baskısı sırasında Tunus'taki En-Nahda'nın şiddet içermeyen toplumsal hareketliliğinin en iyi nasıl bir şekilde açıklanacağıdır. Bu çalışma, En-Nahda'nın neden ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını; siyasi bir parti kurduğunu, Tunus'taki çağdaşı İslami hareketlerden farklı hedefler yarattığını ve ittifak tercihlerinde (ki aralarında rejimin baskısına maruz kalan seküler gruplar da vardı), stratejilerinde ve politikalarında dikkate değer bir ılımlılık, pragmatizm ve esneklik gösterdiğini araştırıyor.

Bu tez, En-Nahda'yı Sosyal Hareket Teorisi'ne göre analiz ediyor ve bu bağlamda Sidney George Tarrow, Doug McAdam ve Charles Tilly tarafından geliştirilen Siyasi Süreç Modeli'ni uyguluyor. Dolayısıyla araştırma sorusunun cevabı, siyasi fırsat yapıları, örgütsel dinamikler ve çerçeveleme süreçleri gibi değişen ve dönüşen faktörleri siyasi alanın ve hareketin hem uluslararası hem de yerel düzeylerinde ortaya çıkarmakta yatıyor. Hareketin politik stratejisini belirleyen bu faktörlerin farklı dönemlerde altının çizilmesi ise süreç izleme yöntemini elzem kılıyor.

Bu tez, Siyasi Süreç Modeli'ni uygulayarak Batılı olmayan yarı otoriter bir siyasi ortamda İslami bir hareketin toplumsal hareketliliğini inceleyerek literatüre katkıda bulunuyor. En-Nahda örneğinden yola çıkan bu tez, İslami bir hareketin, ağır bir devlet baskısına rağmen ılımlılık yoluyla ayakta kalabileceğini ve tabanını harekete geçirebileceğini savunuyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: En-Nahda Hareketi, Tunus, Sosyal Hareket Teorisi, Siyasi Süreç Modeli, İslami Hareketler, Devlet Baskısı, Hareketin Dayanıklılığı

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

This dissertation involves a number of Arabic words, names and place names. In terms of transliteration from Arabic language, I comply with the simplified version of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*. Hence, ‘ indicates the letter **“ع”** (‘ayn) and ’ indicates the letter **“ء”** (hamza glottal stop). I do not utilize diacritics for the names of persons, places, or political movements. Thus, the movement, which is the main topic of this dissertation, is written as “al-Nahda” instead of En-Nahda, Ennahdha, or An-Nahda. In addition, especially for the specific words, which are more widespread in English like shari‘a (the religious law) and shura (the principle of consultation), I stick by the mainstream use of the *IJMES* version.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AISPP	International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners
CNLT	National Council for Liberties in Tunisia
CPG	Gafsa Phosphate Company
CRLDHT	National Committee to Support Mining Basin Residents
ECFR	European Council for Fatwa and Research
FIOE	Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front (of Algeria)
GMI	Young Muslims in Italy
HMS	Movement of Society for Peace (of Algeria)
GIF	Islamic Group in France
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWCC	International Women's Coordinating Committee
JI	Islamic Group
MAB	Muslim Association of Britain
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain
MDS	Movement of Socialist Democrats
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MINAB	Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (of the United Kingdom)
MTI	Islamic Tendency Movement
MUP	Popular Unity Movement
MWL	Muslim World League
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSMT	New Social Movement Theory
PCT	Tunisian Communist Party
PDP	Progressive Democratic Party (previously the RSP)
PLI	Islamic Liberation Party
PPM	Political Process Model
PSL	Social Liberal Party

PVP	Green Party for Progress
RCD	Democratic Constitutional Rally
RMT	Resource Mobilization Theory
RSP	Progressive Socialist Rally (later the PDP)
SWP	Socialist Workers Party (of the United Kingdom)
UCOII	Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy
UDC	Union of Unemployed Graduates
UDU	Unionist Democratic Union
UGET	General Union of Students of Tunisia
UGTE	Tunisian General Union of Students (associated with al-Nahda)
UGTT	Tunisian General Labour Union
UJM	Muslim Youth Union (of France)
UOIF	Union of Islamic Organizations of France

CHAPTER I

1. INTRODUCTION

Beginning from the founding era of Tunisia in 1956, Habib Bourguiba (1903-2000), the first president of Tunisia from 1957 until 1987, pursued pro-Western secular policies and modernization of the Tunisian society, and considered Islam as an obstacle to the implementation of Western reforms. Similarly, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali (1936-2019), the second president of Tunisia from 1987 until 2011, prepared the ground for the 2011 Uprisings by frustrating the hopes for democratization through centralizing the political authority in his own hands. All these semi-authoritarian repressive practices caused an opposition in the political arena from the liberals to the communists, but the most important political opposition movement that emerged against the Tunisian regime was the al-Nahda Movement *(Harakat al-Nahda)*, and it was also the most repressed movement by the regime since the independence of the country.

In this context, Tunisia deserves more attention regarding the mobilization of Islamist movements in terms of its characteristics, since there is a shortage of comprehensive studies regarding Islamism and the al-Nahda movement, in particular, within the limits of the semi-authoritarian structure of the Tunisian state until 2011. In this dissertation, I define Tunisia as a semi-authoritarian regime until 2011, since the Tunisian political authority used the rhetoric of liberal democracy, but tolerated the existence of a few formal democratic organizations, as well as allowing a restricted space for the opposition groups.[1] The Arab Uprisings in the winter of 2010, which challenged some of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region's entrenched authoritarian regimes, played an important role in the return of Rachid Ghannouchi[2] to Tunisia on 30 January 2011. In terms of democratic transition, the Tunisian government legalized the al-Nahda Party as of March 2011, and in

[1] Rory McCarthy also defines Tunisia as semi-authoritarian, since although there were regular elections, there was not chance that any party other than the regime's political party would win power. See: Rory McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda, Between Politics and Preaching* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 178.

[2] Rachid Ghannouchi (1941) is a Tunisian politician. He is co-founder and leader of the al-Nahda Party.

the following elections held on 23 October 2011, the party gained a victory by winning nearly 90 seats out of 217 seats with approximately 40 percent of the votes.[3]

The existing literature involves detailed analyses regarding the resilience of the Ben Ali's regime;[4] however, the number of analyses regarding resilience of the al-Nahda movement in spite of the state repression through decades is still limited. In the literature on Tunisian Islamism, scholars such as Susan Waltz, Nikki Keddie, Marion Boulby and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman engaged in studies regarding the rise of the Islamist movement in Tunisia and its most prominent organization, the al-Nahda movement, in the 1980s.[5] Although these studies give clues regarding the emergence and improvement of the Islamist movements in Tunisia, they do not cover the whole period when the al-Nahda struggled against the semi-authoritarian Tunisian regime from 1981 to 2010.

Moreover, the existing literature on Tunisian politics mainly concentrates on changes and challenges of political transition in Tunisia after the 2011 Uprisings.[6] This literature mainly focuses on how Tunisia transitioned from a semi-authoritarian regime to a democratic one. In addition, these studies do not answer how the al-Nahda movement survived and mobilized its supporters despite the state repression. Hence, due to the repression

[3] Noah Tesch, "Jasmine Revolution-Tunisian History," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 29 December 2011, Web: https://www.britannica.com/event/Jasmine-Revolution, Accessed: 2020-11-06.

[4] See: Francesco Cavatorta, "Geopolitical challenges to the success of democracy in North Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco," *Democratization* 8, 4 (2001), 175–194; Larbi Sadiki, "Political liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Façade democracy," *Democratization* 9, 4 (2002), 122–141; Béatrice Hibou, "Domination and control in Tunisia: Economic levers for the exercise of authoritarian power," *Review of African Political Economy* 33, 108 (2006), 185–206; John P. Entelis, "The unchanging politics of North Africa," *Middle East Policy* 14, 4 (2007), 23–41.

[5] See: Susan Waltz, "The Islamists challenge in Tunisia," *Journal of Arab Affairs* 3 (1984), 99–105; Susan Waltz, "Islamist appeal in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal* 40, 4 (1986), 651– 670; Nikki R. Keddie, "The Islamist movement in Tunisia," *Maghreb Review* 1, 1 (1986), 26–39; Marion Boulby, "The Islamic challenge: Tunisia since independence," *Third World Quarterly* 10, 2 (1988), 590–614; Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The Islamic challenge in North Africa," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8, 2 (1996), 171–188.

[6] See: Laryssa Chomiak, "The making of a revolution in Tunisia," *Middle East Law and Governance* 3, 1-2 (2011), 68–83; Mehdi Mabrouk, "A revolution for dignity and freedom: Preliminary observations on the social and cultural background to the Tunisian revolution," *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, 4 (2011), 625–635; Nouredinne Miladi, "Tunisia: A media led revolution?" *Media Development* 58, 2 (2011), 8-12; Muhammed Kerrou, "New Actors of the Revolution and the Political Transition in Tunisia," in *The Arab Spring: Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions?*, C. Henry and J. Ji-Hyang (Editors) (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 79–100; Amira Aleya-Sghaier, "The Tunisian Revolution: The Revolution of Dignity," in *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond*, R.R. Larémont (Editor) (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 30–52; Nader Fergany, *Arab Revolution in the 21st Century?: Lessons from Egypt and Tunisia* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Paola Rivetti and Rosita Di Peri, *Continuity And Change Before And After The Arab Uprisings: Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt* (Routledge, 2016); Safwan M. Masri, *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly* (Columbia University Press, 2017); Ruth Hanau Santini, *Limited Statehood in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia Citizenship, Economy and Security (Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean)* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Edwige Fortier, *Contested Politics in Tunisia: Civil Society in a Post-Authoritarian State* (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

experience of the al-Nahda movement from 1981 to 2010, the existing literature on this period is so limited, and this makes researchers pay less attention to this epoch of the movement in comparison to other mobilization cases in the Muslim world.

With the exception of the studies by Anne Wolf, Rory McCarthy, and Chuchu Zhang,[7] there is a gap in the existing literature examining this period. Wolf examines history of the al-Nahda from its origins to the present. Her study can be considered as a very valuable contribution to the literature, since it involves multiple formal and informal interviews with numerous actors in addition to the secondary academic materials benefitted in its preparation; however, this work does not go beyond a historiography. McCarthy's research concentrates on the al-Nahda's experience of activism through a fieldwork with grassroots activists of the movement, and this study has also important contributions to the literature. On the other hand, although in McCarthy's research there is an attempt to link the al-Nahda movement with the Social Movement Theory, and the Political Process Model (PPM), in particular, the theory was not applied to the al-Nahda case in the fullest sense. The theoretical discussions on the al-Nahda case based on dynamic relations among the political processes, organizational dynamics and framing processes unfortunately remain limited in his work.

Furthermore, based on his field research, McCarthy analyzes the main ideological fracture within the al-Nahda movement between those who supported politics and those who advocated preaching, relying on how they considered and had experienced the identity of the al-Nahda.[8] In this dissertation, I argue that the main ideological split within the al-Nahda movement was between the hardliners and moderates when I took into account both the political inmates who survived under state repression inside Tunisia and the exiled members who struggled in the countries of asylum despite the existence of many obstacles. McCarthy also examines the al-Nahda movement at an extreme micro level by analyzing the case just in Sousse, a coastal city that is located 140 km south of the capital.

[7] See: Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia, The History of En-Nahda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda, Between Politics and Preaching*; Chuchu Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization, Tunisia's Ennahda and Algeria's HMS Compared, 1989–2014* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
[8] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 165.

In addition, the research has also shown that there were conflicts between those who were exiled and those who were imprisoned from time to time.[9] In this respect, the exiles and the inmates also formed two main groups within the movement.[10] The exiled group was a more educated and intellectual group, whereas the group that was imprisoned in Tunisia, which included members, such as Ali Laarayedh, Hamadi Jebali and Abdelfattah Mourou, was a group that knew the field very well.[11] Among these two groups, there was the rivalry between formally trained ones and self-taught ones.[12] However, the organization at both levels including the exiles and the inmates played a major role in the success of the movement and enabled the al-Nahda to influence a large part of the Tunisian society.[13]

Zhang focuses on how Islamist parties mobilize by comparing Tunisia's al-Nahda Movement and Algeria's Movement of Society for Peace (HMS/*Harakat Mujtama'a al-Slim*) from 1989 to 2014. Yet, although the Social Movement Theory and the PPM is applied in Zhang's study, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI/*Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami*/1981-1989), the predecessor of the al-Nahda, is not included in the analyses. Moreover, Zhang examines both the MTI and the al-Nahda as "abeyance structures"[14] although they were openly established formal political parties. It is possible to study only the Islamic Group (JI/*al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*/1970-1981), the predecessor of the MTI, as an abeyance structure, since the JI operated as an underground movement in Tunisia.

In this dissertation, I study the al-Nahda movement according to the Social Movement Theory, and I apply the PPM advanced mainly by Sidney George Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly.[15] The PPM serves as a theoretical perspective in terms of emphasizing

[9] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] The concept of abeyance focuses on the obstructions, which social movements confront in case of surviving in disadvantageous political milieus. In abeyance literature, it is possible to encounter with researches of collective action in semi-democratic states as well as studies of social activism in non-democratic regimes. For further information, see: Verta Taylor, "Social movement continuity: The women's movement in abeyance," *American Sociological Review* 54, 5 (1989), 761–775; Laurel L. Holland and Sherry Cable, "Reconceptualizing social movement abeyance: The role of internal processes and culture in cycles of movement abeyance and resurgence," *Sociological Focus*, 35 (2002), 297-314; Celia Valiente, "Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies: The women's movement in Franco's Spain," *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 38 (2015), 259-290.
[15] See: Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization To Revolution* (Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978); Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Sidney George Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

the significance of shared and socially formed thoughts in collective action,[16] and this model plays an essential role in analyzing the emergence and mobilization of social movements.[17] As well as focusing on favorable political milieus, this model emphasizes that organizations' inherent structures and framing processes are primary factors that specify to what extent the potency for social mobilization can be realized.[18]

The studies that apply the PPM as part of the Social Movement Theory mainly focus on liberal democracies in the West.[19] On the other hand, there is also growing number of studies on non-Western authoritarian cases, such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, as well as the semi-authoritarian ones, and these studies examine interactions between the regime and the Islamist movements, opposition parties' activities and mobilization processes.[20] In this respect, this dissertation will contribute to this literature by examining mobilization in a non-Western semi-authoritarian political setting by applying the PPM. The research question of this dissertation is how best to explain the nonviolent mobilization of the al-Nahda in Tunisia during a three-decade state repression between 1981 and 2010.

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[16] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements/Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings,* D.McAdam, J.McCarthy, and M.Zald (Editors) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1-20, 5.

[17] See: McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes,"

[18] John McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977), 1212-1241; Doug McAdam, "Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer," *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1986), 64–90.

[19] See: Ronald Aminzade, "Between Movement and Party: The Transformation of Mid-Nineteenth-Century French Republicanism," in *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, J.Jenkins and B. Klandermans (Editors) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 39–62; Kenneth T. Andrews, "The impacts of social movements on the political process: The civil rights movement and black electoral politics in Mississippi," *American Sociological Review* 62, 5 (1997), 800–819; 49-74; Hans De Witte and Bert Klandermans, "Political racism in Flanders and the Netherlands: Explaining differences in the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26, 4 (2000), 699-717.

[20] See: Christopher Alexander, "Opportunities, organizations, and ideas: Islamists and workers in Tunisia and Algeria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, 4 (2000), 465-490; Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (New York: Suny Press, 2001); Ziad Munson, "Islamic mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly*, 42, 4 (2001), 487-510; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Jillian Schwedler, "The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Polity," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Q. Wiktorowicz (Editor) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 205-230; Reinoud Leenders, "Social Movement Theory and the onset of the popular uprising in Syria," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35, 3 (2013), 273-289; Dara Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Joas Wagemakers, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

This dissertation focuses on political opportunities, as well as organizational dynamics and framing processes, in the mobilization process of the al-Nahda movement. In analyzing how the al-Nahda enhanced from an abeyance structure to a banned political party, and how the movement mobilized its supporters in case of political opportunities; this dissertation benefitted from primary sources like party documents and interviews held by the author in Arabic, as well as the secondary literature. The dissertation also provides contributions to the PPM by considering the cultural sides of the case. Among the al-Nahda members and supporters, similar daily practices, highly exclusive emotions, same sufferings kept the cohesion of the al-Nahda movement despite the regime repression. Moreover, this dissertation also highlights that even in semi-authoritarian settings with partial exclusive milieu, Islamist movements are able to function and mobilize by organizational dynamics and creative framing strategies, which utilize political opportunities in a pragmatic way.

1.1. Literature on Islamist Mobilization

In the existing literature, Islam means "a monotheistic faith regarded as revealed through Muhammad as the Prophet of Allah".[21] Islam is regarded by its supporters as the last of the revealed religions, and Muhammad is considered as the last of the prophetesses, constructing on and perfecting the instances and tenets of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus.[22] Islamism, on the other hand, refers to a wide set of modern political ideologies, which use and get inspired by Islamic symbols and customs following a sociopolitical aim.[23] Islamist movements are regarded as various religious trends within the Muslim realm, which desire to reorganize society with respect to Islam.[24] The goals of the Islamist movements differ broadly in terms of their interpretations and implementations of Islamist tradition.[25] Political Islam refers to any interpretation of Islam, which subserves as an essence for

[21] "Islam," O*xford Reference*, Accessed: 2023-11-15, Web: https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100012298.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Adam Zeidan, "Islamism," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 13 October 2023, Web: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamism, Accessed: 2023-11-15.
[24] Asef Bayat, "Islamic Movements," in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, D.A.Snow, D.Porta, B.Klandermans and D.McAdam (Editors). John Wiley & Sons, 2022, 1-7.
[25] Zeidan, "Islamism,"

political identity and action.[26] In other words, Political Islam is regarded as "the movements representing modern political mobilization in the name of Islam, a trend that emerged in the late 20th century".[27]

The literature on political Islam in the Muslim world mainly concentrates on cultural and socio-economic factors lying behind the movement's mobilization.[28] Contemporary Social Movement Theory bases the success of movement efforts on mobilization.[29] Political mobilization represents exciting masses of people, who aim to yield themselves in the political arena and to take political initiatives.[30] The mobilization process includes two important actors: The movement entrepreneurs and the mobilized people.[31] In order to mobilize citizens into politics, movement leaders do not only touch pre-existing discontent, but they also form motivations, resources, and political opportunities for collective action.[32]

It is possible to infer three main patterns regarding the collective action in the mobilization literature. First, we talk about a mobilized and coordinated group following a common interest, whether its size is small/homogeneous, or large/heterogeneous.[33] Second, we observe a network of active relationship among these group members in which organization, leadership, media and communication play important role.[34] Finally, we should take into account the existence of non-linear links and the mediating initiatives taken by institutions, as well as the social ties, which make members know about the actions of others.[35]

In the mobilization literature, collective action refers to a wide range of intentional collective behavior, the most organized of which are social movements that happen over

[26] John O. Voll and Tamara Sonn, "Political Islam," *Oxford Bibliographies*, 02 July 2019, Web: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0063.xml, Accessed: 2023-11-15.
[27] Voll and Sonn, "Political Islam,"
[28] Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.
[29] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*: *Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, 7.
[30] Frank Bealey and Allan Griswold Johnson, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: A User's Guide to Its Terms* (Malden: Blackwell, 1999), 214.
[31] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 23.
[32] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 7-8.
[33] Aniruddha Dasgupta and Victoria A. Beard, "Community driven development, collective action and elite capture in Indonesia," *Development and Change* 38, 2 (2007), 229–249.
[34] Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 71.
[35] Michael Macy, "Chains of cooperation: Threshold effect in collective action," *American Sociological Review* 56, 6 (1991), 730–747.

longer periods with long-term goals and organizational structures.[36] Actually, the Arab street is political in terms of collective sensibilities, shared feelings, and public judgment of ordinary individuals in their daily conversations and practices, which are performed in taxis, buses, stores, walkways, or in massive demonstrations.[37] In this sense, the Arab street works as a passive network empowering people to get together, identify with each other and act with collective action motive.[38] To illustrate, Prince Nayef had oppresed Islamist activists following the Gulf War and negotiated their salvation in the late 1990s; in the process, he had constructed extensive networks in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)[39] and the Salafi movement, which resulted in thoughts that the royal family had built the "one man, seven votes" rule exactly to co-opt preferable activists into government circles.[40]

Actually, the Islamist movements are considered as a remarkable political force in the Muslim majority countries. Islam occupies a significant place in the public discourses, media, and academy.[41] The Islamist movements play an important role in the conduct of opposition activities, and they invite regimes to make reforms through founding a socio-political system based on their politicized interpretation of Islam.[42] Moncef Marzouki, the President of Tunisia between 2011 and 2014, states that Arab community does not live in a land; on the contrary, it lives in a language.[43] In other words, the Arabic language goes back through the Qurʾan, and finally to the poetry and speech of pre-Islamic Arabia.[44] This

[36] Morrill Rao and Mayer Zald, "How social movements and collective action create new organizational forms," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 22 (2000), 239-282.
[37] Choukri Hmed, "Réseaux dormants, contingence et structures (Abeyance networks, contingency and structures)," *Revue Française de Science Politique* 62, 5 (2012), 797-820.
[38] Hmed, "Réseaux dormants, contingence et structures,"
[39] The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is an international Sunni Islamist foundation established in Egypt by an Islamic intellectual and ideologist Hassan El-Banna in 1928. See: Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 269; Youssef al-Hanachi, *الإسلام السياسي في تونس (al-Islam al-Siyasi fi Tunis/Political Islam in Tunisia)* (Tunisia, 2012), 3. The MB in Egypt has had a great advantage in terms of ideology and organization over the rest of the Islamist movements. See: Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shanqiti, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan: Madkhal ila Fikraha al-Istratiji wa al-Tanzimi (The Islamic Movement in Sudan: An Introduction to Its Strategic and Organizational Thought* (London: Dar al-Hikma, 2002), 69. The MB offshoots in the region involve Syria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. See: Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,* 134. The MB will be dissussed in the related chapters.
[40] Pascal Menoret, *Graveyard of Clerics: Everyday Activism in Saudi Arabia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), 94-95.
[41] Sami Zubaida, "Is there a Muslim society? Ernest Gellner's sociology of Islam," *Economy and Society* 24, 2 (1995), 155-188.
[42] Oded Haklai, "Authoritarianism and Islamic movements in the Middle East: Research and theory building in the twenty-first century," *International Studies Review* 11, (2009), 27-45.
[43] Tim Mackintosh-Smith, *Arabs: A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 140.
[44] Mackintosh-Smith, *Arabs: A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires,* 140.

also prepares an appropriate ground for mobilization and collective action within the Muslim realm.

The Islamist movements are in struggle with multiple players involving the state over both elucidation of symbols and domination of the organizations, both formal and informal, which fabricate and maintain them.[45] The Islamist movements, which encounter with opposition from the regimes, are able to attract anti-regime advocators, who consider them as an opposition movement rather a rigid Islamist party.[46] Especially under semi-authoritarian regimes, the Islamist movements are generally thought to benefit from political opportunities over other opposition groups, whether via providing social services, institutional capability, ideological hegemony, or a prestige for well governance.[47]

According to Diane Singerman, Islamist movements are considered as a response against the nonexistence of democracy in the Muslim realm.[48] In fact, Islamist political parties are different from secular ones, since they struggle for enhancing an Islamist way of life and serving the interests of the Muslim Ummah in addition to certain religious ideologies.[49] They internalize formation of a society that is gripped by Islamic teachings and values originated from the sources of shari'a.[50]

Some studies show that Islamist organizations and especially mosques form organizational resources for recruitment of new activists, since welfare associations do not only pursue social tasks, but they also have political agendas.[51] Islamist movements are ofttimes presumed to possess profound social outreach plans with their broad network of schools, medical clinics, and other social services, which create significant mobilization capacity.[52]

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[45] Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5.
[46] Quinn Mecham, *Institutional Origins of Islamist Political Mobilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 22-23.
[47] Melani Cammett and Pauline Jones Luong, "Is there an Islamist political advantage?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014), 187–206.
[48] Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Quintan Wiktorowicz (Editor) (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 143–163.
[49] Mohamed Salih and Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, "Introduction," in *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, M. Salih (Editor) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1–27.
[50] Salih and El-Tom, "Introduction,"
[51] Haklai, "Authoritarianism and Islamic movements in the Middle East," 38.
[52] See: Janine Astrid Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); Steven Brooke, "From medicine to mobilization: Social service provision and the Islamist reputational advantage," *Perspectives on Politics* 15, 1 (2017), 42–61.

Some scholars stress the importance of formal networks like business enterprises, Islamic banks and other financial services.[53] In the mobilization process of the Islamist movements, religious charity organizations also play an important role.[54] Especially in the Northern African countries including Tunisia, the Islamist movements have strong relationships with the religious institutions, which create "states-within-states" networks via specific bodies, such as schools, hospitals, think-tanks, mosques, nurseries and banks.[55] Hence, it is necessary to analyze the strong interrelationship between the Islamist mobilization and the social movements, at first.

1.2. Social Movement Literature

There is no common definition regarding the concept of social movement that is accepted in the literature. The scholars of this literature define social movements in different ways within the scope of elements included in their analytical frameworks. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, who developed the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), define social movements as set of thoughts and beliefs, which aim at changing certain aspects of a social structure and/or distribution of income in a society.[56] According to Charles Tilly, one of the pioneers of the PPM, social movements are form of contentious politics, since they involve collective claims that contend with the benefits of others, and they are political in nature because of the struggles against those, who hold power in the context of these claims.[57] Sidney George Tarrow, another pioneer of the PPM, defines social movements as collective challenges relying on collective objectives and social cooperation in continual coaction with elites, dissidents, and authorities.[58]

On the other hand, Alberto Melucci describes social movements as a type of collective action relying on solidarity, engaging in a contention, and pushing the boundaries of the

[53] See: Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson, *The Politics of Islamic Finance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).
[54] See: Joseph Sullivan Denis, *Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1994); Janine Astrid Clark, *Faith, Networks, and Charity: Islamic Social Welfare Activism and the Middle Class in Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
[55] Shadi Hamid, *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 11-12.
[56] See: McCarthy and Zald, "Resource mobilization and social movements,"
[57] See: Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Boulder, Col: Paradigm Publishers, 2004).
[58] Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 4.

order in which the action happens.[59] According to him, the aim of a social movement is not to be included in the system or to accomplish financial gain, but to draw attention to the problems existing in a society and to transform established cultural norms and identities by questioning them.[60] Mario Diani describes social movement as a network of informal interactions based on a shared identity among more than one individual, group and/or organization in political or cultural conflict, created to achieve or oppose social change.[61] Social movements, especially the Islamist movements, use both conventional/institutional (political parties, elections, protests, lobbies and boycotts) means and unconventional/non-institutional means (strikes, demonstrations, terrorism, rebellion and civil disobedience) in order to actualize their objectives.[62]

There are two prominent theories in the field of social movement studies, which have been developed with the necessity to analyze the new social movements—civil rights movements, student movements, environmental movements, ethnic identity movements, nuclear and anti-war movements—that have been on the rise since the 1960s. These theories are the United States-based RMT and European-based New Social Movement Theory (NSMT).

The RMT focuses on the structural conditions that facilitate the expression of existing grievances,[63] in contrast to the traditional school of collective behavior, which regards deprivation and distress as the main driving force behind social movements.[64] The RMT perceives the individuals participating in a social movement as rational actors seeking their self-interest; and this theory considers the changes in accessible resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action as triggering factor for a social movement.[65] Thus, the RMT concentrates mainly on the organizations, which have considerable capacity to mobilize movement adherents and members. In terms of mobilization process of the al-Nahda movement, the RMT provides many instruments

[59] Alberto Melucci, "The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements," *Social Research* 52, 4 (1985), 789-816.
[60] See: Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*.
[61] Mario Diani, "The concept of a social movement," *The Sociological Review* 40, 1 (1992), 1-25.
[62] Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*, 3.
[63] Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Editors) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 116-152; McCarthy and Zald, "Resource mobilization and social movements,"; J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the study of social movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9, 1 (1983), 527-553.
[64] Aldon D. Morris and Cedric Herring, "Theory and research in social movements: A critical review," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1987), 137-198.
[65] See: Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the study of social movements,"

from group organization to opportunities for collective action in order to analyze the case. In order to understand this, it is necessary to examine the theory in more detail.

The RMT is divided into two branches that are economic and political. The economic branch of this theory examines the formation of a movement through focusing on certain elements, such as movement entrepreneurship, resources and professional social movement organizations, whereas the political branch of this theory focuses on political structures, opportunities and constraints.[66] The economic branch of this theory moves away from the social psychology of collective behavior and focuses on money, labor, legitimacy, opportunity, infrastructure, social networks, solidarity support, experience and the supply of cultural resources.[67] The political opportunities oriented approach of this theory is known as the PPM in the literature, and this model will analyzed in the following part, in detail.

The economic and political opportunity emphases of the RMT save collective action from being characterized as irrational. Yet, it is also argued in the literature that these approaches are unable to examine the meanings of social movements by ignoring cultural dimensions, ideational factors and emotions. The criticisms leveled against the RMT in terms of its insufficiency of understanding the identities of social movements have opened space for the NSMT in the field. According to this theory, social movements that have emerged in post-industrial societies differ from the old social movements in terms of their structure, supporters, goals and values due to the new characteristics of these societies.[68]

The NSMT states that economic, political and cultural structures are all integrated in post-industrial societies;[69] therefore, it is inevitable to focus on the socio-cultural aspects of the social movements. In this respect, the new social movements struggle for their symbolic and cultural demands rather than material gains or increasing their participation in the political system.[70] In other words, culture, identity, lifestyle, decentralization and

[66] See: Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the study of social movements,"
[67] See: Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization,"
[68] See: Alberto Melucci, "The new social movements: A theoretical approach," *Social Science Information* 19, 2 (1980), 199-226; Jürgen Habermas, "New social movements," *Telos* 49 (1981), 33-37; Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or identity: New theoretical paradigms and contemporary social movements," *Social Research* 52, 4 (1985), 663–716; Alain Touraine, "An introduction to the study of social movements," *Social Research* 52, 4 (1985), 749-787; Alain Touraine, *Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Melucci, *Challenging Codes*; Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
[69] See: Melucci, "The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements,"
[70] See: Habermas, "New social movements,"; Cohen, "Strategy or identity,"

autonomy come to the fore among the values emphasized by the new social movements. The main objectives of the new social movements are to pose questions to the system, and to show society that alternative models, norms and lifestyles are possible.[71]

The new social movements have predominantly informal networks in terms of their forms of organization and mobilization. Moreover, these movements have specific communication networks linking various autonomous units rather than a central-hierarchical system. Due to the lack of a certain hierarchical structure, different members within the movement can act as the spokesperson of the movement at different times. In fact, social movement scholars state that individuals also play a significant role through engaging in variety of networks and organizations.[72] In other words, direct ties between people as easy channels of social influence are also important, since they enable a smooth path to incorporate polyvalent influences at the individual level.[73] In this respect, the main field of activity of the new social movements is the civil society where values, norms and identities are built.[74]

In the al-Nahda case, the cultural dimensions and ideational factors also played an important role in the mobilization process of the movement; however, the NSMT alone is insufficient to analyze the case. The main reason behind that is the influence of political opportunities, organizational dynamics and framing processes that mobilized the al-Nahda movement in a dynamic way. Having reviewed the social movement literature, it is necessary to analyze the PPM and its importance in examining the al-Nahda case now.

1.3. Political Process Model (PPM)

The PPM, which points that political opportunity structures are necessary for mobilization, focuses on the effects of changes in these structures on mobilization, strategies and tactics used by dissidents. According to this model, rather than economic factors, it is the changes in political opportunity structures, organizational dynamics and framing processes, which

[71] See: Melucci, *Challenging Codes,*
[72] Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, "Specifying the relationship between social ties and activism," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993), 640-667.
[73] James A. Kitts, "Mobilizing in black boxes: Social networks and participation in social movement organizations," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 5,2 (2000), 241-257.
[74] Cohen, "Strategy or identity,"; Claus Offe, "New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics," *Social Research* 52, 4 (1985), 817-868.

allow or prevent social movements.[75] As the political conditions change, new mobilization opportunities may arise for collective claims. The fact that opportunities and threats are in change affects a social movement in all respects from its mobilization stage to its possible political impacts.[76]

In the PPM, political opportunities are defined as the likelihood that movement entrepreneurs will consolidate their interests or improve the present benefits they can get if they engage in collective action.[77] The main dimensions of political opportunity structures can be listed as the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the state's capability and tendency for repression.[78] Any change in these dimensions may not only stimulate mobilization, but it may also give shape to the mobilization.[79] In this respect, a detailed concentration on changes in the structure of political opportunities can conduce to our analyses regarding the shifting processes of a particular movement.

Yet, there is a division among the theorists regarding how changes in states result in movement mobilization, and there are two main ways of defining political structures related to collective action, which are static structures of opportunity and dynamic ones.[80] In static ones, the emphasis is on cross-national variations, while it is on how states transform and how these transformations impact political opportunity structures in dynamic ones.[81] The static approach includes taking an image of a specific point in time, whereas the dynamic approach involves analysis of conversions over time in primary state apparatuses, processes, and ideologies.[82] The recent literature deals with the political opportunity structures through the dynamic approach, in general. Tarrow also argues that

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[75] See: Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements/Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings,* D.McAdam, J.McCarthy, and M.Zald (Editors) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23–40; David S.Meyer, "Protest and political opportunities," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30 (2004), 125-145.
[76] See: Meyer, "Protest and political opportunities,"
[77] Tarrow, *Power in Movement,* 85.
[78] McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," 27.
[79] See: McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes,"
[80] Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements/Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings,* D.McAdam, J.McCarthy, and M.Zald (Editors) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41–61.
[81] Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," 44.
[82] Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*, 18.

the dynamic opportunities come out much more influence of the decision-making processes of social movements, and allow them to produce their own opportunities.[83] Similarly, in the al-Nahda case, the changes in the processes over time can be clarified through adapting the dynamic approach. The changes in the primary state apparatuses and processes over time will be thoroughly analyzed in the following chapters.

In fact, the political opportunities affect both organizational dynamics and framing processes, since political arrangements form movement entrepreneurs' range of activities including strategy choices for coordinating their structures and framing.[84] Once the collective action is underway, the organizational profile of the movement becomes more significant, since the movement entrepreneurs have to build a sustainable organizational structure for the continuity of collective action. While movements improve within founded establishments or informal associational networks, they are also embedded in these movement settings at the same time.[85]

As stressed by the resource mobilization theorists, after the establishment of a social movement, organizational dynamics play a significant role in forming the appropriate political environment that impact the resilience of the movement directly.[86] As the movement improves, political opportunities and framing processes can be considered as more the product of organizational dynamics.[87] Organizational dynamics give clues on how mobilizing organizations combine money, materials, members and technology into strategic and tactical action.[88] In the PPM, organizational dynamics refers to the formal forms of organization as well as informal ones, which are available to dissidents.[89] Once the movement entrepreneurs are engaged in formal or informal networks, they are located in an interactive structure, which allows them to identify their interpretive framing, ease the process of identity construction and identity consolidation, and compose political consciousness on a specific cause.[90]

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[83] See: Tarrow, "States and Opportunities,"
[84] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 31.
[85] McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 13.
[86] Ibid, 7.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), 45.
[89] See: McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction,"
[90] Florence Passy, "Social Networks Matter. But How?" in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, M.Diani and D.McAdam (Editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21-48.

As with political opportunities and organizational dynamics, framing processes are also important in shaping collective action. In the PPM, framing processes refer to strategic endeavors by groups of people in order to form shared understandings of the universe, which justify and drive collective action.[91] The framing processes are collective processes of elucidation, attribution, and social construction that reconcile opportunity to action.[92] There are three categories of framing, which are diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing.[93] First of all, diagnostic framing identifies the existing problems.[94] Secondly, prognostic framing includes the articulation of an asserted solution to the problems, or a plan of attack, and the strategies for conducting this plan.[95] Finally, motivational framing ensures a rationale for engaging in amendable collective action, involving the construction of convenient vocabularies of motive.[96] Briefly, the movement entrepreneurs specify the considered problem via diagnostic framing; specify solutions and strategies via prognostic framing; and ensure a rationale for action via motivational framing.[97] In this respect, the movement entrepreneurs engage in interrelated problems of consensus mobilization and action mobilization through following these framing tasks.[98]

The piles of action in each context may seem in dissimilar consecutive orders, and the set of factors in each milieu may involve different power relations, institutions, movement entrepreneurs and effects of unexpected historical and political happenings. In this respect, the al-Nahda movement's internal and external structures have to be clarified separately in detail without ignoring the interaction among them. In other words, there is also a necessity to concentrate on both internal and external structures of the al-Nahda movement in order to figure out the dynamic processes of the movement, such as social networks, organizational activities and ideational factors. Based on these aspects of the al-Nahda movement, this dissertation also analyzes the resilience of this movement through considering those two dimensions, which are the movement inside Tunisia (as a repressed movement) and the movement outside Tunisia (as a movement in exile).

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[91] See: McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,"
[92] McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction," 2.
[93] Robert Benford and David Snow, "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000), 611–639.
[94] Benford and Snow, "Framing processes and social movements," 615.
[95] Ibid, 616.
[96] Ibid, 617.
[97] Milena Büchs, Clare Saunders, Rebecca Wallbridge, Graham Smith, Nicholas Bardsley, "Identifying and explaining framing strategies of low carbon lifestyle movement organisations," *Global Environmental Change* 35 (2015), 307-315.
[98] Bert Klandermans, "Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory," *American Sociological Review* 49 (1984), 583-600.

As seen above, the main factors of the PPM are classified as political opportunity structures, organizational dynamics, and framing processes. In this sense, the main advantage of the PPM in this dissertation is that these three dimensions of the model are not isolated from each other; on the contrary, they interact with each other in a dynamic way, which help the researcher to detect and analyze the main trends and changes in the movement. In other words, there is a dynamic relationship among the three main factors of the PPM just like the gears of a wheel.

Diagram-1.1: The Dynamic Relationship among the Three Main Factors of the PPM



This dissertation covers a specific period of time, which encompasses three decades of the al-Nahda movement under repression from 1981 to 2010. In this respect, due to the fact that "time also plays an active role in cases",[99] I analyze the movement in three main episodes (1981-1989, 1989-1999, 2000-2010), since the three main factors of the PPM also change and transform in time.

The PPM emphasizes the critical significance of expanding political opportunities, which is essential for collective action. However, the opportunities are not likely to be maintained unless there is an adequate organization, whether it is formal or informal. In addition, the structural necessities of opportunities and organizations consist of frames shared by advocators of the movement. Furthermore, the impacts of these three factors also depend on each other. In other words, an opportunity becomes meaningful only if the movement entrepreneurs consider it as a political opportunity structure, as well as a group of actors is organized well in order to act on their shared frames. Hence, the victory or defeat of a social movement relies on a systematic combination of these three main factors of the PPM.

[99] Margaret Levi, "Reconsiderations of Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Editors) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 117-133, 120.

Diagram-1.2: The Interactions and Effects of the PPM Factors in the al-Nahda Movement's Mobilization and Resilience



Table-1.1: The Detailed Presentation of the PPM Factors in the al-Nahda Movement's Mobilization

1st Period (The MTI/1981-1989)	**2nd Period (The al-Nahda/1989-1999)**	**3rd Period (The al-Nahda/2000-2010)**
Political Opportunity Structures: ➢ state's tendency for repression ➢ closure of the institutionalized political system *(no legal recognition of the MTI)* ➢ increasing tolerance to the MTI *(the Bread Riots/1984 and the National Pact/1987)* ➢ infiltration of the MTI members to state apparatus ➢ infiltration of the MTI to the UGTT's base and offices	**Political Opportunity Structures:** ➢ regime's heavy repression *(using prison cells as a space for resistance)* ➢ closure of the institutionalized political system *(total exclusion of the al-Nahda from the political arena)* ➢ creation of new political opportunity structures by carrying the al-Nahda's political activities in the countries of asylum	**Political Opportunity Structures:** ➢ reduction of repression *(release of the political al-Nahda prisoners, allowing exiles to return to Tunisia, cooperation of the opposition against the regime)* ➢ creation of new political opportunities by movement entrepreneurs' alliance with secular groups *(18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms/2005)* ➢ lack of coordination among the security units *(infiltration of the al-Nahda to the security units, such as police, military and intelligence)* ➢ splits in the Ben Ali's inner circle
Organizational Dynamics: ➢ network building through informal organizations like Qur'an courses, magazines, mosques, masjids, conservative family structure ➢ recruitment through informal neighborhood organization ➢ contribution of the student wing (*university student associations [establishment of the UGTE as a counter Islamist student organization against the UGET], dormitories)*	**Organizational Dynamics:** ➢ growth of the second-generation al-Nahda members in exile ➢ informal organizations like Islamic cultural centers, parallel party structures *(political bureau, executive bureau, communications office)*, newspapers, television channels, mosques, front companies, and charities in the countries of asylum ➢ division in the movement leadership and the Ghannouchi-led faction gaining the upper hand proposing moderation ➢ unity of Ghannouchi and the second-generation al-Nahda members	**Organizational Dynamics:** ➢ new al-Nahda-linked non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and networks with the aid of the second-generation al-Nahda members ➢ restoration of informal networks between the al-Nahda members in exile and in Tunisia *(international associations for aiding political prisoners [establishment of the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners, AISPP/2001], charities, trade associations, mosques, masjids)* ➢ increasing mobilization of the student wing *(university student associations)*
Framing Processes: ➢ diagnostic framing *(repression, malfunctioning state, corruption, unemployment and injustice)* ➢ prognostic framing *(social justice, legitimate administration, separation of the regime party and the state apparatus, independence of the judiciary, general amnesty for political offenses, free press, democratization, pluralism and religious freedom)* ➢ motivational framing *(creating consciousness against the regime's use of violence)*	**Framing Processes:** ➢ diagnostic framing *(repression, malfunctioning state, ban of masjids and Qur'an courses, injustice, price increases in essential consumer goods, unemployment, devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar)* ➢ prognostic framing *(synthesis between Western values and Islamic perspectives, general amnesty, independence of the judiciary, free press, absolute prohibition of torture, termination of the partisan presidential system, social security, democratization, pluralism and religious freedom)* ➢ motivational framing *(stance against violence)*	**Framing Processes:** ➢ diagnostic framing *(repression, malfunctioning state, widespread inequalities, unemployment, corruption in the judicial system)* ➢ prognostic framing *(synthesis between Western values and Islamic perspectives, social justice ,legislative pardon, freedom of speech/belief, struggle against corruption and misappropriation of national wealth, enforcement of judicial reforms, democratization, pluralism, religious freedom, just Islamic order)* ➢ motivational framing *(alliance for rights and freedoms [18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms], stance against violence)*

In this dissertation, it will be seen that three of the PPM factors were dynamic in each period. To illustrate, political opportunity structures, organizational dynamics and framing processes functioned just like the gears of a wheel. In the 1981-1989 period, in terms of closure of the institutionalized political system, there was no legal recognition of the MTI, but there was a tolerance to the movement, which will be discussed in Chapter III, in detail. Even though the regime did not consider the MTI as a legal political party, it opened up a space for the movement to organize for balancing the opposition leftist movements. In this respect, the MTI members were able to infiltrate state apparatus, as well as the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT)[100] base and offices, which was an important political opportunity structure.

In the 1981-1989 period, despite the state's tendency for repression, the movement was able to engage in network building through informal organizations, such as Qurʾan courses, magazines, dormitories, mosques, masjids, university student associations, and the movement could recruit new activists through informal neighborhood organization. Especially the organizational dynamics of the student wing functioned as perfect mobilizers. The student MTI members on the university campuses were able to establish a counter Islamist student organization against the one that was founded in line with the regime.

During the 1981-1989 period, the MTI determined repression, malfunctioning state, corruption, unemployment and injustice as the main problems by diagnostic framing. The movement determined separation of the regime party and the state apparatus, social justice, legitimate administration, independence of the judiciary, general amnesty for political offenses, free press, democratization, pluralism and religious freedom as the main solutions by prognostic framing. In this period, the movement framed liberal discourses in order to create consciousness against the regime's use of violence by motivational framing.

In the 1989-1999 period, in terms of closure of the institutionalized political system, the al-Nahda was totally excluded from the political arena. Yet, despite the regime's heavy repression, the movement was able to use prison cells as a space for resistance, which was an important political opportunity structure. Moreover, the movement was able to create

[100] The UGTT, which was established in 1946, is primary representative of the leftist movements in Tunisia. For further information, see: Kasper Netterstrøm, "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the advent of democracy," *Middle East Journal* 70, 3 (2016), 383–398.

new political opportunity structures by carrying its political activities in the countries of asylum. The second-generation al-Nahda members in exile grew up, and the division in the movement leadership resulted in the victory of the Ghannouchi-led faction that proposed moderation. In this period, informal organizations like Islamic cultural centers, parallel party structures (political bureau, executive bureau, communications office), newspapers and television channels in the countries of asylum took to the stage, which will be discussed in Chapter IV, in detail.

During the 1989-1999 period, the al-Nahda movement began to acknowledge Western values and interpret them from an Islamic perspective. The al-Nahda greatly improved its framing efforts via issuing series of declarations. The movement determined repression, malfunctioning state, ban of masjids and Qur'an courses, injustice, price increases in essential consumer goods, unemployment and devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar as the main problems by diagnostic framing. The movement determined general amnesty, independence of the judiciary, free press, absolute prohibition of torture, termination of the partisan presidential system, social security, democratization, pluralism and religious freedom as the main solutions by prognostic framing. The movement stressed its stance against violence by motivational framing.

In the 2000-2010 period, in terms of reduction of the regime's repression, the political al-Nahda prisoners were released, the al-Nahda exiles were allowed to return to Tunisia, and the opposition began to cooperate against the regime. The movement was able to create new political opportunities by movement entrepreneurs' alliance with the secular groups. The lack of coordination among the security units resulted in the infiltration of the al-Nahda members to the security units, such as police, military and intelligence, which was an important political opportunity structure. The splits in the Ben Ali's inner circle also played important role as a significant political opportunity structure. The new al-Nahda linked NGOs restorated informal networks between the al-Nahda members in exile and those in Tunisia. The organizational dynamics of the student wing considerably improved on the university campuses.

During the 2000-2010 period, the movement improved its framing processes via anniversary statements of the party, as well as final declarations of the party congresses. The movement determined repression, malfunctioning state, inequalities, unemployment, corruption in the judicial system as the main problems by diagnostic framing. Actually,

widespread demonstrations were held against the worsening economic conditions due to the corruptions of the Ben Ali regime. The movement reformulated political solutions, such as social justice, release of political inmates, legislative pardon, assurance on freedom of speech, struggle against corruption and misappropriation of national wealth, enforcement of judicial reforms, freedom of belief, democratization, pluralism and just Islamic order by prognostic framing. The al-Nahda movement improved its endeavors in terms of synthesizing Western values and Islamic perspectives, to a large extent. In this period, the al-Nahda movement tried to create a rationale by calling society to alliance for rights and freedoms, as well as preserving its stance against violence by motivational framing, which will be discussed in Chapter V, in detail.

In light of these findings, even if I organized the following chapters by focusing on the main historical periods, I have primarily concentrated on the factors of the PPM through process tracing. Due to the fact that the aim of this dissertation is not a simple historiography, the focus will be on the application of the theory to the al-Nahda case, in detail.

In this dissertation, there are no clear-cut lines between these chapters, which encompass the in-depth analyses of the PPM in terms of the three main factors. The main reason behind this is that every process is in a dynamic relationship with each other within the framework of the PPM's dynamics. Thus, I have made this classification only for expressing the factors of the PPM more precisely, taking into account that these factors are not mutually distinct and unrelated. In the following chapters, I will reconstruct this mobilization process by concentrating on the PPM factors in the processes. This endeavor is for not losing the emphasis on factors in the narrow sense and on the theory in the broad sense.

Diagram-1.3: The Detailed Presentation of the PPM Factors in the MTI's Mobilization Process Between 1981 and 1989



Diagram-1.4: The Detailed Presentation of the PPM Factors in the al-Nahda Movement's Mobilization Process Between 1989 and 1999



Diagram-1.5: The Detailed Presentation of the PPM Factors in the al-Nahda Movement's Mobilization Process Between 2000 and 2010



On the other hand, although the framework of the PPM is applied in numerous field studies, there are certain criticisms leveled against the PPM in the existing literature. In fact, the main factors in the mobilization process of the al-Nahda movement also involve cultural elements and emotional behaviors, as well as political opportunities, organizational dynamics and framing processes, which prevent analyzing this case without considering the criticisms leveled against the PPM. Therefore, there is necessity to analyze and take into account these criticisms in order to minimize the possible deficiencies regarding application of the PPM in this dissertation.

1.4. Criticisms Leveled Against the PPM

In the early 1970s, the American sociologists began to focus on the processes by which the resources required for collective action are mobilized. Based on their studies, they argued that collective movements build an extension of the traditional types of political action; the players involve in this action in a reasonable way pursuing their benefits; organizations and movement entrepreneurs assume a leading role in the mobilization of collective sources on which action is established.[101] In this sense, even if feelings of unrest, disagreements, conflicts of interest, and opposite ideological approaches seem to be significant indicators of collective action, these are not enough to explain the emergence of a collective action as a whole.[102]

Findings by different scholars have specified factors that impact the possibilities for collective action, which are socio-economic heterogeneity, size of the group, the presence of non-linear connections and the mediation capacity of institutions.[103] Collective action may concentrate on small size of a group, homogeneous structure and steadiness in social relations, whereas it may also focus on variety, decentralization and a dynamic social and

[101] Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 14.
[102] Della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 14-15.
[103] Dasgupta and Beard, "Community driven development, collective action and elite capture in Indonesia," 234.

political process.[104] Hence, the actors do not need to be in a pure reconciliation on ideologies, beliefs, benefits or objectives to gather and engage in a collective action.[105]

In the existing literature, there are useful works of James M. Jasper, Frédéric Volpi, Charles Kurzman and Wendy Pearlman, who argue for the dynamic role played by emotions and other informal networks.[106] Here there are criticisms leveled against the PPM, and these criticisms lay their foundations on micro-level mobilization. The works of those, who criticize the PPM, are limited to the protest movements, in general. In their justifications, they criticize the PPM for not adequately addressing the individual and the emotional world. Thus, even though the structural framework of the PPM is utilized in many field researches, there are certain criticisms leveled against the PPM in the literature.

According to Jasper, there are five criticisms leveled against the PPM.[107] First of all, the PPM is criticized as it labels anything that is instrumental in the initiation or victory of the movement as a political opportunity structure. Secondly, the PPM formulates strategies as structure. Thirdly, culture, resources and strategy may be used interchangeably in this model from time to time. Fourthly, in the PPM, the political structure is mostly placed above culture. Finally, according to the PPM, removal of the repression is very significant for the future of the movement. However, the critics of the PPM state that repression does not mean everything; on the contrary, symbols and frames also have an important role in the movement.

In fact, engagement in an Islamist movement is not a copper-bottomed action under conditions in which Islamic activities are either severely monitored, or directly banned.[108] Hence, ideational factors come into prominence, and Islamic leaders ought to discover inventive methods to develop the commitment of advocates in Islamic networks to Islamic

[104] Dasgupta and Beard, "Community driven development," 245.
[105] Cristina Flesher Fominaya, "Collective identity in social movements: Central concepts and debates," *Sociology Compass* 4 (2010), 393–404, 395.
[106] See: Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Charles Kurzman, "Meaning-Making in social movements," *Anthropological Quarterly* 81, 1 (2008), 5-15; Wendy Pearlman, "Emotions and the microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings," *Perspectives on Politics* 11, 2 (2013), 387-409; James M. Jasper and Frédéric Volpi, "Introduction: Rethinking Mobilization after the Arab Uprisings," in *Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings*, Frederic Volpi and James M. Jasper (Editors) (Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 11-40.
[107] See: James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (University of Chicago Press, 1998), Chapter IV: Protest and The Broader Culture, 267-334.
[108] Haklai, "Authoritarianism and Islamic movements in the Middle East," 38.

objectives.[109] Especially this point is so critical, since despite the state repression, the movement was able to survive in the al-Nahda case. This shows that actor-oriented mobilization also has to be considered in the mobilization process of the al-Nahda movement.

In this context, the micro foundations of political action deserve more attention, which offers thorough analyses regarding the interactions between actors via taking into account a plenty of factors, from emotional reactions to confusion, which form strategic options.[110] According to this approach, detailed micro-level explanations could and ought to substitute for basic macro-level correlations in most cases.[111] According to Charles Kurzman, structural opportunities are not always arranged with perceived opportunities, since variations between objective and subjective explanations of political opportunity are observed.[112] Actually, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, the prominent figures of the PPM, also reviewed the mechanisms of the model in order to bring more dynamism and culture into the structural nature of the theory.[113]

According to Jasper and Volpi, the endeavors to rethink the concept of political opportunity structures took three major forms.[114] The first response to the criticisms was to admit the cultural work that goes into opportunities, which protestors can form with the true interpretive work, involving emotions. These were subjective initiatives, which were necessary to be imagined, and they relied on decisions taken by all the actors in different platforms.[115] The second response to the criticisms was to differentiate dissimilar forms of opportunity structures, such as discursive, emotional, legal, or corporate ones, and this proliferation was an implied recognition of the other actors in the milieu for protestors. The third response to the criticisms was to determine political structures elaborately. This attempt provided a methodology through which strategies were combined with certain

[109] Haklai, "Authoritarianism and Islamic movements in the Middle East," 38.
[110] See: Jasper and Volpi, "Introduction: Rethinking Mobilization after the Arab Uprisings,"
[111] Jillian Schwedler, "Comparative politics and the Arab Uprisings," *Middle East Law and Governance* 7 (2015), 141-152.
[112] Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review* 61, 1 (1996), 153-170.
[113] See: Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[114] Jasper and Volpi, "Introduction," 13.
[115] See: Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, *Contention in Context* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Charles Kurzman, "The Post-Structuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory," in *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion*, Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (Editors) (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

spheres, switching the jargon of political opportunity structures with notions more common in political science, such as electoral laws.[116]

In fact, a vocabulary of actors and arenas has recently come into view as a forethought endeavor to integrate insights into political structure extracted from process and field theory with cultural insights into the formation of actors and their objectives.[117] In this respect, the arenas are considered as physical places where decisions are taken, whereas the actors refer to individuals or groups who share a common identity, objectives, and who collaborate leastways in one arena.[118] Some actors are excluded from the constructing engagements, whereas others are included but deprived of much impact on the arenas built.[119]

According to Jasper, the trend in recent theoretical shifts is away from macro-level structures toward micro-level ones.[120] In the comparative politics and security literature, there is an inclination to depend on the identity attributes of the Islamists to explain their strategic tendencies and attitudes against steady authoritarian regimes.[121] Before the 2011 Uprisings, the regime resilience let Islamist exceptionalism emerge again in a new structure.[122] In this respect, Asef Bayat asserted an alternative to collective action in authoritarian regimes in which formal activities are repeatedly oppressed by rough states, and he labeled post-Islamism to emphasize its ideological and political pragmatism, and underlined the influence of more informal social networks.[123]

Bayat specified the term "non-movements" to explain the "collective actions of non-collective actors".[124] Due to the fact that authoritarianism openly dissuaded political movements in the region, he proposed that non-movements concretized common practices of numerous ordinary individuals whose fragmented but analogous activities initiate social

[116] Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Tina Fetner, and Michael P. Young, "Challengers and States: Toward a Political Sociology of Social Movements," *Sociological Views on Political Participation in the 21st Century* 10 (2002), 47-83.
[117] Jasper and Volpi, "Introduction," 15.
[118] Ibid, 15-16.
[119] Ibid, 16.
[120] See: James M. Jasper, "Social Movement Theory today: Toward a Theory of Action?" *Sociology Compass* 10 (2010), 965-976.
[121] Jasper and Volpi, "Introduction," 18.
[122] Ibid, 19.
[123] See: Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005), 891-908; Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
[124] Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 20.

transformation although these practices were infrequently directed by an ideology or distinguishable leaderships and structures.[125] This is why there is an increasing trend in the Middle East politics focusing on new social movement dynamics.

In this context, one of the most important things to study is the conditions which allow discontentment to be transformed into mobilization, since the strength for mobilization relies on either the material sources (labor, money, interests, activities), or nonmaterial sources (power, spiritual engagement, belief, friendship) available to the group.[126] Beyond the existing tensions, mobilization stems from the path in which social movements can organize dissatisfaction, decrease the costs of action, create and use cooperation networks, share motives among adherents, and accomplish external consensus.[127]

One significant line of inquiry for scholars in search of comprehending how a sense of cohesion that results in collective action improving in social movement centers on collective identity.[128] Alberto Melucci defines collective identity as "an interactive and shared definition produced by a number of individuals (or groups at a more complex level) concerning the orientations of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which such action is to take place".[129] Actually, the evolution of collective action generates and fosters sustained redefinitions of identity.[130] A social movement's collective identity is continuously shaped and reshaped by people functioning in different places at different times.[131]

Charles Kurzman argues that the changing regional context opens up a space for perspectives offering a more outstanding role to framing and prioritizing actor views at the micro level over structural conditions at the macro level.[132] According to this approach, the actors operate through their expectancies and a wide range of emotions.[133] The cultural factors are considered again as knowledge and instruments that alter in reaction to conditions instead of a given set of traditions as a criticized orientalist tradition formerly

[125] Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East,* 15.
[126] Della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 15.
[127] Ibid.
[128] See: Fominaya, "Collective identity in social movements: Central concepts and debates,"
[129] Melucci, *Challenging Codes*, 70.
[130] Alberto Melucci, "The Process of Collective Identity," in *Social Movements and Culture*, H.Johnston and B. Klandermans (Editors) (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press/UCL Press, 1995), 41–63.
[131] Dorothy Holland, Gretchen Fox, and Vinci Daro, "Social movements and collective identity: A decentered, dialogic view," *Anthropological Quarterly* 81, 1 (2008), 95-126.
[132] Kurzman, "Meaning-Making in social movements,"; Charles Kurzman, "The Arab Spring uncoiled," *Mobilization* 17 (2012), 377-390.
[133] Jasper and Volpi, "Introduction," 25.

pondered upon culture in the Middle East.[134] The emotions are viewed as useful instance of unreserved micro-level mechanisms, and they are utilized as instruments to deal with choices and ambiguity.[135]

The emotions like fear, distress, and embarrassment initiate pessimistic evaluations, and stimulate actors to give priority to security and resign to political conditions, even when they are in contradiction with values of reputation.[136] On the other hand, the emotions like anger, pleasure, and self-esteem initiate optimistic evaluations, they stimulate actors to prioritize dignity and incline voluntariness to join resistance, even when it risks security.[137] In this respect, the emotions can change individuals when instrumentality and values propose alternative paths regarding whether to resign or revolt.[138] In Tunisia, researchers attributed longtime authoritarianism to a potent coercive apparatus, the allegiance of business elites, heavy restraints on freedom of speech, and containment of dissent.[139]

As seen above, most of the criticisms leveled against the PPM in the existing literature (e.g., James Jasper, Frédéric Volpi, Charles Kurzman, and Wendy Pearlman) are related to its less consideration of emotions and cultural factors in its analyses by focusing on the political opportunity structures. In fact, collective action is considered as both an imaginative manipulation of undiscovered symbols and a reaffirmation of tradition, in which process culture plays a critical role.[140] Therefore, through applying the PPM to the al-Nahda case, this dissertation will also test the explanatory value of the model. In fact, the cultural and emotional factors also played important role in the improvement of the al-Nahda movement.

Actually, the JI emerged as an abeyance structure within the Tunisian society through engaging in daily practices in the 1970s. These daily practices were performed in dormitories, university campuses, discussion circles, training groups, sport activities, circles at mosques, scout troops, cinema societies and youth clubs. The dominant emotions

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[134] See: Zachary Lockman, *Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Frédéric Volpi, *Political Islam Observed: Disciplinary Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[135] See: James M. Jasper, *The Emotions of Protest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018); Jon Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[136] See: Pearlman, "Emotions and the microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,"
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Christopher Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb* (London: Routledge, 2010), 36.
[140] Della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 84.

among the JI members and adherents were mainly dissatisfaction, displeasure, disaffection and discontentment. After that the MTI was able to create a subculture within the Tunisian society in the 1980s. In this period, this subculture emerged in marriages, weddings, concerts, religious ceremonies in eids, financial support, families, and Islamic cultural centers. The dominant emotions among the MTI members and adherents were mainly distress, anger, resentment, disappointment, as well as courage, confidence and fortitude.

Between 1989-2010, this subculture improved through plenty of mechanisms with the al-Nahda movement. The movement became active in dormitories, university campuses, discussion circles, training groups, sport activities, circles at mosques, scout troops, cinema societies, youth clubs, intra-movement marriages, concerts, religious ceremonies in eids, financial support through families, Islamic cultural centers. The dominant emotions among the al-Nahda movement members and adherents were again distress, anger, resentment and disappointment. However, in time, these emotions fortified other emotions, such as courage, confidence, fortitude, fairness (telling the truth when others are silent), bravery, devotion to the cause (*da'wa*), loyalty to family members and sense of belonging.

Especially the emotional factors mentioned above have been determined by a thorough literature review as seen in the following chapters. Yet, unfortunately, the current political environment in Tunisia after the coup did not allow conducting in-depth interviews to research the emotional factors in the field. In fact, this further research for the emotional factors is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which generates another dissertation topic in itself. Thus, the discussions on the emotional factors will remain limited in the following chapters. Yet, this dissertation is aware of the deficiencies of the PPM in taking emotions into account, as well as the discussions on this issue in the existing literature.

Actually, the informal networks, such as magazines, dormitories, charities, trade unions, mosques, university student associations, play important role especially in the semi-authoritarian political settings. In this respect, McCharty also argues that the al-Nahda movement built informal networks and subcultural communities, which ensured the resilience helping the movement to survive during three decades of repression.[141] He points out the influential role of the informal networks in creating meanings, forming mobilization, and ensuring organizational resilience.[142] He argues that the al-Nahda

[141] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 8.
[142] Ibid, 12.

movement was able to survive through these informal networks rather than following a formal hierarchy in its organizational structure, and these informal networks surfaced in the 2011 Uprisings and helped the movement in its election victory.[143]

In fact, the repression against the al-Nahda in the political domain created political opportunities for the movement's alternative culture to propagate itself.[144] Different from the Salafi jihadis, the al-Nahda movement recruited new adherents in terms of the movement's values and goals rather than prioritizing the global cause of jihad.[145] The semi-clandestine atmosphere within which the al-Nahda operated during the repressive decades ensured the movement to broaden its public space via construction of Islamic cultural centers, youth clubs, scout troops, cinema societies, which let the movement engage in the local dimensions of the Tunisian society.[146] Furthermore, members of the al-Nahda movement identified themselves predominantly with kinship ties and shared experiences against regime repression, which made them an organic part of the movement.[147]

In the literature, some scholars state that inclusion of Islamist movements in political domain stimulates moderation.[148] On the other hand, some recent studies draw attention to the uncertainties of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.[149] In this context, the al-Nahda case also makes the inclusion-moderation hypothesis complicated, since the inclusion-moderation hypothesis constantly elucidates Islamist conversions in a way that these organizations moderate their actions and attitudes once they are permitted to take part in the political process.[150] On the other hand, the al-Nahda movement experienced an intellectual transformation in the end of a long-term political exclusion instead of

[143] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 170.
[144] Mehdi Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," in *Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and Process*, Goerge Joffe (Editor) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 48-70, 60.
[145] Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," 60.
[146] Ibid, 61.
[147] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (1978-2012) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[148] See: Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Michael D. Driessen, "Public religion, democracy, and Islam: Examining the moderation thesis in Algeria," *Comparative Politics* 44, 2 (2012), 171–189; Laura Guazzone, "Ennahda Islamists and the test of government in Tunisia," *The International Spectator* 48, 4 (2013), 30–50.
[149] See: Manfred Brocker and Mirjam Künkler, "Religious parties: revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis," *Party Politics* 19, 2 (2013), 171–186; Clement Steuer, "Introduction to the issue: 'On Islamist parties and the inclusion-moderation hypothesis: Lessons from the past decade'," *Middle Eastern Law and Governance* (2023), 1–10.
[150] Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, 150.

inclusion. Especially in the last period of the regime's repression, the movement benefited from new political opportunities for cross-party alliances with its growing moderate stance.

In fact, achievement or setback of a movement against repression relies on both the movement's and the state's resilience together.[151] The exclusion policy of the Tunisian regime via repression and social marginalization played significant role in the al-Nahda's move from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 1970s to turn into the mainstream conservative party.[152] Thanks to the moderate pluralist framing of the movement, this repression did not drive the movement into violence as in Algeria. Actually, in the al-Nahda case, the repression had just postponed the process of moderation, which had already started within the al-Nahda movement autonomously from the state repression.[153]

Like Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, I also argue that the al-Nahda movement moderated because of its exclusion from the political system and society. When the al-Nahda movement was excluded by large parts of Tunisian society, state repression did not result in radicalization, but impacted the al-Nahda movement to rethink its ideological principles and strategies, which was concluded with moderation of the movement's policies and actions.[154] In this process, the al-Nahda movement's rejectionist policies of 1970s considerably moderated, and the movement evolved to set a coalition with two centre-left secular parties following the 2011 Uprisings.[155]

In this dissertation, in order to minimize the deficiencies that stem from the model, I have taken into account all of these criticisms regarding the PPM in the application of the model. On the other hand, here it is so crucial to mention that it is inevitable to observe deviations regarding the repercussions of this model. In other words, generalization may mislead us in our analyses, since "no single subject can suffice, and no mode of analysis ever can be entirely self-sufficient".[156]

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[151] Vincent Boudreau, "State Repression and Democracy Protest in Three Southeast Asian Countries," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda Robnett (Editors) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28-46.
[152] Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, "Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party," *Democratization* 20, 5 (2013), 857-875.
[153] Francesco Cavatorta and Raquel Ojeda Garcia, "Islamism in Mauritania and the narrative of political moderation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 55, 2 (2017), 301-325.
[154] See: Cavatorta and Merone, "Moderation through exclusion?,"
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ira Katznelson, "Strong Theory, Complex History: Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics Revisited," in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, M.I.Lichbach and A.S.Zuckerman (Editors) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 96-116, 116.

1.5. The al-Nahda Movement and Violence

Scholars of political violence emphasize the significance of context in comprehending a movement's use of violence, since radicalization is a political process, which occurs in time.[157] This can be strengthened by authoritarian repression that provokes moderate opposition groups to withdraw, since they are reluctant to pay the cost of opposition, facilitating radical members to gain more determinative impact in the movement.[158] Political violence scholars assert that movements select from a range of political tactics involving violence, and that they make their preferences relying on a rational analysis of threats and opportunities.[159] Political organizations prefer to function as a political party or a terrorist group for tactical causes, relying on political circumstances.[160]

The subjects of mass violence are not only triggered by motivational factors, such as destitution, ideological orientation or rational calculation, but they have to experience a radicalization process, which is closely attached to the more extensive political process of violent contention.[161] Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz offer that random and reactive state repression against the Islamist movements is presumably to perform violent mobilization, since it restrains the tactical options valid for the movement, externalizes the moderates, and improves the trustworthiness of those in the movement supporting violence.[162] In this sense, some involve in militant and violent ways of activism, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, whereas others prefer the course of cause *(da'wa)* encompassing plenty of groups, such as the MB in the region.[163]

When the al-Nahda case is considered, as Mohammed Hafez argues, the most important difference in the Algerian case was regarding the massacres of 1997 mainly targeting civilians in the Islamist ghettos, since numerous victims of the massacres had supported the

[157] Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, 15.
[158] Stephen W. Beach, "Social movement radicalization: The case of the People's Democracy in Northern Ireland," *The Sociological Quarterly* 18, 3 (1977), 305-318.
[159] Susanne Martin and Arie Perliger, "Turning to and from terror: Deciphering the conditions under which political groups choose violent and nonviolent tactics," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6, 4/5 (2012), 21-45.
[160] Martin and Perliger, "Turning to and from terror: Deciphering the conditions under which political groups choose violent and nonviolent tactics,"
[161] Mohammed Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Quintan Wiktorowicz (Editor) (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 37–60.
[162] See: Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Q.Wiktorowicz (Editors) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 61-88.
[163] Haklai, "Authoritarianism and Islamic movements in the Middle East," 36.

armed groups clashing with the Algerian regime.[164] In this respect, the al-Nahda case is totally different from the Algerian case. Said Ferjani, an important figure of the al-Nahda movement, analyzed the movement's moderate stance against violence as follows:

> Despite the catalogue of cruelties perpetrated against Ennahdha, it has not reacted with violence because we do not believe that violence should be used, even against dictatorial regimes, even if they were repressive. That is the difference between Tunisia and Algeria. Our approach was to avoid any violent reaction and embrace as much as we can the techniques of peaceful resistance. We have relied on human rights groups and the international media, along with patience, and we have focused on serving our people and membership.[165]

In this context, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis cannot explain the al-Nahda case. The al-Nahda movement was able to accomplish an intellectual transformation after a long-term political exclusion, and this exclusion resulted in moderation of the movement rather than its radicalization.

Actually, in most of the cases, Islamist movements do not emerge violent, but rather supporters of violence improve group of militants from within formed, mainly nonviolent Islamist movements.[166] This is why the majority of studies on violent Islamists fail to elucidate patterns of tactical choices or consider the dynamic character of repertoires of contention.[167] Hence, it is more efficient to analyze violent activists as rational players functioning within a domain of opportunities and restrictions that appraise decisions regarding suitable tactics.[168] Actually, this does not mean that faith or antecedent attributes are unrelated; but rather other theoretically related attributes have to be engaged into our comprehension of Islamist activism and violence as contention.[169]

The opportunities and restrictions existing in the political environment intervene in the rational calculus of movement players and assist in forming intra-movement argumentations over the effectiveness and legitimacy of violence.[170] In this respect,

[164] Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres," 37.
[165] Said Ferjani, "The 'End of Islamism' and the future of Tunisia," *Hudson Institute, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 20 (2016), 117-126.
[166] Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," 63.
[167] Ibid, 65.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Ibid, 66.

especially two facets of the political opportunity structures assist in forming decisions about depending on violence, which are accessibility of the institutionalized political order and the characteristic of state repression.[171]

The characteristic of political repression in an authoritarian regime impacts how dissidents identify themselves. The regimes, which mistreat the dissidents, create a shared identity among these groups; in other words, the common experience of repression transfuses a common identity among the dissidence.[172] According to Elizabeth Nugent, the repression determines political identities through three interrelated reinforcing mechanisms.[173] First of all, repression impacts the psychological processes, and the actors come to know about their group in this way, since it ensures valuable information to political actors regarding the associates of their group, the status of their group with respect to other groups, and the common similarities with other groups. Secondly, repression changes groups' social milieu by assigning whether political detainees are subject to prison or exile, and whether these domains are shared with members of other political groups. Thirdly, repression alters the organizational dynamics of opposition groups, since they endeavor to survive.

According to Hafez and Wiktorowicz, two of the most prominent dimensions of repression are timing and targeting.[174] Firstly, the timing of repression focuses on whether repression is performed preemptively or reactively. If the repression is performed before the opposition movement has seized an opportunity to organize and mobilize different advocators around a collective aim, it is preemptive. On the other hand, if the repression is performed in the ascending stage of the protest cycle, it is reactive.[175] Secondly, the targeting of repression concentrates on the sequence of targets encircled under state repression.[176] The targeting of repression can be either selective or indiscriminate. If the state repression just targets the pioneers and core activists of the movement, it is selective, whereas if it widens to contain advocators, sympathizers and normal subjects engaging in the movement, it is indiscriminate. In this respect, Hafez and Wiktorowicz conclude that

[171] Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," 66.
[172] Elizabeth R. Nugent, *After Repression: How Polarization Derails Democratic Transition* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020), 15.
[173] Nugent, *After Repression*, 15.
[174] Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," 67-68.
[175] Charles D. Brockett, "A Protest-Cycle Resolution of the Repression/Popular-Protest Paradox," in *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, Mark Traugott (Editor) (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), 117-144.
[176] David T. Mason and Dale A. Krane, "The political economy of death squads: Toward a theory of the impact of state-sanctioned terror," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, 2 (1989), 175-198.

preemptive and selective repression dissuades violent contention on a mass scale, whereas reactive and indiscriminate repression probably stimulates it.

In the al-Nahda case, there was preemptive and selective repression. This is why violence was not observed in the al-Nahda movement. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Ben Ali regime labelled the al-Nahda members as extremist; however, there was no precise evidence that the al-Nahda adherents engaged in extremist activities.[177] Many Tunisians tend to consider growing Salafist current as a phenomenon imported which has no roots in their society or culture, as well as it is alien to Tunisia.[178] In this respect, the moderate Islamists within the Tunisian society, mainly the al-Nahda adherents, consider the Salafism as something foreign to the Tunisian society.[179] The al-Nahda cadres also perceive Salafism as different from Tunisia's national Islamic tradition, as well as the country's local Islamic symbols.[180]

In terms of violent activities, it is better to analyze "*Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia*"[181] within the Tunisian context. With outbreak of the 2011 Uprisings, jihadis were not prominent actors in the protests, which resulted in the collapse of multiple regimes in the MENA; however, they benefitted from the changing conditions, such as opening of society, official pardons and freedom of expression.[182] This social milieu provided radical groups to function in ways that were formerly unfeasible and implement lessons learned from prior mistakes as in the Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia case.[183]

The Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia was an extremist Islamist movement that rejected official registration, and depended on jihadist Salafi concepts like takfir.[184] The al-Nahda considered the Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia as irrational, and identified itself as a rational player in search of guiding the Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia towards the moderate Tunisian

[177] George Joffé, "Introduction: Antiphonal Responses, Social Movements and Networks," in *Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and Process*, Goerge Joffe (Editor) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 1-8.
[178] Alison Pargeter, "Radicalisation in Tunisia," in *Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and Process*, Goerge Joffe (Editor) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 71-94, 83.
[179] Pargeter, "Radicalisation in Tunisia," 83.
[180] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[181] Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia is a radical Islamist terrorist organization operating with a Salafi jihadist ideology.
[182] Aaron Y. Zelin, *Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2020), 2.
[183] Zelin, *Your Sons Are at Your Service*, 3.
[184] Jasmin Lorch and Hatem Chakroun, "Othering within the Islamist spectrum: Ennahda and the Political Salafists in Tunisia," *Middle East Law and Governance* 12, 2 (2020), 198-221, 206.

model of Islam.[185] The al-Nahda movement's othering discourse towards the political Salafis was also formed by the comprehensive context of secular-Islamist contestation.[186]

In fact, Tunisian Salafism is not a new phenomenon; on the contrary, it has improved inside Tunisian society through years, and encompasses the political claims of a specific group of the Tunisian people.[187] Until the 2000s, Salafi jihadis survived within isolated cells in the country and did not become popular in the Tunisian society.[188] According to Henri Lauzière, there are different definitions and contradictory narratives of Salafism in the literature.[189] At first, the outcomes of this counter-historical glide, which ignores the process by which the conceptualization of Salafism improved, ought not to be neglected. Secondly, the term transferred an extensive and pliable religious trajectory that was connected with Islamist modernism and the studies of major reformist figures, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). This modernist school of thought of Salafism is distinctly different from the common definitions of contemporary Salafism.

In this respect, Wiktorowicz's Salafi schema, which is based on triple classification (purists, politicos and jihadis), provides a general image for analyzing this phenomenon.[190] According to Wiktorowicz; purists focus on pure Islam, politicos involve in politics, and jihadis concentrate on the idea of jihad through takfir. On the other hand, Joas Wagemakers elaborates Wiktorowicz's categorization, and offers a more comprehensive Salafi schema.

Wagemakers entitles purists as quietists, and analyzes those under three categories (aloofists, loyalists and propagandists).[191] According to Wagemakers; aloofists do not involve in politics, loyalists share their opinion with ruler, and propagandists adhere to the ruler. In this respect, quietists differ from purists in terms of manhaj and faith. Wagemakers analyzes politicos through classifying them in two groups, those of which

[185] Lorch and Chakroun, "Othering within the Islamist spectrum," 209.
[186] Ibid, 210.
[187] Stefano M. Torelli, Fabio Merone, and Francesco Cavatorta, "Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and opportunities for democratization," *Middle East Policy* 19, 4 (2012), 140-154.
[188] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 124.
[189] Henri Lauzière, "The construction of salafiyya: Reconsidering salafism from the perspective of conceptual history," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 42, 3 (2010), 369-389.
[190] Joas Wagemakers, "Revisiting Wiktorowicz: Categorising and defining the branches of Salafism," in *Salafism After the Arab Awakening: Contending with People's Power*, Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (Editors) (Oxford University Press, 2017), 7-24.
[191] Ibid.

involve in political party engagement, or activism within civil society. Finally, Wagemakers analyzes jihadis under three categories (classical jihadis, revolutionist jihadis, and global jihadis). In this respect, classical jihadis rely on the distinction between "*Dar al-Islam*"[192] and "*Dar al-Harb*", revolutionist jihadis are takfir oriented, and global jihadis concentrates on the approach that Israel is "small evil" while the United States is "big evil", which is followed by international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.

In fact, the Salafi jihadism emerged before 2000s in the Maghreb region, consisted of armed groups especially active in Algeria but also operating in Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and had linkage to al-Qaeda.[193] In the past, Salafi jihadis could hold terrorist operations in the Maghreb region, such as the explosions in 2004 in Casablanca, those in 2002 in Tunisia on the Island of Djerba, and many operations in Algeria. The militants and militias of the Salafi jihadism in the Maghreb region pursue a retrogressive discourse against democracy and modernism, and follow a religious culture, which is entirely superficial.[194] The Salafi jihadis do not use the term "Arab Maghreb", since they believe instead in "Islamic Maghreb".[195] There are few Salafi jihadis in Tunisia, and they function clandestinely because of the security reasons.[196]

In this context, it is important to mention the Islamic Liberation Party (PLI), which was formed in Tunisia in 1982.[197] The PLI was a branch of the Liberation Party of Jordan, and operated as a violent Salafist community in Tunisia.[198] This movement aimed at overthrowing the existing regime and establishing an Islamic order through exercising violence.[199] Although the movement mainly concentrated on recruiting low-level military officers, as well as low-level civil servants, in order to broaden its capacity and influence

[192] Dar al-Islam refers to the region where Islam has ascendance. This concept is traditionally matched with the Dar al-Harb, which refers to the region where Islam should expand. See: The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Dār al-Islam," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 18 June 2009, Web: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dar-al-Islam, Accessed: 2021-08-31.
[193] Alaya Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation: 1980-2008," *The Journal of African Studies* 14, 2 (2009), 257-272, 265-266.
[194] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 266.
[195] Ibid, 270.
[196] Ibid, 266.
[197] Aziz Enhaili, "Tunisia," in *Guide to Islamist Movements*, Barry Rubin (Editor) (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), 391-405, 400.
[198] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 56.
[199] Jean-François Legrain, "Palestinian Islamists: Patriotism as a Condition of Their Expansion," in *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, M.Marty and R.Appleby (Editors) (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 413–427.

in Tunisia,[200] the movement's impact was not pervasive and its member pool was limited to dozens.[201] The Tunisian state was able to deactivate the movement.

It is also useful to mention the Islamic Jihad, which was established in 1994 and operated as an underground movement. The Islamic Jihad was constructed by a group of MTI opponents, who were frustrated by the movement's legalist stance in the 1980s, and supported radicalization and functioned as a radical Salafi fraction.[202] For instance, it claimed responsibility for the hotel bombings that happened in the Sousse and Monastir cities in August 1987. Moreover, the group functioned within a jihadi body, performing as a local franchise of a broader network like al-Qaida, and implementing terror attacks on its behalf.

In the Tunisian context, relying on her field research Monica Marks determines specific deficiencies in Merone's and Cavatorta's assertion[203] that economic privation motivates individuals' engagement in Salafism.[204] Marks asserts that numerous prosperous individuals involved in the Salafi groups in Tunisia, and many people who encountered with economic troubles did not join Salafis. Salafism provides an inspirational chance for Tunisian youth to struggle for big goals and attach a meaning to their existence. In this sense, Marks utilizes Wiktorowicz's Salafi schema in the Tunisian context in order to study the different tendencies.

In terms of al-Nahda movement's approach towards Salafis in Tunisia, Marks argues that the al-Nahda considers Salafis as hardheaded juveniles, who are less mature versions of themselves and deprived of exploring moderate Tunisian Islam, instead of considering them as terrorists. Most of Tunisian Salafi jihadis are under the impact of dogmatic Egyptian or Saudi clergymen; hence, the al-Nahda leaders advocate endeavors for reforming Salafi jihadism in Tunisia and establishing Salafi parties in expectation that political inclusion will dissipate anarchic tensions of Salafi mobilization.

On the other hand, as Marks states, most of Tunisian young Salafi jihadis strongly object to the idea of political parties, and they always condemn the al-Nahda movement for taking

[200] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 400.
[201] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 258.
[202] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 400.
[203] See: Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, *Salafist Mouvance and Sheikh-ism in the Tunisian Democratic Transition* (Ireland: Dublin City University, Centre for International Studies, 2012).
[204] Monica Marks, "Youth politics and Tunisian salafism: Understanding the jihadi current," *Mediterranean Politics* 18, 1 (2013), 104-111.

immoral, United States-sided and politically self-serving positions on shari'a. Salafi jihadis severly condemn the doctrinal principles of the al-Nahda and criticize the movement's political stance that the al-Nahda has never adapted jihad for safeguarding Muslims in the world, as well as their fatwas label Rachid Ghannouchi and his adherents as unbelievers *(kaffarin)*.[205] They support the implication of shari'a law by criticizing capitalism, imperialism, and democracy as damaging notions to which non-Muslims have subjugated Muslims.[206] The approach of othering the political Salafis contributed the al-Nahda to organize itself both as a moderate, democratic player standing for the accurate version of Tunisian Islam and as an effective and credible political power.[207] In this respect, I argue that it is not possible to analyze the al-Nahda movement in terms of Salafi mobilization.

In fact, violence was never integrated into the al-Nahda movement's ideology, but only some tactical responses were observed in the field, which did not represent the core belief of the movement. The al-Nahda did not apply violence against the formal institutions of state during the regime's heavy repression against the movement, even though the movement was tried to link with some military-like activities by the Tunisian regime. On the other hand, ideas of violence arouse within the al-Nahda's grassroots in some periods, as evidenced by vigorous confrontations between the regime and the youth organizations of the movement on the university campuses especially in the 1980s.

The al-Nahda leadership distanced itself from jihadist violence, identifying it as inapplicable to Islam.[208] For the al-Nahda cadres, this consideration and divergence have accomplished many functions, such as extenuating the movement's former application to more radical interpretations of Islam and emphasizing its move away from violence, forming its attempt of non-violent movement organization as the true model to be desired by all Islamist players, strengthening the movement's collective identity and strictness among its more radical young members, introducing itself as a mediator between secular and Islamist extremes, and specifying itself with Tunisian society and state.[209]

[205] Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," 57.
[206] Kenneth Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 242.
[207] Lorch and Chakroun, "Othering within the Islamist spectrum," 201.
[208] Ibid, 220.
[209] Ibid.

1.6. Methodology and Methods

This dissertation mainly adopts a qualitative research design, which paves the way for multilayered research of a social movement. The most significant message of the social research cycle is that "there is no single best strategy or set of strategies for researching all topics".[210] In this sense, the most optimal strategy has been constructed in order to study the al-Nahda case thoroughly. This dissertation studies a single case from 1981 to 2010. In this case, the dependent variable is the resilience of a social movement during the repression period, and the study is in search of independent variables.

In terms of the PPM, the primary independent variables are political opportunity structures (the closure/openness of the institutionalized political system, the state's capability and tendency for repression, the the presence or absence of elite allies), organizational dynamics (formal and informal organizations), and framing processes (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing) as expressed above, in detail. The other independent variables encompass the micro-level factors like cultural dynamics, which form strategic options.

This dissertation follows process tracing method. In fact, there is continuity between the processes shaping movement birth and those affecting the ongoing improvement and final decadence of collective action.[211] The similarities and differences between these two stages of collective action become more obvious as the three factors of the PPM are analyzed. In the al-Nahda case, process tracing method plays an important role, since the PPM enables the implementation of process tracing. In this model, each event results in the occurrence of another one.

In the literature, process tracing refers to techniques for examining the intermediary stages in cognitive intellectual processes to comprehend better the heuristics through which mankind decides.[212] Through concentrating on how that process occurs, and whether and how it forms the consequence of interest,[213] the process tracing method tries to determine

[210] Philippe Schmitter, "The Design of Social and Political Research," in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, D. Della Porta and M. Keating (Editors) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 263-295, 264.
[211] See: McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction,"
[212] Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Introduction: Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool,* Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Editors) (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3-37.
[213] Ibid.

the intervening causal process and the causal sequence between independent and dependent variables.[214] In this respect, there is coherence between the process tracing model and the PPM.

In addition, the process tracing is an important method for grasping causal mechanisms in action, which is neither a simple historiography nor an application of statistics.[215] Actually, this helped me in studying the al-Nahda case, since the method includes analyzing events rearward through time from the consequence of interest to possible preceding causes, which provides an appropriate ground for mapping the processes of the movement.[216] Due to applying qualitative research methods, composing timeline assisted my analyses. In this respect, I formed a timeline based on the most prominent publications of the movement.[217]

In this dissertation, the primary sources compose of declarations, congressional records of the al-Nahda Party, as well as founding and anniversary statements of the party. These documents (in Arabic) were mainly retrieved from "The Database of Ennahdha Memory", as well as "The Database of Ikhwan Wiki" and "The Database of Turess". These sources provided a valuable source for thorough analyses of the PPM factors. My Arabic proficiency allowed me to analyze these documents in terms of factors of the model. In addition, I conducted interviews with a wide range of individuals from retired pro-al-Nahda judges, soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats, activists, lawyers to opposition party leaders and members. The secondary sources of data (in Arabic, English, French, and Turkish) compose of magazines, articles, books, newspapers and memoirs. In this respect, some websites broadcasting in Turkish, such as "Haksöz Haber", also became a secondary source. I benefited from some of those interviews conducted with the leading figures of the al-Nahda movement and published in those websites.

As mentioned above, after the 2011 Uprisings, newer studies from Wolf, McCarthy and Zhang have gained access to formerly unexamined historical data with the aid of numerous interviews with the members of the al-Nahda. However, there are still puzzles regarding the al-Nahda movement that exist in the literature waiting to be solved. In fact, this dissertation reflects ten years of research into the topic of the al-Nahda movement, first as

[214] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 206.
[215] See: Bennett and Checkel, "Introduction: Process Tracing,"
[216] For further information, see the mindmaps in Diagram-1.3, 1.4, 1.5.
[217] See: Appendix-1, Timeline/The Highlights of the al-Nahda Movement.

a curious intellectual interest and later as the basis for my Ph.D. dissertation. I lived in Tunisia from 2013 to 2015 for language education, and I became fluent in Arabic in addition to my English. My Arabic proficiency allowed me to conduct interviews in Arabic, and I did not have to make use of an interpreter. Thus, the fact that I conducted the interviews in Arabic was an advantage for me in my research.

I conducted interviews in order to supplement my primary data sources.[218] In this respect, I conducted three rounds of interviews, which were in 2018, 2021 and 2022 respectively.[219] In the first round, in 2018, I conducted the interviews in Tunisia where I traveled to Tunis, Sfax, Gafsa and Sidi Bouzid cities. All the interviews were one-on-one.[220] The interviews were held at the interviewees' offices, homes, or restaurants. I prepared "semi-structured"[221] interview questions for the interviews both in English and Arabic.[222] While a set of questions were covered in the interviews, I pursued topical trajectories in conversation, which made it possible to nourish new ideas and improve interview questions in accordance with the interviewees' responses.[223] This detailed preparation for the interviews helped me to identify and clarify "three sorts of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational".[224]

In 2021, I conducted the second round of interviews through Zoom meetings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the second round of the interviews, although I did not plan my interviews to pursue a "sequential approach",[225] I enjoyed from this opportunity, and I focused on gathering information that the 2018 data lacked. I made some notes during the interviews. After completing the interviews, I remained true to the words of the interviewees as much as possible while I was translating from Arabic to English, since English was not the interviewees' mother tongue.

[218] See: Appendix-4, Ethics Committee Approval.
[219] I interviewed 61 people in total. See: Appendix-3, Interviewee List.
[220] The fact that I lived and studied in Tunisia from 2013 to 2015, and I conducted researches in Tunisia as a MENA Analyst since 2015 provided me an opportunity to become familiar with the Tunisian political environment.
[221] Juliet M. Corbin and Anselm L. Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, 4th Edition (California: Sage Publications, 2015), 39.
[222] See: Appendix-2, Interview Questions.
[223] See: Barbara DiCicco-Bloom and Benjamin F. Crabtree, "The qualitative research ınterview," *Mediterranean Politics* 18, 2 (2006), 207–224.
[224] Charles Tilly, "Mechanisms in political processes," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001), 21-41, 24.
[225] Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 57.

In 2022, I conducted the the third round of interviews in İstanbul, Turkey. The main reason behind that was the political crisis in Tunisia between the President of Tunisia and the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, which was led by the al-Nahda Party. The political crisis started on 25 July 2021, and it still continues. In the 2022 Tunisian Constitutional Referendum, which was held on 25 July 2022, the proportion of the "Yes" votes was 95 percent, whereas the turnout rate was 31 percent. This has been considered as an extremely low turnout rate. The draft constitution has transformed Tunisia's semi-presidential system into a presidential system, providing the president overwhelming authority, whereas restricting the power of the parliament, to a large extent. After that the parliamentary election was held on 17 December 2022 in Tunisia, and this time the turnout rate was 11 percent. The main reason behind that was again Kais Saied, the President of Tunisia, who banned the political parties from fielding or funding candidates in the elections. In this respect, most of the opposition parties including the al-Nahda Party boycotted the elections. In addition, many high-ranking al-Nahda figures were arrested in a wave of arrests, and party offices were closed.[226]

In the third round of interviews, I concentrated on gathering information that the 2018 and 2021 data lacked in order to eliminate the current gaps in the puzzle, which required further research. In the third round of the interviews, I followed a bit dissimilar way of questioning, I improved my questions, and my interviews were in the form of a life history.[227] During these interviews, which ranged from one hour to three hours, I asked interviewees lengthily and chronologically about their personal history concentrating on their political activism, experiences, and opinions. The semi-structured nature of the interviews did not only let me ask about particular issues, but also let interviewees concentrate on the occasions and experiences they think significant for their own political improvement.

In all of these interviews, I used the snowball sampling method. The snowball sampling method is known as "a technique for discovering research subjects where one subject yields the researcher the name of another, who in turn ensures the name of a third, and so

[226] Rory McCarthy, "Islamism, party change, and strategic conciliation: Evidence from Tunisia," *Party Politics* (2023), 1–11, 7.
[227] See: Tom Wengraf, *Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic Narrative and Semi-Structured Methods* (London: Sage, 2001).

on".[228] Especially in conflict milieus, a threatening political atmosphere might raise the propensity and necessity of particular marginalized populations to function underground.[229] Even if the reconciliation is reached, intergroup relations may be dull and unsteady because of the absence of societal trust, which can create distrust towards the researcher as an outsider.[230] In this respect, the snowball sampling method is considered as one of the most efficient methods to access hidden and/or difficult to attain populations.[231]

In addition to the older generation and the current leaders and executives, my interview samples included both women and youth, which reflected both the gender and generational diversity of Tunisian society, and the al-Nahda movement, in particular. To comply with ethical guidelines and preserve the identities of my interviewees, I only identified their positions within the entities that they worked. In addition, I specified the place and the time where the interview was conducted. The anonymity of my interviewees was extremely important in order to provide them a free milieu to speak, since especially after the 2021 Coup, most of the al-Nahda members and activists have been targeted for arrest and detention by the security forces.

1.7. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed main points in the theorization of the PPM, and provided a design that will be used in the application of the model to the al-Nahda case. The chapter also analyzed possible methods in the application of the PPM. In the research, it was detected that the four main categories of the political opportunity structures sometimes may not be enough to analyze the al-Nahda case. The exclusion of the movement pushed the regime to enlarge political openness in order to control both fractions among the ruling elites and competition between ruling elites and opposition groups. In Tunisia, the al-Nahda movement came into view as an opposition; and this was a reaction to the regime's control on religious domain.

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[228] W. Paul Vogt, *Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology: A Nontechnical Guide for the Social Sciences* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 300.
[229] Nissim Cohen and Tamar Arieli, "Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges and snowball sampling," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, 4 (2011), 423-435.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Avelardo Valdez and Charles D. Kaplan, "Reducing selection bias in the use of focus groups to investigate hidden populations: The case of Mexican-American gang members from South Texas," *Drugs and Society* 14 (1999), 209–224.

In this context, this dissertation focuses on political opportunities, as well as organizational dynamics and framing processes, in the mobilization process of the al-Nahda movement. In analyzing how the al-Nahda enhanced from an abeyance structure to a banned political party, and how the movement mobilized its base in case of political opportunities; this dissertation benefit from primary sources like party documents and interviews (in Arabic), as well as the secondary literature. In this process, this dissertation provided new contributions to the PPM by taking into account the cultural sides of the case. Among its members and supporters, similar daily practices kept the cohesion of the al-Nahda movement despite the regime repression. In addition, the dissertation also highlighted that even in a semi-authoritarian settings with highly exclusive milieu, Islamist movements are able to function and improve themselves through organizational dynamics and creative framing processes, which utilize political opportunities in a pragmatic way.

In the following chapters, at first, I will analyze the historical background of the Islamist movement in Tunisia in Chapter II, in detail. After that, I concentrate on the factors of the PPM through process tracing. In this respect, I analyze the movement in three main periods (1981-1989, 1989-1999 and 2000-2010) in Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter V respectively, since the three main factors of the PPM also change and transform in time. However, there will not be clear-cut lines between those chapters, which encompass the in-depth analyses of the PPM in terms of the three main factors. The main reason behind this is that every process is in a dynamic relationship with each other within the framework of the PPM's dynamics. Thus, I have made this classification only for expressing the factors of the PPM more precisely, taking into account that these factors are not mutually distinct and unrelated. In the following chapters, while examining the movement through the PPM, I reconstruct this mobilization process through forming panoramic images by concentrating on the PPM factors in the processes. This endeavor will be for not losing the emphasis on the factors in the narrow sense and on the theory in the broad sense.

CHAPTER II

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN TUNISIA

2.1. French Colonialism and Pre-Independence Period

Tunisia has been the center of the Arab civilization in the "Maghreb"[1] for centuries.[2] The Islamic structures in Tunisia were largely shaped by the relations of Muslim leaders with the state and nationalist movements before the independence period.[3] Islam played an important role in Tunisian history especially in the pre-independence period, and formed the cultural structure of the society. Islam had dominant influence on every aspect in social life, and Islamic customs always remained alive in the memory of Tunisian society.[4] Arabic-speaking people constituted 98.2 percent of the Tunisian society and they were Sunni Muslims in both Maliki and Hanafi madhhabs.[5]

During the Ottoman rule, the Hanafi madhhab was influential in Tunisia; however, the Hanafi madhhab never removed the position of the Maliki madhhab, and the Maliki School has always preserved its dominance in the country.[6] In order to follow the Islamic knowledge more manageable, the Tunisian Bey took certain administrative and fiscal measures at Zaytuna University, involving the appointment of more instructors from the Hanafi madhhab for supplementing those from Maliki madhhab, which was more common

[1] The Mashriq refers to the eastern part of the Arab world, whereas the Maghreb refers to the western part of the Arab world.
[2] See: Muhammad al-Hadi al-Sharif, *Tarikh Tunis, min ʿusur ma qable al-Tarikh ila al-Istiqlal (History of Tunisia, From Prehistoric Times to Independence)* (Tunis: Dar Siras lil-Nashr, 1993).
[3] Emad Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (State, Culture, and Society in Arab North Africa)* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 18.
[4] Abdulmajid al-Najar, *Siraʿ al-Huwiyya fi Tunis (Struggle of the Identity in Tunisia*) (Paris: Dar al-Aman, 1988), 33.
[5] Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, *Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report* (London: Routledge, 1997), 79.
[6] Abdullahi Ahmad an-Na'im, *Islamic Family Law in A Changing World: A Global Resource Book* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 182.

in Tunisia.[7] Most of the Tunisians (Approximately 99 percent of the population) used to identify themselves as Sunni Muslims. In this vein, the population belonged to mainly the Maliki madhhab, and the citizens who belonged to the Hanafi madhhab in the country were in minority.

Benefiting from the uprising of tribes on the Algerian border in 1881, France took Tunisia under its control.[8] However, unlike Algeria, France adapted a different patronage system in Tunisia, and while holding the economic, military, educational and political areas of life, it allowed local families to continue their administration.[9] France and Tunisia signed the Treaty of Bardo in May 1881, and the Convention of La Marsa extended this treaty in 1883. These treaties safeguarded the Tunisian Bey as an absolute monarch and an independent body for the local administration, but involved a basic clause, which obliged the Bey to undertake "such administrative, judicial, and financial reforms as the French government may deem useful."[10]

During French colonial rule, the French staffed in the administrative cadres of Tunisia and the justice system was substantially secularized in the country. Yet, the knowledge of *"ulama"*[11] on shari'a and their loyalty to the Maliki madhhab provided them an exclusive status and allowed them to operate as representatives of the Tunisian society.[12] During French colonial period (1881-1956), Islam played an important role in Tunisian politics, since the ulama kept their strong position in the religious domain, and was able to predominate Islamic foundations, such as shari'a courts and influential mosques.[13]

The French mandate was a spurious, superficial order between colonial rule and independence, and constructed on preliminary state-centralization projects that had enhanced under the Ottoman Empire.[14] French colonialism was legitimatized by the concept of "civilizing mission" and the objective of France was to expand the interests of

[7] Mohamed el-Tahir el-Mesawi, "Muslim reformist action in nineteenth century Tunisia," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 25, 2 (2008), 49–82.
[8] See: Robert Rinehart, "Historical Setting," in *Tunisia: A Country Study*, Harold D. Nelson (Editor) (Washington, DC: American University, 1988), Chapter I.
[9] Ahmet Kavas, *Geçmişten Günümüze Afrika* (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2005), 36.
[10] Nugent, *After Repression,* 76.
[11] The "ulama" refers to body of Muslim scholars, who are considered as possessing proficient knowledge of shari'a and theology.
[12] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 19.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett, "General Introduction," in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Editors) (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1-20.

the French civilization, education system, and language for developing the world.[15] The French colonial missions were run by a nationalistic aspiration to restore France as a prominent world power.[16] The French system was in search of protecting the radical and juridical hierarchies over which the colonial structure was established.[17] In this respect, the Tunisian people were overruled under the image of exemplary French subject, which resulted in deficiency of considering the local Tunisian circumstances. This situation would gradually fuel the reaction against the French colonialism among the Tunisian population.

With the Conventions of La Marsa, amendments to the application of French Law (leaving only personal matters to the Islamic courts) and some military reforms were approved in 1883.[18] The French administration did not need to intervene in the Family Law, which operated in accordance with the shari'a provisions, with the understanding that it did not harm its own economic and social priorities.[19] The French focused on specific economic reforms in order to protect France's regional interests in matters, such as the regulation of finance and banking sector, the industrialization of agricultural sector, and the development of transportation infrastructure.[20]

Tunisia, which was under French occupation for the longest time after Algeria, received intense immigration from France during this occupation period (1881-1956). The French colonial administration formed a parallel French type educational order, extending from primary to university levels.[21] In this vein, French colonialism created a new elite class in Tunisian society through educating talented French and Tunisian children in French schools.

[15] Nugent, *After Repression*, 67.
[16] Peter Sluglett, "Some Reflections on the Nature of the British Presence in Iraq (1914-1932) and the French Presence in Syria (1918-1946)," in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives*, Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Editors) (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 103-127.
[17] See: Florence Bernault, *A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 2003).
[18] Rosalind Varghese Brown and Michael Spilling, *Tunisia: Cultures of the World* (Tarrytown, NY: Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2009), 33-34.
[19] Mounira M. Charrad, "Policy shifts: State, Islam and gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s," *Social Politics*, 4, 2 (1997), 288-290.
[20] Gerald Zarr, *Tunisia-Culture Smart!: The Essential Guide to Customs and Culture* (London: Kuperard, 2009), 43.
[21] Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9.

Under the French colonial administration, two prominent reformist approaches emerged among the Tunisian intellectuals. The first group, which was called as "Young Tunisians", stressed the Western secularizing ideas of reform, and considered Islam in the personal domain, whereas the second group emphasized the Islamist domain of reform, and underlined the Islamist identity of the Tunisian society.[22] In particular, the Young Tunisians organized demonstrations against the privileges that France colonialism desired to give to conservative Islamist circles.

The Young Tunisians, which was established in 1907, was inspired by the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire.[23] The reform movements initiated by the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire and the deteriorating administration system of the French over time triggered Habib Bourguiba's struggle for independence, and the nationalist ideas developed in Tunisia in the first half of the 20th century. As a result of these developments, the Young Tunisians movement improved.

Among the Tunisian people, the coastal areas are called as *"Sahel"* while the inner parts are called as *"Baldis"*, and the Arab nationalism started in the Baldis.[24] In fact, "similar to other countries of the region, nationalism was the outcome of the liberation struggle against the colonizer."[25] In the first half of the 20th century, the French-educated members of the Young Tunisians movement began to resist the French occupation, and the speeches, newspapers and organized boycotts of the Young Tunisians led to their arrest and deportation from Tunisia.[26]

In this period, labor unions, women's rights movement, civil society, political party cadres[27] and Tunisian elites united on the axis of national struggle that concentrated on nationalization against the French occupation.[28] In other words, throughout French occupation, Islamists also began to organize across the country, as well as the nationalist ones, but they acted together on the axis of the national struggle. In this sense, the Islamist mobilization did not directly stem from the colonization experience in Tunisia.

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[22] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 22.
[23] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 19.
[24] Author Interview with the Tunisian Judge (Retired) through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[25] Fabio Merone, "Enduring class struggle in Tunisia: The fight for identity beyond political Islam," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, 1 (2014), 74-87, 4.
[26] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 69–72.
[27] Here, I refer to the Neo Destour Party, which will be discussed in the following parts.
[28] Lamia Ben Youssef Zayzafoon, *The Production of the Muslim Woman: Negotiating Text, History, and Ideology* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 96-98.

During the colonial period, Tunisia was dependent on France in the economic arena, and European and especially French companies benefited greatly from new infrastructure investments. However, the economic conditions of the Tunisian people, who mostly worked in the agricultural sector instead of administrative cadres in the public sector, deteriorated during the colonial period, and especially the intellectual Tunisians discoursed these worsening conditions of the Tunisian people in political arena.[29] However, although France's position in Tunisia turned into a major problem in the past, especially with its desire to maintain its military presence in Bizerte, France remained as the most important trade partner of Tunisia even after the independence, just like Algeria and Morocco.[30]

The Tunisian army was formed in 1956 after the independence. The Tunisian army did not take on the role of the protector of revolutionary change in the country, as in other Arab countries.[31] In Algeria and Egypt, the army declared independence by founding the state, whereas the situation in Tunisia was the opposite. For example, unlike Tunisia, the Egyptian army had historically been an important ally of the regime and its legitimacy in the social sphere was stronger than in Tunisia.[32]

The Tunisian army was founded with the combination of the Principality (Beylik) Guard Troops and an inter-army regiment composed of French troops.[33] After Bourguiba became Tunisia's first president, he established a state order that minimized military interference with politics.[34] During his rule, Bourguiba took a stance that became increasingly authoritarian, alienated from the public weakening his ties with the society.[35]

In fact, after French colonialism, Tunisia was governed under single-party semi-authoritarianism in both Bourguiba (1957-1987) and Ben Ali (1987-2011) eras and there was a widespread repressive environment within the country. The state-building projects predominantly form the institutions of Middle Eastern polities; however, these are directed by a comprehensive colonial strategy that promotes the interests of the colonizer rather

[29] Mahmood Sami Nabi, *Making the Tunisian Resurgence* (Singapure: Palgrave, 2019), 174.
[30] Masri, *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly*, 198.
[31] Abdül Rezak Bilgin, *Arap Baharı Sürecinde Orduların Tutumu: Mısır, Libya ve Tunus Örnekleri* (İstanbul: Birleşik Dağıtım Kitabevi, 2014), 71.
[32] Özge Özkoç, "Arap dünyasında demokratikleşme süreçleri ve siyasal İslam: Müslüman Kardeşler ve En-Nahda hareketi üzerine bir karşılaştırma," *Mülkiye Dergisi* 40, 1 (2016), 29-56.
[33] Bilgin, *Arap Baharı Sürecinde Orduların Tutumu*, 70.
[34] Risa Brooks, "Abandoned at the palace: Why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, 2 (2013), 205-220.
[35] Jacob Coleman Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 413.

than pointing out threats considered by local actors.[36] In this vein, the post-independence authoritarian coercive capacity was mainly formed by the colonial pre-independence institutional structure in Tunisia.[37]

2.2. Tunisian Independence and Its Aftermath

Under the leadership of Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Tha'alibi, the Destour Party,[38] which had a liberal stance, was established in 1920. The roots of this party go back to the Young Tunisians movement, which was founded in 1907 for resistance against the French occupation. Habib Bourguiba wrote important articles in the newspaper, "*Sawt Tunis*", publication of the Destour Party. The Destour Party emphasized the Islamic and Arabic dimensions of Tunisian nationalism, introduced itself as the advocate of Islam, accomplished to form an organizational network, and achieved to have an impact on the urban educated Islamist middle class in Tunisia.[39]

Yet, seeing that the Destour Party became a bourgeois party that distanced itself from the Tunisian society in time, Bourguiba first left the Voice of Tunisia, and founded a new newspaper, "*Harakat Tunis*". After the nationalists' proposals including extensive policies for independence under the leadership of Bourguiba were rejected at the congress of the Destour Party, Bourguiba took an important initiative in 1934.

Habib Bourguiba, who played a key role in the organization of the constitutional liberal movement against the French, founded the party with the same name, New Constitutional Liberal Party *(al-Hizb al-Hurr al-Dusturi al-Jadid)*, which was most commonly known as "Neo Destour Party (1934-1964)". The Neo Destour Party cadres represented the new elite, who came from the Sahel cities of the country and graduated from French universities. The aim of these new cadres was to implement economic and social reforms swiftly with growing nationalist feelings. Considering the events that have developed in Tunisia since

[36] Joan Ricart-Huguet, "The Origins of colonial investments in former British and French Africa," *British Journal of Political Science* (2021), 1-22.
[37] Allison Spencer Hartnett, Nicholas Lotito, Elizabeth Nugent, "The origins of coercive institutions in the Middle East: Preliminary evidence from Egypt," *SSRN Electronic Journal* (2018), 1-29. Web: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3239093.
[38] "Destour" means "constitution" in Arabic.
[39] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 22.

the beginning of the 20th century, it is possible to evaluate the rise of the Neo Destour Party on the axis of the "ethno-symbolism".[40]

The Neo Destour Party had to interrupt its works from time to time due to the obstacles against Bourguiba's activities, as well as the effects of World War II, but it was organized as a strong political party in Tunisia. Especially when Habib Bourguiba was exiled in Egypt in the 1940s due to French repression, the party's Vice President Salah Ben Youssef (1907-1961) continued the activities of the Neo Destour Party, and Ben Youssef led and managed the nationalist movement in Tunisia during this period. Salah Ben Youssef focused on issues like identity and cultural self-preservation, and he framed religion on the bases of social, economic and political patterns instead of concentrating on the spiritual values alone, which was supported by the Islamists, to a large extent.[41]

In this period, although the French increased the powers of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Assembly with political reforms, these reforms did not satisfy the nationalist movement in Tunisia. Habib Bourguiba was known as the "Great Mujahid *(al-Mujahid al-Akbar)*" in the Tunisian society. Bourguiba returned to Tunisia in the late 1940s, and this accelerated the Neo Destour's struggle for independence. The 1946 meeting between the Neo-Destour and the Zaytunians pioneered to approval of a joint program for acquisition Tunisian independence and affiliation in the League of Arab States.[42] In fact, Bourguiba and Ben Youssef endeavored to keep a truce, declaring that the Neo-Destour was a non-ideological party, which operated to bring all Tunisians together for the independence.[43] The ideological contradictions and disputes between Salah Ben Youssef and Habib Bourguiba were abandoned for the independence struggle, and the national movement mobilized Tunisian forces in order to fight for national liberation and gaining independence.[44]

[40] See: Hatice Rumeysa Dursun, "Bağımsızlık öncesi dönemde Tunus'ta milliyetçi hareket ve din ilişkisinin etnosembolcü bir yaklaşımla değerlendirilmesi (1911-1956)," *Bilig* 92 (2020), 185-204.
[41] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 22.
[42] Norma Salem, *Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the Creation of Tunisia* (Dover: Croom Helm, 1984), 116.
[43] Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya 1820–1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 175.
[44] Tawfiq al-Madani, *Tarikh al-Mʿarada al-Tunisiyya min al-Nasha ila al-Thawra: al-Ahzab al-Qumiyya wa al-Yisariyya al-Islamiyya (History of the Tunisian Opposition from its Inception to the Revolution: National, Leftist and Islamist Parties)* (Tunisia: Meskiliani Publishing House, 2012), 14.

In time, the Neo Destour Party became a powerful mass political party, and later formed a significant alliance with the UGTT, which was led by Farhat Hached (1914-1952).[45] This was a critical action in the process leading to independence. The nation-state in Tunisia was founded on the axes of alliance between Bourguiba and the UGTT, overpowering the Islamist groups led by Ben Youssef.[46] The Tunisian Constituent Assembly election results in 1956 were as follows:

Table-2.1: The Tunisian Constituent Assembly Election in 1956[47]

Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
National Union[48]	597,763	98.75	98
Tunisian Communist Party	7,352	1.21	0
Independents	235	0.04	0
Total *(Turnout Rate: 83.56 percent)*	**605,350**	**100.00**	**98**

The young members of the Neo Destour Party were able to mobilize the masses via synthesizing Islam with the Tunisian national identity, since they were aware of the significance of Islam for the Tunisian society in their struggle for the independence.[49] The Neo Destour Party actively utilized religious symbolism in order to attract the Islamist groups within the Tunisian society, especially the mosques were used in the country for propagating the party's views, and the Neo Destour cadres supplemented their speeches with Qur'anic verses.[50]

Yet, after the independence in 1956, Bourguiba dismantled the traditional Islamic establishments and announced Tunisia as part of the West.[51] According to Bourguiba,

[45] Neil Partrick, "Tunisia," in *Europa Regional Surveys of the World, The Middle East And North Africa 2013*, Christopher Matthews, Helen Canton, Philip McIntyre and Iain Frame (Editors) (59th Edition) (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1087-1130, 1088.
[46] Andrea Khalil, *Crowds and Politics in North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya* (London: Routledge, 2014), 42.
[47] Data Source: Juan Montabes Pereira, "Tunisia," in *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich (Editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 911-924.
[48] The National Union was an alliance of the Neo Destour Party, the UGTT, the Union of Tunisian Farmers and the Union of Craftsmen and Merchants.
[49] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 23.
[50] Ibid, 23-24.
[51] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 1.

Islam was not the main element of Tunisia's identity.[52] The Destourians standing by Habib Bourguiba accused the traditional Islamic elites of being too accommodating towards the Protectorate authorities, since the traditional Islamic Destourians standing by Salah Ben Youssef had not sincerely embraced Bourguiba's more confrontational stance vis-à-vis the French.[53] There were a serious rivaly between the supporters of Bourguiba and Ben Youssef, especially between 1955 and 1956.

Actually, the Yousufian movement had emerged as a liberation movement during the colonial period as an armed response to the colonial presence in Tunisia and the Arab Maghreb, as well.[54] The Yousufians were the supporters of the Islamist leader, Saleh Ben Youssef, the General Secretary of the Neo Destour Party.[55] The Yousufians were known for the support of intellectual currents, political parties, trade unions, and patriotic and revolutionary elements that believed in the armed struggle.[56] They were able to gain the support of the vast majority of the Tunisian people.[57]

Yet, Salah Ben Youssef started an opposition movement against Bourguiba within the Neo Destour Party, collaborating with a group including the communists. In this respect, Ben Youssef was purged from the Neo Destour Party on the grounds of his separatist activities. After that, Ben Youssef went to Egypt and continued his activities against the Bourguiba regime there.[58] Different from policies of Bourguiba, Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies and discourses advocated the unity of Arab,[59] and this wave of Pan-Arabism influenced especially the Islamist youth in the 1960s. The Nasser regime in Egypt initially supported

[52] Lewis B. Ware, "The role of the Tunisian military in the post-Bourguiba era," *Middle East Journal* 39, 1 (1985), 27-47.
[53] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia,* 21.
[54] Saleh Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)* (Beirut: Dar al-Safi, 2012), 540.
[55] Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 540.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] After graduating from Sadiqiyya College, Habib Bourgiba studied Law and Political Science in Sorbonne University, whereas Salah Ben Youssef studied in Zaytuna University. The Zaytuna was the primary educational and Islamic foundation in Tunisia (See: Hamza Meddeb, *Ennahda's Uneasy Exit from Political Islam*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019). For instance, Rachid Ghannouchi argued that al-Azhar University in Egypt and Zaytuna University in Tunisia were two important madrasahs in the Islamic realm and that even if states collapsed and rulers were overthrown, they survived and played an important role in shaping an independent civil society (See: Raşid Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama al-Madani)*, translated by Gülşen Topçu (İstanbul: Mana Yayınları, 2018), 104). As a matter of fact, Habib Bourgiba took a modern stance while Salah Ben Youssef took a traditional Islamic position, and Ben Youssef supported the Pan-Arab ideology advocating the idea of acting in unity with Egypt.
[59] Deina Ali Abdelkader, *Islamic Activists: The Anti-Enlightenment Democrats* (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 68.

Ben Youssef in the early 1960s, but then stopped supporting him in order to maintain the balance policy between Egypt and Tunisia.[60]

The Yousufian movement did not provide an ideology on how to liberate the country from colonialism.[61] Rather, it served as a political movement with a Maghreb identity and an Arab-Islamist depth.[62] The Yousufian movement fought two parallel battles, the first against the colonial state and the second against the Bourguiba group.[63] This conflict continued to shift between the Neo Destour Party and the nascent nation state.[64] After the proclamation of the republic, Bourguiba managed to liquidate the opposition Yousufian groups through subsequent trials and executions against its leaders and members.[65]

The period of struggle between Ben Youssef and Bourguiba resulted in Ben Youssef's assassination in exile by the Bourguiba regime because of his disobedience.[66] This was a turning point, which sowed the ideological seeds of the conflict between the regime and Islamists in the independence period. The Neo Destour Party explicated the nation-state project in terms of modernization process; and the Islamists were eventually discarded as anti-modern by the proponent middle class.[67] In order to oppress Ben Youssef and his supporters, Habib Bourguiba tried to divide the ideological and organizational networks of Ben Youssef's Zaytunian advocators.[68] The traditional education system of Tunisia including mosques and madrasahs were transferred to the Ministry of National Education by stages, and the Zaytuna University was closed down in 1957 as a result of which the Zaytuna Mosque, its scholars and collegians swiftly lost their reputation after experiencing this marginalization process.[69] For example, between 1960 and 1988, the number of state built mosques statistically increased by 209 percent, and prayer spaces were formed in ministries and universities.[70]

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[60] Author Interview with the Brigadier General (Retired) of the Tunisian Army in Tunis in 2018.
[61] Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 540.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Lewis B. Ware, "Habib Bourguiba," in *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa - A Biographical Dictionary*, Bernard Reich (Editor) (California: Greenwood, 1990), 119-126.
[67] Abdellatif Hermessi, "L'islamisme et l'État en Tunisie," *L'Homme et la société* 4, 114 (1994), 75-86.
[68] Gilbert Naccache, "Idéologie et Projet de Société: L'Inéquation Tunisienne," *Le Mensuel*, 3 (1984), 30-37.
[69] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 39.
[70] Lewis B. Ware, "Ben Ali's constitutional coup in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal* 42, 4 (1988), 587–601, 591.

According to Hatice Dursun, the basis of the struggle between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef was an ideological and cultural difference of understanding.[71] Even though both of them were aware of the importance of Islam for Tunisian identity, they reflected two different world views within the same party. She argued that Bourguiba instrumentalized religious symbols in the struggle for independence to mobilize the masses against the the French colonialism, whereas Ben Youssef considered defending religious values as a goal in itself. In this sense, Bourguiba's victory in this struggle caused religion to lose its former central importance in the new order established after independence.

Actually, the most important feature that distinguishes Tunisia from other Arab countries was that it was the first Arab country, which adopted secularism.[72] However, secularism was implemented in a different and problematic way in Tunisia by applying Islamic references and religious legitimacy means. The reforms of the Bourguiba regime were sensitive not to contradict to the conservative base of the Tunisian society and to present the modernization steps in accordance with Islam.[73] Although the secularism seemed to separate religion and state affairs in Tunisia, it actually brought religion under the control of the state by closing religious foundations, as well as cutting off their financial resources.[74] This was a significant difference in terms of application of secularism within Tunisia. However, despite all its religious references, the general view of Tunisia in the outside world was that it had a more secular characteristic among the MENA countries.

The secular stance of the Bourguiba regime tried to implement a different socio-cultural model that was foreign to the traditional order of the Arab-Islamic society, and this model was under the influence of Westernism.[75] On the other hand, as al-Munsif Wannas, a researcher in Tunisian politics, argued, Bourguiba's thoughts on secularism were not totally against Islamism.[76] In other words, Bourguiba always used Islam in order to strengthen his legitimacy, since a legitimate regime was necessary to struggle with the

[71] Dursun, "Bağımsızlık öncesi dönemde Tunus'ta milliyetçi hareket ve din ilişkisinin etnosembolcü bir yaklaşımla değerlendirilmesi (1911-1956)," 199.
[72] Habib Bourguiba is considered as the most avowedly secularist political strategist in the Arab world. See: Nazih N. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991).
[73] Author Interview with the Tunisian Ambassador (Retired) in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[74] Ibid.
[75] al-Najar, *Siraʿ al-Huwiyya fi Tunis (Struggle of the Identity in Tunisia*), 105.
[76] al-Munsif Wannas, *al-Dawla wa al-Mas'ala al-Thaqafiyya fi Tunis (The State and the Cultural Issue in Tunisia*) (Tunis: Dar al-Mithaq, 1988), 132.

Islamist movement that was able to challenge the religious values of it.[77] Hence, Bourguiba was very cautious to legitimate his discourses with verses from the Qur'an, words from the Prophet's Sunna or by views from the religious wise people and authorities, as well.[78]

Hamma al-Hammami, leader of the Tunisian Communist Party, stated that the regime considered Islam as one of the main agents of its ideology.[79] In this respect, he pointed out that the Bourguiba regime mainly applied to the shari'a laws while preparing social laws, and financed all religious activities in Tunisia, as well.[80] Hamma al-Hammami strictly criticized the Bourguiba regime due to preserving traditional Islamic values.[81] He also found a serious mistake in the Tunisian constitution in terms of secularism since it acknowleged Islam as the religion of the state.[82] He criticized the regime for using Islam as an instrument in order to preserve the bourgeoisie and control the proletariat.[83]

After the independence, the Tunisian state took the control of the official public education of Islam, and institutionalized the Islamic daily practices, to a large extent. The Qur'anic law councils were transferred to scope of common-law in 1956, which terminated the autonomy of the conventional juridical institutions in the country.[84] The regime formed the Administration of Religious Affairs at the beginning of the 1960s in order to further consolidate its control on the religious domain.[85] Against the growing Islamist trend, the regime used the mosque as an effective instrument in its strategy, and tried to manage the figure of mosque construction permissions, as well as their authorized personnel and religious sermons.[86] The ultimate goal of the regime was to cut the financial resources of the traditional institutions, which provided autonomy for them, transform them into an instrument for legitimizing the regime's authority, and please the modernists within the

[77] Wannas, *al-Dawla wa al-Mas'ala al-Thaqafiyya fi Tunis (The State and the Cultural Issue in Tunisia*), 114-115.
[78] Habib Boulares, *L'islam: La peur et l'esperance* (Paris: JC Lattes, 1983), 198-199.
[79] Hamma al-Hammami, *Didda al-Zalamiyya: al-Ittijah al-Islami* (*Against Obscurantism: The Islamic Tendency*) (Tunis: Dar al-Nashr li al-Maghrib al-'Arabi, 1986), 4-5.
[80] al-Hammami, *Didda al-Zalamiyya: al-Ittijah al-Islami (Against Obscurantism: The Islamic Tendency*), 4-5.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 392.
[85] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 40.
[86] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 392.

government.[87] The High-Level Bureaucrat of the Truth and Dignity Commission described the secularization process in Tunisia as follows:

> From 1956, the educational affairs were placed under the control of the Ministry of National Education, and about 20 percent of the national budget was allotted to education. More than 200 independent Qur'an courses were nationalized. The clergy were given the status of civil servants, and in this way, the supervision of this group became completely under the control of the state.[88]

The Representative of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women elaborated the secularization process in Tunisia as follows:

> The shari'a provisions applied in social life were abolished, and a modern civil code (Code of Personal Status/1956) was adopted. This code regulated the rights of marriage, prohibition of polygamy, divorce, women and children. In fact, these were the rights, which numerous women in the MENA did not have at that time, or even today. In this respect, the conflicts related to these laws were taken from the shari'a courts and transferred to the judicial courts. Moreover, Tunisian women gained the right to access abortion legally simultaneously with the United States Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade landmark decision to legalize abortion in the United States in 1973.[89]

Secular modernist elites of Tunisia, who played an important role in the foundation of the country, believed that the gap between Arab-Muslim society and modern Western society could only be closed by abandoning their past and building a new and different society.[90] Bourguiba took severe precautions against the practices of all religious institutions that he considered to harm the social order including the Zaytuna after he took over presidency in 1957. The Tunisian government replaced the Arabic curriculum in the Zaytuna with the

[87] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 392.
[88] Author Interview with the High-Level Bureaucrat of the Truth and Dignity Commission in Tunis in 2018. The Truth and Dignity Commission (Instance vérité et dignité) is an independent tribunal, which was founded by law in Tunisia in 2013.
[89] Author Interview with the Representative of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women in Tunis in 2018. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (L'Association tunisienne des femmes démocrates) is a Tunisian feminist organization, which was established in 1989.
[90] Charles Antoine Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 34.

Franco-Arab curriculum over time and implemented this curriculum as a single system in the whole country.[91]

Habib Bourguiba's anticlerical strategy involved three basic factors, which were the Islamic institutions, religious personnel, and the religious practices.[92] The main objective of this policy was to dominate Islamic personnel and institutions as well as consolidating the regime's legitimacy and containing Islamism.[93] For example, in the late 1960s, the Administration of Religious Affairs was eventually responsible for coordination of the state's practices in religious issues, appointment and education of clergymen and their wages as civil servants in addition to control of religious activities and religious training programs.[94]

In this context, the crystallization of the Islamist social movement in reaction to Westernization and secularization did not materialize during the French colonization period, but it happened in the post-independence period under the Bourguiba era (1957-1987).[95] The Zaytunian sheikhs were seen as the most prominent representatives of the old social structure and as such, they were perceived as anti-modernists.[96] Modernization process in Tunisia took place in a top-down manner. Bourguiba implemented many reforms, which concentrated on eliminating Islamic symbols, as well as erasing what had remained of Islamic laws.[97] Bourguiba engaged in public campaigns against the Islamist movement, and encouraged the people under his authority to give up celebrating the Ramadan festival and making a pilgrimage.[98] Bourguiba's fight against the Islamic culture of society involved other strict practices, such as prohibiting the veil and announcing breaking the fast in Ramadan.[99]

In Tunisia, the stance of the regime towards the Islamists was tense. The main reason was Bourguiba's support for Francophone culture from one side, and the Islamist movement in Tunisia that considered Bourguiba's secularism as a threat to Tunisian culture from another

[91] Micaud, Brown and Moore, *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization*, 35.
[92] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 391.
[93] Ibid.
[94] See: Franck Frégosi, *La régulation institutionnelle de l'islam en Tunisie: Entre audace moderniste et tutelle étatique* (Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 2003).
[95] See: Muhammed Affan, *Rise and Alleged Fall of Islamism: The Case of Ennahda Movement Party* (İstanbul: Al Sharq Forum, 2017).
[96] Merone, "Enduring class struggle in Tunisia," 5.
[97] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, 10.
[98] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 392.
[99] Yahya Abu Zakaria, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi Tunis min al-Tha'alibi to Ghannouchi (The Islamist Movement in Tunisia from al-Tha'alibi to Ghannouchi)* (Nashiri, 2003), 49.

side.[100] Moreover, the education curricula inspired by Bourguiba's directives weakened the Arab-Islamic identity of the country.[101] This made the Islamist movement focus on the discourse that Bourguiba's practices threatened the Tunisian society with collapse.[102]

Actually, the Bourguiba regime tried to bring a new order in the post-independence period with top-down laws.[103] The reforms made shortly after the independence in Tunisia were not shaped by the demands emerged within from the grassroots, but rather by the preferences of prominent intellectual and political figures. In this process, the whole Islamist project had used up its revolutionary enthusiasm, and the Islamist movement had been divided into nationalist political groups, which supported democracy, elections, and coalitions but without creating a model for an alternative society.[104]

Tunisia tried a mixed economy model from 1956 to 1964, and Habib Bourguiba gave importance to the unity of the Maghreb region in his foreign policy. Bourguiba thought that economic and cultural cooperation based on the solidarity created by the common language with the Maghreb countries would be effective in achieving political unity in the future. Bourguiba was distant to the Nasser regime in Egypt, and in this respect, the Nasserist policies were considered as micro-imperialist by the Tunisian regime within the Arab world.[105] The Tunisian general election results in 1959 were as follows:

Table-2.2: The Tunisian General Election in 1959[106]

Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Neo Destour Party	1,002,298	99.65	90
Tunisian Communist Party	3,471	0.35	0
Total *(Turnout Rate: 91.67 percent)*	**1,005,769**	**100.00**	**90**

[100] Zakaria, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi Tunis min al-Tha'alibi to Ghannouchi (The Islamist Movement in Tunisia from al-Tha'alibi to Ghannouchi)*, 49.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Mounira M. Charrad, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco* (Berkeley, Kaliforniya: University of California Press, 2001), 2.
[104] Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk (London: IB Tauris, 1994), ix.
[105] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1089.
[106] Data Source: Juan Montabes Pereira, "Tunisia," in *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich (Editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 911-924.

The growing dissatisfaction with the Bourguiba regime was intensified by a rising economic crisis in the early 1960s. In this framework, Bourguiba came up with socialism as a remedy for national unity.[107] The regime party was called as "Socialist Destourian Party (1964-1988)" after this shift. The Socialist Destourian Party accepted neither Marxist socialism nor capitalism as its main policy. The party considered Marxist socialism too harsh for Tunisia, and believed that capitalism would not be compatible with the realities of Tunisia.[108] In this sense, the Socialist Destourian Party adapted "constitutional socialism" as its ideological approach.[109]

The Soviet Union increased its financial aid to Tunisia, especially with Habib Bourguiba's transition to the socialist economy model in 1964. In this respect, Tunisia signed long-term economic agreements with the countries of the Eastern Bloc especially from mid-1960s.[110] In this process, Bourguiba took important measures to increase the power of the Socialist Destourian Party and his government in 1964. Habib Bourguiba formed cells affiliated to the Socialist Destourian Party in the professional chambers in order to spread the influence of the party to the grassroots.[111] The aim here was to accomplish sustainable success in the social and economic fields, as well as the political one. These measures also aimed at reducing the power of the UGTT, which used to defend Tunisian workers' rights and often conflict with the government policies. As a matter of the fact, the prominent UGTT leaders Habib Ashour (1913-1999) and Ahmed Tlili (1916-1967) were purged from the Socialist Destourian Party in July 1965.[112]

In the implementation of socialism, there were many problems in the field. A director and a technical director were assigned for each cooperative, but they were not peasant, in general.[113] Most of those directors were from cities, and they did not have enough knowledge and experience on agronomy or climatology.[114] Furthermore, after Tunisia's resolution to nationalize foreigners' farmlands in 1964, the relations between Tunisia and France deteriorated. In this sense, all lands owned by the foreigners (especially the French

[107] Rachid Ghannouchi, *Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami fi Tunis (The Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1989), 109-110.
[108] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the al-Nida Movement in Sfax in 2018. The En-Nida movement is center left political party, which was established in 2012.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishing in Sidi Bouzid in 2018.
[111] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the UGTT in Sfax in 2018.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Mohsen Toumi, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 62.
[114] Toumi, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali*, 62.

citizens) were nationalized and serious measures were taken to collectivize the agricultural sector.

Those efforts were important in terms of replacing the French bourgeoisie with the national bourgeoisie. However, in Tunisia, at that time, the local bourgeoisie was very weak and liberal policies were not successful in achieving this goal. The traces of the French colonialism were still evident in Tunisia both in the field of administration and in the socio-economic life. Due to the severe resistance of the rural population against the socialist agricultural policies, the practice of collective farming policies had to be abandoned in 1969.[115] In other words, the land reform alone was not enough to solve the problems in the country.

Moreover, even though Habib Bourguiba was in favor of socialism, he was against the class struggle view,[116] claiming that Tunisia had a classless society and there was no class conflict in the country. Within this framework, Bourguiba adopted only economic views of socialism and rejected the political ones. The outcome was a failure, and the application of economic socialism did not work in Tunisia. The failure of the regime's socialist policies in Tunisia caused the Bourguiba regime to face a severe socio-economic crisis and marked a turning point in the Tunisian history.[117]

There is a tendency among the political scientists to conceptualize repression as a strategic option; when a ruler accedes, s/he identifies threats and applies the suitable repressive policies and related institutions to struggle with them.[118] Besides the strategic approach, the historical one verifies that how the repressive milieus of independent authoritarian regimes are generally specified by former state-building projects, plenty of which predate independence in post-colonial states.[119] In fact, these projects form the state's capacity to gather intelligence, the organization of policing and other coercive institutions, and possess

[115] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishing in Sidi Bouzid in 2018.
[116] Toumi, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali*, 56.
[117] Lotfi al-Amdouni, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi Tunis: Atwar min al-Nasha wa al-Muhakamat al-Siyasiya al-Kubra, 1965-1981 (The Islamic Movement in Tunisia: Phases of Its Origin and Major Political Trials, 1965-1981)* (Tunisia, 2015), 21.
[118] Nugent, *After Repression*, 59.
[119] Ibid, 60.

traces of the path-dependence for the nature of the coercive instruments during the following authoritarian phase.[120]

While colonial state building projects absolutely do not describe the change in post-colonial repression, historical evidence offers that rulers' strategic choices have less effect than institutional heritage for the structure of authoritarian repression.[121] The Tunisian regime allowed a limited level of pluralism in Tunisia after the independence, which would not jeopardize itself.[122] The regime consolidated its power with the aid of the institutional apparatuses of the state, such as military, police, intelligence service, in almost every period following the independence.[123] The Tunisian general election results in 1964, 1969, 1974 and 1979 were as follows respectively:

Table-2.3: The Tunisian General Election in 1964, 1969, 1974 and 1979

The Tunisian General Election in 1964[124]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Socialist Destourian Party	1,255,153	100.00	101
Total *(Voter Turnout: 96.65 percent)*	**1,255,153**	**100.00**	**101**
The Tunisian General Election in 1969[125]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Socialist Destourian Party	1,363,939	100.00	101
Total *(Voter Turnout: 94.72 percent)*	**1,363,939**	**100.00**	**101**
The Tunisian General Election in 1974[126]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Socialist Destourian Party	1,570,954	100.00	112
Total *(Voter Turnout: 96.89 percent)*	**1,570,954**	**100.00**	**112**
The Tunisian General Election in 1979[127]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Socialist Destourian Party	1,465,260	100.00	121
Total *(Voter Turnout: 80.55 percent)*	**1,465,260**	**100.00**	**121**

[120] Nugent, *After Repression*, 60.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ertan Efegil, "Fas ve Tunus'un Dış Politikalarının Belirleyicileri," *Ortadoğu Analiz* 5, 52 (2013), 104-113.
[123] Author Interview with the Tunisian Prosecutor (Retired) in İstanbul on 15 September 2022.

As seen in the Table-2.3, during the Bourguiba era, the country was governed under semi-authoritarianism, and Bourguiba declared himself as President for life with a law passed in 1974. In addition, the Tunisian parliament, which was elected for five years and assembled for half of the year, had only function of ratification of the president's resolutions.[128] In other words, the parliament's check-balance mechanism over the regime was also restricted. Especially under the single-party rule of Bourguiba, support for the regime was gained through the mobilization of different interest groups in the political system, which developed via corporatism.[129]

In the first two decades of independence, education had spread on a large scale and multiple achievements had been made in the manufacturing, health and other service sectors.[130] These gains had resulted in a modern working class that was gradually growing in light of the national state.[131] However, some unexpected results outcame from the populist promises, such as socialist economic outlook, as explained above. For its existence, the urban proletariat agglomerated citizens from the countryside without capital or urban principles, and crowded them into poor neighborhoods.[132]

Abdelkader Zghal, a Tunisian sociologist, argued that although those people experienced a relative improvements in their of life standards due to the regime's countrywide education program, they witnessed that their hopes of progress in the social arena were thwarted.[133] In other words, after the foundation of Tunisia, a new social periphery began to be seen in rural and semi-rural regions.[134] They were against social marginalization and in search for

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[124] Data Source: Juan Montabes Pereira, "Tunisia," in *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich (Editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 911-924.
[125] Data Source: Ibid.
[126] Data Source: Ibid.
[127] Data Source: "Tunisia," *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, Accessed: 2021-10-13, Web: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/TUNISIA_1979_E.PDF.
[128] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1088.
[129] Emma C. Murphy, "Women in Tunisia: Between State Feminism and Economic Reform," in *Women and Globalization in the Middle East: Gender, Economy, and Society*, Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Marsha Pripstein Posusney (Editors) (London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2003), 169-194.
[130] Haifa A. Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power)," *Dirasat Duwaliya* 58 (2013), 19-48.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Abdelkader Zghal, "La nouvelle stratégie du Mouvement de la tendance islamique: manipulation ou expression de la culture politique tunisienne?" in *Tunisie: la politique économique de la réforme*, Ira William Zartman (Editor) (Tunis: Alif–Les Editions de la Méditerranée, 1995), 197–212.
[134] Abdelkader Zghal, "The New Strategy of the Movement of the Islamic Way: Manipulation or Expression of Political Culture?" in *Tunisia: The Political Economy of Reform*, Ira William Zartman (Editor) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 205–217, 217.

building their ground within society.[135] The leftist and Islamist movements emerged and spread towards 1970s as an expression of protest.[136]

Actually, in the 1970s, the people, who were born in the independence period, grew up in most of the Muslim realm, and these young folks had no face-to-face recollection of the anti-colonial tide of salvation that had legitimized the nationalist orders under which they kept alive; hence, they were out of stage with state elites.[137] Unlike their elders, they were too late to take advantage of the jobs and social progress created after the independence, and the allocation of property left by the colonists.[138] Yet, from 1955 to 1970, the population growth in the Muslim realm was nearly 50 percent, and by 1975, with rapid urbanization and improving literacy, the group under 24 years old exceeded 60 percent of the aggregate population.[139]

This young cohort of the 1970s was far from prosperity, and they gathered under unstable circumstances on the edges of cities, such as the bidonvilles of the Maghreb, the achwaiyyat of the Middle East, and the shantytowns of Turkey.[140] As a result, socio-political dissatisfaction began to be voiced in the cultural domain through denial of the nationalist ideologies of the regimes in favor of the Islamist ideology.[141] This process started on the left-leaning university campuses in the early 1970s, and the Islamist intellectuals disseminated the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, and Ayatollah Khomeini.[142] Qutb and Khomeini's top-down Islamization experiments were on the stage, in general.

Qutb followed a strategy that influenced a cross-section of Muslim adolescence from both educated and destitute backgrounds alienated plenty of clerics and the middle class, whereas al-Mawdudi considered foundation of an Islamic republic as an goal to be achieved stepwise.[143] Only Khomeini was able to construct an applicable coalition of all the interested groups, such as the disinherited, the middle classes, radical intellectuals, and

[135] Zghal, "The New Strategy of the Movement of the Islamic Way: Manipulation or Expression of Political Culture?" 217.
[136] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[137] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 65.
[138] Kepel, *Jihad*, 65.
[139] Ibid, 66.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid, 24.

clerics, which is why the Iranian Revolution was successful in Iran while it was not in other Muslim countries.[144]

In the Muslim world of the late 1960s, religion did not disappear anywhere from popular culture to socio-political life.[145] Islam was just approached in alternative ways by several regimes, and was integrated with nationalism in ways that changed with respect to the social class of those who had captured power at the time of independence.[146] In Tunisian context, although the regime regulated religious affairs and applied religious symbols to sew up all religious activities in the country, its stance towards Islam changed from time to time in a pragmatic manner.

To illustrate, in 1968, the regime formed the National Association for the Preservation of the Qur'an (*al-Jamʿiyya al-Qawmiyya li-l-Muhafaza ʿala al-Qurʾan al-Karim*)[147] in order to reverse socialist policies of the country and project a religious outlook to improve its legitimacy. The National Association for the Preservation of the Qur'an performed as a state-sanctioned institution to disseminate Qur'anic training and functioned as an exceptional meeting site for more religious individuals within the regime, as well as the young preachers.[148] In its early years, the National Association for the Preservation of the Qur'an was an appropriate formal institution for the Islamists in order to perform their religious activities, such as holding meetings and discussing Islamic issues.[149] Therefore, in the beginning, this body provided a political opportunity for the Islamists by serving as legal cover.

Yet, even though some Zaytunian sheikhs attempted to attract these preachers into the regime in order to alter it from within, the preachers refused these offers and soon the regime extracted them from the organization.[150] Although the young Tunisian Islamists began to participate in this association, they started to feel that the association's

[144] Kepel, *Jihad*, 24.
[145] Ibid, 47.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Abu Muhammad Yusuf Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Marashli, *Nashr al-Jawahir wa al-Darar fi Ulama al-Qarn al-Rabie Ashar* (Lebanon, Beirut: Dar al-Marefah Publishing and Distributing, 2006), 2161.
[148] Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire: Politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali* (Paris: Presses de Sciences po, 2003), 277.
[149] Muhammad Abdelbaki Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World*) (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya, 1987), 259.
[150] Mohamed Elbaki Hermassi, "La société tunisienne au miroir islamiste," *Maghreb Machrek: Monde Arabe* 103 (1984), 39–56; Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 72.

willingness to acknowledge them would place the Islamists on the regime's payroll reducing their reliability and turning them extension of the regime in time.[151]

In brief, Bourguiba's primary objective was to dismantle the conventional Islamic institutions in order to protect his regime in case of possible political risks.[152] The treatment adopted by the state authorities towards the Islamists was not a deal with a political opponent, but rather the regime dealt with them as a security threat.[153] Yet, Islam never evanesced from social life during the Bourguiba era; on the contrary, the religious activities were transferred from public sphere to private one.[154] This inclination enabled the movement entrepreneurs to organize and mobilize in the private space, in particular. The regime's attempt to weaken the capacity of the religious structures resulted in fiasco, which led to construction of the Islamist movement clandestinely.

2.3. Islamic Group (JI/1970-1981)

In the late 1960s, Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou laid the foundation of the Islamist movement in Tunisia. At that time, the Islamists' activities were limited to the intellectual endeavors by holding circles in the mosques and engaging in the activities of the National Association for the Preservation of the Qur'an.[155] The Islamist movement was not in an organized structure, but it was formed by breaking away from the National Association for the Preservation of the Qur'an. Abdelfattah Mourou was an important member of the National Association for the Preservation of the Qur'an, and he took advantage of his position within the association via traveling all around Tunisia for enlarging the movement's membership base.[156] Although the regime considered the Islamists as intellectual extension of the Yusufian movement led by Salah Ben Youssef, this time it was different in terms of its organization, methods, and tools of fieldwork.[157]

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[151] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 71.
[152] See: Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy,"
[153] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[154] Rikke Hostrup Haugbøll, "New expressions of Islam in Tunisia: An ethnographic approach," *The Journal of North African Studies* 20, 3 (2015), 319–335.
[155] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[156] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 37-38.
[157] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"

The most important structure in the formation of Islamist movements in Tunisia was the movement known as the Islamic Group (JI/*al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya*), which emerged with the rise of the leftist and communist organizations in the 1970s.[158] The Islamists came together for the first time under the umbrella of the JI in Tunisia as a small religious discussion circle in the Zaytuna Mosque, concentrating on studying religious documents under Rachid Ghannouchi's leadership.[159] In the discussion gatherings of the JI, the movement members advocated pure Islam and disclosed their displeasure against Bourguiba's Westernization policies and distancing from Islamic customs and exercises.[160]

The JI called for a religious state based on the shari'a, and it argued that there was a malfunctioning state, which continued its tutelage over the religious rituals.[161] According to Muhammad Abdelbaki Hermassi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia between 2004 and 2005, the main objection of the JI was the Tunisian regime's battle against the Islamist movement, as well as imposing Western values on Tunisian society.[162] Actually, Tunisia had a different society among all the Arab countries, since the regime challenged the institutional Islam and closed the main traditional Islamic institutions in order to implement socio-cultural reforms.[163] Moreover, this process introduced a radical change in the political leadership of the country and new administrative cadres generated a disparaging stance towards traditional Islam.[164] The emergence of the JI in the early 1970s was a reaction against the exclusion and alienation of the Islamists from the society.[165]

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[158] It is not possible to obtain clear information about the foundation year of the JI, and there are two separate foundation years, which are 1970 and 1972, in the literature. See: Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation: 1980-2008," 258; Anne Wolf, "An Islamists 'Renaissance'? Religion and politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia," *The Journal of North African Studies* 18, 4 (2013), 560-573; Lutz Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," in *Islamic Movements of Europe: Public Religion and Islamophobia in the Modern World*, Frank Peter and Rafael Ortega (Editors) (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014), 50-58; Stefano Torelli, "Al-Nahda's path in Tunisia: A New Model of Islamic Democratic Politics?" in *North African Societies after the Arab Spring: Between Democracy and Islamic Awakening*, Leila El Houssi, Allessia Melcangi, Stefano Torelli, Massimiliano Cricco (Editors) (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 30-54.

[159] Hani Daniel, Hind al-Dawy and Fatima Abdel-Ghani, "al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Tunis... al-Nahda ʿala Tariq Ikhwanihim fi Mısr (The Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia... The al-Nahda is on the path of its brothers in Egypt)," *Islamist Movements*, 01 March 2020, Web: https://www.islamist-movements.com/2724, Accessed: 2020-10-27.

[160] Michael J. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring* (London: Hurst, 2012), 160.

[161] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"

[162] Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World)*, 250.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Ibid.

In its early years, the JI was inspired by the Tablighi Jamaʿat movement in Pakistan,[166] and the Islamist youth engaged in collective action mostly inspired by tablighi methods of preaching and encouraged by experienced wise men of the Zaytuna environment.[167] Tabligh and da'wa were mainly proselytizing and operating as a missionary of Islam.[168] These young people were performing religious trainings in schools and mosques, and their thriving audience consisted of mainly students.[169] Applying to the method of the tabligh for recruiting members, they invited Tunisian people in the streets, coffee houses and workplaces to the trainings on Islam.[170] There were seminars held in the Zaytuna Mosque, and these seminars focused on ideological awareness through clarifying Islamic concepts that influenced the youth.[171]

According to Zghal, in the early publications of the JI, the discourses were not able to go beyond the widespread slogans of old religious Salafi publications.[172] As a matter of fact, the JI later came along the line of the MB, and gained strength with the increase of its activities in mosques, masjids.[173] The JI was influenced by the MB in terms of its ideology and its organizational structures in spite of not directly engaging in politics.[174] In this respect, the JI intellectuals were mostly guided by the MB's ideologues.[175] Among the MB ideologues, the impact of shariʿa-oriented Hassan al-Banna was much more than the others on the JI ideologues. The Islamist mobilization inspired by the MB was improving in Tunisia in the 1970s, primarily through cause (*da'wa*) networks supporting a cultural awakening of Islamic teaching and practices.[176] Even though the JI ideologues were aware of the political inconsistency between their own ideological orientation and the Tunisian regime, they formulated their criticisms in cultural and religious terms.[177]

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[166] Malika Zeghal, "Competing ways of life: Islamism, secularism, and public order in the Tunisian transition," *Constellations* 20, 2 (2013), 254–274.
[167] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 50.
[168] Abdelkader, *Islamic Activists*, 136.
[169] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 50.
[170] Douglas K. Magnuson, "Islamic Reform in Contemporary Tunisia: Unity and Diversity," in *Tunisia: The Political Economy of Reform*, Ira William Zartman (Editor) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 170.
[171] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[172] Abdelkader Zghal, "Le retour du sacré et la nouvelle demande idéologique des jeunes scolarisés: le cas de la Tunisie," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 18 (1979), 41-64.
[173] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 77-78.
[174] See: Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia,"
[175] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 40-41.
[176] See: Francois Burgat, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, translated by William Dowell (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993).
[177] See: Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia,"

Actually, in the 1970s, the foreigners in Tunisia, especially the French, greatly influenced the country's socio-cultural life. The majority of the people living in big cities were closer to European countries rather than the African and Arab ones in terms of their dress, lives and worldviews. The Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Machrou Tunis Movement classified the Tunisian people in the 1970s into three main categories in terms of their lifestyles and mentalities:

> -In the first category, there were modernized European people. A secularist Western stance was evident in this group, which was mainly composed of Tunisian intellectuals.
> -In the second category, there was a semi-Europeanized section of the local people. This group, whose financial situation was partially good, constituted the middle class.
> -In the third category, there were the poor people, who made up the majority. This segment socio-economically constituted the lower class.[178]

The JI, which demanded the revival of Islamic principles, mostly spread among the third group.[179] While specific elite circles in Tunisian society benefited from the advantages of relations with the West, the socio-economic problems in the country caused a discontent in a large part of the population.[180] In fact, there is an agreement in the literature that socio-economic problems are among the main reasons for the emergence of Islamist movements.[181] In Tunisia, Islam began to play an important role in the 1970s as an instrument of spiritual strength and solidarity for the socio-economically poor people.[182]

Salaheddin Jourchi, one of the movement entrepreneurs in the 1970s, analyzed the content of the public support towards the JI, in detail.[183] According to him, the JI endeavored to address all social groups of Tunisia form seculars to leftists and liberals; however, receieved the most powerful support from the youth in rural areas.[184] In the JI,

[178] Author Interview with the Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Machrou Tunis Movement in Tunis in 2018. The Machrou Tunis Movement is a political party, which involves wide range of members from the center left to the center right, and the party was established in 2016 as a breakaway from the al-Nida Party.
[179] Author Interview with the Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nida Movement in Tunis in 2018.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Nagham Muhammad Salih, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi al-Maghreb al-ʿArabi (Islamic Movements in the Maghreb)* (Khartoum: Dar Al-Jenan for Publishing & Distribution, 2010), 110.
[182] Author Interview with the Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nida Movement in Tunis in 2018.
[183] Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World)*, 252.
[184] Ibid.

approximately seventy percent of the members were pupils and students.[185] Especially the students were able to find a peer group within the JI, which made them feel comfortable and provided them a hospitable milieu far away from their home towns.[186] Moreover, the school teachers played important role especially in the rural areas through inviting their students to the da'wa, and this resulted in plenty of new comers, who were attached to the da'wa from the rural communities.[187]

In the 1970s, the main groups criticizing socio-economic problems were students, workers, and the opposition that embraced socialism; however, there was no cooperation among these groups.[188] These groups produced similar slogans in strikes and protests in which the rapid price increases and low incomes were mainly criticized.[189] In 1972, liberalization policies started to be implemented in the socio-economic domain.[190] The foreign debts of Tunisia increased by 50 percent from 1972 (392 million TND) to 1976 (588 million TND).[191] From 1975 on, especially the women workers in the textile sector, confectionary and electronics industries started to protest their decreasing wages and worsening working conditions via informal strikes and demonstrations, and these protests became more common and severe between 1976 and 1978.[192]

The economic policy of the regime angered a great part of the middle class, which had advocated the regime for a long-time.[193] In this respect, the economic stability deteriorated, and this had repercussions especially in the education sector, where the teachers began to work relying on their own interests through losing their reputation in the public shpere.[194] The General Strike of 1978 led by the UGTT showed that the regime was weakening and

[185] Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World)*, 252.
[186] See: Zghal, "La nouvelle stratégie du Mouvement de la tendance islamique,"
[187] Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World)*, 252.
[188] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the al-Irada Movement in Tunis in 2018. The al-Irada Movement is a center left political party, which was established in 2015, and it is also known as the Movement Party (*Hizb al-Harak*).
[189] Ibid.
[190] John Walton and David Seddon, *Riot and Rebellion: Political Responses to Economic Crisis in North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan* (Norwich: School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, 1986), 77.
[191] Toumi, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali*, 134.
[192] Walton and Seddon, *Riot and Rebellion*, 77.
[193] Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World)*, 264.
[194] Ibid.

the opposition groups were starting to get stronger. The General Strike of 1978 led by the UGTT is also known as "Black Thursday" or "26th of January Uprising" in the literature.

Bourguiba continued his policy of repressing all opposition initiatives during the General Strike of 1978. In the strikes, which started due to increasing unemployment and inflation in the country, nearly a hundred people lost their lives due to police violence.[195] In order to prevent possible repercussions of the General Strike of 1978, the Bourguiba regime sent army units to suppress the strike.[196] All the executive staff of the UGTT was changed, the organization became completely under the control of the government, and all of the demands for transition to multi-party system were repeatedly rejected.[197]

Under these conditions, the JI operated as an abeyance structure,[198] and engaged in cultural and intellectual activities, and the circles affiliated to the movement focused on invitations and communiqués, reaching out to all villages and towns.[199] In other words, the JI movement improved "as a result of silent movement work on everyday practices".[200] Although the branches of the JI were not located in the provinces, some people were there representing the movement, and these circles did not only operate within the country, but they also exchanged ideas with many important personalities and movements abroad.[201]

According to Sawyers and Meyer, social movements can proceed in unfriendly political milieus through abeyance structures.[202] They offer an improved model of social movement abeyance, which encompasses not only withdrawing from political engagement, but also disintegration of a large movement coalition.[203] In order to appraise the impacts of social movement abeyance, they call attention to significance of the political opportunity structure, in which the movement arises.[204] In fact, the incidents, which damp down or

[195] Claudia Wright, "Tunisia: Next friend to fall," *Foreign Policy* 46 (1982), 120-137.
[196] Harold D. Nelson, *Tunisia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: American University, 1979), 196.
[197] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the al-Irada Movement in Tunis in 2018.
[198] The abeyance structures represent "moments which reappear like ghosts" (See: Andrew Hussey, "Algiers Underground: A Psychogeographer's Guide," in *The Challenges of North Africa*, Andrew Hussey and Martin Rose, Editors, Paris: University of London Institute in Paris, 2014, 104). The concept of abeyance precludes researchers from deducing that social movements disappear under repressive environments.
[199] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Afek Tounes Party in Tunis in 2018. The Afek Tounes Party is a center right political party, which was established in 2011.
[200] Cihan Tuğal, "Transforming everyday life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Theory and Society* 38, 5 (2009), 423–458, 451.
[201] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Afek Tounes Party in Tunis in 2018.
[202] Traci M. Sawyers and David S. Meyer, "Missed opportunities: Social movement abeyance and public policy," *Social Problems* 46, 2 (1999), 187–206, 187.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid, 188.

disturb governing alliances, can ensure political opportunities both to mobilize and to impact policy reform, and adversary activists can take advantage of such openings.[205] In this respect, it can be said that three important events took place in the emergence and development of the JI, which created political opportunity structures for the movement.

The first one was the Six-Day War against Israel in 1967, which resulted in the defeat of the Arabs. The Israeli triumph played an important role for an Islamic resurgence all around the Arab world.[206] The defeat of the Arabs resulted in the replacement of the nationalist discourses with the Islamic ones in the Arab countries. In this respect, the Six-Day War was an international political opportunity structure for the movement. The second one was the collapse of the socialism-based cooperation experience in Tunisia in the 1970s. After that, the regime turned to liberalism, which had shaken the trust in state within the Tunisian society. The failure of the modern state in achieving full independence had begun to be discussed. The regime declared war against the leftist groups, which resulted in the frustration of youth and students, in particular.

The intense demonstrations in 1978 confirmed the social displeasure in the Tunisian society. The confrontation between the leftist camp and the Tunisian regime, such as the General Strike of 1978,[207] was political opportunity structure for the JI to expand, politicize and organize within the Tunisian society. The JI's activities were welcomed by the regime, which considered the movement as a backer in the face of dominant left.[208] In this respect, JI's influence especially in the universities and trade unions played important role in the movement's success.[209] Meanwhile, some people standing in the regime's side left the Socialist Destourian Party for the purpose of reform and founded the Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS) in 1978. Furthermore, in the late 1970s, a Tunisianist fraction emerged among the Islamists, and they identified themselves in terms of a Tunisian way of being and making progress as Islamists to devise local solutions to the country's matters.[210]

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[205] Sawyers and Meyer, "Missed opportunities," 189.
[206] John L. Esposito, "Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution?" in *The Oxford History of Islam*, John L. Esposito (Editor) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 655.
[207] Hamdi, *The Politicisation of Islam*, 26; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 166; Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation: 1980-2008,"; Ezat Mossallanejad, *Religions and the Cruel Return of Gods* (Toronto: Zagros Editions, 2012), 151.
[208] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[209] Hamdi, *The Politicisation of Islam*, 25-27; Jocelyne Cesari, *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 128.
[210] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 400.

These preachers diverged from the JI, and they established the "Progressive Islamists"[211] as their own apolitical intellectual stream.[212]

Thirdly, the outbreak of the revolution in Iran in 1979 made Islam vital for mobilizing Islamists. Actually, the personal piety also considerably augmented in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[213] At the global level, the Iranian Revolution introduced new Islamist discourses, which played an important role in the Islamization of some left-origin social concepts and in the placement of social conflict within the Islamist context.[214] In this respect, the Iranian Revolution was a period when the Islamist movement evolved from an ideology to become a political party in Tunisia. With the revolution, the people, who thought that they were distanced from their essence by mismanagement, saw Islamist ideology as a beacon of hope to return to their social roots. In this respect, the Iranian Revolution was also an international political opportunity structure for the movement. All of these developments let Islamists have opportunity to expand their ground in the Tunisian society.

In the 1970s, the JI aimed at generating political and Islamist consciousness among its supporters.[215] The intellectuals of the movement started to publish their own writings in various forms, such as articles, booklets, pamphlets and books, which concentrated on intellectual and social issues through drawing an explicit line between the Islamic value system and the Western-secular doctrines.[216] For example, in 1972, the movement started to publish its own monthly periodical, "*al-Maʻarifa*", which became the actual platform for the movement's ideas.[217] This played a significant role in dissemination of the movement's opinions about different issues, and this periodical concentrated on four main issues:

[211] The Progressive Islamists somehow weakened the JI in its struggle with the regime and destabilized the internal balance of the JI due to the importance and weights that supporters of the two movements represented within the Islamist movement. See: Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 535-536.
[212] Enhaili, "Tunisia,"; Burgat, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, 208.
[213] Mark A. Tessler, "Political change and the Islamic revival in Tunisia," *The Maghreb Review* 5 (1980), 8–19.
[214] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, 54
[215] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 77.
[216] Ibid.
[217] It is not possible to obtain clear information about the foundation year of the "*al-Maʻarifa*", and there are two separate foundation years, which are 1972 and 1974, in the literature. See: Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 77; Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"

Culture and intellectual thought; theology and morality; society; and politics; however, it was suspended in 1979.[218]

Hamma al-Hammami, leader of the Tunisian Communist Party, strictly criticized the tacit alliance between the regime and the JI.[219] In fact, this alliance was a political opportunity structure for the movement. The Tunisian communists considered the Islamists' antagonism against the leftist Marxist Leninist groups as the basis of this tacit alliance with the regime in order to weaken the impact of those leftist groups, eliminate socio-economic discontent, and in doing so to refrain from changing the existing order.[220] The regime provided plenty of facilities for the JI, and informally treated the movement as an elite ally, which was an important political opportunity structure for the movement.

In this process, the regime opened up mosques for the JI advocators to give lectures, as well as allowing the JI to publish the *"al-Ma'arifa"* and the *"al-Mujtama'a"* magazines.[221] Especially at the time of the General Strikes of 1978, the *al-Ma'arifa* magazine started to influence the parties in politics, beginning with the disagreement between the government and the labor unions, in which case the magazine indirectly backed the government against the leftists.[222] The Tunisian communists considered the JI as a group implementing the shari'a, and its advocators as representatives of the "dark side" of Tunisian culture.[223]

The *al-Ma'arifa* magazine increased the popularity of the movement and public awareness of Islamic intellectual topics, as well. The circulation of the *al-Ma'arifa* in 1972 was 6,000 and it reached 25,000 in 1979.[224] By 1975, the *al-Ma'arifa* magazine was being printed every month and distributed to so many regions from the Arab world to Europe.[225] The *al-Ma'arifa* drew on articles by prominent opinion leaders from outside Tunisia, such as Hassan al-Banna, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Sheikh Mohammed al-Ghazali al-Saqqa, Sayyid Qutb and Muhammed Qutb.[226] After the suspension of *al-Ma'arifa* in 1979, the *al-Mujtama'a* began to be published in the same year, and it mainly focused on the news of

[218] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 77-78.
[219] al-Hammami, *Didda al-Zalamiyya: al-Ittijah al-Islami (Against Obscurantism: The Islamic Tendency*), 7.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 259.
[223] al-Hammami, *Didda al-Zalamiyya: al-Ittijah al-Islami (Against Obscurantism: The Islamic Tendency*), 141.
[224] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 77.
[225] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 34.
[226] Ibid, 34-35.

the Iranian Revolution, writings and ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini, which influenced the Islamist movement in Tunisia.[227]

In Tunisia, in order to struggle against the leftist movements in the late 1970s, the regime intentionally opened up a space for the Islamists within the universities, as well as the labor unions.[228] The first secret congress of the movement was held in Manouba in 1979. This was the founding congress of the JI, and the movement entrepreneurs came to a decision on giving a more exhaustive hierarchical structure to the movement, involving cells as the main units, a regional division, including distinct organizational structures for the university and the secondary schools, an elected consultative council and executive bureau.[229] During this period, the movement expanded its base primarily among secondary school students and teachers in addition to the students at the institutions of higher education, who were inspired by the achievement of the Iranian Revolution.[230]

In terms of the JI's informal organizational structure, there were two groups in the 1970s, the first one was the baccalaureate students, who would soon enter the universities and establish the movement's base there, and the second one was women.[231] Especially the students, who stayed together in shared dormitories created an efficient network in the 1970s, and the communal milieu distant from their homelands ensured a chance for recruiting new supporters.[232] The students were able to attend community-focused study groups (*halaqat*) at the mosques when the dormitories were free on Sundays.[233] After their graduations, these people constructed a more organized network in different business areas (doctors, engineers, lawyers and teachers) based on their connections built in university campuses.[234]

Among the JI members, while some founded music groups and sang religious hymns for providing financial aid, some established theatre companies and staged plays that showed the reaction of Islam against the repression on the working class.[235] Some members created social network through organizing football matches, in which the football players wore

[227] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 83.
[228] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 396.
[229] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 51.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 70.
[232] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 27.
[233] Ibid, 30.
[234] Ibid, 31.
[235] Author Interview with the MTI Activist (1972-1988) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement in İstanbul on 15 September 2022.

knee-length trousers instead of shorts.[236] Most of the JI supporters were among the people in the 30-40 age groups, who witnessed the struggle for independence in their childhood and could not reach the level that they desired in their profession.[237] Especially the clergy, who took part in the movement, played an important role in spreading the ideas of the movement in the sermons given during the prayers in the mosques.[238]

Especially the mosques as informal organizational dynamics played a significant role in choosing individuals, who were invited to extra study gatherings in the privacy of adherents' houses, and these secret gatherings, which were known as cell *(khaliyya)* or circle *(da'ira)*, provided a political and intellectual dimension to the movement, as well as comprehensive religious trainings.[239] In time, cells *(khaliyyat)* and circles *(da'irat)* were established in other mosques, which began to attract the youth within the Tunisian society.[240] In this respect, the movement was able to create collective action in the 1970s from mosque classes to private study groups at the houses of the sympathizers, which resulted in a resilient informal organizational structure.[241]

The ideologists of the JI entitled the French colonial government in Tunisia as pseudo-modernization, whereas they considered the Zaytuna's modernization as a project emanating from the will to benefit from the contemporary sciences and systems of administration under the condition of preserving Tunisia's Islamic cultural identity.[242] In this respect, Rachid Ghannouchi argued that Habib Bourguiba made widespread and dramatic changes to dismantle the connection of Tunisia with the Arab-Muslim world and impose the French life style.[243]

The JI focused on worship in mosques freely and ensuring the visibility of Islam in the public sphere in order to oppose the strict secularist practices of the existing regime.[244] The movement was not able to engage in thorough analyses regarding the socio-economic crisis

[236] Author Interview with the MTI Activist (1972-1988) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement in İstanbul on 15 September 2022.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.
[239] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 36.
[240] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[241] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 27.
[242] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, 39.
[243] See: Wolf, "An Islamists 'Renaissance'?,"
[244] Daniel, al-Dawy and Abdel-Ghani, "al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Tunis... al-Nahda ʿala Tariq Ikhwanihim fi Mısr (The Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia... The al-Nahda is on the path of its brothers in Egypt),"

of the country at that time;[245] however, the growth and politicization of the JI reflected the complicated impacts of the economic policies of the regime, the marginalization of traditional Islam, and the revolution in Iran.[246]

In this context, the JI was united around three main goals. The first one was to work on re-establishing the awareness of Arab-Islamic culture among young people, who might have forgotten their own historical heritage with Westernization.[247] The second one was to consider Islam as an objective in all social, economic and political institutions of the country rather than considering Islam as an instrument to legitimize state policies.[248] The recommendations in this area ranged from determining the banking principles according to Islamic methods to the administration of the state by the clergy. The third one was to implement nonviolent reforms in Tunisia by constitutional means instead of applying violence.[249]

During the 1970s, the movement was influenced from the leftist organizational strategies, and learned much from the practice of Marxist syndicate mobilization.[250] Actually, the 1978 strikes led by the UGTT played a significant role in the politicization process of the JI,[251] since the movement was able to learn the organization styles and courses of action within the framework of leftist movements' anti-regime opposition.[252] The political discourse of the movement focused on identity and civil liberties beginning from the late 1970s.[253] This prognostic framing had a social equivalent in Tunisia, where the left was strong. The JI's embrace of leftist thoughts was particularly seen in its participation in the International Labor Day event on 1 May 1980 in Tunisia.[254] Rachid Ghannouchi described the interaction with the leftist movements as follows:

[245] See: Cavatorta and Merone, "Moderation through exclusion?,"
[246] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 64.
[247] Author Interview with the Executive (1983-1987) of the MTI in the Neighborhood Organization in İstanbul on 16 September 2022.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Ibid.
[250] See: Alexander, "Opportunities, organizations, and ideas,"
[251] See: Waltz, "Islamist appeal in Tunisia,"
[252] See: Cavatorta and Merone, "Moderation through exclusion?,"
[253] Hamdi, *The Politicisation of Islam*, 100-104.
[254] Ibid, 32.

> We have worked closely with the trade unions in Tunisia even though these bodies were under strong secular left-wing influence, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. By working with the trade unions, we realized how close our views on social justice were to theirs.[255]

In the late 1970s, the Islamists learned to construct direct relationships with the society, and began to formulize people's problems.[256] Their engagement in the trade unions also created consciousness among the Islamists, and made them more active in the Tunisian society.[257] Even though there was an ideological conflict between the Islamist and leftist movements in Tunisia, the Islamists turned this problem into a political opportunity structure. In this respect, the Islamists found chance to learn and practice certain methods that were typical to the leftist movements, such as political meetings, secret magazines, discussions, mural newspapers and in-depth political analysis.[258]

Briefly, roots of the al-Nahda movement and its predecessor the MTI's networks were initially constructed in training circles at mosques and madrasahs, where sheikhs, teachers and preachers intensified the social ties of the movement in the 1970s. Operating as an abeyance structure, the JI formed a broad network of informal entities and NGOs inside Tunisia during the 1970s, and the movement entrepreneurs were able to preserve these local networks through operating clandestinely.

2.4. Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI/1981-1989)

In the literature, there are limited sources regarding the MTI, the predecessor of al-Nahda. The prominent researches are Hermassi's studies of MTI, which focuses on advocators of the movement, and Waltz's analysis, which concentrates on Hermassi's survey. [259] In the process leading up to the foundation of the MTI, at first, it is beneficial to analyze the cleavages from the past within the JI and the internal dynamics of the movement, since this created political opportunity structures on the side of the MTI. In the 1970s, splits came in

[255] Rashid Ghannouchi, "Tunisia: The Advent of Liberal Islamism – An Interview with Rashid Al-Ghannouchi," interviewer Mahan Abedin, *Religioscope***,** 30 January 2011. Web: https://english.religion.info/2011/01/30/tunisia-the-advent-of-liberal-islamism-an-interview-with-rashid-al-ghannouchi/. Accessed: 2021-01-12.
[256] Hermassi, *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muʿasra fi al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Arab World*), 278-279.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Abderrahim Lamchichi, *Islam et contestation au Maghreb* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), 192.
[259] See: Hermassi, "La société tunisienne au miroir islamiste,"; Waltz, "Islamist appeal in Tunisia,"

view among the JI supporters, and one group advocated Islamism within the Tunisian context, whereas the other one favored the shari'a-oriented MB ideologue Hassan al-Banna.[260] As disagreements between the JI's two factions augmented, supporters of each group gathered in the small town of Mornag, to resolve whether to prefer the Tunisian Islam or to advocate the MB.[261] In the existing literature, there is no detailed information about the Mornag Meeting, which was held in August 1974, as well as the participants of that meeting.

The JI held a meeting in Mornag in August 1974 at Sheikh Abdel Qader Salama's house.[262] Among the participants of the meeting, there were important names, such as Rachid Ghannouchi, Ali Neuer, Saleh bin Abdullah, Abdelfattah Mourou, Abdulaziz al-Tamimi, Fadel al-Baladi, Benaissa Demni, Habib Mokni, Salah Karker, Hamadi Jebali, Salaheddin Jourchi, Hmida Enneifer, Abdulmajid al-Najar.[263] The most important side of the Mornag Meeting was that this meeting gave the movement the name "Islamic Group (*al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya*)".[264] Although there were some breaks from the JI between 1978 and 1979, it was still ambiguous whether the split was over, and the discussions continued.[265] In the late 1970s, there was still fraction within the movement, which opposed the transformation of the movement into a political party and insisted that the movement should remain only as an intellectual and cultural current.[266] At the end of these debates, even though the majority asserted their advocate for the MB, the movement did

[260] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 45.
[261] Ibid, 47.
[262] "al-Musharikun fi Mu'tamar al-Mornaq (Participants in the Mornag Congress, August 1974)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-21, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/1974_لقاء_مرناق_الجديدي_لعبد_القادر_شهادة_مؤتمر_مرناق_في_المشاركون#gsc.tab=0.
[263] The other participants of the meeting were Abdel Raouf al-Balaabi, Daoua Sweid, Abdel Raouf bin Ramadan, Abdel Qader al-Jedidi, Abdel Raouf al-Araibi, Habib Rayhan, Muhammad Saleh Nani, Mohammad Khashlaf, Ahmed al-Ahwal, Omar al-Nusairi, Rachid Tamer, Muhammad Omar Kurus, Mubarak Ba'adash, al-Hashemi al-Hamidi, Hashemi Hamdi, Reza al-Ajhuri, Abdul Salam al-Khamari, Muhammad Alani, Muhammad Bou Daqqa and Khaled Ayachi. See: "al-Musharikun fi Mu'tamar al-Mornaq (Participants in the Mornag Congress, August 1974),"
[264] "Nidalat al-Haraka al-Islamiyya min ajli al-Hurriya wa al-Musharaka al-Siyasiyya wa muwajaha al-Istibdad/al-Mu'tamar al-Awwal li al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya bi Tunis (The Struggles of the Islamist Movement For Freedom, Political Participation, and the Confrontation of Tyranny/The First Congress of the Islamic Group in Tunis, August 1979)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-19, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/1979_مؤتمر_منوية_صيف_مقتطف_من_كتاب_نضالات_الحركة_الاسلامية_من_أجل_الحرية/الأول#gsc.tab=0.
[265] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 47.
[266] Fathi Yakan, *al-Manahij al-Taghyiriyya al-Islamiyya Khlala al-Qarn al-ʿIshrin (Manhaj of Islamic Change During the Twentieth Century)* (Beirut: al-Resala Foundation Publishers, 2008), 229.

not officially join the Egyptian MB.[267] Actually, there was no official affiliation to the MB among the members of the movement.

In the late 1970s, with deepening socio-economic crisis in the country, growing ideological interaction between the Islamist students and leftists on the university campuses, increasing political and ideological influences of the Iranian Revolution, the JI's discourses and practices engaged in politics, and from 1977, the Islamist students at the university campuses started to publish leaflets in the name of "Islamic Tendency *(al-Ittijah al-Islami)*", and it was the student wing that triggered the JI's leadership to engage in politics.[268]

The first secret congress of the movement, which was held in Manouba in 1979, was so significant, since the MTI had begun to construct its organizational dynamics, determine its policies for the future, and compromise on the decision of officially declaring itself as a political party. The founding congress of the JI was held clandestinely, in which the basic law that the organizational structure of the MTI was built on was approved.[269] The first congress in Manouba was the most important development after the founding meeting held in Mornag in 1974.

In the summer of 1979, the UGTT, the labour union in Tunisia, had begun to operate as a rigid opposition movement and entered a new period of struggle by confronting the regime.[270] The workers, the poor and the students were heavily involved in the protests against the regime.[271] The regime deployed the army on the streets in order to prevent the protests.[272] As a result of the open fire on the civilians, 400-500 demonstrators lost their lives.[273] The intifada, which had started on 26 January 1978, showed the public's reaction

[267] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 50.
[268] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 50-51.
[269] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[270] "Nidalat al-Haraka al-Islamiyya min ajli al-Hurriya wa al-Musharaka al-Siyasiyya wa muwajaha al-Istibdad/al-Mu'tamar al-Awwal li al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya bi Tunis (The Struggles of the Islamist Movement For Freedom, Political Participation, and the Confrontation of Tyranny/The First Congress of the Islamic Group in Tunis, August 1979),"
[271] Ibid.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid.

to the economic and political situation in the country.[274] Many activists and trade unionists were arrested, and political lawsuits were filed against most of them.[275]

In this process, under the umbrella of political Islam, the JI gained the support of a wide range of youth at the public universities and high schools.[276] The first congress of the JI was held in Manouba on 11-13 August 1979.[277] However, the preparations for this congress started with the events that broke out in 1978.[278] The participants that would attend the congress were determined at the meeting held in Ali al-Shahmi's house in Manouba in July 1979.[279] Among the participants of the congress, there were important names, such as Rachid Ghannouchi, Ali Nour, Saleh bin Abdullah, Abdelfattah Mourou, Fadel al-Baladi, Habib al-Louz, Benaissa Demni, Salah Karker, Habib Mokni, Hamadi Jebali, Abdulmajid al-Najar, Kamal bin Younes, Muhammad bin Najma.[280]

In the congress held in August 1979, in general; the JI had started to make its voice heard on the political scene and the foundations of the process of declaring its existence as a political movement had been laid.[281] In this regard, the importance of political participation, democracy, elections, general rights and freedoms were emphasized by prognostic framing.[282] The Iranian Revolution also showed the Tunisian people that the dictatorship could be overthrown with the support of people, and this revolution was greeted with an enthusiasm by the Tunisian people.[283] The fact that the JI's first congress was held in Manouba in 1979, albeit secretly, indicates that the regime in Tunisia unofficially opened up space for the Islamists in universities and labor unions in the late 1970s to fight against the leftist movements. In this process, the foundations of the MTI were laid.

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[274] "Nidalat al-Haraka al-Islamiyya min ajli al-Hurriya wa al-Musharaka al-Siyasiyya wa muwajaha al-Istibdad/al-Mu'tamar al-Awwal li al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya bi Tunis (The Struggles of the Islamist Movement For Freedom, Political Participation, and the Confrontation of Tyranny/The First Congress of the Islamic Group in Tunis, August 1979),"
[275] Ibid.
[276] Ibid.
[277] Ibid.
[278] Ibid.
[279] Ibid.
[280] The other partcipants of the congress were Abdel Raouf al-Balaabi, Daoua Sweid, Muhammad al-Tar Abulsi, Abdel Raouf bin Ramadan, Muhammad Krous, Lamine Pasha, Abdel Qader al-Jedidi, Muhammad Shamam, Abdel Raouf al-Araibi, Habib Rayhan, Habib Souissi, Muhammad Saleh Nani, Ahmed al-Ahwal, Omar al-Nusairi, Muhammad al-Akrout, Hussein Yahya, Hamed Hamad, Rachid Tamer, Moncef al-Qalai, Najeeb Ayari and al-Hashemi Gharbal.
[281] Ibid.
[282] Ibid.
[283] Ibid.

Similarly, the second congress of the movement, which was held in Sousse in 1981, was so important in the process leading up to the foundation of the MTI. At this congress, the supporters of the moderate wing headed by Ghannouchi won the majority over the supporters of the radical wing headed by Karker, and the moderate wing ratified the political party option.[284] In its founding statement, the MTI rejected violence and favored pluralist political system and democratic elections.[285] With a fundamental shift in its ideological orientation, the MTI left the view rejecting non-Islamic Tunisia through taking a realistic position about the perceptible political and social problems of the country.[286] This reorientation was accomplished through a critical revision of the JI's former ideological concepts, and a specific group of intellectuals and students improved a rigid criticism of the movement's religious ideology via challenging the predominant MB impact.[287]

Actually, when the regime legally banned the MTI in political life, the moderate movement entrepreneurs, such as Hmida Enneifer and Salaheddin Jourchi, had engaged in deep discussions, and began to criticize the credibility of the MB model, considering it as an imported design that was not appropriate for the Tunisian context.[288] For example, they stated that the MB model only concentrated on ideological discussions between Islamism and nationalism, whereas it standed indifferent to other dynamics impacting social improvement.[289] In terms of his ideological stance, Ghannouchi endeavored to distance himself from the MB, and developed his ideas by focusing on Tunisian context.[290] The main reason behind this was that the Tunisia's national Islamic tradition was not same with the MB tradition.

In the process leading up to the foundation of the MTI, there were different practices in the field. For example, the leftist and Islamist university students organized multiple demonstrations against restrictions on freedom of expression on campuses in February 1981.[291] Yet, some protests of the Islamists were also provoking the regime at the same

[284] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 52.
[285] Ibid, 52.
[286] Ibid, 51.
[287] Ibid.
[288] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 400.
[289] Salaheddin Jourchi, "Authenticity, Modernity and the Islamic Movement in Tunisia," in *Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East*, R. Meijer (Editor) (Surry: Curzon, 1999), 115-127.
[290] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi*, 40-46.
[291] Issa Ben Dhiaf, "Chronique politique Tunisie," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 20 (1981), 583–627.

time. For example, an Islamist crowd coerced a preacher (*imam*), who was appointed by the government, for leaving his duty in a mosque in M'saken, Sousse, on 11 July 1981, and they assigned their own imam in that mosque.[292]

By the year of 1980, the Socialist Destourian Party had dominated Tunisian politics for a long time. On the other hand, although the Socialist Destourian Party was influential in all areas of political life, especially since the 1970s, the opposition movements had begun to raise their voices. In April 1981, Bourguiba informed his ruling party cadres that the regime would no longer oppose establishment of other social, political and national foundations.[293] In this respect, Bourguiba mentioned that if they adhered to constitutional rules, protect national interests, oppose violence, and stay away from external actors, opposition movements could establish their formal political parties in Tunisia and represent themselves in the parliament.[294] By this decision, Bourguiba aimed at minimizing opposition criticisms and establish more effective control over the opposition movements, such as the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT), the Popular Unity Movement (MUP), and the MDS.

In this process, the MTI was established as a political party in June 1981, and the movement was formed as a coalition of Islamist intellectuals, teachers, journalists, and university students in order to debate particular issues and endeavor for devising a modern Islamic framework, which was able to meet the challenges of modernity and comprehend the dynamics and characteristics of the Tunisian society from an Islamic view.[295] This was an important political opportunity structure for the movement. However, the MTI received a severe reaction by the regime side, and it was declared as an illegal organization within a short time due to being considered as a political and security threat by the regime. Many members of the MTI were arrested, and ideological publications of the movement were

[292] Jaleleddine Rouis, *al-Khasais al-Tanzimiyya wa al-Haykaliyya li al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi Tunis (Organisational and Structural Characteristics of the Islamist Movement in Tunisia)* (Tunis: Manshurat Karem al-Sharif, 2014), 18.
[293] Sophie Bessis and Souhayr Belhassen, *Bourguiba: Un si long regne (1957-1989)* (Paris: Japress, 1989), 18.
[294] Author Interview with the senior executive of the Popular Front in Sfax in 2018. The Popular Front is a leftist political alliance in Tunisia, which was formed in 2012. This coalition includes the left-wing Tunisian political parties as well as numerous independents.
[295] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 80.

also banned in 1981.[296] The political opportunity structures of the movement were narrowed down by the regime in a short period of time.

Other political parties were also established in Tunisia with Bourguiba's resolution. Apart from the politically banned MTI, four political parties, namely the Socialist Destourian Party, the MDS, the MUP, the PCT, took their place in the multi-party political life. The PCT had acted in a Stalinist line for many years and then followed a policy on the axis of the Russian Federation until its dissolution in 1993. The MUP was ideologically a socialist party. The MDS was a leftist anti-Bourguiba opposition, which supported pluralism and multi-party system, and advocated a more statist economic policy compared to the Socialist Destourian Party.[297]

In addition to the Socialist Destourian Party, the MDS, the MUP, the PCT and an independent group participated in the elections on 1 November 1981. However, the Socialist Destourian Party received 95 percent of the votes and the other parties could not enter the parliament because they could not obtain the required majority of votes. In the 1981 elections, the National Front, which was formed by the Socialist Destourian Party and the UGTT, took part in the assembly. The Tunisian general election results in 1981 were as follows:

Table-2.4: The Tunisian General Election in 1981[298]

Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
National Front[299]	1,859,000	94.78	136
Movement of Social Democrats	65,500	3.28	0
Popular Unity Movement	16,000	0.81	0
Tunisian Communist Party	15,000	0.78	0
Independents	6,627	0.35	0
Total *(Voter Turnout: 84.9 percent)*	**1,962,127**	**100.00**	**136**

[296] Rory McCarthy, "Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia," *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, 5 (2014), 733-750; Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, 50.
[297] Author Interview with the Independent Member of the Tunisian Parliament in Tunis in 2018.
[298] Data Source: "II MM\," *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, Accessed: 2021-10-13, Web: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/TUNISIA_1981_E.PDF.
[299] The National Front was the alliance of the Socialist Destourian Party and the UGTT.

In 1981, the PCT, which had not been allowed to function as a political party since 1963, was allowed to perform again raising hopes that the multi-party order had actually started. On the other hand, Bourguiba did not officially recognize the MDS and the MUP as political parties until 1983. In the success of the National Front, the regime's ability of making alliance with the UGTT for dividing and weakening the greater opposition's strength played important role. The regime consolidated its ability by enforcing legal restrictions on other allowed political parties in the electoral competition. In this way, the regime was able to keep the opposition parties out of the parliament.

The Islamist movement became a significant player in Tunisian politics via its enlarging social base by the late 1970s and early 1980s, and this helped the movement to construct a dynamic organizational structure. In the 1980s, the unsuccessful policies of the Bourguiba regime and quick impetus of the modernization process all conduced to improvement of political Islam and the MTI, the successor of the JI.[300] In the 1980s, while there were strict security measures outside, the poor prison conditions were also getting worse in line with the policy of intimidating the MTI members. However, especially after the foundation of the MTI, many efforts were made by the movement entrepreneurs in order to establish a dialogue and act in cooperation with various groups in society. Yet, the regime perceived the movement as a political threat, and considered even cultural activities of the movement as security threat. Nevertheless, the movement took a moderate political stance by advocating political pluralism in Tunisian society collaborating with other political groups involving the leftist ones in order to gain official recognition for functioning as a legal political party.[301]

The middle-class supported the Islamist movement on the MTI axis when both socialism and capitalism were ineffective to satisfy the expectancies of prosperity and security within the Tunisian society.[302] According to Hermassi's field research, the ordinary member of the MTI was around twenty years old, intellectual, and of a rural and moderate background.[303] Another field research showed that 75 percent of the MTI members were consisted of teachers and students in terms of their occupational background.[304] However, even though the MTI gained support from a wide cross-section of the Tunisian society,

[300] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1089.
[301] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 64.
[302] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia,* 169.
[303] See: Hermassi, "La société tunisienne au miroir islamiste,"
[304] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 94.

number of its advocators was poor constituents living under difficult conditions contradictory to the concepts of justice and human dignity that the Islamist movement supported as the philosophical basis of national life.[305]

In the process that the MTI consolidated its power in Tunisian politics, the Bread Riots (*Intifadat al-Khubz*) was as an important occurrence, which will be discussed in the Chapter III, in detail. The Bread Riots forced the regime for liberalization in the political arena in 1984. The Bread Riots occurred because of the economic measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the economic stagnation in Europe in 1983.[306] This stagnation influenced Tunisia dramatically due to the fact that the Tunisian economy relied on the exports to Europe and the tourism from the European countries.[307]

During this period, the prices rose nearly hundred percent in Tunisia and this resulted in a chaos.[308] Although the regime did not consider the MTI as a legal political party, it opened up a space for the movement to organize for balancing the opposition leftist movements.[309] This was a political opportunity structure for the MTI, and it will be analyzed thoroughly in the Chapter III. Returning to the subject, the election results in 1986 again showed the regime's ability of making alliance with the UGTT, as well as its capacity regarding the enforcement of legal restrictions on electoral competition. In addition, the independents announced their withdrawal on the eve of the elections. The Tunisian general election results in 1986 were as follows:

Table-2.5: The Tunisian General Election in 1986[310]

Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Patriotic Union[311]	2,175,093	100.00	125
Total *(Voter Turnout: 82.94 percent)*	**2,175,093**	**100.00**	**125**

[305] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 175.
[306] Rob Prince, "Structural Adjustment: Former President Ben Ali's Gift to Tunisia (Part One), Tunisia and the International Monetary Fund," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 15 April, 2013, Web: http://fpif.org/structural_adjustment_former_president_ben_alis_gift_to_tunisia_part_one, Accessed: 2022-03-26.
[307] Ibid.
[308] "Tunisia: Bourguiba Lets Them Eat Bread," *Time Magazine*, Accessed: 2022-03-26. Web: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921495,00.html.
[309] Emma Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 72.
[310] Data Source: "Tunisia," *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, Accessed: 2021-10-13, Web: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/TUNISIA_1986_E.PDF.
[311] The Patriotic Union was the alliance of the Socialist Destourian Party and the UGTT.

After the elections, the Prime Minister Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali overthrew Bourguiba with a bloodless coup on 7 November 1987, became the President, and remained in power for 23 years from 1987 to 2011. For Ben Ali, internal stability and regional security were essential for protecting his regime.[312] Therefore, in the early days of his rule, he primarily tried to reduce the pressure on the opposition, which was a tactical action. He changed the name of Bourguiba's Socialist Destourian Party to the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD/1988-2011). Ben Ali followed the same foreign policy with Bourguiba, and continued to develop relations with the Arab Union, the African Union, and the European Union.[313] Tunisia generally tried to follow a pragmatist, neutral foreign policy during the Ben Ali era. Ben Ali's coming to power was opening the curtain of a 20-year process that would plunge Tunisian politics into a more complex whirlwind.

The presence of networks and collective identities do not have to straightly result in collective action in a social movement.[314] However, even though the freshly shaped Islamist networks and frames had not guaranteed the future success of the movement in the MTI period, they subscribed to the improvement of the al-Nahda in the following periods, to a large extent, since one of the most important values in the collective identity of the al-Nahda movement was Islam.

2.5. Al-Nahda Movement (1989-2010)

There have been a number of developments following Ben Ali's rise to power, many of which even created political opportunity structures for the MTI. These developments will be analyzed in Chapter III, in detail. In this part, the developments in Tunisian politics with the establishment of the al-Nahda Party will be analyzed. The MTI's name was changed as "al-Nahda"[315] in 1989, because the Parties Law banned openly parties based on religion. The al-Nahda candidates were allowed to participate in national elections as independent candidates.

[312] See: Efegil, "Fas ve Tunus'un Dış Politikalarının Belirleyicileri,"
[313] Muhammed Adil, "Arap Baharı-1 (Tunus)," *Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Toplantıları*, TASAM, Ankara, 09 January 2012.
[314] Mario Diani, "Networks and Participation," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Editors) (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 339-359.
[315] "Nahda" means "Renaissance" in Arabic.

The al-Nahda movement officially won nearly 17 percent of the total votes and 25 percent of the votes in many constituencies (30 percent in Tunis and 24-28 percent in some other urban districts), which made it the second-largest political party after the RCD.[316] The al-Nahda's popularity was a remarkable accomplishment especially among large sectors of the urban youth and the lower-middle class.[317] However, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali banned the al-Nahda in response to its electoral success.[318] In other words, following Bourguiba, Ben Ali also regarded the al-Nahda movement as a threat to his regime. Rachid Ghannouchi summarized this process as follows:

> The rise to power of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, who deposed Bourguiba in a 1987 coup d'état, seemed to signal a potential political opening. The following year, Ben Ali granted an amnesty to all political prisoners and announced the beginning of a new era of multiparty democracy…. However, the application was again ignored, and the hoped-for opening soon proved to be a mirage, as the Ben Ali regime reverted to the repressive tactics of the Bourguiba era.[319]

The high vote rates of the al-Nahda in its first elections frightened the Ben Ali regime, and the short moderate period between Ben Ali regime and the al-Nahda came to an end.[320] After the 1989 legislative elections, the al-Nahda movement openly blamed the regime for electoral fraud.[321] Although the al-Nahda emerged as a prominent political movement in the more or less free elections of 1989, the regime rejected to yield the movement's political legitimacy, and resolved to repress it with the support of the bulk of the other political groupings.[322] While Rachid Ghannouchi was leading the al-Nahda movement from the United Kingdom, Abdelfattah Mourou assumed the leadership of the movement inside Tunisia, both of whom had moderate stance.[323]

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[316] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 53; Partrick, "Tunisia," 1090.
[317] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 53.
[318] Sarah Souli, "Tunisia's Al-Nahda Distances Itself from Political Islam," *Al Jazeera*, 27 May 2016, Web: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/left-tunisia-ennahda-party-160526101937131.html, Accessed: 2020-08-04.
[319] Rachid Ghannouchi, "From political Islam to Muslim democracy: The Al-Nahda Party and the future of Tunisia," *Foreign Affairs* 95, 5 (2016): 58–67, 61.
[320] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 185.
[321] Michael J. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 134.
[322] Merone, "Enduring class struggle in Tunisia," 8.
[323] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1090.

Ben Ali censored the local press, to a large extent, and built a police state, reminiscent of mafia order. The comments made about the Ben Ali regime years after he came to the power were that the reforms made by Ben Ali were actually the reproduction of hegemonic political exercises rather than sharing power under democratic conditions.[324] Ben Ali, who preferred to highlight the cultural sides of Islam and the Islamic identity of Tunisia against the groups that became a political threat, repeated a policy similar to Bourguiba's policy against Salah Ben Youssef.

In order to prevent the formation of opposition structures, Ben Ali used the police and the intelligence service as two effective instruments and kept the army in the background.[325] The formation of an army incapable of displaying disobedience to the regime was a state tradition inherited from the Bourguiba era.[326] In fact, this situation stemmed from the desire that the army should not interfere with the administration of the country.[327] On the other hand, the fact that the police were more active throughout the country caused the disproportionate use of police powers especially in remote areas from the center,[328] which triggered mobilization of the movement.

Although scholars consider the military as the repressive institution, in fact, it is the police, a domestically concentrated institution, which protects the regime in regular moments of authoritarian administration through performing day-to-day repression of both elite and crowd-based political dissent.[329] As an armed force, the Tunisian army has never staged a coup against the government or provoked a revolutionary movement against the state, and the army was deliberately kept small in both its size and resources.[330] In terms of security affairs, the investments were mainly made in the police forces and paramilitary forces under the Ministry of Interior in Tunisia.[331] In the literature, there are number of works

[324] Larbi Sadiki, "Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy by non-democratic means," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 29, 1 (2002), 57-78.
[325] Author Interview with the Bureaucrat (Retired) in the Ministry of Interior of Tunisia in İstanbul on 15 September 2022.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Ibid.
[329] Nugent, *After Repression*, 61.
[330] Bilgin, *Arap Baharı Sürecinde Orduların Tutumu*, 71-72.
[331] Risa Brooks, "Abandoned at the palace: Why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, 2 (2013), 205-220.

including repressive practices of the Tunisian regime against the al-Nahda movement during the Ben Ali period,[332] which will be discussed in the Chapter IV and V, in detail.

In fact, repression under semi-authoritarianism is precisely dissimilar than that performed in totally exclusive regimes, which restrict all participation and suppress any mobilization.[333] The semi-authoritarian regimes utilize repression as a comprehensive survival tactic, which involves institutionalizing semi-competitive electoral structures, legislatures, and ruling parties for building a pretension to democratization or liberalization.[334] In Tunisia, the regime performed firmly controlled multiparty elections in order to diffuse requests for reform from the mobilized opposition after economic crises.[335]

The regime was designed around a single ruling party in Tunisia, this party progressively won swelling percentages in national elections and functioned as an institution for administrating, canalizing and demobilizing opposition, and collecting surveillance on citizens.[336] Even though the elections were held periodically in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, the RCD, which was always the winning party,[337] won the elections due to the limited party participation and the restricted number of seats allocated to other parties.[338] The RCD encountered a few opposition parties with different ideologies, which is possible to be classified in three main categories: Leftists, Islamists, and splinters from the RCD.[339]

In the Ben Ali era, eight political parties were operating, except for the RCD, and these parties were so weak when compared with the RCD. These political parties were the MUP (1981), the Unionist Democratic Union (UDU/1988), the Social Liberal Party (PSL/1988), the Green Party for Progress (PVP/2005), the Progressive Socialist Rally (RSP/later the

[332] See: Abdelbaki Hermassi, "The Rise and Fall of the Islamist Movement in Tunisia," in *The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World*, L. Guazzone (Editor) (Ithaca: Ithaca Press, 1995), 105–127; Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation,"; Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy,"; Sarah R. Louden, "Political Islamism in Tunisia: A History of Repression and a Complex Forum for Potential Change," *Mathal* 4, 1 (2015), 1–22.
[333] See: Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace/World, 1966); Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
[334] Andreas Schedler, "The menu of manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* 13, 2 (2002), 36–50.
[335] Jillian Schwedler and Laryssa Chomiak, "And the winner is… Authoritarian elections in the Arab world," *Middle East Report* 238 (2006), 12-19.
[336] Nugent, *After Repression*, 21.
[337] The RCD's election results were as follows: 1989 (100 percent of the votes, 141/141 of the seats), 1994 (98 percent of the votes, 144/163 of the seats), 1999 (92 percent of the votes, 148/182 of the seats), 2004 (88 percent of the votes, 152/189 of the seats) and 2009 (85 percent of the votes, 161/214 of the seats).
[338] See: Celalettin Yavuz and Serdar Erdurmaz, *Arap Baharı ve Türkiye, Ortadoğu'da Kırılan Fay Hatları* (Berikan Yayınevi, 2012).
[339] Nugent, *After Repression*, 95.

Progressive Democratic Party-PDP/1983), the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (Ettakatol/1994), the Ettajdid Movement (1993), and the MDS (1978). Especially in the 1990s, some opposition parties, such as RSP and MDS, collaborated with each other in campaigns protesting against the state's excessive practices; however, could not construct any more durable alliance because of the regime repression, as well as the differences among them, over founding linkages with the banned al-Nahda movement.[340]

Among these parties, the MUP, the UDU, the PSL and the PVP were supporting the Ben Ali regime. The PDP and the Ettakatol, which were under the umbrella of 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms (2005), were harshly critical of the Ben Ali regime, and especially the politically banned al-Nahda movement acted in coordination with these parties. The Ettajdid was the successor of the PCT and it was a socialist secular party positioning in the center left. The MSD was the oldest one among these political parties and it had a socialist stance. The ideologies of the other political parties operating in the Ben Ali era were as follows:

Table-2.6: The Ideologies of the Other Political Parties Operating in the Ben Ali Era

Political Party	**Ideology**
Movement of Socialist Democrats	Socialist
Popular Unity Movement	Socialist
Unionist Democratic Union	Pan-Arabist, Arab Nationalist, Arab Socialist
Ettajdid Movement	Secular, Socialist
Social Liberal Party	Liberal
Progressive Socialist Rally	Liberal, Secular
Green Party for Progress	Green Politics
Ettakatol	Socialist, Secular
al-Nahda Movement	Islamist

Especially the authoritarian elites utilize the process of elections to demonstrate themselves broadminded and open to modern democratic exercises for conveying an image of pluralism outside the country.[341] As in the Algerain case, the authoritarian elites also utilize

[340] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 135.
[341] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 25-26.

the elections as an instrument in order to consolidate regime parties' popularity, demonstrate the desperation of opposition groups and ensure ruling elites with intelligence about possible adversaries.[342] In this respect, the process of elections maybe manipulated through plenty of actors, such as military, president, security institutions and regime party for avoiding opposition groups from accomplishment.[343]

In this context, although seemed as if there was a multi-party system, actually there was a system based on single-party semi-authoritarianism in Tunisia. The Ben Ali regime constructed a political system, in which not only the Islamists, but all also the other political groups in Tunisian society were externalized from the exercise of politics, and politics turned into an activity that was foreign and distinct from the daily matters of the big majority of Tunisians.[344] The Ben Ali regime personalized the presidential system in Tunisia. First of all, the 1988 constitutional amendment ensured him to be elected for three five-year terms.[345] Secondly, the 2002 amendment annulled the limitations regarding the requirements for presidency, and the age limit was arisen from 70 to 75 years; in addition, permanent judicial immunity was assured in the president's official acts.[346] These amendments provided a lifetime presidency for Ben Ali, which pushed other political parties out of the political domain.

The dominance of Ben Ali's political party, the RCD, in Tunisian political life led to training of all the political cadres within the country from this party.[347] Even the opposition party structures were run by the political figures, which split from the RCD.[348] In addition, membership in the RCD had become a prerequisite for making progress in the socio-economic life.[349] It was necessary to be a member of the RCD in order to reach high-level cadres, especially in the bureaucracy.[350]

Ben Ali adopted pragmatic policies during his regime. Although the achievements of the Bourguiba period were not denied, Ben Ali's personality was highlighted, to a large extent,

[342] Immaculada Szmolka, "The Algerian presidential elections of 2004: An analysis of power relationships in the political system," *Mediterranean Politics* 11, 1 (2006), 39-57.
[343] Michael C. Hudson, "Arab regimes and democratization: Responses to the challenge of political Islam," *The International Spectator* 29, 4 (1994), 3–27.
[344] Khalil, *Crowds and Politics in North Africa*, 67.
[345] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 393.
[346] Ibid.
[347] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's Political Party, the RCD, in İstanbul on 16 September 2022.
[348] Ibid.
[349] Ibid.
[350] Ibid.

during this period.[351] Ben Ali's main purpose was to keep Islam under surveillance of the regime just like Bourguiba but to increase the regime's legitimacy by protecting the religious values via the state apparatus.[352] In the Ben Ali era, unlike the Bourguiba regime, the tendency towards Arabization of language in the field of education and press was an example to this policy.[353]

Furthermore, Ben Ali even considered making a deal with the few remaining Sufi communites in order to promote the improvement of apolitical Islamic vision that would not create a political threat to his regime.[354] This cooperation developed in the 1990s and 2000s in order to balance the improving prestige of politicized religious activism in the country.[355] Moreover, the Ben Ali regime considered the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" as a political opportunity structure, and successfully framed the perception of terrorism threat in the United States and Europe.[356] In this respect, the regime was able to receive military, financial and political aids from Western countries within the scope of the fight against radical terrorism.[357]

The elections were only supervised by the administrative bureaucratic cadres appointed by the Ben Ali regime, and there was no independent institution overseeing the elections, as it was the case in the Bourguiba period. In this sense, rumors regarding the election fraud were very common in the public in Tunisia. This political scene of Tunisia just constructed a so-called outlook of political pluralism in the absence of political figures with adequate social and economic capabilities.[358] The Tunisian general election results in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 were as follows respectively:

[351] Author Interview with the Diplomat (Retired) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia in İstanbul on 16 September 2022.
[352] Ibid.
[353] Ibid.
[354] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 111-112.
[355] Ibid..
[356] Author Interview with the Diplomat (Retired) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia in İstanbul on 16 September 2022.
[357] Ibid.
[358] Lisa Anderson, "Politics in the Middle East: Opportunities and Limits in the Quest for Theory," in *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics*, M.A. Tessler, J. Nachtwey and A. Banda (Editors) (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 1-10.

Table-2.7: The Tunisian General Election in 1989, 1994 and 1999

The Tunisian General Election in 1989[359]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Democratic Constitutional Rally	2,087,028	100.00	141
Total *(Voter Turnout: 75.91 percent)*	**2,087,028**	**100.00**	**141**
The Tunisian General Election in 1994[360]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Democratic Constitutional Rally	2,768,667	97.73	144
Movement of Socialist Democrats	30,66	1.08	10
Ettajdid Movement	11,299	0.40	4
Unionist Democratic Union	9,152	0.32	3
Popular Unity Movement	8,391	0.30	2
Social Liberal Party	1,892	0.07	0
Progressive Socialist Rally	1,749	0.06	0
Independents	1,061	0.04	0
Total *(Voter Turnout: 95.47 percent)*	**2,832,871**	**100.00**	**163**
The Tunisian General Election in 1999[361]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Democratic Constitutional Rally	2,831,030	91.59	148
Movement of Socialist Democrats	98,55	3.19	13
Popular Unity Movement	52,054	1.68	7
Unionist Democratic Union	52,612	1.70	7
Ettajdid Movement	32,22	1.04	5
Social Liberal Party	15,024	0.49	2
Progressive Socialist Rally	5,835	0.19	0
Independents	3,737	0.12	0
Total *(Voter Turnout: 91.51 percent)*	**3,091,062**	**100.00**	**182**

[359] Data Source: Juan Montabes Pereira, "Tunisia," in *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich (Editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 911-924.
[360] Data Source: Ibid.
[361] Data Source: "Tunisia/Parliamentary Chamber, Majlis Al-Nuwaab, Elections Held In 1999," *Inter-Parliamentary Union,* Accessed: 2021-10-13, Web: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2321_99.htm.

Table-2.8: The Tunisian General Election in 2004 and 2009

The Tunisian General Election in 2004[362]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Democratic Constitutional Rally	3,678,645	87.59	152
Movement of Socialist Democrats	194,829	4.64	14
Popular Unity Movement	152,987	3.64	11
Unionist Democratic Union	92,708	2.21	7
Ettajdid Movement	43,268	1.03	3
Social Liberal Party	26,099	0.62	2
Progressive Democratic Party	10,217	0.24	0
Independents	1,093	0.03	0
Total *(Voter Turnout: 91.45 percent)*	**4,199,846**	**100.00**	**189**
The Tunisian General Election in 2009[363]			
Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
Democratic Constitutional Rally	3,754,559	84.59	161
Movement of Socialist Democrats	205,374	4.63	16
Popular Unity Movement	150,639	3.39	12
Unionist Democratic Union	113,773	2.56	9
Social Liberal Party	99,468	2.24	8
Green Party for Progress	74,185	1.67	6
Ettajdid Movement	22,206	0.50	2
Ettakatol	5,329	0.12	0
Progressive Democratic Party	1,412	0.03	0
Independents	11,552	0.26	0
Total *(Voter Turnout: 89.40 percent)*	**4,438,497**	**100.00**	**214**

[362] Data Source: "Tunisia, Majlis Al-Nuwab (Chamber of Deputies), Elections Held In 2004," *Inter-Parliamentary Union,* Accessed: 2021-10-13, Web: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2321_04.htm.
[363] Data Source: "Tunisia, Majlis Al-Nuwab (Chamber of Deputies), Elections Held In 2009," *Inter-Parliamentary Union,* Accessed: 2021-10-13, Web: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2321_09.htm.

In fact, regimes constantly make use of co-optation via combining other tactics through repressing some dissident groups while co-opting others into formal and informal structures and alliances for dividing and weakening the greater opposition's strength.[364] Furthermore, regimes enforce legal restrictions on allowed political opposition when they attend electoral competition.[365] All of these tactics were applied under the Ben Ali regime as seen in the Table-2.7 and Table-2.8 respectively. As in the Bourguiba regime, the Ben Ali regime repressed powerfull dissident groups, such as the al-Nahda movement, and made alliance with other pro-regime groups for dividing and weakening the opposition. Ben Ali also enforced legal restrictions on other allowed political parties in the electoral competition as will be discussed in the following chapters. The extremely high voting rates of the Ben Ali's political party, the RCD, in the elections was the main result of these restrictive practices of the regime. Therefore, fundamental changes took place in Tunisian political system with the 2011 Uprisings, and the first free and fair elections were held in Tunisia after the revolution. Many newly established political parties won seats in the 2011 elections as follows:

Table-2.9: The Tunisian General Election in 2011[366]

Party	**Votes**	**Percent (%)**	**Seats**
al-Nahda Movement	1,498,905	36.97	89
Congress for the Republic	352,825	8.70	29
Popular Petition	280,382	6.92	26
Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties	285,530	7.04	20
Progressive Democratic Party	160,692	3.96	16
Democratic Modernist Pole	113,094	2.79	5
National Destourian Initiative	129,215	3.19	5
Afek Tounes	76,643	1.89	4
Tunisian Workers' Communist Party	60,620	1.50	3
Movement of Socialist Democrats	22,842	0.56	2
Other Parties	1,384,692	26.48	18
Total *(Voter Turnout: 49.41 percent)*	**4,053,905**	**100.00**	**217**

[364] Holger Albrecht, "How can opposition support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt," *Democratization* 12, 3 (2006), 378–397.
[365] Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, 3 (1998), 387–410; Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Multi-party elections in the Arab world: Institutional engineering and oppositional strategies," *Studies in Comparative and International Development* 36, 4 (2002), 34–62.
[366] Data Source: "al-Qaimat al-Faiza bi al-Maqaid/Lists Winning Seats)," *Tunisian Independent High Authority for Elections,* Accessed: 2023-07-09, Web: http://www.isie.tn/wp-content/uploads/filebases/resultatElection2011/الجمهورية%20التونسية.xlsx.

Actually, with the outbreak of the 2011 Uprisings in Tunisian streets from Ben Guerdane to Bizerte against the corruption and "tyranny" of the regime, the inability of the regime was clear and the demand for change was evident.[367] During the uprisings, no one was the spokesman for the Tunisian political parties, but rather it was the society itself that moved from its depths, defending its right to survive.[368] Especially the social networks were an outlet for the educated but unemployed youth and a way to keep others informed of what was happening, so that they could engage in teamwork.[369] After the outbreak of the uprisings, the Tunisians of all ages and social backgrounds joined the uprisings, which broke the barriers of fear.[370]

The exclusion of underdeveloped rural regions was one of the main elements of the crowds opposing the regime, which triggered group feeling as a reaction to social unrest and violence.[371] During the uprisings, religious/secular segmentation was not observed among the crowds, and the crowds stimulated the challenge of opposition by "uniting and occupying the space of the state, by becoming the state".[372]

The 2011 Uprisings created a domino effect, and caused new uprisings that also effected other MENA countries, which had similar problems. Especially the banned political movements and restricted trade unions, which were under repression, had a large share in the growth of these uprisings in Tunisia that started from the inner parts of the country, which were the poorest regions. Ben Ali took refuge in Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011 and left the country, and a new era began in Tunisia. As of January 2011, Tunisia had been ruled by two leaders as a party state for more than a half century after the colonial period, and the country had developed on an agriculture-based economy in an environment, which was lack of competition.

After accession to power in the first free elections held in October 2011, the al-Nahda movement followed a moderate and reconciliatory policy in the transition period, and took lessons from the repression experience that the movement had exposed to for many years under semi-authoritarian regimes, as well as the experience of exile period abroad. The al-

[367] Bilal al-Talidi, *al-Islamiyyun wa al-Rabiʿ al-ʿArabi (The Islamists and the Arab Spring)* (Beirut: Nama Center for Research, 2012), 24.
[368] al-Talidi, *al-Islamiyyun wa al-Rabiʿ al-ʿArabi (The Islamists and the Arab Spring)*, 24.
[369] Ibid, 65-66.
[370] Ibid.
[371] Khalil, *Crowds and Politics in North Africa*, 38.
[372] Ibid, 56.

Nahda became one of the most influential political movements in the Arab world via preserving moderate Islamist ideas and modernizing the administrative thoughts by integrating them with the Islamic principles.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the mobilization of Islamist movement in Tunisian history, as well as process tracing of the origins of the al-Nahda movement, in particular. The roots of the Islamist movement in Tunisia began to take shape under the leadership of Salah Ben Youssef, one of the leaders of the Neo Destour Party, who played an important role in the independence struggle in the 1950s. However, the power struggle between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef within the country's founding party, Neo Destour, resulted in favor of Bourguiba. The regime considered the Islamist movement as a security threat while the movement considered the regime as a threat to Tunisian culture. This resulted in the state repression against the al-Nahda movement, which made the Islamist movement lose power throughout the country.

Bourguiba's primary objective was to dismantle the conventional Islamic institutions in order to protect his regime in case of possible political risks. The treatment adopted by the state authorities towards the Islamists was not a deal with a political opponent, but rather the regime dealt with the Islamists as a security threat. On the other hand, Islam never evanesced from social life during the Bourguiba era; on the contrary, the religious activities were transferred from public sphere to private one. This inclination enabled the movement entrepreneurs to organize and mobilize in the private space, in particular. The regime's attempt to weaken the capacity of the religious structures led to mobilization of the Islamist movement clandestinely.

In fact, Islam always played an important role in Tunisian history, and formed the cultural structure of the society, to a large extent. In the 1970s, the Islamist movement in Tunisia began to organize under the leadership of the JI as an abeyance structure. In the secret meetings held in mosques and masjids, the JI members criticized Habib Bourguiba's pro-Western policies and the country's distancing from the Islamic tradition. The deepening socio-economic crisis in the country in the late 1970s, the increasing ideological polarization between Islamist students and leftists on university campuses, the increasing

political and ideological effects of the Iranian Revolution were all used as political opportunity structures by the JI cadres.

During this process, the MTI was founded as a political party in 1981 by Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou. However, the MTI, which was considered as a political and security threat by the regime, faced a harsh reaction, soon turned into a banned political party. Many members of the MTI were arrested and the ideological publications of the movement were banned. The Tunisian politics witnessed a rigid confrontation between the regime and the MTI in many fields, from politics to religious and cultural areas, and this created a tense atmosphere in the political arena. However, the pragmatic and flexible framing efforts of the MTI, which considered the repressive practices of the state as political opportunity structures, were effective in negotiating with the semi-authoritarian nature of the state. In this sense, unlike the JI, the MTI was able to produce new ideas that embraced the Tunisian people, and this political stance continued in the al-Nahda period.

As in the Bourguiba regime, the Ben Ali regime repressed powerful dissident groups, such as the al-Nahda movement, and made alliance with other pro-regime groups for dividing and weakening the opposition. Ben Ali enforced legal restrictions on other permitted political parties in the electoral competition. The rumors regarding the regime's election fraud were very common in the public. In fact, this largely explained the regime party's extremely high voting rates in the elections. This political scene of Tunisia just constructed a so-called outlook of political pluralism in the absence of political figures with adequate social and economic capabilities. However, the repression of the regime against the al-Nahda movement somehow nourished the movement by prompting it to mobilize and created a dialectical process in itself. The al-Nahda was able to function and improve through organizational dynamics and framing processes, which utilized political opportunity strctures in a pragmatic way, as will be seen in the following chapters.

In this political scene, the al-Nahda was a social movement, which started with the ideas inspired from the MB; however, which was formed by the Tunisian milieu in time, and transformed into a specific case called as "Islamists unlike any others".[373] Actually, the al-Nahda movement was not simply the Tunisian franchise of the MB even though its promoters were inspired by the MB approach and ideologues in the early years of the

[373] Camau and Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire*, 267.

movement, and the initial public declarations of the movement emphasized dissemination of religious values.[374] The al-Nahda was very different from the MB in terms of its incorporation of issues of Tunisia's national Islamic tradition, especially the Zaytuna approach to reform impressed by the Muʿtazila School of Islamic theology, which emphasizes the coherence of Islam with reasoning and rational thinking.[375]

The instruments implemented by the al-Nahda in building its identity, as well as the moral and physical sources, were mainly the local symbols.[376] The al-Nahda rejected widespread label for Islamist movements like the MB, concentrating on universalist theses, such as the concept of the caliphate (*khilafa*).[377] The al-Nahda applied an expressly nationalistic approach, premised on the thoughts of the legitimacy of independence, and of the necessity for political strategy adaptable to the reality of Tunisia.[378] This advocate for Tunisification, formerly proclaimed in the 1980s, demonstrated the movement's aspiration to stress its unique character in contrast to other Islamist structures in addition to intentionally distance itself from the MB.[379]

The repression against the al-Nahda movement inside Tunisia alongside the setback of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in the early 1990s and the oppression leveled against the MB in Egypt in the mid-1990s influenced the al-Nahda leaders to reconsider their movement's ideology and vision.[380] The movement transitioned from an abeyance structure to a banned political party under semi-authoritarianism, and to an organization in exile. On the other hand, the ideological pragmatism and transformation, the organizational flexibility and diversity, and the conjunction of individualism and collectivism all influenced the al-Nahda believers, followers and members both inside Tunisia and in the countries of asylum. In this sense, the movement still appeared on the eve of the 2011 Uprisings as Tunisia's most competent opposition party, which made the al-Nahda the country's most resilient opposition movement.

[374] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 40-41.
[375] Nugent, *After Repression*, 26.
[376] Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," 56.
[377] Ibid.
[378] Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes, "Political Islam in Tunisia: A Comparative Approach," in *Political Islam in a Time of Revolt, Islam and Nationalism*, Ferran Izquierdo Brichs, John Etherington, Laura Feliu (Editors) (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham., 2017), 177-201, 179.
[379] See: Camau and Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire*.
[380] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 4-5.

CHAPTER III

3. FROM AN UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT TO A BANNED POLITICAL PARTY

The Islamist movements in the MENA region function under authoritarian regimes, in general.[1] The opposition groups under authoritarian regimes confront certain challenges related to the limited opportunities and considerable coercive threats performed by the regimes.[2] Even though these groups have organizational capacity, the authoritarian regimes are inhospitable milieus for the opposition, and these groups cannot survive unscathed.[3] They are formed by the regime's processes of co-optation and repression in addition to official practices, and by the method in which they determine to reply to such cases.[4]

The movement behavior is formed by the political opportunity structures, which is able to ease or inhibit collective action.[5] The presence of allies, the nonexistence of efficient repression, and the emergence of elite splits produce political opportunities for collective action, whereas the reverse conditions disincline mobilization.[6] Different from similar political openings in Algeria, Jordan, and then Morocco, the Tunisian authorities never allowed the legalization of an Islamist political party until the 2011 Uprisings.[7]

Tunisian politics witnessed strict conflicts arose between the regime and the MTI in several areas ranging from politics to religion and culture, and this is what created a tense relationship between the religious and political currents in Tunisia.[8] Yet, the MTI had

[1] McCarthy, "Islamism, party change, and strategic conciliation," 1.
[2] Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, 12.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 48-49.
[5] See: Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres,"
[6] See: J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, "Insurgency of the powerless: Farm worker movements (1946–1972)," *American Sociological Review* 42 (1977), 249–268; McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
[7] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 62.
[8] Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 528-529.

never become a simple ideological organization, but decisions of the movement were always formed by the political opportunities. The movement's political actions were shaped on the bases of its founding characteristics of collectivism, pragmatism and flexibility. Despite the repressive practices of the state apparatus, the MTI's pragmatic and flexible characteristics helped it negotiate with the semi-authoritarian operating milieu of the state. In this sense, the MTI was able to create different approaches from its preceding formations, sometimes the movement became distant from its prior beliefs, and this course of action proceeded in the al-Nahda period.

In the 1981-1989 period, in terms of closure of the institutionalized political system, there was no legal recognition of the MTI, but there was a tolerance to the movement, which was an important political opportunity. Despite the state's tendency for repression, the movement was able to engage in network building through informal organizations, such as Qurʾan courses, magazines, mosques, masjids, and the movement could recruit new activists through informal neighborhood organization. Especially the organizational dynamics of the student wing functioned as perfect mobilizers through university student associations and dormitories. In this period, the movement framed liberal discourses in order to create consciousness against the regime's use of violence.

3.1. Tolerance in the Shadow of State Repression

In the literature, there is a strong linkage between repression and mobilization, and as mobilization scholars argue, opposition against repression is largely a function of the three main factors of the PPM. Interactions between state repression and social movements constitute series of relational facilities between social and state actors.[9] Hence, state repression plays a significant role in forming the periodical dynamics of the popular collective action.[10]

Although there are some exceptions, repression raises the degree of collective action one way or another.[11] In terms of effectiveness of state coercion and control, this contrasts with certain hypotheses advanced by the movement scholars, and proposes that repression

[9] See: Boudreau, "State Repression and Democracy Protest in Three Southeast Asian Countries,"
[10] Marwan Khawaja, "Repression and popular collective action: Evidence in the West Bank," *Sociological Forum* 8 (1993), 47–71.
[11] Khawaja, "Repression and popular collective action," 47.

maybe regarded as a potent mobilization force in similar contexts.[12] Therefore, this relation between state repression and political contention in each case changes remarkably, but in each one, state actors' resolutions regarding the repression determine the alternatives favorable to dissidents.[13]

Some studies state that repression influences participation in a negative way and suppresses the social movement,[14] while some scholars argue that repression improves participation via protests,[15] as well as elections.[16] On the other hand, some studies state that repression largely has responsive results in different modes of disclosing political dissatisfaction.[17] In the literature, state repression refers to the actions performed by authorities against individuals and/or groups within their milieus, which may restrain the attitudes and/or thoughts of citizens via charging negative sanctions, or which may harm citizens via violating their personal integrity.[18]

Actually, the most prominent course of repression was the physical coercive actions held by the Tunisian regime against the movement members, such as detentions, beatings, harassment, conspiracies, assassinations, raids, persecutions, murders, and compulsory exile.[19] There were also psychological forms of repression, such as shouting, intimidating, swearing, threatening, insulting, humiliating, constantly criticizing, controlling one's clothing, restricting one's relations with others and arousing feelings of worthlessness, in order to demobilize the al-Nahda supporters.[20] The impacts of the repression on the movement members were physical affliction, psychological abasement, and trauma.[21]

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[12] Khawaja, "Repression and popular collective action," 47.
[13] See: Boudreau, "State Repression and Democracy Protest,"
[14] See: Jules Boykoff, *The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Squelch US American Social Movements* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Lesley Wood, "Breaking the wave: Repression, identity, and Seattle tactics," *Mobilization* 12, 4 (2007), 377–388; Rune Ellefsen, "Judicial opportunities and the death of SHAC: Legal repression along a cycle of contention," *Social Movement Studies* 15, 5 (2016), 441–456.
[15] See: Doug McAdam, *Freedom Summer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Paul Almeida, *Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925–2005* (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
[16] See: Kraig Beyerlein and Kenneth T. Andrews, "Black voting during the civil rights movement: A microlevel Analysis," *Social Forces* 87, 1 (2008), 65–93.
[17] See: Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, 2 (1987), 266–297; Will H. Moore, "Repression and dissent: Substitution, context, and timing," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, 3 (1998), 851–873; Kevin J. O'Brien and Yanhua Deng, "Repression backfires: Tactical radicalization and protest spectacle in rural China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, 93 (2015), 457–470.
[18] Christian Davenport, "Understanding covert repressive action: The case of the U.S. government against the Republic of New Africa," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, 1 (2005), 120-140.
[19] Author Interview with the Tunisian Judge (Retired) through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

Forms of state repression affect the institutions, social roots and collective repertoires favorable to dissidents.[22] Some types of repression operate dissidents underground, whereas some damage activist organizations.[23] Actually, it is possible to encounter with both of these situations in the al-Nahda case. Especially before 1981, the repression resulted in an underground movement, which functioned as an abeyance structure,[24] whereas it attempted to damage the activist organizations of the movement after 1981.

In the existing literature, the regime type is also considered as a significant factor for the repression. The interactions between state repression and social mobilization over the authoritarian period construct both the movement identities and the relations between state and dissidents.[25] In this sense, repression is frequently considered to be the primary apparatus of authoritarian regimes for maintaining their power, and these regimes are commonly found to perform repression more excessively than democratic regimes.[26] In addition, regimes have capacity to determine the institutional restrictions and official measures for oppression.[27]

Similarly, in the al-Nahda case, the regime performed both the institutional restrictions and the official measures to oppress the movement. In this respect, here it is necessary to analyze the repressive practices of the Tunisian regime against the movement in detail, since the repression towards the movement was not the same in each period, and the interactions based on the changes between the regime and the movement differed considerably in time, which created political opportunities for the movement. Those political opportunities will be thoroughly analyzed now.

The JI held its second congress in the city of Sousse on 9-10 April 1981, in the same period in which the Socialist Destourian Party held its extraordinary congress, and President Habib Bourguiba declared that he considered no objection to the presence of

[22] Frans J. Schurman, "Urban Social Movements: Between Repressive Utopia and Socialist Panacea," in *Urban Social Movements in the Third World*, F. J. Schurman and A. L. van Naerssen (Editors) (New York: Routledge, 1989), 9-26.
[23] See: Boudreau, "State Repression and Democracy Protest,"
[24] I refer to the JI here. The JI functioned as an abeyance structure in Tunisia before establishment of the MTI, the predecessor of the al-Nahda.
[25] See: Boudreau, "State Repression and Democracy Protest,"
[26] See: Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of human rights to personal integrity in the 1980s: A global analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 88, 4 (1994), 853-872; Christian Davenport, "The promise of democratic pacification: An empirical assessment," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, 3 (2004), 539-560.
[27] Abel Escribà-Folch, "Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy," *International Political Science Review* 34, 5 (2013), 543-560.

other parties besides the ruling party.[28] In its second congress, the movement approved the necessity to engage in public action, and also approved changing the name to the "Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI/*Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami*)".[29] In this respect, the JI was terminated; the MTI officially applied to the state to operate as a legal political party.

In the literature, there is some information that the MTI was publicly announced on 6 June 1981 in the press conference held by Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou.[30] However, another document states that the movement was established as an official political party on 31 May 1981.[31] In addition, in this document dated on 31 May 1981, the people in the founding staff of the MTI were mentioned and their hometowns, professions and demographic information were included. The founding staff of the movement, which established the MTI as a formal political party on 31 May 1981, was as follows:

Table-3.1: The Founding Staff of the MTI (31 May 1981)[32]

No	Name and Surname	Occupation	Age	City
1	Sheikh Muhammad Saleh Enneifer	Prof. (Ret.) at al-Zaytuna University	78	Tunis
2	Sheikh Abdelkader Salama	Director of *al-Maʿarifa*	73	Ksibet al-Mediouni/ Monastir
3	Abdulwahab Sulaiman al-Kafimi	Professor of Natural Sciences	51	Kairouan
4	Muhammad Nouria	Officer	46	Moknine/Monastir
5	al-Hadi bin Hamida al-Hajj Ibrahim	Teacher	42	Djerba/Medenine
6	Rachid Ghannouchi	Philosophy Teacher	40	Gabès
7	al-Habib Rayhan	History Teacher	34	Bizerte
8	al-Habib al-Souissi	Officer	33	Béni Khiar/Nabeul
9	Ali Neuer	Mathematics Teacher	33	Sousse
10	Dusuid	Arabic Language Teacher	33	Tataouine

[28] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[29] Ibid.
[30] See: Michael Collins Dunn, "The Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia: From Renaissance to Revolution," in *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa*, J. Ruedy (Editor) (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 149-165; Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[31] "al-Hay'a al-Ta'sisiya li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Staff of the MTI, 31 May 1981)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-05, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/Categorie/المؤسسون#gsc.tab=0.
[32] "al-Hay'a al-Ta'sisiya li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Staff of the MTI, 31 May 1981),"

11	Abdulaziz al-Vakil	Arabic Language Teacher	33	Sfax
12	Abdelfattah Mourou	Lawyer	33	Tunis
13	Abdullah al-Taboubi	Lawyer	32	Béja
14	Abdurrauf Ramadan	Mathematics Teacher	31	Gabès
15	Muhammad al-Hadi al-Zamzami	Lawyer	30	Gabès
16	Jalila al-Kasrawi	Chief Engineer	30	Tunis
17	Fadel al-Baladi	Teacher	29	Bou Salem/ Jendouba
18	Zahir Mahjoub	Instructor at the National School of Engineering	29	Beni Hassen/ Monastir
19	Habib al-Louz	Contractor	28	Sfax
20	Muhammad Najib al-Khediri	History Teacher	28	Sousse
21	Samira Sheikh Ruhu	Doctor	28	Sfax
22	Habib Mokni	Journalist-Publisher	26	Jemmal/Monastir
23	Benaissa Demni	Philosophy Teacher	25	Ras Jebel/Bizerte
24	Abdullah Zuari	Teacher	25	Al-Kef
25	Sawsan al-Sadafi	History Teacher	24	Kairouan

According to this document, the prominent members of the MTI's Political Bureau *(al-Maktab al-Siyasi)* were Rachid Ghannouchi (The MTI Leader), Abdelfattah Mourou (General Secretary), Benaissa Demni (Public Relations Director), Zahir Mahjoub (Finance Director) and Habib Mokni (Media Director).[33]

When the data are analyzed in the Table-3.1, as seen in the Graph-3.1, the founding staff of the MTI mainly consists of teachers, followed by professions such as lawyers, scholars, civil servants, journalists, engineers, contractors and doctors. In the founding staff, the founders of the MTI were from different professions, and that was a political opportunity playing an important role in the mobilization of the movement.

[33] "al-Hay'a al-Ta'sisiya li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Staff of the MTI, 31 May 1981),"

Graph-3.1: Occupational Distribution of the MTI's Founding Staff



When the data are analyzed in the Table-3.1, as seen in the Graph-3.2, the founding staff of the movement mainly consisted of young and middle-aged people.

Graph-3.2: Demographic Distribution of the MTI's Founding Staff



When the data are analyzed in the Table-3.1, as seen in the Graph-3.3, especially the crowded coastal cities, such as Monastir, Sfax, Tunis, Gabes come to the fore, as well as Bizerte, Sousse, Kairouan, al-Kef, Jendouba, Tataouine, Nabeul, Beja and Medenine. In this respect, it is understood that the founding staff of the movement included young and middle-aged members both from the coastal and inner parts of the country, which involved different occupational groups.

Graph-3.3: Distribution of the Cities of the MTI's Founding Staff



With the establisment of the MTI, the Islamist movement in Tunisia turned into a political party, and the MTI began to be considered as a reaction to the Habib Bourguiba regime.[34] The MTI's Political Bureau was operating actively in the field. The main activities of the MTI's Political Bureau were following the political conditions of the country, issuing public statements, coordinating activities with other political parties, and holding press conferences.[35] The MTI's Political Bureau issued a statement in which it declared its ideas

[34] Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 528-529.
[35] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 92.

on the circumstances in the Muslim realm and Tunisia, its goals, and the instruments to accomplish them.[36]

This founding statement of the MTI contained four typical features of political Islamist movements.[37] First of all, it argued that religion and politics are inseparable. Secondly, it focused on the identity politics with an emphasis on the birth of an Islamic characteristic unique to Tunisia and the renewal of Islamic thought. Thirdly, it was in favor of an open Pan-Islamic ideology. Finally, it underlined the necessity to reorganize mosques as centers of worship, mass organization and mobility. In this respect, the Islamists and the regime began to portray themselves as politically opposed powers on the national setting in the beginning of the 1980s.[38]

The MTI opposed to apply violence as an instrument to accomplish political change or to come to power in the country, since the movement believed that this could result in a civil war, which frustrated the hardliners within the movement.[39] The Salafi movement had also gradually enlarged its base in Tunisia since the 1980s.[40] The JI, the predecessor of the MTI, had a welcoming atmosphere for the Tunisian Salafis.[41] This resulted in the split of some movement members in 1981, since those who left the movement condemned the leadership's resolution to apply for a party licence in order to take part in parliamentary politics.[42] Inside the movement, the discussions were between these two groups in 1981, in general. One group under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou was supporting a prompt legal recognition as a political party, whereas the other group under the leadership of Salah Karker was advocating to remain as a socio-cultural movement.[43]

The MTI split up between moderates following Abdelfattah Mourou and hardliners following Salah Karker, and the discussions focused on the conflicts regarding plenty of

[36] "al-Bayan al-Taʾsisi li-Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Statement of the Islamic Tendency Movement)," *The Database of Ikhwan Wiki*, Accessed: 2022-09-05, Web: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=البيان_التأسيسي_لحركة_الإتجاه_الإسلامي_بتونس_"النهضة".
[37] Muhammed Affan, "Hal Asbahat Haraka al-Nahda Hizban 'Ilmaniyan? (The al-Nahda Movement…A Secular Party?)," *Alsharq Forum*, 14 June 2016, Web: https://research.sharqforum.org/ar/2016/07/14/هل-أصبحت-حركة-النهضة-حزباً-علمانياً؟/, Accessed: 2020-10-27.
[38] Burgat, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, 183.
[39] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 399.
[40] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 122.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Camau and Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire*, 287.

fundamental concepts like democracy and women's rights.[44] The first group led by Abdelfattah Mourou was in favor of multi-party politics, involving cooperation with secular groups, whereas the second one led by Salah Karker even refused the independent explication of spiritual texts.[45] When Rachid Ghannouchi propounded to declare the movement's existence and apply for a party licence to operate within a legal framework in the the movement's second congress in Sousse in April 1981, Mourou advocated this proposal, whereas Karker rejected it.[46]

When the movement applied for a party licence in 1981, the moderates moved in a pragmatic way by eliminating all negative references to regime and the Western world, and openly showed their willingness to take part in multi-party politics. This was a break away from the MB ideology.[47] To illustrate, Hassan al-Banna considered the multi-party politics as an instrument utilized by colonial forces to exterminate society resulting in disunity and inner cleavages with kufr.[48] While the hardliners asserted that persistence of the moderate faction with the regime damped down the movement, the moderates argued that thrusting attitude of the hardliners instigated the regime's repression against the movement.[49]

In the midst of these disagreements, the regime's pressure on the movement intensified. There is limited information in the literature regarding the arrests in January 1983. An explanatory statement of the MTI on 16 January 1983 contains detailed information regarding the regime's practices and the people arrested.[50] In fact, January of 1983 was a month when the MTI members were subjected to harsh regime repression. The movement declared that the arrests, detentions, torture and insults of the Islamists during this period (especially after 8 January) were clearly against human rights. Among these illegal practices; detention of multiple family members, house arrests, trespassing to houses and harassment were also available. In the statement, it was noted that all these practices were

[44] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 53.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid, 55.
[47] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[48] John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 139.
[49] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[50] "Bayan Tawdihi min Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Explanatory Statement From the MTI, 16 January 1983)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-08, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_توضيحي_من_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي_حول_الاعتقالات_الجديدة/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة #gsc.tab=0.

an indication of the government's failure in politics and an effort to cover up the crisis in the country. The list of the MTI detainees was as follows:

Table-3.2: The List of the MTI Detainees (16 January 1983)[51]

No	Name and Surname	Occupation
1	Shamsaddin bin Mabrouk	Doctor at al-Razi Hospital
2	al-Nuwy al-Hanzuli	Engineer in the Ministry of Agriculture
3	Ali al-Qaydi	Bureaucrat in the National Social Security Fund
4	al-Hadi Brahm	Company Manager
5	Muhammad al-Fattanasi	Accountant
6	Omar Jeliti	Engineer in the Ministry of Agriculture
7	Najib bin Halima	Bureaucrat in the Ministry of Economy
8	Zaid al-'Asal	Faculty of Law Student
9	Jamal Bennour	Faculty of Law Student
10	Hamouda al-Gharbi	Faculty of Law Student
11	Muhammad al-Saghir al-Gharbi	Faculty of Law Student
12	Ali Schniter	Faculty of Architecture Student
13	Tariq Brik	Faculty of Architecture Student
14	Hashemi Hamdi	Faculty of Literature Student
15	Muhammad Habib Ayashi	Faculty of Law Student
16	Jamal Alawi	Faculty of Law Student
17	Abdul Jaid al-Zar	Medical Student/Tunis
18	Muhammad Fathi	Medical Student/Sousse
19	Muhamad al-Mu'alij	Student of the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Sidi Thabet
20	al-Munji bin Muadh	Student of the National School of Management
21	Zuhair al-Rajabi	Student of the Higher Institute of Management
22	Najeeb Murad	Science Student/Tunis
23	Belqasem al-Sharni	National School of Engineering Student/Gabès
24	Fathi al-Khayari	Agricultural Engineer
25	Fathi Abrouq	Science Student/Tunis
26	Muhammad bin Khamis	Officer at Tunisia Electric and Gas Company
27	Abdul Latif Mumghali	High School Teacher
28	Abdul Hamid bin Abdul Karim	Institute Teacher
29	Hatem bin Ahmed Bahron	Officer in the Railways Establishment
30	Ibrahim bin Saleh Bouchocha	Postal Officer
31	Muhammad al-Hammami	Nurse
32	Muhammad bin Ramadan	Scholar
33	Mustafa bin Mabrouk al-Hakim	Tailor
34	Salih bin Ammar Al-Zawali	Officer in Tunisia Electric and Gas Company/Gafsa

[51] "Bayan Tawdihi min Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Explanatory Statement From the MTI, 16 January 1983),"

35	Latef al-Ayadi	Student of the Faculty of Science/Tunis
36	Ali bin Muhammad al-Shatani	Activist/Gafsa
37	Ezzedine al-Sudani	Officer in a Pipe Company

When the occupational data in the Table-3.2 are analyzed, as it is seen in the Graph-3.4, the MTI members arrested in January 1983 are primarily students, and the others' professions are officers, engineers, bureaucrats, teachers, activists, nurses, tailors, doctors, managers, accountants, scholars. In this list, the most important detail is that the existence of civil servants among the arrested MTI members, which points out that the MTI members had infiltrated to the state apparatus. The infiltration of the MTI members to state was a political opportunity structure and played an important role in the mobilization of the movement by serving as an elite ally.

Graph-3.4: Occupational Distribution of the MTI Detainees



Among the family members of imprisoned MTI members; certain moral character traits developed, such as courage, confidence and fortitude, with the motive of unity and solidarity against the arrests. In addition, the prison experience of the MTI members fostered specific emotions, such as distress, resentment, disappointment and anger, against

the repression. The Tunisian regime acted ruthlessly by performing arrests, enforcements and executions on the supporters and members of the MTI. However, despite all these repressive practices, the MTI members did not engage in violent activities.

In an intra-party declaration on 3 July 1983, the MTI stated five main goals.[52] First one was to implement the projects that had priority. Second one was to maintain the movement's presence in political life and ensure the release of its imprisoned members. Third one was to secure the existence of the movement both at central and local levels. Fourth one was to to prioritize the moral values of the movement in the eyes of society. Final one was to preserve the unity of the movement. In response to the accusations of the regime, the MTI announced its rejection of the use of violence in 1983 and declared that the MTI did not represent those violent Islamist currents.[53] The leaders of the movement also sent a message to President Habib Bourguiba in which they affirmed the movement's rejection of violence and the cooperation with other groups abroad.[54]

In the third congress of the movement, which was held in Nabeul in November 1984, Rachid Ghannouchi was elected again as leader of the movement. In this party congress, there were two main approaches within the movement. The first group was in favor of refraining from political conflicts with the government and focusing on just religious issues, whereas the second group led by Ghannouchi thought that the disavowal of the MTI ought to be considered as a motivation in order to enhance activities of the movement and advocate the existence of the MTI within the political arena.[55] The second approach was much more supported in the party congress. To illustrate, the MTI did not engage in the Afghan jihad even though many MB-linked movements played a significant role in Afghanistan.[56] Especially following the third congress of the movement, Ghannouchi almost turned into a mediator between the democratic faction led by Mourou and the dogmatic faction led by Karker.[57]

[52] "Bayan Dakhili li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Intra-Party Declaration of the MTI, 03 July 1983)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-08, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_داخلي_1983/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة#gsc.tab=0.

[53] Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 533.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 89-90.

[56] Pargeter, "Radicalisation in Tunisia," 77.

[57] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 61.

Due to the state repression against the movement, the political system was not always open to the MTI. The foundation of the MTI resulted in backlash of the regime, and many members of the MTI were arrested, and ideological publications of the movement were also banned. In 1984, Tunisia witnessed the Bread Riots. The regime blamed the MTI for organizing the Bread Riots, and arrested many MTI advocators.[58] After that time, the MTI was known as a movement, which was committed to aiding people in the Bread Riots.[59] In fact, the MTI leaders had encouraged their supporters to join the protests; however, the Tunisian government was not able to detect evidence that the MTI had engineered the Bread Riots.[60]

The Bread Riots was an important political opportunity structure for the MTI. Therefore, it is useful to analyze the Bread Riots thoroughly for formalizing and understanding these political opportunity structures better. In the Bread Riots, the inconvenience was caused primarily by the youth, who were unemployed and ignored by the regime, to a very large extent.[61] This momentum was supported with the participation and impact of more organized political groups, such as leftist movements, as well as Islamist movements, in particular.[62]

In the Bread Riots, most of the protesters were students coming from middle-class social backgrounds.[63] The main matter was to alter the existing system, which had structural problems, such as inequality, unemployment and poverty.[64] This social mobilization was strengthened by the participation and influence of more organized political groups like leftist movements, as well as the Islamist movement. The PCT also requested consultation with all national forces in order to solve the crise.[65] In addition, the MDS and the PCT both criticized the fierce military interventions against the demonstrators.[66]

During the Bread Riots in 1984, especially the women in the southern cities supported the demonstrations by screaming from their houses against the repressive practices of the

[58] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 173.
[59] Kenneth Perkins, "Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in Tunisian Politics," in *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects*, Nouri Gana (Editor) (Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 58-80.
[60] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 173-174.
[61] Walton and Seddon, *Riot and Rebellion,* 198.
[62] Ibid, 201.
[63] Ibid, 10.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid, 202.
[66] Ibid.

regime.[67] To illustrate, in al-Mabrouka, the young women factory labors marched from the textile factory by chanting slogans as a reaction to the price doubling of bread.[68] As the women continued their protests, the furious men around the main cafe in al-Mabrouka participated them, and while they were passing near the high school, the students participated the demonstrators, as well.[69] The protestors including men and women from different political views, and even children attacked the police station in addition to the party bureaus and other important government buildings.[70]

The police directly used force against the crowds but was not able to suppress the protests, and the military was called upon for restoring the public order following the state of emergency.[71] In the protests, the troops even fired on the demonstrators involving women and children, which resulted in many deaths, as well as injuries.[72] The regime killed fifty people until the resolution of Habib Bourguiba on removing the new charges.[73] Within the framework of strict measures taken by the state following the Bread Riots, the regime cut off the activities of the prayer rooms in factories, educational institutions and offices.[74] This created popular support for the MTI within the society through triggering social unrest. The regime's repression against the MTI strengthened the movement's claim to be a collective action fighting for the interest of Tunisian society,[75] which was a political opportunity structure.

During the Bread Riots, the parallel party structures of the MTI in the countries of asylum were also active. In Wolf's book, it is noted that the political bureau and communications office of the MTI were established in Paris in 1987.[76] Yet, there is a document written by the MTI Paris Office on 6 January 1984.[77] In this document, the socio-economic reasons of the Bread Riots that took place in Tunisia from December 1983 to January 1984 and on

[67] Walton and Seddon, *Riot and Rebellion*, 87.
[68] Ibid, 87-88.
[69] Ibid, 88.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Qusay Salih al-Darwish, *Yahduthu fi Tunis (Happening in Tunisia)* (Paris, 1987), 168-169.
[72] Jim Paul, "States of emergency: The riots in Tunisia and Morocco," *MERIP Reports* 127 (1984), 3-6.
[73] al-Darwish, *Yahduthu fi Tunis (Happening in Tunisia)*, 168-169.
[74] See: Boulby, "The Islamic challenge: Tunisia since independence,"
[75] Nouri Gana, *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects Prospects* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 66.
[76] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 87.
[77] "Tahiyya al-Nidal wa al-Sumud li Shaʿbina al-Batal (Greetings to the Struggle and Steadfastness of Our Hero People, Paris, 6 January 1984)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-14, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1984جانفي-25الخبز_احداث_حول_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

which groups and which cities the social mobilization concentrated were explained, in detail.

In the document, the MTI Paris Office stated that with its freedom and liberation struggle, the Muslim Arab Tunisian people openly rejected the economic, political, social and cultural preferences of the Tunisian regime, such as supporting foreign capital, advocating exploitation and pursuing regional discrimination. The MTI Paris Office stated that the increases in prices revealed the severity of the situation in addition to the growing class inequality, unemployment, lack of access to basic foods, corruption, bribery, and deprivation of freedom. The MTI Paris Office stated that the prices of flour, dough, bread and derivatives increased by more than hundred percent. Moreover, the MTI Paris Office argued that these increases came after exorbitant price increases in certain products, such as oil, milk and sugar.

According to the MTI Paris Office, during the Breat Riots, there were protests in many regions, especially in Douz, Kebili, Souk Lahad, al-Hamma, Gabes, Gafsa and Kasserine. After that, these cities were followed by protests in Sfax, al-Kef, Jendouba and the capital Tunis. In this respect, the protests started mainly in the interior cities, and then spread to the crowded coastal cities. In the document, the MTI Paris Office stated that workers, students and the unemployed formed the backbone of the street struggles in the protests, and the regime responded to the protestors with real bullets, resulting in dozens of losses and hundreds of wounded. According to the MTI Paris Office, the Breat Riots, which took place in January 1984, was noted in history as “the fourth bloodshed of the regime” after January 1978, January 1980 and February 1981.

In addition, the MTI Paris Office argued that even though the regime made some changes in some laws and allowed some political parties after 1981, it was later understood that these practices were actually just application of certain scenarios, which were created by the regime. All these findings and documents show that the MTI cadres more or less played role in engineering and encouraging the Bread Riots. However, this growing social unrest was an important political opportunity structure for the movement and allowed the MTI to develop its base.

In 1985, the return of more than 30,000 migrant workers to Tunisia as a result of the conflict with Libya further exacerbated the socio-economic discontent that culminated with

the Bread Riots.[78] The UGTT accused the government of the growing economic crisis and social problems in the country. In addition, the revenues from oil exports dramatically decreased between 1984 and 1986, a heavy drought resulted in a catastrophic harvest in 1986, and tourism revenues declined in the country.[79]

In the context of these developments, the Tunisian regime confronted with a widespread social unrest due to the corruption, unemployment and injustice in the mid-1980s, and the regime had to liberalize political domain. This resulted in tolerance to the MTI, and this was an important political opportunity structure. In terms of closure of the institutionalized political system, there was no legal recognition of the MTI, but there was a tolerance to the movement. In this respect, although the regime did not consider the MTI as a legal political party, it opened up a space for the movement to organize for balancing the opposition leftist movements.[80]

The MTI issued a declaration on 6 June 1985, on the fourth anniversary of the movement's foundation.[81] In this declaration, the movement celebrated both the fourth anniversary of its establishment and the release of its members and supporters, who had been imprisoned for years.[82] The MTI stated that the struggle carried out by the movement was an important step in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms.[83] The MTI also stated that the essence of the aforementioned struggle was the struggle for law and justice.[84] Within the framework of this document, the release of the imprisoned detainees after the Bread Riots was a tolerance of the regime towards the MTI. This was a political opportunity structure for the movement.

In this context, the MTI softened its relations with the regime, giving priority to its political role in general and considering the problem of an official recognition as a political party in particular.[85] The Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali made an official

[78] Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, 69.
[79] Gregory White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco: On the Outside of Europe Looking In* (New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 118.
[80] Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, 72.
[81] "Bayan al-Dhikra al-Rabʿa li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the Fourth Anniversary of the MTI, 6 June 1985)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-10, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_ذكرى_التأسيس_6_جوان1985/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة#lg=1&slide=3.
[82] "Bayan al-Dhikra al-Rabʿa li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the Fourth Anniversary of the MTI, 6 June 1985),"
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 52.

meeting with Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou, and declared that the regime would like to ameliorate its relationship with the MTI in November 1985.[86] The deterioration of the economic conditions played important role in this official meeting, and this was also a political opportunity structure for the movement. With softening of relations between the regime and the MTI, starting in 1985, the movement was allowed to function despite not being granted an official permission.[87]

Some scholars argue that Islamist movements are either tolerated through informal mechanisms (informal tolerance), or involved in political organizations under state control through formal channels (controlled inclusion).[88] In this respect, the authoritarian elites sometimes may raise political openness to specific dissident groups, whereas they exclude other groups in order to counterbalance their opponents within the elite circle.[89] This openness occured via tolerance as in the MTI case through allowance of the movement to function without making it legal, whereas it happened via controlled inclusion through legalization of the political party with certain restrictions as in the MDS and the MUP cases. Hence, the Tunisian regime was tolerant to some opposition parties, to a certain extent.

In terms of its tolerance, the Tunisian regime periodically opened space for the MTI through offering offical pardons and allowing the movement to function at certain times. The regime connived at the MTI's endeavors, such as annoucement of its declarations, and dissemination of its ideas in mosques, despite not recognizing the movement legally.[90] Actually, the regime had stimulated the movement to harm the leftists' influential domain on university campuses and struggle against leftists' student unions in the 1970s.[91] With this popularity, the MTI was able to control 300 mosques and dozens of public university campusses by 1981.[92] This was an important political opportunity structure.

[86] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 62.
[87] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[88] Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and containment in Egypt and Morocco," *Journal of North African Studies* 11, 2 (2006), 123–141.
[89] Ellen Lust-Okar, "Divided they rule: The management and manipulation of political opposition," *Comparative Politics* 36, 2 (2004), 159–179.
[90] See: Waltz, "Islamist appeal in Tunisia,"
[91] Toumi, *La Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali*, 116–117.
[92] See: Boubly, "The Islamic challenge,"

In the mid-1980s, The MTI enhanced its agenda from the religious to one including topics, such as human rights, social justice and democratization.[93] The MTI endeavored to reorganize, construct and consolidate its support and organization, as well as improving linkages with the UGTT and other opposition parties.[94] For example, the MTI constructed firm ties with other opposition movements through participating in the opposition parties' municipal and legislative election boycotts in 1985 and 1986.[95] In this respect, the MTI gained elite allies in the political arena. This was a new political opportunity structure for the movement.

The fourth congress of the MTI was held in al-Menzah[96], Tunisia in December 1986.[97] In this congress, the MTI cadres decided on a three-phase strategy in order to come to power.[98] In the first stage, the movement would present its views to the society. In the second stage, the movement would arrange alternative Islamist programs and prepare their equiped cadres to operate when the Islamists come to power. In the third stage, the MTI would accomplish to govern Tunisia.

In the second half of the 1980s, the MTI became a political and social mass movement, in which actors of distinct social status and understandings encompassing from radical students, religious conservatives, hardliners and moderate intellectuals to middle class professionals, civil servants.[99] Although the Tunisian regime underestimated the Muslim activists, assuming their desire to center public life on Islam as the opposition of the secular outlook that the state had supported, the MTI members considered that their movement's exclusion from the political process offered the most optimal manifestation of a systematic campaign since the independence period to bring Tunisian Islam back to political arena.[100]

On the other hand, the repression of semi-authoritarianism and its cumulative political setbacks proceeded to disrupt the movement's harmony. In March 1987, Rachid

[93] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 165.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 396.
[96] al-Menzah is the name of a group of suburbs, which are at the north of the of capital city, Tunis.
[97] Walid al-Mansuri, *al-Ittijah al-Islami wa Bourguiba (The Islamic Tendency and Bourguiba*) (Tunis: 1988), 63.
[98] al-Mansuri, *al-Ittijah al-Islami wa Bourguiba (The Islamic Tendency and Bourguiba*), 63.
[99] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 54.
[100] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 177.

Ghannouchi was jailed because of preaching in a mosque without authorization.[101] In August 1987, nearly hundred MTI advocaters were tried and accused of founding an illegal organization in order to encompass subversive activities with Iran, engage in overthrowing the regime and replacing it with a new one relying on the Iranian model.[102] Five of the seven members sentenced to death penalty were Hamadi Jebali, Ali Laaridhi and Salah Karker, charged with organizing the violent street protestations in July; Fethi Maatoug, blamed for planting bombs in a hotel on 2 August; and Abdelmajid Mili, accused of direct involvement in the explosion.[103] At the end of the trials, 69 of them received provisions ranging from two years to life sentence.[104] In this period, the political opportunity structures of the movement were somehow narrowed.

These sentences had repercussions at the global level. To illustrate, in Lebanon on 28 September 1987, Islamic Jihad, a pro-Iranian Lebanese group holding Western hostages, threatened to kill the civil servants of the Tunisian regime in case of impletementation of the death sentences.[105] In his defence, Rachid Ghannouchi denounced violence, assured the MTI's commitment to the democracy, and rejected any ties with the Iranian government.[106] In fact, the trials, which eventuated in October 1987, could not reach any evidence that the MTI was subversive, applied violence against the government, had functioned in secret, or had bombed hotels in Tunisia.[107]

The MTI's founding statement had also openly rejected the violence and offered the foundation of a multi-party system in Tunisia.[108] In the 1980s, the Algerian Islamist movement had influenced the Tunisian Islamists through calling for student demonstrations in high schools and universities.[109] However, different from the movements in both Algeria and Morocco, the MTI was not attributed with any acts of violence in spite of its long clandestine history as an abeyance structure, and the movement endeavored to

[101] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 165.
[102] Anneli Botha, *Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism* (Pretoria/Tshwane: Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 114.
[103] Botha, *Terrorism in the Maghreb*, 114; Michael J. Willis, "Containing Radicalism through the Political Process in North Africa," in *Transnational Islam and Regional Security - Cooperation and Diversity between Europe and North Africa*, Frederic Volpi (Editors) (London: Routledge, 2009), 1-14.
[104] Botha, *Terrorism in the Maghreb*, 114.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 99.
[107] Hedi Dhoukar, "Bourguiba contre les islamistes," *Jeune Afrique* 1395 (1987), 28-32.
[108] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 164.
[109] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *al-Islam al-Siyasi Madiyan wa Hadiran wa Mustaqbalan (The Political Islam, Past, Present and Future)* (Rabat: The New Najah Press, 2000), 108.

construct linkages with other movements, such as the UGTT and other opposition parties.[110]

Yet, Bourguiba gave an order for imposing the death penalties, which prepared the political scene for the events on 07 November 1987.[111] Relying on Article 57 of the Tunisian Constitution, the Prime Minister showed reverence for legal institutions, which composed the Tunisian politics.[112] According to the Article 57, in case of an inadequacy of the head of state to perform his duties, the prime minister would direclty assume the functions of the presidency for the rest of the term of the national legislature.[113] In this respect, on 6 November 1987, Ben Ali moved swiftly to gather a board of medical experts, who confirmed that Bourguiba's physical and psychological health was insufficient to fullfil his liabilities.[114]

After the independence, Bourguiba had sent young Tunisian officers in the army to Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, the United States and Belgium, for training purposes.[115] This process had led to the formation of two main factions within the Tunisian army over time, the first one of which was the secular wing while the other one was the conservative wing.[116] In this respect, a coup attempt against the Bourguiba regime was also probable by the MTI cadres, since the movement had so many members and sympathisers operating within the police and military, some of whom were in the leadership positions.[117] Actually, Islamic tendencies were observed in the lower level soldiers serving in the Tunisian army at that time.[118]

In addition, the MTI increased its attempts to recruit from within the ranks of the security units in the second half of the 1980s.[119] In fact, the idea of a violence and the use of weapons in order to struggle with the regime had developed in time among the youth, in

[110] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 164.
[111] Ware, "Ben Ali's constitutional coup in Tunisia," 591.
[112] Ibid, 592.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Author Interview with the Colonel-Major (Retired) of the Tunisian Army in İstanbul on 16 September 2022.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 63.
[118] Anthony H. Cordesman, *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 160-161.
[119] Pargeter, "Radicalisation in Tunisia," 80.

particular, and this phenomenon was confirmed by some MTI members later.[120] Moreover, there were rumours inside the movement regarding the construction of armed cells out of control of the MTI leaders.[121] Those armed cells had capacity to attempt assassinations, as well as triggering a civil war in Tunisia.[122] In fact, some of the al-Nahda figures had prevented that possible civil war in the process leading up to the 1987 coup. In this respect, the analyses made by Said Ferjani, one of the prominent figures of the al-Nahda, clarify this process as follows:

> In 1987, Bourgiba and Ben Ali (who was the Minister of Interior at the time) conducted an intense crackdown on activism that resulted in tens of thousands of arrests, and Bourguiba in his last days was preparing to unlawfully retry (in a special security court) the leadership of MTI to inflict capital punishment upon them. If that had occurred, then civil war would have broken out. Mr.Qasid Farshishi, Mr.Moncef Bensalem,[123] and I decided to talk to the people that we knew within the army, the security forces, and the civilian population, to facilitate a coup d'etat on the 8th of November. Despite Ben Ali being Bourguiba's right-hand man and fighting the grassroots phenomenon of MTI that later became the al-Nahda Party, we decided alone, without any link to any official institution of the MTI, to abort the coup due to the suspension of the security court (as our aim was not power in itself) so that we could prevent a civil war. Violence has never been part of the political-make up of MTI.[124]

After taking over the presidency, Ben Ali announced that he would compromise with all political opposition movements for preserving the national unity with the National Pact published on 7 November 1987. The National Pact endorsed the centrality of the Arab and Islamic heritages of Tunisia, which most of the society believed the Bourguiba regime had intentionally underestimated, calling for stronger link between Tunisia and the Arab world, especially the other countries of the Maghreb.[125] The initial promises of Ben Ali in the pact were primarily about democratization and softening of the restrictions on press, as well as

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[120] Moncef Ben Salem, *Mudhakkarat ʿAlim Jamiʿi wa Sijin Siyasi: Sanawat al-Jamr, Shahadat Hayat al-Idhtihad al-Fikri wa Istihdaf al-Islam fi Tunis (Memoirs of an Academic Researcher and Political Prisoner: The Years of Tension, Living Testimonies of Intellectual Persecution and Targeting of Islam in Tunisia)* (Tunisia: 2014), 43.

[121] Salem, *Mudhakkarat ʿAlim Jamiʿi wa Sijin Siyasi: Sanawat al-Jamr, Shahadat Hayat al-Idhtihad al-Fikri wa Istihdaf al-Islam fi Tunis (Memoirs of an Academic Researcher and Political Prisoner: The Years of Tension, Living Testimonies of Intellectual Persecution and Targeting of Islam in Tunisia)*, 43.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Moncef Ben Salem was a Tunisian politician and academician. He was al-Nahda member, and he was persecuted and tortured because of his political opinions against the Tunisian regime. He served as the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research after the 2011 Uprisings. For detailed information, see: "Dr. Moncef Ben Salem to visit the Fields Institute," *The Fields Institute*, Accessed: 2022-01-05, Web: http://www.fields.utoronto.ca/press/11-12/120320Salem.html.

[124] Ferjani, "The 'End of Islamism' and the future of Tunisia,"

[125] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 194.

the political parties in Tunisia.[126] In the articles of the pact, the necessity for democratic pluralism and the significance of free elections were emphasized.

According to Abdullah Imami, an ardent advocate of the Tunisian regime, Ben Ali had foreseen two counteractions from the MTI side by declaring the National Pact on 7 November 1987.[127] First of all, the MTI had to change itself through following the legitimate procedures. This was the rupture with the clandestine past, and it was necessary for the MTI to deactivate its clandestine military and intelligence networks. Secondly, the MTI would keep its main tenets through restricting its public presence to the activities of well-known movement entrepreneurs while preserving its clandestine organisation through only replacing the members uncovered by the police with new members with clean criminal records. In this respect, the regime assumed a historical responsibility to represent soft face of the state, and paved the way for the MTI to engage in legal and legitimate initiatives.[128]

The initial strategy of the Ben Ali regime was to struggle with the al-Nahda as a political opponent rather than political and security threat, which created new political opportunity structures for the movement. In this sense, the National Pact increased the level of tolerance towards the movement. Thanks to the pact, nearly 3,000 political prisoners, as well as prisoners of faith, were released,[129] the pressure on the press was eased, and the opposition political parties were allowed to organize across the country for a while.

To illustrate, the MTI issued a declaration, which was signed by the MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 6 June 1988, on the seventh anniversary of the movement's foundation.[130] In the declaration, the movement's struggle for justice and freedom in Tunisian political life was confirmed, and all political groups in the country were invited to

[126] Paul Delaney, "Senile Bourguiba Described in Tunis," *The New York Times*, 09 November 1987. Web: https://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/09/world/senile-bourguiba-described-in-tunis.html?scp=2&sq=senile%20bourguiba&st=cseSenile. Accessed: 2022-03-27.
[127] Abdullah Imami, *Tanfidh al-Irhab fi al-ʿAlam al-Islami: al-Namudhaj al-Nahda/Execution of Terrorism in the Islamic World: al-Nahda Model*) (Tunis: al-Dar al-Tunisi li al-Nashr, 1992), 286.
[128] Imami, *Tanfidh al-Irhab fi al-ʿAlam al-Islami: al-Namudhaj al-Nahda (Execution of Terrorism in the Islamic World: al-Nahda Model*), 286.
[129] In this process, even the radical Islamists, who took up arms against the Bourguiba regime, were released. See: Amal Maher, "Milef al-Islamiyyin fi Tunis: al-Ta'wil al-Khatii wa Khafiyat al-Hism (The File of Islamists in Tunisia: Misinterpretation and Hidden Decisiveness)," *Asharq al-Awsat*, Issue:97, 08 August 2005.
[130] "Bayan al-Dhikra al-Sabʿa li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the Seventh Anniversary of the MTI, 6 June 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-12, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1988_بيانات#gsc.tab=0.

preserve fundamental rights and freedoms. In this declaration, the MTI stated that the movement considered the release of Rachid Ghannouchi as an important step towards achieving national reconciliation. This was a significant political opportunity structure.

The Ben Ali regime gradually took certain initiatives for allowing political activities of the MTI. At first, the regime let the movement participate in the high council of the National Pact by the end of 1988.[131] Secondly, the movement began to be represented in the Islamic High Council through Abdelfattah Mourou in the beginning of 1989.[132] Thirdly, the regime let the movement to participate in the parliamentary elections of 1989. Finally, Ben Ali publicly ratified Islam as the state religion, approved Tunisian radio and television stations to broadcast the call to prayer, and legalized the MTI's student organization that mobilized postsecondary pupils.[133]

All of these developments seemed as if they reduced the pressure on the movement providing political opportunities and space for mobilization, to a certain extent. In 1988, Ben Ali advocated Law Number 88–32, which permitted the foundation of a multiparty system in Tunisia, and this promising political athmosphere encouraged Ghannouchi to alter the party's name from MTI to al-Nahda.[134] Due to the fact that the Law Number 88–32 did not permit for the foundation of a political party with religious connotation, Ghannouchi altered the name of the MTI with a more secular alternative.[135] After renaming itself as al-Nahda for complying with electoral laws banning religious terminology in the names of political parties, the al-Nahda applied for political party status.[136]

Yet, the widespread doubt that the Islamists' final objective remained termination of the secular state allowed the regime to temporize.[137] The regime engaged in an official propaganda, which argued that the al-Nahda movement must be banned, since it threatened liberal political practices.[138] In a declaration announced by the MTI on 04 March 1988, the negative repercussions of the political trials and arrests on the movement were

[131] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 263.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 192.
[134] Abdelkader, *Islamic Activists*, 75.
[135] Ibid, 136.
[136] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 194.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Daniel P. Ritter, *The Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 117.

addressed.[139] In the declaration, the MTI announced that both the movement and its members and supporters were living in very unfavorable conditions due to the political trials and arrests by the regime.

In a declaration signed by the MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 9 March 1988, the problems experienced by the MTI were mentioned, and the damage caused by these problems were explained.[140] According to the declaration, the regime's policy of extermination and denial towards the MTI was continuous, and the war against the MTI during the Habib Bourguiba era left no room for the MTI to survive. The movement stated that the violent repressive practices of the Bourguiba regime had caused heavy damage on the MTI, both materially and morally. In the declaration, the MTI argued that there was "official state terrorism" in Tunisia, as a result of which the MTI had dozens of losses in its struggle for survival and encountered thousands of arrests.

Furthermore, in another declaration signed by the MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 10 March 1988, repressive practices of the regime-controlled prison administration were mentioned.[141] The movement condemned the prison administration's practices that harmed the imprisoned members of the MTI. In this respect, the movement identified and publicly disclosed three of these repressive practices in the declaration. First one was increasing security measures and the number of security guards in prisons (especially *al-Nazur* Prison) and smaller prison cells (especially *Burj al-Rumi* Prison). Second one was the transfer of imprisoned members of the MTI, such as Muhammad Shamam, Fadel al-Baladi, Ali al-Zarawi, to al-Nazur Prison, where they were held in narrow/small single-person cells. Third one was the detention of Rachid Ghannouchi and Ali al-Areedh in solitary confinement in prisons that were in remote areas.

Moreover, on 3 May 1988, the regime enacted a new law regulating the mosques in the country.[142] According to that law, people could not give sermons in the mosques unless

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[139] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 04 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-07, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة/1988_مارس_04_بيان_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي#gsc.tab=0.

[140] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 9 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-14, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة/1988_مارس_09_بيان_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي#gsc.tab=0.

[141] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 10 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-08, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة/1988_مارس_10_بيان_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي#gsc.tab=0.

[142] Jalloul Jeribi, *al-Huwiyya fi Tunis al-ʿAhd al-Jadid (The Identity in Tunisia, The New Era)* (Tunis: al-Wikala al-Tunisiyya li al-İttisal al-Khariji, 1992), 46.

they took permission from the Prime Minister, which handicapped dissemination of ideas for the MTI members.[143] All of these practices show that the regime operated as if it decided to struggle with the MTI as a political opponent and provided some political opportunity structures for the movement following the coup. On the other hand, the findings show that the regime simultaneously took other initiatives to increase the pressure on the movement and narrow its space for mobilization following the coup.

Actually, the regime attempted to broaden its ground in the political arena in 1988, and progressively involved the left-wing, liberal and Arab nationalist parties into the political system, in which process the allied parties provided support for accomplishing the anti-Islamist strategy of the regime.[144] In this respect, the initiatives taken for democratization remained as tactical attempts rather than a strategic plan. The widespread arrests against the Islamists started again after a short period, and the accusations and punishments were severe as mentioned above. However, as a response to its exclusion by the regime in spite of its large vote share in the 1989 elections, the MTI aggravated its protests in the streets.[145]

3.2. Network Building through Informal Organizations

The organizational dynamics can differ in many ways regarding their activity styles, social grounds, financial sources, motives, alliances and political discourses. In fact, these changing dynamics help us clarify shifting political opportunity structures in tracing processes. After its foundation, the MTI rapidly improved a hierarchical organizational structure. The Executive Bureau of the MTI consisted of nearly two dozen top leaders, and the Political Bureau of the MTI consisted of nearly 150 members.[146] The Shura Council of the MTI worked as an internal parliament of the movement, and the local bureaus of the MTI across Tunisia played important role on mobilization of the movement.[147]

The 1981-1984 period was the first important confrontation of the MTI in the legal arena. According to Walid al-Mansuri's interview with a Tunisian prosecutor; the main threat

[143] Jeribi, *al-Huwiyya fi Tunis al-ʿAhd al-Jadid (The Identity in Tunisia, The New Era*), 46.
[144] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 393.
[145] Gana, *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution*, 109.
[146] McCarthy, "Islamism, party change, and strategic conciliation," 6.
[147] Ibid.

rose with the MTI was that even though it had begun to function just as a political movement, it transformed into a political party through forming its organizations and requesting legal recognition.[148]

However, this confrontation with the state repression improved the MTI in many fields.[149] To illustrate, the movement was able to restore its unity, continuously claimed official recognition, stated its commitment to democracy, and openly condemned violence on every platform.[150] Those endeavors enhanced the reputation of the MTI among various political, human rights and professional organizations, as well as enlarging the movement's popular base both inside and outside the country.[151]

Some groups also considered that the MTI's emphasis on resurrecting the Islamist character of Tunisia and reviving the mosque as a center for worship and mass mobilization, as well as commitment to political action away from secularism, was an exclusionary stance in itself at that time.[152] On the other hand, the MTI's engagement in political action and its pluralist discourse earned it the support of non-traditional groups, too.[153]

In spite of the arrests of movement entrepreneurs from July 1981, the grassroots movement was thriving, since it included small cells of the most devoted advocators.[154] The MTI was able to construct informal organizational structures, which operated from center to the small cells in the neighborhoods.[155] The movement spirit was strengthened via daily community activities, such as playing football matches, studying Qu'ran, feasting in the Eid holidays, collecting second-hand schoolbooks and clothes for poorer families, collecting endowments in money, legumes from local adherents and transferring them to the poor people, and arranging marriages among like-minded spouses within the Islamist community.[156]

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[148] al-Mansuri, *al-Ittijah al-Islami wa Bourguiba (The Islamic Tendency and Bourguiba)*, 10.
[149] Ibid, 37.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[153] Ibid.
[154] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 53.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid, 56-57.

The MTI was able to create multiple organizations in order to disseminate its conservative social views and consolidate its position.[157] In this respect, the movement did not only apply conventional social organizations like families and mosques, but they also constructed their own organizations like labor and student unions, as well as media.[158] In terms of its organizational dynamics, "*al-Habib*", an Islamist publication, was able to publish only one issue in January 1980 before it was banned.[159]

The MTI issued a magazine, "15/21", in 1982; and the main topics focused on the magazine were political pluralism and social liberties in addition to supporting an unorthodox interpretation of the Qur'an and emphasizing the evolution and dynamics of society; however, the magazine was suspended in 1987.[160] The name of this magazine was giving reference to the fifteenth century of the Lunar Hijri calendar and the twenty-first century of the Gregorian calendar, which aimed to debate and synthesize dissimilar topics. In spite of the harsh press campaigns, the movement was able to maintain itself active, keep its organizational structure alive, issue two secret pamphlets, *"al-Risala"* and *"al-Masar"*, and publish statements in the opposition press, *"al-Rai*", in particular.[161]

The informal neighborhood organization of the MTI was similar with Turkey's political Islamic Welfare Party's "*tesbih*" model.[162] Just like the tesbih model, each neighborhood had an organizer, and this collective actor used to define street representatives in order to gather thorough information regarding the age, political tendency, religious and ethnical origin, and motherland of the residents on the street level.[163] The organization of the party was like a tightly woven mesh, which was in the form of a pyramid, and at every level, there were loyal supporters of the cause who, on the one hand, transferred the political ideas of the party to the lower strata, and on the other hand, reflected the pulse of the street and the supporters to the higher strata.[164] In this respect, the movement was able to

[157] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid, 403.
[160] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 80.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Tesbih model refers to the provincial organizational committee which has 33 members, modeled after the 33 beads of the traditional Muslim rosary, and the *tesbih* (rosary) organizational structure has a strategic capacity to internalize local cultural characteristics of a specific neighborhood.
[163] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Afek Tounes Party in Tunis in 2018.
[164] Lütfi Maktuf, *Tunus'u Kurtarmak: Çalınan Arap Baharı*, translated by Fikret Erkut Emcioğlu (İstanbul: Modus Kitap, 2013), 105.

construct a large social base ranging from students, teachers to professionals, workers and civil servants.[165]

Especially the family structure of conservative Islamists within Tunisian society played a significant role in terms of the movement's organizational dynamics. Both husbands and wives took responsibility for the mobilization of the MTI, and they played an important role in construction of the movement's organizational dynamics. In time, people from the movement's networks married with each other for strengthening their community ties, and these newly created micro level networks fortified the organizational structure of the movement, which were able to keep alive during the repression period.[166]

The family functioned as the primary social instrument for the Islamist movement in Tunisia, and it was the most important front line, which provided opportunities for the MTI to implement its strategies.[167] In this respect, intra-movement marriages provided many opportunities to the movement through constructing alliances among the Islamist families via kinship, which consolidated their loyalty to the movement in case of regime repression.[168] In addition, the private frame ensured by marital bonds and rituals facilitated the gatherings, which provided a suitable space for exchanging information under the umbrella of family visits and celebrations.[169]

According to Rachid Ghannouchi, in terms of women participation in the MTI, the movement did not make any distiction between the veiled and unveiled women, and the MTI did not exploit faith or assert any religious superiority, as well.[170] This was true, to a large extent. For instance, the MTI sought a national referendum on the Personal Status Code in order to encourage women to take jobs within the public domain in 1985.[171] With this action, the MTI women both highlighted the problem of male unemployment and undermined what the Islamists considered as a main societal principle dictating firmly dissimilar male and female responsibilities.[172]

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[165] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 64.
[166] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 169-170.
[167] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Rachid Ghannouchi, *min Tajraba al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi Tunis (Experience of the Islamist Movement in Tunisia)* (London: Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2001), 71.
[171] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 175.
[172] Ibid.

In the mid-1980s, the MTI improved as a middle-class movement concentrating primarily on subject connected with morality and religious duties, and the politicization of the movement allowed it to enlarge its ground from the lower classes to the popular neighbourhoods.[173] This improvement transformed the MTI into a mean of protest against the Tunisian regime. Yet, although the the movement became a reaction to the worsening socio-economic conditions in Tunisia, the MTI never brought about any meaningful militant movement in the country.[174]

The repression created dramatic consequences, and a new generation of religious activists appeared, social and economic marginalization of whom strained them towards more conservative thoughts.[175] For instance, the MTI advocators in different cities in Tunisia constructed their own branches in order to support the movement, gathered in mosque classes, and formed resilient informal networks at schools, universities, mosques, and villages, which built a new religious community.[176] In fact, the movement always believed in the role of mosques in consolidating Tunisian identity and society, since the mosques were able to create collective action that was necessary for mobilization. In mid-1981, the MTI was anticipated to be controlling in 300-350 mosques in Tunisia.[177]

Actually, the mosques play an important role in the mobilization process of the Islamist movements, in general.[178] In Tunisia, the mosques functioned as effective conventional organizations, which were much more than simple spaces of worship, and they constructed another front line in the ideological struggle to influence the masses within the society.[179] Moreover, the mosques provided the MTI more suitable platforms to perform protests against the regime, as well as recruiting new members and mobilizing adherents.[180] For example, during the Bread Riots, the mosques were actively utilized to impose social messages.[181]

In this context, Rachid Ghannouchi stated that in Islamic societies, the states had been administered from the masjids rather than its own centers, and that the masjids had been

[173] Pargeter, "Radicalisation in Tunisia," 73.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 80.
[176] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 15.
[177] Ibid, 46-47.
[178] See: Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
[179] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Walton and Seddon, *Riot and Rebellion*, 201.

the center of both religious and political leadership.[182] Ghannouchi also noted that the education given at the Zaytuna Mosque and similar Islamic centers continued away from the reforms that took place at the state level, and that the charities continued to operate semi-independently from the state, under the supervision of clergy with public funding.[183]

Despite shrinking political opportunities, the MTI has expanded its influence and base. The informal organizational structure constructed a multilevel network among charismatic teachers and opinion leaders from within and without the movement, which helped the transmission of ideas to new generations.[184] Even in exile, the movement kept closely linked to Tunisian political opposition structures, at least in an intellectual sense, through platforms and meetings, and consolidated its solidarity by raising awareness in the international issues.

To illustrate, in a declaration signed by MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 2 March 1988, the stance of the movement towards the Palestinian Cause was clearly disclosed.[185] In the declaration, the MTI declared that the intifada, protests and demonstrations in Palestine were a struggle for survival of Jerusalem and Gaza. In this respect, it was declared that the MTI supported the intifada in the Palestinian Cause, and that the support of the movement for the Palestinian Cause would be both material and moral.

The comprehensive organizational structure and financial strength of the MTI via widespread networks with Islamic NGOs provided various opportunities for the movement when compared to secular opposition groups, which were able to penetrate restricted territories, and could not construct a nationwide network because of inadequate funding.[186] The movement supporters in Europe transferred a considerable amount of funds to the MTI through Bank al-Taqwa, and the movement diversified its financial resources through the membership subscription fees and donations from its adherents.[187]

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[182] Gannuși, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 42.
[183] Ibid, 44.
[184] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 29.
[185] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 02 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-10, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيانات الاتجاه الإسلامي و النهضة/بيان_حركة الاتجاه الاسلامي_02 مارس_1988#gsc.tab=0.
[186] Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Political Parties Between State Power and Islamist Opposition," in *Between the State and Islam*, C.E. Butterworth and I.W. Zartman (Editors) (Washington and Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 158-183.
[187] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 101.

The movement endeavoured to mobilize through its informal organizational dynamics at the local level, as well as its engagement in competition with the political elites of the regime.[188] The main objective of the movement was to legalize itself in order to take part in the center of the Tunisian politics rather than being pushed to the periphery, which let many individuals with various interests and perspectives coexist under one umbrella.[189] The movement kept on engaging with other opposition parties from across the political spectrum while in exile; however, these alliances were disorganized in the 1980s, to a large extent. The main reason behind that was the regime's repressive practices aimed at preventing the cooperation among the opposition groups.

To illustrate, Rachid Ghannouchi had taken an initiative in order to recruit new members for the MTI within the UGTT, expecting to barter Islamist impact in the union for legal recognition as a political party in the end.[190] In this respect, the MTI tried to infiltrate the UGTT's base and offices.[191] In terms of the unionist activities, Tunisia has always been a more active country compared to other MENA countries. In this sense, the UGTT has always played an active role since Tunisia's independence struggle and contributed to the establishment of the country with its support to the national struggle.[192] Despite Ghannouchi's efforts, the regime used plenty of mechanisms in order to control the UGTT, and obstructed the MTI everywhere.[193] On the other hand, Ghannouchi's encouragement towards the members of the movement to participate in the UGTT resulted in an organizational success, and by 1989, the supporters of the MTI formed up to 20 percent of the total UGTT members.[194] The movement achieved similar success in the student wing.

3.3. Perfect Mobilizers: Organization of the Student Wing

In the mobilization process of the Islamist movements, associations and trade unions are key instruments.[195] Similarly, the MTI used two important organizational dynamics, which

[188] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 167.
[189] Ibid.
[190] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 194.
[191] See: Alexander, "Opportunities, organizations, and ideas,"
[192] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's Political Party, the RCD through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[193] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 194.
[194] Camau and Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire*, 294.
[195] See: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Islamic Mobilization and Political Change: The Islamist Trend in Egypt's Professional Associations," in *Political Islam*, J. Beinin and J. Stock (Editors) (Berkeley: University

were the labor union and the media respectively.[196] Especially during the Cold War period, the MTI struggled against the left in the UGTT, and the regime also allowed the MTI students in order to debilitate the leftist movements.[197] This was a political opportunity structure for the movement. The MTI also used the media as an influencial instrument for creating social awareness towards the movement, and this approach was pursued through applying traditional media, at first, and accomplished via the application of modern media later.[198] This endeavor was important for the mobilizitation of the movement, since the literacy rate in Tunisia was 74 percent as of 1984 according to the World Bank.[199]

Especially in the mid-1970s, there were so many JI students within the faculties of science and institutes of technology in the capital city, and their number increased considerably by the 1980s following the foundation of the MTI, since the Islamists were the best in terms of organizing and unifying the university students within the campuses.[200] Different from the strained political athmosphere of the country, the university campuses in the 1980s provided a space of relative freedom for Islamist mobilization.[201]

More than one fifth of the MTI advocators were young Islamists on university campusses in the beginning of the 1980s.[202] The MTI engaged in network building through informal organizations, such as university student associations, in particular. In the mid 1980s, the MTI expanded its presence and impact among the students, as well as the trade unions and the middle-class milieus through communiqués and interviews in the independent press.[203] The MTI members engaged in political dissussions on university campus, and they published weekly student newspapers, which were *"al-Hadath al-Siyasi"* and *"al-Hadath al-Fikri"*.[204]

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of California Press, 1977), 120–135; Ninette S. Fahmy, "The performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian syndicates: An alternative formula for reform?" *The Middle East Journal* 52, 4 (1998), 551–562.

[196] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Ibid, 403.

[199] "Literacy Rate, Youth Total (% of People Ages 15-24)-Tunisia," *The World Bank*, Accessed: 2023-08-02, Web: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS?locations=TN.

[200] See: Waltz, "Islamist appeal in Tunisia,"

[201] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 53.

[202] See: Waltz, "Islamist appeal in Tunisia,"

[203] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 52.

[204] Gsuma Gsuma, "Mujaz fi Tarikh al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya dhat al-Huwiyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Islamiyya bi Tunis (Summary of the History of the Political Movement with an Arab-Islamist identity in Tunisia)," in *Haraka al-Nahda al-Tunisiyya: min al-Sujun wa al-Manafi ila Surrat al-Hukm (The Tunisian al-Nahda Movement: From the Prisons and Exile to the Center of Government),* Abdel-Dayem Numi (Editor) (Tunis: al-Buraq Printing House, 2011), 11–27, 21.

Women mobilization also contributed to organizational dynamics of the MTI, to a large extent. To illustrate, there were four women members in the constituent body that proffered the foundation of the MTI in 1981.[205] The female MTI members engaged in education and preaching via mosques in addition to intellectual endeavors, which were organization of discussion meetings with students, as well as unionist activities with the support of the student wing.[206]

The student organization of the MTI in the universities played an important role especially in the Bread Riots through widespread demonstrations in the poor neigbourhoods of the country.[207] Although many of the MTI members who joined the Bread Riots in 1984 were arrested by the regime, the MTI benefited from the consequences of the Bread Riots, and was able to improve its organizational capacity inside Tunisia. There was close relationship between the "General Union of Students of Tunisia (UGET)" and the labor movement both in activism and in membership, since the universities were appropriate training ground.[208]

The UGET was established in 1952, and operated closely with the UGTT, because both of them progressively became distant from the regime, though at a different pace.[209] The universities in Tunisia, especially in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were the arena of radical activism and left wing politics, and the UGET provided radical elements at the low and middle levels of the organization, in addition to the MTI.[210] On the other hand, the MTI's radicalism was limited to the domain of opportunism and revolutionary politics rather than an armed struggle against the Tunisian regime in the name of Islam.[211]

The MTI endeavoured to organize and activate the UGET in 1985 in order to mobilize its base within the universities.[212] However, the MTI could not gain representation in the UGET, which was mainly controlled by the left-wing movements.[213] In 1985, the student branch of the MTI collected more than 15,000 signatures to officially establish the

[205] Merieme Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements: Towards a Women's Spring?* (The Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, 2012), 7.
[206] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 7.
[207] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 88.
[208] Brecht De Smet, "Dreaming about the lesser evil: Revolutionary desire and the limits of democratic transition in Egypt," *Workers of the World* 1, 17 (2015), 68-75.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Pargeter, "Radicalisation in Tunisia," 81.
[212] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 91.
[213] Hela Yousfi, *Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of the UGTT* (London: Routledge, 2018), 211.

"Tunisian General Union of Students (UGTE)" as a counter Islamist student organization against the UGET.[214] After its foundation, the number of the UGTE members allegedly reached 20,000,[215] and the UGTE became an effective foundation close to the MTI.[216] The regime allowed the foundation of the UGTE by the MTI students in order to debilitate the leftist movements.[217] In addition to being an important organizational dynamic in MTI's social mobilization process, the UGTE also became a strategic political opportunity structure for the movement.

In the late 1980s, the adherents of the MTI captured the majority of seats in student councils, which were long seen as the main stronghold of the leftist movements.[218] The MTI's student wing on the university campuses balanced its exclusion from the political domain.[219] To illustrate, in the student election of 1988, the UGTE, the student union close to the MTI, had won 85 percent of the votes.[220] This served as an important political opportunity.

Yet, the regime considered the growing popularity of UGTE on university campuses as a threat, and repressed the UGTE on the university campuses in February 1987, and Ghannouchi was imprisoned in March 1987 after his unauthorised speech in a mosque.[221] After the new arrests in April 1987, the number of imprisoned activists was more than 200,[222] and they were judged for insulting the president, coup attempt, and treason.[223] In June 1987, the regime responded the protests with tear gas, and published the images of weapons, which were alleged to be detected near Tunis.[224]

[214] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 62.
[215] Jean-Philippe Bras, "Chronique Tunisie," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 24 (1985), 697–744.
[216] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1091; Yousfi, *Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions*, 29.
[217] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.
[218] Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," 61.
[219] Stefano Maria Torelli, "Al-Nahda's Path in Tunisia: A New Model of Islamic Democratic Politics?" in *North African Societies After the Arab Spring: Between Democracy and Islamic Awakening*, Leila El Houssi, Alessia Melcangi, Stefano Maria Torelli and Massimiliano Cricco (Editors) (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 30-53.
[220] Fadhel Kaboub, "The Making of the Tunisian Revolution," in *Understanding the Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings*, I. Diwan (Editor) (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2014), 57–78; Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.
[221] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 64.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Hamdi, *The Politicisation of Islam*, 52.
[224] See: Dunn, "The Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia,"

The Islamist movements may encounter with internal disagreements over responses to repression.[225] In this respect, the consecutive arrests and trials resulted in a split within the movement between those supporting intellectual revision within the legal framework on the one hand, and more radical and activist young adherents on the other hand.[226] Due to the fact that the UGTE engaged in a break with the Bourguiba regime, it sometimes contradicted with the MTI's more prudent formal political stance.[227]

In fact, the organizational dynamics of the MTI were parallel with those of the leftist movements in Tunisia in the 1980s, and the interaction within the university campuses between these two movements played important role in this similarity.[228] The MTI constructed a kinship with the Zaytuna milieu, and presented itself as the only heir to the mosque and university.[229] The Zaytuna milieu assumed the role of opposition, and considered the policies of the Bourguiba regime as anti-Islam and anti-Arab with the support of the Zaytuna students.[230]

This approach was so important, since the Zaytuna University was a very old and reputable Islamic higher education foundation among the Muslim community.[231] This also played significant role in recruiting Islamists in spite of the the movement's marginalized status within the Tunisian society.[232] Therefore, the success of the movement did not only come from the political process that the movement accomplished in the 1989 elections through independent candidates, but the movement also had a strong relation with the UGTE, which provided the movement a resilient organizational capacity.

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[225] Lucia Ardovini and Erika Biagini, "10 years on: New contextual factors in the study of Islamism," *Middle East Critique* 30, 4 (2021), 411–429.
[226] Kamel Ben Younes, *al-Islamiyyun wa al-ʿIlmaniyyun fi Tunis: min al-Sujun wa al-Idtihad ila Tahaddi Hukm al-Bilad (The Islamists and the Secularists in Tunisia: From Prisons and Persecution to the Challenge of Ruling the Country)* (Tunis: Bareq Publications and Distribution, 2012), 82.
[227] Younes, *al-Islamiyyun wa al-ʿIlmaniyyun fi Tunis: min al-Sujun wa al-Idtihad ila Tahaddi Hukm al-Bilad (The Islamists and the Secularists in Tunisia: From Prisons and Persecution to the Challenge of Ruling the Country)*, 95–96.
[228] Camau and Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire*, 284-285.
[229] Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," 56.
[230] al-Madani, *Tarikh al-Mʿarada al-Tunisiyya min al-Nasha ila al-Thawra: al-Ahzab al-Qumiyya wa al-Yisariyya al-Islamiyya (History of the Tunisian Opposition from its Inception to the Revolution: National, Leftist and Islamist Parties)*, 35.
[231] Abdelkader, *Islamic Activists*, 136.
[232] See: Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy,"

3.4. Creating Consciousness against the Regime's Use of Violence

In the process towards the foundation of the MTI, the JI experienced a dramatic shift from concentrating on cultural tenets to Tunisian society's political demands through criticizing political problems and government policies.[233] The founding statement of the the MTI openly criticized the government's strengthening dominance of over other political groups, its inability regarding socio-economic policies, and its approaches in the international arena, which were irreconcilable with the country's national interests.[234] According to the MTI members, the denial of Islamic values in favor of imported ideologies, all of which were unsuccessful to build a just society, had been a fatal mistake.[235] The movement entrepreneurs identified the regime's repression as the main problem through diagnostic framing. In this respect, as Hafez and Wiktorowicz argued, ingrained in the shared symbols of Muslim communities, Islamism provided a suitable diagnostic framing for comprehending and advancing tough living conditions.[236]

In its founding statement, the MTI invited its supporters to embrace a comprehensive vision of Islam, and the movement determined five main goals.[237] The first one was the revival of the Islamic identity of Tunisia for giving an end to the ongoing alienation of the Tunisian people to their Islamic culture. The second one was the restoration of the Islamic view with respect to its main principles, as well as requirements of the modern life. The third one was the renewal of people's right to decide on their own future independently. The fourth one was the fair distribution of the public income on the bases of the Islamic tenets. The last one was the revival of the socio-political Islamic identity for saving the Muslim Tunisian people from the spiritual depression that they were exposed to. The MTI cadres believed that there was a need for a state committed to promising and promoting the Tunisian people to cultivate their religious, but long unregarded, Islamic roots.[238] In an author interview, the main objectives of the MTI were elaborated as follows:

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[233] See: Dunn, "The Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia,"
[234] "al-Bayan al-Taʾsisi li-Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Statement of the Islamic Tendency Movement),"
[235] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 177-178.
[236] Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," 63.
[237] "al-Bayan al-Taʾsisi li-Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Statement of the Islamic Tendency Movement),"
[238] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 178.

> In the founding statement of the MTI, the focus was on Tunisia's regaining its Islamic identity. The idea of creating a strong country that stands against dependence and exploitation was emphasized in the founding statement. Moreover, the aim of making Tunisia center of the great Islamic civilization was stated in the founding statement. The MTI was opposing Western imperialism. The MTI believed that the change in society would only realize through cultural and socio-political struggle of the Islamist intellectuals rather than through weapons.[239]

In order to accomplish these goals, the MTI determined 13 main solutions through prognostic framing in its founding statement in order to mobilize its social base. The first one was renovating the power of the mosques as spaces for mobilization in addition to praying. The second one was bringing cultural life back into action through organizing meetings to support intellectual and cultural movements, as well as promoting press activities and ensuring the rooting of Islamic values in the field of culture and literature. The third one was assisting the Arabization of the education and administration without standing up against other foreign languages. The fourth and fifth ones were rejecting violence and repressive one-party system respectively. The sixth one was explaining the Islamic notions in modern terms and creating alternative cures to the Tunisia's economic problems through in-depth analyses. The seventh one was coalescing with the deprived groups of the society in their struggle against the oppressors through acting based on the principle of shura in the field of politics. The eighth one was advocating the cause of the labor unions in their efforts in order to realize independence and freedom. The nineth one was endorsing the universal views of Islam through distancing from opportunism in the political arena. The tenth one was emancipating the Muslim thought from cultural defeatism. The eleventh one was showing a modern version of an Islamic administrative structure in order to protect the national themes in local, regional and international levels. The twelveth one was revitalizing the networks with the Muslims all over the world. The thirteenth one was advocating salvation movements in every part of the world.[240]

In the mobilization process of the Islamist movements, ideas and discourses play a significant role.[241] The MTI emphasized liberal ideas in order to create consciousness

[239] Author Interview with the Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nahda Movement in Tunis in 2018.
[240] "al-Bayan al-Taʾsisi li-Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Statement of the Islamic Tendency Movement),"
[241] See: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Quintan Wiktorowicz (Editor) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 231-249; Gwenn Okruhlik, "Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi

against the regime's use of violence by motivational framing processes. During the Bread Riots, the main slogans of the MTI in the protests were "Fight against corruption!", "Support for social justice!", and "Legitimate administration!". The movement determined corruption as the main problem through diagnostic framing, and offered social justice and legitimate administration as solution through prognostic framing. The MTI pursued other slogans, such as "There is one God and Bourguiba is the enemy of God!", the Islamist pamphlets were disseminated during the protests.[242]

The MTI aimed at debating particular issues for devising a modern Islamic framework, which was able to meet the challenges of modernity and comprehend the dynamics and characteristics of the Tunisian society from an Islamic view.[243] With the help of prognostic framing, the MTI engaged in courses of action within the framework of leftist movements on specific issues, such as social justice. Rachid Ghannouchi stated the movement's approach towards the left-wing outlook as follows:

> The origin of most supporters of al-Nahda is in the rural areas of Tunisia. We understand social justice very well… Islam is against injustice and the monopoly of wealth and resources. The notion of brotherhood in Islam has profound socio-economic implications in so far as it points to the equitable distribution of economic resources. In the economic sphere, Islam is closer to the left-wing outlook, without violating the right to private property. The Scandinavian socio-economic model is closest to the Islamic vision.[244]

In the Basic Law of the al-Nahda movement in 1989, the goal of founding a new economic system was also emphasized by prognostic framing, which relied on the principle of from each one in accordance with his/her capabilities to each one in accordance with his/her necessities.[245] The MTI used social unrest among the youth as a political opportunity structure. In this respect, the movement formulated creative promising discourses, such as

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Arabia," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Quintan Wiktorowicz (Editor), (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 250–269.

[242] Walton and Seddon, *Riot and Rebellion*, 201.

[243] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 80.

[244] Rashid Ghannouchi, "Tunisia: The Advent of Liberal Islamism – An Interview with Rashid Al-Ghannouchi," interviewer Mahan Abedin, *Religioscope*, 30 January 2011. Web: https://english.religion.info/2011/01/30/tunisia-the-advent-of-liberal-islamism-an-interview-with-rashid-al-ghannouchi/. Accessed: 2021-01-12.

[245] "al-Qanun al-Asasi li-Haraka al-Nahda (The Basic Law of the al-Nahda Movement)," *The Database of Ikhwan Wiki*, Accessed: 2022-09-05, Web: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=القانون_الأساسي_لحركة_النهضة.

guaranteeing employment for the youth, easing the youth's integration into the Tunisian society, as well as preparing them better for the challenges via education.[246]

The founding statement of the MTI highlighted the movement's commitment to democracy, encompassing pluralism and power sharing, and inclusion of all segments of the society in the democratic process confirming that the legitimacy actualizes with ordered electoral process.[247] In fact, this framing was different from the JI, which had focused on replacing the current system with an Islamic one. The movement supported a civil democratic state instead of an Islamic state, in addition to demanding termination of economic exploitation and monopoly, reapplication of Arabic in education and administration, and emphasis on the Palestinian cause in foreign policy.[248]

In 1988, the MTI announced series of declarations in which the movement improved its diagnostic and prognostic framing efforts, to a large extent. In a declaration announced by the MTI on 04 March 1988, the negative repercussions of the political trials and arrests on the movement were addressed.[249] The MTI declared that both the movement and its members and supporters were living in very unfavorable conditions due to the political trials and arrests by the regime. In this declaration, through stating the existing problems related to the political trials and arrests, the MTI improved its diagnostic framing efforts.

Moreover, the MTI directly improved its prognostic framing efforts through listing six solution proposals in this declaration.[250] First one was issuing political amnesties in order to show that the government's intention for democracy was sincere, and not taking any action against the MTI to restrict rights and freedoms in any field. Second one was building a culture of democracy to establish national dialogue in political arena and involving all segments of society in this political dialogue process. Third one was carrying out parliamentary elections in an atmosphere where freedoms are respected. Fourth one was resolving the union crisis and giving workers their legal rights. Fifth one was recognition of the legal existence of UGTE (Tunisian General Union of Students associated with al-Nahda). Finally, in the solution of the economic, social and cultural problems of the

[246] Hamdi, *The Politicisation of Islam*, 183.
[247] "al-Bayan al-Taʾsisi li-Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (The Founding Statement of the Islamic Tendency Movement),"
[248] "al-Qanun al-Asasi li-Haraka al-Nahda (The Basic Law of the al-Nahda Movement),"
[249] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 04 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-07, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي_04_مارس_1988/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة#gsc.tab=0.
[250] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 04 March 1988),"

country, instead of domination of few political parties, ensuring the active participation of all parts of the society and solving the problems through dialogue in a democratic atmosphere was emphasized as a solution proposal.

In a declaration signed by the MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 9 March 1988, the problems experienced by the MTI were mentioned, and the damage caused by these problems were explained.[251] The MTI argued that there was "official state terrorism" in Tunisia, as a result of which the MTI had dozens of losses in its struggle for survival and encountered thousands of arrests as mentioned above. In this respect, the MTI identified the regime's repressive practices by using state agents, such as the police, as a fundamental problem. In this declaration, the MTI greatly improved its diagnostic framing efforts by conceptualizing the term, state terrorism.

Furthermore, in the declaration, the MTI had seven main demands for the protection of individual rights and freedoms.[252] First one was the release of Islamist political prisoners from prisons. Second one was the annulment of unconstitutional lawsuits filed by state security courts. Third one was the disclosure of the problems that the movement was exposed to by the regime. Fourth one was the observation of human rights. Fifth one was the annulment of unconstitutional resolutions numbered 29/87 and 108/81. Sixth one was the amnesty for those who were exiled. Final one was abandoning practices that constituted an exception to the Law on Political Parties.

In a declaration signed by the MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 10 March 1988, repressive practices of the regime-controlled prison administration were mentioned.[253] The movement condemned the prison administration's practices that harmed the imprisoned members of the MTI as mentioned above. This declaration was probably the most important one in terms of improving the movement's diagnostic framing efforts, since it openly detailed the difficulties that the imprisoned MTI members encountered in the prisons, including names of prisons and main problems encountered in prisons, and highlighted the degree of repression against the movement inside the jail cells. With this

[251] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 9 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-14, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي_09_مارس_1988/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة#gsc.tab=0.

[252] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 9 March 1988),"

[253] "Bayan Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the MTI, 10 March 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-08, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_حركة_الاتجاه_الاسلامي_10_مارس_1988/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة#gsc.tab=0.

declaration, the MTI has deepened its diagnostic framing efforts, to a large extent. In addition, the MTI openly demanded the release of its imprisoned members, the establishment of a political atmosphere in Tunisia that involved all political groups, termination of political trials, and stopping interference with the movement.

The MTI issued another declaration, which was signed by the MTI Political Bureau Member Habib al-Louz on 6 June 1988, on the seventh anniversary of the movement's foundation.[254] In this declaration, the MTI announced its expectations from the government under five main articles. First one was declaration of general amnesty for political offenses, abolition of laws and decisions that harmed the MTI, and reassurance to all political movements in the country. Second one was organizing parliamentary elections with the total participation of civilians. Third one was separating the regime party and the state apparatus, making the judiciary independent, and supporting the free press/media. Fourth one was allowing the use of all necessary instruments to ensure economic development. Final one was taking the necessary steps to ensure Arab Unity in the Maghreb, especially in the Palestinian Cause, and supporting the Islamic Ummah to act together against Israel and the United States.

This declaration of the MTI was like a manifesto, in which the MTI expressed its expectations from the government in the most systematic way. In addition to its previous declarations, the MTI put forward new solutions, such as separating the regime party and the state apparatus, making the judiciary independent, and supporting the free press/media. In this context, with this declaration, the MTI made a significant progress in its prognostic framing efforts.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed transition process of the MTI from an underground movement to a political party, which was later banned. In this repsect, the MTI has been analyzed by applying the three main factors of the PPM, as well as considering its socio-cultural dynamics. In fact, the MTI had never become a simple ideological organization, but

[254] "Bayan al-Dhikra al-Sabʿa li Haraka al-Ittijah al-Islami (Declaration of the Seventh Anniversary of the MTI, 6 June 1988)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-12, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1988_بيانات#gsc.tab=0.

decisions of the movement were always formed by the political opportunity structures. The movement's political actions were shaped on the bases of its founding characteristics of collectivism, pragmatism and flexibility. Despite the repressive practices of the state apparatus, the MTI's pragmatic and flexible characteristics helped it negotiate with the semi-authoritarian structure of the state. In this sense, the MTI was able to create different approaches from its preceding formations, sometimes the movement became distant from its prior beliefs, and this course of action proceeded in the al-Nahda period.

The regime did not consider the MTI as a legal political party, but rather dealt with the movement as a political and security threat. The regime's repression against the MTI created political opportunity structures, and strengthened the movement's claim to be a collective action fighting for the interest of Tunisian society. The Tunisian regime confronted with a widespread social unrest of the people due to the corruption, unemployment and injustice in the mid-1980s, and the regime had to liberalize political domain. The regime's tolerance to the movement was a political opportunity structure for the MTI. Even though the regime did not consider the MTI as a legal political party, it allowed the movement to organize for balancing the opposition leftist movements. In this respect, the MTI members were able to infiltrate state apparatus, as well as the UGTT's base and offices. This was an important political opportunity structure for the movement.

In terms of closure of the institutionalized political system, there was no legal recognition of the MTI. However, in terms of its tolerance, the Tunisian regime periodically opened up a space for the MTI by offering offical pardons and allowing the movement to function at certain times. In this respect, the MTI improved as a movement concentrating primarily on subjects connected with morality and religious duties, and the politicization of the movement allowed it to enlarge its ground from the lower classes to the popular neighbourhoods. The informal organizational structure constructed a multilevel network among charismatic teachers and opinion leaders from inside and outside the movement, which helped the transmission of ideas to new generations. This improvement transformed the MTI into a mean of protest against the Tunisian regime.

Especially among the family members of the imprisoned MTI members; certain moral character traits developed, such as courage, confidence and fortitude, with the motive of unity and solidarity against the political arrests. In addition, the prison experience fostered specific emotions, such as distress, resentment, disappointment and anger, against the state.

The Tunisian regime acted ruthlessly by performing arrests, enforcements and executions on the adherents and members of the MTI. Yet, in spite of all these repressive practices, the MTI members did not engage in violent activities, and the MTI did not bring about any meaningful militant movement in the country.

Despite shrinking political opportunities, the movement has expanded its influence and base. As political opportunity structures, both the Bread Riots (1984) and the National Pact (1987) increased the level of tolerance towards the movement. In this sense, despite the state's tendency for repression, the movement was able to engage in network building through informal organizations, such as Qurʾan courses, magazines, mosques and masjids, and the movement could recruit new activists through informal neighborhood organization. Especially the organizational dynamics of the student wing functioned as perfect mobilizers through university student associations and dormitories. The MTI's student wing within the university campuses balanced its exclusion from the political domain. The MTI was able to establish the UGTE as a counter Islamist university student association against the UGET. The UGTE, as an effective organizational dynamic, became a significant political opportunity structure for the MTI.

Moreover, especially the family structure of conservative Islamists within Tunisian society played a significant role in terms of the movement's organizational dynamics. Both husbands and wives took responsibility for the mobilization of the MTI, and they played an important role in construction of the movement's organizational dynamics. The family functioned as the primary social instrument for the Islamist movement in Tunisia, and it was the most important front line, which provided political opportunity structures for the MTI to implement its strategies. In this respect, intra-movement marriages provided many political opportunity structures to the movement through constructing alliances among the Islamist families via kinship, which consolidated their loyalty to the movement against the regime repression.

In this period, the movement entrepreneurs identified the regime's repression as the main problem through diagnostic framing. The movement openly highlighted the difficulties regarding the political trials and arrests, as well as the problems that the imprisoned MTI members encountered in the jails. In addition, the main problems in the country, such as corruption, unemployment and injustice, were highlighted by the MTI cadres via declarations through diagnostic framing.

The MTI determined creative solutions, such as general amnesty for political offenses, separation of the regime party and the state apparatus, social justice, legitimate administration, judiciary independence, and free press/media by prognostic framing. The MTI emphasized the movement's commitment to democracy, encompassing pluralism and inclusion of all segments of the society in the democratic process. The MTI also framed liberal discourses in order to create consciousness against the regime's use of violence by motivational framing. This moderate political stance played an important role in the movement's struggle in the following periods, as well as its political victory after the 2011 Uprisings.

CHAPTER IV

4. STATE REPRESSION VS. SURVIVAL IN COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM

The ways how social movements adapt their organizations to respond to the political opportunities and oppressions in their political milieu and the ways in which they frame complaints are significant processes that influence movement behavior and performance.[1] The required tasks to cope with restrictions formed by a repressive milieu severely stimulate movements to improve exclusive organizations.[2] According to Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, an exclusive organization is one, which constructs rigid criteria and rules for membership.[3] In this respect, in order to eliminate the hurdles of a repressive milieu, the exclusive organizations select their members by analyzing the pool of relatives, companions and neighbours where credence is already consolidated.[4] Despite the heavy repression, the al-Nahda movement was able to survive inside Tunisia with the aid of exclusive organizational dynamics.

Yet, the al-Nahda members in the countries of asylum became the most successful group in projecting the movement's influence in the 1989-1999 period. The al-Nahda movement could rebuild itself in exile and re-emerge in the 2011 Uprisings as the most powerful political party. As the al-Nahda movement adjusted to life in the countries of asylum, its international relationships began to play significant role on its survival. The internationalization of the al-Nahda members through exile stregthened the movement's resilience. This created resources, political links and power that would not only maintain the movement, but also support its return in the 2011 Uprisings. These collective bonds

[1] See: Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres,"
[2] Ibid.
[3] Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organization: Growth, Decay, and Change," in *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays*, Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (Editors) (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987), 125–126.
[4] David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, "Social networks and social movements," *American Sociological Review* 45 (1980), 787–801; Donatella Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988), 155-169.

ensured a platform for the al-Nahda's potent entry into the conflict and political opportunity for the accomplishment of its long-term objectives.

The al-Nahda's time in exile was a seminal experience for the movement with its relationships with multiple European countries, since this ensured education and resources that would aid to maintain and reconstruct the movement in exile, and provided it to establish and keep its organizational structures. Especially the accomplishments of individual members in Europe contributed to the movement by providing an extensive financial network, expert skillsets and significant political connections, creating an effective network providing funds through various charity organizations, as well as Islamic cultural centers in Western countries. During the 1989-1999 period, the al-Nahda was totally excluded from the political domain. The Tunisian regime kept considering the movement as a political and security threat. However, in spite of the regime's heavy repression, the al-Nahda movement could create new political opportunities by carrying its political activities in the countries of asylum.

Actually, political opportunity structures do not have to be given in each case. As long as the movement entrepreneurs are clever enough, they are able to create new opportunities. In this respect, although the political opportunity structures were narrowed with the heavy repression at the beginning of the 1990s, the al-Nahda movement adjusted its organizational dynamics to this process by framing new opportunities. The second-generation al-Nahda members in exile grew up. The division in the movement leadership resulted in the victory of the Ghannouchi-led faction that proposed moderation. Furthermore, informal organizations like television channels and parallel party structures (political bureau, executive bureau, communications office) in the countries of asylum took to the stage.

In addition, the neighbourhood organization of the movement gained ground throughout the country despite the heavy repression. The parallel party structures in the countries of asylum, as well as the broad networks of the al-Nahda linked NGOs in Europe, were supported by the conservative family networks of the al-Nahda inmates through potent neighbourhood organization inside Tunisia. The movement pursued a consensus based flexible and pragmatic stance in the 1989-1999 period, and adjusted its organization and framing in accordance with this process. Especially the second-generation al-Nahda

supporters were able to construct new organizational structures within the social and political setting in Europe.

4.1. Heavy Repression: Prison Experience and Survival in Exile

The period from 1989 to 1999 can be described as the period when the al-Nahda was the most reppressed. The movement experienced different forms of repression ranging from physical to psychological, and it was excluded from the political domain. The heavy repression performed by the regime against the al-Nahda shaped the movement's organizational dynamics in the 1990s, the movement entrepreneurs were classified under two groups, one of which was in exile while the other was in prison. Most members of the movement were in prison while the rest continued their lives in exile. There were no publications of the movement other than those published outside the country. Even though the al-Nahda never abandoned its stated democratic tenets, the experience of semi-authoritarianism had a deep influence on the movement, leading to remarkable physical and cultural changes that obstructed its capacity to function, and that formed following political decisions.

The al-Nahda underwent important external and internal changes during the first periods of the Ben Ali era. Soon after the 1987 coup, the al-Nahda was again outlawed resulting in a sudden narrowing in the movement's opportunities for political engagement. The leadership was then fundamentally weakened with Rachid Ghannouchi's forced exile. According to Ghannouchi, the international athmosphere, as well as the rising crisis in Algeria and the increasing fear of Islamism, enabled and eased the repressive practices of the Ben Ali regime against the al-Nahda movement in the 1990s.[5] Actually, the Algerian Islamist movement had influenced the Tunisian Islamists through calling for student demonstrations in high schools and universities in the 1980s.[6] Hence, the Ben Ali regime did not want to experience the Algerian case, and took severe precautions against the al-Nahda movement.[7]

[5] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 177.
[6] Ibrahim, *al-Islam al-Siyasi Madiyan wa Hadiran wa Mustaqbalan (The Political Islam, Past, Present and Future)*, 108.
[7] Phillip C. Naylor, *Historical Dictionary of Algeria* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 495.

In 1990, especially the student wing of the al-Nahda performed street demonstrations, strikes, gatherings, as well as distributing leaflets, which resulted in a deepening opposition between the regime and the Islamists.[8] To illustrate, in February 1990, the protests of the young generation Islamists increased, which resulted in the escalation of tension with security forces, and the students belonging to the the UGTE, a foundation close to the al-Nahda movement, as well as approximately 600 student activists were detained.[9] The government blamed the al-Nahda for exploiting the students and escalating unrest among the work force, involving a strike by 10,000 municipal workers.[10] The government disabled the UGTE after the police alleged to have found weapons and subversive materials related to the al-Nahda,[11] and most of its members were detained.[12]

In the ninth issue of "*al-Fajr*" newspaper on 16 June 1990, an article on the problematic of "The People of the State or the State of the People?" was published, and then the Ben Ali regime had this issue of the newspaper collected and the editor of the newspaper, Hamadi Jebali, was arrested.[13] Hamadi Jebali, who functioned in the Tablighi Jamaat in France as a student and returned to Tunisia in 1981, had played an important role in the leadership of the MTI.[14] The places, such as Siliana, Makhtar, Nefta, Ibn Khaldun, Sidi Bouzid, came to the fore as the names of Tunisian cities and neighborhoods where frequent protests took place in the early 1990s, and these protests highlighted the discontent of the Tunisian people criticisizing repressive practices of the Tunisian regime; however, these protests were "brutally" suppressed by the regime.[15] As a response to this discontent, the Tunisian regime banned the movement's newspaper, *"al-Fajr"*.[16]

The movement issued a declaration on 18 October 1990 regarding the political assault on Muhammad Hadi al-Zamzami.[17] The Lawyer Muhammad Hadi al-Zamzami, who was in the founding staff of the MTI, was assaulted by an unidentified group of individuals who

[8] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 53-54.
[9] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1090.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid, 1091.
[12] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 402.
[13] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 135.
[14] Nadia al-Turki, "Jebali fi Mudhakkara li al-Sharq al-Awsat (Jebali in his Recollections to Asharq al-Awsat)," *Asharq al-Awsat*, 07 July 2014. Web: https://aawsat.com/home/article/131976. Accessed: 2023-04-11.
[15] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 141.
[16] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 54.
[17] "al-Iʿtidāʾ ʿala al-Ustadh Muhammad Hadi al-Zamzami (Assault on Muhammad Hadi al-Zamzami, 18 October 1990)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-13, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1990_في_الزمزمي_الهادي_محمد_على_الاعتداء_حول_بيان #lg=1&slide=0

gathered in front of the Justice Palace on 18 October 1990. All these events took place in front of the lawyer's colleagues and the civilian population. Upon this political assault, the Head of Lawyers called the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Justice accepted the meeting request of the Head of Lawyers. This declaration pointed out that the severity of growing repression against the al-Nahda movement in the beginning of the 1990s. It was a precursor to other political assassinations that would happen in the next period.

Actually, in the 1990s, police and intelligence agency became the two main institutions that kept the regime alive.[18] The police began to operate on all university campuses.[19] In this respect, during the Ben Ali period, new special security units, such as political police, tourism police, university police, were also formed.[20] In November 1990, some members of the al-Nahda were arrested after the detection of explosives that were "professedly" to have been employed for terrorist activities.[21] In December 1990, senior officials of the al-Nahda were arrested with more than 100 other people, and blamed for attempting to found an "Islamic State".[22]

The crackdown on the al-Nahda movement deepened in 1991. The declaration, which was signed by Abdelfattah Mourou, member of the al-Nahda Movement Executive Bureau, and published on 6 February 1991, included the details of the political arrests and political trials, and the executive bureau harshly criticized the regime's repression on the movement.[23] The declaration strongly condemned the arrest of Hamadi Jabali, member of the al-Nahda Movement Executive Bureau. Similarly, the al-Nahda movement condemned that the Director of *"al-Fajr"* Newspaper was sentenced to one year in prison by the Tunisian Military Court and a monetary penalty of 1,000 TND was imposed on him, and that Muhammad al-Nouri was sentenced to one year and one month in prison and a monetary penalty of 1,000 TND was imposed on him. In the declaration, the movement

[18] Veysel Ayhan, "Tunus isyanı: Arapların devrim ateşini yakması," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 3, 2 (2012), 59-93.
[19] Mohammad Mahmoud Mohamedou, "The Rise and Fall of Democratization in the Maghreb," in *Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratization, Human Rights*, Paul J. Magnarella (Editor) (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1999), 209-240.
[20] Peter J. Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi, "The upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia: Ben Ali's fall," *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 3 (2011), 5-19.
[21] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1090.
[22] Ibid, 1091.
[23] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 6 February 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-18, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_موجه_للصحافة/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة #gsc.tab=0.

stated that the article calling for democracy written by Muhammad al-Nouri in the *"al-Fajr"* Newspaper on 27 October 1990 was influential in this decision.

Furthermore, the arrest of al-Nahda Executive Bureau Member Fadel al-Baladi and the continued detention of al-Nahda Movement Spokesperson Ali al-Areedh and al-Nahda Executive Bureau Member Ziyad al-Dawlatli were condemned in the declaration.[24] The movement stated that the political lawsuits against numerous members and supporters of the movement continued to increase. According to the declaration, among the members of the al-Nahda, whose political trials were ongoing, there were many members of the al-Nahda Sousse Office named Muhammad al-Shamli, Saleh Hashem, Jalab al-Din al-Ruwais and Ali Neuer.

Moreover, in the declaration, the al-Nahda movement condemned the arrest of those, who participated in the press conference to support Iraq on 24 January 1991 in the capital city, Tunis.[25] The pressure on the *"al-Maghrib al-Arabi"* magazine and *"al-Badil"* newspaper was harshly criticized during the political trials aimed at violating the press freedom. The movement declared that political trials deepened the growing problems in the country and caused the country's power transfer to the wrong areas. The al-Nahda movement demanded release of those imprisoned due to thoughtcrime, termination of the political trials and arrests, and invited the security forces to be aware of their historical responsibilities while performing their duties. It was significant that this declaration came in 1991, when the state repression against the movement reached its peak level.

In addition, there was an armed attack on the RCD offices in February 1991 in Tunis, and the government expressed that the al-Nahda had planned the attack.[26] Accusing the al-Nahda for this attack, the regime arrested many al-Nahda members despite the lack of evidence, and increased pressure on the movement.[27] According to the declaration signed by Rachid Ghannouchi on 18 March 1991, the Islamist movement in Tunisia had been under heavy repression since the Gulf War, which started on 2 August 1990, and that this pressure had included even political assassinations since 7 November 1990.[28] In the

[24] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 6 February 1991),"
[25] Ibid.
[26] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1091.
[27] See: Dunn, "The Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia,"
[28] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 18 March 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-07, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1991_مارس_18_في_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

declaration, the movement reported that most of the society was negatively effected by the anti-democratic practices of the regime that restricted individual rights, and the most harmed group in the society was the Islamists that supported the al-Nahda movement.

Moreover, according to the declaration, the outbreak of the Gulf War had doubled the prices of basic goods, fuel and spare parts.[29] In particular, after the demonstration held by the movement in Tunisia on 15 August 1990 protesting the situation in the Gulf region, the regime performed large-scale arrests. Many members of the al-Nahda were imprisoned after "various tortures" and "violent practices" in the Ministry of Interior and prisons as stated in the declaration. al-Tayeb al-Khamasi, Salahuddin Babai and Mabrouk al-Zamzami lost their lives after the police opened fire and used live ammunition during the protests.

In addition, according to the declaration, the opposition newspapers such as *"al-Badil"*, *"al-Maouqif"* and *"al-Fajr"*, which were published in parallel with the al-Nahda movement, were closed.[30] From dozens of al-Nahda executives; Hamadi Jebali, Ali al-Areedh, Ziyad al-Dawlatli, Noureddine al-Behairy, Mustafa bin Salem were in "harsh" situation in the prisons. al-Shir al-Sayd, Ibrahim al-Haidar, Jalloul Azzouna were among those, who were prosecuted on charges of defamation in the political trials. Moreover, the regime used the Bab Souika Attack[31] as an instrument to reppress and intimidate the Islamists. However, in the declaration, it was stated that the al-Nahda movement had nothing to do with the Bab Souika Attack and the movement was "regrettable" for this attack.

Furthermore, in the declaration, the al-Nahda movement openly condemned the "militias" that the regime "tacitly" supported in order to incite violence in the country and especially in the offices and centers of the movement.[32] It was noted that these militias were linked to "armed criminal gangs" and paved the way for the arrests and detentions of innocent citizens. It was stated that these groups intervened in the demonstrations in February 1991 with batons and stones. It was also reported that the armed gangs acting in favor of the regime functioned "illegally" and the security forces "ignored" these armed gangs.

[29] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 18 March 1991),"
[30] Ibid.
[31] The Bab Souika Attack is the terrorist attack, in which the RCD office in the Bab Souika district of Tunis was set on fire on 17 February 1991.
[32] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 18 March 1991),"

In the declaration signed by Ahmed bin Saleh, Rachid Ghannouchi, Mohammed Mzali, Tariq bin Saleh, Ali al-Masoudi, Abdel Raouf Boulaabi, Abdel-Khalek al-Tokabri, Habib Mokni, Ahmed al-Shanoufi on 10 May 1991; the developments on university campuses in Tunisia were mentioned.[33] On 08 May 1991, when the police opened fire on students on the university campuses and attacked the students "harshly", two students lost their lives and many students were injured, and this news was released through the official government channel. In the declaration, the al-Nahda movement declared that these risky actions of the regime forced the Tunisian people to live under repression and instigated violence and instability in the country. Actually, in May 1991, nearly 300 people, involving about 100 members of the security forces, were arrested in relation to an alleged Islamist plot.[34] On the other hand, this clearly showed the infiltration of the al-Nahda members to the security units of the state, which was a political opportunity structure playing an important role in the mobilization of the movement.

Suppression of the al-Nahda proceeded with extensive arrests and massive security presence on the streets. In July 1992, almost 200 alleged al-Nahda members were judged for plotting to take power by force, and in August 1992, the courts announced extended prison sentences for the suspects.[35] The three exiled al-Nahda leaders, Rachid Ghannouchi, Salah Karker and Habib Mokni, were among those people, who received life sentences.[36] The regime claimed that Ghannouchi had received financial aid from the governments of Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia for the subversion of Tunisian regime and was organizing an Islamist revolution.[37]

Briefly, the number of arrested al-Nahda members was around 10,000 according to official records by late 1990.[38] In addition, the suppression of the al-Nahda movement was not only performed against male members, but female members were also under intense pressure. The estimated numbers of female inmates during the Ben Ali period ranged from

[33] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, Paris, 10 May 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-10, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة/بيان_10ماي_1991#gsc.tab=0.
[34] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1091.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Mabrouk, "Tunisia: The Radicalisation of Religious Policy," 60.

300 to 1,500; and female political inmates were frequently imprisoned arbitrarily without trials.[39]

The al-Nahda prisoners were subjected to both physical and psychological tortures in the prisons.[40] Physically; the al-Nahda inmates were subjected to practices, such as sexual harassment, rape, insult, punch, slap, kicking, stabbing, shouting, threatening with fist, staring intimidatingly, kicking the door, breaking things on their body, and not allowing them to go to the doctor in case of severe health problems.[41] Psychologically; the al-Nahda inmates were exposed to practices, such as humiliation, punishment, threatening behavior and attitudes, exploitation of emotions, making them feel guilty, embarrassing, sulking, mocking, swearing, insulting, not allowing them to meet with visitors, pushing and shoving their relatives in front of the prisoners.[42]

Yet, this heavy repression created political opportunities for the movement through prison experience. As part of the regime's strategy of threatening religious activists, the jail officials put the al-Nahda inmates into cells with common criminals, by whom they were assaulted.[43] The al-Nahda prisoners were also retained in jails far from their homes in a venture to deprive them of contacting their families, and even the flow of information between the prisoners and their families were checked by the jail guards.[44] Especially the headscarf-wearing women were not allowed to work in state institutions, visit their relatives in prison, or even to take medical examinations.[45] However, members of the movement were not simple prisoners, and al-Nahda activists created mechanisms in order to debate their experiences, which helped them to renovate freedom of mind and spirit, and maintain the vision of the Islamist project alive.[46] Amir El Üreyit, one of the prominent figures of the al-Nahda, elaborated the significance of the prison experience during the heavy repression period as follows:

[39] Doris H. Gray and Terry Coonan, "Notes from the field: Silence kills! Women and the transitional justice process in post-revolutionary Tunisia," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 7, 2 (2013), 348–357.
[40] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Inmate (1991-1995) in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 81.
[44] Ibid, 83.
[45] Michele Brandt and Jeffrey A. Kaplan, "The tension between women's rights and religious rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia," *Journal of Law and Religion* 12, 1, (1995-1996), 105-142.
[46] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 169.

> Inside Tunisia, all the leaders of the movement were either in prison or in exile outside. Therefore, it was difficult to talk about a systematic training by competent people. There were mostly individual endeavours... There was a difficult process inside. Here I want to mention three points. At first, because of the widespread trials and arrests, at least one person in each family was in prison. For this reason, those who were imprisoned became symbols and spheres of influence both in their family and around their neighbourhood, since they were going to prison for Islam. That is why most of the youth turned to Islam. Secondly, in the face of the hostility towards Islam, the youth showed their reaction. These two points resulted in the third point, and the youth potential of Tunisia turned into masses supporting Islam.[47]

The prison cells were used as meeting places for deep discussions about improving the movement's strategy and ideological vision. The al-Nahda members used the prison cell as a space for resistance in order to recall their reputation in the face of the abasement, since the limited family visits enabled relatives to share stories, which created connections to maintain social ties.[48] Moreover, due to the fact that the al-Nahda and secular politicians had been oppressed together by the regime, their collective experience inside prison cells also nourished ideological convergence, which moderated the al-Nahda cadres in time.[49] Thus, especially the release of the al-Nahda prisoners increased the political opportunity structures, to a large extent. As the prison authorities made family visits difficult more and more via forcing family members for waiting in queues for long hours, large groups of mothers, wives, and sisters began to communicate in these queues, disseminate information, and strengthen social networks.[50] In this respect, the female members of the movement used waiting in queues for weekly prison interviews as a method of meeting with other women.[51]

In the literature, women activists constantly play more significant roles in movements than men through maintaining social networks and groups or building bridges between networks.[52] Rachid Ghannouchi argued that the widespread rumor that women were weak

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[47] Bedir Sala and Bülent Gökgöz, "Ulustan Ümmete Grubu El Üreyit'le Görüştü," *Haksöz Haber*, 07 January 2013. Web: https://www.haksozhaber.net/ulustan-ummete-grubu-el-ureyitle-gorustu-34731h.htm. Accessed: 2021-01-12.
[48] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 169.
[49] Sharan Grewal, "From Islamists to Muslim democrats: The case of Tunisia's Ennahda," *American Political Science Review* 114, 2 (2020), 519-535.
[50] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 92.
[51] Doris H. Gray, "Tunisia after the uprising: Islamist and secular quests for women's rights," *Mediterranean Politics* 17, 3 (2012), 285-302.
[52] See: Nadje al-Ali, "Gendering the Arab Spring," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 5 (2012), 26-31; Zakia Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

and they could not bear the difficulties of invitation to Islam was not true at all.[53] Ghannouchi stated that even a single woman did not give up the cause of Islam in the period of Prophet Muhammad, whereas many men gave up the cause of religion in that period.[54] Especially during the heavy repression performed by the regime in the 1990s, the female al-Nahda members performed clandestine Qur'an memorization and explanation gatherings and comprehensive trainings in jurisprudence, eloquence and ethics.[55]

Furthermore, women's bodies constantly turn into an object for repression and violence.[56] To illustrate, the women members of the al-Nahda movement, who were arrested in the 1990s, were blamed for belonging to an illegal organization, taking part in demonstrations and disturbing the peace.[57] The torture that the female al-Nahda inmates experienced involved physical violence, such as beating, electrocuting, plunging head into toilet, as well as sexual harassment and insulting.[58] The female al-Nahda inmates, who were pregnant, miscarried because of the torture that they suffered within the prison cells.[59] Even after their release, the female al-Nahda members were exposed to administrative surveillance of the regime. For instance, they were to appear in person in two different administrative centers, which were distant from each other, in each morning and evening, and they were exposed to insulting and humiliation in these controls.[60] Moreover, their houses were raided and searched nocturnally again and again through knocking on doors with swearing.[61]

Yet, the repression and torture that the women experience consolidate their personality and stance not only in the society that they live but also inside the movement.[62] In this respect, the thoughts of Rachid Ghannouchi promoted women's role in social arena, and he argued that a social community could not enhance when half of it stayed at home for raising

[53] Raşid Gannuşi, *Kur'an ve Yaşam Arasında Kadın (Al-mar'a bayna al-Qur'an wa al-Waqi' al-Muslimin)*, translated by Muhammed Coşkun (İstanbul: Mana Yayınları, 2011), 106.
[54] Gannuşi, *Kur'an ve Yaşam Arasında Kadın (Al-mar'a bayna al-Qur'an wa al-Waqi' al-Muslimin)*, 106.
[55] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 7-8.
[56] See: Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "Gendering the Arab Spring?" *Security Dialogue* 44 (2013), 393-409; Sherine Hafez, "The revolution shall not pass through women's bodies: Egypt, uprising and gender politics," *Journal of North African Studies* 19 (2014), 172-185.
[57] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 6.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] See: Mervat F. Hatem, "Egyptian discourses on gender and political liberalization: Do secularist and Islamist views really differ?" *Middle East Journal* 4, 48 (1994), 661-676; Ikbal al-Gharbi, "Women in Islamist movements: Alienation or an attempt to liberation," *MERIA Journal* 1, 1 (2006), 58-71.

children and doing housework.[63] Ghannouchi argued that each man ought to encourage talented and righteous women so that they could play important roles and gain reputation in society.[64] In this sense, the female al-Nahda members took part in politics and accomplished a wide presence in the social space via demonstrations, organizations, unions, seminars and forums.[65] This was an important political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement.

The al-Nahda prisoners used different techniques in order to survive, and hunger strike was a very effective method for the political prisoners in jails. In time, the hunger strike became a progressively prevalent cross-ideological method of individual and collective action in order to resist the Ben Ali regime both inside and outside jail.[66] The al-Nahda prisoners used hunger strikes as "weaponization of life",[67] and transformed their bodies to "a dramatic and eloquent form of political expression".[68] For instance, 96 students started a hunger strike after the regime tried to divide its dissidents by dissolving the Thelogical Faculty of Zaytuna University in December 1989.[69] Furthermore, the al-Nahda prisoners in Tunis, Gafsa, Gabes, Mahdia, Harboub and Sidi Bouzid arranged an organized hunger strike before the International Human Rights Day in order to demand their legal rights as prisoners and stop brutal persecution within jails in November and December 1996.[70] In this respect, the hunger strikes turned into an effective political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement.

During the heavy repression period, Rachid Ghannouchi developed close relations with the Algerian Islamists, too. The al-Nahda members and advocators were inspired by the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in 1990-1991; on the other hand, the developments in Algeria had the opposite effect on Tunisia's ruling political elites, as well

[63] Qusay Salih al-Darwish, *Hiwarat maʿa Rachid Ghannouchi (Dialogues with Rachid Ghannouchi)* (London, 1992), 51.
[64] Rached Ghannouchi, *Women between Qur'an and the Reality of Muslims (Al-mar'a bayna al-Qur'an wa al-Waqi' al-Muslimin)* (London: Maghreb Centre for Research and Translation, 2000), 77.
[65] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 32.
[66] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 84.
[67] Banu Bargu, *Starve and Immolate: The Politics of Human Weapons* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014), 14.
[68] Allen Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 219.
[69] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1090.
[70] Abdelwahab Sdiri, *Dans cinq ans il n'y aura plus de Coran: Un prisonnier tunisien témoigne*, translated by Luiza Toscane (Paris: Éditions Paris-Méditerranée, 2003), 124.

as on intellectual elites and secular political opposition groups.[71] In fact, although Rachid Ghannouchi improved strong relations with the Algerian Islamists, he eventually understood that the course of events in Algeria harmed the al-Nahda movement.[72] Even though it is widespread for opposition movements experiencing semi-authoritarian conditions to confirm violent tactics, the al-Nahda survived during the periods of heavy repression without applying an armed confrontation.

In addition to subjecting thousands of al-Nahda activists to relentless jail terms, the Ben Ali regime agonized most of their family members, too. After the regime's heavy crackdown on its activists, the al-Nahda seemed as if it evanesced from the public eye in Tunisia; however, the movement was still alive. Rachid Ghannouchi explained the extent of heavy repression and the survival process of the movement as follows:

> The Tunisian Islamists are different to Islamists in other parts of the Arab world. They have been fiercely harassed and repressed for decades and consequently they are reluctant to show themselves or to adapt an Islamist appearance. For the past 22 years they have kept their Islamic identity in their hearts as opposed to wearing it on their sleeves in the form of headscarves and beards.[73]

Especially among the family members of imprisoned al-Nahda members; certain moral character traits developed, such as courage, confidence, fortitude, honesty, telling the truth when others are silent, rejecting material wealth, bravery, loyalty to family members, faith, devotion to the cause, honor, and demanding the right to live in spite of the repression.[74] In addition, the prison experience of the al-Nahda members fostered specific emotions, such as anger and resentment, against the regime repression.[75] The Tunisian regime acted ruthlessly by performing decades of repression, arrests, enforcements, executions and expulsions on the supporters and members of the al-Nahda. In this respect, despite all these

[71] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 53.
[72] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 199.
[73] Rashid Ghannouchi, "Tunisia: The Advent of Liberal Islamism – An Interview with Rashid Al-Ghannouchi," interviewer Mahan Abedin, *Religioscope*, 30 January 2011. Web: https://english.religion.info/2011/01/30/tunisia-the-advent-of-liberal-islamism-an-interview-with-rashid-al-ghannouchi/. Accessed: 2021-01-12.
[74] Malek Sghiri, "Greetings to the Dawn: Living through the Bittersweet Revolution (Tunisia)," in *Diaries of an Unfinished Revolution: Voices from Tunis to Damascus*, Layla al-Zubaidi, Matthew Cassel and Nemonie Craven Roderick (Editors) (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 9–47.
[75] Ibid.

repressive practices, the al-Nahda case clearly indicates that "repression can force the moderation of Islamist parties".[76]

In the 1990s, the efforts to intimidate al-Nahda members, such as arrests and torture, as well as the closure of Islamic newspapers, did not work, and the public support for the movement increased over time.[77] The al-Nahda used intellectual means, such as books, journals, newspapers and the mass media. The movement also created financial sources through constructing networks among the Islamist traders and craftsmen, who had ensured financial aid via zakat.

In the 1990s, the leaders of al-Nahda movement in the countries of asylum improved close and regular contacts with other Tunisian opposition groups, as well as the international human rights organizations, through calling for a pluralist democratic facade of the opposition.[78] In June 1990, the al-Nahda boycotted municipal elections together with the six legal opposition groups via criticizing the unfree and unfair election conditions.[79] This was an important political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda. Similarly, the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT)[80] was an important initiative, and it was a grouping of 35 Tunisian dissidents, which was established in late 1998, but officially banned.[81] In fact, all these efforts were influencial in the detente of the regime and paved the way for practices that would ease the repression against the al-Nahda. For instance, with the official pardons of the Tunisian regime, 600 detainees interrelated with the al-Nahda movement were released in 1999.[82] This was a political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement to re-organize within the country in the next decade.

[76] Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 4.
[77] Anthony H. Cordesman, *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 158.
[78] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 55.
[79] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1090.
[80] This was a non-governmental organization, which was formed to defend the human rights against the repressive policies of the Ben Ali regime. The prominent members of the CNLT were Moncef Marzouki, Mustapha Ben Jaafar and Sihem Bensedrine. The CNLT had not been recognized until the 2011 Uprisings.
[81] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1092.
[82] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 5.

4.2. Movement in Countries of Asylum: Informal Organizational Structures

The contentious politics literature confirms the long-term effect of authoritarianism and the role that historical repertoires of contestation play important role in forming future repertoires, whereas the political organizations literature advocates that an organization's character ought to go on past as far as a group's founding moments, which release an explicit imprint on a group for life.[83] The leaders in a group's first periods build the ideology, the identity and the establishments that identify how an organization operates, and this influences the path it reacts to political challenges in the following periods.[84] This does not mean that organizations are unable to change or evolve, but that it points to a remarkable endeavor for organizational change to occur.[85] These dynamics are usually more evident in exiled organizations, where the groups frequently define both material resources and recruiting policies, particularly during the first stages in the countries of asylum.[86]

The nature and extent of the al-Nahda's relations with the countries of asylum remain one of its most prominet secrets, except for some members voluntary to debate the subject at all. On the surface, the al-Nahda organizations in the countries of asylum may seem the reason for the movement's survival in exile, but in practice, such links were quite restricted due to the regime's heavy repression against the movement. However, although the al-Nahda members were scattered in the European countries, they maintained strong ties with their Tunisian counterparts as their local backers. The bonds of these members had a perceivable influence on the al-Nahda, which benefited from the improving wealth of its ground, to a large extent.

Especially the donations from its members constituted the main source of funding within the movement. In collecting domestic and foreign financial support for the al-Nahda movement, Rachid Ghannouchi highlighted the spiritual gains of the movement's cause *(da'wa)*. For example, he expressed that if supporters the movement make sacrifices and choose not to enjoy a quiet holiday in the Caribbean and donate this money to the victims

[83] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, translated by Barbara North and Robert North (Paris: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1967), xxxv; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization & Power*, translated by Marc Silver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), xiii.
[84] Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, 13.
[85] Robin T. Pettitt, *Contemporary Party Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 43.
[86] Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 30.

of "tyranny" in Bosnia or Tunisia, they will earn many rewards *(thawabs)* in the sight of Allah in return.[87]

In the al-Nahda case, a social movement was able to surface outside the country's borders when there was heavy repression inside the country. Due to the growing state repression, the movement had to establish a presence outside Tunisia in the 1980s, and streamlined its restructuring in the 1990s. During the 1990s, most of its activities were transfered to Europe and North America among the exiled al-Nahda members in the countries of asylum.[88] Actually, the party officials had already agreed on founding an executive bureau in London in 1989 following the arrival of Rachid Ghannouchi, which resulted in double structure of the movement.[89]

In the literature, the networks constructed by the Islamist exiles are really effective in advocating resistance in the countries of origin.[90] These networks influence the movement through generating simply a specific ideological support from the Muslims in Europe or pointing the presence of actual organized structures within which movement entrepreneurs plan their return to their countries as seen in the Tunisian al-Nahda case.[91] In the period from 1989 to 1999, new political opportunity structures were created by carrying the al-Nahda's political activities in the countries of asylum.

Especially formation of overseas parallel party structures created new political opportunities for the movement, and the liberal context in the countries of asylum, mainly in Europe, played an important role in this situation. The al-Nahda members established parallel party structures, such as political bureau, executive bureau and communications office, in the countries of asylum, and most of the movement entrepreneurs participated in Islamic organizations in those countries. In the 1990s, the al-Nahda movement made progress in spreading the movement's ideological discourse especially in Islamic cultural centers in Europe.[92]

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[87] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 83.
[88] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[89] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 87.
[90] Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jorgen Nielsen, *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society*, Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jorgen Nielsen (Editors) (Leiden: Brill, 2003), p142-143.
[91] Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto and Nielsen, *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe*, 143.
[92] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.

Members of the al-Nahda movement left Tunisia clandestinely by crossing into Sudan with the help and support of the Algeria's HMS, before taking refuge in countries in Europe in the 1990s.[93] Thanks to the human rights and freedoms in European countries, they could survive as refugees in the countries of asylum, and many movement members even gained the right to reside.[94] The al-Nahda members were able to be accepted as refugees on the condition that they showed their al-Nahda membership card in Europe.[95]

Thanks to growth of the second-generation al-Nahda members in exile, new networks were created between movement supporters in exile and those in Tunisia. With the aid of the informal networks in schools and universities, the movement was able to construct transnational Islamist literature and strengthen its common values.[96] The flexibility of the informal organizational dynamics helped the movement to maximize its mobilizing capacity through providing a huge pool of sympathizers and increasing the reputation of the movement in terms of defending the identity and religion including the democratic, social and economic interests of its base.[97] The movement was able to recruit young members in mosques and other places of worship in Europe.[98]

Furthermore, the Tunisian regime's one-sided media campaigns fostered the movement in exile. Media plays a significant role regarding the linkage between repression and mobilization, since it is considered as one of the primary goals for mobilization.[99] At first, media determines the activities of dissidents and authorities through communicating to them regarding the attitude that is presumably to be adapted, the effect of which relies on the main targets of the social movements and governments.[100] Moreover, the media is a

[93] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 39.
[97] Ibid, 38.
[98] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[99] See: John McCarthy, Clark McPhail and Jackie Smith, "Images of protest: Dimensions of selection bias in media coverage of Washington demonstrations, 1982, 1991," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996), 468-99; Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[100] Christian Davenport, "Introduction: Repression and Mobilization, Insights from Political Science and Sociology," in *Repression and Mobilization*, Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller (Editors) (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), vii-xli.

reservoir for what happens in society reporting cases, which come about in the world for a specific audience.[101]

From this point of view, especially the movement in exile in the al-Nahda case deserves further attention to be studied in detail, since it was able to create a rigid counter propaganda mechanism outside the country against the repressive Tunisian regime. One of the most important ways that the al-Nahda intellectuals in exile applied against the regime's repression was founding publications and launching newspapers and television channels as counter propaganda mechanisms. The al-Nahda activists re-launched the newspaper, "*al-Fajr*", in London in 1992, established the publication, *"al-Insan*", in Paris, and launched the "*Zitouna*" television channel in 1999 in French in order to support their base in Tunisia via disseminating their ideology and political thoughts from abroad.[102] This was an important political opportunity structure for the mobilization of the movement.

During the 1990s, al-Nahda's organizational dynamics in the countries of asylum ensured a considerable support for the movement adherents inside Tunisia.[103] According to Lutz Rogler, in the 1990s, the exiled members of the al-Nahda movement played a remarkable role on both organizational and ideological grounds in Muslim contexts in Europe, in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Belgium.[104] In this respect, the political bureau of the al-Nahda movement was headquartered in the United Kingdom, whereas the executive bureau was active in France, and the communications office was active in Germany.[105]

Yet, the research has shown that the exiled al-Nahda members were also influential in other countries. Members of the al-Nahda established a wide network of Islamic cultural centers, mosques, libraries and foundations in Europe in the mid-1990s.[106] In this context, the movement constructed a strong mosque network in Brussels/Belgium, London/United Kingdom and Milan/Italy.[107] Similarly, the al-Nahda established a strong network of Islamic cultural centers in Stockholm/Sweden, Aachen/Germany, Milan/Italy, Romania and the United Kingdom.[108] In addition, the financial institutions with Swiss partnerships, as well as the commercial companies, such as restaurants and car rental companies, which

[101] See: Davenport, "Introduction: Repression and Mobilization,"
[102] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 91.
[103] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 195-196.
[104] Rogler, "Harakat An-Nahda and Islamic Movements in Tunisia," 55.
[105] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[106] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Germany in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[107] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-2006) in Belgium in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[108] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Italy in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.

were established in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, gave significant financial support to the al-Nahda movement in the 1990s.[109]

In this context, the al-Nahda movement provided strong financial support from its adherents in Europe in the name of fundraising, as well as a regular money flow that was ensured via aids and donations.[110] The al-Nahda movement was also able to transfer high amounts of funds to its local networks through using the front companies in the countries of asylum.[111] In this respect, especially members of the shura council of the al-Nahda movement had strong networks in those front companies, and this situation was very effective in the movement's survival against the semi-authoritarian Ben Ali regime, since a significant financial support was provided from these circles.[112]

To illustrate, the family members, such as bride and groom, of the shura council had shares in those large-scale front companies in addition to their networks with the business elite circles in Tunisia.[113] The main instruments strengthened by the organizational capacity of the al-Nahda movement in the countries of asylum were shareholding ties, natural and institutional family ties, board memberships and political connections.[114] These networks were not only limited to financial networks, but they also established an active channel of intelligence against the regime, from politics to the social domain, which the leaders of the al-Nahda movement actually used.[115]

The intellectual cadres of the al-Nahda movement endeavored to gain support for the movement in the countries of asylum while the less educated cadres were more effective in collecting money and attracting sympathizers.[116] In the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Canada, the propaganda activities of the al-Nahda movement were more intense, whereas the movement intensified its ideological organizational activities in Austria, Italy, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria.[117]

[109] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1988-2011) in Sweden in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[110] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[111] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.

The research has shown that three basic criteria played important role in constructing organizational dynamics in the European countries where the al-Nahda exiles were active. First one was the existence of sufficient number of the political al-Nahda exiles in that European country.[118] Second one was the existence of commercial relations of the al-Nahda exiles in that European country.[119] Third one was the presence of a Sunni Muslim community in that European country.[120] In the European countries, where these three criteria had sufficient ground, the al-Nahda movement was seriously organized.

In the United Kingdom, the law regulating charitable organizations ensured the form under which many Muslim foundations and mosques functioned, and all of the mosques and Muslim foundations were de facto registered charities.[121] The number of mosques was 314 by June 1985, whereas it increased to 452 by 1990 in the United Kingdom, and officially registered mosques reached 870 in 2009 despite the estimations involving unregistered mosques might be approximately 2,000.[122] The al-Nahda movement cooperated with plenty of Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Institute, the International Centre for Islamic Studies, the Union of Muslim Organisations, the Council of Mosques, the London office of the Muslim World League (MWL), in this welcoming milieu and mobilized its activists around these mosques.[123] In addition, many figures and organizations gathered under the United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs in 1997, and founded the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which became a prominent actor among the Sunni groups,[124] including the al-Nahda members.

The exile conditions in the United Kingdom provided more convenient atmosphere for Rachid Ghannouchi and the al-Nahda's other prominent figures to engage in pan-Islamist circles and other versions of Islamism than those in Tunisia, and the al-Nahda intelllectuals were able to broaden their intellectual viewpoint to consider not only the Arab countries, but also the non-Arab ones like Turkey.[125] Ghannouchi provided great support from

[118] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[119] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[120] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[121] Jørgen S. Nielsen and Jonas Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe, The New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys* (Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 48.
[122] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 49.
[123] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[124] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 53.
[125] James Brandon and Raffaello Pantucci, "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings," *Hudson Institute, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 13 (2012), 18-46.

London for the establishment of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR),[126] and became the member of the ECFR, which was an important initiative thinking thoroughly on the concept of Dar al-Islam among the European Muslims.[127] In this respect, Ghannouchi developed his relationship with Yusuf al-Qaradawi, chairman of the ECFR, and he called for supporting Arab Muslims to act in unity against injustice.[128]

Rachid Ghannouchi took part in an important Islamic event, which was held in Beirut, Lebanon in October 1997, and many Islamist leaders from Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Algeria and Palestine also attended this event.[129] In this event, the participants reached a consensus on improving rapprochement, cooperation and coordination among the Muslim Arab countries.[130] Moreover, Ghannouchi also enhanced his intellectual endeavors during his exile in London, and he finished his famous books, "Public Liberties in the Islamic State *(al-Hurriyat al-'Amma fi al-Dawla al-Islamiyya)*", which was published by the famous Centre of Arab Unity Studies in Beirut in 1993, and "Approaches to Secularism and Civil Society *(Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*", which was published by the Magharebi Center for Research and Translation in London in 1999.[131]

In the United Kingdom, another important figure of the al-Nahda movement was Said Ferjani, and he operated within Ghannouchi's inner circle. Having released from the prison in Tunisia, Said Ferjani came to London in the 1990s, and became involved with the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB/*al-Rabita al-Islamiyya fi Britanya*) working as Head of Policy, Media and Public Relations.[132] Said Ferjani was able to participate in regular meetings with the media, observe different variants of Muslim activism, contact with the

[126] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[127] Sarah Albrecht, *Dar Al-Islam Revisited: Territoriality in Contemporary Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslims in the West* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2018), 218.
[128] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[129] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-2006) in Belgium in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[130] Ibid.
[131] See: Rached Ghannouchi, *Public Liberties in the Islamic State (al-Hurriyat al-'Amma fi al-Dawla al-Islamiyya)* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1993); Rached Ghannouchi, *Approaches to Secularism and Civil Society (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)* (London: al-Markaz al-Maghribi li al-Buhuth wa al-Tarjama, 1999).
[132] See: Ferjani, "The 'End of Islamism' and the future of Tunisia,"

senior executives of the NGOs and the bureaucrats from all levels of the United Kingdom government via using this position within the MAB.[133]

Actually, the al-Nahda movement had resolved to increase lobbying activities in the countries of asylum, mainly in Europe, in its sixth party congress in Switzerland in 1995.[134] Said Ferjani was able to construct an effective network and become an influential lobbyist in the United Kingdom, since he somehow learned how the United Kingdom government bureaucracy operated.[135] In addition, he assumed an important role in the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which was a United Kingdom government-funded institution aiming at addressing radicalization and inefficient governance in British mosques, and he served as the MINAB's chair between 2008 and 2009.[136] The MINAB was one of the four main Muslim organizations, and the other three founding organizations were the El-Khoei Foundation, a Shia organization headquartered in the United States; the British Muslim Forum; and the MCB respectively.[137]

In addition, the Islamic Cultural Centre had an important role in the United Kingdom, it operated among the exiled, business and professional groups in London, so it made an exclusive emotion for it to be functioned by a board of trustees including the envoys of Muslim countries.[138] The al-Nahda adherents actively cooperated with the Islamic Cultural Centre in the United Kingdom, and used the centre as an organizational dynamic.[139] Especially the al-Nahda students, who studied at universities in the United Kingdom, played important role in construction of organizational dynamics like societies and mobilization of Muslim communities in the country.[140]

France had a big proportion of Muslim immigrants in Europe, mostly from its former colonies, including Tunisia. The first wave of immigration occured during World War I, when the North Africans arrived to serve in the army and labor in factories, which was rewarded with the foundation of the large Mosque of Paris in 1926.[141] The second and

[133] See: Ferjani, "The 'End of Islamism' and the future of Tunisia,"
[134] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[135] See: Brandon and Pantucci, "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings,"
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 53.
[139] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Maruta Herding, *Inventing the Muslim Cool: Islamic Youth Culture in Western Europe* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014), 15.

bigger immigration wave was because of the economic recruitment after World War II, and by 1975 more than a million labors from Islamic countries, primarily Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco had reached France with acquisation of full French citizenship.[142] In this respect, France has an important role in analyzing the al-Nahda case as movement in exile, since the Tunisians has a significant place among the three immigrant nations (Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans) in France from outside Europe.[143]

Furthermore, among the European countries, France has presumedly the highest figure of converts to Islam.[144] In France, while the number of Tunisian settlers in 1975 was 139,735, this number reached 206,336 in 1990, and more than half of the male immigrants had immigrated with their spouses and children.[145] The Tunisian immigrant families inclined to be more scattered, and they were mobile with the labour market.[146] Yet, the Tunisian immigrants were less organized in France when compared to other immigrants from Maghreb region.[147] During the Bourghiba era, the JI established a French offshoot in 1980 under the name of "Islamic Group in France (GIF)".[148] The GIF engaged in large-scale activities in France from summer camps to conferences, and it inclined to make alliances with other Muslim communities and unions, such as associations of Muslim doctors and students.[149]

In France, the Muslim children inclined to attend public schools instead of the private ones due to the cost of school fees as well as the fact that the private schools were less widespread in the urban territories where the Muslims were densely located.[150] Therefore, they did not have access to religious education in the schools, since the public school system had strictly laicist practices like the ban of wearing religious symbols.[151] Yet, in the late 1980s, many mosques began to ensure some form of Islamic education for Muslim children in France, and especially in the case of North Africans including the Tunisians,

[142] Herding, *Inventing the Muslim Cool*, 15.
[143] See: "Immigrants by Country of Birth," *The Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (INED),* Accessed: 2022-05-25, Web: https://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/data/france/immigrants-foreigners/countries-birth-immigrants/#r202%3C!--GreaterThan-.
[144] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 10.
[145] Ibid, 9.
[146] Ibid, 12.
[147] Ibid, 17.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid, 17-18.
[150] Ibid, 23.
[151] Ibid.

the aim was about Arabic education for better understanding of Qur'an and Arab culture.[152] In this process, plenty of both Muslim and national organizations for Arabic education were founded, and the mosque of Paris broadened this activities in the form of an Islamic theological institute in the beginning of the 1990s.[153] This process created mobilization among the adult al-Nahda trainees attending evening lectures.[154]

More than half of the immigrants living in France in the 1990s were from Muslim countries, and the majority of these Muslim immigrants were Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan.[155] The al-Nahda members mobilized the movement through the Islamic organizations and mosques in France.[156] In this context, the al-Nahda movement made a great effort via the activities of French branch of the UGTE, and this endeavors helped mobilization of the movement, to a large extent.[157] Moreover, some prominent al-Nahda figures exiled in France assumed an active role in the formation and administration of associational networks of Muslims in France and Europe, such as the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) and the Muslim Youth Union (UJM), whereas other members engaged in operating educational organizations affiliated with such associations.[158] Especially the UOIF was very influencial in France, and Rachid Ghannouchi performed many speeches at conferences and forums held by the UOIF.[159]

In Germany, the religious groups could function freely under the laws of association, the Muslim organizations used to work under two categories, which were either registered association (eingetragener verein) or foundation (stiftung).[160] In both of these organizations, the al-Nahda adherents could engage in strategic activities in worship places, which strengthened the movement mobilization.[161] In addition, the Association of German Speaking Muslims was very effective, and its activities were concentrated

[152] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 23-24.
[153] Ibid, 24.
[154] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto and Nielsen, *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe*, 143.
[158] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[159] Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd Van Koningsveld, "Loyalty to a Non-Muslim Government," in *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States*, W. Shadid and S. Koningsveld (Editors) (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1996), 84–114, 98; Beverley Milton-Edwards, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Arab Spring and Its Future Face* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2016), 120.
[160] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 29.
[161] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Germany in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.

especially around the Islamic Centres in Aachen and Munich.[162] The al-Nahda adherents engaged in the activities the Islamic Centres in Aachen and Munich, as well as the Association of German Speaking Muslims, and organized regular conferences and assemblies.[163]

This research has showed that the al-Nahda movement had a very strong organizational structure in Italy. Actually, most of the North African immigrants were working without an official status in Italy in the mid-1980s.[164] This situation caused lack of regularization and created political opportunity structures for the al-Nahda exiles to operate freely in the following periods.[165] To illustrate, even though the exact number of Muslims was not clear, the estimated number of the irregular migrants in Italy was 651,000 as of 2008, and the Muslim population was densely populated especially in Rome and Milan, as well as Turin, Palermo and Naples.[166] In Italy, although the number of locations used for regular worship and collective activities was just seven in 1980, this number increased to nearly 50 by the end of 1992, and reached close to 200 by the end of the 1990s.[167]

The research has shown that the al-Nahda movement considerably increased its religious and ideological activities in the Rome Mosque, the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII), and the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy.[168] Although the Muslims of Italy could not accomplish to gain legal recognition, they were allowed to organize religious education at schools when there were a considerable number of pupils of a particular sect.[169] This situation created political opportunity structures among the al-Nahda exiles. "Casa della Cultura Musulmana via Padova" in Milan was an important organization for the al-Nahda movement for dissemination of the ideas and mobilizing its members and supporters.[170] This Islamic cultural center in Milan was an important source of recruiting young members for the movement.[171]

[162] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 35.
[163] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Germany in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[164] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 104-105.
[165] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Italy in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[166] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 105-106.
[167] Ibid, 106.
[168] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Italy in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[169] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 107.
[170] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Italy in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[171] Ibid.

The al-Nahda movement had the strongest recruitment capacity in Italy when compared to other European countries.[172] The second-generation al-Nahda members formed Young Muslims in Italy (Giovani Musulmani d'Italia, GMI).[173] This organization persisted in holding conferences joined by both men and women; speaking Italian rather than Arabic in all their communication in both public and private spheres; and sustaining multilevel religious activities with Christian and Jewish youth groups.[174] In addition, their avant-garde strategies to address Islamophobic behaviors in Italy and build an Italian Islamic identity have encompassed the production of comic strips, theatrical plays, and Islamic rap songs, all of which were expressed with Muslim motifs and heroes.[175]

In Switzerland, the al-Nahda exiles augmented their activities under the umbrella of Islamist organizations and mosques.[176] Especially the French-speaking cantons appealed a high number of North Africans, who inclined to encompass comparatively more professional and better-off families, and these Muslim communities were primarily from the Hanafi madhhab, as well as the Maliki madhhab.[177] This situation created an appropriate ground for the al-Nahda exiles. Moreover, there were not Muslim schools in Switzerland so that all Muslim children had to attend public education.[178] In this respect, the children of the al-Nahda exiles followed Qur'an schools independent of state control, and this situation created solidarity among the members of the movement in the country.[179]

The Netherlands was one of the best records of local churches aiding Muslim communities to build gathering spaces for praying and acquiring planning permission for mosques.[180] The al-Nahda exiles used local churches, as well as mosques for strengthening its network in the country.[181] In Belgium, the Islamic Cultural Centre had an important influence among the al-Nahda exiles through providing library, offices, information service and mosque.[182] This organization also performed as the headquarters of the European Council

[172] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Italy in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[173] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization,* 180.
[174] James Toronto, "Islam Italiano: Prospects for integration of Muslims in Italy's religious landscape," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 28, 1 (2008), 61–82.
[175] Toronto, "Islam Italiano,"
[176] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[177] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 99.
[178] Ibid, 100.
[179] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[180] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 72.
[181] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-2006) in Belgium in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[182] Ibid.

of Mosques for a certain period of time.[183] This organization was a strategic political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda for strengthening its network in Belgium.[184]

In Spain, there were plenty of mosques and prayer-houses all around the country, and the Islamic Cultural Centre in Madrid had an influencive role among the al-Nahda exiles.[185] The al-Nahda members mobilized the movement through improving its networks in the Islamic cultural centre, as well as mosques, prayer-houses and private Muslim schools.[186] In Sweden, the foundation of associations, involving religious ones, was comparatively simple in Swedish law, and there were 45 registered congregations by 1990, whereas the number of the congregations exceeded 150 in 2014.[187] The al-Nahda movement used the congregation networks in Sweden in order to mobilize its adherents.[188] In the light of these findings, the detailed presentation of the organizational dynamics of the al-Nahda movement in the countries of asylum has been mapped in the Diagram-4.1 as follows:

[183] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 91.
[184] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-2006) in Belgium in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[185] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Nielsen and Otterbeck, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 91.
[188] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1988-2011) in Sweden in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.

Diagram-4.1: The al-Nahda Movement in the Countries of Asylum



As seen in the Diagram-4.1, the comparative freedom of the Western countries let the al-Nahda members build more organized networks in the countries of asylum. The movement adherents supported newly arrived Tunisians in terms of finding house and schools, and ensuring cultural orientation.[189] Amir El Üreyit, one of the prominent figures of the al-Nahda, analyzed organizational capacity of the movement in the counties of asylum as follows:

> There was a serious organization outside Tunisia. The members of the movement in the countries of asylum were concerned with Tunisia. They were not only assisting prisoners in jails, but they were also helping detainees' families. We tried to give Islamic education to our young generation in Europe. We encouraged youth to struggle and engage in Islamist activities on specific issues, such as Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[190]

On the other hand, the organization of the al-Nahda in the countries of asylum was scattered over more than seventy countries,[191] which resulted in lack of coordination and communication between the exiles and the activists in Tunisia, to a certain extent. Especially due to the travel restrictions and financial constraints of the activists, the al-Nahda refugees were not able to participate in events during their early years, which resulted in establishment of autonomous institutions in order to operate the daily activities in France, Germany, and Switzerland, where thousands of the al-Nahda members were earning their life.[192] In addition, even in the countries of asylum, the al-Nahda activists coped with close surveillance of the Tunisian regime, and up until the 2011 Uprisings, the agents of the Tunisian intelligence spied and reported their activities to the regime, which created a fear among the al-Nahda activists in exile.[193]

However, despite this high level of anxiety, after consolidating their existence in the countries of asylum, the al-Nahda members began to concentrate on supporting their counterparts, who stayed in Tunisia, and most of the activists engaged in initiatives to help political inmates, provide financial support to families, and to wise up people abroad

[189] Tarek Osman, *Islamism: What It Means for the Middle East and the West* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2016), 29.
[190] Sala and Gökgöz, "Ulustan Ümmete Grubu El Üreyit'le Görüştü,"
[191] François Burgat, *L'islamisme au Maghreb: la Voix du Sud: Tunisie, Algérie, Libye, Maroc (Islamism in the Maghreb: The Voice of the South: Tunisia, Algeria, Libya)* (Paris: Karthala, 1988), 308.
[192] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 88.
[193] Ibid.

regarding the repression that they were exposed to in Tunisia.[194] The prosperous al-Nahda exiles in Europe, North America, and the Gulf constituted an important source that gave financial support to the movement.[195] Smaller contributions were made in all shperes of life, and they involved both small financial aids, as well as donations of time and service to the movement.[196] As the protests menaced the legitimacy of the Ben Ali regime, different political actors in the international arena attempted to turn this crisis into an opportunity through external interventions, and especially from the al-Nahda adherents in the Gulf countries, large amount of financial aid was performed in order to to support the al-Nahda movement to return to Tunisia's political arena.[197]

The al-Nahda also formed another network with the help of international human rights associations and independent unions to inform people regarding the degree of repression on the al-Nahda movement. Especially the associational work within the human rights communities or other political parties, which eventuated at the periphery of the movement, subserved for drawing the al-Nahda members to new destinations through promoting cross-party activism and a new human rights discourse.[198] In this respect, the al-Nahda's activities in France played a significant role due to the country's strong political and financial bonds to Tunisia, and the al-Nahda activists made sensational demonstrations in front of the Tunisian embassy whenever Tunisian officials visited France in order to raise public awareness on the regime's repressive exercises.[199] In this context, Rachid Ghannouchi summarized the ethical paradoxes of European community from the perspective of the al-Nahda movement as follows:

> Thirty thousand of our members and sympathizers were imprisoned in the beginning of the 1990s. There was a crusade against us. Over a hundred died under torture or suffered torture in prison. While this was happening, Ben Ali was receiving great support from Europe, and Tunisia was the first country of the southern Mediterranean to become a trade partner with the European Union. While torture was taking place, documented by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations, and repression was at its highest point, Europe was praising Ben Ali's great achievement and supposed economic miracle. And

[194] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 89.
[195] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 243.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Amel Boubekeur, "Islamists, secularists and old regime elites in Tunisia: Bargained competition," *Mediterranean Politics* 21, 1 (2016), 107–127.
[198] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 169.
[199] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 90.

> European universities were awarding Ben Ali human rights awards, whilst he was slaughtering Tunisians, they were granting him honorary doctorates.[200]

In fact, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the French administration had refrained from granting political asylum to al-Nahda members, as it did not want to disrupt bilateral relations with the Ben Ali regime.[201]

In brief, the al-Nahda movement's organizational capacity was not strong enough to initiate an uprising against the Ben Ali regime in the 1990s.[202] The harsh measures taken by the Tunisian security forces weakened the movement considerably.[203] Even those, who were members of the al-Nahda but supported other movements, were under the surveillance of the Ben Ali regime.[204] All this caused the al-Nahda movement to head to Europe. The al-Nahda movement established a solid network through the cells, which were constructed in the European countries.[205] Thanks to these cells, the movement was able to form a strong base in Europe.[206] The meetings of the movement were held periodically within these cells, and the movement representatives collected financial aid in these meetings.[207]

Moreover, the research has also shown that counterfeit documents -although it is so difficult to prove directly- were provided for the members of the al-Nahda movement, who were wanted due to the formal applications of the Tunisian regime.[208] This made it impossible for the Tunisian regime to arrest the wanted members of the al-Nahda movement in Europe.[209] In addition, the exiled members of the movement, especially those in the United Kingdom, where most leaders of the movement used to live, were in close contact with the human rights organizations.[210] This created a legal defence shield for the

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[200] Rachid Ghannouchi, "Interview Transcript: Rachid Ghannouchi," *Financial Times*, 18 January 2011. Web: https://www.ft.com/content/24d710a6-22ee-11e0-ad0b-00144feab49a. Accessed: 2020-09-09.
[201] Author Interview with the Tunisian Commercial Attaché (Retired) in İstanbul on 21 September 2022.
[202] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (1989-2016) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement in İstanbul on 21 September 2022.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[206] Ibid.
[207] Ibid.
[208] Author Interview with the Tunisian Defence Attaché (Retired) in İstanbul on 21 September 2022.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.

movement.[211] The support from other NGOs and media organizations further strengthened this shield.[212] Finally, the front companies established by the al-Nahda members in Europe also provided an important financial resource to the movement.[213] Thanks to these front companies, the al-Nahda movement both provided a large income and carried out its ideological activities under the umbrella of commercial activities.[214]

Despite many difficulties, the al-Nahda's experience in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden allowed the movement to reconstruct, reinforce and keep its organizational structure, and to live as a cohesive community in the countries of asylum. The conditions in the countries of asylum allowed the al-Nahda members to acquire university degrees and reconstruct their lives in exile. Some al-Nahda figures also had an impact on the politics of the countries of asylum, which played a crucial role in ensuring intellectual foundations for the movement. The al-Nahda's survival in exile was also advocated by its individualist and entrepreneurial vein, which produced an important asset in aiding the movement to enhance its financial ground and improve the considerable international bonds that became crucial to its role in the 2011 Uprisings.

4.3. Division in the Movement Leadership: Triumph of Moderate Wing

In the early 1990s, the al-Nahda benefitted from the opportunity of the Gulf War in order to mobilize its base and create public opinion through disseminating its own slogans, such as "Eliminate the system!", in opposition to the regime.[215] The al-Nahda members protested the arrival of United States Army in Saudi Arabia after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.[216] The al-Nahda organized demonstrations in 1991 in order to advocate Iraq in the Gulf War, which resulted in backlash of the regime.[217]

[211] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom in İstanbul on 14 September 2022.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 18 September 2022.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 265.
[216] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 168.
[217] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 5.

In the literature, there is not enough information about the course of action of the al-Nahda during the Gulf War. The declaration, which was published on 17 January 1991, criticized the increasing aggression of Western states.[218] The movement declared that the United States and its allies were making a military intervention in Iraq by mobilizing all the possibilities of technology. The declaration reported that the West's hostility towards Islam and Muslims was ongoing in Palestine, as well.

In the declaration, the al-Nahda evaluated that the hostility of the West was directed not only against Iraq but also towards Islam and the unity of Muslims. The movement called on all Arab and Islamist organizations to assume their historical responsibilities against the "massacre" and "destruction" in Iraq. This declaration pointed out that the al-Nahda movement tried to raise awareness in the international arena and especially in the eyes of Arab and Islamist organizations with its stance in the Gulf War.

In this context, the Islamist protesters took the position of their counterparts in the Maghreb, who considered that the Gulf War was a struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims.[219] On the other hand, the Gulf War created another disagreement, which resulted in a division within the al-Nahda movement. Rachid Ghannouchi criticisized the Western intervention, which distanced him from the official Tunisian policy, whereas Abdelfattah Mourou promoted his appeal for international military aid, which seriously diminished his influence within the movement.[220]

Thanks to the growth of the second-generation al-Nahda members in exile in the period from 1989 to 1999, the organizational dynamics of the movement improved in the countries of asylum, to a very large extent. However, within the movement, there were successive splits due to theoretical and jurisprudential differences between some leaders and Rachid Ghannouchi.[221] In fact, the regime had benefited from those splits in weakening the movement in every period.[222] After the MTI experience, there was still a division among the al-Nahda members in the countries of asylum, and one wing was

[218] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda: la li al-Uʿdwan (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement: Against Aggression, 17 January 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-17, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة/1991_جانفي_17_بيان_في#gsc.tab=0.
[219] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 265.
[220] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 198.
[221] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[222] Ibid.

composed of hardliners under the leadership of Salah Karker (1948-2012) in France,[223] whereas the other wing was more moderate under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi in the United Kingdom.

Similarly, the main fracture within the Islamist movement in Tunisia was between the moderate wing and the radical wing.[224] The moderate wing, such as the MTI/al-Nahda and the Progressive Islamists, was legalist and pragmatic endeavoring to realize a progressive Islamist change in Tunisia, whereas the radical wing, such as the Islamic Liberation Party and the Islamic Jihad, desired to get hold of controlling the security units for implementing their plan in order to establish an Islamic state, sometimes via applying terrorist activities.[225] The moderate wing prefered to use popular education as an intrument in order to accomplish their political aims, and tried to engage in the political system, while the hardliners aimed at obliterating the existing political system.[226]

Salah Karker was considered as a fierce defender of the MB in the al-Nahda movement.[227] At that time, the MB was very popular and a strong alternative to many regimes in the MENA, which could not satisfy the needs of their people.[228] Thanks to its international network, the MB had members/support all over the world, and it had many years of organizational experience in the MENA, too.[229] In addition, the values espoused by the MB were widely echoed in Arab societies in the MENA.[230]

In this context, Salah Karker promoted the notion that violence can sometimes be necessary to liberate countries from their autocratic and anti-Islamic leaders, an approach inspired by the key ideologues of the MB.[231] Marc Lynch argues that the MB ought to be allowed to pursue its struggles against extremist challengers, but ought not to be misapprehended as a liberal structure or advocated in short-range interests.[232] Similarly, the Executive Bureau of the al-Nahda resolved to exclude Salah Karker from the al-Nahda movement; in other words, Karker's ambiguous stance on the use of "violence" resulted in

[223] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 51.
[224] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 397-398.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 51.
[228] Author Interview with the Senior Expert of the International Crisis Group through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[229] Ibid.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 93.
[232] Marc Lynch, "Islam divided between Salafi-jihad and Ikhwan," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, 6 (2010), 467-487.

his exclusion from the al-Nahda movement.[233] After that, the Shura Council of the al-Nahda movement officially approved this resolution.[234]

The declaration issued by the exiled members of the al-Nahda on 4 August 1995 revealed the extent of the division within the movement.[235] In the declaration, Rachid Ghannouchi's announcement of death of Muhammad al-Jabali, a member of the movement, on 23 July 1995, without confirming the news, and blaming the regime for the death, were harshly criticized. Because, within a short time, Muhammad al-Jabali's relatives stated that he was alive, and this news was also confirmed by the Tunisian Branch of the Human Rights Association.

In the declaration, some exiled members of the al-Nahda claimed that Rachid Ghannouchi had acted thoughtlessly and without common sense, and they criticized the movement's adherence to Rachid Ghannouchi with "absolute obedience principle" and "herd mentality". The exiled members of the al-Nahda stated that in the 14th year of the movement's foundation, many "lies" and "misconceptions" were on the floor, the losses of the movement were increasing day by day due to Rachid Ghannouchi's "wrong" policies, and they demanded Ghannouchi's resignation in the declaration.

This declaration was an important example of intra-movement division. At the end of the declaration, it was noted that the document was prepared by the exiled members of the al-Nahda, but no country or member name were mentioned. After the MTI era, division within the the al-Nahda movement continued to increase in the 1990s between the hardliners in France led by Salah Karker and the moderate wing in the United Kingdom led by Rachid Ghannouchi as mentioned above. In this respect, it was highly probable that this declaration was written by the exiled al-Nahda members, who supported Salah Karker. The fact that the declaration coincided with the period when Salah Karker was expelled from the al-Nahda movement was also strengthing this assessment.

[233] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, xviii.
[234] Ibid, 94.
[235] "Hal Kana la Budda min al-Tasarruʿ? (Was It Necessary to Hurry?, 4 August 1995)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-15, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1995_أوت_4_في_نقدي_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

The declaration issued by exiled al-Nahda members in August 1995 similarly explicitly referred to the division within the movement.[236] The declaration criticized Ghannouchi's denial of the Ministry of Interior on 23 July 1995, declaring that Muhammad al-Jabali was dead, as well as blaming the regime for this. In the declaration, it was claimed that Rachid Ghannouchi made "unrealistic" and "irresponsible" actions in such "illusory statements" and this approach became Ghannouchi's general style of action. In the declaration, some exiled members of the al-Nahda declared that Rachid Ghannouchi always saw himself above the law and all institutions, that he alone ruled the movement and its members by his rules, and that he had led the movement alone since its establishment.

In the declaration, the exiled members of the al-Nahda claimed that after Rachid Ghannouchi was released in 1984, he waged an obsessive struggle for leadership of the movement, purging everyone who opposed him from the movement in the process. In this respect, they noted that Rachid Ghannouchi kept the same stance in order to be the de facto leader of the movement after 1987. In the declaration, the exiled members of the al-Nahda declared that Rachid Ghannouchi had destroyed the ties of the dissidents within the movement with the society; therefore, the people thought that the opposition group within the movement was not loyal to the movement. They blamed Rachid Ghannouchi for the difficult processes of the movement in 1981, 1987 and 1991.

Moreover, in the declaration, Rachid Ghannouchi was accused of allying with Mohammed Mzali in 1987. In this respect, the exiled members of the al-Nahda claimed that Rachid Ghannouchi was identified only with being the head of the movement, was not successful in the pro-violent struggle, as well as in politics, and almost "playing games" with the future of both the movement and intra-movement opposition. Considered together with the previous declaration related to the division within the movement, this declaration was also highly probable to be prepared by the exiled al-Nahda members, who supported Salah Karker.

[236] "Aina al-Sheikh min al-Misdaqiyya? (Where Is the Sheikh of the Friendship?, August 1995)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-17, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/المهجر_من_نقدي_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

Another declaration issued by exiled al-Nahda members in August 1995 openly referred to the division within the movement, again.[237] The declaration criticized the "management weaknesses" and "mistakes" made under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi since the founding of the movement. In the declaration, it was stated that the members of the movement were initially impressed by the style and dignity of Rachid Ghannouchi as a philosophy teacher in the mosques, the Islamic religion was taught in the lesson groups called halaqat, the religious education continued within the families with the principle of secrecy, and a Muslim generation was created within conservative families.

On the other hand, the exiled al-Nahda members claimed that when the movement started to grapple with "lies", Rachid Ghannouchi opposed the Bourguiba regime and declared the movement officially in 1981. They stated that when Ghannouchi got out of prison, he tried to establish an order again in the congress in 1984, and he tried to harden his curriculum both in religious education and in mosques (Ben Arous)[238] in 1987. In the declaration, the exiled al-Nahda members stated that the slogan of the movement turned into abolishing the regime and developing arguments accordingly; however, these arguments turned against the movement in time.[239]

In the declaration, it was stated that Rachid Ghannouchi took refuge in Europe and subsequently conducted shuttle diplomacy in Europe, Africa and America, but "arrogance" and "pride" dominated him in this process. In the declaration, besides the hardships and losses suffered by the members of the movement, it was declared that Rachid Ghannouchi lived a very "comfortable life" with his wife in the United Kingdom and his children were educated in the "best schools" in Europe and America. It has been reported that nothing would change unless they could change the mindset of the movement members and the movement leader, as well. When evaluated together with other intra-movement division declarations, it was obvious that this declaration was also highly probable to be prepared by the exiled al-Nahda members, who supported Salah Karker.

[237] "al-Sheikh Rachid wa Uʿqda al-Sulta (Sheikh Rachid and the Power Complex, August 1995)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-19, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/بيان_نقدي_من_اعضاء_الحركة_بالمهجر/بيانات_الاتجاه_الإسلامي_و_النهضة#gsc.tab=0.

[238] Ben Arous is a small coastal city south of the capital.

[239] "al-Sheikh Rachid wa Uʿqda al-Sulta (Sheikh Rachid and the Power Complex, August 1995),"

Similarly, in the sixth party congress in Switzerland in 1995, there were fierce debates regarding the dilemma between violence and dialogue options.[240] At the end of these debates, it was decided to oppose the semi-authoritarian Ben Ali regime by political means and the movement resolved to collaborate with moderate politicians, such as Moncef Marzouki.[241] In this respect, the congress held in 1995 was a turning point. In this congress, the al-Nahda movement decided to adapt a completely moderate policy and achieved this by interpreting Western values from an Islamic perspective.[242] The moderate stance of the movement in politics played a major role in distancing from violence in its struggle against the Ben Ali regime.[243] In fact, at that time, there were allegations that a militant wing affiliated with the al-Nahda movement was established under the leadership of Salah Karker in some countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Chechnya.[244] However, this wing was liquidated after he lost the rivalry against Rached Ghannouchi.[245]

In this context, the division in the movement leadership resulted in the victory of the Ghannouchi-led faction proposing moderation, and the unity of Ghannouchi and the second-generation al-Nahda members strengthened. Rachid Ghannouchi attracted many al-Nahda members in exile as a charismatic Islamist leader. He turned into a symbol of the movement through exposing his commitment to pluralism, freedom, and deference for individual and public rights while he was in exile.[246] The position of Rachid Ghannouchi within the movement was reinforced by his charisma, since he was the founder of the movement, as well as acting as both a religious leader and prominent politician.[247] The al-Nahda case showed that once the organizational structure was more movement than a party, the members of the movement could mobilize around a charismatic leader.

On the other hand, the research has also shown that there were conflicts between those who were exiled and those who were imprisoned from time to time. In this respect, the exiles and the inmates also formed two main groups within the movement. The exiled group was a more educated and intellectual group, whereas the group that was imprisoned in Tunisia,

[240] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.
[241] Ibid.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid.
[244] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 106.
[247] McCarthy, "Islamism, party change, and strategic conciliation," 3.

which included members, such as Ali Laarayedh, Hamadi Jebali and Abdelfattah Mourou, was a group that knew the field very well.[248] There was rivalry between "formally trained ones" and "self-taught ones" from time to time.[249] However, the organization at both levels including the exiles and the inmates played a major role in the success of the movement and enabled the al-Nahda to influence a large part of the Tunisian society.[250]

4.4. Emphasis on Acknowledgement of Western Values

The al-Nahda movement was different from other Islamist movements in the Arab world with its emphasis on democracy as its basic principle, and the issues of democracy and freedoms were always the central issue of Tunisian Islamists.[251] In addition to rejecting violence as a mean to resolve political and intellectual conflicts, the best thing that distinguished the al-Nahda movement from other Islamist movements was the strategy, which was applying nonviolent means and moderate discourses as the opposition.[252] According to Rachid Ghannouchi, the basic revolutions in Tunisian history relied on Islamic values, which was the primary motive on their achievements.[253] In this respect, he identifed the main problem as the ignorance of Islamic values by diagnostic framing, and determined the solution as adaption of the Islamic values in accomplishment of dramatic changes in society by prognostic framing.

During the 1989-1999 period, the movement began to acknowledge Western values and interpret them from an Islamic perspective. This tendency of the movement was evident in its declarations in this period. After the movement took the name "al-Nahda" in 1989, it issued a series of declarations. In the declaration signed by Abdelfattah Mourou, one of the founding members of the al-Nahda movement, on 8 June 1989, the rejection of the

[248] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Inmate (1991-2006) in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid.
[251] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[252] Zahreddine, *al-Harakat wa al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya wa Fahm al-Akhr (The Islamist Movements and Parties, and Understanding the Other)*, 561.
[253] Rachid Ghannouchi, *min al-Fikr al-Islami fi Tunis (From Islamic Thought in Tunisia)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1992), 26-27.

application of the al-Nahda by the Ministry of Interior was addressed.[254] The al-Nahda Movement stated that the rejection of its application to become a legal political party after changing its name was a major obstacle to Tunisia's democratic life. In addition, the al-Nahda claimed that the regime's refusal to permit the movement to operate as a legal political party also violated the Tunisian constitution.

In this context, the founding members of the al-Nahda movement announced eight articles in this declaration. Firstly, al-Nahda directly condemned the government's refusal. Secondly, the movement considered the government's refusal as a "dangerous" act that undermined democracy after the results of the general election held on 2 April 1989 were annulled. Thirdly, the movement attributed the responsibility of this decision to all the structures that supported it, especially the government. Fourthly, the al-Nahda criticized the slowness of the process on enacting the amnesty law regarding cases against the movement. Fifthly, the movement stated that the government's policy of slowing down the foundation of the al-Nahda movement and its activities dragged the country into uncertainty. Sixthly, the movement declared that the al-Nahda would defend its legal existence on every platform and would stand against all discriminatory and exclusionary practices in the political arena. Seventhly, the al-Nahda movement promised the Tunisian people to continue its struggle for law, justice and freedom. Finally, the movement called on all political parties to take responsibility to get out of this approach that threatened the country and jeopardized democracy. In this declaration, the problems experienced by the al-Nahda movement were determined more professionally compared to the previous declarations and these problems were listed under eight articles. In this respect, the al-Nahda movement improved its diagnostic framing efforts.

In the declaration signed by Abdelfattah Mourou on 13 June 1989, the issue of the repressive measures against the Islamists, which made their living conditions more difficult, were addressed.[255] In this respect, the al-Nahda determined the repressive practices carried out by the regime against the Islamists in the recent period. Firstly, the arrests in Tunis, Bizerte and some coastal cities were criticized. Secondly, the ban of

[254] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 8 June 1989)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-16, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/Article/وثائق_طلب_التأشيرة_وتغيير_إسم_الحركة#gsc.tab=0.

[255] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 13 June 1989)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-16, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/Article/وثائق_طلب_التأشيرة_وتغيير_إسم_الحركة#gsc.tab=0.

masjids and Qur'an courses was criticized. Thirdly, the arrest of leaders and other supporters of the al-Nahda movement, such as Doctor bin Najma, was criticized. Finally, the al-Nahda criticized the other repressive practices of the police, such as covert surveillance of the leaders and supporters of the movement, taking them to the police station for investigation purposes, and controlling demonstrations.

In this declaration, the problems experienced by the al-Nahda movement were specified, in detail. In addition, the movement addressed the problems arising from political actors other than itself, and discussed the problems with a broader perspective. In this respect, the al-Nahda improved its diagnostic framing efforts. Moreover, in the same declaration, the al-Nahda stated that these practices of the government hindered the development of political life in Tunisia and announced a four-point manifesto. Firstly, the al-Nahda movement rejected political trials. Secondly, the al-Nahda called for the release of all its members/supporters who were arrested and prosecuted. Thirdly, the al-Nahda condemned the silence/ignorance of other political parties in the country in the face of violations of freedoms. Finally, the al-Nahda stated that the movement was concerned about the government's stance towards the Islamists, and invited the regime to "purification" in the political arena and demanded that the problems of the country could be resolved with the participation of all political parties. The movement improved its motivational framing efforts by inviting the regime to ensure freedom in the political arena.

In the declaration signed by Abdelfattah Mourou on 17 August 1989, the fixed wages of workers throughout the country for many years and price increases in essential consumer goods were thoroughly analyzed.[256] According to the declaration, the price increases in the essential consumer goods effected a large part of the population; however, the unemployed and middle class were the most effected groups, which increased the class differences in the society. Moreover, the gradual launching of the essential consumer goods to the market also deepened the class differences in the society, and triggered the perception of injustice prevailing in the society at large. In addition, the government used to perform price increases arbitrarily, without consulting different segments of the society. Furthermore, while there had been no increase in the wages for years, the exorbitant price increases brought about the devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar.

[256] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 17 August 1989)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-09, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1989_أوت_19_في_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

In the declaration, the al-Nahda stated that a solution was urgently needed to alleviate the growing burden on the Compensation Fund. The al-Nahda stipulated that all actors in the social and economic field should come together on a democratic ground and produce a shared solution in order to overcome this difficult period that the country's economy. In addition, the al-Nahda declared that in order to make progress in this difficult situation, it was essential to ensure justice in the political, economic, cultural and social fields. In the declaration, the socio-economic problems experienced in the country were systematically turned into political discourses. In this respect, the al-Nahda movement improved its diagnostic framing efforts.

In the declaration signed by Ali al-Areedh, the Spokesperson of the al-Nahda, on 23 December 1989, the United States' "invasion" of Panama was condemned.[257] In this respect, the al-Nahda stated that the discourses of Western states in the field of human rights did not match up with their practices. The al-Nahda stated that many innocent people lost their lives with the United States' invasion of Panama and that a similar situation happened in other territories, such as Palestine and Afghanistan. This declaration was important in terms of demonstrating the reaction of the al-Nahda movement to international developments. In addition, it was possible to see the traces of Hannah Arendt in the criticisms of the al-Nahda movement. In the declaration, the al-Nahda openly critisized the paradox between the theoretical conceptualization efforts of Western states in the area of human rights and their practices against the human rights in the field.

In the article, which was published in the ninth issue of *"al-Fajr"* newspaper on 16 June 1990, the problematic of "The People of the State or the State of the People?" was addressed.[258] In this article, it was stated that the authority should not be centralized instead should be decentralized, because the ruler should not have absolute authority over the legislative, judicial or general policies, such as capital, education, culture, religion; state institutions were not the property of the ruler; posts and ranks must be gained in accordance with laws, as well as the level of competence, merit, reliability and success in the public service.[259]

[257] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 23 December 1989)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-06, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/باناما_على_الأمريكي_العدوان_حول_بيان#gsc.tab=0.
[258] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 135.
[259] Ibid, 137.

In this context, Rachid Ghannouchi improved prognostic framing efforts and listed the main solutions for foundation of "the state of the people" as follows: Freedom to establish parties and associations, removal of restrictions on the press, independence of the judiciary, respect for the will of the people to elect their own parliament and administrators, release of political prisoners, absolute prohibition of torture, impartiality of the administration, termination of the partisan presidential system, opening space for initiative and creative energy in all fields, providing social security, respecting the will of the people to shape general policies, such as education and economy.[260]

In the declaration signed by Ali al-Areedh on 12 September 1990, the al-Nahda movement commemorated the death of al-Tayeb al-Khamassi, who was shot in the chest by a police bullet in the university mosque on 7 September 1990.[261] According to the declaration, in the statement issued by the Ministry of Interior, it was stated that leaflets were distributed at the university and the police opened fire to prevent it. However, the movement claimed that the leaflets distributed consisted of religious brochures and did not have any content related to resisting the police, and the police did not help after shooting the the al-Nahda member leaving him to death.

In the declaration, the al-Nahda openly assessed this as a "murder", and demanded that those, who were responsible, must be punished. The al-Nahda called for termination of restrictions, detentions and hardships on the movement and the release of the movement's detainees. The al-Nahda claimed that the regime considered the movement as a security threat and that the country was wasting state resources by using its security force against the movement. The al-Nahda demanded that the regime should ensure individual rights and freedoms, as well as freedom of belief, and guarantee the worship of people in the mosques in safety.

Furthermore, in the declaration, the movement declared that the prohibition of Qur'an courses was against freedom of belief and all these damaged the atmosphere of trust in the country. Finally, the al-Nahda movement declared that the movement would continue its struggle, and take all responsibility for the protection of rights and freedoms to come out of the crisis in Tunisia. This declaration was very important in terms of showing the extent of

[260] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 140.
[261] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 12 September 1990)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-14, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1990_سبتمبر_12_في_بيان #gsc.tab=0

repression and violence practiced against the movement. In this respect, it also contained some examples of the regime's repressive practices towards the movement. This declaration positively improved the diagnostic framing efforts of the al-Nahda movement.

In the declaration published on 7 November 1990, signed by the spokesperson of the al-Nahda Movement Ali al-Areedh, the movement severely criticized the ongoing crisis in the country.[262] According to the declaration, the ruling party was "unsuccessful" in managing the crisis in the country and was "insufficient" in resolving existing problems. The movement criticized the practices restricting individual rights and freedoms, such as numerous arrests, new political trials and the closure of broadcasting organizations. According to the declaration, the main reason of the crisis stemmed from the ruling party's rejection to position itself as separate from the state apparatus. The declaration pointed out that the severity of the repression against the al-Nahda movement had been increasing. Determining the fact that the ruling party's rejection to position itself apart from the state apparatus as the main cause of the crisis was so significant in terms of the movement's diagnostic framing efforts.

In the declaration published on 23 January 1991, signed by Fadel al-Baladi, Chairman of the al-Nahda Movement Shura Council, the Western "invasion" of Iraq was harshly criticized.[263] According to the al-Nahda movement, the Western rhetoric in the field of human rights was a "deception". The al-Nahda movement declared that it supported Iraq in its war against the West with the understanding of "jihad". In the declaration, the al-Nahda Shura Council issued a ten-point manifesto:

> 1) Allah is with the Iraqi people in their war against the technologically superior enemy.
> 2) This struggle reveals the importance of the Palestine Cause.
> 3) Support to Iraq by Islamist movements will play a critical role in the war.
> 4) Islamist movements under the Islamic Ummah must fulfill their historical, national and cultural responsibility in this war by supporting jihad.
> 5) The Crusader Army under the command of the United States, with the support of England, France and Italy, uses all kinds of means of destruction against the Arab people, and this situation is strongly condemned.

[262] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 7 November 1990)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-10, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1990_نوفمبر_7_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

[263] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 23 January 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-20, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1991_جانفي_23_في_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

6) The hypocritical actions of the Arab organizations in this war and their engagement with the Western bloc are strongly condemned.
7) All Muslim Arab countries are invited to support Iraq and especially Arab countries that are on the side of the West are invited to jihad to support Iraq.
8) In the Western public opinion, demonstrations and movements arguing that the Gulf War is wrong are welcomed.
9) The Tunisian regime's practices towards the Islamists protesting the Gulf War have hardened and the movement has begun to give losses.
10) The al-Nahda movement invites the Tunisian people to support Iraq against the West in the Gulf War. [264]

This declaration had a special importance since it was issued by the al-Nahda Movement Shura Council. In the declaration, the stance of the al-Nahda movement in the Gulf War was clearly expressed, and the movement's criticisms at the local, regional and global level were listed in a systematic way by motivational framing.

According to the declaration signed by Rachid Ghannouchi on 18 March 1991, the al-Nahda movement described the chaos in the country as "state terrorism" and declared that the movement rejected this violence.[265] In the declaration, the al-Nahda movement set out a series of solutions to the regime's "tyranny", "mischief", "lawless behavior" and repression. These were respectively; the general amnesty, the release of political prisoners, the reinstatement of those fired, the return of the exiled members to the country, the recognition of every political party without exception, the freedom of the press in every field, allowing radio and television channels of each political view to broadcast, separating the regime party from the state apparatus, and holding the general elections in an independent and democratic atmosphere.

This declaration was a very valuable document signed by Rachid Ghannouchi, Leader of the al-Nahda Movement. In the declaration, the movement entrepreneurs and problems that were not encountered in the literature were systematically expressed in all details as mentioned in the previous parts. In this respect, the declaration set an important example for al-Nahda's diagnostic framing efforts. In addition, in the last part of the declaration, the solution proposals that the movement invited all political parties in the country, especially the regime, were listed. At this point, the al-Nahda movement improved its prognostic framing efforts.

[264] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 23 January 1991),"
[265] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, 18 March 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-07, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1991_مارس_18_في_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

In the declaration signed by Ahmed bin Saleh, Rachid Ghannouchi, Mohammed Mzali, Tariq bin Saleh, Ali al-Masoudi, Abdel Raouf Boulaabi, Abdel-Khalek al-Tokabri, Habib Mokni, Ahmed al-Shanoufi on 10 May 1991; the al-Nahda movement proclaimed a five-point manifesto.[266] First of all, the violence of the regime against people across the country was severely condemned. Secondly, all Tunisian people, men and women, were invited to publicly reveal the regime's violent actions, "state terror", and restriction of freedoms. Thirdly, the struggle of the students and the unions in order to protect the individual rights and freedoms was supported by the movement. Fourthly, all political groups and state institutions were invited to support the students. It was stated that the regime's "risky" actions against human rights harmed both the Tunisian people and democracy in the country. Finally, the movement called on the world community to help the Tunisian people in the name of democracy and human rights.

This declaration was important in terms of analyzing the state repression and its repercussions on the student wing of the al-Nahda movement, as mentioned in the previous parts. The regime's repression on students, who supported the movement, brought the al-Nahda to a point where the movement was open to cooperation with labor unions. In addition, the direct support of the students' struggle to protect individual rights and freedoms, as well as the unions, was an example of the al-Nahda's endeavor to increase social mobilization despite the heavy repression of the regime in the eyes of Tunisian people.

Rachid Ghannouchi addressed the issue of "fabrications" against the al-Nahda movement in a declaration published in Geneva on 30 September 1991.[267] According to Ghannouchi, the regime's police state practices in Tunisia had turned the country into a "great prison". The declaration stated that the regime's "baseless allegations" and new repressive practices continued increasingly. According to the declaration, while the demand for democracy both in the country and the world was increasing day by day, the current economic and political situation in Tunisia was fueling the social discomfort even more; yet, despite this,

[266] "Bayan Haraka al-Nahda (Declaration of the al-Nahda Movement, Paris, 10 May 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-10, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1991_ماي_10_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

[267] "Hal Baqa Mashhad Akhir Musalsal al-Iftiraʾat didda Haraka al-Nahda? (Is There Another Episode in the Fabrications Against the al-Nahda Movement? Geneva, 30 September 1991)," *The Database of Ennahdha Memory*, Accessed: 2023-01-03, Web: https://ennahdha-memory.com/النهضة_و_الإسلامي_الاتجاه_بيانات/1991_جنيف_في_بيان #gsc.tab=0.

the regime was increasing its repression on the society by accusing the opposition through different "conspiracy scenarios".

In the declaration, Ghannouchi claimed that the al-Nahda movement was accused of a plot to overthrow the country's 100,000-strong armed forces with leaflets and molotov cocktails, an allegation that could not be substantiated with any evidence. On the other hand, through the Ministry of Interior, the regime claimed that there was a weapon production facility belonging to the al-Nahda movement, although it was determined that the weapons broadcasted on the television were weapons used in hunting. In addition, the regime claimed that the al-Nahda movement would shoot down Ben Ali's plane with US-made stinger anti-aircraft missiles and brought these missiles from Afghanistan, accusing the Algerian authorities of collaborating with the al-Nahda movement. In the declaration, the al-Nahda movement declared that all of these accusations were "baseless" and that the regime did not have any evidence. In addition, the movement stated that these "baseless allegations" were served to the public in the media organs, which were controlled by the regime due to the police state practices in the country. In the declaration, Ghannouchi announced a seven-point manifesto:

> 1) The movement followed civil policy mechanisms even if the regime applied violence. The regime's attempt to terrorize the movement would not deter the movement's goal of synthesizing democracy and modernism with Islamic religion and culture. Therefore, the accusations of the regime against the movement without providing any evidence were clearly rejected.
> 2) These conspiracy scenarios targeting democracy were being waged to intimidate the opposition; essentially filling the prisons with thousands of political prisoners and harming the country with violence, torture, arbitrary arrests and political trials.
> 3) After being tortured many times, members of the al-Nahda movement made confessions on the regime's television channels. These were speeches made under torture and pressure, and they were not different from the propagandas made during the Stalin era.
> 4) The conspiracy theories conducted by the regime through the police force also targeted to undermine the movement's relations with many countries, especially with neighbour countries. The al-Nahda movement, as a moderate political movement at home and abroad, advocated multi-party democracy and human rights.
> 5) The current stance of the regime indicated that it was trying to cover up its failure to solve the country's political, economic and social problems by suppressing the opposition. These repressive practices of the regime resulted in its isolation from entities, such as the UGTT, Tunisian Lawyers Association, LTDH. The regime, which was left alone, increased its pressure on the society in order to maintain its dominance.
> 6) Violence would not be a solution to the problems in the country. Despite the violent practices of the regime, all kinds of cooperation for a multi-party democratic system that respected human rights would be supported by moderate civil policy mechanisms.

> 7) The al-Nahda movement invited its supporters, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, youth organizations and other political parties to show civil resistance against the authoritarian practices of the regime.[268]

This declaration, signed by Rachid Ghannouchi, had been published at a time when the regime repression against the al-Nahda movement was at its peak level. The challenges faced by the movement were described in detail in the document. The movement assessed attempts of the regime against the al-Nahda as conspiracy. In addition, the fact that the actors, such as the UGTT, Tunisian Lawyers Association, LTDH, with which the al-Nahda movement had tacit cooperation at certain periods despite some opinion differences, were explicitly mentioned in the document. In addition, the movement invited its supporters, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, youth organizations and other political parties to show civil resistance against the semi-authoritarian practices of the regime. As a matter of fact, although this call did not receive a sufficient response from the society in those years, it increased the movement's influence in the eyes of Tunisian society, especially after 2000, in the axis of democracy, pluralism and freedom of belief.

Women were also effective in the framing efforts of the al-Nahda movement. In April 1994, 120 women intellectuals, journalists, doctors, and university professors signed a petition entitled "An Appeal for Democracy" demanding from the Ben Ali regime more freedom and reverence for individual rights.[269] Meherzia Labidi, who was one of the prominent female figures of the al-Nahda movement, assumed an active role in inter-cultural and religious communication affairs of the movement, and she was also a leading figure of the Global Women of Faith Network, which was led by the International Women's Coordinating Committee (IWCC).[270] The impetus of the Global Women of Faith Network was to encourage the role of religious women, canalize women of faith into all "Religions for Peace" projects and actions, provide that women's matters and viewpoints are counted in the comprehensive planning, performing and assessment.[271]

In the sixth party congress in Switzerland in 1995, the movement engaged in deep self-criticisms regarding its stance within the political arena. In the congress, the participants

[268] "Hal Baqa Mashhad Akhir Musalsal al-Iftiraʾat didda Haraka al-Nahda? (Is There Another Episode in the Fabrications Against the al-Nahda Movement? Geneva, 30 September 1991),"
[269] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 103.
[270] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, xviii.
[271] Angela Oliver, Azza Kararm and Elisa Levy, *Women of Faith Transforming Conflict: A Multi-Religious Training Manual* (United States of America: World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2004), 12.

admitted that the movement had been isolated in the political shpere and had failed to construct relations with allies, who could have advocated the al-Nahda against the repressive practices of the regime.[272] In the Fifteenth Anniversary Statement of the al-Nahda, the movement acknowledged that the movement's political stance in the late 1980s had strangled its cultural and social activities and resulted in direct confrontation with the state.[273]

This party congress played a significant role in restructuring the movement's overseas structures, and provided a genuine institutional framework for the al-Nahda in order to organize its activities outside Tunisia. In the party congress in Switzerland in 1995, the movement decided to concentrate on social activities through creating social messages that aimed at reducing the repression of the Tunisian regime, as well as conveying these mesaages to the public via using media.[274] In the congress, the necessity for more moderate party policies and national dialogue initiatives began to be emphasized.[275] The movement stressed its stance against violence by motivational framing.

Rachid Ghannouchi published a declaration in November 1995 in the London-based, Saudi-owned newspaper, "*al-Hayat*", requesting for a return to democracy, and some academic experts regarded Ghannouchi as one of the key figures within the broader Islamic movement encouraging recognition of political pluralism.[276] In this respect, some researchers thought that the exile period of Ghannouchi made him one of the most sophisticated Islamist ideologists on the theme of democracy and civil liberties.[277] Ghannouchi's ideological approach broadened within the European context, and he synthesized the Islamic moral values with the concepts, such as free elections, free press, preservation of minorities, and equality of both secular and religious parties.[278] In this respect, the movement began to label itself as a modernized party, acknowledged Western values, and interpreted them from an Islamic perspective.

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[272] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 94.
[273] "Bayan al-Dhikra al-Khamisa ʿAshara li Haraka al-Nahda/Durus al-Madi wa Ishkalat al-Hadir wa Tatalluʿat al-Mustaqbal (The Fifteenth Anniversary Statement of the al-Nahda/Lessons From The Past, Problems of The Present, and Aspirations For The Future)," *The Database of Ikhwan Wiki*, Accessed: 2022-09-05, Web: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=حركة_النهضة_بتونس_في_الذكرى_الخامسة_عشرة_لتأسيسها.
[274] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in Switzerland in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.
[275] Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation," 265.
[276] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1091.
[277] Robin B. Wright, "Two visions of reformation," *Journal of Democracy* 7, 2 (1996), 64-75.
[278] Ibid.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the al-Nahda movement in the 1989-1999 period, in which the movement struggled against heavy state repression, as well as making great efforts for survival in the countries of asylum. In this repsect, the al-Nahda has been analyzed through applying the three main factors of the PPM, as well as considering its socio-cultural dynamics. In the 1989-1999 period, the al-Nahda was totally excluded from the political domain. In this sense, the political opportunity structures were greatly narrowed. The Tunisian regime kept utilizing the Islamic threat as an instrument in order to preserve its authority in the political arena. However, in spite of the regime's heavy repression, the al-Nahda movement could create new political opportunities by carrying its political activities in the countries of asylum.

Inside Tunisia, there was heavy repression against the movement. In this respect, the prison cells were used as meeting places for deep discussions about improving the movement's strategy and ideological vision. The al-Nahda members used the prison cell as a space for resistance in order to recall their reputation in the face of the abasement. In this sense, the al-Nahda prisoners used different techniques in order to survive, and hunger strike was a very effective method for the political prisoners in jails. Moreover, due to the fact that the al-Nahda and secular politicians had been oppressed together by the regime, their collective experience inside prison cells also nourished ideological convergence, which moderated the al-Nahda cadres in time. Thus, especially the release of the al-Nahda prisoners increased the political opportunity structures through moderation.

Especially among the family members of imprisoned al-Nahda members; certain moral character traits developed, such as courage, confidence, fortitude, honesty, telling the truth when others are silent, rejecting material wealth, bravery, loyalty to family members, faith, devotion to the cause, honor, and demanding the right to live in spite of the repression. In addition, the prison experience of the al-Nahda members fostered specific emotions, such as anger and resentment, against the regime repression. These emotional repercussions helped the neighbourhood organization of the movement gain ground throughout the country. The organizational dynamics of the women wing also contributed to mobilization of the movement. Especially in the poor areas and peripheries, where the women mobilization of the regime was weak, the Islamist women under the umbrella of the al-Nahda movement found a more inviting milieu and improved social mobilization.

In this period, the informal organizations like parallel party structures (political bureau, executive bureau, and communications office), publications and television channels in the countries of asylum took to the stage. In the 1990s, the al-Nahda movement made progress in spreading the movement's ideological discourse especially in Islamic cultural centers in Europe. The parallel party structures in the countries of asylum, as well as the broad networks of the al-Nahda linked NGOs in Europe, were supported by the conservative family networks of the al-Nahda inmates through potent neighbourhood organization inside Tunisia.

The al-Nahda's time in exile was a seminal experience for the movement, with its relationships with multiple European countries, since this ensured education and resources that would aid to maintain and reconstruct the movement in exile, and provided it to establish and keep its organizational structures. In the literature, the nature and extent of the al-Nahda's relations with the countries of asylum was one of its most prominent secrets, except for some members voluntary to debate the subject at all. This chapter clarified this mystery, to a certain extent. The al-Nahda members, who took refuge in the European countries, maintained strong ties with their Tunisian counterparts as their local backers. The bonds of these members had a perceivable influence on the al-Nahda, which benefited from the improving wealth of its ground, to a large extent.

The research has shown that the exiled al-Nahda members were influential in much more countries than those stated in the literature. The members of the al-Nahda established a wide network of Islamic cultural centers, mosques, libraries and foundations in Europe in the mid-1990s. In this respect, the movement constructed a strong mosque network in Brussels, London and Milan. Similarly, the al-Nahda established a strong network of Islamic cultural centers in Stockholm, Aachen, Milan and London. In addition, the financial institutions with Swiss partnerships, as well as the commercial companies, such as restaurants and car rental companies, which were established in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, gave significant financial support to the al-Nahda movement in the 1990s.

In this context, the al-Nahda movement provided strong financial support from its adherents in Europe in the name of fundraising, as well as a regular money flow that was ensured via aids and donations. The al-Nahda movement was also able to transfer high amounts of funds to its local networks through using the front companies in the countries

of asylum. Thanks to the front companies, the al-Nahda movement both provided a large income and carried out its ideological activities under the umbrella of commercial activities. Especially members of the shura council of the al-Nahda movement had strong networks in those front companies, and this situation was very effective in the movement's survival against the semi-authoritarian Ben Ali regime. The main instruments strengthened by the organizational capacity of the al-Nahda movement in the countries of asylum were shareholding ties, natural and institutional family ties, board memberships and political connections. These networks were not only limited to financial networks, but they also established an active channel of intelligence against the regime, from politics to the social domain, which the leaders of the al-Nahda movement actually used.

The research has shown that the intellectual cadres of the al-Nahda movement endeavored to gain support for the movement in the countries of asylum while the less educated cadres were more effective in collecting money and attracting sympathizers. In the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Canada, the propaganda activities of the al-Nahda movement were more intense, whereas the movement intensified its ideological organizational activities in Austria, Italy, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The research has shown that three basic criteria played important role in constructing organizational dynamics in the European countries where the al-Nahda exiles were active. First one was the existence of sufficient number of the political al-Nahda exiles in that European country. Second one was the existence of commercial relations of the al-Nahda exiles in that European country. Third one was the presence of a Sunni Muslim community in that European country. In the European countries, where these three criteria had sufficient ground, the al-Nahda movement was seriously organized.

Especially the accomplishments of individual members, such as Said Ferjani, in Europe contributed to the movement by providing an extensive financial network, expert skillsets and significant political connections, creating an effective network providing funds through various charity organizations. This capacity was supported via Islamic cultural centers in Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden. In this respect, the al-Nahda movement established a solid network through cells, which it had constructed in the European countries. Thanks to these cells, the movement formed a strong base in Europe. The meetings of the movement were held

periodically within these cells, and the movement representatives collected financial aid in these meetings.

Moreover, the research has shown that counterfeit documents -although it is so difficult to prove directly- were provided for the members of the al-Nahda movement, who were wanted due to the formal applications of the Tunisian regime. This made it impossible for the Tunisian regime to arrest the wanted members of the al-Nahda movement in Europe. In addition, the European members of the movement, especially those in the United Kingdom, where most leaders of the movement used to live, were in close contact with the human rights organizations. This created a legal defence shield for the movement. The support from other NGOs and media organizations further strengthened this shield.

In this period, the division in the movement leadership resulted in the victory of the Ghannouchi-led faction proposing moderation, and the unity of Ghannouchi and the second-generation al-Nahda members strengthened. Rachid Ghannouchi attracted many al-Nahda members in exile as a charismatic Islamist leader. He turned into a symbol of the movement through exposing his commitment to pluralism, freedom, and deference for individual and public rights while he was in exile. The position of Rachid Ghannouchi within the movement was reinforced by his charisma, since he was the founder of the movement, as well as acting as both a religious leader and prominent politician. The al-Nahda case showed that once the organizational structure was more movement than a party, the members of the movement could mobilize around a charismatic leader.

In the 1989-1999 period, the al-Nahda determined the repressive practices of the regime by diagnostic framing. In this respect, ban of masjids and Qur'an courses, the silence/ignorance of other political parties in the face of violations of freedoms and repressive practices of the police like covert surveillance of the leaders and supporters of the movement were criticized. The movement also emphasized price increases in essential consumer goods, devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar and increasing unemployment by diagnostic framing.

The al-Nahda movement improved its prognostic framing efforts, and for realization of "the state of the people" discourse the movement determined main solutions, such as general amnesty and release of political prisoners, removal of restrictions on the press, independence of the judiciary, respect for the will of the people, absolute prohibition of

torture, impartiality of the administration, termination of the partisan presidential system, providing social security, and freedom of belief. The movement began to acknowledge Western values and interpret them from an Islamic perspective. This tendency was evident in the declarations and congresses of the movement.

Finally, the al-Nahda movement improved its motivational framing efforts by openly stressing its stance against violence. The movement invited the regime to ensure freedom in the political arena. The necessity for more moderate party policies and national dialogue initiatives were emphasized. Ghannouchi's request for a return to democracy was an important step for encouraging political pluralism. Ghannouchi was able to broaden his ideological approach on the theme of democracy and civil liberties within the European context.

CHAPTER V

5. STRUGGLE IN PURSUIT OF POLITICAL VICTORY

The constant exposure to democracy and multi-party political systems in the countries of asylum brought in tolerance to the al-Nahda members and moderated them in comparison with other ideological tendencies.[1] Especially the second-generation al-Nahda supporters, who raised in Western politics, played important role in bringing more moderate perspectives to the movement. With the aid of this moderation process, the al-Nahda movement engaged in a framing process through growing away from contentious politics and coming close to consensus politics.

The al-Nahda constructed its diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing by taking lessons from its previous experiences, and the movement transformed into a moderate political party. In addition to the state repression, the movement emphasized malfunctioning state as diagnostic framing, and widespread demonstrations were held against the worsening economic conditions due to the corruptions of the Ben Ali regime. The movement formulated productive political solutions for adapting democratization, pluralism and religious freedom through prognostic framing. In this period, the al-Nahda movement tried to create a rationale by calling society to coalition for rights and freedoms, as well as preserving its stance against violence by motivational framing.

Between 2000 and 2010, new poltical dynamics provided new political opportunity structures, as well as new organizational dynamics. In terms of reduction of the regime's repression, the al-Nahda prisoners were released, the al-Nahda exiles were allowed to return to Tunisia, and the opposition began to cooperate against the regime. The new al-Nahda linked NGOs restorated informal networks between the al-Nahda members in exile and those in Tunisia. The organizational dynamics of the student wing considerably improved on the university campuses in this period.

[1] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 4.

The al-Nahda movement was able to understand how critical to function efficiently within a democratic milieu, since its leadership had experienced decades of exile perceiving how democratic systems operated in reality.[2] In the period between 2000 and 2010, the al-Nahda movement adapted a more flexible approach, enhanced its relationship with the secular groups, and practiced the consensus politics in a pragmatic way. This flexible and pragmatic political stance supported the movement in terms of enlarging its social base, which encompassed various social groups.

5.1. Reduction of Repression and Alliance with Secular Groups

When the Ben Ali regime satisfied that the al-Nahda was too powerless to challenge, it began to loosen repressive policies towards the movement in the 2000-2010 period, which created new political opportunity structures for the movement. For example, the Ben Ali regime let some exiles return Tunisia, and pardoned some al-Nahda affiliated prisoners. The regime released approximately seventy al-Nahda linked inmates in 2006.[3] Similarly, Ben Ali approved the release of 21 inmates most of whom were al-Nahda members in November 2008, and this official pardon was considered as an indicator that Ben Ali no longer regarded the al-Nahda as a threat to his regime.[4]

Especially in 2008, many important figures of the al-Nahda returned to the movement after long prison terms. They started to re-establish contact with their friends, who were in exile outside Tunisia, which created new political opportunity structures for the movement. In fact, there were also rumours that Ben Ali inclined to legalize the al-Nahda for including the movement within the political domain in order to support democratization efforts of the regime; however, this process never actualized since the inner circle within the Tunisian regime convinced Ben Ali that this would put the regime's modernization project at risk.[5]

[2] George Joffé, "Guest Writer: Resentment, Anger and Violence," *Middle East Monitor*, 1 June 2015, Web: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150601-resentment-anger-and-violence/, Accessed: 2022-06-02.
[3] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 107.
[4] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1096.
[5] Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, 179.

In this context, it is also useful to analyze Tunisia's institutional structure, since forms of state repression affect the institutions favorable to dissidents.[6] Before the 2011 Uprisings, Tunisia had three main institutions, which were in charge of dominating and repressing domestic political dissent.[7] First one was the Directorate of State Security operating under the Ministry of the Interior, and this institution concentrated on human intelligence in order to control domestic political risks. Second one was the National Guard under which the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigations was mainly accountable for controlling external risks even though the regime operated its intelligence to report domestic repression, too. Third one was the Presidential Security Sub-Directorate of Intelligence, which was separated from the Minister of the Interior following the 1987 coup for reinforcing the institution's allegiance to the president, and this structure possessed its compact system of intelligence searching for domestic risks regarded as critical to the regime's existence.

The decentralized structure of the intelligence institutions, which were inherited from French colonialism and sustained under two authoritarian leaders after the independence, resulted in three main repercussions.[8] First one was reliance of the system on the outlook of permanent surveillance instead of collecting right information. Second one was dependence of the system on inefficient spies recruited from the local population rather than informants embedded with in groups. Third one was the overloaded state through infighting among many overlapping agencies instead of a centralized intelligence and policing supervisory organization.

In this context, it is also necessary to mention Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan Lupu's analyses regarding the mechanisms constraining state repression.[9] They analyze two sets of mechanisms, which can constrain the state repression. The first one points out the conditions in which the rising costs of repression might constrain the leaders. In this case, the actors and institutions, such as veto players and NGOs, can make repression less likely even though these effects are circumstantial. The second one concentrates on a set of related mechanisms, which are occasionally referred to as the logic of appropriateness. In

[6] Frans J. Schurman, "Urban Social Movements: Between Repressive Utopia and Socialist Panacea," in *Urban Social Movements in the Third World*, F. J. Schurman and A. L. van Naerssen (Editors) (New York: Routledge, 1989), 9-26.
[7] Nugent, *After Repression*, 76.
[8] Ibid., 83.
[9] See: Tiberiu Dragu and Yonatan Lupu, "Collective action and constraints on repression at the endgame," *Comparative Political Studies* 51, 8 (2018), 1042-1073.

this case, the supporters and other actors employ convincing and legitimizing power to alter norms, identities, and preferences that create societies in which human rights violations are considered as disagreeable or even unthinkable.

Dragu and Lupu argue that a third mechanism, which is the logic of expectations, can also constrain repression under certain conditions; since the regime's repressive capacity is exogenous to constraints on repression; however, members of the regime's security apparatus may not always repress when they are ordered to do so. The logic of expectations can constrain the exercise of repression and has the supreme potential to constrain repression in the middle regimes, or anocracies. To illustrate, the Tunisian regime ordered mass repression during the 2011 Uprisings, but the agents of the regime disobeyed. In the 2011 Uprisings, although the Tunisian army protected the public buildings and strategic places, it rejected to suppress the demonstrations, which resulted in the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. Actually, most retrospective remarks of why the Tunisian and Egyptian military acted as they did include rationalization of the attitude of the different actors to make the consequence arise the most rational course of action.[10]

Reduction of state repression between 2000 and 2010 opened up a space for the al-Nahda movement for alliance with secular groups. In the Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of the al-Nahda movement held in London in April 2001, the movement confirmed the party's aim of accomplishment by dialogue.[11] In this declaration, the al-Nahda applied the political discourse, which was commitment to the principle of moderation and search for common destiny with its political collaborators and civil groups. Moreover, the importance of the joint declaration, which was announced by the MDS and the al-Nahda on 19 March 2001, was stressed, and this joint declaration was perceived as a milestone, which showed the desires of both movements in addition to the widespread will for change in Tunisia. This declaration prepared the ground for terminating cleavages, misuse of power and inner conflicts among the opposition groups against the Tunisian regime, which used to benefit from the splits among the opposition.

[10] Jasper and Volpi, "Introduction: Rethinking Mobilization after the Arab Uprisings," 29.
[11] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Sabaʿ li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of al-Nahda)," *The Database of Ikhwan Wiki*, Accessed: 2021-09-19, Web: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=النهضة لحركة السابع للمؤتمر الختامي البيان.

Furthermore, Ben Ali's inner circle was split into two main fractions in 2001,[12] which was an important political opportunity structure for the movement. The first group was against any political change, and they believed that the Tunisian people were primarily interested in their socio-economic conditions rather than civil liberties. This group had strong networks in the Ministry of Interior, and it was close to Ben Ali's family. On the other hand, the second group was under domination of the young generation, and it was worried about the Tunisia's image in the international arena and in favor of greater political openness. The attempts of the second group about encouraging freedom were not seen enough in practice at that time; however, this split in the regime's side was important for the opposition groups including the al-Nahda movement.

In his speech at the end of July 2005 on the anniversary of the republic, Ben Ali stressed the significance of upholding the rule of law.[13] He reaffirmed his commitment to encouraging democratic dialogue in public life, but persisted that dialogue can only be preserved with parties and organizations that were formally recognized and respected the constitution.[14] There would be no dialogue with any political group operating under the veil of religion, a clear reference to the al-Nahda movement.[15] In fact, some opposition parties had asked for general amnesty for the confined members of the al-Nahda, and there had been speculation that the authorities might be arranged to negotiate with the banned party.[16] In this process, the al-Nahda was able to construct charitable networks, as well as enhancing its links with other opposition parties through collaborating with them on campaigns.[17]

In this scene, the cooperation of the opposition groups against the regime's repression created new political opportunity structures for movement entrepreneurs of the al-Nahda. The al-Nahda adherents took part in the protests along with the secular groups in March 2005, and the movement positively supported the protest calls of the student unions and lawyer unions, which provided a suitable ground for social segments with different ideologies to act in solidarity.[18] Moreover, the opposition parties involving the Islamists,

[12] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1093.
[13] Ibid, 1092.
[14] Ibid, 1095.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb,* 196.
[18] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (2000-2010) in the Youth Branch of the Movement in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.

secularists and communists reached an agreement on important points, such as the dictatorship, political misdemeanor and human rights violations of Ben Ali, and formed "18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms" in 2005.[19] The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms was an alliance of different opposition movements and political parties, and the al-Nahda movement dedicated itself to democracy through confirming the moderation of its official ideology within this alliance.[20]

The al-Nahda movement played an important role in the foundation of the 18 October Coalition, and became the member of the coalition.[21] Ali Laaridhi, who was a leading member of the al-Nahda movement both in the shura council and political bureau, made a considerable effort in civil society activities with other opposition groups in the 18 October Coalition.[22] The coalition brought together political movements and civil society organizations, involving the PDP, the PCT and other human rights organizations.[23] In fact, Rachid Ghannouchi had also confirmed that the al-Nahda acted together with socialists and liberals in the process leading up to the 2011 Uprisings.[24] Salaheddin Jourchi, who was one of the prominent figures of the Progressive Islamists, also engaged in the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in 2005.[25] The coalition underlined the freedom of expression and collaboration for everyone, and justice for all political parties, as well.[26]

In the Final Declaration of the Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda in London in May 2007, the movement took decision of operating through creative opposition in the political arena,[27] which also prepared the ground for the movement to initiate political dialogue with the Tunisian regime and cooperate with other opposition groups. The participants of the congress called for accomplishing an extensive national reconciliation without any exclusion. In fact, this call for national reconciliation was almost the same as the ones

[19] Alfred Stepan, "Tunisia's transition and the twin tolerations," *Journal of Democracy* 23, 2 (2012), 89-103, 97.
[20] Michele Penner Angrist, "Understanding the success of mass civic protest in Tunisia," *The Middle East Journal* 67, 4 (2013), 547–564.
[21] Ghannouchi, "Interview Transcript,"
[22] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, xix.
[23] Ghannouchi, "Interview Transcript,"
[24] Raşid Gannuşi, "Ulustan Ümmete Gezi Grubu Tunus'ta," *Haksöz Haber*, 06 January 2013, Web: https://www.haksozhaber.net/ulustan-ummete-gezi-grubu-tunusta-34713h.htm, Accessed: 2021-01-07.
[25] Salaheddine Jourchi, "The state and identity: The relationship between religion and politics - Tunisia as an example," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 6, 3 (2013), 358-375.
[26] Ghannouchi, "Interview Transcript,"
[27] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Thamin li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration Of The Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda)," *The Database of Turess*, Accessed: 2022-09-05, Web: https://www.turess.com/alwasat/6230.

declared in the congresses, which were held in 1995 and 2001. The main objective of the movement on demanding national reconciliation was to organize a new political order via right democratic reforms.[28]

To illustrate, in April 2003, the al-Nahda movement signed a pact with secular groups in Aix-en-Provence in France, and in this pact, the movement promised that it would defend the principle of equality if it came to power.[29] In fact, after the 2011 Uprisings, the movement had repeated its promise to enhance the status of women and strengthen their role in the taking political resolutions.[30] This is why the al-Nahda was able to coordinate with the new Tunisian feminist associations, such as Association Tounissiet, following the uprisings.[31]

Similarly, the al-Nahda improved its cooperation with other opposition groups in other social platforms. For instance, the Second World Summit on the Information Society was held in Tunisia on 16-18 November 2005. In October 2005, eight prominent political dissidents, involving both socialists and Islamists, started a hunger strike to call for better freedom conditions, as well as release of nearly 500 political detainees from Tunisian prisons, and the protest proceeded throughout the summit.[32] Especially during the hunger strikes against the regime between 2000 and 2010, the al-Nahda and the UGTT acted on the same line against the regime's repression, which was a covert collaboration.[33]

Especially in the period from 2000 to 2010, it also became difficult to prevent widespread demonstrations that held against the worsening economic conditions due to the corruptions of the Ben Ali regime.[34] Decades of control mechanisms by the Tunisian regime over mosques, fatwas, mass media, social life and religious education institutions began to dissolve with intense protests in the last years of the Ben Ali administration. For example, the strikes initiated by the UGTT among the Gafsa miners in 2008 and 2010 left the Ben

[28] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Thamin li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration Of The Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda),"
[29] Martínez-Fuentes, "Political Islam in Tunisia: A Comparative Approach," 182.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes and Belhassen Ennouri, "Change and Persistence in the Tunisian Organisational Network for the Promotion of Women," in Promoting Women Rights and Gender Equality in the Middle East and North Africa, Ernst Stetter and Conny Reuter (Editors) (Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies/Solidar, 2014), 135-154.
[32] Partrick, "Tunisia," 1095.
[33] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member Lawyer in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.
[34] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's Political Party, the RCD through Zoom Meeting in 2021.

Ali regime in a difficult position in the political arena,[35] which was an important political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement.

The UGTT represents the leftist movements in Tunisia and sees itself as the guardian of the modern Tunisian state.[36] In fact, the UGTT undertook important responsibilities in the development programs of the state especially in the 1960s.[37] However, the UGTT never acted as the leader of the opposition; on the contrary, it always acted as a mediator between the workers and the state.[38] The UGTT leaders even collaborated with the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes from time to time.[39] Although the UGTT's base sometimes opposed to some of the state's practices, the UGTT's top leaders developed positive relations with both Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes.[40] However, these bilateral positive relations seriously weakened during the last period of the Ben Ali regime.[41]

Especially in the second half of the 2000-2010 period, the gap between the Ben Ali regime and the UGTT widened, and this situation weakened the Ben Ali regime's position in Tunisian politics, to a very large extent. This was a significant political opportunity structure for possible alliances among the opposition groups including the al-Nahda movement. The UGTT was operating just like a mediator in Tunisian politics, and the al-Nahda movement, despite operating in the opposing camps throughout the Tunisian history, considered the UGTT as an effective ally in the political crises.[42] A further worth of history was the al-Nahda's collective tendencies in such cases, which facilitated framing a multi-fronted campaign across the political arena that enhanced its impact and maximized its opportunities to involve in Tunisia's political future. This model was supported with the comparative political impotence of the RCD cadres.

The existing information regarding the events at the protests initiated by the UGTT in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008 is so limited, since the security forces blocked all routes

[35] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's Political Party, the RCD through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Author Interview with the Executive of the UGTT in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] After the 2011 Uprisings, the UGTT totally became a mediator, which was able to resolve the political crises in Tunisian politics. For example, the UGTT played an important role in forming the dialogue process in the country, after the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013.
[42] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.

towards the mining basin in order to obstruct all independent observers and journalists at that time.[43] However, the Gafsa strikes that held in 2008 was the most significant social unrest since the Bread Riots in 1984.[44] The Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC), which worked illegally during the Ben Ali era, participated in the protests in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008, and this act played important role in mobilization among the miners.[45] The UDC supported and organized the protests in solidarity with the local trade unionists, and provided discursive instruments, such as slogans like work, freedom and national dignity *(shughl, hurriya and karama wataniyya)*.[46]

According to Ammar Amroussia, a Tunisian politican, the recruitment results announced by the Gafsa Phosphate Company (CPG) in 2008 had caused great disappointment among the Tunisian public.[47] This was an important political opportunity structure. The main reasons behind this frustration were that the number of positions to be recruited was less than the announced one, as well as favoritism, bribery and loyalty to the regime in the selection process of the candidates took precedence over the objective professional criteria.[48] Hence, in the protests in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008, low and middle income groups including mining labors in Tunisia harshly criticized the economic inequalities.[49]

As stated by Amroussia, the strikes in the Gafsa mining basin lasted more than five months and the Ben Ali regime intervened with the strikes.[50] Thousands of security forces attacked Redeyef, the center of the resistance, and opened fire on the civilians. The districts, where the workers were residing, were besieged, and the doors of the workers' houses were broken down, searched and looted one by one. The workers and their families were subjected to psychological violence, such as humiliation, and they were terrorized. During

[43] Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle, "Rethinking the Role of the Media in the Tunisian Uprising," in *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects*, Nouri Gana (Editor) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 168.
[44] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's Political Party, the RCD through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[45] Irene Weipert-Fenner, "Unemployed mobilisation in times of democratisation: The Union of Unemployed Graduates in post-Ben Ali Tunisia," *The Journal of North African Studies* 25, 1 (2020), 53-75.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ammar Amroussia, "Tunisie: Le soulèvement des habitants du bassin minier, un premier bilan," *Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières*, May 2008, Web: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article26974, Accessed: 2022-07-20.
[48] Amroussia, "Tunisie: Le soulèvement des habitants du bassin minier,"
[49] Yasmine Ryan, "Tunisian Revolution Yet to Solve Inequality," *Al Jazeera*, 11 April 2011, Web: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2011/4/11/tunisian-revolution-yet-to-solve-inequality, Accessed: 2022-06-02.
[50] Amroussia, "Tunisie: Le soulèvement des habitants du bassin minier,"

the strikes in the Gafsa mining basin, the Ben Ali regime blocked Facebook in order to forestall dissemination of discontent through social media.[51]

According to Amroussia, the young Tunisians, who played a leading role in the outbreak of the strikes, were specifically targeted, and many of them were arrested and subjected to severe torture.[52] Hundreds of Tunisian youth fled their homes, and took shelter in the surrounding mountains not to be arrested. Subsequently, the military declared martial law and controlled the roads leading to the mountains in order to prevent the people from bringing food and clothing to their children. Similar incidents took place in Métlaoui after Redeyef. Especially during the trial processes of the arrested people, the courts made their decisions without listening to the defendants and without giving lawyers the opportunity to defend their clients.

As stated by Amroussia, the election campaign for Ben Ali's re-election before the Tunisian General Election in 2009 caused a great frustration among the workers, who were subjected to the inhuman treatments in the 2008 strikes.[53] This was a significant political opportunity structure. The TV channel *"al-Hiwar al-Tounsi"* broadcasting from abroad and the newspaper *"al-Badil"* broadcasting on the internet under the guidance of the Ettajdid Movement (previously the PCT) increased their criticisms against the Ben Ali regime. Moreover, the official opposition newspapers, *"al-Maouqif"*, *"al-Mouatinoun"* and *"al-Tariq al-Jadid"*, also increased the level of criticism against the Ben Ali regime. The illegal newspaper, *"Sawt Echaab"*, broadcasting under the guidance of the Ettajdid Movement raised its voice against the inhuman practices of the Ben Ali regime. The solidarity campaigns organized by the National Committee to Support Mining Basin Residents (CRLDHT) gained sympathy of the Tunisian people.

Although there was a cadre collaborating with the Ben Ali regime in the administration of the UGTT, there were mainly militant revolutionary unionists in its ground and local branches. The mobilization of the Tunisian people triggered the revolutionary wing of the UGTT in the period leading up to the 2011 Uprisings. The UGTT's administrative cadre could not be indifferent to its base, and decided to support the revolution. The Tunisian

[51] Laryssa Chomiak and John P. Entelis, "The Making of Tunisia's Intifada," in *The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East*, D. McMurray and A. Ufheil-Somers (Editors) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 17.
[52] Amroussia, "Tunisie: Le soulèvement des habitants du bassin minier,"
[53] Ibid.

army also refused to use weapons against the rebellions in the 2011 Uprisings. Approximately all social groups complained about the Ben Ali regime, particularly the repressive practices of the state through security and police apparatuses.[54] The widespread social unrest brought different social groups ranging from the unemployed to lawyers and businessmen together for overthrowing the Ben Ali regime.[55] In other words, the 2011 Uprisings played an active role in altering the existing loyalties with the dignity of collective protest.[56]

In this context, although the al-Nahda movement was initally inexperienced in directing the unions, the movement recruited members who could manage the dialogue process with the unions over time, and especially in the pre-revolutionary period, this political opportunity structure contributed greatly to organization of the opposition.[57] Furthermore, the al-Nahda Party was able to embrace all those, who were victimized by the Ben Ali regime.[58] The party gave material and moral support to those segments, such as promises like being a deputy, mayor and bureaucrat, which honored them.[59] To illustrate, the al-Nahda succeeded in attracting even the black groups, who had been discriminated especially in the coastal Sahel region, and organizing them parallel with the movement.[60] This party politics was very effective in widening the movement's elite base during the 2011 Uprisings.[61]

5.2. Neighborhood Organization in the Shadow of Semi-Authoritarianism

The young generation of the al-Nahda grew up through either parental impression or individual spiritual thinking, which provided fresh energy, and triggered the movement to regroup.[62] They began to participate in Qur'an classes and religious discussion societies

[54] Michael J. Willis, "Revolt for Dignity," in *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters*, A. Roberts (Editor) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 30–52.
[55] Ibid.
[56] See: Mabrouk, "A revolution for dignity and freedom,"
[57] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nahda Movement in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 169.

gathering in universities, mosques and cafes.[63] In addition to the widespread use of internet by young generation, family meetings during weekday evenings and Sundays also played significant role, since the family members watched religious programs in those gatherings.[64] In order to ensure a framework for the movement, the al-Nahda constructed executive and consultative councils including mosque leaders in its neighbourhood organization.[65] In this respect, the imams supporting the al-Nahda played a major role in the organization of the movement.[66] In Tunisia, the influence of the imams was great in social life, and they recruited new members to the al-Nahda movement through subliminal messages in the Friday prayers.[67] The second generation imams supporting the movement learned how to use social media and reached large masses through Facebook.[68]

The reconstruction of networks influenced the al-Nahda cadres in the 2000-2010 period. For instance, the released political inmates were able to operate with their wives to push the government to scale down repression on Islamists and enhance political openness for the party, which resulted in establishment of the International Association to Support Political Prisoners (AISPP) in 2001.[69] Thanks to the AISPP, the al-Nahda members were able to provide material and psychological assistance to former prisoners and their families, and ensure employment for those without work and medical care.[70] Moreover, the returning second-generation al-Nahda members did not only transfer funds to foster the al-Nahda affiliated NGOs in Tunisia including the AISPP, but they also coordinated with the local al-Nahda members to communicate with people in grassroots.[71]

In this context, it is also necessary to elaborate the role of civil society in Tunisia. The civil society organizations are among the most resilient and powerful actors among the organizational structures in Tunisia.[72] Unlike other Arab countries, Tunisia played a major

[63] Mohamed Tozy, "Les enchaînements paradoxaux de l'histoire du salafisme: Instrumentalisation politique et actions de sécularisation," in *L'état d'injustice au Maghreb: Maroc et Tunisie*, Irene Bono, Béatrice Hibou, Hamza Meddeb, and Mohamed Tozy (Editors) (Paris: Karthala, 2015), 229.
[64] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 110.
[65] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 398.
[66] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (2000-2019) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 178.
[70] "Association Internationale de Soutien aux Prisonniers Politiques (AISPP)," *Ban Public*, Accessed: 2020-11-03, Web: http://prison.eu.org/spip.php?article4646.
[71] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 179.
[72] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Solidar, the Tunisian Non-Governmental Organization, through Zoom Meeting in 2021.

role in transition to democracy after the 2011 Uprisings, since the civil society organizations could adapt to dramatic changes in their organizational structures more quickly and easily than the state institutions.[73] During the year following the 2011 Uprisings, more than a thousand civil society organizations and 110 political parties were registered.[74]

In this democratic transition process, the activism of formerly co-opted and repressed socio-political actors, such as the UGTT and the al-Nahda movement, gave shape to the reinstitutionalization process within the country.[75] The social organizational dynamics and networks of the al-Nahda movement, with its experience from the past, were very strong, and this played an important role for the al-Nahda movement's progress through using political opportunities to its advantage, both before and after the 2011 Uprisings.[76]

In the period from 2000 to 2010, as the regime decreased the level of repression against the movement, the new al-Nahda-linked NGOs and networks were created with the aid of the second-generation al-Nahda members in addition to restoration of informal networks between the al-Nahda members in exile and those in Tunisia. Especially the revival of associations like human rights organizations played significant role in standing out against the regime repression.[77]

According to Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, preexisting grassroots social networks and organizations accelerate and foster the recruitment and mobilization processes.[78] In this respect, especially the release of some al-Nahda prisoners after 2000 accelerated the network construction endeavors inside Tunisia. For example, after his release in 2006, the al-Nahda activist Hamadi Jebali, who played a significant role in the foundation process of both the MTI and the al-Nahda, recreated the al-Nahda's Executive Bureau, and the

[73] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Solidar, the Tunisian Non-Governmental Organization, through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[74] See: Farhad Khosrokhavar, *The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012).
[75] See: Jean-Pierre Filiu, "The First Year of the Tunisian Revolution," in *The Arab Revolution of 2011: A Comparative Perspective*, Saïd Amir Arjomand (Editor) (Albany: SUNY Press, 2015), 167-186; Joel Beinin, Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
[76] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the Solidar, the Tunisian Non-Governmental Organization through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[77] See : Larbi Chouikha and Éric Gobe, "Les organisations de défense des droits de l'Homme dans la formule politique tunisienne: acteurs de l'opposition ou faire-valoir du régime?," *L'Année du Maghreb* 5 (2009).
[78] See: Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

meetings were regularly held with the application of covert techniques, such as gathering in the family houses of the al-Nahda supporters.[79]

Furthermore, right after his release in 2007, Abdelhamid Jlassi, who was responsible for the movement's domestic institutional affairs, began to reorganize the Islamists throughout the country.[80] In addition to Tunis and Sousse, Jlassi was able to form local representation in Bizerte, Monastir, Sfax, Gabes, Kairouan, and Kebili even though the number of members was small and the membership base was weak because of the constant security surveillance of the regime forces.[81] However, in the period between 2000 and 2010, a remarkable increase was observed among the Tunisian women wearing hijab in daily life,[82] which signaled the growing social unrest regarding the official religious policies of the regime.

Before the 2011 Uprisings, there were many indicators of this growing social unrest. For instance, the Tunisian judiciary was not independent. Most of the judges had direct links with the political parties.[83] The low salaries under Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes were an invitation to corruption.[84] In both Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, the judicial system had always operated under the control of the executive power.[85] Only in the last period of the Ben Ali, the regime allowed the civil courts to function with the military courts.[86] However, until 2011 Uprisings, the military courts always maintained their importance in Tunisian judicial system.[87]

In the pre-revolutionary period, the judges were used as an instrument to preserve the legitimacy of the regime.[88] Many judges took unlawful decisions during these periods in order to protect the interests of the regime.[89] The executive power gave direct instructions to the judges to take certain decisions on certain issues.[90] The research has shown that the al-Nahda movement developed comprehensive networks with some judges to develop a

[79] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia,* 114-115.
[80] Ibid, 115.
[81] Ibid, 116.
[82] Brieg Tomos Powel, "A clash of norms: Normative power and EU democracy promotion in Tunisia," *Democratization* 16, 1 (2009), 193–214.
[83] Author Interview with the Tunisian Judge (Retired) in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

mechanism to counter the regime's repression during the Ben Ali era.[91] The al-Nahda established its networks clandestinely, and the al-Nahda's strongest secret networks were under the Ministry of Interior.[92]

In fact, Tunisia did not have a general scheme of the whole internal security structure, and the state security network in Tunisia was very complex.[93] Obviously, this intricate structure was very convenient for the opposition groups, such as the al-Nahda movement, in constructing deep networks, because multiple different security units were established on different issues during the Ben Ali era.[94] This situation caused lack of coordination among these units and prevented the formation of a uniform hierarchical structure in the internal security system.[95] Especially during the Ben Ali era, the independent security offices and bureaus, which were established by the arbitrary decisions of the executive power, began to abolish the hierarchical control mechanism in the Ministry of Interior over time.[96]

The research has shown that the opposition groups/parties, such as the al-Nahda, were able to survive despite the state repression with aid of clandestine networks that the movement members established within the security apparatuses of the state, such as police, military and intelligence units.[97] In this respect, the al-Nahda movement established its strongest networks before the 2011 Uprisings within the Ministry of Interior.[98] Especially after the 2011 Uprisings, these networks became much stronger and more open.[99] The fact that the most politicized institution in Tunisia was the Ministry of Interior directly accelerated this process.[100]

Actually, the sense of belonging among the al-Nahda members was also an important motivating factor for the enhancement of organizational capacity. The sense of belonging was achieved in two ways among the al-Nahda members.[101] This was either through the ideological bond strengthened by vital sacrifices, or through the spiritual religious sacred

[91] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Adherent Tunisian Military Prosecutor (Retired) in İstanbul on 24 September 2022.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Adherent Director-General (Retired) in the Ministry of Interior of Tunisia in İstanbul on 24 September 2022.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Adherent Police Officer (Retired) in İstanbul on 24 September 2022.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Maktuf, *Tunus'u Kurtarmak: Çalınan Arap Baharı*, 106.

glue that fused the members of the movement.[102] Furthermore, members of the al-Nahda movement identified themselves predominantly with kinship ties and shared experiences against regime repression, which made them an organic part of the movement.[103] In this respect, the movement successfully established a coherent organizational structure, which was able to balance state repression, stimulate the political consciousness of its constituent body, and re-socialize its base with Islamic lines.[104]

On the other hand, most of the al-Nahda detainees' children were not even allowed to attend government schools, and many families were not able to provide private instruction, which was resulted in the interruption of their education.[105] The regime's repression shifted the al-Nahda advocators from public sector occupations into the private sector ones.[106] For example, an educated al-Nahda member, who was an engineer, could be dismissed and had to continue his life as a neighborhood grocer.[107] However, the members of the movement believed that even with a humble place in society, thanks to the solidarity between family members, they could dream big and believe that better days would come.[108]

Due to the lack of free and immediate accession to the Tunisian public opinion, the al-Nahda used international communication means, such as the internet, fax machines, mobile phones, and satellite televisions, which bypassed conventional censorship mechanisms against the movement.[109] Especially the mobile phones, fax machines and websites let the movement convey the information in real time while the satellite televisions like *"al-Jazeera"* helped the movement in disseminating its messages at the global level.[110] The Islamist ideas were rapidly spread under the motto of establishing dialogue and tolerance between religions and civilizations through using these means.[111]

In fact, with widespread usage of the satellite television and the internet in daily life between 2000 and 2010, multiple ultra-conservative channels from the Gulf and Saudi

[102] Maktuf, *Tunus'u Kurtarmak: Çalınan Arap Baharı*, 106.
[103] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (2000-2019) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[104] Shahin, *Political Ascent,* 64.
[105] Doris H. Gray and Terry Coonan, "Notes from the field: Silence kills! Women and the transitional justice process in post-revolutionary Tunisia," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 7, 2 (2013), 348–357.
[106] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 101.
[107] See: Sghiri, "Greetings to the Dawn,"
[108] Ibid.
[109] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 403.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (2000-2010) in the Youth Branch of the Movement in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.

Arabia were established, and these channels triggered the mobilization process especially among the young al-Nahda cadres.[112] For instance, the new satellite channels from the Gulf region, such as "*al-Majd"* satellite broadcasting and "*Iqra"* satellite television, as well as the improvement of social media, provided Tunisian society different interpretations of Islam, which had not formerly been considered.[113] Rachid Ghannouchi analyzed this grassroots movement growing via social media in Tunisia as follows:

> There are many that have grown up while we were absent, we have been forced to be absent from the scene for thirty years… and generations have grown up and been influenced by our thoughts. Many have, for example, set up Facebook groups in our name, but officially, they are not members.[114]

During the Ben Ali period, while the number of internet users in Tunisia was 100,000 in 2000, this number reached 2.8 million in 2009 and 3.8 million in 2010 respectively, and Tunisia became the country with the most internet-using population among the Arab and African countries in that period.[115] Especially beginning from the 2000, the children of the al-Nahda inmates individually began to search online the possible ways against the state repression with the spread of internet, which somehow created an "atomized action".[116]

Before the 2011 Uprisings, most of the young people were unemployed, and despite their different social backgrounds, the Islamist youth organized themselves in networks based on their residency or their hometown within the same neighborhood.[117] These networks created a strong solidarity making the movement more resilient, and with the outbreak of the uprisings, these networks functioned more active and sensitive raising counsciousness in social inequalities and unjustice.[118]

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[112] See: Haugbølle, "New expressions of Islam in Tunisia,"
[113] Chomiak and Entelis, "The Making of Tunisia's Intifada," 53.
[114] Rachid Ghannouchi, "Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi," interviewer Nazanine Moshiri, *Al Jazeera*, 07 February 2011, Web: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011233464273624.html, Accessed: 2020-12-01.
[115] Bülent Karaatlı, *Arap Baharı'nda Farklı Bir Ülke Tunus: Osmanlı'dan Sömürgeciliğe Sömürgecilikten Arap Baharı'na Tunus Modernleşmesi Üzerine* (Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2018), 153.
[116] If a collective action is disguised, it introduces a tactical innovation, which allows activists to hide the group element of organizing behind a front line of atomized actions. See: Diana Fu, "Disguised collective action in China," *Comparative Political Studies* 50, 4 (2017), 499–527.
[117] See: Mohammad, "al-Islamiyyun fi Tunis bayna al-muʿarada wa al-sulta (Islamists in Tunisia between opposition and power),"
[118] Ibid.

Similar to other Islamist movements, the al-Nahda movement ascribed importance to loyalty in membership, which functioned through collective suffering and sub-cultural identity; hence, even if the members discussed tough decisions, they did not leave the movement.[119] The al-Nahda movement was able to recruit those, who sincerely safeguarded it, so it was able to achieve struggling with the regime through attracting many adherents from other parties, movements, foundations and unions.[120] Despite its forced social invisibility under the Ben Ali regime, the al-Nahda movement became perceptible at the beginning of the revolutionary process through advocating the demonstrations, which created political opportunities to stimulate its organisational dynamics and legitimize its social presence.[121]

With growth of the university student activists in the 1980s and 1990s, the al-Nahda transformed into a more prudent middle class movement especially after 2000.[122] The al-Nahda movement had a hybrid organizational structure, which let the movement reach the middle class both in rural and urban areas throughout the country, who had no certain political membership.[123] The socio-political profile of the al-Nahda adherents had certain characteristics, such as conservative stance, exclusion from bureaucratic apparatus of the state, recourse to Islamic values against corruption of the regime.[124]

In this context, the al-Nahda movement was able to construct an organizational structure, which was able to channel popular demands of the neighbourhood to the administrative cadres of the movement. During the 2000-2010 period, the al-Nahda movement could manage its mobilization through giving political responsibilities to its returning exiled members, as well as its released detainees throughout the country. After Ben Ali left the country, the Islamists began to more appear on the political scene with the release of arrested detainees following a general amnesty, and the return of the exiles encouraged the Islamists to increase their presence and influence, which made the movement a dominant player as a "reform-oriented democratic movement".[125]

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[119] Kasper Netterstrøm, "The Islamists' compromise in Tunisia," *Journal of Democracy* 26, 4 (2015), 110–124.
[120] Rachid Ghannouchi, "Nazarat hawla al-Demoqratiya fī al-Maghreb al-ʿArabi (Views on Democracy in the Maghreb)," *al-Insan*, Volume 1, March 1990, 70.
[121] Martínez-Fuentes, "Political Islam in Tunisia," 179.
[122] See: Merone, "Enduring class struggle in Tunisia,"
[123] Martínez-Fuentes, "Political Islam in Tunisia," 180.
[124] Ibid.
[125] al-Talidi, *al-Islamiyyun wa al-Rabiʿ al-ʿArabi (The Islamists and the Arab Spring)*, 67.

5.3. Increasing Mobilization of the Student Wing on the Eve of Uprisings

In the existing literature, the organizations are considered as mobilizing structures that connect movement entrepreneurs together and accumulate the resources required for consistent collective action.[126] These networks are shaped by the collective's forms of organization and leadership, and by its media and communication technologies, as well.[127] A person's engagement in a collective action organization relies on his or her responsiveness to the specific combination of inducements submitted by the organization.[128]

In this context, the academic year 1999-2000 was a turning point, since the number of students (approximately 900) enrolling at Zaytuna University did not fall, but increased compared to the past; in addition, this increasing trend remained throughout the decade, reaching 1,412 new students in the academic year 2010-2011.[129] Despite the repression of the Ben Ali regime, the al-Nahda movement was able organize the university students successfully in the pre-revolutionary period, and managed its struggle through moderate ways without applying violence.[130]

The al-Nahda movement also gave special importance to its women organization among students, and the movement actively used women in its mobilization process.[131] This contributed to create a widespread collective action of female al-Nahda students in the street level.[132] Especially in the poor areas and peripheries where the women mobilization of the regime was weak, the Islamist women under the umbrella of the al-Nahda movement found a more inviting milieu and improved social mobilization.[133] Actually, the al-Nahda was different from other classical political Islamist parties, and this difference surfaced in terms of its organization. To illustrate, the brothers and sisters could sit at the same table in

[126] See: Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987).
[127] Anastasia Kavada, "Creating the collective: Social media, the Occupy Movement and its constitution as a collective actor," *Information, Communication & Society* 18, 8 (2015), 872-886.
[128] David Knoke, "Incentives in collective action organizations," *American Sociological Review* 53, 3 (1988), 311-329.
[129] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 108-109.
[130] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the al-Nahda Movement Youth Branch in Gafsa in 2018.
[131] Author Interview with the Representative of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Andrea Khalil, "Tunisia's women: Partners in revolution," *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, 2 (2014), 186-199.

the al-Nahda movement, whereas the brothers used to be at the forefront in other classical political Islamist parties.[134]

The female al-Nahda members' clandestine Qur'an memorization and explanation gatherings and comprehensive trainings in jurisprudence, eloquence and ethics considerably expanded to the student wing following the release of some al-Nahda inmates in 2004.[135] The women whose spouses were tortured encouraged their children to participate in the demonstrations. This approach of the al-Nahda became even stronger after the 2011 Uprisings, and the movement reached the highest number of female members in Tunisia among other political parties.[136]

In 2003, a small group of students whose families were affiliated with the al-Nahda took initiatives in order to re-organize the Islamists' university movement from Sfax to Tunis, and starting from 2005, Islamist students in Sfax and Tunis started to re-organize themselves under the name of the "Independent Students".[137] The Independent Students held their periodical meetings within rented safe houses and determined their strategies and activities in these meetings.[138]

After 2005, the Independent Students were able to accomplish creating an active network in Tunis, Sfax, Sousse, Monastir, Gabes, and Bizerte.[139] Moreover, starting from 2005, they began to meet with al-Nahda's senior leaders in order to create new mechanism for triggering activism within university campuses, which resulted in implementation of certain actions, such as distributing religious materials like Qur'an CDs and copies of Islamic books, forming places for prayers in the universities and organizing protests on specific topics.[140]

In Tunisia, the university campuses were dynamic milieus, which disseminated ideas and ensured organizational mobilization throughout the society.[141] The al-Nahda movement

[134] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[135] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 7.
[136] Author Interview with the Representative of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[137] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 119.
[138] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (2000-2010) in the Youth Branch of the Movement in İstanbul on 22 September 2022.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 120.
[141] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 48.

endeavored to consolidate its organizational dynamics and construct bases in multiple cities across the country via using its university networks.[142] The young al-Nahda adherents, who educated in science and technology, played an important role in the movement's infiltration into the country's security and military units.[143]

The second generation al-Nahda members, who started their university education between 2000 and 2010, carried out many activities, such as student demonstrations, mass strikes, organized meetings with the participation of different activist groups, as well as labor unions, especially within the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences at the University of Tunisia.[144] However, those students were expelled from their universities because of the activities they carried out on university campuses in favor of the al-Nahda movement.

The disciplinary committees of the universities accused the al-Nahda member students of insulting the president, provocating the public against the regime, performing disinformation harming national security, distributing leaflets, provocating citizens against the ruling party (RCD) and calling foreign powers for help.[145] The al-Nahda member students, who were expelled from the universities, periodically organized sit-ins in front of their faculties and protested their expulsion from the university.[146] These sit-ins had positive results, especially in the process leading up to the 2011 Uprisings, and some students returned to their education. The organized sit-ins on university campuses also created a huge mobilization capacity for the al-Nahda movement, and helped the movement entrepreneurs organize mass protests during the 2011 Uprisings.

The al-Nahda movement's student wing on university campuses created a Facebook page called "Tunisia Street Protest News Agency" and organized to publish a digital bulletin in Arabic, French and English.[147] This bulletin was released on 26 December 2010 under the name "Diaries of Resistance".[148] This internet publication created a link between journalists, activists and revolutionaries in Tunisia and abroad, as well as the student wing of al-Nahda, and created a counter media that opposes the semi-authoritarian structure in Tunisia, presenting the protests to the world in an objective way.

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[142] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 398-399.
[143] Ibid.
[144] See: Sghiri, "Greetings to the Dawn,"
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.

Furthermore, the al-Nahda movement had a very strong base in the Baldis, such as Gafsa, where the mass strikes frequently happened.[149] The conservative youth in the Baldis, in particular, gave great support to the al-Nahda movement.[150] In the 2000-2010 period, despite all the obstacles, many youth conferences were held in the Baldis, and some solutions were started to be produced for the socio-economic problems of the country by raising awareness among the youth.[151]

Moreover, the research has shown that the student wing of the al-Nahda movement was not only at the university level.[152] In the last periods of the Ben Ali regime, especially the high school teachers, who were members of the al-Nahda movement, began to give ideological directions during their lectures.[153] In addition, when the 2011 Uprisings started, the high school teachers, who were members of the al-Nahda, did not teach and directed the youth to organize demonstrations in the streets.[154] The al-Nahda youth mobilized the masses in a disciplined and rapid way during the 2011 Uprisings.[155]

5.4. Emphasis on Alliance for Rights and Freedoms

In the period between 2000 and 2010, the movement's leadership in Europe had to enhance its endeavors to distance itself from violence for keeping its networks in the precautionary atmosphere in the countries of asylum.[156] Rachid Ghannouchi's determined criticism of violence, as well as his discursive differences with the extremist groups within the Islamist milieu in the United Kingdom, with whom he rejected to construct formal ties, also helped these endeavors.[157]

In fact, Rachid Ghannouchi was a different Islamist leader in two ways.[158] Firstly, although Ghannouchi relied on Islamic principles, he was able to disseminate them in the contemporary discourses of his age. This reinforced his contemporary intellectual stance

[149] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Member (2004-2012) in the Youth Branch of the Movement in İstanbul on 25 September 2022.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Adherent Teacher (Retired) in İstanbul on 25 September 2022.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 191.
[157] Camau and Geisser, *Le Syndrome Autoritaire*, 309-311.
[158] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 8.

and improved his reputaion, especially in the international arena. Secondly, Ghannouchi was considered not only as an ideologue, but also as a *"mujahid"* working for the political and social awakening of the Muslim community. In this vein, Ghannouchi shaped his political studies with contemporary Islamic culture. Moreover, instead of conducting his cultural studies in a purely theoretical framework, he used culture as an instrument to lay the groundwork for Muslims to live in better conditions in the future. These two features that distinguished Ghannouchi from other Islamist leaders played a major role in shaping the framing processes of the al-Nahda movement. In this way, the al-Nahda movement was able to construct an organic link between politics and culture in Tunisian dynamics on the axis of its framing processes, and the movement could survive despite decades of regime repression.

Rachid Ghannouchi believed that the incompatibility of shari'a with modern norms of human rights and international relations could only be overcome by reforming shari'a in an integrated manner with the modern concepts.[159] In this context, Ghannouchi shaped the framing processes of the al-Nahda movement by thinking of two basic questions: "1) What are the fundamental conceptions of freedom and approaches towards them in the West? 2) What are the fundamental human rights and freedom in Islam?"[160] Ghannouchi also questioned to what extent the notion of public freedom in the West has accomplished the model of self-government by the people.[161] In this framework, he drew attention to the fact that there are many obstacles to the practical application of the freedoms given in the theory. Ghannouchi stated that people are not fully equal in the liberal sense, and that the state, which adapts liberalist thought as a structure that represents the will of the people, cannot go beyond serving a fortunate group of minorities.

Yet, Ghannouchi also stressed that his critique of the liberal model does not have the right to give effect to a Marxist alternative, or any socialist, nationalist, Islamist or Arab nationalist dictatorian alternatives, no matter how different their slogans are.[162] In this respect, Ghannouchi stated that dictatorship is considered as the biggest enemy of Islam after shirk against Allah and it is recommended that Muslims take sides with the freedom camp against the tyranny camp. Here Ghannouchi refered to the words of Ibn Taymiyyah

[159] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani),* 11.
[160] Ibid, 11-12.
[161] Ibid, 14.
[162] Ibid, 16.

as follows: “It is said that Allah allows the just state to remain even if it is led by unbelievers, but Allah will not allow the oppressive state to remain even if it is led by Muslims.”[163]

In the countries of asylum, the al-Nahda concentrated on keeping its organizational structures, enabling aid for its numerous imprisoned members in Tunisia, as well as conducting widescale campaigns to draw attention to the lack of democracy and human rights abuses by the Tunisian regime.[164] The European Union added Tunisia’s human rights to the agenda of European Union-Tunisia Association Council as of 2000.[165] In this vein, the al-Nahda movement gave importance to encouragement of the young adherents, since the youth was capable of creating discursive frames.[166] The movement concentrated on framing new opportunity structures, and transformed its organizational dynamics in this process in a pragmatic way.

5.4.1. Diagnostic Framing

In the period between 2000 and 2010, the well-equipped young population was feeling uneasy about worsening living conditions due to unemployment and increasing commodity prices.[167] In the literature, Susan Waltz, Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner argue that well-educated middle class, who engage in politics, play important role in mobilization of the Islamist movements, and these movements are framed via their anti-corruption strategies.[168] In this period, especially the middle class was discontented with the Ben Ali regime’s authoritarian practices, as well as the discredited official interpretation of Islam.[169]

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[163] Abu Amina Elias, “Ibn Taymiyyah on ‘Adl: Allah Helps a Just Government, Even by Unbelievers,” *Daily Hadith Online*, 07 July 2012, Web: https://www.abuaminaelias.com/dailyhadithonline/2012/07/07/allah-supports-justice-unbelievers/, Accessed: 2022-07-28.
[164] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, 196.
[165] Richard Youngs, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 77.
[166] Amira Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian revolution: The Revolution of dignity,” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 3, 1 (2012), 18–45.
[167] Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 216.
[168] See: Waltz, “Islamist appeal in Tunisia,”; Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner, “The Justice and Development Party in Moroccan local politics,” *Middle East Journal* 69, 1 (2015), 32–50.
[169] See: Haugbølle, “New expressions of Islam in Tunisia,”

In the Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of the al-Nahda in 2001, the movement enhanced its diagnostic framing efforts. In this vein, the al-Nahda movement underlined socio-economic problems of the country, such as organized misappropriation of public funds, and rapid gaining wealth of the president and his inner circle, which resulted in off-market trading, fraud, financial corruption, market manipulation, bribery in addition to rising unemployment, destitution, and falling national income.[170] In this process, the spread of Qur'an training groups satisfied rising needs of adherents for getting information about social unrest at increasing consumerism and corruption.[171]

Actually, the corruption reached to its peak level between 2000 and 2010 under Ben Ali's business empire. Beginning from the 1970s, Tunisia returned to liberal policies, and adapted market economy in many areas from textiles to tourism.[172] On the other hand, after the 1980s, the so-called liberal reforms carried out by the Ben Ali regime under the name of liberal economy allowed only a limited group of the population to benefit.[173] This situation resulted in various socio-economic problems and the rising corruption cases, which played an important role in the 2011 Uprisings.[174] More than half of Tunisia's business elites were linked to Ben Ali through his three children, seven siblings, and ten siblings of his second wife.[175]

Ben Ali's inner circle accomplished to construct a huge and lucrative business empire, which was maintained through regulatory capture, perverted privatization and tax evasion.[176] To illustrate, Ben Ali's family captured the car market at first, after that the family appropriated public firms via privatization, and later connected entrepreneurs benefitted from a policy-induced surge in demand, while evading import taxes.[177] All of these practices increased the inequality despite attaining noteworthy growth and poverty reduction rates, and Ben Ali's Tunisia became an overregulated rentier economy with the

[170] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Sabaʿ li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of al-Nahda)," *The Database of Ikhwan Wiki*, Accessed: 2021-09-19, Web: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=النهضة_لحركة_السابع_للمؤتمر_الختامي_البيان.
[171] Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, "Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia," *Middle East Report* 262 (2012), 20-25.
[172] Author Interview with the Senior Economist of the World Bank through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 90, 3 (2011), 2-7.
[176] Hassen Arouri, Leila Baghdadi, and Bob Rijkers, "State Capture in Ben Ali's Tunisia," in *Crony Capitalism in the Middle East: Business and Politics from Liberalization to the Arab Spring*, Ishac Diwan, Adeel Malik, and Izak Atiyas (Editors) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 173-204, 199.
[177] Arouri, Baghdadi and Rijkers, "State Capture in Ben Ali's Tunisia," 199.

existence of limited check and balance mechanisms on abuse of power and comparatively limited opportunities for non-connected entrepreneurs.[178]

In the Final Declaration of the Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda in 2007, the movement improved its diagnostic framing efforts. In this respect, the Tunisian regime's closed-door policies were severely condemned in addition to heavy criticisms leveled against public and private restrictions on liberty, ban of civil movements and political parties, repressive security precautions, interference with the judiciary, and arbitrary arrests and accusations of many activists, as well as the continuing unfairness against the al-Nahda inmates.[179] Moreover, in this declaration, the al-Nahda movement focused on the emotions of anger and disappointment that emerged due to social injustice within social domain via identifying their causes by diagnostic framing as follows:

> -The spread of bribery and nepotism all over the country, the spread of all methods of corruption by governmental authorities who administrate the public funds, and other methods of corruption within the state's administrative institutions,
> -The strict restrictions on the activities of unions and civil society organizations, which protect the interests of labors, undefended classes, talented individuals, and graduates, who are oppressed under the widespread unemployment and remissness.[180]

Although the economic growth reached five percent in 2008 and this was called as an economic miracle by the Tunisian regime, the Tunisian economy was based on trade with Europe, the economic crisis that broke out in Europe in the same period directly influenced the Tunisian economy, and the unemployment rate between the ages of 15-24 reached 30 percent in this period.[181] The social injustice, which was felt seriously in cities, such as Sidi Buzid and Kasserine, where protests broke out, was also one of the main reasons for marginalization and social mobilization in the country.[182] Especially in 2008, the problems in political life, along with the economic difficulties, increased the burden on Tunisian society, and the state was unable to create employment for university graduates whose

[178] Arouri, Baghdadi and Rijkers, "State Capture in Ben Ali's Tunisia," 199.
[179] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Thamin li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration Of The Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda)," *The Database of Turess*, Accessed: 2022-09-05, Web: https://www.turess.com/alwasat/6230.
[180] " البيان الختامي للمؤتمر الثامن لحركة النهضة (al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Thamin li Haraka al-Nahda/The Final Declaration Of The Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda),"
[181] Malika Zeghal, "Competing ways of life: Islamism, secularism, and public order in the Tunisian transition," *Constellations* 20, 2, (2013), 254–274.
[182] Ibid.

numbers were increasing day by day.[183] For example, the number of young university graduates, which was 121,800 between 1996 and 1997, reached 336,000 within a decade, and the unemployment rate, especially among those with technical education and graduate degrees, approached 50 percent.[184]

As inferred from the above-mentioned issues, the malfunctioning state structure became more evident, and the al-Nahda movement began to criticize this by diagnostic framing in the period between 2000 and 2010, since the corruption became widespread, the inequalities and unemployment increased, and the judicial system deteriorated, to a very large extent. Although these problems had already existed for a long period, the socio-economic situations grew worse in the period between 2000 and 2010. At that time, the al-Nahda cadres focused on a political rhetoric criticizing the socio-economic problems, such as corruption, poor living conditions, unemployment, food inflation, lack of political freedoms and injustice, on the axis of Islamic principles like righteousness.[185]

The al-Nahda movement's Islamic discourse/stance against corruption resulted in the rise of the movement's popular support from all segments of the society, including the regime's RCD cadres.[186] One of the al-Nahda's basic raisons d'être became its declared struggle for social justice via Islamic principles.[187] Especially the lack of justice in the judicial system in Tunisia played an important role in increasing social unrest during the last periods of the Ben Ali regime. The principle of transparency in the judiciary was not respected and the hearings were closed, which was against the interests of both leftist and Islamist camps.[188] Moreover, worsening socio-economic situations were covered on social media intensely, and this resulted in widespread protests.[189] In addition, the published Wikileaks records, which were related to the corruption in Tunisia and the repressive practices of the Tunisian

[183] Karaatlı, *Arap Baharı'nda Farklı Bir Ülke Tunus*, 173.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Author Interview with the Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's Political Party, the RCD, through Zoom Meeting in 2021.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 164-165.
[188] Author Interview with the Senior Executive of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) through Zoom Meeting in May 2021.
[189] Rania Abouzeid, "Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia On Fire," *Time*, 21 January 2011. Web: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html. Accessed: 2022-03-27.

regime, raised the popular support of the opposition groups in the country, including the al-Nahda movement.[190]

In the period between 2000 and 2010, the socio-economic policies of the Tunisian regime subserved the interests of the ruling elites through managing political balances and economic reform alliances in the business area.[191] This resulted in accumulation of political regulations imposing subjugation contracts for individuals leaving most of society under state control and surveillance.[192] A large segment of the Tunisian society including poors was excluded from the advantages of rapid economic expansion, which preserved the interests of ruling elites.[193] Rachid Ghannouchi accused the Ben Ali regime of dominating the will of the people, usurping the treasury, getting rich illegally, banning the freedom of press, rigging the elections, using the state as an instrument of repression, exploitation and personal ambitions.[194] In brief, the al-Nahda movement improved its diagnostic framing efforts, to a large extent.

5.4.2. Prognostic Framing

The al-Nahda's second-generation in Europe studied Western political theories and monitored Western political systems, and with the aid of Western education and languages, they enhanced more moderate understandings of identity, religion, and values unlike that of their parents.[195] The second-generation al-Nahda members were not eager to preserve the firm regulations of shari'a; on the contrary, they were voluntary to admit the values of their adoptive states.[196] The movement improved an ideological approach, which considered the al-Nahda as a political party that combined both democratic rules and religious tenets.[197] In other words, the al-Nahda movement drew comprehensive lessons

[190] Ian Black, "Wikileaks Cables: Tunisia Blocks Site Reporting 'Hatred' of First Lady," *The Guardian*, 07 December 2010. Web: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-tunisia-first-lady. Accessed: 2022-03-27.
[191] Yafout, *The Women of the Islamist Movements*, 4.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Gamal Amin, *Whatever Happened to the Egyptian Revolution?*, translated by Jonathan Wright (Cairo, Egypt and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2013), 102.
[194] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 124.
[195] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 179.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Sayida Ounissi, "Ennahda from within: Islamists or 'Muslim Democrats'? Islamist on Islamism Today," *Rethinking Political Islam Series, Brookings*, February 2016. Web: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ounissi-RPI-Response-FINAL_v2.pdf. Accessed: 2022-03-30.

from both its previous political experiences and the Qur'an, and succeeded in applying them to contemporary politics.[198]

The al-Nahda reformulated its principles by offering that the authoritarian regime's misgovernment could solely be solved via democratization process that included all political powers; in other words, the al-Nahda introduced itself as a guardian of religious freedom, pluralism and secularism.[199] Living in the Western countries played an important role in the the secularization process of the al-Nahda deputies via enabling meetings and good fellowships with Rachid Ghannouchi, who was also exiled in the United Kingdom and had considerable personal impact over them.[200]

In this context, findings of Sharan Grewal also revealed that the al-Nahda deputies, who were exiled in secular Western countries, were the best advocates of the secular reconciliation.[201] Among the al-Nahda deputies, who had either completed their education or earned their living in secular countries of asylum, more than 90 percent made their choice in favor of protecting freedom of conscience and forbiding religious provocation to violence when compared with nearly 65 percent of their counterparts who had spent their life only inside Tunisia.[202]

In the Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of the al-Nahda in 2001, the al-Nahda movement declared its political demands by prognostic framing. These political demands were social justice, release of political inmates, legislative pardon, removal of all restrictions on liberty, assurance on freedom of speech, removal of the restrictions misused against civil society, struggle against corruption and misappropriation of national wealth, enforcement of judicial reforms, removal of the restrictions on freedom of religion, removal of the state's control on religion and religious organizations.[203] For instance, Rachid Ghannouchi argued that the government ought to withdraw "from the spiritual sphere, leaving it in the hands of the religious establishment".[204]

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[198] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[199] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization,* 182.
[200] See: Grewal, "From Islamists to Muslim democrats,"
[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid, 520.
[203] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Sabaʿ li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration of the Seventh Congress of al-Nahda)," *The Database of Ikhwan Wiki*, Accessed: 2021-09-19, Web: https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=النهضة_لحركة_السابع_للمؤتمر_الختامي_البيان.
[204] Rachid Ghannouchi, "Secularism in the Arab Maghreb," in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, A. Tamimi and J. Esposito (Editors) (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 97–124, 97.

Ghannouchi began to advocate secularism during his exile years through giving refereneces from the Qur'an, which condemned applying religion for any hegemonic aims.[205] Ghannouchi searched for interpreting divine texts by adjusting them in a dynamic direction to Tunisian society through relating them to politics, democracy and Islam.[206] In this sense, he defended his ideas, which were related to democracy and equality, through giving reference to Islam and Qur'an. Ghannouchi argued that Islam brought common principles to our life and the Muslims had an important task to formulate these tenets via interaction between Islamic doctrines and modernity.[207]

To illustrate, Ghannouchi used the Qur'an suras in order to anaylze the concept of shura, and argued that the democratic tenets of political pluralism and tolerance were perfectly coherent with Islam.[208] Ghannouchi opposed any distinction between citizens, and he put absolute equality in the center of the Muslim society.[209] He perceieved the elections as the sole legitimacy and argued that freedom came before Islam as an important footstep directing to Islam.[210]

Ghannouchi claimed that Islam did not ignore the Western secularism's achievements in liberation of the mind, technical and scientific inventions, and democratic freedoms; on the contrary, Islam welcomed it and added a distinguished thought to it with an integrative perspective.[211] In this vein, Ghannouchi argued that Islam used Western secularism as a mean of approaching only Allah instead of destructive and authoritarian purposes, while doing this; it offered all these achievements to the service of mankind and provided solidarity and justice among people in response to God's divine call to all human beings.[212] Here he refered to the verse of al-Hujurat sura in the Qur'an: "O mankind! We have indeed created you from one man and one woman, and have made you into various nations and tribes so that you may know one another./Verse 13 of al-Hujurat".[213]

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[205] See: Wright, "Two visions of reformation,"
[206] Duncan Pickard, "Challenges to legitimate governance in postrevolution Tunisia," *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, 4 (2011), 637-652.
[207] Robin B. Wright, "Islamist's Theory of Relativity: Iranian scholar says faith is open to interpretation, challenging the dogma of hard-line mullahs. His ideas on religion, democracy could lead to a Muslim reformation," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 1995, Web: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-01-27-mn-25033-story.html. Accessed:2022-03-27.
[208] See: Wright, "Two visions of reformation,"
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 25.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.

According to Ghannouchi, Islam places human rights and freedoms on a strong philosophical foundation that does not revolve around personal ambitions; it even encourages a radical liberal revolution against repression, ignorance, and personal ambitions.[214] Therefore, Ghannouchi claimed that freedom in Islam does not mean that people do what they want;[215] on the contrary, it means responsibility and struggle.[216] In this vein, he argued that when people fulfill their responsibilities to Allah and fight against the repression and evil, they become free and accomplish the purpose of their existence.[217]

During the 2000-2010 period, the al-Nahda was such a movement, which had its roots in the past and was eager to alter its practices towards a more modern world. The al-Nahda movement had an objective of developing economy on the principle of equity, terminating the single-party politics, and acknowledging political pluralism and democracy.[218] Refik Abdusselam, a prominent figure of the al-Nahda movement, analyzed the movement's evolution on the axis of pluralism and democracy as follows:

> I think the greatest achievement of Islamic thought might be its integration with modern thought by applying religious values and principles... I mean how we can empower Islam in matters such as pluralism, differences, democracy and human rights. This is the most significant issue that Muslim societies face. How do we both preserve the Islamic values and integrate them with all positive ideas and mechanisms from the West? The biggest challenge right now is not just a question of how to reconcile Islam with modernity and democracy; on the contrary, it is the matter of making Islam a force that will bring a new breath to modernity, democracy and human rights.[219]

The analyses of Refik Abdusselam cleary shows the prognostic framing endeavors of the al-Nahda. This prognostic framing was not only harmonious with the movement's own identity, socio-political and religious culture, but it was also coherent and convenient with its own experiences and interpretations. With the aid of this prognostic framing, the movement had numerous members, which was around 50,000 and the movement's

[214] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 18.
[215] Ibid.
[216] Ibid, 19.
[217] Ibid, 20.
[218] John R. Bradley, *After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2012), 54.
[219] Refik Abdusselam, "Nahda Hareketi ve Tunus'un Geleceği (Röportaj)," interviewer Özgür Tomakin, *Haksöz Haber*, 25 May 2017. Web: https://www.haksozhaber.net/nahda-hareketi-ve-tunusun-gelecegi-roportaj-93340h.htm. Accessed: 2021-01-11.

leadership involved primarily teachers and civil servants, most of whom were from the conservative urban middle class.[220] Although some of its leaders had the MB background, the movement was able to introduce itself as a modern party of the masses.[221]

In the 2000-2010 period, there was an emphasis on democratization, in particular. To illustrate, during a visit to London in June 2000, Moncef Marzouki declared that a national democratic conference was programmed for early December to lay the basics for a democratic state in Tunisia within a decade.[222] Marzouki disclosed the expectancy that the al-Nahda members would attend the proposed conference; hence, bringing together the disunited secular and Islamist dissidents heretofore.[223] After that some al-Nahda figures in Germany went to Milan, Italy in order give a conference in a mosque in 2001, and they were able to disseminate the movement's ideological discourse.[224]

Rachid Ghannouchi emphasized that justice is the backbone in the Islamic approach on human rights.[225] He drew attention to the necessity of establishing a just Islamic order in order to apply these principles in practice, and he argued that the just Islamic order would form the general framework of fundamental rights and freedoms in Islam.[226] In this respect, he refered to the verse of al-Hadid sura in the Qur'an: "We sent our messengers with clear evidence and we sent down with them the book and the balance, that people may establish justice./Verse (ayah) 25 of al-Hadid".[227]

Ghannouchi analyzed justice in an Islamic society at two levels.[228] The first of these was in determining rights, and the second one was justice in practice. The justice in practice does not mean that things are distributed equally among undeserving people. The justice is the balance between two extreme poles. One of these poles is extremeness *(ifrat)*, which means giving the right owner more than s/he deserves, the other pole is negligence *(tafrit)*, which means persecuting the right owner, and both are injustice.

[220] Enhaili, "Tunisia," 398.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Partrick, "Tunisia,", 1092.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Author Interview with the al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Germany in İstanbul on 17 September 2022.
[225] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 113.
[226] Ibid, 21.
[227] Ibid, 28.
[228] Ibid, 60.

Yet, Ghannouchi's just Islamic order discourse was promlematic in some ways, because it contradicted some discourses of the al-Nahda. The movement emphasized pluralism on almost every platform by prognostic framing. However, just Islamic order was not a discourse that referenced any religion other than Islam, and the just Islamic order discourse contradicted with the movement's demand for pluralism. At this point, it was possible to see al-Nahda's pragmatism, and this prognostic framing process played an important role in psychologically breaking the state domination over the movement especially during the 2000-2010 period.

Ghannouchi summarized the most important freedoms of human beings in Islamic thought under four headings, which were freedom of faith, political freedoms, social freedoms and freedoms granted to non-Muslims in an Islamic state through prognostic framing.[229] First of all, Rachid Ghannouchi focused on freedom of faith. Here he refered to the verse of al-Baqara sura in the Qur'an: "There is no compulsion in religion./Verse 256 of al-Baqara". From this point of view, Ghannouchi drew attention to the necessity of religious, political and cultural pluralism in an Islamic society. In this respect, Ghannouchi also stated that freedom of belief and its consequent freedom of thought and expression are considered as the basis of fundamental human rights in Islam because of the wide impact that belief has on other forms of social and individual behaviors. Secondly, Ghannouchi focused on political freedoms. Here he refered to the verse of al-Shura sura in the Qur'an: "…conduct their affairs by mutual consultation/Verse 38 of al-Shura". From this point of view, Ghannouchi drew attention to the fact that it is against the laws to monopolize comprehensive policies related to public affairs by a person or group. Thirdly, Ghannouchi focused on social freedoms. In this respect, he stated that social freedoms are related to the individual's belonging to society, because belonging imposes rights and duties on both the society and the individual. Fourthly, Ghannouchi focused on the freedoms granted to non-Muslims in the Islamic state. In this respect, he stated that regardless of their belief, non-Muslims can benefit from the right of citizenship as long as they accept to be under the general laws of the state, and that citizens in an Islamic state are equal in practice.

The al-Nahda's stress on both religious freedom and pluralist frames had significant effects in two contexts.[230] At first, the al-Nahda's harsh criticism on the regime's restraints on

[229] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 21-23.
[230] Zhang, *Islamist Party Mobilization*, 185.

religious liberty assisted the movement, and the party's new approach towards religious doctrines aided the movement to access larger social groups with the inclusion of secular opposition parties' supporters. Secondly, the al-Nahda's voluntariness to cooperate with secular parties showed its leniency for diversity and its promise for the country's integrity, which accelerated the consolidation of a unified power composed of human right activists, the al-Nahda Islamists and other secular parties after the 2011 Uprisings. In other words, the al-Nahda movement openly asserted that separation of religion and politics were not reciprocally contradictory with a comprehensive vision of Islam.[231]

In order to minimize internal reactions and maintain the harmony within the movement, the al-Nahda leadership engaged in giving references to the traditions of Qur'anic administration, such as consultation (*shura*) and consensus (*ijma*).[232] The al-Nahda movement was able to combine the thoughts of al-Zaytuna scholars and the Islamic reformers like Rashid Rida, and supported an Islamic renaissance through analyzing fundamental religious and cultural components of the sacred texts, while accomplishing inventive reforms to reconcile with modern world.[233]

Rachid Ghannouchi described the way of the intelligentsia to establish a democratic ground as helping to form the core of genuine, democratic Arab communities -even intellectuals with different views on tolerance and pluralism are to be educated on this core- above all ideology and party leves, in addition to transforming power through organizations, such as writers' and lawyers' unions, voluntary societies and trade unions.[234] In this respect, Ghannouchi offered a real democracy, which guaranteed the freedom and dignity of everyone, protected the right to cultural, political and economic initiatives, and preserved the right to choose between different projects and different people without the tutelage control of any authority.[235] Briefly, the al-Nahda case showed that once the organizational structure was more movement than a party, the members of the movement could mobilize around a charismatic leader like Rachid Ghannouchi through prognostic framing processes.

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[231] Teije Hidde Donker, "The sacred as secular: State control and mosques neutrality in post-revolutionary Tunisia," *Politics and Religion* 12, 3 (2019), 501-523.
[232] George Joffé, "Democracy and the Muslim World," in *The International Politics of Democratization: Comparative Perspectives*, N. Teixeira (Editor) (London: Routledge, 2008), 931–949.
[233] Rachela Tonta, "From theory to practice-The concept of an Islamic state Ennahda in the context of political transition in Tunisia," *Hemispheres* 27 (2012), 175-193.
[234] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 117.
[235] Ibid, 134.

In the literature, many studies have shown that the pioneers of the al-Nahda movement, including primarily Rachid Ghannouchi, embaraced democratic values.[236] Ghannouchi emphasized the significance of separation of powers, electoral processes, as well as the power of parliaments in democratic life.[237] Ghannouchi also pointed to the influencive hidden dynamics of democratic mechanisms, liberal rights, as well as market economy.[238] In this vein, Ghannouchi was able to synthesize democratic principles and Islamic values.[239]

5.4.3. Motivational Framing

The 2000-2010 period of the al-Nahda movement under repression can be analyzed within the domain of thought and cause (*da'wa*), which transcends the domain of politics and organization. When compared with the first and second periods of the movement under repression (1981-1989 and 1989-1999 periods respectively), the al-Nahda movement reconstructed its networks with the growth of second-generation al-Nahda members. In this period, the al-Nahda movement tried to create a rationale by calling society to alliance for rights and freedoms, as well as preserving its stance against violence by motivational framing.

Ghannouchi stated that the center of gravity in the Islamic social structure was not the state, but the civil society with its individuals, beliefs and institutions, and within this framework, he identified the main goal of the Islamic movement in Tunisia as reconstructing civil society.[240] In this vein, in order to construct organizational dynamics within Islamic civil society, Ghannouchi pointed out that religion, individual and society should be freed from all authorities above the the nation, except for the authority of Allah. In fact, this motivational framing process played a major role in breaking the regime's pressure on the al-Nahda movement via using state apparatus in Tunisia, where civil society was very strong.

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[236] Cavatorta and Merone, "Moderation through exclusion?,"; Michael D. Driessen, *Religion and Democratization: Framing Religious and Political Identities in Muslim and Catholic Societies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 189; Duncan Pickard, *Tunisia's New Constitutional Court* (Halle: Universitätsund Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, 2015), 644.
[237] Pickard, *Tunisia's New Constitutional Court*, 7.
[238] See: Cavatorta and Merone, "Moderation through exclusion?,"
[239] Pickard, *Tunisia's New Constitutional Court*, 7-8; Driessen, *Religion and Democratization*, 190.
[240] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 52.

Referring to Imam Mahdi Shams al-Din, Ghannouchi argued that the state does not deal with the message of the Qur'an, so the state is not holy, that it is individuals and societies that are sacred.[241] Ghannouchi stated that in an Islamic society, citizens have the right to determine their future, control the administration and rulers, because in an Islamic civil society the government is the servant of the people, not the master.[242] This motivational framing process directly improved the al-Nahda movement's efforts to build a model of a democratic society respecting pluralism and civil liberties.

The movement entrepreneurs learned to form their strategies in accordance with the actual political circumstances in this period. This is for why the al-Nahda movement could create a rationale for alliance for rights and freedoms by motivational framing. The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms came to an agreement on three papers in order to enhance its joint intellectual base.[243] The first paper was about political pluralism, and stressed the right to establish a political party. The second paper was about the women rights, and the al-Nahda reassured other movements in the coalition regarding its stance towards women. The third paper was about the freedom of conscience, and acknowledged that Tunisians have the right to believe in anything, to leave or embrace any faith. With the aid of these papers, the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms transformed into a social project for Tunisians, and improved the motivational framing efforts of the al-Nahda movement, to a large extent.

Ghannouchi emphasized the freedom of dissent among the obligations imposed by the Islamic understanding on both faith and authority.[244] According to him, this freedom was guarantee for the freedom of expression, criticism, opposition and forming parties without the permission of the state. Ghannouchi also stated that one of the things that Islamic thought necessitated was the enactment of the revolution principle that would terminate the leader's despotism, from the lightest to the most severe. He strengthened this statement by referring to the hadith of the Prophet: "Whosoever of you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart-and that is the weakest of faith."[245]

[241] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 53.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ghannouchi, "Interview Transcript,"
[244] Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum (Muqarabat fi al-'Ilmaniyya wa al-Mujtama' al-Madani)*, 36.
[245] "Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi," *Sunnah*, Accessed: 2022-07-29, Web: https://sunnah.com/nawawi40:34.

In the Final Declaration of the Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda in 2007, the movement stressed the prominence of socio-political values, such as liberty, consultation, reverence for the people's preference, social solidarity, and equality among all fellow citizens in rights and duties without any exclusion or distinction.[246] In this congress, the al-Nahda totally took a moderate stance directing all its view, socio-political stand, and cultural vision. In the congress, it was emphsized that the al-Nahda's endeavor to cooperate with its collaborators in the national opposition played an important role in the process of reconciliation and democratic change, and the movement acted as a significant actor in this process. In addition, the participants said that the movement had a key role in supporting moderate way of thinking against extremist and violent trends. The participants also underlined their support for justice, liberty, and human rights both inside and outside the country.

In the 2000-2010 period, the second-generation al-Nahda members fostered the movement with new ideas about how a democratic system truly operates, directing the movement to be more adaptive to pluralist policies, which made the al-Nahda movement form its skeleton. In religious cases, ideas are also important as much as interests in creating mobilization within social movements, as well as forming identities.[247] In this sense, Amir El Üreyit, one of the prominent figures of al-Nahda, analyzed this formation process as follows:

> The general feature of the Islamic movement in Tunisia was to bring a new vision to social life, since the social life in Tunisia was narrowed; in other words, there was a social life isolated from other social dimensions. The Islamist movement in Tunisia desired to create a new vision on issues, such as social justice. It tried to explain that Islam had capacity to regulate personal and interpersonal relations. It took initiatives on women's rights and social rights… In addition to the things done in the social sphere, it also took initiatives regarding the human rights in political domain. This was the idea of building a state that gave importance to the rights and freedoms. At this point, we focused on the concepts of citizenship and equality... Our thinking was the ideology of creating a civil state. Citizens' responsibilities were rights and duties. The equality between citizens refered to religious, social and legal equalities.[248]

[246] "al-Bayan al-Khitami li al-Mu'tamar al-Thamin li Haraka al-Nahda (The Final Declaration Of The Eighth Congress of the al-Nahda),"
[247] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 13; Eva Bellin, "Faith in politics: New trends in the study of religion and politics," *World Politics* 60, 2 (2008), 315-347.
[248] Sala and Gökgöz, "Ulustan Ümmete Grubu El Üreyit'le Görüştü,"

Rachid Ghannouchi's daughters also played important role especially between 2000 and 2010, and it was a motivational framing process in itself. They directly engaged in socio-political activities of the movement in the countries of asylum. They wrote for the Guardian and the al-Jazeera websites where they did not only argue for the Islamist policies, but they also emphasized the left-leaning perspectives.[249] Benefitting from this experience, the al-Nahda members learned how to work in coalitions with other Islamist movements, as well as the non-Islamist ones in which case they were able to broaden their views with the non-Islamist ideas.[250]

In fact, the new Arab generation had more interaction with the outside world than their parents did, and they were able criticize the aging leadership in case of dealing with Islamist activities.[251] For instance, Soumaya Ghannouchi, the daughter of Rachid Ghannouchi, became a considerable media figure in the 2003-2005 United Kingdom protests against the Iraq War, which were frequently arranged in conjunction with Islamist groups like the MAB, as well as the leftist bodies like the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).[252] For example, Soumaya Ghannouchi had a statement as follows:

> I am no fan of the niqab. I feel it turns the wearer into a blank space, an anonymous mass, a non-identity… I, like many, feel quite uneasy about the covering of faces and suppression of all traces of individual identity it entails. But I have no right to interfere in other people's personal preferences just as I would not allow them to lecture me on how I should dress, what I should eat, drink, read, watch, or listen to. The risk of intervention and coercion is all the more worrying if it comes from the state, its officials, or institutions.[253]

Yusra Ghannouchi, another daughter of Rachid Ghannouchi, also involved in activism and later became a spokesperson for the al-Nahda movement.[254] Intissar Kherigi, another daughter of Rachid Ghannouchi, co-organized the "Islam Expo" in London in 2006, and many Islamist scholars including Rachid Ghannouchi, came together in this organization,

[249] See: Brandon and Pantucci, "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings,"
[250] Ibid.
[251] Olivier Roy, "The new Islamists," *Arab Uprisings, The New Salafi Politics, POMEPS Briefings* 14 (2012), 10-14.
[252] See: Brandon and Pantucci, "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings,"
[253] Soumaya Ghannoushi, "The Politics of Choice," *The Guardian*, 09 October 2006, Web: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/oct/09/imnofanoftheniqabbut, Accessed: 2020-08-03.
[254] Brandon and Pantucci, "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings,"

which encouraged a genuine dialogue among Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the United Kingdom.[255]

Rachid Ghannouchi expressed on every platform that the Ben Ali regime was only working to reppress the Islamists instead of fighting against exploitation and imperialism.[256] Ghannouchi did not find it sufficient for the movement to organize only on the popular base in Tunisian society.[257] In addition, he attached great importance to recruition of new members within the army and bureaucracy, who would stand up for the cause *(da'wa)* of the al-Nahda movement.[258] He believed that only in this way, the al-Nahda movement would achieve success in the long run without resorting to violence as experienced in Algeria.[259] Ghannouchi tried to present the al-Nahda movement as a legitimate democratic alternative to replace the current administration in Tunisia, and he tried to spread the idea that Islam was not equivalent to terrorism in the international arena.[260] In this vein, the al-Nahda maintained its stance against violence by motivational framing.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the struggle of the al-Nahda movement in the 2000-2010 period. In this repsect, the al-Nahda has been analyzed through applying the three main factors of the PPM, as well as considering its socio-cultural dynamics. Some political opportunity structures played important role on the movement mobilization in this period. In terms of reduction of the regime's repression, the political al-Nahda prisoners were released, the al-Nahda exiles were allowed to return to Tunisia, and the opposition began to cooperate against the regime. The reduction of the state repression in addition to the splits in the Ben Ali's inner circle opened a space for the al-Nahda movement for alliance with secular groups. In this respect, the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms was an important political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement.

[255] See: Brandon and Pantucci, "UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings,"
[256] Author Interview with the Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council in İstanbul on 23 September 2022.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid.

In the 2000-2010 period, the new al-Nahda linked NGOs restorated informal networks between the exiled al-Nahda members and those in Tunisia. The organizational dynamics of the student wing considerably improved on the university campuses in this period. The young generation of the al-Nahda grew up through either parental impression or individual spiritual thinking, which provided fresh energy, and triggered the movement to regroup. They began to participate in Qur'an classes and religious discussion societies gathering in universities, mosques and cafes.

In addition to the widespread use of internet by young generation, family meetings during weekday evenings and Sundays also played significant role, since the family members watched religious programs in those gatherings. In order to ensure a framework for the movement, the al-Nahda constructed executive and consultative councils including mosque leaders in its neighbourhood organization. In this respect, the imams supporting the al-Nahda played a major role in the organization of the movement. They recruited new members to the al-Nahda movement through subliminal messages in the Friday prayers. The second-generation imams supporting the movement learned how to use social media and reached large masses through Facebook.

Tunisia did not have a general scheme of the whole internal security structure, and the security network in Tunisia was very complex. Obviously, this intricate structure was very convenient for the al-Nahda movement in constructing deep networks, because multiple different security units were established on different issues during the Ben Ali era. This situation caused lack of coordination among these units and prevented the formation of a uniform hierarchical structure in the internal security system. During the Ben Ali era, the independent security offices and bureaus, which were established by the arbitrary decisions of the executive power, began to abolish the hierarchical control mechanism in the Ministry of Interior over time. The decentralized security agencies have made it difficult to monitor the al-Nahda members in a controlled manner inside and outside the country, which was a strategic political opportunity structure for the movement.

The research has shown that the al-Nahda was able to survive despite the state repression with the aid of clandestine networks that it established within the security apparatuses of the state, such as police, military and intelligence units. In this respect, the movement's infiltration into the security units was a significant political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement. The al-Nahda movement established its strongest networks before the

2011 Uprisings within the Ministry of Interior. Especially after the 2011 Uprisings, these networks became much stronger and more open. The fact that the most politicized institution in Tunisia was the Ministry of Interior directly accelerated this process.

Actually, the sense of belonging among the al-Nahda members was an important motivating factor for the enhancement of organizational capacity. The sense of belonging was achieved in two ways among the al-Nahda members. This was either through the ideological bond strengthened by vital sacrifices, or through the spiritual religious sacred glue that fused the members of the movement. Furthermore, members of the al-Nahda movement identified themselves predominantly with kinship ties and shared experiences against regime repression, which made them an organic part of the movement. In this respect, the movement successfully established a coherent organizational structure, which was able to balance state repression, stimulate the political consciousness of its constituent body, and re-socialize its base with Islamic lines.

The organizational dynamics of the women wing also contributed to mobilization of the movement. Especially in the poor areas and peripheries, where the women mobilization of the regime was weak, the Islamist women under the umbrella of the al-Nahda movement found a more inviting milieu and improved social mobilization. Actually, the al-Nahda was different from other classical political Islamist parties, and this difference surfaced in terms of its organization. For instance, the brothers and sisters could sit at the same table in the al-Nahda movement, whereas the brothers used to be at the forefront in other classical political Islamist parties.

In this period, the university campuses were dynamic milieu, which disseminated ideas and ensured organizational mobilization throughout Tunisian society. The al-Nahda movement endeavored to consolidate its organizational dynamics and construct bases in multiple cities across the country via using its university networks. The young al-Nahda adherents, who educated in science and technology, played an important role in the movement's infiltration into the country's security units.

Moreover, the research has shown that the student wing of the al-Nahda movement was not only at the university level. In the last periods of the Ben Ali regime, especially the high school teachers, who were members of the al-Nahda movement, began to give ideological directions during their lectures. In addition, when the 2011 Uprisings started, the high

school teachers, who were members of the al-Nahda, did not teach and directed the youth to organize in the streets. The al-Nahda mobilized the masses in a disciplined and rapid way during the 2011 Uprisings.

The constant exposure to democracy and multi-party political systems in the countries of asylum brought in tolerance to the al-Nahda members and moderated them in comparison with other ideological tendencies. With the aid of this moderation process, the al-Nahda movement engaged in a framing process through growing away from contentious politics and coming close to consensus politics. The al-Nahda constructed its diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing processes by taking lessons from its previous experiences, and the movement transformed into a moderate political party.

The framing processes improved with the enhancement of multi-national networks in the period between 2000 and 2010. In addition to the state repression, the movement emphasized malfunctioning state through diagnostic framing, since the corruption became widespread, the inequalities and unemployment increased, and the judicial system deteriorated, to a very large extent. In this vein, widespread demonstrations were held against the worsening economic conditions due to the corruptions of the Ben Ali regime.

During this period, the framing processes were mainly enhanced through founding statements and anniversary statements of the party, as well as final declarations of the party congresses. The movement reformulated political solutions, such as social justice, legislative pardon, assurance on freedom of speech, struggle against corruption and misappropriation of national wealth, enforcement of judicial reforms, freedom of belief, democratization and pluralism by prognostic framing. In this respect, the al-Nahda movement improved its endeavors in terms of synthesizing Western values and Islamic perspectives, to a large extent.

In this period, the al-Nahda movement created a rationale by calling society to the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms, as well as preserving its stance against violence by motivational framing. In order to minimize internal reactions and maintain the harmony within the movement, the al-Nahda leadership gave references to the traditions of Qur'anic administration, such as shura and ijma. Emphasizing justice as the backbone of the Islam, Ghannouchi drew attention to the necessity of establishing a just Islamic order by prognostic framing.

Yet, Ghannouchi's just Islamic order discourse was promlematic in some ways, because it contradicted some discourses of the al-Nahda. The movement emphasized pluralism on almost every platform by prognostic framing. However, just Islamic order was not a discourse that referenced any religion other than Islam, and the just Islamic order discourse contradicted with the movement's demand for pluralism. At this point, it was possible to see al-Nahda's pragmatism, and this prognostic framing process played an important role in psychologically breaking the state domination over the movement especially during the 2000-2010 period.

Briefly, the al-Nahda movement was able to understand how critical to function efficiently within a democratic milieu, since its leadership had experienced decades of exile perceiving how democratic systems operated in reality. Especially the second-generation al-Nahda supporters, who raised in Western politics, played important role in bringing more moderate perspectives to the movement. The movement adapted more pluralist approach in the period between 2000 and 2010, followed concensus politics with the potential political allies, and acted as a conservative political party embracing the center-right voter base rather than operating just as a religious movement. This flexible and pragmatic political stance supported the movement in terms of enlarging its social base, which encompassed various social groups especially after the 2011 Uprisings.

CHAPTER VI

6. CONCLUSION

The breaking points of social movements are like fault lines. In order to identify these fault lines, it is necessary to understand the social movement thoroughly. In case of any social movement, it is not possible to talk about a monolithic structure. In other words, each social movement has different secrets and distinctive characteristics. Similarly, the al-Nahda movement is an Islamist movement, and it is unique to Tunisia. In this dissertation, I analyzed the al-Nahda movement by considering its own dynamics and processes within the Tunisian context. This dissertation reflects ten years of research into the topic of the al-Nahda movement, first as a curious intellectual interest and later as the basis for my Ph.D. dissertation.

In this dissertation, I studied the al-Nahda movement according to the Social Movement Theory, and I applied the PPM advanced mainly by Sidney George Tarrow, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. The PPM served as a theoretical framework and played an essential role in analyzing the emergence and mobilization of the movement. In addition to focusing on the political opportunities in Tunisia, the PPM helped me to emphasize that organizations' inherent structures and framing processes were also among the primary factors that specified to what extent the potency for social mobilization of the al-Nahda realized. In this vein, this dissertation focused on political opportunity structures, as well as organizational dynamics and framing processes, in the mobilization process of the al-Nahda movement.

The main advantage of the PPM in this dissertation was that these three dimensions of the model were not isolated from each other; on the contrary, they interacted with each other in a dynamic way, which helped me to detect and analyze the main trends and changes in the movement. In other words, there was a dynamic relationship among the three main factors of the PPM just like the gears of a wheel. Hence, in the context of the ongoing discussion

among the theorists regarding how changes in states result in movement mobilization, I analyzed the political opportunity structures related to mobilization of the al-Nahda in a dynamic way. This dissertation explained the non-violent social mobilization process of the al-Nahda in Tunisia during the three-decade state repression from 1981 to 2010.

In this dissertation, by applying the PPM, I argued that the al-Nahda in Tunisia could maintain its nonviolent mobilization between 1981 and 2010 despite facing state repression for the following reasons: First, the MTI, the predecessor of al-Nahda, by successfully seizing upon two political opportunity structures (i.e., the 1984 Bread Riots and political liberation in the form of the National Pact in 1987) established strong organizational networks (mainly informal), while framing democracy and liberalism. Second, facing an increased level of state repression between 1989 and 1999; thus, narrowing down of the political opportunity structures, the al-Nahda went into exile (the moderate wing led by Rachid Ghannouchi to London; the hardline wing led by Salah Karker to Paris), while majority of the remaining members were imprisoned in Tunisia. The al-Nahda in Tunisia remained moderate in tandem with the movement's London branch. The moderate wing gained the upper hand and framed non-violent mobilization via informal networks in Tunisia and in exile. Third, between 2000 and 2010, with the reduction in state repression as a political opportunity structure, the al-Nahda in Tunisia could form close relationships with the moderate wing in London, maintained its mobilization by framing non-violence, democracy, and liberalism as its political rhetoric, while cooperating with Tunisia's liberal and secular opposition against the semi-authoritarian regime.

This dissertation shows the importance of framing consensus and informal social networks, along with the presence of political opportunity structures, for a successful movement mobilization. Facing the narrowing down of the political opportunity structures, al-Nahda's framing of nonviolence, democracy, and liberalism resonated with the masses in Tunisia, while Ghannouchi-led moderate wing's dominance over the movement increased the movement's resilience facing state repression. The state's exclusion of the al-Nahda from the Tunisian political scene resulted in al-Nahda to form itself as a movement in exile, which led to the movement's further moderation as it encountered with Western liberal democratic settings such as, the United Kingdom, in particular. This dissertation also reveals the importance of agency (movement entrepreneurs/activists) facing a repressive state structure for a successful movement mobilization.

In this dissertation I studied a single case between 1981 and 2010, and I adapted qualitative research design. I applied process tracing method, and this method helped me in terms of mapping the processes of the movement, to a large extent. In this dissertation, I used primary sources (in Arabic) such as, declarations, congressional records and meeting minutes of the al-Nahda movement. I conducted interviews (in Arabic) with a wide range of individuals from judges, soldiers, politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, activists, lawyers to party leaders and members. The secondary sources of data (in Arabic, English, French, and Turkish) composed of magazines, articles, books, newspapers and memoirs.

In the dissertation, I analyzed main points in the theorization of the PPM, and provided a design that could be used in the application of the model to the al-Nahda case. I also analyzed possible methods in the application of the PPM. Yet, in the research, I found that the four main categories of the political opportunity structures sometimes might not be enough to analyze the al-Nahda case. The exclusion of the movement pushed the Tunisian regime to enlarge political openness in order to control both the fractions among the ruling elites and the competition between ruling elites and opposition groups. In Tunisia, the al-Nahda movement came into view as an opposition; and this was a reaction to the regime's control on religious domain.

Following Sidney Tarrow and other PPM scholars, I took a dynamic approach toward the political opportunity structures concept to trace changes and continuities in the political opportunity structures vis-à-vis the movement. The PPM enabled me to trace changes and conditions during mobilization of the al-Nahda movement, while interacting with the political setting; thus, the dynamic relationship between agency and structure. Supporting the existing literature (e.g., Jillian Schwedler, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Janine Clark, and Florence Passy) analyzing Islamist movement mobilization, this dissertation showed the importance of informal networks, interpersonal ties, friendship networks, and face-to-face contacts for a successful movement mobilization in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian settings. Following Robert Benford and David Snow, this dissertation confirmed the significance of the framing processes mediating between political opportunity structures and organizational dynamics.

In this context, I also took into account the criticisms leveled against the PPM in the existing literature in order to minimize the possible deficiencies regarding application of the PPM in my dissertation. Most of the criticisms leveled against the PPM in the existing

literature (e.g., James Jasper, Frédéric Volpi, Charles Kurzman, and Wendy Pearlman) are related to its less consideration of cultural factors and emotions in its analyses by focusing on the political opportunity structures. Especially the emotional factors mentioned in the dissertation have been determined by a thorough literature review. Yet, unfortunately, the current political environment in Tunisia after the coup did not allow conducting in-depth interviews to research the emotional factors in the field. In fact, this further research for the emotional factors was beyond the scope of this dissertation, which generates another dissertation topic in itself.

Moreover, the works, which criticize the PPM, are limited to the short-term protest movements. It was not possible to analyze the long-term mobilization process of the al-Nahda without the PPM. Thus, the discussions on the emotional factors remained limited in this dissertation. This dissertation has been aware of the deficiencies of the PPM in taking emotions into account, as well as the discussions on this issue in the existing literature. By applying the PPM to the al-Nahda case, this dissertation also tested the explanatory value of the model, and created better analyses through engaging in the PPM by considering the cultural factors.

Actually, the JI emerged as an abeyance structure within the Tunisian society through engaging in daily practices in the 1970s. These daily practices were performed in dormitories, university campuses, discussion circles, training groups, sport activities, circles at mosques, scout troops, cinema societies and youth clubs. After that the MTI was able to create a subculture within the Tunisian society in the 1980s. In this period, this subculture emerged in marriages, weddings, concerts, religious ceremonies in eids, financial support, families, and Islamic cultural centers. From 1989 to 2010, this subculture improved through plenty of mechanisms with the al-Nahda movement. The movement became active in dormitories, university campuses, discussion circles, training groups, sport activities, circles at mosques, scout troops, cinema societies, youth clubs, intra-movement marriages, concerts, religious ceremonies in eids, financial support through families, Islamic cultural centers.

Especially the repression against the al-Nahda in the political domain created political opportunities for the movement's alternative culture to propagate itself. Different from the Salafi jihadis, the al-Nahda movement recruited new adherents in terms of the movement's values and goals rather than prioritizing the global cause of jihad. The semi-clandestine

atmosphere within which the al-Nahda operated during the repressive decades ensured the movement to broaden its public space via construction of Islamic cultural centers, youth clubs, scout troops, cinema societies, which let the movement engage in the local dimensions of the Tunisian society. Furthermore, members of the al-Nahda movement identified themselves predominantly with kinship ties and shared experiences against regime repression, which made them an organic part of the movement.

In this context, violence was never integrated into the al-Nahda movement's ideology, but only some tactical responses were observed, which did not represent the core belief of the movement. The al-Nahda did not apply violence against the formal institutions of state during the regime's repression against the movement, even though the movement was tried to link with some military-like activities by the Tunisian regime. Yet, ideas of violence arouse within the al-Nahda's grassroots in some periods, as evidenced by vigorous confrontations between the regime and the youth organizations of the movement on the university campuses especially in the 1980s.

The al-Nahda leadership consciously distanced itself from jihadist violence, identifying it as inapplicable to Islam. For the al-Nahda cadres, this consideration and divergence have accomplished many functions, such as extenuating the movement's former application to more radical interpretations of Islam and emphasizing its move away from violence, forming its attempt of non-violent movement organization as the true model to be desired by all Islamist players, strengthening the movement's collective identity and strictness among its more radical young members, introducing itself as a mediator between secular and Islamist extremes, and specifying itself with Tunisian society and state. Hence, it was not possible to analyze the al-Nahda movement in terms of Salafi mobilization.

In this context, the al-Nahda case also makes the inclusion-moderation hypothesis complicated, since the inclusion-moderation hypothesis constantly elucidates Islamist conversions in a way that these organizations moderate their actions and attitudes once they are permitted to take part in the political process. Yet, the al-Nahda movement experienced an intellectual transformation in the end of a long-term political exclusion instead of inclusion. Especially in the last period of the regime's repression, the movement benefited from new political opportunities for cross-party alliances with its growing moderate stance.

The exclusion policy of the Tunisian regime via repression and social marginalization played significant role in the al-Nahda's move from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 1970s to turn into the mainstream conservative moderate party. Thanks to the moderate motivational framing processes of the movement, the repression did not drive the movement into violence as in Algeria. Actually, in the al-Nahda case, the repression had just postponed the process of moderation, which had already started within the al-Nahda movement autonomously from the state repression. When the al-Nahda was excluded by large parts of Tunisian society, state repression did not result in radicalization, but impacted the al-Nahda movement to rethink its ideological principles and strategies, which was concluded with moderation of the movement's policies and actions.

As Bourguiba, who declared himself as President for life with a law, Ben Ali similarly enforced legal restrictions on other permitted political parties in the electoral competition. As reviewed in the literature, the regime engaged in election fraud, making its political party reach extremely high voting rates in the elections in both Bourguiba and Ben Ali periods. In this respect, this political scene of Tunisia just constructed a so-called outlook of political pluralism in the absence of political figures with adequate social and economic capabilities. Yet, the repression of the regime against the al-Nahda movement somehow nourished the movement by prompting it to mobilize and created a dialectical process in itself. The al-Nahda was able to function and improve through organizational dynamics and framing processes, which utilized political opportunity strctures in a pragmatic way.

Many MTI members were arrested and the ideological publications of the movement were banned in the 1980s. The Tunisian politics witnessed a tense confrontation between the regime and the MTI in many fields, from politics to religious and cultural areas. However, the pragmatic and flexible framing efforts of the MTI, which considered the repressive practices of the state as political opportunity structures, were effective in negotiating with the semi-authoritarian nature of the state. In this sense, unlike JI, the MTI was able to produce new ideas that embraced the Tunisian people, and this non-violent political stance continued in the al-Nahda period.

During the 1981-1989 period, the regime did not consider the MTI a legal political party, but rather dealt with the movement as a political and security threat. Yet, the regime's repression against the MTI created political opportunity structures, and strengthened the movement's claim to be a collective action fighting for the interest of Tunisian society.

The Tunisian regime confronted with a widespread social unrest due to the corruption, unemployment and injustice in the mid-1980s, and it had to liberalize political domain. The regime's tolerance to the movement was a political opportunity structure for the MTI. Even though the regime did not consider the MTI as a legal political party, it allowed the movement to organize for balancing the opposition leftist movements. In this respect, the MTI members were able to infiltrate state apparatus, as well as the UGTT's base and offices. This was an important political opportunity structure for the movement.

In terms of closure of the institutionalized political system, there was no legal recognition of the MTI. Yet, in terms of its tolerance, the Tunisian regime periodically opened space for the MTI via offering offical pardons and allowing the movement to function at certain times. In this respect, the informal organizational structure of the MTI constructed a multilevel network among charismatic teachers and opinion leaders from inside and outside the movement, which helped the transmission of ideas to new generations. This improvement transformed the MTI into a mean of protest against the Tunisian regime.

Despite shrinking political opportunities, the MTI expanded its influence and base. As political opportunity structures, both the Bread Riots (1984) and the National Pact (1987) increased the level of tolerance towards the movement. The movement was able to engage in network building through informal organizations, such as Qurʾan courses, magazines, mosques and masjids, and the movement could recruit new activists through informal neighborhood organization. Especially the organizational dynamics of the student wing functioned as perfect mobilizers through university student associations and dormitories. The MTI's student wing on the university campuses balanced its exclusion from the political domain. The MTI was able to establish the UGTE as a counter Islamist university student association against the UGET. The UGTE, as an effective organizational dynamic, also became a significant political opportunity structure for the MTI.

Especially the family structure of conservative Islamists within Tunisian society played a significant role on the MTI's organizational dynamics. Both husbands and wives took responsibility for the mobilization of the MTI. The family functioned as the primary social instrument for the MTI, and it was the most important front line, which provided political opportunity structures to implement its strategies. In this respect, intra-movement marriages provided many political opportunities to the MTI by constructing alliances

among the Islamist families via kinship, which consolidated their loyalty to the movement against the regime repression.

The movement entrepreneurs identified the regime's repression as the main problem by diagnostic framing. The movement openly highlighted the difficulties regarding the political trials and arrests, as well as the problems that the imprisoned MTI members encountered in the jails. In addition, the main problems in the country, such as corruption, unemployment and injustice, were highlighted by the MTI cadres via declarations by diagnostic framing. The MTI determined solutions, such as separation of the regime party and the state apparatus, social justice, legitimate administration, independence of the judiciary, free press/media, and commitment to democracy by prognostic framing. The MTI framed liberal discourses in order to create consciousness against the regime's use of violence by motivational framing.

During the 1989-1999 period, the movement struggled against heavy state repression, and made great efforts for survival in the countries of asylum. Although the al-Nahda was totally excluded from the political domain, the movement used the prison cells as meeting places for deep discussions about improving the movement's strategy and ideological vision. The al-Nahda members used the prison cell as a space for resistance in order to recall their reputation in the face of the abasement. In this sense, the al-Nahda prisoners used different techniques in order to survive, and hunger strike was a very effective method for the political prisoners in jails. Moreover, due to the fact that the al-Nahda and secular politicians had been oppressed together by the regime, their collective experience inside prison cells also nourished ideological convergence, which moderated the al-Nahda cadres in time. Thus, especially the release of the al-Nahda prisoners increased the political opportunity structures through moderation.

The organizational dynamics of the women wing also contributed to mobilization of the movement. Especially in the poor areas and peripheries, where the women mobilization of the regime was weak, the Islamist women under the umbrella of the al-Nahda movement found a more inviting milieu and improved social mobilization. Actually, the al-Nahda was different from other classical political Islamist parties, and this difference surfaced in terms of its organization. To illustrate, the brothers and sisters could sit at the same table in the al-Nahda movement, whereas the brothers used to be at the forefront in other classical political Islamist parties.

During the 1989-1999 period, the informal organizations like parallel party structures (political bureau, executive bureau, and communications office), publications and television channels in the countries of asylum took to the stage. In the 1990s, the al-Nahda movement made progress in spreading the movement's ideological discourse especially in the Islamic cultural centers in Europe. The parallel party structures in the countries of asylum, as well as the broad networks of the al-Nahda linked NGOs in Europe, were supported by the conservative family networks of the al-Nahda inmates through potent neighbourhood organization inside Tunisia.

The al-Nahda's time in exile was a seminal experience for the movement, with its relationships with multiple European countries, since this ensured education and resources that would aid to maintain and reconstruct the movement in exile, and provided it to establish and keep its organizational structures. In the literature, the nature and extent of the al-Nahda's relations with the countries of asylum was one of its most prominent secrets, except for some members voluntary to debate the subject at all. This dissertation clarified this mystery, to a certain extent. The al-Nahda members, who took refuge in the European countries, maintained strong ties with their Tunisian counterparts as their local backers. The bonds of these members had a perceivable influence on the al-Nahda, which benefited from the improving wealth of its ground, to a large extent.

The research has shown that the exiled al-Nahda members were influential in much more countries than those stated in the existing literature. The members of the al-Nahda established a wide network of Islamic cultural centers, mosques, libraries and foundations in Europe in the mid-1990s. In this respect, the movement constructed a strong mosque network in Brussels, London and Milan. Similarly, the al-Nahda established a strong network of Islamic cultural centers in Stockholm, Aachen, Milan and London. In addition, the financial institutions with Swiss partnerships, as well as the commercial companies, such as restaurants and car rental companies, which were established in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, gave significant financial support to the al-Nahda movement in the 1990s.

In this context, the al-Nahda movement provided strong financial support from its adherents in Europe in the name of fundraising, as well as a regular money flow that was ensured via aids and donations. The al-Nahda movement was also able to transfer high amounts of funds to its local networks through using the front companies in the countries

of asylum. Thanks to the front companies, the al-Nahda movement both provided a large income and carried out its ideological activities under the umbrella of commercial activities. Especially members of the shura council of the al-Nahda movement had strong networks in those front companies, and this situation was very effective in the movement's survival against the semi-authoritarian Ben Ali regime. The main instruments strengthened by the organizational capacity of the al-Nahda movement in the countries of asylum were shareholding ties, natural and institutional family ties, board memberships and political connections. These networks were not only limited to financial networks, but they also established an active channel of intelligence against the regime, from politics to the social domain, which the leaders of the al-Nahda movement actually used.

The research has shown that the intellectual cadres of the al-Nahda movement endeavored to gain support for the movement in the countries of asylum while the less educated cadres were more effective in collecting money and attracting sympathizers. In the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Canada, the propaganda activities of the al-Nahda movement were more intense, whereas the movement intensified its ideological organizational activities in Austria, Italy, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The research has shown that three basic criteria played important role in constructing organizational dynamics in the European countries where the al-Nahda exiles were active. First one was the existence of sufficient number of the political al-Nahda exiles in that European country. Second one was the existence of commercial relations of the al-Nahda exiles in that European country. Third one was the presence of a Sunni Muslim community in that European country. In the European countries, where these three criteria had sufficient ground, the al-Nahda movement was seriously organized.

Especially the accomplishments of individual members, such as Said Ferjani, in Europe contributed to the movement by providing an extensive financial network, expert skillsets and significant political connections, creating an effective network providing funds through various charity organizations. This capacity was supported via Islamic cultural centers in Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden. In this respect, the al-Nahda movement established a solid network through cells, which it had constructed in the European countries. Thanks to these cells, the movement formed a strong base in Europe. The meetings of the movement were held

periodically within these cells, and the movement representatives collected financial aid in these meetings.

Moreover, the research has shown that counterfeit documents -although it is so difficult to prove directly- were provided for the members of the al-Nahda movement, who were wanted due to the formal applications of the Tunisian regime. This made it impossible for the Tunisian regime to arrest the wanted members of the al-Nahda movement in Europe. In addition, the European members of the movement, especially those in the United Kingdom, where most leaders of the movement used to live, were in close contact with the human rights organizations. This created a legal defence shield for the movement. The support from other NGOs and media organizations further strengthened this shield.

During the 1989-1999 period, the division in the movement leadership resulted in the victory of the Ghannouchi-led faction proposing moderation, and the unity of Ghannouchi and the second-generation al-Nahda members strengthened. Ghannouchi attracted many al-Nahda members in exile as a charismatic Islamist leader. He turned into a symbol of the movement through exposing his commitment to pluralism, freedom, and deference for individual and public rights while he was in exile. The position of Ghannouchi within the movement was reinforced by his charisma, since he was the founder of the movement, as well as acting as both a religious leader and prominent politician. The al-Nahda case showed that once the organizational structure was more movement than a party, the members of the movement could mobilize around a charismatic leader.

In this context, I argue that the main fracture within the al-Nahda movement was between the hardliners and moderates when I took into account both the political inmates who survived under state repression inside Tunisia and the exiled members who struggled in the countries of asylum despite the existence of many obstacles. In addition, the research has shown that there were conflicts between those who were exiled and those who were imprisoned from time to time. In this respect, the exiles and the inmates also formed two main groups within the movement. The exiled group was a more educated and intellectual group, whereas the group that was imprisoned in Tunisia was a group that knew the field very well. Among these two groups, there was the rivalry between formally trained ones and self-taught ones. However, the organization at both levels including the exiles and the inmates played a major role in the success of the movement and enabled the al-Nahda to influence a large part of the Tunisian society.

During the 1989-1999 period, the al-Nahda determined the repressive practices of the regime by diagnostic framing. In this respect, political trials and arrests of leaders and supporters of the al-Nahda movement, ban of masjids and Qur'an courses, the silence/ignorance of other political parties in the face of violations of freedoms and repressive practices of the police like covert surveillance of the leaders and supporters of the movement were criticized. The movement also emphasized price increases in essential consumer goods, devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar and increasing unemployment by diagnostic framing.

The al-Nahda movement improved its prognostic framing efforts, and for realization of "the state of the people" discourse the movement determined main solutions, such as general amnesty and release of political prisoners, removal of restrictions on the press, independence of the judiciary, respect for the will of the people, absolute prohibition of torture, impartiality of the administration, termination of the partisan presidential system, providing social security, and freedom of belief. The movement began to acknowledge Western values and interpret them from an Islamic perspective. This tendency was evident in the declarations and congresses of the movement.

Furthermore, the al-Nahda movement improved its motivational framing efforts by openly stressing its stance against violence. The movement invited the regime to ensure freedom in the political arena. The necessity for more moderate party policies and national dialogue initiatives were emphasized. Ghannouchi's request for a return to democracy was an important step for encouraging political pluralism. Ghannouchi was able to broaden his ideological approach on the theme of democracy and civil liberties within the European context.

During the 2000-2010 period, some political opportunity structures played important role on the movement mobilization. In terms of reduction of the regime's repression, the al-Nahda prisoners were released, the al-Nahda exiles were allowed to return to Tunisia, and the opposition began to cooperate against the regime. The reduction of the state repression in addition to the splits in the Ben Ali's inner circle opened up a space for the al-Nahda movement for alliance with secular groups. In this respect, the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms was an important political opportunity structure for the al-Nahda movement.

The new al-Nahda linked NGOs restorated informal networks between the exiled al-Nahda members and those in Tunisia. The organizational dynamics of the student wing considerably improved on the university campuses. The young generation of the al-Nahda grew up through either parental impression or individual spiritual thinking, which provided fresh energy and triggered the movement to regroup. They began to participate in Qur'an classes and religious discussion societies gathering in universities, mosques and cafes.

In addition to the widespread use of internet by young generation, family meetings during weekday evenings and Sundays also played significant role. In order to ensure a framework for the movement, the al-Nahda constructed executive and consultative councils including mosque leaders in its neighbourhood organization. In this respect, the imams supporting the al-Nahda played a major role in the organization of the movement. They recruited new members to the movement through subliminal messages in the Friday prayers. The second-generation imams supporting the movement learned how to use social media and reached large masses by Facebook.

Tunisia did not have a general scheme of the whole internal security structure, and the security network in Tunisia was very complex. Obviously, this intricate structure was very convenient for the al-Nahda movement in constructing deep networks, because multiple different security units were established on different issues during the Ben Ali era. This situation caused lack of coordination among these units and prevented the formation of a uniform hierarchical structure in the internal security system. During the Ben Ali era, the independent security offices and bureaus, which were established by the arbitrary decisions of the executive power, began to abolish the hierarchical control mechanism in the Ministry of Interior over time. The decentralized security agencies have made it difficult to monitor the al-Nahda members in a controlled manner inside and outside the country, which was a strategic political opportunity structure for the movement.

The research has shown that the al-Nahda was able to survive despite the state repression with the aid of clandestine networks that the movement members established within the security apparatuses of the state, such as police, military and intelligence units. In this respect, the movement's infiltration into the security units was a significant political opportunity structure for the movement. The al-Nahda movement established its strongest networks before the 2011 Uprisings within the Ministry of Interior. Especially after the 2011 Uprisings, these networks became much stronger and more open. The fact that the

most politicized institution in Tunisia was the Ministry of Interior directly accelerated this process.

Actually, the sense of belonging among the al-Nahda members was an important motivating factor for the enhancement of organizational capacity. The sense of belonging was achieved in two ways among the al-Nahda members. This was either through the ideological bond strengthened by vital sacrifices, or through the spiritual religious sacred glue that fused the members of the movement. Furthermore, members of the al-Nahda movement identified themselves predominantly with kinship ties and shared experiences against regime repression, which made them an organic part of the movement. In this respect, the movement successfully established a coherent organizational structure, which was able to balance state repression, stimulate the political consciousness of its constituent body and re-socialize its base with Islamic lines.

During the 2000-2010 period, the university campuses were dynamic milieu, which disseminated ideas and ensured organizational mobilization throughout Tunisian society. The al-Nahda movement endeavored to consolidate its organizational dynamics and construct bases in multiple cities across the country via using its university networks. The young al-Nahda adherents, who educated in science and technology, played an important role in the movement's infiltration into the country's security units. Moreover, the research has shown that the student wing of the al-Nahda movement was not only at the university level. In the last periods of the Ben Ali regime, especially the high school teachers, who were members of the al-Nahda movement, began to give ideological directions during their lectures. When the 2011 Uprisings started, the high school teachers, who were members of the al-Nahda, did not teach and directed the youth to organize in the streets.

The constant exposure to democracy and multi-party political systems in the countries of asylum brought in tolerance to the al-Nahda members and moderated them in comparison with other ideological tendencies. With the aid of this moderation process, the al-Nahda movement engaged in a framing process through growing away from contentious politics and coming close to consensus politics. The al-Nahda constructed its diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing processes by taking lessons from its previous experiences, and the movement transformed into a moderate political party.

During the 2000-2010 period, in addition to the state repression, the movement emphasized malfunctioning state by diagnostic framing, since the corruption had become widespread, the inequalities and unemployment had increased, and the judicial system had deteriorated, to a very large extent. The movement reformulated political solutions, such as social justice, legislative pardon, assurance on freedom of speech, struggle against corruption and misappropriation of national wealth, enforcement of judicial reforms, and freedom of belief by prognostic framing.

The movement improved its endeavors in terms of synthesizing Western values and Islamic perspectives, to a large extent. In order to minimize internal reactions and maintain the harmony within the movement, the al-Nahda leadership gave references to the traditions of Qur'anic administration, such as shura and ijma. The al-Nahda movement created a rationale by calling society to 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms, as well as preserving its stance against violence by motivational framing. Emphasizing justice as the backbone of the Islam, Ghannouchi drew attention to the necessity of establishing a just Islamic order by prognostic framing.

Yet, Ghannouchi's just Islamic order discourse was promlematic in some ways, because it contradicted some discourses of the al-Nahda. The movement emphasized pluralism on almost every platform by prognostic framing. However, just Islamic order was not a discourse that referenced any religion other than Islam, and the just Islamic order discourse contradicted with the movement's demand for pluralism. At this point, it was possible to see al-Nahda's pragmatism, and this prognostic framing process played an important role in psychologically breaking the state domination over the movement especially during the 2000-2010 period.

The al-Nahda movement was able to understand how critical to function efficiently within a democratic milieu, since its leadership had experienced decades of exile perceiving how democratic systems operated in reality. Especially the second-generation al-Nahda supporters, who raised in Western politics, played important role in bringing more moderate perspectives to the movement. The movement adapted more pluralist approach in the period between 2000 and 2010, followed concensus politics with the potential political allies, and acted as a conservative political party embracing the center-right voter base rather than operating just as a religious movement.

In the al-Nahda case, the ideological pragmatism and transformation, the organizational flexibility and diversity, and the conjunction of individualism and collectivism all influenced the al-Nahda believers, followers and members both inside Tunisia and in the countries of asylum. This flexible and pragmatic political stance supported the movement in terms of enlarging its social base, which encompassed various social groups especially after the 2011 Uprisings, and helped the movement to respond new political opportunity structures, making the movement more resilient.

In the light of these findings, this dissertation contributes to the existing literature by examining al-Nahda's mobilization in Tunisia, which is understudied by the social movement literature. This dissertation reveals that even under conditions of increased state repression resulting in the movement to go into exile, an Islamist movement can still successfully mobilize. This dissertation reveals that by successfully seizing upon present political opportunity structures, while innovatively creating new ones, movement entrepreneurs/activists via forming informal organizational networks and maintaining framing consensus successfully mobilize a social movement by nonviolent means facing state repression and exclusion. This dissertation shows the importance of the agency facing the structure for a successful movement mobilization. This dissertation also contributes to the inclusion-exclusion literature by examining the al-Nahda. The dissertation supports the scholars (e.g., Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone), who argue that exclusion results in the movement moderation.

Today, despite the recent political challenges in Tunisian democracy, the al-Nahda movement still remains moderate. Following the coup on 25 July 2021, the al-Nahda movement confronted with the constitutional amendment transforming Tunisia's semi-presidential system into a presidential system on 25 July 2022. This amendment was followed by the parliamentary election on 17 December 2022 with extremely low turnout rates. As a result, many high-ranking al-Nahda figures were arrested in a wave of arrests, and party offices were closed.

Yet, the al-Nahda still supports the parliamentary system. There are two main reasons behind al-Nahda's approach advocating the parliamentary system. First of all, the al-Nahda believes that the presidential system would ensure the president overwhelming authority, whereas restricting the power of the parliament, to a large extent. Secondly, the al-Nahda leadership believes that they can reach the right of representation in the parliament under

any condition within the parliamentary system, since the al-Nahda movement still has a powerful electoral base in Tunisia. Time will tell how the democratization wind that came with the 2011 Uprisings in Tunisia will continue and how the recent developments will influence the al-Nahda movement in the future.

Finally, during my long-lasting research in this dissertation, I endeavored to expand earlier studies and fill in gaps in the previous works. Yet, I have seen that there is still necessity for further research in three specific areas. First of all, the activities of the al-Nahda movement in the countries of asylum still have many undiscovered details. In this respect, I strongly believe that the exile experience of the al-Nahda movement in Western countries can generate another dissertation topic in itself. A further study on al-Nahda's organizational structure in the countries of asylum can contribute to the existing literature in order to understand the external dynamics of the movement actors to achieve framing consensus. Secondly, the al-Nahda gave special importance to its women organization and actively used women in its mobilization process. A dissertation on the women organization of the al-Nahda by scholars working in this field can make new contributions to the existing literature in women's mobilization in Arab social movements. Thirdly, comparison of the Tunisian case with other MENA movements can contribute to the existing literature in order to further assess the conditions of non-violent mobilization and inclusion-moderation hypothesis.

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APPENDIX LIST

APPENDIX-1: Timeline/The Highlights of the al-Nahda Movement

- **1970**: The Islamists clandestinely come together for the first time under the umbrella of the JI, the predecessor of the MTI, in Tunisia as a small religious discussion circle in the al-Zaytuna Mosque.
- **1974**: The first secret meeting of the JI is held in Mornag, Ben Arous, Tunisia.
- **1979**: The first secret congress of the JI is held in Manouba, Tunisia.
- **1981**: The second congress of the MTI movement is held in Sousse, Tunisia. The MTI, the predecessor of the al-Nahda, is officially founded.
- **1984**: The third congress of the MTI is held in Soliman, Nabeul, Tunisia. Many of the MTI members are tried in the Bread Riots.
- **1986**: The fourth congress of the MTI is held in al-Menzah, Tunis, Tunisia.
- **1987**: The MTI figures including Rachid Ghannouchi are tried.
- **1988**: The fifth congress of the MTI is held in Sfax, Tunisia. Ben Ali, who ousted Bourguiba in November 1987, frees some of the MTI members from prisons. In addition, Ghannouchi is pardoned and released by the Ben Ali regime.
- **1989**: The MTI's name is changed as "al-Nahda". The al-Nahda candidates are allowed to participate in national elections as independent candidates. The group officially wins 17 percent of the total votes and 25 percent of the votes in many constituencies, making it the second-largest political party. However, Ben Ali bans the al-Nahda in response to its electoral success. Ghannouchia and many al-Nahda members are exiled. Other al-Nahda members are jailed.
- **1995**: The al-Nahda exiles hold the sixth party congress in Switzerland, which plays a significant role in restructuring the movement's overseas structures, and provides a genuine institutional framework for the movement in order to organize its activities outside Tunisia. This party congress in Switzerland results in formalization of the al-Nahda's official policy of non-violence.

- **2001**: The al-Nahda members hold the seventh party congress in the United Kingdom, which confirms the party's aim of accomplishing dialogue. This congress points out a "slow and cautious return in Tunisia".[1] The AISPP is established, which aims to provide material and psychological assistance to former prisoners and their families, and ensure employment for those without work and medical care.
- **2005**: The opposition parties involving Islamists, secularists and communists reach an agreement on important points, such as semi-authoritarianism, political misdemeanor and human rights violations of Ben Ali, and form 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms.
- **2007**: The eighth congress of the al-Nahda is held in the United Kingdom.
- **2011**: After Ben Ali's government is overthrown on 14 January 2011, Ghannouchi returns to Tunisia on 30 January 2011 after 22 year exile.[2] The al-Nahda wins 90 seats with more than 40 percent of the votes in Tunisia's first democratic assembly elections.
- **2012**: The ninth congress of the al-Nahda is held in Le Kram, Tunis, Tunisia.
- **2016**: The tenth congress of the al-Nahda is held in Hammamet, Tunisia.

[1] Guazzone, "Ennahda Islamists and the test of government in Tunisia," 43.
[2] "Tunisian Islamists Show Strength at Chief's Return," *Reuters*, Accessed: 2020-08-04. Web: http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/01/30/2011/01/30/tunisian-islamists-show-strength-at-chiefs-return/.

APPENDIX-2: Interview Questions

Opening Speech

Introductions – I will introduce my research: The Mobilization of the al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia (1981-2010).

I. Personal Information (المعلومات الشخصية)

1. What is your profession? (if s/he is active: Where do you work now?) (ما هي مهنتك؟ إذا كان نشطًا: أين تعمل الآن؟)

-Could you tell me about your former jobs, if there are any? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني عن وظائفك السابقة ، إن وجدت؟)

-Were you working when you first enhanced your interest and entered in collective activities? (هل كنت تعمل عندما عززت اهتمامك لأول مرة ودخلت في أنشطة جماعية؟)

-If so, could you tell me about your collective activities during that period? (إذا كان الأمر كذلك ، هل يمكن أن تخبرني عن أنشطتك الجماعية خلال تلك الفترة؟)

2. Could you tell me about your family and childhood: (هل يمكن أن تخبرني عن عائلتك وطفولتك)

-Where are your parents from? Where do your parents live? What were your parents' professions? (من أين والديك؟ اين يعيش والديك؟ ماذا كانت مهن والديك؟)

II. Education, Religious, Social, Cultural Activities (الأنشطة التعليمية والدينية والاجتماعية والثقافية)

1. What schools did you attend? (ما هي المدارس التي التحقت بها؟)

-Where/when? Formal/Informal? Public/ Private school? Private courses? Vocational trainings? (أين و متى؟ رسمي/ غير رسمي؟ مدرسة عامة / خاصة؟ دورات خاصة؟ التدريبات المهنية؟)

2. Did you have a religious education? (هل حصلت على تعليم ديني؟)

-If so, where, when and how did you get it? (إذا كان الأمر كذلك ، فأين ومتى وكيف حصلت عليه؟)

-Traditional madrasahs, mosques, sheikhs, preachers, family elders, brotherhood, personal efforts, schools, etc. (المدارس التقليدية ، المساجد ، الشيوخ ، الدعاة ، شيوخ الأسرة ، الأخوة ، الجهود الشخصية ، المدارس ، إلخ)

3. Have you been attached to a sufi leader or attended to his conversations? (هل كنت مرتبطا بقائد صوفي أو حضرت محادثاته؟)

- If so, how did you create this network? (إذا كان الأمر كذلك ، كيف أنشأت هذه الشبكة؟)

-How being a sufi disciple influence you? Please elaborate. (كيف يؤثر عليك كونك تلميذًا صوفيًا؟ يرجى التوضيح)

4. Have you or your family members experienced difficulty during your religious education? (هل واجهت أنت أو أفراد أسرتك صعوبة أثناء تعليمك الديني؟)

5. Have you experienced any social or administrative difficulty, or support, facility at school (or in later years at work) about your religiosity and/or religious life? (هل واجهت أي صعوبة اجتماعية أو إدارية ، أو دعم ، مرفق في المدرسة (أو في السنوات اللاحقة في العمل) بشأن تدينك و / أو حياتك الدينية؟)

6. What were the publications you followed during your youth and your activism years? (ما هي المنشورات التي اتبعتها خلال شبابك ، وسنوات نشاطك ؟)

-Who were the writers you liked the most? (من هم أكثر الكتاب الذين أحببتهم؟)

7. Were there any particular book, newspaper, television channel, radio station, magazine, author, thinker, sheikh, preacher etc. that influenced you (or still influences you) the most in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s? (هل هناك أي كتاب أو صحيفة أو قناة تلفزيونية أو محطة إذاعية أو مجلة أو مؤلف أو مفكر أو شيخ أو خطيب معين ، إلخ ، أثرت فيك أو ما زالت تؤثر عليك في الثمانينيات والتسعينيات والعقد الأول من القرن الحادي والعشرين ؟)

-Could you tell why and in what ways they influenced you? (هل يمكنك أن تخبرني لماذا وبأي طرق أثروا فيك؟)

8. Have you ever owned, managed, or written for, a newspaper, magazine etc.? (هل امتلكت أو أدرت أو كتبت لصالح صحيفة أو مجلة ، إلخ ؟)

-If yes, how did you engage in this activity? (إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم ، كيف شاركت في هذا النشاط؟)

-Could you tell me the story of this publication? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني قصة هذا المنشور؟)

III. On Political Arena and Political Activities (في الساحة السياسية والأنشطة السياسية)

1. Did your parents have political affiliation? (هل والداك لديهما انتماء سياسي؟)

-Did they engage in political debates when you were a child? (هل انخرطوا في نقاشات سياسية عندما كنت طفلاً؟)

-Do you have dissimilar memories? (هل لديك ذكريات مختلفة؟)

-(If old enough) Do you remember the Bourgiba and Ben Ali dictatorship periods respectively? (إذا كان عمرك كافيا هل تتذكر فترتي ديكتاتورية بورقيبة وبن علي على التوالي؟)

-How were they received in your family? (كيف تم استقبالهم في عائلتك؟)

-Which party did your parents extended their favor? (أي حزب قدم والداك صالحهما؟)

-Do you remember how your parents explained this choice? (هل تتذكر كيف شرح والداك هذا الاختيار؟)

-How do you analyze their choice yourself? (كيف تحلل اختيارهم بنفسك؟)

2. How would you describe your worldview back in your activism days and now? (كيف تصف رؤيتك الكونية في أيام نشاطك والآن؟)

-Did you experience alteration in your views? (هل واجهت تغيير في وجهات نظرك؟)

3. What was the first religious/intellectual/political formation/group/organization in which you participated? (ما هو أول تشكيل / جماعة / منظمة ديني / فكري / سياسي شاركت فيها؟)

-How would you describe your organization in terms of its aims, membership, political allies, etc. ? (كيف تصف منظمتك من حيث أهدافها وعضويتها وحلفائها السياسيين ، إلخ؟)

-How did this organization operate at that time? Could you tell me the division of power within this organization? (كيف كانت هذه المنظمة تعمل في ذلك الوقت؟ هل يمكن أن تخبرني بتقسيم السلطة داخل هذه المنظمة؟)

-What was the role of this organization in Tunisian politics and society? (ما هو دور هذه المنظمة في السياسة والمجتمع التونسي؟)

-Is there a religious, intellectual or political formation you contributed to its emergence/establishment/organization? (هل هناك تشكيل ديني أو فكري أو سياسي ساهمت في نشأته / تأسيسه / تنظيمه؟)

-Could you tell me the story of your participation/entrepreneurship, etc.? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني قصة مشاركتك / ريادتك وما إلى ذلك؟)

4. What do/did you think about the collective Friday prayers of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s? (ما رأيك في صلاة الجمعة الجماعية في الثمانينيات والتسعينيات والعقد الأول من القرن الحادي والعشرين؟)

-Were they helpful in the Islamist collective action in general? (هل كانت مفيدة في العمل الجماعي الإسلامي بشكل عام؟)

5. Were there other associations, institutions, foundations, unions, charities, and political parties, groups you joined and actively participated? (هل كانت هناك جمعيات أو مؤسسات أو اتحادات أو جمعيات خيرية أو أحزاب سياسية أو مجموعات انضممت إليها وشاركت فيها بنشاط؟)

-Could you tell me more about your activities in particular and the activities of this organization in general? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني المزيد عن أنشطتك بشكل خاص وأنشطة هذه المنظمة بشكل عام؟)

6. Why the al-Nahda Party? (لماذا حزب النهضة؟) Why not the Party X, Y, Z etc.? () Please elaborate. (من فضلك وضح)

7. (If the interviewee never supported or worked for a party) Why did you stay away from party politics? (إذا لم يدعم أو يعمل الشخص الذي تجري معه المقابلة لصالح حزب ما- لماذا ابتعدت عن السياسة الحزبية؟)

8. What types of activities (Conferences, seminars, protests, courses, study circles, trainings, etc.) were you organizing through and within your party/movement/association? ما هي أنواع الأنشطة التي كنت تنظمها داخل حزبك / حركتك / جمعيتك؟ - مؤتمرات ، ندوات ، احتجاجات ، دورات ، حلقات دراسية ، دورات تدريبية ، إلخ)

-Do you think they reached their purpose? (هل تعتقد أنهم وصلوا إلى هدفهم؟)

9. What were your duties and responsibilities in your party, movement or organization? (ما هي واجباتك ومسؤولياتك في حزبك أو حركتك أو منظمتك؟)

-(If s/he is still active) What are they now? How and why did you acquire them? (فما هي الآن؟ كيف ولماذا حصلت عليها؟)

-How were such decisions on the division of labor were made? (كيف اتخذت مثل هذه القرارات بشأن تقسيم العمل؟)

10. Have you ever become or thought about becoming a responsible in the party's oversea political bureau, executive bureau, communications office, etc.? Please elaborate. (هل سبق لك أن أصبحت أو فكرت في أن تصبح مسؤولاً في المكتب السياسي الخارجي للحزب ، والمكتب التنفيذي ، ومكتب الاتصالات ، وما إلى ذلك؟ من فضلك وضح)

-How would one become a responsible for such bureaus, offices, etc.? (كيف يمكن للمرء أن يصبح مسؤولا عن مثل هذه المكاتب؟)

11. Could you tell me about your experiences, duties, and difficulties in this mission? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني عن تجاربك وواجباتك وصعوباتك في هذه المهمة؟)

12. During those years (and throughout the years to come) did you have "brothers in cause" (individuals, movements, institutions) within and outside your movement, organization, etc. with whom you disagreed over certain issues or even parted ways? Please elaborate. (هل كان لديك "إخوة في القَضِيَة" [أفراد ، حركات ، مؤسسات] داخل وخارج حركتك ، منظمتك ، إلخ ، الذين اختلفت معهم حول قضايا معينة أو حتى في طرق مفترقة؟ من خلال تلك السنوات وطوال السنوات القادمة فضلك وضح)

13. Did your family, friends, relatives ever complain about your movement/party activities? (هل اشتكى عائلتك وأصدقائك وأقاربك من أنشطة حركتك / حزبك؟)

-Have you ever faced criminal charges, went to jail, followed or harassed by security forces during and because of your activities? (هل سبق لك أن واجهت تهمًا جنائية ، أو دخلت إلى السجن ، أو تعرضت للمضايقة من قبل قوات الأمن أثناء أنشطتك؟)

-If so, were there any personal, political, social, or movement related consequences? What were these outcomes? (إذا كان الأمر كذلك ، فهل كانت هناك عواقب شخصية أو سياسية أو اجتماعية أو متعلقة بالحركة؟ ماذا كانت هذه النتائج؟)

14. Have you ever been exiled during the repression period? (هل سبق أن تم نفيك خلال فترة القمع؟)

-How were the conditions of the movement in the country of asylum? (كيف كانت اوضاع الحركة في بلد المنفى؟)

-How did the movement establish its network in the country of asylum? (كيف أقامت الحركة شبكتها في بلد المنفى؟)

-Were there associations, institutions, foundations, unions, charities, and political parties, groups you joined and actively participated in the country of asylum? (هل كانت هناك جمعيات ومؤسسات ونقابات وجمعيات خيرية وأحزاب سياسية وجماعات انضممت إليها وشاركت بنشاط في بلد المنفى؟)

-Could you tell me more about your activities in particular and the activities of this organization in general? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني المزيد عن أنشطتك بشكل خاص وأنشطة هذه المنظمة بشكل عام؟)

-Were there any particular book, newspaper, television channel, radio station, magazine, author, thinker, sheikh, preacher etc. that influenced you in the country of asylum? (هل كان هناك كتاب معين ، أو صحيفة ، أو قناة تلفزيونية ، أو إذاعة ، أو مجلة ، أو مؤلف ، أو مفكر ، أو شيخ ، أو خطيب ، إلخ ، أثر عليك في بلد المنفى؟)

-Could you tell why and in what ways they influenced you? (هل يمكنك أن تخبرني لماذا وبأي طرق أثروا عليك؟)

15. Have you ever owned, managed, or written for, a periodical, newspaper, etc. in the country of asylum? (هل سبق لك أن امتلكت أو أدرت أو كتبت لمجلة أو صحيفة أو غيرها في بلد المنفى؟)

-If yes, how did you engage in this activity? (إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم ، كيف شاركت في هذا النشاط؟)

-Could you tell me the story of this publication? (هل يمكن أن تخبرني قصة هذا المنشور؟)

IV. On al-Nahda Party/Movement (على حزب / حركة النهضة)

1. Did you support, or involve in the establishment of the al-Nahda Party? Why, why not? (هل دعمت أو شاركت في تأسيس حزب النهضة؟ لماذا- لماذا لا؟)

-How did you participate or oppose? Could you elaborate? (كيف شاركت أو عارضت؟ هل يمكنك التوضيح؟)

2. Who were the al-Nahda movement's allies, and why? (من هم حلفاء حركة النهضة ولماذا؟)

-What was the role of the al-Nahda in Tunisian politics? (ما هو دور حركة النهضة في السياسة التونسية؟)

-Who were significant national/regional allies of the movement, and why? (من هم الحلفاء الوطنيون / الإقليميون المهمون للحركة ، ولماذا؟)

-Did the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) provide a political model to the al-Nahda? (هل قدم حزب العدالة والتنمية التركي نموذجًا سياسيًا لحركة النهضة؟)

3. What was the al-Nahda ideology? What would make the al-Nahda movement Islamic? (ماذا كانت أيديولوجية النهضة؟ ما الذي يجعل حركة النهضة إسلامية؟)

-How did you respond to the ban of the al-Nahda Party? (كيف ردت على حظر حزب النهضة؟)

4. What were your views about the Bourgiba and Ben Ali regime respectively? (ما هي آرائك حول نظام بورقيبة وبن علي على التوالي؟)

-Did you act upon your views? How and why? (هل تصرفت بناء على آرائك؟ كيف ولماذا؟)

5. If you were exiled, did you support the parallel party organizations, congresses, etc. in the country of asylum? Why and how? (هل دعمت المنظمات والمؤتمرات الحزبية الموازية في دول المنفى؟ لماذا و كيف؟)

6. If you were exiled, did your country of asylum support and approve collective action of the al-Nahda activists? Why? (هل دعمت دولتك في المنفى ووافقت على العمل الجماعي لنشطاء النهضة؟ لماذا ا؟)

-What were the consequences (and successes and failures) of these collective actors for the al-Nahda movement in general and the al-Nahda party? (ما هي عواقب -ونجاحات وإخفاقات- هؤلاء الفاعلين الجمعيين على حركة النهضة بشكل عام وحزب النهضة؟)

7. During the repression period how would you convey your (individual, and local party or movement) wishes, demands, needs and/or interests to the party center? (خلال فترة القمع كيف نقلت رغباتك ، ومطالبك ، واحتياجاتك و / أو اهتماماتك -الفردية و الحزب المحلي أو الحركة- إلى مركز الحزب؟)

-How would the party center respond? (كيف رد مركز الحزب؟)

-How did you communicate the wishes, demands and interests of the citizens who came to you for help? (كيف قمت بإيصال رغبات ومطالب ومصالح المواطنين الذين أتوا إليك للمساعدة؟)

8. Did the moderate stance of the al-Nahda increase the tolerance and inclusiveness of the movement in the political arena before the revolution? And to what extent this moderate pluralist framing of the movement was sincere or tactical? (هل ازاد الموقف المعتدل لحركة النهضة تسامح الحركة وشمولها في الساحة السياسية قبل الثورة؟ وإلى أي مدى كان هذا التأطير التعددي المعتدل للحركة صادقًا أم تكتيكيًا؟)

-How would the party center and base respond? (كيف رد مركز الحزب وقاعدته؟)

V. On Islamist Movements (على الحركات الإسلامية)

1. How do you think political engagement through the parliament and political party influence the Islamist movement in general in Tunisia? (كيف تعتقد أن المشاركة السياسية من خلال البرلمان والحزب السياسي اثر على الحركة الإسلامية بشكل عام في تونس؟)

2. Are you familiar with the Islamist movements elsewhere? (هل تعرف الحركات الإسلامية في أماكن أخرى؟)

-How would you compare (the experiences of) Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt or Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey to (those of) your movement? (كيف تقارن تجارب الإخوان المسلمين في مصر أو حزب العدالة والتنمية في تركيا مع تجارب حركتكم؟)

-What was your reaction to the Islamic revolution in Iran? (ماذا كان رد فعلك على الثورة الإسلامية في إيران؟)

3. How would you compare different youth movements in Tunisia? (كيف تقارن الحركات الشبابية المختلفة في تونس؟)

-Differences and similarities between the Islamist youth movements and the others? (الاختلافات والتشابهات بين حركات الشباب الإسلامية وغيرها؟)

-What is the place of the al-Nahda affiliated organizations, such as “International Association to Support Political Prisoners (AISPP)”, within the greater Islamist movements? (ما هو مكان "الجمعية الدولية لدعم السجناء السياسيين" التابعة لحركة النهضة داخل الحركات الإسلامية الكبرى؟)

VI. On Tunisia (yesterday and today) (على تونس -أمس واليوم)

1. Since your participation to your party (movement, organization, group), which, do you think, basic questions and problems persist in Tunisia that needs to be solved? (منذ مشاركتك في حزبك [الحركة ، المنظمة ، الجماعة] ، برأيك ، ما هي الأسئلة والمشاكل الأساسية التي لا تزال قائمة في تونس والتي تحتاج إلى حل؟)

-Have your ideas and proposals for solution of these problems altered since then? (هل تغيرت أفكارك ومقترحاتك لحل هذه المشاكل منذ ذلك الحين؟)

APPENDIX-3: Interviewee List

No	Occupation before and after engagement	Place and time of interview	Interview type
1	The Brigadier General (Retired) of the Tunisian Army	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
2	The Representative of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
3	The Senior Executive of the al-Irada Movement	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
4	The senior executive of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
5	The Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Machrou Tunis Movement	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
6	The Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nida Movement	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
7	The Senior Executive of the Afek Tounes Party	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
8	The Independent Member of the Tunisian Parliament	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
9	The Senior Executive of the Barr al-Aman Research Media	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting

10	The Representative of the Jamaity Tunisian Civil Society Platform	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
11	The Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nahda Movement	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
12	The High-Level Bureaucrat of the Truth and Dignity Commission	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
13	The Senior Executive of I-Watch, Tunisian NGO	Tunis, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
14	The Senior Executive of the Popular Front	Sfax, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
15	The Senior Executive of the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishing	Sidi Bouzid, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
16	The Senior Executive of the al-Nahda Movement Youth Branch	Gafsa, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
17	The Senior Executive of the al-Nida Movement	Sfax, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
18	The Senior Executive of the UGTT	Sfax, 2018	Face-to-face meeting
19	The Tunisian Judge (Retired)	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
20	The Senior Executive of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting

21	The High-Level Bureaucrat of the National Body for the Prevention of Torture in Tunisia	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
22	The Senior Economist of the World Bank	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
23	The Senior Executive of the Solidar, the Tunisian NGO	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
24	The Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's political party, the RCD	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
25	The Senior Expert of the International Crisis Group	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
26	The Representative of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
27	The Senior Executive of the Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance	Online, 2021	Zoom meeting
28	The al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in the United Kingdom	İstanbul, 14 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
29	The al-Nahda Member (1978-2012) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement	İstanbul, 14 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
30	The Tunisian Ambassador (Retired)	İstanbul, 14 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
31	The Bureaucrat (Retired) in the Ministry of Interior of Tunisia	İstanbul, 15 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting

32	The Tunisian Prosecutor (Retired)	İstanbul, 15 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
33	The MTI Member (1972-1988) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement	İstanbul, 15 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
34	The Executive (1983-1987) of the MTI in the Neighborhood Organization	İstanbul, 16 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
35	The Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the Ben Ali's political party, the RCD	İstanbul, 16 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
36	The Diplomat (Retired) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia	İstanbul, 16 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
37	The Colonel-Major (Retired) of the Tunisian Army	İstanbul, 16 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
38	The al-Nahda Inmate (1991-1995)	İstanbul, 17 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
39	The al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in France	İstanbul, 17 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
40	The al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Germany	İstanbul, 17 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
41	The al-Nahda Exile (1990-2006) in Belgium	İstanbul, 18 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
42	The al-Nahda Exile (1991-2011) in Italy	İstanbul, 18 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting

43	The al-Nahda Exile (1988-2011) in Sweden	İstanbul, 18 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
44	The al-Nahda Exile (1991-2008) in Switzerland	İstanbul, 18 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
45	The Tunisian Commercial Attaché (Retired)	İstanbul, 21 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
46	The al-Nahda Member (1989-2016) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement	İstanbul, 21 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
47	The Tunisian Defence Attaché (Retired)	İstanbul, 21 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
48	The al-Nahda Exile (1990-1999) in Switzerland	İstanbul, 22 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
49	The al-Nahda Inmate (1991-2006)	İstanbul, 22 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
50	The al-Nahda Member (2000-2010) in the Youth Branch of the Movement	İstanbul, 22 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
51	The al-Nahda Member Lawyer	İstanbul, 22 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
52	The Executive of the UGTT	İstanbul, 22 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
53	The Member of the al-Nahda Movement's Shura Council	İstanbul, 23 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting

54	The al-Nahda Member (2000-2019) in the Neighborhood Organization of the Movement	İstanbul, 23 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
55	The Former Member of the Tunisian Parliament from the al-Nahda Movement	İstanbul, 23 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
56	The Tunisian Judge (Retired)	İstanbul, 23 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
57	The al-Nahda Adherent Tunisian Military Prosecutor (Retired)	İstanbul, 24 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
58	The al-Nahda Adherent Director-General (Retired) in the Ministry of Interior of Tunisia	İstanbul, 24 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
59	The al-Nahda Adherent Police Officer (Retired)	İstanbul, 24 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
60	The al-Nahda Member (2004-2012) in the Youth Branch of the Movement	İstanbul, 25 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting
61	The al-Nahda Adherent Teacher (Retired)	İstanbul, 25 September 2022	Face-to-face meeting

APPENDIX-4: Ethics Committee Approval

Sayı : 17162298.600-198 13.Temmuz.2018
Konu : Mülakat Soruları

İlgili Makama

Üniversitemiz Avrupa Birliği ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi Doktora Programı öğrencisi Halil Atilla Sivrikaya'nın, bilimsel çalışması kapsamında; Tunuslu kanaat önderleri, siyasetçiler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarıyla yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlar yapmayı planladığı mülakat soruları değerlendirilmiş ve yapılmasında bir sakınca olmadığı tespit edilmiştir.
Bilgilerinize saygılarımızla sunarız.

Başkent Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler ve Sanat Araştırma Kurulu

Adı Soyadı	Değerlendirme	İmza
Prof. Dr. M. Abdülkadir Varoğlu	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Kudret Güven	Olumlu/Olumsuz	
Prof. Ali Sevgi	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Işıl Bulut	Olumlu/Olumsuz	
Prof. Dr. Sadegül Akbaba Altun	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Can Mehmet Hersek	Olumlu/Olumsuz	
Prof. Dr. Özcan Yağcı	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	

Sayı : 17162298.600-189
Konu : Mülakat Soruları

1 TEMMUZ 2022

İlgili Makama

Üniversitemiz Avrupa Birliği ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi Doktora Programı öğrencisi Halil Atilla Sivrikaya'nın, "The Mobilization of the Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia (1981-2010)" başlıklı tez çalışması kapsamında konu ile ilgili Tunuslu kanaat önderleri, siyasetçiler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarıyla yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlar yapma talebi, mülakat soruları kapsamında değerlendirilmiş ve yapılmasında bir sakınca olmadığı tespit edilmiştir.
Bilgilerinize saygılarımızla sunarız.

Başkent Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler ve Sanat Araştırma Kurulu

Ad, Soyad	Değerlendirme	İmza
Prof. Dr. M. Abdülkadir Varoğlu	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Kudret Güven	Olumlu/Olumsuz	
Prof. Ali Sevgi	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Işıl Bulut	Olumlu/Olumsuz	
Prof. Dr. Sadegül Akbaba Altun	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Can Mehmet Hersek	Olumlu/Olumsuz	
Prof. Dr. Özcan Yağcı	Olumlu/~~Olumsuz~~	