

**DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION**  
**EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAM**  
**DOCTORAL THESIS**  
**Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)**

**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY**  
**PROMOTION IN UKRAINE**

**Fulya AKGÜL DURAKÇAY**

**Supervisor**

**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedef EYLEMER**

**İZMİR – 2019**

**THESIS APPROVAL PAGE**



## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Ukraine” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

11/09/2019

Fulya AKGÜL DURAKÇAY

## **ABSTRACT**

**Doctoral Thesis**

**Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)**

**The European Union's Democracy Promotion in Ukraine\***

**Fulya AKGÜL DURAKÇAY**

**Dokuz Eylül University**

**Graduate School of Social Sciences**

**Department of European Union**

**European Studies Program**

**This dissertation analyses the European Union's (EU) democracy promotion in Ukraine based on the assumptions that democratisation cannot be detached from international environment and domestic context is determinant of the success of external actors' democracy promotion policies. It applies Wolfgang Merkel's embedded democracy model which is composed of five partial regimes: electoral regime, political liberties, civil rights, horizontal accountability and effective power to govern. The dissertation adds civil society as the sixth one since Ukrainian civil society has proven itself as an influential actor in Ukraine's democratisation.**

**This dissertation attempts to answer the following questions: What are tools, methods and models of the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine? How does Ukraine's domestic context influence its orientation towards the EU and the EU's democracy promotion patterns? To what extent is the EU's democracy promotion effective in Ukraine's democratisation in the face of Russia's counterproductive policies? To answer these questions, the content analysis of relevant communications and reports from the EU institutions, policy frameworks, official documents on the bilateral relations and the EU's democracy promotion instruments is conducted.**

---

\* This dissertation has been supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) under the 2211-A General Domestic Ph.D. Scholarship Program.

**Ukraine's selection as a case study is based on the country's peculiarity as a crosspressured state between the EU and Russia. The contribution of the study derives from its search for the EU impact on each partial regime of the embedded democracy model by including the Ukrainian domestic context as an in-depth analysis as well as Russia's counter effects in the democratisation process. In this regard, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the EU's conceptual and practical democracy promotion in Ukraine.**

**Keywords: European Union, Ukraine, Russia, European Neighbourhood Policy, Democracy, Democratisation, Democracy Promotion.**



## ÖZET

### Doktora Tezi

#### Avrupa Birliđi'nin Ukrayna'da Demokrasi Teşviki\*\*

Fulya AKGÜL DURAKÇAY

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Avrupa Birliđi Anabilim Dalı

Avrupa Çalışmaları Programı

Bu tez Avrupa Birliđi'nin (AB) Ukrayna'daki demokrasi teşvikini demokratikleşmenin uluslararası çevreden ayrı düşünölemeyeceđi ve iç dinamiklerin dış aktörlerin demokrasi teşviki politikalarının başarısında belirleyici olduđu varsayımlarına dayanarak incelemektedir. Wolfgang Merkel'in beş kısmi rejimden oluşan gömülü demokrasi modeli uygulanmaktadır: seçimsel rejim, siyasi özgürlükler, sivil haklar, yatay hesap verilebilirlik, etkin yönetme gücü. Tez, Ukrayna sivil toplumunun kendisini Ukrayna'nın demokratikleşmesinde etkili bir aktör olarak kanıtlamış olması sebebiyle sivil toplumu altıncı bir unsur olarak analize eklemektedir.

Tez şu soruları yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır: AB'nin Ukrayna'da demokrasi teşviki politikalarındaki araçlar, yöntemler ve modeller nelerdir? Ukrayna'nın iç bağlamı AB'ye yönelimini ve AB'nin demokrasi teşviki modelini nasıl etkilemektedir? AB'nin demokrasi teşviki politikaları Rusya'nın ters etkili politikaları karşısında Ukrayna'nın demokratikleşmesinde ne derece etkilidir? Bu soruları yanıtlamak için AB kurumlarının ilgili tebliğ ve raporları, politika çerçeveleri, ikili ilişkilerin dayandıđı resmi belgeler ve AB'nin demokrasi teşviki araçlarının içerik analizi yapılmaktadır.

Ukrayna'nın vaka incelemesi olarak seçilmesi ülkenin AB ve Rusya arasında çapraz baskıya uğrayan bir ülke olma özelliđine dayanmaktadır. Çalışmanın katkısı; gömülü demokrasi modelinin her kısmi rejimi için AB etkisini tespit etmeye çalışırken Ukrayna iç bağlamının derinlemesine analizinin

---

\*\* Bu tez çalışması, 2211-A Genel Yurt İçi Doktora Burs Programı kapsamında Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu (TÜBİTAK) tarafından desteklenmiştir.

ve Rusya'nın Ukrayna'nın demokratikleşme sürecine yönelik karşıt politikalarının da değerlendirmelere dâhil edilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışma AB'nin kavramsal ve uygulamalı olarak Ukrayna'daki demokrasi teşvikinin kapsamlı bir analizini sunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliği, Ukrayna, Rusya, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, Demokrasi, Demokratikleşme, Demokrasi Teşviki.



# THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN UKRAINE

## CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	vi
CONTENTS	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	xii
LIST OF FIGURES	xvi

INTRODUCTION	1
--------------	---

## CHAPTER ONE

### CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: DEMOCRATISATION, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

I. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK	10
II. DEMOCRATISATION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	15
A. Defining Democracy	15
B. Transition to Democracy	20
C. Consolidation of Democracy	22
D. Theories of Democratisation	24
1. Domestic Centres-Approaches	25
a. Modernisation Theory	25
b. Historical Sociological/Structural Approach	28
c. Transition Studies	29
2. International Dimension of Democratisation	31
III. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	35

A. Motives Behind Democracy Promotion from Different Theoretical Perspectives	37
B. Tools and Methods of Democracy Promotion	43
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION	46
A. Brief Overview of the Literature on the European Union's Democracy Promotion	46
B. Models of the European Union's Democracy Promotion	49
1. Linkage	50
2. Leverage	53
3. Governance	57
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS	60

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY**

I. FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN ITS DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA	61
II. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION	68
A. The Rationale for and the Evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy	68
B. The Incentives and the Instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy	77
C. Democracy Promotion in the Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership	82
III. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD: ACCOMPLISHMENTS OR FAILURES?	87
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS	89

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**FORMATION OF THE MODERN UKRAINIAN NATION AND STATE:**  
**INDEFINITE INTERPLAY AMONG HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND**  
**IDENTITY**

I. AN INTERTWINED HISTORY WITH POLAND AND RUSSIA: THE LEGACY OF KIEVAN RUS’	92
II. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT FROM ITS EMERGENCE TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR I	96
III. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN UKRAINE IN THE 20 <sup>TH</sup> CENTURY: THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION (1917-1920)	101
IV. UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIET RULE (1921-1991)	104
V. ADJUSTING TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR: THE EAST-WEST DICHOTOMY IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE	110
A. Kravchuk Era and the Consolidation of the Statehood (1991-1994)	112
B. Kuchma Era and the Orientation towards “Europe Together with Russia” (1994-2004)	113
C. The Orange Revolution and Yushchenko Era (2004-2010)	116
D. Yanukovich Era (2010-2014) and the Euromaidan	119
E. Violated Statehood and Poroshenko Era (2014-2019)	123
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS	128

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION**  
**IN UKRAINE**

I. ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN UKRAINE BEFORE AND AFTER THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY	131
A. Adjusting to the Role of an External Democracy Promoter: The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Ukraine in the 1990s	131

1. Analysis of the Content: The EU’s Democracy Promotion in Ukraine from 1991 to 2004	132
2. Analysis of the Action: The European Union’s Focus in Transition to Market Economy and Democracy	135
B. The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Ukraine under the ENP	138
1. Analysis of the Content: The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Ukraine from 2004 onwards	140
2. Analysis of the Action: The European Union’s Focus in Institution and Capacity Building, and Developmental and Governance Approaches	146
a. Institution and Capacity Building in Focus	146
b. Expanding the Developmental and Governance Approaches	149
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PROMOTION OF THE EMBEDDED DEMOCRACY MODEL: THE INTERPLAY OF THE UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC CONTEXT AND RUSSIA	152
A. Electoral Regime	152
B. Political Liberties	160
C. Civil Rights	166
D. Horizontal Accountability	175
E. Effective Power to Govern	181
F. Civil Society	184
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS	189
CONCLUSION	191
REFERENCES	205

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AA</b>	Association Agreement
<b>AAs</b>	Association Agreements
<b>ACP</b>	African, Caribbean and Pacific
<b>ARO/AMO</b>	Asset Recovery and Management Office
<b>ATCs</b>	Amalgamated territorial communities
<b>B.C.</b>	Before Christ
<b>BSS</b>	Black Sea Synergy
<b>BYuT</b>	Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko
<b>CARDS</b>	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
<b>CBC</b>	Cross-Border Cooperation
<b>CEECs</b>	Central and Eastern European Countries
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CIS</b>	Commonwealth of Independent States
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>CS</b>	Common Strategy
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organisations
<b>CSOs-LAs</b>	Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities
<b>DCFTA</b>	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
<b>DCFTAs</b>	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas
<b>DCI</b>	Development Cooperation Instrument
<b>DPR</b>	Donetsk People's Republic
<b>EaP</b>	Eastern Partnership
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community
<b>ECU</b>	Eurasian Customs Union
<b>EEA</b>	European Economic Area
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EED</b>	European Endowment for Democracy

<b>EESC</b>	European Economic and Social Committee
<b>EEU</b>	Eurasian Economic Union
<b>EIDHR</b>	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
<b>EMP</b>	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
<b>ENI</b>	European Neighbourhood Instrument
<b>ENP</b>	European Neighbourhood Policy
<b>ENPI</b>	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EU DURE</b>	EU Support to Ukraine to Re-launch the Economy
<b>EUACI</b>	European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative
<b>EUAM</b>	EU Assistance Mission
<b>EUGS</b>	Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy
<b>Euratom</b>	European Atomic Energy Community
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GRECO</b>	Group of States against Corruption
<b>HACC</b>	High Anti-Corruption Court
<b>HR</b>	High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IPA</b>	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
<b>LITPOLUKRBRIG</b>	Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade
<b>LPR</b>	Luhansk People’s Republic
<b>MEDA</b>	European Community’s cooperation programme with Mediterranean partner countries
<b>MENA</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>NABU</b>	National Anti-Corruption Bureau
<b>NACP</b>	National Agency on Corruption Prevention
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NCSF</b>	Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-governmental organisations

<b>NIF</b>	Neighbourhood Investment Facility
<b>NIS</b>	Newly Independent States
<b>NSA-LA</b>	Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development
<b>ODIHR</b>	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OJ</b>	Official Journal of the European Communities/the European Union
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>OUN</b>	Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
<b>PARS</b>	Public Administration Reform Strategy
<b>PCA</b>	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
<b>PCAs</b>	Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
<b>PCF</b>	Programmatic Cooperation Framework
<b>PHARE</b>	Poland and Hungary Action for Restructuring of the Economy
<b>PRAVO</b>	Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine
<b>RUP</b>	Revolutionary Ukrainian Party
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SEA</b>	Single European Act
<b>SGUA</b>	Support Group for Ukraine
<b>SIGMA</b>	Support for Improvement in Governance and Management
<b>SMEs</b>	Small and medium-sized enterprises
<b>TACIS</b>	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia
<b>TAIEX</b>	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument of the European Commission
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty on European Union
<b>TÜBİTAK</b>	Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu / The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
<b>UANTI</b>	Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia
<b>UEPLAC</b>	Ukrainian European Policy and Legal Advice Centre

<b>UfM</b>	Union for the Mediterranean
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>Ukrainian SSR</b>	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNR</b>	Ukrainian National Republic
<b>UPA</b>	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
<b>UPAC</b>	Project against corruption in Ukraine
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>VET</b>	Vocational Education and Training
<b>VLAP</b>	Visa Liberalisation Action Plan
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization
<b>ZUNR</b>	Western Ukrainian People's Republic

## LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1:** The Concept of Embedded Democracy p. 11
- Figure 2:** The Defining Components of Embedded Democracy p. 11



## INTRODUCTION

The issues of democracy, democratisation and consolidation of democracy have become prominent as one of the most debated topics in the literature and especially in the Western policy-making. Transitions to democracy by a vast number of countries beginning with the 1970s contributed to this debate. Democracy as one of the most contested concepts has various definitions, principles and components. This dissertation takes a comprehensive definition of democracy as liberal democracy. A vast literature exists on the internal causes of democratisation. However, it is not possible to detach democratisation from international environment. In this regard, democracy promotion policies of external actors such as states, international organisations and non-state actors have come to target third countries that have either not yet transitioned to democracy or had problems in its consolidation. The motives of democracy promoters may vary from the belief in the superiority of democracy as a value and a political system, cooperation and mutual trust to market-oriented and security interests.

The European Union (EU) has evolved as such an external actor to promote democratic norms and values as its founding principles in the third countries beginning with its enlargement towards Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s. The Cold War's end affected the EU's democracy promotion. The EU interconnected its security agenda and its ambition to be a global actor with furthering its values, norms and principles in its near abroad. As the EU prepared to have its biggest enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), the enlargement process functioned as a transformative instrument for democratisation of these countries. While this Eastern enlargement was impending, the belief in the EU's transformative power was paired with the combat with post-Cold War security threats and challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration within the EU's prospective near abroad after the enlargement.

Under these circumstances, the EU officially launched a new policy towards its new neighbours in 2002-2004. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) developed into a comprehensive framework to include the EU's Eastern –Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine- and Southern – Algeria, Egypt,

Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia-neighbours. The ENP does not strictly rely on a geographical basis since the EU does not have immediate borders with some of the ENP countries. What these countries shared in common is their high degree of instability, the process of transition to democracy and their status as less developed economies in comparison to the EU. The EU developed the ENP as a new way of institutionalising its relations with its neighbours to build a “ring of friends” that would become more secure, stable, democratic and prosperous.

The EU has promoted democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in its foreign and security policy. In this regard, the EU has resorted to democratic conditionality as a mechanism in furthering its relations with third countries. By excluding the membership perspective in the ENP, the EU offered some incentives such as a stake in the internal market, visa facilitation or liberalisation and deepening bilateral relations in several sectors in return for these countries’ approximation to the EU rules, norms and values. The EU has promoted democracy by tying political reforms to economic and financial incentives via the use of conditionality as one of the same tools within its enlargement policy. However, the enlargement tools did not function equally effective and regional developments varied without the membership perspective. In response to the inefficiency of the umbrella scheme for all-16 ENP countries and different interests and policy priorities of different Member States, the EU started the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) for its Southern neighbours in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) for its Eastern neighbours in 2009. The UfM provided a more institutionalised relationship while the EaP provided a more ambitious framework for deepening the bilateral relations.

With the EaP, the EU increased its emphasis on democracy, the rule of law and human rights as well as market economy as an economic norm. Besides, the EU has resorted more to socialisation as an instrument adapted from the enlargement process for transferring the EU norms, values and rules to the third countries via engaging both with the political elites and civil society. It increased the substance of its incentives by offering the prospect of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The EaP countries based on the intensification of their institutional ties to the EU have gone into two different directions. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have intensified their

relations with the EU via the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) and visa liberalisation. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus have not shown much interest in furthering their relations with the EU.

However, the neighbourhood became contested with Russia's increasing assertiveness in the region. Besides the EU's increasing involvement in the region, democratic movements such as Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003 and Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 have contributed to Russia's growing fear of loss of influence. Russia did not hesitate to use hard power to preserve its influence as the examples of Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 have shown. In addition, Russia uses its soft power as a source of attraction by offering alternative integration projects such as the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) leading to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as well as using the migration and mobility interdependence of the EaP countries on Russia. Under these circumstances, effects of the EU's democracy promotion policies cannot be taken for granted.

This dissertation analyses the EU's democracy promotion strategies in Ukraine. Ukraine has always been at the centre of the ENP from the beginning of launching an idea of a specific policy towards the EU's neighbours. Ukraine has experienced an intertwined history with Europe and Russia. Since the beginning of its efforts to build an independent nation-state, the East-West dichotomy has constituted an indivisible part of domestic politics and foreign policy orientations in Ukraine. On the other hand, Russia's annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine as well as Russia's efforts to undermine the EU influence in the country indicate that Russia as a geographical player in the region constitutes a negative external actor in the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine. Herewith, the selection of Ukraine as a case study derives from the country's geopolitical destiny that inherits a dividedness in-between Europe and Russia.

As both the EU and Russia offer alternative regional integration projects, both external actors have the intention to shape and influence the identity, interest, and behaviour of the domestic actors taking a crucial role in the country's path towards democratisation or de-democratisation. For this reason, the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine is also dependent on the political, economic, cultural, and militarily employed cross-conditionality of Russia towards Ukraine. The Russian

linkages and leverages are included in the analysis as part of the Ukrainian domestic context. These peculiarities render Ukraine an ideal case study to examine the EU's democracy promotion efforts vis-à-vis Russia as an inhibitor.

The dissertation takes the year 1991 as the beginning of the analysis but focuses on the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine since the launch of the ENP. The theoretical framework applied is adopted from Wolfgang Merkel's embedded democracy model. The five partial regimes or defining components of embedded democracy are presented by Merkel as electoral regime, political liberties, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective power to govern. This study adds civil society as the sixth partial regime since the Ukrainian civil society has proven itself as a changemaker in favour of democracy. Besides, the EU engages with civil society as the bottom-up force for democratisation especially considering the experiences gained with the Arab Spring.

Although the framework of embedded democracy has been applied in some studies to analyse the EU's democracy promotion (for details please see the first chapter), this dissertation takes a more comprehensive approach. Herewith, the originality and contribution of the study derive from its search for the EU impact on each partial regimes of the embedded democracy model by including the Ukrainian domestic context as an in-depth analysis as well as Russia's counter effects besides focusing on the content of the EU official documents. By including an in-depth analysis of the domestic context of Ukraine, this study aims to provide an improved understanding of the EU's democracy promotion policies by analysing its comprehension of democracy, interests, tools, methods, channels, relations with and impact on Ukraine, both theoretically and empirically.

This dissertation attempts to answer to the following main question: What is the EU's impact on Ukraine's democratisation? With two sets of research questions, the EU's impact is searched for. The first set of these questions are aimed at answering the theoretical framework of the EU democracy promotion in general and in Ukraine specifically:

- I. What is the democratic template of the EU? What democracy does the EU promote? What is the democratic content of the EU's democracy promotion strategies in Ukraine within the framework of the ENP?

- II. How does the EU promote democracy? What are the tools, methods, and models of the EU democracy promotion in Ukraine?
- III. Why does the EU promote democracy? What are the motives behind the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine? How do these motives influence its democracy promotion agenda in Ukraine?

The arguments of this dissertation are as follows. The international context and external actors have the potential, capacity and intention to influence the domestic processes of democratisation. Yet, their influence is dependent on the domestic context of the third countries. In this regard, the presence and intensity of historical, political, economic and identity-based linkages with the external actors in question are likely to provide for necessary conditions for their democracy promotion strategies to work. This dissertation takes the impact of the EU's democracy promotion policies as the dependent variable. Herewith, it argues that the Ukrainian domestic context and to what extent the EU democracy promotion strategies are operationalized by the domestic actors determine the EU's success in promoting democracy. Thus, to explain the impact of the EU on Ukraine's democratisation, the domestic context needs to be understood to reveal how the domestic actors process this external influence.

In this regard, the second set of questions are aimed at revealing the impact of Ukraine's domestic context in the EU's democracy promotion policies:

- IV. How does Ukraine's domestic setting in terms of its history, identity, and political culture influence its orientation towards the EU and/or Russia?
- V. How does Ukraine's domestic setting influence the EU's democracy promotion patterns?
- VI. How do Russia's policies towards Ukraine affect the democratisation process of Ukraine within the scope of the EU's democracy promotion policies and impact?

In order to answer these questions, the thesis uses content analysis and thematic analysis in addition to benefiting from literature review. For determining the EU's democratic template, relevant communications and reports from the EU institutions and policy frameworks –the ENP and the EaP- are analysed. To reveal the democratic content of its democracy promotion policies in Ukraine, eight bilateral documents founding the EU-Ukraine relations are analysed thematically. These documents are the

PCA, the “EU’s Common Position in Ukraine”, the “Action Plan for Ukraine”, the “Common Strategy on Ukraine”, the “ENP Action Plan”, the “Association Agenda”, the AA, and the “Updated Association Agenda”. The analysis is conducted in line with the embedded democracy model. In this regard, the relevant articles containing the word democracy itself or any relevant component of the model are included. To reveal the EU action in Ukraine, its financial and technical democracy-supporting instruments are analysed thematically. For the assessment of the EU’s impact on Ukraine’s democratisation, the reports of the Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, the Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU progress/country reports on Ukraine are analysed thematically in line with the embedded democracy model.

The dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter entitled as “Conceptual and Theoretical Framework: Democratisation, Democracy Promotion and the European Union’s Democracy Promotion” analyses prominent definitions of democracy and democratisation process by sorting it out as transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy in line with the argument of transition is incomplete without consolidation of democracy. In this regard, domestic-centred approaches and international dimension of democratisation are examined. Then, the chapter provides an analysis of democracy promotion as a foreign policy activity of external actors with motives, tools and methods. Lastly, a literature review on the EU’s democracy promotion, together with its approaches, instruments and methods are provided under linkage, leverage and governance as three models of democracy promotion. Hence, this chapter provides answers to the research questions: *How does the EU promote democracy? What are the tools, methods, and models of the EU democracy promotion?*

The second chapter entitled as “The European Union’s Democracy Promotion within the Scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy” addresses the formation and development of the EU’s democratic principles. In this regard, the historical stages of European integration are analysed in an attempt to ascertain the democratic component of the EU’s external relations, its foreign policy and its comprehension of democracy. Then, the chapter discusses the formation and development of the ENP by analysing its rationale, incentives and instruments, and its Eastern dimension with a focus on the

EaP. The crucial communications, reports, treaties and policy frameworks are examined to respond to the research questions: *What is the democratic template of the EU? What democracy does the EU promote? Why does the EU promote democracy? What are the motives behind the EU's democracy promotion in the ENP area?*

The third chapter entitled as “Formation of the Modern Ukrainian Nation and State: Indefinite Interplay among History, Geography and Identity” is designed to provide a historical understanding of Ukraine’s current engagement with the EU and Russia by analysing the historical roots of the cultural, linguistic and political divide in the country. First of all, Ukraine’s process of becoming an independent state is searched for identifying the effects of Ukraine’s historical experiences with Europe and Russia. Then, Ukraine’s recent history under each president since its independence in 1991 is examined to identify the reflections of historical, geographical and identical dividedness on the domestic politics and the foreign policy orientations of the country. This chapter covers the answer to the following research question: *How does Ukraine’s domestic setting in terms of its history, identity, and political culture influence its orientation towards the EU and/or Russia?*

The fourth chapter entitled as “The Analysis of the European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Ukraine” firstly analyses the tools, methods and models of the EU democracy promotion in Ukraine following a chronological perspective in bilateral relations. In this regard, the component of democracy is searched for in the founding documents of the bilateral relations and the democracy supporting instruments before and after the ENP. Then, the EU’s democracy promotion in Ukraine is analysed thematically based on Merkel’s embedded democracy model. For each partial regime, the EU’s democracy promotion strategies both in paper and in action are analysed. Then, Ukraine’s domestic context is explored to understand the current situation and the changes triggered by the EU. Lastly, the counterproductive role of Russia as an impeding condition to the EU’s and Ukraine’s efforts for democratisation is explored for each partial regime. Herewith, this chapter responds to the following research questions: *How does Ukraine’s domestic setting influence the EU’s democracy promotion patterns? How do Russia’s policies towards Ukraine affect the democratisation process of Ukraine within the scope of the EU’s democracy promotion policies and impact? What is the EU impact on Ukraine’s democratisation?*

**CHAPTER ONE**  
**CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:**  
**DEMOCRATISATION, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND THE**  
**EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION**

Democracy is one of the most contested concepts in the studies of political science. How to conceptualize democracy is a long, rich and subjective debate. It is generally conceptualized as a “fuzzy and multifaceted” notion (Silander, 2005: 27). Academic literature on democracy is abundant and exhibits very different definitions, principles, components or models of democracy. For instance, O’Neil (2010: 122) sorts democracy models as parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential with an approach based on institutions. Sargent (2009: 62) associates democracy with popular sovereignty and thus distinguishes democracies as direct, participatory or representative. Çınar (2014: 224-242) on the other hand, groups democracy models either as normative or as descriptive based on their methods. The democracy models he lists are elitist/liberal democracy, pluralist democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, agonistic/radical democracy and global/cosmopolitan democracy.

Vandeputte and Luciani (2018: 1) draw attention to the fact that definition of democracy and its components remain contested and differ according to the conceptualisation of classical, republican, liberal, direct, elitist, pluralist, socialist, deliberative, cosmopolitan, or even authoritarian democracy. The conceptualisation of several regime types with more or less democratic features as subtypes of democracies such as “authoritarian democracy”, “military-dominated democracy” and “neopatrimonial democracy” has been dubbed by Collier and Levitsky (1997: 430) as “democracy with adjectives” which leads to worries about democracy’s conceptual stretching and losing its conceptual validity. This dissertation embraces a comprehensive conceptualisation of democracy as liberal democracy as defined by Diamond (1997: xiv): “*encompasses extensive protections for individual and group freedoms, inclusive pluralism in civil society as well as party politics, civilian control over the military, institutions to hold officeholders accountable, and thus a strong rule of law secured through an independent, impartial judiciary.*”

In this context, this chapter firstly analyses the foremost theorists' definitions of democracy based on its comprehension as liberal democracy. Then, it analyses democratisation as a process that starts with transition from a nondemocratic political regime to democracy and ends with the consolidation of democracy. The section on transition to democracy is discussed mainly based on the prevailing transition comprehensions. In line with the argument that democratisation is completed with democracy's consolidation and the actual transition is consolidation of democracy (Przeworski, 1991), consolidation of democracy is elaborated as part of the democratisation process. Then, theories of democratisation are discussed in two aspects as domestic-centred approaches and international dimension of democratisation.

With regard to democracy promotion, it can be inferred from the literature that democracy and its promotion have been attributed positive connotations. Democracy as a constitutive norm of the West has come to be accepted as a universal value (McFaul, 2004: 147-163; Gershman, 2005: 19-38; Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007: 23-46). Scholars have named the global spread of democracies as "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992), and "the triumph of democracy" (Holden, 2000: 1; Diamond, 2000: 91). Thereby, since an abundant of democracy promoters are Western states or organisations, "modern liberal democracy" has emerged as the most prominent political regime (Schmitter and Brouwer, 1999: 1) and democracy promoters have come to promote mainly a liberal model of democracy (Huber, 2015: 23). In this regard, this chapter's section on democracy promotion firstly examines the motives behind the external actors' democracy promotion policies as a foreign policy act from different theoretical perspectives. Then, tools or instruments, and methods applied in promoting democracy are detailed.


The EU has been regarded as a late-coming or a recent democratizer (Baracani, 2010: 304). Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EU has been pursuing a democracy promotion agenda in its foreign policy. It has extended its "democratic vocabulary" by referring to European democracy, pluralistic democracy, democracy building, deep democracy and democratic governance (Vandeputte and Luciani, 2018: 9). After a brief overview of the literature in the EU's democracy promotion, its strategies,

approaches, instruments and methods are elaborated under three models of democracy promotion: linkage, leverage, and governance.

## **I. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

This study analyses the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine. The research timeframe comprises the period between the beginning of the bilateral relations since Ukraine's independence in 1991 and the last presidential elections in 2019. This study embraces the theoretical framework of "embedded democracy" designed by Merkel (2004: 33-44) as seen in the Figure 1 to determine the substantive content of democracy promotion and the actual extent of the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine. Merkel criticises the degradation of democracy to electoral democracy and distinguishes between consolidated liberal democracies and their diminished subtypes based on the experiences of the third wave of democratisation. Merkel calls consolidated liberal democracies as "embedded democracies" while calling diminished subtypes of democracy as "defective democracies". He proposes that an embedded liberal democracy is composed of five interdependent partial regimes or defining components of democratic regime: electoral regime, political liberties, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective power to govern. Besides, democracy's internal "embeddedness", Merkel underlines the importance of external embeddedness, which supports the five partial regimes for the quality of democracy. He identifies socio-economic context, civil society, and international integration as preconditions for external embeddedness.

**Figure 1:** The Concept of Embedded Democracy



Source: Merkel, 2004: 37.

However, this dissertation argues that civil society –which Merkel defines as an externally embedded ring- should be included as the sixth defining component of the democratic regime since the Ukrainian civil society has proven itself as a changemaker in favour of democracy. Herewith, this dissertation follows the criteria provided by the framework of embedded democracy as seen in the Figure 2.

**Figure 2:** The Defining Components of Embedded Democracy

- |  |
|--|
| <p><b>A. Electoral Regime</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Elected officials</li> <li>(2) Inclusive suffrage</li> <li>(3) Right to candidacy</li> <li>(4) Correctly organized, free and fair elections</li> </ul> <p><b>B. Political Liberties</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(5) Press Freedom</li> <li>(6) Freedom of association</li> </ul> <p><b>C. Civil Rights</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(7) Individual liberties from violations of own rights by state/private agents</li> <li>(8) Equality before the law</li> </ul> <p><b>D. Horizontal Accountability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(9) Horizontal separation of powers</li> </ul> <p><b>E. Effective Power to Govern</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(10) Elected officials with the effective right to rule</li> </ul> <p><b>F. Civil Society</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(11) A well-developed and active civil society</li> </ul> |
|--|

Source: Modified, based on Merkel, 2004: 42.

The embedded democracy framework has already been applied by some scholars but all in a narrower scope than this study aims to explore. Wetzel and Orbie (2015) have used it from a comparative perspective in 11 cases of cross-country analysis in different regions to reveal the substance of the EU's democracy promotion solely focusing on the content of the EU official documents without searching for its impact and without including an in-depth analysis of domestic contexts. Bossuyt and Kubicek (2011: 639-658) have applied the framework in Central Asia by emphasising the importance of the domestic context. Reynaert (2011: 623-637) has applied the external conditions of the embedded democracy framework in the Mediterranean to show its neglect of internal embeddedness' components. On the contrary, Tolstrup (2014) has used the internal embeddedness criteria to determine the EU's impact on the three cases –Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine- by taking the EU's democracy promotion activities as independent variable, and democratisation as dependent variable. Rabinovych (2016: 5-31) has used the framework for the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine after the Euromaidan in 2013 and questioned the applicability of the embedded democracy concept.

By including an in-depth analysis of Ukrainian domestic context and Russia's role in Ukraine's democratisation, this study aims to provide a detailed comprehension of the EU's democracy promotion policies in order to assess its impact, successes and failures. Besides, the thesis contributes to theoretical and empirical studies on the EU's democracy promotion by modifying Merkel's model via adding the sixth component –civil society- into the analysis. This dissertation problematizes the following research question: What is the EU's impact on Ukraine's democratisation? With two sets of secondary questions, the impact of the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine is searched for. The first set of these questions are aimed at answering the theoretical framework of the EU democracy promotion in general and in Ukraine specifically:

- I. What is the democratic template of the EU? What democracy does the EU promote? What is the democratic content of the EU's democracy promotion strategies in Ukraine within the framework of the ENP?
- II. How does the EU promote democracy? What are the tools, methods, and models of the EU democracy promotion in Ukraine?

III. Why does the EU promote democracy? What are the motives behind the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine? How do these motives influence its democracy promotion agenda in Ukraine?

The arguments of this dissertation are as follows. As it will be outlined in the section on the international dimension of democratisation, the international context and external actors have the potential and capacity to influence the domestic processes of democratisation. Through direct or indirect, and active and passive influences, external actors have the potential to influence the identities, calculations, and behaviours of the decisive domestic actors in their move towards or away from democracy. Yet, the influence of external actors is dependent on the scope of the openness that the domestic context provides and also on the presence and intensity of historical, political, economic and identity-based linkages/ties with the external actors in question. In this regard, this dissertation takes the impact of the EU's democracy promotion policies as the dependent variable. Herewith, it argues that the Ukrainian domestic context, and how and to what extent the EU's democracy promotion strategies are operationalized by the domestic actors are determinant for the EU's success in democracy promotion. Thus, to explain the EU's impact on Ukraine's democratisation and on the decisions and choices of the domestic actors, the domestic context needs to be understood to reveal how the domestic actors process this external influence.

The reason for selecting Ukraine as the case study of this dissertation derives from Ukraine's situation as a "crosspressured" (Whitehead, 1999: 75) state due to its geographical destiny. Its "spatial stock" (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000: 12-14) inherits a dividedness in-between Europe and Russia. Ukraine's political and economic environment is composed of both the EU and Russia. Both external actors have the intention to shape and influence the identity, interest, and behaviour of the domestic actors taking a crucial role in the country's path towards democratisation or de-democratisation. For this reason, the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine is also dependent on the political, economic, cultural, and militarily employed cross-conditionality of Russia towards Ukraine. The Russian linkages and leverages are included in the analysis as part of the Ukrainian domestic context. These peculiarities render Ukraine an ideal case study to examine the EU's democracy promotion efforts

to create an international environment that is less threatening to itself while confronting Russia as an inhibitor. In this regard, the second set of research questions are:

- IV. How does Ukraine's domestic setting in terms of its history, identity, and political culture influence its orientation towards the EU and/or Russia?
- V. How does Ukraine's domestic setting influence the EU's democracy promotion patterns?
- VI. How do Russia's policies towards Ukraine affect the democratisation process of Ukraine within the scope of the EU's democracy promotion policies and impact?

In order to answer these questions, the thesis uses content analysis and thematic analysis in addition to benefiting from literature review. For determining the EU's democratic template, relevant communications and reports from the EU institutions and policy frameworks –the ENP and the EaP- are analysed. To reveal the democratic content/meaning of its democracy promotion policies in Ukraine, eight bilateral documents founding the EU-Ukraine relations are analysed thematically. These documents are the PCA, the “EU's Common Position in Ukraine”, the “Action Plan for Ukraine”, the “Common Strategy on Ukraine”, the “ENP Action Plan”, the “Association Agenda”, the AA, and the “Updated Association Agenda”. The analysis is conducted in line with the embedded democracy model. In this regard, the relevant articles containing the word democracy itself or any relevant component of the model are included. To reveal the EU action in Ukraine, its financial and technical democracy-supporting instruments are analysed thematically. For assessment of the EU impact on Ukraine's democratisation, the reports of the Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, the Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU progress/country reports on Ukraine are analysed thematically in line with the embedded democracy model.

By including an in-depth analysis of the domestic context of Ukraine, this study aims to provide an improved understanding of the EU's democracy promotion policies by analysing its comprehension of democracy, interests, tools, methods, channels, relations with and influence in Ukraine, both theoretically and empirically. The EU's

conceptualisation of democracy, its discourses on promoting democracy and its operationalisation of democracy promotion in Ukraine are determined in the light of these documents.

## **II. DEMOCRATISATION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **A. Defining Democracy**

As a subjective term, democracy is concentric with the political, social, economic and cultural contexts. The word itself has derived from as a combination of the ancient Greek words “*demokratia*” as “*demos*” meaning people and “*kratos*” meaning power or rule. In its very essence from its derivation, democracy means the rule of people (Uslu, 2015: 137). The roots of democracy have been attributed to the city-states of ancient Greece around the 6<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries Before Christ (B.C.) and the Roman Empire around 27<sup>th</sup> B.C and 476 in the West, 1453 in the East. The Greek experience of democracy is important for introducing these concepts: public participation in a direct involvement in the affairs of government –although only men meeting the criteria of age and indigenusness were qualified as citizens-, active citizenship, and equalitarianism since all citizens had the right and opportunity to be involved in the conduct of state affairs by rotation and lottery (Çınar, 2014: 207-210). The Roman Empire’s experience is important for introducing the concept of republicanism, separation of powers with its three branches of government and the rule of law by emphasising equality under law (Zakaria, 2013: 189). Although these earliest forms of democratic practices put an emphasis on some basic democratic elements, they also had fundamental restrictions on the formation and exercise of these rights. However, they contributed to the development of the modern liberal democratic regime (O’Neil, 2010: 111-112).

Both the ancient Greek democracy and the Roman republicanism collapsed but the democratic practices reappeared and evolved. Zakaria (2013: 189-190) states that power struggles between church and state, lord and King, business and the state in the West paved the way for greater individual liberty which he states as the *raison d’être*

of democracy. O'Neil (2010: 110-111) draws attention to the fact that democracy is associated with individual freedom and liberalism especially in the West. As he makes a basic definition of democracy as a system in which people exercise power through participation, competition and liberty, this definition is intertwined with the ideology of liberalism.

Çınar (2014: 210-214) ascertains that modern democracy's comprehensions of society, politics, freedom, and equality are very different from the early practices. In this sense, he states the new paradigm of modern democracy as liberalism which is a developing and post-feudal ideology since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The emergence of the ideas of humans' as individuals and the individuals' formation of society based on their wills within the framework of social contracts which are in their interests were deterministic in the modern conceptualisation of democracy. In this way, he states that democratic practices have evolved historically by articulating to the liberal principles, which had already been institutionalized.

Sözen (2016: 59) suggests that definition of democracy can be defined in two different dimensions. The first dimension is based on Schumpeter's minimalist or electoral democracy model. The second dimension is Dahl's pluralist democracy comprehension. In the first dimension, Schumpeter (2003: 250) begins his conceptualisation of democracy by criticising the 18<sup>th</sup> century philosophy of democracy or the classical doctrine of democracy as he calls it. Schumpeter problematizes the components of the common good and the will of the people in the classical definition of democracy. He defines the classical democracy as "... *institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.*" (Schumpeter, 2003: 250). He argues that there is no uniquely determined common good and common good may mean different things to different individuals and groups. On the will of the people, he purports that it is not given, independent, and rational since it emerges from influences, actions, and reactions of the democratic process. Besides, he adds that even the will of people were perfectly definite and independent, the political decisions would not represent this will (Schumpeter, 2003: 251-254).

Hence, Schumpeter (2003: 269) proposes “another theory of democracy”. He starts with reversing the secondary position of the selection of the representatives to the primary aim of electorates’ decision on political issues in the classical model. Therefore, he defines the democratic method as “*that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.*” (Schumpeter, 2003: 269). In his minimalist model, democracy is a political mechanism for arriving at decisions by the political elites who compete for the people’s vote that only determines which elite is going to form the government. In this sense, existence of free and fair elections in which every citizen has the right to elect and be elected is qualified as democracy (Sözen, 2016: 59).

Huntington (1991: 6) argues that Schumpeter’s criticism of democracy’s definition in terms of sources of authority (the will of the people) and in terms of purposes (the common good) served by the government brought about a procedural concept of democracy. This Schumpeterian mode became broadly accepted starting with the 1970s. However, foremost scholars of democracy have acknowledged the shortcomings of electoral or procedural conception of democracy and the significance of adding some substantial or normative criteria. In this sense, as Huntington and also Sözen argue, Dahl’s conceptualisation of democracy adds a second dimension to Schumpeter’s conceptualisation of electoral democracy. Dahl’s conceptualisation of democracy is a hypothetical system where one of the key characteristics of the system is the government’s complete or almost complete responsiveness to the preferences of the citizens. Dahl (1971: 1-9) proposes the term “*polyarchy*” as an alternative to the word democracy since democracy is an ideal system in his conceptualisation. Thus, polyarchy is used to mean the existing institutional arrangements –or actual/existing representative democracies- “*as a kind of imperfect approximation of an ideal*”.

With polyarchy, Dahl (1971: 1-9) speaks of an inclusive political system with opportunities for public contestation and opportunities. In this system, he stresses the importance of free and equal opportunities for citizens to formulate their preferences, to signify these preferences to other citizens and the government, and to have the equal possibility of weighing their preferences in the conduct of the government. Dahl asserts some requirements for democracy that comprises Schumpeter’s electoral

democracy with free and fair elections, right to vote and to be voted, and right of political leaders to compete for vote/support. However, these requirements transcend the first dimension with freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and freedom to form and join organisations. These requirements regulate citizens' freedom of opposition in-between two elections, which guarantees the freeness and fairness of elections (Sözen, 2016: 60).

Schmitter and Karl (1991: 76) define democracy as a system of governance in which the deterministic features are the accountability of the rulers to the citizens, and the competitiveness of the election procedures. They draw attention to the fact that democracies may take many forms depending on the concerned country's socioeconomic conditions, state structures, and policy practices. Although they accept the procedural definition of democracy, they put emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens and the mechanisms of competition other than just elections (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 87). Karl (1995: 73) warns about the "fallacy of electoralism" since the mere holding of elections would not lead to and guarantee the expansion of civic rights, political equality, participation, contestation, and accountability. Alike, Huntington (1991: 10) expresses free, fair and open elections with universal suffrage as essence of democracy. However, he draws attention to the fact that governments constituted in consequence of the elections might be inefficient, corrupt, driven by special interests and incapable of reflecting public good but still not undemocratic.

Sodaro (2008: 171-182) states that representation based on free, fair and competitive elections is not sufficient to establish a fully-fledged democracy. Protection of certain rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech and assembly by the law is required. Accordingly, he presents five core principles or elements to speak of democracy. These principles are laid out as two steps and three pillars that stand on these two steps. The two steps are the foundational steps of democracy. The bottom step is democratic values such as freedom, inclusion, equality, equity, respect, tolerance, compromise and trust. The second step is the rule of law principle meaning that no one is above the law. These two steps are interdependent on each other as the democratic values underlie the law, and the law implements the values. He calls the three pillars as the functional components of democracy. These are popular

sovereignty that gives the people the right to determine how they are governed, rights and liberties that must not be removed or infringed by the state, and economic well-being that is essential for democracies to provide basic needs, opportunities to overcome poverty and improve the quality of life. Although the functional components of democracy may differ in the real world, what is vital is that these pillars must be grounded in democratic values and the rule of law.

Tilly (2007: 7-9) ascertains four main types of definitions among scholars of democracy: procedural, substantive, constitutional, and process-oriented. Procedural definition of democracy focuses mainly on free, fair, and competitive elections. Substantive approaches focus on the promotion of certain principles such as individual freedom, security, social equality, equity, and human welfare. Constitutional approaches single out legal arrangements to determine a regime type and concentrates on laws that this specific regime promulgate to regulate political activity. As different from these three types of definitions, process-oriented approaches specify some conditions that must be continuously in motion to categorize a regime as democracy. For this conceptualisation, he exemplifies Dahl's five process-oriented criteria for democracy: effective participation before a policy is adopted, voting equality, enlightened understanding to learn about possible alternative policies, control of the matters to be placed on the agenda, and inclusion of –almost all- adults.

Bühlmann et al (2008: 5) point to a divide in the literature between three basic concepts of democracy: minimalist, medium, and maximalist. Moving from this scale, they refer to the elitist type based on a minimalist conception of democracy as “government of the people”; the participatory type based on a mid-range concept of democracy as “government of and by the people”; and the social type of democracy based on a maximalist conceptualisation as “government of, by, and for the people”. They define three fundamental principles and necessary conditions to qualify as a democracy: equality, freedom, and control by the government and of the government. These three principles are seen as complementary and their relative weights and proper balance are determinant to the quality of democracy (Bühlmann et al., 2008: 14-15).

## **B. Transition to Democracy**

Huntington (1991: 4-5) reputedly named the worldwide movement to democracy starting with Southern Europe and Latin America in the mid-1970s and 1980s, and post-communist countries at the end of the 1980s with the replacement of many authoritarian regimes by democratic or democratising governments as “the third wave of democratisation”. Western Europe’s leading role in the first wave of democratisation in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century was followed by its reversal from 1922 to 1942. Then the West re-joined the second short wave from 1943 to 1962, which was reversed in the 1958-1975 period (Tilly, 2007: 43). What is significant about the third wave is its impact on the emergence of an extensive literature on transitions to democracy in the 1980s. Besides, Mainwaring (1989: 1) points out to the increased intellectual interest in and commitment to democracy than ever before due to the experiences of restrictions and persecutions under the past wave of authoritarian rules.

As Huntington’s conceptualisation of democratisation as waves has shown, transitions are reversible. Tilly (2007: 13-14) draws attention to the fact that democratisation by definition remains incomplete and has the possibility of de-democratisation -its reversal. In this regard, Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela (1992: 2-4) distinguish between two transitions. The first one is the change of the regime, which is the transition to democracy. Then, the second transition starts with the first one –the inauguration of a democratic government- and ends with the consolidation of the democratic regime. Whitehead (2002: 27) objects to the minimalist conceptualisation of democratisation. In this conceptualisation, democratisation starts with the removal of the authoritarian regime and ends once the competitive elections lead to two successive peaceful transfers of government between rival parties. Contrary to this definition, he defines democratisation as a complicated, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process where the system of government advances to become more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory.

O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 6-9) define transition as the interval between two political regimes. They identify liberalisation as an indicative of the transition’s beginning. Liberalisation leads to several consequences that are crucial for designating the scope and extension of the transition process. Liberalisation is referred as a process

of the installation of effective certain rights to protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary rule and behaviour of third parties. As liberal principles and values such as freedom of speech, movement, petition, and association, freedom from punishment of expression of dissent, the rule of law, and freedom from censorship of the means of communication start to emerge, an important departure from the authoritarian regime takes place at the liberalisation phase. Once some actors are not subjects of sanctions for exercising those rights publicly, others are likely to do the same thanks to a multiplier effect. However, they warn about the possibility of these progressions' reversibility by the government if these liberalized practices are an immediate and obvious threat to the existing regime. If this is not the case, they are expected to accumulate and become institutionalized to lead to democratisation. Besides, they draw attention to the possibility of authoritarian regime's toleration or promotion of liberalisation just to escape pressures and get support without putting accountability and/or free, fair and competitive elections into effect, which is labelled as "tutelary democracy" or "liberalized authoritarianism".

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 6-11) take the announcement of authoritarian rulers' intention to extend the scope of protected individual and group rights as the starting point of the transition process and the advent of political democracy as the endpoint. In this conceptualisation, the transition process tends to be dependent on the authoritarian rulers. Mainwaring (1989: 2) opposes to their conceptualisation on the ground that after the initial stages of the transition process, the authoritarian elites are likely to lose their capability to define the rules and procedures unilaterally.

Linz and Stepan (1996: 3-4) bring the concept of "completed democratic transition" into question. With this concept, they call for attention to the difference between liberalisation and democratisation. As they point out, liberalisation might involve some socio-political changes such as easing of media censorship, providing more space for the freedom/right of organisation, releasing some political prisoners, introducing some measures to improve the distribution of income, and tolerating opposition. However, as for democratisation, it depends upon open competition for the control of the government. Therefore, democratisation encompasses liberalisation but connotes a wider political concept. Although democratisation at the beginning of transition necessitates free elections, Linz and Stepan (1996: 3-4) warn against

electoralist fallacy and the possibility of transitions to be never completed when the democratically elected government does not retain power to rule autonomously from other actors or institutions such as military or foreign forces. Besides, they emphasize the significance of “agreement” in their definition especially among the political elites and the majority of the population regarding the institutional core procedures and arrangements necessary for building democracy.

### **C. Consolidation of Democracy**

As some countries have made successful transitions to democracy and others have experienced reversals or have been “*surviving without consolidating*” (Munck, 1994: 362), academic interest shifted towards determining the factors that lead to enduring democracies and the other factors that reinforce their fragility. Herewith, consolidation of democracy became the prominent focus in literature in the 1990s (Grugel, 2002: 4). The most prevalent features in definitions of democratic consolidation are the institutionalisation and legitimation of the democratic processes (Aknur, 2012: 13). The process of consolidation of democracy differs from the process of transition in various aspects. Consolidation of democracy is distinct from the transition in a way that it gives up having the characteristics of the old system that are incompatible with a democratic regime and it establishes new institutions for the rules to take root in the system (Munck, 1994: 362).

As Pridham and Lewis (1996: 2) discuss, contrary to transition to democracy, democratic consolidation embraces internalisation and then dissemination of its rules and values. Diamond (1999: 65) emphasizes the relationship between legitimacy and consolidation of democracy. He notes that consolidation is understood as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation meaning that all significant actors among the elites and the mass perceive the democratic regime as the most right and appropriate regime for their society. He argues that legitimation involves both normative and behavioural consensus and commitment at both the elite, intermediate –parties, organisations, and movements-, and mass public levels. Consolidation embraces “habituation” in which the commitment of the elite and the mass to the norms, procedures, rules and methods of democracy becomes internalized and routinized. As

consolidation takes hold, Diamond mentions that the range of political actors who participate in democratic conduct enlarges, trust and cooperation among political competitors increase, and the public socialises more through the conduct of democracy in politics and civil society. Therefore, democratic consolidation entails a shift in political culture.

Linz and Stepan (1996: 5-7) remark that there are some conditions for democracy to be considered consolidated. They propose that democratic consolidation is a combination of behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions, which render democracy “the only game in the town”. Behaviourally, there must be no serious threat by political groups to the existence of the democratic regime or no intention of secession from the state. Attitudinally, in times of severe political and economic crises, the majority of people must consider any political change only within the scope of democratic potentials. Constitutionally, all the actors in the polity must resort to established democratic norms for conflict resolution and the violations of these norms must become ineffective and costly. In this way, democracy becomes the habit, routine and internalized in every aspect of life, or in other words, it becomes consolidated. For consolidation of democracy, they identify five interconnected and mutually reinforcing requirements –or “arenas” as they term: civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and economic society. However, the background condition, which these five arenas depend on, is the state itself.

In a similar manner, Diamond (1997: xxiii) specifies five factors for democratic consolidation. The first one is political institutions and institutional design. The state itself is ranked as the most basic institution. The emphasis here is on broad and deep legitimacy, a usable bureaucracy, and institutionalized party systems. Secondly, he makes subordination of the military to civilian control obligatory for consolidation of democracy. The third factor is the existence of civil society that is independent from the state and checks potential abuses of power. Besides, he notes socio-economic development and economic performance as important factors for democratic consolidation. The last distinguishing factor mentioned is international factors such as democracy promotion policies of established democracies, regional demonstration effects, and regional and international assistance efforts to democratic actors.

Sodaro (2008: 222-234) outlines ten conditions that reinforce both the emergence of democratic ideas and movements in an authoritarian regime and a new democracy to become consolidated. These conditions are: elites' commitments to democracy, state institutions that stimulate the democratisation process, national unity, national wealth, private enterprise based on the idea that economic freedom enhances political freedom, a middle class, gaining the support of the disadvantaged citizens by including them in the democratisation process, participation of citizens and civil society by ensuring a democratic political culture, education and freedom of information, and a favourable international environment.

Huntington (1991: 110-120) emphasizes the influence of the characteristics of the preceding regime and the differences between the transitions from different types of undemocratic regimes such as based on military institutions and based on communist parties for the consolidation of democracy. The problems faced by the transitional democracies in the consolidation process differ in accordance with the inherited features from the preceding regimes. In this regard, the most challenging issue for a new democracy in a post-military regime is the establishment of democratic civil-military regimes while it is to separate the functions and personnel of the party and the government for a new democracy in a post-communist regime. Besides, other than the features of the preceding authoritarian regime, contextual problems such as economic problems of low level of socio-economic development and security problems such as having secessionist groups are deterministic for the process of democratic consolidation. Based on the interdependency of the processes of transition and consolidation, he determines a prior democratic experience, socio-economic development, and an external environment supportive of democratisation as conditions for democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991: 209-253).

#### **D. Theories of Democratisation**

The questions of under which specific conditions democracy is possible and it thrives have rendered different explanations to emerge among scholars. These explanations can be grouped into two, based on their focus on the causation of democratisation. In this regard, domestic-centred approaches focus on different

dimensions of internal settings and contexts as facilitating factors or impediments for the course of democratisation. Explanatory accounts of democratisation embedded in the national context dominated the literature in the 1980s (Tolstrup, 2014: 4). As Schmitter (1986: 5) reached this conclusion, transitions to democracy were mostly explained on the basis of national factors. In such cases, external actors were regarded as having an indirect and marginal impact on transitions except for the cases of occupation by a foreign power. However, the approaches focusing on the international dimension of democratisation became prominent in the literature in the post-Cold War era. These approaches account for external factors' influence on democratisation without neglecting the primary causation of domestic contexts for democratisation.

## **1. Domestic-Centred Approaches**

### **a. Modernisation Theory**

One of the most renowned explanations for democratisation with a focus on domestic factors is Lipset's hypothesis on the connection between democracy and certain socio-economic conditions. Lipset (1959: 71-79) argues that there is a positive correlation between democracy and economic development. In Lipset's hypothesis, economic development and political legitimacy are defined as structural features that make a democratic political system sustainable. Wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and education are embraced as primary elements of economic development, with an emphasis on education. Lipset puts forward that education contributes to democracy more directly and stronger since it reveals the basic human requirement of democracy and the need for norms of tolerance. Besides, education brings about the belief in democratic values and support democratic practices, and it decreases the tendency towards extremist and monistic doctrines. Therefore, he emphasizes the necessity of social conditions conducive to democracy while making democracy dependent on the level of economic development.

Hence, according to Lipset, economic development brings about social and political development. Economic development leads to wealth, a better educated and broadened middle class, a change in the cultural structure, and a reduction of

radicalisation among low classes. Hence, the increase in wealth, and the broadened middle class mitigate the class struggle which paves the way for democratisation (Gürsoy, 2016: 87). Lipset's hypothesis is associated with modernisation theory since he associates wealth with capitalism and the modernisation theory attempts to explain democracies' emergence in the modern world under capitalism (Grugel, 2002:47-48). Lerner (1958: 64) argues that modernisation is likely to occur in similar patterns despite the differences among countries. The process of modernisation starts with urbanisation; increased literacy, and media participation follows the process. At the final stage, in Lerner's approach, modernisation produces democracy with the occurrence of democratic governance.

Besides the criterion of the level of economic development, another component focused on under the modernisation theory is the cultural prerequisites for democracy to occur. Almond and Verba (1989: 19-20) develop an approach to political culture based on the cultural preconditions for democracy. They, firstly, present a threefold classification of political cultures: parochial, subject, and participant. They match a parochial, subject, and participant culture with a traditional political structure, a centralised authoritarian structure, and a democratic political structure respectively. At the participant political culture, they emphasize the participatory and active role of citizens in the input and output dimensions of the political system. However, they admit that their classification does not claim homogeneity of any type of political cultures. Furthermore, they acknowledge that even well-established and stable democracies with predominantly participant cultures will include both subject and parochial aspects.

Almond and Verba (1989: 29-30) propose that civic culture, as a mixed political culture of modernity and tradition, is congruent with democracy. In civic cultures, citizens are active in politics, well informed about their choices, and rational in their calculations of interests and principles. With their emphasis on the participation of individuals in the political input process, they adopt the civic culture as a balanced political culture with the maintenance of passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values. Gürsoy (2016: 88) argues that scholars by emphasising the link between political culture and democratisation have contributed

to the main claim of the modernisation theory -economic, social, and political changes are sequential-.

Grugel (2002: 49) states that the relationship between capitalism and democracy is overly simple and lineal. The theory assumes that a transition to democracy can be replicated in all societies regardless of differences and difficulties, which makes it ahistorical. As she argues, modernisation theory is inherently ethnocentric as it is based on the Western practices, which ignores the experiences of the third world. It has also been criticised for its overemphasis on the structure's – capitalism- role at human action's expense. Nevertheless, some scholars like Diamond and Welzel have made some reservations on Lipset's hypothesis and modernisation theory. What is common in their arguments is that human development which takes long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living as indicators of development should be taken as determinant instead of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as taken by Lipset (Vanhanen, 2003: 8).

Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 155-183) assert that modernisation theory does not make a distinction between transition and consolidation. They argue that economic development is crucial for democracy's survival but not for its emergence. In their findings, they conclude that democracy can be initiated at any level of development. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992: 1-5) link democratisation not to the broadening of middle class but to the empowerment of lower classes thanks to capitalist development's transformation of the class structure in a way that the lower classes cannot be excluded from the political process.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 2) present a revised theory of modernisation. They argue that socioeconomic development focus of modernisation theory offers a partial explanation for democratisation. They take modernisation as interwoven with the process of human development. As they argue, human development advances with the increase in socioeconomic developments since it brings cultural changes. These cultural changes tend to increase individual autonomy, gender equality and democracy. Socioeconomic development empowers ordinary people by increasing their action resources and by enabling them to embark on more collective actions. As they become more supportive of the idea of democracy, they increase their demands and put more pressure on the elites for more liberation, civil and political liberties.

With the ongoing process of modernisation, the balance of forces between the elites and masses shifts to in favour of the masses.

Therefore, Welzel (2009: 86-87) puts forward that the decisive effect of modernisation is not that it renders democracy more acceptable to elites but it increases the action resources and capabilities of ordinary people, enabling them to mobilize for democratic freedoms. Welzel and Inglehart (2005) offer “*the human empowerment path to democracy*”. First, material empowerment enables people to practice freedoms. This leads to mental empowerment by motivating people to practice freedoms. Then this brings about legal empowerment by allowing people to practice freedoms. This path to democracy is responsive democratisation since the process is based on responsiveness to mass demands and pressures.

#### **b. Historical Sociological/Structural Approach**

Another explanation for democratisation is offered by the historical sociological approach. It draws on a critique of modernisation theory due to its casual simplicity. It offers state-based accounts of political change instead of society-based ones. In order to account for the emergence of democracy, the historical sociologists or structuralists –as they have been generally called since they emphasize structures and collective acts rather than individual acts- analyse the transformation of a state over time by looking at the relationship between the state and the classes, and its effects on the political system. By rejecting the automatic outcome of the capitalist development, they look at the long-term historical changes. They also admit the particularity of each case of transition and democratisation (Grugel, 2002: 51-52).

In this sense, Moore’s analysis of political change based on the different historical experiences of Britain, France, the United States of America (USA), Germany, Russia, Japan, China and India from the 19<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century is of crucial importance for historical/sociological understanding of democratisation. Moore (1973: viii-xiv) searches through the differentiated roles of the landed upper classes and the peasantry, and their relationship with the bourgeois in the transformation of agrarian to modern industrial societies in order to identify the determinant forces behind the emergence of democracy, and dictatorships –fascist and communist regimes. For

Moore, democracy occurred -in transition to industrial agriculture- when the peasant culture was gradually eliminated, the landed class lost its power, the state weakened, and the bourgeois became the rising power taking the lead to democratisation (Gürsoy, 2016: 89).

Similarly, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992: 270) analyse the power relations between the state and society, economic classes, and transnational forces and argue that changes in these relations are determinant for democratisation. They suggest that urban working classes' push for reformist strategies leads to the introduction of democracy. With weak working classes, the capitalist states tend to remain authoritarian. However, they add that organized working class is not sufficient for transition to democracy. The alliance of the working classes with the bourgeois is the determinant factor for the emergence of democracy in case that the bourgeois does not feel threatened by the working classes (Gürsoy, 2016: 90).

### **c. Transition Studies**

Another approach called transitology or transition studies takes an agency-centred perspective by emphasising the role of actors, individuals, and their decision-making mechanisms in democratisation and regime change. This approach argues that democracy can be initiated independently of the structural context. This agency-centred approach embedded in domestic contexts presents a separation between political negotiation and economic conditions (Grugel, 2002: 57-58). Rustow (1999: 26) criticises the modernisation theory's background conditions of social and economic indicators and defines national unity as the background condition for democracy. He suggests a model of transition to democracy by emphasising that there must be no doubt of the vast majority of public in a democracy-to-be as to which political community they belong to.

In contrast to this single background condition, Rustow (1999: 27-34) stresses that democratisation is a dynamic process and it passes through three phases: a preparatory phase, a decision phase, and a habituation phase. In the preparatory phase, there is a prolonged political struggle that is likely to start with the emergence of new elite, and between different forces. The decision phase which ends the preparatory

phase is to take place with the deliberate decision of political leaders to actualize some crucial aspects of the democratic procedure and to accept the existence of diversity in unity. Rustow suggests that there may be multiple decisions but they are likely to be led by a few leaders. In the habituation phase, both leaders and citizens adjust to the new rules of the new regime and they apply these rules to new issues. What is expected in this phase is that citizens' and politicians' experiences with democratic procedures and competitive recruitment will reinforce their commitment to democracy.

In transition studies, Bunce (2000: 707-709) draws attention to the widespread agreement that political elites are crucial for democratisation. The elites both in power and in opposition are taken as determinant in the foundation of democracy. In this regard, they are also the shapers of democracy since they are the ones who decide the institutional shape of democracy, and the extent to which they will be constrained by democratic rules. Also, they may preserve or destroy democracy in times of political and/or economic turmoil. Schmitter, O'Donnell and Whitehead (1986: 79-80) emphasize the role of the elites, both the authoritarian incumbents and the democratic opposition, in transition. They draw attention to the power of the elites over negotiating the arrangements, concluding the deals and creating the pacts, which may lead to the establishment of the political democracy or may fall apart. Pact-making has been attributed importance since it arises from a genuine consensus among elites with regard to rules and institutions of the democratic structure (Burton, Gunther and Higley, 1992: 3).

Another strand in transition studies explains the role of the actors in democratisation based on the game theory and a rational choice explanation. It accounts for the democratic choices of the elites with an emphasis on the rationality of actors who make cost-benefit calculations to preserve their positions (Gürsoy, 2016: 91-92). Grugel (2002: 58) asserts that these agency-centred approaches of democratisation by utilising the theories of political action offer a political explanation of democratisation and herewith they renounce either sociological or historical approaches. Based on theories of political action, transition studies take democratisation as a process (Thiel, 2010: 65). In this process-oriented conceptualisation of democratisation, process is consisted of choices, which are

redefined constantly in accordance with the redefinition of actors' perceptions of preferences and restraints (Kitschelt, 1992: 1028).

Huntington (1991: 121-151) indicates that the democratisation processes are shaped by the relative power of the groups that can be for or against democracy in the government or in the opposition. In accordance with the attitudes towards democratisation of these groups whether in power or in opposition, Huntington identifies three processes of democratisation based on the crucial interactions of these groups: transformation, replacement, and transplacement. In transformations, the elites in power in the authoritarian regime are determinant in taking the lead for transition to democracy. The crucial interaction takes place between reformers and standpatters within the governing coalition. Transformations only occur in three conditions: if the government is stronger than the opposition, if reformers are stronger than standpatters, and if moderates are stronger than extremists. In replacements, democratic forces and reformers are weak in the government. Democratisation occurs if the opposition becomes stronger and the government becomes weaker until the government collapses or is overthrown. In transplacements, democratisation occurs if democratic forces both in power and in opposition dominates the anti-democratic ones. Therefore, it is led by a combined action of government and opposition. Negotiations with the opposition are crucial in the formation of the new democratic regime with a possible share of power.

## **2. International Dimension of Democratisation**

Pridham (1994: 7-13) remarks that external factors have been subordinated to secondary importance in the literature on democratic transitions. He highlights the importance and influence of the international context –as an umbrella term for different external actors, institutions or conditions- on democratisation. Pridham emphasizes the increased interdependency between the domestic politics and international developments for the regime changes. He points out to the importance of the domestic arena's openness for the influences of international environment and actions of external actors on the regime change. Through multilateral linkages deriving from membership in international or regional organisations or bilateral linkages with other states, domestic political developments become open to spill over effects of common

systemic trends or the regional and/or international political economy. Besides, he draws attention to the dependence of the influence of the international factors on the opportunities provided by domestic developments. Hence, to account for the interaction between international and domestic forces, Pridham refers to the condition of “*penetratedness*” on regime transition. Rosenau (2006: 183) explains the concept of penetration and how domestic political systems became “penetrated” as follows: “*A penetrated political system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals.*”

Rosenau (2006: 184) highlights that penetrated political systems are not static, they emerge, develop, or disappear along with the changes of capabilities, attitudes, or circumstances. They can also be persistent with the change of the penetrator. Pevehouse (2005: 6) argues that internal penetration is often a choice of elites who allow outside influence due to strategic reasons. Putnam (1988: 446-460) explains how domestic and international politics can become intertwined through his framework of the two-level game. He suggests that domestic actors who face strategic constraints and dilemmas make strategic use of domestic constraints and uncertainty of domestic politics to enhance their international negotiation strength, or they can make strategic use of international constraints to counter the opposition at home.

In a similar manner, Welzel (2009: 82) refers to opportunistic democratisation which emerges as a result of the elites’ appeal to democracy as a useful means to be receptive of the credits by the international community or donor organisations. Besides, another path to democratisation is externally imposed democratisation which comes into existence with the installation of democracy usually in post-war settings by Western powers. Hence, Welzel (2009: 88) argues that democratisation is an outcome of not just the power struggles between pro- and anti-democratic forces within a country. It is also an outcome of power struggles between democratic – Western democracies as he exemplifies- and anti-democratic –shifting alliances of empires, and fascist or communist regimes as he exemplifies- regime alliances. However, he underlines that there must be already existing domestic forces in support of democratisation for external actors to become influential in democratisation. Even

if external actors may trigger the establishment of electoral democracy, the lack of the domestic democratic forces will prevent social embeddedness of democracy.

Pridham (2000 :285-286) draws attention to the two-sidedness of interactions between domestic and external variables, and two-way effects of the external causes of democratisation. In this regard, while the prevalence of liberal democratic norms in a region may contribute positively to the state of democracy, the external authoritarian powers in the region may inhibit or counteract the efforts of states to democratize. Besides, with regard to the two-sidedness of interactions, Tolstrup (2014: 35-36) asserts that domestic elites should not be regarded as impotent objects of external influence since they act as gatekeepers to facilitate or restrain ties to external actors.

Pridham (2000: 8) distinguishes the approaches which explain regime change with an emphasis on the influence of international trends as transnational. As he identifies, transnational theories conceptualize the importance of the international context by defining the processes of democratisation as “waves”. Notably, Huntington has termed “the impact of the international context upon regime change” as “waves of democratisation” as aforementioned. Huntington (1991: 15) defines a wave of democratisation as “*a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time*”. He speaks of the third wave of democratisation which started in Portugal in 1974 and followed by Greece, Spain, Latin America and Eastern Europe as “*an irresistible global tide*”. In this regard, countries are not treated as self-contained and isolated units. Therefore, the process of democratisation is assumed to be “*a function of transnational influences or interactions and of geographical proximity*” (Pridham, 2000: 8).

Huntington (1991: 100-102) has termed the international factors contributing to the third wave of democratisation as demonstration effect, contagion, diffusion, emulation, snowballing, or the domino effect. He asserts that an early democratisation in a country sets forth an example for other countries that face similar problems or perceive democratisation as a cure for their problems, or perceive the democratized country as a political and cultural model. Therefore, demonstration effect shows the leaders and groups in another society how to emulate and imitate the techniques and methods of installing a democratic system. Huntington also states that demonstration

effects are most probable among geographically and culturally proximate and similar countries.

Whitehead (2001: 5-16) groups and analyses international factors under three headings: contagion, control, and consent. In contagion, the geographical distribution of democratic countries is observed over time to detect changes. With the hypothesis of “contagion through proximity”, democratisation is not attributed to either internal or external sources and actors but the probability of similar political transitions in neighbouring states is verified statistically. With or without intention of the external actors to influence the domestic political developments, attitudes, expectations, and interpretations of the majority are influenced by neutral transmission mechanisms which makes democratisation unavoidable.

However, Whitehead (2001: 5-16) admits that democracy is not likely to diffuse from one state to another without intentionality. Therefore, within the context of control, democracy is promoted by one country in another through an explicit foreign policy either by positive or negative sanctions. He exemplifies the Western governments’ declarative statements and actions to impose democratic institutions in several countries where they had the power to do so. Whitehead draws attention to the reciprocity of the diffusion process. This means that once the role, intentions, and the actions of external actor have been admitted into the analysis, it is necessary to include the role, intentions, and actions of relevant domestic actors. What is decisive in this process is the interactions between internal and external processes to generate consent for regime changes and new democratic norms. Schmitter (2001: 27-30) who has been the proponent of domestic-centred approaches of democratisation also admitted the necessity of including the effects of the international context into the analysis. He suggests adding conditionality to the three sub-contexts for the analysis of international influence as outlined by Whitehead. Schmitter defines conditionality as multilateral institutions’ attachment of specific conditions into the provision of benefits to recipient countries.

Thanks to the successive transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the diffusion literature on the international dimension of democratisation pointed out several forms of emulation, demonstration, or modelling effects to study similar changes within states (Starr, 1991:

357). The spread of practices, ideas, behaviours, norms or institutions between individuals or groups stays as the hallmark of diffusion. Kopstein and Reilly (2000: 12-14) explain diffusion by stocks and flows. Stocks are a given unit's physical, political, economic, or cultural assets, liabilities, or general qualities that may be facilitating or complicating for democracy and economic development. Flows are taken as the movement of information and resources among countries. Here, Kopstein and Reilly take a given country's spatial stock –meaning a country's external political and economic environment- as its neighbours. Since flows are expected to affect the behaviour and choices of the relevant actors, they conclude that “*the diffusion process, in other words, is in large part a function of how open and interactive states are. Accordingly, states that interact extensively are likely to exhibit similar political and economic behaviour.*” (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000: 13-14).

Brinks and Coppedge (2006: 463-464) argue that the average degree of democracy and non-democracy existing among a given country's contiguous neighbours affects significantly this country's tendency to change its regime. Brinks and Coppedge call this type of democratic diffusion as “neighbour emulation” that is a given country's tendency towards convergence with the level of democracy or non-democracy of their neighbouring countries. They argue that besides the immediate geographic neighbourhood, regional and global powers have strong impact on the democratic performances of the countries within their spheres of influence.

### **III. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Democracy promotion is a specific kind of foreign policy which implies an active pressure on domestic actors for progress towards the advancement of democracy (Silander, 2005: 83). As a foreign policy phenomenon, its first applications date back to Ancient Athens thanks to the diffusion of democratic ideas in person and by the Athenian sea power to the cities throughout the Aegean. With regard to contemporary democracy promotion practices, the USA is seen as the first-generation contemporary democracy promoter owing to its policies in shaping and influencing the political regimes of third countries starting with the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and accelerating

after the First World War. As of the late 1970s, as well as the multilateral global and regional organisations, European countries and the EU emerged as the second generation of democracy promoters since they started to embark on democratic principles in their foreign policies. Non-Western actors such as Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa and Turkey are becoming increasingly visible as the third generation of democracy promoters by means of their democracy promotion activities especially in their neighbourhoods through either bilateral relations or multilateral platforms (Huber, 2015: 7-15).

Different types of actors have become important policy-makers pursuing foreign policies. Democracy promotion has been widely integrated into foreign policy goals of many existing democracies. Besides states, international organisations have become significant actors in promoting democracy (Pevehouse, 2002: 516). Silander (2005: 83-89) lists democracy promoters as global, international, transnational and sub-state actors besides the state itself. In this sense, as for the most prominent global actors that influence democratisation in the world are the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB). However, it should be noted that the impact of the IMF and the WB on democratisation is rather limited and indirect. Their focus is on good governance and sustainable development. In this regard, they do not have an impact on electoral accountability. Nevertheless, they contribute to democratisation by including poverty reduction strategies into debt relief and lending programmes. In this way, they aim to increase the participation of civil society and formerly excluded social groups in formulation of the development strategies (Limpach and Michaelowa, 2010: 1-2). The foremost international organisations in promoting democracy are the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), groups, movements, companies, industries, local authorities and municipals are listed as the sub-state actors that may influence the transnational relations of the state. The most prominent sub-state actors with transnational reach in democracy promotion are exemplified as the Socialist International, the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Silander, 2005: 22-23).

Huber (2015: 22-23) argues that democracy promotion is mainly based on a structural foreign policy although it employs relational foreign policy activities too. Her claim is that democracy promoters aim to shape or influence at least one of the political, legal, economic, social or security structures in a given space while also they might rely on changing or influencing the attitudes and behaviours of other actors. She defines democracy promotion as the sum of all foreign policy activities that intend to encourage the transition to, consolidation of, or advancement of democracy in other states. This definition entails a subjective comprehension of democracy since the promoter designates what democracy is.

Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) define democracy promotion and protection as all overt and voluntary activities of external actors to foster the political liberalisation and democratisation in third countries. In this definition, democracy promotion aims at promoting the political liberalisation and democratisation while democracy protection aims at the consolidation –protection- of democracy. They admit that this definition leaves out the covert activities and indirect activities of external actors since their impacts on liberalisation, democratisation or consolidation of democracy are generally hard to observe and analyse. Similar to Huber, Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) assert that democracy promotion is not apolitical since the established democracies promote “their type of regime” in other countries as a foreign policy.

#### **A. Motives Behind Democracy Promotion from Different Theoretical Perspectives**

Since democracy as a norm is integrated in democracy promotion, the norm itself is promoted both domestically and internationally. The adoption and consolidation of the democratic norm at home is conceptualised as the horizontal development while the diffusion and reinforcement of democracy externally is conceptualised as the vertical development of the democratic norm (Silander, 2005: 91). Why or under what circumstances external actors and international organisations influence the democratisation process of other states is explained by several approaches. Whitehead (1986: 10) argues that the simplest and fundamental motive behind states' spreading democracy to other states is the belief in the superiority of

democracy as a value and as a system of governance from which the other states should benefit from. Peceny (1999: 3) by exemplifying the USA's pro-liberalisation policies abroad, points to an external democracy promoter's moral mission to promote liberal-democratic norms based on a cultural bias. Therefore, democracy promotion also implies an attempt to legitimize their own democracy elsewhere and their external behaviour as appropriate (Silander, 2005: 93). Besides, based on an internal-external analogy, political systems prefer other political systems to be organized in the same principles and values (Kotzian, Knodt and Urdze, 2011: 996).

With regard to normative explanations on democracy promotion, the cultural/normative model of democratic peace theorem focusing on the absence of war among democracies argues that the culture, norms and perceptions which enable democracies to resolve domestic conflicts peacefully come to apply in their external relations with other democracies (Russett and Antholis, 1992: 416). In line with the constructivist reasoning, based on the domestic sociocultural context of foreign policy shaped by national role conceptions, national identities or political culture, democracies externalize their domestic norms and foreign policy behaviour (Wolff and Wurm, 2011: 83-84).

Following the approach of sociological institutionalism, this foreign policy behaviour stems from the "logic of appropriateness" –not the "logic of consequences"– meaning that actors abide by their identity or role's obligations, international norms and collective expectations of appropriate behaviour (March and Olsen, 1998: 951). Democracy promotion in this regard is interlinked to Wendt's conceptualisations of "type identity" and "role identity" (Wendt, 1999: 225-228).<sup>1</sup> Huber (2015: 37-40) argues that a democratic role identity in foreign policy is necessary for democracy promotion. First of all, this requires an internal democratic type identity which constructs and sustains the perception that the self is democratic and the other is undemocratic. However, a democratic type identity is not adequate for pushing a

---

<sup>1</sup> "Type identity" refers to a category of persons -or states in our case- who share commonalities with regard to attitudes, values, language, history, experience and so on. What is crucial for these commonalities is that they must have social content or meaning. For the state system, Wendt speaks of "regime types" and "forms of state" such as capitalist states, monarchical states, democratic states and so on. "Role identity" is based on one's occupying a position in a social structure. Role identities exist only in relation to "others". The "self" sees its role through the eyes of the "other". For states, role identity comes into play in relation to foreign policy roles. Wendt speaks of the agency as role-taking side and the structure as role-constituting side.

democratic state to use democracy promotion in its foreign policy. Hereby, a democratic role identity is required to render democracy a shared foreign policy purpose. Huber draws attention to the external part of a democratic role identity for promoting democracy in foreign policy. This external part may come from the growth of democracy as an international norm. It might serve as a “moral pull” for democracies to promote democracy since it becomes more legitimate and feasible. It may also serve as a “strategic pull” for democracies to increase their soft power. Thus, the logic of appropriateness to behave properly in accordance with collective expectations might result from a rationalisation process based on their norms and identity.

Democratic states’ externalisation of their pacifist and compromise-oriented conflict resolution norms (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 501) in the democratic peace theorem connotes an inherent peacefulness in democracies’ foreign policies and external relations towards other democracies. This is challenged from a social constructivist point of view. The presumption that democracies act in accordance with the perception of other democracies as peaceful as themselves results from an interactive process of learning. In this regard, democracies learn over time that like-minded political regimes are more-peace prone than others. The reason that one state’s domestic political structure matters is that public debate and democratic decision-making influences the course of communication both on the domestic and international level as suggested by the structural/institutional constraints model of the democratic peace theorem (Panke and Risse, 2007: 97).

Decision-makers in democratic states are socialised in the norms that govern their states and tend to interconnect their intentions and preferences by referring to the domestic democratic norms when they interact with their counterparts from other states (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 503). As a result of the process of interaction and mutual learning –or international learning as grasped by Knopf (2003: 185)-, convergence of domestic values and the spread of democracy may lead to a collective identity formation (Wendt, 1994: 389-390).

Thereby, liberal-democratic norms such as cooperation and mutual trust prevail in structuring the international relations between democracies who may overcome the security dilemma (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 503-506). This normative explanation also

reinforces the utilitarian reading of the democratic peace theorem by implying that established democracies should have not only a normative claim to but also a strategic interest in promotion of democracy. These interests range from particular market-oriented and security interests to collective interests such as enhancing international peace and cooperation. However, promoting democracy and other reinforcing interests also inherits a process of international exclusion by distinguishing in-group and out-group dynamics which in return may increase the risk of war by producing conflict and mutual mistrust (Wolff and Wurm, 2011: 81).

Jahn terms this situation as the “specifically liberal security dilemma” which results from the liberal states’ perceptions of the external environment as populated by non-liberal and aggressive states who are the source of problems. As Jahn (2005: 202) asserts, this thinking reinserts the security dilemma by making liberalism the morally superior and denying the non-liberal states the equal rights of sovereignty and non-intervention since democracy promotion is an active political meddling in other states’ internal affairs even when military interventions are ruled out (Wolff, 2013: 479).

Wolff and Wurm (2011: 79-80) state that democracy promotion based on a cost-benefit calculation implies net benefits since there is a considerable investment in democracy promotion. However, as opposed to the costs which are immediate, democratisation and democracy promotion take longer processes. Hereby the conflict-ridden and long process of democratisation may serve as a motive for established democracies to refrain from promoting democracy. As Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 21) ascertain, states are likely to be more war-prone in the transitional phase of democratisation especially when they lack the adequate institutional constraints to prevent foreign disputes from escalating into conflicts. For the democratic norms and institutions to be effective in the international behaviour of states and inhibiting conflicts, the level of commitment to democracy and time passed since the beginning of democratisation are likely to be important. Rapid democratisation is likely to have conflict enhancing effect by giving rise to weak regimes which are not able to obtain effective control and political order (Ward and Gleditsch, 1998: 53).

Wolff and Wurm (2011: 80) point to the necessity of the adequate capacity and appropriate efforts in terms of both resources and time for an external actor to shape the domestic political development of another country through democracy promotion.

This necessitates the external actor's relative power in comparison with to the recipient countries (Monten, 2005: 118). For the democracy promoter to influence the political structure and values of another state, the nature of the relation between the democracy promoter and the receiver indicates an asymmetrical relation where the democracy promoter sets out the demands that the target state is expected to undertake and provides support to assist the democratisation process (Silander, 2005: 100).

Approaches differ in their stances on what determines the power position. In neorealism or structural realism, power is conceptualised as the "*ability to assert one's interests in the international system*" (Baumann, Rittberger and Wagner, 2000: 5). In this regard, all states are motivated to seek power and security in an anarchic system for their own survival (Waltz, 1986: 98). Within the context of self-help system, democracy promotion is seen as a secondary issue and regarded as feasible if it is not in conflict with security and vital economic interests and when systemic pressures are indeterminate (Hyde-Price, 2008: 83).

From the perspective of security-oriented approaches, as the hegemonic stability theory suggests, when the power of a state increases, that state will try to increase its security by expanding its political, economic, and territorial control over its environment. Hence, as Gilpin (1981: 94-95) stresses, constituting an international system in line with its interests is an attempt for security. In neorealist conceptualisation, similarly placed states in the international distribution of capabilities will act similarly without considering their domestic political systems. For this reason, states will respond to their rivals –both democratic and non-democratic ones- in the same way regardless of their domestic political structures when their survival and security are at risk (Layne, 1994: 12-14).

As gaining as much influence as possible over other states is in line with the neorealist attempt to increase power and security (Baumann, Rittberger and Wagner, 2000: 5), Moravcsik (2000: 221) argues that promoting international norms such as human rights can be compatible with the realist thinking when a hegemonic group of great powers is willing to compel or persuade unwilling states to comply with the international norms. Here, it is a must to touch upon Gramsci's theory of hegemon as a combination of material capabilities and intellectual force. Hegemon plays a crucial role in diffusing ideologies necessary for its maintenance (Gramsci, 1971). Cox (1986:

218) assumes a reciprocal relationship between the three categories of forces –material capabilities, ideas and institutions- in a structure.

From the perspective of the critical theory, universal norms, institutions and mechanisms are built by the hegemon to establish the general rules of behaviour for all the states in a way that the dominant mode of production is preserved. Herewith, international organisations serve as a mechanism and as a process through which the ideology and the institutions of hegemony are expressed and developed (Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 137). Hence, actors with great material capabilities have the ability to shape the normative consensus which guides other actors in the international system. Hence, democracy promotion is a tool and has an instrumental value for maintaining an ideological hegemony over subordinate units to achieve traditional realist goals as power and security. Peceny (1997: 418) draws attention to the possible use of democracy promotion by an ideological hegemon to legitimate an expansionist foreign policy.

Similarly, from the perspective of neoclassical realism, democracy promotion might be compatible with traditional goals of foreign policy. Neoclassical realism makes a space for perceptions, ideas and values to influence the foreign policy making process by terming them as “intervening variables”. As Rose (1998: 146-147) states, the perceptions of the political leaders and elites who decide the direction of foreign policy are decisive in this regard. By leaving the structure-first approach of the neorealism and bringing the agency and domestic intervening variables into the foreign policy behaviour, neoclassical realism provides a space for the democratic peace proposition (Coetzee and Hudson, 2012: 273). Once the decision makers accept the fact that democracy makes the knowledge of one’s opponents’ capabilities and intentions more transparent through free movements of information, opposition groups, free press and knowledge of internal politics, institutions and debates (Starr, 1997: 156), threat perceptions will be lowered and cooperation among states will increase (Schweller, 2000: 43). Thereby, democracy promotion has an importance to the instrumentalisation of narrow security-oriented national interests (Wolff and Wurm, 2011: 83).

## **B. Tools and Methods of Democracy Promotion**

For democracy promotion, actors employ several tools and methods. The literature on democracy promotion has mentioned the “hows” of democracy promotion as “tools” (Carothers, 1999: 6), “instruments” (Youngs, 2001), “ways” (Burnell, 2000: 8), “types” (Schmitter and Bouwer, 1999) or “actions” (Huber, 2015: 24). Although different approaches present different contents, the tools used for democracy promotion may be divided into two groups: harder and softer tools. Harder tools are based on the use of force or military intervention to change the regime. Softer tools include many such as the use of diplomacy, persuasive strategies, democracy assistance either financial or through election observation missions, support to civil society and independent media, and guidance with the implementation of the democratic reforms (Tolstrup, 2014: 6). As Stahn and Hüllen (2007: 4-5) rule out the harder tools due to its violating nature of sovereignty, they group the tools used for democracy promotion as diplomacy and foreign aid. In this regard, democracy promoter may use political dialogue and negotiations, unilateral declarations, and positive or negative conditionality and financial and/or technical democracy assistance.

Huber (2015: 24-28) identifies three types of actions to promote democracy: coercive, utilitarian, and identitive democracy promotion. In coercive democracy promotion, actors resort to unilateral, bilateral or multilateral military intervention, the threat of military intervention or covert force to change the regime at the target state. Coercive democracy promotion generally lacks building democracy after the intervention. Utilitarian democracy promotion applies negative and/or positive conditionality towards the targeted state as instruments of pressure. The aim in this type of action is to influence the calculations of the targeted state. After transition to the democratic regime, domestic actors may carry out the process of building democracy or the democracy promoter might involve directly into this process by providing democracy assistance. Identitive democracy promotion aims at altering the values or behaviour of the target state in accordance with its own values. Non-financial means are applied in this type of democracy promotion. Speech acts such as naming and shaming in cases of violations of democratic principles, interactions and

multilateral exchanges, and setting the good example of democracies for imitation are applied for persuading the non-democracies.

Excluding the harder tools or coercive methods, democracy promoters may resort to political and/or economic methods. The political method used in democracy promotion starts with detecting the democratic conditions in the target state. In line with the democratic situation of the target state, democracy promoter attempts to influence a state for transition to or consolidation of democracy by revealing the importance of democratic norms, liberties and rights, providing guidance on the path to democratisation, bargaining on the possible costs and consequences of the political change and making a compromise (Silander, 2005: 95). With the political method, democracy promoter aims at enhancing the knowledge and skills of the actors involved in the democratic process at the target state. For this purpose, democracy promoter may use a wide range of institutional assistance such as electoral support and election observation missions, capacity building of political parties or civil society, guidance on judicial reforms, and training media on democratic principles such as transparency and ethical reporting. The effectiveness of the political method is very much dependent on the openness and willingness of the target state to receive political support from the donors (Alihodžić, 2016: 433).

The economic methods used in democracy promotion might have a dual purpose. Firstly, they may be used to change the behaviour of the target state by influencing the cost-benefit calculations with the introduction of new economic constraints and/or opportunities (Pevehouse, 2002: 518). In case of non-conforming behaviour, economic sanctions and embargoes may be applied to induce the progress on democratisation. The most common economic methods are tariffs, quotas, loans and credits, blacklist, freezing assets, grants or suspension of aids, suspension of trade and financial benefits, and withholding dues to international organisations (Silander, 2005: 97). Secondly, the economic methods may be used as incentives and rewards through conditionality to reinforce and supplement the political aims. They may be resorted as a tool for promoting reform in other areas such as the rule of law and human rights (Theuns, 2016: 3-6) or as a tool for reinforcing socioeconomic development to facilitate democratisation (Silander, 2005: 97).

The tools and methods of democracy promotion may be conveyed to the target state top-down and/or bottom-up. The top-down channel aims at democratisation of the main state institutions while the bottom-up channel intends to strengthen civil society. “Democracy template” of an external promoter as called by Carothers (1999: 86-87) consists of supporting democratisation in three categories –electoral process, state institutions and civil society- and depends on both top-down and bottom-up initiatives in order to increase both the supply and demand sides of democratisation. The top-down approach is intergovernmental as it engages with the high offices of the state such as national and local government, legislatures, judiciaries, militaries, police forces and regulatory agencies. Contrarily, the bottom-up approach is transnational as it engages with several aspects of society such as the media, political movements, associations of groups such as women or minorities, and institutions with a particular focus on education, religion, labour, youth or culture. The top-down and bottom-up approaches may be engaged directly or indirectly. Direct form of democracy promotion refers to the democracy promoter’s position in full control of the democracy promotion activities targeted either towards the state or society. On the other hand, indirect form of democracy promotion refers to the democracy promoter’s engagement with other international actors to reinforce the democracy promotion activities (Magen and McFaul, 2009: 15).

In the top-down inducement of democracy promotion, the political elites play a crucial role in establishing and consolidating democratic institutions and democratic behaviour (Silander, 2005: 98). The initial components of the top-down approach towards the political elites are open political competition, free and fair elections and political parties. With regard to the democratisation of state institutions, this approach grounds on making a democratic constitution, separation of powers with an independent judiciary, a competent executive and a representative legislative branches, and subordination of military to the civil rule. The democracy aids used in the top-down approach include electoral aid, capacity building for political parties, constitutional assistance and the rule of law aid which is towards judiciary and legislative branch. In judiciary, it includes training judges and other court personnel, reforming the procedures of judicial selection and increasing the branch’s budget. In legislative branch, it includes training legislators, enhancing its power and

competences vis-a-vis the executive branch, and enhancing their capacities on democratic substance and methods (Carothers, 1999: 86-88).

The bottom-up formulation of democracy promotion may be used as complementary to and as a reinforcing mechanism for the top-down approach. By providing support and training to civil society, in particular to human rights NGOs and journalists, it aims both to increase their awareness for democratic reforms and to enhance their capacities to investigate and evaluate the transparency and accountability of the state institutions (Carothers, 1999: 157-179).

#### **IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION**

##### **A. Brief Overview of the Literature on the European Union's Democracy Promotion**

The literature has elaborated on many aspects of democracy promotion especially through case studies either on regions or countries. Many studies focus on the EU's instruments, approaches and its similarities with or differences from other democracy promoters, in particular the USA (Stahn and Hüllen, 2007; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Lloyd, 2010; Youngs, 2002). In comparison to the USA, both the EU and the USA have utilized the tools of diplomacy, democracy assistance, and positive and negative conditionality in their democracy promotion policies. Baracani (2010: 308) finds the most striking difference between the two external democracy promoters as the models of "democratisation by force" in the case of the USA and "democratisation through integration" in the case of the EU.

Magen and McFaul (2009: 2-6) identify democracy as a "shared value" and democracy promotion as a "shared objective" of the EU and the USA. They ascertain that both actors tend to value human rights and democracy over the notion of state sovereignty. However, the USA is assessed as "pushing" for and "exporting" democracy by excluding itself from any further engagement with the targeted state while the EU's grand strategy is based on engagement and integration. Carothers (2009: 13) find that both the EU and the USA take a mixture of political and developmental approach to democracy promotion. However, while the political

approach is dominant in the USA's democracy promotion, the EU's approach is more dominantly a gradual and development-oriented one. The EU's support for the empowerment of civil society and grassroots organisations to play a crucial role in bottom-up democratisation is also a focus of some studies (Jünemann, 2002; Fioramonti, 2004; Shapovalova and Youngs, 2012).

Another focus of the literature is about the motives and the linkages between democracy and other interests behind the EU's democracy promotion in third states (Kotzian, Knodt and Urdze, 2011). Alongside the normative motivations, more rationalist motivations such as security, increased trade and welfare, and stability are under scope of many studies (Dandashly, 2018a; Powel, 2009). In this regard, what kind of power is the EU as a democracy promoter has been named from different perspectives (Sjursen, 2006). It has been considered as "civilian power" (Duchêne, 1973: 19), "normative power" (Manners, 2002), "transformative power" (Leonard, 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Börzel and Lebanidze, 2017), "ethical power" (Aggestam, 2008), "hegemon" (Haukkala, 2007), "normative empire" (Del Sarto, 2016) or "tragic actor" (Hyde-Price, 2008).

Many other studies have elaborated on the impact and effectiveness of the EU's democracy promotion in third countries (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002). Although the EU has been regarded as a successful and strong democracy promoter in the case of enlargement (Avery, 2015: 174), it has been portrayed as "reluctant debutante" (Emerson, Aydın, Noutcheva, Tocci, Vahl and Youngs, 2005: 1) in its neighbourhood. Besides, it has been claimed to be a "borrower" from other European/international organisations such as the OSCE and the UN by following a "reinforcement strategy". In this strategy, the EU supports and sustains the existing European institutions' democracy promotion policies by referring to their definitions and standards on democracy and by using its bargaining power in order to create a value, norm and/or rule change in the targeted states (Casier, 2011: 960). In the literature, remarkable amount of studies criticises the EU's democracy promotion as a top-down and linear imposition of the Western democracy models. These studies conclude that the EU should take the domestic/internal/local context of the relevant

country into account for its democracy promotion strategies to be successful (Stewart, 2009).

The EU's effectiveness in transferring democratic rules and norms to third countries is linked to the consistence of the conditionality mechanism and the pressure of a credible membership perspective in the enlargement process (Kelley, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Sedelmeier, 2011). In this regard, the conditionality mechanism in the ENP to promote democracy has been assessed as inconclusive in the absence of a credible membership perspective and in the ambiguity of the rewards (Kelley, 2006: 36; Burlyuk and Shapovalova, 2007: 38; Gawrich et al., 2010). Sasse (2008: 295-297) terms the conditionality in the ENP as "conditionality-lite" that may serve as a reference point for the neighbourhood states who wish to integrate with the EU. Besides, Börzel and Lebanidze (2017: 17) argue that the EU is selective and inconsistent in its application of the conditionality mechanism towards its neighbours once its security interests are at stake. For these reasons, Freyburg et al. (2015: 2-5) assert that the EU is not likely to bring a positive and systemic impact on the democratisation of the ENP countries. That's why they propose a governance model of democracy promotion based on the sector-specific democratisation.

As a rather new and developing area of interest among scholars, the substance of democracy that the EU promotes and whether it promotes a specific democratic model is an emerging subject of research (Wetzel, Orbie and Bossuyt, 2015; Axyonova and Bossuyt, 2016; Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2011). Wetzel and Orbie (2011), and Vandeputte and Luciani (2018) draw attention to the inadequacy of studies on conceptual analysis of the substance that the EU promotes in third countries. The debate on what type of democracy the EU promotes is ongoing. Many scholars have agreed that the EU promotes liberal democracy (Wetzel and Orbie, 2011; Huber, 2013; Huber, 2015; Kotzian, Knodt and Urdze, 2011; Pace, 2011; Kurki, 2010). However, as Vandeputte and Luciani (2018: 3-4) ascertain, liberal democracy has no singular meaning and can be embraced differently from different perspectives and readings. Kurki (2012) recommends to conceptualize the EU's comprehension of democracy in its promotion policies as "fuzzy liberal" without imposing a single specific ideological orientation.

Santini and Hassan (2012), Hout (2010), Reynaert (2011), and Bridaux and Kurki (2015) argue that the EU's comprehension of democracy in its promotion policies is based on a neoliberal paradigm preoccupied with the market while also putting some emphasis on democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Youngs (2003) ascertains a social-democratic perspective, Crawford (2000) emphasizes that the EU's focus is on electoral process and Cardwell (2011) ascertains that it is representative democracy that the EU focuses on. Manners (2008) asserts that both the EU itself and the normative principles that it promotes are consensual democracy embracing representative and participatory democracy.

### **B. Models of the European Union's Democracy Promotion**

Institutional and/or behavioural democratic change in a domestic setting may be derived from diffusion, contagion or example where there is no intentional direct activity of external actors (Baracani, 2010: 307). With regard to diffusion and contagion, considerable research argues and shows that geographic proximity to the EU is correlated with democracy (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). The EU also sets an example especially for the countries who are geographically approximate and have willingness and wish to join or increase the level of institutionalized relations with the Union. Herewith, based on their own intentions, third countries may transfer the EU rules and norms via lesson drawing (Balkır and Soyaltın, 2018: 84). To analyse the EU's intentional, direct and active democracy promotion approaches and strategies, this section covers the three distinctive models of democracy promotion associated with the EU: linkage, leverage and governance. Linkage and leverage reflect main or traditional approaches to democracy promotion while the governance model is a recently employed approach. Besides its internal development, external developments have affected the EU's decision to employ which one of these models in pursuit of democracy promotion (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 886).

## 1. Linkage

Rosenau (1969: 45) defines linkage as “*any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another.*” The linkage politics is based on international interaction and interdependence between domestic and international politics, issues and players. It assumes that states trade-off between achieving objectives on different issue dimensions. By linking issues together, states make a concession on issues of little importance in return for obtaining a concession on issues of greater political or economic importance for them (Lohmann, 1997: 39). This cooperative behaviour stems from one state’s using its strengths to compensate for its weaknesses which makes linkage as a form of strategic interaction (Stein, 1980: 63).

On the application of the concept of linkage to democratisation and democracy promotion, Levitsky and Way (2005: 21-25) define linkage as the “*density of a country’s ties to the external actor*”. They state that there are at least five dimensions of linkages: economic, geopolitical, social, communication, and transnational civil society linkage. Although ties between the target state and the external actor may be based on various sources such as historical factors, military occupation or colonialism, geostrategic alliances, social or economic integration, and openness, they argue that linkages emerge predominantly as a product of geography. By exemplifying the Western powers, Levitsky and Way argue that countries close to the USA, the EU or the Western-dominated multilateral institutions have higher levels of economic interaction, institutional connections, and cross-border flows of people and information with these external actors than the countries that are distantly located geographically. In this regard, extensive linkages between elites, institutions, and international NGOs in the target state and the Western external actors serve a dual role. First of all, in case of a government’s abuse, they disseminate the news in the West and exert some pressure on the Western governments, leading them to take action in response to authoritarian abuses. Secondly, these linkages create or encourage democratising pressure from the political, economic, or technocratic elites, opposition movements and the voters in order to benefit from the existing opportunities thanks to the linkages with the external actors.

Based on the linkage model, the external democracy promoter empowers domestic agents for democratisation from below. Democracy promotion may be carried out directly and/or indirectly at the level of society. In direct democracy promotion, the external actor may support pro-democratic civil society, political parties, groups or movements via material and/or educational support that aims to influence short-term calculations and domestic balance of power of the crucial players such as governments and NGOs. In indirect support via linkage, the external actor targets to improve socio-economic preconditions for democratisation such as economic growth and education. It aims to diffuse democratic norms and liberal values by addressing societal actors from a bottom-up formulation of democracy promotion (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 890-891).

The mechanism of democracy promotion in this model is based on socialisation or the social learning model. Checkel (2006: 804) defines socialisation as the process of transferring a community's own norms and rules to the actors of the other party. At the end of this process, the actors are expected to internalize and adjust the new norms. Checkel distinguishes between two forms of internalisation in the socialisation process. The first one is that actors follow a logic of appropriateness, learn their roles and act in accordance with what is expected from them by role playing. The second one is that actors go beyond role playing and change their behaviours in accordance with the interests and identity of the community that they belong to. Risse and Sikink (1999: 5) define socialisation as the process of internalisation of international norms and their application in the domestic setting.

However, Schimmelfennig (2005: 828-830) by taking a rationalist approach argues that the strategic calculations of the actors are the decisive factors in the socialisation process and socialisation alone is not sufficient to create a change in one's own norms. In this regard, the actors form their political preferences based on the cost-benefit calculations of norm-behaving and norm-violating behaviour and follow norms to gain rewards and avoid punishments from the relevant external actors. In this regard, the causal mechanisms behind transition to or consolidation of democracy may be through rational calculations of the domestic actors through argumentative persuasion of the external actors (Checkel, 2001: 562).

Thanks to the ties between external and domestic actors including the political elites, political parties and NGOs, the transnational networks transfer the democratic norms into the domestic settings, socialise domestic actors and become agents of change (Kubicek, 2003: 15), diffusion agents (Silander, 2005: 82) or norm entrepreneurs (Fiorino, 1996: 375). Socialisation or social learning through the transnational networks between the external democracy promoter and the target state, may lead to the convergence of democratic norms, values and principles (Kubicek, 2003: 6). Hereby, in line with Whitehead's (1991) concept of "democratisation through convergence", Pridham's (1991) argument of "democratisation through system penetration" and Chalmers' (1993) conception of "internationalized domestic politics", a given domestic system, and calculations and strategies of the domestic actors are influenced, penetrated or internationalized by the external actors' pressures or support through which the external actors and/or factors become an inseparable part of the domestic system.

As the EU follows the model of linkage in its democracy promotion strategies, it includes both the governmental and non-governmental actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs), private sector units, universities, and scientific institutions of the target state in the socialisation and social learning processes. The EU funds projects, education and exchange programmes, and twinning projects to increase the likelihood of convergence, norm transfer and political change in the long-term (Balkir and Soyaltın, 2018: 77-78). Besides, as part of the indirect channel of linkage, the EU uses trade, aid and investment to support the socio-economic background conditions of democracy (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 891). The primary instrument of development and democracy assistance is EuropeAid –the Directorate General for International Development-. In a bottom-up approach, civil society programmes are supported in their information and education activities related to human rights and democracy. Non-state actors are supported too in their monitoring the public institutions' actions (Lloyd, 2010: 558). Focusing on human rights and democracy, the primary instrument for the EU assistance is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which is designed to support civil society through funding projects in the areas of human rights and democracy (European Commission, 2019a).

Besides financial measures, the EU makes use of the “discursive socialisation” by including human rights clauses and democratic norms in the political dialogues with third country governments and civil society representatives (Youngs, 2011). As a socialisation-based democracy promotion strategy, the EU uses “normative pressure” as termed by Kelley (2004a: 31-33). Through issuing diplomatic demarches, public declarations, reports and statements, conclusions or resolutions, the EU openly criticises norm-violating behaviours and asks the relevant country to change its behaviour in accordance with its commitments to the democratic norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 903) vindicate that domestic actors tend to respond to such “peer pressure” out of the needs of legitimation, conformity and esteem which are required for the international approval of their belonging in the group. As pointed out by Risse and Sikkink (1999: 15), shaming and normative or peer pressure are effective when the repressive governments want to belong to the community.

For the EU’s effectiveness by using the linkage model and socialisation mechanism, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011: 892) assert that the frequency and intensity of contacts between the EU and the target state or society should be high for the domestic actors to be involved with the democratic ideas and practices. Besides, the target state should be open to external influence and the civil society should have autonomy from the state. Moreover, both the governmental and non-governmental actors should identify with the EU whose norms, rules and demands are perceived as legitimate and appropriate. “Cultural match” or domestic norms’ “resonance” with the EU’s norms is crucial in increasing the EU impact on democratisation (Sedelmeier, 2011: 16). In this context, “cultural filter” plays a prominent role as a mechanism that *“affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms”* (Manners, 2002: 245).

## **2. Leverage**

Leverage is defined as external pressure for democratisation (Baracani, 2010: 307) or as the vulnerabilities of authoritarian governments to the pressure of external democracy promoters (Levitsky and Way, 2005: 21). Instruments or degrees of

external pressure for democratisation varies from peaceful pressure such as diplomatic pressure, democracy assistance, positive conditionality and negative conditionality to coercive measures such as the use of force or military intervention (Baracani, 2010: 308). Levitsky and Way (2005: 21-22) identify three factors for the effectiveness of leverage. The first one is the relative military and economic power of the external democracy promoter. The second factor for the effectiveness of leverage is the lack of conflicting foreign policy priorities in enabling that democracy promotion does not clash with the economic and security interests of the democracy promoter. The last factor is the absence of a regional power that may alternatively provide political, economic or military support to the target state and possibly engage in autocracy promotion (Kastner, 2019: 411)<sup>2</sup> in the same target state.

In this model, the target is the third country governments. Based on an intergovernmental and top-down approach of democracy promotion, the aim is to create a democratic change in state institutions and behaviour (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 889-892). The primary mechanism in leverage is conditionality which is used by states and international organisations to make the third country governments comply with their own rules, norms and policies (Balkır and Soyaltın, 2018: 74). The conditionality mechanism was initially used by the international financial or aid organisations such as the IMF by putting forward demands for certain economic conditions in exchange for loans and coercing governments through sanctions once their demands were not fulfilled. Deriving from the economic conditionality, political conditionality initiated by the WB and some Western governments has been associated with democratisation. Its connection to democratisation stems from making aid conditional on progress in democratisation such as the fight against corruption (Pridham, 1999: 62-63).

Conditionality is a bargaining process between the external and the domestic actors involving a process of setting democratic conditions by the external actor and their fulfilment by the domestic actor. Since there is a bargaining, conditionality implies a rational actor model of politics by involving incentives and sanctions to compel the target state to adopt a rule, norm or policy (Kubicek, 2003: 17). The

---

<sup>2</sup> Kastner defines autocracy promotion as the conscious activities that support autocratic regimes from the outside or slow down the democratisation process in a county that has already began the transition phase.

external democracy promoter may use positive conditionality by offering incentives or rewards in return for the fulfilment of democratic conditions. Also, in case the target state does not fulfil the required progress towards democratisation, it may use negative conditionality (Baracani, 2010: 308). In negative conditionality, the external democracy promoter may apply punishments or sanctions (Eylemer, 2010: 28), or cut the financial aid or suspend diplomatic relations (Veebel, 2009: 208). By following a logic of consequences, utility-maximising domestic actors weigh up the costs and benefits of adaptation to the external pressure. The external democracy promoter influences the domestic balance of power between actors by empowering certain actors via providing legal and political resources to promote the domestic change (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11).

The EU uses conditionality as the primary mechanism in the leverage model of its democracy promotion strategies to create a change in the state institutions and behaviour of the target state (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 893). Under the primary instrument of EuropeAid, the EU provides financial aid, technical assistance such as institution building, capacity building, training of officials for democratisation (Lloyd, 2010: 558) and electoral support and observation (Commission of the European Communities, 2000: 4-9).<sup>3</sup> As incentives, it offers visa facilitation, access to the EU market, trade agreements, association treaties and membership perspective depending on its policy towards the target state in return for the fulfilment of its demands for progress towards democracy. Other than material rewards or benefits, Pridham (1999: 63) underlines the significance of social and symbolic intangible rewards. Since they may provide international legitimisation as the EU's offer of an official relationship is perceived by a democratising country as an approval of new democratic credentials, they may provide the EU with significant leverage over those countries.

The EU's use of conditionality together with a credible membership perspective has been acknowledged as the most successful mechanism or instrument

---

<sup>3</sup> The EU has involved in electoral assistance and election observation missions in third countries. Its support has included both material and technical assistance ranging from helping to establish a democratic framework for elections, providing assistance to political parties and citizens to register, providing training to local observers and media to providing voting material and equipment. However, the EU has delegated election observation and assistance mission to the OSCE and the UN in several occasions.

for the transfer of the EU norms, rules and standards (Sedelmeier, 2011: 17; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002). The EU by making the rewards in its integration policies conditional on democratic norms and institutions has rendered the conditionality mechanism the most powerful and successful mechanism for driving domestic/democratic change especially in the case of the ultimate reward-membership- (Balkır and Soyaltın, 2018: 74).

Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 495-497) state that the EU's main strategy in its democracy promotion is positive conditionality based on "reinforcement by reward". The EU ties the rewards to the fulfilment of demanded democratic reforms and delivers or withholds the promised rewards depending on the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the conditions. In this external incentives model, the EU does not interfere either coercively or supportively in the cost-benefit calculations of the target government to change its behaviour. In this sense, the EU does not impose extra costs -"reinforcement by punishment"- in the case of non-fulfilment of its conditions and also it does not offer unconditional assistance -"reinforcement by support"-. The main difference between "reinforcement by reward" and "reinforcement by support" is that the former strategy is tied to a definite conditionality principle.

In this regard, the EU adheres to "democratic conditionality" where it uses financial aids and institutional ties as leverage for the fulfilment of its conditions on democracy and human rights (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 495-496). Herewith, the EU uses conditionality in a norm-based external incentives model to ensure the compliance with the EU rules and as a mechanism to transfer the EU norms and values to third countries (Eriş, 2012: 245). Although the mechanisms of socialisation and conditionality have widely been considered as contrast strategies in the Europeanisation literature, there are studies that draw attention to the fact that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may be complementary (Bauer, Knill and Pitschel, 2007; Kelley, 2004b; Sedelmeier, 2011).

For the EU to be effective in the model of external incentives, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 672-673) propose that there must be clarity in the EU's setting conditions for rewards. The size and speed of the rewards are relevant to expect a higher compliance from the domestic actors. When the size of rewards is bigger and rewards are more approximate, a higher level of compliance is expected. Besides, the

credibility of using promises to give rewards and using threats to withhold them in cases of compliance and non-compliance is required, which also requires the bargaining power to be in favour of the external actor. Moreover, for the domestic actors to introduce democratic change in accordance with the EU conditions, the benefits of the rewards should exceed the domestic adoption costs. This also necessitates the support of the formal domestic institutions and veto players (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11) -actors whose agreement is required to make a change in the current situation (Tsebelis, 2002). Kubicek (2003: 17) draws attention to the decisiveness of the preferences of elites –in particular the ones in the government– whether to comply with the external pressure since democratisation may cause them to lose power. In this regard, the actors must see a chance of winning in the democratic contestation to make progress towards democratisation.

### **3. Governance**

The definition of governance varies significantly. While some conceptualisations take it as synonym with government, others ascribe it social purposes. The concepts of governance and good governance have been approached in relation to development since the early 1980s. Herewith, these terms are mainly employed in relation to the state's use of its social and economic resources for development. However, beginning with the 1990s, the terms of governance and good governance are used to embrace a process of interaction between state and non-state actors, and to attribute importance to the civic realm, informal institutions, legitimacy, protection of human rights, transparency, accountability, efficiency and participation by citizens in the management and performance of the administration (Weiss, 2000).

The governance model has been proposed as an alternative and complementary model to linkage and leverage (Wetzel, 2015: 59). As opposed to the focus of the linkage and leverage on society and polity respectively, the governance model focuses on the level of public administration and sectoral policy making (Freyburg et al, 2015: 42). This model argues that democracies require not only governments and civil society but also bureaucracies to actively embrace the democratic principles and behaviour (Moncrieffe, 1998: 392). Herewith, the governance model of democracy

promotion targets democratisation of the intermediate level between state and society (Wetzel, 2015: 63).

Rather than taking democratisation as a regime change, it focuses on democratic governance (Freyburg et al., 2015: 42-43) as adoption of the procedural principles of democracy for decision-making and administrative behaviour in all aspects of the public policy. The key principles of democratic governance are transparency, accountability and participation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 889-895). Transparency refers to making decisions and rules in a way that both the processes and other information are accessible by the others (Hood, 2010: 989). Accountability is the answerability and obligation of public officials to justify their policy actions (Schedler, 1999: 14). Participation connotes non-electoral forms of participation in the decision-making and policy implementation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 896; Wetzel, 2015: 65).

What is central to the governance model is the formation of transgovernmental –as to mean sub-units of governments (Keohane and Nye, 1974)- networks across countries through institutionalized relationships and functional sectoral cooperation. As Slaughter points out, these transgovernmental networks facilitate cooperation and the transmission of democratic norms such as accountability, governmental integrity and the rule of law (Slaughter, 2000: 202) Herewith, the characteristic of the governance model is more conducive to the socialisation mechanism since it requires regular interaction (Wetzel, 2015: 61). However, also issue-specific leverage may be effective by setting technical assistance or expertise in a particular policy domain conditional on fulfilment of certain criteria (Slaughter, 2000: 228).

The governance model of democracy promotion stems from the idea that the EU expands its rules and policies beyond its border via its external governance mainly based on the *acquis communautaire*. Since the EU policies are comprised of democratic governance principles such as transparency, accountability and participation, it is proposed in this model that the EU promotes democratic governance indirectly through approximation of third country's administration of public policy in a specific domain to the EU sectoral legislation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 896).

As early as 2001, the EU realised the democratising potential of Community instruments -mainly financial cooperation instruments and bilateral dialogues- by including human rights and democratisation objectives in the scope of various policy areas such as environment, trade and immigration in its external relations with the third countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 6). Although the EU used the term good governance and integrated it into its development policies since the early 1990s (Carbone, 2010: 20-22), the term democratic governance made its first appearance in the official documents in 2006 and integrated the promotion of all aspects of democratic governance into the main objectives of the EU development policy such as poverty eradication, reduction of inequalities and sustainable development (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a: 3).

The modes of EU external governance differ across countries and policies such as foreign policy initiatives including the European Economic Area (EEA) or the ENP, bilateral cooperation agreements with third countries such as Switzerland, cooperation frameworks such as the ones between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, or without any contractual relations in a specific domain of public policy (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 791-792). In this model, transgovernmental networks are established between the EU and the third country public administrators in a specific field of public policy such as environment, immigration and competition in a horizontal direction.

Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011: 889-897) argue that the transfer of democratic governance rules and norms is dependent on the institutionalisation of cooperation between the EU and the target state and the intensity of the target state officials' contact with the EU. Also, other international actors' reinforcement of the EU democratic governance norms increases the likelihood of norm transfer. The asymmetric interdependence on the relevant sector in favour of the EU is crucial for the effectiveness of this model. With regard to domestic conditions, the model's effectiveness also depends on the sectoral adoption costs and the level of accessibility and autonomy of the administration.

## V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The literature on democracy has a deep interest in the causes of democratisation since the third wave of democratisation. Domestic-centred approaches and transnational approaches –as Pridham terms- focusing on the international dimension of democratisation present distinct arguments in their analysis of the factors behind democratisation. Yet, their intersections suggest synergies for the analysis of democracy promotion thanks to the increasing interdependency between the domestic and international politics, which becomes inseparable from each other when it comes to democratisation and de-democratisation.

As some countries have made successful transitions to democracy and others have not, academic interest has shifted towards the conditions for democracy's consolidation, advancement or embeddedness. Therefore, this chapter includes conceptual and theoretical frameworks for democratisation as a process incorporating both transition and consolidation in a way that democracy becomes “the only game in town”.

Since democracy promotion has become an intentional and direct foreign policy activity of external actors, their democracy promotion template is expected to reflect their conceptualisation of democracy. In this regard, as the EU has been trying to extend its governance beyond its borders due to the lost momentum of integration based on membership, promoting democracy through linkage, leverage, and governance models have become a prominent feature of the EU's norm and rule transfer to third countries. However, based on the motives behind democracy promotion strategies of external actors, promoting democracy may be subordinated to the interests of these actors when there is a conflict between the two. In the light of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks, the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine to reveal its comprehension of democracy, interests, tools, methods, channels, relations with and impact on Ukraine are analysed through the embedded democracy model.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY**

The EU has been acknowledged as a late but successful democracy promoter. In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its “*most important achievement ... the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights*” (European Union, 2012a). Its success in promoting democracy and triggering domestic change has been widely attributed to its enlargement policy and the mechanisms that it uses in this regard. As of 2004, based on the experiences of the enlargement rounds, the EU has formulated the ENP whereby it associated its democracy promotion agenda with the goal of creating security, stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood.

This chapter firstly examines the development of democratic principles in the EU in its evolution as an international democracy promoter. Then, it discusses the ENP's origins and evolution as a flexible policy, changing its tune in accordance with the EU's shift from defining its neighbourhood to defining its citizens' interests as a key priority in its foreign policy. Thus, its connection with the EU's security strategy has also been taken into consideration. The ENP's main objectives and instruments are analysed. As Ukraine is part of the EaP, the Eastern Dimension is also included. It aims to ascertain the EU's definition and approach of democracy by analysing the official EU documents as primary sources. As the EU's democracy promotion strategies have been subject to various criticisms, a short assessment of these criticisms with regard to its neighbourhood is also included in the study.

#### **I. FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN ITS DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA**

When the historical stages of the EU's evolution as a democracy promoter are analysed, it is seen that democracy promotion was not on agenda in the European integration's initial phases. In 1951, in the Treaty of Paris establishing the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC), the priority was given to solidarity in the

economic realm and there was no reference to democracy or human rights. Similarly, in the Treaty of Rome, establishing the “European Economic Community” (EEC) and “European Atomic Energy Community” (Euratom) in 1957, there were no explicit provisions regarding democracy and human rights but related provisions were included to regulate economic activities (Demir, 2007: 33-34).

Although it was not treaty-wise, the EU laid the foundations of its understanding of democracy and its agenda for democracy promotion in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, the European Parliamentary Assembly adopted a report –known as Birkelbach Report- triggered by the intention of dictatorial Spain to become a member. The Report emphasized the democratic credentials of the European Community by setting forth the democratic legitimacy of the states who respect and guarantee the fundamental freedoms as a condition for becoming a member. Besides, it referred to the recognition of and adherence to the “Council of Europe’s” (CoE) principles of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms for accession to the Community. At the same time, the Report referred to the condition of membership as a guarantee for the existence of a democratic state (Birkelbach, 1961). The Birkelbach Report was crucial to reveal the expectations of the elites and non-governmental actors with regard to the protection and development of the Community values (Eylemer, 2010: 148).

At the Copenhagen European Summit in 1973, the European Council issued the “Declaration on European Identity”. The declaration listed the fundamental components of European identity as the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law and social justice, which the Community committed to ensure in its relations with other countries (European Council, 1974). In 1978, The European Council (1978) with “Declaration on Democracy” confirmed the commitment to the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and social justice. Besides, the Member States acknowledged the adherence to these principles as essential elements for membership of the European Communities (European Council, 1978). For the issuance of these declarations, the attraction of the membership to the European Communities –especially the membership applications of Spain, Greece and Portugal- and the Community’s interaction with the outside world were deterministic. This in turn led to the incorporation of the democratic values into the treaties and the Community law (Eylemer, 2010: 148-149).

The European Council with the “Solemn Declaration on European Union” in 1983 reaffirmed the “Declaration on Democracy” (European Council, 1983). The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 reflected the will and aspiration of the Member States in accordance with the Solemn Declaration to transform the Community into a European Union. As of the SEA, the EU tried to manage its external policies as to contain human rights and promote democratic principles. The EU addressed the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and human rights in external relations. In the SEA preamble, it referred to the Member States’ constitutions and laws, the “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, and the “European Social Charter” as the basis for fundamental rights (Official Journal of the European Communities –OJ-, 1987). Thanks to the formal references to human rights and democratic principles starting with the SEA, the EU started to apply the criteria of respect for human rights and democratic principles to its external relations (Commission of the European Communities, 1995a: 5).

During the first round of enlargement, the EU did not include any precondition on democracy while admitting Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973 since they have been considered as consolidated democracies. However, with the membership applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, the EU felt the obligation to apply conditionality as an external actor to influence the domestic transformation and democratisation processes of these candidates at the national level. Thus, the EU began to insert in the conditionality-compliance nexus in its enlargement policy to assess the performances of the candidate states (Özkurt, 2017: 5). Although the EU did not define a concrete democratic criteria in the 1970s, it covered some formal conditions of democracy by referring to the free and fair elections, democratic constitutions and the existence of political parties for the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal (Erdenir, 2012: 98). Through setting democratic values as standards for becoming a member, the EU became “a symbolic reference point” and “a source of moral support” for playing a crucial role in democratisation processes of states in transition to democracy (Pridham, 1999: 62).

With the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the EU adopted political, economic and also legal criteria for membership. Starting with the CEECs’ accession process, the Copenhagen criteria have been implemented for enlargement. The two of three

conditions are as follows (European Council, 1993: 13): “*stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.*” Also, the EU’s reference to the aims of economic and monetary union within the Copenhagen criteria is important since it indicates the EU’s linkage of democratisation with economic indicators. These aims were determined in 1991 as the Maastricht criteria -price stability, soundness and sustainability of public finances, exchange rate stability and durability of the convergence related to long-term interest rates- (European Commission, 2018a).

The Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which entered into force in 1993, introduced the development and consolidation of “democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” as an objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Article J.1 and the sphere of development cooperation in Article 130u (OJ, 1992). In the Consolidated Version of the TEU, Article 2 states the EU’s founding values as “*respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.*” Article 7 voices penal sanctions via conditionality in the case of a risk of the breach of these values. It states the possibility of the suspension of certain rights including the voting rights in the Council. In Article 21, the TEU states that the EU should act in accordance with and try to enhance the principles of its own creation, development and enlargement in the international area (OJ, 2012).

As of 1995, the EU dedicated more room for democracy in its relations with third countries. The Commission adopted the “Communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries”. Democratic principles and human rights were referred as an “essential element” of the Community’s contractual relations with third parties (Commission of the European Communities, 1995b). In an attempt to approximate its rhetoric on democracy to its actions, the explicit references to these principles enabled the EU to take actions in case of violations of human rights and democratic principles (Solonenko, 2005: 60). Following the conclusion of the

Amsterdam Treaty of October 1997, the EU undertook to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as an objective in defining and implementing a CFSP (European Communities, 1997: 9-10). Correspondingly, the EU became more active in democracy promotion.

Pridham remarks that during the 1980s and 1990s, the EU has moved from adopting and promoting formal conditions of democracy such as free elections, separation of powers and the rule of law to “substantive democracy” by making more references to the quality of democracy. What compelled the EU to designate a more concrete template of the democratic conditions was the post-Cold War transitions to democracy in Eastern and Central Europe. Through the Europe Agreements signed with the CEECs, the EU introduced political dialogue for its relations with third countries. By this way, the EU institutionalized its links with the CEECs through regular meetings, systemic consultations and working groups to assess the progress on the democratic conditions for accession to the EU (Pridham, 1999: 64-65).

The accession process of the CEECs provided the EU with the opportunity to become an effective external actor in the national political transformation process within its region. However, due to the physical and institutional limitations and reluctance of the EU to enlarge further after the 2004 enlargement, the Union aimed to develop a new strategy for the promotion of democracy and human rights beyond enlargement (Özkurt, 2017: 5). The EU adopted the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” in Nice in 2000. In its preamble, the EU underlined its founding values as the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity and reemphasized its founding principles of democracy and the rule of law (OJ, 2000). The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009, made the Charter legally binding. Article 6(1) of TEU states that both the EU’s institutions and its Member States must respect the Charter in their external relations (European Parliament, 2018: 3).

Although the EU has not yet embarked on a single specific definition of democracy, the Council of the European Union in 2009 acknowledged that the process of democratisation is locally driven which cannot be imposed from outside but can be encouraged by convenient instruments –both political and financial- responsive to each country’s own needs and preferences. Democracy, human rights, poverty

reduction and development were all underlined as being interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The Council of the European Union's (2009: 3) following statement represents the EU's perspective on essential elements of democracy by emphasising accountability and legitimacy: *“Though democratic systems may vary in forms and shape, democracy has evolved into a universal value. Democracy ensures that rulers can be held accountable for their actions. Governments with democratic legitimacy must deliver on the basic rights and needs of people or they risk losing legitimacy and public support.”*

The Treaty of Lisbon stated democracy as the fundamental principle of the EU's foundation and the basis for all its external policies. With its entry into force in 2009, several policy documents were published (Zamfir, 2018: 1). In 2009, the Council (2009a) adopted conclusions on “Democracy Support in EU External Relations”. In 2011, the European Commission (2011a) published a Communication on “Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change”. In 2011 ENP review (European Commission, 2011b), the term “deep and sustainable democracy” appeared. The EU purported the components of deep and sustainable democracy as follows: free and fair elections, freedoms of expression, assembly and association, free press and media, the rule of law accompanied by judicial independence, efforts to combat corruption and democratic control over the armed forces. It also emphasized the importance of the civil society's role in democratic reforms (European Parliament, 2017).

In 2012, the Council adopted the “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy” which determined the principles, objectives and priorities of the EU human rights policy. Promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, protection of human rights and preventing violations of human rights were set as objectives. The EU identified its priorities on human rights such as abolition of death penalty, protection of the rights of women and protection against gender-based violence, freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression online and offline, supporting human rights defenders and ensuring accountability as a response to violations. The EU repeated its ambition, and commitment to promote democracy and human rights. Its primary goals of sustainable peace, development and prosperity

were linked to the promotion of human rights and democracy (Council of the European Union, 2012a).

The EU embraced an “Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy” in 2015 for 2015-2019. The EU specified that it would make respect for and the promotion of human rights the centrepiece of its policies as inferred from its title “Keeping human rights at the heart of the EU agenda”. This Communication emphasized the link between stability, security and democracy and stated that stability, security and prosperity could only be achieved in a democratic society. The EU specified the characteristics of a democratic society as having respect for human rights and freedoms, accountable and uncorrupt political representatives, pluralism, active civil society, free media and independent judiciary. The EU identified the promotion of human rights and democracy with sustainable development goals (European Commission, 2015a: 2). In 2015, the EU adopted the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” by setting 17 “Sustainable Development Goals” (SDGs) and 169 targets at a special United Nations (UN) summit. Although all of the SDGs are interconnected, the goal 16 directly aimed to promote peaceful and inclusive societies and establish effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (European Commission, 2017a).

Carothers (2009: 5-16) defines the EU’s approach to democracy as a mixture of political and developmental approaches as the latter being dominant. The political approach is defined as narrow with its focus on elections and political freedoms. Developmental approach is characterised by a broader conceptualisation of democracy by comprising equality and justice. Its emphasis is on a gradual process of democratisation where a set of political and socioeconomic developments are deterministic. In this approach, institutional and financial aids are expected to create a change in the long-term in a variety of political and socioeconomic sectors emphasising governance and state-building. In this context, he argues that the EU’s democracy promotion approach goes beyond the political approach with its focus on the linkages of democracy and human rights with socioeconomic development. Herewith, the EU’s policies and financial instruments on promoting democracy and human rights focus on: to strengthen the capacities of state institutions, to enhance the civil society’s role in development, to improve social and economic rights besides

political and civil rights, and to promote elections not as prerequisite for democratisation but as gradual steps for a gradual political change.

Youngs (2007: 67-68) emphasizes that the EU's democracy promotion approach is a process-oriented strategy. He purports that the EU perceives and approaches democratisation as part of a general process of social and economic modernisation rather than a product. By doing so, Youngs argues that the EU manages to avoid the opposition of authoritarian regimes for modest political change and to avoid pinpointing specific institutional templates as an external driver of change. Another characteristic of the EU's democracy promotion policies is the shift from its focus on democracy's formal procedural elements to its focus on a more bottom-up civil-society oriented approach.

## **II. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION**

### **A. The Rationale for and the Evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy**

The EU's historical approach to its neighbourhood was similar to its enlargement policy. As the EU enlarged and had new neighbours, it kept the prospect of membership open as long as the third country complied with its norms, rules and conditions. After the USSR's dissolution, the EU's immediate concern occurred as to maintain stability and security in its borders. At the European Council Summit in Essen in December 1994, the promotion of economic development and good neighbourly relations were emphasized. The Council adopted a programme to promote such cooperation between the associated members (European Parliament 1994). In this way, the EU had an interest and intention to push the applicant countries to resolve their conflicts with regard to borders and minorities before their accession to the EU. This resonated with the EU's interest to refrain from any instability via enlargement (Kahraman, 2005: 7). Following previous proposals to increase stability and cooperation between the former Warsaw Pact members, a Pact was signed by 52

countries in March 1995 to resolve disputes bilaterally to establish good-neighbourly relations in Europe (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012).

As to whom to include in the EU, from the outset, the EU formulated its policy towards the CEECs in a way that it developed into one of integration and accession through financial aid via “Poland and Hungary Action for Restructuring of the Economy” Programme (PHARE) and Association Agreements (AAs). However, the EU differentiated its bilateral relations with the former Soviet states that regained their independence through the dissolution of USSR. The EU defined all former Soviet countries except for the Baltic states as the Newly Independent States (NIS). This group of countries as opposed to the CEECs were not given a membership perspective and were included in the financial assistance programmes through “Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia” (TACIS) and the “Partnership and Co-operation Agreements” (PCAs) (Solonenko, 2009: 713).

At the initial stages in these PHARE and TACIS financial aid programmes, the EU allocated the budgets mainly to these countries’ economic recovery and transition to market economy and a limited proportion was distributed directly for democracy promotion (Solonenko, 2005: 62). In 1992, the Parliament verbalised the need to include a special democracy part in the budget for that year. Prompted by the Parliament’s insistence, the Commission decided to create a “democracy programme” to put special emphasis on democracy in the PHARE and TACIS programmes instead of focusing only on market reforms (Olsen, 2000: 148). Therefore, the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme was launched in 1992 to promote pluralist democratic societies, rule of law and NGOs as well as to transfer knowledge, skills and expertise with regard to democracy and the rule of law from the EU to local and national professional organisations in these countries (Braitwaite, Eberhardt and Johnson, 1998: 5).

Within the realm of democracy promotion, the Democracy Programme mainly focused on the restructuring of the state apparatus with special attention to parliamentary practice, transparency of public organisations, increasing the prevalence of NGOs and freedom of media. Despite democracy rhetoric, the priority was still given to economic restructuring and market-oriented reforms. The proportion of aid allocated directly to promotion of democracy was miniscule. As Olsen (2000: 149)

ascertains, this attitude reflected the EU's preference for reaching its foreign policy objectives mostly via the political side-effects of its economic measures.

The EU's enlargement process launched with the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 -setting a schedule for admitting 10 new members in 2004- changed the meaning of the EU's neighbourhood. The new enlargement was perceived as the reunification of Europe (EUR-Lex, 2007). With this enlargement, the EU became neighbours with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. As the EU came closer to the new neighbours that have been less developed economically, socially and in terms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law compared to the rest of the continent, the risk of instability spilling over to the EU from these countries became obvious (Hürsoy and Kutlu, 2018: 170). With an immediate need to sustain stability in the neighbourhood, the EU started to take steps to forge a new policy towards the new neighbours (Smith K., 2005: 758).

As early as 2001, Poland –even before its formal admission to the EU- verbalised the idea of an Eastern Dimension that would prevent the emergence of new divisions between the enlarged EU and non-members by enhancing cooperation and assistance (Eriş, 2012: 246-247). The idea of an Eastern Dimension following the planned enlargement whereby the EU would have a common border with the new Eastern neighbours was in line with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was promoted by Spain and Portugal after their EU accession, and the Northern Dimension, which is the result of Sweden and Finland's accession to the EU (Lorek, 2006: 11).

As the initiatives of the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (EMP) (Adamo and Garonna, 2009: 74)<sup>4</sup> and Northern Dimension (European External Action Service – EEAS-, 2018a)<sup>5</sup> were perceived as successful by Poland, it made efforts to upload the Polish foreign policy priorities of deepening its relations with the Eastern neighbours –Ukraine, Russia and Belarus- to the EU's CFSP. What Poland had in mind in shaping the EU CFSP was to include only the Eastern neighbours in the framework with the membership perspective remaining open as a strong incentive to be given to these

---

<sup>4</sup> The EU launched the Barcelona Process –also called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership- in 1995 with the aim of building a zone of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The EMP established a multilateral partnership via cooperation on the political, economic, social and cultural areas.

<sup>5</sup> The Northern Dimension Policy was initiated in 1999 to strengthen the EU's cooperation, stability and economic integration with Norway, Iceland and Russia that became direct neighbours with the accession of Sweden and Finland.

countries when they are ready to join the EU (Pomorska, 2011: 173-175). The UK also as early as 2002 put forward the idea of a “wider Europe” to include only Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in the prospective policy (Smith K., 2005: 759).

In April 2002, the idea of a “Wider Europe” (Vooren, 2012: 186)<sup>6</sup> was mentioned for the first time in the EU at the Council meeting on General Affairs. The conclusions of this meeting addressed the concept to include the EU’s Eastern Neighbours (Council of the European Union, 2002). With intentions to develop the “Wider Europe” concept, the Council put forward the idea of the EU’s New Neighbours Initiative in November 2002, which was close to Poland’s and the UK’s preferences. The New Neighbours Initiative involved just Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to further their relations with the future enlarged EU and recognised the role of relations with Russia (European Parliament, 2002).

Romano Prodi –the then President of the European Commission- described the “Wider Europe” concept as “*sharing everything with the Union but institutions*” and “*more than partnership and less than membership without precluding the latter*” in December 2002. The new policy was seen as a proximity policy whereby the immediate focus was stability and security beyond the current borders without further enlargement. The aim of the “Wider Europe” concept was stated as to spread the EU’s values, principles and standards to the neighbouring region. The centrepiece would be a common market combined with common political goals and coping with “*common threats, such as crime, terrorism, illegal migration and environmental challenges*” (European Commission, 2002).

In 2003, the Commission adopted a communication titled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. Although the new Neighbourhood Policy ruled out the prospect of membership in the medium term, the EU affirmed its intentions to build “a ring of friends” in its neighbourhood. It offered furthering integration and liberalisation with the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market and the possibility of the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a: 4). In line with the interests and efforts of the EU’s

---

<sup>6</sup> To construct the concept, nine Council Conclusions, two Commission Communications, three European Council Conclusions, one joint letter of Patten and Solana and one European Parliament report were adopted by the EU in 2002 and 2003.

Mediterranean members such as France and Spain, 10 Southern Mediterranean countries in addition to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine were included in the neighbourhood framework in order to further the relations (Hürsoy and Kutlu, 2018: 170). Kelley (2006: 30-31) ascertains the “raison d’être” of the ENP as enlargement since the EU’s experience of promoting reforms on human rights, democracy and the rule of law is based on the EU’s learning and adaptation from its experience of enlargement.

In December 2003, the EU published the “European Security Strategy” (ESS). It described the post-Cold War environment as one in which it is harder to make a distinction between internal and external aspects of security as they have become increasingly interlinked. Key threats were defined as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It referred to the link between democracy and security by stating the positive effects of the spread of democracy and the rule of law on the regime changes from authoritarian to steady and dynamic democracies. Defending the EU’s own security is paired with promoting its values. The best way of ensuring security as stated in the ESS is “*a world of well-governed democratic states.*” The ESS declared building security in the neighbourhood as one of its strategic objectives. Violent conflicts, weak states, organised crime and even exploding population growth in the neighbours are seen as possible threats for the EU. Thus, the EU stated its task as to promote a ring of well-governed states to its East and South. Trade and development policies and assistance programmes are offered as an incentive for social and political reforms, good governance, constituting the rule of law and ensuring the respect for human rights (EEAS, 2003: 1-8). Herewith, the EU has established the promotion of democracy as a strategic goal of the EU security policy (Powel, 2009: 63).

The Commission published “the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” in 2004 and recommended the inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the ENP so that it would comprise 16 countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). The objectives of the ENP were stated in the Strategy Paper as to strengthen both the EU’s and the neighbours’ prosperity, stability and security based on its values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights (European

Commission, 2016a). The very reason for formulating the ENP can be argued to be derived from the need of securing the EU borders.

Wæver (2000: 268) emphasizes that although the EU does not have an expectation of war, as long as the increased insecurity and poverty continues in the continent, it would not feel secure and maintain prosperity. The Commission stated the EU's linkage of democracy promotion with security by referring to the link between the root causes of violence and the lack of human rights, rule of law and inclusive democracy (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b). The then "European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy", Benita Ferrero-Waldner's speech in June 2006 indicated the EU's approach to the security issue as interdependent on democratic development by emphasising the role that the EU should undertake to promote freedom, knowledge and equality (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006).

This way, the ENP combined the EU's traditional approach of stabilisation and integration with regional cooperation to enhance stability, security and prosperity beyond its borders. The ENP's founding principles are stated as the common values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, market economy principles, good governance and sustainable development. It offers the neighbouring countries a privileged partnership on condition that they are committed to shared values (Kahraman, 2005: 2). It aims to construct "*a ring of friends*" around the EU, rather than just third countries, by transferring the European norms such as democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in order to refrain from destabilisation of the EU itself. Through incentives and rewards, the EU aims to make a change in the norms, values, institutional structures, policies and politics of the neighbouring countries to make itself surrounded by this ring of friends (Balkır and Soyaltın, 2018: 94).

The ENP divides the neighbourhood geographically into two areas as the East and South (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). Although the ENP approaches two regions under a single policy, in line with its principle of differentiation, the EU developed two regional dimensions as complementary to the ENP. For the Southern neighbours, the UfM was initiated by the then President of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, in 2007 to relaunch the Barcelona Process. It emphasized

the promotion of economic integration among the EU's Southern Mediterranean neighbours. The multilateral framework of relationship is based on a number of key projects such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration and education (EEAS, 2016a). Democracy promotion is not employed as a high priority on its agenda (Hüllen, 2009: 6). For the Eastern neighbours, the EaP was initiated in 2009 (European Union, 2017a). The Eastern dimension will be elaborated later since Ukraine is addressed in this framework.

In 2011, in particular due to the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis in its Southern neighbourhood, a review of the ENP was needed to manage the new challenges of the uncalculated and rapid changes in the region (Dandashly, 2018b: 65). The EU in a joint communication in 2011 emphasized the need for a more active EU approach to support democracy and human rights in its neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011c: 2). The EU indicated its willingness to support the transition in the Southern neighbours more actively through a "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean". The areas to be addressed under this Partnership are determined as democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law. The EU also underlined the need for a country-specific and differentiated approach (European Commission, 2011c).

Along with these lines, the EU adopted a renewed ENP in May 2011. In this review, the EU accepted its limited effect in its neighbours so far. The need for a more flexible and more country-specific approach for strengthened partnership was underlined. The EU also emphasized the need for more coherence between the EU and Member States' policies in order to become a more active actor especially for addressing the security challenges rising from the protracted conflicts in the neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011d). In the new approach, the EU increased its ambitions and efforts to promote "deep and sustainable democracy and inclusive economic development". As aforementioned, in this revised ENP, by emphasising civil society's role, the EU presented the components of deep and sustainable democracy as follows: free and fair elections, freedoms of expression, assembly and association, free press and media, the rule of law accompanied by judicial independence, efforts to combat corruption and democratic control over the armed forces (European Parliament, 2017).

The EU also introduced the “more for more” principle as a new incentive and a tool of differentiated treatment in the ENP. It indicated that countries undertaking the demanded reforms would have additional support from the EU (European Commission, 2014a: 8). Besides, in case of human rights violations, the EU informed that it would sever relations -by including sanctions- with those governments that commit these violations. Also, it would increase its support to civil society to keep the dialogue open. The establishment of a dedicated “Civil Society Facility” for enhancing the political role of civil society and of a “European Endowment for Democracy” (EED) for increasing the emergence and development of political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions in the neighbourhood were set as targets (European Commission, 2011d).

In March 2015, a consultation process for a new review process of the ENP was started. The European Parliament adopted a resolution in July 2015 with emphasis on the revision of the ENP to be more strategic, coherent, flexible and focused (European Parliament, 2017). The ENP was reviewed in November 2015 once again. The reasons behind the 2015 ENP review derived from the changes beyond the control of the EU. Political tensions, socio-economic inequalities and security challenges were in rise in the neighbourhood. In addition to ongoing tensions arisen from the post-Arab Spring, new security challenges mainly the Ukrainian crisis in the East and growing terrorist threat in the South emerged. This led to a new approach towards its neighbours since these developments constituted an obstacle for them to make progress in the EU-demanded reform process (Delcour, 2015: 1).

In the face of the neighbourhood’s turning from a “ring of friends” to a “ring of fire”, the EU’s partial or insignificant effect in terms of realising the primary goals of the ENP –promoting peace, stability and security- revealed a “conception-performance gap”. For this reason, the EU started to emphasize the need for more differentiation and flexibility in the ENP (Koenig, 2016: 1). In this way, the EU downgraded its ambition to promote democracy especially in the Southern neighbourhood through its emphasis on stabilisation, ownership and differentiation which reversed the EU’s forward-oriented approach (Schumacher, 2016: 2-4). Herewith, conditionality and the reporting framework based on experiences of the enlargement process were decentred. The wills, commitments, and aspirations of the

partner countries to the shared values and reform process were put at the centre as determinant for deepening future relations (Delcour, 2015: 3). The new ENP presents an important policy tool to see the EU presence, actorness and effectiveness in its external relations (Hoffmann and Niemann, 2017).

With this revision, the EU clearly indicated the promotion of its values as its interest by stating the significance of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and economic openness for its own stability. Hence, stabilisation of the Neighbourhood has been given priority (European Commission, 2015b: 2). Besides the stability nexus, the security nexus was underlined by prioritising the cooperation with the partners to counteract terrorism and radicalisation, to prevent conflicts and to ensure energy security. To ensure social and economic stability, tackling the root causes of instability namely “*poverty, inequality, weak social and economic development, corruption, injustice and lack of opportunity*” was set as a target to be addressed via stronger partnerships. The EU repeated its commitment to the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and good governance and the need for more support for civil society. It also notified that the new focus of the ENP would be on security as demanded by the Member States. The new ENP identified economic development for stabilisation, the security dimension, and migration and mobility as three joint priorities for cooperation (European Commission, 2015b). Therefore, the 2015 review strengthened the connection in the policy agendas of the ENP, the EU’s CFSP and migration policy (Koenig, 2016: 1).

As the EU signalled the prioritisation of the security dimension under the ENP, it published the “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (EUGS) in 2016. The EUGS focused on the EU citizens’ interests and the security threats as terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity that would affect the Union’s capabilities to deliver security, peace and prosperity first inside and then outside of its borders. With an emphasis on the need for a stronger Europe, the EUGS defined its first priority as security –both internal and external, as the two is perceived as ever more intertwined. The EU used the term “resilience” in the EUGS to increase the states’ and societies’ endurance and resistance to the threats against their democracies and to its East and South. Here the EU offered the fulfilment of the SDGs as a solution to fragility and as a solution to the

root causes of poverty and inequality, and the threats stemming from these problems. It underlined that it would promote multilateralism with an emphasis on a strong UN as the provider of the multilateral rules-based order (EEAS, 2016b: 1-15).

By acknowledging the inadequacy of soft power (EEAS, 2016b: 44), Teachau (2016) argues that the EUGS sets a delicate balance between reduced and increased ambition by ceasing to overestimate its transformative power. In the EUGS, the term “principled pragmatism” was employed as a guiding principle in its external actions. In this regard, Biscop (2016: 1-2) notes that by stating “*responsible engagement can bring about positive change*”, the EU’s new approach implies Realpolitik with European characteristics. The Global Strategy as the first document to list the EU’s vital interests as peace and security, prosperity and democracy announces this new approach. The neighbourhood is covered as one of the security priorities of the EU – right after the security of the EU itself-, and the EUGS lessened the previous emphasis on democracy and made resilience a strategic priority in the countries within and beyond the ENP. The EU admitted Tunisia and Georgia within the framework of the ENP as success stories due to their “prosperous, peaceful and stable democracies” (EEAS, 2016b: 45). Hence, the EU declared that it would support democratisation in the states that have more favourable circumstances (Dandashly, 2018b: 66). Since the aim is to increase the resilience of people and societies in the neighbourhood, Biscop (2016: 3) calls attention to the possibility of increasing the resilience of repressive regimes while increasing the resilience of the state concerned against external threats.

## **B. The Incentives and the Instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy**

In the ENP, the Commission uses similar instruments to the enlargement policy. The most important instrument is the conditionality principle. Within the scope of the neighbourhood, the EU uses this conditionality as a positive conditionality. As argued by Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 495-496), the EU’s main strategy is based on “reinforcement by reward”. In this strategy, the rewards are given if the demanded reforms are realized by the neighbourhood country and withheld if the conditions are not met. Therefore, the EU does not punish the non-fulfilment of conditions. The EU’s

main strategy is called “democratic conditionality” where the EU uses financial aids and institutional ties as leverage for the fulfilment of its conditions on democracy. Herewith, it uses the conditionality principle both as a mechanism to ensure the compliance with the EU rules and as a mechanism to transfer the EU norms and values.

Catherine Ashton –former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)- has summarized the incentives to “*see deep and sustainable democracy in the neighbourhood*” as “*3 Ms: money, market access and mobility*” (European Union, 2011a). At the launch of the ENP, the Commission stated that the policy would offer following incentives (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a: 10-14):

*extension of the internal market and regulatory structures, preferential trading relations and market opening, perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons, intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats, greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management, greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding, integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European Research Area, new instruments for investment promotion and protection, support for integration into the global trading system, enhanced assistance, better tailored to needs, new sources of finance.*

The Commission expressed that the possibility of reviewing these incentives towards greater integration would depend on the performance of the neighbourhood countries in carrying out the required reforms (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). In 2007, the Commission published a Communication titled “A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy” emphasising the requirement for strengthening the EU’s political leadership in order for the ENP to be fully effective. It introduced DCFTAs as a key incentive to increased economic integration in the ENP (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a).

Besides incentives within the scope of conditionality, the mechanism of socialisation is also employed as a reinforcement strategy in the ENP. Through closer cooperation and interaction, the ENP countries undergo a socialisation process. Sasse (2007: 10-11) argues that besides the actors and institutions of the ENP countries, the EU itself is part of the socialisation process at the ENP. Kelley (2006: 39-40) specifies the major socialising tools and the reflections of soft diplomacy in the ENP as political dialogues, the daily contacts between the officials from the ENP countries and the EU officials, bilateral nature of the action plans, and systematic and objective reviews by

annual progress reports. She argues that specialized dialogues are central to the ENP's aim of extending the EU norms, values and standards and they can provide socialising interaction. This policy takes both domestic political actors and NGOs into the scope of socialising domestic actors towards the EU norms and values.

Bilateral action plans constitute the first step and are central in relations with the ENP countries. They are country-specific reflecting the EU's differentiated approach. These action plans frame political and economic reform agendas for each country with the principle of differentiation whereby the EU handles its bilateral relations with the ENP partners in accordance with the partner country's specific circumstances, interests and priorities (Koenig, 2016: 4). The action plans set short or medium-term priorities for 3 and 5 years respectively. The European Commission publishes country progress reports for each Neighbourhood partner to assess the progress on the realisation of the mutually agreed goals. Each document as based on different aspirations and diversities of individual countries allows for flexibility besides differentiation (European Commission, 2017b).

Action Plans which function as an instrument of soft law are not legally binding on either sides (Ghazaryan, 2014). The EU emphasizes that the ENP is not an imposition of the EU's priorities or conditions upon the partner states but the process is based on the joint ownership of shared values and common interests (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). With the principle of joint ownership, the EU expects the internalisation of reform processes by the ENP partners and to transform them via national reform strategies. The EU values civil society's role for the ENP's success. It attributes civil society the mission of pressuring political elites and increasing mutual accountability (Hürsoy and Kutlu, 2018: 174).

The EU supports the reform agendas through different financial instruments. At first, the ENP did not abolish the previous frameworks towards the neighbours; contrarily it supplemented the previous frameworks. The EMP and the European Community's cooperation programme with Mediterranean partner countries (MEDA) assistance programme were kept to pursue close bilateral relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries (Smith K., 2005: 759). The PCAs and TACIS assistance programme towards the Eastern neighbours also were not replaced at the outset of the ENP but revised and developed (Hürsoy and Kutlu, 2018: 172).

However, in line with the Commission's Communication of July 2003 with regard to a progressive shift towards a new neighbourhood instrument to build upon the experience obtained from the previous instruments for the neighbours (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b), a new Neighbourhood Instrument to promote "security, stability and sustainable development" was introduced. In 2007, the EU introduced the "European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument" (ENPI) to replace the funding instruments of MEDA and TACIS with enlarged objectives and increased budget. The ENPI funding for the 2007-2013 period was €11.2 billion. With the ENPI, the neighbourhood countries gained access to "Institution Building Tools" such as Twinning, the "Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument of the European Commission" (TAIEX) and the "Support for Improvement in Governance and Management" (SIGMA) which are originally utilized for candidate states to accompany the enlargement process and approximation to the EU acquis. Besides country by country funding, regional cooperation within the framework of the ENP through the ENPI is also supported under Erasmus Mundus and Tempus, "Neighbourhood Investment Facility" (NIF), TAIEX, SIGMA and the "Cross-Border Cooperation" (CBC) programmes (European Commission, 2014a: 6-13).

In 2014, the "European Neighbourhood Instrument" (ENI) replaced the ENPI with an increased budget and enlarged objectives. Funding for the period 2014-2020 under the ENI is €15.4 billion. The EU stated this instrument as faster, more flexible, increasingly policy-driven and allowing for greater differentiation. The "more for more principle" is applied by offering incentives based on more support to the best performers. For the aim of mutual accountability, it is stated that the EU would allocate more assistance to human rights, democracy and good governance. The ENI defined one of its targets as to promote "*human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, equality, sustainable democracy, good governance and a strong civil society*". Integration into the EU internal market, increasing mobility and people-to-people contacts, reducing poverty, encouraging development, and promoting confidence building and other measures to prevent conflicts are named as the other targets. Besides bilateral programmes, multi-country programmes, regional cooperation and CBC programmes are supported under the ENI (European Union, 2017b).

Besides the ENI, the EU has used other instruments to finance the ENP. In order to improve market access especially via the DCFTAs, to enhance mobility and to manage migration, the EU put in some new tools. Visa facilitation/liberalisation agreements and mobility partnerships have been composed with some ENP states (European Parliament, 2017). Specific to democracy promotion and as a complementary to other EU external assistance instruments, the EU used the “European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights” as a financing instrument for democracy and human rights between 2000 and 2006. From 2007 to 2013, the EIDHR was used to reinforce democracy and human rights worldwide. In 2014, the EU introduced the new EIDHR to fund projects on democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms outside the EU. The main difference of this instrument from the previous ones is that this instrument is designed for the empowerment of civil society to become the driving force for political reform and the defence of human rights in non-EU countries (European Commission, 2019a).

In line with this goal, most of its funds are allocated to CSOs and human rights defenders at risk while a lesser proportion of funds are used for election assistance and funding EU election observation missions. Although the EU increased the budget of the EIDHR for the 2014-2020 period to €1,332.75 million (around 21% increase), it remains as the smallest EU external financing instrument. The use of the EIDHR is different from other intergovernmental EU financing instruments since it does not require the third country governments’ permission for funding (Zamfir, 2018: 4). Pursuant to the 2011 review of the ENP, the EED was established. It provides funding for local civic and political actors with a focus on those actors who are not funded under other EU funding in the EU Neighbourhood (European Endowment for Democracy, 2018).

The Neighbourhood states also benefit from the “Development Cooperation Instrument” (DCI), which was formulated in 2007 in line with the Treaty of Lisbon. The DCI interlinks its primary goals of reducing poverty and social and economic development with promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights in the developing countries except for those eligible for “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance” (IPA) (European Commission, 2019b). Under this financial instrument, the thematic programme of “Non-State Actors and Local

Authorities in Development” (NSA-LA) was launched. In accordance with the EU’s approach on development and democracy, this programme provides grants to CSOs and local authorities to enhance their capabilities in poverty reduction and sustainable development as well as improving inclusive development (Shapovalova and Youngs, 2012: 4).

The EU increasingly puts civil society in the centre of its democracy promotion policies under the ENP both for strengthening civil society’s role in reforms and democratic changes and for increasing cooperation and interaction between CSOs and state actors to facilitate socialising into European norms and values (Smith N.R., 2011: 391). For this purpose, the “Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility” (NCSF) was put into practice in 2011-2013 to strengthen the role of civil society actors in the democratisation processes of the ENP countries and to enhance their participation in policy dialogue through increasing interaction (European Union, 2017c). The Commission stated the aim of the NCSF as to strengthen the existing initiatives for support to non-state actors and to enhance the EU’s engagement with civil society at the Neighbourhood countries (European Commission, 2011e). Shapovalova and Youngs (2012: 12-13) point at the change in the EU support to civil society as it started to be viewed as a powerful means of democratisation rather than contextualising it with sustainable development. This change was triggered by the power shifts in the Southern neighbourhood with the Arab Spring and the conclusion that no tangible results could be achieved from top-down reforms.

### **C. Democracy Promotion in the Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership**

Following Bulgaria and Romania’s –two Black Sea littoral states- accession to EU in 2007, the EU felt an increased need to address its Eastern neighbourhood by a comprehensive framework for prosperity, stability and security of itself and its neighbours around the Black Sea. The EU in its Communication titled “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative” touched upon both the opportunities in the Black Sea region with its rich energy sources, market opportunities

and transport routes, and its concerns about frozen conflicts, environmental problems, illegal migration and organised crime stemming from the region. As a response to these challenges, the Union announced the “Black Sea Synergy” (BSS) as a new regional cooperation platform for enhancing regional cooperation both within the region and between the region and the EU in key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, mobility and security. The BSS included five Eastern neighbours that take part in the ENP –Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, one candidate state – Turkey- and one strategic partner –Russia. The Commission underlined that this initiative is complementary to already existing pre-accession process, the ENP and the Strategic Partnership frameworks (Commission of the European Communities, 2007b).

In 2008, the EU initiated the BSS which aims to support democratic reforms with an emphasis on respect for human rights and improving civil society, to cooperate on the peaceful settlement of conflicts and to promote economic reforms and development (EEAS, 2008). The BSS was set as a bottom-up initiative with the goal of increasing cooperation in the region via concrete projects about “*environment, maritime, fisheries, maritime transport, energy, education, civil society, cross border cooperation and research fields*” (EEAS, 2016c). Tsantoulis indicates that by making the project oriented character as the basis of addressing regional challenges especially in specific areas like environment and transport; the BSS has become more realistic and more likely to trigger a spillover effect to areas of high politics like energy and security (Tsantoulis, 2009: 2).

The areas of main cooperation were determined as “*democracy, respect of human rights and good governance, managing movement and improving security, the ‘frozen’ conflicts, energy, transport, environment, maritime policy, fisheries, trade, research and education networks, science and technology, employment and social affairs, regional development*”. (Commission of the European Communities, 2007b: 3-8). The EU referred to the standards of the CoE and the OSCE in terms of democracy. The EU undertook to support democratic developments in the Black Sea by sharing experience on democracy and human rights promotion, offering training and exchange programmes and supporting a regional dialogue with civil society.

Only a few months after the initiation of the BSS in Kyiv<sup>7</sup>, Poland and Sweden in a joint proposal voiced the need to develop an Eastern Partnership to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation in a way it advances the ENP. In this proposal, a deepened integration with all Eastern partners –but first and foremost with Ukraine– was offered. For multilateral cooperation, the need for establishing a platform for adding the multilateral dimension as complementary to the existing regional frameworks was expressed. Multilateral cooperation was offered to be project-oriented (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2008). Following this proposal and the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008, the European Council announced the need for a differentiated approach towards its Eastern Neighbours in order to reveal the EU's position after the war between Russia and Georgia, and to deal with its consequent repercussions. The EU by addressing the Eastern neighbours clarified its support for territorial integrity and consolidation of statehood and gave a political message of solidarity (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a: 2-4).

Gültekin-Punsmann and Nikolov (2008: 115) point out to the necessity of an Eastern regional dimension in the EU policies in terms of both structure and timing. In this sense, the BSS and the EaP structurally complement the bilateral structure of the ENP. With regard to timing, these regional structures came into being at a time when the EU's enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania made the Black Sea region the EU's new natural Eastern neighbourhood. Besides, the coloured revolutions and pro-European orientation as well as Russia's increased intrusiveness in these regions necessitated the EU to forge a new framework.

In 2009, at the Prague Summit, the EU established the EaP as a more ambitious and complementary approach within the ENP. The principles of the EaP are built on the existing bilateral relations and expressed as shared ownership, responsibility, differentiation and conditionality. In line with the general objective of establishing stability, security and prosperity in the EU and its neighbourhood, this initiative aims to enhance the existing partnerships through DCFTAs and high-level cooperation on mobility via visa facilitation and readmission agreements, reduce socioeconomic disparities of the partners and develop their administrative capacities through

---

<sup>7</sup> In this thesis, Kyiv is preferred for writing the name of Ukraine's capital since it is the official Latin transliteration and Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine uses the city's name as Kyiv instead of Kiev.

increased financial support and a new instrument, “Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes” individually with each country (Council of the European Union, 2009b: 4-7).

The EaP added new elements to bilateral cooperation. AAs upgrading the PCAs for furthering integration of the partners to the EU legislation, standards and norms are offered (Huff, 2011: 12). Here, the main difference of the EaP from the BSS becomes evident as the EaP intends to approximate the partners to the EU while the BSS is limited to increasing regional cooperation in certain sectors such as environment, transport and energy (Yazgan, 2017: 70). Within the context of multilateral cooperation which is launched as a forum for sharing experiences and intensifying links among partner countries, the EU introduced meetings of highest level officials of the Eastern Partners to be held once a year. In addition to high level political interaction, the EaP established the EaP Civil Society Forum to enhance dialogue and interaction among the CSOs in the Eastern Partners (Council of the European Union, 2009b: 8-9).

The EU reinforced the role of democracy in the EaP. “Additional” and “tangible” support for the Eastern partners’ path to democratic and market-oriented reforms to get closer with the EU was expressed. The EaP defined one of the four policy platforms as democracy, good governance and stability. The other three are economic integration and convergence with EU policies, energy security, and mobility and people-to-people contacts. The basis of the partnership is set as mutual commitment to shared values. The launching of the negotiations for AAs is tied to democratic conditionality by stipulating a considerable progress with regard to the level of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as compliance with international standards in terms of holding elections (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a: 2-4).

The EaP Summits of 2011 Warsaw, 2013 Vilnius and 2015 Riga all emphasized the principles of shared ownership, responsibility, differentiation and mutual accountability. As part of increasing interaction and dialogue between different strands of societies and also increasing the activities under the EaP’s multilateral dimension, the Warsaw Summit established the “Euronest Parliamentary Assembly” and created an “Eastern Partnership Business Forum” and the “Conference of Regional

and Local Authorities of the Eastern Partnership” (Council of the European Union, 2011a: 2). The Vilnius Summit of 2013 set the goal of establishing “Association Agendas” to facilitate the implementation of the AAs/DCFTAs and to monitor the progress towards the objectives of political association and economic integration (Council of the European Union, 2013: 4).

The significance of dialogue and cooperation in terms of foreign policy and security issues was put forward. The three meetings -by that time- of “Informal Partnership Dialogues” that bring together EU representatives as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EaP on the Partnership and foreign policy issues were welcomed as they increased interaction among the stakeholders. Moreover, the conclusion and implementation of “Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Framework Participation Agreements” rendering the participation of the EaP countries in crisis management operations possible was appraised (Council of the European Union, 2013: 9). The Riga Summit of 2015 emphasized the “free, democratic, peaceful and undivided Europe” vision of the EU as a political sign of solidarity and as a reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014 (EEAS, 2015).

One of the prominent components of the EaP is the cooperation in energy efficiency issues. In 2014, the EU published its European Energy Security Strategy stressing its position as a net energy importer. It revealed the EU’s dependence for external sources and vulnerabilities in case of previous energy supply crises. Therefore, the EU indicated the need for solidarity with the neighbouring countries and arriving at political decisions on energy with these countries. The Strategy aimed at further integration of the neighbours into the EU energy market due to the EU’s security concerns on energy supplies (European Commission, 2014b: 18). In July 2017, all the Eastern Partners agreed to enhance cooperation in developing an efficient energy policy for energy security and boosting economic growth (European Commission, 2017c). In line with this decision, at the EaP Summit in November 2017 in Brussels, the Parties emphasized the importance of energy security via diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes (Council of the European Union, 2017: 8).

The EU has concluded AAs and DCFTAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Besides, visa liberalisation has been launched with these three countries. As the EU

emphasized in related documents the political will and wish of the third countries as the basis to deepen their relations with the EU, it has embraced a more tailored approach with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. In this sense, a new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia and a new Framework Agreement with Azerbaijan are in scope of the bilateral relations (EEAS, 2016d).

### **III. ASSESMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD: ACCOMPLISHMENTS OR FAILURES?**

The EU's democracy promotion in the neighbourhood has been criticised and seen as inefficient from various angles, especially for most of the neighbours have failed to consolidate democracy or to show significant democratic development since the beginning of the ENP. Casier (2011: 956-961) criticises the EU's democracy promotion approach as formal rather than substantive. This connotes the EU's insistence on institutional and procedural components such as elections and checks and balances instead of more substantial components as determinants of the quality of democracy such as transparency and accountability which are less tangible. Another point that Casier (2011: 960) brings into question is that the EU does not set its own standards for democratisation and instead it follows the strategy of other democracy promoters such as the OSCE and the CoE as a reinforcement strategy.

Although conditionality in the enlargement process has been acknowledged as a successful instrument to drive domestic change especially in the case of the CEECs, most scholars emphasize the weakness of conditionality in the ENP in the absence of a credible membership perspective (Burlyuk and Shapovalova, 2017: 38). Gawrich et al. (2009: 3) criticise the ENP as a top-down configuration of the EU interests with weak conditionality. Sasse (2008: 295-296) ascertains that since the EU's incentive in the ENP –“*a stake in the internal market*”- is vague, the ENP remains weak when conditionality is evaluated as a rationalist model. Thus, she suggests that the ENP denotes a mode of “conditionality-lite” for non-candidate countries.

Beyond weaker incentives and insufficiency of its tools to trigger democratic change, the EU's use of conditionality as selective and inconsistently is another point

of criticism. Börzel and Lebanidze (2017: 17) argue that the EU is selective in applying conditionality in promoting democracy in the Eastern and Southern neighbours due to its preference of stability over democratisation when there is a conflict between the two. When this is the case, they suggest that the EU has a tendency to prioritize – authoritarian- stability over uncertain –democratic- change. Börzel and Hüllen (2014: 1033) voice that the EU’s two goals of stability and democracy promotion could be in conflict. In this sense, because democratisation might cause authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries to become destabilised in the short run, the EU has traditionally focused on the security threats stemming from instability and conflicts in its Southern neighbours rather than democracy promotion. Pace (2009: 43-44) argues the EU’s motive to be led by its concerns about harming the existing cooperation based on stability and the fight against terrorism in case of pushing the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Santini and Hassan (2012: 66) remark the conflict between the EU’s democracy promotion and its interests in energy supply security, regional alliances, cooperation on migration and counter-terrorism since pursuing these interests require the assistance of the regimes in the neighbouring countries. The EU which cooperated with authoritarian regimes for years in combatting terrorism and illegal migration and in preserving stability in its Southern neighbourhood (Dandashly, 2015: 38), has weakened the legitimacy of its democracy promotion (Börzel and Lebanidze, 2017: 24). Pace (2011: 43) exemplifies this by the EU’s –as well as the USA’s- consolidation of the problems stemming from the lack of democratisation in Egypt by cooperating with Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian rule for stability and counter-terrorism cooperation. As he puts forward, since the governments in the MENA region are aware of the EU’s indifference or actions not going beyond verbal denouncement towards violations of democratic norms, they remained selective in applying political reforms. Similarly, Crawford (2005: 589) ascertains that the EU’s democracy promotion in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sub-Saharan Africa is limited to stability, security and conflict resolution for reasons of precluding migration and asylum requests from these regions.

With regard to the Eastern neighbours, many scholars have put forward the influence of energy dependency on its democracy promotion. Lehne (2014: 10)

exemplifies the case of Azerbaijan where the EU did not hold the ENP's benefits back for severe human rights violations in its significant energy partner. The EU's status as a net energy importer and its dependence on its Eastern neighbours lessened its impact on the reform processes of its democracy promotion targets like Azerbaijan. The EU did not go beyond showing a little opposition to the closure of many NGOs working on human rights, journalism, and blocking CSOs' access to Western financial aids in 2014. Instead of applying the conditionality principle, the EU decided to start negotiations on a new "Strategic Modernisation Cooperation Agreement" with the Azerbaijani government (Alieva, 2015: 12). The EU did not use its democratic conditionality and did not tie the financial aids to democratic principles in Azerbaijan. Contrarily, it preferred increasing cooperation on energy and trade.

Similarly, in the case of Armenia, another energy partner, the EU did not use any sanctions in the face of human rights violations and undemocratic acts but only issued some criticism over unfair elections (Börzel and Lebanidze, 2017: 20). Armenia's stakes at the ENP have been mainly its economic interests. Although the EU's expectations were Armenia's progress in reforms for democratisation and in conflict resolution, it could not manage to drive domestic change in Armenia (Simao, 2012: 197). Despite the human rights and rule of law violations, non-existence of multiparty political groupings and weak civic participation (Freire and Simao, 2013: 180), the EU stayed indifferent and continued to enhance economic relations. This in turn, as Börzel and Lebanidze (2017: 20) conclude, paved the way for consolidating the authoritarian regime in Armenia contrary to the goal of democratisation.

#### **IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The EU has taken the responsibility of promoting democracy in its CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty. Since then, it has increased its emphasis on promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As the EU has included democratic conditionality clauses in its external relations, it has transformed into a democracy promoter. When the EU's enlargement policy was voiced to reach its limits, the EU started formulating its neighbourhood policy as a democratisation tool.

The ENP has its focus on its Eastern Dimension from the start due to the EU's fears and concerns of new threats stemming from insecure and unstable borders in the post-Soviet environment. For keeping internal borders clear of any negative spillovers from its neighbourhood, the EU placed emphasis on enhanced cooperation with its neighbours in various areas. Through various instruments, the EU has been trying to manage the changes occurring in its external borders, both to the East and the South. However, due to the increasing instability at its borders -the post-Arab Spring environment in the South and Russia's increasing assertiveness in the East-, the EU has changed its emphasis on the neighbourhood to its citizens' interests as reflected in its Global Strategy.

The ENP as a tool for creating democratic change is seen as limited to support democratic reforms. Although the EU has been using positive conditionality as a reinforcement strategy through rewards for political reforms, it has been criticised for using this conditionality inconsistently and selectively. Here, the conflicting nature of the EU's goal of democracy promotion with security and stability rises to the surface. In the face of the EU's weaknesses in promoting democracy, the output of democracy continues to be highly dependent on domestic factors and actors.

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**FORMATION OF THE MODERN UKRAINIAN NATION AND STATE:**  
**INDEFINITE INTERPLAY AMONG HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND**  
**IDENTITY**

Contemporary Ukrainian state and society display different regional characteristics when it comes to identity, language preferences and political culture. This fragmented nature of contemporary Ukrainian society and politics has historical roots. Ukraine has shared a very long intertwined history with Poland and Russia. This historical past has impacts on the present-day Ukraine's geographical position and politics. That makes it impossible to understand the current state of Ukraine without taking history into consideration since identity is constructed in interaction with and defined in terms of "others". In the case of Ukraine, these others have a long historical past. While Orthodox and Russian-speaking Ukrainians heavily populate the east and south of the country, the western part is mostly composed of Catholic and Ukrainian-speaking population. Since different regions of the country had different historical and thus political experiences under different countries' domination, regional orientations towards identity, language, state-building and foreign policy preferences vary in accordance with these different historical lines.

This chapter analyses the historical roots of the contemporary Ukrainian state, identity and foreign policy orientations by including the significant historical periods of the country's attempts and phases to exist as an independent state. In this regard, the emergence of the idea of national identity and its political expression are approached in a way considering different historical experiences of different parts of the present-day Ukraine. For this reason, first and foremost Ukrainian experience under Polish and Russian domination for very long times and the effects of these different historical experiences on the emergence of Ukrainian identity are addressed. Thereafter, Ukraine's attempts to develop an independent and sovereign state in the 20<sup>th</sup> century are discussed. Lastly, Ukraine's state-building process since the independence in 1991 is analysed within the context of cultural, linguistic and political divide in the country with reference to the country's shifts between orientation towards Russia and/or Europe.

## I. AN INTERTWINED HISTORY WITH POLAND AND RUSSIA: THE LEGACY OF KIEVAN RUS'

When the geographic setting of the ethno-linguistic territory inhabited by Ukrainians is analysed, it is asserted that parts of the present-day Ukrainian territory was home to the first known Slavic sovereign on the territory, Kievan Rus'<sup>8</sup>, incorporating the lands occupied by the East Slavic tribes and dating back to the mid-9<sup>th</sup> century. During Vladimir the Great's reign (980-1015), Kievan Rus' became the largest state in Europe overreaching from the Carpathian Mountains to present-day St. Petersburg and Moscow and adopted Orthodox Christianity (Kubicek, 2008: 17-23).<sup>9</sup>

The official narratives of both Russia and Ukraine, and also Belarus, claim their national history and identity as the only and legitimate direct successor of Kievan Rus' (Wolczuk, 2000: 673). Russia's imperial grand narrative portrays an uninterrupted thousand-year history of Russian state and nation. Herewith that infers the unity paradigm between Russian and Ukrainian people treating them as sharing the same origin historically, spiritually, linguistically and culturally. Kohut (2001: 70) utters that the idea of a unitary Russia dates back to Russia's first confrontation with Ukraine in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Szporluk (1997: 95) states that the reason for this construction of Russian national history and identity was "*to disinherit the Ukrainians from any claim to historic statehood and thereby deny them any future claim to independent statehood.*"

In the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, Kievan Rus' experienced political fragmentation and invasion of the Mongols. One major political unit of Kievan Rus', Galicia-Volhynia with its ties to non-Russian culture in the west, stood out against the Mongols. The kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia grew into an important power until it was defeated by Polish raid and fell under the Lithuanian rule in 1349 (Kubicek, 2008: 26-27). At the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Moscow –once part of Kievan Rus'- by overcoming the Mongol domination became the most powerful centre and the capital of a new Slavic Kingdom, Muscovy. Russian *translatio imperii* (transfer of rule)

---

<sup>8</sup> Kievan Rus' instead of Kyivan Rus' is preferred for the writing since the sources used in this thesis use it in this way.

<sup>9</sup> Ukrainians were called different names until they began to call themselves as Ukrainian in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Ukrainians were known as Ruthenians in Austria and Poland, and also as Rusnaks in Hungary and Little Russians or Cossacks in the Russian Empire.

theory therefore claims the Muscovite state as the direct and only successor of Kievan Rus' since there was no more an Eastern Slavic political entity on these lands (Wilson, 2015: 17). Russian historiography views the Mongol seizure of Kievan Rus' as the reason for "*the fragmentation of a single people into Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians*" (Prizel, 2000: 15).

After Poland's and Lithuania's incorporation of most of Kievan Rus' lands in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, most of the present-day Ukraine was ruled either by Lithuania or Poland. With the creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569, it became home to almost all Ukrainians. The Tsar in Moscow seized a part of the vast territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the territory inhabited by Ukrainians was partitioned between Poland and Russia in 1667. However, after 1667, Ukrainians and Ukrainian territory under the rule of Warsaw were more than the Ukrainians and Ukrainian territory under the rule of Moscow. A considerable part of Ukrainian lands were parts of Poland for three centuries until these regions were subjugated by Austria in 1772. These lands stayed as Eastern Galicia under the control of Austria until 1945 (Szporluk, 1997: 87-88).

Under the Lithuanian rule, Ukrainians experienced tolerance with regard to using their own language and practising their faith. Many Lithuanians converted to Orthodoxy and Ruthenian became the official language of the Kingdom. Since Ukrainians were granted the right to participate in government, the Lithuanian rule was welcomed by local Slavic nobles. However, the situation under the rule of Poland was quite the opposite. Since non-Catholics could not take part in the legally privileged Polish noble class –*szlachta*- and Orthodox institutions offering higher education were closed down by the Commonwealth, Orthodox Ruthenians felt pressure to convert to Catholicism (Kubicek, 2008: 32-35). Also, the number of Orthodox Ruthenians living in the cities was subject to a limitation and they were excluded from offices and courts (Subtelny, 2000: 87).

Magosci (2010: 157) draws attention to the Polish influence on Ukrainians culturally, linguistically and religiously. Orthodox Rus' nobility's conversion to Roman Catholicism –the official state religion of the Polish Kingdom- and adoption of Polish customs and language led this Rus' nobility to internalize Polish political identity. Magosci lays emphasis on the point that even those who remained Orthodox

embraced Polish political identity and hereby the term of “*gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*” (“*a Pole of Rus’ religion*”) was coined for these strata of Ukrainians. However, in order to refrain from any political instability that would have been caused by the Orthodox Ruthenians seeing Moscow as the spiritual source, the Greek Catholic Church or the Uniate –the Ukrainian Catholic Church- that would preserve the Orthodox rituals but be loyal to the Pope was created in 1596 (Kubicek, 2008: 36).

In this context, it is crucial to touch upon the remarkable differences in political culture between Ukrainians and Russians in addition to the ethnic difference as put especially by historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Thanks to the common system of customary law protecting private property and establishing new fines instead of blood revenge starting in the 11<sup>th</sup> century and also the councils and assemblies of the principalities serving as forums for discussion of daily functions, Kievan Rus’ was seen as a progressive entity (Kubicek, 2008: 25). To emphasize the differentiation, it has also been claimed that Ukrainian-Rus’ under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth experienced the political order of the Commonwealth with its elective monarchy and well-developed corporate and regional rights whereas the Muscovite state was an absolutist monarchy (Kohut, 2001: 70). Despite the common religious denominator under Orthodox Christianity, it has been argued by some Ukrainian scholars that there were differences in the manifestations of faith by the Kievan Rus’ and Muscovy in terms of tolerance and independence (Kubicek, 2008: 28). Ukrainians’ definition of themselves in relation to, and in a confrontation with, their “other” meant the rejection of both Polish and Russian identities. Szporluk (1997: 97) argues that due to Russia’s and Poland’s status as peripheries in relation to the West, Ukraine’s nation-building project in its early stages meant the rejection of being the periphery of a periphery.

Decentralised structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth paved the way for resistance, raids and revolts from the peripheries of the Commonwealth such as the Crimean Tatars and Cossacks who were composed of Poles, Belarusians, Russians, Moldavians and overwhelmingly Ukrainians. Cossacks’ emergence as an organized powerful group at the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century made the Commonwealth’s instrumentalisation of Cossacks against the Crimean Tatars’ incursions or in the wars against Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire possible. However,

as the Cossacks' number grew and as they identified themselves as the defenders of Orthodoxy, they posed a threat against the Commonwealth (Subtelny, 2000: 108-118). For the very reason, the Cossack revolts paved the way for Russian involvement in the Ukrainian populated territory. With the great revolt of 1648, much of the Ukrainian lands were liberated from Polish rule and fell under Russian control. Besides, with the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Ukrainian Cossacks acknowledged the suzerainty of the Tsar of Muscovy in return for their rights and liberties. Under these circumstances, an important part of the Ukrainian clerical elite had a voice in asserting their desire to involve Russia in the Ukrainian populated territory with respect to preserving a world based on the Orthodox faith and the Slavonic language. Some among these elite also regarded the Muscovite Tsar as the only legitimate and independent Orthodox monarch (Kohut, 2001: 71-72).

Russian-Polish rivalry over the control of the Ukrainian lands led to the partition of western and eastern Ukraine plus Kyiv between Poland and Russia respectively in 1667 with the Treaty of Andrusovo. With this arrangement, the Cossacks retained some autonomy. The Hetmanate was the largest and politically most-organized entity under the Cossack rule. Hetman Ivan Mazepa's alliance with Tsar Peter the Great of Russia made the Hetmanate able to unify most of the Ukrainian lands by means of getting the Tsar's approval to occupy the Polish-controlled Right Bank of Ukraine in 1703. However, Russia's wars with Sweden compelled the Tsar to centralise his authority and instrumentalise the Cossacks in the fight against the Swedes. When the Tsar chose not to defend the Cossack-ruled Ukraine against the Polish invasion, Mazepa allied with Sweden. This led in 1709 to the battle of Poltava where the Russians defeated the Cossacks and Swedes and also ended Sweden's ambitions to become the dominant power in northern Europe. This in return led to the incorporation of the Hetmanate into the Russian Empire and later its abolishment in 1785 under the rule of Catherine II. In this way, following the annexation of what had been Poland's border territories in 1793-1795 and the capture of the Black Sea coastline from the Ottoman Empire by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Tsar took political and economic control of most of the lands that constitutes modern day Ukraine (Kubicek, 2008: 46-50).

## II. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT FROM ITS EMERGENCE TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR I

The Russian Empire established an autocratic rule in the Ukrainian land. With the effect of rising nationalism in Europe in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the Russian Empire felt the need to legitimize its rule. The 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian doctrine of Official Nationality interlinked Orthodoxy, autocracy and *narodnost* (Szporluk, 1997: 104; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018).<sup>10</sup> In this regard, Russianness was understood fundamentally in political and religious basis comprising not only ethnic Russians but all Eastern Slavs and Orthodox Christians who were also loyal to the Tsar. Russian nationalism in this sense centred on the state which was an autocratic monarchy instead of the nation as its point of reference (Molchanov, 2002: 69).

Although Ukrainians were seen as the “Little Russians” by Russians meaning that they were culturally and linguistically close to the “Great Russians”, the Russian Empire tried to prevent the emergence of any nationalism other than the officially defined one. As the Ukrainian sense of nationhood started to emerge, the Russian Empire tried to hamper the rise of Ukrainian nationalism through religion and education. Since non-Orthodox Ukrainians were high in number and many of them supported the 1830-31 Polish uprising, the Greek Catholic Church was forbidden in the Russian Empire. Russification through education was realised via promoting the use of Russian language both in primary and higher education and the closure of the Polish-language schools. Simultaneously, Ukrainian national consciousness was emerging in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Ukrainian cultural rebirth through publication of the first books in modern Ukrainian and collection of Ukrainian folk tales and dialects paved the way for making sense of the differences between Russians and Ukrainians. Hereby, to emphasize Ukrainians’ distinctiveness, the term “Ukrainian” started to be used first by historian Mykhaylo Maksymovych starting in the 1830s (Kubicek, 2008: 54-56).

The Ukrainian national consciousness gained a political character with the formation of “the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius” in 1845 in the Russian Empire. Among its members, intellectuals like historian Mykola Kostomarov and poet

---

<sup>10</sup> Narodnost is defined originally to mean “literary fidelity to Russia’s distinct cultural heritage”.

Taras Shevchenko emphasized the differences between Ukrainian and Russian political values claiming to be democratic and despotic respectively. Along with Kostomarov's political ideas of cultural autonomy and liberal constitutionalism, Shevchenko took on a revolutionary and nationalist viewpoint which influenced the advocates of Ukrainian national independence in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Russian Empire's policy of official nationalism conversely contributed to the Ukrainian intelligentsia's engagement with the studies of history, folklore, ethnography and philology (Molchanov, 2002: 70-71).

In 1847, the Brotherhood was disjointed. However, to propagate the ideas of Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia, secret communities –*hromadas*– were organized and books were published in Ukrainian by students in cities like Kyiv and St. Petersburg in the 1860s. In order to counter the rise of the Ukrainian movement, the Russian Empire took some prohibitive measures. The use of the Ukrainian language was restricted in 1863 with a ban on the publication of educational and religious works in Ukrainian. The publication of all Ukrainian writings and the performance of plays and songs in Ukrainian were forbidden in 1876 and 1881 respectively. Besides, all *hromadas* were dissolved and their members were either fired or exiled (Kubicek, 2008: 56-58).

In the emergence of the Ukrainian national consciousness, Szporluk (1997: 88-110) draws attention both to the Polish influence in Ukrainians' social and cultural environment and the Austrian rule in western Ukraine for more than a century. With the incorporation of previously Polish-ruled areas of Galicia and Ottoman-ruled region of Bukovyna into the Habsburg Empire in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Ukrainians experienced a new kind of governance. Especially the political reforms and serfs' becoming legal subjects under the Austrian rule contributed to the emergence of the Ukrainians as a political community. Nevertheless, he underlines that Ukrainians' first higher identity was "Ruthenian", not Ukrainian. With the creation of a single Galicia predominantly inhabited by the Poles in 1772 under the Austrian rule, the region witnessed more Polonisation in comparison with the previous four centuries of Poland's rule. Polish language was the language of education, literacy and civic affairs in the region. This rendered the prominence of Polish ideas and Polonism possible. However, Szporluk argues that the idea of a Ukrainian nation formation did not emerge in Galicia under

the Austrian rule even though it is assumed so. He purports that wishing to belong to a larger Ukrainian nation first arose in Russia. After Ruthenianism and mass Polonisation, starting in the 1830s, Austria's Ruthenians turned to and felt belonging to that larger community of Slavic people.

Within this context, it is crucial to touch on the importance of language as signifying ethnicity, nationalism and ideology. Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Latin alphabet was widely used to record Polish and Ukrainian language texts, and also religious texts especially for the believers of the Uniate in the Right Bank Ukraine and in various parts of the Ukrainian land. Although the Latinisation of the alphabet was not associated with ideological connotations at that time, from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, choosing between Latin and Cyrillic alphabets was transformed into an identification choice whether as Ruthenian, Little Russian and/or Ukrainian. Starting with the Polish uprising of 1830 and political struggles of 1848 in Galicia, the use of Latin script or Cyrillic characterized a competition between cultural, religious and national discourses. The overlapping nature of linguistic and sociocultural divisions in the Ukrainian lands witnessed a competition between Polish and Russian nationalities. In the Right Bank Ukraine, the use of Latin script became a pro-Polish political and cultural propaganda and a symbol of the establishment of contact with European culture while the use of Cyrillic became a symbol of civilisational unity with the rest of the Orthodox culture. Cyrillic alphabet's victory over the Latin in Galicia at the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century corresponds to the Russian Empire's perception of the Ukrainian language in Latin orthography as a threat to the Russian nationalism and loyalty to the Empire. In this regard, the ban on the use of Latin alphabet in the Ukrainian language in 1859 –and later in the Belorussian and Lithuanian languages- came as a response to the envisaged Polish expansion by means of literary influence at the expense of the Russian nationality. Herewith, the ideologisation of the language as a medium for identity formation became an essential instrument for assimilating the East Slavic population into one nation in the Russian Empire (Miller and Ostapchuk, 2009: 169-185).

Politically suppressed by the Tsarist regime, Ukrainians also suffered from the economic domination of the Russian Empire. The urbanisation of Ukraine followed a course that took shape mostly without the participation of Ukrainians since the

Russians, Poles and Jews mostly inhabited the cities and industrial centres of Ukraine. Ukrainian peasantry constituted the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population. Russians' immigration into the cities and industrial centres of Ukraine rendered Russification in the cities and towns in a more significant and visible manner in comparison to the Ukrainian peasantry. This in turn inhibited the cities' potential for becoming a source of Ukrainian nationalist movement since most Ukrainians as the least urbanized national group in the Ukrainian lands lacked the human and institutional resources of the cities like the intelligentsia, schools and newspapers. Without an urban base, Ukrainian national movement was in need of the support of the peasantry who was mostly illiterate (Krawchenko, 1987: 2-21).

At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, both cultural and political organisations were reproduced in order to increase the Ukrainian national consciousness with the efforts of the older intelligentsia and university students. The Taras Brotherhood was founded in 1891 as an underground grouping that called for liberation from the tsarist absolutism till its dissolution in 1893. The General Ukrainian Non-Party Democratic Organisation gathered around twenty *hromada* societies in 1897 to raise cultural awareness in villages. Although these *hromodas* were apolitical in essence, they paved the way for the emergence of political organisations. The first Ukrainian political party in the Russian Empire was established in 1900 with the name of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) (Kubicek, 2008: 61) calling for independence by university students in Kharkiv. Since founding a Ukrainian political organisation was not allowed by the Empire, the Party had to remain underground which in turn prevented it from expanding its base (Magosci, 2010: 402).

The RUP faced political fragmentation in 1903-1904 with the emergence of three main branches with different ideological motives. The Ukrainian National Party adopted a more nationalist stance on ethnic composition of the Empire by otherising Russians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians and Romanians. Spilka (the Union) based on its more socialist stance supported cooperating with Russian socialist parties. The Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party emerged as a more centre party with its call for Ukrainian autonomy and socialist stance. Although Ukrainian political life experienced pluralism to some extent with the formation of several political parties like the Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party, Ukrainian political parties at the

beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century lacked support and interest of most of the Ukrainian society comprised of peasants and industrial workers (Kubicek, 2008: 61).

Since Ukrainians were portrayed as natural members of the East Slavic family governed by the Great Russians in the official narrative of the Empire, Ukrainian nationalism was perceived as an unnatural and separatist movement provoked by foreign powers (Molchanov, 2002: 72). However, in the western Ukraine, a separate Ukrainian identity was recognized by Austria-Hungary towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Austrian government allowed education and publishing in Ukrainian language and formation of political parties. That in turn strengthened the sense of national identity and commonality among Ukrainian-speaking community in both Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. Ukrainians in the Russian Empire having the only opportunity of publishing in the Galician journals got a chance of influencing their counterparts in Galicia (Kubicek, 2008: 71-72).

The Greek Catholic Church was crucial for the emergence of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. At the beginning of the movement, the leading figures were clerics who advocated the idea of commonality with and belonging to the Eastern Rus' world. As the divisions among the Old Ruthenian, Ukrainophile and Russophile orientations became sharpened in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Church adopted a Ukrainianist stance. The call for Ukrainian independence became also prominent in the political parties which began to be formed by 1890 in Galicia. In this regard, the Radical Party, National Democratic Party and Ukrainian Social Democratic Party first embraced the idea of partition of Galicia into two parts and then Eastern Galicia's unification with Dnieper Ukraine under the rule of the Russian Empire to form an independent Ukraine (Magosci, 2010: 475-478).

The difference in the progress of the Ukrainian national movement on the two sides of the Russian-Austrian border was loud and clear as Subtelny (1997: 335) writes:

*When Ukrainians from the Russian Empire visited Galicia in the early years of the 20th century, they were invariably struck by the progress their western compatriots had made. In Kiev it was still forbidden to publish a book in Ukrainian, but in L'viv one found Ukrainian learned societies, schools, headquarters of mass organizations and cooperatives, newspapers, political parties, and parliamentary representatives.*

The Ukrainian national movement experienced a limited liberty thanks to permission of the establishment of political parties, educational societies and publishing in languages other than Russian with the effect of the 1905 Revolution in the Russian Empire. However, by 1908 post-revolutionary era turned to tsarist absolutism. Publishing in Ukrainian was banned once again in 1910 and Ukrainian political and cultural self-expressions were repressed on the ground of Ukrainian separatism. Ukrainians' national consciousness remained poorly developed especially among the masses in the outbreak of the World War I (Kubicek, 2008: 62).

### **III. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN UKRAINE IN THE 20<sup>th</sup> CENTURY: THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION (1917-1920)**

Ukrainians lacked a state of their own at the outset of the First World War. As their lands were divided between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, Ukrainians fought for both of the warring sides in the war. The Russian Empire's capture of Austrian ruled Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna in 1914 explicitly denoted Russian desire for annexing these lands and thus preventing the spread of Ukrainian nationalism into Dnipro Ukraine. In accordance with this desire, the Russian authorities closed Ukrainian cultural organisations, periodicals and cooperatives, suppressed the Greek Catholic Church and tried to switch the language of instruction in schools from Ukrainian to Russian in the occupied Austro-Hungarian lands (Yekelchuk, 2007: 66-67).

As the Russian troops had to retreat from the occupied Austro-Hungarian lands due to the Austrian-German counteroffensive forces, the Austro-Hungarian Empire engaged in supporting the Ukrainian national movement against the Russian Empire. In this regard, Austrian-Hungarian official support for the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" and the General Ukrainian Council which called for independence for the Russian Ukraine but autonomy for Eastern Galicia implied the loyalty of the Galician Ukrainians to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, as the concepts of nationality and ethnicity emerged as an inseparable part of identity during the war, Ukrainians on the territories of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires possessed a sense of

belonging to a unique Ukrainian nation with a claim to a sovereign state enabling the existence of Ukrainian language and culture (Yekelchyk, 2007: 66-67).

The February Revolution of 1917, the Russian civil war, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires all contributed to the rediscovery of ethnicity by Ukrainians. As the Russian Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the throne, the Provisional Government -formed by the liberal members of the Duma- and the “Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers” -formed by the activists of the Revolution in major cities- emerged as dual power (Yekelchyk, 2007: 70). As the February Revolution influenced all parts of the Russian Empire, it became a national revolution for non-Russian territories (Zhukovsky, 1984).

In this regard, Ukrainian nationalists adding the third edge to dual power relations established the “Ukrainian National Council” which was named as “Central Rada” to direct the Ukrainian Revolution. Thanks to the fading authority of the central administration, Ukrainian intelligentsia could use the proliferation of Ukrainian institutions and political parties. Among the influential instruments, there were the “Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party”, “Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists” and “Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party”, the press and the instruction of Ukrainian in primary education for political mobilisation of the predominantly peasant population. Guthier emphasizes the fact that in the revolutionary era, the peasantry constituted the popular base of the Ukrainian nationalism. Since the Russification policies targeted primarily Ukrainians in the cities and industrial centres, *“the village remained the preserve of Ukrainian ethnicity; 88 percent of the region’s peasants were ethnically Ukrainian ... provided the foundation for a political movement which combined nationalism with a populist social program”* (Guthier, 1979: 31-32). The peasantry was the foundation of the Ukrainian movement and this was also reflective on the results of the elections in November and December of 1917 to the “All-Russian Constituent Assembly”. While the Ukrainian parties got 67.8 percent of the votes, they generated support not from urban centres and major cities (Yekelchyk, 2007: 71) that *“were islands of non-Ukrainian language and culture”* (Guthier, 1979: 41).

Himka (2006: 487-488) draws attention to the eastern Ukrainian elites’ reluctance towards the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state during the initial stages of the Ukrainian Revolution. The Ukrainian elites in the “Central Rada”

declared the establishment of the “Ukrainian People’s Republic” or “Ukrainian National Republic” (UNR) in November 1917. However, they did not recognize the Soviet Russia and declared that the UNR was part of a federated Russian state that they hoped to be restored in the near future. It was the military offensive of the Bolsheviks that made the Ukrainian elites aware of the fact that their options were either independence or national annihilation (Wolczuk, 2001: 36). As a response to the Central Rada’s declaration of full independence of the UNR, the Bolsheviks declared the Soviet Ukrainian Republic in Kharkiv in December 1917 due to the fear of losing the major industrial and agricultural regions of the former Russian Empire. The Bolsheviks made it explicit that they would advance militarily until the Central Rada in Kyiv was dissolved (Yekelchuk, 2007: 72-73).

Meanwhile, the UNR signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in February 1918. When the German army occupied Ukraine under the pretext of helping Ukrainians against the Bolsheviks, the Central Rada’s administration was collapsed. With the Germans’ support, a descendant of Cossack Hetman General Pavlo Skoropadskyi came to power and established the Hetmanate in April 1918 (Wolczuk, 2001: 37). Although Skoropadskyi was a Russian-speaking former tsarist general, Ukraine under Skoropadskyi’s Hetmanate witnessed the recovery of Ukrainian culture and education thanks to the establishment of more than 150 schools with instruction in Ukrainian, two new universities and several cultural institutions. In addition to the formation of the first Ukrainian corps, by establishing diplomatic relations with some European states, the Hetmanate took vital steps for a separate Ukrainian state formation until its fall due to the German defeat in World War I. A new Ukrainian government led by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura was formed and called the Directory to restore the UNR (Kubicek, 2008: 84-85).

In western Ukraine, Galician Ukrainians pursued a total independence with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the fall of 1918 and established the “Western Ukrainian People’s Republic” –or “West Ukrainian National Republic” in some sources- (ZUNR). They found themselves at war with the Poles over Eastern Galicia. The Polish forces also fought the army of Petliura in the UNR which made the Polish army the common enemy for both parts of Ukraine (Wolczuk, 2001: 37). Ukrainian-Polish war turned into a Soviet-Polish war and in the meantime, the

Ukrainian populated lands of Bukovyna and Transcarpatia were ceased to an enlarged Romanian state and Czechoslovakia respectively (Kubicek, 2008: 86).

With the Act of Unity in January 1919, the UNR and ZUNR were unified into one state. However, the differences in ideologies and interests between the two Ukraines prevented an actual unification. The Directory fought different enemies -the Bolsheviks, the Whites and the anarchist-peasant forces- simultaneously. In order to avoid the installation of a Ukrainian Soviet administration by the Bolsheviks, the Directory allied with the Whites. Nevertheless, the Whites seized control of Ukraine and reversed the nation building efforts of the Directory by banning the use of Ukrainian and arresting the Ukrainian intelligentsia. In these premises, the Directory entered into an alliance with the Poles against both the Whites and the Bolsheviks (Yekelchuk, 2007: 82). In accordance with the Treaty of Warsaw in April 1920 between the UNR and Poland, Eastern Galicia was left to Poland in exchange for military help. With the Treaty of Riga in March 1921, the Soviets recognized the Polish takeover of Eastern Galicia and Volynia. The UNR's alliance with Poland was perceived as betrayal by western Ukraine and led them to cooperate with the Whites signifying the failure of a state-building project (Wolczuk, 2001: 38).

#### **IV. UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIET RULE (1921-1991)**

In 1922, the “Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” -originally the “Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic” until 1936- (Ukrainian SSR or Soviet Ukraine hereafter) was created as one of the four constituent parts –along with Russia, Belarus and Transcaucasia- of the USSR (or the Soviet Union hereafter) (Magosci, 2010: 566). Being a constituent part of the Soviet Union and also the Soviet Union's acknowledgement of the name “Ukrainians” instead of calling them “Little Russians” meant in theory that the Ukrainian SSR was a sovereign state within the federated Soviet Union (Pritsak and Reshetar, 1963: 254). However, in practice it lacked any independent sphere of jurisdiction without a separate currency, citizenship distinct from that of the Soviet Union, competence to develop its own policies and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world outside joint delegation of the USSR (Rudnytsky, 1972: 237-238).

At the beginning of the Soviet rule, it was expected to embed an indigenisation or nativisation through cultural and linguistic policies. The 1920 *korenizatsiya* intended to spread Bolshevism into Soviet Union's non-Russian union republics and ethnic minorities (Wolczuk, 2000: 672). Reflecting the ideology of decolonisation, this policy perceived Cyrillic as a symbol of Russian imperialism and Russification policies and so promoted the use of local languages in administration and education (Miller and Ostapchuk, 2009: 188).

Thanks to this policy of the Soviets, Ukrainisation was put into practice in political, educational, linguistic and cultural spheres in the 1920s. One of the main manifestations of this policy was the tremendous increase in the number of ethnic Ukrainians both in members of the Communist Party of Ukraine and government officials who composed of mostly ethnically Russian and Jewish until 1927. The government prioritized the Ukrainian's use in education, media and arts. Herewith, the number of institutions offering primary and higher education in the Ukrainian language increased. Also, the books and newspapers published in the Ukrainian language flourished in the 1920s (Kubicek, 2008: 99). This policy of Ukrainisation especially through education contributed to the formation of a Ukrainian culture that was absent in eastern Ukraine (Subtelny, 2000: 394). As Krawchenko (1987: 47) states a salient impact was that by 1926, the percentage of Ukrainians identifying themselves as Ukrainian reached 80% whereas only 9.2% identified themselves as Russian among the people concentrating in the industrial regions of south and south-east regions of Ukraine.

However, it should be noted that this policy of Ukrainisation was part of the long-term goal of the Soviet regime aiming to create unity between the minorities and Russians through temporary diversity. Soviet leaders believed that by permitting minorities to use their own languages, literacy would rise. This in turn would make them want to adopt Russian as a second language since it represents a stronger culture than those of the minorities' and "*the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole*" (Weinstein, 1941: 124-125).

With the effects of this Ukrainisation policy, demands for cultural and political independence for Ukraine were verbalized. Ukrainian nationalism was seen as

nurturing resistance to the politics of the “Communist Party of the Soviet Union”, which clashed with the strengthening of the Bolsheviks (Shkandrij, 2012: 431). In order to prevent any separatist idea and to create a Soviet Ukrainian identity instead of a national Ukrainian one, by the end of 1920s, the Soviet regime concentrated on slowing down the policy of Ukrainisation. All Ukrainian nationalist leaders were started to be purged from their positions and several arrests were made. Dealing with the threat of nationalism of the minorities –non-Russians- to the unity and solidarity of the nations comprising the USSR concurred with the industrialisation, urbanisation and collectivisation policies, which in turn vitally affected the minorities since they were mostly peasants (Borys, 1972: 222-225). In Ukrainian case, the result was the Great Famine of 1932-1933 which is known as the *Holodomor* causing the death of millions because of Stalin’s decision “*to raise Ukraine’s grain procurement quotas in 1932 by 44%*” (Subtelny, 2000: 413).

In the 1930s, *korenizatsiya* policy of the Soviet Union started to be implemented through Russification (Shkandrij, 2012: 431). The history of Ukraine was considered equal to the history of the Ukrainian SSR and the national history was thought as inseparable part of the history of the Soviet Union in the education system (Kas’ianov, 2011: 72). Any references to the works of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, a leading Ukrainian historian emphasising the differences between Ukrainians and Russians, were banned by the Soviet Union. The official Soviet historiography portrayed the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1917-1921) as an origination of bourgeois nationalism which was hostile to the Bolsheviks who achieved the “*national and economic emancipation of Ukrainian peasants and workers*” (Wolczuk, 2000: 673). Reflecting the Russian chauvinism, Russian language became compulsory in the Ukrainian education system and the Ukrainian alphabet, grammar and vocabulary were harmonized to Russian which in turn increased the use of Russian in Ukraine (Subtelny, 2000: 423).

Meanwhile, in the western Ukrainian lands prior to the World War II, Ukrainian populations experienced different political administrations. While Ukrainians under the rule of Romania faced with restrictions for the use of Ukrainian language and severe Romanisation, Ukrainians under the Czechoslovak rule benefited from Czechoslovakia’s consideration itself as a Slavic state and experienced a

constructive environment for political and national expressions (Magosci, 2010: 645-646). Further to that, Eastern Galicia under the rule of Poland witnessed the development of a crucial Ukrainian actor – the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN was an extremist underground political organisation that aimed to establish an independent and ethnically homogenous Ukrainian nation-state and backed up by its armed wing – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (Erlacher, 2013: 290).

Subtelny draws attention to the OUN's use of conspiratorial tactics and political terror against the Polish government along with its popularity especially among the youth prior to the World War II with an estimation of 20.000 members (Subtelny, 2000: 444). During the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the OUN and UPA that collaborated with the Nazis and the Ukrainian nationalists "*were glorified as fighters for an independent Ukrainian state against both Soviet and Nazi occupations*" (Ishchenko, 2011: 370). After the Soviet Union's suppression of the OUN militarily in the late 1940s, its support base was tried to be erased with the discourse of a morally pure and monolithic Soviet community, which excluded those who did not take action against the Nazis or collaborated with them. However, the OUN managed to exist and fight against the Soviets during the Cold War era (Erlacher, 2013: 290-293).

As part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact prior to the Second World War, Poland was invaded by the Soviet and German troops. The Soviet invasion of Poland from the east made the Soviet control of all Ukrainian lands possible. The divided territories of the western Ukraine under the rule of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were incorporated into the USSR in 1945, which was portrayed as the reunification of Ukraine since these lands merged with the Ukrainian SSR. Later in 1954 under Khrushchev, with the transfer of mostly Russian populated Crimea from the Russian Republic to the Ukrainian SSR, Ukraine's territory reached its current situation. The Soviet rule was reinforced in western Ukraine –with the exception of Galicia in order not to alienate the whole population- by closing down many Ukrainian newspapers and journals, arresting the leaders of non-communist Ukrainian political parties and establishing its own administration. After Stalin's totalitarian regime, Khrushchev's relatively more liberal and reformist administration gave space to some manifestations

of Ukrainian national sentiments in political, economic and literary spheres. This in turn made it possible for Ukrainian intellectuals to speak up against the suppressive politics of the Soviet regime, to demand more freedom for expression and Ukrainian culture and to call for Ukrainian independence in the 1960s. However, under Brezhnev's and the Soviet Ukrainian government's rule in the 1970s, opponents were hunted down, purged from their political, academic or cultural positions and arrested; making the Ukrainians the largest ethnic group among all Soviet political prisoners by the early 1980s (Kubicek, 2008: 107-115).

When Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, the policies of *glasnost* (openness), *perestroika* (economic restructuring) and *demokratizatsiia* (democratisation) were instituted in the Soviet Union. Although the intended aim was to preserve Soviet identity, new freedom of expression thanks to *glasnost* enabled the USSR's nationalities –minorities- to voice their national aspirations and demands for independence (Subtelny, 2000: 574). Despite the initiation of union-wide and rapid reforms, Ukraine was kept as an exception since -thanks to its population and industrial production- its existence and the Soviet control over it were seen as essential to preserve the power of the Soviet Union. For this reason, the immediate result of Gorbachev's reforms and path towards independence showed differences. With the application of reforms in the Baltic countries, the Baltic nations' demands for using their own languages, more space for their cultures and eventual independence were galvanized instantly. However, in Ukraine, the reforms were blocked or slowed down by the Ukrainian Communist Party (Blaj, 2013: 166-167).

Nevertheless, the effects of Gorbachev's reform policies were revitalising the opponent Ukrainian intelligentsia and airing of dissatisfactions with the Soviet regime. The first attempts for change came from the civil movements and nationalist organisations emerging in the western part of the country and not from a reformed Communist Party as opposed to the Baltic countries. The most prominent ones with the participation of former political prisoners, intellectuals, students, artists and workers at the end of 1980s were: the "Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia" (UANTI) which brought up the independence issue through publication, the first nationalist environmental organisation "*Zelenyi Svit*" ("Green

World”) which was formed as a reaction after the Chernobyl disaster, the “Ukrainian Culturological Club” calling for discussion and questioning of Ukrainian Soviet History, “*Tovarystvo Leva*” (“Lion’s Society”) calling for democracy and sovereignty of Ukraine and the “Ukrainian Helsinki Union” uttering democratic demands (Surzhko-Harned, 2010: 638-639). Ukrainian national movement was centred in western Ukraine and the capital city Kiev. In addition to nationalist and environmentalist organisations, religious organisations started to be influential in the national question. In western Ukraine where the Soviet regime banned the Greek Catholic Church, Church notables publicly struggled for the relegalisation of their Church. Thanks to *glasnost*, long suppressed religious organisations became active again. In 1989, the Greek Catholic Church was officially recognized by the Soviet authorities (Kubicek, 2008: 125-128).

Proliferation of civil and national groups and especially the formation of the “Ukrainian National Rukh” as the popular front in 1989, their demonstrations and boycott of elections of the “All-Union Congress of People’s Deputies” in 1989 were effective in pushing for democratisation and sovereignty of Ukraine. The first multi-party election in Ukraine’s history was held in March 1990. In the parliamentary elections, the Democratic Bloc, which consisted of 40 organisations, advocated Ukrainian political, economic and cultural sovereignty competed with the “Communist Party of Ukraine”. The result was the victory of the Communist Party. What was essential after the elections was that the civil and national organisations became political parties. Three key nationalist parties in Ukraine in 1990 included the “Rukh”, “Ukrainian Democratic Party” and “Democratic Party of Ukraine” (Surzhko-Harned, 2010: 640).

In early 1990, with the change of leadership in the Ukrainian Communist Party –the ouster of Shcherbytsky who was against the reforms-, there was a transformation in the monolithic structure of the party causing a division between the elites as either pro- or anti-reforms. The “Ukrainian Supreme Soviet” passed a language law making Ukrainian the official language with the aim of enhancing its use in government, education and media (Kubicek, 2008: 130-131). In July 1990, the Ukrainian Rada pressurized by the Rukh took the decision of the “Declaration of State Sovereignty” by a vote of 355 to 4. Without claiming full independence, Ukraine declared its right

to establish a separate military force, a separate citizenship and use its own currency (Clines, 1990). This decision was implemented due to the pressure by students' hunger strike in Kyiv in October 1990 and the workers' threat of a strike in Kiev. The Ukrainian Rada refused to sign the "New Union Treaty" until a new constitution was adopted. The constitution condition was used as a tactic by the pro-independence Ukrainian leaders to delay signature of the Treaty, which was Gorbachev's proposal to restructure the Soviet Union by allowing greater authority for republics (Blaj, 2013: 168).

In addition to growing nationalism and demands for independence in Ukraine, there were two decisive factors in the drive for Ukrainian independence. The first one was the increase in demands for economic improvement by the eastern parts of Ukraine that were heavily industrialized and consisted of a considerable proportion of ethnic Russian population who considered the rule from Moscow as disadvantageous for Ukrainian economy (Kubicek, 2008: 130). The second one was the aspirations of the conservative members of the Ukrainian Communist Party for keeping Ukraine out of Gorbachev's and later Yeltsin's reforms. They made an alliance with the nationalist groups in the referendum of March 1991, whereby Ukrainians were asked three questions of whether they want Ukraine to be part of a renewed federation of equal sovereign states, to be independent and to be part of a union of Soviet states. Because of this alliance, the result of independence became possible (Blaj, 2013: 169). Last but not least, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk who just became the chairman of the "Ukrainian Supreme Soviet" was aware of the growing power of the Ukrainian nationalist groups and managed to use nationalism in his favour as he became the first president of Ukraine that became independent with the decision taken by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on August 24, 1991 (Surzhko-Harned, 2010: 641).

## **V. ADJUSTING TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR: THE EAST-WEST DICHOTOMY IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE**

In newly independent Ukraine, the Soviet legacy was prevailing in norms, values and institutions since it was among the most Russified and Sovietized republics of the USSR. Since the Sovietisation went parallel with the incorporation of Ukraine's

perceived Little Russian ethnocultural element into Soviet Ukrainian identity, Ukrainian-Little Russian dualism in addition to Soviet-Russian dualism was present (Kravchenko, 2015-2016: 447-450). Therefore, in newly independent Ukraine, identity remained strongly regionalized. Hybrid or multiple identities of Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet and some kind of a mixture existed. Western Ukraine remained as one of the least Russian, Russified and Soviet regions of Ukraine by virtue of its historical relationship with Poland and its rather late incorporation into Russian/Soviet rule. Conversely, the eastern parts of Ukraine have developed a quite different sense of national identity because of its historical encounter with Russia. The new state also embodied a large Russian minority who identified themselves with the Russian and/or Soviet identity. In order to foster a national identity, supra-national –Soviet- and subnational –regional- identities had to be outpaced (Wolczuk, 2000: 671-674).

Besides, Ukraine inherited the former Soviet elites –*nomenklatura*-. Although the Soviet-era Communist Party was banned in 1991, the same politicians and industrial managers who were carrying the Soviet policies in Ukraine became the founding fathers of the independent Ukrainian state and entered the parliament. An implicit deal between the old regime and the opposition was made to preserve independence and territorial integrity of the new state (Yekelchuk, 2007: 193). This meant establishing Ukraine's distinctness from Russia. At this stage, history was appealed to legitimize the newly independent state and Ukraine's ruling elites began the process of historicising national identity.

They adhered to what Kuzio defines as “Ukrainophile school of thought” which was banned and defined negatively as nationalist during the Soviet administration and became dominant over Russophile, Sovietophile and Eastern Slavic schools of thought in the post-Soviet era. The Ukrainophile school based on Hrushevsky's ideas recognizes Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group and perceives Ukraine as the legitimate successor of Kievan Rus'. It demands the enhancement of the use of Ukrainian language, national symbols and Ukraine's return to Europe. It was promoted by Ukraine's ruling elites as a requirement of nation-building and independent statehood. During the administrations of Presidents Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid Danylovych Kuchma (1994-2005), they both took steps for the introduction and consolidation of Ukrainophile school into the education system

and armed forces although their personal views on history and ideology was closer to the Eastern Slavic school (Kuzio, 2006: 407-411).<sup>11</sup>

### **A. Kravchuk Era and the Consolidation of the Statehood (1991-1994)**

Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk's administration aimed at establishing strong state institutions. 800,000 soldiers, 200 nuclear-armed missiles and the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea inherited from the Soviet Union were advocated to be kept in Ukraine as a way to protect Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity. The use of Ukrainian language was promoted (Kubicek, 2008: 142). Although the ruling elite envisioned the Ukrainisation process to be gradual, shortly after the independence, opposition of Crimea and Donbas region to Ukraine's independence and the Ukrainisation process resulted in the acceleration of the opposition groups' efforts to guarantee the Russianness of these lands. In Crimea which was given autonomous status in 1991, the parliament passed a declaration of independence in 1992 which was repealed later. Simultaneously, local movements in eastern Ukraine demanded regional autonomy, official status for Russian language in the eastern regions and dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship (Nahaylo, 1999: 434).

On the other hand, Kravchuk gained the support of the western Ukrainians. Ukrainian flag, state emblem and anthem were chosen to reflect a distinct Ukrainian national history. Kravchuk as a former Communist Party member employed much of the national democrats' programme which in return brought him their support. However, Kravchuk underestimated economic and political reforms. He centralised authority in his own hands with the lack of broader marketisation, privatisation and democratisation in addition to high levels of corruption (Kubicek, 2008: 142-143).

The deterioration of economic conditions in western and central Ukraine led to the rise of radical right groups whereas in the eastern and southern Ukraine, communist

---

<sup>11</sup> As opposed to this view, the Russophile school sees Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians as an organic unity under Kievan Rus'. It claims Ukrainians and Belarusians to be only appeared with the division after the collapse of Kievan Rus' and so Russian Empire as the direct successor. In a similar vein, the Sovietophile school claims the Russian Empire as the successor of the Kievan Rus' legacy and treats all three Eastern Slavic groups as originating in Kievan Rus' and Ukrainians as a Russian sub-regional group. The Eastern Slavic school recognizes Ukrainians as separate ethnic group while sees Ukrainians and Russians as equal inheritors of Kievan Rus'.

and pro-Russian groups became influential. The raising voices of opposition groups and workers' strikes in eastern and southern Ukraine forced the government to hold early parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994 (Nahaylo, 1999: 450). The parliamentary election witnessed the run of many candidates as independents, reflecting the weakness of political parties. National democratic parties such as Rukh obtained little support while the candidates with communist past and ties obtained the majority of the seats. However, the voter turnout remained low, resulting in filling 338 of 450 seats. In the presidential elections, the main competition was between President Kravchuk who was backed by national democrats and Prime Minister Leonid Danylovyh Kuchma, an anti-communist elite from eastern Ukraine. While Kravchuk was supported by the nationalist and Ukrainian speaking voters concentrated in the western and central Ukraine by gaining 45.1% of the votes, Kuchma was elected as president with 52.2% of the votes mainly from eastern and southern regions of Ukraine (Kubicek, 2008: 145).

### **B. Kuchma Era and the Orientation towards “Europe Together with Russia” (1994-2004)**

In the electoral campaign, Leonid Danylovyh Kuchma criticised Kravchuk and his national democratic allies as romantic Galician nationalists, positioned Ukraine as a multinational state and proposed to give Russian language the official status alongside Ukrainian. Besides, Kuchma argued that Ukraine has been a part of Eurasia and its national interests should be furthered in the territory of the former Soviet Union. National democrats feared that Kuchma would surrender national sovereignty by leading Ukraine to an integration with Russia. However, in need of gaining support of the national democrats in a parliament overwhelmingly comprised of left-wing members, Kuchma emphasized Ukrainian national sovereignty, pushed for a new constitution in 1996 which vested sovereignty in the Ukrainian people, settled Ukrainian language as the only official language with a commitment to its development and acted as a conciliator between the post-*nomenklatura*, executive elite and the national democrats. He also continued the process of historicising national identity based on Hrushevskyi's scheme. According to the official interpretation, while

Kievan Rus' was seen as the proto-state of the modern Ukraine, the Cossack Host was seen as the first attempt to resurrect it, the Ukrainian People's Republic the second and post-1991 Ukraine the third. Since the Soviet Ukraine was presented as a stepping stone for independent Ukraine, the elites abstained from an explicit condemnation of the Soviet rule (Wolczuk, 2000: 678-681).

Kuchma made moves to strengthen the Ukrainian state. In 1995, Ukraine became a part of the cooperation agreement with NATO and Kuchma expressed officially Ukraine's will to join the EU. Worried by Ukraine's tendency towards integration into the European institutions, Russian President Boris Yeltsin recognized Ukraine's territorial integrity and borders by signing a friendship agreement with Ukraine and divided the Black Sea Fleet (Yekelchuk, 2007: 204). Although Kuchma was elected as president thanks to the votes from more Russified eastern Ukraine, he wanted to gain the support of western and central regions. In 1998, "the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration to the European Union" was adopted through which first association, and then eventual full membership was aimed. Becoming a full-fledged EU member was acknowledged as a national interest and foreign policy priority of Ukraine (President of Ukraine L. Kuchma, 1998). Through his "multi-vector" foreign policy, Kuchma's rhetorical emphasis on Ukraine's European heritage, identity, culture and his wish to be integrated into European economic, political and security organisations were balanced with his emphasis on the need to cooperate with the "Commonwealth of Independent States" (CIS) (Shulman, 2005: 41).

In 1998 and 1999, parliamentary and presidential elections were held respectively. The Communists supported by the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine emerged as the biggest winners by gaining 121 seats whereas national democrats gained only 46 seats out of 450 in the parliamentary elections. However, candidates from small parties created by presidential administration or oligarchic clans and wealthy businesspersons as independents dominated the parliament by gaining 161 seats (Kubicek, 2008: 147). In the presidential elections, Kuchma ran as an independent candidate and developed the discourse of "red revanche" against the leftists by putting the threat of disintegration forward. This time, his support base was more right of the centre although he was elected with the support of eastern and southern regions last time. Although he did not undertake economic reforms and

economy was shrinking, his electoral campaign benefited from his use of state resources and control over media, which disseminated biased information in favour of the president and gave almost no space for political opposition. The result was re-election of Kuchma as president in 1999 by 56.3% against Petro Symonenko from the Communist Party who took 36% of the votes (Birch, 2002: 339-343).

During the 1990s, some businesspeople –so-called oligarchs- made huge profits from the economic transition and became able to exert influence in politics. Melnykovska and Schweickert ascertain that the oligarchic clans have been the most powerful bottom-up forces by gaining dominance over the state authorities and “controlling the enforcement and implementation of institutional reforms” (Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2008: 448). Kuchma and various oligarchic clans solidified their power in the state administration and his presidency became associated with oligarchic rule which was perceived as corrupt. In 2000, Kuchma changed his tune from Ukraine’s European choice to “Europe together with Russia”. Political, economic and security relations with Russia were strengthened. Membership in NATO and the EU was no longer placed as a foreign policy priority (Shulman, 2005: 36-41). However, Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych managed to get consensus of the parliamentary faction of the Party of Regions in 2003 to vote unanimously for a “Law on the Fundamentals of National Security in Ukraine” which stated joining NATO and the EU as Ukraine’s objectives (Haran and Zolkina, 2014: 1-2). Nevertheless, the president took steps to enhance cooperation with Russia. An agreement for the creation of the “Single Economic Space” aiming to establish a free trade zone, a customs union and a monetary union gradually among Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was ratified in 2004 (Shulman, 2005: 41).

During Kuchma’s second term, the main source of opposition to his administration and oligarchic allies started to shift from the “Communist Party” and its “Socialist Party” allies to national democrats and centrists. The two political opposition parties –Victor Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine Party” that managed to win the proportional half of the 2002 parliamentary elections and the “Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko” (BYuT)- started the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement, which turned into mass protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Opposition to Kuchma’s party of power on the grounds of authoritarian rule, corruption and murder of opponent

journalists failed to produce political change in 2001-2002. However, with their success in the 2002 parliamentary elections, the Ukrainian parliament managed to reject the proposal for changing the constitution to allow Kuchma to run for a third term (Kubicek, 2008: 166-167).

### **C. The Orange Revolution and Yushchenko Era (2004-2010)**

In the campaign for 2004 presidential elections, the main competition was to take place between opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko and any candidate chosen by Kuchma and supported by his oligarchic allies to maintain autocratic rule and personal interests. Kuchma, who would not be able to continue his presidency due to the failure of passing the needed constitutional reforms, set a loyal successor and backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich from Donetsk in eastern Ukraine as his heir (Kuzio, 2005: 29-30). White and Feklyunina (2014: 143) point out to Yanukovich's campaign as resting on a deliberate polarisation of society between pro-Russian and pro-European sections. Kuchma administration positioned Yanukovich as "a great friend of Russia" while portraying Yushchenko whose emphasis was on European values, the rule of law, social justice and fighting with corruption as a radical nationalist who would oppress Russian-speaking population in case of winning (Haran and Zolkina, 2014: 2).

Publicly backed by outgoing President Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Yanukovich was declared as president with 49.4% of the votes. By claiming widespread electoral fraud, the results of the presidential elections were contested by Yushchenko who got 46.7 of the votes. Yushchenko urged his supporters to protest until the result was overturned. The hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians came together in Kiev's Independence Square on November 22, 2004 to protest the ruling elite's election fraud. This protest sparked the rise of a powerful civic movement through nationwide nonviolent protests known as the Orange Revolution (Karatnycky, 2005: 35). Named after the campaign colour of Yushchenko, the Orange Revolution became equivalent with demands for democracy and political change. Various reported problems of election fraud included stuffing the ballot box, abuse of absentee ballots and altered turnout rates especially in eastern parts like in Donetsk where more

than 100% of registered voters turned out to vote. The parliament with 402 members out of 450 voted in favour of new elections. As a result, Yushchenko became Ukraine's president with 52% of the votes (Kubicek, 2008: 169-173).

Yushchenko was backed by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators and supported by the BYuT, the "Socialist Party of Ukraine" and several smaller parties. The Orange allies formed a coalition government and Tymoshenko became the prime minister but was replaced by Yuriy Yekhanurov in September 2005. The coalition did not last long due to the disagreements among the Orange allies since some belonged to social-democratic left whereas some were free-market libertarians and some were long opponents to Kuchma while some had profound relations with oligarchic circles (Karatnycky, 2005: 47). Meanwhile, Russia's decision to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine over disagreement on the price increase was perceived in part as punishment to Yushchenko's pro-Western orientation and as reinforcing pro-Russian forces in Ukraine's 2006 parliamentary elections (Yekelchuk, 2007: 223).

In the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovich's "Party of Regions" got the highest percentage of the votes with 35% thanks to its support base from more industrial and Russified eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. However, since no party had a majority, a coalition of parties was needed to form the government (Kubicek, 2008: 176). Attempts were made to revive the Orange Coalition in 2006. Yushchenko announced the agreement between the ex-Orange allies. The Orange coalition was perceived as the triumph of democracy and Ukrainian commitment to European integration as in Tymoshenko's statement in the parliament: "*We won democracy for Ukraine. The very creation of the coalition defines Ukraine's course for many years ahead and will move Ukraine into the European community*" (Walsh, 2006).

Yet, once the "Socialist Party" switched sides and sided with the "Party of Regions" and the "Communist Party", Yanukovich became able to be the prime minister again in August 2006. Yanukovich increased his formal power thanks to the political reform adopted by the parliament just before the repeat second round of 2004 presidential elections (Katchanovski, 2008: 352). The political reform gave prime minister the authority to nominate most of the government ministers and control the legislative agenda. In addition to the increased power of the prime minister,

Yanukovych attempted to reinforce his position by promoting the opposition members of the parliament to change sides in a way to get enough votes in the parliament to change the constitution or override presidential vetoes. Eleven members from the Our Ukraine Party and the BYuT changed sides. Notwithstanding, his rule did not last long due to the dissolution of the parliament by Yushchenko in 2007 on the basis of prohibition of changing parliamentary factions. Early parliamentary elections were held in September 2007. The “Party of Regions” again got the plurality of the votes with 34.4% thanks to its support base from eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The BYuT came as the second with 30.7% of the votes mainly from the central and western parts of Ukraine. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Party together with smaller parties gained only 14.2% of the votes. The Orange forces of the BYuT and Our Ukraine agreed on forming a coalition government with Tymoshenko becoming the prime minister (Kubicek, 2008: 178-180).

The political crises over power struggles between the prime minister and the president due to the increasing power of the prime minister and parliament were persistent during Yushchenko’s presidency. The Orange coalition was once again fell apart this time due to the withdrawal of Our Ukraine from the coalition. The reason was asserted as the BYuT’s alliance with Yanukovych’s Party of Regions to change the constitution. In December 2008, the new coalition government included BYuT, Our Ukraine and Bloc Lytvyn (Malygina, 2010: 8).

In addition to unending political crises and several corruption scandals during Yushchenko’s administration, the official discourse emphasising Ukraine as belonging to European civilisation and its commitment to European values was persistent. In 2007, Yushchenko administration reaffirmed Ukraine’s willingness to integrate further into the Western structures in the meeting of the “North Atlantic Council” and the NATO-Ukraine Commission by stating Ukraine’s ambition to become a full member in NATO. During the meeting, it was historical that the three ministers of defence from Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania uttered the idea of establishing a joint military battalion that would become the first of its kind comprising military forces of three states by evoking the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The battalion turned into a brigade named Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) in 2008 (Bornio, 2017: 140). Ukraine’s membership of the World Trade Organization

(WTO) in 2008 and intensification of relations with the EU were among the indicators of Ukraine's pro-Western path. In this regard, being just a partner with the EU under the EaP was not seen sufficient since the political elites manifested their desire for the EU membership (Stegniy, 2011: 54).

Similarly, in the 2010 presidential elections campaign, candidate Prime Minister Tymoshenko described Ukraine as a part of Europe historically, geographically and culturally. She suggested that the "return to Europe" discourse is not valid for Ukraine since "*at the level of our mentality we have never left it*" (White and Feklyunina, 2014: 143). Nevertheless, Tymoshenko's adversary in the 2010 presidential elections –Yanukovych- became the president by gaining 48.95% of the votes against Tymoshenko's 45.47%. The election results were similar to the previous ones as the Russian-speaking east and south regions overwhelmingly voted for Yanukovych whereas the Ukrainian-speaking western Ukraine and Kyiv voted for Tymoshenko (Harding, 2010a). With Yanukovych's victory, the official discourse shifted from pro-European to one qualifying Ukraine as a bridge between Russia and the West. He referred to shared European values and described Ukraine as a civilised European country through the discourse of "*Ukraine as part of Greater Europe*" (White and Feklyunina, 2014: 145).

#### **D. Yanukovych Era (2010-2014) and the Euromaidan**

In the first months of his term, Yanukovych tried to solidify his power by taking control over media and his opponents and by diminishing the role of the parliament. Tymoshenko government was ousted and she was charged with corruption. New coalition government was formed with Mykola Azarov from the "Party of Regions" as the prime minister. One of the first actions of the new administration was to pass a new law allowing individual members of the parliament in addition to parties to join a coalition. This in turn made possible the formation of a government with the Communists, the Lytvyn Bloc and individual members from other parties instead of forcing the Party of Regions to form a coalition with the BYuT and Our Ukraine bloc which would have forced the Party of the Regions to make compromises (Lange, 2010).

With the increasing power of the more Russia-oriented wing of the Party of the Regions as well as due to the high budget deficits, Ukraine got closer with Russia. In return for price cuts for the Russian gas, the lease for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea and Sevastopol, which would expire in 2017, was extended until 2024 at least with an agreement in Kharhiv in April 2010 (Harding, 2010b). The Ukrainian parliament passed a bill in June 2010 to establish the country's non-bloc status formally by forbidding Ukraine to join any military bloc such as NATO (BBC News, 2010). This change of course in Ukraine's foreign policy also put aside the launch of the LITPOLUKRBRIG unit that was planned to be fully operational by 2011 (Bornio, 2017: 142).

In order for further normalisation of the relations with Russia during Yanukovich's presidency, the use of Ukrainian language was not promoted and the campaign started by Yushchenko during his presidency to make the Holodomor recognized as genocide was dropped out. Although the first foreign policy priority was to improve relations with Russia, Yanukovich intended to establish a balanced foreign policy (Pifer, 2012). He emphasized Ukraine's interest to be a bridge between the West and the East since Ukraine shares a European identity but at the same time historical, cultural and economic ties with Russia. In this regard, although the bid for NATO membership was dropped out, Ukraine's desire for signing an association agreement with and eventual membership to the EU was underlined (Atwell, 2010).

As a manifestation of the balanced policy, the parliament approved the formal cooperation with NATO by allowing the military exercises in Ukraine. Russia's proposal for a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan was rejected since it was seen incompatible with a DCFTA to be concluded with the EU. Besides, joining the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation was left out. Yanukovich prioritised signing an AA and a DCFTA with the EU. However, in addition to the fulfilment of democratic requirements, the EU's condition of the release of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko impeded the signature of the EU-Ukraine AA (Pifer, 2012).

Although Tymoshenko was not released, Ukraine expected the EU to sign the AA on November 28-29, 2013 at the summit in Vilnius. Yet, pressures from Russia on Ukraine not to sign the AA were intense. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's

statement just one month before the summit underlined the decisiveness of Russia to prevent the agreement: “*there would be ‘no breaks’ in relations but that his country would not give benefits to Ukraine if Russian goods have to compete with a flood of products from Europe*” (Stulov, 2013).

On November 21, 2013, Ukrainian government announced that Ukraine was not to sign the AA on the grounds that Ukraine had to protect its national security (Stern, 2013). Ukraine’s decision was welcomed by Russia with offering financial incentives especially in the form of purchasing \$15billion of Ukrainian government bonds and lowering the price of the Russian natural gas from the current level of about \$400 per 1,000 cubic metres to \$268 per 1,000 cubic metres (Walker, 2013). Pro-European Ukrainian protesters filled the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) –or Euromaidan as generally referred- in Kyiv to protest the government’s decision. The small protest turned into a peaceful occupation of the Maidan by thousands of civilians’ anti-governmental movement due to Yanukovych’s deal to sell Ukrainian bonds to Russia. With Ukraine’s special police forces’ entry into the Maidan to end the protests and the use of violence against the protesters, an unprecedented number of Ukrainians from different sectors of the society like the political party sector, students and non-political civic sectors filled the streets. Beyond demanding the signature of the AA, the protesters aimed at putting an end to the corruption (Transparency International, 2013)<sup>12</sup> of Yanukovych and the oligarch associates. The opposition demanded the resignation of Yanukovych and dissolution of the parliament as well as the application of the constitutional changes of 2004, which devolved some presidential powers to the prime minister and the parliament (Duik, 2014).

To stop the violence, the government and the opposition parties signed an agreement under the mediation of Poland, Germany, France and Russia on February 24, 2014. Yanukovych agreed upon the restoration of the 2004 constitutional changes limiting the presidential powers, formation of a new government, holding early presidential elections at the end of the year and the release of Tymoshenko. However, the opposition forces did not conform to the agreement and moved to oust the president and create a transitional government. The parliament’s decision to remove

---

<sup>12</sup> According to the Corruption Perceptions Index which scores 177 countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), Ukraine’s corruption score in 2013 was 25, indicating its highly corrupt status with high rates of abuse of power, secret dealings and bribery.

Yanukovych from presidency was defined as a political coup d'état by Salushev since it was a violation of the constitutional procedures (Salushev, 2014: 41-42).

Yanukovych fled the country and the Ukrainian parliament took over in the interim period, It appointed Alexander Turchynov from the Batkivschina Party as the acting president and a new government was formed on February 27, 2014. To start with, the parliament abolished the 2012 “Law on state language policy” which allowed regions to make a language their second official language if it was spoken by over 10 percent of the local population. This law allowed 13 out of 27 Ukrainian regions, primarily in eastern Ukraine, to adopt Russian as the second official language and 2 western regions to adopt Romanian and Hungarian as official languages (Russia Today News, 2014).

Kuzio underlines the inter-regional tension and crystallisation of pro- and anti-Ukrainian camps during the Euromaidan protests. Kuzio defines some key developments and factors influencing mobilisations of Russians and Russian speakers in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine: The rise of Russian nationalism and its supportive character for the Russian-speaking movements in the former Soviet territory, the rise of the *Ruskii Mir* (Russian World) ideology glorifying the Soviet past and providing a group identity to Russian speakers, and Russia's option of military intervention against national movements in Ukraine and other neighbouring countries which were perceived as Western-backed plots against its interests through its special forces. Besides, the growth of anti-nationalist rhetoric during Yanukovych's presidency was very influential. Depiction of pro-Western Euromaidan protestors as fascists in the Russian media by implying anyone who spoke Ukrainian and supported Ukraine's territorial integrity and integration into Europe, therefore who did not see Ukraine as belonging in the *Ruskii Mir* was useful in mobilising the eastern and southern Ukrainian regions against the Euromaidan. Yanukovych fled from the country and the Party of Power disintegrated, which led to a political vacuum in eastern and southern Ukraine. In Donbas region, this vacuum was filled by marginal Russian nationalist and pan-Slavic groups that were supported by Russia militarily (Kuzio, 2015: 157-163).

## E. Violated Statehood and Poroshenko Era (2014-2019)

On February 23, 2014 separatist groups in Sevastopol gathered around the pro-Russian radical organisation Russian Front demanded the separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia. They ousted the city's mayor and a Russian citizen was appointed as the new mayor (Konończuk, 2014). Russia's reaction to these developments was to support local politicians and militias with the use of Russian Special Forces in seizing key government buildings and the airport in Simferopol, Crimea. On March 1, the Russian Federation Council voted with consensus on permission to use the Russian military force in Ukrainian territory until the socio-political situation in that country normalizes. Supported by Russia, the Crimean parliament by violating the Ukrainian constitution voted on March 6 to join the Russian Federation and decided to put this decision in a referendum. In the referendum of March 16, 96.77% in Crimea and 95.6% in Sevastopol voted in favour of joining Russia with an official turnout of 83%. Based on these results, the Crimean parliament officially declared its independence from Ukraine and demanded unification with Russia. On March 18, with the signature of a treaty of accession between Russia and the Crimean government, Russia annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Spiegeleire, 2015: 24-25).

Russian President Putin used the term “*Novorossiya*” (New Russia) during his speech on April 17, 2014. It was revealing Russia's position on Ukrainian territorial sovereignty regarding Russian and Russian-speaking population of Ukraine (Putin, 2014):

*I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows. They were won by Potemkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known wars. The center of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained.*

However, separatist sentiments were not region-wide in the asserted New Russia. One of the immediate impacts of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in Donbas between Ukrainian troops and separatist and Russian forces was the growth of Ukrainian and Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism. With the spread of Ukrainian patriotism in the conflicted areas of eastern and southern Ukraine

and the pressure of Russia on Russian-speaking Ukrainians who held dual Ukrainian-Russian identity to take sides, pro-Ukrainian sentiments prevailed in the Russian-speaking regions. Regarding the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, the separatists took control of only Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts with self-proclaiming “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR) and “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LPR) on April 7, 2014 and April 28, 2014 respectively (Laruelle, 2016: 57). Yet, pro-Russian sentiments remained weak and pro-Ukrainian sentiments prevailed in Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, and Mykolayiv in 2014 (Kuzio, 2015: 163-164).

This effect was observable in the 2014 elections. In the presidential elections of May 2014 where two front-runners were pro-European Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, Poroshenko won the election in the first round with 56% of the vote without a need to have a second round due to the clearing of 50% threshold (Walker and Luhn, 2014). Yet, the early parliamentary elections of October 2014 were not held in electoral districts where the central government did not have control over. Thus, the elections were not conducted in all 12 electoral districts of Crimea, 9 out of 21 electoral districts in Donetsk oblast, and 6 out of 11 districts in Luhansk oblast which in turn left 27 seats out of 225 for single member seats in the parliament empty. The election results showed for the first time in post-Soviet Ukrainian history an overwhelming victory of pro-European and pro-market parties. It was also the first time that the Communist Party could not clear the 5% threshold to be represented in the parliament. However, the voter turnout remained as the lowest in the post-Soviet period with the rate of 52.42%. New coalition government under the prime ministry of Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2014-2016) from Popular Front was formed with 5 out of 6 parties in the parliament: Popular Front (22.1%), Petro Poroshenko’s Block (21.8%), Self-Reliance (11%), Radical Party of Oleh Liashko (7.4%) and Fatherland (5.7%). The Opposition Block whose members were mainly the elites affiliated with Yanukovych’s Party of Regions remained out of the coalition with its 9.4% of the votes (Shevel, 2015: 160-161).

Ukraine’s new pro-Western administration took two important steps with regard to Ukraine’s integration into the European institutions. President Poroshenko signed the AA with the EU in June 2014, entering into force on September 1, 2017

(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2017). In addition, the Pro-Western parliament during its first session uttered its commitment to European integration and priority of NATO membership (Euronews, 2014). In line with this priority, the parliament overturned -by a vote of 300 to 8- Ukraine's non-bloc status, which was established in 2010 during Yanukovich's presidency as a means to improve relations with Russia (Pifer, 2014). New government also signed the agreement on the formation of the trilateral brigade of LITPOLUKRBRIG in September 2014 and the brigade became operational by January 2016, which made possible the participation of the Ukrainian army in joint exercises and trainings enhancing the country's interoperability capacity within the NATO framework (Bornio, 2017: 144).

As for the military conflicts with Russian-backed separatists in the eastern Ukraine, a peace deal was reached to end the conflicts between Ukraine, Russia and the separatists with the Minsk Agreement on September 5, 2014. However, the peace deal was broken down within two weeks. In order to revive the agreement, a "Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements", known as Minsk II was signed between the parties on February 12, 2015 (The Economist, 2016). The package offered a roadmap for the resolution of the conflict by setting forth 13 points. It centred upon immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides, execution of local elections, exchange of prisoners, amnesty for persons involved in the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. The most important point of the package was Ukraine's obligation to carry out constitutional reform to provide for decentralisation by the end of 2015 with a special reference to the specificities of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which were to hold right to linguistic self-determination (United Nations Peacemaker, 2015).

Ceasefire agreements were not adhered by the parties. The war in Donbas continues. As of the end of the year 2017, over 4 million people were affected by the military conflicts in eastern Ukraine. 1.6 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs) (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018: 6). In the first three years of the conflicts from April 2014 to May 2017, more than 10 thousand people were killed (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017). When and if the war ends, Donbas utters the aspirations to unite

with Russia, “the great Fatherland” (People’s Council of the DPR Official Website, 2018). At the fourth year of Crimea’s annexation, Russian presidential elections were held in Crimea on March 18, 2018. Citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol participated in the Russian presidential elections for the first time. Putin obtained more than 92.2% of the votes in Crimea and 90.2% in Sevastopol, which was perceived as a second referendum justifying Crimea’s reunification with Russia (Meduza, 2018).

One of the latest important developments for Ukraine was that President Poroshenko launched and submitted a legislative initiative to the Ukrainian parliament in September 2018. This legislative initiative aimed at constitutional amendments to make Ukraine’s eventual EU and NATO memberships as strategic foreign policy priorities. The draft bill proposed to give the Ukrainian parliament the authority to define the foundations of domestic and foreign policy. This would enhance the Verkhovna Rada’s role in defining the Ukrainian identity. The bill would also make the president and the cabinet of minister responsible to ensure the implementation of the strategic goal of the EU and NATO memberships. This was an effort aimed at preventing the country’s turn the path towards Russia as experienced under the rule of former President Yanukovich. The parliament passed the constitutional amendments in February 7, 2019 (UNIAN Information Agency, 2019). President Poroshenko signed the constitutional amendment and presented Ukraine’s eventual EU and NATO membership as his strategic mission (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2019).

At the end of 2018, Ukraine was exposed to another Russian military aggression. Russia attacked on three Ukrainian ships that were passing by in accordance with the agreed protocols and procedures in the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov on 25 November, 2018. Later on, Russia blocked navigation in the Kerch Strait, which would impair Ukraine’s navigation and commerce in the Ukrainian seaports. This Russian aggression was interpreted as Russia’s show of strength to legitimize its presence by annexing territorial waters around the Crimean Peninsula and to gain dominance in the Black Sea (Ukraine World, 2018).

Another important development for Ukraine was the “granting of Tomos to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew” in January 2019. This ended the centuries old Russian religious control in Ukraine by giving the Ukrainian Orthodox Church emancipation and independence from the Russian

Orthodox Church (Kalmoukos, 2019). As well as being a long-awaited religious desire, the demand for independence was based on Ukraine's intention to counter the Russian propaganda through the Russia-backed churches in Ukraine (Butler and Usta, 2019).

In 2019, Ukrainian presidential election was held on March 31. The top three candidates with the highest share of votes in the first round were as follows: Volodymyr Zelenskiy (30.2%), Poroshenko (15.9%), and Tymoshenko (13.4%) (Reuters, 2019). When their election campaigns are analysed, it is seen that Tymoshenko's campaign focused on economic reforms, fight against corruption, continuity in cooperation with the IMF, and a promise to increase in pensions and to decrease the price of household gas which is in opposition to the condition set by the IMF for more loans (Williams and Polityuk, 2019). Poroshenko ran an election campaign based on patriotism with three slogans: army, language, and faith. He focused on anti-Russian attitudes, promotion of Ukrainian language, support for the army fighting in the south-east of the country, and his success in obtaining independence for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Roth, 2019).

During Poroshenko's five-year term, gas prices increased steadily and the rate of people living in poverty more than tripled in 2015 and did not fall to the pre-2014 rate so far (Reuters, 2019). One of the most important reason for Poroshenko was not the highest rated candidate in the first round this time was widespread disappointment with him (Walker, 2019). For the second round, Poroshenko used "Poroshenko vs. Putin" campaign posters with a caption reading "The Decisive Choice" (The Moscow Times, 2019). This reflected Poroshenko's depiction of his real rival as Russia instead of Zelenskiy.

As distinct from the other candidates' campaigns, Zelenskiy's campaign mentioned negotiating with Russia and possibly with the Russian-backed separatists to find a resolution to the conflict in Donbas (Walker, 2019). He expressed his pro-Western stance by supporting Ukraine's bid for the EU and NATO memberships. The fight against corruption was at the top of his agenda (Sandford, 2019). Zelenskiy became the president of Ukraine with 73.2% of the votes against Poroshenko with 24.4% in the second round on April 21, 2019.

Zelenskiy got support from all regions of Ukraine. While Poroshenko's votes remained high (62.8%) only in Lviv, western Ukraine, Zelenskiy's highest vote (89.4%) came from Luhansk, eastern Ukraine (Reuters, 2019). The highest support for Poroshenko in Lviv is a reflection of Lviv as the heartland of the Euromaidan protests and the voting behaviour of the western Ukrainians based on pro-Western attitudes since Poroshenko achieved visa liberalisation from the EU, independence for the Ukrainian Orthodox church and not losing the war in Donbas to Russia (Zinets, 2019). On the other hand, the general public mistrust of politics, Zelenskiy's ability to benefit from "anyone but Poroshenko" sentiment and his readiness to speak both Ukrainian and Russian were seen as determinants for his support in the east of Ukraine (Sandford, 2019).

## **VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The underlying structure of the contemporary Ukrainian society and politics has its roots in the country's unique historical division under foreign dominations. The rule of Ukraine by Poland and Russia for centuries makes it path-dependent on its historical, political, cultural and linguistic ties with its constituent "others". In this regard, pre-existing identity patterns affect the formation of the contemporary Ukrainian national identity. Being under the domination of two very divergent sets of rules and identities, different regions of the country have developed different cultural, linguistic and political preferences and also identities.

Western Ukraine under the rule of several European powers until almost the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century has developed a Ukrainian national identity, a sense of belonging to a unique nation and aspirations to an independent statehood. On the contrary, for the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine belonging to the Russian Empire for centuries makes it hard for these regions to embrace the western Ukrainian identity as the Ukrainian national identity. This in turn makes a unified or hegemonic Ukrainian national identity intangible. Therefore, Russia continues to play the role of Ukraine's constituting other and serves both as a negative and positive self-identification source of identity in Ukraine.

As it is seen in the elections since the independence, in the political realm, positive self-identification with Russia is voiced by pro-Russian forces and gains support of the eastern and southern parts of the country. On the other hand, negative self-identification with Russia associates with the “return to Europe” or “belonging to Europe” rhetoric and gains support of the western part of the country and the centre as witnessed recently. As regional differences in language preferences, and self-identifications with Ukrainian or non-Ukrainian ethnicity have become apparent in voting behaviours and election results, the east of the country seems to have tendencies towards allying itself with Russia, while the west seems to see itself as more European.

In the post-Soviet Ukraine, the Ukrainophile school of thought became dominant to preserve Ukrainian independence and to emphasize its distinctiveness from Russia. However, recent Russian annexations and interventions in Ukraine’s territory and its interference in Ukraine’s national politics and foreign policy orientations make Ukraine more divided over the course of identity formation and state and nation building process.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN UKRAINE**

This chapter presents a thematic analysis of the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine. The eight documents on the EU-Ukraine institutional relations, the technical and financial democracy-supporting instruments and reports to assess democratisation in Ukraine are analysed in line with the themes of the embedded democracy model. The chapter is composed of two sections. The first chapter analyses the EU's discourse of democracy in the founding documents of the bilateral relations and the EU's action via the technical and financial democracy supporting instruments in two periods divided as before and after the ENP. These bilateral documents are analysed from 1991 to 2004 (the PCA, the "EU's Common Position in Ukraine", the "Action Plan for Ukraine" and the CS) and from 2004 onwards (the "ENP Action Plan", the "Association Agenda", the AA, and the "Updated Association Agenda"). Secondly, with the same historical approach, thematic analysis is conducted for the EU democracy-supporting instruments. Prior to the ENP, its focus on transition to market economy and democracy is explored through the instrument of the TACIS. With the ENP, its focus on institution and capacity building through the instruments of the Twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA and the Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA), and developmental and governance approaches through the instruments of the ENPI and ENI are explored.

The second section explores the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine through the lens of Merkel's embedded democracy model. For each partial regime, the EU's agenda and activities through its technical and financial instruments are explored thematically. Then, the domestic context of Ukraine is explained historically and currently with regard to these partial regimes in order to identify the possible EU impact. Finally, Russia' counterproductive role as an impediment to Ukraine's exercise of these partial regimes is explored. Last but not least, this chapter takes civil society as the sixth partial regime since the Ukrainian civil society has proven itself as a changemaker in favour of democracy. Herewith, the EU's focus on civil society during the ENP period is covered in the second section.

By analysing the role of democracy in the EU documents on Ukraine, this chapter elaborates on its professed goals and approach. By analysing the actual democracy promotion activities on the ground, this chapter aims to establish the results that the EU targets to get in Ukraine. Through the analytical framework of Merkel's embedded democracy model, this chapter specifies the EU's efforts to create a change in Ukraine's democratic progress. The domestic context of Ukraine and the impact of Russia are analysed as determining factors for the current state of democratisation in each partial regime. The reasons for including these factors in the analysis stem from the fact that Ukraine is regarded as a crosspressured state under the influence of both the EU and Russia in its path towards democratisation and/or de-democratisation.

## **I. ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN UKRAINE BEFORE AND AFTER THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY**

### **A. Adjusting to the Role of an External Democracy Promoter: The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Ukraine (1991-2004)**

The EU officially recognized Ukraine's independence in December 1991, right after the country's independence was approved by a referendum (Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, 2012). In the early 1990s, since Ukraine had not yet de-nuclearized and held the second largest nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union, nuclear disarmament was setting the main pillar of the EU's agenda on its relations with Ukraine. Both internally and externally, democratisation and democracy promotion were not on the agenda of the parties. Ukraine was dealing with the state- and nation-building processes, as it had almost no experience of statehood. Besides, managing a bad economy (The World Bank, 2019)<sup>13</sup> constituted Ukraine's major concern. The EU's priorities and interest in Ukraine were shaped by the need for regional stability, nuclear safety, and transition from centrally planned economy to market economy.

---

<sup>13</sup> Ukraine's annual GDP growth rate was -8,4% at the time of independence in 1991. With a dramatic decline over the following 3 years, it dropped to -22,9% in 1994. The first time Ukraine achieved positive GDP growth was in 2000 with the rate of 5.9%.

During the 1990s, the EU appeared to design its foreign policy towards Ukraine in a way that it would not antagonise Russia. As dubbed by Solonenko, this “Russia-first policy” meant that the EU treated the two different countries –Russia and Ukraine– similarly and prioritized its relations with Russia over Ukraine. It manifested itself in Member States’ hesitation to ratify the Ukrainian PCA until 1998. Although Ukraine was the first NIS that the EU signed a PCA with, the Member States already ratified the PCA with Russia in 1997 despite the ongoing war in Chechnya that the EU condemned. This reflected geopolitical considerations instead of a merit-based approach, which takes adherence to common values and domestic reforms as the basis of action. Similarly, its adoption of a Common Strategy on Russia in June 1999 right before its Common Strategy on Ukraine signalled the Russia-first policy again (Solonenko, 2009: 714-715).

The EU’s agenda before the ENP indicated its support for sustainable development as a nurturing factor for democratisation and a socio-economic precondition. Although the EU did not devote its efforts to promoting democracy in Ukraine in this period, linkages between the EU and Ukraine as the target state were being established through increasing economic interaction, institutional connections, political dialogue, and peer-to-peer interaction and communication between elites, institutions, and NGOs via projects. Herewith, the EU introduced socialisation mechanism or the social learning model for transferring its rules, norms, and values into the bilateral relations. Through the model of linkage, the EU included mostly governmental actors and institutions, and marginally and at a later stage non-governmental actors in its democracy promotion approach in Ukraine.

### **1. Analysis of the Content: The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Ukraine from 1991 to 2004**

In this period, the bilateral relations were governed by the PCA signed in 1994. Ukraine was the first post-Soviet country to start negotiations to conclude a cooperation agreement with the EU. It established a framework for political dialogue between the parties. In its preamble, the PCA referred to the significance of the principle of the rule of law and the establishment of a multiparty system with free and

democratic elections, and respect for human rights, particularly protection of minorities. Article 1 of the Agreement stated the objectives of the Partnership as to promote trade, investment and economic relations so to foster Ukraine's sustainable development, as well as to develop social, civil, scientific, technological and cultural co-operation beyond economic and financial co-operation between the parties. Besides this dimension, the EU undertook to support Ukraine's efforts for consolidating its democracy, developing its economy and transition to a market economy (EUR-Lex, 1998).

The PCA specified the essential of partnership as the respect for democratic principles, human rights and principles of market economy in Article 2. Here the EU referred to the "Helsinki Final Act" and the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" for the definition of the democratic principles. In the following Article, good neighbourly relations among the parties and the NIS as a means for regional stability and prosperity were emphasized. However, as it is seen in Article 6, the Agreement gave prominence to economic goals over the political ones since the further development of political relations were linked to Ukraine's economic convergence with the EU. The PCA set forth the possibility of a free trade area between the parties providing that Ukraine makes progress in market-oriented economic reforms. It established a "Co-operation Council" and a "Co-operation Committee" to oversee its implementation and a "Parliamentary Co-operation Committee" as a forum to meet and exchange views (EUR-Lex, 1998). Through regular meetings, the "EU-Ukraine Cooperation Committee", the "EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council", subcommittees and an "Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee" formed under the PCA have served as socialisation channels for the political elites but remained limited in their scope (Solonenko and Jarabik, 2008: 90).

The Council of the European Union defined a common position on Ukraine in November 1994. With this common position, the EU specified its objectives and priorities in its relations with Ukraine. It verbalized its support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The importance of economic development and reforms for Ukraine's integration into the world economic order came to the forefront within the scope of the EU support. Ukraine's nuclear disarmament process was also on the agenda. Besides, the EU undertook to support

Ukraine's inclusion and cooperation in the Stability Pact, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Western European Union. The common position included a clause on the EU's support for Ukraine's democratic development in two ways. Firstly, the EU undertook an advisory role in democratising Ukraine's legislation and in establishing democratic institutions. Secondly, the EU contained room for mobility by emphasising contacts between Ukrainian and European officials, parliamentarians and NGOs (OJ, 1994).

In June 1995, an Interim Agreement was concluded since the EU did not ratify the PCA at that time. The Interim Agreement entered into force in February 1996. In November 1996, the European Commission approved an Action Plan for Ukraine. The Action Plan aimed at increasing the EU's political and financial support to Ukraine. Besides the economic reforms for Ukraine's transition to market-economy, it targeted the transformation of Ukrainian society, and Ukraine's integration into European security structures. The EU in this Action Plan gave more room for democracy promotion. It undertook to support the consolidation of democratic institutions and individual rights, the reforms in the fields of administration, legislation and education system, introducing a new system of civil protection, and training for civil servants (European Commission, 2018b).

With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU became more active in democracy promotion in its external relations. Correspondingly, in 1999, the European Council adopted the CS within the framework of the CFSP. The relationship between the parties was described as strategic partnership at the outset of the Strategy. Ukraine's aspirations for European integration were recognized. However, the EU composed its policy towards Ukraine without any reference to membership. Hence, its support for Ukraine's European aspirations remained declarative. Description about Ukraine in the phrase "*geography as well as size, the resources of population as well as its location along the North-South and East-West axes*" (European Council, 1999) indicated Ukraine's importance as a partner to achieve peace, stability and prosperity.

Herewith, the EU's democracy promotion appeared as a strategic goal of this partnership as the EU undertook to support the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy as well as the rule of law and a stable functioning market economy in Ukraine. For the democratic and economic transition to be successful, the

EU underlined that the main responsibility belongs to Ukraine for undertaking reforms for economic integration, consolidating its democracy and the rule of law, and solidifying its European identity. The Strategy underlined the significance of the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and an efficient public administration at all administration levels for the functionality of the government. The EU listed the development of democratic, transparent and efficient character of public institutions and a free media as musts for socioeconomic development. For elections, protection of minorities and human rights, it referred to the CoE and the OSCE standards as international standards. The EU's democracy promotion included supporting the Ukrainian legislation's alignment with international obligations such as the abolition of death penalty, promotion of good governance, and transparency of legal system (European Council, 1999).

## **2. Analysis of the Action: The European Union's Focus on Transition to Market Economy and Democracy**

The objectives set forth in the PCA and the following documents in the 1990s were reinforced by financial and technical assistance. In this regard, as beforementioned, the EU used the TACIS programme for the CIS to support the economic and political reforms based on projects through grants. Under the TACIS programme, the EU provided assistance to Ukraine from €50 million to €70 million per year from 1991 until 2004 (Wolczuk and Zeruolis, 2018: 8). The TACIS programme at its initial stages set priority sectors as energy, nuclear safety, transport, telecommunications, financial services, food production and distribution, human resources, and training. The TACIS programme supported the CIS to carry out necessary reforms in order to become effectively functioning market economies (European Commission, 2018c). Privatisation and marketisation continued to be the EU's top priorities in Ukraine in the 1990s. In this regard, the TACIS 1996 Action Programme for Ukraine was adopted to support the country's transition to market economy. The target areas were defined as support for institutional reform and development, private sector development, and energy reform and development (European Commission, 2018d).

As aforementioned in the second chapter, the TACIS took supporting democratisation in its scope as of 1992 thanks to the European Parliament's insistence on it. Herewith, the EU used the TACIS Democracy Programme as an instrument for the consolidation of democracy through knowledge transfer, technical assistance, and projects during the 1990s (Efegil, 2008: 67). The initial focus of the EU in Ukraine was to support state institutions and their capacities. Therefore, the Ukrainian state institutions were the main beneficiaries under the TACIS funding. The political parties, journalists, and NGOs were not in the scope (Zhyznomirska, 2019: 146). As the democratisation process was gathering pace in the post-communist transitions, the EU financed three types of projects under the TACIS Democracy Programme: macro, micro, and ad-hoc projects. Macro projects took non-governmental and non-profit making bodies into its scope. Micro projects were allocated to small groups and organisations. For ad-hoc projects, the European Commission acted as the main institution to initiate these projects to address the urgent needs of the NIS in their progress towards democratisation (Braitwaite, Eberhardt and Johnson, 1998: 7-8).

Within this framework, the EU supported democratisation in Ukraine by providing technical assistance and access to training between the years 1993 and 1997 through four ad-hoc projects. The scope of these projects were parliamentary practice, law and government reform, electoral process, and media monitoring of elections. People-to-people contacts were at the centre of its democracy promotion approach. For parliamentary practice, the EU aimed to transfer Western parliamentary experience to the newly elected members of the Ukrainian parliament. With regard to law and government reform, the EU provided technical assistance for drafting the Ukrainian constitution, electoral reform, and strengthening the independence of judiciary via offering training courses, study visits, workshops and seminars to the relevant Ukrainian officials and legal professionals. For electoral process and media monitoring of elections, the EU established a co-ordination centre for election observers and provided advice and training to the Ukrainian media for capacity building based on ethical journalistic principles (Braitwaite, Eberhardt and Johnson, 1998: 7-19).

These ad-hoc projects reflect that the EU focus in Ukraine was on the development of state institutions, an electoral system compatible with international democratic principles and standards, and a free media. The aim was to introduce or

improve the parliamentary practice and the rule of law, and to develop an independent media to function for democratisation. The EU's strategy for supporting democratisation in Ukraine through the TACIS Programme in the 1990s was directed towards attitude change and institutional capacity development via both top-down and bottom-up approaches by increasing interactions. The leverage model and conditionality can be argued to be soft at best. Both the size and the scope of economic and political incentives remained weak to lead to a democratic change in Ukraine. The EU's democratising pressure was modest.

During the 1990s, the EU carried out its strategy for supporting the democratisation process in Ukraine through the transfer of expertise and policy learning. The TACIS-funded "Ukrainian European Policy and Legal Advice Centre" (UEPLAC) set up to meet the direct requests of the most senior levels of the Ukrainian government was key for practicality (Zhyznomirska, 2019: 145). In the TACIS Annual Report in 1998, the EU informed that its primary support under TACIS would remain as supporting economic reforms for Ukraine's transition to a functioning market economy. In this regard, the EU's support was to focus on economic reform, private sector development, energy reform, and environment. It touched upon support for democratisation only marginally by referring to institutional reform and development under the category of developing human resources. Besides, the "Cooperation Council" established with the PCA determined 16 specified cooperation areas such as nuclear safety and energy, customs, and transport for the 1998-1999 period. None of these areas had direct links to democratisation (Commission of the European Communities, 1999: 45-46).

The EU admitted that the impact of EU democracy promotion in Ukraine remained limited under the TACIS programme in its 1998 evaluation report. Although the training and study visits realized under the implemented projects were evaluated as beneficial for the involved stakeholders, the EU acknowledged the inability to create a substantial change in the Ukrainian decision mechanisms and an impact in the pace of the reforms (ADE, 1998: 2). The change in the EU's official approach starting with the CS reflected on the TACIS funding for Ukraine. The TACIS programme in 2000 defined supporting institutional, legal, administrative reform, civil society, education and training as funding priorities. However, supporting the private sector and the

socio-economic necessities for transition to market economy still dominated the agenda and the allocation of funds. Besides, although the EU carried out election monitoring missions in Ukraine either institutionally or through the OSCE's missions, its democracy promotion policies lacked support to weakly institutionalised political parties (Zhyznomirska, 2019: 146-147).

### **B. The European Union's Democracy Promotion in Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy**

Ukraine remained dissatisfied with the existing state of relations under the PCA. Thus, it persistently demanded for a new bilateral framework that the EU did not offer until the mid-2000s (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2014: 214-215). Despite Ukraine's expression of EU membership aspirations under President Kuchma at the end of the 1990s, the lack of progress in political reforms, democratic deficiencies and Ukraine's more pro-Russian orientation prevented the EU to move beyond the PCA and CS (Pridham, 2011: 19). However, with the accession of Poland, Hungary and Slovakia to the EU in 2004, Ukraine was to become a direct neighbour. Therefore, the enlargement's impact on Ukraine dominated the bilateral relations. Aligning Ukraine's legislation, norms and standards with those of the EU was advised as the best way out of the emerging challenges from the enlargement at the 2002 EU-Ukraine Summit (EEAS, 2002: 2).

With the Orange Revolution's impact and the following free and fair presidential elections in Ukraine, the European Parliament as the driving institution in putting democracy promotion high on the EU's agenda called in 2005 on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to consider "*other forms of association with Ukraine, giving a clear European perspective ... possibly leading ultimately to the country's accession to the EU*" (European Parliament, 2005). However, its official approach remained within the limits of the ENP with respect to the membership perspective. The EU's stance on supporting Ukraine's European integration by treating the country as a neighbour was perceived by the reformers as deficient and declaratory (Zhyznomirska, 2019: 148).

Composing the ENP in 2004 and the EaP in 2009 provided for the EU to become a more determined and effective actor in promoting democracy in Ukraine. As the analysis in the second chapter has shown, the EU increased its emphasis on transferring the core EU principles of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms to the neighbourhood countries. As the EU has become a more assertive actor for promoting democracy in the 2000s, the instruments, new socialisation channels, introduction of conditionality with new incentives and increased financial assistance under the ENP have reflected this shift.

Through the “Action Plan” (2005), “Association Agenda” (2009), AA (offered in 2007, signed in 2014 and entered into force in 2017), and the “Updated Association Agenda” (2015), the level of the EU’s relations with Ukraine has been upgraded. The EU has become more assertive in pronouncing the details of its expectations and demands from Ukraine with regard to domestic reforms. By means of the agreements and policy frameworks and the diversified tools to translate its policy from paper to action, the EU has shown the significance it attributes to the transfer of democratic principles, values and norms to Ukraine (Deugd, 2019: 120-123). Besides, as Ukraine was given market economy status in 2005, the EU’s emphasis on the market in its democracy promotion strategies shifted to the stability and efficiency of state institutions as they were seen essential for regional stability and security (Zhyznomirska, 2019: 148).

Bilateral relations have further deepened with the AA. Major parts of the AA were already provisionally in effect since September 1, 2014 and the Agreement entered into force on September, 1 2017. The DCFTA has been provisionally applied since January, 1 2016. In advance of this provisional application, “*the EU largely liberalised access to its market in April 2014 by providing Ukraine with ‘autonomous trade measures’ and eliminating 94.7% of its tariffs. Under the full provisional application of the DCFTA, Ukraine is to eliminate its tariffs on imports from the EU progressively, mostly within seven years*” (Emerson and Movchan, 2018: 5).

## **1. Analysis of the Content: The European Union's Democracy Promotion in Ukraine from 2004 onwards**

The first step in the EU-Ukraine relations under the framework of the ENP was the “EU-Ukraine Action Plan” in 2005. As a response to the Orange Revolution, the EU updated the readily prepared action plan for the administration of President Kuchma. Although the EU did not alter the content of the Action Plan, it included a 10-point addendum to the document as a way of acknowledging Ukraine's expectations of the EU support. The EU slightly increased its already offered incentives and added some new incentives (Lobjakas, 2005). These incentives included supporting Ukraine in its WTO accession, a free trade area, visa facilitation, increased financial assistance, intensifying people-to-people contacts and loans from the European Investment Bank. In addition, the EU introduced conditionality in its relations with Ukraine as the 10-point plan in the Action Plan linked its incentives to reforms. The EU tied the prospect of the negotiations of a new enhanced agreement to free and fair parliamentary elections to be held in March 2006. Also, it made the prospect of the negotiations of the free trade dimension of the new agreement conditional upon Ukraine's WTO membership (Solonenko and Jarabik, 2008: 87-89).

Solonenko and Jarabik (2008: 88) refers to the EU's 10-point plan in the Action Plan as “the lowest denominator position” in the EU between those in favour of Ukraine's EU membership and those opposed any special treatment of Ukraine other than being an ENP country. Yet, since the Action Plan did not include any explicit reference to the EU's support for the country's European membership prospect, Zhyznomirska (2019: 148) argues that this in turn lacked genuine external support to accelerate the new government's momentum and enhance their legitimacy to pursue democratic reforms.

When the content of this ENP Action Plan is analysed, it is seen that the bilateral relationship shifted from cooperation to a gradual economic integration and intensified political, security and cultural relations. Since the launch of the ENP, the target has been the approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards to those of the EU. When the components of the EU's democracy promotion are analysed, it is seen that the first 3 out of 14 priorities for action speak of institutions

guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, democratic conduct of the electoral process, and freedom of the media and freedom of expression. The chapter on political dialogue and reform again refers to strengthening of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. In the democratic conduct of the elections, the EU referred to the OSCE and CoE norms and standards. Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rights of persons belonging to national minorities, the principles of the separation of powers, the judicial independence and the impartiality of the prosecution, the fight against corruption, and transparency and accountability of the administration stay at the core of the political and legal reforms (EU Neighbours, 2005).

The EU intensified the use of its socialisation mechanism with Ukraine starting with the Action Plan. The EU's offer to Ukraine to align itself with the EU's CFSP statements as part of increased cooperation in foreign policy indicated constant and intense interaction between the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU. Accordingly, diplomatic contacts and visits between the parties have increased considerably (Solonenko and Jarabik, 2008: 91). Although the EU's democracy promotion activities embraced a top-down approach directed at the state institutions and the government, the Action Plan made also noteworthy references to participation by emphasising the involvement of citizens and civil society in the decision making process and in dialogues on several issues such as employment and social policy, and enterprise policy. The EU has focused on strengthening the political dialogue and cooperation on several issue areas to Ukraine's alignment with these priorities for action. Besides, the EU placed emphasis on visa facilitation negotiations and establishment of intercultural dialogue through Ukrainian youth's participation in cultural and educational programmes such as the Erasmus Mundus, Tempus III and Youth Programme (EU Neighbours, 2005).

As the EaP added AAs as a new element to enhance bilateral cooperation, the EU and Ukraine started negotiations of an AA in 2007 to replace the PCA. Under the new framework, the EU rewards have been linked to "election plus rights" demands (Franke et. al, 2010: 157). In exchange for the free and fair 2006 parliamentary and 2007 early parliamentary elections as well as for economic reforms leading to Ukraine's membership to the WTO in 2008, the establishment of a DCFTA was

offered by the EU and the negotiations of the AA was launched in 2007 as a reward. In this regard, the parties adopted the “EU-Ukraine Association Agenda” in 2009 to facilitate Ukraine’s preparation for the implementation of the AA that was still under negotiation. Herewith, the EU increased its emphasis on Ukraine’s deeper integration with the internal market and its political association (EEAS, 2009). Ukraine was the first country among the Eastern European neighbours to get the offer of a DCFTA. Since the inclusion of the DCFTA as an integral part of a future AA was absent in the European strategic partnerships such as with Russia, it has signalled the transformation of the EU policy towards Ukraine and a shift in bilateral relations (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2014: 8).

On democratic reforms, the “Association Agenda” confirmed the previously defined priorities for action in the “EU-Ukraine Action Plan”. It referred to the OSCE standards for the conduct of elections. For strengthening the respect for democratic principles, human rights, fundamental freedoms and minority rights, it made references to international and regional human rights standards such as the UN and the CoE Conventions and related protocols. The “Association Agenda” underlined the need for an inclusive and participatory democratic reform process with regard to state institutions. Ensuring the respect for the rule of law, independence of judiciary, effective checks and balances between the state institutions, transparency and democratic accountability, the fight against corruption, and increasing citizens’ and CSOs’ participation in the decision-making process were among the areas that the parties agreed to cooperate on (EEAS, 2009).

The EU offered the exchanges of best practices, know how, technical expertise and advice, sharing information, training of officials, and cooperation on the adoption of new legislative frameworks and their implementation. As a monitoring mechanism and assessment of annual progress made by Ukraine, a “Joint Committee at Senior Officials level” was established. The EU reiterated its emphasis on the visa facilitation and visa-free regime for increasing mobility and people-to-people contacts. In addition, cultural cooperation programmes such as the EaP Culture Programme and educational exchanges were emphasized for enhancing dialogues, mobility and people-to-people contacts between the EU and Ukraine (EEAS, 2009).

The AA's negotiations were concluded at the end of 2011. The AA was to be signed at the Vilnius Summit in November 2013. However, as President Yanukovich decided not to sign the Agreement, following the Euromaidan protest movement, its signature was completed at two stages. The political chapter was signed in March 2014 and the remaining chapters including the DCFTA were signed in June 2014 after the presidential elections in Ukraine. Herewith, the level of bilateral cooperation moved from partnership to an association between the EU and Ukraine. In the preamble of the AA, the EU confirmed to acknowledge Ukraine's European aspirations and its European choice along with the strong public support and commitment (OJ, 2014).

The AA increased the emphasis attached to the political dialogue for both political domestic reforms and Ukraine's further involvement and participation in the European security settings. The AA laid out holding regular political dialogue meetings at high official level. It also promotes political dialogue at parliamentary and expert levels as well as contacts through the multilateral platforms such as the UN and OSCE. Besides, it created an "Association Council" to meet at ministerial level for the AA's implementation and monitoring. Another improvement in the bilateral relations is that the AA Article 463 authorizes the Association Council to take binding decisions (OJ, 2014).

Since the "Cooperation Council" established under the PCA could only adopt recommendations, the "Association Council" with power to adopt binding decisions is significant in Ukraine's legislative approximation (Van der Loo et al, 2014: 11). Ukraine's progress in legislative approximation is set to be monitored by the progress reports. Besides, the AA introduces a new and comprehensive instrument of the "on-the-spot missions" with the participation of wide range actors such as the EU institutions, nongovernmental bodies and independent experts. For approximation, the EU offers similar tools designed in the "Association Agenda" such as exchanges of information, technical expertise, best practices and know how, training and capacity building support (OJ, 2014).

The AA takes consolidation of domestic political reforms for improving the level of democracy as one of its focal points. In Articles 4 and 6 of Title II, and Article 14 of Title III, references are made to cooperation for ensuring "*stability and effectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and on respect for human*

*rights and fundamental freedoms*” and “*strengthening the judiciary, improving its efficiency, safeguarding its independence and impartiality, and combating corruption*” (OJ, 2014). Cooperation in combating corruption and ensuring transparency in several aspects of the cooperation areas are among the outstanding provisions of the Agreement. The AA underlines the importance of increasing contacts and cooperation between the civil societies of Ukraine and the Member States. As a significant development and as a complementary to the “EaP Civil Society Forum”, the Agreement with Article 469 created a bilateral “Civil Society Platform” as a forum between the members of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the representatives of the Ukrainian civil society to exchange views. The AA aims to ascribe the Ukrainian CSOs a role in the AA’s implementation and monitoring, and disseminating the EU values in Ukraine. It also aims to involve the CSOs in several cooperation areas such as trade and sustainable development (OJ, 2014).

The ENP introduced conditionality as an instrument and mechanism for rule, norm and value transfer to the neighbourhood countries. The EU-Ukraine AA defines the essential elements of the Agreement in Article 2 as the respect for the shared values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. With Article 478, the AA introduces conditionality by making the suspension clause of the Agreement functional in case of the violation by any Party of the essential elements or the general rules of the international law. The essential element clause in Article 2 also includes “*promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as well as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery*” (OJ, 2014).

In this respect, it goes beyond the EU’s classical common values conditionality in similar agreements with other third countries by adding a security perspective. In addition, by not including the principles of free market economy in the definition of essential elements, the common values conditionality makes a distinction between the hard-core common values linked with fundamental values and security that will trigger the suspension of the AA, and other principles required for enhancing the bilateral relationship. The AA also introduces market access conditionality by making the EU’s

further market opening conditional upon Ukraine's progress in legislative approximation (Van der Loo et al., 2014: 12-13).

The EU's conditionality under the ENP is generally considered as a form of weak conditionality in the literature because of its lack of membership perspective (Kelley, 2006: 36; Deugd, 2019: 124; Burlyuk and Shapovalova, 2017: 38; Gawrich et al, 2009: 3; Sasse, 2008: 295-296). The success of the EU in democratic transformation of the candidate countries has been attributed to the strong conditionality with a path to membership (Kelley, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Sedelmeier, 2011). Sasse (2008: 295-297) terms the conditionality applied under the ENP as "conditionality-lite". She remarks that this form of conditionality serves as a reform anchor and provides an external reference point for non-candidate countries that express their membership ambitions to fulfil the demanded reforms. As this paves the way for institutional, behavioural or policy change without an explicit membership perspective, it formulates new forms of external governance.

Following the first meeting of the "EU-Ukraine Association Council" in 2014, the "EU-Ukraine Association Agenda" was updated on 16 March 2015. It serves as the main political tool for the AA's implementation and monitoring. The EU's democracy promotion agenda focuses on constitutional reform, election reform, preventing and combating corruption, judicial reform, and public administration reform as short-term priorities. The EU repeats its references to international standards on democracy. Establishing an effective checks and balances between state institutions is another aspect that the EU draws attention. Decentralisation by strengthening the local and regional self-governments remains on the EU's agenda (The EU-Ukraine Association Council, 2015: 1-8).

This "Updated Association Agenda" reflects the EU's move towards the governance approach in its relations with Ukraine since there is an explicit emphasis on the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and participation as well as priorities for action on sector-by-sector basis. The EU puts emphasis on the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and participation by including civil society actors in the reform processes. Besides, compared to the first version of the "Association Agenda" of 2009, with the "Updated Association Agenda", the EU's expectations from Ukraine and the roadmap for the consolidation of its democracy has

become more explicit and comprehensive. Not just the alignment of the national legislation with the EU standards but the effective implementation and enforcement of the legislation has been more of the EU focus.

## **2. Analysis of the Action: The European Union's Focus on Institution and Capacity Building, and Developmental and Governance Approaches**

The ENP and the EaP created new instruments in order to provide technical and financial assistance for meeting the targets defined in the agreements and policy frameworks. As overviewed above, the EU's democracy promotion policies include a diversified toolkit. The EU's use of this toolkit in Ukraine will be analysed under two categories. The first one is on the institution and capacity building, and the second one is on the developmental and governance approaches. The instruments covered in this chapter include Twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA, and the SGUA for institution and capacity building. For the developmental and governance approaches, the ENPI and the ENI are analysed. The EU's engagement with civil society in Ukraine will be elaborated in the second section of this chapter.

With the ENP and the EaP, the EU's democracy promotion approach in general and specifically in Ukraine leaned on socialisation intensive instruments. Both via top-down and bottom-up approaches, the EU has promoted people-to-people contacts, transfer of knowledge, expertise, and know-how. Besides the regional and bilateral instruments in focus in this chapter, the EaP's high-level meetings, the "EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly", the "Eastern Partnership Business Forum", the "Conference of Regional and Local Authorities of the EaP", "Informal Partnership Dialogues," and the "EaP Civil Society Forum" all serve as ways to increase the channels for socialisation mechanism for the EU's norm transfer to Ukraine.

### **a. Institution and Capacity Building in Focus**

For the initial years of the ENP, the EU's financial and technical assistance focused on institution building, capacity building and transgovernmental cooperation in Ukraine. In this regard, firstly, the EU launched the accession-specific programmes

of Twinning and TAIEX for Ukraine at the end of 2006. Through the Twinning and TAIEX programmes, the EU targets the public administration of a partner country to enhance the administrative capacity and legal adaptation of the central and local governments (European Commission, 2019c). All these instruments aimed to increase the state effectiveness and its institutional capacity as well as transparency and accountability (Zhyznomirska, 2019: 150).

In Twinning projects, civil servants from the Member States and the partner country are linked to work together on a specific reform agenda directed at transfer of expertise, know-how and best practices via people-to-people contacts. Similar to the Twinning programme, TAIEX targets the public administrations of the third states with the aim of approximating their legislation. Civil servants in the central administration, judiciary and parliament, as well as the representatives of trade unions and employers' associations may request the TAIEX assistance. The EU delivers workshops, expert missions and study visits to the beneficiaries, which ensure peer-to-peer interaction and transfer of best practices, know-how and expertise (European Commission, 2019d). In addition to the demand-driven instrument of TAIEX Classic, the European Commission introduced TAIEX Strategic in 2016 for providing assistance to reform efforts of the partner countries (European Commission, 2018e).

As of November 2018, Ukraine have completed 47 Twinning projects out of 62 (Center for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union, 2018) with the highest numbers in the areas of transport, finance, trade and industry, justice and home affairs and energy. Ukraine keeps its position of being the country with most Twinning projects among the EaP countries (Panchuk and Bossuyt, 2018: 3-5). As well as the older Member States, the CEECs such as Poland, the Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia have also participated in the Twinning projects in Ukraine as they share historical and socio-cultural commonalities along with recent transition experiences (Bossuyt and Panchuk, 2017: 334-359). Panchuk (2019) concludes that the Twinning projects in Ukraine produced effective results in creating a lasting change in approximation of the beneficiary organisations to the EU norms and practices via adoption or implementation of a new law/amendment/administrative practice.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian government requested in 2006 a governance assessment from the experts under the programme of SIGMA as a joint institution-building instrument of the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to support public administration reforms. The European Commission decided to extend the use of SIGMA to the ENP countries in 2008 (Center for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union, 2019). In order to support the public administration reform in various areas such as public procurement and human resource management, SIGMA introduced the “Principles of Public Administration” in 2014. Currently under SIGMA, the Ukrainian administration requested the assessment of two separate reform strategies -the “Public Administration Reform Strategy” (PARS) and the “Public Finance Management System Reform Strategy”. The fact that Ukraine’s request of being assessed based on the criteria valid for candidate and potential candidate countries other than the ENP countries (OECD, 2018) shows the country’s ambition for the EU integration with the prospect of membership.

As of 2014, the EU’s allocation of financial assistance to Ukraine has indicated a shift from a single focus on state institutions and policy measures to a sector-focused approach. The European Commission’s decision to establish the Support Group in 2014 as an innovation in its democracy promotion strategies reflects this shift. This decision came as a response to the coming into power of a reform-minded government after the Euromaidan. The SGUA has served as a coordinator for managing all assistance –both European and international- in accordance with Ukraine’s needs. In addition to taking general policy areas into its scope, the SGUA prioritizes a sector-specific approach by providing assistance to sectoral policies such as energy, infrastructure and agriculture (Wolczuk and Zeruolis, 2018: 11).

The SGUA aims to act as “catalyst, facilitator and supporter of reform” in Ukraine in three areas: “reform planning, governance and the rule of law; economic governance; and sectoral policies”. It provides advice and experts from both the EU Member States and the European Commission. The SGUA’s assistance in giving advice and technical assistance is flexible. It engages with both the state institutions such as the Ukrainian government, the parliament and the presidential administration, and the Ukrainian civil society as well as other bodies from Ukraine’s public

administration and from international organisations in accordance with Ukraine's needs and demands in keeping up with its reform objectives (European Commission, 2016b).

### **b. Expanding the Developmental and Governance Approaches**

The EU launched the ENPI in 2007 for the 2007-2013 period. The “Multiannual National Indicative Programme for the period 2007-2011” defined its priorities as to support Ukraine's “*democratic development and good governance, regulatory reform and administrative capacity building, and infrastructure development*”. The EU's democracy promotion agenda under the priority of democratic development and good governance focused on four sub-priorities: “*public administration reform and public finance management; rule of law and judicial reform; human rights, civil society development and local government; and education, science, and people-to-people contacts/exchanges*” (European Union, 2007).

The “Multiannual National Indicative Programme for the period 2011-2013” defined priorities as good governance and the rule of law, the finalisation of the AA including the DCFTA, and sustainable development. Under the good governance and the rule of law, the sub-priorities were defined as “justice, freedom and security; integrated border management; public administration reform and public finance management; and disarmament” (European Union, 2011b). The allocation of bilateral assistance took a sector-wide assistance approach. The ENPI included various sectors such as trade, transport, environment, migration and border management, energy, regional and local development, and sustainable socio-economic development in its scope. The EU emphasized the principle of joint ownership and the principles of public participation, transparency and accountability in its sector-wide approach (European Commission, 2019e).

Currently, the EU's bilateral cooperation with Ukraine is covered under the ENI for the period 2014-2020. This instrument takes an incentive-based approach that embraces rewarding progress towards deep and sustainable democracy and human rights. In this context, additional funds are planned if progress is achieved in reforms on democracy and human rights (EEAS, 2014a). In this regard, Ukraine was granted

€40 million in 2014 to reward the successful reforms up to that time. The EU took action to address the urgent needs in the country as a response to the fragility and instability following Russia's annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and the election of a new pro-Western administration in 2014. Thus, the EU's primary focus in 2014 was the stability of the Ukrainian economy, its economic growth, and furthering reforms to implement the AA and "Visa Liberalisation Action Plan" (VLAP) as well as further engagement with civil society. For the period 2014-2017, the ENI support was distributed to Ukraine as follows: state building (€879.2 million), civil society (€10 million), private sector development, approximation, local authorities (€90 million), anti-corruption (€15 million), public administration reform and the rule of law (€52.5 million) (European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, 2018: 20).

As Ukraine lagged behind in fulfilling the objectives of the multiannual programming due to the fragility and instability in the country, the EU opted for two special measures in favour of Ukraine to be financed under the ENI in 2015. The first one was for private sector development and approximation. This special measure was comprised of two actions: "EU Support to Ukraine to Re-launch the Economy (EU DURE)" and "Technical Cooperation Facility" (European Commission, 2015c). The first action focused on encouraging the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for achieving sustainable and inclusive growth as an alternative to large scale industries a considerable amount of which have become fragile to the worsening economic and financial situation of the country (European Commission, 2015d). The second action focused on improving the capacities of Ukrainian public authorities to realize legal approximation to the EU. This action was based on providing policy advice to several state institutions and bodies. The main objective was promoting good governance by targeting several sectors such as judiciary, home affairs, trade, finance, transport, energy and social policy (European Commission, 2015e).

In 2016, the EU took three special measures in favour of Ukraine to be financed under the ENI. The first one's scope was to support anti-corruption and key reforms in Ukraine through two actions: "EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine" and "Technical Cooperation Facility 2016" (European Commission, 2016c). The action on

supporting anti-corruption reforms aimed at strengthening the role of the parliament, civil society and media in the process of monitoring the reforms (European Commission, 2016d). Under the second action, the EU again targeted sectoral reforms with the principles of good governance. It also emphasized media freedom and an independent public broadcasting in Ukraine (European Commission, 2016e). The second special measure took an action on “Support to Comprehensive Reform of Public Administration in Ukraine” to provide capacity building support in the area of public financial management in line with the OECD principles (European Commission, 2016f). The third special measure took an action on “Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO)”. The PRAVO focused on providing support to justice sector reforms by targeting the judiciary and the police (European Commission, 2016g).

For the 2018-2020 period, the EU has undertaken to support good governance, the rule of law, security, economic development, energy efficiency, mobility and people-to-people contacts in Ukraine under the ENI. The annual action programme of 2018 ENI support targeted energy efficiency through the action entitled “Energy Efficiency Support Programme for Ukraine”. It provided support to Ukrainian institutions to carry out the necessary reforms arising from the AA and to improve the respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms through the action entitled “Technical Cooperation Facility 2018” (European Commission, 2018f). Besides, the annual action programme of 2018 aimed at supporting reform and modernisation of the “Vocational Education and Training” (VET) system in Ukraine through the action entitled “EU4Skills: Better Skills for Modern Ukraine” and promoting people-to-people contacts through the action entitled “People to People Contacts Programme: House of Europe” (European Commission, 2018g). The latest annual action programme of 2019 under the ENI takes supporting four components into its scope: anti-corruption reforms, decentralisation reform, civil society and culture, and the implementation of key reforms related to the AA and the DCFTA. The actions taken in these areas are as follows: “EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine (phase II)”, “U-LEAD with Europe: Phase II”, “Support to Civil Society and Culture” and “Technical Cooperation Facility 2019” (European Commission, 2019f).

## **II. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PROMOTION OF THE EMBEDDED DEMOCRACY MODEL: THE INTERPLAY OF THE UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC CONTEXT AND RUSSIA**

As the analysis of the EU's democracy promotion policies in discourse and in action has shown, the EU has a broad agenda in Ukraine focusing on several aspects of the embedded democracy model. In this section, the progress -or the lack thereof- of Ukraine in its democratisation and the EU impact on this process are analysed in line with the partial regimes of Merkel's embedded democracy model. The data used is taken from the EU Progress/Country Reports, the Freedom House Reports, the reports of the Transformation Index of Bertelsmann Stiftung, and other reports from the EU, the OSCE and the CoE's Venice Commission.

### **A. Electoral Regime**

Merkel (2004: 36-38) places electoral regime at the centre of the five partial regimes that are essential for a stable democracy to be embedded internally. Together with equal political rights, it ensures vertical accountability by reflecting the will and sovereignty of people through the participation of citizens. The four supporting elements of a democratic electoral regime are "elected officials, inclusive suffrage, right to candidacy, and correctly organized, free and fair elections". As Merkel argues, for electoral regime to be meaningful, it should not only guarantee the free, fair, competitive and regular elections for public power positions but also the rule of the democratically elected representatives in accordance with democratic principles in between the elections.

The EU focuses on three aspects of the electoral regime in Ukraine: free and fair elections, adoption of an electoral legislation, and its reform on financing political parties in line with the recommendations of the OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the CoE. The EU has underlined the importance of free and fair elections in the PCA, the CS, the "ENP Action Plan", and "Association Agenda". More specifically, the "Association Agenda" focuses on electoral reform as core reform priorities. In addition, the "Updated Association

Agenda” speaks of an electoral reform although it does not specify the deficiencies in Ukraine’s electoral system. However, the concerns of the EU for electoral standards and reforms did not find any specific reflection in the AA. The “State Building Contract for Ukraine” under the “2014 Special Measure in favour of Ukraine” also listed an expected result of Ukraine’s harmonisation of its electoral legislation and party financing in line with the OSCE/ODIHR and Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of the CoE recommendations (European Commission, 2014c: 9).

Under the technical and financial assistance instruments, the EU support for electoral rights, ensuring free and fair electoral processes, and monitoring of the elections have been provided via the TACIS –although to a lesser extent- and the EIDHR. Besides unilateral instruments, the EU cooperates with the OSCE for election monitoring missions in Ukraine. It cooperates with the CoE through the “Programmatic Cooperation Framework” (PCF) as of 2014 to provide electoral assistance on reforming electoral legislation and practice through a variety of activities such as conferences, seminars, and trainings. The target of the PCF is to strengthen the institutional capacity of the key actors such as parliaments and governmental bodies in the implementation of reforms (EU and CoE, 2014).

The Ukrainian electoral system is regulated in the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the “Law of Ukraine On the Elections of the President of Ukraine”, the “Law of Ukraine On the Elections of the People’s Deputies of Ukraine”, the “Law of Ukraine On the Elections of the Deputies of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”, the “Law of Ukraine On the Elections of the Deputies of Local Councils and Village, Settlement and City Heads”, and the “Law of Ukraine On the Central Election Commission”. The president is directly elected for five years. The law allows for two consecutive five-year terms. The parliament is composed of 450 members who are also elected for a five-year term. The 225 members are elected in accordance with proportional representation on closed party lists while the other 225 members are elected in single-member districts (OSCE ODIHR Legislation Online, 2007).

Ukraine’s post-Soviet Constitution was ratified in 1996 and is in effect with the 2004 amendments. The Constitution gives citizens the right to elect and be elected in public organs and authorities freely and through direct and universal suffrage. It also defines the essence of elections as free (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). However,

Ukraine has struggled substantially with holding free and fair elections since transition to democracy. The OSCE/ODIHR report for the 1999 presidential elections mentions of the deficiencies of the Ukrainian electoral regime for meeting democratic standards. Ukrainian parliament adopted the “Law of Ukraine On the Elections of the President of Ukraine” in 1999. The report refers to the state administration’s selective implementation of the law by avoiding equal opportunities for the candidates. State administration and public officials publicly supported President Kuchma for his second term. The public media and private broadcasters did not provide equal coverage for all candidates. Besides, the report notes instances of violations such as pressure and coercion of students and hospital staff by their superiors to vote against their will, multiple voting, and proxy voting by the state officials (OSCE ODIHR, 2000: 1).

The first and second rounds of the 2004 presidential elections fell short of fulfilling the OSCE standards. These rounds were assessed as not free and fair by the “OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission”. The candidates did not enjoy equal opportunities for election campaign. The reports stated that the campaign of candidate of the party of power -Yanukovych- abused state sources. Besides, there were reports revealing activities impeding the free formation of the will of voters, such as the coercion and intimidation of state employees to support Yanukovych’s candidacy. The repeat second round of the elections was held thanks to the peaceful protests against the election fraud leading to the Orange Revolution. The repeat second round was declared as free and fair since there were more equitable conditions for the election campaign, less use of state resources, and less pressure on voters’ electoral choices (OSCE ODIHR, 2005).

The EU was instrumental in holding the repeat second round of 2004 presidential elections by contributing to a compromise between the Orange camp under Yushchenko and the party in power under then President Kuchma. Thanks to this compromise and the repeat second round, it changed the result by making Yushchenko’s election as president possible (Stewart, 2015: 121). Kelley (2006: 41) notes that meeting the democratic standards in the 2004 presidential election guaranteed the EU’s inclusion of Ukraine in the first seven countries to sign the Action Plans. Since the 2004 presidential election, the European Parliament has observed each

presidential and parliamentary election in Ukraine, which reinforced the EU's presence in supporting the electoral regime in Ukraine (European Parliament, 2019a).

The EU's application of conditionality in promoting democracy in Ukraine is mostly visible in this component. As beforementioned, the EU made the negotiations of a new enhanced agreement –the AA- conditional on holding free and fair parliamentary elections of March 2006. The 2006 parliamentary election (OSCE ODIHR, 2006) and 2007 early parliamentary election (OSCE ODIHR, 2007) caused by a political crisis between the president and the governing coalition were assessed as sufficient for meeting most of the OSCE and CoE commitments and democratic standards. In exchange for these free and fair elections as well as for economic reforms that led to Ukraine's WTO membership, the rewards were given. The EU offered a DCFTA and the AA's negotiations were launched in 2007 as rewards.

The OSCE/ODIHR assessed the 2010 presidential election as free, fair, transparent, and “consolidated progress since 2004” (OSCE ODIHR, 2010: 2). Nevertheless, the EU uttered its constant concern on the free and fair nature of elections for the 2012 parliamentary elections and reminded Ukraine of the condition of the respect for common values required for progress towards political association and economic integration (European Union, 2012b). Stewart (2015: 121) notes that the EU treated the 2012 parliamentary elections as a litmus test for Ukraine's determination to improve democratic standards and increase Ukraine's chances of signing and ratifying the AA. The 2014 presidential election was found to be mostly in line with international standards and commitments in spite of the fragile security environment in Crimea and the eastern region of the country (OSCE ODIHR, 2014a: 1). The 2019 presidential elections were found mostly free and fair despite problems such as the biased media coverage of the election campaign, misuse of state resources, vote-buying and procedural problems during the vote count (OSCE, 2019: 1).

One of the problems in the Ukrainian electoral regime is the lack of its harmonisation with the European standards. Herron (2018: 906-911) describes Ukraine as a “laggard” in the establishment and codification of new formal institutions. At the initial phases of transition to democracy, Ukraine maintained several features of the Soviet era in its electoral system. Although it gained its independence in 1991, the legal framework for parliamentary elections –the “Law on the Election of the

People's Deputies"- was adopted in 1993. It inherited the Soviet election rules of negative ballots in which citizens would delete the names of the candidates whom they did not support and the threshold of 50 percent for any candidate to win a seat in geographically defined districts. The most remarkable feature of the first parliamentary elections in 1994 was that the vast majority of candidates -4,109 out of 5,608- contested as independents claiming no party affiliation. This showed Ukraine's path dependency on its Soviet past because it was the only opportunity for non-members of the "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" to run for seats in the Soviet Congress of the People's Deputies during the late years of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine's electoral legislation for parliamentary elections were amended several times. The absolute majority system of the 1994 parliamentary elections led to a vast majority of independents in the Parliament due to the lack of public support and trust in the political parties and a political fragmentation in the parliament (Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives, 2010: 9-12). In order to increase the role and power of the political parties, the 450 seats of the parliament were divided into two before the 1998 elections. With this change, the 225 members would be selected via national level proportional representation with a 4 percent threshold, while the other 225 members would be selected in first-past-the post single-seat constituencies on party lists. The 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections were held according to this mixed-member-majoritarian system (Herron, 2018: 908).

This system led to the election of small and pro-presidential parties. The absolute majority system and the mixed system led to instable party coalitions, weak governments and ever-changing parliamentary factions. For instance, from 1998 to 2002, there were 600 cases where the deputies switched factions that altered the composition of the parliament. To change this situation, the parliament adopted the "Law of Ukraine On the Elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine" in 2004. It brought about a proportional electoral system with voting for closed lists of political parties and blocs with the aim of reinforcing the role of political parties in policy-making (Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives, 2010: 9-12). This electoral reform brought an alteration to the electoral threshold by lowering it from 4 percent to 3 percent. It also brought a condition for all candidates to compete as party affiliates. The 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections were held in accordance with

the proportional representation system in a single national district to allocate all 450 seats among parties that passed the 3 percent threshold. Prior to the 2012 elections, the electoral system for parliamentary elections turned back to the mixed-member-majoritarian system with increasing the threshold to 5 percent for the party list ballot. The 2012 and 2014 elections were held in accordance with this system (Herron, 2018: 909).

As another EU focus, the 2008 Progress Report on Ukraine raised the issue of drafting and adoption of an election code in line with the European standards for democratic credentials of the electoral regime (Commission of the European Communities, 2009: 3). The EU provided funds for drafting an election code in Ukraine under the expertise of the OSCE/ODIHR through the PCF. The EU welcomed the establishment of a working group by President Yanukovich in 2010 to reform the electoral legislation. However, as the 2010 Country Report on Ukraine noted, the working group did not adhere to the draft code when preparing future draft legislation. In addition, the EU criticised the exclusion of independent experts, representatives of CSOs, and the opposition from this preparation process (European Commission and HR, 2011: 4-5). The 2011 and 2012 Progress reports repeated the EU's concern for new electoral legislation on parliamentary elections for not meeting the European standards (EEAS, 2012: 3), and the need for embracing the OSCE and CoE standards (European Commission and HR, 2013: 3).

The latest OSCE/ODIHR report on Ukraine's parliamentary elections of 2014 articulates some deficiencies in its electoral regime. With the restored 2004 constitutional amendments after the Euromaidan movement, the criteria for members of the parliament to lose their mandates was set. In this regard, they will lose their mandate if they do not join or leave the parliamentary faction of the political party whose list they were elected on. The report states that this amendment is in contradiction with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and has been repeatedly criticised by the Venice Commission. In addition, the report specifies the lack of incorporation of several OSCE/ODIHR recommendations into the Ukrainian electoral legislation for parliamentary elections. One of the most important deficiencies remains as restrictions on candidacy rights on the basis of requirement of an excessive five-year residency, and disproportional limitations for those with a prior criminal record.

The report draws attention to these requirements' contradiction with Ukraine's international commitments and obligations. Another issue raised by the report in disregarding the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations is the lack of uniformity in the application of the electoral legislation, which in turn creates legal uncertainty and unequal conditions for candidates (OSCE ODIHR, 2014b: 7).

The legal framework for presidential elections is regulated by "the Law on Presidential Elections" which was adopted in 1999. One of the main issues raised by the OSCE/ODIHR is restrictions on candidacy. The OSCE/ODIHR criticises the ten-year residency requirement for presidential elections as it contradicts with international obligations. In addition, the requirement of the monetary deposit –2.5 million Hryvnia- is found to be restrictive for candidacy. Although a comprehensive electoral reform that would consolidate and harmonise the various election laws in line with the international standards is still in need, progress made by Ukraine was acknowledged. For instance, the introduction of the right of individuals to dispute the constitutionality of election related laws in the Constitutional Court in 2016 was assessed positively (OSCE, 2019: 2-5).

Another significant problem in Ukraine's electoral regime has been the weakness of the political parties due to the lack of direct public funding for political parties. This in turn led to the political parties' dependency on oligarchs and corporations for private funding. The result has been the election of a considerable number of businessmen to the parliament and the political parties' transformation into political branches of personal business interests. However, since 2002, the parliament took efficient decisions to strengthen the political parties and to decrease the parties' dependency on private funding (Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives, 2010: 11). In this regard, in 2003, the "Law on Amending Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine in Connection with Introducing State Financing of Political Parties in Ukraine" was passed by the parliament to provide for public funding of political parties. However, this law did not come into force (Fedorenko, Rybiy and Umland, 2016: 617). The state support for political parties remained indirect in Ukraine as opposed to the direct funding of political parties in almost all European states (Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives, 2010: 91).

The EU raised this issue by underlining the need for reforming the legislation for financing political parties to decrease their dependency on private funding in the 2010 Country Report (European Commission and HR, 2011: 4-5). The “State Building Contract for Ukraine” under the “2014 Special Measure in favour of Ukraine” also listed an expected result concerning Ukraine’s electoral regime. The EU expected Ukraine to harmonise its electoral legislation and party financing in line with the OSCE/ODIHR and the GRECO recommendations (European Commission, 2014c: 9). Since there were no limits on election funds spent in parliamentary and presidential elections as of July 5, 2005 and as of August 21, 2009 respectively (Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives, 2010: 103), the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR (2013: 13) recommended Ukraine to adopt a reasonable campaign-spending limit. Besides, they recommended Ukraine to end the discriminatory practice of obligating single-mandate district candidates to return any unused funds to the state budget after the elections while permitting political parties to transfer the unused funds to their own accounts.

During Poroshenko’s presidency, Ukraine amended its legal framework for party and campaign financing in line with many recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the GRECO (OSCE ODIHR, 2018: 2). Restrictions on private donations were introduced. With the amendments to the “Law of Ukraine on Political Parties in Ukraine”, Article 15 set the maximum limit for voluntary donations from natural persons to a political party as 400 minimum wages and 20 minimum wages for donations to a single-mandate candidate (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrainy, 2001; Interfax Ukraine, 2019<sup>14</sup>). However, with the adoption of the “Law On Introducing Certain Changes to Legislative Acts of Ukraine in Connection with the Prevention of and Counter-Action Against Political Corruption” in 2016, direct public funding for political parties was introduced (Fedorenko, Rybiy and Umland, 2016: 617). In this regard, as Article 17-3 of the “Law of Ukraine on Political Parties in Ukraine” states, political parties that received at least 2 percent of the votes for its list of candidates in the previous election are eligible for public funding (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrainy, 2001). Besides, reporting requirements were increased and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) was given the

---

<sup>14</sup> The minimum wage in Ukraine is 4,173 Hryvnia as of January 1, 2019.

responsibility of auditing party and campaign finance reports to increase transparency (OSCE ODIHR, 2018: 2).

In the electoral regime, the counterproductive impact of Russia on Ukraine's democratisation is obvious. Due to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and combat operations in Donetsk and Luhansk, the capacity of the state to conduct the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections in these parts of the country was challenged and restricted. These elections could not be held in 27 districts (12 in Crimea, 9 in Donetsk, and 6 in Luhansk) (Herron, 2015: 420-422). These 27 seats could not be filled in these elections. Therefore, these parts of the country were deprived of formal representation in the elections (Herron, 2018: 909). For the presidential elections of 2019, the capacity of the state to conduct the elections was continuously challenged. The elections could not be held in Crimea and in non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (OSCE, 2019: 1). According to the official reports by the Ukrainian government, there are 1.5 million IDPs registered since the beginning of the conflict in the eastern regions of the country (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019). Although the electoral legislation allows voters to transfer their voting address temporarily (OSCE ODIHR, 2014a: 2), a vast majority of the IDPs remains deprived of their voting rights due to the inconsistencies in the legislation's application (European Commission and HR, 2018: 2).

## **B. Political Liberties**

Merkel (2004: 38-39) emphasizes that political rights go beyond elections. They are complementary to the vertical dimension of democracy by enabling the public arena to become an independent sphere of political activity. The essence of political rights is right to political communication and organisation that are vital for the formation of collective opinions and demands of societies. For this reason, Merkel states the most important political rights as the right to freedom of speech and thought, the right to association, demonstration and petition. In addition, for the functioning of these political rights, press freedom is obligatory. Besides public media, private media is required for the distribution of unbiased information free from the state's control.

Political parties' right to political organisation and free speech are also vital for the representation of the citizens' opinions and demands.

The EU's general focus and concern in fundamental freedoms is widespread in all policy frameworks and documents on Ukraine but the EU's concern for the political rights specifically did not reflect much in the documents. The EU's emphasis is on improving freedom, independence, pluralism and diversity of media and the rights of journalists in Ukraine. The "EU-Ukraine Association Agenda" of 2015 is the only document that specifically addresses the freedom of expression, assembly and association as a priority for political dialogue. With regard to freedom of expression, the "Updated Agenda" lists the requirement for a legal framework for public broadcasting in line with the European standards, equal media coverage for electoral candidates, and protection of journalists from the threat or actual violence. On freedom of assembly, it underlines the need for the adoption and implementation of legislation in line with the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission standards. Likewise, on freedom of association, the Agenda voices the necessity of a favourable legal environment for the civil society institutions and citizens to increase their participation in the decision-shaping processes (The EU-Ukraine Association Council, 2015: 11-12). However, the Agenda does not mention any benchmark to indicate Ukraine's progress (Rabinovych, 2016: 16). The EaP Platform 1 "Democracy, good governance and stability" just mentions freedom of speech in the work programme for 2014-2017 without any further reference (EEAS, 2014b). Besides, it did not find a place in the latest working programme for 2018-2019 (EEAS, 2018b).

When the current state of political rights is analysed in Ukraine, the Article 34 and Article 36 of the Constitution of Ukraine respectively protect the right to freedom of speech and thought, and the right to association in political parties and public organisations. The exercise of these rights may be subject to restriction due to the cases of national safety, territorial integrity or public peace, health or defence of rights of other people (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). The legislation related to press, information, and television and radio broadcasting in Ukraine protects the freedom of the press and prohibits censorship (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 10). There is a wide-range of print and electronic media ensuring plurality of sources of information. The number of political parties is quite high in Ukraine. For instance, 132 political parties

participated at the 2015 local elections (Freedom House, 2016). However, the restrictions of freedom of speech of journalists, the media and the opponents in general are among the most crucial deficiencies in political rights.

The state administration has tended to disregard the rights of freedom of speech and expression especially during the election campaigns. State-owned media remains dependent on government support and under the control of the president and government. Freedom House reports on Ukraine mention even cases of given instructions –*temniki*- on acceptable news items and coverage to the press during Kuchma administration (Freedom House, 2003). As abovementioned, the OSCE/ODIHR reports draw attention to the unequal and biased media coverage of candidates especially during the election campaigns. With regard to private media, the owners who are mostly oligarchs and businesspeople influence the publications and broadcastings in line with their political and economic interests. Attacks, threats, intimidation, and murders of journalists and other broadcasting personnel such as publishers and directors who report on corruption or criticise the government and state administration are widespread in Ukraine (Freedom House, 2002).

There have been some improvements in the situation of freedom of speech and expression in Ukraine. Thanks to the public demonstrations during the Orange Revolution, the government loosened its control over the media. Media started to give a place for the opponents on news and programs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006: 7). The rights of association and assembly were respected during Yushchenko's term (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008: 8). These improvements were followed by the removal of restrictions on the freedom of speech of the media and the opponents during Yushchenko's presidency. However, oligarchs' control over the private media remained as a major problem endangering political rights in Ukraine (Freedom House, 2006). Although the election campaigns for 2007 parliamentary elections were carried out in a pluralistic political environment with little state interference on media coverage, the election of Yanukovych as prime minister changed the course of freedom of press and expression in Ukraine once again (Freedom House, 2008).

After Yanukovych's election to presidency, the political rights of participation deteriorated for the opponents, media, and foreign NGOs. Media coverage of political opponents lessened. The number of political prisoners increased. The right to assembly

was informally restricted due to hardened conditions for permission. Police force was used to suppress street demonstrations. The state administration also pressurized academia especially with regard to academics studying on Ukrainian language and culture. Yanukovich aimed at harmonising Ukrainian textbooks with those in Russia (Freedom House, 2012). The government's pressure on the media and the opponents, violence against journalists, and police violence against protesters remained as the most vital deficiencies with respect to the political rights in a democratic regime (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012: 10-11).

The EU underlines enhancing the citizens' rights and public participation in politics, which requires freedom of expression and freedom of media. It raised concerns about the increasing government pressure on the press, the links between the owners of private media and government, and violence against journalists in Ukraine during Kuchma administration (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b: 8). With Yanukovich's election to presidency, the EU increased its efforts to promote political rights in Ukraine. In each progress report on Ukraine, the country was invited to improve the freedom of speech, media freedom, safety of journalists, and align its legislation with the European standards. For long, the EU emphasized the lack of establishment of a public service broadcaster in line with international standards and any improvements on media ownership transparency and privatisation of print media (European Commission and HR, 2011; European Commission and HR, 2013; European Commission and HR, 2014; European Commission and HR, 2015).

Another focus of the EU during Yanukovich's presidency was on the suppression of political opponents. The most outstanding case was the conviction of Tymoshenko -who ran against Yanukovich in the 2010 presidential elections- for seven years for exceeding her authority to make a gas deal with Russia in 2009 (BBC News, 2011). The EU condemned this conviction and others for the members of the former government by terming it as an indication of selective justice and politically motivated prosecution due to the lack of trials in line with international standards of fairness, transparency and independent legal process (Council of the European Union, 2012b). Besides, the EU reminded Ukraine the principle of democratic conditionality by explicitly stating that Ukraine's disregard for universal values and the rule of law

would damage bilateral relations including the conclusion of the AA (European Union, 2011c).

Hence, the EU linked the release of Tymoshenko to the signing of the AA (European Commission, 2012). Although the EU could not secure the freedom of Tymoshenko to participate in the politics, it progressed to sign the AA at the EaP summit in 2013. However, the EU refused to put forward the Agreement for ratification by the European Parliament or the Member States due to the lack of progress in political reforms in a number of areas such as electoral reform, media freedom and selective justice. Besides, the EU suspended some part of economic assistance to the Ukrainian government. As Kubicek argues, this showed the EU's commitment to conditionality principle both in rhetoric and in practice (Kubicek, 2017: 150).

The EU instruments for promoting the political rights in Ukraine first included providing advice and training to the Ukrainian journalists starting with the TACIS Democracy Programme. Under the ENI, the EU made freedom of expression and media freedom as specific objectives and expected Ukraine to improve and implement its legislation on media freedom including journalists' rights (European Union, 2017d: 7-8). The EU via joint projects with the CoE contributes to the approximation of Ukraine's legislation on media with the European standards. In this regard, Ukraine ratified the "European Convention on Transfrontier Television" in December 2008 (Commission of the European Communities, 2009: 18).

In 2011, a new "Law on access to public information" was passed. In 2014, Ukrainian parliament adopted a "Law on public broadcasting to transform the state broadcasting service into an independent public service" (European Commission and HR, 2015: 6). In addition, Ukraine adopted laws on "ensuring transparency of media ownerships, and on the reform of the state and municipal printed media" (Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Government Office for European Integration, 2015). In addition, the EU and the CoE joint project titled "Freedom of media in Ukraine" within the scope of the PCF helped Ukraine to progress on a new law on television and radio broadcasting in accordance with Ukraine's commitment under the AA to approximate its legislation on audio-visual policy within two years following the Agreement's entry into force (Council of Europe, 2018).

The EU directly supported political rights under the EIDHR and the EED. Freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of media and improving public participation were included in the scope of these instruments. Following the Euromaidan protests, the EU's target through the EED was to improve independent and social media platforms for Ukrainian citizens to get objective information. For instance, the EU provided funds for the Kyiv Post journalists to obtain necessary equipment for coverage of the protests (European Endowment for Democracy, 2014a). Besides, the EU provided emergency support to some media outlets such as Kharhiv's ATN television channel to re-equip its broadcasting studio due to its destruction by armed persons (European Endowment for Democracy, 2014b).

Regarding Russia's impact on political rights in Ukraine, the most obvious one has been the restriction of the political rights of participation of the Ukrainian citizens in Crimea and in non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Besides, the media remains under the control of the de facto authorities in these regions. The Ukrainian citizens' freedom of obtainment of information in Ukrainian language was severely restricted due to the suspension of Ukrainian channels in these regions (Freedom House, 2014). Russia's another impact is the use of Russian media, social networks and cyber attacks to provide disinformation in Ukraine. As Kyiak documents them, examples include Russian politicians' use of symbolism such as naming Ukraine as a failed state after the Orange Revolution, naming the representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as fascists, disseminating rumours about construction of concentration camps in Ukraine to create a false image of Ukraine and demoralize the public, and broadcasting false results on Ukrainian elections on the election commission's website and the Russian TV channels during the 2014 presidential election (Kyiak, 2018: 32-34).

In return for Russia's acts of aggression, Ukraine took some national security measures as of 2014 by arguing the need to protect Ukraine's information space from Russian propaganda. In this regard, the broadcasting of various news channels from Russia was suspended. Many Russian journalists were banned from entering Ukraine. As the existing measures against Russian media outlets and journalists remain in place, these measures were extended in number and in overarching the ban on access to Russian social networks from Ukraine (Freedom House, 2019a). Besides, the use and

sale of Russian films produced since 2014 and Russian films that propagate a positive image of Russian security and military services were banned in February 2015 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016: 10). Ukraine banned the use of Soviet or Nazi symbols in 2015. This prevented the participation of the “Communist Party of Ukraine” in the 2015 local elections and the 2019 presidential elections since the party’s name, symbols and charter are contrary to the laws on “decommunisation” (Guz, 2019). In 2017, the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine was approved. This document defines the national interests of Ukraine in the information area as protecting the Ukrainian state and society from especially Russia’s destructive propaganda (Council of Europe, 2019).

### **C. Civil Rights**

Civil rights guarantee the protection from a state’s use of its power to eradicate freedoms. This protection embodies protection of life, freedom and property as well as protection against illegitimate arrest, torture, or unwarranted intervention into personal life by the state or any individual actor. Merkel puts the rule of law at the centre for the guarantee of civil rights and other components of democracy. The rule of law binds the state to enforce its laws effectively as well as to contain and carry out its power in accordance with its laws. In this context, Merkel defines equal access to and equal treatment by the law as the basic civil rights whose effective implementation remain dependent on the independence of judiciary (Merkel, 2004: 39-40).

The EU promotes the rule of law as one of its founding values and principles. Its focus on the rule of law is reflected in almost all EU treaties and other EU documents. The AA emphasizes the rule of law’s significance but does not specify any guidelines or benchmarks. The “Updated Association Agenda” specifically mentions the reform of the judiciary and the police in line with the European standards based on the rule of law, enhancing the training of judges and other law enforcement authorities, and implementation of the civil, criminal, economic and administrative codes. On civil rights, the “Updated Association Agenda” specifically mentions the respect for minority rights, the respect for children’s rights, combating torture and ill-treatment, combating discrimination and ensuring equal treatment as objectives and principles of

political dialogue. The EU refers to the international standards and the UN and CoE Conventions and related protocols as benchmarks (The EU-Ukraine Association Council, 2015: 9-13). Under the EaP Platform 1 “Democracy, good governance and stability”, children’s rights were mentioned in the work programme for 2014-2017 without any further reference (EEAS, 2014b). However, the EU defined gender equality as an objective in the following work programme for 2018-2019 by underlining the implementation of legislation on gender based violence and anti-discrimination (EEAS, 2018b).

Regarding the current state of civil rights in Ukraine, Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees the equality of all Ukrainian citizens before the law without any discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, language, property or any other affiliations. Article 33 guarantees freedom of movement, and Article 35 guarantees freedom of religion. Right to property is guaranteed by the Constitution in Article 54. The possible limitations to these freedoms are set on the grounds of interests of public law, health and morality of the population. Article 129 underlines the independence of judiciary and the equality of all before the law (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996).

Although civil rights are protected by the Constitution, their observance face formal and/or informal limitations. With regard to the freedom of religion and conscience, it is generally respected in Ukraine. There is no state religion and the state and church are separated. Some religious organisations express their support to some political parties or individual candidates during election campaigns (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 7). This was the case during the 2004 presidential elections. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate supported the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and Protestant denominations expressed their disapproval of the ruling elite (Freedom House, 2005). Yanukovich’s explicit support for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was another problem in this regard. The split between the churches and its reflection into politics were also visible during and after the Euromaidan protests. The clergy from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate disapproved the

protests and supported the Russian annexation of Crimean and the separatist movement in the east (Wilson, 2018).

With regard to freedom of movement, it has been generally respected in Ukraine. However, at the initial stages of democratisation, Ukraine kept the Soviet-era regulation –*propiska* system- which required registration with the Interior Ministry at the place of residence and work in order to be able to obtain social benefits. This requirement limited the freedom of movement by tying access to social benefits to the place of a citizen's registration (Freedom House, 1999). In 2001, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine annulled this requirement (Freedom House, 2002).

Ethnic discrimination against the Crimean Tatars and the Roma was reported. The rise of xenophobic violence against migrants, refugees and Jewish establishments since 2007 has been noted. However, the state's interference to protect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities such as the Crimean Tatars has become regular (Freedom House, 2008). Although civil rights have been generally respected after the Orange Revolution, the situation worsened under the presidency of Yanukovich. Threats against the right to life of journalists stayed as an important issue that was poorly addressed (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012: 14-15).

Another deficiency in the observance of civil rights was the right of people in detention due to police abuse and torture, and the high number of death at detention and police stations. Besides, investigation of only a marginal proportion of the reports on police abuse and torture stayed as an important problem. In 2010, Yanukovich's extermination of the human rights monitoring department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was established under Yushchenko's presidency fortified the lack of institutional mechanisms to fight torture (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014: 15-16). During the Euromaidan protests, the observance of civil rights was severely deteriorated. State instruments such as the police, the security service, the prosecutor's office and the tax authorities were used to detain, torture, and suppress the opponents and activists (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016: 11).

The main approach of the EU to promote the respect for civil rights in Ukraine is via bottom-up approach directed towards the NGOs. Before the ENP, the EU used the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights for the period 2000-2006 as a financial instrument for democracy promotion in Ukraine. This instrument's focal

point was to engage with the NGOs in the democratisation projects, the EU's approach presented a shift towards empowering civil society actors as agents for democratisation from below. The EIDHR (as of 2007) funded projects in Ukraine through NGOs in this period focused on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms by concentrating on human rights education, training and awareness-raising, children rights, women's rights and gender equality, and rights of persons with disabilities, the rights of persons belonging to minorities and ethnic groups, strengthening of civil society, independence of media, freedom of the press, the monitoring of human rights, fight against torture, the independence of judiciary and the promotion of access to justice. Under the EIDHR, the EU financed 41 projects in total where Ukraine-based NGOs were the beneficiaries as well as a couple of projects in Ukraine where the CoE was the partner or EU member state-based NGOs were the beneficiaries (European Union, 2019).

Through the EIDHR for the period 2007-2013, the EU provided funds to the NGOs in Ukraine via projects. The EU focus on the civil rights was reflected in these projects which centred upon creating awareness on fundamental freedoms, human rights and minority rights protection, supporting human rights defenders, promoting good governance and the rule of law, judicial and constitutional reforms, impartiality of judiciary, preventing torture and ill treatment, and empowerment of civil society against discrimination of minorities and for monitoring of the executive and the reforms (European Parliament, 2014). The EIDHR projects after the Euromaidan protests focused on the fight against discrimination, preventing torture and ill treatment, providing legal assistance to the victims of human rights abuses and IDPs, and monitoring the human rights situation in Crimea and Donbas regions (European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, 2018: 20-21). However, the EIDHR's focus does not include the protection of the civil rights since its scope is limited to the NGOs and human right defenders rather than the state institutions (Rabinovych, 2016: 16).

The treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in Ukraine has been another focus of the EU. The situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Ukraine and Ukraine's refugee law were found to be contradicting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008: 11). The EU put forward this issue

especially in the VLAP offered by the EU in 2010 as part of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue with Ukraine that started in 2008. The VLAP presented conditions and four blocks of benchmarks for the ultimate goal of visa-free travel. These blocks were: “*document security; border management, migration and asylum; public order and security; external relations and fundamental rights*” (European Commission, 2019g). In the progress reports from 2011 to 2015, the EU assessed Ukraine’s progress on fundamental rights based on three topics: a) ensuring freedom of movement within Ukraine, b) conditions and procedures for the issue of identity documents and c) citizens’ rights including protection of minorities. The EU demands from Ukraine included the adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, providing legal protection against discrimination, and avoiding discrimination in movement, residence, and access to travel and identity documentation. The EU also raised the issues of cooperation with the international organisations such as the UN, the CoE and the OSCE and following their recommendations in meeting the effective protection of citizens and minorities against all forms of discrimination (European Commission, 2011f).

Ukraine progressed in meeting the EU demands over the years. Amendments were made to certain laws such as the one concerning the residence registration procedure. The “Law on Preventing and Combating Discrimination” was adopted in 2012 (European Commission, 2013). It was later amended in 2014 to extend the scope of discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of skin colour, age, disabilities, family status, and sexual orientation (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016: 11-12). The fifth progress report on Ukraine’s implementation of the VLAP deemed the second benchmark of conditions and procedures for the issuance of travel and identity documents as achieved (European Commission, 2015f). The sixth and the last progress report on this topic deemed the benchmarks on freedom of movement within Ukraine and citizens’ rights including protection of minorities as achieved (European Commission, 2015g). In return for Ukraine’s progress in all four blocks, Ukrainian nationals meeting the requirements of biometric passport and time limits have become exempted from visa requirement to travel to the Schengen zone as of 11 June 2017. The EU’s incorporation of conditions on fundamental rights in its democracy

promotion via sectoral cooperation can be interpreted as a “backdoor” democratisation (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie, 2017: 1046).

For the enjoyment of all civil rights, the most important obstacle in Ukraine remains as corruption since it blocks equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law. The EU perceives corruption as a threat to democracy, the rule of law, and economic progress. As of 2001, the EU has broadened its scope of democracy promotion to include good governance. As bad governance and endemic corruption (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2019;<sup>15</sup> Transparency International, 2004<sup>16</sup>) was prevailing in Ukraine, the EU addressed the needs for the principles of transparency, accountability and public participation in the 2000s. The “EU-Ukraine Action Plan” was explicit on the need for the fight against corruption. The Action Plan made a recommendation for reforming the Ukrainian national strategy against corruption, public administration and the civil service based on transparency and accountability (EU Neighbours, 2005).

For combatting corruption in Ukraine, the EU acted in cooperation with other European and international institutions like the CoE and OECD to provide legislative and technical assistance to Ukraine. In this regard, for the period 2002-2004, the EU and the CoE worked together under the Joint Programme IV for Ukraine. Through seminars, study visits, and providing expertise, the EU and the CoE engaged with governmental bodies –especially the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine-, and non-governmental bodies such as NGOs. These activities were used to transfer European experiences and expertise on drafting law on preventing and combating corruption, organised crime, criminal procedure, and implementation of the anti-corruption legislation (European Commission and Council of Europe, 2004: 1-17).

Besides, the EU worked in cooperation with the CoE at the TACIS Action Programme composed in 2004 for Ukraine. Under TACIS, the “project against corruption in Ukraine” (UPAC) was designed for the period 2006-2009 to support good governance in Ukraine. It aimed at reinforcing Ukraine’s insufficient anti-corruption measures based on European experiences. The importance of transparency

---

<sup>15</sup> Endemic connotes the regular frequency of corruption in a way that it becomes the norm due to the organisational weaknesses in the state.

<sup>16</sup> Ukraine’s Corruption Perception Index was 2.2 in 2004. As 10 indicated highly clean, and 0 indicated highly corrupt, Ukraine was classified as highly corrupt.

and accountability principles was underlined. Under this project, advices, recommendations, expertise, expert workshops, conferences, study visits, public consultations and trainings activities for judges and other related bodies on issues related to anti-corruption policy and its implementation were the ways to transfer knowledge, experience, rules and norms. It reflected the needs for an institution mechanism for managing and monitoring the anti-corruption strategies, a corruption preventive body, strengthening the capacities and anti-corruption legislation, and public participation. The EU and the CoE in this project highly engaged with Ukrainian governmental bodies such as Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Parliament, and Council for National Security and Defence. The NGOs, the CSOs, and the media were also among the target groups of the project (European Commission and Council of Europe, 2004: 1-26).

Under TAIEX, Ukraine proved to be the most active participant among the ENP countries by participating in 308 TAIEX activities until 2014. These TAIEX activities in Ukraine included workshops and study visits on judicial reform, human rights issues and anti-corruption policies (Buscaneanu, 2016: 102). The TAIEX activities showed a considerable increase with the European Commission's initiation of the SGUA in Ukraine in 2014. The SGUA experts realized study visits, workshops and other expert missions under the TAIEX programme. With the SGUA's contribution of over 100 activities in Ukraine, over 2,000 Ukrainian public officials were provided assistance to facilitate the reforms (European Commission, 2016b). Ukraine is the state that benefited most from the TAIEX activities. The EU provides technical assistance to Ukraine in various policy areas. For instance, under the policy area of justice and home affairs, the EU organised a regional workshop in 2017 for supporting the establishment of an Asset Recovery and Management Office (ARO/AMO) as a mechanism to prevent corruption and strengthen transparency in Ukraine and other EaP countries (European Commission, 2018e).

Besides, the SGUA's assistance mechanism is compatible with the EU's conditionality mechanism. For instance, its financial support for reforming the Ukrainian public administration was made conditional upon Ukraine's composure of an overall strategy and implementation plan for public administration reform. However, the lack of progress led to the suspension of the offer of financial support.

The result was Ukraine's adoption of a "Strategy for Public Administration Reform" and an implementation plan in 2016 compatible with the EU standards. The SGUA's assistance takes reforms in public administration, anti-corruption, the rule of law, central government, parliament, constitution and electoral system into its scope (European Commission, 2016b).

Ukraine has been criticised for selective justice, the dependence of the judiciary on the executive branch and the appointment of the judges by political considerations (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012: 12-14). As of 2005, there have been some improvements in the level of the rule of law, transparency and the fight against corruption. In 2005, Ukraine became a party to the most crucial international conventions on anti-corruption. In 2005, Ukraine ratified the "CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption". Herewith, Ukraine joined the common European aspiration to overcome corruption by becoming a member of the GRECO. In 2009, Ukraine ratified the "CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and the UN Convention against Corruption". With regard to national legislation, the key development was the adoption of the "Law of Ukraine on the Prevention of Corruption" in 2014 (Semeniy, Grebenyuk, Glushchenko and Stasiuk, 2019).

In 2014, the "National Anti-Corruption Bureau" (NABU) was established thanks to the EU conditionality for relaxation of visa restrictions. The NABU aims to eliminate corruption in government (NABU, 2019). Although the NABU was successful in proceeding the cases of corruption, the unreformed judiciary failed to pursue these cases (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 12). The creation of the NACP in 2015 was an important step for introducing a check procedure with the participation of the CSOs in the process of corruption prevention (UNDP Ukraine, 2015). In 2016, Ukraine started the process of reforming the judiciary to prevent corruption and eliminate the political dependence of judges. For this purpose, Ukraine adopted the "Law on Judicial System", the "Law on Amendments to Constitution", and the "Law on Enforcement of Judgements" (Stelmashchuk and Maksymov, 2016).

With these reforms, an anti-corruption court was established. The immunity of judges was limited and Ukraine introduced a new system for the selection of judges. As opposed to the political domination of the previous system, the new system introduced the selection of judges based on their merits by a new independent panel

(DW, 2016). Similar to the judicial reforms, Ukraine launched a series of reforms to police administration and civil service to increase transparency. The police force was reformed with the establishment of the National Police of Ukraine in 2015. The new system allows for recruitment of the police based on an open competition. The EU Assistance Mission (EUAM) provides assistance in reforming the National Police. The reforms to civil service began in 2016 introduced a merit based system for the selection of civil servants with the participation of the civil society representatives in the process (Emerson and Movchan, 2018: 27).

Also, Ukraine introduced the “Unified State Register of Declarations of Persons Authorised to Perform the Functions of the State or Local Governments” in 2016. With this e-declaration system for property and income declaration, transparency and participation of the civil society activists and public to detect corruption are the major improvements in Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts. The NACP was successful in verifying the declarations of public officials. The EU contributed to using and checking the e-declaration system with the European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI) (Government Portal Official Website of Ukraine, 2019a).

The voluntary resignation of around 1,000 judges after the introduction of new legislation and the e-declaration system in 2016 signalled a substantial renewal of the judiciary (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 11). In addition, Ukraine established the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) as a specialized court in anti-corruption in 2018 in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (NABU, 2018). Despite all these reforms, the lack of the law enforcement remains as the main obstacle for the rule of law and the fight against corruption. For the very reason, the Corruption Perception Index for 2018 listed Ukraine as the second most corrupt country after Russia among its neighbours (Transparency International Ukraine, 2018). Besides, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’s decision in 2019 to annul the Criminal Code’s provision on illicit enrichment undermines Ukraine’s anti-corruption achievements (Transparency International, 2019).

With regard to Russia’s role as an impediment on the observance of civil rights in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and separatist movement in the east of the country play the key role. In the separatist-controlled territories, freedom of religion

has been violated due to the separatist forces' oppression of the Protestant and the Orthodox sects that are not subordinated to Russia. Freedom of movement has been restricted in the country and a considerable number of people in the east has become IDPs (Freedom House, 2016). Right to life has been threatened by the armed conflicts between the separatist forces and the Ukrainian army. From the beginning of the conflict in 2014 to 2019, more than 10,000 people were killed. Right to property has also been under threat due to the nationalisation of many enterprises by the de facto authorities in Donbas region (Freedom House, 2019a).

In Crimea, Crimean Tatar activists were repressed by the Russian occupation authorities. Freedom of religion has been severed due to the occupation authorities' pressures on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and ban on the registration of the mosques associated with Crimean Tatars. The use of the Ukrainian and Tatar languages in education has been almost completely eliminated. Freedom of assembly and association have been limited. Ukrainian citizenship was eliminated since Crimean residents were forced to surrender their Ukrainian passports and take Russian citizenship (Freedom House, 2017). Those who do not accept Russian citizenship face the possibility of unemployment, loss of property rights and freedom of movement. Arbitrary arrest, torture of detainees and corruption undermines the rule of law in Crimea (Freedom House, 2019b).

#### **D. Horizontal Accountability**

Horizontal accountability stems from the division of powers by enabling the checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. It functions if and only the three branches do not dominate or interfere with each other. Horizontal accountability requires an independent and functional judiciary to render functional checks and balances of the executive and legislative branches possible. Herewith, the responsiveness and responsibility of government are checked regularly other than the periodical checks by elections (Merkel, 2004: 41).

For horizontal accountability in Ukraine, the EU underlines the independence of judiciary, constitutional reform and decentralisation. In the "Updated Association Agenda", establishing an effective checks and balances between state institutions was

one of the aspects for the constitutional reforms that the EU drew attention. Decentralisation of power by strengthening the local and regional self-governments was on the agenda of the EU's demands from Ukraine (The EU-Ukraine Association Council, 2015: 1-8).

In Ukraine, the division of powers between legislative, executive and judicial branches is provided in Article 6 of the Constitution (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). Executive branch is composed of the president and the government. Foreign and defence policies are in responsibility of the president while economic and budgetary policies are in responsibility of the prime minister and the government. The president is in a more powerful position in the executive branch. Legislative power rests with the 450-member unicameral Ukrainian parliament – the Verkhovna Rada (OSCE ODIHR, 2018: 3)

The Constitution's provision for the division of powers did not guarantee an effective separation of powers in Ukraine. The 1996 Constitution did not provide any effective mechanism for the parliament to adopt legislation and check the executive. The president had the authority to veto all parliamentary decisions on draft legislation. Besides, the president had the authority to nominate the prime minister as well as to appoint all members of the government and the heads of local state administrations. The president exercised excessive powers in decision-making (Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives, 2010: 10). Both the legislative and judicial branches have suffered from the domination of the executive branch in Ukraine. The relative power of the president to the government and the parliament under the 1996 Constitution led to an imbalance among the state authorities. This paved the way for embarking on constitutional amendments in 2002 but these changes did not occur under Kuchma's administration (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006: 2). Yushchenko's election to presidency in 2004 rendered possible the enactment of constitutional amendments in favour of increasing the parliamentary features of the presidential-parliamentary system established with the 1996 Constitution. The constitutional amendments of 2004 gave the parliament the right to elect the government, approve the prime minister, and dissolve the ministers (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008: 2).

However, the Venice Commission stated its concern on vesting certain powers to the president that may impair the independence and effectiveness of the government.

Besides, the Venice Commission drew attention to the lack of clarity on the division of powers and overlapping competencies between the president and the government in the areas of ensuring state independence, national security, and the implementation of domestic and foreign policy, as well as the rights of legislative initiative. Another issue raised by the Venice Commission on the constitutional amendments was the possible competition between the president and the prime minister on the formation of the cabinet. This concern stemmed from the procedure of the appointment of the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs based on the president's nomination as opposed to the appointment of the rest of the ministers based on the prime minister's nomination. For these reasons, the Venice Commission evaluated the constitutional amendments as insufficient for the establishment of a clearly demarcated and balanced system of government (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2005: 3-5).

As discussed earlier, the Constitutional amendments brought about a change in the election procedure of the members of the parliament. The proportional representation based on party lists was introduced. This in turn increased the party competition in Ukraine. As a result, the use of legislative questions by the Ukrainian parliament to check and hold the executive accountable increased considerably. For instance, the number of legislative questions by the members of the parliament increased from 60 in May-July 2002 session to 3,434 in February-July 2005 session. This showed the influence of the electoral system and partisanship in increasing the parliament's oversight function (Herron and Boyko, 2015: 134-135).

The judiciary in Ukraine has remained subject to political interference for a long time. For instance, the selection procedure for the judges of the Supreme Court as the highest court in the judicial system of Ukraine was subject to political considerations until the introduction of a competitive selection procedure in 2016. Besides, it did not become a norm for the executive branch to carry out the court decisions reflecting the power imbalance between the executive and judicial branches (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010: 9). Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as the body of constitutional jurisdiction (Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 2019) remained subject to political interference stemming from the appointment of judges by the parliament, the president, and the congress of the judges (Freedom House, 1999).

The EU raised its concerns on the independence of judiciary and selective justice in its ENP progress reports on Ukraine. For instance, the EU specifically addressed its concerns on the independence and effectiveness of the Constitutional Court in the 2007 report. The EU emphasized the lack of necessary checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches after the constitutional amendments. The competition between the president and the government as the two power holders in the executive was pointed out as obstacles for the implementation of reforms. The EU also referred to the critics voiced by the Venice Commission on the parliament's adoption of the "Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b: 3). The Venice Commission drew attention to the lack of clarity between the competences of the president and the cabinet of ministers arising from the contradiction between the Constitution and the concerned law in the areas of foreign policy, national security and defence capacity. Besides, it evaluated some of its provisions as undermining the principle of separation of powers for not taking into account the legislative competence of the parliament (the European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2006: 2-4).

Ukraine continued its efforts to make new amendments to the Constitution and established the "National Constitutional Council" in 2007. However, the issue of separation of powers remained the same since the focus of the draft in 2008 was on keeping a semi-presidential system with a double executive of the president and the Cabinet of Ministers (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2010: 4). The EU in its 2009 Progress Report on Ukraine repeated its concern on the unclear separation of powers between the president, prime minister and parliament for impeding the implementation of the necessary reforms. The issue of constitutional reform remained as a top priority in the EU's agenda (European Commission, 2010). The EU participated in advising Ukraine on the constitutional reform through its cooperation with the Venice Commission (Stewart, 2015: 123).

Important developments with regard to the constitutional reform took place in 2010 under Yanukovich's presidency. In April 2010, the "National Constitutional Council" was abolished (European Commission and HR, 2011: 4). In September 2010, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine decided that the constitutional amendments of

2004 was unconstitutional due to the violation of the procedure for reviewing and adopting constitutional amendments (Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 2010). Reactivation of the relevant provisions of the 1996 Constitution necessitated the amendments on the “Law on the Cabinet of Ministers”, the “Parliamentary Rules of Procedure” and 32 other relevant laws. These amendments led to an increase in powers of the president and lessened the parliamentary control over the executive (European Commission and HR, 2011: 4).

The EU repeated its focus on the constitutional reform in cooperation with the Venice Commission during the presidency of Yanukovich. The president set up a “Commission for the Strengthening of Democracy and Rule of Law” in November 2010 to address the recommendations of the Venice Commission on the amendments to the Constitution, the independence of judiciary and the “Status of the Judges” (Council of the European Union, 2010). Also, a “Constitutional Assembly” was set up in 2012 in line with the recommendation of the Venice Commission (European Commission and HR, 2012: 7).

Following the Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian parliament voted in 2014 for the reinstatement of the 2004 constitutional amendments. Besides, the parliament embarked on providing an efficient division of powers, decentralisation and judicial reform by establishing an ad hoc parliamentary commission for constitutional reform (European Commission and HR, 2015: 5). In 2014, there were efforts for reforming local self-government with amendments to the Constitution. However, due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian-backed separatism in Donbas region, it was not possible for the Ukrainian parliament to introduce the amendments on decentralisation to the Constitution. Nevertheless, the government embarked on the decentralisation reform within the limits of the Constitution. The decentralisation reform aimed to lessen the regions’ dependence on the centre, and to increase the investment appeal of the regions, the quality of public services, efficiency of administrative decisions, and people’s control of the government. Also, the government aimed to tackle one of the reasons for rising separatist movements in the eastern region, that is the demand for decentralisation in public administration (Government Portal Official Website of Ukraine, 2019b).

The Constitutional Commission prepared a draft law on constitutional amendments with regard to decentralisation in 2015. The parliament passed the law in its first reading in August 2015 (Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Government Office for European Integration, 2015: 29). However, Russia's demand for significant autonomy from Ukraine to the DPR and LPR increased political sensibility to separatism in Ukraine and a considerable opposition to the reforms emerged in Ukraine (Freedom House, 2016). On the same day of the parliament's approval of the constitutional amendments, violent protests erupted and showed the fragility of the political consensus on decentralisation (Jarabik and Yesmukhanova, 2017). The amendments gave the eastern regions a special status for three years and more powers to local self-government. Also, local elections were set to be held in December. However, the separatists did not conform to the Ukrainian legislation and held their own elections in November 2015. Therefore, the government annulled the special status law (Freedom House, 2015).

Nevertheless, Ukraine progressed in decentralisation reforms owing to the EU's political and financial support. In 2015, the EU took a special measure under the ENI in favour of Ukraine for "Decentralisation Reform". The action "U-LEAD with Europe: Ukraine Local Empowerment, Accountability and Development Programme" included into this special measure intends to enhance the local, regional and central administrations' institutional capacities based on the principles of transparency, accountability and participation. The EU allocated €100 million to the "U-LEAD" to support Ukraine's decentralisation process by supporting the reforms of local self-government and regional development (European Commission, 2015h).

During the decentralisation process, Ukraine has progressed in fiscal decentralisation by transferring additional budgetary powers to local governments (European Commission and HR, 2016: 5). Since the adoption of the "Law on Voluntary Amalgamation of Territorial Communities" in 2015, 882 amalgamated territorial communities (ATCs) were created as of July 2019. These ATCs are composed of 4,043 former local councils –*hromadas*– representing 69% of the population (Government Portal Official Website of Ukraine, 2019b). This made the formation of a basic level of local self-government who is responsible and has its own funds for the management of many administrative services such as education,

healthcare, water, waste and safety possible. For the implementation of the State Regional Development Strategy until 2020, regions were allowed to establish non-profit non-budget institutions of Regional Development Agencies in 2016. Following the progress achieved in the implementation of the regional policy, the EU delivered the first disbursement of the agreed supplementary sector policy support programme (Government Office for the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, 2016: 10).

### **E. Effective Power to Govern**

Merkel voices the requisite for the elected representative's ability to fulfil their tasks of governing and administering the state. This criteria of the embedded democracy model necessitates preventing the extra-constitutional actors such as the military in restraining the decision-making authority and/or capacity of the elected representatives in certain policy domains such as the foreign and national security policy. Merkel remarks veto powers' emergence during transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. These veto powers tend to gain privileges for themselves, which lead to "*the usurpation of power directed against democratic institutions*" (Merkel, 2004: 42).

In Ukraine, the military is democratically controlled. The Constitution and other legal instruments have accomplished the implementation of civilian control over military (Grytsenko, 2000: 4). Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the following separatist movements in the east of the country have challenged the monopoly of the state on the use of force. The size of these uncontrolled areas match up to 12% of the Ukrainian territory. The central government also coped with taking voluntary battalions established in 2014 under its control. Besides, the number of illegal weapons increased enormously (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 6).

What constitutes a problem for the effective power of the elected rulers to govern is the influence of oligarchs in the Ukrainian politics. Although power has shifted several times in Ukraine since the independence, the nature of the oligarchic influence over politics remained unchanged. For this reason, Melnykovska (2008: 10) defines the Ukrainian political system as "oligodemocratic". The oligarchs in Ukraine emerged during the first half of the 1990s during the privatisation process. With the

political support for their capital accumulation by easing the regulatory and inspection procedures, a patronage-client relationship emerged between the new business elites and the state enterprises. At the end of the 1990s, they transformed into important political actors. During Kuchma's presidency (1994-2004), three oligarchic clans as regional networks between oligarchs and political elites emerged: The Dnipropetrovsk network, the Donetsk network and the Kyiv network. These networks were represented in the politics via appointments of their members into public offices and the executive as prime ministers. For instance, President Kuchma had connections to the Dnipropetrovsk network and Prime Minister and then President Yanukovich had connections to the Donetsk network (Pleines, 2016: 112-116).

Hence, besides controlling the major sectors of the Ukrainian economy such as energy, metallurgy, mining and chemical industry (Aslund, 2014: 64), agriculture, and around 80% of the Ukrainian television markets, these actors have gained the control over the executive and legislative branches either by acquisition of formal public offices or by informal political networks. By means of their financial power, media control and established formal and informal networks with the state apparatus, the oligarchs have pursued to take as many seats as possible in the Ukrainian parliament. In return for financing the political parties' election campaigns and ensuring their media coverage, the political parties have collaborated with the oligarchs in furthering their interests or transferring some of the seats on their electoral lists to the candidates determined by the oligarchs. Owing to their influence in the parliament, the oligarchs are able to influence the course of the country's administration by joining to or withdrawing from coalitions (Kononczuk, Cenuşa and Kakachia, 2017: 5-10).

Pursuing their economic interests rather than the political ideology is the driving force behind the oligarchs' preferences in supporting political parties and presidential candidates (Matuszak, 2012: 5). This gives the oligarchs the political flexibility in their support for political parties. For instance, the big business groups were opposed to the transition to market economy and democracy in the 1990s. Therefore, they manipulated the political decision-making process in a way to hamper the reforms on state procurement, state aid and privatisation auctions. The political elites on the other side of the patronage-client relationship benefited from the oligarchs' support for their election campaigns (Pleines, 2016: 112). However, the

accumulation of an adequate level of capital changed their position on the reforms since further rent seeking necessitated the removal of barriers. This paved the way for changing their preferences in favour of international integration and good governance. Herewith, most of the oligarchs supported the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2008: 448).

Many centres of oligarchic power emerged in Ukraine since 2004. This was due to the coalition government crises and the split within the Orange camp –between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko- as well as the global financial crisis. When Yanukovich became president in 2010, the Donetsk clan became dominant. However, as Yanukovich built a family network composed of relatives and friends via state procurement in exchange for political support, his monopoly of power weakened oligarchs. Pleines in his study covering the period between 2000 and 2015 documents the formal networks of 29 oligarchs –who have been politically active at the national level, pursued business interests as core activity and had a wealth of at least 200 million US dollars- with the government. In this regard, according to his findings, 26 out of 29 oligarchs assumed political office, 23 were elected as members of the parliament and 6 of them became either president or prime minister. Their formal presence in the parliament served for ensuring a parliamentary majority for the then president. Also, they showed little or no interest in parliamentary sessions and legislative initiatives (Pleines, 2016: 114-120).

Poroshenko emerged as one of a few influential oligarchs after the ouster of Yanukovich. Before his election to presidency in 2014, he was portrayed as a second-rank oligarch with considerable political experience due to his service as minister of foreign affairs and economy. Although he transferred the management of his company to a trust fund (Kononczuk, Cenuşa and Kakachia, 2017: 2), the nature of the oligarchic relationships remained the same due to the systemic corruption and rent-seeking mechanisms in the country. The political elites sustained their relationship with the oligarchs (Kononczuk, Cenuşa and Kakachia, 2017: 10). Despite the improvements in the fight against corruption and the judicial reform, there have been setbacks in the reforms. There is not a compromise between the anti-corruption bodies and agencies. The influence of the executive branch is visible on the dismissal of criminal cases against certain public officials (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2018: 30).

The EU has not covered the effective power to govern in Ukraine in the sense of Merkel's conceptualisation as preventing some extra-constitutional powers to withhold the elected representatives to exercise their decision-making authority. However, the EU's overall democracy promotion policies aim at enhancing the capacity of the institutions guaranteeing the functioning of democracy. In this regard, the parliament as the direct representative political body of the elected officials is the key institution in the EU's efforts to increase the effective power to govern. The EU's promotion of public financing to the political parties in Ukraine, increasing the control mechanisms of the parliament over the executive, and the principles of transparency, accountability and participation together with the fight against corruption contribute to the elected officials' effective power to govern.

Besides, the European Parliament cooperated with the Ukrainian parliament through the "Parliamentary Cooperation Committee" established by the PCA. This Committee was replaced by the AA with the establishment of the "Parliamentary Association Committee" (European Parliament, 2019b). The European Parliament carried out democracy promotion activities based on a needs assessment mission "On Internal Reform and Capacity-Building for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" in 2015-2016. A "Memorandum of Understanding" for the capacity-building partnership was signed by the Parties. It aimed to strengthen the Ukrainian parliament's capacity in law-making, oversight of the executive and legislative, increasing transparency and accountability to citizens, and approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU acquis (European Parliament, 2016).

## **F. Civil Society**

Merkel (2004: 44) does not include civil society within the five partial regimes of his embedded democracy model. He lists a functioning civil society as an enabling and stabilising condition for democracy but not as a defining component of democracy. However, this thesis suggests that the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine necessitates placing civil society as of the defining components of the embedded democracy model. One reason for this argument is based on the EU's inclusion of civil society as a crucial actor for the development of its deep and sustainable democracy

model. Another reason is the Ukrainian civil society's proven support and lead in the country's democratisation and European integration journey during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests.

The "EU-Ukraine Action Plan" and the "Association Agenda" attribute importance to civil society development. The EU has involved the Ukrainian CSOs in many aspects of the EU-Ukraine relations and policies. The Ukrainian CSOs participate in planned and ad hoc meetings between the EU and Ukraine, visit delegations and high level officials from the EU, and give information to the "EU Deputy Heads of Missions" on a monthly basis. The EU has consulted the Ukrainian CSOs for planning the priorities and objectives of its civil society related programmes such as the EIDHR and the NSA-LA (2007-2013) and the "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities" (CSOs-LAs) (2014-2020). They were also consulted within the scope of the VLAP and Human Rights dialogues. Also, the Ukrainian CSOs have delivered their opinion on the EU policies and Ukraine's approximation in several sectors such environment, energy and migration (EEAS, 2014c: 7-8).

With respect to the technical and financial instruments used for the EU's engagement with civil society, the EIDHR as the main instrument came into force in 2007. Although intergovernmental organisations are in scope of the EIDHR support, the main beneficiaries are groups and individuals without the need for the consent of the authorities (European Commission, 2009). The EIDHR's primary focus is on civil society as an agent for democratisation and sustainable development. Although it is the primary and most-focused instrument for the EU's democracy promotion, it is one of the smallest EU external instrument in terms of its budget share (Valdambri, 2013). Although the EU increased its budget for the EIDHR from €1,104 million for the period 2007-2013 to €1,332.75 million for the period 2014-2020, it still remains as the smallest EU external financing instrument (European Commission, 2019a).

For the 2007-2013 period, the EU financed 38 projects in Ukraine under the EIDHR. This instrument aims at empowering the Ukrainian CSOs as local agents of change. The EU also collaborates in Ukraine with other external democracy promoters such as the CoE, the OSCE and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the EIDHR. These projects focused mainly on the components of elections, political rights and civil liberties in the embedded democracy

model. In this regard, these projects targeted electoral rights, ensuring free and fair electoral processes and civic observation of elections, awareness on fundamental freedoms, human rights and minority rights protection, supporting human rights defenders, promoting good governance and the rule of law, judicial and constitutional reforms, impartiality of judiciary, preventing torture and ill treatment, and empowerment of civil society for discrimination against minorities and for monitoring of the executive and the reforms (European Parliament, 2014). The EIDHR projects after the Euromaidan focused on electoral rights, the fight against discrimination, preventing torture and ill treatment, providing legal assistance to victims of human rights abuses and IDPs, and monitoring the human rights situation in Crimea and Donbas. However, the EIDHR funds for the period 2013-2017 amounted to only €3.5 million for Ukraine (European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, 2018: 20-21).

Apart from its nominal funds, the EIDHR has been criticised due to its lack of prioritising the local civil society strengthening directly. Shapovalova and Youngs ascertain that the main beneficiaries of the EIDHR funds were generally the CoE, the UN agencies or big international NGOs. In this regard, as Shapovalova and Youngs point out to the condition of financing up to 20% of the project costs with their own funding, only well-established, highly professionalised and mainly capital-based organisations became able to benefit from the EIDHR funds (Shapovalova and Youngs, 2012: 2). Nevertheless, the EU makes an effort to compensate this deficiency via other instruments that take civil society into their focus. For instance, the EU launched the EED, which is in action since 2013, pursuant to the ENP's 2011 Review after the Arab Spring. With the EED, the EU has taken a bottom-up approach in its implementing activities under the democracy promotion policies. With the EED, the EU's democracy promotion strategy has taken a bottom-up approach to support political movements and non-registered NGOs that are not financed under other EU financial instruments (Shapovalova and Youngs, 2012: 7).

The EED supported CSOs, non-governmental think tanks, media outlets such as public TVs and radio, movements, journalists and individual activists as agents of change in Ukraine. As of June 2019, the EED has funded 60 initiatives in Ukraine since 2013. The EU's support under the EED came as a quick response since the EU

targeted the need of Ukrainian citizens to access to objective information following the Euromaidan protests. The initiatives supported under the EED in Ukraine have been directed towards freedom of speech, freedom of media, raising awareness of the Ukrainian population about the European integration, providing legal advice for the victims of human rights violations, development of the understanding of democratic values in schools, public outreach campaigns for reforms, and increasing the participation of public, civil society and NGOs in monitoring the reforms and implementation of anti-corruption and transparency mechanisms (European Endowment for Democracy, 2019).

Since 2011, Ukrainian CSOs participate in the NCSF, and the programmes of the NSA-LA and the CSOs-LAs. Ukrainian CSOs also benefit from the EaP Civil Society Forum. While the EIDHR focuses on first generation human rights and democracy, the NCSF and the NSA-LA/CSOs-LAs include a broader agenda with their focus on good governance, accountability, transparency, and sustainable development. The EU aims at improving the legal, economic, and socio-cultural environment for the Ukrainian CSOs to increase their participation in policy-making, monitoring the public policy and the reforms in the implementation of the AA, to enhance their role in conflict prevention, to increase their engagement with the Ukrainian government in the formulation and implementation of the reforms on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and in promoting economic development as well as the implementation of the DCFTA. For the implementation of these aims, the EU takes joint action with other international organisations and international donors such as the WB, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the USAID, the EU Member States, the CSOs, and national and local authorities. The EU's operational support are provided through regional EU-funded project "Civil Society Dialogue for Progress", the ENI "Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme", CSOs-LAs programmes, ongoing projects under the NCSF, and other civil society support programmes of the Member States, international organisations and donors (EEAS, 2014c: 7-24).

The EU took a special measure in favour of Ukraine in 2014, which was comprised of two actions: "State Building Contract for Ukraine and "Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme" (European Commission, 2014d). As beforementioned,

the action entitled as “State Building Contract for Ukraine” targeted stimulating reform in the areas of public administration, anti-corruption, constitutional and electoral law reform. The EU expressed clearly its demands and expected results as an indication of its monitoring of the progress in each targeted area. Almost half of €250 million budget support in this action was made conditional upon Ukraine’s progress in realising the expected results. This action put emphasis on transparency, accountability and participation of civil society in establishing anti-corruption measures and in monitoring the reforms (European Commission, 2014c). The action for “Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme” aimed at improving the role of Ukrainian civil society in driving and monitoring the democratic reforms and inclusive socio-economic development in Ukraine by increasing the participation of the CSOs in policy and decision-making processes. The EU provided technical assistance for capacity development and funding for actions of the CSOs in Ukraine (European Commission, 2014e).

Together with other international donors, the EU’s financial support for the development of the Ukrainian CSOs is crucial since there is a lack of sufficient domestic sponsorship (EEAS, 2014c). Although the civil society established a firm domestic demand for democratic change in Ukraine, it has not always been the main bottom-up force for democratisation (Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2008: 447). Civil society in Ukraine in the 1990s was weak in terms of number of organisational membership arising from the legacy of mistrust of communist organisations, the high politicisation of the public space and the low levels of public participation under the Soviet rule (Howard, 2002: 159-163). The public activism in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution was defined as spontaneous popular protests directed against the dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime rather than a response by a developed and well established civil society. However, it was described as the birth of a civil society which needs to be developed (Stepanenko, 2006: 572).

Due to the pressures by the Ukrainian civil society and the international community, Ukraine adopted the “Law on Civil Society Associations” in 2012 in order to facilitate the registration procedures for the exercise of association and assembly rights (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). However, as discussed under the political rights, these rights were challenged during Yanukovich’s presidency. In this regard, the

Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014 directed against the restriction of political and civil rights as a turn back from democratisation and European integration were a milestone in the development of the Ukrainian civil society. Since then, with the impact of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, the Ukrainian civil society has substituted for the state by providing crucial services to citizens in so far as to supporting the army and volunteer battalions. However, as Shapovalova and Burlyuk argue, this conflict-oriented civil society mobilisation due to the Russian aggression conflicts with civil society's catalyst for democratisation since it overshadows its function as a watchdog of the state. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian civil society has managed to be a collaborator of the government and the parliament and provided advocacy for the implementation and monitoring of the reforms (Shapovalova and Burlyuk, 2018: 11-40).

### **III. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The analytical framework adopted from Merkel shows that the EU has directly or indirectly supported the partial regimes of the embedded democracy model in its broad democracy promotion agenda in Ukraine. With the employment of both top-down and bottom-up approaches, the EU takes a holistic approach. The EU's democracy promotion through linkage politics has become prominent since the beginning of the bilateral institutional relations. The socialisation mechanism comes to the fore in this regard. The application of leverage model remains modest in the absence of a clear membership perspective. As the EU takes a sectoral approach since the beginning of the 2000s, it has combined the promotion of the defining elements of democracy with the promotion of good governance principles in Ukraine.

Once Ukraine's democratic progress is evaluated on the criteria followed by the Freedom House and the Transformation Index of Bertelsmann Stiftung, there has not been a democratic regime change since transition to democracy. Ukraine's status as "partly free" with the freedom rating of 3.5 as the average of a total 7 in political rights and civil liberties in 1999 remains the same in 2019. Its free status after the Orange Revolution was challenged and reversed under Yanukovich's presidency

(2010-2014).<sup>17</sup> A macro assessment indicates that the process of democratisation is an outcome of domestic contexts and dependent on the willingness of the ruling elite. Although the EU has not been a driver for a democratic regime change in Ukraine, the analysis of the defining components of the embedded democracy model shows that there has been an EU impact on Ukraine's democratisation thanks to the adoption of new legislation on several aspects such as the public funding of political parties, anti-corruption mechanisms, and status of judges. The EU's offer of incentives such as visa liberalisation and linking them to the reforms in fundamental freedoms has proven to be effective in the so-called "back-door democratisation".

The EU's democracy promotion through integration has met with Russia's counterproductive efforts. Russia's cross-conditionality arising from its asymmetric power vis-à-vis Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy supplies and trade hampers Ukraine's progress and current state of democratisation. As the security measures taken after Russia's military aggression against Ukraine have shown, conflict-torn societies like Ukraine are prone to de-democratisation since the likelihood of a clash between security and democratisation. The EU's high-level integration with Ukraine via the AA and the DCFTA, together with its budgetary and non-budgetary instruments for institution and capacity building, and engagement with the Ukrainian civil society are likely to play a crucial role in diminishing Russian influence in the country. However, the success of the EU democracy promotion policies remains dependent on the willingness of the political elites for the implementation of the reforms and fighting with corruption as the most endemic impediment to democratisation.

---

<sup>17</sup> For information on scores and status, please see the Freedom House reports on Ukraine analysed in this chapter.

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation analyses the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine. It embraces a liberal notion of democracy and democratisation as a process comprising both transition from a nondemocratic regime and consolidation of democracy. By focusing on the international dimension of democratisation, this dissertation problematizes the EU impact in Ukraine's progress towards democratisation. However, the study acknowledges the dependence of this impact on the domestic context and the openness and willingness it provides for the influence of democracy promoters and in support of democratisation. Through the application of "embedded democracy" model of Merkel, this study benefits from elaborating on several crucial components of democracy by passing beyond democracy's minimalist or electoral conceptualisations.

Ukraine presents a convenient case study to show the two-sidedness of interactions between the domestic and external environments. Geographical proximity of Ukraine both to the EU and Russia becomes a factor that contributes either positively or negatively to its level of democracy. As intentionality of the two external actors to influence the domestic political developments in Ukraine is present, intentions and actions of the domestic actors become determinant to account for any diffusion explanation. In this regard, since Ukraine's spatial stock is comprised of the EU and Russia, Ukraine has been exposed to both sorts of neighbour emulation rendering Ukraine's adoption of similar patterns of behaviour with its two neighbours equally possible.

External actors –the EU specifically in this case- by embarking on a democracy promoter role act beyond their territorial borders. Democracy promotion policies directly are directly aimed at shaping and influencing the political regimes of third countries. The EU has embraced the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in its external relations with the third countries. The EU's type identity as a democratic entity and its role identity and conception as a democracy promoter have been constructed through its institutionalisation process. As the analysis of the official EU documents has shown, the EU's comprehension of democracy and its agenda for promoting democracy has started to be shaped in the 1960s and 1970s with the

adoptions of Birkelbach Report, the Declaration on European Identity, Declaration on Democracy and its enlargement experience with Spain, Greece and Portugal as the countries that were struggling with the consolidation of their democracies at that time. Democratic values have been incorporated into the treaties by containing references to the respect for human rights and democratic principles in its management of external policies. Starting with the accession process of the CEECs, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights became criteria for membership. The TEU in 1993 introduced the development and consolidation of democracy as an CFSP objective.

The EU has become more dedicated to the respect for democracy and human rights in its relations with third countries. It became an essential element of the EU's contractual engagement with the third countries. The EU has taken a mixture of political and developmental approaches both in its comprehension of democracy and democracy promotion. Democracy, human rights, poverty reduction and sustainable development are addressed as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy promotion policies of external actors reflect their own comprehension of democracy. In this regard, the EU projects mainly a liberal model of democracy. With its notion of deep and sustainable democracy, the EU's democracy promotion approach indicates a comprehensive and holistic approach as to involve several crucial elements of democracy such as free and fair elections, freedom of expression, freedom of media, independent judiciary, the rule of law and democratic control of elected officials. The EU also uses a reinforcement strategy in its democracy promotion policies by referring to the conceptualisation of democracy by other European/international organisations such as the OSCE and the UN.

The most commonly used instruments for promoting democracy by the EU are financial and technical assistance, electoral support and election observation missions. The use of naming and shaming is frequent in case of non-confirming behaviour while the use of economic sanctions and embargoes is rare within the limits of the ENP. Economic methods are used as incentives and rewards in the ENP. The EU resorts to them as a tool for promoting political reform in the ENP countries. The EU's approach to democracy promotion involves both top-down and bottom-up approaches. Since the targets of its democracy promotion policies under the ENP are the countries that are

still in democratic transition process, institution and capacity building have been long on its agenda. Hence, the political elites have long played a crucial role in the EU's engagement with domestic actors for democratisation. However, starting with the Arab Spring, the EU has increased its engagement with civil society as an actor to drive for democratisation.

It is important to note that the EU's democracy promotion agenda do not stem only from its value-based approach or its reputation as a normative power. Although the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine and in the EaP and ENP countries generally targets democratisation of nondemocratic regimes or consolidation of democracy, what the EU has been doing by inking democracy to the incentives that further the ENP states' integration with the EU is to create an international environment that resembles more to its internal environment and herewith less threatening to itself. Besides the motive or moral pull of spreading democracy as a norm, it is in strategic interest of the EU to have a secured external environment surrounded by peaceful-minded democratic states. The belief in the EU's transformative power stemming from its enlargement towards the CEECs was paired with the combat with the post-Cold War security threats and challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration within the EU's neighbourhood. Hereby, the ENP resonates well with the arguments of Neoclassical realism and critical theory in the context of democracy promotion that is compatible with traditional goals of foreign policy such as security.

By combining normative motives with its interests in cooperation, mutual trust, liberal market economy, increased trade and security, the EU's democracy promotion approach is reflective and flexible in the neighbourhood. Although its grand strategy for democracy promotion is based on its engagement and integration experiences gained via its enlargement policy, the EU modifies its approach, incentives and instruments in line with the domestic contexts of the neighbourhood countries. The EU's approach to democracy promotion in the neighbourhood was more EU-centric and reflected more the one-size-fits-all approach of the enlargement. However, as the enlargement-inspired approach proved itself as ineffective in creating a region-wide democratic change via a limited effect of conditionality mechanism, the EU's democracy promotion has become much more dependent on the political, economic and social contexts and developments of its neighbours. Both the 2011 and 2015

reviews of the ENP reflected this change. What the 2011 ENP review brought to democracy promotion policies was increased engagement with the civil society actors, creation of new incentives and instruments. However, due to the changes in its external environment starting with the crises in Syria and Ukraine, the EU has lessened its ambition in promoting democracy and focused more on the ENP partners' aspirations.

The EU's democracy promotion based on linkage, leverage and governance models have become an essential feature of the EU's norm and rule transfer to the ENP countries. In the linkage model, the EU takes a bottom-up approach directed towards domestic forces of democratisation from below. The EU attaches great importance to socialisation or social learning process for the transfer of its democratic norms, values and rules in this model. An important factor for the EU to be effective in its democracy promotion policies via linkage model is the existence of a cultural match or resonance with the EU norms. In the leverage model, the EU takes an intergovernmental and top-down approach directed towards the political elites and state officials. Although the conditionality mechanism is less effective than its use in the enlargement policy with the prospect of membership, it has proven itself effective with regard to achieving less ambitious goals such as visa facilitation and/or liberalisation.

Via the governance model, the EU aims at transferring or furthering transparency, accountability and participation in public administration and sectoral policy making. Herewith, it targets democratisation in-between the state and society levels. In this regard, democratisation is not approached as a regime change but rather as adoption of democratic principles for decision-making and implementation. In this regard, the EU aims at increasing the intensity of contacts between the EU and third state officials for norm transfer.

The ENP has its focus on its Eastern Dimension from the start due to the EU's fears and concerns of new threats stemming from insecure and unstable borders in the post-Soviet environment. Ukraine has been at the centre of the EU's democracy promotion policies in the ENP since the construction of the idea of a "Wider Europe". Although the EU has not provided a clear and credible membership perspective in the near future for Ukraine, the EU membership remains an ambitious goal for Ukraine. Ukraine is one of the three countries together with Georgia and Moldova that has the

most intensified relations via the AA with the DCFTA with the EU and visa liberalisation under the ENP and EaP frameworks.

However, the Eastern neighbourhood turned into a contested neighbourhood rather than a shared one due to Russia's increasing assertiveness in the region. Russia projects itself as a geopolitical player with its strategic interests in the former Soviet countries. In addition to Russia's refusal to participate in the ENP due to the ENP's lack of equal relationship between the EU and the ENP state, the democratic movements in the region have contributed to Russia's growing fear of loss of influence. In this context, the launch of the EaP has only contributed to Russia's growing mistrust of the EU and tendencies of the EaP countries towards furthering integration with the EU.

Russia embarked on strategies of contestation with the EU in its so-called backyard. It has not hesitated to use hard power to preserve its influence as the examples of Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 have shown. Russia introduced punitive measures as cross-conditionality such as trade bans, embargoes and increases in natural gas prices. Also, Russia has used its soft power as a source of attraction by offering alternative integration projects such as the ECU leading to the EEU as well as using the migration and mobility interdependence of the EaP countries on Russia. Ukraine has been the target of these Russian contestation strategies. Russia undermines the EU's influence in Ukraine's democratisation. For this reason, the EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine is also dependent on the political, economic, cultural, and militarily employed cross-conditionality of Russia towards Ukraine.

Ukraine shares a very long and intertwined history with Poland and Russia. Its current geographical position reflects a historical and regional pattern in cultural, linguistic, religious and political divide between the East and West. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine's nation and state-building process has revolved around shifts between orientation towards Russia and the EU or Europe. Ukraine's centuries long historical experiences under the rule of Russian administrations and lastly the USSR have played a crucial role in its identity formation process. Russian identity and language specifically constituted both its other in its identity construction and a defining component for Ukraine's large Russian minority. Besides the Russian

minority and the language, Ukraine inherited the former Soviet elites and norms. Since preserving independence and territorial integrity have been priorities in Ukraine, the use of Ukrainian and/or Russian language has become an identity and a loyalty issue. This in turn makes a unified or hegemonic Ukrainian national identity intangible. Therefore, in the ongoing process of state and nation building in Ukraine, Russia continues to play the role of Ukraine's constituting other and serves both as a negative and positive self-identification source of identity in Ukraine.

Ukraine's integration with the Western institutional settings such as NATO and the EU or its move away from this foreign policy priority have been a reflection of its official emphasis on its European heritage, identity and culture and orientation towards Europe or the contrary towards Russia. As it is seen in the elections since its independence, in the political realm, positive self-identification with Russia is voiced by pro-Russian forces and gains support of the eastern and southern parts of the country. On the other hand, negative self-identification with Russia is compatible with the "return to Europe" or "belonging to Europe" rhetoric and gains support of the western part of the country and the centre as witnessed recently. As regional differences in language preferences, and self-identifications with Ukrainian or non-Ukrainian ethnicity become apparent in voting behaviours and election results, the east of the country seems to have tendencies towards allying itself with Russia, while the west seems to see itself as more European.

In the absence of a hegemonic national identity in Ukraine, both external actors have the chance and intention to influence the domestic politics and democratisation process of Ukraine. As Tilly warns rightfully, democratisation has the risk of de-democratisation. Democratisation is a long-term, dynamic and open-ended process. For it to be completed, both the embeddedness of democratic values and the principle of the rule of law and the institutionalisation are vital. In this regard, an agreement among the political elites with regard to the institutional core of democracy and internalisation of democratic values and rules as emphasized by Pridham and Lewis become crucial for democracy to be consolidated.

As Ukraine's experiences of democratisation indicate, the process of democratisation is not ahistorical. It takes the form of the country's specific structures, policy practices, historical experiences and path-dependencies. Ukraine's experiences

of democracy well suit Huntington's comprehension of democracy. Although it fulfils the minimalist or electoral democracy model by regular, free and fair elections especially since the Orange Revolution, this does not guarantee the exercise of necessary elements of democracy such as freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and freedom of association and assembly as pointed out by Dahl. As Huntington does not call the governments that are inefficient, corrupt, driven by special interests and incapable of reflecting public good as undemocratic, the term democracy remains subjective. Nevertheless, embracing a maximalist definition of democracy as "government of, by, and for the people" would problematize Ukraine's observance of democracy with respect to "for the people" part due to endemic corruption in the country.

To this date, Ukraine's democracy "survives without consolidating". The current situation of competition between the EU and Russia for influence in Ukraine proves Welzel's point that democratisation is also an outcome of power struggles between democratic and anti-democratic regimes on the international stage. Although the EU has been effective in creating and supporting some democratic changes in Ukraine, the embeddedness of democracy remains in the hands of the domestic actors. The presence of historical, political, economic and identity-based linkages with the West in Ukraine increases the likelihood of the EU's contribution to Ukraine's progress on democratisation.

The EU's democracy promotion policies were gradually shaping in the 1990s. Both the EU and Ukraine lacked the necessary capacities for democratisation. The bilateral relations focused on Ukraine's transition to market economy, the need for regional stability and nuclear safety. Promotion of trade, investment and economic relations to foster sustainable development was at the EU's agenda. The parties furthered their institutional relations with the PCA, the EU's Common Position in Ukraine, the Action Plan for Ukraine and the Common Strategy on Ukraine. All these documents made references to democracy either as the essentiality of the respect for democratic principles and human rights for the basis of the bilateral relations or as the EU's support for Ukraine's democratic development.

With regard to the EU's approach to and agenda on democracy promotion in Ukraine in the period before the ENP, it indicated the EU's support for sustainable

development as a nurturing factor for democratisation and its socio-economic preconditions. Although the EU did not devote its efforts to promoting democracy in Ukraine, linkages between the EU and Ukraine as the target state were being established through increase in economic interaction, institutional connections, political dialogue, and peer-to-peer interaction and communication between elites, institutions, and NGOs via projects. The main financial and technical assistance instrument of the EU before the ENP was the TACIS programme. The use of this instrument reflected the EU's focus on supporting Ukraine's integration to the world economy. As of 1992, the EU used the TACIS Democracy Programme as an instrument for the consolidation of democracy through knowledge transfer, technical assistance, and projects during the 1990s. The scope of these projects were parliamentary practice, law and government reform, electoral process, and media monitoring of elections. In the 1990s, both the size and the scope of economic and political incentives remained weak to lead to a democratic change in Ukraine at the time. The EU's democratising pressure was modest.

The EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine became more visible and intense with the ENP (2004) and EaP (2009). The EU increased its emphasis on transferring the core EU principles of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms to the ENP countries. Through the "Action Plan", "Association Agenda", AA, and the "Updated Association Agenda" developed under the ENP and EaP, the level of the EU's relations with Ukraine has been upgraded. Since Ukraine was given market economy status in 2005, the EU's agenda shifted from its emphasis on transition to market economy to the stability and efficiency of state institutions as they were seen essential for the regional stability and security. The EU intensified the use of its socialisation mechanism with Ukraine. In addition to its top-down approach directed at the state institutions and the Ukrainian governments, the EU also emphasized the involvement of citizens and civil society in the decision making process and in dialogues on several policy areas.

At the beginning of the ENP, the EU's financial and technical assistance focused on institution building, capacity building and transgovernmental cooperation in Ukraine. Its democracy promotion approach in general and specifically in Ukraine leaned on socialisation intensive instruments. The instruments of TAIEX, Twinning

and SIGMA were used for the transfer of expertise, know-how and best practices via people-to-people contacts. Another focus of the EU has been the governance approach. The EU increased its emphasis on good governance with the principles of public participation, transparency and accountability in its sector-specific approach. As of 2014, the EU's allocation of financial assistance to Ukraine has reflected this shift from a single focus on state institutions and policy measures to a sector-focused approach.

With the ENP, the EU introduced the principle of conditionality into its relations with Ukraine. The EU used this conditionality for the launch of the AA. In exchange for the free and fair 2006 parliamentary and 2007 early parliamentary elections as well as for economic reforms, the establishment of a DCFTA was offered by the EU and the negotiations of the AA was launched in 2007 as a reward. The AA itself contained a conditionality clause with regard to its suspension in case of violations of the essential elements that included respect for democracy. Besides, the use of conditionality in the case of visa liberalisation process in Ukraine proved effective. The EU linked the visa liberalisation process to Ukraine's progress on the freedom of movements and citizens' rights including protection of minorities. Herewith, the use of positive conditionality for other than membership goals worked when the third country –in this case- was eager to obtain the offered incentive. Also, it indicates an example of the EU's governance model of democracy promotion via sectoral cooperation since the EU incorporated conditions on fundamental rights to sectoral cooperation in migration.

The EU's democracy promotion policies in Ukraine follows a pattern in line with its democracy promotion model. However, Ukraine's domestic context has influenced and shaped this pattern in a way that Ukraine keeps the EU's model dynamic and flexible. As the analysis has shown, the post-Soviet transition in Ukraine led the EU to focus on institution and capacity building. This necessitated the extension of the accession-specific programmes to Ukraine and other ENP countries. High levels of corruption in Ukraine paved the way for the EU to focus on and imbed the principles of governance in the founding documents of the bilateral relations as well as its democracy-supporting financial and technical instruments. Ukraine's dedication to the pro-democratic reforms following the Euromaidan brought about an innovation in the

EU's tools by the creation of the SGUA in 2014 which is one of a kind in the ENP framework. Besides, Ukraine's active and pro-democratic civil society has been influential in keeping the EU's focus in civil society on track.

The application of Merkel's embedded democracy model provides insights for the EU's deep and sustainable democracy conception by allowing to identify the EU's discourse and action as well as its impact and the current state of interplay between the domestic and external factors. The EU has paid attention to all components of the embedded democracy model. The EU has addressed the deficiencies of Ukraine's democracy and its needs more actively under the ENP thanks to its wide-range of instruments targeting both top-down and bottom-up approaches.

For the electoral regime, the EU leans on the expertise of the CoE and OSCE and follow their democratic template as a reinforcement strategy. Electoral assistance and election observation missions through cooperation with the CoE prevails in this component. The EU contributed to the observance of free and fair elections via its conditionality principle as outlined above. The EU was effective in addressing the weakness of the political parties by its emphasis on the introduction of direct public funding of political parties. With regard to Russia's counterproductive impact in this component, it restrains the capacity and capability of the Ukrainian state to conduct elections in the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and in Crimea.

The EU's main focus and concern is political liberties in Ukraine. The EU's emphasis is on improving freedom, independence, pluralism and diversity of media and the rights of journalists in Ukraine. The EU emphasises enhancing the citizens' rights and public participation in politics, which requires freedom of expression and freedom of media. The EU has provided advice and training to the Ukrainian journalists starting with the TACIS Democracy Programme. Under the ENI, the EU made freedom of expression and media freedom specific objectives and expected Ukraine to improve and implement its legislation on media freedom including journalists' rights. The EU provided direct support for the political rights under the EIDHR and the EED.

Regarding Russia's impact, the most obvious one has been the restriction of the political rights of participation of the Ukrainian citizens in Crimea and in non-

government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Russia's another impact is the use of Russian media, social networks and cyber attacks to provide disinformation in Ukraine. In return for Russia's acts of aggression, Ukraine took some national security measures as of 2014 by arguing the need to protect Ukraine's information space from Russian propaganda. In this regard, the broadcasting of various news channels from Russia was suspended. Many Russian journalists were banned from entering Ukraine. In 2017, the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine was approved. This document defined the national interests of Ukraine in the information area as protecting the Ukrainian state and society from especially Russia's destructive propaganda.

For civil rights, the EU promotes the rule of law as one its founding values and principles in Ukraine. The reform of judiciary and its independence as well as the respect for minority rights, the respect for children's rights, combating torture and ill-treatment, combating discrimination and ensuring equal treatment are on the EU's agenda. Its main approach to civil rights in Ukraine is bottom-up directed towards the NGOs. With the instruments of the EDIHR, the EU focus on the civil rights was reflected in these projects which centred upon creating awareness on fundamental freedoms, human rights and minority rights protection, supporting human rights defenders, promoting good governance and the rule of law, judicial and constitutional reforms, impartiality of judiciary, preventing torture and ill treatment, and empowerment of civil society for discrimination against minorities and for monitoring of the executive and the reforms

For the enjoyment of all civil rights, the most important obstacle in Ukraine remains as corruption. For combatting corruption in Ukraine, the EU acts in cooperation with other European and international institutions such as the CoE and the OECD to provide legislative and technical assistance to Ukraine. With regard to Russia's role as an impediment on the observance of civil rights in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and separatist movement in the east of the country play the key role. In these areas, the rule of law has been undermined. Freedom of religion, freedom of movement, right to life and right to property are constrained by the de facto authorities and the Russian occupation authorities.

The EU's focus in the partial regime of horizontal accountability has been on the independence of judiciary, constitutional reform and decentralisation for ensuring effective checks and balances between state institutions. In Ukraine, both the legislative and judicial branches have suffered from the domination of the executive branch. The judiciary in Ukraine has remained subject to political interference for a long time. The EU raised its concerns on the independence of judiciary and selective justice in its ENP progress reports on Ukraine. The EU participated in advising Ukraine on the constitutional reform through its cooperation with the Venice Commission. Ukraine progressed in judicial reforms as discussed on the civil rights part and continues its efforts for constitutional reform in cooperation with the EU and CoE. For decentralisation reform, Ukraine's efforts to introduce amendments on decentralisation were interrupted due to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Russian-backed separatism in Donbas region. It became a sensitive issue because of the rising separatist movement in the eastern region. However, owing to the political and financial support of the EU, Ukraine progressed in decentralisation reforms.

For the effective power to govern, what constitutes a problem for the effective power of the elected rulers to govern is the influence of oligarchs in the Ukrainian politics. In return for financing the political parties' election campaigns and ensuring their media coverage, the political parties have collaborated with the oligarchs in furthering their interests or transferring some of the seats on their electoral lists to the candidates determined by the oligarchs. Owing to their influence in the parliament, the oligarchs are able to influence the course of the country's administration by joining to or withdrawing from coalitions. The EU has not covered this component in Ukraine in the sense of Merkel's conceptualisation as preventing some extra-constitutional powers to withhold the elected representatives to exercise their decision-making authority. However, the EU's overall democracy promotion policies aim at enhancing the capacity of the institutions guaranteeing the functioning of democracy. In this regard, the parliament as the direct representative political body of the elected officials is the key institution. The EU's promotion of public financing to the political parties in Ukraine, increasing the control mechanisms of the parliament over the executive, and the principles of transparency, accountability and participation together with the

fight against corruption contribute to the effective power to govern of the elected officials.

Civil society as the sixth defining component of democracy added to analysis in this thesis has been a crucial actor for the EU's engagement in democratisation of Ukraine. The EU has involved the Ukrainian CSOs in many aspects of the EU-Ukraine relations and policies. The Ukrainian CSOs participates in planned and ad hoc meetings between the EU and Ukraine, visit delegations and high level officials from the EU. With respect to the technical and financial instruments used for the EU's engagement with civil society, the EIDHR as the main instrument came into force in 2007. The EIDHR's primary focus is on civil society as an agent for democratisation and sustainable development. Besides the EIDHR, the EED supported CSOs, non-governmental think tanks, media outlets such as public TVs and radio, movements, journalists and individual activists as agents of change in Ukraine. Together with other international donors, the EU's financial support for the development of the Ukrainian CSOs is crucial since there is a lack of sufficient domestic sponsorship.

With the impact of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, the Ukrainian civil society has substituted for the state by providing crucial services to citizens in so far as to supporting the army and volunteer battalions. However, this conflict-oriented civil society mobilisation due to the Russian aggression conflicts with civil society's catalyst for democratisation since it overshadows its function as a watchdog of the state. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian civil society has collaborated with the government and the parliament and provided advocacy for the implementation and monitoring of the reforms.

Overall, the EU addresses several aspects of democracy in Ukraine. Although it has the intention to influence the domestic process of democratisation in Ukraine, its influence remains dependent on domestic actors to carry out the necessary reforms in Ukraine. It is important to note that the EU has been effective in pushing for rule adoption via some key reforms especially in the partial regimes of the electoral regime, civil rights and horizontal accountability. However, when it comes to the implementation of the related laws, there is no enforcement strategy of the EU except for a modest conditionality in the absence of membership perspective. This brings into question the window-dressing or opportunistic democratisation on Ukraine's part.

Besides, Russia's counter effective policies to undermine Ukraine's European integration are effective to push the level of Ukraine's democratisation back. In this regard, the EU's impact in Ukraine's democratisation is dependent on the domestic context. Since Ukraine has acknowledged its path towards the European integration and democratisation both declaratively in the official documents and with the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests, it becomes possible to argue that Ukraine's voluntary adaptation of the EU norms, values and rules in the absence of membership might lead to furthering the current state of its European integration.

In this regard, for future studies, the EU's democracy promotion in Ukraine remains an open-ended process. It depends on the country's future orientation whether towards the EU, Russia or both under the Presidency of Zelenskiy. Besides, it depends on the EU's future position on the ENP's capabilities and priorities. Since the ENP will be subject to periodical reviews as it has been going through one at the time of this thesis' writing. Whether the EU will prioritise its agenda on democratising the neighbourhood countries or more hard security issues is also dependent on both the domestic contexts of the ENP states and Russia's limits to how far it will pursue its strategic goals in the "shared neighbourhood" and how far it will resort to hard power as an external factor.

## REFERENCES

- Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?. *International Affairs*. 84(1): 1-11.
- Aknur, M. (2012). Introduction: Democratic Consolidation in Turkey. *Democratic Consolidation in Turkey* (pp. 1-62). Editor Müge Aknur. Boca Raton FL: Universal Publishers.
- Alieva, L. (2015). The European Neighbourhood Policy and Azerbaijan: When Soft Power and Security are Tightly Related. *Reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy: Eastern Perspectives* (pp. 12-17). Editors Alina Inayeh and Joerg Forbrig. Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- Alihodžić, S. (2016). The Mechanics of Democracy Promotion Tools: Bridging the Knowledge-to-Practice Gap. *Development in Practice*. 26(4): 431-443.
- Almond, G. A. and Verba, S. (1989). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. California: Sage Publications.
- Aslund, A. (2014). The Maidan and Beyond: Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration. *Journal of Democracy*. 25(3): 64-73.
- Avery, G. (2015). EU Expansion and Wider Europe. *The European Union: How does it Work* (pp. 163-186). Editors Daniel Kenealy, John Peterson and Richard Corbett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Axyonova, V. and Bossuyt, F. (2016). Mapping the Substance of the EU's Civil Society Support in Central Asia: From Neo-liberal to State-led Civil Society. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 49(3): 207-217.

Balkır, C. and Soyaltın, D. (2018). *Avrupalılaşıma: Tarih, Kavram, Kuram ve Türkiye Uygulaması*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Baracani, E. (2010). US and EU Strategies for Promoting Democracy. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World* (pp. 320-335). Editor Federiga Bindi. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Bauer, M. W., Knill, C. and Pitschel, D. (2007). Differential Europeanization in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Diverse EU Regulatory Governance Patterns. *Journal of European Integration*. 29(4): pp. 405–423.

Birch, S. (2002). The Presidential Election in Ukraine, October 1999. *Electoral Studies*. 21(2): 339-345.

Blaj, L. (2013). Ukraine's Independence and Its Geostrategic Impact in Eastern Europe. *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*. 21(2-3): 165-181.

Bornio, J. (2017). Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine Join Forces. *Opinion&Analysis*. 140-145.

Borys, J. (1972). Who Ruled the Ukraine in Stalin's Time?. *Canadian Slavonic Papers*. 14(2): 213-234.

Bossuyt F. and Panchuk, D. (2017). The Participation of CEECs in EU Twinning Projects: Offering Specific Added Value for EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood?. *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*. 31(2): 334-359.

Bossuyt, F. and Kubicek, P. (2011). Advancing Democracy on Difficult Terrain: EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 16: 639-658.

Börzel, T. A. and Lebanidze, B. (2017). 'The Transformative Power of Europe' beyond Enlargement: The EU's Performance in Promoting Democracy in its Neighbourhood. *East European Politics*. 33(1): 17-35.

Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2009). Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union's Approaches to Democracy Promotion in Comparative Perspective. *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies* (pp. 34-60). Editors Amichai Magen, Thomas Risse and Michael A. McFaul. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Börzel, T. A. and Hüllen, V. (2014). One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals: Cohesiveness and Consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 21(7): 1033-1049.

Bridoux, J. and Kurki, M. (2015). Cosmetic Agreements and the Cracks Beneath: Ideological Convergences and Divergences in US and EU Democracy Promotion in Civil Society. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 28(1): 55-74.

Brinks, D. and Coppedge, M. (2006). Diffusion is no Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*. 39(4): 463-489.

Bunce, V. (2000). Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations. *Comparative Political Studies*. 33(6/7): 703-734.

Burlyuk, O. and Shapovalova, N. (2017). 'Veni, Vidi, ... Vici?' EU Performance and Two Faces of Conditionality towards Ukraine. *East European Politics*. 33(1): 36-55.

Burnell, P. (2000). Democracy Assistance: The State of Discourse. *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation in Democratization* (pp. 3-33). Editor Peter Burnell. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Burton, M., Gunther, R. and Higley, J. (1992). Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (pp. 1-37). Editors John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buscaneanu, S. (2016). *Regime Dynamics in EU's Eastern Neighbourhood: EU Democracy Promotion, International Influences, and Domestic Contexts*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carbone, M. (2010). The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Coordination. *Third World Quarterly*. 31(1): 13-29.

Cardwell, P. J. (2011). Mapping out Democracy Promotion in the EU's External Relations. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 16: 21-40.

Carothers, T. (1999). *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carothers, T. (2009). Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?. *Journal of Democracy*. 20(1): 5-19.

Casier, T. (2011). The EU's Two Track Approach to Democracy Promotion: The Case of Ukraine. *Democratization*. 18(4): 956-977.

Chalmers, D. A. (1993). *Internationalized Domestic Politics in Latin America the Institutional Role of Internationally Based Actors*. Columbia: Columbia University.

Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization*. 55(3): 553-588.

Checkel, J. T. (2006). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. *International Organization*. 59(4): 801-826.

Coetzee, E. and Hudson, H. (2012). Democratic Peace Theory and the Realist-Liberal Dichotomy: The Promise of Neoclassical Realism?. *Politikon*. 39(2): 257-277.

Collier, D. and Levitsky, S. (1997). Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. *World Politics*. 49(3): 430-451.

Crawford, G. (2000). European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy. *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation in Democratization* (pp. 90-127). Editor Peter Burnell. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Crawford, G. (2005). The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa: The Case of Ghana. *The European Journal of Development Research*. 17(4): 571-600.

Çınar, M. (2014). Demokrasi. *Siyaset: Kavramlar, Kurumlar, Süreçler* (pp. 203-250). Editor Yüksel Taşkın. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Cox, R. and Sinclair, T. J. (1996). *Approaches to World Order*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R. W. (1986). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Neorealism and its Critics* (pp. 204-254). Editor Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Dandashly, A. (2015). The EU Response to Regime Change in the Wake of the Arab Revolt: Differential Implementation. *Journal of European Integration*. 37(1): 37-56.

Dandashly, A. (2018a). EU Democracy Promotion and the Dominance of the Security-Stability Nexus. *Mediterranean Politics*. 23(1): 62-82.

Del Sarto, R. A. (2016). Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the 'Arab Spring'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 54(2): 215-232.

Demir, N. (2007). *Avrupa Birliği'nde Demokrasi*. Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık.

Denys Kovryzhenko Agency for Legislative Initiatives. (2010). *Regulation of Political Parties in Ukraine: The Current State and Direction of Reforms*. Kyiv and Warsaw: Agency for Legislative Initiatives and OSCE/ODIHR.

Deugd, N. (2019). A Normative Power Yes or No? The European Union, Ukraine, and the Transfer of Democracy. *Democracy Promotion and the Normative Power Europe Framework: The European Union in South Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* (pp. 119-135). Editor Marek Neuman. Switzerland: Springer.

Diamond, L. (1997). Introduction: In Search of Consolidation. *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives* (pp. xiii-xlvii). Editors Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L. (2000). Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?. *Journal of Democracy*. 11(3): 91-106.

Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism. *Review of Central and East European Law*. 39: 213-244.

Duchêne, F. (1973). The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, A Nation Writ Large?. *Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community* (pp. 1-21). Editors Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Efegil, E. (2008). Avrupa Birliği'nin Orta Asya Politikasının Analizi: Proje Bazlı Yaklaşımdan Stratejik İşbirliği Anlayışına Geçiş. *Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi*. 16: 65-82.

Emerson, M. and Movchan, V. (2018). *Deepening EU-Ukrainian Relations: What, Why and How?*. Second Edition. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Emerson, M., Aydın, S., Noutcheva, G., Tocci, N., Vahl, M. and Youngs, R. (2005). The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood. *CEPS Working Document*. (223): 1-37.

Erdenir, B. Türkiye'nin Siyasi Reform Sürecinde Avrupa Birliği'nin Demokratik Koşulluluğu. *TODAIE Amme İdaresi Dergisi*. 45(4): 95-117.

Eriş, Ö. Ü. (2012). European Neighbourhood Policy as a Tool for Stabilizing Europe's Neighbourhood. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*. 12(2): 243-260.

Erlacher, T. (2013). Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945-85. *Region*. 2(2): 289-316.

Eylemer, S. (2010). *Avrupalılılaşma Sürecinde Siyasi Koşulluluk ve Elitler: Türkiye Örneği*. (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation). İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.

Fedorenko, K., Rybiy, O. and Umland, A. (2016). The Ukrainian Party System before and after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 68(4): 609-630.

Ferreira-Pereira, L. C. and Vieira, A. V. G. (2014). Ukraine in the European Union's Partnership Policy: A Case of Institutionalized Ambiguity. *European Politics and Society*. 16(2): 143-158.

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*. 52(4): 887-917.

Fioramonti, L. (2004). Analysing Micro-Assistance to Democracy: EU Support for Grassroots Organisations in South Africa. *Development in Practice*. 14: 741-752.

Fiorino, A. (1996). The Evolution of International Norms. *International Studies Quarterly*. 40(3): 363-389

Franke, A., Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I., and Schweickert, R. (2010). The European Union's Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan. *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 26(2): 149-183.

Freire, M. R. and Simao, L. (2013). 'From Words to Deeds': European Union Democracy Promotion in Armenia. *East European Politics*. 29(2): 175-189.

Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Schimmelfennig, F., Skripka, T. and Wetzel, A. *Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and its Neighbourhood*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. and McFaul, M. (2007). Should Democracy be Promoted or Demoted?. *The Washington Quarterly*. 23-45.

Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I. and Schweickert, R. (2009). Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine. *KFG the Transformative Power of Europe*. 3: 1-27.

Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I. and Schweichert, R. (2010). Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 48(5): 1209-1235.

Gershman, C. (2005). Democracy as Policy Goal and Universal Value. *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. 19-38.

Ghazaryan, N. (2014). *The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU: A Legal Analysis*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Gillespie, R. and Youngs, R. (2002). *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa*. Portland: Frank Cass.

Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grabbe, H. (2006). *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.

Grugel, J. (2002). *Democratization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Guthier, S. L. (1979). The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917. *Slavic Review*. 38(1): 30-47.

Gültekin-Punsmann, B. and Nikolov, K. Y. (2008). European Union Approaches to Fostering Synergies of Cooperation and Integration around the Black Sea. *South East European and Black Sea Studies*. 8(2): 109-128.

Gürsoy, Y. (2016). Rejim Değişiklikleri: Otoriterleşme ve Demokratikleşme. *Karşılaştırmalı Siyaset: Temel Konular ve Yaklaşımlar* (pp. 75-100). Editors Sabri Sayarı and Hasret Dikici Bilgin. Fourth Edition. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Haran, O. and Zolkina, M. (2014). Ukraine's Long Road to European Integration. *PONARS Eurasia*. (311): 1-5.

Haukkala, H. (2007). A Normative Power or a Normative Hegemon? The EU and its European Neighbourhood Policy. *EUSA 10<sup>th</sup> Biennial Conference* (pp. 1-24), Montreal. 17-19 May 2007.

Herron E. S. and Boyko, N. (2015). Horizontal Accountability during Political Transition: The Use of Deputy Requests in Ukraine, 2002-2006. *Party Politics*. 21(1): 131-142.

Herron, E. S. (2018). Electoral Systems in Context: Ukraine. *The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems* (pp. 903-920). Editors. Erik S. Herron, Robert J. Pekkanen and Matthew S. Shugart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Herron, E. S., Thunberg M. E. and Boyko, N. (2015). Crisis Management and Adaptation in Wartime Elections: Ukraine's 2014 Snap Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. *Electoral Studies*. 40: 419-429.

Himka, J. P. (2006). The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Typology. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. 28(1-4): 487-488.

Hoffman, N. and Niemann, A. (2017). EU actorness and the European Neighbourhood Policy. *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy* (pp. 28-38). Editors Tobias Schumacher, Andreas Marchetti and Thomas Demmelhuber. London and New York: Routledge.

Holden, B. (2000). Introduction. *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (pp. 14-27). Editor Barry Holden. London and New York: Routledge.

Hood, C. (2010). Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward Couple?. *West European Politics*, 33(5): 989-1009.

Hout, W. (2010). Governance and Development: Changing EU Policies. *Third World Quarterly*. 31(1): 1-12.

Howard, M. M. (2002). The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society. *Journal of Democracy*. 13(1): 157-169.

Huber, D. (2013). US and EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion since the Arab Spring: Rethinking Its Content, Targets and Instruments. *The International Spectator*. 37(1): 57-75.

Huber, D. (2015). *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and non-Western Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma.

Hürsoy, S. and Kutlu, E. (2018). Yenilenen Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası Perspektifinden Avrupa Birliği'nin Doğu Komşularına Yönelik Yaklaşımı. *Ege Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*. 9(2): 169-189.

Hyde-Price, A. (2008). A 'Tragic Actor'? A Realist Perspective on 'Ethical Power Europe'. *International Affairs*. 84(1): 29-44.

Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ishchenko, V. (2011). Fighting Fences vs Fighting Monuments: Politics of Memory and Protest Mobilization in Ukraine. *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*. 19(1-2): 369-395.

Jahn, B. and Kant, M. (2005). Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs. *International Organization*. 59(1): 177-207.

Jünemann, A. (2002). From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. *Democratization*. 9(1): 86-105.

Kahraman, S. (2005). The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement towards Wider Europe. *Perceptions*. 1-28.

Karatnycky, A. (2005). Ukraine's Orange Revolution. *Foreign Affairs*. 84(2): 35-52.

Karl, T. L. (1995). The Hybrid Regimes of Central America. *Journal of Democracy*. 6(3): 72-86.

Kas'ianov, G. (2011). The Holodomor and the Building of a Nation. *Russian Social Science Review*. 52(3): 25-47.

Kastner, A. (2019). Autocracy Promotion. *The Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic Transformation* (pp. 411-415). Editors Wolfgang Merkel, Raj Kollmorgen and Hans-Jürgen Wagener. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katchanovski, I. (2008). The Orange Evolution? The 'Orange Revolution' and Political Changes in Ukraine. *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 24(4): 351-382.

Kelley, J. G. (2004a). *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Kelley, J. G. (2004b). International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. *International Organization*. 58(3): 425–457.

Kelley, J. (2006). New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 44(1): 29-55.

Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. (1974). Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations. *World Politics*. 27(1): 39-62.

Kitschelt, H. (1992). Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanation?. *American Political Science Review*. 86(4): 1028-1034.

Knopf, J. W. (2003). The Importance of International Learning. *Review of International Studies*. 29(2): 185-207.

Kohut, Z. E. (2001). Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of Russian National History (1620-1860). *American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies*. 35(1): 70-76.

Kotzian, P., Knodt, M. and Urdze, S. (2011). Instruments of the External Democracy Promotion. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 49(5): 995-1018.

Kravchenko, V. (2016). Fighting Soviet Myths: The Ukrainian Experience. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. 34(1/4): 447-484.

Krawchenko, B. (1987). *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine*. London: Macmillan Press.

Kopstein, J. S. and Reilly, D. A. (2000). Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World. *World Politics*. 53(1): 12-14.

Kubicek, P. (2008). *The History of Ukraine*. London: Greenwood Press.

Kubicek, P. (2017). Dancing with the Devil: Explaining the European Union's Engagement with Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovich. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 25(2): 143-162.

Kubicek, P. J. (2003). International Norms, the European Union, and Democratization: Tentative Theory and Evidence. *The European Union and Democratization* (pp. 1-29). Editor Paul J. Kubicek. London and New York: Routledge.

Kurki, M. (2010). Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion. *International Studies Review*. 12(3): 362-386.

Kuzio, T. (2005). From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution. *Problems of Post-Communism*. 52(2): 29-44.

Kuzio, T. (2006). National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*. 34(4): pp. 407-427.

Kuzio, T. (2015). Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*. 15(1): 157-169.

Kyiak, M. (2018). The Kremlin's Information Wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine. *UA: Ukraine Analytica*. 1(11): 27-35.

Laruelle, M. (2016). The Three Colors of Novorossiia, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis. *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 32(1): 55-74.

Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 16(6): 791-812.

Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2011). EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?. *Democratization*. 18(4): 885-909.

Layne, C. (1994). Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19(2): 5-49.

Lerner, D. D. (1958). *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Free Press.

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2005). International Linkage and Democratization. *Journal of Democracy*. 16(3): 20-34.

Limpach, S. and Michaelowa, K. (2010). The Impact of World Bank and IMF Programs on Democratization in Developing Countries. *CIS Working Paper*. (62): 1-62.

Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review*. 53(1): 69-105.

Lloyd, L. (2010). European Approaches to Democracy Promotion. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*. 65(3): 547-559.

Lohmann, S. (1997). Linkage Politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 41(1): 38-67.

Lorek, A. (2006). *Poland's Role in the Development of an Eastern Dimension of the European Union*. Germany: GRIN Verlag.

Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. and Valenzuela, J. S. (1992). *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 40(2): 235-258.

Manners, I. (2008). The Normative Ethics of the European Union. *International Affairs*. 84(1): 45-60.

Magen, A. and McFaul, M. A. (2009). Introduction: American and European Strategies to Promote Democracy – Shared Values, Common Challenges, Divergent Tools? *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies* (pp. 1-33). Editors Amichai Magen, Thomas Risse and Michael A. McFaul. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Magosci, P. R. (2010). *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*. Second Edition. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.

Malygina, K. (2010). Ukraine as a Neo-patrimonial State: Understanding Political Change in Ukraine in 2005-2010. *Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe*. 13(1): 7-27.

Mansfield, E. D. and Snyder, J. (2005). *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization*. 52(4): 943-969.

McFaul, M. (2004). Democracy Promotion as a World Value. *The Washington Quarterly*. 28(1): 147-163.

Melnykovska, I. (2008). Ukraine: Europeanization from Abroad or Inside? Chance and Challenge for the European Union. *The ECSA-Canada 2008 Biennial Conference "The Maturing European Union"* (pp. 1-36), Edmonton. 25-27 September 2008.

Melnykovska, I. and Schweickert, R. (2008). Bottom-up or Top-down: What Drives the Convergence of Ukraine's Institutions towards European Standards?. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*. 8(4): 445-468.

Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and Defective Democracies. *Democratization*. 11(5): 33-58.

Miller A. and Ostapchuk, O. (2009). The Latin and Cyrillic Alphabets in Ukrainian National Discourse and in the Language Policy of Empires. *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Ukrainian Historiography* (pp. 169-185). Editors Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press.

Molchanov, M. A. (2002). *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations*. United States of America: Texas A&M University Press.

Moncrieffe, J. M. (1998). Reconceptualizing Political Accountability. *International Political Science Review*. 19(4): 387-406.

Monten, J. (2005). The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy. *International Security*. 29(4): 112-156.

Moore, B. (1973). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Great Britain: Penguin University Books.

Morevcsik, A. (2000). The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. *International Organization*. 54(2): 217-252.

Munck, G. L. (1994). Review: Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*. 26(3): 355-375.

Nahaylo, B. (1999). *The Ukrainian Resurgence*. London: Hurst & Company.

O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

O'Neil, P. H. (2010). *Essentials of Comparative Politics*. Third Edition. London: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.

Olsen, G. R. (2000). Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of 'Europe': Limits to International Idealism. *Democratization*. 7(2): 142-167.

Özkurt, F. Z. (2017). European Union Democracy Promotion via Conditionality in Regional Context. *İstanbul Gelişim Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*. 4(2): 1-21.

Pace, M. (2009). Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: The Limits of EU Normative Power. *Democratization*. 16(1): 39-58.

Pace, M. (2011). Liberal or Social Democracy? Aspect Dawning in the EU's Democracy Promotion Agenda in the Middle East. *The International Journal of Human Rights*. 15(6): 801-812.

Panchuk D. and Bossuyt, F. (April 2018). EU Twinning Instrument in Ukraine: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. *CEPS Policy Brief*. (2018/02): 1-15.

Panchuk, D. (2019). Effectiveness of EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the Neighbourhood: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Twinning Projects in Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 71(3): 480-509.

Panchuk, D., Bossuyt F. and Orbie, J. (2017). The Substance of EU Democratic Governance Promotion via Transgovernmental Cooperation with the Eastern Neighbourhood. *Democratization*. 24(6): 1044-1065.

Panke, D. and Risse, T. (2007). Liberalism. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (pp. 89-108). Editors Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Peceny, M. (1999). *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Peceny, M. (1997). A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous Case of the Spanish-American War. *Journal of Peace Research*. 34(4): 415-430.

Pevehouse, J. C. (2002). Democracy from the Outside-in? International Organizations and Democratization. *International Organization*. 56(3): 515-549.

Pevehouse, J. P. (2005). *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pleines, H. (2016). Oligarchs and Politics in Ukraine. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*. 24(1): 105-127.

Pomorska, K. (2011). Poland: Learning to Play the Brussels Game. *National and European Foreign Policies – Towards Europeanization* (pp. 167-188). Editors Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill. London and New York: Routledge.

Powel, B. T. (2009). The Stability Syndrome: US and EU Democracy Promotion in Tunisia. *The Journal of North African Studies*. 14(1): 57-73.

Pridham, G. (1991). *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Pridham, G. (1994). The international Dimension of Democratization: Theory, Practice and Inter-regional Comparisons, *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe* (pp. 7-29). Editors Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford. London and Washington: Leicester University Press.

Pridham, G. (2000). *The Dynamics of Democratization: A Comparative Approach*. London and New York: Continuum.

Pridham, G. (2011). Ukraine, the European Union and the Democracy Question. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 11(4): 18-33.

Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. G. (1996). Introduction: Stabilizing Fragile Democracies and Party System Development. *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party System in Southern Europe* (pp. 1-22). Editors Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis. London: Routledge.

Pridham, G. (1999). The European Union, Democratic Conditionality and Transnational Party Linkages: The Case of Eastern Europe. *Democracy without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies* (pp. 59-75). Editor Jean Grugel. London and New York: Routledge.

Pritsak, O. and Reshetar, Jr. J. S. (1963). The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building. *Slavic Review*. 22(2): 224-255.

Prizel, I. (2000). Nation-Building and Foreign Policy. *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity* (pp. 11-30). Editors Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997). Modernization: Theories and Facts. *World Politics*. 49: 155-183.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*. 42(3): 446-460.

Rabinovych, M. (2016). The Substance of the EU Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: Is Embedded Democracy the Right Concept?. *Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science*. 30: 5-31.

Reynaert, V. (2011). Preoccupied with the Market: the EU as a Promoter of 'Shallow' Democracy in the Mediterranean. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 16: 632-637.

Risse-Kappen, T. (1995). Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies: A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument. *European Journal of International Relations*. 1(4): 491-517.

Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. (1999). The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (pp. 1-38). Editors Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, G. (1998). Review: NeoClassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics*. 51(1): 144-172.

Rosenau, J. N. (1969). *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. New York: The Free Press.

Rosenau, J. N. (2006). *The Study of World Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges, I*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rudnytsky, I. L. (1972). The Soviet Ukraine in Historical Perspective. *Canadian Slavonic Papers*. 14(2): 237-238.

Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, J. D. (1992). *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Russett, B. and Antholis, W. (1992). Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War. *Journal of Peace Research*. 29(4): 415-434.

Rustow, D. A. (1999). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. *Transitions to Democracy* (pp. 25-52). Editor Lisa Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press.

Salushev, S. (2014). Annexation of Crimea: Causes, Analysis and Global Implications. *Global Societies Journal*. 2: 37-46.

Santini, R. H. and Hassan, O. (2012). Transatlantic Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring. *The International Spectator*. 47(3): 65-82.

Sargent, L. T. (2009). *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Sasse, G. (2007). The ENP Process and the EU's Eastern Neighbours: 'Conditionality-lite', Socialisation and 'Procedural Entrapment'. *Global Europe Papers 2008/9, Paper presented at the Workshop The Study of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Methodological, Theoretical and Empirical Challenges*. University of Nottingham. 25-26 October 2007.

Sasse, G. (2008). The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 60(2): 295-316.

Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. *The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies* (pp. 13-28). Editors Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2005). Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. *International Organization*. 59(4): 827-860.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Scholtz, H. (2008). EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange. *European Union Politics*. 9(2): 187-215.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2002). Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 9(4): 500-528.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 11(4): 669-687.

Schimmelfennig, F. Engert, S. and Knobel, H. (2003). Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 41(3): 495-518.

Schmitter, P. C. (1986). An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (pp. 3-10). Editors Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Schmitter, P. C. (2001). The Influence of the International Context Upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (pp. 26-54). Editor Laurence Whitehead. Oxford: Expanded Edition, Oxford University Press.

Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1991). What Democracy is ... and is Not. *Journal of Democracy*. 2(3): 3-16.

Schumacher, T. (January 2016). Back to the Future: The 'New' ENP towards the Southern Neighbourhood and the End of Ambition. *College of Europe Policy Brief*. (1.16): 1-4.

Schumpeter, J. A. (2003). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. London and New York: Routledge.

Schweller, R. L. (2000). US Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections. *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (pp. 41-62). Editors Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sedelmeier, U. (2011). Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States, *Living Reviews in European Governance*. 6(1): 1-52.

Shapovalova, N. and Burlyuk, O. (2018). Civil Society and Change in Ukraine Post-Euromaidan: An Introduction. *Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Revolution to Consolidation* (pp. 11-40). Editors Natalia Shapovalova and Olga Burlyuk. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag.

Shevel, O. (2015). The Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine, October 2014. *Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies*. 39: 153-157.

Shkandrij, M. (2012). Ukrainization, Terror and Famine: Coverage in Lviv's Dilo and the Nationalist Press of the 1930s. *Nationalities Papers*. 40(3): 431-451.

Shulman, S. (2005). Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism*. 52(5): 32-47.

Silander, D. (2005). *Democracy from the Outside-in? The Conceptualization and Significance of Democracy Promotion*. Gothenburg: Växjö University Press.

Simao, L. (2012). The Problematic Role of EU Democracy Promotion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 45(1-2): 193-200.

Sjursen, H. (2006). What Kind of Power?. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 13(2): 169-181.

Slaughter, A. N. (2000). Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order. *Democratic Governance and International Law* (pp. 199-236). Editors Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, K. (2005). The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy. *International Affairs*. 81(4): 757-773.

Smith, N. R. (2011). Europeanization through Socialization? The EU's Interaction with Civil Society Organizations in Armenia. *Demokratizatsiya*. 19(4): 385-404.

Sodaro, M. (2008). *Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Solonenko, I. (2005). The European Union as Democracy Promoter: The Case of Ukraine. *Romanian Journal of Political Science*. 5(2): 57-69.

Solonenko, I. (2009). External Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: The Role of the European Union. *Democratization*. 16(4): 709-731.

Solonenko, I. and Jarabik, B. (2008). Ukraine. *Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood?* (pp. 81-98). Editor Richard Youngs. Spain: FRIDE.

Sözen, Y. (2016). Siyasi Rejimler: Demokrasiler ve Diğer Sistemler. *Karşılaştırmalı Siyaset: Temel Konular ve Yaklaşımlar* (pp. 45-74). Editors Sabri Sayarı and Hasret Dikici Bilgin. Fourth Edition. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Spiegeleire, S., Akimov, M. and Shantz, K. (2015). From Assertiveness to Aggression: 2014 as a Watershed Year for Russian Foreign and Security Policy. *The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies*. 1-61.

Stahn A. and Hüllen, V. (2007). Different Actors, Different Tools? Approaching EU and US Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent States. *The European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Tenth Biennial International Conference* (pp. 1-31), Montreal. Canada. 17-19 May 2007.

Starr, H. (1991). Democratic Dominoes Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 35(2): 356-381.

Starr, H. (1997). Democracy and Integration: Why Democracies Don't Fight Each Other. *Journal of Peace Research*. 34(2): 153-162.

Stegniy, O. (2011). Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. 27(1): 50-72.

Stein, A. A. (1980). The Politics of Linkage. *World Politics*. 33(1): 62-81.

Stepanenko, V. (2006). Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework of Corrupted Sociality?. *East European Politics and Societies*. 20(4): 571-597.

Stewart, S. (2009). The Interplay of Domestic Contexts and External Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. *Democratization*. 16(4): 804-824.

Stewart, S. (2015). Power Relations Meet Domestic Structures: Russia and Ukraine. *The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases* (pp. 117-133). Editors Anne Wetzels and Jan Orbie. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Subtelny, O. (2000). *Ukraine: A History*. Toronto Buffalo London: University of Toronto Press.

Surzhko-Harned, L. (2010). Liberal Nationalism, Nationalist Liberalization, and Democracy: The Cases of post-Soviet Estonia and Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*. 38(5): 623-646.

Szporluk, R. (1997). Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State. *Daedalus*. 126(3): 85-119.

Theuns, T. (2016). Promoting Democracy through Economic Conditionality in the ENP: A Normative Critique. *Journal of European Integration*. 39(3): 287-302.

Thiel, R. (2010). *Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion: The United States and the Polish Liberalization 1980-1989*. Mörlenbach: VS Verlag für Soziawissenschaften.

Tilly, C. (2007). *Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tolstrup, J. (2014). *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*. Boulder and London: First Forum Press.

Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Uslu, A. (2015). Demokrasi. *Siyaset Bilimi: Kavramlar, İdeolojiler, Disiplinler Arası İlişkiler* (pp. 137-151). Editors Gökhan Atılğan and E. Attila Aytekin. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap.

Van der Loo, G. Van Elsuwege, P. and Petrov, R. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument. *European University Institute Working Papers*. 1-28.

Vanhanen, T. (2003). *Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries*. New York: Routledge.

Veebel, V. (2009). European Union's Positive Conditionality Model in Pre-Accession Process. *TRAMES*. 13(3): 207-231.

Vooren, B. V. (2012). *EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Paradigm for Coherence*. London and New York: Routledge.

Wæver, O. (2000). *The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on post Sovereign Security Orders*. London: Routledge.

Waltz, K. N. (1986). Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power. *Neorealism and its Critics* (pp. 98-130). Editor Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ward, M. D. and Gleditsch, K. S. (1998). Democratizing for Peace. *The American Political Science Review*. 92(1): 51-61.

Weinstein, H. R. (1941). Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine. *The Slavonic Year-Book, American Series*. 29(1): 257-293.

Weiss, T. G. (2000). Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges. *Third World Quarterly*. 21(5): 795-814.

Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *American Political Science Review*. 88(2): 384-396.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Welzel, C. (2009). Theories of Democratization. *Democratization* (pp. 74-91). Editors Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wetzel A. and Orbie, J. (2011). Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion. *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 16: 565-588.

Wetzel, A. (2015). Governance Perspective: Democratic Governance Promotion through Functional Cooperation. *The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases* (pp. 58-67). Editors Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wetzel A. and Orbie, J. (2015). *The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wetzel, A., Orbie, J. and Bossuyt, F. (2015). One of What Kind? Comparative Perspectives on the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 28(1): 21-34.

White, S. and Feklyunina, V. (2014). *Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: The Other Europes*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Whitehead, L. (1986). International Aspects of Democratization. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (pp. 3-46). Editors Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Whitehead, L. (1991). *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Whitehead, L. (1999). Eastern Europe a Decade Later: Geography and Democratic Destiny. *Journal of Democracy*. 10(1): 74-49.

Whitehead, L. (2002). *Democratization: Theory and Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whitehead, L. (2001). Three International Dimension of Democratization. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (pp. 3-25). Editor Laurence Whitehead. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, A. (2015). *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*. Fourth Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Wolczuk, K. (2000). History, Europe and the 'National Idea': The 'Official' Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*. 28(4): 671-694.

Wolczuk, K. (2001). *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Wolczuk, K. and Zeruolis, D. (2018). Rebuilding Ukraine: An Assessment of EU Assistance. *Chatham House Research Paper*. 1-37.

Wolff, J. (2013). Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power: The Example of Germany's 'Value-Oriented' Foreign Policy. *German Politics*. 22(4): 477-493.

Wolff, J. and Wurm, I. (2011). Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion: A Proposal for Theoretical Classification. *Security Dialogue*. 42(1): 77-96.

Yazgan, H. (2017). Black Sea Synergy: Success or Failure for the European Union?. *Marmara University Journal of Political Science*. 5(Special Issue): 67-78.

Yekelchyk, S. (2007). *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Youngs, R. (2002). *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Youngs, R. (2003). European Approaches to Democracy Assistance: Learning the Right Lessons?. *Third World Quarterly*. 24(1): pp. 127-138.

Youngs, R. (2007). Democracy as Product versus Democracy as Process. *Democracy: Europe's Core Value? On the European Profile in World-wide Democracy Assistance* (pp: 67-72). Editors Marieke van Doorn and Roel von Meijenfeldt. The Netherlands: Eburon Delft.

Zakaria, F. (2013). A Brief History of Human Liberty. *Essential Reading in Comparative Politics* (pp. 188-202). Editors Patrick O'Neill and Ronald Rogowski. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Zhyznomirska, L. (2019). Normative Power Europe and the Ukrainian Case in EU Democracy Promotion. *Democracy Promotion and the Normative Power Europe Framework: The European Union in South Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* (pp. 137-160). Editor Marek Neuman. Switzerland: Springer.

## ONLINE SOURCES

Adamo, K. and Garonna, P. (2009). *Euro–Mediterranean Integration and Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*. [http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/oes/nutshell/2009/9\\_EuroMediterranean.pdf](http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/oes/nutshell/2009/9_EuroMediterranean.pdf), (24.09.2018).

ADE. (1998). *Ukraine – Evaluation of EC Country Programme Final Report*. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/reports/tacis/951417\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/tacis/951417_en.pdf), (25.04.2019).

Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. (2019). *Glossary*. <https://www.u4.no/terms#>, (06.09.2019).

Atwell, K. (19 February 2010). *Yanukovich: Ukraine Will be a Bridge between East and West*. <http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1367-Yanukovich-Ukraine-Will-Be-a-Bridge-Between-East-and-West.html>, (14.03.2018).

Baumann, R., Rittberger, V. and Wagner, W. (2000). *Power and Power Politics: Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory and Expectations about German Foreign Policy since Unification*. <https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/47204/pdf/tap30a.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, (20.02.2019).

BBC News. (2010). *Ukraine's Parliament Votes to Abandon Nato Ambitions*. <http://www.bbc.com/news/10229626>, (14.03.2018).

BBC News. (2011). *West Condemns Ukraine over Yulia Tymoshenko Jailing*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15263475>, (22.06.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2006). *BTI 2006: Ukraine Country Report*. [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2006/pdf/BTI\\_2006\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2006/pdf/BTI_2006_Ukraine.pdf), (18.06.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2008). *BTI 2008: Ukraine Country Report*. [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2008/pdf/BTI\\_2008\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2008/pdf/BTI_2008_Ukraine.pdf), (18.06.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2010). *BTI 2010: Ukraine Country Report*. <https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/ukr/ity/2010/itr/pse/>, (01.07.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2012). *BTI 2012: Ukraine Country Report*. [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2012/pdf/BTI\\_2012\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2012/pdf/BTI_2012_Ukraine.pdf), (18.06.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2014). *BTI 2014: Ukraine Country Report*. [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI\\_2016\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Ukraine.pdf), (24.06.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2016). *BTI 2016: Ukraine Country Report*. [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI\\_2016\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Ukraine.pdf), (22.06.2019).

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2018). *BTI 2018: Ukraine Country Report*. [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/BTI\\_2018\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/BTI_2018_Ukraine.pdf), (22.06.2019).

Birkelbach, W. (19 December 1961). *Rapport de Willi Birkelbach sur les politiques et institutionnels de l'adhésion ou de l'association à la Communauté*. [https://www.cvce.eu/obj/rapport\\_de\\_willi\\_birkelbach\\_sur\\_les\\_aspects\\_politiques\\_et\\_institutionnels\\_de\\_l\\_adhesion\\_ou\\_de\\_l\\_association\\_a\\_la\\_communaute\\_19\\_decembre\\_1961-fr-2d53201e-09db-43ee-9f80-552812d39c03.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/rapport_de_willi_birkelbach_sur_les_aspects_politiques_et_institutionnels_de_l_adhesion_ou_de_l_association_a_la_communaute_19_decembre_1961-fr-2d53201e-09db-43ee-9f80-552812d39c03.html), (10.02.2019).

Biscop, S. (29 June 2016). *The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics*.

<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf>, (04.10.2018).

Braitwaite, M., Eberhardt, E. and Johnson, T. (1998). *The European Union's Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme – Compendium of Ad-hoc Projects 1993-1997*. <http://aei.pitt.edu/36372/1/A2441.pdf>, (15.10.2018).

Butler, D. and Usta, B. (05.01.2019). Ecumenical Patriarch Signs Decree Granting Ukraine Church Independence. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-church/ecumenical-patriarch-signs-decree-granting-ukraine-church-independence-idUSKCN1OZ0AO>, (02.06.2019).

Bühlmann, M., Merkel, W. and Wessels, B. (20 March 2008). *The Quality of Democracy: Democracy Barometer for Established Democracies*. <http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/WP10a.pdf>, (03.01.2019).

Center for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union. (29 November 2018). Coordination Group Meeting on Twinning and TAIEX Instruments Implementation in Ukraine. *Press Center*. <http://www.center.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/item/3247-coordination-group-meeting-on-twinning-and-taiex-instruments-implementation-in-ukraine>, (14.05.2019).

Center for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union. (2019). SIGMA – Ukraine Governance Assessment. *About Center*. <http://www.center.gov.ua/en/about-center?layout=edit&id=38>, (14.05.2019).

Clines, F. X. (17.07.1990). Evolution in Europe; Ukrainians Declare Republic Sovereign inside Soviet System. *The New York Times*.

<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/17/world/evolution-in-europe-ukrainians-declare-republic-sovereign-inside-soviet-system.html>, (06.02.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (22 November 1995a). *The External Dimension of the EU's Human Rights Policy: from Rome to Maastricht and beyond*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-external-dimension-human-rights-com95567-19951122\\_en\\_5.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-external-dimension-human-rights-com95567-19951122_en_5.pdf), (16.03.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (23 May 1995b). *Communication from the Commission on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the Community and Third Countries*. <http://aei.pitt.edu/4097/1/4097.pdf>, (26.03.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (23 July 1999). *Tacis Annual Report 1998*. <http://aei.pitt.edu/6078/1/6078.pdf>, (24.04.2019).

Commission of the European Communities. (11 April 2000). *Communication from the Commission on EU Election Assistance and Observation*. [http://www.eods.eu/library/Communication\\_from\\_the\\_Commission\\_on\\_EU\\_Election\\_Assistance\\_and\\_Observation.pdf](http://www.eods.eu/library/Communication_from_the_Commission_on_EU_Election_Assistance_and_Observation.pdf), (08.03.2019).

Commission of the European Communities. (8 May 2001). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - the European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-eu-role-democracy-human-rights-com2001252-20010508\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-eu-role-democracy-human-rights-com2001252-20010508_en.pdf), (11.03.2019).

Commission of the European Communities. (11 March 2003a). *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf), (12.09.2018).

Commission of the European Communities, (1 July 2003b). *Communication from the Commission – Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument*. [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docoffic/official/communic/wider/wider\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/communic/wider/wider_en.pdf), (13.09.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (12 May 2004a). *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004\\_communication\\_from\\_the\\_commission\\_-\\_european\\_neighbourhood\\_policy\\_-\\_strategy\\_paper.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf), (13.09.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (12 May 2004b). *European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report Ukraine*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-enp-country-report>, (19.06.2019).

Commission of the European Communities. (30 August 2006a). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonised Approach within the European Union*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0421&from=EN>, (11.03.2019).

Commission of the European Communities. (25 January 2006b). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Thematic Programme for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide under the Future Financial Perspectives (2007–2013)*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-promoting-human-rights-worldwide-com200623-20060125\\_en\\_5.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-promoting-human-rights-worldwide-com200623-20060125_en_5.pdf), (25.09.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (5 December 2007a). *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*. [https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1\\_avrupa\\_birligi/1\\_9\\_komsuluk\\_politikalari/A\\_strong\\_European\\_Neighbourhood\\_Policy\\_5\\_12\\_2007.pdf](https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_9_komsuluk_politikalari/A_strong_European_Neighbourhood_Policy_5_12_2007.pdf), (21.09.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (11 April 2007b). *Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com07\\_160\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf), (11.10.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (3 December 2008a). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Eastern Partnership*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823&from=EN>, (10.10.2018).

Commission of the European Communities. (3 April 2008b). *Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007’ Progress Report Ukraine*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-progress-report-2007>, (02.07.2019).

Commission of the European Communities. (2009). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008: Progress Report Ukraine, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/eu\\_uk\\_chronology/ukraine\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/eu_uk_chronology/ukraine_report_en.pdf), (10.06.2019).

Constitution of Ukraine (28 June 1996). [https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/constitution\\_14.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/constitution_14.pdf), (08.06.2019).

Constitutional Court of Ukraine. (30 September 2010). *Summary to the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 20-rp/2010 dated September 30, 2010 in the case upon the Constitutional Petition of 252 People’s Deputies of Ukraine Concerning the Conformity with the Constitution of Ukraine (Constitutionality) of the Law of Ukraine*

*'on Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine' 2222-IV dated December 8, 2004 (case on Observance of the Procedure of Introducing Amendments the Constitution of Ukraine).*  
<http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/docs/283?order=created&sort=desc>, (02.07.2019).

Constitutional Court of Ukraine. (2019). *Information for Citizens.*  
<http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/storinka/information-citizens>, (01.07.2019).

Council of Europe. (2018). *Freedom of Media in Ukraine.*  
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/freedom-of-media-in-ukraine>, (17.06.2019).

Council of Europe. (2019). *Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine.*  
<https://rm.coe.int/doctrine-of-information-security-of-ukraine-developments-in-member-sta/168073e052>, (22.06.2019).

Council of the European Union. (15 April 2002). *2421st Council Meeting – General Affairs.*  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/70160.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/70160.pdf), (13.09.2018).

Council of the European Union. (17 November 2009a). *Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations - 2974<sup>th</sup> External Relations Council Meeting.*  
[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf) (03.10.2018).

Council of the European Union. (7 May 2009b). *Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.*  
[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009\\_eap\\_declaration.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_declaration.pdf), (10.10.2018).

Council of the European Union. (22.11.2010). *14<sup>th</sup> EU-Ukraine Summit*. [europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PRES-10-312\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-10-312_en.pdf), (02.07.2019).

Council of the European Union. (29-30.09.2011). *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit*. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124843.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124843.pdf), (12.10.2015).

Council of the European Union. (25 June 2012a). *EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy*. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf) (02.10.2018).

Council of the European Union. (10 December 2012b). *Council Conclusions on Ukraine - 3209<sup>th</sup> Foreign Affairs Council Meeting*. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf), (22.06.2019).

Council of the European Union. (28-29 November 2013). *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit – Eastern Partnership: The Way ahead*. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139765.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139765.pdf), (12.10.2018).

Council of the European Union. (24 November 2017). *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-statement-st14821en17.pdf>, (16.10.2018).

Delcour, L. (December 2015). *The 2015 ENP Review: Beyond Stocktaking, the Need for a Political Strategy*. [https://www.coleurope.eu/system/tdf/research-paper/delcour\\_cepob\\_1-15\\_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=26745&force=1](https://www.coleurope.eu/system/tdf/research-paper/delcour_cepob_1-15_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=26745&force=1), (15.12.2015).

Duik, N. (March/April 2014). *Euromaidan: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution*. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/euromaidan-ukraine%E2%80%99s-self-organizing-revolution>, (16.03.2018).

DW. (02.06.2016). Ukraine Adopts Judicial Reforms Backed by West. DW. <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-adopts-judicial-reforms-backed-by-west/a-19300524>, (30.06.2019).

Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. (December 2018). *Eastern Partnership Index 2017: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development*. <https://eap-csf.eu/wp-content/uploads/EaP-Index-2017.pdf>, (05.07.2019).

Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2018). *Narodnost*. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/narodnost>, (10.02.2018).

EU Neighbours. (2005). *EU-Ukraine Action Plan*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu//content/eu-ukraine-action-plan-0>, (10.04.2019).

EUR-Lex. (19 December 1998). *Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A21998A0219%2802%29>, (23.03.2018).

EUR-Lex. (2007). *The 2004 Enlargement: The Challenge of a 25-Member EU*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ae50017>, (03.05.2018).

Euronews. (27 November 2014). *Ukraine's New Pro-Western Parliament Holds First Session*. <http://www.euronews.com/2014/11/27/ukraine-s-new-pro-western-parliament-holds-first-session>, (20.03.2018).

European Commission and Council of Europe. (2004). *TACIS Action Programme 2004 Ukraine: Support for Institutional and Administrative Reform*. <https://rm.coe.int/16806edf97>, (25.03.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (25 May 2011). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010 Country Report on: Ukraine*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/euroclubs/enp\\_report\\_2010\\_ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/euroclubs/enp_report_2010_ukraine_en.pdf), (10.06.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (15 May 2012). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine Progress in 2011 and Recommendations for Action*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-enp-progress-report-2011>, (02.07.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (20 March 2013). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine Progress in 2012 and Recommendations for Action*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-enp-progress-report-2012>, (10.06.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (27 March 2014). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine Progress in 2013 and Recommendations for Action*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-enp-progress-report-2013>, (20.06.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (25 March 2015). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for*

*Actions.* [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/2015/ukraine-enp-report-2015\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/2015/ukraine-enp-report-2015_en.pdf), (02.07.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (9 December 2016). *Association Implementation Report on Ukraine.* <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/association-implementation-report-ukraine>, (02.07.2019).

European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (7 November 2018). *Joint Staff Working Document – Association Implementation Report on Ukraine, SWD (2018) 462 Final.* [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2018\\_association\\_implementation\\_report\\_on\\_ukraine.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2018_association_implementation_report_on_ukraine.pdf), (13.06.2019).

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE/ODIHR. (7 June 2013). *Joint Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Laws on Election on People’s Deputies and On the Draft Law on Repeat Elections of Ukraine.* [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2013\)016-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2013)016-e), (11.06.2019).

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (13 June 2005). *Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine Adopted on 8.12.2004.* [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2005\)015-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2005)015-e), (02.07.2019).

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (16 October 2006). *Opinion on the Draft Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.* [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2006\)032-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2006)032-e), (02.07.2019).

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (20 December 2010). *Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Ukraine*. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2010\)044-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)044-e), (02.07.2019).

European Commission. (05-06.12.2002). A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability. *Press Release - Romano Prodi Speech*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-02-619\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm), (12.09.2018).

European Commission. (8 May 2009). *The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR): Equal in Rights Worldwide*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-eidhr-2009\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-eidhr-2009_en.pdf), (23.05.2019).

European Commission. (12 May 2010). *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2009: Progress Report Ukraine*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-progress-report-2009>, (02.07.2019).

European Commission. (13 November 2011a). *Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-agenda-for-change-2011\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-agenda-for-change-2011_en.pdf), (08.02.2019).

European Commission. (25 May 2011b). *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/new-response-changing-neighbourhood-review-european-neighbourhood-policy>, (08.02.2019).

European Commission. (8 March 2011c). *Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*. [https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/com\\_2011\\_200\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/com_2011_200_en.pdf), (26.09.2018).

European Commission. (25 May 2011d). *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood – A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy, Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/new-response-changing-neighbourhood-review-european-neighbourhood-policy>, (26.09.2018).

European Commission. (2011e). *Action Fiche for Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, Neighbourhood*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-financing-neighbourhood-spe-general-budget-af-20110920\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-financing-neighbourhood-spe-general-budget-af-20110920_en.pdf), (15.10.2018).

European Commission. (16 September 2011f). *Joint Staff Working Paper – First Progress Report of the Implementation by Ukraine of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation*. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/news/intro/docs/20110920/ua\\_vlap\\_1st\\_progress\\_report\\_sec\\_2011\\_1076\\_f\\_en\\_document\\_travail\\_service.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/news/intro/docs/20110920/ua_vlap_1st_progress_report_sec_2011_1076_f_en_document_travail_service.pdf), (03.05.2019).

European Commission. (22 May 2012). *Stefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, Case of Yulia Tymoshenko*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-12-373\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-373_en.htm?locale=en), (22.06.2019).

European Commission. (15 November 2013). *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Third Report on the Implementation by Ukraine of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation*. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is->

new/news/news/docs/20131115\_3rd\_progress\_report\_on\_the\_implementation\_by\_ukraine\_of\_the\_apvl\_en.pdf, (03.05.2019).

European Commission. (2014a). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013 – Overview of Activities and Results*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/overview\\_of\\_enpi\\_results\\_2007-2013\\_en\\_0.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/overview_of_enpi_results_2007-2013_en_0.pdf), (19.09.2018).

European Commission. (28 May 2014b). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – European Energy Security Strategy*. <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/european-energy-security-strategy.pdf>, (18.10.2018).

European Commission. (2014c). *Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special Measure 2014 in Favour of Ukraine – Action Document for the State Building Contract for Ukraine*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/annex\\_1\\_com\\_dec\\_special-measure-ua-2014.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/annex_1_com_dec_special-measure-ua-2014.pdf), (09.06.2019).

European Commission. (29 April 2014d). *Commission Implementing Decision of 29.4.2014 on a Special measure 2014 in favour of Ukraine to be financed from the General Budget of the European Union*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/com\\_dec\\_special-measure-ua-2014\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/com_dec_special-measure-ua-2014_en.pdf), (20.05.2019).

European Commission. (2014e). *Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special Measure 2014 in favour of Ukraine – Action Document for Ukraine Civil Society Support Programme* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/annex\\_2\\_com\\_dec\\_special-measure-ua-2014\\_-\\_copy.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/annex_2_com_dec_special-measure-ua-2014_-_copy.pdf), (20.05.2019).

European Commission. (28 April 2015a). *Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) 'Keeping Human Rights at the Heart of the EU Agenda'*, *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint-communication-ap-human-rights-and-democracy\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint-communication-ap-human-rights-and-democracy_en.pdf), (02.10.2018).

European Commission. (18 November 2015b). *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118\\_joint-communication\\_review-of-the-enp\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf), (27.09.2018).

European Commission. (23 April 2015c). *Commission Implementing Decision of 23.4.2015 on the Special Measure 2015 for Private Sector Development and Approximation in Favour of Ukraine to be Financed from the General Budget of the European Union*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2015\\_com\\_dec.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2015_com_dec.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2015d). *Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special Measure 2015 for Private Sector Development and Approximation in Favour of Ukraine – Action Document for EU Support to Ukraine to Re-launch the Economy (EU SURE)*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2015\\_annex\\_1\\_to\\_sm.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2015_annex_1_to_sm.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2015e). *Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special Measure 2015 for Private Sector Development and Approximation in Favour of Ukraine – Action Document for Technical Cooperation Facility*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2015\\_annex\\_ii\\_to\\_sm.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2015_annex_ii_to_sm.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (8 May 2015f). *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Fifth Progress Report on the Implementation by Ukraine*

*of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation.* [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/fifth\\_progress\\_report\\_on\\_the\\_implementation\\_by\\_ukraine\\_of\\_the\\_action\\_plan\\_on\\_visa\\_liberalisation\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/fifth_progress_report_on_the_implementation_by_ukraine_of_the_action_plan_on_visa_liberalisation_en.pdf), (03.05.2019).

European Commission. (18 December 2015g). *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Sixth Progress Report on the Implementation by Ukraine of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation.* <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-905-EN-F1-1.PDF>, (03.05.2019).

European Commission. (2 November 2015h). *Commission Implementing Decision of 2.12.2015 on the Special Measure 2015 for Decentralisation Reform in favour of Ukraine to be financed from the General Budget of the European Union.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/com\\_dec\\_on\\_sm\\_ii\\_decentralisation.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/com_dec_on_sm_ii_decentralisation.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (6 December 2016a). *European Neighbourhood Policy.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en), (17.09.2018).

European Commission. (October 2016b). *Support Group for Ukraine: Activity Report – The first 18 Months.* <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/ukraine/20161028-report-sgua.pdf>, (15.05.2019).

European Commission. (26 July 2016c). *Commission Implementing Decision of 26.7.2016 on the Special Measure 2016 for Anti-Corruption and Support to Key Reforms in favour of Ukraine to be Financed from the General Budget of the European Union.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2016\\_4719\\_f1\\_commission\\_implementing\\_decision\\_en\\_v2\\_p1\\_853679.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2016_4719_f1_commission_implementing_decision_en_v2_p1_853679.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2016d). *Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision of 26.7.2016 on the Special Measure 2016 for Anti-Corruption and Support to Key Reforms in Favour of Ukraine – Action Document for EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2016\\_4719\\_039657\\_anti-corruption\\_initiative.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2016_4719_039657_anti-corruption_initiative.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2016e). *Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision of 26.7.2016 on the Special Measure 2016 for Anti-Corruption and Support to Key Reforms in favour of Ukraine – Action Document for the Technical Cooperation Facility, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2016\\_4719\\_039505\\_technical\\_cooperation.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2016_4719_039505_technical_cooperation.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2016f). *Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision of 28.10.2016 on the Special Measure 2016 for Public Administration Reform in favour of Ukraine – Action Document for the Support to Comprehensive Reform of Public Administration in Ukraine.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eni\\_2016\\_sm\\_ii\\_ad\\_039569.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eni_2016_sm_ii_ad_039569.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2016g). *Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Special Measure III 2016 on Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO) – Action Document for Support to Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO).* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eni\\_2016\\_039835\\_action\\_document\\_roldocx.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eni_2016_039835_action_document_roldocx.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2017a). *The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs.* [https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index\\_en.htm](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm), (02.10.2018).

European Commission. (18.05.2017b). Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Supporting Stabilisation, Resilience, Security. *Press Release*. europa.eu/rapid/press-release\_IP-17-1334\_en.pdf, (09.10.2018).

European Commission. (12 July 2017c). *EU and Eastern Partnership Countries Step up Cooperation on Energy Efficiency*. <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/eu-and-eastern-partnership-countries-step-cooperation-energy-efficiency>, (16.10.2018).

European Commission. (2018a). *Convergence Criteria for Joining*. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-criteria-joining\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-criteria-joining_en), (05.05.2018).

European Commission. (19.02.2018b). European Union Action Plan for Ukraine. *Press Release Database*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-96-1065\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-96-1065_en.htm), (26.03.2018).

European Commission. (2018c). TACIS. *Press Release Database*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-92-54\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-92-54_en.htm), (18.03.2019).

European Commission. (2018d). The TACIS 1996 Action Programme for Ukraine. *Press Release Database*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-96-1022\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-96-1022_en.htm), (27.03.2019).

European Commission. (2018e). *TAIEX and Twinning 2017 Highlights*. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/taieux-and-twinning-2017-highlights\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/taieux-and-twinning-2017-highlights_en.pdf), (14.05.2019).

European Commission. (25 July 2018f). *Commission Implementing Decision of 25.7.2018 on the Annual Action Programme 2018 (Part 1) in Favour of Ukraine to be Financed from the General Budget of the Union*. <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood->

enlargement/sites/near/files/20180816-2018-annual-action-programme-for-ukraine-\_part\_1-and-annexes.pdf, (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (26 November 2018g). *Commission Implementing Decision of 26.11.2018 on the Annual Action Programme 2018 (Part 2) in Favour of Ukraine to be Financed from the General Budget of the Union.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20181128-2018-annual-action-programme-for-ukraine-\\_part\\_2-and-annexes.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20181128-2018-annual-action-programme-for-ukraine-_part_2-and-annexes.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2019a). *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).* [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr\\_en.htm\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm_en), (05.03.2019).

European Commission. (2019b). *Development Cooperation Instrument – DCI.* [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci\\_en.htm\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm_en), (06.05.2019).

European Commission. (2019c). *Twinning.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/twinning\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/twinning_en), (14.05.2019).

European Commission. (2019d). *TAIEX.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/taix\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/taix_en), (14.05.2019).

European Commission. (16 May 2019e). *Ukraine.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine_en), (20.05.2019).

European Commission. (14 May 2019f). *Commission Implementing Decision of 14.5.2019 on the Annual Action Programme Part 1 in Favour of Ukraine for Year 2019.* [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c\\_2019\\_3711\\_f1\\_decision\\_aap2019\\_part1.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2019_3711_f1_decision_aap2019_part1.pdf), (21.05.2019).

European Commission. (2019g). *Visa Liberalisation with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia*. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-moldova-ukraine-and-georgia\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-moldova-ukraine-and-georgia_en), (03.05.2019).

European Communities. (1997). *Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>, (02.04.2018).

European Council. (14.12.1974). Declaration on European Identity. *Bulletin of the European Communities*. [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf), (10.02.2019).

European Council. (07-08.04.1978). Conclusions of the Sessions of the European Council. *Bulletin of the European Communities*. [http://aei.pitt.edu/1440/1/Copenhagen\\_1978.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/1440/1/Copenhagen_1978.pdf), (10.02.2019).

European Council. (19.06.1983). Solemn Declaration on European Union. *Bulletin of the European Communities*. [http://aei.pitt.edu/1788/1/stuttgart\\_declaration\\_1983.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/1788/1/stuttgart_declaration_1983.pdf), (10.02.2019).

European Council. (21-22 June 1993). *Conclusions of the Presidency - European Council in Copenhagen*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>, (10.05.2018).

European Council. (23.12.1999). Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine (1999/877/CFSP), *Official Journal of the European Communities*. <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c9c50ad4-e0a9-4ff9-8e3a-6e14a3e541bf/language-en>, (27.03.2018).

European Endowment for Democracy. (28 April 2014a). *Emergency Support to Kyiv Post*. <https://www.democracyendowment.eu/en/our-work/initiatives/913-emergency-support-to-kyiv-post.html>, (21.06.2019).

European Endowment for Democracy. (19 August 2014b). *Support to ATN Television in Kharkiv*. <https://www.democracyendowment.eu/en/our-work/initiatives/953-support-to-atn-television-in-kharkiv.html>, (21.06.2019).

European Endowment for Democracy. (2018). *Our Mission – Five Years of EED: Supporting People Speaking Up for Democracy*. <https://www.democracyendowment.eu/about-eed/>, (03.10.2018).

European Endowment for Democracy. (2019). *Initiatives*. <https://www.democracyendowment.eu/en/our-work/initiatives.html>, (21.06.2019).

European External Action Service. (4 July 2002). European Union-Ukraine Summit Joint Statement. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/eu\\_uk\\_chronology/statement\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/eu_uk_chronology/statement_en.pdf), (26.04.2018).

European External Action Service. (12 December 2003). *European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World*. <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world>, (18.09.2018).

European External Action Service. (14 February 2008). *Joint Statement of the Ministers of the countries of the European Union and of the wider Black Sea Area*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/blacksea/doc/joint\\_statement\\_blacksea\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/blacksea/doc/joint_statement_blacksea_en.pdf), (11.10.2018).

European External Action Service. (15 October 2009). Provisional EU-Ukraine Association Agenda.

[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/eu\\_uk\\_chronology/association\\_agenda\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/eu_uk_chronology/association_agenda_en.pdf), (11.04.2019).

European External Action Service. (15 May 2012). *ENP Country Progress Report 2011* – *Ukraine*.  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/press\\_releases/memo\\_ukraine\\_clean.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/press_releases/memo_ukraine_clean.pdf), (10.06.2019).

European External Action Service. (2014a). *Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2020: Strategic Priorities 2014-2020 and Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 European Neighbourhood-wide Measures*.

[https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/enp\\_wide\\_strategic\\_priorities\\_2014\\_2020\\_and\\_multi\\_annual\\_indicative\\_programme\\_2014\\_20.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/enp_wide_strategic_priorities_2014_2020_and_multi_annual_indicative_programme_2014_20.pdf), (07.06.2019).

European External Action Service. (2014b). *Eastern Partnership Platform 1 'Democracy, Good Governance and Stability'*.  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/platforms/docs/work\\_programme\\_2014\\_2017\\_platform1\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/platforms/docs/work_programme_2014_2017_platform1_en.pdf), (17.06.2019).

European External Action Service. (31 July 2014c). *Ukraine: EU Country Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society 2014-2017*.  
[https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/ukraine\\_civil\\_society\\_roadmap\\_2014.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/ukraine_civil_society_roadmap_2014.pdf), (07.06.2019).

European External Action Service. (22 May 2015). *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit 21*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/docs/riga-declaration-220515-final\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/docs/riga-declaration-220515-final_en.pdf), (12.10.2018).

European External Action Service. (02 February 2016a). *Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)*. [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/329/union-for-the-mediterranean-ufm\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/329/union-for-the-mediterranean-ufm_en) (25.09.2018).

European External Action Service. (2016b). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf). (04.10.2018).

European External Action Service. (2 May 2016c). *Black Sea Synergy*. [https://eeas.europa.eu/arctic-policy/eu-arctic-policy/346/black-sea-synergy\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/arctic-policy/eu-arctic-policy/346/black-sea-synergy_en), (11.08.2018).

European External Action Service. (19 October 2016d). *Eastern Partnership*. [https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en), (16.10.2018).

European External Action Service. (2018a). *Northern Dimension*. [https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/northern-dimension/347/northern-dimension\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/northern-dimension/347/northern-dimension_en), (19.04.2018).

European External Action Service. (2018b). *Eastern Partnership Work Programme - Platform 1 (2018-2019)*. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eap\\_platform\\_1\\_work\\_programme\\_2018-2019.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eap_platform_1_work_programme_2018-2019.pdf), (17.06.2019).

European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department. (2018). *Human Rights in Ukraine and the EU Response, Including Relevant Activities of the European Parliament*. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603834/EXPO\\_STU\(2018\)603834\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603834/EXPO_STU(2018)603834_EN.pdf), (07.06.2019).

European Parliament. (09-10 December 1994). *Presidency Conclusions - European Council Meeting on 9 and 10 October December 1994 in Essen*. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ess1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ess1_en.htm), (24.09.2018).

European Parliament. (10 December 2002). *Oral Question with Debate pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure by Elmar Brok, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy to the Council – Subject: The 'New Neighbours Initiative' and 'Wider Europe'*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+OQ+O-2002-0102+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en> (12.09.2018).

European Parliament. (2 May 2005). *Resolution on the Results of the Ukraine Elections*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2005-0009+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, (26.04.2019).

European Parliament. (2014). *Information Note – EIDHR and Ukraine*. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/droi/dv/83\\_eidhr/83\\_eidhr\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/83_eidhr/83_eidhr_en.pdf), (28.05.2019).

European Parliament. (2016). *Report and Roadmap on Internal Reform and Capacity-Building for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20160229RES16408/20160229RES16408.pdf>, (05.07.2019).

European Parliament. (2017). *The European Neighbourhood Policy, Fact Sheets on the European Union*. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/fiches\\_techniques/2013/060504/04A\\_FT\(2013\)060504\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/fiches_techniques/2013/060504/04A_FT(2013)060504_EN.pdf), (19.09.2018).

European Parliament. (16 April 2018). *Fact Sheets on the European Union - Human Rights and Democracy*. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600413/IPOL\\_PERI\(2017\)600413\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600413/IPOL_PERI(2017)600413_EN.pdf), (02.10.2018).

European Parliament. (2019a). *Observing the Vote*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/globaldemocracysupport/en/elections/election-observation.html>, (08.06.2019).

European Parliament. (2019b). *Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-ua/about/history>, (05.07.2019).

European Union and Council of Europe. (2014). *Council of Europe and European Union Programmatic Cooperation Framework 2015-2020 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus*. <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680462fc3>, (09.06.2019).

European Union. (2007). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Ukraine – National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-national-indicative-programme-2007-2010>, (20.05.2019).

European Union. (20 June 2011a). *Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Press Conference after the Foreign Affairs Council*. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122934.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122934.pdf), (21.09.2018).

European Union. (2011b). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Ukraine – National Indicative Programme 2011-2013*. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/country/2011\\_enpi\\_nip\\_ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf), (20.05.2019).

European Union. (11 October 2011c). *Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the Verdict in the Case of Ms Yulia Tymoshenko*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PESC-11-364\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-11-364_en.htm), (22.06.2019).

European Union. (2012a). *European Union Receives Nobel Peace Prize 2012*. [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2010-today/2012/eu-nobel\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2010-today/2012/eu-nobel_en), (21.10.2018).

European Union. (29 October 2012b). *Joint Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on the Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine*. <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/joint-statement-high-representative-catherine-ashton-and-commissioner-stefan-fule-0>, (10.06.2019).

European Union. (2017a). *Eastern Partnership*, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy#the-eastern-partnership>, (26.09.2018).

European Union. (2017b). *The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)*. <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy/european-neighbourhood-instrument-eni>, (20.09.2018).

European Union. (2017c). *Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, Neighbourhood*. <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east-south/stay-informed/projects/neighbourhood-civil-society-facility>, (09.10.2018).

European Union. (2017d). *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument – Ukraine: National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/ukraine-national-indicative-programme-2007-2010>, (19.06.2019).

European Union. (2019). *EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy & Human Rights 2000-2006: Promoting Democracy & Human Rights Worldwide*. [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/file/25202/download\\_en?token=ns8Vd46z](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/file/25202/download_en?token=ns8Vd46z), (25.04.2019).

Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2 June 2006). The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A Partnership for Reform. *European Parliament*. [https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-06-341\\_en.pdf](https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-341_en.pdf) (25.09.2018).

Freedom House. (1999). *Freedom in the World 1999: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/ukraine>, (25.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2002). *Freedom in the World 2002: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/ukraine>, (18.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2003). *Freedom in the World 2003: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/ukraine>, (18.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2005). *Freedom in the World 2005: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/ukraine>, (29.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2006). *Freedom in the World 2006: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/ukraine>, (18.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2008). *Freedom in the World 2008: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/ukraine>, (18.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2012). *Freedom in the World 2012: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/ukraine>, (18.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2014). *Freedom in the World 2014: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ukraine>, (22.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2015). *Freedom in the World 2015: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/ukraine>, (01.07.2019).

Freedom House. (2016). *Freedom in the World 2016: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/ukraine>, (18.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2017). *Freedom in the World 2017: Crimea*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/crimea>, (30.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2019a). *Freedom in the World 2019: Ukraine*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/ukraine>, (22.06.2019).

Freedom House. (2019b). *Freedom in the World 2019: Crimea*. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/crimea>, (30.06.2019).

Government Office for the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. (2016). *Report on Implementation of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine in 2016*. <http://www.3dcftas.eu/documents/other/report-implementation-association-agreement-between-european-union-and-ukraine-2016>, (03.07.2019).

Government Portal Official Website. (2019a). *Anti-Corruption Reform*. <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/reformi/verhovenstvo-prava-ta-borotba-z-korupciyeyu/borotba-z-korupciyeyu>, (30.06.2019).

Government Portal Official Website of Ukraine. (2019b). *Decentralization Reform*. <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/reformi/efektivne-vryaduvannya/reforma-decentralizaciyi>, (03.07.2019).

Grytsenko, A. (2000). *Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: On the Way from Form to Substance*. *NATO Fellowship Programme*. <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/grytsenko.pdf>, (04.07.2019).

Guz, S. (28 February 2019). *Ukraine's Communists were Banned, or so We Thought*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraines-communists-were-banned-or-so-we-thought/>, (22.06.2019).

Harding, L. (08.02.2010a). Yanukovich Set to Become President as Observers Say Ukraine Election was Fair. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/08/viktor-yanukovich-ukraine-president-election>, (09.03.2018).

Harding, L. (21.04.2010b). Ukraine Extends Lease for Russia's Black Sea Fleet. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia>, (13.03.2018).

Huff, A. (2011). The Role of EU Defence Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood. *European Union Institute for Security Studies*. [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op91-The\\_role\\_of\\_EU\\_defence\\_policy\\_in\\_the\\_Eastern\\_neighbourhood\\_0.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op91-The_role_of_EU_defence_policy_in_the_Eastern_neighbourhood_0.pdf), (10.10.2018).

Hüllen, V. (November 2009). *EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: Cooperation against all Odds?*. [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG\\_9.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_9.pdf), (24.09.2018).

Interfax Ukraine. (1 January 2019). *Minimum Wage in Ukraine up to UAH 4, 173*. <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/556643.html>, (12.06.2019).

Jarabik, B. and Yesmukhanova, Y. (8 March 2017). Ukraine's Slow Struggle for Decentralization. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/08/ukraine-s-slow-struggle-for-decentralization-pub-68219>, (03.07.2019).

Kalmoukos, T. (10.01.2019). Tomos of Autocephaly Officially Given to Ukrainian Church by Patriarch Bartholomew. *The National Herald*. <https://www.thenationalherald.com/226178/tomos-of-autocephaly-officially-given-to-ukrainian-church-by-patriarch-bartholomew/>, (02.06.2019).

Koenig, N. (22 March 2016). *Taking the ENP Beyond the Conception-Performance Gap*. <http://www.institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/enpstrategicorientation-koenig-jdib-mar16.pdf?pdf=ok>,

(10.02.2019).

Kononczuk, W. (13 March 2014). *Russia's Real Aims in Crimea, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/russia-s-real-aims-in-crimea>,

(16.03.2018).

Kononczuk, W., Cenuşa, D. and Kakachia, K. (25 May 2017). *Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as Key Obstacles to Reforms*.

[http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Oligarchs\\_14%20June\\_FINAL\\_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=358&force=](http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Oligarchs_14%20June_FINAL_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=358&force=), (05.07.2019).

Kurki, M. (2012). *How the EU can Adopt a New Type of Democracy Support*.

<http://fride.org/publication/998/how-the-eu-can-adopt-a-new-type-of-democracy-support>, (27.01.2019).

Lange, N. (27 May 2010). *The First 100 Days after Change of Power in Ukraine: Authoritarian Tendencies and Rapprochement with Russia*.

<http://www.kas.de/ukraine/en/publications/19723/>, (13.03.2018).

Lehne, S. (February 2014). *Time to Reset the European Neighbourhood Policy*.

[https://carnegieendowment.org/files/time\\_reset\\_enp.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/time_reset_enp.pdf), (20.10.2018).

Leonard, M. (1 February 2005). *Europe's Transformative Power, Centre for European Reform*. <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2005/europes-transformative-power>,

(20.10.2018).

Lobjakas, A. (24 January 2005). EU: Updated 'Action Plan' For Ukraine Wards off Talk of Membership. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*.

<https://www.rferl.org/a/1057044.html>, (13.05.2019).

Mainwaring, S. (1989). *Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues*.  
[https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old\\_files/documents/130\\_0.pdf](https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/130_0.pdf),  
(03.01.2019).

Matuszak, S. (September 2012). *The Oligarchic Democracy: The Influence of Business Groups on Ukrainian Politics*.  
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76798391.pdf>, (04.07.2019).

Meduza. (19 March 2018). *The Results of Russia's 2018 Presidential Election: Putin's Record Support, Purged 'Dead Souls', and a Second 'Crimea Referendum'*.  
<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/03/19/the-results-of-russia-s-2018-presidential-election>, (21.03.2018).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (June 2008). *Polish-Swedish Proposal – Eastern Partnership*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/polish-swedish-proposal-eastern-partnership>, (11.10.2018).

Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. (2012). *Ukraine-EU Relations, Historical Overview*. <http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/relations>, (16.03.2018).

National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. (24 April 2018). *G7 Supports the Establishment of the Anti-Corruption Court in Ukraine in Line with the Recommendations of the Venice Commission*. <https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/g7-supports-establishment-anti-corruption-court-ukraine-line-recommendations-venice>, (30.06.2019).

National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. (2019). *History of the NABU*. <https://nabu.gov.ua/en/history-nabu>, (29.06.2019).

OECD. (June 2018). *Baseline Measurement Report: The Principles of Public Administration – Ukraine, Publications.*  
<http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Baseline-Measurement-Report-2018-Ukraine.pdf>, (14.05.2019).

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2017). *Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 February to 15 May 2015.*  
[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport18th\\_EN.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport18th_EN.pdf),  
(21.03.2018).

Official Journal of the European Communities. (29 June 1987). *Single European Act, No L 169/1.* <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11986U/TXT&from=EN>, (02.05.2018).

Official Journal of the European Communities. (29 July 1992). *Treaty on European Union (92/C 191/01), No C 191/1.* <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN>, (17.03.2018).

Official Journal of the European Communities. (6 December 1994). *94/779/CFSP: Common Position of 28 November 1994 defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on the Objectives and Priorities of the European Union towards Ukraine, No L 313/1.* <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cb1b963c-0362-4a64-9709-b8e23ab02007/language-en>,  
(26.03.2018).

Official Journal of the European Communities. (18 December 2000). *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, C 364/1.*  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf), (02.10.2018).

Official Journal of the European Union. (26 October 2012). *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, C 326/13.* <https://eur->

lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC\_1&format=PDF, (17.03.2018).

Official Journal of the European Union. (29 May 2014). *Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part, L 161/3*, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0529\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0529(01)&from=EN), <http://3dcftas.eu/publications/key/deepening-eu-ukrainian-relations-what-why-and-how-second-edition>, (16.04.2019).

OSCE ODIHR Legislation Online. (16 November 2007). *Legislation –Ukraine – Other Related Laws*. <https://www.legislationonline.org/legislation/section/legislation/country/52/topic/80>, (10.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (7 March 2000). *Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October and 14 November 1999 Final Report, Amended Version*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/15000?download=true>, (09.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (11 May 2005). *Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674?download=true>, (08.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (23 June 2006). *Ukraine Parliamentary Elections 26 March 2006: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/19595?download=true>, (10.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (20 December 2007). *Ukraine Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections 30 September 2007: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/29970?download=true>, (10.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (28 April 2010). *Ukraine Presidential Election 17 January and 7 February 2010 – OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844?download=true>, (10.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (30 June 2014a). *Ukraine Early Presidential Election 25 May 2014 – OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/120549?download=true>, (11.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (19 December 2014b). *Ukraine Early Parliamentary Elections 26 October 2014 – OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556?download=true>, (12.06.2019).

OSCE ODIHR. (21 December 2018). *Ukraine Presidential Election 31 March 2019 – ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 20-23 November 2018*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407657?download=true>, (11.06.2019).

OSCE. (31 March 2019). *International Election Observation Mission: Ukraine – Presidential Election*. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/415733?download=true>, (12.06.2019).

People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic Official Website. (16 March 2018). *'Russia – Donbass. Together Forever!' Meeting with Delegation from DPR Takes Place in Simferopol*. <http://dnrsovet.su/russia-donbass-together-forever-meeting-with-delegation-from-dpr-takes-place-in-simferopol/>, (21.03.2018).

Pifer, S. (11 June 2012). *Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Losing Its Balance*. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/ukraines-foreign-policy-losing-its-balance/>, (14.03.2018).

Pifer, S. (26 December 2014). *Ukraine Overturns its Non-Bloc Status. What Next with NATO?*. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ukraine-overturns-its-non-bloc-status-what-next-with-nato/>, (20.03.2018).

President of Ukraine L. Kuchma. (11 June 1998). *Decree by the President of Ukraine on Approvement the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration to the European Union*. [http://www.sdfm.gov.ua/content/file/site\\_docs/2007/16.05.06/decree.htm](http://www.sdfm.gov.ua/content/file/site_docs/2007/16.05.06/decree.htm), (02.02.2018).

Putin, V. (17 April 2014). *Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia*. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796>, (20.03.2018).

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (11 July 2017). *EU Formally Approves Ukraine Association Agreement*. <https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-ukraine-association-agreement-formally-approved/28610083.html>, (20.03.2018).

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (19 February 2019). *Ukraine President Signs Constitutional Amendment On NATO, EU Membership*. <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-president-signs-constitutional-amendment-on-nato-eu-membership/29779430.html>, (01.06.2019).

Reuters. (23 April 2019). *Ukraine Presidential Election*. <https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-ELECTION/010090W9135/index.html>, (02.06.2019).

Roth, A. (29.03.2019). *Ukraine Election: Will Voter Anger Propel TV Comic to Presidency?*. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/ukraine-goes-to-polls-with-tv-comic-eyeing-the-presidency>, (02.06.2019).

Russia Today News. (27 February 2014). *Canceled Language Law in Ukraine Sparks concern among Russian and EU Diplomats*. <https://www.rt.com/news/minority-language-law-ukraine-035/>, (16.03.2018).

Sandford, A. (19.04.2019). What is Known of Ukraine Presidential Frontrunner Volodymyr Zelenskiy's Policies?. *Euronews*. [https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/19/what-is-known-of-ukraine-presidential-frontrunner-volodymyr-zelenskiy-s-policies\\_](https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/19/what-is-known-of-ukraine-presidential-frontrunner-volodymyr-zelenskiy-s-policies_) (06.06.2019).

Schmitter, P. C. and Brouwer, I. (1999). *Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection*. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/id/995/>, (12.02.2019).

Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Government Office for European Integration. (2015). *Report on Implementation of the Association Agenda and the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, 2015*. <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/report-implementation-association-agreement-between-european-union-and-ukraine-2015>, (20.06.2019).

Semeniy, J., Grebenyuk, S., Glushchenko, S. and Stasiuk, O. (11 February 2019). *Chambers Anti-Corruption 2019 Guide: Ukraine*. [https://www.asterslaw.com/press\\_center/publications/chambers\\_anticorruption\\_2019\\_guide\\_ukraine/](https://www.asterslaw.com/press_center/publications/chambers_anticorruption_2019_guide_ukraine/), (29.06.2019).

Shapovalova, N. and Youngs, R. (2012). *EU Democracy Promotion in the Eastern Neighbourhood: A Turn to Civil Society?*. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156623/WP\\_115\\_EU\\_democracy\\_promotion\\_in\\_the\\_Eastern\\_neighbourhood.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156623/WP_115_EU_democracy_promotion_in_the_Eastern_neighbourhood.pdf), (18.01.2019).

Stelmashchuk A. and Maksymov, M. (11.10.2016). Judicial Reform in Ukraine. *International Litigation News*. [http://vkp.ua/publications/articles/judicial\\_reform\\_in\\_ukraine/](http://vkp.ua/publications/articles/judicial_reform_in_ukraine/), (30.06.2019).

Stern, D. (21.11.2013). Ukraine Suspends Preparations for EU Trade Agreement. *BBC News*. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25032275>, (16.03.2018).

Stulov, M. (29.10.2013). Lavrov Warns Ukraine over EU Deal. *The Moscow Times*.  
<https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/lavrov-warns-ukraine-over-eu-deal-29022>,  
(16.03.2018).

Teasdale A. and Bainbridge, T. (2012). Pact on Stability in Europe. *The Penguin Companion to European Union*.  
[https://penguincompaniontoeu.com/additional\\_entries/pact-on-stability-in-europe/](https://penguincompaniontoeu.com/additional_entries/pact-on-stability-in-europe/),  
(24.09.2018).

Techau, J. (1 July 2016). *The EU's New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless?*.  
<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=63994>, (06.10.2018).

The Economist. (14 September 2016). *What are the Minsk Agreements?*.  
<https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-explains-7>, (21.03.2018).

The EU-Ukraine Association Council. (16 March 2015). *EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to Prepare and Facilitate the Implementation of the Association Agreement*.  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/ukraine/docs/st06978\\_15\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/ukraine/docs/st06978_15_en.pdf), (22.04.2019).

The Moscow Times. (10 April 2019). *Kremlin Comments on Poroshenko vs. Putin Campaign Posters in Ukraine*.  
<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/10/kremlin-comments-on-poroshenko-vs-putin-campaign-posters-in-ukraine-a65176>, (02.06.2019).

The World Bank. (2019). *GDP Growth (Annual %): Ukraine*.  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=1994&locations=UA&start=1991>, (20.03.2019).

Transparency International Ukraine. (2018). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2018*.  
<https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/corruption-perceptions-index-2018/>, (29.06.2019).

Transparency International. (2004). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2004*. [https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi\\_2004/0](https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2004/0), (25.03.2019).

Transparency International. (2013). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2013*. <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>, (22.03.2018).

Transparency International. (2019). *Constitutional Court Ruling Undermines Anti-Corruption Achievements in Ukraine*. [https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/constitutional\\_court\\_ruling\\_undermines\\_anti\\_corruption\\_achievements\\_in\\_ukra](https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/constitutional_court_ruling_undermines_anti_corruption_achievements_in_ukra), (30.06.2019).

Tsantoulis, Y. (February 2009). *Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?*. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104869/PB\\_12.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104869/PB_12.pdf), (11.10.2018).

UNDP Ukraine. (24 May 2015). *Combating Corruption Topping Ukraine's Reforms Agenda*. <http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/05/24/launching-the-national-agency-for-prevention-of-corruption-topping-the-agenda.html>, (30.06.2019).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2019). *Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)*. <https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/internally-displaced-persons>, (13.06.2019).

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (February 2018) *Humanitarian Response Plan – End-of-Year Report January-December 2017: Ukraine*. [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2017\\_hrp-end\\_of\\_year\\_report\\_20180316.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2017_hrp-end_of_year_report_20180316.pdf), (21.03.2018).

United Nations Peacemaker. (12 February 2015). *Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements*. <https://peacemaker.un.org/ukraine-minsk-implementation15>, (21.03.2018).

UNIAN Information Agency. (8 February 2019). *Ukraine's Path toward EU and NATO: Point of no Return*. <https://www.unian.info/politics/10439406-ukraine-s-path-toward-eu-and-nato-point-of-no-return.html>, (02.06.2019).

Ukraine World. (3 December 2018). *The Azov Crisis Explained: an Interview with Security Expert Hanna Shelest*. [https://ukraineworld.org/articles/russian-aggression/azov-crisis-explained-interviewsecurityexpert?fbclid=IwAR0Pcj7DoQ4GBvsBf\\_mrxG6u4bMOxLlfJskULHg31UrRu4mlCZa5DYsTr-w](https://ukraineworld.org/articles/russian-aggression/azov-crisis-explained-interviewsecurityexpert?fbclid=IwAR0Pcj7DoQ4GBvsBf_mrxG6u4bMOxLlfJskULHg31UrRu4mlCZa5DYsTr-w), (01.06.2019).

Valdambrini, A. (23.09.2013). The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. *TRIALOG*. [http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/study\\_visit\\_croatia\\_ec\\_eidhr\\_meeting\\_2013.pdf](http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/study_visit_croatia_ec_eidhr_meeting_2013.pdf), (28.05.2019).

Vandeputte, N. and Luciani, L. (2018). *European Union Democracy Assistance: An Academic State of Play*. <http://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/EU-Democracy-Assistance.pdf>, (24.06.2018).

Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrainy. (2001). *Law of Ukraine on Political Parties in Ukraine*. <http://www.parliament.am/library/kusakcutyunner2019/ukraina.pdf>, (11.06.2019).

Walker, S. (18.12.2013). Vladimir Putin Offers Ukraine Financial Incentives to Stick with Russia. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/ukraine-russia-leaders-talks-kremlin-loan-deal>, (16.03.2018).

Walker, S. (18.04.2019). Ukraine Elections: Actor and Comedian Poised to Win Crushing Victory. *The Guardian*.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/18/ukraine-elections-actor-and-comedian-volodymyr-zelenskiy-poised-to-win-crushing-victory>, (02.06.2019).

Walker, S. and Luhn, A. (25.05.2014). Petro Poroshenko Wins Ukraine Presidency, According to Exit Polls. *The Guardian*.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/petro-poroshenko-ukraine-president-wins-election>, (19.03.2018).

Walsh, N. P. (21.06.2006). Yushchenko 'Reaches Deal' with Ex-Orange Allies. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/21/ukraine.nickpatonwalsh>, (06.03.2018).

Williams, M. and Polityuk, P. (04.03.2019). Ukraine's Tymoshenko: 'Gas Princess', Prisoner, And Next President?. *Reuters*. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-tymoshenko/ukraines-tymoshenko-gas-princess-prisoner-and-next-president-idUSKCN1QL0LT\\_](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-tymoshenko/ukraines-tymoshenko-gas-princess-prisoner-and-next-president-idUSKCN1QL0LT_) (02.06.2019).

Wilson, A. (11.10.2018). Russia, Ukraine and the Battle for Religion. *European Council on Foreign Relations*.

[https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_orthodox\\_redux\\_russia\\_ukraine\\_and\\_the\\_battle\\_for\\_religion#](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_orthodox_redux_russia_ukraine_and_the_battle_for_religion#), (29.06.2019).

Youngs, R. (2001). *Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy*. <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/77.pdf>, (25.02.2019).

Zamfir, I. (2008). Democracy Support in EU External Policy. *European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing*.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614717/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)614717\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614717/EPRS_BRI(2018)614717_EN.pdf), (02.10.2018).

Zhukovsky, A. (1984). February Revolution of 1917. *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine – Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies*. <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CF%5CE%5CFebruaryRevolutionof1917.htm>, (09.09.2017).

Zinets, N. (21.03.2019). President's Re-Election Pitch Resonates in Heartland of Ukraine's Revolution. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-election-west/presidents-re-election-pitch-resonates-in-heartland-of-ukraines-revolution-idUSKCN1R20HW>, (02.06.2019).

