

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
NATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY STRATEGIES AND
MANAGEMENT**

**PROFILE OF PKK AS A TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION:
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF ITS WEBSITES**

**Ph.D. DISSERTATION
Mehmet Nesip ÖĞÜN**

**Supervisor
Prof.Dr. Turgut GÖKSU**

ANKARA – 2010

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Mehmet Nesip ÖĞÜN's dissertation is accepted as Ph.D. Dissertation by the jury below with
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
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I hereby acknowledge that this dissertation was fully prepared with scientific and ethical procedures, and all the sources that were used in this study were cited properly.

I also recognize all the legal sanctions that would be against me in case of any illegal procedures were to be identified in this study.



Mehmet Nesip ÖĞÜN

02/11/2010

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to some cert people. During the course of my work, there were so many people who were instrumental in helping me. Without their guidance, help and patience, I would have never been able to accomplish this study.

First, I would like to convey my deepest appreciation to Dr. Turgut Göksu who was my supervisor during this study. Without his support and academic guidance, I could not finish this study. I would also express my appreciation to Dr. Hasan Hüseyin Çevik, who was my co-supervisor throughout the study. I would also like to convey my gratitude to Dr. Süleyman Özeren, who directed me to the right path for this study. I would like to send my appreciation to Dr. H. Cenk Sözen who is the master of social network analysis. He helped me a lot during the analysis process. I would also like to thank Dr. Ünsal Sıgır who helped with the methodology. I would also like to thank Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya for his remarkable support and help.

There are some other people that I would like to thank, Professor Yonah Alexander, Professor Gabriel Weimann, Professor Dean C. Alexander, Police Director Ahmet Eren, Police Director Murat Ozer, Police Director Fatih Yamac, Police Director Bilal Sen, Police Director Ömer Yılmaz, Police Director Atalay Unal, Lt.Col. Yusuf Alabarda, Lt.Col.Murat Aslan, Prof. Dr.Mustafa Sağsan, Maj. Olcay Denizer, Capt. Erdoğan Çelebi, Capt. Muharrem Aydın, Dr. Oğuzhan Akova, and Mr.Michael Swetnam who is the Chairman and CEO of Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

I also would like to express my appreciation to my parents, Osman Hüsni and Oya and my brother Orhan, and my mother-in-law Drusila, and finally yet most importantly my deepest gratefulness and thanks to my patient and loving wife, Rebecca, who has been a great source of strength all through this study, and my children, Daniel Nesip and Juliet İlayda. Their love and support during long days and nights of the study was endless value to me.

ABSTRACT

Öğün, M.Nesip, (2010), Profile of PKK as a Terrorist Organization: Social Network Analysis of its Websites, PhD Thesis, Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Turgut Göksu, 251 pages.

Terrorism has been a permanent trouble in human history. It is obvious that with twenty first century, new age of terrorism has started. Terrorism is transnational, institutionalized, technologically advanced, and global. Today's terrorist organizations are using Internet for different purposes. The Internet has become the new and main source of communication in terms of disseminating propaganda for terrorist activities. In this context, PKK terrorist organization, as part of terrorist community, is exploiting the Internet for its purposes and broadcasting propaganda through its websites.

This study is focused on the exploitation of Internet by terrorist organizations for their activities and to examine PKK terrorist organization, as a case study. First, conceptual and theoretical framework were given in starting chapters. Terrorism, Internet and propaganda terms were studied. Later, PKK terrorist organization was analyzed in detailed. To indentify pro-PKK websites, snowball-sampling methodology were used. In this respect, 64 websites were determined. After determining the websites brief content analysis were applied to the websites. As a main focus of the study, social network analysis was used to cover and identify the linkages of these websites along with their contexts affiliated with terrorist purposes. In addition to social network analysis, interview was made to find out the solutions to overcome terrorist networks in terms of terrorist use of Internet.

In this context, most effective websites were demonstrated. Within this regard, pro-PKK websites that are more effective in terms of conducting propaganda and websites that are located at the center of the terrorist network, as a hub, and have more brokerage position than the others in the whole Internet based pro-PKK web system were clarified. In addition, some solutions were proposed in terms of Internet usage of terrorist organizations.

Key Words: Terrorism, Internet, Propaganda, PKK, Social Network Analysis.

ÖZET

Öğün, M.Nesip, (2010), PKK Terör Örgütünün Profili: Web Sitelerinin Sosyal Ağ Analizi, Doktora Tezi, Danışman: Prof. Dr. Turgut Göksu, 251 sayfa.

Terörizm insanlık tarihinin en büyük tehlikelerinden biridir. Yirminci yüzyılın başlamasıyla, terörizm için yeni dönem başlamış oldu. Terörizm, uluslararası, kurumsallaşmış, teknolojik olarak gelişmiş ve küresel hal almıştır. Bugünün terör örgütleri interneti çeşitli amaçlar için kullanmaktadır. Terörist aktiviteler ve propaganda amaçlı kullanmak için internet temel kaynak olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, teröristler kulübünün bir üyesi olan PKK terör örgütü interneti ve web sitelerini kendi amaçları için ve özellikle de propaganda amaçlı kullanmaktadır.

Bu çalışma internetin terör örgütlerinin kendi amaçları için interneti istismar etmesi ve PKK terör örgütünü örnek olay olarak incelemektedir. İlk bölümlerde, konseptsel ve teorik çerçeve kapsamında genel olarak terörizm, İnternet ve propaganda açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra PKK terör örgütü ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiştir. PKK'nın propagandasını yapan 64 adet web sitesinin tespit edilmesi maksadıyla kartopu metodu kullanılmış ve müteakiben web siteleri içerik analizine tabi tutulmuştur. Terör amaçlı kullanılan PKK web sitelerinin haritasını çıkarmak maksadıyla sosyal ağ analizi metod olarak kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca, teröristlerin interneti kullanmalarının engellenmesi maksadıyla uzmanlar ile mülakat yapılmıştır.

Bu bağlamda, PKK'ya müzahir web siteleri tanımlanmış ve en etkili ve merkezi olan web siteleri ile PKK'nın İnternet ağının içerisinde aracılık görevi yapan web siteleri ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Bunlara ilave olarak, teröristlerin interneti istismar etmelerini önlemek amacıyla tavsiyelerde bulunulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, İnternet, Propaganda, PKK, Sosyal Ağ Analizi.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page Number
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS	I
ABSTRACT	II
ÖZET	III
TABLE OF CONTENTS	IV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	IX
LIST OF TABLES	XII
LIST OF FIGURES	XIII
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. TERRORISM IN GENERAL	7
1.1.1 Definition Problem of Terrorism	7
1.1.2. Root Causes of Terrorism	12
1.1.2.1. <i>Economical Causes</i>	13
1.1.2.2. <i>Social Causes</i>	14
1.1.2.3. <i>Political Causes</i>	16
1.1.2.4. <i>Other Causes</i>	16
1.1.3. Components of Terrorism	18
1.1.3.1. <i>Ideology</i>	18
1.1.3.2. <i>Organization</i>	19
1.1.3.3. <i>Action</i>	20
1.2. TERRORISM AND THE INTERNET	20
1.2.1. Internet in General	20
1.2.2. Use of Internet for Terrorist Purposes	22
1.2.2.1. <i>Fund-Raising</i>	24
1.2.2.2. <i>Who are the Target Audiences?</i>	25
1.2.2.3. <i>Recruitment</i>	26
1.2.2.4. <i>Training Through Internet</i>	27
1.2.2.5. <i>Overview of the Terrorist Websites</i>	27

1.2.3. Cyber Terrorism	28
1.3. TERRORISM AND PROPAGANDA	30
1.3.1. Definition of Propaganda	30
1.3.2. Aim of Propaganda	33
1.3.3. History of Propaganda	35
1.3.4. Types of Propaganda	37
1.3.4.1. <i>White Propaganda</i>	37
1.3.4.2. <i>Black Propaganda</i>	37
1.3.4.3. <i>Gray Propaganda</i>	38
1.3.5. Propaganda Tools	38
1.3.5.1. <i>Printed Media</i>	38
1.3.5.2. <i>Visual and Auditory Media</i>	39
CHAPTER TWO	
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
2.1. SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY	41
2.1.1. Weak Ties Versus Strong Ties	43
2.1.2. Structural Holes Theory	44
2.2. THE TURKISH SECURITY STRUCTURE IN TERMS OF DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM	46
2.2.1. National Security Council	47
2.2.2. Ministry of Interior Affairs	48
2.2.2.1. <i>Public Order and Security Undersecretaryship</i>	48
2.2.2.2. <i>General Command of Gendarmerie</i>	50
2.2.2.3. <i>Turkish National Police</i>	50
2.2.3. The Turkish Armed Forces	51
2.2.4. National Intelligence Organization	52
2.2.5. Ministry of Justice	53
2.2.6. Ministry of Finance (The Financial Crimes Investigation Board, MASAK)	54
2.3. COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY IN TURKEY	56
2.3.1. Security Based Precautions	57
2.3.2. Countering Terrorism Measures	57

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PKK

3.1. BRIEF HISTORY	61
3.1.1. Kurds and Territorial Claims of PKK	61
3.1.2. Kurdish Uprisings in Turkish History	63
3.1.3. Establishment, 1970s	65
3.1.4. Preparation, 1980-1984	73
3.1.5. Terror Campaign, 1984 to 1 st Gulf War	76
3.1.6. 1 st Gulf War to Ocalan's Capture	82
3.1.7. Ocalan's Capture to Today	88
3.2. IDEOLOGY, AIM AND STRATEGY	98
3.2.1. Ideology	98
3.2.2. Aim	98
3.2.3. Strategy	100
3.2.3.1. <i>Strategic Defense</i>	101
3.2.3.2. <i>Strategic Balance (Balance of Forces)</i>	102
3.2.3.3. <i>Strategic Attack</i>	102
3.2.3.4. <i>PKK's New Strategy</i>	103
3.3. PROPAGANDA METHODS	104
3.3.1. Armed Propaganda	105
3.3.2. Using Media	106
3.3.2.1. <i>TV Stations</i>	106
3.3.2.2. <i>Newspapers and Journals</i>	108
3.3.2.3. <i>Internet</i>	109

CHAPTER FOUR

CLOSE LOOK INTO PKK

4.1. LEADERSHIP	110
4.1.1. Abdullah Ocalan	110
4.1.2. Prominent Members	113
4.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	120
4.2.1. Political Wing	120

4.2.2. Armed Wing	122
4.3. RECRUITMENT	126
4.4. TRAINING	130
4.4.1. Training Methods	130
4.4.2. Terrorists Camps	131
4.5. ARMAMENTS	135
4.5.1. Weapons Used by PKK	135
4.5.2. IEDs and Mines Used by PKK	137
4.6. FINANCIAL RESOURCES	138
4.6.1. Drug Trafficking	138
4.6.2. Smuggling	141
4.6.3. Extortion	143
4.6.4. Charity	144
4.6.5. Money Laundering	144
4.6.6. Other Activities	145
4.7. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT	145
4.7.1. State Support	147
4.7.1.1. <i>PKK and Syria</i>	147
4.7.1.2. <i>PKK and Iran</i>	149
4.7.1.3. <i>PKK and Iraq</i>	150
4.7.1.4. <i>PKK and Europe</i>	151
4.7.2. Coordination with Other Terrorist Organizations	155
4.8. OPERATIONS BY THE PKK	156
4.8.1. Targets and Attacks	156
4.8.2. Timeline of PKK	158
4.8.3. Campaigns	168

CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT	175
5.1.1. General Problem	175
5.1.2. Specific Problem	175
5.1.3. Research Questions	176

5.2. METHODOLOGY	177
5.2.1. Research Design	178
5.2.1.1. <i>Social Network Analysis</i>	178
5.2.1.2. <i>Interview</i>	183
CHAPTER SIX	
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS	
6.1. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PRO-PKK WEB PAGES	186
6.2. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS	188
6.2.1. Analysis of the Network	188
6.2.2. Degree Centrality Analysis	188
6.2.3. Betweenness Centrality Analysis	190
6.2.4. Closeness Centrality Analysis	192
6.2.5. Geodesic Distance Analysis	193
6.3. INTERVIEW	194
CONCLUSION	198
BIBLIOGRAPHY	207
ANNEXES	

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADYOD	: Ankara Democratic Association of Higher Education (Ankara Demokratik Yuksek Ogrenim Dernegi)
AHKO	: Anatolia People's Liberation Army (Anadolu Halk Kurtulus Ordusu)
ARGK	: Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army (Arteseye Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan)
ASALA	: Armenian Secret for the Liberation of Armenia
BSP	: United Left Party (Birlesik Sol Parti)
DDKD	: Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Society (Devrimci Demokrat Kultur Dernegi)
DDKO	: Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts (Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari)
DDP	: Democratic Change Party (Demokratik Degisim Partisi)
DEP	: Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi)
DEHAP	: Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi)
DEVSOL	: Revolutionary Left (Devrimci Sol)
DHB	: Revolutionary Unity of the People (Devrimci Halkin Birliigi)
ERNK	: Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Eniya Rizgariya Netawiya Kurdistan)
FED-BIR	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in UK
FEK-BEL	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Belgium
FEKAR	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Switzerland
FEYKA	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in France
FED-KOM	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Holland
FEY-KOM	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Austria
FEY-KURD	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Denmark
FKKS	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden
GKK	: Temporary Village Guards (Gecici Koy Kuruculari)
HADEP	: People's Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi)
HEP	: People's Labor Party (Halkin Emek Partisi)
HK	: Liberation of the People (Halkin Kurtulusu)
HPG	: People Defense Force (Hezen Partisina Gel)

HRK	: Kurdistan Freedom Brigade (Hazen Rizgariya Kurdistan)
IED	: Improvised Explosives Devices
IRA	: Ireland Republican Army
I-KDP	: Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (Irak-Kurdistan Demokrasi Partisi)
JC	: Young Women Organization (Jina Ciwan)
KADEK	: Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (Konreya Azadi Demokrasiya Kurdistan)
KARZAZ	: Union of Kurdish Supporters (Yektiya Karsazen Kurd a Natnetewi)
KCK	: Democratic Communities of Kurdistan (Koma Civaken Kurdistan)
KDP	: Kurdistan Democratic Party
KGB	: Committee for State Security (Komitjet Gosudarstvjennoj Bjezopasnost)
KJB	: Community of Great Women (Koma Jinen Bilind)
KONGRA-GEL	: Kurdistan People's Congress
KON-KURD	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe
KOMA-GEL	: People's Congress
KKK	: Kurdistan Democratic Con-federalism (Koma Komalen Kurdistan)
KNK	: Kurdistan National Congress
KUK	: Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari)
OSCE	: The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
PAJK	: Kurdistan Liberal Women Party (Partiya Azadiya Jina Kurdistan)
PCDK	: Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party
PDA	: Proletarian Revolutionary Intellectuals (Proleter Devrimci Aydinlik)
PJAK	: Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistan)
PLO	: The Palestine Liberation Organization (Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyat)
PKK	: Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)
PYD	: The Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîti ya Demokratîk)
PWD	: Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Welatpazeren Demokraten Kurdistan)
RAF	: The Red Army Faction
SHP	: Social Democrat People's Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti)

SIP	: Socialist Power Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi)
TAF	: Turkish Armed Forces
TCK	: Turkish Penal Code (Türk Ceza Kanunu)
THKO	: People's Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu)
THKP-C	: Turkey Popular Liberation Party/Front (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi)
TIHKP	: Turkey Revolutionary Workers Peasants Party (Türkiye İhtilalci İscî Köylü Partisi)
TIKKO	: Turkey's Worker Peasant Salvation Army (Türkiye İscî Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu)
TİP	: Turkey's Workers Party (Türkiye İscî Partisi)
T-KDP	: Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (Türkiye-Kürdistan Demokrasi Partisi)
TSİP	: Socialist Workers party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist İscî Partisi)
YEK-KOM	: Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Germany
YDK	: Kurdish Democratic People's Forces (Yekitiya Demokratîk a Gele Kurd)
YJA-STAR	: Free Women's Movement (Yetkiya Jinen Azad)
YJA	: Free Women's Movement (Yetkiya Jinen Azad)
YNK	: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (Yekîti Nîstîmanî Kurdistan)
YRD	: Democratic Intellectual Association (Yekitiya Roşengeriya Demokratîk)
YRD	: Democratic Press Association (Yekitiya Ragihandina Demokratîk)

LIST OF TABLES

	Page Number
Table 1 : Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism	11
Table 2 : Kurdish Uprisings During Ottoman Government Period	64
Table 3 : Kurdish Uprisings During Turkish Independence War Period	65
Table 4 : Kurdish Uprisings During Turkish Republic Period	65
Table 5 : Captured PKK Weapons	135
Table 6 : Captured PKK Weapons (Country Information)	136
Table 7 : The number of defused/seized IEDs that were used by PKK (2009)	137
Table 8 : The number of defused/seized IEDs that were used by PKK (2008)	138
Table 9 : Activities of the PKK	157

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page Number
Figure 1 : Brokerage Roles in the Organizations	45
Figure 2 : ARGK's Structure	122
Figure 3 : Illustration of Some IP Server Locations for PKK Websites	176
Figure 4 : Sample of a Matrix	181
Figure 5 : Sample of a Diagram	182

INTRODUCTION

In modern terrorism, almost all-terrorist organizations are benefitting from Internet to commit their activities such as message delivering to the masses in the frame of propaganda activities, facilitate communication, and recruit new members to their organizations, raising fund or to train the new hired members. The area of the concern, as a consequence of Internet exploitation, has been extended not only in the domestic realm, but also additionally to transnational and international arena. The secrecy of conducting aforementioned activities can easily be resumed by means of covered or coded methods on Internet. Thus, a comprehensive research of Internet based terrorist activities ought to be analysed by taking sample terrorist organization. In this context, PKK terrorist organization is chosen to identify the answers of the research questions and to lead a common understanding.

The reason for that preference is that PKK operates in the prominent countries in the West, and also at the neighbourhood of the threatened country – the Republic of Turkey.¹ If the general frame of the terrorist group, the PKK terrorist organization, is overviewed, it was founded in 1978 and emerged as the most serious threat against the national security of Turkey after the Eruh and Semdinli attacks in 1984 with its ethnically motivated separatist movement. The PKK is a Marxist – Leninist oriented terrorist organization, aiming to set up an independent-Marxist Kurdish State at eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, which eventually is aimed to be extended to Syria, Iran and Iraq's Turkish neighbouring regions.

The organization has not only aimed to foster a Kurdish "ethnicity", through exploiting the weaknesses of the political system, it also attempted to generate resentment against the government by exploiting inadequate infrastructure, education, housing, social services and economic investments in the region.² The PKK has been waging a terror campaign for decades and ended the lives of more than 35 thousand of Turkish Citizens. Additionally, the PKK has never discriminated people while committing its crimes against humanity by killing the whole families including babies, children, women or elders to deter the loyal citizens to their own

¹ 'The Republic of Turkey will be named as 'Turkey' in the study.

² Bal, Ihsan, (1999), *The Prevention of Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: A Case Study of Turkey*, University of Leicester, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, United Kingdom, p.1, 2.

government. Since 1984, the numbers of civilians have reached to more than 13,000 people other than security forces. Furthermore, assassination campaigns have been conducted against the civil servants living at eastern and southeastern regions of the country. In those attacks, more than 500 civilian public officials were killed or injured, most of who were innocent teachers, engineers or Muslim priests. Just with those casualties sustained, this terrorist campaign traumatized the domestic political, social, cultural and economic dynamics of Turkey and affected her foreign policy, directly or indirectly.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to identify to what extend the terrorist organizations exploit Internet in their activities and to examine PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)³ (also known as) KADEK⁴ and KONGRA-GEL⁵ terrorist organization, as a case study, to test this exploitation by focusing on almost every aspects of PKK terrorist organization and its use of websites. The method of the study will cover social network analysis to identify the linkages of these websites along with their contexts affiliated with terrorist purposes. In this context, it will be determined which websites are serving for the PKK, which pro-PKK websites are more effective in terms of conducting propaganda and which websites are located at the center of the terrorist network, as a hub, and have more brokerage position than the others in the whole Internet based pro-PKK web system.

Another important point emphasized in this study is to provide comprehensive background information of PKK Terrorist Organization and present related literature on its history, organization and code of conduct. It is very interesting that there is a lack of academic research on PKK terrorism in the western media, and Turkey as well.⁶ The studies that were documented on the PKK do not focus on the details of the organization, but some solutions to overcome the issue. Simply put, some authors claim that terrorism could be terminated by killing all the terrorists in the country before implementing social, economic or democratic reforms. Some other authors argues that terrorism can only be ended by taking appropriate

³ Kurdistan Workers Party.

⁴ Konreya Azadi Demokrasiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress).

⁵ KGK, (Kurdistan People's Congress).

⁶ Bal, (1999), *ibid.*, p.6.

social, cultural and democratic reforms and measures. This study aims to give detailed information on the profile of PKK terrorist organization, as a case study, to improve the general understanding of the structure of terrorism, to provide theoretical framework of terrorist use of Internet as an efficient tool of its activities and how its Internet exploitation can be benefitted to analyse its structure and to determine the indicators of its activities.

Problem Statement and Research Questions

Terrorist organizations benefit from Internet for the reasons mentioned above. Governments usually take legal measures to prevent the unwanted usage of the Internet by applying to the national courts. However, flexible opportunities to run a website by changing servers, tags, proxies etc do not deter or deny terrorist organization to exploit Internet. Thus national authorities, responsible for the security, can also exploit and analyse the design and the context of the pro-terrorist organizations' websites to exhibit the context of the activities of the terrorist organizations. At the end of this study, the need to form an international organization can be examined against the terrorist exploitation of Internet. In the light of these facts, pro-PKK websites are taken as samples to search the questions of the research, which are mentioned below, because they are accessible worldwide and worth to examine its context by social network analysis.

The research questions are as follows;

1. Which websites of the PKK are the most influential ones?
2. Based on the statistical analysis, is there a strategy behind PKK's network?
3. What are the vulnerable points of the PKK terrorist network?
4. What are the proposed solutions to overcome terrorist network at national and international level?

Limitations of the Study

The study has several limitations. One of the limitations is inadequate resources to conduct social network analysis on security studies. Since social network analysis is a new research method in the applications on terrorist organizations, there is

inadequate number of researches to refer the case study. Hence, this research will be one of the early analysis experiences in Turkey. Some studies of western academia that was built upon 'social network analysis' benefitted to present the fundamentals of the research such as "Social Network Analysis of the 9-11 Terrorist Network" by Valdis Krebs, "Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research" by Steve Ressler, "Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Organizations in India" by Aparna Basu, "Social Network Analysis for Combating Terrorist Networks" by Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence" by Stuart A. Koschade, "Uncloaking Terrorist Networks" by Valdis Krebs, "Mapping Terrorist Networks" by John Robb, "Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex Systems at the Mid-Range" by Philip Vos Fellman and Roxana Wright. The methodology of the study is to examine such documentation and apply them to PKK case to answer the questions of the thesis.

Another limitation is that there are so many websites related to Kurdish communities living in Syria, Iran and Iraq that is based on ethnical motivated purposes of their communities. This situation complicates to differ the pro- PKK websites from the other Kurdish ethnical motivated websites that are not committed to terrorist activities. The author has only searched the websites that are currently releasing the propaganda of the PKK terrorist organization.

The final limitation is the language that is used in the websites. Most of the pro-PKK websites are serviced by Turkish, Kurdish and some other eight languages. However, there is no standard Kurdish language that addresses all the Kurdish community. Additionally the researcher does not speak Kurdish. The researcher had used Turkish-Kurdish dictionaries and got professional support from Kurdish language speakers.

This study is not focused on preventive measures against PKK terrorism or giving recommendations to solve the problem. This study also does not cover or try to understand the legalization process of PKK. This study's scope is terrorist use of Internet and PKK's website network, as a case study, to demonstrate the map of the websites. Additionally, this study is limited with foundation of PKK to 2009. 2010 activities and events related to PKK were not included in this study.

Organization of the Study

The research of this study involves eight major components. The introductory information about the research and a brief analysis of the problem was presented in the first part. Starting with the purpose of the study, which is to determine, which websites are serving for the PKK and later which pro-PKK websites are more effective in terms of disseminating propaganda and which websites are located at the center of the terrorist network and have more brokerage positions than the others in the whole system. Later, problem statement of the study was given to make the study clear and aim oriented. Following the problem statement, some questions were asked for research process. Since, the researcher is going to use Social Network Analysis to determine PKK websites network, those questions will help to understand the reader to find out the effective websites, PKK's network strategy and vulnerabilities of the system. For the fourth research question, researcher interviewed with academicians and practitioners that are working in related fields.

Chapter One is focused on the conceptual framework of the study and assessed the related literature including terrorist use of Internet and propaganda. Internet is the most common communication tool in modern age. This chapter is giving information on how terrorists exploit the Internet for their purposes such as recruitment, fund raising, training and propaganda. Following the literature review on terrorist use of Internet, detailed information on propaganda is given.

Second part of the study is theoretical framework that discussed the social network theory and defence against terrorism structure in Turkey. Besides these important points, counter terrorism policy in Turkey is examined.

The third and fourth part of the study, which is Chapter Three and Four, includes all aspects of PKK terrorist organization. Beginning with origin and history of the Kurds and brief history of the organization were discussed. Later, ideology, aim and strategy were given. Following with propaganda tools, leadership, organizational structure, recruitment techniques, training methods, weapons that they have been using, financial resources, international support, targets, timeline and campaigns of the PKK were explained.

Chapter Five is the sixth part of the study that involved the methodology of the study. First, snowball sampling is used to collect data to for pro-PKK websites. Qualitative methodology is used for the content analysis of pro-PKK websites. After collecting the data, data were transferred to knowledge by using social network analysis. Another research methodology that was used in the research is interview.

Chapter Six includes analysis of the research. Social network analysis was used to map PKK's website network. Degree, betweenness, closeness, and geodesic distance analysis were applied to the network to demonstrate the website strategy of PKK's web network. For the fourth research question, researcher interviewed with academicians and practitioners that are working in related fields.

The final part of this study is Conclusion part that focuses on the conclusive analysis, policy implications, recommendations, and future research part.

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, conceptual terms and concepts that were used during the whole study will be discussed. Since the study is based on terrorism and terrorist use of Internet, it is important to give common understanding on terrorism, terrorism and Internet and correlation between terrorism and propaganda.

1.1. TERRORISM IN GENERAL

In this part, general information on terrorism will be discussed. Namely, first definition problem of terrorism will be examined and some definitions that were made by experts will be given. Later, root causes of terrorism will be discussed. And, then components of terrorism will be given at the end.

1.1.1 Definition Problem of Terrorism

Since the dawn of the civilization, terrorism has been a permanent threat for societies and states. For the reasons that change in international equilibrium, and the differentiation of international relations, conventional war has been replaced by different conflict tactics and terrorism became more extensive. Despite terrorism is one of the biggest threats to life, liberty and freedom, there is no common there is no common definition of terrorism that is globally accepted.

As suggested by the German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, one cannot always precisely specify the necessary and sufficient elements of a definition, but one can provide a cluster of related concepts.⁷ Up to date, there have been several attempts to define terrorism. Definitions that were made by scholars vary from nation to nation; also, differences may result from many factors including diverging perspectives and interests. In addition, since those who utilize terrorism, those who suffer from it, and those who have not confronted a direct terrorist attack tend to define the term differently, take the argument famous quote ‘one man’s terrorist becomes another man’s freedom fighter’.⁸ However, key aspects of terrorism, such as political or ideological motives, violence, targeting non-combatants, the aim of

⁷ Best, Steve and Nocella, Anthony J., (2004), “Defining Terrorism”, *Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal*, Vol.2, No.1, p.8.

⁸ Wieviorka, Michel, (1995), “Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research”, Martha Crenshaw (Ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, USA: Pennsylvania State University Press, p.598.

terrorizing, the goal to modify behaviour, are relatively clear, but formulating them in a clear, compact, quasi-objective definition has proven to be an enormous challenge.⁹ Even there were an objective, value-free definition of terrorism, covering all its important aspects and features; it would still be rejected by some for ideological reasons.¹⁰ Therefore, it is almost impossible to find a concrete definition of terrorism in general. In this study, some definitions will be given to clarify the concepts of terrorism.

The word terrorism first came out during the French revolution, known as *regime de la terreur*.¹¹ At that time, the leader of the action, Maximilien Robespierre, and some 40.000 people were arrested and executed by guillotine. Maximilien Robespierre believed that virtue was the mainspring of a popular government at peace, but that during the time of revolution virtue must be allied with terror in order for democracy to triumph. He appealed famously to "virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless" and proclaimed: "Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and flexible; it is therefore and emanation of virtue".¹²

Terrorism is defined as intense fear and the systematic use of especially as a means of coercion in Webster's New World Dictionary. In defining terrorism, some elements are put in to the definitions to make it clear; so, terrorism is the intentional use, or threat to use, violence against non-combatants, by states, subnational groups or individuals, in order to achieve political aims through intimidation of fear directed at a large audience. The motivation behind the political aim may be ideological, religious, social or something else and the subnational groups or individuals conducting terrorism may have state sponsors as well.¹³

The following general definitions of some terrorism experts are examples of attempts to define terrorism;¹⁴

⁹ Best and Nocella, (2004), *ibid.*, p.8.

¹⁰ Laquer, Walter, (1987), *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company Press, p.149-150.

¹¹ Hoffman, Bruce, (2006), *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, p.3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹³ Ganor, Boaz, (2002), "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", *Police Practice and Research*, Vol.3, No.4, p.242.

¹⁴ Best and Nocella, (2004), *ibid.*, p.8.

“Terrorism is the threat and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of international law by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals.” by Yonah Alexander, Director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York.

“Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.” by Brian Jenkins founder of the RAND Corporation's terrorism research program.

“Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted.” by Walter Laqueur, Chairman of the International Research Council at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, author of works such as *The Age of Terrorism*.

“Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience.” by James M. Poland, Emeritus Professor, Criminal Justice, California State University, Sacramento.

“Terrorism is the use of force or the threat of force by an individual, group, or nation-state against a civilian population to achieve a political end.” by Robert Jensen, Professor in the School of Journalism, University of Texas at Austin.

“Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation against civilians for political goals ... The goals of terrorism are always political ... Terrorism as a political act is a primary means of expression and not a last resort... The targets of terrorist coercion are the civilian population.” by Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marlon-Just, authors of *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public* (2003).

“Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of such, directed upon civilians in order to achieve political objectives.” by Tomis Kapitan, Philosophy professor, Northern Illinois University.

“Intrinsically, terrorism is a state of mind. Political terrorism, presumably, is the state of mind of political actors who are paralyzed by the threat of unpredictable attack. By default the concept has come to be employed to characterize the kinds of actions that are assumed to induce ‘terrorism’. The circularity of this definition is obvious.” by Ted Robert Gurr, founder and director of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

“Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.” by Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

“Terrorism is an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt objective and involving threat to security of any kind, and in violation of the rights acknowledged by religion and mankind.” by Ayatulla Taskhiri, Iranian religious scholar.

“Terrorism is the half-thinking man’s conditioned reflex to sustained oppression and lack of personal empowerment.” by Shaukat Qadir, retired Pakistani soldier and political analyst.

“Terrorism has become an invective that opposing sides hurl at each other for propaganda. The word means those who deliberately harm innocent life for the purpose of forcing behavioral change.” by Mark Somma, Chair of the Political Science Department, Fresno State University.

Alex Schmid, one of the well-known terrorism experts, in his famous study, compiled 109 scholarly articles that define terrorism, and listed the definitional elements according to their frequency mentioned in different definitions in descending order.¹⁵

¹⁵ Schmid, Alex P. and Jongman, Albert J., (2005), *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, New Jersey: Transaction Books, p.36.

Table 1. Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism

No	Element	Frequency (%)
1	Violence, force	83,5
2	Political	65
3	Fear, terror emphasized	51
4	Threat	47
5	(Psychological)effects and (anticipated) reactions	41,5
6	Victim-target differentiation	37,5
7	Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
8	Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30,5
9	Extra normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarianconstraints	30
10	Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11	Publicity aspect	21,5
12	Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21
13	Civilians, noncombatants, neutral, outsiders as victims	17,5
14	Intimidation	17
15	Innocence of victims emphasized	15,5
16	Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
17	Symbolic aspect, demonstrators to others	13,5
18	Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19	Clandestine, covert nature	9
20	Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
21	Criminal	6
22	Demands made on third parties	4

In the light of his study, Schmid defines terrorism as; “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are generally

chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as a message generators. Threat and violence based communication process between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audiences), turning it into a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought”.¹⁶

Finally, Article 1 of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law of Turkey defines terrorism as; “Any act committed by an individual or individuals belonging to an organization with a view to change the constitutionally determined characteristics of the Republic and the political, legal, social, secular and economic order through oppression, violence, intimidation or threat; to destroy the indivisible territorial and national integrity of the State or to endanger the existence of the Turkish State and Republic; to weaken or take over the state authority; to suppress the fundamental rights and freedoms; to disrupt the domestic or external security as well as public order and health, is an act of terror.”¹⁷

As it can be understood from the definitions stated above, a great number of scholars agree that terrorism is the use of violence and a strategy, which aims to reach certain objectives creating fear in the person that is chosen as a victim. Their ideas also coincide as to how cruel terrorism is and that it does not comply with humanistic principles, and that the essential factor in terrorism is to create public excitement.

1.1.2. Root Causes of Terrorism

There is a relationship between underlying social, economic, political, and other circumstances and terrorist activities. These circumstances are very helpful to explain how, where, and why terrorism happens. Root causes are guide to explain, understand, predict, and prevent terrorism.

Terrorism occurs everywhere, either in rich or poor countries; either in developed or underdeveloped countries; either in modern industrialized or developing countries; either in established democracies or anti-democratic states and

¹⁶ Schmid and Jongman, (2005), *ibid.*, p.36.

¹⁷ “Anti-Terror Law No 3713”, 12 April 1991, Official Gazette, No.20843, Vol.30.

societies. In addition, there are terrorists either among less educated people as well as among educated people. There are terrorists either among psychopaths or mentally normal and healthy people. There are terrorists among men and women of all ages. It is possible to enlarge this list of description. This is just to display that it is not easy to make any generalization in terms of conditions under which terrorism flourishes and prevails. This diversity of conditions not only makes it considerably difficult to generalize about terrorism, but also shows the dynamic nature of terrorism, which makes it also hard to predict future of terrorism.

In order to succeed in the fight against terrorism and to be able to come up with efficient strategies to fight it, first causes of terrorism should be determined. It is almost impossible to counter terrorism unless policies, strategies and tactics developed as a result of close study of the causes that lead people to terrorism, and their ideologies, ideas, and beliefs are adopted.

1.1.2.1. Economical Causes

Average income levels that are considerably low, and the unfair distribution of income that causes a society to get divided into classes, a constant rise in unemployment, economic dependence, inefficiency of economic establishment, frequent occurrences of general strikes and lockout, a rise in firing workers in great numbers, polarization of labor unions due to their ideologies, governments' loss of their control over the economy, inflation getting out of control, increasing external pressures over governments because of rising debts to other countries are all considered factors resulting in terrorism. Economic factors, since involving all occupations in a society are subject to manipulation and provocation.¹⁸ Some factors as unbalanced distribution of national income rise in unemployment and people's having to face economic problem may force people to react in different ways including terror as well. It is considerably important that economy should create jobs for people who just want to earn their livings, so people will be able to sustain their families without having to accept money and place a bomb on a road.

In this respect, poverty is often presented as a basic underlying root cause of terrorism. Poverty can breed resentment, desperation, and support for political

¹⁸ Turkish Chamber of Law Attorneys, (2006), *Türkiye ve Terorizm*, [Turkey and Terrorism], Ankara: Publications of Turkish Chamber of Law Attorneys, p.175, 176.

extremism. In addition, as well as providing grounds for grievance, poverty often means underdevelopment, poor or weak governance, or failed states, something that has been referred to as “back holes” within which fanaticism can emerge.¹⁹ States that lack legitimacy and control over the economy and other traditional levers of power provide the space and oxygen for terrorists groups to flourish.²⁰ Weak states either have a central government lack of control of its territory or do not have a central government at all. In this respect, weak states intentionally or unintentionally provide safe heavens for terrorists for terrorist purposes.

Nevertheless, the active supporters of most terrorist organizations are not poor or uneducated. One study analyzes attitudes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip toward terrorist attacks against Israeli targets, and found that support for violent attacks does not decrease among those with higher education and higher living standards, concluding that neither poverty nor education has a direct, causal impact on terrorism.²¹ This proposes that the link between terrorism and social conditions is complex: “modern terrorist organizations require management and technological skills found in the upper and middle classes yet they also need foot-soldiers who overwhelmingly hail from the poor and down-trodden”.²² Indeed, there is not a direct correlation between poverty and terrorism. However, unemployment, poverty and lack of education may appear as vulnerability points, which could be easily exploited for terrorist purposes.

1.1.2.2. Social Causes

Different opinions in believing religion, denominations and sects, low level of education, ethnic separation, existence of minorities, limited individual or societal rights or freedom, division of society into ideological camps, security forces’ loss of confidence in the eye of the public, moral corruption and society’s losing the belief that is indivisible could be viewed as social causes of terrorism.²³ And, it is argued

¹⁹ Newman, Edward, (2006), “Exploring the Root Causes of Terrorism”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol.29, No.8, p.751.

²⁰ O’Neill, William, (2002), “Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations?”, *Conference Report*, New York: International Peace Academy, p.20.

²¹ Krueger Alan B. and Maleckoca Jitka, (2003), “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Casual Connection?”, *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol.17, No.4, p.119-144.

²² O’Neill William, (2002), “Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations?”, *Concept Paper*, New York: International Peace Academy, p.8.

²³ Turkish Chamber of Law Attorneys, *ibid.*, p.142.

that these social factors create the ground necessary for terrorism to emerge lack of education; the failure in teaching the importance of the unity of society and the necessity of being conscious of one's responsibilities towards the state, and being respectful to the values of society in the family and throughout the educational process appear to be the factors contributing to the ideological basis of terrorism.²⁴

Another social cause to terrorism could be rapid population growth and together with it arising poverty and educational problems. In southeastern part of Turkey, the rapid population growth and uncontrolled internal migration could be one of the social causes of PKK terrorism.

Another account could be urbanization. Urbanization -especially in conjunction with unemployment and poverty- can generate a disaffected population, which enables terrorist recruitment and organization.²⁵ Urbanization, rising income inequality, and increasing class segregation have produced a geographic concentration of affluence and poverty throughout the world, creating a radical change in the geographic basis of human society. As the density of poverty rises in the environment of the world's poor so will their exposure to crime, disease, violence, and family disruption.²⁶

In addition to causes mentioned above, also exclusion of one ethnic/religious group from the sources of governance and economic wealth, and social inequalities could trigger terrorism and conflicts as in the case of Tamil Tigers terrorist activities. In this respect, this could not be the source or cause of PKK terrorism, due to the non-exclusive social structure of society and governance.

Dispossession, human rights abuse, alienation, and humiliation are sources of conflict that are also linked to terrorism.²⁷ Considering terrorist activities in Turkey, PKK terrorist organization exploited the security dilemma caused by the Turkish Security Forces such as moving of some people to other places for security reasons.

²⁴ Turkish Chamber of Law Attorneys, *ibid.*, p.142.

²⁵ Newman, (2006), *ibid.*, p.752.

²⁶ Newman, (2006), *ibid.*, p.752.

²⁷ Newman, (2006), *ibid.*, p.752.

1.1.2.3. Political Causes

Regime which has been unsuccessful to permeate all causes of society, inefficiency of governmental authority, the use of governmental authority in favor of some groups, the large distance between the ideologies of political parties, controversies among political parties becoming uncompromisable, emergence of severe disagreements among legislative, executive and judiciary bodies and state departments, governmental problems' gaining an acute nature, corruption of state establishments, an increase in bribery, the inability of government to adopt itself to the ongoing changes and the state being governed by a political party lacking competence, belief, courage, and virtue could be the reasons of terrorism.

Due to the fact that the political structure is not mature enough, disagreements among diverse authority centers may from time to time influence the people in the street and cause conflicts of interests. Those organizations also abuse such circumstances as much as they can. The delicate balance in international relations undergoes frequent changes and these changes have powerful effects on the domestic issues. By exploiting some circumstances such as disharmony in a country's foreign policies and weaknessess, and its inefficiency to adopt itself to current developments, politicians make those circumstances object of domestic policies. In so doing, they may intentionally or unintentionally promote terrorism.²⁸

Perceived discrimination along economic, political, or cultural lines can trigger tremendous resentment and cause ethnic terrorism.²⁹ Nevertheless, in PKK case, these causes cannot be argued, because of Turkish authorities' policies in the region.

1.1.2.4. Other Causes

Other causes of terrorism could be as follows;³⁰

²⁸ Uyaksil, Ali, (2004), "Turkiye'de Teror ve Terorun Kaynaklari", [Terror in Turkey and Root Causes of Terror], *Police Magazine, Defense Against Terrorism Special Volume*, Ankara: Year: 10, Volume:40, p.93.

²⁹ Byman, Daniel, (1998), "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol.21, p.156.

³⁰ Uyaksil, (2004), *ibid.*, p.93.

Psychological causes; the negative effects of economic and political instability put members of a society under pressure. And this could lead people commit terror crime.

Inefficiency to apply security measures throughly; lack of necessary coordination among security forces responsible for fighting illegal organizations or inability to take actions in time may give rise to terrorist actions.

Religious causes; concept of religion is the most sensitive social issue. Abusing people's religious feeling and converting them into terroristaction is a strategy as old as the history of humankind. Terrorism makes use of social gaps, weaknesses and fragile and sensitive social facts.

Especially it occurs in weak states. It is a strong reason to worry about weak states that inherent insecurity can be exploited by religious fundamentalists. Because religion can unify poeple, above and beyond clan, tribe or wealth, it often provides a sense of community and security where this is lacking.³¹

Globalization could trigger terrorism. Today even who are "for" globalization do accept the fact that globalization increases inequality and it does not create a winner-take-all society.³² In spite of the discussion on poors getting poorer and richs getting richer, globalization accelerates inequality especially in terms of distribution of the benefits. Growing global inequality is laying ground for new motivations for people to turn terrorism such as ethnic nationalism, separatism and religious extremism.

Globalization, when starts promoting a global culture with shared values among the world population, apparently it causes the fragmentation of identities with the growing awareness it brings in. In 1950s, when an earthquake hits Indonesia almost none of the Turkish citizens were aware of it due to lack of global means, now, earthquake incident in Indonesia brought hundred thousands of people for charity purposes together. The same-shared values also happened in earthquake in Haiti. Similarly, when a miss-guided bomb hits the wedding ceremony in Afghani

³¹ Von Hippel, Karin, (2002), "The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths", *The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd.*, p.34.

³² Mickelthwaith, John and Wooldridge, Adrian, (2004), "The Hidden Promise: Liberty Renewed", Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (ed.), *The Globalization Reader*, USA: Blackwell Publishing, p.11.

village, it may create sensitivity among the muslim world and this situation could be exploited for terrorist purposes by terrorist organizations. In addition, globalization creates a big amount of confusion for human being in terms of identity. In order to seek a clear identity, people with certain frustrations may be drawn to extremist movements, including those promote violence. Here Cordesman suggests, “While the relationship between the West and Islamic world is part of the structural problem of terrorism, the West needs to look further and be equally aggressive in making the case for global economic development and growth.”³³

1.1.3. Components of Terrorism

Before one can talk of the existence of terrorism, some basic elements should come together. These prerequisites are ideology, organization and action. According to Anti-Terror Law No 3713 Article 1, a terror crime requires that these three elements should come together. The fact of terror is fed by an ideology that conflicts with existing systems, employs violence, and carries out ferocious activities through its organization.

1.1.3.1. Ideology

Ideology is indisputably an essential ingredient in producing terrorism. To state the obvious, a terrorist without ideological motivation would, by most definitions, be either an ordinary criminal or mentally ill. Moreover, an ideology that was not radical could hardly justify terrorism.³⁴

Each system or organization needs an ideology, forming a starting point, which will ensure its existence, sustain it and justify its actions.³⁵ Ideology is an important factor that possesses great significance for terrorist organization and even guides them. Ideology, acting as a source for terrorist constructions and supporting them, is considered ‘sine qua non’ because an organized activity without any ideology is regarded as organized crime rather terror. In other words, the most significant feature that separates terrorist groups and their activities from other organized activities such as drug trafficking groups dealing with check, contract and

³³ Cordesman, Antony, (2002), “Forging a Transatlantic Strategy for Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare”, USA: *Publication of Center for Strategic and International Studies*, p.12, 13.

³⁴ Sedgwick, Mark, (2007), “Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol.30, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, p.99.

³⁵ Bal, M.Ali, (2003), *Savas Stratejilerinde Teror*, [Terror in the War Strategies], Istanbul: IQ Kultur Sanat Publications, p.81.

cash issues and organized robbery is that they pursue political ends including ideology and violence. Even though PKK is a terrorist organization, it acts like organized crime group especially to fund their activities by drug trafficking.

The concept of ideology may differ depending on its use. Each type of structure may have an ideology, however, ideology viewed within the perspective of terrorism as the concept used in this study refers to the thought that puts its political objectives by gathering around a certain idea and using violence in order to destroy the existing system.

Among their major ideologies upon which terrorist organizations depend today are the ones that have originated from such sources as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, communism, and ideology based on ethnicity, fascism, Kurdist, etc, and religion based ideologies and they aim to change regimes as to establish a new state on lands already divided. PKK terrorist organization's ideology is Marxist-Leninist and separatist ideology based on Kurdish nationalism.

1.1.3.2. Organization

An indispensable feature of terrorism is organization. It is imperative that terrorist organizations get organized to reach success. Organization may be defined as a union formed by people as establishments that have come together to pursue a common goal and to conduct activities to this end.

In Turkish Anti-Terror Law (No 3713), organization is defined as ‘ two or more people getting together for a common goal’.³⁶ In general, this definition actually incorporates organizations, groups, gangs or armed groups spelled out in Turkish legal system. In an organizational structure, there are many people who carry out necessary reconnaissance, conduct the organization and its actions, and give orders or take part in terrorist attacks from the planning stage of a terrorist activity until its fulfillment. It is, therefore, possible to name structures that get together around a common goal and use terrorism to reach their goal.

Even though terrorist organization founded to achieve certain goals, they may differ in their ideological reference and their essential goals. They are similar to

³⁶ “Anti-Terror Law No 3713”, 12 April 1991, Official Gazette, No.20843, Vol.30.

some extent as to their understandings of getting organized. Differences in naming them and in some other related issues emanate from the ideological terminology a terrorist organization is based on its understanding of launching attacks and its organizational level. They are, nevertheless, not functional differences.

1.1.3.3. Action

Action may be defined as “an effort to change a state or to intensify the current state. Once a terrorist group completes its organizational structure, it is now ready to take action. It is time for those organizations, which have already trained militants to do everything for their ideology, to draw public attention onto their cause and make them known.

Particularly in the event that existing political fail to make their voice heard or when the other ways through which organizations express themselves are blocked. They resort to violent action thinking that their cause justifies such means. In other words, with only one single action, they can carry out in a couple of days much more propaganda than they can do with thousands of books.³⁷ At this stage, organizations step into the action stage choosing the violent actions that best fit them to reach their goals. Since terrorism can not reach its goals through peaceful means, it tries to achieve them employing violence. Therefore, terrorism necessitates the use of violence, that is, violence is a prerequisite of terrorism. To put it shortly, violence is one of the most important elements that enable terrorist organizations to exist.

1.2. TERRORISM AND INTERNET

In this part, correlation between Internet and terrorism will be examined. Most importantly, terrorist use of Internet will be discussed in details.

1.2.1. Internet in General

The Internet has revolutionized the computer and communications world like nothing before. The invention of the telegraph, telephone, radio, and computer set the stage for this unique integration of capabilities. The Internet is at once a worldwide broadcasting capability, a mechanism for information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction between individuals and their computers without regard for geographic

³⁷ Laquer, Walter, (2002), *Bomba Felsefesi*, [Philosophy of the Bomb], (Translated by Zeynep Mercan), Ankara: Arac Press, p.59.

location.³⁸ The Internet is a global network of interconnected communication and information systems. A user at any Internet terminal in the world can access the vast wealth of information available on the World Wide Web or communicate, share documents and store information, and engage in commercial transactions with millions of other users throughout the world.³⁹ The Internet has become a platform where people can meet from all over the world and exchange ideas. This was considered as an opportunity to spread the idea of democracy and freedom around the world. Nevertheless, it has become an instrument for assembling people with all kinds of ideas and movements. Groups of any size, from two to millions, can access each other and use the Internet to put an agenda. Their members and followers can come from any geographical region on the Internet, and they can try to influence foreign policy anywhere in the world.⁴⁰

The first recorded description of the social interactions that could be enabled through networking was a series of memos written by J.C.R. Licklider of MIT in August 1962 discussing his "Galactic Network" concept. He has foreseen a globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could quickly access data and programs from any site.⁴¹

There are various applications are Internet that we are using today. These are;⁴²

The World Wide Web: The www is the reason the Internet has become as popular as it has. The web is the most widely used service of the Internet, accessed through a web browser like Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator. The web is an immense collection of web pages, linked together with hypertext links. Thousands of new pages of information are added to the heaving web every hour. Each page is

³⁸ Leiner, Barry M., et all, (1997), "A Brief History of Internet", <http://www.isoc.org/Internet/history/brief.shtml>, (Accessed on: 25.03.2010).

³⁹ Hinnen, Todd. M., (2004), "The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of Internet", *The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review*, Vol. V, <http://www.stlr.org/html/volume5/hinnen.txt>, (Accessed on: 12.02.2010).

⁴⁰ Denning, Dorothy, (n.d.), "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch8.pdf, (Accessed on: 25.08.2010).

⁴¹ Leiner et all, (1997), *ibid.*, p.2.

⁴² Shannon, Ross, (n.d.), "The History of Internet", <http://www.yourhtmlsource.com/starthere/historyofthenet.html>, (Accessed on: 15.04.2010).

placed on a server, a computer continually connected to the rest of the web. The information is then available to anyone else with access to the Internet.

E-Mail: Electronic mail works in much the same way as traditional mail does. Anyone is allowed to sign up for an email address and then people can send messages, or attach files from their computer and send them too. The main benefit of email is the close to immediate delivery of messages that occurs. A person can send an email to the other side of the world and it will arrive in less than a minute.

File Transfer Protocol: While web pages are transferred between computers using the http protocol, other types of files are sent using file transfer protocol. People can share files, like music and videos, among each other and the rest of the world by uploading them to a server and allowing others to download them to their own computers.

Internet Relay Chat: Internet relay chat is a service that allows a person to connect to his/her chosen channel and talk in real-time to people with the same interests as him/her.

USENET (Unit User Network): USENET is a system of bulletin boards where a person can post messages and people will read and reply to them. As with Internet relay chat, person will find boards set up for all sorts of groups of people.

1.2.2. Use of Internet for Terrorist Purposes

Terrorists increasingly are using the Internet as a means of communication both with each other and the rest of the world. Nearly everyone has seen at least some images from propaganda videos published on terrorist websites and rebroadcast on the world's news networks. Western governments have intensified observation of such websites but their prosecution of site operators is hampered by concerns over civil liberties, the Internet's inherent anonymity, and other factors.⁴³

The U.S. Secretary of Defense Mr. Donald Rumsfeld quoted Ayman Al Zawahiri (Al Qaeda's Number Two Man) in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations: "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the

⁴³ Kaplan, Eben, (2009), "Terrorists and the Internet", *Council of Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10005>, (Accessed on: 05.05.2010).

media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims,” and admitted that “today we're engaged in the first war in history unconventional and irregular as it may be in an era of: e-mails, blogs, cell phones, blackberries, instant messaging, digital cameras, a global Internet with no inhibitions, hand-held video cameras, talk radio, 24-hour news broadcasts, satellite television. There's never been a war fought in this environment before.”⁴⁴ This quote also shows that multimedia sources are so vulnerable for terrorist exploitation. The Internet offers terrorists so many advantages such as; easy access, no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control, so many audiences, anonymity of communication, fast flow of information, interactivity, inexpensive development and maintenance of a Web presence, a multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video and to allow users to download films, songs books, posters, etc), the ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a source for stories. The Internet is the main instrument for the modern terrorist networks for recruitment, training⁴⁵, fund raising, and disseminating propaganda.

According to White House's National Strategy for combating terrorism: “the Internet provides an inexpensive, anonymous, geographically unbounded, and largely unregulated virtual haven for terrorists. Our enemies use the Internet to develop and disseminate propaganda, recruit new members, raise and transfer funds, train members on weapons use and tactics, and plan operations. Terrorist organizations can use virtual safe havens based anywhere in the world, regardless of where their members or operatives are located. Use of the Internet, however, creates opportunities for us to exploit. To counter terrorist use of the Internet as a virtual sanctuary, we will discredit terrorist propaganda by promoting truthful and peaceful messages. We will seek ultimately to deny the Internet to the terrorists as an effective safe haven for their propaganda, proselytizing, recruitment, fundraising, training, and operational planning.”⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Rumsfeld, Donald, (2006), “Speech to Council on Foreign Relations”, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060217-12574.html>, (Accessed on: 11.02.2010).

⁴⁵ Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David, (2001), *Networks and Netwars, The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, California: National Defense Research Institute, RAND, p.340.

⁴⁶ State.gov, (2006), “America's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.html>, (Accessed on: 13.02.2010).

1.2.2.1. Fund-Raising

The support sought by, and provided to, terrorist organizations is often not in the form of cash. Terrorist organizations may also use the Internet to solicit other fungible goods (gold or gems), accumulate supplies. It may be tempting to treat terrorist financing just as one would any other form of money laundering or financial fraud, but terrorist financing often has some specific characteristics.⁴⁷

First; terrorists and terrorist organizations are not profit motivated. Their final goal is not to collect wealth; it is rather to inflict harm and encourage terror.

Second; whereas money laundering generally involves financial transactions designed to conceal the illegal origin of funds, the funds used to finance terrorism are often not derived from an illicit source or generated by illicit activity. Sometimes terrorist financing is linked with other crimes, such as fraud or narcotics trafficking, and may be discovered during the investigation of those crimes.

Lastly, Interdicting terrorist financing thus accomplishes more than frustrating a particular type of criminality or recovering criminal proceeds. It presents an opportunity to terrorist organizations of the funding on which their operations depend, to unearth their networks and identify their members before they can act.

Communication age did not only make the connections between the nets easy, it also made organization of the money and money sources easy.⁴⁸ Al Qaeda is one of the best examples that raising funds based on charity groups, non-governmental organizations, and chat rooms and forums through the Internet. The fighters in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya have similarly used the Internet to publicize the numbers of bank accounts to which sympathizers can contribute. Ireland Republican Army (IRA) has a website that allows people to donate money with their credit cards.⁴⁹ Hamas has opened a four different bank accounts, through one of its active groups in London, in the Interpol website in 2003 and sent more than

⁴⁷ Hinnen, (2004), *ibid.*, p.3.

⁴⁸ Tucker, David, (2001), "What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.13, No.3, p.2.

⁴⁹ Weimann, (2007), *ibid.*, p.4.

twenty million US (United States) dollars to different Hamas organizations.⁵⁰ Internet user demographics allow terrorists to identify users with sympathy for a particular cause or issue. These individuals are then asked to make donations, typically through e-mails sent by a front group (i.e., an organization broadly supportive of the terrorists' aims but operating publicly and legally and usually having no direct ties to the terrorist organization).

1.2.2.2. Who are the Target Audiences?

A terrorist campaign usually has four target audiences for its messages; supporters of the terrorist organization, the population that the organization purports to serve, the enemy, or those attacked by the organization, and international public opinion. The messages may change from one target audience to another. To the terrorist organization's supporters, purported community, and potential recruits, the message is of pride, success, commitment, and vision.⁵¹ In the PKK case, the PKK uses its web pages successfully for its supporters. The PKK broadcasts some pictures or videos that were taken during the operation between the security forces. They would like to aim from these publications that how brave and successful they are against security forces. Usually, the target population in these acts is its followers, but sometimes it is for the opposite site.

Terrorist messages to the enemy population is threat and fear with the intention that this fear translate into moral breakdown, collapse of confidence in the government, and pressure on decision makers to accept the terrorists' demands.⁵² The PKK uses this technique since its foundation to make the Turkish government to negotiate on some issues the organization wants. Nevertheless, they could not succeed on this issue.

Lastly, messages aim to reach to the international world. The terrorists' message is usually based on the determination to achieve political goals such as

⁵⁰ Bailey, Timothy.D. and Grimala, Michael.R., (2006), "Running the Blockade: Information Technology, Terrorism, and the Transformation of Islamic Mass Culture", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.18, No.4, p.529.

⁵¹ Weimann, Gabriel, (2006), *Terror on the Internet, New Arena, New Challenges*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, p.38.

⁵² Ibid., p.38.

freedom, equal rights, self-expression, a free state, liberation of prisoners, and so on.⁵³

1.2.2.3. Recruitment

Terrorist organizations need members to commit their crime activities. Recruitment is very important to supply members to the organizations. Terrorist message boards become new recruitment areas of terrorist organizations. The recruiter and the volunteer meet in the message boards on the Internet, and after a series of confidence tests, the volunteer is accepted into the organization. Role of Internet in terms of global communication has made the people join the terrorist organization so easy.⁵⁴ The Internet can be used not only to solicit donations from sympathizers but also to recruit supporters to play a more active role in support of terrorist activities or causes. In addition to seeking converts by using the full panoply of website technologies to enhance the presentation of their message, terrorist organizations capture information about the users who browse their websites. Users who seem more interested in the organization's cause or well suited to carrying out its work are then contacted. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet technology to roam online chat rooms and cybercafes, looking for receptive members of the public, particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards and user nets can also serve as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits.⁵⁵

Terrorist organizations send messages and videos by e-mail to the selected group such as students or conference group. When some people reply with a positive manner, some of them answer with a negative manner. Terrorist organization assumes the whole group so important. They continue to send messages until the every member of the group is convinced. When there are different opinions arouse in the group, terrorist organization exploit different situations such as geography, demographic and phsycological similarities etc.⁵⁶

⁵³ Ibid., p.38.

⁵⁴ Gray, David H. and Head, Albon, (2009), "The Importance of the Internet to the Post-Modern Terrorist and its Role as a From of Safe Haven", *European Journal of Scientific Research*, Vol.25, No.3, p.403.

⁵⁵ Weimann, (2007), *ibid.*, p.4.

⁵⁶ Gerwehr, Scott and Daly, Sara, (2005), "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment", David G. Kamied (ed.), *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, US: McGraw-Hill Companies, p.76.

The power of the Internet to mobilize activist is illustrated by the response to the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK terrorist organization. When Turkish Security Forces arrested Abdullah Ocalan, tens of thousands of sympathizers around the world responded with demonstrations within a matter of hours.⁵⁷

1.2.2.4. Training Through Internet

Terrorist websites offer operational training material to recruits who want to train themselves on their own. The terrorist websites either provide the material in their own website or they direct people to websites where materials are available. The Internet plays a great role in Al Qaeda's adaptation strategy, as the 9/11 report concludes: The emergence of the world wide web has given terrorists a much easier means of acquiring information and exercising command and control over their operations. The operational leader of the 9/11 conspiracy, Mohammed Atta, went online from Hamburg, Germany to research U.S flight schools. Targets of intelligence collection have become more sophisticated. These changes have made surveillance and threat warning more difficult.⁵⁸

1.2.2.5. Overview of the Terrorist Websites

In modern world, almost all active terrorist organizations have websites, and many of them have more than one website and use several different languages. Despite the multiplicity and diversity of terrorist websites, they share a number of key characteristics. These sites are often notable for their colorful, well-designed and visually arresting graphic content. In this context, they seem designed particularly to appeal to a computer savvy, media-saturated, video game addicted generation.⁵⁹ Following categorization shows these organizations come from different regions of the world,⁶⁰

From the Middle East: Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), the Lebanese Hezbollah (Party of God), the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah Tanzim, the

⁵⁷ Weimann, (2007), *ibid.*, p.4.

⁵⁸ National Commission on Terror Attacks, (2004), *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, New York: W.W. Norton, p.88.

⁵⁹ Hoffmann, Bruce, (2006), "Use of Internet by Islamist Extremists", http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf, (Accessed on:12.01.2010).

⁶⁰ Weimann, Gabriel, (2007), "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet", *Asian Tribune, World Institute for Asian Studies*, WIAS Vol.9, No.342, <http://asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4627>, (Accessed on:15.01.2010).

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kahane Lives Movement, the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI-Mujahedin-e Khalq), the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), and the Turkish-based Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party (DHKP/C) and Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C).

From Europe: the Basque ETA Movement, Armata Corsa (the Corsican Army), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

From Latin America: Peru's Tupak-Amaru (MRTA) and Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN-Colombia), and the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC).

From Asia: al Qaeda, the Japanese Supreme Truth (Aum Shinrikyo), Ansar al Islam (Supporters of Islam) in Iraq, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Hizb-ul Mujehideen in Kashmir, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the rebel movement in Chechnya.

1.2.3. Cyberterrorism

Cyberterrorism was coined by Barry Collin who is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California in the 1980s, to refer to the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism.⁶¹ After the recent computer attacks, many have been quick to jump to conclusions that a new breed of terrorism is on the rise and our country must defend itself with all possible means. As a society, it is discussed that we have a vast operational and legal experience and proved techniques to combat terrorism, but are we ready to fight terrorism in the new arena – cyber space?⁶² It is called cyberterrorism.

As Embar-Seddon argues, there have been several obstacles to creating a clear and steady definition of the term cyberterrorism. First, much of the discussion of cyberterrorism has been conducted in the popular media, where the focus is more

⁶¹ Collin, Barry, (1997), "The Future of Cyberterrorism", *Crime and Justice international*, Vol.13, No.2, p.16.

⁶² Karasavin, Serge, (2001), "What is Cyber-terrorism?", *Computer Crime Research Center*, <http://www.crime-research.org/library/Cyber-terrorism.htm>, (Accessed on:16.08.2010).

likely to be ratings rather than creating good operational definitions of new terms. As a result, the term suffers from both misuse and overuse, to the point of becoming a buzzword, such as downsizing or quality time. Another difficulty in creating a clear and consistent definition is that it has been especially common when dealing with computers to create new words simply by placing the word cyber, computer, or information before another word.⁶³ By stating, “no single or globally accepted definition of terrorism exists”, indicate the difficulty of defining cyberterrorism.⁶⁴ Ballard et al. discuss three points that may explain the in defining cyberterrorism. First, because the technology develops so rapidly the operational definition cyberterrorism may change. Second, the definition of cyberterrorism may be biased because of researchers’ personal perspectives as to what cyberterrorism is. They may define cyberterrorism based on solely on their specialized areas of expertise. Finally, there might be legitimate concerns regarding the validity, reliability, and accuracy of the research.⁶⁵

Cyberterrorism was described as “Politically motivated attacks that cause serious harm, such as severe economic hardship or sustained loss of power or water, might also be characterized as cyberterrorism” by Dorothy Denning.⁶⁶ In her another article, cyberterrorism is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical

⁶³ Embar-Seddon, Ayn, (2002), “Cyberterrorism, Are We Under Siege?”, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol.45, No.6, p.1034.

⁶⁴ Ballard J.David., Hornik Joseph.G., & McKenzie Douglas., (2002), “Technological Facilitation of Terrorism: Definitional, Legal and Policy Issues”, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol.45, No.6, p.990; Ozeren, Suleyman, (2009), *Cyberterrorism and Cybercrime: Vulnerabilities and International Cooperation*, Germany:VDM Verlag Dr. Muller, p.32.

⁶⁵ Ballard et al., *ibid.*, p.993; Ozeren, (2009), *ibid.*, p.32.

⁶⁶ Denning, (n.d.), *ibid.*

infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.⁶⁷

1.3. TERRORISM AND PROPAGANDA

In this part, propaganda and correlation between propaganda and terrorism will be examined in details.

1.3.1. Definition of Propaganda

Propaganda, in the most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular ideas. Words frequently used as synonyms for propaganda are lies, distortion, deceit, manipulation, mind control, psychological warfare, brainwashing and palaver.⁶⁸ Journalists and commentators in the press to interpret political discourse, government actions, international strife, and cultural products use propaganda repeatedly. Scholars also use other descriptions, only marginally less provocative, such as ‘news management’, ‘news shaping’, ‘strategic political communication’, ‘the technology of influence’ and ‘applied science of persuasive political communication’ to characterize the self-serving control of information in government, political and journalistic sectors.⁶⁹

Propaganda is concerned with the transmission of ideas and/or values from one person, or group of persons, to another. Where ‘propagation’ is the action, there ‘propaganda’ is the activity. It would therefore seem sensible, rather than searching on a more abstract plane for a more satisfactory definition, to begin with the particular and examine more closely the various stages in the process of transmission.⁷⁰

Propaganda has begun along with the creation of human being and has developed since then. The attempts to change the viewpoint of other people were witnessed in former times as well and it was even found out to have dated back to the

⁶⁷ Denning, Dorothy, (2000), “Cyberterrorism”, *Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives*, <http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html>, (Accessed on:20.08.2010).

⁶⁸ Jowett, Garth and O'Donnell, Victoria, (2006), *Propaganda and Persuasion*, California: Sage Publications, Inc., p.2, 3.

⁶⁹ Cunningham, Stanley B., (2002), *The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction*, USA: Praeger Publishers, p.11.

⁷⁰ Taylor, Richard, (2006), *Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany*, London: .B. Tauris&Co.Ltd., p.7.

discovery of writing. Throughout the history, the propaganda held a tremendous place in numerous societies on religious, cultural and political bases. People tried to change one another's viewpoint, convince them to believe in their beliefs and deeds, influence the political opinions through propaganda.

In Latin, propaganda means "things to be spread out" and comes from the root "Propagare". Different people have different definitions for what we call propaganda. Laswell, who was the first author published a book about this issue, defines the term as "management of thoughts through meaningful symbols or stories, rumours, news, pictures and other means of societal communication means."⁷¹ Brown, yet states that propaganda started along with speaking because it was based upon the fact that the masses were convinced without resorting to any physical power together with influence of people from others, acquisition of language and the onset of communication concept.⁷²

Terence H. Qualter provides the definition of propaganda as a conscious act in which an individual or a group are involved in supposing that they could utilize from communication means in order to shape, control or change other individuals' behaviours and that reactions of these individuals or groups are those suitable reactions in conformity with their own objectives.⁷³

German dictator Adolf Hitler tells it is possible to fool people into believing that "heaven is hell and heaven has the worst living conditions" through a skilful propaganda. In addition, the same masterpiece says that the objective of propaganda is not informing individuals one by one and scientifically. The objective is to draw attention of the masses to particular events, needs and realities. The role of propaganda is to collect supporters for organization. The second role is to tell about the new doctrine and assimilate this.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Laswell, Harold, (1927), *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York: Peter Smith Press, p.9.

⁷² Alexander, James and Brown, Campbell, (1992), *Siyasal Propaganda*, [Political Propaganda], Istanbul: Agac Press, p.31.

⁷³ Qualter, Terence H., (1980), "Propaganda Teorisi ve Propagandanin Gelismesi", [Theory of Propaganda and Evolution of Propaganda], *Ankara University Political Sciences Journal*, Vol. 35, No.1, p.279.

⁷⁴ Hitler, Adolf, (2002), *Kavgam*, [My Fight], Istanbul: Emre Press, p.8-67.

Jean Marie Domenach defines the propaganda as “the efforts to influence so that they could absorb a particular view or behaviour to change the appearance and behaviour of society”.

Propaganda is a conscious behaviour towards influencing, changing or controlling the viewpoints, opinions and behaviours of other groups according to propagandists' wishes by using communication means through individuals and groups.⁷⁵

Propaganda is the term referred to as all of the systematic efforts to influence the beliefs, attitudes or deeds in order to influence the public opinion and circulate around true, little true or false knowledge by the way of symbols.⁷⁶

Propaganda has been a very influential tool for people to influence and direct people. Propaganda is the most effective way the psychological warfare in order to disrupt the morale of the selected masses, terminate their will to succeed and struggle, make individuals lose their self-confidence by diminishing people's beliefs and eventually indoctrinate some opinions determined by them.

Propaganda has no power to either tell of something new or make disbelievers believe again, let alone its failure to go inside unwanted minds. Expert propagandists more develop the opinions and emotions that are already obvious enough in the minds of others and they can reflect the hidden meanings and emotions inside them.⁷⁷ As of early 21 century propaganda acts has become independent, totally discluded from information acts. Friendly allies have become the means in which the impartial states directed and influenced the public opinion in order to disable the rivals. Currently except for its political meaning, propaganda is also a term widely used in business and advertisement sector. Moreover, advertisement sector has become today the most developed and widespread commercial good. In a world globalizing thus far, the companies under the hegemony of global companies have to make some advertisement for the goods to be sold. The term propaganda,

⁷⁵ Domenach, Jean Marie, (1995), *Politika ve Propaganda*, [Policy and Propaganda], Istanbul: Varlik Press, p.4-19.

⁷⁶ Bektas, Arsev, (1996), *Kamuoyu Iletisim ve Demokrasi*, [Public Communication and Democracy], Istanbul: Baglam Press, p.59; Ozsoy, Osman, (1998), *Propaganda ve Kamuoyu Olusturma*, [Propaganda and Making Public Opinion], Istanbul: Alfa Press and Distribution, , p.6.

⁷⁷ Ozsoy, (1998), *ibid.*, p.16

contrary to advertisement, bears a strong negative meaning; Propaganda uses lots of similar techniques alongside with advertisement. The advertisement can be referred to as propaganda made for any commercial good. However, the advertisement contains political or national themes. Moreover, propaganda is made through brochures, posters, TV or radio broadcasts and the other knowledge-holder media.

1.3.2. Aim of Propaganda

When the use of propaganda emphasizes purpose, the term is associated with control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. Deliberate attempt is linked with a clear institutional ideology and objective. In fact, the purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to an audience with a related objective. Whether it is a government agency attempting to instill a massive wave of patriotism in a national audience to support a war effort, a terrorist network enlisting followers in an ideology, a military leader trying to frighten the enemy by exaggerating the strength of its army, a corporation pursuing a credible image to maintain its legitimacy among its clients, or a company seeking to malign a rival to deter competition for its product, a careful and predetermined plan of prefabricated symbol manipulation is sought to endeavor to reinforce or modify the attitudes, or the behavior, or both of an audience.⁷⁸

Propaganda aims to motivate people to a certain direction and make people believe to certain things. Propaganda does not aim to change the conditions. It only aims to change or orient people towards to designated direction. Propaganda does not force people to change; it is based on convincing people towards their future expectations. Propaganda's main aim is to change people's actions.⁷⁹ For this end to occur every possible mean is deemed to be right on its own. For instance during the World War II, the Nazis scared their foes by saying they had invented a weapon that could destroy the enemies in a short time so as to use the propaganda in accordance with their objectives.⁸⁰

The overall objective in propaganda is either to increase the intensity of new thinking act in target mass or change the existing opinions and deeds, thus making it

⁷⁸ Jowett and O'Donnell, (2006), *ibid.*, p.3, 4.

⁷⁹ Domenach, (1995), *ibid.*, p.15-40.

⁸⁰ Qualter, (1980), *ibid.*, p.275.

at least favourable. An as weaker as s/he begins questioning herself/ himself when s/he forms up personal conflict in case of facing with different and opposite opinions and the individual assimilates the ideas put forward in order to get rid of the bulk between incoherency and paradox and lets the propaganda achieve its aim. As well as making a decision by using one's free will while fulfilling its aim, propaganda helps insert the desired thought into subconscious. Therefore, one needs to be very careful while making propaganda and prepared knowledge needs be used so that it could increase the effect of propaganda.

The main reason for propaganda is to direct any thought, which otherwise individuals are not obliged to accept, towards acceptance by their own free will and to direct any movement, which they could not be forced into doing, towards doing with their own free will.⁸¹

One of the paramount leaders of World War II, Adolf Hitler recounts these words. "The first role of propaganda is to gather supporters for the company and the second is to narrate the new doctrine and assimilate this. It is not within the objectives of propaganda to let the persons know one by one and scientifically. The objective is to draw attention to certain events, needs and requisites. In addition, a propaganda should serve for emotions and little bit for mind. It should be made in a area where people can understand. It should keep its spiritual level so much up that even the stupid persons could understand something from that. Under these circumstances, the more people are asked to be a supporter the lower the level of propaganda should be. The propaganda should be balanced towards the mass ahead. In addition, the results from this should be evaluated by results obtained. Moreover, it is necessary to adjust everything towards other people. Propaganda is just a tool and it should be given marks in proportion with fulfilling its aim about it. For that reason, propaganda should be shaped accordingly in order to help its objective. It can have numerous objectives in terms of general benefits. The simpler propaganda is and it appeals to sentiments of society, the surer the success will be. The success is the sole measurement about the value of propaganda".⁸²

⁸¹ Ozsoy, (1998), *ibid.*, p.9.

⁸² Hitler, (2002), *ibid.*, p.161

The purpose behind the propaganda is not to delude people into believing only true thought but also to make people become the tight defender of that opinion. Therefore, the propaganda aims to create real reactions and beliefs rather than making people criticize about what they are made to believe. That is to say, it is necessary to capture the emotions other than addressing to the logic of an individual while making some propaganda.⁸³

The objective of the propaganda is to discover and get together the common things and to draw the undecided masses towards active policy. In this perspective, the propaganda objectives are accepted to put the current power on the table, planned direction of an individual or group in carrying out their current opinion and deeds by changing power and balance, differently converting of target mass upon expectation and attitudes upon current power spread thus keeping mass communication systems under control, controlling the viewpoints and attitudes of public opinion, directing or changing these, thus stabilize the social control this way.⁸⁴

1.3.3. History of Propaganda

One of the earliest uses of propaganda was in connection with religious missionary activity. Propaganda has been around for many centuries, although the term itself was not created until Pope Gregory XV founded the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (“Congregation for Propagating the Faith”) in 1622 shortly after the Thirty Years’ War.⁸⁵ A group of cardinals with the duty of managing the propagation of Christianity by missionaries sent to non-Christian countries. The department of the pontifical administration charged with the spread of Catholicism and with the regulation of religious affairs in non-Catholic countries.⁸⁶

Propaganda for particularly political ends is as old as history. The Bible’ for example, relates that the Assyrian king Sennacherib attempted to frighten the Kingdom of Judah into surrendering by the use of threatening propaganda. Julius Caesar wrote the Gallic Wars to increase his reputation in Rome and to speed his rise to power. The Romans received propaganda in many ways, just as modern people do.

⁸³ Bektas, (1996), *ibid.*, p.159

⁸⁴ Domenach, (1995), *ibid.*, p.114

⁸⁵ Hoyt, Alia, (n.d.), “How Propaganda Works”, <http://history.howstuffworks.com/historians/propaganda3.htm>, (Accessed on 26.03.2010).

⁸⁶ Spiritustemporis.com, (n.d.), “History of Propaganda”, <http://spiritus-temporis.com/propaganda/history-of-propaganda.html>, (Accessed on 28.03.2010).

Some means are almost entirely lost to us, such as the spectacles, processions and games, with their attendant ebmles, music, uniforms, and costumes.⁸⁷

The other example of using propaganda occurs during the Revolutionary War. Propaganda had an obvious impact on the public. The Boston Massacre is one of the best cases of “rebel propaganda” of the time. What actually occurred in Boston was that both rebels and British soldiers fired weapons but the rebels spread propaganda that the soldiers had lined people up and murdered them.⁸⁸ The quality of the propaganda literature of the American Revolution is great. Before the Revolution, the letters circulated by the patriot Samuel Adams and such leaflets from a farmer in Pennsylvania by John Dickinson sought to inform and unify American opinion in the quarrel with Great Britain. The Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson, was a work of art of rational propaganda intended to crystallize public opinion at home and justify the controversial American cause abroad.⁸⁹

Considerable modern propaganda techniques began with World War I. During World War I, thousands of pro-war posters were designed. The posters aimed to get young men to join the army. After World War I propaganda accomplished great importance as an instrument of national policy in the dictatorial state. Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union deliberately shaped public opinion through government propaganda agencies. In Germany, Adolf Hitler established the ministry of propaganda headed by Paul Joseph Goebbels. Adolf Hitler was quite sure of the power of propaganda by stating, “Propaganda made us get the political power in the government, now, it will help us to invade the entire world”.⁹⁰ They were completely dominating all public statements in Germany; this agency initiated the so-called war of nerves.

⁸⁷ Evans, Jane DeRose, (1992), *The Art of Persuasion: Political, Propaganda from Aeneas to Brutus*, USA: The University of Michigan Press, p.4.

⁸⁸ Surveillancevideo.com, (2009), “The History of Propaganda”, <http://www.surveillance-video.com/propaganda-june-2009.html>, (Accessed on 18.04.2010).

⁸⁹ History.com, (n.d.), “Propaganda”, <http://www.history.com/encyclopedia.do?articleId=219897>, (Accessed on 18.04.2010).

⁹⁰ Shirer, William, (1968), *Nazi Imparatorlugunun Dogusu Yukselisi ve Cokusu*, [The Rise and Fall of Nazi Empire], Istanbul: Rasih Guven Agaoglu Press, p.201.

1.3.4. Types of Propaganda

In this part types of the propaganda will be given namely white, black, and gray propaganda.

1.3.4.1. White Propaganda

Propaganda can be classified according to the source and nature of the message. White propaganda generally comes from an openly identified source, and is characterized by gentler methods of persuasion, such as standard public relations techniques and one-sided presentation of an argument. Information in the message tends to be factually accurate and used in a manner to improve the credibility or reputation of the source (may be used as a form of public diplomacy or to boost morale and troops domestically)⁹¹ White propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate. Although what listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to build credibility with the audience, for this could have usefulness at some point in the future.⁹²

1.3.4.2. Black Propaganda

Black propaganda often pretends to be from a friendly source, but is actually from an adversary. Black propaganda is characterized by its presentation of false information to elicit a desired response, and is often used in covert military psychological operations and by large networked organizations such as terror networks or governments. Used in order to confuse, misinform, deceive, lie and manipulate the audience (may be used to lower enemy morale or deceive an audience to follow a specific course of action)⁹³ Black propaganda is when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Another term used to describe propaganda is disinformation. Disinformation is usually considered black propaganda because it is covert and uses false information.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Alexander, Yonah, (2010), "Strategic Communication: Some Historical and Contemporary Perspectives", *Strategic Communication Course, Class Lecture*, Ankara: Turkish Partnership for Peace Training Center.

⁹² Jowett and O'Donnell, (2006), *ibid.*, p.16.

⁹³ Alexander, (2010), *ibid.*

⁹⁴ Jowett and O'Donnell, (2006), *ibid.*, p.21.

1.3.4.3. Gray Propaganda

Gray propaganda is somewhere between black and white propaganda, stemming from a source which is unknown or unconfirmed.⁹⁵ Gray propaganda may come from an adversarial source pretending to be friendly or neutral, and presents misleading information in a more insidious manner than white propaganda. In scale, these different types of propaganda can also be defined by the potential of true and correct information to compete with the propaganda. For example, opposition to white propaganda is often readily found and may slightly discredit the propaganda source. Opposition to gray propaganda, when revealed (often by an inside source), may create some level of public outcry. Opposition to black propaganda is often unavailable and may be dangerous to reveal, because public cognizance of black propaganda tactics and sources would undermine or backfire the very campaign the black propagandist supported.

1.3.5. Propaganda Tools

1.3.5.1. Printed Media (Book, Newspaper, Brochure)

Today the rise in literacy has risen up the use of written media. It is possible to put some desired propaganda topics through book pages and to make some influence upon the reader. All these proofs show that daily newspapers having a circulation over millions create a situation that cannot be overlooked in that they are issued, duplicated in thousands each time and thus sent to everywhere in the world. The widespread use of books as a propaganda means began in 18 century. Books at that time particularly played a major role in distributing knowledge to the masses. Although the books were very important, the printing process being too long and expensive caused the books address only to the certain few.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the help of technology changed this issue.

The use of newspaper as a propaganda tool dates back to the old times. Particularly in the First Age, Rome newspapers such as “Acta Publica, Acta Diurn and Acta Sebatus” were being distributed to the people in order to propagate the ancient Rome states. Then through the invention of printing press, the newspapers proceeded into our daily lives more and began to be used widely. Newspapers, which

⁹⁵ Alexander, (2010), *ibid.*

⁹⁶ Domenach, (1995), *ibid.*, p.22.

have an important place in making public opinion, can even overthrow the leader party in the government in some incidents, make public opinion with some documents they have revealed and even play determinative role in some cases because they have a great reader mass.

Brochures were the oldest propaganda means particularly used during the campaigns. The art of brochure first started in Mesopotamia, later spread to Greece and then found its way into the present.⁹⁷ The most important characteristics of small brochures are they could have an access to everyone and they are small enough to put away.

1.3.5.2. Visual and Auditory Media (TV, Radio, Cinema)

Radio is a means of propaganda used for spreading the ideas up to the far reaches. It is possible to witness an example of this situation in the history of Germans, World War II. Hitler ordered the propagandist minister to use radio to the maximum effect. As for propagandist Goebbels, he launched a definite brainwashing movement by placing supporters in the radio. Finally, each program opened with a slogan like “one nation, one country, and one president”. Having had a great chance to address to the Germans wherever he went through the radio, Hitler carried on his propaganda by using radio and Goebbels, the minister of propaganda, went down in history by being named as radio genius.

Television has become one of the indispensable means in human life of today in obtaining news and entertaining oneself. Both visual and auditory with the blend of words and images more effective than radio, the television is the most effective tool in propaganda.

One of the biggest entertainment means for people from all occupations in collective living, the cinema is a kind of strong propaganda tool, which could complete the human desire to see by explaining the incidents and make this even more attractive by decorating with music.

The Significance of cinema as a potential propaganda weapon has been widely recognised. Lenin remarked that ‘of all the arts, for us cinema is the most

⁹⁷ Topuz, Hifzi, (1991), *Siyasal Reklamcılık*, [Political Advertisement], Istanbul: Cem Press, p.160.

important.’ Stalin described it as ‘the greatest means of agitation’ and Trotsky called it ‘the best instrument for propaganda’. Goebbels echoed these sentiments when he called cinema ‘one of the most modern and far-reaching media that there is for influencing the masses’.⁹⁸

Despite the numerous interpretations and statements, one must always bear in mind a single identifiable feature. The efforts of the propagandist to advance their cause by manipulating text, images, symbols, and data distinguish the act from other forms of conveying information.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Taylor, (2006), *ibid.*, p.15, 16

⁹⁹ Willcox, David R., (2005), *Propaganda, the Press and Conflict: The Gulf War and Kosovo*, USA and Canada: Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, p.22.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this part of the study, social network theory, defence against terrorism structure and counter terrorism policy in Turkey is examined. It is important to explain social network theory, defence against terrorism structure and counter terrorism policy in Turkey. Because, main analysis was made by using social network analysis. In addition, Turkey has been struggling with PKK terrorism more than twenty years. Structure in this effort and policies that were made are very essential to be discussed.

2.1. SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY

Social network analysis originated in several fields, including sociology, anthropology, and social psychology.¹⁰⁰ The first initiator of the study was J.L. Moreno who developed the notion of a sociogram in the 1930s. It was a picture in which people are represented as points in two-dimensional space, and lines linking the corresponding points represent relationships among pairs of people.¹⁰¹

However, the contemporary social network analysis could start with the work of Stanley Milgram. In his work in 1967, Stanley Milgram held a test to understand how people are connected to others. In his research, Milgram found that most people were connected by six relationships.¹⁰²

After the publication of two journals on social networks analysis namely “Social Networks” and “Connections” in 1970s, sociological studies have increased. Network analysis emerged as an alternative of traditional reductionist research methods and approaches, because social network analysis refuses “social behavior is

¹⁰⁰ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, (2001), *ibid.*, p.66

¹⁰¹ Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine, (1994), *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.11, 12.

¹⁰² Ressler, Steve, (2006), “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research”, *Homeland Security Affairs*, Vol. 2, No.2, <http://www.hsaj.org/pages/volume2/issue2/pdfs/2.2.8.pdf>, (Accessed on 25.07.2010)

a result of individuals' behavior" statement in sociology and it examines patterns of relationships.¹⁰³

Social network analysis came out as an alternative of traditional study methods. The value of social network theory versus other political science and sociological approaches is its focus on the value of the network structure rather than the characteristics of the individual. Network analysis focuses on the analysis of data originating from interactions between actors rather than analyzing independent behavior of the actors.¹⁰⁴ Social network analysis can provide rich social information about dynamics and information flow structures in organizations for the predesigned stage of information systems comparing to the well-known social research methods. Social network analysis is an effective tool to understand the characteristics of information circulation, social barriers to reach information and knowledge, closed sub networks groups and actors playing bridge and gateway roles inside an organizational network.¹⁰⁵ While social network analysis leaves room for individuals to affect their fate, it argues that the structure of the network and relationships and ties with others in the network are more important.¹⁰⁶

Social network analysis is the mapping and measuring of relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations, computers, URLs, and other connected information entities. The nodes in the network are the people, groups or URLs while the links show relationships or flows between the nodes. Social network analysis provides both a visual and a mathematical analysis of relationships.¹⁰⁷ Social network is a set of actors that may have relationships with one another. Networks can have few or many actors (nodes), and one or more kinds of relations (edges) between pairs of actors.¹⁰⁸ Social network analysis shows the structure of relationship, ranging

¹⁰³ Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Goodwin, Jeff, (1994), "Network Analysis, Culture and the Problem of Agency", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 99, No. 6, p. 1411-1414.

¹⁰⁴ Parkhe, Arvind, et al., (2006), "New Frontiers in Network Development", *Academy of Management Review*, Vol.31, No.3, p.561.

¹⁰⁵ Sozen, H.Cenk and Sagsan, Mustafa, (2009), "Social Networks Versus Technical Networks: How Different Social Interaction Patterns Effect Information System Utilization in the Organizations?", *Journal of US-China Public Administration*, Vol. 6, No.7, p.67.

¹⁰⁶ Ressler, (2006), *ibid.* p.2

¹⁰⁷ Krebs, Valdis, (2008), "Social Network Analysis, A Brief Introduction", <http://www.orgnet.com/sna.html>, (Accessed on 21.07.2010).

¹⁰⁸ Hanneman, Robert A. and Riddle, Mark, (2005), "Introduction to Social Network Methods", Riverside, CA:University of California,

from casual acquaintance to close bonds, Social network analysis assumes that relationship are important and it maps and measures formal and informal relationships to understand what facilitates or impedes the information flows that bind interacting units, who knows whom, and who shares what information and knowledge with whom by what communication technique.¹⁰⁹

Terrorist organizations are suitable to study using social network analysis. Terrorist organizations are different from other legal organizations. Social network analysis can provide important information on the unique characteristics of terrorist organizations, ranging from issues of network recruitment, network evolution, and the diffusion of radical ideas.¹¹⁰ Organizations and individuals that have numerous network ties can anytime use these connections to transfer knowledge, to reach resources and to influence others in their environment.¹¹¹

Social network analysis could be used as a very effective tool to understand vulnerabilities and weaknesses of terrorist networks. The Internet has become the main propaganda source for the organization as well as providing different information for the target audience. We presence of a terrorist organization is very important for ideological activities. In this case, social network analysis can be used to spot which websites are important to get rid of to reduce the effect of the organization and to interrupt the complete terrorist network.

2.1.1. Weak Ties Versus Strong Ties

There is an ongoing theoretical argument on the types of the ties that are more beneficial for the actors in a network. The traditional social capital approach is based on the idea of close and powerful social ties that can ease the constitution of trust and mutual trade relations between the parties.¹¹² The authors¹¹³ who defend the strength

http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C10_Centrality.html#Betweenness, (Accessed on 12.02.2010).

¹⁰⁹ Serrat, Oliver, (2009), "Social Network Analysis", *Knowledge Solutions*, February 2009/28,; <http://www.adb.org/Documents/information/knowledge-solutions/Social-Network-Analysis.pdf>, (Accessed on 20.08.2010)

¹¹⁰ Ressler, (2006), *ibid.* p.1

¹¹¹ Gargiulo, Martin and Benassi, Mario, (2000), "Traped in Your Own Net? Network Cohesion, Structural Holes, and the Adaptation of Social Capital", *Organization Science*, Vol.11, No.2, p.184

¹¹² Gargiulo and Benassi, (2000), *ibid.*, p.184

¹¹³ Bourdieu, Pierre, (1983), "Forms of Capital", J.R. Richards (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, New York: Routledge, p.249;

of strong ties in a network claim that closely tied members can decrease the level of uncertainty and cooperate for their groups' self-interests. Strong ties can provide control over the members and transfer great amount of information to the actors.¹¹⁴ (Podolny, 2001: 34). Strong tie formation tendency of the actors to gain power can lead to emergence of several sub network sets. These sub network sets restrict flow of information, because the members of sets attempt to share their information resources with the group members. Existence of groups of intensive social relations may prevent knowledge transfer between groups or industries.¹¹⁵

Granovetter¹¹⁶ found that information about a new job position is obtained through the weak ties, which are defined by rare and nonsocial interactions. These kinds of arms-length ties are transactions between parties operating without social closeness.¹¹⁷ Weak ties undertake an integrative role in the society by building connections between social groups.¹¹⁸ When we carry "strength of weak ties" thesis to the macro level, ideas diffuse slowly, scientific efforts might be hindered and sub closed groups may emerge in societies with less weak ties.¹¹⁹ The main proposition about arms-length ties state that access to diverse information of an actor in a market depends on the amount of owned weak ties.¹²⁰

2.1.2. Structural Holes Theory

Structural holes theory is quite different from two other network perspectives because it tries to explain the power of actors with their position in the network instead of their tie formation preferences. Structural holes are the gaps between individuals, groups and organizations in a social network.¹²¹ These gaps emerge because of different beliefs, identities and practices of the actors. Structural holes theory can be explained as information and control advantage of brokers while

Coleman, James S., (1988), "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.8, No.2, p.96; Podolny, Joel M., (2001), "Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.107, No.1, p.35.

¹¹⁴ Podolny, (2001), *ibid.*, p.34.

¹¹⁵ Burt, Stuart, (2005), *Brokerage & Closure*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.23.

¹¹⁶ Granovetter, Mark, (1983), "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited", *Sociological Theory*, Vol.1, No.1, p. 205.

¹¹⁷ Uzzi, Brian, (1999), "Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing", *American Sociological Review*, p.483.

¹¹⁸ Burt, Stuart, (1992), *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*, New York: Harvard University Press, p.26.

¹¹⁹ Granovetter, (1983), *ibid.*, p.202.

¹²⁰ Uzzi, (1999), *ibid.*, p.483.

¹²¹ Burt, (2005), *ibid.*, p.15, 16.

providing relationships between individuals.¹²² Briefly, structural holes emerge with the existence of unconnected actors in a network and those, who link the actors by building bridges, undertake brokerage roles.¹²³

Burt¹²⁴ emphasized that the organizations, which connect the structural holes by their management and collaboration networks can learn faster than the others learn and be more creative in their fields. There are three benefits of being a broker;¹²⁵ ability to access alternative visions and applications, early access to new ideas and thoughts in the social system, and transfer of information to the groups if there is an advantage to be gained. In macro level, board members of the organizations may function as brokers who provide information and connections with others in the sector, state bureaucracy, relevant sectors, scientific institutions and NGO's. In micro level, employees who undertake brokerage roles may create links between departments, hierarchical levels and individuals.

Figure 1, Brokerage Roles in the Organizations




Figure 1 is an example of how brokerage roles operate in organizations. There are structural holes between production, marketing, A & B departments and the top management team. An employee from A & B department may have social ties with the other departments and top management. This position creates a dependency

¹²² Stuart, Burt, (1997), "The Contingent Value of Social Capital", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol.42, p.339.

¹²³ Burt, (2005), *ibid*, p.18.

¹²⁴ Burt, Stuart, (2004), "Structural Holes and Good Ideas", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.110, No 2, p.357.

¹²⁵ Burt, (2005), *ibid*, p.23.

relationship between the broker and others in the organization. Broker plays an important role in terms of knowledge transfer between vertical and horizontal levels in an organization.

There are four different types of brokerage that may create value for an actor according to Burt¹²⁶;

(1) The simplest type of brokerage is to inform the groups about challenges and interesting topics.

(2) The transfer of the best practices between groups is a higher level of brokerage. The actor who is familiar with the activities of unconnected groups is privileged to transfer beliefs and activities, which may create value to both sides.

(3) To transfer information related to similar aspects of the sides.

(4) Brokerage role gives actor a possibility to create a synthesis of behaviors and beliefs of unconnected sides.

Employees in any kind of hierarchical level in organizations can benefit from the advantages of being a broker. A brokerage position in an intraorganizational network may create a dependency relationship with the focal actor and others. Nevertheless, this depends on the perceptions of the potential brokers. Some of them may view the structural holes as an opportunity to position themselves as brokers in social networks whereas the others may not.

2.2. THE TURKISH SECURITY STRUCTURE IN TERMS OF DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

In this part, the Turkish Security Structure in terms of defence against terrorism will be analyzed. In this respect, National Security Council, Ministry of Interior Affairs (Public Order and Security Under Secretaryship, General Command of Gendarmerie, Turkish National Police,), The Turkish Armed Forces, National Intelligence Organization, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance (The Financial Crimes Investigation Board, MASAK) will be studied.

¹²⁶ Burt, (2004), *ibid*, p.355.

2.2.1. National Security Council

National Security Council is another important department in Turkey's security agenda. According to law of National Security Council and Secretariat General of the National Security Council¹²⁷, national security described as the protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State. The State's National Security Policy is described as the policy covering the principles of the course of internal, external and defense actions determined by the Council of Ministers within the views set by the National Security Council with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national objectives.

The National Security Council was established in accordance with the article No.118 in the Constitution. The National Security Council, chaired by the President, consists of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Land Forces Commander, the Naval Forces Commander, the Air Forces Commander and General Commander of the Gendarmerie.¹²⁸ As well as the regular attendees, depending on the agenda, related ministers and persons can also be invited to attend the Council meetings for their views. The Secretary General of the National Security Council participates in the meetings however does not have the right to vote.

Duties of the council is described in Article 4, according to this article; The National Security Council shall, within the framework of the definitions on national security and the national security policy of the State as stated in Article 2 (definitions), take advisory decisions on issues pertaining to the determination, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State, and shall provide its views with a view to ensuring the necessary coordination; it shall submit these advisory decisions and views to the Council of Ministers, and fulfill duties given by laws. The Prime Minister may entrust a Deputy Prime Minister with the responsibility of submitting to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions and views of the National Security Council to be evaluated, and of coordinating and

¹²⁷ Law of National Security Council and Secretariat General of the National Security Council, Law No: 2945, 11 September 1983, Official Gazette, 11 September 1983, No:18218.

¹²⁸ Amended in the article No: 15th January, 2003-3789/1.

following the implementation of these advisory decisions should they are approved by the Council of Ministers.¹²⁹

Council meets every two months, in necessary situations council may meet upon the proposal of the Prime Minister or the direct request of the President of the Republic.¹³⁰ After the meetings of the council, council takes decisions. And the minutes of the decisions are reported. According to Article 10, discussions in the National Security Council are appropriately reported by the officials of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. Original copies of the decisions and the minutes of the meetings are kept in the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. The minutes and the negotiations are to be explained or published. Decisions can be explained or published with the permission of the National Security Council.

Since the terrorism is one of the main problem in Turkey's security agenda, council decides to take necessary precautions against terrorism in the minutes of the council.

2.2.2. Ministry of Interior Affairs

Ministry of Interior Affairs is main responsible body in the defence against terrorism structure. It carries out its functions via its important entities. These are, Public Order and Security Under Secretaryship, General Command of Gendarmerie, and Turkish National Police. Although General Command of Coast Guard is also under the structure of Ministry of Interior Affairs, it has not direct duty in defence against terrorism. Besides its duties, Coast Guards are dealing with some transnational crime and border security issues. Because of this, information regarding to Coast Guards was not mentioned here.

2.2.2.1. Public Order and Security Undersecretaryship

Public Order and Security Undersecretaryship was inaugurated on 17 February 2010 with Law No 5952. It was established to determine the policies and strategies for defence against terrorism and to coordinate the necessary issues with related departments. It was established under Ministry of Interior Affairs. Coordination

¹²⁹ Amended in the article No: 7th August, 2003-4963/24.

¹³⁰ Amended in the article No: 7th August, 2003-4963/25.

Council for Defence Against Terrorism was established in accordance with the Law 5952, to coordinate the necessary issues with security departments and related public departments in the area of defence against terrorism and to evaluate the policies and applications in this field. Coordination Council constituted of Minister of Interior Affairs (Head of the Council), Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, Commander of General Command of Gendarmerie, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization, Undersecretary of Ministry of Justice, Undersecretary of Ministry of Interior Affairs, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary of Public Order and Security Undersecretaryship, Director of Turkish National Police and Commander of Coast Guard Command. If it is needed, some other related personnel could be invited to the council. Council gets together with invitation of Minister of Interior Affairs. The agenda of the meeting is determined by Minister of Interior Affairs in accordance with the comments of the other council members. Secretary issues are held by Public Order and Security Undersecretaryship.

Duties of the Undersecretaryship is explained in the Article 6. According to Article 6, duties of the Undersecretaryship is as follows;

- a) Carry out works to determine policies and strategies and follow agreed policies and strategies.
- b) To evaluate the strategic intelligence that was gathered from security and intelligence departments and to share this intelligence with related departments.
- c) To conduct research and analysis.
- d) To provide strategic knowledge to security and related departments and coordinate the issues among them.
- e) To inform the public and conduct public relations.
- f) To evaluate the international events with Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- g) To conduct investigations.

2.2.2.2. General Command of Gendarmerie

General Command of Gendarmerie is one of the substantial organs of Turkish Armed Forces, directly commanded by General Staff in the fields of education and training; on the other hand, General Command of Gendarmerie is liable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the fields of security, public order and the other related issues. “Internal Security Units” are the main cores of the General Command of Gendarmerie organization in the defence against terrorism.¹³¹

2.2.2.3. Turkish National Police

Turkish National Police is constituted with three units in the defence against terrorism; Department of Combatting Terrorism, Department of Special Police Forces, Department of Intelligence.¹³²

The duties of the Department of Combatting Terrorism are as follows;

✓ The main duties are to follow, search, evaluate, registrate and make the statistics on human and financial resources, relations, arms and logistics, legal and illegal publications, acts, functions and structures of terrorist groups. Regarding to acquired analyses, department of combatting terrorism forms combatting principles and implementing them.

✓ Department of Combatting Terrorism is to provide coordination and co-operation with all corporations, taking part in operations related with cooperation and security and present ideas about them, and participate in international combatting with terrorism operations.

✓ While fulfilling the duty of combatting terrorism, Chieftainship department of combatting terrorism makes the preliminary works related with the legal and administrative amendments to overcome the occurring problems and opens the way of combatting.

Duties of Department of Special Police Forces are to prevent the terrorist acts in residential areas and suburbs, deactivate and arrest the activists and their acts, save the hostages on planes, in cars or buildings and etc. In accordance with other

¹³¹ Information was gathered at <http://www.jandarma.tsk.tr>, (Accessed on 25.08.2010).

¹³² Information was gathered at <http://www.egm.gov.tr>, (Accessed on 26.08.2010).

intelligence units, Department of Intelligence has very important duties gathering information and sharing it with combating terrorism units.

2.2.3. The Turkish Armed Forces

Dealing with internal security problems is the duties of law enforcement units. Law enforcement units are carrying out its activities under the supervision of Ministry of Interior Affairs. If any units of Turkish Armed Forces are needed to serve in internal security problems, Law of Provincial Administration (Law No 5442) are applied.

In accordance with Law of Provincial Administration (Law No 5442) in case of province emergencies, if the governor of the province can not respond or prevent the conflict with law enforcement units, he/she could ask for the help of nearest unit of Turkish Armed Forces. (Army, Navy, Air Force)

The Turkish Armed Forces missions and responsibilities are clearly stated in the Turkish constitution and determined by laws as to react against new security challenges and crises in 2000's, to be ready to face the uncertainties, and to ensure the security of turkey against internal and external risks. Turkish Armed Forces will conduct the following tasks; deterrence, analyses of the security and operation area, operations other than war, crises management, small scale or limited force deployments, conventional war.¹³³

In this context; the small but flexible units, having sufficient capability, equipped with technological weapon and systems, comprising sufficient command-control assets, precise and developed ammunition, covering early warning assets and also able to conduct operation in any weather condition are very desirable and take priority in the new approach.

New politico-military strategic environment after the post cold war era, dominated by instabilities and uncertainties in Caucasus, Middle East and Balkans, deems it necessary for the Turkish Armed Forces to prepare herself for an unforeseeable future.

In the current political military strategic environment where the global and regional balances have not been fully formed yet, the Turkish Armed Forces capable

¹³³ Information was gathered at <http://www.tsk.tr>, (Accessed on 27.08.2010).

of ensuring security of Turkey as well as contributing to regional and global peace and stability aim at maintaining and/or improving the following capabilities.

- ✓ Deterrence of military power,
- ✓ Command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (c4isr) systems,
- ✓ Superior maneuver capability and fire power,
- ✓ Equipped with high tech weapons and systems,
- ✓ Ability to conduct operations day and night,
- ✓ Air/missile defense and nbc protection capability against the mass destruction weapons,
- ✓ Ability to conduct joint and combined operations,
- ✓ Interoperability with the armed forces of the allies,
- ✓ Ability to conduct various type operations such as peace support, counter terrorism, disasters relief, crisis management, small-scale strikes, blockade, embargo, humanitarian aid, control of refugee flow etc. As well as conventional war.

2.2.4. National Intelligence Organization

Intelligence in defence against terrorism is another important issue. Within this respect, National Intelligence Organization has very important role in this effort. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization was founded as a body subordinate to the “Prime Ministry”, under the Law No. 644 on the Turkish National Intelligence Organization, dated July 6, 1965. This law, after being in force for 18 years, has been replaced by Law No. 2937 titled as the Law on the State Intelligence Services and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization as of January 1, 1984 as result of the efforts paid to eliminate any deficiencies, troubles, and gaps that were come across during the practice of the previous law, and to adapt it to the rapidly changing and improving world conditions.¹³⁴

In terms of its duties, The Turkish National Intelligence Organization, which exists to serve the Great Turkish Nation and furnished with duties and responsibilities

¹³⁴ Mit.gov, (n.d.), “Duties, Powers and Responsibilities of the MIT”, <http://www.mit.gov.tr/english/gorev/html>, (Accessed on 27.08.2010).

in line with this aim, is in charge of collecting nationwide security intelligence on existing and potential threats from internal and external sources posed against the territory, people and integrity, the existence, independence and security, all the elements that constitute the constitutional order and the national power. Besides these, The Turkish National Intelligence Organization is in charge of communicating the collected intelligence to the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Secretary General of the National Security Council, and the other relevant state organizations. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization is in charge of meeting the intelligence requirements and needs of the President, the Chief of General Staff, the Secretary General of the National Security and the other relevant ministries in the preparation and implementation of the plans concerning the national security policies of the State.¹³⁵

2.2.5. Ministry of Justice

Ministry of Justice is another important element in terms of crime policies and determining the jails for terrorists. Legislation on defence against terrorism establishes the responsibilities of Ministry of Justice. In this regard, legislation on defence against terrorism in Turkey is as follows;¹³⁶

- ✓ Law No, 3713, Law on Fight against Terrorism,
- ✓ Law No, 5271, Law on Code of Criminal Procedure,
- ✓ Law No, 5190, Law of Amendment in Code of Criminal Procedure, Abolishment of State Security,
- ✓ Law No, 5237, Turkish Penal Code,
- ✓ Law No, 2559, Law of Police Mission and Authority,
- ✓ Law No, 4959, Law of Adapting to Society,
- ✓ Law No, 1481, Law of Preventing assaults Against Public Order,
- ✓ Law No, 5187, Press Law,
- ✓ Law No, 5253, Club Law,
- ✓ Law No, 3201, Law of Police Organization,
- ✓ Law No, 5442, Law of Provincial Administration,
- ✓ Law No, 442, Village Law,

¹³⁵ Mit.gov, (n.d.), "Duties", <http://www.mit.gov.tr/english/g-gorev/html>, (Accessed on 27.08.2010).

¹³⁶ Egm.gov, (n.d.), "Legislation on Defence Against Terrorism", <http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/mevzuat1.html>, (Accessed on 27.08.2010).

- ✓ Law No, 2330, Law of Compensation in Cash and Allowance,
- ✓ Law No, 2821, Law on Trade Unions,
- ✓ Law No, 2820, Law on Political Parties,
- ✓ Law No, 2911, Demonstration Law,
- ✓ Law No, 2822, Law of Collective Agreement, Strike and Lockout,
- ✓ Law No, 1774, Law on Notification of Identification,
- ✓ Law No, 2935, Law of Emergency Case,
- ✓ Law No, 1402, Martial Law,
- ✓ Regulation of Arrest, Taking into Custody, and Taking Statements,
- ✓ Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- ✓ European Convention on Human Rights,
- ✓ European Convention on Preventing Torture and Inhumanity,
- ✓ UN Convention on Penalties for Torture, Inhumanity and Insultation,

2.2.6. Ministry of Finance (The Financial Crimes Investigation Board, MASAK)

Another important department in defence against terrorism structure is the Ministry of Finance. On behalf of the Ministry of Finance the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) was established. MASAK was established in 1996¹³⁷ and started to carry out its functions on 17 February 1997. The functions and powers of MASAK were redetermined with the Law No.5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime which was put into force on 18th October 2006. The mission of MASAK with regard to preventing money laundering and to detecting this offence is to make policies and to contribute making regulations, to collect information fast and reliably and to analyze them, to carry out investigation and research and, to convey the information and the results to relevant authorities. Article 19 of the Law No.5549 is as follows in which duties and powers of MASAK listed:

Article 19- (1) The Presidency of Financial Crimes Investigation Board is directly attached to the Minister of Finance. The duties and powers of the Presidency are as follows:

¹³⁷ Law of Prevention of Money Laundering, Law No: 4208, 19 October 2006.

(a) To develop policies and implementation strategies, to coordinate institutions and organizations, to conduct collective activities, to exchange views and information in order to prevent laundering proceeds of crime.

(b) To prepare law, by-law and regulation drafts in accordance with the policies determined, to make regulations for the implementation of this Law and the decisions of Council of Ministers regarding the Law.

(c) To carry out researches on the developments and trends on laundering proceeds of crime, and on the methods of detecting and preventing them.

(d) To make sectoral studies, to improve measures and to monitor the implementation on the purpose of prevention of laundering proceeds of crime.

(e) To carry out activities to raise the public awareness and support.

(f) To collect data, to receive suspicious transaction reports, to analyze and evaluate them in the scope of prevention of laundering proceeds of crime and terrorist financing.

(g) To request for examination from law enforcement and other relevant units in their fields, when required during the evaluation period.

(h) To carry out or to have carried out examinations on the subject matters of this Law.

(i) To denounce files to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office for the necessary legal actions according to the Criminal Procedure Law in the event of detecting serious findings at the conclusion of the examination that a money laundering offence is committed.

(j) To examine the cases conveyed from Public Prosecutors and to fulfill the requests relating to the determination of money laundering offence.

(k) To convey the cases to the competent Public Prosecutor's Office in cases where serious suspicion exists that a money laundering or terrorist financing offence is committed.

(l) To ensure inspection of obligations within the scope of this Law and relevant legislation.

(m) To request all kinds of information and documents from public institutions and organizations, natural and legal persons, and unincorporated organizations.

(n) To request temporary personnel assignment from other public institutions and organizations within the Presidency, when their knowledge and expertise is necessary.

(o) To carry out international affairs, to exchange views and information for the subjects in the sphere of its duties.

(p) To exchange information and documents with counterparts in foreign countries, to sign memorandum of understanding that is not in the nature of an international agreement for this purpose.

MASAK performs the following functions within the scope of duties and powers determined:

- Developing policies and improving legislation,
- Data collecting, analyzing, evaluation
- Supervision
- Coordination
- Investigation

In this respect, legislative measures regarding to terrorism financing are given in Annex A.

2.3. COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY IN TURKEY

Turkey's counter terrorism policy has also evolved during this time. As Turkey was taking security based precautions in countering terrorism at first, she started to take change its vision in accordance with the perceptions on security. That is, first terror problem was supposed to be solved with countering terrorists, but later countering terrorism started to be important. In this part, first security based precautions will be discussed, and later countering terrorism measures will be examined.

2.3.1. Security Based Precautions

Turkey enacted the Law on Fight Against Terrorism (Law No, 3713) on 12 April 1991. In this law, terror, terrorist and organization terms were identified clearly. Until Law on Fight Against Terrorism was enacted, related departments of the government was carrying out its activities in accordance with the Constitution and Turkish Penal Code.¹³⁸

Especially, after intensive terror attacks, Turkey decided to establish new counter terror units under the structure of Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish National Police. In this context, Department of Combatting Terrorism in 1986 and Department of Special Police Forces in 1993 were established. Besides the progress in Turkish National Police, Turkish Armed Forces abolished the Special War Department and established Special Forces Command in 1991. In accordingly, Special Forces Units were established under the structure of General Command of Gendarmerie.

Village Guard System is another measure that Turkey has taken. In accordance with Article 74 of Village Law (Law No. 442), village guard system was initiated in May 1985.

After abrogating the Martial Law, Turkey enacted State of Emergency in east and southeast of Turkey and established the Governorship of State of Emergency. Even though the applications of this system were perceived useful by some security personnel, it was abrogated by Turkish Grand National Assembly on 30 November 2002. Turkey has enacted the reintegration into society law eight times between 1985-2003. Lately, Public Order and Security Undersecretaryship was inaugurated on 17 February 2010 to determine the policies and strategies for defence against terrorism and to coordinate the necessary issues with related departments.

2.3.2. Countering Terrorism Measures

Because the counter terror policies that were made in Turkey were only security based, the real problems of terror were ignored. Although the armed activities of

¹³⁸ Alkan, Necati, (2009), “Turkiye’nin Terorizmle Mucadele Deneyimi”, [Turkey’s Countering Terrorism Experience], Bal, Ihsan and Ozeren, Suleyman (Ed.), *Uzakdogudan Yeni Kitaya Terorle Mucadele*, [Countering Terror From Fareast to New Land], Ankara: USAK Publications, p.132.

PKK were controlled by Turkish Armed Forces by applying the concept of regional dominancy¹³⁹, these successful applications could not be supported with economical, social, cultural, political and phsycological policies. Because of these deficiencies, Turkey could not get permanent solutions in coutering terrorism.¹⁴⁰

It is a noncontestable fact that there is correlation between economical welfare and joining to terrorist organizations. PKK is one of the organizations that exploiting this economic disequilibrium and recruiting members to the organization. To prevent this exploitation, Turkey understood the importance of this situation and has applied Southeast Anatolian Project (knows as GAP). Turkish Government has allocated 14.5 billion Turkish Liras (almost 10 billion US dollars) for Southeast Anatolian Project in 2008. With the help of village support and municipality support projects, most of the vital problems were fixed such as road constructions, seweg system, electriciticy, phone systems.¹⁴¹

It is known that Islamist terrorist organization Hezbollah as well as PKK are using mosques to spread their ideologies. PKK started to use Islamic preachers to make their propaganda in the mosques.¹⁴² Pro-PKK Islamic preachers are inviting the families that lost their kids during the operations, and they are preaching about PKK during the sermons. PKK is also giving those preachers salaries. To prevent these misleading sermons, Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs started to appoint Islamic preachers to all mosques.

Prisons are important places to recruit people to terrorist organization. To prevent recruitment and rehabilitate the prisoners, Turkish Directory of Religious Affairs organizes sermons once a week in the prisons. In addition to this measure in prison, government started to write letters to the families of the terrorists who are in F Type Prisons¹⁴³ to contact with their kids and to stop them from becoming a member. Moreover, encourage them to harmonize to normal life.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Ozdag, (1999), *ibid.*, p.76

¹⁴⁰ Alkan, (2009), *ibid.*, p.138

¹⁴¹ Alkan, (2009), *ibid.*, p.140

¹⁴² Detailed information is available at: <http://www.habervitrini.com/haber.asp?id=328842>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁴³ F Type prisons were built and opened in accordance with the United Nations Minimum Prison Rules and European Council European Prison Rules in 2000 to supply better and modern facilities to

PKK is using kids for its activities in the cities such as throwing stones to the security during its meetings. Turkish authorities came up with idea of “Do not throw stone, make goal (soccer term)” with project named Social Support Project. The government is building soccer, tennis, basketball, volleyball fields, gyms, movie theaters, water sports areas, parks for the kids and skateboard tracks etc.¹⁴⁵

Ministry of Education has opened 150 libraries in the region for people to use during their leisure times in 2008.¹⁴⁶ In addition to this, Ministry of Education is organizing conferences at junior- high and high school levels for the students. Also, Ministry of Education started a new project called “Heart Bridge Project” which aims to send 100.000 students from the east and southeast of Turkey to the western cities of Turkey during the summer holidays to initiate new friendships and show them that there is no discrimination between Turkish and Kurdish originated citizens.¹⁴⁷

Another project called “Family Support Project” aims to reach to 900 kids and 750 mothers for pre-school education in Diyarbakir, Batman and Mardin in 2008. Project contains start in 62 pre-schools.¹⁴⁸

Turkish Supreme Council of Education adopted a resolution to invest money to 41 newly opened universities in 2008. Project called “Development Annuity” is aiming to support region’s universities by allocating budget, sending professors and researchers.¹⁴⁹

the prisoners. F Type prisons were another measure that taken by Turkish authorities to prevent prisons be a ideological field of training.

¹⁴⁴ Detailed information is available at: <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=191426>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁴⁵ Detailed information is available at: <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=4329978>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁴⁶ Detailed information is available at: <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=4264565>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁴⁷ Detailed information is available at: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/04/04/haber.720DE65074634165B75E74AD21FC5669.html>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁴⁸ Detailed information is available at: <http://egitim.milliyet.com.tr/Egitim/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&Kategori=&KategoriID=117&ArticleID=969496&Date=05.02.2009&b=Guneydoguda%20Aile%20Destek%20Projesi>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁴⁹ Detailed information is available at: <http://www.ogrenciportali.net/Haberler.asp?haber=goster&haberne=185>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

Another and very important project has been started in 2008 by broadcasting Kurdish language in Turkey's Official TV Channel as TRT 6. Aims of this channel are to prevent monopolizing PKK's propaganda at Roj TV¹⁵⁰, without harming unitary system showing cultural diversities and contribute to eliminate the possibilities to join to a terrorist organization.¹⁵¹

Lately, initiated by the government, Turkey started the process called Democratic Opening. Discussions on this issue began when President Abdullah Gul remarked that "we should not miss this opportunity" to continue with the process that included expanding rights for Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. This approach was supported by both the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Council. On the other hand, Turkey's Chief of the General Staff and subsequently AK Party Group supported the principle of "one language, one state, and one flag," rejecting efforts to "divide" the country. Yet, regardless of the outcome of this debate, the fact remains that the Turkish government will not negotiate directly with the PKK.¹⁵² It is an ongoing project and government is working on it.

Besides the prevent measure in Turkey, Turkey has ratified 12 United Nations (UN) conventions and protocols, including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373, which constitutes a solid and comprehensive instrument for combating terrorism. Turkey contributes to the adoption of basic texts and documents on preventing and combating terrorism by international organizations. Turkey also has bilateral security cooperation agreements with more than 50 countries regarding terrorism, organized crimes and drug trafficking.

¹⁵⁰ Roj TV is PKK's television station broadcasting in Kurdish as well as Persian, Arabic, Aramaic, Turkish and English.

¹⁵¹ Detailed Information is available at:

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=1033572&Kategori=siyaset&AuthorID=61&b=Kurtce%20yayin%20politikasi&a=Fikret%20Bila>, (Accessed on 12.07.2010).

¹⁵² Alexander, Yonah, (2009), "Some Perspectives on Turkey's Counter Terrorism Strategy", Ker-Lindsay, James and Alastair, Cameron (Ed.), *Combating International Terrorism, Turkey's Added Value*, London: RUSI Publications, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Turkey_terrorism.pdf, (Accessed on 12.09.2010).

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PKK

The purpose of this chapter is to give general overview of PKK. In this chapter, brief history, ideology, aim and strategy, and propaganda methods will be discussed.

3.1. BRIEF HISTORY

In this part, in consecutive order, Kurds and Territorial Claims of PKK, Kurdish Uprisings in Turkish History, Establishment, 1970s, Preparation, 1980-1984, Terror Campaign, 1984 to 1st Gulf War, 1st Gulf War to Ocalan's Capture, Ocalan's Capture to Today will be examined.

3.1.1. Kurds and Territorial Claims of PKK

It is predictable that the PKK has many arguments on the Kurdish issue on behalf of Kurdish people. First discussions that the PKK makes the Kurds are the first nation that came to Anatolia. Hence, it is essential to discuss the origins of the Kurdish people. Although there are several studies on Kurdish people, they cannot be considered accurate, academic, or objective due to ethnic or cultural prejudice for or against the Kurdish people.¹⁵³ However, there have been 732 documents concerning the Kurdish problem of which were prepared by Russian (270), English (182), French (132) and German (123) writers before the year 1932.¹⁵⁴

Paul White argues the origins of the Kurds by proposing different theories.¹⁵⁵ One theory suggests the Kurds were the people of 'Gutium' in ancient Sumerian. A theory states the Kurds are descendants of the Medes. A third theory is that the Kurds are a branch of ancient Turk or Persian people. Nevertheless, Johon and Harvey argue that the Kurdish people have inhabited the mountainous region in Northern

¹⁵³ Laciner, Sedat and Bal, Ihsan, (2004), "The Ideological and Historical Roots of Kurdish Movements in Turkey: Ethnicity, Demography, and Politics", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.10, p.474.

¹⁵⁴ Cay, Abdulhaluk M., (1992), *Türk Milli Butunlugu Icinde Dogu Anadolu Asiretlerinin Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Kulturel Yapilari ve Boluculuk Meselesi, Tarihi Gelismeler Icinde Turkiye'nin Sorunlari Sempozyumu*, [Socioeconomic and Cultural Structures of East Anatolian's Tribes and Separatism Problem], [Turkey's Problems in the Context of Historical Evolution], Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, p.137.

¹⁵⁵ White, Paul J., (2000), *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey*, UK: Zed Books, p.14.

Mesopotamia for two or four thousand years and are the ancestors of ‘Xenophno’s Anabasis’.¹⁵⁶ They support their claim in reference to the ancient Greek epics, which connect the Carduchis of 24 centuries ago to the Kurds of today. However, it is not powerful evidence to describe the origins of the Kurds.

McDowall has suggested that possibly some Kurdish tribes could have moved from Europe to Mesopotamia 4000 years ago.¹⁵⁷ White strengthens the idea by saying, “Kurdish People speak an Indo-European language, Kurdish, which is the part of the Iranian language group”.¹⁵⁸

Another argument among scholars is the time when Kurd and Kurdistan words were first used. The term Kurdistan has been used to describe the province of the Zagros Mountains during the empire of the Seljuk Sultan Sancar in the twelfth century.¹⁵⁹ Some writers who are trying to explain the roots of the Kurds use Kurdistan to define the lands of the Kurdish people. In the political arena, Kurdistan was first used in the Treaty of Sevres (Le traité de Sévres) on 10 August 1920.¹⁶⁰ However, it was never applied and was abolished with the Lausanne Peace Treaty¹⁶¹ on 24 July 1923.

Other opinions from the Turani people in Turkey argue that the Kurdish people originated from Central Asia, where the Anatolian people and the Mesopotamian Turkish people originally came from.¹⁶² Some Turkish sociologists defined the word ‘Kurd’ in Turkish as “hard snow, hard melting snow in the mountain in summer”¹⁶³ From Iran and Arab sources, ‘Kurd’ has been used to describe ‘the nomadic life’.¹⁶⁴ It has also been expressed as ‘nomad’ during Ottoman

¹⁵⁶ Bullock, John and Morris, Harvey, (1992), *No Friends But The Mountains: The Tragic History of Kurds*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.56.

¹⁵⁷ Laciner and Bal, (2004), *ibid*, p.475.

¹⁵⁸ White, (2000), *ibid*, p.16.

¹⁵⁹ White, (2000), *ibid*, p.15.

¹⁶⁰ Cevizoglu, Hulki, (2005), *Ya Sev Ya Sevr Bir Gafletin Buyumesi*, [Either Love or Sevres, Increase of Negligence], Ankara: Ceviz Kabugu Press, p.10.

¹⁶¹ Libbyu.edu, (n.d.), “Treaty of Lausanne”, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne, (Accessed on 05.03.2010).

¹⁶² Laciner and Bal, (2004), *ibid*, p.477

¹⁶³ Kiziloglu, M.Fahrettin, (1995), *Kurtlerin Turklugu*, [Turkishness of Kurds], Istanbul: Hamle Publications, p.16.

¹⁶⁴ Cay, Abdulhaluk M., (1994), *Her Yonyle Kurt Dosyasi*, [Kurd File with All Aspects], Istanbul: Turan Kultur Vakfi Publications, p.90.

times.¹⁶⁵ The word ‘Kurd’ was first heard in “Yenisey Stones” which was found in the 650s AD. In the stones, Alp Urungu, one of the Turkish Khan was saying, “I am Kurt-el-khan”¹⁶⁶

Even PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan accepted that ‘It is hard to define Kurdistan as a country, and Kurds as a society like other minorities’.¹⁶⁷

Discussions on the origin of the Kurds listed by Cetiner are as follows:¹⁶⁸

- Kurds come from the Karduks (Saka-Iskit Turks). By (Russian Basile Nikitin)
- Kurds come from the Meds (Iranian). By (Russian Vladimir Minorsky)
- Kurds come from the Arabs. By (Arab voyagers such as Mesudi and Ebu Ishak)
- Kurds come from the Indo-Europeans. By (Iranian shahs)
- Kurds come from the Turks. By (Turkish and some international scholars)
- Kurds come from a Georgian-Armenian origin. By (Nikol J-Mart)
- Kurds come from the Sumerians. By (Ephraim Avidgor Spesier)

It can be easily seen from discussions that it is very hard to make a definite comment on the origins of the Kurds. Nevertheless, Kurdish reality should never be disregarded and the freedoms of people signify themselves, as “Kurd” should never be judged.

3.1.2. Kurdish Uprisings in Turkish History

After analyzing the uprisings throughout Turkish history, it is noticeable that most of the incidents occurred after the inauguration of the Turkish Republic.

Reasons for the uprisings during the declining period of the Ottoman Empire might include the Empire’s compulsory military service and tax application. The Ottoman Empire has never put any burden on the tribes during the rise and

¹⁶⁵ Onder, Ali Tayyar, (1999), *Türkiye’nin Etnik Yapısı, Halkımızın Kökenleri ve Gerçekler*, [Ethnic Structure of Turkey, Roots of Our people and Truth], Ankara: Onderler Publications, p.88.

¹⁶⁶ Orkun, H.Namik, (1940), *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, [Ancient Turkish Tablets], İstanbul: Türk Dil Kurumu, p.37.

¹⁶⁷ Ocalan, Abdullah, (2004), *Bir Halkı Savunmak*, [To Defense a Nation], İstanbul: Cetin Publications, p.208.

¹⁶⁸ Cetiner, Selahattin, (2003), *Sorunlarıyla Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorunu*, [East and Southeast Reality with the Problems], Ankara: TSK Mehmetcik Vakfı Publications, p.45-47.

growth period. However, after facing problems in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire had to turn back to her own sources.¹⁶⁹ Kurdish tribes' leaders in east and southeast Anatolia caused most of the uprisings. Reasons could be fear of losing their powers, and protecting the tribe structure and feudal system. In addition, the tribe leaders collected taxes in the region. However, after regulation, this enforcement caused their power to deteriorate.

Another account of the uprisings could be the foreign power against Turks to weaken them and try to create a Kurdish state in the region to serve the benefits of imperial countries. It is a known fact that after the inauguration of the Turkish Republic, some countries supported these uprisings to weaken Turkey. For example, the UK had implemented policies during the Mosul¹⁷⁰ problem. The Mosul problem had occurred during negotiations between the UK and Turkey and it had finished after the negotiations ended. During the 1930s, Turkish armed Forces' control in the region ended the uprisings until the PKK incident. In addition, supporter countries were very busy with their problems during the period of World War II.

Kurdish Uprisings during Turkish History are as follows;¹⁷¹

Table 2, Kurdish Uprisings During Ottoman Government Period

Uprising	Year
Baban-zade Abdurrahman Pasa (Musul)	1806
Baban-zade Ahmet Pasa (Musul)	1812
Zaza	1820
Yezidi (Hakkari)	1830
Bedirhan Bey (Mardin)	1831
Emir Muhammet	1833
Nasturi (Hakkari)	1847
Zeydan-i Sir	1855

¹⁶⁹ Aydin, Ahmet, (1992), *Kurtler, PKK ve Abdullah Ocalan*, [Kurds, PKK and Abdullah Ocalan], Istanbul: Kale Ofset Publications, p.33-34.

¹⁷⁰ The city of Mosul, Iraq.

¹⁷¹ Cetiner, (2003), *ibid*, p.324; Goktas, Hidir, (1991), *Kurtler-I, Isyan-Tenkil*, [Kurds, Insurgency-Repress], Istanbul: Alan Publications, p.13; Sehirli, Atilla, (2000), *Turkiye'de Bolucu Teror Hareketleri*, [Seperatist Terror Movements in Turkey], Istanbul: Burak Publications, p.148-149.

Bedirhan Osman Pasa (Cizre, Midyat)	1877
Sheikh Ubeydullah (Semdinli, Iran)	1880
Bedirhan Emin Ali (Bayburt)	1889
Molla Selim (Bayburt)	1914

Table 3, Kurdish Uprisings During Turkish Independence War Period

Uprising	Year
Ali Bati (Mardin, Cizre, Nusaybin)	11 May – 18 June 1919
Cemil Ceto	20 May – 07 June 1920
National Tribe	01 June – 08 September 1920
Kocgiri (Kocgiri [Zara], Susehri, Refahiye)	01 October 1920 – 17 June 1921

Table 4, Kurdish Uprisings During Turkish Republic Period

Uprising	Year
Nasturi (Hakkari)	1924
Sheikh Sait (Bingol, Mus, Diyarbakir, Bitlis)	1925
Zilan	1925
Semdinli (Semdinli, Beytussebap, Cukurca)	1925
Pervari (Hakkari)	1926
Hakkari Beytussebap	1926
Guyan (Beytussebap)	1926
Kocusagi (Dersim, Ovacik, Cemisgezdek)	1926
Bicar (Lice, Kulp, Hani)	1927
Resul Aga (Siirt, Eruh)	1928
Agri (Agri Mountain, Ercis, Caldiran)	1930
Ruban (Bitlis, Mutki)	1934
Abdurrahman (Siirt, Baykan)	1935
Sason (Siirt, Sason)	1935
Dersim (Tunceli, Erzincan, Bingol)	1937-1938

3.1.3. Establishment, 1970s

In the 1960's, Europe and the world experienced ideological and social movements, youth movements in the 1970's, and ideological conflicts during the Cold War period. Concurrently, the 1961 Turkish Constitution has given liberties, resulting in the establishment of many legal and illegal organizations in Turkey. Some of those organizations used terror to reach their goals and the PKK's roots were established during the same period.

Kurdish activities at that time were from an offshoot of I-KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq [Irak-Kurdistan Demokrasi Partisi]) T-KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey [Turkiye-Kurdistan Demokrasi Partisi]) and DDKO (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts [Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari]) that were established by college students and eastern intellectuals. DDKO was established on 01 May 1969. T-KDP's propaganda subjects were mostly Barzani actions and they were active in Mardin, Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, and partly Diyarbakir. DDKO's members were college students, eastern doctors, lawyers, and educated people, whose propaganda was based on "road, water, electricity to East", and they were active in Diyarbakir, Silvan, Siverek and Agri.¹⁷² T-KDP and DDKO differ from the other organizations such as THKO (People's Liberation Army of Turkey [Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Ordusu]), THKP-C (Turkey Popular Liberation Party/Front [Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi]) and TIHKP (Turkey Revolutionary Workers Peasants Party [Turkiye Ihtilalci Isci Koylu Partisi]) that were established between 1968 and 1971. They differ because; these two parties' mentalities were based on Kurdish movements besides Marxism and Leninism.

DDKO was organizing seminars and conferences, publishing brochures and bulletins particularly based on the Kurdish movement, and dispensing those documents to get supporters.¹⁷³ At that time, Abdullah Ocalan identified himself as a hard-core supporter of the DDKO.¹⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the main part of legalization of the Marxist Kurdish movement was TIP,¹⁷⁵ (Turkey's Workers Party [Turkiye Isci

¹⁷² Aydin, (1992), *ibid*, p.40-43.

¹⁷³ Denker, Sami, (1997), *Uluslararası Teror, Türkiye ve PKK*, [International Terror, Turkey and PKK], Istanbul: Bogazici Publications, p.52.

¹⁷⁴ Ocalan, Abdullah, (2001), *Sumer Rahip Devletinden Demokratik Uygarliga Dogru*, [From the Sumerian Priest State to Democratic Civilization], Istanbul: Mem Publications, p.253.

Also available at Abdullah Ocalan's web page: <http://www.abdullah-ocalan.com/index1.htm>, (Accessed on 02.05.2009).

¹⁷⁵ Sehirli, (2000), *ibid*, p.161

Partisi]) which was abolished by Turkish Constituion Court because of its declaration on its fourth congress talking about the ‘Kurdish People’s Democratic Dream’.

Because of an increase in violence in students’ activities and the separatist Kurdish movement, the Turkish Military had to take over the government. After the military coup, there was a decrease in students’ actions. Moreover, Mahir Cayan’s THKP-C has kept on its activities.

Mahir Cayan’s statement “Armed Propaganda’s Effect on Revolutionary Struggle” influenced Ocalan.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, Ocalan became a supporter of ‘the people’s armed struggle’, in resemblance of Marxist guerilla warfare.¹⁷⁷ While Abdullah Ocalan was attending the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara University as a freshman, he was arrested on 08 April 1972 for distributing illegal flyers to protest the incidents that happened on 30 March 1972¹⁷⁸. Ocalan was placed in the Mamak Military Prison for three months.¹⁷⁹ This was his only time in prison until he was arrested in 1999.¹⁸⁰

During his stay in prison, he had the chance to conserve with the members of TIP, THKP-C and PDA, (Proletarian Revolutionary Intellectuals [Proleter Devrimci Aydinlik]) but he did not take any biases of sections in the Marxist movement.¹⁸¹ He claimed that he had used the time in prison learning Marxist doctrine and ideological political organization.¹⁸² He also claimed to have created the idea of the PKK in prison and he was going to prepare himself for ‘an independent group creation’ after prison.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁶ Ozcan, Ali Nihat, (1999), *PKK Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yontemi*, [PKK’s History, Ideology and Method], Ankara: Avrasya Strategic Research Center Publications, p.30

¹⁷⁷ Mango, Andrew, (2005), *Turkey and War on Terror*, London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, p.33

¹⁷⁸ Mahir Çayan, Hüdayi Arıkan, Cihan Alptekin, Nihat Yılmaz, Ertan Saruhan, Ahmet Atasoy, Sinan Kazım Özudoğru, Sabahattin Kurt, Ömer Ayna and Saffet Alp had three foreign hostages (two British and one Canadian citizen) and died because of an armed conflict between Turkish Military Units on 30 March 1972.

¹⁷⁹ Ozturk, Saygi, (2009), *Apo Olayinin Perde Arkasi*, [Behind The Curtain Apo Incident], Istanbul: Dogan Books, p.99-112

¹⁸⁰ Mango, (2005), *ibid.*, p.33

¹⁸¹ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1995), *Devrimin Dili ve Eylemi*, [Language and Action of Revolution], Damascus: p.19, <http://www.pkk-info.com/tr/eskisite/pkktarihi/DevriminDiliveEylemi.pdf>, (Accessed on 11.04.2010)

¹⁸² Radu, Michael, (2001), “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”, *Orbis*, Vol. 45, No.1, p.47-64.

¹⁸³ Ocalan, (2001), *ibid.*, p.254

After his release, Ocalan went back to the faculty of Political Sciences, but conspiratorial work took up most of his time and he never graduated.¹⁸⁴ He joined the ADYOD (Ankara Democratic Association of Higher Education [Ankara Demokratik Yuksek Ogrenim Dernegi]), because most of the Kurdist students were in prison as a result of the military coup, and Ocalan had the chance to become a chief of the association.

When DDKO was also closed down, it was replaced by DDKD (Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Society [Devrimci Demokrat Kultur Dernegi]), and many Kurds left ADYOD, except Ocalan. Ocalan kept his relations with other Kurdist groups and supported them. He met Kemal Burkay of the TSIP (Socialist Workers party of Turkey[Turkiye Sosyalist Isçi Partisi]), but he did not take Ocalan seriously. He also met Sirac Bilgin who was the secretary-general of T-KDP. Bilgin described him: “This cruel student of the Faculty of Political Sciences was stubborn and ambitious and he formed himself with the certainty that Marxism and Leninism was universally true.”¹⁸⁵

On 21 April 1973, the first initiative of the PKK idea took place in a meeting held in Cubuk Dam in Ankara. In this meeting, it was agreed to struggle for an independent Kurdistan and establish the separatist organization.¹⁸⁶ After several preliminary gatherings, the group came together in Dikmen in Ankara in October 1975 and 1976. The most important result of the first meeting was ‘organization was that the going to be different from other Turkish and Kurdish leftist organizations’ traditional bases.¹⁸⁷ After the first meeting in Dikmen in 1975, Abdullah Ocalan and Hayri Karer, a high-level member of the organization, prepared “The Path of

¹⁸⁴ Mango, (2005), *ibid*, p.33

¹⁸⁵ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid*, p.29; Mango, (2005), *ibid*, p.33.

¹⁸⁶ Bila, Fikret, (2004), *Hangi PKK?*, [Which PKK?], Ankara: Umit Publications, p.24; Turkish National Police, (1999), *PKK Faaliyetleri*, [PKK Activities], Ankara: Turkish National Police Publications, p.41.

¹⁸⁷ Toreli, Turkmen, (2002), *PKK Teror Orgutu*, [PKK Terrorist Organization], Suleyman Demirel University, Institute for Social Sciences, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Isparta, p.54.

Kurdistan Revolution- Manifesto”¹⁸⁸, which was the basic document to guide them. However, publication of the document was postponed until 1978.¹⁸⁹

The second meeting was held in the same province in 1976.¹⁹⁰ In the second meeting, it was decided to travel to Turkey’s south-eastern provinces (Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Tunceli, Mardin, Kars, Agri, Kahramanmaras, and Elazig) and set up a local organization for propaganda activities and recruit new members.¹⁹¹ They were known as Kurdistan Revolutionaries, the National Liberation Army, or Apocus (apoists).¹⁹²

It is interesting that the PKK was formed in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, rather than in the southeast of Turkey where a large Kurdish population resides or in a Middle Eastern country.¹⁹³ Abdullah Ocalan decided to tour some cities to inspect what was going on and verify the reports that were coming to him.¹⁹⁴ He named the tour the ‘Kurdistan Journey,’ which included visits to Agri, Kars, Tunceli, Elazig, Diyarbakir, Urfa, and Gaziantep.¹⁹⁵

After returning to Ankara, Haki Karer, the second man at that time, was killed by the organization called Strekasor, which was another Marxist-Leninist Kurdist organization in 18 May 1977. As a result, Abdullah Ocalan became self concerned and decided to hide. Nevertheless, the leader of the Strekasor organization was also killed in Iskenderun in October 1977. In the meantime, Ocalan was working on the ‘Party Program’. It was decided to get the model from ‘Vietnamese Communist Party’ during a meeting held in Elazig. Ocalan married Kesire Yildirim.

¹⁸⁸ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1976), *Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu, Manifesto*, [The Path of Kurdistan Revolution- Manifest], <http://www.scribd.com/doc/8424952/Kurdistan-Devriminin-Yolu-MANIFESTO>, (Accessed on 12.04.2010).

¹⁸⁹ Bila, (2004), *ibid*, p.24; Ozcan, (1999), *ibid*, p.35.

¹⁹⁰ Abdullah Ocalan, Cemil Bayik, Sahin Donmez, A. Haydar Kaytan, Musa Erdogan, Kesire Yildirim, Turgut Cetineren, Ismet Kilic (that time was engaged to Kesire Yildirim, but later Ocalan married to her), Hasan Asgar Gurgoze, Ali Sir Gurgoze, Mustafa Dereli, Mustafa Karasu, Ismail Gungor, Kamer Ozkan, Mehmet Hayri Durmus, Kemal Aygun, Haki Karer, Baki Karer and Resul Altinok have attended the meeting.

Bila, (2004), *ibid*, p. 25, Turkish National Police, (1999), *ibid*, p.44.

¹⁹¹ Mango, (2005), *ibid*, p.34; Pirim, Oktay and Ortulu, Suha, (2000), *PKK’nin 20 Yillik Oyusu*, [Twenty Years History of PKK], Istanbul: Boyut Books, p.28.

¹⁹² Aydin, (1992), *ibid*, p.43, 44; Akbulut, Ilhan, (1988), *Devlet Terorizmi ve Ulke Boluculugu*, [State Terrorism and Country Separatism], Istanbul: Bogazici Publications, p.105.

¹⁹³ Criss, Nur Bilge, (1995), “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, No.1, p.18.

¹⁹⁴ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid*, p.37.

¹⁹⁵ Ocalan, (1995), *ibid*, p.30.

After their marriage, Ocalan and his wife moved to Diyarbakir and he was granted with full authority.¹⁹⁶ It was also decided that people would quit schools and their jobs and would work as professionals in the party. Another important milestone in the way of establishing a party was the publication of ‘Serxwebun’ journal in October 1978.¹⁹⁷ Publication of a journal that would reflect the opinion, and ideas of the organization, was one of the most important requirements in that time. Abdullah Ocalan identified that time as “the time that the ideology would be transferred to the people in a strategically and tactically organized way”.¹⁹⁸

First publication of Serxwebun journal included ‘The Path of Kurdistan Revolution- Manifesto’ with the article “Çıkarken” (By Starting).¹⁹⁹

Kurdistan Revolutionaries had various armed struggle with some groups such as ‘Path to Freedom’ and DDKD in Diyarbakir and KUK (Liberation Army of Kurdistan [Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari]) in Mardin and ‘Liberation of People’ in Tunceli to establish the hierarchy. After those events, there were several incidents, which led to emphasis on the idea of becoming a party.

The PKK was formally established in Seyfettin Zogurlu’s house, a member of the organization, on 27 November 1978 in Diyarbakir, Lice, the village named Fis²⁰⁰, with 22 delegating, including Abdullah Ocalan.²⁰¹ Since they were known as other names, they changed their name to Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan workers Party). Moreover, they named this the first meeting of congress.

The structure of the party was prepared as²⁰²;

Headquarter Executive Council Members;

Abdullah Ocalan - General Secretary

¹⁹⁶ Bila,(2004), ibid, p.25; Ozcan, (1999), ibid, p.38.

¹⁹⁷ Bila, (2004), ibid, p.26.

¹⁹⁸ Ocalan, (1995), ibid, p.57.

¹⁹⁹ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1992), *Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu*, [The Path of Kurdistan Revolution], Forth Edition, p.iii.

²⁰⁰ Demirel, Emin, (2002), *Teror*, [Terror], Istanbul: Alfa Publications, p.65.

²⁰¹ Turk Demokrasi Vakfi, (1996), *Türkiye Gerceğinde Kurtler ve PKK Teroru*, [Kurds and PKK Terror in the Turkey’s Reality], Ankara: Koneks Press, p.35.

²⁰² Yilmaz, Omer, (2007), *PKK Teror Örgütünün Siyasal Alan ve Legalleşme Faaliyetleri (1975-2006)*, [The Legalization and Political Field Activities of PKK (1975-2006)], Police Academy, Institute for Security Studies, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Ankara, p.21; Rojaciwan.com, (n.d.), “PKK’nin Kuruluş Tarihi”, [History of PKK’s Establishment], <http://www.rojaciwan.com/makale-315.html>, (Accessed on 12.04.2009).

Cemil Bayik - Deputy General Secretary
Sahin Donmez – Member

Headquarter Committee Members;

Abdullah Ocalan - General Secretary
Cemil Bayik - Deputy General Secretary
Mehmet Karasungur – Ch. Military Committee
Mazlum Dogan – Ch. Publication
Sahin Donmez – Organization Member
Mehmet Hayri Durmus - Organization Member
Kesire Yildirim - Organization Member
Baki Karer - Organization Member

Region Preparation Committee Members;

Ali Cetiner – Secretary
Abdullah Kumral – Member
Faruk Ozdemir – Responsible for Military Activities
Saime Askin – Ch. of Propaganda, Publication and Women Section
Ali Omurcan – Responsible for the Workers
Ali Erek – Responsible for Youth

Kesire Yildirim was the only woman who attended the establishment of the PKK. She also established relations with the Soviet Culture Center in Damascus, Syria, where Soviet agents trained terrorist fugitives from Turkey.²⁰³ The first minute of the meeting involved keeping the meeting and the establishment a secret until the planned effective activity took place.²⁰⁴

Security forces captured one of HQ Committee Members, Sahin Donmez, in May 1979 in Elazig.²⁰⁵ He and the members were afraid of being captured as well, because Sahin Donmez confessed very important information about the organization.²⁰⁶ It started a new era of the PKK's prison activities after Sahin

²⁰³ Yildirim was also sent to Iran in 1988 to supervise PKK's activities while the group was moving its camps from Iraq to Iran. The British Broadcasting System, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1988.

²⁰⁴ Aydin, (1992), *ibid*, p.50.

²⁰⁵ Bal, (2003), *ibid.*, p.166.

²⁰⁶ Ocalan, (1995), *ibid*, p.31.

Donmez and some PKK members' were captured.²⁰⁷ Ocalan declared Sahin Donmez²⁰⁸ as a traitor and gave explicit orders to members that if anyone were to be captured, he must never reveal any information.²⁰⁹

Duran Kalkan was appointed to replace Sahin Donmez at the Central Committee meeting that was held on 05 June 1979. The most important resolution of the meeting was the restructuring of the provinces. The regions of the activities were rearranged into four provinces, which were North, Middle, South and West. The Northern province consisted of Mus, Erzurum, Kars, the Middle province consisted of Bingol, Tunceli, Elazig, the Southern province consisted of Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, Mardin, Urfa and the Western province consisted of Gaziantep, Maras, and Malatya.²¹⁰

The organizations' members did not want Ocalan to be in jeopardy. Moreover, Ocalan was worried about his life as well, and the members wanted him to leave the country. Ocalan went to Syria in July 1979²¹¹ with Ethem Akcan who arranged the whole trip and the accommodations in Syria.²¹² Except for two brief visits to Eastern Europe, he stayed in Syria until the Turkish government forced the Syrians to expel him in October 1998.²¹³

After supplying a safe place for himself, Ocalan ordered his members to create a big event to promulgate the organization. On 29 July 1979, the PKK attacked against Mehmet Celal Bucak, a high official in the conservative Justice Party and well-known landlord in eastern Turkey, incited a campaign of violence against government officials and between terrorist groups of varying ideologies. The PKK condemned Bucak for "exploiting the peasants" and "collaborating" with the

²⁰⁷ Yimaz, (2007), *ibid*, p.33.

²⁰⁸ He was killed by PKK in Istanbul 03 April 1990. "PKK Tarafından Oldurulenlerin Listesi", [List of people who were executed by PKK], <http://www.habervitrini.com/haber.asp?id=342732>, (Accessed on 13.04.2009).

²⁰⁹ Ortulu and Pirim, (2000), *ibid*, p.35.

²¹⁰ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid*, p.44.

²¹¹ Ozdag argues that Ocalan left the country because Bulgarian Secret Service has warned him.

Ozdag, Umit, (2007), *Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonlari*, [PKK Operations of Turkish Army], Istanbul: Pegasus Publications, p.37.

²¹² Manaz, Abdullah, (2006), *Türkiye'ye Yonelik Teror Odaklari*, [Terror Aims Towards Turkey], Istanbul: IQ Kultur Publications, p.100.

²¹³ Mango, (2005), *ibid*, p.34.

government. Soon after, the PKK attempted to assassinate him, but failed.²¹⁴ Armed conflict in Siverek and the villages continued. While armed militants in positions of the organization were combating the members of the Bucak family, some of the people left the villages. Pamphlets that declared the establishment of the PKK were left at the location of the incident.²¹⁵ This attack, however, promoted conflicts between right and left wing groups in Turkey, leading to PKK attacks on so-called fascist groups, including the DHB (Revolutionary Unity of the People [Devrimci Halkin Birliği]), HK (Liberation of the People [Halkin Kurtulusu]), DDKD and KUK. Almost 100 people lost their lives because of armed conflicts.²¹⁶

After armed struggle with other Kurdish organizations, Abdullah Ocalan had extended his goals towards the tribes in the southeast that were known as being loyal to the Turkish Republic.²¹⁷

The PKK had separated its activities between rural area activities and city activities.²¹⁸ The PKK tried to create conflict among the tribes by giving support to different ones against the others, especially in Batman, Siverek, Kiziltepe, and Derik.²¹⁹

Because of various struggles between the rightist and leftist groups, security analysts did not focus on the PKK. Ocalan took advantage and felt his organization was powerful so he focused his attention on the security forces and the Turkish Police became their new target.²²⁰

Since its establishment, the PKK was responsible for killing 354 and injuring 356 people until the military coup in 12 September 1980.²²¹

3.1.4. Preparation, 1980-1984

²¹⁴ This incident occurred on 31 July 1979, when five terrorists drove up to a village home in southeast of Turkey and 'riddled it' with bullets. Bucak was wounded, as were seven others. An eight year-old child was killed in the attack. Reuters Wire Service, 31 July 1979.

²¹⁵ Yilmaz, (2007), *ibid*, p.35

²¹⁶ Yilmaz, (2007), *ibid*, p.35

²¹⁷ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid*, p.35

²¹⁸ Aydin, (1992), *ibid*, p.52

²¹⁹ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid*, p.35

²²⁰ *Ibid*, p.36

²²¹ Ozcan, Ali Nihat, (2000), "Teror ve Ekonomi", [Terror and Economy], Ozdag, Umit and Ozturk, M.Osman (Ed.), Ankara: ASAM Publications, p.300.

It is very important to analyze the activities of the PKK before, during, and after the military coup. Ocalan had taken 250²²² of his men to be trained at the bases of the PLO (Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyat [The Palestine Liberation Organization]) with help of agent Yevgeny Primakov, of the KGB (Komitjet Gosudarstvjennoj Bjezopasnost [Committee for State Security]).²²³ Taking the advantage of the lack of authority in Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the PKK has sent one of its members, Mehmet Karasungur, to Iran to enhance their relations with the Iran-Kurdistan Democratic Party.²²⁴

In January and April 1980, Cemil Bayik, a member of the central committee, had agreed on the decision that PKK members were to be trained on explosives devices by Armenian ASALA (Armenian Secret for the Liberation of Armenia) members.²²⁵

The PKK and ASALA terror organizations held a joint press conference on 8 April 1980 in the City of Sidon in Lebanon where they issued a declaration. Since this drew a significant reaction, they decided that their relations should be maintained on a secretive basis. The responsibility of the attacks launched against the Turkish Consulate General in Strasbourg on 9 November 1980 and the Turkish Airline office in Rome on 19 November 1980 were undertaken jointly by the ASALA and the PKK. The PKK announced the period from 21 to 28 April 1980 as the “Red Week” and started to organize meetings on April 24 as the anniversary of the alleged so-called genocide against Armenians. Honorary membership of the Association of Armenian Writers was awarded to Abdullah Ocalan for his 'contributions to the idea of a Greater Armenia'.²²⁶

The PKK had sent its first armed group to Turkey for armed struggle in April 1980, but before any action took place, Turkish Armed Forces had taken over the government in 12 September 1980. Mainly due to the destabilizing influence of terrorism on Turkey's social, political, and economic condition, on 12 September

²²² Ocalan argues that he could only get room for 250 people, Ocalan, (1995), *ibid*, p.50.

²²³ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid*, p.38.

²²⁴ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid*, p. 46; Yilmaz, (2007), *ibid*, p.36.

²²⁵ Yimaz, (2007), *ibid*, p.36.

²²⁶ “Armenian Terrorism”, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D313A781CAA92714FCE03268F856B8965D8A>, (Accessed on 12.05.2010).

1980, the Turkish Armed Forces, seized power, suspended the constitution, dissolved the assembly, proclaimed martial law, and set up a military-civilian cabinet.²²⁷ From 1978 to 1982, the Turkish National Security Council confirmed approximately 43,000 incidents of terrorism in Turkey and an average of 28 terrorist-related deaths per day. Because of anti-terror operations, the Turkish Armed Forces had captured many PKK terrorist between 1980 and 1982. When some of the terrorists were arrested, some of them were sentenced to capital punishment.²²⁸

In June 1981, Ocalan went to the Helve training camp located in Lebanon, but on the Syrian border, and protected by the Syrian Army. He allocated this base to the organization, and the PKK held its first conference in the Helve training camp between 15-26 July 1981.

In order to protect its members from ongoing operations in Turkey, the PKK had decided to take its members away Turkey. The first training camp was established in Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley in 1982, with the support of the PLO and Syria.²²⁹

In June 1982, the Israeli Armed Forces started a military operation against Palestine camps existing in Lebanon. The PKK terrorists had to conceal themselves in Palestine guerillas and moved to Syria. They left 20 people in the Helve camp, resulting in the PKK's need for another place to move. They had chosen Northern Iraq, but this territory was controlled by Mesut Barzani's KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Celal Talabani's YNK (Yekîî Nîstimanî Kurdistan [PUK, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]. The President of Syria, Hafiz Esad, had convinced Mesut Barzani to allow the PKK to use KDP's camp in Northern Iraq.²³⁰ The PKK moved to camps in Northern Iraq between January 1982 to October 1982.

The PKK held its second congress on 20-25 August 1982 in Syria, close to the Jordanian border.²³¹ In this congress, the PKK decided to start long term

²²⁷ Reuters Wire Service, 12 September 1980.

²²⁸ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid*, p.38.

²²⁹ *Ibid*, p.39.

²³⁰ Iraq supported the Muslim Brothers by allocating weapons, especially in city Hama in 1982. Therefore, Syria was seeking an opportunity to use against Saddam's administration.

²³¹ Aydin, (1992), *ibid*, p.82.

resistance acts in Turkey.²³² Therefore, the PKK took advantage of the border between Iraq and Turkey and sent its members to Turkey to prepare depots for their food supplies and weapons in 1983.

A treaty of border security and cooperation was made between Iraq and Turkey in 1983. Because of the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran, Iraq had difficulties controlling the border, and therefore, allowed a Turkey pass 10 kilometer on Iraq's side to chase terrorists.²³³ Turkey had made her first cross-border operation on 25 May 1983.²³⁴

After one month of Turkey's cross-border operation, Barzani and Ocalan had declared KDP and PKK cooperation in July 1983.²³⁵ Ocalan thought that the PKK was powerful enough to start its activities, and consequently sent the armed groups to the southeast of Turkey. Between May – June 1984, terrorist groups have passed to Turkey as shown below:²³⁶

- Hakkari region from Iraq
- Eruh-Sirmak region from Iraq
- Van-Catak region from Iraq
- Mardin region from Iraq
- Sason-Diyarbakir-Bingol region from Iraq
- Kars-Agri region from Iran
- Adiyaman region from Syria.

3.1.5. Terror Campaign, 1984 to 1st Gulf War

In late June 1984, the PKK had formed three armed propaganda units.²³⁷ Moreover, these units were formed under the establishment of HRK (Hazen Rizgariya Kurdistan

²³² Ozdag, (2007), *ibid*, p.40.

²³³ Hale, William, (2002), *Turkish Foreign Policy*, London: Frank Cass Publications, p.172.

²³⁴ Ozdag, *ibid*, p.47.

²³⁵ Ozdag, Umit, (1999), *Turkiye, Kuzey Irak ve PKK*, [Turkey, Northern Iraq and PKK], Ankara: Avrasya Strategic Research Center (ASAM) Publications, p.36.

²³⁶ Aydin, (1992), *ibid*, p.96.

²³⁷ Mahsun Korkmaz, aka 'Agit', was the leader of July 14 Armed Propaganda Unit, Abdullah Ekinci, aka 'Gozluklu Ali (Spectacled Ali)', was the leader of March 21 Armed Propaganda Unit,

Halil Kaya, aka 'Terzi Cemal, Kor Cemal (Blind Cemal, Tailor Cemal), was the leader of May 18 Armed Propaganda Unit.

Kalkan, Duran, (n.d.), "Kurdistan'da Hicbir Sey Savassiz Kazanilmiyordu", [Nothing Could Be Won Without War in Kurdistan], <http://dengemed.net/modules.php?name=Forum&topic=1627.0>, (Accessed on 23.05.2009).

[Kurdistan Freedom Brigade]). The PKK attacked Eruh and Semdinli counties, murdered one soldier, and injured nine soldiers and three civilians on 15 August 1984. The group that was supposed to attack in Catak County was confused with the date, and the attack did not occur.²³⁸

The PKK announced the establishment of the HRK²³⁹ by leaving pamphlets in place.²⁴⁰ Those attacks were described as 15 August Leap.²⁴¹

Those attacks made a huge impact among the public. However, officials could not understand the seriousness of the attack and unfortunately, they called this incident made by a “little gang”.²⁴²

Nevertheless, security forces took the attacks seriously and implemented operations against the organization, and killed terrorists.²⁴³ Although security forces took control and defeated the PKK in the region, the PKK attacked a military unit in Senoba-Sirnak and killed three soldiers in 24 September 1984.²⁴⁴ After this incident, the PKK terrorists attacked Karagecit Village and killed nine people including three babies in 08 November 1984.²⁴⁵

The achievement of security forces made Abdullah Ocalan take his terrorist groups to North Iraq and Syria for recovery. His intention was to establish regional militia forces. Abdullah Ocalan with the members of the organization: Duran Kalkan, Selahattin Celik, Mahsum Korkmaz, Abdullah Ekinci, Sabri Ok, Halil Kaya, Ali Omurcan, and Halil Ates decided to announce the establishment of the ERNK (Eniya Rizgariya Netawiya Kurdistan [Kurdistan National Liberation Front] by creating large-scale activities. Sabri Ok and some other members were caught in Turkey.²⁴⁶

²³⁸ Ozturk, Saygi, (2002), *Devletin Derinliklerinde*, [In the Deepness of the State], Ankara: Umit Press, p.18.

²³⁹ Ersever, A. Cem, (1993), *Kurtler PKK ve Abdullah Ocalan*, [Kurds PKK and Abdullah Ocalan], Istanbul: Milenyum Publications, p.102.

²⁴⁰ Marcus Aliza, (2009), *Blood and Belief, PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, New York and London: New York University Press, p.115.

²⁴¹ Ocalan, (1995), *ibid*, p.55.

²⁴² Kislali, Mehmet Ali, (1996), *Güneydoğu Düşük Yoğunluklu Catisma*, [Low Intensity Conflict in Southeast], Ankara: Umit Publications, p.169.

²⁴³ Ozdag, (1999), *ibid*, p.42

²⁴⁴ Kundakci, Hasan, (2004), *Güneydogu'da Unutulmayanlar*, [Unforgettables in South-east], Istanbul: Alfa Publications, p.29.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.31.

²⁴⁶ Bila, (2004), *ibid*, p.41.

Planned activities could not be executed; therefore, Abdullah Ocalan announced the establishment of ERNK in the capital of Greece, Athens in 21 March 1985.²⁴⁷ Mahsum Korkmaz was assigned as the leader of ERNK.

Another important measure was by the Turkish Government to reactivate the Temporary Village Guards (Gecici Koy Koruculari [GKK]) in 27 June 1985. The PKK had started planning new terror acts in 1985 and 1986. Abdullah Ocalan had terrorists undergo military training in the camps located in Syria, Lebanon, and North Iraq during winter times. After February 1986, new groups arrived in Turkey. Another incident influenced the PKK was death of Mahsum Korkmaz who was killed by security forces in Mountain Gabar in 28 February 1986. As they were planning, the PKK lacked the ability to terrorize efficiently.²⁴⁸

To evaluate the situation and make new plans for the future, the PKK had its third congress between 25-30 October 1986 in Bekaa Valley.²⁴⁹ Abdullah Ocalan decided to replace Duran Kalkan, Selahatten Celik, Kesire Ocalan, Abdullah Ekinci, Ali Omurcan, and Halil Atac because of their failures with Halil Kaya, Sah Ismail Al, Haydar Altun, Sahin Balic, Cemil Isik, Sehmus Yigit, Muslum Durdun, Semdin Sakik and Cihangir Hazir.²⁵⁰ It was the third congress which really marked the beginning of an era of bloody suppression comparable, in a way, to the era of the wash out and Stalinist trials of the Soviet communist party in 1937.²⁵¹

At the congress, HRK was abolished and ARGK (Arteseye Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan [Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army]) was established. In addition, it was agreed on to start the so-called 'military recruitment law' (voluntary and compulsory), execute temporary village guards and their families, and replace the name of the Helve Camp with Academy of Mahsum Korkmaz.

After the congress, the PKK increased its terrorist activities in 1986 and 1987, and instead of attacking or ambushing military units, they attacked villages and

²⁴⁷ Aydin, (1992), *ibid.*, p.166.

²⁴⁸ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.41.

²⁴⁹ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.62.

²⁵⁰ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.41.

²⁵¹ Kutschera, Chris, (2000), "Disarray Inside PKK", *The Middle East*, No.301, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/DISARRAY+INSIDE+PKK-a061963559>, (Accessed on 08.06.2009); Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.62.

civilians. The PKK attacked 14 villages and they killed 242 peasants and wounded 115. Besides attacking villages, they demolished 137 schools. Turkey blamed the KDP for the PKK attacks that originated from North Iraq and carried out an air attack on the Sirat, Ela, and Alamis regions in North Iraq in March 1987. That incident made the KDP dissolve the agreement between the KDP and the PKK in May 1987.²⁵²

While terror incidents increased in Turkey, Turkish Government modified the enforcement and martial law to exclude 10 cities (Hakkari, Van, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, Bitlis, Siirt, Bingol, Mus and Tunceli) in 14 July 1987. In addition, the Gendarmerie Security Command was established.

Taking the advantage of the Iran-Iraq war, the PKK used Iranian territory to pass to Turkey. The PKK used three countries, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, to pass Turkey and coerced Turkish Security Forces to expand its forces to vast areas. The PKK intended to put local people between the Turkish Government and the PKK. Ocalan called this situation “People are taking both side (Turkey and PKK) as government”.²⁵³

After having no relations with Barzani’s KDP, the PKK wanted to establish partnerships in North Iraq, and after having long negotiations, the PKK had a protocol of mutual understanding with the Celal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 01 May 1988.

The Iran-Iraq war ended on 18 July 1988. After the war, Iraq within the context of ‘Operation Anfal’ attacked to Barzani’s forces in Northern Iraq. Many people died in the attacks, and Barzani’s forces had to go to Iran. Taking this opportunity, the PKK went to Barzani’s camp and captured all weapons. Even some of Barzani’s forces joined to the PKK. Because of ‘Operation Anfal’, 80.000 Iraqi Kurds arrived at the Turkish border which Turkey opened.²⁵⁴ The PKK took this advantage and increased its members.

²⁵² Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.66, 67.

²⁵³ Bila, 92004), *ibid.*, p.44, 45.

²⁵⁴ Ozkan, Tuncay, (2004), *CIA Kurtleri, Kurt Devletin Gizli Tarihi*, [CIA Kurds, Secret History of Kurdish State], Istanbul: Alfa Publications, p.73.

In 1988, the main goal of the PKK was to establish a liberated area (a safe region) in the regions of Siirt-Sirnak-Uludere-Beytussebap-Hakkari-Van (so-called Botan), as well as to establish a mobile guerilla brigade. However, the PKK could not establish neither a liberated area nor a mobile guerilla brigade. Consequently, Abdullah Ocalan was not pleased with the developments and told the people who were with him “....We are looking at practices of various countries, they have begun to establish a guerilla team with three hundred people and increased it to ten thousand people in two years. We initially started with three hundred people as well, but, we are still with five hundred people, why...”²⁵⁵ However, the bottom line was that the PKK killed 104 people and wounded 34 citizens in 1988.²⁵⁶

Abdullah Ocalan aimed to reach his objectives in 1989, which he could not accomplish in 1988. Abdullah Ocalan stated that the number of militants who were trained and driven into Turkey were around 1,500 members in 1989.²⁵⁷ Moreover, he planned to hold the fourth congress of the organization in the so-called Botan area in 1990. However, the PKK could not achieve Ocalan’s objectives, and only executed bloody activities, killing 174 people and wounding 73 citizens in 1989.²⁵⁸

The PKK’s major objective in 1990 was to establish a liberated area in the same manner and hold the fourth congress in Turkey. It planned attacks against civil and military targets to reach these goals. In addition, the PKK ordered to end the killing of villagers and to offer village guards (and their families) capitulation.²⁵⁹

The first public demonstration occurred during the funeral ceremony of 13 dead PKK terrorists who were killed on 12 March 1990 in Nusaybin. The community had significantly supported the PKK and these demonstrations were named ‘serhildan’.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1989), *Parti Onderliginin Ocak Cozumlemeleri*, [January Analysis of Party Leadership], Damascus, p.170.

²⁵⁶ Aydin, (1992), *ibid.*, p.129-131.

²⁵⁷ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1989), *Parti Onderliginin Cozumlemeleri*, [Analysis of Party Leadership], Damascus, p.18.

²⁵⁸ Aydin, (1992), *ibid.*, p.129-131.

²⁵⁹ Gunter, Michael M., (1997), *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*, USA: Palgrave Macmillan Publications, p.49; Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.83.

²⁶⁰ Marcus, (2009), *ibid.*, p.140.

Since the PKK could not establish a liberated area, it wanted to organize its second conference to discuss some issues and also prepare for the fourth congress. The PKK held the second conference in Lebannon between 04-13 May 1990. Later, the PKK held its fourth congress in Haftanin, North Iraq on December 1990.²⁶¹

In this conference,²⁶² the decisions made were;

- ✓ To separate activities in the highest level as political bureau and military committee and make the political bureau responsible from front activities,
- ✓ Because uprisings are going to increase, people should be organized accordingly and front organization should be formed according to the developments,
- ✓ To develop press activities and each so-called region (state) should publish its own media organ,
- ✓ To establish legal institutions and foundations and to bring community around them,
- ✓ To establish ERNK's sub units and organize them in the public,
- ✓ Significance should be given to religious and denominational organizations and to establish organizations under this purpose,
- ✓ To initiate the works related to the development of cultural activities and Kurdish language,
- ✓ To continue the works for preparation towards the assemblage of so-called national congress and so-called national assembly,
- ✓ To spread armed activities from rural areas to metropolitans and increase the number of armed units.

Following these decisions, and mass demonstrations in the region cities, actions regarding going out of business and switching off the ignition key had been brought into the agenda. In the fourth congress the leader of the organization, Abdullah Ocalan, did not attend. Although Abdullah Ocalan did not attend this congress, he communicated that instruction and evaluations were to be based on the decisions of the attendants. Decisions were made similar to those made in the second

²⁶¹ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.48.

²⁶² Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.99, 100.

conference during the congress held under the presidency council, Mehmet Cahit Sener, a member of central committee of the organization.

Decisions were as follows;²⁶³

✓ Decisions were taken towards the establishment of the solidarity of aggregate activities and political activities as well as the creation of liberated areas part by part,

✓ Due to the termination of the Socialist Block in the congress, in accordance with the changes in the balances of the world under the title of “Situation of World Humanity”, some evaluations were made to be deemed escape from Marxism.

✓ The most important decision taken in the congress was “the widening of so-called guerillas”. In addition to these decisions, further ones were taken as below;

- To abandon the violence against public in appearance,
- To proclaim amnesty in order to abolish GKK (Temporary Village Guards) system,
- To organize going out of business, protest marches and hunger strikes,
- To bury dead PKK members with ceremony battles,
- To penetrate into political parties that are organizing legal activities,
- To support mass demonstrations with armed actions,
- To celebrate the dates; August 15, March 21 and May 1, as holidays,
- To approach tribes moderately and to gain them,
- To organize assassins against Turkish officials,

3.1.6. 1st Gulf War to Ocalan’s Capture

Following the fourth congress, the Gulf Crisis began with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 02 August 1990, which became an unexpected opportunity for the terrorist organization. During the Gulf Crisis, prohibition of the north on the 36th parallel by the Baghdad Administration created significant results for both the PKK and Turkey.

²⁶³ Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.100-103.

The PKK settled in the north of Iraq and established camps. Weapons and ammunition left by the Iraqi Army while falling back from the north were taken by the PKK. Within this period, the organization showed important development in terms of logistics. As of autumn 1991, the PKK began raiding border military units starting with the Samanli border military unit. The PKK strated to regain power and because it could return to North Iraq easily by the utilizing the Northern Iraqi chain of mountains, it could arrange raids with 200- 300 terrorists.

Umit Ozdag argues that the PKK had the best opportunity to reach the second stage, strategic balance.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Ihsan Bal argues the PKK could never obtain any safe region although they had the best period of their history during those years.²⁶⁵ Abdullah Ocalan explains strategic balance period like this;²⁶⁶ “During strategic defense period, -that the periods are not so distinctive for us- even we can not reach the balance in terms of militarily superiority, we can easily reach the balance by political superiority and we can say we already reached it. What was meant by political balance stage and determinations regarding administrations were: Even guerilla can not reach the military balance within itself, it is the type of war playing the fundamental role to determine the victory. This is its different face from national independence wars of other countries. They may claim to accomplish by ordinary wars. However, we can accomplish many targets through guerilla war only. The truth in our heart is guerilla’s political qualification, political superiority and to push the enemy towards bottom in terns of political aspects”

Within this period, TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) began to apply the concept of regional dominancy. In August 1991, the Turkish Armed Forces intruded North Iraq and performed a 14-day large scaled operation. They performed these operations on October 11, and October 25, successfully establishing regional dominancy.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Ozdag, Umit, (1999), “Terorle Mücadelede Varılan Nokta”, [The point at the Countering Terrorism], *Cumhuriyetin 75nci Yilinda Dogu Anadolu’da Guvenlik ve Huzur Sempozyumu Bildiriler*, [Security and Peace Symposium in East of Anatolia at the 75th year of Republic] 17-18-19 Aralik 1998”, Izmir: Caglayan Publications, p.352.

²⁶⁵ Bal, (2003), *ibid.*, p.253.

²⁶⁶ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1993), *4ncu Kongreye Sunulan Politik Rapor*, [Political Report to Fourth Congress], p.178, 179; Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.102.

²⁶⁷ Ozdag, (1999), *ibid.*, p.76.

The year 1991 was a time when the organization realized the importance of the establishment of legal organizations, which can reach to the public as well as work for the press. As a matter of fact, in the general elections of this year, 22 parliamentarians, from HEP (People's Labor Party, Halkin Emek Partisi) which is a Kurdish origin party supported by the organization, had been elected as parliamentarians from the list of the SHP (Social Democrat People's Party, Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti). The election campaign of HEP and SHP was run by ERNK. The results of the election displayed the PKK as victorious.²⁶⁸ This situation allowed the organization to gain power on a political platform and ensured that Kurdish issues remain on the agenda for a longer time.

In early 1992, the PKK decided to establish liberated areas again, but could not achieve that goal. The PKK had created civil trouble in Cizre, Silopi, and Nusaybin on 21 March 1992 resulting in 75 deaths. In 1992, due to cross border operations performed by security forces in North Iraq, the PKK lost significant power.

Consequently, due to the reasons why the organization could not achieve most if its objectives in 1992, such as border line and cross border operations performed by security forces, the PKK's loss of power, and the continuation of its terrorist image in international environments, the PKK wanted to proclaim a one sided cease fire. Abdullah Ocalan reiterated his opinion in a press meeting on 17 March 1993 held together with Celal Talabani in Barelías, a 1,5 hour distance to Beirut.²⁶⁹

After the one-sided cease-fire agreement of the PKK, the insincerity of this agreement was disclosed when 33 soldiers, 3 teachers, and 2 others were killed on the Elazığ-Bingöl highway on 24 May 1993.²⁷⁰

The Constitutional Court ordered the closure of the HEP and its activities based on a breach of constitutional and political parties' law on 14 June 1993. When the court case for the closure of the HEP began on 07 March 1993, the DEP (Democracy Party, Demokrasi Partisi) was founded. On 25 February 1994, the DEP

²⁶⁸ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.94.

²⁶⁹ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.52-55.

²⁷⁰ Pirim and Ortulu, (2000), *ibid.*, p.196.

decided to boycott the local elections (27 March 1994). A case was opened in the Constitutional Court to terminate this party for reasons including assertions made that the boycott decision was taken upon the PKK's request and some organic links between the DEP and the PKK.²⁷¹

The Constitutional Court closed the DEP on 16 June 1994. Some parliamentarians were convicted under Article 8 of the Law of Fight Against Terrorism and under Article 168 of the Turkish Criminal Law²⁷². One month prior to the closure of the DEP, work towards the foundation of HADEP (People's Democracy Party, Halkin Demokrasi Partisi) had begun and was finally founded on 11 May 1994.

The PKK had its third conference under Abdullah Ocalan's supervision between 5-15 March 1994 in Syria. Decisions were as follows;

- ✓ To shift armed struggle towards Caucasians and Black Sea rural areas (Artvin-Hopa-Trabzon) (North Opening Plan),
- ✓ Primarily starting with Western European Countries, open representative offices of the organizations in all countries,
- ✓ To widen TV and radio broadcasts by renting a satellite in Europe. So the PKK's propaganda activities will reach wider areas,

To realize actions based on bombing and sabotage metropolitan provinces in Turkey and tourism regions, which can create sensation and splash.

With the Abdullah Ocalan's instruction, the HADEP had undertaken the ERNK's functions. City activities were carried out through the "Committees for Community, Committees for Arrested People's Families, Youth Commissions, and Women Commissions"²⁷³ founded by the HADEP.

The PKK's activities were weakened due to the operations performed by security forces and the 'regional dominance concept'. Abdullah Ocalan held the fifth congress, which he regarded as "an adjudication congress" between 08-28 January 1995 in North Iraq. In congress, the general presidency authority was established to

²⁷¹ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.60.

²⁷² Bardak, Cengiz, (1997), *Terorle Mucadele Kanunu ve Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemeleri Kanunu*, [Counter Terrorism Law and State Security Court Law], Ankara: Yetkin Publications, p.266.

²⁷³ Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.133.

substitute the PKK general secretary and presidency council, in order to centralize power. The PKK removed the hammer and sickle from its flag, which was a socialist symbol and accepted a motif in yellow- green and red. In accordance with the decisions taken in the fifth congress, the PKK signed a protocol with Marxist-Leninist organizations and decided to move in tandem on 22 December 1996. One of the decisions made in this congress was to take notice of sensational actions such as suicide attacks in order to provide moral support. After the attack, suicide bombers will have the honor of being martyr and hero of the PKK. Another important result of the congress was the establishment of the “Kurdish Parliament in Exile”. This decision of the congress was announced in Brussels on 12 January 1995. After that, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile was officially inaugurated in Holland on 12 April 1994. The PKK had concentrated on political activities for the recognition of Kurdish identity.

In the elections on 24 December 1995, the HADEP established a coalition with the SIP (Socialist Power Party, Sosyalist İktidar Partisi), the BSP (United Left Party, Birlesik Sol Parti) and the DDP (Democratic Change Party, Demokratik Degisim Partisi). They acquired 1.171.623 votes in the election.²⁷⁴ However, earned votes could not exceed the country limit line with its vote by a rate of 4.17 percent, where the limit was 10 percent. The HADEP took votes by a rate of 17 percent in the east and southeast provinces.

The PKK’s fourth conference was held in a camp belonging to the organization between 01-15 May 1996 near Damascus. In this conference, the decisions were;

- ✓ To establish liberated areas,
- ✓ To arrange attacks on crowded places,
- ✓ To restart civil disobediences (serhildan),
- ✓ In addition, to develop suicide activities.²⁷⁵

There had been suicide attacks in the Tunceli, Adana, and Sivas provinces in 1996.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Belgenet.net, (n.d.), “1995 Yili Genel Secim Sonuclari”, [Results for the 1995 General Election], http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=12, (Accessed on 22.05.2009).

²⁷⁵ Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.139.

In 1996, 7873 PKK terrorists were caught (2972 dead, 88 wounded, 4536 caught, 277 surrender). Within in the same year, the PKK terrorists killed 157 civilians, 446 soldiers, 25 police officers and 132 GKKs (Temporary Village Guard).

Abdullah Ocalan attempted to motivate his members with his directive published under the title, "1997 Perspectives" indicating that the year 1997 shall be their "Resolution and Final Way". The PKK attempted to state that "an Independent Union Kurdistan" was being formed including North Iraq, and the East and Southeast of Anatolia. On the other hand, the PKK attempted to articulate that North Iraq and the PKK had integrated the slogan; "the PKK has been southernized". Meanwhile, the PKK brought another slogan; "the PKK is being Turkeyized (Turkiyelilesiyor)".

The PKK began the year 1997 with the slogans; "year of conquest, victory and final". Although the PKK received some training during the wintertime in North Iraq and Syria as well as from domestic areas, the PKK would not be successful in its armed struggle in the East and Southeast of Anatolia and began to weaken. Regarding propaganda activities toward the region's community, statements were used such as "PKK is not a Kurdist organization, a guerilla activity for the liberations of all Turkey's nations".

Following the cases of the PKK, a serious of operations by security forces were implemented; in August 1997, the burning of tourists around Kemer, in February 1998, shooting at traffic police the Kemer region again and, in early March of 1998, the murder of two people in a burning car. After these operations, three terrorists involved were caught, and ten terrorists were killed in the Serik and Manavgat regions. Thusly, the dream of expansion into the Mediterranean had ended.

In 1998, one of the top members of the organization, Semdin Sakik was caught on Abdullah Ocalan's request and he surrendered to the KDP forces. After he was caught, he was taken to Turkey²⁷⁷. This case weakened the PKK and brought it to its last stages. Between 15-25 March 1998, the PKK performed its fifth conference in Syria under the supervision of Abdullah Ocalan.

²⁷⁶ Details of the suicide attacks could be reached at next chapter , Timeline of PKK.

²⁷⁷ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.151

3.1.7. Ocalan's Capture to Today

As of late 1988, Turkey developed a new strategy in its struggle against the PKK and strengthened its statements and policies against Syria, which provided the most significant support to the PKK. The removal process of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK from their administration center in Syria reached an indispensable stage because of political pressures intensifying and the statement made by the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, Full General Atilla Ates on 16 September 1998 who threatened military intervention.²⁷⁸ Finally, Syrian authorities exiled Abdullah Ocalan on 09 October 1998.²⁷⁹ The tension between Turkey and Syria ended with the signing of a contract by Syria indicating the termination of PKK support.

Abdullah Ocalan's following travels provided a clear picture of his international connections. A Syrian plane first took him to South Cyprus. From there, he went to Greece, but Greek officials told him to move on within three hours. He then flew to Moscow.²⁸⁰ The Russian parliament voted that Abdullah Ocalan should be given political asylum, but the government disregarded the advice and tried to find another country willing to take him. The Italian Communist Party (Communist Refoundation/RC) invited Abdullah Ocalan to Rome. Abdullah Ocalan arrived in Rome with a fake passport and was arrested. Turkey wanted him extradited, but Italy refused compliance. Italy tried to persuade the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schoroeder, of Ocalan's extradition to Germany under an arrest warrant issued earlier by a German court. During this time, the PKK organized vicious demonstrations in Rome and in Western Europe while in Turkey, an unofficial boycott of Italian goods and services began.²⁸¹

Under these conditions, the German government chose safety in inactivity and refused to provide the arrest warrant of its own court. The court ordered Abdullah Ocalan's release and he took up residence in a villa on the outskirts of

²⁷⁸ Nachmani, Amikam, (2003), *Turkey: Facing a New Millenium, Coping With Intertwined Conflicts*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.49.

²⁷⁹ Ozkan, Tuncay, (2005), *Abdullah Ocalan Neden Verildi? Nasil Yakalandi? Ne Olacak?*, [How was Abdullah Ocalan Captured? What is Going to Happen?], Istanbul: Alfa Publications, p.64.

²⁸⁰ Ozkan, Tuncay, (2000), *Operasyon*, [Operation], Istanbul: Dogan Books, p.185.

²⁸¹ Radikal.com, (1998), "İtalyan Malları Kara Listede", [Italian Goods are in The Black List], <http://www.radikal.com.tr/1998/11/20/anasayfa/03tic.html>, (Accessed on 23.06.2009).

Rome.²⁸² A faction within the Greek government spirited Abdullah Ocalan out of Rome in hopes of finding a country outside of Europe willing to take him. Abdullah Ocalan once again flew to Greece on 31 January 1999. He was then taken Nairobi, where he was lodged on Greek diplomatic property. Abdullah Ocalan was getting restless and used his mobile phone frequently to call his friends. The calls were traced, and Abdullah Ocalan left his Greek safe house and was driven to Nairobi airport. He was carrying a South Cyprus passport, issued in a false name, and he thought that he was going to Holland, where he applied for political asylum. Instead, upon arrival at the airport, special forces hustled him onto a Turkish private plane.²⁸³ With the jointed operation of Turkey, US, Israel, and Kenya,²⁸⁴ he was taken to Turkey.²⁸⁵

While in the plane to Turkey after being captured, Abdullah Ocalan told the authorities “I like my country. My mother was also a Turk. If I get the chance to serve, I will do it. In case you give me the opportunity after coming to Turkey, I will serve, if we let the superiors know about this, I am pleased to serve my country.” When he was warned by the authorities that they were recording, he replied; “You can broadcast it, you have not tortured to me. These are my sincere feelings. I like Turkey. I also like the Turkish nation. I believe I will serve in the best manner.”²⁸⁶ With his speech, everybody was surprised; moreover, it was the sign of a change in the PKK’s strategy.²⁸⁷

The trial of Abdullah Ocalan began on 31 May 1999 before the Ankara State Security Court and in the presence of certain foreign representatives as well as the press.²⁸⁸ There were 773 press members including the international press. Abdullah Ocalan’s trial was carried out on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara. It took

²⁸² Hurriyet.com, (1998), “Katil Serbest”, [Murderer Has Been Released], <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1998/11/21/79157.asp>, (Accessed on 06.04.2009).

²⁸³ Cavit Caglar (ex-minister and parliamentar)’s plane was used for this operation.

²⁸⁴ Ozturk, Saygi, (2005), *Kirmizi Klasor*, [Red File], Istanbul: Harf Publications, p.23, 24.

²⁸⁵ Mango, (2005), *ibid.*, p.45

²⁸⁶ Hurriyet.com, (1999), “Hizmetinize Hazirim”, [I am ready for Your Service], <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1999/02/18/97244.asp>, (Accessed on 06.04.2009).

²⁸⁷ Abdullah Ocalan’s changed the whole strategy of PKK and came out with the idea of Democratic Republic. This part is going to be analyzed at the next chapter.

²⁸⁸ Alexander, Yonah, et all, (2008), *Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights and the European Union*, New York: Routledge Publishers, p.382.

place on the island for security and safety reasons.²⁸⁹ Abdullah Ocalan appeared as a poor figure when he appeared in the court. He declared that he would cooperate with Turkish state, and called on his supporters to end their attacks and leave Turkish territory. He was given the opportunity to defend himself, but his apology did not change the verdict.

Abdullah Ocalan's Final Statement²⁹⁰

"I reject the accusation of treason. I believe that I am struggling for the unity of the country and freedom. I believe that my struggle was for a democratic republic not against the republic.

I hope that the problem, which has grown as a result of historic mistakes, will reach a solution. I want this trial to contribute to that. I am repeating my call, the determined promise I made at the onset, for a fair and honorable peace and brotherhood in line with the democratic republic.

I call on humanity, the state and all societal forces to fulfill their duty. The future of the country lies with peace not war. I greet you all."

Verdict in the Trial of Abdullah Ocalan²⁹¹

"I am reading out the decision of the court. I am inviting you to stand while you listen to the paragraph on the verdict.

"As a result of this trial, our court has sentenced suspect Abdullah Ocalan to death in accordance with Article 125 of the Turkish Penal Code [TCK] as befitting his action, because we have determined that he undertook actions aimed at separating a portion of the territories that are under the sovereignty of the state from the administration of the state, by guiding and administering the armed terrorist organization PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party], which he established by means of the decisions he made and the commands and instructions he issued.

²⁸⁹ Ozturk, (2009), *ibid.*, p. 125-128.

²⁹⁰ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1999), "Ocalan's Final Statement", <http://web.archive.org/web/20060709075222/www.ict.org.il/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=23>, (Accessed on 14.04.2009).

²⁹¹ "Verdict in the Trial of Abdullah Ocalan", <http://web.archive.org/web/20060709075024/www.ict.org.il/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=21>, (Accessed on 14.04.2009).

In view of the intensity and continuity of the suspect's actions and the fact that thousands of innocent people - regardless of whether they were infants, children, women or elderly - were killed; because hundreds of the crimes that were committed as a vehicle for the intended crime require the death penalty; because the actions constitute a serious, close and great danger to the country; and in order to uphold criminal justice and comply with the rules of justice and propriety, the court has unanimously decided

- ✓ That there is no room for the application of Article 59 of the TCK with regard to the suspect.
- ✓ That the suspect be forever banned from public service in accordance with Article 31 of the TCK.
- ✓ That the suspect be kept in detention throughout the criminal process in accordance with Article 33 of the TCK.
- ✓ That the time spent by the suspect in detention during the course of the trial process be reduced from his sentence and that he remain under arrest in accordance with Article 40 of the TCK.
- ✓ That his personal belongings - namely, one Zenith watch, a glass case, a leather belt, Rayban sunglasses, and a tie - be returned to him.
- ✓ That the intervenors' right to compensation be preserved.
- ✓ That according to the official legal fees in effect at the time, the suspect pays 56,350,000 Turkish lira each to the lawyers representing the intervenors.
- ✓ In addition, that the decision be announced to the intervenors and their representatives who are not in attendance via TRT in accordance with Article 21 of Law 2845.

The decision is subject to appeal by both sides. Thank you to all.”

He was sentenced to death on 29 June 1999, and the court of appeal confirmed the sentence on 21 October 1999.²⁹²

The PKK terror organization held its sixth congress on January-February 1999 in Mountain Kandil. After congress was over, the following statements were

²⁹² Mango, (2005), *ibid.*, p.45.

published in the magazine named “Ozgur Politika” (Free Politics) on 05 March 1999. In congress;²⁹³

- ✓ With the expression, “Victory Congress is the reply against international conspiracy”, the PKK’s leader’s expel from Syria is criticized.

- ✓ In Congress, Abdullah Ocalan, was re-elected again as the general president with unanimity.

- ✓ The Turkish Republic’s administrators were warned by the expression “Current applications against our leader should be stopped immediately and he should be considered as the representative of our nation”.

- ✓ It was decided that ARGK should be continuously developed.

- ✓ It was stated, “it is required to carry out diplomatic relations primarily with Middle East nations and all socialist and democratic countries and environments in the world”.

- ✓ “All party militants (so-called) and ARGK warriors (so-called) should follow the path of Abdullah Ocalan”.

- ✓ It was emphasized that PAJK (Partiya Azadiya Jina Kurdistan [Kurdistan Liberal Women Party]) should be applied as action and under the framework of an organization.

- ✓ AHKO (Anatolia People’s Liberation Army, Anadolu Halk Kurtulus Ordusu) has been established.

- ✓ Congress confirmed Abdullah Ocalan’s revolutionist and socialist thoughts and way of life.

- ✓ Congress made a call saying “to establish a strong unity at the leadership line in order to exceed all kinds out of party movements.”

- ✓ It was stated “We call our nations start a struggle with all kinds of methods at a stage of nation rebellion in order to make the system collapsed in Turkey’s metropolitans which are in North Kurdistan (so-called). We call our nations who in other parts of Kurdistan (so-called) to support our president Abdullah Ocalan and our struggle in North Kurdistan (so-called) and we call Kurdistan (so-called) youth to execute the militancy of this struggle heroically and to join our guerrilla army (so-called) ARGK sides.”

²⁹³ Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.147, 148.

✓ It was said, “Kurdish nation’s civil disobedience (serhildan) will continue and guerilla (so-called) movement will come to a point to destroy the enemy”.

Following the statements above, 300 separate terrorist acts were executed and ten civilians were assassinated in the Istanbul province alone, especially in the period between 14 February-16 March 1999. In the following months, terrorist actions decreased both in Istanbul and other provinces. In the early months of 1999; hungerstrikes were organized in HADEP party buildings to protest the capture of Abdullah Ocalan. On the Imrali Island, Abdullah Ocalan stated on the 6 and 13th of May 1999 through his advocates; “I call PKK to abandon armed struggle as of 1 September 1999, which is being carried out since September 1998 and to take their forces out of the border for peace”. Meanwhile, eight PKK members that followed Ocalan’s call of “surrender,” and were residents of Europe, were arrested in Istanbul on 29 October 1999. In 1999, it was generally observed that PKK terrorists did not execute actions in rural areas.

Although it was estimated that after Abdullah Ocalan’s capture, the organization would lose power, on general elections in April 1999, showed the HADEP had increased its votes to 4,72% whereas it was 4,17% in 1995.²⁹⁴

During the PKK’s seventh congress held in the Iranian territory of the Kandil Mountains between 02-23 January 2000, the PKK decided to end its armed struggle. Abdullah Ocalan sent a 20 page report to congress with the head line “Kurds are the engine of the democracy” on 04 December 1999. Decisions taken in the congress in which the organization changed its strategy are as follows;²⁹⁵

- ✓ It is officially accepted that armed struggle is stopped.
- ✓ The new strategy of the party is accepted as “democratic political struggle”.
- ✓ ARGK (Arteseye Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan [Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army]) was abolished and HPG (Hezen Partisina Gel [People Defense Force]) was established.

²⁹⁴ Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.159.

²⁹⁵ Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.149, 150.

✓ It was decided that ERNK (Eniya Rizgariya Netawiya Kurdistan Kurdish [National Liberation Front]) should be restructured YDK (Yekitiya Demokratik a Gele Kurd [Kurdish Democratic People's Forces])

✓ With the party's new administration, Abdullah Ocalan was selected unanimously again the general president of PKK.

✓ PKK Central Committee was renamed as "Party Assembly".

✓ Number of the members of Party Assembly was increased to 41.

✓ Number of members of PKK Presidency Council which was 7 previously was increased to 9.

✓ PKK's so-called flag was arranged as "a red star in a sun" figure in the left upper edge of the flag with a red background color.

Between between 4-10 April 2002, the PKK held its eight congress during which the PKK had been introduced into the agenda of EU countries because of its inclusion to the terror list.²⁹⁶ The most important decision made in the congress was the establishment of the KADEK (Kongreya Azadi ü Demokrasiya Kurdistan [Kurdistan Liberty and Democracy Congress]) to replace the PKK as it completed its mission by "creating a Kurdish nation from non- existence and carrying it to a political process," as the new strategy requires a wider restructuring of the organization.²⁹⁷

This congress was also accepted as the KADEK's foundation congress at the same time. Decisions taken in the congress are given below;²⁹⁸

✓ Abdullah Ocalan is considered as the modern leader of Kurdish and Middle East nations. Attitude against Abdullah Ocalan life is considered as a reason of war or peace.

✓ The line of the democratic civilization mentioned in defenses is considered as the manifest of reaching to democratic liberty. While all works are arranged in accordance with this line, it is accepted as a base to follow Abdullah Ocalan and to apply his directives under a decisive manner.

²⁹⁶ Kurdistan.org, (n.d.), "PKK Becomes KADEK", <http://www.kurdistan.org/Current-Updates/kadek.html>, (Accessed on 14.05.2009).

²⁹⁷ Yilmaz, (2007), *ibid.*, p.141.

²⁹⁸ Serxwebun.com, (2002), "Onderlik Gercegi ve Demokratik Uygarlik Cizgisi Uzerine", [On Reality of The Leadership and Democratic Civilization], <http://www.serxwebun.com/2002/05/hab12.html>, (Accessed on 18.04.2009).

✓ The line of democratic civilization, besides Kurds, is also attributed to Middle East nations and is placed into the middle of the works carried out in terms of the resolution of the problems.

✓ Presentation and owning the leadership reality and line of democratic civilization is accepted as a main mission.

✓ All works to be carried out in diplomatic, political and other fields are organized and developed to be dependant on the liberty of Abdullah Ocalan.

✓ Establishment of defense committees of Abdullah Ocalan in various fields.

✓ An international organization should be formed for captivity conditions of Abdullah Ocalan.

The PKK terror organization was included with the DHKP/C onto the terror organizations list by the EU Council in May 2002. The PKK focused on the political field during the time when terrorist acts were minimal. As the case regarding HADEP's closure was continued by the Constitutional Court, in 03 November 2002 elections, the existence was executed under the umbrella of the DEHAP (Democratic People's Party, Demokratik Halk Partisi). The HADEP, the EMEP (Party of Labor, Emegin Partisi) and the SDP (Socialist Democracy Party, Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi) united under the DEHAP, which took votes by a rate of 6.2% in the elections.²⁹⁹ The HADEP, based on similar legislative intention with HEP and DEP cases, was ordered to dissolve on 3 March 2003 by the Constitutional Court. That same day, the chief prosecutor of the Republic, with similar reasons, opened a case in the Constitutional Court for the closure of the DEHAP.

Between 26 October and November 2003, KADEK abolished itself in their second regular congress and established KONGRA-GEL instead. These decisions were based on the following reasons: because KADEK could not incorporate the change to its internal organization and functionality, because the PKK's cadre and administration structure had continued in KADEK as well, and because assertions indicated that the KADEP is the continuation of the PKK. Abdullah Ocalan was named as so-called 'Chief of Kurdish People' and Zubeyir Aydar was assigned as chairman of KONGRA-GEL.

²⁹⁹ Bila, (2004), *ibid*, p.121.

Despite all the efforts of the terrorist organization, KONGRA-GEL could not succeed in anything and the European Union Committee of Representative Offices Abroad placed KONGRA-GEL on the list of terrorist organizations with the PKK and the KADEK.³⁰⁰

Osman Ocalan (Abdullah Ocalan's brother) and some other members decided to form an alternative party and split from KONGRA-GEL. They established the PWD (Partiya Welatpazeren Demokraten Kurdistan [Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan] on 26 October 2004.³⁰¹

Meanwhile, Abdullah Ocalan has prepared the second part of his defence³⁰² and sent it to the European Court of Human Rights on 27 April 2004. In his defence he suggested; 'Kurdish People's Democratic Administration in Kurdistan and State as General Public Authority'. He defined 'State as General Public Authority' as Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In addition, he wanted to establish the PKK again. Moreover, he named it as the "Reorganization of PKK and KOMA-GEL (People's Congress) Period". Abdullah Ocalan defined KOMA-GEL as the "People's Congress as Democracy Without State".

Work towards the reconstruction of the PKK was initiated in the second congress of KONGRA-GEL. Reconstruction of the PKK was completed in the congress between 28 March-04 April. Therefore, due to the inadequacy of KADEK and KONGRA-GEL in terms of fulfilling their missions, the PKK was reestablished again.³⁰³

The PKK's purpose was "to develop the unity and democratic administration of the Kurdish nation based on confederative principles and in the line of Democratic, Ecologic and Gender Libertarian Society, to realize the democratic resolution of Kurd international problem, to provide the contraction of dependant states on Kurdistan and to bring them sensitive to democracy to provide the liberal

³⁰⁰ Ibid, p.167.

³⁰¹ Pwdnerin.com, (n.d.), "PWD Kurucular Kurulu Toplantısı Sonuç Bildirgesi", [PWD Meeting of Establishment Committee Report], www.pwdnerin.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=38, (Accessed on 22.05.2009).

³⁰² Ocalan, Abdullah, (2004), *To Defense a Nation*, Istanbul: Cetin Publications.

³⁰³ Pkkinfo.com, (2005), "PKK Yeniden Insa Bildirgesi", [Report of PKK's Reorganization], <http://www.pkk-info.com/tr/eskisine/pkktarihi/PKK.ilk.bildirgesi.html>, (Accessed on 28.06.2009).

and democratic conversion of the Kurdish community by eliminating outdated feudal remains, to protect basic human rights by developing a democracy based on liberty of women and ecology, to carry out relations and solidarity with the nations in the region on the basis of the Democratic Middle East Confederation, to get forward through the line of scientific-democratic socialism as being a part of global democratic society.³⁰⁴ Abdullah Ocalan was chosen the leader of KKK (Koma Komalen Kurdistan, Kurdistan Democratic Con-federalism).

KONGRA-GEL held its third congress, with the qualification of the KKK assembly, between 04-21 May 2005. The issues, which had not been taken into consideration in Committee for reconstruction of the PKK, were discussed in this congress. The most important decision was: the acceptance of the KKK contract, which was considered as a result of the works initiated by the Justice and Human Rights Committee-formed to vitalize Law Project under the decisions of KONGRA-GEL's opening congress-with the purpose of shaping the relations between so called Kurdish democratization structure and process with other nation and states, in addition which was considered as a preliminary stage of so called "Kurds Democracy Constitution", deemed as final document in this issue.³⁰⁵

The statement of the Kurdistan Democratic Con-federalism was the final point of the strategy and ideology of the PKK terror organization which was developed as "democratic republic thesis" due to capture of Abdullah Ocalan, as "Democratic-ecologic society paradigm due to foundation of KONGRA-GEL in 2003, and finally as "democratic-ecologic gender libertarian society paradigm" due to the re-proclamation of PKK in 2005. After this point, the PKK, in the Congress held on 25 may 2007, founded the KCK³⁰⁶ (Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Democratic Communities of Kurdistan) with the same ideologies. The PKK had carried out its violent attacks both in the rural areas and the city centers, ultimately making it one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in human history.

³⁰⁴ Pkkinfo.com, (2005), ibid.

³⁰⁵ Rojaciwan.com, (n.d.), "Koma Komalen Kurdistan Sozlesmesi", [Contract of Confederalism of Democratic Kurdistan], <http://www.rojaciwan.com/modules.php?name=eBoard&file=print&fid=2&tid=7340>, (Accessed on 28.06.2009)

³⁰⁶ Kurdistanbarisgaziler.com, (n.d.), "Koma Civaken Kurdistan Sozlesmesi", [Contract of Democratic Communities of Kurdistan], <http://www.kurdistan-baris-gaziler.com/Onderlik/sozlesme/index.html>, (Accessed on 25.07.2009)

3.2. IDEOLOGY, AIM, AND STRATEGY

3.2.1. Ideology

Although the ideology of the PKK had variously changed in time due to some evolving conditions, the adopted ideology by the PKK has been the Marxist-Leninist ideology since its foundation. In the first years; the PKK expressed itself with this ideology and remained loyal rather than Kurdish Nationalism.³⁰⁷ Later on, because of the problems of creating support groups and new developments in the socialist bloc of the world, the PKK revised its ideology. The omittance of the hammer and sickle figures from the party emblem is an example of this revision.³⁰⁸ The PKK's intellectual infrastructure is entirely based on the communist-socialist ideology.

Even though the PKK's ideology is based on Marxist-Leninist ideas, Abdullah Ocalan stated that he was neither a Marxist nor Leninist in one of his interviews given to the journalist, Hasan Cemal. He added that he had a judgemental view about Marxism and Leninism, and stated the best ideology was scientific socialism.³⁰⁹

3.2.2. Aim

The oldest documents that reveal the purpose of the group, are "The Path of the Kurdistan Revolution-The Manifesto", Party Program and the foundation declaration which are all prepared in 1975. The purpose of the group is to establish an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan state based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology in the area they call Kurdistan, which covers east and southeast Turkey, and some parts of Syria, Iran and Iraq.³¹⁰

The purpose of the group is explained in the foundation declaration as : "... PKK, has the purpose of; saving the Kurdistan people off the imperialist and colonialist system in the era of falling imperialism and rising proletariat revolutions;

³⁰⁷ Radu, Michael, (2001), "The Rise and Fall of The PKK", *Orbis*, Vol. 45, No.1, <http://web.macam.ac.il/~arnon/Int-ME/extra/RISE%20AND%20FALL%20THE%20PKK.htm>, (Accessed on 11.08.2009).

³⁰⁸ Gurses, Emin, (2001), *Ayrilicki Terorun Anatomisi Anatomisi IRA-ETA-PKK*, [The Anatomy of Separatist Terror, IRA-ETA-PKK], Istanbul: Baglam Publications, p.89.

³⁰⁹ Cemal, Hasan, (2003), *Kurtler*, [Kurds], Istanbul: Dogan Books, p.40.

³¹⁰ Bal, (2003), *ibid*, p.164.

founding a peoples dictatorship in the independent and united Kurdistan; and finally achieving the establishment of the classless society.³¹¹

The first goal of the PKK was to seize a territory, to have the control of that territory and start a civil war in the country. The PKK was trying to at least create and show to the world an image of a civil war in Turkey.³¹² The PKK had the intent of capturing a specific region in East and Southeast Turkey and creating a free zone. To achieve this goal, the group had planned to create a support group by propaganda among the people in the region, to nullify the security forces, by conducting activities such as ambushes, bombings and attacks and the government authority, and by sabotages against government facilities, economic assets and other infrastructures such as transportation networks.

The PKK had declared its main purpose in documents that it published before 1980, which included gaining the independence of the Kurdish people who were under pressure, persecution, were victims of colonialism, and who have the right of plebiscite.³¹³ It was remarkably noticeable that this statement was derived from the popular expressions of those days such as ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental freedoms’ in order to get support especially from European and other societies of the world. According to the party program, the groups’ aim was initially establishing an independent and Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan State in Southeastern Turkey by using armed propaganda techniques, then uniting with the other Kurdistan states to be established in the neighboring countries – Iran, Iraq and Syria- and finally declaring the “Independent-United Kurdistan”.³¹⁴

In order to achieve this goal, the PKK chose armed conflict as its main action plan. As a result of this plan, the PKK not only conducted massacres against the innocent and unarmed civilian people of the region, but also attacked and sabotaged every government investment and service that the government initiated to improve the economy and living conditions of the region’s people. Additionally, the PKK

³¹¹ Pkkinfo.com, (n.d.), “PKK Kurulus Bildirisi”, [PKK’s Inauguration Announcement], <http://www.pkk-info.com/tr/eskisite/pkktarihi/Yeniden.PKK.html>, (Accessed on 04.07.2009).

³¹² Ozdag, Umit, (2005), *Türkiye’de Düşük Yoğunluklu Catisma ve PKK*, [Low Intensity Conflict in Turkey and PKK], Ankara: Uc Ok Publications, p. 67.

³¹³ Imset, Ismet G., (1995), “The PKK: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?”, *American Kurdish Information Network*, <http://kurdistan.org/Articles/ismet.html>, (Accessed on 18.05.2009).

³¹⁴ Kislali, (1996), *ibid.*, p.188.

sabotaged touristic structures and historical assets, attacked tourists and placed propaganda outside the country in order to prevent or at least reduce the number of tourists visiting the region, resulting in a decline in tourism and therefore a decline in the region's wealth.

3.2.3. Strategy

To establish an independent Kurdistan, the PKK had developed a strategy as follows;

- ✓ Firstly, some cultural and social rights will be gained,
- ✓ In the second phase, the unitary structure of Turkey will be disrupted and will try to establish an autonomous or semi-independent administration in the region.
- ✓ Then, a "Kurdish State" will be established in the areas including some parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
- ✓ Finally, these parts in different countries will be united and the so called "Kurdistan" will be achieved.³¹⁵

The PKK had cited that its campaign would be a long and weary one. The group based its action plans upon the book "Basic Principles of People's War" by Mao Tse-tung.³¹⁶ Thus, the PKK based its strategy on "the Long term People's War" strategy.

The PKK basically used armed violence techniques; tries to gain some political power and to channel this power into creating more violence.

Abdullah Ocalan picked the Vietnamese Revolution in Hindu China as a role model and called the PKK's strategy as the so-called Kurdistan Revolution. He espoused the purpose of establishing an independent, united, and democratic Kurdistan under the guidance of scientific socialism, by organizing a political group, and a national salvation front under the leadership of this political group, creating a fighting and strong people's army under the command of this front; and conducting a long term people's war.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ Cemal, (2003), *ibid*, p.284

³¹⁶ Pamukoglu, Osman, (2004), *Unutulanlar Disinda Yeni Bir Sey Yok*, [Nothing New Except The Forgotten], Istanbul: Inkilap Publications, p.62.

³¹⁷ Ocalan, (1976), *ibid.*, p.65-73.

The PKK, adopted strategic defense, strategic balance and strategic attack methods as the requisites of the long-term people's war and picked guerilla war as its main technique. In order to execute these actions, it organized its structure as party, front, and army.³¹⁸ Mao Tse Tung had improvised every aspect of guerilla war gradually in time. Mao Tse Tung explained the first state of the three phased long-term people's war as "Formula of 16 attributes". The PKK had tried to implement Mao's "Formula of 16 attributes" and the three phased long term people's war strategy which is the extension of this formula, had not been successful.

The path that the PKK drew for itself could be explained briefly as follows: The armed conflict will be started in the rural areas where the villagers are the majority and the sovereignty of the government is not effective enough. Thus, it is planned to gradually spread the activities, which originated from a region where the information flow is slow and restricted and where public organization is weak to the rural areas. People in those areas are very fragile and open to the effects of violence. The next step is to cut the links between the people and the government by weakening government control and legitimacy while increasing the group's control and influence in the territory; and by reorganizing these people politically and militarily against the government. Once the rural areas become free havens, government authorities will be stuck only in the cities and since the links between villagers and the government are cut, the information flow will be stopped. Then, the PKK will try to take control of the roads connecting these rural areas thus becoming more dominant in the region as it will try to increase its military power. Since the cities will be surrounded, the format of the actions will differ: civil disobedience and partial riots will be promoted in the cities and these will be spread to the whole community and will be transformed into widespread uprisings.

3.2.3.1. Strategic Defense

Strategic defense is the stage when the government authority and the security forces are strong and sovereign in the region and in the attacking manner while the group is aiming to stay in defense. Favoring from its' attributes of flexibility and mobility; the group could figure out and attack the weak points of the government and reach a point where they have strong enough forces to deal with the security forces at even

³¹⁸ In Mao Tse Tung's On Guerilla Warfare.

conditions. At this level, while the emphasis is on improving political power, the main goal is to create armed groups and to weaken the security forces by limited and less risky attacks. The objective, at the end of this stage, is to transform the political power into a military power, which is at balance with the security forces.

3.2.3.2. Strategic Balance (Balance of Forces)

The Strategic balance stage can be explained as the efforts of coming to a balance with the government forces by drawing masses into armed conflicts with intense violence, by promoting actions such as popular unrest, civil disobedience, general strikes and boycotts. At this stage, some local territories are saved from the government authority but control of most of the region, is at a balance between government and the PKK. It is planned that, along with small-armed units, formations of high mobility such as battalion, regiment and brigade formations will be adopted and dynamic armed conflict forms will be conducted. Throughout the long lasting conflict, hatred and antipathy aroused among the people against the merciless enemy will turn into civil mutiny.

3.2.3.3. Strategic Attack

After the balance has been reached with the government forces, comes the strategic attack phase, where the main target is to overcome the enemy forces by a general attack both in the rural areas and in the cities.³¹⁹ At this stage, security forces are driven out from the mountains to the plains and hit by intense attacks and general strikes and boycotts are conducted in the cities. Some small towns are invaded and the enemy, stuck in the plains, retreats to the cities, becomes immobilized and takes a defensive position. Every suitable member is called to arms and the last preparations and plans for a general attack are made. Then, simultaneously, the PKK attacks the cities and incites riots in the cities, thusly surrounding the enemy from both the outside and inside. Finally, the PKK tries to eliminate all the enemy forces with fierce attacks.³²⁰

Abdullah Ocalan states that, in order to transform all the efforts into armed uprisings, and political activities derived from Marxist-Leninist ideology, it should

³¹⁹ Demirel, Emin, (2003), *Dunya'da Teror*, [Terror in The World], Istanbul: IQ Publications, p.289.

³²⁰ Usta, Orhan, (2003), *Guneydogu'da Teror Gorunumu ve Devlet Siyaseti*, [Terror in South-East and Policy of the State], Ankara: Siirt Governorship Publications, p.37, 38.

be supported with armed conflict and the revolutionary resistance must be based on the people's revolutionary intension. Stages of the conflict could be summarized as;³²¹

- Organizing the people,
- Settlement phase,
- Operational phase (Transition from strategic defense to strategic balance),
- Covered conflict phase (Transition to strategic attack),
- Civil war phase,
- Foundation of an Independent Kurdish State,
- Establishment of the independent, united and democratic so-called Kurdistan.

According to Abdullah Ocalan's estimates at the beginning, the strategic defense stage and strategic balance would have been over by 1995 and 2000 respectively, and the PKK would have had a conventional army, which was supported by uprisings, consisted of rebels, and powerful enough to defeat the Turkish armed forces in South Eastern Turkey.³²² However, none of these estimates has been realized.

3.2.3.4. PKK's New Strategy

After Abdullah Ocalan was seized, the PKK had revised its strategy. However, this revision can not be attributed to this seizure solely: The new conjuncture developed all over the world after the suicidal attacks of Al-Qaeda terrorists on September 11 2001³²³ to the World Trade Center, has also accelerated the development of this new strategy. Since, perception of world states of terrorism has changed after 9/11 attacks, and the PKK had to temporarily abandon armed conflict in parallel to this new perception and implement a new strategy. Thus, the PKK has canalized and accelerated its efforts to move its members out of the country for recovering its forces, to improvise and activate new legal or illegal propaganda techniques for acknowledgement of the Kurdish identity, and to enforce the government for an amnesty (especially release of Abdullah Ocalan).

³²¹ Kışlalı, (1996), *ibid.*, p.189

³²² Ozdag, (2007), *ibid.*, p.41

³²³ Alexander, Yonah and Swetnam, Michael S., (2001), *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: A Profile of a Terrorist Network*, New York: Transnational Publishers, p.x.

3.3. PROPAGANDA METHODS

The most important action for the terrorist organization is to announce their actions both in Turkey and abroad. They form propaganda units under a political wing, and announce their ideology and activities by using this organization. Other than military activities, all legal and illegal activities are conducted by YDK (Yekitiya Demokratik a Gele Kurd [Kurdish Democratic People's Forces]).

Some of PKK's propaganda tactics are as follows;

- They use every opportunity to start their propaganda.
- They can communicate with the region's residents easily.
- They give extra attention to anti-propaganda of the Turkish security forces.
- Their target audience is all forms of occupations (old, young, kids, security forces etc.)
- If they need to use violence, while their propaganda is in process, they do not hesitate to kill.
- The specialists and leaders prepare propaganda materials carefully. They do not allow ordinary members to have contact with the villages.
- After every attack or activity, they gather villagers to increase the effects of the activity.
- Unfortunately, most of the population in southeast of Turkey is not enough, so it is easy to spread incorrect news.

The PKK is conducting big propaganda in the East and Southeast of Turkey to generate Kurdish awareness. They use the following arguments;

- They claim that Kurdish people have a history of a thousands years.
- Lands that they are living in right now were known as Kurdistan and belong to them.
- Newroz is a Kurdish Independence Day.
- So-called Kurdistan has always felt that imperialists have invaded them. Now, it is invaded by four countries. (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria)
- They are not allowed to speak their mother tongue (Kurdish) and they are treated as second-class citizens.
- The Turkish Government does not provide any investments to the region.

- So-called Kurdistan has so many natural resources and it is despoiled.
- Kurdish people are assimilated. (In modern Turkish history, there is a Kurdish originated president and many diplomats.)
- Rebels are killed and exposed to torture.

The Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) is the continuation of other parties that were closed by the Constitutional Court takes every opportunity to make propaganda of the terrorist organization and Abdullah Ocalan. Some examples are; in the DTP Adiyaman City Council, Ibrahim Binici, Sanliurfa DTP parliamentarian, praised Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK on 17 March 2008.³²⁴

Aysel Kutluk, Diyarbakir DTP parliamentarian, was sentenced to go to prison for her speech on 16 May 2006 for not accepting the PKK as a terrorist organization on 05 February 2009.³²⁵ ("People whom you consider terrorists are heroes to others," she said.) The PKK is also using Islamic preachers to create their propaganda. For instance, in February 2008, Islamic preacher Muhittin Eryilmaz was convicted by a court in Diyarbakir for a speech he gave at a protest against a Turkish incursion into Northern Iraq aimed at Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militants.³²⁶

3.3.1. Armed Propaganda

Propaganda is extremely important for the PKK; besides using other elements of propaganda, the PKK uses armed propaganda to announce their actions. For this reason, armed activities are called instances of armed propaganda. Armed propaganda is a way to reach goals, and declare that they are powerful in public. Mahir Cayan³²⁷ said that armed propaganda is a daily banner headline to awaken repressed crowds against imperialism. The PKK announced the establishment of the

³²⁴ Caginpolisi.org, (n.d.), "Adiyaman'da PKK Propagandasi", [PKK Propaganda in Adiyaman], http://www.caginpolisi.org/article_view.php?aid=50, (Accessed on 23.06.2009).

³²⁵ Milliyet.com, (n.d.), "DTP'li Vekile Hapis Cezasi", [DTP Parliamentarian was sentenced to go to Prison], <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1055892>, (Accessed on 24.06.2009), (She was sentenced for 1 year 6 months).

³²⁶ Javno.com, (n.d.), "Turkish Court Sentences Imam for PKK Propaganda", <http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=148034>, (Accessed on 24.06.2009).

³²⁷ Mahir Cayan is famous deceased terrorist in Turkey who was killed in 1972. He was a member and founder of Turkey THKP-C (One of the left-wing terrorist organization).

HRK³²⁸ after attacking military units in Eruh and Semdinli by leaving pamphlets in their place.³²⁹ Aims of using armed propaganda are;

- ✓ Increase efficiency of political propaganda,
- ✓ Convince the public that the organization is undefeatable,
- ✓ Intimidate people,
- ✓ Increase sympathetic views of the public to organizations.

After each terrorist act, organizations try to communicate with the media to announce the act and undertake responsibility of the attack, or sometimes they leave handouts at the crime scene. Suicide attacks are another source of strong propaganda instruments for terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, it is known that suicide attacks are the last option for an organization.

3.3.2. Using Media

The PKK has been conducting its propaganda measures by using TV stations, radio stations (11 different languages, Denge Mezopotamya, Radyo Serhildan), Internet, and 750 people. In addition to the PKK media organs, the PKK uses the video sharing web site “Youtube” to create its propaganda.

In the seventh congress of the PKK between 02 and 23 January 2000, the PKK decided to establish a new formation for its press activities. This establishment was called as YRD (Yekitiya Roşengeriya Demokratik, Democratic Intellectual Association). In the congress establishment of KONGRA-GEL, the PKK decided to establish the Press and Information Association to work with YRD. After, reorganization of the PKK, the PKK reformed the organization YRD as YRD (Yekitiya Ragihandina Demokratik, Democratic Press Association) on 14 June 2005. Furthermore, to develop the Kurdish language and to educate free press staff, the PKK opened a press school called “Gurbetelli Basın Okulu”.

3.3.2.1. TV Stations

The first TV channel of the PKK was MED TV. It was broadcasted between 1995 and 1999 from Belgium. But by violating broadcasting law 45/A, the broadcast was

³²⁸ Ersever, (1993), *ibid.*, p.102.

³²⁹ Marcus, (2009), *ibid.*, p.115.

suspended for three weeks and was later shut down because of violating, “the public order, and encouraging people to commit crime activities” on 23 April 1999.

After the termination of MED TV, the PKK got a broadcasting license from France CSA (The Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel) on 30 July 1999, and MEDYA TV began broadcasting. It was understood that MEDYA TV was the PKK's TV station that encouraged criminal activity, and it was closed by France CSA (The Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel) on 12 February 2004. The PKK wanted to decrease the effects of MEDYA TV's closure and share its broadcasts with MEZOPATAMYA TV. Nevertheless, the PKK wanted to have its own TV channel and, established ROJ TV on 25 February 2004 with test broadcasts. Moreover, after it was broadcasted on 01 March 2004 from Denmark, all the people working in MED TV and MEDYA TV began working for ROJ TV.

Although the Turkish Government proposed many incentives for Denmark to close ROJ TV, with the permission license from Denmark, MMC TV, a music channel, started to broadcast from the same frequencies with MEZOPATAMYA TV on 03 November 2005.

Besides those TV channels, the PKK had a total of nine TV channels such as; “Kurdistan,” “Kurd Sat,” “Rojhilat,” and “Gun”.³³⁰

Benefits of MED TV for the PKK could be categorized in three parts.³³¹

First, the PKK took all opportunities to act of hostile towards Turkey during meetings of the United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and others and the PKK put Turkey on the spot all the time.

Second, because it was the only TV channel that was broadcasting in Kurdish for a long time, it claimed to be the representative of all the Kurds in the world. In addition, it helped the legitimization of activities by the PKK.

Third, it created the PKK's propaganda among the citizens of Kurdish origin living in Europe.

³³⁰ Rojaciwan.com, (n.d.), “108 Yil Sonra Yeni Ozgur Politika”, [New Free Politics after 108 Years], <http://www.rojaciwan.com/haber-20791.html>, (Accessed on 28.06.2009).

³³¹ Laciner, Sedat, (2002), “MED-TV'nin Etki ve Islevleri”, [Effects and Functions of MED TV], *Stratejik Analiz*, Ankara: ASAM Publications, Vol.: 3, No.: 27, p. 119–132.

3.3.2.2. Newspapers and Journals

The journal “Serxwebun” was published after October 1978. The first publications were Abdullah Ocalan’s writings, and have been published regularly since 1978 in Koln/Germany. After 1985, the second journal of the PKK named “Berxwedan” was published in Germany as well.

After 1988, the PKK published many newspapers, journals and publishers such as; Toplumsal Dirilis (Communal Resurrection), Halk Gercegi (People’s Reality), Yeni Ulke (New Country), Yeni Politika (New Politics), Demokrasi Gazetesi (Democracy Newspaper), Ozgur Halk Dergisi (Free People Journal), Xebat, Agiri, Ciwanen Azad, Komunar, Melsa Yayınevi (Melsa Publications), Zagros Yayınları (Zagros Publications), Dicle Haber Ajansi (Dicle News Agency) and Diz Basın (Diz Publications).

The PKK began publishing Ozgur Politika (Free Politics) newspaper Nuisenburg/Germany in 1995. Local security forces created an operation on 05 September 2005 for both Ozgur Politika and Mezopatamya News Agency, which was running its activities since 01 December 2001 in Nuisenburg/Germany. After it was realized that they were serving under the PKK, Germany banned the activities and blocked their Internet web page.

After Germany banned the newspaper and the news agency, the PKK established a brand new agency called the “Firat News Agency” in October 2005 in Frankfurt/Germany. They also began publishing a brand new newspaper called “Yeni Ozgur Politika” (New Free Politics) on 16 January 2006. The Yeni Ozgur Politika newspaper had 16 pages, 14 pages in Turkish, 2 pages in Kurdish.

In addition to this, the PKK had been publishing a weekly newspaper called “Azadiya Welad” in Kurdish since 1996 in Turkey, it was began to published daily after 16 August 2006. Another newspaper, Ozgur Gundem (Free Agenda), began publishing on 01 March 2004 in Turkey. For promoting the propaganda of the PKK, it was banned on 16 November 2006. After that, the PKK started to publish a new newspaper called “Toplumsal Demokrasi” (Communal Democracy) after 23 November 2006. Turkish Authorities also banned this newspaper for promoting the

propaganda of the PKK terrorist organization. After that, the PKK began publishing a new newspaper called the “Gundem” (Agenda) on 17 January 2007.

3.3.2.3. Internet

Detailed information will be given in future chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

CLOSE LOOK INTO PKK

The purpose of this chapter is to give detailed information on PKK terrorist organization.

4.1. LEADERSHIP

Contrary to other terrorist organization, PKK has different leadership understanding under the leadership structure under Abdullah Ocalan. PKK is leader centered terrorist organization.³³²

4.1.1. Abdullah Ocalan

In order to understand the PKK terrorist organization, it is essential to understand Abdullah Ocalan first. He is also known as “Apo” and “Ali Firat”. Abdullah Ocalan was born in 1949 in a poor family in the village Omerli, Sanliurfa, Turkey and had a very problematic childhood.³³³ He is the first-born child of seven children. His father Omer is of Kurdish origin³³⁴, and his mother Uveys is Turkish. From an early age, he claims to get all the attention from the village with having a different life style and behaviors, such as not respecting the traditions, being a leader among the other kids, a good hunter and a rebel.³³⁵

He had strange stories about his childhood, For instance; one day he was not taken into the house after the kids beat him up unless he took his revenge. That is when he learned the feelings of mercy and revenge.

He defines his mother as authoritarian and sapient, because she managed the house and his father. He defines his father as miserable, and lacking a distinct character. In addition, he always mentions that he does not like his father.³³⁶

³³² Özeren, Süleyman, (2010), *Evaluation of PKK's Leadership Structure*, Class Lecture, Ankara: Turkish National Police Academy.

³³³ Pirim and Suha, *ibid.*, p.4; Sakik, Semdin, (2005), *Apo*, Ankara: Sark Publications, p.26.

³³⁴ Some claims that Omer Ocalan is Armenian of Syrian Stock.

³³⁵ Ocalan, Abdullah, “Yasami”, [His Life], <http://www.abdullah-ocalan.com/index1.htm>, (Accessed on 12.03.2009).

³³⁶ Imset, Ismet G., (1993), *Ayrilikci Siddetin 20 Yili, PKK*, [Twenty Years of Separatist Violence, PKK], Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, p.20, 21.

He went to Saylakkaya Elementary School, which was far from his village; therefore, he had to walk to school for some kilometers, one hour going to school, and one hour coming home. He claims that he learned Turkish in elementary school. His trial however, made it clear that he never learned either of the two major Kurdish languages (Kurmandji and Zaza) and in fact all of his communications with his followers have been in Turkish.³³⁷ After elementary school, he fought with his father in the village center and then left the village. He started junior high school in Nizip, where his sister Havva was residing. He accommodated in his sister's house. He defines starting junior high school as his second phase in his life with "meeting the bourgeois society and republic" worlds.

After junior high school, he wanted to join the military high school. He explains the situation like this "My real passion was military high school. When I learned that I was old for this, I was really disappointed. It had a very negative effect on my dream of transforming the public with power."³³⁸ After he understood that, he would not have a career in the military and religious life. He decided to go to vocational high school. Until he was a senior, he defines himself as religious, rightist, against communism, under the influence of village conservatism and religious dominance, and a poor village boy.³³⁹ The last year in high school, he tells that he met leftism, and his story is, "one night I found a book named "A B C of Socialism", after I read this I remember saying "Mohammad lost, Marks won".³⁴⁰

After graduating from high school, he started to work in the land registry department in Diyarbakir in 1970. He learned the idea of Kurdistan in Diyarbakir. That year he registered himself with the DDKO (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts [Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari]). He passed the university examinations and started to attend the ITU (Istanbul Technical University [Istanbul Teknik Universitesi]). But he changed his mind and came to Ankara and registered with the Faculty of Political Sciences at the Ankara University. He became involved in Maoist politics. While he was attending the faculty, he was arrested on 08 April 1972

³³⁷ Radu, (2001), *ibid.*, p.47-64.

³³⁸ Ocalan, (2001), *ibid.*, p.253.

³³⁹ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.17.

³⁴⁰ Ocalan, (2001), *ibid.*, p.253.

because of distributing illegal flyers. He was put into Mamak Military Prison for three months.³⁴¹ This was his only spell in prison until he was arrested in 1999.³⁴²

After his release, Ocalan went back to the faculty of Political Sciences, but conspiratorial work took up most of his time and he never graduated.³⁴³ He founded the PKK in 1978. At the First Congress in November 1978, he was elected as the leader of the organization.

He escaped from Turkey in 1979 and went to Syria, before the military coup of September 1980, which led to the imprisonment of thousands of members and sympathizers of the organization. He stayed in Syria until the Turkish government forced the Syrians to expel him in October 1998.³⁴⁴

He left Syria in November 1998. He fled to Russia and then Europe; where he was arrested after arriving from Moscow to Rome's Fiumicino Airport. He was soon released while he appealed for political asylum, because Italian law forbids the extradition of someone to a country where they would face a death sentence. An extradition request from Germany also collapsed amid political maneuvering. He left Italy on 16 January 1999 and returned to Russia but soon left for Greece, apparently intending to fly from there to The Hague. He was refused to enter into a number of European countries and instead, the Greece authorities flew him to Nairobi, Kenya. On 15 February 1999, he was arrested in Nairobi and quickly transported to Turkey. On 16 February 1999, across Europe, the PKK terrorists had lots of protests, committed acts of violence and terrorism. Abdullah Ocalan was charged with treason.

Abdullah Ocalan was sentenced to death on 29 June 1999, after a State Security Court found him guilty of the charges of "treason and separatism" under Article 125 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). He is a prisoner in Imrali Island. He has permission to talk to his immediate family members, and his lawyers since his parents are deceased. Abdullah Ocalan's life is pretty much the same history of the PKK. "Turkish journalists who have interviewed Ocalan have come away with the

³⁴¹ Ozturk, (2009), *ibid.*, p.99-112.

³⁴² Mango, (2005), *ibid.*, p.33.

³⁴³ Mango, (2005), *ibid.*, p.33.

³⁴⁴ Mango, (2005), *ibid.*, p.34.

impression of a "megalomaniac" and "sick" man who has no respect for or understanding of the "superior values of European civilization."³⁴⁵

4.1.2. Prominent Members

Murat Karayilan

He is also known as "Cemal". He is from Birecik, Sanliurfa. His father's name is Mehmet, and his mother's name is Zeynep. He joined the PKK in late 1979. He is the most effective person in the organization, and is the chief of the executive branch/committee. He stands for the policy of armed struggle, and is for the conservative wing. He follows the KONGRA-GEL's chairman Zubeyir Aydar (aka 'Behzat') who lives in Europe.

He is one of the most important characters and is adored by the terrorists, as he enjoys his popularity and concrete authority after Ocalan's capture. He has initiated the "Independent Confederalism of Kurdistan" thesis and could not get along with the deputy chiefs of the executive branch/committee, especially with two head figures Duran Kalkan and Cemil Bayik. Murat Karayilan is the main figure of the PKK defensive and offensive actions, planner and coordinator of small unit terrorist actions against the Turkish Security Forces. His influence in Iraq and Syria territories and relations with resistance leadership enabled the PKK to adopt IED (Improvised Explosives Devices) and Road-Side Mining against Turkish Security Forces. He has close connections with Nejirvan Barzani. There are strong evidence and intelligence about his regular meetings with Nejirvan of the KDP and Sokrat Resul of the PUK. After living somewhere around Kerkuk or Erbil, for a while, he headed to Northern Iraq in 2006. He is living in Mountain Kandil.

According to Abdullah Ocalan, "Murat Karayilan is ex-smuggler, good at taking the mines out at the border, an expert in public relations, and he has peasant characteristics. He caused so many losses during the operations in 1999 because he does not have a strong military concept." According to Semdin Sakik,³⁴⁶ "Murat Karayilan is privileged because he is Abdullah Ocalan's countryman. He has

³⁴⁵ Witschi, Beat, (1999), "Who is Abdullah Ocalan, Ocalan: Key Moments of His Life", <http://web.archive.org/web/20071005155817/edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/ocalan/stories/ocalan.profile/>, (Accessed on 26.06.2009).

³⁴⁶ Semdin Sakik (aka "parmaksiz zeki"), could be described as a deputy to Abdullah Ocalan and former military commander of PKK, was captured in 1998 in northern Iraq by Turkish Security Forces.

unconscious characteristics and he is not good at politics and military issues.³⁴⁷ His name is in the Interpol wanted list with the red bulletin.

Cemil Bayik

He is also known as “Cuma”. He was born in Elazığ, Hazar in 1951. He is one of the founders of the PKK. After graduating high school in Elazığ, he entered the Ankara University’s Faculty of Language, History and Geography. He was elected to the administrative board of the ADYOD in 1972. He took part in youth activities of the terror organization in Ankara until 1976 and after carried out propaganda and organizational activities in various provinces of the eastern and southeastern Anatolia regions. He served as the director of the political school camps of the PKK in Damascus and Northern Iraq and directed the archives of the PKK. He used to be the leader of the organization’s army (ARGK). Following the capture of Semdin Sakik in Northern Iraq, Cemil Bayik was discharged from his duty as the commander of ARGK and sent to Suleymaniye region to carry out political activities.

Cemil Bayik is a deputy chief of the executive branch/committee. He is number two in the organization. He is in a competitive struggle with Murat Karayilan. He is trying to put a limit on Murat Karayilan’s responsibility and authority. Cemil Bayik is responsible for the relations with Iran, and is the architect of the Mountain Kandil organization, Syria-Iran connections and has good relations with Iran Intelligence. He claims that he is the free and democratic voice of the PKK. He strongly believes that a dialogue with US authorities in Iraq will be a force multiplier for the PKK’s political efforts in the future, and also believes that only this channel may persuade Turkey into open negotiations with them, and he is living in Mountain Kandil. He is in the Interpol wanted list with the red bulletin. He has difficulties with walking due to his back problems, and usually goes to Syria and Iran for medical purposes.

According to Abdullah Ocalan, “Cemil Bayik is a not good in military issues and practical field. He usually stays behind the front. He killed 17 terrorists because they were wounded and he did not want them to be captured.” According to Semdin Sakik, “He is not good at military issues but he is good at organizing. He is very

347 Milliyet.com, (2007), “Hedefteki 12 Terorist”, [Target; 12 Terrorists], <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/10/18/son/songal503.asp>, (Accessed on 26.06.2009).

experienced in diplomacy and training groups. And he connives Abdullah Ocalan's scandals."³⁴⁸

Ali Riza Altun

He is also known as "Ebubekir". He was born in Kayseri in 1956. He is Kurdish-Alawite origin. His family moved to Ankara many years ago. He graduated from elementary school in Ankara and did not go to school again. He worked as a waiter in the restaurants until 1976. He met Abdullah Ocalan in 1976 and started to join the meetings. He joined to organization in 1978. Under the supervision of Abdullah Ocalan, he conducted training and organizational activities in various parts of Eastern and South-eastern regions of Turkey. He is member of headquarter executive council. He is one of the people who are in charge of Europe. He is known for money chest of the organization. He was captured in Austria in 2007 but he was able to leave to Northern Iraq. He stands for the policy of the armed struggle. He is for the conservative wing. According to Abdullah Ocalan, "Ali Riza Altun is one of the people that established the PKK." According to Semdin Sakik, "Ali Riza Altun is good in politics and diplomacy, but is not good in military issues. He does not like Abdullah Ocalan. In addition, he might escape from the organization due to the developments in the organization."³⁴⁹ He is in the Interpol wanted list with the red bulletin. He is living in Europe.

Duran Kalkan

He is also known as "Abbas". He was born in Adana, Karaisali in 1954. He graduated from Ankara University Faculty of Sciences. He was appointed as a teacher after he had graduated from University. After a short time he resigned from his job. He joined a PKK meeting in April 1978 and took part in issuing and illegal publication. He joined the congress of PKK's foundation. He is a deputy chief of the executive branch/committee. He is one of ideologue theorists of the organization. He was the behind the scene during Murat Karayilan's assassination attempt in June 2005. He is trying to establish a central chain of command to control the troops under Murat Karayilan's command. He is acting as a 'dove figure', he is trying to reduce the 'Hawk' figure of Murat Karayilan's popularity and efficiency, but on the other

³⁴⁸ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

³⁴⁹ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

hand acknowledging his military skills. He is trying to keep Murat Karayilan in action, for the future Turkish Security Forces operations. He has been in the list of Interpol wanted list with the red bulletin. He is living in Mountain Kandil.

According to Abdullah Ocalan, “He is a good provocateur. He is bad at practical field but good at training and ideology. He can endure in hard conditions of mountains. He can find a place for himself even with Barzani.” According to Semdin Sakik, “He has a good knowledge, but he is monomaniac.”³⁵⁰

Mustafa Karasu

He is also known as “Huseyin Ali”, “Avares” and “Okkes”. He was born in Sivas, Gurun in 1950. He is one of the founders of the PKK. He is responsible for foreign relations. He used to be a member of the Science and Illumination Committee of the PKK. He was put in jail during military coup in 1980. He stayed in jail for a long time. He practiced death fast in the jail. He is the sole name in the command group who has never been on the field. He used to organize the bribery operations on Iran Border Troops to provide safe passage to PKK Narcotics Couriers. He is the long-term coordinator of the PKK journals and information units. Regarding his Alevi roots, he used to be a respected and prominent person in Syria during Hafez Esad era. He has been in the list of Interpol wanted list with the red bulletin. He is living in Mountain Kandil.

According to Abdullah Ocalan, “He was responsible for the jail organization during his stay in the jail. After he went out to the fields he was weak. He is honest and loyal to Abdullah Ocalan”. According to Semdin Sakik, “He joined to organization in 1978. Contrary to Ocalan’s statements’ he does not like Ocalan. He is honest, naive and loyal to the organization. He is good at politics, but bad at military issues”.

Osman Ocalan

He is also known as “Ferhad”. He was born in Halveti, Sanliurfa in 1956. He is the younger brother of Abdullah Ocalan. He joined the terror organization in 1978 upon encouragement of his brother Abdullah Ocalan when he was studying at Sanliurfa

³⁵⁰ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

Educational Institute. He went to Syria after the military coup in 1980 and served in the camps at a high level. He used to be the deputy chief of the PKK.

After Abdullah Ocalan's capture he left the PKK and established the Democratic Patriotic Party of Kurdistan (PWD). Later he left this organization as well. Murat Karayilan wanted to assassinate him by putting poison into his coffee in 2005, but he survived. According to Abdullah Ocalan, "He is successful in the political wing of the organization, but he is bad in the practical field. He does not know how to use the terrain. According to Semdin Sakik; "He does not like his brother Abdullah Ocalan. He is clever and good at diplomacy, but bad at military issues. He was sentenced to death by the organization, but Abdullah Ocalan forgave him."³⁵¹ General Secretariat of Interpol issued the red bulletin on 08 August 2000 for Osman Ocalan upon the request of Turkish authorities. He is living in Mountain Kandil.

Nizamettin Tas

He is also known as "Botan". He was born in Van, Varto in 1961. He is a member of the headquarter executive council. He used to be the deputy chairman of the KONGRA-GEL. He used to be one of the so-called state commanders before Abdullah Ocalan's capture. He left the PKK with Osman Ocalan and joined the Democratic Patriotic Party of Kurdistan (PWD). According to Abdullah Ocalan, "Nizamettin Tas is good at military issues. However, he is undisciplined. He caused so many losses in the field. According to Semdin Sakik, "He is good at diplomacy and military issues. He knows Abdullah Ocalan's weaknesses and does not like him."³⁵²

Ali Haydar Kaytan

He is also known as "Fuat". He is from Tunceli. He is the chief of the intelligence section. According to Abdullah Ocalan, "He is not inadequate of organizing people. He has skills in comment and ideology making. He is determined and brave. According to Semdin Sakik; "He is good in theory but bad in practical field.

³⁵¹ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

³⁵² Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

Members do not like him in the organization. He has a bad personality and became when Sakik was caught.”³⁵³

Halil Atac

He is also known as “Ebubekir”. He joined to the PKK in 1979. He used to be a member of the executive council. He is also responsible for intelligence. Terrorists who want to leave the organization know him as a torturer. He is supporting Murat Karayilan. He was in the group that established the Democratic Patriotic Party of Kurdistan (PWD). According to Abdullah Ocalan, “He is very good at military issues, but he works with the capacity of 10%. If he could get over his peasant behaviors, he could be a good commander. According to Semdin Sakik, “He is not good at political and military issues. People do not like him in the organization. He takes the advantage of being Abdullah Ocalan’s countryman.”³⁵⁴

Zubeyir Aydar

He is also known as “Behzat”. He was born in Siirt in 1961. He graduated from Istanbul University Law Faculty. While he was a lawyer in Siirt, he was elected as a parliamentar in HADEP. He is the chairman of legislative branch (KONGRA-GEL) in KCK system. After Abdullah Ocalan’s capture, he carried on political activities in Europe. He often goes to Northern Iraq to meet the other senior members of the PKK.³⁵⁵ He was arrested in Belgium and was put in the prison on 04 March 2010.

Numan Ucar

He is also known as ”Mahir” and ”Welat”. He used to be a representative of Moscow. He is the one that took Abdullah Ocalan to Moscow. Abdullah Ocalan claimed to have met him for first time in Moscow. According to him, “Ucar is good at political issues and knows more about international relations, but he can not succeed in the field. According to Semdin Sakik, “He is responsible for the relations with Russia and Iran. He is very experienced and good at political issues.”³⁵⁶

³⁵³ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

³⁵⁴ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

³⁵⁵ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

³⁵⁶ Milliyet.com, (2007), ibid.

Fehman Huseyin

He is also known as “Dr. Bahoz Erdal”. He is from Syria and the former so-called commander of the HPG. He is a member of executive council. He is supported by Cemil Bayik and Duran Kalkan, and is considered to be the new Murat Karayilan. He accuses the PKK for not committing enough terrorist attacks. He is loyal to Murat Karayilan, regarding his so-called ability in military skills, operational plans, and new training methods. He resides in Camp Zap. He gives importance to Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian citizens to join the PKK.³⁵⁷

Nurettin Sofi

His real name is unknown. He used to be the so-called commander of the Amed region. On 16 April 2009, he was promoted to be the so-called commander of the HPG.

Cigdem Dogu

She is also known as “Rengin Botan”. She is the so-called commander of YJA-STAR (Yetkiya Jinen Azad [Free Women’s Movement]) (the armed branch of the female structure of the PKK).³⁵⁸

Sakine Cansiz

She is also known as “Sara”. She was born in 1958. She joined the organization in 1978. She was imprisoned for three years. She used to be a company commander in Haftanin. She was captured in Germany, but afterwards she was released.³⁵⁹

Nuriye Kesbir

She is also known as “Sozdar Avesta”. She was born in Mardin. She was elected as a member of central committee and in the 7th congress held in 2000. She is good at politics and agitation and she does not have so many experiences in military issues and in practice. She behaves like a man to hide her characteristic weakness. She was taken into custody, and then imprisoned while infiltrating to Holland via Iran to conduct activities in Europe.

³⁵⁷ Milliyet.com, (2007), *ibid*.

³⁵⁸ YJA STAR (Women Forces of Liberty) is the women guerilla forces. Official web site of the organization is: http://www.hpg-online.com/yja_star/index.html, (Accessed on 26.06.2009).

³⁵⁹ Internethaber.com, (2007), “Iste En Cok Aranan 10 PKK.li”, [10 Most Wanted PKK Member], http://www.internethaber.com/news_detail.php?id=111626, (Accessed on 26.06.2009).

Remzi Kartal

He was born in Van in 1948. He graduated from Dental Medical School. He is a former DEP³⁶⁰ parliamentarian and the leader of the PKK in Lunberg. He is responsible for the media issues, mainly for Roj TV and Ozgur Politika (Free Politics) in Europe. He was captured by German officials in 2005 and then was released. Lately, Spanish officials captured him on 24 March 2009, but he was released as a conditional discharge. He was arrested in Belgium and was put in the prison on 04 March 2010.

Gulizar Tural

She is also known as “Peslin-Tolhildan”. She was born in Malatya in 1971. Her father’s name is Niyazi and her mother’s name is Elif. She is adopted the views of THKP-C and DEV-SOL organizations in 1990s and she conducted some activities with those organizations. She was a student of Middle East Technical University in Ankara. She left the school and joined the PKK in 1994. She is a member of the executive branch/committee. She is responsible for the women establishment of the PKK, the PAJK.

3.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The PKK has both a political wing and an armed wing to achieve the idea of so-called prolonged people’s war. The political wing is the ideological and political resolution branch of the organization. The party leads the army, and front structure is supporting the army activities.

4.2.1. Political Wing

The political wing of the PKK is mainly their party structure. The party structure of the PKK is consists of the chairman, Abdullah Ocalan, an executive council, a central committee, and a central disciplinary board. Elections for executive council and all of the related councils and committees are held every four years with the participation of several hundred delegates. Each congress, council and committee is entrusted with different functions.

The party congress is the highest-level authority within the PKK and is the only body open to mass participation. It meets every four years either when called for

³⁶⁰ Democracy Party, established in 1991, abolished in 1994.

an emergency meeting by the chairman or when two-thirds of the central committee vote for such a meeting. Delegates from all party organizations participate in congress meetings yet the number of participants from each organization depends on the strength of these organizations and their membership level. The chairman, members of the central committee and members of the central disciplinary board are natural members of the congress. The party congress also has the authority to evaluate and amend the party program and to draw the plans for a four-year policy.

The party conference more or less resembles the party congress but is a contingency committee that meets during emergencies when the congress cannot be called up. Its main duty is to evaluate current policies and pass policy decisions. However, unlike the Congress, it does not have authority to change the party program.

Between two congresses, or in the four-year gap between the delegate meetings, the party executive council is entrusted with carrying out the role of leading both the party and its other related organizations. The chairman works together with the executive council and can be elected only with a two-third-majority vote in party congresses. The chairman also has to submit a full report of his activities before the congress and his duties include the creation of new fields of operations in the sciences, arts and other areas of social interest.

The executive council assists the chairman in his work and controls all ideological, political, organizational, military and front activities.


The party's main decision-making and executive organ is the central committee. The central committee elects the executive council from among its members for a period of four years and is responsible mainly for organizing overall activities. It is regarded as "the highest level tactical leadership structure" within the PKK and is in charge of organizing and controlling all other party organizations and committees. It meets every year but emergency meetings may be called by the chairman or on a two-third-majority vote. The central committee makes policy decisions but all must be based on an absolute majority; failure to reach such a majority could lead to replacements from among reserve members.

The PKK's central disciplinary board is in charge of inspecting party discipline and functions for four years between congresses. It is attached to the chairman and has the authority to investigate all abuses of discipline and party regulations and inform the central committee of its findings.

4.2.2. Armed Wing

Since the PKK started its violent acts, all activities are run by the PKK's military structure. The ARGK is the main military structure of the organization. First, the PKK has organized a military wing named the HRK to wage guerilla warfare. PKK announced the inauguration of the HRK by attacking military units in Eruh and Semdinli on 15 August 1984.³⁶¹ The HRK was abolished and the ARGK was established in the PKK third congress in 1986. After its establishment, the ARGK Regulation has been prepared with the contents of general information, people's war, guerilla units, organization structure, organizational process and crime and punishment.³⁶² It is known that the PKK does not have stabilized military structure but the ARGK's top units include the Supreme Military Command, Supreme Military Council and General Staff.³⁶³

Figure 2, ARGK's Structure



Supreme Military Command; Abdullah Ocalan is the chief of the Supreme Military Command. Almost all military activities have been carried out on the orders of Abdullah Ocalan.

³⁶¹ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.39.

³⁶² Belgenet.com, (1999), "Ocalan Davasi", [Ocalan Case], <http://www.belgenet.com/dava/dava07.html>, (Accessed on 18.02.2009).

³⁶³ Toreli, (2002), *ibid.*, p.43.

Supreme Military Council; It conducts its activities under the guidance of the chief of the Supreme Military Command. The Supreme Military Council's members are chiefs of main headquarter branches, field commanders, state commanders, PKK central committee members, and region and unit commanders.

General Staff; It is a team of people that are elected from the Supreme Military Council. It is responsible for controlling the operations ordered by the supreme Military Council.

Main Headquarter, It is responsible for supporting the operations of the ARGK. It contains branches like the intelligence section, planning section, operations section, logistics section, communication section, health section, archive-record section and publication section.

Sub-commandership Headquarters; It contains field, state, regional and local commandership headquarters. It also has branches such as the intelligence section, planning and operations section, logistics section, communication section, health section, archive section, publication section, budget section, inspection section and women army organization.

Troops; Even though the troops are named as brigade and regiment in practice they are organized as squads, platoons, companies and battalions. Political Commissariat in management is kept to control the military decisions in accordance with organization's political decisions. Political and military leaders act like each other's inspectors in the organization.

Troop Management; Except the squad management, all troop management includes a commander, political deputy, military deputy and two members. The commander is the main person responsible for the unit. The political deputy is responsible for ensuring the troops activities adhere to the organization's ideology. The military deputy supports the commander in the activities.

Steady Troops; A squad consists of three people, a platoon consists of three squads, a company consists of three platoons, and a battalion consists of three companies.

Active Troops; These are generally platoons and companies that have higher levels of physical conditioning, training, and supplies and have goals to commit sensational activities.

After the PKK's sixth congress, the PKK decided to have a more flexible troop mentality. According to this decree, a company consists of 27-40 people, including one female platoon and two male platoons. A platoon consists of 13 people. A team is the smallest armed formation consisting of three or four people.

During the PKK's seventh congress in 2000, (after Abdullah Ocalan was arrested and brought to Turkey) the ARGK's name was changed and the HPG (Hezen Partisina Gel [People Defense Force]) was established.³⁶⁴

ERNK (Eniya Rizgariya Netawiya Kurdistan Kurdish [National Liberation Front]); As the PKK's activities increase, the organization needed more supplies and support. As a result, the PKK needed another structure to draw support from the region, to engage in creating propaganda and to make supplies.

All the activities of PKK in Turkey and abroad such as recruitment, getting public support, getting financial and logistics support for the activities, and legitimating acts are called front activities.³⁶⁵ Abdullah Ocalan, along with the members of the organization, Duran Kalkan, Selahattin Celik, Mahsum Korkmaz, Abdullah Ekinici, Sabri Ok, Halil Kaya, Ali Omurcan and Halil Ates decided to announce the establishment of the ERNK by conducting large-scale activities. Sabri Ok and some other members were caught in Turkey.³⁶⁶ These activities could not be accomplished, therefore Abdullah Ocalan announced the establishment of the ERNK in the capital of Greece, Athens on 21 March 1985.³⁶⁷ Mahsum Korkmaz was assigned the leader of the ERNK. The ERNK was established as a political wing of

³⁶⁴ Demirel, Emin, (2005), *Gecmisten Gunumuze PKK ve Ayaklanmalar*, [From Past to Today PKK and Commotions], Istanbul: IQ Kultur Sanat Press, p.238.

³⁶⁵ Pirim and Ortulu, (2000), *ibid.*, p.160.

³⁶⁶ Bila, (2004), *ibid.*, p.41.

³⁶⁷ Aydin, (1992), *ibid.*, p.166.

the PKK to draw sympathizers from students, workers and young people, to recruit new members, to organize political activities, but mainly for propaganda purposes.³⁶⁸

Abdullah Ocalan defined the ERNK's purposes as follows;³⁶⁹

- ✓ End all the activities of security forces in the region.
- ✓ Clarify government organizations.
- ✓ Take over all the economical institutions of the government.
- ✓ Enhance the Kurdish language and take over educational institutions.
- ✓ Capture all the lands in the region from the landlords.
- ✓ Establish a national assembly and a people's government.
- ✓ Allocate land to poor people, and organize an independent economy.
- ✓ Establish an independent judicial system.
- ✓ Establish human rights.
- ✓ Give opportunities to minorities.

The ERNK has established many institutes and committees to devise propaganda and recruit new members in Europe. ERNK organized so-called social activities to obtain some funding for operations. Other aim of this organization is to conceal the PKK's terrorist face and to try to identify PKK as a legal organization. In some ways, they achieved their objectives because in some countries, the PKK is known as a group of freedom fighters, not terrorists.³⁷⁰

However, after Ocalan's capture and the PKK's seventh congress, the PKK decided to replace the ERNK with YDK. PKK convened a congress from 2-10 May 2000, abolishing the ERNK and announcing the inauguration of the YDK with its main journal, Serxwebun.³⁷¹

³⁶⁸ Cesme, Ahmet, (2005), *PKK Psikolojik Harekat ve Kansiz Mucadelenin Kanli Yuzu*, [PKK Psychological Operation and Bloody Face of Bloodless Struggle], Istanbul: IQ Kultur Sanat Press, p.149.

³⁶⁹ Ocalan, Abdullah, (1982), *Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Problemi ve Cozum Yollari*, [Problem of Kurdistan National Independence and Solutions], <http://www.belgenet.com/dava/dava05.html>, (Accessed on 06.08.2009).

³⁷⁰ Alexander, Yonah, (23 February 2009), Washington, D.C., Prof. Alexander argues that PKK is a bloody terrorist organization not freedom fighters. In one of the interview held with him. He said, people abroad thinking that you are fighting with freedom fighters, but in fact PKK is terrorist organization.

³⁷¹ Serxwebun.com, (2000), "YDK Kurulus Bildirgesi", [Announcement of YDK], <http://www.serxwebun.com/2000/05/hab07.html>, (Accessed on 25.04.2009).

In April 2009, Turkish Police conducted major operations in the city to find out the latest developments in the PKK. Police forces completed a successful operation, discovering the organizational structure of the PKK and in other words, the system of the KCK (Annex B).³⁷²

4.3. RECRUITMENT

The PKK recruits new members to the organization to survive and continue its bloody actions. The PKK has several reasons to recruit new individuals. First, they aim to be effective over a large area to reach their goals. Second, they want to replace their losses. Hence, the organization cannot survive without maintaining continuous recruitment. It has been known that effective recruitment motives are adapted to the audience and its cultural, social, and historical background.

The PKK addresses the psychological and social needs of the people with whom they plan to be in touch. The PKK applies different recruitment methods for different social groups and ages. Social, psychological and other relevant factors are all important because they increase the percentage of the population who support terrorism.

New recruits mainly have,

- ✓ Family Problems
- ✓ Weaknesses
- ✓ The wrong friends
- ✓ Financial problems
- ✓ Ethnic and cultural origin
- ✓ Psychological and social needs,

There are four steps for the process,³⁷³

First Step in the Recruitment Process: Using Group Dynamics

- ✓ Detailed search on the person
- ✓ Organizing social activities

³⁷² Aktifhaber.com, (2009), “Polisten Fotolu KCK Semasi”, [Pictured KCK Chart from Police], http://www.aktifhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=219746, (Accessed on 28.04.2009).

³⁷³ Egm.gov, (n.d.), “Teror Orgutleri Gencleri Nasil Kazaniyor”, [How do the Terrorist Organizations Recruit Young People?], <http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/mucadele1.html>, (Accessed on 29.04.2009).

- ✓ Financial help (Scholarships ,etc.)

Main aim is to conquer hearts.

Second Step in the Recruitment Process: Changing the Attitude

- ✓ Strong propaganda (books, magazines)
- ✓ Teaching the ideology
- ✓ Giving small responsibilities

Main aim is to brainwash.

Third Step in the Recruitment Process: Changing the Perception

- ✓ Thinking of nothing but the organization.

Main aim is to making a robot.

Fourth Step in the Recruitment Process: Impersonating Military Identity and Personality

- ✓ Changing the identity
- ✓ Delete personal background

Main aim is to establish the idea of “Everybody else is the enemy”

A survey made by the Turkish police shows us the reasons that students join the PKK to create a social life. According to the autobiographies of 150 young students, students were joining the organization not to solve a problem, but to escape from their own problems that they are not able to solve alone. Economic difficulties, problems related to family and their social environment have made them hate the community in which they live.³⁷⁴

Research shows that the PKK uses children. Eighty-six percent of those who had joined the organization did so to strengthen their families' incomes following offers that it would provide for their families in return for service. All of the new recruits reported that these offers were not fulfilled. Eighty percent of those surveyed also reported that they had actively stopped other family members, usually younger brothers, from joining the PKK too. Sixty percent of those surveyed had an education level below high school. When asked why they stayed in the organization, two thirds

³⁷⁴ Guven, Recep, (2005), “Lessons From Combating Terrorism”, *Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security*, Ankara: Oncu Press, p.339.

stated that they were afraid of being caught after deserting as retaliations are not just limited to physical harm towards the militant; their families would be at risk as well. Five percent said that it was from fear of punishment by the Republic of Turkey.³⁷⁵

In 1998, it was reported that “the PKK had 3,000 children within its ranks, more than ten percent of whom were girls. The youngest child witnessed with the PKK was seven years old. From 1994, it appears that the PKK started to systematically recruit more and more children and even created children’s regiments. It was claimed, for example, that a children’s battalion named Tabura Zaroken Sehit Agit was composed of three divisions and was, in theory at least, run by a committee of five children aged between eight and twelve years.” The PKK is employing children in this drug-trafficking as well. “Police in Hamburg, Germany arrested a group of eleven year-old Kurdish children who had been smuggled into Germany from the Turkey in order to sell drugs for PKK. Similarly, the Turkish police caught a thirteen year-old girl with 9.236 kilograms of drugs trafficked by the PKK on 11 January 2007”.³⁷⁶

Women have great importance in the organization in terms recruiting. Women history in the PKK begins with one of the founding members of the PKK terrorist organization, Kesire Yıldırım, Abdullah Ocalan’s ex-wife, who participated in the founding meetings of the PKK. Before late 1992 or early 1993, there was no separate movement for women in the PKK. Until that time, female members were a part of the general organization and attempts to meet or discuss gender issues in the organization or to build a separate female structure were taken as an attempt to divide the PKK. This was strongly opposed by Abdullah Ocalan. As the number of female members in PKK increased, Abdullah Öcalan relented and ordered the construction of a separate female group in 1993.³⁷⁷

The PKK’s female wing is called the KJB (Koma Jinen Bilind [Community of Great Women]). The KJB is actually an umbrella organization that is composed of

³⁷⁵ Hurriyet.com, (2007), “Hepsi Kandirilmis Cocuklar”, [They are all inveigled kids], <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6673759.asp?gid=180>, (Accessed on 08.05.2009)

³⁷⁶ Dikici, Ali, (2008), “Preventing the PKK’s Misuse of Children by Introducing Community Policing: The Şanlıurfa Case”, *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, Ankara: Vol.1, No.2, Fall 2008, <http://www.coedat.nato.int/publications/datr2/Ali%20Dikici.pdf>, (Accessed on 23.05.2009).

³⁷⁷ Buldan, Nejdet, (2002), *PKK.da Kadın Olmak*, [Being Woman in PKK], Istanbul: Doz Publications, p.22.

the PAJK, the YJA (Yetkiya Jinen Azad or Free Women's Movement), the JC (Jina Ciwan, Young Women Organization), and the YJA-STAR. The KJB organization is under the PKK's structure in the KCK system.

The PAJK, the YJA, the JC, and the YJA-STAR are interlinked and conduct different functions. The same person can be a member of all three. PAJK's function is to produce strategies and construct an intellectual base for the female structure in the PKK. PAJK is composed of six so-called committees: "Leadership," "Legitimate Defence (the term they use for armed terrorist activities)," "Training," "Culture and Arts," "the Project of Transformation of Men" and "Media." All of these committees function to produce a female-centric strategy for the future.³⁷⁸ The YJA is the transient organization that functions as a bridge between the population and the terrorist organization. The main goal of the branch is to spread the ideology of the organization among the women of the target population at the grassroots level. YJA-STAR is the armed branch of the female structure of the PKK.

There is a large amount of women terrorists in the PKK compared to other terrorist organizations. There are some reasons to define this situation. It has been accepted that men and women are equal in Turkish society since 1926, but it is hard to say that it is true in some parts of Turkey, especially in the southeast. Women in the southeast of Turkey generally have participated in the PKK for two main reasons. The first is family; the second is propaganda.³⁷⁹ Family reasons are based on several factors. Families wanted to give their daughters the PKK to take revenge on family members that were killed by Turkish security forces. On the other hand, women joined to PKK to avoid family suppression, because in that part of the country, some girls are forced to get married to an older man that the family chooses when they turn thirteen to fourteen years of age. These women saw the PKK as a way out and freedom. Moreover, strong propaganda has been made by PKK to hoodwink young girls to join the PKK and become "guerillas".

³⁷⁸ Pajkonline.com, (n.d.), "KJB'nin Ideolojik Ayagi", [The ideological Echelon of KJB], http://www.pajkonline.com/tr/ozeldosyalar/pajk/index_pajk.html, (Accessed on 23.05.2009).

³⁷⁹ Ozcan, Ali Nihat, (2007), "PKK Recruitment of Female Operatives", *Terrorism Focus*, Vol.: 4 Issue: 28, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4394, (Accessed on 24.05.2009).

Another important factor is that the PKK is using the advantage of the fancy word “guerilla” to influence, especially, uneducated and unemployed young people with the slogans of “Social Status” and “National Case”.

In recruitment process prisons have a great role as well. In Turkey eighty-five percent of detainees are juridical while fifteen percent are terror aggravated. Although the juridical detainees are the majority, they serve their time without creating any problems. The reason for this situation is that they are not organized in the prison or outside. The PKK is conducting its activities in prisons in accordance with activities on the outside. In addition, the PKK prisoners control everything in the prison according to the decisions by supreme council. They force members to act and dress along with the PKK rules. If they do not obey the PKK rules, those people are punished or exterminated. The PKK detainees mostly protest the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Law’s Article 16.³⁸⁰ Reports that have been prepared by PKK detainees were sent to members by people coming to visit detainees. Research clearly expresses that prisons are extremely suitable for recruitment efforts. Organizations usually use strong propaganda, expose their ideology, and help the person financially in order to gain new members to their organizations in prisons. One of the leaders of the PKK terrorist organization declared that Diyarbakır Prison Facility was the core of the organization in the establishment process.

4.4. TRAINING

4.4.1. Training Methods

Operational training is given to PKK recruits Mountain Kandil terrorist training camps in the Northern Iraq. It is a 3,500 meters mountain that stands astride s the Iranian border of Iraq and is located one hundred kilometers from the Turkish border. PJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK, is located a southern flank of the mountain. Communication is facilitated through short-range radio devices according to James Brandon of the Jamestown Foundation.³⁸¹ He depicts the camp:

“PKK operates at Mountain Qandil more as a mini-state rather than as a simple "training camp." While weapons training does take place and forms an

³⁸⁰ Law No 3713 Anti-Terrorism Law Article 6 legislates that terrorists have to serve their times in 1, 2 or 3 person bedrooms.

³⁸¹ Brandon, James, (2006), “Mount Qandil: A Safe Haven for Kurdish Militants-Part 1,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol.4, No.17, p.1.

important part of training for new recruits, the PKK puts great emphasis on ideological training. Education in Kurdish history, culture and politics aims to create dedication to the Kurdish cause with loyalty to Abdullah Ocalan. At the same time, many the PKK members are middle-aged and have been in the camp since 1999, or even earlier. The camp is intentionally situated far from the frontlines and its primary role is to act as a safe haven for Turkish Kurds. The sense of lethargy that pervades the camp comes from the fact that the PKK's leader is still Abdullah Ocalan who, despite being in prison, aims to micromanage the movement”.³⁸²

From the photographs that are posted on the PKK websites, it is seen that small arms training, guerilla tactics and ideological training constitute most of the training program. In the PKK's main websites (pkk.org), one of the trainers writes that their training program in the training camp includes self criticism of their past tactics, which is Abdullah Ocalan's so called “Democratic ecologic and gender free socialist paradigm” and alleges that this new paradigm is the only alternative against the hegemonic capitalist system.³⁸³ The emphasis on the ideological training in the program demonstrates that their first priority is creating robust indoctrinated ideologically devoted terrorists and then giving them the operational skills to kill.

According to Brandon, Internet connection is available from a few computers through satellite uplinks in the camp. Satellite TV is not the only way they can make their propaganda, transmit their messages, mobilize their people and motivationally train and sustain the motivational commitment among its members. The PKK terrorist network largely uses the Internet for these purposes. As observed by, a political science professor at Concordia University “when Turkish forces arrested Ocalan, Kurds around the world responded with demonstrations within a matter of hours.” He attributed the swift action in part to the Internet and web. “They responded more quickly than governments did to his arrest.”³⁸⁴

4.4.2. Terrorists Camps

The first training camp was established in Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in 1982, with the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria. Under

³⁸² Brandon, (2006), *ibid*, p.3.

³⁸³ Munzur, Roni, (n.d.), “What are the renewals in PKK's new training program and its effects? <http://www.pkk.org/tr/Okuldosya/roni.html> , (Accessed on 13.06.2009).

³⁸⁴ Denning, (n.d.), *ibid*.

intensive this main pressure, camp moved to Northern Iraq in 1998, after Syria expelled Ocalan and shut down all camps established in the region.³⁸⁵

Instead of one big camp, which could be easily destroyed, the PKK established many small camps. During this period, the PKK set up a fully functioning commune with training camps, storage facilities, and reconnaissance and communications centers. PKK has two types of camps, the border camps that were used as forward bases from which terrorists could break into Turkey. The units deployed there are highly mobile and the camps have only minimum infrastructure. Camps in Mountain Kandil have more developed infrastructure, including field hospital, electricity generators and a large proportion of the PKK's weapons.³⁸⁶

There are also training camps in other countries; the PKK's camp which is indiscernible deep in the woods and was dismantled near Eindhoven in the Netherlands and following raids resulted in arrests and seizure of materials in The Hague, Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Capelle aan den IJssel.³⁸⁷ There was another training camp in Belgium, which PKK uses training camps in Europe for political and ideological training.³⁸⁸

Besides the camps above, PKK has twenty-three camps, five of them in Iran, eighteen of them in Northern Iraq. There are eight camps in Mount Kandil.³⁸⁹

Camps in Iran (5)

1. Camp Sehidan: It is at the border of Iran and Iraq. It is located right behind the hill that is called 'Kirksehitler', east of Hakkari Yuksekova.

2. Camp Kozares: It is located one-hour away from City Sapur. In addition, it is two hours walking distance to Van Baskale.

³⁸⁵ Hooper, Simon, (2007), "PKK's decade of Violent Struggle", <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/10/10/pkk.profile/index.html>, (Accessed on 26.06.2009).

³⁸⁶ Jenkins, Gareth, (2007), "Turkey Weighs Military Options Against PKK Camps in Iraq", *Global Terrorism Analysis*, Volume 4, Issue 33, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373722>, (Accessed on 24.07.2009).

³⁸⁷ Nisnews.nl, (n.d.), "PKK Training Camp Dismantled Near Eindhoven, 38 Arrests", http://www.nisnews.nl/public/131104_1.htm, (Accessed on 23.06.2009).

³⁸⁸ (UN)United Nations, (2004), "Report Of The Committee Against Torture", New York: OHCHR Studies, p.276-277

³⁸⁹ Tumgazeteler.com, (2007), "Iste Hedef Kamplar", [Here are the Target Camps], <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2359067>, (Accessed on 23.06.2009).

3. Camp Danbat: It is located in the rocky region, across Mountain Agri, in Iran territory.

4. Camp Tures: It is located 1.5-hour distance to City Sapur.

5. Camp Kuran: It is located eleven kilometers to distance to Elvatan Village in City Piranşehir.

Camps in Mountain Kandil (8)

1. Camp Zeli: It is located near the Suleymaniye Kalediz. There are houses for senior management. Political trainings are conducted in this camp. It is known that there is a hospital in the camp inside a creek, there is a big generator and stone houses have been built to accommodate high-level members of the organization. At the same time, political education is carried out in this camp.

2. Camp Dole-Koge: It is located to the Northern of Iraq and the border of Iran. It is the ideological headquarter. There are on going trainings about of PKK's political activities. There are hospitals, schools and electric plant in the camp. But, it is evacuated in winters.

3. Camp Sehit Ayhan: It is located near the Suleymaniye Ranya region. There are 300 terrorists in the camp. Especially, suicide attacks trainings are being conducted in this camp. In addition, so called special forces trainings are being conducted as well. There are 'RGP-7' rockets, 'Dokca anti-aircraft ammos' and '60 mm mortars'.

4. Camp Sehit Harun: It is located at the peak of Mountain Kandil. It controls offshoot terrorist organizations in Iraq, Iran and Syria.

5. Camp Kala Turka: It is located 1.5 hours walking distance to Camp Dole-Koge. New recruits are taking both military and political trainings in this camp. There are 'SAM-7' missiles and satellite phones in the camp.

6. Camp Kani Cengi: It is located ten kilometers distance to Suleymaniye and 2 hours walking distance to Iran border. There are 1000 terrorists in the camp. It is the most important and strategic key location because all the logistic transitions are supplied in this camp.

7. Camp Bele Kati: It is located between Mountain Helgort and Suleymaniye. There are 1000 terrorists in the camp. There are two control points in the camp for the smugglers. PKK is collecting money from the smugglers through taxation.

8. Camp West Side: It is located between Mount Helgort and Suleymaniye. There are 550 terrorists in the camp. There are twenty ‘SAM-7’ missiles.

Other Camps

1. Camp Hakurki: It is located in the southern part of the border of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. It is on the west of Mount Zagros, and the side of Mount Sekif. It is formed against the attacks of Turkey and Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party.

2. Camp Hinere: It is located between City Sino (Iran) and Sedeka (North of Iraq) and south part of Turkey’s border, near to Lolan Water. The central headquarter of the terrorist organization is in the camp. The camp is relatively bigger than the others. There is one hospital, one tailor store and a river dam. There are 1000 terrorists. The camp is a research center on press and literature issues. After their release from prisons, terrorists are gathered in this camp. There is also a graveyard in the camp.

3. Camp Lolan: It is located near Lolan Water, which is close to Hakurki Valley. Mostly, new recruits are staying in the camp. There are 150 terrorists in the camp.

4. Camp Zap: It is a five-six hours walking distance to Turkey. It is near the Felas Village. It is at the side of Zap Water. There is no building in the camp. It is a temporary place for terrorists before they head to Turkey.

5. Camp Metina: It is located in the Hakkari Cukurca province. It is 15-20 kilometers distance to Turkey.

6. Camp Avasin: It is located in a valley that is between Turkey and Iraq border. It is across the Hakkari Daglica.

7. Camp Haftanin: It is located 1-hour distance to Zaho and 3 hours walking distance to border of Turkey.

8. Camp Keleres: It is located at the border of Iran and Iraq. The PKK is collecting money from the smugglers through taxation in Camp Bele Kati. Moreover, the money is delivered to the executive council through this camp.

9. Camp Piran: It is located on the two sides of Piran River and ten kilometers to City Salmas (Iran). New recruits are also taking military and political trainings in this camp as well.

10. Camp Makhmur (Refugee Camp): It is under the authorization of the Northern Iraqi administration. It is located in the Musul-Makhmur region. Although it is under

the supervision of United Nations, but it is known that PKK has the chance of creating propaganda and recruiting terrorists in the camp. The Camp is located in the south of Musoul, Northern Iraq. Camp residents, who are approximately 10000 in number, are installed in the camp named ATRUSH by the UNHCR. The Atrush Camp has been closed down in April 1997 because of its falling under the control of PKK and therefore losing its essence as an UN camp.

4.5. ARMAMENTS

4.5.1. Weapons Used by the PKK

Evidence from weapons that were captured by security forces demonstrates that the PKK weapons are mostly coming from Russia and China. Some of them are coming from Germany, Italy, Spain and the USA. The Turkish Armed Forces makes a detailed survey on the all weapons that they capture. Here are the detailed lists of the weapons that were captured by security forces.³⁹⁰

Table 5, Captured PKK Weapons

Type of The Weapon	Captured Weapons (Number)	Weapons that had Recognizable Place of Origin		Country of Origin
		Result		
		Amount	%	
Kalashnikov (AK-47)	11297	4500	39.83	Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States 71.6%
				China 14.7 %
				Hungary 3.6%
				Bulgaria 3.6%
Other Rifles (Kanas Sniper Rifle, PKC Light Machine Gun, Arbiki, Dragunov Sniper Rifle, G-3, G-1, Mauser, M- 16)	5713	959	16.78	Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States 45.2%
				UK 13.2%
				USA 9.4%

³⁹⁰ Hurriyet.com, (2007), "Iste PKK Silahlarinin Listesi", [List of PKK Weapons], <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6922630.asp?gid=180>, (Accessed on 29.07.2009).

Rocket Launcher	1610	313	19.44	Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States 85.3%
				Iraq 5.4%
				China 2.5%
Gun / Machine Gun	2885	2208	76.53	Czechoslovakia 21.9%
				Spain 20.2%
				Italy 19.8%
Mine	11568	8015	69.28	Italy 60.6%
				Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States 28.3%
				Germany 6.2%
Hand Grenade	3490	136	3.89	Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States 72.0%
				USA 19.8%
				Germany 8.0%
TOTAL	36563	16131	44.1	

Table 6, Captured PKK Weapons (Country Information)

COUNTRIES	Kalashnikov (AK-47)	Gun / Machine Gun	Rifle	Rocket Launcher	Hand Grenade	Mine	Total	% Country
Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States	3222	124	434	267	98	2268	6413	39.8
Italy		439	3			4857	5299	32.8
China	651	16	21	6		2	708	4.4
Germany	91	6	76	7	11	496	687	4.2
Spain	25	484	5				514	3.2
Belgium	1	448	4			2	358	2.2
Hungary	162	14	3				179	1.1
USA		34	91	7	27	3	162	1

Other Countries	338	311	298	24		387	1358	8.5
TOTAL	4500	2208	959	313	136	8015	16131	

4.5.2. IEDs (Improvised Explosives Device) and Mines Used by PKK

Most of the mines are made by Italy.³⁹¹

The Number of IED and Mine Incidents Perpetrated by the PKK in 2009³⁹²

(01 January – 10 April 2009)

- The number of defused/seized IEDs that were used by the terror organization:13

Table 7, The number of defused/seized IEDs that were used by PKK (2009)

No.	Type of The Explosives	Amount
1	TNT/Dynamite	100,512 Kg.
2	Plastic Explosive	38,236 Kg.
3	Ammonium / Potassium Nitrate	1118,01 Kg.
4	Undefined	38,655 Kg.
5	Mine	13 Pieces
6	Others	13 Pieces

- The number of IED incidents carried out by the members of the PKK:
8

The Number of IED and Mine Incidents Perpetrated by the PKK in 2008³⁹³

(01 January – 31 December 2008)

³⁹¹ Hurriyet.com, (2007), [List of PKK Weapons], ibid.

³⁹² Tsk.mil.tr, (2009), “The Number of IED and Mine Incidents Perpetrated By Terror Organization in 2009”, http://tsk.mil.tr/eng/news_and_events/explosive_devices/toplam.htm, (Accessed on 13.08.2009).

³⁹³ Tsk.mil.tr, (2008), “2008 Yilinda Bolucu Teror Orgutu Mensuplari Tarafindan Gerceklestirilen Patlayici Madde ve Mayin Kullanma Olaylari”, [The Number of IED and Mine Incidents Perpetrated By Terror Organization in 2008], http://tsk.mil.tr/10_ARsIV/10_3_Haberler_ve_Olaylar/10_3_13_Patlayici_Madde_ve_Mayin_Kullanma_Olaylari/Patlayici_Madde_ve_Mayin_Kullanma_Olaylari_2008.html, (Accessed on 14.08.2009).

- The number of defused/seized IEDs that were used by the terror organization: 334

Table 8, The number of defused/seized IEDs that were used by PKK (2008)

No.	Type of The Explosives	Amount
1	TNT/Dynamite	254,616 Kg.
2	A-4 Type Plastic Explosive	84,025 Kg.
2	C-4 Type Plastic Explosive	95,425 Kg.
2	C-3 Type Plastic Explosive	17,4 Kg.
3	Ammonium / Potassium Nitrate	3437,3 Kg.
4	Anti-Personel Mine	55 Pieces
5	Trapped Anti-Tank Mine	1 Piece
6	Trapped Ammunition	85 Pieces

- The number of IED incidents carried out by the members of the PKK: 151

4.6. FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Terrorists need to cover their operational activities, clothing, healthcare, transportation, and propaganda expenditures. To sustain the existence of the terrorist organization and keep its activities going, it is imperative to find enough money to cover every expenditure item. Terrorist organizations have various income sources to meet these needs. While the financial needs of terrorist organizations vary respectively with their ideologies, they resort to almost identical methods to fund their activities.³⁹⁴

4.6.1. Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking is one of the major methods used by terrorist organizations to raise funds for their activities. The PKK is no exception. Since its establishment, the PKK

³⁹⁴ Ogun, M.Nesip, (2008), "Financing of Terrorism", *NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism Newsletter*, Ankara: p.16, <http://www.coedat.nato.int/publications/newsletter/newsletter6.pdf>, (Accessed on 23.09.2009).

has been using drug profits to fund its campaign of terror. After the military coup in 1980, many PKK terrorists immigrated to Europe. This gradually created a supply of human capital for the PKK to use in the continent.

Sources reveal that PKK members control the European drug cartel.³⁹⁵ The PKK controls around eighty percent of the European market. Since that is one of the most important regions of the global drug market, it is not difficult to comprehend how the PKK has managed itself to sustain for more than two decades.³⁹⁶ Likewise, the reports underline that the PKK uses heroin production and trafficking to support its acts of terror. Classified information pointing to persistent reports of the PKK's involvement in narcotics trafficking through Turkey, repeats that the PKK not only uses taxes extracted from narcotics traffickers and refiners to finance its operations, but may be more directly involved in transporting and marketing narcotics in Europe as well.³⁹⁷

The drug trade has proved to be a particularly lucrative business for the PKK. Heroin has proven to be the most profitable commodity. According to one source, a kilogram of heroin can be bought for between \$1,000 and \$2,000 in Thailand or Afghanistan. In Turkey, its value rises to \$6,000–\$8,000, before reaching Germany where it wholesales for \$20,000–\$80,000, with a street value of \$200,000.³⁹⁸ When one considers that one-kilogram of cocaine costs 100,000 Euros in France and 50,000 Euros in Turkey, it is easy to understand why drug trafficking is a major income source for terrorist organizations.

³⁹⁵ State.gov, (1992), "Control Strategy Of International Drug Trafficking", http://state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/europ96.html, (Accessed on 23.09.2009);

Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, (2002), Loc.gov, (2002), "The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators and Organized Crime Networks In Western Europe", <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/>, (Accessed on 23.09.2009); Judiciary.senate.gov, (2002), "Testimony United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Narco-Terror; The Worldwide connection Between Drugs and Terrorism", <http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony=196>, (Accessed on 23.09.2009).

³⁹⁶ Laciner, Sedat, (2008), "Drug Smuggling As Main Source of PKK Terrorism", <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=702>, (Accessed on 23.09.2009).

³⁹⁷ Barnhart, Stephen R., (2002), *The New International Terrorism and Political Violence Guide*, USA: Trafford Publishing, p.119.

³⁹⁸ Roth, Mitchel P. and Sever, Murat, (2007), "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.30, No.10, p. 903.

Turkey is a key trans-shipment point for drug trafficking because of its desirable geographic location connecting Europe to Asia. Moreover, Turkey is neighbor to the region called ‘the Golden Crescent’³⁹⁹ that is known for being the heart of illegal opium production. Many narcotics specialists agree that eighty percent of Europe’s illegal drugs are being passed through Turkey. The PKK is playing a dominant role in Turkey’s narcotics smuggling industry. The PKK is also playing a significant role in organizing drug trafficking in Europe. The PKK collects 86 billion dollars yearly from drug trafficking.⁴⁰⁰

The PKK is not only involved in the transportation of illegal drugs, but over the years it has extended its role into production and marketing as well. In short, PKK has grown into a full-service business coordinating the production, use, and transportation of illegal drugs, particularly in Western Europe.

The PKK’s involvement in the drug trade has been noted in a number of U.S. Congressional Testimonies and Hearings. The Annual Dayton Model United Nations Conference (DAYMUNC) and the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) have also listed the PKK among the terrorist organizations involved in the illegal drug trade.⁴⁰¹

According to statements made by Abdullah Ocalan and other high-ranking imprisoned terrorists, PKK relies heavily on transnational organized crime in order to fund its operations. Of these, the most profitable is drug trafficking, which funds the purchase of weapons. Germany’s chief prosecutor has asserted that eighty percent of the drugs captured in Europe have been linked to the PKK.⁴⁰²

The Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly interviewed Semdin Sakik in Diyarbakir Prison in 2003. His remarks link the terrorist group to the international drug trade as well: “The source of our money was drug trafficking. The PKK and Abdullah Ocalan always have a big share from the

³⁹⁹ The Golden Crescent is the name given to one of Asia's two principal areas of illicit opium production, located at the crossroads of Central, South, and Western Asia. This space overlaps three nations, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, whose mountainous peripheries define the crescent.

⁴⁰⁰ Gurses, (2001), *ibid*, p.97.

⁴⁰¹ Dayton Model United Nations Conference (DAYMUNC), (2005), “Which terrorist groups participate in narco-terrorism?”, <http://www.sinclair.edu/organizations/daymunc/pub/daymunc/2005bgctc.htm>, (Accessed on 23.09.2009).

⁴⁰² Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.905.

drug trafficking on the drug route of Turkey-Middle East. We collected money from drugs to purchase weapons. Latest investigations by Turkish Police confirm the PKK is still in the drug business. In a September 2004 case, Turkish Police busted a drug gang suspected of importing heroin to Europe in September 2004. A follow-up investigation revealed that the suspects were previously involved in PKK terrorist actions in Hakkari.⁴⁰³

It is known that Osman Ocalan, brother of Abdullah Ocalan, is involved in drug trafficking. During Abdullah Ocalan's trial, answering the judge's question as to whether the PKK was involved in the drug business, Abdullah Ocalan answered:

"Osman Ocalan, (Abdullah Ocalan's brother,) is collecting money from people who conduct drug trafficking. In addition, there are some structures called customs units of the organization and located along the borders. They collect the money as well On the borders a certain amount of money is collected from traffickers as a tax. Apart from that, I did not accept the proposal of drug trafficking in Iran/Maku region, although I knew it would provide a high level of income. Despite this fact, I learned that some people in the organization, in particular my brother, Osman Ocalan, were trafficking drugs to Europe through Iran, Zagros, and Romania. I warned them not to get involved in this. However, at certain points, it is obvious that I could not control the organization very well".⁴⁰⁴

4.6.2. Smuggling

Human smuggling is treating humans against their wills such as marketing humans illegally and for trading purposes, begging, sexual abuse (prostitution, forced marriages etc.) and forced labor with low wages and under poor conditions. Human smuggling is capturing, collecting, hiding and transferring humans by fraud, cheat and force. Human smuggling is the modern equivalent of slavery. The PKK kidnaps people (especially in the southeast of Turkey) by force, recruits them as terrorists, and then uses them for its foul ambitions.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰³ Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.906; Stargazete.com, (2004), "24 Kilo Ele Gecti, 5 Kisi Tutuklandi", [24 Kilogram was Captured, 5 People were Arrested], <http://www.stargazete.com/guncel/haber-kisa-kisa-23429.htm>, (Accessed on 23.09.2009).

⁴⁰⁴ Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.908.

⁴⁰⁵ Ogun, (2008), *ibid.*, p.18.

The PKK is using its drug trade routes to smuggle illegal immigrants from South Asia to Europe. By using human smuggling as a financial resource, The PKK is both getting additional funds and recruiting new members to the organization. The PKK also cooperates also with illegal immigration organization:

- ✓ The PKK gives permission for immigrant to cross borders, and collecting money under the name of ‘tax’,
- ✓ Transporting illegal immigrants to Europe,
- ✓ Breaking all the laws of various European countries and by using various techniques of counterfeiting, apply for political asylum,
- ✓ Refugees are getting financial aid from the European countries. PKK is collecting money from the refugees,
- ✓ They use illegal immigrants for their terrorist activities and purposes.⁴⁰⁶

The PKK transports refugees from North Iraq to Italy through Turkey. The three most popular routes include Istanbul to Milan, Istanbul-Bosnia-Milan, and Turkey-Tunisia-Malta-Italy.⁴⁰⁷ PKK uses small fisherman boats to illegally transport members or sympathizers through either Meric River or Aegean Sea to Greece or Italy by using fake passports.

Interpol has estimated PKK revenues from illegal immigration and people smuggling as ranging from two to three thousand Euros for each individual. In 2005 the Romanian daily newspaper ‘Adevarul’, reported that the Romanian police has destroyed a PKK-affiliated human smuggling ring that had been transporting people through Turkey, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Britain, and France. Police found faked passports and bank documents during an investigation of the operation’s headquarters. Each individual was reportedly expected to pay six to seven thousand Euros per person for transportation to Berlin, Vienna, Paris, or London. According to the Romanian police, money generated from smuggling was being transferred to PKK camps in North Iraq.⁴⁰⁸ German and Turkish officials have proved that PKK is

⁴⁰⁶ Gunes, Ozkan, (2004), “Turkiye Ile Baglantili Yasadisi Goc ve Insan Kacakciliginin Analizi”, [Analyzing Illegal Immigration and Human Smuggling Dealing With Turkey], Turkish Military College, Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara, p.29.

⁴⁰⁷ Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.908.

⁴⁰⁸ Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.908.

using fake passports for illegal immigration.⁴⁰⁹ However, lately with operations of security forces, there is a decline on human smuggling.

4.6.3. Extortion

Extortion is a special payment, which the amount determined by the organization collected by force from all people whether connected to the organization, or not. It can be in the form of either money or goods. Extortion may be conducted by using different methods such as protection, not harming, threatening, kidnapping and threat to inform authorities about a guilt or situation. In fact, assistance of the sympathizers, threatening people opposing organization about the safety of lives or businesses, threat to inform authorities about illegal workers or immigrants and taking commission for protection against security forces, are commonly known methods. Turkish citizens living in foreign countries have been targeted in particular for extortion purposes by terrorist organizations.

Until 1995, the PKK collected significant amounts from citizens living in the east and southeast of Turkey by force. Citizens, who do not agree to pay tribute, have in the past been attacked by bombs, kidnapped, and assassinated.⁴¹⁰

In 2002, the PKK attempted to collect money and food in South Cyprus and North Iraq by force. The PKK additionally collected money from the villages around Mount Kandil by force, collected commissions from the smugglers working between North Iraq and neighboring countries, and also made similar attempts in the regions of Mesut Barzani's KDP and Celal Talabani's YNK (PUK)⁴¹¹

In any case, by most accounts the majority of extortion victims avoid making formal complaints due to the obvious consequences. In 1993, the PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds from Kurdish immigrants and executives within Great Britain. By most accounts, the PKK has been quite successful at filling its reserves with money extorted from other drug smugglers as a "tax." According to a U.S. Senate committee

⁴⁰⁹ Dalman, Metin and Tabak, Ismail, (1995), "Avrupa'da İnsan Ticareti ve PKK", [Human Smuggling in Europe and PKK], *Terror Researches Series -I*, p.48-67

⁴¹⁰ Alkan, Necati, (2004), "Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları", [Financial Resources of Terrorist Organizations], *Police Magazine, Defense Against Terrorism Special Volume*, Ankara: Year: 10, Volume: 40, p.292.

⁴¹¹ Trcinfo.com, (2002), "Terrorist Organization Tries to Extort Money in Cyprus", <http://www.trcinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/arsiv2002/turkcearsiv/haziran280602.htm>, (Accessed on 24.09.2009).

hearing in 2002, “The PKK also taxes ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers in Western Europe.” During the PKK’s terror campaign in Turkey in 1996, the PKK made use of money extorted from London. One authority noted, “The PKK runs an intricate protection racket in Green Lanes in Northern London where many restaurants have to pay ‘insurance fees’ or face retaliation.” That same year Belgian police carried out an operation called ‘Sputnik’ that they discovered a list of the names of Turkish businessmen of Kurdish origin and companies in Belgium from which the PKK extorted almost 300,000 francs per month. In a related investigation German police, searching the PKK offices and hideouts in North Rhineland Westphalia and Saxony found evidence of similar extortion activities in Europe, which brought in almost 250 million deutsche marks per month. Most recently, in a news report by the Anadolu News Agency on 5 April 2005, the German newspaper *Franfurter Allgemeine* reported, “The PKK (is) still extorting money in Germany through threats and force.”⁴¹²

4.6.4. Charity

The PKK is additionally collecting money from people who sympathize with the PKK in the name of charity. So far, the amount of the money that was collected this way is unclear.

Abdullah Ocalan declared that in one of the campaigns held in Germany, the PKK collected 2 billion Deutsch mark.⁴¹³ Until the seventh congress of the PKK, the PKK collected money from charities under the auspices of the political wing of the organization, ERNK.⁴¹⁴ After the seventh congress, ERNK was replaced by YDK. After that, YDK began to collect money for the organization. In particular, they have collected money from the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin.

4.6.5. Money Laundering

Money laundering is a process by which money is disconnected from its source and then reinserted into the legal system. Systematic money laundering takes place as follows;

⁴¹² Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.910.

⁴¹³ Birand, Mehmet Ali, (1992), *APO ve PKK*, [APO and PKK], Istanbul: Milliyet Publications, p.186.

⁴¹⁴ Imset, (1993), *ibid.*, p.161-170.

- Insertion; The first phase is the insertion of the black money, which is gained from illegal works and is mostly cash by nature, into a banking system or any financial organization.
- Alienation; The second phase involves the swapping of black money to and from many financial organizations and accounts.
- Integration; The third stage is the integration of money into the legal market economy by investing or buying.

All illegal money that the PKK obtains could be labeled money laundering, not only the money it is getting from drug trafficking, extortion and other illicit funding sources.

4.6.6. Other Activities

The PKK has been involved in a series of other illicit activities. As the amount of the money has increased, the PKK could not deal with this money by small transfers. Therefore, the PKK decided to establish corporations in London, Paris and Berlin.⁴¹⁵

Improvements in technology have allowed the PKK to take advantage of counterfeiting opportunities. According to Interpol cases in the mid-1990s involved counterfeiting government stamps as well as more than 2,500 \$100USD banknotes.⁴¹⁶

The sale of illegal cigarettes has been another commercial operation for the PKK. The PKK has been linked to the smuggling of illegal imports cigarettes with forged tax stamps. Evading tax on wholesale cigarettes and then selling them for retail prices results in significant profits; according to one account cigarette smugglers can earn up to \$60USD per carton in this style.⁴¹⁷

4.7. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Turkey, due to its significant geographical location, has been targeted by countries with some interests in its lands throughout the history and is still the point of attraction of such countries. These countries have provided assistance to terror organizations active in Turkey, primarily the PKK, in terms of training, organizing,

⁴¹⁵ Gurses, (2001), *ibid*, p.98.

⁴¹⁶ Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.910.

⁴¹⁷ Roth and Sever, (2007), *ibid.*, p.910.

quartering/sheltering and finance. The collapse of the two-poled system has caused countries, which created their strategies based on Cold War conditions, to produce new policies, especially European countries that supported the PKK terror organization in order to keep a power implicitly against developments, which might occur in the Middle East possessing strategic resources within this new environment.

Countries' existing conflicts of interest within the context of their relations with Turkey have been effective in creating better conditions for the PKK to settle down in the subject country as well as creating increased support for the terror organization. Within this context, due to Hatay and cross board waters problem; Syria, due to Aegean and Cyprus problem; Greece, and finally due to so-called Armenian massacre assertions; Armenia supported the PKK.

The PKK today has representative offices in almost all countries. The foreign support provided for PKK, accepted as a terror organization by the USA and the EU can be classified under following headlines:

To determine policy and provide strategy for the PKK

- ✓ To provide sheltering/quartering facilities to top-level leaders of the PKK
- ✓ To procure logistics (arms and ammunition)
- ✓ To allocate camp place
- ✓ To provide training
- ✓ To provide financing
- ✓ To support drugs and human smuggling
- ✓ To provide treatment facility
- ✓ To provide facilities in airway transitions
- ✓ To arrange housing
- ✓ To provide forged identification cards/passports
- ✓ To provide intelligence for the organization personnel who will make actions
- ✓ To provide support through border patrols for terrorists who made actions in Turkey and are currently running away
- ✓ To send the youngsters, who were convinced and made to join the PKK in Europe, to organization camps in Iraq over their own lands.

- ✓ To provide facilities for international and regional broadcasting institutions in their activities of issuing statements and carrying out published/written propaganda
- ✓ To provide support to the PKK for their cooperation and common training activities with other terror organizations and organization of contacts and meetings with international institutions and some western parliamentarians
- ✓ To provide the communication facilities to the PKK members through mobile phone, wireless, fax and telex
- ✓ To provide PKK people free circulation and free entry- exit facilities to third countries,
- ✓ To provide convenience to the PKK for procurement of arms, materials and documents, and the transportation of these materials to groups in Turkey and North Iraq⁴¹⁸

Even some parliamentarians, governors, mayors, and retired generals from some of the countries have visited camps of the PKK in Northern Iraq and discussed the issues of cooperation. PKK terrorists have been trained by retired officers of Turkey's NATO alliance, Greece, and some other countries, the head of the terror organization has been invited to their country by their parliaments, forged passport has been issued through South Cyprus, and income provided by the terror organization through illegal ways have been deposited in their own banks. When Abdullah Ocalan was captured, a passport issued for the nationality of South Cyprus was found with him.

4.7.1. State Support

4.7.1.1. PKK and Syria

Syria is the leading country among those providing support to the terror organization the PKK. Syria sheltered Abdullah Ocalan since 1979, providing camps to the organization, assisting training of terrorists and supporting them on all occasions. Syria prefers to utilize terror as a mediator for resolution of the problems with Turkey. Syria used Abdullah Ocalan as a subcontractor within this terror campaign, which it prevailed with zero cost.⁴¹⁹ It is obviously known that there is a strong PKK

⁴¹⁸ Bila, (2004), *ibid*, p.255, 256.

⁴¹⁹ Kundakci, (2004), *ibid*., p.357.

presence among Syrian citizens with Kurdish origin many of the leaders in the organization are of Kurdish origin.

The Hatay-Iskenderun dispute is significant in light of its historical relationship between Turkey and Syria. In 1938, Hatay-Iskenderun was part of the Syrian state controlled by France. In 1939, internal elections held in Hatay resulted in a Turkish majority in its parliament. Later, this area became part of Turkey through plebiscite. Syria, however, continues to have the desire to wield authority over this area. The PKK is able to exploit this issue in order to obtain Syrian support.

The purpose is to weaken Turkey through terror and create an environment in favor of themselves in the said issues. Syria refused to acknowledge publicly that the PKK was a terrorist organization until an April 1992 official gathering between Turkey and Syria. During the meeting, Syria also admitted the presence of PKK terrorists in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley. Official talks between the Syrian and Turkish officials proved to be productive when Lebanese troops captured the main PKK training camp in Bekaa in cooperation with Syria. Some contend that the Syrian government began to take the PKK issue more seriously after observing signs from Ankara that action against PKK camps by military forces was an option under consideration by Turkish authorities.

Syria's support for PKK could be specified as below;⁴²⁰

- ✓ To quarter/shelter terrorists who ran away from Turkey
- ✓ To provide money and passport to the terrorists who went to Lebanon or other countries
- ✓ To establish relation through the PKK with other terror organizations struggling against Turkey
- ✓ To procure money, arm and ammunition to the PKK
- ✓ To permit the opening of the PKK representative offices and propaganda bureaus in Syria

Abdullah Ocalan, in his statement taken after his arrest, discloses the relationship between Syria and PKK as; "There have been discussions between us

⁴²⁰ Basar, Cem, (1993), *Teror Dosyasi ve Yunanistan*, [Terror File and Greece], Istanbul: Promat Publications, p.161.

and Syria about conducting activities inside Turkey before 1984. Syria has demanded intense actions in return for overlooking PKK's activities in Syria. She provided us all kinds of support. There have been all kinds of support from Syria in political, military and economic means to help our organization grow..."⁴²¹

4.7.1.2. PKK and Iran

Iran has an important role in the PKK's history in terms of its geographical position and political issues. Iran had to deal the revolts of the Kurds for the last two centuries. Moreover, Kurds had a chance to establish a Kurdish State in Iran.⁴²² In the political conflicts between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, later between Iran and Iraq, they had always adopted as the basic instrument of their policy to manipulate the Kurdish groups against one another.⁴²³

Support by Middle East countries of terror in terms of physical, military and political aspects is generally provided through the camps in the region.⁴²⁴ Iran had an agreement with "Party Leadership" with the following principles.⁴²⁵

- ✓ To provide intelligence on Turkey
- ✓ Not to carry out any political activities with Kurdish people in Iran, and when any event occurs with Kurdish people in Iran it would be treated as (double agent)
- ✓ To treat the Iran-KDP as an enemy

⁴²¹ Okur, Mehmet, (2005), "Soguk Savas Donemi ve Sonrasi Turkiye'nin Guvenligini Tehdit Eden Teror Orgutlerine Bolge Ulkelerinin ve Avrupa Devletlerinin Destegi", [Support of Region's and European Countries Support to Terrorist Organizations that are Threaten Turkey's Security During and After the Cold War], Ankara: *Stratejik Arastirmalar Dergisi*, Volume:6, p. 98; Ozturk, Saygi, (2003), *Kasadaki Dosyalar*", [Files in the Locker], Ankara: Umit Publications, p.157.

⁴²² "Republic of Mahabad" is the first and only Kurdish state in the history. It was established by Gazi Muhammed in Iran on 22 January 1946. On 26 March 1946, Due to pressure from the Western powers such as the United States, the Soviets promised the Iranian government that they would pull out of northwestern Iran. In June, Iran reasserted its control over Iranian Azerbaijan. This move isolated the Republic of Mahabad, eventually leading to its destruction. By this point, Gazi Muhammed's support was declining, especially among the Kurdish tribes who had supported him initially. Their crops and supplies were dwindling, and their way of life was becoming hard as a result of the isolation. Economic aid and military assistance from the Soviet Union was now gone, and the tribes saw no reason to support Gazi Muhammed. Many tribes began to leave. Those who stayed began to resent the Barzani Kurds, as they had to share their resources with them. On December 5, the war council told Gazi Muhammad that they would fight and resist the Iranian army if they tried to enter the region. On December 15, Iranian forces entered and secured Mahabad. Finally, on March 31, 1947, Gazi Muhammad was hanged in Mahabad on counts of treason. After that, Mustafa Barzani lead the Kurdistan Democrat Party and the Kurdish movement.

⁴²³ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid.*, p.76.

⁴²⁴ See next parts for the Training Camps

⁴²⁵ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid.*, p.81.

- ✓ Not to conduct any actions in the fifty kilometers strip inside the Iranian border
- ✓ To conduct operations against the American facilities in Turkey

US military existence in Turkey especially “plays an determinative role in Iran-Turkey relations. Iran is disturbed by the existence of US soldiers in Turkey. Moreover, Iran’s purpose towards “exporting the revolution” gives the PKK importance in Iran’s foreign policy.”⁴²⁶

Iran carries out its PKK policy by cooperating with Libya. Again, Iran performs its “covered/implicit activities” against Turkey (exporting the regime, cooperation with fundamentalist organizations) through cooperation with PKK on the one hand, and through “radical islamist” organizations - those under ideological integration and directed by itself - on the other hand. Iran from time to time brings these bidirectional works on the same platform.”⁴²⁷

Abdullah Ocalan explains the relationship between PKK and Iran as follows: "Said (name, person) from the secret service came to me from time to time and we saw each other. We were talking about Iraq and on the issues of Talabani and Barzani. We came to an agreement on the safe deliverance of the guns and other logistic support to us via Russia. Besides, we agreed that a hospital, which would belong to the organization, would be built in Urumiye, or the treatment of the injured people at that location. In return for that, we would not interfere with the activity zone of the Hizbullah in Turkey, and we would stop armed conflicts with this organization. This agreement is still valid. Iran is supplying us with accommodation, treatment and the ability to establish camps in its territory.”⁴²⁸

4.7.1.3. PKK and Iraq

Iraq’s support for the PKK initiated with a secret agreement made between the PKK and Saddam Huseyin in 1988. The purpose was to strengthen Abdullah Ocalan, and thus to make KDP and PUK ineffective in Iraq. Saddam at the same time has aimed to punish Turkey within the context of water problem and the traditional Arabic hostility while strengthening the PKK and making the KDP and the PUK ineffective.

⁴²⁶ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid.*, p.225.

⁴²⁷ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid.*, p.237.

⁴²⁸ Okur, (2005), *ibid.*, p.99; Ozturk, 92003), *ibid.*, p.160.

Iraq allocated a very wide stretch of land in North Iraq to the PKK after he eliminated Barzani and peshmergas by chemical weapons in 1988. The Iraq government also committed very important facilities to the PKK during the Gulf War as well as to other terrorist organizations. Especially in 1991, relations between the PKK and Iraq had been intensified. During this period, the Iraq Intelligence Service provided arm support to the PKK.⁴²⁹

In the buffer zone north of thirty-sixth parallel, which was created after the Gulf crisis in 1990, (besides the KDP and the PUK's dominancy), the PKK formed base and activity areas and settled down, entirely due to the authority gap that arose here. It is known that the actual situation in North Iraq has been providing significant contributions to the PKK's activities. The PKK, which tried to utilize Iraq only as a hinterland for a long time, used the north of the region as a dominancy zone after the Gulf Crisis. The PKK believes that being an effective power in this area shall bring in the international environment the advantage of being a side of Kurdish problem.

4.7.1.4. PKK and Europe

Europe had two different importances for the PKK. Having the first one is that there were so many Turkish citizens living in Europe, most of them gone to work after 1960 the second one is that Europe is a political center.⁴³⁰ This situation has offered the PKK suitable conditions for development and activities. Therefore, Europe became an activity area for the PKK from 1980. The PKK has established its links with Europe before 1980 at sympathizer level. The PKK decided to take its members out of Turkey to avoid extra casualties and dissolution. Upon that decision, some of the members fled to Syria and some to Europe. The principles of organization were decided at the first conference in July 1981 in order to conduct propaganda and collect financial donations. The PKK wanted to organize Kurdish origin citizens and acquire both financial and human resources. The attitude of European countries made the activities possible. That turned out to be a remedy for the PKK for their weaknesses and created an opportunity to become a power.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ Cesme, (2005), *ibid.*, p.62, 63.

⁴³⁰ Ocalan, (1993), *ibid.*, p.121.

⁴³¹ Ozcan, (1999), *ibid.*, p.110, 111.

The developments in Europe gained momentum after 1990 for two different reasons. The first was the political uncertainty that arose after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Especially, Germany reformulated its policies in Turkey and the Middle East after the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of the Soviet threat diminished Turkey's importance for Germany. The second issue was the world public's interest in the "Kurdish question" which was promoted to the world agenda by the Gulf Crisis. Germany's hope to carry out independent policies and play a role in the future had an impact on reshaping the Middle East after the crisis. Meanwhile, the PKK's terrorist activities increased in Turkey and its organizations in Europe caused serious concern in Germany. Hence, Germany imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, and led to a tension in relations, and decisions were taken against Turkey on various platforms.⁴³²

Germany; The intensive Turkish population in Germany is a reason for the PKK to consider this country as a significant base and center in terms of the organization of the activities in Europe. Germany's support to this organization almost started with its foundation. In Koln (Cologne), in 1985, 4,000 terrorists performed an outdoor meeting with Germany's permission.

Due to a lack of recruitment within recent times, the PKK has been providing political training to the people in Germany who are sympathizers through seminars and meetings within the context of organizations with legal appearances and sending them primarily to the Middle East and Turkey afterwards.

Germany supports the organization especially in terms of political aspect. On 27-28 September 1991, in the city of Bonn in Germany, an international Kurdish conference was held with the title of "No future without human rights" by the organization Kurdish Human Rights Movement and by the Lower Saxony Government. In the final declaration of the Bonn Conference, it was demanded that "the Kurdish nation should be provided the right to determine its own future and pressures on Kurdish people should be stopped"⁴³³ The organization was performing its activities in Germany through the mediation of the Kurd Associations Federation in Germany, YEK-KOM. Germany, which showed obviously its political support by

⁴³² Ozcan, (1999), *ibid.*, p.112, 113.

⁴³³ Demirel, (2005), *ibid.*, p.157.

permitting its foundation, permitted the flow of money, which was collected under the membership fees of this association and obtained from broadcasting institutions; those extortions which were collected from Kurdish people living in this country under the name of so-called tax and income provided from ticket sales of the organized concerts- to the organization thus providing financial support to the organization.

A Kurdish economy Congress has been held in Germany, and as a result of this an international organization under the name “KARZAZ” (Yektiya Karsazen Kurd a Natnetewi, Union of Kurdish Supporters) has been constituted which shall act in Germany as a base with the purpose of gathering so called Kurdish capital under a unique umbrella. KARSZAZ held its third congress between 30 January and 02 February 2003 in Germany.

Ozgur Politika (Free Politics), have been published in Nuisenburg/Germany as a daily newspaper in Turkish language since August 1995. This newspaper has also a web page on Internet.

The German press has been providing a big support to the organization. Namely, the expression took place in an article published on 8 April 1991, in Der Spiegel, one of the leading magazines of Germany, it read; “Kurds living in Turkey so far have been tortured and put under pressure due to the actions by a killer army and Gendarmerie.” In another article published in the same magazine on 3 March 1991 it was said that, “Saddam assassinated thirteen thousand North Iraqi Kurds by using chemical weapons, but don’t get worried...in Turkey, our ally, Kurds are murdered every day. Turks already killed 1.5 million Armenians in the First World War.”⁴³⁴

Greece and South Cyprus; Greece is one of the main countries, which supports the PKK. For Greece, The PKK is nothing more than a small gain of its struggle against Turkey since 1960s. In other words, support provided by Greece to the organization is not a target or an objective of its foreign policy but just a mean of it. It always uses this card in problems related to the Aegean region or Cyprus. This support is the

⁴³⁴ Demirer, Mehmet Arif, (1995), *Sosyalizm Anarsi Teror*, [Socialism Anarchy Terror], Ankara: Emre Publications, p.36.

creation of an armed attack through indirect ways. Since the Second World War, the use of power/force has been prohibited as a rule. This rule was obviously stated in the 24th article of UN provision, primarily OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe) documents, Turkey, as other countries in many international documents which put its sign, has also committed not to apply force/power.⁴³⁵

The PKK terror organization can easily act in Greece and South Cyprus. From the information obtained and the expressions of PKK militants caught, it can be understood. Especially as of 1994, the PKK militants who were sent to Greece from Turkey and Europe through various ways have been subject to explosives training in existing camps in Greece and militants who completed this training process entered into Turkey in order to engage in bomb attacks in metropolitan areas and touristic regions in which they were ordered. The PKK has been organizing its activities against Turkey through the ERNK representative office and the Kurdish Committee located in Athens and Kos (Istankoy).

Intensive efforts of Greece towards putting a spanner in Turkish tourism aiming especially to affect European public and their support for providing trainings for bombing and sabotage directed to our touristic regions, which was formed under the guardianship of their parliamentarian, military and other official people, indicate at what extent Greece integrates in common denominators with this illegal organization.

Consequently, support provided for the PKK terror organization by Greece and South Cyprus is carried out at state level. These countries' ministers, parliamentarians, journalists and other sections provide an intensive support to the PKK terror organization. In short; Greece maintains a non-proclaimed war campaign against Turkey.

Abdullah Ocalan expresses the PKK's relations with Greece with these words: "In 1998 one of the former generals of Greece Negazakis came together with a Turkish speaking translator and a journalist whose name was Haralamus. We made

⁴³⁵ Pazarci, Huseyin, (2006), *Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, Dördüncü Cilt*, [International Law Classes, Forth Book], Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, p.115.

some discussions. Besides, retired colonel A. Nastaski came to us in Bekaa with a delegation consisting of seven persons. It was decided that the Lavrion Camp shall be utilized, and ERNK representatives shall be formed. They requested us to get focused on actions in metropolitan areas in Turkey. Thus we shifted our actions towards cities. Greece requested us to tend to economic targets such as tourism in Turkey. Besides, trainings for technical sabotage and forest fires were provided in camps in Greece.⁴³⁶

4.7.2. Coordination with Other Terrorist Organizations

The PKK worked in the 1990s with DEVSOL (Devrimci Sol [Revolutionary Left]) and TIKKO (Turkiye Isci Koylu Kurtulus Ordusu [Turkey's Worker Peasant Salvation Army]) with the aim of increasing its urban activity. The former was somewhat successful in transforming its preexisting relationship into a practical working one inside Turkey by which DEVSOL and TIKKO cadres in the cities launched attacks as PKK's subcontractors and helped it expand into Turkey's northern and southern coastal regions where it lacked a support base. All three groups shared training and supply facilities in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, in Greece and in South Cyprus.⁴³⁷

The PKK is known to have close working relationships with terrorist organizations such as the LTTE (Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), ETA (Spanish Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Fatherland and Liberty), and the Lebanese Hezbollah.⁴³⁸ Some other terrorist groups that have relations with PKK are PLO (the Palestine Liberation Organization), ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and RAF (the Red Army Faction). For example, an early alliance was completed with ASALA on 06 April 1980, in which ASALA and PKK signed an agreement of cooperation in Seldom, Lebanon. This pact outlined a common goal of overthrowing the Turkish Republic.

The German RAF (and its successors) also maintained contact with the PKK. It has been noted that an RAF activist participated in a "leading function" in a PKK-controlled solidarity rally in Bonn. Reports by the Federal Organization for the

⁴³⁶ Demirel, (2005), *ibid.*, p.230

⁴³⁷ Aktan, Gunduz and Koknar, Ali, (2005), *Turkey*, (Yonah Alexander Ed.) "In Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries", New Delhi: Manas, p.268, 269.

⁴³⁸ Aktan and Koknar, (2005), *ibid.*, p.268.

Protection of the Constitution (BfV) confirm that RAF has links to PKK. At a meeting In Budapest, BfV's Vice President Peter First described the international ties maintained by the RAF and discussed activities such as the "participation in demonstrations against PKK ban and the trips of some members of the RAF to Turkey."⁴³⁹

4.8. Operations by the PKK

4.8.1. Targets and Attacks

Primary targets have been the Turkish government security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey. The PKK had used murder, intimidation, kidnapping, and destruction to achieve its evil objectives. It targets ordinary people because it aims to suppress the local population into supporting its evil deeds in southeast of Turkey. The PKK had attacked all the inhabitants of villages in the southeast.⁴⁴⁰ The PKK does not discriminate among innocent citizens, be it children, babies, the elderly or women. Since 1984, 13.045 ordinary people were killed or disabled as a result of violent terrorist attacks by the PKK, not to mention losses in the security forces.

Furthermore, assassination campaigns have been conducted against the civil servants living in the eastern and southeastern part of the country. In those attacks, more than 500 civil servants, most of who were teachers, engineers, and religious functionaries, were killed or injured. Almost 2000 public facilities including 250 schools, 110 mosques and 50 dispensaries have been destroyed by the PKK's terrorist attacks.

Moreover, the PKK destroys schools, sets forests on fire, blows up railways and villages, plants mines on roads, burns down construction machinery, and demolishes health centers.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁹ Scherer, Peter, (1994), "RAF Split", Die Welt in German (26 March 1994). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report – West Europe.

⁴⁴⁰ Barnhart, (2002), *ibid.*, p.16.

⁴⁴¹ Barnhart, (2002), *ibid.*, p.16.

Table 9, Activities of the PKK⁴⁴²

Target	Activities		Turkey	Northern Iraq	Western Europe
Government	Demonstrations/Protests		+	+	+
	Riots		+		+
	Kidnapping		+		+
	Assassination		+	+	
	Sabotage		+		
	Chemical warfare		+		
	Bombing Attacks	Post/Train/Power	+		
		Police	+		
		Outposts	+		
	Armed Attacks	Military	+	+	
		Police	+		
		Village Guards	+		
Civilians	Kidnapping		+		
	Assassination		+	+	
	Bombing Attacks	Villages	+	+	
		Touristic Facilities	+		
		Commercial Units	+		
Organized Crime	Extortion		+		+
	Drug Trafficking		Transit	Transit	Destination
	Human Trafficking		Origin	Origin	

⁴⁴² Globalsecurity.org, (n.d.), “Kurdistan Workers' Party”, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pkk.htm>, (Accessed on 15.10.2009).

4.8.2. The Timeline of the PKK

The timeline of the PKK terrorist organization begins with Abdullah Ocalan's first capture and placement in prison because of illegal activities. Ihsan Bal started the chronology of the PKK from 1976.⁴⁴³

08 April 1972: Abdullah Ocalan was arrested because of distributing illegal flyers.

April 1973: A meeting that was held in 'Cubuk Dam' in Ankara was the first time the PKK idea surfaced.

October 1975: The group came together in Dikmen, Ankara. (First Meeting)

1975: Abdullah Ocalan and Hayri Karer had prepared "The Path of Kurdistan Revolution- Manifesto".

1976: The second meeting was held in the same province.

1977: Publication of Serxwebun.

27 November 1978: The PKK was formally established in the village named Fis (Diyarbakir, Lice).

31 July 1979: The PKK attacked Mehmet Celal Bucak, a high official in the conservative Justice Party and well-known landlord in eastern Turkey. The PKK headed a campaign of violence against government officials and between terrorist groups of varying ideologies. In this attack, Mehmet Celal Bucak was wounded and his eight-year-old son lost his life. Pamphlets declaring the establishment of the PKK were left at the location of the incident.

July 1979: Abdullah Ocalan escaped to Syria with Ethem Akcan who arranged the whole trip and the accommodations in Syria.

November 1979: Ocalan, had taken 250 of his men to be trained on the bases of the PLO with help of agent Yevgeny Primakov, of the KGB.

⁴⁴³ Bal, Ihsan and Ozkan, Emre, (2006), "Chronology of PKK Terrorist Organization (1976–2006)", <http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=2&id=217>, (Accessed on 25.10.2009). Detailed information was given with the citation at Chapter Three, Brief History of PKK.

January and April 1980: Cemil Bayik, a member of the central committee, had agreed to the decisions stating that the PKK members to be trained by Armenian ASALA (Armenian Secret for the Liberation of Armenia) members on explosives devices.

8 April 1980: The PKK and the ASALA terror organizations held a joint press conference at the City of Sidon in Lebanon where they issued a declaration.

15-26 July 1981: The PKK held its first conference in the Helve training camp.

20-25 August 1982: The PKK held its second congress in Syria close to the Jordanian border. In this congress, the PKK decided to initiate a long term resistance acts in Turkey.

July 1983: Mesud Barzani and Abdullah Ocalan had agreed to the KDP and the PKK cooperation.

May – June 1984: Terrorists groups had passed to Turkey.

June 1984: The PKK had formed armed propaganda units.

15 August 1984: The PKK attacked Eruh and Semdinli counties, murdered one soldier, and injured nine soldiers and three civilians. The group that was supposed to attack in Catak County was confused with the date, and the incident did not occur. The PKK announced the establishment of the HRK by leaving pamphlets in their place.

17 August 1984: The PKK attacked a police station in Siirt.

22 January 1987: The PKK launched a massacre in Ortabag Village of the Uludere district in Hakkari and killed eight citizens by placing bombs into a heating stove.

23 January 1987: The PKK attacked Midyat and killed ten citizens.

27 January 1987: The PKK changed its strategy and began targeting village guards.

20 June 1987: The PKK killed sixteen children, six women, and eight men; a total of 30 people in Pinarcik Village of the Omerli district in Mardin.

09 May 1988: The PKK terrorists killed eight children, and two women; in total, ten people from the same family in Tas Village of the Nusaybin district in Mardin. Two children were heavily wounded and PKK terrorists in Sirnak kidnapped three people, who were found dead.

26 November 1989: The PKK terrorists killed 21 people and kidnapped nine citizens in Iki Yaka Village of the Yuksekova district in Diyarbakir.

22 March 1990: The PKK terrorists killed nine engineers in Elazig.

16 April 1990: The PKK terrorists killed five people in Elazig, including three teachers.⁴⁴⁴

11 June 1990: The PKK terrorists killed twelve children, and women; total of twenty-seven people in the Cevrimli Village of Sirnak. In addition, PKK bombed a house in Diyarbakir, killed five people and wounded six people.

14 July 1991: The PKK terrorists killed nine people in Pazarcik Village and the Caglayancerit Village districts of Kahramanmaras. After the terrorists burned their bodies and ran away.⁴⁴⁵

25 December 1991: PKK terrorists marching in Istanbul threw a molotov cocktail at a shopping center, which killed eleven people and wounded seventeen in the fire.

11 June 1992: Armed PKK terrorists stopped a minibus and killed thirteen people in Tatvan.

27 June 1992: The PKK terrorists attacked the mosque in Yolac Village of Silvan. They killed ten people who were taken from the mosque where there were praying.

⁴⁴⁴ Milliyet.com, (n.d.), “Vahset”, [Violance], http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/hmLFHNkLclmKOgK9s5R5mg_x3D_x3D_, (Accessed on 28.10.2009).

⁴⁴⁵ Milliyet.com, (n.d.), “Guneydogu’da Kanli Gun”, [Bloody Day in South-East], http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/pfipCn6Ljf9m6X7a2r25pA_x3D_x3D_, (Accessed on 28.10.2009).

05 September 1992: The PKK terrorists closed the Bingol-Genc highway and killed seven people.

15 September 1992: The PKK terrorists killed ten people and wounded six people by planting a bomb on a minibus, near Kozluk district of Batman.

01 October 1992: The PKK terrorists killed thirty people and wounded twenty-five people. Among the people there were women and children in Cevizdali Village of Bitlis and the terrorists set the village on fire while kidnapping thirteen village guards.

10 November 1992: The PKK terrorists killed a local journalist and nine citizens in Hani district of Diyarbakir.

15 November 1992: The PKK terrorists killed eight citizens and wounded thirteen in the Ortaalican district of Igdir and Balpinar village of Mardin.

07 December 1992: The PKK ambushed a minibus killing four and wounding twelve citizens.

1992: The United States government declared that the PKK is controlling the narcotics cartel in Europe with the “Control Strategy of International Narcotics” document.

20 March 1993: Abdullah Ocalan declared a one-sided ‘so-called’ ceasefire. He aimed to mislead the public opinion about his terrorist image. However, the PKK never stopped terrorist activities.

15 June 1993: The PKK militants attacked to Gozluce Village of Sirvan district in Siirt and Ucpinar Village of Ilicalar subdistrict in Bingol with rockets, killing nine citizens, kidnapping four people, and even killing a paramedic on Siirt-Eruh highway.

04 June 1993: The PKK terrorists killed seven people and kidnapped three women in the villages in Bingol and Hakkari.

06 July 1993: The PKK terrorists killed twenty-eight people among whom there were women. Three people were wounded in Basbaglar village of Kemaliye district in Erzincan and the terrorists set fifty-seven houses on fire and ran away.

19 July 1993: The PKK terrorists killed twenty-six people among whom there were 22 women in Vanizer Village of the Bahcesaray district in the city of Van.

04 August 1993: The PKK terrorists stopped two minibuses on the way between Kavakbasi and Yenidogan Villages of Mutki district in Bitlis and killed fifteen people and wounded thirteen people.

10 August 1993: The PKK ambushed a minibus in Genc district of Bingol and killed ten passengers and wounded ten people.

29 August 1993: The PKK kidnapped fourteen people in Kovancilar district of Elazig. Nine of them were killed.

30 September 1993: The PKK terrorists killed seven members of a village guard family and wounded three people.

05 October 1993: The PKK terrorists killed thirty-five people (most of them were women and children) and wounded ten people in villages of Batman, Siirt and Hakkari. Twenty-two houses were raided.

25 October 1993: The PKK terrorists attacked the Erzurum's Cat district in the Yavi region, taking citizens from their homes and relocating them to a coffee shop. They created propaganda and then killed thirty-five people and wounded almost fifty people. The terrorists set the houses on fire and ran away.

30 October 1993: The PKK terrorists killed six people in Cicekli village in the Pasinler district of Erzurum.

12 February 1994: The PKK terrorists put bomb in a garbage box in a train station in Tuzla, Istanbul. Five-reserve officers students and one citizen twenty-nine people were wounded.

19 March 1995: The PKK terrorists attacked a military convoy traveling from Tunceli to Ovacik, eighteen soldiers were killed and ten were wounded.

01 January 1995: The PKK terrorists killed five children and four women in Hamzali village in Kulp district of Diyarbakir.

05 August 1995: The PKK terrorists killed eight people (three of them were children) and wounded four people with rockets in Hatay.

07 September 1995: The PKK terrorists attacked a chrome mine in Samandag and killed nine mineworkers.

1995: The PKK started to apply intensive terror acts in big cities.

16 January 1996: The PKK terrorists killed (burned them inside the vehicle) eleven people by launching a rocket into a minibus near Taskonak village of Sirnak by rockets.

22 June 1996: The PKK terrorists killed six people and wounded fourteen people in Soz TV building and Altindag Recreation Facility.

30 June 1996: The PKK suicide bomber Zeynep Kinaci (aka-Ayten-Gulistan) killed three NCOs and five soldiers and wounded twenty-nine soldiers in Tunceli.

13 August 1996: The PKK attacked Demriz train station in Kangal, Sivas and killed eight people.

25 October 1996: The PKK suicide bomber Leyla Kaplan (aka-Revsan) killed three police officers, 1 civilian and wounded nine police officers and three civilians in front of the police department in Adana.

29 October 1996: The PKK suicide bomber Guler Otas (aka-Bermal, Zekiye, Sukran) killed 3 police officers, 1 civilian, and wounded 10 in Sivas. (Terrorist Haci Can (aka-sinan) had also died)

1998: Abdullah Ocalan declared a one-sided 'so-called' ceasefire, which mainly resulted from Turkey's increasing pressure on Syria.

09 October 1998: Abdullah Ocalan was expelled from Syria.

12 November 1998: Abdullah Ocalan aimed to gain the status of a political immigrant at the Roman airport. He remained for Italy one month.

17 November 1998: The PKK suicide bomber Fatma Ozen (aka-Rojbin-Amanos) wounded three soldiers and two civilians in Hakkari.

01 December 1998: The PKK suicide bomber Husniye Oruc (aka-Binevs-Amed) wounded two soldiers and ten civilians in Diyarbakir.

24 December 1998: The PKK suicide bomber Hamdiye Kapan killed one high school student and wounded twenty-four soldiers in Van.

15 February 1999: Abdullah Ocalan was captured in the Embassy of Greece in Kenya while holding a Greek Cypriot passport.

20 March 1999: The PKK suicide bomber Tacettin Sahin (aka-Ferhad) wounded three police officers and one civilian in Van.

27 March 1999: The PKK suicide bomber Meral Mamyak wounded three police officers and 8 civilians in Istanbul.

05 April 1999: The PKK suicide bomber Baki Tatli (aka-Banan-Sahan) killed one civilian and wounded twelve civilians in Bingol.

08 April 1999: The PKK suicide bomber Turab Mahmudi (Iranian) (aka-Ferhat, Ferhenk) one soldier, wounded three officials and eight civilians in Hakkari.

02 June 1999: While Village Guards took two terrorists to the Security Forces, one of them blew himself and killed one child, other terrorist were wounded in Sirnak.

26 June 1999: Ocalan was adjudicated from the Article 125 of Turkish Republic Criminal Code. In this case, Ocalan said he was a citizen of the Turkish Republic; he had respect for the State and its Criminal Code and added that his advocacy would be of political not juridical. During this period, the PKK kept its armed elements in Northern Iraq and trained suicide activists as a protest of Abdullah Ocalan trial. After that, the statement of “we (PKK) accept democratic republic within the structure of the unitary state system” has become more pronounced.

05 July 1999: A woman PKK suicide bomber killed ten officials and four civilians in Adana.

September 1999: Abdullah Ocalan wanted PKK to stop its armed attacks in Turkey for a while and wanted it to extract from the borders of Turkish Republic. PKK obeyed his decision. Ocalan aimed to ease the anger of the aroused public opinion against him and a possible punishment of death and to be isolated from the organization, which cause him to succeed in his aims.

December 1999: Abdullah Ocalan attempted to make the best of his opportunity from the Turkey's EU proposal through Helsinki Summit; he tried to realize some of his short-term aims by means of Copenhagen criteria, and planned to rest the armed groups on cross-border while gaining benefits from the legal arena with the declarations of cultural rights.

February 2000: PKK trained its terrorists in camp Dole Koge. Those terrorists were relatively better educated and trained to be gathered under the title of Democratic Working Groups (Turkiye Calisma Gruplari) on the issue of "disobedience". Those terrorists were the forerunners of civil disobedience.

August 2000: Members of "Democratic Working Groups" were sent to Turkey. However, security units identified them and their activities were prevented in advance. More than 70 members of PKK were captured who were trained in camp Dole Koge.

July 2001: Civil movement called "Serhildan Party" was founded in order to activate the terrorists trained and increase acts in the name of civil disobedience. Although the movement was tried to be continued under different titles and with different groups until 2006, PKK has failed in this action.

27 December 2001: PKK was described as terrorist group and included into terrorist organization by European Council in Brussels.

10 April 2002: PKK abolished and replaced itself with KADEK.

March 2003: European Court of Human Rights decided that there is no illegitimate circumstances in Abdullah Ocalan's prison conditions.

November 2003: PKK/KONGRA-GEL was established as a new organization including KADEK and KNK., It was stated in the founding manifest that “US played an important role with intervention to Saddam regime. Saddam restrained all Kurds and all the people. Kongra-Gel is welcoming this intervention and designates that to be able to reach positive results, Kurdish issue/problem should be resolved permanently”.

13 January 2004: US identified PKK and all its forms as terrorist organization. (PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL)

05 April 2004: European Union identified PKK/KONGRA-GEL as terrorist organization.

01 June 2004: The new administration (conservative part) that was supported by Abdullah Ocalan, lead by Murat Karayilan, finished the so called ceasefire. Terrorist attacks began before the specified date and intensified day by day and came to city centers from rural areas. New administration adopted the idea that “Political activities that were not supported by guerilla movement could not succeed”.

06 July 2005: Hikmet Fidan who used to be deputy in HADEP before the party was closed, was killed in Diyarbakir on his way back from the meetings with PWD groups in Northern Iraq. After his death, PWD declared that Hikmet Fidan had met PWD elements in Northern Iraq before he was killed by PKK terrorists.

16 July 2005: PKK terrorists killed five people including the tourists from UK and Ireland and wounded thirteen people by launching a bomb attack in Kusadasi (touristic place).

17 July 2005: PKK’s ‘so-called’ representative of Austria; Hasan Ozen with alias Yusuf-Salih was killed. Hasan Ozen was against to Abdullah Ocalan’s declarations and he wanted to leave the organization.

12 February 2006: PKK's former 'so-called' representative of Europe, Kani Yilmaz⁴⁴⁶ was killed in his car in Northern Iraq. Kani Yilmaz was burned to death in the car with a former PKK militant Sabri Tori.

28 March 2006: During the funerals of four PKK terrorists that were killed by security forces on 25 March 2006, PKK tried to turn it to a provocation. The incidents tended to be spread to other regions by support of the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Roj TV. However, the security units prevented the events from intensifying by means of efficient and proper precautions and applications.

04 May 2006: PKK terrorists killed eight soldiers and eleven students and wounded 21 people by blasting a school bus in Hakkari.

11 August 2006: El-Maliki administration decided to close all offices of PKK in the capital of Iraq and prohibit all activities of the terrorist organization.

14 August 2006: UK announced PKK, KADEK and KONGRA-GEL as terrorist organization. The regulation that prohibits the organization called Kurdistan Freedom Falcons was promulgated on 25 July 2006 by the Parliament.

28 August 2006: Three explosions triggered by PKK terrorists in Marmaris wounded ten British tourists and eleven Turkish citizens.

28 August 2006: Explosion triggered by PKK terrorists in Antalya killed three people and wounded 20 people.

28 August 2006: Retired 4-star General Joseph Ralston, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was assigned as United States Special Envoy for Countering PKK.

13 September 2006: PKK terrorists killed eleven people and wounded seventeen people by blasting a bomb in one of the recreation parks of Diyarbakir.

⁴⁴⁶ Kani Yilmaz had escaped from PKK camp in Northern Iraq with Abdullah Ocalan's brother Osman Ocalan and established PWD. He had said that PKK had been planning to kill them all. When Abdullah Ocalan had escaped to Italy and could not get refugee rights, Kani Yilmaz had been accused as a betrayer.

21 October 2007: PKK attacked to Daglica Battalion, and killed 12 soldiers, wounded 16 soldiers and kidnapped eight soldiers.

03 January 2008: PKK exploded a bomb, which was put under the car with remote near the military bus, and killed seven people.

05 October 2008: PKK attacked to Aktutun Military Unit and killed 17 soldiers.

29 April 2009: 9 soldiers died by the mine trap that were put by PKK.

4.8.3. Campaigns

Identification Statement and Campaign of Education in Native Language

In the Ozgur Politika (Free Politics) journal in connection with PKK publication organs; it was brought into agenda that; in accordance with the decisions taken in PKK sixth conference, this signature campaign which was initially started in June 2001 shall be discussed in Turkey. It was also stated that campaign should be better to be carried out within the subject period together with constitution discussions to be handled within the context of European Union harmonization law packets. Similar campaigns with education in native language has been repeated from time to time in smaller scales⁴⁴⁷ and the actions which were made as the first assault of so-called serhildan (civil disobedience) assault have been praised by PKK terror organization.

The Campaign; “I am Kurdish and a member of PKK”

This campaign, initiated by the terror organization in 2001 towards Europe with the purpose of protesting for its inclusion into terror organizations list and for avoiding pressures over the organization by presenting the image of being the legal representative of so-called Kurdish nation towards world public, has been organized in Germany, French and Switzerland. Official applications with the title “I want my national and political identity” which was signed by four thousand people, has been delivered to United Nations Central Bureau together with posters and t-shirts with “I

⁴⁴⁷ Kenthaber.com, (2005), “DEHAP anadilde Egitim Kampanyasi Baslatti”, [DEHAP Started Campaign on Education in Native Language], <http://www.kenthaber.com/guneydogu-anadolu/siirt/Haber/Genel/Normal/dehap-anadilde-egitim-kampanyasi-baslatti/1b449dc4-1082-4c32-9b63-470d750f898e>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

am Kurd”, “ I am a member of PKK”.⁴⁴⁸ It was asserted that; in the actions maintained in Italy, eleven parliamentarians and four senators, film producers and human rights organizations have also provided their supports.⁴⁴⁹ These activities have been also appreciated by PKK just as identification statement and campaign of education in native language.⁴⁵⁰

“Campaign of Defending and Ownage of President APO”

KADEK’s so-called presidency council made a statement on 8 December 2002 and declared that they initiated a new campaign between December 10 World Human Rights Day and the anniversary of capture of Ocalan on 15 February 2003.⁴⁵¹ During this campaign period which was praised by sponsor sections for the organization; actions have been organized as; marching, demonstration, hunger strike, boycott, going out of business, mass diplomacy, so-called official diplomatic attempts, turning off the lights, collecting signatures, sending letters to national and international institutions, providing information through files and application letters, illegal demonstrations, press statements, Molotov bombing and attacks with stones and sticks against security forces.

In the European pillar of the campaign, under the leadership of its subsidiary organization Europe Kurd Associations Federation (KON-KURD); other structures under KON- KURD as Denmark Kurd Associations Federation (FEY-KURD), Germany Kurd Associations Federations (YEK-KOM), Austrian Kurdish Associations Federations (FEY-KOM), French Kurd Associations Federations (FEYKA), Switzerland Kurd Association Federation (FEKAR), Nicosia Kurdistan Committee have presented files and documents to governments, prime ministers or to

⁴⁴⁸ Ozgurpolitika.org, (2001), “Ben Kurdum ve PKK'liyim”, [I am Kurd and a member of PKK], <http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2001/06/19/hab31.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁴⁹ Ozgurpolitika.org, (2001), “İtalya’da Kimlik Gosterisi”, [Identification Show in Italy], <http://www.ozgurpolitika.com/2001/07/12/hab30.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁵⁰ Serxwebun.com, (2001), “Kurt Halki Siyasal Mucadeleye Baslangic Yapmayi Basarmistir”, [Kurdish People Achieved to Start to Political Struggle], <http://serxwebun.com/2001/12/hab03.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁵¹ Ozgurpolitika.org, (2002), “KADEK’ten Demokratik Eylem Kampanyasi”, [Democratic Action Campaign from KADEK], <http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2002/12/09/hab11b.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

their secretaries, presidents of political parties, parliamentarians and on the other hand militants under YCK and PJA have made actions.⁴⁵²

Campaign for General Amnesty for Social Peace and Democratic Participation

Against “ the Law for Decarceration to Society” issued by Turkish government which is known as repentance law by the organization, according to campaign decision taken in DEHAP’s extraordinary congress on 8 June 2003, in a press conference held by DEHAP Istanbul Provincial Organization in Taksim Hill Hotel, the content of the issued law was protested, moreover DEHAP Tarsus District Organization and Adiyaman provincial Organization have also arranged signature campaigns accordingly and the subject campaign was ended on July 14.

Campaign for struggle for Peace and Democratic Resolution

During KADEK’s campaign between 20 September-27 November 2003, which was initiated against; health problem threatened Abdullah Ocalan’s life under hardened isolation conditions- it is asserted that it threatens so-called piece and democratization process-, pressured repentance and surrender pressured against KADEK and HPG and increasing threatens over so-called Kurd democratic institutions,⁴⁵³ some actions were made such as various illegal demonstrations, carrying Ocalan’s poster, opening posters and shouting slogans in favor of Ocalan .

“President Abdullah Ocalan’s Health is Health of Kurdish Nation” Campaign

A campaign was initiated based on the agitations; Ocalan has been captured alone in a narrowed isolation in an island for four years, he is not entitled from the rights presented for a regular political prison and existed in Turkish state laws, he is not permitted for weekly advocate and family visits, thus with the subject campaign it was aimed to make pressures over Turkey in international arena.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵² Ozgurpolitika.org, (2002), “Kurtlerden Demokratik Eylem Serisi”, [Serious of Democratic Action from Kurds], <http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2002/12/11/hab39.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁵³ Ozgurpolitika, (2003), “KADEK’ten Cozum Icin Baris Kampanyasi”, [Peace Campaign for Solution by KADEK], <http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2003/09/19/hab05.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁵⁴ Fekar.ch, (n.d.), “Baskan Abdullah Ocalan’in Sagligi Kurt Halkinin Sagligidir”, [President Abdullah Ocalan’s Health is Health of Kurdish Nation], <http://www.fekar.ch/guncel.html> , (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

Democratic Free and Equal Citizen Movement

Abdullah Ocalan, in an interview with his attorneys on March 10, 2004 has stated; "I can say the following about the relations with Turkey. We do not have an intention of a state. Our point of origin is the free citizen movement. I have no theories regarding the state whatsoever. I want democracy all the way. Kurds should establish democracy among themselves, and they should democratize Turkey." Besides, on his March 17 2004 interview, by stating that; "I sloganize the Kurd movement in four or five words. This is the name of our peoples move; democratic free and equal citizen movement. There is no need to say that this is only a movement of the Kurds, I say a move for democracy", they announced that they aim at not being against the state, but they aim at free and equal citizenship on basic rights, and at establishing a committee and at providing the participation of all segments of the society. As a result of this campaign, posters reading "Free Citizen Movement" have been hung on many districts and again in the scope of this campaign in some cities and towns printed petitions were given to the governor's offices and district governorates.⁴⁵⁵

Campaign for Freedom to Leadership

Within this campaign "Freedom to Leadership" held between 01 February-01 May 2004 by KONGRA-GEL prior to 2004 Local Administrations Elections, with the purpose of providing the application of F⁴⁵⁶ and D type prison and for protesting so-called isolation of Ocalan, some actions were made as press statements and illegal demonstrations, it was also determined that these actions and activities were mainly organized during day time intensively on Tuesdays, in case the visits were not permitted again, this time these actions were made on Wednesdays and converted into actions with violence including Molotov cocktail bombing, illegal demonstrations and attacks with stone and sticks."

⁴⁵⁵ Simsek, Erdal, (2006), *Abdullah Ocalan'in Avukatlarına Verdigi Talimatlar, Imrali PKK'nın Yeni Karargahı mı?*, [Abdullah Ocalan's Directives To His Lawyers, Is Imrali new HQ of PKK], Istanbul: Neden Kitap Press, p.253, 254.

⁴⁵⁶ F Type prisons were built and opened in accordance with the United Nations Minimum Prison Rules and European Council European Prison Rules in 2000 to supply better and modern facilities to the prisoners. F Type prisons were another measure that taken by Turkish authorities to prevent prisons to be a ideological field of training.

“Campaign for I consider and accept Abdullah Ocalan as a political authority in Kurdistan”

Following the decision of European Human Rights Court Major Department dated 12 May 2005 on Ocalan case, within this campaign initiated on 8 May 2005 and terminated on 1 May 2006 by KON- KURD with the demand of re -adjudication of Ocalan and execution of this adjudication by a fair and objective court to be established, additional demands were brought into agenda as; freedom for Abdullah Ocalan, peaceful resolution for so-called Kurdish problem, termination of military operations, taking basic right and so-called freedoms of Kurdish nation under the constitutional security and mutual dialogue for permanent peace.⁴⁵⁷

Campaign for Speaking in Kurdish

This campaign was initiated by so-called Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) on 8 September 2006 and which was planned to be terminated on 14 May 2007, thought to be celebrated as “Kurdish Language Holiday” in accordance with the decisions taken on 21 June by KONGRA-GEL “Kurdish Language and Training Committee”⁴⁵⁸; has been announced to public by KNK Language Committee President Rojan Hazım with the slogan “Speak Kurdish persistently and insisiently”.⁴⁵⁹

2005 Semdinli Incidents

During 01 January-9 November 2005 in Hakkari province, Semdinli and Yuksekova districts 13 soldiers were martyred and a civilian was killed and 31 soldiers, 7 police officers and 32 civilians were wounded in 22 terror attacks,⁴⁶⁰ afterwards on 9 November 2005 in Semdinli one civilian died and six civilians were wounded due to the bombing of a book store; these incidents caused the people living in the town to blame and accuse some people, including two military people who were providing

⁴⁵⁷ European Kurdish Associations Federation, (n.d.), “Tum Dostlarimiza Duyuru”, [Announcement to All Our Friends], <http://www.kon-kurd.org/turkce/index.php?f=archiv&act=show&id=4>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁵⁸ Yeniozgurpolitika.com, (n.d.), “Kurtceye Sahip Cikin”, [Look After Kurdish], <http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com/?bolum=haber&hid=4169>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁵⁹ Yeniozgurpolitika.com, (n.d.), “KNK'den Dil Kampanyasi”, [Language Campaign by KNK], <http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com/?bolum=haber&hid=7381>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁶⁰ Tihv.org, (2006), “TBMM İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, Hakkari Semdinli İnceleme Raporu”, [Turkish Great National Assembly, Commission for Human Rights, Report on Hakkari and Semdinli], http://www.tihv.org.tr/data/Ra_2006_Turkiye_Insan_Haklari_Raporu/011_EK_SemdinliRapor.pdf, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

intelligence regarding mine attacks of PKK and one confessor among them, from these attacks, as the people were already under tension due to precious killings and attacks. These people who were intended to be lynched were rescued due to the measures taken by security forces but meantime one died due to firing and ten people were wounded.⁴⁶¹

Actions that were mentioned above; are obviously seen how PKK terror organization agitates people towards its own purposes by abusing all incidents to exist. At the same time, as these incidents are being used to create pressure over Turkey in international field by national or international legal establishments in connection with the terror organization, the effects of realized actions are also increased. Within this context, Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir carried these incidents into European agenda three days after, expressing that “voice coming from Semdinli should be also heard in Brussels”. At the same day the Co-President of DTP Ahmet Türk invited European Community to Semdinli.

2006 Diyarbakır Incidents

Alike the civilian disobedience incidents existed in 2005 in Semdinli, some incidents occurred in Diyarbakır in March 2006. In the operation carried out by security forces in 25 March 2006 against PKK terror organization at Asmakaya Village Meydan region; the junction of; Bingöl province, Solhan district, Diyarbakır province, and Mus province Senyayla region, 14 terrorists were captured dead.⁴⁶² During the funeral ceremonies of the terrorists, mass actions were arranged by sections under the organization in Adana, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Hakkari, Hatay, Istanbul, İzmir, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Van, Batman and Sirnak provinces, primarily assisted by PKK terror organization’s Denmark based ROJ TV channel and provoked by organization’s members or legal extended representatives, such as illegal demonstration, Molotov cocktail and attacks against security forces, public buildings, civil and official vehicles with sticks and stones.

⁴⁶¹ Hurriyet.com, (2005), “Semdinli Gergin”, [Tension in Semdinli], <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3505417&tarih=2005-11-10>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

⁴⁶² Hurriyet.com, (2006), “Mus’ta Operasyon”, [Operation in Mus], <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4144681&tarih=2006-03-25>, (Accessed on 02.11.2009).

In these demonstrations, public officers and children were tried to be exposed to each other. Besides, the demonstrations where women and elderly people also attended in front lines have been directed in so prepared and practiced manner by professional agent members in limited numbers, society and the state which is responsible from its security were attempted to be exposed against each other.⁴⁶³ The incidents continued for three days and according to the determinations of Diyarbakır Governorship dated 3 April 2006; totally nine people lost their lives, 199 people in charge of security and 161 civilians, totally 360 persons, were injured, 566 people who were taken into custody were 354 were arrested by the relevant courts, loss assessment were performed in 320 business places and in addition it was observed that 80% of 2500- 3000 people who were estimated to join in these incidents consisted of children.

As a conclusion, it is seen that; since 1999, according to the new statement developed, PKK terror organization increased agitation and actions towards the community, their performed actions were rather semi-legal and illegal types of activities in order to force the existing system in Turkey to conversion, most of theses actions were based on Abdullah Ocalan's health and freedom, however massive street demonstrations which were towards the gaining of Kurdish cultural rights and which might provide power, motivation and new gains to the organization were also applied. Moreover, it was determined that; the most significant elements which the organization based on while performing these actions were; terror organization junction-national and international legal extensions such as political parties, association, federation and other civil society institutions, besides especially in actions alike active civilian obedience privately trained provocative militants took key roles as well.

⁴⁶³ Bal, Ihsan, (2006), *Alacakaranlıkta Terorle Mucadele ve Komplo Teorileri*, [Fight Against Terror in Twilight and Conspiracy Theories], Ankara: USAK Publications, p.236.

CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology of the research and present the detailed research plan. This chapter involves problem statement, research questions, research plan, general methodology, and the explanation of research design.

5.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The problem of this research has two steps; defining the general problem and presenting the specific problem of the research as detailed below.

5.1.1. General Problem

The general problem of the research is that in countering terrorism, especially countering or preventing the effects of terrorists' use of Internet can not be deterred or suppressed by state actors themselves only. Lack of international legal measures and lack of international cooperation, maybe because of the lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism and pinpointing the terrorist organizations, are the causes of the deficiencies in countering Internet based terrorist activities. However, this dimension of the perceptions does not challenge the Internet based terrorist activities. The fact of terrorist exploitation of Internet stands as it is.


The researcher, first, identified the theoretical tenets of examining the general problem and applied the theory on general problem. Secondly, background information is presented before going through the specific problem to denote the base line. The general problem is built upon terrorist organizations in general. The use of Internet in terrorist activities and its analyses forms the fundamentals of general problem.

5.1.2. Specific Problem

In the light of the general problem, which is terrorist use of Internet for their brutal purposes, can be searched in the context of PKK terrorist organization. The specific problem is PKK's exploitation of Internet and its description by means of social network analysis. It should be noted that although most of the PKK terrorist websites are banned with Turkish national judiciary decisions, they are accessible to domestic

and international public by changing their proxy server settings of the computer or by using free proxy servers in the Internet. In the frame of applying social network analysis, this research will attempt to find out the most effective PKK websites. In this context IP addresses and IP locations of the websites are obtained by benefitting from Internet services. This specific problem will be utilized to prove that international cooperation and institutionalized norm building mechanism are prerequisites to deter and deny Internet exploitation by terrorist organizations, as shown in the following figure.

Figure 3, Illustration of Some IP Server Locations for PKK Websites



5.1.3. Research Questions

The questions of the research are designed to reach the conclusion if it is possible to deter and deny Internet use of terrorist activities, while underlining the necessity of international cooperation. However, it must be noted that this research may be benefitted in analyzing the network of terrorist organizations by monitoring their Internet based activities. Websites may be operated by the conscious members of the

organizations or blog groups no more than sympathizers. The research covers all of the websites disregarding their linkage to the PKK terrorist organization. Consequently, the research questions are as follows;

1. Which websites of the PKK are the most influential ones?
2. Is there a strategy behind PKK's network in terms of PKK's web pages?
3. What are the vulnerable points of the PKK terrorist network in terms of PKK's web pages?
4. What are the proposed solutions to overcome terrorist networks at national and international level in terms of terrorist use of Internet?

5.2. METHODOLOGY

In this research, several research methodologies were examined. First of them is the theoretical research that was necessary to look at. Theoretical research was used to identify and study the conceptual and theoretical framework of the whole study. Secondary sources and information relating to conceptual and theoretical framework, as well as PKK terrorist activities since 1970s in Turkey were studied. Secondary sources for the study, which has contributed to the theoretical basis, was gathered in Washington, D.C., USA as well as in Turkey. Publications that were in English were mostly gathered from libraries in Washington, D.C. area, during the research in the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Those were mainly library of George Washington University, Georgetown University, International Law Institute, and Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. The studies about the PKK in Turkey were collected from universities, institutions, and newspapers such as Library of Police Academy, the National Library, library of Bilkent University, and the library of the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism.

Since it is the main security problem in Turkey for decades, it was very important to analyze first hand information. In order to understand the organization's view, primary sources including publications of the PKK, and Abdullah Ocalan's writings and interviews with his lawyers were used in the study.

Besides the theoretical research, empirical research methods were used in this study. In order to understand the PKK, its network and some proposed solutions to

eliminate terrorist use of Internet some empirical data gathering methods such as observation, and interviews were applied. Observation is also very important technique to analyze the roots of the PKK terrorism. The purpose of the observations was to get the sense of terrorism and understand the importance of the case. Interviews were the following important data collection method in finding out the websites of the organization. Well-known academicians and law enforcement officials were interviewed to find out the research questions. Nevertheless, for security purposes identifications were kept in secret.

To be able to find out the answers of the research questions mainly two-research technique were used in the study. First, social network analysis was used to identify the first three research questions. Second, qualitative interview was used to find out the answer the fourth research question.

5.2.1. Research Design

As indicated before, two main research methodology were used to find out the answers of the research questions. That is, Social Network Analysis and Interview Analysis.

5.2.1.1. Social Network Analysis

Main focus of the study was ‘Social Network Analysis’. Before analyzing the websites by using social network analysis, content analysis were applied to the websites to understand the PKK websites. It is important to revise the content of the websites with a comprehensive study. During the content analysis, qualitative methodology was used to analyze content of the websites to give a better understanding of the network. Qualitative methodology that based on discourse and content analysis techniques could provide us opportunity to analyze the PKK websites, because this methodology provides us deeper understanding and sense making analyzing.⁴⁶⁴ During the stage of analyzing data, meanings, which have tacitness, were organized in an order. The below questions were asked in order to find out more reasonable answers to questions. These are;⁴⁶⁵ What are the most important texts for analyzing? How can we benefit from the selected texts?.

⁴⁶⁴ Van Maanen, John, (1979), “Methods for Organizational Research: a Preface”, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol.24, No.4, p.520.

⁴⁶⁵ Phillips, Nelson and Hardy, Cynthia, (2002), *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction*, London: Sage Publication, p.75.

Assertions, actors, videos, music, and arguments came up during the analysis of discourses. The representations, identities, and relationships in the text are so important.⁴⁶⁶ As a result, some techniques could be used for discourse analysis such as metaphor that allows us to understand the representations of symbols⁴⁶⁷ and storytelling, which are based on the experiments of members.⁴⁶⁸

This study was conducted specifically for PKK terrorist organization. The PKK has been using different communication tools including journals, newspapers, radio channels, TV channels, and Internet. Since the Internet is the main communication and propaganda tool in Today's world and all other PKK's communication services (journals, newspapers, radio and TV channels) have specific website for each service.

The first step of the research is making the dataset of web pages. During preparing the dataset snowball sampling research technique was used. Snowball sampling is a special nonprobability method used when the desired sample characteristic is rare. Snowball sampling is a technique for developing a research sample where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. Thus, the sample group appears to grow like a rolling snowball. As the sample builds up, enough data is gathered to be useful for research. This sampling technique is often used in hidden populations, which are difficult for researchers to access; example populations would be drug users or prostitutes. Researchers studying hidden populations find that standard probability sampling methods are either inapplicable or prohibitively costly because their subjects lack a sampling frame, have privacy concerns, and constitute a small part of the general population. Therefore, researchers generally employ non-probability methods, including location sampling methods such as targeted sampling, and chain-referral methods such as snowball and respondent-driven sampling.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁶ Phillips and Hardy, (2002), *ibid.*, p.58, 59.

⁴⁶⁷ Manning, Peter K., (1979), "Metaphors of the Field: Varieties of Organizational Discourse", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.4, p.664.

⁴⁶⁸ Boje, David M., (1991), "The Storytelling Organization: a Study of Story Performance in an Office-Supply Firm", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol.36, No.2, p.110.

⁴⁶⁹ Heckathorn, Douglas D., (2002), "Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden Populations", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 1, p.11.

The most common and famous search engine (google.com) was used to determine the PKK websites. First, “PKK” was searched in google.com and the hyperlinks were traced one by one. Some hyperlinks directed the researcher to the other PKK websites. The same method was followed for every website.

After the comprehensive research, only pro-PKK websites were used in this research. Sixty-four different websites were identified that have links to PKK. Some links like major media organizations such as CNN, BBC or international organizations like human rights watch or amnesty general were not included in the dataset. With such an approach, it can be possible to understand level of centrality and brokerage roles of the important websites in the network. Some PKK sympathizers use common video sharing sites like youtube to broadcast PKK propaganda. It was also not included in the dataset.

The table at Annex C is showing current pro-PKK web pages. The first column is the line number of the web page. The second column is showing the address of the web page. The third column is showing the IP address of the website. The fourth column is showing the languages in which the websites are published. Web pages mainly are serving in Kurdish, Turkish, English, Arabic and Farsi. Although some web pages serve in only one language, Abdullah Ocalan’s books come in different languages. Especially, when it is logged on to <http://www.abdullah-ocalan.com>, web page is in Turkish. However, Ocalan’s books are available in different languages such as Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Italian, English, German, Russian, Greek, and Farsi. The fifth column is showing the main content of the web sites. It is mainly to teach the members and its sympathizers Abdullah Ocalan’s writings on all about PKK and its history. Having analyzed the web pages, press releases, news sympathetic to the terrorist network, interviews, culture and art activities, information on so called security forces, glorifying dead terrorists, motivational training, teaching Kurdish language, encouraging its members with music, videos are available. The sixth column is showing the links from this particular web page’s URL to the other web pages with line order. The seventh column is showing the geo-location of the server of the web page. The eighth column is showing whether the web page is taking any commercial to the web site. This is showing us also the PKK is raiding funds through its web sites by getting

commercial. The ninth column is showing if the web page has the access of using blog. This is some other useful information that terrorists are using blog for communication to each other. In addition, the terror organization's sympathizers are logging on to these web pages to write their feelings about the organization.

The second step is the visual and statistical analysis of PKK linked websites using network analysis matrix. The terms used for the elements of networks are nodes or actors. The relationships between these elements are connections, edges or ties. The Matrix algebra has been used as a common tool to represent and to analyze networks. The generally accepted method for data entry is to form a matrix by symbolizing the existence of a relationship with 1 and the absence of a relationship with 0.⁴⁷⁰

A list including addresses of all websites was prepared to collect network data. If a website has a link to the other one, it was marked with "1". If it does not have a link, it was left empty. The addresses were listed with X forms not to complicate the visual system. The matrix of the study is at ANNEX D.


Figure 4, Sample of a Matrix

	A	B	C	D
A		1		1
B	1			1
C		1		
D	1		1	

⁴⁷⁰ Hanneman and Riddle (2005), *ibid.*

After making the dataset for each analysis diagrams were used to visualize the study.

Figure 5, Sample of a Diagram



Measurement items of the centrality analysis in social network analysis are; degree (The total number of direct ties of an actor to the others), indegree (The total number of ties from other actors to the focal actor (incoming links), outdegree (The total number of ties from focal actor to the others (outgoing links), betweenness (The degree of mediator or brokerage position of an actor between two other actors), closeness (The degree of closeness or ease of access of an actor to the others).

Social network analysts use two kinds of tools from mathematics to represent information about patterns of ties among social actors: graphs and matrices. Network analysis uses one kind of graphic display that consists of points or nodes to represent actors and lines or links to represent ties or relations. The researcher used UCINET

6.0⁴⁷¹ and NetDraw social network analysis software for data entry and analysis. The lists containing data about network ties of the websites was entered the computer through the social network analysis software.

5.2.1.2. Interview

As explained before, second method that was used in this study is interview. Even though face-to-face interviews have long been dominant interview technique in the field of qualitative research, in the last two decades, telephone interviewing became more and more common. Due to the explosive growth of new communication forms, such as computer-mediated communication, other interview techniques can be introduced and used within the field of qualitative research. With computer mediated communication is meant: a process where messages are electronically transferred from a sender to one or more recipient(s), both in synchronous (in real time) and in asynchronous (independent from time and place) setting.⁴⁷² In this part of research, asynchronous communication was used.

Interview method is an appropriate methodology for answering the fourth research question, since the interview involves several judgment questions for which expertise is necessary to answer. To make the study, the first major step involved identifying the participants of the interview. In other words, the experts whom the interview is made are identified. The main point is to come up with solutions to overcome terrorist networks at national and international level in terms of terrorist use of Internet, so, experts were chosen such that they reflect a variety of expert positions. They are not randomly selected to establish the reliability of the solutions. In other words, to make sure the accuracy of the responses, the participants of this research are selected based on their expertise. Experts in this research involve academics who focus on terrorism, cyberterrorism and media. In addition to academicians, practitioners from the field who have hands-on experience in terms of terrorism and cyberterrorism investigations and prosecution are selected. In this context, Prof.Dr. Yonah Alexander (Professor Emeritus State University of New York, also Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, Washington

⁴⁷¹ Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C., (2002), *Ucinet 6 for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*, USA: Harvard University Press, MA: Analytic Technologies.

⁴⁷² Opdenakker, Raymond, (2006), "Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques", *Qualitative Social Research*, Vol. 7, No 4, Art. 11, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0604118>, (Accessed on 12.03.2010)

D.C.), Prof.Dr. Gabriel Weimann (Director of communication Department, Haifa University, Israel), Prof. Dean C. Alexander (Director of Homeland Security Department, Western Illinois University, Chicago) and Prof. Dr. Suleyman Ozeren (Director of International Terrorism and Center, Ankara, Turkey) in the group of academicians and some important officials of law enforcement units were interviewed. However, for security purposes identification of the law enforcement officials were kept in secret.

After selection of the respondents, the next and important step was to formulate the questions. To do that, the researcher prepared pilot questions, that to be distributed to the actual participants of the research. Before delivering the questions to the experts, the researcher selected three experts, including academicians and practitioners who have experience and high quality background in the areas of terrorism, cyberterrorism and media. These experts were given the questions so that they could analyze and give recommendations about the format and the content of the questions. The purpose of the pilot study was to have a more comprehensive and powerful interview. Based on the responses, the researcher could adjust, change and reformulate the questions.

After the questions were prepared based on the pilot study, the questions were asked to the participants, who were experts from United States, Israel and Turkey. The research instrument of the second part of the research was questions, which were distributed to the experts including academicians and practitioners from variety of fields including terrorism, international security, political science and media. Questions were designed to analyze the solutions to overcome terrorist networks in terms of terrorist use of Internet.

Interview questions that are focused on the solutions involve four major issues, which are legal issues, use of technology, role of Internet service providers, and role of government. There are total of four questions.

Question # 1: What are the proposed solutions in terms of legal issues (national and international levels)?

Question # 2: What are the proposed solutions in terms of the use of technology (global in nature)?

Question # 3: What are the proposed solutions in terms of the role of Internet service providers, Internet companies (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, Twitter) that are used by extremists/terrorists?

Question # 4: What is the role of government (executive branch, legislative branch, judicial) as well as military, law enforcement, intelligence community to stop terrorist use of Internet?

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the findings of the research. First, content analysis of the pro-PKK web pages will be examined. Later, starting with analysis of the network, degree centrality analysis, betweenness centrality analysis, closeness centrality analysis, geodesic distance analysis, and interview results will be given.

6.1. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PRO-PKK WEB PAGES

The pro-PKK web pages are publishing the information in ten different languages (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, German, English, Farsi, Finland, French, Italian, and Danish). In the web pages, Turkish is the most common language that is used, because Turkish is the most spoken language in the region. Having thought that Abdullah Ocalan does not know Kurdish, it could be easily understood why Turkish is the most popular and common language in the web pages. In addition, dialectical differences in Kurdish languages make Turkish useable in communication between Kurdish originated citizens. Western languages such as English, German, and French mainly target the Kurdish originated Turkish citizens who moved to European countries. Young population may not know either Turkish or Kurdish, so western languages are so important to influence the young people and to recruit through the net. Other reason of using western languages might be explained like emphasizing and influencing the western community by addressing some critical terms such as democracy, human rights, women rights, and freedom. The PKK is also using Farsi and Arabic for Kurdish people residing in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Because, Farsi and Arabic is the first spoken languages in these countries.

The PKK uses its websites to advertise its propaganda. Having linked to the web pages of the organization, the formation and history of the PKK is given to the visitors. Since the foundation of the organization to today, detailed history is available on the websites. The information in the history is of course not neutral. Some of the stories are changed to serve to organization.

Especially starting with Abdullah Ocalan, biographies of the organization's leaders, and some other dead terrorists can be found. Especially some parts of Abdullah Ocalan's biography are given with his own words. Although some stories are very normal daily issues and events, but interestingly they are told, as they were anecdote of some kind of heroic stories to influence and create a god like image on the young members. In blogs of the web pages, there are letters written to Abdullah Ocalan. When the letters are read, a person can get the impression that Abdullah Ocalan is super human.

There is a serious propaganda on the Kurdish history, language, and the culture on the web pages. The PKK claims that Kurds are the oldest civilization on the region. They put some stories and pictures from the history to show it. Moreover, the imaginary maps of so-called Kurdistan are available in almost every web page.

The web page "<http://www.gerila.tv>" shows the operations between the PKK and the security forces. The web pages hide their losses and overstate the casualties of the security forces again to influence their young members.

While the web pages "www.heval.org/" and "www.radyowelat.com/" broadcasting Kurdish music, they show pictures of terrorists dancing, cooking, and playing. It emphasizes that terrorists are very normal people and living their lives in peace. They were not the people that terrorized the population and killed so many innocent people. The most of the web pages have videos, animations, songs, poems, and multicolored pictures in order to attract the young population with Kurdish music.

The web page "<http://www.cmg-team.com/>" (Cyber Median's Guerillas) teaches the members hacking techniques, computer security and basic information on computers. Most of the web pages are protected by this web page. In the bottom part of the web pages there is a sign saying, "This web page is protected by cyber median's guerillas. In this web page, it also shows the visitor's IP address and duration of the visit. It aims to scare the people who are not members or sympathizers of the organization.

The web page "www.pajkonline.com/" is the main web page of the women establishment of the organization. It gives detailed information about the women

structure. The page shows how the organization is giving importance to the women. It has poems and some saying about the women like “The world is better with women”.

Because of terrorist contents and encouraging criminal activity, access of some of the web pages is restricted with a court warrant in Turkey. Nevertheless, some other active web pages are showing how to access to these websites by changing the proxy server or using free proxy servers. Content analysis shows that the organization is Internet to communicate and create a massive propaganda both for themselves and for international community.

6.2. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

In this part, Social Network Analysis of PKK websites will be examined.

6.2.1. Analysis of the Network

Some basic measurement tools like density, diameter, and node distances were used to make a general definition of the network. The degree of centrality, which means the total number of direct ties of an actor to the others was, used a measurement item. The network data was treated as asymmetric to find indegree and outdegree centrality scores of the websites for detailed analysis.

The network consists of 64 nodes. The size of the matrix (Annex D) is 64*64. This means there are $(64*64)-64=4032$ connection possibilities. The density of the network is 0,1927 and standard deviation is 0,4562. These values mean that the network has only 19% of the all-possible ties.

6.2.2. Degree Centrality Analysis

Actors who are central tend to be more active (continuously working to maintain contacts) and have more ties (quantity) or the configuration of ties (strategic location).⁴⁷³ Degree centrality reflects actor’s popularity within a network. Degree centrality can be further defined in terms of in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality. Out-degree centrality is the extent to which the focal actor has identified others as a close node. In-degree centrality is the extent to which others in the network have identified with the focal actor. Out-degree centrality is concerned

⁴⁷³ Lee Seung Hwan Mark, et al., (2009), “The Role of Network Centrality in the Flow of Consumer Influence”, *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, Vol.20, Issue 1, p.67.

within an individual's set-perception of actor's own popularity, whereas in-degree centrality is concerned with the individual's popularity as rated by others in the network.⁴⁷⁴

Actors who have more ties to other actors may be advantaged positions. Because they have many ties, they may have alternative ways to satisfy needs, and hence are less dependent on other individuals. Because they have many ties, they may have access to, and be able to call on more of the resources of the network as a whole. Because they have many ties, they are often third-parties and deal makers in exchanges among others, and are able to benefit from this brokerage. Therefore, a very simple, but often very effective measure of an actor's centrality and power potential is their degree.⁴⁷⁵

As it can be seen at Annex E, it shows that two different types of degree centrality results of the social network. First calculations are based on the hypothesis that each tie between nodes is symmetric. Symmetric relations mean that a relationship exists from A to B and B to A. Websites, which are bold in the Annex E, X8, X49, X25, X12, X1 take up first five positions in terms of hierarchical ranking of degree centrality. The other degree calculations are based on asymmetric relationships meaning consistent or one-way ties between nodes. The websites www.bizekalan.net/19863-guncel_online_proxy_servisi.html, <http://www.urmiye.org>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, and <http://www.hpg-online.com> also take up highest four ranking positions in terms of degree centrality of asymmetric ties. www.bizekalan.net/19863-guncel_online_proxy_servisi.html, <http://www.urmiye.org>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, and <http://www.hpg-online.com> have high out-degree scores compared with their in-degree scores (in-degree means the total number of ties from other actors to the main actor). The websites www.bizekalan.net/19863-guncel_online_proxy_servisi.html, <http://www.urmiye.org>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, and <http://www.hpg-online.com> have the greatest out-degree scores, and might be regarded as the most influential websites. The websites <http://www.roj.tv>, <http://www.azadiyawelat.com>, <http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com> are joined by <http://www.firatnews.org> and

⁴⁷⁴ Lee Seung, et all, (2009), *ibid.*, p.67.

⁴⁷⁵ Hanneman and Riddle, (2005), *ibid.*, p.63.

<http://www.denge-mezopotamya.com/> have the highest records when in-degree scores are examined. That other websites share information (give links) with these five would seem to indicate a desire on the part of others to exert influence. This is an act of deference, or a recognition that the positions of the websites <http://www.roj.tv>, <http://www.azadiyawelat.com>, <http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com> and <http://www.firatnews.org> and <http://www.denge-mezopotamya.com/> might be worth trying to influence the others. In general, the degree centrality scores show that important websites are mostly located at the central parts of the social network. If an actor receives many ties, they are often known to be important or to have high prestige. That means, many actors seek to direct ties to them, and this may point out their importance. Actors who display high out-degree centrality are often known as influential actors.⁴⁷⁶ “Freeman centrality measures” reveals the situation statistically and gives the prominent websites in descending order.

In multi-dimensional scaling graph of PKK website network shows us that this network as a whole may have a group of central actors. It could be seen that "centrality" as an characteristic of individual actors as a consequence of their position; it could also be seen that how the graph is centralized on certain websites.

In this context, the websites www.bizekalan.net/19863-guncel_online_proxy_servisi.html, <http://www.urmiye.org>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, and <http://www.hpg-online.com> have the greatest degree scores. That means, these web sites are the most influential and effective websites.

6.2.3. Betweenness Centrality Analysis

Betweenness centrality is defined as the extent to which an actor falls between pairs of other actors on the shortest path connecting individuals in the network.⁴⁷⁷ For example, if the actor is high in betweenness centrality, the actor strategically holds a position in a network such that the actor provides links to otherwise unconnected individuals. In other words, betweenness centrality refers to the degree to which an actor is on the path between other actors. Thus, the centrality measure comes closest

⁴⁷⁶ Hanneman and Riddle, (2005), *ibid.*, p.63.

⁴⁷⁷ Freeman, Linton C., (1979), “Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification”, *Social Networks*, Vol.1, No.1, p.220; Mehra, Ajay, et all, (2001), “The Social Networks of High and Low Self-Monitors: Implications for Workplace Performance”, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No.1, p.123.

to measuring the degree to which an actor operates as a powerful broker within a network.⁴⁷⁸

Betweenness centrality identifies an entity's position within a network in terms of its ability to make connections to other pairs or groups in a network. Actor with a high betweenness centrality generally; holds a favored or powerful position in the network, has a greater amount of influence over what happens in a network. Sharing of knowledge is important not only for the transmission of knowledge between the actors within the organization but also for the interaction between organizations. Quality and management of the relations that an organization or an individual has obtained at a certain period can be determiner of the performance of the actor or inter organizational networks that the actor is a member of.⁴⁷⁹ These actors, who have a brokerage role in the transmission of knowledge in the system, are brokers who gain the advantage of affecting the system according to their own interests.

The betweenness centrality views an actor as being in a favored position to the extent that the actor falls on the geodesic paths between other pairs of actors in the network. It can be seen that there is a lot of variation in actor betweenness (from zero to 443), and that there is quite a bit of variation (std. dev. = 69.5 relative to a mean betweenness of 22.719). Despite this, the overall network centralization is relatively low. The reason of this is most of the connections cannot be made in this network without the aid of any intermediary; therefore there cannot be many betweenness.

The betweenness scores are very important in analyzing PKK's websites and understanding the network. As it can be seen at Annex G, <http://www.hpg-online.com>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, <http://www.pkk-online.net> and <http://www.pajk-online.com> are occupying first four positions, which have the

⁴⁷⁸ Ansell, Christopher, (2003), "Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Movement", p.126, (Diani, Mario and McAdam, Doug ed.), *Social Movements and Networks, Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁷⁹ Kirkbesoglu, Erdem and Sagsan, Mustafa, (2009), "Knowledge Manipulation in Inter Organizational Networks: A New Role for Brokers", (Bolisani, Ettore and Scarso, Enrico ed.), *Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Knowledge Management*, Vol.1, Italy: Universita Degli Studi Di Padova, , p.452

highest betweenness scores. There are some powerful websites in this network. This result means other websites depend on <http://www.hpg-online.com>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, <http://www.pkk-online.net> and <http://www.pajk-online.com> in the network to connect with others. These scores also show the control capacity of the websites over the information flow inside the network. Clearly, there is a structural basis for these websites to perceive that they are different from other websites in the network. That shows us PKK has a strategy to disseminate its propaganda through its network. As it could be noted that there is control power over the websites to connect one website to other. <http://www.hpg-online.com>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, <http://www.pkk-online.net> and <http://www.pajk-online.com> are playing brokerage position in the network.

In this framework, the websites <http://www.hpg-online.com>, <http://www.rojaciwan.com>, <http://www.pkk-online.net>, and <http://www.pajk-online.com> are occupying first four positions. These scores demonstrate that there is a control capacity of the websites over the information flow inside the PKK's web network.

6.2.4. Closeness Centrality Analysis

Closeness centrality describes centrality by specifying the location that an actor occupies in a social network. It points out reachability; that is; an actor's ability to easily reach or connect to others by being connected closely enough that the actor has access to others' information. Closeness centrality is a straight forward measurement that simply calculates the average of the direct and indirect links to all others in the network relative to the focus actor.⁴⁸⁰ Closeness centrality measures how many steps an actor is from others in the network. Those with high closeness are those who can reach many actors in few steps.

One could criticize the degree centrality measures because scores only take into account the immediate ties that an actor has, or the ties of the actor's neighbors, rather than indirect ties to all others. One actor might be tied to a large number of others, but those others might be rather disconnected from the network as a whole. In a case like this, the actor could be quite central, but only in a local neighborhood.

⁴⁸⁰ Brass, Daniel J., (1995), "A Social Network Perspective on Human Resources Management", *Research in Human Resources Management*, Vol.13, p.45.

Closeness centrality approaches emphasize the distance of an actor to all others in the network by focusing on the distance from each actor to all others.

Closeness centrality analysis provides a number of alternative ways of calculating the farness of each websites from all others. Farness is the sum of the distance from each ego to all others in the network. Farness is transformed into "nearness" as the reciprocal of farness. That means, nearness would be equal to the score that one websites is divided by farness. Nearness can be further standardized by norming against the minimum possible nearness for a graph of the same size and connection.

The PKK website network is directed so, separate closeness and farness can be computed for sending and receiving. A directed network is called (simply) connected if there is a path between any pair of players. The path does not need be directed. A directed network is called strongly connected if there is a directed path from any player to any other.⁴⁸¹ As it is in Annex I, it could be analyzed that <http://www.knc.org.uk/> has the largest sum of geodesic distances from other actors (inFarness of 4032) and to other actors (outFarness of 4032). Because, this website does not have any ties to the other websites. The farness figures can be re-expressed as nearness (the reciprocal of farness) and normed relative to the greatest nearness observed in the graph (here, the outcloseness of website <http://devrimcitavir.net>).

Within this regard, closeness analysis demonstrates that <http://devrimcitavir.net> has the biggest closeness score from other websites. Because, this website has more links to the other websites.

6.2.5. Geodesic Distances Analysis

Most algorithms to define more complex properties of individual's positions and the structure of the network as a whole use one particular definition of the distance between actors in a network. This quantity is the geodesic distance.⁴⁸² Geodesic distance is the shortest distance between two actors. The geodesic metrics are useful for describing the minimum distance between actors in the network. The web page

⁴⁸¹ Jeong-Yoo, Kim and Tackseung, Jun, (2007), "Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network", https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=FEMES07&paper_id=84, (Accessed on 22.04.2010).

⁴⁸² Hanneman and Riddle, (2005), *ibid.*, p.50.

network of PKK has maximum value of four in terms of geodesic distances. That means any type of information broadcasted in one of the websites can be reached by four clicks on the hyperlinks. Geodesic distances analysis shows us any information that was put in the system gets around fast enough in the whole network.

6.3. INTERVIEW

The research of this part involves two groups of people. The first group is academicians, and the second group is practitioners. As stated in Chapter 5, a targeted sampling method was used in this research. Since the research questions require extensive knowledge, those who do not have necessary level of knowledge and expertise cannot contribute to this research. Academic background of the academicians represents variety of fields, including political science, international affairs, international law, communication science, and international law. These academicians are not only the prominent academicians in their fields; they are also nationally and internationally recognized scholars. Besides the academicians, the practitioners are the second group of the respondents. Practitioners are those who are actually working in the area of terrorism, cyberterrorism, computer security, and intelligence.

Answers from the experts for presenting their solutions to overcome terrorist networks at national and international level in terms of terrorist use of Internet are discussed as follows. Regarding the legal aspect of the terrorist exploitation of Internet, law enforcement officials agree on the easy legal access and dissemination of information by terrorist organizations. The display of thoughts and channeling the communication meets no legal barrier whilst being tunneled to the masses or small groups. Court decisions or control mechanisms may suppress the usage of Internet, but covered exploitation or legal extensions of terrorist organizations can bypass these measures. Blogs and easy-to-reach websites will tolerate the infiltration of terrorists into the minds of people. As a result, legal solutions should be expected to fall short in countering the Internet exploitation. Governments' legal tools will be far from denying the Internet usage of terrorist organizations though, as law enforcement officials argue, monitoring their Internet activities will be utilized in countering terrorism. On the other hand, academicians claim that an expansion of such legislation, greater enforcement thereon would be beneficial. Nevertheless, human

rights concerns and individual freedoms are fundamental legal obstacles to prevent Internet access of terrorist organizations.

In terms of ‘solutions in terms of the use of technology’ law enforcement officials claim the efficient legal response, contrary to their common belief that it will not be an efficient way of denying it, as was mentioned in the previous paragraph. The reason is that legal solutions are must to show the decisive stance of the government and suppress the sympathizers who does not have any direct link to the organization. Additionally law enforcement agencies may benefit from the Internet access to commit offensive measures against these organizations. For instance, software could be built to track the terrorist web pages in gathering information and obtaining intelligence. Moreover, academicians suggest that traditional security hardware and software can be used relative to cyber terrorism, including the following: antimalware, application software, authentication software, email, identity and access management, intrusion detection/prevention, mobile data security, network firewall, security remote access, security information management, unified threat management, vulnerability management, wireless security. In addition, software that allows for amalgamating content from various websites and categorizing it, as well as finding key words is helpful in tracking websites. In addition, translation software can aid in translating foreign language websites into native tongues. Furthermore, link analysis software has a role in analyzing extremist/terrorist websites. Regarding offensive activities, the following could be used; botnets, malicious code hosted on websites and email. In addition, training and services relative to combating cyber terror/extremist exploitation is worth noting. Among some possible training components are open source collection, network discovery and reconnaissance, identifying vulnerabilities, hacking network devices and intranets, etc.

Regarding the service providers such as YouTube, Facebook or Twitter, law enforcement officials underline the inefficiency of banning these websites. As can be seen from the Turkey case of banning some Internet service providers with the courts warrant, Internet users could not be prevented to access aforementioned websites due to the existence of software and by-pass-web pages. A solution could be proposed as enforce these websites to establish self-control mechanisms. However, it should be

concerned that service providers are operating worldwide by their trans or international structure, making any enforcement inefficient on them. Then an international legal response and enforcement ought to be established. Similar to law enforcement officials, academicians suggest that governments should discourage Internet service providers and Internet companies from allowing their websites to be used by extremists/terrorists. This government policy could be manifested in imposing civil liabilities (penalties and revoking of government authorizations for running Internet companies). In addition, criminal laws could attach to such companies by initiating prosecutions alleging that such firms provide “material support” to terrorists groups by allowing them to aid terrorist activities. Criminal laws could be possibly used relative to alleging a conspiracy to provide material support or a conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. At an extreme, government could attack specific websites operated by the Internet service providers or remove content from such companies. Moreover, by prosecuting individuals and groups that own extremist/terrorist websites, the government could discourage the existence of such websites. Companies that run ISPs could charge much higher rates for websites run by extremist/terrorist organizations. Companies that run ISPs or Web 2.0 firms (YouTube, etc.) could increase the monitoring of their websites and take down improper content. Moreover, such firms could allow for greater collaboration with law enforcement/intelligence communities. Furthermore, initiating a campaign by the users of Facebook, etc against those companies allowing their businesses to be used by extremist/terror groups. In doing so, perhaps they will get a decline in advertising and other revenue, which would ultimately get them to be tougher on such extremist/terrorist websites or submissions/participation on their websites.

In terms of ‘role of government’, both academicians and law enforcement officials suggest that executive branches of the governments could set the tone by designing policies that will undermine the accessibility and use of the Internet by extremist/terrorist groups. The executive branch could collaborate with the legislative branch in constructing legislation in this realm. In addition, the executive branch could make countering extremist/terrorist Internet use as a priority at respective government agencies. Furthermore, the executive branch can collaborate with provincial/state, municipal, and local government to discourage industry’s direct

and indirect assistance to extremist/terrorist groups. State prosecutors can be very active in initiating civil and criminal complaints against ISPs, Web 2.0 companies, extremist/terrorist groups, individuals, non-profits, and others who assist in perpetuating this type of activity. In addition, best practices in dealing with such cases can be shared domestically and internationally. Moreover, the legislative branches could pass laws that will undermine the capacity of extremist/terrorist groups to use ISPs, Facebook, YouTube etc. In accordance with those, the judiciary could ensure that civil and criminal cases that are brought before it are dealt with accurately and fairly.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the Findings

Internet is the easiest and the most effective tool for terrorist organizations to commit their efforts in realizing propaganda, communication, recruitment, fund raising and training. Internet appeared to be a ground for a new type of front in countering and conducting terrorist activities. The targeted audience and its access to Internet define the capability and desire of the terrorist organizations. The more freedom to access Internet reveals the more terrorist activities. Western hemisphere has, almost, no constraint to the exploitation of Internet, except legal courts and monitoring activities of the security forces for intelligence purposes. No matter what motivation the terrorist organization pursues, western mindset presents the perfect digital environment for these organizations.

It is obvious that the Internet has supplied a new safe haven and safe arena for terrorist groups. Online activities significantly improve the ability of such terrorist organizations to raise funds, lure new faithful, and reach a mass audience.⁴⁸³ Former head of the United States National Infrastructure Protection Center, Michael Vatis, has stated that ‘Terrorists are already using technology for sophisticated communications and fund raising activities.’⁴⁸⁴ In this study, terrorist use of Internet was classified as fund raising, training, recruitment and propaganda. Use of Internet by PKK terrorist organization was analyzed in the light of this reference.

The Internet is an ideal propaganda tool for terrorists: in the past terrorists had to communicate through acts of violence and hope that acts gathered sufficient attention to publicize the perpetrators cause or explain their ideological justification. With the advent of the Internet, the same groups can disseminate their information straight by the media and untouched by government sensors.⁴⁸⁵ Until the start of the

⁴⁸³ Arquilla, John, et al, (1999), “Networks, Netwar and Information-age Terrorism”, (Ian O.Lesser et al. ed), *Countering the New Terrorism*, California: RAND.

⁴⁸⁴ Conway, Maura, (2002), “Reality Bytes: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet”, <http://doras.dcu.ie/498/1/first-mon-7-11-2002.pdf>, (Accessed on 23.08.2010).

⁴⁸⁵ Conway, (2002), *ibid*.

Internet, terrorists' hopes of winning publicity for their causes and activities depended on attracting the attention of television, radio, or the print media.⁴⁸⁶

Money is terrorism's lifeline; it is "the engine of the armed struggle".⁴⁸⁷ A vital part of operating a terrorist network is to locate and obtain the necessary funding for their activities. The Internet provides the cover of secrecy and global reach necessary for the fund raising activities of numerous subversive groups. PKK terrorist organization generally does not use the Internet for funding their activities. PKK does not utilize donations, which could be obtained through fund raising network of charities. Some terrorist organizations make bank account numbers and banking information publicly available at their websites and those of their support through monetary contributions. PKK has been organizing so many campaigns in terms of its propaganda objectives. Yet, PKK does not organize fund raising activities through its websites. Instead of using web for fund raising activities, the PKK is using other techniques to raise fund such as drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion, charity, money laundering etc.

Recruitment refers to groups' efforts to recruit and mobilize sympathizers to support terrorist activities. The Internet offers different ways for recruitment efforts; the Internet makes information gathering easier for potential recruits by offering more information, more quickly, and in multimedia format; the global reach of the Internet allows groups to publicize events to more people; and by increasing the possibilities for interactive communication, new opportunities for assisting groups are offered, along with more chances for contacting group directly. In addition, by discussion forums, it is also possible for members of the public to engage in debate with one another.⁴⁸⁸

Social network analysis and social network centrality measures contribute to understand the structure of the networks and communication flows in terms of PKK's propaganda tactics through the net. In this context, PKK and its Internet cobweb structure, along with its content, are searched as a modal to describe the

⁴⁸⁶ Conway, Maura, (2006), "Terrorist 'Use' of the Internet and Fighting Back", *Information & Security, An International Journal*, Vol.19, p.13.

⁴⁸⁷ Napoleoni Loretta, (2004), "Money and Terrorism" *Strategic Insights*, Vol.3, No.4, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/si/si_3_4/si_3_4_nal01.pdf, (Accessed on 26.10.2010).

⁴⁸⁸ Conway, (2006), *ibid.*, p.16.

Internet's position in terrorist activities. In this study, social network centrality measures were used to demonstrate PKK's web strategy. From the perspective of social network analysis, social network centrality measures demonstrate that the PKK has an intentionally built strategy in its web network system. None of the websites are randomly created and linked to the other websites. It could be noted that web system is centrally controlled by the PKK's propaganda team. The PKK counts on certain websites for its propaganda purposes through its effective hubs. This built strategy looks like an advantage for PKK in terms of having a centralized network system and having some important websites' brokerage positions for utilizing its tactics through the net. On the other hand, it is also a vulnerable point for the terrorist organization. Vulnerability can be defined as "a point where a system is susceptible to attack".⁴⁸⁹ In terms of computer systems and networks, vulnerability is defined as "a weakness in system security procedures, system design, implementation, internal control, etc., that could be exploited to violate the system's security policy".⁴⁹⁰ In PKK's network system, system has two side of the coin. One side is strategy; other side is vulnerable to trust to certain websites. If PKK's centered and most influential websites would be eliminated and taken out of the network system, the other websites would be isolated and would have no link to the others.

Knowledge manipulation is one of the most important processes in terms of managing knowledge in the organizations. It is argued that the manipulation can be evaluated as a barrier for creating, sharing, organizing, using, and auditing of knowledge at the organizational level. The manipulation of knowledge is emerged by organizational actors depending on their ability to use knowledge in the network.⁴⁹¹ PKK terrorist organization, through its websites and propaganda teams, manipulates the knowledge or facts within its web network.

Below incident is very good example how PKK manipulates the information.⁴⁹² Because of a bomb blast, on 12 September 2006, eleven people died

⁴⁸⁹ Icove, David and Seger, Karl, (1995), *Computer Crime: A Crimefighter's Handbook*, Sebastol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., p.89.

⁴⁹⁰ Ozeren, (2009), *ibid.*, p.39.

⁴⁹¹ Kirkbesoglu and Sagsan, (2009), *ibid.*, p.452.

⁴⁹² Celebi, Erdogan, (2006), "System Approach to Terrorism; Countering the Terrorist Training Subsystem", NPS School, Unpublished Master Thesis, Monterey, California, p.78, 79.

and seventeen people (seven were children) were wounded in children's park in Diyarbakir, Turkey. After the unpleasant incident, one of PKK website broadcasted a story that a new radical group called Turkish Revenge Brigades took responsibility for the attack. The new group was depicted by the PKK website as retaliating to an incident in which a Turkish soldier had been killed in a clash between Turkish Security Forces and PKK terrorists. In the story, there were also pictures of the bomb's detonation system, and statements alleging that these pictures were taken from the website of the Turkish Revenge Brigade (TRB), where the TRB's communication of responsibility could allegedly be found. The communication was obviously designed to provoke hatred between Kurds and Turks saying that "kill ten Kurds in Diyarbakir for every Turk killed." The incident sparked a lot of violent street demonstrations in southeastern region of Turkey and major cities like Istanbul with the provocations of the PKK terrorists and their media supporters. When the story was first published on the PKK website, there was no link to the alleged website in which the communication of responsibility was published. One day later, the story was republished with an URL address to the website (<http://www.turkintikamtugayi.8m.com>). However, people who entered this site through the link saw the responsibility communiqué and frog images in the places of improvised explosive detonation system pictures, which the PKK site alleged that they took from [turkintikamtugayi.8m.com](http://www.turkintikamtugayi.8m.com). The reason why frog pictures appeared in the site was that the website did not have enough capacity to store the IED system pictures that were published in the PKK's news story. PKK terrorist network already had the pictures before bombing. This was their very deliberate psychological campaign to take the advantage of the incident. However, it was prepared very unskillfully. The bombers, story makers, website designers, and the provocateurs all proved to be the same group. Investigations later showed that the bomb was PKK's device that exploded prematurely before it was planted next to a big police station very close to the children's park. The incident was an illustration of how a modern terrorist group uses the Internet and manipulates the information.

Social network analysis is applied to the structure of pro-PKK websites. It is selected 64 websites by snowball sampling method to determine the degree, betweenness, closeness centrality and geodesic distance analysis. Degree analysis

indicated that the websites www.bizekalan.net/19863-guncel_online_proxy_servisi.html, www.urmiye.org, www.rojaciwan.com, and www.hpg-online.com took up highest four ranking positions and these websites are the most influential websites. Betweenness analysis indicated that the websites www.hpg-online.com, www.rojaciwan.com, www.pkk-online.net and www.pajk-online.com are occupying first four positions. These scores demonstrated that there is a control capacity of the websites over the information flow inside the network. Obviously, there is a structural basis for these websites to perceive that they are different from other websites in the network. Closeness analysis indicated that www.devrimcitavir.net has biggest geodesic distance (closeness) score from other websites. Because, this website has more links to the other websites. Geodesic distance analysis indicates that the web page network of PKK has maximum value of four. It demonstrates that any type of information broadcasted in one of the websites can be reached by four clicks on the hyperlinks.

Qualitative method is utilized to search content of the pro-PKK websites. In this context, it is concluded that the PKK is using its websites professionally, colorfully, well designed in ten different languages. Having linked to the websites, the PKK makes a person to read whatever PKK wants, PKK makes a person to listen to music whatever PKK wants, and PKK makes a person to see whatever images PKK wants. The PKK's web network is organized in such a way that when a neutral person links to the websites, he/she is indoctrinated according to PKK's ideology and perceives it from terrorists' perspective. Another interesting point that was noted after the content analysis. The PKK's network security is protected by specific website that is www.cmng-online.com. When linked to some of the PKK websites, you are informed with a statement that "This website is protected by cmgonline.com. This is some kind of a warning that a person who is not a member or sympathizer and linked to this website should be careful what he/she is doing. Because, he/she is being monitored and his/her IP address is shown at the end of the webpage.

If the results of both social network analysis and content analysis are merged, PKK delivers its messages with a consciously built cobweb by complimenting its web design by a perfect image of content.

Interviews, made by law enforcement officials and academicians clearly indicate the necessity of the legal responses to deny the Internet usage of terrorist organizations, although they, especially law enforcement officials, do not have confidence in terms of the efficiency of legal measures. Regarding the use of technology, law enforcement officials harshly claim the offensive measures such as the use of hardware and software benefitted by terrorist organization to exploit their weaknesses. Both academicians and law enforcement officials argue on the need of governments' commitment to compel service providers to establish self-control mechanisms and prevent the undesired utilization of Internet by terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, it is fact that an overall international enforcement is needed to coerce service providers in accordance with the interests of state actors. In terms of the role of the government, all branches of the governments should be in consent with countering the Internet usage by terrorist organizations. Any broken chain between the organs of legislative or executive branches will diminish the efficiency of Internet exploitation.

Policy Implications

Turkey, struggling to be a member of European Union and an actor of western international political system for centuries, offers freedom of access to Internet for its own citizens, as the other western countries do. Hence, Turkey is a clear target of Internet based terrorism. PKK, the significant terrorist organization operating in international arena but targeting Turkey, easily benefits from Internet to achieve its goals and reach the masses. If its activities in both close neighborhoods of Turkey and in most of the western countries are concerned, PKK is one of the smartest terrorist organizations utilizing from Internet in its activities.

Consequently, this search, on the axis of PKK exploitation of Internet, contributed to countering and suppressing terrorism by, firstly enhancing the capability of security forces in intelligence and analysis procedures, secondly increasing the awareness of the society not to be deceived by pro-terrorist websites, if results of such analysis are released by media.

In accordance with findings, influential and prominent websites should have the first priority in an elimination strategy while conducting social network analysis, because the other sites simply imitate or use these influential websites as their main

source. In this context, social network analysis of pro-PKK websties shows us that PKK has a consciously built strategy with increased awareness behind its Internet network system. Especially, degree and betweenness centrality demonstrates that PKK has replaced its websites in a particular order to control the whole system by some specific websites.

The PKK terrorist organization depends on certain websites for disseminating propaganda easily and quickly through controlled effective hubs. This seems to be an advantage for PKK in terms of having a centralized network system and having some important websites' brokerage positions for utilizing its tactics through the net. On the other hand, it is also a vulnerable point for the terrorist organization. If these centered websites would be taken out of the network system, the other websites would be isolated and would have no link to the others.

It should be noted that banning the PKK website with a court warrant in Turkey is a temporary solution to protect the public from PKK's propaganda attacks. There should be formed a national anti-cyberterrorism organization to overcome those problems. This organization should focus on the websites that has the central power and brokerage roles to organize cyber-attacks to disturb the network system. This way PKK's most effective communication strategy would be terminated.

If the consequences of this search are applied to the dilemma of global Internet exploitation for terrorist purposes, certain measures ought to be taken to prevent coordinated terrorist activities. International usage of Internet, with no barriers, requires the states to institutionalize in countering Internet based terrorist activities. These activities may extend from monitoring to deter, suppress and also actively countering the exploitation of Internet. It is a prerequisite to form an organization to frame the countering Internet based terrorism and creating norms to maintain the survivability of these measures.

Recommendations

A full cooperation and coordination of efforts are prerequisite to prevent the Internet usage of terrorist organizations. In this context, both state and non-state level cooperation must be institutionalized to create a check mechanism. Ever since terrorism and other types of transnational criminal activities have become the main

topic in the international arena' the term "cooperation" has become a focal point for every government.⁴⁹³ The PKK terrorist organization publishes their websites from almost every country that has web-hosting providers. The PKK can move its websites if they are banned in one country. For this reason, cooperation strategy for removing or reducing the effects of terrorists' websites should be comprehensive. In this respect, with the responsibility of United Nation, such an organization could be institutionalized. Moreover, this organization could be in charge of monitoring terrorist websites and website hosters. If the difficulty of this awareness and cooperation is concerned, law enforcement officials could be forced to benefit the information articulation of terrorist organization in countering it.

Furthermore, government, industry, non-profits, non-governmental institutions, and the public need to be highly proactive to combat the ideological arguments and radicalization processes that terrorist groups pursue globally through the Internet. In addition, law enforcement and intelligence community could monitor terrorist websites and relevant online social network spheres. To create a public awareness on this issue could also help people to prevent themselves from terrorist propaganda. Greater oversight could be applied by families and friends of individual's Internet activities. Moreover, use of Internet filtering technologies could help families to create any misunderstandings and exposition created by terrorist organizations. Because, as it was explained before, one of the reason and way is recruitment on Internet.

If the Internet usage of terrorist organization is properly monitored, policies of an efficient public diplomacy could be identified to influence the hearts and minds of the masses. The messages of the terror units could be used as weapons of mass persuasion against them to question the credibility of the terrorist organization.

Future Research

After each terrorist attack, terrorists put information about the incident to their communication services, especially on the Internet. During the content analysis, the researchers should search the websites after the terror incidents and put the findings to their reports.

⁴⁹³ Ozeren, (2009), *ibid.*, p.57.

Due to the lack of studies on this specific issue, the researchers should focus on social network analysis on mapping the terrorist networks in order to foil the exploitation of Internet by terrorist organizations.

This research is limited itself with only PKK terrorist organization. Future research could make comparative study between two terrorist organizations to lay out the differences to help security forces to understand and aware of diversity. Future research should also focus on how terrorist organizations establish networks with other terrorist organizations.

In addition, there is a need to do research in the area of wide-ranging cooperation. Future research should include and focus on how international and supranational organizations, such as Interpol, Europol, and other regional training centers assist cooperation. Besides the formal cooperation among organizations, there is a need to focus on how informal cooperation can be set without violating any legal regulations to prevent terrorists to exploit the Internet.

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Annex A, Legislative Measures Regarding to Terrorism Financing in Turkey

Terrorist financing offence which has been drawn up in the Law No. 5532 Regarding Amendment in the Anti-Terror Law came into force on 18.07.2006 and in Article 8 of Law No.3713 To Fight Against Terrorism is as follows:

“Whoever knowingly and willfully provides with or collects fund for committing partially or fully terrorist crimes, shall be punished as a member of an organization. Fund cited in the first paragraph of this Article shall mean money or all types of property, right, credit, revenue and interest, value of which may be presented by money, and benefit and value that was collected as a result of conversion thereof”

In the concerning article it is stated that the persons who committed terrorist financing offence shall be punished as a member of an organization and also in the article 7 of the same law it is stated that the members of the organization shall be punished according to the provisions of article 314 of Turkish Criminal Code. In article 314 of Turkish Criminal Code it has been stated that any person who becomes a member of an organization shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of five to ten years. Accordingly, the punishment of terrorist financing in Turkish law is imprisonment for a term of five years to ten years. On the other hand, in article 8/A of Law No.3713 it has been stated that if crimes included in this Law are committed through undue influence in the public service, punishment to be given shall be increased by one half. In article 8/B of the same Law it has been stated that if crimes included in this Law are committed in the context of a legal personality, security measures peculiar to those persons as per the Article 60 of the Turkish Penal Law shall be adjudged.

Law No.5237 Turkish Criminal Code

“In the article 282 of Turkish Criminal Code entitled as “Laundering of Assets Acquired from an Offence” it is stated that “A person who transfers abroad the proceeds obtained from an offence requiring a minimum penalty of six months or more imprisonment, or processes such proceeds in various ways in order to conceal the illicit source of such proceeds or to give the impression that they have been

legitimately acquired shall be sentenced to imprisonment from three years up to seven years and a judicial fine up to twenty thousand days.

A person, who, without participating in the commitment of the offence mentioned in paragraph (1), purchases, acquires, possesses or uses the proceeds which is the subject of that offence knowing the nature of the proceeds shall be sentenced to imprisonment from two years up to five years.”

Because the sanction of terrorist financing offence is determined as imprisonment for a term of five years to ten years, terrorist financing offence is considered to be the predicate offence of laundering and transferring the assets derived from terrorist financing offence abroad or concealing the illegitimate source of such and processing various operations giving the impression that such asset has been legitimately acquired is evaluated in the scope of “laundering” offence.

Law No.5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime

With the Law No.5549; legal arrangements have been made in order to ensure the prevention of laundering proceeds of crime and terrorist financing and the efficiency in combating mentioned offences, obligations have been determined in this scope and the duties and scope of powers of MASAK have been enhanced including combating terrorist financing in addition to combating laundering.

Besides the arrangements made for combating solely terrorist financing in the Law No.5549, the arrangements made relating to combating laundering also seem to be possible to be evaluated in the scope of terrorist financing as the terrorist financing offence is the predicate offence of laundering.

Provisions concerning suspicious transaction reporting have been established in the article 4 of Law No.5549 and it is stated that in case that there is any information, suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that the asset, which is subject to the transactions carried out or attempted to be carried out within or through the obliged parties, is acquired through illegal ways or used for illegal purposes, these transactions shall be reported to the Presidency by the obliged parties.

With the article 19/e and 19/1 of law No.5549 MASAK is given the duty and power to collect data, to receive suspicious transaction reports, to analyze and evaluate them

in the scope of prevention of laundering proceeds of crime and terrorist financing and to convey the cases to the competent Public Prosecutor's Office in cases where serious suspicion exists that a money laundering or terrorist financing offence is committed.

In the article 17 of law No.5549 entitled as "seizure" it has been stated that in cases where there is strong suspicion that the offences of money laundering and financing terror are committed, the asset values may be seized in accordance with the procedure in article 128 of Criminal Procedure Law No. 5271.

Regulation on Measures Regarding Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism

The Regulation on Measures Regarding Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism was published in the Official Gazette No.26751 on 09.01.2008. The enforcement date has been determined as 01.04.2008 in the article 51 of the mentioned Regulation.

Principles and procedures regarding obliged parties, obligations and inspection of compliance with obligations, disclosure to customs administration and other measures for the purpose of preventing laundering proceeds of crime and financing of terrorism have been regulated in the Regulation drawn up for the implementation of Law No. 5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime.

Suspicious transaction has been defined as the case where there is any information, suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that the asset which is subject to the transactions carried out or attempted to be carried out within or through the obliged parties has been acquired through illegal ways or used for illegal purposes and is used, in this scope, for terrorist activities or by terrorist organizations, terrorists or those who finance terrorism.

Masak General Communiqué No:2

Principals and procedures regarding suspicious transaction reporting and 19 types of suspicious transactions have been defined in MASAK General Communiqué No.2 which entered into force on 31.12.1997 through being published in the Official Gazette.

In accordance with the suspicious transaction type “*Transferring large amounts of money from countries or to countries in which there are illegal activities regarding narcotic substances, smuggling or in which there are terrorist organizations and, transferring large amounts of money from or to offshore centers*” a contribution to combating financing of terrorism has been made through including transactions carried out to and from countries and centers where terrorist organizations operate within the scope of transactions that shall be reported by obliged parties.

Masak General Communiqué No: 3

In MASAK General Communiqué No.3 that entered into force on 07.02.2002 through being published in the Official Gazette the following transaction type has been included as a 20th suspicious transaction type in addition to the 19 types given in MASAK General Communiqué No.2 in order to help obliged parties in suspicious transaction reporting obligation: “*Reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or is to be used for terrorism or terrorist acts*”

General Communiqué of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Regarding Terrorist Financing


In General Communiqué of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Regarding Terrorist Financing that entered into force on 07.11.2007 through being published in the Official Gazette there are explanations and clarifications for efficient, timely and proper fulfillment of suspicious transaction reporting obligation regarding terrorist financing.

In this General Communiqué it is stated that the definition of suspicious transaction given in Article 4 of Law No. 5549 covers “the use of the asset subject to transaction for illegal purposes” in addition to its acquirement through illegal ways and it has been set forth in this scope that cases where there is any information, suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that the funds are used for terrorist activities or by terrorist organizations, terrorists or those who finance terrorism, or that the funds are related or linked to terrorist organizations, terrorists or those who finance terrorism shall be subject to suspicious transaction reporting.


Moreover, it is stated in the mentioned General Communiqué that the primary objective of terrorism is to compel a government or an international organization to

do or to abstain from doing any act by intimidating a people or arousing indignation in a people. In this framework, cases where there is information, suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect regarding not only financing of terrorist acts against Turkish Republic but also against other states and international organizations shall be reported to MASAK.


Annex B, The System of Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Democratic Communities of Kurdistan



Annex B, The System of Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Democratic Communities of Kurdistan-




Annex B, The System of Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Democratic Communities of Kurdistan-




Annex B, The System of Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Democratic Communities of Kurdistan-

Fields



Annex B, The System of Koma Civaken Kurdistan, Democratic Communities of Kurdistan- Continued



Annex C, Pro-PKK Websites

N .	Web Address	IP Address	Language	Content	Links	IP Address Location	Any Commercial Taken?	Use of Blog? (Membership)
1	http://www.hpg-online.com	66.252.9.244	Kurdish Turkish Arabic German English	Declarations, Information about So-called Security Force's Operations	2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 23, 26, 32, 40, 41, 47	USA	No	Yes
2	http://www.pkk-online.net	66.252.9.252	Kurdish Turkish English Arabic Farsi	Releases, Interviews, History of PKK, Culture&Art, So-called Martyrs, Articles	1, 3, 5, 6	USA	No	Yes
3	http://www.pajk-online.com	66.252.9.250	Turkish Kurdish English Arabic	Women Establishment, Interviews, Books, Poems, Pictures	2, 7, 41	USA	No	Yes
4	http://www.gerila.tv	209.212.149.17	Kurdish English Turkish	Songs, Movies	1	USA	No	Yes
5	http://www.pkk-online.net/Komunar/index_kom42.html	66.252.9.252	Turkish	Monthly Ideological Journal	none	USA	No	Yes
6	http://www.pkk-online.net/wejekurmanctirki/index.html	66.252.9.252	Kurdish Turkish Arabic	Literature (Poems, Books etc.)	none	USA	No	Yes
7	http://www.abdullah-ocalan.com	85.214.134.176	Turkish	Books, photos, movies, press releases and life story of Abdullah Ocalan (Books are available in different languages such as Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Italian, English, German, Russian, Greek, Farsi)	none	Germany	No	Yes
8	http://www.rojaciwan.com	87.98.241.167	Kurdish Turkish	Discussion Forum, News blog,	1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24, 44, 46	Germany	No	Yes
9	http://www.pirtuk.info/(www.mezopotamyayinevi.info)	85.13.141.185	Kurdish Turkish English German	Mesopotamia Publishing House	None	Germany	No	Yes
10	http://www.denge-mezopotamya.com/	213.163.67.213	Kurdish	Kurdish Radio Channel, Music	None	Netherlands	No	Yes
11	http://www.zimanekurdi.org	85.13.139.77	Kurdish	Teaching Kurdish	8, 12, 17	Germany	No	No
12	http://www.roj.tv	94.23.0.29	Kurdish	PKK's TV channel's website	13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18	France	No	Yes
13	http://www.firatnews.org	193.138.204.110	Turkish	News Agency	None	Netherlands	No	Yes
14	http://www.azadiyawelat.com	88.249.39.3	Kurdish	Online Newspaper	None	Turkey	No	Yes
15	http://www.yeniozgurpolitik.com	85.13.143.79	Turkish Kurdish	News Agency	None	Germany	No	No

Annex C, Pro-PKK Websites

16	http://www.gundem-online.net/	85.214.134.176	Turkish	News Agency	None	Germany	No	Yes
17	http://www.mmc.tv/	212.97.132.127	Kurdish	TV channel's website (Only Information)	None	Denmark	No	No
18	http://www.diclehaber.com/	81.169.139.232	Turkish Kurdish English	News Agency	None	Germany	No	No
19	http://www.lekolin.org	213.163.67.207	Turkish	News Agency (So-Called Kurdistan Strategic research Center)	None	Germany	No	No
20	http://www.ygk-info.com	80.237.132.73	Turkish Kurdish	So-Called Veterans of Kurdistan	None	Germany	No	No
21	www.rizgari.com	67.15.60.65	Kurdish Turkish English German	News Agency	None	USA	No	No
22	http://www.cewlik.net	85.13.129.195	Turkish Kurdish	Discussion Forums, Biased News Blog, Radio	13, 14, 15, 18, 23	Germany	No	Yes
23	http://www.dozame.org (http://www.hpg-online.net/ku/)	66.150.161.141	Turkish Kurdish German English Arabic	Information on So-called Security Force's Operations	1, 2, 3, 4	USA	No	Yes
24	http://www.amigra.org	94.23.2.186	Turkish	Culture Literature and Art Publication	none	France	No	Yes
25	http://www.urmiye.org	213.157.66.4	Kurdish English Farsi Finland Turkish	Biased News	1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 45	Finland	No	Yes
26	http://www.hpg-online.net/yja_star/index.html	66.252.9.244	Turkish Arabic	Women News, Dead Terrorists News, Abdullah Ocalan News	1	USA	No	No
27	http://www.yekkom.com	85.13.138.176	German Kurdish Turkish	Germany Kurdish Association	10, 14, 15, 17	Germany	No	No
28	http://www.kongrakurdistan.net	213.163.67.216	Kurdish Turkish French English	So-Called Kurdistan National Congress	none	Netherlands	No	No
29	http://www.rojhelat.nu	83.168.226.126	Kurdish English Farsi	Biased News	none	Sweden	No	Yes
30	http://www.kurdmedia.com	213.171.218.62	English	News Agency (News on Kurds, biased news about PKK)	13	UK	No	Yes
31	http://www.kurdistanpost.tk/	209.172.59.196	English	News Agency (News on Kurds, biased news about PKK)	none	Canada	No	Yes

Annex C, Pro-PKK Websites

3 2	http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com/	217.115.142.100	English Italian German	Site of an International Campaign for Amnesty for Ocalan	12, 30, 33, 34, 35	Germany	No	Yes
3 3	http://www.khrp.org/	72.249.30.100	English	So-Called Kurdish Human Rights Project	none	UK	No	Yes
3 4	http://www.kurdish-info.eu/	213.163.67.211	English French German Italian Kurdish Turkish	Biased News	none	Netherlands	No	Yes
3 5	http://kurdistanobserver.com/	66.113.136.225	English	Biased News	none	USA	No	No
3 6	http://www.ozgurgundem.net/ (http://www.gundem-online.net/)	85.214.134.176	Turkish	News Agency	none	Germany	No	Yes
3 7	http://www.metv.dk/	212.242.40.82	Kurdish Danish English	Mezopotamya TV Channel	14, 35, 38	Denmark	No	No
3 8	http://www.kurdistan.org/	207.155.252.12	Kurdish English	American Kurdish Information Network, Biased News	none	USA	No	Yes
3 9	http://www.knc.org.uk/	194.154.164.100	English	So-Called Kurdistan National Congress	none	UK	No	Yes
4 0	http://piak.org/	83.168.226.126	Farsi Arabic English	PKK's Iranian branch	none	Denmark	No	Yes
4 1	http://www.sehid.com	213.163.67.215	Turkish	Biographies of Dead Terrorists, Terrorist Memories	none	Netherlands	No	Yes
4 2	http://www.kurder.dk	62.141.42.12	English Turkish German	Biased News, Radio	12, 16	Germany	No	Yes
4 3	http://www.konkurd.org/tr/	87.98.150.91	Kurdish English German French Turkish	Association of Kurdish Organizations in Europe	none	France	No	No
4 4	http://www.welatparez.com (http://www.bilgin.nu)	195.35.83.97	Turkish English	Site of a Faction From PKK, Propaganda News	none	Sweden	No	Yes
4 5	www.kurdlander.com	74.220.215.76	English	Music, Videos, Games	8	USA	Yes	Yes
4 6	http://www.cmg-team.com	209.212.149.22	Turkish	Hacker Group's Site (Cyber Median's Guerillas)	none	USA	No	Yes
4 7	http://rastibini.blogspot.com	209.85.135.191	English	Biased News Blog	2, 12, 14, 15, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 40, 48	USA	No	Yes
4 8	http://kurdishrights.org/	174.143.252.196	English	Alliance for Kurdish Rights	none	USA	No	Yes

Annex C, Pro-PKK Websites

49	www.bizekalan.net/19863_guncel_online_proxy_servisi.html	195.47.247.117	Turkish Kurdish	Blog Service	1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 36, 43, 46, 52, 53, 54, 55	Denmark	No	Yes
50	http://devrimcitavir.net	81.169.145.65	Turkish	News Page against Imperialism and Fascism (It is not directly for PKK but it contains propaganda news about PKK)	7, 8, 15, 21, 36, 38, 51	Germany	No	Yes
51	http://www.nasname.com/	88.80.6.198	Turkish Kurdish	Biased News	25, 46	Sweden	No	No
52	http://www.fermandar.com/	195.47.247.138	Turkish Kurdish	Writings about PKK and Dead Terrorist Mahsum Korkmaz	3, 13, 46	Denmark	No	Yes
53	http://mazlumdogan.com/	81.169.145.68	Turkish	Writings about Dead Terrorist Mazlum Dogan	12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 36	Germany	No	Yes
54	http://www.jiyanboard.org/	85.13.131.225	Turkish English	Biased News and Blog	1, 8, 46, 49, 57	Germany	No	Yes
55	http://www.heval.org/	94.23.26.43	Turkish Kurdish	Kurdish Music Video	56	France	No	No
56	www.radyowelat.com	94.23.237.183	Turkish	Kurdish Music Video	None	France	No	No
57	http://www.evindarim.org	213.163.67.212	Turkish	Biased News, Music, Blog	12, 15, 46, 54	Netherlands	No	Yes
58	http://www.kurdishcenter.ru/	91.121.61.37	Kurdish	Biased News and Blog	1, 2, 8, 12, 14, 17	France	No	Yes
59	www.awazaciwana.com/	85.13.134.118	Turkish Kurdish	Biased News, Radio and Blog	3, 13, 20, 41, 46, 61	Germany	No	Yes
60	http://dengemed.net	81.169.178.6	Turkish Kurdish English French German	Biased News, Radio, Video, and Blog	12, 13, 33	Germany	No	Yes
61	http://www.ozgurtutsak.com	85.13.131.225	Turkish	Radio	59	Germany	No	No
62	http://ocalan-books.com	217.115.142.100	English	Commercial of Abdullah Ocalan's Books	32	Germany	No	No
63	www.hebunname.com/?	195.47.247.159	Turkish English	Blog Service	4, 10, 12, 17	Denmark	No	Yes
64	www.awazagel.com	87.106.249.42	Turkish	News Agency	1, 4, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16,	Germany	No	Yes

No.	Web Address
1	http://www.bps-online.com
2	http://www.pds-online.net
3	http://www.nid-online.com
4	http://www.girls.tv
5	http://www.pds-online.net/Komnet/index_kon42.html
6	http://www.pds-online.net/vocokurman/tiki/index.html
7	http://www.abdullahocalan.com
8	http://www.reaction.com
9	http://www.pmrk.info /www.mazopotanyayntroo.info
10	http://www.dango-mazopotanya.com/
11	http://www.sirmandard.org
12	http://www.net.tv
13	http://www.firanova.org
14	http://www.analyzovet.at.com
15	http://www.yenigortutika.com
16	http://www.garden-online.net/
17	www.rizgin.com
18	http://www.cerelik.net
19	http://www.doornie.org (http://www.bps-online.net/kn)
20	http://www.amiga.org
21	http://www.univis.org
22	http://www.bps-online.net/yic_star/index.html
23	http://www.ydkorn.com
24	http://www.kongardian.net
25	http://www.colbat.org
26	http://www.kordsocka.com
27	http://www.kordasopst.de
28	http://www.freshkoffe-ecolan.com/
29	http://www.klap.org
30	http://www.kordakrills.org
31	http://kordascherret.com/
32	http://www.orggarden.net(http://www.garden-online.net/)
33	http://www.mars.dk
34	http://www.kordam.org
35	http://www.kordam.org.uk/
36	http://www.trink.org
37	http://www.wild.com
38	http://www.kurtin.dk
39	http://www.korkind.org/tr
40	http://www.votaperez.com (http://www.blain.net)
41	www.kordack.com
42	http://www.cris-tiam.com
43	http://maithia.blogspot.com
44	http://kordakrilla.org
45	www.kordatan.net/1985-guest_online_proxy_servis.html
46	http://dorimictavr.net
47	http://www.natania.com/
48	http://www.fernandez.com/
49	http://maafindagan.com/
50	http://www.lyrboard.org/
51	http://www.beval.org/
52	www.radysvetar.com
53	www.kordakrill.com
54	http://www.majestad.net
55	http://www.majestad.net
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97	http://www.kordakrill.com
98	http://www.kordakrill.com
99	http://www.kordakrill.com
100	http://www.kordakrill.com

Annex E, The Hierarchical Ranking of Degree Centrality Scores

Data treated as symmetric;

	1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
8 X8	25.000	39.683	0.072
49 X49	23.000	36.508	0.066
25 X25	21.000	33.333	0.061
12 X12	18.000	28.571	0.052
1 X1	16.000	25.397	0.046
47 X47	12.000	19.048	0.035
14 X14	11.000	17.460	0.032
15 X15	11.000	17.460	0.032
2 X2	10.000	15.873	0.029
13 X13	10.000	15.873	0.029
3 X3	9.000	14.286	0.026
32 X32	8.000	12.698	0.023
50 X50	7.000	11.111	0.020
46 X46	7.000	11.111	0.020
53 X53	7.000	11.111	0.020
64 X64	7.000	11.111	0.020
17 X17	7.000	11.111	0.020
58 X58	6.000	9.524	0.017
27 X27	6.000	9.524	0.017
4 X4	6.000	9.524	0.017
59 X59	6.000	9.524	0.017
18 X18	6.000	9.524	0.017
7 X7	6.000	9.524	0.017
36 X36	5.000	7.937	0.014
23 X23	5.000	7.937	0.014
22 X22	5.000	7.937	0.014
54 X54	5.000	7.937	0.014
10 X10	5.000	7.937	0.014
37 X37	4.000	6.349	0.012
57 X57	4.000	6.349	0.012
35 X35	4.000	6.349	0.012
52 X52	4.000	6.349	0.012
63 X63	4.000	6.349	0.012
16 X16	4.000	6.349	0.012
41 X41	3.000	4.762	0.009
60 X60	3.000	4.762	0.009
33 X33	3.000	4.762	0.009
30 X30	3.000	4.762	0.009
51 X51	3.000	4.762	0.009
20 X20	3.000	4.762	0.009
11 X11	3.000	4.762	0.009
42 X42	2.000	3.175	0.006
45 X45	2.000	3.175	0.006
40 X40	2.000	3.175	0.006
9 X9	2.000	3.175	0.006
38 X38	2.000	3.175	0.006
55 X55	2.000	3.175	0.006
28 X28	2.000	3.175	0.006
19 X19	2.000	3.175	0.006
26 X26	2.000	3.175	0.006
5 X5	1.000	1.587	0.003
24 X24	1.000	1.587	0.003
29 X29	1.000	1.587	0.003
6 X6	1.000	1.587	0.003
31 X31	1.000	1.587	0.003
56 X56	1.000	1.587	0.003
21 X21	1.000	1.587	0.003
34 X34	1.000	1.587	0.003
43 X43	1.000	1.587	0.003
44 X44	1.000	1.587	0.003
61 X61	1.000	1.587	0.003
62 X62	1.000	1.587	0.003
48 X48	1.000	1.587	0.003
39 X39	0.000	0.000	0.000

Descriptive Statistics;

	1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1 Mean	5.406	8.581	0.016
2 Std Dev	5.346	8.486	0.015
3 Sum	346.000	549.206	1.000
4 Variance	28.585	72.021	0.000
5 SSQ	3700.000	9322.247	0.031
6 MCSSQ	1829.438	4609.316	0.015
7 Euc Norm	60.828	96.552	0.176
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	25.000	39.683	0.072

Network Centralization = 32.10%
Heterogeneity = 3.09%. Normalized = 1.55%

Data treated as asymmetric;


	1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
49 X49	23.000	1.000	36.508	1.587
25 X25	20.000	1.000	31.746	1.587
8 X8	19.000	8.000	30.159	12.698
47 X47	11.000	1.000	17.460	1.587
1 X1	11.000	10.000	17.460	15.873
50 X50	7.000	0.000	11.111	0.000
64 X64	7.000	0.000	11.111	0.000
58 X58	6.000	0.000	9.524	0.000
59 X59	6.000	1.000	9.524	1.587
12 X12	6.000	12.000	9.524	19.048
53 X53	6.000	1.000	9.524	1.587
22 X22	5.000	0.000	7.937	0.000
54 X54	5.000	2.000	7.937	3.175
32 X32	5.000	3.000	7.937	4.762
27 X27	4.000	2.000	6.349	3.175
23 X23	4.000	2.000	6.349	3.175
57 X57	4.000	1.000	6.349	1.587
2 X2	4.000	8.000	6.349	12.698
63 X63	4.000	0.000	6.349	0.000
52 X52	3.000	1.000	4.762	1.587
37 X37	3.000	1.000	4.762	1.587
60 X60	3.000	0.000	4.762	0.000
3 X3	3.000	7.000	4.762	11.111
11 X11	3.000	1.000	4.762	1.587
42 X42	2.000	0.000	3.175	0.000
51 X51	2.000	1.000	3.175	1.587
30 X30	1.000	2.000	1.587	3.175
4 X4	1.000	6.000	1.587	9.524
45 X45	1.000	1.000	1.587	1.587
62 X62	1.000	0.000	1.587	0.000
61 X61	1.000	1.000	1.587	1.587
26 X26	1.000	2.000	1.587	3.175
55 X55	1.000	1.000	1.587	1.587
24 X24	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
33 X33	0.000	3.000	0.000	4.762
36 X36	0.000	5.000	0.000	7.937
5 X5	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
6 X6	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
7 X7	0.000	6.000	0.000	9.524
40 X40	0.000	2.000	0.000	3.175
9 X9	0.000	2.000	0.000	3.175
34 X34	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
35 X35	0.000	4.000	0.000	6.349
44 X44	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
13 X13	0.000	10.000	0.000	15.873
14 X14	0.000	11.000	0.000	17.460
15 X15	0.000	11.000	0.000	17.460
16 X16	0.000	4.000	0.000	6.349
17 X17	0.000	7.000	0.000	11.111
18 X18	0.000	6.000	0.000	9.524
19 X19	0.000	2.000	0.000	3.175
20 X20	0.000	3.000	0.000	4.762
21 X21	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
38 X38	0.000	2.000	0.000	3.175
39 X39	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
56 X56	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
41 X41	0.000	3.000	0.000	4.762
10 X10	0.000	5.000	0.000	7.937
43 X43	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
28 X28	0.000	2.000	0.000	3.175
29 X29	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
46 X46	0.000	7.000	0.000	11.111
31 X31	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587
48 X48	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.587

Descriptive Statistics;

	1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
1 Mean	2.859	2.859	4.539	4.539
2 Std Dev	4.786	3.132	7.596	4.971
3 Sum	183.000	183.000	290.476	290.476
4 Variance	22.902	9.808	57.702	24.712
5 SSQ	1989.000	1151.000	5011.338	2899.975
6 MCSSQ	1465.734	627.734	3692.956	1581.593
7 Euc Norm	44.598	33.926	70.791	53.851
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	23.000	12.000	36.508	19.048

Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 32.477%

Annex F, Degree Centrality Diagram of the Network
(Multi-Dimensional Scaling Graph of PKK Website Network)



Annex G, The Hierarchical Ranking of Betweenness Scores

Betweenness Scores;


	1	2
	Betweenness	nBetweenness
1 X1	443.000	11.342
8 X8	283.167	7.250
2 X2	173.000	4.429
3 X3	101.500	2.599
47 X47	92.917	2.379
32 X32	80.917	2.072
12 X12	53.250	1.363
25 X25	49.833	1.276
59 X59	36.000	0.922
54 X54	36.000	0.922
23 X23	31.000	0.794
4 X4	27.000	0.691
49 X49	24.167	0.619
51 X51	10.333	0.265
11 X11	4.083	0.105
55 X55	3.000	0.077
37 X37	2.000	0.051
30 X30	1.667	0.043
57 X57	0.667	0.017
27 X27	0.500	0.013
10 X10	0.000	0.000
18 X18	0.000	0.000
20 X20	0.000	0.000
6 X6	0.000	0.000
24 X24	0.000	0.000
26 X26	0.000	0.000
13 X13	0.000	0.000
28 X28	0.000	0.000
21 X21	0.000	0.000
14 X14	0.000	0.000
29 X29	0.000	0.000
16 X16	0.000	0.000
33 X33	0.000	0.000
34 X34	0.000	0.000
31 X31	0.000	0.000
36 X36	0.000	0.000
5 X5	0.000	0.000
38 X38	0.000	0.000
7 X7	0.000	0.000
40 X40	0.000	0.000
9 X9	0.000	0.000
42 X42	0.000	0.000
35 X35	0.000	0.000
44 X44	0.000	0.000
45 X45	0.000	0.000
46 X46	0.000	0.000
15 X15	0.000	0.000
48 X48	0.000	0.000
17 X17	0.000	0.000
50 X50	0.000	0.000
19 X19	0.000	0.000
52 X52	0.000	0.000
53 X53	0.000	0.000
22 X22	0.000	0.000
39 X39	0.000	0.000
56 X56	0.000	0.000
41 X41	0.000	0.000
58 X58	0.000	0.000
43 X43	0.000	0.000
60 X60	0.000	0.000
61 X61	0.000	0.000
62 X62	0.000	0.000
63 X63	0.000	0.000
64 X64	0.000	0.000

Descriptive Statistics;

	1	2
	Betweenness	nBetweenness
1 Mean	22.719	0.582
2 Std Dev	69.500	1.779
3 Sum	1454.000	37.225
4 Variance	4830.257	3.166
5 SSQ	342169.500	224.273
6 MCSSQ	309136.438	202.622
7 Euc Norm	584.953	14.976
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	443.000	11.342

Network Centralization Index = 10.93%

Annex H, Betweenness Centrality Network Diagram



Annex I, The Closeness Centrality Scores

Closeness Centrality Measures;

	1 inFarness	2 outFarness	3 inCloseness	4 outCloseness
14 X14	2116.000	4032.000	2.977	1.563
13 X13	2170.000	4032.000	2.903	1.563
15 X15	2178.000	4032.000	2.893	1.563
17 X17	2198.000	4032.000	2.866	1.563
18 X18	2246.000	4032.000	2.805	1.563
16 X16	2250.000	4032.000	2.800	1.563
12 X12	2303.000	3654.000	2.736	1.724
35 X35	2448.000	4032.000	2.574	1.563
33 X33	2453.000	4032.000	2.568	1.563
30 X30	2512.000	3969.000	2.508	1.587
34 X34	2517.000	4032.000	2.503	1.563
32 X32	2556.000	3345.000	2.465	1.883
10 X10	2560.000	4032.000	2.461	1.563
36 X36	2567.000	4032.000	2.454	1.563
7 X7	2605.000	4032.000	2.418	1.563
41 X41	2611.000	4032.000	2.413	1.563
46 X46	2612.000	4032.000	2.412	1.563
40 X40	2619.000	4032.000	2.405	1.563
20 X20	2621.000	4032.000	2.404	1.563
5 X5	2622.000	4032.000	2.403	1.563
6 X6	2622.000	4032.000	2.403	1.563
19 X19	2629.000	4032.000	2.396	1.563
9 X9	2629.000	4032.000	2.396	1.563
44 X44	2630.000	4032.000	2.395	1.563
24 X24	2630.000	4032.000	2.395	1.563
28 X28	2636.000	4032.000	2.390	1.563
48 X48	2641.000	4032.000	2.385	1.563
1 X1	2662.000	1852.000	2.367	3.402
2 X2	2663.000	1881.000	2.366	3.349
3 X3	2664.000	1911.000	2.365	3.297
8 X8	2671.000	1850.000	2.359	3.405
4 X4	2673.000	1886.000	2.357	3.340
23 X23	2681.000	1881.000	2.350	3.349
26 X26	2681.000	1886.000	2.350	3.340
47 X47	2682.000	1873.000	2.349	3.364
11 X11	2692.000	1881.000	2.340	3.349
27 X27	3660.000	3780.000	1.721	1.667
38 X38	3783.000	4032.000	1.665	1.563
56 X56	3786.000	4032.000	1.664	1.563
53 X53	3846.000	3530.000	1.638	1.785
29 X29	3846.000	4032.000	1.638	1.563
37 X37	3846.000	3843.000	1.638	1.639
55 X55	3846.000	3969.000	1.638	1.587
45 X45	3846.000	1822.000	1.638	3.458
43 X43	3846.000	4032.000	1.638	1.563
31 X31	3846.000	4032.000	1.638	1.563
52 X52	3846.000	1875.000	1.638	3.360
54 X54	3906.000	1308.000	1.613	4.817
25 X25	3907.000	1411.000	1.612	4.465
49 X49	3907.000	1287.000	1.612	4.895
57 X57	3907.000	1341.000	1.612	4.698
51 X51	3969.000	1388.000	1.587	4.539
59 X59	3969.000	1807.000	1.587	3.486
21 X21	3969.000	4032.000	1.587	1.563
61 X61	3969.000	1843.000	1.587	3.418
42 X42	4032.000	3596.000	1.563	1.752
50 X50	4032.000	1258.000	1.563	5.008
22 X22	4032.000	1841.000	1.563	3.422
58 X58	4032.000	1801.000	1.563	3.498
60 X60	4032.000	3533.000	1.563	1.783
39 X39	4032.000	4032.000	1.563	1.563
62 X62	4032.000	3293.000	1.563	1.913
63 X63	4032.000	1838.000	1.563	3.428
64 X64	4032.000	1813.000	1.563	3.475

Statistics;

	1 inFarness	2 outFarness	3 inCloseness	4 outCloseness
1 Mean	3141.219	3141.219	2.109	2.374
2 Std Dev	702.714	1086.040	0.464	1.091
3 Sum	201038.000	201038.000	134.949	151.921
4 Variance	493807.313	1179483.625	0.215	1.191
5 SSQ	663108032.000	706991296.000	298.328	436.827
6 MCSSQ	31603668.000	75486952.000	13.779	76.201
7 Euc Norm	25750.883	26589.309	17.272	20.900
8 Minimum	2116.000	1258.000	1.563	1.563
9 Maximum	4032.000	4032.000	2.977	5.008

Annex J, Closeness Centrality Network Diagram

