GEOPOLITICS AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

GEOPOLITICS AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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This study seeks to examine the main theories and theorists of geopolitical imagining and argue for an intrinsic relation between traditional geopolitics and the development of international relations both in theory and practice. By doing so the study aims to pursue an assessment of the insights of critical geopolitics, as reflected in the works of John Agnew, Geraróid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal), Simon Dalby, Klaus Dodds and others, for the theory of IR, more specifically its dominant paradigm realism. The aim of this study, in other words, is to identify and describe the geopolitical assumptions that have led IR theory to turn out to be 'realist'. In this respect, throughout the work similarities with regard to the basic premises of the two fields, parallel ways of thinking, how visualizations and perceptions shaped the world and how the world in return shaped them as well as the emergence of "paradigmatic blindspots" will be handled in an effort to put forth an answer to the question: "Why

do IR theory books not contain any chapters on traditional and critical geopolitics? And why is it that they should?”

Keywords: Geopolitics, Critical Geopolitics, International Relations Theory, Realism

ÖZ

JEOPOLİTİK VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ÇALIŞMALARI

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Doktora, Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışmanın amacı jeopolitik tahayyülün temel varsayımları ile teorisyenlerini incelemek ve "jeopolitik tahayyül" ile hem pratik hem de teorik manada "Uluslararası İlişkiler" arasındaki ilişkiyi ele almaktır. Bu itibarla çalışma, John Agnew, Geraróid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal), Simon Dalby gibi yazarların çalışmalarında ortaya konulan eleştirel jeopolitiğin Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi ve onun temel paradigması olan realizme getirebileceği katkıların değerlendirilmesini hedeflemektedir. Bir diğer deyişle bu çalışmanın amacı, Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisini 'realist' yapan coğrafi varsayımların incelenmesi ve tespitidir. Bu çerçevede çalışma boyunca, iki alandaki benzer dayanak noktaları ve parallel düşünce biçimleri ele alınacak; algılamaların dünyayı, dünyanın da algılamaları nasıl etkilediği ve "paradigmatik kör noktaların" nasıl oluştuğu ortaya konulmaya çalışılacak ve "Niçin

Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi kitaplarında geleneksel ya da eleştirel jeopolitiğe atıf yok; ve niçin olmalı?" sorusu yanıtlanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jeopolitik, Eleştirel Jeopolitik, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Realizm

To Vecdi and Özgür

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As an International Relations (IR) student I never had any particular interest in geopolitics or any theory relating to it. Whether classical or contemporary, geopolitical theories always struck me as being intellectually impoverished, strongly biased toward the interests of one group or another, and as being of at best secondary importance. They were, in my opinion, nothing more than the attempts of certain authors to become popular and to write sellable books. In other words I treated them as tabloid theories.

It was when I signed up for a lecture entitled "The Politics of Global Space" during my doctoral program that my thoughts on the matter began to change. In this class students read the work of authors from the golden age of geopolitics as well as scholars from the field of critical geopolitics. These readings piqued my interest in geographical studies and whetted my geopolitical appetite. To my surprise it was quite exciting to read the passionate and ambitious nineteenth and early twentieth century geopolitical texts as well as the books of scholars belonging to the then newly emerging field of critical geopolitics. It was this experience that led me to choose geopolitics as the topic of my PhD thesis, though by the time I arrived at this decision I still lacked a precise research question.

As a long time lover of IR theory, and after having read and re-read the corpus of work on geopolitical theory, political geography, cartography and critical geopolitics, I decided that I would work to link these two areas of study, to bridge the poorly integrated fields of IR theory and geopolitics. The more I read on the subject of geopolitics the more important it became for me. And the more important it became for me the more I noticed its absence in mainstream IR literature.

One of the most well known and widely used textbooks regarding IR theory and its development is a book edited by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater. At some stage of my research I felt a need to check the new editions of the book. I knew that this book was being updated to keep it in step with the developments in the field, and thought that the editors might have added a new chapter on the subject of geopolitics. My hopes were disappointed. Scanning the literature on IR theory and critical geopolitics I came to realize that the chapter missing from the Burchill and Linklater did not appear in any other basic textbook either. The link between IR theory and critical or traditional geopolitics has been so neglected that no basic text related to IR theory has seen fit to address the subject.

For me the field of geopolitics, both in traditional and critical senses, was so relevant, and its importance regarding both the history and present of IR theory so was obvious, that I was surprised that no work had been done regarding the subject. How could IR theory textbooks not cover such a critical area of theoretical inquiry? And

that is how I arrived at my research question: “Why do IR theory books not contain any chapters on traditional and critical geopolitics? And why is it that they should?”

Geopolitics was born in the late nineteenth century and disappeared from universities with the end of the Second World War. IR as a separate academic discipline was born during the interwar period. Despite the fact that both IR and geopolitics deal with common issues and share many common assumptions, IR theory never directly mentions geopolitics or its prominent figures. This was due, at first, to the idealist character of American IR when it emerged during the interwar period. After the Second World War realists came to the fore. In place of the idealist worldview realists viewed IR as power politics and competition between self-interested states in an anarchical international system. It is ironic that the Second World War marked the victory of realism and at the same time loss of geopolitics. Just like the term race, geopolitics was erased from academic literature in accordance with its close association with Nazism.

I believe that mainstream IR theories cannot be properly understood or analyzed without addressing the theories of geopolitics that abounded and informed them during the period of their genesis. The fields of geopolitics and political geography were central to political thought long before IR grew into its own as a separate academic discipline in the aftermath of the First World War. Classical geopolitical theories, linking history and geography, were part of the wellspring out of which

realist approaches to IR arose. Any history of IR that fails to address the links between classical geopolitics and realist theories of IR thus remains fundamentally flawed, historically speaking. Furthermore, this ignorance of the background of the IR theories prevalent today cannot help but hamper efforts to critically assess these theories and their fruits. Thus a failure to address the bearing of geopolitics on IR poses a problem on two fronts, making for both bad history and for bad theory.

This thesis constitutes my attempt to highlight the links between mainstream IR theory and traditional and critical geopolitics and to push for a dialogue between the two fields.

Many might argue that classical geopolitics, in contrast to classical realist perspectives on IR, has nothing new to say. I would argue that although it may well not have anything new to say, there is much that it has said over the course of its life. And what it has said has significantly affected the framework of practice upon which IR was built in the twentieth century. The study of the field of geopolitics is thus legitimate, if only for the purposes of uncovering its historical importance and the effects it has had upon the realist theories of IR that abound today.

"In a world where there is much to know, there are also many ways of knowing."[1] In this thesis, my aim is to display the ways in which traditional geopolitical theorists viewed the world and how "the way they knew the world" has affected the way we understand the world today.

In an effort to reveal the geographical assumptions that have led mainstream IR theory to turn out to be "realist" I will focus on the deep similarities between the two fields, their basic assumptions and methodological and theoretical parallels. I will argue that their shared visualizations and perceptions worked to shape the world, and that the world in turn worked to shape them.

The second chapter of this study will constitute a review of classical geopolitics and important geopolitical theorists, such as Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, Rudolf Kjellen, and Karl Haushofer. The second chapter thus will focus on the rise and fall of geopolitics in the academy, offering an historical examination of the field of geopolitics and providing a glimpse of geopolitical thinking from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War. These will establish a foundation for the discussions in the following chapters.

The third and fourth chapters will cover two fundamental concerns of critical geopolitics: the relationship of geopolitical discourse with hegemony and

[1] Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, Edinburg: Pearson Education Limited, 2000, p. 30.

mapmaking. I will argue that these play a crucial role in shaping the theories we use to analyze the world and thus in some measure shape our world view. I will moreover argue that critical geopolitics has the potential to offer a dialogue between political geography and IR theory.

The fifth chapter will address the development of IR as a separate academic discipline with a focus on realism, its central theory. Following this I will discuss the commonalities between the two fields regarding their basic assumptions, and revisit the relation between geopolitical visualization/imagination and the development of international relations in theory and practice. I should note that in the third and fifth chapters I will draw, in part, from my research in my master thesis "Ethnicity and Identity in International Relations," dated 2003.

Finally, in the concluding chapter I will offer an answer to my research question, "Why do IR theory books not contain any chapters on traditional and geopolitics? And why is it that they should?"

It is important to note that this study does not aim to promote geopolitics or to reduce realism to geopolitics. It should also be noted, as mentioned above, that geopolitics and mainstream IR theory will be the central focus of this study. Thus certain insights of critical geopolitics and post-positivist IR theories, both fecund areas of inquiry, will be handled only sparingly.

What follows is my account of the importance of bridging the fields of traditional and critical geopolitics and IR, and my own modest attempt to do so.

CHAPTER II

GEOPOLITICS

2.1. Introduction

> *Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a third world war as the theory of "geopolitics."*[2]

The period between the end of the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War might be defined as the golden era of "classical geopolitics" both in terms of theory and practice. From the nineteenth century onwards, as the age of geographical discovery drew to a close and global political rivalry was on the rise, all of the major rival powers—Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and the USA—had prominent geopolitical theorists who constructed theories to enhance or at least to preserve the power of their countries. These geopolitical theorists were both academics and statesmen and their theories were to a large extent adopted by the decision makers of their home states. Their theories thus played an important role in the relations among the great powers of the age.

[2] Charles Clover, "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 78, March/April 1999, p. 9.

Although the term geopolitics was only coined in 1899, by Rudolf Kjellen, the field of geopolitics as an intellectual tradition and an expression of state interest and identity politics[3] dates back further to the universities, geographical institutes, and centers of learning in the rival empires of the late nineteenth century.[4] This was a period that saw the growth of imperialist institutions and associations that tried to legitimize colonial expansionism. It was within this context that geography was elevated to a "science" and treated as a scientific discipline. Intellectuals writing and thinking on the subject of the influence of geography on state and foreign policy emerged from this context. The different intellectuals writing in this field over the years who will be analyzed in the following pages include: Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Karl Haushofer, Nicholas Spykman, and George Kennan, as well as some others.

Since its formal inception as a concept in 1899, "geopolitics has enjoyed a contested and controversial intellectual history."[5] It is thus not an easy attempt to outline the intellectual history of geopolitical thinking. As geographer Dodds puts it:

> Over the last hundred years, many attempts have been made to chart the complex history of geopolitics, but few have managed to capture the historical and political complexities of the field. Throughout the twentieth

[3] Stefano Guzzini, "Self-fulfilling geopolitics? Or: The Social Production of Foreign Policy Expertise in Europe," 15 June 2010, p. 17, www.ciaonet.org.

[4] Gerard Toal, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 21.

[5] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 31.

> century, academic work on geopolitics has often been conflicting, contradictory and confusing because of the variety of approaches brought to the historical examination of this intellectual field and contemporary analyses of world politics.[6]

The theories generated by the founding scholars/statesmen constitute what is today labeled as classical or traditional geopolitics. Although it is not possible to define traditional geopolitics as a unitary and coherent approach, one may provide something of a general outline of the field, as all geopolitical "fathers" built their theories upon certain shared assumptions and world outlook.

Before discussing these common assumptions and worldviews, this chapter will review the intellectual history of traditional geopolitics. I will briefly outline what is meant by "traditional geopolitics" by summarizing the theories of the founding fathers, with reference to their context and personal background as necessary.

Following this brief introduction I will discuss the problem of definition. After this I will continue on to survey "European geopolitics," as the field was first "invented" and developed within Europe. Having surveyed the foundations of the field, the subsequent sections will address "US Geopolitics" and "Post-Cold War geopolitics" respectively.

[6] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 31.

2.2.Definition of the Term

Before attempting to define what geopolitics is, it would be prudent to say a few words on geography. The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines geography as "the study of the countries of the world and of the seas, rivers, towns etc.... on the Earth's surface." According to the Dictionary of Human Geography, geography "may now [in the twentieth century] be viewed as the study of the earth's surface as the *environment* and *space* within which human beings live. Geography is therefore concerned with the structure and interaction of two major systems—the ecological system that links human beings to their environment and the spatial system that links some area of the earth's surface with another."[7] According to the Encyclopedia Britannica geography is the "science of the Earth's surface, which describes and analyzes the spatial variations in physical, biological, and human phenomena that occur on the surface of the globe and treats their interrelationships and their significant regional patterns," whose essential elements are: spatial analysis with an emphasis on location, ecological analysis with an emphasis on people and their relationship with the environment, and regional analysis with an emphasis on region building. [8]

[7] Brian Goodall, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 189-190.

[8] "Geography," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/ EB checked/topic /229637/geography.

German geographers Carl Ritter (1779-1859) and his senior Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) are considered to be the founders of modern geographical science. Von Humboldt's approach was more related to physical geography, whereas Ritter, more a historian than a geographer, wrote what has come to be known as a geographical interpretation of history.[9] The ideas of both geographers, especially those of Ritter, deeply influenced geographical research and thinking everywhere, though they perhaps had the deepest influence on German theoreticians.

Geography is a sound science. Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé's famous motto "you cannot argue with geography" suggests that geography concerns the way things are, not the way we imagine or wish them to be, and thus it is as fundamental as any other natural science. The Earth, after all, does revolve around the sun. This is not just Galileo's point of view. In other words, as Nicholas Spykman puts it, geography "does not argue, it simply is."[10] In the final analysis, geographical knowledge/geosophy[11] is universal among human beings.[12]

Geography as a discipline has many branches: agricultural geography, anthropogeography, cultural geography, economic geography, electoral geography,

[9] "Carl Ritter," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/ topic/ 504667/Carl-Ritter.

[10] Nicholas Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy, II," *American Political Science Review*, No. 32, 1938, p. 236.

[11] Geosophy is a term introduced by J. K. Wright for the study of geographical knowledge.

[12] Goodall, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 191.

historical geography, human geography, industrial geography, Marxist geography, medical geography, macrogeography, microgeography, social geography, rural geography, urban geography, welfare geography, and finally political geography.

Political geography developed as a branch of the discipline of geography and was in common in use until the invention of "geopolitics" in 1899. Political geography argued that states' politics emanated from their geography. As territory is one of the constitutive elements of states, geography is essential to inter-state politics. That is why the age of discovery was sponsored by states. That is why Napoleon, who argued that every state pursues the politics of its own geography,[13] founded the first chair of geography at the Sorbonne University. According to the Dictionary of Human Geography, political geography is:

> [t]he study of the effects of political actions on human geography, involving the spatial analysis of human phenomena. Traditionally political geography was concerned with the study of states—their groupings and global relations (geopolitics) and their morphological characteristics, i.e. their frontiers and boundaries. In the last twenty years increasing interest has been shown in smaller political divisions, i.e. those within states, involving an appreciation of the interaction between political processes and spatial organization, e.g. the nature and consequences of decision-making by urban government, the relationship between public policy and resource development, the geography of public finance and electoral geography.[14]

[13] Alexandre Defay, *Jeopolitik*, Ankara: Dost, 2005, p. 13.

[14] Goodall, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 362.

There are many approaches to political geography. What unites all of them is the basic tenet that understanding geography is fundamental to understanding politics.[15]

If geography is the study of the Earth and International Relations is the study of the World, I would argue that geopolitics is the study of "turning the Earth into the World." Geopolitics, like political geography, deals with concepts such as power, politics, and policy, and space, place, and territory, and embraces an innumerable multitude of interactions within these various fields.[16] According to the Penguin Dictionary of Human Geography the distinction between political geography and geopolitics is clear: "geopolitics is concerned with the spatial *requirements* of a state, while political geography examines only its spatial *conditions*."[17]

So what is geopolitics? According to the Encyclopedia Britannica geopolitics is the "analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations,"[18] whereas the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines

[15] Martin Jones, Rhys Jones and Michael Woods, *An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics*, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 170.

[16] Jones et. al., *An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics*, p. 170

[17] Goodall, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, p. 191.

[18] "Geopolitics," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http:/ /www.britannica.com/EB checked/topic /229932/ geopolitics.

geopolitics as "the study of the effect of a country's position, population, etc. on its politics."[19]

The inventor of the term, Kjellen, defined it as "the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space."[20] Notable geopolitical theorist Haushofer, on the other hand, defined geopolitics as an ambitious science: "geopolitics is the new national science of the state (…) a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography."[21] Thus, unlike geography or political geography, geopolitics has always had a national bias. As Taylor puts it, "in the case of geopolitics, it has been very easy to identify the nationality of an author from the content of his or her writings."[22] In relation to this outlook another definition of geopolitics provided by Hagan is that "geopolitics is a contemporary rationalization of power politics."[23]

[19] *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, Essex: Longman, p. 433.

[20] Werner J. Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1943, p. 57.

[21] Peter J. Taylor, "Political Geography", Longman, Third Edition, 1993, quoted in Leonhardt van Efferink, "Definition of Geopolitics," January 2009, http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Efferink_van_Leonhardt_The_Definition_of_Geopolitics_Classicial_French_Critical.html

[22] Saul Bernard Cohen, "Geopolitics of the World System", Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, quoted in Leonhardt van Efferink, "Definition of Geopolitics," January 2009, http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Efferink_van_Leonhardt_The_Definition_of_Geopolitics_Classicial_French_Critical.html

[23] Charles B. Hagan, "Geopolitics," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1942, p. 485.

One of the central points of commonality of geopolitical theorists is their endeavor to reach a correlation between geography and history. Thus, geopolitics can also be considered to be a combination of history (political processes) and geography. According to this outlook,

> [g]eopolitics is the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. (...) Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction.[24]

For Cahnman, writing in 1943, this is not only a perspective, but a "must":

> [t]he features of significant parts of the earth's surface as explored by geographers provide Geopolitics with a framework into which political events must fit themselves if they are to lead to success in the long run. To be sure, the actors upon the political scene are free to depart from such a framework now and then, but the close relationship of political events to the earth's surface will certainly make itself felt sooner or later.[25]

In geopolitical thinking, the influence of environment over the actions of men is considered to be a natural rather than an historical relationship.[26] The doctrine of environmental/geographical determinism argues that "the environment, in particular the physical environment, is the primary causal or determining factor in human

[24] Cohen, "Geopolitics of the World System," 15 June 2010, http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/PublicationEfferink_van_Leonhardt_The_Definition_of_Geopolitics_Classicial_French_Critical.html

[25] Werner J. Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1943, p. 56.

[26] Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," p. 56.

activity." Thus, political history is a laboratory from which the geopolitical theorist makes his observations.[27] In short, the analysis of history and geography was and is a common focus of geopolitical theorists. From Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder to Zbigniev Brzezinski, geopolitical theorists have sought a correlation between geography and history.

Another issue of controversy is about where and when geopolitics first started. Many scholars like Cohen argue that intellectuals such as Aristotle, Montesquieu, Kant, Hegel and Humboldt already had an understanding of geopolitics.[28] Hagan states that

> [t]he relation which subsists between man and his geographical environment has been subject to speculation at least since the time of Greeks. The answers to the question have varied from time to time as well as the emphasis which attaches to that relation. The Greeks and the Romans treated of this matter, and the subject was revived by Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century. Later Montesquieu attempted to formulate a systematic theory of the influence which environment exerted on political practices. Carl Ritter in the early part of the nineteenth century wrote a gigantic work attempting to trace the relations between man and his geographic position.[29]

According to this outlook, as explained by one of the founding fathers Haushofer, "while the theoretical foundations of Geopolitik were laid in recent times, its practical application- the instinctive sense for geopolitical possibilities, the

[27] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 485.

[28] Cohen, Saul Bernard, "Geopolitics of the World System", Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, quoted in Leonhardt van Efferink, "Definition of Geopolitics," January 2009, http://www. Exploring geopolitics.org/Publication_Efferink_van_Leonhardt_The_Definition_of_Geopolitics_Classicial_French_Critical.html.

[29] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 478.

realization of its deep influence on political development- is as old as history itself."[30] The world history is after all the story of competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space.[31]

In this respect, geopolitics, as will be discussed in detail further on, can also be regarded as a "discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power."[32] According to geographer Kearns, who might be considered as a member of the field of critical geopolitics, "geopolitics is a discourse that describes, explains, and promotes particular ways of seeing how territorial powers are formed and experienced."[33]

Geopolitics, like many other terms in the social sciences, is slippery. The overuse and thus misuse of any term inevitably results in a certain degree of ambiguity. This statement is as valid for the term "geopolitics" as it is for any other. There is no consensus on a single definition. The abovementioned definitions of geopolitics should suffice to give an idea regarding what geopolitics is about.

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[30] Karl Haushofer, "Why Geopolitik?," in Gerard Toal, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.33.

[31] Toal, *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 2

[32] Gerard Toal, quoted in Leonhardt van Efferink, "Definition of Geopolitics," January 2009, http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Efferink_van_Leonhardt_The_Definition_of_Geopolitics_Classicial_French_Critical.html

[33] Gerry Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics: Geopolitical Visions at the Dawn of the American Century," in John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, Gerard Toal eds., *A Companion to Political Geography*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 173.

I would argue that in the final analysis geopolitics is a way of seeing the world. It is first of all about the visualization of a map, about placing one's feet squarely in history and geography while keeping one's eyes upon a speculative future. Geopolitical theorists take the global stage as their starting point and apply a "God's eye view of world" [34] over the map. Every geopolitical theorist has certain priorities and generates theories to serve an end. Geopolitics is also a shorthand term[35] that has been used, overused, and misused by a wide spectrum of people- from lay people to students, journalists, academicians, and politicians. It is a semi-scientific endeavor with a national bias standing at the intersection of political geography and IR.

As Flint puts it, our goals of understanding, analyzing, and being able to critique world politics require us to work with more than one definition.[36] Thus, throughout this study, geopolitics will be assessed as an intellectual tradition, as an expression of state interest, and finally as an expression of identity politics.[37]

[34] Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 4.

[35] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 4.

[36] Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, London: Routledge, 2006, p.121.

[37] Stefano, Guzzini, "Self-fulfilling geopolitics? Or: The Social Production of Foreign Policy Expertise in Europe," 15 June 2010, www.ciaonet.org, p.14.

2.3.European Geopolitics

Regarding its intellectual tradition and history the word geopolitics immediately calls Germany to mind. For many it is a German science, produced and applied by Germans. The articles of Wickham Steed and George Kiss[38] argue that geopolitics is the production of consistent German aims and philosophy. This pervasive influence of German philosophy and German thought may be seen in everything from Fichte's "Speeches to the German Nation" to the "blood and soil" thoughts of Chancellor Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II, and from Carl Schmitt, Hegel, Schlegel, and Chamberlain to Adolf Hitler, whose lines of thought in many respects displayed an explicit consistency.

The German Empire was founded in 1871 with the political unification of the German peoples, and it soon became one of the major powers on the European continent. The empire was dissolved in 1918 after the First World War and lost much of its territory and its colonies as a result of the Versailles Treaty. In 1933 Adolf Hitler became chancellor and in 1939 Germany invaded Poland, which led to the outbreak of the Second World War. Throughout this challenging history, geopolitics served as a German "national pedagogical enterprise designed to awake people from

[38] Wickham Steed, "From Frederic the Great to Hitler: The Consistency of German Aims," *International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1938, pp. 655-681; George Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics: Recent Trends in Germany," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 32, No.4, 1942, pp. 632-645.

feeling a false security and to show them the interconnectedness of social and political phenomena upon this globe."[39]

According to Kiss, the German mindset, shaped heavily by Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, was deeply affected by Germany's defeat in the Thirty Years' War and the victories of Napoleon on German soil.[40]

> Prussian realism, issuing from the philosophy of Kant, believed in the development of all German energies and resources within Reich. The followers of Hegel, on the other hand, held that Germany's eternal mission was one of conquest and domination, and that Germany was destined to become the mistress of the continent, to inherit the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation.[41]

1871 was a relatively late date for any country to become a major world power, as by then all other rivals had already occupied the important territories of the earth. But, for Germans, as Chancellor Bismarck puts it, Germany deserved its "place in the sun."[42] For many, Germany's aspirations to become a world power were the main cause of the First World War. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles these pre-war German aspirations were developed into post-war German rights by German thinkers. Though this evolution may be traced back to the early Thirty Years' War, it

[39] Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," p. 55.

[40] Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics …," p. 632.

[41] Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics …," p. 633.

[42] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 20.

was the Treaty of Versailles that brought to it concreteness and legitimacy that it had previously lacked. After the war, The Karl Haushofer School, which aimed at proving, in scientific terms, the territorial injustice of the Versailles Treaty,[43] became very influential. During the interwar period, the German position was determined by

> the demand for restitution of German territories 'robbed' by the Versailles treaty, the demand that Germany be returned to full sovereignty as a nation alongside all others, and the demand that Germany be accorded sufficient *lebensraum* (living-space) to support its population.[44]

In the final analysis, it would not be wrong to argue that both the theory and practice of geopolitics has had a close relationship with the German spirit, German higher culture, the German language, and thus ultimately with German identity. Geopolitics, from its rise to its fall, has been a distinctly German enterprise. The three most important names of German geopolitics are Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen and Karl Haushofer, whose theories will be summarized in the following pages.

Before getting started, it is important to note that this overview will constitute but a brief and selective glimpse, considering the scale and wide scope of their writings. Keeping the main focus of this study in mind, certain aspects of these theories will be

[43] Defay, *Jeopolitik*, p. 25.

[44] Wolfgang Natter, "Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-45," in Agnew; Mitchell; Toal eds., *A Companion to Political Geography*, p. 190.

handled with an eye to their effects on the practice and theory of the IR field, which will be discussed later on.

2.3.1. Friedrich Ratzel

For many the greatest name in the sphere of political geography is German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, whose "Politische Geographie" (1897) and paper "Laws on the Spatial Growth of States" (1896) laid the concrete foundations for "geopolitik". Ratzel developed the organic theory of the state, which treated the state as a form of biological organism—territory being its body— and alleged that states behaved and lived in accordance with biological laws.

Ratzel considered geography an indispensable and indivisible part of the social sciences and argued that the whole interconnected complex of social sciences could only be developed upon a geographic foundation. In his view, the neglect of geography would make social sciences unfounded. For him, scholars ignoring the importance of geography have "built their theories in the air" [45] and the aim of geopolitics is to fill this gap. According to Ratzel geography provides all social sciences with a good basis and only by means of geography can we reach a total political science. Without that basis the road would become longer and more

[45] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 479.

dangerous. Geography, the spatial aspects of states, forms a point of departure and the path ahead constitutes geopolitics.

For Ratzel, the state has its "roots" in the land and therefore grows in accordance with the nature of its territory and location. According to the organic theory of state, because every state is a living organism, growth is in every state's nature and naturally a growing state would tend to absorb less successful and smaller ones. He thus measured the growth of the state by its expansion[46] and alleged that expansion and political growth is healthy for a state since it adds to its strength. Ratzel believed that every state's geographical value and ultimate destiny might be foreseen and emphasized given the importance of physical environment as a factor determining human activity.

In his article "Studies in Political Areas: The Political Territory in Relation to Earth and Continent," Ratzel traced the need for the study of political geography. He argued that each geographical part of the world was in relation with other parts and thus they all together constituted a whole. That whole is shared among the states that are living organisms and are in need of expansion. Because the total amount of space is limited all political extensions of territory had to stop at some point. Since the size

[46] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 479.

of the earth's surface puts limits to expansion, the "zenith" could be reached by only a few states at the same time.[47]

The natural selection and survival of the fittest of Darwinian theory became, in Ratzel's analysis, the survival of civilized and developed societies. The relationship between a people and its land is fundamental. For Ratzel, people are rooted to their land. Over the course of history a people sheds it blood for its land, and with time it becomes impossible to separate the one from the other. It thus becomes impossible to consider a Germany without Germans, or France without the French.

In addition to the organic theory of state, Ratzel's another important legacy is the concept of Lebensraum,[48] which conceptualized state's need for a living space. In an article published in 1949 in the American Political Science Review Charles Kruczewski wrote:

> Literally translated, *Lebensraum* means "living space," and when interpreted by anyone in Germany it is taken to indicate all that which is necessary for guaranteeing the life and development of the German people-physically, politically, and economically. It embraces all kinds of issues based upon prestige, historical and geographical considerations.[49]

[47] Friedrich Ratzel, "Studies in Political Areas: The Political Territory in Relation to Earth and Continent," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 3, November 1897, p. 299.

[48] Living space: "Leben" means living, and "Raum" means open space.

[49] Charles Kruczewski, "Germany's Lebensraum," *American Political Science Review*, Vol.34, 1940, pp. 946-975, quoted in Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 488.

A German geopolitical theorist Kurt Vowinckel wrote in 1939 that "*Lebensraum* has implications of a biological, economical and cultural character."[50] Considered as such, Lebensraum turns out to be a concept connecting nation and territory—the two basic elements of any state—and treating both as a unitary biological being.

It can be argued that Ratzel's theories placed the intentions of Germany on a scientific and theoretical grounding, thereby legitimizing both German territorial expansion and the growth of its population as a means of achieving its "place in the sun."[51] By treating the German people as an organism in need of living space, and by arguing that physical environment had a determining effect on human activity, Ratzel emphasized that every state's geographical needs and ultimate destiny might be ascertained and pursued as a policy objective.[52] Ratzel was a German geographer, who argued for the primacy of Germany and its need and right for a lebensraum; he laid the scientific foundations of these arguments and paved the way for a "geopolitical science".

[50] Kurt Vowinckel, "Zum Begriff Lebensraum," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Vol.16, 1939, pp. 638-639, quoted in Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 488.

[51] Bruno de Almeida Ferrari, "Some Considerations About the Methods and the Nature of Political Geography and Geopolitics," p. 2, 15 June 2010, www.ciari.org/investigacao/Politicalgeopdf.

[52] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…" p. 176.

During the time that Ratzel lived, Germany was unified into a single country and worked to find its identity as a new state. Ratzel was both affected by the circumstances and events of his time and, in turn, his work left his mark on both the period in which he lived and on subsequent generations.

2.3.2. Rudolf Kjellen

Rudolf Kjellen is important regarding the invention of the term and the further development of Ratzel's organic state theory. However, to this date, none of his publications have been translated into English. Although Kjellen's citizenship was Swedish, it is possible to consider him under the label of German geopolitics since he, as Ratzel's student, was both affected by and affected that tradition, which made him in the end become a part of it.

Kjellen argued that states had to apply five complementary types of policies in order to be powerful. Those policies were Econopolitik, Demopolitik, Sociopolitik, Kratopolitik, and finally Geopolitik.[53] He argued that the feet of geopolitics are literally on earth and geopolitics is not legalistic or idealistic, but realistic. Based on Ratzel's organic state theory, Kjellen treated states as biological and geographic organisms. His influence was particularly strong in Germany, where his *Staten som*

[53] Bruno de Almeida Ferrari, "Some Considerations About …," p. 1.

Livsform (The State as a Life-Form) published in 1916 was widely read and where "geopolitik" took on a wider and deeper ideological meaning.

Kjellen propagated the idea that states were dynamic entities that "naturally" grew with greater strength. The engine for growth was "culture." The more vigorous and "advanced" the culture, the more right it had to expand its "domain" or control more territory. For him, it was only natural for advanced cultures to expand into the territory of "others." Thus borders were not set in stone, but malleable: an aspiration or an attempt to legitimize state expansion. Another central element of Kjellen's theory is the concept of autarky. Autarky simply meant state's sufficiency which in a wider sense simply meant power.

Kjellen and Ratzel are important names as they laid the foundations for the theories of Karl Haushofer, who made geopolitics an intrinsic part of our lives. It was Haushofer who carried the field to its zenith. He was also, however, largely responsible for the field's ultimate fall from grace. Haushofer was a follower of Ratzel, Kjellen, but most importantly and especially of Mackinder. Thus, before outlining Haushofer's understanding of geopolitics and the developments that caused the end of geopolitics, it would be apt to introduce the famous British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder.

2.3.3. Sir Halford Mackinder

While it is true that the most important names in the field of geopolitics are German, geopolitics should not be considered merely a German science. Regarding the field's intellectual and scientific history as well as the practice, it was in fact an Englishman, Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), who founded geopolitics as a distinct field, though he himself never used the word. This thesis argues that British political geographer and politician Halford Mackinder, regarding his influence on both theory and practice, was the most important geopolitical theorist. He established modern geopolitical imagination and visualization, created an image of the World as a total both in terms of time and space, searched for a correlation between history and geography, and argued for the geographical essence of world politics.

Mackinder had two main ambitions during his lifetime. His first goal was to establish geography as an independent science in Britain in order to fill the gap against continental Europe, which was, for him, far ahead regarding both the study and use of geography. Geography, he contended, had to be an essential element in the education of British citizenry. He noted in 1907 that, "[o]ur aim must be to make our

whole people think Imperially – think that is to say in spaces that are world wide – and to this end our geographical teaching should be directed."[54]

His second goal was to generate a theory for the survival of Britain's imperial power against possible threats posed by the two main emerging geographical powers of the time: Germany and Russia. It was in this second task that Mackinder left his most lasting mark upon history, as his thoughts created a domino effect that altered the course of history.

Halford Mackinder laid out his famous Heartland theory before the Royal Geographical Society on the 25th of January, 1904, in an address entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History,"[55] in which he analyzed the relation between geography and politics in a historical context. At the beginning of his presentation Mackinder declared that geography as a science of discovery and exploration was over.[56] He argued that in the post-Columbian era there would be little opportunity for imperial states to make new territorial conquests because there were few opportunities left to pursue.[57] Moreover, there were no lands left for the Europeans to

[54] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 121.

[55] Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904, pp. .

[56] For Gerard Toal the date of the address carries a significant importance as a few years earlier Mackinder took his famous trip to Mount Kenya where he realized that the geographer was not and could not be an explorer anymore since unexplored space was no more available.

[57] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 122.

discover or to fight over; the world had become a closed system and thus any event in one part would eventually affect the events in other parts of the world.

Since the map of the world was now complete, "intensive survey" and "philosophic synthesis" became possible and these would constitute the basic endeavor of the new "geographer" represented by himself. As the Colombian epoch that lasted 400 years ended after the year 1900, and as the map of the world had reached its accuracy in displaying a closed system open to the analysis for the new geographer, he announced that,

> (…) in the present decade we are for the first time in a position to attempt, with some degree of completeness, a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical realizations. For the first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world, and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in universal history.[58]

In a nutshell, Mackinder treated history as a struggle between land-based and sea-based powers. As the new geographer, with the "accurate" world map in his hands, Mackinder treated the world as one big battlefield and argued that identification and control of key global positions would lead to global supremacy. He thus divided the

[58] Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," p. 422.

world map into zones/islands and sought a correlation between geography and history in an effort to identify the "natural seats of power."



Figure 1: Mackinder's Map of Natural Seats of Power[59]

The conclusion of Mackinder's survey over the world map and history was his well-known formula: Who rules the East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World.[60]

It is important to note that Mackinder was writing at a time when new imperial powers were emerging. Two years before Mackinder read his paper Britain had

[59] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Heartland.png

[60] This meant who controlled the Heartland (Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, The Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet and Mongolia) would have the possibility of commanding the entire World Island, that is Asia, Africa, Europe together, and thus the World.

signed a treaty with Japan in order to deter Russian expansion, two weeks after which the Russo-Japanese war broke out.[61] Mackinder's main concern was the relative decline of Britain as a world and sea power and the growing challenge posed by the rise of Germany and the threat/danger of a possible Russian-German alliance.

Both Russia and Germany were growing powers and regarding their geographical locations, had the natural capability to command the Heartland by uniting their peoples. Mackinder was concerned because United Germany was rising. Railways were developing and this country had access to East Europe, which could pave the way for controlling the Heartland and thus commanding the World Island. Mackinder thus emphasized the importance of the creation of a middle tier, a buffer zone based on nationality, which would consist of a number of independent states providing a check to German and Russian expansion. As early as 1919, in his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, he wrote "[i]t is a vital necessity (for lasting peace) that there should be a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia."[62]

Mackinder's speeches and writings met with a receptive audience in Germany, which was a late comer yet an ambitious rival to Great Britain on the world scene. Thanks to Mackinder, Germany, which was in search of a "lebensraum," was suddenly

[61] John Rennie Short, *An Introduction to Political Geography*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 18.

[62] Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, New York: Norton&Co, 1962, quoted in Ronald Hee, "World Conquest: The Heartland Theory of Halford J. Mackinder," 15 June 2010, http://www.argumentations.com/Argumentations/StoryDetail_1040.aspx.

provided with a scenario for world domination (Weltpolitik). In the act of trying to warn his own countrymen of the new geopolitical realities Mackinder inadvertently inspired a wave of German thinkers to build upon his theories, "learning from their enemy." Haushofer is especially noteworthy in this regard. One might thus argue that Halford would never have become the famous Mackinder had the Germans not been pursuing primacy in world politics.

It was thus the theories of Halford Mackinder that set up the intellectual basis for German geopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century. As will be discussed further on, Heartland roughly represented the territorial core of the Soviet Union. Thus the German invasion of Russia, a move into the heartland, was the most important development that highlighted the effects of Mackinder's theory.

In "The Geographical Pivot of History," regarding the American continent, Mackinder did not pay much attention to the US as he believed that the US, as an Eastern power, would not have a direct impact on the European balance of power. In 1924, however, Mackinder published his theory of the Atlantic community and proposed an alliance with the US to counter a possible alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. This idea, as is known, also became a reality after the Second World War with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover his argument for the necessity of creation of a buffer zone between Germany and Russia was put into practice during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

Mackinder passed away in 1947, but his ideas lived on. Thus, it is possible to argue that Mackinder's theories affected not only Germany, but also Cold War geopolitics and the foundation of NATO.[63] Academics and policy makers continue to discuss the relevance of his theory. His ideas were even used in justifying the nuclear policy of Reagan.[64] It is also possible to see the influence of Mackinder's theory in the aftermath of the Cold War. Even today his heartland theory still remains relevant as in the case of Zbigniew Brzezinski's famous book "The Grand Chessboard."

We have overviewed the theories of three big names in traditional European geopolitics. It would be appropriate to introduce Karl Haushofer who carried geopolitics to its zenith and tried to elevate geopolitics to the level of a comprehensive science, but who also paved the way for the demise of the term.

2.3.4. Karl Haushofer

On 7 September 1945, Office of US Chief of Council stated:

> Haushofer was Hitler's intellectual godfather. It was Haushofer, rather than Hess, who wrote Mein Kampf (...) Geopolitics was not merely academic theory. It was a driving, dynamic plan for the conquest of the heartland of Eurasia and for domination of the world by the conquest of that heartland (…) Really, Hitler was largely only a symbol and a rabble-rousing mouthpiece.

[63] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 18

[64] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 17.

> The intellectual content of which he was the symbol was the doctrine of Haushofer.[65]

Today Haushofer's association with the Nazi regime remains controversial. However during and after the Second World War he was considered to be the person responsible of the massacres caused by German policies.

Major General Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) was a German army officer, political geographer, politician and a leading proponent of geopolitics. He wrote, thought, and taught in the interwar period, under the great influence of Ratzel's organic state theory. Regarding Mackinder's "Geopolitical Pivot of History," he claimed "never have I seen anything greater than these few pages of a geopolitical masterwork."[66]

The first central element of Haushofer's theories was Ratzel's Lebensraum. Haushofer defined Lebensraum as a nation's right and duty to provide necessary space and resources for its people. He asserted that to obtain Lebensraum a state had the right to resort to "just wars." A second central element was the concept of Autarky developed by Kjellen, which meant self-sufficiency and states' right to

[65] Office of US Chief of Counsel, 1945, quoted in Holger Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," in Colin S. Gray; Geoffrey Sloan (eds.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 218.

[66] Ronald Hee, "World Conquest: The Heartland Theory of Halford J. Mackinder," 15 June 2010, http://www.argumentations.com/Argumentations/StoryDetail_1040.aspx.

maintain it. A third element was Panregionalism, which foresaw states' need to expand their space to include people of similar and related culture. He associated panregionalism with the US conception of legitimate geopolitics that basically was Wilson's principle of self-determination. By panregionalism he argued for the incorporation and annexation of the lands of settlements similar and related to German culture. [67]

Haushofer's own contribution to the theory of geopolitics was the concept of dynamic frontiers. Contrary to the general belief in fixed and static borders in his time, he argued for temporary borders that were destined to change in accordance with the state's search for lebensraum, autarky and panregionalism. He treated boundaries as living organisms and called for a new sense of "dynamic and ever-changing border region"[68].

Haushofer put Mackinder's idea of Heartland into the center of his theories. For Haushofer, it was Mackinder's Heartland that would provide Germany with the necessary Lebensraum, Autarky, and panregional success.[69] He believed that Mackinder's Heartland was really the "heart" of the world.

[67] Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 221.

[68] Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 221.

[69] Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 228.

Haushofer was very influential both on the German public and its leadership. Together with like-minded geographers he started to publish the famous journal *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* from January 1924 onwards. The orientations of the geographers of the journal were diverse.[70] Especially in the final years of the Second World War the journal's articles were to a large extent focused on legitimizing the policies announced by the Nazi regime.[71] However, when stripped of their nuances, ambiguities, and contradictions, it is possible to argue that what is today labeled as German geopolitics mostly developed around the articles published in this journal. Four years after its foundation the journal offered a definition of the term:

> [g]eopolitics is the science of conditioning of spatial processes by the earth. It is based on the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography, as the science of political space organisms and their structure. The essence of regions as comprehended from the geographical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics within which the course of political processes must proceed if they are to succeed in the long term. Though political leaders will occasionally reach beyond this frame, the earth dependency will always eventually exert its determining influence. As thus conceived, geopolitics aims to be equipment for political action and a guidepost in political life.[72]

Zeitschrift für Geopolitik had a wide circulation and was aimed at increasing the geographical consciousness of German people around some basic catchwords such as "lebensraum," "volk renewal," "rule by the fit," "soil mastery," "struggle for power,"

[70] Natter, "Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-45," 199.

[71] Natter, "Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-45," p. 198.

[72] Natter, "Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-45," p. 194.

etc.[73] Haushofer also shared his views with the public by writing in other popular journals and newspapers as well as preparing highly rated radio programs. Throughout his career he published more than 40 books and 400 articles.[74]

Haushofer was an important name not only in terms of the German geopolitical appetite, but also regarding geopolitics' adventure as a science. In other words his ambition was not only towards German geopolitics but also for the science of geopolitics. He was also a diligent follower of world literature on geopolitics and endeavored to make Germany catch up (as Mackinder did for Britain). For him geography was an indispensable part of politics, and geopolitical study was in turn an intrinsic part of the knowledge of statesmen. Haushofer believed geopolitics to be a living science that had to be diligently taught and carefully learned. Haushofer's geopolitics had no limits or boundaries; everything related to life and power was related to geopolitics. As Cahnman put it, for Haushofer and his followers, "geography provided a convenient framework while the actual aim was a 'total' political science comprising all the social sciences in their political aspects."[75]

[73] Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 230.

[74] Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 221.

[75] Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," p. 56.

Regarding the development of the concept, it is also important to note that Haushofer drew the demarcation line between political geography and geopolitics. He defined geopolitics as a tool and guidance for political action.[76] For him geopolitics "is the theory of political events integrated into their geographical setting,"[77] which "intends to and must come to be the geographic conscience of the state."[78] Geopolitics as the geographic conscience of the state advances/develops foreign policy strategies to expand or strengthen the state, or at least to prevent the shrinking or weakening of the state.[79] His main aim was to build up a geopolitical vision that would allow for both territorial growth and colonial acquisition for Germany, which remained a prisoner of the Versailles Treaty. He wrote,

> Germany must emerge out of the narrowness of her present living space into the freedom of the world. We must approach this task well equipped in knowledge and training. We must familiarize ourselves with the important spaces of settlement and migration on earth. We must study the problem of boundaries as one of the most important problems of Geopolitik. We ought to devote particular attention to national self-determination, population pressure, living space, and changes in rural and urban settlement, and we must closely follow all shifts and transfers of power throughout the world. The smaller the living space of a nation, the greater need for a far-sighted policy to keep the little it can still call its own. A people must know what it possesses. At the same time, it should constantly study and compare the living spaces of other nations. Only thus will it be able to recognize and seize any possibility to recover lost ground.[80]

[76] Karl Haushofer; Erich Obst; Hermann Lautensach; Otto Maull, *Bausteine zur Geopolitik*, Berlin, 1928, p. 27 quoted in Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," p.56.

[77] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 484.

[78] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 485.

[79] Hagan, "Geopolitics," p. 486.

[80] Haushofer, "Why Geopolitik?," pp. 3-35.

On the other hand, learning from the history of the Kaiser era, Haushofer also warned that it was imprudent to go further than the limits of one's knowledge could support.[81] To do so, for him, would be to act out of ignorance, and would make one's road much longer and more dangerous.[82] Retrospectively this statement summarizes what happened during the Second World War. The end was the loss of Germany and geopolitics.

Whether or not Haushofer was a Nazi himself still remains controversial. It is clear, however, that his theories intellectually paved the way for the Nazi terminology and legitimacy. Clausewitz's blood and Ratzel's space and soil got combined in Haushofer's theories and provided Hitler with the legitimate basis for his "just war." In the final analysis it was Haushofer who, in the words of his son Albrecht, "broke away the seal… [and] let the daemon soar into the world."[83]

While the demon was soaring into the world, a profound anti-geopolitical mindset was developing across the Atlantic. During the war, geopolitics was declared to be an intellectual poison in the United States. US officials from the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency) as well as geographical scholars defined geopolitics to be "intellectually fraudulent, ideologically suspect,

[81] Werner Cahnman, "Methods of Geopolitics," *Social Forces*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1942, p. 153.

[82] Cahnman, "Concepts of Geopolitics," p.56.

[83] Albrecht Haushofer, *Moabit Sonnets*, London: Norton, 1978, p. 49 quoted in Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum," p. 237.

and tainted by association with Nazism and its associated policies of genocide, racism, spatial expansionism, and the domination of place."[84] During and after the war widely US magazines like Reader's Digest, Life, and Newsweek published anti-geopolitical articles, depicting it as evil and shaping the perspectives of the public and the elite.

The award-winning *Why We Fight* series, directed by Frank Capra, was also noteworthy. The series contained seven one-hour films – *Prelude to War*, *The Nazi Strike*, *Divide and Rule*, *Battle of Britain*, *Battle of Russia* (Parts 1 and 2), *Battle of China*, and finally *War Comes to America*.[85] Prepared at the request of the United States government, they were designed to show the American people why their country was fighting against enemies around the world. According to Dodds, among the seven films, *The Nazi Strike* was cartographically one of the most prominent. It described and explained Hitler's plans for world domination by direct reference to Mackinder's maps and famous geographical dictum.[86]

[84] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 22.

[85] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, p. 131*.

[86] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, p. 131*.

Figure 2: The 'Heartland' from *The Nazi Strike* (1942)[87]

In the end Haushofer and his Jewish wife, as a result of increasing persecution, committed suicide. It would not be over-exaggerating to state that his death also marked the demise of geopolitics. After his death, geopolitics was virtually erased from academic literature. The rest of the story continued on the American continent, where geopolitics had a secret, but "active," life.

[87] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, p. 132.*

2.4.US Geopolitics

2.4.1. From the late Nineteenth Century to the Second World War

American geopolitics was determined by the famous Monroe Doctrine until the First World War. The Doctrine was put forth by President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress in 1823 where he acknowledged that the Old World and New World had different systems and must remain distinct spheres. The Doctrine declared that the United States would not interfere in the wars between European powers and any attempt by a European power to control the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as a hostile act against the United States.[88]

However, while the centuries-long power struggle was escalating in Europe, the new power of the Fourth World was developing. The Spanish-American war of 1898 was the first American overseas war of conquest and thus constituted the first crack in the doctrine. As a result of emerging need, America's first strategists and geopolitical theorists started to generate theories by the turn of the century. With the aim of strengthening the power of their country, these strategists set about "developing

[88] "Monroe Doctrine," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/ topic/390243/Monroe-Doctrine

doctrines for a neo-ocean naval supremacy, and the American navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain 'rules the waves.'''[89]

The first well-known strategist/geopolitical theorist of the USA was Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), a naval officer and historian who in 1890 published his college lectures in a book entitled *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. In the book, Mahan argued for the importance/supremacy of sea power over land power, and that naval superiority was the fundamental principle and basis of foreign policy. Mahan's work won immediate recognition and was widely read in Great Britain and Germany.[90] Although Mackinder in his famous address of 1904 paid little attention to the Forth World, both the British and the Germans took Mahan's discussion on land powers versus sea powers seriously. Mahan influenced the buildup of naval forces in the years prior to World War I, especially in Germany. Moreover, Mahan's distinction between land and sea-powers continued to influence geopolitical thinkers throughout the Cold War, as Mahan had also advocated an alliance with Britain to counterbalance Eurasian land-powers.[91]

Mahan harbored many imperialist beliefs and wanted the US to become a world power. The way he envisioned for the US to attain this goal was through the buildup

[89] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, New York: Basic Books, 1997, p. 3.

[90] "Alfred Thayer Mahan," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/ topic/357900/Alfred-Thayer-Mahan.

[91] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 20.

of its naval forces. In other words, in order to become a world power, the USA first had to establish its strength on the high seas. He also asserted the idea that international law and means of law and diplomacy are of secondary importance whereas power is the basis for foreign policy.

The beginning of the First World War officially marked the end, or from another vantage point the extension, of the Monroe Doctrine. The USA argued that it entered into the First World War as the result of its international moral responsibilities.[92] It was with this step that the USA became an active player in world politics.

US intervention also marked the beginning of the idealist enterprise in world politics. During the interwar period idealism/liberalism, associated with the thoughts of President Woodrow Wilson, predominated. According to this philosophy each nation had the right to self-determination. Instead of applying racial codes nations were defined in cultural terms, such as having common history, traditions, and language.

Wilson's views brought an end to the age of empires in the sense that national self-determination became the order of the day. According to this geopolitical vision the new geopolitical subject was peoples/nations, with their geopolitical institutions being their nation-states. The new regime also required alliances in order to prevent

[92] Defay, *Jeopolitik*, p. 24

the disaster from occurring again. Thus nations established a "league" for themselves and other nations at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The mindset behind that outlook as summarized by Kearns is as follows:

> A people that had shown determination, distinctiveness and defensibility should be offered the hand of international fellowship. Colonialism should be curtailed. Multilateral international alliances should deal with rough states in their own world region. In time, the League of Nations might evolve as a sort of world government of nation-states.[93]

The geographer of the Wilsonian idealist enterprise was Isaiah Bowman, who was a key consultant to the government, most notably at the Treaty of Versailles. Shortly after entering the First World War, President Wilson created an Inquiry Committee, which produced 1,200 maps focusing on the ethnic, political, and historical boundaries of Europe.[94] Bowman was a key member of the Committee. He later became the director of the American Geographical Society in 1915 and worked there for the subsequent 20 years. At the Paris Peace Conference Bowman participated in the American Delegation as Chief Territorial Specialist and played a significant role in the post-war mapmaking efforts.

During the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the prevailing trend was to draw better boundaries for a better fit of nations and states in order to establish unitary nation-

[93] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," p. 177

[94] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 127.

states. The USA was both the model and the guarantor of the new system which aimed at engineering a fit between ethnicity and space[95]

Bowman also played a significant role in the foundation of Council on Foreign Relations and the publication of its famous journal *Foreign Affairs*, which became "a major outlet for foreign policy experts to consider the affairs of the United States in the wider world."[96] Bowman's book *New World: Problems in Political* Geography, published in 1922, sketched out the implications of the 1919 peace settlement and implicitly foresaw an increasing role for the USA regarding world politics.[97] Bowman believed, contrary to the isolationists, that America should play a central role in the development and evolution of the world economy. For Bowman, power, if it was going to be exercised effectively over territories, would have to be informed by a commitment to free trade and diffused through international institutions. He was later to be instrumental in providing specialist advice to the Roosevelt administration in the early 1940s, leading to the establishment of the United Nations. According to Dodds, the location of United Nations in the American city of New York was testimony to how geographers such as Bowman were able to promote American national interests as simultaneously representing something more universal.[98]

[95] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," p. 177.

[96] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* p. 130

[97] Short, *An Introduction to Political Geography*, p. 19.

[98] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* p. 130.

Although Alfred Mahan and Bowman were influential names in geopolitics, the person who brought the traditional geopolitical mindset to the USA was Nicholas Spykman. As Hoffman puts it, Spykman was the scholar who taught the Americans that foreign policy is about power and the struggle for power rather than ideals.[99] Spykman's central ambition was to apply European geopolitical mindset to the American case.

Writing at a time when American isolation was coming to an end and the issue of what kind of policy the US should follow in world politics was on the agenda, Dutch-born American scholar Spykman warned Americans that the end of the First World War was not the end of power politics and argued that the time of isolation and passivity in foreign affairs was definitely over for the USA.

Spykman, just like Mahan, believed that the statesman conducting foreign policy should concern himself with values of justice, fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or at least do not interfere with the primary objective of their state's power. He acknowledged power as the basic controlling factor in relations among states.

[99] Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science:International Relations," *Daedalus*, Vol. 106, No.3, p. 44.

Nicholas Spykman moreover argued that geography was the most important factor in world politics. He put forward the relation between geography and foreign politics and argued that the effect of size, world location, and regional location played a very important role in a state's foreign policy, as they determine the options that a country might choose and follow as a foreign policy path. For Spykman a state cannot escape from its geography however skilled its Foreign Office is, as "geography does not argue, it simply is."[100]

He thus analyzed the geographical locations of states, their frontiers, climate, and topography, and sought for formulas to be followed in foreign policy. He argued that there are three types of states in terms of regional locations: landlocked states, island states and states that have both sea and land frontiers. The security problem of the landlocked states was defined exclusively in terms of land defense and in terms of immediate neighbors. Regarding the island states he categorized two main sub-types: island states situated near the mainland and island states that have a wide ocean barrier. The example for the first type was the UK, while that of the latter was the USA. He argued that the character, nature, and type of a state's primary defense problem depended on various factors such as the length of its frontiers, its world and regional location, and its topography and climate. Climate and topography together determine the nature of the borders and whether contacts will take place in a zone of exposure or a zone of protection. States like the US, Canada and Russia had difficult

[100] Nicholas Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 32, No.2, April, 1938, p. 236.

defense problems since they had to maintain both land forces and sea forces. Because geography affects the foreign policy of a country in multiple ways, Spykman argued that in attempting to classify a state one must take into account all of these conditioning factors.

He also, like Mackinder, offered a geographical division of the world that foresaw an Old World, consisting of the Eurasian continent, Africa, and Australia, and the New World, consisting of the Americas. According to him, the US dominated the Old World and he thus proposed "an active, non-isolationist US foreign policy to construct and maintain a balance of power in the Old World in order to prevent a challenge to the United States." [101] Spykman is also referred as the Rimland theorist as he identified Mackinder's "inner crescent" as the "Rimland" and defined it as the key geopolitical arena.

As early as 1942, at a time when anti-Japanese and anti-German propaganda was at its heights, Spykman announced that once Germany and Japan had been defeated they should both been included into an anti-Soviet alliance, in order to prevent the USSR gaining a too favorable position in Eurasia.[102] Drawing upon Mackinder, he believed that the balance of power in Eurasia would directly affect the security of the

[101] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 22

[102]Bordonaro, "Rediscovering Spykman," 15 June 2010, http://www. Exploring geopolitics .org/ Publication_Bordonaro_Federico_Rediscovering_Spykman Rimland _Geography_Peace_Foreign_ Policy.html

USA. For this reason Spykman is also often referred as the "godfather of containment."

It is important to note that although Wilson, together with his geographers and some major thinkers, generated the liberalist/idealist international project and tried to put it into application, his efforts also entailed a certain contradiction. The liberalist Wilsonian American enterprise foresaw a universal league of states, which also meant the extension of Monroe doctrine to a "world doctrine."[103] The USA also turned to a geopolitical mindset because after the war it took its place on the international stage as one of two superpowers. As I will be arguing later on, dominant powers, by their nature, apply geopolitics.

The term geopolitics was imported to the USA from Europe by the Dutch-born scholar Spykman. Although the term itself was not used in the USA in the period between the end of the Second World War and détente, the mindset developed around geopolitical aspects of foreign politics survived, but followed a different path under the auspices of Cold War US Administration, which constitutes the topic of the following section.

[103] Ola Tunander, "Swedish-German Geopolitics For a New Century: Rudolf Kjellen's 'The State as a Living Organism'," *Review of International Studies*, No. 27, 2001, p. 463.

2.4.2. Cold War Geopolitics

Although many books on geopolitics contain a chapter entitled "Cold War geopolitics," the word "geopolitics" was rarely ever used during the Cold War. This was especially the case during the first half of the period.

The Cold War refers to the period of Soviet-American geopolitical and ideological confrontation spanning the 40 year period between the end of the Second World War through to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Although the term "geopolitics" itself was rarely used until Kissinger brought it back into use in the 1970s, the mindset the term represented continued to affect the political practice throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

In his article "Cold War Geopolitics" Dodds argues that it was the American journalist Walter Lippman who first coined the phrase "Cold War" in 1947.[104] According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, however, the word was first used by famous English writer George Orwell in an article in 1945 in which he predicted that a nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union would mark the coming era. Encyclopedia Britannica states that the term was brought to the United States by the American financier and presidential adviser Bernard Baruch in a speech

[104] Klaus Dodds, "Cold War Geopolitics," in John Agnew, Kathryne Mitchell, Gerard Toal (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 207.

at the State House in Columbia, in 1947.[105] I would argue that Lippmann, given his status as an important figure in media and in the US administration at the time, popularized the term and brought it into widespread use, though he himself might not have been the one to coin it. What is more interesting than "who" coined the word, however, is "how" the word was coined. How could whoever coined the term, as early as 1945-47, have predicted that the war between two important, if not yet super, powers would be "cold," even before the war had properly begun? Was this a naïve prediction or a plan to channel the events to come? This discussion is beyond the scope of this study, however, the person who produced Cold War geopolitics is important and relevant.

It was American diplomat George F. Kennan who played a crucial role in the development of the famous US Cold War "containment" policy. In 1929, as a young member of the US Foreign Service, Kennan was sent to the University of Berlin to study Russian thought, language, and culture. He completed his studies in 1931 and eventually became the first American diplomat to receive specialized training in Russian affairs.[106]

[105] "Cold War," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online,* 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/topic/ 125110/ Cold-War.

[106] Walter Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast*, Columbia University Press: New York, 1989, p. 6.

This was a period when the German school of geopolitics was on the rise and Mackinder's perception of the natural seats of power was at the zenith of its popularity. Thus Kennan, during his studies in Germany, would have been exposed to the German geopolitical mindset and its perspective about Russia. Moreover, it would not be imprudent to assume that Kennan, during his studies in Germany even adopted the German geopolitical vision, along with his studies of Russian language and culture. This mindset included two crucial points: that the Soviet Union had a natural seat of power in the pivot area or the Heartland, and that the Soviets were ambitiously seeking out power.

After acquiring the German geopolitical mindset during his studies in Berlin and following the US recognition of the Soviet government, Kennan was appointed to the US Embassy in Moscow[107] and devoted his twenty-two months between 1944 and 1946 to opposing wartime "marriage de convenance" with the Kremlin.[108] It was in February 1946 that Kennan sent his famous "Long Telegram" from the US Embassy in Moscow. The 8000 word telegram argued for the necessity of the containment policy. The telegram was widely read in Washington and brought Kennan much recognition. His arguments were so well embraced in Washington that he was brought back to the United States later that year and in 1947 became the director of the State Department's policy-planning staff.

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[107] "George F. Kennan," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 314760/George-F-Kennan.

[108] Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast*, p. 21.

Kennan's view on the containment policy was published in an article appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947, signed "X" to protect his State Department identity. In this article Kennan, developing the argument he had made in the Long Telegram, questioned the nature of Soviet politics and suggested that the US should be prepared for the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. Soviet communism for Kennan, as taught by his mentors during his studies in Germany, was nothing more than a pretext used to justify state actions, the Bolsheviks were a "pariah regime" aimed at world conquest.[109] He believed that it was a matter of indifference to Moscow whether a given area was "communistic" or not, as the main concern of Russian efforts was power.

George Kennan's article, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,"[110] constituted another landmark of the Cold War. In this article Kennan analyzed the nature of the Soviet dictatorship and the mindset of the Communist Party. He presented the Soviets as the main enemy of the US, stating that the United States "must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena." He added that, "where the Russians hold power, there our world stops; beyond that line we should not try to lift our voices unless we mean business." He thus argued that the main policy that had to be followed with regard to the Soviets should be a "long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

[109] Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast* , p. 6.

[110] George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 1947 in Toal; Dalby; Routledge, (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader*, pp.159-169.

He also classified the world into regions, defining a maritime trading world (the West) and a despotic xenophobic East.

Kennan's views became the core of US policy toward the Soviet Union when the National Security Council (NSC) called for a global conflict against Communism. The US launched Operation Rollback at home, creating what amounted to a state of terror. In the 1950s the US Senate created a committee headed by John McCarthy to investigate domestic anti-Americanism and those who sympathized with the Soviet Union and communism. Communism was seen as a disease, an illness, and infection,[111] which had tendency to spread and to create a "domino effect" within the world biological organism.

The American policy of containment developed with remarkable speed in Europe as well. The European Recovery Program, usually referred as the Marshall Plan, entered into force as a result of the Truman Doctrine. Turkey and Greece were aided financially to counter possible Soviet influence. Finally NATO was founded, in 1949, as a 12 state military Alliance against the threat of "Soviet aggression," and eventually expanded to include 16 members.

[111] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 209.

According to the US outlook during the Cold War the world was the body, the USA was the protector of that body, and the Soviet Union was a disease that had the strength to bring an end to it. In order to combat this disease, The USA, as the lead protector of the body, divided the world into friendly and unfriendly spaces.[112]

Throughout the Cold War, both super powers developed geopolitical strategic views that guided and legitimized their actions as they began to develop their roles as world powers. Their geopolitical views aimed at commanding the world and took the form of ideologies. Government statements assumed the status of "theories," and hence took on the authority of objective "truths."[113] Thus it was not long after the end of the Second World War that two big camps emerged in opposition to each other.

The communist geopolitical vision, associated with the ideas of Marx and Engels, foresaw that "all hitherto existing human history was the history of class struggle."[114] According to Kearns the Soviet ideology argued that:

> Nation-states were managed by the capitalist class to promote their collective interests against their workers, against capitalists of other countries, and, sometimes, in self-restraint to sustain the longer term viability of the system in the face of its self-destructive, competitive anarchy.[115]

[112] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 210.

[113] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 22.

[114] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics …," p. 178.

[115] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics …," p. 178. An important note is that although the communist geopolitical vision became quite popular in some parts of the world it never became prevalent or mainstream in IR thought. This was due to the fact that IR itself was an American discipline. In this

At the end of the Second World War, geopolitics, along with the concept of race, became something of a black sheep due to its close association with Nazism. The Cold War era witnessed the demise of "geopolitics" as a term due to its associations with the Nazi regime. It continued to live on, however, enjoying a secret life. Although it is said that it was Henry Kissinger who, during the détente period, brought the word back into use in the USA, the Cold War itself was nothing more than the actual realization of geopolitical game played on the world chessboard. Throughout the period both super powers constantly articulated the danger posed by the other camp until one of them, the Eastern bloc, collapsed. As Brzezinski puts it:

> (…) the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union represented the fulfillment of the geopoliticians' fondest theories: it pitted the world's leading maritime power, dominant over both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, against the world's leading land power, paramount on the Eurasian heartland (with the Sino-Soviet bloc encompassing a space remarkably reminiscent of the scope of the Mongol Empire). The geopolitical dimension could not have been clearer: North America versus Eurasia, with the world at stake. The winner would truly dominate the globe. There was no one else to stand in the way, once victory was finally grasped.[116]

In the end the USSR collapsed. This made the USA the victor, although it did not win any battle. The collapse of the USSR also marked the end of the Cold War ideological geopolitical order.

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respect Soviet geopolitics will not be dealt with further here, as the main focus of this thesis is upon geopolitics and mainstream IR thought.

[116] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 6.

Geopolitics becomes popular during times of change, crisis, and war. This was especially noticeable during the dissolution process of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, through which the study of geopolitics became in vogue again after nearly half a century of neglect. During the storm caused by the winds of change at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, scholar's appetite for geopolitics revived once again. Fukuyama announced the end of history, and Huntington proclaimed the beginning of clash of civilizations. As the World Island became an open space once again Zbgniew Brzezinski, drawing upon Mackinder's Heartland Theory, defined the new but old rules of the "Grand Chessboard." What the world or the new superpower needed was a new drama and new geopolitical theories to go along with it. In the following section I will try to briefly outline the major geopolitical theories of the post-Cold War era.

2.5.Post-Cold War Geopolitics

The end of the Cold War marked the end of many things, the birth of many new things, and the refashioning of many others. Issues related to globalization, culture, and identity, which had remained frozen in the coldness of the Cold War for so long, returned back to the high political agenda from the early 1990s on. The world witnessed processes of integration and fragmentation at the same time; many argued for the end of nation-states and withering away of territorial borders, whereas many

others argued for their becoming stronger than ever. People, however, remained cautious as the stability and well known rules of the old world were being replaced by the chaotic structure of the so-called "New World Order". At the same time a great deal of technological development was taking place. Friedman, in the paragraph below, summarizes the characteristics of both eras in opposition to each other:

> If the defining perspective of the cold war was "division," the defining perspective of globalization is "integration." The symbol of the Cold War system was a wall, which divided everyone. The symbol of the globalization system is a World Wide Web, which unites everyone. The defining document of the Cold War system was "The Treaty." The defining document of the globalization system is "The Deal"… while the defining measurement of the Cold War was weight – particularly the throw weight of missiles- the defining document of the globalization system is speed- speed of commerce, travel, communication and innovation. … in the Cold War, the most frequently asked question was: "How big is your missile?" In globalization, the most frequently asked question is "How fast is your modem?"…if the defining anxiety of the Cold War was fear of annihilation from an enemy you knew all too well in a world struggle that was fixed and stable, the defining anxiety in globalization is the fear of rapid change from an enemy you can't see, touch or feel—a sense that your job, community or workplace can be changed at any moment by anonymous economic and technological forces that are anything but stable.[117]

As the old enemy had lost the war, the search for a new enemy and the creation of it determined the basic geopolitical characteristic of the post-Cold War era. During this process geography continued to matter. As Dodds puts it, despite the claims made in favor of ever more intense forms of globalization, the relevance of territory, international boundaries, and claims to sovereignty remained as pressing as ever.[118]

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[117] Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and The Olive Tree,* New York: Knopf, 1999, pp. 8,9; 11 quoted in Timothy W. Luke, "Postmodern Geopolitics," in Agnew; Mitchell; Toal (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, p. 228.

[118] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 1.

Geopolitics was suddenly explicitly on the high agenda again, becoming the new fashion.

In a nutshell, the demise of the Soviet Union as an ideological other altered the basis on which Cold War ideological geopolitics was constructed. The new question that arose was "What will be the basis for the new geopolitics?" One of the most popular answers to this question was given by Samuel Huntington.

Huntington brought a "new" insight to the discussions that started at the end of the Cold War by declaring that the politics of the new era will take place along civilizational fault lines. The crucial and the central aspect of global politics, Huntington argued, is that the fundamental sources of conflict will be cultural rather than ideological or economic. In other words the clash of civilizations would determine global politics, and the fault lines between civilizations would be the battle lines of the coming era.

In his article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations"[119] published in 1993 in *Foreign Affairs* Huntington gives a brief outline of the history of conflicts, which consists of four major periods: pre-1789; post-1789; the Cold War period, and the post-Cold War era. During the first three, conflicts—be they among princes, nation-states, or

[119] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," in Toal; Dalby; Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader*, pp.159-169.

ideologies—had taken place within Western civilization. The distinctive feature of the fourth is that it marks the shift of international politics beyond its Western phase. This fourth phase is determined by the interaction between the Western and non-Western civilizations. The first three periods also involved non-Western entities, though in these earlier periods they were involved as objects rather than subjects.

There exist several levels/units of identity and civilization. For Huntington, civilization constitutes the highest one. In other words, it is the broadest cultural grouping/identity that determines the borders of a group. It may consist of a large group of people or a small one; it may also include sub-civilizations. Whatever size they might be, he argues, civilizations constitute the main determinants of human history and thus of the future. According to him, the main civilizations shaping the politics of the future would include the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly the African. After this brief discussion on identity and civilization Huntington asks his crucial question: Why will civilizations clash?

He argues that, first and foremost, the differences between civilizations are not only real but also basic. Civilizations and thus people are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and religion. Religion, for Huntington, is the most important one. It is a difference that generates and will continue to generate politics and conflict. Secondly, as the world gradually becomes a smaller place, he argues that the civilizational consciousness and awareness of people increases and

gets stronger. This fact makes the fault lines clearer and more central. Thirdly, as a result of the identity crisis brought on by globalization there emerges a gap that is in most places filled by religious identity in a fundamentalist form. This revival provides a good basis for identity and commitment that transcends nation-states and unites civilizations. Fourthly, Western civilization reached its zenith in terms of power at the end of the Cold War, but non-Westerns will in the future have an increasing will and desire to confront and challenge Western civilization in non-Western ways. The fact that identities and cultures are given and thus fixed entities constitutes the fifth reason for civilizational conflict. He argues that "cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones (…) In conflicts between civilizations, the question is 'What are you?' That is a given that cannot be changed."[120]

He also asserts that economic regionalism is increasing, and that this will reinforce civilizational consciousness. A successful economic regionalism necessitates a common culture/basis. The clash of civilizations, for Huntington, takes place at two levels: the micro and the macro. At the micro-level neighboring groups enter into struggle for the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level states from different civilizations compete for military and economic power. In a nutshell he argues that the central axis of world politics would be the conflict between the West and the Rest.

[120] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," p. 161.

Francis Fukuyama is another noteworthy name who has become one of the most popular scholars of the post-Cold War era with his famous article[121] and book declaring the end of the history. Fukuyama, writing in 1989, asserted that what we had been witnessing was not just the end of the Cold War, but the end of history. The twentieth century for Fukuyama in the end returned to where it started: not to an end of ideology or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, but to the victory of economic and political liberalism. What he means by the end of history is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. For Fukuyama, the fact that liberalism or the ideals of the French Revolution are not being implemented at every corner of the world does not constitute an obstacle for proclaiming the end of history.

As acknowledged by Fukuyama himself, the rhetoric or the idea of the end of history, however, is not new. Its best-known advocate is Marx who borrowed the idea from Hegel. Hegel proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806, which marked Napoleon's defeat and the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution. Both Hegel and Marx regarded history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle and an end. Fukuyama, though analyzing the ideas of Hegel, does not criticize or comment on the shortcomings or the contradictions of Hegel's understanding of dialectical history, as by logic history cannot have an end since it will always have its anti-thesis. So do 1806 or 1989 not have anti-theses? Fukuyama does not put the question

[121] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," in Toal; Dalby and Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader*, pp. 114-124.

in that way but rather handles the challenges to liberalism and their defeat: the defeat of fascism and communism as living ideologies at every level. But does one's victory mean the other's defeat, or does the fact that communism and fascism had lost the game mean that liberals have really won? He neither asks nor answers those questions.

Another important argument put forth by Fukuyama is that the part of the world that has reached the end of history is far more occupied with economics than politics. The passing of the communist ideology means the growing "common marketization" of international relations and the diminishing of the likelihood of large-scale conflicts. In "Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later,"[122] Fukuyama states that the assertion "the end of history" is not a statement about the empirical condition of the world but a normative argument concerning the justice or adequacy of liberal democratic institutions.

In addition to the writings of Fukumaya and Huntington two other "intellectuals in statecraft" that attracted attention in the post- Cold War era were Zbigniew Brzezinski and Thomas Barnett.

[122] Francis Fukuyama, "Reflections on the End of History: Five Years Later," *History and Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1995, p. 27.

In his book entitled *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski, Polish-born US statesman who once served as President Carter's national security policy advisor, treated the world stage as a chessboard and analyzed the policies to be followed by the USA, as it was now the history's first and true superpower. He thus endeavored to determine the grand strategy for the maintenance of US's exceptional position in the world with a special focus on Eurasia and aimed at laying out the "realities" of the board on which the game would be played. He argued that "America is now Eurasia's arbiter, with no major Eurasian issue solvable without America's participation or contrary to America's interests."[123] For him, it was time for America to formulate an integrated, comprehensive and long-term geostrategy for all Eurasia, the "heart" of the world.

Thomas Barnett, in his New York Times bestseller book *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*[124] aimed to establish a "new" strategy for the US to explain how the new world works after the demise of one of the superpowers. He also treated the world as one big battlefield and aimed to draw the new map for the statesmen of his country.

[123] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, 1997, p. 3.

[124] Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, London: Penguin, 2004.

2.6.Concluding Remarks

This chapter aimed at providing both an historical examination of the field of geopolitics and a glimpse of geopolitical thinking from the late nineteenth century onwards in order to establish a foundation for the discussions in the following chapters. Special attention has been paid to nineteenth century texts as these texts constituted the foundations of geopolitics. As illustrated, geopolitical fathers shared certain commonalities regarding their assumptions about geography and power. Another commonality that these geopolitical fathers shared was that they worked as both theorists and practitioners. They were people who were actively trying to contribute to the development of their states. Moreover, all their writings "had a cache of expertise and authority." Last, but not least, they all treated their geographical arguments as natural rules and believed that geopolitics was an objective science based on the study of natural phenomena and laws of nature.

As I have illustrated, the geopolitical vision is never innocent, but always a "wish-posing" analysis. Every geopolitical vision has a geopolitical subject and an institution to promote. Every geopolitical vision or theory claims to be realist and objective. As Kearns puts it,

> [e]ach of these geopolitical visions is based on an essentialism that tries to naturalize its world view and thereby devalue competing presentations of the

> nature and purpose of geopolitical change. This is how geopolitics pursues its normative goals: see the world like this and you can only imagine its future like that. Each vision keeps other utopias off the agenda."[125]

This study argues that in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of IR history and theory one needs to treat the geopolitical texts of the nineteenth century as among the basic texts of IR.

Throughout the chapter, I have employed an editorial and selective eye over the course of events, the connections in-between, as well as the theories informing them. At the same time I have preserved the criticisms and discussions surrounding the central debates of the periods to be discussed later on.

The end of the Cold War not only marked the revival of classical geopolitics, but also stimulated studies in the field of "critical geopolitics," which had already been developing since the 1980s as a subfield of political geography. In the following chapter "critical geopolitics," that aimed at unpacking the well-established assumptions of classical geopolitics and thus opened up new research agendas, will be surveyed with a special focus on the relation between geopolitical discourse and hegemony.

[125] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," p. 174.

CHAPTER III

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

3.1.Introduction

> *The more we are aware of our basic paradigms, maps, or assumptions, and the extent to which we have been influenced by our experience, the more we can take responsibility for those paradigms, examine them, thereby getting a larger picture and a far more objective view.*[126]

Critical geopolitics is a loose field that emerged in the late 1980s at the interface between Political Geography and International Relations. Prominent figures in the field include geographers such as John Agnew, Gerard Toal[127], Simon Dalby, and Klaus Dodds. The term "critical geopolitics" was coined and inspired by the works of these geographers.[128] In 1991 Simon Dalby articulated the need for a critical geopolitics as follows:

> What is being argued for here is nothing less than a recognition of the importance of studying the political operation of forms of geographical

[126] Stephen R. Covey, *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, London: Simon& Schuster, 2004, p.29.

[127] Gearóid Ó Tuathail.

[128] Klaus Dodds, "Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics After Ten Years," *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol 25, No. 3, 2001, p. 470.

> understandings, recognizing that geo-graphs are specifications of political reality that have political effect. To construct critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit our attention to a study of the geography of politics within pre-given, taken-for-granted, commonsense spaces, but investigate the politics of the geographical specifications of politics. That is to practice critical geopolitics.[129]

In 1992 John Agnew, together with Gerard Toal published a paper "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy."[130] This paper in turn precipitated a research agenda and together with Agnew and Corbridge's article "The New Geopolitics: The Dynamics of Geopolitical Disorder,"[131] created an urge for the study of critical geopolitics.[132]

In a nutshell, critical geopolitics is aimed at revisiting and unpacking the foundational assumptions of classical geopolitics. It seeks to revisit the epistemological assumptions and ontological commitments of conventional geopolitics. It has produced a number of in-depth studies which, together with

[129] Simon Dalby, "Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, No. 9, 1991, p. 274, quoted in Gerard Toal, *Critical Geopolitics*: *The Politics of Writing Global Space*, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 62.

[130] Gerard Toal; John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography*, No. 11, 1992, pp. 190-204. The article was already written in 1987, but could not find its way into print for more than five years.

[131] John Agnew; Stuart Corbridge, "The New Geopolitics: The Dynamics of Geopolitical Disorder," in R. Johnston and P. Taylor eds. *A World in Crisis*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, pp. 266-288.

[132] Dodds, "Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics After Ten Years," p. 469.

accurate biographical works, have helped scholars to better understand the cultural origins, biases, and theoretical limitations of classical geopolitics.[133]

Critical geopolitics also examines geopolitical practices with the goal of understanding geographical and political reasoning and how it conditions practices in world politics. It examines geopolitical tradition, revisiting the historical and geographical context of ideas about geography and politics, the relation between geopolitics and popular culture, and last but not least it studies structural geopolitics linking the practices of statecraft to globalization and information networks.[134] In a wider sense it aims at critically examining anything related to geography and politics. It helps us to assess how the practice of world politics has been executed throughout different geopolitical orders and how our view of the world is built upon these premises.

Political geographers John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, in their book *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*,[135] put forth the concept of "geopolitical order" and outlined how geopolitical orders are associated with certain geopolitical discourses. According to this view, the three distinct

[133]Federico Bordonaro, "Rediscovering Spykman," 15 June 2010, http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Bordonaro_ Federico_ Rediscovering _Spykman Rimland_Geography_Peace_Foreign_Policy.html

[134] Dodds, "Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics After Ten Years," pp. 470-471.

[135] John Agnew; Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, London: Routledge, 1995.

geopolitical orders that prevailed from 1815 to 1990 were: the geopolitical order of the Concert of Europe, the inter-imperial rivalry, and the Cold War. The work of Agnew and Corbridge illustrated how geopolitical discourse shaped practice and how practices shaped discourse during these three phases, each of which had its own combination of elements.

Later on, in 1998, Agnew defined three ages of geopolitics that developed over the period from the early nineteenth century to the 1980s in his book *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*.[136] These three ages are the age of civilizational geopolitics, naturalized geopolitics, and ideological geopolitics respectively. According to this view, in the first geopolitical order, which was a combination of the Concert of Europe and British domination, civilizational geopolitics prevailed. In the geopolitical order of inter-imperial rivalry, on the other hand, naturalized geopolitics prevailed, whereas throughout the geopolitical order of the Cold War ideological geopolitics prevailed, accompanied by their own geopolitical discourses.

Other geographers also attempted to make a range of categorizations and came up with new concepts and definitions. Toal, for example, introduced new concepts in his article "Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the

[136] John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, London: Routledge, 1998.

Critical Study of Geopolitics,"[137] departing from Agnew and Corbridge's definitions. Some of his concepts include: "geopolitical structure," "geopolitical order," "geopolitical economy," "geopolitical condition," "cultures of geopolitics," "geographical imaginations," "geopolitical culture," "geopolitical traditions," "geopolitical visions and geopolitical subjects," "geopolitical discourse and discursive policy process," and "geostrategic discourses."

I do not intend to go further into the details of these concepts and their definitions or other topics of critical geopolitics, as they are outside the scope of this study. Departing from these categorizations, this study acknowledges that throughout the history of the inter-state system certain geopolitical orders prevailed at certain periods, with the exception of times of "geopolitical disorder" or "geopolitical transitions." The names, definitions, and timelines of these orders might change according to the scholar's point of view, but no matter how we categorize them it is possible to argue for their existence and certain continuities linking them together.

As what we are discussing here are social processes, this study also acknowledges that there are no sharp dividing lines between these different categories. It is important to note that none of these geopolitical orders/discourses replaced former ones in absolute terms. Orders/discourses continued to co-exist. Moreover, at times

[137] Gerard Toal, "Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics," in Lasha Tchantouridze (ed.), *Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns*, Bison Paper 4, Manitoba: Contemporary Printing, 2004, pp. 75-102.

of geopolitical disorder and transition, it is possible to observe all historical geographical discourses at the same time with equal strength, as in the case of the post-Cold War era.

At this point I would like to argue that the three geopolitical discourses, outlined by Agnew, now do co-exist. Civilizational geopolitics might have started in the eighteenth century but it would be wrong to assume that it ended at the end of the nineteenth century; it has never ceased to exist. Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis serves as a good example of this. This continuity is closely related to the fact that these orders/discourses shape how we see the world and become "real" from our perspective.

The basic characteristic of geopolitical orders/discourses/conditions or whatever we may choose to call them is that they all enumerate friends and enemies. Modern geopolitical discourse emerged with the Age of Discovery and the European geographical exploration and discovery of the continents such as America and Africa, which also meant the discovery of the "other." At its center lay issues of identity and difference. Although the language and the points of emphasis of each have changed over the course of history, the essence has always remained the same: the us/them dichotomy. In the final analysis, world politics consists of a range of "us and them" relations and the struggle between these two will continue to exist,

regardless of whether the difference between “us” and “them” is religion, language, race, color, or something else.

Critical geopolitics is thus relevant to the study and theory of IR, despite the fact that it continues to be neglected in IR teaching and thinking. In the following pages, building upon the ideas brought forward by the prominent figures of critical geopolitics, I will reflect upon issues regarding geopolitical discourse and the relation between geopolitics, discourse, and hegemony, in an endeavor to analyze the characteristics of modern geopolitical discourse. In doing this, I aim to illustrate the relevance of critical geopolitics to IR theory and practice.

Following this, in an effort to offer for an explanation regarding the essential characteristics of modern geopolitical discourse, I will resort to sociology and make use of the premises of identity politics, the crises of European identity, and humans’ need to belong and categorize.

3.2.Modern Geopolitical Discourse

According to the *Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought*, the concept “discourse” is usually equated with language “in use,” taking account of actually occurring texts in a genuine context. It is concerned with the meaning of the

"utterance" rather than the "sentence" and thus related to pragmatics. The concepts of discourse range from the most narrow text-linguistic description to macro concepts "which attempt to define theoretically ideological clusters or 'discursive formations' which systematically organize knowledge and experience, and repress alternatives through dominance."[138]

Discourse is thus the domain of language-use, unified by common assumptions[139] and by which words are used and take on specific meanings. In this respect discourse simply means "the way in which we use language to construct meaning or the way in which we infuse words with meaning or significance."[140]

In poststructural analysis discourses are regarded as practices that "systematically form or create the objects that they speak."[141] In this respect, according to poststructuralism, discourses are themselves a form of practice. The dividing line between theory and practice thus collapses, meaning that theory is practice.[142] From

[138] William Outhwaite; Tom Bottomore (eds.), *Dictionary of Twentieth Century Social Thought*, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993, p. 161.

[139] Nicholas Abercrombie; Stephen Hill; Bryan S. Turner, *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, London: Penguin, 1994, p. 119.

[140] Jill Steans; Lloyd Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2001, p. 222.

[141] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes* p.137.

[142] David Grondin, "(Re)Writing the 'National Security State': How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2004, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72868_index.html, p. 1.

this vantage point, dominant theories are regarded as dominant discourses that shape our view of the world and our ways of understanding it. According to Grondin,

> [a] discourse is a way of learning about "something out there in the "real world": it is rather a way of producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing. We consider "real" what we consider significant: a discourse is always an interpretation, a narrative of multiple realities inscribed in a specific social or symbolic order. Discursive representation is therefore not neutral; individuals in power are those who are "authorized" to produce "reality" and therefore, knowledge. In this context, power is knowledge and the ability to produce that which is considered "true".[143]

If we treat discourses as practices, it becomes possible to argue for a triangular relationship wherein theories create discourse, which in turn creates practice, which is again theorized by the theorists. I, however, think that in the end there exists a material world out there. This material world is to a large extent shaped by the dominant discourses, though they are not necessarily the only determinants.

One of the basic aims of critical geopolitics is to deconstruct hegemonic geopolitical discourses. Discourse analysis thus constitutes the basic element of this approach. As put by Toal:

> (…) to study geopolitics we must study discourse, which can be defined as the representational practices by which cultures creatively constitute meaningful worlds. (...) Most cultures do this by means of stories (narratives) and images. (...) Since geopolitics is a discourse with distinctive 'world' constitutive ambitions (...) we must be attentive to the ways in which global

[143] Grondin, "(Re)Writing the 'National Security State'…," pp. 6-7.

> space is labeled, metaphors are deployed, and visual images are used in this process of making stories and constructing images of world politics.[144]

Critical geopolitics argues that geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge relation and should thus be critically investigated. Such an analysis enables us to see how social and political life is constructed through discourses. What is said or written by political elites—the whole community of government officials, political leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors—is a result of the unconscious adoption of rules of living, thinking, and speaking that are implicit in the texts, speeches, and documents. This group, on the other hand, is also considered to be the elite that guides the masses concerning how they should live, think, and speak. It is thus a ready-made way of thinking and has similarities with the characteristics of ideologies. Thus analyzing geopolitical discourse, by revealing the writing of the international geopolitical order, is of crucial importance, since it informs action and practice in the world. [145] As put forward by Dodds:

> [d]iscourses play a prominent role in mobilizing certain simple geographical understandings about the world which assist in the justification of particular policy decisions. Political speeches, for instance offer possibilities for the promotion of certain ideas to influential actors in world politics. The use of symbolism, metaphors and tropes can be crucial to the shaping of political understanding (…)[146]

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[144] Gerard Toal quoted in Leonhardt van Efferink, "The Definition of Geopolitics," January 2009, www.exploringgeopolitics.org.

[145] Nicholas Abercrombie; Stephen Hill; Bryan S. Turner, *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, London: Penguin, 1994, p. 120.

[146] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 35.

The term “geopolitical discourse,” as used by Agnew and Corbridge, refers to how the geography of international political economy has been “written and read” in the practice during different periods of geopolitical order. Policies in/of each order have been developed and carried out around certain characterizations of space, places, and peoples, defined and determined by certain modes of representation.

This study argues that when we are to study international politics as a whole, it is the dominant geopolitical discourse that matters. I have argued that discourses are not the only determinants of reality and acknowledged that in the end there is a material world out there quite apart from them. But when dealing with international politics I argue that discourses do in fact shape our reality. The world in its totality and relations produced and experienced on it are beyond our perception as human beings. We access this world- the world of foreign relations- only through discourse. Thus, in international relations our perception is shaped by dominant theories and discourses which constitute our reality and truth. Since IR is a Western enterprise, its dominant discourse has been the discourse of the Western hegemony, be it European or American.

The basic characteristic of modern geopolitical discourse is the drawing of dividing lines between friends and enemies. Modern geopolitical discourse emerged with the Age of Discovery, with the discovery of the “other.” Thus issues of identity and difference lie at its center. Although the language and the points of emphasis have changed over the course of history, the essence of the discourse has always remained the same.

This foundation upon which geopolitical discourses are based is, in my opinion, a combination of several interwoven factors. The first factor, which I will be reflecting upon in the following pages, lies in the interests of dominant powers or the hegemon.

3.2.1. The Geopolitical Discourse of the Hegemon

Analysis of discourse has turned out to be a fashion in the academy since the post-positivist turn in the social sciences during the 1980s. The core argument has been that discourses serve political purposes. Accordingly dominant discourses serve the purposes of dominant powers.

Contrary to the legal assumption that states are equal sovereign entities, the reality is quite the opposite. At any given time over the course of the history of the inter-state system, there have always been certain states that were, in George Orwell's words, "more equal than others."

As put forth by Ratzel as early as 1897, each geographical part of the world is in relation with other parts and they all together constitute a whole. The total space is limited, and thus all political extensions of territory have to stop at some point. Since the size of the earth's surface puts limits on expansion, the "zenith" can be reached

by only a few states at the same time.[147] This geographical analogy is also valid for other sorts of distribution of power, whether in terms of population, wealth, technology, military potential, etc.

Thus, logically speaking, at any given time there are certain dominant powers, and sometimes there is one decidedly more dominant than others in world politics, namely "the ruler" (hegemon). As noted in the second chapter of this study, the pursuit of primacy by the dominant states of the interstate system, i.e. the quest to be "the ruler," was a central concern of traditional geopolitical theorists. Theorists of the dominant powers all sought to make their countries "the ruler," which led to the conceptualization of the world in terms of power politics. For them, the world's surface was the board upon which they applied their grand strategy for their country's acquisition of more power.

Hegemons by definition act along geopolitical lines and require geopolitical analysis and advice in order to maintain their power and status. Regarding geopolitical theories, the Earth is a given natural/geographical entity. The world, in contrast, is an artificially produced political/historical entity. It is thus important to understand that geopolitics is not a given, but rather a human construction made either by or for the hegemon.

[147] Ratzel, "Studies in Political Areas …," p. 299.

This study argues that it is the hegemon or the strongest state of the world political arena that shapes practice and accordingly the reality in the international realm, though other major powers may contribute to a greater or lesser degree to this process. It is a fact that superpowers/hegemons have a capacity to influence events at a global level. As the main aim of dominant powers or the hegemon is to maintain their position on the top of the world, they tend to incorporate as much of the world as possible into their "sphere of influence."

The concept of "spheres of influence" can be defined as the territory in which a superpower can wield effective power. The size of the sphere of influence and the degree of the influence enjoyed by a country determines a country's "superpowerness." The aims and aspirations of superpowers are codified in geopolitical discourse in order to legitimize their international role and increase their sphere of influence.

To create and increase spheres of influence, dominant powers or the hegemon, when there is one, need to acquire supporters. An important component of this process of creating "spheres of influence" is discourse. Hegemons shape geopolitical understandings of the world through discourse. The process of "shaping the reality" by the hegemon is bound up with the process of shaping the discourse. In other words hegemons need discourses based upon the enemy/friend dichotomy in order to

legitimize their mission and maintain their status and sphere of influence. That is why friends and foes, threats and dangers have to be created.

A constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is needed for the state, nation, and spheres of influence to exist, as they are always in flux. As David Campbell points out, "danger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. (…) Nothing is a risk in itself; (…) it all depends on how one analyses danger, considers the event."[148]

To make the others identify themselves with, the superpower assumes certain missions and generates discourses based upon dichotomies. As described by Short, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Spain—then the hegemon power—defined itself as the protector of Christian virtue. Its mission was to maintain a Catholic light in the darkness of paganism. In the nineteenth century, the British Empire assumed a civilizing mission, to protect "the" civilization against the darkness of the undeveloped primitive barbarians. In the twentieth century, the USA assumed the role of world policeman in order to fight against the evil communism and save the

[148] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1994, pp. 1-2.

world.[149] As Short points out dominant powers tend to come in pairs; they struggle and contest with each other for domination.[150]

> Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage, the USA and the USSR; the bipolarities continue through the centuries. An essential element in their relationship is their denigration of each other. The competitor becomes the 'evil other', the source of disorder and unrest, a country populated by demons and devils. In the rhetoric of the cold war the USA saw the USSR as a menace to peace and world harmony, hell-bent on world domination. The Soviets, in contrast, saw an enemy empire which had military bases all over the world, which had used the atomic bomb on innocent civilians, which wanted to destroy their society. Opinions were polarized; it was a case of forces of good against the power of darkness. The ideologies fed off each other, they needed each other to provide an enemy, an easily identifiable source of trouble. The USA could blame the USSR for social unrest around the world, the USSR could see the hand of the Americans whenever the population in their satellite states of Eastern Europe wanted more independence. There was a symmetry. The CIA could see the KGB at work, the KGB was sure of CIA involvement. Military build-up in the USA led to a military build-up in the USSR, which led the Pentagon to ask for more money, which in turn led the generals of the Red Army to demand more military hardware.[151]

There is always room for criticism regarding these discourses and the roles assumed by the hegemon. It is important to acknowledge, however, that these conceptualizations remain dominant as long as the given hegemony survives. Thus we reach another definition of geopolitics. It is possible to argue that geopolitics is the politics generated and applied by dominant powers. In this respect Dodds makes a pertinent observation:

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[149] John Rennie Short, *An Introduction to Political Geography*, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 73.

[150] Short, *An Introduction to Political Geography*, p. 54.

[151] Short, *An Introduction to Political Geography*, p. 54.

> The current distribution of power within the international system means that some states (…) are in a better position than others to influence the production and circulation of political discourses, hence they possess the capacity to shape geopolitical understanding of the world.[152]

Thus the use of discourse based upon binary oppositions, the hierarchical layering of global space, and the geographical division of the world along binary oppositions constitutes the fundamental characteristics of the geopolitical discourse of the hegemon. These affect the course of world politics and, accordingly, IR and its theories.

Modern geopolitical discourse is a product of a Western/European worldview and identity politics. Thus, it would be appropriate to have a closer look at the process of the formation of the Western/European identity and the categorizations and classifications generated by it.

Agnew and Corbridge ask the important question of why there has been an insistence in modern geopolitical discourse on characterizing geopolitical difference in terms of a temporal/historical ideal type, that of modern versus backward. They seek the answer in European history. Although I consider history to be relevant, I believe that this insistence is also related to humans' never-ending need to categorize, identify, and belong and the problems of Western/European identity.

[152] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 36.

In this respect, setting aside the historical aspects of the development of modern geopolitical discourse to be dealt with later on, at this point of the study I would like to refer to sociology in order to be able to reach some more comprehensive answers.

3.2.2. Our Need to Categorize, Identify and Belong

> *There is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the unknown. He wants to see what is reaching toward him, and to be able to recognize or at least classify it.* [153]

In modern life, one of the greatest human fears is the "fear of the touch of the unknown." All of the boundaries that men create around themselves are dictated by this fear. They shut themselves into houses that no one may enter. As Canetti puts it, the fear of burglars is not only the fear of being robbed, but also the fear of a sudden and unexpected threat.[154]

The fear of being touched remains with us when we go out among other people; the way we move in a busy street, in restaurants, trains or buses, is governed by it.[155] Even when we stand next to others and are able to watch and examine them closely,

[153] Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, London: Penguin, 1973, p. 15.

[154] Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, p. 15.

[155] Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, p. 15.

we avoid closer contact. That is why we apologize[156] when we touch somebody while walking in a crowded street, or in a bus, although that simple touch does not hurt. Indeed, we apologize not for hurting him or her, but for touching and making them uncomfortable.

It is only in a crowd that man becomes free of this fear of being touched. This is the only situation in which the fear changes into its opposite.[157] In other words, since no man lives in isolation, man needs a crowd to belong in order to avoid this fear. He needs a crowd, a group, a family, and then a larger family to exist in and to live in.

According to Canetti there are two main crowd categories: the open and the closed crowd. The open crowd is the natural one. It has no limits, wants to consist of more and more people, and to seize everyone within reach. In his words, "The urge to grow is the first and supreme attribute of the crowd."[158] It is open everywhere and in any direction. The open crowd exists so long as it grows; it disintegrates as soon as it stops growing.

> A few people may have been standing together -five, ten or twelve, not more; nothing has been announced, nothing is expected. Suddenly everywhere is black with people and more come streaming from all sides as though streets had only one direction. Most of them do not know what has happened and, if

[156] Canetti, *Crowds and Power,* p. 15.

[157] Canetti, *Crowds and Power,* p. 16.

[158] Canetti, *Crowds and Power,* p. 17.

> questioned, have no answer; but they hurry to be there where most other people are. There is a determination in their movement, which is quite different from the expression of ordinary curiosity. It seems as though the movement of some of them transmits itself to the others. But that is not all; they have a goal which is there before they can find words for it. This goal is the blackest spot where most people are gathered.[159]

Canetti notes that this is the extreme form of the spontaneous crowd. In its innermost core it is not quite as spontaneous as it appears, but, except for the five, ten, or twelve people with whom it actually originates, it is everywhere spontaneous. But just as suddenly as it emerges, the open crowd disintegrates. Its openness brings about its end at the same time as it helps it grow. It absorbs everyone as a result of its nature. Because of its nature it can grow indefinitely, it can spring up anywhere, and it is possessed of a universal interest. But again, because of its nature, it must ultimately fall into pieces.[160]

The open crowd does not serve as a basis for any meaningful identity unit as we define the term. The concept itself is, however, useful for understanding human need for collectivities and human fear of environment. It thus provides a useful framework for analyzing society.

[159] Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, p. 16.

[160] Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, p. 17.

In contrast to the open crowd, there is the *closed* crowd, which renounces growth and puts the stress on permanence.[161] The most distinctive feature is that it has a boundary. The boundary prevents disorderly increase and dispersal, and thus the dissolution of the crowd. In Canetti's words:

> It establishes itself by accepting its limitation. It creates a space for itself which it will fill [in]. This space can be compared to a vessel into which liquid is being poured and whose capacity is known. The entrances to this space are limited in number, and only these entrances can be used; the boundary is respected whether it consists of stone, of solid wall, or of some special act of acceptance, or entrance fee. Once the space is completely filled, no one else is allowed in. Even if there is overflow, the important thing is always the dense crowd in the closed room; those standing outside do not really belong.[162]

The distinction between these two categories—the open and the closed crowd—give us some tips for understanding the processes of the formation of identity groups. The strength and importance of a "common fear" and the need for "protection" in a general sense make people come together and *constitute* collectivities. In order to prevent these collectivities from falling apart boundaries are drawn and maintained.

In today's world everyone is a member of numerous groups: family, the company one works for, an ethnicity to which one belongs and usually a citizenship. "These groups vary in size and longevity, from a few individuals in a nuclear family to hundreds of millions in large ethnic groups, from a tribe that may exist for centuries

[161] Canetti, *Crowds and Power* , p. 17.

[162] Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, p. 17.

to a department in a company that may be created and dismantled within a few years."[163]

As Bell-Fialkoff puts it, whatever its size and longevity, each group tries to maintain homogeneity. Each group explicitly or implicitly creates a set of rules that members are expected to follow. The very existence of a group depends on its ability to keep its members together. The stronger it establishes its solidarity, by maintaining a system of symbols and sets of rules governing relationships between group members and outsiders, the longer it exists.[164]

The concept of the closed crowd may serve as a basis for our understanding of collective identities. In the modern world this larger family is usually regarded as one's ethnic group or nation in which s/he satisfies the need of belonging. Within these groups individuals satisfy not only the need for belonging but also are provided with self-esteem, social status, existential security and knowledge, and social protection.[165] For sure these four factors can be regarded as the elements of our 'need to belong'. Identification theory, which is a psychological theory, is useful in understanding why we need collective identities:

[163] Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 70.

[164] Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*, p. 70.

[165] Colin Wayne Leach; Lisa M. Brown, "Ethnicity and Identity Politics," *Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Volume 1,* San Diego; London: Academic Press, p. 767.

> In order to achieve psychological security, every individual possesses an inherent drive to internalize—to identify with—the behavior, mores and attitudes of significant figures in her/his social environment; i.e. people actively seek identity. Moreover every human being has an inherent drive to enhance and to protect the identifications he or she has made; i.e. people actively seek to enhance and protect identity.[166]

As this point illustrates it is not any specific identity category or unit like national identity that is printed in our genes, but rather the need to belong and the need for security. Identity units have existed since the dawn of history, and will probably continue to do so until the end of the human world.

Our need to belong to a crowd is also closely associated with and necessitated by our need to categorize. We approach the world through categorizations. We categorize things, substances, peoples, animals, plants, in short, our whole environment. We name birds and trees although they do not have any "true" names. When we learn these artificial names as we grow, we also learn the prejudices ingrained in these categorizations. In time we construct our own prejudices and our own knowledge of our environment. In other words the cognitive actions of typifying and categorizing constitute the essential elements of the relations of the self with the environment.

[166] William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 23.

As Jenkins puts it, to identify something is to locate it in time and space and identifications are always constructed from a point of view.[167] In order to be able to locate ourselves in time and space we identify ourselves and our environment. In time, our categorizations become more precise and we identify ourselves with *something* and internalize it as part of us. Inevitably, this internalization involves externalization and these two together draw our social map. We project ourselves into cultural identities, internalize their meanings and values, and make them part of us.[168]

In other words, to locate ourselves in time and space we need to typify, categorize, and identify what is around us. Although the process of categorization itself is problematic, misguiding and reductionist, it is yet crucial to every human being. As neurobiologists put it, mapping/categorizing is a central activity of the brain. When there is no categorization, we feel chaos.

All collective identity units and their elements—ethnicity, religion, nationality—serve as a mean of typifying the world. They are pre-constituted and pre-organized and thus taken for granted. Most of the time we think that they are imprinted in our genes.[169] This world is experienced by us "as a web of social relationship, of systems

[167] Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, London; New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 27.

[168] Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in Stuart Hall; David Held; Tony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and Its Futures*, Cambridge: Polity, 1992, p. 276.

[169] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," p. 276.

of signs and of institutionalized forms of social organization."[170] It is important to note that our identification takes place within this "taken for granted framework of cultural patterns."[171] In Alfred Schultz's words,

> Any member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standardised scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all situations which normally occur within the social world.[172]

Marilynn Brewer's "optimal distinctiveness" theory is also important for understanding identities. According to Brewer people have simultaneous needs for differentiation and inclusion. People want to be different and same at the same time. As a result of these two competing tendencies, people often move from one situation to another in order to balance their need for differentiation and their need for inclusion.[173]

Thus, the processes of categorization and identification necessitate drawing a line between "us" and "them." In the formation of the spheres of influence of the

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[170] Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers I*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, pp. 226-231 quoted in Tarja Väyrynen, "Socially Constructed Ethnic Identities: A Need For Identity Management," in Håkan Wiberg; Christian P. Scherrer (eds.), *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*, Aldershot; Singapore; Sdney: Ashgate, 1999, p. 132.

[171] Väyrynen, "Socially Constructed Ethnic Identities: A Need For Identity Management?," p. 132.

[172] Schutz, *Collected Papers I*, quoted in Väyrynen, "Socially Constructed Ethnic Identities: A Need For Identity Management?," p. 132.

[173] Leach; Brown, "Ethnicity and Identity Politics," p. 768.

hegemon, an identity—"us"— is developed. This development also necessitates the creation of the "other." This point brings us to the issue of identity politics.

3.2.3. Identity Politics and the Creation of "Other"

When answering the question "when did international relations first start?" there are several answers. From the perspective of identity studies one answer is that international relations started with the conquest of the "other."

As the core element in each conflict or struggle is difference, the creation of the "other" then becomes the core element of geopolitics. For an identity unit to develop there needs to be at least two agents. There can be no single identity without an other.

In every identity unit there are certain binding factors—be they race, nation, culture, ethnicity, religion, or language—that constitute "us" and maintain the boundary between "us" and "them," "they," or the "other." The "other"—be it an enemy or a

friend—is always one of the main ingredients that constitutes a unit of identity. Sometimes these boundaries or differences are built and sometimes the "given differences" are made stronger. According to political preferences, the degree of conflict, or the degree of the potential of a conflict, the lines of these differences may wax or wane. Identity and difference and the relation between these two constitute one of the main determinants of social life.

> The practical significance of men for another (…) is determined by both similarities and differences among them. Similarity as fact or tendency is no less important than difference. In the most varied forms both are the great principles of all internal and external development. In fact the cultural history of mankind can be conceived as the history of the struggles and conciliatory attempts between the two.[174]

Identities are created in and through opposition to other identities. In our social environment we discover ourselves by categorizing our environment as "us" and "them." Historically all national identities, all sub-national and supra-national identities have "others" and boundaries in-between. A state's "other" is very often its neighboring states and societies. A sub-national or an ethnic identity's "other" is usually the national identity of the country in which its adherents live. A supra-national identity's "other" could be the state identity and the national identities themselves. Sometimes the "other" is regarded as an enemy; this makes the identity stronger and more distinct. In such situations the definition of "us" centers upon not being the other.

[174] K. H. Wolff (ed.), *The Sociology of George Simmel*, New York: Free Press, p. 30 quoted in Jenkins, *Social Identity*, p. 6.

> (…) one of the things *we* have in common is our difference from *others*. In the face of their difference, our similarity often comes into focus. Defining 'us' involves defining a range of 'thems' also. When we say something about others, we are often saying something about ourselves (…) Similarity and difference reflect each other across a shared boundary. At the boundary we discover what we are and what we are not.[175]

The existence of the "other" and of difference involves both objective and subjective elements. For any unit of identity there is a need for an "other." As Yurdusev puts it, "[l]ogically, to identify something means to differentiate it, and similarly to identify yourself with some group, requires that you to distance yourself from another."[176] Furthermore we see that historically all societies have been defined through their differences from other societies. Thucydides tells us that the Hellenes are identified through their difference from the Persians. Similarly the English and French mutually determined each other. The Ottomans of the East had been an important factor in the formation of the European identity.[177]

Thus, the ideas of "other" and "foreigner" are not new; both terms have a long history. In ancient Greece people born from non-Athenian parents were considered

[175] Jenkins, *Social Identity*, pp. 80-81.

[176] Nuri Yurdusev, "Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)-European Relations," in Tare Ismael; Mustafa Aydın (eds.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p. 82.

[177] Yurdusev, "Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)-European Relations," p. 83.

as foreigners and did not have the right to be elected or to elect.[178] During the development of Christianity, Christians, despite their universalist idea of "love your neighbor" created their own others: the non-Christians.[179] During the feudalism of the Middle Ages, the person who was not born on the territory of the landlord was the other.[180] After the rise of the nation-state non-citizens became the other. During the twentieth century, the mass immigration all over the globe that took place as a result of the economic, political and social conditions, created the emergence of new others. Throughout the European history the process of the creation of the "other" was closely related with the process of European geographical explorations.

It is important to note that, because identities are imagined does not mean that they are imaginary. They are socially real.[181] The elements of identities may change over time; they might be constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed in the course of history. We cannot accept or expect any identity unit to be homogenous and static forever, but this does not make them imaginary or unreal. Identities are socially real. That is why identities are important regarding politics. Men's mass mobilization can only be obtained for the sake of the survival of identity.

[178] Nazan Aksoy, "Çokkültürlülük Üstüne," *Modernleşme ve Çokkültürlülük*, Helsinki Yurttaşlar Deneği, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001, p. 51.

[179] Aksoy, "Çokkültürlülük Üstüne," p. 51.

[180] Aksoy, "Çokkültürlülük Üstüne," p. 51.

[181] Jenkins, *Social Identity*.

Both modern geopolitics and IR theory are Western enterprises and depend upon Western/European identity. It is thus important to understand the process and history of Western/European identity formation and the categorizations and classifications generated by it, in order to be able to reach a better understanding of modern geopolitical discourse and its perspective on world politics. In the following section I will reflect upon the problems of European and Western identity, which directly affected modern geopolitical discourse, which in turn shaped world politics.

3.2.4. Problems of the Western/European Identity and Modern Geopolitical Discourse

Now what's going to happen to us without Barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.[182]

Western identity is an identity unit that has developed on the basis of European identity. It is thus appropriate to begin with an examination of the formation of European identity.

What is Europe? Europe has not only been a geographical space; it is a concept that has represented a social, political, and cultural value; it has been a civilizational

[182] C. P. Cavafy, *C. P. Cavafy: Collected Poems*, E. Keeley and P. Sherrard (trans.), London, 1975, p. 15.

domain and a historical actor. However, both the physical boundaries of Europe and the cultural and political concepts associated with the idea of Europe have been subject to dispute. To the extent that one wishes to speak of a common European historical destiny and identity, one would find that European history has more often witnessed competition, rivalry, strife and war than cooperation.[183]

Despite the optimistic views, discussions on European identity conclude that this identity unit has always lacked necessary objective elements as common language, common historical experience, common ethnic stock, territory, common culture, etc., and has developed around the concept of the "other,"[184] namely the "barbar." Thus, use of binary oppositions and "otherization" was a necessity for the creation of a European consciousness, common identity, and cause. In other words, the only solution to the crises of the European identity is in the existence/creation of the "other." When there is no other, there can be no European identity or Europeans.

Geographical discoveries of places such as America and Africa played a significant role in the formation of European identity. As Europeans discovered people that were different from them, they needed to categorize this world and create an identity with which they could affiliate themselves.

[183] Tom Bryder, "A Contribution from political Psychology," in Jansen, T. (ed.) *Reflections on European Identity,* http://europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/working-paper/ european_identity_en.pdf

[184] For a wider discussion on this see Nuri Yurdusev, "Turkey and Europe: The Other in Identity Formation," *Zeitschrift fur Turkeistudies,* 13. Jahrganh, Heft 1, 2000, pp. 85-94.

The discovery of a new world across the Atlantic as well as the "old" world of Africa and of seemingly "primitive" peoples in all parts of the world, encouraged fifteenth century Europeans to identify themselves with a civilization surrounded by barbarians.[185] Thus an idea of a distinct European civilization reaching back beyond to Ancient Greece and Rome started to develop. Herodotus, in the mid-fifth century BC, referred to the "barbarians" to define non-Greeks; by the time of Aristotle a hundred years later barbarians and barbarous nations had come to be defined by certain types of behavior reference to cultural habits. The "barbarians" had become lesser people than the Greeks, who were seen by themselves, and later by the Europeans, as the epitome of civilization.[186]

Thus, by making use of geographical science, Europeans wrote and created a chain of history from ancient Greece and Rome with which European civilization could affiliate itself. Europeans identified themselves with Greco-Roman traditions, law and democracy, Christian theology, Renaissance humanism and individualism, and Enlightenment rationalism. This trend ended with the idea that civilization was white and Christian and everything else was barbarian.[187]

[185] Roger Osborne, *Civilization: A New History of the Western World*, London: Vintage, 2007, p. 4.

[186] Osborne, *Civilization: A New History of the Western World*, p.3.

[187] Osborne, *Civilization: A New History of the Western World*, p. 5

Thus, in the process of European identity formation, categorization and identification has always been carried out by means of hierarchical binary oppositions such as civilized West, primitive East. The first term in each opposition referred to a privileged entity whereas the second term identifying the "barbar" was always viewed as inferior.[188]

The feeling of superiority in time paved the way for the European perception that Europe was the best governed and most civilized area of the entire world. European discourse constructed Europe as "the" civilization that shaped the developments and conceptions in "other" parts of the world.

Thus, the borders of Europe as "the civilization" were determined along civilizational lines. The "boundary" example of the Ottoman Empire, for Agnew, is an explanatory case in this regard. The Ottoman Empire, contrary to its active role in European politics from the fifteenth century onwards, was not recognized as a part of the Concert of Europe. The fundamental barrier to the Turkish participation was "otherness." Turks were constructed/perceived as the "others" of the European civilization and, under the circumstances of civilizational geopolitics, "otherness" played a crucial role as the main determinant of political practices.

[188] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 138.

In this respect, a civilizational geopolitical thinking emerged based upon hierarchical divisions. Hegel was an influential philosopher in terms of such categorizations. In his *The Philosophy of Right*, published in 1821, Hegel divided the world into four realms in a hierarchical order and argued for Oriental as the lowest category, Germans as the highest, and placed the Greeks and Romans in-between.[189]

Civilizational geopolitical discourse was based upon the idea of European uniqueness and distinctiveness as a civilization and reached its peak in the first half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis was not only upon difference but also superiority.

The most important of the various binary oppositions to be combined with the feeling of superiority has been a persisting East-West divide. In the European case, the Orient (East) was "considered as the negation of all that was being claimed for the West."[190] Binary divisions also worked with other basic oppositions "between temperate and torrid climates, pluralist West and despotic East, sea powers and land powers, and civilized and barbarian, that relate ideas about the nature of economic and political practices to geopolitical visions of how the world works as a whole."[191]

[189] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, p. 43.

[190] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, p. 43.

[191] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, p. 30.

This geopolitical era was followed by what Agnew termed naturalized geopolitics. Geographical research in the nineteenth century, influenced by the work of Charles Darwin, was primarily engaged with the rules of nature. This approach led to a rather deterministic view of geography: history was to be explained as a consequence of natural conditions.[192] At the end of the nineteenth century civilizational geopolitical thinking and the Darwinian racial biological mindset that prevailed within social sciences as a scientific trend of the time melted into each other and all categorizations generated by European mindset started to be perceived as natural.

The colonial and imperial interests, strategies, modes of annexation and control and territorial ambitions boosted civilizational thinking combined with Darwinian thinking which in return legitimized colonialism. In accordance with this outlook European geopoliticians foresaw that,

> (…) 'our' civilization is bigger, better, and more advanced than others., that 'we' have a right to invade, annex and control territories which currently serve as the ecumene of civilizations with different ambitions; and that 'we' have a moral duty to export and impose our concepts of progress upon other civilizations whether they want it or not.[193]

Traditional geopolitics was built upon that basis. Traditional geopolitics, especially at the end of the nineteenth century, sought to explain in scientific terms the direction

[192] Goodall, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, pp. 155-156.

[193] Mark Boyle, "A Good Act of Contrition?: Geography, Civilizational Thinking and the Colonial Present," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 13, October 2008, p. 726.

in which history was moving.[194] The gaze of geopolitical theorists enjoying a "God's eye view" of the world was another important characteristic regarding categorizations.

According to Toal the geopolitical gaze might from a critical point of view be reduced to a single Western eye, gazing at the whole world map from a Western imperial vantage point, using Western systems of identity/difference, and creating a Western world order.[195] The so-called fathers of geopolitics established and codified what Toal calls "a distinctive geographical gaze" upon international politics. For Taol the aim of this gaze was to monitor and control the chaos of international affairs by categorizing the objects to be defined. At the center lay a sovereign center of judgment, the Western "I/eye," with an impulse to master. Toal's use of "I/eye," or in other words his equation of eye with I, is a simplification which perfectly illustrates the traditional European mindset of geopolitical thinking.

The gaze of the I/eye on international politics in order to monitor, control, and master the chaos makes implicit and explicit categorizations**.** "By gathering, codifying, and disciplining the heterogeneity of the world's geography into the categories of

[194] Toal, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p. 25.

[195] Toal, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p. 53.

Western thought, a decidable, measured, and homogenous world of geographical objects, attributes, and patterns is made visible, produced."[196]

> Traditionally, geopolitics has claimed to be able to paint neutral and complete pictures of "how the world works": what drives historical changes, what causes countries to fight, what determines whether a country will become a great power or not. The classical geopoliticians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries invoked a "God's eye view of the world," providing simple histories or theories that, they claimed, not only explained what has happened in the past, but suggested particular policies to inform the actions of their own country in a global competition with others. In other words, geopoliticians made dubious claims of historical and theoretical "objectivity" to support their own biased view of how their own country should compete in the world.[197]

As critical geopolitical studies point out, geopolitical knowledge is situated knowledge. European geopolitical theoreticians constructed their frameworks within particular political contexts and within particular academic debates (paradigms) that were influential at a particular time.[198] As is illustrated in Flint's *Introduction to Geopolitics*, among the basic features of classical geopolitics are: an author in a privileged position (white, male, elite, and Western), the masculine perspective ("all seeing" and "all knowing"), labeling/classification (territories are given value and meaning), a call to objective theory or history (universal truths used to justify foreign

[196] Toal, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p. 53.

[197] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 33.

[198] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 17.

policy), simplification (a catchphrase to foster public support), and state-centricism (politics of territorial state sovereignty).[199]

Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen were among the most influential geographers in Europe, and all approached their subject with a civilizational and biological view of the world.[200] All claimed their own race to be superior. For them the better the race, the better its chances of survival in the process of natural selection. These nations would expand into the territory of "others" until they reached the border of an "equal."[201]

Traditional geopolitical theorists used a "limited and dubious Western-centric theory of 'history' to claim an objective, neutral and informed intellectual basis for what in fact is a very biased or 'situated' view with the aim of advocating and justifying the policy of one particular country."[202] As noted in the first chapter of this study, these geopolitical theorists had their own priorities and shaped reality accordingly.

The geopolitical subject of Mackinder, for example, was the Anglo-Saxon race, whose institution was the British Empire. In his famous address of 1904, Mackinder

[199] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 17.

[200] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," p. 175.

[201] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," p. 175.

[202] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 18.

identified the "East" as perpetually threatening, unstable, and at times racially incapable of peaceful governance.[203] It is interesting to note that in his address Mackinder defined the USA as an eastern power. However, in 1919, his views had changed and he argued for the necessity of an Alliance with the USA as the USA had by then become a Western power for him.

According to Kearns, Mackinder considered three types of associations as important in order to sustain the (British) rule. The first type of association assumed a vertical relationship. In accordance with the Darwinian "scientific" realities, inferior/weaker races/nations needed the help of stronger and thus superior races/nations for their survival. Otherwise, they would cease to exist. That is how Mackinder explained why colonies and especially India needed British rule.[204] The second type of association foresaw the development of relations with white/equal colonies such as Canada. Third type of association was to establish alliances with Anglo-Saxons outside the British Empire. The development of geopolitical thinking in Germany also illustrated the classification of the earth and its peoples into a hierarchy that then justified political actions.

In short the processes of "otherization" and "barbarization" along civilizational lines, which was a necessity for the European identity to develop, has always played a

[203] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 35.

[204] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," p. 175.

crucial role in the Western/European identity formation, world domination, and legitimization, and continues to do so. Moreover this civilizational mindset developed in close association with geographical explorations. As Agnew puts it "since Columbus first returned from his trans-Atlantic voyages we have become so used to characterizing geographical differences in idealized temporal terms that we cannot see any problems with this way of thinking."[205] "We" have continued to read the *whole* world through these basic oppositions.

The making of geopolitics became possible when it was possible to view the world as a whole. Those looking at the world-picture were Europeans, and identifying Europe as different from the others on the other side of the boundary was necessary for the development of an European identity. As Agnew puts it, the European society and the idea of Europe itself could only arise in reference to what it was not and in relation to where it started and ended.[206] Throughout this identification process, what Agnew calls "binary geographies" developed.

Naturally Europeans identified themselves with positive features where they defined others by using oppositions; if the Europeans were advanced and modern then the Rest was backward and primitive. A sense of a hierarchy of human societies from primitive to modern was created among European intellectuals. These views, however, never rested on empirical evidence but rather on *a priori* assertions.

[205] Agnew, *Geopolitics,* p. 47.

[206] Agnew, *Geopolitics,* p. 20.

Western identity and geopolitical discourse carry all the above mentioned heritages of European identity. This study argues that just as the world is round, which is to say that the West may also be the East depending on one's perspective; the West is an identity unit, which covers Europe, the USA, and others that share the same mindset more than it is a geographical space. In other words, it is not a geographical unit, but rather an identity unit based upon the premises of European identity and its discursive aspects. This study moreover argues that this West has been dominant both in theory and practice of modern geopolitics and IR.

Using Canetti's definitions it is possible to argue that West as an identity unit is a semi-open crowd that wants to grow in every direction to rule the world, but is semi-closed as it knows that the bigger it gets the more easily it may fall apart. The only way to keep it safe and mobilized is to draw borders via geopolitical discourses as the West, in the final analysis, has no geographical boundaries.

In other words, as the modern European and accordingly Western identity lack necessary common objective elements like language, culture, geography, etc., its discourse has to depend upon the negation of the "other." When there is no "other" the Western identity is in crises. That is why from Mackinder to Churchill's "Iron Curtain" and from Reagan's "Evil Empire" to Bush's "Axis of Evil," the East-West dichotomy and the discourse based upon it have been used by dominant powers.

3.3.Concluding Remarks: The Reason of the Consistency

In this chapter, I offered a survey of critical geopolitics and its different perspective regarding world politics, with a special focus on modern geopolitical discourse. I aimed to illustrate the importance of analyzing geopolitical discourse and its relevance to the IR field, a subject upon which I will be reflecting more in the final chapter of this study. I examined the question posed by Agnew and Corbridge—why there has been insistence in modern geopolitical discourse on characterizing geopolitical difference in terms of a temporal/historical ideal type: modern and backward—but in addition to their explanations I also looked for an answer in identity studies and the formation of the European identity.

As modern geopolitics is a Western enterprise, its theory and practice relating to world politics has been shaped under the influence of the discourses of Western powers or hegemons. Other potential powers have played the role of the other. Theories developed in "other" countries have never become mainstream in Western geopolitical thinking. Thus modern geopolitical discourse carries the heritage of Western/European identity, the development of which has been based upon a range of hierarchical binary oppositions.

What I am arguing is that geopolitical discourse is an important aspect of world politics. Global geopolitics is determined by the discourse of dominant powers which is generated in their pursuit of their primacy. Dominant powers or hegemons have established geopolitical discourses to maintain their status. As geopolitics is a Western enterprise, its discourse is based upon Western categories of identity and difference.

In the end, we individuals internalized these discourses. We did so firstly because they served to satisfy our need to categorize, establish a fixed point of view, and belong. In other words these categorizations not only served the interests of the dominant powers, but also "ours."

Secondly, we bought into these discourses because we did not have any other chance as we do not have access to the world politics in its totality other than the dominant discourses. This is to say we need discourses, and when the issue at stake is international politics we have to buy into the dominant discourses as we do not have any other means of accessing this world. In the end what we have is a result of a semi-artificial and semi-natural process.

It is important to note that two sides of the discourses, the us/them dichotomy, are artificial. However, as soon as we buy into these discourses they become socially real. After that point it would be senseless to talk about the non-sense of the

discourse, now that it is real. Thus, just like social identities, discourses might be imagined but they are not imaginary; discourses are socially real.

All in all, all these arguments tell us that there is a consistency in modern Western geopolitical discourses. I will reflect upon the relevance of this consistency to the study of IR in the final chapter. Before that I would like to focus upon another issue: the importance of maps and cartography to geopolitical studies.

As critical geopolitics suggests, another main characteristics of modern geopolitical thinking is the visualization of the world as a whole. The mapping of global geopolitical space is a common concern for all geopolitical theorists. As the seers and discoverers of the "Earth," Europeans also created the "World" and its map. All the above mentioned oppositions were based and illustrated on these maps. The importance of map-making comes to light when viewed in this context. Europeans were capable of both making maps and imposing them on others. In doing so they shaped others' conceptualizations. Thus the next chapter addresses a crucial exercise of cartographic studies: mapmaking. I argue that mapmaking provides the foundation upon which rests the edifice of all assumptions related to world politics.

CHAPTER IV

GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF MAPS

4.1.Introduction: Seeing and Being

Maps are neither mirrors of nature nor neutral transmitters of universal truths. They are narratives with a purpose, stories with an agenda. They contain silences as well as articulations, secrets as well as knowledge, lies as well as truth. They are biased, partial, and selective.[207]

In one of his essays published in the newsletter of FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education, entitled "You Can't Argue with Geography," Walter A. McDougall shares one of his memories in teaching. I quote it in full:

> I suppose I am an old-fashioned teacher. My subject - diplomatic history and international relations- could not be further removed from the avant-garde of post-modern cultural studies. My methodology is traditional, centering on the critical interpretation of documentary evidence and the logic of cause and effect in the belief that facts exist and falsehood, if not perfect truth, is discoverable. My lectures and books are in narrative form, because in political history sequence is critical to understanding why decision-makers acted or reacted as they did. And my assignments require students to demonstrate knowledge of at least the most important names, dates, and events because concepts and theories are empty unless one knows what

[207] John Rennie Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, Firefly Boks Ltd., 2003, p.24.

factual evidence inspired them and what phenomena they are advanced to explain.

Old-fashioned, demanding, some would say boring—and yet, my courses in diplomatic history draw hundreds of students. Evidently, the collegiate consumers of history, not to mention the book-buying public, find more value and enjoyment in rigorous studies of the origins of wars and peace than in speculative studies of, for instance, the "gendering" of gravestones in 17th century France. The downside of having large classes, however, is that the only students I get to know personally are those who come to my office hours and voluntary discussion sections. So it was that I was taken aback when one anonymous face from my 19th century European diplomacy lectures visited my office accompanied by a big and decidedly businesslike black labrador dog. I was about to make a joke, or a protest, when I looked up and realized the young man was blind.

He felt for a chair and asked for my help: he had received a B+ on the midterm, but was used to getting straight A's. His problem, he said, was with maps. He could understand the ideological or commercial motivations for the foreign policies of liberal Britain, Napoleonic France, the multi-national Hapsburg Empire, or reactionary tsarist Russia. But he had trouble visualizing the strategic, balance-of-power relationships among the various states. Suddenly I felt both wholly inadequate and ashamed of feeling inadequate given the courage he boldly displayed. If a student unable to read by himself could aspire to study history, it was incumbent upon me to assist him. So I pulled out a map of Europe, took the boy's finger in my hand, and traced for him the coastlines of the continent and the location and boundaries of the various states. I showed him where the mountains and rivers were located, and tried to convey their strategic significance. I described how large the countries were — hoping that he had some notion of distance — and told him how swiftly (or slowly) pre-industrial sailing ships and armies could move so that he might imagine how railroads and steamships exploded the old equation between space and time. Never letting go of his finger lest he become disoriented, I repeated the lessons until he stopped me. His memory was extraordinary, and he soon displayed a better feel for the geopolitics of Europe than many, perhaps most, of my students blessed with sight. He would return periodically, however, for more information, such as the locations of the provinces of Italy and Germany that united into national states between 1859 and 1871, and I recall having an especially difficult time when the European colonialism of the 1880s ushered in the era of world politics. But he finished with an A in the course. The blind student had to learn his geography in order to understand history.[208]

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[208] Walter A. McDougall, "You Can't Argue with Geography," *The Newsletter of FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education*, Vol. 6, No. 5, 2000 at http://www.fpri.org/ footnotes/065.200009. mcdougall.cantarguegeography.html

Following a discussion about this memory, one of the conclusions that McDougall reaches is that "one must learn more geography whenever one endeavors to learn more history."

Throughout my graduate studies regarding diplomatic history, I had never been challenged to study geography. To be honest I never needed it to pass my class, but on the other hand I never felt that I knew diplomatic history. I think that my experience is probably similar to that of many IR students, since the field places so little emphasis on geography. I think that is also the case in the USA, the birth place of the discipline, since McDougall also complains about the geographical ignorance of his students and states that "it is so disheartening that most Americans emerge from their schooling as functional illiterates in geography."

All in all, I would totally agree with him that geography matters and one should know geography in order to be able to understand history. Although I agreed with McDougall when I first read this passage, I still asked myself why one should know geography in order to be able to understand history. That is how I realized that I had not thought on that matter before.

As I was staring at the computer screen with blank looks, I suddenly recalled Napoleon's words "every state pursues the politics of its own geography" which I

had known since long ago, but which at the time appeared to me to enclose new meanings.

Napoleon's words were not just a speculative statement or a motto; he was simply stating the truth: states did follow the politics necessitated by their country's geography and that was why there had been such a strong correlation between diplomatic history and geography. Rival states in search of power, which meant gaining more territory, simply pursued the politics dictated by their geography. That is why the blind student could not reach a comprehensive understanding of history, for he did not know geography. But what is a state's geography? How does one come to know the position of states on the earth, and what do statesmen look at when determining their grand political strategies? Maps. Thus a state's geography is its map. In other words, states are prisoners of their maps. What about us?

Geopolitics became possible when it was possible to view the world as a whole. Agnew suggests "the history of modern world politics has been structured by practices based on a set of understandings about 'the way the world works' that together constitute the elements of the modern geopolitical imagination."[209] This geopolitical imagination, which has its roots in the sixteenth century Europe, structured and conditioned world politics then and has continued to do so ever since. Though the players and the power balances between them have changed over the

[209] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, p. 4

centuries, the modern geopolitical imagination still remains prevalent in framing the conduct of world politics.

For Agnew the primary feature of modern geopolitical imagination is "global visualization," without which global politics would not be possible. In his words "world politics was invented only when it became possible to see the world in its totality (in the imagination) as a whole and pursue goals in relation to that geographical scale."[210]

Modern geopolitics became possible with global visualization and global visualization became possible with the development of modern maps. Maps enabled theorists and practitioners to see the world as a unitary whole. All grand strategies depend on world maps, which mean that the map is their fundamental assumption.

But what is a map? We encounter maps on a daily basis. The media uses them to pinpoint the location of some international crisis, books use them as illustrations, and we make use of them to go from one place to another. But, as David Stephens puts it, maps are so commonplace that we never question what they are; we just tend to take them for granted.[211]

[210] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, p. 2.

[211] David Stephens, "Making Sense of Maps," http://historymatters.gmu.edu/mse/maps/map.pdf

Throughout human history the world has been mapped and remapped, imagined and re-imagined. Our global visualization depends upon maps which we consider to be the mirrors of the world. All geopolitical theories are built upon the geographical assumptions put forth by maps. The map of a territory is not, however, the territory itself. Whichever projection is applied, mapmaking is in the final analysis an effort to reflect a three dimensional globe in only two dimensions. A certain degree of misrepresentation is thus inevitable. No map can truly reflect the territory it attempts to represent.

Thus if we are to study geopolitics or IR, it is necessary to have a closer look at maps and the assumptions inherent to them, as they are the dominant tools in the making of international politics and the shaping our conceptualizations. In other words, if we are to study relations among states, we need to know how to read their maps.

4.2.The Strength of the Map

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines a map as a "representation of (part of) the Earth's surface as if seen from above, showing the shape of countries, the position of towns, the height of land, the rivers, etc." The term "map" comes from the Latin "mappa," meaning cloth.[212] The uses of maps differ:

[212] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p.8.

they are used to plot journeys, sometimes to claim territory, or to locate phenomena, to describe the world, to explain history, to guide action, and to justify events[213]or to speculate about the future.

Maps are powerful texts. A map hung on a wall at a school or a conference room is powerful firstly because it has no author. This makes one think that the map is accurate and objective as an authorless scientific picture.[214] This authorless, objective, purely natural and neutral picture dominates our political and geographical imagination. Moreover, it is the only instrument that allows us to see the whole world at once.

As cartography studies point out, however, every map has an author. This invisible author of the map—the cartographer, that is—chooses the projection to be applied and the orientation of the map. Additionally, the cartographer is not the only author of a map. Maps might have many authors and many aims. After a brief discussion on these issues I will focus on Mercator, the most important map-maker in terms of the study of IR.

[213] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, 9.

[214] Ward Kaiser; Dennis Wood, *Seeing Through Maps: The Power of Images to Shape Our World View*, ODT Inc., 2001, p.4.

4.3.The Orientation of a Map and Map Distortions

Maps represent the world, or parts of the world, but do so from a particular direction. The directionality of a map is referred to as its orientation. Many people consider the north as the top of a map and south as the bottom, because the majority of contemporary maps reflect the reality as such. We, however, live in a spherical world where there is no obvious top or bottom and in a universe where the terms "top" and "bottom" actually have no intrinsic meaning.[215]

In modern maps north is up, south is down, east is to the right, and west is to the left. Still, the world is round, and whether we define the location of the USA as being in the east or that of Norway as being in the south; both definitions are correct. As will be recalled, Mackinder in his famous address defined USA as an eastern power.

Stuart McArthur's "Universal Corrective Map of the World" is an important projection in this respect. Australian citizen McArthur generated the "upside down" map of the world when he was a fifteen year old exchange student in Japan. The map illustrated that this fifteen year old is not coming from the bottom of the world (Australia) but rather from the top of the world.

[215] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography,* p. 14.



Figure 3: McArthur's Universal Corrective Map of the World[216]

Today, we are so used to seeing maps oriented toward the north that when we see one with an alternative orientation it comes as a great surprise. Throughout the history, however, people used different orientations. The term "orientation" is derived from the word "oriens" being the Latin for "east."

In the past, religion played a significant role in map orientations. Medieval cartographers often placed Jerusalem at the center of their maps, which were

[216]http://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=http://writing101.net/wp/wp-content/gallery/miscellaneous/mcarthur-map.jpg&imgrefurl=http://writing101.net/2008/09/14/questioning-tradition/&h=642&w=960&sz=154&tbnid=cij__q5qY2NB3M:&tbnh=99&tbnw=148&prev=/images%3Fq%3DMcArthur%2Bmap&usg=__CHzayiUQGctwsCgBjeTQ2eL9VYc=&sa=X &ei= untVT KeNK MyK OOO2 _Z4O&ved=0CBgQ9QEwAA, 15 June 2010.

orientated toward the Holy Land in the east, thus they had east at the top. In this respect, to orient a map meant placing east at the top. On the other hand, Islamic maps have always been oriented towards south to Mecca. Thus in Islamic maps south was shown at the top of the world.

It is possible to argue that map orientations are often the result of implicit judgments and particular perspectives on the world. The center of maps plays an important role regarding our perception of the world. In other words, map orientations structure how we see the map, thus the world and where we think the center of that world is.

All map projections are attempts to portray the three dimensional earth or a portion of the earth on a two dimensional flat surface. Thus distortions are inevitable. Some technical distortions of conformity, distance, direction, scale, and area always result from this process. Some projections minimize distortions in some of these properties at the expense of maximizing errors in others. It is important to note that whichever scientific projection or orientation one might choose, all maps are distorted, but they differ in what they distort. Any map will be more or less distorted, but the mapmaker chooses what he or she distorts. Some distortions are the unavoidable consequence of rendering a three dimensional object in two dimensions, whereas other distortions are intentional and often serve political ends.

4.4.Maps and Power

After so much critical investigation, today some of us are aware of the fact that maps are instruments that the powerful use for the purposes of gaining more power. In other words, it would not be wrong to assume that throughout history maps and power went hand in hand. As Mark Neocleous puts it

> to map a territory means to formally define space along the lines set within a particular epistemological and political experience- a way of knowing and dominating- transposing a little known piece of concrete reality into an abstraction which serves the practical interests of the state, an operation done for and by the state.[217]

First of all, as tools of the powerful, maps may serve internal political ends. The Soviet Cartography Administration's cartographic practice is an example of such distortion. Brian Moynahan in his book *Russian Century* conveys that the head of the administration once admitted that, "until 1988 all maps for public use were distorted at the orders of the KGB. Almost everything was changed; roads, rivers moved, streets titled. Even the weather was a secret, weather broadcasts were not published in the newspapers until the 1970s."[218]

[217] Mark Neocleous, "Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography," *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 417.

[218] Brian, Moynahan, *Russian Century: A History of the Last Hundred Years*, New York: Random House, 1994, p. 4.

All maps tell lies; they are selective with the truth, they exclude, they generalize, they exaggerate. Whether some lie more that the others is debatable, but when maps selectively use and exaggerate information in order to advance certain agendas they move into the realm of propaganda. There is always, of course, a strong element of relativism in operation; while "their" maps are certainly propaganda, "ours" are completely accurate.[219]

German cartography presents a useful example of maps produced for the purposes of propaganda. During the inter-war period maps were widely used for raising the German people's "public awareness" of the "legitimacy" of German foreign policy ends, which argued for the injustice brought by the Versailles territory arrangements and Germany's need for a Lebensraum.[220] When maps are used as propaganda, then the misrepresentation and cartographic lies become more obvious.

As Dodds points out German geographers and cartographers began to produce new maps depicting a Germany as the prisoner of Versailles after the 1919 Peace Conference. These maps, through their use of symbols, color, and scale, drew attention to "bleeding borders." These maps also drew a greater Germany, retaining all of the German Empire but also Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia. These maps, which were later banned after the war, were widely published in newspapers,

[219] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 206.

[220] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, 121.

magazines, posters, postcards, and school atlases.[221] Thus during the inter-war period Germany's geopolitics was evident in its maps, and these maps in turn constituted a way of naturalizing politics.

Maps might also be used for territorial claims. Imperial maps were examples of such distortions aimed at political purposes and territorial claims. Throughout the age of colonialism, for example, empires mapped the territories under their control. These maps were not innocent of claims to power and authority, for to map a territory simply meant claiming it. The examples of such distortions can be multiplied, including the Russian mapping of Siberia, the Belgian mapping of Congo, and the Dutch mapping of the East Indies.[222] One of the best examples of the use of maps as a political weapon is the competition for territory in North America between Britain and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

> In 1656 Nicolas Sanson, a geography teacher to Cardinal Richeliu and King Louis XIII of France, produced a map of North America called Le Canada, ou Nouvelle France: Canada, or the New France. The map is distorted, but the distortion is revealing. The interior of the country has been truncated so that Lake Erie is shown to be close to the northern boundary of Florida. This distortion minimizes the English territories along the eastern seaboard and maximizes the French claims to the interior. From the mouth of the St. Lawrence River to Florida the territory is clearly marked as French. The French were not only claiming "their" territory but also claiming territory that wasn't theirs, or which was in dispute at that time, or which had not yet been claimed by either side.[223]

[221] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* 126-127.

[222] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 124.

[223] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 136

Maps might also be used to draw borders. Borders among states are simply cartographic lines on a map. Drawing cartographic lines on maps can change the course of the history of a nation. As Short puts it,

> [w]hen the new nation of the United States emerged from British colonial rule, the drawing of boundaries was an important cartographic exercise. At the discussions prior to the Treaty of Paris of 1783, the British and American negotiators used the detailed map of North America first produced by John Mitchell in 1755. A copy of the map used at the meeting is covered with red lines that demarcate the boundaries between the United States and Canada, which was then British. Because the final treaty line of 1783 was considered favorable to the United States, public access to the map was forbidden by the British Government until 1896.[224]

Imperial cartographers during the age of colonialism drew the borders of the African countries they had never visited by using artificial cartographic lines, which did not suit the real geographical landscape.[225] Thus, the borders imagined on a map became the reality afterwards.

Maps have also been be used to provide a better fit for nations and states. According to Dodds, at the Paris Peace Conference over twenty European peoples were identified as having right to self-determination. American geographers, especially Isaiah Bowman as the Chief Territorial Specialist, were instrumental in formatting the new territorial and national boundaries. During the Conference geographical intelligence was understood to be an important instrument of power. As Bowman explained to one of his colleagues in England:

[224] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 204.

[225] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 204.

> Where the experts of [other] nations came fully stocked with ideas, they did not have the mass of information assembled in a flexible, workable form. Only the US delegation has such a resource, and we anticipated that this would give us a negotiating advantage even over the French, in whose capital city the fate of Europe and the Near East would be decided.[226]

During times of change when ambiguity leads to feelings of insecurity, or during times of war when national survival is under attack, geopolitics and maps become popular. President Roosevelt's 23 February 1942 radio address is a case in point, as it led millions of people to go out and buy maps to study the threats that the President pointed out.

> We must all understand and face the hard fact that our job now is to fight at distances, which extend all the way around the globe. Look at your map. Look at the vast area of China, with its millions of fighting men. Look at the vast area of Russia, with its powerful armies and proven military might. Look at the British Isles, Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch Indies, India, the Near East, and the continent of Africa, with their resources of raw materials, and of peoples determined to resist Axis domination. Look too at North America, Central America, and South America. ... I ask you to look at your maps again, particularly at that portion of the Pacific Ocean lying west of Hawaii. Before this war even started, the Philippine Islands were already surrounded on three sides by Japanese power. On the west, the China side, the Japanese were in possession of the coast of China and the coast of Indo-China, which had been yielded to them by the Vichy French. On the north are the islands of Japan themselves, reaching down almost to northern Luzon. On the east are the Mandated Islands – which Japan had occupied exclusively, and had fortified in absolute violation of her written word. The islands that lie between Hawaii and the Philippines ... these islands, hundreds of them, appear only as small dots on most maps. But they cover a large strategic area. Guam lies in the middle of them – a lone outpost which we have never fortified.[227]

[226] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* p. 129

[227] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* p. 115-116.

Maps may be used to emphasize certain geopolitical needs. During the Cold War, European centered projections were popular in the West because they exaggerated the size of the Soviet Union, making it appear more threatening by overstating the strategic significance of the Russian "heartland."[228] Although the USA made use of this projection, US leadership also felt the need to developed a second new projection, because maps centered on Europe underestimated the "bigness" of the USA and moreover illustrated the country and the enemy USSR so far apart that it was not easy for a regular citizen to realize the "close threat" posed by the Soviet Union.

As a result of these emerging needs, a new world map projection centered on the North Pole was developed, which illustrated the US and NATO Allies to be surrounded by the Soviet Union. The polar projection presented a new USSR that was not far away, but rather very close to areas of possible conflict and security threats.[229] According to Short, the State Department and the Office of Strategic Services (later to become the CIA) was highly influential in promoting this "new" view of the world.

[228] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 125

[229] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 119.



Figure 4: Polar Projection of the World[230]

In short, maps may be used for many purposes. From the examples illustrated above, it is possible to argue that although maps are perceived to be neutral and accurate, all maps are selective and every map advances an interest. As Ward and Wood put it, "every map is a purposeful selection from everything that is known, bent to the

[230] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*,p. 136.

mapmaker's end. Every map serves a purpose. Every map advances an interest."[231] All maps are material objects, social documents, and historical artifacts at the same time. They have a producer and a consumer. And they all express a message, sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit.[232]

Critical geopolitics no longer treats maps as value-free, socially neutral depictions of the earth, but rather as social constructions that bear the marks of power and legitimization, of conflict and compromise. Scholars of critical geopolitics are aware of the fact that "[m]aps are social as well as technical products, and mapping is not only a technical exercise, but also a social and political act."[233] As pointed out by Dodds,

> [c]ritical geopolitical writers, along with historians of cartography, tend to be skeptical of anyone who claims that their maps are beyond political and geographical conceits and prejudices. Maps are conceived as instruments of power and states have long recognized the importance of mapping. Indeed it has been common for many countries, especially those with disputed boundaries and territories, to retain a tight control over the production and circulation of maps.[234]

[231] Ward; Wood, *Seeing Through Maps*, p.4.

[232] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 8.

[233] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 25.

[234] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 143.

Nowadays the creation of maps has been revolutionized by computers, the Internet, and the development of remote sensing from satellites. As a consequence, it is argued that mapmaking today has become far more impersonal.[235]

I would, however, argue that maps, especially the Mercator projection, have shaped our visualization of the world for so long that our imagination of the globe is still the picture drawn by early European projections. When you "google" world map, what you come across is a more developed version of the Mercator projection.

Europeans, as the explorers and discoverers of the "Earth," enjoyed a certain priority in creating the "World." Map-making emerged as a beneficial tool in constructing European identity. Europeans were capable of both making maps and imposing these maps on others. In doing so they shaped the way other people conceptualized the world, and imparted to them the Europeans' own Eurocentric worldview. Moreover, the hierarchical layering of global space was based upon these maps. As geographer Stephen Hall puts it "maps to be sure have long been a part of scientific discourse. [236]

[235] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 214.

[236] Stephen Hall, "Uncommon Landscapes: Maps in a New Age of Scientific Discovery," *The Sciences*, September 1991, p. 16.

Thus, in spite of the technological revolutions in mapmaking, it would not be wrong to assume that Mercator projection, the basis of all European maps, has conditioned our way of viewing the world and thus its being. At this point, I would like to introduce cartographer Gerardus Mercator, the developer of these maps, who left a permanent mark in human history.

4.5.The Mercator Projection

As students of IR we study relations on the world. Regarding the picture of this world that we study, our basic assumption is the Mercator projection.

From the sixteenth century onwards the Mercator projection has served as the basis of people's visualization of the World. Our geography education depends on the Mercator projection. When we "google" the world map on the internet the first images we come across are again Mercator projections. When we are asked to visualize the world picture, or asked about the geographical location of a country we again visualize the Mercator projection. In the end, people think in images[237] and our world image is the Mercator map.

[237] Hall, "Uncommon Landscapes: Maps in a New Age of Scientific Discovery," p. 16.

[237] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction,* p. 125

Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator was born in 1512. His map, which was generated in 1569, was his most important innovation. This innovation was not only important for him but also for the whole humanity. According to Hayes, he was the person who freed Europeans from the "tyranny of ancient Greek and Roman geographers, especially from Ptolemy."[238]

In the beginning Mercator's map became popular because it had straight meridians and parallels that intersected at the right angles. In other words, in his projection, parallels and meridians were rendered as straight lines so that users had an accurate ratio of latitude to longitude regarding any point on the world. [239] Thus, during the age of discovery, Mercator's map served as the only accurate map for the use of navigators. He also introduced the term atlas for a collection of maps. His map was published 1569, whereas his atlas was published in 1590. His maps were so influential that the title "atlas" is still used to refer to a book of maps.[240]

[238] Carlton Hayes, *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, New York: Macmillan, 1939, p. 132.

[239] "Gerardus Mercator," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/ topic/375626/Gerardus-Mercator.

[240] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 122



Figure 5: Mercator Projection of the World[241]

The basic characteristic of Mercator projection is that Europe lies at its center. In accordance with its basic aim, to provide an accurate ratio of latitude to longitude for the discoverers, it has produced many technical distortions. In this respect, the Mercator projection makes Europe (3.8 million square miles) look larger than South America (6.9 million square miles).[242] It makes Alaska look three times larger than the size of Mexico, which is in reality larger than Alaska. According to Short, the Mercator projection was a particular favorite of the British in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as it exaggerated the size of Canada, Australia, and UK. Thus, when the territories of the British Empire were colored in red on a map based

[241] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/375638/Mercator-projection, 15 June 2010.

[242] Ward; Wood, *Seeing Through Maps*, p.4.

on this projection, the empire seemed far larger than it actually was.[243] Mercator's map also enlarges Russia and Greenland and radically shrinks Africa.

I would like to argue that the Mercator map had two main effects on history. First, it has not only shaped the way we visualize the world, but has also served as a tool to impose the idea of Western superiority with Europe at its center. This is due to the fact that most maps in history were drawn by Europeans for Europeans. Europe thus occupied a central position in their maps and was consequently represented at the center of the world and much larger than its actual size. As we put forth in the beginning of this chapter, distortions in maps are technically inevitable. As a European, Mercator's distortions were naturally made in favor of Europe, showing it at the center of the world.

As the Europeans were discovering the world and mapping it, a geographical layering of space accompanied civilizational divisions. The idea that the world is divided into separate continents was first developed by ancient Greeks who identified three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. Deriving from mythical goddess Europa, Europeans drew imaginative maps showing Europe as the queen of the world. Thus not only a sense of difference but also a sense of superiority started to develop[244] on the basis of the Mercator projection.

[243] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 207.

[244] Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, p. 52.

Mercator's second effect on history occurred through Mackinder. In his search for natural seats of power, Mackinder naturally used Mercator's map which draws the viewer's attention immediately to the Heartland. Drawing upon Mercator's map, Mackinder divided the world into three regions and depicted an "outer crescent" across the Americas, Africa and the oceans, an "inner crescent" across Europe and southern Asia, and the "Heartland" located at the heart of Eurasia and argued for his famous motto. His main source for depicting the "natural seats of power" was Mercator projection. An important question that comes to mind is that if we assume that the available world maps of the time were polar projections, illustrated above, would Mackinder still be depicting the same areas as the "natural seats of power?"

Figure 6: Europe as a "Queen"[245]

[245] Agnew; Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 54.

It would not be groundless to argue that Mercator should also be given the necessary credit in the IR field, considering the fact that Mackinder's theory based upon Mercator's map influenced both Nazi strategy during the Second World War and American foreign policy strategy during the Cold War and thus affected the practice of international relations. Yet the importance of Mercator's map is not mentioned in any IR text book.

4.6.Concluding Remarks

Maps shape not only the way we view the world, but also the theories with which we attempt to come to terms with that world, the goals we form within this world of our perception, and ultimately the way we act within that world.

In this chapter, by revolving around investigations proposed by critical geopolitics, I tried to illustrate that the map of any given territory is never a value-free representation of that territory. Every map is, in its own way, a theory, and thus affects practice. However, just like discourses, we need to buy into what is presented to us and maps are our only means of seeing the whole world at once, replete with the locations and positions of the countries that populate it. Maps imprison us. Critical geopolitics, however, provides us with another chance.

Critical geopolitics suggests that it is essential to view all maps with a critical, some might say cynical, eye. This is vital if we are to read in-between the "cartographic lines" and get at the truth of the map. Who drew it, and why? When did the person draw it and for whom? Like any historical document maps too are made by people in power, and they have many interests to serve beyond that of mere "truth."[246]

Although today, the maps to be used in education are a hot discussion topic among geographers, I am not trying to be a part of this discussion. What I argue here is not that we must change the maps we use, but rather that as students of IR we must realize that what we visualize is only a projection and not the world itself.

Moreover, if theory shapes practice and practice shapes theory, then the importance of cartography and mapmaking should be given the necessary credit and Gerardus Mercator should be embraced as one of the theorists that shaped the visualization of the modern world and thus the field of IR.

Despite its reliance on their maps, however, contemporary IR theory seems to continue to neglect its classical geopolitical heritage. In order to be able to illustrate the extent of this heritage the following chapter will address mainstream IR theories and realism, followed by a discussion on the common assumptions of the two fields.

[246] Short, *The World Through Maps: A History of Cartography*, p. 207.

CHAPTER V

MAINSTREAM IR THEORY AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

5.1.Introduction: The Discipline of International Relations and Geopolitics

Although "geopolitics" was condemned as an "intellectual poison" after the end of the Second World War, it has continued to be "a 'travelling theory' par excellence in the sense that it has entered a wide variety of disciplines and geographical regions."[247] This thesis argues that chief among the diverse disciplines and regions "contaminated" by this intellectual poison were IR and the US.

In order to determine the existence and extent of this "contamination," it would behoove us to overview the basic assumptions of classical realism and classical geopolitics and to survey some of the other basic commonalities between the two fields.

My argument in this chapter is that central assumptions as well as some certain paradigmatic blind spots are common to both classical realism and classical geopolitics. Assumptions are important. They are central to any theory, and thus play an important role in determining our view of the world. Common assumptions, therefore, indicate shared world views. My main aim in this chapter is not to unlock

[247] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 31.

and revisit the assumptions made in classical realist theory or in geopolitics, but instead to highlight the shared nature of these assumptions and blind spots between the two fields. Before discussing the main assumptions of the two fields, however, this chapter will begin by briefly surveying the development of IR as a separate academic discipline, with particular attention to the major theoretical debates that have emerged over the course of IR's development as a field.

5.2.IR Theories: A Concise Outline

The study of International Relations as a distinct discipline is a relatively recent development in the Western academy. Though the discipline itself argues that its roots may be traced back to Thucydides' realist account of the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC, it is only over the last century that International Relations has come into its own as a separate academic discipline.[248] In spite of its relative youth as a discipline, or perhaps because of it, International Relations stands today as a field in which very little is agreed upon and nearly everything is fiercely contested.[249]

Prior to its establishment as an independent discipline the various aspects of the field that was to become IR were covered by departments of history, law, economics,

[248] Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, London: MacMillan, 1994, p. 8.

[249] Scott Burchill, "Introduction," in Scott Burchill; Andrew Linklater et. al., *Theories of International Relations*, New York: St Martin's Press,1996, p. 3.

politics, and philosophy. The formal recognition of IR as a separate academic discipline began with the establishment of a Chair of International Politics at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War and "in reaction to the unprecedented horrors of the conflict."[250] In the early 1920s, the first Department of International Relations was founded in the London School of Economics.

The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies, which was founded in 1927 in Geneva for the purpose of educating diplomats associated with the League of Nations. The institute offered one of the first Ph.D. degrees in international relations. In the United States, the first faculty of international relations was Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, founded in 1919 and the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago was the first to offer a graduate degree, in 1928.[251] Despite the fact that IR was first recognized as an independent subject of scholarly inquiry in Britain, it was in the United States that IR was developed into a discipline in its own right.[252]

[250] Burchill, "Introduction," p. 5.

[251] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations

[252] Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," p. 43.

In the words of David Davies, one of the founders of the discipline, "international relations would help to prevent the future outbreak of wars because the scientific study of world politics would highlight the causes of political problems and would therefore contribute to the peaceful resolution of global tensions."[253] Thus the study of IR began as a response to war with the aim of preventing its recurrence.[254]

IR emerged out of debates on war, its causes, and conflict prevention. In line with this turbid genesis there has never been any one single "theory" of IR. Instead the discipline has always stood as a loose assortment of distinct but related theories, differing from one another in terms of their object of study, subject matter, methodology, and epistemology.[255] As with any other social science, there is nothing in the field of IR akin to the degree of consensus.

Some scholars bemoan this confused state of affairs. Michael Nicholson, for example, writes that, "[i]deally we would have a theory of international system to which all scholars give broad assent, in the same way that virtually all physicists accept the theory of relativity."[256] Others, like Fred Halliday, view the diversity of

[253] Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 30.

[254] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations,* p. 8.

[255] Burchill, "Introduction," p. 3.

[256] Michael Nicholson, *International Relations: A Concise Introduction,* London: Macmillan, 1998, p. 90.

the field as a strength rather than a weakness.[257] Regardless of one's stance on the matter, the multitude of different voices in the field necessitate that one speak of "theories" of International Relations rather than any one all-inclusive "theory" of IR.

Before getting started, one should acknowledge that IR is an incredibly broad field, and one that is rapidly changing at that.[258] Thus, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, one has to make certain generalizations and simplifications when attempting to categorize or define the field. This is why in university teaching the development of IR theory is normally addressed from the perspective of four major debates: realism versus idealism, realism (historians/classicists) versus behavioralism, realism versus pluralism/globalism, and neo-realism versus post-structuralism/ postmodernism.

According to this categorization, the first school of thought in IR is idealism, which dominated the early history of the discipline. The realist-idealist debate of the 1920s focused on the means of maintaining world order, and on power politics versus collective security. The debate between historians/classicists and behavioralists during the 1950s and 1960s addressed methodological questions. The realists-pluralists/globalists debate that arose during the 1960s enlarged the study area of the

[257] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 1.

[258] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes,* p. 9

discipline. Realists versus post-realists/postmodernists, chronologically the last debate, brought new perspectives to IR.

The following pages will, for the purposes of clarity, make use of the same four-debate approach in an attempt to draw a concise outline, while at the same time keeping in mind that such distinctions are unnatural and constitute a reductive approach to the field. Though there may be no such distinct groups as pluralism or idealism these terms and their like serve as heuristic devices providing a language with which to access, discuss, and come to terms with what would otherwise be an impossibly nebulous field, and a starting point from which to do so.

This study argues that realism is the most established and dominant of the different theoretical perspectives in IR. Realism is also one of the major actors of this study, as one of the aims of this study is to display the linkages between traditional geopolitics and mainstream IR theory. That is why, while outlining the so-called major debates, central attention will be paid to realism. Other schools and theories will be reviewed only to the extent they have contributed to the evolution or the development of realism, as realism has never been a stagnant perspective. It is also important to note that the structure and content of the following outline is based upon fundamental IR theory books, in an attempt to show how the history of IR theory has been conceptualized in IR teaching.

5.3.Major Debates

The realist approach first emerged in opposition to idealist arguments in the debate on how to prevent war. In the aftermath of the First World War the dominant paradigm in the international realm was liberal internationalism—later labeled idealism by the realists—and proponents of this school included Woodrow Wilson and Sir Alfred Zimmen. The so-called idealists assumed that human nature was basically "good," and therefore that cooperation and peace among human beings should be possible. Accordingly the so-called idealists sought to limit or prevent war by means of recourse to international law, treaties, negotiation procedures, and the growth of international organizations, especially the League of Nations.[259] They argued that peace is the normal condition of the international system and that there must be a community of power rather than a balance of power, and an organized common peace instead of organized rivalries. In the words of Bull:

> The distinctive characteristic of these writers was their belief in progress: the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of the 'international mind', the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teachings, it was in fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way.[260]

[259] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 10.

[260] Bull quoted in Burchill, "Introduction," p. 5-6.

In the light of the failure of the League of Nations and the outbreak of another devastating war, the rise of a more pessimistic worldview in the post-Second World War period was not entirely surprising.[261] After the Second World War realism emerged as the accepted wisdom in international relations.[262] The so-called idealists were blamed for having been unable to prevent the Second World War, one of the most extreme massacres of the twentieth century.

Thus "idealism" gave way to realism, initially in the work of E. H. Carr and later in the work of a range of US-based writers, including Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Kenneth Waltz.[263] Carr's book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* published in 1939 was a critique of idealism or an anti-idealist attack rather than a grand theory about world politics. It was Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, first published in 1948, that constituted the grand realist theory of IR. In opposition to idealism, though not denying the role of morality, law, and diplomacy, realists emphasized "armed might as an instrument of maintaining peace"[264] and argued that "idealist" values could only be maintained if backed by the threat of force.[265]

[261] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 22.

[262] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 23.

[263] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 10.

[264] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 10.

[265] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 22.

In a parallel development the so-called English School scholars, including Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Fred Northedge, emphasized the degree to which the international system lacked any central ruler and was thus in an anarchical state.[266] They viewed the international system as a kind of "society" that consisted of a group of states interacting with one another in accordance with certain rules such as diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, the role of the great powers, and war.[267]

In 1950s some scholars brought forward the argument that studies in the discipline should be more scientific. Although realists like E.H. Carr criticized idealism for being normative, realism itself was based upon normative assumptions as well. The so-called behavioralists criticized the normative assumptions about human nature that the idealists and realists built their theories upon and brought forward the problem of methodology.

Behavioralists objected to assumptions that could not be observed and that were thus not scientific. They called for IR to become a more scientific, objective, and universal discipline, rather than an ideological, subjective, and historical one. The

[266] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 11.

[267] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 11.

essence of the debate was whether or not an explicit and internally coherent methodology could be used for the analysis of international relations.[268]

In other worlds, with the opening of the second debate, the debate of "what to study" was replaced by the debate of "how to study." The new question was about the methodology to be used in the analysis of the subject matter of the discipline.

The third debate occurred between neo-realists and pluralists/globalists, and contributed to IR theory by means of enlarging the scope of the field and its units of study. Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s assumptions about the basic structure of the international system once again came under scrutiny. According to pluralists the state-centric realist image was becoming irrelevant to the contemporary international system because that system had became dominated by new actors and marked by increased interdependence between states and the emergence of new issues. They argued that the international system had been transformed to such an extent that traditional paradigms for understanding international politics had become outmoded and thus that new paradigms were needed.

The basis of the pluralist challenge was the fact of the "shrinking of the world," brought on by increased global interdependence. The pluralists stated that recent

[268] Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, p. 106.

decades had seen a growing degree of interdependence among nations in the spheres of politics and economics.

Pluralists argued that the role and the function of the nation-state in international politics had changed and that new actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations, and cartels had emerged, and that traditional models could not take these into account.[269] In addition, non-military and non-security issues such as population growth, pollution, the distribution of food, the depletion of natural resources, the dependency of Third World countries on more developed countries, and the use of oceans and outer space had come to the forefront. Pluralists also argued that war was no longer a major option for foreign policy decision-makers and that the more powerful the nation, the less viable war had become. Advocates of this approach believed that we were moving to an era dominated by economic power, an era in which war between major states might virtually disappear.

The challenges to realism were coming from pluralists, transnationalists and globalists. These three are different from each other, but not dramatically. According to the globalists the state was no longer an effective agent for political and economic security. Furthermore technological developments and particularly nuclear power had made the state even less viable, for it could no longer protect its own citizens.

[269] Nicholson, *International Relations: A Concise Introduction,* p. 98.

Pluralists, on the other hand, accepted these views but did not go so far as to declare the end of the nation-state.

The third debate made some important contributions to realism. It showed that the state was not the only actor in international relations, or in other words that there were important actors in addition to them. It also showed that the importance of these non-state actors was growing, and both altering and challenging the international stage set up by the realist paradigm.

The contributions of the pluralist challenge both enriched and widened mainstream IR theory. Particularly worthy of note in this regard is the acknowledgement of the existence of new trends such as interdependence, economic internationalization and integration, as well as new actors such as transnational organizations, supra-national and sub-national entities and multinational corporations. In tracking the development of the realist account of IR, Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations'* editions are noteworthy. This was a book that developed itself throughout the decades and embraced the abovementioned contributions.

Another important approach that has had a significant effect on IR theory is structuralism. Structuralism reflects a mode of thinking and a method of analysis practiced in the twentieth century in social sciences and humanities. It has been one of the major approaches affecting the social sciences in the post-war period. The

main characteristic of the structuralist approach in IR is systemic analysis. According to the structuralists social relations must be analyzed as a system.[270] The relations among the components of the whole, it is thought, are much more important than the components themselves. The structuralist approach tried to understand the norms or the functioning of a system and in this respect has been against individual or piecemeal explanations.

In the mid-1980s a critical turn occurred in the IR theory, and approaches such as critical theory, postmodernism, green thought, feminist theory, and constructivism developed within this context. Although these approaches differ dramatically from one another, their basic aim has been to deconstruct and revisit the basic assumptions of the mainstream theories and in this respect it is possible to gather them under the title of "post-positivist approaches."[271] These approaches argued that knowledge is never innocent and attempted to put forth the linkage between knowledge, power, and practice. These approaches, however, are beyond the scope of this study and will not be handled in detail here. As mentioned before the main aim of this study is to display the linkage between classical realism and classical geopolitics, and thus the scope of this thesis is necessarily limited to mainstream IR theories.

[270] Nicholson, *International Relations: A Concise Introduction,* p. 99.

[271] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p.209

Although different theories exist within the discipline of International Relations, mainstream theories indeed revolve around the same topics. As Fred Halliday puts it:

> International Relations (IR) has occupied an uneasy, often marginal, place in the study and teaching of social sciences. Yet its subject matter is, in the simplest terms, clear enough, comprising three forms of interaction—relations between states, non-state or 'transnational' relations across frontiers, and the operations of the system as a whole, within which states and the societies are the main components. While they may vary in the stress they lay on each of these forms of interaction, all theories of the 'international' propose some explanation of each: indeed the major debates within IR revolve, to greater or lesser extent, around these three dimensions and the primacy of one or the other.[272]

It should be noted that realism is an area of debate rather than a single specific position,[273] and thus certain qualifications have to be made before moving on to a fuller discussion of the subject. In this respect throughout the following pages I will discuss those basic premises of realism directly related to the scope of this study. In other words only those aspects of realism that are related to geopolitical thought will be handled. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, realism will be presented as a coherent perspective in International Relations theory.

[272] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, p. 1.

[273] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 20.

5.4.Mainstream IR Theory Realism

Realism, which is defined as "the longest standing and most useful school of international relations theory,"[274] has been and remains the dominant paradigm in International Relations.[275] Differences and nuances aside, a number of texts and authors in International Relations have been collectively labeled "realist" because they share common assumptions and key ideas.

Although realism has changed and developed in tandem with the modifications, clarifications, additions, and methodological innovations[276] brought on by the various debates described above, the essence of the theory remained the same.

As outlined in the previous section, in IR teaching classical realism is described as having emerged during the interwar period in opposition to idealism and as having developed into its own after the close of the Second World War. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that when realism first emerged, and as it was later "reborn" over the course of time in response to the various great debates in IR, the

[274] Barry B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Michael Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 104.

[275] Nicholson, *International Relations: A Conscise Introduction,* p. 91.

[276] Paul R. Viotti; Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 82.

realist school of IR carried and continues to carry with it, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the heritage of classical geopolitics. This study further argues that idealism was born out of opposition to classical geopolitics, but ultimately lost out to the realist school of IR.

In other words, except for one period of American interventionist idealism, there has always been a marked consistency between classical geopolitics and realism. This is not to say that realism might or should be reduced to geopolitics. Without any doubt, the two approaches are different from each other. However, I would like to argue that there are certain consistencies regarding the way they treat the world. This is to argue that although they may not agree on every point, they share crucial assumptions and thus the same worldview. In an attempt to illustrate that consistency, in the following section I will review the basic assumptions and thus worldviews of both fields.

5.5.Consistencies between the Two Fields

5.5.1. Common Assumptions: Power, State and Nations

Combining the summaries provided by Nicholson and Steans and Pettiford, the basic tenets of realism are as follows:

i) States, based around homogenous nations with fixed identities, are the dominant actors in the international system;

ii) States pursue power, defined in terms of national interest;

iii) As the relationships of states with each other depend entirely on their power relationships with each other, a state's relations with other states has nothing to do with the internal structure of the state or with its regime type, which is labeled as the so-called high/low politics distinction;

iv) The condition of anarchy prevails in the international system, in accordance with the lack of a central sovereign authority to regulate relations among states;

v) Conflict is an ever present reality of international relations, in accordance with the self-interested nature of human beings and thus states;

vi) Order and security can be maintained by shifting alliances among states which prevent any state from becoming overwhelmingly powerful and thus constituting a threat to the peace and security of others. This is the essence of the "balance of power" theory;

vii) International institutions and law play a role, but are only effective if backed by force or effective sanctions.[277]

These are the basic assumptions that every IR theory textbook outlines regarding realism. Built upon these assumptions the questions that classical realist theory tries to answer revolve around the issues of power, sovereignty, stability, and force. Examples include: "how to maintain stability; how and why it breaks down; how to

[277] Nicholson, *International Relations: A Concise Introduction*, p. 95; Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, pp. 28-29.

retain sovereignty; when and how to use force to maintain stability and sovereignty."[278] The basic concepts of traditional geopolitics, on the other hand, are: power, state, geography, hegemony, the identification of spaces as advanced or primitive; a conceptualization of the state as the highest political entity; and the pursuit of primacy by competing states.

All in all, if we were to determine the two most central elements of traditional geopolitics and classical realism, those would be the state and power accompanied by the paradigmatic blind spot of the "nation." The centrality of power and state constitute the basic common characteristic in both approaches. Despite its status as a central object of IR theory, nation, as will be discussed in the following pages, has been taken for granted and tucked in the borders of the concept of state in both approaches.

In mainstream IR theorizing power has shared center-stage with the concept of state, and is viewed as the basic currency[279] of international relations. As stated by Nicholson, "[r]ealists argue that states are the most important actors in the international system, to the virtual exclusion of all other actors. The security of the state and its citizens is the primary motivation of the state."[280] The realist conception

[278] Marysia Zalewski; Cyntia Enloe, "Questions About Identity in International Relations," in Ken Booth; Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, p. 294.
[279] Devetak, "Postmodernism," p. 180.

[280] Nicholson, *International Relations: A Concise Introduction,* p. 91.

of the international arena, reduced to its simplest form, consists of nation-states trying to maximize their national-interest as defined in terms of power. This is the basic assumption of the theory put forth by one of IR's founding fathers, Morgenthau. Realists believe that the pursuit of power and national interest are the major forces driving world politics.

As Agnew puts it, two geopolitical assumptions have been dominant in mainstream IR thought: firstly, that "power flows from advantages of geographical location, size of population and natural resources" and, secondly, "that power is entirely an attribute of territorial states that attempt to monopolize it in competition with other states."[281]

In the beginning geopolitical theorists' accounts of power focused on power as being a product of geography. Over the years, however, the concept of power in geopolitics took on a much more holistic scope, especially in the theories of Ratzel and Haushofer. As Flint puts it:

> Geopolitics, as the struggle over the control of spaces and places, focuses upon power, or the ability to achieve particular goals in the face of opposition or alternatives. In nineteenth and early twentieth century geopolitical practices, power was seen simply as the relative power of countries in foreign affairs. For example, in the early 1900s US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan's categorization of power was based upon the size of a country, the racial "character" of its population, as well as its economic and military capacity. In the late twentieth century, as the geopolitical study of power

[281] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, pp. 74-75.

> became increasingly academic, scholars created numerous indices of power, which remained focused on country-specific capabilities of industrial strength, size and educational level of the population, as well as military might. Definitions of power were dominated by a focus on a country's ability to wage war with other countries.[282]

Although nominally equal sovereign entities, states in the modern interstate system are in reality radically different from each other in terms of their geographic location, territorial extent, natural resource endowment, social organization, political leadership, and power potential. These differences have long been classified and conceptualized by geopolitical theorists within the context of relative struggles for power between states. The pursuit of primacy by dominant states at the local, regional, and global scales has generated discourses which have sought to explain and justify state militarism, territorial expansionism, overseas imperialism, and warfare as inevitable consequences of the uneven distribution of power potential across the globe.

Geopolitics is mostly about a dominant power's pursuit for hegemony or the maintenance of the primacy of the hegemon. Thus, traditional geopolitical theories assume states to be actors that are in pursuit of primacy, which can only be achieved by means of power and armed force. Thus, in addition to power, state-centricism is another determining characteristic of geopolitical theory. For geopolitical theorists the global space is a space controlled solely by states. And, since the only entity that

[282] Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 28

can possess, control, and rule any given piece of territory is the state, geopolitics is by definition state-centric.

Realism similarly holds that the state in its modern form is the fundamental unit in the world system and, therefore, that it is possible to treat it as the basic unit of international relations. In other words, according to realists international relations should be a discipline that studies politics among nation-states. States are again conceived of as actors working to promote and maximize their national interest, defined in terms of power. Although realists admit that considerable changes have occurred in the international system since World War II, they hold that the state remains the primary actor in world politics.

Thus the state-centric approach represents another commonality between the two fields, which has evolved in both practical and formal geopolitical reasoning over the centuries. International relations theory had always known, or so it claims, what states were. Liberals knew that states existed to protect individuals from each other; realists knew that states protected themselves from each other. The identification of security with the state was almost total, and classical writers (and many others) hardly felt the need to separate out categories like “society” or even “nation” from

that of the "state." Because people thought they knew what "state" meant, remarkably little attention was paid to exploring the concept and its ramifications.[283]

Another common assumption underpinning state-centricism is that of the individuality of states. In both fields states are considered to be unitary and rational actors. In the anarchical structure of international arena societies (nations) are assumed to be represented by their states. Thus nations themselves do not get involved in foreign politics. That is why all the actions of the state in the international arena are considered to be legitimate by that state's citizens. As a result of this view scholars of International Relations have treated international relations as interstate relations.

In both realist IR theory and in geopolitics, then, the state is considered to be a self-sufficient actor with a certain territory and population, and sovereignty over the two. States are treated like people, autonomous and self-contained. A good example in this respect would be to recall the references made to capitals in everyday speech regarding international affairs. During discussions about international affairs in the news, press, and academic articles, Ankara, Washington, and London are referred to as if they are capable and independent actors on their own right.[284] I would argue that

[283] Martin Shaw, "State Theory and the Post-Cold War World," Michael Banks; Martin Shaw (eds), *State and Society in International Relations*, New York; London: Harvester; Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 2.

[284] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, 68.

this way of thinking is linked to the organic theory of state first developed by Ratzel, and that it has become a vital part of the way the world is viewed and of how states are treated within the geopolitical tradition.

Realists established an analogy between the state and the selfish individual of Hobbes' "state of nature" theory, who behaves in a self-interested manner.[285] Realists moreover equated the nation with the state and assumed states to be coherent, unified, purposive, and rational actors. Although Hobbes' self-interested individual is referred to in every IR theory book, I would argue that Ratzel's theory of the organic state is indeed much more relevant and pertinent to the question of realists' individualization of states. This is not to say that Hobbes has no relevance, but rather to point out that Ratzel and other geopolitical theorists should be given the necessary credit regarding the development of this mindset.

Another common point or assumption in this respect is that both approaches regard law and cooperation as secondary and ineffective on their own. As discussed earlier, in geopolitical thinking states are treated as living organisms and the growth of a state is measured by its expansion. From such a perspective the ultimate goal is inevitably domination and not cooperation. Just like geopolitical theorists, realists argued that respect for law could only be achieved "if it was backed by the threat of

[285] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes, p.* 28.

force.[286]" "At different times, influential writers like Morgenthau and Carr have both insisted that the study of International Relations should eschew normative concerns with justice or rights in the interest of discovering more about the realities of power."[287] The famous geopolitical theorist Mahan, among others, argued that the use of force was primary whereas law was only ever secondary. Both fields assume that world politics was conducted by the "rule of power" rather than the "rule of law." Furthermore, in both perspectives peace is conceived of as a negative situation entailing nothing more than the "absence of war."

According to Agnew, the state-centric approach is underpinned by three geographical assumptions, each of which is explicit in realist thinking as well:

i) states have an exclusive power within their territories, represented by the concept of sovereignty;

ii) "domestic" and "foreign" affairs are essentially separate realms in which different rules obtain;

iii) the boundaries of the state define the boundaries of society such that the latter is "contained" by the former.[288]

[286] Steans; Pettiford *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes, p.* 24.

[287] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 208.

[288] Agnew, *Geopolitics,* p. 49

In the following pages I would like to argue that the abovementioned assumptions as well as the self-sufficient and coherent identity attached to states bring forward two interlinked paradigmatic blind spots that equate nations with states. These blind spots are inherent in the two world views. They treat nations as fixed and immutable social groups and take their existence as such for granted. This ultimately results in the reduction of international relations to interstate relations.

5.5.2. Paradigmatic Blind Spots

5.5.2.1. Equating Nation with State:

Many of the assumptions inherent in mainstream IR theory depend on a conceptualization which equates the nation with the state. Even the name of the discipline, "international relations," is based upon this paradigmatic blind spot. However, as identity studies argue, the nation and state are two different subjects of politics. Naming the human population of a state a "nation," or naming the political entity of one of these populations a "state" is the result of a set of misunderstandings common to IR theorizing. Even after the end of the Cold War, in spite of the so-called decline of the nation-state and the rise of ethnic conflicts in various regions of

the world, little attention has been paid to the relationship between nation and state.[289]

As Roger Tooze puts it, wherever we live today we find ourselves within a political entity based on the state. This political structure is also based on "the assumed identity that nation equals state, or perhaps more appropriately given the sources of power, state equals nation."[290] It is this specific political identity that has dominated mainstream thinking in International Relations. "It is this collective identity which is one of the principal starting points for the subject of International Relations (IR) and the corpus of theory associated with IR."[291]

Regarding international politics, the question of the entity with which the mass of people identify themselves is of crucial importance. Wherever the people's identifications lie, there lies the power of mass mobilization.[292] The nation-state as the dominant unit and level of analysis became prominent in IR thinking due to the fact that the state was the political entity with which people most readily identified

[289] David Michael Green, "The End of Identity? The Implications of Postmodernity for Political Identification," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 68.

[290] Roger Tooze, "Prologue: States, Nationalisms and Identities- Thinking in IR Theory," Jill Krause; Neil Renwick (ed.), *Identities in International Relations*, Oxford: St. Anthony's College, p. xii.

[291] Tooze, "Prologue…," p. xii.

[292] Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, p. 120.

themselves at the time.[293] In line with this, according to the realist account of world politics, people identify first and foremost with nation-state.[294] It was on the basis of this assumption that the nation-state became the main unit of analysis in mainstream IR theory.

In the modern world one of the principal sources of cultural identity was/is the national cultures into which we were born. In defining ourselves we sometimes say we are English, Turkish, or Greek. National identities sometimes gain too much importance in defining ourselves, to the extent that we almost believe they are imprinted in our genes. We think of them as if they are a part of our essential nature. However national identities are not things that we are born with, rather they are formed and transformed within and in relation to representation.[295] As I argued in the second chapter, indeed "collective cultural identities have 'always' existed but it is only with the emergence of nationalism that they came to be defined in national terms."[296]

[293] It is important to note the exception of E. H. Carr within this generalization. According to Burchill, Carr argued that there was no need to assume that the nation was the "ultimate group unit of human society." He envisaged other units based upon religion, class and ethnicity. For more information on that issue see Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism," in *Theories of International Relations*, p. 71.

[294] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 38.

[295] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," p. 292.

[296] *Encyclopedia of Nationalism Volume 2*, San Diego, San Francisco: Academic Press, 2001, p. 360.

A nation is often defined as a group of people who share a common history, traditions, myths, a common descent, a common language, and who have a common enemy. The state, in its simplest form, may be defined as a political entity that has a territory, a population, and which acts as a sovereign political unit. When the human population of a state is characterized as homogenous and dubbed a "nation," then we reach the definition of nation-state, which is accepted as the main actor in International Relations. And in its simplest form nationalism may be defined as the ideological bridge that connects the state and the nation. Thus national identity is based upon the ideas of a common territory, a common history, a common will,[297] and shared political and legal principles.[298]

The word nation comes from Latin. When first coined, it clearly conveyed the idea of common blood ties. It was derived from the past participle of the verb *nasci*, meaning to be born.[299] Throughout the nineteenth century and up until the first decades of the twentieth century nation and race were used as synonyms. In keeping with the popularity of Darwinian theory at the time, the focus of classical geopolitics centered mainly on race. In other words in geopolitics the term "race" and nation were used as synonyms and their connotation was the same. In the first half of the twentieth century, however, this focus on race disappeared from academic and

[297] A common will refers to what Ernest Renan calls an "everyday plebiscite".

[298] *Encyclopedia of Nationalism Volume 1*, p. 360.

[299] Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: A Quest for Understanding*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 94.

political language. Two primary reasons lie behind this disappearance: American aversion to racial theory and Nazi fondness for it.

In accordance with the American idealism of the time, the trend was to draw better boundaries for a better fit of nations and states in an endeavor to engineer unitary nation-states. Shortly after entering the First World War, United States President Woodrow Wilson created an Inquiry Committee, which produced 1,200 maps focusing on the ethnic, political, and historical boundaries of Europe.[300] A key member of the Committee was geographer Isaiah Bowman. Mackinder, however, did not participate in the post First World War geo-graphing exercises, otherwise known as the Peace Conferences. Although he was the prominent geographer of his country, he was not invited to be a member of his national delegation. According to Kearns, this was because his blood and soil racism was not dominant either in the USA or in Britain[301] at the time.

The second reason for the fall from grace experienced by the term race was the Second World War. The Jewish holocaust demonstrated the extremes racism could

[300] Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, 127

[301] Kearns, "Imperial Geopolitics…," in *A Companison to Political Geography*, p. 177.

lead to. The word "ethnic" was invented in Western sociology to replace "race"[302] as a result of the negative connotations the latter term had acquired. [303]

The assumption that every state has its own nation, and that nations are homogeneous entities, has always fallen far short of reality. According to a research study, of 132 nation-states:

i) only twelve states (9.1%) can justifiably be described as nation states;

ii) 25 contain a nation or a potential nation[304] accounting for more than 90% of the state's population but also contain an important minority;

iii) another 25 contain a nation or a potential nation accounting for between 75% and 89% of the population;

iv) in 31 states the largest ethnic element accounts for 50% to 74% of the total population;

v) in 39 states the largest nation or potential nation accounts for less than half of the population.[305]

[302] Although the term "ethnic" was first invented to replace race, in the existing literature there are many uses of ethnicity referring to racial relations. The most widely used example of this situation is the concept of "ethnic nation," which refers to a nation that is not civic but constructed upon racial ties, where the membership criteria is racial.

[303] Orhan Türkdoğan, *Etnik Sosyoloji*, İstanbul: Timaş, 1999.

[304] A potential nation means a group of people who have all the necessary prerequisites (a sense of common origin, of common beliefs and values, and a common feeling of survival in brief a common cause) for nationhood.

[305] Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 96.

In reality there are very few countries which do not contain any minorities. In addition to the abovementioned facts, one estimate says that over 200 million people are living in countries other than the one in which they were born, whether because of war, political oppression, economic opportunity, or other reasons.[306]

The fallacy of equating nation with state stems from the idea that nations are homogenous entities. Both mainstream IR theory and classical geopolitics had long assumed that states consisted of homogenous nations, societies, or races. However, as illustrated above, the real world does not always fully reflect the analytical categories we seek to impose upon it. Rather than consisting of nation-states, the world consists of multi-ethnic states and multi-state nations. Both IR and classical geopolitics, however, reduce them to an ideal-type. The concept of a homogenous, immutable population of the state constitutes one of the basic assumptions and paradigmatic blind spots of the two fields.

Moreover, although national identities were regarded as fixed and unchanging, today it is quite certain that they are capable of changing over time. Being German today, for example, involves something very different than being German would have before reunification, and both would be very different from the identifications

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[306] David Michael Green, "The End of Identity? The Implications of Postmodernity for Political Identification," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,* Vol. 6, No 3, Autumn 2000, p. 75.

involved with being German in 1938, 1916, or 1871.[307] Another example might be the meaning of the word "Turk." During the 19th century, in the Balkans, the term "Turk" was used to refer to Muslims, and had nothing to do with ethnic or national ties.[308] Today it is sometimes used to refer to a civic nation that is the sum of the citizens of the Turkish Republic. Other times it is used to refer to an ethnic nation that includes all of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia in addition to the ones that live in Turkey.

I would argue that such conceptualizations of state and nation are first and foremost geopolitical ideal types. Geopolitical theorists have long been wedded to the idea that the boundaries of states are coterminous with those of nations. The idea of a nation and a state perfectly representing it represent the ideals and "unrealist" spots inherent in both fields.

In short, both mainstream IR theory and classical geopolitics continue to equate nations with states and treat them as biological organisms. Both continue to assume that nations are homogeneous entities that existed before us and will continue to exist forever. These nations have established their states in order to survive in the anarchical structure of the international arena. Because the structure of this

[307] Jenkins, *Social Identity*, p. 93.

[308] Eran Frankel, "Urban Muslim Identity in Macedonia," in Eran Frankel; Christina Kramer (eds.), *Language Contact- Language Conflict*, New York: Peter Lang, 1993, pp. 29-44 quoted in Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 178.

international arena is anarchical and because a state's main aim is to survive, the international arena represents an area of high politics. In order to survive states must be powerful, and in order to thrive they must be more powerful still. The more powerful the state the more it pursues primacy. Power is thus pursued as both a means and as an end in and of itself. This leads us to another basic assumption shared by both realist thought and geopolitics: the distinction between high and low politics.

5.5.2.2. The Distinction between High and Low Politics

The distinction between high and low politics that mainstream IR theory rested upon for so long suggests that "the high politics of diplomacy and strategic affairs could and should be separated from the low politics of domestic politics and transnational relations."[309] Mainstream IR theory and classical geopolitics rest upon a distinction between high and low politics. This distinction is built upon the two interwoven assumptions that the foreign and the domestic are two totally distinct realms, and that the realm of the foreign is hierarchically higher. The idea here is that "the internal domain of the reasoned peace is juxtaposed to that of an 'external' domain of

[309] Lui Hebron; John F. Stack, "The Internationalisation of Ethnicity: The Crises of Legitimacy and Authority in World Politics," Lui Hebron; John F. Stack (eds.) *The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*,Connecticut: Praeger, 1999, p2.

unreasoned anarchy."[310] This distinction is based upon the characterization of the international arena as anarchical.

Realists hold that anarchy is one of the major problems in international relations and often referred to Hobbes' "state of nature" theory to explain that "reality." According to the realist account, anarchy prevails in the international system for two reasons: firstly because a sovereign international authority with power over and above that of all other authorities does not and cannot exist (because states would not give up their sovereignty to an international body), and secondly because the nature of human beings and the states they construct is inherently selfish and totally concerned with the pursuit of survival and power. According to this outlook anarchy in the international realm is inevitable,[311] and accepting the necessity of preparing for war is the only the sure means of avoiding being forced to fight. This was the assumption underpinning balance of power theory, which is also central to classical geopolitical theories.

The old assumption, embodied in Cold War realism, that the high politics of diplomacy and strategic affairs could and should be separated from the low politics of domestic politics and transnational relations is no longer valid. Ethnicity, with its ability to influence state behavior both domestically and internationally—perhaps

[310] Krause; Renwick, *Identity in International Relations*, p. xii.

[311] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 28.

most obviously through secessionist and irredentist movements in a number of critically important regions—is now the very essence of high politics.[312] Thus this distinction has turned out to be another paradigmatic blind spot.

As mentioned before, states do not, with only a few exceptions, consist of homogenous communities. Even if they do consist of ethnically homogenous groups, the dichotomy of identity and difference would always be there since homogeneity does not mean uniformity. Thus it is difficult to regard the internal affairs of states as taking place within a "sphere of peace," and thus place it in the category of low politics. In other words it is difficult to agree with Martin Wight when he claimed that "domestic politics is the sphere of good life while international politics is the sphere of security and survival,"[313] or with Hans Morgenthau when he stated in his sixth principle that "the political sphere is autonomous from every other sphere, thus international domain is analytically distinct."[314]

[312] Hebron; Stack, "The Internationalisation of Ethnicity…," p. 2.

[313] Martin Wight, "Why is There No International Theory," in H. Butterfield; Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics,* London, 1996, p. 33 quoted in Andrew Linklater, "Rationalism," in Scott Burchill; Andrew Linklater et. al., *Theories of International Relations,* London: MacMillan, 1996, s. 94.

[314] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1973, p. 13.

5.5.3. Common Aims and Ambitions

Every theory is generated for someone and for some reason. Almost every IR theory book states, in its discussion of realism, that the primary aim of the discipline was to develop an objective characterization of international politics. In addition to this aim, however, realist theorists worked to provide guidance and policy-relevant advice for decision-makers, policy-planners, and state leaders. In other words, in addition to developing an objective analysis of international politics realism also aimed at generating guidance for the leaders. Both aims were defined by the founding father Morgenthau.

Traditional geopolitics aimed at serving as a policy guide as well as developing a scientific approach to better understand the relations among states. However, as illustrated in the first chapter, all geopolitical theories are based upon the goal of promoting a certain country, especially that of the hegemon. Geopolitics is, after all, designed to provide the state with "tools and guidance for political action."[315] Thus, geopolitical theories are generated either by or for the dominant powers, the hegemon (when there is one), and for those so-called medium powers who have the will and ability to change the "status quo" at a regional level.

[315] Haushofer, "Why Geopolitik?," p. 34.

While aimed at such an ambitious end, both approaches also shared the ambition of being scientific. All geopolitical theorists, from Ratzel and Mackinder to Haushofer, aimed at creating a "science" of geopolitics. However, as their main aim was to promote the interests of a certain state, the discipline has never been capable of escaping its at best semi-scientific character.

It can be argued that realism's approach to world politics, starting with Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*, has been "scientific," at least to the extent that any social science can be. As geopolitical thinking prevailed in practice, however, realism, as the theoretical expression of that practice, could not eschew its assumptions that the world was created in accordance with geopolitical "facts." Moreover both geopolitical theorists and realists were "intellectuals in politics."[316] Some basic IR theory texts argue that realism provides a guide, based on the principles of realpolitik, for states to pursue their preservation and interests.[317] When defined as such, it is no different from geopolitics. This point also tells us that the consistency between classical geopolitics and realism turned out to be compulsory and inevitable.

Building their theories upon basic assumptions about states, power, and nations, both approaches moreover claim to be valid throughout time and across the globe. The traditional geopolitical theorists of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries

[316] Hill, 1994, quoted in Grondin, "(Re)Writing the 'National Security State'…," p. 4.

[317] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 207.

expressed confidence in knowing "how the world works."[318] To prove how realism is an age old wisdom, realists often refer to the thoughts of sixteenth century Italian political thinker Niccolo Machiavelli and seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, or even further back to Greek historian Thucydides. Geopolitical thinkers, on the other hand, argue that their theories are built upon the correlation between history and geography and ambitiously aim at catching the essence of world history and geography. Indeed, the sole aim of geopolitical theory is to discover in the locus of geography and history the underlying timeless and invariable laws governing the world political arena. In essence both approaches aim at nothing less than knowledge of the essential truths and fundamental nature of international politics.

Moreover theorists of both approaches offered up their theories as if they were capable of separating themselves from their environment. In their writings, they abstracted themselves from their context and argued for describing the world as it is, with a cache of expertise.

Both approaches share common assumptions, which mean common worldviews. They both consider the nature of the international realm to be anarchical. They both view states as the primary actors in the political realm, and they both believe that the

[318] John Agnew, *Making Political Geography*, London: Arnold, 2002 quoted in Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 29

fundamental aim of states is the pursuit of power and, with it, primacy in the anarchical structure of international relations. Both approaches draw a similar normative world picture.

The seven basic assumptions of realism that I outlined earlier in this chapter are also explicitly visible in and shared by traditional geopolitics. I have argued that all of these assumptions are historically questionable and tenuous yet that they nevertheless function in the practices of everyday statecraft and provide a common link between geopolitics and realism. What I am trying to suggest is not that realism is merely geopolitics but the fact that the impact of geopolitics and the consistency of geopolitical thinking should be given the necessary credit within IR theory. After all, the realist assumptions of world politics did not suddenly emerge after the end of the Second World War. Realists took these assumptions for granted and to treat them as "observed realities" in the aftermath of the Second World War precisely because the prominence of geopolitical theory had made them a commonplace in the decades before the war.

It is often argued that realism has dominated International Relations to such a degree that students, and even scholars, have often lost sight of the fact that it is simply a

perspective, and present realism as if it were a "common sense" view of the world against which all other perspectives should be judged.[319]

Despite the efforts of the postmodernist school, realism continues to enjoy its status as the common sense account of international relations. Or, to put it another way, common sense still seems to lend credence to realist claims. If realism emerged during the interwar period, did our "common sense" regarding international politics also emerge at that time? My answer to this question is negative.

Agnew suggests that "[a] large part of Europe's heritage to the World, is the continuing strength of the 'common sense' about world politics bequeathed in the form of geopolitical imagination."[320] This common sense is common to public opinion, policy-makers and leaders. It constitutes the basis of practice and thus theory. If IR's common sense is a European geopolitical heritage, I would argue that this heritage was brought to the USA by the European immigrants who changed the course of American science.

[319] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 20.

[320] Agnew, *Geopolitics*, p. 6.

5.5.4. The Impact of Immigrants

Another point of commonality between realism and geopolitics is the impact scholars who immigrated to the US from Europe have had on both fields. As Hoffman puts it these scholars have played a crucial role in the development of American academic disciplines, particularly International Relations. Hoffman argued that these scholars, whose philosophical training and personal experience was quite different than that of the American scholars "provided not merely an injection of talent, but talent of a different sort."[321] In Hoffman's words:

> (…) they often served as conceptualizers, and blended their analytic skills with the research talents of the "natives." Moreover, they brought with them a sense of history, an awareness of the diversity of social experiences, that could only stir comparative research and make something more universal of the frequently parochial American social science. In the field of international relations, in addition to Morgenthau, there was a galaxy of foreign-born scholars, all concerned with transcending empiricism: the wise and learned Arnold Wolfers, Klaus Knorr, Karl Deutcsh, Ernst Haas, George Liska, and the young Kissinger and Brzezinski, to name only a few. They (and quite especially those among them who had crossed the Atlantic in their childhood or adolescence) wanted to find out the meaning and the causes of the catastrophe that had uprooted them, and perhaps the keys to a better world.[322]

This thesis argues that what these scholars brought with them was mostly the geopolitical mindset which was only starting to emerge in the USA at the time. The

[321] Hoffman, "An American Social Science:International Relations," p. 46.

[322] Hoffman, "An American Social Science:International Relations," p. 47.

emergence of such a mindset was necessary for the USA at the time as a result of its breaking away from (or expanding upon) the Monroe Doctrine and preparing to become a world power. In this context, what those immigrants with their strong geopolitical background were bringing was the established geopolitical wisdom of Europe, which was still experiencing its golden age.

Hoffman states that in the USA two names were especially important regarding the development of the geopolitical mindset. The first was Nicholas Spykman who we dealt with in the first chapter, and the second was Hans Morgenthau.

Morgenthau was born in the same year that Halford Mackinder gave his famous address. He is known as the German-born American founder of the discipline of International Relations, and as "a leading analyst of the role of power in international politics."[323]

According to the accounts of Encyclopedia Britannica, Morgenthau studied law at the Universities of Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich, completed his postgraduate studies in Geneva, was admitted to the bar in 1927, and served as acting president of the Labor Law Court in Frankfurt. Because of Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933 he immigrated to the USA, where he took up the residence in 1937, and

[323] "Morgenthau," *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/topic/ 392323/ Hans-Joachim-Morgenthau.

became a naturalized citizen in 1943. He taught at the faculties of Brooklyn (New York) College (1937–39), the University of Missouri–Kansas City (1939–43), the University of Chicago (1943–71), the City College of the City University of New York (1968–74), and the New School for Social Research (1974–80).[324]

In 1948 Morgenthau published his famous *Politics Among Nations*, which laid the foundations of the classical realist approach. Morgenthau argued that politics is governed by "distinct immutable laws of nature and that states could deduce rational and objectively correct actions from an understanding of these laws."[325] It would not be an exaggeration to argue that all of the abovementioned assumptions of the realist theory depend upon Morgenthau's work. Central to Morgenthau's theory was the concept of power as the dominant goal in international politics and the definition of national interest in terms of power. Despite his background in law, he argued for the primacy of power politics and aimed at creating a theory to guide those in power.[326]

Sharing Hoffman's views I would argue that immigrants played a central role in the development of International Relations in the USA and helped to establish a strong link between traditional European geopolitics and realist theory there. I would

[324] "Morgenthau," *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/topic/ 392323/ Hans-Joachim-Morgenthau.

[325] "Morgenthau," *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, 15 June 2010, http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/topic/ 392323/ Hans-Joachim-Morgenthau.

[326] Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," p.47.

moreover like to argue that this link was established not only by immigrants but also by some important American political figures who studied in Europe and adopted the geopolitical mindset. A very important name in this respect is George Kennan, whose direct impact on Cold War geopolitics and the containment policy we reviewed in the first chapter.

It is possible to argue that if George Kennan had not been sent to Germany to study Russian politics, and while there had not learned about the German geopolitical mindset and the importance given to Mackinder's Heartland Theory at the time, then history might have looked quite different. Would he still have considered the Soviet Union, then the "friend" of the US but also the ruler of the Heartland, a threat to US hegemony, and would he have sent his famous long telegram to Washington warning of the Soviet threat?

Obviously, there is no clear answer to this question. It is possible to argue, however, that immigrants as well as American political scientists educated in Europe affected the way IR developed, and that both worked to ground the discipline in the geopolitical mindset. Although the term was almost forbidden in the post-Second World War period, in the end it was again an immigrant, Henry Kissinger, who brought the term into usage in the 1970s in the US.

European émigrés aimed at avoiding catastrophe and, excited by the promise of a new US hegemony, provided guidance to the US administration. In their studies however they did not refer to "geopolitics," or "Mackinder," or "Ratzel," or "Haushofer," as they had witnessed the catastrophic impact these people and their theories had on Europe. These immigrants were people who had personally experienced the "evil" of geopolitics. Moreover, the connotation of the word "geopolitics" was decidedly negative, as the whole field was viewed as a disease or infection in the USA. The word itself and its proponents were things that had to remain buried in the ashes of the Second World War.

In the end, theoreticians are conditioned by their own historical experiences. These experiences cannot be artificially separated from their work, because they are embedded in the theoretical worlds that they construct.

These immigrants believed in American ideals and, as new citizens, wanted to promote the country's strength and contribute to the maintenance of its hegemony along "scientific" lines. This was how the discipline of IR as an American science was born, and this occurred at a time when the word "geopolitics" and the names of its founding fathers had been totally erased from academic circles. In the end, IR was born out of the human tragedy of war, and European émigrés constituted the invisible bridge between traditional geopolitics and realist paradigm of IR.

5.6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I summarized the birth and development of IR and outlined the major assumptions of classical realism, the central theory of IR, and argued that both classical realism and traditional geopolitics shared common assumptions and thus a common world view.

Yet no mention is made of either geopolitics or critical geopolitics in the IR classroom or in its textbooks. In the following conclusive chapter I will reflect on this matter and attempt to answer the question of why these subjects are not dealt with, and conclude by offering my account for why they should be.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF IR

> *The more we are aware of our basic paradigms, maps, or assumptions, and the extent to which we have been influenced by our experience, the more we can take responsibility for those paradigms, examine them, thereby getting a larger picture and a far more objective view.*[327]

In the introductory chapter of this study I asked a question: "Why do IR theory books not contain any chapters on traditional and critical geopolitics? And why is it that they should?" In order to pave the way for an answer to that question, in the second chapter of this study I outlined traditional geopolitics under three basic titles: European geopolitics, American/Cold War geopolitics, and post-Cold War geopolitics, with reference to the basic approaches utilized under these respective headings and to the founding fathers of important theories.

In the third chapter of this study I focused on critical geopolitics, which emerged in the 1980s at the interface of political geography and International Relations, and reviewed its basic subjects of study—namely modern geopolitical discourse and the relation between discourse and hegemony—in an attempt to illustrate its effects on practice. I then referenced identity studies in order to display how the basic

[327] Covey, *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, p.29.

characteristics of western geopolitical discourse carry with them the binary oppositions that lie at the foundation of their European heritage.

Following that, in the third chapter I offered a critical analysis of modern cartography and mapmaking, which is also a subject of critical geopolitics, in order to illustrate how maps shape our world view and constitute an assumption shared by geopolitical theorists and scholars of international relations. Throughout these chapters I suggested that just like common assumptions the discourse and the map projections we choose represent and shape our theories and thus our reality. A common discourse and common world map indicates a common world view, and thus constitute sufficient proof of a link between the two fields of geopolitics and international relations theory.

In the fifth chapter I reviewed the development of IR as a separate academic discipline and outlined the major IR theories with a special focus on realism, which I argued to be the most established and dominant perspective in IR. Following that, in an attempt to highlight some specific points of commonality between traditional geopolitics and realism I overviewed the common assumptions and ambitions of the two fields and argued for their congruence. I argued that this consistency was due to the mindset of immigrant scholars who had migrated to the USA as a result of the chaos caused by the Second World War, as well as American policy makers like George Kennan who studied in Europe and gained the traditional geopolitical mindset.

In IR theory textbooks neither geopolitics nor its founding fathers are embraced. They are not even mentioned. In books regarding the theory of the field there is no mention of either. In IR theory outlines, or books like *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*[328] there are many references to political thinkers, but none to geopolitical theorists. Throughout the pages of this study I have argued that this was due to the demise of geopolitics after the end of the Second World War as a result of its association with imperialism and Nazism. Flanders, as early as, 1945 stated that

> [g]eopolitics must not be brushed aside merely because it has been a handmaiden to German imperialism. Analytical tools are as important in securing the benefits following World War II as material weapons were in winning the war. Geopolitics is one of these analytical tools.[329]

However, after the Second World War geopolitics became a forbidden concept in both Europe and the USA. Not only geopolitics, but also the science of geography and its subdivision political geography shared the same destiny. Murray states that during the 1960s and 1970s both geography and political geography disappeared from the curricula of higher education in the USA.[330] By the mid-1970s political geography was taught in only half of British universities' geography departments, with over two thirds of heads of geography departments considering that the

[328] Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, London: Routledge, 1999.

[329] Dwight P. Flanders, "Geopolitics and American Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1945, p. 585.

[330] John Agnew, "Global Political Geography Beyong Geopolitics," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, p. 92

development of political geography literature was unsatisfactory compared with other branches of geography.[331] Geography Professor Peter Taylor outlines the destiny of geopolitics and political geography as follows:

> As a subdiscipline, it is minuscule, albeit variable in size across countries and over time. For instance, compared to the similar discipline of International Relations (IR) with its university departments and numerous journals, geopolitics is indeed a very poor relation. In fact we can view geopolitics as the periphery of a periphery of a periphery: it has always had an uneasy relation with political geography, which in turn has been located at the edge of human geography, which in turn has never established itself within the core of social science.[332]

Thus, in the second half of the twentieth century the destiny of geopolitics in the academy has been to be in the periphery of the periphery of the periphery. According to Jones et. al. the history of political geography as an academic sub-discipline can be roughly divided into three eras: an era of ascendancy from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War, an era of marginalization from the 1940s to the 1970s, and an era of revival from the late 1970s onwards.[333] Famous geographer Leslie Hepple's article, published in 1986, was a turning point regarding the importance attached to geopolitics in Geography departments. Hepple warned that:

> Lack of serious historical and political critique of geopolitics many not only result in the reinventing of the wheel, but in being caught in the trap of

[331] Jones et. al., *An Introduction to Political Geography*, p. 8.

[332] Peter Taylor, "Geopolitics, Political Geography and Social Science," in Klaus Dodds; David Atkinson ed., *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 375.

[333] Jones et. al., *An Introduction to Political Geography*, p. 4.

> accepted myth and unquestioned intellectual structure… there is also a second danger from neglect of history: users of geopolitics always risk having the subject's past used against them[334]

The revival of political geography in academia brought forward the revival of geopolitics as well. I would argue, however, that the revival of geopolitics was mostly due to its dominance in practice. In this respect, what survived in practice survived in theory as well.

During the Cold War years geopolitics played a central role in the political-military sphere. The formulation of the containment policy, the NATO Alliance, and the weapons deployments of the 1970s and 1980s were all motivated by geopolitical arguments.[335] It was Henry Kissinger who brought the term geopolitics back into use again. It was Kissinger's re-use of the term that for many scholars erased the Nazi stigma they associated with the word.

Later on, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union boosted the geopolitical appetite of states and scholars, and after almost a century political geography and geopolitical studies enjoyed a public revival. The strength and impact of Brzezinski's *Grand Chess Board*, in which he, drawing upon Mackinder, announced that "Euroasia is the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy

[334] Leslie Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics," *Political Geography Quarterly* 5, Supplement Issue, 1986, p. 33 quoted in Dodds, "Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics After Ten Years," p. 470.

[335] Tunander, "Swedish-German Geopolitics For a New Century…," p. 459.

continues to be played,"[336] is enough proof to argue for the liveliness of geopolitics. In other words, although it was erased from the literature, the practice of geopolitics has continued to be an integral part of IR practice: geopolitical thinking is inherent to the very practice of foreign policy, though this is not always made explicit.

The end of the Cold War marked not only the revival of traditional geopolitics, but also opened up the new perspective of "critical geopolitics." Critical geopolitics aims at unpacking the well-established assumptions of traditional geopolitics, and thus its emergence opened up new research agendas very relevant to the study of IR.

In short, the 1980s marked the return of geopolitics both in critical and traditional forms. Interestingly, the revival of geopolitics and the development of critical geopolitics occurred simultaneously. On the one hand, there emerged new geopolitical theorists such as Brzezinski, Huntington, Fukuyama, and Barnett arguing for "new" traditional geopolitical theories. At the same time theorists of critical geopolitics appeared and, utilizing discourse analysis, began to deconstruct the classical theories, worldviews, and mindsets of traditional geopolitics.

Thus, my simpler answer to my first question "Why do IR theory books not contain any chapters on geopolitics?" is that IR theory textbooks do not recognize geopolitics—in either its traditional or its critical formulations—because during the

[336] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 31.

years when IR was growing into a separate academic discipline geopolitics was a forbidden concept due to its so-called association with Nazism and imperialist policies. But the field survived as one of the dominant forces affecting world politics. This brings us to the second question: "Why should IR theory books have a chapter on geopolitics?"

Throughout this thesis I have illustrated that, although it is not recognized in theory, geopolitics has remained and continues to constitute an intrinsic part of IR practice. I have argued that it was classical geopolitical theories that prepared the intellectual basis for the First and Second World Wars as well as the Cold War. Whether the two world wars and the Cold War were struggles entirely conforming to the premises of Mackinder's theory is another discussion, and one beyond the scope of this thesis. My argument is rather that this question would be a valid, relevant, and potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry for scholars of IR. In other words, if we today, after the post-positivist turn, argue that theory is practice, then the theories of geopolitical theorists and their effects on war would not be a irrelevant discussion for the study of IR.

IR textbooks, such as Steans and Pettiford's well known *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, characterize International Relations as having originated in the aftermath of the First World War. Its first theory was idealism, and after the

Second World War realism emerged as the accepted wisdom in IR. [337] A question that comes to mind is, "what did we have until then as an international theory?" What I argue is that, although it is not recognized in IR literature, we had geopolitics as the dominant perspective regarding international relations. If the discipline of IR was created with the intention of coming to an understanding of war and developing strategies to prevent its reoccurrence then the analysis of geopolitical tradition has to be a part of IR history.

According to Scott Burchill, realists were not the first to think and write about international relations, though they were the first to offer a "comprehensive account of the international system in practice," which in effect meant the codification of practice.[338] In the preface of the second edition of *Politics Among Nations* Morgenthau states that the book was written in 1947 based upon the experiences and observations of the last twenty years.[339] In this respect what Morgenthau did was, in a way, the codification of practice. However in his 618 page book geopolitics is spared only one and a half pages. And in these one and a half pages the field is reduced to nothing more than geographical determinism. In this respect, if realism does indeed codify practice as Burchill argues, it would be prudent to take a closer look at the practice, and at how it is shaped and the people doing the shaping.

[337] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 20
[338] Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism," in *Theories of International Relations*, p. 79.

[339] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. xiii.

Traditional geopolitical texts display the mindset and practice that gave birth to realism and which realism in turn codified. If we argue that theory is responsible for practice and that practice shapes theory, then traditional geopolitical theories should be given credit for their role in the history of IR theory. They should be given credit for the effect they have had on the practice of IR, and on the mainstream IR theories that codified that practice. In the final analysis, we act on the basis of our knowledge. Our actions have the effect of confirming the correctness of our theories. As Zalewski points out

> (…) events in the world, issues in international politics, are not ontologically prior to our theories about them. This does not mean that people read about, say realism, and act accordingly, but that our (and by 'our' I mean theorizer/global actors) dominant ways of thinking and acting in the world will be (re)produced as 'reality'.[340]

Analyzing nineteenth century geopolitical theories and their mindset, discourse, and practice will pave the way for a more comprehensive understanding of mainstream IR theories, since traditional geopolitical texts explicitly display the biases and political purposes which the latter codified. The theorists behind traditional geopolitics believed at the time that they were scientists and scholars engaged in the pursuit of truth, and thus had no "academic" reservations regarding their work. Analysis of the civilizational mindset together with the Darwinian scientific mindset

[340] Marysia Zalewski, "All These Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Pilling Up: Theory, Theorist, Theorising," Steve Smith; Ken Booth; Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond,* New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 350-351, quoted in Grondin, "(Re)Writing the 'National Security State'…," p. 20.

prevailing in these texts would help to explain the context in which realism was born. If we are to apply discourse analysis it would be much more relevant to apply that to the traditional texts than their codifications, observations or oppositions. As Grondin puts it, "What people see as the 'real world' is implicitly bound up with the epistemological, methodological and ontological stance they take in theoretical discourse."[341] The so-called "facts" about the world are influenced by our own values, interpretations, and explanations about the world.

If we are to admit that a realist vs. idealist debate has in fact occurred,[342] then we should also acknowledge the context into which realism was born. Indeed Carr, the founder of the debate, explicitly acknowledged that link by stating that realism without utopianism could have descended into a cynical "realpolitik."[343]

As Covey puts it, "[e]ach of us tends to think we see things as they are, that we are *objective*. But this is not the case. We see the world, not as *it is*, but as *we are*-or, as we are conditioned to see it."[344] In this respect, it would not be wrong to assume that the geopolitical tradition of the nineteenth century determined to a large extent the

[341] Grondin, "(Re)Writing the 'National Security State'…," 22.

[342] As I noted earlier we should be also skeptical of the existence of such an idealism vs. realism debate. It was E. H. Carr and other "realists" who channeled the event as such, writing in opposition to some group of theorists and ideas and labeling them as idealist. Liberalism was not recognized as a coherent theory as such until it was collectively and derisively termed as "idealism" by Carr.

[343] Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, p. 8.

[344] Covey, *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, p. 28.

way realists were conditioned to see the world. Regarding the relation between theories and the social world Stean and Pettiford argue that,

> [s]ocial values and practices always have a bearing on research, influencing both what we choose to study, and how we interpret the evidence. In this view, the natural world and the social world are different, because the social world is a world infused with social and cultural meanings, constructed through language which invokes powerful symbols and imagery.[345]

In this respect, from the perspective of this study the social world of realists was the taken for granted world of geopolitics. In order to understand the characteristics of that social world and how it has shaped theory and practice in the field of IR there is a need to rediscover the traditional authors of geopolitics. In IR teaching, rather than ignoring or despising it, classical geopolitical thought should be regarded as a valuable tool for the purposes of gaining a deeper and better contextualized understanding of international relations. Geographical discoveries like the conquest of America and Africa and their impact on the political mindset of Europe should furthermore be seen as an intrinsic part of IR history. The contributions that the discipline of geography has made to the development of the field of IR should be recognized and embraced.

[345] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes, p.* 207.

As classical geopolitics is an intrinsic and integral part of IR practice, this aspect of the geopolitical contribution to IR should be given its proper due as well. The same argument is valid for critical geopolitics too. Great powers think in geopolitical terms. Thus geopolitics is always influential in shaping reality. Foucault's view of the power-knowledge relationship, that power produces knowledge, is thought-provoking and enlightening in this respect.

> Everything that we think we 'know' for sure is merely an expression of dominant modes of thought or explanation. We 'know' because we believe these things to be true. We believe these things to be true because we are taught in schools, or told by scientists, technical 'experts', bureaucrats and policy-making elites. Since societies are always organized on the basis of hierarchy and inequality, we cannot accept that what passes as 'knowledge' is disinterested and impartial.[346]

Without examining the roots of the dominant representation and practices that constitute the modern geopolitical imagination any IR theory book remains incomplete. Dodds argues that "disciplines such as International Relations are contributing to a re-examination of key concepts in political geography." I would argue that critical geopolitics' contribution to the re-examination of key concepts in IR is much wider and deeper and thus should be given the necessary credit.

It is important to note that my aim in this study has not been to argue that the legacy of political science or history as academic disciplines is less relevant than that of

[346] Steans; Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, p. 133.

geopolitics or political geography, or to promote the importance of geopolitics to the exclusion of all other fields, but rather to illustrate that geopolitics has not been a separate realm and in the main IR textbooks the necessary connections with geopolitics—either traditional or critical—should be made.

It is possible to argue that IR as an American social science was developed both in opposition to and alongside of classical geopolitics. This is not to say that the mainstream IR theory of realism is merely geopolitics, which would be to call an apple an orange. What I would like to argue is that, just like the legacy of political science and history, geopolitics, critical geopolitical analysis, and especially the names of several important names in these fields should be recognized as a part of IR theory and practice.

The eclectic approach displayed by critical geopolitics also has the capacity to lead to a comprehensive understanding of IR. The "division of knowledge" in the twentieth century, primarily an American-led phenomenon,[347] had caused the birth and development of interdisciplinary studies. The contemporary field of geopolitics seems to be precisely such a multi-disciplinary project, and one with the potential to fill in some of the gaps in the field of IR, especially considering that IR is still a field in search of its own identity. Critical geopolitics has the capacity to offer a dialogue between the two important fields of geography and IR.

[347] Taylor, "Geopolitics, Political Geography and Social Science," p. 376.

Famous geographer Leslie Hepple stated in 1986 that, "geopolitics must come to terms with its past, and examine the nature of its discourse"[348] I think that with the developments in critical geopolitics Hepple's hope has become real. Drawing upon Hepple's statement I would like to argue that it is now IR's turn to come to terms with its past and examine the nature of its discourse. As Osborne puts it,

> [h]istory is selective in the standpoint, background and social status of the historian geopolitician, in the time it is written, in the availability of the documents, in its connection to the great themes of the past, and in the possibility of new revelations and discoveries. If there is not much we can do to alter the course of our journey through the past, we should at least be aware of the invisible forces that guide our footsteps.[349]

Geopolitics has been the invisible force that guided mainstream IR theories, and we, as students of IR, should at least be aware of it. To educate, after all, means to "lead out" (educo, in Latin). In this respect IR theory books should lead the student out to discover the hidden and forbidden history of geopolitics and unrecognized presence of critical geopolitics. A merger between both the traditional and critical accounts of the two fields would enable the writing of a new and comprehensive narrative of IR history and theory.

[348] Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics," p. 34, quoted in Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World*, p. 212.

[349] Roger Osborne, *Civilization*, p.19.

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APPENDICES

1. Türkçe Özet

Bu tezin amacı geleneksel ve eleştirel jeopolitik ile Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi arasındaki bağlantıları ortaya koymak ve jeopolitiğin uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarına sağlayabileceği katkıları tartışmaktır. Bu amaçla giriş bölümünde araştırma konusu- jeopolitik ve uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmaları- ve sorusunun -"Niçin Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi kitaplarında geleneksel ya da eleştirel jeopolitiğe atıf yok; ve niçin olmalı?"- ortaya çıkışı ve gelişimi anlatılmıştır.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde "Avrupa Jeopolitiği," "Amerikan Jeopolitiği" ve "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem Jeopolitiği" genel başlıkları altında geleneksel jeopolitiğin doğuşu ve gelişimi temel teori ve teorisyenlere atıfla aktarılmıştır. Bir diğer deyişle, bu bölümde jeopolitiğin "baba" teorisyenlerinin görüşleri, birbirleri ve uluslararası politika üzerindeki etkilerine atıflarla özetlenmiştir. Coğrafya disiplininin alt dalı olan siyasi coğrafya alanında çalışan ve yazan bu akademisyenler, farklı bir bakış açısıyla uluslararası ilişkilerin özüne ilişkin değerlendirmeler yapmışlar ve daha sonra ortaya çıkan Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini ve disiplinin temel teorisi olarak kabul edilen realizm üzerinde etki yaratmışlardır. Ancak, bu isimler uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerine ilişkin temel ders kitaplarında anılmazlar.

"Avrupa Jeopolitiği" başlığı altında jeopolitiğin "altın çağı" olarak da tanımlanan, on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında başlayan ve İkinci Dünya Savaşıyla birlikte sona

eren dönem ele alınmıştır. Geleneksel Avrupa jeopolitiği ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında, Uluslararası İlişkilerin bir disiplin olarak olgunlaşmasından neredeyse yüzyıl önce ortaya çıkmıştır. Kelimeyi icat eden İsveçli bilim adamı ve siyasetçi Rudolf Kjellen olmakla birlikte jeopolitiğin büyükbabası olarak anılan isim Alman siyasi coğrafyacı Ratzel'dir. Ratzel devletlerin biolojik organizmalar olarak değerlendirildiği organik devlet teorisini ortaya atmış, Kjellen bu teoriyi geliştirmiştir.

İngiliz coğrafyacı Halford Mackinder, 1904 yılında Kraliyet Coğrafya Enstitüsünde yaptığı meşhur sunuşuyla tanınmaktadır. Sunuşunda Mackinder, 400 yıl süren keşifler çağının sona erdiğini ve nihai dünya haritasının oluşturulduğunu ifadeyle tarih ve coğrafyayı analizlerinde birleştiren yeni bir tür coğrafyacıya ihtiyaç bulunduğunu belirtmiş ve ünlü formülünü açıklamıştır: Dünyanın kalbini yöneten dünya adasını yönetir. Dünya adasını yöneten dünyayı yönetir.

Bütün bu teorisyenlerin teorileri Alman coğrafyacı Haushofer'de birleşmiştir. Haushofer, Ratzel ve Kjellen'in organik devlet teorisini ve güç kavramını, Mackinder'in de "Heartland" teorisini alarak Versay mahkûmu Almanya'nın kurtuluşu için çalışmalar yürütmüştür. Bir başka deyişle, Karl Haushofer, kendisinden önce gelen isimlerin teorilerini birleştirerek jeopolitiği popüler bir bilim olarak zirveye taşıyan, ancak aynı zamanda jeopolitiğin sonunu da hazırlayan isim

olarak değerlendirilebilir. Bugün tartışmalı olsa da, o dönemde Haushofer'in doğrudan Hitlerin teorilerini üreten kişi olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda, ABD'nin savaş açtığı Nazizm ile birlikte jeopolitik de kaybedenler arasında yer almış ve akademik literatürden silinmiştir. 1970'lerde Kissinger'ın kelimeyi tekrar kullanıma sokmasına kadar jeopolitik kelimesi ne akademide ne de siyasette duyulmayacaktır.

Jeopolitiğin bundan sonraki gizli hayatı Amerika kıtasında devam etmiştir. Dolayısıyla Soğuk Savaş aslında bir açıdan jeopolitiğin gizli hayatı olarak tanımlanabilir. Bununla birlikte, ABD'de jeopolitik düşünce münhasıran Soğuk Savaş ile başlamamıştır. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılda yaşamış önemli bir jeostratejist Alfred Mahan'dır. Mahan deniz güçlerinin kara güçlerine göre üstünlüğünü savunmuş ve Avrupa'daki jeopolitik tartışmaları ve pratiği etkilemiştir. ABD'de jeopolitik düşüncenin gelişmesinde önemli rol oynayan bir diğer isim Danimarka doğumlu akademisyen Nicholas Spykman'dır. Ancak, jeopolitik düşüncenin bu ülkede başat hale gelmesini sağlayan isim George Kennan'dır.

ABD'li diplomat Kennan iki savaş arası dönemde, ABD'nin ilk Rusya uzmanı diplomatı olmak ve bu çerçevede Rus Dili, Edebiyatı ve Kültürü konularında çalışmalar yürütmek üzere ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı tarafından Almanya'ya gönderilmiştir. Bu dönem Almanya'da Haushofer'in jeopolitik okulunun zirvede

olduğu ve Rusya'nın Mackinder'in "Heratland" teorisi çerçevesinde dünyanın kalbini teşkil ettiğine inanıldığı bir dönemdir. Dolayısıyla Kennan'ın Almanya'da Rusya üzerine çalışmalarını yürüttüğü dönemde Alman jeopolitik bakış açısını kazandığını iddia etmek mümkündür. Bu itibarla Kennan savaş sonrası dönemde SSCB'yi diğer Amerikalılardan farklı algılamış, teorilerini bu çerçevede geliştirmiş ve Moskova'ya tayin edildikten kısa bir süre sonra "Long Telegram" olarak bilinen sekiz bin kelimelik telgrafını Vaşington'a göndermiştir. Kennan telgrafında ve daha sonra yayımladığı makalelerinde SSCB'nin sanıldığının aksine dost değil rakip olduğunu ve çevreleme politikasının hayata geçirilmesinin elzem olduğunu bildirmiştir.

Bundan sonra cereyan eden Soğuk Savaş tam olarak bir jeopolitik pratiği teşkil etmekle birlikte kelimenin kendisi 1970'lere kadar kullanılmamıştır. Bu dönemde sadece jeopolitik değil, coğrafya ve siyasi coğrafya da akademik bir düşüş yaşamıştır.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ise jeopolitik tekrar yükselişe geçmiştir. Bu dönemde, Fukuyama, Huntington, Brzezinski gibi isimler dikkat çekmiştir. Bu devlet entelektüelleri eski ama yeni teoriler üreten popüler isimler haline gelmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren jeopolitik teoriler ve bunların pratikteki etkilerinde bir süreklilik olduğunu iddia etmek mümkündür.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde eleştirel jeopolitik ve bu alandaki gelişmeler aktarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Eleştirel jeopolitik 1980'lerde siyasi coğrafya disiplini içerisinde doğan ve geleneksel jeopolitiğin eleştirisi olarak tanımlanabilecek bir akımdır. Çalışma konuları itibariyle çok geniş olan bu alanda çalışan başlıca akademisyenler, Agnew, Dalby, Toal, Dodds, Flint gibi siyasi coğrafyacılardır. Eleştirel jeopolitiğin üzerinde durduğu başlıca konular ise on dokuzuncu yüzyıl siyasi coğrafya metinlerinin analizi, modern jeopolitik söylemin ve jeopolitik dönemlerin oluşumu ve bunların uluslararası siyaset üzerindeki etkileridir.

Önemli eleştirel coğrafyacılardan biri olan Agnew, *Geopolitics* adlı kitabında, modern devlet sisteminin ortaya çıkışından Soğuk Savaşın sonuna kadar üç temel jeopolitik düzen- medeniyet jeopolitiği, doğal jeopolitik ve ideolojik jeopolitik- tecrübe edildiğini iddia etmiştir. Medeniyet jeopolitiği, Avrupa uyumu ve İngiliz hegemonyası altında cereyan etmiştir. İmparatorluklar arası çekişme döneminde doğal jeopolitik ve Soğuk Savaş döneminde de ideolojik jeopolitik hüküm sürmüştür.

Mevcut çalışmada bu dönemlerin hiçbirinin mutlak surette diğerini ortadan kaldırmadığı, bilakis yeni düzenlerin var olan düşünce yapısına eklendiğini, jeopolitik geçiş ve düzensizlik dönemlerinde de tüm düşünce biçimlerinin aynı güçte canlanarak etkili olduğu, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin buna bir örnek teşkil ettiği (örneğin Huntington'un "Medeniyetler Çatışması" tezi) öne sürülmüştür.

Eleştirel jeopolitikle ilgili açıklayıcı giriş bölümünden sonra, alanın temel çalışma konularından biri olan modern jeopolitik söylem konusunu ele alınmıştır. Eleştirel jeopolitik, modern jeopolitik söylemin güç ve bilgi arasındaki ilişkinin bir sonucu olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Buna göre güç bilgiyi; bilgi de gücü doğurmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, jeopolitik söylem, hem uluslararası politikaya ilişkin pratiği hem de bireylerin uluslararası ilişkilere yönelik algısını doğrudan etkilediği için hayati bir önem arz eder.

Eleştirel coğrafyacılara göre modern jeopolitik söylem keşifler çağıyla, Amerika, Afrika gibi bölgelerin, yani "öteki"nin keşfiyle ortaya çıkmıştır ve ikili zıt tanımlamalar üzerine kuruludur. Dolayısıyla bu süreçte coğrafyacılar da önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Mevcut çalışmada söz konusu karşıtlıkların temelinde yatan en önemli nedenlerden birinin hegemonik söylemin doğası olduğu öne sürülmüştür.

Uluslararası sistemde hukuken devletler eşit varlıklar olarak kabul edilmekle birlikte, gerçekte, bazı devletler daha eşittir. Dolayısıyla modern devlet sisteminin her döneminde daha eşit devletler olan başat güçlerin ve bazı dönemlerde bir hegemonun varlığından söz etmek mümkündür. Bir devlet hegemon güç olmayı arzu edip etmemekte serbesttir, ancak bu rolü üstlenmeyi tercih eden bir devlet doğası gereği sahip olduğu gücü ve statüyü artırmak ya da en azından korumak için jeopolitiğe ihtiyaç duyar.

Easasen on dokuzuncu yüzyılda jeopolitiğin ortaya çıkışı ve gelişimine ilişkin süreç de bu çerçevede gelişmiştir. Dolayısıyla jeopolitik teoriler hegemon devlet için ya da hegemon devlet tarafından üretilmektedir. Bu teorilerin diğer ülkeler ve kitleler tarafından kabul edilmesi ise yaratılan söylemlerle sağlanır. Hegemonların sahip oldukları gücü artırmaları ancak etki alanlarını genişletmeleriyle mümkündür. Burada söylem devletin amaçlarını meşrulaştırma ve etki alanını artırma görevini üstlenir. Bir başka deyişle uluslararası ilişkilerde gerçekliği şekillendiren hegemon devletler ve onların ürettikleri söylemlerdir.

Etki alanlarını oluşturabilmek için modern hegemonlar belirli bir misyon üstlenirler ve ürettikleri söylemler vasıtasıyla "biz" ve "onlar," "düşman" kavramlarının tanımlarını ve sınırlarını belirlerler. Tarihte bunun örneklerini görmek mümkündür. On altıncı ve on yedinci yüzyıllarda İspanya, Hıristiyanlığın koruyuculuğu misyonunu üstlenmiştir. On dokuzuncu yüzyılda İngiltere ve diğer Avrupa güçleri "medeniyet"i koruma misyonunu üstlenmişlerdir. Yirminci yüzyılda ABD önce komünizme sonrasında da terörizme karşı dünya polisliği misyonunu üstlenmiştir. Bu çerçevede, bu bölümde söylem-hegemon ve uluslararası ilişkiler pratiği bağlantısı ortaya koymaya çalışılmıştır.

Agnew ve Corbridge *Mastering Space* adlı kitaplarında söylemler hakkında önemli bir soru sormaktadır: "Niçin modern jeopolitik söylemlerde "biz" ve "onlar"; "modern" ve "geri kalmış" ayrımı vardır?"

Mevcut çalışmanın eleştirel jeopolitiğe ilişkin üçüncü bölümünün müteakip sayfalarında bu soruya bir cevap aranmış ve Avrupa tarihinin yanı sıra kimlik çalışmalarına dair literatür de incelenerek bazı sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. Buna göre, sınıflandırma, tanımlama ve ait olma ihtiyaçlarımız çerçevesinde kimlik gruplarına ve kimlik politikalarına tüm bireylerin ihtiyaç duyduyu, bu çerçevede "biz" ve "öteki"nin oluşturulmasının bir gereklilik olduğunu, özellikle Avrupa ve Batı gibi kimlik gruplarının incelenmesinden görüldüğü üzere, "biz"i oluşturan dil, kültür, tarih gibi objektif unsurların zayıflığı halinde, "öteki"nin varlığının/yaratılmasının bir zaruret haline geldiği, Avrupalıların antik Yunan ve Roma ile başlayan bir tarih yazarak "barbarlar" üzerinden kendilerini tanımlayageldikleri, bu süreçte Afrika, Amerika gibi bölgelerin keşiflerinin de belirleyici bir rol oynadığı, modern jeopolitik söylemin de bu mirası taşıdığı öne sürülmüştür.

Modern jeopolitik söylem yalnızca "biz" ve "onlar" ayrımına değil, "biz"in üstünlüğü iddiasına da dayanır. Coğrafi keşifler sonunda Avrupa kendisini yeryüzüzdeki en medeni birim olarak tanımlamıştır. Bunun sonucunda, belirli bir hiyerarşiye dayanan coğrafi sınıflandırmalar doğal ve gerçek olarak kabul edilmiş ve böylelikle uluslararası politika pratiğine hakim Doğu-Batı ayrımı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu şekilde gelişen medeniyetçi söylem on dokuzuncu yüzyıl sonunda sosyal bilimlerde hakim Darwinist akımla birleşerek "bilimsel" bir nitelik kazanmıştır. Geleneksel jeopolitik de bu düşünce yapısı içine doğmuştur. Dolayısıyla eleştirel jeopolitiğin irdelediği bu konular uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin çalışma alanıyla yakından ilgilidir.

Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünde eleştirel jeopolitiğin önemli çalışma konularından biri olan harita yapımı ve projeksiyonları konusunu ele alınmıştır. Jeopolitik ve uluslararası politika ancak küresel tahayyülle mümkün olmuştur. Bu tahayyül de haritaya dayanır. Uluslararası ilişkiler öğrencilerinin dünya coğrafyasına ilişkin temel varsayımı Mercator projeksyonuna dayanan dünya haritasıdır. Ancak bu haritanın ne olduğu ve üç boyutlu küresel dünyayı iki boyutlu düz kâğıda aktarırken ne gibi zaruri ve kasti deformasyonlar yapıldığı sorgulanmaz. Haritalar realiteyi yansıtan aynalar olarak kabul edilir. Oysaki eleştirel çalışmaların ortaya koyduğu üzere, aslında her haritanın bir yazarı ve bir mesajı vardır. Neticede her harita üç boyutlu dünyayı iki boyutlu kâğıda yansıtma çabasıdır ve hatalar kaçınılmazdır. Bu teknik saptırmaların yanı sıra haritalar üzerinde kasti siyasi yanılsamalar da yaratıla gelmiştir. Tezin bu bölümünde haritaların hizmet ettiği amaçlar tarihten örneklerle izah etmeye çalışıldıktan sonra Mercator projeksyonu ele alınmıştır.

Gerardus Mercator on altıncı yüzyılda yaşamış bir Flaman coğrafyacıdır. Yaptığı haritayla dünya tarihini etkilemiş olmakla birlikte ismi pek az bilinir. Mercator'un haritasında coğrafi kâşiflere yol göstermesi amacıyla paralel ve meridyenler düz çizgiler olarak yansıtılmıştır ve doğru açılarda kesişirler. Bunun sonucunda, Avrupa ve Avrasya gerçekte olduğundan daha büyük gösterilmiştir. Avrupa dünyanın merkezinde yer alır. Mackinder bu haritaya bakarak "Heartland"ini belirlemiş ve dünya tarihinin akışını etkilemiştir.

Bugün coğrafyacılar arasında eğitimde hangi haritaların kullanılması gerektiğine dair devam eden yoğun tartışmalar bulunmaktadır. Çalışmanın bu bölümü bu tartışmanın bir parçası olmayı hedeflememekle birlikte, uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarında haritaların gerçeğin aynası değil yalnızca bir projeksyonu olduğunun farkında olunması ve eleştirel jeopolitiğin konuya ilişkin katkılarının Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini tarafından kabul edilmesi gerektiğine dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamıştır.

Gerardus Mercator, haritası vasıtasıyla hem Avrupa merkezli dünya görüşünün gelişmesi hem de Mackinder gibi siyaseti etkileyen jeopolitikçilerin tezleri üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Fransız lider Napoleon "her devlet kendi coğrafyasının siyasetini izler" demiş ve Sorbonne Üniversitesi'nde ilk coğrafya kürsüsünü kurmuştu. Burada coğrafyadan kastedilen haritadır. Harita dünya politikalarına ilişkin temel varsayımlarımızdan birini teşkil ediyorsa, Gerardus Mercator da uluslararası ilişkilerin önemli isimlerinden biri olarak kabul edilmelidir.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümünde on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren geliştirilen jeopolitik teorilerle iki dünya savaşı arası dönemde doğan uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini ve disiplinin hâkim paradigması olarak kabul edilen realizmin temel varsayımları karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiştir. Söz konusu bölümün birinci kısmında Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin doğuşu ve gelişimini anlatılmıştır. İkinci kısımda ise güç, devlet merkezlilik, uluslararası sistemin anarşik yapısı, "high/low politics" ayrımı, devlet ve ulusun sınırları örtüşen varlıklar olarak kabul edilmesi ve

devletlerin bireyselliği gibi realizmin temel varsayımlarının esasen on dokuzuncu yüzyılda gelişen jeopolitik çalışmalara dayandığı, realizmin temel amaçlarından birinin pratiğin kodifiye edilmesi olduğu, bu çerçevede realizmin kodifiye ettiği pratiğin de esasen jeopolitik olduğu, söz konusu bağlantıların Uluslararası İlişkiler eğitiminde de kurulmasının bir çok açıdan yarar sağlayacağı belirtilmiştir. Bu bölümde ayrıca, her iki alanın da bilimsel olma kaygısı taşıdığı ve uluslararası politikanın her zaman ve her yerde geçerli olacak "öz"üne ulaşma iddiasında olduğu anlatılmıştır.

Uluslararası İlişkiler yirminci yüzyılda idealist emellerle doğmuş bir Amerikan bilimidir. Disiplinin ilk paradigması olarak kabul edilen idealizm ikinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında başat konumunu realizme bırakmıştır. Bir Amerikan bilimi olan ve başlangıçta "idealist" bir nitelik taşıyan Uluslararası İlişkilerde realizmin hakim konuma geçmesinde Hans Morgentahu, Karl Deutsch, genç Kissinger ve Brzezinski gibi göçmen akademisyenler önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Kennan gibi Avrupa'da çalışmalar yürütmüş devlet adamları ve akademisyenlerin yanı sıra yukarıda adı geçen akademisyenler ABD'de jeopolitik bakış açısının gelişmesinde ve hakim uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinin realizm olmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır.

Kısaca tezin bu bölümünde, geleneksel jeopolitik ve klasik realism arasındaki ortaklıklar ve bağlantılar ele alınmış ve idealist dönem hariç geleneksel jeopolitik ve realizm arasından doğrudan bir devamlılık bulunduğu öne sürülmüştür.

Çalışmanın sonuç bölümünde, giriş bölümünde ortaya konulan , "Niçin Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi kitaplarında geleneksel ya da eleştirel jeopolitiğe atıf yok; ve niçin olmalı?" sorusuna kapsamlı bir yanıt aranmıştır.

Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi kitaplarında disiplinin geleneksel jeopolitik ya da siyasi coğrafya alanıyla mevcut bağlantılarına ya da bu alanlarda çalışmalar yürütmüş geleneksel ya da eleştirel teorisyenlere atıfta bulunulmaz. Temel ders kitaplarında Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli gibi isimlerden muhakkak bahsedilmekle birlikte bu tez içerisinde ele alınan isimlere yer verilmez. Mevcut çalışmada, bu durumun başlıca nedeninin İkinci Dünya Savaşı ertesinde Nazizm ve emperyalizmle olan bağlantılarından dolayı jeopolitiğin yasaklanması ve bir anlamda hor görülmesi olduğu öne sürülmüştür.

Ancak, söz konusu "gizli," ya da "kayıp" bağlantıların yeniden kurulması belirli açılardan önem taşır. Öncelikle, teoride yasaklansa ve hor görülse dahi jeopolitik pratikte yaşamaya devam etmiştir. Uluslararası ilişkilerin ve devletlerarası politikaların özellikle hegemon güçlerin uygulamalarında etkilidir. Mercator'un haritasına dayanarak Mackinder tarafından geliştirilen "Doğal Güç Koltukları" tezi ve Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Brzezinski'nin yazdığı *Büyük Satranç Tahtası* tezi bu duruma örnektir. Jeopolitik düşünce dış politika pratiğinin ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır ve pratikte başat olan teoride de başattır.

Geleneksel jeopolitik, hakim uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi realizmin içine doğduğu ve daha sonra kodifiye ettiği düşünce yapısını temsil eder. Bu itibarla, bu teze konu olan bağlantıların tanınması daha kapsamlı ve "doğru" bir Uluslararası İlişkiler tarihinin yazılmasını sağlar.

Bu amaç doğrultusunda, uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarında on dokuzuncu yüzyılda ortaya çıkan geleneksel jeopolitik metinlerin değerli bir araç olarak kabul edilmesine, ayrıca coğrafi keşifler ve bunların siyasi düşünceler üzerindeki etkisinin de uluslararası ilişkiler tarihinin bir parçası olarak kabul edilmesine ihtiyaç vardır.