A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE *STILL* IN THE MAKING: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL NEWS TELEVISIONS' COVERAGE OF EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS SUMMIT

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A transnational public sphere *still* in the making: Comparative analysis of global news televisions' coverage of Eurozone debt crisis summit

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Abstract

In an age where the world is often described as interconnected, borderless or more participative than ever, assuming that cross-border TV networks and ICTs have finally brought the democratic human potential to an unprecedented level is an undemanding effort at best. Although there are proofs that the production of information is done by more actors than ever, many scholars find that suggestion untimely optimistic. Building on that, this paper differentiates global markets, borderless communication technologies, transnational conglomerates and a global culture of consumption that make up the "globalized world" from an inclusive and participative transnational public sphere. The paper will argue that questions on inclusiveness of the debate and the use of this "debate" as a tool of self-legitimation problematize any transnational public sphere.

To illustrate that, the summit on Eurozone debt crisis that took place on 7-9 December 2011 in Brussels and it's coverage on four cross-border news televisions will be analyzed. The news items aired on Euronews English, BBC World News, CNN International and Al-Jazeera English on the summit will be subject to a comparative discourse analysis in regards to who gets to join to these discussions? Is the discussion has a chance of influencing political decision-making? The paper will argue that the analyzed news networks' claim as being "global" or "cosmopolitan" becomes highly questionable with the detection of exclusionary discursive elements in their reporting of this event. Finally, the paper will also inquire the limitations of news narrative practices on

24 hours news televisions in an effort to discuss any further if the transnational

public sphere at hand is blocking some groups' access to representation and

decision-making or not.

Özet

Sınırların ortadan kalktığı, bağlantıların arttığı ve daha önce görülmemiş bir katılımcılığın tanımladığı söylenen bir dönemde sınırötesi TV kanallarının ve bilgi ve iletişim teknolojilerinin insanın demokratik potansiyelini nihayet görülmemiş bir seviyeye yükselttiğini iddia etmek en iyi ihtimalle kolay bir çaba olarak adlandırılabilir. Enformasyon üretiminin birden çok kaynak tarafından yapıldığına dair kanıtlar olsa da bu öneriyi zamansız olarak nitelemek mümkündür. Bu çalışma küresel finansal pazarlar, sınırların bulunmadığı iletişim teknolojileri, ulusötesi şirketler ve küresel tüketim kültürünün oluşturduğu "küresel dünyayı" kapsayıcı ve katılımcı bir ulusötesi kamusal alandan ayırmaktadır. Tez, barındırdığı tartışmaların kapsayıcılığı ve bu tartışmaların kendini meşrulaştırma amaçlı kullanılmasının ulusötesi kamusal alanı sorunlu bir hale getirdiğini savunmaktadır.

Bunu göstermek için 7-9 Aralık 2011'de Brüksel'de gerçekleştirilen Euro bölgesi mali krizi zirvesinin 4 uluslararası haber kanalındaki yayını incelenmiştir. Euronews English, BBC World News, CNN International ve Al-Jazeera English'de yayınlanan zirveyle ilgili haberler eleştirel söylem analizine tabi tutulmuş ve söz konusu tartışmalara kimin dahil olabildiği ve tartışmaların siyasi karar alma mekanizmalarını etkileme olasılığı sorgulanmıştır. Tez, incelenen haber kanallarının küresel ya da kozmopolit olma iddialarının haber söylemlerindeki dışlayıcı öğeler nedeniyle sorgulanabilir olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Ayrıca, haber kanallarındaki haber anlatım pratiklerinin

sınırlayıcılığı da göz önünde bulundurulmuş ve ulusötesi kamusal alanın bazı grupların bu alanda temsiliyetlerinin engellenmesine ve karar alımına katılıp katılmadıklarına bakılmıştır.

Chapter I: Introduction

In an age where the world is often described as interconnected, borderless or more participative than ever, assuming that cross-border TV networks and ICTs have finally brought the democratic human potential to an unprecedented level is an undemanding effort at best. Although there are proofs that the production of information is done by more actors than ever, many scholars find that suggestion untimely optimistic. Building on that, this paper differentiates global markets, borderless communication technologies, transnational conglomerates and a global culture of consumption that make up the "globalized world" from an inclusive and participative transnational public sphere.

The paper will argue that questions on inclusiveness of the debate (Fraser) and the use of this "debate" as a tool of self-legitimation (Mihelj) problematize any transnational public sphere. To illustrate that, the summit on Eurozone debt crisis that took place on 7-9 December 2011 in Brussels and it's coverage on four cross-border television news networks will be analyzed. The news items aired on Euronews English, BBC World News, CNN International and Al-Jazeera English on the summit will be subject to critical discourse analysis in regard to who gets to join to these discussions? Does the discussion have a chance of influencing political decision-making? The paper will argue that the analyzed news networks' claim as being "global" or "cosmopolitan" becomes highly questionable with the detection of exclusionary discursive

elements in their reporting of this event. Finally, the paper will inquire the limitations of news narrative practices on 24-hour news televisions in an effort to discuss further if the transnational public sphere at hand is blocking some groups' access to representation and decision-making or not.

This will be done by first delving into classical Habermesian theory of public sphere and then going through the criticisms that he has received and subsequently the revisions that he has made into the theory. Discussions on globalization, transnationalization and cosmopolitanism is followed by a debate on European public sphere. A description of news and dual filter system of Thomas Meyer takes place before ending the chapter with an overview of 24-hour news networks and rolling news mentality. On the methods and procedures chapter it will be explained how the research will actually be carried out, with the explanation of the chosen method and the actual steps that will be taken during the analysis. The next chapter will be the Data Chapter where the actual analysis on the data will take place.

Chapter II: Literature review

II.I. Public Sphere Theory

II.I.I. The theory in detail: What Habermas had for the breakfast?

Since the translation into english of Jürgen Habermas' seminal work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in 1989, media studies used the theory to discuss crises of modernity, democracy and inclusiveness. In his work Habermas, by the method of historical comparison investigates changing relations between public opinion and political processes. He recounts this, firstly, by the advent of capitalism in the UK and Germany in late 18th and 19th centuries that coincide with the rise of the mass media and then, by dwelling on post-war western liberal democracies. Habermas describes public sphere as "a sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion." (Habermas, 1974: 50)

Public sphere originated around a time when individuals started to come together outside of the state apparatus to discuss matters relating to themselves. Although the trade and business was a main factor of the public sphere it was not the only explanation for this kind of gathering. *People necessitated a new kind of private* to be able to reflect and have an effect on their surroundings since religion's relocalization in the privacy of individuals as the "first area of private autonomy" (1974: 51) after the Reformation proved that doing so *is* possibile. Broadly, this socio-cultural change was linked to

the growth of urban culture— metropolitan and provincial—as the novel arena

of a locally organized public life (meeting houses, concert halls, theaters,

opera houses, lecture halls, museums), to a new infrastructure of social

communication (the press, publishing companies, and other literary media; the

rise of a reading public via reading and language societies; subscription

publishing and lending libraries; improved transportation; and adapted

centers of sociability like coffeehouses, taverns, and clubs) (Eley: 291)

Other than the favorable urban infrastructure for such gathering and

discussions, a whole new understanding of "voluntary association" started at

the time. This was a need born out of the desire to minimize monarchies' power

and separate the public from the ruler which, hitherto, were the same. Before

that transformation, the court of a monarch was represented "not 'for', but

'before' the people" (Habermas, 1989: 8) That kind of court society paved way

to a new sociability in 18th century salons where bourgeoisie started to play an

important role. On this issue however, Habermas does not mean to suggest that

"what made the public sphere bourgeois was simply the class composition of its

members. Rather, it was *society* that was bourgeois, and bourgeois society

produced a certain form of public sphere" (Calhoun, 1992: 7)

This new public of private individuals, by joining in the rational critical

debate gradually broke the monarchs' right to represent. "Officially regulated

intellectual newspapers" was the first medium that's been used by the bourgeois

public sphere against the authorities. Institutions of sociability (such as

coffeehouses) and discourse (a news traffic that immediately followed up the

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traffic in commodities) were the prime movers of this. The bourgeois public sphere, by coming together in an unrestricted fashion, formed an unprecedented civil society not just to weaken absolutism but also to move away from the arbitrary decision making to install a rational authority that will take its decisions by public and open debate organized under certain laws. Elections, liberal constitution and civil rights before the law (free speech, right to assembly and fair trial) have been the consequences of this rational decision making public authority.

Habermas cherishes the private realm as something that has to be defended against the domination of the state under all circumstances. In this realm, only the strongest argument has a chance of survival, as participants to the public sphere are accepted as equals. On equality of participants Habermas observes "a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether" (Habermas, 1989: 36). This claim was, of course, an idealized narrative of the public sphere and one of the main criticisms that Habermas has later received to his theory in regard to exclusion and inequality of participants.

Britain serves as the most suitable example of public sphere development as it is the first spot that put aside the institution of censorship. This elimination is "crucial to putting the public in a position to arrive at a considered, rather than merely a common, opinion." (Calhoun, 1992: 14) It was also first in Britain that the political opposition started to exist without turning

to violence. Habermas relates this novelty to the emergence of critical debate of the public.

After giving the account of the rise of the public sphere, he subsequently moves on to the fall of the public sphere where it "turns into what Habermas calls a manipulated public sphere in which states and corporations use 'publicity' in the modern sense to secure for themselves a kind of plebiscitary acclamation." (Outhwaite, 1994: 10, quoted by Lunt & Livingstone) In the idealized public sphere there was a strict separation between public and private. States, guarding their limits, did not penetrate the private realm to try to influence the people. Private organizations, on their part, were not assuming public power at that moment. In this era, the separation between the state and the society was starting to blur and that paved the way to the transformation of the public sphere.

Habermas explains this shift by giving the account of the literary journalism in the second half of the 18th century where the editorial staff has started to become a crucial intermediary but the more important thing was the newspaper publisher's change of role "from a vendor of recent news to a dealer in public opinion" (Karl Bücher, quoted by Habermas, 1974: 53)

"Refeudalization" of the society has mixed up the boundaries between the norms private and public while rational-critical debate was replaced with the consumption of culture. By refeudalization he means that the public sphere went back to the feudal times in which creators and consumers of information

and opinions were not the same people, and public sphere's only function was to "acclaim" the authority of certain opinions and information.

In Habermas' description of the decay of public sphere, the birth of the modern welfare state plays an important role. In a process that dates back to 1870s the tension in the self understanding of the bourgeois public sphere between *homme* and *bourgeois* allowed for a multitude of social groups gaining political rights and access to the public sphere. "As a result, it was no longer possible to ignore the inequalities and injustices in society, and the state was now called upon to ameliorate these." (Thomassen: 44) This results in breaking down of the division between state and society and to the introduction to the realm of the welfare state. Thus, the public opinion that's hitherto been reached by intensive rational debate has turned into a negotiated compromise among those different interests:

> *"The process of the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public administration. The public as such is included only sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute its acclamation" (Habermas, 1989: 176)*

The decomposition of the public sphere is further realized by a passive culture of consumption and an apolitical private sociability of the new individual. Habermas contextualizes these two elements as somewhat related to each other. The new public sphere is made out of individuals who spend their income to different products. Their consumption choices are guided by

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advertising that "is aimed at the masses as made up of individual, 'private' consumers who do not need to communicate with one another in order to consume." (Thomassen: 45)

Habermas' critique of the mass culture is not at all at odds with the Frankfurt School. He finds the decomposed public sphere, depoliticized and impoverished very much by the removal of critical discourse. (Calhoun, 1992: 24) The consumers of opinions or information are almost always passive and exemplified by the TV watching masses that does not react to anything in any case.

The refeudalization thesis is present in the functioning of politics as well. The mass political parties are hierarchically bureaucratized and for this reason can not be influenced from bottom to top. Also, the rulers of these parties try to manipulate the public sphere to gain the votes of the citizens. Public sphere is not contested by only politicians but by other state actors and corporations as well. On the other hand, "the role of the citizens is reduced to that of acclaiming, or not, what they are presented with, whether in the voting booth, when shopping, or with the remote control." (Thomassen: 46) The only occasions in which they can react are the plebiscites. But it is worth noting that even in plebiscites; the citizens, on their decision-making, rely on the information produced by spin-doctors.

In this final stage and by the way of these transformations the public sphere becomes a stage for advertising and loses its rational-critical edge "by seeking to instill in social actors motivations that conform to the needs of the

overall system dominated by those states and corporate actors." (Calhoun, 1992: 26) In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, his solution to the present decayed status of the public sphere is setting "in motion a critical process of public communication through the very organizations that mediatize it" (Habermas, 1989: 232) His proposal is firstly to democratize associations and institutions and using them as the main blocks of the revitalized public sphere. Although he doesn't go into much detail on how he's going to realize this Calhoun finds him "persuaded more by his account of the degeneration of the public sphere than by his suggestions of its revitalization through intraorganizational reforms." (1992: 32)

II.I.II. Plaintiffs at work: Public sphere theory criticized

Although Habermas' public sphere theory is a widely used formative theory for social sciences and media studies, it's not an unchallenged one, especially on the account of history, political analysis (his ideal of a direct democracy functioning in a territorial nation state has been found out of fashion with regards to modern society and cross-border communication flows) and, his "apparent blindness to the many varieties of exclusion (based on gender, class, ethnicity, etc.)" (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013: 90)

One of the most common and main critique that Habermas has received is how he ignored the biases and exclusions in the bourgeois public sphere and how he has managed to keep his idealization of the heyday of the public sphere while the press at that time *also* included gossip, scandal, disinformation,

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limited access and so on which were "hardly conducive to the rational debate that he is after" (Thomassen, 2010: 48)

Feminist scholars were influential in pointing out the crooked aspects of the public sphere by underlining the insufficient attention paid by Habermas to the patriarchal structure of the idealized public sphere. They argued that being a man was identical to being a human being but the same thing cannot be said about the women in bourgeois public sphere.

Furthermore, as the bourgeois public sphere presented a "stylized picture of the liberal elements of the bourgeois public sphere" (Habermas 1989a: xix) and should have contained diversity, debate, tolerance and consensus. But in actual fact "the bourgeois public sphere was dominated by white, property-owning males." (Kellner: 267)

Habermas has also been criticized in his negligence of the plebeian public sphere in *The Structural Transformation Of the Public Sphere*. He argued on the book's introduction that he purposely ignored the plebeian one to focus on the bourgeois public sphere and "the plebeian public sphere must be understood as derivative of the bourgeois public sphere." (Thomassen, 2010: 49)

II.I.III. Let the philosopher out talk himself: Habermas revises

Habermas' ignoring of other public spheres has been criticized as being overly holistic since it disregarded the demands of other parts of the society. This has pushed Habermas to revise his views on Calhoun's edited volume on

public sphere (1992) where he has admitted that there is not only one public sphere but many overlapping and conflicting public spheres. He realigned his view on this by declaring that "from the beginning a dominant bourgeois public collides with a plebeian one" (1992: 430) and that there is obviously a certain "pluralization of the public sphere" (426) and "competing public spheres" (425).

Habermas has been, furthermore, criticized by being extra pessimist about the present "refeudalized" state of the public sphere and being deeply tied to the Frankfurt School's view on cultural industries. As mentioned above Habermas, by overlooking the potential of non-bourgeois public spheres such as the plebeian one sees degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere as a catastrophe and "if Habermas had paid more attention to alternative public spheres, the decline and disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere may not necessarily be such a loss" (Thomassen, 2010: 50) provided that there were alternatives to it.

Moreover, Calhoun points out to the lack of social movements in *The Structural Transformation Of the Public Sphere.* (1992: 36-37) Habermas, in his later work not only acknowledges the role played by social movements in the last half of the century (1992: 425) but reformulates his theory of deliberative democracy by developing a more positive role for the public spheres, especially in *Between Facts and Norms* that he wrote in 1996. (Thomassen, 2010: 51)

In these later works, Habermas reassigned public spheres a more central role in the political system by speaking of weak and strong publics. The weak publics are civil in foundation and they provide the opinion and identity formation such as citizens' daily debating of issues related to them. Strong public on the other hand are characterized as the public in parliament. Members of the parliament do not just argue and debate, but they pass laws according to their discussions. Habermas claims that strong publics can be fed by the weak publics. This circulation of the communicative power might be the solution to the problems if the public spheres can "lie in better communication, that is, better conditions for participants to engage in a domination-free, rational dialogue." (Thomassen: 52)

II.I.IV. Fraser spots huge gaps

Nancy Fraser, in 2007, argued that all the critics of public sphere theory disregarded the theory's Westphalian framework and although their critiques were right in the lack of *legitimacy* and *efficacy* in *Structural Transformation* they took for granted that public opinion was addressed to a territorial state. Fraser insisted that the theory needs to reformulate itself and it's area of coverage to be able to critically grasp the present era.

She declares six assumptions of the public sphere theory that has now become obsolete in the face of increasing globalization and cross-border activities. (1) The sovereignty of a national state is contested by the global organizations, intergovernmental networks and NGO's such as International

Atomic Energy Agency, the International Criminal Court, World Intellectual Property Organization, etc... (2) Then, after laying out new phenomenas such as "migrations, diasporas, dual and triple citizenship arrangements, indigenous community membership and patterns of multiple residency" she states that for many observers, for instance Calhoun (2002), post-Westphalian publicity appears "to empower transnational elites, who possess the material and symbolic prerequisites for global networking" (Fraser, 2007: 16) A territorially based (3) national economy is contested with the presence of outsourcing, transnational corporations and offshore business. While the assumption that the public opinion is carried out through a national communications infrastructure (4) is contested by "corporate global media, restricted niche media and decentered Internet networks", she asks the question of "how could critical public opinion possibly be generated on a large scale and mobilized as a political force?" (2007: 18) The necessity of a (5) single national language and an Andersonian shared social imaginary which flourishes in (6) a national vernacular literature are the final obsolete assumptions for a public sphere to function.

Fraser further debated transnational public sphere's neglected questions that should be of central importance to critical theory. First she asked if such a sphere is inclusive enough to provide access to all those affected. Her second concern was about the participants status as peers or unequals and lastly the inquiry of participants' likelihood of effecting political decision making were missing in the debates on/around transnational public spheres. Transnational

public sphere becomes questionable on these grounds on whether it creates new forms of exclusions, or not.

II.II. How do you like your communication? Global, transnational or cross-border?

II.II.I. The G word

The word "globalization which is now used critically or uncritically by almost everybody, was hardly used by anybody in the early 1980s." (Rantanen: 2008) So how can one define this catch-all word and is it still a relevant concept or approach for understanding today's complex structures and flows?

The social scientists/philosophers of the last 15-20 years were busy discussing what to make out of globalization often in conflicting and sometimes in praising ways. Before going any further a need to differentiate globalization tendencies in different arenas must be fulfilled. Appadurai (1990) did this by laying out different *scapes* of finance, technology, culture, migration and ideology, arguing that they are globalized in different amounts and ways. This might serve as a starting point in the differentiation of profit seeking transnational companies' quest for power and the millennial promises of cross-border flows.

Straubhaar broadly defines globalization as "the worldwide spread, over both time and space, of a number of new ideas, institutions, culturally defined ways of doing things, and technologies." (2007: 81) Giddens (1991) outlines four major areas of globalization as multilateralism, global division of labor,

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spread of capitalism and military alliances. He further underlines "the intensification of worldwide social relations [of] distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (:64). Tomlinson's (1999) definition of "globalization refers to the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependencies that characterize modern social life." (:174, quoted by Straubhaar, 2007: 81)

Globalization can also be perceived as a tool to diffuse ideas and ideologies from some countries to others. An ideological-wise transmission would indeed mean the modernization and capitalism. Since Lerner's (1958) developmental communication strategies of 1950's communication technologies have been accepted as mobility multipliers for some. Although this modernization framework has now been discarded to some extent, western powers are still approaching to many parts of the world in similar vein. Thus, "one way to attempt to simplify the level of complexity which the intensification of global flows is introducing in the figuration of competing nation-states and blocs, is to regard globalization as an outcome of the universal logic of modernity" (Featherstone & Lash, 1995: 2, quoted by Straubhaar, 2007: 83).

This "intensification of relations" and changing nature of borders is made possible by technological advancements and fluidity of finances. Towards the end of the 20th century "a borderless media system has developed whose backbone is a global communication network comprising fibre optic pipes and

TV broadcast satellites. Its expansion is driven by the internationalization of media markets following deregulation and a worldwide integration of the media industry." (Chalaby, 2005: 30)

Nation-states' autonomies have been curbed to a certain extent by major changes in trade regimes. "In the 1980s, the United States spearheaded a worldwide policy shift of deregulation and liberalization, which opened the gates to a round of corporate consolidation in the following decade" (Chalaby: 2005: 29) These gigantic firms have started to move beyond the countries of their origin as the new markets opened up. Companies like Time-Warner, Viacom and News Corporation are now active in different areas in many parts of the world. Advertising industry should also be mentioned in here as there is around 10 global agencies that 'control more than 80 percent of global media billings' (Tharp and Jeong, 2001: 111, quoted by Chalaby: 2005: 30).

Starting from the 1970's and early 1980's satellite-based cross-border TV channels started to emerge. But the direct satellite broadcasting became commercially popular in the mid 1990's. With the advent of satellite technology cultural imperialism thesis suggested that national identities will suffer heavily. Moreover, as "satellites can technologically cover a good part of the globe, many people expected them to produce a global village of the sort anticipated by Marshall McLuhan." (Straubhaar, 2007: 120) Anticipations of a global village or dissolution of nationalism have not realized as of yet even with the introduction of internet. People's choice of media consumption might depend on cultural proximity and asymmetrical interdependence and one-way

structures of media imperialism theories is not enough in understanding this phenomena. (Straubhaar, 1991)

Furthermore, changing migration patterns and the innovative use of media by diasporas changed the nature of communication beyond borders. Diasporas are staying in touch with their homelands through media use and introduction of relatively affordable commercial flights.

II.II.II. Raise your arms for the transnational communication

In light of above mentioned points Chalaby in 2005 pointed out a need for a new paradigm in media studies and claimed that transnational is a more up to date and appropriate level of analysis than global.

> *As a term, transnational has a merit over international in that actors are not confined to the nation-state or to nationally institutionalized organizations; they may range from individuals to various (non)profitable, transnationally connected organizations and groups, and the conception of culture implied is not limited to a national framework. (Straubhaar, 2007: 105)*

In late 20th century the technological leaps in communications paved the way of global reach to many conglomerates. CNN certainly became global in scope. However, some globalizing firms such as SBS and Vivendi had to pull back operations in some regions after suffering heavy losses. This lack of profit in global scope have pushed global media companies to regionalization, adaptation of content and segmentation. Chalaby argued that these tendencies point out to a transnational pattern rather than global. (2005b)

The new era is also being characterized by the growing influence of non-western media companies. Many of these companies operate in a regional scale crossing borders of respective countries such as Globonews from Brazil or Zee News from India.

On the other side of the scale, audiences are becoming more hybrid and transnational as well. Aksoy and Robins (2003) found that migrant audiences are not particularly looking for a diaspora-specific programming but rather something enjoyable or fun as any other audience. Diasporic identities are not simple or one sided in their nature that they have the opportunity of consuming different media material from different cultures. This transnational way of TV viewing habits put them in a place that "fosters a relationship to knowledge and experience that is moving beyond the frame of national society." (Aksoy & Robins, 2005: 36)

II.II.III. Cosmopolitanism: As it should be?

Cross-border flows started with the telegraph companies' and news agencies' "international expansion" that connected different parts of the world in an unprecedented speed. The globalization stage is characterized by total "worldwide integration". The distinguishing trait of the transnational era for Chalaby is *cosmopolitanization*. (2005b: 32) Beck's (2002) definition of cosmopolitanization is "inner globalization" – "globalization from within the national societies": "borders are no longer predeterminate, they can be chosen (and interpreted), but simultaneously also have to be redrawn and legitimated

anew" (:17–19 quoted by Chalaby 2005b: 32). Moreover, Beck points out to an epistemological turn that occurs "within an interpretative framework in which [...] 'methodological cosmopolitanism' replaces the nationally centred ontology and imagination dominating thought and action" (2004: 132). While nationalism is perceived as exclusive, cosmopolitanism is most generally seen as universal and thus inclusive.

It might be useful to get back to Habermas at this point, at least to his later work *The Postnational Constellation*, where he advocated for a political cosmopolitanism that through a global legal order will institutionally embody values of equality, solidarity and human rights, as well as the expression of a universal political consensus (2001). Like many other works of Habermas, this is inspired by "the cosmopolitan vision of Kant, which can be found in his writings on perpetual peace, and remains an authoritative approach within political cosmopolitanism. In Kant's view, cosmopolitan law regulates not only the relation between states, but also the interaction between state and individuals." (Nowicka & Rovisco, 2009: 5)

Habermas's (2001) vision of a cosmopolitan global public sphere has been criticized by Cheah (2006) for remaining in the neoliberal logic of capitalism, "especially with regards to the imbalance in power relations created by an allegedly cosmopolitan North that is sustained by global exploitation of a postcolonial South in structural conditions of deep inequality." (Nowicka & Rovisco, 2009: 4)

II.III. European public sphere

II.III.I. Much debate is the necessary rate

Thomas Risse (2010) on the other hand touches the issue of transnational public sphere on a different note, through europeanisation. According to him, the conventional wisdom that disregards the possibility of a public sphere when there is no common language, no widely used common (European) media and the lack of a consensus on the (European) project at hand is challenged by the transnationalization of national public spheres and collective identities. Transborder communication happens when same issues discussed in same time with similar frames of reference, that is, an awareness and recognition of different frames. Mutual observation across national spheres is another dimension of transborder communication meaning the degree to which national media regularly observe, report, comment about one another with regard to EU; and, of course, recognition of speakers from other countries as legitimate contributors, not foreigners.

According to Risse public spheres are neither tangible nor given, and especially, they are "not out there waiting to be discovered by analysts". (2010: 110) All types of public spheres are social constructions and they can be conceptualized in many forms. His own construction of a European public sphere is in terms of "the Europeanization and transnationalization of national public spheres" and the communication in his conceptualization "does not

require consensus; conflict and even polarization are necessary prerequisites for lively public debates" (2010: 108)

While it is evident that most national public spheres are fragmented, the same can be said about the transnational public spheres. Thus, Risse by claiming that "to assume, however, that national cultural barriers are insurmountable, while regional, class, or gender barriers are not, is hard to defend" (112) is seeking construction of a normative transnational public sphere. He then lays down two normative requirements for a public sphere in liberal democracies as "openness to participation" and "the possibility of challenging public authorities to legitimate their decisions." (p. 115) While the former was also included in Nancy Fraser's work (2007) as mentioned above, the latter can be seen as the substitute of the "likelihood of effecting political decision making" in the same work.

II.III.II. Can I get my European *to go*?

Debates on European public sphere revolves around it's particular nature. As it is "neither a state nor a nation" (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007: 12) it should definitely be different from a national public sphere. European public sphere *is* a transnational public sphere and it does not necessarily need a transnational media to exist as explained in detail above in Thomas Risse's definition of European public sphere. Of course Risse was not the only scholar who wrote on europeanization through national media. There were others like Eder and Kantner who spoke of "a pluralistic ensemble of issue-oriented

publics that exists once the same issues are discussed simultaneously and within a shared frame of reference" (Lingdenberg, 2006 quoted in Gripsrud, 2012)

We have already mentioned that Habermas revised his views in *Between Facts and Norms* to include a more complex understanding of public spheres that "branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, regional, local, and sub cultural arenas" (1996: 373) European public sphere has been conceived as an open space for the issues that surpass national borders of the states for the citizens and political elites. Habermas claims that the public sphere is not one big forum of discussion but many overlapping, intersecting and sometimes independent network of forums

> *from the episodic publics found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets; through the occasional or "arranged" publics of particular presentations and events such as theatre performances, rock concerts, party assemblies, or church congresses; up to the abstract public sphere of isolated readers, listeners, and viewers scattered across large geographic areas, or even around the globe, and brought together only through the mass media.* (374)

Any public sphere is constituted by different layers of public communication. The transnationalization of public spheres might as well be a gradual and multidimensional process. Thus, the suggestion that "the establishment of transnational media could be regarded as one dimension of a transnational public sphere." (Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 695) become a reasonable one.

After the dissolution of initial stages of a transnational media that existed in the 18th century in Europe with the availability of cross-border newspapers that were available in salons and cafés across the continent (Darnton, 1995 cited by Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg). The introduction of nation state as the main political constituent and implementation of borders in 19th century led to the discontinuation of the European public sphere until the 1980's where technological and policy-wise changes set the scene for the emergence of transnational media. The former relates to satellite broadcasting, introduction of Internet and more recently online and digital publishing possibilities and the latter is the opening up of markets to private conglomerates who want to broadcast across the borders.

II.IV. What is news?

Any public sphere is fueled up by media. News media is especially important when it comes to political public spheres as, normatively, news provide essential information for a citizen to make her/his decision firstly about various current topics that are *said* to be important for the society and eventually on whom s/he votes for. But of course this definition is a nation-state centred definition; since many members of migrant communities don't have the right to vote where they live. We will come to that later but first, let's try to come up with a basic definition of news.

II.IV.I. No news is good news

Jason Salzman's quotes of Leon V. Sigal can help us make a provocative entrance to the subject: "news is what's in the news" and "what is newsworthy is what attracts an audience". (Vissol: 47) While these are not soothing definitions at all they certainly point out to ephemerality of any definition of news as it is. What's decided to be on the news and what's left out is a conundrum at best.

In the late 70's sociologists like Herbert Gans, Philip Schelsinger, and Gaye Tuchman were able to show "how journalism was less a transparent 'window on the world' than the product of series of practices and routines." (Lewis: 81) The innocence of news is highly susceptible and media studies try to detect malfunctions and make a sense out of the endless flow of news.

Audience company EBU defines information in news, news magazines, documentaries and current affairs as:

> *programme intended primarily to inform about current facts, situations,*
> *events, theories or forecasts, or to provide explanatory background*
> *information and advice. Information programme content has to be non-*
> *durable, that is to say that one could imagine that the same programme would*
> *not be transmitted e.g. one year later without losing most of its relevance.*
> (quoted in Vissol: 47)

One thing that catches the eye in the above description is the makeshift nature of news. Rantanen in his *When News Was New* argued that news has re-invented itself as something "new" in various media all through history. In her analysis, "the key term is 'disposable news', a form of built-in obsolescence

that serves a profit motive but impedes public understanding of the world." (Lewis: 83) The temporal limit that define what news is might have a twofold outcome.

Firstly, news items generally don't give any historical background fearing that it might endanger temporality of the news items since the news items should stay in the borders of recent developments. Secondly, the news items rarely focus on what might come next after a certain event or give its audience different perspectives and background information that can inform the public and provide basis to an informed audience. This creates a certain forced continuity in news that readers/viewers have to abide to. As an illustration, one cannot dare to apprehend Israeli-Palestinian conflict by just consuming, for example a couple of news items about the Israeli construction of new settlements in West Bank as the issue goes back to many topics and historical facts such as the birth of zionism, Holocaust, Millet system, two state solution, Arab nationalism, etc...

II.IV.II. Dual filter system: "Distortion is the norm"

Thomas Meyer's (2002) Dual Filter System of the Media is a useful concept as it accepts any news item as a strained version of an original fragment of a political reality. He talks about the limited capacity of media "to transmit a full and complete picture of the nearly limitless wealth of events that comprise political reality, so they always have to pick and choose what they will feature

and how they will present it." (:46) While translating real events into media

products, the media apply two different filter systems which distorts a pre-

selected "reality". "The more of these reportage factors that apply to an event,

the higher will be its expected newsworthiness, and the more likely the media

will pay heed to it." (:46) This mechanism that unconsciously pushes the

journalists to select an issue over the other in the name of "newsworthiness" is

"a tacit professional consensus". (:29)

**'DISTORTION IS THE NORM':
DUAL FILTER SYSTEM OF THE MEDIA**

| Event, fragment of political reality | → | **Filter1: News values (logic of selection)**

1. short time-span
2. proximity (geographically, politically, culturally
3. surprise value
4. conflict
5. serious harm, great success
6. personalisation | → | **Filter2: rules of stage-managing (logic of presentation)**

* form of story telling

* models of theatricalisation | → | **Product** (article, TV report etc.) |

TABLE 1 - Thomas Meyer's Dual Filter system

Meyer calls the second filtering "rules of stage-managing" (logic of

presentation) which deals with how this political reality that made it through the

first filtering system will be presented and theatricalized by the media to attain

a final product, -article, TV report, etc. These rules are picked up from the

codes of theater performance and the discourses of popular culture such as

story-telling, personification, conflicts of mythical heroes, drama, archetypal

narratives, verbal duels, social-role-dramas, actions with symbolic overtones, entertainment artistry, and news-reporting rituals that promote social integration. (:47)

Personification casts natural persons as embodying "qualities, forces, tendencies, virtues, programs or powers that carry powerful resonance in a country's political culture and mythology." (:32) Meyer argues that Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder has been portrayed as men of will, virtue, innovativeness and the "can-do" spirit, "regardless of the actual content of programs they stood for." (:32) *Drama* is another pattern borrowed from theater. News items "depict a tragic conflict between persons, whether heroic or not, driven by fate toward a denouement that leaves behind only the victors, the vanquished, and the failures." (:32) *Archetypal narratives* in news items are the stereotyped characters that are heavily present in both theatre and arts such as the friend and the enemy, the ruler, the good guy, the bad guy, the traitor, the innocent, the expert, the up-and-comer, the powerful and the powerless, "all in the shape of known and unknown political actors." (:33)

Meyer further points out the existence of appearances, gestures toward a real event albeit one that never actually takes place in the real world of politics. To illustrate that he gives the example of highly publicized visits of Ronald Reagan to schools, while at the same time it was his administration that cut the education budgets. (:34)

II.V. 24-hour news television is rolling without hesitation

II.V.I. Rolling News

In the television universe news are presented in two different settings. The first one is the dedicated news hours (i.e. evening news) in generalized TV channels. These channels do not usually try to present news in all times of the day, especially in the absence of a major event. On the other hand, news televisions have an unwritten commitment to present news by the hour (and for many, on the half-hour as well). A fresh development is expected to be "first" on these networks. These news networks are available to viewers in most public spaces, in cable and satellite TV and ready to be consumed in a relentless fashion.

After the advent of satellite TV and emergence of a multitude of 24-hour news channels many high-ranking officials have pointed-out the need to feed never-ending needs of real-time television news. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair used one of his final speeches to warn the dangers posed by 24-hour news cycle: "In the 1960s, the government would sometimes, on a serious issue, have a Cabinet lasting two days. It would be laughable to think you could do that now without the heavens falling in before the lunch on the first day. Things harden within minutes. I mean, you can't let speculation stay out there for longer than instant." In a similar tone US President Barack Obama underlined how political decision making have been affected by the rolling news mentality: "Too many in Washington put off hard decisions for some other time on some other day...an impatience that characterizes this town-an

attention span that has only grown shorter with the 24-hour news cycle...”
(Cushion & Lewis p. 2-3)

These statements might be accounted as the stress of under-heavy-scrutiny politicians but there are many on the other side of the picture who feel the same way. American journalists Howard Rosenberg and Charles Feldman see a parallelism between 24-hour news cycle and never-ending pace of modern life when they claim that the desire for rolling news is much like the desire for “drinking instant coffee while listening to instant analysis of instant polls. It includes not only speed dialing and speed reading, but speedier dialing and speedier reading, living life by stopwatch, cramming and more into less and less. We want faster food and faster orgasms” (Rosenberg & Feldman, 2008: 18 quoted by Cushion & Lewis: 3)

CNN, the first dedicated news channel is launched in 1980. Around 30 years later, by 2009, while CNN was potentially available to 2 billion people in over 200 countries, European countries had an average of 21 24-hour news channels to choose from. In countries like France, Germany and UK, the figure is much higher. In total, Europe had 160 national and international news channels in 2009. (Bromley, 2010: 35)

Using McLuhan’s notions of a *global village* as a starting point many researchers heralded a definitive arrival of globalization with the advent of 24-hour news channels on satellite. Along these researchers, Tomlinson argued the importance of the “deterritorializing” effect (1999) and Volkmer (2003) pointed out that the ability to simultaneously broadcast around the world and bring

them on a same page during key moments is a sign of an emerging "global public sphere" and lays cosmopolitan foundations of citizenship. Furthermore existence of contraflows like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya and intensifications of flows and interpenetration is proof enough for others who see a rightly globalized world such as Held and McGrew's *Great Globalization Debate* (2003). (Rai & Cottle: 52)

On the other hand, many theorists such as McChesney and Boyd-Barrett take up the issue with a traditional geo-political economy approach passing through cultural imperialism thesis. Thussu (2003) feels that while the growth of regional news stations is a direction towards democratization, what really happens is a cross-border "CNNization" of television news. So rather than pushing for a "global public sphere", these regional news stations bring off a standardization of "US style" journalism and homogenization of news structures and forms around the world. (Rai & Cottle, 2010: 52)

After putting down these two positions of *global public sphere* and *global dominance* on satellite news landscape Rai & Cottle contends that there is evidence to support both positions (74) rather than a homogenous format among various 24-hour news channels. At a transnational level they go along with the likes of Boyd-Barrett, McChesney, Thussu and evaluate that the "ownership and reach lend credence to traditional political economy arguments underlining the continued supremacy of major Western players" (75).

On the other hand there is surely multi-directional flows, regional "mini-imperialisms" and newly empowered minor media players from

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Singapore, Middle East, etc. (75) Furthermore many 24-hour news televisions emerged in the national borders recently. For instance, in Turkey's private Digiturk satellite platform there are 16 Turkish and 6 English language 24-hour news televisions as of date.[1] Another trend is the surfacing of publicly financed news networks from different parts of the world such as Iran's Press TV, Russia's RT, France's France24 and so on...

II.V.II. Who's interested in news that criss-crosses borders?

Many transnational television channels are 24-hour news stations. Although there are special interest channels like MTV and Eurosport. CNN International, BBC World News, Euronews, Sky News, Deutsche Welle TV, France 24 and Al Jazeera English are the notable rolling news channels. CNBC and Bloomberg are financial news channels.

Television remains as the big and powerful medium even after the huge growth of Internet and it is still the medium where most people get their news most of the time. (Lewis, 2010: 92) Yet, although pioneering 24-hour news networks like CNN and BBC World now have the ability to broadcast a common set of programming simultaneously to different markets around the globe, audience numbers stayed low compared to national programmings. In many regions, "cultural and linguistic barriers proved to be particularly resilient, and the needs and preferences of different audiences increasingly varied." (Rai & Cottle, 2010: 71) Straubhaar explains limited access to

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[1] http://www.digiturk.com.tr/kanal/tumkanallar/

transnational television networks with Bourdieu's (1984) *cultural capital.*

Bourdieu found that schooling and cultural experiences directly influence

cultural capital that people acquire. So he proposes that there is, indeed, a

correlation between the size of cultural capital and the choice of music that a

person can enjoy. Applying this logic to television Straubhaar contends: "Those

with less economic or cultural capital are more likely to choose local, national,

or regional material, which is easier for them to understand." (Straubhaar, 2007:

92)

Transnational news networks like CNN is followed by two groups:

First, a globalized elite who speaks English and interested in CNN's

perspective of events and secondly, people in the Anglophone countries of the

world who are already used to consuming television content from the US.

(Straubhaar, 2007: 125) In 1998, Sparks found that the actual audiences for

BBC Worldwide and CNN were quite small to be considered as a potential

"global public sphere". Similarly transnational televisions have not acquired no

more than two percent of the cumulated audience shares in European national

markets. (Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 698)

Euronews reaches 5.38 million people in Europe each day (2.7 million

cable and satellite viewers and another 2.7 million viewers coming through its

national windows broadcast) while CNN International and BBC World News

reach 1.4 million and 844 thousand viewers a day respectively.[2] (Euronews, 2012) These numbers remain small compared to general interest television stations but their audience, while small, tends to include Europe's political and economic elite. However, they are appreciated by the more educated socio-professional categories and the audience share can reach up to 50% of that universe in surveys such as European Media Marketing Survey (EMS) that concern the consumption of the 20% richest households in 16 Europeans countries. (Vissol, 2006: 54)

Despite the fact that audience numbers for transnational television is small, looking at EMS results their audience numbers is increasing in size, at least in elite categories. EMS European audiences in terms of reach, which is defined as the number of people having seen at least once a specific programme or spot over a defined period (daily, weekly or monthly). Table 2 shows the weekly reach – the industry standard – of our chosen Pan-European TV channels over the last 12 years in the EMS universe.

The universe of the largest EMS survey measures the habits of "Europe's most affluent consumers and top business decision makers" of 21 European Countries. This top universe is chosen on the basis of income and it's size is about 49 million individuals (13 per cent of the total population).

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[2] Euronews is a multilingual news channel that broadcast 11 languages simultaneously compared to anglophone broadcasters like CNN Int. and BBC World News and it was not possible to reach audience numbers for Euronews in English.

Channels/Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2012
BBC World News	1.8	2.3	3.3	4.4	5.7	6.3	6.6	7.8	9.7	11.4	11.9	11.6	13.1
CNN Int.	16.5	15.1	15.5	16.1	18.2	17.2	19.5	17	18.5	19	19.2	17.5	18
Euronews	12.1	11.2	12.1	13.3	16.5	16	15.2	15	15	16.9	17.8	18	14.2
Aljazeera English													3.4

* http://ems.ipsos-nederland.nl/EmsApp/

TABLE 2 - PETV Weekly Reach in EMS Regular Universe of 40 million Europeans, 1996-2007 (in percentage of viewers within this universe) 49 million people includes the top income earners of 21 European Countries in 2012

This is also observable in the increase in advertising revenues, that is up from 31 million in 1988 to 628 million in 2002. "This 20-fold increase should be compared to the 2.5-fold increase in total television ad-revenue during the same period." (Vissol, 2006: 53)

To sum up, while transnational communication space in Europe is growing and attracting influential elite audiences, "the role of transnational media in reaching out to the broader European public remains very modest." (Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 707) Thus, a possible influence of political decision-makers from bottom to up remains as a normative ideal. This might be all the more important, for instance, for European citizens as many decisions that affect them has been taken on a transnational level, that is the so-called Troika made-out of European Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank. (ECB)

Chapter III: Methods & Procedures

III.I. The rationale

In order to discuss the research questions mentioned above, coverage of an event with "transnational importance" is needed. In this case, the coverage on four 24-hour news networks of the summit on Eurozone debt crisis that took place on 7-9 December 2011 in Brussels will be analyzed. The chosen transnational news networks are Euronews, BBC News, CNN International and Al-Jazeera English. BBC News is known as a public service broadcaster from United Kingdom with a transnational perspective. Euronews is a eurocentric news network operating as Europe's cross border public broadcaster with state owned shares mainly from France, Italy, Russia and Turkey. While CNN International is "frequently mentioned as the perfect example of a leading global medium that encourages exchange of political opinion worldwide" (Hafez: 12), Al-Jazeera English is seen as the only non-western global news network. These channels are further discussed below.

The reason behind the choice of transnational 24-hour news networks lies in their claim to be global or transnational. After stressing the need of differentiation between quickly reporting from different parts of the world and the effort of explaining and reporting the world as a single place, Berglez (2008) concludes that "it is not possible to say that CNN International is, in all cases, more global in its outlook than a national newspaper."

The data from the news networks is collected from a combination of YouTube accounts and own websites. Euronews[3] and AJE[4] uploads every news bulletin to YouTube as video clips. CNN has its own video hosting service[5]. BBCwn used to have a dedicated channel on Youtube but they closed it to move on their own website[6]. The week debuting from 5 December 2011 has been accepted as a starting point and all videos related to Eurozone debt crisis summit has been recorded as such. In total, 37 reports from Euronews, 17 from AJE, 40 from BBCwn and another 30 from CNNi has been taken into consideration.

III.II. Critical Discourse Analysis

Relations of power and dominance is the main point of inquiry for this study, primarily, because of the persistence of nation-state and secondly to look into what Fraser calls "exclusionary effects" (Fraser: 12) of transnational public sphere that blocks some groups' access to representation and decision making. In a similar vein, Calhoun, contemplating on cosmopolitanism argues that

> *In offering a seeming ''view from nowhere,'' cosmopolitans commonly offer a view from Brussels (where the postnational is identified with the strength of the European Union rather than the weakness of, say, African states), or from Davos (where the postnational is corporate) (Calhoun, 2002: 873)*

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[3] http://www.youtube.com/user/Euronews
[4] http://www.youtube.com/user/AlJazeeraEnglish
[5] http://edition.cnn.com/
[6] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/video_and_audio/

Building on that it's important to hold discussions on discourse which is used as a tool for holders of power to naturalise their position and make it a part of natural order of things. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was developed to open up texts and submit them into critique. By doing that, CDA stands out as a serious alternative to the quantitative methods of news analysis that provide an objective accounting of news content.

Van Dijk describes CDA as concerned with "the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance" (van Dijk, 1993: 249). Dominance is defined as the "exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality" (van Dijk, 1993: 250). Van Dijk argues that "news media are elite forms of discourse and suggests that critical discourse analysis is particularly appropriate for news media because it plays such an important role in our everyday lives" (Polson & Kahle: 256-257) and because it is a form of social power in that access to (control over) news discourse is not equal to all groups and individuals in society (van Dijk, 1991: 110). News media are one of the most important sources of discourse and, as van Dijk argues (and several studies have shown), "help to shape public perceptions of social and policy issues." (Polson & Kahle: 257)

CDA examines both the content and the form of news item including semantic aspects along with the text. Van Dijk summarizes the method as follows:

Discourse analytical approaches systematically describe the various structures and strategies of text or talk, and relate these to the social, political or

political context. For instance, they may focus on overall topics, or more local

meanings (such as coherence or implications) in a semantic analysis. But also

the syntactic form of sentences, or the overall organization of a news report

may be examined in detail. (van Dijk, 1991: 35)

As a consequence, CDA will be used as method of analysis "to uncover

the implicit or taken for-granted values, assumptions and origins of a seemingly

neutral, self-evident and objective text, and relate it to structures of dominance

and power." (Berglez & Olausson, 2011: 38) CDA will be applied to not just

the texts but to the use of images as well.

III.III. Global news networks

This section is dedicated to formations of and discussions about four 24-hour

news networks that the data has been taken from.

III.III.I. The originator: CNN International

CNN was launched in 1980 as the first dedicated news channel ever. At

that time, 1.7 million American homes had access to CNN. Thirty years later

than that CNN is available to 2 billion people in more than 200 countries. Only

after the development of cable television in mid-1980s the channel began to

operate with profit, thanks to advertising revenue followed by cable

penetration. (Flournoy & Stewart, 1997: 2 quoted by Cushion, 2010) In its

initial launch, many found the venture as financially unconvincing because the

channel had a limited budget to produce a 24-hour news agenda compared to

well established networks like CBS, NBC and ABC that reigned the nightly

news audiences with greater budgets. So "to provide a sustainable economic model of broadcasting, CNN had to quickly stamp its editorial credentials on the genre of news and justify the existence of a dedicated television news channel." (2010: 16)

Over the years the channel developed extensive news gathering facilities. Although they closed down a couple of bureaux after the 2009 crisis, as of April 2013 CNN has 12 US based and 33 worldwide bureaux including 9 in Middle East, 10 in Asia Pacific, 5 in Central/Latin America and 3 in Africa.[7] While CNN's US headquarters is situated in Atlanta, Georgia CNN International (CNNi) is produced and broadcasted from different destinations such as London, Hong Kong, Mexico City and, since 2009, Abu Dhabi. CNN's parent company Time Warner group runs joint news channels in Spain (CNN+) and Turkey (CNN Türk).

CNNi's founding goes back to 1985, albeit it became notorious with the first Gulf War where it provided live images of Baghdad under attack. "It was, in short, a global event and, for the genre of rolling news, arguably represented the moment when 24-hour television news 'came of age' and demonstrated the influence it could potentially wield." (Cushion, 2010: 19) In time this has prompted many to voice their concerns about the possible wrongdoings of an ever influential global news network. This has been known as "CNN effect", "CNN curve" or "CNN factor" (Livingstone, 1997: 1) Cushion contends that rolling news channels might have affected policy making by turning it into a

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[7] http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/cnn-fact-sheet/

televised live event, "a spectacle for viewers around the world to tune into to see humanitarian crisis unfolding 24 hours a day". (2010: 20) "CNN effect" began to refer other manifestations of transnational communications later on. But, the more recent research neither proved, nor denied media influence on US foreign policy decision making as its "empirically difficult to assess." (2010: 21)

CNNi remains as the leading 24-hour news brand in the world, as evidenced in the EMS results seen in Table 2. CNN sells the news that it gathers to its home market in the US. This helps CNN to make profit topping to their good earnings in advertising sales. It is useful to note that CNN is the world's only news channel that makes a profit. (Chalaby, 2009: 175) However, the channel's reporting is sometimes generally perceived as excessively western oriented. Furthermore, CNNi, as a symbol of globalization is directly aligned to American imperialism or Western Supremacy for some scholars.

III.III.II. A quasi public beast of the world: BBC World News

BBC's radio, World Service was for many decades an important source of communication along different countries and regions, putting in motion a transnational network. After it had established itself a reputation of balanced and impartial news making (Walker, 1992 quoted by Cushion) the quasi-private media company launched a news television in 1991 called BBC World Service News (renamed as BBC World in 1994 and BBC World News in 2008) with an

identical public broadcasting mentality. It reached soon enough to remote markets of the world and started to compete with CNNi. (Cushion, 2010: 21)

BBC World News produces a single bulletin to broadcast in all available countries compared to BBC World Service Radio and websites that has 27 versions in different languages.[8] The first problem that comes to mind is the difficulty of selecting stories that can work well in different countries/regions as some stories necessitate additional background information for people who are not directly related to a certain part of the world in which the story actually belongs to. In presentation stories are made relevant by focusing on themes that can resound across borders. (Chalaby, 2009: 176)

Overall, BBC World News is known as a news organization "that is remarkably aware of the globalized nature of the world and the cosmopolitan character of the human condition in the twenty-first century." (Chalaby, 2009: 178) Moreover, being the most trusted brand in elite audiences can be seen as another indicator of the powerful global brand. (175) Nevertheless, in a recent research Polson and Kahle found that while reporting on migration to Britain, BBC Online put forward a "complex and subtle racism that can be found in even the best attempts at objectivity, and in particular how such racism is masked by language of the 'nation'." (2010: 253)

Furthermore, Cushion (2010b) suggested that "the race to be Britain's most watched news channel" has pushed BBC World News (BBCwn) to provide more breaking news items and reporting of live action. BBC's relaxing

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[8] http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/languages/index.shtml

of its editorial guidelines to allow reporters and anchors to be more speculative is a result of entering in competition with Sky News. This proves that market forces have an external influence even for a financially backed semi-public institution like BBC.

III.III.III. This one had a pan-European mission: Euronews

A project to develop a pan-European news service dates back to 1980s, but the desire to do so, grew over time with EU's enlargement and growth in power. Euronews finally launched in 1993 "to convey a shared political, cultural, and linguistic image of European nation-states." (Cushion, 2010a: 21) The existence of Euronews is also tied to an attempt to foster a European identity among European citizens. It was furthermore intended to have a PR function "to present news and European culture in order to encourage a better appreciation of Europe's uniqueness and cultural wealth." (Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009: 703)

Since its inception the channel's shareholders and funding have been dependent on public broadcasters, although the channel started to make more profit out of advertisements and sponsorships in the recent years. European Union provides around 20% of Euronews' expenses. Financing comes from 21 national broadcasters that air the channel on their frequency and additional investments in the form of becoming a shareholder and sitting in the supervisory board. The latter has been recently realized by Russia and Turkey. In February 2009 TRT purchased 15.70% of the channel's shares and became

the fourth main partner making up the supervisory board with France

Télévisions (23.93%), Italian RAI (21.54%), and Russian RTR (15.98%).[9]

Although the channel was intended to create a pan-European public

sphere along the vicinity of Europe, it's broad availability made the channel "an

alternative to CNNi's American 'window on the world'." (Cushion, 2010a: 21)

The *alternativeness*, of course, can be discussed in many levels as United States

and European Union are rarely in disagreement in various issues.

Based in Lyon, Euronews employs "over 400 journalists of 25 different

nationalities" (Euronews, 2012) The channel doesn't use anchors in its news

presentation. Images that are acquired from various sources are dubbed in 11

languages. This gives visuality even a greater emphasis than the other rolling

news stations. "Commenting on images that may not be exclusive Euronews

struggled for a long time to find it's own editorial line and establish its

repertorial authority." (Chalaby, 2009: 179) But the choice of dubbing them

over keeps the budget in a certain control for a channel that want to operate in

11 different languages simultaneously. The voice-overing of images ties up the

hands of the channel when it comes to live debates or interviews. "And the

absence of talking heads on Euronews may add to the perception that the station

is a bit remote from events." (180)

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[9] http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=47271

III.III.IV. Another voice? Al Jazeera English

In 1996, when Al Jazeera was founded exactly five years after the first Gulf War, nobody had expected it to be this successful for Arabic speaking Middle Eastern audiences. The channel had gained exclusive coverage rights from the war in Afghanistan just like CNN's acquiring of iconic images of Baghdad under attack. But, "unlike the American news channel, its coverage revolved around Middle Eastern concerns and issues." (Cushion, 2010a: 22) Al Jazeera's following coverage of the US invasion of Iraq, too, contrasted with Western media outlets' coverage. While Al Jazeera tried to put forward human sufferings of locals caused by the war, western outlets have concentrated on military operations. (22) Continuing to propose this different structure generally at odds with the western oriented 24-hour news stations "the rise of Al Jazeera on the world media scene represents a rupture in a hegemonic West-centric media order" (Zayani, 2010)

After the immense success of Qatari network Al Jazeera on Arabian Peninsula, the network launched a separate English service in November 2006. Al Jazeera English (AJE) has around 1000 staff from more than 50 nationalities.[10] AJE is notable for its broadcast services in Doha, Kuala Lumpur, Washington DC and London so it can theoretically "follow the sun round the globe by broadcasting its news bulletin from where the world is awake." (Chalaby, 2009: 178)

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[10] http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/

AJE with its different take on events and strong coverage of overlooked parts of the world such as Bangladesh or Tanzania and to the issues such as human rights violations and climate change certainly constitutes a global outlook. Chalaby puts AJE with BBC World News and CNNi into a list of news channels that "report the world to the world" (2009: 187) instead of a list with those "that tell stories within their borders" (such as Euronews and Sky News), and finally, those "that tell stories about their borders" (including Deutsche Welle, Russia Today and France 24) (2009: 173). This widely accepted classification, in a sense, ignores AJE's dubious approaches towards various Middle Eastern countries such as Bahrain or how it almost always ignores human rights abuses in Qatar.

Chapter IV: Analysis

IV.I. Treaty On Stability, Coordination And Governance In The Economic And Monetary Union

Many countries in Europe have been seriously affected from the 2008 crisis. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and, lastly, Cyprus were hit the hardest. The deficits in national budgets are seen as the main causes of the crisis. The Maastricht rule that has been put into play in 1999 by unanimous agreement of all EU member states to implement a fiscal policy that aims for the country to stay within the limits on government deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (60% of GDP).

Financially strong countries; Germany, Italy and France were all amongst the first to break the Maastricht rule during the last decade, while Spain and the Republic of Ireland ran surpluses before the 2008 crisis. Since 2008, peripheral economies such as Spain, Greece and Portugal had run big deficits, because their economies were in a bad shape, generating less tax revenues and requiring more unemployment benefit payments as their population grew older.

In December 2011 European Union (EU) leaders, in an attempt to avoid the continuation of the 2007-2008 credit crunch, sought an accord involving all the members of the EU. 17 countries that make out the Eurozone and 10 other European Union members make up that list. Representatives from these countries gathered in 8 December 2011 in Brussels to sign this new treaty that

will control budget policies first laid out in Maastricht treaty and impose

penalties to those who run budget deficiencies. Germany and France wanted a

disciplined, balanced budget *golden rule* that will be adopted by all; automatic

sanctions if deficits exceed 3% gross domestic product; harmonisation of taxes

for corporations inside the eurozone and a tax on financial transactions.

After lengthy talks in Brussels, "the Heads of State or Government of

the Euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced

architecture for Economic and Monetary Union"[11]. UK as a non-member of the

Eurozone, vetoed the treaty. It is called a treaty but it is in fact an

intergovernmental agreement because of the exclusion of Britain. UK's refusal

has been explained by Prime Minister David Cameron in the form of a failure

to safeguard financial service regulations that would affect the City of London.

He also said there were insufficient safeguards for the future workings of the

EU single market. The key points of the treaty are:

- *A "balanced budget rule" to be incorporated into national legal systems, at constitutional level or equivalent;*

- *European Court of Justice to check whether nations implement budget rule properly - it will fine them up to 0.1% of national output (GDP) if they fail to do so;*

- *More automatic mechanism to force states to correct budget deficits - it will kick in unless a qualified majority of eurozone states vote against it;*

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[11] Treaty On Stability, Coordination And Governance In The Economic And Monetary Union

- *Plans for bond sales and all major economic reforms to be reported to EU institutions in advance;*

- *Eurozone summits to be held at least twice a year;*

- *Treaty to be signed in March and remain open to other EU countries that wish to join;*

- *Aim is to incorporate it into EU treaties within five years of it taking effect. ("Q&A: EU Treaty to Control Budgets")*

The agreement entails more than the fiscal details as these strict regulations are generally seen as a prolongement of harsh austerity measures imposed upon the countries who needed the bailout agreements. As the crisis grew unemployment rate has expended in Eurozone, especially in Greece, Spain and Portugal resulting many public employees to lose their jobs or an important part of their salaries while retirees' pensions has been cut. Thus, a notable part of these societies feel that they are becoming culprits of the wrongdoings of big companies, banks, politicians and the Troika (an imagined consortium made out of powerful Eurozone countries, ECB and IMF). This has been evidenced in many widespread demonstrations. Having said that, it should be noted *again* that this research is not interested in what can be the real solution to the financial crisis. But the human cost of the crisis must make an integral part of this picture.

IV.II. Dual Filter

IV.II.I. Logic of selection

As a set of rules Meyer's *dual filter system* is present in most of these news items. The first filtering system that deals with the selection logic of events into news is present here to fortify importance of the event and eventually attract more audience. An event must contain a surprise value or conflict and/or serious harm to someone or great success of a person to find it's way in the media. Being a supranational event the summit doesn't normally require these to get media attention. But this kind of story telling is so much embedded into newsmaking processes that the reports can't make without them.

Primarily, there's the addition of *surprise value* in almost all four news outlets' coverage of the event. The British veto is presented as a shocking news at least in AJE's *Impact of EU veto by UK* and BBCwn's *Is Britain now isolated in Europe?*. UK, as the country who doesn't use the common currency has always situated itself a bit far from the other European countries. Furthermore, looking at David Cameron's comments before the summit, the PM clearly states that they can veto the treaty. The harbinger of this veto is mostly visible in BBCwn (*Eurozone crisis: PM vows to fight for national interest*). Euronews also talks about this in the reports aired on December 2; "Britain's interests" (*Treaty changes must favour Britain says Cameron*, Euronews); and in December 7 "Not all 27 members are singing from the same hymn sheet. Britain, although outside Eurozone opposes radical treaty change"

(*Crunch time for the euro at vital Brussels summit*, Euronews). BBCwn's

reporting before (*Eurozone crisis: PM vows to fight for national interest*) and

during the summit shows a potential veto by David Cameron. in the news item

aired while the summit is in session summarizes what the treaty proposal is

about and segues to David Cameron's short remarks just before entering the

summit on "protecting Britain's interests" and finishes the news item off with

the following voiceover "the best protection would be an end to Euro crisis."

The summit contains *conflict* as all but one member of EU decides to

stay out of an agreement. 24-hour news networks, in their presenting bring this

conflict further to a level of personal conflict, in this case between Prime

Minister of UK, David Cameron and the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy.

This personal conflict come into being in the form of snubbing at the Brussels

meeting room. The images distributed from inside the meeting room shows Mr.

Sarkozy chatting joyfully with one leader to another before ignoring David

Cameron who passes right next to him. All four of the news networks use this

image heavily. Euronews was by far the most frequent user of this image

although it's the only one that didn't directly comment on the visual itself.

CNNi states "See how David Cameron goes to shake hands but settles for a

face-saving pat on the presidential arm" (*EU leaders reach deal without*

Britain, CNNi). AJE reads "...and the British PM being given the cold shoulder

by some in Europe." (*Britain more isolated than ever after treaty veto*, AJE)

and BBCwn "[...]a summit full of tension. The French President chipper. A

British prime minister managing a clench smile as Britain's relationship with

Europe changed too" (*Is Britain now isolated in Europe?*, BBCwn). What's important here is BBC's usage of "*the* president" and "*a* British prime minister". For all three, the disregard of financial policies, cultural and historical differences between two countries, the *imagined* personal conflict between the two leaders and the depiction of David Cameron as the almost-ridicule leader deserves a notice.

Serious harm/great success is, also, heavily ingrained in their reporting as the general consensus seems to be seeing the new treaty as a success and proposing that Cameron inflicted harm to UK and to the EU by rejecting the deal. Euronews is the network who underlines this the most by using words like "isolated", "mistake" and "failed". This "mistake" is presented as a *personal* mistake of David Cameron in Euronews: "David Cameron's decision to veto the move" and BBCwn: "David Cameron's decision to go it alone". An identical expression, "leaving out in the cold" has been used by both Euronews (*Cameron faces Commons after EU veto*) and AJE (*Britain more isolated than ever after treaty veto*).

IV.II.II. Rules of stage-managing

There is certainly a theatricalization of the organization of the summit. In all 4 of the news channels we see European leaders arriving to the summit with black cars, before walking through the red carpet to go into the building where the summit will be held. On this short red carpet trip journalists take pictures and shout their questions to leaders. Leaders respond to these questions

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in a manner that resembles actors attending to Oscars ceremony before they go into the Kodak Building in Hollywood. This is very much what Thomas Meyer describes in his Dual Filter System of the media under the second filter, the "rules of stage-managing".

AJE and Euronews use "family" as a figurative expression. While the presenter of Euronews mouths "almost perfect family" (*Europe's '27 minus 1' agreement*) over the EU leaders photo op, AJE has a more tale-like narrative: "Playing happy families at the end of a crucial summit in Brussels. [...] But like all families the European Union has its feuds and its black sheep." (*Impact of EU veto by UK*)

One of the most striking storytellings have been put forward by BBC when the channel starts of the news bulletin with Sarkozy rebuffing Cameron. The narrative then moves into leaders leaving the building at "4 in the morning"; most of them, especially Cameron looking very tired. Then, they get "2 hours of sleep" and come back to the meeting hall "at daybreak" only to find just enough time for reporting to the media. While Merkel gives her account of the British pull-out, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė shines as the only non-german, french or british leader who gets to speak, merely to point out David Cameron's *irrational* behaviour: "Brits divided and they are outside of decision-making". The news item ends with a "mood of Britain as the outsider extends to a ceremony welcoming Croatia as the latest EU member" with the announcer of the ceremony calling British PM to stage with these words: "now, *last but not least* UK, Mr. David Cameron". (emphasis added)

AJE uses special effects to boost dramatic storytelling. The report kicks off with an almost story-like sentence over the images of vibrant sea: "Winter storms are battering British coastline..." that mixes into a map of Europe where the main British island slowly moves away from the continental Europe. The second special effect is done to illustrate proposals of a possible "two-speed Europe" where an AJE journalist speaks in the middle of two different roads with one road significantly more revved up than the other. The last one is the disappearance of David Cameron from the EU leaders picture. This report stands out from the others because of this usage of special effects.

Personification is another theatricalization of the event sought by all four of the 24-hour news networks. Cameron is presented as under-fire leader, sitting by himself and drinking a glass of water tiresomely. (*Cameron: Britain's better off outside the euro,* Euronews*; EU leaders win praise but euro doubts remain,* Euronews*; David Cameron's decision to go it alone*, BBCwn. CNNi has the most bizarre and despising attitude: "The pictures spoke volumes As Europe's leaders chatted about closer ties Britain's Prime Minister sat alone, isolated, next to the Maltese PM". (*EU leaders reach deal without Britain)* On other news items Cameron is the one who has to defend his decision all by himself in a different space than the meeting room or the hall of the accustomed Brussels setting. This can remind some, of the quiz show *Weakest Link*, where the loser has to defend/comment on his performance after he has been eliminated by the unanimous decision of other players.

In addition to that, archetypal narrative of the winner/the loser has been used as well. BBCwn declares David Cameron "hopelessly outmanoeuvred by the French President." and in an exclusive interview, a BBC journalist asks the following question to Cameron: "You compared the negotiations to a chess game but it's checkmate to Sarkozy. What do you make of this?" The report also mentions Sarkozy leaving the summit smiling. (*David Cameron's decision to go it alone*, BBCwn) Another report that clearly states the winners and the losers is by Euronews (*EU leaders win praise but euro doubts remain).* "The make-or-break summit has ended with Nicolas Sarkozy seen as a winner" the report read stating that "David Cameron was defiant in his isolation. [...] Angela Merkel succeeded [...] and Mario Draghi, the head of the ECB has been praised[...]"

IV.II. Who gets to speak

The questions that Fraser saw fit to any transnational public sphere stand out for this event as well. It is plain simple that in the coverage of the summit only few representatives of selected countries had a chance of explaining their views. These are Germany, France, UK and the President of Lithuania (on the basis of her public dismissal of David Cameron). The agreement touches all the signatories but only the mightiest have a chance to vocal what they think. Ms. Merkel's interchangeable usage of "we", "the countries that signed the treaty" and "the Europe" is important. (*Merkel hails Brussels "breakthrough"*, Euronews) The other leaders are sometimes seen in

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pictures to illustrate a cohesive EU that Britain *selfishly* opted out but neither

their names nor their voices are heard. This answers the next question of are

they represented as peers or unequals? CNNi's usage of "David Cameron sat

alone, next to the Maltese PM" constitutes the landmark in here as the most

disdaining comment. On the other hand European bureaucrats such as the

president of ECB and European commissioner find their way more than the

leaders of other countries especially in Euronews.

Granted that representatives of most EU countries don't utter a word in

these reports, Ed Miliband, leader of the British opposition party speaks his

mind in a comfortable fashion in Euronews (*EU summit: Cameron tells*

Commons he acted in UK's interest) and BBCwn (*David Cameron's decision to*

go it alone). This constitutes a european public sphere in Risse's definition as

"speakers from other countries are accepted as legitimate contributors." This

might be linked to not missing out the opportunity of publicly denouncing

David Cameron's *narrow-minded* decision.

IV.III. Singular(s)

All of the four networks have dense similarities in their reporting around

that time. They mainly focus on comments made by French, German and

British leaders with the addition of some higher bureaucrats of European

institutions. There are only a few reports that leave the plot behind. AJE's

European austerity increases immigration pictures a Greek diaspora prospered

in Melbourne, Australia. In the report, the Greek community in Melbourne is

doing well, compared to people who stayed in Greece and they talk about a shortage of Greek speaking public workers to take care of the ageing community.

Human cost of the crisis is distinctly present in a report on Portugal in Euronews (*Merry crisis from Portugal*) and on Portugal and Greece in AJE (*Europe's austerity bites before Christmas*) where ordinary people talk about their hardships in fulfilling their needs and the future which they see as bleak.

Euronews' *Merry crisis from Portugal* is particularly interesting as it voices a certain national discourse very highly as opposed to the general cosmopolitan inclination in most of the other reports. After describing a crisis-hit Lisbon, the report moves to a Christmas market where almost every good is produced in Portugal. The manager of the market, proposes a national solution to economic hardships by declaring that "Portuguese people have to be more Portuguese. Local products will make the Troika leave the country as soon as possible." National discourse, and David Cameron's insistence on "Britain's interests" has only been praised by the Tory Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, in BBCwn. Mr. Johnson's approval of Cameron's decision is linked to his insistence on "national sovereignty". On the other hand, the most pan-European comment is heard from José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission. Mr. Barroso, before the summit declares that "All the world is watching us. And what the world attends from us is not more national problems but European solutions." (*Eurozone crunch time as EU heads meets in Brussels*)

Chapter V: Conclusion

When something significant happens in the world, the international news TV channels are the first place the elite audiences and journalists around the world turns to because these stations have established themselves with access to places and key people. But their reporting and the transnational public sphere that they're feeding into have problematic traits.

The news items aired on four 24-hour news stations about the Eurozone crisis summit have major similarities. When implemented Meyer's dual filter system, these news channels' coverage of any event can be broken into different narrative structures. Logic of selection and rules of stage-managing laid out by Meyer is present in all four of news networks' reporting. Logic of selection's surprise value, conflict, and serious harm/great success are an integral determinant of its newsworthiness. The selection logic is so pressing that it affects how the news is presented per se. Rules of stage-managing, on the other hand, find their ways into all four news networks' coverage. Findings suggest that, theatricalization happens to take less place in Euronews, since the channel doesn't use humorous elements, special effects, and it uses techniques such as personification and storytelling only to a certain extent.

Although not observable instantly, the distortion made by the dual filter system of the media is indeed there. A fragment of reality, which in this case can be unemployment or poverty, finds its way in media in a whole different

appearance than it actually is such as in the form of another country's representative getting out of his/her car or a televised snubbing.

Approached from Thomas Risse's definition, the summit's coverage on the global news networks does indeed contribute to the emergence of a European public sphere. Risse proposes that a public sphere is something that is constructed in the minds, not only in the times of harmony but also during conflict and even in polarizations. In the Eurozone debt crisis summit there's exactly that: A conflict between UK and the powerful Eurozone countries and a personal feud between two heads of the state, -David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy. In this case, both countries' citizens have a chance to listen to the speaker from the other country (Cameron or Sarkozy) as a legitimate voice.

However, these channels' claim is to be global and their attempt in bringing all the world's news each with different perspectives does not add up when their reporting approach is highly similar. This similarity cannot only be explained by their reliance on news agencies or their ownership structure. An EU-wide summit in Brussels means that all the channels can afford sending an actual reporter to cover the event instead of aggravating the report from other sources. An explanation depending on the ownership structure stays afloat on the basis of existence of different ownership structures of each news outlet (semi-public, private, state sponsored and supra-nationally financed) that should have been in the end, resulted in a certain difference in the coverage.

Of course, this similarity might be principally linked to the norms of news making processes and the mentality of 24-hour news networks, and

secondly, to the audience of transnational news networks. Elite audience's numbers are small, compared to general television networks' audience numbers. But, what is more important is their other features. They already tend to travel a lot (%22 of EMS Universe in Europe has seen 3 international airports in 2012) and, evidently, most of them speak the broadcast's publication language which is English. This audience is cosmopolitan by nature and the networks wouldn't jeopardize losing their cosmopolitan outlook by putting other perspectives, as the latter comes with the risk of sounding too "national". This argument can be fortified by the fact that each criticism to the summit has found its way to the transnational public sphere, in the form of national outbursts such as "national interests" or "kicking the Troika out".

Over and above that, this cosmopolitan outlook that they possess is not as cosmopolitan as it reflects. The most intense debate about the treaty change is whether the British will sign or not. The Franco-German plan has been presented with a built-in consensus. Not necessarily needing a multifaceted discussion. The transnational networks have legitimized France and Germany's positions as the decision-makers. And the absence of all the other countries' voices in the discussion accounts for their consent.

The transnational public sphere that has been emerged around EU and come into being with the Eurozone debt crisis summit in December 2011 can be classified as not inclusive that consists of unequal participants, with a low possibility of influence on decision-making.

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