

CONCORDANCE AND ISLAMIZATION IN
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PAKISTAN AND
TURKEY

A Master's Thesis

by
Faria Pitafi

Department of
International Relations
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
August 2021

FARIA PITAFI CONCORDANCE AND ISLAMIZATION IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS BILKENT UNIVERSITY 2021
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

CONCORDANCE AND ISLAMIZATION IN
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

FARIA PITAFI

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

August 2021

ABSTRACT

CONCORDANCE AND ISLAMIZATION IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

Pitafi, Faria

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Dr Ersel Aydınlı

August 2021

In order to test and reanalyse the theory of concordance proposed by Rebecca Schiff, this thesis applies it to two case studies – Pakistan’s 1999 coup and Turkey’s 2016 coup attempt – using a qualitative approach. Inquiring whether concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry prevents domestic military intervention, the study focuses on the military coup outcome as its dependent variable. By using a comparative case analysis approach, not only the level of concordance is evaluated based on four indicators of concordance – social composition of officer corps, recruitment method, the political decision-making process, and military style – across two Muslim-majority democracies, but the role of Islamization in the military in achieving or preventing concordance is also explored. Comparing Pakistan with a highly Islamized military, an Islamic constitution, and a non-secular civilian government in the 1988-1999 period, and Turkey whose military has low and covert Islamization, a secular constitution, and a non-secular civilian government in the 2002-2016 period, this study concludes that Islamization in the military both aids and prevents concordance and hence, domestic military intervention, depending on specific conditions. Furthermore, although this research verifies concordance theory, it also proposes modest modifications to the theory by presenting different types of concordance that may exist among the three actors and highlighting the role of Islamization as an essential part of the culture in Muslim-majority states.

Keywords: Concordance, Islamization, Turkey, Pakistan, Civil-military, Coup

ÖZET

SİVİL-ASKER İLİSKİLERİNDE CONCORDANCE (UYUM) VE İSLAMİLESME: PAKİSTAN VE TÜRKİYE ÖRNEKLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMALI ANALİZİ

Pitafi, Faria

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı

Ağustos 2021

Rebecca Schiff tarafından önerilen concordance (uyum) teorisini test etmek ve yeniden analiz etmek için bu tez, nitel bir yaklaşım kullanarak bunu iki vaka çalışmasına – Pakistan'daki 1999 askeri darbesi ve Türkiye'deki 2016 darbe girişimine - uygulamaktadır. Ordu, siyasi seçkinler ve yurttaşlar arasındaki 'concordance'ın iç askeri müdahaleyi önleyip önlemediğini sorgulayan çalışma, bağımlı değişken olarak askeri darbe faktörüne odaklanmaktadır. Karşılaştırmalı bir vaka analizi yaklaşımı kullanılarak, yalnızca concordance düzeyi, iki çoğunluğu Müslüman demokraside dört uyum göstergesine (subayların sosyal bileşimi, işe alma yöntemi, siyasi karar verme süreci ve askeri tarz) dayalı olarak değerlendirilmekle kalınmamakta, ayrıca ordulardaki İslamleşmenin concordance sağlamadaki veya önlemedeki rolünü de araştırmaktadır. Pakistan'ı 1988-1999 döneminde yüksek oranda İslamlaşmış bir ordu, İslami bir anayasa ve laik olmayan bir sivil hükümetle, ordusu düşük ve örtülü İslamlaşan, laik bir anayasaya ve tam laik olmayan bir sivil hükümete sahip Türkiye ile karşılaştırarak (2002-2016 döneminde), bu çalışma, orduda İslamleşmenin, belirli koşullara bağlı olarak iç askeri müdahaleye hem yardımcı olduğu hem de engellediği sonucuna varmaktadır. Bu araştırma concordance teorisini doğrulamakla birlikte, üç aktör arasında var olabilecek farklı uyum türlerini tartışarak, Müslüman çoğunluklu devletlerde kültürün önemli bir parçası olarak İslamleşmenin rolünü de vurgulayarak teoride mütevazı değişiklikler önermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Concordance, Uyum, İslamlaştırma, Pakistan, Türkiye, Sivil-askeri, Darbe

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express sincere gratitude to my advisor, Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı, for his continued guidance, constructive criticism, and encouragement throughout my thesis process. His inquisitive and emphatic personality constantly inspired me to think out of the box. I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr Zeki Sarıgil and Assoc. Prof. Dr Nihat Ali Özcan, my examining committee members, for their invaluable suggestions and insightful comments.

I also wish to thank all of my professors at Bilkent University throughout my undergraduate and graduate studies for their support and guidance.

Writing this thesis would have been all the more difficult had it not been for the continued motivation and love of my husband, Suleman.

Finally, my eternal gratitude goes to my supportive family and friends. I am thankful to my Ami, Papa, and little sister, Marvi, who have kept a constant check on my emotional well-being as well as my academic progress.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|------|
| ABSTRACT..... | III |
| ÖZET | IV |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..... | V |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS..... | VI |
| LIST OF FIGURES | VIII |
| CHAPTER 1 | 1 |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1.1. Background | 2 |
| 1.2. Objective of the Study..... | 3 |
| 1.3. Thesis Structure..... | 4 |
| CHAPTER 2 | 6 |
| RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY | 6 |
| 2.1. Research Strategy..... | 8 |
| 2.1.1. Case selection..... | 8 |
| 2.1.2. The variables..... | 13 |
| 2.2. Data Collection and Analysis..... | 15 |
| 2.3. Limitations of the Study..... | 17 |
| CHAPTER 3 | 21 |
| THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS | 21 |
| 3.1. Key Concepts | 22 |
| 3.1.1. Culture..... | 22 |
| 3.1.2. Islamization..... | 23 |
| 3.1.3. Coups | 25 |
| 3.1.4. Concordance | 26 |
| 3.1.5. Muslim-majority (weak) democracy..... | 27 |
| 3.1.6. Islamic/Secular constitution..... | 27 |
| 3.1.7. Non-secular/Islamic civilian government..... | 28 |
| 3.2. Civil-Military Relations Literature..... | 29 |
| 3.3. Concordance Theory | 37 |
| 3.4. Limitations of Concordance Theory | 43 |
| 3.5. Conceptual Framework of Analysis..... | 45 |
| 3.5.1. Case studies..... | 46 |
| 3.5.2. Islamization in the military and Concordance Theory..... | 48 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| CHAPTER 4 | 50 |
| LEVEL OF CONCORDANCE IN PAKISTAN | 50 |
| 4.1. Background of the 1999 coup d'état | 50 |
| 4.2. Indicators of concordance | 55 |
| 4.2.1. Social composition of the officer corps | 56 |
| 4.2.2. Recruitment method..... | 60 |
| 4.2.3. The political decision-making process..... | 62 |
| 4.2.4. Military style..... | 64 |
| 4.3. Impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance..... | 66 |
| 4.3.1. Level of Islamization in the Pakistani military | 66 |
| 4.3.2. Islamization in the military and the level of concordance | 69 |
| 4.4. Summary | 71 |
| CHAPTER 5 | 73 |
| LEVEL OF CONCORDANCE IN TURKEY | 73 |
| 5.1. Background of the 2016 coup attempt | 74 |
| 5.1.1. The rise of AKP and the fall of military dominance..... | 75 |
| 5.1.1.1. The first AKP government: 2002-2007 | 76 |
| 5.1.1.2. The second AKP government: 2007-2011 | 77 |
| 5.1.1.3. The third AKP government: 2011-2015..... | 79 |
| 5.1.1.4. The 2016 coup attempt | 80 |
| 5.2. Indicators of concordance | 80 |
| 5.2.1. Social composition of the officer corps | 81 |
| 5.2.2. Recruitment method..... | 84 |
| 5.2.3. The political decision-making process..... | 85 |
| 5.2.4. Military style..... | 88 |
| 5.3. Impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance..... | 90 |
| 5.3.1. Level of Islamization in the Turkish military | 90 |
| 5.3.2. Islamization in the military and the level of concordance | 92 |
| 5.4. Summary | 94 |
| CHAPTER 6 | 98 |
| CONCLUSIONS..... | 98 |
| 6.1. Contributions..... | 98 |
| 6.2. Islamization in the military: A Comparative Analysis..... | 101 |
| 6.3. Research implications | 103 |
| REFERENCES | 105 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 1 Direct civilian control policies based on degree of civilian meddling | 34 |
| Figure 2 Officer Market Share 1994..... | 57 |
| Figure 3 Types of concordance based on the level of concordance | 100 |



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations is one of the truly interdisciplinary fields of study in social science. It has been advanced by historians, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and international relations theorists as well. Against the backdrop of rising national populism around the world, maintaining stable civil-military relations has become a challenge for several nations. Anti-populist coups d'état and coup attempts even in the twenty-first century – Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 – suggest that the phenomenon is still relevant today. The coups can result from numerous combinations of factors including military grievances, economic decline, domestic political crisis, and even contagion from other regional coups. However, there are various strategies to prevent the occurrence of coup d'état, and one of them will be discussed as part of this research. According to Rebecca Schiff, agreement among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry on a set of indicators regarding the role of the military can reduce the probability of domestic military intervention significantly. This mutual agreement – namely concordance – results from the shared cultural and historical values and experiences of the three actors. With the coups d'état still occurring and hence, still relevant today, it is paramount to review and reformulate the strategies used by countries to maintain stable civil-military relations without fear of the 'other'. Moreover, although the theory of concordance focuses on shared cultural values, there is not much discussion regarding what shapes and forms that culture could take. Therefore, this thesis also brings light to one form of that culture, Islamization, particularly in the military, to further evaluate the role of culture and contribute to the theory.

1.1. Background

A major chunk of civil-military relations literature has focused on the prevention of domestic military interventions. The prevention strategies highlighted significantly in the literature are objective and subjective civilian control, which mainly belong to the category of separation. According to the theory of separation, the functions of the civil society – mostly referring to the highest civilian authorities – and the military must be entirely separate. However, the final authority must be of the civilian government, even vis-à-vis issues that require military expertise, and their view trumps the view of the military even if they are less experienced in the field. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong. Although the different theories of civil-military relations will be discussed further in the following chapters, it is important to highlight their emphasis on the elements of ‘control’ and civil-military dichotomy. Most of the civil-military literature has focused on the rivalry between the military and the civilian authority for ‘control’ of the decision-making power in the state affairs. Moreover, the theoretical approach of the separation theory pays little attention to a nation’s unique and indigenous culture, or any culture at all, since it focuses on replicating United States’ civil and military institutions. Even the latest version of separation theory – agency theory – preserves the civil-military dichotomy and keeps culture out of the discussion.

This research focuses on a purportedly richer and more suitable theory of concordance which has a wider applicability and relevance to different cases around the world. Instead of treating the civil society and the military as rivals for control of the decision-making power, this theory focuses on dialogue, accommodation, and shared values among not just the military and civilian authorities, but the citizens of the country as well. It is not unlikely that three partners’ shared cultural values and objectives can bind them into an agreement to fulfil their individual duties, not through separation but through concordance. By agreeing on the role of the armed forces regarding social composition of the officer corps, recruitment method, the political decision-making process, and military style, the three actors can form a partnership through which domestic military intervention can be prevented. Furthermore, shared cultural values can take many forms and one of them, particularly in Muslim-majority countries, can be Islamization. Hence, this thesis also focuses on the role of Islamization in the military in achieving or preventing concordance among the three actors.

1.2. Objective of the Study

The thesis aims to fulfil two primary goals: one is to reanalyze the key arguments of the concordance theory and second is to evaluate the role of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance. The main proposition of this thesis is similar to Schiff's argument: high level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry regarding social composition of the officer corps, recruitment method, political decision-making process, and military style, makes domestic military interventions highly unlikely. Nevertheless, after reanalyzing this argument using additional case studies, different time periods, and a comparative approach to evaluate the role of another cultural factor, Islamization in the military, this research aims to test the theory of concordance not based on the likelihood of coup attempt but based on the likelihood of the successful outcome of that attempt. Hence, the thesis challenges the arguments of concordance theory by using two case studies of Pakistan and Turkey. Moreover, it also tests the claim that similar cultural values lead to greater chances for concordance. One primary reason for focusing on Schiff's argument is the potential power of Islamization as a transformative process in Muslim-majority countries and the role it can play as a bridging ideology among the society, institutions, and government. Hence, to explore the role of Islamization in these two countries, reanalysis of the theory using these case studies was essential to this research.

According to the findings of this research, concordance on the four indicators does prevent the success of domestic military intervention. In the case of Pakistan, it was primarily discordance among the three actors which led to the occurrence of 1999 coup. Whereas, in the case of Turkey, concordance led to the prevention of 2016 coup attempt; however, it was more a result of a high level of concordance between the civilian government and the citizenry and less a result of concordance among all three actors. It must also be noted that the thesis does not make an attempt to disqualify various other explanatory factors leading to or preventing coups in the two cases. The study focuses on the role of concordance and cultural factors, without disregarding other explanatory variables which go beyond the scope of this research. A second finding of this research is that shared cultural values can cause both deterrence and assistance for the success of domestic military intervention. In both the cases, Islamization in the military also led to discordance because of the actors' claims to a

particular Islamist narrative. Hence, even if the civil-military dichotomy is separated from the discussion, the argument returns to ‘controlling’ the decision-making authority by directing the cultural narrative. Although Islamization in the military led to concordance between the military and the society in the case of Pakistan, it led to concordance between the civilian government and (a large faction of) the society in the Turkish case. The 1999 coup in Pakistan was successful and even accepted by the public whereas the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey failed and was rejected by the society. This also shows that concordance between the military and society could legitimize a coup, even if government is not part of the agreement, while concordance between the civilian government and the society would prevent the coup, even if military does not participate directly into it. Moreover, the impact of Islamization in the military, is also affected by the level of Islamization in the civilian government and the public. In countries where there is a significant degree of Islamization, theory of separation and similar approaches focusing on ‘objective civilian control’ become complicated as Islamization is such an overarching ideology and cannot be separated among different actors involved in the state affairs.

This thesis can be characterized as a preliminary study to a considerable larger research on the impact of culture on civil-military relations. It contributes to civil-military literature by challenging concordance theory and drawing further conclusions from its arguments. By claiming that concordance theory can also be applied to the success or failure of the outcome of the domestic military intervention, this research aims to suggest certain modifications to the theory. Moreover, the cultural aspect has also been opened to further critique by introducing the Islamization factor into the debate. The thesis also proposes a typology of concordance – stable and unstable concordance – and argues that a bilateral concordance, in comparison with Schiff’s trilateral concordance, can also have similar effects as predicted by the concordance theory.

1.3. Thesis Structure

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 focuses on the research design and methodology used in this thesis. This chapter discusses the research question, case selection, variables, data collection and analysis, and limitations of the study.

Chapter 3 – theoretical framework of analysis – highlights the previous theoretical approaches employed in the field, literature review, and the conceptual framework of

analysis proposed for this study. This chapter also discusses the case studies and the role of Islamization in the military.

Chapter 4 evaluates the level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry in Pakistan using the four indicators of concordance. It further goes on to analyse the level of Islamization in the Pakistani military, particularly Pakistan Army, and its impact of the level of concordance among the three actors.

Chapter 5 evaluates the level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry in Turkey using the four indicators of concordance. It further goes on to analyse the level of Islamization in the Turkish military, particularly Turkish Army, and its impact of the level of concordance among the three actors.

The final chapter concludes the thesis by analysing the results through a comparative analysis of the two cases. It also includes policy implications of this research and opportunities for future research on the subject.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This study plans to test Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory using Pakistan's 1999 coup and Turkey's 2016 failed coup attempt as its case studies. The aim of this research is to answer the following questions:

What was the level of concordance among the Pakistani and Turkish militaries, political elites, and citizenry, prior to the military coup/coup attempt?

Did a high level of concordance lead to the failure of domestic military intervention in the Turkish case? Alternatively, did discordance among the three partners in Pakistan lead to the success of 1999 military coup?

What role did Islamization in the militaries of the two Muslim-majority democracies play in achieving or preventing concordance?

Hence, the main research question asked in this thesis is similar to Schiff's research question leading to her concordance theory, with the focus on the intervention's outcome, rather than the attempt, and with the additional factor of Islamization.

Does concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry, prevent the success of domestic military intervention, and what is the role of Islamization in the military of a Muslim-majority democracy in this process?

As there are different measures of CMR, this particular study focuses on the military coup outcome as its dependent variable. In the cases of Pakistan and Turkey, there have been a number of coups d'état and coup attempts in the past; however, this study aims to analyse the most recent one in each country. Although there are other continuous dependent variables that are more inclusive of other indirect interventionist activities of the military beyond the coup, domestic military intervention is most obvious and

easily measurable in the case of coup especially when applying the concordance theory. The pros and cons of using this specific factor as the dependent variable in this study will be explained in the subsequent subchapters.

The research involves a comparative case study of Pakistan and Turkey. Although the reasons for adopting this research design with these particular cases will be elaborated further, I must be honest in accepting that choosing these specific cases also comes from my cultural familiarity with the two countries as well as the relative ease of access to the data as compared to other countries whose languages and cultures I am unfamiliar with and with limited access to their data. The two selected cases are analysed in the period before major political changes took place in the two countries. In the case of Pakistan, the period analysed is from 1988 to 1999; an eleven-year military rule ended in 1988, and the democratically-elected government was deposed through a coup in 1999. On the other hand, in the case of Turkey, the time period analysed is from 2002 to 2016; the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – AKP) came to power through general election in 2002, after the 1997 military memorandum, and a military coup attempt against the democratically-elected government failed in July 2016. Although, for both the countries, the starting years of analysis depict major political changes, for Turkey it moved towards civilian dominance over the military with the ultimate failed coup attempt while for Pakistan, the military continued to exert power even after general elections in 1988. This study aims to discover if a high level of concordance among the Turkish military, political elites, and the citizenry prevented the successful outcome of the domestic military intervention in 2016 and similarly, if discordance among the Pakistani military, political elites, and the citizenry caused the success of 1999 coup. Moreover, the research also explores the role of Islamization in the military in the two Muslim-majority democracies, one with a secular constitution and the other with an Islamic constitution, in achieving or preventing concordance among the three partners. Concordance theory focuses mainly on the role of shared cultural and historical experiences of the three actors in forming a partnership regarding factors affecting civil-military relations. With Islamization, whether for religious or political purposes, at the core of Muslim-majority societies' culture, its role in civil-military relations cannot be overlooked or underestimated. Hence, this thesis goes beyond challenging concordance theory and analyses the role of Islamization in the military in aiding or preventing civil-military partnerships. The following subchapters

will discuss the research strategy, case selection for this study, different research methods employed, what data was used and how it was gathered and analysed, and finally, the limitations of this research.

2.1. Research Strategy

In this section, I will discuss my research approach, case selection, variables, and their operationalization and measurement.


Using a comparative case analysis approach, this study aims to test the following claim of concordance theory, but by replacing the domestic military intervention with the outcome of that intervention:

Domestic military intervention can be avoided if there is agreement among the military, the political leadership, and the citizens regarding four indicators: social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.¹

Hence, using these four indicators, it will be examined whether there was concordance among the three partners in Pakistan and Turkey before 1999 and 2016 respectively. Moreover, as the concordance theory is based on the cultural and historical experiences of a country and how these experiences shape the level of concordance, this thesis will explore the role of Islamization (culture) in the military in this regard as well.

2.1.1. Case selection

The dependent variable in this research, the outcome of coup d'état, is different for both Pakistan and Turkey. Hence, the two cases were selected following the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). In order to explain the design, I will first give a visual representation of the argument.



¹ Rebecca Schiff, *The military and domestic politics: A concordance theory of civil-military relations* (Routledge, 2008): 13.

According to the literature on the subject, the civil-military relations of a country are impacted by different factors including the political regime type, social and religious cleavages in the society, internal and external security threats, history of CMR, and the role of military.² Considering these factors and their similarities among the two selected cases, a comparative case analysis is performed following the most-similar systems design (MSSD). The MSSD for this specific comparative case analysis is explained below:

| Factors/Variables | Pakistan | Turkey |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Political regime type (Polity IV) ³ | (Weak) Democracy ⁴ | (Weak) Democracy ⁵ |
| Global Freedom Score (Freedom House) ⁶ | Partly free ⁷ | Partly free ⁸ |

² Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-military relations 1," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999).

³ The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority.

⁴ "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Pakistan," *Systemic Peace*, July 1, 2011, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Pakistan2010.pdf>.

To access legend key for trend graphs, refer to "The Polity IV Country Report 2010 Series," *Systemic Peace*, <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/keynew.htm>.

Between 1988 and 1999, Pakistan was categorized as a democracy (polity score rising to +8); however, the democratic period was overshadowed by factionalism and military dominance. Hence, it is categorized as a weak democracy in that period.

⁵ "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Turkey," *Systemic Peace*, July 1, 2011, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Turkey2010.pdf>.

To access legend key for trend graphs, refer to "The Polity IV Country Report 2010 Series," *Systemic Peace*, <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/keynew.htm>.

Between 2002 and 2016, democracy in Turkey was also overshadowed by factionalism; however, the polity score remained above +6. It must be noted that the +6 score is at the borderline between democracy and autocracy and thus, Turkey is categorized as an overall weak democracy in that period.

⁶ For each country and territory, *Freedom in the World* analyses the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, the functioning of the government, freedom of expression and of belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.

⁷ Roger Kaplan, *Freedom in the World: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 1995-1996* (Freedom House, 1996), <https://bit.ly/2TBSfWP>.

This score is measured in the 1995-1996 period.

⁸ Arch Puddington, *Freedom in the World: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 2012* (Freedom House, 2012), <https://bit.ly/3rEnixV>.

This score is measured in 2012.

| | | |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| Muslim majority | Yes (95-98%) ⁹ | Yes (95-98%) ¹⁰ |
| Second largest sectarian category | 10-15% ¹¹ | 10-15% ¹² |
| Coups/overthrown by military decisions | 3 | 4 |
| (Immediate) external security threat | Yes (India) | Yes (Greece, Armenia) |
| Instability in neighbouring states | Yes (Afghanistan) | Yes (Northern Iraq, Syria) |
| Ethnic cleavages/internal security threat | Yes (Baloch Liberation Army, Sindhu Desh) | Yes (Kurds, PKK) |
| Religious cleavages | Yes (Sunni, Shia, Ahmadis) | Yes (Sunni, Alawites) |
| Ideological conflicts | Yes (conservatives vs liberals) | Yes (conservatives vs liberals) |
| Transition from military rule to democracy | Yes | Yes |
| Role of military | Strong (guardian role) | Strong (guardian role) ¹³ |

⁹ “Population by Religion,” *Pakistan Bureau of Statistics*, <https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-religion>.

Having a Muslim majority does not signify an Islamized society. However, it does mean that there may be a high potential of the influence of Islamization.

¹⁰ “Turkey, Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions,” *European Commission*, January 13, 2021, <https://bit.ly/3yajBCD>.

Having a Muslim majority does not signify an Islamized society. However, it does mean that there may be a high potential of the influence of Islamization. A large faction of the Turkish society considers itself secular as will be explained in the subsequent chapters; however, a Muslim majority means that Islam as a religion and Islamism as an ideology are relevant in that case.

¹¹ “Estimated Percentage Range of Shia by Country,” *Pew Research*, October 2009, <https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2009/10/Shiarange.pdf>.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Although the role of Turkish military in state affairs has changed with the military becoming less dominant than it used to be, this research considers the overall role of Turkish military from a historical perspective. Hence, even if Turkey entered into a post-guardianship era with military being pushed into background during the 2002-2016 period, its role is considered strong taking into account the military

Taking into account these key similarities, the outcomes (dependent variable) of civil-military relationships are different.

| Dependent Variable (D.V.) | Pakistan | Turkey |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Outcome of Coup d'état | Successful | Failed |

Hence, taking into account the similar conditions of the two cases but leading to different outcomes, the MSSD is adopted. In my research, I will test Schiff's theory of concordance and argue that the different outcomes are mainly a result of the level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry.

| Independent Variable | Pakistan | Turkey |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Level of concordance | Low | High |

In addition to the independent variable, there is a combination of other factors taken into account as well including the level of Islamization in the military, the type of country's constitution, and the type of civilian government.

| Other factors | Pakistan | Turkey |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Level of Islamization in the military | High | Low |
| Type of constitution | Islamic | Secular |
| Type of civilian government | Non-secular/Islamic | Non-secular/Islamic |

The constitution type also takes into account that Pakistan was created on Islamic grounds whereas Turkey was formed on secular grounds.

Considering the above comparisons, where Turkey and Pakistan are mostly similar in the relevant variables, military coup was successful in Pakistan whereas it failed in the case of Turkey. Although the theory of concordance can be tested without using a comparative analysis, the impact of Islamization in the military would be clearer

dominance throughout most of the Turkish political history. To read further on the changing role of Turkish military in politics, refer to Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish military: principal or agent?" *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 1 (2014): 168-190.

through comparison of the two cases. Based on the concordance theory, I argue that the military coup was successful in Pakistan due to lack of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry; whereas it failed in Turkey due to high level of concordance among the three partners. Moreover, with Pakistan's Islamic constitution and non-secular civilian government before 1999, high level of Islamization in the military helped the military keep its dominance in the different areas of civil-military relations, and also caused discordance among the three partners. On the other hand, in the case of Turkey, with a secular constitution but a non-secular civilian government (particularly after 2011), low Islamization in the military (with the military's general secular outlook) led to concordance among the three partners and remains the reason that the 2016 coup attempt failed. Although the 2016 attempt is considered an action by one faction in the military, it must also be noted that the incident has gathered multiple controversies regarding who propagated it; where most sources seem to agree that the Gulenist movement was behind this coup, some also make the claim that it was the government's self-inflicted staged coup for a purge against anti-government groups.¹⁴

Another point to be addressed is the level of analysis and deductive/inductive approach debate. As discussed by Carsten Anckar in his article on MSSD in comparative research, the MSSD is "particularly useful in cases where we are interested in variables at a systemic level."¹⁵ In my research, the variables studied are generally at sub-system level (for example, the level of Islamization in the military, coup d'états, and type of constitution). However, although the variables may be at sub-system level, I am making cross-national observations and thus, the logic of the MSSD proves to be the feasible option for this study. Regarding the approach, I am adopting a deductive approach but in future, it could also become an inductive approach. My question is, '(how) does the

¹⁴ Some sources suggest the possibility of 2016 coup attempt being a hoax including M. Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koç, "The Turkish coup attempt: the Gülen movement vs. the state," *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 4 (2016): 136-148; Hakkı Taş, "The 15 July abortive coup and post-truth politics in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 18, no. 1 (2018): 1-19. On the other hand, there are numerous studies highlighting the role of Gulenist movement in the 2016 coup attempt such as Uslu Cennet, "Why Did People Become Human Shields Against The Coup?," *Bilig* 79 (2016): 197-210; Francesco F. Milan, "Turkey: What hides behind a failed coup attempt," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no. 4 (2016): 28-32; Koray Caliskan, "Explaining the end of military tutelary regime and the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey," *Journal of Cultural Economy* 10, no. 1 (2017): 97-111.

¹⁵ Carsten Anckar, "On the applicability of the most similar systems design and the most different systems design in comparative research," *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 11, no. 5 (2008): 392; Henry Teune and Adam Przeworski, *The logic of comparative social inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 36.

level of concordance (I.V.) cause or prevent success of coup d'état (D.V.)?' This study also explores the impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance in a Muslim-majority democracy. This formulation of the research question puts the focus on the independent variable aiming to test the concordance theory's assumption that concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry contributes to how civil-military partnerships form and work in a country. Moreover, the Islamization in the military is taken as one aspect of the culture, which Schiff highlights in her theory as the defining factor in civil-military relations, in order to find out if it has a contribution in the level of concordance. The next step of this research could be finding cases among Muslim-majority democracies with the presence or absence of successful coups asking the question, 'what explains the success or failure of a military coup?' If across those cases, the level of concordance and the level of Islamization in the military have a link, the applicability of the findings could expand to all Muslim-majority democracies, under specific conditions. This would be the inductive approach and could further build the concordance theory by bringing in the Islamization factor.

2.1.2. The variables

This section will explain why the particular independent and dependent variables are used for the purpose of this research and how they have been operationalized. Since the study aims to test and revise Schiff's concordance theory, the variables and their operationalization will be based on her research. The additional factor of Islamization will be explained as well.

The independent variable in this study is the level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry of Pakistan and Turkey. According to Schiff, the level of concordance among the three actors shows the level of agreement among them on the role of the armed forces in a nation. Concordance is measured using four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style. Although these indicators have been used in the civil-military relations literature before the concordance theory as well, Schiff, in this theory, considers them within a wider historical and social context that "allows richer theoretical conclusions and enables better evaluation of empirical case

studies.”¹⁶ Taken within the context of historical and cultural realities, the indicators determine if the relations among the three partners will take the form of integration, separation or some other hybrid form. The four indicators will be elaborated further during the discussion of Schiff’s concordance theory.

The dependent variable in this research is the military coup outcome. Coup d’états symbolize the central problem of the “military exploiting their coercive strength to displace civilian rulers.”¹⁷ Under the category of coups, political scientists have examined two distinct questions: “on the one hand, the instance or frequency of coups (or coups attempted), and on the other hand, the probability that a coup will be successful.”¹⁸ This research focuses on the second one. As there are coup attempts in both the cases, the attempt is successful in Pakistan and unsuccessful in Turkey. It analyses if concordance among the military, political elites and citizenry, will increase or decrease the probability of a coup being successful. Furthermore, where a coup may indicate military strength, at least compared to the other political actors the military suppresses, “it can also indicate military weakness, reflecting the military’s inability to get what it wants through the normal political process.”¹⁹

In addition to the two variables, the level of Islamization in the military is also taken as a crucial factor in this research. It is considered an exogenous variable and comes in the second part of the thesis, when the level of concordance has been measured in both the selected cases. The level of Islamization is a continuous variable but based on the two cases, it can be divided into high level of Islamization and low level of Islamization in the military. Before delving further in the discussion, it is important to explain the concept of Islamization, particularly for this research. This study will focus on Islamization of education, rules and regulations, and social policies within the military. Throughout the relevant literature, there is no clear definition of Islamization as a process. However, Islamization is generally understood as imposition of *Sharia law* from the top, and of Islamic lifestyle from the bottom in various spheres of life. This research will take Islamization as this very basic process through which Islamic laws and practices are implemented and practised in a society or institution from the top as

¹⁶ Rebecca Schiff, “Civil-military relations reconsidered: A theory of concordance,” *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (1995): 14.

¹⁷ Feaver, “Civil-military relations 1,” 218.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

well as bottom. Hence, this concept is operationalized as attempts to strengthen credentials of students graduating from religious schools, recruitment process based on religious grounds, the promotion of Islamic curricula in military academies, an increased representation of Islamists in military bureaucracies, sanctioning of specific ‘un-Islamic’ social practices, and encouraging the practice of certain Islamic customs.²⁰ Along with the level of Islamization, there is also the distinction between overt and covert ways of Islamization. Overt Islamization is adopting the above-mentioned practices openly as in the case of Pakistani military whereas covert Islamization is adopting these practices secretly, without making it obvious, as done by the Gülenist movement within the Turkish military. High Islamization is when these practices are very common in the military as in the case of Pakistan and low Islamization is when it does not take place very frequently as in the case of Turkey.

For the purpose of this study, Islamization is taken as part of the ‘culture’ which is the focus of Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory. According to Schiff, CMR of a country can be understood better by respecting and recognizing that the historical, cultural, and political context is different in each country.²¹ Moreover, the concordance theory also focuses on the society of a country as well in CMR, rather than taking it only as a relationship between the military and political elites. In the cases of both Pakistan and Turkey, the political, cultural, and especially religious contexts play a very important role in the way military, political elites and the society interact with each other. Taking on from the importance of culture in CMR, I argue that Islamization in the military must also contribute significantly, given the contrasting historical, cultural and political contexts of the two selected cases.

2.2. Data Collection and Analysis

This comparative cases study generally follows a qualitative approach and the research methods have been chosen accordingly. The data used in this research is entirely secondary data. However, data collection of major secondary sources will be described to check the validity and reliability of the sources. As this thesis aims to reanalyse the findings of concordance theory proposed by Rebecca Schiff, it changes the time period

²⁰ Juris Pucpenoks, “Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: lessons for the post-Arab Spring Muslim world,” *The Middle East Journal* 66, no. 2 (2012).

²¹ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 18.

of analysis (in the case of Pakistan) and adds a case study (Turkey).²² This may fall in the category of ‘reanalysis’ as the research problem of concordance theory is analysed using additional data – a different time period for Pakistan, and an additional case study of Turkey.²³

The research uses published secondary data including public records, government publications, journals, survey results, interview excerpts, and ethnographic research. Regarding the case of Pakistani military, unique data mobilized by Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz addressing the Pakistan Army’s geographical recruitment base has been used. Although I emailed the authors regarding the availability of data, I did not receive any response. Hence, I used their findings and analysis as part of my secondary data. The data used was acquired by Shuja Nawaz in spreadsheet form from the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi as part of a historical account of the Pakistan Army. The spreadsheet catalogues the annual number of officers recruited from specific districts between 1970 and 2005. Although the authenticity of the records cannot be verified independently, general features of the data do accord with the general literature on the Pakistan Army.²⁴

In addition to this, World Values Surveys has also been used to analyse the variable of ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ in the armed forces for both Pakistan and Turkey. Nevertheless, this data is limited in exploring various other aspects of public opinion regarding the armed forces and civil-military relations in general. I have also used survey findings and analysis of Zeki Sarigil based on a public opinion survey, aimed at “identifying and analysing societal attitude toward the military and civil–military issues.”²⁵ The survey was implemented through face-to-face interviews in early October 2011 with a nationwide, representative sample of 2,775 respondents, with the sample constructed by using a multistage, stratified cluster-sampling technique.²⁶ This research also utilizes data collected by Metin Gurcan through survey as well as semi-structured in-depth

²² Paul S. Herrnson, “Replication, verification, secondary analysis, and data collection in political science,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 28, no. 3 (1995): 452-455.

²³ David Wästerfors, Malin Åkerström, and Katarina Jacobsson, “Reanalysis of qualitative data,” *The SAGE handbook of qualitative data analysis* (2014): 467-480.

²⁴ For detailed discussion of the data handling and analysis, refer to Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, “The changing Pakistan army officer corps,” *Journal of Strategic Studies, Forthcoming* (2010).

²⁵ Zeki Sarigil, “Public opinion and attitude toward the military and democratic consolidation in Turkey,” *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (2015): 291.

For detailed information on the survey and its findings, refer to the article.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

interviews with the focus group of 80 serving officers in the Turkish Armed Forces. Gurcan conducts the survey with the help of a group of Point of Contacts (POCs), who can create a network of officers to fill out the questionnaires. This strategy ensures a ‘trusted’ interaction between the PoC, or the surveyor, and the participating officers.²⁷ Other sources of secondary data include Statistical Yearbooks of Turkey,²⁸ Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (modified up to May 2018), Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (modified up to 2017), Government of Pakistan Economic Surveys, Annual Polity IV dataset,²⁹ publications and reports on official military websites, and other historical and statistical documents as well as scholarly journals and literature review articles.

With regard to Islamization in the military, books and articles of experts in this field have been used for secondary data. Moreover, since articles in scholarly journal usually undergo a peer review, other experts in the same field review the content of the article for accuracy, originality, and relevance. These books and articles include both primary and secondary analyses by the authors using interviews, surveys, questionnaires, personal accounts of soldiers, news reports, military academies’ curricula, and personal experiences (several authors have previously served in the military). Although verifying a vast set of primary and secondary data would be a time-consuming and challenging task, the rigorous review process through which these articles go ensures their accuracy and reliability profoundly.

2.3. Limitations of the Study

Although the thesis aims to achieve accurate and reliable results, there are several limitations of this study. The most conspicuous one is limited access to the data. It is a common issue discussed by most of the scholars in the field of civil-military relations. Due to the paucity of concrete data in the cases of both Pakistan and Turkey, there is limited scholarship available on the subjects of recruitment patterns, social backgrounds of the military officers, their political ideologies, and Islamization in the

²⁷ For detailed discussion of the data collection and analysis, refer to Metin Gürcan, “Opening the blackbox: the transformation of the Turkish military,” PhD diss. (Bilkent University, 2016).

²⁸ *Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı* 1983 (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1983) State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, Turkey, 1983.

²⁹ This dataset categorizes political regimes on a scale from -10 to +10. Countries that score -6 and below are coded as autocracies and those with a score of +10 as (full) democracies.

military. This could be a result of lack of trust between the military and the academicians, lack of a public national security strategy, as well as limited access after nuclear proliferation in Pakistan in the early 1990s. This limitation in data collection and lack of primary sources are evident in this research, especially with regard to examining Islamization in the military. Overcoming this problem was beyond the scope of this research and hence would require improved research strategies overall in the field. Nevertheless, employing a variety of secondary sources using multiple and differing data collection and analysis techniques, as done in this study, might reduce the negative impact of this limitation on the research. Another limitation is lack of research on the Islamization factor in military and its impact on civil-military relations, particularly of Muslim-majority democracies. There is an inadequate amount of primary and secondary data concerning Islamization in the military and therefore, the part of the research focusing on this phenomenon, could not be elaborated significantly. However, this issue is also an opportunity for further research on the subject, particularly in terms of collecting primary data, though that is a challenge on its own. Furthermore, the 2016 coup attempt as a case study might be considered a premature effort as the issue is still controversial and the debate surrounding it unresolved, however, it is a critical case from the perspective of concordance since the civilians were actively involved in the proceedings.

It is also important to highlight the methodological weaknesses of the concordance model that requires modification. For example, it treats the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry as blocks rather than heterogeneous actors. In practice, it is very difficult to neatly divide these three entities in civil-military relations.³⁰ There have always been internal divergences preventing them from being treated as blocks. Although the officer corps have been considered a fixed variable in most of the research, particularly in the Turkish case, they may also reflect the political divergences ongoing in the society.³¹ To overcome this issue, more research has to be directed to explore the inner side of these groups and institutions. This fallacy is also possible in comparative research with the assumption that a country is a homogenous unit.³² In my

³⁰ John M. Anderson, *Civil-military relations and concordance theory: a case study of Argentina* (Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA, 1998), 30.

³¹ Mustafa Uluçakar and Ali Çağlar, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Turkey," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 14, no. 55 (2017): 54.

³² B. Guy Peters, "The logic of comparison," in *Comparative Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1998), 44.

study, I do not claim that either or both of my cases are homogenous units and neither is that assumption present. While comparing the extraneous variables which are similar across the two cases, it is mentioned that two countries have Muslim majority but they also have other religious sects as well as different attitudes towards religion; there are ethnic, religious, and ideological cleavages mainly because they are not homogenous societies. The reason that this serves as an advantage in this research and not a weakness is that the factors that make the two cases non-homogenous are similar across Pakistan and Turkey. Hence, the non-homogeneity in the two cases actually helps us understand that although sectarian and ethnic differences among nations impact their CMR, the impacts across the two countries might be quite similar.

With regard to the limitation of the methodology used, although MSSD is a feasible and appropriate option for my research design strategy and case selection, there could be a few shortcomings of adopting this design as well. Firstly, as highlighted by Peters in his book *Comparative Politics*, MSSD may eliminate a number of possible explanations, but it also admits and fails to address a large number.³³ It will never be possible to keep constant all potential explanatory factors.³⁴ Any MSSD model may suffer from the problem of ‘many variables, small number of cases’;³⁵ however, by keeping extraneous variance as constant as possible in my research study, I have tried to minimize the negative impact of this problem. Hence, in order to control extraneous variance, we must try to identify all the relevant factors that can produce differences among systems.³⁶ As is the case with most of the comparative research, it is almost impossible to control all the extraneous variables in a cross-national analysis, especially when comparing only two cases. However, as discussed earlier, I have tried to demonstrate that most (if not all) extraneous variables which are relevant to CMR are similar across Pakistan and Turkey. Limitations of the study also include the conflicts arising from cultural bias and other personal issues in surveys, interviews, and questionnaires. As I have not conducted these qualitative data collection methods myself, the secondary analysis by the scholars whose data I have used highlight this

³³ Peters, “The logic of comparison,” 38.

³⁴ Theodore W. Meckstroth, ‘Most similar systems’ and ‘most different systems’: a study in the logic of comparative inquiry,” *Comparative Political Studies* 8, no. 2 (1975): 134; B. Guy Peters, *Comparative politics: Theory and methods* (NYU Press, 1998), 38-39.

³⁵ Arend Lijphart, “Comparative politics and the comparative method,” *The American political science review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 685.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

problem clearly. Various efforts have been made by individual scholars to minimize the negative impact of this limitation by maximizing the accuracy, reliability, and verifiability of the results.³⁷



³⁷ For details, refer to the articles' methodology sections cited in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Civil-military relations have been the focus of research mainly after Samuel P. Huntington's book *The Soldier and the State* was published in 1957. Most of the subsequent research on the topic has been a discussion or critique of Huntington's work. Where Huntington's theory of separation –also known as institutional theory– emphasizes on the 'objective civilian control' of the military with a general separation of the military and civilian government, Morris Janowitz brings up the element of active interconnectedness between the civil society and the military.³⁸ Although the works of Huntington and Janowitz differ on multiple grounds, they both advocate civilian control of the military in one form or another. Rebecca Schiff, on the other hand, shifts the focus of the civil-military relations' literature to 'partnership' instead of 'control' and argues that the most effective solution to the civil-military problematique is a cooperative relationship among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry.³⁹ Although this chapter will review the main literature on civil-military relations, the focus will remain on the feasibility, effectiveness, and applicability of Schiff's concordance theory for this research. Moreover, the chapter will also elaborate on the key concepts used in this research and their multiple definitions, and will discuss what different CMR theories say about the relationship between these concepts.

This thesis aims to test the applicability of Schiff's theory of concordance to the cases of Pakistan and Turkey, by replacing the likelihood of domestic military intervention with the successful outcome of the intervention, and with the additional factor of Islamization in the military of each country. The concordance theory claims that the type of government, whether democracy or autocracy, does not affect the applicability of the theory. According to Schiff, it is more important and relevant to identify "the

³⁸ Morris Janowitz, *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait* (Simon and Schuster, 2017).

³⁹ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*.

elites who represent the government and have direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces. Thus, cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchs are all possible forms of governmental elites.”⁴⁰ Nevertheless, both Pakistan and Turkey can be counted as democracies, though weak and flawed, which could increase the probability of concordance among the three distinct partners – the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. Since this study involves concepts and terminologies with multiple definitions, it is crucial to first discuss them.

3.1. Key Concepts

This section will discuss some important concepts for this research including culture, Islamization, coup d'état, Muslim-majority (weak) democracy, Islamic/secular constitution, and non-secular/Islamic civilian government.

3.1.1. Culture

According to Rebecca Schiff's theory of concordance, culture forms an important part of the civil-military relations in any country.⁴¹ More importantly, the theory argues that since each country possesses its own institutional and cultural attributes, the 'formula' for effective civil-military relations is different for each country. Although Schiff does not define the concept of culture clearly in her book, her four indicators of analysis represent the parameters she evaluates the culture on. The social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style vary from country to country based on the norms, values, and customs of that country as well as the relationship between the military and the society. Hence, according to Schiff, social and institutional conditions vary from culture to culture and so do civil-military relations. Similar to Schiff's approach, O'Donnell and Schmitter also argue that the fundamental factor determining the civil-military relationships is the perception of the military in the society.⁴² For example, if the majority of a society considers its army as guardian of state and respects its decisions more than the civilian

⁴⁰ Ibid., 44.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

government, the military might find itself in a more dominant position, affecting the civil-military relations.

Nevertheless, since the thesis will elaborate how Islamization is categorized as a part of culture, it is important to clearly define culture as well. There are plenty of definitions of culture in the literature and they mostly focus on the beliefs and practices acquired by a society. The anthropologist Edward Tylor defines culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, [etc.] and any other capacities acquired by man as a member of society.”⁴³ A more specific and detailed definition of culture is given by Kroeber and Kluckhohn in the following words.

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.⁴⁴

Taking these definitions of culture in account, it is essential to note that even if there are similar cultures across different states, the culture pertaining to specific national values and customs is unique to every nation. Considering this notion from the view of this thesis, citizens of a country could be recruited into the military with preferences based on their religion, sect, ethnicity, or level of religiosity, depending on the culture of that country. Similarly, the military style of a country including uniforms, rituals such as parades and saluting, and traditions come from and reflect the culture as well. The subsequent chapters will discuss in detail the importance of culture, Islamization in particular as a part of culture, in shaping civil-military relations of a country.

3.1.2. Islamization

Just as there are different variants of Islam among the Muslim-majority countries and beyond, there are different forms of Islamization as well. However, since this research focuses on the concept of Islamization as one of the variables, it is essential to clearly define this phenomenon. Based on the type and aim of research, the concept of Islamization has been defined differently by scholars and hence, Islamization of the military would differ from Islamization of the law, for example. Nevertheless, it is also

⁴³ Edward Burnett Tylor, *Primitive culture* (New York, NY: Harper, 1958), 1.

⁴⁴ Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions* (Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum, 1952), 181.

crucial to highlight that this thesis focuses on both Islamization in the military and of the military as an institution and this changes the approach to defining the concept as well. General literature on Islamization concerning the military has focused on reshaping the beliefs, codes, and rituals of the military based on the Islamic beliefs and practices.⁴⁵ This comes under the Islamization of military as an institution and forms the major chunk of this thesis. However, considering the dependent variable in this research i.e. coup, it must be noted that Islamization in the military is also crucial to understanding the relationship. Literature in the field hardly distinguishes between the two processes but Islamization in the military can be presented as a process at a deeper level when the Islamization of the institution gradually leads to Islamization of the military individuals, their families, and their discourse as well. Islamization of the military as an institution is a wider and broader phenomenon involving the specific beliefs and practices whereas Islamization in the military highlights the impact of those changes on the individuals. This thesis will look at both types of Islamization and their combined effect on the level of concordance in civil-military relations. Hence, the concept of Islamization will be defined accordingly.

Islamization has been used by scholars interchangeably with Arabization, Muslimization, Shariatization, and also Talibanization.⁴⁶ According to Julian Lee, Islamization refers to “the process of instilling and creating that which is in ostensible accord with orthodox conservative Islam.”⁴⁷ Michael Buehler⁴⁸ and Arskal Salim⁴⁹, on the other hand, link Islamization to the adoption of Sharia. According to Salim, Shariatization is “a process of certain measures and campaigns, regardless of the identity of the advocates and the motives behind the actions, that call for the establishment of what are regarded as Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political, and

⁴⁵ Charles H. Kennedy, “Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989,” *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 1 (1990): 62-77, accessed June 2, 2021, doi:10.2307/2759814.

⁴⁶ Andrey Korotayev, “Parallel-Cousin (FBD) Marriage, Islamization, and Arabization,” *Ethnology* 39, no. 4 (2000): 395–407, doi:10.2307/3774053; Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007); Mark Lindley-Highfield, “‘Muslimization,’ Mission, and Modernity in Morelos: The Problem of a Combined Hotel and Prayer Hall for the Muslims of Mexico,” *Tourism Culture & Communication* 8, no. 2 (2008): 85–96; Farzana Shaikh, “From Islamisation to Shariatisation: Cultural Transnationalism in Pakistan,” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (2008): 593–609.

⁴⁷ Julian C. H. Lee, *Islamization and Activism in Malaysia* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 19.

⁴⁸ Michael Buehler, *The politics of shari'a law: islamist activists and the state in democratizing Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1.

⁴⁹ Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia* (University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 45.

social systems.”⁵⁰ Farzana Shaikh opines differently and connotes that there is dissimilitude between the leaders and supporters of Islamization and Shariatization; where Islamization’s major promoters are statist modernizing groups, Shariatization’s main proponents are non-Westernized groups, such a clerics.⁵¹ However, as Raja M. Ali Saleem argues in his book *State, Nationalism, and Islamization*, it is hard to accept that Islamization of government can be undertaken without the help of clerics and that Shariatization can be achieved without the help of the state.⁵² Similarly, there is a variety of other definitions of Islamization falling in this spectrum and hardly out of it. For the purpose of this research, the concept of Islamization is understood as defined by Salim, and Islamization of the military will be taken as implementation of Islamic doctrines within the institution. Although the Islamic doctrines are different for Turkish and Pakistani militaries and will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, the implementation methods observed are similar across the two institutions. These methods will be explored in the operationalization of Islamization.

3.1.3. Coups

In this research, the outcome of domestic military intervention is the dependent variable; however, the focus remains primarily on the coup outcome. Symbolizing the central problem of the military exploiting their coercive strength to displace civilian rulers, coups have been the traditional focus of civil-military relations. Although looking at coups only can underestimate military influence and other ways in which military ‘intervenes’, they do serve as a clear and definite instance of domestic military intervention. Moreover, since this research focuses on Schiff’s concordance theory which mainly studies intervention with force, coup is the most appropriate choice for this particular study.

A coup d’état is defined by Welch as “a sharp, clear event, easy to date and (if successful) possible to document.”⁵³ However, there are also other criteria to label an event as coup. A coup is identified by its target as well. The primary target of a coup is the state’s leader and thus, only the attempts to overthrow the chief executive are

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Shaikh, “From Islamisation to Shariatisation.”

⁵² Raja M. Ali Saleem, *State, Nationalism, and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan* (Springer, 2017), 16.

⁵³ Claude Welch, *Soldiers and State in Africa* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 1.

considered.⁵⁴ Hence, by using this target of the coup, it is separated from less extreme mechanism of pressuring the leadership. Another criterion to define coup is the type of perpetrators. Although Finer limits perpetrators to ‘the armed forces’⁵⁵, coups may also be undertaken by any elite who is part of the state apparatus. However, for this particular study, since the aim is to analyse relations between the military and the civilian government, civilian members of government will not be considered as part of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, non-civilian members of the military and security forces may be included. Finally, a coup is also defined by the tactics used in the act. There are two important factors to be considered in regard to tactics used to overthrow the leader. First, the activity must be illegal.⁵⁶ This factor might overlook the political pressure on the leadership. The second tactic focuses on the claim that coups must be ‘illegally’ undertaken.⁵⁷ For the purpose of this research, coups which are both illegal and illegally undertaken are taken into account.

3.1.4. Concordance

In this research, concordance refers to agreement among the three social actors – the military, the political elites, and the citizenry – with respect to a set of indicators defining the civil-military relations of a country.⁵⁸ These indicators comprise the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. Since this research is testing Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory’s applicability to two Muslim-majority democracies – Pakistan and Turkey – the concept of concordance is defined as presented in the theory. There is high concordance in civil-military relations of a country if there is a general acceptance of the three actors on these indicators.

⁵⁴ Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (March 2011): 250, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397436>.

⁵⁵ Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 23.

⁵⁶ Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset,” 251.

⁵⁷ Patrick J. McGowan, “African military coups d’état, 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 339–370.

⁵⁸ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*.

3.1.5. Muslim-majority (weak) democracy

A Muslim-majority democracy does not necessarily mean an Islamic democracy such as the theo-democracy in Iran in which Islam and Islamic values are constitutionally privileged and mandated, and where elections serve only to elect the executive while the legislative function remains subordinate to the Sharia. It is merely a democracy in which the majority of the population is Muslim. However, it is essential to define democracy for the purpose of this research. Since neither Pakistan nor Turkey is a full-fledged democracy and are both categorized as weak democracies in the periods analysed, only the minimum threshold for democracy is looked for which comprises universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information.⁵⁹ However, as Schiff explains, concordance theory examines the conditions that are likely to result in military overthrow of forms of domestic military intervention; the type of government that keeps the military in check or creates a partnership with it may be democratic, or authoritarian, or fall somewhere in between on a continuum of political development and societal concordance.⁶⁰ Moreover, Muslim-majority states have been chosen for comparative case analysis because in these cases, Islamization would have a powerful connection with the society and its culture as well, which forms the basis of concordance theory. The Muslims form 99 per cent of the population in Turkey⁶¹ and 96 per cent of the population in Pakistan.⁶²

3.1.6. Islamic/Secular constitution

Islamic constitutionalism emerged in various countries at different times. Its emergence in Pakistan took place right after the country's independence in 1947 and till now, Pakistan has a constitution based on the major Islamic doctrines. Hence, a constitution following the main principles of Islam and the Sharia is considered Islamic constitution. In the case of Pakistan's Islamic constitution, the 'repugnancy clause'⁶³ embodies the

⁵⁹ Morlino Leonardo, "What is a 'good' democracy?," *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004), 10-32, doi: 10.1080/13510340412331304589.

⁶⁰ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 46.

⁶¹ "Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions," *European Commission*, January 13, 2021, <https://bit.ly/2TCS1b1>.

⁶² "Population by religion," *Pakistan Bureau of Statistics*, May 26, 2021, <https://bit.ly/2SR1CRW>.

⁶³ The term comes from the British colonial policy of recognition of native, customary law so long as it was not "repugnant" to constitutional and statutory law.

idea of Sharia as a limitation to legislation stating that “no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah.”⁶⁴ On the other hand, secular constitution reinforces the separation of religion and the state. According to José Casanova, secularization includes three elements: the increasing structural differentiation of social spaces resulting in the separation of religion from politics, economy, science, and so on; the privatization of religion within its own sphere; and the declining social significance of religious belief, commitment, and institutions.⁶⁵ Adopting a secular national identity, Turkey’s constitution is also secular with the institutional separation of religious and political domains being a generally accepted norm in Turkey. Hence, the basic principle of the Turkish Republic as defined by the 1982 Constitution is that “Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law.”⁶⁶ However, as this thesis will show, Islam still forms an important part of Turkey’s culture and historical experiences with its powerful symbolic and cultural role in the constitution of societal relations and social identity formations of the Turkish people;⁶⁷ and thus, cannot be disregarded when it comes to the partnership between the military, political elites, and citizenry.

3.1.7. Non-secular/Islamic civilian government

For the purpose of this research, non-secular and Islamic civilian government are used interchangeably. Islamic civilian government is simply the government supporting, advocating, and imposing elements of Sharia through laws, values, and norms, and non-secular government, if not actively, passively supports these practices as well. However, since there are different variants of Islamic doctrines even within a society, governments use specific forms of Islamization which support their political and sometimes, even personal agendas. In the case of Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) seems to have followed completely different trajectories in its three terms in office. AKP’s self-identification as a ‘conservative democratic’ party rather than an Islamist one had received suspicion from the opposition; however, till 2008, AKP did

⁶⁴ Pakistan Const. (1956) art. 205, sec. 1.

⁶⁵ Talal Asad, “Religion, nation-state, secularism,” *Nation and religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* 17896 (1999), 178.

⁶⁶ Ayla Göl, “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular,” *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (2009), 806, doi: 10.1080/01436590902867383.

⁶⁷ Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Icdygu, *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions, Turkish Experiences* (London: Routledge, 2005).

emphasize and represent the themes of democracy, national will, people power, and economic development.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, with time, AKP seemed to follow an Islamist agenda when it became clear that religion had started transforming many areas such as the media, the Kurdish issue, foreign policy, gender issues, and the implementation of the rule of law.⁶⁹ Hence, this thesis will consider AKP's government as non-secular or (de facto) Islamic since 2002. In the case of Pakistan, no Islamic political party has won a majority in general elections in spite of the country's Islamic political ideology and constitution. Nevertheless, it is difficult to label any major political party secular as the most secular and progressive parties – Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) – could not defy the constitution based on the Islamic doctrines. Hence, the two political parties in power from 1988-1999 (PPP and PMLN) are identified as non-secular in this research.

3.2. Civil-Military Relations Literature

The literature on civil-military relations revolves around the civil-military problematique, a simple paradox in which “the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.”⁷⁰ This problematique is complicated because it requires balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war and must be always ready even if it is never used.⁷¹ The size of the military should be enough to meet any threats confronting the polity and thus, the protection force of the country cannot be vitiated to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military institution would be dangerous for the country by inviting outside aggression but not being strong enough to defend against their predations, and by giving false confidence to the leaders.⁷² On the other hand, the military must also conduct itself so as not to “destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect.”⁷³ Since the military has coercive power to use against the enemy, it can also use it against the community

⁶⁸ Ihsan Dagi, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: Turkey's AKP in Power,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008): 27, doi:10.1353/jod.0.0015; Hasan Turunc, “Islamicist or Democratic? The AKP's Search for Identity in Turkish Politics,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 15, no. 1 (2007), 79-91, doi: 10.1080/14782800701273417.

⁶⁹ M. Hakan Yavuz and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, “Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdoğan,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 19, no. 1 (2019), 1-9, doi: 10.1080/14683857.2019.1580828.

⁷⁰ Feaver, “Civil-military relations 1,” 214.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

that created it. Human history is filled with instances where militaries are involved in direct seizures of political power and this is the traditional worry of civil-military relations theory. Making the military too powerful could also involve the military draining country's resources in a quest for ever greater strength, the military pushing the country into unnecessary wars, or simply disobeying the civilian authority and pursuing its own interests. Hence, the civilian government must be strong enough to protect the citizens but again, not strong enough to become tyrannical. Therefore, the tension between the two desiderata is inherent in any civilization.⁷⁴ In democracies, this tension is acute as they involve designated political agents controlling designated military agents where the hierarchy of de jure authority favours civilians over the military. Hence, even if the military is best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat, it would be the civilian who can set the level of acceptable risk for the society even if it does not possess the relevant expertise.⁷⁵ The military can only assess the risk and suggest, but only the civilian government judges and is authorized to take any action. The two desiderata – protection by the military and protection from the military – are almost always in tension because “efforts to assure the one complicate efforts to assure the other.”⁷⁶ Fighting persistently against the enemies can bankrupt the country while minimizing the strength of the military can leave the society vulnerable to external threats. Different theories of civil-military relations seek that perfect balance between the two extremes; however, between the battlefield defeat and military coup, there are many other ways the military can impose its will on the civilian authority indirectly adding to the worries of democracies as well as the civil-military theorists.

The whole literature on civil-military relations generally addresses the problematique discussed above, in one way or another. The modern intellectual history generally dates to the pre-World War II literature on antimilitarism, especially Vagts⁷⁷ and Lasswell⁷⁸. After that, the second large wave of literature came with the onset of the Cold War, as American social scientists debated the need for a permanent and large standing army considering America's traditional suspicions of the threats to liberty posed by standing

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Robert Dahl, *Controlling Nuclear Weapons* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

⁷⁶ Feaver, “Civil-military relations 1,” 215.

⁷⁷ Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession* (New York: Norton, 1937).

⁷⁸ Harold D. Lasswell, “The garrison state and specialists on violence,” *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941), 455–468.

armies.⁷⁹ Huntington's landmark study, *The Soldier and the State* (1957), was a continuation of this debate as well and what has been written since has been an explicit or implicit response to his argument. Huntington's contribution to CMR literature comes in the form of the theory of separation which supports the separation of the military institution and the civilian authority. Offering a now-classic description of the military mind – conservative, realistic, and pessimistic about human nature – he prescribes 'objective control' as the optimum form of civil-military relations.⁸⁰ This form of civilian control is achieved by maximizing the professionalism of the officer corps with the subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.⁸¹ According to Huntington, there should be a balance in the civil-military relations which is attained when on the one hand, the statesman acknowledges "the integrity of the [military] profession and its subject matter" and on the other, the military officer remains "neutral politically" and accepts "political guidance from the statesman."⁸²

Huntington and many other social scientists to follow have focused on 'controlling' the military and this comes in two forms: objective and subjective. Where subjective civilian control relies on shared outlook and common modes of thought between civilian and military authorities, objective civilian control demands clear-cut boundaries between civilian and military authorities.⁸³ The former requires a maximization of civilian power whereas the latter needs "recognition of autonomous military professionalism".⁸⁴ In order to understand the importance of concordance theory for this research, it is essential to trace back to how the civil-military relations literature was shaped and what remained constant in spite of numerous theoretical and structural changes. Huntington, in his book, highlights four main aspects of civil-military relations. First, he suggests that military officers and civilians constitute two

⁷⁹ Jerome Gregory Kerwin, *Civil-Military Relationships in American Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Harold D Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950); Arthur A Jr. Ekirch, *The Civilian and the Military* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Charles Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield and Harry Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1958).

⁸⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations* (Harvard University Press, 1981).

⁸¹ David E. Albright, "A comparative conceptualization of civil-military relations," *World politics* 32, no. 4 (1980): 554.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

distinct groups.⁸⁵ However, the relations between these groups are inherently conflictual in nature. In order to constrain the conflict, the officer corps must be subordinated to civilians except on matters requiring military expertise. Finally, he perceives eventual shifts in civil-military relations as a function of the degree of effectiveness of civilian control.⁸⁶ Huntington focuses on military professionalism as a guarantee of objective civilian control; however, it must be recognized that the army is also sometimes deliberately politicized in order to establish civilian control.⁸⁷ Moreover, professional soldiers also tend to develop characteristic political ideas and are prone to “the politics of wanting to be above politics” which might result in professionalism making the military less rather than more responsive to military control.⁸⁸

After Huntington, the field of civil-military relations split along two distinct tracks. The first track was a sociologically oriented examination of the military, starting in the United States and then extending to other parts of the world. The extensive amount of literature focusing on Huntington’s work is followed by hundreds of studies examining Morris Janowitz’s landmark study, *The Professional Soldier*⁸⁹ which focuses on the relationship between society and the armed forces.⁹⁰ Janowitz is known as the founder of American military sociology who takes a different tack from Huntington, proposing a ‘constabulary’ model for the military officers with an increasing resemblance to

⁸⁵ Huntington, *The soldier and the state*; Albright, “A comparative conceptualization of civil-military relations,” 555.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ A. Robin Luckham, “A comparative typology of civil-military relations,” *Government and Opposition* (1971): 6.

⁸⁸ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of the New Nations* (Chicago, 1964), 63-64.

⁸⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, IL, 1960).

⁹⁰ Charles C. Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military* (New York: Russell Sage Found, 1970); Charles C. Moskos, *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1971); Arthur D. Larson, “Military professionalism and civil control: a comparative analysis of two interpretations,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2 (1974):57–72; David R. Segal, John Blair, Frank Newport, and Susan Stephens, “Convergence, isomorphism, and interdependence at the civil-military interface,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2 (1974):157–172; Sam Charles Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975); David R. Segal, “Civil-military relations in the mass public,” *Armed Forces Sociology* 1 (1975): 215-229; Jerald G. Bachman, John David Blair and David R. Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977); Charles C. Moskos, “From institution to occupation: trends in the military organization,” *Armed Forces Sociology* 4, no. 1 (1977):41–50; Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brasse, 1988); Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988); James Burk, “Morris Janowitz and the origins of sociological research on armed forces and society,” *Armed Forces Sociology* 19, no. 2 (1993): 167–186.

police forces.⁹¹ Just as the police forces organize and apply violence in tightly controlled and limited circumstances while retaining close links with the society they protect, the officership has undergone a fundamental transition on a similar track. Although Janowitz agrees with Huntington on the importance of professionalism among the military officers, he argues that perfect professionalism is impossible.⁹² Moreover, Janowitz “understood civilian control in terms of societal control rather than state or institutional control” and societal control, measured in part as integration with society, was his normative and empirical focus.⁹³ According to him, the military officer is subject to civilian control not only because of “self-imposed professional standards,” but also because of a “meaningful integration with civilian values.”⁹⁴ The second track is an institutionally-oriented examination of postcolonial civil-military relations in developing countries dominated by Finer,⁹⁵ Huntington,⁹⁶ Stepan,⁹⁷ Perlmutter,⁹⁸ Welch,⁹⁹ and Nordlinger,¹⁰⁰ focusing mainly on the problem of coups. This track further led to a number of specialty literature based on civil-military relations in specific contexts such as in communist regimes,¹⁰¹ in ethnically divided polities,¹⁰² in

⁹¹ Eliot A. Cohen, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,” in *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997): 220-221.

⁹² Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, “Beyond ‘the soldier and the state’-the theoretical framework of elite civil-military relations,” (PhD diss., The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013), 12.

⁹³ Peter D. Feaver, “The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control,” *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 166.

⁹⁴ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 420.

⁹⁵ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*.

⁹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

⁹⁷ Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁹⁸ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁹⁹ Claude Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military* (New York: State University New York Press, 1976).

¹⁰⁰ Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

¹⁰¹ Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); Dale R. Herspring (ed.) *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978); Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); C. Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948–1983: Uncertain Allegiance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Dale R. Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

¹⁰² Donald Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes,¹⁰³ and so on. The dependent variables, however, have not been limited to coups with an increased focus on military influence, where the military is powerful enough to influence without intervening directly. Nordlinger invented a tripartite typology of praetorianism, comprising moderators, guardians, and rulers in order to measure the military influence variable.¹⁰⁴ However, this typology does not capture the covert ways in which the military can shape government actions. Introducing a superior gauge of influence, Stepan explicitly includes military behaviour short of insubordination by force by tracing prerogatives through 11 issue areas ranging from defence policy to the legal system.¹⁰⁵ Colton, on the other hand, offers an even more sensitive operationalization of military influence by distinguishing between four types of policy issues over which the military exercises influence (internal, institutional, intermediate, and societal) and by distinguishing between the four means used (official prerogative, expert advice, political bargaining, and force).¹⁰⁶

It is paramount to this discussion to analyse some of the main aspects of critique on Huntington's theory of separation as it is from there that Rebecca Schiff's theory of concordance takes its form. Most of the literature on civil-military relations swings between 'objective control' and 'subjective control', focusing on the separation of the




Figure 1 Direct civilian control policies based on degree of civilian meddling
Source: Clemmensen, 2013

military institution and civilian authority in both cases, as shown in figure 1.¹⁰⁷ However, especially among advanced democracies, subjective control is rarely

¹⁰³ Alain Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, transl. PE Sigmund, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Jendayi E. Frazer, "Sustaining civilian control in Africa: the use of armed counterweights in regime stability" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1994); Felipe Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

¹⁰⁴ Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*.

¹⁰⁵ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*.

¹⁰⁶ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*.

¹⁰⁷ Rahbek-Clemmensen, "Beyond 'the soldier and the state,'" 33.

considered an option and in this regard, Huntington does not analyse the key policy dilemma facing modern elite civil-military relations.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, subjective control is common among certain democracies, especially defected ones, in which civilian authority make appointments of top officers based on their political affiliation and fire and replace officers who have different values, or who are loyal to opposition factions.¹⁰⁹ This leads to civilianization of the military. Objective control, on the other hand, requires allowing the military a certain amount of autonomy within their own institution and control over tactical and operational details, which in turn ideally leads to minimum meddling in the civilian government decision-making processes.¹¹⁰ There is one more policy option between the subjective and objective controls, namely ‘assertive control’ which is “direct civilian supervision over the military, particularly over military operations [and tactics].”¹¹¹ An assertive control policy involves civilians meddling in tactical and operational decisions, but permits continued existence of an independent military organization, where appointments are based on merit rather than political connections.¹¹²

In addition to defining assertive control, Peter Feaver also presents an alternative theory of civilian control focusing on the roles of the institutional environment of the state and past strategic behaviour on how civil-military relations are shaped.¹¹³ He explains his principal-agent model empirically, using American Cold War and post-Cold War civil-military interaction as his cases; however, his framework can only be applied to elite relations, ignoring how other factors in society may affect these relations.¹¹⁴ Similarly, Eliot Cohen also criticizes Huntington’s lack of focus on matters of strategy and too much focus on a harmonious division of labour between the civilians and the military.¹¹⁵ During wartime, Cohen argues, war-leaders constantly meddled in the strategic details and drove their generals to the brink of exhaustion.¹¹⁶ Thus, rather than

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 127.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Peter D. Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians. Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 9.

¹¹² Rahbek-Clemmensen, “Beyond ‘the soldier and the state,” 128.

¹¹³ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

¹¹⁴ Rahbek-Clemmensen, “Beyond ‘the soldier and the state,” 42.

¹¹⁵ Cohen, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.”

¹¹⁶ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).

division of labour, civil-military relations is more of an Unequal Dialogue – “a constant and often messy discussion between soldiers and civilians, where the civilian leader retains the final authority to decide the political course.”¹¹⁷ Another critic of Huntington’s work, Michael Desch, presents a theory of civil-military relations that focuses on the role of the domestic and international threats facing a government on elite civil-military relations.¹¹⁸ Desch surveys some 20-odd cases from the 20th century and shows that “civilian control is weakened by the existence of internal threats, while external threats may – under the right circumstances – strengthen the civilian governments hold on power: civilian control is strongest, when the government is stable, yet faces an external threat.”¹¹⁹

This thesis cannot completely cover the vast literature on civil-military relations; however, it does show the major works on the subject which focus on civilian control of the military, in one way or another. Most of the dependent variables examined in the literature discussed, emphasize on how civilian control can be increased. This concentration on ‘control’ led to the introduction of concordance theory by Rebecca Schiff, which highlights the importance of partnership rather than competition for control or complete separation between the military institution and civilian authority. Although Schiff’s concordance theory may have similarities with Janowitz’s emphasis on convergence and a military more representative of the ideals and norms of civilian society, it goes beyond civilianization of the military and introduces a harmonious partnership not only between the military and the civilian authorities, but also with the citizenry. Although Schiff’s main goal is also minimizing domestic military intervention as of other theorists, she proposes a theory of partnership among the military, the political elite, and the citizenry, rather than rivalry.¹²⁰ Moreover, the role of cultural and historical experiences of a society also determines how that partnership is formed. If actors involved in civil-military relations share cultural values, significant conflict between them will not occur. The following subchapters will analyse Schiff’s concordance theory, its limitations, the role of Islamization in civil-military relations, and the conceptual framework of analysis of this thesis.

¹¹⁷ Rahbek-Clemmensen, “Beyond ‘the soldier and the state,’” 40.

¹¹⁸ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military. The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

¹¹⁹ Rahbek-Clemmensen, “Beyond ‘the soldier and the state,’” 43.

¹²⁰ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*.

3.3. Concordance Theory

According to Rebecca Schiff, the greatest weakness of separation theory is in the civil-military dichotomy – civil versus military.¹²¹ This theoretical approach also disregards cultural analysis and interpretation. Schiff's concordance theory, on the other hand, uses deductive causation or generalizations about the world that can be tested empirically while involving the culture of a particular society. The main proposition of concordance theory is that an agreement among the military, the political leadership and the citizenry regarding four indicators can help in avoiding domestic military intervention. These indicators include social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.¹²² Schiff defines the military as "the armed forces and the personnel"; the political elite as "cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, or monarchies"¹²³; and the citizenry as a nation's citizens. Although the basis of concordance theory is culture, Schiff does not label it as the sole explanatory factor. According to her, the range of causal conditions more or less likely to mitigate domestic intervention can be identified; however, those conditions cannot be predetermined "without reference to the social structures, culture, and values of a particular nation."¹²⁴ The civil-military relations literature contains identification of a number of explanatory factors for coups, military influence, civil-military friction, and other dependent variables, including external factors such as external threat and other external systemic factors¹²⁵ and internal factors including the nature of the domestic cleavages in society, internet threat, the nature of the domestic political system, the degree of professionalism in the officer corps, and the degree of institutionalization within civilian society.¹²⁶ However, as Schiff argues,

¹²¹ Ibid., 11.

¹²² Ibid., 13.

¹²³ Schiff, "Civil-military relations reconsidered: A theory of concordance," 14.

¹²⁴ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 14.

¹²⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*; Lasswell, "The garrison state and specialists on violence"; Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, "War and the survival of political leaders: a comparative study of regime types and political accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 841-856; Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy*.

¹²⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority*; Colton and Gustafson, *Soldiers and the Soviet State*; Finer, *The Man on Horseback*; Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective*; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*; Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*; Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*; Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America*; Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*; Stepan, *Rethinking*

these set of explanatory factors or conditions do not take historical and cultural analysis of a nation into account which is unique to every society. Civil-military relations requires real policy making and on-the-ground organization of military and political institutions; hence, fieldwork and cultural interpretation help in the development of critical skills and methods.¹²⁷ Concordance theory not only explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relations among the military, the political elites, and society, but also predicts that if the three partners agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur.¹²⁸

The application of separation model, primarily analysing and explaining the American civil-military relations, is limited when it comes to civil-military relations in the developing world. In addition to several other factors, the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations provide different challenges and opportunities to shape their civil-military relations. Moreover, the frequency of coups and other forms of military interventions is much higher in the developing countries. Although the concordance theory does not disregard the possible need for separations between the military and civilian authority, it argues that the three partners – the military, the political elites, and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship whether they agree on separation or shared roles. Schiff's main criticism is regarding the emphasis on 'control' in all previous major works on civil-military relations. The separation theory, agency theory,¹²⁹ and all other alternatives to these theories focus on controlling the military. Douglas L. Bland, on the other hand, does acknowledge the importance of culture and claims that the civil–military relationship is “maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers.”¹³⁰ However, according to Schiff, he ultimately also affirms the old separation argument for distinct civil and military institutions.¹³¹ Shifting the focus from 'control' to 'partnership', Schiff also attempts to shift the understanding of the military identity. Hence, concordance theory departs from a long-standing tradition in the field of civil-military

Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone; Vagts, *A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession*; Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*.

¹²⁷ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 16.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹²⁹ Civil–military relations is a game of strategic interaction.

Peter Feaver, “The civil–military gap in comparative perspective,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 2 (2003): 1-5.

¹³⁰ Douglas L. Bland, “A unified theory of civil–military relations,” *Armed Forces and Society* 26 (1999): 9, 21.

¹³¹ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 36.

relations with the presumption that militaries are not innately hostile and coercive institutions.¹³² Furthermore, discussing the explanatory factors for the prevention of domestic military intervention, Schiff also argues that although the external threat conditions can be critical to the role of military in a nation, it is ultimately concordance under any condition of threat that prevents domestic military intervention.¹³³ She supports this argument with the case of Israel whose entire socio-political dynamic is largely the result of high external threats but it was still concordance which has prevented domestic military intervention.¹³⁴

Since concordance theory analyses civil-military relations of a nation based on its unique cultural and historical experiences, each nation must be studied on its own merit in order to determine the success of concordance in preventing domestic military intervention, among the four indicators.¹³⁵ For example, the concept of professionalism, highlighted by Huntington and Janowitz, can be different depending on national cultures as well, as reflected in the Israeli “non-prim and sloppy-looking ZAHAL infantry uniform” which, in appearance, is opposite from Janowitz’s depiction of the professional American soldier.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, the ZAHAL uniform style is most appropriate to Israeli culture. Furthermore, in order to analyse the partnership among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry, it is important to understand that a nation can have various social groups across the spectrum of ethnic and religious lines who may recognize and relate to the military in vastly different ways. For example, the Buddhist monk community in Myanmar represents a religious group completely at odds with the armed forces.¹³⁷ Although the concordance theory emphasizes on the success of concordance in preventing domestic military intervention, the theory is limited by its causal objective of predicting the prevention or occurrence of domestic military intervention, though it does successfully predict its likelihood.¹³⁸ In contrast to the theory of separation which emphasizes on increasing the authority of the civil sphere over the military, the theory of concordance underlines the importance of dialogue,

¹³² Ibid., 39.

¹³³ Ibid., 41.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 41.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 38.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 42.

accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society.¹³⁹

Before bringing the Islamization factor into concordance theory, it is important to highlight and explain the main assumptions of the theory. Concordance theory, as mentioned above, argues that if there is an agreement among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry of a nation, regarding four indicators, domestic military intervention would be less likely in that country. Those four indicators are reflective of the cultural and historical experiences of a nation; hence, each nation's process of achieving concordance would be different. Regarding the military intervention, Schiff does not take coup d'état as the only form of it, though it is considered the most dramatic and newsworthy one. The coup is "the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government."¹⁴⁰ It must be noted that a coup is not always violent and does not involve the takeover of government by a sizable army; it is "a plan executed to seize power within the present system."¹⁴¹ In addition to coup, domestic military intervention could also be in the form of praetorianism which involves both 'oligarchical praetorianism' and 'middle-class praetorianism'. A praetorian society is a politicized society where exclusive social and political groups are in collusion with the military.¹⁴² In oligarchical praetorianism, dominant rulers are mainly from elite and wealthy segments of society, and as the military becomes the more dominant oligarchical group, it seeks to take power through a coup, which is comparable to a 'palace revolution.'¹⁴³ On the other hand, middle-class praetorianism involves a more broadly based army operating within a centralized state in which the officer corps ally with various social groups that have become dissatisfied with the ruling oligarchy. Unlike the 'palace revolt,' this involves a more violent attempt to take control and at some point, a conspiracy against the state develops resulting in a coup. Other forms of domestic military intervention can involve 'supplanting' or 'displacement' of a civilian regime by threatening or blackmailing the government.¹⁴⁴ Military gets involved in this form of intervention by threatening the government and refusing to defend it in case of a civil revolt or the military may be

¹³⁹ Ibid., 43.

¹⁴⁰ Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'état* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 26-27.

¹⁴¹ Luttwak, *Coup d'état*, 58-59.

¹⁴² Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 21.

¹⁴³ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 195-201.

¹⁴⁴ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 22.

politicized to such an extent that it becomes an integral part of the political system and may blackmail the regime using 'legitimate' procedures. In democracies, this threatening and blackmailing also takes the form of military influence through recommendations or control of the flow of information.¹⁴⁵

According to concordance theory, all these forms of domestic military intervention can be prevented if there is concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry of a nation. If the three partners agree on these four indicators and the role of military in them, the level of concordance would be high. The social composition of the officer corps is a primary indicator of concordance. The officer corps is generally responsible for the broad institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces, and consist of the career soldiers who are essential in defining the relationship of the military to the rest of society.¹⁴⁶ Since the officer corps act as leaders of the armed forces, they provide critical links between the citizenry and the military as well as between the military and the government. Even if the officer corps do not represent all the constituencies of the nation, concordance is still possible since the society and the military could agree on a less broadly representative corps. Schiff gives the examples of Israel where ultra-orthodox Jews are exempt from military service and India where the militarily skilled Sikh community comprising only 2.5 per cent of the population has at least a 10 per cent representation in the Indian officer corps; yet, there is agreement on the representation among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry.¹⁴⁷ Hence, the agreement on which communities should be more or less represented in the officer corps is more important than the fair representation of those communities.

The second indicator is the political decision-making process which involves the institutional organs of society that play an important role in determining the military budget, material, military size, and structure.¹⁴⁸ Again, the government can be democratic or authoritarian, as the process refers to the specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military.¹⁴⁹ The military often makes its needs known through a governmental channel or agency which accounts for both military and

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 23.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

societal resources and needs. On this issue, there may be a collusion between the military and industry or a close partnership between the two. The industry could be persuaded to join the demands of the military in the situation of serious external threat conditions. In such situations, the business sector and citizens also stand in support of the military to gain from the creation of new industry and employment.¹⁵⁰ Regardless of the external threat conditions, to avoid domestic military intervention, there has to be an agreement among the political elites, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best meets the need and requirements of the armed forces. Although this does point toward a type of government based on widespread agreement i.e. a modern-day democracy, concordance can be achieved regarding the matter in any type of government.

The third indicator of concordance is recruitment method which involves the system for enlistment of citizens into the armed forces.¹⁵¹ This recruitment could be practised both coercively and persuasively, as discussed by Samuel Finer through his “extraction-coercion-persuasion cycle.”¹⁵² In coercive recruitment, the people are conscribed and supplies are extracted forcibly through taxation from the citizenry for military purposes. Due to the involvement of force against people’s will, this form of recruitment usually does not allow concordance between the military and the citizenry. On the other hand, persuasive recruitment is based more on the beliefs of the individual citizens and can take the form of voluntary or involuntary enlistment. The citizens volunteer themselves to sacrifice for the sake of security, patriotism, or any other national cause and the government is not forced to coerce its people into military service.¹⁵³ This form of recruitment implies an agreement among the political leadership, the military, and the citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed forces.

The final indicator of concordance is military style. According to Schiff, military style refers to “the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it.”¹⁵⁴ Military style is important in determining concordance because it can both draw and

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 46.

¹⁵² Samuel Finer, “State and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military,” in C. Tilly (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

¹⁵³ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 46.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 47.

eliminate social boundaries. Style gives value and meaning to symbols, conveying a type of power or authority. In a sense, military style embodies the cultural values of a nation and deals directly with the human and cultural elements of the armed forces. The appearance of the military and the messages it conveys, highlights the deep and nuanced relationship among soldiers, citizens, and the polity.¹⁵⁵ Military style could serve as the most important factor in connecting with the citizens of the society by symbolizing elements of respect, professionalism, cohesiveness, and national honour. Military symbols and rituals such as military parades and marches, military music, social traditions, and ceremonies capture the sense of belonging to the armed forces.¹⁵⁶ Hence, in combination with the other indicators of concordance, military style acts as an important aspect where the agreement of the military, political leadership, and citizenry is essential.

Concordance theory claims that concordance regarding these four indicators most likely prevents the domestic military intervention in a country. Agreement regarding these important factors means that the military, political elites, and citizenry share cultural and institutional values. If cultural values impact the level of concordance, then Islamization in the military should also affect how concordance is achieved. Islam forms an important part of many Muslims' cultural values and practices and in Muslim-majority nations, it is bound to impact politics and thus civil-military relations. Even if the country is constitutionally secular like Turkey, the Muslim-majority factor brings Islam into everyday life of the individuals and thus, affects how civil-military relations are formed and reformed. The following subchapters will highlight the Islamization factor studied in this research and will elaborate the conceptual framework of analysis for this thesis.

3.4. Limitations of Concordance Theory

The critics of concordance theory highlight some critical problems in this theory which are hard to overlook. Firstly, a very basic issue with Rebecca Schiff's theory is that there is lack of clarity on the definition of culture. As Clemmensen argues, Schiff treats culture, the theory's key variable, as a black box that cannot be used to make general

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

claims of causality.¹⁵⁷ However, for the purpose of this study, clear definition of culture is given in the beginning of this chapter. Moreover, although I believe that the key concepts in the thesis should be presented clearly, Schiff's choice of not defining culture seems deliberate. As she points out, the concordance indicators are manifested and described on their own terms with respect to each case study.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, culture cannot be defined in specific terms for all nations; in some nations, religion is closely associated with the institutional regulations and environment of a country and hence forms a big chunk of the culture, while in others, religion may be only an individual practice. Hence, instead of presenting a specific definition of culture, Schiff describes the cultural conditions of each case study and explains how those conditions shape the concordance indicators for that case. This thesis also gives a general definition of culture and explains the cultural conditions of each case study selected.

According to Clemmensen, Schiff "does not explain why these four indicators show the crucial cultural agreement that determines the state of civil-military relations."¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, with the exception of military style, these indicators have been identified by leading scholars of civil-military relations as key determinants of military function and role in most societies.¹⁶⁰ The military function and role are largely influenced by the cultural conditions and historical experiences of a nation and hence, the cultural agreement on these indicators reflect the shared cultural values of the three partners involved. Another limitation of the theory is its causal limitation as Schiff argues that concordance theory has predictive, but no explanatory value.¹⁶¹ The theory can identify when a society will have harmonious civil-military relations but not why this happens.¹⁶² However, through case studies and process tracing, it is possible to identify the causes of concordance and lack of domestic military intervention as well, as the cause would be specific to each case study considering the distinct cultural conditions of each case. Furthermore, regarding the three partners, concordance theory seems to take citizenry as a homogenous unit. If the Sikh community in India makes up a large chunk of the army, what is the citizenry agreeing on this composition of the officer

¹⁵⁷ Rahbek-Clemmensen, "Beyond 'the soldier and the state,'" 44.

¹⁵⁸ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 41.

¹⁵⁹ Rahbek-Clemmensen, "Beyond the soldier and the state," 44.

¹⁶⁰ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 40.

¹⁶¹ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 13.

¹⁶² Rahbek-Clemmensen, "Beyond the soldier and the state," 44.

corps? Does it include the Hindu, Muslim, Christian, or other religious (nationalist) factions, for example? Nevertheless, for the cases of Pakistan's 1999 coup and Turkey's coup attempt, the Sunni Muslims will be considered the majority of the citizenry. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to factor in the sub-sects of Muslims and other ethnic and religious groups in the research question. However, it must be noted that the citizenry and militaries of both the nations consist of several ethnic as well as religious groups though the similar ethnic and religious cleavages within the two nations indeed helps in the comparison across these cases.

Another limitation of concordance theory concerns its dependent variable. The theory focuses on the likelihood of coups d'état, palace revolts, and military influence involving direct and indirect means and mostly comprising intimidation, blackmail, or force.¹⁶³ However, it does not include subtle ways in which the military influences the political decision-making or other policy issues such as official prerogative, expert advice, and political bargaining.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, since it is difficult to operationalize and measure military influence, it would also be hard to connect the level of concordance with military influence. Nevertheless, Schiff does not specify the type of military intervention she is referring to in each case study and generally refers to it as domestic military intervention. Since this thesis only analyses the outcome of direct domestic military intervention i.e. coup, this limitation of the theory does not cause any problem for the research.

3.5. Conceptual Framework of Analysis

After analysing the theoretical framework of Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory, this subchapter will discuss the objective of this research, the relationship between the variables, the potential addition to the theory, and the expected results. This research comprises two parts; the first part will test Schiff's concordance theory using the case studies of Pakistan's successful 1999 military coup and Turkey's failed 2016 military coup attempt, and the second part will explore the role of Islamization in the military of each country. As mentioned earlier, instead of using the likelihood of the domestic

¹⁶³ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*.

¹⁶⁴ Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority*.

military intervention as the dependent variable as done by Schiff, this study looks at the likelihood of the success (or failure) of the intervention.

3.5.1. Case studies

This study aims to test concordance theory using two case studies, limited to specific events in the history of two countries. There has been limited research on these two cases from the theoretical approach of concordance and most of the research on civil-military relations in Pakistan¹⁶⁵ and Turkey¹⁶⁶ has been based on theory of separation. Concordance theory claims that if there is agreement among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry of a country, it is highly likely that there will be no domestic military intervention. By modifying the theoretical framework, I claim that if there is agreement among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry of a country, it is highly likely that the result of the domestic military intervention will be unsuccessful. In the case of Pakistan, there was a military coup in 1999 implying that there was lack of concordance among the three partners before the coup. Hence, using the four indicators proposed by Schiff, this study will analyse if there was agreement among the three partners regarding these indicators. Covering the period after the death of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who became the President of Pakistan after declaring martial law in 1977, this study will examine the level of concordance during four governments' terms in office through general elections from 1988 to 1999. Although the eleven-year period involved democratic elections without any military coups or coup attempts, none of the three governments were able to complete their terms. This already signals towards discordance among the three partners prior to 1999 coup; however, it is crucial

¹⁶⁵ Although Rebecca Schiff has studied Pakistan as one of the case studies in concordance theory, there has not been much research on the country's civil-military relations following her work. Some of the works on concordance in Pakistan include: Zulfiqar Ali, "Contradiction of concordance theory: Failure to understand military intervention in Pakistan," *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 3 (2014): 544-567; Ejaz Hussain, "Failure to Understand Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Rejoinder," *Armed Forces & Society* 44, no. 2 (2018): 368-378; Shaun Gregory, "Democratic transition and civil-military relations in Pakistan: The limits of theory 1," In *Democratic transition and security in Pakistan* (Routledge, 2015), 60-75.

¹⁶⁶ Most of the previous work on Turkey's civil-military relations has been from the lens of theory of separation and its different versions. There has been limited research using the concordance theoretical approach. Some of the works on concordance in Turkey include: Nilüfer Narli, "Concordance and discordance in Turkish civil-military relations, 1980-2002," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 215-225; Mustafa Uluçakar and Ali Çağlar, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Turkey," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 14, no. 55 (2017): 41-57; Adem Üstün Çatalbaş, "Militarism, Democracy, and Concordance: The Role of Citizenry in (Re)-Establishing Democratic Order in Argentina and Turkey," PhD diss. (University of Cincinnati, 2020); Rahman Dag, "The Role of Contesting Ideologies: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Journal of Global Analysis* 6, no. 2 (2016).

to analyse and understand where and how the discordance occurred and if there were indeed a few instances of concordance. Hence, the objective of analysing the period before 1999 coup in Pakistan is testing Schiff's concordance theory using an additional case study. If there was discordance among the three partners before the 1999 coup, as expected, concordance theory is applicable in this case with a stronger prediction power. However, if there was indeed agreement among the three partners regarding the four indicators before the 1999 coup, concordance theory's applicability will be limited and the scope of the theory would have to be redefine.

On the other hand, Turkey has been selected as a case study in which domestic military intervention clearly failed in 2016. Based on Schiff's concordance theory, there should be concordance among the three partners in the Turkish case which prevented the success of the military coup. This study will analyse if there was concordance prior to 2016 coup attempt using the four indicators proposed by Schiff. The time period examined is between 2002 and 2016, starting when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections and formed government in 2002 and ending with the failed military coup attempt in July 2016. During this period, a number of changes occurred in the country including the Islamization of the government and public spaces,¹⁶⁷ further civilianization of the military,¹⁶⁸ and Turkey's involvement in regional conflicts such as the Syrian war. Although this thesis will not focus directly on the civilianization of the military, the process may have contributed to high level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry. Nevertheless, it must be examined if there was agreement among the three partners regarding the social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. By using this case study with a positive outcome – failure of domestic military intervention – concordance theory will be again tested with the focus on finding high level of concordance, in contrast to finding discordance in the case of Pakistan. If this particular case study fits concordance theory, it will be an additional case study to prove the theory right. However, if it is found that there was indeed discordance among the three partners in the Turkish case, the applicability of the theory will be limited and the scope of the theory would have to be redefined.

¹⁶⁷ Birol Yesilada and Barry Rubin, *Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule* (Routledge, 2013).

¹⁶⁸ Mehmet Bardakçı, "Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey under AKP Rule," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 3 (2013): 411-428, doi: 10.1080/14683849.2013.831256.

3.5.2. Islamization in the military and Concordance Theory

The second part of the thesis aims to add to the factors affecting concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry, and expand the scope of the theory. After analysing if there was concordance in the two case studies, this part aims to carry out a comparative case analysis to research on the role of Islamization in the military on civil-military relations of Muslim-majority democracies. In both Pakistan and Turkey, Islam holds an important position in the state affairs and the public sphere to a certain extent. Although the two states differ ideologically, politically, religiously, and socially, there are key similarities between them regarding the factors affecting civil-military relations.¹⁶⁹ Hence, their comparison would serve the purpose of analysing the role of Islamization in the military in achieving or preventing concordance among the three actors.

In the case of Turkey, there is low Islamization in the military in the selected time period with a generally secular outlook of the military. With a secular constitution of the Muslim-majority country, but a non-secular government since 2002, Islamization in the military can attain a crucial role in the relations among the military, the civilian government, and the society. As Schiff focuses on the impact of cultural and historical experiences of a country on its civil-military relations, Islamization is treated as a part of culture which cannot be disregarded when understanding civil-military relations. Islamization can act as both an impediment and an aid towards achieving concordance depending on the context and other conditions being taken into consideration. On the other hand, in the case of Pakistan, Islamization in the military is high and the general outlook of the military is Islamic as well. The constitution of the state is Islamic, with centrist governments in power during the time period being studied, and the country is Muslim-majority as well. Theoretically, in the case of Pakistan, Islamization in the military should aid the concordance among the three partners considering the Islamic factors in the case study. Whereas, in the case of Turkey, it should cause clash among the three partners with differing characteristics of the three partners regarding the role of Islam.

¹⁶⁹ Refer to Chapter 2, page 9.

Analysing the impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance would be a contribution to the concordance theory. In a way, the second part of the research is also testing concordance theory and its emphasis on culture. If Islamization in the military is found to have a positive impact on concordance, taking into account all the other conditional factors, Schiff's concordance theory would stand firm. However, if Islamization in the military does not make any clear impact on concordance level, Schiff's focus on culture might be regarded as having limited applicability. In the former case, Schiff's theory can be used not only to understand civil-military relations but impact of Islamization as well, which forms a separate field of research on its own as well. Hence, the second part of this thesis will look more into the 'impact of culture' aspect of the concordance theory. The following chapters will explore the level of concordance and impact of Islamization in the military on concordance for each case study. They will also include findings of the research determining whether the claims discussed above are proved.

CHAPTER 4

LEVEL OF CONCORDANCE IN PAKISTAN

In this comparative case study, 1999 coup d'état has been chosen from the Pakistani military coups. Twenty-two years have passed since General Pervez Musharraf took over the state in 1999 by imposing martial law; although there has not been a coup since the end of nine years of military rule in 2008, the military has continued to dominate the state affairs even today. The period between 1988 and 1999 was crucial for democracy in Pakistan as the military stepped back in order to witness the failure of civilian rule in the country. The military indeed witnessed the disappointing rule of four civilian governments during this eleven-year period; however, it had a primary role, as well as interest, in causing these governments to fail. Hence, when military took over the government again in 1999, it was a continuation of the old military rule but in overt manner now. This chapter will first analyse the 1999 coup from a historical perspective and then, using the indicators proposed by Schiff, evaluate the level of concordance among the military, political elites, and citizenry before the coup took place. The last subchapter will analyse the role of Islamization in achieving or preventing concordance among the three actors.

4.1. Background of the 1999 coup d'état

Before the 1988 general elections, Pakistan remained under military rule for eleven years after General Muhammad Zia ul Haq declared martial law in 1977. Hence, in order to evaluate the level of concordance among the three partners as well as the role of Islamization in the military on that level, it is crucial to understand the history of military rule in the country. After the 1977 coup, which was originally imposed in order to “resolve the impasse between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan

National Alliance (PNA) over the fairness of general elections,”¹⁷⁰ the military dictatorship continued till 1988 and undertook extensive law-making during that time period.¹⁷¹ Considering the dominance of military over almost every institution, General Zia was able to get his extraconstitutional coup approved by Pakistan’s military within three months of taking power and based on the doctrine of necessity, the court also gave him broad powers to form new laws and amend the constitution.¹⁷² According to General Zia and other military generals, the 1973 constitution did not have any built-in mechanism to balance the power of the prime minister, becoming a source of deadlock and instability. Hence, in 1980, General Zia amended the 1973 constitution by first subordinating the judiciary.¹⁷³ After that, he assigned the prime minister’s primary executive powers to the president, including the power to appoint key state officials, such as military service chiefs, provincial governors, the chief election commissioner, and even Supreme Court judges.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, General Zia also granted the president constitutional coup powers to dissolve the national assembly arbitrarily.¹⁷⁵ Another significant decision enforced during this dictatorship was the formation of a National Security Council (NSC) to make “recommendations relating to the proclamation of emergency under article 232, the security of Pakistan,” and other important national matters.¹⁷⁶ Comprising the president, the prime minister, the Senate chairman, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the service chiefs, and provincial chief ministers, NSC was mainly designed to give General Zia, the president, and the military service chiefs a “constitutional role in supervising the functioning of government rather than evolving a coherent national security policy.”¹⁷⁷ Under the umbrella of these broad

¹⁷⁰ In 1976, nine religious and conservative parties formed a common platform, called Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in order to counter Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The PNA was united behind religious slogans and a right-wing political agenda. However, Bhutto still gained a supermajority in the Parliament and the PNA caused severe civil unrests following the results.

¹⁷¹ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between mosque and military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 133.

¹⁷² Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between mosque and military*, 135.

For a discussion of the Pakistani judiciary under Zia ul Haq, see Paula Newberg, *Judging the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 171-99.

¹⁷³ Superior- court judges were required to take a new oath of office under Zia ul Haq’s Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981.

¹⁷⁴ Aqil Shah, *The army and democracy* (Harvard University Press, 2014), 160-161.

¹⁷⁵ The Eighth Amendment Act of 1985, clause 58(2) b, allowed the president to “dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion, a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.” Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

¹⁷⁶ Shah, *The army and democracy*, 160-161.

¹⁷⁷ Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Reality: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 238– 239.

transformations, General Zia imposed several minor decisions which favoured military rule during that time and in the future. More importantly, Islamization of the military was essentially initiated during Zia's dictatorship as well; however, it did not end with his death in 1988.

After General Zia's death, the primary motivation to allow general elections was institutional as his repressive military government had tarnished the public reputation of the military institution.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the military continued to control the state affairs as the president still had the power to dismiss civilian governments arbitrarily. According to one former lieutenant general, "There were enough safeguards to guide the transfer of power; if the civilians misgoverned, or otherwise crossed the lines of political propriety, the president could reset the system."¹⁷⁹ Husain Haqqani, a former adviser to two prime ministers in the 1990s, also highlighted the continued dominance of the military by stating that "the level of military support for elected civilian leaders corresponded with their willingness to support the military's internal autonomy and veto over India policy."¹⁸⁰ Henceforth, the military was actively, but covertly, involved in election campaigns as well as political decision-making processes. In 1988, the military tried to neutralize the Pakistan People's Party's potential victory using the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),¹⁸¹ by brokering and funding a right-wing alliance, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance, IJI).¹⁸² IJI, with the support of the military's establishment, was able to contain the PPP's success in the 1988 election.¹⁸³ Thus, although the eleven-year democratic period had begun, the military continued to reinforce its dominance over the civilian governance.

¹⁷⁸ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 15. See also Michael Hoffman, "Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan," *Democratization* 18, no. 1 (January 2011): 75–99.

¹⁷⁹ Shah, *The army and democracy*, 167.

Interview of former corps commander (V Corps, Karachi) Lieutenant General Naseer Akhtar (ret.) by the author, Lahore, December 2008.

¹⁸⁰ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 310.

¹⁸¹ Shah, *The army and democracy*, 167.

Interview of a former ISI officer by the author, Islamabad, August 2008.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, operationally responsible for gathering, processing, and analysing information relevant for national security from around the world.

¹⁸² "Hamid Gul admits he had role in IJI Formation," *Daily Times* (Lahore), January 5, 2010.

¹⁸³ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 158.

PPP's success was contained by the current government's decision that only voters with national identity cards would be allowed to vote, which effectively disfranchised one-fifth of registered voters who had not yet been provided with these cards; General Beg then prevailed upon the courts to uphold the

PPP's Benazir Bhutto became the prime minister after extensive behind-the-scenes bargaining involving her, President Ishaq Khan,¹⁸⁴ General Beg,¹⁸⁵ and the US ambassador, Robert Oakley.¹⁸⁶ In order to be nominated as prime minister by President Ishaq Khan, she had to support him in upcoming presidential elections, promise the US continuity in Pakistan's foreign policy, maintain existing levels of defence spending, and assure the military that she would not interfere with the military's privileges and perquisites.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the difficulties between the civil-military bureaucracy and the political leadership remained, surfacing time and again until Bhutto was dismissed from office in August 1990.¹⁸⁸ After her dismissal, IJI President Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was installed as caretaker prime minister. In the 1990 election, a grand anti-Bhutto coalition was created by the ISI,¹⁸⁹ resulting in the victory of IJI with Nawaz Sharif¹⁹⁰ becoming the new prime minister. The Sharif government and Pakistan's military were ideologically committed to similar positions; hence, there were fewer clashes between the two as compared to Bhutto's rule. However, differences in stance soon began to surface as Sharif's relatively moderate views clashed with the radical pan-Islamism of his Islamist allies and in spite of ISI's support to the fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Sharif started tilting in favour of the moderate mujahideen groups.¹⁹¹ The trigger, however, for the military was when following the sudden death of army chief General Asif Nawaz and his wife's statement regarding alleged involvement of the prime minister in his death, Sharif accused President Ishaq Khan in a televised speech of undermining his government.¹⁹² President Ishaq Khan dismissed Sharif the next day, "accusing him of corruption and mismanagement,"¹⁹³ appointed a caretaker prime

restriction. Those excluded from voting by this ruse were usually poor farmers and urban workers, both classes that generally favoured the PPP.

¹⁸⁴ Ghulam Ishaq Khan took over as acting President after the death of Zia ul Haq in 1988.

¹⁸⁵ General Mirza Aslam Beg succeeded General Zia as the Chief of Army Staff.

¹⁸⁶ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 159.

¹⁸⁷ Christina Lamb, *Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy* (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), 40-47. See also Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan," *Survival* 31, no. 3 (May-June 1989), 255-68.

¹⁸⁸ Samina Yasmeen, "Democracy in Pakistan: The Third Dismissal," *Asian Survey* 34, no. 6 (June 1994), 573.

¹⁸⁹ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 165. See also John Bray, "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline," *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (April 1997), 324.

¹⁹⁰ The IJI's most resourceful leader was Nawaz Sharif, a young industrialist whom Zia ul Haq had appointed chief minister of Punjab.

¹⁹¹ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 168.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ Edward A. Gargan, "President of Pakistan Dismisses Premier and Dissolves Parliament," *New York Times*, April 19, 1993.

minister, and dissolved the parliament.¹⁹⁴ Although Sharif did come back after Pakistan's Supreme Court declared his dismissal unconstitutional, confrontation between Ishaq Khan and him persisted, and eventually the army stepped in to convince both Sharif and Ishaq Khan to resign.¹⁹⁵

Before the 1999 coup d'état and after their dismissals from the office, both Bhutto and Sharif came to power once more in the subsequent elections. Bhutto's second term witnessed the peak of Pakistan's support for insurgents in Indian-controlled Kashmir and the level of military support for elected civilian leaders depended on their willingness to support the jihad in Kashmir.¹⁹⁶ In order to avoid clashes with the military during her second term, Bhutto supported the jihad in Kashmir as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁷ However, after the Taliban's human rights violations and their hosting of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network surfaced, Bhutto's government showed reluctance towards supporting the Taliban resulting in the Islamists demanding her resignation.¹⁹⁸ This clash with the military's stance as well as corruption charges against Bhutto's husband led to President Farooq Leghari dismissing her and dissolving the Parliament on November 5, 1996.¹⁹⁹ After Bhutto's dismissal, the Taliban consolidated their control over most of Afghanistan and Pakistan extended diplomatic recognition to their regime.²⁰⁰ The subsequent elections resulted in the victory of Nawaz Sharif as the prime minister and there was a brief period of cooperation between Bhutto and Sharif on the subject of removing the provision that enabled Pakistani presidents to dismiss elected governments.²⁰¹ Seeking protection from presidential dismissal and securing his position through other constitutional amendments, Sharif alarmed the military with the prospect of "prime ministerial dictatorship."²⁰² Pakistan's deteriorating economic situation and Sharif's restraint in testing its nuclear weapons after India's successful nuclear tests, again caused a rift

¹⁹⁴ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 168.

¹⁹⁵ Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1993: Some Dramatic Changes," *Asian Survey* 34, no. 2 (February 1994), 192-194.

¹⁹⁶ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 171.

¹⁹⁷ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 293.

¹⁹⁸ Robert LaPorte Jr., "Pakistan in 1996: Starting Over Again," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 2 (February 1997), 119.

¹⁹⁹ Kamran Khan, "Bhutto Out as Premier in Pakistan; President Charges Corruption, Dissolves National Assembly," *Washington Post*, November 5, 1996.

²⁰⁰ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 174.

²⁰¹ John F. Burns, "Pakistan Acts to Cut Power of President," *New York Times*, April 2, 1997.

²⁰² Anwar H. Syed, "Pakistan in 1997: Nawaz Sharif's Second Chance to Govern," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 2 (February 1998), 119.

between him and the military. However, it was the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan which catalysed the ousting of Sharif by the military. In the midst of the peace process between Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Pakistani troops intruded into a part of Indian-controlled territory along the Line of Control in Kashmir.²⁰³ This operation in Kargil was led by General Pervez Musharraf. With the potential of this conflict escalating into nuclear war along with constant US pressure, Sharif decided to withdraw from Kargil,²⁰⁴ and asked the army “to proceed against the principal actors in this episode and get rid of them.”²⁰⁵ With Sharif planning the removal of General Musharraf from Chief of the Army Staff position amidst the Islamists’ demonstrations against the withdrawal from Kargil, the military took the opportunity to take over and General Musharraf ousted Sharif by imposing martial law on October 12, 1999.²⁰⁶

4.2. Indicators of concordance

This subchapter will further analyse the 1988-1999 period using the four indicators of concordance proposed by Rebecca Schiff. As discussed in the methodology chapter in detail, the measurement of these indicators in the case of Pakistan is widely carried out using secondary sources. Moreover, the discussion of the coup itself and the subsequent military rule is not much significant to this research as the main goal is to investigate the level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry before the coup took place. The four indicators of concordance comprise the social composition of the officer corps, recruitment method, the political decision-making process, and military style. This section will analyse the level of concordance among the three actors concerning each indicator in order to test whether there was low concordance (or high discordance) before the 1999 coup and evaluate if the success of the coup was a result of low concordance as proposed by Schiff’s concordance theory.

²⁰³ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 177.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 178.

²⁰⁵ Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Crisis 1999,” *RUSI Journal* (April 2002), 29.

²⁰⁶ Kamran Khan, “Army Stages Coup in Pakistan; Troops Arrest Prime Minister, Seize Buildings after Firing of General,” *Washington Post*, October 13, 1999.

4.2.1. Social composition of the officer corps

In order to investigate the level of concordance regarding the social composition of the officer corps, this study employs the data collected and organized by C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, regarding Pakistan Army's geographical recruitment base.²⁰⁷ Due to the opacity of the Pakistan Army despite being a politically important organization, academic research has been limited on the subject. Nevertheless, Fair and Nawaz have mobilized a unique set of data corresponding to the geographical distribution of the officers' annual intake. The Pakistan Army is an all-volunteer force according to Article 39 ('Participation of People in Armed Forces') of the 1973 constitution, which says that the state "shall enable people from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the armed forces of Pakistan."²⁰⁸ Moreover, the supply of candidates for officer recruitment is higher than the demand of the military officers.²⁰⁹ Hence, the social composition of the officer corps is largely determined by both supply-side and demand-side constraints. Since concordance takes into account the agreement among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry regarding the social composition of the officer corps, the harmony in the supply and demand of the officers should mean the agreement between the military and the citizenry. Although there could be several reasons due to which the military might not be representative of the polity, only deliberate discrimination against certain ethnicities will be considered as military's failures in preventing non-representativeness. However, as Schiff emphasizes, broad representation is not a "requisite condition for concordance, since it is conceivable that the society and the military could agree on a less broadly representative corps."²¹⁰ Hence, if there is an agreed-upon underrepresentation of an ethnic group in the military, concordance can still take place.

²⁰⁷ Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," 63-94. The details of the data collection and analysis are present in methodology chapter.

²⁰⁸ See text of the 1973 constitution, with the various alterations, http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf, accessed 3 July. 2021.

²⁰⁹ Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."

²¹⁰ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics: A concordance theory of civil-military relations*, 45.

In the Pakistan Army, there has been a high number of Punjabi and Pashtun military corps and a low number of Sindhi and Baluchi officers since the country's independence in 1947.²¹¹ Considering the importance of cultural and historical traditions in achieving concordance among the three actors, this higher representation of Punjabis and Pashtuns was followed as a colonial recruitment practice of the British.²¹² Hence, the cultural and historical experiences cannot be disregarded when evaluating the civil-military relations. During the British rule, Punjabis and Pashtuns were regarded as the 'martial races' and other ethnic groups including the Sindhis, Baluchis and Bengalis were widely excluded from military service.²¹³ Extreme discordance was witnessed after the Bengalis were discriminated against in the military, resulting in the 1971 war, the partition of Pakistan, and the creation of Bangladesh.²¹⁴




Figure 2 Officer Market Share 1994
Source: Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."

The Pakistan Army took several steps after 1971 to make the military more representative of the different ethnicities of the country, which will be discussed in the recruitment method section. Nevertheless, there was a high level of ethnic imbalance

²¹¹ Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."

²¹² Ibid., 71.

²¹³ See Douglas M. Peers, 'The Martial Races and the Indian Army in the Victorian Era,' in Daniel Marston and Chandar Sundaram (eds), *A Military History of India and South Asia* (Bloomington: Indiana UP 2008), 34–52.

²¹⁴ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 80.

in the military even during the 1988-1999 period and in spite of military's efforts at widening its recruitment base distribution. In 1994, as Figure 2 shows, majority of the officer recruits came from Punjab and NWFP.²¹⁵ The important concern regarding concordance is whether the Punjabi and Pashtun domination and the underrepresentation of Sindhis and Baluchis were based on an agreement among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. In order to analyse the level of concordance between the military and the citizenry, supply-side and demand-side constraints should be taken into account. Supply-side constraints include the willingness and actions of people to join the Army.²¹⁶ Although limited accessibility to the relevant data prevented the obtaining of percentage of applications received from the underrepresented Sindhi and Baluchi ethnic groups in the 1988-1999 period, the positive results of Army's efforts at increasing representativeness imply that there used to be discrimination against the minority ethnic groups in terms of selection. With the ease in recruitment criteria for Sindhis and Baluchis, more officers from these provinces were recruited,²¹⁷ indicating the willingness of these ethnic groups to join the Army. Whether these officers had previously been eager to join the Army or whether the results were due to ease in recruitment criteria, is questionable. Nevertheless, deliberate efforts at recruiting more Sindhis and Baluchis during the 1988-1999 period and positive response from these ethnic groups show that there was an increase in concordance between the military and the citizenry. With a gradual decline in the market share for the Punjab during the 1988-1999 period, between 1971 and 2001, the market share declined from over 80 per cent to a low of less than 40 per cent.²¹⁸ From 1997 to 1999, the percentage of new officers from Punjab fell from around 73 per cent to around 62 percent, becoming similar to Punjab's 56 per cent share of Pakistan's population (per the 1998 census).²¹⁹ On the other hand, NWFP accounted for 13 per cent of Pakistan's overall population according to the 1998 census and its market share increased from around 11 per cent in 1998 to 16 per cent in 1999 (increasing to 20 per cent in 2000).²²⁰ Recruits from FATA²²¹ remained somewhat stable and were roughly

²¹⁵ NWFP is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). NWFP will be retained in this thesis as this name was in use during the period covered by the data and this study.

²¹⁶ Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," 77.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 81.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 82.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Federally Administered Tribal Areas. FATA is a semi-autonomous tribal region in north-western Pakistan, consisting of seven tribal agencies (districts) and six frontier regions, and are directly

proportional to their population distribution in Pakistan.²²² Nevertheless, representation of Baluchistan and Sindh remained low in spite of higher leniency in their recruitment. Although there was an increase in the market share of Sindh, it remained below 10 per cent in 1998 despite its accounting for some 22 per cent of Pakistan's population.²²³ Similarly, Baluchistan accounts for about 5 per cent of Pakistan's population but had about 1 per cent of the market share.²²⁴ Although there is ethnic imbalance in the social composition of officer corps and there is an underrepresentation of Sindh and Baluchistan, the leniency towards the recruitment of officers from Sindh and Baluchistan and their gradually increasing market share indicate that there is some level of concordance between the military and the citizenry.

Taking into the demand-side constraints, the Army also has its preferences. In spite of the leniency towards the recruitment of Sindhis and Baluchis to create ethnic diversity, Punjabis and Pashtuns may still be considered 'martial races', the practice during the British era. The recruitment is widely based on merit and there is tough competition. Although ethnic diversity benefits the military in tackling critical internal security challenges as well as in creating a positive social impact on the society, there are certain limitations of the extent of representativeness in the military. Nevertheless, it is hard to spot discrimination against the ethnic minorities in the social composition of officer corps between 1988 and 1999. Regarding the third partner, the political leadership, there was not much role that could be played in achieving concordance. In the 1988-1999 period, the democratically elected leadership was struggling for its survival due to constant military interventions. The political leadership did not have much decision-making power even in state affairs; hence, the agreement on social composition of the officer corps was one of the requisites to stay in power. The agreement of the political leadership could only be counted as unstable concordance as there was continuous military domination. In spite of the presence of concordance between the military and the citizenry during the relevant time period, the absence of the political leadership's role in the whole process prevents it from becoming a three-partner agreement. Moreover, Army's focus on ethnic diversity also came from its drive to regain the

governed by Pakistan's federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).

²²² Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," 82.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

positive reputation of the Army among the society, after the repressive dictatorial years of Zia ul Haq's rule.

4.2.2. Recruitment method

The recruitment method of Pakistan's military in the 1988-1999 period focused on ethnic diversity. The historical district-level data on officer intake employed in the previous section deals with the intake into the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul, NWFP. The selection rate of PMA is less than 11 per cent from the 3,000 applicants nationwide for each regular long course.²²⁵ Recruits must obtain a score of at least 50 per cent in their matriculation (10th grade) or a Faculty of Arts degree (FA) or Faculty of Sciences degree (FSc) (12th grade) exams.²²⁶ Moreover, in the initial testing and screening at regional selection centres, candidates must score at least 50 per cent. This criterion has been relaxed for persons from Sindh and Baluchistan who must achieve a score of 45 per cent.²²⁷ After the testing, candidates have to go through the interview process at the Inter-Services/General Headquarters Selection and Review Board (ISSB) in Kohat, NWFP.²²⁸ During the four days at ISSB, candidates undergo observation and testing to assess their intelligence, psychological profile, leadership potential, and physical fitness.²²⁹ After these processes, successful candidates are recommended for the PMA. Although the selection of officers is based on merit, Pakistan Army relaxed standards for Sindhi and Baluchi candidates in the early 1990s in order to increase their recruitment and ethnically diversify the military. During the 1980s, in effort to induct Sindhi and Baluchi recruits more quickly into the PMA and then the Army, the Army allowed the Sindhi and Baluchi recruits to study an abbreviated course at the now defunct Junior Cadet Course after which they could go to the PMA. Sindhi and Baluchi applicants to the infantry enjoyed even further relaxed grading standards with respect to their FA/FSc exams²³⁰ relative to other candidates.²³¹

²²⁵ Ibid., 68.

Brig. (now Maj. Gen.) Khawar Hanif, Defence Attache', Pakistan Embassy, 2007.

²²⁶ Official website of the Pakistan Army, [5www.joinpakarmy.gov.pk/intr-procedure-for-comission.php4](http://www.joinpakarmy.gov.pk/intr-procedure-for-comission.php4).

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," 70.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ High School 12 grade of schooling.

²³¹ The percentage scores of candidates in their Intermediate (12 year) examinations are placed into grade levels A, B, C, etc. B is the standard minimum grade level, except for areas that are being favoured by an affirmative action policy. Candidates from the favoured areas may be admitted with C grades.

Moreover, Sindhi and Baluchi candidates recommended by the Inter-Services Selections Board were selected into the PMA irrespective of their rank on the 'merit list'. Thus, Baluchi and Sindhi recruits were favoured in two ways: first their threshold scores for passing was lower than for others and second they need not be placed as highly on the merit list due to a quasi-quota system that is in effect for selection.²³²

Between 1988 and 1999, Pakistan Army made several efforts to ethnically diversify the military and at times, compromised on the merit in order to recruit a higher number of officers from the underrepresented provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. These efforts came as a result of different issues faced by the military. The Bengali alienation by the military prior to 1971 and the subsequent partition of Pakistan led the Army to not repeat the earlier mistakes. Moreover, separatist movements had started in Sindh including the Sindhu Desh movement based on Sindhi nationalism and Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) based on Baluchistan's independence.²³³ In order to make the military more inclusive of different ethnic groups and also to counter the separatist movements and insurgencies in these underrepresented regions, the military's recruitment method focused on encouraging concordance with the society. On the other hand, the civilian government during the 1988-1999 period was focused on its survival and was forced to agree on these military affairs. Nevertheless, since the military focused on inclusion and diversity, the civilian government would have agreed with the military had there not been several other ongoing clashes between the two institutions. In contrast, amidst constant clashes between the Army and the political leadership, military's concordance with the citizenry regarding the recruitment method benefitted the former's continuous domination in the civil-military relations. Hence, as Schiff argues, to prevent domestic military intervention, there needs to be concordance among the three actors. With the political leadership left out, there was concordance between the military and the citizenry, but overall discordance among the three actors leading to the 1999 coup.

²³² Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," 71. (Information provided to S. Nawaz from Army General Headquarters.)

²³³ Raju GC. Thomas, "Secessionist Movements in South Asia," *Survival* 36, no. 2 (1994): 92-114.

4.2.3. The political decision-making process

Unlike the presence of some level of concordance in social composition of the officer corps and recruitment method, the political decision-making process in the 1988-1999 period experienced higher levels of discordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. With the military dominating the civil-military relations throughout the 1988-1999 period as discussed in the background section, the political leadership did not have any significant role in the decision-making regarding military budget, size, material, and structure. Although the annual budget had to be approved by the parliament, it was the military that predetermined the defence budget.²³⁴ In 1988, Pakistan experienced a financial crisis due to its deteriorating resource situation. The government's budget deficit reached 8.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation accelerated, the current account deficit doubled to 4.3 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP), the external debt service ratio reached 28 per cent of export earnings, and foreign exchange reserves fell in half, to \$438 million, equal to less than 3 weeks of imports.²³⁵ During this time, the country's defence burden remained one of the heaviest in the world, i.e. around 7 per cent of GNP in 1992.²³⁶ During fiscal 1994-95, defence accounted for 26.4 per cent of the total budget spending.²³⁷ Moreover, according to one study investigating the impact of military expenditures on income inequality in Pakistan using data over the period of 1972–2012, higher military expenditure leads to higher income inequality in Pakistan.²³⁸ Although infrastructure, social, educational, and economic programs have been limited, the military budget and defence expenditure remained high.²³⁹

²³⁴ Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's military economy* (Oxford University Press, 2007), 151.

²³⁵ World Bank (1991) *Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and Prospects, Report No. 9283-PAK* (Washington, DC: The World Bank).

²³⁶ Robert E. Looney, "Excessive defense expenditures and economic stabilization: The case of Pakistan," *Journal of Policy Modeling* 19, no. 4 (August, 1997), 382, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA528058.pdf>.

²³⁷ Ahmed Rashid, "Getting tough: Pakistan's Bhutto tries for fiscal austerity," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (June 23, 1994), 61.

²³⁸ Syed Ali Raza, Muhammad Shahbaz, and Sudharshan Reddy Paramati, "Dynamics of military expenditure and income inequality in Pakistan," *Social Indicators Research* 131, no. 3 (2017): 1035-1055.

²³⁹ Fiaz Hussain, Shahzad Hussain, and Naila Erum, "Are defense expenditures pro poor or anti poor in Pakistan? An empirical investigation," *The Pakistan Development Review* (2015): 875-892.

During the 1988-1999 period, the premierships of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could not challenge the high military budgets and defence expenditures. Moreover, the military controlled several economic activities with a huge Milbus. As defined by Ayesha Siddiqa who carried out an extensive case study of Pakistan, Milbus refers to military capital used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity.²⁴⁰ The concept includes all activities that transfer resources and opportunities from the public and private sectors to an individual or a group within military, without following the norms of public accountability.²⁴¹ Milbus in Pakistan includes the Fauji Foundation (FF), one of the leading military-business conglomerates.²⁴² In the 1988-1999 period, Milbus grew exponentially with the increased benefits for the individual members of the armed forces in the form of new housing schemes as well as greater business opportunities to the military's public sector organizations such as the National Logistic Cell (NLC) and Frontier Works Organization (FWO).²⁴³ Moreover, the civilian government in this period allowed the military-controlled companies to replace public-sector departments.²⁴⁴ However, the most noticeable expansion of Milbus occurred at the level of the subsidiaries which enhanced their operations to include newer areas of business activity such as banking, finance and insurance, real estate, travel, IT, the energy sector and education.²⁴⁵ Since the political leadership could not question the financial activities of the military due to military's domination as well as due to the leadership's own corruption, it continued to give financial guarantees to military foundations.²⁴⁶

With the consolidation of military's economic interests, the institution became even more dominant. Moreover, Zia ul Haq had made various amendments in the constitution and eased military rule and domination opportunities. The 1973 constitution had been revived by Zia ul Haq, giving many overriding powers to the President, and weakening the position of the Prime Minister.²⁴⁷ The military has not only secured its professional and corporate interests, but has also maintained its domination with regard to Pakistan's foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan as

²⁴⁰ Siddiqa, *Military Inc.*, 5.

The concept of Milbus comprises both serving and retired military personnel, and a limited number of civilians who are directly dependent on the military business complex.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid., 6.

²⁴³ Ibid., 153.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 154.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 154.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 166.

²⁴⁷ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, state and society in Pakistan* (Springer, 2000), 191.

well as regarding the Kashmir issue.²⁴⁸ Clashes with the civilian government over Pakistan's foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan led to the dissolution of parliament more than once. Moreover, the expanding role of the intelligence agencies also benefitted the military as ISI collected intelligence on domestic political affairs and supplied it to the military which was also used to affect election results.²⁴⁹ One example of military's use of ISI in implementing its political agenda is the 'Operation Midnight Jackals' in September-October 1989 which involved two ISI officers swaying some of the PPP members of the National Assembly to the opposition side for the vote of non-confidence against the Benazir Bhutto government.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, as elaborated in the background section, four civilian governments were removed from office by the military during the 1988-1999 period. The political decision-making process had to be under the authority of Pakistan Army even the civilian governments had to survive in office. When Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had even minor clashes with the military over political decision-making, they were removed on accounts of corruption or mismanagement. Hence, discordance between the military and the political leadership was clear in the 1988-1999 period. Moreover, the citizenry was neither satisfied with the government's performance nor pleased with constant military interventions, evident through very low voter turnouts.²⁵¹ In 1999, another political decision-making clash between the Sharif's government and the Army concerning the Kargil crisis resulted in the coup in the same year, caused by high discordance among the three partners.

4.2.4. Military style

According to Schiff, this concordance indicator directly expresses the human and cultural elements involved in the armed forces and is often part of the historical evolution associated with military tradition and symbols.²⁵² Even before 1988, military underwent what Heeger describes as the 'demystification' of the military; its image as being above politics is seriously undermined, and it is seen as one of the contending

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 193.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Rizvi, *Military, state and society in Pakistan*.

²⁵² Schiff, *The military and domestic politics*, 86.

groups engaged in power politics.²⁵³ Moreover, the Pakistani military represents the Islamic ideology of the country.²⁵⁴ However, the exploitation of Islamic ideology for political gains as well as the repressive Islamization during Zia ul Haq's era did portray a negative image of the military in front of the citizenry. Islamic symbols, mottos, and terms were widely used in speeches and military trainings in order to keep the Army as the face of Islam in Pakistan.²⁵⁵ The Islamic symbolization by the military has for a long time legitimized military domination in different spheres of the country's affairs and hence, forms an important part of military style to achieve concordance between the military and the citizenry.

Another important part of military style involves the theory of 'martial races', also discussed above. Although according to Schiff, Pakistani military continued the British era 'martial races' practice by discriminating against Sindhi and Baluchi candidates and favouring Punjabi and Pashtun candidates, there were serious efforts to modify the martial races theory after the 1971 war. Moreover, due to a decline in openings in the Gulf region for junior officers in the 1990s, the new officers in the Pakistani military grew frustrated at the middle and lower levels.²⁵⁶ This led to further erosion of the distinction between the personal and public domains in the military leading to the misuse of official transport, manpower and regimental resources and facilities by not only the senior officers and their families, but by junior officers as well.²⁵⁷ This created discordance between the military and the citizenry. Nevertheless, the image of the military as the 'guardian' and 'saviour' of the state, especially during crisis situations when the civilian governments were held responsible for the chaos, caused the citizenry to trust the military more than they would trust the political leadership.²⁵⁸ Hence, the citizenry had fluctuating levels of concordance with the military. However, the image of the military as 'saviour' of the state caused deep discordance between the military and the political leadership as this image was often exploited to legitimize the dissolution of parliament.

²⁵³ Gerald A. Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistan Experience,' *World Politics* (Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1977), 242-262.

²⁵⁴ Rizvi, *Military, state and society in Pakistan*, 245.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 247.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 243.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ Iram Khalid and Zahid Yaseen, "Role of Military as the Guardian of Democracy in Pakistan," *Journal of Political Studies* 22, no. 1 (2015).

4.3. Impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance

In the previous section, the concordance theory proposed by Rebecca Schiff was tested using the case study of Pakistan's 1999 coup d'état. Utilizing the four indicators of concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry, it was proved that there was discordance among the three partners before the 1999 coup. Although the evidence favours the arguments made by concordance theory, it must be noted that there was continuous domestic military intervention during the 1988-1999 period which prevented any form of concordance among the three actors before the coup took place. However, it can be observed that some levels of concordance between the military and the citizenry as well as unstable concordance between the military and the political leadership prevented the coup from succeeding earlier than 1999. Before the coup, the military was able to keep its dominance through other means; however, at the peak of discordance, when the military was not able to control the situation otherwise, coup d'état was conveniently planned and executed. As this thesis aims to go beyond testing the concordance theory by analysing the impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance, after finding high discordance among the three partners before the 1999 coup, this study will continue towards the second part. This section will first analyse the level of Islamization in the Pakistani military and then evaluate its impact on the level of concordance.

4.3.1. Level of Islamization in the Pakistani military

The authoritarian rule of Zia ul Haq from 1977 to 1988 had significant impact on the military's professional values and beliefs, especially regarding Islamization of the officer corps.²⁵⁹ However, even before Zia, the Pakistan Army traditionally used religious imagery, rhetoric, and myth as devices for motivational purposes. According to majority of the Pakistani military officers, the "Islamic character of Pakistan was reflected in the Islamic character of the military."²⁶⁰ Nevertheless, before Zia, Islam was more of a symbol than a practice to be integrated into the daily lives of the military officers. Being part of Zia's wide-scale Islamization scheme, Islamization in the military became extensive during the 1977-1988 period. Pakistan Army was categorized as liberal before the Zia era and Islamic practices were not part of the

²⁵⁹ Shah, *The army and democracy*, 162.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

normal routine. However, after 1977, individual displays of piety and devoutness, such as keeping of beards and the offering of prayers in units and messes, became normal.²⁶¹ Furthermore, there was a prohibition on the consumption of alcohol in officers' messes, and proselytizing activities of the Tableghi Jamaat, an influential Islamic missionary movement, were encouraged and facilitated in the army.²⁶² While Islam was emphasized only as an identity and a motivational force prior to Zia, it later started being linked with Islamic conservatism and orthodoxy in the Army.²⁶³ Moreover, with the institution's bias in favour of Islamic conservatism influencing the promotion policy as well as Army's encouragement to the officers to attend the annual congregations of the Tableghi Jamaat, many officers began expressing their fascination with the ideologies of Tableghi Jamaat and Jamaat-i-Islami.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, the rebirth of the concept of Jihad among the Army personnel during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1989 also reinforced the Islamic zeal among Army personnel.²⁶⁵ The Islamization in the military during Zia ul Haq's rule is important to this research because it had considerable effects even many decades after his death in 1988. The Zia period witnessed the Islamization of laws, public policy, and popular culture.²⁶⁶ Hence, by consolidating the Islamic ideology of the citizenry with a top-down reformation process and presenting the military as the real face of Islam in the country, rather than the civilian governments, the military continued to develop concordance with the citizenry. After the death of Zia in 1988 and the transition to civilian government, there were constant struggles of power between the military and civilian politicians, and Islamist forces, and secular political institutions.²⁶⁷ While the civilian governments of Bhutto and Sharif tried to normalize relations with India and resist the Islamist forces pushing for support of Taliban in Afghanistan and Jihad in Kashmir, the coalition of military forces and Islamic parties countered this trend by ever more tightly weaving Pakistan's

²⁶¹ Ibid., 163.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Rizvi, *Military, state and society in Pakistan*, 245.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

Tablighi Jamaat (lit. 'Society of Preachers') is a transnational Islamic missionary movement.

²⁶⁵ Rizvi, *Military, state and society in Pakistan*, 245.

²⁶⁶ Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1986); Lawrence Ziring, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 24, No. 9 (September 1984), 931-46; Charles Kennedy, "Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-89," *Pacific Affairs* 63, No. 1 (Spring 1990), 62-77; Charles Kennedy, *Islamization of Laws and Economy: Case Studies on Pakistan* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1996).

²⁶⁷ Vali Nasr, "Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 32, no. 6 (June 1992), 521-37.

foreign policy and regional interests with Islam, and thus continuing to anchor domestic politics in the debate over Islamization.²⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it is a challenge to investigate Islamization in the military after the Zia period as access to the Pakistan Army diminished after 1990 when numerous US sanctions on Pakistan limited defence cooperation and other forms of bilateral engagements.

Due to limited data regarding the military in the 1988-1999 period, Islamization in the institution cannot be measured appropriately. Hence, it will be analysed using military's outlook on Islamization, its support towards Islamist groups, and its use of Islamization in the rhetoric. The thesis assumes that if these factors represent greater inclination towards Islamism, it would also indicate that considerable efforts would not have been taken to end the Islamist practices integrated in the military during the Zia period. During the years between 1988 and 1999, Pakistan Army continued its support to Jamaat-e-Islami and used it to counter the civilian governments whenever they clashed with the military.²⁶⁹ With its political and strategic interests in Afghanistan, ideological rivalry with India, and claim over Kashmir, the military also continued its emphasis on Jihad, a concept that had become an integral part of training in the armed forces at the PMA and other training institutions such as the National University of Science and Technology.²⁷⁰ Although some senior army leadership after Zia was sceptical of the impact of his policies on the army with officers substituting "professionalism and discipline with Islam-oriented activism," Zia's successors continued to acknowledge the role and importance of Islam within military ideology.²⁷¹ With the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, a new militant Islamist force was introduced to Pakistan and the military turned to this new militancy to strengthen up its position in Pakistan's politics and Afghanistan's civil war.²⁷² Although military was still considered the 'face of Islam', 1993 general election results suggested that Nawaz Sharif had a strong appeal to the Islamic vote bank and Army-backed Jamaat-e-Islami could not limit Sharif's

²⁶⁸ Vali Nasr, "Military rule, Islamism and democracy in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (2004): 197.

²⁶⁹ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Religious militancy in Pakistan's military and Inter-services Intelligence Agency," *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater* 29 (2010), 50.

²⁷⁰ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The armed forces of Pakistan* (NYU Press, 2002), 82.

²⁷¹ Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, 247.

²⁷² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan* (London: Zed Books, 2002); William Maley, *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban* (New York: New York University Press, 1988); Larry Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

electoral success.²⁷³ Controlling the Islamist narrative was essential to continued public support and legitimacy to the military dominance; hence, a military-Islamist alliance was formed that struggled to take back control of Islamism.²⁷⁴ Since the Pakistani military was trying to regain its image as the ‘saviour’ of the state and control the Islamist narrative, the level of Islamization of the military was high and the process was overt. However, the level of Islamization in the military cannot be claimed high due to limited data and accessibility. Islamization in the military by normalizing Islamic practices and strengthening Islamic beliefs among the officers was evident during the Zia period. However, there is scarce literature on Islamization in the military during the 1988-1999 period. Nevertheless, Islamization of the military institution through attempts to control the Islamist narrative continued. The reforms in the military brought by Zia were not discontinued or opposed. Islamization might not have increased during the 1988-1999 period; however, it remained active till the 1999 coup.

4.3.2. Islamization in the military and the level of concordance

In spite of limited data on the Islamization in Pakistan’s military, research does not show that Zia’s Islamization was discontinued in the 1988-1999 period. Moreover, Islamization in the military was never practised as a covert process. The civilian government and the citizenry were aware of the ongoing Islamization and even after Zia, the military’s outlook as fighting for Islamic ideology and openly speaking in support of Jihad in Kashmir indicated that the emphasis on Islamism continued at high level in the subsequent years. In this study, Islamization is taken as a form of culture which forms a central element of Schiff’s concordance theory. Hence, it should have a significant impact on the level of concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. Moreover, since Islamism is a phenomenon important to all the three partners in concordance, it has the potential to act as a unifying force. However, due to continued distrust among the three actors and past military coups as well as the unifying power that came with Islamist agenda, each one aimed to control the Islamist narrative. Hence, in the case of Pakistan, Islamization in the military contributed to discordance rather than concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry.

²⁷³ Nasr, “Military rule, Islamism and democracy in Pakistan,” 199.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

This section will discuss the events in which Islamization in the military led to discordance among the three actors. The military had supported Jamaat-e-Islami mainly to counter the votebank of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League, and to use the unifying power of Islamism among the citizenry against the civilian governments whenever they clashed with the military. Before the elections following Zia's death in 1988, the ISI assembled a coalition – Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI-Islamic Democratic Alliance) of Islamist and pro-military parties to serve as the military's proxy in a controlled political process.²⁷⁵ The military was successful in using IJI against Bhutto's PPP and limiting her votebank. The Islamization in the military had convinced the officers and Pakistani's society that the military represented the Islamic ideology Pakistan was created on. By exploiting that image and the society's inclination towards Islamized military, the military used an Islamist party to divide PPP's votebank and showed that even if not directly in power, the Army still drove the politics. In this situation, Islamization in the military became a source of concordance between the military and the citizenry, but created deep discordance between the military and the civilian government. Moreover, during the second term of Benazir Bhutto, her reluctance in accepting the Taliban rule in Afghanistan gradually led to her dismissal.²⁷⁶ Again, the Islamization in the military had helped gained support for the Taliban rule within the military as well as public support from the society. There was no public discontent over the dismissal of Bhutto and the military legitimized this step by labelling Bhutto pro-India and anti-Islamist.²⁷⁷ Islamization in the military did succeed in building concordance with the citizenry, but developed discordance with the political leadership. It had a negative impact on concordance also during the political leadership of Nawaz Sharif. The military gained its legitimacy and public support mainly by controlling the Islamist narrative. Hence, when in 1993 Sharif had a strong appeal to the Islamic votebank and the Jamaat performed poorly, the military sensed its potential irrelevance in the eyes of the public with regard to Islamism.²⁷⁸ With Sharif's moderate Islamism and growing appeal, he was also dismissed on the bases of corruption and mismanagement and thus Islamization in the military contributed towards discordance among the three actors.

²⁷⁵ Lamb, *Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy*.

²⁷⁶ John F. Burns, "Pakistan Shifting Stance on Hard-Line Afghans," *New York Times*, March 27, 1996.

²⁷⁷ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*.

²⁷⁸ Nasr, "Military rule, Islamism and democracy in Pakistan," 199.

4.4. Summary

In a Muslim-majority state, Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology can have considerable impact on the civil-military relations. Based on Schiff's concordance theory, just as similar cultural and historical experiences can help build an agreement among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry regarding the role of armed forces in the society, similar Islamist beliefs and practices should also help the three actors develop concordance. The data regarding the four indicators of concordance in Pakistan suggests that apart from some concordance between the military and the citizenry in social composition of the officer corps and recruitment method, there was considerable discordance among the three actors in the 1988-1999 period. The military continuously switched between its guardian role and government role and with a lack of concordance between the military and the political leadership regarding the political decision-making, domestic military intervention stayed a common practice throughout the eleven years of 'democratic' rule. The successful outcome of the 1999 coup was a result of discordance among the three actors concerning the role of military. Since the military was clearly a dominant actor in the state affairs, the discussion on the level of concordance is carried out from the perspective of the military. Thus, the higher the dominance of an actor, the more important role it can play in achieving or preventing concordance. In the case of Pakistan, objective control or subjective control of the military were not practical options for the political leadership as the country had just gotten out of eleven years of military dictatorship and the military was still dominating the politics. The only viable option for the political leadership was to agree with the military for its own survival. During the 1988-1999 period, there were instances of unstable concordance in Pakistan which later led to discordance between the military and the political leadership ultimately resulting in the successful domestic military intervention.

On the other hand, Islamization in the military does have a significant impact on achieving or preventing concordance among the three actors. In the case of Pakistan, with an Islamic constitution and ideology, Islamism acts as a galvanizing force among the society. Whoever controls the Islamist narrative, controls the majority of the citizenry. Islamization in the military made Islamism essential to the Pakistan's military and supported the Army to stay dominant throughout the 1988-1999 period.

Furthermore, the role of culture, as proposed by Schiff's concordance theory, is key to civil-military relations. Theories of separation or concordance cannot be deemed appropriate for a specific context without taking into account the cultural and historical experiences of the country. Islamism is integral to Pakistan's constitution and its society; hence, it cannot be overlooked in civil-military relations, especially when society is also taken into account. The concordance model would be appropriate to the case of Pakistan when the rivalry over controlling the Islamist narrative would end. Nevertheless, since Islamism can act as a unifying force as well, it can help in achieving concordance if Islamization in the military is reduced. In the 1988-1999 period, Islamization in the military contributed to preventing concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry.



CHAPTER 5

LEVEL OF CONCORDANCE IN TURKEY

In this comparative case study, 2016 failed coup attempt has been chosen as a case of unsuccessful outcome of the domestic military intervention in Turkey. After fourteen years of transition towards becoming a civilocracy,²⁷⁹ an attempt was made by a faction of the Turkish military to violently dismantle the government. The attempt not only failed but also brought the Turkish military's dwindling authority to a minimum.²⁸⁰ After the 1997 post-modern coup, the country entered a period of democratization starting in 2002 with the electoral win of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP, Justice and Development Party). The 2002-2016 period was crucial for democracy in Turkey since although the military had been the caretaker of secularism and frequently intervened to protect the founding ideology of the country, military domination did negatively affect the democratization process of Turkey. Hence, after the 1960 coup d'état, it was the first time that civilian supremacy appeared to prevail in Turkish civil-military relations. Although the later terms of the AKP government have indicated potentials of elective dictatorship,²⁸¹ the country had started to move away from the possibility of military tutelage in future during the 2002-2016 period and hence, 2002 turned out to be an important turning point in the Turkish civil-military relations. This chapter will first discuss the background of the 2016 coup attempt by analysing the 2002-2016 period, as well as the 1997 post-modern coup. Next, using the indicators of concordance proposed by Rebecca Schiff, the level of concordance among the military,

²⁷⁹ A polity in which the military is effectively controlled by the political elites and civilians prevail over the military even in the case of a conflict.

Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish military: principal or agent?" *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 1 (2014): 5. See also Anton Bebler, "Typologies Based on Civilian-Dominated Versus Military Dominated Political System," in *Contemporary Political Systems: Classifications and Typologies*, ed. Anton Bebler and Jim Seroka (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 261-75.

²⁸⁰ Compared to the military's power throughout the Turkish Republic's history.

²⁸¹ Lord Hailsham, "Elective Dictatorship," *The Listener*, (21 October 1976): 496-500. See also Timur Kuran, "Turkey's electoral dictatorship," *Project Syndicate*, April 10 (2014).

the political leadership, and the citizenry, in the period before the failed 2016 coup attempt, will be determined. The purpose of this research is neither to discuss nor disregard all other explanatory factors contributing towards the prevention of domestic military intervention in Turkey, but to evaluate if there was concordance among the three actors prior to the failed coup attempt and if it had a role in preventing the coup's success. Moreover, the controversies surrounding who staged the coup must also be taken into consideration; the event is recent and highly politicized and securitized; hence, the argument of this research could be further developed when more light is shed on the issue in the coming years. The last subchapter will analyse the role of Islamization in achieving or preventing concordance among the three actors.

5.1. Background of the 2016 coup attempt

Throughout the Turkish Republic, “the military has been the one institution that has repeatedly checked civilian autocratic tendencies, maintained moderation, and ensured the preservation of the state.”²⁸² Since its transition to a multiparty system in 1950, the country has witnessed six attempted domestic military interventions in politics of which four (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) succeeded and three (1962, 1963, and 2016) failed.²⁸³ The 2016 coup attempt signified a weak and disorganized face of the military faction, against the norm of domestic military interventions in Turkey. Nevertheless, it was the chain of events in the 2002-2016 period in Turkey which led to how the 2016 coup attempt turned out. Although it was the year 2002 which marked the onset of the decline of military supremacy in Turkish civil-military relations, the 1997 post-modern coup is also essential to this discussion. Apart from restraining the civilian autocratic tendencies, one of the major concerns of the Turkish military has been political Islam and hence the Islamic-oriented political parties and societal groups in the country.²⁸⁴

²⁸² David Capezza, “Turkey’s Military is a catalyst for reform,” *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (2009): 13–23.

²⁸³ Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, “Turkey: How the coup failed,” *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 59.

Although not listed here, the 2007 e-coup may also be counted as a coup attempt.

²⁸⁴ Pinar Tank, “Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 1 (2005): 9; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” *Comparative Politics* 30, no. 1 (1997); Sam Kaplan, “Din-u Devlet All Over Again? The Politics of Military Secularism and Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34 (2002); Tanel Demirel “Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective,” *Armed Forces and Society* 31, no. 2 (2005). There are also some exceptions to this general attitude. For instance, in the early 1980s, the military tried to promote Islam as an antidote against the threat of communism. See Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” 68-70; Kaplan, “Din-u devlet all over again?,” 119.

Being the “guardians of the flame of Kemalism,” and the custodian of country’s founding principle of secularism, the Turkish military has always viewed Islamic radicalism as a threat to its ideology.²⁸⁵ Hence, when political Islam began to gain popularity during the 1990s through the *Refah Partisi* (RP, The Welfare Party), the military started to recognize the radical religious activities as important destabilizing factors in Turkey.²⁸⁶ The RP, headed by Necmettin Erbakan, embodied political Islamic views and became the largest party in the 1995 elections.²⁸⁷ As a result of RP’s inclination towards political Islam, in 1997, all state organs, particularly the National Security Council (NSC – *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, MGK), engaged in countering extremist threats and on 28 February 1997, the military presented the government a package demanding 18 anti-Islamist measures, focusing on extending compulsory education from five to eight years and restricting the activities of religious schools and private Quran courses.²⁸⁸ Although the Parliament approved the measures, the RP refused to implement them leading to the Turkish Armed Forces releasing a report on the ‘Spread of Political Islam’ in Turkey.²⁸⁹ In June 1997, Erbakan was forced to resign and his party was banned shortly thereafter.²⁹⁰ The new government was a coalition acceptable to the military. Most scholars define this as a ‘post-modern coup’.²⁹¹

5.1.1. The rise of AKP and the fall of military dominance

The limitations on the military’s authority began even before the AKP won 2002 elections. After Turkey was declared a European Union candidate country at the European Council’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999, several democratization reforms were introduced to meet the requirements for full membership.²⁹² These reforms also targeted the democratization of Turkish civil-military relations and subsequently, major legal and institutional changes were initiated to restrict the

²⁸⁵ James Brown, “The Military and Society: The Turkish Case,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 3 (July 1989): 399.

²⁸⁶ Sertif Demir and Oktay Bingöl, “From military tutelage to civilian control: an analysis of the evolution of Turkish civil–military relations,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no. 2 (2020): 178.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁸ Nilüfer Narlı, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” in Phillip H Fluri, Gustav E Gustenau, Plamen I Pantev (Eds) *The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe* (Heidelberg: Phsica Verlag, 2005), 229–258.

²⁸⁹ Demir and Bingöl, “From military tutelage to civilian control,” 178.

²⁹⁰ Nilüfer Narlı, “Civil-military relations in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 1, no. 1 (2000): 116.

²⁹¹ Demir and Bingöl, “From military tutelage to civilian control,” 178.

²⁹² Metin Gürcan, “Opening the blackbox: the transformation of the Turkish military,” PhD diss. (Bilkent University, 2016), 42.

military's political powers. Hence, the civilianization process was triggered by the EU's decision regarding Turkey's candidacy.²⁹³ In 1999, the seats of the military judges were removed from the State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri*, DGM).²⁹⁴ Moreover, in 2001, Article 118 of the Constitution was amended in order to increase the number of civilian participants in NSC meetings and the statement of "Any MGK decision would primarily be taken into consideration by the Cabinet" was changed to "would primarily be evaluated by the Cabinet" in order to uphold the credibility of the cabinet.²⁹⁵ EU harmonization also led to agreement between the civilian governments and Turkish military called the 'grand consensus',²⁹⁶ regarding the reduction of military influence and increased civilian control of armed forces.²⁹⁷ The reformation process accelerated during the first term of AKP government.

5.1.1.1. The first AKP government: 2002-2007

Although AKP labelled its ideology as 'conservative democracy', the party was frequently characterized as an Islamist party²⁹⁸ despite its pro-Western and liberal reformation process.²⁹⁹ The first term of AKP involved intense support for Turkey's EU bid, and restraint concerning political Islam and confrontation with the military on critical issues of headscarf and secularism.³⁰⁰ Since AKP and the military both supported the EU process, the potential EU membership served as a source of *modus vivendi* between the two actors.³⁰¹ Moreover, the chief of general staff position during

²⁹³ Zeki Sarigil, "Europeanization as institutional change: The case of the Turkish military," *Mediterranean Politics* 12, no. 1 (2007): 39-57.

²⁹⁴ Gürçan, "Opening the blackbox," 43.

Under the 1982 Constitution, the then military government established State Security Courts to try cases involving crimes against the security of the state, and organized crime.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁹⁶ Ersel Aydın, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz, "The Turkish military's march toward Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (2006): 83.

²⁹⁷ Umit Cizre, "Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone," *European Journal of Political Research* 43, (2004): 107.

²⁹⁸ Hasan Turunc, "Islamicist or democratic? The AKP's search for identity in Turkish politics," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 15, no. 1 (2007): 79-91.

AKP was considered de facto Islamist party and despite its earlier moderation, it has inculcated religious beliefs into Turkish politics. However, the non-secular policies were not widely put into practice until 2007. Although these policies may be seen as part of democratization and representation of the marginalized Islamist factions of the society, they naturally fall in the category of Islamization of Turkish politics.

²⁹⁹ Ihsan Dagı, "Islamist Parties and Democracy: Turkey's AKP in Power," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008): 25-30, doi:10.1353/jod.0.0015.

³⁰⁰ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformation* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2007): 9-34.

³⁰¹ Metin Heper, "Civil-military relations in Turkey: toward a liberal model?" *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 241-252.

this time was held by General Hilmi Özkök who preferred negotiation and persuasion with AKP leaders, rather than confrontation over security issues.³⁰² Nevertheless, the relations between the military and the AKP became tense when General Yaşar Büyükanıt was appointed as the new chief of general staff in 2006.³⁰³ During Büyükanıt's term, friction between the civilian government and the military was evident when the latter decided to intervene in the presidential nomination. The AKP nominated Abdullah Gül for the President and the Turkish military being against the decision, released a 'midnight memo' on 28 April 2007, warning that if Gül was elected President they would "openly display [their] reaction."³⁰⁴ However, the military did not receive expected pro-coup support from the civil society and in 2007 elections, AKP won with 46.58 per cent of the vote.³⁰⁵ Unable to gather sufficient public support, the military watched the decline in its popularity and the erosion of its role as the state's guardian, while the AKP strengthened its position with the expansion of the domain of civilian politics.³⁰⁶ The Turkish military was being slowly pushed into the background also with AKP's "zero-problems with neighbours" foreign policy.³⁰⁷ The emphasis on a soft power approach further reduced the role of the military. Another source of vast support for the AKP was also through expansion of the economy, which provided the government with leverage and flexibility to implement various significant social and political reforms.³⁰⁸ Hence, the first term of AKP in office demonstrated a gradual shift to civilian dominance in the country's civil-military relations, rise in public support for the party, and increased legitimacy of the civilian government.

5.1.1.2. The second AKP government: 2007-2011

The second term of AKP was marked with several events leading to further civilianization of the Turkish military. First, the AKP won 2007 elections despite military's reservations, strengthening both the public support and its self-confidence.³⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the turning point in the decline of Turkish military's role and reputation

³⁰² Gürcan, "Opening the black box," 46.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁰⁴ Ibrahim Kalın, "After the coup attempt, Turkey's success story continues," *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 3 (2016), 11–17.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ Demir and Bingöl, "From military tutelage to civilian control," 183.

³⁰⁸ Ariana Keyman, Ariana, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *e-International Relations* 21 (2012).

³⁰⁹ Gürcan, "Opening the black box," 50.

was the Sledgehammer-Ergenekon cases. In 2008, allegations arose concerning the existence of a secret criminal organization, Ergenekon, which would create turmoil in the society to create legitimate grounds for a military coup.³¹⁰ Following these allegations, another historic case, the Sledgehammer, appeared in the media in which a large number of soldiers were charged with planning an intervention in 2003.³¹¹ Those plans were revealed in 2010 through a newspaper, *Taraf*, leaving the public in shock.³¹² Details in the newspaper included plans of the plotters to create a chaotic atmosphere by bombing two mosques in Istanbul and shooting down a Turkish aircraft over the Aegean Sea.³¹³ Although the evidence was not completely convincing, only few criticized the incoherencies from fear of being associated with the alleged Ergenekon terrorist organization.³¹⁴ In 2013, 275 of the accused, including the former chief of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, were sentenced to life or long prison terms.³¹⁵ Although the two cases and the reactions led to democratization and demilitarization of the country, the Turkish military faced deep humiliation at the hands of the AKP government resulting in reduced public support and a tarnished reputation.³¹⁶ In addition to this, the civilian government also strengthened its control over the military through a constitutional referendum in 2010 that brought the military under civilian jurisdiction and limited military courts' jurisdiction over civilians.³¹⁷ The AKP also abolished the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order (EMASYA) in January 2010, reducing the role of the military in internal security.³¹⁸ Furthermore, due to low public support and narrow power in politics, the military could not react to the government's lifting of the ban on headscarves in universities in 2010 or to the government's negotiations with the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a

³¹⁰ Gareth Jenkins, *Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation* (Washington, D.C.: SAIS Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, 2009).

³¹¹ Acar Kutay, "From guardianship to civilian control: how did the Turkish military get here?" *Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право* 10, no. 3 (2017).

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Gareth Jenkins, "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation," *Silk Road Paper* 84 (2009), <https://bit.ly/3i3jOlu>.

³¹⁵ Chaitram Singh and John Hickman, "Soldiers as Saviors of the State: The Cases of Turkey and Pakistan Contrasted," *Journal of Third World Studies* 30, no. 1 (2013): 39-54. See also Pinar Doğan and Dani Rodrik, "How Turkey Manufactured a Coup Plot," *Foreign Policy*, 6 April 2010, foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/06/how-turkey-manufactured-a-coup-plot-2/.

³¹⁶ Hakan Sahin, "Turkey's Play with Its Military: Civil-Military Relations before and after the 2016 Coup," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2018): 36.

³¹⁷ Demir and Bingöl, "From military tutelage to civilian control," 185.

³¹⁸ Yaprak Gursoy "The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil–Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections," *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 2 (2012): 191–211.

separatist Kurdish group.³¹⁹ In addition to this, the AKP government was also involved with the Gulenist movement in taking control of the military and by restricting the power of the military as the Gulenists had infiltrated the institution and gained access to senior positions within the military.³²⁰ Moreover, the Ergenekon-Sledgehammer cases were also an alleged attempt by both the AKP government and Gulenist movement to reduce the dominance of the military.³²¹

5.1.1.3. The third AKP government: 2011-2015

In 2011 elections, AKP won a third term in parliamentary elections by increasing its vote to 49.8 per cent, becoming the only political party in Turkish history to win three consecutive general elections by receiving more votes than in the previous election each time.³²² Further civilianization of the Turkish military followed in this term and an unexpected development occurred in July 2011 with the then-Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan stating that the promotion of detained officers in the Supreme Military Council will not be approved by the government.³²³ This resulted in mass resignations of Turkish commanders and indicated a potential crisis; however, the government handled the situation smoothly by assigning a new command echelon, including the General Staff. Another step towards civilianization was taken in June 2013, when the Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Internal Service Code was removed from the TAF's Internal Service Law No. 211 of January 1961 and the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces was amended from "protecting and preserving the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic" to the duty "to defend the Turkish homeland against foreign threats and dangers."³²⁴ Another development took place during AKP's third term with the government's previous ally, the Gulen movement,³²⁵ turning into its challenger.

³¹⁹ Mustafa Akyol, "Turkey considers new 'peace process' with PKK," *Al-Monitor* (January 3, 2013).

³²⁰ Seda Demiralp, "The breaking up of Turkey's Islamic alliance: The AKP-Gülen conflict and implications for Middle East studies," *Meria Journal* 20, no. 1 (2016); Kim Shively, "Pragmatic politics: The Gulen movement and the AKP," in *The Turkish AK Party and its Leader* (Routledge, 2016), 183-204.

³²¹ Natalie Martin, "The AKP and the Gulenist News Media," in *The Securitisation of News in Turkey* (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020), 89-111; Hakkı Taş, "A history of Turkey's AKP-Gülen conflict," *Mediterranean Politics* 23, no. 3 (2018): 395-402; Natalie Martin, "Allies and enemies: the Gulen movement and the AKP," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2020): 1-18.

³²² Gürcan, "Opening the black box," 55.

³²³ Nurcan Yıldız, *Tanklar ve Sözcükler (Tanks and Words)* (Ankara: Alfa Publishing, 2007).

³²⁴ Demir and Bingöl, "From military tutelage to civilian control," 185.

³²⁵ This movement was founded by a clerical leader, Fethullah Gülen, who is currently in self-imposed exile in the U.S.A. He founded the movement, called *Hizmet* (Service), in the 1970s and enlarged it through various educational institutions. His followers regarded him as a spiritual leader and they claim

Since 2013, the Gulen movement was officially defined as a terrorist organization, Fethullah Terör Organizasyonu (FETO).³²⁶ With the members of the organization having infiltrated into different sectors including the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police, and the military, despite previous measures to expel suspected Gulen sympathizers from the armed forces, the cleansing of the military by the AKP government in order to remove all Gulenists from the institution resulted in further civilian dominance and military subordination.³²⁷

5.1.1.4. The 2016 coup attempt

After AKP's victory in 2015 elections, the government continued further civilianization of the Turkish military. However, the 15 July 2016 coup attempt served as a critical juncture in the Turkish civil-military relations when elements within the Turkish military attempted, but failed, to seize political power from the popularly elected government. Turkish officials linked the coup plot to Fethullah Gülen.³²⁸ The coup failed because it did not follow the chains of command and only a few field units supported the coup attempt.³²⁹ While senior commanders were held captive in an airbase in Ankara, the commander of the first army in Istanbul, General Ümit Dündar, condemned the coup at an early stage.³³⁰ Thousands of citizens came out on the streets resisting the soldiers on the call of President Erdogan and the failed coup was immediately condemned by all political parties as well. The 2016 coup attempt was a turning point in Turkey's civil-military relations because the level and pace of civilianization following the failed coup has not been witnessed throughout the history of the country.

5.2. Indicators of concordance

This subchapter will further analyze the 2002-2016 period using the four indicators of concordance proposed by Rebecca Schiff. As discussed in the methodology chapter in

to have promoted a tolerant Islam that emphasizes altruism, modesty, hard work and education. See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846>, (accessed: 21 September 2016)

³²⁶ Kutay, "From guardianship to civilian control," 77.

³²⁷ Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koç, "The Turkish coup attempt: the Gülen movement vs. the state," *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 4 (2016): 137.

³²⁸ Jim Zanotti, "Turkey: Failed Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy," *Federation of American Scientist*, *CRS INSIGHT*, July 19, 2016, p.2, (IN10533), available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IN10533.pdf, (Accessed on 9 June 2021).

³²⁹ Kutay, "From guardianship to civilian control," 79.

³³⁰ Ibid.

detail, the measurement of these indicators in the case of Turkey is widely carried out using secondary sources. Moreover, the discussion of the coup attempt itself and the subsequent further civilianization is not much significant to this research as the main goal is to investigate the level of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry before the coup attempt took place. The four indicators of concordance comprise the social composition of the officer corps, recruitment method, the political decision-making process, and military style. This section will analyse the level of concordance among the three actors concerning each indicator in order to test whether there was high concordance before the 2016 coup attempt and evaluate if the failure of the coup was a result of high concordance as proposed by Schiff's concordance theory.

5.2.1. Social composition of the officer corps

In the case of Turkish military, the social composition of the officer corps is analysed less through the ethnic diversity lens and more through the perspective of different orientations of the officers. Although the officer corps constitute only 6 per cent of the total personnel, it is the dominating elite group and therefore, the attitudes, opinions, strategic calculations, and behaviours of the officer corps help determine the Turkish military's actions.³³¹ Although the Turkish military still significantly represents the ideology of Kemalism, its assertive guardianship of the twentieth century is hardly evident in Turkish politics since the late 2000s. Through demilitarization and civilianization steps taken by the AKP government since 2002, the military has been relegated to a secondary position within the state apparatus, signalling a shift to a post-guardianship era in the Turkish Republic.³³² Most of the research on the Turkish military prior to civilianization developments asserts that that Turkish officer corps regarded itself as the guardian of the ideology of Kemalism, named after Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.³³³ Kemalism represented the ideology of secularism and hence military officers have been 'indoctrinated' in the preservation of Kemalism against internal threats such as political Islam and Kurdish separatism.³³⁴

³³¹ Metin Gurcan, "A snapshot of the blackbox: a 2015 survey of the Turkish officer corps," *Turkish Studies* 19, no. 1 (2018): 97-117.

³³² Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent," 176.

³³³ Gregory J. Wick, (2000), "Professionalism in the Turkish Military: Help or Hindrance to Civilian Control," MA Thesis (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, USA, 2000).

³³⁴ Mustafa Uluçakar and Ali Çağlar, "Turkish Professional Military Education and Civilian Control," *Bilig* 79 (2016): 174.

However, a vast majority of the Muslim Turkish population may not identify themselves closely with the ideology of secularism, apparent through the rising popularity and vote bank of AKP since 2002.³³⁵ In spite of being from the same ethnic group, the predominance of the Kemalists within the military might not be viewed by the non-secularists as equal representation in the institution.

The issue of representation of the Kurdish, Turks, Alawites, and other groups is not necessarily based on ethnic differences but on social class. Based on both official and unofficial texts, there is no visible discrimination against the admittance of ethnically Kurdish, Alawite and non-Muslim citizens to the academies or opportunities for promotion.³³⁶ Nevertheless, submitting to the principles of Kemalism was required, especially before the civilianization of the Turkish military. Moreover, non-Muslim minorities, namely Christians (Greek and Armenian) and Jewish citizens, hardly have successful applications in the military.³³⁷ The officer corps does not deliberately exclude any group, but the social composition shows that there is a large percentage of urban men from central Anatolia and the Aegean and Marmara regions.³³⁸ These officers are modern and secular, and are committed to Kemalism.³³⁹ Although there has not been any wide scale opposition to this composition from the public,³⁴⁰ there has been filtering out of several Kemalist officers after the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases.³⁴¹ In the late 2000s, the officer corps became more diverse in terms of their religious commitment, ideas about secularism, and Turkey's foreign policy options.³⁴² Earlier, the Supreme Military Council could filter out pious and religiously oriented

³³⁵ See Kayhan Delibas, *The rise of political Islam in Turkey: Urban poverty, grassroots activism and Islamic fundamentalism* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014); Senem Aydın and Ruşen Çakır, "Political Islam in Turkey," *Insight Turkey* (2007): 38-55.

³³⁶ Acar Kutay, "Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey: A Historical Survey," *CMI Working Paper* (2016), 24.

³³⁷ Gareth Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics," IISS Adelphi Paper 337 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 59-60.

³³⁸ James Brown's study on the demographic background of the officer corps (in 1982-84) showed that a large proportion of the War Colleges' cadets and War Academy officers' origins were urban areas and they often came from the following regions: Central Anatolia (29.2 per cent), Marmara and Aegean Sea (29.1 per cent), Black Sea (12.7 per cent) and Mediterranean (12.4 per cent). While they were fairly represented, officers from Eastern (10.4 per cent) and Southeastern region (6.3 per cent) were relatively under-represented. See Brown, "The Military and Society," 394-395.

³³⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel, an Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991).

³⁴⁰ Narli, "Civil-military relations in Turkey."

The Supreme Military Council takes the decision of expelling the officers who have Islamist and separatist or extremist tendencies.

³⁴¹ Kutay, "From guardianship to civilian control."

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 80.

officers with the charge of involvement in non-disciplinary acts; however, religious orientation is no longer defined as a non-disciplinary act and the officers, charged previously, can apply to receive their titles back.³⁴³ Moreover, based on the interviews conducted by Metin Gurcan with military personnel, military elites fall into the categories of symbionts, pragmatists, and reformists.³⁴⁴ Hence, with regard to the representativeness of the officer corps, the categories of Kemalists, anti-secularists, and Islamists, could depict a better picture of the diversity in the social composition rather than of Turks, Kurds, and non-Muslim minorities. In the period between 2002 and 2016, the social composition of the officer corps changed (or was changed) to include fewer Kemalists through various filtering measures as part of the civilianization process.

Considering AKP's policies which do not align with Kemalism, it is safe to assume that the dominance of Kemalists or secularists in the Turkish military could serve as a source of discordance between the military and the civilian government. The previous domestic military interventions show that the Turkish military took upon the role of guardian of secularism when the Turkish politics seemed to deviate from the ideology of Kemalism. The military's involvement concerning the candidacy of Abdullah Gul for 2007 presidential elections suggested that the institution still represented that ideology. However, with the filtering out of Kemalists following the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases as well as with the introduction of several constitutional amendments and legal reforms aimed at civilianization of the institution, the civilian government succeeded in achieving concordance regarding the social composition of the officer corps. Nevertheless, the Kemalists were replaced in large numbers by the Gulenists who later allegedly perpetrated the 2016 coup; hence, the filtering out of the Kemalists only led to concordance in the short run. The replacement of the Gulenists with new military officers after 2013, on the other hand, did contribute to greater concordance between the civilian government and the citizenry. Although the officer corps is more diverse now, there could be underrepresentation of the secularists with the current civilianization of the military.

³⁴³ Kutay, "Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey," 24.

³⁴⁴ Metin Gürcan, "Never Again! But How? State and the Military in Turkey after July 2015," *IPC-Mercator Policy Brief* 16 (2017), URL: http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Never-Again_Metin-Gurcan.pdf.

5.2.2. Recruitment method

The social composition of the officer corps is clearer when discussed in association with the recruitment method. If there is high level of concordance with regard to this indicator, it is highly likely that the social composition of the officer corps is also based on concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. Concrete data on the recruitment patterns of military elites in Turkey is scarce, especially in recent years.³⁴⁵ However, recruitment method has not changed drastically and thus, earlier research is also useful. Recruitment of cadets to the military academies has two sources: the military high schools and the equivalent civilian institutions.³⁴⁶ The service academies play an important role in inculcating the cadets with the values of Kemalism.³⁴⁷ In the 1980s, more than 44 per cent of the Army cadets came from Central Anatolia, a region representing 29.2 per cent of the total population; this could be because the region is closely associated with Ataturk and the Revolution.³⁴⁸ On the other hand, both Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia are underrepresented in all recruitment patterns due to geographic remoteness of the areas, economic underdevelopment, and a higher rate of illiteracy than the rest of Turkey; Southeastern Anatolia is populated largely by Kurds.³⁴⁹

In the Turkish case, there is compulsory conscription and serving the military is perceived not only as a duty of citizenship but also as a cultural necessity of being a 'real man'.³⁵⁰ Countries that apply compulsory military service suggest a strong relationship between compulsory conscription system and strength of the militarist discourse in that society.³⁵¹ Hence, concordance between the citizenry and military could be facilitated through the compulsory conscription system as well which served

³⁴⁵ Brown, "The military and society," 387.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 392.

There are three military high schools devoted to the Army: Kuleli (Istanbul), Isiklar (Bursa), and Maltepe (Izmir); the Navy has one: the Naval Lycee on Heybeliada (Istanbul). These institutions provide a free education to the students and are under the control of the Turkish General Staff. As for the War Colleges, admission is attained through competitive examinations, and presupposes a clean political and civil record for the student and his family.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 395.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 395-396

³⁵⁰ Such as "Every Turk is born as a soldier" and "Martyrs are immortal, and our land is indivisible." Burak Toygar Halistoprak, "Construction of civil-military relations in Turkey," PhD diss. (Bilkent University, 2011), 95.

³⁵¹ Karen A. Cerulo, "Symbols and the World System: National Anthems and Flags," *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 2, (1993): 243-271.

as a tool of social engineering to reshape society and an opportunity to teach the new Kemalist philosophy to the youth to consolidate its founding principles among the masses.³⁵² Nevertheless, fulfilling military service does not necessarily have a significant impact on the military's popularity;³⁵³ and in a survey conducted by Metin Gurcan involving the Turkish military, 66.4 per cent of the officers were of the view that compulsory military service should be abolished.³⁵⁴ Prior to the 2000s' developments, the army was known to have recruited itself from sons of military personnel and civil servants in a way that helped carry the positivist-progressive ideals of Kemalism.³⁵⁵ More significantly, this recruitment pattern has also assured the military's place in the political system as the "guardians of the flame of Kemalism."³⁵⁶ Nevertheless, a vast population of Turks does not adhere to the army's Kemalist ideals.³⁵⁷ In addition to this, as part of the rigorous selection process of the military academies, there was emphasis on leftist and/or Kurdish separatist sympathies, as well as indications of excessive piety or religious activism of the candidate or their relatives in the vetting process.³⁵⁸ After the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases, the filtering out of many Kemalist military officials also coincided with the new recruitments of the Gulenists.³⁵⁹ The recruitment method has not changed much during the 2002-2016 period. However, the trials, dismissals, and replacements of several military officials loyal to Kemalism resulted in the deliberate appointments of new military officials more devoted to the Gulenist movement and AKP.

5.2.3. The political decision-making process

In the 2002-2016 period, the civilian government has generally prevailed in cases of a clash between the government and the military regarding political decisions. These decisions involve military budgets, promotions, as well as the modes of military expenditures. Although the Turkish military controlled the appointments and

³⁵² Dilek Koçak and Sertif Demir, "Organizational Culture and the Turkish Military," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 13, no. 25 (2019): 46.

³⁵³ Zeki Sarigil, "Public opinion and attitude toward the military and democratic consolidation in Turkey," *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (2015): 294.

³⁵⁴ Gurcan, "Opening the black box," 302.

³⁵⁵ Brown, "The Military and Society," 399.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷ Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The anatomy of the Turkish military's political autonomy," *Comparative politics* (1997): 151-166.

³⁵⁸ Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance," 23.

³⁵⁹ Yavuz and Koç, "The Turkish coup attempt."

promotions of the officers, since 2011, discretion has been transferred to civilians.³⁶⁰ Previously, the Supreme Military Council could filter out pious or religiously oriented officers with the charge of involvement in non-disciplinary acts but now, religious orientation is no longer defined as a non-disciplinary act.³⁶¹ Regarding the defence budget, before 2002, it was never subjected to parliamentary debate.³⁶² However, during AKP rule, the military budget has been subject to democratic oversight and has remained almost stagnant. A number of new reforms were implemented, including achieving partial transparency of the defence budget through increasing the powers of inspection of the Court of Account.³⁶³ The military budget's share in the non-interest government budget has fallen from 11.4 per cent in 2002 to 5.3 per cent in 2014.³⁶⁴ Moreover, even in terms of the expanded SIPRI coverage which includes the significant improvement in the off budget funding facility for procurement, Turkey's military burden (in GDP) is halved, approaching the EU average in the last decade.³⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the Turkish military has gained much economic power through its enterprise known as the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK), which was founded in 1961 and has become one of the most profitable business enterprises in Turkey.³⁶⁶ Although the military budget has come under civilian scrutiny, the military industry is still a powerful tool as OYAK enjoys both the legal status of any other public enterprise and is thus immune from heavy taxation, and the legal status of a private enterprise and is thus free from government control.³⁶⁷

As a result of the civilianization of the Turkish military under AKP rule, the political decision-making processes have been largely determined by the civilian government. The AKP's two-thirds majority in parliament in its first term meant that it could single-handedly pass constitutional amendments. Various constitutional amendments in 2003 resulted in a decrease in the frequency of National Security Council meetings, a civilian

³⁶⁰ Kutay, "Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey," 24.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Sakallioğlu, "The anatomy of Turkish military," 159.

³⁶³ Demir and Bingol, "From military tutelage to civilian control," 184.

³⁶⁴ Gülay Günlük-Şenesen and Hikmet Kırık, "The AKP era: Democratization or resecuritization? An assessment of the institutional and budgetary reflections," *Research and Policy on Turkey* 1, no. 1 (2016): 84-85.

³⁶⁵ Sam Perlo-Freeman, Neil Ferguson, Noel Kelly, Carina Solmirano, and Helen Wilandh, "Military Expenditure Data, 2004–2013," in SIPRI Yearbook 2014, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, 221–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 221-250.

³⁶⁶ Kutay, "Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey," 26.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.: İsmet Akça, *Military-economic structure in Turkey: present situation, problems, and solutions* (Tesev Publications, 2010).

majority in the Council, and removal of the requirement that only a military officer could become the NSC Secretary General.³⁶⁸ Moreover, a referendum in 2010 brought about 26 constitutional amendments restraining the power of military courts and reversing the immunity from prosecution the 1980 coup leaders had given themselves.³⁶⁹ In addition to these changes, the role, function and structure of the NSC were also modified to reduce the military's supremacy, while military representatives were removed from various high-level state boards.³⁷⁰ Furthermore, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations, though all the accusations were accepted as fabricated and were dropped, led to the redesigning of the Turkish military and gave further control to the civilian government in political decision-making processes.³⁷¹ Another example demonstrating civilian prevalence is the 2007 presidential candidacy of Abdullah Gul. The AKP planned to put forward Abdullah Gul, who was known as a pious person and his wife wore a headscarf, as a candidate for the presidency and the military warned civilians with the purpose of protecting secularism.³⁷² However, the military was unable to mobilize the secular masses against the AKP; AKP called for an early election and it further increased its public support.³⁷³

The political decision-making process indicator in the case of Turkey demonstrates that there were instances of discordance in the beginning of AKP rule between the military and the civilian government; however, agreement on the EU accession policies and later, with the civilianization of the military, the discordance became less prominent. Elements in the military causing clashes between the military and the civilian government were filtered out through 'cleansing' of the institution following the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases as well as through institutional and legal reforms. Although it cannot be argued that there was a civilian-military partnership regarding the political decision-making process, there was an absence of discordance, especially after the second term of AKP. The cultural and historical experiences of the civilian

³⁶⁸ Zehra Rehman, "Decline of Military Intervention in Turkish Politics," *Defence Journal* 18, no. 7 (2015).

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Demir and Bingol, "From military tutelage to civilian control," 184.

For a detailed report on the reforms until 2009, see Linda Michaud-Emin, "The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 1, 25-42; Tuba Unlu Bilgic, "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 5 (2009): 803-824.

³⁷¹ Ersel Aydınlı, "Turkey under the AKP: civil-military relations transformed," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 1 (2012): 104.

³⁷² Kutay, "From Guardianship to Civilian Control," 72.

³⁷³ Sarigil, "The Turkish military: principal or agent?" *Armed Forces and Society* 40, no. 1 (2014): 180.

governments suggest that military could intervene if their authority as the guardian of secularism is challenged; hence, before the AKP challenged the notion of secularism, it had already consolidated the democratic control of the armed forces (decaf) and took over the political decision-making process.

5.2.4. Military style

The military style mainly refers to how the military appears and that appearance stands as a symbol that conveys and signifies a type of power or authority.³⁷⁴ In the case of Turkey, the military institution has always been a symbol of secularism and Kemalism. However, despite the rise of political Islam beginning in the late 2000s, the majority of the Turkish armed forces (49.1 per cent) do not consider the principle of secularism to be under threat.³⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the sensitivity regarding secularism decreases along with rank with 64 per cent of colonels thinking that secularism is under threat, while only 31 per cent of lieutenants/first lieutenants perceiving that secularism is under threat.³⁷⁶ Furthermore, almost 100 per cent of the armed forces are of the view that matters of religion and state ought to be separate.³⁷⁷ Thus, although there has been filtering out of the Kemalists and recruitment of new members, the Turkish military still carries the identity of secularism. The role of the military as the guardian of the state has been so powerful that even the military interventions do not seem to damage its popularity or its prestigious position in society.³⁷⁸

Although the popularity of the Turkish military still remains high among the citizenry after the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases, it has declined as compared to early 2000s. Based on the World Values Survey results of 2010-2014, the confidence of the public in the armed forces was 73.9 per cent.³⁷⁹ However, compared with 86.2 per cent in 1999-2000, the confidence in the armed forces has decreased.³⁸⁰ On the other hand, the confidence in the government was 58.9 per cent and confidence in the Parliament

³⁷⁴ Schiff, *The military and domestic politics: A concordance theory of civil-military relations*, 47.

³⁷⁵ Gurcan, "Opening the black box," 287.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 288.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 293.

³⁷⁸ Tanel Demirel, "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (2004).

³⁷⁹ Gurcan, "Opening the black box."

Both 'a great deal' and 'quite a lot' confidence answers were considered: 43.5% (a great deal) 30.4% (quite a lot).

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

was 54 per cent. The military's popularity is high among nationalists; however, it is limited among pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups.³⁸¹ This could be due to the strongly secular characteristics of the Turkish military which has always been concerned about political Islam and kept a close watch on Islamic-oriented political parties and societal groups.³⁸² Nevertheless, the Turkish military still has respect and confidence of the citizenry including the country's non-Muslim minorities. Turkey's Armenians for example, the largest non-Muslim minority group living in the country, consider the Turkish Army as the most credible and trustworthy institution and a career as an officer as a desirable occupation.³⁸³ The Turkish military is known for its adherence to law and order and is considered the most trusted institution in the country.³⁸⁴ Moreover, the military and society have had a good and strong relationship.³⁸⁵ For example, the Eurobarometer opinion poll of 2008 indicates that the vast majority of Turkey respects the military as an institution and a total of 84 per cent of Turks named the military as the most trusted institution in the country.³⁸⁶ On the other hand, the Turkish military as an institution has remained isolated from the rest of the society. Soldiers have separate residential areas, social activity centres, restaurants, and summer camps.³⁸⁷ Nevertheless, there has not been an open conflict between society and the soldiers. It must also be noted that Turkish culture is not monolithic and there are various ethnic, religious, and political identities. These identities affect how people approach the institution and while Turks have a pro-military attitude, Kurds have an anti-military attitude.³⁸⁸ Similarly, religious people, mainly supporting the AKP, are more sceptical towards the political role of the military.³⁸⁹

The military style of the Turkish military indicates that despite varying attitudes towards the institution based on different identities within the citizenry, it is considered a prestigious and respected institution. There has been discordance between the civilian

³⁸¹ Sarigil, "Public opinion and attitude toward the military and democratic consolidation in Turkey."

³⁸² Tank, "Political Islam in Turkey"; Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey"; Kaplan, "Din-u Devlet All Over Again?"

³⁸³ Birsen Örs, "The perception of the army by Armenian minorities living in Turkey," *Armed Forces & Society* 36, no. 4 (2010): 604-626.

³⁸⁴ Yaprak Gürsoy, "The impact of EU-driven reforms on the political autonomy of the Turkish military," *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 2 (2011): 293-308.

³⁸⁵ Sarigil, "The Turkish military, principal or agent?"

³⁸⁶ Gareth Jenkins, "Poll suggests military still the most trusted institution in Turkey," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 25 (2008).

³⁸⁷ Narlı, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey."

³⁸⁸ Kutay, "From Guardianship to Civilian Control," 73.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

government and the military regarding the secularist identity of the latter and the anti-secularist identity of the former; however, after 2007, the civilian government enabled its domination over the military. On the other hand, the military and the citizenry have generally experienced concordance between themselves concerning this indicator; however, the level of concordance has reduced between 2002 and 2016.

5.3. Impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance

In the previous section, the concordance theory proposed by Rebecca Schiff was tested using the case study of Turkey's 2016 failed coup attempt. Utilizing the four indicators of concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry, it was proved that there were varying levels of concordance among the three actors before the 2016 coup attempt. The rising support for AKP showed that the concordance level between the civilian government and the citizenry remained high throughout the 2002-2016 period. Moreover, although there was not a high level of discordance between the military and the citizenry, the popularity of and the confidence in the military institution went down. The concordance level between the civilian government and the military remained high during the 2002-2007 period mainly due to partnership on the EU accession matter; however, a low level of concordance between the two actors in the following period led to the coup attempt in 2016. Nevertheless, the coup attempt failed due to high concordance between the civilian government and the citizenry prior to 2016, as well due to absence of discordance between the government and the higher authority in the military. As this thesis aims to go beyond testing the concordance theory by analysing the impact of Islamization in the military on the level of concordance, after finding concordance or absence of discordance among the three actors, this study will continue towards the second part. This section will first analyse the level of Islamization in the Turkish military and then evaluate its impact on the level of concordance.

5.3.1. Level of Islamization in the Turkish military

Since the Turkish military has always symbolized the ideology of Kemalism and secularism, Islamization in the military is not a common phenomenon. Nevertheless, despite the military's identity of a secularist institution, there have been elements of Islamization especially after 2002. Although Turkish citizens take pride in their

country's secular lifestyle, many of them follow religious law in their private lives, to varying degrees.³⁹⁰ With the majority of Turkey's citizens being Muslim, Islamic tradition is an important element in the country's culture.³⁹¹ Within the military, the attitudes toward Islam are not necessarily negative as religion acts as a powerful unifying force.³⁹² For example, meals in military mess halls begin with a general blessing using the word *Tanrı*, a Turkish and more secular equivalent of the Muslim *Allah*.³⁹³ However, an 'overly' religious candidate or a candidate actively involved in religious organizations is likely to be rejected as the religious has to be followed within certain boundaries prescribed by the institution.³⁹⁴ Moreover, graduates of the religious school network (*Imam Hatip*) were not accepted to military officer academies and thus could not serve as Turkish officers.³⁹⁵ In addition to this, religiosity can also be categorized as a non-disciplinary act and between 1995 and 2000, 745 officers and non-commissioned officers were dismissed by the Supreme Military Council on these grounds.³⁹⁶ For Turkish military, the commitment to the military should be greater than the commitment to one's religious beliefs and therefore, Islamization in the military can only be through covert means.³⁹⁷ In this regard, limitations to Islamic practices in the military include clash of prayer times and military activity timings, no availability of military imams or chaplains in the Turkish military, and no exemptions to fasting soldiers.³⁹⁸ In order to measure the level of Islamization in the Turkish military, survey results carried out by Metin Gurcan are also useful. Based on the findings, 78 per cent of the officers opposed the woman in public service to cover their heads.³⁹⁹ 84 per cent of the respondents were against female students in primary and secondary schools to cover their heads.⁴⁰⁰ Aiming to measure the level of piety of the officers, the belief of

³⁹⁰ Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance."

³⁹¹ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21–23; Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, *Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey* (Istanbul, Turkey: TESEV, 2000), English summary, http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/project/TESEV_search.pdf.

³⁹² Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, "Mediating structures and the military: The case of religious soldiers," *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no. 4 (2008): 615–638.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 627.

K. (former Turkish soldier), personal correspondence of Stollman, November 10, 2004. The complete blessing is *Tanrimiz hamdolsun, milletimiz var olsun, afiyet olsun* (May our God be praised, may our nation exist and bon appétit).

³⁹⁴ Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance," 23.

³⁹⁵ Yüksel Sezgin, "Can the Israeli Status Quo model help Post-February 28 Turkey solve its Problems?" *Turkish Studies* 4, 3 (Autumn 2003): 63–64.

³⁹⁶ Jenkins, "Context and Circumstance," 26, 28–29.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 28–29.

³⁹⁸ Rosman-Stollman, 628.

³⁹⁹ Gurcan, "Opening the black box," 293.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

officers in the afterlife was inquired with 64 per cent of them believing in the concept but 13.8 per cent not responding to the question, suggesting that the expression of opinions about piety is still taboo in the Turkish military.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 92.4 per cent of the officers stated that they prefer science in a situation of contradiction between religion and science.⁴⁰² The survey results generally signal towards low level of Islamization in the military or potentially covert means of Islamization which the officers do not intend to expose.

Islamization in the Turkish military has increased through the Gulenist movement and through the civilianization process during the AKP government. As discussed earlier, in the late 2000s, the officer corps became more diverse in terms of their religious commitment and ideas about secularism.⁴⁰³ The Supreme Military Council could no longer dismiss officers on the charges of being pious and religiously oriented officers as religious orientation is no longer defined as a non-disciplinary act and the officers, charged previously, can apply to receive their titles back.⁴⁰⁴ With regard to the Gulenists, many Islamist officers remain undercover in the military and might be even populating the senior infrastructure of the Turkish General Staff.⁴⁰⁵ Although secularism still remains the dominant ideology of the Turkish military, civilianization of the institution as well as dismissals and replacements of the secularist officers with ones more loyal to AKP and Islamism, has resulted in a military institution more tolerant to even overt Islamization.

5.3.2. Islamization in the military and the level of concordance

In spite of limited data on the Islamization in the Turkish military, it is evident that there have been traces of the process in the institution. Moreover, it is also clear that the process of Islamization was covert and at a low level. Even during the civilianization of the Turkish military, especially after 2007, there was no explicit campaign to Islamize the institution and the steps taken were rather subtle. In this study, Islamization is taken as a form of culture which forms a central element of Schiff's concordance

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 294.

⁴⁰² Ibid. 295.

⁴⁰³ Kutay, "From guardianship to civilian control," 80.

⁴⁰⁴ Kutay, "Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey," 24.

⁴⁰⁵ Merdan Yanardağ, *Fethullah Gülen Hareketinin Perde Arkası, Türkiye Nasıl Kusatıldı?* (Istanbul: yah Beyaz Yayın, 2006), based on interviews with Nurettin Veren on Kanaltürk television, June 26, July 3, 2006.

theory. Hence, it should have a significant impact on the level of concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. Moreover, since Islamism is a phenomenon significantly impacting all the three partners in concordance, it has the potential to act as a unifying force. Nevertheless, in the case of Turkey between 2002 and 2007, Islamization has been a source of discordance, especially between the military and the civilian government, as both the actors aim to control the Islamist narrative. Even when the Turkish military symbolizes the Kemalist and secularist ideology, it does not disregard the significance of Islamism as a unifying force and intends to shape the level of Islamization in the institution and in the society. On the other hand, low level Islamization in the military aided in achieving concordance between the civilian government and society, especially after 2008. It must be specified that this is the impact of low level of Islamization in the military and a high level of Islamization in the Turkish military may have negative impact on concordance, taking into account the large secularist faction of the society.

This section will discuss the ways in which Islamization in the Turkish military led to both concordance and discordance among the three actors during the 2002-2016 period. One case contributing to discordance between the military and the civilian government was the nomination of Abdullah Gul as a candidate for the President. Gul was believed to have roots in political Islam and his wife wore a headscarf.⁴⁰⁶ However, in this particular case, Islamization of the civilian government rather than Islamization in the military led to discordance. Moreover, the concordance between the civilian government and the military was very strong on the matter of EU accession and hence, saved the two actors from discordance on several other matters. Following the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases and the civilianization of the military undertaken mainly by the AKP government, the representation of the non-secularists increased in the military. Moreover, the officers could no longer be dismissed on the basis of being ‘overly’ religious as religious orientation was no longer categorized as a non-disciplinary act. This led to concordance between the civilian government and the citizenry as the underrepresented non-secularists or Islamists found better representation in the military. To some extent, this also led to concordance between the military and the citizenry as although the changes were made by the civilian

⁴⁰⁶ Sarigil, “Public opinion and attitude toward the military and democratic consolidation in Turkey public opinion.”

government, it was the Islamization in the military which rendered the military more representative of the previously underrepresented group of non-secularists and Islamists in the country. Another aspect of this debate is the power struggle between the AKP and the Gulenist movement. According to a wide consensus, though the trials are still ongoing, the 2016 coup attempt was perpetrated by the Gulenist faction within the Turkish military.⁴⁰⁷ This could mean that there was discordance between the civilian government and a faction of the military on the matter of controlling not only the state but equally importantly, the Islamist narrative. Hence, it can be argued that discordance between the military and the civilian government was not due to clash between secularism and Islamization in the military, but was a result of different forms of Islamization in the institution, one carried out covertly by the Gulenists and the other carried out more explicitly as part of the process of civilianization of the military by AKP. In the case of Turkey, it is evident that Islamization in the military does not have a significant impact on the level of concordance. This could be due to the fact that the Islamization is low and covert. Nevertheless, due to the Muslim majority of the population with vast majority of those who identify themselves as non-secularists, as well as the Islamist orientation of the civilian government (more explicit after 2011), Islamization in the military affects the level of concordance between the government and the citizenry positively.

5.4. Summary

In a Muslim-majority state, Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology can have considerable impact on the civil-military relations. Based on Schiff's concordance theory, just as similar cultural and historical experiences can help build an agreement among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry regarding the role of armed forces in the society, similar Islamist beliefs and practices should also help the three actors develop concordance. The data regarding the four indicators of concordance in Turkey demonstrates that there was concordance between the military and the citizenry in social composition of the officer corps, recruitment method, and military style during the 2002-2016 period. Concordance was found even in the political decision-making process; however, concordance level in this indicator as well as in

⁴⁰⁷ Kutay, "From guardianship to civilian control," 78; Esen and Gumuscu, "Turkey: How the coup failed."

military style reduced from 2002 to 2016. This could be due to a combination of factors such as society's reaction to the alleged Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases against the military, rise of political Islam through AKP, continued civilianization of the military, and increased religious diversity in the institution. With the military not being able to demonstrate its guardian role, and with an increase in the level of concordance between the civilian government and the society due to AKP's favourable EU accession and economic policies, the confidence in the institution declined. Moreover, those who identified with the Kemalist ideology of the Turkish military could not relate with it as they did before since the civilianization of the institution led to rise of non-secularism as well. On the other hand, the level of concordance between the civilian government and the military remained stable between 2002 and 2007 particularly due to agreement on the EU accession policies. Although the level of concordance dropped in the second term of AKP, the civilianization of the institution prevented any form of extreme discordance between the two actors. Even if there were grievances, they were not loud enough to be categorized as discordance. It must also be noted that since the civilian government emerged as the dominant actor among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry, the discussion on the level of concordance is carried out from the perspective of the military. Thus, the higher the dominance of an actor, the more important role it can play in achieving or preventing concordance.

From 2002 to 2007, the military, the civilian government, and the citizenry were in a partnership on the four indicators of concordance. However, it was not Islamization in the military which in any way aided concordance in this period. The partnership was built around the goal of EU membership and with the government leading Turkey's policy with regard to its EU accession positively, the military and the society included themselves in the partnership automatically. Moreover, AKP's cooperation with the Gulenist movement in the military also helped it keep control over the institution's procedures in the late 2000s. Nevertheless, following the candidacy of Abdullah Gul in 2007 as well as the alleged Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases, there was a brief period of discordance between the military and the other two actors. This discordance was handled with the civilianization of the military institution and could be categorized as unstable concordance. Moreover, AKP's falling out with the Gulenist movement, mainly to limit the increasing domination and potential power of the latter, at first limited the government's power of the military, but later helped it gain further control

by expelling the Gulenists from the institution. However, the 2016 coup attempt indicated that the discordance between the military and the civilian government had not completely dissolved. On the other hand, one of the reasons why the coup attempt failed was the high level of concordance between the civilian government and (a large faction of) the citizenry. Hence, when both the civilian government and the citizenry agreed on the role of the military that it should not intervene even if it had to protect the ideology of secularism, domestic military intervention was prevented. Although there were many sources of concordance between the two actors, one of them was the Diyanet (Directorate) of Religious Affairs which was used by the civilian government to mobilize the masses.⁴⁰⁸ Although the Diyanet was established by the Kemalist elite in 1924 to oversee the administration and maintenance of mosques, it got involved in day-to-day politics during the AKP government.⁴⁰⁹ Following President Erdoğan's appeals at the event of 2016 coup attempt, top Diyanet officials told imams in more than 86,000 mosques to say the call to prayer as a statement of defiance against the coup.⁴¹⁰ Hence, the extensive network of mosques in Turkey was used effectively by the civilian government to gain support of the society against the 2016 coup attempt. Moreover, although the coup was staged by a faction of the military, the institution generally stood against it – huge public support for the AKP government being one of the possible reasons – which could also signal that there was some level of concordance even with the military.

With regard to the Islamization in the military, it did not play a powerful role in achieving or preventing concordance in the case of Turkey which could be due to low and covert Islamization. Moreover, discordance due to Islamization in the military between the institution and the civilian government was also prevented by the concordance power of the EU accession goal of the three actors. Nevertheless, it is evident that when the military represented strong secularist ideology while the civilian government inclined towards non-secularist policies, low level of Islamization in the military would hardly help in achieving concordance. On the other hand, when the secularist identity of the military weakened and the Islamist identity of the civilian

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 65-66.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Pinar Tremblay, "How Erdoğan Used the Power of the Mosques against Coup Attempt," *Al-Monitor*, 25 July 2016, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkeycoup-attempt-Erdogan-mosques.html.

government became more prominent, Islamization in the military helped not only achieve concordance but increase civilian control of the military as well and lead to forced concordance of the military. Finally, Islamization in the military in combination with the majority of society inclined towards a party with non-secularist agenda, could lead to concordance between the military and the society as the previously underrepresented Islamist faction of the society would see this process as increased representativeness of the institution. Islamization in the military, aided by the civilian government, also helped achieve concordance between the government and the previously underrepresented Islamist faction of the society. Nevertheless, a vast secularist population of the country have the power to prevent concordance with a non-secularist civilian government in the future.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Since concordance theory focuses on dialogue, accommodation, and shared values, it tends to lose its effectiveness when emphasis is diverted from these features. Unlike other theories of civil-military relations, concordance theory is not premised on the basis that actors are intrinsically pessimistic. Hence, instead of aiming for control and power, the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry aim to achieve a harmonious partnership. Using the case studies of Pakistan and Turkey, the research question of this thesis can be answered in the affirmative. Concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry does prevent the success of domestic military intervention; similarly, discordance among these actors facilitates the success of coup d'état. However, it is difficult to completely eliminate the element of control from the discussion of civil-military relations. For example, in the case of Turkey, even when there was a high level of concordance among the three actors concerning EU accession policies, there was still some level of mistrust among the actors regarding their motive and implementation. Hence, despite the shared values and objectives of the three actors, EU accession policy could not create a long-lasting partnership. This study makes several conclusions which serve as contributions to the civil-military literature, and concordance theory in particular.

6.1. Contributions

One major conclusion derived from these case studies is that domestic military intervention can succeed or fail based on the concordance between only two actors from the military, the political elites, and the citizenry, as well. However, the outcome depends on who the two actors are. Hence, in comparison with Schiff's trilateral partnership, this study proposes the possibility of a bilateral partnership which could

prevent the success of domestic military intervention. In the case of Pakistan, a high level of discordance between the military and the civilian government led to the 1999 coup; however, it was also concordance between the military and the society which facilitated the coup and increased its legitimacy. Similarly, in the case of Turkey, the military was not necessarily involved in concordance and a high level of concordance between the civilian government and the citizenry prevented the 2016 domestic military intervention. This new typology of concordance is explained below:

| | Possible Configurations | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|------------|
| | I | II | III | IV |
| Military-Citizenry | C | C | D | D |
| Citizenry-Government | C | D | D | C |
| Likelihood of coup success | <i>Contingency</i> | <i>High</i> | <i>Contingency</i> | <i>Low</i> |

Note:

C: Concordance; D: Discordance

Discordance between military and government is taken as given.

Table 1 Bilateral concordance configurations and the possible outcomes of coup attempt⁴¹¹

Assuming that there is discordance between the military and the civilian government, the first configuration (C-C) refers to the military taking action against the civilian government with both the actors having concordance with the citizenry. The success of the domestic military intervention is contingent on the citizenry's preferences and actions. Supporting the civilian government might lead to the failure of the coup whereas supporting the military might result in the success of the coup. The second configuration (C-D) depicts the case of Pakistan where military-citizenry concordance and citizenry-government discordance resulted in the successful outcome of the 1999 coup. The third configuration (D-D) has high chances of coup success; however, it is contingent on other factors as well. The fourth configuration (D-C) is closest to the case of Turkey in which military-citizenry discordance and citizenry-government concordance prevented the 2016 coup attempt from succeeding.

This study also helps in formulating yet another typology of concordance which could better explain the types of partnership that could exist among the three actors. Although it could be further elaborated and refined with advanced research, this preliminary study helps to identify two types of concordance: stable and unstable concordance, as shown

⁴¹¹ I would like to thank Dr Zeki Sarigil for suggesting this conceptual framework.

A final contribution of this study is regarding the role of the perception of each actor regarding the level of concordance between the other two actors.⁴¹² This perception is key to their respective behaviours during a coup attempt. For example, in the case of Pakistan, if the military had not perceived the lack of concordance between the society and the civilian government, it might have refrained from intervening. Similarly, one of the reasons why the Pakistani citizenry did not support the government against the coup could be the perceived discordance between the political leadership and the military with the latter being much more powerful and influential. Moreover, the reason why Pakistani political leadership could not rally against the coup could be due to the perceived concordance between the military and the public. In the case of Turkey, the military perceived the strong concordance between the society and the popular AKP government and hence, abstained from intervening actively as an institution in the 2016 coup attempt. This aspect concerning the role of one actor's perception regarding the existing partnership between the other actors, may also determine how they act in a given situation and is not discussed by concordance theory. Further research on this aspect could also advance the theory.

6.2. Islamization in the military: A Comparative Analysis

With regard to Islamization in the military, the comparative case study suggests that its impact on the level of concordance can be both positive and negative. The data indicates a high level of overt Islamization in the Pakistani military but a low level of, generally covert, Islamization in the Turkish military. In the case of Pakistan, with an Islamic constitution and Muslim majority population, Islamization in the military aided concordance between the military and the society, even if the civilian government did not fit in. However, even if Islamization served as a bridging ideology among the three actors and had the potential to instil shared values and objectives among them, the heterogeneity of the phenomenon prevented this from happening. Different factions among the three actors aimed to control the Islamist narrative to maintain power and hence, Islamization in the military did not have a significant impact on achieving or preventing concordance among the three actors, though it aided concordance between the military and the citizenry. Islamization in the military made Islamism essential to the Pakistan's military and supported the Army to stay dominant throughout the 1988-

⁴¹² I would like to thank Dr Ersel Aydınli for this analysis.

1999 period and also ensured minimum public objection to the 1999 coup. Nevertheless, since Islamism can act as a unifying force as well, it can help in achieving concordance if Islamization in the military is reduced. Hence, in the 1988-1999 period, Islamization in the military contributed to preventing concordance among the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry.

On the other hand, Islamization in the military did not play a powerful role in achieving or preventing concordance in the case of Turkey, which could be due to low and covert Islamization. Moreover, discordance due to Islamization in the military between the institution and the civilian government was also prevented by the concordance power of the EU accession goal of the three actors. Nevertheless, it is evident that when the military represented strong secularist ideology while the civilian government was inclined towards non-secularist policies, the low level of Islamization in the military would hardly help in achieving concordance. On the other hand, when the secularist identity of the military weakened and the Islamist identity of the civilian government became more prominent, Islamization in the military helped not only achieve concordance between the civilian government and a large faction of the society, but also increase civilian control of the military. It is important to highlight that this concordance could be due to low Islamization in the military and a high level of Islamization in the military might cause unstable concordance or discordance due a large secularist faction in the Turkish society. Finally, Islamization in the military in combination with the majority of society apparently inclined towards a party with non-secularist agenda, could lead to concordance between the military and the society as the previously underrepresented Islamist faction of the society would see this process as increased representativeness of the institution. Islamization in the military, aided by the civilian government, also helped achieve concordance between the government and the previously underrepresented Islamist faction of the society. Nevertheless, a vast secularist population of the country may have the power to prevent concordance with a non-secularist civilian government in the future.

Comparing the two cases, it can be concluded that Islamization in the military can have a significant impact on the level of concordance only under certain conditions. Otherwise, on its own, it is not a dominant force in either achieving or preventing concordance. Nevertheless, its role is central to concordance as in Muslim-majority countries, Islamization itself forms the part of culture of the society. That role impacts

concordance depending on the type and level of Islamization in the military in combination with the constitution type, civilian government policies, and society's attitude towards the phenomenon.

6.3. Research implications

This research has several important implications for both theory and policy. The study has reanalysed the concordance theory and proposed typologies of concordance and potential modifications to the theory; advanced the Islamization debate in civil-military relations; and identified possible loopholes in the theory. Since Islamization is paramount to Muslim-majority countries, it cannot be overlooked in their civil-military relations. Hence, this study allows for further opportunities to research on the role of Islamization not only in concordance, but in other civil-military theoretical approaches as well. A large-N analysis is also possible by identifying the level of Islamization in the military of Muslim-majority states and analysing if there is a relation with the outcomes of domestic military intervention. Furthermore, a qualitative study to examine the role of Islamization in the military involving more case studies would also help advance the field. It would be a daunting task, but inquiring the role of Islamization in every indicator of concordance would be the next step of this research, as that would help identify its impact on a much specific level. In addition to this, Islamization in the civilian government and in the society, can be treated as separate areas of research and must be delved in further to explore their particular roles in concordance and civil-military relations.

Additionally, this research also has policy implications. Since policy issues are rooted in culture, Islamization in the military and in general, impacts the policies as well. A highly Islamized military in Pakistan would affect how the military establishment views the country's foreign policy towards India, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and United States, for example. Hence, the military establishment should be capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued. This would also impact the relationship between the military and the civilian government, as well as the society, concerning the country's internal security and foreign policies. Concordance would be even greater in democracies, thus, increasing the level of concordance could speed up a country's democratization process by strengthening the relationship between the citizenry and the other two actors. Concordance is particularly required during periods of external threat

and in the process of policy-making, the role of Islamization in the military should be examined during those periods. Hence, monitoring the level of Islamization in the military is important by both the military and the civilian government as it has the power to achieve as well as prevent concordance. Whether the Islamization is high or low, overt or covert, it should be monitored and regulated in order for it to aid in concordance of the three actors, rather than prevent it.



REFERENCES

- “Estimated Percentage Range of Shia by Country.” *Pew Research*. October 2009.
<https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2009/10/Shiarange.pdf>.
- “Hamid Gul admits he had role in IJI Formation.” *Daily Times* (Lahore). January 5, 2010.
- “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Pakistan.” *Systemic Peace*. July 1, 2011.
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Pakistan2010.pdf>.
- “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Turkey.” *Systemic Peace*. July 1, 2011.
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Turkey2010.pdf>.
- “Population by religion,” *Pakistan Bureau of Statistics*. May 26, 2021.
<https://bit.ly/2SR1CRW>.
- “Population by Religion.” *Pakistan Bureau of Statistics*.
<https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-religion>.
- “Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions.” *European Commission*. January 13, 2021. <https://bit.ly/2TCS1b1>.
- “Turkey, Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions.” *European Commission*. January 13, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3yajBCD>.
18, no. 7 (2015).
- Aguero, Felipe. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
- Akça, İsmet. *Military-economic structure in Turkey: present situation, problems, and solutions*. Tesev Publications, 2010.
- Akyol, Mustafa. “Turkey considers new ‘peace process’ with PKK.” *Al-Monitor*. January 3, 2013.
- Albright, David E. “A comparative conceptualization of civil-military relations.” *World politics* 32, no. 4 (1980): 553-576.
- Ali, Zulfiqar. “Contradiction of concordance theory: Failure to understand military intervention in Pakistan.” *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 3 (2014): 544-567.
- Amin, Tahir. “Pakistan in 1993: Some Dramatic Changes.” *Asian Survey* 34, no. 2 (February 1994), 192-194.

- Anckar, Carsten. "On the applicability of the most similar systems design and the most different systems design in comparative research." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 11, no. 5 (2008): 389-401.
- Anderson, John M. *Civil-military relations and concordance theory: a case study of Argentina*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA, 1998.
- Asad, Talal. "Religion, nation-state, secularism." *Nation and religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* (1999): 178-196.
- Aydın, Senem, and Ruşen Çakır. "Political Islam in Turkey." *Insight Turkey* (2007): 38-55.
- Aydınlı, Ersel, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz. "The Turkish military's march toward Europe." *Foreign Affairs* (2006): 77-90.
- Aydınlı, Ersel. "Turkey under the AKP: civil-military relations transformed," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 1 (2012): 100-108.
- Aziz, Sartaj. *Between Dreams and Reality: Some Milestones in Pakistan's History*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Bachman, Jerald G., John David Blair and David R. Segal. *The All-Volunteer Force*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.
- Bardakçi, Mehmet. "Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey under AKP Rule." *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 3 (2013): 411-428. doi: 10.1080/14683849.2013.831256.
- Bebler, Anton. "Typologies Based on Civilian-Dominated Versus Military Dominated Political System." In *Contemporary Political Systems: Classifications and Typologies*, ed. Anton Bebler and Jim Seroka. pp. 261-275. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
- Bilgic, Tuba Unlu. "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 5 (2009): 803–824.
- Birand, Mehmet Ali. *Shirts of Steel, an Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991.
- Bland, Douglas L. "A unified theory of civil–military relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 26 (1999): 7-25.
- Bray, John. "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline." *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (April 1997): 315-331.
- Brown, James. "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case." *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 3 (July 1989): 387-404.

- Buehler, Michael. *The politics of shari'a law: islamist activists and the state in democratizing Indonesia*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Burk, James. "Morris Janowitz and the origins of sociological research on armed forces and society." *Armed Forces Sociology* 19, no. 2 (1993): 167–186.
- Burns, John F. "Pakistan Acts to Cut Power of President." *New York Times*. April 2, 1997.
- Burns, John F. "Pakistan Shifting Stance on Hard-Line Afghans." *New York Times*. March 27, 1996.
- Caliskan, Koray. "Explaining the end of military tutelary regime and the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey." *Journal of Cultural Economy* 10, no. 1 (2017): 97-111.
- Capezza, David. "Turkey's Military is a catalyst for reform." *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (2009): 13–23.
- Carkoglu, Ali, and Binnaz Toprak. *Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey*. Istanbul, Turkey: TESEV, 2000. English summary.
http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/project/TESEV_search.pdf.
- Çatalbaş, Adem Üstün. "Militarism, Democracy, and Concordance: The Role of Citizenry in (Re)-Establishing Democratic Order in Argentina and Turkey." PhD diss. University of Cincinnati, 2020.
- Cennet, Uslu. "Why Did People Become Human Shields Against The Coup?," *Bilig* 79 (2016): 197-210.
- Cerulo, Karen A. "Symbols and the World System: National Anthems and Flags." *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 2, (1993): 243-271.
- Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. *The armed forces of Pakistan*. NYU Press, 2002.
- Cizre, Umit. "Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone." *European Journal of Political Research* 43, (2004): 107-125.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait." In *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997): 220-221.
- Cohen, Eliot A. *Supreme Command. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Anchor Books, 2003.
- Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars*. New York: Penguin Press, 2004.
- Colton, Timothy J. and Thane Gustafson. *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

- Colton, Timothy J. *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Dag, Rahman. "The Role of Contesting Ideologies: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Journal of Global Analysis* 6, no. 2 (2016).
- Dagi, Ihsan. "Islamist Parties and Democracy: Turkey's AKP in Power." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008): 25-39. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0015.
- Dahl, Robert. *Controlling Nuclear Weapons*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985.
- Dahl, Robert. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and Randolph Siverson. "War and the survival of political leaders: a comparative study of regime types and political accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 841-856.
- Delibas, Kayhan. *The rise of political Islam in Turkey: Urban poverty, grassroots activism and Islamic fundamentalism*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.
- Demir, Sertif, and Oktay Bingöl. "From military tutelage to civilian control: an analysis of the evolution of Turkish civil–military relations." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no. 2 (2020): 172-191.
- Demiralp, Seda. "The breaking up of Turkey's Islamic alliance: The AKP-Gulen conflict and implications for Middle East studies." *Meria Journal* 20, no. 1 (2016).
- Demirel, Tanel. "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective." *Armed Forces and Society* 31, no. 2 (2005): 245-271.
- Demirel, Tanel. "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (2004): 127-150.
- Doğan, Pınar and Dani Rodrik. "How Turkey Manufactured a Coup Plot." *Foreign Policy*. 6 April 2010. foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/06/how-turkey-manufactured-a-coup-plot-2/.
- Edmonds, Martin. *Armed Services and Society*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988.
- Ekirch, Arthur A Jr. *The Civilian and the Military*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Esen, Berk, and Sebnem Gumuscu. "Turkey: How the coup failed." *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 59-73.

- Fair, Christine and Shuja Nawaz. "The changing Pakistan army officer corps." *Journal of Strategic Studies, Forthcoming* (2010).
- Feaver, Peter D. "Civil-military relations 1." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999).
- Feaver, Peter D. "The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149-178.
- Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Feaver, Peter D. *Guarding the Guardians. Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Feaver, Peter. "The civil-military gap in comparative perspective." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 2 (2003): 1-5.
- Finer, Samuel. "State and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military." In C. Tilly (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Finer, Samuel. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988.
- Frazer, Jendayi E. "Sustaining civilian control in Africa: the use of armed counterweights in regime stability." PhD diss. Stanford University, 1994.
- Gargan, Edward A. "President of Pakistan Dismisses Premier and Dissolves Parliament." *New York Times*, April 19, 1993.
- Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. "Religious militancy in Pakistan's military and Inter-services Intelligence Agency." *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater* 29 (2010).
- Göl, Ayla. "The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular." *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (2009): 795-811. doi: 10.1080/01436590902867383.
- Goodson, Larry. *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.
- Gregory, Shaun. "Democratic transition and civil-military relations in Pakistan: The limits of theory 1." In *Democratic transition and security in Pakistan*. pp. 60-75. Routledge, 2015.
- Günlük-Şenesen, Gülay, and Hikmet Kırık. "The AKP era: Democratization or resecuritization? An assessment of the institutional and budgetary reflections." *Research and Policy on Turkey* 1, no. 1 (2016): 84-85.

- Gurcan, Metin. "A snapshot of the blackbox: a 2015 survey of the Turkish officer corps." *Turkish Studies* 19, no. 1 (2018): 97-117.
- Gürcan, Metin. "Never Again! But How? State and the Military in Turkey after July 2015." *IPC-Mercator Policy Brief* 16 (2017). URL: http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Never-Again_Metin-Gurcan.pdf.
- Gürcan, Metin. "Opening the blackbox: the transformation of the Turkish military." PhD diss. Bilkent University, 2016.
- Gursoy, Yaprak. "The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil–Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections." *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 2 (2012): 191–211.
- Gürsoy, Yaprak. "The impact of EU-driven reforms on the political autonomy of the Turkish military." *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 2 (2011): 293-308.
- Hailsham, Lord. "Elective Dictatorship." *The Listener* (21 October 1976): 496-500.
- Halistoprak, Burak Toygar. "Construction of civil-military relations in Turkey." PhD diss. Bilkent University, 2011.
- Haqqani, Husain. *Pakistan: Between mosque and military*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
- Heeger, Gerald A. Heeger. 'Politics in the Post-military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistan Experience.' *World Politics* (Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1977): 242-262.
- Heper, Metin. "Civil-military relations in Turkey: toward a liberal model?" *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 241-252.
- Herrnson, Paul S. "Replication, verification, secondary analysis, and data collection in political science." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 28, no. 3 (1995): 452-455.
- Herspring, Dale R. (ed.) *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978.
- Herspring, Dale R. *Russian Civil-Military Relations*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- Hoffman, Michael. "Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan." *Democratization* 18, no. 1 (January 2011): 75–99.
- Horowitz, Donald. *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

- Horowitz, Donald. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations*. Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Hussain, Ejaz. “Failure to Understand Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Rejoinder.” *Armed Forces & Society* 44, no. 2 (2018): 368-378.
- Hussain, Fiaz. Shahzad Hussain, and Naila Erum. “Are defense expenditures pro poor or anti poor in Pakistan? An empirical investigation,” *The Pakistan Development Review* (2015): 875-892.
- Iqbal, Afzal. *Islamization of Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1986.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Military in the Political Development of the New Nations*. Chicago, 1964.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*. Simon and Schuster, 2017.
- Jenkins, Gareth Jenkins. “Poll suggests military still the most trusted institution in Turkey.” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 25 (2008).
- Jenkins, Gareth. “Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics.” IISS Adelphi Paper 337. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001.
- Jenkins, Gareth. *Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation*. Washington, D.C.: SAIS Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, 2009.
- Kalın, Ibrahim. “After the coup attempt, Turkey’s success story continues.” *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 3 (2016), 11–17.
- Kaplan, Roger. *Freedom in the World: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 1995-1996*. Freedom House, 1996. <https://bit.ly/2TBSfWP>.
- Kaplan, Sam. “Din-u Devlet All Over Again? The Politics of Military Secularism and Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34 (2002): 113-127.
- Kennedy, Charles H. “Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989.” *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 1 (1990): 62-77. Accessed June 2, 2021. doi:10.2307/2759814.
- Kennedy, Charles. “Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-89.” *Pacific Affairs* 63, No. 1 (Spring 1990), 62-77.

- Kennedy, Charles. *Islamization of Laws and Economy: Case Studies on Pakistan*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1996.
- Kerwin, Jerome Gregory. *Civil-Military Relationships in American Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
- Keyman, Ariana. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey." *E-International Relations* 21 (2012).
- Keyman, Fuat and Ahmet Icduygu. *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions, Turkish Experiences*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Keyman, Fuat, and Ziya Öniş. *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformation*. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2007).
- Khalid, Iram, and Zahid Yaseen. "Role of Military as the Guardian of Democracy in Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 22, no. 1 (2015).
- Khan, Kamran. "Army Stages Coup in Pakistan; Troops Arrest Prime Minister, Seize Buildings after Firing of General." *Washington Post*. October 13, 1999.
- Khan, Kamran. "Bhutto Out as Premier in Pakistan; President Charges Corruption, Dissolves National Assembly." *Washington Post*, November 5, 1996.
- Koçak, Dilek, and Sertif Demir. "Organizational Culture and the Turkish Military." *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 13, no. 25 (2019): 37-51.
- Kolkowicz, Roman. *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Korotayev, Andrey. "Parallel-Cousin (FBD) Marriage, Islamization, and Arabization." *Ethnology* 39, no. 4 (2000): 395–407. doi:10.2307/3774053.
- Kroeber, Alfred Louis and Clyde Kluckhohn. *Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions*. Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum, 1952.
- Kuran, Timur. "Turkey's electoral dictatorship." *Project Syndicate*. April 10 (2014).
- Kutay, Acar. "Civilian and Military Relations in Turkey: A Historical Survey." *CMI Working Paper* (2016).
- Kutay, Acar. "From guardianship to civilian control: how did the Turkish military get here?" *Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право* 10, no. 3 (2017).
- Lamb, Christina. *Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy*. New Delhi: Viking, 1991.

- LaPorte, Jr. Robert. "Pakistan in 1996: Starting Over Again." *Asian Survey* 37, no. 2 (February 1997): 118-125.
- Larson, Arthur. "Military professionalism and civil control: a comparative analysis of two interpretations." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2 (1974):57–72.
- Lasswell, Harold D. "The garrison state and specialists on violence." *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941), 455–468.
- Lasswell, Harold D. *National Security and Individual Freedom*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950.
- Lee, Julian C. H. *Islamization and Activism in Malaysia*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
- Leonardo, Morlino. "What is a 'good' democracy?," *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004), 10-32, doi: 10.1080/13510340412331304589.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative politics and the comparative method." *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 682-693.
- Lindley-Highfield, Mark. "'Muslimization,' Mission, and Modernity in Morelos: The Problem of a Combined Hotel and Prayer Hall for the Muslims of Mexico." *Tourism Culture & Communication* 8, no. 2 (2008): 85–96.
- Looney, Robert E. "Excessive defense expenditures and economic stabilization: The case of Pakistan." *Journal of Policy Modeling* 19, no. 4 (August, 1997).
- Luckham, A. Robin. "A comparative typology of civil-military relations." *Government and Opposition* (1971): 5-35.
- Luttwak, Edward. *Coup d'état*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Maley, William. *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*. New York: New York University Press, 1988.
- Marsden, Peter. *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan*. London: Zed Books, 2002.
- Martin, Natalie Martin. "Allies and enemies: the Gülen movement and the AKP," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2020): 1-18.
- Martin, Natalie. "The AKP and the Gülenist News Media." In *The Securitisation of News in Turkey*. pp. 89-111. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020.
- McGowan, Patrick J. "African military coups d'état, 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 339–370.

- Meckstroth, Theodore W. ‘Most similar systems’ and ‘most different systems’: a study in the logic of comparative inquiry.” *Comparative Political Studies* 8, no. 2 (1975): 132-157.
- Michaud-Emin, Linda. “The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey.” *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 1 (2007): 25–42.
- Milan, Francesco F. “Turkey: What hides behind a failed coup attempt.” *The RUSI Journal* 161, no. 4 (2016): 28-32.
- Millis, Walter, Harvey C. Mansfield and Harry Stein. *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy*. New York: 20th Century Fund, 1958.
- Mills, Charles Wright. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Moskos, Charles C. “From institution to occupation: trends in the military organization.” *Armed Forces Sociology* 4, no. 1 (1977):41–50.
- Moskos, Charles C. and Frank R. Wood. *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brasse, 1988.
- Moskos, Charles C. *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1971.
- Moskos, Charles C. *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military*. New York: Russell Sage Found, 1970.
- Narli, Nilufer. “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey.” In Phillip H Fluri, Gustav E Gustenau, Plamen I Pantev (Eds) *The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe*. pp. 229-258. Heidelberg: Phsica Verlag, 2005.
- Narli, Nilüfer. “Concordance and discordance in Turkish civil-military relations, 1980– 2002.” *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 215-225.
- Nasr, Vali. “Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan.” *Asian Survey* 32, no. 6 (June 1992), 521-537.
- Nasr, Vali. “Military rule, Islamism and democracy in Pakistan.” *The Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (2004): 195-209.
- Nordlinger, Eric. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
- O’Donnell, Guillermo and Phillipe C. Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Örs, Birsen. “The perception of the army by Armenian minorities living in Turkey,” *Armed Forces & Society* 36, no. 4 (2010): 604-626.

- Peers, Douglas M. 'The Martial Races and the Indian Army in the Victorian Era.' In Daniel Marston and Chandar Sundaram (eds), *A Military History of India and South Asia*. pp. 34-52. Bloomington: Indiana UP 2008.
- Perlmutter, Amos. *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Perlo-Freeman, Sam, Neil Ferguson, Noel Kelly, Carina Solmirano, and Helen Wilandh. "Military Expenditure Data, 2004–2013." In SIPRI Yearbook 2014. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. pp. 221–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Peters, B. Guy. "The logic of comparison." In *Comparative Politics*. pp. 28-57. London: Palgrave, 1998.
- Peters, B. Guy. *Comparative politics: Theory and methods*. NYU Press, 1998.
- Pinar Tremblay, Pinar. "How Erdoğan Used the Power of the Mosques against Coup Attempt." *Al-Monitor*. 25 July 2016. www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkeycoup-attempt-Erdoğan-mosques.html.
- Powell, Jonathan M. and Clayton L. Thyne. "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (March 2011): 249-259. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397436>.
- Puddington, Arch. *Freedom in the World: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 2012*. Freedom House, 2012. <https://bit.ly/3rEnixV>.
- Pupcenoks, Juris. "Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: lessons for the post-Arab Spring Muslim world." *The Middle East Journal* 66, no. 2 (2012).
- Qadir, Shaukat. "An Analysis of the Kargil Crisis 1999." *RUSI Journal* (April 2002): 24-30.
- Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon. "Beyond 'the soldier and the state'-the theoretical framework of elite civil-military relations" PhD diss., The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.
- Rashid, Ahmed. "Getting tough: Pakistan's Bhutto tries for fiscal austerity." *Far Eastern Economic Review* (June 23, 1994): 331-356.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.
- Raza, Syed Ali, Muhammad Shahbaz, and Sudharshan Reddy Paramati. "Dynamics of military expenditure and income inequality in Pakistan." *Social Indicators Research* 131, no. 3 (2017): 1035-1055.

- Rehman, Zehra. "Decline of Military Intervention in Turkish Politics," *Defence Journal* 18, no. 7 (2015).
- Rice, C. *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948–1983: Uncertain Allegiance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari Rizvi. "The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan." *Survival* 31, no. 3 (May-June 1989): 255-68.
- Rosman-Stollman, Elisheva. "Mediating structures and the military: The case of religious soldiers." *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no. 4 (2008): 615-638.
- Rouquie, Alain. *The Military and the State in Latin America*, transl. PE Sigmund. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Sahin, Hakan. "Turkey's Play with Its Military: Civil-Military Relations before and after the 2016 Coup." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2018): 32-51.
- Sakallioğlu, Ümit Cizre. "The anatomy of the Turkish military's political autonomy." *Comparative politics* (1997): 151-166.
- Saleem, Raja M. Ali. *State, Nationalism, and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan*. Springer, 2017.
- Salim, Arksal. *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia*. University of Hawaii Press, 2008.
- Sarigil, Zeki. "Europeanization as institutional change: The case of the Turkish military." *Mediterranean Politics* 12, no. 1 (2007): 39-57.
- Sarigil, Zeki. "Public opinion and attitude toward the military and democratic consolidation in Turkey." *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (2015): 282-306.
- Sarigil, Zeki. "The Turkish military: principal or agent?" *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 1 (2014): 168-190.
- Sarkesian, Sam Charles. *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975.
- Schiff, Rebecca. "Civil-military relations reconsidered: A theory of concordance." *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (1995): 7-24.
- Schiff, Rebecca. *The military and domestic politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Segal, David R. "Civil-military relations in the mass public." *Armed Forces Sociology* 1 (1975): 215-229.

- Segal, David R., John Blair, Frank Newport, and Susan Stephens. "Convergence, isomorphism, and interdependence at the civil-military interface." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2 (1974):157–172.
- Sezgin, Yüksel. "Can the Israeli Status Quo model help Post-February 28 Turkey solve its Problems?" *Turkish Studies* 4, 3 (Autumn 2003): 63–64.
- Shah, Aqil. *The army and democracy*. Harvard University Press, 2014).
- Shaikh, Farzana. "From Islamisation to Shariatation: Cultural Transnationalism in Pakistan." *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (2008): 593–609.
- Shively, Kim. "Pragmatic politics: The Gülen movement and the AKP." In *The Turkish AK Party and its Leader*. 183-204. Routledge, 2016.
- Siddiq, Ayesha. *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's military economy*. Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Singh, Bilveer. *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007.
- Singh, Chaitram, and John Hickman. "Soldiers as Saviors of the State: The Cases of Turkey and Pakistan Contrasted." *Journal of Third World Studies* 30, no. 1 (2013): 39-54.
- Smith, Louis. *American Democracy and Military Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Stepan, Alfred. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Syed, Anwar H. "Pakistan in 1997: Nawaz Sharif's Second Chance to Govern." *Asian Survey* 38, no. 2 (February 1998), 116-125.
- Tank, Pınar. "Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity." *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 1 (2005): 3-19.
- Taş, Hakkı. "A history of Turkey's AKP-Gülen conflict." *Mediterranean Politics* 23, no. 3 (2018): 395-402
- Taş, Hakkı. "The 15 July abortive coup and post-truth politics in Turkey." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 18, no. 1 (2018): 1-19.
- Teune, Henry and Adam Przeworski. *The logic of comparative social inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970.

- Thomas, Raju G. C. "Secessionist Movements in South Asia." *Survival* 36, no. 2 (1994): 92-114.
- Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı* 1983 (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1983) State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, Turkey, 1983.
- Turunc, Hasan. "Islamicist or Democratic? The AKP's Search for Identity in Turkish Politics." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 15, no. 1 (2007): 79-91. doi: 10.1080/14782800701273417.
- Tylor, Edward Burnett. *Primitive culture*. New York, NY: Harper, 1958.
- Uluçakar, Mustafa and Ali Çağlar. "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Turkey." *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 14, no. 55 (2017): 41-57.
- Uluçakar, Mustafa, and Ali Çağlar. "Turkish Professional Military Education and Civilian Control." *Bilig* 79 (2016): 173-198.
- Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession*. New York: Norton, 1937.
- Wästerfors, David, Malin Åkerström, and Katarina Jacobsson. "Reanalysis of qualitative data." *The SAGE handbook of qualitative data analysis* (2014): 467-480.
- Welch, Claude. *Civilian Control of the Military*. New York: State University New York Press, 1976.
- Welch, Claude. *Soldiers and State in Africa*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Wick, Gregory J. "Professionalism in the Turkish Military: Help or Hindrance to Civilian Control." MA Thesis. Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, USA, 2000.
- Yanardağ, Merdan. *Fethullah Gülen Hareketinin Perde Arkası, Türkiye Nasıl Kusatıldı?* Istanbul: yah Beyaz Yayın, 2006. Based on interviews with Nurettin Veren on Kanaltürk television, June 26, July 3, 2006.
- Yasmeen, Samina. "Democracy in Pakistan: The Third Dismissal." *Asian Survey* 34, no. 6 (June 1994), 572-588.
- Yavuz, Hakan, and Rasim Koç. "The Turkish coup attempt: the Gülen movement vs. the state." *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 4 (2016): 136-148.
- Yavuz, M. Hakan and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk. "Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdoğan." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 19, no. 1 (2019), 1-9. doi: 10.1080/14683857.2019.1580828.

- Yavuz, M. Hakan Yavuz. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Yavuz, M. Hakan. "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* 30, no. 1 (1997): 63-82.
- Yesilada, Birol and Barry Rubin. *Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule*. Routledge, 2013.
- Yıldız, Nurcan, *Tanklar ve Sözcükler (Tanks and Words)*. Ankara: Alfa Publishing, 2007.
- Zanotti, Jim. "Turkey: Failed Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy." *Federation of American Scientist, CRS INSIGHT*, July 19, 2016, p.2, (IN10533). Available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IN10533.pdf, (Accessed on 9 June 2021).
- Ziring, Lawrence. "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan." *Asian Survey* 24, no. 9 (September 1984), 931- 946.
- Zisk, Kimberly Marten. *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).