THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY:

TURKISH POWER PROJECTION IN SYRIA, LIBYA, AND AZERBAIJAN

SEYYİD ÇAKIR

BOĞAZİÇI UNIVERSITY

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Seyyid Çakır

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The thesis of Seyyid Çakır

has been approved by:

Assist. Prof. Alper Yağcı   _____
(Thesis Advisor)

Assoc. Prof. Zühre Aksoy   _____

Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş   _____
(External Member)

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Seyyid Çakır, certify that

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- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;

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ABSTRACT

The Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy:

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Turkish foreign policy has changed in the years of 2015-2016 to such a degree that we talk of a paradigm shift, as since 2016, Turkish foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, and a clear difference with the periods before is the use of unilateral force by Turkey beyond its territorial borders. Before the paradigm shift, the use of force was executed through multilateral frameworks, with the exceptions of Cyprus 1974, and counter-terror operations in northern Iraq. As Turkish power projection has become increasingly important as part of Turkish foreign policy in the post-2016 era, it is critical to understand its drivers, methods, and implications. By first defining power projection and the related concepts in international relations and understanding the reasons that led to the paradigm shift, we will explore how Turkish power projection emerged and how it materialized in the real world in the theaters of Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. We will also look at the case of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 to provide a historically comparative perspective. By looking at these cases one will have a better understanding of Turkish foreign policy at present. As the drivers, methods, and implications of Turkish power projection remains understudied, a comprehensive and holistic framework which combines the existing literature with the historical contexts of Turkish foreign policy will shed much-needed light on Turkish power projection at present. The result is deeper insight into the behavioral responses in Turkish foreign policy.

ÖZET

Türk Dış Politikasındaki Paradigma Değişimi:
Suriye, Libya, ve Azerbaycan'da Türk Güç Projeksiyonu

2015-2016 yıllarında Türk dış politikası öyle bir derecede değişmiştir ki, 2016 yılından itibaren Türk dış politikasının giderek daha iddialı hale geldiği ve bu dönemden önceki dönemlerle açık bir fark olarak Türkiye'nin kendi toprak sınırlarının ötesinde tek taraflı güç kullanımına başvurduğu konuşulmaktadır. Paradigma değişimi öncesinde, güç kullanımı, 1974 Kıbrıs ve Kuzey Irak'taki terörle mücadele operasyonlarının istisnaları dışında, çok taraflı çerçeveler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. 2016 sonrası dönemde Türk güç projeksiyonunun Türk dış politikasında giderek daha önemli hale gelmesi, bu dönüşümün nedenlerini, yöntemlerini ve sonuçlarını anlamak açısından kritiktir. Güç projeksiyonu ve uluslararası ilişkilerdeki ilgili kavramları tanımlayarak başlayıp, paradigma değişimine yol açan sebepleri anladıktan sonra, Türk güç projeksiyonunun nasıl ortaya çıktığını ve Suriye, Libya ve Azerbaycan tiyatrolarında gerçek dünyada nasıl somutlaştığını inceleyeceğiz. Ayrıca, tarihsel karşılaştırmalı bir perspektif sağlamak amacıyla 1974 Kıbrıs müdahalesi vakasına da bakacağız. Bu vakaları inceleyerek, günümüzdeki Türk dış politikasını daha iyi anlamış olacağız. Türk güç projeksiyonunun sürücüleri, yöntemleri ve sonuçları üzerine yapılan çalışmalar yetersiz kaldığı için, mevcut literatürle Türk dış politikasının tarihsel bağlamlarını birleştiren kapsamlı ve bütüncül bir çerçeve, günümüzdeki Türk güç projeksiyonu üzerine çok ihtiyaç duyulan ışığı tutacaktır. Sonuç, Türk dış politikasındaki davranışsal tepkiler hakkında daha derin bir içgörü sağlayacaktır.

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To my dearest Mother and Father

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ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access / Area Denial
AKP	'Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi' / 'Justice and Development Party'
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BoP	Balance of Power
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DoD	Department of Defense
DSP	'Demokratik Sol Parti' / 'Democratic Left Party'
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EOKA	'Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston' / 'National Organization of Cypriot Fighters'
EU	European Union
FETÖ	'Fetullahçı Terör Orgütü' / 'Fetullahist Terror Organization'
FMF	Foreign Military Funds
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FP	Foreign Policy
FSA	Free Syrian Army
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GME	Greater Middle East
GNA	Government of National Accord
HTS	Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KCK	Koma Civakên Kurdistanê

KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LNA	Libyan National Army
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGK	'Milli Güvenlik Kurulu' / 'National Security Council'
MHP	'Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi' / 'Nationalist Action Party'
MILGEM	'Milli Gemi Projesi' / 'National Warship Program'
MIT	'Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı' / 'National Intelligence Agency'
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NK	Nagorno-Karabakh
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê
POTUS	President of the United States
PP	Power Projection
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRTDIA	Presidency of Türkiye Defense Industry Agency
PRTPSB	'Presidency of Türkiye: Presidency of Strategy and Budget
PYD	Democratic Union Party
R&D	Research & Development
SAGEB	'Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığı' / 'Presidency of Development and Support for the Defense Industry'
SCW	Syrian Civil War
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SG	Secretary General
SIG	Syrian Interim-Government
SNC	Syrian National Council
SSB	'Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı' / 'Presidency of Defense Industry'

SSM	'Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı' / 'Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry'
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TBMM	'Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi' / 'Turkish Grand National Assembly'
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
THK	'Türk Hava Kurumu' / 'Turkish Aeronautical Association'
TOMTAŞ	'Tayyare ve Motor A.Ş.' / 'Airplane and Motor Corporation'
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WW2	World War 2
YAŞ	'Yüksek Askeri Şura' / 'Supreme Military Council'
YPG	Yekîneyên Parastina Gel

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Turkish diplomacy and Turkish foreign policy (TFP) are important subjects to be studied if one ought to understand the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Europe, and Central Asia. Neighboring the fragile Balkans in the west, the Caucasus in the east, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean to its south, and the Black Sea to its north, while governing the important passageway of the Bosphorus, Turkey is an important country and its influence across its borders, and the way it exerts this influence through foreign policy (FP) requires thorough examination. Turkey's involvement in major global issues and conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, as well as its international diplomacy, and membership in important alliances, makes it an important global player in today's world. The effects of decisions made in Ankara can be felt in its immediate region. The materialization of TFP results in the execution of *power projection* (PP). But what does power projection actually mean? The real purpose of this study is to understand Turkish PP as part of TFP from 2016 onwards and the *paradigm shift* of 2015-2016 that preceded it. TFP is constantly evolving, and at times it goes through what we call a 'paradigm shift', where there is a large shift in terms of the application of TFP, as we saw in the years of 2015-2016. However, in the literature, there is a gap in understanding why TFP changed in 2015-2016, and how it changed and resulted in the form of PP thereafter. Since 2016, TFP has gone through a remarkable transformation in its FP approach, characterized by an intensified and assertive pursuit of influence beyond its borders. As such, this thesis delves deep into

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the multifaceted aspects of Turkish power projection while examining its drivers, its methods, and its implications.

Traditionally, TFP ever since the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923 has remained within the confines of its institutional *strategic cultures*, such as republicanism, westernism, modernism, nationalism, non-interventionism, and multidimensionalism. Turkey has rarely projected unilateral force beyond its borders, except for Cyprus in 1974, and incursions into Iraq starting from the 1980s as part of counterterrorism efforts against the PKK. Turkey does however have a long history of projecting force within multilateral contexts as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) going back as far as the Korea War (1950-1953), followed by contingent armed forces operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia.

Since 2016 however, Turkey has increasingly resorted to the unilateral use of force beyond its borders, and the drivers, methods, and implications of this have remained understudied, as well as misunderstood. The direct consequence is that Turkey is intricately enmeshed in many of the developments and dynamics that happen in its direct vicinity and sometimes even beyond. Turkish diplomacy now finds itself at the heart of issues ranging from the Ukraine War and Grain Deal, to mediating government formation in Libya, to resolving the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There is a clear militarization trend within TFP from 2016 onwards. We have to understand why and how Turkish power projection and especially *hard power projection* emerged so dominantly as part of Turkish foreign policy after 2016. As such, this thesis aims to dissect the drivers, methods, and implications of Turkish power projection in the post-2016 era. The conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) will be chosen as cases where Turkish

PP has been executed, and the methods which have been used in these cases will clearly define Turkish PP as part of TFP, and the implications for Turkey in the regional and global context.

The structure of this thesis requires comparative methods, and a clear understanding of the related literature is crucial as many concepts and definitions are very specific with a lot of jargon within political science and international relations (IR). There is also the matter of evolution over time, and thus the importance of the historical contexts to understand the why and how of Turkish PP. To address these challenges, firstly having a working definition of power projection is important for the reader, followed by examples of PP by other states in the global context, related concepts in the international relations discipline, and a brief and general outline of the major changes in TFP before and after the paradigm shift. After this brief literature review, the focus will be on the cases of Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan where Turkish PP has been applied in the post-2016 era, and the comparative approach of these cases will show the differences in the methods of Turkish PP according to the strategic objectives as well as limitations set by TFP. After these cases, the case of Cyprus in 1974 will serve as a historically comparative case with the post-2016 era, as it is the only instance where unilateral use of force and thus hard PP by Turkey was applied. Throughout the entire thesis, the emphasis will be on hard power projection more than s*oft power projection*, as reliance on hard PP in the post-2016 era is a major difference from the period before 2016 when soft PP was largely dominant within TFP. Hard PP is also easier to measure and characterize than soft PP and is in practice stronger as it revolves around compellence while soft PP revolves around incentivization.

While the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in 2011 marked the end of 'hegemonic stability' in the Middle East, the biggest change came in the paradigm shift of 2015-2016. These years are deeply critical because of many important developments and cataclysmic events: 1) Turkish foreign policy adapted *realpolitik*, recalibrated its FP according to the Russian presence, abandoned its objective of toppling Assad, and effectively ended the 'zero-problems-with-neighbors' foreign policy approach of then prime minister Davutoğlu, who very symbolically stepped down as prime minister, 2) the formidable entrance of Russia into the Syrian theatre, the downing of the Russian jet and ensuing tensions with Russia, 3) the beginning of the US-YPG partnership and the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and 4) the 15 July Coup Attempt in Turkey, its effects on the Turkish military, the birth of the AKP-MHP alliance, and the first of a series of successive military interventions by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Azerbaijan. This year also saw the highest increase in registered refugees in Turkey, with the number rising from roughly 1,5 million to 2,5 million due to the battles raging in and around the Aleppo and Idlib regions (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2024).

Turkey as part of its 'zero-problems-with-neighbors' foreign policy did not have substantial experience in power projection as part of what military experts call 'hybrid' or 'asymmetric warfare' on the scale as required by security challenges emanating from the Syrian Civil War (SCW). While actively fighting insurgents from the PKK since its birth in 1984, which led to the establishment of military bases and recurrent incursions in Iraq, the SCW presented the Turkish state with a different level of security challenges. The history of TFP and the Turkish Armed Forces has not been without large-scale military operations or war-making however, as seen in

the Korean War of 1950-1953, and the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Realpolitik and hard power were naturally not as essential to its wider foreign policy doctrine as the 'peace at home, peace in the world' doctrine in TFP, which was dominant ever since the birth of the Republic. The problem is that this shift towards realpolitik, or 'politics based on practical and pragmatic needs rather than on ideals' (Emery, 1915), is noted by many yet the increasing use of PP beyond its borders and its applications in the real world are not yet fully understood and consequently understudied. It is important to note that realpolitik's bare effects can best be seen in zones of conflict where players invest in PP using the military, economic, and diplomatic means that are at their disposal. The Syrian conflict has become a spider web of warring parties, backed by external players who, in a very Clausewitzian sense, are heavily invested in making the outcomes of the conflict favor their own political objectives. Libya and Iraq are similar and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan as well. All four arenas are now hotbeds of Turkish PP activity, whereas the applications of hard- and soft power differ. Endings to these conflicts are far from sight and they will continue to dominate the TFP agenda as well as the Turkish public agenda for years. Therefore, understanding the drivers, methods, and implications of Turkish PP as part of its new assertive TFP from 2016 onwards is highly important. This includes analyzing the immediate past, present, and the likely future of TFP, its opportunities as well as its limitations. The research question therefore is, what led to the paradigm shift of TFP of 2015-2016, and the Turkish power projection from 2016 onwards, and how does Turkish power projection take shape? I will argue that 1) the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011 meant the effective withdrawal of the American hegemon from the region, and the emergence of a security vacuum that is exploited by terrorist organizations like the PKK and

ISIS, 2) the entrance of Russia militarily in Syria turned the tide of the SCW and led to the recalibration of TFP goals in Syria, 3) the US-YPG partnership aggravated Turkish security concerns and fueled a deterioration in the Turkish-American relationship, 4) the 15 July Coup Attempt and its immediate effects on Turkish politics and the military increased the assertiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), and 5) the relative success of national arms production made possible new instruments of PP, strengthened existing instruments of Turkish PP, and lowered the costs of the use of unilateral force or hard PP. These are the main reasons for the paradigm shift and the birth of modern Turkish PP from 2016 onwards.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Understanding Turkish power projection as part of Turkish foreign policy requires adequate knowledge of the literature on the subjects studied. Defining power projection becomes of utmost importance as there are differing views in the academic community. First, we will look at the definitions of PP, and the related concepts to it. PP is not a concept that exists in and of itself entirely, its exact meaning becomes only clear when other concepts from IR exist and interrelate to it. One of the most important concepts to the definition of PP, as well as to the entire discipline of IR, is the concept of 'power'. Scholars have been debating the exact meaning of power since at least the start of written history itself. That is why we will look at some of the related concepts to PP in detail. Then we will look at examples of PP by other significant employers of PP as seen on the world stage, these include the US, Russia, China, India, and Brazil. This will shed light on the difference in executions of PP by different actors, producing an insight into how material and non-material differences between the global executors of PP result in different forms of foreign policy execution and PP as part of it. Then we will look at the most important concepts in understanding PP, which are 'hard power', and 'soft power', to construct a working definition of PP for this study. Hereafter, we will look at the concept of 'strategy', to provide a clear insight into what factors and elements converge to create a clear-cut strategy, which is critical in understanding both TFP and PP in practice. Then we will look at the concept of 'alliances' in IR, as it determines state behavior, and in extension both foreign policy as well as PP. After that, we will look at the 'functions of force' to reflect on and categorize the use of force by states.

Following these concepts, we will look broadly and superficially at the period before 2016 in terms of Turkish foreign policy, and then at the paradigm shift of the years 2015-2016, followed by the post-2016 period of TFP. By looking at and comparing these respective periods of TFP, a general framework of historical context in TFP will be provided that serves to show there was a paradigm shift in the years of 2015-2016 in TFP, and as such modern Turkish PP emerged as a result. By way of this holistic approach that defines the existing concepts in the literature that are interrelated with our subject matter, in combination with the historical perspectives uncovering the evolution of important trends within Turkish foreign policy and political history, our goal is to produce the necessary context to understand Turkish PP at present.

2.1 What is power projection?

Although the precise definition of power projection is subject to debate within the academic literature, many of its core elements remain consistent. The academic literature is proliferous on the subjects of American (R. G. Davis, 1998; S. Davis, 2011; Klein, 1988; Montgomery, 2014; Ochmanek, 2018; Sullivan, 1993), Russian (Braun, 2012; Brylew, 2020; Karasik & Blank, 2018; Galeotti, 2019; McDermott, 2016; Renz, 2018), Chinese (Stoll, 2000; Kane, 2014; Lampton, 2008), Indian (Ladwig; Mudiam, 2007), and even Brazilian power projection (Gardini, 2016), and the Turkish (Bibi & Yousaf, 2021; Gürzel, 2014) form of power projection is becoming increasingly important in the academic literature, yet its exact materialization in the real world and the comparative analysis of different cases of Turkish PP remains understudied.

2.1.1 Defining power projection

The US Army Field Manual 100-7 (Department of Army, 1995) defines power projection as:

> . . . the ability of the US to apply any combination of economic, diplomatic, informational, or military instruments of national power. An effective power-projection capability serves to deter potential adversaries, demonstrates US resolve, and carries out military operations anywhere in the world (p. 5)

Some scholars believe power projection revolves around military power alone. Stoll (2000, p. 3) argues that "power projection involves the ability to use military force at a significant distance from the country's homeland.". Stoll (2000, p. 3) believes that PP is the 'ability of a state to project military power at a distance from its territorial borders', and hence looks directly from the hard power perspective alone, and lists the military tools which are key for active PP: 'intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental bombers, fighter and attack aircraft (with the ability to refuel them at long ranges), aircraft carriers, surface ships, nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious assault assets'. Stoll (2000) looks at the historical trends since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1816 and finds that only major powers could effectively project power, and they did this with large navies, as these are critical in transporting and protecting troops while securing the 'lines of communication' with the homeland. Gunzinger (1993, p. VII) argues that PP can be defined as:

> Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature.

Gunzinger (1993) makes an interesting limitation in scope to the definition of PP, in excluding that '*total war*' for a state, and everything it entails is related to PP, as he believes that total war 'invokes an entirely different set of planning as well as employment conditions than limited conflicts'. In response to this US-centric perspective, I would argue that the condition of total war, or the total allocation of state resources and all forms of capital for the ends of war-making, requires total PP, with every means of the state in question at its disposal, while *limited war*, as seen more frequently in today's world, inherently requires limited PP.

Here the debate revolves around what constitutes power exactly. Many scholars believe that 'power can be summarized as being able to do certain things, and control others, including making them do what they would otherwise do not'; here the key aspect is the part of 'making others do what you want'. In International relations, some scholars therefore summarize power in the political realm as 'having possession of the following resources: population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability' (Nye, 1990, p. 154). The concepts of hard power and soft power become important in this regard, as the nuances that academic scholars make in their discussions of the concept of PP, are more often than not tied to their respective positions to the importance of these two concepts. Power projection can thus be defined in terms of scope as being the sum of hard power and soft power of the particular state. Overall, the academic literature divides power projection into the following central elements: 1) military capabilities (Davis, 1998; Davis; 2011; Klein,1988; Ochmanek, 2018; Sullivan, 1993); 2) political/diplomatic influence (Klein, 1988); 3) economic influence (Cumings, 1984; Maier, 1977); 4) scientific capabilities (Wojciuk, 2018); and 5) cultural/ideological influence (Lampton, 2008; Nye, 1990). Each element has been thoroughly studied in

the academic realm. Our working definition of PP for this study will be the following: 'the execution of hard- and soft power to achieve strategic objectives as part of foreign policy beyond a country's own borders'. For matters of convenience, and to protect this study's epistemological simplicity, our focus will be largely on the military, political, and economic dimensions of Turkey's PP as part of TFP, and thus the focus will be on hard power projection.

2.1.2 American power projection

When we look at American power projection, Klein (1988, p. 136) describes power projection as the capacity to deploy military forces beyond a nation's borders, primarily through naval and aerial assets, with the aircraft carrier exemplifying these capabilities. While some researchers might argue that this perspective is too narrow and only encompasses hard power, it is a crucial component for defining power projection as a state that cannot extend its military forces beyond its borders is unable to effectively project power. Klein (1988) further differentiates between 'conventional' and 'nuclear power projection', both characterized by delivering destructive power abroad and convincing domestic audiences that the war is defensive in nature. Klein (1988, p. 140) contends that the American approach to power projection was developed through atomic bomb deterrence in the post-WWII era and the establishment of international economic initiatives such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Marshall Plan. This approach combined 'military strategy and international political economy and involved creating a global forward defense network through international military alliances and the establishment of overseas military bases'.

The military aspect of the American form of PP is effectively built on the presence of close allies, either as part of multilateral frameworks like NATO, or as part of bilateral relationships like Israel, and the presence of military bases in foreign countries, in tandem with the designated carrier strike groups which are a combination of naval and aerial assets, while the key decisions are made in particular sites, such as the White House, Pentagon, and regional command centers (Davis, 2011). Hence, according to Sullivan (1993), after the Cold War, the American 'national military strategy is built on the elements of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution'. Yet, the American network of military bases abroad is constantly changing, and there are important practical nuances, as some bases are 'spy bases' and do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DoD), whereas others are empty bases, and some are operated by private security contractors, or by the militaries of the host countries in which they are built, and some fall in the territories of former colonies, like Guam, Hawaii, the Marshall Islands etc.; hence Davis (2011) calls it a global network of bases, which the Americans use to move troops to and from with a high form of efficiency according to perceived global threats and crises. It is important to note here that the US' position in the global power order is unique insofar as it is the only power capable of large-scale global PP: "At present and for the foreseeable future, the United States alone has the military wherewithal to project large-scale military forces over intercontinental distances and conduct sustained military operations across a broad range of mission sets." (Ochmanek, 2018, p. 3). Carrier groups and military bases form the backbone of modern American PP in this sense.

Regarding international political economy as part of American PP, it is important to know that the Americans were the biggest victors of the Second World

War, and they occupied the primary states that had lost: Germany and Japan. In both countries, the US pacified their armies, rewrote their constitutions, divided, and suppressed movements from the Left, and forged and shaped their market economies (Maier, 1977). The US continued to shape the international economic order according to its own will, as American economic principles based on productivity, and international economic institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and the Bretton Woods system made up the brunt of the American-led international political economy; it skillfully used this economic architecture to project power in light of American interests, and especially as part of the anti-Soviet containment doctrine (Cumings 1984; Maier, 1977).

2.1.3 Russian power projection

Russia's ability to deploy and sustain military forces and resources beyond its territorial borders is thoroughly researched and written in the academic literature. While some scholars have focused on Russia's military modernization and the change in its army's structure and doctrine (Braun, 2012; McDermott, 2016; Renz, 2018), others have focused more on its foreign policy and its desire to return to great-power status (Brylew, 2020; Karasik & Blank, 2018; Tsygankov, 2013). According to Renz (2018), Russia's nuclear arsenal made it a significant player on the world stage after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it remained the strongest military actor within the territories of the former USSR, and it used its strength to wage war, as seen in the wars in Chechnya during the 1990s; but it could not execute operations outside its borders, making Russian PP virtually non-existent at the time. Then in the 2000s, the Russian leadership and military elites came to the conclusion, after a decade of discussions over possible military reform, that the twentieth-century

doctrine of mass mobilization did not fit into modern times, and this became apparent when Russia's invasion of Georgia showed that the 'hard power tools of Moscow were both limited and primitive' (McDermott, 2016). The Russians reformed the army's 'top-heavy' structure after this war, and created 'smaller, more mobile forces, with fewer officers, and brigades that were on a constant level of readiness' (McDermott, 2016). The effects were obvious with the occupation of Crimea by the Russians in 2014, and the entrance of the Russians into the Syrian Civil War in 2015 (Renz, 2018). From now on, it was evident that 'the Russians were confident and capable enough to use military force outside its borders, turning the Russians again into a perceived threat to the Western security architecture' (Renz, 2018). Russia's entrance into the SCW was designed both to achieve its strategic objectives, but also as a public relations exercise, as it showed the world its 'resurgent military power and willingness to shape global events through force' (Galeotti, 2019). Russia's methods of PP were however not solely traditional, as they were 'developing capabilities that appear to be designed to counter traditional US military advantages' and maintaining an 'approach based on hybrid warfare, or multidimensional warfare, where multiple instruments of war are integrated, including non-military means, like cyberwarfare and mass political manipulation as part of information warfare' (Renz, 2018). Hybrid warfare has become a popular academic term with which to describe Russian PP since its annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Galeotti, 2019). Its definition can best be described as:

> . . . the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilising diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure. (Galeotti, 2019, p. 7).

Russia's military reforms and changing doctrines helped shape this new hybrid warfare. Russia's new doctrines that preceded its use of effective power projection were based on the protection of its 'Near Abroad', where Russia wants to remain the primary actor and protect itself against NATO encroachment as per the 'New Military Doctrine' of 2010 (Braun, 2012). Braun (2012) also mentions that 'unilateral action by the Russian army outside its borders is taken by Russian national interests and to protect its regional dominance', whereas 'Russia has also proven to be more willing to use the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to deploy forces'. What is remarkable here is that there are domestic factors in light of the 'changing global geopolitical situation that requires action' according to Putin, Medvedev, and other Russian political elite figures and that a strong focus on the national development of its defense industry becomes a high priority in extension (McDermott, 2016). Intriguingly a similar trend with a similar reaction is happening in Turkey, where the 'changing times' are put forward along with a certain threat perception to the 'nation', and the importance of investing in and expanding the defense industry becomes the key for survival.

Another key characteristic in Russia's hybrid warfare is the use of private mercenaries to maintain a range of deniability, and since the Donbas and Crimea operations in Ukraine in 2014, and in the SCW in 2015, the Wagner Group, headed by one of Putin's close aides, Prigozhin, has been used often, in countries like Ukraine, Syria and Libya, while expanding their operations gradually, even venturing into the Central African Republic (Galeotti, 2019). Yet not everything that the Russians do is different from the Americans. The Russians have inserted themselves firmly in the Middle East for example, and are seeking to build bases in Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen, while selling arms to Egypt, Iran, and

Turkey, and making energy deals with Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Karasik & Blank, 2018). Energy- and arms exports form hence another pillar of Russian power projection by using these as political instruments.

2.1.4 Chinese power projection

Given that the US is the primary, and arguably the only superpower on this earth, it is natural that great powers, like Russia, or in this case China, use asymmetrical means to counter US PP in times of war or peace. In the case of China, it makes use of 'non-traditional assets like activists and private security personnel' as it is well aware of this asymmetric *balance of power* (BoP) against the US (Kane, 2014). It is also aware that it 'cannot sustain long-range PP in military terms', and thus will be conciliatory beyond its immediate region, while 'the disputed maritime territories in East Asia are an immediate test for Chinese PP' (Kane, 2014). The People's Republic of China (PRC) 'seized islands from Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, while it regularly enters into territorial disputes with the Philippines and Japan; but besides territorial disputes, the PRC sends naval forces to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy efforts, and ground troops and police forces to African countries' (Kane, 2014). The PRC also makes use of its companies, expatriates, and broader diaspora abroad to sustain and grow its influence in other countries (Kane, 2014).

China's PP consists of three pillars according to Lampton (2008), these are 'military power, economic power, and ideational or soft power', and continues to state that China's military growth is due to 'US intervention into the Taiwan issue, China's vulnerable nuclear forces, the vulnerability of its rich coastal areas, and dependence on oil'. Lampton (2008) also notes that China's economic might is well known, yet its development is internally asymmetric, leaving potential weaknesses in the

economic fabric of the country, and dependences as seen in the case of energy and especially oil. China's soft power or 'ideational power' is also severely underestimated says Lampton (2008), who believes that the founding fathers of the PRC suppressed the nation's rich history, yet the modern cadres of the political elite instead promote Chinese history and its cultural prowess, transforming historical and cultural weight to soft power.

2.1.5 Indian power projection

When it comes to Indian power projection, Ladwig (2010) claims that hard power projection is untraditional to the Indian army, as well as Indian foreign policy, choosing instead to focus on soft power projection. However, the Indian army has argued that it seeks to change this as a 'means for supporting its foreign policy, and thus allowing the expansion of hard power projection by investing in its instruments in the form of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, long-range aircraft, and landing ships, as well as the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)' (Ladwig, 2010). Ladwig (2010, p. 1166) further distinguishes military power projection into two main groups:

> . . . it is possible to disaggregate military power projection into nine different aspects based on the political goals being sought and the level of force employed. Four of these relate to the employment of "soft" military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping), and five are primarily concerned with "hard" military power (showing the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest).

Ladwig (2010) also claims that while the Indian state is currently not interested in expansionary foreign policy in the sense of 'conquering new territories', it is however increasingly interested in projecting power in external terms as it is

surrounded by unstable states as neighbors, it is dependent on naval security for its international trade and supply chains as the brunt of this trade gets carried along routes in the Indian ocean, and it feels increasingly the sense of protecting its Indian citizens in its direct neighborhood and slightly beyond, as for example millions of Indians live and work in the Gulf countries.

Mudiam (2007) argues that after the Cold War, India is seeking to realize its foreign policy objectives of 'political independence and strategic autonomy', and therefore 'tries to counter any form of unilateralism in its direct neighborhood and the Greater Middle East (GME), as seen in the cases of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan by the US after 9/11'. Mudiam (2007) argues that India has a vested interest in defining the regions directly in its vicinity, like the GME, as it has considerable political, economic, ethnic, and cultural ties to this region, and in terms of trade and diaspora, the GME's development as a stable and wealthy region has favorable consequences for India itself.

2.1.6 Brazilian power projection

Measuring Brazil's power projection is more difficult as academic scholars have failed to reach a consensus on Brazil's exact positioning within the global order of powers, yet its potential as an economic powerhouse, its geographic extent, and its demographic weight have put the country on many international analysts' watchlist (Gardini, 2016). Gardini (2016) mentions that many of the labels and the definitions of existing concepts and terms within the International Relations (IR) discipline are borrowed from both the world as it was in the nineteenth century as well as in the Cold War, hence the difficulty of categorizing Brazil's power and power projection within the existing realms of the discipline. Gardini (2016) believes that Brazil is an

'emerging power', and these are characterized by 'having domination over its neighbors in terms of military- and economic capacity, as well as population and territory, while having the wish to change the global distribution of power, and assume leadership in some form on the global stage, while acting as veto powers on global issues, yet lack the power to become effective agenda-setters'. While Brazil's main foreign policy goal is to 'achieve international recognition', its network of diplomatic establishments, its contribution to international organizations like the IMF, and its share in global trade, among others, are far behind its peers, making Brazil's status as a 'large power' questionable (Gardini, 2016). All things considered, Brazil is hard to categorize within the existing realms of classifications that relate to power in the discipline of IR according to Gardini (2016), yet Brazil boasts an impressive capacity for soft power projection into its immediate region and can assert itself as an important global player with diplomatic initiatives and the efficient exploitation of its soft power potential. However, in the future, Brazil's capabilities in terms of PP and especially hard PP might become clearer, as the country boasts significant resources for the materialization of hard PP if it deems it necessary.

2.2 Related concepts in international relations

Understanding the related concepts in the literature is critical when defining the subject matter, as in social sciences concepts are interrelated, and one cannot understand the full meaning of a particular concept without a basic understanding of the most basic concepts in political science and international relations. As our subject matter revolves around FP and PP, there are numerous concepts that need to be explored to provide the necessary contexts.

2.2.1 Realism

Realists in IR believe that the international system is anarchic, states are the main actors, and they seek survival first and foremost, by either maximizing power (Morgenthau, 1948; Mearsheimer, 2001) or by maximizing security (Waltz, 1979). There is an absence of an ultimate authority presence in the international system, which allows the 'threat or use of force to be omnipresent in global politics' (Drezner, 2021). As survival is never guaranteed, states are always looking for survival. Threats are always present, and states look to the material capabilities of active or would-be adversaries. However, when a state actor tries to increase its power, it is faced with negative reactionary effects, as the balance of power can shift against its interests, and create a 'security dilemma' (Drezner, 2021). This security dilemma at its core explains much of international state behavior:

> Wherever such anarchic society has existed–and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level–there has arisen what may be called the "security dilemma" of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. (Herz, 1950, p. 157)

Balance of power theories are a subfield of IR, interrelated with realism as they view power politics with utmost importance, and critical in understanding state behavior in terms of foreign policy execution, global positioning, alliance politics, and in logical extension PP as well (Haas, 1953).

If we look at power projection from a realist framework, we can utilize the central tenets as put forward by Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* (1979). For Waltz (1979), the distribution of power in the international system is important, and

power projection becomes a means for states to secure their interests within the international system. As the world system is highly anarchic, and states are driven by their goal of survival within this anarchic system, states use PP to survive, and to maintain their position relative to others, as states are the primary actors within the international system, and they are rational actors looking to maximize their security. The main interests of states are often tied to securing their sovereignty, maintaining their territories, and pursuing military, economic, and political power within this international system. Another key concept within realism is that of 'relative gains versus absolute gains'. Relative gains are tied to zero-sum situations, in which according to realism, when one state increases its economic power for example, the other state feels threatened as they have become relatively stronger, whereas absolute gains are closer to the liberalism school of thought within IR, as they argue that gains can be absolute and not threaten the other state, and cooperation is possible. These central concepts of IR are intrinsically linked to the concept of PP as they either explain the motivation for its use or the dynamics under which it is being used within the international system. Realism in IR is much more intrinsically linked to PP than liberalism as in terms of paradigmatic epistemological schooling of related concepts and assumptions, realism deals more with the questions of security and power in comparison.

2.2.2 Hard power, soft power & smart power

While some scholars look at PP purely from a military perspective, only looking at 'hard power' elements (Stoll, 2000; Brylew, 2020; Gunzinger, 1993; Sullivan, 1993), other scholars also add 'soft power' elements to the definition of PP (Gardini, 2016;

Keohane & Nye, 1998), and others combine them to create 'smart power' (Wilson, 2008).

Scholars largely agree on the fact that hard power revolves around coercion, and this comes in the form of military force and economic coercion. Hard power also entails the use of coercive diplomacy as per Wilson (2008, p. 114): "Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests.". Keohane & Nye (1998) argue that 'hard power is the ability to get others to do what you want through threats and rewards, or military coercion and economic incentives'. Other scholars mention the importance of having local allies and military alliance structures in general for the execution of effective hard power as part of PP (Sullivan, 1993).

Soft power is different from hard power as it relies more on persuasion, attraction, incentivization, and the absence of coercion. Soft power, according to Keohane & Nye (1998), is the 'ability to get desired outcomes because others desire what you want', and this is done 'through ideas, culture, or agenda-setting via institutions'. Keohane & Nye (1998) created the term 'complex interdependence' to address the changes in the modern world, where 'security becomes less important, and countries are tied to each other through a web of relationships in social, economic, and political terms'. Keohane & Nye (1998) argue that the 'Information Revolution' in the modern world has 'increased the channels of contact between countries', as 'communication through technological innovation keeps becoming easier, cheaper, and more accessible for the ordinary person because giant state bureaucracies have lost the monopoly on information transfers'; however, 'military force still remains critical in the relationships that states have as security can become the most important issue in foreign policy'. Keohane & Nye (1998) also admit that

there are spatial restrictions to complex interdependence, as 'outside of the world where there is 'democratic peace' there is no complex interdependence, and realism and military force, and security, remain the most important laws'. Renowned IR scholar Joseph S. Nye is often mentioned for coining the term 'soft power' (Wilson, 2008), and the terms 'behavioral power', which is 'the ability to obtain outcomes you want', and 'resource power', which means that 'resource possession provides the outcomes you want' (Smith-Windsor, 2000). Soft power is thus markedly different from hard power, and Nye (2023, p. 12) introduces the term 'Co-optive Power' to explain soft power: "Co-optive power–getting others to want what you want–and soft power resources– cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions . . .". It is important to note that 'scientific attraction' as put forward by Wojciuk (2018) is interrelated with 'higher education' and falls under the 'international institutions' part of Nye's (2023) soft power definition.

So, if hard power is based on coercion, and the feeling of fear, and its main elements are military, political/diplomatic, and economic forms of coercion, and soft power is based on cooperation, persuasion, and the feeling of attraction, of which its elements are based on cultural, ideological, economic, and institutional cooperation and attraction, then what is smart power exactly? Smart power as a concept combines both hard power and soft power. While some scholars like Nossel (2004) have used the term 'smart power' to bring forth a critique of the Bush Jr. Administration's handling of foreign policy, arguing that 'alliances, institutions, diplomacy, and ideals are to be the US' preferred 'smart power' tools'; other scholars like Wilson (2008, p. 115) have tried to 'reframe the issue into IR compatibility': "This article defines smart power as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are

advanced effectively and efficiently.". According to Wilson (2008, p. 115), a 'framework for smart power should include the following considerations: A) the target over which one seeks to exercise power should be intensively studied, this is where intelligence agencies thrive; B) self-knowledge and understanding of one's own goals and capacities; C) the broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted; D) the tools to be employed, and when and how to deploy them'. With this definition, and these similar elements, it looks like smart power is more of a synonym for strategy than anything else. Hard- and soft power are about capabilities, and so is power projection, whereas smart power is more about the strategy of using these capabilities. The similarity with strategy will be uncovered in the following chapter. Wilson (2008) argues that 'smart power requires knowing the uses and limitations of the instruments or tools of statecraft and combining them while knowing when to use coercion and when to use persuasion is the job of the wise statesman'. Again, this is closer to the concept of strategy. The context within which smart power, and thus hard power and soft power as well, operate, is institutional by design according to Wilson (2008), this means that there are institutional constraints and restraints at play with the active use of these forms of power, examples are bureaucratic budgets, chain-of-command organizations, or deadlines.

While smart power is an effective way to describe the strategic use of hard power and soft power, it must be noted that in the real world, hard power dominates the field, particularly when it comes to influence in policy making (Wilson, 2008). Smart power is also different from hard- and soft power, as it revolves more around the strategic use of state capabilities, whereas the latter defines these capabilities, and this is why smart power as a concept will be abandoned in this study. Understanding

hard- and soft power individually and using them to define different areas of capabilities is more useful and accurate, and thus they make up the central pillars of our working definition of power projection. Distinguishing between hard- and soft power instruments is more accurate when trying to define the particularities of PP. PP is a security-driven operation at the core, and thus hard power instruments will always be favored by institutional actors as a result when possible. However, Wilson's (2008) 'framework of considerations' is highly valuable in understanding how to effectively analyze hard- and soft power, and in relation PP, and underscores the importance of having a strong and successful intelligence agency for the successful use of PP as information becomes key to all operations.

2.2.3 Strategy

To better understand power projection, one must have a complete picture of what 'strategy' is as a concept. PP is executed and built with strategy in mind. So, what does the concept of strategy mean? The origin of the name strategy comes from 'strategos' or 'strategon', which means 'military commander' in old Greek, and its definition can be conveniently summed up as the 'use of available resources to gain any objective' (Howard, 1976). This definition is concise yet suitable to describe and define what strategy means.

The term strategy is widely used in today's social world, yet it does not have to include the military aspect in its definition as it can be summarized as 'the application of ends to means' (Smith, 2011). One branch of academic study where strategy is central is that of 'strategic theory', which deals with the 'assessment of social activity to attain goals while removing moral valuations' (Smith, 2011). Strategic theory revolves around 'seven core assumptions' according to Smith

(2011): 'A) the ends and means, B) the political actor as the central unit, C) its preferences, D) the wider strategic environment, E) rational assumption, F) clashing interests, and G) moral neutrality'. Strategic theory originates from economics, and its position within the IR discipline remains contested, while 'strategic studies', also used interchangeably with 'security studies', is closer to IR and deals with the study of military power in international relations (Smith, 2011).

Clausewitz' (1976) famous saying 'war is politics by other means' lends itself to the importance of clearly defining what strategy is in the modern world, as the presence of war, and the propensity for conflict and the use of force in the international system among states, has not changed since Clausewitz' famous book *On War* (1976) was written in the early nineteenth-century. The question then becomes, how do states in the international system adopt the concept of strategy? The answer is by creating what scholars call a '*grand strategy*' in IR. Grand strategies are 'roadmaps for states', which allow for 'foreign policy stability' as 'heads of states come and go' while 'providing a vision for states to be followed' and 'built on the realities of the state's geography, strategic culture, and international system' (Abuşoğlu, 2022). A state's foreign policy is subservient to grand strategic considerations, as in temporal terms, grand strategy acts as a 'compass to policymakers for priority-setting over long-term periods' (Abuşoğlu, 2022). Power projection and foreign policy are thus executed with grand strategy in mind, where both are 'the final stages and behaviors of the states according to their respective grand strategies based on the realities of the international system and 'great powers', or 'large powers', are the ones creating grand strategies as they have the power to make global policies, while 'middle powers' and 'small powers' respond to those policies to the limits of their own respective power' (Abuşoğlu, 2022). Formulating

grand strategies is thus more an action of large powers in the international system, while the others have more limited power and behave more reactionary than proactive to changes or challenges in the international system. However, the concept of grand strategy can also be used relatively at the state-level, to describe a country's broader general 'plan', or the 'plan above plans', its outlines for foreign and security policies, its guiding principles in the years ahead, and its dependence on certain resources as such. In short, we can define a grand strategy as the 'national strategy based on political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military resources of a state to achieve national interests or goals' (Aydin, 2020). Understanding Turkey's 'grand strategy' requires understanding its strategic cultures based on historical facts and the principles of the republic like secularism, nationalism, and republicanism, while understanding that it evolves over time, as for example, Atatürk's infamous 'peace at home, peace in the world' non-interventionism doctrine dominated TFP in the twentieth century; however, it is important to know that much of what could be called the Turkish grand strategy is documented in the top-secret 'National Security Policy Document', made by the 'National Security Council', and which contains the analysis of 'internal and external threats facing Turkey, a general outline of the principles for its foreign and security policies', and a 'National Security Strategy Paper', 'which outlines resources, strategies and guidelines' (Aydin, 2020). The secrecy of such documents can be discussed in terms of practicality, as what I call 'transparent deterrence' requires clear communication of red lines, as mixed signals can hamper the effectiveness of deterrence against other states, inhibiting security in turn.

The concept of strategy is thus critical to understanding power as it creates an intellectual architecture combining means and ends, resources and objectives. We

can analyze social phenomena according to the elements of strategy, and can use its framework of A) goals, B) methods, and C) tools. These are detrimental to understanding PP, analyzing its elements, and building a viable strategy for power projection in the real world.

2.2.4 Alliances

Alliances are common in the international system, in fact, one cannot imagine international politics without alliances. The alliance-building behavior of states is directly tied to the balance of power (BoP) dynamics that exist in the same system (Dar, Haq, & Khan, 2018; Niou & Ordeshook, 1994). Therefore, the structure of the international system in terms of orders of power, for example, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, have different effects on the alliance-building behavior of states in that system.

Defining an 'alliance' is not as difficult as defining other concepts in IR for scholars. Renowned scholar Walt (1990) argues it is 'a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more states'. Alliances can also be seen in the 'game-theoretic lens of being a coalition of people coordinating strategies to realize an outcome that can only become reality through coordinated action' (Niou & Ordeshook, 1994). Hence, alliances always have a A) goal in mind, and B) function through coordination. To use a working definition of alliance, that of Niou & Ordeshook (1994, p. 170) is sufficient:

> An alliance is a collective security arrangement among states in which all members of the alliance agree to not threaten each other, to punish defectors from this agreement whenever possible, and to threaten countries outside of the alliance whenever it is in their individual interest to do so.

While some scholars like Waltz (1979) argue that states create alliances to balance against power, others argue that states form alliances to balance against threat (Walt, 1990). As states are rational actors in an anarchic system driven by self-help and needs for survival, states either ally themselves with other states or coalitions of states to protect their own security, or by bandwagoning, where alliances are different from other arrangements between states as alliances include the 'promise to protect each other' and hence always include a military element of cooperation (Dar et al., 2018). Alliances help 'manage relations between the states of the international system and can promote transparency while making the system more stable and predictable, yet they can also be dangerous to the same states (Dar et al., 2018). Turkey's entrance into NATO due to Soviet irredentist demands on Turkish territories in the 1940s can be seen in this perspective of entering into an alliance to balance against power or threat (R. Ö. Özkan, 2010).

For countries that are in alliances, three results and subsequent dynamics with different chains of cause and effect can occur if they or another member of the alliance is attacked: A) they can be dragged into conflict either close or far from their own territories, willingly or unwillingly, and the costs of denying to honor alliance commitments can be too high to opt out of compliance behavior; B) they can be pacified, or quieted under the de-escalation patterns of alliance behavior if the member state is under attack, or under threat, as the costs of alliance-wide conflict are too high; or C) they can be completely abandoned by the alliance when the member state is attacked or under threat of attack, as again the costs of conflict are too high for the alliance, or the sense exists among alliance members that the member state has provoked the enemy unnecessarily. All three of these have

significant consequences for intra-alliance dynamics in terms of the loyalty of its members, the stability of the alliance, and the organization of the alliance.

Alliance dynamics have consequences for a state's willingness and capacity to project power beyond its borders. Projecting power in the modern age often comes with multilateral diplomatic entanglements because of the question of prestige and reputation in the international system and the presence of international organizations like the United Nations. Unilateral use of force and PP is often condemned by the 'international community'.

2.2.5 Functions of force

Then there are the 'functions that force can serve: A) *defense*, B) *deterrence*, C) *compellence*, and D) *swaggering*' (Art, 1980). These are important to understand the motivation for states to project power in the international arena and to classify their behavior. In terms of defense, the use of force aims to achieve 'fending off an attack and the minimization of damage of said attack', while deterrence revolves around the 'threat of retaliation, where one deters an adversary and in effect prevents it from doing something deemed undesirable' (Art, 1980). Both are 'defensive in nature, as the former convinces the adversary that its forces are not conquerable, while the latter presents certain retaliatory destruction' (Art, 1980). Compellence is about 'making an adversary either stop from doing something, or making it do something that it has not done yet, and in this way, it is different from deterrence in that it involves the active use of force, whereas deterrence is about the passive use of force', thus compellence involves influencing the other actor's choice of action insofar that it takes a different path of choices that it otherwise would not (Art, 1980). Swaggering does not involve these dynamics, but 'revolves around the desire

for prestige and respect', according to Art (1980), who also mentions that it 'can be justified on realpolitik lines, if it causes other states to take your interests more seriously'. Examples of swaggering behavior are arms parades, where countries show off their most sophisticated weaponry in combination with a specific event, of which an example is the Moscow Victory Day Parade, where each year on the 9th of May the Russians parade their arms as a show of force while commemorating their victory over Nazi Germany at the end of the Second World War. These four functions of force as put forward by Art (1980) will be detrimental in classifying state behavior and the motivation for the use of PP.

2.3 Turkish foreign policy

Findings in the literature review indicate that TFP has changed towards a more assertive realpolitik direction from 2016 onwards as the 'Davutoğlu era' of TFP made way for the 'Erdoğan era' of TFP (Aras, 2019; Keyman, 2017). While some scholars believe that this change does not constitute a 'break with the past but constitutes fine-tuning in TFP' (Aras, 2019), others define this change to a new type of TFP with the Erdoğan era as the start of 'moral realism in TFP defined by military assertiveness coupled with humanitarian norms' (Keyman, 2017). An account of the complexities pre-2016 and post-2016 in TFP will provide the necessary chronological and historical background for the reader to understand how TFP evolved and changed with the paradigm shift in 2015-2016 that led to the creation of Turkey's form of power projection. I believe that there is a clear shift in TFP to assertive realpolitik and the use of effective power projection after the paradigm shift of 2015-2016 due to several underlying reasons which will be discussed in depth.

Whereas this new type of TFP characterized by hard power assertiveness with military capabilities is acknowledged, it becomes evident that there is a gap in the literature between the study of general TFP with power projection and the instruments thereof since 2016 and the underlying reasons why this change occurred. Academic debates on this shift in TFP often focus solely on the agency of individuals, and especially current president Erdogan's decision-making, yet often ignore the underlying systemic factors that made the paradigm shift necessary. And while Turkey has shown it does not refrain from taking military action time and time again since 2016, no academic framework combining the underlying reasons that led to the paradigm shift, the shift in TFP itself, and the subsequent Turkish forms of PP has been created. A comprehensive framework will be the result of the research done in this paper such that any reader will understand why the shift in TFP to realpolitik happened and what its consequences were for Turkish PP and the theaters of its execution.

2.3.1 Pre-2016 Turkish foreign policy

To understand TFP before the years of the paradigm shift during the 'Davutoğlu era', we must understand the thoughts of its main architect: Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu used to be an academic before he became a chief advisor in charge of foreign policy to the then-prime minister Erdoğan and then rose the ranks to become foreign minister, and then prime minister, as well as chairman of the reigning AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party). Davutoğlu's 'zero-problems-with-neighbors' foreign policy was well known and celebrated as a success in the early years of the AKP era up until the Arab Spring as Turkey increased its diplomatic network, reached out to its neighbors in a pragmatic way, and seemed to

increase its international standing as a result as it symbolized a 'bridge between the East and West, between the Muslim Middle East and the Christian modern West' (Erdoğan, 2017; Murinson, 2006). Davutoğlu's book '*Strategic Depth*' (2001) laid out the academic framework for the policies he implemented. In this era Turkey quickly increased its economic size, pushed democratic reforms in domestic politics, and stood as a candidate for accession to the liberal European Union. Davutoğlu's 'strategic depth' was based on a constructivist understanding of different 'civilizations' in the world 'exercising their agency' (Yeşiltaş, 2014). In hindsight, although Turkish politics is never peaceful, this era until the Arab Spring is even characterized by AKP critics as a 'peaceful' time.

The real challenges to the 'strategic depth doctrine' came with the eruption of popular protests during the Arab Spring. When the Arab Spring unleashed enormous instability across the region where Turkey was ideologically, economically, and diplomatically invested, Davutoğlu's foreign policy doctrine soon seemed unable to cope with the challenges emanating from the Arab Spring, particularly Syria. Turkey was hesitant about NATO's Libya operation and subsequent toppling of Ghaddafi in 2011, lost an ally when Morsi was overthrown in Egypt in June 2013, and invested in the fall of Assad in Syria, while its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood strained relations with many of the Gulf countries. Turkey needed a realist analysis of realities on the ground in Syria and a capacity for effective PP. Ideational policies and romantic symbolism proved to lack any real effect on the SCW, and its challenges for Turkey in terms of security, economy, diplomacy, and refugee flows. There was a clear gap between Turkey's capacities and its commitments, while the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy was not ready for 'soft power projection beyond its traditional concerns for security and stability' (Aras, 2019).

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It is also important to define TFP's general outlines before focusing on the shift in paradigm and PP after the years 2015-2016. Aslam (2019), like many other scholars, argues that the pre-Arab Spring TFP was characterized by an emphasis on soft power capabilities, with Turkey being a 'liberal democratic Islamic country' model for the rest of the MENA region, whereas the Arab Spring made a paradigm shift to hard power necessary. This paradigm shift culminated in the years 2015-2016, yet its groundwork was firmly laid since 2011. Aslam (2019) argues that according to 'role theory', the pre-Arab Spring showed Turkey had 6 roles, all associated with soft power instruments, and after the Arab Spring it embodied 5 roles, associated with hard power instruments. These roles are worth mentioning to clarify the behavioral aspect change in TFP (Aslam, 2019, p. 6-7), the pre-Arab Spring soft power -associated 6 roles are:

1. Mediator

2. Defender of regional peace and stability

3. Regional subsystem collaborator

4. Good neighbor

5. Bridge across civilizations

6. Trading state

and these turn into the 5 roles based on hard power instruments after the Arab Spring:

1. Central/pivotal country

2. Active independent country

3. Developer

4. Protector of the oppressed

5. Model/example country

A paradigm shift is evident in the change of roles. Such a paradigm shift needs to be placed within the context of Turkey's role in the international system. Parlar Dal (2016, p. 4-5) provides an excellent account of how to conceptualize Turkey as a 'regional emerging power' by using four critical factors:

1. active engagement within regional and international organizations
2. possession of necessary power resources
3. employment of foreign policy instruments
4. acceptance of leadership by third parties".

Parlar Dal (2016) argues that Turkey's soft (and especially 'ideational power'), as well as its material hard power, is ranked first in the neighboring regions of the Middle East and Balkans, while second to Russia in the Black Sea and Caucasus. She acknowledges however that a part of the soft power of Turkey in MENA was lost ever since the beginning of the SCW, as Turkey invested heavily in its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, to the chagrin of the UAE-Saudi alliance, losing influence over Egypt in turn after the coup that ousted Egypt's first democratically elected president Morsi and installed the UAE-Saudi backed military dictator Sisi. Turkey's soft power was economically backed by its ability to use 'trade relations, non-state actors and material welfare elevating its regional actor capacity' and its economic influence on its neighbors has stayed stable due to its size, despite

occasional setbacks and embargoes (Parlar Dal, 2016). Both hard power and soft power capabilities are interlinked with the classification of states in ranking orders and their behaviors, these are 'small, middle, large, and superpowers', whereas Turkey can be classified as a 'middle power' on the global stage and an 'emerging power' in regional terms: "… emerging powers dominate their neighbours in terms of power over resources, that is, population, territory, military capacity and gross domestic product." (Gardini, 2016, p. 14). Turkey is also called a 'regional power' quite frequently in the literature (Keyman, 2017; Parlar Dal, 2016). Turkey's aggregate weight in these hard- and soft power terms makes it an important player in multiple issue areas in its direct neighborhood, as such this classification is highly accurate.

2.3.2 The paradigm shift of 2015-2016

The paradigm shift of TFP in 2015-2016 was not without early warning signals. The years since the start of the Arab Spring and especially the SCW in 2011 meant that Turkey was faced with considerable and unprecedented security challenges from its southern neighbor. As it shares hundreds of kilometers of borders with Syria, Turkey was one of the most affected countries of the SCW, and Davutoğlu's TFP was unable to properly address the challenges that the SCW posed. The result was a major paradigm shift symbolized by the departure of Davutoğlu as prime minister, chairman of the AKP, and the main architect of TFP. This paradigm shift in TFP meant major changes in its approach and application of traditional and non-traditional diplomacy and power projection to advance its interests abroad.

I find these years deeply critical because of many structural reasons and cataclysmic events: 1) Turkish foreign policy definitively adapted realpolitik,

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recalibrated its FP according to the Russian presence, abandoned its objective of toppling Assad, and effectively ended the 'zero-problems-with-neighbors' foreign policy approach of then prime minister Davutoğlu, who very symbolically stepped down as prime minister, 2) the formidable entrance of Russia into the Syrian theatre, the downing of the Russian jet and ensuing tensions with Russia, followed by a new transactional relationship between Ankara and Moscow, 3) the beginning of the US-YPG partnership and the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and 4) the 15 July Coup Attempt in Turkey, its effects on the Turkish military and the elimination of Gülenist or FETÖ-elements, the domestic restructuring of Turkish politics with the AKP-MHP alliance, and the first of a series of successive military interventions by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Azerbaijan. This year also saw the highest increase in registered refugees in Turkey, with the number rising from roughly 1,5 million to 2,5 million (UNHCR, 2024) due to the battles raging in and around the Aleppo and Idlib regions which was effectively a limited proxy war between Russia and Turkey which ended with the capture of Aleppo by regime (and allied) forces and the Astana accords.

Besides the events of the years of 2015-2016, two important drivers have influenced the paradigm shift of TFP, these are 1) the withdrawal of the US hegemon militarily from Iraq, which arguably might have sparked the Arab Spring, and therefore the departure of the regional hegemon taking care of security, of which its absence created a security vacuum, which was exploited by terrorist groups like the PKK and ISIS; and 2) the development of an increasingly domestically-sourced and vibrant Turkish defense industry ecosystem, of which domestic independence is a guideline, and bureaucratic hurdles are removed by centralizing its flagship organizations like the SSB under the direct hierarchy of the presidency.

Therefore, I will argue that 1) the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011 meant the effective withdrawal of the American hegemon from the region which resulted in a security vacuum which is exploited by terrorist organizations like the PKK and ISIS, 2) the entrance of Russia militarily in Syria turned the tide of the war and started a new chapter in the Turkish-Russian relationship, 3) the US-YPG partnership aggravated Turkish security concerns and strained the Turkish-American relationship, 4) the 15 July Coup Attempt as a cataclysmic event led to the birth of the AKP-MHP alliance and the restructuring of the military (including the removal of Gülenists) which increased military assertiveness, and 5) the relative success of national arms production made possible new instruments of PP, strengthened existing instruments of Turkish PP, and lowered the costs of military intervention. All of these variables or drivers created both the paradigm shift in TFP and the need for effective Turkish power projection as part of TFP. By looking at these drivers the research question of why the paradigm shift happened in 2015-2016 and why Turkish power projection emerged post-2016, and how it materialized will be answered.

2.3.3 Post-2016 Turkish foreign policy

Right after the 15 July Coup Attempt in 2016 on the 24th of August, the TAF began a military cross-border intervention named 'Euphrates Shield' against ISIS in the area of northern Aleppo, while citing the UN Charter's Article 51 'The Right of Self-Defense' (Yeşiltaş, Seren, Özçelik, 2017). It was to be the first of many cross-border operations under Turkey's new, more assertive, more in line with realpolitik, foreign policy. It was an exercise of effective power projection in its purest form. The

paradigm shift of 2015-2016 changed the way TFP was executed. And hence TFP post-2016 is different from the years before.

Some scholars like Keyman (2017, p. 56) confirm this 'rupture' and argue that TFP has shifted to 'moral realism': "The radical reset of Turkish foreign policy since 2015, as will be analyzed in detail throughout this paper, involves a rupture rather than continuity with the 2002-2010/2015 "Davutoğlu era". Keyman (2017) argues that this change in TFP is there to stay and claims that the new form of TFP which he calls moral realism is a 'strategic choice with the goals in mind of A) proactivism, B) promoting humanitarianism, and C) responding to security challenges through assertive hard power'. He also argues that any proactive foreign policy requires the elements of 'A) a suitable environment, B) a capacity to implement, and C) a clear strategy' (Keyman, 2017).

Other scholars like Aydin (2020) agree that Turkey's foreign policy has changed from its 'zero-problems-with-neighbors' doctrine, with an emphasis on soft power, to the model of 'order builder' with an emphasis on hard power in its direct neighborhood. Turkey today still inherits 'strategic cultures and strategic patterns' from its past, for example, 'balancing the major powers against each other,' and 'pragmatism rooted in realism' was also used during the reign of the Ottoman Empire, in addition to 'westernism' and 'multidimensionalism', which are still relevant today (Aydin, 2020). As such, Turkey today maintains a secure military alliance with NATO with highly active participation in its activities and exercises while fostering increasingly warming and transactional ties with the Russian Federation in economic (particularly energy), diplomatic, and even military terms.

Since 2016, Turkey has intervened militarily in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Azerbaijan, and the East Mediterranean. In Syria it has executed the major cross-

border offensive operations of Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, followed by Operation Olive Branch in 2018, Operation Peace Spring in 2019, Operation Spring Shield in 2020, and countless other minor operations and retaliations. In Iraq, Turkey executed Operation Claw in the years 2019-2020 and continues to execute Operation Claw-Lock at the present in 2024, among other minor military operations and airstrikes against the PKK. In Libya, Turkey intervened on behalf of the UN-recognized GNA (Government of National Accord) in Tripoli, successfully foiled Haftar's takeover of the Libyan capital and its surrounding regions, stabilized the western part of Libya, and effectively ended the Second Libyan Civil War. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey supported the Azerbaijani army with military advisors, UAVs, munitions, intelligence, and more, leading to the Azerbaijani victory in the Second Karabakh War. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey as part of its Blue Homeland Doctrine escorts naval exploration vessels with warships and drills for oil and gas in 'contested' waters as part of its policies to protect its declared 'EEZ' (Exclusive Economic Zone). Apart from these executions of hard PP, Turkey also continues to arm the Ukrainians against the Russian offensive with effective UAVs like Baykar's TB2, which has created the 'Bayraktar legend' in Ukraine and serves as an effective war propaganda tool (Soylu, 2022a); continues to arm the Kosovan state against Serbia, as claimed by Serbia (T. Ozturk, 2023); has expanded its military footprint in Qatar (Yüksel & Tekineş, 2021); negotiates with Afghanistan's Taliban government (Sahinkaya, 2022); and negotiated the Black Sea Grain Initiative to allow Ukrainian and Russian grain exports to resume securing a steady supply for the world's food markets (Wintour, 2023); among other initiatives. Turkey's multidimensional diplomatic outreach continues at a dizzying rate, increasing the number of its involvement in negotiation mechanisms each year.

Hence, a clear difference arises with the periods before, that is the trend of militarization in TFP. Three main drivers cause this militarization in TFP according to Mehmetcik & Çelik (2021): '1. the pursuit of strategic autonomy, 2. the closing tandem between the domestic and foreign policy, and 3. the Turkish military-industrial complex'. While 'militarization is nothing new, as the military was the most powerful institution in Turkish politics from the 1960s onwards, this influence was curbed in the 2000s and 2010s through courts and reforms' (Mehmetcik & Çelik, 2021). Militarization in foreign policy means the 'glorification of the use of hard power as a foreign policy option,' and as the 'influence of the military grows in the government, the state is more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policy' (Mehmetcik & Çelik, 2021). Since 'the late 1990s onwards, Turkey has been an 'autonomy maximizer' in terms of foreign policy', and in the last five years, meaning the post-2016 period, this 'strategic autonomy maximization has become apparent in TFP, as Turkey's security concerns are disregarded by its traditional allies' (Mehmetcik & Çelik, 2021). Turkey's domestic and foreign policies are also growing closer according to (Mehmetcik & Çelik, 2021), as 'domestic identity and ideology determine TFP'. The Turkish military-industrial complex is the third driver of the militarization in TFP, as it becomes an important 'policy influencer,' given Turkey's military operations in different countries (Mehmetcik & Çelik, 2021). The militarization trend within TFP is closely related to the emergence of a vibrant Turkish defense industry in the last decades which continues to evolve and supply the instruments for Turkish hard PP.

2.4 Conclusion

To understand Turkey's foreign policy at present, and how it materialized in the form of PP in different theaters of war we have to first address the definition of PP. In defining PP, we have seen that there are different views in the literature on what it exactly entails. However, we have effectively looked at the different definitions of PP and concluded that the most useful and applicable definition is in short that of 'the execution of hard- and soft power to achieve strategic objectives as part of foreign policy beyond a country's own borders'. In doing so our working definition required of course the knowledge of important related concepts in IR. But before looking at the related concepts we looked at the different versions of PP that exist as they are executed by different players on the world stage.

That is why we looked at the American, Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian forms of PP and how they differ from one another. One can infer a lot and draw important lessons by looking at the differences as the matters of capabilities, agencies and institutionalism, balance of power dynamics, and more influence the particular state's choice of PP beyond its borders. Here we see that for example arguably the world's only superpower that is the US has full control of the global oceans and uses its international network of military bases, military alliances, and air- and naval power to project military power, while the global economic institutions and monetary system it effectively built after WW2 form the second leg of American PP. When it comes to the Russians this is markedly different, as they adopt the reactionary act of balancing against US power in their form of PP, and they do this by combining traditional with non-traditional (asymmetric) means, which scholars have coined hybrid warfare; where the Russians use information manipulation, cyber-attacks, private military companies, energy- and arms exports, political

influence, and diplomatic methods along with traditional military power. The Chinese do it differently. Given that the Chinese are (like the Russians) reactionary in terms of the characteristics of their PP against US power, it is not a surprise that the Chinese tend to focus on their soft power aspects more as they boast an enormous economic power, while building up their military capabilities, which are lacking in terms of long-distance military PP with the US effectively landlocking them through their naval power and military allies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines) where they cannot expand beyond their immediate seas. The Chinese try to compensate by using their diaspora and ideational, diplomatic- and economic power as asymmetric means of PP. The Indian form of PP is built mainly on soft power as well while developing their military capabilities as they seek 'strategic autonomy' and the safeguarding of their significant naval interests as a seafaring country where naval trade and supply chains are existential to their economy. Another important objective for the Indians in their use of PP is the denying of unilateral interventionism in their immediate vicinity as they harbor a large diaspora in areas like the Gulf, and similarly to the Chinese, use their economic, ideational, and diplomatic power as their main means of projecting power beyond their borders. We see resemblances to the Chinese form of PP in the Indian use of their diasporas and scientific/ideational- and economic influence. Finally, we have the Brazilian form of PP, which is built on soft power as the Brazilian military is too insignificant due to the absence of pressing geopolitical challenges like the Russians, Chinese, or Turks have. That is why scholars have a hard time characterizing Brazil's position in the global world order as they have great potential in terms of soft power with economic and diplomatic initiatives yet see Brazil lacking in their willingness to adopt a more assertive role on

the world stage, and their capacity in hard power terms thus remains underdeveloped making their PP insignificant as a result.

After looking at the definition of PP and the different forms of PP as it has materialized through different players on the world stage, we have looked at the important related concepts in IR. The first one is that of realism, where the main motivations of states are survival, maximizing their power or security, and balancing against their enemies, as the international system is highly anarchic, leading to the motivations and systemic conditions and prerequisites for using PP. At the international level of analysis, these systemic conditions force states to project power beyond their borders as balance of power dynamics and security dilemmas make it impossible for states to remain neutral in certain conditions, and we have seen the consequences for the PP forms as executed by the states mentioned above, where for example Brazil does not meaningfully venture into hard power projection, as it does not have any real geopolitical challengers in its immediate vicinity and both South- as well as North America is firmly positioned under American military dominance as part of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other side of the spectrum, these systemic conditions also make the Russians, and even the Chinese, venture into effective PP to balance against the 'American threat'.

Then we looked at the concepts of hard power, soft power, and smart power, and ruled that hard power can be defined shortly as 'the combination of military, diplomatic/political, and economic means of coercion that a state uses in relation to other states'. The term coercion is critical here, as soft power is instead built on cooperation, persuasion, attraction, incentivization, and co-option where it is simply 'everything that hard power is not' hence economical, demographical, ideological, ideational, cultural, scientific, and other forms of incentivization, persuasion, and

attraction that states use to influence other states to want the same outcome. It is here that with the concept of smart power, the matter of PP becomes interesting, as smart power's characteristics were so in line with the definition of strategy, that it strengthened our epistemological position and our working definition that power projection is simply the sum of hard- and soft power. The inventors of smart power as a concept also aimed to combine hard- and soft power applications which results in smart power, yet in doing so made a concept that resembles strategy more than the concepts of either hard- or soft power. The clearest definition of smart power according to Wilson (2008) was the 'mutually reinforcing combination of hard- and soft power to further one's interests' which looks identical to our definition of PP as 'the execution of hard- and soft power to achieve strategic objectives as part of foreign policy beyond a country's own borders', yet revolves more around the strategic use of hard- and soft power, and thus does not add additional depth to the equation, making the elimination of smart power as a useful concept necessary to our study. Moreover, the 'considerations of smart power' as put forth by Wilson (2008) which are A) the target, B) self-knowledge, C) regional and global context, and D) the tools, are again more about the strategic use of hard- and soft power than a different kind of concept defining state capabilities. Therefore, we believe that the distinctions between the dichotomous concepts of hard- and soft power are more useful and apt to explain our theoretical framework.

After that, we looked at the concept of strategy, which in short is the 'use of resources to achieve an objective' (Howard, 1976). Yet this is not sufficient as a working definition for us, and the concept of strategy is important to understanding the concept of power projection itself. The 'application of ends to means' (Smith, 2011) is a similar concise definition of the concept of strategy that aims to explain

the same social and political construct. It is here that the study of strategic theory with its 'seven core assumptions' of 'A) ends and means, B) the political actor as the central unit, C) preferences, D) strategic environments, E) rational assumption, F) clashing interests, and G) moral neutrality' by Smith (2011) explains what strategy is as it is lacking in definition without the proper understanding of these elements. In terms of IR, the concept of grand strategy becomes important in relation to state behavior and the execution of power projection. Here, it becomes clear that large and powerful states have grand strategies where their behavior can posit more variation, and they can be more flexible in their foreign policies and wider grand strategy executions, merely because they have higher material resources, are more secure, and can act as agenda-setters, in the global context vis-à-vis their smaller, weaker counterparts. Therefore, large powers can be proactive in their grand strategies and foreign policies, while middle- and small powers are left to be more reactionary in their behaviors. However, one can also use the term and concept of grand strategy to merely describe the 'national plan or roadmap' of any state where it will be 'grand' relative to their other smaller plans. But what does grand strategy actually mean? The most concise way to define grand strategy is to call it a 'roadmap for states', while being built on 'the realities of the state's geography, strategic culture, and international system' (Abuşoğlu, 2022). As grand strategy acts as a 'compass to policymakers' (Abuşoğlu, 2022), it is natural that foreign policy and PP are subservient to the grand strategy of states as they are the real-world materializations of grand strategic considerations. As a working definition, we have adopted the following definition of grand strategy: 'a national strategy based on political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military resources of a state to achieve national interests or goals' (Aydin, 2020). Grand strategies also functionally act as

agenda-setters as elected officials come and go, yet the state's security considerations remain, and the results become what we call 'strategic cultures' where well-established patterns of strategic state behavior become institutional traditions, and national security documents outlining the priorities and guidelines of the state in the face of threats (Aydin, 2020). Some of these strategic cultures are well-known in Turkish political history, and some examples are westernism, multidimensionalism, balancing, republicanism, and so on (Aydin, 2020). The use and practical application of Turkish PP are tied intrinsically to these strategic cultures and national security documents, as state bureaucracies are dominant when it comes to matters of security which requires the absence of impulsivity. Finally looking at all of these characteristics of strategy, we define and simplify its nature concisely into a framework of three elements of A) goals, B) methods, and C) tools, which make up any kind of strategy, and which also act as a useful dissection of power projection with which to evaluate its relative success. An example of such a framework would be Turkey's intervention (or power projection) in Libya where one of the goals was preventing Haftar's takeover of Tripoli, the method was military intervention, and the tools used were drones, mercenaries, military advisors, arms deliveries, naval assets, and intelligence.

Then we looked at the concept of 'alliances'. Understanding alliances is important as they can either motivate or constrain the application of PP by a state in the real world and often also shape its particular characteristics if such PP materializes. The presence of alliances in the international system is once again tied to its systemic conditions and the balance of power dynamics that emerge as a result of these conditions (Dar, 2018; Niou & Ordeshook, 1994). Then there is the fact of the structure of the international system, like multipolarity, duopolarity, and

unipolarity, which also affects alliance-building among states, and as a result the use

and form of PP. When defining the concept of alliance there is a rather stable

consensus in the literature as this concept is relatively easier to define. For example,

Walt (1990) calls it a 'formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation'

which is a concise and descriptive way of explaining the basic nature of the concept

of Alliance. However, another working definition by Niou & Ordeshook (1994) also

captures its deeper working nuances as they call it 'a coalition coordinating strategies

to realize an outcome that can only become reality through coordinated action'. Now,

when we think of NATO, these two definitions perfectly describe its nature, while

recognizing that the desired outcome can change over time while security in some

form or another will always be at the heart of it. Here it is important to note that there

are differences in IR on the nature of the cause of alliances, as Waltz (1979) argues

that 'states create alliances to balance against power' whereas Walt (1990) believes

that 'states form alliances to balance against threat'. Alliances also make the

international system more stable and predictable (Dar, 2018). However,

understanding alliances means understanding the effects alliance membership has in

terms of freedoms and constraints. These are A) being dragged into conflict, B) being

pacified in the name of de-escalation, and C) being abandoned, and understanding

these three hypothetical scenarios means understanding the effects these have on the

intra-alliance dynamics of loyalty and stability of the organization. One could argue

for example that Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015 and was pacified by a lack

of commitment and support from its allies in NATO. Another example of a different

effect of being a member of an alliance is the recent NATO-wide support for the

Ukrainian state against the Russian invasion of their territories, where not supporting

the Ukrainians with logistical and military aid is 'frowned upon' and seen as a breach

of alliance-wide solidarity, while, in a possible conflict with Russia, the alliance members are all dragged into conflict due to the alliance's most important clauses and articles. Hence, as part of foreign policy, grand strategy, and possible alliance membership, power projection is executed by calculating the possible effects and consequences of these in mind.

As the final part of looking at the related concepts in IR, we looked at the 'functions of force'. As the use of force in the international system is done with calculations in mind it is important to understand these functions that force can serve which are: 'A) defense, B) deterrence, C) compellence, and D) swaggering' (Art, 1980). These describe the different motivations for states to project power in accordance with their goals, and we can classify the behavior of these states by looking at the use of their force. Defense aims at fending off an attack, while deterrence revolves around the threat of retaliation, and both can be classified as being defensive in nature; while compellence means forcing your adversary or target from stopping the execution of a certain action or course of action contrary to your interests, or forcing them to do something in your interests, where the use of force is active, contrary to deterrence where the use of force is passive, and finally swaggering, where the state shows force to gain 'prestige or respect' in the international system (Art, 1980). The difference between deterrence and compellence is in the passive or active use of force, and this distinction is highly important in understanding state behavior and by extension the use of PP. One could, for example, argue that the Euphrates Shield operation in 2016 in northern Syria was an act of compellence against the YPG which sought to unify their 'cantons of Afrin and Kobane' and which brought an end to this, while it could also be argued to be defensive in nature in the long term, as a stronger YPG means higher costs for the

TAF in a possible conflict in the future, hence the classification of certain functions of force can be interpreted in temporal terms as well.

We then proceeded to look at the different periods of Turkish foreign policy, as the era of Davutoğlu's 'zero-problems-with-neighbors' doctrine during the 'liberal' 2000s made way for the paradigm shift in the years of 2015-2016 after the doctrine failed to meet the challenges posed by the Arab Spring revolts and particularly the SCW. This era also coincided with the presence of American troops in Iraq from 2003 onwards and its effects on the wider region in extension which we will address later. In any case, the AKP era of foreign policy from 2002 to 2011, the start of the Arab Spring was widely celebrated as being a model for the Middle East, and the wider Islamic World. As part of this doctrine, Turkey relied largely on its soft power capabilities to foster better relations with its neighbors and promote social, cultural, and economic ties among others. However, its capacity and experience in hard power terms remained lacking relative to the 'romantic' position it took during the Arab Spring where its desire was the toppling of dictators throughout the region and a new wave of influence over these countries. Yet, as has been the case since at least the French Revolution, protests and uprisings proved to have reactionary effects, and the status quo of authoritarianism was largely restored throughout the region in a relatively short time. The real nail in the coffin was the ouster of Morsi in 2013 for the romantic dreams of Turkish 'expansionism' based on Davutoğlu's constructivist understanding of shared values. To be fair however, in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and other countries, the Western states were quickly on the side of the protestors, while also keeping ties to the authoritarian regimes, as if hedging their bets, but the pendulum seemed to swing towards the departure of Assad in Syria, and the opposition was supported by the Western states, yet not

sufficiently to force his departure, leading to one of the most difficult times for Turkish foreign policy since the birth of the Republic, as Turkey effectively waged a limited war with Russia in 2015-2016, which it lost, and recalibrated accordingly. The paradigm shift of 2015-2016 and its underlying causes are thus very important in understanding why TFP changed and how the Turkish forms of power projection came to exist. These underlying causes for the paradigm shift and the modern forms of Turkish PP built on hard power capacities are the subject of this research and will be dealt with in detail.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY

The Turkish defense industry is an important subject that requires special attention. One of the major tenets of modern power projection is the use of military tools. These tools come in many shapes and forms and form the third leg of what makes up the concept of 'strategy' in this context. Strategy is made up of three major elements: A) Goals/objectives, B) methods, and C) tools/instruments. Naturally, all three are effectively interlinked, and a change in C can on occasion, but rarely, affect a change in A and B. Yet they are not equal in weight, as a change in A will shape the choices of B and C. In Turkey's case, the dynamic of these elements of strategy is peculiar. The decades-long push by respective governments, bureaucrats, and regular citizens for the national production and development of indigenous arms has wielded effective results. Hence, we need to touch upon the ever-growing and popular Turkish defense industry, as they produce the tools for C, which effectively affect A and B. In the Turkish case, this has made worldwide headlines, as indigenous weaponized drones, or UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) have allowed Ankara to engage in more risky power projection in multiple theaters of conflict like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Somalia. The advantages of cost-effective drones on the battlefield are many. The loss of such drones in combat does not mean the loss of valuable personnel, and their domestic production means it can keep up with the attrition of lengthy engagement in conflict areas. The immediate result is that TFP can put forward objectives that would not be available without such instruments of C, hence a different C opens up new options for A. An example is the use of UAVs on behalf of the GNA in Libya, with traditional airpower being denied

access due to a lack of viable airbases or aircraft carriers. Would TFP risk an intervention in Libya without such instruments now becomes an important question. Hence, C has influenced A and B, marking a clear preference for effective hard PP with tools that carry less risk of losing valuable manpower, and upsetting domestic audiences in the process. Therefore, we see a marked difference in the post-2016 Çavuşoğlu Era and the Fidan Era in the reliance on effective hard PP as part of broader TFP. To fully understand how the domestic defense industry has had important consequences for Turkish PP, we have to understand its history first.

Turkish analysts often use the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus Operation as the birth of the modern defense sector, as the embargoes by traditional weapons suppliers like the US on Turkey increased the importance of domestic arms production for government officials (Özlü, 2021). Others go back to the birth of the Republic of Turkey and the armaments factories established at the time (Demir, 2020). We will use the periodical categorization in historic terms as used by the SSB (Savunma Sanayi Başkanlığı) or 'Defense Industry Agency', which categorizes 6 different periods as follows: I) pre-1923, II) 1923-1950, III) 1950-1974, IV) 1974-1985, V) 1985-2006, VI) 2006-present, to provide a brief history of the Turkish defense industry (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Defence Industry Agency (PRTDIA), n.d.).

3.1 Period I: pre-1923 Ottoman era

The Ottomans were revolutionizing warfare, especially in terms of cannon production, during the times of Mehmed the Conqueror's conquering of Constantinople, present-day Istanbul, yet they could not keep up with technological developments in the West and lost their cutting-edge innovation in military

technology during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Özlü, 2021, p. 221).

However, 'the Ottomans were not entirely inactive, building military factories in the

districts of Tophane, Zeytinburnu, and Bakırköy, despite shortages of raw materials

in the Empire needed for the defense industry' (Özlü, 2021). 'The Industrial

Revolution, which started in Great Britain first, and expanded later throughout

continental Europe and the Americas in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

made the Ottoman Empire's arms production look primitive in comparison' (Özlü,

2021). Then 'on July 22, 1908, the Ottoman Ministry of War was established, and

only a year later, the General Directorate of Warfare Production, or *'İmalât-ı*

Harbiye-i Umumiye Müdürlüğü', was founded, and the Empire's arms production

was centralized under this new authority' (Özlü, 2021). 'Then, as the Ottomans lost

WW1, an armistice was signed, and this armistice came with specific conditions, and

the production of arms was effectively stopped as a result' (Özlü, 2021). As the

'Turkish War of Independence started in 1919, some of the materials of these

factories were smuggled to the regions under Turkish control, and reorganized on

March 19, 1920, leading to workshops being opened in Ankara, Eskişehir, Konya,

and Erzurum' (Özlü, 2021). These workshops and factories 'were then put under the

General Directorate of Military Factories, or *'Askeri Fabrikalar Umum Müdürlüğü',*

established on January 10, 1921' (Özlü, 2021). According to Özlü (2021), the

'military factories during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) could be

categorized into three distinct groups: arms, ammunition, and chemicals'. 'Arms

were produced by the following factories: the Ankara Arms Factory, Kırıkkale Rifle

Factory, and Kırıkkale Cannon Factory; whereas ammunition was produced by: the

Kırıkkale Ammunition Factory, Ankara Cartridge Factory, and Silahdarağa Cartridge

Factory; and chemicals were made by the following factories: Kırıkkale Gunpowder

Factory, Elmadağ Barut Factory, Konya Güherçile Kalhane, and the Mamak Gas Mask Factory' (Özlü, 2021).

3.2 Period II: 1923 - 1950

The period of the early days of the young Republic was characterized by state-led initiatives to revive the country's defense industry. According to the SSB, 'machinery, craftsmen, and workmen were discreetly transferred from Istanbul to the Anatolian cities of Ankara, its surroundings, and Erzurum; and not only state-led initiatives were at the helm of creating facilities, but also private initiatives helped support the defense industry' (PRTDIA, n.d.). The Ministry of National Defense played an important role in supervising and supporting these private initiatives (Özlü, 2021, p. 221). Şakir Zümre Bey, Nuri Killigil, and Nuri Demirağ are some of the private businessmen responsible for aiding the Turkish Republic's fledgling defense industry (Özlü, 2021, p. 222). Killigil 'established a pistol factory in 1942'(Özlü, 2021), whereas 'Demirağ produced many aircraft like the NuD-36 and NuD-38, and gliders, from 1936 to 1943, with everything domestically built except the engines (Yavuz, 2013). However, despite great achievements in domestic development and production of arms, ammunition, airplanes, and more, political reasons concerning the preference to procure from foreign sources have effectively inhibited and stymied domestic research and development, and natural production.

Şakir Zümre was a businessman born in 1885 in Varna, present-day Bulgaria, who was awarded the highest honor, the *'Istiklal Madalyası'*, or 'Independence Medallion' by the Turkish parliament, the 'Grand National Assembly', or *'Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'* (TBMM), for his support of delivering arms and ammunition to the Turks during the War of Independence (1919-1923) (Savunma Sanayii

Dergilik, 2020a). Zümre built the Turkish Republic's first privately-owned defense industry company in 1925 in Haliç, Istanbul, called the *'Türk Sanayi Harbiye ve Madeniye Fabrikası',* or 'Turkish Industrial War and Materials Factory' (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020a). The factory produced arms and ammunition for the *'Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri' (TSK),* or Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), including the bombs used by bomber planes for the Turkish Air Force, or *'Türk Hava Kuvvetleri',* bombs used by the Turkish Navy, or *'Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri',* flares, mines, grenades, and 5-horsepower engines running on diesel fuel (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020a). He successfully produced and exported arms and ammunition to Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, despite facing difficulties in logistics and supply of materials and spare parts for his machines in his factory boasting two thousand employees, due to WW2 creating supply chain bottlenecks and blockages (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020a). Due to the Marshall Plan, Zümre transformed his factory in 1944 into producing casting, hardware, farming tools, and even stoves (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020a). Şakir Zümre died in 1966, and his factory closed only 4 years later in 1970 (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020a).

Nuri Killigil was born in 1890 in Bitola (Turkish: Manastır), in present-day Northern Macedonia (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020b). He is the brother of Enver Pasha (Turkish: Paşa), the infamous leader of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), or *'İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'*, and consequent Minister of War in the Ottoman Empire during WW1, and the nephew of Halil 'Kut' Pasha, the famous victorious commander of the Ottoman *'Kût'ül-Amâre'* campaign in present-day Iraq (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020c). He served as a military officer, following in his family's footsteps, in Libya, and later Azerbaijan, where he was known as the leader of the 'Caucasus Islam Army,' or *'Kafkas Islam Ordusu',* and is heralded as the

'Savior of Baku' from the Red Army Russians and the Armenians (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020b). Like Zümre Bey, he was awarded the Independence Medallion in 1929 for his outstanding achievements in the War of Independence (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020b). Nuri Pasha opened his first factory in Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, where he produced rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bombs for airplanes, and artillery shells (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020b). He exported arms and ammunition to Egypt, Pakistan, Syria, and Palestine, and developed his pistol, the Nuri Killigil Pistol, after which he relocated his factory to Sütlüce, Istanbul, in 1942, and opened a second factory in Pendik, Istanbul (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020b). On 2 March 1949, there were explosions in his factory in Sütlüce, where he died together with firefighters, and his body was never recovered, leading many to suspect foul play and sabotage (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020b).

Nuri Demirağ 'was born in 1886 in Sivas, present-day Turkey, where he became a bureaucrat for the Ziraat Bank, after which he was transferred to Istanbul, and became the Maçka leader of the *'Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti'*, or 'Defenders of Law Society', the umbrella organization of Turkish resistance groups against foreign occupation, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself' (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020d). He is 'known for his enormous contribution to building railroads in the new Republic of Turkey, causing Atatürk himself to call him 'Demirağ' or 'Iron Net' (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020d). 'After opening a cigarette paper factory in the 1920s, Demirağ continued starting many ventures well into the 1930s, and laid his eyes on the sky, opening the Nuri Demirağ Airplane workshop in Beşiktaş, Istanbul, in 1936' (Savunma Sanayii Dergilik, 2020d). With Turkish engineers, and German support, Demirağ constructed his airplane factory and produced the first Turkish airplanes NuD-36 and NuD-38 airplanes, along with the production of gliders, but

the THK did not find the NuD-36 trainer aircraft up to technical standards and did not procure the promised 24 units of NuD-36 which were produced, sparking a long legal process between Demirağ and the THK (Dilek, n.d.). Demirağ continued to create the NuD-38 model 6-person transport aircraft, a plane enormously popular and modern at the time, yet the THK did not procure them (T.C. Sivas Valiliği, n.d.). Demirağ died on 13 November 1957 (T.C. Sivas Valiliği, n.d.).

The aviation industry lends its birth to the 1911 Turkish-Italian war in Libya, after which the Turkish Aeronautical Association was founded in 1925, with support from Atatürk, also called the *'Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti'* in Turkish, or today's *'Türk Hava Kurumu'* (THK*)* (Atatürk Ansiklopedisi, n.d.). In 1926, the *'Tayyare ve Motor Türk A.Ş.'* (TOMTAŞ) was founded, with the support of the German Junkers Corporation, but due to *'Junkers Flugzeugwerke AG'*, headquartered in Düsseldorf Germany, having financial difficulties, the partnership was officially ended in 1928 with TOMTAŞ filing for bankruptcy (Deniz, 2018). While Junkers was invited by Turkish officials, and the project saw great support from the Turkish leadership and the public at the time, and Junkers was supported by the German foreign ministry, bankruptcy was unavoidable (Deniz, 2018). TOMTAŞ holdings were first bought up by the Turkish Airplane Association and consequently delivered to the Ministry of Defense (Deniz, 2018). The factory in Kayseri remained, and under the Ministry of Defense produced around 200 foreign aircraft from 1932 to 1942 in the factories in Kayseri with American, German, British, and Polish licenses (Yalçın, 2010). The Turkish Aeronautical Association (THK) opened the Ankara Akköprü workshop in 1925, yet as this workshop alone was insufficient, the Etimesgut workshop was opened in 1939, which later became the THK Etimesgut Uçak Fabrikası, or THK Etimesgut Airplane Factory, in 1941 with the help of Polish refugee scientists like

Jerzy Wędrychowski (Genç, 2018). The THK Etimesgut Airplane Factory built Miles Magister airplanes, along with THK-1 to THK-16 series airplanes (Yavuz, 2013). The THK Gazi Uçak Motoru Fabrikası or THK Gazi Airplane Engine factory facility was created in Ankara in 1945, producing engines from 1948 onwards (Yavuz, 2013). The Ankara wind tunnel was planned in 1945 and finished in 1950, but with the closure of both the Etimesgut Airplane Factory and the THK Gazi Airplane Engine factory in 1950, the Ankara wind tunnel stayed dormant until 1994, when it was revised and reactivated under TÜBİTAK-SAGE (Yavuz, 2013). First-person accounts of the closures of the factories like high engineer Şükrü Er tell us that as a person employed in those factories at the time, 'his heart broke at the fact that despite domestic production of airplanes in the THK factories, procurement by defense officials focused on foreign producers, deliberately withholding orders from the THK factories, leading them to bankruptcy' (Yavuz, 2013). A similar first-person account by high engineer Mehmet Kum, tells us that 'despite orders from defense institutions to Nuri Demirağ's factories, the airplanes were not bought by the same institutions, prompting the bankruptcy of Demirağ in 1942' (Yavuz, 2013).

In naval terms, the 'Gölcük military shipyard was created in 1924, and the Taşkızak military shipyard was reactivated in the year of 1941 after being closed shortly after WW1 (Özlü, n.d.). Turkish officials ambitiously planned and purchased many warships during this period, like the Adatepe, Kocatepe, Tınaztepe, and Zafer destroyers, as well as the Doğan, Martı, Deniz Kuşu assault boats, and the Birinci İnönü, İkinci İnönü, Dumlupınar, Sakarya, Gür, Saldıray, Atılay, Yıldıray, and Batıray submarines (Özlü, 2021). In addition to the Gölcük and Taşkızak military shipyards, 'the regular shipyards of Haliç and Camialtı helped build the smaller

auxiliary ships for the Turkish Navy, and an agreement was signed with Germany in 1936 for the procurement of 4 submarines for the Turkish Navy' (Özlü, 2021).

Between the years of 1941 and 1945, a total of 95 million dollars in defense equipment as part of the 'Lend and Lease Program' was given to Turkey by the US (PRTDIA, n.d.). Further military aid as part of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan after WW2 helped satisfy the procurement needs of Turkey partly, yet it effectively inhibited the development of the domestic defense industry, as foreign procurement was preferred over domestic procurement (PRTDIA, n.d.). Hence, despite considerable efforts in the early years of the Republic, with Turkey entering the Western security alliance of NATO, domestic development of airplanes for defense was halted, and existing facilities were transformed to occupying maintenance roles alone. Atatürk's period and the early republican era was a period however characterized by state-led initiatives to develop the defense industry domestically. The underlying thought was that the independence of the Republic could only be protected by having independent production and development of arms and ammunition, and by achieving the technological innovation in the defense industry that the late Ottomans failed to achieve which led to their downfall. The psychology of the early republican period is important as Turkish political elites aimed to build the Turkish nation-state under Atatürk's leadership in the wake of the Turkish War of Independence. Hence a lot of national effort is exerted on domestic reforms in this period while building a domestic defense industry with a limited budget.

Notable establishments of defense industry organizations in this period include (M5 Dergi, 2018) the General Directorate of Military Factories in 1921; the Gölcük Shipyard in 1924; Şakir Zümre's 'Turkish Industrial War and Materials

Factory' in 1925; Tayyare and Motor Turk A.Ş. or TOMTAŞ in 1925-1926; Nuri

Killigil's 'Gun, Mortar, and Ammunition Production Facilities' in 1930; Kirikkale

Power Plant and Steel Plant in 1931; Nuri Demirağ's Aircraft Factory in 1936;

Turkish Aeronautical Association's (THK) Aircraft Factory in 1941; Taşkızak

Shipyard's reopening in 1941; THK Etimesgut Aircraft Factory in 1941; Malatya

Plane Repair Workshops in 1942-1943; Mamak Gas Plant in 1943; THK Gazi

Aircraft Engine Factory in 1945; and Ankara Aircraft Motor Factory 'Koç Sistem' in

1945.

3.3 Period III: 1950 - 1974

This period is characterized by Turkey entering NATO in 1952, concluding the

courtship of and by the Western alliance after WW2, and foreign military aid and

procurement, leading to a downturn in domestic research, development, and

production, as well as the start of Turkish dependency on Western arms and

equipment (PRTDIA, n.d.). Allied countries donated surpluses and aged equipment

to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) for its equipment needs, and domestic efforts to

develop the defense industry slowed down, while TAF orders from domestic military

factories became smaller, in turn making these factories burdens on the national

budget (PRTDIA, n.d.). The *'Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi A.Ş.'* (MKEK)*,* or

'Machines and Chemistry Industry Corporation' was created in 1950, as the

successor of the *'Askeri Fabrikalar Umum Müdürlüğü'* (M5 Dergi, 2018), and these

military factories were handed over to the MKEK (PRTDIA, n.d.). One of these

factories was the THK Etimesgut Airplane Factory, which produced Turkish-built

airplanes and successfully exported them to Denmark yet was handed over to the

MKEK and became a textile factory in 1968 (PRTDIA, n.d.). Another factory turned

over to the MKEK was the THK's Gazi Airplane Engine factory, which later in 1954 became the 'Minneapolis-Moline Turkish Tractor and Farming Machines Corporation' (Genç, 2018). The birth of the MKEK in 1950 signified the start of public economic enterprises in the defense industry, meaning that they were entirely or partly controlled by the state. Agreements between Turkey and the US as part of the Truman Doctrine had strict conditions and bylaws for the military aid given by the US, and these would become a burden later during the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 (PRTDIA, n.d.). In 1954, the Research and Development (R&D) branch of the Ministry of Defense was created, in light of the equipment needs of the TAF, and in 1963 the government proposed the first of the successive 5-year development plans, part of this was to develop the domestic defense industry further (PRTDIA, n.d.). The first 5-year plan from 1963-1967 stresses the importance that WW2 had on the economy of Turkey and remarks that after the war, there were claims endangering Turkey's territorial integrity, implying the Soviet Union's claims on the Bosphorus at the time, which meant that the heavy weight that defense expenditures had on the national budget had to continue for years, delaying normalization in this regard (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Plânlama Teşkilâtı, 1963). The second 5-year plan from 1968 to 1972 notes that the Gölcük military shipyard is partly being used for the construction of commercial ships, and that Turkey's shipyards are insufficient considering the demand, while not giving any significant attention to the defense industry (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Müsteşarlığı, 1968). The third 5-year plan of 1973-1977 stressed the importance of industrialization in the domestic defense industry for the first time (PRTDIA, n.d.).

It is important here to understand the weight of Turkey's regional positioning in terms of alliances vis-à-vis NATO and the Soviet Union (R. Ö. Özkan, 2010).

Turkey sought to position itself strongly inside the Western security architecture and chose to 'become a part of the United Nations in 1945, the European Council in 1949, NATO in 1952, and signed the Ankara Agreement of 1963' (M5 Dergi, 2018). The Soviet claims on Turkish territories, and particularly the Bosphorus, were detrimental for Turkish officials to choose the course that would anchor them strongly inside the Western security architecture, and this was an external systemic factor that had fundamental consequences on how the domestic defense industry developed in this period, characterized by foreign procurement. 'Internal systemic factors having fundamental consequences for the development of the domestic defense industry were the coup d'états of 1960, 1971, and 1980' (M5 Dergi, 2018). 'When Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited the US in 1954, he asked for extensions of economic and military aid, to which American President Dwight D. Eisenhower reacted positively, signifying the dependence on American arms and equipment' (M5 Dergi, 2018). This dependence spurred 'outrage in Ankara when Lyndon B. Johnson (President of the United States, POTUS) at the time sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inönü in 1964, reminding Turkey that there are conditions to the use of American arms and equipment considering the events in Cyprus' (M5 Dergi, 2018). Then, 'in the 1970s, Necmettin Erbakan, who held the positions of Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister, gave great importance to the industrialization of the defense industry and laid the groundwork for many factories, as well as the birth of TÜMOSAN in 1975, *or 'Türk Motor Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi',* 'Turkish Engine Industry and Trade Enterprise', which built tractors and diesel engines' (M5 Dergi, 2018). As 'part of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey received foreign arms and equipment, including M47/M48 main battle tanks, artillery, airplanes like the F4E and T-38, ammunition, and naval vessels like the Perry-class

frigates' (M5 Dergi, 2018). However, 'there was slight progress in the development of the domestic defense industry as an ammunition factory was opened in 1957, the MKEK started to produce anti-tank rockets, the G3 infantry rifle and MG3 machine gun rifle' (M5 Dergi, 2018). 'The G3 and MG3 were rifles licensed by Germany for production within Turkey with the MKEK' (PRTDIA, n.d.). 'The problem in this era was that the officials in charge of procurement failed to see that there was no sustainability in only favoring foreign procurement and the inhibiting effects of said foreign procurement and military aid on the domestic defense industry as there was no real technology transfer with this procurement model' (M5 Dergi, 2018). However, 'during the 1970s, these donations started to stop, as ethnical and political tensions and civil war in Cyprus put Turkey and Greece on a collision course, with American enmity leading to straight embargoes between 1975 and 1978 against Turkey' (M5 Dergi, 2018).

Notable establishments of defense industry companies and organizations in this period (M5 Dergi, 2018) are the MKEK Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation General Directorate in 1950; the Ministry of Defense's (MSB) R&D Branch in 1954; Otokar in 1963; BMC in 1964; Kalekalip Machinery and Mold Industry in 1969; Meteksan in 1969; the Turkish Air Force Support Foundation in 1970; the TÜBİTAK Defense Industry Research and Development Institute in 1972; the Turkish Navy Foundation in 1972, TUSAŞ in 1973; the Turkish Land Forces Support Foundation in 1974; and ASIL Steel Industry and Trade in 1974.

3.4 Period IV: 1974 – 1985

The Cyprus conflict and the Cyprus Peace Operation were a wake-up call for Turkish defense officials in that they exposed the sheer dependency on Western arms in terms

of procurement, and the conditions with which they came limiting their use in theatres of conflict. 'Turkey was sanctioned and embargoes were installed by the US from 1975-1978, leading Turkey to turn to Libya for ammunition and spare parts' (M5 Dergi, 2018). However, the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 is heralded by many as the birth of the modern defense sector in Turkey as the effects of these embargoes would shape decisions for decades by Turkish defense officials. From now on, political decisions would be made with the objective of creating an independent and modern defense industry.

While Turkey received military aid as part of the American 'FMF' (Foreign Military Funds) and 'FMS' (Foreign Military Sales), from 1972 onwards, these were halted between 1975 and 1980 (M5 Dergi, 2018). In reaction to the embargoes by the US, foundations were set up like the 'Kara Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı', the 'Deniz Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı', and the 'Hava Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı', or 'Strengthening the Land Forces Foundation', 'Strengthening the Naval Forces Foundation' and the 'Strengthening the Air Forces Foundation' (PRTDIA, n.d.). As it became obvious that the requirements of the TAF were not being met sufficiently, the government of Turkey chose to create the *'Savunma Donatım İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü',* or the 'Defense and Equipment Enterprises General Directorate' in 1983, which according to the *'Resmi Gazete'*, or Official Gazette of Turkey, was 'headquartered in Ankara, had 50 billion Turkish Liras as starting capital, was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and aimed to equip and supply the TAF for every equipment, arms, and ammunition need, and produce spare parts, raw materials, medicines, and to carry out renovation' (T.C. Resmi Gazete, 1983). This organization was later reformed and restructured in 1985 and became the well-known 'SAGEB' or *'Savunma Sanayi Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığı'*,

or 'Defense Industry Development and Support Management Administration', which later became the 'SSM' in 1989 or 'Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı', or 'Defense Industry Undersecretariat'(PRTDIA, n.d.).

Notable establishments of Turkish defense industry companies and organizations in this period are (M5 Dergi, 2018): ASELSAN in 1975; ASMAŞ in 1978; IŞBIR Electrical Industry in 1979; ASPILSAN in 1981; HAVELSAN in 1982; the Defense and Equipment Enterprises General Directorate in 1983; the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 1984; Aksa Machinery Industry in 1984; and ETA Electronics and Design in 1984.

3.5 Period V: 1985 – 2006

The year 1985 was a 'turning point' according to the former head of the Defense Industry Agency Ismail Demir, because of significant institutional reform and the creation of 'SAGEB' in 1985 (Demir, 2020), which was later restructured as the SSM in 1989 (PRTDIA, n.d.). This institutional position only changed in 2018 when the entire structure was reorganized under the Turkish Presidency (Demir, 2020). Every need of the TAF was aimed to be produced by domestic means, which meant preferring local suppliers over foreign suppliers, promoting, and investing in new technologies, promoting partnerships with foreign technology suppliers, supporting research & development (R&D), opening up the industry to the private sector, opening up export possibilities, and elevating Turkey from being only a customer in partnerships with NATO allies to a position of partner (PRTDIA, n.d.). Law 3238 was passed in 1985, creating SAGEB, henceforth making it a priority for every equipment need of the TAF to be produced in Turkey, opening new opportunities for the private sector, and focusing on the importance of having a dynamic defense

industry able to produce products for both the domestic and the international defense markets (PRTDIA, n.d.). From now on, defense industry officials underscore the importance of 'joint production' rather than simple foreign procurement. During this era many of the companies we know today in the defense industry were created. Demir (2020) however argues that this era is marked by 'ups and downs that cannot be compacted'. In the decade of 1990 to 2000, the focus of the Turkish defense industry in terms of procurement changed from 'purchasing to joint production' (Demir, 2020).

Notable establishments of Turkish defense industry companies and organizations in this period are (M5 Dergi, 2018): SAGEB in 1985; TUSAŞ Engine Industries in 1985; the MAN Truck and Bus Company in 1986; the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation in 1987; FMC-NUROL Defense Industry in 1987; Roketsan in 1988; SSM in 1989; HAVELSAN Technology Radar in 1990; Defense Technology, Engineering and Trade (STM) in 1991; NUROL Machinery Industry in 1992; TISAŞ Trabzon Weapons Industry in 1993; GIRSAN Weapons Industry in 1994; and Alp Aviation in 1998.

3.6 Period VI: 2006 - Present

From 2006 onwards, local Turkish suppliers have been preferred when it comes to procurement of TAF needs, and the trend of optimizing the entire sector to a higher level of efficiency has become the dominant norm (M5 Dergi, 2018). This optimization shows itself in the planning and budgeting aspect of defense projects. In the 9th Development Plan of 2007-2013, the defense industry's priorities are said to be the following: 'procuring the needs of the TAF stably and competitively with domestic production, dynamic and self-sufficient integration of domestic R&D with

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domestic industries, and joint-production and R&D partnerships with foreign partners, and the establishment of the proper environment for these priorities' (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2007). According to the SSB, 'projects like the MILGEM Corvettes, Altay main-battle tank, Atak attack helicopter, Anka and Bayraktar UAVs, Hürkuş trainer jet, Göktürk-1 satellite, New Type Patrol Boat, national infantry rifle, mine-resistant armored vehicles, and air defense and missile systems' are the results of these policies (PRTDIA, n.d.).

In the 10th 5-year development plan of 2014-2018, 'the increase in national production of the arms industry is stated to be remarkable yet still insufficient as the percentage of locally produced systems went from 41,6% in 2007 to 54% in 2011, while it is also noted that in developed countries this number ranges from 85% to 95%' (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013). The increase in national production of defense industry products also naturally spills over to other sectors like medicine, where medicinal equipment and machinery are also aimed at being produced locally (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013).

In the 11th 5-year development plan of 2019-2023, the same main objectives remain of increasing national production and 'strengthening the defense industry ecosystem' with the goals of meeting 'the needs of the TAF and security forces', while increasing the exports of the sector, and to create spillover of the 'skills acquired to the civil sector' (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey: Presidency of Strategy and Budget [PRTPSB], 2019). The nationalization of the defense industry ecosystem is realized through 'national technologies and domestic opportunities' while products are continuously improved, and a 'product range that addresses different needs and task areas' is continuously strived for (PRTPSB, 2019). It is also important to note that 'external dependency at the system, sub-system, and

component levels will be minimized' (PRTPSB, 2019). 'Financial support, as well as training support, education, coordination, and cooperation, will be increased to optimize the defense industry sector' (PRTPSB, 2019). In 2018, 'the defense industry exports stood at roughly 2 billion USD, with an ambitious goal of 10 billion USD in 2023; defense industry turnover was 6.7 billion USD in 2018, intending to reach 26.9 billion USD in 2023; employment in the industry stood at 44.7 thousand people, with the goal of 79.3 thousand in 2023; and domestic production and sourcing rate stood at 65% in 2018, with the goal of 75% in 2023' (PRTPSB, 2019). In 2022, the total defense industry exports stood roughly at 4.3 billion USD, which means it more than doubled since 2018, and the countries that bought the most Turkish defense products were 'Qatar, the UAE, the Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, India, Burkina Faso, and Azerbaijan'; while the range of products that were exported the most include UAVs, munitions, missile systems, turbojets, sub-systems for the aviation sector, hunting rifles, guns and gun stations, and military helicopters (SavunmaSanayiST, 2023). 'The companies that exported the most were Baykar, TUSAŞ, Pratt & Whitney THY Tek., TUSAŞ Motor Sanayi, and BMC' (SavunmaSanayiST, 2023). 'The sector's turnover was roughly 12.2 billion USD, and the R&D investment in the sector was 2.1 billion USD in 2022' (Çalkaya, 2023). 'Defense industry employment stood at roughly 75 thousand people at the end of 2022' (Hayatsever, 2022). The domestic production and sourcing rate stood at roughly 80% at the end of 2022 (Hürriyet, 2022).

While SAGEB was created institutionally in 1985, heralding the modern era of the Turkish defense industry in structural terms, it was restructured later in 1989 as an 'undersecretariat' and became the 'SSM', functioning under the Ministry of Defense; this was again changed and restructured in 2017 and 2018 under the

Presidency directly, creating the 'Presidency of Defense Industries' or 'SSB' through an executive order (Demir, 2020). 'By tying the overseeing institution of the defense industry directly to the Presidency, the objective was to smoothen and optimize the decision-making process' (Demir, 2020). According to Demir (2020) 'two events transformed the industry', these were the 'creation and transformation of the counter-terrorism doctrine since the 1980s, and the coup attempt on the 15th of July 2016'. Demir (2020) also notes that while 'counter-terrorism operations were mostly domestic from the 1980s onwards, this changed since 2016, to abroad, in Syria and Iraq, with an evolving model that included local fortifications, in the form of military bases, and intervention in the field'. Demir (2020) also makes the point that from 2016 onwards, we can speak of a new era in the defense industry's history, as structural changes are so wide in scope, that there are marked differences from the period before, as he claims that 'the national production of arms made possible the military operations in Syria and Iraq, without the fear of embargoes negatively affecting their progress'. It becomes evident that the pursuit of 'autarky, or self-sufficiency is an objective of the Turkish defense industry as it is willing to shoulder the burdens of financial support and technological hurdles' (Kurç & Neuman, 2017). However, it is important to note here that 'planning errors, prioritization, external dependence, and American pressure seem to affect the industry negatively' (Kurç & Neuman, 2017).

At the start of 2023, Turkey's defense industry ecosystem is vibrant and developing year-on-year with increased interest in the sector both domestically and from foreign countries. Turkey's use of UAVs as part of its PP in multiple theaters of war has led to a significant increase in the interest in and acquisition of Turkish defense products. Baykar was the largest exporter in 2022 of all Turkish defense

industry companies, and after signing a deal for the export of the infamous TB2 drones to Kuwait worth 367 million USD (Asmar, 2023), Baykar had exported the TB2 drones as of July 2023 to a total of 30 foreign countries (Tavsan, 2023), making it the most proliferous armed drone in the world. In fact, Baykar has produced at least 500 TB2 drones in total as of July 2023 (Hürriyet Daily News, 2023). Baykar's more advanced air-to-ground strategic armed drone 'Akinci' has also been exported to at least six countries so far as of July 2023 (Ergocun, 2023). This drone can fulfill many of the air-to-ground bombing roles that traditionally Turkish F16s have undertaken in the fight against the PKK, and at a fraction of the cost. Baykar has also created a new unmanned fighter jet named the 'Kızılelma', its name referring to the Turkish mythical 'Red Apple' which can be summarized as the 'goal to be achieved' like a destiny of sorts, which focuses on achieving air superiority, and which can work together with existing fighter jets, in the form of a 'loyal wingman' to be directed and steered by the fighter jet pilot, while it is being modified to be the main aircraft on Turkey's first aircraft carrier, the 'TCG Anadolu' (Brimelow, 2023). The Bayraktar TB3 is the next version of the TB2 with higher payloads and longer and foldable wings and is developed to be operated on the TCG Anadolu as well (Brimelow, 2023).

Baykar is not the only company that has grown fruitfully over the years. TUSAŞ (or TAI, Turkish Aerospace Industries) and its subsidiaries like TEI, have produced engines, engine parts, and drones like the 'Anka', 'Aksungur', and more. TUSAŞ's Anka has been exported to or has export orders to deliver to the countries of Tunisia, Indonesia, Chad, Kazakhstan, and Algeria (Şahin, 2023a), while Malaysia is set to be the next (Yıldırım, 2023). It is also developing Turkey's first national fighter jet the TF-X 'Kaan', a fifth-generation fighter jet with advanced avionics,

electronics, radar systems, and more as it is set to replace the country's aging F16

fleet (Charpentreau, 2023). TUSAŞ has also produced the light-attack helicopter the

T129 'Atak' or 'Atak 1', which it will export to the Philippines and Nigeria, and of

which it has delivered at least 83 units to the TAF (Şahin, 2023b). It is currently

developing the 'Atak 2' or T929, a heavy-attack helicopter like the US' 'Apache'

(Şahin, 2023b). TUSAŞ also recently announced it is developing the 'Anka 3', which

is a 'delta-wing jet-powered combat drone' with stealth characteristics for the roles

of surveillance and 'deep strike' (Defensebridge, 2023). Other significant companies

in the Turkish defense industry are Aselsan, Tübitak, FNSS, Roketsan, Havelsan,

Aspilsan, BMC, STM, MKEK, Kale, Sarsılmaz, and YDS among others (Besenyo &

Málnássy, 2022).

As states seek survival, they seek the maximization of their security

according to the neorealist tradition. The defense industry is intrinsically tied to this

as it fulfills certain roles in military, political, and economic terms (Besenyo &

Málnássy, 2022). Some of these roles are the 'building of the military-industrial base,

the arming of the armed forces with national weapons and achieving self-sufficiency,

stimulating the economy through domestic and foreign orders (exports), maintaining

force capabilities, and the acquiring of political influence and prestige outside of

one's borders among others' (Besenyo & Málnássy, 2022). An additional role, as

mentioned in the 5-year plan of 2014-2018, that the defense industry fulfills is that of

creating technological spillover to the civil sector, with the example of medicine

(T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013). These roles are all applicable to Turkey's case at

present. Another role that the defense industry fulfills is that during the elections the

reigning government showcases their defense industry projects to garner votes, as

these projects are highly popular and address the Turkish public's feelings of

chauvinism, insecurity, and prestige. During the national and presidential elections of 2023, the AKP government effectively used the defense industry projects and key figures of the industry to showcase its achievements and progress in this sector (Bekdil, 2023).

To conclude, we looked at the history and chronological development of the Turkish defense industry, as this sector is key in understanding much of TFP, its conjunctural challenges and shifts over time, and its relationship with the quest for autonomy of the Turkish state. As security is one of the highest, if not the highest, form of politics, the defense industry and its capacity for national arms production has been historically the most important factor in a country's drive for autonomy. Independence is hardly gained with foreign arms supplies, which are if procured, at times unpredictable, unstable, or too expensive. Thus, looking at the historical aspect of the defense industry, we see the reflections of the Turkish political climate on this sector and can draw many conclusions because of it. Simplified, we see that during and after the birth of the Republic, even during the end times of the Ottoman Empire, there was a focus on the national production of arms, and this was stimulated as well, while from the Second World War onwards, there is a clear shift to procurement from foreign sources, which in this case were the Western powers, and the US especially, as Turkey entered the Western security architecture of NATO, and the Western-dominated international political economy. The Soviet claims on sovereign Turkish territories effectively ended a longstanding tradition of neutrality in TFP and hurled Turkey toward the West. During this era, the Turkish political system also changed to a multiparty democracy, and liberalization of the society, economy, and politics followed. This era in the Turkish defense industry continued until the Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974 when the sector became the subject of arms embargoes by

its military allies, after which officials understood dependence on foreign procurement was a burden on the country's autonomy and sovereignty. After this era, much of the modern defense industry's building blocks were laid with the founding of important companies in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and the subsequent restructuring of policymaking into more effective and optimal settings. After these years, the AKP government in the 2000s continued the trend of national arms production and made national procurement an important objective, which it still does today. More companies were founded and flourished during the AKP era, and the defense industry's policymaking architecture was restructured firmly and directly under the Turkish presidency. The defense industry continues to increase its exports year-on-year with high growth rates, and this industry remains one of the bastions of the AKP government's boasting success, albeit with relative accuracy. The important part of the story of the defense industry is that it provides the tools of strategy, which we have addressed, and in doing so, it can affect the choice of goals/objectives and methods of strategy as well. Turkish drones have in recent times proven a cost-efficient solution to the 'risky' behavior of Turkish PP, they have increased the flexibility of the options of choice in goals and methods of strategy, and made PP much easier, as the costs for losing personnel are non-existent, the accuracy of drone operations sufficient, and the cost of maintaining these drones or UAVs is relatively cheap among other advantages that they bring. Hence, it is important to understand that the national production of the tools of strategy made possible different choices for the goals and methods of strategy, and much of the modern forms of Turkish PP we know today would not be possible without them.

The Turkish defense industry's evolution over time reveals many important lessons and trends for scholars and researchers of Turkish political history. Domestic

production of weaponry and ammunition opens new options for Turkish PP that were not available before. Therefore, the Turkish defense industry is an important driver of the paradigm shift and the emergence of Turkish PP in the post-2016 period, which will be explored in depth in this study.

CHAPTER 4

DRIVERS OF THE PARADIGM SHIFT OF 2015-2016

Turkish foreign policy changed dramatically due to several reasons which will be
explored in this chapter. It is important to understand the nature and the historical
contexts of this paradigm shift in 2015-2016. The first cause of the paradigm shift is
related to the departure of the American hegemon in military terms from the region
and the colossal ripples in political, economic, social, and other dimensions it has
created in the neighboring countries of Turkey. The destruction of the Iraqi-Iranian
status quo and balance of power especially has had the most lasting effects on the
wider region, but the failure of establishing state authority and the climate it created
are also equally important. The second cause is related to the military entrance of the
Russian state in Syria and its consequences. Turkish foreign policy and Turkish PP
have changed fundamentally as a result of the new Russian military presence to its
south. The third cause is related to the American partnership with a non-government
entity the YPG, the armed wing of the PYD, which is in turn part of the wider PKK
and KCK, with which the Turkish state has had an active conflict since the 1980s.
The YPG's meteoric rise in Syria has led Turkish security officials to prioritize
counterterrorism in Syria above all else. The fourth cause for the paradigm shift is
the 15 July 2016 coup attempt and the severe political and military ramifications it
has had for Turkey as it effectively led to sweeping changes in and reorganization of
the Turkish political climate and the TAF. The fifth and final cause for the paradigm
shift is the Turkish defense industry reaching a relatively self-sufficient stage in the
national production of weapons platforms like armored cars and UAVs, munitions,
and missiles, which opens up new instruments and thus more flexibility in power

projection. It is important here to note that these causes and events happen in the real world, and as such are interconnected.

Therefore, I will argue that 1) the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011 meant the effective withdrawal of the American hegemon from the region and its destabilizing effects created a security vacuum for which Turkish intervention became necessary, 2) the entrance of Russia militarily in Syria turned the tide of the war and started a new chapter in the Turkish-Russian relationship, 3) the US-YPG partnership aggravated Turkish concerns and strained the Turkish-American relationship, 4) the 15 July Coup Attempt as a cataclysmic event led to the birth of the AKP-MHP alliance and the restructuring of the military (including the removal of Gülenists) which increased military assertiveness, and 5) the relative success of national arms production made possible new instruments of PP, strengthened existing instruments of Turkish PP, and lowered the costs of military intervention

4.1 The withdrawal of the American hegemon

With the departure of the American military from Iraq in 2011, the region lost its dominant military hegemon and was engulfed in protests as the Arab Spring unfolded at the same time. While the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the elimination of the Saddam Hussein regime meant the destruction of the rather stable status quo in the Middle East, the presence of the formidable American military meant that there was a form of 'hegemonic stability' in the region. During this period, the Middle East was 'the main place of hegemonic exercise' (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2013). There was no inter-state violence, while the collapse of the Baath regime in Iraq meant that there was a security vacuum within Iraq, as the Americans failed to enforce ultimate authority over large parts of the country. Hence, there was intra-

state violence, rather than inter-state violence, of which the latter's absence is characteristic of the post-Cold War era. In Iraq, the American foreign policy establishment was 'torn between realism and its national interests and power calculations on the one hand, and idealism and its democracy promotion and liberal values on the other hand and this was exacerbated by the Arab Spring' (Atlas, 2012). The American withdrawal was largely due to the Obama doctrine of pivoting American power projection to Asia and the Pacific.

When it comes to the regional effects of the American military footprint in Iraq, the hegemonic stability theory, originating from international political economy, but later also a part of international relations, becomes useful in explaining the dynamics of hegemonic exercise in regional terms. Hegemonic stability theory briefly means that 'international economic stability and openness are best promoted when there is a single dominant hegemonic state' and the 'distribution of power among states in the international system determines the international economic system' (Webb & Krasner, 1989). Hegemonic stability theory posits that there has to be a 'stabilizer' for the 'public good of international economic stability to arise as only the hegemon is capable of providing it' and that 'all countries benefit from it' (Kindleberger, 1981). This position can lend itself to the regional context as well, where in the Middle East the US is said 'stabilizer' and more so during its active military presence in Iraq, from which Turkey and other neighboring countries benefited from the public goods of both security as well as economic stability. The period in Turkish political history that aligns with the period of active military presence by the US in Iraq in the years between 2003 and 2011 is well documented as being a period of relative peace and economic prosperity through neoliberal privatization and liberal democratic reforms.

While the absence of hegemony does not mean the total impossibility of cooperation, as 'international regimes facilitate decentralized cooperation between actors that are inherently selfish' (Keohane, 1984), the presence of a military hegemon in a regional context like the Middle East means that the neighboring countries, including Turkey, are relatively secure from foreign aggression, and hence can invest more in economic, cultural, social and other forms of development without being dragged into the vicious cycle of an arms race. Related to the exercise of international hegemony, the strategic asset of oil is highly important in explaining the US invasion of Iraq according to scholars, as it means the protection of the hegemonic position of material dominance and the international economy (Lehmann, 2018). The steady and stable supply of oil means the realization of a 'primary characteristic of hegemony in the form of mastery over distance' (Gilpin, 1981). Hence, oil is critical for American power projection.

The American military presence meant that regional security was 'taken care of', hence, its departure meant the creation of a security vacuum, while knowing that the American military's withdrawal in 2011 was partial, as regional command centers and its web of traditional allies continue to exist, and American military intervention changed from direct intervention to indirect intervention, using 'special forces, drones, and Iraqi security forces' (Mohammed, 2019). The American presence in the region is also nothing new, as even as far back as the 1970s, the 'Americans took the role of guarantorship upon them from Britain in the Gulf and tried to protect a military balance of power between Iraq and Iran' (Allai, 2023). This policy was effectively abandoned in 2011, as the American withdrawal meant the indirect control of Iraq by Iran, and further Iranian political, military, cultural, and religious expansion in Iraq through former Prime Minister of Iraq Maliki and hence

destabilization by way of Iranian expansion (Pollack, 2011; Yom, 2023). The withdrawal also came with concerns regarding the balance within Iraq's political situation, with Maliki becoming too powerful, going after Sunni politicians, while Iraq's often tense Arab-Kurdish relations were traditionally mediated by the Americans (Romano, 2010). Iraq's former Vice-President Hashimi fleeing to northern Iraq, and then Turkey, was a primary example of Maliki's divisive policies following the American withdrawal (Kardas, 2012).

The security vacuum left by the American withdrawal led to the Iranian expansion into Iraq, and subsequently Syria. The status quo of a rather stable balance of power that held for decades between Iraq and Iran was destroyed as the Iranians expanded westward. Turkey and Iran have had different views on the future of Iraq, as the Iranians see the country as its natural sphere of influence, and as an extension of their quest for 'regional hegemony', Turkey however wants a 'stable Iraq, with a coalition leading it and a voice for the Sunni elements of society' (Guzanski & Lindenstrauss, 2011). As the security vacuum persisted in Iraq, and Iraq was even further destabilized by internal and external strife following the American withdrawal, the vacuum was naturally filled by non-government entities like the PKK, and Sunni- and Shia militias, and later ISIS was born out of this vacuum. In the northern part of Iraq, the semi-autonomous Kurdish KRG drifted strongly towards Turkey's sphere of influence. As a result, an issue straining ties between Baghdad and Ankara would be the KRG's exports of oil to Turkey and payments related to it. The area around Baghdad and Basra fell strongly under the Iranian sphere of influence, whereas the middle of Iraq became the center of the security vacuum.

The destabilization of Iraq following the American military withdrawal in 2011, and the numerous consequences it has had, including the destruction of the

balance of power between Iraq and Iran, which was artificially held together by the American military presence, and the security vacuum that was created where terrorist organizations and all forms of militias and non-governmental entities thrived, meant the structural destabilization of Turkey's southern flank. The PKK thrived and grew within this anarchic environment, causing Turkish officials to understand the necessity even more of cross-border power projection. Historically, Turkey's counter-terrorism doctrine has changed much over the last few decades, but one thing has not, it seeks to prevent the infiltration of PKK terrorists from mountainous northern Iraq to Turkish territory. For this purpose, it has created a web of military bases along the Turkish-Iraqi border, and inside northern Iraq, and the TAF carries out military operations inside Iraq to clear out the PKK presence, and then establishes more bases to hold the territory and denies the PKK from creating a foothold once again by creating a 'security belt' (B. Ozturk, 2022). It is partly due to this destabilization of its southern flank because of American intervention and military withdrawal, and its effects on the region, the expansion of the PKK inside Iraq, Syria, and even Turkey, and the rapid birth and expansion of ISIS, that Turkey's security establishment constructed a new doctrine from 2016 onwards. In the social world everything is connected, and American intervention and withdrawal led to the failure of state authority and rule of law in Iraq and Syria, which in turn led to the creation of terrorist organizations, and favorable conditions for growth of these organizations, which created the need for Turkish power projection beyond its borders because of security concerns.

4.2 The entrance of Russia in Syria

Syria has traditionally been a state with warm ties to the Russians, going as far back as the Soviet Union in the bipolar Cold War era. However, it is telling that the Russians only intervened with conventional forces in 2015, roughly 4 years after the start of the Syrian Civil War. Russia's intervention was untraditional however in the sense that Syria was not in the region what experts call Russia's 'near-abroad of post-Soviet Eurasia', it nevertheless intervened with its military, because 'the Assad regime was going to collapse, this would have severe security implications for the Russians, and diplomacy proved to be ineffective' (Charap, Treyger, & Geist, 2019). Russia's interests in keeping the Assad regime from collapsing were directly related to 'its use of the port of Tartous as a naval facility, its airbase in Latakia, its traditional supply of arms to Syria, as well as energy, infrastructure, and other investments, and the prevention of further Western influence in Syria' (Cengiz, 2020). Certain conditions proved to be necessary for the Russian intervention however, and these were 'air access to the theater, ability and permission to use ports and airbases, and the presence of allies on the ground' (Charap et al., 2019). The 'Russians were certain that the US' ongoing Operation Inherent Resolve targeting ISIS would not mean the contestation of airspace over Syria as it did not target Assad regime areas, which would have most likely hindered the Russian intervention' (Charap et al., 2019). The implications for Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's domestic politics, and its society at large have been tremendous.

Up until that point, Davutoğlu as the architect of Turkish foreign policy, and the Turkish government, had invested heavily in the fall of the Assad regime. With Russia stabilizing the regime and changing the balance of power effectively in Syria, it naturally was at odds with Turkey in terms of clashing national interests. The

Russians intervened militarily in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime and started targeting opposition groups inside Syria that were close to Turkey. What followed was a series of escalations that strained the Turkish-Russian relationship. The incident that drew the most international recognition and proved to be a strain in the bilateral relationship was the TAF's shooting down of a Russian fighter jet on the 24th of November 2015, leading to retaliation by the Russians in terms of economic sanctions like suspending visa-free travel, banning flights and imports from Turkish companies, and especially fruits and vegetables (BBC News, 2015). It was the first time a Russian plane was shot down by a NATO member since the 1950s (BBC News, 2015). The subsequent loss of the unilateral sanctions to the Turkish economy was significant with an estimated loss between 9 and 11 billion US dollars (Erşen, 2017). The Turkish-Russian relationship then became strained for months until Turkish President Erdoğan sent a 'letter of regret' to Russian President Putin in June 2016 (Erşen, 2017).

In the same period in the first half of 2016, the 'government' forces of the Assad regime executed military offensives to retake their control over the opposition-held eastern part of Aleppo, aided by the Russians and Iranian proxies. The battle over Aleppo's control was one of the largest battles of the SCW, and a turning point in Turkey's position in the conflict. As opposition groups close to Turkey failed to keep their control over half of the city, the Russians managed to fulfill one of their strategic objectives, and the division of Aleppo into two opposing sides of control since the start of the war was finally over. The defeat of the opposition forces in Aleppo meant that it was the final nail in the coffin for those advocating regime change by force. At the same time, Turkey was suffering from terrorist attacks by the PKK and ISIS; the uncomfortable 'Peace Process' with the PKK had broken down,

and ISIS was in control over large parts of Syria and was strong in terms of capabilities, and it showed this by executing terrorist attacks in Turkey. Turkey was and is still bothered strongly by the PKK's Syrian branch the PYD's, and its armed wing the YPG's, relationship with the Americans, and the Russians knew how to exploit this 'rift' in the Turkish-American relationship (Erşen, 2017). The officials in Ankara were aware that the security vacuum in Syria fed these terrorist organizations and their attacks on Turkish soil, hence reconciliation with the Russian leadership made sense in terms of Turkish border security. Very shortly after the letter sent by President Erdoğan in June 2016, Turkey was shaken to its core by a coup attempt by Gülenists, or the FETÖ organization (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü), on the 15th of July, which changed the Turkish political climate entirely, and which we will address later in the study, but it is important to understand that Turkey's traditional allies and their 'perceived' hesitation in denouncing the coup, and the American clandestine relationship with FETÖ did not sit well with Ankara, and this also created a significant boost for further Turkish-Russian reconciliation efforts.

As Turkey's position in Syria changed from actively pursuing the forced overthrow of the Assad regime, to a focus on establishing border security, preventing further refugee flows, preventing the creation of a PKK/PYD statelet in northern Syria, and eliminating the terrorist groups of the PKK and ISIS, reconciliation with the Russians made sense given all calculations. Ankara's position on maintaining the territorial integrity of Syria remained unchanged since the start of the SCW. The recalibration of TFP according to the new Russian presence at its southern wing is best symbolized by the departure of Turkey's foreign policy architect Ahmet Davutoğlu in May 2016 who had dominated the foreign policy landscape for over a decade. Erdoğan once again became the official chairman of the reigning AKP and

retook effective control over the foreign policy establishment. The result of the change in TFP in the SCW was the start of the Astana talks between Russia, Turkey, and Iran in January 2017.

Previous attempts at mediation were done by the Arab League, and the UN, with its special envoys Kofi Annan, Brahimi, and De Mistura, with the Geneva I, II, and III talks respectively, but due to conflicting interests of the outside actors coupled with the intense fighting on the ground of the opposing forces, all mediation attempts failed to bring a lasting ceasefire in Syria (Cengiz, 2020). Some of the factors explaining the failure of the previous attempts are 'the lack of inclusivity, the lack of effective leverage, the presence of implacable mutual hostility, military optimism, the fate of Bashar Assad, the splintered opposition and 'international community', and the entrance of the Russian military'(Cengiz, 2020). The Astana talks between the three guarantor states of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, and the representatives of the regime and the opposition progressed, some key agreements were made, and fighting simmered down. In May 2017, the plan to create de-escalation zones was adopted by the guarantors of Astana, and the de-escalation zones served to surround opposition pockets in and around Damascus in the south, and around the Hama-Homs region, which were entirely cut off by regime forces (France24, 2018). The Assad regime and its backers however cleverly used the opportunity of having these pockets completely isolated from the outside world, started offensives to retake them one by one, and transported opposition fighters in buses from these de-escalation areas in the south to opposition-held areas in northern Syria following deals that they made with the local opposition groups. The Assad regime thus established full control over southern Syria, freeing up the army divisions for offensives in the north. Turkey in the meantime made concerted efforts

to consolidate its gains in northern Aleppo, took control over the wider Afrin area with the Olive Branch Operation, reformed the opposition groups with efforts to unify them through umbrella organizations, and tried to reshape the powerful HTS in Idlib by way of diplomacy (Van Veen, 2021).

Then in September 2018 in Sochi, a memorandum was signed between Russia and Turkey, building further on the Astana Process, clearly outlining the goal of 'stabilization of the Idlib de-escalation area', and observation posts and demilitarization of certain areas, as well as joint Turkish-Russian patrols were part of the signed memorandum (Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-escalation Area, 2018). Turkey started creating a web of military bases in Idlib and northern Aleppo in opposition-held areas, to stem refugee flows by blocking further regime advances. The regime and the opposition however had regular clashes, and offensives by the regime backed by Russian airpower led to considerable loss of areas for opposition groups in the wider Idlib region and the establishment of control over major highways like the M4 and M5 connecting Aleppo with the rest of the country. Turkish military bases have also been targeted on more than one occasion, and as for the rules of engagement, retaliation by the TAF has been a natural reaction leading to losses of regime forces. The most significant escalation however was the bombing and subsequent martyring of 34 Turkish soldiers in an airstrike on a local Turkish headquarters in Idlib on the 27th of February 2020, sparking Operation Spring Shield, which quickly decimated entire regime divisions with a heavy focus on drone warfare, attracting international attention for its efficiency against armored targets, and the weakness of Russian air defense systems (Kasapoglu, 2020). Independent OSINT analysts like 'Oryx' have visually confirmed and counted the Assad regime's material and personnel losses as much as possible as drone footage

was constantly shared by Turkish authorities during the operation showing precision strikes, and the amount of equipment and manpower lost was significant enough to halt the regime's offensives into Idlib (Mitzer, & Oliemans, 2020). On the 5th of March 2020, President Erdoğan and the Turkish delegation met with President Putin and Russian officials to sign the ceasefire for the Idlib region, and the ceasefire has since then been rather stable, with back-and-forth clashes and retaliation strikes happening from time to time.

The Russian military presence in Syria means that there now is a Russian military reality on its southern flank to Turkish strategists and officials. While the Assad regime was historically also close to the former Soviet Union, direct military entrenchment at this scale is unprecedented. Russia's advanced air defense systems cover parts of southern Turkey, while its air force is actively patrolling the air from its critical airbase in Hmeimim, and its naval assets are regularly docking in Tartous and patrolling in the eastern Mediterranean. The new Russian presence in Turkey's southern flank has thus, taking into account all of the above-mentioned aspects of Russia's political, military, economic, and diplomatic weight and influence, created lasting and structural effects and changes in TFP and Turkish PP. TFP has adapted accordingly and shifted to a more realpolitik doctrine together with abandoning its goals of toppling the Assad regime and shifting to a focus on curbing and eliminating the PKK and ISIS within Syria, with the objectives of counter-terrorism, stemming refugee flows, and protecting the territorial integrity of Syria. Turkish PP has since the Russian intervention in the SCW changed fundamentally with the political and military reorganization of opposition groups under its direct influence, the use of active drone warfare synchronous with conventional artillery and other armed assets, and direct military cross-border operations with conventional forces and special

forces embedded in opposition-linked paramilitary groups, heralding the birth of a new military doctrine, which Turkey carried out in Libya and Azerbaijan as well.

4.3 The US-YPG relationship

As part of the American counter-terrorism strategy against ISIS, the US has effectively partnered with the PKK's Syrian wing, the PYD, and its armed wing, the YPG. Around the YPG, the Americans have structured Arab elements and called the coalition the SDF, or Self-Defense Forces. However, the brunt of the fighting troops and the main decision-makers inside the coalition still is the YPG, whose top echelon consists of experienced PKK leaders who have decades of experience under the belt in guerrilla-style warfare and the organization of paramilitary activity (Kaválek & Mareš, 2018). Turkey naturally condemns this partnership vehemently and at every point in the discourse of the Turkish-American relationship, has voiced this strong grievance regularly and publicly. Ankara has a right to be upset, and the US-YPG partnership is a legitimate obstacle in furthering Turkish-American bilateral ties. The PKK has waged war for decades in the name of secession against the Republic of Turkey and it is not a 'conventional' terrorist group (International Crisis Group, 2024). It goes way beyond that, as it has evolved over the years with significant support from foreign states like the US, Iran, Syria, Russia, and Iraq among others (Kaválek & Mareš, 2018). There is irony in that the PKK is still an internationally recognized terror group by the EU and NATO, yet its subsidiaries are working together with the governments of the Western countries, many of which are traditional NATO allies to the Turks. Hence, rebranding under different names and combinations of letters is what characterizes the present US policy in Syria concerning the PKK and what Turkey considers to be its Syrian wing the

PYD/YPG/SDF. The American who is regularly known as the father of the relationships who holds this policy together is Brett McGurk, currently Biden's 'National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East', a widely known career bureaucrat since the Bush administration for his dominance over US policy in Iraq and the wider Middle East, his 'warm ties' with Iraq's sectarian prime-minister Maliki, and the culprit of many US policy failures (Wood, 2021).

At the moment, in Syria, the YPG is ruling a large part of the northern countryside with American support, and there are military bases by countries like the US, Russia, the UK, and France in its territories. Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the multilateral operation headed by the US, was in short largely an air operation by the 'Coalition' members and made use of the YPG's cadres and ground troops as 'boots on the ground in the fight against ISIS'. In Iraq, the US in a similar fashion provided air support to Shia militias who acted as ground troops, the result was the 'flattening of Sunni cities from Raqqa to Mosul' (Wood, 2021). However, early on, the YPG benefited from the collapse of state authority in the SCW and sent its experienced leaders to exploit the security vacuum in the early years of the SCW. The result was a land-grabbing strategy where it managed to expand its influence and authority over a large part of the northern countryside, including large cities, and it benefited from its relationship with the US and the 'Coalition' and grew even more as part of OIR. At the same time, it developed a pragmatic relationship with Russia, and has regularly, against Turkish military operations, played off both Russia and the US against each other, who ironically both are on the same side in general when it comes to limiting and curbing further 'Turkish expansion' against the 'Kurds'. The 'Kurds' have also been popularized to Western audiences through mass media as 'heroes' against the 'barbaric ISIS hordes', and propaganda pieces in well-

established reputable news outlets have only added to the myth of the 'heroic Kurdish warrior'. Especially female YPG terrorists have been popularized, making use of the feminist sentiments of its audiences (Efe, 2019). The push to legitimize and mainstream the PKK, or YPG, in Syria to the popular audiences started at the same time, in the years of 2013/2014, as the partnership with the Americans as part of its counter-terrorism strategy and measure against ISIS started to materialize. Also, the myth of the 'Kurds' was created, and the PYD/YPG were their representatives as if the Kurds were a single homogenous political entity, rather than fractured into a multitude of political parties in a political landscape as repressive as the Assad regime. In extension, 'Turkey was now at war with the Kurds', putting pressure on Ankara to inhibit its 'expansive military operations' and to respect the 'rights of its minorities'. The American PR machine and its gears thus turned as part of its inconsistent foreign policy in Syria with a myopic obsession against ISIS alone. The YPG took Raqqa with 'Coalition' air support, and other major cities, and while ISIS was defeated, it continues to survive, whereas the YPG has established control over a significant part of Syria to the east of the Euphrates, with significant oil deposits.

The clear differences and sheer American neglect of Turkish sensitivities regarding the partnership with the YPG have had strong negative effects on the bilateral relationship. It has strained the relationship severely and continues to create a strain as long as the American relationship with the PKK/PYD/YPG continues. A direct result has been that Ankara has opted for closer ties with the Russians. However, the Russians have also developed a relationship with the PKK/PYD/YPG, as representative offices have been opened in Moscow, and with Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, Operation Olive Branch in 2018, and Operation Peace

Spring in 2019, the YPG has worked together with the Russians and the Assad regime, and in extension Iranian forces, to limit the expansion of the Turkish controlled zone through military entrenchment and diplomacy (Uras, 2019). Military bases have been set up to this effect. Ever since the Astana Agreement, Turkey has actively changed its objectives in Syria. Preventing further expansion of the YPG and eliminating it from being a significant presence on the ground have become the new objectives. Preventing the PKK's international legitimization efforts through diplomacy with foreign states is another important Turkish objective, as well as the stemming of refugee flows, and the protection of Syria's territorial integrity. As a result, direct military interventions have been costly in terms of both material resources and, more importantly in terms of international prestige and reputation, as military intervention always has the political cost attached of being viewed as an 'aggressor'; Ankara has instead, faced with clear American, Russian, Iranian, and other countries' efforts to prevent further Turkish expansion of its controlled areas through its opposition-linked proxies, chosen to destabilize the political control of the YPG in its areas through concerted and regular precision-strikes on high figures of its ruling organizations. Turkish intelligence has been reformed and reorganized and made more powerful abroad, and it shows in the counter-terror materializations of PP, as regularly, vehicles that carry PKK figures are hit with presumably Turkish drones, in Syria, as well as in Iraq (Yetkin, 2023). These pinpoint operations have the presumed aim of degrading the PKK's 1. political uniformity and capacity of organization, 2. its mobility, as leading figures are moved even more underground, and 3. general morale of the ranks. For the PKK this means the loss of valuable human capital as with the death of leading figures comes the loss of their, often decades of, experience and knowledge in insurgency. Internationally, however, these

Turkish pin-point strikes have naturally made less noise than its cross-border military operations. Then on the 1st of October 2023, a suicide bombing terrorist attack targeting the Interior Ministry in Ankara by the PKK led to a strong response by the Turkish government, as the new foreign minister Hakan Fidan expressed on the 4th of October that it was determined that the terrorists had 'entered Turkey through Syria and received training there', and that now 'all infrastructure, superstructure, and energy facilities that belong to the PKK/YPG would be considered as legitimate targets by Turkish security- and armed forces, and intelligence units' and that 'third parties should stay away from these facilities hinting at US, Russian, and French troops' (Reuters, 2023a). The Turkish security forces also raided multiple houses arresting individuals with ties to the PKK, while the TAF bombed targets in northern Iraq. This remarkable escalation shows that the use of power projection by the Turkish government is intricately linked to its counter-terrorism efforts and that the presence of hostile terrorist organizations just beyond Turkey's borders creates the need for Turkish power projection, as the suicide bombers both entered Turkey through Syria and received training there.

The American relationship with the PKK/PYD/YPG/SDF in Syria has hindered further progress on restoring the Turkish-American relationship, and while the former will continue to exist, the latter will probably never occur. Using the YPG as ground troops has thus cost the Americans heavily in strategic terms as they have alienated a key traditional NATO ally. In return, of course, Ankara has changed its foreign policy accordingly and adapted as best as it could. It reached out and started to act more in line with the Russians, starting from Astana, as well as taking unilateral decisions, as shown, and materialized in its direct military interventions in Syria, as well as in Iraq. Hence, Turkish foreign policy was influenced by the

American decision to partner with the YPG, and this caused a recalibration and restructuring of certain elements of Turkish power projection, and the propensity to use them. One example is the restructuring of the national intelligence agency, the MIT, to incorporate foreign operations, and use pin-point strikes against the PKK, with domestically built military instruments in the form of UAVs (Yetkin, 2023). The YPG's relentless expansion and land grabbing in Syria aided and abetted by the Americans, has led to Turkey's change in objectives in Syria towards a focus on countering and eliminating the YPG as a whole. The reasoning and implementation of Turkey's cross-border military operations, and the unifying, training, and equipping of proxy forces from among the Syrian opposition ranks, share these objectives of countering and eliminating the PKK/PYD/YPG in Syria. Thus, the existence and the growth of the YPG in Syria, and its risks to Turkish national security, led to the need and establishment of effective Turkish power projection to counter and eliminate the PKK/YPG in Syria. The Americans have indirectly induced in this way the establishment of the modern Turkish form of power projection.

4.4 The 15 July Coup and its political & military consequences

On the evening of the 15th of July 2016, Turkey was shocked by a coup attempt by members of FETÖ, or Gülenists, loyal to Fethullah Gülen, a so-called imam in exile in the US, and their elements in the Turkish military. For modern Turkish political history, one cannot overlook the sheer importance of that cataclysmic day and the implications it has had for the entirety of Turkish society. In terms of making shallow but useful comparisons, some liken the coup attempt to 9/11 as it created a powerful shock in society and politics, of which we still feel its ripples today. The coup

attempt led to Ankara turning towards a completely security-driven behavioral response in the following years. Although the failure of the coup meant the protection of popular democracy in Turkey, the security-driven response and subsequent draconian authoritarian measures by the government have led to many analysts and critics voicing concern over Turkey's democratic route since.

The events preceding the coup attempt are often thought to start with the attempt by FETÖ prosecutors to arrest the then head of national intelligence MIT, Hakan Fidan, on the 7th of February 2012, when then prime minister Erdoğan was scheduled to have surgery allegedly due to complications in his digestive tract (CNN Türk, 2021). The event is now known as the beginning of FETÖ efforts to undermine the political strength of the incumbent government (Kaya, 2022). The alliance between the Gülenists and the ruling AKP had effectively ended. The government in the following period made legal changes to limit and close the number of private education institutions which were known as 'dershanes', and which were dominated by and in practice a stronghold for FETÖ and a primary source of income in Turkey. The next escalation in the power struggle was the 'corruption probes' which came in two waves, the first on the 17th of December 2013, and the second on the 25th of December 2013, where leading figures in and around the government were indicted for corruption by prosecutors who were later uncovered to be loyal FETÖ members, and of which the alleged ultimate goal was the prosecution of then prime minister Erdoğan (Yayla, 2016). Consequently, Turkish society became even more polarized on the subject of FETÖ, with some advocating that they were too powerful nationally and internationally and that they were dangerous, as they wielded enormous influence over numerous elements of society and state, including the state bureaucracy, armed forces, and the highest judicial organs, while others severely

underestimated their capacity and willingness to further their aims and resort to violence (Yayla, 2016). Then on the 15th of July 2016, the bridges connecting Istanbul were closed by the military, and the public learned that there was a coup attempt unfolding, Turks took massively to the streets, blocking the exits of military bases, lying in front of tanks and armored vehicles, protesting the soldiers who were led by or part of the FETÖ elements within the military, while civilians and security forces clashed all over Turkey with the elements of FETÖ in the security- and armed forces. The putschists opened fire on civilians on the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul, in front of the Municipality building of Istanbul, and other places all over Turkey. The civilians as well as government buildings including the Turkish parliament, Office of the Presidency, and the Police headquarters were bombed by F16s and attack helicopters by the same FETÖ putschists. Both the president and the prime minister were targets of assassination attempts, while the Chief of Staff of the TAF was captured by the FETÖ members within the military. The coup attempt was defeated by the heroic acts and resistance of the civilian population and the security-, armed- and intelligence forces not associated with FETÖ, as well as the cooperation of the government, media, political parties, and other elements of Turkish society acting in unison against the FETÖ putschists. At least 251 people were killed and at least 2200 were injured because of the coup attempt (Ibrahim, 2022). The resistance to the coup generated its own heroes, as with the story of Sergeant Ömer Halisdemir, who upon a call from his commander Major General Zekai Aksakalli, the commander of the Special Forces Command, went outside the building of the Special Forces Command and eliminated the putschist leader Brigadier General Semih Terzi after which Ömer Halisdemir was martyred but thanks to him the putschists there

were now leaderless and disorganized (Tasci, n.d.). The coup attempt was defeated by the early morning and thousands were arrested.

All of the evidence, including 'intelligence data, historical records, witness statements and confessions and more prove that the coup attempt was organized by FETÖ' (Yayla, 2016). Therefore, understanding the group and its leader Fetullah Gülen is important to understanding the 15 July coup attempt. Without a clear understanding of FETÖ, it is impossible to understand at least the last 2 decades of Turkish political history as they were powerful and influential both in Turkish society and all or almost all state institutions. What was different however with previous coups and coup attempts in Turkish history is the sheer willingness of 'resistance and retaliation by the Turkish people, the media organizations, civil society organizations, and the political leaders' (Yayla, 2016). What was significant was the reluctance of Turkey's traditional Western allies to denounce the coup, whereas a quick denunciation and support by the Russian government further helped the rapprochement of Turkish-Russian relations (Mankoff, 2016). After the coup attempt, a state of emergency was declared for months, and thousands were arrested as they were allegedly either part of the coup attempt or tied to FETÖ to some extent. However, as the Turkish government and society were now in a crisis, in the aftermath, political alliances were reshuffled and the AKP government was now supported by the nationalist MHP, or 'Nationalist Action Party', and this newly-cemented coalition has withstood the test of time ever since the 15 July Coup in 2016. The effects this has had on both domestic and foreign policies of the Turkish state are important in understanding the need for Turkish PP and is one of the major reasons for the paradigm shift in TFP ever since 2016. Firstly, the MHP's 'security-first outlook in foreign policy' makes security ever-more important both in domestic

as well as in foreign policy, and the 'Kurdish Question' lies at the heart of these security concerns (Aras, 2019). The direct and most important result is that the government's reliance on and propensity to use effective hard PP to address these concerns becomes more likely. Secondly, the ranks of the armed- and security forces and bureaucratic cadres have been either co-opted or filled with 'nationalists' since the purges of FETÖ-elements have left open positions in these ranks. The removal of FETÖ-elements in these ranks has significantly strengthened the willingness and decisiveness of the government and the entire security architecture for the use of effective hard PP. An example is the removal of the 2nd Army Commander of the TSK, Major General Adem Huduti, as part of the anti-FETÖ court cases, and his subsequent arrest and imprisonment (Gökmen & Kaşik, 2018). The 2nd Army of the TSK is directly in charge of the Turkish territories bordering Syria, Iraq, and Iran. And thirdly, the bureaucratic security institutions, including MIT, have gone through a complete restructuring phase with the adoption of the 'presidential system', which has accelerated after the 15 July Coup, and where internal and external security has become their own distinct domains (Ataman, 2023). An example is the subordination of the entire military under the Ministry of Defense, and the removal and transfer of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard from the TAF to the Interior Ministry. The latter is also a perfect example of 'coup-proofing', a traditional and historic method of dividing the armed- and security forces into two roughly equal parts in terms of manpower, such that a coup attempt by one side requires the elimination or subjugation of the other side first, significantly making the risks of failure of a coup attempt higher for the instigators. These reforms have led to the establishment of new institutional frameworks, and the increase in the effectiveness of existing institutional frameworks, in terms of the internal- and especially external security architecture,

and as such have increased the organization and capacity of these institutions for the effective use of hard PP. These reforms have also come with an increase in material resources for these institutions and an increase in focus and specialization of these institutions through their professional cadres. An example is MIT's increased jurisdiction, influence, and activity beyond Turkey's territories where it executes covert operations as well as diplomacy together with the TSK, Foreign Ministry, and other government institutions.

4.5 The instruments of the Turkish defense industry

The effective use of hard PP requires adequate military instruments. As airpower and carrier strike groups form the backbone of American hard PP together with their global network of military bases, Turkish hard PP requires the procurement, development, and effective use of military instruments on land, air, and sea together with its network of military bases. The Turkish defense industry has become critical in this respect. As discussed earlier, these instruments come in many shapes and forms and form the third leg of what makes up the concept of 'strategy' in this context. Strategy is made up of three major elements: A) goals/objectives, B) methods, and C) tools/instruments. Naturally, all three are effectively interlinked, and a change in C can on occasion, but rarely, affect a change in A and B. Yet they are not equal in weight, as a change in A will shape the choices of B and C. The decades-long push by respective Turkish governments, bureaucrats, and regular citizens for the national production and development of indigenous arms has wielded effective results. Hence, the importance of the ever-growing and popular Turkish defense industry, as they produce the tools for C, which effectively affect A and B. In the Turkish case, this has made worldwide headlines, as indigenous weaponized

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drones, or UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) have allowed Ankara to engage in more risky power projection in multiple theatres of conflict like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Somalia, among others. The advantages of cost-effective drones on the battlefield are many. The loss of such drones in combat does not mean the loss of valuable personnel, and their domestic production means it can keep up with the attrition of lengthy engagement in conflict areas. Hence, C has influenced A and B, increasing the scope and flexibility of the choices for and the execution of hard PP. Modern military instruments like drones make a difference in that they carry less risk of losing valuable manpower and as such the risk of upsetting domestic audiences in the process. Therefore, we see a marked difference in the post-2016 Çavuşoğlu- and Fidan eras in the reliance on effective hard PP as part of broader TFP.

The domestic development of military instruments has four critical advantages for the producing state. Firstly, it means that the state that can domestically produce military systems is less reliant on foreign procurement for its security needs and as such can act relatively more independently in its actions. This has direct consequences for the state's behavior and its FP as military alliances and foreign procurement almost always come with specific conditions attached. An example is Canada's suspension of export permits for Canadian military sensors to Turkish defense companies over Turkish drone deliveries to Azerbaijan, which the government of Canada has vowed to lift after Turkey's ratification of Sweden's accession bid to NATO (Spicer, 2024). Secondly, the state that can produce military instruments domestically has a relative advantage over states that cannot produce military instruments at home. This is important because, in a conflict between neighboring states, valuable stockpiles of munitions are prone to depletion after a

certain duration of the conflict. Hence, the rate at which these stockpiles can be filled, and the military needs met, directly affects the chances of survival for the given state. Examples of these are the current conflicts in Ukraine, and Armenia-Azerbaijan, where Ukraine is reliant on arms supplies from the West, Armenia is reliant on Russia, and Azerbaijan is reliant on Russia, Turkey, and Israel. The third advantage of domestic production of military instruments is an economic one and involves the cutting down of costs and the increase in military sales and exports that come with it. Foreign procurement is almost always more expensive relative to domestic production. As companies from the US, Russia, and China, dominate the global military exports, they naturally profit from these exports. Domestic production means that, if the quality is more or less equal to the foreign product, and as such domestic procurement takes place, a smaller amount of the government's budget is allocated for the same security needs. In terms of exports, the domestic production of these military products means that there is employment created in the home country, a valuable procurement and development supply chain is created, and as these domestic companies become profitable, further development and education of human capital, the spillover to the civilian sector in terms of consumer products, and a stimulus to the country's national GDP is created. This is one of the reasons why respective Turkish governments have insisted on creating a national defense industry ecosystem. A good example is the company Baykar, which has exported roughly 1,76 billion USD worth of military products in 2023. A fourth advantage of domestic production of military products is once again related to exports but revolves around the gains achieved in political and diplomatic terms. Military exports are never done to foreign states with a clear hostility to the home state. Instead, military exports to a foreign state often mean the establishment of a 'bond of trust' between the two states.

Military exports thus provide an important impetus to furthering diplomatic relations. What we also see is that military exports can create client-patron relationships, and deepen the cooperation in general military terms, sometimes to the point of creating a military alliance. The establishment of foreign military bases often follows the onset of military exports between the two states if military and diplomatic relations deepen further. Military exports also create valuable political influence in the receiving country. A good example of this is Turkey's involvement in the Second Karabakh War in 2020, where Turkey's delivery of critical military arms and its political and diplomatic support has deepened the relationship between the two countries to such an extent that a military alliance has been announced, military bases have been established, and even Turkish generals have become advisors to the Azerbaijani minister of defense (Caucasus Watch, 2022).

These new instruments do not come without their limitations however, as there is a well-known engine production hurdle within the Turkish defense industry, where the necessary knowledge is often still lacking, and the engines and sub-systems are often still procured from foreign companies. Furthermore, Turkish weapon platforms such as the UAVs are battle-tested in Syria, Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, yet they are susceptible to interception by enemy aircraft and SAM (surface-to-air missiles), and their performance in high-density A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) areas where missile defense systems are concentrated is noteworthy but they are regularly shot down (Crino & Dreby, 2020). A high production rate and the absence of valuable human personnel do mitigate these disadvantages.

The Turkish government also recently announced on the 17th of October 2023, that it plans to increase its defense budget in 2024 significantly with an

approximate increase of 150% from 16 billion USD to 40 billion USD (Felstead,

2023). This increase is remarkable and unconventional when we look at the last

decades of defense spending. Two major reasons could be behind the rationale for

this increase. Firstly, the government is seeking to react to an increasingly volatile

neighborhood with this major boost in defense spending, and investments in defense,

particularly-the navy, are costly. Secondly, the government is most likely seeking to

maximize the efficiency of its defense exports by allocating this larger sum to

domestic procurement, and in this way helping promising projects which can then be

exported at scale, signaling an investment into the close future of the domestic

defense industry. While the domestic defense industry has had many promising

projects in recent years, the lack of procurement meant that these projects would

remain merely projects and thus not enter serial production. In any case, the

substantial increase in defense spending also signals the continuation of and an

increase in the use of hard PP in the future.

It is because of these reasons related to the existence of a continuously-

developing national defense industry in Turkey, that the military instruments for hard

PP have been created. As such, Turkish PP after the 15 July Coup Attempt has

consistently made use of these military instruments, as well as its already existing

military weapons. Together with traditional military instruments on land, air, and sea,

the new Turkish defense products, especially the Turkish UAVs, and the 'smart-

munitions' and missiles that they use, have been used in all three of the theaters of

war in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. These new military instruments have

significantly lowered the costs of unilateral force, as for one, the loss of human

capital is non-existent. Secondly, as they are domestically produced, procurement is

relatively cheap, and they are easily replaceable compared to foreign procurement of

similar military products. These important factors are significant enablers when the choice of the application of military force is at the table of government and military officials. The probability that these new instruments of warfare will continue to be used in Turkish hard PP is high and as such the propensity of the Turkish government's reliance on these instruments is only more likely in the near future

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES

5.1 Turkey in Syria

Since the start of the SCW in 2011, Syria has remained at the top of issues

dominating the TFP agenda. At the moment, the Turkish-Syrian border is 911

kilometers long and currently in the hands of three different parties on the side of

Syria, these are from the West to the East, the Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS) in Idlib,

the Turkish government, and the PKK/YPG/SDF (Tokmajyan & Khaddour, 2022).

With such a lengthy border comes the natural consequence of spillover of security

risks and dangers from the Syrian side to Turkish territories, as such the SCW has

created challenges for Turkish policymakers and TFP has changed since the start of

the SCW, but fundamentally after Davutoğlu's departure, the Astana Agreement, and

after the paradigm shift in 2015-2016. In the second half of 2015 and the first half of

2016, the episodes of war in northern Syria were particularly bloody, especially

around Aleppo, where the opposition fought for control of the major city but lost it

due to regime offensives supported by the Russians. This year also saw the highest

increase in registered refugees in Turkey, with the number rising from roughly 1,5

million to 2,5 million as a result (UNHCR, 2024). The refugee issue has had major

consequences for Turkish domestic politics as well, as racism is on the rise in

Turkey, and anti-refugee statements are now popular tools in the hands of populistic

politicians. The reason is the large exodus of Syrians from their natural homeland

into Turkish cities, where ethnic tensions and economic hardships, fueled by

political- and social media agitators, have created a strong anti-Syrian sentiment in

the Turkish public. The war in Syria has thus affected both Turkish domestic as well

as foreign politics, and in this chapter, we will look at the materialization of Turkish power projection in Syria as part of TFP. We will see that Turkish PP in Syria aims at stemming refugee flows, eradicating terrorist groups like the PKK, and ISIS, and protecting Syria's territorial integrity; and we will see that Turkish PP as part of its TFP in Syria has repeatedly changed over time.

5.1.1 The Davutoğlu era

In retrospect, the Davutoğlu era was marked by a certain degree of naivety among Turkish policymakers. That the Assad regime would inevitably fall was considered natural given the course of events during the early years of the SCW, as Aslam (2019, p. 13) puts it quoting Davutoğlu himself: "…when the popular movements began in Syria, it was much easier to predict their course given how events had turned out in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and even Yemen.". Not only Turkish policymakers, but almost everyone after unrest erupted in Syria expected the Assad regime to crumble in the face of immense internal and external pressure. Turkey first tried diplomatic methods to force Assad to give democratic concessions, but as it cracked down harshly and repressed the democratic uprisings, Ankara started to use harsh rhetoric against Assad. The opposition groups became allies of Turkey, and the Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed, which was supported by Turkey and most major Western states. During those years, the opposition groups were recognized as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people by Turkey and the 'West'. Turkey expected more in those years from the West and its NATO allies in favor of toppling the Assad regime, much like what happened in Libya, yet this did not happen. NATO meetings were held after Turkey's fighter jet was shot down, but support for Turkey's interventionist approach did not materialize except for symbolic

shows of support. A limited NATO air defense contingent was placed, consisting of Patriot batteries, along the Turkish-Syrian border. Most were withdrawn years later except for the Spanish Patriot batteries. The Americans got involved mainly to 'eliminate the ISIS threat' but ended up carving out its sphere of influence in northern Syria, although bureaucratic competition resulted in incoherent US policy in Syria. The CIA armed specific rebel groups close to Turkey with anti-tank guided missiles (Perry, 2015), while CENTCOM rebranded the YPG-dominated groups (including elite PKK leadership cadres) into the Syrian Democratic Forces as their proxy against ISIS and opposition groups (Szuba, 2020). Iran, however, did not refrain from getting militarily involved by sending manpower, arms, and capital almost as soon as the SCW started. Hezbollah, as Iran's proxy, also started to intervene on behalf of the Assad regime, especially near the Lebanese borders, and in the cities of Hama and Homs. Most of the countryside remained in the hands of the opposition in the years 2012 and 2013. The YPG, the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, started expanding in northern Syria, while the 'Peace Process', the ceasefire and negotiation stage that had the goal of ending the decades-long conflict between Turkey and the PKK was ongoing within Turkey. The Peace Process started in the Spring of 2013 with the imprisoned leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan calling for a ceasefire, and withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkey to northern Iraq. However, the withdrawal of PKK fighters in the summer of 2013 was only limited as 20% of them retreated to their areas of control in northern Iraq (Al Jazeera, 2013). The Peace Process ended definitively with the execution of two Turkish police officers in 2015 and the following 'Trench Wars' in the southeast of Turkey (Al Jazeera, 2015). With the meteoric rise of ISIS in Syria, the PKK/YPG became the main ally of the US administration under Obama in the years 2014-2015 and the SDF was born.

Airstrikes helped the YPG/SDF take parts of northern Syria at an increasing rate, while the YPG expanded westwards and southwards consolidating its control, which alarmed Ankara in the process. The Russians only fully intervened in 2015, mainly to secure their strategic naval facility in Tartous and their Hmeimim airbase, and to restore control for the Assad regime. Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that had allegedly entered its airspace after repeated warnings in November 2015, retaliation by the Russians in terms of economic sanctions ensued, and rebel groups close to Turkey were repeatedly targeted. In 2016 the two sides reached a consensus and a Turkish-Russian rapprochement followed, a dynamic that would shape northern Syria very strongly in the coming years. The years 2015-2016 were the rupture years that would shape TFP and northern Syria, very powerfully symbolized by the sacking of Davutoğlu from office. The rapprochement between Russia and Turkey happened following the Astana Agreement, and the Sochi memorandum later.

5.1.2 The Çavuşoğlu era

Former Foreign Minister and now-Prime Minister Davutoğlu resigned in 2016, while a coup attempt on the 15th of July 2016 failed. The Turkish-Russian bilateral relationship became ever more transactional and dominated by pragmatism in the following years, while the Turkish-American relationship worsened. The coup attempt is an important catalyst in TFP marking the beginning of an increasingly assertive realpolitik-based TFP in its immediate vicinity. The city of Aleppo fell definitively into the hands of the Assad regime, supported by Shia militias under the control of Iran and Hezbollah, and supported by Russian airstrikes. Aleppo was divided between the opposition and the regime for four years. The fall of Aleppo meant that the opposition had effectively lost any chance of toppling the Assad

regime by military force. The Turks, Russians, and Iranians then agreed in Astana as part of the Astana Peace Process for a nationwide Syrian ceasefire, while the rebel pockets were isolated from each other by the forces of the Assad regime. Turkish observation posts were created in Idlib along the frontier of the rebel groups and the Assad regime. Many fighters were sent by buses to the opposition-held territories in Idlib and northern Aleppo, while the Assad regime successfully cleared the rebel pockets militarily and established its control. It was also victorious over ISIS leading to a frontline between the expanding Assad regime and the US-backed YPG from Manbij to Deir Ezzor. The fighting happened sporadically between both sides, but after a strong response from US forces, the frontline has largely held. The Turks after the coup attempt launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, pushing back ISIS from the northern Aleppo countryside, establishing the first Turkish-controlled area within Syrian borders, administered by the Syrian Interim Government and rebel groups. Operation Olive Branch followed from January to March 2018, neutralizing the PKK/YPG in Afrin. The YPG still holds considerable areas in the Tal Rifaat region and Manbij, west of the Euphrates, supported by the Russians in particular. Turkish demands for the cleansing of the YPG in this region have not been accepted by the Russians because of the threatening implications it would have on regime control over the city of Aleppo. The third military operation by the Turks came in the form of Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, carving out a safe zone in northern Syria, east of the Euphrates River, and leading to American withdrawal under Trump, while the Russians moved in to contain further Turkish expansion. The Americans withdrew further east and continued to support their YPG proxies. The fourth military operation within Syria is that of Operation Spring Shield in February and March 2020, which started after the Assad regime (or the Russians) bombed a

Turkish headquarters in Idlib, leading to the death of 34 Turkish soldiers (Reuters, 2020). The Assad regime had started an offensive to recapture Idlib, creating huge refugee flows to the Turkish border from the overpopulated Idlib region, and managed to shrink the rebel pocket significantly until the start of the operation, which lasted only 7 days, but saw a significant portion of Assad's army eliminated with 3.136 regime targets neutralized (Ozcan & Barakat, 2020). The regime offensive was effectively halted by the unforeseen destruction of this scale, documented by open-source intelligence (OSINT) Dutch analysts 'Oryx' (Mitzer & Oliemans, 2020). OSINT researchers have been documenting and visually confirming losses of manpower and equipment ever since the beginning of the SCW. The following period is marked by a fragile stalemate, while the Turkish military is entrenched in Idlib. In Idlib, the Turks have a pragmatic relationship with the main rebel group of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader Jolani, who was tied to Al Qaeda, but broke off his allegiance in a quest for power, and even helped eliminate leading Al Qaeda figures in Idlib (Ajjoub, 2021). In total 4 significant military operations in Syria have been carried out by the Turks, all after the 2016 July Coup Attempt. In Libya and Azerbaijan, Ankara has staged military interventions on behalf of governments, also after 2016, successfully turning the tides of the conflicts, whereas it is still waging military operations against the PKK in Iraq where it cooperates with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) ruled by the Barzani family.

5.1.3 The Fidan era

Although it is still early to characterize the Hakan Fidan era as he has been recently appointed as the new foreign minister of Turkey, he is no stranger to matters of domestic and international politics. Hakan Fidan is the first foreign minister of Turkey to come from an intelligence- or security institution as he was the former head of national intelligence, the MIT (Ataman, 2023). After having won the elections for his presidency on the 28th of May 2023, president Erdoğan appointed Hakan Fidan as the new foreign minister, succeeding Çavuşoğlu. Fidan is not a stranger to the corridors of foreign policy as MIT has been at the forefront of the normalization of relations with countries with which Turkey has had frosty relations (Ataman, 2023). These countries include Israel, Egypt, and Syria as a few examples. Fidan has effectively restructured the MIT into 'internal and external intelligence' and made it an effective player in Turkey's PP efforts as it conducts external operations now as well, including the pinpoint strikes against PKK figures in northern Syria and Iraq with domestically built UAVs. The distinction between internal and external intelligence is not a coincidence, as, after the 15 July Coup Attempt in 2016, Ankara restructured much of its security institutions, with the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard now becoming part of the Interior Ministry, allowing the TAF to focus more on external security and threats (Ataman, 2023). The restructuring of MIT thus was part of a complete process of overhauling security institutions, sparked by the coup and the larger paradigm shift of TFP and its 'grand strategy' based on the causes that we have discussed. As a result, a change in TFP either in stated goals or in the implementation is more than likely compared to the Çavuşoğlu era, where it will have more in common with the Çavuşoğlu era than with the Davutoğlu era in terms of effective PP. However, with normalization efforts going on with the formerly 'problematic' countries in the Middle East, and

challenges emanating from the Ukrainian war with Russia, it seems Turkey is on the track again of implementing its traditional mode of foreign policy which is being rooted in the Western security architecture of NATO, as seen with Turkey's support to Ukraine in terms of weapons, while it distances itself from blindly parroting Western talking points against Russia, in line again with its traditional institutional culture of 'balancing' in TFP, and while being assertive against security threats coming from its southern flank. As such, it is reasonable to estimate that this Hakan Fidan era will be characterized by the traditional institutional strategic cultures that have ruled TFP for decades, like Westernism, and a balancing multidimensional approach, without the romanticism that ruled Davutoğlu's era, and now with the assertive realpolitik approach to the security challenges around its borders through effective power projection. A hint of this new assertiveness can be seen in Ankara's reaction to the suicide bombing by PKK terrorists against the Interior Ministry in Ankara, on the 1st of October 2023, after which Fidan expressed in a statement that 'all of the PKK/YPG/SDF's facilities would now be deemed legitimate targets and that third parties should stay away, referring to countries like the US, Russia, and France', after which a systematic and selective bombing of these facilities has commenced by the TAF and MIT (Gumrukcu, 2023).

5.1.4 The evolution of Turkish foreign policy in Syria

As the matter of the SCW is at the heart of TFP, we see a marked difference in the assertiveness of TFP and PP between the two eras following the rupture years of 2015-2016, as a total of 4 significant military operations have been executed by the TAF in Syria after the 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt, and 2 other military interventions in Libya and Azerbaijan, while a multitude of operations continues in Iraq. The

causes of the paradigm shift of TFP which we have discussed at length are also critical to understanding the evolution of TFP in Syria. They are interconnected. And it is important to see this evolution over time. For example, the only military operation in the Davutoğlu Era in Syria was much smaller, with the sole aim of moving the Suleyman Shah tomb, the Turkish exclave in Syria, to Turkish territory (Arsu, 2015). The withdrawal of the American hegemon, and the developments that characterized the rupture year of 2015/2016 like the entrance of Russia militarily into Syria, the birth of the US-YPG partnership, and the 15 July Coup Attempt by FETÖ elements in the military, caused the paradigm shift to a more assertive TFP, strongly influenced by the developments in the Turkish defense industry which created instruments of PP that were not available in the Davutoğlu Era. Any strategy is made up of three elements: A) the goals/objectives, B) the methods, and C) the instruments. In the Davutoğlu Era, the goal of TFP in the SCW was A) toppling Assad, B) using opposition groups and diplomacy, and C) arming opposition groups. In the Çavuşoğlu era this has changed to A) shrinking and eliminating the PKK/YPG and stabilizing Syria to stem refugee flows and prevent the partition of Syria, B) using opposition groups together with military interventions by the TAF, and C) arming opposition groups and using military force with new national arms, especially armed drones. Hence, all elements of Turkish strategy and thus its PP, its goals, methods, and tools have changed in Syria compared to the Davutoğlu era. And in the Fidan era, this same strategy within Turkish PP is expected to continue.

The first driver that led to the shift in TFP was the departure of the US hegemon from the region, which laid the systemic groundwork for the SCW from erupting, and the gradual shift to realpolitik in TFP was one of the results of this withdrawal of the Americans in 2011 from Iraq. This departure effectively led to the

pitting of regional states against each other due to security dilemmas, whereas during

the American presence between 2003-2011, the countries of the Middle East took

advantage of a relatively stable power balance in the region leading to relative ease

of economic transaction. In IR this is closely related to the hegemonic stability

theory which argues that 'stability is most likely when there is a single dominant

state' (Webb & Krasner, 1989). With the withdrawal of the American hegemon, the

countries faced challenges in realizing the balance of power in the region, and

regional instability was exacerbated by the collapse of state authority in the case of

the Arab Spring, including the SCW (Cropsey & Roughead, 2019). During the SCW,

the US refrained from military intervention, and President Obama's red lines after

the Ghouta chemical attack were crossed by Assad on multiple occasions (Engel,

2016), further discrediting US willpower to act assertively against the Assad regime

and its backers. This effectively emboldened Assad and the Russians in their military

solution to the uprising. This in turn meant the recalibration of TFP and its PP

according to this reality. The American failures in Iraq also led to the security

vacuum in Iraq, which led directly to the birth of ISIS in Iraq, with disastrous

consequences for the political landscape in Iraq and Syria, and the turn to

assertiveness in TFP from 2016 onwards.

The second driver that led to the shift in TFP was the entrance of the Russian

military into the SCW. The Russian military factor completely eviscerated the

opposition's chances of winning a military victory over the Assad regime, leading

Ankara to recalibrate its objectives and forego its desire to topple Assad, while its

new focus became limiting and shrinking the PKK/YPG in Syria. The Russians have

proven themselves with their own ruthless policies in Syria to be a more rational

actor vis-à-vis Turkey in their transactional relationship and negotiations than the

Americans. The Astana Agreement is a direct example of this Russian pragmatism. They have also successfully restored Assad's authority over much of Syria's territories, defeating opposition groups close to Turkey in the effort, and leading to Ankara abandoning its objective of the Davutoğlu era of toppling Assad, and recalibrating its FP according to the Russian military reality in Syria.

The third driver explaining the shift in TFP is that of the birth of the US-YPG partnership and the creation of the SDF. It is the most important element in explaining the downturn in Turkish-American bilateral ties as well. While Turkey has waged a war on the PKK since the 1980s, the Americans, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat ISIS, partnered with the PKK's Syria wing, the YPG, and rebranded other opposition groups under its umbrella and called it the SDF. With American air support, the YPG/SDF has expanded enormously and taken territories that were traditionally Arab-populated. Major cities like Raqqa and Tabqa are now under the control of the YPG/SDF. Ankara has made it known over the years on repeated occasions that the partnership with its archenemy has been a significant burden on its relationship with the US. The expanding YPG/SDF presence along most of the Turkish-Syrian border, coupled with their organic ties to the PKK within Syria, and in Iraq, significantly bolstered the Turkish military- and political leadership's willingness to carry out the military operations that aimed to prevent the YPG from connecting their 'cantons', and to eradicate their capacity for any kind of political rule or insurgency. Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 made the unifying of the YPG's cantons impossible. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 removed the PKK/YPG from having a significant presence in Afrin along the Turkish border. Operation Peace Fountain in 2019 to the east of the Euphrates River aimed at establishing a limited safe zone for the return of Syrian refugees, the enlargement of

areas under opposition control, and the weakening of the PKK/YPG's political project in Syria, while strengthening Turkey's thesis in diplomacy and on the ground. Lastly, Operation Spring Shield in 2020 aimed at stemming the refugee flows from Assad's offensives in Idlib, punishing the Assad regime for the martyring of Turkish commandos in Idlib, and signaling to the Russians to respect the de-escalation points made in Sochi after the Astana Agreement.

The fourth driver that explains the shift in TFP was the catalytic event of the 15 July Coup Attempt in 2016 by FETÖ elements. Its failure led to a wide crackdown within the army and the elimination of FETÖ sleeper cell elements. The 2nd Army Commander Adem Huduti, in charge of the southeastern borders, including Syria, was detained shortly after the coup for being part of the FETÖ network and sent to 15 years in prison following his trial (Gökmen & Kaşik, 2018). The elimination of certain elements from the military, including those who opposed unilateral assertiveness, made Turkey's military interventions easier. Hence, an increase in willpower to exert military power helped shift TFP from non-interventionist to interventionist. The 15 July Coup attempt led to a purge of officers as well as a structural reorganization of the decades-old hierarchy within the TAF. The former Chief of Staff of the TAF Hulusi Akar became Defense Minister, subordinate to the Presidency, and the Army, with its three branches of Land-, Air-, and Sea Command, became subordinate to the Defense Ministry. This reorganization, similar to the American model, has helped increase assertiveness and quick decision-making.

The fifth and final driver that explains the shift in TFP is the parallel development of nationalization of arms production and weaponized drones in the Turkish defense industry, which continues to attract international attention. While the

Turkish-Russian relationship is multilayered and complex, Turkish drones have successfully countered Russian expansion, due to their own increased assertiveness in FP in recent years, in the conflict theatres of Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. The most renowned of the Turkish armed drones, the Bayraktar TB2 has been exported to Azerbaijan, Libya, and Ukraine, and exports to Poland have been signed (Adamowski, 2021), while the Baltic country of Latvia confirmed interest in acquiring them (Kay, 2022). The success of TB2 drones in warfare and the destruction of Russian arms in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, including air defense systems, has led to countries neighboring Russia either acquiring these drones or expressing an interest in acquiring them, in turn adding another layer of depth in the Turkish-Russian relationship. National arms production is directly related to a country's capability for independent FP-making and should be seen as instrumental for Turkish hard power and PP.

5.1.5 The future of Turkey in Syria

The future for Turkey in Syria is once again uncertain. While there are talks of normalization with the Assad regime, especially at the level of intelligence institutions, in reality it is more difficult than perceived. Multiple issues are compounding the complexity of this matter. One of which is the fact that many of the Turkish requirements or desires can be asked of Russia, and Iran, the patrons of the Assad regime, directly. The question here becomes 'What does Assad have to offer?'. Another problem of normalization lies with the fact that so much blood has been spilled on opposite sides, and Turkey has invested so heavily on the side of the opposition, with the SNC, SIG, FSA, and the entire political spectrum of opposition groups and armed groups under its direct or indirect control, that upsetting them will

produce a certain cost. Notwithstanding, the fact that given a choice between living in Turkey, or living under the Assad regime, the average Syrian refugee in Turkey who has lost a cousin, a father, a brother or sister, or a friend to the Assad regime's repressive actions, it becomes clear that these grievances have become permanent and hence normalization carries the risks of estranging or radicalizing these anti-Assad Syrians. Then comes the fact that the Assad regime is still hugely unpopular globally and its reputation has permanently been shattered as a ruthless regime that has committed war crimes. Also, the sheer number of hostile acts and martyring of Turkish soldiers by the Assad regime is easily remembered by the Turkish public and government. So, the question becomes 'What does Assad have to offer which outweighs these concerns?'. Then on the other side, the partition of the Syrian territories is not in the interest of Turkey, as it means the realization of the PKK/YPG's 'Rojava' project in northern Syria under the protection of the Americans, the French, and other foreign powers. So, the PKK has to be defeated in Syria, and hence the Turkish campaign of pinpoint strikes against leading figures, and now the facilities, to eradicate the PKK/YPG's capacities. Another goal is the stemming of refugee flows from Syria and the relocation of Syrians to Syrian territories under Turkish control. Given the sheer hostility and the rise of racism against Syrians, fueled by agitators, ethnic tensions, and economic woes, and brought under constant attention by a specific agenda-setting political party in Turkey, the Turkish government has constantly reiterated that the relocation is being worked on, yet that they are against the rising wave of racism against Syrians. Hence, there are no substantial changes expected shortly in the political partition of Syria, but everything can happen at once, as the SCW has taught us from the start, is that the Middle East remains utterly unpredictable. Turkish PP will not change however, in

that Turkish proxy forces from the opposition groups, its embedded soldiers among these groups, the amount of Turkish military bases, the fact that these Turkish-controlled areas have been fought for with Turkish blood as well, the fact that much of the Turkish-controlled areas have now been economically integrated with the Turkish market economy, and that Syrians are now accustomed to Turkish rule there, among other factors, means that the Turkish withdrawal from Syria becomes very improbable.

5.2 Turkey in Libya

Failed states are interesting theatres of lawlessness in the political world. In the case of Libya, the ouster of the former dictator Muammar Ghaddafi has led to the country being embroiled in conflict since 2011. To stabilize the country and climb out of this state of conflict a tough road lies ahead but it is important to understand what needs to be done to shape the political equilibrium in such a way that the country will climb out of the current dire situation. To realize this, it is important to look at both the political as well as economic dimensions. Both political and economic realities need to be considered when formulating a strategy toward a stable political equilibrium. Libya is a country highly dependent on the exports of oil and management of a country's natural resources is critical for the development of the economy. As the realms of economy and politics are always intertwined, and developments in one realm have effects on the other, it is important to formulate a strategy toward a new political equilibrium according to the interplay between these realms. Within this frame of thought, it is important to understand the critical variable of political stability in relation to market economies that are heavily reliant on the export of natural resources. In Libya, the role of Turkey as a stabilizing factor has been

extensively researched and well-recognized. While some view it as an encroaching, disturbing, or even 'imperial' actor, Turkey's real entrance into the conflict in late 2019 by arming, organizing, and training the UN-recognized government in Tripoli and its militias, and foiling the plans of Khalifa Haftar's offensive into Tripoli, has been a welcome stabilizing influence for many Libyans, and a necessary step on building a stable political equilibrium supported by Turkish power projection.

5.2.1 Ottoman Libya

Turkey has a long historical relationship with Libya, as the Ottoman Empire ruled Libya from 1551 to 1911 in the period that many call 'Pax Ottomana' (Koloğlu, 2007). Historically Libya went through different rulers, starting from the Greeks, the Romans, Muslim Arabs, and then the Ottomans, Italians, Nazi Germany, and the Allied forces, followed by independence at last. Libya was historically divided into three parts, of which their significance still holds today; these are the Tripolitania region in the West, Cyrenaica in the East, and the Fezzan in the South (Koloğlu, 2007). Historically, the Ottomans were more welcomed by the Libyans in contrast to Western powers, due to shared religious beliefs, and the less intrusive Ottoman rule socially into Libyan society and culture (Koloğlu, 2007). The Ottomans opted for a decentralized administration in this region as communication with the capital required channels over the sea, which were arduous and unreliable (Koloğlu, 2007). As the areas around modern Libya, which the Ottomans called 'Trablus' or 'Tripoli', were important for the defense of Ottoman lands in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant, with threats of European naval attacks and European-led internal power struggles, the Ottomans chose to construct the 'Odjak' system or 'Ocak' in Turkish, which means 'hearth'; these were institutions with a strong emphasis on 'naval

forces in Libya, with backup from land forces, and administered by a 'Beghlerbey' or 'Beylerbey' in Turkish, a governor of sorts appointed from Istanbul and which oversaw the coastal line mainly and the hinterland occasionally for a short period of two to three years, which the Ottomans did to inhibit ambitious intentions of the appointed Beghlerbeys' (Koloğlu, 2007). The Odjak system was an interesting one to say the least, as society was effectively divided into 'social strata': the 'Odjaklu', or 'Ocaklı', or 'fellows of the Odjak', were young Anatolian men who were recruited from Izmir for military cadres in Libya, and who served in the battle ships of the Ottomans, and were stationed in Tripoli where their numbers ran in the thousands, and were placed under strict discipline; then there were the 'Kuloghlu', or 'Kuloğlu', these were the 'descendants of the Turkish Odjaklis and the Arab women, and it is estimated that there were already more than 50.000 of these in the 17th century, as the Turkish presence continued for generations, and they made up a lot of the irregular infantry units, tasked with overseeing the security of the outer city defenses, road network, and tax collection, while they were themselves exempt from taxes'; then 'there were the 'natives', who were the 'reaya' who paid taxes, like the Jews from Spain living there, and the 'makhzen' who were exempt from taxes, the reaya lived in cities, while the makhzen were largely nomadic tribal members' (Koloğlu, 2007). The Ottoman Empire did not 'seek to colonize, nor take over the trade in the region', instead 'it allowed a high sense of freedom for merchants and traders, and employed nomadic tribes for the security of trade routes in the hinterland, and this respect for native customs and intra-society dynamics allowed the Ottomans to largely avoid conflicts with the native people and secure a sense of authority in the desert hinterlands where tribal domination was stronger than along the coast' (Koloğlu, 2007). In addition, it must be noted that there were calls from the local people to the

Ottomans for protection and the Turks' hands-off approach to local customs fostered religious- and cultural diversity, drawing from their experience in ruling heterogeneous populations in the Balkans and Asia (Koloğlu, 2007).

While the Ottomans were the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Europeans started expanding into its sphere of influence, and the Turks lost Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Libya in 1911, after which the European powers sought to eradicate Turkish roots in these countries (Koloğlu, 2007). Members of the Young Turk movement were exiled to the Fezzan in southern Libya in 1897, many of these exiles were elites and held highly esteemed professions, and they settled in Tripoli despite being sent to the Fezzan region (Koloğlu, 2007). The Ottomans lost Libya to the invading Italians as they were unable to withstand the invasion with only 4.680 soldiers, as units were sent to Yemen as well, while the invading Italians had a superior technological advantage and an invasion force of roughly 35.000 soldiers (Koloğlu, 2007). The inferior Ottoman forces were however strengthened by irregular militias as many Libyans joined the call for arms, but this was not enough, and the Italians invaded the 12 Islands in the Aegean Sea as well, putting further pressure on the Ottoman Empire, leading to the Ouchy Declaration of Peace on the 16th of October 1912 (Koloğlu, 2007). In 1920, the legendary leader of the Libyans, Omar Mukhtar, sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was intercepted and asked for assistance in their war against the Italians (Koloğlu, 2007). The Italians feared Ottoman support for the guerrilla warfare by the Libyans after the Ottomans retreated formally, however, a special clause was inserted into the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which diminished the potential for Turkish support and mitigated Italian concerns effectively (Koloğlu, 2007). The period of Libya under Ottoman rule has had lasting effects on the modern state of Libya and its society:

If the Ottoman government did not contribute to the economic progress in Libya, it at least had the merit of securing its unity, defining its geographical and political limits, and protecting it as a Muslim territory from European tutelage. Considering this outcome, the Turkish presence was an important factor in the creation of modern Libya. (Koloğlu, 2007, p. 91)

The Turkish presence in Libya is back again after a little more than a century, and it has considerable influence in the country at present.

5.2.2 Post-Ottoman rule

After the Ottomans, the Italians were the main power in Libya until the Allied Forces took over the country in 1943 during the Second World War, after which independence followed in 1951 under King Idris Senussi. While the British argued that Libya was not fit to be self-governed, the Turkish representatives, who were talking at the gathering of the newly formed United Nations General Assembly in 1949, fully supported the founding and independence of Libya (Koloğlu, 2007). Turkish figures played a key role during the founding of the country, for example, Sadullah Koloğlu, a former Turkish governor and bureaucrat with Libyan origins became the first prime minister of Libya between 1949 and 1952 (Biyografya, n.d.)[1], while a Turkish general named Ümran Yetişal was sent to Libya to organize and train the Libyan army (Koloğlu, 2007). A close relationship between the Turkish governments and King Idris Senussi during the early years of independent Libya was a natural result, further strengthening the ties with Turkey in political, military, economic, cultural, social and historic terms (T. Turan & T.E. Turan, 2011). Libya's independence was widely celebrated in Turkey as well (Koloğlu, 2007). Then, while

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[1] Biyografya (n.d.). Sadullah Koloğlu. *Biyografya.* Retrieved from https://www.biyografya.com/biyografi/19393; Sadullah Koloğlu is the father of the writer Orhan Koloğlu whose work (2007) has been cited numerous times in this chapter.

Libya was an underdeveloped country at first, massive oil reserves were found in the 1950s and 1960s, making the country very wealthy at a fast pace. In fact, Libya was so underdeveloped that its budget was funded by foreign powers, namely 50% by Great Britain, 30% by the US, and 4% by France (Koloğlu, 2007). The finding of oil reserves, however, has not been completely positive for the development of the country as exports became solely focused on the resources, and the country's development has suffered from what political scientists call the 'resource curse', or the 'Dutch Disease', where the dependence on and the development of oil reserves and their exports inhibit the development of other parts of the economy (Ali & Harvie, 2013).

5.2.3 Ghaddafi rule

From Nasserist Arab nationalist currents came the coup d'état of Muammar Ghaddafi in 1969, which led to the nationalization of the economy, and the infusion of anti-imperialism as the dominant ideology (Koloğlu, 2007). During the Cyprus Operation of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in 1974, Ghaddafi supported the Turkish side as after the US arms embargo against Turkey, Ghaddafi's Libya supplied militarily what the Turks needed through covert channels (Koloğlu, 2007). Ghaddafi's claims about Atatürk, and Turkish secularism, as well as Turkey's positioning in the First Gulf War, have at times created friction with Turkey, but these were always dealt with by way of reconciliatory diplomacy (Koloğlu, 2007). Following its support to Turkey in light of the Cyprus Operation in 1974 and the embargoes that Turkey faced from its Western allies, the bilateral relations warmed up and there was a Libyan delegation visiting Turkey in 1975, which was followed by further economic agreements, of which it must be noted that the most significant

was the entrance of Turkish construction companies in Libya in the following years, which reached a considerable number of 60 companies in 1981 (Koloğlu, 2007). The importance of economy in the bilateral relationship, and hence soft power as an extension, between the two countries in those years can easily be summarized by looking at the weight of Turkish investments in Libya (Koloğlu, 2007, p. 264):

> The highest amount of total contracts signed by the Turkish contractors was in Libya with 11.6 billion US$. The contracts won in Saudi Arabia followed next with half of this amount. In the number of Turkish guestworkers Libya took the third place after Germany and France. In Libya, there were 49.376 Turkish workers. This was equal to 5.3% of the Turkish workers in the world. This was 70% in Germany and 6.1% in France. Saudi Arabia was fourth with 3%. In 1984, the Libyan Minister of Agriculture declared that there were 120.000 Turkish guest workers in almost 150 Turkish companies in Libya. With this number Libya climbed to the second place among the countries employing Turkish workers. Direct daily flights were inaugurated for ease of communication and Turkey became one of the places of predilection for the Libyan tourists.

In 1993, the number of Turkish contracts reached 14.5 billion US$, which was the highest number of contracts for Turkish companies worldwide, showing the extent to which Libya was important for Turkey in terms of investments (Koloğlu, 2007). Libyan-Turkish bilateral trade remained largely stable around the 6 billion US$ mark for the years between 1983 and 2002, with Libya mainly exporting oil and gas, and its derivatives, while Turkey's exports to Libya were more widely differentiated, including a lot of semi-finished and finished products, but also food products and textiles (Koloğlu, 2007). Turkey's investments in Libya, and vice versa, have been a constant pull factor in the bilateral relationship between Libya and Turkey, and guarantee the constant interest of Turkey in the political situation in Libya. Turkey's soft PP into Libya has been a historical fact, both in Ottoman times, as well as in modern times under the Republic of Turkey.

5.2.4 NATO intervention

Following the Arap Spring uprisings, Libya went through a period of strong upheaval, as riots broke out, and the Ghaddafi regime decided to violently suppress these uprisings. While at first Turkey was not positive to NATO intervention, it changed its decision as it saw that a NATO intervention against Ghaddafi was inevitable and that France had already started with air strikes, to which it argued that any intervention should be done under the multilateral umbrella of NATO, and not unilaterally in any form (Head, 2011). After UNSC Resolution 1973, and the Arab League's support for an intervention, Turkey changed its stance; although Turkey tried to create dialogue between the warring parties in Libya, and facilitate a political transition process (Head, 2011), the dynamics for Ghaddafi's overthrow were already set in motion.

While NATO's Secretary General (SG) Rasmussen argued on the 24th of February 2011 that there were no plans to intervene in Libya, as there was no direct threat to NATO members (NATO, 2011a), the following day on the 25th of February, he claimed that Libya is 'of great concern' and a 'threat to thousands of citizens from NATO member states', and that 'an emergency meeting of the NATO Council was called', while claiming that 'humanitarian assistance and evacuation is a priority' and 'NATO has assets that can be used if individual member states want to take action' (NATO, 2011b). The change in tone and argument in only a single day is interesting and possibly hints at the intention of some member states, like France, to take assertive action against the Ghaddafi regime at this point. NATO's SG once again on the 9th of March claims that 'NATO has no intention to intervene in Libya, but has started planning for all eventualities, and expanded the air and sea surveillance in the

region' (NATO, 2012). NATO's Defense Ministers then convened on the 10th of March, and agreed to 'increase the presence of maritime assets in the Central Mediterranean', and 'Supreme Allied Commander Admiral Stavridis is responsible for the command of these ships', while NATO's SG argues that 'a heightened situational awareness is the objective, and the arms embargo as per UNSC Resolution 1970 will be enforced', while 'more ships from the Standing NATO Maritime Group and Standing Mine Countermeasures Group may be used', and 'the topic of a possible no-fly zone was discussed, while planning was required in the case of a UN mandate' (NATO, 2011c). The UNSC Resolution 1970, adopted on the 26th of February 2011, expressed concern about the repression against civilians and called for an end to such 'crimes on humanity', and called for an arms embargo by all UN member states on the Libyan state, and an asset freeze on specific entities and individuals, while calling for all member states to provide humanitarian assistance, and clearly stated that it would keep the 'Libyan authorities under constant review' and change the measures taken in the future according to the 'compliance of the Libyan authorities' (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2011a). Then on the 17th of March 2011, the UNSC adopted the resolution 1973 and 'deplored the failure of Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970', once again 'expressed grave concern' and 'reiterated that parties to armed conflicts bear the responsibilities to protect civilians', and recalled the resolution 1970 clause which stated the 'readiness of the Council to take additional appropriate measures', and stating that 'the situation in Libya constitutes a threat to international security', while under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, calls for 'a ceasefire, a political solution, and Libyan authorities to comply', and 'authorizes member states that act either nationally (unilaterally) or through regional organizations (multilaterally) to take all necessary measures to

protect civilians under the condition that they notify the UN SG', and effectively 'imposes a no fly zone by calling all member states to enforce the relevant conditions to it', and upholds the arms embargo and asset freezes of key individuals, like the sons of Ghaddafi, and entities, like the Libyan Central Bank and Libyan National Oil Corporation (UNSC, 2011b). NATO welcomes this UN resolution on the 18th of March and complies with its articles (NATO, 2011d). Then on the 22nd of March announced it had 'decided to launch an operation to enforce the arms embargo' and 'all allies are committed to the effort', while 'it has completed its plans for the enforcement of the no-fly zone above Libya' (NATO, 2011e). On the 24th of March NATO announced that it has decided to enforce the no-fly zone (NATO, 2011f). On the 25th of March, NATO held a press conference where it announced that the command of the operation lies with NATO Joint Forces Command in Naples, Italy, and stressed the fact that there are AWACS aircraft in the air along with other assets for surveillance, which coordinate the fighter jets for the enforcement of the no-fly zone (NATO, 2011g). Then on the 14th of April following a meeting of NATO states' foreign ministers, the press release states that 'a high operational tempo against legitimate targets will be maintained until the attacks against civilians have ended, military and para-military forces have withdrawn to their bases, and humanitarian assistance has been allowed to reach the proper channels' (NATO, 2011h). NATO Operation Unified Protector continued for months, and on the 7th of July, NATO spokesperson Lungescu stated that 'the arms embargo and no-fly zone are effective, and there are no coordinated attacks against civilians', while the spokesperson of the Operation Unified Protector Commander Bracken stated that 'they have degraded Ghaddafi's military capacity to the point that he is no longer able to mount a major offensive'(NATO, 2011i). NATO SG Rasmussen then issued

a press release following the death of Ghaddafi on the 20th of October 2011 wherein he claimed that the 'rule of fear has come to an end' and 'the people of Libya can now decide their own future', and that they will 'terminate their mission in coordination with the UN and the National Transitional Council'(NATO, 2011j). Operation Unified Protector had come to its natural end and on the 31st of October 2011, a reconnaissance and surveillance asset in the form of 'AWACS' made its last flight as part of the NATO mission, which was followed by the departure of naval assets the next day (NATO, 2015). The command structure of the operation was headed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which oversaw the grand political directions, while NATO's 'Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe' (SHAPE) carried out the decisions with Joint Forces Command in Naples (NATO, 2015).

5.2.5 Post-NATO intervention

Following Colonel Ghaddafi's death, the country of Libya became a failed state extremely fast, evolving into a playground for warring parties and warlords. External meddling and interference were never absent. Contrary to the simplistic perspective that many analysts and observers have, the conflict within Libya is not simply a war between two camps, the GNA and the LNA, but rather a power struggle between 'militias, tribes, and foreign powers' (Hayden, Bolger, Rand, & Ricciardone, 2015). It is here that the former head of the CIA, retired general Michael Hayden makes a point on the utility of Arab autocrats, one which includes Ghaddafi, and claims that as the Sykes-Picot agreement was highly artificial, it neglected local realities, and as it evolved into the Cold War where there were two camps, they preserved with the use of power, through these autocrats, the boundaries that were set and frozen, despite local realities, as both camps were afraid their clients could drag them into

war (Hayden et al., 2015). This is one of the effects that alliance relationships have as mentioned before. As such, a NATO intervention as seen in the year 2011 in Libya would be unimaginable during the Cold War where a bipolar world order was the norm, yet possible in the rather unipolar world of today.

5.2.6 The Turkish intervention

The Turkish military intervened in 2019 and 2020 on behalf of the UN-recognized government of Tripoli of the GNA. There are several reasons for the intervention. Firstly, 'Ankara is seeking to expand its influence in Libya, to deepen its footprint in North Africa, especially since it lost influence in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring, as Turkish policymakers see Libya as its 'near abroad' where it was forced to withdraw in historic terms' (Yüksel, 2021). Hence, the historical and cultural connection to Libya makes developments in the country of interest to the Turkish government as well as its people. Secondly, Ankara seeks to protect its 'commercial interests, consisting of mainly real estate and construction contracts worth approximately 19 billion USD' (Yüksel, 2021). Turkey, as discussed, has been a big investor in the Libyan economy. And thirdly, 'Turkey sees Libya as an important part of its strategy and foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean, where it is at odds with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel over maritime borders, and exclusive economic zones, with the exploration and extraction of natural gas and oil' (Yüksel, 2021). Libya becomes an important theater for Turkish PP in this regard, as Ankara seeks to maximize its position relative to the aforementioned countries regarding the economic exploitation of eastern Mediterranean energy deposits. As such, the intervention of Turkey in Libya is in line with Turkey's 'Blue Homeland' doctrine, where it has set borders for maritime delimitation as part of its exclusive economic

zones and puts forward the idea of defending these borders on its neighboring seas (Gingeras, 2020).

If we look at the three elements of Strategy, Turkey's objectives in Libya were A) the stabilization of the GNA government in Tripoli and the protection and advancement of Turkish geopolitical interests in northern Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, while its methods were B) military intervention and support, and its instruments C) the arming of armed groups loyal to the GNA, their military training, as well as the takeover of their military command, and direct military intervention in the form of military advisors, intelligence assets, mercenaries, naval assets, armed UAVs, artillery systems, electronic warfare systems, and air defense systems. Turkey also used communities it had developed relationships with, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, and the Karaghla (Köroğlu/Kuloğlu) community in Misrata (Yüksel, 2021). Following the LNA and Haftar's offensive towards Tripoli in 2019, the GNA government requested military assistance from Turkey, and Turkey subsequently intervened. The Americans had withdrawn from Libya in 2019, while the LNA was supported by the Russians and the UAE (Yüksel, 2021). Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA government in Tripoli in 2019 for 'security and military cooperation' preceding the direct military intervention (Yüksel, 2021). The result was a defeat of the LNA forces in the wider Tripolitania region, the stabilization of this region under joint GNA-Turkish control, and the start of further institutionalization of the Turkish military footprint, as training centers are established, a Turkish naval base is built in Misrata, and the Vatiyya military airbase near the borders of Tunisia and Algeria becomes operational for the Turkish military (Yüksel, 2021). In addition to payment in terms of Libyan oil revenues, the GNA

also signs a maritime delimitation deal with Ankara to secure the Turkish claims of its EEZ borders in return (Yüksel, 2021).

The consequences for Libya have been that the country is now divided into two camps with the GNA in Tripoli supported by Turkey and Qatar, while the LNA camp is supported by Egypt, Russia, the UAE, and France. However, the intervention by Ankara has produced positive results for the war-torn country, as the stalemate now proved to be an effective foundation for further diplomatic negotiations led by the UN, and since the failed LNA offensive in 2019-2020, there has not been a major resumption of military conflict. The diplomatic consequences are that Turkey is now at odds with Egypt, Russia, the UAE, and France in Libya, although mitigated by diplomatic efforts and negotiations. Turkey's intervention can be seen by Libyans as a foreign power meddling in Libya's internal affairs, and its ties to armed groups can be subject to debate. However, as long as the public goods of security and economic prosperity are provided, the Turkish presence in Libya can also become very popular for Libyans, if not already the case. What is certain is that Turkey's military intervention and its PP created a balance of power in Libya that fostered political negotiations and halted the military offensives through a productive stalemate.

The political consequences of the Turkish intervention have been fruitful for the stabilization of Libya. The most significant development has been the creation of the new interim government on the 5th of February 2021 as part of the UN-led 'Libya Political Dialogue Forum' and the election of Dbeibah, a figure close to Turkey as interim Prime Minister (Yüksel, 2021). Dbeibah is currently still holding this office after an initial date to hold national elections was postponed due to disagreements between the political parties, and there has not been a national election since due to political deadlock. The Turkish government has also been at odds with the European

Union (EU) over the maritime operation of IRINI, which enforces an arms embargo in naval terms, and not on land or air, which in practice emboldens Haftar's LNA, as they receive arms shipments more from land and air, whereas the Turkish-backed GNA bloc receives a significant portion of aid from the sea (Yüksel, 2021). The Turkish navy has in turn 'prevented IRINI from checking Turkish ships suspected of delivering arms to the GNA' (Yüksel, 2021).

All in all, Libya's political and economic stabilization requires the holding of national elections sooner than later. However, the country's political blocs and their foreign backers are still at odds over the exact route to said political and economic stabilization. The presence of valuable oil and gas deposits in Libya, and the migration to EU countries from Libya of Africans makes the EU an important actor in the country next to Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Russia, and the UAE. Ankara knows this and acts according to its interests in turn.

5.3 Turkey in Azerbaijan

To understand Turkey's PP in Azerbaijan we have to look first at how the First Karabakh War of 1988-1994 developed. This will provide the context and a contrast with which to evaluate the differences of PP, or the lack thereof in the past, versus the present. Then we will look at the 'Karabakh Interbellum' of 1994-2020 and look at the period until the start of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and the developments and dynamics preceding this war. After that, we will look at the Second Karabakh War in 2020 to see how important the Turkish PP has been in deciding the war's outcome. Finally, we will look at the multidimensional nature of Turkish power projection in Azerbaijan at present and conclude the chapter on Turkish PP in Azerbaijan.

5.3.1 The First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994)

During the reign of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the Caucasus, the Armenians lived under the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Azerbaijanis lived under the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. As the influence of the Soviets began to decline in the region, local Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) wanted independence and passed a resolution in 1988 aiming to join the Republic of Armenia, which was rejected by the Republic of Azerbaijan, leading to the first Karabakh War which lasted from 1988 to 1994 (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], n.d.). Both Armenia and Azerbaijan obtained statehood after the dissolution of the USSR, and in 1994 Russia brokered a deal between the two warring parties, which led to the 'independent' Nagorno Karabakh state, not recognized by the majority of countries in the world, and in practice a vassal state heavily reliant on the state of Armenia (CFR, n.d.). Regular troops of the Armenian army and units that belonged to the former Soviet army supported the ethnic Armenians in NK, Armenian militants were armed with weapons flowing in from cities like Beirut where there were significant Armenian sympathizers, and Azerbaijan thus effectively lost the First Karabakh War (Cornell, 1998). Roughly 20% percent of the territory of Azerbaijan fell into Armenian hands, as more than a million Azeris fled the conflict and their native homes in the NK area (Cornell, 1998). In the international arena, 'Azerbaijan has found itself isolated as Russia, the US, and Iran supported the Armenians, while Turkey has been the only constant supporter of the cause of Azerbaijan, supporting Azerbaijan diplomatically on the world stage, embargoing Armenia together with Azerbaijan, and refusing to normalize relations with the Armenians, yet Turkish support has also been very limited as no promise for military intervention an Azerbaijan's behalf has been made, nor any financial aid with the goal of arms procurement has been made for the cause

of Azerbaijan in NK, thus Turkish support in the first Karabakh War was significantly limited' (Cornell, 1998).

The international community represented in this case by the United Nations, 'delegated its role in peacebuilding to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which did reaffirm the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the Summit of Lisbon in 1996, but as is generally the case, failed to create any enforcement mechanisms making the move more symbolic than practically tangible' (Cornell, 1998). 'While US' policies are influenced heavily by powerful Armenian lobbies in the American political system, much like France in this issue, making the US favor policies supportive of the Armenian cause; the Russians have vertically integrated themselves into the Caucasus states by way of military bases, advisors, and political influence' (Cornell, 1998). 'The Azerbaijanis and Georgians led by nationalist leaders, have historically positioned themselves farther away from Moscow than the Armenians since the dissolution of the USSR', and Russian interests in Azerbaijan can be summarized as the following by Cornell (1998, p.58):

1. 'Preventing Turkey and Iran from establishing themselves as influential powers in the Caucasus through Azerbaijan'

2. 'To establish Russian troops, guarding the borders with Turkey and Iran'

3. 'To establish influence over the decision-making of Azerbaijan's oil and gas, primarily from the Caspian Sea, and to see that these are exported through Russian markets'

The Russians do not like the OSCE 'intruding in their sphere of influence in the Caucasus', as they see themselves as the primary dealmakers in the region (Cornell, 1998, p. 58). Iran counterintuitively, as a Shia Muslim state, did not support the Azerbaijanis, but lent its support to the Armenians because of the fear of Azerbaijani Turkish nationalism spreading to Iran according to Cornell (1998, p.58-59), as 'the Iranians fear a prosperous Azerbaijan in the north, due to possible irredentism among its own Azeri Turkish population living in Iran's north, which nationalist Azerbaijanis call 'Southern Azerbaijan', which is more numerous than Azerbaijan's entire population'.

Other Muslim Turkic states in Central Asia also refrained from openly supporting Azerbaijan 'due to fears of angering Moscow at the time' (Cornell, 1998). Thus, Azerbaijan's only supporter, although limited was Turkey. Turkey was quick to recognize Azerbaijan after the collapse of the USSR, recognizing Azerbaijan on the 9th of November 1991, yet refrained from building too close relations with the secular nationalist and pro-Turkey president of Azerbaijan Abulfez Elçibey, because of 'the fear of angering Russia and Iran' (Cornell, 1998). However, 'Azerbaijan did not officially ask for the intervention of Turkey in the conflict and preferred Turkey to support the Azerbaijani cause on the world stage through its international networks and alliances' (Cornell, 1998). 'Turkey at the onset of the First Karabakh War adopted a stance of neutrality, making diplomatic efforts for deconfliction and peacebuilding by reaching out to their Western counterparts, yet as fighting intensified particularly after the Khojaly massacre by Armenians in February 1992, which led to Turkish public anger, Turkey started to adopt a more pro-Azerbaijani stance during the conflict' (Cornell, 1998). Domestic pressure on Ankara to intervene in the conflict on Azerbaijan's behalf was very strong at the time, making any

neutrality unsustainable in the long run, and as Armenian advances continued this pressure only increased as political leaders like Alparslan Türkeş of the nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) 'argued for military intervention in the war', and the Democratic Left leader of the Demokratik Sol Partisi (DSP) Bülent Ecevit criticized the government 'as inaction by Turkey would undermine Turkish prestige in the Caucasus and Central Asia', while the main opposition party, Motherland Party's leader Mesut Yılmaz (Anavatan Partisi) 'called for troop deployment along the Armenian border and in the autonomous region of Nakhchivan' (Cornell, 1998). Concrete support for Azerbaijan by the Turks came in the form of 'inspecting airplanes headed for Armenia through Turkish airspace', 'effectively imposing an arms embargo on Armenia', and 'refusing to let aid to Armenia pass through Turkey in the form of an economic embargo' (Cornell, 1998). Armenia did not recognize the borders of Turkey, keeping 'potential territorial claims on the wider Kars region of Turkey' (Cornell, 1998). However, the pro-Turkish Elçibey was ousted in a coup, bringing current president Ilham Aliyev's father Haydar Aliyev, a former leader of the country during the Soviet era to power, 'making many question the influence of Turkey in Azerbaijan, as many observed this development as the restoration of Russian influence in the country' (Cornell, 1998). Aliyev however 'did not turn out to be as pro-Russian as many thought, denying the presence of Russian troops in Azerbaijan, while annulling many agreements the former Elçibey administration made with Turkey, and expelling a significant number of 1600 Turkish military experts from the country', harming Turkey's confidence in himself in the process (Cornell, 1998).

Cornell recognizes five main constraining factors for Turkey's involvement in the First Karabakh War on the side of Azerbaijan (Cornell, 1998, p. 63-66):

1. 'The doctrine of Kemalism's 'Peace at Home, Peace Abroad' in Turkish foreign policy actively promotes non-interference in terms of military power projection, and any other form of adventurism, with the possible exceptions of Cyprus and Mosul, while this does not in practice refrain Turkey from posturing by moving troops to the border with Armenia and creating deterrence'

2. 'The Western Alliance's influence and pressure on Turkey actively made the Turks refrain from adopting a more assertive stance in the conflict, with many believing that Turkish involvement would only escalate the situation even more, particularly risking confrontation with Russia and Iran in the process. Turkey's NATO membership actively inhibited Turkey's degree of assertiveness and any form of adventurism, leading to Turkey not being able to diverge from the official NATO stance in the conflict, strengthened by A) the presence of American arms procurement to Turkey in the face of the PKK insurgency, and the risk of the Americans cutting military aid, thus facing an American arms embargo, and B) the risk of Turkey's EU membership application being harmed, keeping in mind the negotiations for a Customs Union with the European bloc at the time. A more neutral Turkey would mean a stabilizing Turkey in the region in the eyes of the Western Alliance.'

3. 'The fear of harming the relationship with Russia, including the military strength of Russia being a deterrent factor, as well as the business relationships between the private sectors of the Turks and Russians, as Turkish firms have established strong footholds in the emerging Russian market in sectors like construction, and as the Turkish-Russian bilateral trade is significantly higher than the entirety of trade with all Caucasus states. Also,

the prospect of possible procurement from Russia in terms of arms, given Western reluctance to support Turkish anti-insurgency measures in the country's Kurdish southeast, was an important factor.'

4. 'The legacy of the alleged genocide of Armenians during WW1 in the Ottoman Empire also constrains Ankara from taking specific courses of action as powerful Armenian lobby groups in the US push for recognition of the alleged genocide. In 1991 Armenia did not recognize the borders with Turkey, drawn in the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1921, effectively hindering the further development of relations between the Armenians and Turks. Any hostile courses of action towards the Armenians would be amplified by the Armenian diaspora, showing the Turks as aggressors to the international community. Hence Ankara has consistently tried not to appear aggressive towards Armenia in the face of such dynamics.'

5. 'The international reaction that Ankara saw after its operation in Cyprus in 1974 effectively inhibited Turkish officials from rushing to project power on the side of Azerbaijan. After the Cyprus conflict, Turkey was subject to arms embargoes from its Western allies and faced severe scrutiny in all political realms.'

The Azerbaijanis both felt 'betrayed' as well as 'understood' the constraints that Turkey faced, leading Turkey to lose prestige in Azerbaijan's private and public realms (Cornell, 1998). Faced with these constraints, Turkey's options in hard PP were very limited at the time, yet it did effectively project soft power into the Caucasus and the Central Asian Turkic states, as student scholarships take place between those countries and Turkey, and Turkish mass media is expanding and

thriving in these countries, proving clear examples of Turkey's willingness to 'expand cultural, scientific, and economic relations with the Turkic states' (Cornell, 1998). According to Cornell, this soft PP has the potential to unlock warmer ties between Turkey and the Turkic states, and the 'setback in Karabakh is only a piece of the puzzle' (Cornell, 1998). Cornell's accurate prognosis in 1998 has held at present by any metric (Cornell, 1998, p. 68):

> Especially if a wider time perspective is applied, it seems clear that this episode will be recalled as an early failure of Turkey to exert a distinct political influence in the Caucasus, but not as a hindrance to further relations, nor even to Turkey's future influence in the area.

Turkey 'realized the limits to its power with the constraints emanating from multiple factors and its relationships with the West, Russia, and Iran, preventing its independent policies towards Armenia and Azerbaijan during the First Karabakh War' (Cornell, 1998). Turkey thus did not show its assertiveness in the Caucasus region at the time, limited by the constraints, and lost prestige among the supporters of Azerbaijan, yet remains the link between these Caucasus countries and the West (Cornell, 1998).

Turkey's position at the time was clearly different, its willingness and capacity for PP was far less, and given the constraints at the time, Turkey opted for a more hands-off approach to the First Karabakh War despite overwhelming political pressure domestically. Its relationship with the Western Alliance was more important at the time, as it sought to not diverge from the official NATO standpoint. Turkish officials were also less willing to take risks despite pressure from opposition parties. Also, a particularly important factor for Turkey's hesitation to assertively project power was its reliance on the procurement of arms from its Western alliance partners, and the US in particular. The arms embargo after the Turkish Cyprus

Operation in 1974 (codename: "Operation Atilla" (Cumhuriyet, 2022)) by the West effectively made Turkish officials nervous about possible arms embargoes in the case of Turkish active support on the side of Azerbaijan.

5.3.2 The Karabakh interbellum (1994-2020)

More than a million Azerbaijanis and Armenians fled their homes after the First Karabakh War. The territories over which they clashed are internationally recognized by UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884, adopted in 1993, and they affirm Azerbaijan's legitimacy to rule over the contested territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and call for the withdrawal of Armenian troops (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). The wounds from the First Karabakh War installed a victim psyche in the national Azerbaijani psychology, and symbolic cities like Shusha, the cultural heart of Azerbaijan, were lost during the First Karabakh War (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). Yavuz & Huseynov (2020) also mention that Armenia was 'emboldened by its victory in the First Karabakh War and that it thus was unresponsive to peace negotiations, and diplomacy was used to freeze the status quo of consolidating the areas it had occupied while hoping that it would lead to international recognition of its occupation over time' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). 'The Armenian leadership also changed over time naturally, and figures like Ter-Petrossian, the first president of Armenia until 1998, were more susceptible to dialogue and open to establishing relations with Turkey, as he saw the unsustainability of the situation, yet he lost to Robert Kocharyan in 1998, who was a more hardline nationalist than his predecessor, effectively diminishing the potential for peacebuilding through diplomacy' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020).

From the end of the First Karabakh War in 1994 to the start of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, the conflict remained largely frozen when we look at the casualties that warm conflicts produce, yet the period can best be described as a period of low-intensity intermittent fighting. From 2015 to 2020, excluding a brief period of high-intensity border clashes between the 2nd and 11th of April 2016, a total of 180 military personnel, and 10 civilians were killed, whereas 58 military personnel and 12 civilians were wounded over this period of 5 years (International Crisis Group, 2023a). A total of 292 counts of incidents took place during this period, while both sides 'built up their arsenals' in the lead-up to the Second Karabakh War, with the procurement of 'attack helicopters, fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank artillery systems, and long-range mortars' (International Crisis Group, 2023a). Both sides deployed special operations forces who regularly crossed the front lines, and both sides also used kamikaze drones and surveillance drones since at least April 2016 according to International Crisis Group (2023a), which cross-checks open-source data with official government data. In 2016 there was a brief period of high-intensity conflict when clashes began on the 2nd of April morning along the frontlines which lasted until the 11th of April as Russia intervened by brokering a ceasefire on the 5th of April after which 'flare-ups' continued; this brief period of high-intensity conflict led to the estimated deaths of hundreds of people (International Crisis Group, 2023a).

An interactive timeline is available on the International Crisis Group website which shows the chronological developments from 2015 to the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and a number of them will be mentioned below to give the reader a sense of what low-intensity inter-state conflict is like until war erupts, and the level

of multilateral involvement in trying to keep the conflict from escalating

(International Crisis Group, 2023a):

- 15 January 2015. 'President of Azerbaijan Aliyev mentions on an official visit to Turkey that Nagorno Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory'
- 26 January 2015. 'Armenian president Sargsyan warns of preemptive strikes if they see a 'threatening accumulation of forces along the Line of Contact'
- 27 January – 5 February 2015. 'OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs voice serious concern about incursions'
- 4 February 2015. 'Russian secretary-general of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) Bordyuzha expresses deep concern regarding recent clashes
- 16 February 2015. 'Sargsyan recalls protocols with Turkey that aimed at normalizing relations between the two states'
- 2 July 2015. 'Russia grants arms deal worth $200 million to Armenia for procurement of Russian weapons'
- 13 September 2015. 'De facto Nagorno-Karabakh holds local elections with 56% turnout, and the ruling Free Homeland Party wins a quarter of the seats. Azerbaijan condemns the elections'
- 18 February 2016. 'Armenia plans to switch defense doctrines from 'Static Defense' to 'Active Deterrence' in NK according to deputy defense minister of Armenia, Davit Tonoyan'
- 2-5 April 2016. 'Four days of fighting kills hundreds'
- 2 April 2016. 'Aliyev says he will not negotiate on territorial integrity'
- 2 April 2016. 'Co-Chairs of the OSCE urge all sides to stop shooting'
- 3 April 2016. 'Aliyev declares victory and unilateral ceasefire having won some ground, Sargsyan calls on foreign powers to urge Azerbaijan to return to the 1994 truce'
- 4 April 2016. 'Sargsyan threatens to recognize NK officially. He accuses Turkey of inciting 'great war in the region by supporting Azerbaijan's adventurism'
- 5 April 2016. 'Putin and the OSCE Minsk Group voice deep concern over the clashes and call for ceasefire'
- 7-8 April 2016. 'Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Yerevan and Baku'
- 15 April 2016. 'Yerevan Hosts CSTO meeting'
- 22 April 2016. 'Sargsyan tells Lavrov talks have failed'
- 20 June 2016. 'Putin hosts Aliyev and Sargsyan for talks'
- 21 September 2016. 'Armenia parades advanced missile systems. These are the Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems (SRBM), 9K58 Smerch 300 mm multiple-rocket launcher systems (MRLS), and Buk surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems'
- 7 October 2016. 'Aliyev claims growing international support'
- 29 October 2016. 'Armenian Defense Minister Vigen Sargsyan introduces new 'nation-army' ideology'
- 3-10 December 2016. 'Aliyev and Sargsyan visit front lines'
- 20 February 2017. 'Armenian President Sargsyan questions peace talks, calls for stronger army'

- 8-14 March 2017. 'French President Hollande hosts Armenian and Azerbaijan presidents'
- 19 July 2017. 'NK re-elects de facto president Bako Sahakyan'
- 12 October 2017. 'Russia extends Armenia a $100 million loan to procure Russian arms'
- 31 October 2017. 'Turkish President Erdoğan calls for Armenia to end its NK occupation on a visit to Baku, calls it an 'open wound for Turkey'
- 8 November 2017. 'Protests break out in Armenia because of the new mandatory army service'
- 16 December 2017. 'Armenia criticizes Turkish comments on NK and for siding with Azerbaijan'
- 8 February 2018. 'Aliyev claims Yerevan 'Azerbaijan's historical land'
- 14 March 2018. 'De facto NK leader Sahakyan visits Washington'
- 11 April 2018. 'Aliyev wins fourth presidential term'
- April-May 2018. 'Velvet Revolution topples President Sargsyan, protests led by MP (member of parliament) Nikol Pashinyan make him the natural candidate to become Prime Minister'
- 8 May 2018. 'Pashinyan is elected the new Prime Minister'
- 9 May 2018. 'After the election Pashinyan travels to NK'
- 14 May 2018. 'Pashinyan meets Putin in Sochi'
- 27 May 2018. 'Pashinyan's son deployed to NK for mandatory military service'
- 11 June 2018. 'Azerbaijan displays long-range missiles it acquired from Belarus and Israel with more than 300 km ranges'
- 26 June 2018. 'Azerbaijan claims control over new territory in Nakhchivan'
- 16 September 2018. 'Aliyev's son is drafted into the army'
- 27 September 2018. 'Putin visits Baku'
- 2 November 2018. 'Lavrov against including NK in peace talks'
- 27 December 2018. 'Pashinyan meets Putin'
- 11 January 2019. 'Aliyev opposes NK participation in peace talks'
- 27 February 2019. 'Pashinyan says Azerbaijan must be first to compromise'
- 29 March 2019. 'Pashinyan and Aliyev hold first official talks in Vienna'
- 11 April 2019. 'Pashinyan urges more contacts to ready people for 'peace, not war'
- 27 May 2019. 'OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs tour the region'
- 20 June 2019. 'Foreign Ministers (FM) of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet in Washington to discuss security measures agreed in April'
- 28 June 2019. 'Armenia and Azerbaijan swap one prisoner each'
- 5 August 2019. 'Pashinyan claims NK (Armenian term: Artsakh) is Armenia'
- 17 August 2019. 'Armenia and Russia agree to deepen military cooperation'
- 6 September 2019. 'NK holds local elections with 65% turnout'
- 17 September 2019. 'Azerbaijan says it does not seek to join the Russian-led CSTO'
- 1 October 2019. 'Putin visits Yerevan for Eurasian Economic Council'
- 2 October 2019. 'Lavrov condemns Pashinyan's comments that NK is part of Armenia'
- 3 October 2019. 'Aliyev claims NK is part of Azerbaijan'

- 4 December 2019. 'Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers talk as part of OSCE meetings'
- 12 December 2019. 'US Senate recognizes Armenian genocide'
- 27 December 2019. 'Armenia receives SU-30SM fighter jets from Russia'
- 24 February 2020. 'Harutyunyan becomes new NK Defense Minister'
- 2 March 2020. 'Armenia buys military radars from India for $40 million'
- 19 March 2020. 'US ends funding for demining the NK area'
- 21 May 2020. 'Harutyunyan becomes new NK de facto president'
- 12-16 July 2020. '18 people are killed in new clashes along the Line of Contact. The OSCE Minsk Group, the UN Secretary-General, the US, Russia, and the EU call for restraint on both sides. Turkey declares its full support to Azerbaijan. Putin calls Erdoğan to discuss stabilization efforts'
- 13-26 July 2020. 'Border feud spills over to foreign cities as diaspora members of both sides clash with each other'
- 29 July – 10 August 2020. 'Turkey and Azerbaijan launch largest ever joint military drills, while Pashinyan accuses Ankara of heightening tensions'
- 13-25 August 2020. 'Turkey and Russia compete to provide military offers to Azerbaijan'
- 21 August 2020. 'Lavrov blames Armenia for the clashes, as Armenia moved its military positions close to major oil and gas pipelines'
- 27 September 2020. 'Fighting has started as Armenia and Azerbaijan both mobilize troops, and dozens are killed on both sides, the Second Karabakh War has started'
- 10-25 October 2020. 'Three failed ceasefire attempts, facilitated by Russia, France, and the US'
- 9 November 2020. 'Sides declare ceasefire after six weeks of war through a Russian-mediated ceasefire, the Armenian troops are supposed to withdraw from all territories adjacent to NK, a monitoring center will be opened, displaced people will be allowed to return to their homes, prisoner exchanges will be held, and communication lines will be opened between both sides'
- 10 December 2020. 'Azerbaijan holds a victory parade, displaying weapons and drones used in the war, along with captured Armenian arms and destroyed Armenian equipment. Azerbaijani and Turkish soldiers march together while both Erdoğan and Aliyev attend the parade. Erdoğan declares Turkey is ready to open borders with Armenia if it takes positive steps towards Turkey.'

What becomes evident when we look at the timeline over the last five years preceding the Second Karabakh War is the multilateral diplomacy aimed at facilitating talks to stabilize and deconflict the low-intensity conflict along the Line of Contact. We see international actors like the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, Turkey, France, Germany, and the US making efforts to foster diplomacy to facilitate a possible solution to the conflict. The Russians provide Armenia with military support

continuously while making clear efforts to not estrange Azerbaijan with statements condemning Armenian provocative actions at times. The Russians aim to protect a measure of equidistance to both sides in the conflict while Turkey stands firmer on the side of Azerbaijan than it did decades ago during the First Karabakh War. We see that the diplomatic initiatives led by international actors like the OSCE Minsk Group fail to achieve the prevention of war.

5.3.3 The Second Karabakh War (2020)

On the 27th of September 2020, war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Troops are mobilized on both sides and dozens are killed. Many did not expect war to break out between both sides as the conflict was a low-intensity conflict for thirty years with a few notable exceptions that did not last for more than a few days. The Second Karabakh War lasted for 44 days from the 27th of September to the 9th of November 2020 (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020), and resulted in at least 5000 soldiers officially killed in total on both sides, with 143 civilians killed, thousands of wounded, and tens of thousands displaced (BBC News, 2020). The result of the war was an Azerbaijani victory, as they reclaimed much of the NK area. Azerbaijan's objectives were the protection of its territorial integrity and the liberation of its internationally recognized territories in NK from Armenian occupation, while Armenia's objective was the protection of the 'self-determination of the Armenians of NK' (BBC News, 2020). The Armenians had erected a network of defenses in the mountainous area of NK with Soviet-style military thinking, including tunnel networks, minefields, and air defenses to prevent an Azerbaijani 'blitz offensive' (Kasapoglu, 2021). The Armenians also had some significant weapons systems like the SS-26 Iskander, Scud-B, and Tochka ballistic missiles, and the S-300 missile

defense systems which gave them an effective 'intra-war deterrence'; this means the 'deterrence of controlling escalatory patterns within an ongoing conflict' (Kasapoglu, 2021). The Armenians used some of these missile systems on populated areas, like the ballistic missile strikes on Ganja, and the Human Rights Watch has found 11 incidents of missile strikes by the Armenians on civilian areas, with other strikes in Aghdam, Barda, Fizuli, Ganja, Goranboy, Naftalan, and Tartar, for a total of 18 strikes, killing 40 civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2020). As the Armenians were outfought technologically, they resorted to these ballistic missile strikes on civilian areas as a form of intra-war deterrence (Kasapoglu, 2021).

The outbreak of the Second Karabakh War was effectively the natural response to the First Karabakh War's realities on the ground, and Armenia underestimated the Azerbaijani willingness and capacity to wage war. Yavuz & Huseynov (2020, p. 106) argue that there were four major factors responsible for the outbreak of war:

1. 'The failure of the OSCE Minsk Group to effectively solve the conflict through diplomacy'
2. 'The aggressive rhetoric of Prime Minister Pashinyan who claimed that NK is part of Armenia'
3. 'The July 2020 fighting that resulted in the death of an Azerbaijani general'
4. 'Pressure from Azerbaijanis towards their government to restore territorial integrity'

'The Armenians also overestimated Russian willingness to protect the status quo of the occupied regions against Azerbaijan, while the Russians effectively 'hedged'

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their bets in the face of a strengthening Azerbaijan and Turkey' (Yavuz & Huseynov,

2020). Yavuz & Huseynov (2020) argue that the alliance of Russia and Armenia

within the CSTO, the dependence of Armenia in economic terms on the Russians,

and the presence of Russian military bases inside Armenia's borders further

complicate the conflict's multidimensional dynamics. 'While Azerbaijan spent $24

billion on arms procurement between the years 2008 and 2018, Armenia spent a

mere $4 billion, while both states procured arms from the Russians' (Yavuz &

Huseynov, 2020). Azerbaijan also effectively used Israeli weapon systems it had

procured, including many drone types like loitering munitions, as it was the largest

source of arms procurement for Azerbaijan in the 2016-2020 period, surpassing the

Russians in 2016, with Turkey coming in third place (Göksedef, 2020). Armenia had

lost more than four thousand men until the ceasefire was signed in November

(Outzen, 2021). Pashinyan came to power with the promise of strengthening ties with

the West but also has been 'guilty of irredentism, as he for example in August 2020

proclaimed The Treaty of Sevres as a historical fact, not recognizing the Treaty of

Lausanne which established Turkey's territorial borders, angering Turkey in turn'

(Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). Pashinyan aggravated the situation in 2019 by visiting

Shusha, the cultural heart of Azerbaijan, and proclaiming it is part of Armenia

(Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). 'Turkey recognized that a peaceful solution would not

be possible, and stood firmly on the side of Azerbaijan, while it was worried that

inaction against Armenian aggression over the border clashes would stir up political

chaos inside Azerbaijan as public sentiment and opposition parties put pressure on

the government led by Ilham Aliyev' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). Yavuz &

Huseynov (2020) argue that Turkey did not instigate the conflict, yet exposed the

OSCE Minsk Group failures and Armenian aggression, and proclaimed anything that

Azerbaijan would need would be provided, fully backing the Azerbaijanis, which resonated both within Turkey and Azerbaijan's domestic audiences. President Erdoğan has always criticized the rather weak behavior of Turkey during the First Karabakh War, and this sense of guilt has been very strong among Turkey's political elites as well as the public, adding to Turkey's change in behavior which can be explained with many factors according to Yavuz & Huseynov (2020, p. 108-109):

1.　　Ethnic kinship between Turkey and Azerbaijan

2.　　Azerbaijan's cause for restoring its territorial integrity

3.　　The Turkish feeling that Armenia is using Western and Russian support to maximize its irredentist demands

4.　　The economic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the delivery of Azerbaijani oil and gas to Turkey, including its pipelines running through Turkey

5.　　Turkey's nationalist coalition and increasing nationalism among the public

6.　　Armenia's insistence on the claim of genocide in 1915 and the Armenian lobbies using this in Western political circles as an extension

Azerbaijan has kept Russia close, due to its 'imperial ambitions' in the Caucasus, yet Azerbaijan also has diversified its arms procurement sources, as it increasingly has bought arms from Israel and Turkey alongside Russian arms procurement (Göksedef, 2020). 'The Russians in turn have used the NK region to keep Armenia firmly under its influence, while simultaneously aiming to do the same with Azerbaijan, which leads us to conclude that an unresolved conflict in NK is instrumental for Russian influence in the region' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). 'Turkish and Russian rivalry is

historically rooted in the region, and Turkey is 'the guarantor of two autonomous regions in the Caucasus: Ajaria in Georgia, and Nakhchivan in Azerbaijan' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). Yavuz & Huseynov (2020) claim that Armenia is supported by Russia and Iran, whereas Azerbaijan is supported by Turkey, Israel, Great Britain, and Hungary. 'Pashinyan has also tried to mobilize the Armenian diaspora, and many Armenians have traveled from countries like the US, Canada, France, and Lebanon to fight on the frontlines, using the claims of genocide in 1915 to this effect' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020).

'The ceasefire signed on the 9th of November 2020 serves to further Russian interests, as Russian peacekeepers are deployed on the ground, while a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center has been established' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). 'As the ceasefire was signed, Azerbaijanis celebrated their victory over Armenia, and the recovery of 30% of the NK area, while Armenians protested against Pashinyan for leading them to a military defeat' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020). 'Armenia lost thousands of men, equipment, and national confidence in their abilities to wage war against Azerbaijan' (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020).

5.3.4 Turkish power projection in Azerbaijan

Turkey was an important winner of the Second Karabakh War, but its power projection in Azerbaijan goes back decades. Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the bilateral relationship has had its fluctuations over the last decades, the last years have seen an increasingly warm and arguably accelerating momentum of warming ties, and these have been political/diplomatic, military, and economic in nature. The Second Karabakh War has shown to both sides just how effective Turkey's PP is, and this

military victory has only boosted already accelerating and warming ties. Hence, Turkey's PP is multidimensional in Azerbaijan.

Firstly, Turkey consistently supported Azerbaijan diplomatically and politically since its birth. Militarily and economically many agreements have been signed between both sides. In recent history, Turkey signed a strategic agreement in 2010 with Azerbaijan, called the 'Strategic Partnership and Mutual Help Agreement' (Göksedef, 2020), and 'maintains hundreds of military advisors in bases located in Baku and Nakhchivan, and air bases like Gabala, Dollyar, and Yevlach (Outzen, 2021). 'This strategic agreement paved the way for further integration between the TAF and the Azerbaijani army and established mutual defense in the face of aggression, mutual procurement through domestic defense industries, joint military exercises, the education of military cadres, and the provision of logistics support to the armed forces' (Göksedef, 2020). Only a month later, in September 2010, the establishment of the 'High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council' between Turkey and Azerbaijan was announced (Göksedef, 2020). After the Second Karabakh War, the Shusha Declaration was signed on 15 June 2021, and ratified in February 2022; the Shusha Declaration raises the bilateral defense relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan to the level of alliance and states clearly that in case of foreign aggression, both sides will rush to the defense of the other (Daily Sabah, 2022), much like the famous article 5 of NATO. Another diplomatic and political result of the war was the acceleration of activities and increase in the prestige of the 'Turkic Council', recently renamed the 'Organization of Turkic States' (OTS), an umbrella organization for the Turkic states including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan as member states, and Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Northern Cyprus as observer states (Organization of Turkic States, 2024). Turkey's

successful military aid to Azerbaijan during the war caught the eyes of the other Turkic states as well, and with this increase in prestige, multilateral frameworks like the OTS have gained significance, and become effective mechanisms through which Turkey projects power. As a result, Turkish military sales have increased as well. Other states of the OTS have procured Turkish drones, with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan wielding the famous Bayraktar TB2, and Kazakhstan is a prospective buyer of the drone (International Crisis Group, 2023b), while Kyrgyzstan has procured 4 different Turkish drones, including the Bayraktar TB2 (Baykar Tech.), Akıncı (Baykar Tech.), Anka (TAI), and Aksungur (TAI) (Daily Sabah, 2023, January 17).

Secondly, Azerbaijani forces were trained by the TAF for decades, as entire military cadres of Azerbaijan traveled to Turkey for military training, making the Azerbaijani army highly prepared to wage war as the TAF is one of the most operationally experienced armies in the world due to its involvement in many fronts of counterinsurgency. A Turkish Colonel-General by the name of Bahtiyar Ersay, the head of the 'Special Command Group of the TAF in Azerbaijan' was even appointed as an advisor to the Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Zakir Hasanov (Caucasus Watch, 2022). Turkey aims to raise the Azerbaijani army to NATO standards and integrate the Azerbaijani army with the TAF to a degree. Azerbaijan's President Aliyev even said that his intention is 'to reshape the Azerbaijani army based on the Turkish model' (Shahbaz, 2022). Azerbaijan has since made plans to grow the military with new units, set up a new 'National Defense University', and increase the number of special forces units; all of these reforms are based on the 'Turkish Model' (Shahbaz, 2022). The high performance of Azerbaijani soldiers who were trained in Turkey, the TAF record of successful operations in Syria and Libya, and the

excellent performance of Azerbaijani special forces units (who were trained in Turkey as well) in the Second Karabakh War, are contributing factors to the Azerbaijani decision to reshape their army based on the Turkish model (Veliev, 2022). 'In August 2021, the Turkish YAŞ decisions (Yüksek Askeri Şura), or 'High Military Council', appointed 4 generals to speed up the transition of Azerbaijan's army to the Turkish Model' (Veliev, 2022). The special forces are at the top of the military reform agenda in Azerbaijan, as it emulates the Turkish 'commando' model, and has significantly increased the number of special forces units available, and these new 'commandos' will serve under the new 'Land Forces Command' which is also drawn from the TAF, and its first commander is Lieutenant General Anvar Afandiyev, who is a graduate of the 'Turkish Military Academy' (Shahbaz, 2022).

Thirdly, the Azerbaijani army used a special war doctrine it received from the TAF, which can be summarized as having highly mobile special operations forces on the ground who penetrate deep into enemy lines, backed by artillery for support, and reconnaissance- and armed drones (UAVs) in the air (Kasapoglu, 2020), which proved to be enormously effective for the Azerbaijanis, and catastrophic for the Armenians whom still resorted to outdated doctrines of the 1990s in establishing static frontlines and the digging in of troops along the Line of Contact. Open-source intelligence analysts who visually confirm the loss of personnel and equipment have compiled lists together with visual evidence of the targets destroyed by the Bayraktar TB2 drone in Nagorno-Karabakh and other countries (Mitzer, Oliemans, Janovsky, Dan, & COIN, 2022). The TB2s proved so valuable, because they effectively destroyed Russian anti-air defense systems like the S-300PS, Buk-M2, Tor-M2, and Pantsir-S1, thought to be the most advanced systems in the world, while evading detection from these systems, and continuing to bombard Armenian lines with smart-

munitions like the MAM-L produced by Turkey's Roketsan, ravaging entire

Armenian armored columns, and infantry groups (Mitzer et al., 2022). The TB2s also

destroyed artillery systems, and Armenian ballistic missile systems which caused

civilian casualties during the war (Mitzer et al., 2022). The TB2s not only destroyed

targets themselves but they were also used for reconnaissance and helped mark

Armenian targets with lasers for destruction by other systems, including loitering

munitions (Hecht, 2022). Countless hours of footage were served during the war,

taken from the TB2s, showing the destruction of numerous Armenian targets by

these drones, and effectively demoralizing the Armenian side while propping up the

morale of the Azerbaijanis. Other weapon systems procured from the Turks are the

'Kaplan' ballistic missiles, 'TRG-300' (Roketsan) guided multiple launch rocket

systems (MLRS), 'T-122' (Roketsan) Sakarya MLRS, and 'Cobra' (Otokar) armored

tactical vehicles (Göksedef, 2020). It is important to note here that Azerbaijan's

performance in the Second Karabakh War was a 'replication' of Turkey's Operation

Spring Shield in northwestern Syria, with drones putting sustained pressure on

enemy lines, leading to a war of attrition according to Kasapoğlu (2021), which can

be summarized as: "The operational art prioritized high tempo, minimal casualty,

integration between land-based fire-support capabilities and drones, as well as

systematic surgical strikes to overwhelm the adversary." (p. 13). This doctrine serves

to show the importance that Turkey has had in Azerbaijan's victory in the Second

Karabakh War.

The fourth pillar of Turkish power projection in Azerbaijan is economic

investments and bilateral trade. In 2020, Turkey was second in rank in both the

exports as well as imports of Azerbaijan, with Turkish investments in Azerbaijan in

the 2002-2020 period being valued at $12 billion, and Azerbaijani investments in

Turkey in the same period being valued at $19.5 billion; while the bilateral trade in 2021 was valued at $5.02 billion, and a total of 470.618 Azerbaijani citizens visited Turkey in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey [MFA], n.d.-a). Turkey also ratified a free-trade agreement with Azerbaijan in February 2020 (Ergöçün, 2021), while Turkey's trade minister Ruhsar Pekcan stated that the 'goal was to reach $15 billion with the agreement, and put forward plans to lower transition quotas, toll fees, and more concerning customs, while strengthening the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail line, and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route' (Daily Sabah, 2021). Azerbaijan also plans to increase natural gas exports to Europe to a total of 11.6 billion cubic meters in 2023, in light of the Ukraine War and the falling Russian gas supply (Reuters, 2022). The European Commission already signed an agreement in July 2022 with Azerbaijan to double the natural gas supply until 2027, much of this gas will be delivered through Turkey with the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (Euronews, 2022), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2019). Turkey has also changed its energy strategy and opted for a diversification of its energy supply as it is dependent on foreign energy for 74% of its energy needs (MFA, n.d.-b), while having geopolitical realities in mind concerning the bilateral relationships with Russia and Iran, in relation to the Syrian War; leading to Turkey diversifying its energy procurement from different sources in its goal to become an energy supply hub, and oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan, and even Turkmenistan, is the natural candidate in this regard (Soylu, 2022b).

Keeping these multi-dimensional dynamics in mind, we see that Turkey's power projection in Azerbaijan includes hard power support in military terms, and soft power support in economic terms, alongside other soft power political and

cultural elements, based on ethnic kinship and diplomatic initiatives like the Organization of Turkic States. Turkey has reformed and continues to reform the Azerbaijani armed forces, and educates their officers, while arming them with the most modern war doctrines, and weapon systems, including armed and unarmed drones, artillery systems, and more. It is only natural that the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationship will continue to deepen in the near future, and that Turkish PP will also deepen as a result. This will have significant consequences for the Caucasus region and the wider Central Asian region, as other states see multidimensional gains in political, military, economic, and cultural terms that Turkish PP opens to them.

5.4 Turkey in Cyprus 1974

Turkish PP in the post-2016 era has important similarities as well as differences with its intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Ever since the Cyprus Intervention in 1974, Turkey did not execute significant hard PP until the post-2016 era. Hence, it is important to compare the two periods of hard PP to draw lessons on the evolution of Turkish PP. The intervention in Cyprus in 1974 is an anomaly in Turkish history as it was an example of unilateral force projection, whereas Turkey traditionally only applies force in multilateral contexts, up until the post-2016 period, and excluding counter-terrorism incursions into northern Iraq. That is why the case of the Turkish intervention in 1974 is a useful example for comparative reflection on the evolution of the Turkish PP over time.

5.4.1 The history leading up to the Cyprus Peace Operation

The Turkish Foreign Ministry states that the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was a consequence of the 'modern Cyprus Question' beginning in 1960 on an island

divided into two ethnic groups: the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots (MFA, n.d.-c). Historically speaking, the peoples living on the island of Cyprus did not 'ethnically mix, nor actively engage in commercial partnerships', and after the independence of Greece in 1821, the idea of 'Enosis', or the unification of the island of Cyprus with the Greek mainland, found stronger support after the transfer of administrative power of the island to British authority in 1878 (MFA, n.d.-c). The 'formal annexation of Cyprus by the British in 1914' only exacerbated this Greek nationalism in Cyprus, and a 'bloody campaign to annex and incorporate the island into Greece started in 1955 with the founding of EOKA motivated by the idea of Enosis' (MFA, n.d.-c). The problem stated is that the Greek Cypriot government is seen internationally as the representative government of the entirety of Cyprus, which denies the agency of the Turkish Cypriots (MFA, n.d.-c). 'In line with the British decolonization efforts around the world, diplomatic initiatives aimed to find a solution for the self-determination of the two ethnic peoples on the island, which resulted in intensive diplomacy between the parties of Greece, Turkey, the UK, Greek-Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots' (MFA, n.d.-c). In 1960, a 'bi-communal republic was formed out of the compromises of aforementioned parties, with a single international identity' (MFA, n.d.-c). Greece, Turkey, and the UK were given guarantorship status, and thus the rights to intervene if necessary (MFA, n.d.-c). Shortly after, 'the Greek Cypriots led by Archbishop Makarios escalated with militia attacks, usurping the rule of law, and civilian massacres against the Turkish Cypriots took place in 1963, 1964, 1967, and 1974' (MFA, n.d.-c). The UN intervened with a peacekeeping force but was effectively powerless (MFA, n.d.-c). Then in 1974, 'Makarios was overthrown by a coup d'état led by mainland Greeks who installed

Sampson as president' which led to the intervention by Turkey as a guarantor on the 20th of July 1974 (MFA, n.d.-c).

Concerning the legality of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, it must be mentioned that it was the result of the failure of diplomacy in Cyprus, and in line with its role and responsibilities as a guarantor state to protect Turkish Cypriots. The military intervention was in accordance with international law: *"Many Western observers agree that Ankara had a strong case under international law for its initial landing of July 20, 1974."* (Camp, 1980, p. 47). However, the 'legality of the intervention becomes a topic of discussion as article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee clearly states that unilateral action is only allowed with the aim of re-establishing the state of affairs as created by the treaty' (Camp, 1980). In reality, according to Camp (1980), while the Turkish reasons for intervention were wholly justified, 'the expulsion of Greek Cypriots from their lands, the arrival of Turkish colonists from the mainland, and further expansion of the Turkish-controlled zones' were not in line with the treaty and the Zurich-London accords that led to the creation of the state of Cyprus in 1960. The unique political situation of Cyprus during this time is interesting, to say the least, as 'the state of Cyprus enjoyed a particularly unique separation of representation in the army and civil and elective offices under the 1960 constitution, with a ratio of 60-40 in the army, and 70-30 in the mentioned offices, along Greek-Turkish lines' (Camp, 1980). In 1963, Makarios attempted to force these Turkish Cypriots out of their offices by proposing thirteen amendments to the constitution, and as these amendments annulled the ethnic requirements that were set in the London and Zurich accords, they were unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community, and fighting broke out between the two sides, starting the circle of violence and polarization that led to the Turkish intervention in 1974 (Hughes-

Wilson, 2011). The Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot demands in Cyprus have been historically more consistent and reasonable according to Camp (1980), while the Greek side has consistently stalled and foiled multiple attempts at reaching a political settlement because of Greek infighting. Following the 15 July Coup in 1974, a 'civil war on the Greek side led to thousands of deaths, while Sampson and EOKA-B were ready to declare Enosis and ethnically cleanse the Turkish Cypriots on the island, supported by thousands of soldiers from the Greek mainland' (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). Nevertheless, the Turkish side is still often seen as the aggressor on the international stage:

> For nearly four decades, tenacious and skillful propaganda has managed to airbrush the Greeks' responsibility for the events of 1974, and the war that followed, out of the history books. The story of Cyprus has been seen only through the distorting prism of the Greeks' tragic chorus. Turkey has been denounced as the aggressor and the sole cause of all Cyprus' woes. (Hughes-Wilson, 2011, p. 85)

Concerning the legality of the Turkish intervention, 'Greek parties like Makarios and the Greek Court of Appeals in Athens, as well as the Assembly of the Council of Europe, proclaimed that the Turkish intervention was both legal according to the treaties as well as a natural response to the coup in terms of cause and effect' (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). The two opposing sides also had opposing solutions to the conflict, with the Greek side desiring a union of Cyprus, while the Turkish side wanted a partition under a federal structure (Camp, 1980).

The Turkish intervention in Cyprus, also called the 'Cyprus Peace Operation', in 1974 is the 'only instance of Turkish unilateral force against another country' (A. Özkan, 2018). The international diplomacy preceding the intervention and Turkey's particular situation within the Cold War dynamics are important to

understand, as the Turks were disappointed with the American stance against Turkish military intervention in 1964. Then-prime minister Ismet Inönü talks to the Americans about the Cyprus Question and Turkish military intervention despite being warned not to go to the Americans, and despite enormous Turkish public and state support for interventionism, gets a clear message from the US in the form of the 'Johnson letter', named after the US president Lyndon B. Johnson, in which it roughly states 'NATO weapons cannot be used for this purpose, and the Americans will not aid the Turks in the face of Soviet aggression' (A. Özkan, 2018). This naturally caused disappointment and disillusionment within the Turkish foreign policy and security cadres, as well as the Turkish public, with the US and NATO, and increased the feeling of the importance of self-reliance, as well as the need for further warming of ties with the Soviet Union, which started through reciprocal diplomatic visits (A. Özkan, 2018). Then after the pro-Greek coup took place in Cyprus on the 15th of July 1974, the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) convened and Ankara started preparing for a military intervention which happened on the 20th of July shortly after, undeterred by American diplomatic initiatives (A. Özkan, 2018). Turkish military plans like 'Atilla' were already prepared and made as far back as 1967 (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). Furthermore, it is important to understand that the realization of Enosis, the joining of Cyprus with mainland Greece, was a continuous national security threat to respective Turkish governments between 1964 and 1974, yet the international dynamics had changed, as in 1964 the Cold War was at a peak of heightened tension between the two superpowers, who were both opposed to Turkish interventionism out of fear of larger escalation, but this was not the case anymore in 1974 (A. Özkan, 2018). The Americans were preoccupied with domestic matters while the Soviet Union lent Turkey its approval for a limited

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intervention (A. Özkan, 2018). The TAF were also deemed to be not ready for a large-scale intervention in 1964 but were already prepared for the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 in doctrinal as well as material terms (A. Özkan, 2018). Correspondence between the US embassy in Ankara and the State Department on the day of the coup in Cyprus on the 15th of July 1974 unveils the Turkish worries that led to the military intervention:

> GOT (government of Turkey) will move strongly, directly, and unitedly to prevent enosis by all means, including use of force, when and if it is convinced enosis is imminent. This is not only nationalist or emotional reaction but part of accepted Turkish grand strategy. The next day, following the MGK meeting, Prime Minister Ecevit declared that it was now "a simple matter for the Greeks to proclaim enosis and thus create a Hellenic island base from which, for the first time, Central and South-eastern Turkey would come within range of the Greek air force bombers. (A. Özkan, 2018, p. 13)

Strategic considerations thus also played a part naturally in Turkey's reasoning for the intervention, as it was detrimental to Ankara to prevent the unification of the island with Greece, which would lead to further Greek military presence close to Turkish territories. Hence, the Turkish 'grand strategy' required the prevention of Enosis by any means necessary as its realization would mean that the Turkish southern flanks would be vulnerable in any Greek-Turkish war.

5.4.2 The Cyprus Peace Operation

As violence in Cyprus erupted following Makarios' proposed amendments to the constitution in 1963, the Turkish government made plans in doctrinal and material terms for the military invasion of the island relying on its role as a guarantor country. In 1963, the Turkish government as well as the public was largely solidified in solidarity for this cause, yet military preparedness was found to be lacking, as well as

the risk of further escalation in Cold War terms made Turkish officials uneasy over an intervention. In 1964, the TAF responded in what is now Erenköy with airstrikes against Greek Cypriot positions to ensure that violence stopped, and in 1967 military plans were drawn like the 'Atilla' plan for the realization of the military intervention if the government deemed it necessary (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). On the 20th of July 1974, 5 days after the pro-Enosis Greek coup in Cyprus, the Turkish intervention named the 'Cyprus Peace Operation' started (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). At first, the military objectives were to create beachheads on the northern shores of Cyprus, where Turkish divisions were to land in the first phase, followed by the second phase where the realization of the 'Atilla' line and the expansion of the military operation would lead to the cutting off of the northern part of the island along that determined line (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). There were naturally problems during the realization of the landings, with the 'first wave including the forces of three landing ships, twenty landing crafts, five destroyers, two gunboats, and three thousand men', these forces were to realize the security of the areas for further landing, as 'the second wave of forces with thirty ships, the rest of the 39th Division, gendarmerie forces, and a commando brigade with artillery' was waiting on the Turkish shores for departure (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). The Greek side had made a contingency plan against a possible Turkish invasion named 'Aphrodite 1973', and they rushed to provide resistance against the Turkish forces, which had secured the beachheads, but were effectively surrounded on all sides, but the Turks achieved total air superiority over the battlefield (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). The Greek side focused on suppressing and defeating the forces of the Turkish Cypriots wherever they were and other opposition against the coup, and as such were lacking in their effectiveness against the Turkish forces due to their dispersion and had also estimated a different Turkish plan of

invasion in which Turkish forces would land more to the east of the island around

Famagusta (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). The TAF also made errors, as parachutists were

dropped directly onto enemy lines, and Turkish airplanes bombarded Turkish

warships on the seas, mistaking them for Greek forces, largely due to

miscommunication and lacking communication equipment (Hughes-Wilson, 2011).

The Turkish forces secured the port of Kyrenia for further reinforcements in three

days, after which on the fourth day Turkish forces rushed to secure the international

airport in Nicosia, which was strengthened by Greek commandos on the night before,

and heavy fighting ensued, after which the UN forces took control over the airport

(Hughes-Wilson, 2011). In the second phase, a four-day ceasefire was brokered by

the UN, after which Turkish forces, including two divisions, an armored brigade, two

hundred tanks, and numerous guns, as well as air superiority rapidly expanded the

military control of the TAF as the Greek forces were unable to resist the advance,

and the Turkish forces secured control over the northern part of the island, leading to

the borders we have today (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). Hughes-Wilson (2011) as the

former Operations Information Officer of the UNFICYP (United Nations

Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) in 1975-1976, attests that the Turkish intervention

did result in a lasting ceasefire and relative peace, which has remained the case for

the last five decades.

5.4.3 Similarities with the post-2016 period

While the Turkish intervention in 1974 was done under an entirely different set of

circumstances, including the Cold War dynamics, and a quite different Turkey in

terms of political, economic, and military dimensions, some aspects remain the same

in Turkish PP. For instance, Turkey's hard PP switches from the passive use of force

to the active use of force decisively when grand strategic considerations deem that a red line is about to be crossed, as seen with the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, and as seen in the Euphrates Shield operation in 2016. While with the former, the rights of Turkish Cypriots, the possibility of Enosis, and the possibility of further Greek military presence that would enable Greek PP to Turkey's central, southern, and eastern flanks were deemed red lines by consecutive Turkish governments; with the latter, the possibility of unification of the YPG cantons along almost the entire Turkish-Syrian border, and thus the strengthening of the YPG, and the PKK in turn, which would increase the risks of terrorist attacks at home, and strengthen the secessionist claims by the PKK camp, were deemed red lines by Ankara. In both instances, drawing on the 'functions of force' (Art, 1980) leads us to conclude that Turkish concerns about its red lines according to grand strategic considerations have led to shifts from 'defense', and thus the 'calculation of minimization of attack potential in the future', and 'deterrence', as a passive use of force, to an active use of force through compellence. Both the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and the Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016 are instances of Turkish compellence through PP in which the desired outcomes were not attainable merely through defense and deterrence. The same applies to the Turkish interventions in Libya and Azerbaijan. One can argue that having power means the ability to realize desired outcomes with minimal or no use of effort or capabilities; with this line of thought, compellence and thus hard power projection become necessary when defense and deterrence are insufficient. A higher degree of power would mean that the active use of force would never be necessary. From this perspective, the Turkish use of PP is reactionary in nature in both periods.

There are other intriguing similarities between both periods of the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and the post-2016 period when we take into account Turkey's international diplomacy, its state of relations with its traditional allies, and its course of advancing 'strategic autonomy'. In both periods, the relationship with its main traditional ally which is the US is deteriorating because of the Turkish disillusionment of US sensitivity to Turkish national security concerns. The Johnson Letter in 1964 led to Turkish disillusionment and distrust with US foreign policy, its role as a mediator, and its role as an arms supplier, and much is the same at present with the US' relationships with the YPG, and FETÖ, and other issues straining the Turkish-American relationship. The Turkish response is to further 'strategic autonomy' (Yeşiltaş, 2020), of which national procurement of arms becomes an important pillar of policy. As mentioned, following the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, the US arms embargo led to the creation of national defense companies, and that period is seen by many as the birth of the modern Turkish defense industry. At present, there is an active US and Western arms embargo against Ankara. In both periods, Ankara seeks warmer ties in response with then the Soviet Union, and at present its successor, the Russian Federation. Turkey's strategic cultures of multidimensionalism and balancing in its FP thus also remain the same in both periods. Turkey is also an active and powerful NATO member in both periods.

Another similarity that is important to mention is the scale of government and public support for effective hard PP during the Cyprus Peace Operation and the Second Karabakh War in Azerbaijan. Much of this high degree of support can be attributed to the factor of ethnic kinship, as in both Cyprus as well as in Azerbaijan, there are ethnically Turkish lives at stake. There is also the historical and psychological factor of the 'Greek' and 'Armenian' enemy image deeply imprinted

in the Turkish psyche because of WW1 and the Turkish War of Independence, which would arguably make the Turkish public more susceptible to support cross-border interventions to protect ethnic kin against 'historical enemies'. For Libya, or Syria, the ethnic kinship connection to justify military intervention can be established through the 'Köroğlu/Kuloğlu' and the Turkmen, respectively, but in both cases, these are Turkish minorities in Arab-majority countries, making the ethnic kinship solidarity connection weaker in Turkish society, particularly when the 'historic enemy' factor is missing.

5.4.4 Differences with the post-2016 period

There are many differences between the period of the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 and the post-2016 era in terms of Turkish PP. Firstly, the execution of the Turkish PP in 1974 was done under a wholly different set of international conditions. The international system is not the same in terms of polarity as the Cold War was a bipolar system, and the current system is often characterized as a unipolar system. Fears of escalation between two polar opposites made Turkish intervention difficult in 1963, more so than in 1974, and while these fears of escalation exist today, they are not similar to the kind of escalation potential as was the case during the Cold War. Much of Turkey's immediate environment where it exerts PP has also changed. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US and NATO's military primacy led to different political and economic landscapes in Turkey's neighborhood.

In terms of differences with the 1974 period, Turkey itself has changed drastically as well. Back in 1974, there was a coalition government at the time, with vastly differing political parties at the helm; while at present there is again a coalition between the ruling AKP and MHP, the current coalition is not ideologically far apart.

Turkey's economic size, as well as its demography and sociological situation, have also changed significantly. As has the political regime, as Turkey switched from a parliamentarian regime, which was the case during the Cyprus Peace Operation, to a presidential regime gradually which culminated with the 2018 national elections. As such, there is a difference in the effectiveness and culture of political decision-making. At present decisions and laws from the presidency are pushed through easily in contrast with the Turkey of 1974. The presidency is also much more active in different domain areas compared to before. The result is that Turkey is seen as declining in terms of democratic standards in comparison to the periods before. Another particular difference is the architecture of the entire armed- and security forces, as the armed forces are now under the direct control of the defense ministry, the gendarmerie under the interior ministry, and the intelligence agency among others have new institutional frameworks that are doctrinally focused on national interests outside of Turkey's borders. The result of these reforms is that executing PP becomes easier in terms of institutional bureaucracy. In comparison, the media landscape is also more monopolized at present, and more under the influence of the government, which in turn helps legitimize and popularize cross-border interventions when necessary.

One of the most striking differences is related to the capabilities of the TAF due to reforms and the decades-long push for strategic autonomy in relation to the defense industry. Investments that started as a reaction to the disillusionment with the US as a trusted arms supplier have borne fruit, as the defense industry has multiplied in size across different measurement criteria, as has its output and levels of innovation. During the Cyprus Peace Operation, deficiencies that hampered the TAF's effectiveness on the battlefield, particularly in communication technologies,

were costly, and as such plans were made in the following periods to reduce foreign dependency and to eliminate these deficiencies. At present, the Turkish defense industry is largely capable of fulfilling domestic orders, and although much remains to be improved, the differences between the periods then and now are very significant. The TAF has improved in terms of executing hard PP as a result. The effectiveness of the intelligence agency MIT both domestically as well as in foreign territories has added to the strength of the TAF when executing hard PP.

Concerning the legality of the executions of Turkish hard PP, it has to be mentioned that the Euphrates Shield Operation in 2016, and the following military operations in Syria, were largely unilateral on the side of Turkey. Whereas, in Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish intervention was done under the legal pretext of Turkish guarantorship. In Libya, as well as in Azerbaijan, the legal pretexts were born out of the invitations of the governments of Libya and Azerbaijan, hence intervention per invitation. Both in Cyprus, as well as in Syria, the ruling governments were hostile to the Turkish interventions. In Libya, the ruling UN-recognized government invited Turkish intervention, and in Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani government welcomed Turkish military support, while the Armenian government naturally did not.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

As we conclude this study on Turkish power projection from 2016 onwards it has become evident that Turkish foreign policy has gone through a major Paradigm Shift in the years 2015-2016, of which we have delved deeply into detail on its drivers, methods, and implications. Turkey's shift to a more assertive foreign policy has its roots in complex dynamics that are not simply positive or negative. A profound understanding requires a broad theoretical framework that explains the evolution of this shift in foreign policy. As we have looked at the immediate past, present, and probable future of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish power projection, it becomes clear that there are dynamics at play that are reactionary in nature. Turkish assertiveness in its foreign policy is a reactionary response to changing geopolitics and the challenges that they produce in Turkey's immediate neighborhood. Hence, the emergence of Turkish power projection is not necessarily a positive development, as its consequences require further study. Such a study should focus primarily on the consequences of executing power projection, as it requires resources, and involves creating a new series of political and diplomatic entanglements. The debate on what power exactly entails is crucial here, as the execution of power in material terms can show both its presence as well as its absence paradoxically. Does a powerful actor need to execute power projection which means that its interests are not fully realized? Or does power projection emanate simply from the capability to do so, of which its presence means being powerful in the first place? These are important philosophical questions one must address before attributing positive or negative conclusions to the use of power projection.

While some drivers can be classified as internal, emanating from within developments in Turkey, like the 15 July Coup attempt and its political consequences, and the evolution of the Turkish defense industry producing instruments for PP, other drivers are more external, emanating from outside Turkey, like the American withdrawal from Iraq, the Russian entrance into Syria, and the American partnership with the YPG. The result is that a broad and complex framework is necessary to tackle the exploration of the causes of a paradigm shift within TFP. The multidimensional set of drivers that are both internal as well as external in nature addresses the question of the causes of the paradigm shift in TFP. What is certain in TFP is the paradigm shift itself in 2015-2016, which started in 2011, but culminated during those critical years.

Understanding these drivers becomes important in this regard. Simply put, the American invasion and subsequent withdrawal from Iraq as a hegemonic power resulted in the collapse of state authority, destroyed the status quo in terms of the Balance of Power between Iraq and Iran, and resulted in a security vacuum that empowered terrorist organizations like the PKK and ISIS. TFP required addressing the security challenges that these organizations produced. After that, the Russian entrance into Syria turned the tide of the SCW and made the Russian military presence on Turkey's southern flank a reality. Turkish recalibration of strategic objectives as part of TFP in Syria was a direct result, and rapprochement with the Russian state became ever more important. In addition, the American partnership with the PKK's Syrian wing, the PYD/YPG, soured the Turkish-American relationship and made rapprochement with the Russians in TFP more important in line with Turkey's goals in Syria. It also led to the strengthening of the PYD/YPG; and hence the PKK in Syria, with the possibility of a 'terror statelet' from the

Turkish perspective, a development that is concerning in terms of Turkish national security. Turkey's internal dynamics rapidly transformed following the 15 July Coup Attempt in 2016, with the birth of the AKP-MHP alliance, the restructuring of the TAF, and the elimination of FETÖ-elements, which led to an increase in assertiveness in political and military terms. The first unilateral military intervention in Syria happened shortly after. Finally, the presence and evolution of the Turkish defense industry provided the instruments for effective hard PP, strengthened existing instruments, and lowered the costs of hard PP by using these instruments.

The emergence of assertiveness and militarization within TFP was a natural result, and hence the emergence of and reliance on Turkish hard PP in TFP, which is a clear distinction from the periods before. Before 2016, the Turkish use of force in international terms only existed in multilateral contexts, except for Cyprus in 1974, and cross-border counterterrorism incursions into Iraq starting in the 1980s. However, since 2016, Turkey has repeatedly used force in unilateral contexts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Azerbaijan, and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is why delving deeply into the cases of Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, in terms of Turkish PP was important for this study. A comparative look at these cases has shed light on Turkish PP in the post-2016 period, especially hard PP. The results are remarkable. In Syria, a series of military interventions and intense diplomacy has resulted in a fragile stalemate in northern Syria, which at present does not satisfy Turkey's objectives of protecting Syrian territorial integrity, eliminating the PYD/YPG, and preventing refugee flows. In Libya, Turkish intervention has resulted in a stalemate as well, with the establishment of a fragile balance of power with Turkish help, and the start of intensive diplomacy for the future of Libya. In Azerbaijan, Turkish support to the offensives in Nagorno-Karabakh proved crucial for an Azerbaijani victory, and

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Azerbaijan retook its claimed territories, following which Armenian-Azerbaijanian diplomacy and dialogue is showing progress towards full normalization and peace for the first time in decades. As was the case in Cyprus in 1974, Turkish hard PP and thus unilateral force have created roughly equal balances of power, which has resulted in military stalemates with the possibility of ultimate peace. From this perspective, Turkish interventions have been relatively successful, although each case should be examined individually, as the Turkish intervention in Azerbaijan has proven to be more successful than its interventions in Syria.

What this means for TFP in the future becomes an important question. As Turkish hard PP has had relative success in creating military stalemates, its dominance within TFP looks to continue, and thus the militarization within TFP looks to continue as well for at least the foreseeable future. The consequences this will have are important to reflect upon. Turkey's hard PP seems to be more reactionary against security challenges in its near abroad. However, as is always the case, the use of force has important consequences for the actor using it. But Turkey's behavior in terms of FP is not only reactionary in nature. Turkey's hard PP can also be understood in terms of its behavior as an autonomy maximizer, where its quest for strategic autonomy requires unilateral actions (Yeşiltaş, 2020). This autonomy-maximizing behavior is a well-documented pattern in Turkish history, and the evolution of the Turkish defense industry, as well as its strategic cultures of multidimensionalism and balancing between powers, all are interlinked to this quest for autonomy. Turkey's hard PP in this light is also a product of the efforts to realize the objectives Turkey has autonomously set itself. Unilateral actions are more often than not born out of autonomy-maximizing considerations. This is why in the future, one must keep an eye on Turkey's relationships with its traditional allies, as this

autonomy-maximizing behavior and the shift from multilateral to unilateral use of force can have consequences for alliance membership. At the worst, it shows that Turkish interests are not satisfied by said alliance membership, and hints at estrangement. This is also well-documented in Turkish history, and the embargoes against the Turkish defense industry after the Cyprus Intervention in 1974, and the embargoes at the present, are important examples of this estrangement due to autonomy maximization. As such, following the future of TFP requires keeping these nuances in mind.

To conclude, it must be said that understanding Turkish power projection requires recognizing that it is dynamic more than static, and the complexities around its reactionary and autonomy-maximizing nature require further study. What the Fidan era will mean for TFP is now the important question, but what is certain is that power projection will remain a pillar of Turkish influence in its near abroad. As we have looked at the drivers, methods, and implications of the paradigm shift of 2015-2016 and the emergence of Turkey's hard power projection, what has become certain is that understanding the strategic choices within TFP requires the knowledge that it transcends and thus cannot be minimized down to a simplistic positive or negative lens. Turkish assertiveness in foreign policy in the post-2016 period is a behavioral change that requires understanding its reactionary and autonomy-maximizing nature in the face of strong internal and external geopolitical challenges. This study has combined the past, present, and possible future of TFP by looking at the drivers of the paradigm shift in TFP in 2015-2016, and the execution of Turkish hard power in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan as a result, I hope that this study will serve not only the academic discourse but also future policymakers well in order to better understand

the complexities of Turkish foreign policy in the face of future challenges, and serve

as an example of the adaptability of nations in a constantly changing world.

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