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ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

THE REPRESENTATION OF TRUMP'S PROPOSAL FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IN NEW YORK TIMES NEWSPAPER: A CORPUS-BASED ANALYSIS

MASTER'S THESIS

Mohammed R. MATAR

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ONAY FORMU

DECLARATION

I hereby declare with the respect that the study "The Representations of Trump's Proposal for the Middle East in New York Times Newspaper: A Corpus-Based Analysis" which I submitted as a Master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and that the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (28/07/2021)

<div align="right">Mohammed R. MATAR</div>

FOREWORD

First, I would like to express my endless gratitude to God for being who I am right now and helping me to find patience, strength within myself to complete this thesis.

I would also like to thank my family not only for encouraging me to go abroad for a master's degree but also for teaching me how to chase my dreams and never give up.

I feel very fortunate to have Dr. Akbar RAHİMİ ALISHAH as my supervisor and want to express my appreciation for guiding me within the whole research process in a patient and effective manner.

Prof. Dr. Türkay BULUT is not only professional in her field, but a person with a great heart that keeps encouraging me.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the important contribution of Istanbul Aydin University to my life, not only in the academic perspective but also in helping me to meet great and diverse people who inspired, supported and motivated me.

July, 2021   Mohammed R. MATAR

THE REPRESENTATION OF TRUMP'S PROPOSAL FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IN NEW YORK TIMES NEWSPAPER: A CORPUS-BASED ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT

This research proposal is an attempt to examine the ways that the influential U.S. newspaper, the *New York Times*, utilizes to present Donald Trump's Deal which is proposed to the Middle East. Trump's deal is a plan suggested by Trump's administration, particularly to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A text corpus is gathered from selected news reports published over the time span of 2019-2020 on the *New York Times* online website. The methodological framework used for this study is based on Norman Fairclough's Model of Critical Discourse Analysis. This approach has three analytical dimensions: (i) lexical analysis, (ii) discursive interpretation of processes/ interaction, and (iii) socio-cultural practice. Texts are analyzed for their representational strategies. Then, explanations of such lexical choices are presented gradually. Finally, the sociocultural analysis focuses on the context of production and reproduction of dominance and opinion.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Fairclough's Model, Trump's Proposal, Ideology.

NEW YORK TIMES GAZETESİ'NDE TRUMP'IN ORTADOĞU ÖNERİSİNİN TEMSİLLERİ: DERLEM TABANLI ANALİZİ

ÖZET

Bu araştırma, ABD'nin etkili gazetesi New York Times'ın Ortadoğu'ya önerilen Donald Trump'ın Anlaşmasını sunmak için kullandığı yolları incelemeye yönelik bir girişimi ortaya sunar. Trump'ın anlaşması, Trump yönetiminin özellikle Filistin-İsrail ihtilafını çözmek için önerdiği bir planıdır. 2019-2020 zaman aralığında New York Times çevrimiçi web sitesinde yayınlanan seçilmiş haber raporlarından bir metin bütünü derlenip toplanmıştır. Bu çalışma için kullanılan metodolojik çerçeve, Norman Fairclough'un Eleştirel Söylem Analizi Modeline dayanmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımın üç analitik boyutu vardır: (i) sözcüksel analiz, (ii) süreçlerin/etkileşimin söylemsel yorumu ve (iii) sosyo-kültürel pratiktir. Metinler anlatımsal (temsil) stratejileri açısından analiz edilmiştir. Daha sonra bu tür sözcük seçimlerinin açıklamaları aşamalı olarak sunulmuştur. Son olarak, sosyokültürel analiz, tahakküm ve kanaatin üretimi ile yeniden üretimi bağlamına odaklanır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel Söylem Analizi (CDA), Fairclough'un Modeli, Trump'ın Önerisi, İdeoloji.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AJE	: Al Jazeera English
BBCWN	: The British Broadcasting Corporation World News
CDA	: Critical Discourse Analysis
CD	: Critical Discourse
CDS	: Critical Discourse Studies
DRA	: Dialectical-Relational Approach
DHA	: Discourse-Historical Approach.
NYT	: New York Times
SFL	: Systematic Functional Linguistics
SCA	: Socio-Cognitive Approach
UN	: United Nations
UK	: United Kingdom

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I.   INTRODUCTION:

In a very mediated world, media occupies an influential position in agenda-setting, opinion-shaping, power-producing, and culture-reproducing. Media has a very strong influence on our perception of reality since media is not a neutral source of information and this impacts the perception of the reader (Littlefield, 2008). Collins (1991) and Schiller (1973) indicate that media can shape our beliefs and attitudes of readers positively or negatively, which in turn affect their behavior patterns. In a similar vein, Ndiayea and Ndiayea (2014) opines that mass media has the power to modify individual perception, social life and national culture. This is why, it is necessary to be aware of the strategies utilized by the media industry. Media now is more than a "magic window" to the world; it has become "a door" which lets ideas and beliefs ingrain into our consciousness (Harris & Sanborn, 2013). In other words, people perceive reality through texts or talks that media produces for their audiences (Brooks & Hebert, 2004). This can empower the reader to move beyond the passive receiver to be an active analyzer.

Since media plays a complex role as filter for reality (Ross, 2019), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been utilized to study different disciplines, such as media discourses and politics. Leading researchers such as Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, and Ruth Wodak developed CDA; each one has added a new brick to the overall CDA approach. That is why CDA is conceptualized as an "umbrella approach" in which various paradigms are used to critically analyze a spoken or written text (Wodak & Mayer, 2008; Amer & Amer, 2011). CDA enables readers and listeners to carefully look into the dynamics of discourse creation and consumption.

Similarly, Van Dijk (2001, p. 96) proposes that CDA is an analysis "with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk in order to establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse of power". CDA allows a space of reaction or opposition to what is directed at the listener or reader. Likewise, Fairclough (1989) says that CDA "helps increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards

emancipation". Besides, Jaworski and Coupland (1999) stipulate that language is not an unbiased medium for cultivating knowledge, but rather plays a key role in producing it. So, it is up to CDA to unveil such bias, power, inequality, control, and social order which are represented, practiced or normalized in any given text—spoken or written. Several studies have been carried out by applying CDA in order to reveal power dynamics we are mostly unaware of. For example, Wang (2010) analyzed Obama's speeches, focusing on three meta-functions of Halliday's SFL namely, I) ideational function, II) interpersonal function, and III) textual function. He concluded that Barack Obama was using simple and colloquial language to be close to his audience. As a theoretical strategy, Obama used the first pronoun and religious beliefs in order to persuade and shorten the distance between him and his audience. Regarding Donald Trump, Gil-Bonilla (2018), on the other hand, scrutinized Trump's speeches as a businessman and president on the issue of immigration. Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach indicated that Trump as a businessman did not look at immigrants as outsiders and showed some empathy towards them. On the contrary, he as a president chose to polarize immigrants as Others and out-groups who affect Americans' lifestyles. It is possible to see his dispositions as a businessman versus the president of the United States.

For this research, the researcher relies upon Faircloughian Dialectical-Relational Approach, DRA, for several considerations. First, DRA tries to combine two paradigms: I) textually-oriented discourse analysis and II) non-textually oriented discourse analysis which is also found in Michel Foucault's approach, to name but a few. Second, it also pays a special attention to the political discursive nature of social conflicts and plays an emancipatory role against problems (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Fairclough unveils the misconception that media plays a neutral role in transferring knowledge. According to him, media is an active participant in shaping reality. As a result, DRA can be used to uncover the hidden ideologies and hegemonic discourses presented in New York Times' Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal.

A.   Significance of the Study:

Palestinian-Israeli conflict holds an important position in the Middle East agenda. Analysis of media texts, such as NYT, would offer a critical assessment of the language used to describe the situation or how the ages-long conflict is explained. CDA

investigates the practices and texts which are ideology-loaded and determined by power relations and struggles over power (Fairclough, 1995). Consequently, this discourse study analyzing NYT newspaper on Israel-Palestinian Peace Plan contributes to the inquiry of production and reproduction of power relationships, dominance and social order/ justice. Because Trump has recently published his views with this plan, this research is recently formulated discourse.

B.   Purpose of the Study

This study critically examines discourse representations of Trump's Peace Plan to the Palestinians and Israelis as presented in NYT online newspaper and this study tries to understand its socio-cultural consequences of the media representations. Language is not a value-free and innocent means of communications, the researcher uses Faircloughian model to reveal hidden or not directly obvious, ideologies and hegemonic discursive means of mind control in discourse (Amoussou & Allagbe, 2018). CDA suggests to choose pick typical texts from daily life, the researcher chooses NYT because it enjoys an undenied powerful, and reputable national and international status and has a wide readership. This study also stresses the importance of unbiased journalism to inform the public, because it is the responsibility of the journalism to serve the public with neutral news.

C.   Research Questions:

While conducting CDA, the researcher adopts the following questions:
Primary research question:
How is the text positioned by New York Times writers in terms of quoting verbs, patterns of direct/ indirect quoting, representational strategies, passivization, suppression, modality, hedging, anonymisation, and nominalization?
Secondary research questions:
1.   Who benefits from the found positioning?
2.   Whose interests are negated in NYT news regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
3.   What are the social and cultural consequences of this positioning?

D.   Limitation of the Research:

CDA relies on meta-theoretical criterion and the interpretations are subjective and multiple. Discursive interpretations of any text are contextualized, which allows for the possibility for new alternative interpretations and developments.

In addition, CDA, as a research approach, is also problematic with validity as interpretations are various and mutlifaceted since discourse is a social construct and has many meanings. Therefore, a CDA-based study or research cannot be assessed in terms of single normative true or false (ibid), but should be seen in multiple lenses and standpoints.

E.   Keywords Definitions

- **Critical Discourse Analysis** (CDA): is an approach in which systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power (Fairclough, 1995).
- **Fairclough's Model**: is a paradigm which is founded by Norman Fairclough. This discursive analytical model consists of three layers: text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice (Mirazaee and Hamidi, 2012).
- **Trump's Proposal:** is a plan devised by Trump's administration to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli question.
- **Ideology:** is a belief system which "invloves the representations of the world from the perspective of a particular interest" (Faircloguh, 1995).

II. LITERATURE REVIEW:

A. Critical Discourse Analysis:

This chapter sets the context for CDA in general and discusses the approaches of leading researchers: Norman Fairclough, Teun A.van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak respectively. Then, the researcher reviews some of the recent studies concerning with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Critical Discourse Analysis emerged in the early 1990s when a group of influential scholars gathered in a symposium in Amsterdam in January, 1991. In that meeting, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuweem and Ruth Wodak set the foundations of CDA, discussing various theories and methodologies (Wodak, 2009).

CDA originates in the basic theories of Critical Linguistics (CL), which was addressed by Halliday, to name but few. It starts with the analyzing details and continues to scrutinize non-textual signs and pictures (i.e. semiosis). As a definition, CDA is an interdisciplinary and eclectic approach that investigates text or talk, as a social practice. CDA is sometimes referred to as Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as found in Teun van Dijk's canon, because he is concerned that the term CDA might give the impression that CDA is a single approach or method, not emphasizing the pluralistic nature of CDA adequately (cited in Wodak & Meyer, 2009). CDA, however, continues to be the most used and popularized designation (Van Dijk, 2008; Wodak, 2009).

It is noteworthy to highlight the subtle differences between Discourse Analysis (DA) and CDA. DA is concerned with describing and examining languages as they appear in texts per se. However, Brown and Yule (1983: p. 26) elucidate that doing DA "involves not only doing syntax and semantics but also doing pragmatics". On the other hand, CDA is interested in social issues, such as political problems, dominance and inequality, which are perpetuated in texts or discourses. Shedding light upon the core of CDA, Rogers (2004) argues that the significant difference about CDA is that it endeavors to offer an understanding of "why and how discourses work" and the way

they do. To van Dijk (2001), CDA "focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination". Roughly speaking, CDA is characterized by its relations with history, power, and ideology (Wodak, 2008; Habibie, 2016). Also, it is important to bear in mind that CDA is a research programme or umbrella approach that, as perceived by Bell and Garret (1998), contains and adapts a plethora of theories and schools of thought; it does not have a single, unitary or strictly defined method or framework (Wodak, 2009; Amer & Amer, 2011; van Dijk, 2016; Al Khazraji, 2018; Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, 2019). In a nutshell, CDA is multifarious, interdisciplinary, and heterogeneous.

B.   Major Theories in Critical Discourse Analysis:

CDA views discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997)

It is starkly conspicuous from the above quoted paragraph that CDA practioners view discourse as a social practice governed by social norms, traditions and structures. That is, discourse is an indispensible element of social life, serving the benefits of a powerful organization, elite groups, or group of people in the mere shallow meaning of the word. However, researchers are at variance when it comes to defining discourse as a concept. For instance, Reisigl (2004) claims that Foucault used the concept of discourse in 23 different senses. Phelan (2007) states that 'discourse' is an ontological concept and understood differently. More specifically speaking, some scholars made

a clear distinction between discourse and text like in Germany and Central Europe (Brünner & Graefen, 1994; Vass, 1992; Wodak & Koller, 2008). Other use the term interchangeably for written words or spoken words like in English speaking countries (Gee, 2004; Schiffrin, 1994). Yet, even after understanding the difference between written text and spoken text, the term 'discourse' is still of special enigma. Poole (2010) advises analysts to follow O'Halloran (2003) who classifies discourse into Discourse 1 and Discourse 2: "Discourse (1) refers to the coherent understanding the reader makes from a text. . . Foucauldian discourse, or discourse (2), refers instead to the way in which knowledge is organized, talked about and acted upon in different institutions".

Furthermore, the term 'critique' is also of vital imprtance. It was first introduced to the study of languges by Critical Linguistics. As metioned before, CDA does not aim at describing linguistic phenomena, but it aims at demistifying "the embeddedness and interconnectedness of things" (Fairclough, 1995; Conndfgon, 1976). Some researchers trace back CDA in its critical sense to the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory which are directed towards critiquing and changing societies—rather than describing or understanding them. Too, it is said that the critical power of CDA and other 'critical' approaches are somewhat the heritage of enlightenment (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1969/1991). Also, critical theory aims at integrating major social sciences to help come up with a fully holistic comprehension of social phenomena or ills (Fay, 1987; Thompson, 1988; Anthonissen, 2001; Wodak, 2008). That is why CDA consists of overlaping theories and tenets. But, being critical does not mean being negative or judgmental; it means being open and receptive to complexity—to challenge and unmask "reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies" (Wodak, 2001; Amoussou & Allagbe, 2018).

Since CDA cares about the effects of ideologies in social life; it is interested in the latent and concealed ideologies such as "conceptual metaphors and analogies," (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Wodak & Meyer, 2008). Also, ideology is another important term when it comes to CDA. Ideology is "a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values" (Wodak & Meyer, 2008). No one can deny that the connotations associated with this concept are various and are altered as time marches. Nonetheless, the overall connotational meaning is negative. Knight (2006) believes that it is difficult to free the concept, "ideology", from its negative entailment. For van Dijk, ideology is "schematically organized complexes of

representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g. the schema […] whites have about blacks" (van Dijk, 1993). For Fairclough, he has a Marxist view of ideology. Ideology is, in his own words, Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts…is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique" (Fairclough, 2003).

Power is also another important term while operationalizing CDA. Power gives important insights for understanding society and social structures. From CDA's perspective, text is considered as the manifestation of power and social action. Language is used to exercise power—to sustain power—to change power. Habermas (1967) considers that "language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations ... are not articulated…language is also ideological".

Finally, another intriguing notion of CDA's is admission. It refers to the access to discourse and communicative events. In other words, people have more or less power to genres, discourses and styles. For instance, politicians only have access to parliamentary debates. Analyzing admission helps in comprehending the correlation between social structure, power and discourse access.

1.   Norman Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational Approach:

Faircloughian approach stems from Systematic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and sociolinguistics (Poole, 2010; Jahedi, Abdullah & Mukundan, 2014). Yet, Fairclough does not strictly follow SFL or sociolinguistics. He is intereseted in the systematic relationships between the language use variations and social variables (Fairclough, 2001). Simultaneously, he (ibid) thinks that sociolinguistics fails to link these variations and facts with power and struggles. In other words, Fairclough looks at language/ discourse as an integral part of society, concluding that there is dialectical relationship between discourse and society i.e. "linguistic phenomena are social" and "social phenomena are linguistic" (Fairclough, 1995; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Consequently, he devised a textually-oriented approach. This approach is considered to be extensive and fundamental in CDA since Fairclough is considered as the most influential CDA practiner (Widdowson, 2004).

Fairclough firstly offers two definitions for discourse. He (1995) defines discourse as "language use conceived as social practice". Then, he updated his definition of discourse to "way of signifying experience from a particular perspective" (Poole, 2010). After that, Fairclough declares:

> The term 'discourse' . . . signals . . . an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements. But, again, the term can be used in a particular as well as a general, abstract way – so I shall refer to particular 'discourses' such as the 'Third Way' political doctrine of New Labour (Fairclough, 2003).

As suggested, Fairclough sees discourse with two senses: one is general referring to language or other processes of significations (i.e. semiosis), and the other is abstract referring to a particular way of representation.

Viewing discourse as a form of social practice, Fairclough theorizes a three layered approach; each layer is called a dimension. The dimensions are (i) text, (ii) discourse or discursive practices, and (iii) socio-cultural practices. At the first dimension or word level, text is analyzed in accordance to its formal linguistic features. At the second dimension or discursive level, Fairclough divides discourse practices into two paradigms: institutional processes and discourse processes (Khazraji, 2018). Institutional modules focus on production and distribution of text while discourse modules look for consumptions and changes that happen during the former processes. Fairclough explicates that discourse practices serve as a middle ground between text and social practices. "Discourse practices straddle the division between society and culture on one hand, and discourse, language and text on the other hand" (Fairclough, 1995). At the third dimension or socio-cultural level, an analyst explains, discusses and critiques the relationship among discourse, society, and culture.

Fairclough also borrowed some concepts from other scholars. He adopted Julia Kristeva's concept of intertextuality; he explained that intertextuality "focuses on the borderline between text and discourse practice" (Fairclough, 1995). He (2003) said that a text is intertwined with other texts through linguistic devices and each discourse could be considered as a form of intertextuality. Also, Fairclough utilized the concept of ''hegemony'', which is a central tenet of Marxism (Fairclough, 2003). This term firstly devised by Antonion Gramsci in 1971. According to Gramscian view, hegemony is a particular way of conceptualizing power, whereas hegemony, based on Faircloughian view (1993), is "a way of theorizing change in relation to the evolution

of power relations which allows a particular focus upon discursive change, but at the same time a way of seeing it as contributing to and being shaped by wider processes of change". Fairclough believes that the concept of hegemony is paramount to interpret orders of discourse, which are "network[s] of social practices in its language aspect. The elements of orders of discourse are not things like nouns and sentences (elements of linguistic structures), but discourses, genres and styles" (Fairclough, 2003). Furthermore, he cares about the concept of ideology. The term ideology was first theorized by Destutt de Tracy in the early 1800s, which is connected too with Marxism somehow. Drawing on the concept of ideology and its developments, Fairclough surmises that discourses are associated with certain assumptions which are in nature ideological; such ideologies could be observed in language because it is a social behavior where views and thoughts are shared (Machin & Mayr, 2012). In fact, the two concepts, hegemony and ideology, overlap with one another since seeking hegemony means to maintain power which is of 'ideological work' (Fairclough, 2003).

Some scholars, like Widdowson (1998; 2004), believe that Faircloughian approach is political rather than linguistic. For example, Fairclough (2003) himself declares that he is a socialist, that is why, as it is believed, he systematically attacked the discourse of New Capitalism and Neolibralism. Like Widdowson, Mills (2004), addresses CDA as "the analysis of texts and conversation using linguistics, from an avowedly politically committed perspective".

2. Van Djik's Socio-Cognitive Approach:

Van Dijk created socio-cognitive approach (SCA) which is concerned with ideological structures and social cognitions. He accentuates the ideological dimension of CDA, saying that "ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies" (Van Dijk, 1995).

His system is composed of two levels: micro level and macro level; language use, discourse, verbal interaction and communication are said reportedly to form the micro level of social order, whereas the macro level refers to power, dominance and inequality between social groups (van Dijk, 2003). In SCA, context models are central to understanding discourses. Context models are "mental representations of the structures of the communicative situation that are discursively relevant for a

participant. These context models control the 'pragmatic' part of discourse, whereas event models do so with the 'semantic' part" (Wodak & Mayer, 2008).

Also, van Dijk (2001) divides 'power' into two categories: "coercive power" which is based on force like armed military, violence... etc. and "persuasive power" which is based on knowledge and information like professors, journalists and the like (see also Gramsci, 1971). Van Dijk's model overlaps with Fairclough's, but lacks the meso-level, the discursive practices; van Dijk does not pay much attention to discursive practices (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). Instead, he focuses on social cognitions, which are "socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpreting, thinking and arguing, inferring and learning" (Van Dijk, 1993). So, his model is tripartite, orbiting around three notions: discourse, cognition, and society (Jahedi, Sathi & Mukundan; 2014).


Figure 1 Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Model

Also, he emphasizes upon the importance of comprehending ideological structure and social relations when it comes to understanding any discourse. For him, ideologies are "the basis of the social representations of groups" (van Dijk, 2006). Moreover, van Dijk introduces the concept of ideological squaring (cognition) to present a dichotomy of "in-group" and "out-group". This concept consists of four principles: "I) emphasize positive things about Us; II) emphasize negative things about Them; III) de-emphasize negative things about Us; IV) de-emphasize positive things about Them".

Figure 2 Van Dijk's Ideological Squaring:

3.   Ruth Wodak's Disourse-Historical Approach:

Influenced by socio-linguistics and ethnography (Chilton, 2005; Wodak, 2015), Ruth Wodak (2001) theorizes discourse-historical approach (DHA). This approach, like other approaches, concentrates on power, ideology and dominance, yet emphasizes the historical dimension of the hermeneutic process to understand a specific discourse. She says "that all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context" (Meyer, 2001; Wodak, 2008). She (2001) also defines discourse as "as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as 'texts'".

Wodak describes her approach as interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, and eclectic one. According to Wodak (ibid), "studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies". So, studying a social phenomenon requires using multiple methodologies and strategies for social phenomena are too complex (e.i. it would be of naivety to study it from one side, ignoring other intricate sides and factors). That is why the principle of triangulation is fundamental to DHA; it equips and urges researchers to utilize different methodologies and various ways of collecting data since

"there is no typical way of collecting data" (Meyer, 2001). This principle guards researchers from being subjective, too (Wodak, 2015).

Like Fairclough (1995 & 1999) and Chouliaraki (1999), Wodak also believes that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and communicative and societal evets; they influence one another in a sophisticated way. She (2001) says, "on the one hand, the situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and on the other, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions. In other words, discourses as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, as being constituted by them."

Moreover, Wodak highlighted the significance of 'context' and divided it into four types: (I) "the immediate language or text internal co-text"; (II) "the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses"; (III) "the social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a particular context of situation", and (IV) "the broader socio-political and historical context which the discursive practices are embedded within and related to". So, too, like Fairclough, Wodak pays a special attention to intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Here, interdiscurcivity means that discourses are related to each other, whereas intertextuality means that texts are overlapping (Wodak, 2001, 2015; Jahedi, Abdullah & Mukundan, 2014)

In the tradition of DHA, it is eye-catching that language is not considered as powerful by its own; language gains its power when powerful people use it to maintain their power and dominance (Wodak, 2015). According to Wodak (ibid), power is exercised in discourses; power relations can be persuaded or denied in discourses.

C.   Recent Studies Covering the Palestinian-Israeli Question:

In recent years, Assaiqeli (2019) examined the discourses of two UN resolutions, 242 and 338, using Ruth Wodak's historical approach. He found that UN resolutions are prone to preserve the status quo of Israeli power and its policy for expansion rather than tackling the origin of the conflict. So, too, El-Gody (2018) studied media represenation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, considering the escalation on Jerusalem conflict in December, 2017 in two newspaper sites: the British Broadcasting Corporation World News, BBCWN, and Al Jazeera English, AJE. The

study has found the BBCWN is pro-Israelis, tending to depict Palestinians as a growing threat to "Israeli victims", whereas AJE is found to be pro-Palestinians.

In additon, Amer (2017) evaluated systematically chosen texts from four newspapers (i.e. the Guardian, the Times London, the New York Times and the Washington Post) to analyze the representations of Gaza war 2008- 2009. Following van Leeuwen, he found that the four newspapers generally support Israelis over Palestinians. So, there was a tendency among editors to establish a positive discourse towards Israel. Also, readers of US and UK newspapers, he concluded, did not have adequate or enough context or information about all sides involved in that war to form an informed opinion.

Likewise, Baidoun (2014) studied four media outlets (two Palestinian and two Israeli newspapers) during the escalation of violence in Gaza from 20-25 December, 2013, exploring their ideologies and their effects on reporting practices. Through the analysis, she found that, regardless of liberalism or conservatism, Palestinian newspapers (i.e. Maan and Al-Ray) created pro-Palestinian dominant ideologies for the Palestinian public. These hegemonic ideologies were in harmony with the Palestinian common sense; the Israeli newspapers (i.e. Haaretz & Jerusalem Post) did too for their Israeli audience. For example, she found that Israeli coverage was full of nationalism, emphasizing the supremacy of Israelis over Palestinians. On the other hand, Palestinian news highlighted the ideology of "imagined community" by convincing readers that Palestine and Palestinian community are worthy to die for.

Also, she noticed that both perspectives were biased to their own nations, trying to demoralize or dehumanize the enemy, which is contrary to the neutrality of journalism (Mral, 2006). Too, Zaher (2009) scrutinized selected news reports of Arabic and Western media outlets during the second Intifada (uprising). The dissertation aimed at comparing the representations of the ideologies and actions, particularly armed violence of each camp, using an eclectic approach combined from various CDA's theories as seen appropriate. She found that all reports lacked the needed contextualization to paint a clear picture for readers. Also, it was found that Israel was always institutionalized; therefore, Israeli violence was seen a 'military act'. On the other hand, Palestinians were not institutionalized; therefore, their violence was not justified and seen as 'militancy'.

III.   SAMPLE AND METHODOLGY:

In this chapter, the researcher first presents his article word count and source information. Then, he explains his sampling method and Fairclough's analysis approach which is used throughout the conduction of this study. Finally, he puts definitions to his instrument tools namely, passivization, suppression, modality, hedging, anonymisation, and nominalization.

The corpus consists of five news articles (i. e. 6646 words, including titles and photo captions). These articles have been collected from the online website that belongs to New York Times Newspaper in the time span of 1 June, 2019 until 4 February, 2020. This newspaper is selected because it has influence locally and internationally. Also, NYT enjoys high readership, around five million subscriptions according to a report published by NYT on February 6, 2020. The sample gathered falls under convenience sampling since only free news articles are analyzed.

The corpus is analyzed according to Fairclough's framework, which is segmented into three levels. At the first level, formal linguistic description, including syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, is presented. The linguistic analysis tackles quoting verbs, patterns of direct/ indirect quoting, representational strategies, passivization, suppression, modality, hedging, anonymisation, and nominalization. Then, at the second level, discursive practices such as text production, distribution, and reception are analyzed in the light of the previous linguistic description. That is, linguistic description and discursive practices are analyzed simultaneously since level 1 and level 2 are intertwined and overlapping with one another. At the third level, explanation is made to clarify the correlations between discourse and social structures; social phenomena, like power relations, hegemony, and ideology, are also under scrutiny at this dimension. Thus, Faircloughian approach is useful, for it sheds light upon various stands and positions (Janks, 1997).

Figure 3 Fairclough's three-dimensional conception of discourse

A. Instruments:

A group of data instrument tools are used to analyze the gathered text. They are as follows:

1. Passivization: the process of changing the verb or a sentence into passive voice to hide real agents chiefly.
2. Suppression: the act of intentionally avoiding a specific narrative or information.
3. Modality: refers to the utilization of model verbs and their special meanings.
4. Hedging: the process of avoiding definite statements and commitment.
5. Anonymisation: the act of removing or concealing identity of social actors.
6. Nominalization: the transformation of verb processes into noun constructions in order to delete active agents and create ambiguity.

IV.   DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS:

The author discusses and interpret the articles he collected in his sample in details in this chapter; then, he moves to draw his insightful conclusions from his findings.

In order to start analyzing a text, Fairclough insists upon the description of the formal linguistic features. For Fairclough (1989), "description is the stage which is concerned with formal properties of text". This lexico-grammatical anaylsis is segmented into individual sections to make it easier to follow.

A.   Speech and Speakers; Quoting Verbs:

It is insightful enough to start the analysis of media discourse with speech and speakers since they are the pillars of discourse. According to Fairclough (1988), what we see in news discourses is not "transparent report of what was said or written", but it is a representation of speech; "there is always a decision to interpret and represent". In other words, the implication of reporting verbs offers an understanding of the establishementarian view of what is reported. For example, "claim" implicates a position of weakness or inferiority, whereas "explain" alludes to a position of strength or power over knowledge (Floyd, 2000). Quoting verbs carry tacit implicatures which are windows to reporters' views (Austin, 1975; Coulthard, 1994; Fairclough, 1995).

It is obvious that NYT writers often use neutral structuring verbs to quote American officials, which indicates disengagement and leads to no particular connotation or evaluation. However, NYT reporters use metapropositional verbs when it comes to Palestinian and Israeli officials like *react, express,* and *declare*. Yet, Palestinians are associated with negative semantic fields. For example,

"The Palestinians swiftly rejected the plan, as they had for all of Mr. Trump's peacemaking efforts since he announced in 2017 that he was recognizing Jerusalem as the Israeli capital." (New York Times, June 22, 2019)

"Israeli officials reacted more mildly, with some noting that the plan seemed calculated to turn the Palestinians against their entrenched leaders. The officials expressed skepticism that the Arab countries would foot the bill and noted that

the plan sidestepped the difficult political issues." (New York Times, June 22, 2019)

As shown in the examples above, Palestinians are depicted semantically in a negative light, as they act "swiftly" without pondering or listening. On the other hand, Israelis are portrayed as rational and receptive, for they "react more mildly" and "express skepticism", but do not refuse the "deal". Assuming that the Israeli reaction is mild suggests the existence of "unmild" reactions; if Israeli reaction is mild, this leaves the opposite to Palestinians, insinuating and accusing them for extremism. Here, refusal and rejection are meronyms of the whole Palestinian image.

B.   Representational Strategies: Honorifics

It is noteworthy that referential strategies to present the social actors are personalized to a large extent and triangulate among three: Trump, Natanyahu, and Kushner. This indicates that Trump's proposal is a mere personal view; it is a personal plan to use power and serve self-interest, in order to please Natanyahu or his son-in-law. It looks like a family business not a political or international issue. This is evident when one looks at Kushner's representation. Kushner is always depicted as close to Trump based on familial relations namely, being the husband of Trump's daughter. However, when it comes to actual doing, referential strategies are, to some extent, impersonalized and labeled by the "White House" to gain authority and legitimacy. For example,

"the White House announced an unprecedented three-way meeting in Jerusalem"

In fact this meeting was initiated by Trump. So, too, the Israeli and American figures are so much individualized and humanized while the Palestinians are almost always collectivized. For example,

"That gathering is meant to lay the groundwork for a subsequent diplomatic proposal to end decades of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians" (New York Time, June 22, 2019).

"…to settle the seemingly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinians." (New York Time, January 28, 2020).

"President Trump on Tuesday unveiled his long-awaited Middle East peace plan with a flourish, releasing a proposal that would give Israel most of what it

has sought over decades of conflict while offering <u>the Palestinians</u> the possibility of a state with limited sovereignty" (New York Time, January 28, 2020).

"President Mahmoud Abbas of the <u>Palestinian Authority</u> immediately denounced the plan as a "conspiracy deal" unworthy of serious consideration…" (New York Time, January 28, 2020).

"<u>Israel</u> agreed to limit its settlement construction in a four-year "land freeze," during which <u>Palestinian leaders</u> can reconsider whether to engage in talks." (New York Times, Jan. 28, 2020)

Palestinians are collectivized, showing them as a bunch of unorganized people or an authority (with an indefinite article) in conflict with Israel as a modern organized state. Lan Roderick (2016) generally stipulates that the degree of individualization depends on the saliency of social actors. That is, the more important an actor is, the greater the degree of individualization will be. Accordingly, NYT reporters seem to give much importance to Israeli officials compared to their Palestinian counterparts.

In addition, whenever there is any reference to Palestinians, there is a lack of formal references like president, minister etc. Palestinians are either described as collectivized masses or negotiators, denying their countrial or statal formalities. It is also crystal clear that the use honorifics, which signal the level of importance and seniority, is slanted towards American and Israeli directions. Besides, one can notice that American and Israeli officials are functionalized (i.e. they are mentioned with their functional titles like president and advisor). On the other hand, Palestinians are generically mentioned. That is, Palestinians are pushed into the background.

C.   Passivization and Suppression:

Passivization is another way which is used to hide social actors, cushion one's language or hide truth.

"Mr. Kushner will be under pressure to tilt the plan ever further in Israel's favor." (New York Time, June 1, 2019)

Considering the preposterous statement, one might ask who will put "the planner, the senior advisor, the son-in-law" under pressure. It would seem of bias if the reporter said, "Kushner will tilt the plant...". Consequently, passive voice would work best to soften the language and conceal the actual agents.

Furthermore, what is excluded from being in a text is as important as what is mentioned in a text. Or in Fairclough's words, "what is said in a text is said against a background of what is unsaid, but taken as given."(Faircloguh, 2003). It is conspicuous that Palestinians are given less space and opportunity to explain themselves; and even if they have a room, they are presented negatively as shown in the excerpts below.

"The Palestinians have vowed to reject it out of hand, branding it a blueprint for Israeli domination." (June 1, 2019)

"Some experts question whether President Trump will ever put a peace proposal on the table, given the Palestinians' vow to reject his efforts and his looming re-election campaign in the United States" (June 22, 2019).

"The Palestinians swiftly rejected the plan, as they had for all of Mr. Trump's peacemaking efforts since he announced in 2017 that he was recognizing Jerusalem as the Israeli capital" (June 22, 2019).

From the examples presented above, one could notice that Palestinians are presented as having a penchant for rejection without even contemplating or reflecting upon their narrative. It is never explained why the Palestinians reject such proposal or why they see it as a lopsided one. That is, Palestinian narrative is suppressed here, suggesting that Palestinian stance is preposterous or lacks rationality. This suppression may mislead or could be considered as a way of mind control since recipients or potential readers may not have the knowledge or information to challenge the information they are exposed to (Wodak, 1987). After analyzing the coverage by the BBC1 and ITV of the second Palestinian Intifada, Philo and Berry (2004) knowingly state:

"The absence of key elements of Palestinian history makes it difficult to understand their perspective. Their actions could appear without context and in consequence they may be seen as 'initiating' the trouble… the fact of the military occupation and its consequences is crucial to an understanding of the rationale of Palestinian actions."

Also, Amer and Amer (2011) believe that there is a big absence of essential incidents, regarding the Palestinian stance, which, in turn, leads to misunderstanding of the Palestinian position or alteration of facts.

D.   Modality:

Models are also of vital importance when it comes to CDA. Models, through various types, suggest certainty, judgment, or ability... etc. According to Machin and Mayr (2012), Models reveal author's identity and power over knowledge.

The NYT authors relied mostly on epistemic modality to express their level of certainty, which looks sort of high. For example, authors use "will" very often when the context speaks about American policies, since they are aware of what is going on there; likewise, the usage of epistemic modality is high too when it comes to Israeli context, indicating close relationship between the two contexts. This, for instance, could be noticed here:

"For both leaders, therefore, the political calculus will argue for a plan that makes as few demands of Israel as possible." (New York Time, June 1, 2019).

"That will allow Mr. Netanyahu to showcase another of his long-term strategic goals — closer ties between Israel and Sunni Muslim leaders in the Persian Gulf, with whom he shares a deep hostility toward Iran." (June 1, 2019).

Fairclough (2003) points out that reporters' statements are generally authoritative. However, in the Palestinian context, it appears that there is a rare use of epistemic modality, insinuating lack of knowledge or information of Palestinian angle or simply a politicized negligence.

E.   Hedging, Anonymisation, and Nominalization:

Hedging is a discoursal tactic to create a strategic ambiguity to conceal or soften a nugget of information (Machin and Mayr, 2012).

"...with some noting that the plan seemed calculated to turn the Palestinians against their entrenched leaders." (New York Time, June 22, 2019)

One can see that "seemed" here is a hedging technique to avoid confrontation with plan makers, who might be seen as solicitors.

"Mr. Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner, met Mr. Netanyahu in Jerusalem to discuss the status of the plan on Thursday, hours after the prime minister failed to form a governing coalition. Mr. Kushner emerged with a longer timetable and a narrower diplomatic mission, these people said." (New York Time, June 1, 2019)

The reporter here uses the verb "emerged" to avoid commitment to information, which gives the impression of being neutral, precise or detailed. Another vague sentence is "these people said"; who are these people? And why were only the saying of these people quoted? Is not this a preferential quote? Ironically, reporters use these hedging clauses to show neutral and balanced journalism, yet, when one ponders, the opposite prevails.

Moreover, anonymisation is sometimes used to hide social actors or hedge some information as found in the example below:

> "A senior administration official said only that the plan would be presented when the "timing is right."" (New York Time, June 1, 2019)

Also, the reporters used anonymisation when the discoursal context intensifies or bears a political heat. This technique is handy to lessen the tension and/or avoid debunking

> "But to do that, analysts and former diplomats said, the president will have to sacrifice any last hopes of proposing a peace plan that is acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians." (New York Time, June 1, 2019)

> "{T}he political calculus will argue for a plan that makes as few demands of Israel as possible." (New York Time, June 1, 2019)

This act of nominalization, to conceal social actors, maintains dominance and preserves inequality. Van Dijk (1993) states that using noun phrases is one of the techniques to background information. In the example above, saying "the political calculus" will be attuned to Israel, without addressing the actors, advocates for accepting this lopsided justice. That is, instead of saying that Trump or his son-in-law wants so, the reporter used the nominalized phrase, inviting us to accept this 'unavoidable reality'. This leads to hegemonic discourse.

It is obvious enough that the collected corpus, written by NYT reporters, is characterized by a fair amount of non-restrictive and long noun phrases, which suggests a sense of precision and sophisticatedness.

V.   CONCLUSION:

This research aims at exploring and understanding the representations and effects of Trump's proposal for the Middle East in NYT newspaper while using Faircloughian model of CDA which was explained in the Methodology chapter.

The linguistic analysis shows that lexical selections are largely in harmony with Israeli rationales. Also, it demonstrates reporters' failure to contextualize the current clashes with respect to historical and political contexts. According to Fairclough, the orders of such biased discourse is ideologically organized and controlled. In fact, some analysts believe that what is found in a context could be part and parcel of a broader discourse (Machin & Mayr, 2012). In other words, this representation could be a result of an overall editorial policy favorable to Israel.

Moving to ideology and hegemony, the analysis shows a tendency by NYT to background, alienate or avoid the Palestinian perspective (the weak). This has been largely implemented through problematizing the Palestinians and their rationales and using different discursive strategies mainly such as suppression and honorifics, which resulted in a negative image being associated to the Palestinian people in comparison with their Israeli counterparts. At the same time, media discourse was utilized to back up the reasoning of the powerful (U. S. and Israelis). For example, reporters largely described Israel as part of "us", which implies detrimental and unbalanced journalism. This also stresses what Nohrstedt (2009) pointed out that ideologies behind news texts are becoming more and more salient than news texts themselves.

Nonetheless, this research is just an example of studying aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict reflected in a U. S. newspaper; further investigations are strongly recommended to decipher the complicated dimensions of this century-long issue qualitatively and quantatively, especially in light of the continual escalations between both sides every now and then.

Finally, journalists must include the full complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict while reporting since focusing on current events without highlighting the historical and political dimensions will ultimately restrict and narrow the scope of understanding, resulting in unjust reporting and biased journalism (Amer & Amer, 2011). Ze'ev Chafets (1984) states:

"The Middle East is an area that produces a great deal of news – but very little information… A national debate on the wisdom of American involvement and the parameters of American policy in the Middle East depends on the flow of reliable, comprehensive and balanced information from the area. It is the job of American press to provide that information…anything less will distort America's view of the region." (Cited in Barranco & Shyles, 1988).

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APPENDICES:

Article 1:

Trump's Middle East Peace Plan Faces a Crossroads After Coalition Talks in Israel Crumble Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointing to a map of Israel given to him by President Trump, who had drawn an arrow pointing to the Golan Heights and scrawled "Nice."CreditCreditAtef Safadi/EPA, via Shutterstock

By Mark Landler

● June 1, 2019

WASHINGTON — President Trump plans to throw his full weight behind Benjamin Netanyahu's campaign to save his job as prime minister of Israel. But to do that, analysts and former diplomats said, the president will have to sacrifice any last hopes of proposing a peace plan that is acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians.

Mr. Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner, met Mr. Netanyahu in Jerusalem to discuss the status of the plan on Thursday, hours after the prime minister failed to form a governing coalition. Mr. Kushner emerged with a longer timetable and a narrower diplomatic mission, these people said.

Rather than make concessions to the Palestinians, Mr. Kushner will be under pressure to tilt the plan ever further in Israel's favor. Far from being a bold effort to break decades of enmity between the two sides, it could end up becoming a vehicle to resurrect Mr. Netanyahu's political fortunes and to protect Mr. Trump's.

The plan, which Mr. Kushner has drafted under a veil of secrecy for more than two years, was already looking like a doomed effort. Though its details remain unknown, Mr. Kushner has suggested it will not call for the creation of a Palestinian state, jettisoning decades of American policy toward the conflict. The Palestinians have vowed to reject it out of hand, branding it a blueprint for Israeli domination.

Certainly, a wounded Mr. Netanyahu lost no time in exploiting his friendship with Mr. Trump. He brandished a copy of a map of Israel that Mr. Trump had signed and sent to him with Mr. Kushner. In the margins, the president had drawn an arrow pointing to the long-disputed Golan Heights, which he had recognized as Israeli territory, and had scrawled "Nice."

The White House is expected to hold off on the political component of its plan — which deals with thorny issues like borders, security and the status of Jerusalem — until after the Israeli elections, scheduled for Sept. 17. A senior administration official said only that the plan would be presented when the "timing is right."

But that timing has grown increasingly problematic. Any new Israeli coalition probably would not be formed until at least October, which would delay the announcement of a Trump plan until November, uncomfortably close to the first primaries of the 2020 election in the United States.

Mr. Trump, eager not to alienate evangelical voters or influential pro-Israel donors like the casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, is unlikely to present a plan that would put Israel or Mr. Netanyahu in an awkward position. For both leaders, therefore, the political calculus will argue for a plan that makes as few demands of Israel as possible.

"To get Netanyahu re-elected, Trump is clearly now willing to take instructions from him," said Martin S. Indyk, a former American ambassador to Israel. "I believe Netanyahu will return the favor by arguing forcefully to American Jews and evangelical voters that they should vote for Trump because he's the best friend Israel has ever had."

Mr. Trump has already gone further in his support of Mr. Netanyahu than any president has for any Israeli leader. Before recognizing Israeli authority over the Golan Heights, he moved the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. And in a remarkable intrusion into Israeli electoral politics, Mr. Trump on Monday tweeted his support of Mr. Netanyahu's efforts to form a coalition.

"Hoping things will work out with Israel's coalition formation and Bibi and I can continue to make the alliance between America and Israel stronger than ever," Mr. Trump said, using the prime minister's nickname. "A lot more to do!"

Two days later, the White House announced an unprecedented three-way meeting in Jerusalem of its national security adviser, John R. Bolton, with his Israeli and Russian counterparts, Meir Ben-Shabbat and Nikolay Patrushev. The meeting, to discuss security issues in the Middle East, is a feather in the cap for Mr. Netanyahu, underlining his ability to convene the world's major powers.

Mr. Indyk said a staunchly pro-Israel peace plan — one that snuffed out the goal of a two-state solution, for example — would constitute Mr. Trump's third major gesture to Mr. Netanyahu, after the embassy and the Golan Heights.

This week, after Mr. Netanyahu's coalition negotiations collapsed, Mr. Trump made no effort to disguise his disappointment.

"It looked like a total win for Netanyahu, who's a great guy," the president said. "That is too bad. Because they don't need this. I mean they've got enough turmoil over there. It's a tough place."

Mr. Kushner's visit to Jerusalem coincided with the Israeli Parliament's vote to dissolve itself and call for new elections — arguably one of the darkest days in Mr. Netanyahu's career. But rather than wave him off, the prime minister welcomed Mr. Kushner, posing for pictures and showing off the letter from Mr. Trump.

The next gift for Mr. Netanyahu could come on June 25, when Mr. Kushner convenes an economic conference in Bahrain. The Palestinians have announced they will boycott the meeting; the Israelis are going. That will allow Mr. Netanyahu to showcase another of his long-term strategic goals — closer ties between Israel and Sunni Muslim leaders in the Persian Gulf, with whom he shares a deep hostility toward Iran.

By holding the meeting, which he calls a "workshop," Mr. Kushner split the economic component of his plan from the more fraught political solution. The idea was to give the Palestinians and other Arab leaders an incentive — in the form of billions of dollars of investment — to support a peace accord.

Mr. Kushner made some headway on this front. He won a pledge by Qatar, a major financial supporter of the Palestinian enclave of Gaza, to attend the workshop, even though it was pushed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are engaged in a bitter feud with the Qataris.

During his tour of the region, Mr. Kushner worked to build Arab support for his plan. His meetings with King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan were "very positive and productive," according to an administration official, though King Abdullah pointedly declared that any plan must provide for a Palestinian state.

The refusal of the Palestinians to attend the Bahrain meeting was a reminder of Mr. Kushner's uphill struggle to engage with them, ever since they broke off communications with the White House after Mr. Trump moved the embassy.

In the wake of Mr. Netanyahu's setback, the chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, cracked that the "deal of the century," as people have taken to calling the Trump plan, had become the "deal of the next century."

Given that the plan was almost certain to be summarily rejected by the Palestinians if Mr. Kushner had presented it in the coming weeks, some former diplomats said the Israeli elections amounted to a reprieve for him and his partner, Jason D. Greenblatt, the president's special envoy.

"What happened in Israel over the last 48 hours gives them a more public rationale for why they're delaying, so it's actually good news for them tactically," said David Makovsky, who negotiated between the Israelis and Palestinians during the Obama administration. "The Israeli election has given them an out."

The trouble is, the political atmosphere for a peace initiative is not likely to get any less forbidding in the fall. Mr. Kushner, who helped manage his father-in-law's campaign in 2016, will be as aware as anyone of the domestic political cost of a plan that puts pressure on Israel.

"You'll see the political folks in the administration weighing in on how it affects the election dynamics," said Ghaith al-Omari, a former Palestinian negotiator who is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "We'll get into a totally different set of considerations by November and December."

Article 2:

White House Unveils Economic Portion of Middle East Peace Plan Palestinians demonstrating in the occupied West Bank town of Ramallah against the Trump administration's plan last week.

By Mark Landler and David M. Halbfinger

● June 22, 2019

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration said on Saturday that it hoped to raise more than $50 billion to improve the lot of the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors, releasing an economic plan titled, "Peace to Prosperity," that reverses the actual sequence of its peacemaking efforts in the Middle East.

The blueprint sets the stage for a two-day economic workshop next week to be convened by the White House in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain. That gathering is meant to lay the groundwork for a subsequent diplomatic proposal to end decades of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. But the political component of the plan has been repeatedly delayed, most recently by the call for new elections in Israel after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to assemble a governing coalition. Some experts question whether President Trump will ever put a peace proposal on the table, given the Palestinians' vow to reject his efforts and his looming re-election campaign

in the United States. The 38-page plan sets ambitious goals, like doubling the amount of drinkable water in the Palestinian territories and nearly tripling exports as a percentage of the Palestinian economy. With slick graphics and the promotional tone of a real estate prospectus, the plan envisions a variety of funding sources, like grants and private equity.

But there are no concrete dollar commitments from the United States; the bulk of the money is to come from countries in the Persian Gulf. It was not clear how the United States planned to entice these governments or private investors to ante up so much capital without confronting thorny issues like the aspiration of the Palestinian people for their own state or the political status of Jerusalem.

The Palestinians swiftly rejected the plan, as they had for all of Mr. Trump's peacemaking efforts since he announced in 2017 that he was recognizing Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. "First lift the siege of Gaza, stop the Israeli theft of our land, resources and funds, give us our freedom of movement and control over our borders, airspace, territorial waters etc." Hanan Ashrawi, a senior Palestinian negotiator, declared on Twitter. "Then watch us build a vibrant prosperous economy as a free and sovereign people."

Israeli officials reacted more mildly, with some noting that the plan seemed calculated to turn the Palestinians against their entrenched leaders. The officials expressed skepticism that the Arab countries would foot the bill and noted that the plan sidestepped the difficult political issues.

Yair Lapid, a former finance minister of Israel, described the report as a "very serious document which there is no reason to oppose, especially as it does not say a word about the foolish notion of annexation, which will lead to a binational state that will put an end to the Jewish state."

During his recent campaign, Mr. Netanyahu raised the prospect of Israel annexing some Jewish settlements in the West Bank, a proposal that contradicted decades of American policy toward the Middle East but is viewed sympathetically by at least some members of the Trump administration.

Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser, has tended to view the peacemaking process through an economic prism. The American ambassador to Israel, David M. Friedman, said in a recent interview with The New York Times that, "Under certain circumstances, I think Israel has the right to retain some, but unlikely all, of the West Bank."

Mr. Friedman is one of three officials — along with Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser, and Jason D. Greenblatt, his special envoy to the Middle East — who have spearheaded the effort to broker a peace accord.

The economic plan bears the imprint of Mr. Kushner, the scion of a real-estate family. He has tended to view the peacemaking process through an economic prism, speaking often of how the Palestinian people can improve their fortunes if they find a way to coexist peacefully with their Israeli neighbors.

"I laugh when they attack this as the 'deal of the century,' " Mr. Kushner said in an interview with Reuters , referring to the lofty nickname that Mr. Trump's peace plan has assumed over the last two years. "This is going to be the 'opportunity of the century' if they have the courage to pursue it."

The White House provided Reuters with an advance copy of the plan. The blueprint contains ambitious proposals to transform the Palestinian economy, like a transportation corridor that would link the West Bank with the Palestinian enclave of Gaza. It would earmark up to $900 million for new cargo terminals and other facilities to make border crossings more efficient.

But other elements seem more far-fetched. It talks about turning the West Bank and Gaza into tourism destinations, not taking into account the continual threat of violence from clashes between Israeli security forces and militants.

And other proposals seem at odds with the administration's recent actions. The report calls for up to $900 million to build hospitals and clinics in the Palestinian territories. But the United States last year cut $25 million in aid to six hospitals in East Jerusalem that serve Palestinians.

More than half of the $50 billion would be allocated to the Palestinians; the rest would go to Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. That is calculated to build support among other Arab donors, but the Gulf countries have been noncommittal, and their record of investment is not encouraging.

Even the Bahrain conference is convening under a shadow because of growing tensions between Iran and the United States. On Thursday night, Mr. Trump ordered, and then canceled, a strike on Iranian targets with missiles to retaliate after Iran shot down an American surveillance drone. Still, former diplomats said that the bigger hurdle to the plan was the lack of hope for a genuine breakthrough between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

"It's the kind of highly stylized detailed and glossy presentation that a commercial real-estate entrepreneur might make to potential investors," said Aaron David Miller, a diplomat who negotiated between the two sides. "If it led with a serious and balanced effort to address Palestinian national aspirations, it might even get a serious hearing and investors."

Article 3:

What to Know About Trump's Middle East Plan?

The proposal, three years in the making, favored Israeli priorities and was conceived without Palestinian input. Here are the main points and some of the most contested elements. President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel unveiled the Middle East plan at the White House on Tuesday.

By Megan Specia

● Jan. 29, 2020

President Trump stood alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel at the White House on Tuesday to reveal a long-awaited plan intended to resolve generations of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Noticeably absent from that announcement, though, was any Palestinian representation, and Palestinian leaders have flatly rejected the plan. The proposed settlement strongly favors Israeli priorities rather than having both sides make significant concessions.

Mr. Trump vowed at the start of his presidency that he would negotiate a "bigger and better deal" to broker peace than anyone could imagine. Three years later, experts say that the plan, developed under the supervision of Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump's son-in-law, falls remarkably short of that goal and is unlikely ever to become the basis for a peace agreement.

What does the plan say?

While Mr. Trump's proposal is the latest in a series of United States-brokered attempts to forge peace between Israelis and Palestinians, his framework was a sharp departure from decades of American policy. The United States has long voiced support for the creation of a Palestinian state with only slight adjustments to the Israeli boundaries that existed before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, when Israel wrested the West Bank from Jordan, and Gaza from Egypt.

Instead, the 181-page Trump plan proposes a West Bank riddled with interconnected chunks of Israeli territory containing Jewish settlements, many of them

largely encircled by Palestinian lands. For the Palestinians, it would mean giving up a claim to large amounts of West Bank land — including places where Israel has built settlements over the past half-century and strategic areas along the Jordanian border. Most of the world regards the settlements as illegal.

The framework also sets aside the longtime goal of a fully autonomous Palestinian state. Instead, Mr. Trump vaguely promised that Palestinians could "achieve an independent state of their very own" but gave few details, while Mr. Netanyahu said the deal provided a "pathway to a Palestinian state" with significant caveats.

The Palestinians do not subscribe to the plan, though the deal provides for a four-year window for them to engage in renewed settlement talks. During that time, Israel would refrain from constructing settlements in those parts of the West Bank that the plan has designated for Palestinians.

Previous American proposals spoke of uprooting tens of thousands of Israelis from the settlements to return those areas to the Palestinians for inclusion in their state, but the Trump plan promises to leave both settlers and Palestinians in their current homes. Rather, it maps out a series of linked settlements and other areas that would officially become Israeli territory in the midst of the West Bank.

The plan also envisaged a Palestinian capital in "eastern Jerusalem," on the outer edges of the city beyond Israel's security barrier, while guaranteeing Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem. The city is a holy site for the Jewish, Muslim and Christian faiths and has long been a sticking point in peace negotiations.
Mr. Netanyahu later clarified that the proposed Palestinian capital would be in Abu Dis, a Palestinian village on the outskirts of the holy city.

The plan proposes transportation links between the unconnected Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza. But the element of the plan that may prove to be its only lasting effect is American recognition of Israel's claim over the Jordan Valley and all Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
How would this redraw the map of Israel?

The proposal gives American approval to Israel's plan to redefine the country's borders and formally annex settlements in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley that it has long sought to control.

`That would leave the West Bank portion of any potential Palestinian state surrounded on all sides by Israel. Israeli forces seized the West Bank from Jordan

during the 1967 war, and Israeli settlements have steadily encroached on the region over the decades since, a move largely condemned internationally.

Mr. Netanyahu caused controversy in September when he vowed, while running for re-election, to annex the Jordan Valley, a strategically critical chunk of the occupied West Bank nestled against the border with Jordan. On Tuesday, he made it clear that he saw President Trump's plan as giving legitimacy to claiming Israeli settlements and the Jordan Valley as Israeli territory.

"For too long, the very heart of the land of Israel where our patriots prayed, our prophets preached and our kings ruled has been outrageously branded as 'illegally occupied territory,'" Mr. Netanyahu said. "Well today, Mr. President, you are puncturing this big lie."

Mr. Netanyahu said that his cabinet could move within days to assert sovereignty over those areas, but the decision could be subject to legal challenges because the current government is an interim administration.

What has the Palestinian reaction been?

Despite Mr. Trump's assertion that the deal was "a win-win opportunity" for both sides, Palestinians have largely rejected it. Mahmoud Abbas, the 84-year-old leader of the Palestinian Authority, condemned the plan in a speech on Tuesday evening, calling it a "conspiracy" not worthy of serious consideration.

"We say a thousand times over: no, no, no," Mr. Abbas said, speaking from Ramallah in the West Bank. The Palestinian leadership cut off communication with the Trump administration in 2017 after Washington recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and later moved the American Embassy to the city. On the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, protests against the plan broke out on Tuesday.

Was the focus peace or politics?

David Friedman, the United States ambassador to Israel, said in a call with reporters after the plan was announced that the big reveal was timed in a "nonpolitical way." He said that the plan was "fully baked" before an Israeli election last April but that American officials had held off introducing it then. When that election produced no government, the United States again postponed any announcement until after a second election in September, he said.

Now, as Israel approaches a third election in less than a year, which could also fail to produce a government, Mr. Friedman said that the time had been right to introduce the proposal. He noted that American officials had also discussed the plans with Benny

Gantz, the leader of the centrist Blue and White Party and Mr. Netanyahu's main rival in the March 2 election.

But experts say that the timing of the rollout has more to do with the domestic politics of the United States and Israel than with resolving the conflict, with Mr. Trump facing an impeachment trial and Mr. Netanyahu facing trial on corruption charges.

William F. Wechsler, director of Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based research organization, said in an emailed statement that the plan was unlikely to have a major impact in the short term.

"The announcement's chosen timing, specific staging, limited participants, and indeed its substance make clear that it has less to do with a good-faith effort to reach peace between Israelis and Palestinians," Mr. Wechsler said, "and more to do with the immediate legal and electoral challenges that confront both leaders."

Article 4:

Trump's Middle East Peace Plan

Faces Dimmer Prospects Than Ever

Israel's political limbo and a new United States policy toward settlements have further diminished hopes that the plan will be the basis for an Israeli-Palestinian deal. As he seeks to build a re-election record, President Trump could benefit from being seen as offering a blueprint to resolve the conflict.

By Michael Crowley

● Nov. 19, 2019

WASHINGTON — The prospects for a Trump administration plan to strike a Middle East peace deal have been receding for months, thanks to a protracted political stalemate in Israel and the refusal by the Palestinians to engage with Washington. But they may have reached a new low this week.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's announcement on Monday that the United States no longer viewed Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal under international law, coupled with a monthslong deadlock in Israeli politics that may require a new election to resolve, is casting further doubts that a long-awaited proposal from President Trump can resolve the 70-year territorial conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Although Mr. Pompeo said the Trump administration's view on settlements would make peace easier to achieve, the Palestinians, along with many foreign

governments and Israeli politicians, insist the opposite. And if there is an election to determine whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can keep his job, it would not occur until early next spring.

"Nobody believes this plan is coming," said Ilan Goldenberg, a top aide to President Barack Obama's chief Middle East negotiator, who recently returned from a weeklong visit to Israel, where he met with senior officials. "This did not come up once."

Trump officials insist the plan, which was completed months ago under the supervision of Mr. Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner, is still coming, although past predictions of timing have proved to be inaccurate.

For the past two months, the White House has held off as Mr. Netanyahu and his chief political rival, Benny Gantz, the former Israeli Defense Forces general, have vied to form a new government after the country's inconclusive Sept. 17 election. But Mr. Netanyahu has already tried and failed to form a government. And if Mr. Gantz is unable to do so by midnight on Wednesday, Israel is likely to hold a new election in March. That, many analysts and some Trump officials believe, could prompt Mr. Trump to release his plan rather than wait until Israel finally settles on its political leadership.

Mr. Kushner, deputized by the president early in his term to take on an account that has become a symbol of unsolvable problems, is said to be eager to do that. Mr. Kushner and Mr. Trump's Middle East envoy, the former Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt, crafted a plan whose details remain secret but is believed to slant heavily toward Israel on several long-contested territorial and political issues, including Israeli settlements. It tries to cushion the blow to Palestinians through major Arab investments in their economy lined up by Mr. Kushner.

But the Palestinians have shown little interest in such a deal, and have long refused to communicate with Mr. Kushner and other Trump administration officials. Palestinian leaders say the Trump administration has adopted a punitive approach toward their interests through policies like recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital, cutting American aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, shutting down the Palestinian Authority Consulate in Washington and making Monday's announcement, which was widely seen as an endorsement of Israeli settlement building.

Trump officials say that will not stop them, and some analysts say that submitting even a dead-on-arrival plan could appeal to the Trump team. "They see it more as a vision than as a plan," said David Makovsky, a senior fellow at the

Washington Institute for Near East Policy who worked as a Middle East peace negotiator in the Obama administration. The Trump administration hopes to establish "a historic baseline, so if they're re-elected they can use it as a basis for future negotiations."

In domestic political terms, Mr. Trump fashions himself as a grand deal maker and, as he seeks to build a re-election record, could benefit from being seen as offering a blueprint to resolve the conflict.

A plan that asks fewer concessions of Israel than those devised by past White Houses would be popular among conservative Republicans, many Jewish voters in Florida and evangelical Christians who support maximal Israeli expansion. Any Trump plan would most likely "reframe United States policy to make a two-state solution impossible," said Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who served as a Middle East peace negotiator under presidents of both parties.

"Given that Palestinian rejection of the plan is a foregone conclusion and there won't be an Israeli government capable of accepting the plan, launching it before the Israeli election makes no sense," said Martin S. Indyk, who served as the Middle East peace envoy for a year under Mr. Obama. "Unless it's a plan so slanted in Netanyahu's direction that its release would be designed to help him."

"But then it wouldn't be a peace plan; it would be a plan to help Bibi get re-elected," Mr. Indyk added.

Even as a political document, a peace plan presents Mr. Trump with risks. Some prominent religious conservatives have warned that asking virtually any concession of Israel, especially in a traditional "land for peace" deal, would amount to a betrayal.

Mike Evans, a member of Mr. Trump's evangelical advisory team, said in an interview on Tuesday that he did not expect that outcome. "I don't believe that Donald Trump is a land-for-peace person. I don't think he's going to trade land or force them to give up land by people that want to kill them," said Dr. Evans, whom Mr. Pompeo called shortly after his announcement on settlement policy.

"We'll release the plan when the time is right and when we think it has the best chance of success," Mr. Greenblatt said in an exit interview with the Arab publication Asharq al-Awsat when he returned to the private sector on Nov. 1. He has since been replaced by Avi Berkowitz, a 31-year-old adviser to Mr. Kushner.

Mr. Trump has mostly kept his distance from the political scrum that has followed Israel's most recent election, on Sept. 17, when Mr. Netanyahu's failure to win a clear majority prompted the months of political jockeying that have followed. In the election's aftermath, Mr. Trump offered a seemingly cool tone toward his longtime ally. "Our relations are with Israel," he said the day after the election when asked about Mr. Netanyahu's fate.

In the two months since then, Mr. Netanyahu has tried and failed to form a governing coalition and now awaits the results of Mr. Gantz's effort. In the meantime, Mr. Netanyahu remains the country's prime minister, but lacks a political mandate to make weighty decisions.

Mr. Trump sounded bemused by the state of affairs in a Nov. 12 appearance before a group of Orthodox Jewish supporters at a Manhattan hotel. The remarks were not released by the White House, but a video was posted on Twitter.

"What kind of a system is it over there, right, with Bibi and…" Mr. Trump said. "They are all fighting and fighting."

"We have different kinds of fights," he said. "At least we know who the boss is. They keep having elections and nobody gets elected." Relations have remained cordial between the leaders. But some analysts say Mr. Trump has been less effusive toward the Israelis than Mr. Netanyahu might like, given Mr. Trump's strong popularity within Israel, where, Mr. Trump joked at his New York event last week, he could easily win election as prime minister. Still, Mr. Trump sent Mr. Netanyahu a letter for his 70th birthday last month, calling the Israeli "one of my closest allies." And after Mr. Pompeo's announcement on Monday, the two men spoke for the first time since before Israel's election."I spoke on the phone with US President Donald Trump and told him that he had corrected a historic injustice," Mr. Netanyahu wrote on Twitter after the call.

Article 5:

Trump Releases Mideast Peace Plan That Strongly Favors Israel

The plan would discard the longtime goal of granting the Palestinians a full-fledged state. President Trump called it "a win-win" for both sides; Palestinian leaders immediately rejected it.

By Michael Crowley and David M. Halbfinger

● Published Jan. 28, 2020

● Updated Feb. 4, 2020

WASHINGTON — President Trump on Tuesday unveiled his long-awaited Middle East peace plan with a flourish, releasing a proposal that would give Israel most of what it has sought over decades of conflict while offering the Palestinians the possibility of a state with limited sovereignty.

Mr. Trump's plan would guarantee that Israel would control a unified Jerusalem as its capital and not require it to uproot any of the settlements in the West Bank that have provoked Palestinian outrage and alienated much of the world. Mr. Trump promised to provide $50 billion in international investment to build the new Palestinian entity and open an embassy in its new state.

"My vision presents a win-win opportunity for both sides, a realistic two-state solution that resolves the risk of Palestinian statehood to Israel's security," the president said at a White House ceremony that demonstrated the one-sided state of affairs: He was flanked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel but no counterpart from the Palestinian leadership, which is not on speaking terms with the Trump administration.

President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority immediately denounced the plan as a "conspiracy deal" unworthy of serious consideration, making the decades-long pursuit of a so-called two-state solution appear more distant than ever. "We say a thousand times over: no, no, no," Mr. Abbas said on Tuesday in Ramallah, in the West Bank.

As part of the proposal, Israel agreed to limit its settlement construction in a four-year "land freeze," during which Palestinian leaders can reconsider whether to engage in talks. But before returning to Israel on Tuesday, Mr. Netanyahu told reporters that he would ask his cabinet to vote Sunday on a unilateral annexation of the strategically important Jordan River Valley and all Jewish settlements in the West Bank, a move that is sure to further inflame the Palestinians.

Nearly three years in the making, Mr. Trump's plan is the latest of numerous American efforts to settle the seemingly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. But it was a sharp turn in the American approach, dropping decades of support for only modest adjustments to Israeli borders drawn before 1967 and discarding the longtime goal of granting the Palestinians a wholly autonomous state. The reaction of key Arab governments to the plan was mixed. In a statement, Jordan's foreign minister affirmed his country's support for an independent Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital and warned against "the

dangerous consequences of unilateral Israeli measures, such as annexation of Palestinian lands.”

But a statement from the United Arab Emirates’ ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, called the plan “a serious initiative that addresses many issues raised over the years.” And Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a muted statement saying that it “appreciates the efforts of President Trump’s administration to develop a comprehensive peace plan.”

Mr. Trump said in outlining his plan that “it is only reasonable that I have to do a lot for the Palestinians, or it just wouldn’t be fair.”

Still, the plan does far more for Israel than it does for the Palestinians, whose proposed state would not have a standing military and would be required to meet other benchmarks overseen by the Israelis, including a renunciation of violence and the disbandment of militant groups like Hamas, which is based in Gaza.

Some analysts said the larger goal of Mr. Trump’s and Mr. Netanyahu’s was to shift the starting point of any future negotiations sharply in Israel’s favor and to put the Palestinians in the defensive position of saying no.

Mr. Trump called on Mr. Abbas, who played no substantive role in shaping the plan, to join talks with Israel’s government. “President Abbas,” Mr. Trump said, “I want you to know that if you choose the path to peace, America and many other countries, we will be there. We will be there to help you in so many different ways.” Mr. Trump’s announcement ended years of suspense over a highly anticipated peace plan that was widely criticized even before its details were known. Rather than viewing it as a serious blueprint for peace, analysts called it a political document by a president in the middle of an impeachment trial working in tandem with Mr. Netanyahu, a prime minister under criminal indictment who is about to face his third election in a year.

But the guests invited to the East Room, including the conservative Republican megadonor Sheldon G. Adelson and evangelical Christian leaders, greeted the plan with enthusiastic applause.

“It’s a big opportunity for the Palestinians, and they have a perfect track record of blowing every opportunity they’ve had in their past,” Mr. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who oversaw the plan, told CNN on Tuesday. He urged Palestinian leaders to “stop posturing” and accept the plan.

Mr. Trump took a sterner tone at the White House. Whereas past American presidents have sought to cajole the Palestinians to accept a deal, Mr. Trump issued them a warning.

"After 70 years of little progress, this could be the last opportunity they will ever have," Mr. Trump said, though a Democratic successor could prove much friendlier to the Palestinian cause.

The proposal imagines new Israeli borders that cut deep into the West Bank and what Mr. Netanyahu has previously described as a Palestinian "state-minus" that lacks a military capable of threatening Israel. The White House called it "a demilitarized Palestinian state" with Israel retaining security responsibility west of the Jordan River, although over time, the Palestinians would assume more of that responsibility.

Mr. Trump said it was the first time that Israel had authorized the release of such a conceptual map illustrating territorial compromises it would make. He said it would "more than double Palestinian territory" while ensuring that "no Palestinians or Israelis will be uprooted from their homes."

But under the plan, those Palestinians would find themselves virtually encircled by an expanded Israel and living within convoluted borders reminiscent of a gerrymandered congressional district. The proposal also envisions a tunnel connecting Gaza to the West Bank.

Mr. Trump, who loves to claim that he has outdone his predecessors, noted that several past presidents had "tried and bitterly failed" to achieve peace. "But I was not elected to do small things or shy away from big problems," Mr. Trump said.
Mr. Netanyahu agreed that Mr. Trump had devised a "realistic path to a durable peace" that "strikes the right balance where others have failed." But his move to annex West Bank territory could make any practical dealings with the Palestinians even more difficult.

"Front-loading the annexation seems to destroy the plan on the very day it's released," said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who was a member of Secretary of State John Kerry's Middle East negotiating team. "It reaffirms the worst fears that this is more an annexation plan than a peace plan."

A new Palestinian state would have a capital, to be called Al Quds, that would include some of the outer portions of East Jerusalem. The plan would preserve the

status quo at the sprawling compound that Jews call the Temple Mount and Muslims call the Noble Sanctuary, or Al Aqsa, which is the name of one of two main Islamic shrines there. The location is the holiest place in Judaism and the third-holiest place in Islam, and has been the site of numerous clashes over the years. Muslims would continue to be permitted to visit Al Aqsa Mosque.

A White House official said Mr. Trump's proposed $50 billion economic plan for the new Palestinian state would create one million new jobs over 10 years, double the size of the Palestinian economy, cut poverty in half and reduce unemployment to below 10 percent. The money would be supplied by international donors, chiefly in Arab nations.

Mr. Kushner and a small circle of Trump officials chose not to pursue the traditional path of brokering talks between the two parties that could lead to a joint proposal but to hand one down from Washington.

Working secretively, Mr. Kushner and his team — which included the American ambassador to Israel, David M. Friedman, a strong supporter of Israeli settlement construction — consulted closely with Mr. Netanyahu's government. But their contact with Palestinian officials ended after Mr. Trump announced in December 2017 that he would move the United States Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv.

In the near term, the 181-page plan will be an issue in both American and Israeli politics. Mr. Trump is sure to cite its warm welcome by Israeli leaders on the 2020 campaign trail as he courts conservative Jewish voters and evangelical Christians who back Israeli expansion in the Holy Land.

Mr. Netanyahu will welcome it as a distraction from his criminal indictment six weeks before Israel's elections on March 2.

Democrats were largely critical. Senator Chris Van Hollen of Maryland sent a letter to Mr. Trump on Tuesday, signed by 11 of his colleagues, calling the proposal a "one-sided" blow to prospects of a "viable" two-state solution.

"Previous presidents of both parties successfully maintained the respect of both Israelis and Palestinians for the United States' role as a credible player in difficult negotiations. Your one-sided actions have made that impossible," the senators wrote, calling the plan "a recipe for renewed division and conflict in the region."

Mr. Trump's potential opponents were similarly withering, a reminder that a Democratic victory in the presidential election in November could result in a much different approach.