



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY ON THE INTERSECTION OF  
THE CRIME PREVENTION AND THE COUNTER RADICALIZATION  
LITERATURE**

**Master's Thesis**

**Hilal Bacı**

**Peace and Conflict Studies**

**August 2021**





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## **PLAGIARISM**

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work.

To my mum and dad,

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I want to thank the people that helped me to complete my dissertation. Firstly, I want to thank my academic lodestar, Assoc. Prof. Ersun Necati Kurtuluş, on this journey from the bottom of my heart. He was always kind and the source of my numberless intellectual epiphanies. I really appreciate the wisdom, knowledge and time he shared with me. Secondly, I want to thank my encouraging family: my lovely parents Hamiyet and Suat Sami and my dear siblings. Because it was kneaded with blood, sweat, and tears, this dissertation could not really come to an end without their selfless help. I genuinely appreciate what they have done for me. Lastly, I want to thank the committee members Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş and Prof. Nezir Akyeşilmen for their contributions.

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## ÖZET

Bu tezin amacı, suç önleme ve radikalleşmeyle mücadele literatürlerinin, ne ölçüde örtüştüğünü, benzeştiğini ve birbirinden ödünç aldığını incelemektir. Yeni ortaya çıkan bir alan olarak radikalleşmeyle mücadele, savaş olarak terörizm anlayışına alternatif olmaya çalışmaktadır. Ancak bunu yaparken terörizm, radikalizm, aşırıcılık ve radikalleşmenin kavramsal belirsizliklerini bir kenara bırakmaktadır. Üstelik, karşı radikalleşme, literatürünü “radikalleşme şiddete yol açar” önermesi üzerine inşa etmektedir. Ayrıca, daha önceki radikalleşmeyle mücadele çalışmalarının önemli bir bölümünün kasıtlı veya kasıtsız olarak suç önleme literatüründen ödünç aldığı görülmektedir. Bu çalışma, böyle liberal bir yaklaşımın sorunlu olduğunu iddia etmekte ve takip eden ifadeyi tezin ana argümanı olarak belirlemektedir: Suçun önlenmesi yasal statükoyu korumayı amaçlarken, radikalleşmeyle mücadele literatürü, yasal statükonun yanı sıra siyasi statükonun korunmasına da aktif olarak katkıda bulunur. Bunun nedeni, radikalizmin ortadan kaldırılmasının salt yasal değil, aynı zamanda politik olmasıdır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Suç Önleme, Radikalleşmenin ve Aşırıcılığın Önlenmesi Yoluyla Terörizmin Önlenmesi, Radikalleşmeyle Mücadele, Deradikalleşme, Şiddet İçeren Aşırıcılıkla Mücadele

## **ABSTRACT**

The object of this dissertation is to examine to what extent crime prevention and counter radicalization literature overlap, resemble and borrow from each other. As a newly emerging field, counter radicalization tries to stand as an alternative to terrorism as warfare understanding. However, while doing that, it sets aside the conceptual ambiguities of terrorism, radicalism, extremism and radicalization. Besides, counter radicalization builds its literature on “radicalization leads to violence” premise. Also, it is seen that a significant portion of the previous counter radicalization studies deliberately or inadvertently borrow from crime prevention literature. This study argues that such a liberal approach is problematic and sets the following statement as the main argument of the dissertation: Whereas crime prevention aims to preserve the legal status quo, counter radicalization literature actively contributes to the preservation of the political as well as the legal status quo. This is because eradication of radicalism is not purely legal but also political.

**Keywords:** Crime Prevention, Terrorism Prevention Through the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism, Counter Radicalization, Deradicalization, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

|         |                                     |
|---------|-------------------------------------|
| CCP     | Community Crime Prevention          |
| CONTEST | The UK's Counter-Terrorism Strategy |
| CVE     | Countering Violent Extremism        |
| DCP     | Developmental Crime Prevention      |
| EU      | The European Union                  |
| IDF     | The Israel Defense Forces           |
| IRA     | The Irish Republican Army           |
| PVE     | Preventing Violent Extremism        |
| RNR     | Risk-Need-Responsivity              |
| SCP     | Situational Crime Prevention        |
| UN      | The United Nations                  |

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. The Statement of the Problem

In this part, first of all, it will be explained how the shortcomings of war on terror and terrorism as crime understanding lead to counter radicalization practices. And then, the statement of the problem will be introduced, which is related to the intersection of the crime prevention and counter radicalization literature.

After the 9/11 attacks, “War on Terror”, causing unilateral security policies depending on the military, was declared by the Bush administration in the US (Lewis & Reese, 2009). Until Obama announced the end of “Global War on Terror” in 2013, the war rhetoric continued (Shinkman, 2013). However, long before this announcement, some critical voices had raised against this war rhetoric. For example, Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post and Victoroff (2007), had explained why the “war on terror” rhetoric had to be replaced and instead of the war metaphor, they discussed the alternative metaphors like the law enforcement metaphor, the social epidemic metaphor and the metaphor of prejudice reduction.

One of the alternatives regarding terrorism is “terrorism as crime” approach. There are even some clear-cut definitions which strongly advocate this stance as the following: “Terrorism is a form of crime in all essential respects.” (Clarke & Newman, 2006, p. vii). This view is particularly important when there is a shift from terrorism as warfare understanding to alternative approaches. Besides, according to LaFree and Freilich (2016), the research on terrorism has been mostly done in the fields of political science and psychology even though the interest towards terrorism research rapidly increased among the social and behavioural scientists in the last twenty years and they argued that

this can be found surprising since “terrorism clearly falls within the domain of criminology” (p. 4).

As Koehler (2017b) stated that after the devastating attack on 11 September, 2001 and the following terror incidents in Europe, it was recognized by the Western and non-Western states that depending only on repression and prosecution to fight against terrorism, violent radicalization and extremism is not enough and there is a need for alternatives to get rid of the terrorism threat. Also, especially after the London bombings in 2005, homegrown terrorism was realized as an important phenomenon that needed to be tackled (Crone & Harrow, 2011). Therefore, searching for alternatives became more crucial and the shift towards softer counter-terrorism approaches like deradicalization, countering violent extremism (CVE), preventing violent extremism (PVE) was firstly seen in Europe in order to combat terrorism (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). However, because such approaches are in their infancies, related research fields like criminology and desistance, gang research, the sociology of role change, and new religious movements were examined to take insights (Koehler, 2017b).

As a result, bearing in mind the background above, the convergence of terrorism research and criminology on terrorism phenomenon was inevitable. However, it was also inevitable that these two fields affected each other’s studies when they research related topics, problematizations, etc. from their perspectives. Thus, the converged realms of criminology and terrorism research will be discussed throughout in this dissertation and these are prevention of crime (terrorism) and counter-terrorism focusing on the premise that “radicalization leads to violence” (counter radicalization) respectively.

Furthermore, in spite of the fact that trying to prevent crime is not a new phenomenon, modern crime prevention appeared in the 60’s (Lab, 2016). On the other hand, counter radicalization has a rather younger history given the fact that even the term radicalization was rarely used before the 9/11 attacks (Sedgwick, 2010). Thus, this situation creates an imbalance between the literatures of crime prevention and counter radicalization because crime prevention has a well-established literature compared to a newly emerging literature like counter radicalization. As a result, this also raises the question of whether counter radicalization is reinventing the wheel or not if both try to prevent the same phenomenon.

Not unrelated to the issue above, counter radicalization literature suffers a lot from the conceptual ambiguities. Therefore, this study is also not an exception. Although generally, the term of counter radicalization is used to describe the soft counter-terrorism strategies, time to time, countering violent extremism is preferred since it is widely used by certain researchers.

## **1.2. The Purpose of the Study**

The aim of this study is to examine to what extent crime prevention and counter radicalization literature overlap, resemble and borrow from each other by focusing on counter radicalization approaches from an interdisciplinary point of view. In order to uncover the nexus and the interface between them, the literature of crime prevention and the literature of counter radicalization will be critically studied including the concepts that these research areas are based on and the models and tools they utilize. The sources that are used in this dissertation are mainly from academic publishing like books and peer reviewed journals and occasionally from grey literature written on these subjects.

## **1.3. The Importance of the Study**

The significance of this dissertation is that it tries to contribute to filling the research gap between the literatures of crime prevention and counter radicalization. Crime prevention literature perceives terrorism as a crime and builds a literature on terrorism prevention from such a perspective even though unique aspects of terrorism are noted usually. Nonetheless, counter radicalization literature has a complicated attitude towards this phenomenon. Sometimes, it benefits from crime prevention but does not accept terrorism as a crime and sometimes it claims that terrorism is a completely different phenomenon. As a consequence, studying on terrorism prevention through the prevention of radicalization and extremism proposes a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary look at the complex phenomenon at hand.

## **1.4. The Organization of the Study**

This dissertation contains six chapters in total. The first chapter is Introduction, where the emergence of the research problem, purpose, significance and organization of the study are explained.

In the second chapter, as a background, there will be brief discussions on the main approaches to terrorism to be able to understand where counter radicalization stands.

In the third chapter, there will be discussions on the basic concepts in the crime prevention and counter radicalization literature. And then, what these discussions bring to us will be debated. Thus, this chapter is not simply a chapter which includes discussions on the basic concepts but it constitutes the backbone of the whole study.

In the fourth chapter, the models and tools utilized by these two literatures will be discussed even though the issues that deal with are different.

In the fifth chapter, the debate is about how counter radicalization is prone to fail when the differences between politically motivated crime and ordinary crime are ignored although they have similarities in practices by benefiting from the experience of the UK.

Finally, the sixth chapter is Conclusion. In this chapter, there will be the summary of this dissertation and some brief discussions regarding future studies.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **BACKGROUND: APPROACHES TO TERRORISM**

It is clear that how the literatures of criminology and terrorism research approach the phenomena that are studied on is crucial to grasp the rationale behind. Therefore, before going into depth on the central discussion of this dissertation, it is necessary to quickly look at what the main approaches to terrorism are. Stating that they are defined implicitly and there can be other lenses (like revolutionary instrument or psychology related dimensions), these five frameworks or lenses for terrorism are presented by Schmid (2004):

- “1. terrorism as/and crime;
2. terrorism as/and politics;
3. terrorism as/and warfare;
4. terrorism as/and communication; and
5. terrorism as/and religious fundamentalism.” (p. 197)

As Schmid says that the states generally apply either the criminal justice model or the war model when terrorist actions happen (2004); therefore, for the purpose of this study, only two of them, terrorism as crime and terrorism as warfare, are necessary to reflect.

#### **2.1. Terrorism as Crime**

The first approach is terrorism as crime. Researchers (generally criminologists) who have such an approach towards terrorism accept that terrorism is as crime despite some ambiguities. As a result, they seek the solution in the criminal justice system with the cooperation of law enforcement agencies and other actors who can contribute to

maintain the legal status quo; namely, they want to achieve this with crime prevention strategies, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

From a criminological point of view, Hamm (2007) argues that in the nature of terrorism, historically there is a seismic shift. According to him, after World War II, terrorist activities were low-cost strategic warfare with the purpose to affect international relations using the threat of violence. Further, these activities were sponsored by states as low-military activities. He claims that until the collapse of communism, terrorism was considered as diplomacy by other means because state-sponsored terrorism remarkably reduced after the collapse. Thus, this led to terrorists being more active in criminal activities as an alternative source of support like the Irish Republican Army. After losing state support, the IRA became active in organized crime. In addition, he also argues that decline in state involvement increased international drug trade as the collaboration of M-19 and drug cartel Pablo Escobar did in Colombia because in the past, terrorists were unwilling to do drug trade not to lose state support behind them. Hence, Hamm calls this shift as privatization of terrorism and after this change, the reason why terrorists committed more and diversified crimes was to provide logistical support for their goals. For this reason, to detect and prevent terrorists, law enforcement became an important opportunity as Hamm states.

Actually, what Hamm focuses on after the collapse of communism is the dramatic increase in criminal activities as means for terrorism, not the very nature of terrorism. According to Schmid (2004), the majority accepts that terrorists' acts are criminal acts because both are illegal but terrorists' acts also include political motivations and these two are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, as Miller (2010) states that in terms of theory, certain terrorist actions can be thought as common crimes since they are bound to domestic and international law and the criminal justice system can work in the same way for both terrorists and common criminals. However, he also argues that some terrorists' actions are acts of war; so, they cannot be bound to domestic law. If this is the case, these terrorists can be regarded as terrorist combatants and they can be subjected to the same (to be killed, captured, bombed, etc.) as military combatants according to Miller.

On the other hand, according to Bjørge (2016), it is not appropriate to take military action against the majority of terrorist attacks in modern democratic states; thus, it is

necessary to approach them as crimes and utilize crime prevention in full capacity. By the same token, Vila and Savage (2011) claim that seeing terrorism as war is limited in terms of countering it because it is destructive, counterproductive and a short-term solution while assessing it as crime allows the application of long-term solutions like crime control strategies.

Berkell (2019) also thinks that terrorism is a form of crime but differently, it has a political motive like the ideas of Clarke and Newman in the Chapter 1. Therefore, she argues that it is logical to consider that terrorism prevention is a form of crime prevention. It can be said that this kind of thinking is actually the simplest expression of the terrorism as crime understanding.

## **2.2. Terrorism as Warfare**

The second approach is interpreting the terrorism phenomenon as warfare. Albeit the followers of this approach remarkably increased after 9/11 under the war on terror atmosphere, one of the most assertive pieces that advocates this view was written five years before this shocking event. In the article, American military historian Caleb Carr (1996) simply argues that terrorism should be seen as warfare by holding a strong position against terrorism as crime understanding. In his article, he says that even though the actions of ordinary criminals are similar to terrorists, terrorists commit these actions as if they are in warfare guided by some philosophical and political rationalizations. Furthermore, with the help of military history, Carr describes terrorism as total war; that means, as a military strategy and tactic to force the enemy citizens to submit. As a result, he advocates that a military solution should be formulated for a military problem rather than a criminological solution.

Another strong supporter of terrorism is a warfare argument is Andrew Silke, a terrorism expert who has a criminology background. Silke claims that terrorism should be considered as warfare specifically as guerrilla warfare (Silke, 1996). According to Silke, categorizing violent acts as crimes seems more suitable than categorizing them as war; however, war is a more encompassing concept because during wars, lots of committed actions by conventional soldiers are technically crimes like raping a woman.

Therefore, he argues that if what terrorists do are acts of crimes, it means that they are war criminals; otherwise, they should be treated as soldiers.

According to Laqueur (2003), with the help of terrorism history, it can be seen that most of the new concepts emerged after intense interest in terrorism studies are not actually new; hence, terrorism was not new but seen as asymmetric warfare all the time. However, he adds that history is not the key to understand terrorism anymore because he claims that terrorism has really some new crucial elements like highlighted religious-political fanaticism, access to weapons of mass destruction and being indiscriminate (Laqueur, 2003).

On the other hand, instead of using the old and new terrorism concepts, an influential counter-terrorism expert Boaz Ganor makes a similar distinction between what he calls classical terrorism and modern terrorism (2004). Nonetheless, as a difference between classical and modern terrorism, Ganor emphasizes attacking indiscriminately on civilians instead of attacking selectively in order to send a message to the whole of a targeted community. Moreover, he argues this can happen easily with the help of technological advances in communication and claims that “Modern terrorism is psychological warfare pure and simple.” (Ganor, 2004, p. 40). Actually, what Ganor means by terrorism as a strategy of psychological warfare and what Carr means by terrorism as military strategy and tactic are the same in essence. Both authors argue that terrorists’ actions and common criminals’ actions can be the same (like murder) but the motive is different; that is, the aim of terrorism is making targeted community vulnerable by fear and ready to obey for the demands of the terrorists. However, Ganor says that terrorists know it is impossible to reach their aims only with military means; therefore, he focuses on the perceived risk rather than giving importance to the actual harm caused by attacks.

In the same way, Schmid agrees on the view of terrorism as a tool of psychological warfare (2005). His explanation develops from an idea which set out that terrorism is a violent form of communication between terrorists and their different types of audiences in order to reach their ultimate ends because for Schmid, the difference between a violent criminal act and a violent criminal terrorist act is that hurting the direct victim is not the final goal of the latter. The important emphasis here is that the author does not only

concentrate on fear among the people caused by the attack, and he describes the phenomenon also as propaganda by remembering anarchists' propaganda of the deed. In this context, he also discusses the importance of the role of the media and how terrorists go beyond the physical harm they caused unlike conventional forms of warfare; as a result, how they are mainly interested in the psychological effects of their attacks.

In brief, regardless of the different denominations for terrorism, the common point of all these terrorism experts' opinions is the acceptance of terrorism as warfare.

### **2.3. Counter Radicalization Strategies as an Alternative Approach**

By considering the aforementioned approaches, is it possible to understand where counter radicalization stands as an approach? How do the states look at the terrorism phenomenon when they want to prevent or counter it by counter radicalization policies? As crime or as warfare? Or do they hold an alternative approach by mixing them together? To be able to understand where counter radicalization stands as an approach, there will be a discussion on how much these approaches are alike or different.

As debated above, like Carr (1996), when terrorism is seen as a warfare in classical sense, a military solution can be expected to "end" these wars. However, as Bjørge (2016) stated, in democratic states, taking military actions against terrorist attacks is generally not appropriate. Moreover, Miller (2010) argued that liberal-democratic states are remarkably restricted by the human rights whether terrorism as crime or terrorism as warfare framework is applied. On one hand, if terrorism as crime is implemented as a framework, right to action, freedom of speech or right to privacy, etc. can be under threat. On the other hand, if terrorism as warfare is implemented as a framework, the right to freedom or the right to life is at stake since capturing or killing the terrorists is more stressed as a practice. Therefore, when the potential human rights violations or the possible infringements of the aforementioned human rights are compared and contrasted under these circumstances, terrorism as crime is found more suitable to apply as a framework according to Miller (2010).

Thus, as Bjørge (2016) suggests, can crime prevention in full capacity be the best option to prevent terrorism? Or does not the only problem of terrorism as crime

framework is relatively less significant human rights violations compared to terrorism as warfare?

The important discussion here is about the nature of terrorism; that is, whether terrorism is an ordinary crime or not. Nevertheless, since it will be discussed in the following chapters, now it is only needed to express the view that advocates terrorism is like common crimes understanding is puzzling for many.

As stated under the terrorism as crime title, what makes terrorism as an act of crime is international or domestic laws. Nonetheless, according to Klinger and Heal (2011), since there are laws to designate certain terrorist actions as crimes, it does not mean that these actions are merely crimes although it is hard to comprehend due to this modern mindset. Because accordingly, the modern mindset accepts Clausewitzian understanding of war which is something applied between national militaries under international law unlike non-state actors' brutal mass-casualty attacks. Hence, these two academics claim that seeing terrorism only as crime is problematic; so, they claim that it is also possible to see the mass-casualty attacks as war acts.

In order to understand this phenomenon, Klinger and Heal (2011) use Lind's classification of first, second, third and fourth generation warfare and they say that the mass-casualty attacks or terrorist acts fall under the fourth-generation warfare. Since they are outside of the scope of this dissertation, first, second and third generation warfare will not be mentioned. However, it has to be known that these three generations of warfare were between states; to put it in a different way, the states' monopoly on war came to an end in the fourth-generation warfare (Lind, 2004). Namely, because the fourth-generation warfare exists inside the nation-state system and non-state actors are not powerful as states, they implement unconventional means as terrorist do (like hijackings, suicide bombings and small groups' military-style assaults) to impose their wills (Klinger & Heal, 2011).

As a result, for liberal-democratic nation states, it is hard to take action accepting either terrorism is simply an act of crime as an ordinary crime by ignoring the nature of terrorism or accepting terrorism is an act of warfare as traditional warfare by ignoring the benefits of the less serious infringements of the human rights. Besides, the ambiguousness

of the actors and their means makes the problem more challenging for such states under current international law. Thus, under these circumstances, these approaches cannot be enough to explain the terrorism phenomenon on their own; consequently, they cannot propose solutions solely within their own boundaries in practice. As Schmid (2004) states that focusing on only one framework for conceptualising terrorism can be misleading; therefore, all related aspects have to be understood properly. In fact, it is clear that how counter radicalization approaches perform in practice is quite related to this perplexing background.

As stated under the terrorism as warfare title, even though terrorism as psychological warfare is not seen exactly as traditional wars by its supporters, there is a strong emphasis on the psychological dimension of the terrorism phenomenon especially in its modern or new form. According to American Psychologist Everly (2003), terrorism is not a conventional military combat but it is a psychological warfare. Therefore, he claims that it is important to understand psychological dynamics of terrorism both in law enforcement and in the military to be able to answer accordingly; so, he proposes to apply Caplan's tripartite preventive psychiatry to counterterrorism.

Not differently, yet from a military viewpoint, psychological operations represent the same with psychological warfare. As Clow (2008) states that psychological warfare, hearts and minds, political warfare and propaganda are other terms or synonymous of psychological operations. To illustrate, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the hearts and minds of Palestinians were tried to win by both Hezbollah and the IDF as a part of psychological warfare (Schleifer, 2014). Therefore, even though it can be practiced by both states and non-state actors, it can be concluded that psychological warfare is at least one facet of warfare if not it is accepted as a conventional military combat. In the same way, Schmid argues that "If terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, we should be focusing as much if not more on countering the propaganda as we focus on preventing and controlling terrorist violence." (Schmid, 2005, p. 143)

Not surprisingly, the goal of counter radicalization strategies reflects the sentiments of Schmid on how psychological warfare of terrorists should be taken precautions against it. According to El-Said (2015), the aim of approaching radicalization as a process is to win the hearts and minds of vulnerable communities that have potential

to radicalization and violent extremism. Correspondingly, as for Schmid (2020), the purpose of deradicalization is to win back or to change the hearts and minds of the terrorists, violent radicals or violent extremists (Schmid, 2013). For this reason, the objective of counter radicalization strategies is directly related to the hearts and minds as in psychological warfare. So, if terrorism is psychological warfare; that is, influencing the hearts and minds of the targeted population for a political cause, what counter radicalization approaches try to do is no different but the practitioners are the status quo-sided unlike terrorism.

Since the practitioners of counter radicalization strategies are the status quo-sided, they can be practiced directly by states or in contact with states. Hence, law enforcement and crime prevention strategies were always available to prevent terrorism even if terrorism is accepted as a crime or not. Especially after the war on terror was declared by the Bush administration in the subsequent process of 9/11, plenty of academics and scholars (and later certain politicians too) drew attention to the possible adverse consequences of the kinetic approach to counter-terrorism (El-Said, 2015). And recently, there is a growing interest to counter radicalization strategies which aim the hearts and minds since it is premised that these practices produce less harm and more gain.

However, benefiting from the law enforcement and crime prevention does not mean that the stance of the supporters of counter radicalization strategies regarding terrorism is the same with the stance of the adherents of terrorism as crime. As it will be discussed in the following chapters, even if the tools, strategies and methods of counter radicalization are quite similar to crime prevention, their perspective towards terrorism phenomenon is not alike. As a result, excluding the steadfast supporters of terrorism as crime, it can be concluded that people working on counter radicalization strategies advocate terrorism is not an ordinary crime since it cannot be isolated from its political aspects.

In conclusion, in this chapter, where counter radicalization stands as an approach was discussed. Merging terrorism as psychological warfare as a philosophical background and terrorism as crime by practically utilizing crime prevention strategies reflects a pragmatic solution since neither traditional warfare understanding nor crime prevention that ignores the nature of terrorism cannot help liberal-democratic nation

states that try to survive with the disturbance of both domestic and global chaos surrounding by non-state actors' violent threats. In addition, this pragmatic mix of contemporary counter-terrorism which focuses on radicalization clearly points out the main argument of this dissertation which will be debated in detail starting from the next chapter to the end. However, before moving on to the other chapters, clearly stating the main argument as follows would be beneficial to be able to follow the upcoming discussions: Whereas crime prevention aims to preserve the legal status quo, counter radicalization literature actively contributes to the preservation of the political as well as the legal status quo. This is because eradication of radicalism is not purely legal but also political.



## **CHAPTER 3**

### **DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIC CONCEPTS**

In this chapter, in relation with the main argument of this dissertation, it is argued that differently from crime which is designated by law, radicalism and extremism (and their off-shot terrorism) are defined politically. Thus, counter radicalization means creating a preventative defence against substantial political change.

To be able to dive into this argument, there will be discussions on the basic concepts of crime prevention and counter radicalization since how the concepts are defined is critically important to understand what counter radicalization means. Therefore, in the first subsection, the objects of crime prevention and counter radicalization will be debated. And then, in the next subsection, there will be a discussion on the nature of crime prevention and counter radicalization. Finally, there will be the main discussion regarding where all of these discussions bring to us.

#### **3.1. What to Prevent: The Objects of Crime Prevention and Counter Radicalization**

In this part, what crime prevention and counter radicalization aim to prevent; to put differently, the objects of crime prevention and counter radicalization will be debated: crime for crime prevention and the rest (terrorism, radicalism, extremism, radicalization) for counter radicalization.

##### **3.1.1. Crime**

“Crime, in its most straightforward sense, denotes those behaviours that are formally prohibited and punishable under criminal law.” (O’Brien & Yar, 2008, p. 32). This definition of crime more or less gives the notion behind how a crime can appear as a crime. If an act, deviant or not, is officially declared as unlawful and deserved to be

punished by authorities, it is a crime. Thus, it is crystal clear that “crime is not frozen in time or place.” (Quinney, 1970, as cited in Grabosky & Stohl, 2010, p. 4) because it is socially constructed (O’Brien & Yar, 2008). For example, a behaviour which was accepted as a crime in the past can be regarded totally normal today or vice versa. In the same way, an act which is not deemed as a crime in one country can be a serious crime in another country. As a result, it is important to understand that a crime can change according to a certain time and place.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are not universally accepted crimes like homicide (Grabosky & Stohl, 2010). Especially, when it comes to certain actions concerning all of the humanity like genocide, aggressive war or slavery, all the countries in the world agree on the prohibition and punishment of them imposed by international criminal law. Here, it is better to explain it with a term, *jus cogens*, from international law. If an act obtains this status, it is thought that it is accepted as a crime by all international communities. In other words, these compose the peremptory norms of international law (Bassiouni, 1996; Lowe, 2007).

### **3.1.2. Terrorism**

What is terrorism? Although this question sounds quite easy to answer because it can be heard almost every day and everywhere, in reality, like almost all other highly publicized concepts in social sciences, it is hotly debated and remains vague. The difference is that the ambiguities related to the terrorism concept creates fatal real-life consequences. Unfortunately, the barrier against having a unified attitude to prevent terrorism is due to the definition problem of terrorism; therefore, if it is aimed to effectively combat terrorism, it is needed that all relevant actors agree on what terrorism is (Mullins & Thurman, 2011). Thus, it is quite critical to get an agreed definition if the focal point of the literatures of the prevention of terrorism crime and countering terrorism by aiming to change the hearts and minds is related to what scientifically is done for combatting terrorism rather than publishing polemics. Even though, terrorism still does not have an internationally accepted definition, there were serious attempts to reach a consensus on its definition at least by academics.

The latest important attempt to reach academic consensus on the definition of terrorism was published in 2011, edited by the principal author of the book, Alex P. Schmid, one of the leading terrorism experts. In this enlightening study, 91 experts responded to the questionnaire that includes a lot of questions concerning different aspects of terrorism and the ones about the definition of terrorism are specifically valuable for the purpose of this dissertation. After mentioning fair complaint about the abundance of the terrorism studies partly or completely full of the definition of terrorism, Schmid shares the respondents' divergent results on the terrorism definition of the US State Department in 2006, the draft definition of the United Nations, and the academic consensus definition came out in 1988. By critically discussing the shortcomings and problems of all of these terrorism definitions, the revised academic consensus definition of terrorism was born in 2011 as follows:

Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. (Schmid, 2011, p. 86)

As stated above, terrorism is not an uncontested concept. But why? According to Klinger and Heal (2011), since the subject matter of crime and war contains violent conflict between human beings and the terrorism concept is closely related to both of these two terms, there is a conceptual fog surrounding it. Hence, once more, this brings the same discussion in the second chapter: is terrorism crime or war? However, this time, it will not be debated as approaches to terrorism.

There is one noticeable definition that shows this fog clearly in their relationship between crime, war and terrorism. According to Schmid (2004), the acts of terrorism could be considered as "the peacetime equivalent of war crimes" (p. 203). Nonetheless, as for Laqueur (2003), this is far from being reasonable because this definition means that attempting to kill Pol Pot, Adolf Hitler or other post-war dictators when they were reigning would have to be judged as a war crime.

As a matter of fact, terrorism shares some characteristics of crime and war because the acts are similar. However, the motivation behind is different. This is why the revised academic consensus definition is important. It strongly reflects the political aspects of terrorism while not ignoring the other important aspects like violence, morality and legality. On the other hand, while reaching academic consensus seems very promising for the development of terrorism studies, there are sceptics that question the existence of terrorism ‘experts’ (by using a term called ‘terrorism mafia’) focusing on lack of empirical studies in the field (Stampnitzky, 2013). On the fringe of this kind of thinking, there are even nihilistic views about the existence of terrorism by comparing it to the existence of unicorns and zombies since talking about something cannot prove the existence of entities if it is not in a scientific manner (Mac Ginty, 2018). Although this academic consensus definition of terrorism cannot represent all the actors, it will be referred throughout the study because of the practical easiness when it is necessary. Otherwise, this dissertation can also turn into a study which cannot go further because of the definitional ambiguity problem.

By remembering that deeming an action as a crime can change by time and place (one of the very good examples of this is the legal status of same-sex relationships in history and in different parts of the world), it could be said that how to define terrorism can be varied according to domestic laws of each country in the world. Nevertheless, like other crimes against humanity, terrorism goes beyond varied jurisdictions or domestic laws of countries besides its international nature. So, why is not it possible to accept terrorism under the category of crimes against humanity even though it is an international phenomenon? By reaching jus cogens status, could not have been known more what to do about countering terrorism because getting rid of the definition debates can open up rooms for manoeuvre? Of course, these are just modest questions beyond the aim of this dissertation; however, the current situation clearly shows the failure of the UN and the international community in defining the widely-used concept of terrorism whether it is really a unique phenomenon or not.

By taking all of these aspects into consideration, it can be claimed that terrorism still cannot be designated as a crime by international law because it is defined politically rather than value-free, objective criteria. For instance, if it is not self-defence, every

killing between civilians is judged as a homicide even if the murderer can gain sympathy from the public because of his/her unique justification. The reason behind this is that, free from the motivation of the murderer, homicide is clearly designated by law. Therefore, even if the political aspects of terrorism are crucial for defining it, this does not hinder to set objective criteria for which acts are acts of terrorism. However, in practice, as McCulloch and Pickering (2009) states that “Terrorism is a label that arises primarily in the arena of politics rather than the courts.” (p. 640) although this does not have to be in this way.

In short, terrorism is defined politically and for this reason, covered by an insisted conceptual fog. This clarity problem of the definition of terrorism directly affects the related concepts in the field as the following by-products of terrorism: radicalism, extremism, radicalization and naturally antis of these terms. Consequently, from now on, there will be discussions constantly dealing with conceptual ambiguities coming from terrorism because the subsequent concepts more often than not are associated with terrorism.

### **3.1.3. Radicalism**

To be able to understand what radicalization is, in the first place, there is a need for looking at what radicalism is because radicalism is the cornerstone for all other derivatives of the concept (Schmid, 2013). Radicalism lies at the centre of the whole the hearts and minds focused terrorism prevention strategies since the premise was that one becomes a radical before being a terrorist, as it will be discussed under radicalization title. Although not necessarily so, on its own radicalism often is taken for granted as a source of evil due to this premise; therefore, as in other similar conceptual ambiguities, different distinctions appear to be able to overcome this pejorative connotation problem. Namely, such distinctions imply that the problem is not being radical but being violent.

According to McLaughlin (2012), radicalism is generally not clarified. However, when the political science literature is examined, most of the time, it is seen that definitions of radicalism concentrate on these two: sweeping change and returning to basic principles or the roots (Pisoiu, 2012). As a result, because it focuses on fundamental change, radicalism means being against the established order and legitimating

transgression and finally extremising worldviews (Galland & Muxel, 2020). However, these do not necessarily happen so. The transition from political attitudes to political action is crucial here since they can be violent or non-violent. Hence, as long as there is no violence, it is hard to claim that radicalism is destructive on its own. On the contrary, it can contribute to the justice that everyone craves for.

Like the relativity of crime place to place and time to time, what people understand from radicalism changes. For example, in the past, radicals most often were non-violent activists like the suffragettes (Schmid, 2013) although today radicalism is associated with violent political actions. As McLaughlin (2012) states that the term radicalism has had both positive and negative connotations throughout history. Negative connotations are perversity, revolution or revolutionism and utopianism whereas positive connotations are progress or progressivism, adequacy and innovation even though these are not shared by all (McLaughlin, 2012).

According to Moskalenko and McCauley (2009), even so it is quite popular, the conveyor belt metaphor, which means activism can give way to radicalism without difficulty and radicals predominantly come out of activism, is problematic and they argued that the distinction between activism and radicalism and to understand the political mobilization and the transition are important. In terms of intentions, activism is described as being ready to take action in a legal and non-violent way while radicalism is described as being ready to take action in an illegal and violent way (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). In another study, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argue that there are certain mechanisms behind radicalization, and the same mechanisms can lead a small portion of the people to terrorism and the majority of the people to activism, which can be illegal sometimes like illegal marches, violence against property and capturing buildings (ecotage or monkeywrenching of environmental activists can be good examples of these actions) and these generally are not described as terrorism but radicalism.

Like the difference between radicalism and activism, extremism is differentiated from radicalism in the literature; thus, in the following title, extremism will be discussed.

### **3.1.4. Extremism**

Radicalism and extremism are used as synonymous in some contexts (McLaughlin, 2012). Even though both of them represent a situation which is being on the other side of mainstream, moderate and status quo positions (Schmid, 2013), they are not exactly the same thing. According to Schmid (2020), the difference between radicalism and extremism is about their views regarding out-groups; for this reason, pluralism, human rights for all are rejected by extremism besides its supremacist approach while radicalism can be more egalitarian and more open to out-group members of the society.

In his book on extremism, after stating the working definition problem of extremism, J. M. Berger defines it as follows: “Extremism refers to the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group.” (Berger, 2018, p. 44). This definition is based on competing between in-group and out-group; in other words, us and them by benefiting from social identity theory. Furthermore, the author emphasizes that terrorism and extremism are different things and he claims that “Terrorism is a tactic, whereas extremism is a belief system.” (Berger, 2018, p. 30); therefore, not all terrorists are extremists or vice versa. This differentiation is important since lately, preventing violent extremism and terrorism prevention has been used as the same by some (Schmid, 2020). Also, because such differences can cause chain reactions for all related concepts, even a minor difference can be crucial while defining them.

Besides, again another distinction emerges between these two: violent extremism and non-violent extremism. Violent extremism has almost the same definition but only the word violent is used instead of hostile in the above-mentioned extremism definition. In other words, obviously violent extremism is just the more severe form of non-violent-extremism.

### **3.1.5. Radicalization**

The most crucial concept in this dissertation is radicalization because the aim and the focus of counter radicalization is to reverse people who are affected by radicalization

in the first place. Therefore, to understand the root causes of the phenomenon, what it is, why and how it happens, a vast literature on radicalization has been produced especially in the last fifteen years. According to Koehler (2017b), although throughout history, radicalization had different meanings in various contexts, it has drawn attention recently from the mainstream science and politics. Thus, it is important not to lose focus in this separate body of literature by going into depth on lately popular radicalization concept; nonetheless, it is necessary to discuss the common point of the definitions to grasp the rationale behind radicalization.

According to Daniela Pisoiu (2012), in the West, what makes radicalization is a problem to focus on was homegrown Islamist terrorism because before September 11 attacks, the term radicalization was not used that often and the aim was not to combat radicalization but terrorism. Furthermore, she adds that the larger number of the EU member states concentrated on radicalization processes as the first phase of the terrorism engagement. As a result, combatting radicalization became the new trend to combat terrorism. Consequently, as Koehler (2017b) states, in lots of Western countries, counter radicalization programs were designed to combat terrorism even though violent radical activities existed before all of this homegrown terrorism and radicalization processes debates.

Since the focus of this dissertation is not the definitions themselves, there is no point to add the different definitions of radicalization here. However, it is necessary to state that in most of the definitions of radicalization, there is a common point, which is the emphasis on the process of ‘becoming a terrorist’ (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 11). As summarized in the following sentence “‘Radicalization’ is at present the standard term used to describe “what goes on before the bomb goes off.””(Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). On the other hand, according to Maskaliūnaitė (2015), the majority of the definitions of radicalization concurs that it is a process; however, those definitions cannot merge at the same point about whether the process leads to the same place. As for Hafez and Mullins (2015), “Scholarly consensus converges on a nonlinear, evolutionary approach to radicalization, one that rejects talk of a sequential process of steps, stages, or phases.” (p.970). Thus, they argue that academic consensus approached radicalization as a nonlinear way although some scholars use metaphors like the staircase (Moghaddam,

2005) to show the different steps of radicalization in the old studies and instead, they propose a better metaphor to get rid of the confusion produced by such models because such process-based models that classify people in different phases of radicalization process are not empirically valid (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). Hence, they suggest that if we think this phenomenon as jigsaw puzzles, we can understand this nonlinearity better because even though the four pieces (“grievances, networks, ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures”) of radicalization puzzle could be found in every radicalization theory or model, this does not mean that these pieces exist at the same time or in the same order due to their interdependency (Hafez & Mullins, 2015, p. 959).

According to Marc Sageman (2017), using the term radicalization to describe how one turns to political violence as the literature mostly does is problematic because this means that radical or extreme ideas lead to using violence even though in reality believing in radical ideas generally do not bring violence; therefore, he claims that believing in radical ideas and turning to political violence are separate processes and should not be confused. As a consequence, it is beneficial to look at the attitudes-behaviour debate to get the picture better.

After stating that attitudes behaviour relationship is weakly comprehended in terrorism studies, Khalil (2014) claims that the same can be seen in the radicalization terrorism relationship and he differentiates radical beliefs from violent actions. Thus, he gives two concepts. In the first one, he explains certain behaviours that contribute to political violence like explosive detonation and in the second one, he explains beliefs or values condoning the just-mentioned behaviours. As stated in this article and in some other studies (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), it is known that radical beliefs are not enough or necessary for political violence because having radical beliefs and supporting violent behaviours do not necessarily lead to performing violent behaviours even if it is premised that behaviours and radical beliefs are strongly correlated for most of the terrorism studies. This discussion will be important especially for disengagement-deradicalization debate in the next part of this chapter.

Regarding radical beliefs and violent behaviour relationship, Bartlett and Miller (2012) use violent radicalization and non-violent radicalization distinction. While violent radicalization refers to a process which causes directly committing or helping the terrorist

activity, non-violent radicalization is defined as “the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, aid, or abet terrorist activity.” (Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 2). The two researchers conducted a study about homegrown terrorism and this study included terrorists, radicals and as a control group, young Muslims to be able to understand the difference between them. As a result, it is seen that violent radicals (terrorists) are emotionally pulled to radicalization not just as a result of rational choice and critiques about the status quo.

In relation with the emotional pull argument in the process of violent radicalization, another important concept, the radical milieu, is critical for this dissertation when terrorism or radicalization as a way to terrorism is aimed to be tackled since it shows the significance of the effect of the social environment. According to Malthaner and Waldmann (2014), the radical milieu refers to a dynamic community interacting with both terrorists and the society. In terms of attitudes, there can be certain similarities between the radical milieu and terrorists; however, in terms of behaviours, the radical milieu is rather different from terrorists since this small community still continues to interact with the rest of the society. Therefore, this situation allows them to recruit new members to the terrorist groups and becomes an important pathway to violent radicalization.

Lastly, as Koomen and Pligt (2015) states in their book, *The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism*, even though the knowledge about how an individual turns to political violence increased a lot after all of these studies following 9/11, it is yet hard to predict to profile before an action happens. In other words, to be able to predict who will perform violent behaviours and when this will happen is limited because of “complex processes in which individual, social and societal factors interact with one another” (Koomen & Pligt, 2015, p. 259). Such a limitation is a problem for crime prevention too (Ekblom, 2011); however, as stated before, terrorism and crime is not the same due to the political aspects of terrorism. As a result, it is better to be careful while dealing with these uncertainties; otherwise, making mistakes in such sensitive issues can be counterproductive. In fact, because it is politically useful, non-scientific, groundless and unlawful usage of political violence can open the doors for defining these terms politically and resulting in implementing ill policies as it will be debated in the subsequent parts of this dissertation.

### **3.2. The Nature of Crime Prevention and Counter Radicalization**

In this subsection, what the purposes of crime prevention and counter radicalization are and what differentiates one from another will be discussed. For this reason, firstly, crime prevention and later, the following counter radicalization strategies will be discussed: disengagement, deradicalization, countering violent extremism and preventing violent extremism.

#### **3.2.1. Crime Prevention**

According to Chainey and Ratcliffe (2005), crime prevention, crime control, crime reduction, community safety and law enforcement can be used interchangeably although they are not exactly the same thing and these five have definitional ambiguity problems. Therefore, the authors give clear definitions for each. The differences between them are not crucial for the purpose of this dissertation; so, there is no need to discuss them in detail; however, it is necessary to state that all of them share the same purpose, which is having less crime and more safety.

This short definition of crime prevention can be a good starting point to discuss the prevention rationale: “Crime prevention entails any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime.” (Lab, 2016, p. 39). As the author states that the definitions of crime prevention generally lack fear of crime, which is an important detail because reducing the fear of crime is also aimed by most of the crime prevention programs (Lab, 2016). Thus, this means that the purpose of crime prevention is enhancing the safety of the people not only by preventing the occurrence of crime but also reducing the fear of crime even if there is no real threat. This is critical if the aim is to prevent or counter-terrorism since as it is discussed before, terrorism is closely related to perceived threat when it is accepted as a strategy of psychological warfare. When the aforementioned revised academic consensus definition of terrorism is checked, terrorism is defined as something ‘fear-generating’ political violence and it is clearly seen the emphasis on psychological effects on people.

Crime prevention can be used in a broad or narrow sense. On one hand, when it is used in a broad sense, it means that preventing crimes before happening or reducing their

occurrence and severity (Bjørger, 2013). On the other hand, if there is not an offense but there is just anticipation of an offense, it means that it is used in a narrow sense; in other words, pure prevention (Welsh & Farrington, 2012). In this study, crime prevention refers to a broad understanding of prevention. Other than these, much more details will be given in the next chapter about crime prevention when the different models of it are discussed.

### **3.2.2. Counter Radicalization**

9/11 marked a new epoch in the history of terrorism studies and the intense interest in terrorism accelerated in the subsequent term with certain terrorist attacks in several European countries including cities like London and Madrid. The strange part of the incidents was related to the perpetrators' background since it was thought that lots of them were radicalized on their own without any effect of an outside intervention (Crone & Harrow, 2011). Interestingly, the perpetrators were born in Europe, and they grew up in Europe. They were educated in schools with core European values and they entered European work life and so on (Nesser, 2010; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). This phenomenon was conceptualized as homegrown terrorism. Besides homegrown terrorism threat, the second striking set of events concerning terrorism and political violence emerged after Syrian civil war because foreign fighters who went to the Levant from the Western countries were not different. So, how did they radicalize and join terrorist activities in spite of their Western origin?

As a result, the reasons behind homegrown terrorism and the issue of foreign fighters became an important debate in terrorism circles and the focus of the terrorism studies shifted to radicalization processes and consequently to counter radicalization especially after these foreign fighters wanted to return their "homes". First, although European countries took both hard and soft measures dealing with the issue (Vidino, 2014), solely contingent upon hard measures cannot be a favourable option for European countries especially against their own citizens when the problem has arisen at home. Second, because radicalization was seen as a pathway to terrorism, dealing with radicalization; to be more precise, counter radicalization was more appropriate in terms of human rights for European countries as it was stated earlier.

According to Vidino and Brandon (2012), European countries improved the existing counter-terrorism strategies like conventional counter-terrorism weapons, intelligence and legislation but they also introduced counter radicalization strategies as an innovative additional step to fight against this homegrown terrorism threat. In addition, the authors also state that these strategies aimed deradicalization and disengagement of violent extremists besides preventing the new radicalised individuals (like pure prevention).

In the literature, the problem with counter radicalization strategies is that they can be used interchangeably. For instance, in some studies like the above-mentioned study (Vidino & Brandon, 2012), counter radicalization is used as if it is the umbrella term for all radicalization-focused strategies. In one study (Koehler, 2018), it can be found that countering violent extremism programmes can be used as a broader term for counter radicalization programmes and while doing so, the author also means all radicalization-focused strategies in that study. Or as stated in another study (Stephens et al., 2019), countering violent extremism, CVE, and preventing violent extremism, PVE, can be used interchangeably in the counter-terrorism literature. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss their nature to clarify the differences between them.

Butt and Tuck (2014) accept that counter radicalization and deradicalization are different. Whereas counter radicalization aims to prevent radicalization before happening, deradicalization aims to reverse what already happened by both fighting against extremist ideologies and physical participation of the individuals in the extremist groups. Therefore, disengagement also becomes an essential part of this counter radicalization discussion.

To sum up, no matter how they are used and defined in the literature, all of these counter radicalization strategies (this study adopted counter radicalization as an umbrella term even though CVE is also can be used in the same way because it is widespread) are based on the assumption that radicalization leads to violence. Some focus on the process before its occurrence while some, as an intervention, try to change the current situation either or both focusing on ‘hearts and minds’ and behaviours. The reason will be elaborated in the following chapter too since this ambiguity is also related to prevention rationale itself (like narrow-broad understanding of prevention and primary-secondary-tertiary prevention classifications of the prevention literature in the next chapter).

### 3.2.3. Disengagement

Disengagement and deradicalization go hand in hand in most of the literature because of the assumed relationship between attitudes and behaviours. As stated under the radicalization title, the attitudes-behaviour debate is significant for both disengagement and deradicalization. Basically, disengagement refers to leave the radical group whereas deradicalization refers to change one's radical beliefs (Rabasa et al., 2010). Thus, disengagement aims the departure of violent radicals from the organization while deradicalization aims to change violent radicals' heart and minds so that they can turn away from violent behaviours. The following questions appear here: if one leaves or disengages from the violent radical group, does it mean that he/she also changes his/her radical belief? Or, if one changes his/her radical belief, does it mean that he/she also leaves the violent radical group (if he/she was involved in such a group in the first place due to his/her radical belief)? The answer cannot be simply positive because although it is assumed that the value system and behaviours of a person should be compatible, in practice, this is always not the case.

According to Bjørge and Horgan (2009), the behavioural and cognitive aspects should be separated, and altering the violent behaviours is more significant than altering the radical attitudes. The crucial point here is the existence of people who have extremist views yet stay away from violent groups and behaviours because this makes the supposed causal relationship, radicalization leads to violence, questionable. Moreover, they also found that certain people became radicals after joining the violent groups because recruitment of terrorists can be realized in different ways with or without strong ideological commitments (Koehler, 2017b; Nesser, 2010). Thus, the members of violent groups are not necessarily radical, and the radical individuals do not necessarily join the violent groups and/or commit violent acts. In the same way, one does not necessarily disengage from the violent group because he/she changed his/her radical attitudes and one does not necessarily change his/her radical attitudes even if he/she disengaged.

Altier, Thoroughgood and Horgan (2014) state that why individuals join terrorist groups was studied much in the literature; however, to understand why individuals leave them is also quite valuable. To be able to understand the reasons for leaving a terrorist group, they integrated certain fields like criminology, sociology and psychology into their

study. Therefore, by benefiting from the accumulated knowledge, the authors argue that there cannot be only one reason to leave a terrorist group; on the contrary, there are varied push and pull factors which makes the departure of the individual easier. Plus, they formed these factors compactly at Table 3.1 below. “Push factors are aspects related to individuals’ experiences while involved in terrorism that drive them away. Pull factors are outside influences that lure individuals to a conventional social role.” (Altier et al., 2014, p. 648) In another study, while push factors are defined as “the negative social incidents and circumstances that make it uncomfortable and unappealing to remain in a specific social environment”, pull factors are defined as “positive factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative” (Bjørgero, 2016a, p. 234).

Table 3.1: Factors for terrorist disengagement

| <i>Push factors</i>  | <i>Pull factors</i>                                  |
|--|--|
| Unmet expectations   | Competing loyalties                                  |
| Disillusionment with strategy/actions of terrorist group               | Positive interactions with moderates                 |
| Disillusionment with personnel   | Employment/educational demands or opportunities      |
| Difficulty adapting to clandestine lifestyle                           | Desire to marry/establish a family or family demands |
| Inability to cope with physiological/psychological effects of violence | Financial incentives                                 |
| Loss of faith in ideology  | Amnesty  |
| Burnout  |  |

Source: (Altier et al., 2014, p. 649)

Thus, the purpose of disengagement programs is to promote exit (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013) by intervening in the departure process. Traumatic or special events can make the departure easier because they can trigger cognitive opening and questioning of the involvement too (Koehler, 2017b). As a result, although disengagement is simply seen as the physical departure from the violent group, it is clear that the hearts and minds of the individuals can play a key role during this process whether it is because of the intervention (i.e., disengagement and deradicalization programs) or not. Therefore, this

explains one of the reasons why disengagement and deradicalization go hand in hand and leads us to discuss deradicalization.

#### **3.2.4. Deradicalization**

As two leading academics working on deradicalization and disengagement emphasize that “Deradicalization often appears to be understood as any effort aimed at preventing radicalization from taking place.” (Bjørge & Horgan, 2009, p. 3). On the other hand, as stated above, deradicalization is also used as an intervention aiming to reverse radicalization. Hence, how radicalization is understood directly affects what it is meant by deradicalization.

For instance, in the radicalization definition of Ashour (2009), it is seen that legitimizing violence and rejecting democratic values is a crucial characteristic of the radicalization process. As a consequence, his deradicalization definition reflects the reverse of this process. Not substantially different, but stressing the impact of ideology more, Koehler (2017b) defines radicalization as the de-pluralization process of political values while accepting non-violent solutions are ineffective; therefore, the opposite of radicalization; namely, deradicalization suggests the process of re-pluralization of political values and renouncing violence as an option for reaching ends.

The article written by Gordon Clubb (2015) is pretty valuable concerning the disengagement-deradicalization and the attitudes-behaviour debates because he identifies the problem clearly and uses a distinction called broad deradicalization and narrow deradicalization. In the broad definition of deradicalization, it is expected that changing one’s ideology affects the attitudes and behaviours of the individual whereas in the narrow definition of deradicalization, what is expected is a change in the behaviours of the individual regarding political violence. Differently from the previous one, narrow deradicalization does not necessarily expect ideological change or a general change in attitudes. This became more critical when it is known that “there is no evidence to suggest that disengagement from terrorism may result in deradicalization.” (Horgan, 2009, p. 298). Thus, the difference in the second one comes from the notion that if one does not change his/her ideology, he/she can commit violent acts for political purposes again. In other words, the change in behaviours can be tactical; thus, not to have recidivism

problem, the motivations (ideology in this context) for political violence or terrorism should be targeted (Clubb, 2015). As a consequence, to have a durable change in behaviours and due to the risk of re-radicalization (Koehler, 2020), some suggest that ideological change also should be aimed besides physical disengagement while the others do not see it as a necessary part for successful deradicalization. According to Koehler (2020), even though the ideology is crucial for both engaging and disengaging processes, what helps to clear the terminological ambiguity is the function of violence. As it is clear, the significant part of the discussion here is about the disengagement of the former violent extremists because in terms of the existing practices of deradicalization and disengagement, especially prison rehabilitation is widespread as it will be discussed in the next chapter.

Therefore, in the literature, there are different understandings of deradicalization. For instance, in other studies, deradicalization can be used as psychological disengagement (Horgan et al., 2017). This means that deradicalization does not set aside cognitive aspects of being out of the violent extremism. While narrow deradicalization and physical disengagement more or less refer to the same phenomenon, it can be said that broad deradicalization includes both physical and psychological disengagement. However, one way or another, due to its nature, what deradicalization aims cannot be free from the security or ideology-related concerns.

### **3.2.5. Countering Violent Extremism**

Like the strong bond between deradicalization and disengagement, Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) can be found together in the form of P/CVE in the literature because of the connection between these two concepts. Moreover, as it was stated above, CVE and PVE can be used interchangeably although some claim they are different concepts.

2015 is an important year for CVE because of the White House's international high-level CVE Summit (Koehler, 2017b) and the UN's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (Szmania & Fincher, 2017); however, CVE has precursors since utilizing soft measures to tackle terrorism was not a new idea (Frazer & Nünlist, 2015). These soft measures; in other words, "war of ideas", an expression which strongly evokes Chapter

2, were effective since the second term of George W. Bush and it continued with different implementations with subsequent presidents in the US (Starr-Deelen & Pazos, 2018). However, the trend did not emerge there; on the contrary, “The shift towards a CVE approach to counter-terrorism was first seen in Europe.” (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016, p. 7). Besides, there were many practices which focus on radicalization in the rest of the world since “radicalization that leads to violence” turned into a burning issue almost everywhere. On the other hand, the one in the UK (The Prevent Strategy) is particularly important for this dissertation because that practice shows how theoretical debates in this study are not merely theoretical debates as it will be discussed in Chapter 5.

To differentiate CVE practices from other practices is challenging because what CVE aims is not clear. According to Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit (2016), some CVE projects aim to change behaviours and some aim to dispute beliefs or attitudes while some others’ purpose is social cohesion; therefore, CVE projects are quite dissimilar. Thus, these three authors argue that “CVE should be understood as a policy spectrum.” (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016, p. 6). Correspondingly, Cherney and Belton (2019) state that CVE programs include lots of diverse activities and add that in general the most commonly used approach in these interventions are related to secondary and tertiary prevention, which will be discussed in the next chapter under the title of Public Health Model. In a very simple way, this means that CVE is rarely into primary prevention because in this one, there is no sign for a deviant action and there is no a committed offense. According to Koehler (2020), using CVE as the umbrella term is more appropriate both for the practices of prevention (pre-radicalization) and also the practices of intervention (in-radicalization and post-radicalization). Furthermore, he advocates that prevention practices are commonly used as counter radicalization or PVE practices and intervention practices are used for practices like deradicalization.

All of these discussions about CVE and other classifications indicate that in the literature, there is not a consensus on the boundaries and the nature of these practices. One of the reasons of this is that radicalization-focused approaches are newly emerging. As a matter of fact, more important than being in its infancy (Koehler, 2017b), they are bound to the ambiguities of terrorism. Because having “the *Holy Grail* of terrorism

research - an agreed conceptual framework” can be optimistic (Silke, 1996, p. 27), “radicalization leads to terrorism” approaches may be doomed to this ambiguity as well.

### **3.2.6. Preventing Violent Extremism/Radicalization**

According to Koehler, “PVE programmes can be defined as programmes designed to prevent recruitment and radicalisation into violent extremism leading to terrorist actions.” (2017a, p. 91). Moreover, the author adds that these can include primary prevention like resilience building programmes and secondary prevention which focuses on at risk individuals or groups. On the other hand, in the literature, because security-focused approaches are found problematic in the pre-criminal space due to varied reasons, some PVE approaches claim that they do not hold a framework which is security-driven (Stephens et al., 2019). Especially from the criminal justice framework, having or sharing radical or extreme views or beliefs cannot be denoted as crimes as long as they are not violent and unlawful (OSCE, 2014).

According to Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier’s (2019) literature review on preventing radicalization and PVE based on seventy-three studies, four themes recurred in this literature. These are developing resilience, identity and dialogue and action focusing on the individual and lastly building community resilience against violent extremism. Although this article tries to exclude explicitly security-focused papers because the differences between CVE and PVE is not clear in the literature, it shares some criticisms of certain studies against these programs as follows: the programs aim resilience-building “are directed toward changing the mindset of individuals rather than addressing institutional or systemic issues or injustices.” (Stephens et al., 2019, p. 355). This is related to the political characteristic of the subject that is dealt with.

### **3.3. Discussion**

In this chapter, it was argued that differently from crime which is designated by law, terrorism and its by-products (counter radicalization, disengagement, deradicalization, countering violent extremism and preventing violent extremism) are defined politically. As a by-product of terrorism, counter radicalization is defined

politically as well. Thus, counter radicalization means creating a preventative defence against substantial political change.

Until this part of the chapter, time to time, supporting arguments were presented implicitly not to impair the integrity of the chapter while discussing the basic concepts of the crime prevention and counter radicalization literatures. However, it is necessary to state and discuss them explicitly in a coherent and structured way in this section.

First of all, albeit the designation of crimes is not completely away from political contexts, terrorism is directly and substantially related to the political. Denoting a crime as a crime (law-making) is the result of a political process. Nevertheless, decreeing an act as a crime can be realized due to the existing laws by courts; therefore, everyone who respects the principle of rule of law and the independence of the judiciary accepts the decisions of courts. Since discussing the separation of powers here would cause to digress from the argument, it is enough to emphasize that different from terrorism, crime is designated by law. The reason behind this is the conceptual fog around terrorism and related terms since this causes a complete mess. Moreover, due to the conceptual ambiguity of terrorism, even though every country creates their own definitions for this international phenomenon, it is challenging to obtain a universally accepted definition by the UN.

Secondly, when terrorism does not have a proper definition, this situation opens the door of pejorative meanings and terrorism turns into a rhetorical device (Schmid, 2011) beyond the action itself. To illustrate, if a murderer committed homicide, the motivation of him/her is less significant when the sentence is decided since there is a fixed minimum sentence independent from the motivations. The reason behind this is that the definition of homicide is well-defined. Of course, the sentence of homicide can change place to place or time to time like capital punishment or incarceration (even the criminality of the act can change although it seems that this is only possible in the state of nature); however, the definition of homicide is not vague as terrorism. On the other hand, when a terrorist committed an act of terrorism, the motivation of the terrorist becomes more important than the act itself unlike homicide. Thus, if terrorism is not well-defined, this creates a huge chaos and everyone can make their own definitions without any reasoning. This can be very useful and well-paying especially for politicians due to

the sensitivity of the problem for the masses or citizens of a country. As Schmid states “‘Terrorism’ may well be the most politicized term in the political vocabulary these days.” (2011, p. 40).

Lastly, while crime prevention means creating a preventative defence against crimes designated by law, counter radicalization means creating a preventative defence against substantial political change. The purpose of counter radicalization, whether it is in pre-criminal space or post-criminal space, cannot be free from the ideological change of the individuals because their framework suggests what they try to prevent exists because of a toxic ideology not because of psychological or structural reasons of deviant behaviours. For instance, even in the non-security driven programmes for preventing violent extremism, the signs of the indoctrination of a desired ideology can be seen as stated above. Although it is security-driven, maybe the most valid concept in counter radicalization literature is disengagement because the purpose is behavioural change independent from cognitive change. Once more, it is seen that if the aim of counter radicalization is only the security, focusing on behaviours or actions rather than motivations, beliefs or ideas would be more suitable for the continuance of the legal status quo like crime prevention.

As a result, whereas crime prevention contributes to the legal status-quo, counter radicalization contributes to both the legal and political status quo. Because counter radicalization accepts the premise of “radicalization leads to violence”, it tries to prevent violence. Therefore, in that way, it contributes to the legal status quo as crime prevention initiatives realize. At the same time, because while doing that, counter radicalization initiatives focus on the ideological change on the behalf of the specific ideology of the practising authorities or states, it contributes to the political status quo.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **HOW TO PREVENT: THE MODELS AND THE TOOLS OF CRIME PREVENTION AND COUNTER RADICALIZATION**

Similar to Chapter 3, in order to have a more coherent and structured study, in this chapter, firstly, there will be discussions on the models and the tools of crime prevention and counter radicalization and then, at the end of the chapter, there will be a short discussion section. However, unlike the previous chapter, this chapter will predominantly constitute crime prevention. This situation is not surprising but natural because as stated in Chapter 1, there is an imbalance between the literatures of crime prevention and counter radicalization. Therefore, when terrorism is seen as a form of crime than warfare, crime prevention literature is a fertile ground for a newly emerging field like counter radicalization. Even if terrorism is not seen as a crime, by ignoring the differences between an ordinary crime and terrorism, the rich literature of crime prevention and criminology would be a good starting point to get insight for an empirically barren land.

While discussing the models and tools, it will be seen that crime prevention and counter radicalization use similar models and tools; however, the issues that they deal with are different because politically motivated crime is different from self-interest motivated ordinary crime.

#### **4.1. The Models of Crime Prevention and Counter Radicalization**

According to Cherney (2016), regarding the causes and prevention of terrorism, criminology contributed a lot and likewise, it did the same for dealing with radicalization and violent extremism. As a result, he argues that as a subfield of criminology, crime prevention can also help for dealing with radicalization and violent extremism as a counter-terrorism practice since this field is in its infancy. Definitely, Cherney is not the only academic who thinks the same way as literature clearly indicates that. Hence, in this section, there will be discussions on the models of crime prevention and counter

radicalization and how similar or different they are. The models here are crime prevention models (public health model was adopted); however, they are (un)deliberately utilized by counter radicalization too. Because the public health model started to be popular in counter radicalization or CVE literature, it will be discussed the first. And then, situational, developmental, community, and criminal justice models will be discussed.

#### **4.1.1. Public Health Model**

Although public health classification for disease prevention appeared at the end of 50's (Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994, as cited in Harris-Hogan et al., 2016), in the 60's and 70's, crime prevention adopted the public health model for classifying the crime prevention initiatives since it was a well-established model for disease prevention (Lab, 2016). Public health model basically classifies disease prevention initiatives into three categories as primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention includes efforts like vaccinations before any disease occurs. Secondary prevention is interested in the early signs of a disease while tertiary prevention deals with a disease that has already appeared (Lab, 2016). Put it differently, primary prevention takes actions in the pre-disease period and secondary prevention focuses on people or situations that are at risk whereas tertiary prevention tries to find a solution in the post-disease period. When this model is borrowed by crime prevention, crime is considered as a disease. As it can be seen from Table 4.1, whereas primary prevention can include various initiatives environmental design to public education, secondary prevention can involve diverse implementations of situational crime prevention to community policing and tertiary prevention can include conventional criminal justice activities like incapacitation and rehabilitation. In addition, tertiary prevention is also primary prevention for potential offenders due to general deterrence (Lab, 2016). Hence, this can create problems when an initiative is described as primary or tertiary as it was cross-referred in chapter 3, the debates on the concepts of CVE, counter radicalization and deradicalization because these are not absolute and can be classified according to the purpose of the particular initiative.

According to Bhui, Hicks, Lashley and Jones (2012), the criminal justice framework is limited for countering violent radicalization and the public health model can be a solution for this.

Table 4.1: Crime Prevention Approaches

|   |
|---|
| <b><i>Primary Prevention</i></b>  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environmental design               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Architectural design</li> <li>Lighting</li> <li>Access control</li> <li>Property identification</li> </ul> </li> <li>Neighborhood watch               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Surveillance</li> <li>Citizen patrols</li> </ul> </li> <li>General deterrence               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arrest and conviction</li> <li>Sentencing methods</li> </ul> </li> <li>Public education               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Levels of crime</li> <li>Fear</li> <li>Self-help</li> </ul> </li> <li>Developmental crime prevention               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early intervention programs</li> </ul> </li> <li>Social crime prevention               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unemployment</li> <li>Poverty</li> <li>Employment/job training</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
| <b><i>Secondary Prevention</i></b>  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identification and prediction               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early identification of problem individuals</li> <li>Crime area analysis</li> </ul> </li> <li>Situational crime prevention               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Problem identification</li> <li>Situation-specific intervention</li> </ul> </li> <li>Community policing</li> <li>Substance abuse               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prevention and treatment</li> <li>Schools and crime prevention</li> </ul> </li> </ul>   |
| <b><i>Tertiary Prevention</i></b>   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specific deterrence</li> <li>Incapacitation</li> <li>Rehabilitation and treatment</li> </ul>   |

Source: (Lab, 2014, p. 29)

In the same way, quite similar arguments are proposed by other scholars who claim that the criminal justice model is dominant in the CVE context and public health framework can be utilized instead (Weine et al., 2017). On the other hand, Aggarwal (2019) criticizes these views of mental health professionals because risk factors are not clear for violent extremism which does not have a proper definition. In brief, the common point of these ideas is that the criminal justice framework is security-driven, and this creates problems like stigmatization, suspect societies, etc.; therefore, the public health model can solve this problem by treating violent extremism as a disease threatening public health.

However, the problem regarding these views is that if terrorism is crime and radicalization and extremism are pathways to terrorism, these cannot be isolated from security contexts because of the nature of the concept. Of course, it is known that “Rather than proposing a one-size-fits-all solution, the public health system of classification aims to identify combinations of solutions that work for different groups in different contexts.” (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016, p. 8). As a consequence, if their concerns are not proposing alternatives but supporting the existing practices, as it can be seen in the following titles and Table 4.1, the only applied prevention model or approach is not criminal justice model; therefore, from the crime prevention perspective, what they propose (either public health model or other models) is not new in crime prevention literature for conventional crimes even if this literature does not reject the criminal or security dimensions of such phenomena. Therefore, the essence of the issue is not being security-driven but being non-scientific. For instance, because we assume preventing radicalization or violent extremism can reduce recruitment of terrorists, it does not mean that the reality automatically reflects that and we can behave accordingly. Here, the discussions in earlier chapters emerge again; even what terrorism and by-products are not clear in the minds; nonetheless, endless “possible” solutions can be proposed by different professionals from different fields as if terrorism and by-products are isolated concepts which are not related to the political contexts.

Furthermore, even if we ignore this missing link and focus on the public health model itself, it does not mean that this model is perfect for CVE. In the context of terrorism prevention by focusing on radicalization and extremism, Hardy (2020) states

that making analogy between diseases and violent extremism is problematic although the aim of both is harm prevention; in other words, because the objects of prevention are different, the strategies, techniques cannot be the same for preventing diseases and radicalization and extremism. As an example, he says that most of the people can benefit from an ad about how exercise can be good for health; however, the same cannot be applied to countering violent extremism. Also, when radicalization and extremism are considered as a disease, as stated in Chapter 3, it is known that even the small portion of radicals became terrorists; thus, targeting the general public can be counterproductive when bearing in mind the fear-generating purpose of terrorism. As a result, the caveat of Hardy about the differences between diseases and violent extremism is quite crucial.

#### **4.1.2. Situational Crime Prevention Model**

Four crime prevention strategies were identified in the study of Tonry and Farrington (1995) and from now on, these will be used because it is widely referred in the crime prevention literature. The first one is law enforcement and criminal justice, which will be discussed at the end of this section. Besides this model is known by everyone and implemented in everywhere, the other three, situational, developmental and community models are also very effective strategies in today's world although situational crime prevention model is more dominant than the models based on social factors in the context of Britain since the 80's (Crawford & Evans, 2012).

Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), very simply seeks to reduce the opportunities for the occurrence of any crime (Clarke, 2018) based on theories like rational choice theory, routine activities theory and crime pattern theory (Lab, 2016). On the other hand, the root causes of offenses are not the focus of SCP; thus, it does not aim to address them (Schneider, 2015; Tilley, 2012). To illustrate, environmental design like lightening, closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras or property identification (see Table 4.1) are well-known examples of SCP even though this is just a very small part of it.

When the intersection of terrorism prevention and crime prevention literature is examined, it is seen that one of the most benefited models is SCP. For instance, the book of Clarke and Newman (2006), *Outsmarting the Terrorists*, is a good and early example of this and after this book, SCP got a lot of attention in terrorism prevention literature

(Berkell, 2019). In this book, the scholars wrote 20 principles on outsmarting terrorists extracted from SCP literature. The first one is that “We must not rely on changing the hearts and minds of terrorists.” (Clarke & Newman, 2006, p. 11). This is because SCP does not concentrate on the root causes of terrorism but reducing the opportunity. To put it differently, SCP is “looking at crime events rather than at the underlying dispositions behind the criminality.” (Gill et al., 2017, p. 115). According to Clarke and Newman (2006), the motivation behind terrorism is the consequence of a long process, and it is not easy to change them in a short time but reducing opportunity for committing any act of crime is possible. However, if SCP is not interested in the underlying dispositions, what is the relevance of SCP in the context of counter radicalization?

As stated more than once in this dissertation, the premise “radicalization leads to violence” is widely used in the literature. And because SCP focuses on reducing the opportunity, not focuses on the hearts and minds, terrorism prevention through preventing violent extremism and radicalization seems out of the context of SCP. Although it seems irrelevant, according to Hardy (2020), SCP can be implemented in CVE and these especially can be related to online extremism. Hardy elaborates this more and gives examples of it like suspending social media accounts. Indeed, since the Internet is a place that makes the recruitment possible, “would-be terrorists” (Gill et al., 2017, p. 115) can be prevented by controlling the online communication and the interactions of radical accounts as big social media companies already do. Although it is emphasized that it should be a fight against violence not against the expressions of radical views (Gill et al., 2017), how to draw a line between these two is still problematic while the concepts related to terrorism suffer from definitional ambiguity problem and also the relationship between radicalization and violence needs more scientific studies.

#### **4.1.3. Developmental Crime Prevention Model**

According to Tonry and Farrington, “the child is father to the man.” (1995, p.10) is the rationale behind Developmental Crime Prevention (DCP). Besides longitudinal studies which look into the crime levels of young people starting from early childhood, DCP is depending on “motivational or human development and life-course theories on criminal behavior,” (Welsh & Farrington, 2012, p. 6). Therefore, because DCP advocates that “offending is determined by behavioural and attitudinal patterns learned and

produced throughout the course of an individual's life" (Crawford & Evans, 2012, pp. 781–782), it focuses on the root causes of offending unlike SCP and targets to "influence the scientifically identified risk factors" (Welsh & Farrington, 2012, p. 6) to prevent offending especially for certain groups like children and young people.

As a result, the essential part of this model is concentrating on risk factors. In the context of CVE, the key example of this is the Channel program of the UK since this program identifies risk factors for radicalization of youth (Hardy, 2020). This program will be discussed in the next chapter; however, it can be stated that pathways, early risk factors, and desistance from crime are important concepts in DCP. More importantly, desistance from crime has an impact on the soft strategies of terrorism prevention. Nevertheless, according to Hardy (2020), in terrorism literature, instead of desistance from crime, push and pull factors (see Table 3.1) for disengagement and deradicalization are favoured more because terrorism scholars think that the desistance factors that influence people from ordinary crime and terrorism are different and it is found that disillusionment are more important than others.

#### **4.1.4. Community Crime Prevention Model**

Community Crime Prevention (CCP) is concentrating on the community benefiting from both SCP and DDP. Thus, in general, "community-based efforts to prevent crime are thought to be some combination of developmental and situational prevention." (Welsh & Farrington, 2012, p. 7). Similarly, according to Schneider (2015), CCP can be separated into two. The first one is the community defense model. In this one, the purpose is to strengthen the community to be able to defend itself via opportunity reduction measures. The second one is the community development model. The aim of this model is eliminating the root causes of crime via community building and social developmental measures. According to Tilley (2012), it can be said that community policing, community engagement and neighbourhood watch are CCP's three main approaches.

As a theoretical basis, the studies of the Chicago School of Criminology after the 1920s is quite crucial for CCP (Schneider, 2015; Tonry & Farrington, 1995). This school argued that intense industrialization caused urbanization and, in that way, communal and

social ties became weaker; as a result, this situation induced more crime due to lack of social control in modern societies (Schneider, 2015).

In the context of counter radicalization, community-based efforts are quite significant because they are directly related to CVE (Hardy, 2020). However, the problem is that implementing some of the social cohesion or building community resilience programs can be beyond CVE (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). For example, because the scope of social cohesion programs is broader than CVE, organizing baking competitions or football matches cannot be limited to targeting at risk groups that are vulnerable to be radicalized (Hardy, 2020).

#### **4.1.5. Criminal Justice Prevention Model**

Criminal Justice Prevention basically aims to prevent crime through the punishment (Bjørgero, 2013). With the help of general deterrence and specific deterrence, criminal justice agencies try to reduce the crime in society (Lab, 2016). Through general deterrence, potential offenders avoid committing crime because they know if one breaks the law, they will be punished (Lab, 2016). And through specific deterrence, it is aimed that the person who committed a crime would not violate the law again because he/she already experienced how it is like to be sentenced (Lab, 2016). Because criminal justice prevention is a regular part of crime prevention, it is implemented as a natural part of terrorism prevention independent from the root causes of this offence. This is not directly related to CVE; however, CVE is more like a complementary part of criminal justice prevention.

All in all, it can be said that the boundaries between crime prevention models are not always clear in practice; nevertheless, it is clear that counter radicalization literature benefited from crime prevention literature a lot even though some scholars noted that ordinary crime and terrorism are different offences.

#### **4.2. The Tools of Crime Prevention and Counter Radicalization**

In this section, to be able to reflect the examples of tertiary, secondary and primary prevention in the counter radicalization literature, the four tools of counter radicalization will be discussed. These are rehabilitation, mentoring, family counseling and lastly media

and counter narratives. Even though these tools can be also utilized in crime prevention, to demonstrate the different aspects of counter radicalization and not to digress from the main discussion, the focus will be on the implementations of them in the CVE context.

#### **4.2.1. Rehabilitation**

As Mullins (2010) states, offender rehabilitation dates back to the 1950s even though there are questions regarding its efficacy even for ordinary criminals. However, because recidivism reduction is the main goal, one of the most prevailing tools in counter radicalization is rehabilitation. As discussed in the previous chapter, reducing recidivism of former offenders is very crucial for deradicalization interventions. Moreover, because when there is no terrorist act committed and by only leaning on “radicalization leads to violence” premise, early (primary, secondary preventions) counter radicalization interventions can create more problems in practice; however, dealing with the convicted terrorists is less questionable because they have more potential for offending inside or outside of the prison. Hence, prison rehabilitation becomes a useful tool for both Western liberal nation states and the rest of the world due to the severity of its effects.

The expression of Horgan and Altier explains the purpose of rehabilitation shortly and precisely as follows: “The goal of the rehabilitation effort is not just to turn former terrorists, but also to assess the risk of reoffending and to equip the former terrorist with the social and psychological tools to re-enter society” (2012, p. 85). Thus, it seems like rehabilitation targets well-being of both the individuals and the society.

If the aim of imprisonment of convicted terrorists is simply specific or general deterrence (classical criminal justice practices) without any other interventions by hoping that the convicts will understand the negative consequences of his/her actions, there are certain risks of this especially for a politically motivated crime like terrorism. This is because the convict can be a threat after release if he/she still thinks that he/she behaved righteously and also the existence of the terrorist convict in the prison can be a very suitable opportunity for recruiting new members. According to the study of LaFree, Jiang and Porter, “when radicalization occurs in the context of prison, the criminogenic effect of imprisonment is doubled.” (2020, p. 473). In such a context, unlike other self-interest

motivated ordinary crimes, the role of ideology in rehabilitation can be found vital for some researchers.

According to Mullins (2010), although there is not a perfect rehabilitation program, in the literature, there are certain agreements on more effective practices to reach the goal of less recidivism. One of the most cited and agreed one is the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) principles. These are produced by Andrews, Bonta and Wormith (2006). Basically, risk principle refers to targeting offenders according to their risk of reoffending; need principle refers to targeting criminogenic needs (factors related to offending) according to eight risk/need factors and lastly responsivity principle refers to being responsive to the needs of offenders while intervening (how the intervention is delivered) (Andrews et al., 2006; Hansen, 2020; Kessels et al., 2017; Mullins, 2010). These eight are history of antisocial behaviour, antisocial personality pattern, antisocial cognition, antisocial associates, family and/or marital, school and/or work, leisure and or/recreation and lastly substance abuse (Andrews et al., 2006, p. 11). Therefore, RNR principles are also quite important for CVE rehabilitation interventions; however, as stated before, the ideology is significant. Such programs, including ideology, are implemented in different parts of the world due to the potential threat of reoffending and recruitment of new members even though ideological programs can receive diverse criticisms especially in Western liberal nation states. As a result, rehabilitation of the terrorists is significant for both reducing recidivism after release and minimizing the effect of the prison as a “school of crime” for terrorists (LaFree et al., 2020).

#### **4.2.2. Mentoring**

Mentoring mainly can be a part of offender rehabilitation (because rehabilitation can include a wide range of activities like vocational training, arts, sports etc.) or it can be used for potentially radicalized individuals. There are different types of mentors in CVE. Professional mentors, ex-offenders or former extremists and victims of terrorism can be mentors in practice (Koehler, 2017b). Especially ex-offenders’ mentoring is important since ex-offenders know both the inside and the outside of the terrorist organization. Although there are academic studies to understand how disengagement happens by using the experiences of former terrorists (Scrivens et al., 2020), benefiting from them in an active role is also logical because their experiences before engagement,

during and after disengagement are valuable in CVE to guide the individuals. Furthermore, using former extremists as mentors can be beneficial for also attracting and communicating with the targeted group since for this group, ex-offenders can be more trustable than officials (Koehler, 2017b).

On the other hand, the difference between self-interest motivated ordinary crimes and politically motivated crimes appears again. According to Spalek and Davies, “mentoring around violent extremism carries distinctive features, and can be distinguished from mentoring in other areas of criminal behavior or in drug/alcohol use.” (2012, p. 357). Therefore, the political aspects of countering violent extremism become crucial and points out the main discussion once more.

#### **4.2.3. Family Counselling**

Another widely used tool in counter radicalization is family counselling. This is maybe the most special community-based tool in CVE initiatives because the trust builds on the families or friends of at-risk individuals. The civil servants like nurses, teachers, etc. as it will be discussed in the next chapter, can cause problems when they are involved in the prevention of terrorism as a part of early intervention because this can cause securitization of public life. However, benefiting from families without forcing them can reduce such problems since it is expected that family members wish the well-being of each other and know their family members more than other community members. Especially, this can be a good tool for states in terms of detecting lone-wolves.

According to the study of Gill, Horgan and Deckert on 119 lone-actor terrorists, “In 63.9% of the cases, family and friends were aware of the individual’s intent to engage in terrorism-related activities because the offender verbally told them.” (2014, p. 429). Thus, without any suspicion, the majority of them clearly was known by the family and friends since there is a relationship building on trust. According to Koehler (2017b), for early prevention, family and friends are the most significant tool since they are the social environment of the individuals.

Nevertheless, even though the position and effect of the family on the individual is thought positively, Spalek argues that “families may provide both risk and protection

factors in relation to radicalisation.” (2016, p. 50). In other words, families also can trigger being radicalized in contrast to the expectations. Therefore, regarding counter radicalization, even families cannot be a reliable tool all the time. On the other hand, in crime prevention literature, the purpose of the interventions about families is to minimize the negative effects of highly problematic families on children and society by changing their behaviours because the focus is on families at risk, not on the potentially radicalized individuals (Nixon & Parr, 2008). Namely, such families are seen as the risk factor for anti-social behaviours of their children and the family interventions constitute teaching parenting skills to these families different than family counselling practices in counter radicalization.

There are different implementations of using this tool in CVE. One of the most widespread one is helplines. These helplines exist to help potentially radicalized people through their families in some European countries including Germany, the Netherlands, etc. Nonetheless, Koehler (2017b) also warns that the families should not be seen as source of intelligence. However, as long as the concern is the security, this is not a realistic caveat in practice because gathering intelligence is a natural reaction of states if there is a real threat as such. As a result, family counselling stands at the grey zone with its methodology.

#### **4.2.4. Media and Counter Narratives**

After discussing the examples of tertiary and secondary prevention, media and counter narratives will be discussed as an example of primary prevention tool in the CVE context. Media can be a good tool for raising awareness about any kind of crime in the society; however, it can be more valuable for CVE. Because narratives are important to attract individuals to radicalization and extremism, disseminating counter narratives via media is critical for the opposite effect. For example, interviews with former extremists can have such an effect because in that way, raising awareness about this threat can be possible among the general public (Koehler, 2017b).

The inoculation theory is significant to understand the rationale behind this. This theory suggests that normal people who learned about persuasive extremist views are less under threat when they face with such messages in the way that inoculated people

encounter the virus in disease prevention (Braddock, 2019). In other words, how inoculated people's bodies know the virus by getting the weakened virus with vaccines into the body beforehand, with counter narratives, the same is valid for the people who encounter violent extremist views according to this theory. Actually, what primary prevention in disease prevention proposes is the same with this theory in essence. However, as stated before, making analogy between diseases and violent extremism is problematic due to the natures of these different types of harms. Especially when media is used for this purpose before there is no danger, this contributes to the preservation of the political status quo more than any other tool since terrorism and related concepts, which were discussed in the previous chapter, are defined politically.

### **4.3. Discussion**

In this chapter, it is argued that crime prevention and counter radicalization use similar models and tools; however, the issues that they deal with are different because politically motivated crime is different than self-interest motivated ordinary crime.

Firstly, as Fussey (2017) says that the basics of crime prevention strategies are applied to counter-terrorism. According to Schmid, "When it comes to terrorism prevention, some of the most inspiring ideas have come from the literature on crime prevention." (2020, p.26). Furthermore, as Bjørgo states that "Within democratic societies, counter-terrorism is almost exclusively about crime prevention." (2016b, p. 25). The reason behind this is that the acts of self-interest motivated ordinary crimes, and the acts of politically motivated crimes are not too different. Nevertheless, the purposes of these actions are different. For instance, killing someone for stealing his/her money and killing someone for generating fear among the society are the same if we only look at the actions although the effects of these actions are not the same due to their motivations. Therefore, if the aim is to prevent these actions without focusing on the motivations, crime prevention and counter-terrorism can be considered almost as the same. However, it is seen that doing so or implementing conventional crime prevention; in other words, criminal justice measures (incapacitation, deterrence, etc.) or protecting vulnerable targets (an example of SCP) are not enough to prevent terrorism as it was seen in the first five years after the 9/11 attacks (Bjørgo, 2016b). One of the reasons of this is that the effect of politically motivated crime goes beyond action itself. Therefore, the author

continues with this highly significant information: “a narrow counter-terrorism strategy has gradually been supplemented with a broader Counter Violent Extremism approach, with a stronger emphasis and priority to prevention, counter-narratives, deradicalisation and rehabilitation of former extremists” (Bjørge, 2016b, p. 25). Hence, what Bjørge states here is directly related to the very nature of politically motivated crimes.

Secondly, before discussing what kind of a crime terrorism is (if it is a crime), first, there is a need to introduce these two types of crimes in criminology literature: instrumental crime and expressive crime. This classification is significant in terms of crime prevention because it affects the crime prevention policies (Miethe & Drass, 1999). Basically, while instrumental crimes are committed for achieving clear future goals, expressive crimes are committed because of anger and frustration in a spontaneous way in general (Miethe & Drass, 1999). Terrorism is not simply an instrumental crime which offers someone explicit personal gains like theft when it is committed because the acts of terrorism are committed for more lofty aims within a specific worldview or ideology. These lofty aims may be rational or not within the political status quo; however, they are committed for achieving a higher goal, unlike self-interest motivated ordinary crimes. On the other hand, although terrorism seems more alike to instrumental crimes, it also carries the characteristics of expressive crimes because the acts of terrorism are committed due to anger and frustration caused by the political status quo. Thus, it has emotive aspects too, like expressive crimes even though it is hardly possible to commit an unplanned, spontaneous terrorist act. Nonetheless, the crime prevention models and tools that are produced for instrumental and expressive ordinary crimes cannot be fit into politically motivated crimes because of the differences between motivations of them. Therefore, when the purpose is to prevent the criminal acts by focusing on the motivations, such a classification used for crimes can barely fit into politically motivated crime. The political dimension of politically motivated crime changes everything and inevitably brings counter radicalization or CVE initiatives that dominate the current terrorism prevention policies.

Lastly, as it was discussed throughout this chapter, as a terrorism prevention strategy, countering violent extremism also benefited a lot from crime prevention literature. Both CVE and crime prevention benefited from situational, developmental,

community, and criminal justice crime prevention models and similar tools as rehabilitation, mentoring, family counselling and lastly media with some differences coming from the natures of the phenomena that are dealt with. As long as these differences are related to the changing the hearts and minds of the individuals (especially if it is related to ideology), the practices of CVE cannot be solely thought within the boundaries of crime prevention; in other words, it cannot be argued that counter radicalization contributes only to preservation of the legal status quo as crime prevention practices do for self-interest motivated ordinary crimes.

In CVE literature, the focus is on the prevention of radicalization and extremism, not the acts of terrorism themselves because the premise of “radicalization leads to violence” is accepted. As long as this premise is correct, CVE contributes to the preservation of the legal status quo because with the prevention of the violent attitudes, violent actions can be prevented (of course, if the prevention of radical and extremist ideas can be successfully realized). However, even if this premise is correct or not, the prevention of radicalization and extremism definitely contributes to the preservation of the political status quo since eradication of radicalism and extremism is political.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **IGNORING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ORDINARY CRIME AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CRIME**

In this chapter, it will be argued that since counter radicalization is copying from crime prevention in many respects while dealing with a different problem, such approaches are prone to fail. In order to make this argument clearer, this study will benefit from the experience of the UK.

Although this is not a case study, it is better to explain why the UK is a good example to discuss this argument. According to Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall and Jarvis (2014), even though in counter-terrorism policy, the UK can be thought as the market leader, in counter radicalization, the UK does not have a monopoly on the industry. On the other hand, Vidino and Brandon state that “The pioneer in the field has been Great Britain” (2012, p. 164). Furthermore, although the 9/11 attacks become the milestone for terrorism studies, even the US implemented counter radicalization programs after the UK because the officials in the US could not understand homegrown terrorism well and they did not think that radicalization is their domestic or internal problem until 2007 (Clifford et al., 2020). Therefore, even if the UK is not a monopoly, because it is the first country in the West which implemented a counter radicalization strategy with its Prevent Strategy (Heath-Kelly, 2017) and because the UK has a long crime prevention history, benefiting from the UK’s counter radicalization policy seems logical to discuss the consequences of ignoring the differences between self-interest motivated ordinary crimes and politically motivated crimes in this interdisciplinary study.

As a result, firstly, the UK’s Prevent Strategy will be presented very shortly and then the argument of this chapter will be discussed with the help of this concrete example.

## 5.1. The UK's Prevent Strategy

After 9/11, in 2003, in the UK, the Prevent Strategy was introduced (Qurashi, 2018; Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Prevent is actually one of the four pillars or strands of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) of the UK while the other three are Pursue, Protect and Prepare (4 Ps) (Elshimi, 2020). Starting from 2006, and continuing with 2009, 2011 and lastly 2018, until today, CONTEST had four versions or iterations (Elshimi, 2020).

As a crucial part of the Prevent Strategy, in 2007, “Channel” was piloted (HM Government, 2020; Koehler, 2017b). The importance of Channel is that it targets at-risk individuals who are “vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism” and it does not only include the law-enforcement employees but also includes the contributions from other public sector employees like social workers, health care workers, teachers, etc. based on 22 risk factors (see Appendix) for identifying these at risk individuals (HM Government, 2020, p. 7; Koehler, 2017b).

Although there is no need to discuss all of the four iterations (2006, 2009, 2011, 2018) of CONTEST separately and in detail, to understand the rationale of Prevent is important. Therefore, from an official document, the purpose of Prevent is “to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Delivery of Prevent is grounded in early intervention and safeguarding.” (HM Government, 2020, p. 5). And the objectives of Prevent are to:

- tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism
- safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support
- enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate (HM Government, 2020, p. 5).

It is clear that the above-mentioned objectives of the Prevent Strategy are also primary, secondary and tertiary prevention as it was discussed in the previous chapter

under the title of Public Health Model; however, what Prevent tries to prevent is not directly the acts of terrorism or criminal acts but radicalization of the individuals with the acceptance of the premise of “radicalization leads to violence”.

According to Qurashi, “At its core, the Prevent strategy was built to be the ‘hearts and minds’ dimension of the overall CONTEST strategy.” (2018, p. 2). As a consequence, it is also clear that what Prevent is trying to achieve is to prevent terrorism through the prevention of radicalization. In other words, by changing or targeting the ideologies or “the hearts and minds” of the individuals, Prevent strand of CONTEST tries to fight against violent radicalisation and terrorism in the UK (Elshimi, 2017).

## **5.2. Discussion**

As it was argued in the previous chapter, crime prevention and counter radicalization use similar models and tools although they deal with different issues. These are just some parts of the similarities between crime prevention and counter radicalization. No matter what the similarity is, copying from crime prevention in many respects while dealing with a different problem can be problematic for counter radicalization and this makes counter radicalization policies prone to fail.

First of all, copying from crime prevention by ignoring the differences between ordinary crime and politically motivated crime can cause criminalization and stigmatization of certain parts of a society. According to Heath-Kelly (2017), in crime prevention, with some statistics, certain correlations are established to predict the probability of crimes in specific areas and demographics. This is because in certain places, it is known that there are higher levels of crime and with this information, it is possible to understand the causes of the existence of these crime hot spots and find ways to prevent crime (Weisburd & Wire, 2018). With a similar rationale, in 2007, if a place has more than 5% Muslims (later changed to 2%), local authorities could benefit from Prevent funding for resilience building since Muslims were at risk due to the beliefs of the perpetrators of September 11 and London Bombings in 2005 (Heath-Kelly, 2017). As Clutterbuck (2010) states, violent jihadism was the focus in the aftermath of 9/11 in the UK; therefore, it is not surprising that in the beginning, CONTEST almost completely concentrated on violent jihadism and Muslims. Because the nature of ordinary crime and

politically motivated crime are different, identities or political ideas of people could be thought as a source of vulnerability or threat. Nevertheless, this caused criminalization and stigmatization of Muslims in the UK.

Another example is about risk factors. As it was stated in the previous chapter under rehabilitation title, there are RNR principals in crime prevention. Similar to the eight risk factors in RNR principals, there are 22 risk factors (see Appendix) in the assessment of at-risk individuals in Channel. When these factors are checked, it is seen that they are open to discussions according to different interpretations and it can cause stigmatization of people who are suspected due to having “extreme” views even if they do not have any crime record (Edwards, 2014). According to the study of Dresser, “Professional partners in particular were encouraged to trust their own subjective judgements in the absence of observable risk indicators and tangible evidence.” (2019, p. 605). In crime prevention, some of these 22 factors cannot be risk factors at all because they are not related to the occurrence of criminal acts whatsoever but they are related to the political dimension of the issue.

Secondly, copying from crime prevention by ignoring the differences between ordinary crime and politically motivated crime can cause the infringements of human rights and to survive in a “suspect community” (Hickman et al., 2011). Therefore, if states interfere in the lives of their citizens unlimitedly due to their political ideas for the sake of taking precautions against potential security threats according to unproved premises like “radicalization leads to violence”, this is problematic and not compatible with the values of a liberal democratic country. For example, in 2018, one of the universities in the UK, warned the students of politics about an essay from their reading list named “Our Morals: The Ethics of Revolution” written by Professor Norman Geras because if the students do not read the text in a secure setting and leave the essay accessible to others, it can be seen “by those who are not prepared to view it” (Courea, 2018, para. 3). As it was discussed in Chapter 4, the purpose of Situational Crime Prevention is reducing the opportunities of committing crimes. For instance, warnings to be careful while using knives during and after a gastronomy class or using guns during and after a security class are meaningful to reduce any opportunity for any possible misuse of these items; however, implementing the same rationale to political ideas in a politics class is

apparently more than safeguarding and preventing radicalization or pathway to politically motivated crime. As a result, even though “‘winning hearts and minds’ is less costly than waging wars.” (El-Said, 2015, p. 263), surviving in a suspect community can be more costly in terms of total well-being of a society including human rights.

In addition, apart from failures coming from the differences between politically motivated crime and ordinary crime, if we think that counter radicalization as psychological warfare as it was discussed in Chapter 2 because it targets the hearts and minds of the individuals, Ron Schleifer’s book, titled “Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, is critical because in this study, it is argued that “psychological warfare is invaluable.” (Schleifer, 2014, p. 184). This important author looks at the issue from both of the sides and reaches such a conclusion. Although focusing on discussing the successes or failures of targeting “hearts and minds” is beyond the scope of this particular study, it is necessary to state that if counter radicalization policies copying from crime prevention reflect aforementioned failures while psychological warfare has such a power in other contexts, this situation strengthens the argument of this chapter.

As a consequence, ignoring the differences between ordinary crime and politically motivated crime and implementing similar policies for different issues mean potential failures. Moreover, this chapter also shows that counter radicalization strategies cannot only aim to preserve the legal status quo because of the political aspects of politically motivated crime.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this study was to examine to what extent crime prevention and counter radicalization literature overlap, resemble and borrow from each other by focusing on counter radicalization approaches from an interdisciplinary point of view because both crime prevention and counter radicalization has a common aim, which is to prevent terrorism or with a less controversial expression, politically motivated crime. The question behind this study was that if both crime prevention and counter radicalization try to prevent exactly the same thing by benefiting from similar models and tools, what is the purpose of a new literature as counter radicalization while crime prevention already targets the terrorism phenomenon with the help of its well-established literature?

To fulfil this aim, first of all, it was needed to understand whether there are differences between in the crime prevention and counter radicalization literature towards the terrorism phenomenon. When criminology and its sub-discipline crime prevention literature on terrorism and at the same time, political science-based literature of terrorism and counter radicalization were examined, it was seen that there are two distinct approaches related to the terrorism phenomenon as the following: terrorism as crime and terrorism as warfare. Even though there are challenging discussions in criminology literature against terrorism as crime understanding like the ideas of Klinger and Heal (2011), in general, criminologists are closer to terrorism as crime understanding. On the other hand, scholars who support terrorism as warfare understanding have diverse backgrounds. The interesting thing is that the most strong, persuasive arguments about the inadequacy of terrorism as crime approach come from criminology literature. That being said, it was seen that counter radicalization strategies do not simply reflect either terrorism as crime or terrorism as warfare understandings. It is clear that politically motivated crime is not solely perceived as ordinary crime and seen more like a psychological warfare because of the emphasis on the hearts and minds of the individuals;

however, when the practices of counter radicalization are checked, the significant part of them are alike to the practices of crime prevention. Therefore, it can be said that counter radicalization finds a pragmatic solution and stands as a mixture of these two literatures.

However, both to be able understand the problem at hand better (where counter radicalization stands?) and to be able to comprehend the similarities and differences in crime prevention and counter radicalization literatures, examining the basic, fundamental concepts in these two literatures were highly significant. Therefore, the objects of crime prevention and counter radicalization (crime, terrorism, radicalism, extremism, radicalization) were debated first; and then, crime prevention and counter radicalization strategies (disengagement, deradicalization, countering violent extremism and preventing violent extremism) were discussed. What captures attention about these concepts is the conceptual ambiguities of terrorism and related concepts. While the definitions of crime and crime prevention are clearer, the definitions of terrorism and related concepts including radicalism, extremism, radicalization, deradicalization, countering violent extremism and preventing violent extremism suffer terribly from conceptual ambiguities. Not surprisingly, this situation affects the quality of the literature in a bad way and also opens the doors of misuse of these concepts especially in the political arena. Correspondingly, it was argued that differently from crime which is designated by law, radicalism (and its off-shot terrorism) is defined politically. As a result, counter radicalization means creating a preventative defence against substantial political change.

Another interesting outcome is that whereas crime prevention is behaviour-focused, counter radicalization is attitude-focused. This is one of the most important differences in these two literatures. This difference is best seen in disengagement and deradicalization debate. Because the rationale of disengagement is not too different than desistance from crime, these two resemble each other in terms of their focus on behavioural change. Other than disengagement, the rest of the counter radicalization strategies (deradicalization, countering violent extremism and preventing violent extremism) are attitude-focused because they target the hearts and minds of the individuals. Of course, counter radicalization strategies aim to change the behaviours of violent extremists; nonetheless, the rationale behind this is that behavioural change is contingent upon attitudinal change. That's why, counter radicalization emphasizes the

hearts and minds. This also helps to understand better “radicalization leads to violence” premise, which counter radicalization builds on.

After discussing the basic concepts of crime prevention and counter radicalization literatures, examining the models and tools of them was very important to understand whether these two literatures overlap when they try to achieve their ends. In this part of the dissertation, it was seen that counter radicalization literature mostly benefited from Public Health Model, which is one of the most crucial widely-used models in crime prevention. In addition to that, counter radicalization deliberately or inadvertently borrowed from crime prevention literature when the situational crime prevention, developmental crime prevention, community crime prevention, and criminal justice models were examined. And then, because Public Health Model is favoured in counter radicalization literature, to be able to reflect the examples of tertiary, secondary and primary prevention in the counter radicalization literature, rehabilitation, mentoring, family counseling and lastly media and counter narratives were examined. Thus, it was seen that counter radicalization benefited from crime prevention but what it tries to prevent is radicalization, not directly an act of crime. As a result, in chapter 4, it was argued that crime prevention and counter radicalization use similar models and tools; however, the issues that deal with are different because politically motivated crime is different than self-interest motivated ordinary crime.

If counter radicalization is reinventing the wheel now, it means that without realizing, it will reach the similar conclusions as crime prevention already had. If not; that is, if counter radicalization is a separate body of literature because it is interested in a different phenomenon, it is expected that counter radicalization cannot borrow from the modus operandi of crime prevention freely; otherwise, it will face failures.

Lastly, bearing in mind the background above, in the final chapter, by benefiting from the experience of the UK, it was argued that since counter radicalization is copying from crime prevention in many respects while dealing with a different problem, such approaches are prone to fail. If counter radicalization aims to prevent the acts of politically motivated crime, crime prevention already works to achieve this end. However, if counter radicalization aims to change the hearts and minds of the individuals for preventing radicalization because it leads to violence, it would be better to prove this premise first

instead of learning its validity by experimenting on the individuals by implementing countering violent extremism programs especially when there are other counter-terrorism strategies which do not threaten the communities' well-being that much.

All in all, what this study argues that whereas crime prevention aims to preserve the legal status quo, counter radicalization literature actively contributes to the preservation of the political as well as the legal status quo. This is because eradication of radicalism is not purely legal but also political.

As a recommendation for future studies, conducting a contract-based study on the same subject can provide an unusual look and lead these discussions to a more challenging ground. If we elaborate more, as it is accepted that when the modern states deem certain actions as crimes, they can actually realize that based on the contract between the states and their citizens. For ordinary crimes, it is thought that, if citizens break the laws, as a consequence of their behaviours, they accept any sanction for the well-being of others; that is, the peace and security in the community. In other words, these citizens break the contract by committing crimes; nevertheless, while doing that, they do not question the contract itself. On the other hand, in the case of politically motivated crime, because some citizens want to renew and change the contract since they reject the current one, the issue is not simply breaking the laws; therefore, the responsibility of the states is not solely ensuring the safety of their citizens but also protection of the contract. As a result, such a study can show that implementing similar policies to prevent different deviances, ordinary crime and politically motivated crime, is not possible anyway.

Another suggestion for future studies is to examine how similar or different the ethical and philosophical aspects of the crime prevention and counter radicalization interventions, especially when "the paradox of freedom" in liberal democratic states is taken into account (Popper, 2011). Although it is internally contradictory to forbid any kind of political view in liberal societies, to a certain extent, it can be found meaningful and rational to limit certain ideas to protect the survival of liberal society. However, discussing how ethical to limit ideas in a liberal society can be an important philosophical debate because limiting any political idea is not like limiting an act deemed as a crime based on laws. As a result, conducting such a study would be a very valuable contribution

to the literature. Because counter radicalization is a newly emerging field, there are such gaps on key issues in its literature.



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## APPENDIX

### 22 FACTORS THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO VULNERABILITY

#### *Engagement with a group, cause or ideology.*

- feelings of grievance and injustice
- feeling under threat
- a need for identity, meaning and belonging
- a desire for status
- a desire for excitement and adventure
- a need to dominate and control others
- susceptibility to indoctrination
- a desire for political or moral change
- opportunistic involvement
- family or friends' involvement in extremism
- being at a transitional time of life
- being influenced or controlled by a group
- relevant mental health issues

#### *Intent to cause harm.*

- over-identification with a group or ideology

- ‘them and us’ thinking
- dehumanisation of the enemy
- attitudes that justify offending
- harmful means to an end
- harmful objectives

***Capability to cause harm.***

- individual knowledge, skills and competencies
- access to networks, funding or equipment
- criminal capability

Source: (HM Government, 2020, p. 51)

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