

**MORAL PANIC AS A POLITICAL PROJECT: A DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS ON THE NEWS ABOUT SYRIAN REFUGEES IN
TURKEY PORTRAYED AS FOLK DEVILS**



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**MORAL PANIC AS A POLITICAL PROJECT: NEWS ABOUT
SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY AS FOLK DEVILS**

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PLAGIARISM

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ABSTRACT

“Moral Panic” is a term that came to surface in 1960’s and was constructed by Stanley Cohen as a theory. It is simply a media manipulated response devise to direct the thoughts and emotions of the media audience towards an agenda set by the political powers. The discourse used while conveying the “moral panic” subject is considered as a source of propaganda for Political Project. Via this process normativity, temporality and intentionality of the subject matter of the “moral panic” is planned how it is civilized and dicivilized through the discourse is structured as a Project.

In this thesis, the matter of Syrian Refugees is focused on as the subject of the “moral panic”. The news covering Syrian Refugees in two most circulated newspapers, Sözcü (oppositional) and Hürriyet (mainstream) internet news sites, are taken as the focus of the study. The process of how the topic of Syrian Refugees became a “moral panic” entity just before and after the 2019 Municipality Elections is analyzed using discourse analysis.

Keywords: Moral Panic, Press News, Migration, Syrian Refugees, Critical Discourse Analysis.

ÖZET

Ahlaki Panik 1960'larda ortaya çıkan ve Stanley Cohen tarafından bir teori olarak inşa edilen bir terimdir. Medya izleyicilerinin düşüncelerini ve duygularını siyasi güçler tarafından belirlenen bir gündeme yönlendirmek için basitçe medyaya manipüle edilmiş bir yanıttır. Ahlaki panik konusunu aktarırken kullanılan söylem, Siyasi Proje için bir propaganda kaynağı olarak kabul edilir. Bu süreç aracılığıyla ahlaki panik konusunun normativitesi, zamansallığı ve niyeti, söylem yoluyla nasıl uygarlaştırıldığı ve medenileştirilmediği bir Proje olarak yapılandırılmıştır.

Bu tezde Suriyeli Sığınmacıların meselesi ahlaki paniğin konusu olarak ele alınmaktadır. Suriyeli Mültecilerin en çok tirajlı gazetelerde, Sözcü (muhalif) ve Hürriyet (ana akım) internet haber sitelerinde yer alan haberler, çalışmanın odağı olarak ele alınmıştır. Suriyeli Mültecilerin konusunun 2019 Belediye Seçimlerinden hemen önce ve sonra nasıl ahlaki bir paniğe dönüşme süreci söylem analizi kullanılarak analiz edildi.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Moral Panik, Haber, Göç, Suriyeli Göçmen, Eleştirel Söylem Analizi.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Cohen described the term of “moral panic” in the third release of *“Folk Devils and Moral Panics”* (2004); rose up out from the late 1960s communal response hypothesis, particularly the worry with the media’s job in stereotyping and distorting abnormality and the discernment that such revealing may add to a deviancy intensification winding. He builds up a methodology that accentuated that communal manipulation can prompt increased deviance through an intelligent procedure of mental alteration and inevitable communal activity.

The terminology of “Moral Panic” is used as a regulatory device by the hegemonic groups to maintain a certain status quo by creating a volatility of circumstances, that are changeable according to the social, economic, political and socio-psychological changes, to ensure a chance to manipulating power. Thus, using the regulatory devises the subject of the “moral panic” – folk devil – would be applicable for the notions of normativity, temporality and intentionality.

One of the aims of this thesis is to discuss the terminology of “Moral Panic” in the content of Political Project. The risk factors of the subjects becoming a “moral panic” device via the political power and the immergence of the regulatory power is focused upon after explaining how media creates “moral panic” via normativity, temporality and intentionality.

Another subject taken in hand and discussed in this study is Intentionality of the context created as Senseless Violence, which is the development of viciousness in different settings. How a standardization of tension in the public discourse and the media is to aim an outcome as “moral panic” with regards to the political framework is studied in this thesis. Through this study how “moral panic” creates civilizing and

decivilizing processes as a political project is discussed. Furthermore, here in this study how this process would be applied as short-term panic or long term-panic is portrayed. “Moral Panic” as an Agenda Setting process is also looked upon in this thesis.

The question of immigration and being a political refugee is examined and then as another topic of this study discussed from the frame of the Syrian Refugees in Turkey. Then, how they become a political project in the course of “moral panic” is illustrated by doing a study of discourse analysis on the newspapers between the dates just before and after the municipality elections, 1st March 2019 – 30th April 2019. The newspapers that are the subject of this thesis are: Sözcü, Hürriyet and Internet website. Sözcü is selected as to be the oppositional and Hürriyet is to be the mainstream media that are circulated the most.

The question of this thesis is whether the chosen newspapers have been deviced as “moral panic” mediums in the course of the municipality elections of 2019. If so on which basis they were part of this political project and what their discourse in this process was.

One hypothesis is that newspapers are vividly using “moral panic” entities to manipulate the agenda. Another hypothesis is that during the election of 2019 newspapers were potentially used as “moral panic” devises in scope of Syrian Refugees. The third hypothesis is that both newspapers’ discourse employed feature to civilize or decivilize the refugees using the entities of “moral panic” applicable to the both sides.

2. MORAL PANIC AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TERM

The term “moral panic” is brought by Stanley Cohen figures that, “Sociological and public imagination through his book, *Folk Devils and “Moral Panics”*, first distributed in 1972” He presents that the term as pursues: “Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of “moral panic”. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right- thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible (Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folk- lore or collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long- lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives of itself” (Cohen, 1972: 28).

The other exemplary investigation of “moral panics”, *Policing the Crisis* (1978), it is stressed by Stuart Hall and his associates that the; “Consensual idea of “moral panics”; they succeed in light of the fact that we as a whole 'buy into' their meaning of the issue: When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’ in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk ‘with one voice’ of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations universally stress ‘sudden and dramatic’ increases (in numbers involved or events) and ‘novelty’ above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of

the beginnings of a moral panic” (Hall, 1978: 16).

The probability of the “moral panics” have been taken further by ensuing investigations, however all concur that the accompanying components are probably going to be available: a risk or concern; cliché introduction of this; accord about what the issue is and threatening vibe towards it; and disproportionality in the introduction of the issue and the reaction to it (see Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Young, 2009; Weeks, 1985). The fundamental moral measurement to the communal response is being underlined by Garland (2008). Watney in the interim contends that “moral panic” “mark the site of permanent ideological struggle over the meanings of signs”. “We do not,” he contends: witness the unfolding of discontinuous and discrete “moral panics”, but rather the mobility of ideological confrontation across the entire field of public representations, and in particular those handling and evaluating the meanings of the human body, where rival and incompatible forces and values are involved in a ceaseless struggle to define supposedly universal ‘human’ truths” (Watney, 1987: 41).

2.1. Moral Panic as a Term

English sociologist Stanley Cohen created a unique plan of “moral panic” underlined a social constructivist perspective on social issues and deviance and proposed that social commentators be cautious in understanding how, by whom, and why a specific conduct or marvel is characterized as freak, whose interests are influenced, and how in 1972. This particular view was later strengthened by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1974), additionally including that in a “moral panic”, the layout of the communal issues are developed in a specific way so that they end up being connected to (that is saw to be brought about by) a politically feeble gathering and compromise a politically significant gathering. The communal issue ends u being

characterized in a way that is misrepresented and unbalanced to its “true” degree, commonly encouraged by exceptionally notable and sensationalized media accounts, at last uncovering hidden communal pressures and concerns, for instance, bigotry, preference, sexism and homophobia (Cohen, 2002; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). It is very significant to note that the minor event of a “moral panic” is not to propose that a communal issue does not exist; rather, how the issue is characterized and the reaction to it are of concern (Cohen 2002). There are four different components demanded by “moral panics”: an enemy, a victim, a perceived or actual threat or a real risk or result coming from the activities of that foe, and a societal accord to act. Adversaries commonly comprise of social gatherings that are “effectively impugned, with little power and ideally without access to the front lines of social governmental issues” (that is, racial minorities, socially minimized or generally trashed or dreaded gatherings) (Cohen, 2002). A conduct or a marvel is connected to the adversary or “folk devil” and recognized as dangerous and representing a risk or communal outcome “losing America”.

The exploited people of “moral panics” who are undermined by the issue connected to the adversary, are ordinarily bunches with whom society effectively distinguishes (“the mainstream” or “middle class”) and hold increasingly political power in respect to the foe. From the panic and dread encompassing the conduct or wonder currently connected to the adversary, agreement develops that it undermines more extensive society except if move is made, generally enactment or an official activity (for instance, impromptu team or commission) purportedly tending to the issue (Cohen, 2002).

The way of seeing how response to a given communal issue incites “moral panic” is the data given about it through social talk, commonly through media and

news outlet inclusion. Talk is likewise transmitted by compelling or powerful figures, for example, church, lawmakers and superstars. The discourse of community is deciding how society comprehends and at last characterizes abnormality, a procedure that frequently induces an official reaction (Cohen, 1972). The characteristics of “moral panic” implanted inside the talk are worry about the risk presented to the people in question, threatening vibe toward those esteemed in charge of the issue, accord or understanding that move be made against the danger, disproportionality or embellishment about the recurrence or force of the danger whenever disregarded, and instability, to such an extent that the caused frenzy regularly abruptly disperses (Cohen, 1972).

Herdt (2009b) contended that hair-raising language and pictures are utilized in talk to evoke an exceptional enthusiastic response that expands open concern and threatening vibe. An objective of this talk is to feed outrage and develop a shared adversary as shameless, unsafe, and justifying control. In that capacity, defenders of the “moral panic” can bring together generally unique gatherings and manufacture accord toward activity (Herdt, 2009b). Connecting the issue with the shameless conduct of a disagreeable or dreaded social gathering gives an extra measurement to its risk, filling threatening vibe and supporting calls for brutal, reformatory "solutions" including new enactment and legal decisions (Cohen, 1972).

Cohen considered “The English gun crime scene as a classic “moral panic” since it contains every one of the characterizing components distinguished by him, when he originally broke down the wonder. However, ensuing examination has appeared “moral panics” differs from one another in an assortment of shapes and sizes, as do the types of deviance to which they purportedly react, and their consequent consequences for the communal world. Maybe it is worth stopping to say

something regarding these varieties of structure and core interest.”

“Moral panics” fluctuate in force, length and communal effect. Abandoning little follow them, some of them are very minor and transient scenes: who presently re-individuals the alert provoked in 1950s Britain by the Teddy Boys (Pearson, 1983), other than the members. Others are major, pivotal advancements which change masses of lives and entire social scenes: the European witch-fever of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Trevor-Roper, 1967) or tensions about 'national decline' in nineteenth century Britain (Stedman Jones, 1971) would be take these examples.

Concerning causation, this may likewise fluctuate with the nature and focal point of the “moral panic”, yet the exploration writing, also known as literature, returns over and over to a loose set of causal conditions that are related with the marvel. Encouraging conditions incorporate (i) the presence of a sentimentalist broad communications (in spite of the fact that students of history recognize “moral panic” scenes in the mid-nineteenth century and previously: see Davis, 1980; Pearson, 1983; Adler, 1996 – maybe a compelling station of aggregate correspondence is all that is required); (ii) the revelation of some new or until now unreported type of deviance; (iii) the presence of minimized, outcast gatherings reasonable for depiction as “folk devils”; and (iv) an as of now prepared, sharpened open group of onlookers. Concerning hastening causes, the writing proposes that these have to do with advances in the social, financial or moral request of the general public. Dangers to existing progressive systems; status rivalry; the effect of social change upon built up lifestyles; and the breakdown of beforehand existing structures of control – these are the profound sources of surface panics frequently distinguished.

These were the notion’s most urgent hypothetical inceptions, in spite of the fact

that obviously, one can follow others by traveling way back in the sociological past². However, the possibility that created by Cohen' and his partners likewise had a statement that can be called by one as a cultural source which is being reproduced from the characteristic communal behaviors of the minds of youthful 1960s sociologists like Cohen, Young and Ditton and their associates in the National Deviancy Conference. The standpoint of the hip was this, abnormality acknowledging in other words deviance appreciating, member onlooker who was frequently communally closer to freaks than to their controllers, and who saw criminal law as a lost type of suppression, at any rate as it connected to the delicate deviance, the soft deviance, of the style of sub-social and drug-taking. A standard basic reaction is created by these sociologists, an evaluate with which to encounter harsh social response, notwithstanding what viewed as ignorant, narrow-minded and pointlessly abuse responses to abnormality and deviance by traditionalist and conservative authorities.

There were two critical different viewpoints in "moral panic" area. Firstly indicated an empirical error, provoked by the misplacement and the uneasiness: They implied "Straight society is over-reacting"; "the problem is much less serious and much less threatening than people think. Relax, do not panic, no one here is getting hurt". The second aspect was much more increasingly standardizing in character, progressively centered around the type of the communal response, and increasingly reproachful of its admonishing, judgmental position: "The real problem is not the deviant behavior, it is your compulsive need to moralize. Be more tolerant, more open to difference and diversity. The terminology of "moral panic" caught these reactions superbly, perfectly consolidating investigation and disposition - as much catchphrase as an idea in its common utilization. In any case, we should never forget to note that

naming scholar like Cohen and Young were, for the most part, discussing the deviance, deviance, minor misconduct and 'victimless' offenses as opposed to nonsense wrongdoing. The evaluation of their misrepresented moral response was coordinated principally towards shallow-end wonders and phenomena, for example, delicate and soft usage of drug, deviance and deviance of sexuality, and adolescent culpable instead of to murder, assault or theft. Thusly, the investigation was being forced further by them then it had gone previously when Stuart Hall and his associates connected the term 'moral panic' to the communal response incited by English "muggings".

The consideration and accuracy of its unique application were overlooked as its utilization turned out to be progressively broad and unpredictable, as regularly occurs in times of an idea appears to be particularly amazing or enlightening. The examination was subjected to the frame of mind, and for a short period in the late 1980s. The term was gotten up to speed in ideological fights in which the communal significance of abnormality, deviance and response, crime, wrongdoing and control, ended up as stakes in criminological discussion as well as in national governmental issues, politics (Garland, 2001).

The term "moral panic" is quite often an outside spectator's class, not the members' self-depiction, at least not in any event while they are taking an interest, notwithstanding the reflexive critique made by the media and knowing abuse by government officials. It is a credit, an attribution, a mark applied by outcast. The label demands that the responsive conduct it depicts is unseemly, poorly judged, lacking extent. It must be guessed by one that the general population whose lead is being portrayed along these lines do not trust that they are occupied with a "moral panic" and would ordinarily challenge that depiction. Thus, regarded as a negative name, it

is connected to the individuals who participate in negative marking, the investigator's vengeance on the powers of communal response.

To attribute this name to the lead of others, to portray a social responsibility as a "moral panic", infers in excess of an experimental judgment about direct: a positive position is additionally suggested by it with the respect to the examiner, a particular introduction. The sociologist of "moral panics" essential frame of mind is not separated authenticity or logic, or even only the-actualities induction. It is the behavior of *skepticism*. Also, it is an urbane denial to be taken in or diverted, a mentality of knowing skepticism. The assignment of uncovering them as "moral panic" tumbles to cynics, skeptics and unbelievers, in the event that "moral panic" some of the time have religious energy attached to them, even antiquated fundamentalism. This is a moral distrust is all that there is, and one of the introductions and exposing is the activity, in numerous occasions. This mode is being embraced and adopted by most journalistic writing in terms of "moral panic". Yet, in crafted by sociologists like Cohen or Hall, the distrust that allows the underlying perception offers a path to an alternate disposition – one that is progressively systematic, increasingly illustrative, or maybe better, progressively demonstrative. Review that the attribution is of a 'moral' and not only an error or a misinterpretation. The examiner is indicating an eruption as well as to a type of masochist conduct, a delirium, a psychopathology to that degree, and by suggestion, to a basic clash that is creating the "moral panic" as it's carrying on articulation. At the point when this logical lead is finished methodically, it can deliver an inside and out record of the fundamental procedures that join to over-decide the moral upheaval. Regularly, a completely created determination clarification will work at the dimensions of *symbolic meaning, social relations, and historical temporality*. With its covered informative

structure and its multi-dimensional experimental request, *Policing the Crisis* is still standing in this manner as a model of something – not least in its range an aspiration, and its prescient experiences about Britain's float to a lawfulness society.

The concept of a “moral panic” is without a moment's delay, not only much more Durkheimian but also much more Freudian than is normally assumed as a sociological thought. The psychoanalytical angles of it –the panics symptomatic character, the folk devil development's projective idea, the procedures which are being stressed by the social and psychic clashes- are moderately clear and understandable and do not demand additional elaboration, however, its Durkheimian dimensions are worth featuring since these are at times disregarded. Cohen's hypothesis' Durkheimian components not just simply relating to the limit characterizing nature of “moral panics”, which are speaking to an expansion of Durkhem's (1982) hypothesis of abnormality response though in psychotic structure, in this admiration- yet additionally to the “collective effervescence” that is snapshotting of “moral panic” normally displays. What is demanded to be endured as a main priority by one is, just as the happiness created by these aggregate rush of honorable judgment, the fervor, and vitality that are released by “moral panic” episodes – for members and spectators, notwithstanding the objections of response. A prerequisite for the common speculation of mass media and the political class in panic creating forms is, without a question, the enthusiastic vitality and aggregate fervor can be incited into feeling energetic shock, together with every one of the open doors that this vitality gives that are released at whatever point a mass open. Thus, the concept of problematization proposed by Foucault (1985) directs attention to several ways in which a problem needs to be solved and the containment of this solution for how the “development of a given into a question . . . transform[s] a group of obstacles and difficulties into

problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response” (Foucault, 2000: 118).

The term “moral panic” is dating back to Jock Young’s (1971) work which is delivering an argument about the public conviction of a “hippie commune” involved in drug abuse. As young revealed, the “moral panic” which was born was not at all about the usage of drug. It was instead all about drug users whose pleasure searching values and “hippie culture” were in direct dissent with larger societal values (Young 2009: 5). The issue’s social imagery which is causing the deviance to augment is being provided by the media since it acts as both condemner and amplifier of the issue as young put forward. The increased fear and pressure upon the public agents of social control in order to oppose the issue by operating greater controls is what this afterward led to (Young, 2009). By ensuring much more comprehensive definitions along with methodically outlining the actors who took part in the process of creating them, Cohen (1972) advanced this model of “moral panic”. Therefore, according to Cohen (Cohen, 1972: 9) the occurrence of “moral panic” happens when:

“A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values or interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians or right- thinking people . . . Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.”

The opinion that this brings about is coming from, where indeed saying that the objectivity is remarkably predominated by the existing threat would be right (Bonn,

2010), the enactment and the enforcement of law, social policy and social perceptions (Cohen, 1972) which can be affected by certain phenomena's media presentations reacted by certain manipulated public. A formula for "moral panic" is put forward by Cohen (1972) in the sake of actuation for this. There are five different sets of actors which are needed in this formula to be executed: (1) folk devils; (2) rule enforcers (3) the media (4) politicians and (5) the public.

The folk devil is one of the first and most necessary determinants of moral panic's occurrence as being the person or a group who are responsible and the representatives of the deviance and the criminal acts. Cohen (1972: 10) signifies they "become the embodiment of *visible reminders of what we should not be*" since these individuals can be identified as evil (Rothe and Muzzatti, 2004) seeing that they take upon themselves the representations of it.

Also known as one of the policy-making actors of the "moral panic" is the rule enforcers as the second one. For "moral panic", rule enforcers are an indispensable genesis. To abbreviate the duration of the issue, rule enforcers are who gets called for action as it's the expectancy of society by them. By identifying the folk devils, imprisoning the guilty and penalizing them, the occurrence of this event is happening through the process in the light of these steps (Cohen, 1972). The problem is being stated by the agencies as it is violating the social order, positioning themselves as if guarding the society in the part of protector and forestalling the society's disruption into chaos, anarchy and mayhem. (Rothe and Muzzatti, 2004).

By producing "moral panic" and also being the third actor of its own conclusion, the media is also responsible. What causes that is the media's declaration to the public about the apprehensions of several communities (Cohen, 1972; Jenkins, 1992; Rothe

and Muzzatti, 2004) and this leads to increases in terms of public anxiety and concern, because it has an influential role in the generation of “moral panic” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Bonn, 2010).

“Moral panics” fifth and also one of the most important actors are politicians. The status politicians place themselves is the place where they can execute orders in order of preventing the public from the presented threats and protecting them against the existing ones which need to be terminated by fulfilling the execution of the rules. The presented threats can also be constituted as mischief of the folk devil against morality (Cohen, 1972, 2002,). The politicians can easily come up with a social construction of the represented reality which can vastly satisfy the need of influencing the public’s understanding of the subject when the problem is being investigated in a certain manner (Bonn, 2010).

“Moral panics” last, but also the most important accepted actor is the public reaction. The media’s confederated efforts are what ignites the public reaction along with the rule of enforcers and politicians. Bonn (2010) mentions from Welch (2011) that *“support for the rule enforcers is garnered from the public through the generation of fear, which is instilled in the public by disproportionate presentations of the problem which compounds contempt and hostility towards the folk devils”*. Politician’s socially formed perception in the media, which contains dissemination through it and within, means a real threat to the existing society, together with the faith of future’s harm is not only imminent but also tremendous (Rothe and Muzzati, 2004). This is what allows politicians to provide the outlet for public concern constituted through the “moral panic” along with the individuals in power positions (Bonn, 2010). The other defining elements of a “moral panic” are what being focused

in the event of further research, going beyond the involved actors in a “moral panic”.

For instance, the assertion that put forward by Goode, and Ben-Yehuda (1974) points out:

“That the media campaigns are used to reinforce stereotypes, and maintain the already existing partitions, not only societal but also worldwide while also encouraging the fear at the same time. This is a fact which cannot be acknowledged through reading since it contains the presence of a certain criteria which is dependent on. Firstly, on condition that it is committed by a specific group, there has to be a focus on a definite behavior, whether it is real or imagined. These groups are then being transformed into “folk devils” by media having undressed from all of their favorable representations of their characters and put on particularly with the negative ones’ (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994: 28). By going through the vehicles of advanced media coverage which is also generating the public’s increased concern, these unfavorable characteristics change to the public by turning into defining, and are repeatedly disseminated.”

The already existing societal worries in terms of crime and deviance are being increased by the folk devils’ and their behaviors’ representations in media. As the communal concern is without a question always exists in society for deviant and criminal behavior to some extent (Rothe and Muzzatti, 2011), detrimental influence of the group and their behaviors increasingly frightening the people of the public and progressively become intolerant of them. Secondly, there is an inequality between the mass media’s presentations about these groups and the actual threat(i.e. the probability of harm happening) which they lay out with their behavior of the group poses. Lastly, the grade of anxiety is waving inconsistently up and down over time

rather than being stable. During most of the examples and situations, a behavior's getting noticed and concluded as a hazard is what fires up the process. As a result of this, concerns about the problem not only lead to a rapid escalation in public but also it suddenly subsides in many different instances (Bonn, 2010). The advanced concern about the issue (real or perceived) which is often of important, causes the highly punitive legislation to be enacted which is for the most of the time unnecessary, because what all it accomplishes is serving to the agendas of individuals and their justifications in positions of power and authority (Simon and Feeley, 1995).

The incidental episodes which are different from the worries of normal society and also ensuring that it happens, are as important as the actors that are playing a huge part in the formulation process of "moral panic". Hence, the five criteria are being used when it comes to determining the difference between "moral panic" and normal societal concern which are providing these incidental episodes to be assessed using the five criteria. (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Cohen, 2002). To respectively array the five criteria, the first one is the heightened concern over the comprehended threat (not fear); the second one is the aggression considered as moral insult towards the folk devils who process the movement and the responsible agencies; the third one is a communal concurrence over threat's importance status over how real and serious it is (not necessarily total settlement), the fourth one is the threat's solution process must be fulfilled disproportionately with regards to the response to the issue (the overreaction is included in this process to the potential risk if ignored, and status of moral aggression); and the fifth one volatility which is making reference to the "moral panics" sudden eruption which is also followed by its dispersion. Society's common concern is able to forge "moral panic", and it does not have to be necessarily fear. The social problem is determined by this concern, by being perceived

as an issue before the society. The intolerance towards a specific community of individuals is being increased by the references of hostility criteria, tied with arrogance and contempt for those actors supposed responsible. For the communal members, the concurrence is a significantly common belief in this intolerance. Among the people who are occupying chairs in positions of power and influence, this consensus ought to be shared in general, including the media. The frequency and severity of the issue must also receive a disproportionate reaction to themselves. Bottomed on the belief, this situation can be characterized as an overreaction that the society is being in trouble and imminent harm of this threat caused by the issue. Finally, the ephemeral character of the “moral panic” is being referred by the volatility since the achievement of the is happening very quickly, earlier disappearing in a alike manner. The social, cultural, historical and extant structural requirements which are intersecting with the complicated relation of power that underlies “moral panic” are being hidden by this lack of permanence (Rothe and Muzzati, 2011). All of the processes listed above have to be fulfilled for the occurrence of a “moral panic”.

The utility of implementing the outline of “moral panics” are being underlined by these works in order to comprehend the contextual communal response to occasions and happenings, comprehended or real (Levi, 2009). In order to describe it differently, they are examining if a particular “problem” is actually causing a “real” threat or is a “moral panic”: an exaggerated reaction of political and public to a damaged communal threat posed by professed hazardous or threatening individuals or groups (Bonn, 2010).

“Moral panic” events can be tempting upon people to a high degree such as felony. Conversely, the progress of the expression “moral panic” is changing

continuously. It has moved towards becoming affiliated with rather careless portrayals such as the infidelity of media, the fallacy of audience and the basic mistakes which are being done in terms of reason. The portrayals are not only limited with those, the complaints which are displaced haphazardly on unfortunate passive purposes, on fleeting occurrences and the environmental discomforts in an otherwise organized universe can also be counted as associated with (Young).

According to the sociology; “the deviance and the mass media, the notion of “moral panic” has advanced to wind up a standout for its place as one of the most important concepts since its initiation in the early 1970s. “Moral panic” has indicated no sign of easing off in the publications and conferences made upon it for more than forty years. While “moral panic” attracts the attention as one of the most enlightening concepts to investigate the social elements of, and reactions to, social tensions and fears, contemporary social issues together with changing mechanisms of control and direction are being kept on advising by panics.”

Research of moral panic is dating back to both Jock Young’s (1971) and Stanley Cohen’s (1972) studies. The structure of the mods and rockers are researched by Stanley Cohen and the drug taking’s social meaning is investigated by Jock Young. Research of the moral panic had its improvements throughout the years, but it developed around the 1970s and 1980s. In the course of its development, it focused chiefly on the role which claims moral guardians and claim makers. There were also areas which were focused such as the media play in the construction, amplification and the overstatement of the deviance.

The supreme explanatory power of the “moral panic” studies is far from being understood notwithstanding the interest for “moral panic” analysis is developing in an

accelerating rate in the fields of sociology and criminology (Hier, 2011). The case of “moral panics” is still being conceptualized as exceptional by many scholars instead of having it as a notion which is trying to describe the illogical and unproportional reactions to exaggerated intimidations with ordinary constructions of deviance. Owing to conceptualizing the “moral panic” in this manner, one of the consequences is that the explanatory power of the subject is either minimized if not dismissed in terms of more comprehensive investigations of the daily ordinary moral rule process (Hunt, 1999). The qualifications how “moral panics” are reasonable and ordinary structures of daily life has begun to be demonstrated thanks to the small number of assistances made to the “moral panic” findings that have its role of contributing within and beyond state in terms of continuing processes of “moral panic” regulation (Hunt, 1999; Moore and Valverde, 2000). “Moral panic” findings have recently started to have its influence on the directions of research, enquiry and argumentation despite the struggles with “widen the focus” (Critchler, 2009) of the matter.

Contribution is the main point in that study. With the examination of the relevance between the chronologies of “moral panic” and moral regulation, continuing discussions about the extending the emphasis of “moral panic” studies are being contributed. This study forward the idea that the tendencies for folk devils and their followers to stand against both regulation and typification have accurately stressed by the “moral panic” scholars (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995). Bearing in mind all of these; this study argues that the scope of “moral panic” studies is insufficient. The boundaries of the scope of “moral panic” studies must be extended to a level where it is beyond resisting primary specifications for assessing the broader foundations of the episodic nature that sustain and give rise to moral regulation’s ongoing processes. No matter how much the folk devils and their supporters fight and resist against the

dominant claims, their entire refusals can be overthrown. To say it differently, the subjects “moral panics” representing are the episodes of contestation and negotiation. Moral regulation of extensive processes is either emerged from and contributed to or reinforced by these.

This Study was investigated the “hoodies” which are assumed to be the reason for the moral decline among the youth in present-day Britain in order to prove these conceptual and theoretical arguments which are proposed. After the ban on hooded tops placed by a shopping center in Kent, our particular focus is the British press’s claims-making activities.

Debates continued to appear in the mass and alternative media which are objecting the ban even though the activities of the youth is moralized (Cohen, 1972; Coleman, 2005; Thornton, 1994) because of the moral regulation’s facing each other the meaning of hoodies who gathered motion from an established cultural desire. In the name of justifying legislative strives to impose administrative measures on British youth, the government officials of Britain invited the “hoodies” signifier to discuss the youth tendencies towards anti-social behavior. In order to attribute the guilt for a scope of crime and anti-social behaviors, the signifier of the “hoodies” used as a rhetorical device as media reported. Of what Hall and so forth were demonstrated thanks to these processes indications.

In 1978 Hall conceptualized as an explanation spiral:

“Basically what it means that increasing the received threat of the emergent incidents surpassing the thresholds of social forbearance, as a technique of remarking events by the union of a recently identified concern with other social issues. No matter what, in the mainstream and alternative media counterclaims,

the problematization of the hoodies is “fought back” by different groups which are consisting of and having diverse interests about the situation.”

In 1972 Cohen published his first book. After 30 years, he was added the following introduction to this terminology of “moral panic”:

“Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes . . . in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself” (Cohen, 2004: 1).

What Cohen is actually meaning by “panic” is not completely mentioned, but the traditional usage is obviously in his mind which is described by the OED as follows: “A sudden and excessive feeling of alarm or fear, usually affecting a body of persons, and leading to extravagant or injudicious efforts to secure safety”.

In the description which is supplied by that other “moral panic” classic

analysis, “*Policing the Crisis*”, but in this work the *consensual* characteristics of the faded communal response is the stress, regardless of consensus being strained and artificial in some degree:

“When the official reaction to a person, groups of person or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’, in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians, and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk ‘with one voice’ of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations universally stress ‘sudden and dramatic’ increases (in numbers involved or events) and ‘novelty’ above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of . . . a moral panic.”
(Hall et al., 1978: 16, emphasis in original)

What is identified by the standard text on “moral panics” which is established by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994) is the five different features of the phenomenon: the first one is the “*concern*” (some announced or occasion sparks uneasiness and anxiety); second is the “*hostility*” (the culprits are depicted as folk devils); third is the “*consensus*” (the negative communal response is expansive and bound together); fourth is the *disproportionality* (the degree of the contact, or the danger it presents, are misrepresented); fifth is the “*volatility*” (the media's detailing and the related panic rise all of a sudden, however, can scatter rapidly as well).

There are two key elements to the indispensable meaning of the notion which Cohen developed. First is the *moral dimension* of the communal response, especially the introspective soul-searching which is escorting these episodes; and the second one is the notion of somehow describing the deviant behavior at issue as *symptomatic*. As

it is stressed by Cohen in his original case research, the immediate issue is always being reached beyond by the responses of “society’s guardians”, connecting it to the other bothering discomfort symptomatic. Before introducing assertions about related issues and more extensive implications, they are all saying “It’s not just this...”. These two components together, a moral dimension and a symptomatic quality, are significant. The real nature of the underlying discomfort is being pointed out by them, and in that case, with respect to the communal actors that built up the value system, the anxious concern on the part is being menaced. What is pointing to the main part of Cohen’s statement of moral panics is the concern of a sainted way of life’s being in difficulty, their nature and genesis. In fact, the dislodged governmental issues of gathering relations and status rivalry are being discovered by the sociology of “moral panic”.

Stan Cohen (2004: xxx) attracts attention to the “successful moral panics owe their appeal to their ability to find points of resonance with wider anxieties” in the introduction section of his book’s third edition. Obviously, his grades were done best in order to make associations by Mr. Duncan. David Cameron who is The Conservative Party leader was much more careful, but by indicating to “absent fathers”, “family breakdown” as them being at the main point, “at the heart”, of the problematic, he too also portrayed the occasions as symptomatic (Cowell, 2007). Herein, as shown by a *Guardian*/ICM poll (detailed in the Glover and Travis, 2007) the mood of the public is seem to have caught by him, which discovered that 80 percent of the people who voted concurred with the explanation that the absence of control and the family breakdown happening inside the house are mostly in charge of the development of the growth of a gun culture.

In spite of the fact that it is likewise certain that most subjects do not move toward becoming ‘successful MPs’ (Jenkins, 1992), the scope of points related with “moral panic” appears to be boundless, however the utilization of the expression is very normal. “moral panic” is frequently utilized protectively, or as an approach to anticipate or dishearten over-reaction. Different utilizations showed up when the new century rolled over as journalists turned out to be progressively acquainted with “moral panic”. One model was a report about gated networks, with explicit spotlight on the emblematic implications of “gates”.

To the new meaning of “moral panic” a criminal justice professor noted;

“Another syndrome associated with the gates ‘is what social scientists call moral panic, an overreaction to crime’, said Mercer Sullivan, a professor of criminal justice at Rutgers-Newark. ‘People react to rapid changes in society by building walls around themselves’ (Quinn, 2000: 13).

It is recommended by news reports that “moral panic” has evoked genuine emotion as a general method to assault preposterous cases about social issues and issues that may result in solid arrangement action and endorses. It is added to the news discourse by “moral panic” by giving an opposite view that is unsurprising, even scripted. The establishment for articulating what might be named the “implied agency of moral panic”, or all the more hypothetically, a vocabulary of thought processes in “moral panic” (Mills, 1940), proposes the oppositional job of this notion, and the content is fitting for certain points in the fear narrative, yet not others. In fact, the findings is just a single case in which a dynamic development/ introduction/ orientation was tested as advancing a “moral panic”. These included affirmations by some women's activist researchers, also known as feminist scholars that not

exclusively are rape very normal and ordinary yet that 25 percent of ladies will be assaulted and raped amid their school years. This report plans is not to figure out the accuracy of the case, yet rather, to utilize the trade, particularly the broad communications announcing about it, to show the outstanding utilization of “moral panic”: “Labeling rape ‘the phantom epidemic’, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley has started a national debate by challenging recent studies by ‘feminist researchers’ who, he said, insult women, trivialize the crime and incite ‘a moral panic’” (Kahn, 1991: A1).

Cohen's unique investigation about the manner clarified that there is an intuitive relationship between “moral panics” and their folk devils – regularly one of deviance intensification that happens in light of the fact that media consideration and expanded social control brief a solidifying of the first abnormality, or even an upgrade of its fascination for potential degenerates. As it is depicted by Hacking (2000), this is a ‘looping effect’ by which social response associates with the thing reacted to, achieving the change of the last mentioned. This forming impact of social response – the way toward ‘making and moulding’ as Hacking depicts it – is liable to experimental variety and in no way, shape or form dependably results in “amplification”, as Cohen in 2004 surrenders in the prologue to the third statements of his book. Contingent upon setting, parity of powers, cooperation elements, and the continuous selections of members, the rise of a “moral panic” can make the abnormality being referred to be ended, intensified or through and through changed. (Take into consideration, as an instance, the sorting out, assembling and politicizing impacts that “moral panic” responses have some of the time had on gatherings, for example, welfare petitioners, single parents, illicit migrants, HIV sufferers, gay men, and so forth.)

2.2.Moral Panic As a Theory

“Moral panics” frequently have a symptomatic quality as it is clarified by Cohen (1972). A panic does not have to necessarily possess the need of being related to the original occasion in this sense, rather it tends to be perused as an analogy and a metaphor for contemporary inconveniences, troubles and a representative gadget through which a scope of communal tensions are explained and communicated (Sparks 1992). These tensions are no doubt identified with the political, social and cultural context (Cohen, S. (1972), *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 1st edn. Paladin).

The reason why the system of “moral panic” used for was it is utilized to see how overstated records of, and social worries about, communal issues, deviance and abnormality are being instilled into popular conclusion and communal approach. In times of a “condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen, 1972: 1), the occurrence of “moral panic” happens. What is unbalanced to its own genuine hazard and risk is the claim of threat along with the problem is, through communal talk (that is, media, public figures), sensationalized in the sake of threatening the vibe toward a focused on gathering and cause an agreement toward activity (Cohen, 1972). In terms of individualistic, the accentuation where “moral panic” is placed on, over the auxiliary communal variables, moralistic practices in reactionary, regularly correctional approaches which are leading to suffering institutional, political and communal shifts along with the cultivate communal injustice, segregation and frequently criminalization of the gathering which is being focused in terms of their activities or both (Cohen, 1972; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). By tending to the results of social brokenness, and social control, by tending to its causes, therefore social laborers are

associated with born social treatment (Day & Schiele, 2012).

In spite of the fact that the *Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers* (NASW, 2015) does not expressly address “moral panic”, in its containments a moral guide guiding social laborers is included to “challenge social injustice . . . particularly with and on behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of people” (2015: 5) and a moral standard guiding social specialists to focus on not only “the broader society” but also “facilitate informed participation by the public in shaping social policies and institutions” (2015: 27). As a result of this, social laborers have to cautiously look at the conditions under which specific practices related with specific populaces are delegated freak and progress toward becoming focuses of social control.

In any case, no unequivocal use of “moral panic” existing within the social work literature in the United States was revealed (some have connected it to tyke welfare social work in Europe; see Clapton, Cree & Smith, 2013). “Moral panic” theory is perused in this article.

The systems of social control are tied up by “moral panics” and are worry to proficient social workers. By recognizing territories of potential concern, creating arrangements and intercessions, and actualizing projects to lighten communal issues, an essential job is assumed by social laborers in reacting to communal dysfunction. Along these lines, communal specialists are associated with not only social treatment, by tending to the results of communal dysfunction, but also social control, by tending to its causes. (Day&Schiele, 2012).

In terms of this collection, the paper of Lumby and Funnel is the most express case of “moral panic” inquires about as immediate meditation in the media portrayal

of various subjects. As it has marked over, the demonstration of mediation requires the distinguishing proof of purposes of passage into a specific discussion and the acknowledgment of components of existing “common ground” inside the discussion, regardless of whether this implies suspending certain constructionist auras normal for “moral panic” scientists. This strain between an understood “political introduction” towards the dark horse and the express communal constructionism that may somehow or another tend towards relativism is distinguished by Cohen as integral to the emblematic interactionist humanism of Becker, Lemert, Kitsuse and Goffman, from whose work Cohen's own thoughts regarding “moral panics” were first created. The distinctions that rose over the ensuing decades over the political angle from which “committed” “moral panic” scholars mediated are featured in this accumulation in the diverse ways to deal with the inquiry taken by Jenks, Cohen, Young, Critcher, Lundström, Pearce and Charman, just as by Lumby and Funnell. Liberal constructionists, progressively segregated social scientists, analytical columnists and radical commentators of private enterprise have all built diverse points of view. It is maybe astonishing to believe that, while winding up progressively received by segments of the media, the term “moral panic” has likewise turned out to be considerate with the political mediations of neo-preservationists, as reported in Critcher's record of the individuals who contend that “liberal elites” have squeezed “political correctness”, postmodernism, human rights, personality governmental issues, wellbeing and securely, and case/pay culture past “sensible” (conservative) limits of “common sense”. It is important that comparable investigates of such a culture of dread additionally originate from the purportedly extreme left. In the meantime, Cohen and others in this accumulation propose that more extensive media get to has permitted “good” “moral panics” to be encouraged by earthy people,

women's activists and different voices that were once in the past more minimized.

2.2.1. Social Theory and the Use of Moral Panic

“Moral panic” rose up out of being a counter-account to a focal piece of the news position as communal researchers and others protected ordinary focused on gatherings, for example, poor people, youth, and subgroups. For instance, an American human science (sociology) educator cautioned in a survey of his book *Gangs, Supergangs, and Kids on the Corner*, about erroneously distinguishing the roots and attributes of Milwaukee's rising groups:

“The book turns out to be a repudiation of the idea that the People and the Folks have spread from Chicago to his city. In fact, a large part of the book chastises politicians, police and the news media for starting a moral panic about the spread of super gangs from metropolitan areas to smaller cities” (Campbell, 1989: 36).

If “moral panic” somehow happened to be maintained a strategic distance from in managing street crime, cubicle crime was a whole different story. One specialist suggested that a “moral panic” about street crime was more engaging groups of onlookers than white collar crime. In the wake of taking note of that President Reagan helper, Michael Deaver, was anticipating a jail sentence, he included:

“There appears to be little anxiety about having behind bars a country within a country, a burgeoning prison population of over half a million overwhelmingly poor, overwhelmingly black people. Yet no moral panic has greeted a simultaneous crime wave of virtually unparalleled scope and effect: the wave of white collar crime.” (Lewis, 1988: C1)

The different gatherings of people and press step by step received the utilization of “moral panic” since it filled their needs and fit into their digressive practices and rules, including finding better approaches to state old things (McRobbie, 1994). “Moral panic” was utilized more during the 1990s and past. As something to be maintained a strategic distance from, yet as synonymous with panic or overcompensation, the utilization of “moral panic” started to change during the 1990s.

Just as it is noted down, “moral panic” turned into a helpful and intriguing term/idea/concept for alluding to the “other side” that tested the authenticity of procedures that, as a result, worked individuals up and drove them to substitute. The clearest this change was in surveys, highlights and opinion/sentiment places. For instance, media “moral panic” showed up in 23 surveys and reviews, 33 commentary and conclusion pieces, op-ed, while the Guardian highlighted “moral panic” in 59 reviews and 35 'Weekend' exchanges and discussions in selected US (Hunter, 1993). The refine “moral panic” in discourse is utilized by communal researchers and different commentators as “sources” in different news reports, however own much more grounded expressions in articles just as book surveys. Mike Males (2002), who has composed widely on incorrect cases about decadence of youth, including crime, savagery, violence and drug use, regularly spoofs against belittling youth in terms of sociological research. Numerous precedents were experienced by us where publication remarks forewarned against “moral panic”, taking note of that the broad communications, also known as mass media, assumed a vast job, even to the point of citing from Cohen's conclusive article.

Regarding “moral panic” its presentation as positive also prevails. It is found that news media delineations of “moral panic” that usually compared with genuine or foreseen automatic and approach endeavors to respond politically to reports about

specific issues and problems, for instance sedates, sexual conduct, child abuse, etc. In news reports, such points have turned out to be typical. So fundamental has “moral panic” moved toward becoming as a major aspect of talk of restriction to social control, that defenders of specific activities foresee that what may be named the “Moral Panic defense” and really express that their proposition 'be a worthwhile “moral panic”’. Given the uneven manner by which “moral panic” is utilized, this turns out to be increasingly applicable. As a proper term to portray authorities' conduct, consider a model in which “moral panic” is denied, that is predictable with “moral panic”, for instance web sting activities by Prosecutor Pirro that verged on entanglement:

“Some critics have also said that the recent surge of outrage about child pornography and pedophilia is driven by a moral panic reminiscent of 19th-century vice crusades. But there is nothing censorious about fighting pedophiles on the internet. It simply an extension of her longstanding interest in fighting child abuse and domestic violence, she said. ‘It’s really about protecting the vulnerable, whether they’re senior citizens or children. . .’”
(Worth, 2001: 1).

This announcement mirrors a counter-news design use of “moral panic” in that the standard job of difficult an open response should likewise be responded to or discredited in light of the fact that it is extremely about 'protecting the vulnerable'.

“Moral panic” is a sociological notion that tries to clarify a specific sort of overcompensation to an apparent communal issue. Created in the fierce political and scholarly setting of the late 1960s, its important point was to uncover the procedures associated with making worry about a communal issue; worry that drag little

relationship to the truth of the issue, however in any case gave the premise to a move in social or lawful codes.

In the course of recent four decades, be that as it may, the idea of “moral panic” has turned into a somewhat diverse and fissured, instead of durable, collection (see David et al., 2011). Today, this sociological build, “moral panic”, is confronting two similarly perilous entanglements: routinization/trivialization (because of a wide and obscure use) from one viewpoint and dynamic relinquish (because of an absence of sociological enthusiasm) on the other. For “moral panics” to abstain from windling without end, it is fundamental to approach the idea from various hypothetical points of view. Subsequent to investigating the intrinsic shortcomings of “moral panic” look into, the article will re-stimulate the idea of “moral panic” by developing Bourdieu's hypothetical ideas of habitus, field and hysteresis. It demonstrates how a Bourdieusian casing of “moral panic” inquire about gets rid of the recognized entanglements while incorporating progressively hypothetical meticulousness with the field of “moral panic” considers.

The idea of “moral panic” can be a clean or productive purpose of flight to investigate explicit kinds of responses to communal issues, contingent upon whether it is utilized as a simple exposing device or as an apparatus appropriate for the headway of the sociological creative energy.

Jock Young in 2011 clarified; “The notion of moral panic initially addressed C. Wright Mill's long-standing order to researching the relations “the personal troubles of a milieu” along with “the public issues of social structure” (1958: 8).

The three unique panic studies about gave proof of sociological creative ability by associating the states of aggregate nervousness with more extensive procedures of

verifiable and basic changes in cutting edge modern social orders. (Cohen, 2002) During this snapshot of verifiable conjuncture, that is, post-war Britain, “moral panics” were an unmistakable delineation of what Mills (1959: 11) when portrayed:

“When people cherish some set of values and do not feel any threat to them, they experience wellbeing. When they cherish values but do feel them to be threatened, they experience a crisis - either as a personal trouble or as a public issue. If all their values seem involved, they feel the total threat of panic.”

However contemporary “moral panic” contemplates have relinquished a great part of the sociological creative ability that was once at the core of the idea of “moral panic” (Garland, 2008; Young, 2005, 2009). Today, the idea is all the time just connected instead of thoroughly considered. All the more especially, the idea of “moral panic” is utilized as a negative standardizing judgment to depict apparently extreme and wrong responses to communal issues (see, for example, Burns and Crawford, 1999; Rothe and Muzzatti, 2004; Welch et al., 2002). What makes a specific group of onlookers respond disproportionately in a particular time and area is not thought significant to the new venture close by, in other words, to "liberate" individuals by recommending that their responses are only confusion of the reality of the risk (Garland, 2008). Curiously, the scholarly utilization of the thought of “moral panic”, as a short-hand term for discussing surface qualities like “disproportionality”, has turned out to be very like its exaggeration form in the prevalent media, with both uncritically utilizing the term to depicting aggregate responses to social issues (Jewkes, 2004: 65).

In the “*Rules of Sociological Method*”, Durkheim (1966: 75) composed

that: “When research is only beginning and the facts have not yet been submitted to any analysis, their sole ascertainable characteristics are those sufficiently external to be immediately apparent. Those less apparent [in French in the text, ‘plus profond’] are doubtless more essential. Their explanatory value is greater, but they remain unknown at this stage of scientific knowledge and cannot be visualized save by substituting for reality some conception of the mind.”

As Rohloff and Wright (2010) watch, the aspiration of panic researchers to uncover what they see as overstated responses to social issues may clarify their presentcentred center to the detriment of the truly organized procedures that feed into “moral panics”. At the point when need is given to describing evidently unnecessary responses to communal issues, panic researchers do not subscribe to the sociological creative ability and deny open doors for investigating further socio-social patterns producing panics.

The exposing stimulus of contemporary panic researchers has created a more extensive disappointment with the scientific legitimacy of the idea of “moral panic” as confused in its destinations and needs (Hunt, 1999). In the long run the dynamic surrender of the idea of “moral panic” is fortified by the observation that “moral panic” hypothesis is never again satisfactory to think about contemporary social orders (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995) and no longer sound despite ongoing improvements in social hypothesis (McRobbie, 2011).

The depleting without end of help for “moral panic” inquire about has urged a few creators to reconnect with the sociology of “moral panic”. Drawing from the sociology of hazard and moral guideline, Hier (2002, 2008, 2011) proposes to

reconceptualize “moral panics” as a transitory reversal of individualizing long haul administrative procedures (for example, drinking capably or checking kids all the more intently in the recreation center) into collectivized yet unstable talks of mischief presented by “untrustworthy” others (see likewise Critcher, 2009). Such talks call for more straightforward cautious gathering responses to guarantee a comprehensive feeling of aggregate security (as an example, rebuffing alcoholic drivers or freely declaring the personality of sex offenders). Drawing on Norbert Elias' social hypothesis, Amanda Rohloff (2011; see likewise Rohloff and Wright, 2010) distinguishes “moral panics” as momentary moralizing efforts against “less cultivated” others when long haul acculturating expert cases of oneself separate.

As indicated by Rohloff; the thought of “moral panic” can be similarly characterized as a “civilizing offensive” at the crossing point among humanizing and de-enlightening patterns “with a comparing increment in mercilessness and the potential for re-development of savagery into the open circle” (2010: 417). Rohloff is enlivened by the problem of climate change and offers the case of the ozone layer's opening, with an argument type of moralizing between individualized hazard the executives procedure and aggregate moralizing effort (Rohloff, 2011: 639).

These tale approaches are on the double auspicious and befuddling augmentations to current discussions and talks encompassing “moral panic” hypothesis. There are clear chances to broaden the extent of “moral panic” research to fuse new hypothetical strands of thought, for example, talk examination, hazard society and moral guideline. As David Garland (2004: 163) points out, '[a] hypothetical structure that remaining parts static after some time is a landmark to a confused perspective on what hypothesis is with'. In any case, what is especially surprising in endeavors to think “beyond” “moral panic” is that they have fabricated a

totally unexpected form in comparison to the one initially brought about by Young, Cohen and Hall in the mid-1970s. For researchers like Hier or Rohloff, “moral panic” is no longer interpreted as the developmental component, activating more extensive administrative procedures, but instead as a momentary burst in a more extensive task of moral guideline (Hier, 2002). The subsequent change is an all out inversion of the arrangement of procedures. Ostensibly, at that point, these novel records cannot be depicted as an augmentation of “moral panic” hypothesis however as a burst with its unique objectives and needs. “Moral panics” are taken to stream straightforwardly from the activities of flippant others, or pre-marked folk devils from this updated vantage point. Appropriately, the purposes why certain gatherings are made into folk devils or why they deny ventures of moral guideline are not (any longer) thought about an issue deserving of sociological investigation. Besides, these novel records explicitly clear the disproportional character of “moral panics” (Rohloff and Wright, 2010: 419). Similarly, tricky they propose erratic times of “moral panics”; the probability of “moral panics” is constantly present, showing up and vanishing from outside more extensive administrative procedures without apparent reason. While the first focal point of “moral panic” is on more extensive recorded changes in social structures, the focal point of contemporary panic look into is on “transitory occasions, fringe unsettling influences in a generally directed universe” (Young, 2009: 4).

These researchers miss numerous vital setting explicit, generally arranged clarifications behind moral panics by speculating “beyond” “moral panics”. In the way of the amazing ideas of terrific hypothesis, their overhauled idea of “moral panic” gives instant responses to every single imaginable question about the when, why, who and whither of “moral panic”. Especially significant here, Pierre Bourdieu (1984: 160– 161) saw that: '[t]hose who give moment consideration to the moment, which,

suffocated in the occasion and the feelings it stimulates, segregates the basic minute, and in this way establishes it as a totality containing inside itself its very own clarification'.

2.2.2. Moral Regulation and the Volatility of Panics

Investigations of “moral panic” consistently start with the contentions exhibited in “Stan Cohen's (1972) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. For Cohen (1972: 41), each moral panic has its folk devil: the embodiment of abhorrence who is (or that are) vulnerable to acknowledgment dependent on 'unambiguously unfavorable symbols.'” “The resource of moral panic is not simply the folk devil; rather the folk devil fills in as the ideological exemplification of the moral panic. At the point when folk devils are uncovered to people in general in a cliché design through predominant press announcing, they are built as dangers to the communal/moral texture requiring prompt administrative intercession (see Young, 2009). Regularly the emblematic folk devil corresponds around to specific people and gatherings, yet it is basically a method of portrayal that capacities as an intermediary for the hurtful other in talks about crime, law, and request. Cohen's system compares to what Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 124– 143) depict as the “interest group” hypothesis of “moral panic” – one of three conventional models of ‘moral panic’.”

In this model, “moral panic” is clarified as the unintended result of moralizing ventures attempted by intrigue bunches with an end goal to attract open consideration regarding a particular “moral evil”. Goode and Ben-Yehuda recognize that “interest group” from the “elite-engineered” show. The world class built model thinks about “moral panic” as the result of made battles that are intended to occupy consideration far from genuine social emergencies (Hall et al. (1978), for instance, contend that “moral panic” is a component used by the decision class to bewilder further

emergencies in the entrepreneur framework.

As opposed to the intrigue gathering and tip top built models; “Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) propose a third model: grassroots. The grassroots model stipulates that “moral panic” begins with the overall population. In the grassroots model, “moral panic” is comprehended to give discharge to a repository of communal weakness. The three conventional models of “moral panic” keep on impacting “moral panic” contemplates, yet resulting endeavors to “rethink” “moral panic” hypothesis have raised doubt about the suppositions of the three primary models. They have done as such to create elective approaches to clarify “moral panic”. It has been contended that most contemporary political systems are media techniques, and that the connection between procedures of cases making and social control is less encircled than past plans surrender (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995).” An example of that DeYoung (1998) contends that the childcare suppliers who turned into the point of convergence of sinister childcare panics through the 1980s were very much incorporated into their networks, and that they did not have the social periphery of customary folk devils.

However, nearby news inclusion of these examples was extraordinary, showing the examples as significantly various types of social issues. While the Zimmerman example was treated as a important for race and racial relations against the background of visual impairment, the Goetz case was treated as symptomatic of summed up social breakdown and broad disappointments encompassing crime imbued with racial "code words (Harris 2012; Omi and Winant 2014).

“Not at all like Goetz inclusion, inclusion of the Zimmerman case did not present a solid, racialized criminal; rather it attracted regard for contending stories that challenged the creation of "folk devils" and recast them as

exploited people. Scholarship proposes that crime news confining will in general pursue the rationale of a "moral panic": adapted folk devils, especially young fellows of shading, are introduced as illustrative of an intense danger to the authoritative qualities related with communal request."

In spite of the fact that news outlets have turned out to be more broken and, to some degree, increasingly responsive units the portrayal and assorted variety since the 1980s (Garland 2008; Hier 2002, 2008; McRobbie and Thornton 1995; Parnaby 2003; Ungar 2001), investigations of crime news surrounding will in general stress the multiplication, as opposed to destabilization, of domineering racial classes (Chiricos and Eschholz 2002; Dixon and Azocar 2006; Dixon and Linz 2000; Parham-Payne 2014). News inclusion of the Zimmerman case gives a negative case, set against this literature. How does counter-authoritative crime news confining dispense reprehensibility and mischief?

Endeavors to reexamine (and move beyond) customary models of "moral panic" give numerous dynamic experiences into the idea of moralization, and they have incompletely affected the course of hypothesis and observational investigation. The other issues with endeavors to reconsider "moral panic", be that as it may, is that they have prompted the deconstruction of customary models without a reproduction of elective methods of clarification. In most "moral panic" inquire about, there is a presumption that the damage accepted to be presented by folk devils is disproportional to the mischief that really exists, which addresses an inclination in "moral panic" concentrates to force a undesirable regulating decision on clarifications of unpredictable critical talks as 'irrational' assessments of the threat(s) presented (see Hier, 2008). Despite the fact that revisionist endeavors have problematized the observational bases through which these logical decisions are rendered, experts are

compelled to depend on standardizing esteem decisions to condense evaluations relating to the 'unreasonableness' of public convictions (see Doran, 2008).

Hier (2008) points out that the sociology of administration concentrates to hypothesize “moralization” (for example moral guideline) to cure these hypothetical challenges as far as rationalization developments of self and other that are transmitted through regular talks of hazard the executives and damage shirking. Hypothesized thusly, moralization references a liberal origination of 'the moral' that qualifies singular rights. The sending of modern liberal rights works as an intermediary for moralization, and one focal, shared liberal moral incentive during a time of evident “moral relativism” is to guarantee one's entitlement to opportunity from damage (Hier, no date). By way of regular exercises become moralized as decisions relating to what is good and bad as far as the contrary ramifications for other individuals, moralization discovers articulation through the intermediaries of hazard, mischief, and moral duty. One basic component of moralization in regular day to day existence figures out persons are named upon to participate in dependable types of individual hazard the board that exist in strain with aggregate focus places of “harmful others” (likewise observe Hunt, 2003). On a theoretical dimension this infers moralization is rationalistic: individualizing talks calling upon individuals to assume individual liability to oversee chance (for example drinking dependably) are arranged against collectivizing talks speaking to the subject position of damage (for example the alcoholic driver).

The unpredictability of moralization brings into play an alternate connection of qualities and feelings (Hier, 2008; Walby and Spencer, 2011). Throughout the sending of a lot of electrifying talks that eject all of a sudden, and die down rapidly, the moral logic that arranges individualized hazard the board against an aggregate component of

damage is transformed. Talks that call upon people to take part in dependable types of self-direct to oversee chance are transposed into collectivizing talks of hazard the executives. The last appear as protective gathering responses against what is spoken to as a quick component of mischief presented by 'irresponsible' others: the individuals who neglect to take part in individual hazard the executives. As an unstable aggravation over the span of moral administration, "moral panics" are fleeting unsettling influences concentrated on restricting the office of "folk devils". Where regular "moral panic" ponders are frequently worried about the "origins" of every "episode" of "moral panic" as far as a specific occasion, guarantee or other "tipping point" with causal supremacy, the reasonable model we utilize centers around the ramifications of unstable moralization for the advancement of various administrative methodologies.

The "moral panic" over viciousness picked up altogether approximately the development of the class of "senseless violence" in 1997. The brutal demise of Meindert Tjoelker in Leeuwarden (1997) could be viewed as a cause that prompted a checked increment in media inclusion of relational savagery. Later his passing and the consideration gave to it, a casualty of comparative brutality the prior year, Joes Kloppenburg, was regarded with a quiet walk a year after his demise. Meindert Tjoelker states that in this manner prompted the development of the classification "senseless violence", which could then be connected "*ex post facto to cases that were, qua violence*", comparable however at this point found from an alternate perspective. Kloppenburg's demise in 1997 currently came to be viewed as 'sense-less brutality' one might say *avant la lettre*. So also, an even more seasoned case came to be named 'senseless violence'. This was the demise of Kerwin Duinmijer in 1983, a 15-year-old dark youth beaten and cut seriously in a supremacist assault by skinheads, and who

passed on as a result of his wounds. In the mid 1980s, his demise was transcendently observed as a supremacist incident, as bigotry was a noteworthy open issue back then. His case was it might be said renamed as 'senseless violence' after 1997 and it came to genius vide one of the most punctual instances of a wonder that could now be given a history and could be believed to have altogether expanded in scale since those early cases. This prompts the confusing circumstance that, in the main occurrence, the rise of the classification of senseless violence demonstrates a subjective development of savagery, which at that point turns out to be popular to the point that it begins to retain different classes of viciousness to the degree that it usurps them out and out. At the point when media inclusion of "senseless violence" was thought of it as, supposedly included such episodes as a Turkish instance of respect vengeance, street temper and physical savagery on open conveyance, and the instance of a schizophrenic drifter wounding a man to death in a library "just like that". Hence, the notion appeared to turn in on itself: while it at first included acts no rational individual would submit, it currently created the impression that anybody could eventually or other have been a culprit of "senseless violence". This can be defended by conjuring the conservative thought that all viciousness is "senseless", which ends up obvious.

The word "senseless violence" was acquainted in the awareness with which is alluded here by police official Bangma, who distributed an article utilizing the term in the *Leeuwarder Courant*, a provincial paper, following the brutal demise of Meindert Tjoelker on 13 September 1997. The general population of Leeuwarden is called upon by Bangma, where the episode occurred, to watch one moment of quiet. In that capacity, consideration regarding "senseless violence" was prodded by a police chief, who can for this situation be viewed as a major aspect of an interest group. What

pursued was a huge reaction that set a case for different urban areas. In a generally brief time, silence – regardless of whether a few minutes' silence or a silent march – turned into a trademark reaction to 'senseless violence'. Furthermore, the media were not just a medium, yet they were, to summarize McLuhan (1994), in the meantime the message. However, the media are nevertheless one of the performers Cohen (1972) portrays as vital to “moral panics”. By the media, law enforcement, politicians, action groups and “folk devils” (moral deviants) are included.

2.2.2.1. Moral Panic and Normativity

From its commencement (Cohen, 1972; Young, 1971), the “moral panic” idea has been utilized as a type of social study; where panics are portrayed as social responses that seem to be 'irrational' and, along these lines, inherently misled. As Cohen himself watches, panic inquire about has would in general spotlight on:

“Cases where the moral outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary forces the point [of research] was to expose social reaction not just as over-reaction... [but also as] *tendentious* (that is, slanted in a particular ideological direction) and as *misplaced* or *displaced* (that is, aimed – whether deliberately or thoughtlessly – at a target which was not the ‘real’ problem).”

(Cohen, 2002: xxxi)

In fact, in an ongoing article Chas Critcher (2009: 32) has contended that the 'scholarly undertaking [of “moral panic” research] is additionally a political one'; where the finding about the legitimacy of the response as contrasted and the truth of the issue apparently is the basic point of “moral panic” look into.

Hier states that (2002a: 312);

“This 'problem' of normativity clarifies why “moral panic” has been (and keeps on being) apparently unappealing to late improvements in social hypothesis; specifically, to the writing on moral guideline”

(for instance, Hunt, 1999; Moore and Valverde, 2000). In response to such reactions, Critcher contends: “.... moral panic” examination is at last dependent on the view that sociology has as one of its center capacities a capacity to evaluate the cases made about the status of a communal issue or freak gathering. This is never simple and continually testing however ought not to be deserted (Critcher, 2008: 1141).

An issue with Hier's (2002a, 2008) contention, at any rate as far as creating “moral panic” “beyond the heuristic”, is that his area of the unpredictable idea of “moral panic” inside the more extensive arena of moral administrative procedures that are normal, overall and not exactly awesome may essentially allow it to be *further* convenient crosswise over reality. Without a doubt, Critcher (2009: 24) reacts that, while Hier's work is conceivably inventive, there is a danger of “incorporating possibly *any* point inside it transmit” (accentuation included), and accordingly better detail of the extent of moral guideline is required where-upon we may clear up the limits between those subjects that are simply protester of administrative talks, and those that are bound to emit into out and out panics.

Then again, Critcher (2009: 27– 32) contends that whether a subject can be characterized as underhanded eventually relies upon whether it “inherently fits the definition” (state, it undermines the honesty of youngsters) and on its “intangible resonance” inside the general public in which it presents (state, where the assurance of the innocent child is fundamental). This would not just request that the panic expert is

one who is found, arranged and in this way socially fit the bill to give an assessment on the propriety of the reaction to the occasion or issue being referred to, yet would, thusly, expect that there is a personal stake in exposing the foreseen response (see Jenkins, 2009). Also, a socially arranged contention ends the need to analyze more extensive communal and recorded procedures behind an issue's introduction just by ideals of that capability. We are hence diminished to, by and by, making a *normative* appraisal about a *temporal* issue.

2.2.2.2. Moral Panic and Temporality

“Moral panics” are regularly conceptualized as brief, transient scenes. Except for a couple (for example Corridor et al., 1978; Jenkins, 1998), most panic contemplates are “present centred”; that is, they do not assess the truly organized procedures that feed into the panic.² However maybe part of the emphasis on the “event”, in seclusion, is identified with our first issue: normativity. Here, the longing to expose the response – to demonstrate that it is “misplaced”, “displaced” and “tendentious” – may have added to a reduced tendency to look past the present scene. This is fairly amusing thinking about that the paradigm of disproportionality essentially relies upon a level of a chronicled measure (example: crime rates are down while dread of crime is up). In any case, Cohen's accentuation on the responsive procedures and the forecast that such procedures would more than once return, in different occasions and spaces, offers a feeling of immortality to panic, and a rationale of transference crosswise over issues and occasions. This was certainly a key inspiration driving both Hall et al's. (1978) expansion of the idea into a Marxist sociology, and Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (1994) modification of the idea resulting to an examination of a variety of contextual analyses crosswise over existence.

“Goode and Ben-Yehuda point to an all-encompassing time period for investigation: panics are not like fads, trivial in nature and inconsequential in their impact; they do not come and go, vanishing, as it were, without a trace. Even those that seem to end without impact often leave informal traces that prepare us for later panics. A close examination of the impact of panics forces us to take a more long-range view of things, to look at panics as social process rather than as separate, discrete, time-bound events. “Moral panics” are a crucial element of the fabric of social change. They are not marginal, exotic, trivial phenomena, but one key by which we can unlock the mysteries of social life.” (Goode and Ben- Yehuda, 1994: 229)

Notwithstanding the way that these creators likewise take care of the oft-dismissed part of “moral panic” – *why* panics arrive at an end, distinguishing that usually with an abusive (however to a great extent representative) change in law, which fills in as a sign that *something has been done* to relieve the conduct being referred to (see additionally Critcher, 2003) – obviously their focal point of study is one way: on the effect, or consequence, of a panic and not on why, or how, it was delivered (see Critcher, 2003: 26). This ends up hazardous, for how might one decide the effect of a panic on the off chance that one does not inspect how the communal issue is being referred to may have been growing long haul preceding the panic? It is in such manner that Hier alarms us to Durkheim's notice: that the

“Setting center upon useful clarifications may mean causal clarifications are neglected; a notice Hier notes as an incongruity to regard, given that it is a Durkheimian establishment from which a “moral panic” epistemology is inferred” (Hier, 2002a: 314).

2.2.2.3 Moral Panic and (Un)intentionality

A third issue of investigations of “moral panic” is the variety in records identifying with obligation. In (1972) Cohen explained the “moral panic” for instance, is seen generally as a unintentional and unexpected advancement, however with a specific accentuation on the job of the media in strengthening a feeling of anticipation and fit as a fiddle to gossip and equivocal circumstances. Then again, Hall et al's. (1978) Evaluation of the robbing wonder uncovered a *vital* panic utilized by elites to organize authority and redirect consideration from a fundamental (industrialist) emergency. In their investigation, the 'mugging' name and the activities of the control culture went before the folk devils and the 'incidents'; an arrangement of *intervention* uncovering degenerate activity in that creation for social response, this with an end goal to divert social nerves produced by the financial retreat of the mid 1970s.

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) built the issue as an issue of purposeful activities against inadvertent advancements. Intrigued by the components of intention and obligation, these researchers “*recognize grassroots, interest group and elite-engineered*” panics. The primary model, the “*grassroots*” panic, recommends that while concern may show inside different divisions, for example, the media or among political bodies, it is the profoundly felt mentalities and notions of an expansive region of lay society that react in the main occasion. The other model, the relevance group panic, recommends the response as a result (proposed or not) of endeavors for the benefit specifically noteworthy gatherings and moral business people who work to focus on a particular moral “evil”. The last model, the elite-engineered panic, is the cognizant and intentional aftereffect of promulgation crusades intended to keep away from a certified answer for a genuine auxiliary issue whose introduction would undermine elite interests.

“Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 134, 143) further propose that every one of the three are to be viewed as “ideal types” that, when connected, will delineate distinctive parts of a panic. In this manner, it is imperative not to lessen panic to some; for instance, the grassroots model is gullible in separation as it cannot represent how crude concerns are heightened and activated (that is, unexpected “anxieties” require deliberate 'directing'). Be that as it may, in spite of Goode and Ben-Yehuda's declarations, one of the issues with such perfect sorts is that they can prompt the decrease of the unpredictability of panics to a “type”, as has been the situation, for instance, with the characterization of Hall et al's. investigation as a “elite-engineered” (intentional) panic, and Cohen's examination as a “interest group” (unintentional) panic.”

Later evaluations contend for a more full valuation for the majority of responses going with moral affirmations. These basic commitments are particularly worried about delineating the obstruction endeavors and increases made beside essential descriptions and predominant cases, which show how the development of “new moral minorities” serves not just as the modern oppositional political voice (as the qualification between the left and the privilege turns out to be practically indistinct), yet additionally gives both the vehicle and the encouraging groups of people through which folk devils can “fight back”. Furthermore, the negativity of the “moral panic” idea (the elite model especially) cannot envision that the people in question (folk devils) may praise this prominence as a privilege of generational entry, or that panic might be utilized by different promoting outlets as “priceless PR campaigns” (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995: 565). In any case, while these contentions confound the experimental bases whereupon the basic models stand, they miss the mark

concerning recreating substitute methods for clarification and hypothesis (Hier, 2008).

3. MORAL PANIC AS POLITICAL PROJECT

In the first place, it is pertinent to take note of that overall sentiments of weakness among the Dutch public hint at no “moral panic” as indicated by the measurements (CBS, 2006; SCP, 2004, 2006). During the 1990s, a slight abatement of sentiments of uncertainty can be noticed. From 1999 to 2004, they endure generally steady, remaining to 1999 dimensions in 2004 after a slight increment (CBS, 2006; SCP, 2006). Regardless, 80 percent surprisingly in 2004 suspected that 'crime has as of late developed' and more than 25 percent experienced sentiments of weakness. Besides, around 75 percent of Dutch individuals believed that issues of rough crime would be more noteworthy in 2020 (SCP, 2004: 480). Solidness in sentiments of weakness can at present imply that the dimension of experienced uncertainty is fairly high – the call is regularizing here, and I will not wander into making any further determinations. In any case, interestingly, in spite of the fact that these sentiments absolutely do not grow, a “moral panic” over “senseless violence” has in any case risen. Discussing such a “moral panic” is completely defended once organized common activity against “senseless violence” and its media inclusion are considered. That sentiments of uncertainty have scarcely risen yet desires for expanding savagery exist makes these center components of a “moral panic” all the additionally intriguing in light of the social development of the danger voiced in talk on “senseless violence”.

Viciousness is a subject of “public supposition” in popular discourse. Luhmann characterizes public sentiment as that which is watched and portrayed as public supposition (Luhmann, 2002: 286). Public assessment consequently has a self-actuating inclination. When 'individuals' feel viciousness is developing, it progresses

toward becoming what 'one' cannot neglect to see. Prominent or public talk is regularly compared to "society". This, obviously, is an "ideological" develop, as in all instances of "society", which by and by has a sweeping performative limit. It is hence expressed that there exists "unrest" inside society over a particular event of viciousness or over the alleged increment in instances of savagery. The consciousness of a social issue, for example, savagery is said to "live" in the public eye. In such discourse, the possibility of a overall development of savagery neither assumes the job of inspiring exchange regarding its reality – since conventional individuals have no methods for achieving an end on this point – nor does it serve to legitimize the settlement of policy goals. Or maybe, in public discourse, the notion that savagery develops has a confusing helpful capacity. In nine out of 20 silent marches detailed by Boutellier (2000), compassion was referenced as a thought process in participate on the walk; another intention was outrage and feebleness. Much referenced were insightful thought processes relating to inquiries of standards and qualities, to the inquiry whether brutality can make or have 'sense' by any means, and to regard, tolerance, resistance and so forth (Boutellier, 2000: 325– 6). Growing viciousness, canalized through reference to 'senseless violence', can be contended to give individuals an intellectual edge, a depiction of reality that orders recognition and sublimates a portion of the frailty experienced by those taking part. Something about 'senseless violence' can be comprehended after all .

Hier states that the connection between the generation of importance and the capacity these implications reach out to. This is a *critical* origination of ideology, where setting accentuation on the substance of specific setups of talk empowers the people to then inspect the reason for communal actualities (Hier, 2002a).

Hier explained fights that, under a neoliberal methods for administration, administrative procedures have discovered articulation through intermediaries of hazard, damage and moral duty: we are presently solicited to take part in capable structures from individual hazard the board; a call to self-direct which sits in a persuasive position to an aggregate subject position of 'harmful others'. Hier (2008) offers the case of the talks which call us (exclusively) to drink dependably and how these are in pressure with (but depend on) the talks which speak to the aggregate mischief of the alcoholic driver. (2002a, 2008)

Notwithstanding, the street whereupon guideline ventures is not constantly smooth as moral reasons for living are not generally paid attention to. The conceptual subject position is filled by recognizable individual/s and the risk turns out to be progressively explicit; he/she/they and it are then reacted to through cautious exercises for the benefit of the more extensive gathering, at these conjunctions. It is currently an aggregate talk of hazard the executives which sits against a prompt and customized measurement of damage; that is, the ordinary persuasion (of individual hazard the board against the aggregate component of mischief) is immediately switched. Hier told that this these minutes are the readers scenes of “moral panic”. (2002a, 2008)

Remarks have concentrated on the association of news reports with “moral panic” so as to enlighten the points and issues related with this vital sociology idea. It is underlined by me at the start that media groups are key sorting out highlights of talk. Review the point about the scarcity of “moral panic” in United State arranges news reports, contrasted with its increasingly regular utilization in paper articles and conclusion parts. Paper designs in terms of newspaper formats, managing space as

opposed to time (as in TV), are all the more tolerating of “moral panic” contentions, particularly in the article and remark areas. The outskirts encompassing recognizable challenged issues like sex and medications show limits, yet they likewise separate proper from wrong issues, satisfactory and unsuitable subjects for fundamental analysis going with “moral panic”. One such limit is terrorism. This recommends we are not prone to discover “moral panic” related with terrorism reports.

Terrorism is not challenged as a statutory concern. Terrorism and the fear monger danger are still viewed as genuine and dispassionately genuine by numerous individuals in the United States and the The United Kingdom; it is not seen as a social development and the administration activities are not treated in the broad communications as discretionary overcompensation. For sure, resistance groups in the The United States demand that terrorism is a problem that is begging to be addressed, and offer slight contrasts in how to battle it (Altheide, 2006). In this manner, terrorism has not been united with “moral panic” regardless of utilizing comparative components of dread as sex and medications.

The idea of “moral panic” is everything except missing in broad talks of terrorism, including trepidation and terrorism, exploitation and terrorism, and various undesirable results of purposeful publicity and approaches about terrorism (Walker, 2002; Garland, 2008). What has been consumed just by The United States alone is more than \$1 trillion on a war purportedly against terrorism, abused social equality of its natives, and as a feature of its “extraordinary rendition” approach and procedure, abducted people all through the world and transported them to different terrains where they would be tormented so as to get data about terrorism. Be that as it may, terrorism is not connected to “moral panic” in prevailing press, nor until all the more as of late, in scholastic reports (Rothe and Muzzetti, 2004; Garland, 2008). Not many news

reports place terrorism or dangers of terrorism near “moral panic”. Albeit elective media do as such, “moral panic” is not being connected to the terrorism through the mainstream media. Paper editors do not seem willing to acknowledge the “moral panic” meaning of a circumstance that may conceivably include terrorism, but instead, it is beyond the limits reach, in a manner of speaking, in standard news media to stretch out the talk to incorporate real resistance and portrayal of terrorism with Cohen's exemplary meaning of MP. Be that as it may, it is an alternate story with elective media: psychological oppression is united with “moral panic” on a huge number of media locales, including scholarly book promotions, meeting introductions, too writes and other elective media. One writer, a teacher, composed a paper (initially distributed in *The Humanist*) associating trepidation to terrorism and “moral panic”:

“The terrorism scare is a moral panic, similar to many throughout recent history. Social scientists call these society-wide scares MPs because they are founded upon fear of threats to society from moral deviants of the worst kind. In general, MPs begin when events occur that cause a great many people to feel threatened by an internal enemy, hidden deep within their society. Secret groups of foreign terrorists, believed to be fanatics who kill without guilt, fit the bill perfectly” (Victor, 2006).

Such proclamations are exceptionally uncommon in standard news media. The utilization of “moral panic” assists to expose guarantees about target and major dangers to communal request. Since such dangers are reflexive of the talk of dread, it pursues that “moral panic” certainly encounters the talk and imagery fundamental cases about risk and threat. That scarcity of remarks connecting fear based oppression to “moral panic” proposes that psychological warfare is not worthy as a feature of the ordinary news talk of point/contrast (or opposite sides/resistance) about specific

subjects, particularly those related with “moral panic”. Cohen declared that,

“In standard news media “moral panic” and a casual rundown of subjects are implicitly affirmed for news talk and stimulation news designs, yet terrorism is not. This is especially valid with US TV organize news, which contained basically no references to “moral panic”, in spite of the fact that the more limited TV positions are not fruitful reason for developing moral panics” (2001).

As “moral panic” encounters the talk of dread on a specific theme, its nonappearance with different points, similar to terrorism, continues the emblematic request developed by the media rationale of the terrorism foundation. The intensity of an unconcealed image like terrorism is continued as it winds up both talked and adjusted and merged with different subjects that might be given a role as “terrorist like”.

3.1. Risk and Regulations of Moral Panic In The Concept of Political Project

Obviously, there was a staggering impression that status contrasts were for the principle part viewed as genuine, with just a single focus group member offering a disagreeing voice, given the measure of threatening vibe communicated towards asylum seekers. The larger part see was that asylum seekers were unjustifiably advantaged in connection to the host network and that their treatment ought to be more as per that of a lower status gathering.

Hall described the terminology of “moral panic” in that words;

“The moral panic appears to us to be one of the principal forms of

ideological consciousness by means of which a 'silent minority' is won over to the support of increasingly coercive measures on the part of the state, and lends its legitimacy to a 'more than usual' exercise of control." (Hall et al., 1978: 221)

“Moral panics” frequently appear to be temporary yet after some time their total impact can be to make social divisions and redistribute societal position just as structure frameworks of guideline and control that endure long after the underlying scene has run its course. Therefore it has been contented by James Marone (2003) in the USA that “moral panics” have more than once offered ascend to a type of receptive state constructing that is of great significance, where the philosophy of restricted government ordinarily discourages the development of state establishments. Marone contends that the exceptional 'politics of sin' in a religious 'Hellfire' nation—provoked by clamors about the pernicious impacts of liquor, the sex exchange, and drugs – have prompted a development of administrative guideline and across the country implementation that would never have been accomplished by methods for ordinary political procedures.

Notwithstanding, to be cautious here in case the credit an excessive amount of adequacy to 'panics' and excessively little to sound responses to basic issues – despite the fact that it is regularly experimentally hard to unravel the two. For example, the wonder of child abuse, which, as Ian Hacking has discerned, is a communal issue that has been featured, conceptualized and tended to in ongoing decades. The progressive communal and administrative responses to saw child abuse have made, in our communal orders, a totally different routine of doubt, management and jurisdiction:

“Child abuse has created a world of difference. Children are subjected to

education about it, by way of videos, from the earliest years of schooling. Television and movies have a steady diet of it. There are support and confessional groups for abusers modeled on the lines of Alcoholics Anonymous. Abuse has been firmly grasped by the co-dependency movements. By 1985 there were cities – Portland, Oregon, for example – in which anti-abuse activists had been so successful that men were advised never to touch a child in public; if a child not in the family is hurt, be sure there is a friendly witness there before helping in any way.” (Hacking, 2000: 160)

It would be a mix-up, nonetheless, to trait this new administrative routine solely to “moral panics”. Dissimilar to the dream of 'satanic ritual abuse' – which seems to have been founded completely on unconfirmed cases – increasingly commonplace works on including the 'abuse' of youngsters (by disregard, abuse, mental, physical and sexual viciousness, and so on.) are very genuine, and, having been rendered noticeable, would without a doubt brief judgment and endeavors at control with or without insane clamors and overstated announcing. As it is included in several different situations, the underlying “moral panic” may serve to pull in public consideration and power the issue onto the political motivation, yet the uncovered character of the fundamental marvel might be adequate to clarify consequent communal responses.

A reason culture includes created inside the adolescent equity framework. It pardons itself for its wastefulness, and time after time pardons the youthful wrongdoers before it, inferring that their conduct in light of their social conditions cannot be helped by them.

The standardization of the **The Child Development Associate (CDA)** means a

more extensive ideological move in the guideline of British youth from a “minimum intervention” approach that prevailed during the 1990s to a safeguard 'early intervention' approach (Crawford, 2009a; Squires, 2008). As Bottoms and Dignan (2004) clarified that,

“the purpose behind this move was the apparent disappointments of the Conservative Party's alleged 'new-orthodoxy' that won among youth equity laborers in the period 1985– 1997. The 'new orthodoxy' received two discernible administering standards: initial, a retreat from carceral techniques dependent on the conviction that organization and the “official processing of juvenile delinquents” was both hurtful to youth and helpful for setting up progressively long haul criminal inclinations in youthful offenders; second, the underwriting of the “age-crime curve”– an attestation that most of youthful offenders normally 'develop out of crime' after some time.” (2004: 33)

The CDA was encouraged by the Audit Commission's report on the adolescent equity framework, which found that a significant part of the £1bn spent every year on handling youthful offenders ‘was wasted through lengthy and ineffective court procedures’ (Muncie, 1999: 150). The Audit Commission (1996: 96) prescribed a move to deterrent approach, finishing up: ‘the present arrangements are failing young people – who are not being guided away from offending to constructive activities’.

The question do “moral panics” need moral regulations or how does it work needs to be focused on further. The papers exhibited in this unique problem feature a standout amongst the most gainful strains to have endure the life of the “moral panic”

idea itself, viz (a) the degree to which “moral panics” can be comprehended as responses by elites or potentially interest groups to specific dangers to the prevailing social request, and (b) how much “moral panics” can likewise be grassroots as well as interest groups undertakings that could possibly act to support overwhelming routines of regular moral guideline (Hier, 2002a, 2008, 2011). It is proposed by Cohen in his paper that a key component of contemporary society is the expanding inclusion of social developments, character legislative issues and unfortunate casualty advocates inside “moral panics”, including a developing varieties of new moral business visionaries, including sociologists and women's activists, and a developing degree for such non-customary moral business visionaries to pick up media presentation. Some “moral panics” can be viewed as “good”, and his confidence in the genuine augmentation of the term to a scope of subjects (specifically, ecological crimes etc...) past what may customarily have been the area of “moral panic” research (and its examinations concerning well-known subjects, for example, vulgarity, inebriation and savagery), Cohen proposes not just that “moral panics” have multiplied as of late, yet that they are progressively different in being both for and against the upkeep of existing conditions.

Critcher thought that the idea of “moral panic” is the best comprehended with regards to relations of intensity and guideline. Cohen and Critcher are in understanding that it is basic for the term “moral panic” to be comprehended inside a more extensive theoretical system, instead of essentially as a free-skimming term to be connected to mark any outflow of shock or concern whose legitimacy a specialist may try to address. In any case, Cohen stops some path shy of embracing Critcher's proposal that piece of such a structure ought to be the confinement of the term “moral panic” to those types of distortion by which elites strengthen prevailing regulative

practices by methods for reproaching outcasts and long shots. Furthermore, while Critcher does not, Cohen acknowledges the likelihood of counter-authoritative “moral panics”. Critcher proposes that necessity to delineate just the legislative issues of “moral panics”, yet in addition the monetary variables that limits or advances the extension for “moral panic” improvement. Contra Cohen, Critcher keeps up the significance of supporting a progressively incorporated auxiliary record of “moral panics”.

3.2. Intentionality of Moral Panic in the Political Context of “Senseless Violence”

“Senseless violence” specifically, and the possibility of the development of viciousness as a rule, resounds in different settings. Having talked about the standardization of tension in grassroots developments, public discourse and the media, it is pertinent to finish up with the outcomes of this “moral panic” with regards to the political framework.

In the legislative issues, public tension as a matter of first importance offers ascend to the political (re)definition of “social issues”. Violence is viewed as a “vexing and anxiety- arousing problem” (Bauman, 2000). Violence at that point turns out to be additionally implanted in the political motivation and therefore turns into a theme of expanding importance inside the political framework. Not exclusively does public tension become a pertinent factor in the political framework, however government officials presently need to enter public discourse too. Legislators need to “talk to the people”, they have to stroll at the head of silent marches, which shows their worry and responsibility, and yet horrendously uncovers their frailty. All things considered, what more can a city hall leader at last do than appropriate bibs to babies? Whenever somebody is slaughtered, the person in question will fundamentally be past

the point of no return, once more. In the Netherlands, legislators have been generally missing from the “moral panic” over “senseless violence”. Truth be told, this can be referenced as an explanation behind the organization of common types of uneasiness, since legislators are imagined as not doing what's necessary, and regular citizens consequently need to arrange and assemble themselves against the dangers. . The equivalent has been contended in Belgium, concerning a practically identical wonder including 'white marches' (Hooghe, 1998).

This, in any case, joined with the incomprehensible idea of nervousness, presents governmental issues with a twofold tie. For if government officials don't give due consideration to violence, they are blamed for lack of engagement and of not paying attention to the general population. This is one side of the twofold tie. The other, similarly ugly, comprises of politically obliging the subjects of public discourse. What happens then is that legislators 'taking the people seriously' by giving due consideration to the expected reason for their uneasiness risk just adding to that tension thusly. From one perspective, this is because of the way that dread is best overlooked and, when focused on, just increments. Then again, this can be credited to the feebleness of legislators against moderately arbitrary demonstrations of relational violence. Their expanded regard for the issue then just makes them look progressively insufficient and unfit to carry out the responsibility. Notwithstanding the uneasiness brought about by public pictures of a young fellow pounded the life out of for no evident reason, legislators outcries censuring such acts emerge as insubstantial and negligible. In a similar individual, valuation for lawmakers' commitment can even run inseparably with questions concerning their capacities. Government officials obviously dependably have the likelihood of alluding to police duty, however this still implies the charge of being uninterested can be made against them, and this procedure

effectively turns itself back against legislative issues in any case, since the police are troubled by effectiveness focuses on that are politically chosen and that generally rule out troublesome cases, for example, the “whodunit” in instances of “senseless violence”. In a similar individual, valuation for lawmakers' commitment can even run inseparably with questions concerning their capacities. Government officials obviously dependably have the likelihood of alluding to police duty, however this still implies the charge of being uninterested can be made against them, and this procedure effectively turns itself back against legislative issues in any case, since the police are troubled by effectiveness focuses on that are politically chosen and that generally rule out troublesome cases, for example, the “whodunit” in instances of “senseless violence”. At the point when police are working under politically indicated proportions of proficiency and adequacy, such cases do not satisfy – the interest in time these cases require just methods the police will not achieve their productivity objectives, which makes them look terrible. Assuming, at that point, government officials blame the police for an absence of enthusiasm for instances of “senseless violence”, a counter-allegation is prepared within reach.

Given the connection between public uneasiness and publicity of government officials' endeavors to take care of the issue, the last are looked with a second twofold tie, since their political survival depends to some degree on public information of their accomplishments. Loïc Wacquant has proposed that political thoughtfulness regarding law authorization when all is said in done is an aftereffect of the 'deficiency in legitimacy' confronting contemporary western fair governmental issues (Wacquant, 2001: 402). Nevertheless, such consideration is probably not going to cover for that shortfall. For correspondence to the public concerning political estimates that adequately decrease fierce crime may well, now and again of elevated tension, have

the unanticipated impact of expanding public nervousness about the problem – since any correspondence about vicious crime, positive or negative, can possibly build public uneasiness; while non-correspondence of political viability is rebuffed by the public either by allegations of political lack of engagement, since nothing is going on in the political field, or just by the way that lawmakers at any rate experience serious difficulties profiting politically from their approach accomplishments. Now and again of lower public nervousness, at that point, legislators face the issue that approach victories must be conveyed through the media, and the media are principally keen on putting out correspondences that identify with public tension. During an era of minimal public uneasiness, arrangement accomplishments are a totally not an attractive subject for the media and in this manner for the public moreover. This could well have been the situation in the Dutch races of 2002, where the PvdA (Labor Party) was vanquished following eight sequential long stretches of government, being blamed for separation from the public while being unfit to profit politically from approach accomplishments. What's more, this was regardless of the gathering's case that there had been a *decrease* in violence amid the time it was in office. While amid decisions ideological groups make security a top-need subject, for decision parties, this can likewise have negative results. This likely could be a motivation behind why, as one criminologist notes not without amazement, the greatest ideological groups *do not* make reference to the word 'senseless violence', or even the prototypical type of this violence: violence in the city (Brants, 2002: 10).

Principal criminologists have noticed that government officials' choices with respect to crime all in all are not educated by criminological experiences, but instead by enthusiastic responses with respect to the public (Garland and Sparks, 2000). In view of the presence of 'senseless violence', there could, for example, be support for

measures towards progressively harsh arraignment of rough crime in the courts, as has occurred in the Netherlands.³⁰ A developing worry over violent crime was one of the characterizing factors prompting the striking climb of new ideological groups that were organized 'bottom up', and that expressly rebuked the 'power games of the Hague'. The LPF, named after its whimsical pioneer Pim Fortuyn, was said to channel political distress and disappointment with the set up political range. It upheld (and still advocates) 'progressively, higher, and quicker disciplines'.³¹ For this situation, be that as it may, after the passing of its pioneer and its cooperation in government, the LPF was killed and acknowledged the terms of built up legislative issues. In any case, current arrangement and ideological groups have joined a great part of the attention on lawfulness that Fortuyn propagated. It is currently the customary ideological groups that have embraced the mark of 'new politics', unequivocally moving further 'political correctness'. This has been accomplished generally by seeming to be oppressive on issues of migration, reconciliation, integration and crime. To put it plainly, 'senseless violence' is one problem that prodded an emphasis on oppressive approaches towards crime. The overall nonattendance of outrageous right gatherings in the Netherlands has been clarified by the way that on issues of peace, regular gatherings have joined populist issues (see Scheepers et al., 2003). Dutch strategy on crime has been a mix of oppressive and preventive methodologies since the arrangement articulation 'Society and Crime' (*Samenleving en Criminaliteit*) in 1985. Progressively, the severe side of this approach has turned out to be predominant, particularly since 2000. The 2002 proclamation 'Towards a Safer Society' (*Naar een veiliger samenleving*) is characteristic of an expanding center around police and jail adequacy. In like manner, Uit Beijerse and Van Swaaningen (2005) have flagged an expanding center around public request in the planning needs of the Department of Justice, most importantly so

in 2003. That the height of the “moral panic” over “senseless violence” in the media fell around 2002– 3 can in this way likely be viewed as identified with the overall brutality of strategy explanations on crime since 2002. The standardization of nervousness over “senseless violence” has more than likely been one factor in propagating a pattern towards rightist and oppressive approaches on crime and equity.

Ongoing grant (for instance, by McRobbie and Thornton, 1995) accentuates the relative shortage today of consensual communal responses and the significance of oppositional voices in the media and in the public space. In the beginnings of 1960s, when the occasions portrayed by Cohen occurred, a moderately firm foundation and a barely engaged broad communications could give the impression of a bound together public response. In the decades from that point forward, the development of publicly open media, together with the rise of an elective youth press, the presence of counter-specialists who challenge doomsayer cases, and activists willing to stand up for the benefit of focused folk devils, make consensual articulations of concern significantly more abnormal.

These adjustments in the conditions and conceivable outcomes for public articulation have suggestions for the idea of “moral panics”. They recommend a move *away* from “moral panics” as customarily imagined (including a vertical connection among society and a deviant gathering) towards something all the more intently taking after American-style 'culture wars' (which include a progressively flat clash between social gatherings). If so, it proposes that the UK may, in this regard, be developing nearer to the USA, where it is hard to locate any public problem on which there is expansive public understanding and a nonattendance of contradicting voices. The unavoidable appearance of racial, religious and territorial divisions, cultivated by character legislative issues and given articulation by public access media, guarantees

that most social or moral problems brief particularly spellbound reactions, regardless of whether the terms of political and monetary discussion are barely drawn.

There are, no uncertainty, events where real “moral panics” happen in America (the panic over child abuse is a genuine model) – where extensively shared societal qualities are bothered by a deviant gathering's behavior. Be that as it may, this is considerably less normal than moral campaigns, emblematic governmental issues and culture wars, where explicit communal gatherings take part in moral legislative issues so as to redistribute economic wellbeing and pronounce one type of life better than its adversaries. Sociologists like Joseph Gusfield (1986) and antiquarians like James Marone (2003) have portrayed this wonder in detail (see additionally Garland, 2007).

In the event that there has without a doubt been a move from consensual “moral panics” to conflictual culture wars then the significance and estimation of the direct being referred to will in general be considerably more challenged, and the power adjusts between battling bunches significantly less asymmetrical. Rather than getting to be folk devils who are feeble even with public shock, and are compelled to halt or else embrace the polluted character forced on them, the objectives of the present moral battles will now and again have the ability to oppose deviant personalities and affirm the social esteem and ordinariness of their direct. In moral clashes of the last sort, the shock communicated by one lot of spectators prompts not a public panic but rather a rebellious (and similarly insulted) reaction from the 'folk devils' whose direct was brought into inquiry. Ongoing clashes including same-sex couples and the subject of gay marriage, or illicit settlers, immigrants and law reforms and changes, or Muslim ladies and the wearing of the *hijab* in school, have now and again started as “moral panics” and finished as politically challenged culture wars – recommending that these elements might be influenced by regularizing advancement and changes in the status

of the deviant gathering just as by media multiplication and political discontinuity.

At long last, the ongoing grant (Thompson, 1998) has additionally accentuated the degree to which the procedures of “moral panic” have gotten comfortable with the goal that members are presently considerably more hesitant and intentional than already. The media's treatment of “moral panics” has turned out to be to some degree normal and unsurprising. The standards of the diversion are outstanding. Players adjust themselves to acceleration or de-heightening, contingent upon their interests, while the media reflexively remarks without anyone else practice, frequently making an account of the story. Along these lines, in the precedent I cited concerning weapon violence in London, David Cameron and Alan Duncan were seeking after an expansion procedure, looking to feed the panic, to sum up the issue, and to shape the public clamor to their very own closures. In the meantime, it was being asked calmly by Tony Blair, endeavoring to 'keep things in perspective', trying to limit instead of sum up, planning to make light of the issue without being gotten in the device of apparently being 'out of touch' with well known involvement. In the interim, media reporters –, for example, Melanie Phillips (2007) in the Daily Mail – remarked on the observers, discussing 'the anticipated indications of panic'. In an alternate setting, editorialist Simon Jenkins (2007) parodied the media's standard panic process – which he marked 'mad publicity disease' – scorning the 'stroked hysteria' and 'hullabaloo', and encouraging public suspicion even with disturbing reports and pontificating specialists. The inclination of a self-included media to ironicize its own emotionalism, bringing up its alarmism at a similar minute that it sounds the alert, together with the new potential outcomes of obstruction talked about before, will in general lessen the preparing intensity of “moral panics” today, in any event contrasted and the detailed circumstance thirty or forty years back.

3.2.1 Moral Panics as Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes

It has been contended by Chas Critcher that, for its ceaseless improvement, the “moral panic” idea should be associated with sociological hypothesis (2003, 2008, 2009). A few writers have just added to this advancement. Sheldon Ungar has inspected the connection between “moral panic” and hazard in his examination of the 'rise and decline of global warming as a social problem' (1992), where he contends that panics may create following 'real-world' occasions.

Looking at the procedures that happen amid a “moral panic”, Rohloff (2008) gives us an immediate examination between Stephen Mennell's (1990) conceivable side effects of decivilizing forms, from one perspective, and conceivable indications/results of “moral panics” (Cohen, 2002; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994), on the other. While decivilizing forms are depicted by Jonathan Fletcher (1997) as liable to happen where there is a *actual* increment in dimensions of peril alongside a lessening in the state's imposing business model of the methods for violence, with “moral panics” there need just be a *perceived* increment in risk, with an apparent disappointment of the state to decrease those risks. Elias (2000: 532) depicts how “the defensive layer of acculturated lead would disintegrate all around quickly if, through an adjustment in the public eye, the level of instability that existed before were to break in upon us once more, and if threat wound up as inestimable as it once might have been”. Thus, amid “moral panics”, “civilized” direct might be influenced. Example: panics over pedophiles have seen both the resurgence of vigilante developments (Critcher, 2002; Pratt, 2002a) and the (re)introduction of laws that would, at different occasions under different conditions, be seen as 'uncivilized' (Pratt, 2002b, 2005).

One example of decivilizing social groups would be underlying

problematization of hoodies, paper inclusion enhanced the seriousness of the issue by connecting hoodies to a scope of crimes. The raising inclusion on hoodies epitomizes what Hall et al. (1978) theorize as a connotation winding, which assigns the representative acceleration of damage presented by deviants through a procedure that blows up the volume and size of deviance credited to implying classifications. The “master” sentiments of crime-control officers were attracted upon endeavors to connect cheerful slaps to hoodies.

“Police have now identified so-called ‘hoody’ culture as a major concern, as yobs lurk in our streets and shopping malls with their faces hidden behind hoods and baseball caps ... innocent members of the public are being targeted in the latest craze for ‘happy slapping’ in which children randomly attack complete strangers just for fun.” (Knapp, 2005)

Meaning spirals hasten the emblematic enhancement of deviance over specific ‘thresholds’ of societal resilience (Hall et al. 1978). Essential markers of edge break in the hoodies discourse came through expanding calls for administrative activity versus the developing impression of an ‘out-of-control’ circumstance.

After a short time, news sources called for new administrative reactions. Requests, for example, “hooded hooligans and happy slappers ought to get longer sentences than different lawbreakers, a previous senior policeman said yesterday” (Roberts, 23 May 2005), calls for “mandatory national community service” (*Express*, 2005a), and an ‘nationwide ban’ of hoodies (Fagge and Chapman, 2005) pursued. The enhancement of the mischief presented by hoodies included various combining factors. One component that was missing from before apparel guidelines was the absence of deliberate endeavor by essential definers to express the boycott with

regards to more extensive social issues. Albeit administrative cases added to the strengthening of concern – and demonstrated endeavors to look for assent for their proposed development of administrative measures under the sponsorship of the ASBA – the paper media further pervaded the hoodies signifier with an element of hazard. Despite the fact that it is vital not to preclude the earnestness from claiming the genuine crimes and demonstrations of violence detailed by the media – which the term 'amplification' may seem to do – it is in any case defended to utilize the term enhancement due to the variety of random crimes and offenses that are credited to a solitary subject position with little proof.

There was great proof from center gatherings to help both in-gathering and out-bunch social arrangement and social correlation forms. This is essential in setting up the job that between gathering elements play in supporting receptivity to “moral panic” discourse. In each center gathering, asylum seekers were ordered as an unmistakable gathering from the host network, with gathering limits drawn based on social contrasts. Language and religion were the most well-known distinctive components distinguished.

Such social correlation forms included the specific emphasis of intergroup contrasts that supported the in-gathering. For instance, the host networks were described as dedicated individuals with 'good standards' in connection to obligingness and neatness interestingly with chaotic, languid asylum seekers:

“They set up their own culture and they do things necessarily which we would find unacceptable, you know leave trash, make a mess of the countryside, don't respect our laws” (Michaela, Nottingham).

There was additionally proof for the generation of negative generalizations, for

example, “spongers” and “illegal asylum seekers”, and most center gathering members treated 'asylum seekers' as a homogenous gathering, discussing what 'they' do, instead of separating them as people. Example of definition:

“If they’re going to come into this country they must actually act like we do and keeping places tidy and live like we do instead of like they want to live in their own country” (Dennis, Birmingham).

In spite of the fact that center components are impervious to adjustment, social portrayals have their beginning in correspondence and are hence issue to change. That could be found in the advancement of portrayals during the time spent correspondence.

An example of this point of view:

“How “economic threat” was extended to incorporate “taking our jobs” the point at which it entered the public domain – and furthermore in the change of portrayals crosswise over time and in relationship with different portrayals. For instance, the portrayal of “asylum seeker” has been both educated and changed by portrayals of “terrorist” and “Muslim”.

3.2.2. The Spread and Transformation of Moral Panic Discourse

As noticed, the bad portrayals distinguished in that investigation were strikingly comparative in substance and were effectively replicated, even by the individuals who had not absorbed them. It is likely these portrayals started in the media, as they were imitated in center gatherings by members with no immediate experience of asylum seekers or elective source of data. Moreover, newspaper wording, for example, “illegal asylum seekers” and “spongers” was recreated, paying little respect to whether

members purportedly read these publications. The media was additionally straightforwardly referred to support negative contentions and deluding media detailing was repeated. For instance, reliable with past research (see Pearce and Stockdale, 2009), mistaken media reports that France plays host to couple of asylum seekers were frequently attracted upon to help the contention that 'all' or 'most' asylum seekers go to the The United Kingdom. Negative media portrayals that met with existing sentiment or practice were especially ground-breaking. An example of that center gathering members living in social lodging who were worried about asylum seekers being housed in comparable properties were especially responsive to newspaper media portrayals of asylum seekers as “freeloaders”. In spite of the fact that it was unrealistic to set up whether it was through media impact or the determination of papers which bolstered their current perspectives, there was proof to help a connection between media utilization and host portrayals of asylum seekers. For instance, people who read the Guardian newspaper or the Independent newspaper knew about pessimistic portrayals however had not acclimatized them. That exhibits the job of the media in encouraging and multiplying “moral panic” discourse and demonstrates the power and extent of undesirable portrayals.

The investigation additionally exhibited that center portrayals are impervious to alteration. Example of this comment, following a Press Complaints Commission (2003) direction annotation in regards to the utilization of erroneous term, the media moved far from alluding to “illegal asylum seekers”, supplanting that phrasing with “failed asylum seekers”. Despite the fact that this is an apparently more positive term, through over and over partner “asylum seeker” with fizzled applications, media inclusion proceeds to rep-disdain asylum seekers as “ill-conceived” and the center portrayal thusly stays unaltered. Focus group participants additionally exhibited this

propensity through acclimatizing opposite data without modifying their center portrayals.

3.2.3. Short-Term Panics and Long-Term Processes

While this furnishes the readers with a diagram of the decivilizing patterns that may happen amid a “moral panic” *in the short-term*, the readers can likewise inspect how more extensive, long haul, social procedures influence the advancement of “moral panics”. As opposed to only applying decivilizing manifestations to a “moral panic” and confirming that “moral panics” are undoubtedly scenes of decivilization, the utilization of Elias to “moral panics” goes more remote than this.

Innitially, as referenced prior, “moral panics” happen halfway as the result of socializing forms – where procedures of development add to decivilization. One model is the long-haul progress pattern towards expanded specialization and “expertization” of learning. This procedure, alongside the technicization of the scattering of information, has progressively empowered the misrepresentation and contortion of occasions, just as the decrease of occasions (Murphy et al., 1988).

The other, to take care of the issue of temporality with explicit exact precedents, readers would then be able to investigate how the particular panics are influenced by more extensive social procedures explicit to the given model under scrutiny (Rohloff, 2010). The accompanying inquiries could be solicited from the relationship of momentary panics and long-haul forms: how do particular social issues come to be characterized in that capacity, and form into “moral panics”; how do particular gatherings of individuals come to be the foci of procedures of “disidentification”?

By investigating the connection between transient panics and more extensive, unplanned social procedures, readers can likewise take care of the issue of

(un)intentionality. The chronicled component of a figurational way to deal with “moral panic” research could likewise incorporate investigating *changing* force relations (see Elias, 1978: Ch. 3) and how these influence the improvement of “moral panics”. Elias contends that procedures of human advancement included long haul patterns towards expanding utilitarian democratization: with expanded separation and association, control proportions will in general become all the more even. People can observe this inside “moral panic” inquire about, where, as McRobbie and Thornton (1995) contend, some folk devils are (for the most part) not as underestimated as they used to be (see likewise Rohloff, 2008; Ungar, 2001).

3.2.4. Involvement And Detachment To Maintain Moral Panic As a Political Project

For a notion to be not only important but fit for exact application it needs to work inside a system of different ideas, against which it very well may be recognized or contradicted. The more extensive diagnostic setting inside which the idea of “moral panic” works is the investigation of social response, and the examination of “social reaction” – a nonexclusive name for an extremely differed and complex arrangement of wonders – obviously fits more than one idea.

Having plot how the utilization of Elias can be utilized to address the issues of transience and (un)intentionality in “moral panic” look into, people presently come back to the issue of normativity. To emphasize, while as yet permitting space for the “political project”, how might people take care of the charge of normativity in “moral panic” investigate?

Elias was reproachful of the interruption of what he named “heteronomus

valuations”, into the sociologies particularly. However, rather than endeavoring the inconceivable errand of “value neutral” sociology, Elias utilized elective terms and reformulated the issue as one of a harmony among “involvement” and “detachment” (Elias, 2007; see additionally Kilminster, 2007; Mennell, 1998: 160, Figure 4), where research ought to be described by moderately more prominent dimensions of separation. A figurational approach which is following Elias, where “the sociologist-as-member [increasingly involved] must probably remain back and become the sociologist-as-onlooker and-translator” (Maguire, 1988: 190; see likewise Bloyce, 2004; Elias, 1978), is seen as being progressively helpful for expanding the “reality congruence” of information.

According to Dunning; “That figurationalists should: explore connections and regularities, structures and processes for their own sake. By attempting as dispassionately as possible to contribute to knowledge rather than to help in the achievement of some short-term goal, you will increase your chances of avoiding bias as result of personal interests or because of your membership of or identification with a particular group or groups” (1992: 253).

With the case of “moral panic”, people can perceive how the transient objective of featuring without ratio, and, in this way, “proving” the panic was “tendentious” and “misplaced” or “displaced”, may have added to a progressively included and less isolates examination and, thusly, shut specialists to the likelihood that panics might be more than simply “bad”, “irrational”, momentary distortions.

Dunning (1992: 252) clarifies, this procedure of venturing back includes “[locating] the objects of your exploration generally and in the more extensive system of social interdependencies in which they are implanted. Basically endeavoring to do

this will constrain readers into more noteworthy separation.”

When the sociologists have done their exploration in a generally segregated way, they would then be able to utilize that information collected from the examination to illuminate activity towards whatever “problem” they have been considering. Notwithstanding, as Elias and others have contended, this procedure must be one stage expelled from the exploration (Quilley and Loyal, 2005).

Jenks recommends that; people have gone into another time of individualization, a period in which a dread of opportunity has been supplanted by a dread of any sort of aggregate control. The idea of “moral panic”, with its center arrangement of concerns which challenge moderate (over)reactions to unregulated conduct that means outside the limits of customary beliefs of country, family, network and undertaking – especially when such conduct includes sex, inebriation, sluggishness or migration – can be viewed as being fixing to its roots in the late 1960s and mid 1970s, when individual transgressions of whatever sort were seen by the foundation as compromising the structure holding the system together.

In other words; “Jenks, in today’s world, the idea that society exists, let alone that its fabric weaves people together in any essential fashion, is much less significant than it once was, and for him this changes the meaning of “moral panics” in a fundamental way. Thus, contemporary outbreaks of moral indignation over the selfishness of particular individuals or groups can only ever be short-lived since the very collective character of such mass indignation cannot be sustained in an environment of intense individualism. Not only is people attention lost when an issue does not affect people personally, but also collective engagement in such indignation soon peters out under such conditions.” (David, Rohloff, Peyley & Hughes, 2011: 7).

Various different writers in this problem point out the ascent of individualization, as portrayed by authors, for example, Anthony Giddens (1992) and Ulrich Beck (1992), and utilize the language of “risk” as opposed to “immortality” acquired from this more up to date edge of reference. The degree to which this new dialect of hazard is perfect with the thought of “moral panics” has been highly discussed (Ungar, 2001; Hier, 2003; see additionally Critcher, 2003), yet here it is essential basically to bring up a critical differentiation and equivalent. Scholars in this field have since a long time ago perceived the constrained character of “moral panics” as endeavors to hold together an aggregate request that is for all time announcing its very own downfall despite the “barbarians” at the gates. All things considered, the subject of whether a decrease in collectivity when all is said in done, and of moral collectivity specifically, speaks to another reality or only an endlessly repeating expected reality remains an open one.

Cohen recommends that “moral panics” seem, by all accounts, to be on the expansion, with more on-screen characters taking up the job of moral business person and more media space being made accessible to scattering their perspectives. Jenks recommends that such blasts of panic have turned out to be progressively temporary. This makes more space for an expansion of panics to happen in quick progression.

3.3. Moral Panic and Agenda Setting in Press and Reform

To this point how “moral panic” was devised as to direct the media manipulated responses of the folk and create folk devils. McRobbie (1994: 111) recognizes that – when the sole light conveyor for the protection of “moral minorities” – the scholarly is presently supported and even outperformed by “another band of specialists” as gifted agents from weight gatherings and intentional associations. Beneath the matter of how

the predominant surrounding of hoodies was countered by extremist gatherings, making no cases about the accomplishment of these endeavors at battling back.

While “mass media” are normally conceptualized as a stone monument in investigations of public arrangement development, it is critical to reflect writings that fall on the fringe of standard originations of the “mass media”. Overwhelming, state-supported cases might be countered, or circumvent by specific endeavors beginning in miniaturized scale, specialty, or elective media (Couldry and Corran, 2002; McRobbie, 1994) or through a commitment with the 'mass' media by composed gatherings who try to subvert prevailing discourses. Devoted communicative systems dense around hoodies. The libertarian network “libcom”, for instance, opened a gathering committed to hoodies that yielded a basic discourse arranging the legislative issues of negative youth portrayals and was liable to more than 5000 perspectives.

In January 2006, the agenda was extended to incorporate extra administrative measures, including fines for the guardians of “anti-social children”, another command enabling the legal executive to prohibit individuals from their very own homes for recidivist hostile to social action, and the presentation of “on the spot” fines exacted by watching police. The “Regard Task Force” – entrusted with conveying the Respect Agenda – was propelled in January 2006 by Home Secretary Charles Clarke with this location:

“Tackling disrespect in our society is an absolute priority for the Government and this new task force will play a vital role in improving our communities and the lives of people in them. From bad behavior in schools and poor parenting to binge drinking and noisy neighbors, disrespect for others can take many forms. ... We all have the right to live our lives free from

harassment. But with those rights come responsibilities, and people all need to play a part in tackling disrespect and unacceptable behavior.”

Notwithstanding whether New Labor acted to invigorate the hoodies discourse, the motivation's political adequacy lay in its linkage with a built up discourse of hostile to social conduct, and adapted portrayals of declining conduct models among the polis – young people specifically. Language utilized by state spokespersons to legitimize the new enactment drew on the typification of adolescence conduct in the media following the Bluewater activity. While the long haul undertaking of ethically directing youth pivots upon a call for normal hazard topics to self-control, the hoodies discourse is demonstrative of a brief breakdown of moral guideline, whereby the organization of youth went under investigation and resulting guideline. Cases making by government officials and lawfulness authorities attributed fault to youth as far as an “irresponsible” retreat into a “culture of disrespect”. This thesis now further takes in hand how the political refugees from Syria became a “moral panic” political project and how media especially Turkish press head conveyed them in such manner.

4. MIGRATION AND DIFFERENT APPROACHES

In the historical process, communities had to leave or change the places they lived for different reasons. Although it was initially defined as the movement of the masses or the displacement of communities, the phenomenon of migration, which is studied internationally today, has been a mobility applied by people for different reasons. The structure of mixed societies; In other words, when we look at societies far from one culture, one religion, one language and race, it is seen that the members of the community or their previous generations have moved from different geographies for different reasons and are rooted in the geography they are currently in. Migration also brings about the efforts of immigrants to find “others” who are similar to themselves in order to create themselves individually or as a community in new places and to realize themselves.

Migration has a counterpart such as a change of place (Özer, 2004: 11). The cause and result of migration change the values and order of the migrated and abandoned geography. One of the periods in which this effect was felt deeply was the activity that started in December 2010 and called the "Arab Spring". This mobility, which affected the Middle East and African countries, caused a migration that encompassed the whole world, and affected Turkey, especially due to the population migrating from Syria.

The phenomenon of migration is familiar by definition, but it is an area of interest for different disciplines, which gives rise to different approaches when looking at its reasons. Migration does not only change human life, it also shapes geographies and changes the world. The versatility of migration makes it suitable for interdisciplinary work in fields such as economy, politics, sociology, history, communication and anthropology. Understanding the relationship between citizen,

identity and state before the concept of migration will help to discuss the causes and consequences of migration more clearly. In this part of the study, we will try to reveal the concepts surrounding migration and immigrants and explaining human mobility, the legal status, and the causes and consequences of this mobility within the framework of the phenomena we have mentioned above.

4.1. Immigration, identity and other concepts

4.1.1. Identity and Citizenship Bond

The most influential and shaping concepts in defining identity are explained by the state through the bond of citizenship. The state gives identity to the person and defines the characteristics of identity. The loss of these features, to which the state provides loyalty to the land within the framework of the concept of citizenship, causes the ties between them to be lost, broken or changed. Identity is also a definition of belonging and refers to values and power (Tokan Şenol, 2014: 279). It is stated that a person, who has the power to live with the community and alone, “points to the collective identity in terms of including the elements of belonging and belonging to his individual identity” (Göka & Beyazyüz, 2005: 21). According to Connolly, identity is a self-revelation; how we are and what we are is told by our identity (1995: 92). We can say that identity is an important knowledge of belonging that starts with the point of departure of the individual, determines the point where his consciousness will go and draws his destiny.

Identity is a problem of consciousness at both individual and social level. He deserves them to the extent that he understands, presents or reveals himself as an individual in a group within the framework of the concepts of "ancestry", "people" or "nation" (Assman cited in Tokan Şenol, 2014: 285). Social or collective identity is shaped by the individual's nationality, religion, and his relationship with political

groups. In this sense, while revealing his collective identity, the individual unavoidably emphasizes group affiliation depending on their social identification (Yapıcı, 2004: 55). In addition to Bauman, who defines identity as “an escape from uncertainty”; Connolly says, “Identity needs difference to exist and transforms difference into otherness to secure its own certainty” (1995: 93).

While the identity that the individual emphasizes in the Post-modern society is a proof of his existence, his continuing existence with different statuses has created a different field of struggle for him. People who are subject to a state but have to go under the administration of another state from the lands they belong to are referred to as immigrants or refugees in these countries. Although these concepts find their place according to the status given by international law, each of them has a negative side by the peoples of the migrated countries. At this stage, it would be appropriate to explain the concepts of migration, immigrant and refugee.

4.1.2. Migration, Migrant and Refugee

Migration as a concept has been discussed with similar points in different sources. Migration has a spatial counterpart, everything "*related to the society, especially the psychological state of the individual*" (Guvenc, 1996: 21) is affected by migration. As a concept, migration has been handled with similar points in different sources. Migration is a word which is comes from “migrare” that means to change residence (Latin Dictionary, 2017). The simplest definition of migration has been defined as “the act of moving individuals or communities from one country to another, from one settlement to another for economic, social and political reasons, moving, emigration, immigration”

(http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5cae5421127086.12496271. Access: 10.10.2019). Basically, the concept of "human

migration" can be summarized as the permanent "displacement of an individual or group across an international border or within the state" (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2021).

Migration is defined as "the movement of people, especially within national borders, from one geographical area to another" (Giddens and Sutton, 2014: 109).

Another definition of migration belongs to Mustafa Mutluer. "The main element effecting individual's life as social, political, economic and cultural by changing place of residence whether it is voluntarily or compulsorily and for a short or long term" (Aksoy, 2012: 294).

From a sociological point of view, migration means moving from one place to another for some reasons (Türk, 2016: 54). If we evaluate all of the definitions, it should be stated that it is a classifiable concept by considering different parameters. Türk makes this classification with four values as "will, border, duration and place of residence". With a similar approach, migration can also be evaluated as "the population movement that changes the social, economic, cultural and political dimensions of the process of changing geographical location, and the effects of the phenomenon of migration on the social structure" (İçduygu, 1998: 215).

Other definitions include shorter period and time. But in essence, these are move-and-go-based approaches. On the other hand, migration as a concept refers to "population movements that result in displacement of people regardless of their duration, structure" or reasons (Akkayan, 1979: 22). From this mobility, both those who migrated, that is, those who came and those who live in the migrated area, that is, the locals, are affected from different aspects and the new life that emerges offers different conditions to these two parties. Migration, which has emerged on a national or international scale, has brought social and economic changes with it and reveals

"health, education, urbanization, social security and similar problems" (Üçdogruk, 2002: 158). One perspective for "migration is a population mobilization from one regime to another, which are distant and not consecutive, in order to settle" (Yılmaz, 2014: 11). Lee, on the other hand, approached migration as "permanent or semi-permanent displacement" (1996: 16). And also "the migration includes all movements that has a meaningful distance and leaves an impact" (Yılmaz, 2014: 1686). De Tapia expresses International migration as; permanent residents, temporary contract workers, temporary professional workers, undercover or illegal workers, asylum seekers and refugees. (Aksoy, 2012: 294).

In the simplest definition, a refugee can be defined as an "asylum seeker", and an immigrant who leaves his own country and goes to other countries (anyone, family or community) to settle in another country (sozluk.gov.tr, reached: 21.05.2021). When we look at the use of the words refugee and immigrant, we can say that the expression of the refugee indicates a more specific area and current. In the international arena, these two concepts refer to different groups. When we look at the classification of immigrants, "foreigners, foreign entrepreneurs and workers who come primarily for tourism, health and education purposes, those who come to the country with the aim of settling legally, foreigners who enter the country illegally and are in illegal status, and refugees who come to find a place to live are included in the classification of immigrants" (Akıncı et al., 2015: 64).

As stated before, with the intensive use of the concept of migration in daily language and its being a part of the lives of especially Middle Eastern and African countries and their close circles, new expressions based on migration have been encountered in the international arena. These new uses, which we can exemplify with concepts such as "asylum, refugee, illegal immigration", "basically include increasing

inequalities between countries (economic, ethnic, political, religious, war, labor, cultural, etc.) and immigration methods developed against restrictions on legal immigration" (Gençler, 2003: 175).

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (YUKK) No. 6458 defines the concepts of refugee, immigrant and migration. The law also defines the concepts of regular and irregular migration. Regular migration refers to the regular entry and residence of foreigners into the country, to work within the legal period, while irregular migration refers to the illegal entry and residence of foreigners and their illegal work.

Refugee identity is detailed in "*The Convention Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees*" which was created by The United Nations High Commissioner and took its place in international law with the acceptance of the party countries, has been regulated by reviewing all the previous agreements regarding the legal status of refugees. The Convention was prepared by taking into account and validating the basic human rights articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948. Accordingly, in Article 1, subparagraph 2 of the Convention, the definition of refugee is as follows and is very clearly and detailed: (www.multeci.org.tr, Access: 23.06.2021).

"The person defined as a refugee: As a result of the events that took place before 1 January 1951; He/she is the person whose nationality he/she has nationality in his/her country on issues such as race, identity, religion, political opinion and social position cannot act impartially to him/her, losing confidence in his/her state due to the thought that he/she is under pressure and leaves his/her country and seeks asylum in another country, but his/her request

is accepted by that country. Those who migrate for economic or touristic reasons are not considered refugees.” (UN, 1951) (www.multeciler.org.tr, Accessed: 23 June 2021).

However, Turkey ratified the agreement signed on August 24, 1951, on the status of refugees, stating that "No provision of this agreement can be interpreted as providing the refugee with more than the rights of Turkish nationals in Turkey" on August 19, 1961 (Akıncı et al., 2015: 65).

4.1.3. Causes of migration

The concept of migration appears with the Migration of Tribes when we look at the history. Apart from being massive, the most infuriated aspect is its rationale and results. Social scientists who conduct migration studies deal with migration from the perspective of different disciplines, mainly internal migration and external migration; secondly, they dealt with it with a basic categorization as voluntary or forced migration. However, when migrations are examined with their own dynamics, different approaches emerge. These approaches also provide the opportunity to discuss the reasons for migration in more detail. Each period comes to different conclusions with the reasons for migration created within the framework of its own conditions.

There is no single and definite reason for people to migrate. Reports of Global Migration Group shows us some realities of the huge population's movement. Global Migration Group, which has focused on the migration mobility that has occurred in recent years, states the reasons for people to migrate as “people have moved either to explore new horizons, for survival or in search of better means of livelihood, or were forced to move because of persecution” (2008: 75). First entry of Syrians into Turkey

as large groups is in 2012 and they have been “welcomed as guests.” This guest rhetoric is essential to have a grasp of not only the public perception of Syrians at the beginning but also the state response and policy-making understanding.

Theories that emerged as a result of researches on migration, which are divided into two as internal migration and external migration, are an important guide for understanding the types of human mobility. As a result of his research based on the censuses made in England, Ravenstein listed the general causes of migration in seven items. These laws, referred to as *Immigration Laws*, were evaluated as follows:

1. Most of the immigrants migrate to big trade and industrial centers over short distances.
2. As a natural consequence of the migration movement, the gaps left behind by the immigrants are filled by immigrants from more distant parts of the country.
3. The process of leaving a region, on the contrary, initiates a migration flow towards that region.
4. Every major migratory flow creates a balancing counter current.
5. Immigrants traveling long distances generally prefer large trade or industrial centers.
6. Those living in urban areas tend to migrate less than those living in rural areas.
7. Females are more migratory than males.
8. Economic factors are the main cause of migration” (1885: 198-199).

In this and later works, Ravenstein has examined the causes, types, sources and types of migration in depth.

The rapid population growth in the cities has led to the emergence of new tensions and polarizations in the social and political fields as well as in the economic field. This tension and polarization paved the way for the social, cultural and economic to evolve into politics, especially the urban settlement segregation (Ekici & Tuncal, 2015:.12).

4.1.4. Migration Theories

In this study, it is encountered different classifications within the framework of the perspective discussed with migration theories. The classification, which covers a large area especially in the field and is the basis of many studies, is the theories that examine the factors that cause the voluntary or compulsory occurrence of migration mobility. Theories described by Lee, Petersen, and Öberg describe both reasons and migrants. Revenstein's Laws of Immigration have been the basis for the studies we will describe in this section.

Expressing it as Push-Pull Factors Theory (1966) in his work titled "A Theory of Migration", Lee tried to determine the migration characteristic and revealed four main elements that can be used as a basis for the analysis:

“1. Factors associated with the Area of Origin: There are many factors which motivate people to leave their place of origin to outside area. They are push factors.

2. Factors associated with the Area of Destination:

There are very attractive forces at the area of destination to which the proportion of “selectivity” migrants is high. According to Lee, such

forces are found in metropolitan areas of a country. Pull factors are present in such areas.

3. Intervening Obstacles: There are intervening obstacles like distance and transportation, which increase migrant selectivity of the area of destination. These obstacles have been lessened in modern times with technological advances. Lee also refers to cost of movements, ethnic barriers and personal factors as intervening obstacles.

4. Personal Factors:

Lastly, it is the personal factors on which the decision to migrate from the place of origin to the place of destination depends. In fact, it is an individual's perception of the 'pull and push forces', which influence actual migration. He categorizes these forces into "pluses" and "minuses" respectively. In other words, pluses are pull factors and minuses are push factors. In between them are "zeros" which balance the competing forces." (Lee, 1966: 54; Yalçın, 2004: 30).

These four factors listed also include the relative and personal reasons for migration.

Petersen's Migration Typology was formulated in his work entitled *A General Typology of Migration*. Based on Fairchild's statement that "*man is sedentary unless he acts by force*", Petersen (1958: 258) shaped his work with the question "why do some naturally settled people migrate while others do not?". In his study, Petersen emphasizes that the factors accepted in the classical push-pull theory should be differentiated according to their nature (1958: 259). Petersen put forward four basic

migration typologies in his study: Primitive Migration, which emerged as a result of “the mobility of people who could not cope with natural events and driven factors due to ecological reasons” (Petersen, 1958: 259) in pre-industrial societies; Forced and Directed Migration (Petersen, 1958: 261), which is expressed as forced migration in the absence of social structure and directed in the presence of decision-making will; Free Migration (Petersen, 1958: 263) in which the wishes of the immigrants are the determining factor, and Mass Migration (Petersen, 1958: 263), which we can explain as the adoption of the traces and gains of the pioneer immigrants who acted individually by the subsequent immigrants and the massization of migration.

The last theory, named Soft and Hard Factors Theory by Öberg, carries the elements found in the definition of today's migration phenomenon. Öberg also explained the results obtained by examining Petersen's Push and Pull factors under different headings. Öberg's analysis in the study titled “Spatial and Economic Factors in Future South-North Migrations” is socioeconomically based (Öberg, 1996: 336). He reveals the reasons for migration in the elements structured within the framework of the developed west and other developing countries. Öberg, who defined Petersen's push factors as structural causes of migration, developed the Soft and Hard Factors Theory. According to Öberg, "events such as wars, famine/famine and disasters are described as hard push factors, while factors such as poverty and social exclusion are described as soft push factors" (1996: 346).

4.2. The Case of International Migration and Syria

The internal turmoil in the countries that started in the Middle East in 2005, known as the Arab Spring with the western name, has gained a regional character by going beyond the borders of the countries. Syria, on the other hand, was caught in the internal turmoil that started this process in 2011 and was at the head of global

problems. Especially mass migrations have made Syria an important topic of discussion in the eyes of the western public. The humanitarian dimension, which should be discussed before the security, international and economic dimensions of a civil war, comes after the above-mentioned elements in international migration policies and concept discussions. However, the content of the immigrant news, which is the subject of this study, has caused the concepts of immigration and immigration to be discussed more intensely in recent years. However, its international dimension is even more important for Turkey due to the insecure position of its border neighbors.

The number of refugees and migrants in Turkey, which also forms the basis of the study, has been determined as 3 million 672 thousand 646 people as of May 2021, according to official records (Access: 23. 06. 2021, <https://multeciler.org.tr/>). The identification of Syrian citizens with different status in Turkey before the law is met with the expressions of refugees and immigrants. The Turkish Immigration Administration announced the number of Syrians granted citizenship as 110 thousand (30 December 2019). According to the same report, 31,185 Syrians were given work permits in Turkey, and the number of companies with at least one Syrian partner was 15,159.

The significance of these numbers is as follows; In the representation of Syrian immigrants, which is the field of research, in the news, the ideology reproduced in the language of the press is the most frequently mentioned characteristics of immigrants of Syrian origin (refugees and citizens), which is expressed as the reason for "economic injustice and the economic and social bottleneck of Turkish citizens".

5. MORAL PANIC AS A POLITICAL PROJECT: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ON THE NEWS ABOUT SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY PORTRAYED AS FOLK DEVILS

5.1. Methodology

5.1.1. Research Hypothesis

The language in the news produced in the media influences the formation of social values and concerns. The language used in the news is effective in generating moral panic. As news subjects, Syrian immigrants / refugees are targeted with a language that is used as a target for reasons such as political power, loss of values and social peace, economic instability, and unemployment.

5.1.2. Research Purpose and Importance

This study examines the news with the content of Syrian origin immigrant / refugee / asylum seeker on the internet news sites of nationally broadcast newspapers and reveals the moral panic caused by the language produced. The subject of the news, the people of Syrian origin with different statuses in Turkey, the economic and security problems experienced in the country and the news that use the social conflicts together were targeted. The process and important points of the public opinion formed by this news are revealed.

5.1.3. Research System and Method

Within the scope of the research, the dates of March 1, 2019 and April 30, 2019 of Sözcü and Hürriyet newspapers were selected. From the news made on the said dates, 100 news with the content of refugees / immigrants / asylum seekers of Syrian origin were examined, and a total of 10 news, five for each newspaper, were selected for analysis. The titles of Political material, Moral Conflict – Social Values,

Illegal Actions and Focus of Crime, Security- Social Peace, Unemployment and Economic Problems were determined and analyzed.

As the analysis method, Teun A. Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis, which extensively examines immigration and immigration news, was used to explain how the news content in the content defined in internet journalism is produced, which subjects are used, which target audience is focused on, and how events and concepts are handled in the news content.

Critical Discourse Analysis is described by Teun A. Van Dijk as “an interdisciplinary study that spans multiple disciplines, the subject of which is people and society”. The method dates back to the early 1970s and gained a more holistic form with the interaction of studies that seemed to be separate from each other in the first phase and that seemed to be on their own. (van Dijk, 1988a: 17, 22). Discourse analysis studies seem to have gained prominence as an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach with theorists such as Teun A. van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Bell, Graham and Pecheux (Evre, 2009: 134- 135). The main purpose of Critical Discourse analysis is discourse. In the method, which is explained as producing clear and systematic definitions of language use, which has two dimensions, textual and contextual, the textual dimension is related to the definitions of structures at various levels of discourse, and the contextual dimension is related to various qualities of these structural definitions such as cognitive processes and representations or sociocultural factors (van Dijk, 1988a: 24). -25). The method of critical discourse analysis, which tries to explain the structures of media texts, examines the process of transforming the social structure (power relations, values, ideologies and identities) behind the media discourse into linguistic constructs. Critical Discourse Analysis is a pragmatic (pragmatics) method and is successful in

analyzing aspects of texts that cannot be revealed by classical linguistic and literary text analysis methods.

In this method, which is used by Van Dijk when examining news content targeting others especially in Europe, the texts are analyzed in two main categories as macro and microstructures. In the macro structure analysis, sections such as news headlines, sub-headings, news entry and spots are analyzed thematically (van Dijk, 1998: 13-85). In the schematic analysis, which consists of two subsections, the first of the two subsections (Situation), the narrative structure, the second (Comment) examines the real sources of the event and the reactions of the parties involved in the event. In microstructure analysis, Dijk traces the reflections of the discourse on the units of the language. It examines word choices, sentence structures, causality relationships established between sentences by associating them with rhetoric (van Dijk, 1988, 1985, 2008).

The Critical Discourse Analysis used within the scope of this thesis was chosen and used because it consists of analyzes involving migration-immigrants in common research examples and because the study targets discourse.

5.2.Moral Panic As A Political Project: A Discourse Analysis On The News About Syrian Refugees In Turkey Portrayed As Folk Devils

POLITICAL MATERIAL

NEWS 1:

SÖZCÜ NEWSPAPER

Olay yaratan pankartı astıran İYİ Partili İlay Aksoy: “Asıl beka sorunu Suriyeliler”

İYİ Parti Fatih Belediye Başkan adayı İlay Aksoy'un, Fatih Saraçhane'ye astırdığı "Fatih'i Suriyeliler'e teslim etmeyeceğim" yazılı pankartı sosyal medyada büyük tepki çekti. Sözcü'ye konuşan İlay Aksoy, "Ben siyasi jargonla değil, halkın diliyle konuşuyorum. Artık gerçekçi olmak zorundayız. Fatih'te yaşayan vatandaşlar bu projeyi fazlasıyla destekliyor" diye konuştu.



Seda ÖNCELER
Güncellenme: 12:59, 15/03/2019

Haberler | Gündem



A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: İlay Aksoy from the İYİ Party, who hung the banner that created the incident: “The real problem of survival is Syrians.”

(15.03.2019)

Entry of the news / Spot: *“İYİ Party Fatih Mayor candidate İlay Aksoy's banner, written by Fatih Saraçhane, “I will not surrender Fatih to the Syrians” has drawn great reaction on social media. Speaking to Sözcü, İlay Aksoy said, “I am not speaking with political jargon, but with the language of the people. We must be realistic now. Citizens living in Fatih support this project very much.”*

Photo: There are 3 photos in the news. 2 photos belong to the banner and the place where it hangs, the third photo belongs to İlay Aksoy from the İYİ Party.

31 Mart 2019 yerel seçimlerin için Fatih'te İYİ Parti'den Belediye Başkan adayı olan İlay Aksoy'un seçim afişi sosyal medyada tepkiye neden oldu. Aksoy'un seçim çalışmaları kapsamında Fatih Saraçhane'de astırdığı pankartta “Fatih'i Suriyeliler'e teslim etmeyeceğim” ifadeleri yer aldı.

Söz konusu pankartla ilgili Sözcü'ye konuşan İlay Aksoy “Ben günde 10 kilometre yol yürüyorum. Yaşlıların, işverenlerin, esnafın, annelerin birinci önceliği Suriyelilerdir. Ben sorunla ilgileniyorum ve o pankartta düşüncemi ifade ettim. O pankart tepki görmek yerine çok büyük bir destek aldı. Vatandaşlardan; ‘Oh be sonunda birisi hislerimize tercüman oldu’ diyerek bana destek verdiklerini görüyorum. Biraz gerçekçi olmak gerekiyor. Ben trollerin dışında kimseden olumsuz bir tepki almadım ve sözümün arkasındayım” dedi.

In the introduction part of the news, the statement “I will not surrender Fatih to the Syrians”, by the administration of Fatih District, which was turned into a struggle for surrender, and the density of the people living in it, indicates a state of conflict and war. Expressing an occupied state, “not surrendering” gains a different meaning here due to the expression of a political figure. In addition, the statement of Aksoy, who positions himself as the voice of the people of the region in the news, “ah, finally, someone has articulated our feelings” has also caused him to position himself as a needed leader or opinion leader in this regard.



“ASIL BEKA SORUNU SURİYELİLER”

Aksoy, Fatih Belediye Başkanı seçilirse Suriyeli vatandaşlarla ilgili yapacaklarını ise şöyle anlattı “Birincisi Fatih’te bulunan Arapça levhaların hepsi kesinlikle indirilecek. Burası Türkiye. Yurt dışında göç eden hiç kimse kendi dilini bu kadar katı bir şekilde kullanamıyor. Mülteciler geldikleri ülkeye uyum sağlar. Buldukları ülke onlara uyum sağlamaz. Beka diyoruz ya asıl beka budur. Çünkü bizim toplumsal yapımız bozuluyor bu şekilde. Bizim kültürümüze son derece uzak bir yapıyla zorla yaşamak zorunda bırakılmak asıl beka sorunudur. Okullarda Türkçe bilmeyen birçok Suriyeli çocuk var. Eğitim seviyemiz Suriyeliler yüzünden gerilemiş vaziyette. Onların sayesinde de inanılmaz bir gerileme yaşıyoruz.”

In this section of the news, the phrase “THE MAIN PROBLEM OF survivability is SYRIANS” is used in the subtitle. In the text, the concepts of problem and Syrian are used side by side a few times. The elements highlighted in the news, which emphasizes the changes of Syrians on life in the region, are “language” and “culture”. In this context, the use of expressions such as “migration, language, cohesion, survival, problem, Turkish, Syrian children, regression due to Syrians” together and in

succession is also a problem concerning Syrians living in Fatih, stating a problem of survival, the reason for the decline in language and culture, and the reason for the decline in the language and culture which resulted in negative effects by Syrian children.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The main event is given incompletely in the news. It is said to have received a great reaction on social media, but there is no data or quote showing this.

Results: Stating that our education level has declined because of the Syrians, Aksoy continues to convey her messages through discrimination, generalization and hate speech by using the phrase “We are experiencing an incredible decline because of the Syrians.” The expressions of “survival” and not surrendering in the news also give rise to meanings such as national security, occupation.

Background / Context Information: In the news, the person who is the subject of the allegation has been given the right to speak. However, the part called reactions was not supported. It is incomplete and left only in discourse.

News Resources: İlay Aksoy and Seda Erkenler, the IYI Party Fatih Mayoral Candidate

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: The statements of İlay, the candidate of the IYI Party Fatih Mayor, are included. However, there are no statements of Syrians who are the target of the news.

Schematic Structure Analysis

The fact that the phrase “The banner that creates an event” is not included in the headline of the news and what kind of event, reaction or analysis is not included in the continuation of the news shows us that this may be a fiction. Buna karşın İlay Aksoy’un açıklamalarına uzun uzun yer veriliyor. On the other hand, İlay Aksoy's statements are given at length.

Micro Structure Analysis

Metalingual Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: There is no regional cohesion.

Choice of Words: “Arapça”, “İYİ Parti”, “Suriyeliler”, “Fatih”, “Saraçhane”.

Rhetoric of News: The news included the statements of the banner owner, İlay Aksoy, but the opposite part, called the “great reaction”, remained in the air. In addition, considering that Istanbul is a city where people from different cultures and ethnicities live, it will be impossible for the Fatih region not to get its share of this diversity. For this reason, the claim that the only people living in the region as immigrants / asylee / refugees are Syrians and that all the mentioned “problems” are caused by Syrians is another point that needs to be discussed.

NEWS 2:

HÜRRİYET NEWSPAPER

Gündem DHA | Haber Giriş: 16.04.2019 - 11:09 | Son Güncelleme: 16.04.2019 - 12:34

Bakan Soylu Suriyelilerle ilgili önemli rakamı açıkladı



Bizi Takip Et   

İÇİŞLERİ Bakanı Süleyman Soylu, Afrin ve İdlib'te 368, Fırat Kalkanı bölgesinde ise 285 noktada yardım faaliyetlerinin devam ettiğini belirterek, "Bölgede hayat normalleştiğiçe geri dönüşler de artıyor. Şu ana kadar 321 bin 93 Suriyeli kardeşimiz bu güvenli bölgelere dönüş yapmıştır" dedi.

En Çok Okunan Haberler

A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: "Minister Soylu announced the important figure regarding the Syrians." (16.04.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: "Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu stated that aid activities continue at 368 points in Afrin and Idlib, and at 285 points in the Euphrates Shield region, and said, "As life becomes

normal in the region, returns increase. So far, 321 thousand 93 Syrian brothers have returned to these safe areas.”

Photo: A photo has been used in the news.

In the title of the news, there is a numerical information about Syrians given by Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu. When we look at the introduction of the news, we see that Minister Soylu gave two kinds of numbers here. One of them is how many points there are providing aid activities in Afrin, Idlib and Euphrates Shield region, and the other is how many Syrians have returned to safe areas so far.

'321 BİN SURIYELİ GÜVENLİ BÖLGELERE DÖNDÜ'

Afrin ve İdlib'te 368 noktada, Fırat Kalkanı bölgesinde ise 285 noktada yardım faaliyetlerinin devam ettiğinin vurgulayan Bakan Soylu, "Bölgede hayat normaleştikçe geri dönüşler de artıyor. Şu ana kadar 321 bin 93 Suriyeli kardeşimiz bu güvenli bölgelere dönüş yapmıştır" şeklinde konuştu.

In the last part of the news, we see the numbers given in the introduction. It is not clear whether the number to draw attention to is the number of points that carry out aid activities or the number of Syrians who have returned to safe areas so far.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The main event is selected from a small part of the news in the conclusion part.

Results: We cannot see which of the two important figures announced in the news is the figure that is said to be explained in the title of the news.

Background / Context Information: There is a lack of information prior to the news. The statement *“As life normalizes in the region, returns increase as well”* shows that there are problems in the past, but no reference has been made on this issue.

News Resources: Demir Ören News Agency (DHA)

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: Only the statements of the Minister of Interior were included in the incident.

Schematic Structure Analysis

No clear information has been given about which of the two figures described in the news is the “number” which is said to be explained about the Syrians in the title of the news.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalingual Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: Regional Cohesion: There is no regional cohesion.

Choice of Words: “Süleyman Soy lu”, “Minister of the Interior”, “AFAD”, “Euphrates Shield”, “Afrin”, “Idlib”, “Syrian”, “safe zone”.

Rhetoric of News: The figure highlighted in the news could not be clearly shown in the content.

MORAL CONFLICT – SOCIAL VALUES

SÖZCÜ NEWSPAPER

NEWS 3:

Suriyeli kadınlar ikinci eş oldu...

CHP'nin raporunda bu tespit yapıldı: CHP, "Yanlış göçmen politikasının faturasını vatandaş ödüyor" ve "Ensar ve muhacir söylemi Suriyeli sığınmacıya derman olmuyor" başlıklı iki ayrı rapor hazırladı.



Başak KAYA

Güncellenme: 13:02, 27/03/2019

Haberler | Gündem



4 milyon göçmen nedeniyle Türkiye'nin üstlenmek zorunda kaldığı ekonomik ve sosyal maliyetlere dikkat çekilen raporda, "Suriyelilerin 2 milyon 184 bini, 15-65 yaş aralığındadır ve çalışma izni verilen Suriyeli sayısı ise 27 bin 930'dur. Büyük bölümü kayıt dışı olmak üzere 1 milyonun üzerinde Suriyeli çalışmaktadır" ifadesi kullanıldı.

A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “Syrian women became second wives ...” (16.03.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: *“The detection made in the CHP's report: CHP prepared two separate reports titled “Citizen pays the bill for the wrong immigration policy” and “The discourse of Ansar and Muhajir does not cure Syrian refugees”“*

Photograph: One photograph has been used in the article.

In this news title, a generalization was made to the Syrian refugee women, “Syrian women became second wives...” There is an information omission in the title of the news. The status of being a “second wife” was included in the headline of the news, and different information about Syrian refugees was also included in the news content. The high number of young Syrian refugees and the number of illegal workers are stated.

4 milyon göçmen nedeniyle Türkiye'nin üstlenmek zorunda kaldığı ekonomik ve sosyal maliyetlere dikkat çekilen raporda, "Suriyelilerin 2 milyon 184 bini, 15-65 yaş aralığındadır ve çalışma izni verilen Suriyeli sayısı ise 27 bin 930'dur. Büyük bölümü kayıt dışı olmak üzere 1 milyonun üzerinde Suriyeli çalışmaktadır" ifadesi kullanıldı.

'13-14 YAŞINDA EVLENİYORLAR'

CHP'nin raporunda, Suriyelilerin ucuz iş gücü olarak çalıştırıldığına dikkat çekilirken, kadınların 2'nci eş olarak yasaya aykırı biçimde evlendirildikleri öne sürüldü. Konuya ilişkin şu değerlendirme yapıldı: "15-18 yaş arasındaki her 100 Suriyeli kadından 15'i evlidir. 13-14 yaşında gebelik ve çok eşlilik yaygındır. Kadınlar mağdur olmasının gerekçesi ile Türkiye'ye çok eşli halde gelenlerin evlilikleri, geçerli sayılmıştır. 13 yaşındaki bir çocukla imam nikâhıyla evlenerek cinsel istismar suçu işleyen bir Suriyeli de yasaları bilmediği gerekçesi ile beraat etmiştir. Suriyeli kadınların 2'nci eş olmayı kabul etmesiyle evlilik maddi çıkar unsuru haline gelmiştir."

The news content lists the negative aspects of Syrians such as breaking the law as a result of being a second wife, working illegally, and being low-cost labor. In the news, it is seen that pregnancy and polygamy at the age of 13-14 are emphasized by detailing the negative aspects of women. It was stated that this situation was used as a reason to prevent the victimization of women due to their being women.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of the Main Event: The main event is only given in the news.

Results: It was stated that the marriages of those who came to Turkey as polygamous on the grounds that women with pregnancy and polygamy at the age of 13-14 are not victims are considered valid.

Presentation of The Main Event: The main event is only given in the news.

Results: It was stated that the marriages of those who came to Turkey as polygamous on the grounds that women with pregnancy and polygamy at the age of 13-14 are not victims are considered valid.

Background / Context Information: The background and context information of the news is incomplete.

News Resources: CHP Research Report

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: Regarding the generalizations in the research report, the opinions and thoughts of the Syrians, who are the subject of the subject, are not available.

Schematic Structure Analysis

While it is pointed out that Syrians are employed as cheap labor throughout the article, it is claimed that women are illegally married as second wives. Pregnancy and polygamy at the age of 13-14 are presented to be common. The news title is susceptible to misunderstanding, unlike the content. A Syrian woman cannot marry a Turk and become a second wife.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalogical Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: Regional Cohesion: There is regional cohesion.

Choice of Words: “CHP”, “marriage”, “pregnancy”, “second wife”, “illegal” “immigrant”, “Syrians”

Rhetoric of News: The photos used in the news are suitable for the integrity of the news.

NEWS 4:

HÜRRİYET NEWSPAPER

Tacizciyi taksi durağında dövüler



Google reklamları
Bu reklamı gösterme
Neden bu reklam? ⓘ

En Çok Okunan Haberler

Son dakika haberi: 'Tosuncuk' Mehmet Aydın mal varlığını açıkladı! İşte emniyetteki ifadesinden detaylar.

Tosuncuk 'mağdurları'nda sessizlik hakim: Zaten yeterince rezil olduk

Sınır dışı edilmemek için sabun yutmuşlar!

Erzurum'da cami inşaatında çökme! 3 işçi enkaz altından çıkarıldı

Konya'da İngilizce eğitimi gördüğü kurs binasına girene kadar H.K.K. (20) adlı genç kıza takip edip, eteğini kaldırarak taciz eden Suriyeli İ.E.H. (23), çevredekiler tarafından taksi durağında dövüldü. İ.E.H., polis ekiplerince gözaltına alındı.

A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “They beat the abuser at the taxi stand” (30.04.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: “The Syrian I.E.H. (23), who followed and harassed the young girl named H.K.K. (20) until she entered the building where she studied English in Konya, by lifting her skirt, was beaten by the people in the taxi stand. İ.E.H. was taken into custody by the police teams.”

Photograph: Video recording and a photograph were used in the article.

In the headline of the news, the reaction to a possible harassment event that was not finalized was given as certain. In the introductory part of the news, the place of the crime was emphasized. The Syrian identity of the person who was attacked due to an estimated attack, was highlighted in the news entry. The expression of identity directs the perception of the reader and the language of the news. The language of the news is in a position that both conveys the news and judges and makes the decision.



Olay, saat 13.30 sıralarında meydana geldi. H.K.K., İngilizce eğitimi gördüğü kurs binasına yürüyerek giderken iddiaya göre, Suriye uyruklu İ.E.H. tarafından takip edildi. Genç kız, kurs binasına girmek isterken İ.E.H. de adres sorma bahanesiyle arkasından geldi.

Bir süre konuşan İ.E.H., daha sonra genç kıza eteğini kaldırarak, taciz etti. H.K.K.'nin bağırması üzerine çevredekiler yanına gelip durumu öğrendi. Genç kızın tacize uğradığını söylemesi üzerine kaçmaya çalışan İ.E.H., taksi durağına alınıp dövüldü.

Bu sırada ihbarla olay yerine polis ekipleri geldi. Genç kız ise olayın şokuyla uzun süre gözyaşı döktü. Gözaltına alınan İ.E.H., suçlamayı reddetti. Polis, çevrede yaptığı incelemede iş yerinin güvenlik kamerası kayıtlarında taciz anının olduğunu belirledi. İ.E.H., sorgulanmak üzere polis merkezine götürüldü.



In the later parts of the news, it is understood that the group, which is said to have beaten the Syrian person, took action with the words of the party claiming to be harassed. Although there was no witness in the incident, the words of the party claiming harassment were accepted as final and correct, and the trial was conducted by this group within the framework of this statement.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The main event started to be presented from the spot of the news and continued with additional information in the text.

Results: The Syrian man and the abused girl appeared side by side in the news fiction of those who responded to this abuse. An individual behavior is owned by the whole.

Background / Context Information: The background and context information of the news is incomplete. A common crime is tied to nationality through the individual. The event and ID connection is incorrect.

News Resources: Security guards, witnesses

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: This accusation made in the incident included only the view of the Syrian youth that he “refused to accuse” with a single expression.

Schematic Structure Analysis

Throughout the news, a harassment incident is described and the place where the incident occurred is given by emphasizing “Konya”, “Syrian”, “harassment”. In the content of the news, the way of harassment is explained. It is reported that the citizens reacted to the incident and that the young man who was emphasized as “abuser and Syrian” was beaten at a taxi stand.

In the incident described in the content part, it is understood that the people around did not see the way the incident took place, and that the citizens in the vicinity beat the young man after the young girl told him.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalingual Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: There is regional cohesion.

Choice of Words: Konya”, “English”, “harassment”, “Syrian”, “beating”, “police”.

Rhetoric of News: The video and photo used in the news are suitable for the integrity of the news.

*ILLEGAL ACTIONS – FOCUS OF CRIME**SÖZCÜ NEWSPAPER**NEWS 5:*

İstanbul'da Suriye mafyası ile Cezayir mafyası birbirine girdi

İstanbul Fatih'te Suriyelilerle Cezayirlilerin sokak hakimiyeti kavgası kanlı bitti. Bir Cezayirlinin hayatını kaybettiği olayla ilgili soruşturma başlatan İstanbul Polisi 4 Suriyeli'yi gözaltına aldı.



Tugay SADAY

Güncellenme: 11:16, 13/03/2019

Haberler | Gündem



A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “The Syrian mafia and the Algerian mafia clashed in Istanbul”

(13.03.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: *“The fight between Syrians and Algerians for street dominance in Istanbul Fatih ended in blood. Istanbul Police, which started an investigation into the incident in which an Algerian lost his life, detained 4 Syrians.”*

Photograph: One video was used in the article.

The headline of the news is “The Syrian mafia and the Algerian mafia collided in Istanbul”. In the introduction of the news, it is stated that Istanbul has been flooded with refugees in recent years and that these refugee groups have established dominance in the streets of Istanbul, which is like a mafia.

Son yıllarda mülteci akınına uğrayan İstanbul'da bu kez Cezayirli bir grup ile Suriyeliler arasında sokak hakimiyeti kavgası yaşandı. Olayın adresi ise Fatih'e bağlı Molla Gürani Mahallesi'ydi.

“BİZİM MEKANA GELMEYİN” KAVGASI

Polisin derlediği bilgiye göre; Cezayir uyruklu Hıçham Zuozat (26) ve arkadaşı Facıl Sadouk Bouzanne (28) Fatih'e bağlı Molla Gürani Mahallesi'nde bir bilardo salonunu mesken tutmuştu. Aynı bilardo salonuna Suriyeli bir grubun da sık sık gidip gelmesine Cezayirli iki arkadaş tepki gösterince aralarında bıçaklı kavgaya yaşandı.

SURİYELİLER İNTİKAM İÇİN SALDIRDI

Yaşanan ilk kavgada Cezayirli Facıl Sadouk Bouzanne, Suriyeli Ömer Ramadan'ı (19) bıçakla yaraladı. Kavganın ardından iki grup arasında husumet büyümeye başladı. 5 Mart Günü ise Basıl El Hüseyin (25), Ömer Ramadan (19), Musa R. (23) ve Ali Kessar isimli 4 Suriyeli Cezayirli iki arkadaşına bıçakla saldırdı.

BİR CEZAYİRLİ HAYATINI KAYBETTİ

Yaşanan kavgada Hıçham Zuozat ve Facıl Sadouk Bouzanne aldıkları bıçak darbeleriyle yere yığıldı. Olayı gören çevredeki vatandaşların araya girmesiyle Suriyeliler kaçarken, ihbar üzerine olay yerine gelen sağlık ekipleri tarafından Cezayirliler hastaneye kaldırıldı. Hastanede yapılan tüm müdahalelere rağmen Hıçham Zuozat hayatını kaybetti.

Olayla ilgili soruşturma başlatan İstanbul Cinayet Büro Amirliği ekipleri, çevredeki güvenlik kameralarını incelemeye aldı. Yapılan incelemelerde kimliği belirlenen Suriyelileri yakalamak için takip başlatıldı. Sürdürülen takipler sonucu Basıl El Hüseyin, Ömer Ramadan, Musa R. ve Ali Kessar gözaltına alındı.

Emniyette yapılan sorgulamaların ardından bıçağı kullandığı belirlenen Basıl El Hüseyin ile birlikte Ömer Ramadan ve Ali Kessar tutuklanırken, Musa R. ise serbest bırakıldı.

The information given in the title of the news as “mafia showdown” stated that a fight between two Algerians and four Syrians in the billiard room recurred later. It is reported that an Algerian youth died as a result of

this incident, which turned into a knife fight. Emphasizing the phrase “Don't come to our place” in quotation marks in the sub-title highlights the emphasis that a refugee, a foreign citizen, is in a structure that will endanger the security in Turkey. Here again, we see that the common values in the society are threatened. In the next sub-title, the words “Syrian, revenge and attack” are emphasized as a threat to national security.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: It is detailed in the content of the news.

Results: It has been stated that there is a situation like the mafia that creates tension about refugees. However, in the content, it is explained that there is a fight between two groups of friends.

Background / Context Information: The reasons and parties of the tension that caused the event are given by emphasizing.

News Resources: Tugay Saday

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: The news included the information collected by the reporter and the images in the video.

Schematic Structure Analysis

In the news, it was explained that the citizens of the two countries who were refugees in Istanbul became mafia, dominating the streets and fighting. The first fight starts when another group comes to a place where one group is constantly hanging out. An Algerian youth stabs a Syrian youth.

This fight starts the hostility between the two groups. The rhetoric of “attacked for revenge” was used, likening the second fight to a mafia showdown. Algerian Hikham Zuozat, who was injured by a knife stroke because of the fight, after 4 Syrians attacked two Algerian friends with knives, dies.

Three of the four young Syrians caught by the Istanbul Homicide Department work, are arrested and one is released.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalingual Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: There is harmony in the consecutive sentences.

Choice of Words: “Algeria”, “Syria”, “murder”, “tension”, “Istanbul”, “fight”, “Syrians”, “incitement”, “health”.

Rhetoric of News: Video was used in the article.

Gündem İHA | Haber Giriş: 12.04.2019 - 15:16 | Son Güncelleme: 12.04.2019 - 15:41

Adana'da kaliforniyum operasyonu! Gramı 4 milyon dolar...

Bizi Takip Et   

Adana'da Suriyeli bir kişi, nükleer silah başlıklarında ve atom enerjisi santrallerinde kullanılan kaliforniyum olduğu değerlendirilen bir tüp içerisindeki maddeyi satmak isterken yakalandı.

A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “Californium operation in Adana! 4 million dollars per gram...”

(12.04.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: “In Adana, a Syrian person was caught trying to sell a substance in a tube that was evaluated to be californium used in nuclear weapon warheads and atomic power plants.”

Photograph: A photo was used in the article.

The title of the news is given in two parts; “Californium operation in Adana!” with the title “4 million dollars per gram...”, the high price is emphasized.

In the first sentence of the news entry, we learn that a “Syrian” person was caught trying to sell “californium” in the headline of a substance used in nuclear weapons and atomic power plants.

Alınan bilgiye göre, merkez Çukurova ilçesi, Güzelyalı Mahallesi'nde bir kır düğünü tesislerine, güvenlik güçlerince düzenlenen operasyonda, Suriye uyruklu bir kişi, uluslararası dolaşımı yasaklanmış ve radyolojik tehlikesi olan kaliforniyum olduğu tahmin edilen tüp içindeki maddeyi satmak isterken yakalandı.

Durumun bildirilmesi üzerine Adana AFAD Arama Kurtarma Birlik Müdürlüğü, olay yerine Kimyasal, Biyolojik, Radyolojik, Nükleer (KBRN) aracı ile 6 kişilik ekip gönderdi. 1 gramı 4 milyon dolara satılan ve kaliforniyum olduğu tahmin edilen maddeyi incelemesi için olay yerine bir ekip daha istendi.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The presentation of the main event was made at the entrance.

Results: In the case of the sale of a substance whose international circulation is prohibited, the origin of the person who made it was emphasized.

Background / Context Information: The only information missing in the article about the person who wanted to sell the substance is that he is a “Syrian”. Background information is missing.

News Resources: Ihlas News Agency

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: Only the information obtained by the reporter is included.

Schematic Structure Analysis

While the article, whose value is highlighted in the title, was informed that an operation was carried out, person's identity as a "Syrian national" who did this was kept in the foreground in the news entry and afterwards.

Then the importance of the operation and the value of this article are stated.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalogical Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: There is a connection between causality and functionality.

Choice of Words: "Syrian", "californium", "Çukurova", "AFAD", "Biological", "Chemical", "Radiological", "Nuclear".

Rhetoric of News: Video was used in the article.

SECURITY – SOCIAL PEACE

SÖZCÜ NEWSPAPER

NEWS 7:

Şehir merkezinde Suriyeli kavgası! 5 kişi gözaltında

Şanlıurfa'da, iki grup kent meydanında bilinmeyen nedenle kavga etti. Tarafların birbirlerine tekme tokat saldırdığı kavga, polislin müdahalesiyle sona erdi, 5 kişi gözaltına alındı.

Güncellenme: 20:26, 02/03/2019

Haberler | Gündem



A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “Syrian fight in the city center! 5 people are in custody”

(02.03.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: *“In Şanlıurfa, two groups quarreled in the city square for an unknown reason. The fight, in which the parties kicked and slapped each other, ended with the intervention of the police, and 5 people were detained.”*

Photograph: A photo and a video were used in the article.

The subject of the news titled “Syrian fight in the city center! 5 people in custody” is Syrian youth. In the introduction of the news, it was stated that there was a fight with kick and slap in the city center of Şanlıurfa and 5 people were taken into custody after the police intervened.

Olay, öğleden sonra kentin en işlek noktalarından olan Rabia Meydanı’nda meydana geldi. Aralarında Suriyelilerin de bulunduğu iki grup arasında bilinmeyen nedenle çıkan tartışma, kavgaya dönüştü. Taraflar birbirlerine tekme tokat saldırdı.



DHA

Çevredekilerin ihbarıyla bölgeye, aralarında özel harekâtçıların da olduğu çok sayıda polis sevk edildi. Kavgayı güçlükle sonlandıran polis, olaya karışan 5 kişiyi gözaltına aldı, soruşturma başlattı. DHA

In the news, no information was given about the others who were involved in the fight between the two groups, including Syrians. However, this event was titled “Syrian quarrel!” highlighted and moved to the title of the news in this way. In the image in the video there are people attacking each other and trying to separate them. In the photograph, it is seen that special operations forces came to the scene and intervened.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The main event is given in the introduction part of the news and the details are also explained.

Results: It was reported that the police took 5 people into custody, ended the incident with difficulty and started an investigation.

Background / Context Information: There was no information about the background or background of the news.

News Resources: Demirören News Agency

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: There is information about the incident that the reporter obtained from his own sources.

Schematic Structure Analysis

The exclamation mark used in the headline of the news draws attention to the identity of “SYRIAN” and it was stated that the police ended the fight between the groups in the city square with difficulty. However, the expression “Syrians among them” in the news content does not inform the

reader about the identities of the other groups or individuals participating in the fight. Therefore, one of the parties to the event, Syrian and others, remains anonymous. The element of crime causes it to focus on Syrians. The definition of the security forces that intervened in the incident as “special operations” and the police also carries an emphasis on the incident that threatens public security. Bringing these two important points together, the Syrians were left at the center of the incident and assumed the crime element.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalingual Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: There is regional cohesion.

Choice of Words: “Syrian”, “fight”, “police”, “Şanlıurfa”

Rhetoric of News: The news photo and video used in the news describe the situation. The extent of the unrest created was emphasized by stating that it was “in the city centre”.

NEWS 8:

Bilardo salonu kavgası kanlı bitti




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Bizi Takip Et

Fatih'te Cezayirli'lerin mesken tuttuğu bilardo salonuna Suriyeliler'in sık sık gelmesi üzerine iki grup arasında başlayan tartışma bıçaklı kavgaya dönüştü. Bu kavgalarda bir Cezayirli ölürken, bir Cezayirli ile bir Suriyeli de ağır yaralandı. Polis, bıçaklama olayına karışan 4 Suriyeli'yi gözaltına aldı.



En Çok Okunan Haberler

A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “The billiard room fight ended in blood” (13.03.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: “The argument that started between the two groups after the frequent arrival of Syrians in the billiard room in Fatih, where Algerians live, turned into a knife fight. While an Algerian died in these fights, an Algerian and a Syrian were seriously injured. The police detained 4 Syrians involved in the stabbing incident.”

Photograph: A photo and was used in the article.

In the headline of the news, it is stated that the fight in a place ended in blood. And in the details of the news, the fight between Algerians and Syrians in a billiard room in Fatih district of the incident, in which one person died and two people were seriously injured, is described. The striking part is that anyone can enter a billiard room in Turkey, but with the emphasis that Algerians live here, foreign nationals live in a place in a way that is contrary to gangs, mafia and social order.

Polis kayıtlarına göre, Cezayirli Hıçham Zuozat (26) ve arkadaşı Facıl Sadouk Bouzanne'in de (28) arasında bulunduğu Cezayirli grup, [Fatih](#) Molla Gürani Mahallesi'nde bir bilardo salonunu mesken tuttu. Son zamanlarda Suriyeli bir grupta bilardo salonuna gelerek vakit geçirmeye başladı. Cezayirli grubun bu durumdan rahatsız olması üzerine iki grup arasında zaman zaman tartışma yaşanmaya başladı. İlk olayda Cezayirli Facıl Sadouk Bouzanne, Suriyeli Ömer Ramadan'ı (19) bıçakla yaraladı.

5 Mart 2019 günü iki grup tekrar karşı karşıya geldi. Suriyeli Basıl El Hüseyin (25), Ömer Ramadan (19), Musa R. (23) ve Ali Kessar, Cezayirli iki kişiye saldırdı. Bıçaklı kavgada, Hıçham Zuozat ve Facıl Sadouk Bouzanne aldıkları bıçak darbeleriyle yere yığıldı. İhbar üzerine olay yerine gelen polis ve sağlık ekipleri yaralı Cezayirli hastaneye götürdü. Hastanede yapılan tüm müdahalelere rağmen Hıçham Zuozat hayatını kaybetti. Asayiş Şube Müdürlüğü Cinayet Büro Amirliği ekipleri, çevredeki güvenlik kameralarını incelemeye aldı. Yapılan incelemelerde kimliği belirlenen Suriyelileri yakalamak için takip başlatıldı. Basıl El Hüseyin, Ömer Ramadan, Musa R. ve Ali Kessar gözaltına alındı. Emniyette yapılan sorgulamaların ardından bıçağı kullandığı belirlenen Basıl El Hüseyin ile birlikte Ömer Ramadan ve Ali Kessar tutuklanırken, Musa R. ise serbest bırakıldı.

In the content of the news, a group of Algerian people are residing in this billiard room in Fatih and a group of Syrians have started to come to this place recently. There are occasional arguments between Algerians and Syrians, who are uncomfortable with this situation. In the first fight, Algerian

Facil Sadouk Bouzanne injures Syrian Ömer Ramadan (19) with a knife. Later, when the two groups meet again, four young Syrians attack two Algerian youths with knives. Two young Algerians gets seriously injured. Despite all the interventions in the hospital, Hicham Zuoat dies.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The main event is given in the introduction part of the news.

Results: Algerian and Syrian citizens can kill each other in order not to share the place where they are constantly hanging out with others.

Background / Context Information: A cause-effect relationship has been established.

News Resources: Çetin Aydın

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: There is information about the incident that the reporter obtained from his own sources.

Schematic Structure Analysis

The general idea of the news is that Algerian and Syrian groups will be able to kill people for no apparent reason.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalogical Analysis: Active sentence structure has been used.

Regional Cohesion: Information about the history of the incident was insufficient.

Choice of Words: “Algerians”, “Syrians”, “billiard room”, “police”, “stabbing”

Rhetoric of News: The news photo has been used to be compatible with the general theme of the news.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

SÖZCÜ NEWSPAPER

NEWS 9:

SPOT:

Ekonomik kriz Suriyeli şirketleri de vurdu

Ekonomik kriz Suriyeli patronları da vurdu. Bu yılın şubat ayında Türkiye’de Suriye ortaklı 71 şirket kuruldu. Geçen yılın şubat ayında ise Suriyeliler 102 şirket kurmuşlardı. Şubat ayında Türkiye’de kurulan Suriye ortak sermayeli şirket sayısı geçen yılın aynı ayına göre yüzde 42.7 azaldı.



Erdoğan SÜZER
Güncellenme: 07:58, 26/03/2019

Haberler | Ekonomi



A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “The economic crisis has also hit Syrian companies.” (26.03.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: *“The economic crisis has also hit Syrian bosses. In February of this year, 71 companies with Syrian partners were established in Turkey. In February last year, Syrians established 102 companies. The number of companies with Syrian joint capital established in Turkey in February decreased by 42.7% compared to the same month of the previous year.”*

Photograph: The photo of a shop with an Arabic sign was used in the article.

In the title of the news, it was stated that the economic crisis in Turkey also affected the companies opened by Syrian bosses. The number of Syrian companies opened in the same months of the two years was compared in the news. It is given as a result of the research that the number of companies with Syrian joint capital established in Turkey decreased by 42.7% compared to the same month of the previous year. Emphasis on “Syrian companies too” in the title has given us that Turkish companies are more likely to be affected by the crisis than Syrian companies. This emphasis has been drawn to the fact that Syrian companies are privileged, even they are affected, and besides the crisis, attention is drawn here.

Şubat ayında Suriyeli patronların şirkete koyduğu sermaye tutarı da yüzde 12 azaldı.

71 ŞİRKET KURULDU

Bu yılın ocak ayıyla kıyaslandığında da yeni kurulan Suriyeli şirket sayısında yüzde 20.2 gerileme oldu. Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı (TEPAV) şubat ayı yabancı sermayeli şirketler bültenini yayımladı. TOBB verileri üzerinden hazırlanan araştırmaya göre, geçen ay içerisinde toplam 13 milyon lira Suriye sermayesi olan Suriye ortak sermayeli 71 şirket kuruldu.

Şubat 2019'da Suriye ortak sermayeli kurulan şirket sayısı, Şubat 2018'e göre yüzde 42.7, Suriye ortak sermayesi ise yüzde 12 azaldı. Bir önceki aya göre de Suriye sermayeli şirket sayısında yüzde 20.2, Suriye sermayesinde de yüzde 5 gerileme oldu. Araştırmaya göre, ülke genelinde faaliyete başlayan 71 Suriye ortaklı şirketin 54'ü İstanbul'da kuruldu. İstanbul'u 7 şirketle Mersin, 6 şirketle Hatay izledi. Kilis, Antalya, Bursa ve Adana'da da birer Suriye ortaklı şirket kuruldu. Suriyelilerin yeni kurduğu şirketlerden 23'ü toptan ticaret, 10'u gayrimenkul sektörlerini tercih etti.

YÜZDE 25.2 AZALDI

Geçen ay Türkiye genelinde yerli ve yabancı olmak üzere yeni kurulan toplam şirket sayısı ise 8 bin 488'de kaldı. Yeni kurulan şirket sayısının geçen yılın şubat ayına göre yüzde 17, bu yılın ocak ayına göre ise yüzde 25.2 oranında azalması dikkat çekti.

Emphasizing “Syrian bosses” in the news content, it was stated that the amount of capital they invested in the company decreased by 12 percent. Afterwards, it is given numerically that there was a 20.2 percent decline in the number of newly established Syrian companies.

In the news, it is stated that the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) has published the February foreign capital companies bulletin, but only the percentage of Syrians among the “foreign capital companies” is given here.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The presentation of the main event is given in the introductory paragraph.

Results: Emphasizing that companies with Syrian partners established in Turkey were also affected by the economic crisis, the news emphasizes that while Turkish companies are affected by the economic crisis, it is normal for Turkish companies to be affected, as well as Syrians being affected and the effect of the crisis is getting bigger.

Background / Context Information: The information was compared by examining the annual data.

News Resources: Erdogan SÜZER, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: In the news, the data of the Turkish Economic Policy Research Foundation were examined rather than the comments.

Schematic Structure Analysis

Throughout the news, the same dates of the two years of the Syrian companies during the economic crisis in Turkey were examined and the shrinkage experienced was given with figures.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalogical Analysis: Datum and figures are used in the news.

Regional Cohesion: Causality does not exist completely. Given that there was a crisis and the decrease in the number of companies with Syrian partners is given here.

Choice of Words: “Economy”, “Syrian”, “Company”, “Turkish”, “Syrian”

Rhetoric of News: The news was persuasive because numerical datum were used.

HÜRRİYET NEWSPAPER

NEWS 10:

SPOT:

Türkiye’den net mesaj




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Bizi Takip Et   

Brüksel’de yapılan Suriye konferansına katılan Dışişleri Bakanı Çavuşoğlu, Türkiye’de her gün 300 Suriyelinin doğduğunu belirterek mültecilerin külfet paylaşımı konusunda daha fazla destek istedi. Türkiye’nin Suriyeliler için 37 milyar dolar harcadığına işaret eden Bakan Çavuşoğlu, “Daha iyi ve hızlı çözümlere ihtiyacımız var” dedi.



En Çok Okunan Haberler

A- MACRO STRUCTURE

1. Thematic Structure

Title: “Clear message from Turkey” (15.03.2019)

Introduction of The News / Spot: *“Attending the Syria conference held in Brussels, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu stated that 300 Syrians are born in Turkey every day and asked for more support in sharing the burden of refugees. Pointing out that Turkey has spent 37 billion dollars for Syrians, Minister Çavuşoğlu said, “We need better and faster solutions.”*

Photograph: Photographs of people looking at and photographing collapsed buildings and a smashed big truck were used in the article.

In the headline of the news, a remarkable emphasis was made by saying "clear message from Turkey". This title aroused our curiosity to read the rest of the news. In the news entry, it is said that Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu stated that Syrians in Turkey give birth to 300 children every day at the Syria conference he attended in Brussels, and asked for more support in terms of burden sharing. Afterwards, it is stated that Turkey spends 37 billion dollars for Syrians. We understand that there is a problem, albeit indirectly, from the words of Minister Çavuşoğlu, “We need better and faster solutions”. With this news, it is stated that Syrian refugees have a great financial and population burden on Turkey.

SURİYE'de sekizinci yılını dolduran savaş nedeniyle ülkelerini terk etmek zorunda kalan 3.6 milyon mülteciye ev sahipliği yapmayı sürdüren ve en büyük donörlerden olan Avrupa Birliği'nin tamamından daha fazla para harcayan Türkiye, yük paylaşımı konusunda net mesaj verdi. Brüksel'de üçüncüsü düzenlenen "Suriye'nin ve Bölgenin Desteklenmesi" konferansına katılan Dışişleri Bakanı **Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu**, Türkiye'nin Suriyelilere yönelik çabalarının süreceğini ancak bu sorumluluğun tek başına taşınmasının mümkün olmadığını söyledi.

400 BİN SURİYELİ DOĞDU

Uluslararası toplumun yardımlarından memnuniyet duyduklarını ancak mevcut sınamalarla kıyaslandığında verilen desteğin son derece düşük kaldığına dikkat çeken Çavuşoğlu, Türkiye'de her gün 300'den fazla Suriyelinin doğduğunu, son 7-8 yılda Türkiye'de doğan Suriyeli sayısının ise 400 bin olduğunu söyledi. Suriyelilerin yerel halkla barış ve uyum içinde yaşayabilmesi için kapsamlı bir sosyal uyum politikası benimsediği, 1 milyon okul çağındaki Suriyeliden 650 bininin eğitime devam ettiği ve iki yılda eğitime katılım oranının yüzde 30'dan yüzde 62'ye yükseltildiği de Çavuşoğlu'nun vurguları arasında yer aldı.

In the continuation of the news, we see that Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu emphasized that Syrian refugees are a great burden on Turkey. It is emphasized again that Turkey hosts 3.6 million refugees and spends more money than the whole of the European Union, which is one of the largest donors, and wants to share this burden. In the continuation, we see Çavuşoğlu saying that it is not possible to carry this responsibility alone.

Again, the emphasis was placed on "400 THOUSAND SYRIANS BORN" as a sub-title on population. Stating that the international community has helped, Çavuşoğlu draws attention to the fact that the support given is extremely low when compared to the current tests.



AB ve üye ülkeler, 2011'den beri Suriye için 17 milyar Euro harcarken, aynı dönemde Türkiye'nin tek başına harcadığı miktar 37 milyar dolar oldu. Bazı AB ülkelerinin Suriyeli mültecilerin Birlik ülkelerine yerleştirilmesine direndiğini hatırlatan Çavuşoğlu, AB'nin vermeyi taahhüt ettiği ikinci 3 milyar Euro'luk kaynağın planlamasına başlanan bir ortamda daha ilk 3 milyar Euro'nun sadece 2 milyar Euro'sunun ödendiğinin altını çizerek, "Daha iyi ve hızlı çözümlere ihtiyacımız var" dedi. AB Dışişleri Yüksek Temsilcisi Federica Mogherini, "Türkiye'ye mülteciler için vaat edilen ikinci yardım diliminin (3 milyar Euro) 1.5 milyarlık bölümünün AB tarafından karşılanacağını teyit ediyorum" dedi.

Çavuşoğlu states that EU countries do not want Syrian refugees to be resettled in the Union countries and in this context, he states that only 2 billion euros of the first 3 billion euros have been paid in an environment where the planning of the second 3 billion euros worth of resources that he

has committed to give to Turkey has been paid, and states that this is a deadlock.

2. Schematic Structure

Presentation of The Main Event: The presentation of the main event is given in the introductory paragraph.

Results: It is emphasized that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has increased with births and this population is a great economic burden to Turkey and it creates disruptions in the money that the EU has previously promised to give.

Background / Context Information: The information was compared by examining the annual data.

News Resources: Güven Özalp

Interpretation of the parties to the incident: In the news, the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu was given rather than the comment.

Schematic Structure Analysis

In the news, the economic and population burden created by the Syrian refugees living in Turkey is given in numbers.

Microstructure Analysis

Metalingual Analysis: Datum and figures are used in the news.

Regional Cohesion: Causality exists in its entirety. It is seen that there is a heavy load and this is indicated by numbers.

Choice of Words: “Birth”, “Syrian”, “Population”, “Turkey”, “Migration”, “Economy”

Rhetoric of News: The news was persuasive because numerical datum were used.



6. CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the “moral panic” studies, it was difficult to measure reaction of the society. However, it was easily understandable for the press to identify issues that disturbed society and guide the agenda. “Moral panic” is the representation and reaction of a subject that disturbs the masses in different ways in public. From this point of view, we can state that the media undertakes the most important task in demonstrating and spreading this reaction. The continuation of these reactions and panic, being a tool, plays an important role in affecting the masses in certain segments.

The importance of the media in the study of Syrian immigrants, which are the subject of the study, is remarkable. When we examine the factors that cause “moral panic” reaction, the crime factor draws attention. In ninety percent of the news, a process in which Syrian - immigrant and crime faced - is used side by side. Another remarkable point is the generalization intensely. Especially in judicial cases, the “Syrian” nationality is used side by side with the name of the suspect, and the identity of the suspect is clearly given even if the name of the suspect is not certain.

Another point that attracts attention in the investigation is that Syrian immigrants are shown as a burden and should be get rid of. However, it is even more remarkable that this discourse is expressed by political characters. Individuals operating in the political field show Syrian immigrants as “a problem”, reflect them as “to be get rid of” individuals and target them as “invaders”.

Look at the sharp differences between the language of the news and the official statements. The opposition group creates targeting and evaluating sections by using

warrior, discriminatory and close to hate language. The consequences of showing Syrian immigrants so close to crime as an economic burden, the cause of social deterioration, and those that disrupt peace and order are of course devastating. Political characters who express that the society thinks this way show themselves as the spokesperson of the society.

Immigration is an international issue and mass migration affects geographies in terms of economic, social, political, and security. Its cultural and health effects deeply affect societies. The intensity of the news by the citizens of the country of migration indicates the immigrants as the reason for the changes we mentioned.

In the news, there are no statements of immigrants as parties and they are not seen as news sources. It is used unilaterally, without following news, in an accusatory or separating language. Immigrants experience their effects in depth in the areas mentioned above. However, another remarkable point is that the human dimension is not discussed, the place left, the change in order made, the difficulties experienced by the arrivals, and the solution suggestions for the problem of adaptation are not discussed.

Due to the scope and title of the study, this field could not be entered in depth, but the answers to the questions we asked in later researches can be investigated

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