

A RECONCILIATION OF TWO APPROACHES TO FREEDOM:

NEO-REPUBLICANISM AND MARXISM



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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

A Reconciliation of Two Approaches to Freedom: Neo-Republicanism and Marxism

Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner argue that neo-republican freedom, which is freedom as non-domination, is a negative conception of freedom. It is an alternative to all accounts of positive freedom and the liberal understanding of negative freedom. However, such an understanding of freedom implicitly requires certain virtues from individuals. One has to construct himself as an equal to others. Also, one has to act in a way that does not reproduce the ideologies that support domination. For those reasons, freedom as non-domination requires a certain degree of self-realization and there is an exercise-concept aspect of it. Contrary to what Pettit and Skinner think, that concept makes neo-republican freedom a form of positive freedom. Such an analysis annihilates a possible categorical difference between Marxist freedom and neo-republican freedom. Then, the implications of freedom as non-domination in work-life necessitates a transformation in property relations. Because capitalism inevitably produces domination relationships between capitalist and worker. On the other hand, Marxist freedom necessitates a social structure free from all sorts of domination. Therefore, Marxist freedom and neo-republican freedom converge at one point.

ÖZET

İki Özgürlük Anlayışının Uzlaştırması: Yeni-Cumhuriyetçilik ve Marksizm

Philip Pettit ve Quentin Skinner, tahakkümsüzlük olarak tarif edilen yeni-cumhuriyetçi özgürlüğün kavramsal olarak negatif bir karakterde olduğunu iddia eder. Onlara göre bu özgürlük anlayışı tüm pozitif özgürlük anlayışlarına ve liberal negatif özgürlük anlayışına alternatiftir. Ancak, Pettit'in ve Skinner'ın iddiasının aksine, böyle bir özgürlük anlayışı içsel olarak bireylerden belli erdemlere sahip olmasını bekler. Kişi kendi benliğini başkalarına denk olduğu bilinci ile kurmalıdır. Ayrıca, kişinin davranışlarını ve düşüncelerini tahakküm üreten ideolojilerin yeniden üretimine katkı koymayacak şekilde düzenlemesi gerekir. Bu sebeplerle tahakkümsüzlük olarak özgürlük anlayışı belli seviyede bir kendini gerçekleştirme gerektirir ve bir yönden egzersiz kavramıdır. Bu da yeni-cumhuriyetçi özgürlüğü bir tür pozitif özgürlük yapar. Böyle bir analiz Marksist özgürlük ile yeni-cumhuriyetçi özgürlük arasındaki muhtemel bir kategorik farkı ortadan kaldırır. Ayrıca, tahakkümsüzlük olarak özgürlük fikrinin çalışma hayatı üzerindeki içerimleri mülkiyet ilişkilerinde bir dönüşümü gerektirir. Çünkü kapitalizmde kaçınılmaz olarak kapitalist ile işçi arasında tahakküm ilişkisi bulunur. Diğer taraftan, Marksist özgürlük tüm tahakküm biçimlerinin ortadan kalktığı bir sosyal yapıyı gerektirir. Bu sebeple Marksist özgürlük ile yeni-cumhuriyetçi özgürlük bir noktada birbirine yakınsar.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
MARXISM AND NEO-REPUBLICANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGATIVE FREEDOM AND POSITIVE FREEDOM	5
2.1 Marx and positive freedom.....	7
2.2 Triadic formulation of freedom	14
2.3 A brief definition of neo-republican freedom	16
2.4 The case of self-imposed domination.....	20
2.5 Neo-republican freedom as an exercise-concept of freedom	26
WORK AND FREEDOM FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF MARXISM AND NEO- REPUBLICANISM.....	30
3.1 The historical affinity of republicanism and socialism	30
3.2 The relation between work and dependency	32
3.3 The illusion of free labor contract	35
3.4 Dependency in capitalism and the transformation of work.....	39
CONCLUSION.....	50
REFERENCES	54

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the last few decades, republicanism has a comprehensive coverage in both academic and political discourse. The contemporary thinkers Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner made the most significant contribution to this expansion, who reread the traditional republican texts. These people significantly comprehend how to understand past republican texts and how republicanism may contribute to today's political problems. That is why they draw a well-deserved interest. Today, academic works related to the philosophy of freedom would remain deficient without mentioning Pettit's and Skinner's neo-republican line. This interest in neo-republican freedom may connect the decreasing interest in Marxism and a motivation to replace this alternative.

Most of the 20th century involved the Cold War. There was a pitched battle between two systems with all their ideologic, philosophic, economic, and political extensions. This battle resulted in the dissolution of the socialist block and the victory declaration of capitalism. Then, all the values represented by the socialist block lost favor. Furthermore, as the philosophical constituent of the block, Marxism retreated compared to the attention it attracts in the third quarter of the 20th century. People who lost their faith in Marxism were still not convinced by the capitalist values, and they started searching for alternatives. Then, some of them engaged in partial recovery

politics, such as identity politics and environmental politics, rather than complete grand narratives.

There is a severe difference between liberalism and Marxism about the notion of freedom and in what circumstances it can be achieved. Synchronically to the decreasing interest in Marxism, liberal doctrine began to dominate the idea of freedom. Here, the reason for the rising interest in neo-republican freedom is rooted in searching for an alternative to liberal hegemony. It filled the space that is left by Marxism. In this context, two possible routes of escape from liberalism are Marxism and republicanism. The relation between those two possible alternatives to liberalism includes a significant affinity. In this thesis, I will aim to explore some of those affinities.

Marx's account of freedom is a form of positive freedom, as widely accepted. On the other hand, neo-republican freedom does not fit into Isaiah Berlin's dichotomy of positive and negative freedoms, Pettit puts forward. It has a negative character conceptually (Pettit, 2002a, p.340). However, it is different from what Berlin refers to negative freedom. Contrary to what Pettit and Skinner argue, I hold that freedom defined as the absence of domination is positive. Whether it is analyzed only logically, or historically and politically, or with the help of Charles Taylor's concepts of freedom as opportunity-concept and exercise-concept, either way, the positive emphasis of freedom as non-domination will manifest itself.

In the second chapter, I will analyze the political and social implications of a commitment to the idea of freedom as non-domination through the concept of work. For actualizing non-domination in work life, it is a precondition to abolish private property

over productive assets. The idea of freedom as non-domination and Marxist freedom with its communist ideal has to converge. In other words, despite Pettit's and Skinner's intentions, I intend to show that freedom as non-domination is positive freedom, and such freedom is more compatible with a communist society rather than the market economy.

It is possible to distinguish between Pettit's and Skinner's roles according to their share concerning the constitution of the neo-republican *ecole*. Skinner's share is more of a historian. He rereads republican tradition from a different perspective. Especially in the works about Machiavelli, he challenges the wide reading of the writer as a manipulative person and justifier of malicious politics. For him, Machiavelli represents the Neo-Roman line and a proponent of a specific understanding of freedom, which is the absence of dependency. On the other hand, Pettit's role is slightly different. He clarifies the concepts and puts together the terminology. While frequently mentioning that he owes to Skinner's historical works, Pettit identifies the conceptual frame of neo-republican thought, defines republican freedom as the absence of non-domination, and presents the constitutional and political requirements of such an understanding of freedom.

According to Pettit's and Skinner's shared view, republican freedom is an alternative to the liberal idea of freedom as non-interference and all forms of positive freedom. Freedom is the lack of potential arbitrary interference of others and not being dependent on someone else's goodwill. Skinner refers to this state as non-dependence, and Pettit refers to it as non-domination. Even the naming differs both refer to the same idea. Pettit (2002a) also explicitly says that he agrees with Skinner about non-

dependency and non-domination designations refer to the same idea (p. 341). Pettit and Skinner's only difference is Pettit (2002a) thinks that republican freedom is just non-domination, while Skinner holds that it is both non-domination and non-interference in Neo-Roman thought (p. 342). The following four cases are illustrative to grasp the difference between Pettit and Skinner:

1. Interference with domination
2. Non-interference with domination
3. Non-interference without domination
4. Interference without domination

The first two of those cases create situations in which freedom is restricted for both Pettit and Skinner. The third one is suitable for freedom since it neither includes interference nor domination. However, when we think about the last case, this is the fair rule of law case for Pettit, and there is no obstacle to freedom in this case. Instead, this case preconditions freedom. Besides, Skinner holds that republicans seek to minimize domination as well as interference, as liberals do. That is to say, interference without domination is a case where freedom is violated for Skinner. Pettit (2002a) considers this case as the only little disagreement between him and Skinner (p. 344). Relying on the fact that there is not much disagreement between Skinner and Pettit, and Pettit's being more active on the constitution of terminology, I will use Pettit's concepts in this work. However, if for any reason, *dependency* is used instead of *domination*, still the same idea is referred.

CHAPTER 2

MARXISM AND NEO-REPUBLICANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGATIVE FREEDOM AND POSITIVE FREEDOM

Since Isaiah Berlin published his famous work *Two Concepts of Liberty*, most discussions about the philosophy of freedom refer to him. Some of them embrace, and some other rejects Berlin's frame; however, in any case, it is apparent that he is cited too often. Neo-republican thinkers Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner also start by referring to Berlin's dichotomy while they are about to clarify what their understanding of freedom is. So, it is almost inevitable not to talk about Berlin when writing about neo-republicanism.

In this chapter, I will examine the limits of Berlin's positive freedom and negative freedom distinction. Then, Taylor's two concepts of freedom, namely *freedom as exercise-concept* and *freedom as opportunity-concept*, will help me overcome Berlin's limitations. Supposing the distinction between positive freedom and negative freedom is accurate, the question will be on which side the neo-republican freedom belongs. Classical republican tradition is generally considered as a form of positive freedom. However, one of the main arguments of neo-republican thinkers is that republican freedom is not positive freedom. Despite their effort to differentiate neo-republican freedom and positive freedom, there is still a strong connection. Contrary to Pettit and Skinner, the implications of neo-republican freedom do not let us think it separates from positive freedom.

Berlin argues that most of the different approaches to freedom can be gathered into two distinct central camps. The first of these camps is expressed with the range in which a person or group can act without being exposed to interference. Berlin calls this negative freedom, and the exact term is *non-interference* for this kind. A person or group is free as much as the area in which he can act without any external obstacle. “Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others” (Berlin, 2006, p. 34). In this account, freedom is defined through the absence of something, namely the absence of interference. When talking about negative freedom, the question in mind is not what does the subject possess. It is more about being safe from some external entities.

By referring to Benjamin Constant’s ideas about ancient and modern notions of freedom, Berlin argues that negative freedom is the proper understanding of freedom for the contemporary democratic world. Besides, there is also a domain of positive freedom. This domain includes more variety. It includes the ancients, Jacobins, Marxists, Hegelians, radicals, Rousseau, and more others. The common point between these varying ideas is the focus on the source of the subject’s choices rather than the area in which the subject acts free from interference. Advocates of positive freedom expect the subject to be the source of their actions to be called free. The subject has to be ruled by his capacities, not by alien powers. Furthermore, this capacity often refers to the rational capacities of the subject. The subject's permanent, genuine, and rational aspect should command the self rather than instant motives, deceptive feelings, or illusions. Berlin depicts such a general model for proponents of positive freedom and blames them by dividing the self unreasonably. Describing freedom as an effort by the rational self to

control the primitive self breaks the unity of self into pieces (Berlin, 2006, p. 44). Also, Berlin thinks that this approach inevitably concludes that what is rational is also universal.

Those who believed in freedom as rational self-direction were bound, sooner or later, to consider how this was to be applied not merely to a man's inner life, but to his relations with other members of society. Even the most individualistic among them ... came at some point to ask themselves whether a rational life not only for the individual, but also for society, was possible, and if so, how it was to be achieved ... For if I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reasons, be right for others who are rational like me. (Berlin, 2006, p. 47)

This conclusion creates a tendency to be governed by totalitarian regimes. From the perspective of such a government, masses are always like children to be fixed, directed through righteousness, or something that needs help to realize its genuine interests. In this respect, there is a strong bond between paternalism and positive freedom.

In a nutshell, negative freedom is freedom as non-interference for Berlin. On the other hand, positive freedom is defined around terms like self-mastery, self-realization, or living a life in accordance with rules determined by reason. The validity of such a distinction will be discussed in the following parts. However, before that, I will mention the inaccuracy of Berlin's critique of positive freedom concerning Marx.

2.1 Marx and positive freedom

Supposing that the distinction between positive freedom and negative freedom is valid, it would be apparent that Marx's account of freedom is a positive one. Marx and Engels (1956) support this idea with similar wording in *The Holy Family*. Being free in the

materialist sense, is not being free through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert one's true individuality (Marx & Engels, 1956, p. 176).

As stated before, the domain of positive freedom is so broad and includes varying schools of thought. However, one of Berlin's mistakes is rooted in this effort to gather those different schools of thought under a single concept and criticize the whole at once. There is reasonable ground for Berlin's critiques for some of the proponents of positive freedom, but the critiques fall irrelevant for some others. Marxism is one of those latter.

If one supposes a positive freedom doctrine that claims to know the best for people in general, the prescription is for free life and forces people to be free with this prescription, this doctrine is not Marxism. Only a superficial and inaccurate reading of Marx can lead to such a supposition. Marxism is indeed a doctrine of emancipation from alienation and self-realization. However, alienation for Marx is not an idea that depicts becoming distant from the natural self, as Rousseau thinks. Also, self-realization does not mean living in accordance with a universally prescribed life. Marx never elaborates on details of a future society, the ideal lifestyle for a person to follow, or how to organize the administrative works. Those are something that we cannot foresee today. People will discover this through struggle and praxis.

Berlin criticizes the idea that human nature has an essence, and to be free, one needs to reach that nature. An example of that kind of idea may be the Christian thought. Christians hold that religious belief is at the essence of human nature and finding one's

level is only possible by consecrating oneself to god. This belief is the proper way for freedom. Another example would be Aristotelianism. According to that line of thought, substantially, the human is a political animal, and freedom can be achieved through political action. Both examples provide some ground for Berlin's critiques with their essentialist stances, independent from the critique is right or wrong. However, Marx's stance on human nature is a critique of essentialism.

In order to understand Marx's theory about freedom, we should first understand his approach to work. Then, to understand what work means for Marx, the concept of 'alienation' should be illuminated. Lastly, for alienation, Marx's stance about human nature should be grasped first. So, the narrative is organized as a chain of concepts. I think his ideas about human nature are the first ring of the chain. There are different interpretations of Marx's position on human nature. Some interpreters argue that Marx is a proponent of a unique form of universal human nature idea. Moreover, some other interpreters hold that Marx considers an individual similar to *tabula rasa* and completely determined by historical and social conditions. Norman Geras is one of the leading figures of the initial idea. In his work, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, he argues that Marx indeed believes in human nature. His work mainly focuses on Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach: "... the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations" (Engels & Marx, 2002, p. 8). According to Geras (2002), the accurate reading of Marx tells us social relations have some impacts on human nature, but there are also unchanging and fixed aspects of human nature.

Geras's work is essentially a refutation of Louis Althusser's reflections on Marxism. Althusser is a social constructivist about human nature. He thinks that an individual is only a reflection of social and historical constructions, and that is the proper reading of Marx. In his view, Marx's work can be categorized as early humanist period, which is followed by an epistemological break and an anti-humanist period. In the later period, "Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and politics on an essence of man" (Althusser, 2010, p. 227). Althusser represents the structuralist reading of Marxism. On the other hand, besides him, the idea that Marx rejects immutable human nature is the mainstream interpretation in Marxism.

Apart from the discussion of whether there is a notion of fixed human nature in Marxist theory or not, it is sure that Marx's position is radically different from essentialist thinkers of enlightenment and ancient philosophers. Even if it includes some form of a fixed human nature. Some of the questions of enlightenment philosophers are whether the human is essentially good, and social development corrupted him, or human is essentially malicious, and the necessity for living together and social contracts made him accommodating to society. Early philosophers tried to discover the ontological and ethical aspects of human nature with such questions. However, Marx does not think that those questions have answers.

No matter he is an essentialist, a social constructivist, or historicist. All accounts of human nature have to accept that some amount of essential, societal, and historical factors operate on the individual. However, the difference of varying accounts lies in determining the weight of those different factors. The dominant driving forces and determining factors vary among the different accounts of human nature. With this

respect, Marx also does not deny that there are common, shared attributes of being a human. The biological needs are apparent. “Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But in the abstraction which separates them from the sphere of all other human activity and turns them into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal” (Marx, 2007, p. 139). Therefore, the biological needs are not essentially human. However, the distinctive human aspect is a conscious activity of production.

We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose in those materials. (Marx, 2004, p. 284)

Marx prefers the term *species-being* for the universal capability of being a human, which is conscious labor activity. This inquiry is allegedly different from a common essentialist philosophical inquiry. It does not give a fixed answer to ethical questions of human nature, whether it is essentially good or bad. For Marx, “By acting on the external world and changing it, (human) at the same time changes his own nature” (2007, p. 177). Because, human essence “is the ensemble of the social relations” (Engels & Marx, 2002, p. 8). By producing the means for his life, human shapes nature and society. And, the society, which determines the limitations of human activity, shapes the human. “Just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him” (Marx, 2007, p. 195). There is a reciprocal relationship between man and society/nature. So, for Marx, apart from the shared attribute of conscious life activity, the rest of human essence is a dynamic concept changing through history.

Marx's radically different approach to the concept of human essence and the relation between man and nature is the starting point to understand the difference between Marx and other philosophers, who employ notions like alienation and self-realization. Besides the capacity for conscious productive activity, Marx rejects the idea of fixed human essence with ethical implications. According to him, overcoming alienation and self-realization is not a call to live as per the fixed human essence. It is a call for emancipation from a specific social structure. This social structure represses human potential and restrains some competencies that could come out in an alternative social reality.

Alienation expresses a situation in which human potential does not come out. It does not express a state of being alienated from the fixed human essence. However, Marx does not give the exact prescription about living, jobs to hold, and tastefulness to have for self-realization. People can discover ways to live, jobs to hold, and tastes to have in a transformed social structure and property relations. One of the base conditions of Marxist freedom is "giving to each the social room for his essential life expression" (Wood, 2004, p. 52). From this perspective, it would be inaccurate to ascribe a paternalist position to Marx that imposes the correct way of life. In other words, Marx does not tell the necessary lifestyle for self-realization; it analyses the possible conditions in which people can find ways to realize themselves. Furthermore, the constitution of the conditions will not be the result of external power; it will be the product of people's collective struggle. The shape of future society will be something that people will discover while struggling. Marx rejects the idea of educators, who have a grasp of truth priorly and educates the society with that knowledge. The revolution

itself and the post-revolution period will be emancipation without emancipators.

Because the capitalist mode of production does not have the capacity to fulfill its promises and contains necessary contradictions to make people aware of exploitation by themselves.

The recognition [Erken- nung] of the products as its own, and the judgement that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper - forcibly imposed - is an enormous [advance in] awareness [Bewusstsein], itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production. (Marx, 1993, p. 463)

Berlin was probably influenced by the Cold War era's political atmosphere while criticizing the whole positive freedom advocates. He is more like talking about the Soviet practices and Lenin's theory of the vanguard party while talking about Marxism. Lenin injected some ideas into Marxism. One of the main ideas is that capitalism will not collapse by itself. There is a need for a vanguard, firmly organized cadre party to lead the proletariat through the establishment of socialism. Aside from Lenin's idea is accurate or not, it is not necessarily implicit to Marxism. Vanguardism is an insertion of another thinker and politician Lenin, to Marxism. Marxism is suitable for such insertions as well as contrary insertions. However, Berlin proposes a vanguardism-alike idea while arguing that positive freedom necessarily leads to paternalism. Marx himself cannot be the object of forcing to freedom criticism. For those reasons, an effort to criticize all advocates of positive freedom with a single argument seems inaccurate.

2.2 Triadic formulation of freedom

What criterion to consider while determining a particular understanding of freedom close to positive freedom or negative freedom is challenging. For example, it is mentioned that Marx's account of freedom is connected to the conditions that repress human potential. Then, is it possible to assume Marx's formulation of freedom with a negative character due to a language trick as follows: freedom as the absence of alienation and oppression?

It is impossible to consider a specific understanding of freedom as negative freedom only because the absence of something expresses it. There are semantically equivalent ways of expressing something with positive emphasis or negative emphasis. If we keep the analysis at a purely logical level, it is possible to formulate different understandings of freedom, either as positive or negative. In Marx's perspective, freedom necessitates self-realization as well as the absence of specific conditions for self-realization. Likewise, neo-republican freedom as non-domination necessitates the absence of domination as well as necessitating the existence of some capacities for the subject. If the analysis remains at this level, considering freedom as a triadic relation would be more accurate, as MacCallum argues.

According to MacCallum (1967), each account of freedom can be expressed as follows: X is free from Y to do or become or not to do or not to become Z. Here, the X variable represents the subject, the Y variable ranges over obstacles, and the Z variable ranges over activities or situations. If one of these variables does not exist in a particular freedom expression, the reason is that it is obvious in the context. For instance, we may

complete the full grammatical expression for freedom as non-interference as such: The subject is free from interference to do what he wants. It is also possible to apply the same linguistic transformation for freedom as non-domination or Marxist freedom: A worker is free from domination by his own creations to realize himself.

Supposing MacCallum's over-analytic formulation is valid would lead to a disappearance of the distinction between positive freedom and negative freedom. As a result, the question of whether there is a categorical difference between Marxist freedom and freedom as non-domination becomes meaningless. However, before MacCallum's analysis, Berlin (2006) himself states that the difference between positive freedom and negative freedom is not a purely logical distinction; instead, it is more of a historical one:

The freedom which consists in being one's own master, and the freedom which consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men, may, on the face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each other - no more than negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing. Yet the 'positive' and 'negative' notions of freedom historically developed in divergent directions not always by logically reputable steps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each other. (p. 44)

Freedom as non-domination is an expression that emphasizes the absence of something. Its focus is freedom from something, but not freedom to something. However, this linguistic structure is not enough to consider freedom as a non-domination distinct from positive freedom in the above context. The mere linguistic analysis leads us to MacCallum's triadic expression argument and unveils the deficiency of negative freedom – positive freedom distinction. However, as Berlin stated, a purely logical and linguistic distinction does not provide an insight into the historical distinction between different accounts of freedom. So, a different set of concepts is needed to determine

whether a particular understanding of freedom belongs to positive freedom or negative freedom.

2.3 A brief definition of neo-republican freedom

The root of republican thought goes back to Roman ideals. The successors include Renaissance Italy, city-states such as Florence and Venice, philosopher Machiavelli, Commonwealth era Britain thinkers like James Harrington, John Milton, Algernon Sidney, American independence struggle, J.J. Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. For Pettit (2013), republicanism can be divided into two sections. One is the Franco-German tradition, which consists of Rousseau and Kant, and the other is the Italian-Atlantic tradition that consists of the rest. Pettit adopts the Italian-Atlantic tradition in his writings. This line has three main criteria: Freedom as non-domination, mixed constitution, and contestatory citizenship (Pettit, 2013, p. 171). These criteria are the distinctive characters of both classical republican Italian-Atlantic tradition and Pettit's and Skinner's neo-republicanism.

Rousseau's and Kant's accounts of freedom as autonomy are similar to freedom as non-dependence of the Italian-Atlantic tradition. Rousseau says that "if people are to be free, each must be 'perfectly independent of all the others'" (as cited in Pettit, 2012, p. 12). However, he differs on the mixed constitution and contestatory citizenship topics. Defends popular sovereignty instead of a mixed constitution. Also, he sticks up for citizens that contribute to collective sovereignty and play along with it instead of contestatory citizenship (Pettit, 2013, p. 179). In this thesis, the subject of examination is

neo-republican thought. Because of their commitment to the Italian-Atlantic tradition, the Franco-German tradition will be out of coverage whenever republicanism is mentioned.

Scholars most commonly posit classical republican freedom among the proponents of positive freedom. However, contrary to that reading, neo-republicans argue that the Italian-Atlantic tradition of republicanism does not belong to positive freedom. Pettit finds Berlin's positive-negative distinction insufficient in terms of comprising the neo-republican freedom. For him, this freedom is a third alternative to Berlin's alternatives. He thinks that freedom as non-domination is not positive freedom because "the absence of mastery by others clearly does not guarantee the achievement of self-mastery" (Pettit, 2002b, p. 22). Also, freedom as non-domination is not negative freedom as non-interference in Berlin's sense because there are cases in which freedom is violated without interference. Neo-republican freedom does not fit into this duality. However, still, "the republican conception of freedom is certainly negative" (Pettit, 2002a, p. 340). It is a negative conception, but it should not be confused with liberal freedom as non-interference.

Pettit (1998) defines three principles to be interiorized for republicanism:

- 1- All individuals must be entitled as citizens.
- 2- Republican citizenship requires freedom as non-dependence and non-domination; it ensures the competence for citizens to look into the eyes of others as equivalents.

- 3- The Republican government should secure citizens' freedom by qualifying and protecting them against domination and by improving democratic control mechanisms. (p. 12, own translation)

The second principle defines the neo-republican freedom itself, while two others display the necessary conditions to secure and expand that freedom. Over those three principles, another three specifications are listed to demonstrate the conditions in which domination occurs. In a relation, “someone dominates or subjugates another, to the extent that:

- 1 –they have the capacity to interfere

- 2 –on an arbitrary basis

- 3 –in certain choices that the other is in a position to make” (Pettit, 2002b, p. 52).

Republicanism defines freedom based on slavery. Neo-Roman thinkers (this is how Skinner calls Italian-Atlantic republicans) hold that losing freedom means making one a slave (Skinner, 1998, p. 52). In a master-slave relation, the master can arbitrarily interfere with decisions that should belong to the slave. Apart from actualizing this capacity or not, the situation itself withholds the slave’s freedom. There may be varying reasons for the absence of interference. The master could possess goodwill, or the slave may know how to act to please his master and avoid interference. However, none of these cases ensure any freedom for the slave. The slave would be free whenever he has a life independent from his master.

Thinking of freedom as non-domination in comparison with Hobbesian freedom can be more illustrative. Berlin's depiction of negative freedom as the absence of external obstacles has its origin in Hobbes. According to this understanding, every external interference, including the fair rule of law, violates natural freedom. The source of the interference is not relevant to the violation of freedom. No matter the power is a monarchy or people's power, rules and limitations withhold freedom to the same degree. As Pettit quotes from Hobbes, living in the republican city Lucca, whose gateway is decorated with a big *LIBERTAS* caption, or living in the despotic Constantinople makes no difference (Pettit, 2002b, p. 38). Because both limits the area in which people can act with their own rules. The source of the rules is irrelevant to the amount of enjoyed freedom. However, Hobbes does not argue that freedom is something to be maximized at all costs. Freedom can be limited in some areas for the sake of other goods, such as security, equality, or peaceful coexistence. He defends the necessity to obey the rules. However, arguing that the limitations and rules are themselves a form of freedom would be inaccurate. Freedom is freedom, equality is equality, and security is security. Reducing one good to balance another good should not lead to any confusion about concepts.

In response to the Hobbesian idea, Pettit (2002a) argues that the fair rule of law is not a constraint to freedom. On the contrary, it is the precondition of freedom. In other words, laws do not constitute but condition freedom. He asserts that "it may be that that bodies in my blood constitute my immunity to certain diseases, the ordinances of nonarbitrary law under which I live constitute my status as a free, undominated citizen" (Pettit, 2002a, p. 347). Pettit analyzes the existence of non-arbitrary law as a

conditioning factor for freedom, not as a compromising factor. In this respect, laws do not stand as an obstacle if they do not incorporate domination. Shortly, Pettit's difference from the Hobbesian freedom becomes clear on these following claims: 1- Domination without interference restricts freedom. 2- Interference without domination does not restrict freedom; on the contrary, it constitutes the conditions for freedom.

Pettit's definition of domination resembles living in the panopticon. A prisoner living in the panopticon can never have a mind of his own and cannot have the opportunity to practice his will after being persuaded that the jailer is consistently watching him (Baumann, 2015, p. 25). Any given time will pass by looking out for how the jailer evaluates him and trying to live following the jailer's will. There may not be a jailer in the panopticon at any given time, but the possibility of his existence forces the prisoner to live by minding it. It is similar to the master-slave relation. A master, who possesses goodwill, may not have the urge to make arbitrary interference to the slave at any given time. However, the possibility of using that power forces the slave to live by minding it.

2.4 The case of self-imposed domination

Pettit and Skinner mainly focus on the existence of dominating external subject. However, there are also possible cases in which one is subjected to domination in his will. Such a voluntary servitude may have different motivations. In this part, I will examine the possible reasons for voluntary servitude and its implications to positive freedom and neo-republican freedom relationship.

A more current case of domination compared to master-slave relations would be man and woman relations. In these relations, gender roles are constructed to include domination for most of the conservative spheres. Man often has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with decisions that should normally belong to the woman, such as what she wears and when she can go out.

Mary Wollstonecraft, known as a feminist and a republican, attempts to demonstrate how women live under domination and how they do not actively resist that domination in her 18th century based work *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. Wollstonecraft (1997) depicts women as insufficient and dependent, who live with a single aim in life: looking good. However, this is not derived from any inherent insufficiency of women. Male-dominated social structure results in such a women model due to its indoctrination starting immediately after birth. Such a social structure leaves women out of the sphere of education. The period was very disadvantageous for women. In fact, even one of the most progressive thinkers of the period, Rousseau, thinks that women's education should only aim to satisfy men's desires.

This framework implies that considering the patriarchy as something full of force used by men against women would be misleading. This system includes some amount of force and some amount of consent. In a patriarchal society, some women may tend to live a dependent life rather than pursue an independent life. Such cases constitute the hard cases of feminism. Natalie Stoljar (2018) lists these cases in three categories: Self-abnegation, unconscious adaptive preference formation, and deliberate decisions of agents that physically or psychologically harm them for the sake of some other group's benefit (Stoljar, 2018). An example of hard cases can be derived from traditional

Turkish families, where three generations live together. In such a family, the oldest man in the house has the highest authority, and the youngest bride has the least authority. Women are always inferior to the male counterparts of their generation. However, among the genders, the oldest woman in the house is responsible for administering young girls and brides. Older women have some power, and there is a cycle of power in family life (Kandiyoti, 1988, p. 279). In such a family, the structure of the relations may canalize the woman to excessive deference. The illusion of a superior man image may result in a false inclination, which tells those rational and emotional expectations of man is far more important than women. Alternatively, unconsciously, women may act so that rather than objecting and running counter to the power balance in the family, conforming to available relations is more rewarding. Because the prior option may result in more significant social isolation problems, conforming to rules may have relatively much power in the women's cycle of power. Also, as the third option, women may deliberately think and decide that man is indeed superior. For social harmony, a young bride should bow down willingly and serve voluntarily.

The endeavor for ideological hegemony is a common practice in any oppressor and oppressed relation. The oppressive group tries to show their interests as the interests of the whole society by way of ideological apparatuses and hopes oppressed groups internalize that. However, as the mentioned hard cases of feminism suggests, the internalization of the oppressing system by the sufferer is not always a product of mere manipulation. Practicing the dominating relations itself has a feature to make that relationship a norm and reproduces the domination.

The internalization of domination by the sufferer is as much dangerous as the existence of the dominating subject. An empirical example shows the degree of such a case. Today, one in five believe that women are inferior to men. Furthermore, worsely, men and women show a similar dispersion in terms of the rates (Ipsos, 2017).

These examples of consent and voluntary servitude will help us to understand whether neo-republican freedom is positive freedom or not. Domination is an intersubjective relation. One side of the relationship has the capacity for arbitrary interference, and the other side is concerned with being exposed to arbitrary interference. That means there is a psychological aspect of neo-republican freedom as well as the political aspect. The absence of freedom is partly related to the sufferer's fears and anxieties.

Skinner (2006) claims that Berlin misses the difference between formal freedom and effective freedom, and such a misleading analysis “results at best in confusion and at worse in a kind of mockery of freedom” (p. 248). Formal freedom is roughly the freedom obtained by ensuring the rights of individuals, and effective freedom is the freedom obtained by having the necessary material conditions for achieving one’s goals (Carter, 2011, p. 1). Berlin thinks that a person, who cannot read because of blindness, is neither free nor unfree. He is incapable. The problem of freedom can be in question only for a person that can read. Unfreedom can emerge only when the subject possesses the capacity, for instance, when the agent has no physical problem with sight but is blindfolded. As Hobbes argues, for freedom to be in question, one should have the inner capacity to act in a certain way.

All living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say, it wants the liberty; but the power to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness. (Hobbes, 1998, p. 139)

That means, for Hobbes, if there is a problem with internal abilities, the question at hand is not freedom but power. On the other hand, Skinner (2016) argues that a person who cannot read because of blindness without any external obstacle is formally free but efficiently unfree (p. 248). A blind person loses freedom partially in Skinner's sense.

Skinner's argument, which is directed to Berlin, should be applicable for his account of freedom, as well. For example, imagine a person who has grown up in a strictly gerontocratic society, internalized older people's authority, and then moved to another society where older people have no extraordinary power. This person may attribute a vital role to older people in his new society even if there is no power domain or domination potential. He may not act freely because of the remaining feeling of being inspected around older people. Such a person has to be evaluated as having formal freedom but lacks efficient freedom in terms of neo-republicanism. His freedom is restricted because of internal restrictions and incapacabilities even when there is no dominating subject around. In this respect, formal freedom and efficient freedom distinction show us that freedom as non-domination also suffers from just internal insufficiencies.

A person can posit himself as subject to domination because of some irrational fear and anxiety. However, it may not always be the result of such negative feelings. Some strong ideological motivations can also lead to a demand for being subject to

domination. This relation can occur between a young and an old, a woman and a man, a student and a teacher, or a worker and a capitalist. Suppose the first subject of those sample relationships commits to ideologies of either gerontocracy, patriarchy, or capitalism. In that case, that person may be the active contributor of being dominated. Their decisions and actions actively reproduce the system that restricts their freedom. If that is the case, in a word, if the sufferer can be a part of the reproduction of the system that dominates him, then the responsibility of ongoing domination would be on both the dominating and dominated subject. These cases suggest that for being free a person should both be safe from domination and have the appropriate mindset to avoid domination. The arrangement of external conditions is not enough to be free; a proper frame of mind is also a must for freedom as non-domination. The reason for the lack of freedom can be external dominating factors as well as the possible states of false consciousness. Therefore, to enjoy neo-republican freedom, each citizen must possess the proper mindset. This makes freedom something to be learned.

In short, self-domination and voluntary servitude issues are not handled by neo-republicans satisfactorily. Neo-republicans do not account for bad motivations of an agent or internal barriers to freedom. At the same time, their freedom definition implies that a person is not the final authority on his freedom. A servant who is happy with his position and thinks that his servant position does not harm his freedom would not be an admissible case for freedom as non-domination. In this case, the servant claims that he is free, but neo-republicanism suggests that he is not free. Since both claims cannot be valid simultaneously, either neo-republicans should revise their definition of freedom as

non-domination, or they have to employ the concept of false consciousness to be able to account for such cases.

2.5 Neo-republican freedom as an exercise-concept of freedom

Charles Taylor's alternative definitions of positive freedom and negative freedom help explain why neo-republican freedom is a positive one. For Taylor, beyond defining negative freedom as the absence of external obstacles and positive freedom as the collective self-determination, there is a more profound difference between those two doctrines.

Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one's life. On this view, one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept. By contrast, negative theories can rely simply on an opportunity-concept, where being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options. (Taylor, 2006, p. 143)

When thinking about freedom as an opportunity-concept, a person's actions and whether his plans actualized or not do not matter. A person is active or not is irrelevant to his area of freedom. On the other hand, for freedom as exercise-concept, having opportunities available is not enough to be free. A person has to use some of those opportunities, act in a way, decide certain things, or become something. In this account, having a range of opportunities is not enough to be free. In connection with this, "the subject himself can't be the final authority on the question whether he is free" (Taylor, 2006, p. 147).

Based on Taylor's frame, let us turn back to the situation of a woman who consents to patriarchy and actively contributes to the reproduction of it. When examined through freedom as an opportunity-concept, it is possible to consider such a woman as someone living as she wishes. This account of freedom would lead us to argue that a woman, who does not position herself as a sufferer of patriarchy and actively and deliberately prefers living dependent on a man, is free since she is not forced to act in a certain way by any external force. However, a person who chooses to be dependent is not free in the eyes of neo-republicanism, even if she chooses to be like that by herself. As I presented in the previous chapter, neo-republicans have to discriminate among an agent's motivations to account for voluntary servitude. There are appropriate motivations and inappropriate motivations that determine the freedom of any agent. Exercise-concepts of freedom also requires us to discriminate among motivations (Taylor, 2006, p. 146). Therefore, as in the exercise-concept of freedom, neo-republicans do not favor the subject as the final authority on the question of whether he is free or not. To be free, aside from the absence of domination, one has to shape his choices and behaviors not to corroborate and reproduce the structure of domination. In another saying, even if there is no one dominating, possible internal restrictions may lead to loss of freedom as if being subject to domination. Such a loss of freedom can occur because the person is "totally unrealized, if, for instance, he is entirely unaware of his potential, if fulfilling it has never arisen as a question for him, or if he is paralyzed by the fear of breaking with some norm which he has internalized but which does not authentically reflect him" (Taylor, 2006, p. 144).

Opportunity-concept of freedom allows an agent to do what he wants. Such an account of freedom has to be content-neutral. For example, a person, who recently got out of jail, may want to return to prison because of solid accustomedness. A desire for being a prisoner would be compatible with freedom as opportunity-concept. However, for freedom as exercise-concept, “you are not free if you are motivated, through fear, inauthentically internalized standards, or false consciousness, to thwart your self-realization” (Taylor, 2006, p. 147). The same motivation applies to neo-republican freedom. In order to give an adequate explanation of a voluntary prisoner case, neo-republicanism should employ the same concepts with freedom as exercise-concept.

Eventually, freedom as non-domination has to allow a distinction between the authentic standpoint and the inauthentic one. Neo-republicanism demands the subject to internalize some values, motivations, and virtues and refuse others. Such an account of freedom is similar to the exercise-concept of freedom because it “requires me to have become something, to have achieved a certain condition of self-clairvoyance and self-understanding. I must be actually exercising self-understanding in order to be truly or fully free. I can no longer understand freedom just as an opportunity-concept” (Taylor, 2006, p. 162). That is the reason for freedom as non-domination is being bonded to freedom as an exercise-concept. In this respect, Pettit and Skinner are not right about suggesting that neo-republican freedom is distinct from positive freedom. Freedom as non-domination necessitates equipped citizens. For that reason, it is a form of positive freedom as an exercise-concept.

The primary motivation of showing that freedom as non-domination is a definite form of positive freedom is to support the affinity of freedom as non-domination and

Marxist freedom. The first step is to show no categorical difference between those two understandings on the surface. Pettit starts the first chapter of *Republicanism* to demonstrate that neo-republican freedom is distinct from positive freedom. On the other side, Skinner argues that Machiavelli and classical republicans that he calls Neo-Romans are advocates of a negative conception of freedom as the absence of dependency. However, no matter it is called freedom as non-domination or freedom as non-dependence, such a conception of freedom cannot be disjoined from the positive freedom. In the next chapter, I will examine how the neo-republican understanding of freedom intersects with the idea of socialism in general and Marxism in particular. The focus will be on implications for the economy and work life.

CHAPTER 3

WORK AND FREEDOM FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF MARXISM AND NEO-REPUBLICANISM

3.1 The historical affinity of republicanism and socialism

Considering the ideals and the eras in which it is on the rise, republicanism can be regarded as a revolution doctrine. In Europe and North America, most revolutions took place around republican themes like anti-slavery, constitutional regimes, subverting the monarchies, et cetera (Isaac, 1990, p. 487). Marx sees these revolutions as progressive movements in history, affirms, and calls them bourgeoisie revolutions. Concerning the 1789 revolution, he identifies the republican character of bourgeoisie revolutions as follows: “the heroes as well as the parties and the masses of the old French Revolution, achieved in Roman costumes and with Roman phrases the task of their time: the emancipation and the establishment of modern bourgeois society” (Marx, 2006, p. 18). It is possible to detect continuity between those revolutions and the ideas of Marx. In a sense, republicans, with Hegel, are precursors of Marx (Wood, 2004, p. xx). Additionally, there existed many radical movements with socialist tendencies within the republican spectrum.

While arguing that bourgeoisie revolutions are progressive movements, Marx also claims that bourgeoisie becomes reactionary and starts to oppress the masses as soon as it comes into power. Because the principles revealed during revolutionary days start

serving contrary to the interests of the class in power. For that reason, liberal thought becomes more dominant in the power paradigm. Egalitarian motives are pushed into the background, and a specific interpretation of freedom comes into prominence.

The Revolutions of 1848 in Europe also came into existence on the same ground. Radical republicans and people disappointed by the governments that do not fulfill the promises of previous revolutions took action in that era. However, the revolutionary wave of 1848 did not accomplish the final goals, and the groups that struck for more progress were defeated. Afterward, the 1871 Paris Commune emerged. This commune coronated more radical political motives; but, it still remained on the same line. Marx (2009b) depicts this relatively short-lived commune as “the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour” (p. 41).

While thinking about the intersection points of Marxism and the neo-republican idea of non-domination, the affinity between republicanism and socialism should be kept in mind, as well as the conceptual analysis. As Rosa Luxemburg states, “every socialist is naturally a republican” (as cited in Muldoon, 2019, p. 4). Clearly, the idea of socialism is a broad spectrum and not just made up of Marxism. Republicanism also includes much more than the idea of freedom as non-domination and includes varying interpretations. Some of this variety include the ecoles like labor republicanism, and workplace republicanism, both of which apply the republican principles into work life with more egalitarian motives. They both share the argument about the incompatibility of republicanism and a form of *laissez-faire* capitalism. On a similar line of thought, I will examine those versions of republicanism more in detail and the implications of Pettit’s conceptualization of freedom, namely freedom as non-domination, in the

following chapters. The implications overlap with Marxist ideas about labor to a large extent.

3.2 The relation between work and dependency

John Maynard Keynes has a prediction for the year 2030. He thinks that by 2030 technological advancements and automation will take up more space to supply the needs of people; people will work less; weekly working hours will come down to 15 hours (Keynes, 1963, p. 361). This prediction seems highly optimistic when we are getting closer to 2030. Today, for instance, in Turkey, the weekly working hours are around 47,7 hours according to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports (De Luce, 2019). Additionally, it is probably more than this study shows if we think about the nonmeasurable overtime hours.

Similar to Keynes' predictions, Herbert Marcuse also has an envisagement for the future. He thinks that all the historical project of humanity is to dominate nature. Overcoming the problem of limited resources is bound to the degree that nature is dominated and its resources are treated. The apex of dominating nature is automation. This automation is also the medium for complete freedom and resolving conflicts between people. The root cause of the classes in society is the limited resources problem (Andrew, 1970, p. 241). Marcuse thinks that work is inherently oppressive and something to avoid as much as possible.

Necessary labor is a system of essentially inhuman, mechanical and routine activities; in such a system, individuality cannot be a value and an end in itself.

Reasonably, the system of societal labor would be organized rather with a view to saving time and space for the development of individuality outside the inevitably repressive work-world. (Marcuse, 1998, p. 292)

The origins of the same line of thought go back to Ancient Greek. “The philosophers of antiquity taught contempt for work, that degradation of the free man, the poets sang of idleness, that gift from the Gods” (Lafargue, 1907, p. 12). Work was something that slaves do, and it was not deserving respect.

While some approaches towards work are shown, another related concept, *dependency*, has a transformation in history. Philosopher Nancy Fraser and historian Linda Gordon (1994) trace the story of this transformation. They think that the concept of dependency circulated in four different contexts. These are economical, sociolegal, political, and moral/psychological contexts. In the preindustrial term, dependency did not have a pejorative connotation for individuals. It was the natural state of humanity to some extent. In an explicitly hierarchical society, almost everyone is inferior to others, obeys the superior, and dependent. The era is not the era of citizenship but the era of vassalage. Being dependent on someone else is almost a norm, so dependency does not make degrading sounds for people. The reverse of the dependency, namely independence, is a form of existence not for individuals but for institutions like churches or nations. There is no apparent distinction between economic, political, and sociolegal contexts regarding the concept of dependency in these conditions.

Fraser and Gordon (1994) further express that the notion of citizenship goes public along with democratic revolutions in the industrial era. By extension, political and sociolegal independence starts to become a norm for individuals. Also, in the economic context, the dependency concept had a significant transformation. In the pre-

industrial era, working for someone else was a state of dependency, even if it was not degrading. However, in the industrial era, the relationship between dependency and wage labor was redefined. In the new period, wage labor became one of the symbols of non-dependency, just like self-employment and proprietorship. Along with the emergence of protestant work ethics, people who are out of the scope of work (except proprietaries) were considered dependent and degraded.

Fraser's and Gordon's genealogy on dependency and ancients and Marcuse's mentioned ideas show many controversial approaches to the relationship between work, dependency, and freedom in history. Then, the question comes up: is wage labor a state of independent life? Is work a degrading activity to avoid as much as possible in any case, as Marcuse and some ancients argue? Revealing the relationship between work and dependency would help comprehend the relation between work and the neo-republican conception of freedom as non-dependency. On the other hand, an examination about whether work is inherently oppressive and wretched or the way for an individual to be independent and realized would explain how to relate Marxism with neo-republican freedom.

My answers to these questions are as follows: Work, in its available form, does not reflect a state of independence, but it is not necessarily oppressive in every possible world. The problem is not inherent to work itself; it is a problem with capitalism. People, who think that wage labor is independence, probably consider that a wage-laborer earns his life with work and does not need any welfare system or charity. I will object to identifying work in capitalism with independence from two standpoints. One is the idea of freedom as non-domination, and the other is Marx's ideas about the proper

quality and quantity of work. Those two standpoints imply similar sentiments when it comes to economic life, and there is not an actual conflict between those two.

3.3 The illusion of free labor contract

Wage labor occurs via a contract between the employer and employee. Employee signs the contract for getting an agreed amount of wage in return for offering his workforce. According to *laissez-faire* liberalism, the contract is based on a free relationship since no one forces the employer or the employee to relate. The worker is willingly and consciously takes part in the contract. However, it is worth questioning how free that contract is. One of the philosophers who question that issue is Marx. He thinks that a worker “is compelled to sell himself of his own free will” (Marx, 2004, p. 1423).

The worker leaves the capitalist, to whom he has sold himself, as often as he chooses, and the capitalist discharges him as often as he sees fit, as soon as he no longer gets any use, or not the required use, out of him. But the worker, whose only source of income is the sale of his labor-power, cannot leave the whole class of buyers, i.e., the capitalist class, unless he gives up his own existence. He does not belong to this or that capitalist, but to the capitalist class; and it is for him to find his man – i.e., to find a buyer in this capitalist class. (Marx, 1963, p. 203)

Marx thinks that considering the parties involved in the contract free would be faulty. While one party owns the means of production and the other is obliged to sell his labor to survive, building a counterbalanced relation between the two is impossible. Capitalism weakens the worker's bargaining power with the reserved army of unemployed and the necessity to work to maintain one's life. The absence of power balance indicates the dominating factors of the contract. As the labor leader George

McNeill puts it, “workers in a labor contract ‘assent but they do not consent, they submit but do not agree’” (as cited in Gourevitch, 2013, p. 596).

For most of the working class, the threat of unemployment and the urgency of economic concerns reveal the freedom problem of the labor contract. However, in some branches of economic activity, the problem of labor contracts may not be apparent at first sight in some historical conditions. For example, today, with the industry's changing dynamics, workers in the software business do not feel the urgency of the freedom problem for a labor contract. There is not a plenitude of qualified labor force around the world as capitalists wish in that field. For that reason, workers in the information technologies sector get relatively better payments. Also, mobility of workers is high because they do not feel obliged to work in the same place for years if they do not feel happy enough. These conditions entail an illusion for information technologies (IT) workers. Most of them believe that they are not part of the proletariat and are a free labor contract party. However, considering IT workers' relatively advantaged situation as a temporary historical contingency rather than a structural assurance would be more accurate. Since capitalism excludes centralized planning, the labor supply falls short for some sectors at some periods. However, it does not take so long to eliminate the relatively advantaged position for workers and the relatively disadvantaged position for the capitalist. Governments set to regulation on behalf of capitalists in such a case. If needed, education policies change, or sectoral exhortations show up. Finally, those policies weaken the bargaining power of available workers more than filling the so-called empty positions in the industry. Because the policies aim to supply a workforce more than the industry's needs. For that reason, considering oneself as free from

domination in the labor contract would be unsound independent from the branch of economic activity. Workers should not be deceived by the illusion of a temporary, contingent, and relatively advantaged situation just as a slave serving to a master who possesses goodwill as a contingency.

One another problem of labor contracts is they are being incomplete. As Oliver Hart rightly puts it in his works, contracts are condemned to carry some ambiguousness due to incompleteness. “Actual contracts ... are poorly worded, ambiguous, and leaves out important things. They are incomplete” (Hart, 2017, p. 1732). Contracts are limited, and it is impossible to hold them broad to cover each possible moment and situation of work life. Each day, life produces conditions that are not entirely predictable and cannot fit into a labor contract. The question of who will be in charge of not fully predicted conditions is a key one. In a capitalist organization of work, the one who is in charge is indeed the capitalist. In situations that are not and cannot be covered in the labor contract, the continuation of the process is shaped by the capitalist. That makes a labor contract that enables one party to purchase another party rather than a mutual consent of determined rules. In such a case, the worker is subject to the capitalist's arbitrary will.

Additionally, this arbitrariness may even be irrelevant to the production process itself. For instance, on an occasion, the capitalist may come and invite everyone to a moment of silence for a specific political leader or event. In such a scenario, which the labor contract cannot cover, the worker may feel obliged to censor himself or act in accordance with the capitalist's political engagements. However, the reverse never occurs in capitalism. Apparently, such a work organization violates the requirements of neo-republican freedom. If a capitalist has the capacity to decide how and where to use

the labor force, he has the capacity to interfere with the productive activity of workers arbitrarily. This capacity itself is the deprivation of neo-republican freedom. Aside from the production processes, a capitalist and a worker are not equivalent from cultural, ideological, and political aspects. The asymmetric power relation and the dependency take the worker the confidence to look each other in the eye without fear, which is an expression of neo-republican freedom. Only free people can “look each other in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best” (Pettit, 2012, p. 84). That power imbalance also violates the general republican principle about political participation.

Capitalism produces domination both in the period of labor contract and production. “The employment contract creates the capitalist as master; he has the political right to determine how the labor of the worker will be used” (Weeks, 2011, p. 21). A worker cannot determine how to use his cultural background and qualities in work life. The authority is on the side of the party that purchases the laborer. A capitalist determines the tools, amount, methods, and the period of production. He may take into consideration the advice of managers or appoint someone to make decisions. The number of managers increases when the organization gets more complicated with the increasing capital and work capacity. However, eventually, no matter he is blue-collar or white-collar, everyone is a wage-laborer in this organization and dependent on the goodwill of capitalists. Marx (2007) defines gaining relatively higher wages as “better payment for the slave” (p. 153).

The main problem from the point of a wage-laborer is beyond the questions of which capitalist participates in the labor contract or how much wage is on the deal. A worker can be free to have a labor contract with this or that capitalist, but “in reality, the worker belongs to capital before he has sold himself to the capitalist. His economic bondage is at once mediated through, and concealed by, the periodic renewal of the act by which he sells himself, his change of masters and the oscillations in the market price of his labour” (Marx, 2004, p. 1106). Job changes or wage changes can be regarded only as the freedom to change the master from the worker's point.

3.4 Dependency in capitalism and the transformation of work

The main constituents of Marx’s alienation critic are the lack of determining power of workers in the production process and workers being in a position such as an object or a thing in the production process. Capitalism generates many problems in work life, such as wages, assurance, and exploitation. However, above them, the main problem is whether the worker is dependent on some alien power or enjoys self-determination. For this reason, the wage-laborers problem persists under any circumstances of capitalism, independent from the conditions of the labor contract.

Marx defines alienation in four aspects. It is mainly caused by the private property of the means of production. A production organization based on private property alienates the worker both to production processes and the production itself. Because of not controlling the production processes, the worker cannot add his character to the product. He cannot objectify his potential subjectivity on it. The product is the

objectification of some other subjectivity disconnected from the worker, which is the subjectivity of capital. Then, the worker becomes estranged from his species-being. This estrangement inevitably leads to being alienated from the other members of species-being, i.e., from other people. In short, Marx holds that estrangement to the product, production process, self, and other people constitutes the four aspects of alienation that come by capitalism.

Work has a repressing character for human potential under capitalist conditions, while it could have been a means for realizing human potential and leading to real freedom. In a communist society, the object of work can be “the objectification of man’s species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created” (Marx, 2007, p.144). That statement means that work is neither inherently repressive nor liberating. Solely the work that is practiced in a certain social structure can be liberating. It will be possible only through the transformation of production relations.

For Marx, the transformation of work is a necessity. However, Pettit thinks that “there is no particular threat to people’s freedom as non-domination associated with participation in the market” (as cited in Corvino, 2019, p. 107). The market economy does not harm freedom. He considers republican tradition as of the same mind as liberal and libertarian traditions with respect to market economy admire (Pettit, 2006, p. 134). Besides, the property system of the market economy is not in the scope of freedom or unfreedom. To be able to talk about violation of neo-republican freedom, there must be a subject that has the capacity to intentionally and arbitrarily interfere with the business of

some other subject. In this respect, Pettit makes a distinction between social freedom and outright freedom. In the scope of outright freedom, the factors that restrict the freedom are not intentional, like natural disasters, genetic disorders, or climatic changes. Such factors limit the possible range of areas to exercise freedom. However, since they are not intentional actions of a subject and not intersubjective relationships, they fall out of the scope of social freedom. Pettit regards the property relations of the market economy as similar to those natural restrictions. That system emerged as a result of the unintentional cumulative activity of individuals and groups throughout history. It does not mean one stands as an obstacle to another's freedom as non-domination only because he is more advantaged in life than the other. Therefore, the market economy itself is not an obstacle to freedom because it is not an agent (Pettit, 2006, p. 139).

On the other hand, just as natural factors, the market economy may lead to contingencies that result in domination relations. For example, the possible dangers of an imbalance between labor supply and the available positions for that labor in the market is a concern for Pettit, as well.

Suppose there are just a few employers and many available employees, and that times are hard. In those conditions I and those who like me will not be able to command a decent wage: a wage that will enable us to function properly in society. And in those conditions it will be equally true that we would be defenseless against our employers' petty abuse or their power to arbitrarily dismiss us. (Pettit, 2007, p. 5)

For that reason, there is a need for some steps to regulate the market. This regulation may be through taxation or some other government regulations. "Economic redistribution or restriction will be supported under a republican political theory, so far as material poverty or inequality is productive of domination" (Pettit, 2006, p. 141).

Pettit advocates the universal basic income right to prevent the potential domination relations resulting from economic inequalities. There have to be two main desiderata of any argument that advocates for universal basic income: “First is that of adequacy: the argument should establish a right to an intuitively adequate level of income. Second is that of independence: the argument should establish a claim to a nonnullifiable, nonstigmatizing basic income” (Pettit, 2007, p. 2).

By way of unconditional basic income, workers can have better bargaining power in labor contracts because they know the alternative is not starving. Also, they will have the option to quit when they feel under pressure during production. The basic income should be provided to each citizen as a right, rather than determining the ones in need. This way, people can get a basic income without being stigmatized.

[Without the universal basic income] we would be defenseless against our employers’ petty abuse or their power to arbitrarily dismiss us. Other protections, such as those that strong trade unions might provide, are possible against such alien control. But the most effective of all protections, and one that should complement other measures available, would be one’s ability to leave employment and fall back on a basic wage available unconditionally from the state. (Pettit, 2007, p. 5)

As Pettit argues, universal basic income may solve the economic problems resulting from unemployment. Pettit’s suggestion considers employment just with the financial aspect. However, the benefit of employment is not only the wage. Moreover, the right to work is not equal to the right to have an income. Marxists would argue that work is a means to self-realization and is not reducible to wage. However, even this argument is not embraced, empirical studies also falsify equating the work with income. When asked whether they would continue working or not if they had enough inheritance that lets them live without a need to work, 80 percent of people answered that they

would continue working (Work in America, 1973, p. 9). “Work plays a crucial and perhaps unparalleled psychological role in the formation of self-esteem, identity, and a sense of order” (Work in America, 1973, p. 4). So that, a threat of unemployment still would be a source of dependency. Since universal basic income cannot solve all the psychological benefits of employment, such as productivity.

Pettit makes a significant contribution to the literature by associating domination with freedom. However, he fails to detect the domination points in work life. He does not pursue the real implications of his account of freedom in the economic field. There is much more than the unconditional basic income needed to overcome the domination in work life. Labour republicans and workplace republicans also mention the same deficiency in Pettit’s analysis while keeping the republican motives.

Workplace republicanism is a concept developed by Nien-hê Hsieh to define his position. The main argument of this position is “even if there is no basic right to control productive assets, there is a basic right to protection against arbitrary interference at work” (Hsieh, 2005, p.117). Furthermore, to protect workers from arbitrary interference, a right to quit one’s place of work is not enough. There have to be additional institutionalized forms of protection (Hsieh, 2005, p.134). The quit option is not enough because there is another aspect of work that provides self-respect to workers. Moreover, Hsieh argues that some jobs are very firm-specific. For a person, who works in a firm-specific job, quitting may not be a reasonable option because she would lose some productivity in an alternative job. Hsieh defends an economic regime, in which workers participate in firms' governments via a right to contest managerial decisions.

Nevertheless, such a regime does not necessitate collective control of the means of

production (Hsieh, 2005, p. 138). It is still compatible with private ownership of productive assets.

On the other hand, as Alex Gourevitch (2013) lays down, in the 19th century, labor republicans argued for a cooperative model of production. In this way, republican freedom can come to life not just in the political sphere but also in the economic sphere. However, Neo-republicans hold that the unconditional basic income is sufficient for republican freedom to be realized. The exit option that comes from the security of basic income can satisfy the conditions for freedom. According to Gourevitch, neo-republicans fail to explain the economic field because of a missing concept, structural domination. This concept denotes the domination that is not rooted by a specific master but many masters. To put non-domination into practice and for a broader exercise of freedom, structural domination should be abolished. This abolishment will be through a transformation that enables workers to have control over productive assets.

Labor republicans hold that there are three contexts in which domination occurs for a wage-laborer. These are the power imbalance during labor contract, the capacity to interfere with the worker during the work process arbitrarily, and the structural domination (Corvino, 2019). I mentioned the first two in relation to neo-republicanism. The third context, structural domination, is the missing part in the neo-republican analysis of Roman slavery and today. In Roman slavery, the picture is described as follows: A slave lives in an order created and maintained by a social class of masters. The order is not just the product of his own master; it is the product of many masters. Laws and order maintain slavery, and there are specific applications to keep slaves enslaved. Punishing the slaves by law when they escape from the patronage of their

master, forbidding slaves from owning property, or setting free some of them to discipline others are some examples of institutional practices (Gourevitch, 2013, p. 601). In such an order, a slave is subject to domination not just by his master but many masters. The concept of structural domination fills this gap.

Similarly, a wage-laborer is subject to the structural domination of many capitalists and not just the single domination of his boss. The source of this structural domination is the unequal control power over productive assets. Ones who do not possess the property are dependent on others who own property to support themselves, work, and earn. “A reason for calling this structural domination is that the unfreedom of the laborer is not a product of his situation vis-à-vis a specific employer, but rather of his dependence on some employer or another for livelihood” (Gourevitch, 2013, p. 602). A wage-laborer lives under the domination of capitalists that defend and act to maintain the available property relations, just as a Roman slave living under the domination of masters who defend and maintain the laws of slavery.

The reason for Pettit to rule out structural domination is his approach to market relations as something natural and unavoidable. While explaining the difference between social freedom and outright freedom, he parallels the market economy and natural factors like environment, genetic, and climate (Pettit, 2006, p. 133). That is why he does not consider the market economy as a source of domination. However, drawing a parallel between the market economy and people’s way to meet natural factors like environment, genetic, and climate would be more accurate than natural factors themselves. To illustrate, suppose an earthquake, a natural factor that is beyond the human intention and will. A similar scenario can be applied to the market economy and

the regulations to be prepared for an earthquake. Not between the market economy and the earthquake itself. Alternatively, the fact that somebody borns into prosperity, while some other borns into poverty, is not similar to that of somebody born with genetic disorders, while others are born healthy. While part of the reason for borning into different economic conditions is social structure forces, the other part of that inequality is the people's intentional actions towards maintaining the available property laws. "Just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him" (Marx, 2007, p. 195). It is not an inescapable contingency of nature. Defending the available property laws and acting for its continuation may not include an intention to dominate a specific person. However, it is a willingness to force some indefinite people to live with structural domination.

Alienation is defined in the German Ideology as follows: "the fixation of social activity, the consolidation of our product as a real power over us, growing out of our control" (Marx, 1976, p. 12). Pettit's positing the market of somewhere over human will, somewhere similar to natural factors, evokes this definition of alienation. However, there is no a strong tie between those two because Pettit's mistake is a perceptual issue, while alienation is more than a point of view or an emotion. Marxist analysis of alienation is not something that someone can overcome by himself, by trying to change the point of view or trying to have a different mindset. It is an objective result of the objective conditions, and the only way to overcome alienation is to transform social conditions. The gap between the potential in society's forces of production and the realization of that potential gives us alienation (Wood, 2004, p. 45). It is the state of unrealized potentials rather than a subjective form of self-perception. In order to

overcome alienation, the social structure and the organization of work-life must have a transformation, just as the requirement to overcome structural domination.

For Marx, freedom can only be actualized when one has control over processes and means of production. “Obtaining control over the conditions of one’s life and subjecting them to a conscious, rational plan” (Brenkert, 1979, p. 82) is a development of one’s freedom. Also, obtaining control over conditions requires being aware of necessities and working to fulfill them. Additionally, work is not a break to freedom, and freedom is not just experienced during leisure. Work is a way to actualize freedom.

Marx (1993) puts it in the following way:

Certainly, labour obtains its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity - and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits - hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. (p. 611)

For freedom, a person needs certain working conditions to objectify his relations, attitudes, and activities. Thus, work is not intrinsically favorable and liberating, and it is not necessarily oppressive and wicked. Analysis changes according to the conditions of work. In history, work has always been external forced labor and a repellent obligation in the forms of slave-labor, serf-labor, and wage-labor (Marx, 1993, p. 611). However, another form of work is possible. In a society that is organized in a way to let human potential flourish, labor would become life’s prime want (Marx, 2009a, p. 531).

As seen, Marx praises the work in communist society and associates it with freedom. If such, it can be expected from him to defend work to dominate life

quantitatively. However, Marx does not argue that one is liberated as much as he works in a communist society. He defends the transformation of work to make it the means of freedom, and at the same time, he defends limiting the time spent on work. "... the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite" (Marx, 1981, p. 820).

This paragraph is often quoted by some Marx scholiasts, who think that Marx is a pessimist about work, and he advocates the minimization of work hours as much as possible. On the other hand, developmentalist socialist movements that praise work often quotes the passages that mention the association between labor and freedom and self-realization. However, I think the passages that lead to contradictory interpretations can be reconciled without contradiction.

Marx's attitude towards work is neither an attempt to minimize its area as much as possible nor an attempt to make it the primary component and the dominating power of each sphere of life. It is more accurate to consider work and leisure as feeding each other rather than contradicting concepts. Work is the moment of objectifying the subjectivity of a person. On the other hand, leisure is the duration of constructing subjectivity. That is to say, leisure is the interval in which the aggregation to be objectified is accumulated. To be able to objectify something, there is a necessity for gaps to collect something and construct the subjectivity, rather than uninterrupted work. "Free time - which is both idle time and time for higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject" (Marx, 2009a, p. 11). This understanding

solves the contradiction on the surface. So, work is both a liberating activity and something to be shortened.

The shortening of the workday is a request for a free society in a Marxist sense. Similarly, it is also a prerequisite for the classical republican accounts. The intense work life is a severe obstacle for citizens to political participation in capitalist societies (White, 2011, p. 16). Pettit does not consider political participation itself an expression of freedom like the Aristotelian tradition, mainly represented by Hannah Arendt. He attributes a role to the citizen to follow politics, monitor the republic, and contest when necessary, rather than being an active decision-maker and administrator. “There is a need to guard against the corruptibility of human beings: ... most people ... are capable of being corrupted if they are exposed to powerful temptations” (Pettit, 2002b, p. 278). In this respect, political activity is not directly the freedom itself; it is just one of the assurances to protect the conditions of freedom for Pettit.

Eventually, as Marx predicts, the communist collectivization of work and society works out both the problem of exploitation and domination in a neo-republican sense. As labor republicans put it, the actualization of freedom as non-domination in the economic sphere is only possible by transforming people’s control over assets and processes of production. Those two show that the idea of freedom as non-domination and Marxist ideals converge at some point. The two sides’ concepts point to a similar future: Non-domination, non-dependency, and references to master and slave relations on the neo-republican side; and self-realization, self-determination, overcoming alienation, and masterlessness on the Marxist side. The difference lies in the methods to actualize those ideas.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This thesis has two main arguments. The first claim asserts that neo-republican freedom is indeed a form of positive freedom. Because, while the idea of freedom as non-domination mentions the existence of external dominating power, there is an implicit emphasis on internal fears, anxieties, and the feeling of being inspected for the same idea. That psychological aspect partially determines the case of freedom, and it can subsist even when there is no dominating subject. One possible reason can be internalized ideologies or cultural values for that. Some ideologies or natural tendencies may result in people positing themselves as inferior to others. Those people may submit their will to another person or group and may demand a dependent relationship. In such cases, subjects may feel subject to domination, even when there is no dominating subject around. So, it is necessary to avoid practices that could reproduce ideologies associated with domination in every decision and action. Also, one must build his self based on being equal to others. In this respect, neo-republican freedom includes substantial positive freedom implications. The conceptual negativity in the expression of freedom as non-domination is not enough to categorize this account of freedom as a form of negative freedom. If such a linguistic analysis were sufficient, we would express each form of freedom as a triadic relation, like MacCallum states. However, mere linguistic and logical analysis is insufficient while discriminating different accounts of freedom.

The second claim of the thesis asserts that neo-republican freedom necessitates a communist society and is not compatible with the market economy. In a market economy, being forced to sell one's labor and being dependent on a capitalist's arbitrary will are some sources of domination. Pettit detects some potential conditions for domination in economic life and posits himself as an advocate of redistribution. However, his analysis misses some crucial notions. The problem with the market economy does not only consist of the insecurities during labor contract and production. The primary source of domination is being dependent on another's will to use one's labor force. The relation between a capitalist and worker includes domination inevitably. The actualization of neo-republican freedom requires the transformation of work and the annihilation of private property over means of production. This is the transformation that Marx underlines. Freedom as non-domination can be experienced broader in a classless society, where people have equal power in work organization. For this reason, considering neo-republican freedom as an idea encapsulated by Marxist ideals would be more accurate than positing them over against. Neo-republican freedom is like a subset of Marxist freedom. Because it necessitates masterlessness and a degree of self-realization, i.e., constructing the self with the confidence to look into the eyes of others. In a similar vein, Michael J. Thompson (2019) evaluates Marx's critics of capitalism as a radical expression of republicanism (p. 2). However, my argument is not that comprehensive. I do not talk about republicanism in the broad sense and all of its implications. The arguments here only focus on the neo-republican formulation of freedom. In this respect, Marx's ideas can be read as a radical expression of neo-republican freedom, but nothing more, because neo-republicans have uncompromisable ideas on the state's role with Marxism. While one side considers the state as the

executive of fair laws, as a neutral referee, the other, Marx, thinks that the state is an apparatus for class oppression. These two approaches are antipodes, and it is not possible to reconcile them. However, when it comes to freedom, Marxism and neo-republicanism employ cognate terminologies. “Marx’s concept of freedom is absolute: man ought to be freed from all kinds of alienation, oppression, exploitation, estrangement, and domination” (Selucky, 1979, p. 81). Furthermore, Pettit’s concept of freedom is being free from domination. That is to say, Pettit’s account of freedom is not a sufficient condition but a necessary condition for Marx’s account of freedom.

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