

T.C.
ANTALYA BİLİM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION
GLOBAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THESIS PROGRAM

**AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD
WAR**

DISSERTATION

PREPARED BY
ALIJON ALIEV

ANTALYA - 2021

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ÖZET

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana Rusya, Batı ile dostane ilişkiler kurmak veya kurmamak arasında gidip gelmiştir. Bu nedenle Rusya'nın Batı'ya yönelik dış politikası birçok kez değişmiştir. Rusya'nın, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile ilişkilerini yönlendiren ideolojilerdeki baş döndürücü değişikliklere rağmen ABD'nin Rusya'nın değişen dış politikasına nasıl dahil edildiğini ve tasvir edildiğini gösteren çok az çalışma bulunmaktadır. Bu tez, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği'nin (SSCB) çöküşünden sonra ABD'ye yönelik Rus dış politikasını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Akademik çalışmalar, Rus hükümetinin dünya üzerindeki etkisini artırmayı hedeflediğini öne sürmektedir. Bu çalışma sonucunda, Rus dış politika stratejisinin ABD'yi bölgesel nüfuz alanından uzak tutmak ve Batı ile güç dengesini korumak için dünyada daha etkili bir güç haline gelmek olduğu görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, ABD, Vladimir Putin, Rusya-ABD ilişkileri, Dış Politika

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has switched back and forth between harboring friendly and non-friendly relations with the West. Therefore, its foreign policy towards the West has changed multiple times. Despite the head-turning changes in the ideologies which has driven Russia's relations with the United States of America (USA), few studies have examined how the USA is included and portrayed in Russia's changing foreign policy. This thesis aims to analyze the Russian foreign policy towards the USA after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The study suggests that the Russian government is aiming to increase its influence over the globe. Russian foreign policy strategy is to keep the US out of its regional territory and raise its own influence to keep balance of power with the West.

Keywords: Russia, USA, Vladimir Putin, Russia-USA Relations, Foreign Policy

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	:	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AIIB	:	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APC	:	Agreement of Partnership and Cooperation
APEC	:	Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBC	:	Cross-Border Cooperation
CCT	:	Council of Cooperation Treaty
CIS	:	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	:	Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAEU	:	Euro Asian Economic Union
EU	:	European Union
FDI	:	Foreign Direct Investment
G20	:	Group of Twenty
G8	:	Group of Eight
GHG	:	Green House Gas
IMF	:	International Monetary Fund
MD	:	Missile Defense System
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	:	Northern Dimension
NDB	:	New Development Bank
NDC	:	Nationally Determined Contribution
OECD	:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE :	Objective Structure Clinical Examination
PDVSA:	Petroleos de Venezuela
PRC :	Partnership, Relationship and Cooperation Treaty
RIC :	Russian India China Trilateral Grouping
SDN :	Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
SFOR :	The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SPIPA:	Strategic Partnerships for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement
TACIS:	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TGNFC:	Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation
TLSC :	Total Link System Chart
UAE :	United Arab Emirates
UK :	United Kingdom
UN :	United Nations
UNFCCC:	The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC :	United Nations Security Council
USA :	United States of America
USAID:	United States of America Aid Organization
USSC :	United States Security Council
USSR :	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB :	World Bank
WMD :	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO :	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the late 20th century, the victory of the USA and its allies in the Cold War which had lasted almost half a century led to the collapse of the last powerful “Empire”. This signified the end of one of the two pillars of the bipolar global order created in the second half of the twentieth century and the world transformed into a unipolar system under the USA hegemony. It was a seismic upheaval that ushered in fundamental global changes and sparked a slew of unresolved conflicts (Lukyanov, 2018, p. 123).

The new state that emerged after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation was a state with a new political ideology. Ambrosio (2017, p. 1) mentions that the changes made by Mikhael Gorbachev in the USSR’s foreign and domestic policies had played a large part in its collapse. So, with the establishment of a new state, the ideology which had guided Moscow since the takeover by the communists in 1917 vanished with little to replace it. Russia’s domestic policies as well as its foreign policies required radical adjustments as the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism could no longer serve as its guiding principles (Ambrosio, 2017, p. 1).

As it attempted to define a new political ideology and foreign policy for itself, Russia had a number of options to choose from. It could choose the “bandwagon” (join the hegemonic alliance that surrounds the USA, therefore solidifying USA unipolarity), “balance” (build an anti-hegemonic coalition to challenge the USA’ dominance), “transcend” (overcome structural anarchy through international institutions), or “hide” (isolate itself from great power diplomacy, and content with dominating the former Soviet Republics in a new type of Monroe Doctrine) (Ambrosio, 2017, p.1).

During this initial time, both Russia and the West were hopeful that the fall of the Soviet power, the abolition of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the end of the Cold War would usher in a more peaceful world, one in which Moscow would cease to be a threatening adversary and instead become a cooperative member of the international community. However, this “honeymoon period in East-West ties” was short-lived. Within two years, it was clear that the previous optimism was misguided. Within Russia, support for close collaboration with the West dwindled, Russian foreign policy became more aggressive and nationalistic, and Moscow clashed with the West on a number of key topics (Marantz, 1997, p. 78).

In some cases, Russia’s powerful military gives it power over some lesser powerful states, leading to positive achievements. But in the case of more powerful states, such as the USA, Russia is faced with the negative consequences, for instance sanctions and embargos. Many states named Russia as a “Brown Bear”, an animal that is aggressive and attacks when it sees its victim (Genadevich, 2021, p. 35). Some scholars argue that Russian officials are primarily concerned with reclaiming Russia's status as a major power. Others say that Russian foreign policy is concentrated on maintaining Russia's position as the leading power in the post-Soviet area and fighting against foreign meddling in domestic issues (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 1).

Russia acts with a liberal point of view in some instances, by making agreements and signing treaties, but we can observe that Russia has used Geopolitics, Realism, Atlantism and Eurasianism, Pragmatism, and even Anti-Western perspectives to make their foreign policy during different time periods. Russia has powerful military capabilities, so it is easy for it to use hard power and in some cases act aggressively to achieve its goals. The realism strain of thinking on international politics is strongly established in Russian intellectual discourse, which impacts political leaders. Influential Russian academics who use their positions as specialists to influence Russian politics are rarely social constructivists lecturing Putin on the building of dangers, such as the relevance of nuclear weapons. They are mostly geopoliticians (the most notable of whom is Alexander Dugin) or historians (Natalya Narochnitskaya) who produce interpretations of Russia's history and place in the world that are unaffected by the Fourth Great Debate's methodological problems (Leichtova, 2016, p. 6).

The world, in the eyes of powerful persons in modern Russia, is more of a zero-sum game, a balance of power among geopolitical wholes, than a social construct. However, during President Yeltsin's administration, a significant number of Russian politicians (Prime Minister Primakov, General Lebed) were experienced Soviet leaders or military officials, and President Putin surrounded himself with a large number of military leaders who held prominent positions in his administration (Sergey Shoygu, Sergey Ivanov). Even these consultants and politicians are proponents of seeing international politics through the lens of realist ideas such as power balances, geopolitical centers, and spheres of influence (Leichtova, 2016, p. 6).

Within this context, the aim of this study is to examine, analyze and explain the changes in the Russian foreign policy since the end of Cold War, specifically towards the USA. The main research question is “Why did Russia's foreign policy towards the USA develop as it did during the different time periods since the end of the cold war?” The driving factors behind the changes in the Russian foreign policy towards the USA are analyzed through the theoretical perspectives of international relations like geopolitics, realism, pragmatism, and so on.

The study was conducted in a qualitative manner, with secondary data acquired through qualitative document and content analysis. To collect data from books, journals, newspapers, and speeches, this study uses discourse analytic techniques. The analysis will be based on remarks and comments from memoirs, academic literature, and journalistic sources. It is possible to object to such an analysis on the grounds that it is unclear if the reported views are true perceptions or simply politically motivated assertions about the circumstance. Memoirs and official declarations, on the other hand, are direct indicators of status conferral. Furthermore, the instances mentioned here do not serve as a comprehensive final test of the arguments made in the research, but rather as an illustrative or preliminary plausibility probe of the reasons for the changes in the Russian foreign policy towards the USA.

Because the research takes a qualitative approach, the data was gathered from resources such as academic articles from JSTOR, Websco, Taylor, and Francis, as well as reports and news from the Congressional Research Service, Foreign Policy documents, and governmental websites for comparing the differences in foreign

policies during the different eras. The information was gathered and examined via readings, expert analysis, reports, and official governmental acts. For the research, the gathered data was analyzed on the basis of realism and liberalism theories.

The data from the books, articles, and reports was first sorted into categories for data analysis based on the thesis draft. The data was initially evaluated in terms of how the Russian foreign policy towards the USA evolved after the Cold War. Next, the reasons behind these changes were evaluated using different theories by tracing the background and history of the relation between the USA and Russia and evaluating the different ideologies adopted by the different presidents of Russia for dealing with the USA. The data for the study was gathered from history, mostly from 1991 to the present, with events from the different eras in the foreign policy of Russia included and connected to the dissertation.

This dissertation has been split into four chapters consisting of thorough research on the Russian Foreign policy towards America. The first chapter of the study provides an introduction to the Russian foreign policy towards the USA in the post-Cold War world. This chapter also relates the research question of the thesis and the methodologies for analyzing and gathering data for the research. The second chapter of the dissertation examines the policymaking institutions in Russia and the impact of the Cold War on the Russian policies, and how they shifted after the cold war on the basis of existing literature on these topics. The USA-Russia ties are also discussed, and the changes in the Russian foreign policy, particularly towards the USA also come under discussion. The third chapter of the thesis covers all the different eras of the presidents since the end of the cold war and explains how the Russian foreign policy towards the USA was formulated during their tenures. There have been 3 different presidents during this time period with Putin holding office twice. So, the Russian foreign policy during these four tenures is explained in detail. The fourth chapter of the dissertation offers different ideologies that the Russian government seemed to have employed during different eras to deal with the formulation of the foreign policy towards the USA. It also includes a number of theories which aim to analyzes all the changes in Russian policy.

CHAPTER 2

THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD

2.1. Dynamics, Instruments, and Institutions of Russian Foreign Policy

Not only did the year 1991 signal the end of another empire—the final one—but it also signified the end of one of the two pillars of the bipolar global order created in the second half of the twentieth century. It was a seismic upheaval that ushered in fundamental global changes and sparked a slew of unresolved conflicts (Lukyanov, 2018, p. 123). The state that came into being as a result of this war, Russia's foreign policy changes are critical due to its strategic location in the center of Eurasia, its history of territorial expansion and high goals, and its nuclear arsenal. The manner in which Russia interacts with foreign actors has a significant impact on the organization of the post-Cold War international arena (Ambrosio, 2017, p. 1).

Apart from possessing an arsenal of nuclear weapons, Russia's geographic position makes it impossible to ignore it. Russia's territory spans two continents, and when it comes to the Northern Hemisphere's dominance in the international system, the globe cannot be turned in any direction without excluding Russia: the problems of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific regions, and the Arctic are all visible from Russia's borders and within Russia's security and economic reach. Thus, the sphere of Russian interests is spatially arranged “naturally” throughout the bulk of the Northern Hemisphere. The territory's distinctive size and historical development contribute to its cultural uniqueness and again, the importance of its policies towards other states in the world (Leichtova, 2016, p. 18).

Understanding the nature of policymaking in Russia is challenging due to the Russian government's opaque and personalized nature. The president is the most significant individual in charge of Russian foreign policy, though he does not make or define policy alone. Observers are disputed on the degree and form of authority among Russian foreign policy decision makers but are usually unable to pinpoint the

policymaking process. Nonetheless, researchers have identified important organizations, persons, and interactions in Russian foreign policymaking (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 2).

On one hand, Russian foreign policy decisions are made through a combination of official institutions, and on the other hand, personal or informal ties that overlap and sometimes override more formal institutional procedures (Ledeneva, 2013). Security and defense organizations in Russia have historically played a large influence in domestic and foreign policies (Pallin, 2007, p. 2). Informal and small group decision making appears to be dominant in certain contexts and for particular problems; in others, politicians dominate policy through formal institutions and committees. Businesspeople, state-owned company executives, and religious or cultural icons have all been accused or recorded of being engaged in foreign policy decisions (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 2).

The president is engaged in all important decisions and policy formulations under Russia's centralized presidential administration, and he retains substantial influence and decision-making. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense are two important policymaking organizations, and the Russian diplomacy is supposedly carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, increased military capabilities have aided in the endorsement and implementation of a more militaristic foreign policy during the previous decade (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 2).

2.1.1. Presidential Administration

Bowen and Welt (2021, p. 3) mention that the presidency is the most powerful branch of Russia's centralized government, and the presidential administration is in charge of both domestic and foreign policies (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 3). The Presidential Foreign Policy Directorate is responsible for giving the information and analytical and organizational support for the foreign policy and international relations activities of the President and Presidential Executive Office. It is also responsible for the content of foreign policy events in which the President takes part (Presidential Executive Office subdivisions, n.d.).

2.1.2. Security Council

The Security Council, which is technically part of the presidential administration but functions mostly independently, is in charge of most of the national security and foreign affairs (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 4). The Security Council is in charge of formulating high-level policies, such as the National Security Strategy, as well as

providing analytical support to the Presidency. It also has official meetings where members debate policies and settle disagreements (Galeotti, 2019). Although the Security Council's stated function is to coordinate, monitor, and mediate among various security and intelligence agencies and stakeholders, observers and analysts say that the council also plays a more political role by originating, influencing, and guiding policies (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 4).

2.1.3. Intelligence Agencies

A large role in the policymaking in Russia is played by its intelligence agencies. They are active and powerful, and their relative strength and influence are frequently determined by their heads' strong personal relationships with the president and other officials. Four main agencies are responsible for collecting foreign intelligence. These are the Federal Security Service (FSB), Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU, commonly referred to as the GRU), Federal Protective Service (FSO), and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) (Bowen & Welt, 2021, p. 5).

2.2. Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War

From historical perspective, if we look at USSR, it was a great power when the world had a bipolar system. Two great powers; USA and USSR were competing between each other in order to get the Hegemon title. From competition, these two states switched to the Cold War, which lasted almost 50 years. USSR collapsed in 1991 and we saw the end of the Cold War, with the victory of the USA. Since 1991 the history started to record a new political and international order under the USA hegemon, and the world became unipolar. The fall of the USSR was a plainly beneficial event for the West—the USA and its allies—since it ushered in “a new world order”—one in which Western countries had not only a political but also a moral right to organize the world as they saw fit (Lukyanov, 2018, p. 387).

Lukyanov (2018, p. 387) says that no new order had been established, according to Russia's perspective, which became stronger over time. What little of the prior order survived gradually disintegrated. The international system descended into disorder as its institutions deteriorated, despite the fact that they had been relatively successful in the previous century but were unable to adapt to new-century circumstances. All attempts to establish a "centralized" or "unipolar" global governing structure have failed.

Casier (2006, p. 387) deduces that Russia's post-communist foreign policy has never been a model of clarity and consistency. Russian diplomacy has a history of speaking in a variety of voices and is difficult to decipher. Russian diplomacy was extremely sectionalized, particularly during Yeltsin's rule (Lo, 2002, p. 5). This is owing to the large number of individuals involved in foreign policymaking, all of whom have competing interests and goals (Timmermann, 1999, p. 1008). This is partly owing to the political environment in which post-communist foreign policy arose, which included both ideological and power struggles. Russian foreign policy was at its most perplexing during the late Kozyrev years, when liberal reformers were under growing pressure (Casier, 2006, p.387). Nevertheless, Russia's foreign policy has steadily developed a growing degree of continuity (Lynch, 2001), particularly after 1996 when Primakov took office.

The Russian foreign policy is divided into four phases on the basis of the Presidents that have served in the office since 1991. The reason for naming these time periods after the president at that time is due to the Russian Federation's strong executive presidency, which concentrates decision-making authority in the hands of the president and his close aides, notably in terms of foreign policy. The presidency, which controls all other institutions and allows the occupant to manage with a strong hand, is a critical focus for understanding how Russian foreign policy is formulated (Roberts, 2017, p. 3). The first phase in the Russian foreign policy is the Yeltsin era, the second one is Putin-1 era, the third is Medvedev, era and the fourth one is Putin-2 era. In these four phases, the Russian foreign policy was changing gradually and step by step they got a new power.

The first Russian president, who came to power, was Boris Yeltsin. He was a pro-Western leader; his ideology was westernized and mostly his foreign policy was focused on that area. Russia's goal during this time was to erase all signs of Cold War antagonism and gain complete Western backing by showing that the new Russian state was fundamentally different from its Soviet forerunner. The Russian government wanted to show that, unlike the USSR, it would not seek unilateral gain by allying itself with anti-Western groups. It would completely collaborate on issues of great importance to the West, such as Iraq's discipline and the containment of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Marantz, 1997, p. 80).

Boris Yeltsin, Russia's new president, and Andrei Kozyrev, his foreign minister, thought that the new Russia needed to embrace a Western-style growth model defined by

democracy and capitalism (Tsygankov, 2006, p. 56). According to Fukuyama, the new administration claimed that Russia had no alternative to Westernization and that it should abandon geopolitical ambitions in favour of democratisation, which is based on non-confrontational interactions between nations. The liberal government viewed their nation as a component of Western culture, which the Soviet state had "erroneously evolved" into backwardness and authoritarianism (Kozyrev, 1995, p.16).

Russian foreign policy in 1992 could hardly have been better from the perspective of the West. Moscow backed drastic reductions in nuclear weapons and signed the "START II" Treaty to achieve them. At the United Nations, Russia was helpful, refraining from using its Security Council veto, and even voting in favour of Western plans for economic penalties on rump Yugoslavia in May 1992 to punish it for assisting Serbian expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite Russia's historic connections to Serbia and considerable support in the Russian legislature for Serbia, Moscow voted in favour of the sanctions. This was done to show that Russia had firmly abandoned Soviet foreign policy's anti-Western manoeuvring and could now be relied on as a constructive participant in the post-Cold War international system's construction (Marantz, 1997, p. 80).

The liberal idea of national interests was unique, as Russian leaders had never been so eager to deconstruct the authoritarian imperial state, or so critical of their previous practises, or so sympathetic of the West. For liberals, it was not sufficient for Russia to aspire to good ties with the West; Russia needed to assimilate into the West. Even Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR's final president and a social democrat, did not go as far as Yeltsin. Gorbachev received many plaudits in the West for his "New Thinking", since his foreign policy emphasised peaceful ties and mutual respect between governments (Tsygankov 2006, 60). Gorbachev believed, however, that Russia should remain an autonomous socialist state with its own national interests, despite the fact that Russia shared interests with other nations (Tsygankov 2006, p.61).

Yet Yeltsin and Kozyrev maintained that there was no alternative to Western-style growth and that non-Western culture could not provide a superior alternative to liberal government (Tsygankov 2006, p.61). Until 1993, Russia's liberal government was a staunch backer of the West's European security agenda. Russia made no objections to NATO's Eastern European expansion. Moscow even joined the West's campaign against

Yugoslavia, condemning the Serbs for atrocities committed against Muslims during the Balkan War (Tsygankov 2006, p. 71).

Additionally, the Kremlin did not reject a resolution of the United Nations Security Council sanctioning the use of military force against Yugoslavia (Tsygankov 2006, p.71). In 1999, Moscow and Washington signed the START II arms control treaty, which reduced Russia's nuclear arsenal by half and eliminated all land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with multiple warheads, while the USA retained its warheads in submarines (Donaldson & Noguee 2002, p.193). For the first time in history, Russia was willing to give up a significant portion of its strategic weapons in exchange for allowing the USA to retain its own.

This honeymoon phase was short lived. Russian lawmakers and foreign policy specialists began to voice their disapproval of Russian foreign policy by 1992 (Marantz, 1997, p. 81). The rising chorus of opposition to Kozyrev and Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy emanated throughout the Russian political spectrum. The Eurasianists argued for a more independent foreign policy from the West. While the Eurasianists were not anti-Western, they emphasized the necessity of preserving Russia's freedom of action and protecting Russia's national interests, even if doing so causes discomfort in the USA or other Western nations (Marantz, 1997, p. 81).

Boris Yeltsin's Russia had no cohesive foreign policy and no global strategy as a result of the abrupt collapse of the USSR. Its foreign policy, like its domestic policy, was divided between those who hoped for a revival of, if not the USSR, then at least Russia's standing as a regional Great Power, and those who turned to the West for help and direction in converting Russia into a more European country. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who looked to be always looking out for Russia's national interest, exemplified the former viewpoint. Yevgeni Primakov, his immediate successor, shared the latter viewpoint (Petro, 2018, p. 306). Then E.M. Primakov came to power and took over as head of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russian foreign policy was dubbed "Romantic Period" during the Kozyrev era, but "Pragmatic Period" during the Primakov era.

Casier (2006, p. 387) mentions that when Primakov became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996, Russia was in the midst of a long-running crisis. The financial situation was dire. Russia was confronted with a variety of domestic dangers, ranging from

independence to terrorism. Furthermore, it was apparent that Russia's influence on global events was limited. Without Russian involvement, the EU and NATO enlargements were about to be determined. Fears were rising that Russia might find itself cut off from the rest of the world, losing total control over international events. As a result, Russia's fear of isolation became one of the most significant guiding principles in its foreign policy (Stent and Shevtsova, 2002, p. 127).

Casier (2006, p. 387) further writes that Primakov devised a new foreign policy strategy in this setting. In basic terms, Primakov's foreign policy philosophy may be summarised as follows; the goal was to restore Russia's status as a major power. To achieve this goal, Russia's national interests must be constantly observed. The aim is based on the concept of a multipolar world. International affairs will be controlled by a small group of equal-status major powers. Primakov emphasised the pragmatic nature of his trinity-based foreign strategy. Despite the fact that he bases his approach after Gorchakov, he recognises that the 19th century's great power politics and imperial mentality are a thing of the past. As a result, a balanced approach to national interests is required. Russia must fiercely protect its interests, but not at any expense. Rather of fighting, it should seek collaboration (Casier, 2006, p. 387). According to Primakov, 'There are no continuous adversaries, but there are constant national interests,' as he puts it. (Goble, 1998)

In the later part of 1999, Boris Yeltsin retired from his position and promoted Vladimir Putin to the presidency position. Putin's election completely transformed Russia's status in the international arena. The state was led by a leader with Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnost (KGB) - now the Federal Security Service (FSB) expertise, and the framework of the country's foreign policy began to take form as a result of this. When Putin took office, he mostly continued to follow the same foreign policy strategy. He reaffirmed the goal of transforming Russia into a big power, stating that "Russia's potential as a great power has not diminished" (Putin, 2000). He also agreed that developing a foreign policy based on the country's national interests should be a top priority. As Primakov did, he emphasised the importance of doing so in a realistic and balanced manner. Russia should distinguish between "zones of essential interests," while also respecting the independence of other nations (Casier, 2006, p. 388).

Casier (2006, p. 388) adds that despite an international situation that was not favourable to pragmatism, the Russian Federation's Concept of National Security (Kontseptsiya, 2000) confirmed the three pillars of the Primakov foreign policy approach — great power status, multipolarity, and the national interest. Russia's ties with the USA and Western European nations were particularly strained in 1999. NATO expanded to the east, taking Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary with it. At the same time, the Alliance approved a new Strategic Concept, opening up new possibilities for actions outside NATO's borders. The Kosovo crisis was the third incident that occurred after that. NATO made the decision to engage independently in Serbia. After all, Russia, Europe's largest military force, was not participating. The events of 1999 established a consensus among the Russian elite about the necessity for a more aggressive national interest-based foreign policy and dealt the liberal Westernizers a last blow (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000, p.79).

Casier (2006, p. 389) analyses that Putin can be seen to have continued and even advanced pragmatism beyond Primakov. He expressed concerns and, without a doubt, he assertively pursued national interests, but he also sought to avoid diplomatic action impeding dialogue with the West. Putin reaffirmed his pragmatic foreign policy stance during his re-election campaign on 14 March 2004: 'Russia will not allow itself to be drawn into conflict or aggressive ways of achieving its national objectives. We would exercise pragmatism and seek compromises that would benefit both us and our partners.' (Putin, Emerson, 2004, p. 13).

Casier (2006, p. 389) further adds that gradually, it became clear that, while Putin did not fundamentally alter Primakov's foreign policy scheme, he began to shift the emphasis in two critical ways. Initially, the concept of multipolarity faded into the background, gradually being supplanted by references to multilateralism. Given that the latter is a more apolitical, less ideological concept, this development may be interpreted as a further step toward pragmatism. Instead of opposing the USA hegemony, the emphasis is now on increasing Russia's engagement in international affairs. Second, and perhaps most significantly, Putin made Russia's integration into the global economy a top foreign policy objective. Foreign policy economization was not a novel concept. Primakov also emphasised the importance of restructuring the Russian economy in order

to bolster Russia's international standing. However, under Putin, the economization of foreign policy reached unprecedented levels.

Former Foreign Minister Ivanov (2002, p. 141) states in *The New Russian Diplomacy*: 'The central objective of Russian foreign policy has been and continues to be to create the optimal external conditions for continued domestic transformation that strengthens the government, improves the economy, and improves the well-being of Russian citizens.' Russia's active economic diplomacy has as its primary objective the integration of the Russian economy into the global economy. Putin's goal was to raise the Russian influence in the global politics and turn Russia into one of the powerful states. Instead of following the USA policy, he wanted to create a new policy and power. The purpose was to show the power of the Russian Federation in front of the other states. As many states had pro-Western politics, Putin wanted to get their attentions and shift their policies to the Russian side. Of course, it was not through straight and formal actions. Putin demonstrated the Russian military power, their capabilities, and economic spheres to the underdeveloped states (Levchenkov, 2019, 236).

From 2008 to 2012, the president of Russia was Dmitry Medvedev, and during his presidency the West was relatively more comfortable to have a relationship with Moscow. When he was elected President in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev made it clear that Russia's foreign and security policies would remain largely unchanged under his watch. However, his administration was launched by two security concerns that had previously been dismissed as pure speculation: the Russia-Ukraine war in South Ossetia, and the "energy wars" (the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict) (Sergunin, 2016, p. 157).

A crisis in the Russian foreign policy towards the USA brought Georgian war in 2008 was when Russian military attacked the Georgian soldier in North Ossetia. It was a land dispute between Georgia and Ossetia, while the problem turned out to be military confrontation and Russia responded it asymmetrically. It was during Medvedev presidency, while both parties wanted to make a new stage in the relationships. In 2008 Russia, had a new leader; Dmitry Medvedev and the USA also had a new president; Barak Obama. So, both states came to the point that they should make 'Reset' in their foreign policies towards each other. But this policy didn't last long, due to the Ukrainian crisis. When Russia involved in the Ukrainian internal issues, USA political actors claimed it

brought partners to the critical stage. Especially when Russia annexed Crimea, this was the end of 'Reset' relations and the start of economic sanctions (Sergunin, 2016, p. 157).

In August 2008, Georgia entered North Ossetia's territory and wanted to annex it into Russian territory. The Russian president was Dmitry Medvedev. When Georgia launched an attack on South Ossetia and the Russian troops stationed there in August 2008, the Russian government was forced to conduct the first-ever full-scale peace enforcement operation in its post-Soviet history, compelling Georgia to return to the status quo. Even though Russian military doctrine had anticipated the potential of a short-armed confrontation, it was obvious that the Russians were unprepared for such an operation. Redeploying troops from North Ossetia to South Ossetia took a lengthy time. (Sergunin, 2016, p. 157). However, in a short time period, Russia forced Georgian military to put step back. After this incident, the world saw the power of Russia. The image of the Russia started to rise; Moscow started to be important to the Western states. On the one hand, the West started to respect and considers Russia as a partner. On the other hand, it was a threat for them to have such a big and powerful neighbour. Russia is not powerful through economic perspective, but in terms of military power, Russia is one of the powerful states in the globe. In the most cases, Russia uses hard power for its own favour which means it uses realism perspective in the foreign policy.

2.3. Russian-American Relations

Traditional yardsticks of influence in international politics for both Russia and the West were Russia's increasing GNP, energy resources, and military build-up. These were elements that were thought to improve Russia's status as a major power. International crises, as well as accompanying military and diplomatic activity, are generally more difficult to analyze (Forsberg, 2014, 323).

With the conclusion of the Cold War, the Russian Federation, the successor to the USSR, gained a fresh perspective on national priorities. Boris Yeltsin, Russia's new president, and Andrei Kozyrev, his foreign minister, both felt that the new Russia needed to adopt a democratic and capitalist growth model from the West (Tsygankov 2006, 56). According to Fukuyama, the new administration claimed that Westernization was the only option for Russia and that geopolitical ambitions should be abandoned in favor of democracy based on peaceful interactions between nations. When it came to Western culture, liberals argued that the USSR had "wrongfully evolved" (Kozyrev 1995, p.16)

their nation in the direction of stultification and totalitarianism. Because of this, he felt that liberal principles like as democracy, free markets, and the protection of human rights were essential for Russia to go further in this direction (Kozyrev 1992, p.51).

The Westernizers relied on their "natural friends" in the West for moral and financial assistance in order to achieve this (Breslauer 2002, 157). Yeltsin wanted Russia to be a part of Western organisations like the EU, NATO, the IMF, and the G-7, therefore he implemented radical changes (Tsygankov 2006, 59). Liberals asserted that since the new world order was based on Western institutional predominance and economic interdependency, Russia should prepare for a decline in its great power status. This was because the "community of civilised nations" (Kozyrev 1992 (2), 9-10) resolved their disputes without resorting to violence. National interests were redefined liberally for the first time since Russian leaders had never been so eager to destroy the authoritarian imperial state, or so critical of their own past actions and as pro-Western. Liberals argued that cordial ties with the West were not enough for Russia; it also needed to become an integral part of the West. Even the USSR's final president, social democrat Mikhail Gorbachev, did not go as far as Yeltsin. Gorbachev's foreign policy was hailed in the West as "New Thinking," since it aimed for peaceful ties and mutual respect among nations (Tsygankov 2006, p.60). And although while Russia had similar interests with other countries like the USA and Europe, Gorbachev insisted that Russia should remain an autonomous socialist state (Tsygankov 2006, p.61).

The non-Western culture could not provide a superior alternative to the liberal government structure, according to Yeltsin and Kozyrev (Tsygankov 2006, p.61). For a long time, Russia's liberal government backed the West's European security agenda. When NATO pushed into Eastern Europe, Russia made no protests (Tsygankov 2006, p.71). Even throughout the Balkan War, Moscow stood on the West's side against Yugoslavia and denounced the Serbs for their crimes against Muslims (Tsygankov 2006, p.71). On top of that, the Russian government did not object to the decision of the United Nations Security Council authorizing the use of force against Yugoslavia (Tsygankov 2006, p.71). It was signed in 1999 that the Russian nuclear arsenal was reduced in half, and all land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads were eliminated, while the USA retained its submarine-based weapons in place (Donaldson & Noguee 2002, 193). Russian President Vladimir Putin was ready to give up the bulk of his country's strategic weapons in exchange for allowing the USA to keep its own. Yeltsin

and Kozyrev had a pro-Western outlook, which meant that Russia's foreign policy goals were dependent on good ties with the West. Other nations, such as the former USSR and other non-Western countries, lost significance due to their reputations for being behind the times and authoritarian regimes that opposed Western ideals. Many Russian liberals agreed with Fukuyama, believing that non-democratic nations like China, which fell apart after the USSR, would do the same. Because of Moscow's criticism of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and of Beijing's backing for the anti-Gorbachev Moscow coup in 1991, ties with China were particularly strained (Tsygankov 2006, p.72).

As a result, ties between Russia and China were put on hold, and liberals in Russia even avoided meeting with Chinese government officials. In an effort to thaw ties, Kozyrev went to China in 1992, but the trip was fruitless since the two nations were at odds over human rights and "different approaches to some very important problems" (Bazhanov 1995, p.170). In terms of national security, Moscow aimed to keep its military presence abroad to a bare minimum. By encouraging international groups to take part in dispute resolution, the liberal administration was minimizing Moscow's responsibilities. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian soldiers withdrew and asked NATO to send peacekeeping forces in their place. Russia declined to intervene militarily when Chechnya proclaimed its independence from the USSR in 1991. (Tsygankov 2006, p.67). Furthermore, Moscow was unconcerned about the millions of ethnic Russians remaining in the former Soviet republics and the risk of an ethnic war arising from this. Similar peacekeeping troops from the UN or NATO may be stationed in regions prone to ethnic violence (Tsygankov 2006, p.71).

Kozyrev said that the USA was attempting to dictate Russia's relationship on its own terms and did not see his administration as an equal partner by the end of 1992, ties between Moscow and the West started to stagnate (Tsygankov 2006, p.67). More than that, despite Western financial assistance to Moscow and cooperation on many subjects, Russian liberals had far greater expectations from their relationship with the West. Even though the Yeltsin administration sought complete integration with the West, Moscow had made little headway toward NATO membership by 1992 and, despite its nominal participation in the enlarged G-8, Russia's official inclusion was only finalized in subsequent years, starting in 1994. The public support for liberal ideals also declined substantially, as shown by a survey showing a decrease in support for a US-style society from 32% in 1990 to 13% in 1992. (Sogrin 1996, p.32). Other research revealed a similar

shift towards societies modelled after the Japanese or the German ones (Sogrin 1996, p.32).

Yeltsin's liberal administration was accused by the Russian parliament of abandoning its traditional allies, the Serbs, in the Balkans, where the Supreme Soviet was severely critical of the government's pro-Western stance. December 1992 saw the Supreme Soviet adopt a resolution demanding sanctions against all warring parties and for Russia to use its veto against UN proposals for military involvement in the Balkans (Tsygankov 2006, p.74). In the same year, Russia refused to support UN sanctions on Yugoslavia and refused to allow Croatian peacekeepers to enter Sarajevo to help in a UN-mediated peace accord in that country (Tsygankov 2006, p.74). When NATO began airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs in 1994, domestic pressure increased. As a consequence, Yeltsin and Kozyrev were placed in an awkward position. The government in Moscow sought to avoid a political dispute with the West, which might have harmed the country's efforts to join the group of "civilised countries". However, their pro-Western ideas for Russia had fallen out of favor with the general people (Tsygankov 2006, p.75).

A stronger anti-Western opposition required a lot of concessions from the liberal administration. Yevgeny Primakov took over from Kozyrev at the end of 1995. Following statist thinking, Primakov moved the focus of national interest to Eurasia, the resurgence of Russia's global influence, and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in the former Soviet states. In other words, Russia's national interests shifted to include geopolitics. A big power strategy toward the rest of the world should reflect that, as Primakov put it: "Russia has been and remains a great power" (Donaldsen & Noguee 1998, p.119). Although Kozyrev's foreign policy was focused on Moscow's advocacy of 'rational' interests, Primakov was far more pragmatic when dealing with the West. They emphasized Russia's historical *Derzhava* status, which signifies keeper of the balance of power on the world stage (Tsygankov 2006, p.93). *Derzhavas* are characterized by their capacity to defend themselves against any possible aggressors, as well as their ability to protect their own interests and maintain their position of authority. Primakov claimed that Russia must serve as a counterbalance to the USA, which he accused of attempting to establish a unipolar global order, in order to restore balance to the distribution of power (Tsygankov 2006, p.95).

Moldova's instability and ethnic strife and NATO's expansion, which was fiercely resisted by Russian officials, spawned a new discourse. As many statist saw these actions

as showing a lack of concern or respect for Moscow's geopolitical interests, the NATO expansion strained ties between Russia and the West. Moscow believed that the West was using its weakness to increase its geopolitical dominance, and this influenced the statist's view of international affairs. Statists like Primakov, who subscribe to realism thinking, see NATO's growth as a danger to Russia's national interests. The development of liberalism and democratic peace, according to Westernizers, would have a significant impact on international affairs, but Primakov disagreed.

Contrary to popular belief, Primakov did not advocate that Russia should become antagonistic to the West but rather that Moscow should work together with the West on issues of common interest. He saw international affairs as a kind of realism great power rivalry. However, as Kozyrev argued, Moscow could not be merged with the West due to Russia's duty to maintain a fair distribution of power. When it came to non-democratic nations, statisticians had a different take than liberals. A multipolar global order, according to Primakov, requires Russia to reengage with the non-Western world and, if necessary, form counter-alliances against coalitions such as NATO. Primakov (Tsygankov 2006, p.95).

In order to implement this balancing strategy, Russia had to take advantage of conflicts that already existed inside Western nations or between the West and countries in the Muslim or Asian worlds. When it comes to international affairs, Russia must move away from a one-way focus on the West and instead develop multilateral ties with all important players in the international system, as Primakov himself puts it: China, India, and Japan are included in Russia's national interests, not simply those of the USA or Europe. The 'Third World' and the Middle East are also included. Russia will cease to be a great power if its geopolitical horizons are too narrow (Tsygankov 2006, p.95). As a result, during the Primakov period, relations between Russia and non-Western nations like China began to improve. In 1996, the two nations agreed to a "Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World Order and the Formation of a New International Order" (National Interests 2018).

Due to the widespread belief that NATO was rendered obsolete by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact's withdrawal at the conclusion of World War II, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was Russia's preferred means of achieving European security. As a result, NATO has ceased to serve its basic mission and has thus become obsolete. NATO's growth in 1994 showed, however, that the OSCE would not

be able to fulfil the role that Moscow had hoped for. Consequently, both Westernizers and statisticians saw NATO's eastward extension as a threat to Russian national security and a breach of the post-Cold War transformation's democracy and peace spirit (Macfarlane 1999, p.242).

Despite Primakov's verbal opposition, he recognized that Moscow had little power to stop NATO's expansion. This meant that Russia's approach was to minimize the harm that might be done, adjust to the new circumstances, and work to preserve its interests via diplomatic cooperation with the West. As a result of this agreement, Russia joined NATO as a full member of the Alliance in 1997. A significant diplomatic success for Moscow, Primakov said, was the treaty's inclusion of Russia in decisions and cooperative action on European security issues. Even if Primakov hoped for it, the Founding Act did not provide Russia the power to influence European security policy as the Balkan war subsequently proved (Tsygankov 2006, p.105). Russian ally Serbia was attacked by the West because of Russia's junior cooperation with the West, according to Tsygankov (2006, p.105). Believing that things might become worse, Yeltsin reluctantly agreed to the terms of the Balkan peace talks, despite his vehement opposition to the assault (Tsygankov 2006, p.105). As a result, NATO had already extended into the former USSR's Baltic nations — the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary — and planned to go much farther.

Relations between Russia and the West changed again when Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as president in 1999. After the Al Qaeda terrorist assault on the World Trade Center in September 2001, Moscow's view of national interests changed dramatically. Perceived threats to national security have altered due to the terrorist threat, with Putin seeing this threat emanating from non-state entities like Al-Qaeda rather than state-sponsored groups like NATO, as in the West and in Russia. Bush said that terrorism was "pure evil" and that the USA had to fight this danger as part of the new War on Terror, in which other countries were either "with us (the USA) [...] or you are with the terrorists" (The White House 2001).

Putin saw the danger of terrorism as a fresh chance to boost domestic support for Moscow's own war in Chechnya and improve ties with the West. Putin seized on the opportunity. Putin's new pragmatism in great power politics blended Westernist and Statist components as the global stage changed under the influence of such events. When it came to relations with other countries, Putin saw more possibilities than Primakov saw dangers in Russia's relations with the West. The new global order demanded that Putin's

Russia adjust to the fact that power was no longer only determined by military might, but also by economic measurements, in which countries vied for markets, investments, and geo-economic sway over others. Putin said it best: "It is widely recognized that international security encompasses far more than just military and political stability. It includes global economic stability, the eradication of poverty, financial stability, and the creation of an international dialogue across cultures (The Washington Post 2007).

Another significant difference between Putin and Primakov is that the new leader believes that economic influence must be used to protect Russia's national interests rather than military methods of power balance. By 2005, Putin had stated that Moscow's foreign policy priorities included membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Common Economic Space (CES) (Zank 2016, p.73). the Russian government set up an office to promote Russian influence in former Soviet countries via the energy industry, commerce, business, cultural connections, migration and language programs in the same year they set up its Russian influence department (Zank 2016, p.73). Putin, in contrast to Yeltsin and Kozyrev, was a conservative. The new Russian president saw his nation as a stand-alone superpower and had no desire to integrate it with the West. Following statist ideology, Putin placed an emphasis on bolstering state institutions and maintaining political stability at the expense of democratic growth (Tsygankov 2006, p.132).

When it came to ties with the West, Putin was able to win over both liberals and statist with his new vision for Russia's relationship with the West. For liberals, one of the president's main selling points was his support for economic growth. Because of Putin's ambition to expand the state and its capacity to project power, statist backed him. After the Balkans conflict soured ties with the West, the events of September 11 presented Putin with an excellent chance to mend fences with the West. It didn't take long for President Obama to respond, giving the USA full assistance for anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. It includes exchanging information, opening Russian airspace for humanitarian missions, participating in search and rescue efforts and unifying nations in central Asia to back US operations while equipping troops in Afghanistan's battle against Taliban insurgency (Tsygankov 2006, p.138). Russian-American relations hit a new high in February 2002 when the two countries signed a joint statement on energy cooperation. Russian oil exports of a million barrels a day will be allowed to continue for the next five years, according to an agreement reached between the two nations in May of this year

(New York Times 2002). According to The Economist, "America's ties with Russia are currently better than at any point since the conclusion of World War II and are improving" (Economist 2002).

Putin stressed the need of strengthening relationships with the EU as well as with the USA. This was crucial since the majority of Russia's energy markets were in Europe, which accounted for 55% of Russia's exports while just 5% of Russia's exports were to the USA (Tsygankov 2006, p.139). In terms of global security, Russia aligned itself more closely with Europe's major powers like Germany and France than the USA, as shown by its refusal to join the US-led invasion of Iraq. Putin proposed in 2003 that EU-Russia visas be phased out by the year 2006, according to Reuters (Tsygankov 2006, p.139). These attempts to strengthen ties with the West, on the other hand, were motivated by pragmatism. Moscow distrusted the EU's proposal for combined peacekeeping operations in the former USSR, such as Moldova, because of the limited collaboration on security concerns (Carnegie 2017). The Russian government shut down the Peace Corps program in the USA in 2003. (SFGATE 2003).

When President Bush took office in 2005, his top foreign policy priority was to promote democracy throughout the world. These measures made it obvious to Moscow that the War on Terror was not confined to combating terrorist organizations, and the promotion of liberalism wasn't exclusive to the Middle East alone. Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution ousted the previous governments and empowered the USA's policy in the former USSR as a result of corruption accusations (Tsygankov 2006, p.152). Aside from military intervention, these events gave the USA a chance to educate and fund regime change activists. The Kremlin saw this approach as failing to achieve its original goal of combating terrorism since terrorism was not a state-based issue. In this way, Moscow's response was similar to that of the country's response to US-backed political groups in the former USSR as a danger to its own area of influence (Tsygankov 2006, p.152). Russia, for example, put its support behind the regime's candidate when the West ramped up its support for pro-EU Viktor Yushchenko. The West was also critical of Moscow's strong ties to Belarus, Armenia, and central Asian nations, such as Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (Tsygankov 2006, p.153).

Realistically, Moscow had cause to believe that the West's policy of regime change in the post-Soviet area was motivated by geopolitical interests, which might have led to the expansion of the EU and NATO, as well as increased control over natural

resources in the region. As a result, the Kremlin has always been wary of Western attempts to oust it via humanitarian means. Foreign involvement may only be permitted by the UN Security Council, according to former Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov, who said that the "doctrine of humanitarian intervention" might undermine world order (Merzekho 2015, p.190). Russia and the West are still able to work together on areas of mutual interest notwithstanding diplomatic resistance.

Russia's drive for prestige has been a recurring theme in its foreign policy for a long time. Throughout history, the concept of great-poweriness has been seen as constituting the heart of Russia's state identity, including what we can see now (Clunan, 2009; Hopf, 2002; Oldberg, 2007; Omelicheva, 2013; Smith, 2012; Trenin, 2011). As Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov memorably declared in 1996 "Russia always was, is, and will be a great power,". Or as Neumann (1996) mentions that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2012) stated: "I am certain that Russia just cannot live as a subservient country." Status issues, in particular, play an important role in Russia's ties with the West, which has long been seen as Russia's major "other" (Forsberg, 2014, p. 323).

According to Jeffrey Mankoff (2007, p. 133), a Russia that is confident in itself and its place in the world is more likely to be a stable and dependable partner for the West. Stephen Cohen (2012) writes that the driving diplomatic premise must be acknowledgment of Russia's parity with the USA as a sovereign nation and legitimate great power. In most situations, these authors imply that acknowledging Russia's position as a major power would not be too difficult, because expressing respect is purely symbolic and does not need the sacrifice of any vital material interests (Forsberg, 2014, p. 324).

There are other scholars who believe that it is Russia's obligation to adapt its aspirations for status to the current conditions. Adomeit (1995, p. 65) argued that self-assured and self-confident governments would conduct logically, but Russia's foreign policy is characterized by numerous illogical, unexpected, and contradictory characteristics. According to Donald Jensen (2014), the US approach to Russia in 2013 was "very Russia-centered," supporting the Kremlin's illusion that Moscow is a global force equivalent to Washington (Jensen, 2014).

According to this more hard-line group of experts, the answer to resolving the status dispute is for Russia to abandon its hopeless goal to be a great power. Status politics, in fact, may create a self-reinforcing loop. When the West tries to make up for

actions that Russia says have harmed its standing by treating Russia with more respect and conferring higher status, it sends conflicting signals. When Russia feels that the West truly believes it deserves a better position, action that degrades Russia's status looks to be more deliberate and targeted at Russia (Forsberg 2014, p.324).

The relationship of Russia to its place in the world necessitates, first and foremost, an answer to a critical question: how do Russian society and the political class see their own state—as a state with certain intrinsic, deeply rooted values, or as a shard of a “real,” far greater country that was ruined (in part by the designs of others)? The former viewpoint implies that, despite all of the setbacks, Russia's search for its position in the world will be successful. The latter view, on the other hand, is more problematic—not least in terms of practicality—because it implies a return to superpower status in some form or another (Lukyanov, 2018, p. 124).

Status and dignity have frequently been cited as reasons for Russia's involvement in wars or cooperation with Western allies and have also been used to explain why their ties were strained (Tsygankov, 2012; Wohlforth, 1998). According to prominent researchers, the major issue in the bilateral connections is how Russia obtains the prestige and respect that Russia expects from the West (Monaghan, 2008; Neumann, 2008; Sakwa, 2008; Stent, 2014; Tsygankov, 2012). A status dispute arises in ties between Russia and the main Western governments and political institutions, collectively known as “the West” (Bavaj, 2011), when Russia believes, she is entitled to status recognition from the West, but the West fails to provide it. This prompts Russia to take retaliatory measures, forcing the West to consider Russia, but the situation does not improve the degree of trust in the ties (Forsberg, 2014, p. 323).

CHAPTER 3

WITH THE USA OR AGAINST THE USA: HOW RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE USA CHANGED SINCE THE COLD WAR

3.1. Russian Foreign Policy Towards the USA During the Yeltsin Era (1991-1999)

Since the Second World War until the collapse of the USSR, the international arena has been dominated by a competition between two major states. One was the USSR, and the other was the USA. When World War II concluded, the world entered the Cold War era, a conflict between the USSR and the USA. These two states aspired to be the world's hegemon. This competition lasted nearly 50 years, until the USSR imploded, and the USA emerged victorious. The fall began in 1989 and ended in 1991, when Moscow declared its independence and raised a new flag in the Kremlin. This was a victory for the USA and a fresh beginning for the world order. If we dig further, we can see that the USA's objective was to wipe Russia off the map. (Levchenkov, 2019, p. 236).

With the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, a new world order was established. In the international arena, the world system became unipolar, with only one state and one hegemon. Since the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation has been founded. Russia was suffering in the early 1990s due to a lack of democracy, economic catastrophe, and, to a lesser extent, a military takeover. Moscow struggled to formulate their foreign policy due to divergent views among their political actors. They lacked a central government to make decisions. Gorbachev was in one section, the military was in another, and Yeltsin was in the third. By watching this scenario, we can deduce that Russia had internal problems; political actors were battling for control of the state. This complicated the Russian government's ability to conduct foreign policy on the world stage. In the long term, Yeltsin ascended to power and initiated the process of democratization. Under Boris Yeltsin, relations between Russia and the USA began to warm; their partnership began on a political level and proceeded with trade. Russia and

the USA began with a bilateral connection; Russia's goal was to normalize relations with the USA; given Moscow's weakness in the 1990s, Yeltsin sought the assistance of the USA in order to demonstrate their standing as a powerful state in the international arena. During the administrations of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton, the relationship between two partners accelerated. Russia and the USA signed an arms control deal in 1987 (ex-USSR); this treaty took effect in 1991 with the election of Yeltsin. This step on the Russian side was taken to demonstrate to the USA that "we are prepared to take our relationship to a new level." (Levchenkov, 2019, 236).

It was the "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty," and by concluding it, Yeltsin demonstrated his intentions toward the USA. In 1993, the parties signed a new pact, START II, which was set to phase out the employment of certain weapons, including multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Both parties signed this pact, but it was terminated in 2002. Between the 1990s and 2000, Russia's foreign policy toward the international community underwent a shift. Because Yeltsin was not a strong leader, the USA's objective was to exert pressure on Moscow. Russia faced a massive economic crisis following the demise of the USSR. A slew of international debts, internal conflicts, and the state's division of ethnic groupings. It was challenging to maintain control over all of these issues. From the standpoint of the USA, it was appropriate, given the country's domestic and economic issues. Russia was unable to cooperate or compete with the USA. In the majority of cases throughout the 1990s, Moscow was preoccupied with internal issues. (Genadevich, 202, p. 35,).

The Russian economic crisis reached a tipping point, Russian-American relations deteriorated, and both sides mistrusted the other. Both eventually developed a connection. It was unclear to what extent or in what manner they should continue their relationship following the Cold War's end. Russian liberals believed they had won the Cold War as a result of Communism's demise and the birth of democracy. As a result, it was critical for Russian liberals to rebuild diplomatic relations with the USA. One of the most critical objectives for Moscow was to maintain its status as a superpower state, yet Russia was in a precarious position. Many Russian political actors found it difficult to recognize that Russia was not a great power; Moscow was dependent on US assistance and international organisations controlled by the US. (Genadevich, 2021, p. 35).

Between 1990 and 1999, Russia's internal and diplomatic policies suffered. Yeltsin was unable to retain control of Russia; many political actors were displeased to see him in the Kremlin. One example was losing considerable stature and becoming a weaker state in comparison to the USA. On the other hand, the USA exploited Russia's weakness. America began expanding their economy, military capability, and global influence. NATO integration, in particular, began to accelerate. As a result, the Russian-American relationship progressed slowly, as both parties were focused on their respective national interests. Specifically, in the case of the USA, with its rapid expansion of influence around the globe and formation of alliances with post-Soviet states. This fostered suspicion and competitiveness. (Levchenkov, 2019, p.236). Despite their mutual suspicion and competition, they were working because both are strategically significant to the other. For example, cooperating in science, counter-terrorism activities, and exchanging astronautics and space experience.

Since 1990, there has been no official document establishing a strategic partnership between Russia and the USA, and hence no applicable criteria. Both partners assert that they have a strategic cooperation agreement, although no such agreement was written in actual paperwork. Due to the absence of a legal document establishing a strategic collaboration, both sides experienced a rocky start. As a result, Russia and the USA typically begin at the beginning in order to reach an agreement that is beneficial to both parties. Numerous times, the world has witnessed Russia and the USA of America rekindling their relationship. It was difficult to create a common ground and form a strategic cooperation due to national interests. Moscow was not agreeing to accept the "Restrained Confrontation" system, according to the Russian perspective. Because it ran against to Russian interests and would prevent them from achieving great power state status in the international arena. Additionally, it was incompatible with Russia's "unilateral disarmament" and "voluntary abandonment of a nuclear missile shield." This is all contrary to Russian national interests and places Moscow's power legislation inside the framework of international law. (Andreyevich, 2018, p.1).

As a result of these contradictions, both parties considered forming a realistic strategic cooperation in the center. One of the fundamental issues in Russian foreign policy is their national interest and international priorities. In some instances, Russia contacts international organisations, academics, and individual political scientists in order to establish a common ground with the USA and draught an appropriate diplomatic

document. We can see hostility and misunderstanding in both the Russian and American cases. Both parties are not abiding by their agreements, as evidenced by the Kremlin's "delays in ratifying the START-2 Treaty by the Russian parliament, as well as ambiguity concerning missile defense." Additionally, Russia violated previously agreed accords, such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention. If we go back to the time when Russia and the USA agreed to reduce their WMD, Russia had more missiles. In that case, Russia lost more missiles than the USA. As a result, Russia began to violate its promises following that deal. Numerous instances prevent both parties from establishing a concrete and formal document to demonstrate their diplomatic relationship. (Andreyevich, 2018, p. 1).

NATO's enlargement in East Europe was one of the issues that bothered Russia and the USA. Russia was displeased to see NATO bases so close to its borders. All of these issues can be resolved if both states' political institutions begin to work together properly. Following the end of the Cold War, many political actors began to wonder what kind of relationship Russia and the USA should have. How should they interact with one another? This is an important question that has yet to be answered. It's difficult to claim that Russia and the USA signed a strategic partnership agreement because no proper and official document exists to prove their relationship status. Of course, Russia and the USA are collaborating to some extent, but in many cases, we can see more competition than cooperation. During the 1990s, the relationship between the two states was knee-deep, and it only stabilized after two decades. The USA was pleased to see Russia's democratization process, but it did not last long. When Bill Clinton took office and Russia's president was Boris Yeltsin, democracy began to crumble, and the situation shifted to an authoritarian regime. The USA assumed that Russia's democratization process would be similar to that of Latin American countries, but this was a mistake. Russia's goal was to increase democracy and gain a foothold in the international arena with the help of the USA. However, Russia failed to recognize that completely overhauling the state system would be difficult. The transition from Communism to Democracy caused some problems in Russia, which even the USA was not prepared to deal with. During the 1992-1993 period, the democratization process caused some problems in the relationship between Russia and the USA. An asymmetric relationship was another issue that Russia faced in their foreign policy with the USA in 1993-1994. When the USA gained more global power through a unipolar system, hegemon power,

and economic and military expansion. Russia, on the other hand, was dealing with economic, demographic, and geopolitical issues. As a result of these issues, Russia believed that its relations with the USA was still in the same state as it was during the Cold War. We didn't see much progress between Russia and the USA in the 1990s because the USA was always portraying Russia as a failed powerful state. Moscow will never regain the power it had during the Soviet era; it was the end of the Russian era (USA claimed). (Albertevno, 2008, p. 1).

The Russian case was one of the main topics in Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, with many political actors claiming that the USA did not do enough to preserve Russian democracy and raise the country's economic default. Yeltsin, on the other hand, was a pro-Western leader. He was relying on the West to achieve his objectives and maintain Russian leadership. He was following the Western political system, and democratization was his idea to enlist the assistance of the USA in his own political campaign. From the standpoint of the USA, Bill Clinton and his administration exploited Yeltsin's weakness and forced him to act in accordance with Western demands. Yeltsin was not a strong political leader, especially after 1995, and he was not an ambitious leader who wanted to advance his country. (Albertevno, 2008, p. 1).

Many obstacles hampered the development of the Russian-American relationship in a short period of time. It was clear that these two countries had a long-standing Cold War relationship, which made building trust difficult for both parties. As a new state with a new administration, Russia had a difficult time in the 1990s. Many military bases in USSR member states were lost to Moscow. Because Russian military power was low at the time, the USA saw an advantage. The second impediment was the Chechen war, which, according to some Russian politicians, was financed by Western countries. By forming a new small state, the West hoped to separate or dissolve Russian territory. Russia faced difficulties in formulating its foreign policy as a result of the Chechen war. Moscow was preoccupied with internal policies and issues. Primakov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a key player in shaping Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, building a diplomatic bridge between Russia and the USA. Russia was unable to take a new step in their foreign policy due to Yeltsin's alcoholism. As a result, Primakov was tasked with resolving foreign policy issues in general. When Ivanov took over as Minister of Foreign Affairs after Primakov, he continued the same strategy and maintained Russia's strategic partnership with the USA. On the other hand, the USA and

its allies were expanding NATO's borders. The USA began to establish itself as a global power quickly. During the 1990s, Yeltsin and B. Clinton had a "friendship," but it is clear from the Clinton administration's actions that the USA was solely focused on its own interests. (Genadevich, 2021, p. 35).

Since the disintegration of the USSR, Russia took action against the USA for the first time in 1999. When the USA invaded Yugoslavia with NATO forces (Serbia). Serbia, Albania, and Kosovo were involved in the conflict (province in Albania). When the USA began bombing Serbia, Russia intervened. Russia was a part of the SFOR operation, which was part of a UN-led effort to resolve the Yugoslav problem. The bombing of the USA killed over 500 000 people and left no proper solution. As a member of the UNSC and a member of SFOR, Russia intervened in the bombing. In that case, China backed Russia, which decided to send troops to Pristina and occupy their airport ahead of NATO forces. As part of this operation, Russia failed to notify the USA and sent troops to occupy an airport and solve the problem. (Genadevich, 2021, p. 35).

In the end, Russia found a peaceful solution to the problem, but the USA was not pleased with Russia's behavior toward them. Russian action in that case demonstrated that Moscow can still make decisions and act, despite the fact that the US was leading the operation. During the 1990s, this was Russia's only serious and significant foreign policy decision. From 1991 to 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin was a pro-American leader who supported US policy and implemented nearly identical rules and policies in Russia. Following the disintegration of the USSR, Yeltsin established close ties with US political figures in order to gain their support during the presidential campaign. The Russian reform was formulated with the cooperation of the USA. During the 1990s, Russia's foreign policy toward the USA was flawed. Because of Yeltsin's pro-American ideology, Russia missed many opportunities to rebuild quickly. The Chechen war, the Yugoslav case, internal issues, an economic nightmare, and external pressure, particularly from the USA, all contributed to Russia's economic default in 1999. That was the end of everything that had been accomplished since 1991. Many countries believed Russia was doomed. (Sergeevich, 2013, p.11).

The collapse of the Russian economy and policy in 1999 marked the end of Yeltsin's presidency. In many regions, civil war, banditry, and gangsters controlled many governmental institutions and key positions. With the rise of terrorism in the North Caucasus, radicals waged a war against the Russian government. All of these issues came

together and led to Russia's demise. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia faced economic difficulties, and the USA refused to allow Moscow to rise and develop its economy. In the long run, Russia's economy was weak, and it faced economic default in 1999. "I am tired, and I am resigning from my position," Boris Yeltsin said during his speech on December 31, 1999. The USA believes that this is yet another victory over Russia. Their prediction was for Russia to vanish from the map. Vladimir Putin took power on December 31, 1999 and became Russia's new president. With the election of a new president with a military background, Russia's foreign policy entered a new era.

3.2. Russian Foreign Policy Towards the USA During the Putin Era - I (1999-2008)

Starting in the new millennium, Russia had a new leader, Vladimir Putin, a young and energetic leader with a military background. During the same time period, George W. Bush, the current president of the USA, was elected. During his presidential campaign, he proposed that they stop bothering each other and rebuild their relationship. George W. Bush claimed that the USA's foreign policy was ineffective, and that they needed to create a new relationship system that could bring them all to the same place. Russia began to support the Iranian nuclear deal in the 2000s, despite Russian and US agreements. In addition, the USA began to support and invest in Russian opposition groups. This conflict caused them to misunderstand each other, prompting Bush to propose a "New American Age." Many people, including politicians, believed that this program would be beneficial. Russia, on the other hand, was not pleased to see the US deploy a missile defense system in Europe. One of Putin's first acts was to sign a decree titled "Conception of Russian Foreign Policy." The main goal of foreign policy, according to this document, should be "to provide state security, to format a stable, democratic, and fair international order, to find a common goal and strategic partnership with Western partners, to support and protect Russian citizens' interests, and, of course, to prioritize Russian national interest." Many politicians in both countries claimed during the first presidential term, particularly before the Iraq war, that Russian-American relations were at a "historical climax." The restart, which was carried out by both parties, got off to a good start. (Sergeevich, 2013, p. 12).

In the year 2000, Russia and the USA agreed to use a portion of Weapons Grade Plutonium. Particularly through the production of MOX-fuel (mixed oxide fuel), which

is used in nuclear reactors. According to this agreement, both parties should use a portion of their Plutonium. About 34 tons of plutonium reserve are used by Russia and the USA. In June 2001, Putin met with George W. Bush for the first time in Slovenia's capital, Ljubljana. Bush claimed that when he "looked into his eyes" (Putin's eyes), he "felt his soul" and saw a "trustworthy person" in them. After the terrorist attack in New York on September 11, 2001, the Russian-American relationship grew rapidly. Russia backed the USA, culminating in Russia's participation in the anti-terror coalition. This coalition was formed by US military institutions with the goal of combating the Taliban terrorist group in Afghanistan. It was the Rome Declaration, which was signed by Russia and the USA, as well as their allies. It was a positive development in Russian foreign policy toward the USA. The cooperation of Russian military forces with NATO was a first step toward building trust between Russia and the USA. Both sides established a Russian-NATO Council in 2002. Russia expected to develop a close relationship with NATO and join as a member state. NATO military troops were allowed to use Russian territory as a transit zone on their way to Afghanistan. Russian foreign policy toward the USA reached a high point during Putin's first year in office. Russia, according to George W. Bush, is not a threat to them. Russia is important to the USA as a regional superpower. (Sergeevich, 2013, p. 12).

As a result, both states' strategic partnership grew rapidly, but their relationship grew colder in the long run in some cases. One of the examples was the USA's output from the "Missile Defense Limitation Treaty." From the Russian point of view, the USA's output from this agreement, which provided them with strategic partnership, dashed Russian hopes of building a trusting relationship. To some extent, the USA's action was a step toward mistrust with Russia. What they gained from their collaboration was lost, and the Russian government has accepted this as a destabilizing factor in the international arena. Russia has decided to withdraw from the B-II agreement. Following the conclusion of the agreement, the USA began enlarging NATO; in 2004, seven states joined NATO, three of which were from the Baltic states. These countries share a border with Russia. During the Cold War, the world did not experience much expansion, which was a critical situation between Russia and the USA. In 2003, the US took another action that had a negative impact on Russian foreign policy toward Washington. On March 20, 2003, the USA launched a war against Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and was supporting Al-Qaida. Russia was opposed to the war. Without

the approval of the UNSC, the USA and its allies began military operations. The USA's only ally in the Iraq war was the UK, while Germany and France backed Russia. Russia was adamantly opposed to the invasion of Iraq, but the USA ignored this. The action taken by the USA was the brainchild of neo-conservatives. They didn't consider the Russian idea, which is the neo-conservatives' main idea: "their private interest." In turn, Russia began to grow its economy and form economic-strategic alliances with the post-Soviet states. Also, by signing agreements with post-Soviet states, Moscow began to focus more on their military sphere. The Collective Security Treaty Organization was one of the agreements that Russia signed and then established as a security organization (CSTO). Russia formed a new organization with the same members as before. The Eurasian Economic Organization is a non-governmental organization based in Eurasia. Moscow's goal was to maintain their position in the international arena while also moving closer to US organizations. Since Putin's election, Russia's foreign policy toward the USA has shifted and it has begun to set its own rules. All of these changes and developments in their relationship, however, did not yield positive results. Their relationship, on the other hand, grew colder after the USA led a war against Iraq and NATO enlargement. Despite the fact that Russia did not claim to be the world's hegemon or superpower in the 2000s, their goal was to increase their power in order to protect their national interests and borders. (Sergeevich, 2013, p. 13).

The USA, on the other hand, was enraged by these actions and began to confront Russia. Russian action in the international arena was largely passive from 1990 to 2005, which suited the USA. During this time, the USA's global clout grew to new heights. The USA's actions as a global hegemon did not bode well for Russian foreign policy and global position. During that time, the USA expanded its influence over states bordering Russia, and Washington established military bases (NATO bases) in the Baltic states that bordered Russia. From Russia's perspective, this action can be interpreted as an attempt by the US to provoke Moscow. In 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said, "Maturity and strength of relationship can be seen when there are difficulties." As a result of the USA's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the launch of a war against Iraq without UNSC approval. It was a difficult time for the Russian government to keep that picture in mind. But, unlike before, the states did not begin fighting and competing in armament. Rather than competing with the USA, Russia chose strategic partnership to combat terrorism and find solutions to global problems. The USA established two

military bases in Central Asia in the same year, one in Uzbekistan and the other in Kyrgyzstan. This had a negative impact on Russia's position in post-Soviet countries. Russia was provoked by the USA's actions. However, entering post-Soviet territory was one of the USA's key strategic plans. As a result, Russian foreign policy toward the USA has shifted in a negative direction since 2004. Both parties made numerous improvements and developments, but it did not take long for their diplomatic relationship to improve. The USA has always viewed Russia as a threat, making it difficult to build a trusting relationship that was eventually shattered. (Stent, 2018, p. 44).

The USA's most recent action, which effectively ended trust and development in their relationship with Russia, was to invest in and support revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine and Georgia experienced "colorful revolutions" in 2003-2004. During the presidential elections in Ukraine, the orange revolution erupted. The USA government invested in and supported this revolution in order to create chaos and install a pro-American president. From its vantage point, Russia backed Viktor Yanukovich, a pro-Russian president who wanted to make Russian a second language and join the Single Economic Union. By looking at the situation between Russia and the USA, we can see that the two countries are not fighting directly; their rivalry is more akin to a proxy war. In the territory of the third state, they are competing and fighting. (Stent, 2018, p. 44).

Since 2005, Russia has pursued an active foreign policy in the post-Soviet states, without the support of the USA, and has implemented a number of policies on its own. The US administration claimed that Russia is not the same as it was before, and that since the election of a new president, Russian influence has grown around the world. The administration of George W. Bush prepared a plan for Russian foreign policy toward post-Soviet states. The goal of the US was to put pressure on Russia or create an internal problem that would prevent Moscow from increasing its influence and power. The world was about to enter a new era of conflict between two superpower states. It was, in some ways, the beginning of the Second Cold War between two powerful states. If one country's foreign policy was more successful than another, it was viewed as a loss (Stent, 2018, p. 44).

By isolating Russia from the international arena, the USA demonstrated their intentions. The goal was to increase the number of democratic countries near Russia's borders. To maintain a balance of power with Russia, the USA used all states that border

Russia. Russia, on the other hand, was employing natural resources as a foreign policy tool. Ukraine served as a transit zone for Russian gas to Eastern Europe. In order to counter US policy, the Russian government used gas as a tool or weapon against Eastern Europe. Many European countries have suffered as a result of the political rivalry and competition between Russia and the USA. In addition, Russia's military cooperation with Iran's nuclear deal, North Korea, and Syria has continued. The states that irritated the USA, on the other hand, wanted to demonstrate their power to the USA. The USA was opposed to a North Stream agreement between Russia and Germany (agreement of a gas pipe). Making that agreement, according to the US administration, would be a threat from Russia. Due to Russian policy of using energy as a foreign policy tool, it would be a weapon against the EU. Even though the USA was not on board, Russia signed the North Stream agreement with Germany. During the first two years of George W. Bush's presidency, Russia's foreign policy toward the USA improved. In terms of the anti-terrorist war, economic agreements, and Russia's democratization, two superpower states have become strategic partners. Since 2003, the relationship has deteriorated, with numerous disagreements and misunderstandings. The invasion of Iraq by the USA was the final event that ushered in the new Cold War era for two countries. (Sergeevich, 2013, p. 14).

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Russia and the USA, on the other hand, have been economic partners since 2000, despite their relationship problems. Their commodity circulation increased 2.5 times

between 2000 and 2006. In terms of the economy, astronomy, and the anti-terrorist war, Russia and the USA were inextricably linked. Both states, in particular, began to work on the aerospace industry. A joint sputnik mission was launched into space by Russia and the USA. They also collaborated on a flight to Mars, which helped to establish aeronautical engineering. However, the economic sanctions imposed by the USA on Russian aircraft affected "Suhoy." These issues brought two countries to a standstill in their joint work on aeronautical engineering and sputnik development. In exchange, Russia froze a \$3 billion deal with Boeing, putting the USA aircraft industry in jeopardy. Instead of Boeing, the Russian government chose Airbus and signed a contract with them. In addition, Russia has canceled a \$12 billion agreement with USA companies in the gas and energy sectors. (Sergeevich, 2013, p. 15).

Many economic agreements were signed between Russia and the USA, and many American companies invested in Russian oil and gas producers. Many American investors came to Russia as a result of a partnership with the Russian Gazprom company. The USA's foreign direct investments in Russia aided Moscow's rapid economic growth. In addition, food companies such as "Coca-Cola, Pepsi, McDonalds, and Mars," as well as a number of other large corporations, have invested in the Russian market. That was a multibillion-dollar investment. Although the USA is an important economic partner for Russia, Russian companies are now investing in the American market. Lukoil purchased 60 percent of Getty Petroleum. Both partners suffered losses as a result of the Russian sanctions and were unable to complete their joint projects. The Russian share of international trade with the USA is 1%, while the USA's share of international trade with Russia is 10%. We can conclude from these figures that Russia requires the USA as an economic partner. Even though Russia and the USA have political differences in their foreign policies, both countries are working to maintain economic ties. In this way, the Russian market requires US investors in order to grow and develop. Many Russian factories and markets are out of date because they are Soviet-era relics. Russia is a country rich in natural resources, and many American businesses have invested there to make money. It was a means for Russia to improve its economic position in the international arena. (Eugene Rumer, 2021).

Since 2007 Russia switched from lender state to the donor state, as their economy raised and their position in the international arena reached high level. But still Moscow can't compete with the USA in terms of economy. As the USA's economic position took

the maximum level, officially the took leading in IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization. In order to compete with the USA, Russia must rise and develop their economy sphere. Scenario which Russia economy has now is not satisfied. Unfortunately, due to the secrecy we can't understand is it important for Russia to support Iranian nuclear deal and cooperate with the USA opposition states by selling them weapons and missiles. Either, to become a member of WTO and OECD. Moscow claimed that there is no nuclear deal in Iran, in order to convince the USA, Putin said that Russia is not cooperating in term of nuclear deal with Iran. (Eugene Rumer, 2021, p. 1).

Since 2006 Russian foreign policy towards the USA changed radically, the Kremlin administration started to become more careful during their relationship. Due to the mistrust and withdrawing from some agreement from the USA side, the Russian administration lost hope towards their partnership. Russia paused distribution of the USA Missile Defense in Europe, Moscow proposed to the Washington to use their old bases and Azerbaijanian polygon. The USA aim was to support and defense EU from Iranian nuclear threat. From 2000 until 2008 Russia's foreign policy mission was to get more allies in order to get enough power to compete with the USA. The power between them was not equal, the world was not taking Russian actions serious until 2008. Therefore, Russia foreign policy towards the USA was changing time by time. To some extent it was a pragmatic foreign policy, but in most cases, Russia was likely to act through a realism theoretical perspective. The aim of Moscow was to make the world anarchy, dissolve the USA's hegemonic power and defend their national interest. The rise of energy power in Russia worried the USA, because Russia uses its potential as a tool to put pressure over the USA's allies. (Eugene Rumer, 2021, p. 1).

Because the USA wanted to build military bases in East Europe, which is close to Russia's borders, Moscow began to exert pressure. Putin claimed in the 2000s at the International Munich Forum that Moscow was fighting USA's military bases near their borders. In 2007, Putin made his second speech, in which he expressed his opposition to USA's bases in Eastern Europe. Putin claimed that "the USA is always trying to solve international problems in terms of military and war," and he chastised NATO and the EU for attempting to replace the United Nations. The next point of contention or miscommunication between Russia and the USA was a geopolitical issue. Each state owns up to 200 miles of sea or islands within the specified territory, according to a UN resolution. The case involved an Arctic Island close to Russia's borders. However, the

USA, which had not signed the convention, as well as Canada, Denmark, and Norway, divided the territory. Since Putin's ascension to power in 2000, Russia has attempted to forge a strong, trustworthy, and strategic relationship with the USA. However, the letter on Moscow began to encounter problems, prompting them to consider the USA. Oil, gas, gold, and diamonds are all found in the North Arctic Ocean. That is why the world's powers wanted a piece of that land. However, Russia has already drawn its borders and obtained a piece of the Arctic with the help of an American commission. Does the USA impose sanctions or impose a freeze on Russian foreign exchange reserves held in the USA? This is a question that the Russian government is concerned about. (Eugene Rumer, 2021, p. 1).

The Russian government claimed several times in 2007 that it had eliminated the USA's Missile Defense System from Eastern Europe, which posed a threat to Russia's nuclear missile capability. The USA, on the other hand, did not consider Moscow's offer. In exchange, the Russian government located their Iskander 9K720 missile complex in Kaliningrad. Later, Putin signed a decree ordering "all Russian actions related to armaments agreements in Europe and international agreements related to this" to be put on hold. Many in international politics have interpreted Russia's decision to renegotiate the agreement as a challenge to the West. The USA and NATO members devised a parallel plan to exert pressure on Russia's administration, with the goal of forcing Russia to rescind the moratorium and resolve the military issue in Moldova and Georgia. Moscow refused to heed the demands of the USA and did not back down. It was an opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its international power and image. If they backed down in response to the US request, it would expose Moscow's administration's flaws to the rest of the world. As a result, a unilateral Russian moratorium went into effect in December 2007. The document that Putin signed to declare a moratorium included the following:

"The East European states that joined NATO and signed the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty should impose limitations on NATO enlargement. NATO members should move quickly to implement and adapt a 1999 CFET agreement. NATO military bases must not be built in Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia (as they are members of NATO) Military base of the USA of America to be built in Bulgaria and Romania" (Eugene Rumer, 2021, p. 1).

The Russian administration was firm in their stance toward the USA. That was the start of Russia's foreign policy confrontation with the USA. Due to NATO's administration to Ukraine and Georgia in order to plan for membership in the NATO block, Russia's relationship with the USA and NATO grew colder in the beginning of 2008. The USA backed the inclusion of members from Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest summit. The USA's goal was to get closer to Russia's borders because they saw Russia as a threat. As a result, Moscow has labeled the US and NATO's actions as provocative. Members of NATO have stated that Ukraine and Georgia could join the alliance if they meet all of the conditions set forth by the West. Russia saw it as a threat to their European strategic interests. Both Russia and the USA held presidential elections in 2008, electing two new presidents. Dmitry Medvedev became President of Russia, and Barak Obama became President of the USA. The world had high expectations for the two presidents. Political actors predicted that the relationship between Russia and the USA would shift and a new dynamic would emerge. The relationship between Russia and the USA was critical and cold during the final days of George W. Bush's presidency, as it had been during the Cold War. Many scholars believed that their economic relations with the USA would improve as a result of the critical situation in their foreign policy with the USA, but their exports and imports gradually declined. A new presidential administration represented hope for a closer relationship and a resumption of their foreign policy with the USA. Obama's goal with Russia was to restart everything from the beginning. He claimed that Russia was a strategic partner for the USA, and that the two powerful countries needed to find a common ground to repair their relationship. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has not been a superpower, and the international community has not recognized Moscow as a powerful and leading nation. However, the picture changed in 2008, when Russian military power grew rapidly, and the country's economy grew as well. Russia was a member of the United Nations Security Council, as well as the G8 and G20 summits. Because of Russia's participation in these summits and organizations, the world has begun to respect Russia's position and power. As a result, Obama's goal was to find a point of agreement with Medvedev. It was easier for the US to reach agreements and establish relationships with Medvedev than it was with Putin. According to the USA administration, Medvedev is a soft and, to some extent, liberal leader. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 15).

Relations between the USA and Russia were colder under George W. Bush than they were during the Cold War. With the phrase 'New Start,' Obama began a new foreign policy with Russia when he took office. They began to form alliances and collaborate in some ways. According to some scholars and politicians, the USA's power began to wane around that time. "As early as February 2009, Vice President Joe Biden claimed that the USA and Russia needed to push a "reset button" on their mutual relationship," according to Jan Hornat¹². The goal of this reset was to forge closer ties with Russia and to put aside all of the disagreements that arose during and after the Cold War. Because the USA and Russia had some disagreements in the international arena, this policy was not entirely successful. For example, during the Arab Spring, the USA wanted to promote democracy and assist the opposition in ousting dictators from power. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 15).

Russians, on the other hand, had a different perspective, preferring not to interfere in those countries' internal affairs. The next issue that arose between the two superpowers was the Ukrainian crisis, which eventually led to the annexation of Crimea. We can deduce from these disagreements that the 'Reset' policy didn't work properly and ultimately failed. In the international arena, these two states have opposing viewpoints, and they have had disagreements in the majority of cases since 1945. Even if Obama attempted a "reset" with Russia, we can now see that it failed miserably, as the West and the USA have imposed economic sanctions on Russia. Instead of saying some words and using theories, the USA's action of imposing sanctions on Russia demonstrates how two states interact. We can see the reality of their Reset policy, which in the end failed miserably. The "Reset" policy with the USA failed, and Russia's new administration attempted to make progress, but the USA has begun to support Georgia with arms and military equipment. The Russians' faith in the USA was shattered. The same story was repeated, and the world witnessed the same Russian-American relationship scenario. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 16). After Russia and the USA began to reach agreements as a result of the "Reset" program, Hilary Clinton met with Sergey Lavrov to discuss the two countries' partnership and find a solution to the problems they were experiencing. When the "Reset" program was launched, their relationship progressed quickly, but when the US began to support the Georgian administration in the North Ossetia dispute, Russia saw it as a challenge. Putin was Prime Minister at the time of the Georgian conflict, and he was in China when Georgian forces attacked North Ossetia.

3.3. Russian Foreign Policy Towards the USA During the Medvedev Era (2008-2012)

The US president was still George W. Bush during the North Ossetian conflict, but Russia's president was Dmitry Medvedev. The USA believes that because Putin is not in power, Russia will be less powerful during Medvedev's presidency. They wanted to take advantage of the situation, so they helped Georgia invent and bomb North Ossetia. Russia, in turn, responded with a firm and direct response. The Russian government issued a decree in August 2008 to support North Ossetia and bomb Georgian military forces. For the next 4-5 days, Russian forces bombed and drove Georgian forces out of North Ossetia. It was the Russian government's first military operation outside of their borders since the Chechen war. The Russian military's power and operational capability were on display all over the world. Since 2008, the world's perception of Russia and its power has shifted. Moscow's government has begun to speak out in the international arena, particularly in relation to the USA. After the Georgian conflict, the USA took no action; the world expected the USA to impose sanctions on Russia, but it did not. Because both states' military ships were a mile apart in the Black Sea, it was one of the most critical moments between Russia and the USA since the end of the Cold War. One small blunder and the entire world could be thrown into chaos. As a result, on March 6, 2009, Russia and the USA pressed the Reset button. The goal was to start their relationship from the beginning; the meeting between H. Clinton and Lavrov took place in Geneva, but Russia and the USA were still geopolitical rivals at the time. The USA wanted to reduce Russian influence in post-Soviet states, such as Georgian administration support. The next case in point is Ukraine, which has experienced numerous revolutions and protests since 2002. Anti-Russian protests were backed by the US administration. The competition between two superpowers ushered in a new era of cold relations. The Reset program was not completed and failed. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 19).

Despite the failure of the Reset program, Russian foreign policy toward the USA was normalized, and their leaders began to reach agreements at international summits. For example, at the 2009 G20 summit, Medvedev and Obama agreed that both countries should be strategic partners and that the Cold War era should be ended. Medvedev planned to sign a new B "START" agreement with the US administration. Medvedev's next conversation with Obama was about finding a common ground in Euro-Atlantic and

European security, as well as a solution to the Iranian nuclear deal. NATO's sixty-fifth anniversary was celebrated in Strasburg on April 3-4, 2009, and during that summit, NATO's administration claimed to renew the Russian-NATO Council, which had been frozen since 2008. During the summit, NATO also planned to build a joint missile defense system with Russia. Obama went to Moscow in 2009 and signed a memorandum "on mutual understanding." The goal of the memorandum was to reduce the two countries' strategic nuclear arsenals. Obama claimed that the Jackson-Vanik amendments would be repealed, and that Russia and the USA would form a Russian-American presidential commission. This commission's mission was to work together on "nuclear safety and arms control," as well as "humanitarian cooperation and ideological issues." (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 20).

In 2009, the USA announced at the United Nations General Assembly that the Missile Defense Project in Poland and the Czech Republic would be terminated. The USA's plan, however, was not to cancel all of their projects in Eastern Europe. It was only one project that they halted. Instead of this project letter, the USA has planned a new missile defense project that will run from 2011 to 2020. During NATO's General Secretary's visit to Moscow in 2009, the NATO administration claimed that they are not a threat to Russia. However, Russia has had a history of mistrust with the USA, which has influenced their foreign policy. In 2010, Ukraine held presidential elections, and in their presidential campaign, Kiev faced two main rivals. Yuliya Tymoshenko, a pro-American politician, and Viktor Yanukovich, a pro-Russian leader, were two of the candidates. Because Ukraine was a geopolitically and militarily strategic zone for both sides, it was yet another political competition between Russia and the USA. From a political standpoint, keeping the US military force away from their borders was critical, and the only way to do so was to keep Ukraine under their control. The goal of the USA was to entice the Ukrainian government with a variety of offers (economic, political, such as EU and NATO membership) in order to establish a military base and navy in the Black Sea. Yanukovich eventually won the elections and was elected President of Ukraine. He began his pro-Russian policy by establishing political and economic ties. Yanukovich also restored agreements that had been frozen under the previous president, including a treaty establishing a Russian gas pipeline and a navy base in Sevastopol. Both parties agreed to extend the Russian navy's presence in Sevastopol until 2017. Russia's power

and intentions over Ukraine were promoted to the US through these agreements. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 19).

On April 8, 2010, Russia and the USA signed the CHB-3 (START-3) Treaty on Strategic Offense Weapons Reduction and Limitation, in which Russia and the USA agreed to reduce strategic nuclear forces for seven years. There were nearly 700 strategic nuclear forces and 1550 nuclear warheads. The agreement was approved by both states' legislatures and went into effect on February 5, 2011. The culmination of Russian foreign policy toward the USA was not concrete; it was contingent on the situation and national interests of both countries. We can see ups and downs in their relationship from the end of the Cold War until 2010. We can compare it to the up and down graphs of the stock exchange to some extent. Scholars had a hard time catching their stable relationship with one another. Medvedev, unlike Putin, had a different foreign policy strategy during Obama's presidency because he was a pragmatic leader. As a result, between 2008 and 2012, Russia and the USA made the most progress in their relationship, but they also had the most disagreements and mistrust. (Vladimirovma, 2014 p. 20).

Ukraine was one of the most important and painful topics in the Russian-American relationship; because Ukraine is located near Russian borders, the USA has always tried to make Kiev an ally. The Ukrainian parliament passed an internal and foreign policy decree in the middle of summer 2010. The decree's main goal was to create an independent bloc that was not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or NATO. However, interrelationships and cooperation with NATO must be maintained. It was a step forward for the USA when H. Clinton traveled to Ukraine to meet with the Kiev government and reach an agreement. This decree, as well as the USA's invasion of Kiev, worried Russia. By looking at this case, the world saw that Ukraine has been a part of Russian foreign policy toward the USA since the Orange Revolution. It was one of the most significant rivalries between two superpowers. From 2000 to 2010, Russia's foreign policy toward the USA fluctuated in terms of levels and positions, as well as ups and downs. Both sides attempted to make up for lost time and privileges during the first four years. Putin and his son, George W. Bush, were working together on terrorism, the economy, and trade. Their goal was to strengthen their relationship in all areas, with the USA claiming Russia as a strategic and important partner. Both Presidents Putin and his son Bush's relationship deteriorated during their second presidential term.

According to some scholars, it was the second start of the Cold War era. In terms of the economy and, more importantly, the military, the situation between two powerful states was problematic. The world's leaders were terrified of a war between Russia and the USA. Both states' presidents changed in 2008, and the USA gained a pragmatic leader who was eager to re-establish relations with Russia. On the other hand, Russia had a new leader, Dmitry Medvedev, who agreed to restore the country's foreign policy toward the USA. The goal was to build and increase trust between the participants, which worked well in the beginning but failed in the end. (Vladimirovma, 2014, p. 20).

3.4. Russian Foreign Policy Towards the USA During the Putin Era - II (2012 - Present)

3.4.1. Russian Foreign Policy Towards the USA (2010-2020)

The Russian-American cooperation agreement on "peaceful uses of atomic energy" entered into force on January 11, 2011. The states agreed to form two new groups within the framework of the Presidential Commission at the next meeting between Medvedev and Obama. Medvedev also reached an agreement with the USA to collaborate on anti-terrorist operations. In the same year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to the USA and signed a "simplified visa issuance" agreement. The military operation in Libya was one of the factors that caused a rift in the Russian American relationship. The US military operation in Libya has been compared by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to a crusade. Putin also criticized the UN Security Council resolution, noting that Russia did not use its veto power, instead opting to abstain. The Arab Spring ushered in a new era of competition between two superpowers. It was a race to gain influence over the Middle Eastern states, which are one of the world's most important and strategic regions. Because Russia is an oil-producing country, it was keen to get involved in the Middle East. The game's rules were that the state that gained control of the Middle East gained control of the world's oil. Because Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar were allies of the USA, Russia began to support anti-American states. Libya was the one who eventually failed. Putin was concerned about the situation in Libya and the death of Muammar Gaddafi. He repeatedly chastised the US administration at international summits, claiming that Kaddafi was assassinated without a trial or justice. Russia claims that the states that the US created in order to develop democracy, such as Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, have completely failed. As a result, in 2012, in a situation similar to Syria, Russia exercised its veto power in the UN Security Council.

In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin was re-elected, and on June 18 of that year, Putin and Obama met and agreed to form a new work group under the Presidential Commission to cooperate "on military-technical cooperation." In addition, Russia and the USA signed an agreement on economic relations and cooperation aimed at "improving nuclear safety." In September of the same year, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met at an APEC summit and signed an intergovernmental memorandum. That memorandum was about Russia and the USA cooperating on Antarctica and developing their economic and political relationship. (Vladimirovma, 2014, p. 21).

The Russian government banned the USA Agency for International Development (USAID) from working in Russian territory in 2012. Moscow claimed that the US used their AID organization to influence their internal policy and achieve their goals. The USA Agency for International Development (USAID) was acting to support Russian opposition and the rise of pro-American people. Both sides were dissatisfied with the results of Restart. Instead, before the Restart program, their commodity circulation was lower. For example, their commodity circulation was \$35 billion in 2008, but it dropped to \$25 billion in 2009 after the Restart program. Even economic spheres have declined, according to these figures. Russian purchases of Boeing planes have resumed, and Moscow has begun importing American chicken. One of the most important aspects of Russian foreign policy toward the USA is Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which took 17 years to sign. Finally, on August 22, 2012, this agreement was signed and put into effect. In 2011, the world witnessed the rise of revolutions in the Middle East region, with Syria experiencing its own revolution. On the one hand, the USA backed Assad's opponents, while the Russian government backed Syria's legitimate government. There were disagreements between Russia and the USA in that case. Since the end of the Cold War, that has been the start of their rivalry and, to some extent, a proxy war between two superpowers. H. Clinton, the US Secretary of State, slammed Russia's actions, claiming that Moscow is still an authoritarian state that hasn't fully democratized. Russia was concerned in the year letter of 2012 because of the USA's support for NATO enlargement. In a meeting with M. Saakashvili at the White House, Obama stated that the USA administration supports Georgia's membership in the NATO alliance. In 2012, the USA brought up the issue of Ukraine once more, with Hillary Clinton claiming that the Ukrainian government was not a democracy. During their

parliament elections, they did not follow international rules and regulations. The USA's goal was to incite Ukrainians to revolt against their government. Because Yanukovych was a pro-Russian leader, the USA sought to install a pro-American president and shift Ukraine's political policy to the west. From 2010 to 2012, Russian foreign policy toward the USA was stable, and their relationship did not rapidly improve. Russia and the USA had many contradictions in their foreign policy toward each other, rather than rising and developing their relationship. During Bush's presidency, the foundation of their contradictions was laid. Bush's son was a neo-conservative who had a policy of bringing all of the world's states under their control, even those that were unimportant to USA's foreign policy. In response, Russia reacted asymmetrically, beginning to cooperate with post-Soviet states and expanding its global influence. As a result, from 2010 to 2012, Russia had disagreements with the USA, with the Ukraine case being particularly important for the Kremlin. The "zero sum game" failed due to the high level of contradictions and mistrust between Russia and the USA (Vladimirovma, 2014, p. 21).

In August 2013, the Russian-American relationship reached a breaking point. Their ties haven't been this strong since the Cold War ended. Obama's planned visit to Russia in September was canceled due to Edward Snowden's presence in the country. Snowden was given shelter in Moscow in order to stay there. Edward was an ex-CIA officer who used Wikileaks to publish all of the USA's classified information. The next issue that brought Russia and the USA to a critical juncture was the Syrian case, in which the two superpowers disagreed. Obama's visit to Russia has been canceled, according to the White House, because the two countries have made no progress or developments in their "economic and trade, missile defense and control over their arms, global security, and human rights." According to Washington, Russia has made no changes in those areas of its foreign policy toward the USA in the last year. Even if Russia and the USA have issues and Obama's visit is canceled, the leaders of both countries could meet at international summits such as the G8 and G20. Their relationship, however, was icy, and they had some disagreements in the G8. (Samuel, 2010, p. 90).

The beginning of 2014 marked Obama's second presidential term, and the Russian-American relationship was a ticking time bomb that could explode at any moment. When the second post-Soviet state decided to promote pro-American foreign policy, the bomb in their relationship exploded. It was one of the longest-running crises between Russia and the USA. Again, Ukraine found itself sandwiched between two

superpowers, and competition erupted right away. The Kiev government chose to prioritize their relationship with the West over their relationship with Russia. In addition to NATO membership, the EU encouraged them to join their union. The West's offers were enticing, so Ukraine embarked on a pro-American foreign policy strategy. In the long run, Russia began to exert pressure on Kiev, cutting off gas supplies and demanding payment for their gas. Viktor Yanukovych was in Russia in 2014, when Ukraine was hit by a new wave of revolutions, and he was deposed from the presidency. Ukraine was divided into many different parts, ethnic group conflicts erupted, and Donetsk and Lugansk declared independence. Russia backed Russian speakers (Russian ethnic groups) in Ukraine, while the USA backed a new administration. Putin slammed the US's actions and claimed that the new Ukrainian government is illegitimate. According to him, the new Ukrainian administration has seized power. (Samuel, 2010, p. 90).

In the same year Crimea had a referendum in order to be a part of Russia, and results of referendum was in favor of the Kremlin. In 2014 Crimea was annexed from Ukraine and connected to the Russian territory. The globe faced a new wave of conflict and disagreement between the Russian and USA relationship. Washington started to put economic sanctions over Russia. The USA claimed that Russian action towards Crimean annexation is illegal, it was not a referendum instead it was a capture of territory. In return Russia annexed Crimea and announced it as their territory. Russian foreign policy towards the USA during Ukrainian conflict was unstable. The USA wanted to isolate Russia from the international arena, many economic and political sanctions was put over Russian administration. It was impossible to make dialog between Russia and the USA when Moscow annexed Crimea. Due to the economic sanction and isolation Russia economy failed and inflation started. Because of their foreign policy towards the USA, Russia started to face internal problems. In March 2014 the USA administration initiated to stop their cooperation in terms of Russian American presidential commission which was established in 2009. Also, many agreements and treaties which were signed by both parts were cancelled. In the same year by the USA initiative Russia was bred from G8 summit. The USA administration put visa, financial and property sanctions. Also, sanctions included many Russian political actors and businessman, banks and companies, these sanctions negatively affected both sides economy. (Samuel, 2010, p. 92).

In March 2014 the USA State Secretary John Kerry claimed that the “Restart” policy left in the past and “We entered a different phase of relationship with Russia”. On

March 30 Russia's president had a phone call meeting with Obama. The partners talked about the situation over the Ukrainian case. After this conversation Lavrov and Kerry met in Paris in order to find a solution and agreement over Crimean annexation. In the same year April, 14 Putin and Obama had a phone call conversation. In the conclusion of this conversation the USA officially announced that Russia is supporting South-East region of Ukraine. Obama claimed that "South-East region of Ukraine are pro-Russian opposition which are fighting towards Kiev administration". (Samuel, 2010, p. 93).

The US offered to lay down missiles and arms in exchange for Moscow's help in swaying pro-Russian opposition groups. It was a political game between Russia and the USA, and the two superpowers couldn't fight each other straight. Ukraine was a territory that could demonstrate the power of Moscow and Washington to the rest of the world. On April 17, diplomatic representatives from Ukraine, the EU, the USA, and Russia met in Geneva to discuss anti-terrorism operations. Four countries reached an agreement to de-escalate the conflict and issued a joint statement.

- "Disarmament of illegal armed groups, release of seized government buildings, streets, squares, and public spaces"
- "Amnesty for protesters and those who will free the building and other public places by voluntarily laying down their arms; those who committed serious crimes will be convicted."
- "Establish an OSCE special monitoring mission to facilitate the immediate implementation of these measures aimed at deescalating the situation, under the supervision of the USA, the European Union, and Russia."

"Implementation of a comprehensive, transparent, and accountable constitutional process, as well as the beginning of a dialogue that includes the interests of all Ukrainian regions" (Samuel, C., 2010, p. 93). The signed agreement was not implemented, and the Ukrainian military launched an anti-terrorist operation to aid the people of the Eastern region. The only paragraph completed by the observant states was the OSCE's special monitoring mission. In response, the US administration prepared a "European initiative containment" plan in 2014. It was a policy of bolstering their military might in Eastern Europe. In order to keep Russian aggression under control, the USA should increase its military power and arms in the European Union. Since the annexation of Crimea, the USA and its allies have viewed Russian actions as a threat, prompting NATO to launch a major

military exercise. The USA Congress has allowed military equipment and arms to be exported to Ukraine since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. The goal of the US administration was to support Ukraine's independence, so it authorized the export of arms to Kiev. In exchange, Russia backed the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. However, the Obama administration was opposed to providing Ukraine with full military support. His administration claimed that arming Ukraine with air weapons would result in a massive conflict in Donbas. In the long run, a conflict between Russia and the USA would erupt, which is why the USA only exported some weapons and arms to Ukraine. (Stent, 2018, p. 49).

The relationship between Russia and the USA deteriorated in June 2015 as a result of the USA's actions in Eastern Europe. The USA planned to station tanks in East Europe, close to Russia's borders. "This is one of the most aggressive actions taken by the USA against Russia since the end of the Cold War," the Russian government said of the US action. In the same year, Russia and the USA had another disagreement. It was officially negotiated with Assad when Russia announced their invasion of Syria. According to the Russian government, Russian air forces will launch their base in Syria at the request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia launched its first air strike against terrorists on September 30, 2015. The USA saw it as a threat because it was their first military operation outside of Russia since 2000. Because the NATO coalition was bombing Syria and fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Syria, following the Ukrainian conflict, was one of the most serious and divisive conflicts between Russia and the USA and its allies. Russia used and demonstrated modern and developed military equipment and air force weapons to the rest of the world. When Russia and Turkey were at odds in 2015, Turkish air forces shot down a Russian air strike plane. Moscow has deployed its C-400 missile defense system in Syria. It was done to demonstrate to the world's powers that "Russia will attack third-country air force planes if they cross Syria's air borders." During the Syrian war, Russian military ships and frigates were frequently confronted in the sea by USA and NATO frigates. It was a critical juncture between two powerful states, and one small blunder could spell disaster for the entire world. The goal of the US was to keep Russian military forces out of the conflict. By deposing Assad, Washington hoped to demonstrate its hegemon power and bring Syria under its control (Stent, 2018, p. 50).

If Russia becomes involved in the Syrian conflict, according to the USA, Moscow will establish a military base and navy in the Mediterranean Sea at the end of the conflict.

It is not acceptable for the USA to have a Russian navy and air force base near NATO military forces, as Russia did in the end. In the Syrian crisis, the world was divided into two parts: one was a war between the USA and its NATO allies, and the other was a war between Russia and its allies (anti-American states). During the Syrian conflict, Russia strengthened its position in the international arena and demonstrated its power and potential to the rest of the world. Carter, the USA's Minister of Defense, announced containment measures against "Russian aggression" in November 2015. "The USA plans to modernize their nuclear weapons, develop their drones and strategic bombers, and develop their laser and railgun arms," Carter said. When Russia launched airstrikes in Syria against terrorist targets, this plan was announced. In the real war, Russia promoted their developed and modernized military power around the world. As a result, the USA viewed it as a threat to themselves, signaling the start of a new round of military competition between the Kremlin and the White House. The anti-terrorism agreement between Russia and the USA was terminated in 2015 as part of the USA initiative. Following the Libyan conflict and the subsequent letter from Ukraine on the Syrian case, the USA's power began to wane. In the Ukraine and Syrian conflicts, Russian foreign policy triumphed. The USA did not achieve their objectives in these two conflicts, but they did impose sanctions and an embargo on Russia. However, the results were unsatisfactory for Washington, and Moscow continued to promote its power and aggression despite their actions. Global powers claimed that during Obama's presidency, the USA's power began to wane and that it lost control of some regions. Since Putin's re-election as president in 2012, Russia's foreign policy strategy has shifted toward the USA. Previously, the Russian administration made concessions to the USA, but since 2012, the Kremlin has begun to promote its position in the international arena. The Georgian war in 2008, when the USA backed Tbilisi in its attack on North Ossetia, laid the groundwork for this strategy. The Kremlin's mistrust of the USA had reached an all-time high, but during Obama's presidency, Moscow began to trust and cooperate. However, the Restart program did not succeed because the USA backed opposition forces in Ukraine. (Stent, 2018, p. 51).

According to a UK magazine published in January 2016, the USA plans to spend \$355 billion on military spending between 2015 and 2025. According to the Guardians, the USA's goal was to restore their nuclear program, and a new era of competition between Russia and the USA had begun. Since the Cold War, it had been a plan to restore the full

nuclear arsenal. "Putin wants the USA to accept Russian superpower, and the USA should act with Moscow as a superpower state," according to the Director of National Intelligence of the USA in October 2016. In terms of Ukraine and the Syrian crisis, Russia and the USA have had numerous disagreements. The annexation of Crimea strained relations between Russia and the USA. In many strategic areas, their military institutions have stopped cooperating. On October 3, 2016, Putin claimed that he had put an end to a 2000 agreement between the Russian and American governments regarding the use of plutonium. Due to the changing state of Russian-American relations, the US administration poses a strategic threat. Russia claimed that the USA had broken an agreement signed between the two countries, and that in order to protect the Russian Federation's security, the Kremlin had cancelled the agreement. In 2016, President Barack Obama's term came to an end, and the USA held presidential elections. Russia was monitoring the election process, but the US administration accused Russia of hacking and cyberattacking USA's internal policies and stealing Democratic Party documents. In the end, all documents and secrets of Democrats, particularly Hilary Clinton's emails and chats, were published on the internet. (Stent, 2018, p. 53).

3.4.2. Russia and the USA (Putin and Trump period)

The USA administration investigated the cyberattack and stated that Russia was aware of it. "The Kremlin wanted to hack and publish all documents in order to influence the US elections and support Republicans Donald Trump," the US administration stated. Trump won the 2016 presidential election and became the president of the USA, surprising many world leaders because the USA's allies expected Hillary Clinton to win. Many accusations have been leveled against Russia, alleging that Moscow influenced the US presidential election. The Kremlin has dismissed these allegations, with Putin saying, "If the USA has any facts, they should provide them." Putin sent Trump a telegram in November 2016 congratulating him on his victory, and their first phone conversation took place on November 4. However, on January 28, 2017, Trump and Putin spoke on the phone as presidents of the USA of America. The world was waiting for their real gathering, but for a few months, the two leaders had only exchanged phone calls. (Vladimirovma, 2014, p. 26).

Both sides claimed during their first phone call that relations between Russia and the USA are not friendly. Both parties supported the normalization process of their

relationship, which Putin described as "extremely unsatisfied." Putin and Trump met for the first time at the G20 summit in Hamburg. Their meeting lasted nearly two hours, during which the two sides discussed various aspects of their relationship, including the state of their foreign policies toward each other and global politics. The second meeting took place on November 11, 2017 at the APEC summit, where Putin and Trump agreed in a joint statement on Syria. Putin did not meet with Trump during his first presidency in an official and comprehensive manner. Their meetings took place at international summits, but there were no official visits between the two parties. According to diplomats and experts, relations between Russia and the USA have reached their lowest point since the collapse of the USSR. The root of their sour and icy relations was the USA's internal policy issues; many Americans suffer from Russophobia. During their elections, both Democrats and Republicans used Russophobia in their campaigns, and the US administration claimed that Russia influenced the outcome. The Russian FSB has been blamed by USA intelligence agencies for cyberattacks and the use of social media as a tool of manipulation during presidential elections. The USA presidential elections were hacked in January 2017, according to 17 American special services, and Russia was one of the perpetrators. Trump claimed that "anyone, including Russia, could hack the Democratic Party's server," but he didn't elaborate, and his response was vague. The "Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act," which included a new anti-Russian sanction, was signed by Trump in August 2017. This Act stipulated that the president of the USA of America could not lift the sanctions without the consent of Congress. This law, according to Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, marks the start of a trade war between Russia and the USA, which will last decades. The Ministry of Finance requested the creation of a list of Russian political actors and businessmen who are close to the Kremlin administration under this Act. Democrats Senators forwarded a 200-page report titled "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for US National Security" to Trump. The purpose of this report was to persuade Trump to implement new anti-Russia sanctions. Due to Russia's threat to the West, Congress also wanted to form a new global front that included EU members. When Trump took office, the world's expectations for Russian-American relations were drastically different. According to experts, Trump will be a pro-Russian leader, and their relationship will improve. The Kremlin, on the other hand, was confronted with a slew of

new sanctions. "Our Western partner does not want to talk and find a solution," Putin said calmly, "instead they are pushing with their sanctions." (Vladimirovma, 2014, p. 26).

The USA's Ministry of Finance released the "Kremlin Report" on January 29, 2018, which included a list of Russian officials, businessmen, and close associates of the Kremlin. Medvedev was also included in this list. Russia did not take asymmetric actions, and Putin has stated numerous times that the US sanctions would be detrimental to both sides. Before imposing these sanctions, the USA released its National Security Strategy, which stated that "Russia and China compete with the USA, and they pose a threat to their development and security." According to the US administration, nuclear weapons would be one of the most important tools for deterring Russian aggression. When the Ukrainian conflict is resolved, the relationship between Russia and the USA will return to normal. "We don't have illusions about Russian foreign policy," USA Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said. "Moscow is a threat to us and East Europe, as evidenced by Russian military influence in Ukraine and Georgia." Since 2014, one of the main issues between Russia and the USA has been the Ukrainian conflict, which has had little impact on the Syrian situation. In the case of Syria, the US and its allies backed the opposition, while Russia, rather than Iran, was the only powerful country to back Assad. Putin's official foreign policy strategy toward the West was revealed by his support for Assad. "Russia is a powerful state that can make decisions in foreign policy strategy without the influence of outside powers," one could say of this action. The USA Minister of Defense announced a new National Security Strategy in January 2018, stating that "the big problem of US security now isn't terrorism, but strategic competition between states like Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea." When the USA announced their National Security Strategy, they stated that they would begin work on their nuclear deal as well as the development of their continental ballistic missiles. Russia responded asymmetrically as well, announcing plans to expand their military capabilities and claiming that the "Russian administration guarantees their security and defense." Putin slammed the USA nuclear deal, saying, "Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia, Russian allies, whether it is a minimum, medium, or hard attack, will be counted as an attack on the Russian Federation, and the response will be immediate and asymmetric." It was the first time Putin had made a scathing remark about the USA's nuclear policy. Because the USA unilaterally terminated a missile defense agreement, Russia has begun to formulate a new foreign policy in terms of military power toward the USA. (Vladimirovma, 2014, p. 27).

On June 27, 2018, the US president's national security adviser paid a visit to Moscow, and Putin met with him in the Kremlin. Their discussion focused on the Russian-American relationship, disarmament, the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, both parties agreed on the timing of Putin and Trump's official meeting. After three days in Moscow, the Pentagon released "Russian Strategic Intentions," which states that Russia poses not only a military but also a politico-ideological threat to the West. The Russian goal is to re-establish Russian influence in post-Soviet states. "Restore their image as a superpower state in the international arena," rather than promoting Moscow as a key regional player. The main goal of Russian foreign policy, according to US officials, is to defeat the USA. The long-awaited meeting between Putin and Trump took place in Helsinki on July 16, 2018. It was Putin and Trump's first full-format meeting; their conversation began in a one-on-one format. The world's political leaders awaited the outcome of their meeting and the course of events. Putin and Trump discussed the ways in which Russian-American relations can be normalized and developed. Putin met with USA's President Donald Trump's national security adviser, John Bolton, for the second time in October 2018. Bolton also meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, and a Russian Security Council Secretary. The purpose of the visit was to talk about the Russian-American relationship and its evolution. Putin paid a visit to Paris on November 11, 2018, to mark the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I. (Stent, 2020, p. 28).

Putin and Trump had a discussion in that event, but the results of their meeting were not properly announced due to the closed door meeting. The official documents were not signed; instead, Putin and Trump had an oral discussion. Putin and Trump will meet again at the G20 summit in Argentina on December 1, 2018. Putin and Trump discussed the situation in the Kerch Strait, as well as the conflict in Ukraine. Their meeting yielded no official or substantive outcomes in their political relationship. Putin and Trump had two phone conversations and one official full-format meeting in 2018. This is insufficient to resolve their conflict and rivalry, but unfortunately, between 2017 and 2018, Putin and Trump did not have extensive contact. (Stent, 2020, p. 51).

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump met only a few times, their foreign ministers had extensive meetings and relationships. Between 2015 and 2016, Lavrov had 130 phone calls and 30 official meetings with Kerry.

During Trump's presidency, Lavrov met Tillerson for the first time at the G20 Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Lavrov spoke about the political relationship between Russia and the USA, as well as the economy and the market. Tillerson visited Moscow and met with Lavrov and Putin, during which the parties discussed their political relationship and the resolution of some of their disagreements. Following the Ukrainian conflict, Russia and the USA were confronted with the Syrian conflict, which has yet to be resolved. As a result, Russia convened an interstate forum on the Syrian conflict with Iran and Turkey, which was held in Sochi. Turkey, Iran, and Russia formed a new coalition as a result of the forum's outcomes. The goal was to solve the Syrian conflict by working together, but the USA administration was not pleased with that picture. Ankara was unable to reach an agreement because Turkey is a USA's ally and a NATO member. The Russian goal was to draw the attention of USA allies and demonstrate their power over them. In February 2018, an international coalition led by the USA clashed with the pro-government Syrian army in Deira Zora province, which included Russian citizens. The situation was critical between two coalitions, and it threatened to ignite a war between two superpowers. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the incident had nothing to do with their army or soldiers. In response, the USA claimed that Russian aggression and threat compelled their coalition to respond quickly. In addition, the USA has used economic and political sanctions against Russia as a tool of its foreign policy; since 2014, the US has sanctioned over 700 Russian companies. Russia's foreign policy toward the USA began to deteriorate, and their relationship began to deteriorate. The reason for this was the USA administration's announcement of restrictions on Russian diplomatic and consular representation. The Russian General Consulate in San Francisco was closed, as were their trade representations in New York and Washington. This action marks the beginning of their diplomatic relationship's demise. The US announced the persona non grata of 60 Russian diplomats, including 12 UN mission staff, at the end of March 2018. In exchange, Russia did not take asymmetric action; instead, Putin invited USA's diplomats to the Kremlin for dinner. "By having dinner with our USA partners, we promote our friendship toward their administration, even if they send back our diplomats," Putin claimed. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 50).

The USA did not stop at sending diplomats to Russia; on August 8, 2018, Washington announced the USA law, which was passed in 1991. In relation to Russia, "on the control of chemical and biological weapons and the prohibition of their military

use." The US administration stated that sanctions will not be lifted "as long as Russia continues to use chemical and biological weapons." As a result, Russia implemented asymmetric and mirror measures. When the USA administration decided to withdraw its troops from Syria, the competition between Russia and the USA on the Syrian conflict came to an end. However, the USA's troops did not immediately withdraw; instead, the USA administration announced that an international coalition would remain in Syria to control the situation. However, as part of a deal, Russia gained control of the Syrian conflict, and Moscow became the region's dominant power. One of Syria's opposition groups claimed that the government's military had used chemical weapons, and the USA blamed Moscow. Because of Russia's support for Assad, Trump claimed that "Russia will pay a high price." Their relationship was on a roller coaster, and anything could happen at any time. The USA demonstrated their determination to exacerbate tensions by claiming that "if there is a need to clash with Russia, we are ready." On April 14, the USA, the UK, and France bombed Syria, knowing that Russian troops were present. In terms of political analysis and thought, it could be seen as a provocation by Western powers toward Russia. Perhaps the USA awaited an asymmetric response from Russia in order to blame Moscow for military crimes. Then force them to angle, but Moscow pays no attention to the West's bombing. Putting characterized the USA's action as inept and a threat of war with Russia. (Dmitrevich, 2021, 51).

The Idlib conflict, in which the Syrian government bombed anti-government groups in Idlib, created a tense situation between Russia and the USA. The USA has urged Russia and Iran to refrain from assisting Syria in the operation. Putin, on the other hand, stated that the international arena should include and prevent conflict between government and anti-government groups. It could result in a large number of casualties, which is why Russia ignored the USA's request. The situation was tense until Russia and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding in Idlib province to stabilize the situation. From the start of the Syrian conflict, Russia's administration has backed Assad, despite the USA's interests in the region. The US coalition sent their frigates and destroyer USAS ROSS with USAS Sullivans even during the Idlib conflict. One comes from the Mediterranean Sea, while the other comes from the Persian Gulf. Since the start of the war, Russia has mobilized one of the most powerful military groups, and Russian frigates have been stationed near Syrian shores. Trump wanted to pull their troops out, but in a letter, he decided to keep them. The goal was for them to gain more power and influence

in Syria. Because of Russia's and Iran's support for the Syrian government (two anti-American countries), the USA decided to station troops in Syria and press Iran to withdraw its troops. Trump decided to withdraw his troops from Syria at the end of 2018, but the international coalition power would remain in Syria. Putin also declared the Syrian war to be over when he visited the country and declared, "Our anti-terror war is over, we completed our mission." In the end, Russian forces took control of Syria, including the province of Idlib. However, the province of Idlib remains a contentious and problematic area.

At the start of 2019, the UAE established diplomatic relations with Syria, but Trump began to threaten USA's allies in the Middle East. He claimed that "those who initiate diplomatic relations with the USA will be subjected to USA's sanctions." Russia, on the other hand, backed Syria and advised its allies to establish ties with Damascus. It was a diplomatic competition between Russia and the USA to see who could be the most powerful and assertive in the Middle East. The USA has re-imposed sanctions on Russian legal entities and individuals, as well as Russian ships that supply fuel to Russian aerospace forces. "It will not stop our ships and military forces from supporting our base in Syria," Russia's foreign ministry said in response to the US sanctions. Furthermore, Russia claimed that in the Syrian conflict, Moscow and Washington are on opposing sides, making finding a solution to the conflict together impossible. (Dmitrevich, 2021, p. 52).

In January 2019, the USA announced its unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Medium-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), which was signed between the USSR and the USA. Washington blamed Moscow for breaking their agreement, claiming that Russia did not eliminate all of their INF. Putin declared Russia would act asymmetrically and signed the same decree, withdrawing Moscow from the Treaty. In addition, the USA terminated their Missile Defense Agreement, which Russia had requested prior to the Ukrainian conflict. As it was during the Cold War, it was the start of a new era of competition. According to many academics and political actors, "the new Cold War era between Russia and the USA began in 2008 and accelerated in 2014," and we can now see competition rather than cooperation in their foreign policy toward each other. Due to the sanctions imposed on Russia's Duma members, Russian inter-parliamentary contact with the USA Congress has dwindled in recent years. Rather than improving and developing their relationship in terms of economy, politics, education, and

culture, they are deteriorating it. Russia and the USA could not develop their diplomatic relationship without contact between their political institutions. How can two countries develop diplomatic and political ties when the USA has declared many Russian diplomats *Persona non grata*? Aside from trade, other spheres began to decline in 2019. However, their trade increased by almost twofold. This could be due to Trump's background as a businessman, and thus his goal to improve their trade relationship. (Nikolaevna, and Lyovna, 2013, p. 1).

The USA and Turkey reached an agreement on the Syrian conflict in 2019, after the USA lost control of Idlib. Washington desired to make use of an ally. The agreements were aimed at creating a safe passage for Syrian refugees and putting an end to the fire. Prior to this agreement, Russia and Turkey had a dispute over the Idlib province. In the end, Russia and Turkey came to an agreement in Sochi, and the conflict was resolved. As a result of their agreements, Syria's borders, which are close to Turkey's, will be controlled by Russia and Turkey. The USA was a no-show for this agreement, and their clout in the Syrian conflict waned. Instead of finding a solution to the Russian-American conflict, Washington has exacerbated it. Many treaties and agreements that were signed between two states after much effort were canceled. The USA was the catalyst for this. Russia, on the other hand, took an asymmetrical approach. Because of the Kerch Strait incident, Russia and the USA had a tense relationship. Putin and Trump were supposed to meet at the G20 summit, but their meeting was canceled. Washington announced in a letter that it would be preparing a new set of sanctions against Russia. The USA has asked the European Union to drop the North Stream II project. In September 2019, Russia and Ukraine exchanged detainees under a "35 to 35" agreement, which Trump described as "one of the world's most significant actions." It was the first positive agreement between Russia and Ukraine since the conflict began, and the USA backed both sides in the agreement. The Venezuelan crisis was the next point of contention in Russia's foreign policy with the USA. Maduro, the legitimate president, began to compete with Guaido; in the end, Guaido declared himself president, and the USA administration recognized him as a legal government. In exchange, Russia backed Maduro, with Putin personally calling him to express his support, claiming that "the only legal administration in Venezuela is Maduro's." The Russian foreign ministry slammed the USA action, claiming that using military and arms would result in catastrophic consequences. The Russian government stated that they would stand by their strategic partners (Venezuela). The

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the USA intends to stage a coup in Venezuela and will use all available resources to achieve this goal. Russia and China backed Venezuela's legal system, and both used their veto power in the UNSC to block a resolution authorizing the use of military force in Venezuela. Following this incident, the USA imposed new sanctions against Russia, including adding "Eurofinance Mosnarbank" to the SDN list (Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons). This sanction was imposed as a result of Russian Bank's dealings with Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA). The USA has prohibited its companies from working with Mosnarbank, and the bank's participation in international payment systems such as Visa and Mastercard has been suspended. The USA wanted to strengthen their grip on the global economy and exert pressure on Russian businesses. The goal was to persuade Russia to withdraw its support for Maduro. However, the USA's foreign policy toward Russia did not work out in the Venezuelan conflict. Both sides dictated their positions and policies regarding the Venezuelan conflict, with one supporting Maduro and the other Guaido. In the last decade, Russia's position in the international arena has risen and become more powerful. As a result, Russia has refused to make concessions to the USA (Nikolaevna, and Lyovna, 2013, p. 1).

What will the relationship between Russia and the USA change after the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA? The National Interest of the USA administration would come first, and there are no significant changes in their relationship. The relationship between Russia and the USA will be influenced by the global situation; Trump's administration has had a rocky relationship with Russia. The world hasn't faced any major challenges; aside from sanctions and a reduction in their relationship level, the international arena hasn't seen anything. Scholars primarily use scenario analysis to assess the future of the Russian-American relationship. However, it is now difficult to analyze and promote the current state of Russian-American relations. Despite the fact that their relationship is uncertain, analytical scenarios are used in cases where there is a high level of uncertainty. It is difficult to say anything about Russian foreign policy toward the USA in this case; the only option is to formulate a few scenarios that could occur in the future. One scenario is that if Trump wins the election, the USA's foreign policy toward Russia will be more aggressive. The picture could be like this, with the US allies shifting their attention to the Russian side. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, for example, may shift their focus and support Russia. It will be extremely damaging the USA administration's

image, particularly in the international arena. If these countries become Russian allies, the USA will lose influence in the Middle East, as well as its military bases. From the Russian perspective, scenarios may vary depending on the situation. In the year 2020, the world is confronted with the Covid-19 virus, which has wreaked havoc on the American economy and political system. The USA is the most severely harmed by this virus; one of the world's most powerful countries has lost its power and potential in the face of the virus. As a result, the future political game may change, and Washington's influence over Russia and some regions may wane. The Kremlin, which would be suitable for Moscow, might attract the attention of the USA's allies. "USA's nuclear weapon modernization does not jeopardize nuclear parity with Moscow," is the only way to normalize Russian-American relations. When discussing European security issues, Russia's interests are taken into account. The lifting of economic sanctions and a mutual understanding on the Ukrainian crisis Cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and other global threats to be resumed. The USA will not seek to exacerbate tensions with China and Iran. "Moscow and Washington's coordinated response to the new crises in international relations." (Nikolaevna, and Lyovna, 2013, p. 1). This would be one of the best and most appropriate scenarios for Russian-American relations. If both parties sign off on this agreement, their relationship will begin to normalize. Otherwise, it is impossible to see Russia and the USA developing a close relationship.

CHAPTER 4

ATTEMPTING TO ANALYZE THE REASON BEHIND THE CHANGES IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE USA

4.1. Ideological Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy

In American and Western study, the topic of how to interpret Russian policy has frequently revolved around the issue of ideology. However, ideology is a loaded phrase, both in general and in Russia in particular (Roberts, 2017, p. 6), and there are a variety of differing opinions by scholars on the ideological foundations of the foreign policy of Russia.

Russia had, arguably, an ideological vacuum before Putin's third term, particularly under Boris Yeltsin. One of the main claims made by the Yeltsin administration was that once communism fell apart, Russian foreign policy became "de-ideologized." Kozyrev (1992a) declared an end to ideological confrontation in his first statement as Foreign Minister of the new Russian state, asserting that the 'developed countries of the West' were Russia's 'natural allies,' a sentiment later formalized in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA) draft of foreign policy guidelines (Kozyrev, 1992b, p. 2).

According to Donaldson and Noguee, the loss of ideology's formal stance, coupled with the collapse of the Communist Party of the USSR (CPSU) and the break - up of the USSR itself, left a conceptual emptiness in the newly independent Russian Federation's foreign policy, raising to the fore the question of Russia's national identity (Donaldson & Noguee, 1998, p. 38).

Putin initially exhibited little interest in ideology when he took power, but he is now thought to be following a developing narrative about Russia's position in the world. Putin, according to Arutunyan, has no philosophy other than to stay in power (Arutunyan, 2014, p. 190). This confirms an early consensus that Putin's Russia is devoid of ideology; yet others argue that this is evolving (Roberts, 2017, p.7). Putin opposes ideology out of fear of upheaval, preferring the "steady persistence of the present" (Morozova, 2009, p.

683). This indicates that no clear identity-based goals were established, which may explain why deriving meaning from Putin's actions has been so difficult. Beyond Russia's professed goals in being a great power and being acknowledged as one, it has been difficult to comprehend what motivates foreign policy (Roberts, 2017, p. 7).

Throughout the 1990s, dueling views of Russia's role in the world dominated Russian foreign policy debates—Eurasianism vs. Atlanticism vs. anything in between. Those who advocated for a non-identity-based expression of Russia's interests were victorious. The pragmatic Putin embodied this transition away from ideocracy (Roberts, 2017, p. 7). Morozova agrees, seeing a transition from "an ideology-permeated and mission-oriented foreign policy to an interest-driven, diverse, and pragmatic foreign policy" (Morozova, 2009). The rebuilding of Russia's history and envisioned future has returned in foreign policy thought with Putin's third term (Roberts, 2017, p. 7).

Magda Leichtova in *Misunderstanding Russia: Russian Foreign Policy and the West* offers a set of ideologies on which Russia bases its foreign policy. Leichtova (2016, p. 17) mentions that Geopolitics and a realist perspective of the international system are two of Russia's most important interpretive tools for understanding the international system. To deal with the old fear about the endangerment of its large territory and separatism, the Russian public and leadership appear to have embraced a prescription: a strong, powerful Russia (Leichtova, 2016, p. 17).

4.2. A Realist Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy

Sergunin (2016, p.27) writes that for international relations theorists, Russian foreign policy has always been an "uncomfortable" or "unusual" issue. Theories that they have attempted to apply to the analysis of Moscow's international trajectory in the post-Cold War era have either failed miserably or failed completely. Scholars who wish to apply Western theories to Russian foreign policy frequently find themselves having to defend their positions against claims that Russia is a unique case, and that empirical knowledge of Russia's history, culture, and current policies is far more important than theoretical sophistication in order to understand Moscow's international behaviour. According to the history of science, however, it is both ineffective and harmful to juxtapose theoretical knowledge with actual information. The ideal situation would be for them to work together and encourage one another. For example, some European experts on Russian foreign policy have correctly observed that "without theoretical reflection,

research on Russian foreign policy risks remaining a branch of area studies that relies on descriptive approaches while at the same time being replete with hidden commitments to dubious theoretical assumptions" (Forsberg et al. 2014, p. 262). To continue along this line of thinking, research that does not have theoretical grounding frequently lacks either the critical edge or the credibility. These theories of the Kremlin's post-Soviet foreign policy are critically examined in this chapter (Sergunin, 2016, p.27).

4.2.1. Realism

According to Bobo Lo (2002, pp. 103–18), the development of Russian foreign policy confirms three basic notions: zero-sum game logic, discussions on how to divide power in the system based on ideas like balance of power and spheres of influence. Even in the early 1990s, Russia's "liberal" or "pro-Western" policy did not fully disguise its realist, geopolitical, and power core (Leichtova, 2016, p. 21).

Zero-sum game logic is a way of interpreting how actors behave in international relations. Using this reasoning, we perceive assets (power, territory, money resources, etc.) as indivisible or irreproducible. Also, if one actor gets a portion of an asset, another must lose the same share; the amount is negated; one actor's loss equals the other's gain. In contrast to this, in non-zero game logic, the total may be positive or at least not nullified for all players. This might happen when sharing administration of an area or dividing spheres of influence. As should be obvious, our perceptions of others' motives and the likelihood of solutions influence our expectations, and therefore the actions we take to prepare for such circumstances (Leichtova, 2016, p. 21).

Russia's foreign policy is typically based on zero-sum reasoning. Lo claims that throughout the 1990s, this was "almost solely directed towards the USA" (Lo, 2002, p. 103). This claim is supported up by recent changes in Russian foreign policy, which restricts itself to a few Western governments whose rising power should be curbed or destroyed as a threat to others, including Russia. The NATO expansion is the most apparent example of this notion. Russia did not and does not accept the view of NATO expansion as creating a shared security region that benefits both Europe and Russia, which is institutionally linked to NATO. Instead, Russia's political elite views NATO as a threat to Russian security, or as a way to increase "Russophobia" among its members (Kosachev, 2010). Expanding NATO through armed actions outside member nations (primarily Kosovo and Iraq) reinforced this zero-sum game logic in Russian view of

bilateral ties. After both operations, the “arrogant” West gained a reputation for dismissing Russia's protests and disregarding its interests while abandoning its own values (Leichtova, 2016, p. 22).

Fear of a fresh wave of violence in Europe has led the West to employ unlawful force, writes Fyodor Lukyanov, editor in chief of Russia in Global Affairs Journal. And then another. While there were genuine humanitarian motivations in Kosovo, the Iraqi effort was built on falsehoods and deception from the start. Thus, liberal interventionism became ethically bankrupt. The line between using force for the greater good and using it for personal gain was razor thin. After 2000, the Russian Federation implemented a multi-vector approach that was more flexible, aggressive, and effective. Russia currently builds more flexible coalitions with diverse players in the international system depending on the situation (Leichtova, 2016, p. 23).

Leichtova (2016, p. 23) says that the West is the major focus of these power-balancing efforts. The multi-vector approach allows Russia to build a flexible network of alliances that are activated only if the different parties agree that they are essential. Unlike the relatively tight-knit alliance of Western powers, this style of coalition building allows participants to focus exclusively on certain shared interests, allowing Russia to create its own objectives and counterbalance the West's dominance globally.

4.2.1.1. Power Transition Theory

According to Western specialists on Russian foreign policy, the realism / neo-realist power transition theory (PTT) created by A.F.K. Organski (1958) and his successors Wittkopf (1997) and Tammen (2000) is the most widely accepted international relations theory (IR theory). In order to explain the reasons of international conflicts and wars, this theory proposes that rising powers, who are dissatisfied with international norms set by the existing countries, should rise to prominence. According to this idea, all states may be divided into two categories: those that maintain the status quo and those that are reformist. Powerful and prominent nations such as the USA, which have benefitted from the previously established world order, are classified as status quo states, whereas those unsatisfied with their position on the international spectrum are classified as revisionist states (Sergunin, 2016, p.27).

In establishing the PTT, it was assumed that a revisionist state seeks either a dramatic alteration in existing norms or the imposition of new rules on other international

players. Russian President Vladimir Putin's Russia, according to the PTT school, is a classic revisionist state. For example, analysts at the Heritage Foundation in the USA think that Russia offers four different, but connected, issues for the USA and other international players. These are as follows: As a starting point, Putin's administration calls into question fundamental democratic ideals by coupling a lack of respect for political, civil, and economic rights with a malfunctioning economic system. Russia, the world's second most hazardous country for the West, offers a variety of global strategic and diplomatic problems, including the development of a nuclear weapons and military capabilities. Russia also poses a danger to specific U.S. allies and favorable regimes across the world, including the Baltic States, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and the Republic of Georgia, as well as the Ukrainian and Georgian governments. Fourth, Russia's collaboration with "rogue" nations (such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea) and its rising proclivity to play a spoiler role offer a new set of dangers to the international community (Carafano 2015, p. 1). The supporters of the "revisionist" school of thought think that Russia maintains a zero-sum perspective of the world in terms of security. Total security is the objective, yet if achieved, it would result in absolute insecurity for everyone else on the planet. The Russian people have a great conviction in the military instrument, and the country has spent the previous decade concentrating on strengthening its military capacity. The program includes measures against smaller neighbors as well as against unlawful annexation (Granholt et al. 2014, pp. 10-25).

4.2.1.2. Peaceful Coexistence Concept

For the greater good, Lenin's creation of the policy of peaceful coexistence flowed naturally from his idea of world revolution. In accordance with this idea, a socialist revolution was conceivable in a single nation due to the unequal development of the world at the time. As a result, it was important to figure out how such a country would interact with the other countries that continued to be capitalists. Leninism recognized the possibility of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and socialist states, as well as the fact that it was in the interests of the working class in each country to avoid military confrontation. As a result, socialism should pursue a policy based on peaceful coexistence (Sergunin, 2016, p.38).

Ultimately, the goal of Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence was to limit the potential of armed conflict between Soviet Russia and the "capitalist camp," as well as to

make it more difficult for "war-mongering capitalist countries" to launch wars against the USSR. Insofar as capitalism persists, any reasonable socialist government would be forced to implement such a program. In reaction to the inability of the world revolution to successfully struggle for state power in the other nations, as well as the inevitability of a time of coexistence, Lenin attempted to find a means to deal with the contradictions that existed between the two systems. The attempts to maintain military peace, however, did not rule out the possibility of a different sort of conflict, according to Lenin. In the arguments about exchanging concessions, Lenin made the observation that "Concessions did not imply a peaceful coexistence with capitalism, but rather a battle in a new field. Economic warfare has taken the place of the conventional battle of guns and tanks " (Lenin 1970, p. 78).

The first worldwide exposition of Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence took place in Genoa, Italy, in April 1922, during the International Economic Conference. It was the goal of the Soviet delegation, led by Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin, to demonstrate Moscow's non-aggression intentions and to dispel unfavourable perceptions of the new Soviet state that had been created by the Bolsheviks' policy of "export of revolution." As Chossudovsky (1972) pointed out, Chicherin offered three fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence, which were as follows:

1. A fundamental topic of coexistence is the acknowledgment of the differences in property systems between capitalist and communist nations (...).
2. The primary goal of foreign policy and diplomacy in East-West relations is the settlement of all issues in dispute without resorting to force, i.e., by negotiation, rather than confrontation.
3. War is not an unavoidable outcome.

Interwar Russia (the 1920s–1930s) remained committed to the peaceful coexistence strategy, managing to attract Western investment and technologies to modernize the Soviet economy, join the League of Nations, and even engage in a dialogue with some European countries on the creation of a collective security system aimed at Nazi Germany during the interwar period (Hubarian 1976; Tsygankov 2012, pp. 97–171).

In spite of the fact that such a plan failed to prevent the outbreak of a second global war, its legacy was extremely beneficial for postwar peace-building and world-ordering efforts, including the formation of the United Nations organisation and the development

of international law. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (CPSU) in 1956, the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev raised the idea of peaceful coexistence to the rank of official Soviet ideology, a position that it has held since. Along with the Leninist concept and the principles of the UN Charter, the revised version drew heavily on the more recent Indian concept of Pancha Chila, or "Five Principles," which included principles such as coexistence, respect for the territorial and integral sovereignty of others, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of others, and the recognition of the equality of others (De Coning and colleagues, 2014, pp. 100–112). Peaceful coexistence was subsequently incorporated into the Communist Party of the USSR's Third Program (CPSU 1961, Chapter VIII), its revised form (CPSU 1986, Part 3, Chapter III), and the Soviet Constitution (CPSU 1977, Chapter III) (Konstitutsiya 1977, Chapter 4, Art. 28 and 29). Among the principles outlined in the latter two documents were an expanded list of principles such as sovereign equality, mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights of peoples and the right to determine their own destiny, international cooperation, arms control and disarmament, and fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals (CPSU 1986, Part 3, Chapter III; Konstitutsiya 1977, Chapter 4, Art. 29) (Sergunin, 2016, p.40).

In the Gorbachev period, the notion of peaceful coexistence has not only survived, but has also grown in strength as a result of his policies (see next chapter). The situation, on the other hand, has altered significantly since the collapse of the USSR. Under the Yeltsin and early Putin administrations, the notion of peaceful coexistence was virtually missing from the Russian political vocabulary, in contrast to its key place in Soviet foreign policy thought. The doctrine's ideas were still present in post-Soviet Russian thought and international policies, but the word itself was seen as mostly a historical event. It had such strong Marxist-Leninist overtones that many Russian audiences instinctively connected it with the Soviet era when they first saw it (Sergunin, 2016, p.40).

However, by the mid-2000s, the notion had been reintroduced. Initially, some Russian commentators used the phrase "cold peace" to allude to the establishment of a "cold peace" in ties between the USA and Russia under the Bush Jr. administration in a sarcastic manner. For example, in 2006, the Russian famous foreign policy expert Sergey Karaganov jokingly inquired whether Moscow and Washington would be "going back to

peaceful coexistence?" suggesting that the two nations' foreign policies were founded on fundamentally different ideas than one another (Karaganov, 2006). There are a variety of factors that contribute to Moscow's increased interest in the notion of peaceful coexistence. The Kremlin realised, first and foremost, that previous models of Russia's relations with the West, such as comprehensive security (late Gorbachev's era), Russia as the West's "younger partner" (Kozyrev's era), cooperative security (late Yeltsin's and early Putin's periods), strategic (or just) partnership (second Putin's and Medvedev's administrations), Russian foreign policy experts saw the return to an ancient, tried-and-true, and—on the surface—reliable foreign policy idea as a natural next step in the quest for a suitable doctrinal foundation for Moscow's international strategy (Sergunin, 2016, p.40).

Furthermore, since the mid-2000s, Moscow has grown increasingly dissatisfied with the West's unwillingness to recognize Russia's global and regional interests and regard her as an equal player in international affairs. Russia began to rethink its foreign policy after Putin's speech in Munich in 2007. It was at this point that the Kremlin began to be more assertive in its foreign policy (Putin 2007). In the course of time, the Russian-Western debates on international problems were exacerbated by fundamental differences in interpretation of fundamental principles such as democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights, freedom of expression, and an independent mass media, among other things. With each passing day, the West's criticism of the Putin government became stronger, with accusations of authoritarianism and human rights abuses levelled against it. Both the West and Russia, in a similar vein to the Cold War era, had a tendency to feel that they belonged to, if not antagonistic, then at the very least to distinct sociopolitical systems. Accordingly, the Russian government regarded the coexistence concept as an appropriate strategy to working with its Western counterparts in these circumstances (Sergunin, 2016, p. 41).

4.2.1.3. Soft Power Concept

As a result of Russia's new / old foreign policy ideology of "coexistence" and reformism, the hunt for international tactics that are alternatives to hard power approaches has gained momentum. The idea of soft power, created by Joseph Nye (2004), was deemed important to the new Russian foreign strategy by the Kremlin in 2004. If we look back at the development of the soft power idea in Russia, we can see that it became

appealing to the country's leadership as early as Vladimir Putin's second presidential term, which spanned from 2004 to 2008. The notion originated in the context of the Kremlin's more active actions in the so-called "near abroad" (i.e., in the post-Soviet area) in particular, as Moscow sought to cement its authority among those it believed to be its countrymen in the region at the time (Sergunin, 2016, p. 45).

The "Russian World" idea, which encompassed Russian speakers residing in other countries, was launched as part of the initial iteration of a soft security policy, and it has since become widely accepted. The succession of "colour" revolutions in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 served as a catalyst for the emergence of the discussion over Russian soft power in the region. Soft power was used by the Kremlin to promote economic, political, and socio-cultural integration in the post-Soviet area, with the assistance of the idea of soft power. Its earlier policies in the region were mostly geared toward the privileged. In practice, this meant protecting the positions of local regimes at the price of Russia's security and economic interests (which was frequently the case) (Sergunin, 2016, p. 45).

It seemed, however, that pro-Russian administrations were ousted from power in several CIS countries (for example, Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine), and that their successors frequently chose to play the anti-Russian card in order to maintain their positions of power. The popular support for integration with Russia is now insufficient, even in the most stable and historically pro-Russian nations, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus. Through the use of soft power methods, Russia seeks to enhance their worldwide image and strengthen their appeal to both elites and societies in the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The need to improve Russia's international image—not only in the CIS countries, but also throughout the world—followed the "five-day war" with Georgia in August 2008 and public protests against alleged fraud during the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections, both of which were held in Moscow (Sergunin, 2016, p. 45).

To improve Russia's image as a "aggressive" and "undemocratic" country in order to make it more appealing to international partners, the Kremlin started a huge propaganda effort in the fall of 2014. This objective was seen to be particularly crucial in terms of Moscow's ties with the European Union. On the one hand, it was seen as a vital international actor, as well as Russia's most important trading partner and as a source of investment and technological know-how. For its part, Russia's primary critic was the

European Union in areas such as human rights, the lack of progress in legal and administrative reforms, and the fight against corruption, among other things (Makarychev and Sergunin 2013).

For example, the idea of soft power gained popularity in the Russian political lexicon during the 2012 presidential campaign, particularly in the so-called "programmatic" essays written by Vladimir Putin (2012). Putin pledged in these writings that Russia would become an appealing and dependable international partner that would be open to collaboration with other countries. Furthermore, following the 2012 presidential election, it became necessary to reexamine the notion of foreign policy. According to President Putin's order of May 7, 2012 (which was released immediately following his inauguration), the fundamental aims of the preceding model had not been fulfilled as of that date (Putin 2012). The failure to use soft power tools, according to Putin, was one of the causes that hindered Russia from taking "firm and respected positions in the international community," as required by the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept (Medvedev 2008), as well as other issues. According to the Kremlin, Russia was trailing behind other major international players that had already established and began to apply their soft power doctrines but claimed that this was due to a lack of resources (Sergunin, 2016, p. 46).

Constantin Kosachev (ex-director of Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian government agency responsible for relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russian citizens living abroad) believes that Russia has maintained hard power parity with other major international players, but that Russia is lagging behind these players when it comes to soft power (Kosachev 2012b). According to the Russian Foreign Policy Concept published in 2013, soft power is being utilised by some international players in a harmful and illegal manner (Putin 2013a). Russian analysts frequently make comparisons to the USA, which they believe prefers to employ soft power as a complement to military and coercive tools rather than as its sole foreign policy instrument (Konyshev and Sergunin 2012; Kubyshev and Tzvetkova 2013). Many Russian specialists are also becoming increasingly persuaded by Nye's concept of smart power, according to which "hard and soft [power] reinforce one other" in a smart power strategy (Nye 2013). However, while these analysts believe that Russia should emulate American "best practises," they believe that the country should also strive to build a more successful model of soft power strategy. Following his re-election in 2012, President

Putin called on Russian foreign policymakers to consider the use of non-traditional foreign policy instruments, such as soft power tools, in their country's foreign policy. President Vladimir Putin (Putin, 2012b).

The necessity for Russia to develop soft power capabilities was also recognised in the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which was published in February 2013 and elevated to the rank of official Kremlin doctrine at that time. When the Kremlin began to show an increased interest in the idea of soft power, it was at the same time that Russia's foreign policy thought underwent significant transformations (which were described earlier). Notably, the Russian political leadership and academic community have understood soft power in ways that are distinct from Nye's original interpretation of the idea. In Nye's view, soft power is one of three viable methods for an actor to exert power and achieve his or her objectives: force; money; or attraction; and he links soft power with the latter of these three methods. However, as Nye points out, countries such as China and Russia, who have publicly declared their support for the soft power idea for a variety of reasons, have failed to draw the attention of targeted worldwide audiences. According to Nye, one of the most fundamental mistakes made by China and Russia was that they did not recognise that they were at war with each other "It is not necessary for the growth of soft power to be a zero-sum game. All countries can benefit from the fact that they find each other appealing " (Nye 2013).

Many Chinese and Russian soft power programmes pursue explicitly pragmatic, interest-based aims rather than attempting to take into account the interests of foreign partners, and as a result, they are often viewed with scepticism or even hostility by international partners. For the most part, Russian political leaders have approached the concept of soft power in a most practical and instrumental manner. Initially, Moscow regarded it as a political tool to influence the behaviour of its countrymen in former USSR nations. For example, in 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2008) stated that "soft power"—the capacity to influence the environment via civilizational, humanitarian, cultural, foreign policy, and other kinds of attractiveness—is playing an increasingly important role in today's world. I believe that the whole grammar of our various connections with our fellow citizens should be built specifically with these considerations in mind. Starting in 2012, with the commencement of Putin's third presidential term, the Kremlin shifted its definition of soft power to a wider, albeit still instrumentalist, perspective. Its soft power strategy is today seen as a collection of foreign policy "tools"

that aid in the achievement of Moscow's objectives in relation to specific countries and, more broadly, the strengthening of Russian positions across the world (not only in the CIS) (Sergunin, 2016, p. 47).

Thus, according to the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, soft power has become an indispensable component of contemporary international politics, and is a complex set of instruments for resolving foreign policy tasks backed by civil society, information and communication technology (ICT), humanitarian aid and other methods and technologies, as an alternative to traditional diplomacy (Putin 2013a). It is widely believed that the development of Russia's favourable image abroad is a high-priority objective in the country's soft power strategy. To accomplish this, as stated in the preceding doctrine, it is necessary to invest in and develop "effective means of informing and influencing public opinion in foreign countries," as well as to strengthen Russian language and culture's international standing by recruiting and supporting compatriots (Putin 2013a). Sergunin and Karabeshkin (2015) and Tsygankov (2013) are among the notable Russian thinkers who have linked the notion of soft power to a new, broader interpretation of security (Sergunin, 2016, p. 47).

The soft (non-military) dimensions of "security" according to these analysts include economic, political, societal, environmental, human, and information strands in the post-Cold War era. "Security" is defined as "the ability to protect oneself from harm." Furthermore, they assert that power in international relations is gradually altering its character; it is becoming less coercive and supplier. This school of thought believes that military power is associated with the use of force, whereas soft power is associated with non-military attributes such as a viable economy, political strength, a healthy society, environmentally friendly production and consumption practices, an appealing culture, and effective public diplomacy. In other words, the Russian Institute of International Relations proposes a different and larger view of the notion of soft power than Nye's definition. However, it encompasses all non-military instruments and resources accessible to international players, including diplomatic and humanitarian assistance. The notion of soft power, as defined by Nye, is in conflict with this since he eliminates coercion as well as economically motivated persuasion (referred to as 'payment' in his language) from the definition of soft power.

4.2.1.4. Status Theories

This theory is particularly effective in understanding Russia's allegedly "irrational," "unpredictable," "emotional," and "voluntaristic" conduct, which has been characterized as "irrational," "unpredictable," and "voluntaristic." The rationalist international relations theories, including as PTT, soft power, and notions of peaceful coexistence, are frequently inadequate to explain why Moscow behaves in ways that are counter to its stated national interests. To provide an example, Russia was opposed to an expansion in NATO's military presence on its western borders; yet the Ukrainian conflict, which was largely sparked by Moscow, ultimately resulted in NATO's military build-up in Eastern Europe. As a result of the conclusion of the Cold War, Russia did not want to alienate Ukraine from itself, and it sought to maintain cordial ties with this nation no matter what kind of political administrations were in power in Kiev. Although it tried, it was unable to develop positive ties with the post-Yanukovych administration, opting instead to annex Crimea and provide assistance to the Donbass rebels, while Ukraine grew increasingly anti-Russian and pro-Western in its policies (Sergunin, 2016, p. 59).

Among the many examples of Russia's "irrational" and "self-destructive" actions on the world stage that cannot be explained by "traditional" international relations theory are the following: State-sponsored theories of status attempt to deal with the non-rational factors that influence a state's foreign policies, focusing on drives such as self-esteem, reputation, resentment and anger as well as shame and sympathy as well as honor, dignity, and glory, among other emotional and psychological categories, which frequently clash and cause a country's international course to become chaotic and unpredictable. It should come as no surprise that the status theories were derived from disciplines like as social psychology and social anthropology and adopted by IR (Sergunin, 2016, p. 60).

For example, between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, a body of international relations study arose that was concerned with the link between conflict and status consistency / inconsistency. It was the goal of this group of scholars to establish a link between status inconsistency (the situation in which a certain state believes that it is being treated by other states in a manner that is inconsistent with its (often self-perceived) status) and violent conflict (war). This sort of research was then carried on by studies on the roles of status deficiency and worries in the start of various regional wars, among other things. In order to avoid the sheer empiricism that characterizes status-related studies, several academics have attempted to develop IR-based status theories (for

example, Renshon (2013) proposed a methodology of network-based measurements of international status). (Sergunin, 2016, p. 60).

Sergunin (2016, p. 60) writes that in the 2000s, a corpus of academic work that investigated the role of status in world politics from a variety of international relations perspectives began to emerge. To be sure, traditional international relations paradigms, including those associated with neo-realism and liberalism, tended to place emphasis on material interests such as survival and economic gain, viewing status as being primarily determined by the military and economic capabilities of the states involved in the conflict. In the case of the postpositivist schools, the idea of status was not initially considered a priority analytical category for their study agenda, either. Instead of stressing the relevance of status or prestige concerns in state action, social constructivism, for example, prefers to highlight the importance of identity and norms (Onuf, 2013).

Nevertheless, constructivism, with its emphasis on identities, norms, and intersubjective interactions, has opened the way for theoretical approaches that are centered on psychological elements of foreign policy decision-making and conduct in the international arena (Shannon and Kowert 2012). When it comes to post-Cold War Russian foreign policy, arguments on whether Russia's major objective has been to rebuild and enhance its place as a great power in world affairs or to obtain certain material benefits and secure its security began to take shape (Sergunin, 2016, p. 60).

As would be expected, these debates were more heated under the Putin administration, when Moscow's foreign policy has been increasingly forceful, with the Kremlin being even more sensitive to the need to preserve its interests as well as its standing in the international community. The breakup of the USSR, which President Putin considers to be the biggest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century, and the resulting loss of superpower status have put Russia in an agonizingly precarious position, according to some analysts. While Russia's nuclear arsenal still qualifies it for the top tier, its performance in nearly every other area has placed it among countries that were, until recently, considered to be inferior to Russia. Forsberg et al. (2014) argue that this relatively sudden development has resulted in a state of status inconsistency, if not "status panic," from which post-Soviet Russia is still struggling to emerge. Moreover, as Richard Pipes (2009) points out, Moscow's desire for great power status can take on obsessive characteristics, particularly because "Russians suspect deep down in their hearts that their claim to great power status is dubious—that they are not truly a great power in economic,

political, or military terms." In the words of the American scholar, "this obsession serves to compensate for the inferiority complex that a majority of Russians experience when compared to genuine great powers, such as the USA." (Sergunin, 2016, p. 61).

According to Hanna Smith (2014), Russia has been a status underachiever since 1991 in that it has not consistently been recognized as a great power internationally, while at the same time great powerness has been assumed, for historical and geopolitical reasons, as has been stated for the Russian population and political elites. This misalignment between great powerness as a component of one's self-identity and the real status of a state in international politics can lead to misperceptions and misunderstandings on both sides, which can eventually lead to potentially deadly tensions. Andrei Tsygankov (2012) and Andrei Tsygankov (2014, p. 353) both stress the importance of emotions in Russia's ties with the USA. In his opinion, the metaphor of "sibling rivalry" might be useful in portraying ties between Russia and the USA, but he cautions that "family quarrels" may be particularly difficult to reconcile or keep under control. In the opinion of Tsygankov (2014, p. 353), the perspective of sibling rivalry suggests that sharing power and status may not be sufficient to resolve current problems in Russian-Western relations; rather, what may be required is an ongoing process of extending to Russia social recognition and including it as an equal participant in various economic, political, and security projects. Russian-Western cultural interdependence is shown by the metaphor of a family fight. Only through learning to accept each other's values can Russia and the West make progress in their bilateral ties, according to the metaphor. Additional incentives for IR theorists to apply different analytical approaches to the study of Moscow's international behavior included Russia's tough stance in the Ukrainian conflict and its determination to demonstrate political and military power, as seen in the Syrian case, as well as the Syrian civil war. For some (neo-realist) scholars, Russia's assertive turn in foreign policy is simply a symptom of the ongoing struggle for power and security in the international anarchy (Mearsheimer 2014; Sergunin 2014b), whereas for others (constructivists and post-structuralists), Russia's assertive turn in foreign policy has more to do with national identity and internal politics. According to this point of view, Russia's current behavior is primarily motivated by its fear of losing its great power status (Tsygankov, 2016, pp. 251–255;). Even prior to the Ukrainian conflict, many academics argued that status considerations had surpassed pure security and economic concerns on Russia's foreign policy agenda, and that this was particularly true in the wake of the

Russian military intervention in Syria. Those who disagree with us point out that this has been the case for ages.

Sergunin (2016, p. 63) mentions that Richard Sakwa (2008) believes that the historical "Russia Problem" is not about the security challenge but rather about Russia's ability to acquire the status and respect from the West that it expects. The same is true for Russia, according to Iver Neumann (2005), who believes that the country's primary concern in Europe may not be a one of security per se, but rather one of Russia's standing in respect to other European powers. In Russia's ties with the West, concerns of status have been increasingly prominent. In several studies, the absence of real acknowledgment of Russia's great power status and equality with other Western great powers has been cited as a key cause for Russia's refusal to cooperate with the West on a variety of topics. The general consensus is that status concerns contribute to poor decision-making since foreign policy is driven more by emotions than by logical interests, which is a common criticism.

The psychological complex described by the Russian preoccupation with being a great power, according to some experts (Casula 2010; Malinova 2014; Morozov 2009; Pipes 2009; Smith 2005 and 2014), underlies Russia's unpredictable and aggressive conduct. Other scholars argue that Russia's emphasis on status is a logical response to the West's disregard for it following the end of the Cold War (Sergunin, 2016, p. 63).

4.2.1.5. Pragmatism

A basic paradox in Russia's foreign policy may appear to be the mix of a language of national interests with typically cooperative, pragmatic diplomatic conduct. Russia's pragmatism is dominant not despite its national interests, but precisely because sensible pragmatism is now best supporting what Russia considers to be its essential interests (Casier, 2006, p. 385).

Russia's foreign policy toward the West may be described as pragmatic since it is guided by the realities of domestic and international structural limitations rather than idealistic notions. It is goal-oriented, willing to make concessions, and typically avoids confrontations. Russian diplomacy's pragmatism, according to former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (2002, p. 33), is defined by "a sober and realistic assessment of Russia's status and role in international affairs, free of any ideological biases and clichés." Whether pragmatism was a feature of the early years of post-communism is a point of dispute. For

example, Bobo Lo (2002, 7) says that foreign policy has not been de-ideologized, but rather that ideological consistency has been lost. With the appointment of Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, marks the beginning of realistic foreign policy. Prior to Primakov, there was a period of transition from 1991 to 1995, during which it was difficult to detect continuity (Casier, 2006, 387).

The fear of isolation following the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe explains a lot of Russia's foreign policy. Russia wants its new post-communist status as a "normal" country to be acknowledged by the rest of the world. Because this indicates that Russia should be recognized as a part of the Western community, this recognition can only come from 'the West,' namely the EU and its main member states, as well as the USA. (Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002).

4.2.2. Geopolitics

Classical geopolitics, to be precise, is geopolitics as it is commonly understood, with the label classical added to distinguish it from critical geopolitics, which is more modern and left leaning (Wu, 2017, p. 2). "Geographic space is treated as an essential pre-condition for all politics," according to classical geopolitics (Wu, 2017, p.1). The portrayal of a world of sea power vs. land power, heartland vs. rimland, maritime vs. continental, and so on were all part of traditional geopolitics. States are always in a condition of existential rivalry, which can lead to conflicts (Wu, 2017, p. 6).

The contributions of three significant geopolitical philosophers are often regarded as the foundation of classical geopolitics: American political scientist Nicholas John Spykman, American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, and British political geographer Halford John Mackinder. Because the three theories are similar in character and complement one another, they might be considered a "organic entirety." They provided the most important foundation for subsequent geopolitical thought and analysis (Wu, 2017, p. 5).

According to Leichtova (2016, p. 17) acceptance of the geopolitical approach of observing and understanding the world system is a prerequisite for studying Russian foreign policy. This method is typical in that we see the world as a collection of different "pan regions" that are defined primarily by geographical factors: for example, a continental mass and the specific landscape and climate associated with it; an independent continent that serves as a natural barrier separating it from its surroundings; or a region

characterized by a similar way of life on various shores. Each such region is thus connected by a certain form of political structure and a shared technique of societal organisation in the geopolitical view of the international system. These areas are also considered to have the "character of a distinct civilization," with clearly defined centers and peripheries. Geopolitics has historically served as the primary tool of direction in the international system for Russian elites (Leichtova, 2016, p. 18).

The interest shown by prominent political figures in developing geopolitical theories of varying quality and form demonstrates the relevance of geopolitics in understanding and interpreting the international system in Russian perspectives of the world. Such representatives from opposition parties include, for example, Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, or Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the long-time leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party and nationalist, who is best known for his book *The Final Thrust South*, in which he defends the expansion of Russia's borders to the Indian Ocean with an inherent air of chauvinism and imperialism (Leichtova, 2016, p. 18).

Russia's foreign policy is largely based on the concept of polarity in the international system: in other words, it seeks to identify key power centers in the system, including who they are, who they are allies with, and how many and how powerful the international system's poles of power are. The Russian elite considers the trend toward unipolarity under the hegemony of the USA to be undesirable since it relates to the belief in Russia's cultural distinctiveness and power significance, which would be undervalued in a unipolar system. Furthermore, bipolarity, which is defined as the division of determining power in the international system between the USA and Russia, is an unrealistic goal in the current period of Globalisation (Leichtova, 2016, p. 19).

Leichtova, (2016, p. 19) continues to say that Russia has emerged as a prominent proponent of the multipolar arrangement of the international system, with the Russian Federation serving as a representation of one of the poles, as expressed via by its officials and by the publication of foreign policy papers. The tendency to interpret the international system as several universal poles of power with a group of dependents or sympathizers, rather than as a postmodern and impenetrable network of specialized actors creating their own status in multilevel and multi-themed relations with surrounding actors, can be observed even in this context. It is apparent from such a conception of international relations that the geopolitical viewpoint, which is committed to establishing the areas of

influence, conflicts, and collaboration of various poles of power, is the most appropriate framework for gaining an understanding of this system (one of them being Russia).

Many renowned experts have warned of Putin's revanchist foreign policy aims, and there has been a chorus of doubt regarding Russia's claimed motivations for military intervention in Ukraine. The conventional opinion is that Putin's game is geopolitics and balancing against Western dominance; other motives, particularly those Putin has expressed, have gotten less attention (Roberts, 2017, p. 3). Geopolitics—the “old school battles” for territory and military power—cannot explain Putin's behaviour on its own, but it may have influenced his ideational narrative. All three post-Soviet Russian presidents have expressed worry about Western encroachment, particularly NATO expansion, but these warnings have mostly gone unheeded by Western officials and researchers (Roberts, 2017, p. 3).

Geopolitical debate, on the other hand, is hardly unfamiliar territory, even among the governing elite. Aside from the official nature of Russian foreign policy papers, it would be appropriate to recall President Putin's well-known remark, in which he referred to the fall of the USSR as “the biggest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century” (cited for example by Allen, 2005). Aside from this quote, the attempts to portray Russia as a superpower capable of countering the trend towards unipolarity in the international system under the leadership of the USA, as well as the actual concept of multi-vector policy aimed at key players in individual world regions, support statements about the geopolitical essence of Russia's view of the world” (Leichtova, 2016, p. 19)

Russian foreign policy's geopolitical underpinnings have been tested historically and are beneficial at the moment. They emphasize Russia's civilizational and cultural distinctiveness, which bolsters the Russian state's legitimacy to exist. Additionally, they stress physically discernible characteristics such as the territory's vastness or its existence on two distinct continents. Taking these considerations into account, we can deduce that Russia's national and security interests are defined across a vast geographical expanse and frequently include the responsibility to safeguard its territory or culture or to expand it into regions “naturally” under Russian control. Such a division of the international system into “civilization ally allied” units enables a relatively economically weak country with little political “soft power” over its Neighbours or partners to “naturally” formulate national interests as one of the world powers and project influence on the surrounding region, and even on a global scale (Leichtova, 2016, p. 20).

As a result, we may conclude that a political course aimed at restoring the position of a world power is most easily justified through geopolitical means. Dmitry Trenin highlights another element of Russian political thinking that takes use of "natural" tendencies, namely the usage of geopolitical scales when emphasizing the relationship between economic concerns and the geopolitical interpretation of international relations: "The same is true for geoeconomics as it is for geopolitics. Although the former Soviet republics are now considered foreign countries, Russia continues to see its neighbors as economic zones in which it retains comparative advantages over third parties" (Trenin, 2007, p. 99). Trenin makes a point of emphasizing the link between Russian political objectives and the economic environment created by the state's control of critical firms in critical sectors of the economy. As a result, geopolitics also acts as a weapon for modern Russian leadership in terms of meeting the state's economic demands (Trenin, 2007, p. 95).

4.2.3. Atlanticism and Eurasianism

Following the demise of the USSR in 1992, many predicted that Russia would rapidly join the 'Western camp,' and its foreign policy would be marked by increasing collaboration with the USA and the West. These predictions appeared to be correct, as Yeltsin and his colleagues pursued Atlantism characterized by a greater emphasis on cooperation with the USA and the West, as well as strong support for many Western initiatives on a variety of issues, including sanctions against Iraq and efforts to end the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Grossman, 2005, p. 335).

By the mid-1990s, this pro-Western stance had given way to the Eurasianists' considerably more aggressive foreign policy, focused on "the championing, above all, of Russia's own national interests, which do not always correspond with the interests of other nations" (Simonia, 1997, p. 38). According to Eurasianists, Russia has its own interests, which are frequently at odds with those of the West. As a result, Russia's first priority should be the defence of its own interests, not collaboration with the West (Grossman, 2005, p. 335).

4.2.4. Anti-Westernism

In two ways, Russia's quest for its own identity is a long-running and incomplete process that plays a critical role in the formulation of its foreign policy. To begin with, it has an impact on the ties with Western nations, as Russia's relationship with the West lies at the heart of the argument over Russia's place in the international order. The policies

used toward the West does not have to match Russian conduct toward other partners and areas, but Russian policy toward these other regions appears to be inextricably linked to ties with the West, because no other country is as important as the West in determining Russia's position in the international arena. Furthermore, the position of Russia as a regional or global force is inextricably linked to both discussions.

In the 1990s, the vision of Russia as a global powerhouse was the major aim of foreign policy, and it has been the key priority for its foreign policy ambitions since 2000 (Leichtova, 2016, p. 34). If there is such a thing as Putinism, it is growing increasingly nationalist in form and reflects the perception that Russia is being threatened by a hostile West intent on harming Russian interests (Roberts, 2017). Putin's ideology, according to Igor Panarin, is to "preserve and further develop (Russia's) moral and cultural values and become a moral core and the center of gravity for the cultures of the West and the East, the North and the South" (Panarin, 2012).

Anti-Westernism is a hallmark of both old and modern Russian ideology, according to Laqueur, who continues to look to the past for ideological cues. Whether it was the British Empire, France, or Germany, Russia has always battled to be treated equally by the West. The attitude remains the same, but Russia's preoccupation has shifted. 'America, and to a lesser extent Europe, are Russia's adversaries, ready to harm the homeland in every way imaginable," writes Laqueur (Laqueur, 2014). Anti-Westernism was cultural in the nineteenth century, ideological under the Soviets, and today Laqueur accuses Putin of intellectual sloth for adapting old views to the modern world. Laqueur appears to believe that there is no reason to be afraid of the West, and that Putin is instilling fear and anti-Western attitude in order to gain domestic support. Anti-Westernism, in other words, is a means to an end, a vehicle via which Putin advances his own power interests. The idea that the West's actions—particularly NATO expansion—have helped to molding Putin's narrative about Russian identity and its position in the international order is undervalued or ignored in Laqueur's opinion. It is erroneous to dismiss Putin's statements about Russia's weakness in regard to the West merely because Putin's domestic government style is one that Western leaders despise. It's one thing not to trust Putin; it's another to disregard the rising nationalism that underpins Putin's motivations for Russia's actions in Ukraine (Roberts, 2017).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Russia and the USA have had a long-standing relationship, dating back to 1945 when both sides were in competition. The Cold War era began in 1945 and ended in 1991, when the USSR was decommissioned. Their competition lasted nearly 46 years, and in the end, the USA emerged victorious in the Cold War. During the Cold War, the relationship between states was in a precarious state, and the rest of the world was concerned that it could lead to the outbreak of a third World War. However, in 1991, their competition came to an end, and a new era in the relationship between Russia and the USA began. The USA achieved their goal of erasing the USSR from the map. 1991 saw Russia as a weak state confronted with a civil war and a terrorist attack in the North Caucasus, where they were a victim of both. Russia was confronted with an economic crisis in their central region, which ultimately resulted in the country's default. As President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin was a pro-Western leader who shifted the country's foreign policy emphasis from the USSR to the USA. From 1991 to 2000, Russia was considered a weak state by the West, who predicted that Russia would be erased from the map. Furthermore, the West expected to see a significant increase in its influence over Russia. As a result, the USA began to establish diplomatic relations and agreements with Russia. The only thing that brought them together was their shared interest in the anti-terrorist program and the astronaut program. In the 1990s, neither Russia nor the USA had an official document stating the terms of their agreements. As a result, it was difficult to determine which areas the parties were collaborating on and which were competing. Even in their actual policies, which encourage us to engage in confrontation or partnership, we can see this dynamic at work. A pro-Western policy prevailed in Russia throughout the 1990s, as part of a process of westernization.

The relationship between Russia and the USA has been deteriorating since 2000. In the first year of the twenty-first century, they signed a number of agreements relating

to the anti-terrorist program and drug trafficking activities. After that, their diplomatic relations began to deteriorate rapidly, with the most recent factor being the USA invasion of Iraq in 2003. In response to this action by the USA, the relationship between Russia and the USA has become unfriendly. In his administration, George W. Bush's son implemented anti-Russian policies. The relationship between Russia and the USA was colder and worse in 2004-2005 than it had been during the Cold War. The policies of both sides were in direct opposition to one another's positions. The NATO expansion, the Iraq invasion, and the presence of a US military base in Kyrgyzstan were all factors in this confrontation. These issues caused Russia to become more embroiled in internal issues while simultaneously increasing its military power. In order to challenge the power of the USA, Russia sought to develop and increase its military capabilities. Putin announced in 2002 that Russia would modernize and develop their military equipment following the problem with the Russian submarine, which was ultimately resolved. Their military-technical equipment would be completely modernized under the program until 2020. While Russia's actions were not in the national interest of the USA, Washington's goal in attempting to subdue Russia was to do so. As of 2008, the relationship between Russia and the USA has declined rather than improved, with the most recent event being the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, which was sparked by actions taken by the USA government.

In 2008, when Barack Obama was elected president, a new era of their friendship began. America and Russia began their "Reset" program during President Obama's administration. It was a chance to start over and grow their relationship. The sides began to hold joint summits and reach agreements on their differences, but the North Ossetian conflict and the Ukrainian crisis both derailed their efforts to reestablish their relationship, causing it to become completely ruined. Following the Ukrainian crisis, the USA and its allies began imposing sanctions and trade embargoes against Russia, which continues today. There were sanctions in the form of economic, political, and military pressure. As a result of the failure of the "Reset" program, their relationship did not progress. Russian-American relations continued to deteriorate during Obama's presidency, and the USA retaliated with sanctions that made their relationship even more tense in the long run.

When Donald Trump was elected president in 2016, the world realized that the relationship between Russia and the USA would undergo a new Reset under his

administration. As a result, rather than beginning to build a relationship, the USA imposed additional sanctions, making it more difficult for the two countries to cooperate. The long-term outcome was that Biden rose to power; and as a result of his presidency, the relationship between Russia and the USA began to deteriorate even further.

The foreign policies of Russia and the USA towards each other have changed throughout their relationship, which began in the 1990s and has continued to the present time. While liberals were more likely to be associated with the USA and Russia in the 1990s, as Russia embarked on its Westernization process and the USA backed Yeltsin, the two countries enjoyed a stable bilateral relationship at this time. During the Bush son presidency and Putin's presidency, however, their relationship began to shift toward neo-conservatism on the American side, beginning in the early 2000s. Relations between Russia and the USA began to experience difficulties that were worse than those experienced during the Cold War. However, even during Obama's administration, their relationship was grounded in pragmatic policy, while Russian policy continued to be framed in the context of realism. Both sides see each other as competitors, and the USA, as a hegemon power, seeks to exert pressure on Russia in order to achieve its objectives. The Russian military on the other hand, has grown and developed in recent years. In light of these considerations, Russia began to take a position in opposition to USA foreign policy on a global scale.

Two of Russia's most important interpretive tools for events occurring in the international system are geopolitics and a realist understanding of the international system, which views international relations as dangerous and untrustworthy environments. One of Russia's most important tools for interpreting events in the international system is geopolitics, which is one of the most important tools in its arsenal. In Russia, this refers to a historically formed concern about the endangerment of the country's vast territory and expansive borders, as well as the threat of separatism in various areas, which has developed over time. A threat to the Russian Federation is easy to perceive, particularly when an international conflict erupts in close proximity to its borders or when other great powers begin to expand their sphere of influence. Strong and powerful Russia appears to be the prescription that the Russian public and political elites have chosen in order to deal with such challenges in the short term.

Russia's search for its own identity has been a long-term and incomplete process, but it has played an important role in the formulation of foreign policy in two ways. First and foremost, it serves as a model for other countries that are seeking to define their own national identity. Primarily and most importantly, it has an impact on Russia's relations with Western nations, as Russia's relationship with Western nations is a primary motivation for the disagreement over Russia's place within the international system in the first place. By examining the current state of the debate, we can determine whether Russian foreign policy toward the West is more positive or more autonomist in its outlook. No requirement exists for Russia's foreign policy toward other partners and regions to be consistent with its foreign policy toward the West; however, Russian foreign policy toward these other regions appears to have always been linked in some way to the country's ties with the West. Why? Because the Western world is far more important to the definition of Russia's role in the system than any of these other locations are to any other place's definition. Secondly, Russia's role as a regional or global power is inextricably intertwined with both discussions—the formation of Russian national identity and Russia's role in the international system—and can't be separated from one another.

Russians' strong sense of personal identity helps them maintain their influence in neighboring countries, which is important for them both emotionally (through nostalgia and solidarity) and rationally (for security and economic reasons). It is also a significant domestic policy topic and a barometer for the success of their government. While Russia was aspiring to become a global superpower during the 1990s, it has remained as the primary steppingstone for its foreign policy ambitions since 2000. The vision of Russia as a global superpower has remained as the country's primary foreign policy goal since 2000.

To summarize, Russia's foreign policy toward the USA has shifted over the years. We can't see many changes or differences between the USA and the rest of the world. Even after the end of the Cold War, the two sides were constantly at odds with one another. Their relationship had to deal with a period that was even worse than the Cold War era period. In 2021, Putin stated that "the Russian-American relationship is incapable of dealing with new aspects and will not be capable of making any progress." Although studying Russian foreign policy within the confines of this dissertation does not provide

a clear picture, it is clear that Russia wishes to keep the USA out and intends to use its foreign policy to prevent the USA from encroaching on its territory, both figuratively and literally.



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