

ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCE
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

**URBAN PROTESTS AGAINST NEOLIBERAL URBAN POLICIES:
THE CASE OF ISTANBUL**

M.Sc. THESIS

**Dilek KARABULUT
(502101813)**

Department of Urban and Regional Planning

Urban Planning Programme

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Gülden ERKUT

JANUARY 2015

İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ FEN BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ

**NEOLİBERAL KENT POLİTİKALARINA KARŞI KENTSEL
PROTESTOLAR: İSTANBUL ÖRNEĞİ**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

**Dilek KARABULUT
(502101813)**

Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Anabilim Dalı

Şehir Planlama Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Gülden ERKUT

OCAK 2015

Dilek Karabulut, a **M.Sc** student of ITU **Graduate School of Science Engineering and Technology** student ID **502101813**, successfully defended the **thesis** entitled **“URBAN PROTESTS AGAINST NEOLIBERAL URBAN POLICIES: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL”** which she prepared after fulfilling the requirements specified in the associated legislations, before the jury whose signatures are below.

Thesis Advisor : **Prof. Dr. Gül den ERKUT**
Istanbul Technical University

Jury Members : **Assist. Prof. Dr. Başak DEMİREŞ ÖZKUL**
İstanbul Technical University

Assoc. Prof. Dr Besime ŞEN
Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University

Date of Submission : 15 December 2014
Date of Defense : 26 January 2015

*To Ayşegül and Betül, who have always believed in me,
and
in memory of my beloved grandmother
Ayşe Karabulut,*

FOREWORD

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude and special thanks to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Güliden ERKUT for her encouragement, insight and support throughout my study from the beginning. Without her belief and sincere encouragement it would not be possible for me to believe and continue this study. I wish to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Besime ŞEN for her guidance, insight support and invaluable contribution not only to this study, but also to my life with her sincere encouragement since my bachelor degree. I would like to present my deepest thanks to Assist. Prof. Dr. Başak DEMİREŞ ÖZKUL for her intimate understanding, valuable contributions and sincere encouragement for the study.

I especially want to thank to Prof. Dr. Emel Göksu and Prof. Dr. Sezai Göksu for their suggestions and comments in the very beginning of this study. Their guidance greatly helped me to create the outline of this study. I am grateful to Assist. Prof. Dr. Neriman Yörür, Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Altınörs Çırak and my dear office mate Assist. Prof. Dr. Eylem Bal for their comments, sharing experiences, motivations and moral supports which helped me a lot to complete this thesis.

I also would like to thank to the members of Dokuz Eylül University Department of Urban and Regional Planning for their support throughout my master study. I would like to thank to research assistants of the department once more for their support and insight despite the heavy workloads and to Sebahat Budak for her patience and understanding.

I also express my thanks to my dear friend Cansu Yapıcı for her motivation, insight and support during the study. I would like to thank also to my dear friend Betül Baki for her help and suggestions especially for the data collection process of the study.

I express my deepest thanks to my parents, Aysel and Sait Karabulut, for their invaluable support, sincere encouragement and insight throughout my education and my life.

And lastly, special thanks to two precious people. I express my special thanks to my my dearest sister Ayşegül Karabulut who has sincerely supported me and presented her lovely and sincere encouragement every stage of my life. I also deeply thank to Betül Koçak for her lovely encouragement, insight and motivations that I always feel myself very lucky to meet with her. Without both of their invaluable and sincere endeavours, patience and belief it would not be possible to write and complete this thesis. Therefore I also dedicate this study to these two precious women.

February 2015

Dilek KARABULUT
(Research Assistant)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xi
ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
LIST OF TABLES	xv
LIST OF FIGURES	xvii
SUMMARY	xix
ÖZET	xxi
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The Purpose of the Study	1
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis	3
1.3 Methodology and Data Collection Process	5
2. CONCEPTUAL CONFIGURATION OF THE STUDY	9
2.1 Theoretical Framework: Space, Urban Politics and Urban Conflicts	9
2.2 Is There Any Place for Urban Social Movements in General Social Movements Theory?.....	15
3. URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS	29
3.1 Reading Manuel Castells on Urban Social Movements	29
3.1.1 Castells's early studies	29
3.1.2 Castell's late studies	34
3.2 Development of Urban Social Movement Concept	43
3.3 The Role of 'Class' in Urban Social Movements	57
4. URBAN POLICIES AND URBAN STRUGGLES IN ISTANBUL	61
4.1 Gecekondu Settlements as the Places for the Rise of Urban Movements: 1950 – 1980.....	62
4.2 Urban Policies and Urban Opposition in the Neoliberal Era: 1980-1990.....	74
4.2.1 Seeking for an opposition in the urban area.....	87
4.3 Urban Policies and Urban Struggles in the Era of Globalization: 1990 – 2002	92
4.3.1 Socio-economic and political characteristics of the period	92
4.3.2 Urban policies of the period: Istanbul as a “Global City”	95
4.3.3 Urban opposition / reconciliation with “civil society institutions”: What did Habitat II bring or take away?	107
4.4 Urban Policies and Urban Struggles between 2002 and 2010: Accumulation by Dispossession	115
4.4.1 Socio-economic and political characteristics of the period	115
4.4.2 Urban policies under Justice and Development Party	124
4.4.3 Urban struggles against the attack of neoliberal policies.....	144
4.5 Evaluation of the Chapter	159
5. RECLAIMING THE CITY ON THE STREETS	165

5.1 Introduction	165
5.2 Methodological Tool	166
5.3 Findings	167
5.3.1 Housing protests	170
5.3.2. Protests about workplaces	187
5.3.3. Reclaiming public spaces and public buildings	194
5.3.4. Protests about urban infrastructure/transportation	218
5.4 Evaluation of the Findings: Conflicts in the Neoliberal City	223
6. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION	229
REFERENCES	247
APPENDICES	261
CURRICULUM VITAE	281

ABBREVIATIONS

CBD	: Central Business District
DLP	: Democratic Left Party (Demokrat Sol Parti)
DP	: Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
IETT	: Istanbul Electricity Tunnel and Tram Business
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IMM	: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
IMP	: Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Urban Design Centre
JDP	: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
KİPTAŞ	: Istanbul Housing Plan Industry and Trade Inc. (İstanbul Konut İmar Plan Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.)
MP	: Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
MHA	: Mass Housing Administration
NIMBY	: Not in my Back Yard
NMP	: Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
RPP	: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
SDM	: Social Democratic Municipalism
SDPP	: Social Democratic People's Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti)
TMMOB	: Turkish Union of Chamber of Architects and Engineers (Türkiye Mimarlar ve Mühendisler Odası Birliği)
TPP	: True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)
UN	: United Nations
WB	: World Bank
WP	: Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
Table 4.1 : The Number and the Ratio of Beautification Associations between the Years 1946 and 1968 (Yücekök, 1971).....	69
Table 4.2 : Population and Population Growth Rate of Turkey and Istanbul (1927-2010, General Population Censuses, TUIK).	82
Table 4.3 : Gecekondu and the Population of Gecekondu in Turkey (Keleş, 2004:561).	83
Table 4.4 : Socio-economic and political characteristics, urban policies and urban mobilizations of the periods.	161
Table 5.1 : Categories of urban-based protests.	169
Table 5.2 : Housing protests by objections between 1990 and 2010.	172
Table 5.3 : Housing protests by objections for the periods of 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).....	173
Table 5.4 : Issues of anti-eviction protests between 1990 and 2001.....	175
Table 5.5 : Issues of the anti-eviction protests between 2002 and 2010.....	180
Table 5.6 : Anti-eviction protests for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).	184
Table 5.7 : Workplace protests by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).....	189
Table 5.8 : Workplace displacement protests by the type of workplaces for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).	190
Table 5.9 : Protests about public spaces/public buildings by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).	195
Table 5.10 : Protests about public spaces by functions (total frequency).	196
Table 5.11 : Protests about public spaces by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).....	204
Table 5.12 : Protests about public buildings by functions of the buildings and by objections of the protests (total and annual frequency).....	205
Table 5.13 : Protests about public building by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).....	217
Table 5.14 : Protests about urban infrastructure/transportation by demands and objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).....	219
Table 5.15 : Main issues of the protests: reactive or demanding (annual frequency).	228

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 4.1 : Privatization Transactions by Years (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration).....	122
Figure 4.2 : The Map of Forced Eviction (Advisory Group on Forced Evictions, 2009).....	147
Figure 5.1 : The development of urban-based protests between 1990 and 2010....	168
Figure 5.2 : The rate of different categories of urban-based protests.	170
Figure 5.3 : The Rate of housing protests by objections.....	172
Figure 5.4 : Housing protests for the periods of 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).....	173
Figure 5.5 : The rate of anti-eviction protests by periods.	174
Figure 5.6 : The rate of the issues of anti-eviction protests between 1990 and 2001.	175
Figure 5.7 : The frequency of anti-eviction protests by neighbourhood (1990-2001).	179
Figure 5.8 : The rate of the issues of anti-eviction protests between 2002 and 2010.	180
Figure 5.9 : The frequency of anti-eviction protests by neighbourhoods (2002-2010).....	183
Figure 5.10 : Anti-eviction protests for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).	185
Figure 5.11 : Workplaces protests by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).	189
Figure 5.12 : The rate of the workplace displacement protests by type of workplace.	190
Figure 5.13 : Workplace displacement protests by types of workplaces for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).	190
Figure 5.14 : Protests about public spaces/public buildings by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).	196
Figure 5.15 : Public space protests by functions.....	197
Figure 5.16 : Public space protests by objections.	197
Figure 5.17 : Protests about public parks/gardens by objections.	200
Figure 5.18 : Protests about coastal areas by objections between 1990 and 2010..	202
Figure 5.19 : Protests about public spaces by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).....	204
Figure 5.20 : Potests about public buildings by functions.	205
Figure 5.21 : Protests about public buildings by objections.	206
Figure 5.22 : Protests about education buildings by objections.....	207
Figure 5.23 : Protests about medical buildings by objections.	209
Figure 5.24 : Protests about cultural buildings by objections.	211

Figure 5.25 : Protests about other public buildings by objections.	213
Figure 5.26 : Protests about public buildings by objections for the periods 1990- 2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).....	217

URBAN PROTESTS AGAINST NEOLIBERAL URBAN POLICIES: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL

SUMMARY

In Turkey, neoliberal policies that have been adopted since 1980 have largely transformed urban areas through market-oriented policies. Both local and national policies have played significant roles in changing urban patterns, social and political structures, and class relations in urban areas by highlighting the exchange value of space. These shifts have also led to the mobilisation of urban-based opposition to the enacted neoliberal urban policies.

The main purpose of the study at hand is to analyse historically urban-based oppositional mobilisations within the context of both socio-economic-political processes and enacted urban policies in order to present a causal relationship between social-economic-political processes and urban movements in Istanbul. Within this purpose, the main question of the study explores how urban oppositional mobilisations vary in demand, motivation, organisational type, and repertoire within the context of socio-economic-political processes and enacted urban policies across different periods of time.

Since 1980 is an important breakpoint for the study, for the purpose of presenting a comprehensive understanding of the urban policies and urban-based oppositional mobilisations before and after neoliberalism, this study also discusses the period before 1980, extending back to the 1950s. In order to evaluate the socio-economic characteristics, urban policies, legal tools, resulting discourses, and their effects on urban areas, together with urban oppositional mobilisations between 1950 and 2010, this study analyses and categorises trends observed in different historical periods. This analysis reveals that mobilisation efforts and resistance against enacted urban policies in the neoliberal period started to increase after the 1990s. Therefore, the study conducted a systematic search of daily newspapers for articles about urban-based protests between 1990 and 2010 in order to present a quantitative analysis of cycle, changing demands, repertoires and organisational status of the protests over a 21-year period. This quantitative research covers two periods: the first period (1990 - 2001) was marked by political instability and economic recession in Turkey, led by coalition and minority governments; and the second period (2002 - 2010) saw a powerful one-party government (JDP) that strengthened neoliberal urban policies and increased state intervention in urban space with rent-seeking projects.

The study's results indicate that the protests present two main characteristics by their goals: they either demand the provision or improvement of urban services or resist the changes imposed by local or central authorities. Contextualising the findings in two different periods, the dataset reveals that, the average number of overall protests increased in the second period; and while the number of protests which demand the provision of urban services relatively decreased in the second period, reactive

protests which oppose to the imposed policies and implementations of the authorities significantly increased during the same time in accordance with the strengthened neoliberal policies. Furthermore, the study shows that; the repertoires, organisational types and targeted institutions of urban-based protests present differentiation both by socio-economic characteristics of the periods and claimed demands of the protests.

NEOLİBERAL KENT POLİTİKALARINA KARŞI KENTSEL PROTESTOLAR: İSTANBUL ÖRNEĞİ

ÖZET

Türkiye’de 1980’lerden itibaren benimsenen neoliberal politikalar kentlerin sermaye odaklı dönüşümünü de beraberinde getirmiştir. Tezin çalışma alanını oluşturan İstanbul ise bu süreçten en fazla etkilenen kent olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Gerek uluslararası gerekse de ulusal ve yerel politikalar bu süreçte kentsel dokuyu, kentin toplumsal ve politik yapısını ve kent mekânındaki sınıf ilişkilerini mekânın değişim değerini öne çıkararak dönüşmesinde önemli rol oynarken, bu durum, aynı zamanda yürütülen neoliberal kentsel politikalara karşı yerelde mücadele deneyimlerini de beraberinde getirmiştir.

Çalışmanın temel amacı; kentsel hareketlerin tarihsel olarak toplumsal, ekonomik, politik süreçler ve benimsenen kentsel politikalar bağlamında nedensel ilişki kurularak değerlendirilmesidir. Bu amaç kapsamında çalışmanın temel sorusu kentsel mücadele deneyimlerinin farklı dönemlerdeki sosyo-ekonomik ve politik süreçler ve kentsel politikalar ile birlikte taleplerinin, örgütsel yapılarının ve repertuarlarının nasıl değiştiğini ortaya koymaktır.

Türkiye’de neoliberal politikalar açısından önemli bir başlangıç niteliği taşıyan 1980 yılı, çalışmanın da önemli bir kırılma noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Kentsel politikaların ve kentsel mücadelelerin neoliberal dönem öncesi ve sonrası süreç içerisinde nasıl dönüştüğünü izleyebilmek amacıyla, çalışma 1950’lerden itibaren bir tarihsel dönemlemeyi izlemektedir. Toplumsal, ekonomik ve politik süreçleri, kent politikalarını, yasal araçları, politikacılar ve medya tarafından özellikle *gecekondu* alanları için geliştirilen söylemleri ve tüm bunların kent mekânı üzerindeki etkilerini, kentsel alanda ortaya çıkan muhalif hareketler ile birlikte değerlendirebilmek amacıyla, 1950-2010 yılları arasında yazılı basın, parti programları, seçim vaatleri vb. yararlanarak niteliksel bir analiz yürütülmüştür. Bu analiz ile neoliberal dönemde kentsel hareketlerin özellikle 1990’lardan itibaren artış gösterdiği görülmüştür. Bu nedenle çalışmanın son bölümünde 1990-2010 arası dönem için iki farklı günlük gazete veri analizi yöntemiyle sistematik olarak taranmış ve 21 yılı kapsayan bu süreç için ayrıca niceliksel bir analiz yürütülmüştür.

Çalışmanın 1950-1980 yıllarını kapsayan ilk döneminde kentsel muhalefet deneyimlerinin kendi içerisinde de üç farklı şekilde ayrışma gösterdiği gözlemlenmiştir. Köyden kente göçün ilk yoğunlaştığı dönemi oluşturan 1950’lerde göç karşısında dönemin politikalarının yetersizliği, göç edenlerin kentlerde kendi imkanlarıyla yerleşmelerini de beraberinde getirmiş ve bu durum günümüze kadar hem yaşayanlar hem de kentler açısından süreklilik içermeyen politikalar, dışlayıcı söylem ve uygulamalarla birlikte, gecekondu yerleşimlerini gerek hükümetler gerekse de yerel yönetimler açısından dönemin koşullarına uygun olarak bazen oy bazen rant sağlama aracı haline getirmiştir. Yine bu dönemde kentin dönüşümü ise dönemin sosyo-ekonomik ve politik yapısına uygun olarak kendini en çok büyük

bulvarların açılması ve otomobil temelli ulaşım stratejilerinin geliştirilmesi şeklinde göstermektedir. Bu dönemde gerek gecekondu yerleşimleri gerekse de tarihi dokuyu parçalayarak projelendirilen büyük bulvarlar birkaç gazete makalesi ve küçük ölçekli protestolar dışında kentsel muhalefet gündemi oluşturmamıştır. Planlı dönem olarak literatürde yer bulan 1960'lar ise gecekondu sakinlerinin kentte kalıcılıklarını sağladıkları ve buna bağlı olarak özellikle mahalle güzelleştirme dernekleri altında örgütlendikleri ve kentsel hizmetlere yönelik taleplerini dile getirmeye başladıkları ilk dönem olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. 1970'lere gelindiğinde ise; artan işçi sınıfı hareketleri, işçi sınıfının konut alanı olan gecekondu alanlarında, çalışma açısından özel bir önemi olan, ilk politik kentsel hareketlerin doğmasına neden olmuştur. 1970'lerde işçi sınıfının mücadeleleri sonucu elde ettiği siyasal kazanımlar ile birlikte sosyalist solun bu dönemde gecekondu mahallelerinde örgütlü bir şekilde planlama ve konutların dağıtımındaki rolü ve yıkıcı devlet politikalarına karşı mücadeleleri bu mahalleleri konut hakkı mücadelelerinde önemli bir yere taşımaktadır.

1970'lerin siyasal kazanımları 1980 askeri darbesiyle birlikte çözülürken, darbenin ardında bıraktığı miras sadece toplumsal hareketleri baskılamak olmamış, aynı zamanda ekonomik yapıda neoliberal yapılanmayı 24 Ocak kararlarını hayata geçirerek getirmiştir. 1970'lerde gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde küresel kriz ortamında terk edilen ithal ikame modelin yerini alan neoliberal politikaların, Türkiye'de 1980'lerden itibaren hakim politika olarak ortaya çıktığı gözlenmektedir. Neoliberal politikalar aynı zamanda kent mekânının da büyük bir dönüşüm içerisine girmesini beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu yeni birikim modelinin, yapılı çevrenin dönüşümünü ve yeniden şekillenmesini getirdiği kadar, kentlerin toplumsal, siyasal yapısında ve sınıf ilişkilerinde de büyük değişimler getirdiği gözlenmektedir. 1980 darbesiyle birlikte gücünü kaybeden siyasal hareketlerin de zayıflığında bu dönemde neoliberal politikalar büyük bir direnişle karşılaşmadan hızlı bir şekilde yürütülebilmiştir.

Neoliberal politikaların kent mekanında yapılanması özellikle yarışan kentler ve küresel kent kavramlarıyla şekillenmektedir. Sermayenin kent mekanında hegemonyası bu söylemlerle meşrulaştırılırken bu dönemde yatırımların ise sanayi yerine, ulaşım, altyapı gibi kentsel hizmetlere ve inşaat sektörüne kaydığı gözlemlenmektedir. Birçok kentte olduğu gibi İstanbul'da da bu politikalar sanayinin desantralizasyonu ve hizmet sektörünün payının kent içerisinde artmasıyla yer edinmiştir. Bu dönemin diğer bir özelliğini ise birbiri ardına yasallaşan imar afları oluşturmaktadır. Gecekondu alanlarına yönelik bu politikalar, bu alanlar ile bir tür patronaj ilişkisi kurulmasına ve gecekonduların apartmanlaşmasına neden olmuştur. Aynı zamanda bunlara bağlı olarak imar aflarının bir diğer sonucu, ilk dönemlerde kullanım değeri ile öne çıkan gecekonduanın anlamını değiştirerek yerini yaşayanları mülkiyet ilişkileri içerisine çeken değişim değerine bırakması olmuştur. Ancak, özellikle belirtmek gerekir ki, bu ilişkiler tüm gecekondu alanları için aynı şekilde geçerli olmamıştır. Kurulan bu patronaj ilişkileri gecekondu alanlarında kendi içerisinde de bir ayrışmayı meydana getirmiştir. Özellikle 1990'larda Doğu ve Güneydoğu'da yaşanan köy boşaltmalarıyla zorunlu göç içerisinde yer alan gruplar bu sürecin en dezavantajlı kesimini oluşturmuştur.

1980'lerin toplumsal ve siyasal atmosferi içerisinde kentsel muhalif hareketleri de oldukça sınırlı olarak ve genellikle profesyoneller, eğitimli küçük burjuva veya yeni yeni gündeme gelen STK'lar ile medya, basın açıklamaları, hukuki süreçler veya küçük çaplı protestolar ile ortaya çıkmıştır. 1970'lerden farklı olarak bu muhalefet

deneyimlerinin politik bir söylemden özellikle kaçınmaları ise dönemin toplumsal ve siyasal yapısına uygun olarak şekillenmiştir.

1990'larda ise, özellikle vurgu yapılan söylemlerin 'yönetişim', 'yerelleşme', 'globalleşme' olarak karşımıza çıktığı görülmektedir. Yönetişim söylemlerine paralel olarak, özellikle 1996'da İstanbul'da gerçekleşen Habitat II Konferansı'ndan sonra STK'ların güç kazandığı gözlemlenmektedir. STK'ların politik alandan uzak yapısı bu dönemde birçok insanın kentsel konular ile ilgili bir araya gelmesinde özellikle önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Dönemin gazetelerinde konferansın önemi vurgulanırken konferans ardından oluşan derneklerin, inisiyatiflerin yine o dönemin kent üzerine yayın yapan dergilerinde oldukça yer bulduğu gözlenmiştir. Bu dönemdeki birçok derneğin ve inisiyatifin özellikle 'mahallelik', 'İstanbulluluk' bilinci üzerine vurgu yaptığı ve mahallelerini ve şehri korumayı amaçladıkları görülmektedir. Genellikle orta sınıflar tarafından oluşturulan bu dernekler ve inisiyatifler, 3. Köprü veya Gökkafe gibi kentin tamamını ilgilendiren konularda muhalif hareketleri organize etmeleriyle birlikte, kimi durumlarda 'kendi' mahallelerini koruma amaçlarının eşitlikçi ve ilerici sonuçlar doğurmadığı ve mahallenin soylulaşmasıyla sonuçlandığı görülmektedir. Gecekondu alanlarına yönelik özellikle orta sınıf ve profesyonellerin dışlayıcı ve elitist tutumları ise bu dönemde dikkat çekicidir.

1990'ların istikrarsız koalisyon ve azınlık hükümetleri, 2002'de AKP'nin yüksek bir oy oranı ile seçilmesiyle son bulmuştur. Hükümete geldiğinde 1998'de başlayan ikinci yapısal reformlar ve 2001 ekonomik krizi ardından imzalanan 18. stand-by anlaşması AKP'nin 'güçlü hükümet' vurgusu ile birlikte, 1990'lardaki ekonomik durgunluk ve istikrarsız politik yapı ile nispeten yavaşlayan neoliberal politikaları hızlı bir şekilde hayata geçirmiştir. AKP döneminde güçlenen neoliberal politikalar, özellikle kentsel alanda bugüne kadarki en büyük dönüşümü de beraberinde getirmiştir.

Kentsel dönüşüm projeleri AKP döneminde neoliberal politikaların en önemli aracı haline gelirken işsizlik, uyuşturucu veya afet riski gibi tüm toplumsal, mekânsal ve ekonomik problemlerin çözümü olarak sunulmuştur. Projelerin ilk olarak hedeflediği alanların ise gecekondu alanları ve kent merkezindeki eski tarihsel alanlar gibi düşük gelirli grupların yaşadığı rantı yüksek olan bölgeler olduğu görülmektedir. Bu politikalara uygun olarak güçlendirilen yasal araçlar ile neredeyse tüm kentsel alanın dönüşüm alanı olarak ilan edilebilmesine olanak verilmesiyle birlikte, dönemin gecekondu temsilleri ise benimsenen politikalara uygun olarak daha dışlayıcı bir şekilde kurulmuştur.

2000'lerdeki neoliberal politikaların kentsel alana taarruzu aynı zamanda farklı toplumsal ve politik grupların kentsel muhalefette yer almalarına da neden olmuştur. Bu dönemde özellikle mahalle odaklı kentsel dönüşüm projelerine karşı mücadeleler kentsel muhalefette önemli bir yer edinirken, aynı zamanda kamusal/müşterek alanlar/binalar için, büyük ölçekli inşaat/ulaşım projelerine karşı veya doğal ve tarihsel alanları korumak için yapılan mücadelelerde de bu dönemde artış gözlemlenmiştir. Çalışma içerisinde gerek kentsel dönüşüm projelerinin yerel ve merkezi hükümet tarafından geliştirilen söylemleri, gerekse de bu projelere karşı geliştirilen mücadelelerin yapısı, talepleri ve aralarındaki çatışma veya müzakere dinamikleri incelenmiştir.

Çalışmanın son bölümünde veri analizi yöntemiyle niceliksel olarak kentsel protestoların talepleri, repertuarları ve örgütsel yapıları 1990-2010 yılları arasında

değerlendirilmiştir. 21 yıllık bir periyodu içeren bu dönem, ekonomik durgunluğun ve siyasi istikrarsızlığın yaşandığı 1990-2001 yılları ile güçlü tek parti ve artan neoliberal politikaların öne çıktığı 2002-2010 yılları şeklinde iki dönem kapsamında karşılaştırılarak incelenmiş ve tüm bulgular ilk bölümlerde ortaya konulan kentsel toplumsal hareketler literatürü ışığında değerlendirilmiştir. Elde edilen sonuçlar göstermektedir ki, kentsel protesto hareketleri ikinci dönemde önemli derecede artmıştır. Diğer bir bulgu ise, protestoların ya kentsel hizmetlere yönelik taleplerini dile getirmek için, ya da yerel veya merkezi otorite tarafından üretilen kent politikalarına karşı koymak için gerçekleştiği şeklindedir. İkinci dönem olarak çalışmada adlandırılan 2002-2010 döneminde, kentsel hizmet taleplerine yönelik protestolarda birinci döneme göre nispeten bir düşüş yaşandığı gözlenirken; üretilen kent politikalarına karşı gerçekleştirilen protestolar, güçlenen neoliberal politikalar ve kentsel mekana artan müdahalelere paralel olarak önemli derecede artış göstermiştir. Aynı zamanda, hareketlerin repertuarlarının ve örgütsel yapılarının hem farklı dönemlerin özelliklerine bağlı olarak hem de protestoların taleplerine göre değişiklik gösterdiği görülmüştür. Son olarak çalışmanın orta koyduğu bir diğer bulgu ise, ilk dönemde kent temelli protestolar daha fazla yerel yönetimi hedef alırken, ikinci dönemde merkezi otoritenin artan gücüne paralel olarak, kentsel protestoların daha fazla merkezi yönetime karşı gerçekleştiği şeklindedir.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Purpose of the Study

In Turkey, neoliberal policies have oriented both local and national decisions and policies since the 1980s, a trend that has intensified sharply in the recent years. These policies have brought large interventions to cities, transforming their built environment and urban form. This process has also threatened to privatise almost all public spaces and public services through market-oriented policies. In addition, it has transformed low-income neighbourhoods through urban renewal/regeneration projects. Gecekondu neighbourhoods, which were working-class residential areas for workers who have migrated to the cities since the 1950s, formed the first urban areas of this neoliberal transformation. Furthermore, while working-class housing became the target of the destructive urban policies, members of the working class were also deprived of their employment due to the decentralisation policies of industrial areas. As urban areas were transformed into finance districts, business centres, and gated communities through project-based policies in order to attract capital, mobilisation efforts against and resistance to these policies increased locally.

The main purpose of the thesis is to analyse historically both the socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of the periods, as well as the mobilisation movements resisting these policies in Istanbul in order to understand how socio-economic characteristics and urban policies have affected urban-based protests and how these protests vary in demand, motivation, organisational type, and repertoire across different periods in Istanbul.

Studies exploring Istanbul's urban struggles have become more prevalent, especially in recent years. However, these studies generally focus on a specific area rather than attempting to represent a comprehensive view of urban-based protests historically. While analysing a broader area over a longer time period restricts the exploration of detailed information about the conflicts, presenting the delimitation of the study, it facilitates the evaluation of historical confrontations between policy-makers and

groups that are affected by these policies. Another limitation of the study is that it does not consider the results and achievements of the protests in general—although in some cases, the protests’ achievements are relevant. The reason for this limitation is twofold. Firstly, the period under study is limited to the recent past and present, which does not present the opportunity to examine achievements of all the protests. Secondly, a movement’s achievement or failure is linked to many other reasons in the social movements’ literature that beyond the scope of the study.

This study evaluates the socio-economic and political characteristics of the periods and their urban policies by presenting information about urban-based mobilisations and resistance movements against these policies since the 1950s. Furthermore, the period between 1990 and 2010, when mobilisation and resistance efforts expanded, is given special attention through event data analysis to explore the demands, organisational status, and repertoires of urban-based protests shaped around collective consumption demands.

Given the study’s stated purposes and limitations, the primary study question is:

- How urban oppositional mobilisations vary in demand, motivation, organisational type, and repertoire within the context of socio-economic-political processes and enacted urban policies across different periods of time in Istanbul?

From this main question, the following sub-questions are formed:

- How do neoliberal urban policies affect urban oppositional mobilisations?
- During which historical periods do urban oppositional mobilisations show decreasing and increasing trends? And how can these trends be evaluated in relation to the socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of the periods?
- Are changes in the demands, organisational status, and actors of urban oppositional mobilisations linked to the general socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of different periods?
- Considering the different demands of the mobilisations, how do the protests’ actors, organisational status, and repertoires vary between 1990 and 2010?

- Do the specific demands of the mobilisations change across periods? And how can these demands be evaluated with reference to the socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of the periods?

1.2 The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of six sections.

In the first chapter, the thesis introduction presents the study's purpose, research questions, structure, and methodology.

In the second chapter, the theoretical framework of the study is elaborated by describing the basic concepts of urban social movements. In this section, the concepts of space, urban politics, and urban conflicts are examined, particularly through the lenses of two prominent scholars, Henri Lefebvre and Manuel Castells. This chapter also examines the place of urban social movements in general social movements' literature and explains the basic concepts and theories of social movements.

In the third chapter, the concept of the urban social movement is analysed. This chapter begins with the studies of Manuel Castells, the father of urban social movements. Both his early and late studies of urban social movements are analysed, as they differ significantly. And later, the development of the urban social movement is examined through other scholars' conceptualisations of urban social movements and their critiques of Castells. Lastly, this chapter discusses the role of class in existing literature about urban social movements.

In the fourth chapter, urban policies and urban struggles in Istanbul are examined between the years 1950 and 2010. This chapter is divided into four parts, and each section focuses on the economic and social conjunctures, urban policies, and urban oppositional mobilisations of the time periods. The first part, comprising the period between the 1950s and 1980s, includes information about rural-urban migration and *gecekondu*¹ construction processes put in motion by urban policies starting from the 1950s in Istanbul. This section also includes state interventions in *gecekondu*

¹ *Gecekondu* means slum dwelling in Turkish. In the third chapter, background information is given about *gecekondu* settlements in Turkey.

settlements, dwellers' resistance to the demolition of *gecekondu* settlements, and mobilisations effort for urban services in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. The second section spans the period between 1980 and 1990, the primary years of construction of the neoliberal city. In this period, urban policies emerged that resulted in large interventions in urban areas. At the same time, professional organisations began to participate in urban oppositional movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) began to emerge in Turkey. In the third section, urban policies and urban struggles are analysed in İstanbul between the years 1990 and 2002, when the policies focused on globalisation process of the city which led transformation and gentrification of the city. NGOs played important roles in the opposition efforts against these interventions. Especially after Habitat II, which was held in İstanbul in 1996, the role of NGOs expanded; and, they held the significant part of urban oppositional mobilisations in İstanbul. Also during this period, neighbourhood 'beautification' associations increased in the neighbourhoods in order to oppose the interventions to the neighbourhoods through both legal actions and protests. Finally, the fourth section focuses on the period between 2002 and 2010, the peak phase of neoliberal policies during the time interval under study. . In those eight years, major legal and administrative regulations were changed or generated to establish urban regeneration projects, while major construction and transportation projects were carried out. Almost all *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and even neighbourhoods in which residents had title deeds for their dwellings became the subject of regeneration projects and forced-eviction processes. In order to counter these interventions, multiple associations and organisations would combine to establish common resistance networks and platforms.

The fourth chapter of the study also illustrates that in the neoliberal period, mobilisation efforts against urban policies increased especially after the 1990s. Therefore, in the study's fifth chapter, special attention is paid to the period from 1990 to 2010. Event data analysis of daily newspapers in Istanbul is conducted to quantify urban-based protests in the city between 1990 and 2010 and to categorise these protests by demand, as well as motivation, organisational type, and repertoire. This information indicates whether the protests pertained to housing, workplaces,

public buildings and spaces, or urban infrastructure/transportation. Information regarding all urban-based protests in Istanbul is obtained² for the years 1990-2010 and analysed in terms of the protestors' demands, motivations, organisational types, and repertoires across different periods. In order to analyse the information by issue, a coding table is generated, and all of the protests are enumerated through this coding system.

Lastly, the final chapter of the thesis presents the evaluation and conclusions of the findings through reconsidering the theoretical framework of the study.

1.3 Methodology and Data Collection Process

The methodology of this study is based on evaluating urban oppositional mobilisations in the context of general socio-economic framework and urban policies in Istanbul. The conceptual configuration of the study is first explained within the contexts of space, urban politics, conflicts, and social movements. Later, the study's theoretical framework is explored in the concept of urban social movements. After establishing the study's theoretical basis, general socio-economic and political contexts, urban policies, and urban oppositional mobilisations in Istanbul are explained, with an attempt to categorise distinct time periods from the 1950s onward. This facilitates an understanding of the general socio-economic and political characteristics of different time periods, together with each period's distinct urban policies. After presenting these two interwoven processes, the urban oppositional mobilisations are given for each period in order to understand how these policies generated reactions in the urban area and vice versa. The evaluation of these three aspects of every period does not only yield the characteristics of specific periods; it also identifies causal explanations for these three contexts and determines how they have changed with time.

In order to evaluate the three aforesaid contexts, a qualitative analysis is employed with both earlier studies and a search of newspapers and journals (especially the *Istanbul Journal*, which was published by the Historical Foundation of Turkey, and the journals of professional organisations such as the Chamber of Architects or

² The Methodology chapter explains how information about the protests was obtained and analysed.

Chamber of Urban Planners) during the specified periods. These processes provide information about the characteristics of the periods and shed light on how the implemented policies and oppositional mobilisations against these policies were handled and represented by the media and interpreted by professionals. In addition, researching print media from the periods supplies information about policy-makers' discourses (especially in the mainstream media) and about the opposition efforts that developed to counter the policies of the authorities (especially the journals of professional organisations). Some sources—for example, the *Istanbul Journal*—illuminate the perspectives of the middle class, professionals, and intellectuals on urban issues. Considering the policies, their effects on urban areas and on oppositional arguments-mobilisations through aforementioned techniques provides a qualitatively evaluation. And the final chapter, consisting of an event data analysis of urban-based protests about collective consumption demands, offers a quantitative evaluation for the last two periods in order to test the study's hypothesis.

An event data analysis of urban-based protests is employed between 1990 and 2010, and the analysis results are evaluated in the contexts of socio-economic processes and urban policies. Scholars have used event analyses since the 1960s to explore collective actions 'using records from archives, newspapers, historical documents, and police³ or magistrate records' (Olzak, 1989). Because event analysis provides statistical data and pertinent information regarding timing, range of events, or systematic evidence, data that case studies generally lack, this type of analysis is useful to social movement studies, as well as other subfields of sociology (Olzak, 1989).

In this study, event analysis of urban-based protests is explicated within the contexts of socio-economic processes and urban policies in İstanbul. Over the specified 21-year period, data regarding urban-based protests were collected and coded according to target, organisation, repertoire, type, and location; these data points were also categorised according to time period, demands, and motivation. The analysis results

³ In 'Sokak Eylemlerinde ve Polis Denetiminde Tarihsel Süreklilik ve Kopuş' (2007), Uysal uses data from the Turkish National Office's archives from 1994 to 2000, and in her article, she explains both the advantages and the disadvantages of using police archives to collect protest event data.

were compared across periods to identify how protestors' demands, repertoires, and organisational types changed over time in conjunction with changing policies.

The study collected data from national newspapers published from 1990 to 2010. Scholars of collective action and social movements have used newspaper accounts for data collection more commonly in the past few decades (Earl et al., 2004). Newspaper-based event data collection offers both useful opportunities and disadvantages to scholars. Disadvantages of newspaper data include the indexing system's inclusiveness; newspapers' reports selectivity, also called selection bias; and newspapers' distortion or inclusiveness of events, also called description bias (McCarthy et al., 1996, 1999, as cited in Earl et al., 2004). Given these disadvantages, newspapers' indexing systems may not always yield the accurate total number of protest events. Firstly, articles with title words or keywords pertaining to protests may not in fact be about relevant protests, or vice versa; secondly, indexers may miss or make mistakes about relevant articles; and thirdly, some terms used in the index can change meaning over time (Earl et al., 2004). Due to selection bias, newspapers' data do not report on all events due to editorial reasons, newspaper space, or other reporting factors (Earl et al., 2004). Similarly, due to description bias, some news information (e.g., location, subject) may be omitted or distorted, or newspapers may report only the most intriguing details of the protests while omitting other equally relevant data (Earl et al., 2004). Scholars have developed new techniques—such as triangulation of multiple sources, use of electronic archives, or a combination of various methods—to minimise the disadvantages of event data analysis (Earl et al., 2004).

Nonetheless, the use of newspaper data yields significant advantages, such as giving historical information about peak and low periods, testing a study's hypothesis with systematic evidence, and enabling researchers to obtain salient information before and after events occur. According to Olzak (2009), although newspapers are flawed sources like all other sources, researchers cannot turn to any more reliable alternatives.

With the aim of minimising the disadvantages of newspaper data collection, this study did not employ the indexing system, which is limited to keyword searches. Instead, relevant newspapers were scanned daily in their original print versions over

the 21-year period. Then, to minimise the effects of selection and description biases, a secondary newspaper was also scanned daily.

Before choosing which newspapers to scan, Turkey's national newspaper circulation for the year 2010 was checked. *Zaman* was the first newspaper in the newspaper circulation rate. However, examining one year of *Zaman* issues revealed that the newspaper rarely reported urban-based protests. As the period of study comprises 21 years, the primary newspaper for data collection must have been published during that period. Therefore, other long-term newspapers were compared. *Cumhuriyet* was the most inclusive of urban-based issues compared to other well-established newspapers such as *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, or *Hürriyet*. As the secondary newspaper, *Radikal* was scanned in order to control for protest events reported in *Cumhuriyet*. The original print versions of both newspapers were scanned in Atatürk Library, giving the researcher the opportunity to track events that occurred before and after certain periods for contextual information. In total, the newspaper scans yielded 867 mentions of protests, 90% of which were obtained from *Cumhuriyet*⁴.

After all issues of *Cumhuriyet* and *Radikal* over the specified 21-year period were scanned, a coding system was generated based on Charles Tilly's London studies with R.A. Schweitzer (1981, 1982), Susan Olzak's coding systems for ethnic conflict analyses (1992), Olzak's environmental protest studies conducted in the United States with Sarah Soule (2009) and Kathleen Bruhn's study on urban protest in Mexico and Brazil (2008). In addition, *The Urban Question* (1977) and *The City and the Grassroots* (1983), both by Manuel Castells, served as important references in generating the study's coding system. With the guidance of these studies, a coding table (see Appendix A) was prepared, and the problems, goals, locations, subjects, and organisations of the protests were enumerated historically with main and sub-categories. The analysis results were compared historically with the study's quantitative analysis results and also evaluated in the contexts of socio-economic processes and urban policies.

⁴ *Radikal* was the second data source for the study. Therefore the mentions which were obtained from *Radikal* were checked before if they were already mentioned in *Cumhuriyet*. The data which were already obtained from *Cumhuriyet* newspaper were not seized also from *Radikal* newspaper.

2. CONCEPTUAL CONFIGURATION OF THE STUDY

In this chapter, in order to draw a framework for the concept of urban social movements, the basic concepts which are referred in the study will be explicated. In the first section, the concepts of space, urban politics and urban conflicts will be emphasized through referring the studies of two important Marxist scholars, Henri Lefebvre and Manuel Castells. And then, contentious urban politics will be emphasized within the process of urban crisis.

And in the second section, the concepts in the social movements literature and different theories of social movements will be discussed. As this section also provides the concepts of social movements literature which is used in the last chapter of the study widely, it also gives a discussion of the place of urban social movement in general social movements theories.

2.1 Theoretical Framework: Space, Urban Politics and Urban Conflicts

“... we can begin to understand how the city changes not under the pressure of city-planning technicians but under that of the conflict process in social groups, and also how the new question posed by the urban problematic are expressed in action that reopens the roads the revolution in our societies by linking other forms of conflict with those arising from the productive system and from political struggle.”

Manuel Castells, 1977, p. 378

Castells and Lefebvre differ in analysing the concept of ‘space’ epistemologically, theoretically and politically (Gottdiener, 1984). In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre’s theory of “production of space” associates the categories of city and space in a spacious social theory by analysing spatial processes at different levels. According to the concept of the “production of space”, Lefebvre theorizes that “space” is linked with social realities, and it cannot perform as an “epistemological starting position” in itself (Schmid, 2008). Lefebvre gives the the reason of this as; space is not existed in itself but it is produced. He states that:

... the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make use of it. The social and political (state) forces which engendered this space now seek, but fail, to master it completely; the very agency that has forced spatial reality towards a sort of uncontrollable autonomy now strives to run into the ground, then shackle and enslave it. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26)

There are two stages in Lefebvre's late works, which are social space and social time (Meyer, 2008). To him, neither space nor time exists universally, because they are socially produced, and they can only be understood in a specific society (Ronneberger, 2008). Space refers 'synchronic order of social reality', and time indicates the historical order (Schmid, 2008). According to this understanding, space and time are integral view of social practice and they are both the outcomes and preconditions of the "production of society" and their historical way comprises power relations and conflicts (Schmid, 2008).

In Lefebvre's dialectics, he engages with three German thinkers which are Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. And according to this, three-dimensional dialectical figure is interconnected. He worked out material social practice of Marx, language and thought of Hegel and creative act of Nietzsche. Lefebvre identifies his dialectic as a "*radical critique of Hegel based on Marx's social practice and Nietzsche's art*" (Schmid, 2008, p.33).

In order to define socio-spatial processes, Lefebvre identifies three dimensions of production of space which are *spatial practices* or *perceived space*, *representation of space* or *conceived space* and *representational of space* or *lived space* (Milgrom, 2008). According to Lefebvre, spatial practice of society is emerged through decoding of its space. Perceived space is the collective production of urban reality and what society reproduces its spatiality (Ronneberger, 2008). And to Lefebvre (1991), spatial practice under neo-capitalism defines a close link with "daily reality" which is "daily routine" and "urban reality" which is the routes between work, home and leisure. And the second one, which is "conceived space", is shaped through "knowledge, signs and codes" and intends to "representations of space" by specialists (Ronneberger, 2008). Lefebvre identifies "*representation of space as the space of scientists, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers*" and to him, conceived space is a dominant space in all societies. And the last one, which is

representational of space, is experienced by inhabitants and users in daily life. To Lefebvre, social space is analysed linking with these three dimensions. Firstly, social space seems in spatial practice as a linking network of activities by lying a material basis such as built environment; secondly this spatial practice can be described and separated as space and creates a representation of space; and lastly the material order can become the vehicle transmitting the meaning and social norms, values and experiences are expressed by spatial symbolism (Schmid, 2008). According to Lefebvre, the core of his social space is the everyday life.

Lefebvre also gives identification of another type of space, which is abstract space or space of capitalism. This identification of space of Lefebvre is based on the “production of space” which Lefebvre states that: *“Today, the analysis of production shows that we have passed from the production of things in space to the production of space itself”* (1979, p. 186). This production of space instead of production in space transforms the space into a commodity which can be sold and bought that is abstract space which Lefebvre explains as:

Capitalism and neo-capitalism have produced an abstract space that is a reflection of the world of business on both a national and international level, as well as the power of money and the politique of the state. This abstract space depends on vast networks of banks, businesses, and great centres of production. There also is the spatial intervention of highways, airports, and information networks. In this space, the cradle of accumulation, the place of richness, the subject of history, the centre of historical space-in other words, the city-has exploded. (1979, p. 187)

In this manner abstract space put forwards the exchange value of the space instead of use value. With the concrete abstraction of space Lefebvre refers to Marx’s description of universal characteristics of all commodities (Stanek, 2008) which Marx states that every commodity has two-fold aspects which are exchange value and use value, and he explains them in the first volume of Capital as:

Use values become a reality only by use or consumption: they also constitute the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth. In the form of society we are about to consider, they are, in addition, the material depositories of exchange value....Exchange value, at first sight, presents itself as a quantitative relation, as the proportion in which values in use of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort, a relation constantly changing with time and place. Hence exchange value appears to be something accidental and purely relative, and consequently an intrinsic value, i.e., an

exchange value that is inseparably connected with, inherent in commodities, seems a contradiction in terms. (1972, p.44)

Therefore as Lefebvre states that the urban space has transformed into commodities through producing it, the exchange value of the space comes forward as abstract space. To him, capitalism in order to keep itself alive reproduces all the social relations of production, including space. According to Lefebvre capitalism produces a different space for domination and it does this through a spatial form which is “city centre” (Gottdiener, 1984). To Lefebvre abstract space is a hierarchical space which is produced and dominated by state, rulers, planners and capital. But also according to Lefebvre abstract space is not only sensed by capitalist spatial practices or representations by planners, but also by inhabitants’ practices in this space can be abstract because of one-sided consideration of the space (Stanek, 2008).

Lefebvre states that, abstract space has its own contradictions which are especially based on *“the pulverization of space by private property, the demand for interchangeable fragments, and the scientific and technical (informational) capacity to treat space on ever more vast levels”* (1979, p. 189). To Lefebvre, these contradictions also give rise the different kind of movements, from the known movements like concerning work, business and workplaces, they demand for reorganization of the space. And Lefebvre calls them as “consumer movements” which they point out that: *“Space is not merely economic, in which all the parts are interchangeable and have exchange value. Space is not merely a political instrument for homogenizing all parts of society.”* (1979:191)

To Lefebvre, demanding use value of space and time is only possible with intervention of the class struggle in the production of space which he states that:

Only class conflict can prevent abstract space from spreading itself across the planet and therefore erasing all spatial differences. Only class action can produce differences that oppose what is internal to economic growth, namely, strategy, logic, and system..... One of the most important points for the power of the left is to support consumer movements that have not yet found their voice and that are very often enclosed in such narrow frameworks that the political significance of their actions escapes them. One of the political roles for the left, then, is to use the class struggle in space. (1979, p. 188-191)

And he suggests that socialist space can be created if only which ceases private property and political domination of space. And to him it could be possible if only struggles would extend to reproduction area and to daily life (Şengül, 2001). But

Şengül (2001) states that the weakest part of the argument of Lefebvre is this point which he does not give any explanation how it could be managed.

Another prominent Marxist scholar, David Harvey, is also inspired from Lefebvre, but he refuses Lefebvre's distance determinative attributions to spatial relations (Harvey, 1988). According to Harvey, space is a social dimension which forms and is formed by human. In the foreword of *Social Justice and the City*, Katznelson quotes Harvey's understanding of spatial forms as following: "*Spatial forms are ... seen not as inanimate objects within which the social process unfolds, but as things which 'contain' social processes in the same manner that social processes are spatial*" (1988, p. 3-4).

Also some other criticisms come to Lefebvre from Castells. According to Gottdiener (1984) Lefebvre uses Marxist approach to theorize urbanization, but in contrast to Castells, he introduces historical argument of urban similar to Weber. To Lefebvre, the city itself is subject to capitalist development (Lefebvre, 1972 cited in Gottdiener, 1984). Gottdiener makes a comparison between Lefebvre's and Castells's understandings of urban:

"... for Lefebvre, the essence of the 'urban' is a spatial form which is both a product and reproducer of capitalist relations in general, while for Castells, the essence is a process, the reproduction of labour-power which is embedded in a spatial form" (1984, p. 205).

According to Lefebvre, state interventions are not only towards working class but also against everyday life and against to social space. To him, in the capitalist society there are two main strategies which are "neoliberalism" which maximizes the initiatives concerning urbanism, and "neomanagerialism" which emphasises planning in the urban area with the intervention of 'specialists and technocrats and state capitalism' (Lefebvre, 1970 cited in Merrifield, 2006). In *The Urban Revolution* (2003), Lefebvre points out the role of urbanism, to him urbanism is stuck in between special interests and political interests and urbanists act between entrepreneurs and the state. Because he sees state's role as a producer of abstract state of domination, he rejects urban planning. He states in *The Survival of Capitalism* that: "*It is a worth remembering that the urban has no worse enemy than urban planning and 'urbanisme' which is capitalism's and the states' strategic instruments for the manipulation of fragmented urban reality and the production of controlled space*" (1976, p. 15). With this argument Lefebvre rejects late

capitalism's economic and state interventions over everyday life (Gottdiener, 1984). But Castells objects Lefebvre's argument and finds this as "alienation of everyday life" and even "utopian anarchism" (Gottdiener, 1984). Also Castells criticizes Lefebvre about the comprehension of the city. According to Castells, city is a "product of abstractly conceived instances of the social formation" instead of what Lefebvre considers that contradictory agency between everyday life and the social order (Kipfer et al., 2008).

Castells opposes to Lefebvre's approach of 'space' and generates a theory in Althusserian terms. To Castells, space is:

... a material product, in relation with other material elements – among others, men, who themselves enter into particular social relations, which give to space (and to the other elements of the combination) a form, a function, a social signification. It is not, therefore, a mere occasion for the deployment of the social structure, but a concrete expression of each historical ensemble in which a society is specified" (1977, p. 115).

According to Castells, space is one society's elementary "material dimension". Thinking space separately from social relationships is to dissociate nature from culture and to break down the principle that "matter and consciousness are interrelated" (Castells, 1983). Consequently, to Castells, spatial forms, like all other matters, are generated by human action, and, depending on the mode of the production, function in the interests of the dominant class. And they are also grounds for resistance by oppressed classes and people. According to Castells, space and cities are the products of resistance to the dominant class, dominant genders, and dominant subjects not the products of what dominant interests impose to the city.

To Castells "space" is an implementation of Althusserian approach to the description of the production of the built environment and it is an initiative to rescue the term "urban" (Gottdiener, 1984). And in order to comply Althusserian approach that economic relations dominate all the others in the current mode of production, Castells uses economic element of the "urban", and that economic structure is formed of two main elements: "the means of production and labour power", therefore to him, "urban" is a "spatial unit of the reproduction of labour power" (Gottdiener, 1984).

According to Castells, the study of urban politics can be analysed into two analytical and inseparably connected areas which are urban planning, and urban social movements (Castells, 1970, cited in Dunleavy, 1977). Castells points out the city as:

“...’the city’ is not a framework but a social practice in constant flux the more it becomes an issue, the more it is a source of contradictions and the more its social manipulation is linked to the ensemble of social and political conflicts. A whole series of relationships thus grows up between the conflictual field, specifically linked to urban contradictions, and the conjuncture of social movements.” (Castells, 1972, p. 93)

In this sense, he points out that, social movements are a form of organization of social practices and the logic of contradictions to the “institutionally dominant social logic” (Castells, 1972). He gives the social significance of urban planning interventions and oppositions to provisions of urban planning. And to him, these oppositions are more than “consumer reaction”. He links the development of urban movements to the advanced capitalism (Castells, 1978). To him, urban movements emerge from two issues; first from the urban crisis which arises from socialization of consumption, and the second from the political crisis which arises from state interventions in social life. And, as we will detail in the third chapter, to Castells, if a movement achieves to its goals it becomes an urban social movement, and similarly to Lefebvre, also Castells links the success of the urban movements to the its merging character with class struggles.

However, Castells do not give any information about how it would be possible to merge urban movements with class struggles. But as Şengül states;

In his subsequent works, especially in the *City and the Grassroots*, he accepted this problem and oriented towards more historical and empirical open-ended analysis. But this orientation, haplessly, instead of targeting to associate the contradictions and struggles which emerge in the production level with the ones which emerge in the reproduction level; resulted with a post-Marxist position which foresees the independency of these two areas. (2001, p. 18-19)

2.2 Is There Any Place for Urban Social Movements in General Social Movements Theory?

Early writings on urban movement displayed a relative isolation from general social movement theory (Pickvance, 2003). According to Pickvance (2003), the reasons of this isolation are as following. Firstly, scholars, who are interested in urban social movements, were from various academic disciplinary, and Castells’s theoretical

framework prevented them to look more deeply into social movement theory. And secondly, scholars who were interested in new social movements avoided urban movements because of their connection with “old” social movements.

Pickvance (2003) states that, this isolation created both positive and negative results. The first positive result of this situation was entailing urban social movement writings to be focused on movements’ effects rather than their type of organizations. These effects were about improvements in public services, or political which is about changes in power relations. This contradicted with social movements in two major ways; firstly this showed great consideration to mobilization and the expression of collective identities, and secondly showed little consideration to interaction between protest and the political system (Melucci cited in Pickvance, 2003). The second positive feature created a productive discussion between urban protest and state authorities. Until Tarrow’s “political process” approach, general social movement literature was not interested in political power, but political power played always a central role in the urban social movement literature. The third positive result was the political concentration of urban movements. This identified that urban movements generate more easily under some political and social conditions than others, instead of spontaneous reactions to practical inequalities or deprivations. This situation created a debate between Castells and some other scholars (see Pickvance, 1985; Fainstein and Hirst, 1995 cited in Pickvance, 2003). In Castells’s opinion (1983 cited in Pickvance, 2003) this played a negative role on the effects of context, and on the contrary the others thought that, it played a positive role.

Nevertheless, the isolation created also negative features as well. According to Pickvance (2003), the first one; this situation entailed unlinking the urban social movement theory from general social movements’ literature. Since 1970s social movement theory developed and created many different theoretical frameworks as collective behaviour, relative deprivation, resource mobilization, rational choice, political opportunity structure, new social movements, political process and framing; but this did not fully seized by urban movement works (Pickvance, 2003). Secondly, some empirical gap occurred in the urban movement studies because of this isolation. The mobilization process was disregarded in early studies partly because of structuralist writers who treat urban movements as a matter of detail. Writers who were also activists assured and retained this again (Pickvance, 2003). And thirdly,

according to Pickvance, this isolation led the separation of voluntary associations' studies and urban movements' studies, and there is still a debate on if citizen actions should be counted as urban social movements or voluntary associations.

Here, in order to understand urban social movements' place in general social movements' theory, we will first elaborate the different theories of social movements from North America which focus more on how question of collective action that are collective behaviour theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity theory; and also from Europe which focuses on more 'why' question which is new social movements. And then we will try to point out the some scholars who try to link urban social movements with general social movements theories (particularly with resource mobilization, political opportunity and new social movements).

The term "social movement" was first introduced in 1850 by German sociologist Lorenz von Stein in his book *History of the French Social Movement From 1789 to the Present* (Tilly, 2004). During that period, analysts of social movements have generally differed by program, organization and setting. For example Engels seized pluralized social movements as he stated in his preface⁵ to The Communist Manifesto's English edition of 1888 (Tilly, 2004). In the late nineteenth century, scholars extended social movements from "organized proletarians to farmers, women, and a wide variety of other claimants" (Heberle 1951: 2-1.1, cited in Tilly, 2004).

From mid 1960s to the 1970s social movements' studies were pursued by specialists in "collective behaviour" who were not very interested in urban setting (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Writers within this tradition treated social movements as "collective manifestation of irrational or deviant behaviour"⁶ and they thought all mass movements trigger totalitarian regimes (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Political changes in American and European cities gave rise to the idea that formal "political institutions are unable to handle urban societies" demands and this caused to lose old approaches (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Fainstein and Hirst, explains how this

⁵ Engels states that: "Wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down" (Marx & Engels 1958: I, 26, cited in Tilly, 2004).

⁶ This way of thinking goes back to Gustave LeBon (1960) (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995).

political and social situation led rise of urban social movements and disappear the old approaches as following:

...urban social movements (USMs) became agents for social change through their effects on popular consciousness and their actions challenging both the process and outcomes of social and political decision making... Moreover, the moral foundation of movements demanding racial justice, respect for the environment, and community participation made it hard to dismiss them as deviant elements to be equated with Nazis and Ku-Klux-Klan. (1995, p. 181-182)

During the late 1960s, the world encountered with great upheavals. American civil rights movements, 1968 revolts in France, students' protests in Germany, Britain and Mexico, and also women and environmental movements emerged almost all around the world in order to demand transformations and changes (Della Porta, Diani, 2006). And accordingly, the studies of social movements appeared in the academic field. Especially by the mid-1970s collective action was one of the most significant research subjects of sociology (Marx and Wood, 1975 cited in Della Porta, Diani, 2006). And at the end of the 1980s there was a noticeable increase on theoretical and empirical writings on social movements and collective action (Morris and Herring, 1987 cited in Della Porta, Diani, 2006).

One of the most important scholars who addresses social movements in his studies is Charles Tilly. In his book *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (2004), he points out that contentious politics necessitates a historical understanding. According to him, the history of social movements is different from other political forms' history like electoral campaigns or displays of military force. Therefore when he talks about social movements he does not mean all collective actions. According to him social movement is:

... a distinctive form of contentious politics -contentious in the sense that social movements involve collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with someone else's interests, politics in the sense that governments of one sort or another figure somehow in the claim making, whether as claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the contention. (2004, p. 3)

Contentious politics do not only include social movements. They comprise different public and collective political struggles, like revolutions, nationalism, strike waves or social movements (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001 cited in Staggenborg, 2008). And another term which is largely used in contentious politics is protest. Taylor and

Dyke state that: *“Protest – or the collective use of unconventional methods of political participation to try to persuade or coerce authorities to support a challenging group’s aims – is perhaps the fundamental feature that distinguishes social movements from routine political actors”* (2004, p. 263). Also they point out that, protest is sometimes used by institutionalized political actors like political parties and they put the difference between social movements and other political actors as:

If there is a single element that distinguishes social movements from other political actors, however, it is the strategic use of novel, dramatic, unorthodox, and noninstitutionalized forms of political expression to try to shape public opinion and put pressure on those in positions of authority. (2004, p. 263)

To Tilly, differently to other contentious politics, social movements include three factors, which are campaign, repertoire and WUNC. He elaborates these factors as following:

“Campaign... [is]... a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities... social movements repertoire is employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action... [and] WUNC... [stands for]... worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies.” (2004: 3-4)

Worthiness means moderate attitude, for example presence of mothers with children in the movements; unity is like wearing same badges or costumes, or marching together; numbers is filling the street, more signs on petitions; and lastly commitment is resisting to repression or bad weather and sacrifice (Tilly, 2004).

Especially repertoires of the social movements are studied largely by many of the scholars. Biggs states that: *“People making claims against powerful adversaries almost always select a tactic from their existing “repertoire,” a small subset of the set of all possible tactics.”* (2013: 407) According to Tilly tactics are “learned cultural creations” (1995: 42 cited in Biggs, 2013). And while the same tactics are used for different movements, also the adopted tactics show diversity for different kind of movements. As Taylor and Dyke state that while labor movements use *“sit-down strikes, labor walkouts, and secondary boycotts as weapons of political coercion”*, right-wing groups use *“constitutional confrontations”* like *“the violation of gun laws”* or like skinheads and neo-Nazis, use *“racist music, literature, graffiti, and personalized political strategies including wearing swastikas, insignias, tattoos,*

shaven heads..."; differently LGBTT movements use of "*street performances, cross-dressing, gender transgression, and alternative underground magazines*" also political activism on internet use the tactics of "*hacking, online sit-ins, defacing Web pages, email floods, viruses and worms, and data theft or destruction*" etc. (2004, p. 264-265).

There are many different theoretical approaches which affected social movement concept both in Europe and North America. Some of the studies intend to develop universal theories about movements across time and place; but generally studies on social movements point out how movements operate in certain circumstances (Staggenborg, 2008). Before 1980s, European and North American studies developed distanced from each other, as we stated while "new social movement theory" was developed in Europe, "collective behaviour", "political opportunity" and "resource mobilization" theories were developed in North America (Staggenborg, 2008).

Collective behaviour theory is generally known as classical model of social movements. And because collective behaviour emerges during social disruption rather than being normal part of political process, it is also labelled as strain or breakdown theories (Staggenborg, 2008). The Collective behaviour theorists consider social movements as noninstitutionalized social change efforts (Jenkins 1983 cited in Morris and Herring, 1987). Most scholars on short-term incidents of collective behaviour such as "panic, lynch mobs"; and long-term social movements such as "revolutions, religious cults" have considered collective behaviour as noninstitutionalized group behaviour, but later the segregation between collective and institutionalized behaviour decreased (Marx and Wood, 1975). Collective behaviour theory includes the phenomena like "crowds, panics, mobs, riots, crazes, fads, religious cults and revivals, social movements, and revolutions" (Staggenborg, 2008). "Crowds" study is based to Gustave Le Bon's late nineteenth century studies. According to Le Bon, crowds are irrational and anomalous; and even many of collective behaviour theorists refused this idea, they have still concentrated on participants' psychological states (Staggenborg, 2008).

Even if there are some similarities in different collective action approaches, also there are significant differences. We can consider four different approaches on

collective behaviour theory, which are Chicago School approach, Smelser's theory, mass society, and relative deprivation theory.

The Chicago School approach to collective behaviour launched in 1920s by Robert Park and Ernest Burgess with "symbolic interactionist" approach which focus on how participants build meaning through social interaction. Theorists from this approach point out the emergence of social movement and to them collective behaviour emerges when meaning of current system depressed, and participants try to find new meanings (Staggenborg, 2008).

Neil Smelser, in his book *Theory of Collective Behaviour*, created the "value added" model (cited in Staggenborg, 2008). In this model, in order to explain collective behaviour, Smelser adds value for each condition. These conditions are; "structural conduciveness", "structural strain", "growth and spread of generalized belief", "precipitating factors", "mobilization for actors" and "social control" (Staggenborg, 2008). Even if some scholars find this model effective, some others criticized Smelser for trusting on structural strains far too much (Staggenborg, 2008).

Mass society theorists view social movements as phenomena which emerge when unorganized participants come together to change their social milieu (e.g., Kornhauser, 1959; Arendt, 1951; Lipset, 1963; Hoffer, 1951; Cantril, 1941; King, 1956 cited in Morris and Herring, 1987). This approach of social movements points out the interface between social - structure and personality (Morris and Herring, 1987). According to Della Porta and Diani:

Mass society theorists posited that associations would discourage radical collective action because of their capacity to integrate elites and ordinary citizens, socialize their members to the rules of the game, give them a sense of political efficacy, and provide them with primary attachments and a more satisfactory life. (2006, p. 120)

Even if for some scholars mass society theory considers irrational individuals participate in movements in order to find an identity, studies show that oppositely individuals who have social networks more likely participate the movements (Staggenborg, 2008).

Relative deprivation theory is a more general theory than mass society and focuses on the psychological reasoning for joining the social movement (Locher, 2002). According to Denton Morrison (1971) there are social conditions that give rise to relative deprivation and if enough people sense this way, a social movement emerges

(cited in Locher, 2002). In relative deprivation, an individual may feel deprivation not matter how much they have and something that is demanded and expected by a large number of people whether the demand is new desires or a reduction in previous conditions (Locher, 2002). Relative deprivation theory was used as an explanatory tool until 1980s (Walker and Smith, 2002). Many theorists criticize that this is only one reason that form a social movement and this theory does not include some factors like social, economic or political issues (Locher, 2002). Following social movement studies focused on more other concepts like resource mobilization in order to explain why and when people come together in order to form a social movement (Walker and Smith, 2002).

Resource mobilization theory acquired significance with the book *Social Conflict and Social Movement* by Anthony Oberscall in 1973 and pointed out that social process plays an important role for a movement to form and succeed (Locher, 2002). Resource mobilization theory gives more consideration to political and economic issues and less attention to psychological traits than mass society or relative deprivation theories (Locher, 2002). Jenkins makes the comparison of collective behaviour theory and resource mobilization as following:

Social movements are traditionally seen as extensions of more elementary forms of collective behaviour and as encompassing both movements of personal change (e.g. religious sects, cults, and communes) and those focused on institutional changes (e.g. legal forms and changes in political power). Resource mobilization theorists have, in contrast, seen social movements as extensions of institutionalized actions and have restricted their focus to movements of institutional change that attempt to alter 'elements of social structure and/or the reward distribution of society' (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1218), organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites (Gamson, 1975:16-18), or represent the interests of groups excluded from polity (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; Tilly, 1978, 1979). (1983, p. 3)

Resource mobilization theory reflects that, individuals participate in a collective action when the benefits for them outweigh the costs (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). This argument overthrows the earlier analysis of social movements which describe social movements as irrational. Nevertheless this theory also treats all forms of non-institutionalized collective actions analogous; regardless of participants' social background, aims or method of action (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). It focused on

‘how’ the movement is formed and succeeds or fails, instead of ‘why’ they exist (Rootes, 1990).

Resource mobilization theory asserts that, movements’ success depend not just on strategic choices but also effectiveness for attracting participants to the movement and sufficiency of the movement’s mobilization with its participants and other movements (Jenkins, 1983 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995).

Some scholars who work on urban social movements use resource mobilization theory for their analysis. Pickvance (1995, cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995), who operates the less limited form of the theory on rise and decline of urban movements, is one of them. He limits his definition of urban social movement success to their capability of organizations to mobilize participants. Fainstein and Hirst (1995) states that, Pickvance determines two main factors in the urban context which cause decline of urban movements about demanding development on collective consumption. The first one is a new policy environment which is in budget constraints and promoted by market-based ideologies which is calling for decrease in government social welfare efforts, caused reducing participation of movements which are demanding more state spending. This caused reducing the potential returns of activism. The second one is a new stress on the privatization of public services and movement organizations and leaders started service delivery and this caused increasing the costs.

Castells claims that urban social movements’ strength differs from place to place and the trend is globally upward, on the contrary, Ceccarelli argues that large scale urban movements disappear as quickly as they come up, however, Pickvance (1995) separates himself from both of arguments, and according to him, stating that “there is a clear comparative upward trend” or defending Ceccarelli’s argument is not making any sense (cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). According to him, movements, which are in different context, have different roots; therefore the important thing is to figure out “the relationship between the movement and its context” (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). For Fainstein and Hirst (1995), even if a movement’s strength and tactics relate to the socio-political framework; because this framework is formed by its activities, outcomes of the movement also depend on consciousness and tactics of its participants.

The political process theory was introduced by Douglas McAdam in *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970* in 1982 (Locher, 2002). According to McAdam, classical social movements theories concentrate too heavily on the psychological dynamics of participants; and resource mobilization theory presents an elitist perspective and concentrates too much on “material sources and outside assistance” instead of political environment (Locher, 2002). The political opportunity theory stresses the interactions of social actors with the state, political opportunities and the outcomes of the movement (Staggenborg, 2008). This theory states that social movements come up when potential actors get that conditions are favourable (Staggenborg, 2008). According to political opportunity theory, ideology and beliefs are as much important as material resources; therefore it attempts to combine mass society, relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories into a more historical and political perspective (Locher, 2002).

To Sidney Tarrow (1998), contention is more linked to opportunities in collective action rather than social or economic experience of participants. Tarrow states that:

Contention increases when people gain the external resources to escape their compliance and find opportunities in which to use them. It also increases when they are threatened with costs they cannot bear or which outrage their sense of justice. When institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression declines, challengers find opportunities to advance their claims. When combined with high levels of perceived costs for inaction, opportunities produce episodes of contentious politics. (1998, p. 7)

Political opportunity theory also tries to interact between institutional and noninstitutional actors (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). According to Della Porta and Diani (2006), when citizens interrelate with political parties, interest groups or bureaucrats, political opportunity’s institutional structure will be more open and the state will be weaker.

Political opportunity theory also received some criticisms. According to Goodwin and Jasper (1999), the wider definition of political opportunity thesis tautological because of stating that people cannot create a movement when they do not have any

appropriate conditions to act⁷. And the second critic to political opportunity theory from Godwin and Jasper is McAdam's claim on the variables of political opportunity that should only contain "structural" factors but not "cultural processes". In this case according to Godwin and Jasper, McAdam recognizes the cultural process but excludes it.

According to Pruijt, "political opportunity structure" approach of general social movement literature applies in urban social movements. He demonstrates the reason of his finding as, when citizens find themselves in the same deprivation, they participate to the movement, but also one neighbourhood's gain can be another one's loss; similarly after regeneration project who will be able to re-house and who will not is another reason for participating the movement or countering it.

To Pickvance (2003) urban movements generate more easily under some political and social conditions than others, instead of spontaneous reactions to practical inequalities or deprivations. Therefore political concentration of urban movements are important, for some it has a positive effect on the movement's success and for others not. Even there is still debate on movement's success, the fact that urban movements emerge more easily in certain political conditions (Pickvance, 2003) is significant for the link between political opportunity theory and urban social movements.

For many scholars especially resource mobilization theory and political opportunity approach are significantly important for analysing urban social movements. But some writers classifies urban movements as new social movements because of their demands which include new rights and other "non-material" features (Fainstein and Hirst cited in Pickvance, 2003) Pickvance (2003) states that the term "urban social movements" served to unite scholars "who wanted to challenge the hegemonic North American social movement theories of the 1970s", which are collective behaviour and resource mobilization.

New social movement theory, which emerged in "post-industrial" or "advanced-capitalist" society, comprises the movements like "peace, environmental, gay and

⁷ Here, Goodwin and Jasper (1999) gives the example of the society which is described in George Orwell's 1984. And according to them in those conditions, for sure, people will not find any opportunity to create a movement.

lesbian, student, and women” (Staggenborg, 2008). New social movement perspective may be seen as the first theory that pointing out how the stakes and central actors are changed under different structural conditions (Della Porta, Diani, 2006). New social movement theorists have stated that these movements are different from the “old” movements of industrial society, particularly from the labour movement, because of their diverse structure, type of constituents and ideology (Staggenborg, 2008).

Some scholars also state that social change has created a new “social stratum” which is new middle class and this class plays a central role in these new conflicts (Della Porta, Diani, 2006) According to Della Porta and Diani:

The new middle class ... is constituted from sectors of the population that tend to be employed in the service sector: they are highly educated, yet are not comparable with managers or traditional professionals. As a result of their technical and cultural competence and of their economic-functional position, members of the new middle class are more likely to mobilize in conflicts of the new type we have just described: that is, to fight against technocrats, public and private agencies engaged in the dissemination of information and in the construction of consensus, the military and the apparatus responsible for social control. (2006, p. 55)

However, some researches also show that activists from the new middle class participate equally both to political ecology movements and traditional environmentalist movements even if we cannot count conservationist group as new social movements (Diani, 1995 cited in Della Porta and Diani, 2006).

New social movement theory came up substantially as a response to the classical Marxism in order to analyse collective action (Buechler, 1995). According to this theory’s scholars of classical Marxism have two types of reductionism which new social movement theory will resolve (Buechler, 1995). The first one is economic reductionism which considers all social actions emerge from economic logic of capitalist production and excludes all other social logics; the second one is class reductionism which considers all participants are rooted in the process of production and excludes all other social identities. And as a response to this, new social movement theory gives consideration particularly to the issues based in politics, ideology and culture, and other kinds of identities such as “ethnicity, gender and sexuality”, however, even though new social movement theory is a response to classical Marxism, some new social movement theorists try to review and update

Marxist approach (Buechler, 1995). And one of them who tries to revise the conventional Marxist approach, is Manuel Castells who adopts the new social movement theory from Alain Touraine.

Castells points out the influence of capitalist dynamics on the transformation of urban space and urban social movement's role in this process (Buechler, 1995). In his late studies, Castells states that urban movements emerge around three major subjects which are collective consumption, cultural identity and self-management.⁸ Castells's analysis of urban social movements represents many new social movements themes but he also brings a different framework to these themes through standing closer to some of the issues of conventional Marxism than other new social movements' theorists and he perceives the role of both non-class based and class based substances of urban social movements. Thus his version of new social movement theory is more cautious to the role of the state and he recognizes the role of political dynamics more than other new social movement's theorists that his approach recommends relevance of a specific way of neo-Marxist analysis with some versions of new social movement theory (Buechler, 1995).

Finally, some writers classify urban movements as new social movements and some others categorize as "old" social movements because of the material character of their demands. But according to Pickvance, demands of urban social movements can include also new rights and other "non-material" features; as well as material demands therefore urban movements cannot be neatly categorized as either new or "old" social movements. And to Pruijt (2007), the goals of the urban movements are arbitrary; that, the same movement can be seen both identity movement and instrumental movement⁹.

⁸ Castell's theory and these three concepts will be elaborated in the second chapter.

⁹ Pruijt (2007) gives Dutch squatters' movement as an example. He states that according to some opinions, Dutch squatters' movement was aiming to achieve a new way of life so it was a "new social movement" in other words identity movement. And for some others its goal was affordable housing so it was an instrumental movement.

3. URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Before May 1968, urban sociology did not pay attention to the political economy of urban development or conflicts, and emphasised more on community and social integration (Pruijt, 2007). But, after this date, urban movements' studies emerged especially with the studies of Manuel Castells (Pruijt, 2007). Castells introduced "urban social movement" as a term in the early 1970s when North American and British urban sociology scholars were studying on different subjects, which mainly focused on working class populations, and the subjects like urban politics, local government, pressure groups and parties, that the power and conflict were mainly excluded (Pickvance, 2003).

In this chapter, firstly as the father of urban social movements, the studies of Manuel Castells will be elaborated through giving place to his early and late studies which largely differ on analysing the concept of urban social movements. In the second part, other scholars' conceptualization of urban social movements and their critics on Castells' studies will be explicated through the historical development of the concept. And in the last part of the chapter, the role of class in the urban social movements' literature will be discussed.

3.1 Reading Manuel Castells on Urban Social Movements

3.1.1 Castells's early studies

In the late 1960s, "the growing urban contradiction and conflicts in advanced capitalist societies" entailed renewed ideas on urban theory, and both Lefebvre and Castells, introduced class conflict analysis into the urban problems and they developed the inheritance of Marxist theory (Castells, 1983). Castells explains this period as following:

During the last ten years we have obviously been aware of the production of urban forms and issues as a result of conflictual processes between social actors that we named social classes,

following the Marxist tradition. But we were also aware of the necessity to relate the forms of conflict to the social and economic structure, or, in other words to connect class structure and class struggle. (1983:297)

With this idea, Castells first wrote *Luttes Urbaines* in 1973 in order to point out to the new forms of struggles which rise from the city. In this study, Castells did not give much determination of the outcomes of struggles on social structure (Castells, 1983). And later in 1974 he wrote *Monopolville* with Francis Godard. In this work, they attempted to figure out how to enlance logic of capital with the state in the production of urban area (Castells, 1983). In *Crise du Logement et Mouvements Sociaux Urbains: Enquete sur la Region Parisienne* (written in 1974, published in 1978), they tried to bring logic of capital, the state and the formation of urban social movements together.

In his significant book, *The Urban Question*, he works with some examples of urban mobilizations, like urban reconquest of Paris, Montreal citizens' committees and Pobladores movement in Chile; and perceived the internal structure of these processes of change and conflict. He explains the main aim of this book as: "... to develop new tools of research while criticizing the traditional categories with which the social sciences, technocracy and the mass media have usually conceived urban problems." (1977, p. vii) With this book, Castells, described a new field on urban sociology which is different from the "institutional contained urbanism thesis of the Chicago School" and as Lowe states: "[he] reconstructed a new subject field which saw the urban system not as the location of geographically contained social processes, but as the focus of political conflict based on state intervention into the provision of key public services" (Lowe, 1986, p. 2).

In *The Urban Question*, Castells indicates that social integration was one of the problems which prevailed in urban sociology (Pickvance, 2003). Hence, he purports that "social order" is the problem of urban sociology instead of the needs of groups which could not meet by that social order. Until him, working-class households and immigrants issues were considered as a threat to the order and the "social order" was rational, unproblematic and "of no analytical interest" (Pickvance, 2003) But Castells refuses this argument and adopts an uneasy combination of Althusser's structuralism and Touraine's theory of social action in his own structure (Rucht cited in Pickvance, 2003).

According to Castells, urban is not only spatial form but also the social organization of the process of reproduction. Castells defines the urban area as the arena of collective consumption processes and to him, urban is pivotal for new challenges to the dominant capitalist order together with class struggle (Lowe, 1986). He emphasizes that new forms of conflict and new ways of the collective creation of everyday life stem from new social issues; and to him the urban social movement is the most salient statement of this. And he identifies urban social movements as the only mechanism for structural change in the urban system (Castells, 1977, Pruijt, 2007).). In Castells's approach urban social movements exemplify the displacement of class struggle from the workplace to the living space (Gottdiener, 1984).

To Castells (1977), the political importance of an urban movement is connected to its effects on the power relations between social classes in a certain condition. And these effects upon class relations link the urban issues with other issues in social structure. Thence, urban movements become social movements when they turn out one of the element of some political movement which challenges the social order, like workers' struggle. The consumer unionism connected directly to the method of allocation of communal resources must be distinguished from the development of class conflict out of these issues. And only, if there is a close link between unionism and revolutionary workers' movement, there is also a steady interaction between urban protest and questioning of our way of life. When communal consumption is guided more by state apparatus, urban movements tend to interrogate the social administration of our way of life in the basic facilities of daily life through public intervention. Therefore to him, revolutionary side of urban movements relates to the integration of state apparatus, in other words, to the resources it can assign to integration, and to the balance of power between classes and to the guidance of public resources (Castells, 1977).

In *The Urban Question*, Castells's main consideration is a focus on linking urban social movements to the general crisis of capitalism in getting over the descending profits through state intervention to the sphere of consumption (Gottdiener, 1984). Castells discusses that the state's role is gradually increased in the consumption process in advanced capitalist society because of business and population pressure (Pickvance, 2003). He calls this new case as "collective consumption" and to him, this enriched the urban. This conflict in the urban becomes the second one additional

to conflict between labour and capital (Pickvance, 2003). To his theory, state intervention causes new sources of inequality because of its unequal distribution of collective consumption goods and services (Gottdiener, 1984). According to Castells, the more state intervenes in the consumption sphere the more conflicts emerge because of those who cannot utilize from this new sphere (Pickvance, 2003). And Castells identifies urban planning as the state intervention in the area of the processes and units of consumption. In *The Urban Question* Castells, like Lefebvre, emphasizes on urban planning and its critique, but for Castells urban social movement is the main point of urban politics (Gottdiener, 1984). And also to Castells, while state intervention in the urban system is essential of the evolution of the capitalist economy in order to “control and stabilisation of the workers”, the intervention of state to the collective goods and services also politicised the issue (Lowe, 1986). Castells state that:

The permanent and ever extending intervention of the state apparatus in the area of the processes and units of consumption makes it real source of order in everyday life. This intervention of the state apparatus, which we call urban planning in the broad sense, involves an almost immediate politicization of the whole urban problematic, since the administrator and interlocutor of the social claims and demand tends to be, in the final analysis, the political apparatus of the dominant classes. However, the politicization thus established is not necessarily a source of conflict or change, for it may also a mechanism of integration and participation: everything depends on the articulation of the contradictions and practices or, to put it another way, on the dialectic between the state apparatus and urban social movement. (1977, p. 463)

According to *The Urban Question*, if an urban movement seeks to link urban issues to general social issues, it turns into a source of social change. If an urban movement seeks to separate them by following specific, restricted objectives; it becomes a tool of participation within institutional objectives. The characteristics of the organization and its line of action are subject to specific social factors and its success or failure in leading social mobilization. Castells noted that every case has its own position and social condition in urban social movement practice and he stated that:

One of the essential tasks of research is therefore to explain the social conditions surrounding the different lines of action. But in every case it is in this interaction between the position of the urban issue in the social structure, the position of the social group in the class relation and the politico-ideological characteristics of the intervening organizations that the ultimate secret of urban social movements lies. (1977, p. 378)

Also to Castells, when the struggles connect with trade unions and political organizations, urban social movement stresses the potential of urban struggles to represent structural contradictions and to encourage bringing radical changes in political power (Pickvance, 2003). In Castell's way of thinking urban social movement was the consequence when trade unions, political organizations and urban-based groups assemble.

According to Castells (1977); speaking of urban struggle in general, assembles and confuses widely different problems. To Castells (1977), the social significance of the problem and the terms of the issue are very different in diverse situations. In order to understand the social content of the issue, implementing a structural analysis of the basic problem by substituting it in its economic and political context is reasonable, instead of speaking of false unity of "urban struggles". Therefore, each urban struggle has its own structural content and each of them plays its own role with different social classes.

Consequently, as Lowe states, early studies of Castells are based on these basic elements:

- (a) The redefinition of urban in terms of social relations of space and as the arena for the process of the reproduction of labour power; (b) the intervention of state as a provider of 'collective consumption' facilities arising from contradictions in the social system; and (c) the determinant effect of structure and class struggle on state action, with a tendency to shift towards the latter as the key influence. (Lowe, 1986, 14)

However, in the last part of the English edition of *The Urban Question*, he adds new dimensions to his conceptualization of urban social movements with cross-class alliances (Lowe, 1986). And in the *City, Class and Power*, he even leaves his earlier position which links the success of the movement to the linkage with workers struggle. And therefore Castells contradictorily to his earlier studies indicates some new approaches in his studies of late 1970s which can be stated as:

First, there is the break with structuralism and the strong suggestion that class struggle is not the only source of social change. Second, there is Castells's interest in the role of the new petit-bourgeoisie in politics, the ecology movement, cultural forms and struggles for 'community'. Third, there is the suggestion that urban movements should be autonomous from political parties if they are to have a decisive effect on social change. Fourth, there is Castells's call for an historical enquiry into the role that urban contradictions have played in

social change, which should be the bedrock of a new theory and science of urban politics.
(Lowe, 1986: 28)

Castells details these new approaches largely through a new theory of urban social movements in his later study, *The City and Grassroots*, which will be exemplified in the next section.

3.1.2 Castell's late studies

Castells, in his later book, *The City and the Grassroots*, identifies the purpose of the book as advancing the understanding of the relationship between cities and social change. Castells (1983) declares that, instead of dealing with “management of urban functions” by planning or “creation of urban forms” by design, in his book, he focuses on creation of new “urban meaning” by urban social movements. He states that in his study, he attempts to understand in the analysis of social change significance of spatial forms come from the conflict between dominant class and social movements.

In *The Urban Question*, Castells used Marxist approach to understand the city and urban social movements. But in his late studies, Castells indicates that Marxism was not able to be fully sufficient for understanding urban challenges. He states that:

To the physical determinism of human ecologists, or to the cultural idealism of the Wirthian tradition, Marxists tended to respond by reducing the city and the space to the logic of capital. The reintroduction of economic factors under the conditions of capitalism into the analysis of urbanization has been a useful reminder of a too often neglected aspect of the analysis of space...” (1983, p. 297)

Castells states in *The City and The Grassroots*, that, Marxist tradition helped little on the understanding of urban social movements. Castells agrees with Henri Lefebvre, who provided a major contribution to the city analysis, about classical Marxism's contribution to the city which he thinks is limited in the studies of the relationship between city and countryside. According to Castells, social movement concept as a factor of social transformation is unthinkable in the Marxist theory. To him, this is because in Marxist theory there are struggles and mass organizations but there are not collective actors who can liberate themselves. He elucidates his opinion with working class's institutionalized movements with unions and parties. According to Castells (1983), the critical fact is self-conscious, self-organized social movements.

To him, even if Marxist theory is not thinkable in social movements, class struggle is still an important issue for social movements.

Castells (1983) states that he benefits from Alain Touraine experience in order to improve new concepts and methods in the theory of social movements but he highlights that he does not use his theory. Even Castells adopts Touraine's definition of social movement he draws a line to his definition about class relations. Conversely to Touraine, Castells does not see any reason for a movement that can emerge without being based on class, like feminist movement.

In *The City and Grassroots*, Castells introduces a wide range of case studies of urban social movements (the Castilian cities that revolted against the King of Spain between 1520 and 1522, The Paris Commune of 1971, the Glasgow rent strike of 1915, the tenants movement in Veracruz in 1922, the 1960s uprising in American inner cities, Madrid Citizen Movement in the 1970s), and generalize them by their characteristics and presents general explanations about the sources of conflicts and their outcomes (Fincher, 1986). And he reaches the point of "cross cultural theory of urban social change" (Lowe, 1986).

Castells (1983) identifies city as "a social product resulting from conflicting social interests and values"; and to him, institutionalization of socially dominant interests, significant changes in the role, meaning and structure of the city incline to be results of grassroots mobilization and demands. Even so, he does not reduce the process of urban social change to the effects of accomplished social movements. Therefore theory of urban change link both with dominant interests' spatial and social effects, and also grassroots alternative to this hegemony.

Castells describes the meanings of urban social change, urban planning and urban design as:

We call urban social change the redefinition of urban meaning. We call urban planning the negotiated adaptation of urban functions to a shared urban meaning. We call urban design the symbolic attempt to express an accepted urban meaning in certain urban forms. (1983, p. 304)

Since Castells identifies urban planning and urban design in this way, that makes them conflictive processes like urban meaning. And also, this identification clears that urban social change occurs when a new urban meaning is produced. In this case, which processes generate a new urban meaning? In *The City and the Grassroots*,

Castells gives four processes for that. The first one is “urban renewal” for cities and “regional restructuring” for territories. In this instance, dominant class, which has the institutional power, rebuild social forms for its own interests and values. The second one is a kind of “partial or total revolution” by dominant class. Likewise in this situation dominant class changes urban meaning for their own interests. Castells gives Glasgow social housing system, which is charged by the workers in 1915, as an example to this process. The third one is “social movement” which imposes its own meaning to the space as opposition to the dominant meaning. And the last one is “social mobilization” which introduces a new urban meaning against institutionalized urban meaning and dominant class’s interest. Castells describes urban social movements in the last process. According to Castells, urban social movements are the only urban-oriented mobilizations. And to him; the other kind of mobilizations - like working class revolution- might not affect the urban meaning but urban social movements does. He describes urban social movements as: “*a collective conscious action aimed at the transformation of the institutionalized urban meaning against the logic, interest, and values of the dominant class*” (1983, p. 305).

To Castells, the new urban meaning, which is created by dominant class, lacks of experience. He points out that, social movements occasionally come out, challenge the spatial structure’s meaning, and try to bring new functions and forms. Therefore spatial form of capitalist technocracy is challenged by “labour, women, cultures, citizens” and “urban social movements” in terms of alternative urban meaning. And to him, transformation of spatial forms and urban meaning is originated by urban social movements.

Castells (1983) states that, in the course of industrial model of development of capitalist production, dominant class tries to bring changes in the territory and urban meaning. This causes a generalized urban crisis in “housing, services, and social control”. State’s action, in order to handle this urban crisis, entails to increase politicization of the early type of urban movements. He describes the dominant interests’ reaction to the structural crisis in two ways: first, by “political – repression and integration”, and the second, by technological change on the management and production.

In *The City and the Grassroots*, Castells asserts that urban movements lost the capability of bringing structural change in power relations (Pickvance, 2003). He

argues that the ‘meaning’ of the city is established generally by macro forces and urban movements are only “reactive utopias”. Despite his opinion, urban social movement acquires and protects its popularity (Pickvance, 2003). To Castells, even if urban social movements are unable to transform society, they still transform the “urban meaning” (Mayer, 2006).

Castells specifies that local focuses of urban movements prevent them to be able to transform of production, communication and government. To him, they can get their maximum potential for social change when they maintain all the three goals which are collective consumption, cultural identity and self-management; in this case Castells calls these movements as urban social movements. According to Castells, the sources of urban movements do not have efficient channels for social change. For example labour movements are unable to point some issues like social wage or living conditions and therefore urban trade unionism shows up for these issues. Likewise, one-way information flows are just voiced by alternative cultures and just territoriality. The conflict against the centralism caused an increasing separation between the state and civil society. To Castells, therefore, all sources come together in a reactive way which he calls urban movements.

Castells uses the term “urban social movement” in two contents which are restrictive and generic (Pickvance, 2003). The restrictive content is in the following manner. In his earlier study, he emphasize that citizens put effects on urban politics with three levels (according to the scale of changes): the lowest one which is “participation”, intermediate one which is “protest” and the highest and rarest one which is “urban social movement”. He describes “participation”’s outcome as symbolic in urban and political change; “protest” brings minor reforms but does not challenge the fundamental structure; but “urban social movement” brings fundamental changes in power at urban and societal levels (Pickvance, 2003). And he states that:

When they are primitive one-dimensional reactions, they take the form of urban protest. When they have developed an alternative global vision, they form a counter-culture, and feel more comfortable if they define their alternative in a territory: they propose an alternative social organization, an alternative space, an alternative city. They become urban social movements. (1983, p. 326-27)

However, about being “alternative” Castells makes an important division. Castells gives reference to Charles Tilly on his division of social movements as reactive and

proactive (1977, cited in Castells, 1983). To Castells, reactive ones challenge the dominant class and proactive ones suggest new relationships between space and society. To him, apart its utopian extent, a movement can only be “reactive” not “proactive”. Therefore means of “alternative” is not about social alternative, because the city itself cannot be linked with, as Castells says, “*an alternative mode of production and development, nor to a democratic state adapted to the world-wide processes of power*” (Castells, p. 327), it has only an evidence of social limit. Accordingly, urban social movements cannot convert the society but urban meaning. Therefore, they are not an alternative but a reaction as demanding the presence but not being able to create new breadth and not being able to knowing “why, how, or if”. He explains this point as follows:

When institutions remain insulated or unresponsive, banks maintain their high interest rates, police takeover the streets again, and meaningful space continuous to disintegrate, and urban social movements no longer call for an alternative city. ...their hope for society as projected by their desired space and cherished city...if...[they] are not heard, if the political avenues remain closed, if the new central social movements (feminism, new labour, self-management, alternative communication) do not develop fully, then urban movements –reactive Utopias that tried to illuminate the path they could not walk- will return, but this time as urban shadows eager to destroy the closed walls of their captive city. (1983, p. 327).

But why urban movements are not able to transform the history? According to Castells (1983), one reason of it that, they are politically ineffective, and also they are distant to the political system. To him, urban movements are not mediator for social change but they are indications for resistance to the social domination and just by this resistance they do have major impacts on cities and societies. Because of their defensive role they cannot introduce any historical appropriate project for “economic production, communication, or government”. The chance for getting an achievement for the production or delivery of public goods and services is just feasible with a world-wide opposition; and urban movements’ local-based mobilizations are not sufficient for them. Under the circumstances that if only international working class movements can achieve this target, why do people still insist on urban movements? To Castells, because they do not have any other option. Since the historical actors like political parties, institutions, social movements are not able to organize about urban issues and labour movement has widely lost its potential, people try to seek for their existence locally. And also even national extent is still important; citizens

consider national state is too distant from their own problems. Castells signifies this position in his these words:

“... (Citizens) tend to oscillate in their vote, hoping that the alternance of apparently moderate formula will yield results. But each time that the pendulum moves and little happens, belief in the political system is further undermined, and people dig a little bit deeper into their local trenches. ... So when people find themselves unable to control the world, they simply shrink the world to the size of their community” (1983, p. 330-31).

But, even if he considers that social change would not come out with urban movements, he does not undermine the role of urban movements about showing the potential of demonstrating contradictions. According to Castells, even if urban movements have very distinctive types of mobilizations like “counter-cultural squatters”, or “middle class neighbourhood associations”, or “shanty town defence groups”; they still have common basic attributes and important degree of homogeneity. He aligns these aspects in that way; firstly, they recognize themselves as urban or citizen or associated with the city or community; secondly, they have “locally-based” and “territorially defined” features; and thirdly, as he emphasizes consistently in *The City and the Grassroots*, they generally mobilize over three basic goals, which are, collective consumption, cultural identity, and self-management. And according to him, if these three goals assemble together in a movement, it emerges social change; and if they separate and tend to be in the advantage of an interest group then the movement fails about its identity and impact. He also emphasizes that those three goals come up against the logics of “capitalism, informationalism and statism”. But even if urban movements have a degree of homogeneity, the differences of their effects and progresses come out from their specific historical context and pattern of behaviour.

As we stated, Castells describes three basic goals in *The City and The Grassroots*, which urban social movements are materialized and structured around which are “collective consumption trade unionism”, “community”, and “citizen movements”. He identifies “collective consumption trade unionism” as demanding use value of the city instead of exchange value. He highlights that, the use value may change in different cities, different places, or between different classes. And the use value is determined by the residents themselves. He includes demanding housing as a public service, demanding conservation of historical building, or demanding for open space in this goal. This goal is for advanced collective consumption on the contrary to city

for profit. The second goal, which is “community”, demands cultural autonomy, identity, and communication. In this goal community defence their communication, autonomous social meaning and face-to-face interaction instead of monopoly of messages and one-way information flows. And the third one, which is “citizen movement”, demands neighbourhood decentralization, local autonomy and urban self-management instead of centralism, subordinated territorial administration. To Castells a movement is defined by its goal and a movement can include more than one goal together.

Castells also defines adversaries for each goal. To him, the movements and adversaries have a historical conflict over their goals. He describes social structure of urban movements which he elaborated in his book *The City and the Grassroots* as in Appendix B. According to this table, he defines also “urban actors” for each goal of the movements. Castells, explains urban actors as urban movements themselves. When movements link with mobilization for an urban goal they become social actors themselves (Castells, 1983). He elaborates this as follows:

The movements are urban actors, defined by their goals and their urban condition. The components of the urban movements come from a variety of social, gender, and ethnic situations, according to their urban and national contexts... To be more specific, they are neither working class movements nor a middle class movement... (1983, p. 320)

Castells’s critical point in *The City and the Grassroots* is the emphasis on the success of urban movements. Because he identifies urban social movements as a capacity of effects and changes on urban meaning, he attaches high importance on this issue. He structures a formula in order to understand a movement’s success. And in his case studies in *The City and Grassroots*, he introduces Madrid Citizen Movement as the most successful one which contains the formula fully. In his formula, he introduces four basic elements: The first one is; as we stated, an urban movement must articulate three goals in its praxis which are “collective consumption”, “community culture” and “political self-management”. The second one is realizing its role as urban social movement. The third one is to be linked with society through organizational operators, such as, media, professionals, and political parties. And the last one, which is essential particularly for Castells, is, in order to achieve the goals, to be linked with political system leastways partially. To him, the active groups in urban movement would be in solidarity with other social movements’ groups and

link with political organizations and professionals. And at the end, Castells describes a fifth rule which is, the first element must master the others in order to be connected with the praxis of the movement.

But even if Castells states that the active groups in urban movement should be in solidarity with political organizations in order to achieve their goals, he emphasizes that the movements “*must be organizationally and ideologically autonomous of any political party*”. Therefore in *The City and the Grassroots*, he does not only trivialize the role of class struggles in the urban movements, he also de-emphasizes the political parties. Through giving the examples of mobilizations all around the world in 1960s, he indicates that:

People mobilized, in a variety of historical context and social structures, without parties, beyond parties, with parties and against parties, and for parties. The parties’ role has not been a discriminatory variable; the crucial phenomena have been self-conscious, self-organized social movements. So although Marxist theory might not have room for social movements other than the historically predicted class struggle, social movements persist. So experience was right and Marxist theory was wrong on this point, and the intellectual tradition in the study of social change should be recast. (1983; p. 299-300)

In *The City and the Grassroots*, he purports a list which includes five levels of movements. Here differently from the book, the list is given from the last one to the first by considering the level of the effects. The fifth one of the movements are “urban shadows” which are not able to generate any transformation, and he describes these movements as they do not have three basic dimensions which are city, power and community; and they exist just because a political party which use the neighbourhood as a cover for their political ‘agitation’ (Castells, 1983). And to him, even those parties try to originate a neighbourhood movement; they will not encourage any urban change. The fourth group of movements, which he calls ‘urban corporatism’, only generate urban effects because of their limited scope. In his work he examines his examples and according to his examples these movements have an idea in common which is “a narrowed dimensional structure”. He explains his two examples which are in this group as the first one has only urban issue and the second one has urban and political issue but not community. In this group a political party becomes an urban trade union in order to protect residents’ interests but it does not link its practise to other fields of society. The third group of movements, which he calls “urban utopia”, generate a high level of urban and cultural change, but do not

change the political system. Castells explains the reason of calling this group as “urban utopia” as; even a movement produces urban and cultural change, if it does not alter the political system, this change will not be lasting. These movements’ characteristics have the basic structural formula of a social movement but they have two basic differences which are lack of power in their practices and lack of political party as an operator. According to him, political actions do not have to challenge institutional power, but an apolitical mobilization can never challenge the political system. The second group of movements are “urban reforms”. He describes these movements as following, they achieve their immediate urban demands but they do not alter the urban system; they encourage the strength of left wing parties but they do not change the institutions; and they develop neighbourhoods’ social networks but they do not redefine the urban culture. And the first group of movements is “urban social movements”. In addition to describe them, he also puts these movements in a formulation¹⁰.

Castells (1983) contradicts with Ira Katznelson, John Rex and John Foster about their notion which argues all historical contexts must be explained in the structure of social classes in general, and social movements in particular. He opposes this opinion and sets his idea as every urban social movement has its own structural formula and must be evaluated according to its own structure. But even he assumes this opinion, according to him; his formula is very general and targets just one result which is the change in the urban meaning.

As a consequence, in *The City and Grassroots*, after the criticisms which he has received for *The Urban Question*, he orients towards the social bases of the movements. While in his earlier studies class had the primary role in the movement, in *The City and Grassroots* he reaches the realm of “personal experience” (Lowe, 1986). And he also puts less importance in political parties and enriches the

¹⁰According to this formulation, urban social movements comprise these criteria: city, power, community, media, political party, relationship between the political party and the movement, professionals, the immediate urban demand, the modification of basic premises underlying the model of urban development, the reinforcement of democracy and the increased support of left-wing parties, improvement of neighbourhood-based social interaction, innovation of cultural patterns with reference to the city, And also urban social movements may include class position, and class consciousness, very randomly and solidarity with other social movements, has equal value in all cases (Castells, 1983).

autonomous groups in the movements. But his position in the City and Grassroots which is distanced from Marxism has been also largely criticized by the scholars which will be elaborated in the next section.

3.2 Development of Urban Social Movement Concept

Castells made a great contribution to the urban politics through describing urban social movements. His conceptualization of urban social movements has varied during the time and both his earlier and late studies were largely used and were also criticized by the scholars, and the new approaches were presented. In this section through giving the criticisms to Castells's studies, first we will summary the alteration of his theory and then through criticism to his approach we will give other prominent scholars' approaches on urban social movements.

The protests and civil disturbances in 1960s and 1970s became an important turning point for urban politics. To Walton (1998), the prejudiced argument that displaced masses of rural migrants suffer from unemployment, alienation, and vulnerability in the cities generate extremist movements (Kornhauser, 1959; Abrahms, 1965 cited in Walton, 1998) and this has transformed after the political events of 1960s (Walton, 1998). After 1960s instead of seeing urban poor as 'marginal masses', their active participants to the movements is recognized (Ross, 1975; Perlman, 1976; Castells, 1977; 983 cited in Walton, 1998) When the concept of urban social movement was introduced by Castells in the early 1970s, urban sociology was interested in "*life, housing, patterns of kinship, neighbouring and friendship, voluntary associations, urban social problems such as crime, and urban spatial structure*" (Pickvance, 2003). After then, urban social movements were seen as agents for social change (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995).

As we stated, in his early studies, Castells, engaged with structural Marxist perspective with an Althusserian approach by emphasizing collective consumption and class-based movements in the development of urban struggles. His approach in his earlier studies stresses the relation of urban movements with working class movements. And he links the success of urban movements - and therefore become an urban social movement- to its relation with working class movements and its ability to challenge the political system. Also the state has a great importance on his early studies, which, to him, state reproduces the capitalist system and the more state

intervenes to the collective goods and services, the more contradictions appear and therefore this politicizes the issue.

This early approach of Castells has received a large criticism. The first one was about the idea that, if only urban social movements can change the system. According to Pickvance (1976 cited in Lowe, 1986) also institutional sources like local authorities can create a system change through local central conflicts. Another criticism was about the inadequacy of explaining the how or under which social base and issue a social movement can emerge (Lowe, 1986). Therefore it was about the fail of Castells for explaining the characteristics of the social base which an urban social movement emerges. And also another criticism was about that the struggle about collective services and goods which do not always emerge through the class divisions (Lowe, 1986).

Castells, in his late studies, tries to fulfil these criticisms through more empiric and historical analysis but this engenders him to adopt a neo-Marxist approach (Şengül, 2001). In the *City and the Grassroots*, while Castells preserves the term urban social movement, he leaves the primary role of class in the movements in order to create urban transformation, and reaches the point of “personal experience” of non-class alternative and counter-cultural movements. And accordingly he also underrates the role of political parties and adopts the autonomous character of the movements. He also emphasizes the transformation of urban meaning, and identifies three issues about urban social movements which are collective consumption, community culture and political self-management. And also through case studies he makes a formula about the success of the urban social movements through including some factors like city, power, community, media, political party, relationship between the political party and the movement, professionals etc.

While this approach of Castells was adopted by many scholars, it also received a large criticism. In order to try to give these criticisms, we will start first through the meaning of urban social movements which there is still not a definitive identification.

To Finkelstein (1981), urban social movements are the respond to the urban crisis which was given by dominated classes. And according to her, these struggles are

neither same with workers' conflicts nor political movements. She elucidates urban movements as:

Urban movements create popular organizations, which are incompatible with 'traditional' organizations. They overflow the known schemas, they deal with new conflicts, social bases and social forces. They are a new form of questioning the present social system, and, even if they coincide in some respects with the workers' movements of trade-union type, or with some actions of the political organizations, they have their own and unique field of action, because they deal with urban matters, urban affairs. (1981: 239)

According to Pickvance (2003), there is an uncertainty in Castells's definition of urban social movement. While Castells points out a system of practices which "development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system"; Pickvance asserts that, this does not have to be actual effect; it can also be potential effect (Pickvance, 2003). To Pickvance even if the actual effect is limited, we can still say that potential effect is larger. Therefore, even the actual effect of a protest is "reform" or "participation", to Pickvance, it can still have the potential of "urban social movement". Because of this distinction between actual and potential effects, according to Pickvance (2003), many scholars choose the generic usage of the urban social movements. Pickvance (2003) uses the more straightforward usage of "urban movements" instead of "urban social movements" and he explains the reason as, even if usage of "environmental movement" instead of "environmental social movement" and the same for "feminist movement" is more common, using the term "urban social movement" has become a symbol because of influence of Castells's writings. And according to him, the group of writers who use the term "urban social movement" want to distinguish themselves from those who are interested in voluntary associations or NGOs, and they want to put forth the potential for radical change of non-institutionalized urban political action.

Fainstein and Hirst (1995) also choose using urban social movements for any urban movements without separating if they are transformative of the urban structure and culture or not. Because, according to them, all urban movements have a transformative effect.

The same usage of urban movements is also adopted by Pruijt (2007) who identifies urban movements as sort of social movements which comprise shaping the urban

environment. And to him; urban environment includes “the built environment, the social fabric of the city, and the political process”.

Apart the identification of the concept of urban social movements, also the social base of the concept which Castells describes as “personal experience” in *The City and Grassroots* is still found problematic by scholars because of not analytically associate the sociological relevance of social process into his method like Lowe states:

Having responded to the criticism of Pickvance, Rex and others, we argue that Castells has still not integrated a sociological understanding of the importance of the nature and characteristics of social bases in the mobilisation processes; of how a social base becomes, or fails to become, a social force. What Castells has done, and this is important, is draw attention to the significance of local communities as focal points of urban movement activity. (1986, p. 52)

Also another critical point which Lowe criticizes Castells about is his “alternative city” notion and about providing inadequate information about how urban movements can emerge the city with “autonomous” urban movements that Lowe asserts that:

His final image is of the new social movements as embryos of future societies that are being nurtured within ‘local utopias’ created by urban movements. If this is the role they play, is Castells right to attach such significance to them, to the exclusion of other avenues of analytical focus? And his notion of the ‘alternative city’, is a network of self-managed, ‘culturally meaningful’ communities (the perfect harmonisation of this three core themes) necessarily a desirable place? The crucial problem with this reading is that nowhere does Castells provide any evidence that urban movements are embryos of a future city, and he gives no clues about how autonomous urban movements might, one day, instigate urban social change. (1986, p. 192-193)

DeFilippis and North also contradict to Manuel Castells and consider that collective actions, which are about domestic property, do not always have to be either progressive or radical. To DeFilippis and North (2004) the mobilizations about property right have “class and owner-occupier biases”, but if “property-right” gives its place to ‘home’ then it include a broader frame. Therefore DeFilippis and North

state that protection of 'home' is embraced by 'collective reproduction'¹¹ is the central issue of collective action in the community. Therefore some theorists describe the "geographic sphere of the community as the scale of social reproduction" (DeFilippis and North, 2004).

And also Pickvance (1985) states that the movements do not have to be "progressive from a Left point of view" as some movements that try to control their neighbourhoods would reveal exclusionary motives which Pickvance stress this with "*tout ce qui bouge, n'est pas rouge*" statement (1985:39).

Furthermore, John Davis (1991 cited in DeFilippis and North, 2004) has studied in order to figure out how place and territory relate with residents' relation to their own property to emerge the collective action in urban space. In order to understand how residents' relations of their own property can initiate a radical transformation, he applies Karl Marx's conversion of "a class in itself to a class for itself" to neo-Webberian comprehension of housing classes and to him the model is a process of three phases which are "collective consciousness", "conflict consciousness" and "radical consciousness" (DeFilippis and North, 2004). In collective consciousness people recognize "shared interests and property relations" and proceeds to conflict consciousness and they realize how these interests are in conflict with other property interests and it moves to radical consciousness and they recognize these structures and relationships are unfair, however, to Davis, this process does not have to finish always with radical consciousness especially when middle class homeowner associations mobilize (cited in DeFilippis and North, 2004).

Another point which the late study of Castells was criticized about is the formula which Castells presents in order to understand the fail or success of the movement. Pickvance (1983, 1985 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995) opposes with Castells's argument and states that every movement has its own internal dynamics; thus it is not possible to produce a simple examination of a movement separate from its context. Pickvance argues that Castells's model "refers exclusively to characteristics of the movement, and ignores characteristics of the context in which the movement exist" (1985: p. 35) and criticizes Castells for linking the movement's success only with the

¹¹ According to DeFilippis and North (2004) collective reproduction which includes housing, education, health care etc., is not simply field of consumption but "spheres of active".

movement itself through excluding its contextual features. And according to this criticism to Castells's cross-cultural theory of urban social change, Pickvance (1985) presents his own modelling methodology for the comparative analysis of urban social movements according to their militancy and incidence. Pickvance defines five contextual features which urban movement experiences are shaped by:

- Rapid urbanisation which increases the demands for state intervention in consumption like housing, water or hospitals. Pickvance particularly stresses that, this demand emerges especially in the societies which the state intervention is already exists in the consumption sphere (like third world countries) and also democratic political system is present.
- The second one is state action that is relevant both in arousing demands and in responding them. In the first case that state becomes the executive of consumption issues, it politicise them. In the second case, when state responds favourably to the movements, incidence of the movements becomes higher.
- The third one is political context which include the effectiveness of political institutions in expressing urban conflicts, cultural understanding of urban politics and presence of broader political movements.

To Pickvance, if a movement becomes a part of a broader political movement they are more able to achieve the success through increasing resources.

Cultural understanding of urban politics is introduced as the popular perceptions of the state and urbanization process by different societies.

And the last one, ability of formal political institutions to express conflict which effects the movements in direct proportion. Therefore political parties', especially oppositional political parties', role is important here. Pickvance describes three levels of effectiveness here: the first one is when "effective opposition party is not existed", the second is when they exist but one party is always in power at either national or local levels, and the third when they exist and they alternate in office. Pickvance asserts that in the first case the movements around collective consumption are tend to increase because of the roles of opposition parties in becoming channel on

standing for collective consumption. But to him, for other demands this can change because of powerful interests.

- The fourth one is the role of middle class which effects the movement's form and success because of two reasons. The first one is because they have time, money, personal contact and organizational relations which are crucial for the movements. And secondly, they are more related to the city as a "living space" instead of "growth machine".

Here Pickvance also argues that while movements which demand for collective consumption trade unionism have a broad class base (although the leadership is generally held by middle class) but defensive movements about environmental issues are largely held by middle class.

- And the last one is general economic and social condition which can change both the demands of the movements and lead them to rise or fall like he sees that the periods when the economic crisis occurs there is a decline of movements which are looking for state spending. Also during the periods which large projects are implemented, the defensive movements increase.

Through these contextual features Pickvance tries to introduce causality between these characteristics and movements. However it is important to state that, to Pickvance, even if these features vary independently, still the causation continues, he states that: *"However, even if characteristics varied independently, arguments about causation would continue since causality is nonobservable: causal interferences must be compatible with observations, but the causal link itself is not observable"*¹² (Pickvance 1982 cited in 1985).

Even if this modelling methodology of Pickvance is found convenient for the comparative analysis of urban social movements by Lowe, he also criticizes this methodology because of having similar drawbacks of Castells's theory. But before proceeding to the Lowe's criticisms of Pickvance, also the types of movements which Pickvance describes in his study will be given.

¹² In this study, this statement is particularly important, is that, the study attempts to present the causality of the contextual features with the mobilizations.

Pickvance (1985) describes four types of urban demands which have three content definitions of urban: “*collective consumption, local level political process and spatial proximity*”. And he describes those four types of urban movements as follows: Movements for the provision of housing and urban services (type 1), movements over access to housing and urban services (type 2), movements for control an management (type 3) and defensive movements (type 4). The first type of movements is in collective consumption sense like the issues of provision of housing and urban services. These movements are generally emerged in rapid urbanization societies and the fail of state intervention in consumption (therefore relate with the first contextual feature). Pickvance gives examples to these movements of squatter movements that are demanding land rights or urban services like water, electricity or hospitals. The second type of the movements about the access of housing and public services therefore this is also about the collective consumption. But this type of movements include the financial access like bus fares or level of provision of services like frequency of schools, hospitals and also include eligibility of housing and coverage of services. The third type of the movements is about the control and management which actors demand for participation in town planning or self-management. And the last one is defensive movements which are opposing with both physical and social threats to the housing or neighbourhoods like demolition of the housings, urban renewal or like different races or social classes. Pickvance argues that type 1 movements have a broader class base but especially defensive movements for environmental issues are mostly conducted by middle classes. However working class involvement is observed when there is an “objective deprivation” such as especially in type 1 and also type 4 (against urban renewal) or there is a “broad political mobilization”.

And again when we go back to fourth contextual feature which is general economic and social conditions, Pickvance emphasizes that, in some cases particular type of movements tend to increase or decrease which he state that:

Conditions of raised expectations and social tension generate both statist and libertarian demands—leading to movements for popular control (type 3) and for collective consumption (type 2). In periods of affluence and big projects, defensive movements are also plentiful. Economic crisis conditions are accompanied by selective cutting of social expenditure (Pickvance, 1982) and lowered expectations. This has resulted in a considerable number of localised type 2 movements... In economic crisis conditions, three types of movement seem

likely to be more enduring: those concerned with nonfinancial aspects of access to housing and urban services (and self-management), which may impose no costs on the state; defensive movements around the home and neighbourhood for reasons other than large state-construction projects; and, of course, movements for less state spending. (1985: 43-44)

According to Pickvance a movement can show more than one characteristics of different type of movements. But for Pickvance the militancy and incidents of the movements which were described in five contextual features above are more important in order to evaluate and compare the movements than defining them. As we stated Lowe (1986) criticises the modelling methodology of Pickvance. Even if Lowe admits that the model of Pickvance presents the “core structuring elements”, he states that there are some inconveniences on to use these elements as a predictive model. He states that:

The models do not adequately explain the causal relationships between movements type and societal feature, and that is leads to a number of difficulties; the models do not account for the non-action field with its important focus on nature of urban power structures, and there is a related problem involving the interpretation of which societies are seminal to the models and which are exceptional; and, finally, they do not acknowledge the existence of intra-national variations of urban movement types and activity. (1986: 184)

Lowe, after criticizing both the “diverse reality” model of Pickvance and “cross-cultural theory” of Castells, puts a more thematic approach which he classifies under two headings: “those relating to political process, and those relating to social process” that the major elements of these two headings are given in Appendix C. And also Lowe presents four principles for analysing and explicating the place of urban social movements in the urban system which are:

- 1- ***The identification and definition of social bases, which may form around residential or ‘non-place’ bases:*** the social structure, the consumption stakes and cross-cutting associational networks are prior conditions to understand the emergence or non-emergence of a social network.
- 2- ***The theme of local political power is central to the study of urban protest:*** comprises the history and structure of the systems of local administration, and sub-theme of central-local relations.
- 3- ***Analysis must relate specifically to the ideological structuring of the urban system:*** he asserts that in British context there are two main ideologies which

are the notion of local representative democracy and public/private sectorial division of the urban public services¹³.

- 4- ***The effect that general economic climates have on the phasing and on types of movement activity***: he states that even if making a causal relations are difficult, general economic tendencies show a structuring effect on available social conditions. (1986: 194-195)

Also after the globalisation processes new approaches on urban social movements are developed by some scholars like Margit Mayer. According to Mayer (2000) while globalisation process led both the social and economic structure, and urban functions and urban hierarchy to transform; it also exterminated conflicts and movements of Fordist era, and therefore 1990s urban movements are not similar with the ones in 1970s or 1980s in the western capitalist world. Mayer (2000) acknowledges the Castells approach which the demands of the movements were around on three main goals, collective consumption, cultural identity, and self-management, in the 1970s or 1980s; but to her, after globalization the movements became more heterogeneous and the issues and struggles of the movements did not show a clear overweight.

Mayer (2000) describes the new trends of local politics after globalization in three levels: the first one is *“the new competitive forms of urban development”*, the second one is *“the erosion of traditional welfare rights”* and the last one is *“a shift from government to governance”*. She states that, the competition of the urban development causes rise of cities’ locality, in order to attract especially investors in international level. Therefore local politics try to stress *“economic innovation”*, *“entrepreneurial culture”* and *“flexibility in the labour-market”* (Amin, 1994 cited in Mayer, 2000). The new urban politics for the competition in the international level gives rise to restructuring the city with new functions like business districts, service centres; and also with great infrastructure projects like highways etc. To Mayer, since the city centres transform to the places for marketing the city, other neighbourhoods are left for the unattractive functions. And also restructuring the city

¹³ Also according to Kling and Posner (cited in DeFilippis and North, 2004) in the United States the issue, which people mobilize easily around, is property right and the second one is participation in the decisions which are about life situation such as education, traffic etc.

centres causes urban expansion towards green areas. She states that, even in the beginning of this process, these projects were welcomed for the sake of development of the city (Keil and Ronneberger, 1994 cited in Mayer, 2000) later encountered with great oppositions because of their effects, which are generally displacement, pollution, gentrification, congestion and damage of natural, historical and traditional heritages. These oppositions vary from *defensive and pragmatic attempts* in order to keep existing situation or *privileges*¹⁴ to politicised and militant. The first groups are sometimes come out as NIMBY (not in my backyard) movements which consist of middle-class or quality of life movements in order to defence their own place. These movements mobilize quickly around the repertoires of petitions, lobbying, street confrontations, and legal operations (Mayer, 2000). There are also other types of movements which are generally formed by working-class and middle-class participants and they generally oppose to the issues like highway construction, traffic congestion, polluting industries or housing shortages, and their repertoires include the repertoires of NIMBY movements and overlap them with the repertoires like putting public pressure on polluting firms (Di Chiro, 1992; Russel, 1990; Bullard, 1993 cited in Mayer, 2000). And the other type of movements in Mayer's approach is generated by the poor for changing the social structure is called 'poor empowerment groups' (McCarthy and Castelli, 1994 cited in Mayer, 2000). These movements' goals include 'improving local working conditions', 'rehabilitating abandoned buildings', 'reinvesting low-income communities' (Mayer, 2000).

Mayer states that, movements, which oppose to urban growth or gentrification, are generally engendered by large projects like Olympics or World Expo which are about marketing city better (Haubermann and Siebel, 1993; Scholz, 1997 cited in Mayer, 2000). These prestige projects are opposed generally because of the lack of participation, taking attention just on their sides and leaving behind the other urban problems, restrain the investments in other areas (Mayer, 2000) and also causing dislocation and gentrification. The movements against these projects generally come out with interrogating the democratic planning process and they have capacity of

¹⁴ Mayer introduces these oppositions as '*... sometimes progressive, environmentally conscious and inclusive, but at the other times selfish, anti-immigrant or racist*' (2000:143)

bringing other local movement groups together. She states that, they generally try to break the city image for sending the investors and speculators away.

The second urban politics which Mayer describes in the globalized city is corroding local welfare state. This factor shows itself in two ways, first by 'dualisation of labour market', 'the expansion of precarious and informal jobs', 'shift in social policies', 'social exclusion' and 'new poverty'; and they bring major amount of homeless people on the streets. Besides the first factor brings homeless people in the cities the second policy is shaped into 'anti-homeless' and 'anti-squatter' discourses. Even the 'progressive' governments do not want homeless or poor people to be visible in the city especially in the places like business districts. For sending them away from the city centre, policies marginalize them as 'dangerous classes' or 'enemies of the state'. To oppose these policies many non-profit organisations are established. 'New popular movements', which are one of these movements, arise with supporters, advocacy and anti-racist organisations and their protest activities are generally spontaneous and destructive in strategy. Their destructive strategies aim city governments in order to obstruct their exclusive policies (Mayer, 2000).

To Mayer, another movement, which opposes of housing policies, describes its actions as 'resistance against the political, social and economic relations in the city and the country' (Knorr-Siedow and Wilmer, 1994 cited in Mayer, 2000). And Mayer describes the third trend in the urban politics in the globalization era as 'governance' instead of 'government' which is described in political science as 'less hierarchical' and 'more moderating than directing' way of administrating. Local politics, in favour of getting competitive trend in the world economy, tries to organise partnerships with non-governmental stakeholders. And not only with investors have they organized partnerships with, also with 'voluntary groups', 'associations', 'former social movement organizations', 'education bodies', and 'local unions'. With this trend especially from the late 1980s new agents have been established like 'alternative renewal agents', 'sweat equity programmes', 'the funding of self-help' and 'social service groups', and they even have put the issues like 'drugs, immigration integration, AIDS' in their agendas. And even if many projects are consisted in their agenda also like women projects, these initiatives relate with economic re-production and labour market problems very little (Mayer, 1987 cited in Mayer, 2000).

Mayer states that since 1980s partnerships led former social movement organizations to shape urban movements. But is this a positive trend for urban movements or not? To Mayer this trend only makes the urban movements 'parts' of the politics and their role in urban movements is relatively complicated. From one side they let urban movements' stability and continuity; but on the other side they cause new conflicts and polarizations inside the movement and enable other movements, which do not prefer (do not have any chance) to have partnerships with local politics, to be marginalized by the administrators. Mayer describes this as follows:

The movement organizations now participating in the new governments arrangements are subject to the danger of institutional integration, 'NGOisation' and of pursuing 'insider interests', and their own democratic substance is far from guaranteed (Feshe, 1995; Lang, 1995; Roth, 1994) ... It is true though that these new structures of governance are open to the less progressive, xenophobic and anti-social movements as well. (2000: 149-50)

As well as she states that, this trend generates new marginalisation, it also damages the 'social cohesion' of the city. Because generally these 'institutionalized', 'professionalised' and 'entrepreneurial' movements stay away from marginalised or disadvantaged groups. But also to Mayer, their potential of being stable, accessing the resources and networks easily may produce a 'political and social climate' which marginalized groups may also represent themselves more easily.

Also Walton (1998) emphasizes the role of NGOs role in urban movements which have increased especially after 1980s. Walton state that studies on migrant adaptation to the city give importance to the role of voluntary local organizations in order to support newcomers with housing, employment and self-defense (Little, 1965; Gilbert and Gugler, 1992 cited in Walton, 1998). According to Walton:

Civil society is the realm of voluntary association outside the state that draws its authority from culture rather than laws of government or the market. Civil society in the third world city is represented by neighbourhood associations, squatter organizations, religious societies, groups of women and mothers, regional and ethnic associations. Theorizing about trends and types of urban collective action begins with an analysis of developments in each of these realms and their relationships. (1998:463)

In the globalized city, Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer (2000) are described (at least) three different kinds of struggle which are:

...those around the costs of striving towards the top of the global urban hierarchy; those dealing with the new phenomena of urban decay and marginality, increasingly in the form of

routinized cooperation with the local state and mediated through a variety of revitalisation and/or (economic) development programmes; and those reflecting the erosion of the local welfare state. (2000: 8)

Differently, Pruijt (2007) categorizes urban movements in three groups which are as following. The first one is 'collective consumption' includes housing, healthcare and education problems, and also infrastructure problems as water supply, electricity and sewers. The second one is about 'urban planning' like displacement and cityscape issues. And the last one is about some certain issues like property-owners against social housing or taxes, 'racist groups against migrants'. According to Pruijt (2007) targets of protests of urban social movements 'measurable' and 'clear', such as obstructing transformation in the built environment or preventing construction of a high-way or demanding a rent-reduction. And do movements success to achieve these goals? To Pruijt, some of the protests succeed achieving their goals fully or partially. To him, we can see the evident of their success in the unfinished highway constructions in the cities. Preventing of a construction project is one of the victories of urban movements but also more importantly they sometimes manage to change planning decision-making processes. And also sometimes there are some negative outcomes which are not planned in the movement, such as aiming to improve a low-income neighbourhood may cause gentrification (Prujt, 2007).

Especially after 2000s the studies were emerged also about the action repertoires of urban movements. Walton (1998) states that collective consumption actions mobilize around the issues which are presence of collective and public goods such as housing, transportation, education, health and urban services and with the repertoires of land invasion, squatting, protests and street demonstrations. According to Pruijt (2007), the action repertoire of urban social movements resembles with other type of social movements, however, there are some typical repertoires for urban social movements such as 'the rent strike, squatting and developing alternative plans'. And he adds that, however recently squatting is very much in use also in other types of social movements.

But we must state that especially with the conducted large scale development projects in the contemporary cities as the consequences of neoliberal urban policies; present a preventing tool for the potential of extending urban social movements to a larger scale level (national or international levels). According the study of

Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez (2002) which focuses on thirteen large-scale urban development projects in twelve European Union countries, the “decentralized, more horizontal, informal, flexibilized, bottom-up, and network planning” approach prevent the “public” and “traditional organized groups” to access the decision making processes equally. And they state that:

The downscaling of urban policies to place-specific interventions in a context in which traditional redistributive policies are being reduced at higher-scale levels forces social movements to operate through localized actions. This, in turn, militates against the urgent need to translate these place-specific actions and demands into more general social and economic programs articulated at the national, EU, or international scale. (2002, p. 579)

Similarly Harvey states that:

Under these conditions, ideals of urban identity, citizenship, and belonging, of a coherent urban politics, already threatened by the spreading malaise of the individualistic neoliberal ethic, become much harder to sustain. Even the idea that the city might function as a collective body politic, a site within and from which progressive social movements might emanate, appears, at least on the surface, increasingly implausible. (2012, p. 15-16)

Harvey states that even if there are many different kind of urban struggles and movements all around the world, until now we could not see any coherent movement which meets with gaining the control over the uses of surplus. However, he still admits the revolutionary role of the city:

... That collective right, as both a working slogan and a political ideal, brings us back to the age-old question of who it is that commands the inner connection between urbanization and surplus production and use. Perhaps, after all, Lefebvre was right, more than forty years ago, to insist that the revolution in our times has to be urban-or nothing. (2012, p. 25)

3.3 The Role of ‘Class’ in Urban Social Movements

Castells, in his earlier work, *The Urban Question*, emphasises class struggle’s latent role in the urban social movements. To him, urban movements can only play a significant role in social change if they link with organizations in the class struggle.

Castells, in *The Urban Question*, claims that urban social movements causes class struggles move from workplace into the city, because of that urban social movements are ‘secondary structural issues’ and limited because of their insufficiency of transforming class relations (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995).

In his later work, *The City and Grassroots*, he leaves even more the opinion of Marxism and abandons his previous separation of urban conflict to class conflict and presents culture as a motivating force (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). In *The City and Grassroots*, Castells depresses the role of class in urban social change compared to *The Urban Question*. To him, even class conflict and relationship is significant for comprehension of urban conflict, they are not the elementary source of urban social change. And he determines alternative sources as; gender relationship, the ethnic and national movements, citizen movements, and the autonomous role of state. Likewise Castells states that technology and structure of economy are not the primary forces behind urbanization:

Economic factors and technological process do play a major role in establishing the shape and meaning of space. But this role is determined, as well as the economy and technology themselves, by the social process through which humankind appropriates space and time and constructs a social organization, relentlessly challenged by the production of new values and the emergence of new social interests. (1983, p: 291)

Other writers give even less importance on the political economy in urban social movements; and ‘culture, identity, the shaping of space and remaking of everyday life’ become more important for their studies (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). This situation is not in use just in urban social movements, but also in new social movements studies put down the role of economy and state and deal more with culture, identity and consciousness (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995).

However the relationship between class, mode of production and urban social movements is still an important issue. Participants in urban social movements are accused to not to comprehend the logic of capital which shapes urban process and class position which affects popular consciousness (Katznelson, 1981; Harvey, 1989 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Also Kling and Posner (1990 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995), criticize ‘neo-populist’ urban movements which are related in participatory democracy but avoided from a substantive, class based agenda. According to them neo-populists are not able to get significant change because they do not trace the reasons of their problems to the political economy. To Kling and Posner (1990 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995) ‘neo-populists, who do not seek to change the economic framework, are in highly problematic, possibly retrogressive endeavour’. However, Castells is not as much critical as Kling and Posner about movements’ objectives and sees urban movements as limited because of their

localism (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). In Castells's opinion, urban movements do not produce any 'historically feasible project of economic production, communication, or government', and to him, social transformation is just possible with 'central' movements' success like feminism and self-management (1983 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995).

According to Castells's later study, which is *The City and the Grassroots* (1983), even if urban social movements can be linked with petty-bourgeoisie, they are 'cutting across the class structure'. To Castells, urban social movements are not attached directly to the relationship of production but instead to relationships of 'consumption, communication, and power'. This structure of the movements makes them 'multi-class movements' instead of middle class.

To Fainstein and Hirst (1995) social movements are always oppositional to the power, but their position may change according to their context or internal development from resistant to transformative or from reactionary to progressive. They state that: "*Social movements are collective social actors defined by both their (dis)organization and their aims*" (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995: 182). To Fainstein and Hirst, the 'old' social movements ensued from class structure of industrial capitalism and tried to eliminate material inequalities generated from the mode of production and the 'new' social movements cut across the class and aimed to non-material issues (Offe, 1987; Scott, 1990; Touraine, 1992 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). And they state that, urban social movements are a form of new social movements because of their non-class base, activity of outside of the production field and participatory culture. They try to eliminate uneven distribution of power and resources by the government, and they have more political framework than feminism or cultural radicalism. Touraine (1985 cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995) describes urban social movements as the most representative phenomenon in industrial societies.

According to Pruijt (2007), urban social movements are cross-class mobilizations which can take place with different class of participants like urban squatters' movements or just with middle-class participants such as students. Nevertheless, some urban movements can be limited just with the same ethnic participants such as Black or Latino mobilizations, or class such as rent strikes, or age such as Italian Social Centres' movement.

According to Finkelievich (1981) social conflicts are clashes of interests (and the interests change according to social, economic and political conjectures) between dominant classes and the dominated ones over the subjects of urban development, its logic and results. To Finkelievich (1981), urban problems affect all social classes therefore urban struggles are not always connected with dominated classes but also dominant classes play a role in the struggles. Also dominated classes always think about the intervention of the dominant classes into the struggle. Finkelievich (1981) identifies these two factors as the bi-polarity of class practices in urban social movements. She also elucidates two kinds of classes in the urban struggles. The first one is 'the social base or class situation of the struggle' and the second one is 'the social force of the struggle'. The first one includes interests or goals of the classes and the second one is 'active defender of each class's interests'. And to her, class root of social force does not have to match with the social base of the struggle.

And lastly according to Harvey (2012), urban social movements do have class content even if they mobilize around the issues like rights, citizenship or social reproduction. To him, like capitalists retrieve the value from workers, landlords charge high-rise rent on housing. Also to him, urbanization itself is produced by workers, for this reason we can focus on the city instead of factory as surplus value production. He emphasizes that at the center of the dissatisfaction of the quality of daily life there are practices of accumulation by dispossession, high rents and high profits. And urban social movements emerge from the perpetuation of class power on living and working issues.

4. URBAN POLICIES AND URBAN STRUGGLES IN ISTANBUL

The urban area is the arena of conflicts between the enacted policies and the oppositions against these policies. The contextual features of the movements which comprise both general economic and social conditions and also urban policies with the central-local relations are recognized as the one of the most important key elements in order to understand the urban movements by scholars (Pickvance, 1985; Lowe, 1986). In this chapter, through adopting this approach, in order to understand the mobilizations and oppositional movements against the enacted policies; both the socio-economic and political processes, and also adopted urban policies will be given for the periods between 1950 and 2010.

This chapter also attempts to category of different periods in Istanbul by considering both the general socio-economic conditions and urban policies and also through the urban-based struggles which are held against these policies. The periodization by considering all these three features raises a number of difficulties. It should be stated that even these categorizations are based on some refractions; they are also highly interwoven with the previous and following periods. Therefore, because it is not very significant to divide them based on a single year (probably differently 1980 is the one which we can determine as an obvious breakpoint), here the categorization should be read as the approximate periods instead of just after or before that individual year. Furthermore as the reader will observe, all the periods also include some information about previous or following periods.

Since 1980 is an important breakpoint with the reasons which will be pointed out below, the period from 1950 to 1980 is considered as the first period of the chapter, which gives information about the socio-economic and political processes, rural-urban migration, the rise of gecekondu dwellings and also the first urban movement experiences of Turkey before neoliberalist era. The period between 1980 and 1990 forms the second period which presents the neoliberal transformation of Turkey's economic system with socially and politically oppressed conditions. In this period,

while 1970's political arena was dissolved with 1980 coup d'état, the first NGOs were also started to be seen. Because the study particularly comprises the periods between 1990 and 2010 (even if it provides information and evolution also for the previous periods), in order to demonstrate compliance with the last chapter of the study the last two periods are divided as 1990-2001 and 2002-2010. Even if 2002 is important because of the success of Justice and Development Party (JDP)¹⁵ on the general elections with the high rate support after fragile coalition governments and also because the party has conducted neoliberal policies with a great increase until now; also this period still should not be considered as based on a single year in this chapter. Since 1990s present the period of re-increasing the urban oppositions but this time with NGOs, which have increased especially after Habitat II in 1996 and after 1999 earthquake, 2000s puts forwards the deepened neoliberal policies together with the varied urban oppositional mobilisations.

4.1 Gecekondu Settlements as the Places for the Rise of Urban Movements: 1950 – 1980

After the Second World War the states have played an important role on the accumulation processes. This has emerged in the developed countries with Keynesian accumulation strategies, and in the developing countries, including Turkey, this has formed by import-substitution industrialization model (Şengül, 2009). In this period Turkey has experienced many changes economically, socially and politically, especially in the consequence of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid. Marshall Aid, which came in the middle of 1940s, has affected agriculture through causing the decrease of rural labour force and by letting to the seizure of small farms by the landlords (Şenyapılı, 2004).

Furthermore, in this period Turkey detached from its statist and one-party political regime and tended to be the part of the world capitalist system (Doğan, 2005). In 1946 multi-party system has started with Democrat Party (DP)¹⁶ which became the ruling party in 1950's election. From 1946 to the mid-1960s liberal economic development with import-substitution industrialization model was emerged with

¹⁵ In Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP).

¹⁶ In Turkish: Demokrat Parti (DP)

Republican People's Party (RPP)¹⁷ in the second part of the 1940s, but it has largely developed with DP's liberal economic development policies. This has led the beginning of several important socio-spatial impacts in Turkey which are the rapid urban population growth, the housing and infrastructure problems of newcomers, and the marginal/informal sectors (Doğan, 2005)

In 1950s, the massive rural-urban migration has taken place in Turkey. While the rate of urban population was %25.4 in 1950, it increased to %31.92 in 1960. Since there was a huge urban population growth, particularly in the first part of 1950s, all the sources were primarily directed to the industrialization, and it brought a limited transfer of funds to the urban infrastructure, urban services (Şengül, 2009) or housings. This triggered a new kind of housing model in the cities of Turkey which is *gecekondu*. Before proceeding further, the term *gecekondu*, and its economic, spatial and social impacts will be elucidated.

If the term *gecekondu* is translated mot-a-mot from Turkish language, it means 'built overnight'. It stands for the temporary housing in the peripheral areas of the city which serves as the housing mostly for rural-urban migrants (Erman and Eken, 2004). Ocak, identifies the term *gecekondu*¹⁸ as a "ready to think" product therefore to him, any conceptualization is not sufficient for *gecekondu* (Ocak, 2002 cited in Pérouse, 2004).

The first *gecekondu* dwellings were constructed closed to the business centres of the cities and mostly to the geographically disadvantaged areas like streambeds; but later they moved to the city borders and created the neighbourhoods (Erman, 2004). Şenyapılı (1998) states that the term *gecekondu* was not mentioned until 1947 in the newspapers and the news on the urban area in that period were more about the inadequate infrastructure services, security problems or inadequate housing stock for middle class groups. The mentions about *gecekondu* problems begin in 1947's newspapers for two areas: in Ankara Altındağ district and in Istanbul around the Byzantine tombs and city walls niches (Şenyapılı, 1998). Even if the first examples

¹⁷ In Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)

¹⁸ Pérouse (2004) also describes other terms which were derived from 'gecekondu': 'apartkondu', 'mezarkondu', 'camikondu', 'surkondu', 'kent kondu', 'seçimkondu'. And we can add to this usages 'mahallekondu', 'belediyekondu.'

of gecekondu settlements were seen in Ankara, in time, the number of gecekondu dwellings in İstanbul left behind the numbers of Ankara.

After 1947, industrial areas were relocated to the outside of the city walls in Istanbul and it brought widespread gecekondu neighbourhoods around these industrial areas. Kıray (2007) describes two tendencies on rural-urban migrants' placements in the city. In the first trend, they rented a dwelling closed to working area and then moved to a gecekondu neighbourhood; and in the second trend, they initially bought, built or rented a gecekondu in the peripheries of the cities. In İstanbul, the first dense gecekondu neighbourhood was formed in Zeytinburnu¹⁹ in 1947 and this continued with Taşlıtarla, Eyüp, Maltepe-Topkapı, and Kağıthane (Şenyapılı, 1998). In 1949 there were 5 thousand gecekondu dwellings in İstanbul, and 3218 of them were just in Zeytinburnu (Evren, 2003 cited in Aslan, 2008).

Şenyapılı (1998) specifies DP's victory in the elections in 1950 as the first breakpoint on gecekondu processes. While until 1950s gecekondu settlements were makeshift, jerry-built sheds on the state lands; after 1950 with the Law No: 5218²⁰ in 1948, Law No: 5228²¹ in 1948, Law No: 5431²² in 1949, Law No: 6188²³ in 1953 and with DP's populist policies these settlements transformed to the neighbourhoods. Therefore Şenyapılı describes the period between 1950 and 1960 as "*mahalleleşme*"²⁴ or "*settling*" to the city.

Eraydın (1988) describes the cities' role in the capital accumulation process after 1950s, as the focus of accumulation. To her, in this period urban rents became competitive with production sector on the orientation of the accumulation. Therefore, the cities differed from the previous periods' as the places of the accumulation of capital and they decelerated capital accumulation cycles with the housing and land

¹⁹ Zeytinburnu was the area for leather, textiles, cement and some other industries and very closed to Kazlıçeşme which was the area for leather industry. Therefore rural-urban migrants have first chosen these areas for gecekondu construction. This closed site selection to the workplaces also prevented the increase of workers' wages and sometimes employers promoted the workers for building their own gecekondu. With subsequent, the population of Zeytinburnu reached to 50 thousand and it became *bucak* (township) in 1953 (Şenyapılı, 1998).

²⁰ Law on the Allocation of Municipality and Government Land for the Construction of Houses in Ankara.

²¹ Law for the Encouragement of Construction

²² This law covered all illegal settlements on public land by legalising and providing cheap land

²³ Law for the Encouragement of Construction and for Unauthorized buildings

²⁴ This can be translated in English as "to be transformed into neighbourhood".

speculation, that made gecekondu to be adopted by political powers in order to decelerate the cities' accumulation functions as an alternative to the industrial investments. Rural-urban migrants had also another important role in the economic life. They were significantly important for serving as an active, flexible and cheap labour which was needed for industrialization (Şenyapılı, 1998). Şenyapılı (2004) describes the situation of gecekondu dwellings and dwellers in this period as follows: *"The shelters were in bad condition, but in them an industrious population was living that [this population] was ready to work in any employment opportunity, kept proper family relations, and was courageous, determinate, progressive and enterprising"* (2004, p. 4). The gecekondu dwellers' needs, and in accordance with these needs their cheap work forces in a newly industrialized country made them to be indispensable in the urban area. These buffer roles of gecekondu dwellings in order to sustain economic development led it to be tolerated by the political powers.

Erman (2004) describes the representation of gecekondu dwellers between the years 1950 and 1960 as "rural other". And also they were seen as a source of votes by DP. But still there was a kind of reconciliation between different classes and also between the gecekondu dwellers and the government. The oppositions to the gecekondu settlements were generally raised from former residents of the city and professionals or elites through media, but there was not a significant opposition or conflict between those groups. These oppositions through media led the authorities to try to block the rural-urban migration or to find solutions in order to send them back in an ostensible way. For example in August 1951 the governor of Istanbul expressed that government can buy bus tickets for 500 migrants every month to send them back to their villages (Cumhuriyet, 1951 cited in Şenyapılı, 2004). But these ostensible preventions never worked because of patronage relations and latent reconciliations.

The period between 1950 and 1954 the economic growth has increased at the rate of 13 percent (Ahmad, 1995 cited in Ertem and Altunel, 2011). But after 1954 because of the national and international circumstances²⁵ the share of foreign trade and GDP growth rate of Turkey has decreased and this economic downturn and financial troubles led also the reduction of the public support for the government (Ertem and

²⁵ The economic problems of Turkey and also political tension in Cyprus, Events of 6-7 September, import restrictions, and in 1958 "stabilization measures" (Ertem and Altunel, 2011)

Altunel, 2011). Between the years 1954 and 1961 liberal foreign trade policies have tended to end and economy entered a period of recession, and as a response to this recession import restrictions were adopted with foreign trade regime in 1954 (Boratav, 2014). Apart from foreign trade regime, in this period the government has engaged with import substitution policies which largely developed in 1960s.

Because of these economic downturns, the Prime Minister of the period, Adnan Menderes, apart from import restrictions and import substitution policies, found a solution for gaining the support of the public again with the reconstruction of the cities. And because of its potential source of votes (Kuban, 2012), Istanbul was chosen for the reconstruction area in 1956. In this year two laws²⁶ were passed in order to carry out these ‘construction operations’ in İstanbul. In contrast to the previous periods, starting from 1950s instead of railway-oriented transportation strategies, road transportation strategies were adopted (Doğan, 2005). This new transportation strategy brought the construction of the wide roads in the urban area and triggered new kind of public transportation vehicles which are known as *dolmuş* (Doğan, 2005).

During the three and half years period of the ‘construction operations’ 7289 buildings were expropriated and demolished in order to solve the traffic problem with the wide roads and to ‘beautify’ the city with squares, monuments, statues and with the restoration of some religious buildings like Süleymaniye Mosque and Eyüp Sultan complex (Tekeli, 1994).

These years were also the period of establishment of the professional chambers as semi-autonomous organizations. Most of the criticisms and oppositions to these interventions were emerged from the Chamber of Architects, which was established in 1954, and the objections were generally about not taking consideration the real problems of Istanbul such as gecekondu settlements, and implementing just large scale populist demolition projects without any plans and trained staff (Tekeli, 1994). Oppositions to these interventions were generally arisen through some journals,

²⁶ The first law, which was Zoning Law No: 6765, aimed to empower the municipalities on urban planing and building control; and the second law, which was Expropriation Law No: 6830, aimed to organize the expropriation implementations.

bulletins and newspapers of the period. Boysan (1987) describes the oppositions of the periods as followings:

...there was not any opposition besides a couple of architects' mumblings and even there were cheers in the name of modernization ... In 1950s which were the period of the construction operations of all İstanbul, the only known collective action came when the trees were cut down in Ordu Avenue: The trees had been cut down during the night and the next morning they appeased the people who gathered together in the avenue by saying that 'we will plant the greater ones in the future'. (1987, p. 20)

In 1960s most of the developing countries left their liberal development model and export-oriented economies and adopted planned development model with import substitution (Şenyapılı, 2004). Also in Turkey after the coup d'état in 1960 planned development model was tried to be implemented. The first five-year development plan was prepared in 1963 which was stressing its strategic choice as import-substitution model of industrialization (Boratav, 2014). And also The Greater Istanbul Master Plan Office was established in 1966 in order to prepare the metropolitan master plan for Istanbul.

Gecekondu dwellers played an important role in the economic life also in this period and they earned their persistence in the urban areas. While in 1950s they worked in service, distribution and manufacturing sectors, starting from at the end of 1950s with the effect of the import substitution development model they started to serve in the fields like maintenance, repair, spare parts production and reproduction of imported technology and capital (Şenyapılı, 1998). Therefore while they were serving in 'marginal sector', by the middle of 1960s they have started to work in 'informal sector' (Şenyapılı, 1998).

In the 1960s, the middle-class also played an important role on the urbanization. Their peculiar type of interrelation with the city has affected both the urban form and urbanization processes (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). This interrelation, which is called "*apartmentization*", played an important role on emerging and enrichment of the urban middle-class in Turkey with a kind of relationship which stays in the midst of formal/informal line (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). This relationship, which is called "*build-sell*"²⁷, even if has emerged in 1950s, its peak period was in 1960s.

²⁷ In Turkish languages, it is called as 'yap-satçılık'.

The “*build-sell*” type of housing production led a wide range of groups to own a house and revival of the housing sector.

The planned development model was also tried to be adopted in the urbanization process after 1960s. In 1965 Condominium Law was passed for the legal regulations of “*apartmentization*” and, in 1966 Gecekondu Law No: 775 was passed and for the first time gecekondu was defined in the laws. In this law the term gecekondu were described as: “*Unauthorized structures which were built on the terrain or land that do not belong to itself without the owner’s authorization, and regardless the general regulations and directives determining construction work requirements*” (Gecekondu Law, 1966). With this law the government aimed to improve and refine of gecekondu dwellings and prevent the new ones. But municipalities have failed about providing land for transferring the some existing dwellings to the new areas, that even if 60.000 people applied for demanding the new land, just 6.000 of them have obtained the land in that period (Aslan, 2008). But still, with this law, gecekondu settlements have largely had their infrastructure and roads in their settlements.

Another important factor in this term is the increasing number of associations starting from 1950s. In his study, Yücekök (1971) analyses the associations in Turkey between the years 1946 and 1968 and according to his study, while the number of persons per association was 20868 in 1950, it decreased dramatically, and in 1955 it reached to 5625. This downward trend proceeded during the 1960s and in 1968 while the number of persons per association was 1088 in Turkey, this number was 771 in İstanbul (Yücekök, 1971).

Yücekök (1971) also categorizes the types of these associations in 14 groups and to this study the highest increase on the associations in these years were on religious associations such as mosque-building associations. These results are also compatible with the strengthening of conservative parties in the country.

One of the categories of Yücekök’s studies is ‘beautification’ associations’²⁸.

²⁸ In Yücekök’s study (1971) beautification associations (in Turkish language ‘Güzelleştirme Dernekleri’) comprise the associations of the development of towns, villages and cities; the associations of zoning, beautification and promotion; the associations of building water channels, bridges, roads and police stations; the associations of conservation of trees and afforestation; the associations of making monuments, memorials, statues; the associations of lovers of city, town and village; and tourism associations.

According the numbers (Table 4. 1), in 1946 there were only 34 beautification associations in Turkey, later it increased to 102 in 1950, to 853 in 1960, to 2677 in 1965 and to 4644 in 1968. To these numbers, the maximum growth in the percentage of the beautification associations in the total number of associations was between the years 1960 and 1965. This shows the increase of the demand of organizations around the matters of neighbourhoods, towns and urban issues after 1960s.

The increasing tendency of organizations on the urban issues was also related to the gecekondu neighbourhoods. Especially at the end of the 1960s gecekondu neighbourhoods have started to demand urban services like infrastructures and roads for their neighbourhoods in order to improve their quality of life. These demands were largely met with RPP's new municipalism approaches' promises.

Table 4. 1 : The Number and the Ratio of Beautification Associations between the Years 1946 and 1968 (Yücekök, 1971).

Year	The Number of Beautification Associations	The Total Number of Associations	The Percent of Beautification Associations in the total numbers (percent)
1946	34	814	4.17
1950	102	2023	5.04
1955	330	5799	5.69
1960	853	12034	7.08
1965	2677	19441	13.76
1968	4644	27076	17.15

The period which starts from the late 1960s and proceeds throughout the 1970s and ends with 1980 coup d'état has a particular importance for this study. There are two important reasons of this: First, the representations of gecekondu dwellers have changed from 'other rurals' or 'innocent labourers who could not adapt to urban life' to 'objectionable other' (Erman, 2004). In this period gecekondu dwellers' struggles to protect their neighbourhoods and dwellings are counted as the first broad political urban movement experiences in Turkey. And the second one is the change of Kemalist approach of RPP's policies which is specified in the literature as 'new

municipal movement'. Before proceeding further to gecekondu dwellers' struggles and RPP's new municipalism approach, it is important to give some brief information about economic and social features of the 1970s.

1970s' most important economic incident was the global economic crisis which came after the oil crisis in 1973 and 1978, but Turkey's reaction to this crisis became to postpone this depression at any cost in order to prevent reflection of it to the upcoming elections (Boratav, 2014). Demirel tried to solve increased political impotence and tense political environment with some 'populist' economic policies, but this could not prevent the inevitable crisis (Boratav, 2014). Under such conditions national bourgeoisie, which was created by import substitution model (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013), was very weak in the external competition conditions. And the crisis and also Turkey's unstable political situation, which was ruled by coalition governments, showed themselves with the queues of basic necessities, black market and high inflation (Şengül, 2009). This economic situation was more visible in the large cities and urban problems were generally seen as the reason of underdevelopment (Şenyapılı, 2004). The largest international institutions like World Bank and IMF took the role for solving the urban problems especially for urban poverty and inequality which also included gecekondu settlements (Şenyapılı, 2004)

In the second part of 1970s interclass reconciliation relations, which had been dominated factors in Turkey's urbanization process from 1950s to 1970, have also largely detached (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). Şengül (2009) describes the period between 1950 and 1980 as the period of 'urbanization of labour'. However, Doğan (2005) states that urbanization process of the 1960s was different from the 1970s. To Doğan (2005), in 1960s the main factor which has directed the urban development was 'urbanization of small manufacturers' and to him the determining role of 'urbanization of labour' on urban policies has started virtually in 1970s. In 1970s wage workers in urban sectors have increased dramatically, therefore the parties, which supported to fulfil workers' demands in the urban area, started to rule the municipalities (Doğan, 2005).

The demands of gecekondu dwellers shaped the populist policies of the parties starting from 1950s and these patronage relations were generally held by liberal-right parties. But in 1970s, RPP, through canalizing its policies to more leftist directions, had a significant effect on some gecekondu neighbourhoods. RPP has made its first

attempt to declare its new political line in 1961 and 1964 party congresses, and in 1965 the party has declared its new policy as “the left of the centre” (Bozkır, 2005). This new municipalism has declared its principles as being autonomous, manufacturer, effective in the regulation of consumption, and collaborative and integrative (Kazancı, 1983). And with 1973 local elections, municipal managements of the largest cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir were ruled by RPP with its public entrepreneurs and social justice policies of the period until the 1980 coup d'état. RPP's victory in the local elections was the result of the economic problems of the period and the increasing dynamics of working class and also the consequence of ‘educated, urban petty-bourgeois groups’ oppositions (Doğan, 2005). Likewise while in 1960s *gecekondu* dwellers had established a patronage relationship with the centre-rights (especially with DP), in 1970s they were more closed to left-wing parties because of the increasing inequality over income distribution, the increase in the working class movements and the left tendencies in the society of the period (Doğan, 2005). In these circumstances RPP's social municipalism policies had a significant effect on *gecekondu* labourers and leftist petit-bourgeois; and this also affected the meaning of the neighbourhood in terms of social unity and community-based initiatives (Doğan, 2005). Şengül (2009) describes this as, transition of 1960s’ “urban development period of state and middle-class centred” to 1970s’ “community-based urbanization period”.

This period is also called as ‘social democratic municipalism – SDM’ or ‘new municipalism movement’ because of the conflicts between municipalities and central government; that is, while central government limited financial autonomy of the local governments and established authority on the municipalities, municipalities expressed their aim as decentralization and democracy at the local level (Çetin, 2014). To Kazancı (1983) ‘new municipal movement’ led the public to consider the local governments as a political arena. But this movement besides receiving interferences from the conservative central government, it received also the oppositions from some groups in RPP's own organization; and also it could not establish the local democracy with the efficient participation of urban poor who supported RPP to get the local power (Şengül, 2009). And this led ‘new municipalism movement’ to be a kind of elitist movement which middle classes led (Şengül, 2009). According to Şengül (2009) the weakest side of ‘new municipalism

movement' was to be failed to be a broad-based social movement, and he relates this with movement's institutional ties.

Also this period is known for the urban oppositions against the first bridge from 1960s to 1970s. Because of the political atmosphere of the period, the oppositions to the first bridge were also held in a political sphere. The oppositions against the first bridge, which was opened in 1973, were held in two different campaigns. The first one, which was named as *The Campaign of Feasibility*, was held by professional organizations, and focused on the urban transportation through defending that the bridge would not be the solution for the traffic of Istanbul (Boğaza Üçüncü Köprü, 2008). And the second one was held by mostly revolutionary university students, who stressed the poverty of the East and South-eastern Anatolia, and this campaign was named as *The Bridge to the Zap Water not the Bosphorus* (Boğaza Üçüncü Köprü, 2008). In this campaign while students pointed the poverty of the East and South-eastern, they also went to Hakkari and built a bridge on Zap Water in order to inhibit more loss of life in that area and presented their oppositions to the first bridge (Boğaza Üçüncü Köprü, 2008). And just after the opening of the first bridge, the second bridge was started to be mentioned. Two days before the 12 October 1975 election, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel announced the second bridge plan in Taksim Square which newspaper gave this as "Demirel promised for the second bridge and colour television" (Bir Köprü Bir Köprü Daha, 1975).

Furthermore, the period of 1970s was not only important for the rise of the visibility of professional organizations, left parties and trade unions in the urban area; it was also important to enclose other important experiences on the radical struggles of gecekondu dwellers. As we stated above, while until the 1970s gecekondu neighbourhoods were seen as the vote storages for the right parties, after 1970s they had an oppositional identity to the system, and oriented towards to the left parties (Pekdemir, 1988). In this period, urban movements, which were emerged in the gecekondu neighbourhoods, aimed to develop infrastructure solutions to the existed gecekondu settlements and to provide housings to the urban poor who did not have a shelter (Aslan, 2004). In 1970s housing problem was considered as a part of the struggle for the left groups and therefore gecekondu has gained a political and organized character (Aslan, 2004). This character of gecekondu led the state interventions to these neighbourhoods. Until the mid-1970s gecekondu settlements

did not experience large interventions apart from some restrictions (Gökmen, 1998 cited in Aslan, 2008). But after the second part of 1970s the neighbourhoods, which were established as the results of political urban movements, became the target of tough and destructive policies of the authorities (Aslan, 2008).

In some neighbourhoods, socialist left has affected the establishment of the neighbourhoods and these organizations protected their neighbourhoods from state's surveillance and control (Şengül, 2009). These neighbourhoods differently from the previous ones were planned by socialist groups with the help of professionals and students. And because of their political identity, for some groups they were "liberated areas" and needed to be "clean" and for some others they were the "centres of struggles and resistances" (Aslan, 2004). One of these political neighbourhoods was presented by Şükrü Aslan's (2004) research on 1 May Neighbourhood²⁹. 1 May Neighbourhood was different from other neighbourhoods both because of the solidarity during the establishment of the neighbourhood and because of the relations which were established with the power (Aslan, 2005). This neighbourhood took part in the newspapers especially with the massive gecekondu demolition events which resulted many people to be killed, injured and arrested in 1970s. Another example of these kinds of neighbourhoods which was established by socialist left in 1970s was Çayan Neighbourhood³⁰ (Aslan and Şen, 2011). This neighbourhood was also established with class consciousness and Şen (2013) explains this neighbourhood as:

This is a significant and unique example in the history of (socialist) urban planning in Turkey, where, following the establishment of the neighbourhood, a socialist organisation aspires and solidifies its political domination through the process of reproduction of social relationships spatially. Çayan neighbourhood was established through the confiscation of the public land by a socialist organisation. During the construction phase, architects, planners, who were self-defining themselves as socialist architects and socialist planners, worked voluntarily and generated a, so to say, an alternative social housing and living space. The dwellings were constructed for the workers. (2013, p. 3)

Therefore these neighbourhoods presented the examples of important political urban movements of 1970s and showed the political and class consciousness characteristics

²⁹ The official name is Mustafa Kemal Neighbourhood.

³⁰ Çayan is now officially one part of Güzeltepe Neighbourhood in Eyüp.

of that period. Hence, we can state that 1970s *gecekond* movements were formed with the period's political and class-based approach differently from the previous periods. However this political atmosphere was largely dissolved with the coup d'état in 1980 and neoliberal policies and state pressure dominated both the economic and political environment of the country.

4.2 Urban Policies and Urban Opposition in the Neoliberal Era: 1980-1990

As we stated in the previous section, oil crisis has affected economic system of all the capitalist countries and this also disrupted import substitution model of Turkey in 1970s. These economic conditions led massive social struggles and politicization of the social groups in Turkey. This also led a rupture between bourgeoisie and its representation in the political system (Kaya, 2009). In order to overcome this global crisis, neoliberal policies have started to be adopted in 1970s especially by the developed capitalist countries. As been largely affected by the economic crisis, Turkey's capitalist economy and import substitution model have also suffered and as a solution a new kind of accumulation strategy was adopted at the end of 1970s.

The neoliberal transformation of Turkey's economic system was initiated with 24th January 1980's decisions and triennial stand-by agreement with IMF in June 1980 (Sönmez, 2009). But the political situation of the period (mobilization and politicization of the masses, instability of the government) did not present a convenient 'base' for this transformation and this was 'solved' by the authoritarian regime of 12 September 1980's military junta. 1980 coup d'état has sharply terminated the 1970's political arena and has established authoritarian regime on the political groups. In this term, state took a strict position towards unionisation and class-based struggles (Türkün and et al. 2014). But 1980 coup d'état did not just affect the country politically and socially with its authoritarian enforcements, it also transformed the capital accumulation process of the country.

The coup d'état of 1980 engaged with the neoliberal programme of 24 January decisions. And the period, which has started from 1980, was affected from 24 January Decisions which were formed by "stabilization policy package" that IMF had imposed to the developing countries in the 1970s, and "structural adjustment program" which was developed by World Bank (Boratav, 2014). Therefore this period was the end of the import substitution model of the capital accumulation

process and the beginning of a new kind of capital accumulation model with neoliberal policies.

The period of 1980s had also primary importance on transformation of urbanization processes of cities in Turkey. Since neoliberal reconstruction aimed to minimize the socio-economic dimensions of the nation-state, it highlighted the local levels and the cities; thus capital groups, which had withdrawn from the manufacturing with the end of import substitution model, oriented towards the financial markets and urban rents (Doğan, 2005). Therefore cities played an important role in the neoliberal process as being dominated by the capital and by becoming commodities for the capital. This led changes the cities' "economic structures, socio-spatial textures, class relations and urban alliances" (Doğan, 2007)

After 1980, Turkey established strong relations with world economy system, and "metropolitan cities, external affairs and outsource transfers" took an important part in this period (Eraydın, 1988). The spatial configurations of neoliberal era were based on the competition and hierarchy of local units with the dominance of world cities or global cities (Doğan, 2001). In this period capital has established its hegemony on the urban areas much more than ever before thus Şengül (2009) identifies this period as "urbanization of the capital".

Metropolitan areas have become decisive in creating and distributing of capital accumulation with their increasing external affairs and foreign trade income (Eraydın, 1988). The focus of this economic dislocation in Turkey was İstanbul which had 22 percent of the national income in that period (Sönmez, 1996). After 1980s İstanbul has come forward with its international finance, service and tourism role through aiming to be a world city (Türkün et al., 2014). And with this target, administrators purposed to decentralize the industrial areas and to create tourism and business centres. These decentralization policies led some manufacturing facilities in Golden Horn and Historical Peninsula to move to İkitelli; and leather industry in Kazlıçeşme was also relocated to Kurtköy (Türkün et al., 2014). This sectorial transformation led also spatial transformation and regeneration, while old industrial areas were demolished and moved to small industrial sites or to organized industrial zones, and new facilities were located convenient to tourism, business and service sectors.

The metropolitan master plan for İstanbul had started to be prepared before the 1980s. The Greater İstanbul Master Plan Office had been established in 1966 in order to prepare this plan and studies had been conducted through the 1970s. İstanbul Metropolitan Area Master Plan at the scale of 1/50000 was prepared and approved before the 12 September 1980 coup d'état in July 1980. The plan was based on four guiding principles:

1. Preservation of the water resources, agricultural areas and forest areas in the northern part of İstanbul.
2. Growth linearly in the east-west axis, because of the prohibition of construction in the northern part of İstanbul.
3. Conservation of the 'cultural heritage and natural environment' in the areas of Historical Peninsula, Galata-Beyoğlu and Bosphorus and the decrease of the population density in these areas.
4. Formation of the interdependent public transportation by linking the existing railway routes in Asia and Europe sides with a rail tube tunnel (Ekinci, 1994:31-32).

But after 1980 coup d'état The Greater İstanbul Master Plan Office was closed and the plan was not implemented. And in February 1981 *Law about Share Given to Municipalities and Special Provision Administrations from General Budget Incomes* was published in Official Gazette in order to ensure %5 of tax income to the municipalities from the general budget (Tekeli, 1994).

In this period, İstanbul has developed without any master plan discipline and this led the increase of the speculation of the forest areas, agricultural areas and watersheds. This speculation has increased especially in the period of Motherland Party (MP)³¹. After getting the power in the central government, MP started to rule also the local administrations with the local election which was held in 1984, and this led the beginning of Bedrettin Dalan period, which has proceeded until 1989, in İstanbul.

The Greater İstanbul Master Plan Office was cancelled with Law on Administration of Greater Municipalities No. 3030 in 1984 and with Planning Law No.3194 which was legalized in 1985, the authorizations of planning, approval and implementation

³¹ Motherland Party is in Turkish, Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) which is a centre-right party was established by Turgut Özal in 1983 and after the military coup the party won the first election which was held in 1983 and continued to be the ruling party until 1991's general election.

were given to the İstanbul Greater Municipality (Türkün et al. 2014). Bill 3030 increased the municipality share in the general budget one more time and provided legal entities to the district municipalities which were removed during the military regime (Doğan, 2007).

Ekinci (1994) states that in this period all the implementations in İstanbul urban area were applied just as the opposite way of İstanbul Metropolitan Area Master Plan's decisions. In this period 1/25000 scale environmental plans and 1/5000 scale master plans were prepared by İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality and many other plans were given to national and international companies (Öktem, 2005). After 1986, water resources, agricultural areas and forest areas in the northern part of İstanbul³² were opened to construction with "local zoning plans" and "improvements plans" (Sönmez, 1996). The second bridge and its peripheral roads, which were constructed between the years 1986 and 1988, also accelerated this process.

In this process the state, as the reverse of the previous period, has invested the resources largely to the urban services as transportation, infrastructure and housing rather than industry; and by doing this it also established the hegemony of urban entrepreneurship (Şengül, 2009). These investments were largely carried out by private sectors through tenders that urban investments played an important role on transferring resources to the capital (Eraydın, 1988; Şengül, 2009). These major road and construction projects were generally carried out through build-operate-transfer models. And while MP municipalities have transferred the sources to the private sectors, companies in the construction sector have found capital accumulation channels both in domestic and in foreign markets (Eraydın, 1988). Between the years 1978 and 1988 with the 36 percent rate construction sector had the largest share of the investments (Türkün et al. 2014).

³² Especially in Sarıyer – Kilyos area; green areas in Zekariyeköy, Demirciköy, Uskumruköy were opened to construction and Garanti-Koza Construction which was belonged to Koç Group has built 6 thousands villas for 25 thousands people (Sönmez, 1996). Water sources were spoiled in two ways with opening to construction for the large capitals and with illegal construction. Especially villas, mass housing projects, free trade area, private university campuses, private airports were built by the large capitals around Büyükçekmece Lake and illegal constructions were located in Ümraniye, around Ömerli Barage, Elmalı Barage and Alibeyköy Barage (Sönmez, 1996).

Before 1980s small or medium scale speculators had been interested in land speculation of İstanbul, but after 1980s the largest capital groups have started to be interested in the land speculation of İstanbul by building shopping-malls, villas or hotels; and this trend has increased especially in 1990s (Sönmez, 1996). Tekeli (1988) describes this process as “the transition from small capitals’ city to the large ones”. The interest of the large capitals led two trends in order to seize urban land. Firstly, previously untouched natural areas like forest areas, Bosphorus or watersheds were opened to construction, and secondly they have seized historical and cultural buildings in order to restore (Sönmez, 1996).

After 1980 international capital groups also became significant on the urbanization process. In this period foreign capital inflows were encouraged and foreign capital groups became interested in finance and service sector in Istanbul. But these trends were needed new legal regulations, and in order to transfer resources to the capital through the transformation of the urban area, both military regime and MP government have first prepared the legal regulations, and especially MP has removed all the legal restrictions in order to present the urban land to the capital’s service.

Therefore in this period so many new laws and legal amendments have taken place. The first important law was *Law for the Encouragement of Tourism No. 2634*³³, which was legalized in March 1982. The law identifies its purpose as: “...to ensure that necessary arrangements are made. Necessary measures are taken for the regulation and development of the tourism sector and for giving this sector a dynamic structure and mode of operation” (Law for the Encouragement of Tourism, 1982). With this law a series of natural and cultural environmental areas were declared as tourism centres and became the subject of investments. After this law 32³⁴ tourism centres were declared in İstanbul between 1984 and 1990, and 13 of them are still in force. Some of the areas, which were declared as Tourism Centres in 1989, were cancelled due to court decision in 1993 (Türkün et al. 2014). And many of the Tourism Centre areas were planned as tourism and business centres, and even

³³ This law was legalized during the period of military government by Advisory Council. And because the 1982 constitution adjudged that Advisory Council Decisions and Council Decisions cannot be the case of unconstitutionality, this law has never been subjected the court case in terms of unconstitutionality (Ekinci, 1994).

³⁴ The numbers of Tourism Centres were given as 37 in some other sources but in this study we have used Sönmez’s (1996) research which also provides the list of them.

they just had small part of tourism functions, the buildings were constructed with the construction opportunities of the tourism buildings (Sönmez, 1996). Therefore this law brought both deterioration of cityscape with skyscrapers and high-rise buildings; and destruction of natural and cultural environmental areas.

Another important legal regulation was about the opening the Bosphorus to the construction. In 1985, a change was made in the zoning laws and it led the right to construction in Bosphorus Frontal Panoramic Zone, and companies got authorization for 1335 villa ³⁵ (Sönmez, 1996). And between the years 1984 and 1994, 3 thousands illegal constructions were built around the Bosphorus (Sönmez, 1996).

Besides declaring tourism centres and building luxury houses around Bosphorus, MP also aimed to transform İstanbul to an international business, culture and finance centre of Middle East and Europe. This was the policy of engaging with global city hierarchy through building skyscrapers, wide roads, shopping centres and luxury housings and hotels. The first central business district was declared as Dolapdere Piyalepaşa axes with Essen Plan in 1986 (Öktem, 2005) In this period, Dalan wanted to create an international business district in Dolapdere Piyalepaşa axis and this project was considered to be linked with Be-Sam Project (Beşiktaş – Samatya Inner City Highway Project). Dalan states his demand in that period as: “... *The essential character which we want to achieve for Istanbul is to make it a metropolis. To create 15 business districts. One of them was planned in Piyalepaşa...*” (Milliyet, 15.11.1987 cited in Ekinci, 1994). But this demand of Dalan was materialized in Zincirlikuyu and Maslak axis instead of Piyalepaşa. And this business district has grown along the transportation axis, and in the Asian side Altunizade and Kozyatağı, which were supported by the transportation axis, were appointed as the secondary international business centres (Öktem, 2005). Accordingly skyscrapers, residences and shopping malls were built and these areas became the business districts by the agency of the construction of the first and second bridges.

Also, linking with these processes new professional groups who worked in these business and culture centres have emerged. These new professional groups, which

³⁵ Even the amendment was cancelled by the Supreme Court, the court order was published in the Official Gazette after 126 days and this allowed enough time for receiving the authorization for 979 villas in this time (Sönmez, 1996).

are also named as new middle classes or yuppies, have generally moved to the old historical areas of the city centres and generated a new kind of urban renewal which is called gentrification. The gentrification process is generally seen after 1990s in İstanbul, therefore we will discuss this in detailed in the next section, but in 1980s some signs of gentrification were also seen. According to İslam (2006) the increasing number of new professional groups led the formation of a potential “gentrifiers” in İstanbul. In the 1980s gentrification has emerged mostly in the coastal areas of Bosphorus like Kuzguncuk, Arnavutköy or Ortaköy through rehabilitating the housings, but this has increased mainly after 1990s.

Besides new middle class who has started to choose places in the central areas, new riches of the neoliberal process have mostly moved to the suburban areas of the city. This demand of moving away from the city centre was supported with No.335 Legislative Decree. With this decree town municipalities were established apart from district municipalities within the border of metropolitan areas. And this led to give authorization of preparing, approval and implementation of the plans to the town municipalities, and this authorization provided opening the new building zones in those areas (Türkün et al. 2014). Some destructive results of this Decree were seen as opening the construction of water sources or forested areas. And also this trend affected urban form of İstanbul with sub-urbanization.

Before 1980s suburban areas were generally the places for lower classes but in the 1980s even some mass housing projects were still conducted for lower paid employees of middle class, another trend was also seen as isolated luxury housing projects. With this trend, municipalities have built isolated luxury housing projects in the suburban areas and have created “rich ghettos”³⁶ (Hamamcı, 1996 cited in Doğan, 2007). And these bourgeois ghettos and new transportation axis have also led a new kind of urban growth which is urban sprawl. The urban sprawl led agricultural and forest areas to be damaged by constructions and new roads. And another effect of these settlements was encouraging the car ownership.

³⁶ These luxury houses in the suburban areas will increase in 1990s and 2000s therefore in the next sections the information about these settlements will be given more detailed.

The second trend about sub-urbanization was mostly promoted by cooperatives and Mass Housing Administration (MHA)³⁷ which was found in 1984 with Bill 2985 (Mass Housing Law). This law was one of the most important regulations for residential areas in this period. Bill 2985 describes its purpose as:

This Law governs satisfaction of housing needs, drafting of guidelines and procedures that apply to housing builders, development of machinery and equipment through the agency of industrial construction techniques adaptive to national circumstances and materials, and supporting to be provided by the State. (Mass Housing Law, 1984)

Although mass housing projects were still just for paid employees instead of marginal precarious workers in the gecekondu settlements. Türkün et al. (2014) state the results of this law as follows:

...individual loans have taken place, the size of the credited housings increased to 150 square meters and a large amount of credits were given to large capital groups. The second housing constructions were supported also with this law. Beside, an autonomous mass housing fund was emerged ... all the authorizations were concentrated in the central government ... In this period the main duty of the Administration was not producing house instead financing the under construction buildings. (2014: 93)

In this period subsidies to agriculture sector were also removed and this led a new immigration wave especially to the large cities like İstanbul (Türkün et al. 2014). As can be seen in Table 4.2 the period between 1980 and 1985 was the most active term about urbanization and migration, and accordingly rural population has decreased in this period. Between the years 1975 and 1985, 12,6 percent migrants within all the migrants in Turkey has migrated to İstanbul, and in 1990 the rate of 63 percent of the population in İstanbul was born in other cities (Sönmez, 1996). Also while in 1950 to 1975 the migrants generally had come from Black Sea and Middle Anatolia, after 1980s migrants has migrated from East and South-eastern Anatolia³⁸ (Doğan, 2007).

Also emigration became an important issue for İstanbul in this period, especially from Balkans and the Caucasus, that in 1980 the number of emigrants who lived in İstanbul was 260 thousands and in 1990 it increased to 670 thousands (Sönmez, 1996).

³⁷ In Turkish Toplu Konut İdaresi (TOKİ).

³⁸ This has especially increased in the 1990s because of village evacuations and forced migration.

Table 4.2 : Population and Population Growth Rate of Turkey and Istanbul (1927-2010, General Population Censuses, TUIK).

Years	Population of Turkey	The Rate of Urban Population	Annual growth rate of population Turkey (%)	Population of Istanbul	Annual growth rate of population Istanbul (%)
1927	13 648 270	24.22	-	806 863	-
1935	16 158 018	23.53	21,1	883 559	11,4
1940	17 820 950	24.39	19,6	991 237	23
1945	18 790 174	24.94	10,6	1 078 339	16,9
1950	20 947 188	25.04	21,7	1 166 447	15,7
1955	24 064 763	28.79	27,8	1 533 822	54,8
1960	27 754 820	31.92	28,5	1 882 092	40,9
1965	31 391 421	34.42	24,6	2 293 83	39,6
1970	35 605 176	38.45	25,2	3 019 032	54,9
1975	40 347 719	41.81	25	3 904 588	51,4
1980	44 736 957	43.91	20,7	4 741 890	38,9
1985	50 664 458	53.03	24,9	5 842 985	41,8
1990	56 473 035	59.01	21,7	7 309 190	44,8
2000	67 803 927	64.90	18,3	10 018 735	31,5
2007	70 586 256	70,5	5,7	12 753 836	32,5
2010	73 722 988	76,3	15,9	13 255 685	26

Because the industry has relatively receded in İstanbul starting from 1972, gecekondu dwellers have started working at the marginal jobs in the service and trade sectors and these sectors have largely concealed the hidden unemployment (Sönmez, 1996) And inflation and the shrinking of employment opportunities in the industry sector after 1980s led other family members like women and children of the gecekondu dwellers to start working (Sönmez, 1996).

The new migration waves also led increasing number of gecekondu in this period. Keleş (2004) demonstrates the number of gecekondu and the number of gecekondu dwellers in Turkey between 1955 and 2002 (Table 4.3). According to these numbers the period between 1980 and 1990 there is a significant increase in urban population.

Table 4.3 : Gecekondu and the Population of Gecekondu in Turkey (Keleş, 2004:561).

Years	Number of Gecekondu	Population of Gecekondu (Thousand)	The rate in urban population (%)
1955	50.000	250.000	4.7
1960	240.000	1.200.000	16.4
1965	430.000	2.150.000	22.9
1970	600.000	3.000.000	23.6
1980	1.150.000	5.750.000	26.1
1990	1.750.000	8.750.000	33.9
1995	2.000.000	10.000.000	35.0
2002	2.200.000	11.000.000	27.0

The increase of gecekondu dwellings in this period was supported by state's policy. Indeed the state's policy on gecekondu settlements in Turkey was matching with UN and World Bank housing policies of the period. Mike Davis (2006) explains the UN and World Bank's role on slums areas in his significant book *Planet of Slums*³⁹. Davis (2006) states that the financial aid which was given to slum areas by World Bank provided Bank both a patronage relationship with slum communities and with NGOs, and also provided an opportunity to impose its policies to the other countries. Therefore starting from 1970s and proceeding in 1980s states transformed to be the

³⁹ Davis (2006) illustrates IMF as "bad cop" and World Bank as "good cop", and states that after 1970 they played an important role on determining housing policies of Third World governments. So that, World Bank increased the credits on urban development from 10 million dollars in 1972 to 2 billion dollars in 1988, and between 1972 and 1990 World Bank has promoted 116 slum areas in 55 countries.

“enabler” of the poor in cooperation with NGOs and international benefactors (Davis, 2006). This was the influence of English architect John Turner’s “self-housing” approach which was also supported by liberal economist Hernando de Soto (Davis, 2006). De Soto (1989, 2000 cited in Türkün et al. 2014) states that in order to solve the problem of the poverty, properties should be legalizing in the informal settlements and urban poor should be integrated in formal markets and therefore in this process state’s role should be legalize the informal settlements. Davis (2006) evaluates “self-housing” approach as “amalgam of anarchism and neoliberalism”⁴⁰ and “a radical departure from public housing to slum upgrading”. Indeed many slum upgrading projects which were promoted by World Bank in developed countries did not reach to planned results, some were mired down and never finished and some others were just “poached” by the middle class instead of slum dwellers (Davis, 2006)

Even if there was not a direct fund of UN and World Bank to Turkey in this period, a similar approach was also adopted in Turkey in the same periods as election promises. During the period between 1983 and 1988 five different laws were legalized for gecekondu settlements. After the 1980 coup d’état, the military regime had repealed all the municipal councils and established municipal committees and also had prohibited building gecekondu with a memorandum in 1981. However after the general selection and victory of MP a new development amnesty law was passed in 1983 and this was followed by the new ones in 1984, 1986. Therefore in this period, legalizing gecekondu dwellings and unlicensed buildings became one of the important election promises and housing policies.

In 1983 the first development amnesty law of the period were passed which was Bill 2805 *The Law on Procedures to be applied to the Structures Contrary to Zoning and Gecekondu Regulations and on Changing the one Article of Zoning Law No. 6785*. With this law gecekondu which were built before 1983 were legalized. But in 1984 new amnesty law which was Bill 2981 was passed and almost all unlicensed buildings were legalized. Again in 1986 the scope of the Bill 2981 was extended with two new amnesty laws. And another law, which was Bill 3414, was passed in 1988

⁴⁰ Davis’s this evaluation was especially on John Turner’s presentation “*Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments*” in the first UN-HABITAT conference in 1972.

in order to cancel the one article of Bill 775 Gecekondu Law which was about banning to sell or to transfer gecekondu in 20 years, and with this change gecekondu has been commodified in the housing sector through letting the buying-selling or transferring to the apartment (Türkün et al. 2014).

All the laws' aim was to legalize gecekondu settlements and transferring them to the apartment blocks (Şenyapılı, 1998). But this helped also the changing the meaning of gecekondu, while in the beginning gecekondu had come forward with its use value as a sheltering and housing, this was transformed to apartment blocks and resulted to be stated with its exchange value. Also this led labourers to be articulated in capitalist relations (Türkün et al. 2014) and ownership involvement.

Even if in this period large capital groups have started to be interested in the urban land, and small entrepreneurs have still proceeded to take advantage of urban rents even more easily than 1970s. Doğan (2007) describes this as follows:

In the 1970s the activity of small entrepreneurs in the urban area had been restricted by RRP municipalities which were relied upon the alliances with white-collar, educated small bourgeois groups and by poor labourers in the gecekondu areas ...[but]... in the 1980s ... small entrepreneurs have constituted a quorum in the local councils and because municipalities' powers have extended with reinforcement of financial and managerial powers of the municipalities, development amnesty laws and authorizing the municipalities for planning; they became more profitable in the process of urbanization of capital than 1970s. (2007: 55-54)

In 1970s the politicization and organization of the groups had put forward the use value of the gecekondu settlements, although after 1980s exchange value of gecekondu became more featured characteristic because of also the policies and discourses of the politicians. The “apartmentization” process of gecekondu led gecekondu dwellers to find a place in capitalist relations. But still this process was not same for all gecekondu settlements and gecekondu dwellers. In this period, gecekondu settlements and dwellers were also segregated in their own groups through their relations with the ruling party, ethnicity, religion, political stance, being newcomers, the localization of the gecekondu settlement in the city, and when we consider about mafia relations and other relations there were many other intricate structures which created this segregation.

The development amnesty laws in 1980s led more inequality and segregation in this heterogeneous structure of gecekondu settlements. While some groups have taken

advantage from these development amnesty laws fully, built 4-5 storeyed buildings and were transformed to the “new rich”; some others’ living conditions have become even more difficult. This was seen especially between former gecekondu dwellers and the new ones. Şengül (2009) describes the role of localization of gecekondu settlements in the city on the utilization of these amnesty laws as follows: *“Gecekondus have taken advantage of these rights according to being closed to the zoned part of the city, some parts of the gecekondu settlements even if they had zoning plans they were not renewed because of the their geographical locations”* (2009: 145).

In this period local administrations also created new accumulation channels and played a role in the distribution between social classes (Eraydın, 1988). But this situation triggered a major gap in the income distribution. The breakdown in the income distribution led some social groups not to reach some collective consumption goods (Eraydın, 1988).

While the state left its “adjudicator” role completely, this led the increasing income gap, “aggressive entrepreneurial strategies” informal sectors and segregation within social classes (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). In the process of neoliberal reconstruction, working class and urban poor became the most disadvantageous groups. While the new relations were being established between the local and international capital groups and all restrictions were removed in order to free the circulation of capital, new inequalities were also emerged (Doğan, 2001).

This segregation has manifested itself also spatially. While urban poor has tried to stay at the edge of the city with difficulties and with increasing poverty, lower middle classes have localized peripheries through cooperatives, and super classes have settled in the gated communities outside of the cities which led them not to see or encounter any poverty or misery (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). Also as we stated, these groups were also segregated in their own classes because of different relations.

This was both economic and political results of 1980s which destroyed largely the solidarity and organization structure of 1970s and imposed individualism⁴¹.

Even if many development amnesty laws were legalized in Dalan period, so many gecekondü dwellings were also demolished. And some urban services like waste collection and disposal were privatized. And all these policies and implementations like segregating the social groups, creating “new riches” but also deepening the poverty, destroying cultural, environmental and historical areas, corruptions, favouritism in the bids and the other negative results of MP municipalities have created an opposition towards Dalan and his party. And this has reflected to 1989 local elections with Social Democratic People's Party's (SDPP) victory. But before passing through the SDPP's municipal administration period, the urban-based oppositions against MP government and Dalan municipality will be discussed.

4.2.1 Seeking for an opposition in the urban area

1980 coup d'état did not just affect the economic system with the neoliberal policies; it has also affected social and political structure of the country. As we stated above military junta sharply ceased the political atmosphere and organized structure of the 1970s with an authoritarian regime. 1980 coup d'état has led depoliticization and un-organization of social groups. This trend has also proceeded during MP government.

After getting the victory in the central government election in 1983, MP has also gained power in local administrations in 1984. Boratav (2014) describes MP's policies on social groups in this period as follows:

In this period a ‘crooked’ populism was enacted towards public classes. The aim of this approach was to dispossess especially poor masses from class consciousness and to create large groups which were ready to surrender to the programme and ideology of capital. (2014:153)

In this period development amnesty laws were one of product of these populist policies which have transferred urban rents to the mass of people, and were used as appeasing tools in order to decrease social oppositions (Boratav, 2014). And also

⁴¹ Individualism was the result of both 1980 coup d'état and neoliberalism. In this period also politicians discourses, which were about individualism or gaining money through shortest path, affected this process.

some funds⁴² were provided to the poor people in order to solve their economic problems outside of the workforce market (Boratav, 2014). Boratav proceeds to describe MP's policies as:

In this way, MP's policy of redistribution was dominated with while following a strict and uncompromising policy to class-based economic demands like unionisation, wage struggles, the demands of peasants for being supported; on the other hand another strategy has tried to satisfy the same groups with their 'urban, *gecekondulu*, poor and consumer' features. (2014:153)

MP's these populist policies became partially successful on *gecekondulu* dwellers. With getting their land registers and having some extended rights like enhancing their *gecekondus* to 4 storeys, they largely have articulated in the capitalist relations. And also because of military junta's domination and authority to the neighbourhoods which were known with their political characteristics have encountered with arrestment, oppressions and interventions. These two economic and political situations led *gecekondulu* settlements to start losing their working class-based, political structures of 1970s.

Apart economic and political results of 1980s, military junta has bequeathed another characteristic to the 1980s social groups which is the official ideology of the Turkish Islamic synthesis. This ideology was transferred to the students and young people from primary education to the universities with "anti-communism", "national unity" and "harmful and destructive ideologies that want to break up the country" themes (Boratav, 2014). Indeed while these ideology was transferring to the society through education system or through other tools, in the same period media especially new bought TVs have transferred popular culture and "shortest paths to get rich" methods to the society. This getting rich in a shortest way, "a millionaire in every neighbourhood" discourses had emerged in the period of Menderes and were even strengthened in Özal's period in 1980s.

Also starting from 1980s the disadvantaged groups like urban poor were segregated diversified and disintegrated comparing to 1970s. And the local communities became withdrawn and uncommunicative (Erder, 1996). And especially working class and

⁴² The most known was "fak-fuk-fon" which stands for poor fund which was legalized with Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Act in 1986.

urban poor have proceeded to be the most disadvantageous groups because of also losing the organization and struggle channels.

Even if this period managed to form depoliticization and un-organization in the society, MP's implementations in the urban area have still encountered with some opposition of dwellers/residents. But these oppositions were not like the 1970s class-based, political urban struggles; instead these were from professional organizations, some media institutions, intellectuals, and NGOs⁴³.

As we stated above the first important legal regulation in this period which has affected the urban area was *Law for the Encouragement of Tourism No. 2634*. With this law so many areas were declared as Tourism Centres and especially four of these Tourism Centres have encountered with opposition of dwellers/residents from 1980s to 1990s and even in 2000s which were ITU (İstanbul Technical University) Taşkışla campus, İTU Maçka campus, Gökkafe and Park Otel.

After Bill 2634 was passed, Park Hotel and Gökkafe areas were declared as Tourism Centres in 1984 which have become issues for the oppositions almost for 30 years for disrupting the cityscape with their heights. These protests were largely held by professional organizations, beautification associations and some media institutions. Especially oppositions for Park Hotel were held by Ayaspaşa Environment and Beautification Association. For both of the buildings lawsuits were filed and eleven floors of Park Hotel were demolished according to court decision in 1993 and today it is still standing in ruin. But even the court gave the decision of illegality for Gökkafe, the construction was completed while the cases were still proceeding.

Also ITU Taşkışla campus was declared as Tourism Centre in 1987, and Taşkışla building, which had been declared as the first degree historical monument in 1983, was planned to be rented to a private company for 49 years in order to transform the building to a five star hotel. But this attempt did not reach its goal because of both students and academics' protests and conducted legal proceedings by ITU academics and Chamber of Architects. These protests have gone through with a campaign

⁴³ NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are generally used in Turkish as Civil Society Organizations/Institutions. And their presence in urban oppositions became more visible in 1990s which will be discussed in the next section.

which was called *Saving Taşkışla* and also with signature campaigns, slogans, press releases, students' sit-ins and theatre performances. The court issued a stay of execution in 1988 and cancelled the hotel project in 1989. A similar experience was seen also for İTÜ Maçka Campus which was rented for 49 years in order to transform a Stock Exchange Building in 1990. But this attempt has also encountered with students and academics' resistances and again with the court decision this plan could not be implemented like Taşkışla hotel project.

Like we mentioned above between 1980 and 1990 also large scale road construction projects were implemented with the automobile-based transport strategy. With these road constructions so many important historical buildings and areas were damaged or demolished especially in Golden Horn (industrial areas and warehouses) and Tarlabası (historical buildings, houses, workplaces). Tarlabası destructions also have encountered with oppositions from professional organizations and residents. In April 1986 Dalan stated to construct 36 meter road in Tarlabası in order to 'beautify Beyoğlu', to 'reduce prostitution' and to 'ease traffic congestion' (Gürsel, 1990). But the area had been declared as protected area in 1978 and has comprised the buildings of Levantine architecture. In order to oppose the destructions, an organization, which was named as *Beyoğlu Tourism Development Co-operative*, was established and a campaign, which was called as *How to rescue Beyoğlu*, was held by Chamber of Architects and the residents (Etikan, 1989). Also legal proceedings have enacted to stop destructions, but until the end of the judgement process 368 buildings (167 of them were registered) were destructed and Tarlabası Boulevard was opened.

In this period apart the explained ones, other implementations also have encountered oppositions like coastal road, which was also called as 'piled road', from the residents of the villas in Arnavurköy, new zoning law, construction in Bosphours, business districts especially in Piyalepaşa-Dolapdere, Zincirlikuyu and Şişli from professional organizations and by some media institutions. But many of these oppositions were generally held through media, journals or press releases or with legal proceedings.

Besides the oppositions, which were held by professional organizations, also other kind mobilisations were raised against the demolitions in Büyük Hendek Street in Galata by a group which was called as *Green Solidarity*. This group opposed these demolitions in 1987 through different actions such as cleaning or dying the houses,

organizing a festival, preparing posters and brochures (Gümüş, 2004). These actions which did not have political discourses were seen by some groups as the first creative civil society examples of the period (see Gümüş, 2004). And to Gümüş (2002, 2004) because they did not have political discourses, they became successful for being heard in the public. After Büyük Hendek protests, this group took part also the oppositions of Nişantaşı Park, Taşkışla, Park Hotel and Şişli Business Centre (Gümüş, 2004). These kinds of actions and structures which stay away from political discourses formed the base of the urban oppositional mobilisations especially in 1990s.

Besides the interventions of the authorities to the historical and public places, the policies on gecekondu settlements were largely criticized in this period. Even if development amnesty laws were passed in order to legalize gecekondu dwellings, as we stated above this helped to increase inequality and segregation. And while some gecekondu dwellings were demolished and residents faced with deepening poverty, some others could get the opportunity to be “new riches”. But resistances to these demolitions could not be executed in an organized and political ways like in 1970s.

Also because of these amnesty laws the government and municipalities encountered with oppositions from professional organizations, former residents of the city and some media institutions. In 1980s gecekondu dwellers were represented as “plunder”, “depredator”, “ill-gotten gains” (Erman, 2004) “invaders”, “providers of the unfair distribution” or as “freeloaders” on the media. And also the discourses such as “İstanbul became the city of newcomers instead of its real residents” were generally stated by some elites and media institutions. Therefore until 1980s while gecekondu dwellers were represented as ‘poor villagers’, in 1980s discourses of former residents of the cities and some media institutions’ about gecekondu dwellers have changed.

As seen, in this period the oppositional mobilisations in the urban area did not have political and class-based structure like in 1970s and were generally held by professional organizations, educated small bourgeoisie, intellectuals, some media institutions and newly formed NGOs. The strength of NGOs in the urban opposition increases in 1990s, that is, especially after Habitat II which was held in İstanbul in 1996.

4.3 Urban Policies and Urban Struggles in the Era of Globalization: 1990 – 2002

4.3.1 Socio-economic and political characteristics of the period

The period after 1980 is generally described as “counterattack of capital” because of the neoliberal transformation in the economic system and consequently the changes in the political and social life. Boratav (2014) states that, starting from 1978-79, neoliberal world economic system has passed through three circuits; the first one was between 1980 and 1988, the second one was between 1989 and 1997, and the last one was between 1998 and 2007. According to these historical categorizations, this section occupies the second circuit which Boratav (2014) classifies it in two phases as descent phase between 1989 and 1992, and rising phase between 1993 and 1997.

In this period Turkey has experienced economic crises and many different coalition governments. The military regime’s and MP’s one party rule has terminated with coalition of old parties’ return with first in 1989 local election and then in 1991’s general election. Kaya (2009) describes this as:

... [this was] clearly failure of Özal’s ‘nationalist-conservative-liberal (free market economy)- social justice’ synthesis claim. But also the new political framework did not give any hope to overcome the structural problems of Turkey’s political system and to settle them in a stable equilibrium. (2009:243)

Boratav (2014) links this termination of MP’s one party rule to the both class based influence which has started in 1989 with the working class resistances, and the removal of restrictions on capital movements in 1989. The protest movements which were led by the public sector workers (Boratav, 2014) were the result of oppression and low incomes which had proceeded for almost ten years. These protests led MP government to adopt some populist policies like increasing the wage of public sector workers and officers. But these policies could not prevent MP to fail first in the local election and then in the general election. The oppositions against MP government have reflected to 1989 local election through the victory of Social Democratic People’s Party (SDPP)⁴⁴ with the support of middle-left parties.

⁴⁴ In Turkish: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP).

And the second influence was removal of restrictions on capital movements which comprised both internal and external financial liberalization. Even if the external financial liberalization and removal of restrictions on foreign capital movements have started in 1983 and continued in 1984 with two decrees, in August 1989 with Decree 32 all foreign exchange transactions and capital movements have liberalized, and in 1991 with some regulations in Decree 32 external financial liberalization has been fully provided (Sönmez, 2009). And the last attempt to liberalize external trade was Customs Union with European Union in 1995. This new accumulation model was the result of obstruction at outward-oriented growth model, inflationary pressures, high public deficit, being not able to finance capital accumulation and economic growth through domestic savings and financial globalization (Sönmez, 2009). And these results led first SDPP's victory in the local elections in 1989, and the establishment of True Path Party (TPP)⁴⁵ and SDPP's coalition government in 1991 general elections. After the local election in 1989 even SDPP has made some improvements for urban poor and gecekondu neighbourhoods, it has avoided adopting a class based opposition (Boratav, 2014). And after 1992 and especially 1994 crises, SDPP municipalities have changed their middle left policies and engaged with neoliberal policies.

But even the policy change in the local level led the decrease of supports for SDPP, it did not prevent SDPP to win general election with the coalition of TTB in 1991. While SDPP came forward with its low-income and working class favour policies, TTP was the competitor of MP in the right wing and produced the policies for the socialization of agricultural classes and agricultural traders in Anatolian cities (Doğan, 2007). But this coalition government could not largely carry out its election promises and did not make any changes in the accumulation strategy. Even if it has made some regulations in the favour of the working class; this class-based revival did not take long because of dismissals as the result of increasing incomes, economic crises and increasing privatization; and this led also decline in syndication (Boratav, 2014). According to Kaya (2009), TTP-SDPP coalition which had established with 1980 coup d'état's 'victims' agreement could not implement many of its promises such as a new democratic constitution, and what the coalition has managed about

⁴⁵ In Turkish: Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP).

constitution was just the abolition of the state monopoly on radio and television which also prepared the base for implementing neoliberal policies easier.

Also TTP-SDPP coalition came forward with its privatization implementations. The coalition has left its “privatization for the purpose of efficiency” and adopted “privatization for the purpose of covering the public deficits” (Boratav, 2014). And these privatizations also came forward with favouritism, corruption, mafia and malpractice.

Therefore in this period starting from MP’s last term and proceeding with TTP-SDPP coalition while some pro-working class policies like increasing the wages were adopted in the consequence of working class movements, at the same time in order to cover the public deficits unlimited liberalization of the capital movements has adopted and this became the important factor of 1994 economic crisis. And privatization implementations, unemployment in the consequence of increasing wages, economic crises, corruptions and uncompleted and unsuccessful implementations of SDPP municipalities led also the parties which have declared themselves as social democrat not to affect and orient the national policies since then (Kaya, 2009). And this has led WP to win the election in the local level and be affective in the central governments in the second part of the 1990s. Doğan (2007) describes the political and economic situation of the country before 1994 local elections as follows:

Workers movements because of the effects of national and international conditions have acquiesced the achievements of the beginning of 1990’s ... the economic crisis which came out because of trying to cover increase of workers’ wages and agricultural product prices between 1989 and 1992 with public debts, the intensification and then transformation a ‘low intensity war’ of conflicts between Turkish Armed Forces and PKK militants after 1989 in East and South-eastern Anatolia, the loss of power of central right and left in the period of TTP-SDPP coalition’s unsuccessful practice (issues on the solution of Kurdish problem and economy policies) and Welfare Party’s, which represents the Islamist line, rise in this political framework. (2007:78)

WP which has won the local election in 28 municipalities in 1994 has declared the party's ideology as the proceeding of National Vision⁴⁶. The WP's victory in the local elections has continued in 1996 general elections with the coalition of TTP until to be closed in 1998 as a consequence of the 28 February military memorandum (also known as postmodern coup) in 1997 and then re-established as Virtue Party and Felicity Party. Therefore after this period İstanbul has been ruled first by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 1994 to 1998 and then by Ali Müfit Gürtuna until 2004.

4.3.2 Urban policies of the period: İstanbul as a “Global City”

The rate of gecekondu dwellings in Turkey has reached to 33.9 percent in 1990 (Table 4.3). This high rate of gecekondu dwellings has largely oriented the local election and urban policies in this period. In the 1989 local election the competition between the parties has generally emerged on the promises about gecekondu settlements. Bedrettin Dalan, after passing amnesty laws in his period, has accelerated the distributing title deeds just before the local elections such as Milliyet newspaper gave the news of distribution of 5000 title deeds in Şişli and Kağıthane two months before the election (Şişli ve Kağıthane’de, 1989). And Özal declared that they would solve the gecekondu problem after the elections (Çamur Atana İnlanmayın, 1989). Also SDPP İstanbul Province Leader Mustafa Özyürek stated their election promise as:

We will not demolish gecekondu dwellings. But villas will be demolished. If we have to demolish gecekondus we will make agreements and give their rights...If necessary we will change the laws ... We cannot demolish gecekondus, they are our grassroots. (Villaları Yıkacağız, 1989)

Besides gecekondu settlements SDPP's oppositions against Dalan municipality were generally on transportation policies, major destructions in order to build large roads, disrupting the cityscape, inequality and corruptions. And also SDPP has presented itself as the inheritor of 1970's RPP (Doğan, 2007). SDPP's this trend was appropriate with the increasing working class revival of the period as we stated in the previous section. This led SDPP to become the strongest channel to gather working

⁴⁶ In Turkish Milli Görüş is an Islamist movement which has started with National Order Party in 1970 with the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. This movement has continued with National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party and Felicity Party in the next periods.

class movements which have risen in 1988-1989 (Doğan, 2007), and also led the party to be successful in the many large cities' municipalities including İstanbul. Accordingly after starting to rule municipalities, SDPP tried to make some implementations in order to reduce inequality and disintegration in the city. Doğan describes these attempts as follows:

...increasing the capacity and the dealership network of the People Bread factory, ... supporting consumer cooperatives, providing free public transportation in the mornings and in the evenings to some poor gecekondu neighbourhoods, developing the infrastructure in those neighbourhoods, distributing milk every mornings to those neighbourhoods, allocation cheap land and providing infrastructure conveniences to housing cooperatives, providing cheap rental houses to the university students. (2007: 74)

Even these attempts have provided some improvements for low-income groups; these implementations could not proceed for a long time. But still SDPP municipality of İstanbul with Nurettin Sözen tried to struggle against large scale construction projects such as Park Otel, Gökkafes and villas around Bosphorus and forested areas. But especially after 1992, SDPP municipalities have started to change their middle-left policies. Doğan (2007) links this change to the following reasons:

... the working class pressures, which had brought the party to the power, has decreased after 1991, the wage increases between 1989 and 1991, the high cost of low-intensity war in East and South-eastern Anatolia, economic recession because of increasing deficit in public finances both through social expenditure and support purchases in agriculture. (2007:75)

Since SDPP has tried to struggle with some large scale construction projects, it did not leave neoliberal policies and MP's goal on creating a global city especially after 1991-1992. But SDPP's approaches to the global city merged with more democratization and human rights aspects (Öktem, 2005). In this approach SDPP tried to articulate İstanbul to Europe system with its cultural and historical features and accordingly established or participated to some platforms or activities like Eurasia Marathon, Eurodialog, WALD (World Academy for Local Government and Democracy), IULA (International Union of Local Authorities) (Öktem, 2005). SDPP also adopted the approach of international business district, but differently from ANAP, SDPP has chosen Ferhatpaşa area for international urban district in order to inhibit the development of the city towards north and protect Bosphorus skyline (Öktem, 2005) Öktem refers to Report of İstanbul in 1992 in order to mention SDPP's global city approach:

SDPP considered globalization inevitable because of the developments on communication, transportation and technology and stated global economy organize in the metropolitan areas. ... [The Party] emphasized that Turkey should globalize by joining European Union and in this process the role of Istanbul is significant. ... It aimed to make Istanbul an important transportation and communication point in Europe, Balkans and Middle East and prepare it for international capital for transforming İstanbul an international science, art and culture centre. For that; free trade zones, world trade centre, international fairs, stock market, modern offices, international airport, modern communication centre, five stars hotels, railways, motorways, international congress and culture centres, international stadium and sport centres were proposed. (2005:52)

As seen, SDPP's urban policy has oriented towards neoliberal policies especially after 1992 with also global city concept. This policy change of SDPP municipality has also merged with privatization implementations and urban regeneration projects. And especially after 1992, urban policies have largely oriented towards the favour of small bourgeois instead of urban poor (Doğan, 2007). And these implementations were also mentioned with the attempts to get a share on urban rents, subcontracting and malpractices⁴⁷. Also some problems on urban services like water shortages, waste collection because of the workers strikes have emerged in this term. These policies and implementations of SDPP municipalities led them to lose confidence of urban poor and a new party with National Vision ideology has emerged with 1994 local election.

Before 1994 local elections all the parties have again concentrated on the gecekondu dwellings. Milliyet newspaper gave this situation by this title: *now the fashion is to love them* (Şimdi Onları Sevmek Moda, 1994). According to the news MP, TTP, SDPP and WP have guaranteed not to demolish any gecekondu before the elections. And Dalan, who had criticized the SDPP municipalities because of developing infrastructure in the gecekondu neighbourhoods, has started to describe the people who demolish the gecekondu as devil. And also the news gives the information of State Statistical Institute research which has stated %30 of the residents in İstanbul were living in gecekondu (Şimdi Onları Sevmek Moda, 1994). This number also explains the Parties' competitions on gecekondu dwellers. In the news, while TTP has promised to transform gecekondu to villas, MP and SDPP have found the

⁴⁷ Especially corruption scandal of Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration was the most known of them.

solution with cooperatives (Gecekondulular Hızına Yetişemediler, 1994). And WP with Erdoğan has determined the problems of Istanbul as malpractice, transportation, unplanned construction, waste management and air pollution and has promised not to demolish gecekondu and finding the solution by producing the land.

Also WP, differently from other parties did not adopt the global city policy before the elections (Bora, 2006). WP has declared its election promises on more nationalist developmentalist approach which included social justice, anti-corruption, equality for religious and ethnic issues, social security, brotherhood and unemployment (Öktem, 2005) Therefore WP presented a “public Istanbul” for gecekondu dwellers who were excluded and marginalized with global city concept (Bora, 2006) And with the help of these election promises and also because of the social and political situation of the country, WP has managed to win the 1994 local elections with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

But Erdoğan’s election promises about gecekondu settlements have not been fulfilled. Just after the elections Erdoğan has written an article in the municipality bulletin about gecekondu settlements with the title of “*no permission to the plunder*” (Türkün et al., 2014). In the another issue of the bulletin, Erdoğan has stated to transfer gecekondu settlements to the mass housing projects, and in order to remove 700.000 gecekondu, he has claimed to produce 120.000 housings with the assistance of KİPTAŞ⁴⁸ (Türkün et al., 2014). And 3 months after the elections Erdoğan has declared to demolish all the unregistered buildings around Bosphorus and watersheds, which newspaper gave this news with *Reported Gecekondu War of Erdoğan* title (Erdoğan’ın Bildirili, 1994). Erdoğan’s exclusionary language was also significant. For instance in order to prevent the migration to İstanbul, he has offered visa application for the entrance to İstanbul.

The migration to the large cities has continued also in this period. Accordingly the rate of urban population has increased from 59 percent to 64.9 percent from 1990 to 2000 (Doğan, 2007) But in this period migration to the cities has generally come from East and Southern East. The one of the important reason of this was village

⁴⁸ KİPTAŞ, which stands for Istanbul Housing Plan Industry and Trade Inc. (in Turkish İstanbul Konut İmar Plan Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.) is an institution of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality. And the institution declares its main goal on its website as resolving the unplanned construction of İstanbul (<http://www.kiptas.com.tr>).

evacuations and forced migration in 1990s. While Turkey Grand National Assembly (TGNA) commission declared that 1.5 million migrants were subjected to the forced migration in this period, Human Rights Association declared this number as 3.5 million (Doğan, 2007). The population who was subjected to the forced migration, has migrated generally to some large cities like Diyarbakır, Van and also to peripheral areas of İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, Mersin between 1993 and 1997⁴⁹ (Doğan, 2007). The neoliberal policies which have started in 1980s and the forced migration in 1990s have deepened the poverty and led newcomers living conditions much tougher than the previous periods (Kaygalak, 2009).

As we stated in the previous sections, the migrants who came to large cities in the previous periods did not generally rupture the relations with their own villages or towns, and these relations generally helped them in the large cities to establish a new life and not to experience a deep poverty. But in this period newcomers who came to the large cities with forced migration did not have any chance to continue their relations with their own villages or towns (Erder, 2002). Therefore, differently from previous periods children and elderly population have also migrated without any preparation, they could not get any support from their villages, and they generally have experienced the political exclusion in the large cities (Yılmaz, 2008).

In 1990s, a new concept for gecekondu dwellers was established by media which is '*varoş*'. While the real means of this term is suburbs, in Turkish usage a link was established between *varoş* and violence and illegal activity (Erman, 2004) Although, the link between *varoş* and uncultured, "deprived of aesthetic consumption" and "degenerate" was established in 1980s (Erman, 2004), in 1990s the general representation of *varoş* was linked with "dangerous", "violence", "lawlessness", "illegality", "system opposition" (Bozkulak, 2005). This term was used in this meaning especially after 1 May 1996 and Gazi episodes in 13-15 March 1995 which have caused many people to be killed, injured or arrested. The newspapers of that period gave the conflictive social events in 1 may 1996 as "*varoş came down to the city centre*" (Erman, 2004) and *varoş* was held responsible for these events by the media (Doğan, 2007). But the term *varoş* was not used for all the gecekondu

⁴⁹ There are many studies about the consequences of the forced migration in the cities. Some examples of them: Kaygalak, 2009; Şen and Tunç, 2011.

neighbourhoods; this usage was generally adopted for the neighbourhoods which have experienced social, political and urban movements like Gazi, 1 May (Mustafa Kemal), Gülsuyu, Güzeltepe, Küçükarmutlu, Okmeydanı and Sarıgazi Neighbourhoods (Aslan, 2011). There are some common features for these neighbourhoods, such as many of them were established by socialist organizations in 1970s, and they have experienced collective actions and struggles as the part of the daily lives and also the third common feature is the high rate of Alevi population in those neighbourhoods (Aslan, 2011). These common features led also them to be in solidarity in the struggles. Therefore the term *varoş* was largely connected with the neighbourhood's mobilizations in the social, political and urban movements. Another usage of *varoş* was used for the neighbourhoods which have Islamist identity like Sultanbeyli (Bozkulak, 2011). But according to Aslan (2011), this usage for Sultanbeyli was emerged because of its religious identity which disrupted the system in 1990s, but when it has started to integrate with the power increasingly in the following years, *varoş* representation for Sultanbeyli has declined.

As WP has changed its policies on gecekondu settlements, it also changed its policies on global city concept after the local election in 1994. Bora (2006) identifies WP's global city description as an alternative global city which a "symbol of Ottoman and/or Islamist territorial hegemony". In this policy, İstanbul had a role for being a centre for international management, trade, science and technology centre through articulating the economy of the country to Middle East, Balkans, Europe and Islam countries (Öktem, 2005). And WP's international business district for the global city was Yenibosna (Öktem, 2005). Öktem describes the global city plan of WP by referring the 1995 Master Plan of İstanbul as follows:

...conserving historical urban pattern, constructing sport, culture, trade and service areas on an international scale, upgrading cultural and social activities, creating art and culture centres, building museum and archive centres, developing tourism potentials, encouraging specialization, improving the quality of recreation and tourism areas, decentralizing the industry, encouraging the development of service sector, upgrading the transportation and communication system and advancing central business centre. (2005, p. 58)

Therefore, in order to engage with the hierarchy of global city, the investments for the international finance districts, which had started in the second part of the 1980s, have continued in WP period. The victory of WP with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was an important breakpoint for urban policies, that after this victory of WP, global

city/world city concepts with the urban regeneration projects have largely oriented urban policies until now (Türkün et al. 2014). This has continued in the period of following WP mayor of İstanbul, Ali Müfit Görtuna, after 1998.

After WP won the local election in 1994, the master plan of İstanbul, which was prepared and approved in SDPP period, was not implemented (Ekinci,2004). And in 1995 İstanbul Metropolitan Sub-regions Plan was prepared by Erdoğan but was not put into action because of the objections (Türkün et al., 2014). In Görtuna period a report, which was called *The Projects of the Major Transformation of İstanbul* with 2023 goals and 500 projects⁵⁰, was published and the report has declared to implement 1995 İstanbul Metropolitan Sub-regions Plan with the change of the target date from 2010 to 2023 (Türkün et al., 2014). But most of the regeneration projects which were declared in Görtuna's period could not be implemented because of the political and financial aspects⁵¹ (Türkün et al., 2014).

In WP period of İstanbul (1994-2004) the trend of attracting the capital to the cities has continued and in the interim period of SDPP also, in the words of Şengül (2009), “the urbanization of capital” process did not stop. WP both by carrying out Dalan's plans and also by producing new projects on the urban area has tried to create a global city. But these policies could not be implemented as much as in Dalan's period. According to Öktem (2011), neoliberal policies, which have started to form the cities from 1980s, have declined between 1991 and 2002 because of political instability and economic recession and have revived after 2002. Öktem also links this decline of 1990s to SDPP's more conservative policies on creating a global city which led SDPP to be accused by the capital groups. And after SDPP, WP also did not fully implement the neoliberal policies in the urban area as much as Dalan's period (Öktem, 2011). Therefore to Öktem, neoliberal policies could revive again only after 2002 with the victory of JDP.

⁵⁰ Türkün et al (2014) introduce some points of the report as follows: “*Eurasian Corridor as the Fact of World Vision, The results of the regional vision: CBDs and Hierarchy, Mega Urban Transformation, The vision of the Transition to the Information Society: Prestige Centres and IT Valleys, The Vision of the Longing of the Green to Blue, Green Corridors from North to South, Environmental Projects and Ecological Transformation.*” (2014:100)

⁵¹ But the projects which were implemented in subsequent periods, such as Zeytinburnu Regeneration Project, Küçükçekmece Regeneration Project, Haydarpaşa Regeneration Project, Miniaturk, Feshane, Formula 1, French Street, Golden Horn Culture Valley, Rahmi Koç Museum, Kadir Has University, Söğütözü Congree Centre, have been prepared in this period (Emiroğlu and Ünsal, 2006 cited in Türkün et al. 2014).

But even the neoliberal policies could not be implemented as strict as in Dalan's period because of political instability and economic recession, many social and spatial changes have occurred also in this period with the effect of neoliberal policies. While 1980s came forward with neoliberal policies, in 1990s globalization was a featured phenomenon (Öktem, 2005). In this period globalization was recognized as ineluctable process, and both right and left parties were articulated to this process. One of the outcomes of the globalization was global/world city concept and as we already mentioned above first MP and then SDPP and WP tried to produce some policies to find a place for İstanbul in the global cities hierarchy. The reflection to the space of these efforts formed as skyscrapers, business districts, trade centres, five stars hotels, international congress and culture centres etc. And also some other projects like Formula 1 track or Koç University were implemented in the contiguous area of the city. Implementing these projects on the peripheral areas of the city was eased with No.335 Legislative Decree as we mentioned in the previous section. And while these large scale construction projects have damaged the natural areas of the city, gated communities in the suburban areas have also increased.

Starting from in the second part of 1980s upper classes had started to leave the city centres and moved to luxury houses in the outside of the cities. This was supported by the legal regulations starting from 1980s. And this has even increased in the 1990s. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2013) describes two trends on the moving to the outward of the city; in the first trend, upper classes have moved to the areas which were relatively more closed to the city centre, especially around new developed finance centres. And in the second trend, upper classes have move to the either outside of the metropolitan areas or Bosphorus ridges, but for both of them there was always a natural view like lake, sea or forest (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). This trend has started in 1980s in the ridges of the Bosphorus and in 1990s has enlarged to the outside of the city such as Belgrad Forests, Terkos Lake or Büyükçekmece Lake (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). And after 1999 earthquake this trend has even increased (Öktem, 2011). In November 2001 there were 270 gated communities with different sizes which have been providing housings for 100.000 people, and approximately 60.000 of them have been living in luxury gated communities (Pérouse, 2011). These projects were generally isolated gated communities and were advertised as 'purified', safe, appropriate for family life, away from noise, traffic and chaos of the cities,

intertwined with nature, earthquake proof⁵², a new life style, away from city's crowd but very easy to reach everywhere⁵³ and peaceful, outstanding places. Many studies have taken place about luxury gated communities in Istanbul (Kurtuluş, 2005; Geniş, 2009; Pérouse, 2011; Öncü, 1997) especially in Bahçeşehir, Beykoz and Göktürk. Also some of the gated communities like Bahçeşehir or Kemer Country were rewarded as “the best examples of the urban planning” in Europe and the USA (Geniş, 2009).

These new suburbs also have played an important role on eliminating the integration of different social groups and led a radical social segregation (Kurtuluş, 2005). While some of them evacuated the gecekondu dwellings, some others destroyed natural areas. And also it led a radical class division in the space. But besides the land demands of the large capital groups in the peripheral areas of the city, other displacements were also experienced in the central areas through gentrification.

1980s' first wave gentrification was in the coastal areas of Bosphorus like Kuzguncuk, Ortaköy, Arnavutköy but in 1990s a second and third wave gentrification took place in Cihangir, Galata, Asmalımescit and Fener Balat (İslam, 2006). And many studies on gentrification in İstanbul have taken place (Şen, 2005, 2006, 2011; İslam, 2006; Ergün, 2006; Uzun, 2006; Enlil, 2000). Especially after 1990s because of the increase in the value of central areas, a kind of class evacuation has experienced in the city centres (Şen, 2011). In this process, while new middle classes have moved to the central areas of the city; urban poor and working classes have been forced to displace to the outer parts of the city (Şen, 2011). Şen describes new middle classes as follows:

...kind of urban classes which are highly educated, knowing a foreign language and working in high-income jobs. They are generally young people who describe themselves as exceeded the traditional cultural values. They also have the small bourgeois features with their class characteristics of the old small bourgeois “bohemian” [style]. But they have more ‘liberal’ attitude differently from known bohemian groups. (2011, p. 6)

According to Şen's study (2006, 2011) new middle classes also played an important role on gentrification through civil society activities and associations. They try to

⁵² Especially after 1999 earthquake.

⁵³ Which were generally supported with motorways and bridge connecting roads.

improve urban services, environment of the neighbourhood, “awareness-raising” about historical and cultural values and settling down their friends in the neighbourhood through these associations and their own relations (Şen, 2011). These kinds of NGOs activities show the characteristics of NIMBY movements. While they tried to improve the ‘quality’ of their neighbourhoods, this started the gentrification process. Therefore because of the increasing costs, and sometimes by force⁵⁴, former residents were moved away from the neighbourhoods. Another accelerator of this process became some funds for the neighbourhoods. Fener-Balat was one of the examples of this kind of gentrification. Fener-Balat Rehabilitation Programme which was financed by European Commission played as an accelerator function for the gentrification of the area (İslam, 2006).

Therefore in 1990s, neoliberal policies in the urban area have largely proceeded even if they could not be implemented fully because of economic recession and unstable political situation. In this process globalization and global city concepts were commonly mentioned phenomenon, and both right and middle left parties have considered this phenomenon as inevitable and tried to orient their policies in this line. But apart global/world city concept, some other concepts like ‘localization’, ‘competing cities’ and ‘governance’ were put forward after 1980s and especially in 1990s linking with globalization.

“Globalization”, “Localization”, “Governance” and “Civil Society”

In this period, globalization was seen as an inevitable process, and the articulation to this process became the most important endeavour. Since the states were withdrawn, local units were come into prominence with localization. Therefore as the result of globalization, localization also became one of the most important phenomenon of the period. And this has led a new strategy named as ‘development through the localities’ which describes the competing cities for attracting the national and international capitals through using the cities’ social and physical potentials (Doğan, 2007) This strategy was supported with ‘competing cities’ discourse and cities were

⁵⁴ The streets like Pürtelaş Street and Ülker Street, which transvestites and transsexuals used to live in, can be given as the examples of these kinds of forced dislocations and gentrification. In Pürtelaş Street some associations and polices played role on sending transvestites and transsexuals away from the streets (Kaldırım, 2011). And In Ülker Street the “cleaning” operations took place in the beginning of Habitat II (Kaldırım, 2011).

tried to be highlighted with their potentials in order to attract the capital more than the others. And accordingly, strategic plans and regional development agencies became the products of this process.

These strategies were implemented in Turkey in two ways. Firstly, the strategies were produced in order to develop Anatolian cities by manufacturing industry that supporting with competing cities discourse. These cities were named as *Anatolian Tigers* which include some cities like Edirne, Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Eskişehir, Denizli. In this approach local based industrialization takes the place of industrialization with the state (Şengül, 2009). This approach was supported with liberalizing international capital movements in 1989 and Customs Union in 1995. But this strategy generated negative results especially for working classes. In these small scale enterprises, organization of the working classes was very limited and also workers exploitation through child labour, minimum wage, long working hours were widespread.⁵⁵ And also according to some scholars this strategy could not led a major progress in these Anatolian cities and Istanbul continued to attract the capitals and investments (see Sönmez, 1998, 2008).

And the second trend was transforming İstanbul to a global city and attracting the international capital flows. Therefore, Istanbul was tried to be marketed to the capital groups in order to uplift all the country. For instance Keyder in his article “*How to Sell Istanbul*” states that:

After 1980, growth in their own right and avoidance from the logic of the capital is almost impossible for national economies because of the processing of the world economy. Now the whole issue can be formulated as integrating to the world economy in a better way. ... If we consider the whole economy of the country, the globalization of Istanbul by undertaking a specific function will strengthen the capital flows for the whole Turkey. ... So the fail of İstanbul will punish the remaining population of the country in some degree. (2004, p. 108-109)

Therefore in this approach we can consider that Istanbul has become a showcase in order to attract especially foreign capital to the country. This goal was supported with the legal regulations in order to free circulation of capital since 1980s and aimed to find place for Istanbul in the “global cities network”. And according to this

⁵⁵ For a detailed study on restructuring capital and its social transformation in neoliberal globalization process for Gaziantep, Denizli and Eskişehir, see Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman, 2009.

approach if Istanbul manage to find a place in global cities hierarchy, all the country will benefit from this situation. But Şengül (2009) states that even if Istanbul becomes a global city; the question of how the other cities would benefit from this situation is uncertain. Because, he asserts that, in this approach local units do not have any responsibility for other local units except the economic work sharing (Şengül, 2009). And while this approach adopts “competing cities” discourse, other cities will be competitor for Istanbul. And also in this situation there is not a total gain for all Istanbul. This creates a deepened gap between working classes and capitals and accordingly a sharp spatial segregation in the urban area that Şengül states that: *“By its nature, capitalist city creates this kind of socio-spatial inequality. However, global city indicates the extreme point of this inequality”* (2009, p. 255).

In this period the spatial form of Istanbul shows this deep spatial segregation and duality. These results of neoliberal globalization which had started in 1980s have even sharpened in 2000s, but 1990s were important not just for liberalizing the international capitals in the country, also for the middle lefts’ adoption of this approach. This acceptance of globalization by some left approaches was largely the results of democracy promises of the globalization/localization process.

While state was withdrawn from some services and transferred them to the private sector, especially after 1990s the relation between state and private sector was formed with a new model with the assistance of NGOs which is named as ‘governance’. This new model proposed multi-actors instead of only state-centred role of the government. This was also adopted in local levels with the name “local governance”. This new model highlights the role of civil society and NGOs became the most essential elements of this process.

Şengül (2009) describes governance as a “human face” of new right project and he stresses the reason of the adoption this project also by left approaches as participator local administrations and reinforcement of civil society elements of the project. And according to him while this approach displays a continuity of 1970s’ strategy of strengthening civil society and democracy, he criticizes the rupture of class based approach. He states that:

The focus of the new struggles is civil society. While the strategy of 1970s aimed to strengthen civil society by taking the local governments in the centre, the strategy of 1990s proposes a struggle by taking the civil society in the centre ... Today local governances’

orientation is towards to the capital [instead of labour] ... In this point, the left [approach's] stuck [position] in the democracy discourses instead of producing alternatives about local administrations led significant costs for working classes. Because in this situation, cities become the tool for exchange value instead of use value and therefore they transform the capitals' cities ... (2009, p. 182)

In Turkey, Habitat II - Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, which held in İstanbul in 1996, played a significant role on local NGOs. Habitat II which was stated on the media of that term as “summit of the summits” led civil society to be an essential tool for both local administration and urban opposition. In that period apart from some opposition to civil society based urban struggles; this approach was largely adopted by almost all the actors and groups in the local levels.

4.3.3 Urban opposition / reconciliation with “civil society institutions”: What did Habitat II bring or take away?

As we stated above 1990s' oppositional mobilizations in the urban area which were held largely by NGOs show a major differences with 1970s' urban struggles. As Şengül (2009) states, the first important difference is detaching from class-based approach of urban struggles. While 1970s' *gecekondu* resistances were mostly based on class approach, and had a political position; 1990s urban oppositions were generally based on the objections of NGOs. This difference shows itself also on the actors of the urban oppositions. While in 1970s apart the supports of some professionals and students, mostly working class formed the organizations; in 1990s elites, academics, professionals took important roles in the organizations. This situation shows alterations in two periods through the formed language, organization, type of action and oppositions' goals. But before specifying these differences, Habitat II conference, which established the large base of the role of civil society in urban opposition in Turkey, will be emphasized.

In order to understand the reflections of Habitat II in that period, the journals of Chamber of Architects, the journals of Chamber of Urban Planners, Istanbul Journals which were pressed by History Foundation and newspapers of the period were scanned.

It is observed that before the conference, many meetings were held starting from 1994 in order to determine the theme and the goals of the conference. In 1994, Tekeli

states the difference between Habitat II and Habitat I, as Habitat II Turkey National Committee Advisory Board meeting as abandonment of the seeking solutions based on state and strengthen the different actors of the society (Tekeli, 1995). And he states two themes for the conference which were the representation of the settlements and governance. Before the conference 12 working groups, which were called as “koza”, were established (Habitat II ve Kozalar, 1996). And one of these ‘kozalar’ was urbanization koza which was constructed the workings areas under seven topics: new settlement problems; conserving of cultural heritage; NGOs participation of urban geographic information system; forms of urban service delivery; public spaces and methods for developing public projects; the critic of space and evaluation techniques of project and implementation quality; and urban management and regulation of Civil Society Organizations (Habitat II ve Kozalar, 1996).

Also before the conference Istanbul was prepared for the conference, and this “preparation” was largely criticized. New stones were paved in the sidewalks, workbenches were removed especially in Beyoğlu, some houses were evacuated, many people⁵⁶ were sent out of the city, and almost 60 thousands stray animals were killed (Zirveye yakılan, 1996) in order to “clean” Istanbul.

In June 1996 Habitat II was held in Istanbul under two main thematic motivations: i) Sustainable Cities; and ii) Adequate Housing for All; and with three main goals: i) sustainability; ii) liveability iii) fairness. And a report, National Report and Implementation Plan for Turkey, was prepared. This report proposed the preparation of local habitat agendas. Tekeli (1996) suggests local “kozalar” for the local agendas which people can participate and leave with their own demands. He proposes two kinds of *kozalar*, the first is neighbourhood koza and the second is specific *kozalar* according to special problems which can increase by the time (Tekeli, 1996). And he describes a horizontal relation of individuals, private and public institutions in the *kozalar* and between *kozalar*, and to him political public sphere should not be included in this arena. And a local habitat *koza*, which is the platform for establishing decisions between different *kozalar*, is proposed by Tekeli. He describes these *kozalar* as public

⁵⁶ Especially homeless people and transvestites-transsexuals were sent out the city. And travesties and transsexuals’ houses in Cihangir were evacuated (Zirveye yakılan, 1996; Kaldırım, 2011)

sphere of civil society (1996: 90). And in many cities⁵⁷ this local *koza* experience was carried out after Habitat II.

While so many organizations have participated in Habitat II Conference in 1996, some organizations have protested the Summit and established an alternative forum. One of these alternative forums was “*Outsiders Forum*” which was emerged with the participation of left parties and organizations. This forum has protested the evacuated villages and forced migration in South-eastern Anatolia. They protested that human settlements conference was held in the country which destroys the settlements and also contested the preparation implementations. The news gives this with “burned villages shadow to the Summit” (Zirveye Yakılan, 1996). Also some of the organizations even oppose the preparation implementations and forced migration, they have participated the Summit and showed their objections in the conference.

The concept of “Civil Society Institutions⁵⁸” in the urban oppositions was also emerged in this period in Turkey. Gümüş (2002) describes the emergence of the concept as follows:

Before the UN Summit, an equivalent concept to English ‘non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) was sought. ... Almost two years ago from the Summit some concepts⁵⁹ were come up. ... “Civil Society Institutions” concept which is simpler and has a bit intellectual reference that not very closed to public language became a solution in these dates. The concept of “Civil Society Institutions” has started to be widely used before Habitat II Conference and probably was settled after this date. (2002, p. 103)

Another concept in Turkey is “Democratic People Organizations”. This concept has been used widely for the organizations before 1990, but in 1990s civil society institutions took their place. However we can say that after 2000s some organizations started to describe themselves again as democratic people organization instead of civil society institutions. But in 1990s many organizations have described themselves as civil society organizations including some professional organizations or unions. The difference between them was generally described as while democratic people

⁵⁷ The first local Habitat was carried out in Bodrum. For the process of Local Habitat in Bodrum see Denisenko, 1998.

⁵⁸ In Turkish Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları (STK)

⁵⁹ Gümüş (2002) defines these concepts in Turkish as “Devlet Dışı Kuruluşlar” (DDK), “Hükümet Dışı Kuruluşlar” (HDK), “Gönüllü Teşekküller”. Which the first two of them are the translation of “Non-governmental Organizations” in Turkish; and the third one can be translated in English as “voluntary organizations”.

organizations adopt a political and class-based approach, civil society organizations do not have these kinds of relations. Gümüş (2002) links this to the political and dissident connotations of democratic people organizations and to him democratic people organizations were not appropriate to the “*international developments wind*” and therefore, to him, they were not perceived “*cute*” for civil society institutions. And he states that:

Eventually, while the other concepts embrace only the political wings, civil society institutions have been used for the left alliance.... Professional organizations, unions, even government agencies’ subsidiaries, specialized agencies, organizations based on the representation of the mass, organizations established by local people were gathered in the civil society organizations pack. (2002, p. 103-104)

But this inference of Gümüş was not eligible for all the left organizations. Some organizations did not adopt describing themselves as civil society institutions. And the unpolitical and non-class aspects of civil society institutions were also criticized by some left organizations and by some professional organizations. But still describing themselves as civil society institutions was widespread in 1990s.

In this period, participating to a civil society institution is perceived as a positive social scale (Gümüş, 2002) and meant doing something good and democrat (Kadioğlu, 2002). Therefore so many organizations have described themselves as civil society institutions. But many writers in that period criticized some other kind of organizations such as Kadioğlu (2002) states that the organizations which are closed to the power should not be counted as civil society institutions that civil society institutions should have oppositional attitude to the power. And to her, the relationship should be established between civil society institutions and political sphere and therefore civil society institutions should be political.

From another aspect, Gümüş (2002) criticizes some NGOs and professional organizations which claim themselves as “the real Istanbul⁶⁰” and which oppose with local associations and public. And he also criticizes the professional organizations’ oppositions in the previous periods. To Gümüş (2004) professional organizations’ urban oppositions like oppositions to the first bridge were elitist, and they used to purports their oppositions and demands to the state, therefore these

⁶⁰ “Istanbul” means a person whose origin is Istanbul.

oppositions were not adopted by the public. And to him (2002) this was the reason professional organizations were marginalized by the government. According to Gümüş, Büyük Hendek protests which were held by “Green Solidarity” in 1987 was one of the first successful NGOs protests and their success was linked with their unpolitical and creative actions. And he sees (2002) local NGOs as the opportunity to rupture from this ‘elitist’, ‘corporatist’ tradition of civil society.

Differently, Ekinçi (2002) remonstrates from this marginalization of the opposition groups in the urban area. According to Ekinçi, sensible groups of the urban oppositions were ridiculed by the media and sometimes they were declared as “public enemy” or “outdated bureaucratic grinds”. To him, this situation led social insensitivity and left alone the civil adoption in the urban areas. And according to Ekinçi (2002) the opposition of the first bridge can be counted as the first example of the NGOs movements.

In these different arguments we can see the different approaches on the role of civil society institutions in the urban opposition. We can state that in that period, civil society institutions were kind of popular concepts, and so many organizations have declared themselves as civil society institutions, but also from different sides different types of urban oppositions can be counted as civil society movement or not.

Also we can see some elitist approach of civil society organizations from some writers. For instance, Kuban (2002) states that, the expectations of the large part of the population generally do not match with bourgeois (here he uses Turkish “*kent soylu*” in a kind of “good” manner) aims of the NGOs’; and he specifies that neither people nor politicians participate to the events for protecting historical streets or houses. According to Kuban, NGOs could be heard only in the neighbourhoods which have the high rate of “urbanized” or “civilized” population like Beyoğlu or Arnavutköy because this population is “responsive” and “sensible” to the urban issues, but in the neighbourhoods such as Fener, Balat, Kocamustafapaşa, Ümraniye or Zeyrek, NGOs could not be heard. To Kuban, the reason of that, NGOs voices are the voices of the “urbanized” people and they are always few. And he offers NGOs to “reach” the public and “urbanize” them.

In 1990s many associations, platforms and initiatives were established in order to protect urban space in Istanbul. While after Habitat II the number of the civil society

institutions was increased, with 1999 earthquake they have even increased more. After 1999 earthquake many organizations were established in order to form the solidarity with people in the earthquake zone. Ertür and Yum (2002) states that after the earthquake, civil institutions arrived in the earthquake zone in a short time and started supporting the works of search and rescue and removal of debris. International organizations were oriented to the area and individuals gathered together with different groups like Network-17. And also the Association of Transceiver and Radio Amateurs started to provide the communication just after three hours of the earthquake (Ertür and Yum, 2002). And Ertür and Yum (2002) state the role of neighbourhood associations in the earthquake zone. To them, in the beginning there were almost 20 neighbourhood associations, but later the number has exceeded and reached to 100, and by the time their goals have oriented towards the risk mitigation before the earthquake. After the earthquake many symposiums, panels, meetings workshops were organized by civil institutions. Therefore 1999 earthquake was the important phase for the solidarity of civil society.

Issues of Istanbul Journals present substantial source for following the associations, initiatives and platforms in that period. The Journal has a section named as “The voice of Istanbul” and gives the news about associations, platforms and petition campaigns about the urban issues in Istanbul.

On the eighth issue of the Journal, Savcı (1994) announces the establishment of the Platform of Istanbul with the title of “*individual oppositions do not work*”. She presents the Platform as “*It is open to everyone who has sensibility to Istanbul and has the consciousness of being urbanized*” (1994, p. 89). And she states that the first goal will be the demolition of Park Hotel. And one year after the platform announces to establish a foundation (İstanbul Platformu, 1995).

On the tenth issue, Istanbul Journal gives the news of the establishment of Istanbul Association in Europe which aim to conserve and advertise the cultural heritage of Istanbul and to establish solidarity of “*Istanbullu*” people in the abroad (İstanbul Derneği, 1994).

On the twelfth issue, the Journal gives a list of the “*civil society institutions which work for Istanbul*” which includes 24 organizations (İstanbul için Çalışan, 1995).

And also in this issue Kafaoğlu (1995) explains the emergence of S.O.S Istanbul platform in 1991.

On thirteenth issue, Galata Association announces its establishment in 1994, the bulletin of Galata and Galata Festivals. The association explains its aims as; conserving the Galata, improving the consciousness of “*mahallelik*”⁶¹, protecting Galata from the wrong implementations and invisible accidents (Galata Derneği, 1995).

On the fourteenth issue, Bermek (1995) announces the establishment of Çengelköy Association for improving the consciousness of “*mahallelik*” and conserving Çengelköy. In the same issue Mavi Marmara Association announces its establishment for protecting the Marmara Sea (Mavi Marmara, 1995). And other associations and platforms such as Cihangir Association (1995), Tophane Initiative (1996), Gayrettepe Environment, Culture and Business Cooperatives (1996), Istanbul Social Ecology Group (1995), Kız Kulesi Association, Istanbul World Friends, Islands Friends Association (1989), Gazhane Environment Volunteers, Ataköy Association (1995), Istanbul Council Association (1997), Kuzguncuk Association (1997), Arnavutköy Initiative (1999) were also established in this period.

Many neighbourhood associations explained one of their aims as improving of the consciousness of “*mahallelik*” and many others aimed to improve consciousness of “*Istanbulluluk*”. These aims engaged with also protection of the neighbourhood or the city. One of the common features of these associations was to be formed generally by middle and upper middle class residents and they generally showed the features of NIMBY movements, so they tried to protect their “own” neighbourhood which in some cases led the gentrification of the neighbourhood. But for some issues they presented the trend of getting together like for 3rd Bridge or Gökkafe. These associations took part many urban-based protests in that period and some still try to protect their environment with different attempts today. These protests were held with different actions as: signature petition, press releases, festivals, demonstrations, planting tree, human chain etc. These different types of actions will be elaborated in the last chapter. But generally in this period protests were held against to the mosque

⁶¹ Feeling belonging to the neighbourhood.

in Taksim Square, Park Hotel, Gökkafe, 3rd bridge, Cercle d'Orient- Emek Cinema, Moda Pier, Galata demolitions, Gazhane, Göksu Stream, Swissotel, destruction of the forested areas and watersheds, Moda highway, Formula 1, private universities. And also some protests were held against the shortages of the urban services like water or waste collection.

But as we stated in the previous section these neighbourhood associations' activities did not emerge always equitable results. Some associations' endeavours led the gentrification of the neighbourhood (see Şen, 2006). While they tried to improve urban services, environment of the neighbourhood, "awareness-raising" about historical and cultural values; they also led the rise of the prices. And also their aim which was improving the consciousness of being urbanized generally emerged as the result of sending the former residents away. And also Tuğal (2002) gives the example of a satellite town, Ataşehir, which middle class or upper class residents of the district were organized and tried to rupture the links with Ümraniye. And they tried to prevent the road construction between Ataşehir and Ümraniye in order to "protect" themselves from the urban poor and migrants.

In this period many articles were written about the migration, disruption of Istanbul, losing Istanbul, new owners of Istanbul, "*varoş*" neighbourhoods of Istanbul or articles with the concept of "*this city is not ours*", how to rescue the city, uncultured neighbourhoods; and many writers have found the solution to "*urbanize*", "*educate*" and "*Istanbullulaştırmak*" (make them from Istanbul) of the newcomers.

And the stigmatization of the city has increased in this period. And as we stated above, after 1 May 1996 and Gazi episodes in 13-15 March 1995, discriminatory language of the media has increased and some neighbourhoods have also experienced serious discrimination and conflictive social events in this period (see Erder, 2002; Aslan, 2004; Bozkulak, 2005).

As we can see, 1990s oppositions were generally emerged with NGOs, differently from 1970s. This situation has started in 1980s and after Habitat II and 1999 earthquake it has increased even more in 1990s. And also again just before Habitat Conference, civil society institution information centre was established in order to provide the relation between different NGOs in Turkey by History Foundation. And in the following years many conferences and courses were held by foundations,

universities and associations. Therefore, in 1990s, civil society institutions were kind of popular concepts. While so many organizations were described themselves as civil society institutions, some civil society institutions did not accept the others inclusion in this sphere. This popularity of civil society institutions of 1990s was appropriate to the social and economic discourses of the period. This was both the result of the global socio-economic conjuncture and also the hesitation of the participating a political organizations after 1980s. NGOs' unpolitic and non-class aspects played important role to gather many people in these organizations, and NGOs were seen as a new hope for that period. This does not mean all the opposition in 1990s has oriented by the NGOs, but we can state that NGOs held the major opposition channels in this period.

4.4 Urban Policies and Urban Struggles between 2002 and 2010: Accumulation by Dispossession

4.4.1 Socio-economic and political characteristics of the period

“Good-bye budget deficits, hello democracy deficit...”

(Diaz-Alejandro cited in Yeldan, 2009, p. 155)

As we stated in the previous sections, since 1980, neoliberal economic policies have been conducted in Turkey starting with 24 January decisions and 1980 coup d'état. This process has proceeded with the liberalization of trade in 1984 and because of the political pressure on the working classes; this new accumulation process was carried on without any obstacle and even with the support of international capital organizations until 1989. Even if working class's mobilisations against these neoliberal policies have emerged in 1989 with The Spring Actions; 1992 and 1994 economic crises have swept the earned rights of working class.

Both the economic and political situation of the country was unstable in 1990s. The economic crises in 1994, 1998-1999 and in 2000-2001, and different coalition governments in this process even if has slow down the neoliberal policies relatively, they have been proceeded to be conducted. However needed powerful and stable government for implementing the neoliberal policies was fulfilled with Justice and JDP in 2002.

While the first generation structural reforms which has started in 1980s with 24 January decisions brought removing the obstacles for capital and privatization implementations; the second generation structural reforms, which started with the “close monitoring agreement” with IMF in 1998, has deepened the neoliberal policies and has emerged new legal and institutional regulations for these policies (Biçer, 2009).

The Closed Monitoring Program, which was carried out with IMF in 1998, has transformed to “three-year stabilization program” in the beginning of 2000 and the stand-by agreement in this program has emphasised on “the sustainability of the debts” (Balseven and Önder, 2009). Balseven and Önder explain this program as follows:

The goal of the program can be stated as both guarantying the creditors’ ‘rights without making any change in payment terms and orienting the economy to new restructuring by opening it. There are two ways to provide this: (1) repressing the politically weak groups (2) liquidating of valuable public assets by selling! (2009, p. 21)

The first way was carried out with employee rights of public workers and with public services (Balseven and Önder, 2009). And the second way was implemented with structure reform through privatization the some profitable institutions and freeing all markets including social security and health (Balseven and Önder, 2009).

This new economic policy programs has continued with 17. 18. and 19. stand-by agreements and when stability program has collapsed with 2001 crisis, Program for Transition to a Strong Economy – PTSE (also known as Derviş Program) was carried out with floating rate instead of currency peg.

With 2001 economic crisis the coalition of Democrat Left Party (DLP)⁶², Nationalist Movement Party (NMP)⁶³ and MP has left the economic management entirely to IMF and nominated Kemal Derviş, who was served in World Bank, as the State Minister Responsible for the Economy (Kaya, 2009). And Derviş passed many legal regulations which were about financial system, distribution relations and social security system (Kaya, 2009). And 18th stand-by agreement in 2002 was emerged.

⁶² In Turkish: Demokrat Sol Parti (DSP).

⁶³ In Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP).

Therefore, when JDP won the election in 2002, it encountered with the process of 18th stand-by agreement which proceeded for three years. The structural reforms which were implemented by coalition government for struggling with inflation, was extended in the period of JDP (Sönmez, 2009).

Before 2002 election, 2001 economic crisis increased the weakness of neoliberalism (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). In 2002 an early general election has taken place with the lowest participation of the last years (Kaya, 2009). Kaya describes the situation before the election as follows:

...before the elections DLP, NMP and MP as the coalition parties presented a fatigue picture. Virtue Party, which was indicated as the responsible for the process of 28 February, was closed and Erbakan was prohibited from politics and important parts of the party team were detached from the movement. And Çiller's True Path Party, because of the shock of the establishment of the government with Erbakan, was even in an inability position to sustain the internal integrity. In short, both 'classic' central rightists and 'classic' political Islamists were not in the situation to undertake the needed 'representation' function. ...RPP was already unthinkable for such a 'representation' mission. RPP which entered the election with a suggestion, 'social-liberal synthesis', that was away from giving a message to the masses; and the party did this with a name, Kemal Derviş, whose name was identified with IMF policies... (2009, p. 253)

From 1999 to 2002 DLP with Bülent Ecevit has ruled the country with minority and coalition governments. But Ecevit's policies in this period were very different from his role in 1970s in RPP (Boratav, 2014). His new policies adopted IMF programmes with Kemal Derviş and started the process of stand-by agreements. The economic crisis in 2001 emerged an opposition towards IMF programmes and in connection with it towards the political parties which had responsibility in IMF programmes before the elections in 2002 (Boratav, 2014). Therefore RPP and new established JDP have formed the potential channels to seize the oppositions towards IMF programmes (Boratav, 2014). But according to Boratav (2014), RPP did not use this opportunity and took the side of capital by nominating Kemal Derviş in the party list. Conversely, JDP has used this opportunity very successfully and the party concealed its neoliberal policies until the elections. Therefore we can state that 2002 general election has proceeded by the parties with the adoption of IMF programmes or not and JDP which exhibited distant position from IMF programmes has won the election.

Also because of 2001 crisis, and corruption news, there was a search for a new strong alternative in the society, and JDP was seen as an alternative with its justice, equality discourses. The result was beyond the estimations that while SDPP, NMP, TPP and MP could not exceed the threshold, JDP took the %34,4 of the votes and RPP took the %19 of the votes (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009).

JDP was one of the established parties with Felicity Party, after Virtue Party was closed in 2001. While JDP has come from the National Vision line, the party has announced “to change the shirt of National Vision”. This change led to identify party’s approach as “post-Islamist” or ‘moderate islam” (BSB, 2008). JDP, differently from National Vision, did not only try to attract small middle capital and little bourgeois, it also took the support of large capitals and adopted free market model unquestionably (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). JDP while preserving its Islamic policies, it left national vision line of Turkish-Islam movement and became more closed to the West (Yeldan, 2009) in its early years. While financial and economic crisis brought JDP to the government, JDP has exceeded and deepened the neoliberal policies (Sönmez, 2009). Yeldan (2009) calls JDP’s economic policies as pragmatist and pro-Western Islamism.

But JDP did not only get the support of large capital groups; also some working class groups have largely supported JDP. Ataay and Kalfa describe the reasons of this as follows:

JDP was also seen as an alternative for working class who became impoverished after 2000-2001 crises, despaired from central left and central right and searched for the alternatives. Certainly, the effect of the term after 1980 which make the society more religious cannot be denied for making JDP to be seen as an alternative for the working classes. But, the main factor which explains the success of JDP is the predominance of longing for a change in the society in 1991-2001 periods, which could not overlap the problem of recession and political instability and consumed away all the main parties in the political spectrum, and the absence of labour-based political organisation which responds these expectations. ... [and] JDP was in the position which had the most dynamic base and organization through having a dynamic party organization which was activated by religious motives and through has been starting to establish ‘patronage relations’ with local governments in 1990s, and through cult and congregation ties, relation networks via Islamic foundations, associations etc., and also through the network of Islamic TVs, newspapers, schools, student dormitories. (2009, p. 316-317)

And JDP, while receiving the votes of both capital groups and some of working class groups got the victory of 2002 election and has continued its existence in the government until now. JDP government was seen as both the remedy of needed economic and political stability and also democratisation project with its multicultural, market-oriented reforms and with EU nomination process (BSB, 2008).

On the financial policy, JDP has focused on the primary surplus and continued financial accumulation model with speculative-growth, therefore in 2002 the party's first implementations were to cancel the law about the taxation of financial rent and tax amnesty (Sönmez, 2009).

One of the main economic policies of JDP government was to attract the hot money in the country, and in order to cover the current deficit, the government sold the largest public institutions, and also real estates to the foreign capitals (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). Attracting the short term capital flows to the country provided to expand the economy by controlling inflation and cheapening the imports (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009).

Even if JDP exhibited a distant position from IMF programmes before the election, after winning the election in 2002, it also proceeded neoliberal policies with its “strong government” discourses and did not encounter with a major social opposition (Yeldan, 2009). The structural reforms were the most important agenda for also JDP government and with the Emergency Action Plan in 2003 and 19th stand-by agreement in 2005, JDP has developed this inheritance. The 19th stand-by agreement, which proceeded for three years, was generally interpreted as “the exception of the exceptions” or “political favouritism” by the professionals (Boratav, 2014). Even if, in that term, JDP could not provide any preconditions of IMF, it was still promoted by putting forward the next election in 2007 as one of the “exceptional circumstances” (Boratav, 2014). Therefore we can state that JDP has had large support of international capital organizations since its first years.

Therefore from 1998 to 2008 an uninterrupted IMF programmes has oriented the economy of the country which Boratav (2014) names this terms as “uninterrupted IMF monitoring” and also BSB (2007) identifies this term as “different governments, single policy”. Boratav identifies the aim of the structural reforms as follows:

The ultimate goal was the liquidation of the distribution arrangements which form a directly or indirectly load on the capital [and] completely delivery wages, agricultural product and input prices which determine the relative situation of working class and peasants to the market mechanism. This transformation would materialize by shrinking the welfare state, and by overtaking financial burden which arise from this by benefiting from the services in increasing rates. The groups which are marginalized and impoverished by this process would be guarded not by arranging, 'correcting' of the market, but by completely separate poverty alleviation programs. All the surroundings of the bourgeoisie have supported this orientation enthusiastically. (2014, p. 200)

19th stand-by agreement also included the social regulations such as social security; pension; commercialization, privatization and pricing of the health system (Sönmez, 2009). Therefore economic and social life became entirely surrounded by neoliberal policies (Sönmez, 2009). Yeldan explains this as follows: *"The primary and most important goal of these regulations, eliminating the obtained successes in public services, social security, education and health and compensating these services by privatization"* (2009, p. 131).

In 2007 election, IMF and large capital groups proceeded to support JDP, and the party answered these supports by showing the party more closed to central right with Özal's and Menderes's pictures in the party banners and by putting some old democrat liberal names in the party list (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). Before the election, other large parties of the period did not orient their oppositions towards JDP's economic policies and they opposed more on secularism (by RPP) or nationalism (by NMP) line and also by giving closed messages to the capital groups and by showing some central names in the party list, RPP tried to attract capital groups instead of its old social democrat line (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). And RPP and NMP could not receive the much support of working classes again in 2007 election. Differently JDP presented more closed policies for lower-middle classes which Ataay and Kalfa describe this as follows:

... JDP put forward the KÖYDES and BELDES projects in order to improve infrastructure investments in the rural areas which were neglected for a long time, [and also the party put forward] the mass housing projects, charity and aid to poor projects in order to recover regressive social policies. JDP could manage to present as an advance even restructuring and privatization policies in health and education fields which has been conducted with World Bank to the large parts of the society... And [the party] provided a 'reformist' party presentation for ... [some] parts by using compliance with the EU and the reforms of World

Bank... And JDP's opposition to the military action [to North Iraq which RPP and NMP asked to] played an important role to gain the support of Kurdish people. (2009, p. 327)

In all these conditions JDP became successful of 2007 elections (both in general election in June and Presidential election in August) by increasing its vote rate, this was also seen as a victory of neoliberal policies, and the party became the main party of the capital (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). The Party has acted "faster" and "more daring" on implementation of neoliberal policies than the previous governments (Yeldan, 2009). Privatization implementations have increased in this period with JDP compared to 1980s and 1990s. Many large institutions such as TEKEL, TÜPRAŞ, and TELEKOM were privatized and new legal regulations were conducted in this term. Boratav states that;

... after the privatization of TÜPRAŞ, TEKEL and TELEKOM, and the sale of treasury shares in ERDEMİR, few major institutions, which were dominated by the state ownership, were left. The laws and regulations on communication, energy, public bids, banking, Savings Deposit Insurance Fund and autonomous (Regulatory and Supervisory) institutions on agriculture should be evaluated in the same title. [And also] laws and regulations related to municipalities, special provincial administrations, development agencies, Land Office and Mass Housing Administration (and part of related to urban rents) should be added. So that, these years will go down in the history with configuration of central and local public management all over again in Turkey. (2014, p. 202-203)

Figure 4.1 shows the privatization implementations between 1986 and 2014. According to the figure between 1986 and 2003 the total amount of the privatization was 8,240 million dollar but from 2004 and 2014 the total amount of the privatization reaches totally 52,499 million dollar. This figure shows the dramatic increase of privatization implementations in JDP period.

After 2001 crisis real wages have decreased substantially and this decrease has proceeded also in JDP period. But this was not experienced only in Turkey, the counterattack of the capital towards labour has proceeded in 1970s in the name of neoliberal globalization, and flexibility and privatization have eroded labour wage also in other capitalist countries (Yeldan, 2009). During all these processes neoliberal policies were largely adopted by almost all capitalist countries and especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, globalization was largely seen as inevitable.




Figure 4.1 : Privatization Transactions by Years (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration)

In JDP period almost all the capitalist countries have experienced 2008-2009 crises. And even if prime minister of the period, Erdoğan, claimed that “the crisis has passed Turkey tangentially”, the numbers showed the reverse in Turkey. Even the banks were dragged into the crisis because Central Bank lowered the interest rates rapidly, the unemployment has increased and labourers has encountered with deepened crisis (Boratav, 2014). Also, capacity utilization rate of manufacturing has decreased much more than in 2000-2001 crises (BSB, 2009). And the five golden years of JDP with %7 average annual growth rate, has started to decelerate in 2007 and decreased to -4,7 percent in 2009 (Sönmez, 2010).

In this process, neoliberal policies have found the solution to the unemployment through ‘resilience of the labour market’ (Boratav, 2014). Medium-term program which was published by JDP in 2009 includes one of the main themes as dissemination of flexible forms of employment; accordingly, the new legal regulations were conducted in order to “flexible” of the labour market which brought subcontracting and contractual employment (Boratav, 2014).

The unemployment and flexible working conditions led the increase of segmentation and differentiation in the labourers and these also affected negatively the unionisation and union movements (Mütevvelioğlu and Işık, 2009). Even if there has been %36 increase in the rate of insured labourers, the unionization rate according to Ministry of Labour and Social Security was at the rate of %11 (Mütevvelioğlu and Işık, 2009). The insecure and flexible working conditions while become the one of

the reason of decrease in unionisation rate, they also led increase in the work accidents. Such that Mütevellioğlu and Işık (2009) gives one of the dramatic result of this as, the total number of lost working days because of the working accidents is ten times more than the total number of lost working days because of the strikes in Turkey.

As neoliberal policies negative outcomes on labour wage do not only affect the economic situation of the workers, also in order to cover the public deficits, governments generally restrict employee rights of the workers (Yeldan, 2009). Yeldan specifies two problems of these transformations as follows:

“...these problems can be identified as transferring the decisions about public sphere from constitutional institutions to ‘independent’ higher regulatory institutions which operate according to global rules, and commercialization of public economic activities as covering the public services and regulations (BSB, 2006). This process, which is legitimated as ‘separation of politics from economy’, strengthens global capital and its local extensions in the society through keeping away the large public groups and labourers from political processes.” (2009, p. 155)

Furthermore, JDP’s policies for poverty were based on social aids instead of constant formal social policies (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). This policy was compatible both with religious charity implementations and also with “governance” model which was produced as an alternative to the public policies by World Bank (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). Another ‘good’ part of this model was not to emerge extra cost for the budget because of providing the budget from informal financings (Ataay and Kalfa, 2009). These social aids also created a party base for JDP and the party has implemented this model for gaining more people for the party. JDP has also oriented the process of distribution relations in the favour of closed groups to the party and even by penalizing the opposed business premises (Boratav, 2014).

We can state that, with the international capital organizations’ reports not only economic process also social and political life of the society encounter with changes accordingly to the reports’ demands, and JDP policies were very compatible with Bretton Woods Institutions’ demands. Therefore while the economic situation and social rights of working classes have worsened in these period, large capitals especially the ones which were closed to the party has gained with neoliberal policies. Also in this period, the social movement channels have oriented more on cultural issues than class-based oppositions. The process of “terminating of class-

based politics” which has started from 1980s has continued also in this period and class-based policy has left its place to identity-based policies with multiculturalism discourses (BSB, 2008). And with community, congregation relations which are based on mutual identity, that especially has started with Welfare Party and continued with JDP, had an important role on terminating class-based policies (BSB, 2009). And these were mostly provided with Social Aid and Solidarity Foundations and municipalities which also led clientelism (BSB, 2009).

4.4.2 Urban policies under Justice and Development Party

Capital necessarily creates a physical landscape in its own image at one point in time only to have to destroy it at some later point in time as it pursues geographical expansions and temporal displacements as solutions to the crises of overaccumulation to which it is regularly prone. Thus is the history of creative destruction (with all manner of deleterious social and environmental consequences) written into the evolution of the physical and social landscape of capitalism.

(Harvey, 2004, p. 66)

After 1999 earthquake and 2001 economic crises, 2002 was a breakpoint for both urban and rural areas in Turkey. After starting to rule the government in 2002, JDP has also started to rule many cities’ municipalities including Istanbul in 2004 and the party has started an uninterrupted neoliberal transformation and reconstruction for cities until now. These transformation and reconstruction were held through large scale construction and transportation projects; regeneration projects, construction of new gated communities, shopping malls at a great pace and with restructuring of the public administrations and with a series of legal regulations.

In this period, interventions to the urban space have taken place much more than the previous periods which make this period the ‘golden era’ of the neoliberal restructuring of the urban space. Therefore the exchange value of urban space came forward in this period more remarkably and urban space, especially in Istanbul, became the most attractive commodity for the capital.

The process of globalization and liberalization of the economy in Turkey, led Istanbul more featured city than the previous periods and made it the focus for many neoliberal projects (Şengül, 2014). Such as, even the budget of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is more than 12 ministries in 2011; mayor of Istanbul emphasizes insufficiency of the investments (Şengül, 2014)

But not only public investments led Istanbul to be featured in this process. Şengül explains this as follows:

Gradually growing capacity of rent, which was created by the real estate sector and was put forward by the process of financialisation, attracted the large capital groups that were organized on a national scale and were operated in the real sector before. In a similar manner, it can be seen that many transnational corporations which want to get a share from aforesaid rent, started to locate in the large cities, especially in Istanbul (Tokatlı and Erkin, 1998). ...many companies which were operated in the real sector before assign or sell their lands for high rent housings, shopping malls, plazas through liquidating their production facilities in the cities. (2014: 440-441)

In the party programme of JDP in 2002, the implementations of previous governments were criticized as:

Because of the implemented wrong policies, the role of the state in the economy could not keep up with the changing conditions, the distribution of the wealth to the society and regions could not be provided in justice and a well privatization could not be conducted. Our country could not get rid of cumbersome and extremely centralized structure, malpractice and political decay. (58th Government Programme, 2002)

Erdoğan explains the urban policies of JDP before 2004 local election as *“decentralized management, governance, participation, local development, urban and local entrepreneurship, social municipalism and municipalism which is compatible with the era”* (Öktem, 2011).

Therefore in the party program local governments and privatization were highlighted policies and the vision of Turkey in the party program was stated as *“to settle the competitive market structure”*. Some featured promises about urban policies in 59th Government Programme (2003) and in Emergency Action Plan (2003) can be aligned as follows:

- Local Government Reform
- Tourism Reform
- Privatization
- Major Transportation/Construction Projects
- Renewal of Gecekondur Areas – Housing Campaigns – Construction.

With all these promises a complete restructuring and transformation of the urban area has emerged. This transformation was conducted both by the central government

(generally through MHA), also by planning institution, local governments and as well as by the large capital groups.

In the Emergency Action Plan (2003) Local Government Reform title emphasizes these headings:

- Reconstructing of the local governments,
- Redefining the authorization of local governments according to European Charter for Autonomy and Local Governments,
- Strengthening the financial structure of Local Governments,
- Establishing city councils in order to increase the participation and
- Establishing Regional Development Agencies.

In order to reconstruct the local governments, many legal regulations have been conducted in this period. In this context, with Local Government Reform also with the effect of second generation structural reforms, and with other internal and external dynamics, a report, which is called “Change in the Management for the Management of Change” in 2000s, and also the Draft Law of Fundamental Public Administration in 2003 were prepared (Emini, 2009). Also especially in 2004 and in 2005 with the laws of municipalities, metropolitan municipalities and special administrations, the authorization of local governments were strengthen (Sertesin, 2011).

For example with Metropolitan Municipality Law (Law No: 5216), which was passed in 2004, the authorization area of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has increased from 1.864 km² to 5.343 km², and also with this law Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s partnership relations with private companies have achieved a legal base (Öktem, 2011). Furthermore, this law ceased the requirement of governor approval for the transactions of the municipalities including the budget of the municipalities (Urhan, 2008).

Even JDP has passed some laws in order to give more authorization to the local governments with public administration reform; the government has still implemented many neoliberal urban policies through the central institutions especially with MHA and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. In 2004 with the change of 4th article of Mass Housing Law (Law No: 2985), MHA was authorised to make plans in “*gecekondu renewal areas, in the lands and plots which*

were owned by itself, and in the areas which are determined as mass housing areas by the governor.” Therefore, according to Serteser (2011), with the recent laws like giving the authorization to make plans in public lands in all scales to The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization there is a “turnaround” again from decentralization to centralization. Likewise Erkut and Sezgin (2014) evaluate the planning system of Turkey as: *“trends towards decentralization and re-centralization”* and they state that: *“The driving forces of the changes are globalization, Europeanization and the neoliberal intervention of the central government at different scales”* (2014:253). Likewise, some other institutions such as Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Privatization Administration were authorised of planning. And with all these legal regulations 27 different institutions had the authorization of planning and approving the plans in Istanbul, that is, both has complicated the process of planning and also has led the segmented planning process in different parts of the city (Öktem, 2011).

Therefore we can regard these decentralization attempts as a short term trial, but JDP has generally conducted its neoliberal policies with both local and central governments, and when we consider Bill 6306, central government role has overweighed especially in the last period.

Another implementation in the concept of Local Government Reform was city councils. The conceptual framework of governance and the process of Habitat II were given in the previous section. And after Habitat II Conference, city councils (which came into prominence in Rio Summit in 1992 in the concept of Local Agenda 21) became the one of the most mentioned organizations in that period; and after the Conference, the councils were established in many cities in Turkey. But the legalization of the councils was conducted after 2000s. The city council was mentioned firstly in the Municipal Law (Law No: 5393) in 2005 and then the Regulation of City Councils was passed in 2006. In the Law, the city council is defined as:

City Council shall be responsible from promotion of urbanization and fellow-citizenship vision, preservation of the rights of the inhabitants and materializing the rules stipulating developmental consistency, environmental care, social solidarity, transparency, participation in management and stable operation of control mechanism. The Municipalities shall provide the necessary assistance and support to the City Council to enable performance of above listed activities effectively... (Municipal Law, 2005)

These formations were criticized generally with the following headings: the efficiency of the private sector in the local administrations with the governance approach; the institutions which adopt these councils are largely featured institutions for being compatible with neoliberal policies like WB, OECD, TESEV/TUSIAD; secondary role of city councils after the municipalities; and the insufficiency of the legal regulations in order to provide them an autonomous space (Doğan, 2009). But according to Doğan (2009), these should not mean to leave totally these tools, instead they should have been improved in the approach of “right to the city”, that, can be conducted with reunion of urban social movements around “right to the city” slogan and orient these councils in the locals.

Another tool of Local Government Reform is mentioned as Regional Development Agencies in the Emergency Action Plan in 2003. These agencies, by leaving their ‘Regional’ word were legalized in 2006. In the Election Declaration in 2007 JDP declares the aim of Development Agencies as:

“The Development Agencies will be established in order to influence the dynamics of migration in a positive way, to reduce disparities between the regions and within the regions, to improve our competitiveness through expanding the production of culture on all around the country, and to spread the social welfare to the base by increasing.” (JDP 2007 Election Declaration, 2007, p. 108)

According to the 62nd Government Programme (2014) 26 development agencies were established as the most important tool of “New Turkey”, and the programme announces that 26 regional plans will be prepared and implemented between 2014 and 2023. And also according to aforesaid Programme (2014) these agencies led the SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), professionals and civil society institutions to use 1.8 billion grant resources in the areas for industry, agriculture, tourism, infrastructure, human resources and social development.

Furthermore, The Programme (2014) states that, 97 Environmental Plans (Master Plans) were prepared and country spatial strategy plan was started to be prepared until 2014. One of these master plans was Istanbul Environmental Master Plan which was approved in 2009.

With the extended authorization of the municipalities, just after being elected as the mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş established IMP (Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Urban Design Centre) within BİMTAŞ Co.⁶⁴ in 2004. The office has prepared Istanbul Master Plan (Environmental Plan) and the plan was approved in 2006. But after professional organizations have taken out a summons against the plan, the plan was cancelled in 2008 with the trial results and was revised in 2008. But the first version of the plan was approved again in 2009 (Öktem, 2011). The plan includes the vision of “*an information society which is competitive on a global scale with a high quality of life*” and in order to reach this, the plan foresees a ‘*structural transformation*’ for the cities (Aksoy, 2014). Aksoy states that, with the ‘structural transformation’ emphasis the plan intends that:

...reducing to one quarter of the share of the manufacturing sector in the urban employment until 2023; orienting the infrastructure of service industry to the finance, IT and information based services; and reforming urban profile of Istanbul in order to increase the attractiveness of urban space for global investors. (2014, p. 31)

Indeed the plan foresees the employment structure as %70 service sector, %25 industry sector and %5 agriculture sector in 2023 which it was %60 service sector, %32 industry and %8 agriculture in 2000 (Istanbul Environmental Master Plan, 2009). And The Master Plan determines this transformation in order to “*provide competitive advantage in the global platform*” (Istanbul Environmental Master Plan, 2009)

And also the plan foresees a multicentre gradual linear macroform with new attraction centres in the both sides of the city, for this purpose it proposes first degree centres in Bakırköy, Yenibosna Basın Axis and Silivri in European Side; and Kartal and Ataşehir-Kozyatağı in Anatolian Side. And as the second degree centres, the plan points out around Esenyurt-Haramidere and Gaziosmanpaşa which is foreseen to be transform from industry to service sector in European Side, and the south part of Pendik-Şeyhli industry area in Anatolian Side (Istanbul Environmental Master Plan, 2009).

⁶⁴ BİMTAŞ, which stands for Bosphorus Construction Consultancy Co, is one of the companies of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

According to the decisions of the Master Plan the reputed architects like Zaha Hadid and Ken Yeang were invited to plan Kartal and Küçükçekmece for marinas, hotels, residences and business centres (Aksoy, 2014). And also IMP did not just prepare the Master Plan of Istanbul, the office has also prepared urban regeneration and design projects for the different parts of the city in order to materialize neoliberal policies of the municipality (Öktem, 2011). Maybe the best part of the plan was not to include the third bridge. But even the plan did not include it, it was started to be constructed despite the oppositions. Also the “*crazy projects*” like Channel Istanbul or two new cities were not included in the plan. And the place of the airport was in Silivri-Gazitepe instead of Akpınar where is being constructed currently.

The Action Plan (2003) declares the promises of some transportation projects like construction of 15.000 km double road, tube tunnel project or railway in Gebze-Halkalı. And in order to implement these projects, the plan suggests using build-operate-transfer model, and also the plan stresses that with this model private sector and foreign capital will take part in the railways. 61st Government Programme (2011) “heralds” the starting of the construction of Marmaray, Eurasian Tunnel Project and 3rd Bridge. And also aforesaid Programme announces the large scale projects like Channel Istanbul, two new cities, which one is in European Side and the other one is in Asian Side, third bridge, Topçu Military Barracks in Gezi Park, Taksim Pedestrianization Project and new concepts of Yassiada and Sivriada. But in the 62nd Government Programme (2014) the same projects were repeated with two exceptions, in this programme there is not any mentions about Topçu Military Barracks in Gezi Park and Taksim Pedestrianization Project after the massive resistances for Gezi Park in 2013.

These neoliberal policies include also the tourism investments. 58th Government Programme’s promises for Tourism includes the promotion projects for the brand of “Turkey”, tourism investments for attracting the capital, legal regulations for the selling of the properties to the foreign capital and the creation of new tourism areas (58th Government Programme, 2002). Also, Emergency Action Plan (2003) states that, in order to increase the tourism revenues and to create new employment opportunities; a tourism reform will be conducted. In this context, the plan specifies the preparation of “Istanbul Tourism Project”. Also the plan signifies the creation of new tourism cities with some privileges.

With these tourism promises and also with global city discourses, the number of luxury hotels and shopping malls have increased in this period and the bed capacity of five stars hotels has increased from 2.000 in 1980s to 10.199 in 2000s and 47 new shopping malls were constructed in Istanbul between 2000 and 2008 (Öktem, 2011). And according to the 2014 report of the JLL (Jones Lang LaSalle)⁶⁵ “as of May 2014, 5-star hotels represent a 41% share of total room supply of Istanbul” (JLL Report 2014: 15).

Also, the increase of the number of shopping malls in this period is considerable. In her study Bal (2011), gives the numbers of shopping malls in Istanbul. According to her study, 92 percent of the shopping malls in Istanbul were opened between 2000 and 2010. And they were constructed mostly in Şişli, Büyükçekmece, Beylikdüzü, Beşiktaş and Bahçelievler in European Side, and in Ümraniye and Pendik in Asian Side. According to the 2010 report of the JLL, gross leasable area (GLA) of the shopping centres was 2.65 million square meters in 2010 with 92 shopping malls in Istanbul and also report states that the supply of the total grade A offices was 2.5 million square meters in 2010 which %44 of it in CBD, %29 in Anatolian side and %27 in the outside of the CBD in European side. In 2014 these numbers increases to 3.692 million square meters GLA with 99 shopping malls, to 3.6 million square meter supply of the total grade A offices. And the report stresses that: “*Levent in the CBD, Kağıthane and Seyrantepe in the European Side and Ataşehir, Kozyatağı, Ümraniye, Küçükyalı, Maltepe and Kartal on the Asian side were the most demanded areas by national and multinational occupiers in the first months of 2014*” (JLL Report, 2014:9).

Also many international organizations were taken place in Istanbul in order to market the city, and these organizations led also ease the transformation of the urban area. Öktem states some of the international organizations and events in that period as follows:

“European Capital of Culture, attempt for Olympics and Atatürk Olympic Stadium, Formula 1, NATO Summit, UEFA European Champions League Final Match, Eurovision Song

⁶⁵ JLL is a firm which introduces itself on its website as a “financial and professional services firm that specializes in commercial real estate services and investment management.”

Competition, Moto GP, World Architecture Congress, 2009 World Water Forum, The World Council Meeting of UN and Local Governments etc.” (2011:35)

In order to provide this structural transformation for global city, privatization was the basic tool for the government. The Emergency Action Plan (2003) states some issues for the privatization, such as selling of Public Economy Enterprises, supporting of private enterprises in many areas including education and health, selling of social facilities which the plan identifies them as extravagance etc. As we stated in the previous section between 2004 and 2014 privatization was implemented almost 6.5 times more than the total number of previous years. In this process public spaces and public buildings became subject of the privatization including forest areas, coastal areas, old factories, public parks and gardens, public education and health buildings, etc.⁶⁶

In this period especially the urban space of Istanbul formed the largest investment channels for both foreign and local large capital groups. Even if this trend has started in 1980s, in 2000s urban space has reached its most valuable period. For example Aksoy (2014) states that, when Privatization Administration sold 100.000 m² of land which was owned by General Directorate of Highways in Zincirlikuyu in 2007 for 800 million dollars, this was the largest amount of the privatization for one parcel until that time. But later right next to this parcel, the 46.000 m² of land which was owned by IETT (Istanbul Electricity Tunnel and Tram Business)⁶⁷ was sold for 705 million dollars to a Dubai company and with this privatization land prices have increased to 15 thousand dollars per square meter which are more than the average value of central business centres in London and Tokyo (Aksoy, 2014)

Thus, the reproduction and distribution of land became the fundamental way to upgrade the deteriorating economy during neoliberal period (Çavuşoğlu, 2010). Therefore construction sector became the main tool for the accumulation of the capital in the urban area in this period. This was externalized in the Emergency Action Plan in 2003 as “*starting the housing campaign*” which was explained as

⁶⁶ In this process Law No: 5793 (passed in 2008), which is known as “bag law”, is very critical. With this law while the authorization of MHA has extended with planning, project and tax exemption and the other institutions got the authorization to make plans; also public spaces such as coastal areas, education sites, the state railways sites, highways sites etc. became the subject of privatization more easily.

⁶⁷ In Turkish İstanbul Elektrik Tramvay ve Tünel İşletmeleri.

providing home ownership to lower income groups “like paying rent”, and the programme states that this “measure” will contribute to solve the “most emergent problem of Turkey” which is unemployment.

In the 60th Government Programme (2007), the number of housings, which 140.000 of them were completed by MHA, is stated as 500.000. And according to the 61st Government Programme (2011), 505 thousands housings were started to be constructed and 360 thousands of them completed by MHA. After three years these numbers increased to 620 thousands new housings which 480 thousands of them were completed (62nd Government Programme, 2014).

Besides construction of housings by MHA, also private investors, large capital groups played important roles in the construction sector in this period. After 2005 the construction sector in Istanbul has largely increased with gated communities in the northern side of the city and in Bosphorus ridges and with residences and high-rise gated communities in the city centre (Öktem, 2011). Bal (2011) gives the number of gated communities which were constructed between 2000 and 2010 as 786. In this period gated communities were constructed generally around CBDs like in Göktürk - Kemerburgaz, Zekeriyaköy-Demirciköy, Bahçeşehir, Büyükçekmece in European side; and in Beykoz, Çekmeköy-Dudullu and Ömerli in Anatolian side (Colliers-Rescoe, 2003 cited in Öktem, 2011). As seen, E-5 and TEM roads are the key axes in this distribution. While gated communities mostly placed in urban fringes which have mostly natural characteristic or view of forest, lake etc. also in this period residences were placed in the city centre for high income groups. According to Bal (2011), residences are the new housing types peculiar to 2000s which have constructed firstly in 1999 in Şişli. And until 2010, Bal gives the number of residences in this period in İstanbul as 52 which are mostly in Şişli, Beşiktaş, Ataşehir and Kartal and generally built with other functions like shopping malls and offices.

With all these housing constructions, dwellings were constructed more than the demands in this period. Keyder (2010) states that while average square meter for building permits was 3 million in 2002, this increased to 10-11 million square meter in 2006-2007. And according to the data, the number of construction permits in 2010 increased by 58,7 percent compared to the previous year and reached the highest point in the history of Republic of Turkey (Kuyucu, 2014). Also in the master plans

of the cities the size of the area which is foreseen to be constructed is more than the needed area for foreseen population growth (Şengül, 2014).

In these constructions, foreign capital share of these investments have also increased by years. While the capacity of foreign direct investment in the construction sector was 22 million dollars in 2000, this has increased to 735 million dollars in 2007 (Yalçintan et al., 2014). Moreover in 2011 almost 2 billion dollars and in 2012 2,6 billion dollars were invested in real estate sector (Yalçintan et al., 2014). This both shows the foreign investments increasing share in construction and real estate sector, and also the changing logic of housings and urban land. As Şengül (2014) states, the houses were bought and sold in the logic of stock certificate in this period.

Besides, these constructions provided employment opportunities in the construction sector. And the government tried to solve unemployment problem with these projects as was mentioned in the Government Programme, even if this has provided temporary and insecure work conditions for labours.

All these implementations were conducted with the cooperation of state and capital, and legal regulations have been the tools of this process. In order to implement these projects many legal regulations were carried out in this period with the support of the capital.

In many of these projects, MHA was the main actor. As we stated in the previous section, while the main role of MHA was to provide housings for low-income groups, the authorization of the Administration was largely extended and MHA has started to construct stadiums, shopping malls, police stations, mosques, schools, trade centres or luxury gated communities. And in order to extent the authorization of MHA, 14 legal regulations were passed between 2002 and 2008 (Balaban, 2011 cited in Aksoy, 2014). With these legal regulations one of the main roles of the Administration became the urban regeneration projects.

In this period, urban regeneration projects were seen as the solution for almost all the social, spatial and economic problems like unemployment, economic depression or crime, drug, “social decline” or unplanned urbanization, poor urban image, disaster risk. Therefore they were implemented as a “national mobilization”. But the real reason lies behind the site selection of the projects. The neighbourhoods which

were/are subjected to the urban regeneration were/are generally in the high rent areas where lower-income groups live in.

Istanbul came forward with these implementations because of being showcase of the country and being important for global city vision. Therefore these projects were presented both the remedy for the earthquake risk and an important leap for marketing Istanbul and attracting foreign capital to the city. Because the city has expanded and was planned to be extended, almost all the areas of Istanbul turned into valuable economic resources for the capital groups. Therefore old gecekondu areas, historical zones in the city centres or old industrial zones were exhibited one of the most valuable areas of Istanbul and accordingly became the first areas for the urban regeneration projects.

Just after JDP had victory in the election in 2002, the party has explained its projects for clearing gecekondu areas. In the Emergency Action Plan (2003) this aim was specified in the “Urbanization and Localization” section as “prevention of gecekondu”, and explained this aim as follows:

In order to prevent gecekondu and create a modern urban view through removing existing gecekondu, the power of municipalities will be increased through presenting the alternatives with receiving the support of gecekondu owners.

Within this framework, planned urbanization will be provided firstly through increasing land production and land supply. The renewal works will be conducted in the existing gecekondu areas through giving houses according to the land prices. (2003, p. 112)

With these aims first in 2004 Northern Ankara Entrance Urban Regeneration Project Law (Law No: 5104) was passed. But this law was just for a specific area and one year later, Municipal Law (Law no: 5393) was passed and it gave the authorization to the municipalities, which have more population than 50.000, to declare and implement urban regeneration projects with its 73rd article. The same year, under a new law, municipalities (also with MHA) got authorization to declare and implement urban regeneration projects in the historical urban areas with Law 5366 (this law will be detailed later below). According to Kuyucu (2014) between 2001 and 2010 12 major regeneration projects were declared in Istanbul which would displace 100.000 people.

Also in 2006 a new draft law was prepared in order to extent these areas. That draft law was not legalized in that form and in 2010 with the Law of Amendment of

Municipal Law (Law No: 5998) 73rd article of Municipal Law was changed. This change brought large authorization to the municipalities for urban regeneration projects which states:

Municipalities may, by a resolution of the municipal council, carry out urban regeneration and development projects in order to create housing areas, industrial areas, business areas, technology parks, public service areas, recreation areas and all sorts of social facility areas, rebuild and restore worn-out parts of the city, preserve the historical and cultural heritage of the city or take measures against earthquake.

The municipal council shall have sole authority to decide that the area to be declared as an urban regeneration and development area should be planned or non-planned areas with or without buildings on, specify the building height limits and density, require that the area size be minimum 5 and maximum 500 hectares, and the regeneration be executed in phases. (Law of Amendment of Municipal Law, 2010)

With this law without exception almost everywhere could be subjected for regeneration projects. And the integrity of plans were destructed because of the given area sizes which is from 5 to 500 hectares. And also with this Law municipalities had the authority to increase structure density and height just for certain small areas. Many regeneration projects were declared under this law including gecekondu areas. And legal regulations for extending the “extraordinary” authorizations of MHA were added to these laws in order to ease urban regeneration.

Therefore with these aims and legal regulations, the process of sending the gecekondu dwellers to the outside of the city accelerates. This was a kind of exile of low-income groups and working classes. While in 1980s and 1990s governments have decreased labourers’ organizational power and wages; they tried to “win” them with amnesty laws for gecekondu (Boratav, 1991 cited in Koçak, 2011). But in 2000s JDP government has adopted a different policy which Koçak explains as follows:

... in new right strategy, including the labourers in the distribution relations with individual-space based policies is not a tool for the government in order to establish and maintain its legitimacy. JDP government’s social legitimacy and political energy are based on providing development opportunities for new riches and middle classes which increase accordingly with dynamics of global capitalism that Turkey has articulated increasingly along 2000s; and also with material-moral aid/support/promise relations with poor people which increase with the effects of the same dynamics... (2011, p. 44-45)

Therefore JDP has adopted a different policy towards gecekondu neighbourhoods from previous periods. This policy was very compatible with the current dynamics of neoliberalism and global city aim of the government. Urban regeneration projects of the neighbourhoods of low-income groups were formed the most important tool of aimed ‘structural transformation’ of the urban area in order to reproduce the urban land. Therefore many different statements were represented in order to establish the legitimacies of this transformation.

The urban regeneration projects were always appeared with “urgency discourse” (Türkün et al. 2014) and this discourse was generally legitimated with the earthquake risk. The emphasis of disaster and earthquake establishes the legitimacies of these regeneration and renewal projects also in the government programmes. Likewise the presses of the period generally support urban regeneration projects and represent them as the only choices for the measures of earthquake risk.

In this period the representations of the gecekondu dwellers in the mainstream media and in the discourses of the politicians were much more exclusionary than the previous periods (Türkün et al. 2014). The Prime Minister of the period, Erdoğan, states his view towards gecekondu dwellings as follows: “*Our biggest dream was to eliminate the gecekondu which encircle our cities like a tumour. Now we are managing it, we must manage it all across Turkey.*” (Sabah, 2006 cited in Türkün et al. 2014) Likewise, Head of Mass Housing Administration, Erdoğan Bayraktar states in The Conference of Urban Regeneration and Real Estate in 2007 as follows: “*The base of terror, drugs, distorted perspective to the state, psychological negativity, lack of education and health problems is gecekondu areas and unplanned areas.*” (Zaman, 13 November 2007 cited in Türkün et al. 2014)

In parallel to these discourses of the politicians and bureaucrats, the mainstream media gives the connection of gecekondu areas with terror and crime many times, for instance Zaman newspaper gives the news of urban regeneration projects with the title of “*Urban Regeneration Projects Destroy the Sanctuary of Criminal Organizations*” and gives strange determinations of one “terror specialist”. According to this expert in the gecekondu neighbourhoods, people who have the same origin live together but in the mass housings they leave their prejudices and radical thoughts, and they become more tolerated. And the same news continues with its determinations as: “*It is remarkable that, members of criminal and terrorist*

organizations choose *gecekondu* areas as housing areas.” And according to the same news the terrorist organizations provoke people against urban regeneration projects and the news continues with some *muhtars*⁶⁸ pro-urban regeneration opinions in the some neighbourhoods like Hatice Sultan (Sulukule), Başbüyük, Aydınlı and Kuştepe Neighbourhoods (Maman, 2008).

In contrast to this exclusionary and criminal language towards *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and towards opposition groups to the urban regeneration projects, the projects were introduced in the real estate pages or the supplements of the newspapers with “good” foreign examples and ideal, modern, liveable urban images. For example Milliyet newspaper gives urban regeneration news with “*renewed cities, changed lives*” title and defines urban regeneration projects as a “remedy” for *gecekondu* neighbourhoods (Yenilenen Kentler, 2004).

And the mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş, shortly after the election presents himself determined for demolishing the *gecekondu* areas and “takes the risk to be known badly” which he states that: “*I will demolish. They may know me badly. I will demolish, I am determined. Istanbul is an important step and important key for modern Turkey. Istanbul should be the centre of the local approach which raises Turkey.*” (Özçakmak, 2004). He also states that the urban centres will be evacuated with urban regeneration projects and will be constructed new housing areas like in Bahçeşehir, and with this, Istanbul will be “rescued” from being plundered by illegal housings. And he adds that, the new houses, which will be delivered to the residents, will be closed to the city centre (Özçakmak, 2004). But in many examples like in Sulukule or Ayazma this promise of the Mayor was not fulfilled.

Other legitimacies of these interventions were global city/world city discourses or development/growth rhetoric. These discourses also ease and accelerate the implementations. Indeed, politicians and some mainstream media labelled the opposition groups against the projects as “people who do not want Turkey to be progressed”. Therefore, *gecekondu* areas, which have formed important sources for the investment, were represented in this period as ‘tumour’, ‘illness’, ‘disease’, ‘terror sanctuaries’, ‘criminal areas’ by the politicians and mainstream media; on the

⁶⁸ Muhtar is a head of the neighbourhoods and villages in Turkey.

contrary the regeneration projects were represented as assuring ‘modern’, ‘decent’, ‘liveable’ urban image and the way for developing the country and making the economy better.

The 61st Government Programme (2011) gives the number of regeneration/renewal projects. According to the Programme 248 gecekondu regeneration/renewal projects, which includes 188.000 housings, in 60 cities were started by MHA and local governments. But in the 62nd Government Programme (2014) these numbers were given as 90.653 housings were started and 55.197 of them were completed and delivered. The same programme also gives the news of “rural regeneration projects” which will be started in the next periods.

These urban regeneration/renewal projects do not only evict working classes from their houses, also they deprive their sources of livelihood, their working places. This process has implemented with decentralization of the industrial areas from city centres and left their places to financial, business centres. Koçak (2011) calls these both displacements of the working classes and deprivation of their working places as “urban exile of labour”.

In this process also the buildings of collective memory, historical and cultural heritage sites and buildings have tried to be transformed to the different functions like Hasanpaşa Gazhanesi, Haydarpaşa Train Station, Tekel Tobacco Factory buildings, Emek Cinema; and many of them were planned to be transformed to the hotels or shopping malls (like Four Seasons Hotel in Sultanahmet, Cercle D’orient building in Beyoğlu). And resistances were experienced in order to claim these cultural heritages. Besides buildings of collective memory, historical and cultural heritage sites were destructed with a powerful law: Bill 5366.

The purpose of The Law of Renovating, Conserving and Actively Using Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Immovable Assets (Law No: 5366), which was legalized in 2005, is:

...[to] reconstruct and restore, in a manner consistent with area development, the areas registered and announced as protected areas by the cultural and natural heritage conservation boards and protection zones of such areas which have been dilapidated and are about to lose their characteristics, create zones of housing, business, culture, tourism and social facilities in such areas, take measures against risks of natural disasters, renovate, conserve and actively use historical and cultural immovable assets. (Law of Renovating, 2005)

The fourth article of the Law states that “*Mutual agreement shall be the fundamental rule in dealing with the evacuation, demolition and expropriation of buildings located in the renovation areas.*” But it continues with:

Where an agreement is not reached, special provincial administrations and municipalities may expropriate the immovable property owned by natural persons or private law legal persons. The expropriations to be effected under this Law shall be considered as expropriations with the purpose of realizing the housing projects stated in the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Law No. 2942 on Expropriation.

Also with this Law renewal areas became the subject of “emergent expropriation”. The law was criticized with its authoritarian way of implementing the projects, also with focusing directly to demolishing and bringing gentrification to those areas. With this law some of the most important historical areas such as Sulukule, Süleymaniye, Tarlabası and Fener-Balat were declared as “renewal areas”. In the renewal areas people were sent out of these neighbourhoods and the areas were planned for the high-income groups mostly by destructing and damaging the historical heritage. Therefore we can state that Law No: 5366 brought a state-initiated gentrification and state-initiated damage in the historical sites.

Even if this study includes the period until 2010, one important legal regulation which was passed in 2012, is needed to be explained in order to understand the policy of government for urban regeneration projects. After Van earthquake in 2011, a law was passed with extraordinary power and authorization and this law formed the strongest stage of the authority in order to transform urban areas. Türkün et al. (2014) reads this law as “the last stage of power and centralization”. Indeed the law with its authorization for declaring the areas as “risky areas”, implementing the projects, sanctions, permitting restrictive judgement conditions and with superior position to the previous laws demonstrated an “above law” and authoritarian substance. As we stated the legitimacy of urban regeneration projects were generally established with the earthquake risk, and media and politicians declared these projects as the only choices for the earthquake measures. After Van earthquake in 2011, this perception has increased, and in May 2012 Law of Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risks (Law No: 6306) entered into force. The scope and objective of the law is proposed as follows:

...to set forth any work and processes and their related methods and principles regarding the improvement, settlement and renovation at areas under disaster risk, as well as any other

lands and plots which accommodate risk-bearing buildings, with the aim of establishing healthy and safe living environments compatible with science and craft norms and standards. (Law of Transformation, 2012)

And its most criticized articles can be stated as follows, in the Disposal restrictions 4th Article 3rd paragraph:

If claimed by the Ministry, MHA or the Administration during the implementation of this Law, electricity, water and natural gas shall not be supplied to the buildings in the risk areas and the risky buildings and the available utility services shall be ceased.

In implementing processes 1st paragraph of 6th article:

Decisions for the construction of new buildings, sales of the shares, reutilization on a flat-for-land basis or by revenue distribution and other methods shall be made with the minimum two thirds majorities of the stakeholders. Concerning the land shares related to the independent sections of those who disagree with this decision, the Ministry shall have their current values assessed and the shares shall be auctioned to the other stakeholders in agreement at a value not less than this specified value. If the shares cannot be sold to the stakeholders in this way, such shares shall be registered by right of office in the title deed in the name of the Treasury on the condition that the specified current value is paid by the Ministry, and shall be accepted as allocated to the Ministry for the purposes of utilization within the framework of the agreement, or any shares deemed suitable shall be transferred to MHA or the Administration.

In Implementing processes 9th paragraph of 6th article,:

In accordance with this Law Lawsuits and legal proceedings can be conducted in accordance with the Law No: 2577 Administrative Procedure Act which was dated 6/1/1982 against the implemented administrative process within thirty days from the date of notification. In such cases courts may not adopt the motion for stay of execution

And in Implementing processes 10th paragraph of 6th article: *“Notifications made to the addresses given in the address-based population registration system in relation to the works and processes performed according to this Law shall be deemed to be interlocutor.”* This law has encountered with many objections from residents, professional organizations and associations, and also many lawsuits were filed including constitutionality. And later 10th paragraph of the 6th article and the second sentence of the 9th paragraph of the 6th article were cancelled by Supreme Court in February 2014. But still the coercive sanctions of the Law obligate many people to leave their houses.

While Prime Minister Erdoğan states about the Law: “*We will do it at the expense of loss of power*” Minister of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization explains that:

A national policy will be followed. Cities will be reconstructed. Firstly, in Istanbul and in Izmir. In the first place 6 million housings are in the target. Firstly, it will be asked to the homeowner “you demolish” if she/he does not, there is no escape. The state will be regulatory; the prices will be rolled back. Like exactly public bread model.(Kentsel Dönüşümün İlk Hedefi, 2012)

According to the Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 1106,25 ha area was declared as risky area in Istanbul including 16 districts⁶⁹ (Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, nd). According to the news in August 2014, until that date 121 areas which enclosed 6930 ha were declared as risky area in Turkey (Yüzak, 2014) and almost five per cent of them are in Istanbul. And according to the same news some least risky areas in Istanbul were also declared as “risky area” like Gaziosmanpaşa, Esenler, Fikirtepe/Kadıköy, Okmeydanı/Beyoğlu, and Sultangazi (Yüzak, 2014). The common point of these areas to be in high rent districts of the city and to house lower-middle income groups.

As can be seen, 2000s established the most powerful period of neoliberalism in the urban area with renewal projects of gecekondu settlements, old city centres and old industrial areas; also with gated communities, shopping malls, business centres, and large scale development projects; as well as with the legal regulations in order to ease and accelerate this neoliberal transformation. And the urban space was perceived as the most valuable commodity and was featured with its exchange value. According to Şengül (2014) when the space is perceived as the commodity, it is transacted to be consumed and reproduced for being consumed again such as losing the values of old shopping malls and leaving their places to the “new concept” shopping malls which demonstrates the “creative destruction”.

And even, in this process the emphasis of capital and the discourse of anti-state were very strong; all the phases of these interventions were conducted by the state

⁶⁹ These districts are Bağcılar, Bayrampaşa, Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Esenler, Gaziosmanpaşa, Güngören, Kadıköy, Kartal, Küçükçekmece, Pendik Sarıyer, Sultangazi, Tuzla, Üsküdar, Zeytinburnu (See Appendix D).

(Şengül, 2014). This was very compatible with neoliberal process which Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2005) specify as “*neoliberalism hinges upon the active mobilization of state power*”. They state that:

Neoliberalism does not entail the ‘rolling back’ of state regulation and the ‘rolling forward’ of the market; instead, it generates a complex reconstitution of state-economy relations in which state institutions are actively mobilized to promote market-based regulatory arrangements. (2005, p. 102)

Also Brenner and Theodore point out that on the neoliberal urbanization, neoliberalism is considered “(a) as a modality of urban governance; (b) as a spatially selective political strategy; and (c) as a form of discourse, ideology and representation” (2005, p. 103). These all three forms can be seen largely in İstanbul in this period. While the neoliberal projects have been implemented in the urban area, the collaboration of state, private sector and also some non-governmental organizations role in this process has come forward as Siemiatycki and Grengs state that, “*neoliberalism is generating new forms of empowerment and disempowerment within a key sphere of urban governance*” (cited in Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 104). Also these projects have generally sent low-income groups away from the prosperous urban area and affected different parts of the city in diverse ways which is compatible with spatially selective political strategy. And lastly, while the urban policies of JDP has identified as entrepreneurship, marketing, creating an image, local development, strategic planning, major urban projects (Öktem, 2011) and also with competing cities, all these, as Brenner and Theodore specifies, put forwarded the representation of “*an idealized neoliberal ‘utopia’*” (2005, p. 106).

As İstanbul came forward with all these neoliberal policies, canalizing all the investments to İstanbul also led the city to exceed its ecological growth limit and also increase the gap and disequilibrium between the cities. This inevitably led to increase regional disparities in the country. But the inequality is not limited for the different regions or cities. Also the inequality of the distribution in İstanbul has reached its peak point in this period. For example, according to 2003 data, while the poorest %20 part of the population of İstanbul get just %6,4 share from total revenues, the richest %20 part of the population seizes %50,4 share of them (Şengül, 2014). Therefore the gap between the different groups has extended in this period and with gated communities and isolated life areas especially rich groups have

isolated themselves from the city. And this led the increase spatial segmentation and urban tension within different classes. The policy of the government towards this inequality and poverty has generally shaped with social aids and charities.

The most important effect of these neoliberal policies became the loss of gained rights in almost all the areas like social security or losing public assets via privatization and commodification of all cultural and historical items etc. which David Harvey calls this as accumulation by dispossession and he specifies that:

The escalating depletion of the global environmental commons (land, air, water) and proliferating habitat degradations that preclude anything but capital-intensive modes of agricultural production have likewise resulted from the wholesale commodification of nature in all its forms. The commodification of cultural forms, histories and intellectual creativity entails wholesale dispossessions ... The corporatization and privatization of hitherto public assets (like universities) to say nothing of the wave of privatization of water and other public utilities that has swept the world, constitute a new wave of 'enclosing the commons'. ... The reversion to the private domain of common property rights won through past class struggles (the right to a state pension, to welfare, or to national health care) has been one of the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of neo-liberal orthodoxy. (2004, p. 75)

Also Şengül through identifying the policies of JDP both in central and local governments compatible with the process of accumulation of dispossession and through taking a step further of Harvey's concept specifies accumulation by dispossession in the urbanization as:

Accumulation by dispossession means the brutal attack of the capital to the all layers which came before it and which did not reflect its own logic. Within this framework, the layer which we identify as urbanization of capital is created through plundering previous layers, seizing the functional ones, destruction or displacement of the incompatible ones for enabling the new investments. These kind of seizing or displacing processes are generally conducted with unlawfully usage of power of state, and in this process planning institution plays a special role. (Şengül, 2014, p. 442)

4.4.3 Urban struggles against the attack of neoliberal policies

The attack of neoliberal policies to almost all the areas of the city has accordingly led the increase the oppositional movements against these policies compared to 1980s and 1990s. In this period the opposition to these neoliberal policies have assembled generally around neighbourhood scale resistance and organizations against

regeneration/renewal projects, reclaiming public assets which became subjects of the privatization and transformation together with large scale projects like 3rd bridge, Topçu Military Barracks in Gezi Park, Taksim Pedestrianization Project, Haydarpaşaport or Galataport; historical and cultural heritage sites; and also environmental issues. While many different groups have taken part in the urban movements, the political, social and class characteristics of these groups showed large differentiation. Indeed, to draw a broader urban movement framework for all these groups is not possible for this period. While all this opposition was somehow against the neoliberal transformation of the city, in some cases this aim was voiced much more than the others. Likewise, especially neighbourhood scale mobilizations against the regeneration projects were generally criticized for being remained in the property ownership demands instead of building an opposition against the neoliberal transformation of the entire city. But still in some cases they also showed the trend of being politicized (Şen, 2010) and being interacted with other demands about the urban space. In order to understand these oppositional mobilizations and resistances in the urban area, all these different and largely interwoven issues firstly will be given separately for this period and later these struggles will be handled together in order to see the urban opposition pattern of this period.

As stated in the previous section, especially after 2004 the local and central governments focused on old gecekondu areas and “rundown” historical zones in the city centres with regeneration projects. Differently from earlier periods in this term central and local authorities left their populist policies on gecekondu areas and adopted strengthen neoliberal policies. Therefore in this period many neighbourhoods have encountered with demolition and eviction threats and implementations. Advisory Group on Forced Evictions’ (AGFE) study on the forced evictions in Istanbul in 2009 presented the areas which became the subject of forced evictions in this term (Figure 4.2). Common point of these areas are generally to be emerged in high rent areas where lower-income groups live in. While the central and local governments aimed to implement these projects with extended legal tools; this led extended oppositional movements and resistances towards these projects in this period.

The struggle against demolitions and evictions in gecekondu neighbourhoods differently from 1980s and 1990s also received the support of some middle class

groups like professionals, academics and students. This form of the opposition even show a similarity of 1970s gecekondu struggles through including academics, professionals and students in the struggle (Gündoğdu, 2010); there is an important distinction for these different two periods. While the struggle in gecekondu settlements in 1970s has showed the political characteristic; the oppositions in this period have generally avoided being in the political sphere despite some neighbourhoods which have political characteristics.

In the beginning of this period authorities have used two legal tools in order to declare the neighbourhoods as regeneration areas. The first one was the joint project protocol which was enabled by the new municipality law and signed between IMM(Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), district municipalities and MHA(Mass Housing Administration) and the second one was Law 5366. With these legal tools the first areas which became the subject of urban regeneration projects were Ayazma in Küçükçekmece and Sulukule in Fatih. These both areas (now demolished) were settlements where the most disadvantaged groups lived. While Ayazma was the place for mostly Kurdish people who came to Istanbul after forced migration in the late 1980s and 1990s; Sulukule was the first known neighbourhood for Rome people. These two areas also located in two of the most valuable places in Istanbul. Ayazma was closed to the Olympic Stadium, Organized Industrial Zone and main motorway, and Sulukule was located in historical peninsula.




Figure 4.2 : The Map of Forced Eviction (Advisory Group on Forced Evictions, 2009).

Ayazma together with Tepeüstü Neighbourhood were declared as regeneration areas and according to this project 1625 buildings were demolished and 10675 dwellers were evicted (Türkün and Aslan, 2014). While dwellers who owned the property were sent to MHA housings in Halkalı-Bezirganbahçe; this was not provided for the tenants, even if the municipality had promised to do in the beginning of the project. Therefore 42 families who were renters in the neighbourhood lived in barracks after the demolition in the neighbourhood, but the authorities also demolished these sheds (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011). Even so, after the demolition of the sheds, 18 families continued staying there for three years long with difficult living conditions, and they protested this every week in front of the municipality for a long time. In this process, one of the biggest construction companies in Turkey, Ağaoğlu, have won the tender and built a luxury gated community there which is called My World Europe. While the struggle against the project was not highly-organised before the demolition in Ayazma, the process has operated differently in Sulukule.

Through taking the support of different organizations and groups including academics, intellectuals and students and through the historical and cultural characteristic of the neighbourhood; Sulukule dwellers have managed to make their voices heard to the broader groups including UNESCO, EU Parliamentary or UN-HABITAT Advisory Group on Forced Evictions (AGFE). Sulukule Platform, Sulukule Association, Sulukule Workshop and STOP (No Frontiers Autonomous Planners) formed the main organizations or groups of the opposition against the renewal project in Sulukule. Also in this process, professional organizations, NGOs and individuals raised their oppositions against the project, and the oppositions were largely stated on the media. Differently, another type of urban movement repertoire was also experienced in Sulukule. Besides resistances against demolitions, demonstrations, press releases, festivals and other kind of widely experienced repertoires of urban movements, an alternative plan was also prepared by STOP in order to manage to keep Roma people in the neighbourhood. The aims of plan were executed as *“Restoring Sulukule for Istanbul, developing spatial strategies for social progress and economic development, and not aggrieving local community”* (Sulukule Günlüğü, 2008). After the alternative plan was presented to the public, Fatih Municipality wanted to meet with STOP in order to evaluate the alternative

plan but even the plan was presented to Municipality any agreement could not be achieved (Yalçınan and Çavuşoğlu, 2011). Apart this, legal battles were initiated by professional organizations and dwellers. Even the project was cancelled by the court decisions; the entire neighbourhood was demolished, and dwellers were sent away from the neighbourhood⁷⁰. The new ottoman-style buildings were constructed for the new dwellers and the project has formed one of the examples of state-led gentrification in İstanbul.

A similar attempt for the alternative plan was also experienced in Gülsuyu and Gülensu⁷¹ which are old gecekondu neighbourhoods in Maltepe. The first gecekondu settlements have seen in these neighbourhoods in 1950s. Differently from Ayazma and Sulukule, these neighbourhoods are featured neighbourhoods with their political characteristics and involvement in social movements especially in 1970s. Gülsuyu met with urban regeneration with Maltepe 1/5000 Northern Side of E-5 (D100) Development Plan⁷² in 2004, and just after the announcement of the urban regeneration project the residents came together in order to find ways to oppose and cancel the plan. With this solidarity in the neighbourhood, residents of 6000 dwellings gave objection petition to the plan and 32 different legal battles were initiated by the dwellers in order to cancel the plan (Yıldız, 2008). These initiatives led the authorities to revise the plan, and to include a note in the plan that the planning process will be conducted with the participation of local people. This opposition was largely pursued by Gülsuyu-Gülensu Neighbourhood Association. And the neighbourhood association together with Solidarity Planning Studio, which was formed by academics and students from universities, attempted to prepare an alternative plan like in Sulukule. But the agreement about alternative plan was not ensured and the plan was never prepared (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011).

As we stated above, even these initiatives for alternative plan show a similarity in 1970s gecekondu neighbourhoods' planning experience for their neighbourhoods

⁷⁰ The municipality agreed with 346 families in order to move Taşoluk housings which were built by MHA and located 42 km away from Sulukule. And it is known that almost all came back to the central city. And some has never gone to Taşoluk.

⁷¹ Even Gülsuyu – Gülensu are administratively two different neighbourhoods, because they both have a common neighbourhood organization and experienced the struggle against the urban regeneration project together, only Gülsuyu will be referred for them henceforth in the study.

⁷² This plan was for 9 different neighbourhoods in Maltepe, which comprised 2544 ha area and 200-300 thousands people.

because of including professionals, academics and students (Gündoğdu, 2010), 1970s' political characteristic was not seen in these experiences. According to Erdoğan Yıldız who is the representative of Gülsuyu-Gülensu Neighbourhood Association, this was preferred initially. He explains the first period when neighbourhood associations were started to be established against the regeneration projects in 2004-2005 as follows:

... Another serious problem of that period was that, there were mostly political groups in the centre of these issues [opposition]. The opposition against urban regeneration was seen as a tool for political organization. They had viewpoint which postpone the solution for the urban regeneration to the socialism and revolution. ... This situation was more widespread in the neighbourhoods which had a background with political organizations like Gülsuyu, Armutlu and Okmeydanı. They have told that 'Leave the plan works. We barricade and resist...' They were of course coherent in their own, but they did not suggest a solution to our problem. Their serious viewpoint difference with neighbourhood associations led neighbourhoods to move amongst themselves. (Yıldız, 2008, p. 37)

Also Gündoğdu (2010) states the difference of these two different struggle experiences in two different periods as:

...with a more in-depth approach, the locality-based initiatives like alternative planning situate in neoliberal era of capitalism which is a quite different period than 1970s' social economic context... Similar struggle strategies would likely let quite different even opposite results in different contexts.... It is an important question that in which forms local initiatives would emerge an anti-capitalist logic under the intensive effect of wider geographies' dynamics. Furthermore, to evaluate a practice like planning, which tries to ensure social order by using capitalist distinctions (public-private, policy-economy, state-society), as a "solution tool" through isolating contradictions and tensions which arise from aforesaid distinctions should be questioned carefully. (Gündoğdu, 2010: 356-357)

Therefore Gündoğdu also criticizes the using "planning" as a tool for the struggle in the neoliberal period of capitalism. This criticism is compatible with Lefebvre's point of view on urban planning. And to use this tool for the struggle does not reject the capital relations in the urban area; instead it just shows how it could be possible to arrange these relations through also taking into account the local people in the area. But it is important to state that according to Yalçınan and Çavuşoğlu (2011) all the other repertoires in the struggle was used in order to manage to cancel the project in Sulukule, but alternative plan became the last option after the failure of all other tools. Still the criticism on alternative plan was also emerged by the some dwellers

in Gülsuyu, and this also led not to emerge an alternative plan. In this sense Şen's (2010) argument is very important on the alternative planning:

The financial and legal conditions which create urban regeneration found its implementing power with planning and projects decisions. To develop a 'counter plan' could be a way to break this power and there was not a long period between mentioning this and implementing. Later in the process this idea of counter plan was formulated with the concept of 'alternative plan'. This process became the response of a political seek which was unable to dare to lose." (Şen, 2010: 336-337)

Even two neighbourhoods came into question with alternative planning or alternative agenda, in other neighbourhoods the process have operated differently according to the neighbourhoods' political and social structures. For example just near Gülsuyu-Gülensuyu neighbourhoods, struggle in Başbüyük was different from its neighbours on the other side of the valley. As being a poor working-class neighbourhood, Başbüyük like Gülsuyu-Gülensu met with urban regeneration with Maltepe 1/5000 Northern Side of E-5 Development Plan in 2004. Differently from Gülsuyu-Gülensu, Başbüyük was a conservative neighbourhood which 72 per cent of the population voted for JDP in 2004 local elections⁷³. In 2006 a protocol was signed between Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Maltepe municipality and MHA in order to demolish gecekondu in this area and send the dwellers who were the owners (excluding tenants) of the dwellings to the apartment blocks which were built by MHA. But this project encountered with a great resistance which was conducted mostly by women. Kuyucu and Ünsal state that: *"it was the first time that this conservative population, who overwhelmingly voted for the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP), had participated in such a public demonstration"* (2010, p. 1479).

Başbüyük residents were informed about the project in 2006 when two years later the Development Plan was approved. The neighbourhood association tried to organize and inform people about the project. The association demanded the title deeds and opposed the construction of high-rise buildings in the park of the neighbourhood where seven water wells were situated in (Şen and Türkmen, 2014). In 2007 some participants of the association went to Ankara in order to meet with

⁷³ This decreased to 55 per cent in 2007 general election.

opposition parties which are RPP, NMP and MP. While they were in Ankara, a massive intervention has occurred in the neighbourhood by the police. Since the intervention of the police was managed to be beaten back, in November 2007 contractor with the police came again to the neighbourhood in order to start the construction. But residents of Başbüyük gave them an unexpected welcome which Kuyucu and Ünsal describe as follows:

A group of residents, dressed in White as if attending a funeral ceremony, carried signs that read ‘Our neighbourhood is our pride’, ‘We will resist until we die’ and ‘Başbüyük will be a grave for the MHA’. Next to them, a group of women chanted ‘Fikri!’⁷⁴ Don’t cross the line, don’t test our patience’. (2010, p. 1479)

After this protest, contractor withdrew from the project and the project was transferred to another contractor. On 27 February 2008 another major conflict took place with 3000 polices and after that police intervention, conflict and 24 hour-presence police force have become continuous in the neighbourhood with gas bombs and police violence. And the residents, especially women, started their resistance in the tents against the police intervention and construction which Deniz explains this process as follows:

...the clashes were not the typical unorganized spontaneous gatherings to prevent the instantaneous threat of demolitions. A certain tactic and motivation decided by the organization was behind the clashes. The organization instrumentalized the clashes with the police to strengthen the organization’s hand at the negotiation table with the Municipality. Moreover, all of the militancy of the neighbourhood was used as a way intimidate against the authorities to establish the terms of the organization. Through the end of the period it became to be a legitimate agent on the eyes of Maltepe Municipality to have a word on the future of the neighbourhood. (2010: 79)

This resistance has led the perception of urban space to become politicized (Şen and Türkmen, 2014). The neighbourhood has received the support of left parties, organizations and media. As being a conservative neighbourhood this resistance made the residents, especially women, politicized. For example on 6 April 2008 women in Başbüyük participated a demonstration which was conducted by *Herkese Sağlık Güvenli Gelecek Platformu* (The Platform of Health to Everyone and Secure Future) with “we will neither let them to demolish our houses, nor sell our health”

⁷⁴ Fikri Köse who was the mayor of Maltepe Municipality.

banners (Kadıköy Mitingi'nde, 2008). But the extreme police violence and siege, with many injured and detained people made the situation unbearable for the residents, and the association made an agreement with the municipality on 8 May 2008 (Şen and Türkmen, 2014). Kuyucu and Ünsal state that:

In Başbüyük, an established gecekondu neighbourhood with strong social networks, the implementation of the UTP⁷⁵ generated a swift and powerful resistance movement, which lost its fervour with an equally surprising speed. A large number of the residents have already agreed to, or are seriously considering accepting, the project terms. (2010:1492)

Besides the demonstrations and resistances on the streets residents also initiated legal battles against the project. And even if the residents won the lawsuit against the project, the construction gained speed (Lodos, 2009) and at the moment in that area 6 buildings with 14 floors were built. And even Maltepe Municipality has changed in 2009 local elections with the victory of RPP, also RPP did not fulfil its promises and according to the representative of the association “*RPP has managed what JDP could not manage and segmented the neighbourhood in two parts*” (Kaya, 2011). Therefore the future of the neighbourhood is still uncertain.

While Başbüyük struggle, even in a short term, presented a kind of politicization experience for a conservative neighbourhood in order to defend their houses, some other neighbourhoods which were featured neighbourhoods in 1970s with the struggle of socialist left like Güzeltepe were included in the struggle against urban regeneration projects with also the right to housing demands for the tenants through also extending the struggle to the class-based and political discourses. The tenants struggle in Güzeltepe also shows an experience of housing problem with a class consciousness (Şen, 2010). Güzeltepe together with Nurtepe were the places for the 15-16 June 1970 worker movements and featured neighbourhoods for revolutionary movements (Ergin, 2006) and therefore class consciousness was also the heritage of 1970s' political and class-based struggle in the neighbourhood. After the demolition on 22 and 28 July 2005, 6 families who were the renters in the area have resisted in the bus stations. The tenants' demands on their right to housing were not supported by some of the gecekondu owners which Ergin explains as:

⁷⁵ Stands for “Urban Transformation Project”.

...there was a sense that the struggle was pursued especially by the renters. The gecekondu owners were blaming the renters for worsening the situation and also for being “political”. The owners were accusing them for profiting more than them; since due to their protest; the renters (defined as “Durakkonducu” especially by the media for people staying in the bus stations, instead of gecekondu because of the demolition) received a one-year rent furniture aid from the municipality. The owners stated that because of what the renters gain, their “possible” benefit decreased and failed in a bad situation between “the renters” and “the municipality”. Most of the renters left the quarter; the gecekondu owners are transformed into “social housing” indebted. (Ergin, 2006, p. 127)

As we stated, while in this period urban transformation projects threatened many neighbourhoods, the resistance and struggle against these projects have increased and extended. Some other examples to these resistances were experienced in Derbent, Armutlu, Okmeydanı, Karanfilköy, Tarlabası, Fener-Balat, Tozkoparan, Hürriyet, Yakacık, Kurtköy and so on. These struggles against the transformation projects in the neighbourhoods were generally conducted by neighbourhood associations. But it is important to state that the participation to these neighbourhood associations was very low for some neighbourhoods (Türkmen, 2011). Another problem of the period was not to get these neighbourhood associations together, in order to strengthen the struggle and share the experiences with each other. In order to overcome this problem a platform was established in 2006 which was called as Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform. The platform came together on June 2007 with “Neighbourhoods talking, No to Urban/*Rantsal*⁷⁶ Transformation” Symposium with 23 neighbourhoods and put forth its aims with a declaration. Some of the aims, which were stated in the declaration, were as follows:

We want to get sufficient and equal urban services (housing, infrastructure, transportation, health and education) without leaving our neighbourhoods, and we demand our urban rights to be on legal assurance without concerning ‘when, what will happen’.

We invite public institutions to produce needed projects and fulfil the requirements of being social state in order to reassure the sheltering and living rights of our neighbours who are renters in our neighbourhoods.

... We declare that we protect not just our neighbourhoods but also the future of entire Istanbul... (Mahaller Konuşuyor, 2007)

⁷⁶ Means based on urban rent.

But even some attempts were emerged in order to generate an umbrella platform for the neighbourhood associations like The Platform of Istanbul Neighbourhoods Association, it is important to state that still the neighbourhood associations show different characteristics socially and politically. Some of these organizations and groups have sought “*short term results, such as property ownership, construction opportunities or bargaining on the deals*” instead of “*collective rights in the city*” (Türkmen, 2011, p. 2). And some of them have more political characteristics than other. This was largely connected to the political characteristic of the neighbourhood.

While the organizations in the neighbourhoods, which left-wing groups are more dominant, have more the political discourses; also some studies show that this also affected the progressing the struggle out of the ownership relations or not. Studies show that when the property structure is homogenous in the neighbourhood which none of the dwellers have legal title for their houses and when the neighbourhood has a left-wing political structure, these neighbourhoods have more ability to mobilize against the projects (see Deniz, 2010).

Also the struggles against the evictions in the regeneration areas have generally tried to be ruptured by the authorities with property ownership mechanisms. Both the public authorities and the public-private partners have featured property ownerships and personal gains in order to transform the struggles into bargaining (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). For example one of the initiatives, IMECE⁷⁷, which is the one of the active groups in urban movement in Istanbul, criticizes this as follows:

... the strategies which were conducted in the urban regeneration projects, which affect large amount of people, can be in disjunctive and modifier character for the orientation of the struggles and oppositions. Today, momentum of these struggles were aimed to rupture with new legal regulations and with different ‘reconciliation grounds’. ‘New rent share’ construct, which is the most fragile point of urban opposition, tries to prevent the people, who are closely affected from these projects and decisions on the urban area, from being the subject of the struggle through setting ground for a new ‘resignation’ mechanism. The ostensible participation discourses and practices, which go along with these processes, sometimes weaken the endeavour for a common opposition channel. (IMECE, 2011)

⁷⁷ Society’s Urbanism Movement (Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi).

Therefore the struggles against the urban transformation projects in the neighbourhoods settle on a very fragile point about property relations and personal gains. Even if these are very acceptable demands for the dwellers for not being evacuated from their houses; these bargaining processes generally both weaken the struggle through separating the residents between tenants and owners and also this gives chance to the authorities to rupture the resistance through starting the bargaining process. And according to the experiences until today in Istanbul, generally none and rarely with very few and temporal gains (in Ayazma and Güzeltepe with the struggle of the tenants) tenants have always been evicted from their neighbourhoods without getting any right in the projects, and owners have generally been sent to the outskirts of the urban area with large amount of debts. But still it is wrong to say that these struggles did not let any gains for the residents, especially about bargaining conditions some amendments were obtained by the residents after the struggles, but these conditions still do not provide a full achievement and also they are always under threat to be withdrawn (IMECE, 2011).

We can see that despite the achievements of the struggles (so that we can never talk about a full and constant achievement in the urban struggles in Turkey, because even the struggle had a victory on the streets or on the courts, after a while, -and this time period always vary- the authorities bring the same or slightly changed version of the same project into agenda with different tools or even sometimes with the same tools) we can state that some points effect the mobilization ability of the neighbourhood against the project. First of all it is not wrong to say that to have a political structure or not affect this (see Deniz, 2010), secondly the time period between the project was heard and started to be implemented, also to be an old or new settlement affect this, and the networks with the other neighbourhoods also important for the mobilization ability. Even other factors can be added to these points, especially in the neighbourhoods where the residents have migrated at the end of 1980s and 1990s because of forced migration, the mobilization was weaker than the gecekondu neighbourhoods which were established earlier. Because of their disadvantages of not having opportunity continue their ties with their villages also led them not to establish strong relations in the city. Therefore they became the most undefended groups also for urban regeneration projects.

In sum, while the authorities have developed their discourses about urban regeneration projects on earthquake risk, crime, illegal construction, poor urban image etc., the resistances and mobilizations against these projects were generally constructed with belonging to the neighbourhood, historicity of the neighbourhood, and criticism of the new projects which would bring extra financial burdens, poor urban design and architecture which are not compatible with lives of local people, locating away from old neighbourhood, failure to ensure participation and to be based on capital interests instead of people's benefit (IMECE, 2011). However authorities in order to weaken the struggle have responded these resistances in two ways. Firstly as we stated, through some little amendments on the bargaining processes generally for the owners of the settlements and with this it generally manages to separate the groups in two and weaken the struggle. And secondly through using brutal strategies, which Gough and Gündoğdu explain as:

The authorities have used their access to the media to present the dwellers in squatter areas as 'invaders' of public land, notwithstanding the previous decades of their legitimation. ... Public services such as transport, water and electricity have been cut off or closed. Finally, the residents have been frightened by pressures applied to leading resisters, and by police harassment targeted on the most marginalized groups including Kurdish immigrants, left activists, homosexuals and people of African descent. (2009, p. 23)

Besides neighbourhood associations some neighbourhoods have organized under local committees like Alibeyköy Public Committee, Gazi Public Committee. And also besides Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform, Coordination of Working People Against Demolitions (Yıkımlara Karşı emekçi Halk Koordinasyonu) which was called as Coordination of Right to the Housing (Konut Hakkı Koordinasyonu) later, became other common platforms for the groups which are against the transformation projects. Also some other groups have come together with larger scale organizations or urban initiatives against urban transformation projects. As we stated above one of them Solidarity Studio but apart it some organizations like TMMOB, IMECE, Social Rights Associations, *Halkevleri*⁷⁸ have played important roles in this struggle. Some of these organizations also have a political structure (Şen, 2010) even if some others avoided it intentionally. Also some left political parties supported the struggle of gecekondu dwellers.

⁷⁸ Literally means public houses.

Even if especially urban regeneration projects in the neighbourhoods formed the core point of the urban struggle in this period, the struggles against the mega projects were formed another urban-based oppositional movement. While in the process of transforming Istanbul to a global city brought many large scale transformation projects like Galataport, Haydarpaşaport, Topçu Military Barracks in Gezi Park, Taksim Pedestrianization Projects and also large scale transportation projects like 3rd bridge, highways, Marmaray etc., the opposition against these projects have also increased and varied in this period. To protect public spaces, common places, the places which are important in the public memory, cultural-historical heritages and urban environment formed the main goals of the mobilizations. Also putting forward the exchange value of the space instead use value, exploitation of the nature and history in the favour of capital became other adversaries in these struggles. The mobilizations on these issues also tried to get together on a common ground which demands right to the city.

While the mobilizations against the urban regeneration projects in the neighbourhoods led to include local groups in the mobilizations and enclosed different parts of the groups, the struggle against the major projects were generally conducted by the platforms (like The Platform for Life Instead of Third Bosphorus Bridge), professional organizations (like Chamber of Architects or Urban Planners), trade unions (like United Union of Transport Employees –especially for Haydarpaşa) or other organizations (like IMECE, Social Rights Associations) also by academicians and some other individuals. We can state that, differently from the mobilizations against the urban regeneration projects in the neighbourhoods, these struggles were generally conducted by the middle class groups.

Another struggle in this period emerged against privatization of the urban services like schools or hospitals. As we stated in the previous section, while the privatization implementations have increased dramatically in this period, this also included education and health facilities. Against these implementations, mobilizations with ‘do not touch my school/hospital’ slogans were held by the platforms, organizations, trade unions and also by parents and students.

Also public open spaces were formed the other issues of urban struggles. While many urban open spaces including urban squares or parks were opened to constructions for shopping malls, residents or for other market-oriented functions;

reclaiming these spaces were formed one of the most important demands for the urban struggles. Even this study includes the neoliberal urban policies and resistances against them until 2010, not mentioning Gezi Park Protests which were emerged at the end of May 2013 would be an important gap for the study. In order to contest the construction of Military Barrack in Gezi Park, the sit-ins in the park have extended almost all the cities of Turkey with a wide range of demands in spite of and also against the violent police oppression. Even if the protests demands and process exceed the limits of this study, the demonstrations have left important heritage for social movements and urban-based movements in Turkey. After the demonstrations, the public forums which were organised in many neighbourhoods in Turkey, led to discuss many issues including urban-based demands for the participators. These public forums became the arena for discussing and resisting against the neoliberal projects in the cities. Also recently, the participation to the urban struggles and demanding right to the city became much more featured demand in the urban area.

4.5 Evaluation of the Chapter

In this chapter, in order to understand the mobilizations and oppositional movements against the enacted policies; both the socio-economic and political processes, and also adopted urban policies are given in four different periods between 1950 and 2010.

It is observed that, the first period (1950-1980) is when the rural-urban migration has taken place in Turkey together with the rise of gecekondu dwellings. This period also provided significant information about the first political urban movements which were emerged in the gecekondu neighbourhoods. The second period, which consists the era between 1980 and 1990, presents the neoliberal transformation of economic system of Turkey with socially and politically oppressed conditions with the effect of 1980 coup d'état. It is seen that, 1970s' political characteristics have largely dissolved and urban oppositional mobilizations were very limited that were held only by some professionals and elites. 1990s present the period of re-increasing the urban oppositional mobilizations but differently from 1970s with unpolitic aspects through NGOs, which have increased especially after Habitat II in 1996 and after 1999 earthquake. And the last period (2002-2010) comes forward with the powerful one party government (JDP), strengthening neoliberal urban policies and increasing

intervention of the state on urban space with rent-seeking projects. In this period, the increased contradictions in the urban space led also the increase of oppositional mobilizations with varied demands, adversaries and organizational types. As an evaluation of this chapter Table 4.4 was prepared in order to understand and compare the characteristics of the periods between 1950 and 2010.

Table 4.4 : Socio-economic and political characteristics, urban policies and urban mobilizations of the periods.

	1950 – 1980 Import substitution model and Rapid Urbanization	1980 – 1990 The early phase of neoliberalization and hegemony of urban entrepreneurship	1990-2002 The period of political instability and economic recession with global city discourses	2002-2010 The peak phase of neoliberalization and accumulation by dispossession
Socio-Economic and Political Characteristics	1950s: -liberal economic development import substitution policies -Truman Doctrine - Marshall Aid -multi-party system -marginal sectors (the buffer role of active, flexible and cheap workforces of rural-urban migrants in order to sustain economic development) - import restrictions and “stabilization measures” - economic recession and financial troubles - import restrictions and import substitution policies - the reconstruction of the cities in order to overcome the economic downturn 1960s: - coup d'état in 1960 - planned development model - gecekondu dwellers started to work in informal sectors instead of marginal 1970s -global economic crisis (oil crisis) -increasing inequality over income distribution -inadequacy on basic needs, black market and high inflation -increasing dynamics of working class	-24th January 1980’ decisions -triennial stand-by agreement with IMF in June 1980 -12 September 1980 coup d’état -a new kind of capital accumulation model with neoliberal policies -authoritarian regime on the political groups by military junta - depoliticization and unorganization --capitals’ orientation towards the financial markets and urban rents -engagement with “stabilization policy package” of IMF and “structural adjustment program” of WB -orienting the resources largely to the urban services - construction sector had the largest share of the investments -Presence of large capitals in the urban area -new middle classes -removal of subsidies on agriculture -new rural-urban migration wave -self-housing approach of IMF and WB – new amnesty laws -“aggressive entrepreneurial strategies” informal sectors and segregation with and within social classes - Turkish Islamic synthesis ideology -liberalized foreign exchange transactions and capital movements -working class mobilization in 1989	- working class mobilization in 1989 (The Actions of Spring) - Different coalition and minority governments -Political instability -globalization as an ineluctable process both right and left parties - external financial liberalization -1992, 1994, 1998-1999 and in 2000-2001 economic crisis -Withdrawal of earned rights of working classes because of the crisis - Customs Union with European Union - privatization for the purpose of covering the public deficits - the second generation structural reforms which started with the “close monitoring agreement” with IMF in 1998 -conflicts between Turkish Armed Forces and PKK militants -forced migration -28 February military memorandum -1999 earthquake -Globalization/Localization -Governance - after 2001 crisis Program for Transition to a Strong Economy – PTSE (also known as Derviş Program) -18th stand-by agreement in 2002 was emerged.	- Effects of (18th stand by) -Victory of JDP: “changing the shirt of National Vision”. “post-Islamist” or ‘moderate islam” - multicultural, market-oriented reforms and with EU nomination process -selling largest public institutions in order to cover the current deficit through – highest privatization rate in the history of the country -19th stand-by agreement (2005) - uninterrupted IMF monitoring (1998-2008) - social regulations like social security; pension; commercialization, privatization and pricing of the health system - charity and aid to poor projects in order to recover regressive social policies – clientelism - patronage relations - The laws and regulations on communication, energy, public bids, banking, Savings Deposit Insurance Fund and autonomous institutions -2008-2009 economic crises. - unemployment growth and declining real wages - resilience of the labour market- flexible working conditions – decrease on unionisation and union movements – unsecure working conditions – decreasing social rights of working classes - identity-culture based movements

Continued table.

	1950 – 1980 Import substitution model and Rapid Urbanization	1980 – 1990 The early phase of neoliberalization and hegemony of urban entrepreneurship	1990-2002 The period of political instability and economic recession with global city discourses	2002-2010 The peak phase of neoliberalization and accumulation by dispossession
Local Government-Urban Policies and Planning Processes	1950s: Amnesty Laws for gecekondu dwellings reconstruction of the cities (road transportation strategies) 1960s: The Greater İstanbul Master Plan Office was established in 1966 Legal regulation for condominium and gecekondu amnesties -“urban development period of state and middle-class centred” 1970s -RPP: new municipalism (social democratic municipalism) with public entrepreneurs and social justice policies which had an effect on gecekondu labourers and leftist petit-bourgeois -“community-based urbanization period”	- İstanbul Metropolitan Area Master Plan but after 1980 coup d’état The Greater İstanbul Master Plan Office was closed and that plan was not implemented. -new environmental and master plans - hegemony of urban entrepreneurship -“the transition from small capitals’ city to the large ones” - competition and hierarchy of local units with the dominance of world cities or global cities discourses - international business, culture and finance centre of Middle East and Europe - legalizing the informal settlements - <i>apartmentization</i> of gecekondu dwellings (exchange value and articulation in the capitalist relations) (inequality – segregation – mafia relations) - privatization of urban services like waste collection and disposal.	- The high rate of gecekondu dwellings’ effect on national urban policies - even SDPP has made some improvements for urban poor, it has avoided adopting a class based opposition -After 1992-1994 crisis SDPP municipalities’ policy change towards neoliberal policies -privatization, subcontracting, implementations in the favour of small bourgeois instead of low income groups -Global city with SDPP merge with the discourses of democratization and human rights aspects (articulating Europe System) -municipality workers strike -the victory of WP in 1994 local elections – National Vision - Global city with WP “symbol of Ottoman and/or Islamist territorial hegemony” - Localization - ‘development through the localities’ – competing cities – marketing cities -Urban governance	- neoliberal transformation and reconstruction for cities -urban governance -privatization of public lands/assets - Local Government Reform (decentralization, governance - city councils, regional development agencies, - segmented planning process (28 different institutions on planning processes) -Tournout from decentralization to centralization -IMP - 2004 - İstanbul Environmental Plan – 2009 -Large Scale Development Projects -Tourism reform -Regeneration/renewal projects -Construction for economic development -evictions / demolitions both in gecekondu neighbourhoods and old central historical areas where low-income groups live -urban exile of labour -destruction of natural and historical areas
Featured Legal Tools	-Zonning Law No:6765, Expropriation Law: 6830 -Laws for the Encouragement of Construction and for Unauthorized buildings (5228, 5431, 6188) 1960s -Condominium Law (legal regulations of “<i>apartmentization</i>”) in 1965 Gecekondu Law No: 775 in 1966 -Since 1948 seven amnesty laws	- Law about Share Given to Municipalities and Special Provision Administrations (1981) -Law 2983 (1984) - Law of Municipalities No. 3030 (1984) - Planning Law No.3194 (1985) - Law for the Encouragement of Tourism No. 2634 (1982) -Regulation on the zoning law - No.335 Legislative Decree -Mass Housing Law (MHA) -Five different amnesty laws	- Privatization Law No:4046 (1994)	-Metropolitan Municipality Law (Law No: 5216)-2004 -14 legal regulations about MHA. -Law 5366 - 2005 -Municipal law change on 73rd article (5393) 2005 -Regulation of city councils 2006 - Municipal Law (Law No: 5998) 73rd article – 2010

Continued table.

	1950 – 1980 Import substitution model and Rapid Urbanization	1980 – 1990 The early phase of neoliberalization and hegemony of urban entrepreneurship	1990-2002 The period of political instability and economic recession with global city discourses	2002-2010 The peak phase of neoliberalization and accumulation by dispossession
Representations and oppositions against the gecekondu settlements	1950s: “Rural other” for gecekondu dwellers (opposition generally from former residents of the city and professionals or elites since governments and capital establish patronage relations and latent reconciliations – vote/workforce) 1960s: “Innocent labourers” – “Objectionable other” 1970s: “liberated areas” (for the neighbourhoods which were established through the mobilization of socialist left)	“plunder”, “depredator”, “ill-gotten gains” “invaders”, “providers of the unfair distribution” or as “freeloaders” (generally by some media institutions and oppositional groups like former residents of the city) -“Istanbul became the city of newcomers instead of its real residents” were generally articulated by some elites and media institutions	-plunder, visa application for the entrance to Istanbul (politicians – Erdoğan) -“Varoş” in the meaning of “dangerous”, “violence”, “lawlessness”, “illegality”, “system opposition” or also uncultured, “deprived of aesthetic consumption” and “degenerate” but mainly for the neighbourhoods which were established by socialist organizations in 1970s and which are highly mobilized in the social, political and urban movements.	- tumour, the base of terror, drugs, distorted perspective to the state, psychological negativity, lack of education and health problems, sanctuary of criminal organizations, illness, disease (mostly by politicians, bureaucrats and mainstream media)
The effects of conducted socio-economic and urban policies over urban areas	1950s: -seizure of small farms by landlords -rural-urban migration and rapid urban population growth - inadequacy of the state for providing urban services - gecekondu - construction operations of Menderes (demolishes for wide roads, building squares, monuments, statues and and restoration of some religious buildings in Istanbul) 1960s: -persistence of gecekondu dwellings -<i>apartmentization</i> of middle classes – build-sell type of housing, increase on owning houses and revival of housing sector - urbanization of small manufacturers 1970s: - urbanization of labour -RPP has changed its policies towards “the left of the centre” -mobilization of socialist left - state’s surveillance and control on gecekondu neighbourhoods which were established through the mobilization of socialist left.	- neoliberal reconstruction and increasing role of urban areas as exchange value –change on economic structures, socio-spatial textures, class relations and urban alliances of the cities - urbanization of the capital (Şengül, 2009) -Decentralization of industrial areas - international finance, service and tourism functions. - speculation of the forest areas, agricultural areas and watersheds with “local zoning plans” and “improvements plans” - major road and construction projects - build-operate-transfer models - shopping-malls, villas or hotels and restoration of historical and cultural buildings -tourism centres - international business districts -gated communities – rich ghettos -urban sprawl -growth on urban population –increase on the number of gecekondu settlements - <i>apartmentization</i> of gecekondu dwellings -spatial segregation (urban poor/gecekondu – middle class/cooperatives – super class/rich ghettos) -first wave gentrification	- problems on urban services like water shortages, waste collection in SDPP period -forced migration- deepening poverty in the urban area, social and political exclusion - skyscrapers, business districts, trade centres, five stars hotels, international congress and culture centres, etc. And also some other projects like Formula 1 track or Koç University. - Gated communities -social/spatial segregation, class division - Gentrification -“preparation” of the city for Habitat II (evictions and displacements) - discrimination especially towards gecekondu dwellers	- urban space became the most attractive commodity for the capital - exchange value of the urban space - transformation of the urban sector (from industry to service) -Major Transportation projects (third bridge – highways- Marmaray) -Major Construction Projects (Galataport, Haydarpaşaport, Channel Istanbul, Topçu Military Barracks, Taksim Pedestrianization Project) -Tourism reform (luxury hotels, shopping malls, international organizations...) -privatization of urban services and public areas (parks, coastal areas, forest areas, education – health facilities) -increase on construction (more than demand – highest point in the history of Turkey in 2010) -gated communities –residences

Continued table.

	1950 – 1980 Import substitution model and Rapid Urbanization	1980 – 1990 The early phase of neoliberalization and hegemony of urban entrepreneurship	1990-2002 The period of political instability and economic recession with global city discourses	2002-2010 The peak phase of neoliberalization and accumulation by dispossession
Characteristics of urban based oppositional mobilizations	Establishment of the professional chambers (Chamber of Architects in 1954) and (limited) opposition to construction operations of Menderes and government's populist policies over gecekondu 1960s: Increase on Beautification Associations Increase on gecekondu neighbourhoods demands on urban services 1970s -Mobilizations of the workers in gecekondu settlements -New municipalism (social democratic municipalism) movement (RPP): conflicts between municipalities and central government -oppositional movements to the first bridge -struggles of socialist left on gecekondu neighbourhoods demanding housing and urban services which have a political, organized and class-based character (accepted as the first broader urban movement in Turkey)	- military junta's domination and authority to the neighbourhoods which were known with their political positions, arrestment, oppressions and interventions - depoliticization, unorganization and individualism of the society - development amnesty laws as an appeasing tool in order to decrease social oppositions -oppositions against the increase of gecekondu settlements -urban opposition with NGOs, professional organizations, educated small bourgeoisie, intellectuals, some media institutions -oppositions were generally conducted through media, journals or press releases or with legal proceedings by NGOs and professional organizations - staying away from political sphere was important and necessary for being heard for some groups	- Gentrificators and middle classes role on NIMBY movements -Habitat II - governance -Opposition to Habitat II (Outsiders Forum) -Increasing role of NGOs – a sharp rupture of class based approach on urban struggles -The role of intellectuals, academics and professionals (mostly about public spaces, cityscape, historical and natural heritage of the city) - Civil Society Institutions /Democratic People Organizations. -Increase on the number of associations, platforms and initiatives about urban issues with the largely mentioned aims which are consciousness of “mahallelik” and consciousness of “İstanbulluluk”, protecting their “own” neighbourhood, “awareness-raising”. -Opposing the gecekondu settlements with the statements that losing Istanbul, new owners of Istanbul, “varoş” neighbourhoods, “this city is not ours”.	-neighbourhood scale mobilizations and organizations against regeneration/renewal projects (residents, also professionals, academics, students, platforms, initiatives, professional organizations also transnational organizations) - reclaiming public assets which became subject to the privatization and transformation - protecting historical, natural and cultural heritage; - variation on the organizational status, demands and repertoire tactics -presence of middle classes in the oppositional movements for gecekondu dwellings -Attempts to unite different neighbourhood associations under some umbrella platforms -some organizations adopted political positions, some others initially avoided being in the political sphere -alternative plan was also used as a tool for the struggles but this was also largely criticized.
Featured examples of oppositional mobilizations	1950s: <i>only known collective action to construction operations came when the trees were cut down in Ordu Avenue</i> 1960s: - Protests of gecekondu dwellers about urban services 1970s: -“The Campaign of Feasibility” against the first bridge -“The Bridge to the Zap Water not the Bosphorus” against the first bridge -Mobilization of socialist left in some gecekondu neighbourhoods like 1 May Neighbourhood, Çayan Neighbourhood.	- İTÜ Taşkışla campus, -Gökkafes -Park Otel -Tarlabaşı demolishes - piled road in Arnavutköy -construction in Bosporus -Piyalepaşa-Dolapdere axes -Büyük Hendek Street in Galata	- Park Hotel -Gökkafes - İTÜ Maçka campus, -3rd Bridge -Mosque in Taksim Square -Cercle d'Orient- Emek Cinema -Moda Pier, -Galata demolitions, -Gazhane, -Göksu Stream, -destruction of the forested areas and watersheds, -Moda highway, -Formula 1 -shortages of the urban services -protests against demolition of gecekondu settlements	-Ayazma regeneration project (renters resistances) -Sulukule renewal project(alternative plan, demonstrations, festivals...) -Gülsuyu Gülsusu (objection petitions, demonstrations, attempt for an alternative plan) -Başibüyük resistance -Güzeltepe renters resistances - Also resistances against the regeneration projects in Derbent, Armutlu, Okmeydanı, Karanfilköy, Tarlabası, Fener-Balat, Tozkoparan, Hürriyet, Yakacık, Kurtköy and so on. - Kuzguncuk, Validebağ, Taksim Square - old TEKEL buildings, Emek, AKM...

5. RECLAIMING THE CITY ON THE STREETS

5.1 Introduction

Neoliberal urban policies, which have formed the urban space since 1980s in Turkey, increased the conflicts in the city. While these policies put forward the exchange value of urban areas through transforming them to commodities, this has restricted the accessibility of collective consumption demands especially for urban poor, and has increased the contradictions and conflicts in the urban area.

As authorities produce policies in order to form urban area for their own interests, these policies and implementations also give rise to oppositional movements. And these oppositional movements are not always held through institutional channels like lawsuits, lobbying or press conferences; they also emerge with extra-institutional tactics like demonstrations, marching on the streets against the urban policies or resisting against the implementations.

Especially in his early studies, Castells stresses the contradictions in urban area through economic policies of the capitalist state. To him, the more contradictions take place in economic system or urban area, the more mobilisations are observed. Also even he makes a distinction between urban protest and urban social movement with a restrictive usage, the generic usage of urban social movements, which mentions all actions independent from its potential effects, adopted by large amount of scholars (Pickvance, 2003).

As Taylor and Dyke identify protest as the “fundamental feature that distinguishes social movements from routine political actors”, they also state that:

Protest can encompass a wide variety of actions, ranging from conventional strategies of political persuasion such as lobbying, voting, and petitioning; confrontational tactics such as marches, strikes, and demonstrations that disrupt the day-to-day life of a community; violent acts that inflict material and economic damage and loss of life; and cultural forms of political expression such as rituals, spectacles, music, art, poetry, film, literature, and cultural practices of everyday life. (2004, p. 263)

In this chapter, urban protests which were emerged as oppositions towards neoliberal urban policies in Istanbul between 1990 and 2010 are presented through a systematic data analysis of daily newspapers. During the enumeration of the newspapers six main issues are obtained in order to oppose neoliberal urban policies or demand collective consumption. These main issues are: Housing protests, protests about workplaces, protests about public spaces/buildings, protests about urban infrastructure/transportation, protests about urban environment and protests about cityscape. In this chapter, firstly these protests will be given for two different periods which are 1990-2001 and 2002-2010, and then the four main issues of them which are housing protests, protests about workplaces, protests about public buildings/spaces and protests about urban infrastructure/transportation will be emphasized and evaluated within the context of neoliberal urban policies of the periods.

5.2 Methodological Tool

In this chapter, event data analysis of urban-based protests is employed between the years 1990 and 2010. In 21 year period all urban-based protests about collective consumption are collected and coded with their targets, organizations, repertoires, demands, targeted institutions and according to where they take place; and are categorized according the time periods and their main goals. The results which we obtain through event analysis are evaluated within the context of urban policies, compared in different periods and tried to find out how protest demands, repertoires and organizational types change in different periods.

Data collection of the study is obtained from national newspaper reports in a period of 1990 to 2010. In order to adopt a protest in the study or not is defined with three criteria which are:

- 1) The protest event must comprise more than one person. Therefore the protests which were held individually, such as self-immolation, are not included in the study.
- 2) People in the event should get together in order to oppose a policy or implementation consciously and should specifically state a demand which must be about collective consumption in urban area such as housing, leisure, working or urban services.

- 3) The event must be held in a public open space like squares, streets, parks or open spaces of neighbourhoods. Therefore, the press releases, which were held in an indoor space like in the apartments of the associations or professional organizations, are not included in the study. However, if they were occurred in an open space, these events are counted.

Another important point for the coding the events is to categorization of the protest events according to their demands, that some protest events comprise more than one demands which in different categorization in the study. In order to deal with this problematic, the protest event is evaluated through the most mentioned demand or objection during the protest.

5.3 Findings

During the enumeration, which is conducted in the study, more than 1000 news articles are obtained about urban-based protests which are about collective consumption between 1990 and 2010. But as we stated in the methodological tools some urban-based protests which exhibit the following characteristics are not included in the data set:

- 1- If the protest was held only by one person,
- 2- If people came together and held a certain type of repertoire because of a necessity instead of opposing an urban policy or implementation consciously,
- 3- If the protest event was held in an indoor space.

Therefore after excluding those types of protest events, totally 867 news articles are achieved. Also through scanning the newspapers daily, we also get chance to obtain the period of the protests. And when we consider also the time period of the protests which were held more than one day⁷⁹ 1058 events are achieved. Figure 5.1 shows both the number of the news and the period of the protests between 1990 and 2010. According to the figure, there is an overall upward trend of the protests even if they decrease in some years. And the protests have especially increased after 2006, when the outcomes of regeneration projects became apparent to the public, that long term

⁷⁹ In this case newspapers give the information about the protests not daily instead they give them after a while with the information like “10th day on the protest”.

resistances against the urban regeneration projects in 2008 (especially in Başbüyük) form the peak point of the graph. Another outcome of the graph is, during the periods when the election activities are conducted, the number of protests tends to decline which can be explained as the result of populist policies of the authorities just before the elections.




Figure 5.1 : The development of urban-based protests between 1990 and 2010.⁸⁰

As we stated, all these protests are classified according to their demands and six main titles are formed which are housing protests, protests about workplace, public spaces/buildings protests, protests about urban infrastructure/transportation, protests about urban environment, and protests about cityscape.

Under these aforesaid demands the following protests are evaluated in the study:

Housing protests: The protests which comprise the issues about housings such as evictions (including urban regeneration/renewal projects or right to the housing demands) or unplanned/unsafe housing stock.

Workplace protests: The protests about displacements or high-rents of workplaces (including industrial areas, small businesses/shops, local markets or the protests of peddlers/street vendors).

⁸⁰ All the figures and tables in this chapter are based on the enumeration of Cumhuriyet and Radikal Newspapers between 1990 and 2010.

Protests about public spaces/buildings: The protests which are against the privatization of the public spaces/buildings, transformation of them to other public functions, insufficiency or neglected/unsafety conditions of them and restrictions to reach the public spaces (including urban squares, parks/gardens, coastal areas, forested wooded areas, education buildings, medical buildings, cultural buildings or other kind of public spaces and buildings).

Protests about urban infrastructure/transportation: This title includes the protests about provision of basic infrastructure services such as provision of water, electricity, waste collection and environmental cleaning, access to urban services/transportation (including financial aspects), safe/healthy infrastructure and transportation, adequate/accessible transportation infrastructure, urban traffic load and large scale transportation projects.

Protests about the urban environment: In this title the protests about environmental issues are evaluated like protests against the base stations, marine pollution, air pollution, forest fires, mining/power plant, climate change etc.

Protests about cityscape/urban silhouette: The protests which demand to preserve the urban silhouette. These protests generally oppose to skyscrapers, the buildings which disrupt the view of the city.

As seen in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 housing protest form the highest rate of the urban-based protests and, the protests about infrastructure/transportation and public space/building follow the housing protests.

Table 5.1 : Categories of urban-based protests.

	Frequency	Rate
Housing	271	25.61
Workplace	81	7.66
Public space/building	230	21.74
Infrastructure/transportation	239	22.59
Urban environment	197	18.62
Cityscape/silhouette	22	2.08
Other	18	1.70
Total	1058	100.00




Figure 5.2 : The rate of different categories of urban-based protests.

In order to understand and evaluate of urban-based protests with enacted urban policies of the periods, four main titles of the protests are detailed in this chapter which are housing protests, protests about workplaces, protests about public space/buildings and protests about urban infrastructure/transportation. Furthermore, the information about the repertoires, organization types and targeted institutions of the protests is explained respectively.

5.3.1 Housing protests

A process of displacement and dispossession, in short, also lies at the core of the urban process under capitalism. This is the mirror image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment.

David Harvey, 2012:18

“Right to the housing” has formed one of the most featured demands of urban-based protests in Turkey especially in the last periods. As we stated in the previous chapters, the rural-urban migration which has taken place especially after the 1950s in the cities of Turkey, made the shortage of affordable, adequate housing the most fundamental problem particularly in Istanbul. While new-comers have found their own solutions to this problem with gecekondu dwellings, policies of the authorities toward gecekondu settlements have varied. While these different policies sometimes came up with amnesty laws, in some other cases they also emerged as large destructions of the dwellings. These policies have led the oppositions both against the amnesty laws - generally by former residents of the city - and also against the

gecekondu destructions and evictions. As these different policies, the process of the development of gecekondu settlements and different oppositions were specified in the previous chapter, here we will give the protests against these policies quantitatively between 1990 and 2010.

In the study, 164 newspaper articles are obtained about housing protests between 1990 and 2010 from the enumerated newspapers. Some of these protests were held more than one day. Therefore when we consider the period of the protests, the frequency of the housing protests are increased to 271. As we stated above, the protests which we consider in the study include the collective actions which are held in a common open space with more than one person, and demand should be expressly set forth and people should get together and act intentionally instead of exigency, in order to demand collective consumption or oppose/resist against an urban policy or implementation. Therefore some every day resistances are not included in these numbers. For example even their protests on the streets or in front of the municipality are included in these numbers, major resistance of 18 families in the barracks in Ayazma for three years long (Baysal, 2010) is not included in the numbers⁸¹. Likewise the period of “*durakkondu*” resistance of Güzeltepe residents in Eyüp is not included. But their resistance against demolitions, or later the conflicts with police or with municipal officials, or marches on the streets or press releases etc. are included. But Başibüyük resistance, which has taken place for more than two months with a continuous conflict with police, is included in the numbers. But also for Başibüyük, the period is restricted with the period which the conflicts and protests were taken place. As we stated above all these information is limited with the data which is obtained through the enumerated newspapers. But for only long term resistances, other sources are also referred⁸² because of the insufficient data about the length of the protests on the newspapers for some resistances.


Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the housing protests by objections between 1990 and 2010. Two main issues are obtained from the enumeration: anti-eviction protests and protests against unplanned/unsafe housing stock.

⁸¹ For further information about resistance and everyday resistance see Bayat (2006).

⁸² Like Başibüyük resistance, Şen and Türkmen (2014) states the period of the conflictual resistance in Başibüyük with a continuous police violence between 27.02.2008 and 08.05.2008.

Table 5.2 : Housing protests by objections between 1990 and 2010.

Housing Protests	The number of the news articles	The number of the protests
Eviction	152	259
Unplanned/unsafe housing stock	9	9
Others	3	3
Total	164	271

**Figure 5.3 : The Rate of housing protests by objections.**

As shown in the Figure 5.3, 96 percent of the housing protests are against the evictions. And just 3 percent of them are against unplanned/unsafe housings which were generally against the amnesty laws (especially in the early the 1990s) and also against the weak housing stock which came forward especially after the 1999 earthquake. In order to understand the distribution of the housing protests in two different periods, which are appointed as 1990-2001 (will be mentioned as “first period” in the rest of the study) and 2002-2010 (will be mentioned as “second period” in the rest of the study), Figure 5.6 is prepared through considering the annual frequency of the different demands of the housing protests.

Table 5.3 : Housing protests by objections for the periods of 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Eviction	56	4.67	203	22.56	259	12.33
Unplanned/unsafe housing stock	5	0.42	4	0.44	9	0.43
Others	1	0.08	2	0.22	3	0.14
Total	62	5.17	209	23.22	271	12.9

Note: Tf stands for total frequency and Af stands for annual frequency.



Figure 5.4 : Housing protests for the periods of 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).

As shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4, in the second period there is a significant increase both in total and annual frequencies of housing protests compared to the previous period. According to the numbers, the annual frequency of the protests increases almost 4.5 fold in the second period studied, and anti-eviction protests occupy the one which increases greater (almost 5 fold).

As the protests about unplanned/unsafe housing stock was already stated, the urban policies and implementations which give rise to anti-eviction protests are needed to be emphasized. Before proceeding to the policies and implementations which create the causes of the protests, the varying rates of the anti-eviction protests for two different periods should be elaborated.

Figure 5.5 shows the rate of anti-eviction protests for two different periods. As shown in the figure, the second period covers 78 percent of the protests. This shows the significant effect of urban regeneration/renewal projects in urban area in the second period.

In both of the periods the evictions were mostly implemented in the neighbourhoods where lower-income groups live. And the policies of central and local governments implemented the transformation projects mostly through sending the residents outside of the city, and through not producing any policies about the tenants. Accordingly, these policies brought large forced-eviction implementations through sometimes using brutal police violence⁸³. And residents protested and resisted against these interventions sometimes by their own, sometimes by organizing with other neighbourhoods and sometimes with the supports of platforms, associations, volunteers academics etc.




Figure 5.5 : The rate of anti-eviction protests by periods.

The first period's legal power was weaker than the lately one. But according to the enumeration, which is conducted in the study, the areas which were encountered evictions, and developed an opposition against these in the first period have more varied causes than the following one.

Figure 5.6 shows the issues of the anti-eviction protests which were taken place between 1990 and 2001. According to the figure, while 73 percent of the total anti-

⁸³ For example Başibüyük is one of these neighbourhoods which encountered with police violence during the resistance against urban renewal project. According to Adem Kaya, who is the head of The Neighbourhood of Başibüyük Environmental Beautification, Sustenance and Protection, in this process 79 people were wounded, 52 people were detained and one person was struck with paralysis because of the stress (Lodos, 2009).

eviction protests in this period were raised from/for gecekondu settlements, the next tool, which anti – eviction protests oppose, came up as expropriation. But still the rate of the expropriation is quite lower than the protests for gecekondu settlements.

Table 5.4: Issues of anti-eviction protests between 1990 and 2001.

	Gecekondu settlements	Expropriation	Other illegal houses (villa)	Social housings-facilities-camps	Large-scale housing protests	Other	Total
Total	41	4	2	3	3	3	56




Figure 5.6 : The rate of the issues of anti-eviction protests between 1990 and 2001.

Forced-evictions, which were sometimes experienced with violent police force, and resistances of the residents in order to prevent destructions of their houses were represented in the newspapers in this period (see Appendix E). It is observed on the many newspaper articles that demolitions were conducted while residents were still living in the houses. And some neighbourhoods managed to prevent or postponed the demolitions through their resistances.

As we stated in the previous chapter, both in the 1989 and the 1994 local elections, gecekondu became the featured election promise for political parties. In the 1989 local elections, a social democratic party (SDPP) won the elections in Istanbul through its pro-gecekondu promises. Even if in this period, the SDPP made some improvements for gecekondu neighbourhoods like free transportation or developing infrastructure in gecekondu neighbourhoods (see chapter 4), gecekondu demolitions and forced-evictions were proceeded to take place in the newspapers. Sarıyer, Ümraniye and Şişli became the mostly featured districts for gecekondu demolitions

during the SDPP period. Especially the destructions in Küçükarmutlu/Sarıyer and Halideadivar/Şişli were encountered with significant resistance movements.

Before the 1994 local elections, the parties have concentrated again on the gecekondu settlements including the WP and the SDPP. The mayor candidate of WP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially emphasized gecekondu settlements in his election speeches also through avoiding the global city discourses. While WP described a party line for urban poor and ‘marginalized’ people with its equality, religious discourses before the election; these promises were not fulfilled after the election, and Erdoğan came into prominence with his exclusionary language for gecekondu settlements. The *Reported Gecekondu War of Erdoğan* (Erdoğan’ın Bildirili, 1994) was carried on rapidly just after the elections. Since he also left his opposition toward the global city after the elections, to him the demolitions in the gecekondu settlements were the steps for moving Istanbul to a “higher degree in the global city competition”.

Therefore in the WP period, gecekondu demolitions and resistance movements against demolitions have continued like in the SDPP period. Similarly in the SDPP period, Sarıyer was the most featured district for anti-eviction resistances also in the WP period. Another enforcement which encountered with the protests was revived Dolapdere-Piyalepaşa 1/1000 scaled Zoning Plan. Even though this plan was prepared in the period of Dalan, was passed from Beyoğlu Municipal Council in the WP period. The plan has foreseen major destructions especially in Hacıhüsrev, Kasımpaşa, Okmeydanı, Hasköy areas, and construction of business centres, wide roads in these areas. The protests against the plan were generally held by an organization, which was Citizen Commission for Following the Plan⁸⁴. The commission, which was formed by the residents of the areas, was also supported by professional organizations and some left-wing political parties.

Another opposition which became prominent in that period was the sale of Derbent Neighbourhood to Automobiles Artisans Residential Cooperative.⁸⁵ The protests

⁸⁴ In Turkish: *Plan Takibi için Yurttaş Komisyonu*.

⁸⁵ Later in the 2000s The Cooperative made an agreement with a private company and this led also resistances against the eviction processes in that period.

were taken place by the residents against the sale of the neighbourhood which was a treasury property.

Figure 5.7 shows the frequency of anti-eviction protests spatially during 1990 and 2001. As the figure shows, the highest number of the protests was taken place in Sarıyer through both the resistances against the demolition attempts in Küçükarmutlu Neighbourhood, and also with the protests against the sale of Derbent Neighbourhood. The second one is Beyoğlu district, the protests were held in this district especially after approval of Dolapdere-Piyalepaşa 1/1000 scaled Zoning Plan. And Ümraniye, Üsküdar, Kağıthane followed these districts.

Therefore, both in the SDPP and the WP periods, eviction of the gecekondu residents have encountered with the protests and resistances. Also in some cases different neighbourhoods came together for solidarity against the evictions. For example in 1992, a protest of different neighbourhoods, including Örnektepe, Okmeydanı, Gürsel, Çağlayan, Gültepe, Ferahevler, Hacıosman and Küçükarmutlu neighbourhoods, was taken place in front of the Metropolitan Municipality in order to protest the failure of fulfilling the election promises which include the promise for stopping the demolitions.

Also during Habitat II Summit in 1996, right to the housing and anti-eviction campaigns and protests were taken place in Istanbul by both the participants of the Summit and opponents of the Summit. While many of the protests were conducted during Habitat-II by the participants of the Conference, other anti-eviction resistances were held in Beyoğlu by the victims of Habitat-II “preparations”. The protests against the forced-eviction of travesties and transsexuals in Ülker Street in Beyoğlu were one of these protests. The preparations made for Habitat II were criticised for their gentrification of some neighbourhoods. Therefore while some organisations protested the enacted urban policies within the conference, others protested the conference itself because of the preparation process and the irony that a human settlement conference was taking place in a country that conducted village evacuations and forced migrations.

The 1990s also differ from the previous periods because of the forced migration from Southern East to the large cities of Turkey. As we stated in the previous chapter, these new comers were much more disadvantageous than the previous rural-urban

migrants. Therefore they have found themselves in a deep poverty in the large cities. Also in this period a new concept was emerged, in order to define some gecekondu neighbourhoods, which is “*varoş*”. While this term was generally used in order to link gecekondu settlements with “violence”, “illegal activity” (Erman, 2004), “lawlessness”, “system opposition” (Bozkulak, 2005), or “deprived of aesthetic consumption” and “degenerate”, this representation came forward especially after 1 May 1996 and Gazi episodes in 13-15 March 1995 which have caused many people to be murdered, injured or arrested. The media gave these events with stressing the word “*varoş*”, and “*varoş*” was held responsible for these events (Doğan, 2007). Therefore this term was generally used for the neighbourhoods which have a political identity and high degree mobilization on the social, political and urban movements like Gazi, 1 May (Mustafa Kemal), Gülsuyu, Güzeltepe, Küçükarmutlu, Okmeydanı and Sarıgazi Neighbourhoods (Aslan, 2011). In the enumeration of the newspapers, the majority of the eviction attempt articles are obtained for these neighbourhoods like Küçükarmutlu, Sarıgazi or Okmeydanı. While in 1990s not as much forced-eviction as in 2000s were held, it is significant that those forced-evictions and the resistances against them were generally emerged in the neighbourhoods which were represented as “*varoş*” in the media.

Besides gecekondu neighbourhoods, expropriation was another tool for forced-evictions in the 1990s. Also illegal villas were become the subject of the demolitions in this period as both SDPP and WP had promised to do before the elections. But these demolitions were not conducted as determined as conducted in gecekondu neighbourhoods.

After 2002 a sharp refractive is observed towards gecekondu neighbourhoods and also towards the high rent areas where lower-income groups live. As it can be seen on Figure 5.5, %78 of the anti-eviction protests was held between 2002 and 2010. This increase is linked with the extended and strengthened legal regulations which prepared the legal base of the urban regeneration/renewal projects in this period.




Figure 5.7 : The frequency of anti-eviction protests by neighbourhood (1990-2001).

As stated in the previous chapter, urban regeneration projects were perceived as the solution for almost all social, spatial and economic problems in urban area, and they were implemented with a strong decisiveness through using newly-legalized legislations in this period. Indeed, they formed the most important tool of neoliberal policies in urban area. Therefore the powerful legislations about urban regeneration projects, which have been continuously extended and strengthen within time, comprised almost all areas in Istanbul.

Accordingly, in this period, anti-eviction protests have increased much more than the previous periods. According the enumeration of the newspapers, these protests were taken place especially against two issues: eviction in the gecekondur neighbourhoods and eviction in the “worn-out” historical areas which were declared as urban renewal areas through Law 5366 (see Figure 5.8).

Table 5.5 : Issues of the anti-eviction protests between 2002 and 2010.

	Gecekondur neighbourhoods	“Worn-out” historical areas (5366)	Large-scale housing protests	Other	Total
Total	138	58	3	4	203




Figure 5.8 : The rate of the issues of anti-eviction protests between 2002 and 2010.

According to the Figure 5.8, 68 percent of anti-eviction protests in Istanbul were held against eviction in gecekondur neighbourhoods. As we stated, in this period, almost all evictions were conducted through urban regeneration projects. Even the first legal tool of urban regeneration/renewal projects was legalized for Ankara in 2004; Istanbul became the “laboratory” of these projects in collaboration with MHA and municipalities.

While many legal regulations were passed in order to extent the authorization of MHA, also with legislative changes municipalities seized the authorization to carry out the regeneration projects in order to:

...create housing areas, industrial areas, business areas, technology parks, public service areas, recreation areas and all sorts of social facility areas, rebuild and restore worn-out parts of the city, preserve the historical and cultural heritage of the city or take measures against earthquake (The Law on Making Amendments in the Municipality Law, 2010).

The featured legitimacy of these projects became the earthquake risk, and also exclusionary language of politicians, bureaucrats and media for gecekondur neighbourhoods came forward. As stated before, gecekondur neighbourhoods were mentioned as “tumour”, “illness”, “disease”, “terror sanctuaries”, “criminal areas” in this period. And regeneration projects were promoted as the projects which would bring modern, liveable urban images and also as the solution of economic and social problems. With all these legitimacies as Kuyucu (2014) stated 12 major regeneration projects were declared in Istanbul which would displace 100.000 people between 2001 and 2010. And against these projects significant oppositional movements were taken place as we stated in the previous chapter, and some of them were emerged as the protests and resistances on the streets.

According to the enumeration, Maltepe, Sarıyer, Eyüp, Küçükçekmece, Pendik were the featured districts with the protests against the eviction in gecekondur neighbourhoods. In Maltepe especially Başbüyük and Gülsuyu-Gülensu Neighbourhoods; in Eyüp Güzeltepe and Alibeyköy; in Pendik Ertuğrul Gazi; in Küçükçekmece Ayazma; and in Sarıyer Küçükarmutlu, Derbent, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Cumhuriyet, Pınar Neighbourhoods came forward with the resistances against the regeneration projects and demolitions (see Figure 5.9). Especially long term resistance of Başbüyük Neighbourhood, Güzeltepe tenants’ every day resistance in the bus stations after the demolition, and also Ayazma tenants’ almost three years long everyday resistances in the barracks were the examples of the major resistances of the period.

In this period, neighbourhoods also developed solidarity with each other under some platforms like Coordination of Labourer People against the Destructions, or The Platform of Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations, and they created oppositional mobilizations through organizing. These platforms, coordination and associations

were also supported by professional organizations, political parties, unions, political organizations, academics, and some other volunteers.

Besides gecekondı neighbourhoods, old historical areas became the subject of the renewal projects through Law 5366 which was enacted in 2005 comprising the areas Sulukule (in Fatih), Tarlabası (in Beyoğlu), Fener-Balat (in Fatih) and Süleymaniye (in Fatih). According to the conducted enumeration, %29 of the anti-eviction protests was held for these areas between 2002 and 2010 (Figure 5.8). The most featured area of anti-eviction protests were held in was Sulukule. The residents and some volunteers and academics came together under Sulukule Platform. While this platform managed to take attention internationally with both historical characteristic of the area and Romany culture, these did not work in order to stop authorities' decisive policies. Not as much as Sulukule, but also Fener-Balat and Tarlabası came forward with the oppositions against the projects.

Figure 5.9 shows the frequency of anti-eviction protests by neighbourhoods between 2002 and 2010. As the figure shows, the majority of the protests against the evictions were taken place in Maltepe, because of both the long term resistance of Başibüyük residents against the police violation and the protests for Gülsuyu-Gülensu neighbourhoods. The second one was Fatih district, especially protests against Sulukule renewal project and the resistances during the demolitions and also 40 day long Sulukule festival against the projects generated this outcome. And, Sarıyer, Eyüp and Küçükçekmece follow these districts.

Therefore, with the extended legislations, the 2000s establishes the most powerful period of reflection of neoliberal policies in urban area. And urban regeneration projects became the most important tool for this structural transformation of urban space. While many neighbourhoods were affected from this transformation and lower-income groups were evicted from their houses with the extended legal regulations; this led also resistances and protests in many neighbourhoods.




Figure 5.9 : The frequency of anti-eviction protests by neighbourhoods (2002-2010).

In order to see the difference of the frequency of anti-eviction protests annually for the different issues between two periods, Table 5.6 and Figure 5.10 were prepared. According to them, while annual frequency of anti-eviction protests in gecekondu neighbourhoods was 3.42 in the first period, this number increases to 15.33 in the second period which is almost 5 times more than the first period. This figure also shows the annual frequency of anti-eviction protests which were held against to Law 5366 in the second period. Annual frequency of anti-eviction protests against the Law 5366 is almost twice of the anti-eviction protests which were held in the first period for gecekondu neighbourhoods. Accordingly the total number of the anti-eviction protests shows an increase in the second period. While the annual frequency of anti-eviction protests was 4.67 in the first period, this increases by almost 5 fold in the second period.

Table 5.6 : Anti-eviction protests for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Gecekondu neighbourhoods	41	3.42	138	15.33	179	8.52
“Worn-out” historical areas	-	-	58	6.44	58	2.76
Expropriation	4	0.33	-	-	4	0.19
Illegal housings (villa)	2	0.17	-	-	2	0.10
Social housings-facilities-camps	3	0.25	-	-	3	0.14
Large-scale housing protests	3	0.25	3	0.33	6	0.29
Other	3	0.25	4	0.44	7	0.33
Total	56	4.67	203	22.56	259	12.33




Figure 5.10 : Anti-eviction protests for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

As the number of anti-eviction protests shows a significant increase in the second period, also the actors in protests present a variety in the 2000s. While anti-eviction protests were mostly conducted by the residents of the neighbourhoods in the first period, they were held or supported by different organizations after 2002. The first reason of this was the increase on the local organizations which opposed to regeneration projects. Furthermore, other platforms, organizations, academics participated or supported the anti-eviction protests more in the second period than the previous one. While in the 1990s these groups mostly opposed to policies regarding cityscapes, public spaces/buildings, and the urban environment; and sometimes, their discourses were exclusionary toward *gecekondu* settlements. In the later period, however, resistance on behalf of *gecekondu* settlements was also supported by some middle-class groups, such as professionals, academics, and students. This can be evaluated as the outcome of the increasing intervention of the authority toward *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and continuous forced-evictions as an inevitable result of this process. But also as we stated in the previous chapter 1990s better-off classes' neighbourhood associations (Erman and Yıldar, 2007) came together generally in order to “*improve the consciousness of mahallelik or Istanbulluluk*” and the presses in that period (like Istanbul Journal) generally emphasize “*to rescue Istanbul*”, “*urbanized, civilized people’s struggle against rural culture*”, “*intellectuals should educate and urbanize them*” etc. Also their aims include protecting their

neighbourhood from “*others*” which led in many cases to gentrify the neighbourhood. But in 2000s, especially in the second part of 2000s, in the framework of right to the housing, a trend to develop solidarity with neighbourhoods, which encountered forced-evictions, can be observed. This does not mean that all the neighbourhood associations of the better-off classes oriented toward or supported mobilizations of gecekondu neighbourhoods against the evictions; but while they tried “to protect their neighbourhood from rural culture” in 1990s, in the second period some of them also tried to support gecekondu neighbourhoods for their anti-eviction struggles. Also in the second period intellectuals’ exclusionary discourses, such as “educate” or “urbanize” the new comers, were seen less than the previous periods. It can be stated that, while the discourses against the gecekondu neighbourhoods were established with more marginalized and criminalized statements by the authorities in the second period, the observed elitist discourses of the middle-upper class associations or intellectuals were seen less compared to 1990s.

The JDP has adopted much more destructive policies towards gecekondu neighbourhoods from previous periods, and these policies were very compatible with the current dynamics of neoliberalism and global city aim of the government. And urban regeneration projects formed the most important tool of aimed ‘structural transformation’ of the urban area in order to reproduce the urban land. And this led to increase resistance and struggles against these projects with extended repertoires and tactics. For both of the periods repertoire of the anti-eviction protests include mostly the resistance against the demolitions through barricading, conflicting with the police, blocking the road or sometimes through self-harming; and also sit-ins, petition campaigns, demonstrations, rallies and sometimes festivals, picnics are formed the mostly observed repertoires. Also in the second period alternative plan was adopted as another repertoire for the opposing the current plan. And as we stated in the previous chapter, since some organizations and neighbourhoods stayed in the political sphere in order to oppose the projects and plans, some others preferred avoiding the political discourses intentionally; a similar diversity was seen also the preferred repertoires of the protests. While some neighbourhoods tried to oppose the projects and plans through alternative plans, some other neighbourhoods rejected adopting alternative plan as one of the repertoires of the struggles and some

of them adopted more conflict-prone strategies. Also, the presence of women and children are observed many of the protests that especially in some resistances the role of women was significant.

Furthermore, it is revealed that police intervention against anti-eviction protests were much more common than the other urban-based protests between 1990 and 2010 (which almost 60 percent of the anti-eviction protests⁸⁶ encountered with police intervention including wounding or detaining the activists).

5.3.2. Protests about workplaces

As we stated in the previous chapter, the 1980 coup d'état transformed the capital accumulation process by enforcing 24th January decisions, and it also affected Turkey politically and socially with its authoritarian regime. While the neoliberal reconstruction of the 1980 coup d'état materialised especially in urban areas and was highlighted at local levels; it also led manufacturing sectors to be withdrawn and left their places to the service and finance sectors. While these policies merged with global city and competing cities discourses, the main aim of the different governments became to market the cities to the capitals since 1980s. And incontestably Istanbul became the main target of these policies.

All these policies brought a significant alteration in the class relations and economic structure as well as in the socio-spatial texture of the urban area (Doğan, 2007). While this process led working classes to be sent to the outside of the city by seizing their living areas, it also deprived their working areas. In this new image of the city lower-income groups, working classes, small artisans were exiled from the central areas of cities, and urban area has become the place for the large capital groups with finance and business districts or shopping malls. And through this spatial reconfiguration, capital has established its hegemony on urban areas.

In the process of transforming Istanbul to a global city, both local and central governments aimed to decentralize the industrial areas in order to create tourism or business centres. These decentralization policies have targeted some important manufacturing areas such as Golden Horn or Kazlıçeşme, or some important

⁸⁶ This rate is based on the news articles which do give information about the police intervention.

factories such as Paşabahçe Glass Factory in Beykoz or TEKEL⁸⁷ factories. Also small industrial facilities have moved to the industrial sites or organized industrial zones.

Although, these policies did not led displacement of only industrial areas, also small businesses were affected from this process such as fishermen bazaar in Kumkapı or destruction of some cafes and shops in Kadıköy or Beşiktaş, also lately the renewal project of Perşembe Bazaar in Karaköy.

Besides industrial areas and small businesses, some local markets were also moved to the other areas like Salı Bazaar in Kadıköy. The other workers who were affected from this transformation were peddlers or street venders. Mostly with the reason to have more “modern” and “clean” view, some street venders were also displaced like the ones in Cihangir during Habitat II.

Displacements of workplaces in urban area have also met with oppositions and protests. But protests for workplaces were not held only against the displacements, also the increase of the rents of workplaces caused protests from workers or tradesmen. In this section, the rate of these protests is elaborated through objections of protests and types of workplaces between 1990 and 2010.

As shown in Figure 5.11, displacement of workplaces occupies the highest rate of objections of workplace protests in the both periods. Although, while the annual frequency of the protests against displacements is 2.58 in the first period, it increases by almost two folds in the second period. On the contrary, the protests, which are against the high rents, decrease in the second period. Protests against the high rents of the workplaces were held especially for wholesale market in Bayrampaşa and Spice Bazaar in Fatih in the first period. And in the second period, only the protest of tradesmen in the Galata Bridge Restaurants is obtained.

⁸⁷ TEKEL is a monopoly of Turkish Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages, which was privatized in 2008.

Table 5.7 : Workplace protests by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Displacements	31	2.58	42	4.67	73	3.48
High rents	4	0.33	1	0.11	5	0.24
Others	2	0.17	1	0.11	3	0.14
Total	37	3.08	44	4.89	81	3.86




Figure 5.11 : Workplaces protests by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).

In order to analyse the types of workplaces which became the subject of displacement protests, Table 5.8 and Figure 5.12 were prepared. According to them, the protests about the industrial areas have the greatest ratio by the rate of %38. And protests for small businesses/shops and peddlers/street venders' protests against displacements follow the protests for industrial areas with the rate of %25 between 1990 and 2010.

Table 5.8 : Workplace displacement protests by the type of workplaces for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Industrial areas	7	0.58	21	2.33	28	1.33
Small businesses/shops	10	0.83	8	0.89	18	0.86
Local markets	6	0.50	3	0.33	9	0.43
Peddlers / street venders	8	0.67	10	1.11	18	0.86
Total	31	2.58	42	4.67	73	3.48




Figure 5.12 : The rate of the workplace displacement protests by type of workplace.

Furthermore, the distribution of displacement protests for workplaces for two different periods can be read both in Table 5.8 and in Figure 5.13. As shown, annual frequencies of protests for all types of workplaces increases in the second period, except the protests for local markets.




Figure 5.13 : Workplace displacement protests by types of workplaces for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).

As stated before, between 1990 and 2001, neither the SDPP nor the WP municipalities leave neoliberal urban policies and global city discourses which they inherited from the MP municipalities. While the SDPP tried to articulate to global city competence through its pro-European policies especially after 1992; the WP tried this through an alternative global city as a “symbol of Ottoman and/or Islamist territorial hegemony” (Bora, 2006). Even there was a difference for creating an image for Istanbul in order to engage with the hierarchy of global cities, their urban policies were quite similar in order to reach these different images. They both mentioned about decentralising the industrial areas, encouraging the service and tourism sectors and planning business districts, five star hotels, free trade zone, international congress and culture centres etc. in urban area (Öktem, 2005). Furthermore, the privatization implementations have increased especially after the economic crisis in 1994 through the Privatization Law, which brought privatization of the state-owned enterprises, especially the ones placed in the high rent areas. Accordingly these policies brought displacement of industrial areas and small businesses in Istanbul.

The data set reveals that, in the 1990s, the protests in order to oppose to displacement of industrial areas included for the industrial areas of Golden Horn Dockyard in Beyoğlu, Leather Factory in Beykoz, Bomonti Beer Factory in Şişli, and Cement Factories in Kartal and Pendik. Especially workers’ protests for the Golden Horn Dockyard were featured. They protested the closure and transfer of the dockyards to the Istanbul Governor, and stated that Istanbul Governor would close this area and then privatize in order to use as other functions such as museums (Tersane İşçilerinden Eylem, 2000). Indeed the mayor of the period, Ali Müfit Görtuna, stated that:

Dockyards are important for us both because of the environmental arrangement and because of being the biggest barrier which closes Golden Horn. This area is a big problem for cleaning Golden Horn. ... after they are removed, cleaning will be accelerated. Tersane İşçilerinden Eylem, 2000)

And the process for the Golden Horn Dockyard was implemented like what workers had stated that time. Firstly, the dockyards were privatized and closed. And at the moment a project which is called Golden Horn Port is mentioning by the media for this area which includes two marinas, two 5 stars hotels, restaurants, congress and

culture centres, entertainment facilities, mosque and car parking area (Kundakçı, 2014b).

Another industrial area, which became the subject of protests, was the first beer factory of Turkey, Bomonti Beer Factory, which was found in 1890 and transferred to TEKEL in 1938. During the privatization of the factory in 1994, workers of the factory held protests in order to prevent the sale. Also 12 workers established *The Committee of the Struggle against the Privatization* (Yiğit, 2010). But their struggle could not stop the privatization of the factory.⁸⁸

Protests against the displacements of small business/shops were generally held for the old bus station and Bostan Wholesale Market in Topkapı, Fisherman Market in Kumkapı, some cafes and restaurants in Üsküdar and Kartal coastlines in the first period. And the street vendors' protest against the removal of the vendors in Cihangir during Habitat II was also one of the featured protests in the 1990s.

However, as we stated, the victory of JDP in 2002 gave rise to implementation of neoliberal policies which could not be enacted in the 1990s because of economic recession and unstable political situation. With the JDP's "structural transformation" policies in urban areas, a sectorial transformation was adopted in order to attract the global investors. While this transformation was stated in the Master Plan of Istanbul with the aim of increasing employment in the service sector by 10 percent and to decrease the employment in the industrial sector by 7 percent in Istanbul, this also brought significant changes in spatial distribution of the sectors in urban area. Also the same plan proposed new attraction centres in the both sides of city such as Bakırköy, Yenibosna and Silivri in European Side; and Kartal and Ataşehir-Kozyatağı in Anatolian Side.

Together with all these policies and implementations, decentralization of the industrial areas and dissolving of the small businesses were conducted more than the previous periods. Therefore while low-income groups lose their houses with urban regeneration projects, also workplaces of these groups were sent to the outside of city. Koçak (2011) calls this as "*urban exile of labour*"; he states that; the labourers

⁸⁸ In the second period the building of Bomonti Beer Factory will be subject of protests in order to preserve the building as an industrial heritage. This struggle will be explained in the section of public buildings protests in the study.

which came to the city in 1950s encountered with an elitist opposition in 1980s and 1990s, but in 2000s this “*grumble*” transformed a systematic/institutional destruction.

Accordingly, these implementations and policies towards working areas have encountered with oppositions more than the previous period. According to the enumeration, annual frequency of protests for workplaces has increased by almost two folds in the second period. This increase is observed especially on protests about industrial areas which increase by more than 4 fold compared to the former period. The most featured protest for the industrial areas in this period was the 18 days resistances of workers in order to prevent Beykoz Paşabahçe Glass Factory to be closed. Also another featured protest was observed against the closure of Dockyard in Tuzla and Cevizli Tekel Factory in Kartal.

Furthermore, the tobacco unit of TEKEL was included in the privatization programme in 2001 and was privatized in 2008 (İçinden Demiryolu, 2010). The struggles and strikes of TEKEL workers against both the privatization of TEKEL and also against the insecure working conditions which specified as 4/C status were prominent in this period. But their long term resistances against the privatization of TEKEL could not stop the process. While this led many workers to be unemployed, or to work in insecure conditions also this led many TEKEL factories to be transformed into private functions. One of them was Cevizli Tekel Factory in Kartal, which was registered both as natural protected zone and archeologically protected area. The workers of the factory struggled against the privatization decision through chaining themselves to the factory and also through demonstrations and strikes. But like all other TEKEL factories this could not stop the process, and at the moment that area is under construction in order to transform a private university.⁸⁹

Furthermore, protests against displacement of small business/shops were observed especially in the coastline of Kadıköy and Yeşilköy; and also in Gedikpaşa-Eminönü in this period. Besides, protests for local markets were seen in Esenyurt, Üsküdar and Eminönü; and protests of street vendors were mostly held in Eminönü.

⁸⁹ After the evacuating of the factory, the platforms and groups demanded to preserve the area as green area and cultural centre. The struggles against the transforming of the area to the private university will be explained under the public buildings title in this chapter.

For many of the protests about workplaces - especially for industrial areas - the role of trade unions was important. Also professional organizations like chamber of tradesmen, some associations and political parties took part in the protests. But the protests which were for small business or local markets were held generally by individual artisans and tradesmen rather than an organised workers union.

5.3.3. Reclaiming public spaces and public buildings

Neoliberal urban policies also targeted public spaces and public buildings in order to transform them into commodities. The most important demand of the protests about public spaces/buildings is demanding the use value of space instead of the exchange value. Therefore the struggle against the transformation of public spaces and public buildings formed one of most important struggles against neoliberal capitalism.

After the 1980s the spatial configurations of neoliberal policies focused on the metropolitan areas through competition of local units with world cities or global cities discourses. Therefore, as we stated, Istanbul came forward through presenting international finance, service and tourism functions in order to find a place for itself in this competition. While this aim was tried to be fulfilled through decentralizing industrial areas or regeneration of the housing areas; also public spaces and public buildings have provided important sources for the authorities and capital groups. Through privatizing these areas/buildings, authorities both supplied hot money in order to cover the current deficit, and also new urban areas and buildings in order to build/rebuild with the functions which are compatible with neoliberal urban policies such as hotels, shopping malls, residents etc.

The enumeration of the newspapers from 1990 to 2010 shows that the protests for public spaces and public buildings in Istanbul are based on six main objections (see Table 5.9): The most important one is against the aforesaid implementation which is transformation of public space/building into a private function. But also commonly seen process for public buildings is also closing of public buildings (generally because of a fire or because of maintenance) without notice of their future functions. These buildings have (and some still are) generally kept closed for a long time. Especially in the second period, this has formed the second featured objection, after the privatization, for the protests about public buildings. Also other objections about the protests for public spaces and buildings are observed as the transformation of

public space/building to another public function, insufficient urban facility, unmaintained/unsafe building and restricted access to the public spaces.

Enumerating the newspapers and coding them for the protests about public spaces/buildings show that, like housing or workplaces protests, annual frequencies of the protests present an increase in the second period (see Figure 5.14). And the most increased objected issue (with 3 times increase) is closing the public facility without informing officially about the future function of it. Generally in order to overcome the opposition toward privatization, this formed the mostly adopted strategy for the authorities. By keeping buildings closed for a long time, allegedly for maintenance or due to earthquake risk, and by not officially informing about which decision will be adopted for the facility, or giving contradictory and different explanations about the adopted decision; authorities try to dampen the opposition. Although, according to the implementations, this strategy frequently resulted in the privatisation of the buildings.

Table 5.9 : Protests about public spaces/public buildings by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Transformation into private function	56	4.67	84	9.33	140	6.67
Transformation into another public function	18	1.50	12	1.33	30	1.43
The close of public buildings without notice of their future functions	10	0.83	23	2.56	33	1.57
Insufficient urban facility	5	0.42	4	0.44	9	0.43
Unmaintained/unsafe building	6	0.50	1	0.11	7	0.33
Restricted access to the public spaces	2	0.17	6	0.67	8	0.38
Other	2	0.17	1	0.11	3	0.14
Total	99	8.25	131	14.56	230	10.95




Figure 5.14 : Protests about public spaces/public buildings by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).

According to the data analysis, 220 articles are obtained about the protests of public spaces/buildings. But some of these protests were lasted more than one day; therefore when we take into consideration also the period of protests, the total number increases to 230, which 122 of them are about public spaces, and 108 of them are about public buildings. In this section, protests about public spaces and public buildings are detailed both based on their functions, and also based on the objections of protests.

Protests about Public spaces

According to the enumeration, four main functions are obtained about the protests for public spaces in Istanbul between 1990 and 2010. These are urban squares, parks/gardens, coastal areas and forested/wooded areas. Also some other public open spaces which cannot be included in these headings are evaluated (See Table 5.10).

Table 5.10 : Protests about public spaces by functions (total frequency).

	Transformation into private function	Transformation into another public function	Restricted access to the public spaces	Other	Total
Urban squares	0	3	4	0	7
Parks/gardens	39	10	0	1	50
Coastal areas	17	3	3	1	24
Forested/wooded areas	22	3	0	0	25
Other public open spaces	11	4	1	0	16
Total	89	23	8	2	122

As seen in Figure 5.15, the protests about parks/gardens form the highest number of the protests about public spaces with 41 percent rate, and coastal areas and forested/wooded areas follow parks/gardens with the rate of %20. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 5.16, transformation of these areas into private function generates the greatest segment of objections of the protests with 75 percent rate.




Figure 5.15 : Public space protests by functions.




Figure 5.16 : Public space protests by objections.

In order to detail these protests, the functions of public spaces are evaluated respectively. As seen in Figure 5.15, urban squares generate the lowest segment of the protests with 6 percent rate. And two different objections are obtained from the enumeration about urban squares which are transformation into another public function and restricted access to squares. Taksim square is the one which was mostly mentioned in protests. And it has come into prominence with a project which intend to construct a mosque in the square, and also with restrictions which prevent people to get together in the square.

The mosque project in Taksim Square was started to be mentioned in 1960s when Süleyman Demirel was the Prime Minister. In these years an association (*The*

Association of Constructing Mosque in Taksim) was established. Council of Ministers has taken a decision in 1965 which stipulates the construction of the mosque in 10 years. However, this decision was not materialized, and in 1979 the decision was renewed. But with the 1980 coup d'état this decision also could not be conducted. In the 1980s, even though Bedrettin Dalan promised to construct the mosque in Taksim Square before the elections, he also did not give place the mosque project in plans. Also Nurettin Sözen did not take the mosque into his agenda (Gürsoy, 1994). But after 1994, when the WP has won the local elections with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul, the project came into the agenda again. This project also became an important issue in 28 February process (also known as postmodern coup in 1997) because of secularism debates. After 2002, when the JDP has won the elections with a high majority, the project came up again. According to the enumeration, protests have emerged against the project during the WP period and after 2002 when the JDP has become the ruling party. It is observed that mostly stated opposition against the project was the site selection of the project which was in a conserved historical area. And also the second opposition was about the symbolic meaning of Taksim Square and secularism debates. To construct a project in the most important square of Istanbul has an important symbolic meaning. Also constructing the mosque higher than Atatürk Monument in the Square was another mostly discussed issue in that time. Furthermore, the political meaning of the square, especially for the workers in the labour days, is important in this discussion. Therefore Taksim Square has always protected its important symbolic meaning for different political approaches. Also in the JDP period other projects came into agenda in Taksim which are Taksim Square pedestrianization project and Military Barrack in Gezi Park which led major demonstrations across the country in 2013.

As we mentioned, another issue for the protests about urban squares was the opposition to restricted access to squares. Especially for the Labour Day celebrations the restrictions which inhibit workers to reach the square has formed one of the most important opposition. And these restrictions were also conducted by the authorities with massive police violence. While left organizations and parties adopt Taksim Square as 1st May Square (especially after the violent attack on 1 May 1977), the restrictions and interventions of the authorities with police violence led the conflicts between workers and polices.

Besides, parks and gardens form another issue for the protests about urban public spaces. As seen in Figure 5.15, almost half of the protests about public spaces are based on public parks/gardens. And as seen in Figure 5.17, the main objection comes up as the transformation of public parks/gardens into a private function (with 78 percent rate). Therefore privatization of these areas formed the main objections and the most featured struggles emerged in the data analysis for Kuzguncuk Garden and Validebağ Grove.

The history of Kuzguncuk Garden (which is also a protected area) goes further back. The owner of the Garden was a Greek family, but in 1977 the property of the Garden was passed to the General Directorate of Foundations, and until the giving build permission for a school in 1986, the area was recognized as a green area. The struggles for Kuzguncuk Garden (also known as Ilya's Garden in Üsküdar) started in 1992, when the garden was rented to Turkey Organ Transplantation and Burn Treatment Foundation by the General Directorate of Foundations. The Foundation has aimed to build a private hospital in the area and residents, who lived around the Garden, struggled against this construction through petition campaigns, media, demonstrations and lawsuits. And in 1997, residents established *The Association of Kuzguncuk*. Even if the construction of hospital could not be materialized in the Garden, the area came into agenda again in 2000 with the construction of a private school. The residents again came together and resisted against the project through barricading in front of construction machineries (Kuzguncuklular Bostana, 2000) and also they established a festival in order to protest the project (Protesto Şenliği, 2000) and conducted petition campaigns. Also they established a cooperative in order to rent the garden for using it for agriculture. Amy Mills (2006) links the idea of establishing a cooperative for being able to use the Garden for agriculture with the models in Europe and the USA. To Mills, this shows the relations of some broad members of the association with global green movement. And in 2002 Turkey Organ Transplantation and Burn Treatment Foundation did not renew the rental agreement and the residents of Kuzguncuk had the victory in their struggles for that time. But in 2010 an eviction notification was sent to the renter of the Garden, which was a landscape architecture company that grows flowers in the garden. Thus, construction in the garden came into agenda again and the residents started a campaign with “*hero garden is against the construction*” slogan.

As we stated in the previous chapter, Kuzguncuk became the subject of the first wave of gentrification in the 1980s. And the struggle for the Kuzguncuk Garden was also conducted generally by intellectuals and artists who came to the area after the 1980s. Mills (2006) states about the movement for Kuzguncuk Garden that: “... *Garden movement is considered as a part of gentrification of Kuzguncuk*”. The residents also by romanticizing the old days of Kuzguncuk show their belongings to their locality (Mills, 2006). Mills (2006) also states that two groups who live in Kuzguncuk do not generally take place in the movement: the residents who live in gecekondu in Kuzguncuk and the former residents, who are largely Non-Muslims, of the neighbourhood. Therefore we can state that especially the pioneers of this struggle were generally gentrifiers of the neighbourhood. But also the residents who came to the neighbourhood in the 1940s and 1950s from Karadeniz supported the struggle (Mills, 2006).

Therefore, the issues during the struggles for Kuzguncuk Garden were stated by residents, associations and platforms with the grounds that, the area is a conserved area, an important urban open space which can be used after an earthquake, the garden is a memory of past days in Kuzguncuk, the garden is one of the few and important green areas not only for Kuzguncuk also for the entire city and also residents link the garden with the identity of being from Kuzguncuk.




Figure 5.17 : Protests about public parks/gardens by objections.

Also Validebağ Grove was another featured public green area which became subjects the struggles against the construction in the Grove between 1990 and 2010⁹⁰. The ownership of the Grove was under the treasury and in 1927 it was assigned to Ministry of Education. The area is important for being both the second largest green area in Anatolian Side, and also because of being conserved area with its biodiversity. Also there are historical buildings in the Grove like Adile Sultan Kasrı (it is used as *öğretmenevi* - literally means teacher's house), Abdulaziz Mansion and Çamlı Mansion. In 1998, the Grove came into agenda in order to build a hospital, and activists opposed this decision through petition campaigns and demonstrations, and they managed to register the Grove as a protected area in 1999. While these struggles were held by Validebağ Volunteers, in 2001 they established the Validebağ Volunteers Association in order to be able to struggle also through lawsuits (<http://www.validebag.org/>). They also applied to European Union for an urban environmental project in order to protect Validebağ Basin in 2004 (Yeşil Savaşçılarına, 2004). However, in 2006 a protocol was signed between Ministry of Education and Üsküdar Municipality in order to provide cleaning, maintenance services for the Grove. But building jogging tracks and a road in the Grove were also mentioned in the protocol. Therefore in that period Validebağ Volunteers opposed this through demonstrations and public presses. Even though the project could not be implemented in that period, in 2009 The Municipality again attempted to build a jogging track in the Grove and this also met with opposition. At the moment there is still an ongoing struggle against the project which aims to build a mosque in the Grove.

Besides Kuzguncuk and Validebağ, there have been many other struggles between 1990 and 2010 against the construction in the public green areas; some of them were Ayamama Valley in Bakırköy, Abbasağa Park in Beşiktaş, Göztepe Park in Kadıköy, Kuşdili Meadow in Kadıköy, Altunizade Grove in Üsküdar, Olympiad Park in Bakırköy, etc. Generally residents of the area have taken part in struggles, but also professional organizations, platforms, and other organizations which are interested in urban issues, supported the struggles. The repertoires, which were adopted for the

⁹⁰ The struggle for Validebağ Grove also currently continues like Kuzguncuk Garden. Furthermore, recently Yedikule Gardens became prominent about the struggles for protecting green areas against constructions in Istanbul.

struggles, were mostly petition campaigns, demonstrations, public presses; but also picnics, festivals, barricading, occupying were other observed repertoires during protests. Like Kuzguncuk Garden movement, gentrifiers of neighbourhoods played important roles in struggles. Also like organic agriculture project in Kuzguncuk or urban environmental project in Validebağ the educated, upper class intellectuals established relations or originated from European or American experiences in movements. Additionally, it was seen that transformation of green areas into mosques started the secularism debates in the struggles especially in the post-2010 period.

Besides public parks/gardens, coastal areas form other public spaces which are obtained in the analysis. These struggles generally aimed to protect coastal areas from constructions; and also activists protested the restrictions which prevent people to reach coastal areas. Figure 5.18 shows the objections of the protests about coastal areas between 1990 and 2010. According to the figure, 71 percent of the protests were against the transformation of coastal areas into the private functions. The struggles against the sale of Moda Pier, the construction of a motorway in Moda Coast, declaring tourism centre of Ataköy Coast were the most featured ones in 1990s and in early 2000s. And in the second period, Galataport Project, Haydarpaşaport Project, Marina Projects in Bebek and in Kadıköy, and the sale of Ataköy Coast by MHA became the subjects of the struggles.




Figure 5.18 : Protests about coastal areas by objections between 1990 and 2010.

It is obtained in the study that, the protests for coastal areas are mostly conducted by platforms, professional organizations and some associations. Also the roles of intellectuals in the protests are significant. Especially for the places which intellectuals and artists live around such as Moda, intellectuals' role in protests are

more noticeable. Platforms, which take part in protests, were generally established in order to protect that individual area, such as *The Protection Committee against the Plundering of Ataköy Coast* or *Moda Neighborhood Initiative*. But also professional organizations and some left-wing (mostly) political parties took place in protests in order to protect coastal areas.

Also protests about public forested/wooded areas generate another public area which became subject of the protests. 88 percent of the protests, which were about public forested/wooded areas, were against the transformation of the areas into private functions such as residences, private universities or large scale projects e.g. Formula 1. And the rest of them were against the transformation of the areas into another public function. Mostly mentioned areas during the protests were Florya Atatürk Forest, Koç University Land, Kemerburgaz Forest, Formula 1 Land and Aydos Forest. And also 2B Lands (the lands which lost forest characteristics) came forward in the analysis as the most debated and opposed issue.

Besides urban squares, public parks/gardens, coastal areas and forested wooded areas; also other public urban spaces which do not show any of aforesaid characteristics such as old IETT land in Şişli or French Street in Beyoğlu were obtained as the subject of the protests about public spaces. Also mobilizations about these areas opposed mostly to the privatization of the land, such as sale of old IETT land in order to construct Dubai towers; or opposed to the restricted access to the public spaces, such as starting a controlled access implementation for newly restored French Street in 2004.

When we take into account all these protests about public spaces, it is seen that in the second period the annual frequency of the protests increase compared to the first period (See Table 5.11 and Figure 5.19). It is observed that especially the protests against the privatization of the public spaces increase more in the second period which is compatible with the empowered neoliberal policies of this period.

Table 5.11 : Protests about public spaces by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Transformation into private function	47	3.92	42	4.67	89	4.24
Transformation into another public function	14	1.17	9	1.00	23	1.10
Restricted access to the public spaces	2	0.17	6	0.67	8	0.38
Other	1	0.08	1	0.11	2	0.10
Total	64	5.33	58	6.44	122	5.81




Figure 5.19 : Protests about public spaces by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).

The main justifications of the protests for public spaces include: demanding use value of space, protecting public function or current function of space, right to reaching public space, protecting the urban open space in order to use them in the case of a disaster, and protecting the collective memory of the public space. Also their natural, urban and historical richness form other important justifications of the protests. As we stated many of these areas were also conserved areas. According to the data set, almost 60 percent of these areas were registered as conserved areas that urban squares and coastal areas generate the greatest rate.

Protests about public buildings

According to the enumeration, which is conducted in the study, three main issues are obtained for the public building protests in Istanbul between 1990 and 2010. As seen on Table 5.12, these are education buildings, medical buildings, and cultural

buildings. Also some protests are obtained for other kind of public buildings which cannot be included in these headings.

Table 5.12: Protests about public buildings by functions of the buildings and by objections of the protests (total and annual frequency).

	Education buildings	Medical buildings	Cultural buildings	Other public buildings	Total
Transformation into private function	16	7	6	22	47
Transformation into another public function	5	0	2	0	7
The close of public buildings without notice of their future functions	14	5	13	1	33
Insufficient public facility	7	2	0	0	9
Unmaintained/unsafe building	4	0	0	3	7
Other	0	0	0	1	1
Total	46	14	21	27	108

Figure 5.20 shows the functions of the public buildings which became subject of the protests between 1990 and 2010. According to the figure, with 43 percent ratio the highest rate of the protests are obtained about education buildings, and with 25 percent rate other public buildings followed this.




Figure 5.20 : Potests about public buildings by functions.

When we consider the objections of protests about public buildings, transformation of the buildings into private functions - similarly the protests for public spaces-, has the largest rate with 47 per cent (see Figure 5.21). Differently from public spaces an objection is significant for the protests about public buildings, which is the close of public buildings without notice if the function of the building will change or not. As we stated above these buildings were closed generally because of a fire or with the

reason that the building is needed a maintain, and they have been kept closed for a long time without informing about the planned status of the building. According the enumeration this forms the 31 percent of the protests about public buildings. Also objected issues about the protests for public buildings are observed as transformation of public building into another public function, insufficient urban facility and unmaintained/unsafe building.

In order to detail the protests about public buildings, they are evaluated due the functions of the buildings. Protests about education buildings which occupy 43 percent of all the protests about public buildings is detailed firstly.




Figure 5.21 : Protests about public buildings by objections.

As seen in Figure 5.22 transformation of the education buildings into private function form the highest segment of the protests with 35 percent rate. From 1990 to 2001 the protests were held against the sale or rent of ITU Maçka Campus and Gedikpaşa Primary School to private companies. As we stated in the previous chapter, ITU Taşkışla campus, which was declared as Tourism Centre in 1987, was planned to be rented for 49 years to a private company in order to transform the building into a five star hotel. In order to prevent this; students, academics and professional organizations held protests and conducted legal proceedings in the 1980s and managed to “save” the building. A similar opposition was held in the 1990s for ITU Maçka Campus, which was rented for 49 years in order to transform it into a Stock Exchange Building in 1990. But this attempt was also met with students’ and academics’ resistances. They started a petition campaign, also held public releases and started legal proceedings. Also it is observed on the news articles that, academics

have resisted during an irruption of Stock Exchange authorities. And again with the court decision this plan could not be implemented like Taşkışla hotel project.

Also Gedikpaşa Primary School came forward in the 1990s with the protests against the rent of the school to Eminönü Municipality. Protests were held by students, parents also by trade unions through press releases and demonstrations. But the school was kept closed for nine years until it was sold to a construction company in 2006 (Gedikpaşa İlköğretim, 2006). After the sale, a building with the functions of hotel, shopping mall and parking area was started to be built in that area through the revision on the plans. Chamber of Urban Planners has taken out a summons against the revision of plan but until the court gave the stay of execution the construction of the hotel has already been completed.




Figure 5.22 : Protests about education buildings by objections.

Also again in the 1990s the protests were held against the attempts of the close of some schools with the reasons of maintenance, strengthening for the earthquake or because not having enough students such as Ibrahim Ökten Primary School in Kadıköy, Marmara University Nişantaşı Campus, Taksim Primary School. As we stated, while generally students, parents and trade unions held these protests; repertoire of the protests extended from petition campaigns to occupying or roadblocks.

In the second period the transformation of schools into private function or the close of the buildings without informing about the planned function increased compared to the first period. Many schools, also the ones which were registered as historically protected, were included in privatization implementations such as Istanbul High School, Gaziosmanpaşa Primary School in Ortaköy, Kartalköy Primary School,

Bakırköy High School, etc. Also some of them were devastated with fire which also aroused the suspicion like Gaziosmanpaşa Primary School in Ortaköy. Gaziosmanpaşa Primary School, which was registered as the first degree historically protected building, was declared as one of the privatized schools, and after this declaration a fire broke out in the building in 2002, and the building became unusable and kept closed for a long time. The area of the building first was used as the parking area and then it was sold to a company in order to build a hotel. During the oppositions, many protests were held in order to preserve the building as an education building, also legal cases were initiated.

Furthermore 45 schools were planned to be sold in 2009 with the reasons of “reviving the economy” (Keleşir Okul, 2009), “being placed in the central areas and therefore reasoning the traffic congestion” (Bukrek, 2010) or because of weak building structure for earthquake. While some historical schools were also included in this privatization programme, all these schools were mostly placed in the highest rent areas in Istanbul, such as Çamlıca High School, Beyoğlu Technical and Industrial Vocational High School, Fenerbahçe High School, Etiler Vocational High School or Kandilli High School. And in order to prevent the sales of schools, *Eğitim-Sen* (Education and Science Workers’ Union) held protests and demonstrations in front of the schools. Later together with the participants of other organizations and political parties, an initiative was established which is called as *Do not Touch My School Initiative*. The initiative tried to stop the sales both through protesting and taking the attention of other organizations and individuals, and also through the legal proceedings (Bukrek, 2010). And even though they managed to stop or delay the processes for some schools, the threats for the schools, especially for the ones which placed in the high rent areas, still continue.

The followed processes by the authorities for the privatization of the schools are generally conducted in two ways; either the schools stop accepting the registrations for new students, or they are closed for a long time with the reason of maintenance (Bukrek, 2010). And for some of them the authorities do not give any official information about the adopted decision of the buildings. As we stated especially in the second period this became a kind of general policy for the authorities in order to privatize the public buildings without a large opposition. According to Bukrek

(2010), in this way the authorities wait for public to forget about the education building. And also they wait for the relief of the reactions.

And recently another issue came forward in the struggles for the education buildings which is transformation of the high schools into theology high schools. While *Do not Touch My School Initiative*, parents, and other organizations struggle against this implementation with petition campaigns, demonstrations; this also started the debates about secularism - like construction of mosques in green areas - and also right to have secular education.

As we stated, another issue for the protests about public buildings, was medical buildings. Transformation of the buildings into private function also formed the highest segment of the objections of protests about medical buildings with 50 percent rate (See Figure 5.23). 86 percent of these were emerged between 2002 and 2010. In the 1990s the struggle against the closure of Beykoz Children and Chest Diseases Hospital which was serving in a historical building (in Beykoz Palace) was the most featured one. Even the closure of the hospital was met with opposition from trade unions and associations; it was transferred to Directorate of National Palaces in 1997.




Figure 5.23 : Protests about medical buildings by objections.

The increase of the protests for protecting the medical buildings is observed especially after 2003 when The Health Transformation Programme was put into force by the government. While the program brought neoliberal policies in the health system with “efficiency and productivity” criteria and increased the private hospitals, it also threatened the public medical buildings. It is observed that, especially trade unions and professional organizations such as Turkish Medical Association have largely opposed against this program.

In 2006 the closure of Beykoz Children and Chest Diseases Hospital came into prominence again, and trade unions, organizations, parties and some new established platforms like *Beykoz Health Platform* held protests against the closure of the hospital also in this period. Furthermore, again in this period moving hospitals to the outside of the city such as Koşuyolu Heart and Vascular Diseases Hospital to Kartal, Şişli Etfal Hospital to Seyrantepe, Istanbul University School of Medicine to Küçükçekmece, was another project which met with protests (Bahçetepe, 2006).

The privatization and displacing the public medical buildings have even increased in the following years with the new laws. And some large scale protests, such as the demonstrations in 2008 against the Social Security Reform Bill, were held in order to oppose the new laws about the health system. While the privatization of the health system has accelerated with these new laws, the implementations of decentralizing the state hospitals to the outside of the city, merging them together or closing them have also increased. Transforming Bezm-i Alem Vakıf Gureba Hospital into a private university hospital, closing Şişli State Hospital, merging Beykoz State Hospital with Paşabahçe State Hospital, and Validebağ State Hospital with Üsküdar State Hospital were some of the implementations which different organizations came together and struggled against with *Do not touch my hospital* slogan. As we stated, while these protests were held mostly by trade unions, professional organizations and some political parties; also new platforms like *Sağlığıma Engel Olma Platformu* (literally The Platform of Do not Obstruct my Health) or Beykoz Health Platform have taken part in these protests. Furthermore besides trade unions, professional organizations or platforms, sex workers' protest against the changing the place of Istanbul Skin and Genital Diseases Hospital in 2009 was one of the important protests. And like the protests for education buildings, the repertoires of these protests comprised generally petition campaigns, demonstrations, press releases and rallies.

The third issue for the protests about public buildings is obtained for cultural buildings. Most of these protests' objections –with 62 percent rate- is acquired as the close of cultural building without notice of any official information (or contradictory information) about the future function of the building. The most featured protests about cultural buildings were for Atatürk Cultural Building (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi-AKM) and Emek Cinema in the second period. But before explaining that process,

the information will be given about the implementations and protests about cultural buildings in the 1990s. Aziz Nesin Stage in Güngören was the one of these buildings which was closed in 1993 in order to use as wedding and city council hall. It is given in the newspapers that in order to protest this implementation some political parties and trade unions came together in that period.




Figure 5.24 : Protests about cultural buildings by objections.

Furthermore, even though the most featured protests for Emek Movie Theatre were held in the second period, the rental agreement, which was signed between Pension Fund and a private construction company for 25 years in 1993, led also the protests in the first period. Cercle d'Orient building, which comprised Emek Movie Theatre, was built in 1884, and in 1924 it was started to be used as movie theatre which was called as Melek. In the 1940s the building was bought by municipality and transferred to Pension Fund in 1957. After this date the cinema was called as Emek. On December 1993 an agreement was made between Pension Fund and a private construction company with a preliminary project. And this started oppositions and struggles in order to prevent the closure of the cinema. According to the newspapers of the period, the preliminary project foresaw to preserve the building façade, which was facing to Istiklal Street, but to demolish the building and to build 8 floors business centre with an underground parking (Demirkaya, 1994). This started the opposition especially from the groups who were in the arts and culture environment. In order to struggle this implementation a petition campaign was held, and according to the court decision the project was cancelled for that period.

But like all the other protests, the increase about the protests for cultural buildings is observed in the second period. Emek Cinema city block, which was registered as the

first degree historical asset in 2006, was declared as “renewal area” in the same year and the preliminary projects which were prepared by the private company was approved in 2009. And after that date, the protests against the project were increased and also professional organizations have taken out summons against it. The protests were generally held by *Emek Bizim İstanbul Bizim Initiative* and Chamber of Architects with the support of intellectuals. Also the repertoires of the protests were striking, such as playing trumpets or film screenings. Furthermore the historical feature of the building and especially its public and common role, and its place in the public memory were stated during the protests. But even though the high participation was ensured for the protests, the building was demolished in order to build a shopping mall on May 2013.

The featured protests in the second period were also held for Kartal State Theatre which was planned to be demolished because of not being safe for the earthquake risk; also for Muhsin Ertuğrul Stage and for AKM. As we stated, especially the protests for AKM were the ones which created the biggest impact. Because of both being the most important cultural building in Turkey and being important both architecturally and symbolically⁹¹, the closure of the building met with major opposition in this period. The attempt to demolish the buildings has started in 2005 but it was prevented through the oppositions of different organizations and groups, and was registered as a protected building. And in the concept of 2010 Europe Capital of Culture it was closed in 2008 in order to renew, but the project was not conducted through the court decision. And the building has been kept closed since 2008. The protests were held by intellectuals, trade unions, professional organizations, political parties and some other organizations in order to object the decision of the closing the building. And also the repertoires of the protests were striking with the theatre shows, different costumes and dances etc.

Also some other buildings (especially the ones which were old industrial buildings) became the subject of the protests. In this heading the protests are obtained for other kind of public buildings besides the functions of education, health or culture; such as

⁹¹ Especially during Gezi Park Protests in 2013, the building became one of the symbols of the resistance with banners of slogans of different political groups and organizations. But especially just after the protests the building was started to be used almost as a ‘police station’.

old industrial buildings, Haydarpaşa railway station, Radio House in Harbiye, Kızkulesi and also for administrative buildings. As it is seen in Figure 5.25, 81 percent of these protests were against the transformation of these building into private functions.




Figure 5.25 : Protests about other public buildings by objections.

In order to detail the protest for old industrial buildings, the protests will be explained within two different periods. In the 1990s, the most featured protests were held for Hasanpaşa Gasworks in Kadıköy. And in the second period while the protests for Hasanpaşa Gasworks has continued, also Mecidiyeköy Liqueur and Cognac Factory, Bomonti Beer Factory and Kartal Cevizli Tekel Tobacco Factory became the most featured buildings in protests.

Hasanpaşa Gasworks, which began the production in 1891 and was sold to the Istanbul Electricity Company in 1931, and then transferred to the IETT in 1945 (Yüksel, 2011) The protests for The Gasworks formed the most featured protests for public buildings in the first period. After the closure of the factory in 1993, the building was used as coal storage by IETT and largely damaged. In 1996 it came into agenda with the project of transforming the area into car parking area and business centre (Ilgaz, 1996). In order to protect the building and its environment, and prevent the construction of the parking area and business centre, *Gasworks Environment Volunteers* started a campaign in 1996 and managed to collect 8 thousand signatures (Gazhaneliler, 1997). They demanded the Gasworks building and its environment (33.000 m²) to become a cultural centre and green area in the favour of public instead of capital interests. With the efforts of Gasworks Environment Volunteers, The Gasworks was registered as the historical monument in 1996.

Also the struggles for Hasanpaşa Gasworks have continued in the second period. While a project was prepared by Istanbul Technical University in order to transform it into a culture centre and the project was planned to be implemented within the context of Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture, it did not put into practice at that time. But according to the newspapers, the Gasworks is under restoration at the moment in order to implement that project (Kundakçı, 2014a).

As we mentioned in the previous sections, in spite of the workers' struggles against the closure of Bomonti Beer factory, it was closed in 1990s. In the second period, while some groups demanded to preserve Bomonti Beer Factory, which was registered as a protected building, through transforming it into a cultural centre; Ministry of Finance went to the tender in order to transform it into congress and exhibition centre, restaurants and hotels. This project presented the maximum construction conditions of Istanbul. And it was protested and also was brought the trial by professional organizations, some associations and political parties. But at the moment there is the largest hotel and conference centre of Istanbul (Hilton Istanbul Bomonti Hotel & Conference Center) in the area of the factory with its 34-storeys and 829 rooms. And the factory building is under restoration in order to serve as an entertainment venue.

Compared to the protests for Hasanpaşa Gasworks, the protests for Bomonti Beer Factory were less conspicuous. This was mostly through the endeavours of Gasworks Environment Volunteers and residents of Hasanpaşa. The residents of Hasanpaşa tried to preserve this industrial heritage and public urban area with petition campaigns, festivals, exhibitions, concerts etc., but a similar process could not be held for Bomonti Beer Factory as organized as Hasanpaşa Gasworks.

Also the struggle against the privatization of Cevizli Tekel Tobacco Factory in Kartal and Mecidiyeköy Liqueur and Cognac Factory in Şişli were the ones which were largely reported on the media. Mecidiyeköy Liqueur and Cognac Factory, which was built in 1930s by French architect Robert M. Stevens, was transferred to MHA and a plan revision was conducted by IMM in 2008. With the plan revision, the area was transformed to “commercial area with special conditions” with high construction rate. The Factory had been registered as protected building in 2006, and also the trees in its garden and entrance pavilion had been registered in 2008 (Erbil, 2013). The political parties and professional organizations protested the plan revision and also

have taken out summons against it. But even the court gave the stay of execution to the plan; the construction was continued by the private company which had won the auction in 2008. And in order to overcome the court decision, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization has prepared a new plan revision for the area. Despite the efforts of the authorities to get over the court decision, the plan was cancelled in 2013. But until that date, the factory had been already demolished. And at the moment 40-storeys two buildings with hotels, residences, offices, commercial areas and parking areas are being built in the area through destructing both the factory, which was one of the most important industrial heritages, and the green belt that was one of the few open spaces in Şişli. Also just closed to this area another project is under construction on an old stadium which will be serving as offices and residences⁹². Therefore with these two projects, the area has lost its last public open spaces despite the protests and court decisions.

As we stated in the previous section, for a long period TEKEL workers' have resisted against the privatization of TEKEL and unsecure job conditions, but this could not stop the process and many TEKEL factories were evacuated. One of them was Cevizli Tekel Factory, and the struggles have also continued after the evacuation of the factory. While the professional organizations, some political parties and also *Cevizli Tekel Solidarity* demanded the area to be used as public green, and building to be preserved, in 2008 a private university wanted to seize the Factory and a plan revision was conducted by IMM in order to change the function of the area from industrial area to education area. Even the organizations both protested this decision and also have taken out summons against it; these did not stop the process. And according to the newspapers the demolition of the area has already started in order to build a private university (Güvemli, 2014).

Even if the most featured struggles for old industrial buildings were detailed here, in this period almost all old industrial buildings have been under the threat of demolition or transformation into private functions. But as we stated, the protests

⁹² It is important to state that on September 2014 ten workers died during the construction of this project because of the malfunctioning lift. And on October 2014 one more worker died because of falling from the building of the old Liqueur Factory construction. Also these work "accidents" led the protests against the constructions of these two projects and against poor job security conditions and also against the subcontracting system.

were held not just for old industrial buildings, but also Haydarpaşa Train Station, Radio Station in Harbiye and Kızkulesi were other public buildings which became subject of the protests. Especially the struggle for Haydarpaşa Railway Station and Port presents one of the important struggle experiences. The struggles for Haydarpaşa Railway Station and Port have started in 2004 when *Haydarpaşa will transform to Manhattan* news have started to be taken part on the media. On September 2004 a law was legalized in order to transfer the property of the area to The State Railway Administration. And the project of World Trade Centre and Cruise Port” came into prominence with seven skyscrapers (Özmen, 2005). In order to struggle against this decision more than 70 organizations came together and established Haydarpaşa Solidarity. Solidarity has started their protests every Thursdays and Sundays in front of the Gar in order to protect Haydarpaşa Railway Station. However in 2010 a fire broke out in the building during the maintenance and the station was closed because of the construction of high-speed train project in 2012. And today, the protests of the Solidarity still continue in front of the Railway Station every week.

As seen, all these protests for public buildings increase in the second period especially because of the privatization implementations. Table 5.13 and Figure 5.26 show the objected issues of the public building protests for two different periods. It shows that total annual frequency of the protests increase by almost 3 fold in the second period. And the maximum rise is achieved for the protests which oppose the transformation of the public buildings into private functions with more than 6 time increase on annual frequency. Also the closure of the public facilities without giving any information about the future functions forms the second most increased issue with 3 times increase. But the protests for unmaintained/unsafe buildings present a decrease in the second period. This is largely because of the protests for the schools, and administrative buildings, such as courthouses, in the first period, just after the 1999 earthquake.

Table 5.13 : Protests about public building by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Transformation to the private function	9	0.75	42	4.67	51	2.43
Transformation to the another public function	4	0.33	3	0.33	7	0.33
Closure of the public facilities (not informing about the future function)	10	0.83	23	2.56	33	1.57
Insufficient urban facility	5	0.42	4	0.44	9	0.43
Unmaintained/unsafe building	6	0.50	1	0.11	7	0.33
Other	1	0.08	-	-	1	0.05
Total	35	2.93	73	8.11	108	5.14




Figure 5.26 : Protests about public buildings by objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (annual frequency).

According to the data set, these protests like the protests for public spaces were generally held by professional organizations, public parties and platforms which were established in order to reclaim generally an individual public building or a type of function. And the repertoires of the protests were generally press releases, rallies, demonstrations, petition campaigns and also some striking repertoires such as dancing, wearing different costumes, singing, movie screenings etc. Another important point of the protests about public buildings are that, the buildings which became the subject of the protests were generally registered as protected buildings. Therefore we can state that historical feature of the building form one of the

important issues for the protests. And also we can assume that, the mobilizations for the buildings which are in a neighbourhood that has strong ties and was settled by mostly middle-class groups (such as Hasanpaşa Gasworks) have generally stronger mobilization ability than other buildings which are settled in an industrial areas or in a poorer neighbourhoods. Also another outcome is, the protests which were held for public buildings were generally adopted by certain groups that either they were affected from the implementation directly (such as students or parents of the closed schools, or residents who lived nearby the public space/buildings) or some organizations which mobilize around urban issues. But still the solidarity of different groups can be observed especially in the last period. Also if the building is one of the public buildings, which is important for the public memory for a large group of people, such as Haydarpaşa Train Station or Emek Movie Theatre, the mobilization ability or consciousness about that building is stronger. But still the protests for the public buildings could not create a common ground for large amount of people between 1990 and 2010. Even so, we can assume that after Gezi Park Protests, the mobilizations about public spaces or buildings gained strength.

5.3.4. Protests about urban infrastructure/transportation

In this title 205 news articles were obtained about the protests about urban infrastructure/transportation. But also like the previous ones, some of these protests were held more than one day. Therefore when we consider also the number of the days of the protests, 239 events are obtained under this title. And when we classify the protests according to their demands, 9 different groups are achieved which are: provision of basic infrastructure services in the housings, provision of waste collection and environmental cleaning, price of basic services, safe/healthy infrastructure and transportation, adequate/accessible transportation infrastructure, price of public transportation, rearrangements on transportation implementations, urban traffic load and large scale transportation projects (see Table 5.14).

Table 5.14 : Protests about urban infrastructure/transportation by demands and objections for the periods 1990-2001 and 2002-2010 (total and annual frequency).

	1990-2001		2002-2010		Total	
	Tf	Af	Tf	Af	Tf	Af
Provision of basic infrastructure services in the houses	17	1.42	7	0.78	24	1.14
Provision of waste collection and environmental cleaning	9	0.75	1	0.11	10	0.48
Price of basic services	3	0.25	27	3.00	30	1.43
Safe/healthy infrastructure and transportation	5	0.42	8	0.89	13	0.62
Adequate/accessible transportation infrastructure	15	1.25	14	1.56	29	1.38
Price of public transportation	7	0.58	36	4.00	43	2.05
Rearrangements on transportation implementations	31	2.58	21	2.33	52	2.48
Urban traffic load	1	0.08	5	0.56	6	0.29
Large scale transportation projects	7	0.58	23	2.56	30	1.43
Other	1	0.08	1	0.11	2	0.10
Total	96	8.00	143	15.89	239	11.38

Under these aforesaid demands and objections the following protests are evaluated in the study:

Provision of basic services in the housings: Protests demand for provision of water, electricity, sewage system or heating system in the houses.

Provision of collection and environmental cleaning: Protests demand for sufficient cleaning service of the municipality.

Price of basic services: Protests oppose to prices or raise of prices of electricity, water and natural gas.

Safe/healthy infrastructure and transportation: Protests demand for secure or healthy infrastructure or transportation services. These protests were generally held after an accident or disaster.

Adequate/accessible transportation infrastructure: Protests demand for accessible transportation, especially for the individuals with disabilities.

Price of public transportation: Protests oppose to prices or raise of prices of public transportation.

Rearrangements on transportation implementations: Protests oppose to new arrangements on transportation like closing/opening a road for traffic, changes on routes of buses or minibuses etc.

Urban traffic load: Protests oppose the traffic jam, air pollution which is caused by traffic. These protests also demand for bicycle paths.

Large scale transportation projects: Protests oppose to large scale transportation projects especially the ones which destruct the natural, historical areas like wide roads, 3rd bridge or Marmaray Project.

As can be seen on Table 5.14, 143 of these protests (which mean %60) were held in the second period. And also annual frequency of the protests about urban infrastructure/transportation is almost two times more in the second period. But not all these issues are in the increase trend. As seen, the annual frequencies of the protests which demand provision of the basic services in the housings, provision of waste collection and environmental cleaning and rearrangements on transportation implementations are declined in the second period. Firstly these protests will be evaluated in this section.

In the first period, the protests which demand provision for basic services in the housings were mostly about the water outages. Especially in 1990, 1993 and 1994 a long term water outages in Istanbul were experienced because of the low occupancy rate of the dams and because of insufficient water distribution line for some neighbourhoods. It is observed that repertoire of many of these protests include blocking the roads, carrying water bottles or sit-ins. While almost all Istanbul has experienced water shortages in that period because of the low occupancy rate of the dams, many of these protests were held generally in gecekondü neighbourhoods (according to the news some of them could not access water for six months). Also some protests were held for newly-built MHA houses which people have lived in without electricity, water or heating system connections. Furthermore, the role of women was remarkable in these protests which almost all the protests were held by women in the neighbourhoods without an organization. And the police interventions to some of these protests were observed.

In the second period, the protests about basic services in the houses were more about the right to access to water. These protests were against the sale and commercialization of water and demanded free access to water as a human right. And these protests were held generally by political parties, associations or platforms like *Suyun Ticarileşmesine Hayır Platformu* (No to Commercialization of Water Platform).

Also 90 percent of the protests about access to waste collection and environmental cleaning were held in the first period. In 1991 the residents of Aydınlı village in Pendik protested against the relocation of Yakacık waste area to their villages. On 30 July 1992 municipality workers' strike decision in some big cities like İstanbul, İzmir, Adana led many people to protest the municipality. While uncollected waste threatened the public health, the demands of the workers were not fulfilled by the municipality. And people and some organizations also protested municipality because of not meeting the demands of the workers. Another protest was held for the demand of removing of Hekimpaşa waste area to another place. While the explosion of Hekimpaşa waste area in Umraniye caused the deaths of 39 people in 1993, people protested the municipality because of both the site selection of waste area and also unsafe conditions of living nearby a waste collection area.

Besides, the protests about rearrangements on transportation implementations held generally against the removal of minibuses from the traffic, preventing minibuses to reach inner-city and changing the routes of them in the first period. Also the declining the number of ferry lines formed another issue of the protests in 1990s. In the second period the protests against the change of the ferries were the featured protests with “*we want our ferries*” slogan.

While these protests (which are generally about the inadequacy of the urban services) have declined in the second period, the protests about the prices of basic urban services and transportation, large scale transportation projects, and traffic load have increased. Totally 73 protests were obtained about the prices of basic urban services and transportation which 30 of them were about the prices of basic urban services such as prices of water, electricity or natural gas. And it is observed that in the second period there is a dramatic increase on these protests which 90 percent of them held after 2002. The vast majority of them were held by the organizations instead of individuals like political parties, political groups, associations and platforms. The

most featured organizations were *halkevleri* and Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi). Therefore we can indicate that the protests, which were about the prices of basic services, were largely held by left groups and parties. The similar situation was observed also for the protests about the prices of public transportation. While 43 protests were obtained about the prices of public transportation, 84 percent of them were held in the second period. The role of students came forward on these protests. Also political parties, political groups, associations and platforms were the ones which held the protests about the prices of public transportation. Again left organizations like *halkevleri* or *halkcephesi* were important organizations on these protests. Also while the repertoires of the protests showed similarity with other kind of protests like demonstrations, petition campaigns, rallies etc.; some distinctive repertoires were observed like marching barefoot or jumping over the turnstiles without paying.

The protests which call attention to traffic load and accordingly to air pollution which was created by traffic were held generally through using the bicycles. Therefore cycling formed the one of the important repertoires. These protests were held generally by the associations, platforms or groups like *The Street is Ours Association* with their *the street is ours one day a month* protests. Also in the 1990s it is observed that in order to prevent the passing the minibuses on their streets, residents blocked the street with stones.

One of the most important protests in this title was also held against the large scale transportation projects. Likewise majority of these protests (% 77) were held in the second period. 3rd Bridge was the most featured issue in these protests. *Arnavutköy Initiative's* struggles against the 3rd bridge continued in the second period with professional organizations, political parties, associations and platforms. Some of these protests managed to get large amount of people together especially in the second period (for example in 2010 protestors created a human chain which lengthened 1 km). Through petition campaigns, demonstrations, festivals, rallies and human chains different organizations and platforms protested the 3rd bridge. Although, the construction of the bridge has started through destroying large forest areas. Also the protests against the highway projects and Marmaray Project were evaluated under this title.

And the last issue about these protests was safe/healthy infrastructure and transportation which also increased in the second period. This title included the protests against the traffic accidents because of the unsafe road construction or insufficient traffic signs and markings. Unsafe infrastructure and construction, which caused the death of people such as Hekimpaşa waste area explosion, Ayamama flooding or train accidents, was also evaluated in this title. Especially Ayamama flooding which caused 8 women workers death was protested largely by trade unions, women organizations and especially by left groups.

Therefore we can reach the conclusion that while the protests about the inadequacy of the infrastructure and transportation systems were more in the first period, in the second period even if the inadequacy of these urban services were partially fulfilled; the prices of the urban services and the destruction of natural and historical areas through large projects increased. And these new projects could not meet with safety conditions both as a result of created urban environment and also with unsecure working conditions for the workers during the constructions.

5.4 Evaluation of the Findings: Conflicts in the Neoliberal City

The findings show that, urban protests which were held in Istanbul in order to develop collective consumption, have an increase trend between 1990 and 2010. Another outcome about the trend of the protests is, during the periods when the election activities were conducted, the number of protests tends to decline. This can be explained as a result of populist policies of the authorities just before the elections. Furthermore a sharp increase is achieved especially after 2006 when the results of the urban regeneration/renewal projects have started to be revealed.

In order to evaluate the urban protests according to their different demands, four main issues were explicated in this chapter. The first one was the most mentioned type of urban movement, housing protests. According to the findings, anti-eviction protests constituted the major part of the housing protests between 1990 and 2010 (with 96 percent rate). Another issue which was evaluated in the housing protests was the protests about unplanned/unsafe housing stock which were held mainly after the 1999 earthquake.

When we evaluate the anti-eviction protests for two different periods (1990-2001 and 2002-2010) it was observed that annual frequency of the protests has increased almost five times in the second period which was compatible with the increasing legal tools which emerged the eviction processes. Nevertheless, for both of the periods gecekondü settlements were formed the highest rate of the anti-eviction protests. Also besides gecekondü settlements, while in the first period the issues which emerged the eviction implementations were expropriation, demolition of other illegal houses like villas and evacuation of social houses/facilities/camps; in the second period law 5366 formed the most important tool for the evictions after gecekondü dwellings.

Another difference between two periods was the targeted neighbourhoods which were met with evictions. In the first period (even if both SDPP and WP showed themselves as gecekondü friendly parties) the neighbourhoods which were represented on the media as *varoş* neighbourhoods like Küçükarmutlu, Okmeydanı or Sarıgazi were generally threatened by eviction. But in the second period, this enclosed all gecekondü neighbourhoods also the ones which provided high rate vote for the ruling party JDP. And also it was observed that while in the first period anti-eviction protests were concentrated mostly in the central areas, in the second period they were extended through almost entire city with the extended and strengthened legal regulations.

In the second period, urban regeneration/renewal projects were the most important tools for sending lower-income groups out of the city as the result of conducted neoliberal policies. While the authorities legalized new laws in order to ease these processes, these policies and implementations met with major resistances and oppositional mobilizations in many neighbourhoods of city.

This increase of the struggles also brought some changes on organizational status, tactics and repertoires of the protests. In the first period anti-eviction struggles were mostly held by local organizational structures of the neighbourhoods and with the support of some left-wing organizations and parties. The roles of intellectuals, academics or other kind of platforms were very limited. Nevertheless, some different neighbourhoods, which were under threat of evictions, established their own platforms like *Citizen Commission for Following the Plan*. However in the second

period struggles of the neighbourhoods were also supported by other organizations, platforms or individuals.

While many neighbourhood associations were established in order to oppose the urban regeneration/renewal projects; also the ones which were already existed have oriented towards the struggles against these projects. The resistances of different neighbourhoods also tended to come together under some platforms and also received the supports of some organizations, groups, intellectuals or academics. While in the 1990s generally left groups have supported the struggles of the neighbourhoods, in the second period also other groups which were avoided to be in a political sphere were included in the struggles. Especially the roles of the academics, intellectuals and students were featured in the second period. But still some neighbourhoods and organizations did not leave the political sphere and developed the conflictual process in a political sphere.

Indeed, this alteration in the organization status also brought some differences on the repertoires of the collective actions. Even if sit-ins, petition campaigns, demonstrations, rallies, barricading, conflict with police, blocking the road and sometimes picnics formed the repertoires of the protests for both of the periods, also in the second period alternative plan was another repertoire for some neighbourhoods. But still the repertoire of alternative planning was not adopted for many neighbourhoods especially the ones which have political characteristics.

Also it is seen that the in many protests women were in the forefront. A similar case was also seen in the protests about the shortages of basic services. Furthermore, the police intervention was observed in a high rate. So that, the incidents of arrest and injury were seen in the housing protests more than the other ones between 1990 and 2010.

A second issue which was explicated in this chapter was protests about workplaces. While opposed issues of these protests were evaluated in two categories which were displacements and high rents; displacements formed the highest rate of the protests that included industrial areas, small businesses/shops, local markets and protests of peddlers/street vendors.

When we compare two different periods for workplaces protests, also an increase was observed in the second period. Especially protests about displacement of the

industrial areas formed the highest increase which was the outcome of the decentralization and privatization policies of JDP (privatization of TEKEL formed the one of the important reason of that). Furthermore, together with decentralization of industrial areas, displacements of small shops and sending away the street vendors from the city centre were the other consequences of the global city discourses of the period.

In order to oppose these policies and implementations the struggles of trade unions and workers were featured especially for the industrial areas. Also professional organizations, associations and political parties took part in the protests. But it was seen that, besides the protests for industrial areas, the struggles were generally held by individual artisans and tradesmen. Also the study showed that the repertoires of the protests exhibits the characteristics of workers protests like strikes, closing the shutters of the shops etc.

The third demand which was detailed in the study was to protect public buildings and spaces. This section was explicated through six main opposed issues which are transformation of public space/building into private function, the close of public building without notice of its future functions, transformation of the public space/building into another public function, insufficient urban facility, unmaintained/unsafe building and restricted access to the public spaces. Like all other issues, also the protests about public buildings and spaces showed an increase in the second period. And the most increased opposed issue was the close of public buildings without notice of their future functions. As we stated this was a kind of strategy of the authorities to ensure the prevention of large opposition especially in the second period. Through closing the buildings for a long time and not officially informing about the future function, or giving contradictory and different explanations about it, authorities tried to keep out of sight of those buildings. And according to the study, this process generally ends with the privatization.

In order to oppose these implementations, many different platforms, professional organizations such as TMMOB, political parties, associations or sometimes residents who live around the area came together. Also according to the study, gentrifies of some neighbourhoods played important roles especially in the protests for public gardens and historical buildings (such as in Kuzguncuk Garden).

Also the protests about urban infrastructure/transportation have increased in the second period. But while the ones which were about the provision of the urban infrastructure/transportation were decreased in the second period, the protests which opposed to prices of urban services, large scale transportation projects which destruct the natural and historical areas, urban traffic load and unsafe/unhealthy infrastructure and transportation services have increased.

Consequently, we may reach the point that all these protests are assembled under two main issues. They either demand for a change for urban services (demanding) or resist against the imposed change from local or central authorities (reactive). We totally acquired nineteen different demands or objections, and when we add also cityscape/silhouette we reach twenty demands or objections for five different headings. On Table 5.15, the reactive or demanding types of the movements are presented according to their demands or objections. It shows that, while the reactive protests which resist against the imposed change have increased in the second period almost three times; the demanding protests which demand for a change or provision has decreased in the second period. While this shows the fulfilling partly the insufficiency of urban services in the second period, this also shows the increase of the reactive movements against neoliberal urban policies.

Furthermore, we see that protests have targeted not only local or central governments, but also in some cases to infrastructure companies or school/hospital administrations. But even in these cases local and central governments were the most opposed adversary actors. Also we can state that while in the 1990s the protests' adversary actor was mostly the local government, in the second period central government was prominent actor which was targeted. This can be explained with two grounds. Firstly and most importantly, because of the increase of power of central governments on urban area through new legal legislations such as expanding the authorization of MHA, or increase on privatization implementations; made central government the main adversary of the protests which attempted to challenge neoliberal authoritarianism. The second reason is, while in the 1990s there was not a powerful only party or figure which can be opposed to because of the different coalition and minority governments, however, in the second period this has changed with the JDP.

Table 5.15 : Main issues of the protests: reactive or demanding (annual frequency).

Main Category	Goals or Adversaries	Opposing or Demanding	1990-2001	2002-2010
Housing	Anti-eviction	Reactive	4.66	22.56
	Unplanned-Unsafe Housing	Demanding	0.42	0.44
Workplaces	Displacement	Reactive	2.58	4.67
	High-rents	Reactive	0.33	0.11
Public Buildings / Spaces	Privatization	Reactive	4.67	9.33
	Another public function	Reactive	1.5	1.33
	Closure without informing	Reactive	0.83	2.56
	Insufficiency	Demanding	0.42	0.44
	Unsafe	Demanding	0.5	0.11
	Restrictions to reach	Reactive	0.17	0.67
Urban Infrastructure / Transportation	Access to basic infrastructure services	Demanding	1.42	0.78
	Access to waste collection	Demanding	0.75	0.11
	Price of basic services	Reactive	0.25	3
	Unsafe	Demanding	0.42	0.89
	Adequate/accessible transportation	Demanding	1.25	1.56
	Price of public transportation	Reactive	0.58	4
	Rearrangements on transportation	Reactive	2.58	2.33
	Urban traffic load	Both	0.08	0.56
	Major transportation projects	Reactive	0.58	2.56
cityscape / silhouette	-	Reactive	0.75	0.77
		Total Demanding	5.18	4.33
		Total Reactive	19.48	53.89

6. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

This study aims to analyse the socio-economic-political processes and urban policies of certain periods, as well as the mobilisations-resistance efforts against these policies historically in Istanbul in order to identify causal explanations for these three contexts and determine how they have changed with time. In other words, the study considers how socio-economic characteristics and urban policies across different periods affect urban-based protests and how these protests vary in demand, motivation, organisational type, and repertoire over different periods in Istanbul.

Since the contextual features of urban movements—both general socio-economic and political processes and urban policies with central-local relations—are recognised as one of the most important elements in understanding urban movements, the study is based on the socio-economic-political characteristics and enacted urban policies of different time periods in Istanbul, in relation to the urban-based oppositional movements. In order to evaluate these three processes, two different analyses were conducted in the study. Firstly in the fourth chapter, general socio-economic and political contexts, urban policies, legal tools, and their effects on urban areas, together with the representations of *gecekond* settlements, and the oppositional mobilisations against these policies and implementations are explained through previous studies and a search of newspapers, journals and legal tools of the periods with a qualitative analysis until 2010. This analyse provided information about the characteristics of the periods and shed light on how the implemented policies and oppositional mobilisations against these policies were handled and represented by the media and interpreted by professionals. In addition, researching print media from the periods supplied information about policy-makers' discourses. Some sources also gave the perspectives of the middle class, professionals, and intellectuals on urban issues.

After analysing socio-economic-political processes, urban policies and urban-based oppositional mobilisations against these policies historically in Istanbul in the fourth

chapter through qualitative analysis, it was observed that mobilisations and resistances against urban policies in the neoliberal period increased mainly after the 1990s. Therefore, an additional analysis was conducted for urban based-protests about collective consumption demands between 1990 and 2010 in the fifth chapter in order to identify trends in demand, repertoire, and organisational status quantitatively over that 21-year period. In this part of the study in order to quantify urban-based protests in Istanbul, event data analysis was conducted through scanning the national daily newspapers systematically, and also with the aim of minimising the disadvantages of newspaper data collection; two different newspapers were scanned daily in their original printed versions.

Adopting both qualitative and quantitative analysis provided to evaluate the contextual processes historically and illuminate the research questions of the study with systematic evidences. In this conclusion part, the findings of the both analyses will be evaluated in the context of the theoretical framework of the study through considering the research questions of the thesis.

In order to identify the causal explanation for the socio-economic-political processes, urban policies and urban-based oppositional mobilisations of the certain periods, five different sub-questions were formed in the study. Firstly two interwoven questions of the study will be evaluated. These questions were formed as:

- How do neoliberal urban policies affect urban oppositional mobilizations?
- During which historical periods do urban oppositional mobilisations show decreasing and increasing trends? And how can these trends be evaluated in relation to the socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of the periods?

In order to present a holistic view of the processes of mobilisation and resistance against urban policies enacted before and after neoliberalism, the pre-1980 period also examined in this study dates back to the 1950s. This period, unlike previous eras, was marked by liberal economic development due to the import substitution industrialisation model and by rural-urban migration. As a result of inadequate state policies regarding migration, newcomers mobilised to build their own housing, and *gecekondu* settlements rapidly increased in number since then.

Gecekondu settlements occupy an important part of this study because of the mobilisation efforts of *gecekondu* dwellers—firstly, in order to establish their settlements and demand urban services, and then to defend their neighbourhoods from destructive neoliberal policies. In the 1960s, these dwellers organised under beautification or hometown associations, and starting in the late 1960s and 1970s, as a consequence of highly mobilised working-class movements, they emerged the first broad urban political movement aiming to establish and to defend their neighbourhoods. Until that time, *gecekondu* settlements had been represented by the media as “rural other” or “innocent labourers”; after the political- and class-based mobilisations of some *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in the 1970s, they came to be viewed as the “objectionable other” (Erman, 2004). Therefore, state intervention in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods was negligible until the 1970s, after which the political mobilisation of the socialist left, with the support of professionals and students, made these neighbourhoods the target of state surveillance and intervention.

The 1970s period was marked by particular political and class-based characteristics, and as this affected the political structure of urban struggles in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, and also shaped some political parties, orienting them to the left and toward more progressive local policies. Even though this attempt for a “new municipalism movement” could not produce a broad-based political movement and remained a primarily elite movement supported by the middle class and leftist *petit bourgeoisie*; it still partly presented one of the characteristics of emphasised by Pickvance (1985) and Lowe (1986), that is, the role of political opposition parties in expressing political conflict at the local level against the central government.

The political trends of the 1970s did not only manifest in housing conflicts, the demand for urban services, or community-based local administration attempts; they also manifested in defensive movements, such as opposition to the construction of the first bridge. Through the increased dynamism of working-class movements, also the visibility of left-leaning parties and trade unions increased until the sharp rupture of 1980 military junta.

The 1980 coup d’état transformed the capital accumulation process by enforcing 24th January decisions, and it also affected Turkey politically and socially with its authoritarian regime. The neoliberal reconstruction of the 1980 coup d’état materialised especially in urban areas and was highlighted at local levels. Since

urban areas encountered the greatest amount of destruction and were subject to state surveillance, this new accumulation process was carried out with little resistance due to the oppression of political groups, but with the support of international capital organisations.

In the 1980s, disrupted cityscapes, extensive road construction, and the damage of natural-historical heritage sites in Istanbul inspired opponents of oppositional mobilisations in urban areas. In addition to these issues, policies regarding *gecekondu* settlements were largely criticised in this period, especially by professional organisations, former city residents, intellectuals, and some media institutions. These oppositions were largely stated on the journals and newspapers with ‘Istanbul became the city of newcomers instead of its real residents’ discourses. Meanwhile, *gecekondu* dwellers were represented on the media as ‘plunderers’, ‘depredators’, ‘ill-gotten gains’ (Erman, 2004), ‘invaders’, ‘providers of unfair distribution’, and ‘freeloaders’.

As the political characteristics of 1970s dissolved with the entry of an authoritarian military regime in 1980, this also curtailed political urban mobilisations. Because of these socio-economic and political characteristics of the 1980s, and enacted populist policies in *gecekondu* settlements, urban-based oppositional mobilisations were very limited and mostly spearheaded by professional organisations, intellectuals, educated small bourgeoisie, or newly-established NGOs through media, journals, press releases, and legal proceedings. These oppositional mobilisations did not have political characteristics as they did in the 1970s that newly established NGOs initially avoided political activity. However, the increase on NGOs and mobilization of middle class is observed especially in the 1990s, that both globalization-localisation and governance discourses and Habitat II Conference of 1996 and 1999 earthquake had significant effects on this.

After Habitat II, many associations, platforms and initiatives were established in order to protect urban space in Istanbul, and after the 1999 earthquake, the number of NGOs multiplied even more rapidly. Many neighbourhood associations described one of their aims as improving the consciousness of “*mahallelilik*” or “*Istanbulluluk*”. These aims were intertwined with the protection of the neighbourhood or the city. One common feature of these associations was that, they were often formed by upper- and middle-class residents, and the associations shared the features of

NIMBY movements; they tried to protect their “own” neighbourhoods, which in some cases did not yield equitable results and led to gentrification. Nonetheless, for some more general urban issues such as the 3rd Bridge or Gökkafe, these organisations banded together. NGOs’ un-political and non-class aspects played an important role in bringing people together, and NGOs were regarded as a new hope. This does not mean that all opposition efforts in the 1990s were organised by NGOs, but NGOs did lead most of the mobilisations in this period.

Furthermore, this study found that during the 1990s, many media articles pertained to migration, ‘*the disruption or loss of Istanbul*’, ‘the new owners of Istanbul’, and ‘*varoş*’ neighbourhoods of Istanbul, or to discourses such as, ‘*this city is not ours*’, ‘*how to rescue the city*’, and ‘*uncultured neighbourhoods*’. Many authors argued that the solution was to ‘urbanise’, ‘educate’, or ‘*Istanbullulaştırmak*’ of the newcomers.

Therefore, in the 1990s, local initiatives emerged together with the mobilisation of the middle class, which generally took part in movements about environmental or cityscape issues. These initiatives often produced exclusionary and elitist discourses against the *gecekondu* settlements. Then, in the 2000s, the situation changed. Together with the increased attacks of neoliberal policies on urban areas, defensive movements against regeneration projects in *gecekondu* settlements received also the support of the middle class.

Although the major economic crises of 1994, 1998-1999, and 2000-2001, and the different coalition governments hampered neoliberal policies relatively in 1990s, those policies survived. However needed powerful and stable government to enact the neoliberal policies fully was found in the Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002.

The JDP’s strengthened neoliberal policies materialised in urban areas through the rapid transformation and reconstruction of cities. Urban regeneration projects became the most important tool of neoliberal policies and were considered to be the solution for almost all social, spatial, and economic problems such as unemployment, economic depression, crime, drug use, ‘social decline’, unplanned urbanisation, poor urban image, disaster risk, etc. The projects mainly targeted high-rent areas occupied by lower-income groups, including *gecekondu* settlements or old historical zones in city centres.

The JDP adopted a different policy toward *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, a policy compatible with current neoliberalist dynamics, increased urban rent, and the government's aim to create global cities. While the party sought to generate policies in favour of the new upper and middle classes, it strengthened ties with low-income groups through its discourse on aid and support (Koçak, 2011). Just after the winning the election, the party explained its intentions to clear *gecekondu* areas, and it created or changed laws to fulfil this aim. With its extended legal power and extraordinary reach, the JDP could make almost any urban area the subject of the regeneration projects.

Accordingly, in this period, the representation of *gecekondu* dwellers in the mainstream media and in political discourse grew even more exclusionary than that of previous periods. *Gecekondu* settlements were labelled as a tumour, illness, disease, terror sanctuaries, or criminal areas, while their residents were described as having a “*distorted perspective of the state*”, “*psychological negativity*”, “*lacking education*”, and “*drug addiction*”. In contrast, regeneration projects were described as enabling a ‘modern’, ‘decent’, and ‘liveable’ urban lifestyle that would develop the country and its economy.

The attack of neoliberal policies on almost all urban areas spurred urban oppositional mobilisations that attracted different social and political groups. These mobilisations were generally centred on the issues like, neighbourhood-scale resistances against regeneration/renewal projects, the reclamation of public assets that had been privatised and transformed, and opposition to large-scale projects such as the 3rd bridge, Topçu Military Barracks in Gezi Park, Taksim Pedestrianisation Project, Haydarpaşaport or Galataport. Many of these projects threatened historical and cultural heritage sites, as well as the urban environment. However, while these largely interwoven oppositional mobilisations were somehow against the neoliberal transformation of the urban area, in some cases, this aim was voiced much more vociferously than the others. In particular, neighbourhood-scale mobilisations against regeneration projects were criticised for being entrenched in property ownership demands instead of building an opposition against the neoliberal transformation of the entire city. But still in some cases these mobilisations were politicised (Şen, 2010) and combined with other demands about urban space.

Amnesty laws played an important role in articulating *gecekondu* in capital relations and changed the meaning of *gecekondu* from use value to exchange value. This issue formed the most fragile point of the resistance efforts in this period. While almost all areas where low-income groups lived were declared regeneration areas, regardless of whether they had title deeds or not; the presence or absence of title deeds and the distinction between home-owners and renters generated owner-occupier biases. Property ownership mechanisms became the authorities' strongest tools to channel the struggles into bargaining processes. Thus, the resistance movements were ruptured by both central and local governments and private partnerships through reconciliation grounds, which featured personal gains, construction opportunities, or rent shares. This also led to the separation of residents between tenants and owners with inoperative participation discourses. Even the bargaining processes resulted in some gains and amendments for residents, as evidenced by real-life cases, tenants were often evicted from their neighbourhoods with no or few rights, and owners were frequently sent to the outskirts of urban areas with large amounts of debt.

In this period, the conflict process for neighbourhood-scale regeneration/renewal projects between authorities and inhabitants could be described as follows. The authorities developed their discourses about the projects to alleviate earthquake risk, crime, illegal construction, poor urban image, etc. The residents would oppose these projects based on: their excessive financial costs; poor design and architecture, which would be incompatible with local life; the threat of homelessness, as the projects might evict them; failure to ensure the residents' participation; and the projects' capital and not personal interests (IMECE, 2011). Other justifications cited by the residents were preservation of the neighbourhood and its historical value (IMECE, 2011). Authorities would respond in two ways: through small amendments in the bargaining process, primarily for homeowners, which would pit the homeowners and renters against one another; and through brutal strategies, such as representing the *gecekondu* residents as "invaders" in the media, cutting off vital services such as electricity, water, and transportation, surveillance and social pressure, and even police force and violence (Gough and Gündoğdu, 2009).

Furthermore, during this time, opposition to large-scale urban projects and the privatisation of urban services (e.g., schools, hospitals, or public open spaces) resulted in other urban-based mobilisations. The desire to protect public spaces,

common places, places with significance in the public memory, cultural-historical heritage sites, and the urban environment was the main goal of these causes. The promotion of the exchange value of space instead of its use value and the exploitation of nature and history by market-oriented policies became the adversaries of these struggles. Mobilisation movements attempted to band together on the common ground of right to the city.

According to the analysis, which was conducted in the study between 1990 and 2010 protests increased in frequency between 1990 and 2010—especially after 2006, when the outcomes of regeneration projects became apparent to the public. During the second period, when neoliberal policies were strengthened and increasingly intervened in urban spaces with rent-seeking projects, a significant increase in urban-based oppositional mobilisations was observed. This outcome is relevant to Castells's (1977) approach in his early studies, in which he linked the increase of oppositional mobilisations to the increase of contradictions in the surrounding economic or urban system. The analysis also revealed that during the periods when election activities were conducted, the number of protests tended to decline. These results lead to two implications. Firstly, the increase of neoliberal policies is directly proportional to the increase of oppositional mobilisations in urban areas. Secondly, the decline of protests during election activities can be explained by the populist policies that authorities tend to adopt directly before elections.

Furthermore, according to the data analysis, six main types of protests were obtained between 1990 and 2010: housing protests, protests about workplaces, public spaces/buildings protests, protests about urban infrastructure/transportation, protests about the urban environment, and protests about cityscapes. The data show that housing protests were the most common type of protest. To understand and evaluate urban-based protests in the context of urban policies adopted during these time periods, the study focused on four types of protests: housing protests, protests about workplaces, protests about public spaces/buildings, and protests about infrastructure/transportation.

Data analysis reveals that, housing protests could be grouped into two primary types: anti-eviction protests and protests against unplanned-unsafe housing stock which became more common after the 1999 earthquake. The dataset revealed that anti-eviction protests occupied the majority of housing protests, and they increased by

almost five fold in the second period studied. This result indicates that strengthened neoliberal policies and legal tools led to increased eviction rates. Furthermore, while *gecekondu* settlements occupied the highest rate of these protests in both periods, it was observed that during the first period, expropriation, demolishing of illegal houses such as villas, and the evacuation of social houses/facilities/camps also led to anti-eviction protests. In the second period, however, protests against Law 5366 were most common, second to struggles in *gecekondu* settlements.

Another important point about the protests in *gecekondu* settlements is the neighbourhoods from which the protests emerged. During the first period, protests against demolitions and evictions primarily took place in neighbourhoods represented by the media as *varoş* neighbourhoods, such as Küçükarmutlu, Okmeydanı, and Sarıgazi. Then, in the second period, this encompassed all *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, including those that favoured the ruling party, the JDP. Furthermore, in the first period, anti-eviction protests were concentrated in the city centre, but after 2002, they extended to all parts of the city due to strengthened legal tools.

A second issue detailed in the study is protests about workplaces, spurred by two reasons: displacement or high rent. In workplace protests, displacement was the more common reason—displacement of industrial areas, small businesses/shops, local markets and peddlers/street vendors. Displacement protests with regard to workplaces increased by nearly twofold in the second period under study. And, while the 1990s most commonly saw protests about the displacement of small businesses and shops, the 2000s' most common protests were held against the displacement of industrial areas. This outcome makes sense, given the decentralisation and privatisation implementations of industrial areas since the 1980s and the governmental aim of causing structural transformations in cities via large-scale projects in 2000s. .

The third issue examined in this study is protests about public buildings and spaces. These types of protests were against: the transformation of public spaces or buildings into private spaces; the close of public buildings without notice of their future functions; the transformation of public spaces or buildings into another public function; insufficient urban facilities; unmaintained/unsafe buildings; and restricted access to the public spaces or buildings.

Similar to the types of protests described above, protests about public buildings and spaces became more common during the second period studied here. The privatisation of buildings and spaces was the most common cause of these protests. During the second period, the most common reason behind the protests was the closure of public buildings without notice about their future functions or giving contradictory information about their use. Given the data, one can conclude that the authorities used this strategy (lack of information) to prevent large opposition forces from organising. By keeping buildings closed for a long time, allegedly for maintenance or due to earthquake risk, authorities tried to prevent the public from accessing the buildings in an effort to dampen the opposition. This study found that this strategy frequently resulted in the privatisation of the buildings.

The functions of public buildings and spaces were also evaluated in the study. The data analysis revealed that the following functions were the subject of the protests: urban squares, parks/gardens, coastal areas, forested-wooded areas, education buildings, medical buildings, cultural buildings, and other public lands such as IETT land, or other public buildings, e.g., industrial buildings such as Hasanpaşa Gasworks, the Mecidiyeköy Liqueur and Cognac Factory, Bomonti Beer Factory, etc. Many of these protests were defensive protests, in which the protestors sought to protect a building or space against the intervention of state or capital groups. Furthermore, according to the study, the protests centred not only on the functions of spaces and buildings, but also on their historical or natural heritage, or on their significance to public memory.

The last type of protest investigated in this study was protests about urban infrastructure/transportation, and like the other protests, these increased in frequency during the second period. Unlike the other types of protests, while some demands of these protests declined during the second period, others increased significantly. Demands regarding the provision of urban infrastructure/transportation decreased during the second period. However, protests opposing the prices of these services, the large-scale transportation projects' destruction of natural and historical areas, urban traffic load, and unsafe/unhealthy infrastructure and transportation services increased. This leads to the conclusion that even if the inadequacy of these services were partially fulfilled in the second period, this could not meet the payable, safety and health conditions of urban services.

Therefore, as Pickvance (1985) and Lowe (1986) state (and also criticise Castells for this point), a time period's socio-economic and political processes affect both the rise and decline of urban social movements and their demands. As Pickvance and Lowe assert, and this study confirms, even though making a causal relationship is difficult and the causal link itself is not always observable between the movements and general socio-economic and political processes; the general processes of the periods and their contextual features show a structuring effect on the mobilisations.

Furthermore the study shows that these processes do not only affect the rise and decline of the protests, but also their repertoires, organisational statuses, and targeted institutions which were formed under the following research questions:

- Are changes in the organisational status, and actors of urban oppositional mobilisations linked to the general socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of different periods?
- Considering the different demands of the mobilisations, how do the protests' actors, organisational status, and repertoires vary?

Political characteristics of the 1970s generated class-based political organisations; but after the 1980s, when neoliberal policies were adopted in conjunction with society's depoliticisation and the emergence of NGOs, urban-based mobilisation efforts—especially those that originated in the middle class—initially avoided the political sphere. Then, in the 1990s, anti-eviction struggles were mostly organised by local neighbourhoods with the support of some left-wing organisations and parties; the roles of intellectuals, academics, and other kinds of platforms were quite limited. This changed in the 2000s, when the struggles of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods were adopted by other organisations, platforms, and individuals.

The study reveals that, in the 2000s, the struggles against forced evictions in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods presented differentiation from 1980s' and 1990s' anti-eviction resistances. Anti-eviction struggles in the previous periods were primarily conducted by *gecekondu* residents and some leftist organisations, and middle-class groups were mostly opposed to policies regarding cityscapes, public spaces/buildings, and the urban environment; and sometimes, their discourses were even exclusionary toward *gecekondu* settlements. In the later period, however, resistance on behalf of *gecekondu* settlements was also supported by some middle-

class groups, such as professionals, academics, and students. This change can be explained by the political atmosphere and the perception of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods by the middle class and intellectuals in the two periods, as well as by the increased intervention of neoliberal policies in neighbourhoods during the second period. Even this characteristic of the mobilizations in the 2000s, show a similarity of 1970s *gecekondu* struggles through including academics, professionals and students in the struggle (Gündoğdu, 2010), the political characteristics of the struggles in during these two periods were quite different. While the *gecekondu* struggles of the 1970s reflected highly political characteristics through the mobilization of socialist left in the neighbourhoods; the oppositional mobilisations of the later period avoided the political sphere. This apolitical characteristic of the later oppositional mobilisations, at least in some *gecekondu* settlements, was compatible with the depoliticisation process and neoliberal policies that were instigated by the 1980s' coup d'état.

Changes in organisational status also caused changes in the repertoires of collective actions. This evolution can be linked to middle-class participation in the mobilisation movements of *gecekondu* settlements and to the movements' better-developed tactics. As a result of the increased participation of academics and intellectuals in the resistance movements of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in the 2000s, new tactical strategies emerged. Sit-ins, petitions, demonstrations, rallies, barricading, conflicts with police, road-blocking, and picnics were used by protestors of both periods; but in the second period, alternative plans or festivals were also adopted by the anti-eviction protestors.

The alternative plan was attempted to be prepared for two regeneration/renewal areas, Sulukule and Gülsuyu-Gülensu. While a plan was prepared for Sulukule by academics and students, an agreement about an alternative plan for Gülsuyu-Gülensu could not be reached. Furthermore, the plan for Sulukule was not implemented; instead, the neighbourhood was demolished and became one of the examples of state-led gentrification. Also, using "planning" as a tool for the struggles was criticised because of not excluding the development of capital relations; instead, only presenting how it could be possible to arrange these relations through also taking into account the local residents' demands. Therefore, the repertoire of alternative plan was criticised as being "*the response of a political seek which was unable to dare to*

lose” (Şen, 2010, p. 337). And this strategy was not adopted by all *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, especially not those with political leanings.

Another change in the 2000s is the adoption of more varied strategies across different neighbourhoods. While an alternative plan might be adopted by some neighbourhoods, others would reject the alternative plan and adopt a more conflict-prone strategy. The processes of the resistance efforts against regeneration/renewal projects had distinct methods and repertoires, depending on each neighbourhood’s political and social structures. Some neighbourhoods cultivated politicised resistance movements spurred by the desire to defend their homes. Some other neighbourhoods which were featured neighbourhoods in the 1970s political movements also extended their resistance to class-based and political reasons, citing tenants’ housing demands and rights, e.g., Güzeltepe. The neighbourhoods which have political characteristics also held the struggle in a political sphere, such as Okmeydanı, Küçükarmutlu, etc.

Even if participation in some neighbourhood associations was low the resistance movements against transformation projects were generally organised by these associations. In addition, neighbourhood associations or committees from different neighbourhoods took the initiative to band together under some unified platforms in order to strengthen struggle and share their experiences. However, despite these merges, neighbourhood associations still presented distinct social and political characteristics. Some groups sought short-term results in the bargaining process, and others championed the broader right to housing. Furthermore, in the 2000s, some groups came together under larger organisations or urban initiatives against urban transformation projects, and, like local associations and organisations, some adopted a political structure while others avoided this intentionally.

In this study, the struggles against neighbourhood-scale urban regeneration projects featured different characteristics according to their social and political structures, and also according to their stances on capital relations, depending on class and owner-tenant biases. These differing characteristics and structures in varied neighbourhoods confirm Pickvance’s (1983, 1985, as cited in Fainstein and Hirst, 1995) assertion that every movement has its own internal dynamics; thus, it is not possible to produce a simple examination of a movement separate from its context. However, still, in the context of these findings, certain features can be identified that impact the mobilisation and organisational ability of neighbourhoods against

regeneration/renewal projects. Nonetheless, we must stress that this identification does not take into account the certain achievement, one of the reasons of this, in Turkey case we can never talk about a full and constant achievement about the struggles, that is, even when a protest achieved victory on the streets or in court, eventually—and the time period varies—the authorities would incorporate the same or slightly changed version of the same project into the agenda with different tools or even the same ones. However, according to studies, the first factor that impacts mobilisation and organisational ability is the neighbourhood's political structure. Neighbourhoods with a left-wing political structure have a greater ability to mobilise against the transformation projects (see Deniz, 2010). Other impacting factors include: the period between when the project was heard and when it was implemented; whether the project was taking place in an old or new settlement; and relationships with other neighbourhoods (in this case, the role of the middle class presents a potential for the mobilisation). Another important point is the homogeneity of the property structure— that is, when all of the residents are tenants or do not have ownership status, the movement's organisational ability is greater. And also both, the political structure of the neighbourhood and its property structure homogeneity affect the mobilization in order to overcome the owner-occupier biases (Deniz, 2010).

Furthermore, opposition to large-scale urban projects and the privatisation of urban services (e.g., schools, hospitals, or public open spaces), unlike the neighbourhood-scale urban regeneration projects, were generally spearheaded by the middle class through official platforms, professional organisations, urban initiatives, or trade unions. In addition, academics, intellectuals, students, and professionals were largely involved in these mobilisation efforts.. The study also found that gentrifiers of some neighbourhoods played important roles, especially in protests for public gardens and historical buildings e.g., Kuzguncuk or Hasanpaşa, However, for some areas or for buildings in unsettled areas, the opposition forces against the privatisation of the areas were not very powerful e.g., the Mecidiyeköy Liqueur and Cognac Factory. Furthermore, the struggles in the areas adopted by large groups of people achieved stronger mobilisation ability and power, for example, Taksim Square, Haydarpaşa Train Station, or buildings which were in areas used by many people, such as Emek

Cinema. Certainly, the roles and strength levels of the platforms or groups are also important sources of mobilisation abilities.

Pickvance's (1985) observation about the role of the middle class in resource mobilisation and its relationship to the city as a "living space" is also significantly relevant to the outcomes of this research. It is observed that for mobilisation efforts surrounding environmental issues or public/common buildings/spaces, the role of the middle class was more salient in the Istanbul case. As Pickvance asserts, even when there is an "objective deprivation" such as eviction, a broader class base can be achieved; but the middle class is more likely to engage in defensive movements against large-scale projects or other threats to urban areas. The second role, which is the place of the middle class in resource mobilisation (because, as Pickvance states, members of the middle class have money, time, and personal contact), can be observed in both protests about public spaces/buildings and anti-eviction protests. The mobilisation movements against neighbourhood-scale urban regeneration projects, which received the support of the middle class, became more visible in the media. Similarly, the inclusiveness of the middle class affected the visibility of mobilisation efforts to preserve public buildings and spaces. Although this study did not examine the success of these protests, the data show that mobilisation efforts for public spaces and buildings that took place in neighbourhoods with stronger ties, settled by primarily middle-class groups (e.g., Hasanpaşa Gasworks), were generally stronger than mobilisation movements in industrial zones or poorer neighbourhoods. Likewise, when the buildings/spaces were important to public memory for a large group of people (e.g., the Haydarpasa Train Station or Emek Cinema), the mobilisation ability or protestors' consciousness about these buildings/spaces was stronger.

Another point is the progressive form of the mobilisations. Even when the middle class have an important role in mobilisation efforts about public spaces and buildings, this does not always guarantee equal results. As gentrifiers play important roles in mobilisations, the mobilisation itself can result in gentrification, as exemplified by the Kuzguncuk Garden movement. In addition, many neighbourhood-based mobilisations against urban regeneration/renewal projects, as DeFilippis and North (2004) state, have 'class and owner-occupier (in this sense we can add also tenants) biases'.

Furthermore, it is observed that, the repertoires of urban protests also present differentiation by changing demands of the protests. The repertoires adopted by protests about buildings and spaces—including dances, songs, movie screenings, festivals, and concerts—are more striking and unique than those adopted by other types of urban protests. The tactics of these movements in the 2000s were also impacted by the characteristics of global movements. Also, differently, the repertoires of workplaces protests also demonstrated the particular characteristics of workers' protests, e.g., strikes, chaining, closing shop windows, and so on.

The study's data also show that the targeted institutions of these urban-based protests changed from the 1990s to post-2002, when they switched from local governments to the central government. This change can be explained by two reasons: firstly and most importantly, the increased power of the central government in urban areas through new legislations; and secondly, in the 1990s, the various coalition and minority governments, which prevented protestors from unifying against one party or figure. However, after 2002, this changed with the entry of the JDP.

As seen, socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of the periods both affect the demands, organizational statuses, repertoires and also targeted adversaries of the protests. As well as organizational statuses and repertoires of urban-based protests present differentiation by changing demands of the protests. However, one more aspect needs to be clarified, which is:

- Do the specific demands of the mobilisations change across periods? And how can these demands be evaluated with reference to the socio-economic characteristics and urban policies of the periods?

It can be concluded that all of these protests were assembled under two primary demands. Protestors either demanded a change in available urban services or resisted changes imposed by local or central authorities.

Reinforcing Pickvance's assertions about the effects of general social and economic conditions on urban movements, the study finds that during the period of economic regression and political instability (1990-2001), protests demanding the provision of urban services increased. However, in the second period (2002-2010), when neoliberal policies increased with large-scale rent-seeking projects, reactive movements such as mobilisations against urban regeneration projects, the

privatisation of public spaces and the financial aspects of access to urban services (consisting of prices of electricity, water, transportation) etc. increased. This result shows that during the first period, protests were mostly spurred by the demand for the provision of urban services. However reactive protests against the increased intervention of state and capital groups in urban areas increased in the second period via strengthened neoliberal urban policies. The study also reveals that protests against unsafe urban infrastructure and transportation increased in the second period. This leads to the conclusion that even during Turkey's period of political stability and relative economic growth (which lasted until 2007), the demands for the provision of urban services were partially fulfilled compared to what was observed in the previous period, but strengthened neoliberal policies retrieved this provision through large-scale urban projects, urban regeneration projects, and increased prices of urban services, together with the destruction of natural and historical areas. To exacerbate matters, these new projects could not meet required safety and health conditions due to the resulting urban environment and the unsafe working conditions for construction workers. In particular, unhealthy built environments, unsafe construction projects, and unsafe transportation injured and killed many people; this was one result of the increasingly strong neoliberal attack on urban areas, which in turn triggered mobilisations against unsafe and unhealthy urban services.

As we see, in the period after 2002, a complete restructuring and transformation of urban areas occurred, and more extensive interventions in urban spaces have taken place, compared to previous periods. Thus, this has emerged as the 'Golden Era' of the neoliberal restructuring of urban spaces. The exchange value of urban space came to the forefront during this period, and urban spaces, especially in Istanbul, have now become the most attractive commodity for capital. And even though, some legal arrangements gave more authorizations to local administrations; new regulations such as authorising the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation to make plans for public lands on all scales, and Law 6306 which was passed in 2012, implemented an authoritarian "turnaround" from decentralisation to centralisation. As stressed throughout this study, the enacted implementation and, accordingly, the mobilisation efforts against these interventions in urban spaces came forward also with secularism debates, especially after 2010, as evidenced by movements against transforming high schools into theology schools, or constructing mosques in public urban open spaces.

Therefore, the increased intervention of the authorities on urban areas with more conservative and authoritarian neoliberal policies has resulted in increased oppositional movements that also broke out with Gezi Uprising in 2013.

At the end of May 2013, sit-ins against the construction of Military Barrack in Gezi Park grew into a nationwide anti-government uprising, with protestors making a variety of demands despite and against violent police oppression. Protestors who occupied Gezi Park in order to prevent its destruction faced massive police brutality, which sparked collective action throughout Turkey against the JDP government's neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and conservatism. Protestors adopted a wide range of strategies, including street art, barricades, creative slogans, *cacerolazo*, sit-ins, etc. Although this study did not consider the demands and processes of this uprising, the Gezi Park Protests have set an important precedence for social movements and urban-based mobilisations in Turkey. After the protests, public forums, which were organised in many neighbourhoods throughout the country, created public spheres in which people could discuss their urban-based demands. These public forums also became the arena for discussion of and resistance to neoliberal projects in Turkey's cities. Furthermore, after this nationwide uprising, urban residents became much more attuned to urban struggles and to demand right to the city.

Since this study encompasses urban-based oppositional mobilisations that occurred between 1990 and 2010, examining post-2010 process would further contribute to understand the effects of the Gezi Park Protests on urban oppositional movements in Turkey. By doing this, researchers can evaluate the effects of the JDP government's rising authoritarianism and conservatism through neoliberal policies in the post-2010 period, and investigate opposition and resistance movements against these policies before and after the Gezi Park Protests.

REFERENCES

- Advisory Group on Forced Evictions (2009)** Mission to Istanbul: Report to Executive Director of UN-Habitat Programme, New York.
- Aksoy, A.** (2014) İstanbul'un Neoliberalizmle İmtihanı, , in Yeni İstanbul Çalışmaları, p. 27-46, eds. Ayfer Bartu Candan and Cenk Özbay, Metis.
- Aslan, Ş.** (2004) 1 Mayıs Mahallesi: 1980 öncesi Toplumsal Mücadeleler ve Kent, İletisim Yayınları.
- Aslan, Ş.** (2005) Sıradışı Mahallede Tarih ve Kimlik Sorunsalı, Kebikeç İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi, 20:149-163.
- Aslan, Ş.** (2008) Yasalar ve Kamu Yönetiminin Politikaları Üzerinden Türkiye'de Gecekondu Sorunu, Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi, 6/1: 155-166.
- Aslan, Ş.** (2011) "İstanbul'daki Örnekler Üzerinden 'Gecekondu Mahalleleri' İle 'Varoşların' Sınırlarındaki Esneklik", Toplumbilim Banliyö Özel Sayısı, 26: 99-107.
- Aslan, Ş. and Şen, B.** (2011) Politik Kimliğin Temsil Edici Mekanları: Çayan Mahallesi, Toplum ve Bilim Dergisi, 120: 109-133
- Ataay F. and Kalfa, C.** (2009) Neoliberalizmin Krizi ve AKP'nin Yükselişi, in Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm, p:303-333, eds. Nergis Mütevellioğlu and Sinan Sönmez, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler (BSB)** (2007) IMF gözetiminde on uzun yıl 1998-2008: Farklı Hükümetler Tek Siyaset, Yordam Kitap.
- Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler (BSB)** (2008) 2008 Kavşağında Türkiye: Siyaset, İktisat ve Toplum, Yordam Kitap.
- Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler (BSB)** (2009) Türkiye'de ve dünyada ekonomik bunalım 2008-2009, Yordam Kitap.
- Bahçetepe, H.** (2006) Hasta Ranta Kurban, Cumhuriyet, p. 7.
- Bayat, A.** (2006) Ortadoğu'da Maduniyet Toplumsal Hareketler ve Siyaset, eds. Özgür Gökmen and Seçil Deren, İletişim.
- Baysal, C.** (2010) İstanbul'u Küresel Kent Yapma Aracı Olarak Kentsel Dönüşüm ve Ardındaki Konut Hakkı İhlalleri: Ayazma(n)'dan-Bezirgânbahçe'ye Tutunamayanlar, Unpublished Master Thesis, İstanbul Bilgi University.
- Bal, E.** (2011) Türkiye'de 2000 Sonrası Neoliberal Politikalar Çerçevesinde İmar Mevzuatındaki Değişimler ve Yeni Kentleşme Pratikleri: İstanbul Örneği, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir.
- Balseven, H. and Önder, İ.** (2009) Türkiye'de Kamu Kesiminde Neoliberal Dönüşüm, , in Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm, p:77-128, eds. Nergis Mütevellioğlu and Sinan Sönmez, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

- Bedirhanoğlu, P. and Yalman G. L.** (2009) Neoliberal Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye’de ‘Yerel’ Sermaye: Gaziantep, Denizli ve Eskişehir’den İzlenimler, *Praksis*, 19: 241-266.
- Bermek, G.** (1995) Çengelköy’ün de Bir Derneği Var!, *İstanbul Dergisi*, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 14: 104.
- Biçer, Ö.** (2009) Maddi ve Sembolik Yeniden Üretim Sürecinde İktidar Olarak AKP, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul.
- Biggs, M.** (2013) How Repertoires Evolve: The Diffusion of Suicide Protest in the Twentieth Century, *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 18(4): 407-428.
- Bir Köprü Bir Köprü Daha** (1975) *Mimarlık Dergisi*, 10: 16-17.
- Boğaza Üçüncü Köprü Çözüm Değildir** (2008) *Türkiye Mühendislik Haberleri*, 447: 23-33.
- Bora, T.** (2006) Fatih’in İstanbulu Siyasal İslam’ın "Alternatif Küresel Şehir" Hayalleri, in *İstanbul Küresel ile Yerel Arasında*, p: 60-77, ed. Çağlar Keyder, Metis.
- Boratav, K.** (2014) *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, İmge Kitabevi.
- Boysan, B.** (1987) Her Yer Birbirine Benziyor, *Mimarlık*, 87/1: 19-24.
- Bozkır, G.** (2005) Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nde Bülent Ecevit ve Ortanın Solu Düşüncesi, *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol. IV, 11: 231-248.
- Bozkulak, S.** (2005) “Gecekondu”dan “Varoş”a: Gülsuyu Mahallesi, in *İstanbul’da Kentsel Ayrışma*, p. 239- 266, ed. Hatice Kurtuluş, Bağlam.
- Bozkulak, S.** (2011) Eski Şişeye Yeni Şarap: Gecekondu dan Varoşa, *Toplumbilim*, Banliyö Özel Sayısı, 26: 107-115.
- Brenner, N. and Theodore, N.** (2005) Neoliberalism and the Urban Condition, *CITY*, Vol. 9, No. 1: 101-107.
- Bruhn, K.** (2008) *Urban Protest in Mexico and Brazil*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Buechler, S. M.** (1995) New Social Movement Theories, *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36, 3: 441-464.
- Bukrek, N.** (2010) Okuluma Dokunma İnsiyatifi, Kaldırım, Sosyal Haklar Derneği Kent Bülteni, 2: 3.
- Castells, M.** (1972) Urban Renewal and Social Conflict in Paris, *Social Science Information*, 11 (2), pp. 93-124.
- Castells, M.** (1978) *City, Class and Power*, St. Martin’s Press.
- Castells, M.** (1977) *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*, MIT Press.
- Castells, M.** (1983) *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*, University of California Press.
- Çamur Atana İnanmayın** (1989, 19 January) *Milliyet*, p. 13.

- Çavuşoğlu, E.** (2010). İstanbul'da planlama: Mekanın yeniden üretimi ve sınıfsal sonuçlar, in Küreselleşen İstanbul'da Ekonomi, p: 36-52, ed. Çağlar Keyder, Osmanlı Bankası Arşive ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları.
- Çetin, Ö. Ç.** (2014) The Social Democratic Municipalism In Turkey: The Metropolitan Municipal Case Of Ankara, International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 7: 129-143.
- Davis, M.** (2006) Planet of Slums, Verso.
- DeFilippis, James and Pete North** (2004) The Emancipatory Community? Place, Politics and Collective Action in Cities, in Lees, Loretta (ed.) The Emancipatory City? Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Della Porta, D. and Diani, M.** (2006) Social Movements: An Introduction, Blackwell Publishing.
- Demirkaya, M.** (1994) Emek Sineması için İmza Kampanyası, Cumhuriyet, p. 7.
- Denisenko, L.** (1998) Habitat ve Yönetişim, in Sivil Toplum için Kent, Yerel Siyaset ve Demokrasi Seminerleri, p. 251-264, Wald Akademisi Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Deniz, M. B.** (2010) Grassroots Action Against Gecekondu Renewal Projects: The Case Of Istanbul Başibüyük and Ankara Dikmen Vadi, Unpublished Master Thesis, Bogazici University, Istanbul.
- Doğan, A. E.** (2001) Türkiye Kentlerinde Yirmi Yılın Bilançosu, Praksis, 2: 97-123.
- Doğan, A. E.** (2005) İslamcı Belediyelerin On Yılı (1994-2004): Kayseri Örneğinden Sosyo-Mekansal Bir Çözümleme, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Ankara University.
- Doğan, A. E.** (2007) Eğreti Kamusalılık: Kayseri Örneğinde İslamcı Belediyecilik, İletişim Yayınları.
- Doğan, A. E.** (2009) Kent Konseylerini “Kent Hakkı” Açısından Yeniden Düşünmek, Eğitim Bilim Toplum, Vol.7, 25: 93-106.
- Dunleavy, P.** (1977) Protest and Quiescence in Urban Politics: A Critique of Some Pluralist and Structuralist Myths, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 1, Issue 1-4: 193–218.
- Earl, J., Martin, A., McCarthy, J.D and Soule, S. A.** (2004) The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action, Annual Review of Sociology, 30: 65-80.
- Ekinci, O.** (1994) İstanbul'u Sarsan On Yıl: 1983-1993, Anahtar Kitaplar.
- Ekinci, O.** (2002) İstanbul'da “Sivil Duyarlılık” ve Toplumsal Duyarsızlık, İstanbul Dergisi, 42: 56-61.
- Ekinci, O.** (2004) İstanbul'un “İslambol” On Yılı: Mart 1994-Mart 2004, Anahtar Kitaplar.
- Emini, F. T.** (2009) Türkiye’de Yerel Yönetimler Reformunun İç ve Dış Dinamikleri, Yönetim ve Ekonomi, 16/2: 31-48.

- Enlil, Z.M.** (2000) Yeniden İşlevlendirme ve Soylulaştırma: Bir Sınıfsal Proje Olarak Eski Kent Merkezlerinin ve Tarihi Dokusunun Yeniden Ele Geçirilmesi”, Domus, 8: 46-49.
- Environmental and Urbanism Directorate of Istanbul** (nd) İlan Edilen Riskli Alanlar, <http://www.csb.gov.tr/iller/istanbulakdm/index.php?Sayfa=sayfa&Tur=webmenu&Id=10108>, date retrieved 22.11.2014.
- Eraydın, A.** (1988) Sermaye Birikim Sürecinde Kentler, Değer Dergisi, 5: 133-153.
- Erbil, Ö.** (2013) Likör Fabrikasında Karar, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/likor_fabrikasinda_karar-1134437, date retrieved 21.11.2014.
- Erder, S.** (1996) İstanbul’a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye, İletişim Yayınları.
- Erder, S.** (2002) Kentsel Gerilim, um:ag, Ankara.
- Erdoğan’ın Bildirili Gecekondu Savaşı** (1994, 18 June) Milliyet, p. 23.
- Ergin, N. B.** (2006) Grassroots Resistance Against Urban Renewal: The Case of Güzeltepe - Istanbul, Unpublished Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- Ergün, N.** (2006) Gentrification Kuramlarının İstanbul’da Uygulanabilirliği, in İstanbul’da Soylulaştırma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sakinleri, p: 17-30, Eds. David Behar and Tolga İslam, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Erkut, G. and Sezgin, E.** (2014) Spatial and Strategic Planning in Turkey: Institutional Change and New Challenges, in Spatial Planning Systems and Practices in Europe, p. 236-254, eds. Mario Reimer, Panagiotis Getimis and Hans Heinrich Biotevoget, Routledge.
- Erman, T.** (2004) Gecekondu Çalışmalarında ‘Öteki’ Olarak Gecekondu Kurguları, European Journal of Turkish Studies, Thematic Issue No. 1, <http://ejts.revues.org/85>
- Erman, T., A. Eken** (2004) The “Other of the Other” and “unregulated territories” in the urban periphery: *Gecekondu* violence in the 2000s with a focus on the Esenler case, İstanbul, *Cities*, 21 (1), pp. 57-68.
- Erman, T., Yıldar, M.** (2007) Emergent Local Initiative and the City: The Case of Neighbourhood Associations of the Better-off Classes in Post-1990 Urban Turkey, *Urban Studies*, 44: 2547-2566,
- Ertem B., M.C. Altunel** (2011) İstanbul İmarındaki Tarihi Eser Kaybının Tarih ve Turizm Açısından İncelenmesi: Karaköy-Kabataş Bölgesi, ODÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt 2, 4:61-79.
- Ertür, G. and Yum, A.** (2002) Kentine Sahip Çıkan Sivil Toplum, , İstanbul Dergisi, 42:91-96.
- Etikan, H.** (dir), (1989) Tarlabası Tarlabası [Motion picture on DVD], İstanbul Metropolitan Branch of Chamber of Architects, İstanbul.
- Fainstein, S. and Hirst, C.** (1995) Urban Social Movements, in D. Judge, G. Stoker and Wolman, H. (eds), *Theories of Urban Politics*, Sage Publications.

- Fincher, R.** (1986) The City and the Grassroots Book Reviews, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 76, 3: 435-438.
- Finkelievich, S.** (1981) Urban Social Movements and the Production of Space, Acta Sociologica Vol. 24, 4: 239-241.
- Galata Derneği** (1995) İstanbul'un Sesi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 13: 106-108.
- Gazhaneliler Duman İstemiyor** (1997, March 30) Cumhuriyet, p. 6.
- Gecekondular Hızına Yetişemediler** (1994, 19 January) Milliyet, p. 11.
- Gecekondular Law – Law No: 775 (1966)** Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 12362, 30 July 1966.
- Gedikpaşa İlköğretim Okulu 21 milyon YTL'ye satıldı** (2006, 16 November) <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=204679>, date retrieved 10.11.2014.
- General Population Censuses**, Turkish Statistical Institute, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do;jsessionid=ryvjJnbbg1LxMQJnWZkKGh689lJbLpJ0vWlnpbLfmQ0QwQzfQSRQ!995794460>, date retrieved 13.08.2014.
- Geniş, Ş.** (2009) Neo-liberal Kentleşmenin Mekanda yansımaları: İstanbul'da Güvenlikli Siteler, Toplum ve Bilim, 116: 121-156.
- Goodwin, J. And Jasper, J. M.** (1999) Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory, Sociological Forum, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 27-54.
- Gottdiener, M.** (1984) Debate on the Theory of Space: Toward an Urban Praxis, Urban Affairs Annual review, Cities in Transformation, Ed. Michael Peter Smith, 26: 199-218.
- Gough, J. and Gundogdu, İ.** (2009) Class-cleansing in Istanbul's world city project, in Whose Urban Renaissance?: an international comparison of urban regeneration strategies, p. 16-24, eds. Porter, L. and Shaw, K. London: Routledge.
- Gümüş, K.** (2002) Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ve Yerellik, in STK'lar, Yerelleşme ve Yerel Yönetimler, p. 102-110, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları.
- Gümüş, K.** (2004) Yakın Tarihimizde STK Hareketinin Gelişimi ve Kamu Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları İlişkisi, Savunuculuk ve Politikaları Etkileme Yazıları No 3, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Eğitim ve Araştırma Birimi.
- Gündoğdu, İ.** (2010) Sosyalist-Sol Yerel Strateji?: Yerellikler, Kent Planlama ve Sulukule Atölyesi, in , in Tarih Sınıflar ve Kent, p. 354-370, eds. Besime Şen and Ali Ekber Doğan, dipnot.
- Gürsel, Y.** (1990) Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Kent ve İnsan, E Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Gürsoy, A.** (1994, 09 April) Taksim'e Cami'nin Tekmil Hikayesi, Milliyet, p. 3.
- Güvemli, Ö.** (2014, 9 December) Sessiz Yıkım, Cumhuriyet, p. 3.
- Habitat II ve Kozalar** (1996) İstanbul Dergisi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 16:109.

- Hamel, P., Lustiger, T. H. and Mayer, M.** (2000) Introduction: Urban social movements - local thematics, global spaces, in *Urban Movements in a Globalising World*, p: 1-22, eds. P. Hamel, H. Lustiger-Thaler and M. Mayer, Routledge.
- Harvey, D.** (1988) *Social Justice and the City*, Basil Blackwell.
- Harvey, D.** (2004) The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession, *Socialist Register*, 40: 63-87.
- Harvey, D.** (2012) *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*, Verso.
- İlgaz, K.** (1996, 21 October) Gazhane K lt r Merkezi Olsun, *Cumhuriyet*, p. 7.
- İ ık, O. and Pınarcıo lu, M. M.** (2013) N betle e Yoksulluk: Sultanbeyli  rne i, İletişim Yayınları.
- İ inden Demiryolu,  st nden  zelle tirme Ge en Tekel** (2010) <http://kentvedemiryolu.com/icerik.php?id=673>, date retrieved 11.12.2014.
-  MECE Toplumun  hircilik Hareketi** (2011) Kentsel Toplumsal Muhalefeti Yeniden Tartı mak, http://www.toplumunsehircilikhareketi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=198:kentsel-toplumsal-muhalefet-yenden-tartimak&catid=8:makaleler&Itemid=15, date retrieved 08.11.2014.
-  slam, T.** (2006) Merkezin Dı ında İstanbul'da Soylula tırma, in İstanbul'da Soylula tırma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sakinleri, p: 43-58, Eds. David Behar and Tolga  slam, İstanbul Bilgi  niversitesi Yayınları.
-  stanbul Derne i** (1994) Okurlardan, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 10: 114.
-  stanbul Environmental Plan Report** (2009) Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, approved on 15.06.2009.
-  stanbul i in  alı an Sivil Toplum  rg tleri** (1995) İstanbul'un Sesi, İstanbul Dergisi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 12: 99.
-  stanbul Platformu Vakfı** (1995) İstanbul'un Sesi, İstanbul Dergisi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 13: 99.
- Jenkins, J. C.** (1983) Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9: 527-53.
- Jones Lang Lasalle** (2010) Turkey Commercial Real Estate Overview Report.
- Jones Lang Lasalle** (2014) Turkey Commercial Real Estate Overview Report.
- Justice and Development Party Election Declaration** (2007) The Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
- Kadıo lu, A.** (2002) Kravatlı Erkekler Dı arı; Burası Sivil Toplum, İstanbul Dergisi, 42: 120-122.
- Kadık y Mitingi'nde on binler SSGSS'ye dur dedi** (2008, 6 April) <http://www.sendika.org/2008/04/kadikoy-mitinginde-on-binler-ssgssye-dur-dedi/>, date retrieved 08.11.2014.

- Kafaoğlu, T. B.** (1995) İstanbul için SOS!, İstanbul Dergisi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 12: 94-95.
- Kaldırım** (2011) Bellek/Deneyim: Abanoz'dan Tarlabası'na Travesti ve Transseksüeller, Sosyal Haklar Derneği Kent Bülteni, 4: 2-3.
- Katznelson, I.** (1988) Foreword, in Social Justice and City, Basil Blackwell.
- Kaya, A.** (2011, 3 March) Yaşam Alanlarımız Yok Oluyor (3) Tozkoparan'dan Başbüyük'e ortak mücadele, <http://www.evrensel.net/haber/1301/yasam-alanlarimiz-yok-oluyor-3-tozkoparandan-basibuyuke-ortak-mucadele>, date retrieved 08.11.2014.
- Kaya, R.** (2009) Neoliberalizmin Türkiye'ye Siyasal Etkileri Üzerine Değerlendirmeler ve Tartışma Öğeleri, in Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm, p:235-260, eds. Nergis Mütevellioğlu and Sinan Sönmez, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Kaygalak, S.** (2009) Kentin Mültecileri: Neoliberalizm Koşullarında Zorunlu Göç ve Kentleşme, Dipnot.
- Kazancı, M.** (1983) Yerel Yönetim Üzerine Birkaç Not, AİD, 16, 4:36-51.
- Keleşir Okul Satışları** (2009, 17 December) Cumhuriyet, p. 9.
- Keleş, R.** (2004) Kentleşme Politikası, İmge Kitabevi.
- Kentsel Dönüşümün İlk Hedefi 6 Milyon Konut** (2012) <http://www.gazetevatan.com/kentsel-donusumun-ilk-hedefi-6-milyon-konut-451464-eylak/>, date retrieved 20.11.2014.
- Keyder, Ç.** (2004) Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası, Metis.
- Keyder, Ç.** (2010) Küreselleşen İstanbul'da ekonomi, in Küreselleşen İstanbul'da Ekonomi, p:7-11, ed. Çağlar Keyder, Osmanlı Bankası Arşivi ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları.
- Kıray, M.** (2007) Kentleşme Yazıları, Bağlam Yayınları.
- Kipfer, S., Schmid C., Goonewardena, and Milgrom R.** (2008) Globalizing Lefebvre?, in K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, Schmid, C. (eds), Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, Routledge.
- Koçak, H.** (2011) İstanbul "Emeksizleştirilirken", İÜ Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, No:44, pp. 41-48.
- Kuban, D.** (2002) İstanbul'a ve İstanbulluya Ulaşmak, İstanbul Dergisi, 42:47-49.
- Kuban, D.** (2012) İstanbul Bir Kent Tarihi, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Kundakçı, O.** (2014a) Hasanpaşa Gazhanesi'nin kaderi çiziliyor, <http://www.birgun.net/news/view/-hasanpasa-gazhanesinin-kaderi-ciziliyor/1154>, date retrieved 21.11.2014.
- Kundakçı, O.** (2014b) Haliç Tersaneleri üretimi sürdürmeli, <http://www.birgun.net/news/view/halic-tersaneleri-uretimi-surdurmeli/3842>, date retrieved 15.11.2014.

- Kurtuluş, H.** (2005) Bir “Ütopya” Olarak Bahçeşehir, in İstanbul’da Kentsel Ayırışma, p. 77-126, ed. Hatice Kurtuluş, Bağlam.
- Kuyucu, T.** (2014) Hukuk, Mülkiyet ve Muğlaklık: İstanbul’un Kayıtdışı Yerleşimlerinin Yeniden Yapılandırılmasında Hukuki Belirsizliğin Kullanımları ve İstisnaları, , in Yeni İstanbul Çalışmaları, p. 71-90, eds. Ayfer Bartu Candan and Cenk Özbay, Metis.
- Kuyucu, T. and Ünsal, Ö.** (2010) ‘Urban Transformation’ as State-led Property Transfer: An Analysis of Two Cases of Urban Renewal in Istanbul Urban Studies, 47(7), 1479–1499.
- Kuzguncuklular Bostana Sahip Çıktı** (2000, 2 June) Cumhuriyet.
- Lefebvre, H.** (1976) The Survival of Capitalism, Reproduction of the Relations of Production, St. Martin’s Press, New York.
- Lefebvre, H.** (1979) Space, Social Product and Use Value, in State, Space, World, p: 185-195, eds. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Lefebvre, H.** (1991) The Production of Space, Blackwell Publishing.
- Lefebvre, H.** (2003) The Urban Revolution, University of Minnesota Press.
- Locher, D. A.** (2002) Collective Behaviour, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Lodos, E.** (2009) Bir yıkım projesi 3: En büyük gecekondu TOKİ’den, old.mo.org.tr/gzt/evrensel/20090225-1.doc, date retrieved 08.11.2014.
- Lovering, J. and Türkmen, H.** (2011) Bulldozer Neo-liberalism in Istanbul: The State-led Construction of Property Markets, and the Displacement of the Urban Poor, International Planning Studies, 16:1, 73–96.
- Lowe, S.** (1986) Urban Social Movements - The City After Castells, Macmillan Education Ltd: London.
- Mahalleler Konuşuyor Sempozyumu Sonuç Bildirgesi** (2007) <http://v3.arkitera.com/h17659-mahalleler-konusuyor-sempozyumu-sonuc-bildirgesi.html>, date retrieved 08.11.2014.
- Maman, K.** (2008) Kentsel dönüşüm projeleri, suç örgütlerinin sığınaklarını yok ediyor, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_kentsel-donusum-projeleri-suc-orgutlerinin-siginaklarini-yok-ediyor_690942.html, date retrieved 12.11.2014.
- Marx, K.** (1972) Capital : a critique of political economy / Karl Marx; trans. Samuel Moore, Edward Aveling, (ed) Frederick Engels London : Lawrence & Wishart.
- Marx T. G. and Wood. J. L** (1975) Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behaviour, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 1 : 363-428.
- Mass Housing Law – Law No. 2985** (1984) Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 18344, 17 March 1984.
- Mavi Marmara Derneği Destek Bekliyor** (1995) İstanbul’un Sesi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 14: 106.

- Mayer, M.** (2000) Urban Social Movements in era of globalisation in Urban Movements in a Globalising World, p: 141-156, eds. P. Hamel, H. Lustiger-Thaler and M. Mayer, Routledge.
- Mayer, M.** (2006) Manuel Castells' The City and the Grassroots, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 30.1:202-206.
- Merrifield, A.** (2006) Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction, Routledge.
- Meyer, K.** (2008) Rhythms, Streets, Cities, in K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, Schmid, C. (eds), Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, Routledge.
- Milgrom, R.** (2008) Lucien Kroll: Design, Difference, Everyday Life, in K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, Schmid, C. (eds), Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, Routledge.
- Mills, A.** (2006) İlyâ'nın Bostanını Korumak: Kuzguncuk'ta Bir Mahalle 'Landscape'i Özlemini Gerçekleştirmek in İstanbul'da Soylulaştırma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sakinleri, Eds. David Behar and Tolga İslam, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Morris, A. D., and Herring, C.** (1987) Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review." Annual Review of Political Science 2:137-198.
- Mütevvelioğlu, N. and Işık S.** (2009) Türkiye Emek Piyasasında Neoliberal Dönüşüm, in Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm, p:159-204, eds. Nergis Mütevvelioğlu and Sinan Sönmez, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Olzak, S.** (1989) Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 15, pp. 119-141.
- Olzak, S.** (1992) The Dynamics of Ethnic Mobilization, Stanford University Press.
- Olzak, S. and Sarah A. S.** (2009) Cross-Cutting Influences of Protest and Congressional Legislation in the Environmental Movement, Social Forces, 88: 210-225.
- Öktem, B.** (2005) Küresel Kent Söyleminin Kentsel Mekanı Dönüştürmedeki Rolü: Büyükdere-Maslak Aksı in İstanbul'da Kentsel Ayırışma, p. 25- 76, ed. Hatice Kurtuluş, Bağlam.
- Öktem, B.** (2011) İstanbul'da Neoliberal Kentleşme Modelinin Sosyo-Mekansal İzduşümleri, İÜ Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, No:44, pp. 23-40.
- Öncü, A.** (1997), The Myth of the 'Ideal Home' Travels across Cultural Borders to İstanbul, in Space Culture and Power : New Identities and Globalizing Cities, eds. A.Öncü and P.Weyland, Zed Books, London.
- Özçakmak, Ş.** (2004, 06 September) Yıkacağım, Varsın Beni Kötü Bilsinler, Milliyet, p. 15.
- Özmen, K.** (2005) Haydarpaşa Halkındır Satılamaz!, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/62683-haydarpaşa-halkındır-satılamaz>, date retrieved 08.11.2014.
- Pekdemir, M.** (1988) Gecekondu ve Anti-Faşist Mücadele", Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, Vol: 7, İletişim Yayınları.

- Pérouse, J. F.** (2004) Deconstructing the Gecekondu , European Journal of Turkish Studies, Thematic Issue No. 1, <http://ejts.revues.org/195>
- Pérouse, J.F** (2011) İstanbul’la Yüzleşme Denemeleri: Çeperler, Hareketlilik ve Kentsel Bellek, İletişim Yayınları.
- Pickvance, C.** (1985), “The rise fall of urban movements and the role of comparative analysis”, Society and Space, Vol.3, p. 31-53.
- Pickvance, C.** (2003) From Urban Social Movements to Urban Movements: A Review and Introduction to a Symposium on Urban Movements, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 27, 1: 102–109.
- Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatization Administration,** Privatization Transactions by Years, <http://www.oib.gov.tr/>, date retrieved 18.09.2014.
- Protesto Şenliği** (2000, 26 June) Protesto Şenliği, p. 7.
- Pruijt, H.** (2007) Urban Movements, in Ritzer, George (ed) Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology, Malden: Blackwell, 5115-5119.
- Republic of Turkey 58th Government Emergency Action Plan** (2003) <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/content.aspx?List=66c383c0-9aa5-4c4f-9acb-b7f86625e690&ID=13&Source=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ekalkinma%2Egov%2Etr%2FPages%2FEylemVeDigerPlanlar%2Easpx&ContentTypeId=0x01007497A6E53A69774FACFF49082D58209F>, date retrieved 09.10.2014.
- Republic of Turkey 58th Government Programme** (2002) <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP58.htm>, date retrieved 09.10.2014.
- Republic of Turkey 59th Government Programme** (2003) <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP59.htm>, date retrieved 09.10.2014.
- Republic of Turkey 60th Government Programme** (2007) <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP60.htm>, date retrieved 09.10.2014.
- Republic of Turkey 61th Government Programme** (2011) <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP61.htm>, date retrieved 09.10.2014.
- Republic of Turkey 62th Government Programme** (2014) <http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/HProgram.pdf>, date retrieved 09.10.2014.
- Ronneberger, K.** (2008) Henri Lefebvre and Urban Everyday Life: In Search of the Possible, in K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, Schmid, C. (eds), Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, Routledge.
- Rootes, C. A.** (1990) Theory of Social Movements: Theory for Social Movements, Philosophy and Social Action, 16 (4) : 5-17.

- Savcı, M.** (1994) İstanbul Platformu: Bireysel Tepkiler İşe Yaramıyor, İstanbul Dergisi, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 8: 89-90.
- Schmid, C.** (2008) Henri Lefebvre's Theory of the Production of Space: Towards a three-dimensional dialectic, in K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, Schmid, C. (eds), Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, Routledge.
- Sertesin, S.** (2011) Yerel Yönetim Reformu Kapsamında Yerel Yönetimlerin İdari Özerkliği Nasıl Tartışılmalı?, Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1329840441-3.Yerel_Yonetim_Reformu_Kapsaminda_Yerel_Yonetimlerin_Idari_Ozerkligi_Nasil_Tartisilmali.pdf, date retrieved 10.11.2014.
- Smelser, N.** (1962) Theory of Collective Behaviour, The Free Press, New York.
- Sönmez, M.** (1996) İstanbul'un İki Yüzü: 1980'den 2000'e Değişim, Arkadaş Yayınevi.
- Sönmez, M.** (1998) Bölgesel Eşitsizlik: Türkiye'de Doğu-Batı Uçurumu, Alan, İstanbul.
- Sönmez, M.** (2008) "Anadolu Kaplanları" Efsane, AKP İstanbul'u ve TÜSİAD'ı İstiyor, Bianet, <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/109773-anadolu-kaplanlari-efsane-akp-istanbul-u-ve-tusiad-i-istiyor>, date retrieved 23.09.2014.
- Sönmez, S.** (2009) Türkiye Ekonomisinde Neoliberal Dönüşüm Politikaları ve Etkileri, in Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm, p:25-75, eds. Nergis Mütevellioğlu and Sinan Sönmez, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Sönmez, M.** (2010) Teğet'in Yıkımı: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Küresel Krizin 2009 Enkazı ve Gelecek, Yordam Kitap.
- Staggenborg, S.** (2008) Social Movements, Oxford University Press.
- Stanek, L.** (2008) Space as concrete abstraction: Hegel, Marx, and Modern urbanism in Henri Lefebvre, in K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, Schmid, C. (eds), Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, Routledge.
- Sulukule Günlüğü** (2008) Sulukule Toplumsal Gelişme- Ekonomik Kalkınma Planı ve Mekansal Gelişme Stratejileri, <http://sulukulegunlugu.blogspot.com.tr/search?updated-max=2008-10-04T00:46:00%2B03:00&max-results=50>, date retrieved 05.12.2014.
- Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A.** (2002) Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy. Antipode, 34: 542-577.
- Şen, B.** (2005) Soylulaşma - Kentsel Mekanda Yeni Bir Ayırışma Biçimi, in İstanbul'da Kentsel Ayırışma, p. 127- 160, ed. Hatice Kurtuluş, Bağlam.
- Şen, B.** (2006) Kentsel Gerilmeyi Aşmada Çelişkili Bir Süreç Olarak Soylulaştırma: Galata Örneği, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, İstanbul.

- Şen, B.** (2010) Kentsel Dönüşüm ve Kaybetmeden Mücadele Etme Arayışı: Gülsuyu-Gülensu ve Başibüyük Deneyimleri, in Tarih Sınıflar ve Kent, p. 309-353, eds. Besime Şen and Ali Ekber Doğan, dipnot.
- Şen, B.** (2011) Kentsel Mekanda Üçlü İttifak: Sanayisizleşme, Soylulaştırma, Yeni Orta Sınıf, İÜ Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, No:44, pp. 1-21.
- Şen, B.** (2013) The Production of Autonomous Settlements for the Working Class by the Turkish Socialist Movements, RC21 Conference, Resourceful Cities, http://www.rc21.org/conferences/berlin2013/RC21-Berlin-Papers-4/26-distributed_besime-sen.pdf, date retrieved 21.11.2014.
- Şen, B. and Tunç, A.** (2011) Kanarya Mahallesi: Zorunlu Göç, Enformellik ve Siyaset, Toplum Bilim, 26:117-128.
- Şen, B. and Türkmen, H.** (2014) Başibüyük: Bir Kentsel Dönüşüm Sınaması, in Mülk, Mahal, İnsan: İstanbul'da Kentsel Dönüşüm, p: 143-188, ed. Asuman Türkün, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Şengül, T.** (2001) Sınıf Mücadelesi ve Kent Mekanı, Praksis, 2:9-31.
- Şengül, T.** (2009) Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset: Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçlerinin Eleştirisi, İmge Kitabevi.
- Şengül, T.** (2014) Türkiye'nin Kentleşme Deneyiminin Dönemlenmesi, in 1920'de Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim, p. 407-453, eds. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, Phoenix.
- Şenyapılı, T.** (1998) Cumhuriyet'in 75. Yılı Gecekondunun 50. Yılı, 75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık, Tarih Vakfı, İstanbul.
- Şenyapılı, T.** (2004) Charting the 'Voyage' of Squatter Housing in Urban Spatial 'Quadruped', European Journal of Turkish Studies, Thematic Issue No. 1, <http://ejts.revues.org/142>
- Şimdi Onları Sevmek Moda** (1994, 17 January) Milliyet, p. 5.
- Şişli ve Kağıthane'de 5000 adet İmarlı Müstakil Tapu Sahiplerine Dağıtılıyor** (1989, 05 January) Milliyet, p. 11.
- Taylor, V. and N. V. Dyke** (2004) "Get up, Stand up": Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements, in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi, Blackwell Publishing.
- Tarrow, S.** (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press.
- Tekeli, İ.** (1988). Kentleşmeye Kapital Birikim Süreçleri Açısından Bakmanın Sağladığı Açıklama Olanakları, Defter Dergisi, 5: 130-132.
- Tekeli, İ.** (1994) The Development of the İstanbul Metropolitan Area: Urban Administration and Planning, IULA-EMME, Kent Basımevi, İstanbul.
- Tekeli, İ.** (1995) Habitat II'nin Gündemini Oluşturan Temel Kavramların İrdelenmesi, Mimarlık, 262: 11-14.
- Tekeli, İ.** (1996) Bir Demokrasi Projesi Olarak Yerel Habitatlar, Ada Kentliyim, 8: 86-91.

- Tersane İşçilerinden Eylem** (2000, 19 February) Cumhuriyet, p. 8.
- The Law for the Encouragement of Tourism – Law No. 2634** (1982) Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 17635, 16 March 1982.
- The Law of Renovating, Conserving and Actively Using Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Immovable Assets – Law No. 5366** (2005) Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 26023, 14 December 2005.
- The Law of Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risks - Law No. 6306** (2012) Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 28309, 31 May 2012.
- The Law on Making Amendments in the Municipality Law – Law No. 5998** (2010) Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 27621, 17 June 2010.
- Tilly, C. and Schweitzer, R. A.** (1981) The Changing Geography of Contention in London, 1755-1835: Sketch of a Research Plan, CRSO Working Paper No.225, University of Michigan.
- Tilly, C. and Schweitzer, R. A.** (1982) How London and Its Conflicts Changed Shape: 1758-1834, Historical Methods, Vol. 15, 2:67-77.
- Tilly, C.** (2004) Social Movements: 1768-2004, Paradigm Publishers.
- Tuğal, C.** (2002) Globalleşme Ekseninde STK'lar Bir Alternatif Olabilir mi?, İstanbul Dergisi, İstanbul'a Sivil Sahip Çıkış, 42: 50-55.
- Türkiye Ulusal Rapor ve Eylem Planı** (1996) Habitat II Kent Zirvesi, İstanbul.
- Türkmen, H.** (2011) Debates on Right to the City in Istanbul, International RC21 Conference, The struggle to belong Dealing with diversity in 21st century urban settings, Amsterdam.
- Türkün, A. and Aslan, Ş.** (2014) Ayazma ve Tepeüstü'nden Bezirganbahçe'nin 'Konut Depolarına': Mekanı Değişen Yoksulluk, in Mülk, Mahal, İnsan: İstanbul'da Kentsel Dönüşüm, p: 355-389, ed. Asuman Türkün, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Türkün A., Öktem Ünsal, B. and Yapıcı, M.** (2014) İstanbul'da 1980'ler Sonrasında Kentsel Dönüşüm: Mevzuat, Söylem, Aktörler ve Dönüşümün Hedefindeki Alanlar, in Mülk, Mahal, İnsan: İstanbul'da Kentsel Dönüşüm, p: 79-139, ed. Asuman Türkün, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Urhan, V. F.** (2008) Türkiye'de Yerel Yönetimlerin Yeniden Yapılandırılması, Sayıştay Dergisi, No: 70: 85-102.
- Uysal, A.** (2007) Sokak Eylemlerinde ve Polis Denetiminde Tarihsel Süreklilik ve Kopuş, in F. Ergut, A. Uysal, Tarihsel Sosyoloji: Stratejiler, Sorunsallar, Paradigmalar, dipnot, Ankara.
- Uzun, N.** (2006) İstanbul'da Seçkinleştirme (Gentrification): Örnekler ve Seçkinleştirme Kuramları çerçevesinde Bir Değerlendirme, in İstanbul'da Soylulaştırma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sakinleri, p: 31-42, Eds. David Behar and Tolga İslam, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Villaları Yıkacağız** (1989, 08 January) Milliyet, p. 6.

- Walker, I. and Smith, H. J.** (2002) *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Walton, J.** (1998) *Urban Conflict and Social Movements in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence of Collective Action*, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp: 460-481.
- Yalçın, M.C and Çavuşoğlu, E.** (2011) *Sulukule'den Arda Kalan: Yenileme Sürecinin Öğretileri ve Yenilikçi Muhalefet Pratikleri*, *Toplumbilim, Banliyö Özel Sayısı*, 26: 129-145.
- Yalçın, M.C; Çalışkan, Ç.O.; Çalgın, K. and Dünder, U.** (2014) *İstanbul Dönüşüm Coğrafyası*, in *Yeni İstanbul Çalışmaları*, p. 47-70, eds. Ayfer Bartu Candan and Cenk Özbay, Metis.
- Yenilenen Kentler Değişen Yaşamlar** (2004, 14 May) *Milliyet* Ev, p. 5.
- Yeldan, E.** (2009) *Finans Çağında Eklemlenme Kalıpları: Neoliberal Küreselleşmenin Çevresel Bir Ekonomisi Olarak Türkiye Örneği*, , in *Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye'de Neoliberal Dönüşüm*, p:129-158, eds. Nergis Mütevellioğlu and Sinan Sönmez, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Yeşil Savaşçılara AB Desteği** (2004, 23 October) *Cumhuriyet*, p. 3.
- Yıldız, E.** (2008) *Ne Yapılacaksa Bizimle Yapılacak*, *Ekspress*, 82: 37-39.
- Yılmaz, B.** (2008) *Türkiye'de sınıf-altı: Nöbetleşe Yoksulluktan Müebbet Yoksulluğa*, *Toplum ve Bilim*, 113: 127-145.
- Yiğit, E.** (2010) *Emek Tarihinden Kente Bakmak: Bomonti ve Bira Fabrikası Örneği*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, İstanbul.
- Yücekök, A.** (1971) *Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı 1946-1968*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara.
- Yüksel, S.** (2011) *Evaluation of the Kadıköy Hasanpasa Gasworks in The Context of Sustainable Urban Design*, in *The Sustainable World*, p. 109-116, ed. C.A. Brebbia, Wit Press, Boston.
- Yüzak, Ö.** (2014) *Afet riskini azaltayım dersin sosyal riski arttırıyorlar*, *Cumhuriyet*, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/surdurulebilir_yasam/109713/Afet_riskini_azaltayim_dersen_sosyal_riski_arttiriyorlar.html, date retrieved 22.11.2014.
- Zirveye Yakılan Köy Gölgesi** (1996, 4 June) *Cumhuriyet*, p. 3.
- Url-1 <<http://www.kiptas.com.tr>>, date retrieved 05.10.2014.
- Url-2 < <http://www.validebag.org/>>, date retrieved 02.12.2014.

APPENDICES

Appendix A : Event Coding Table.

Appendix B : The social structure underlying the dynamics of contemporary urban movements (Castells, 1983, p. 321).

Appendix C : The major facets of political and socio-economic processes of Lowe's thematic approach on urban movements (Lowe, 1986: 185-186)

Appendix D : Declared Risky Areas in Istanbul (Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization)

Appendix E : Selection from Newspapers

Appendix A : Event Coding Table.

Source of the Event

1. Code _____ 2. Name of the Newspaper _____
3. Two or more events from same article _____ 4. Date of the News/...../....
5. Pages _____ to _____ 6. Author _____
7. Title of the News _____

Place and Date Information

8. District _____ 9. Neighbourhood _____
Location of the Event: 10. District _____ 11. Neighbourhood _____
12. Start Date .../.../..... 13. End Date .../.../..... 14. Period of the Event (day) _____
15. Site of the Protest:
☐ Urban Square
☐ Avenue
☐ Street
☐ Highway
☐ Public Building*
☐ Company Building*
☐ Green Space
☐ Other _____
16. Site Name _____ 17. Destination Site (If exists) _____

Participation and Organization

17. Type of the Organization (*may be chosen more than one*)
☐ Local / Neighbourhood Association
☐ Platform
☐ Professional Organizations
☐ Political Party
☐ Political Organization
☐ Trade Union
☐ No Organizational Presence

☐ Not mentioned

☐ Other _____

18. Participants (*may be chosen more than one*)

☐ Residents

☐ Intellectuals

☐ Workers

☐ Street Vendors

☐ Shopkeepers

☐ Students

☐ Academics

☐ Other _____

19. Number of Participants (If mentioned) _____

Intervention to the Protest:

20. Is there an intervention to the protest?

☐ Yes (go to question 21)

☐ No (go to question 22)

21. Groups of the intervention:

☐ Police

☐ Other Government Officials

☐ Municipal Officials

☐ Company Officials

☐ Opposing Groups

☐ Other _____

Repertoire and Target of Protests

22. Repertoire of Protest:

☐ Demonstration

☐ March

☐ Occupy

☐ Street blockage

- ☐ Conflict with police
- ☐ Alternative Plan
- ☐ Petition Campaign
- ☐ Dancing
- ☐ Singing
- ☐ Movie screening
- ☐ Chaining
- ☐ Barricading
- ☐ Cycling
- ☐ Strike
- ☐ Other _____

23. Target of Protest

- ☐ Central Government
- ☐ Local Government
- ☐ *Muhtar*
- ☐ Private company
- ☐ School/Hospital Administration
- ☐ Other _____

Main Issues and Demands or Objections of the Protests

24. Main Issue of the Protests

- ☐ Housing (go to question 25)
- ☐ Workplace (go to question 26)
- ☐ Public Spaces/Building (go to question 27)
- ☐ Urban Infrastructure/Transportation (go to question 28)
- ☐ City Scape
- ☐ Urban Environment
- ☐ Other _____

25. Demands or Objections of Housing Protests

- ☐ Eviction (go to question 25a)

- ☐ Unplanned/unsafe housing stock
- ☐ Other _____

25a. Issues of Eviction Implementation

- ☐ Gecekonddu Settlements
- ☐ “Worn-out” historical areas (Law 5366)
- ☐ Expropriation
- ☐ Other Illegal houses (villa)
- ☐ Social Housings-Facilities-Camps
- ☐ Large Scale Protests for Right to the Housing
- ☐ Other _____

26. Demands or Objections of Workplace Protests

- ☐ Displacements (go to question 26a)
- ☐ High Rents
- ☐ Other _____

26a. Types of Workplaceses

- ☐ Industrial areas
- ☐ Small businesses/shops
- ☐ Local markets
- ☐ Peddlers / street venders
- ☐ Other _____

27. Public Space or Public Building?

- ☐ Public Space (answer both 27a and 27b)
- ☐ Public building (answer both 27a and 27c)

27a. Demands or Objections of Public Spaces/Buildings Protests

- ☐ Transformation into private function
- ☐ Transformation into another public function
- ☐ The close of public buildings without notice of their future functions
- ☐ Insufficient urban facility

- ☐ Unmaintained/unsafe building
- ☐ Restricted access to the public spaces
- ☐ Other _____

27b. Functions of Public Spaces

- ☐ Urban squares
- ☐ Parks/gardens
- ☐ Coastal areas
- ☐ Forested/wooded areas
- ☐ Other _____

27c. Functions of Public Buildings

- ☐ Education buildings
- ☐ Medical buildings
- ☐ Cultural buildings
- ☐ Other _____

28. Demands or Objections of Infrastructure/Transportation Protests

- ☐ Provision of basic infrastructure services in the houses
- ☐ Provision of waste collection and environmental cleaning
- ☐ Price of basic services
- ☐ Safe/healthy infrastructure and transportation
- ☐ Adequate/accessible transportation infrastructure
- ☐ Price of public transportation
- ☐ Rearrangements on transportation implementations
- ☐ Urban traffic load
- ☐ Large scale transportation projects
- ☐ Other _____

* In front of the buildings

Appendix B: The social structure underlying the dynamics of contemporary urban movements (Castells, 1983, p. 321).

Goal of the urban movement.	The city as a use value.	Identity, cultural autonomy and communication.	Territorially based self-management.
Ideological themes and historical demands included in this goal	- Social wage. - Quality of life. - Conservation of history and nature.	- Neighbourhood life. - Ethnic culture. - Historical traditions.	-Local autonomy. -Neighbourhood decentralization. -Citizen participation.
Goal of the adversary.	The city as exchange-value.	Monopoly of messages and one-way information flows.	-Centralization of power, rationalization of bureaucracy. -Insulation of the apparatus.
Social issues and ideological themes.	-Appropriation of land rent. - Real estate speculation. - Infrastructure for profitable capitalist production.	-Mass culture. -Standardization of meaning. -Urban isolation.	-Centralism. -Bureaucratization. -Authoritarianism.
Conflicting projects over the historical meaning of city.	City as a spatial support for life. <i>versus</i> City as a commodity or a support of commodity production and circulation.	City as a communication network and a source of cultural innovation. <i>versus</i> Despatialization of programmed one-way information flows.	City as a self-governing entity. <i>versus</i> City as a subject of the central state at the service of world-wide empires.
Structural historical contradiction of which the urban conflict refers.	Capital. <i>versus</i> Labour in the appropriation of surplus value and the decision over investment.	Information (excluding communication). <i>versus</i> Communication (that necessarily information).	Order and authority. <i>versus</i> Change and freedom.
Name of the adversary (historical actor).	Bourgeoisie.	Technocracy.	State.
Name of the urban movement by this particular goal (urban actor)	Collective consumption trade unionism.	Community.	Citizens.

Appendix C : The major facets of political and socio-economic processes of Lowe's thematic approach on urban movements (Lowe, 1986: 185-186)

Under the heading of political process, consideration must be made of:

- 1- The structure and political history of the local administrative system and its interaction with the central level – the theme of central/local relations.
- 2- The party political system in the society and its effectiveness in mediating social conflict. (This is essentially the same as Pickvance notion to the ability of formal political institutions to express political conflict)
- 3- The osmosis of activists between urban movement and the party system, and also the existence of social movement in the wider cultural/political sphere creating alternative sources of activism.
- 4- The identification of those economic and social forces that underpin the national and local state. The presence or absence of which decisively effects the policy strategies of the local authorities and the tactical range available to urban protest movements.
- 5- The need to be sensitive to intra-national variations in urban movement experience.


The second group of comperative themes taken under the heading socio-economic process mainly concern the characteristics of the social bases from which movement activity might be generated or contained. The major facets are:

- 1- The stage of development of the urbanisation process linked specifically to the periodization of industrial production – of expansion or decline, both potentially including economic and technologic restructuring. Crucial to this theme is the role of the consumption process in assisting the restructuring of fundamental social and economic systems by providing new markets for goods, and in the ideological stabilisation of rapidly changing societies.
- 2- Closely linked to the latter processes is a set of considerations relating to social and demographic adaptations to national economic development. Periods of rural/urban migration may be involved here, but in the contemporary period a major source of social base production centres on the interface between the public and private sector provision of social consumption, and generally involves a gradient of

influences favourable to the private sector (although this has not yet assumed sufficient proportions likely to stimulate mobilisation in the Eastern bloc societies).

3- The sociology of the social bases requires close scrutiny: on the one hand, scrutiny of the range of mediating associational and social network factors that might screen out protest; and, on the other hand, of the identification of solidaristic communities based on residence or on common access to a service, both of which might generate a social movement.


Appendix D : Declared Risky Areas in Istanbul (Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization)



Appendix E : Selection from Newspapers

(a) Deprem değil, zabıtaılar yıktı (Cumhuriyet, 24.06.1993).

Deprem değil, zabıtaılar yıktı



Polislerle birlikte loderleriyle geldiler. Yeşiller içindeki Nakkaştepe'yi depremden çıkma çevirdiler. Yılların emeği evler bir anda, çirkin ve homurtulu loderin darbeleriyle yere seriliyordu. Geride, kendileri gibi sokaka atılmış eşyaları, öfkeleri ve çaresizliğin huncıyla gözyaşları kaldı.

Üsküdar Nakkaştepe'de önceki gün başlayan gecekondu yıkımı dün tamamlandı. Mağdur durumdaki vatandaşlar, "Vergilerimizi aldılar, elektriğimizi suyumuzu bağladılar, şimdi de evlerimizi başımıza yıkıyorlar" diye isyan ettiler.

İstanbul Haber Servisi - Üsküdar Nakkaştepe'de MSB-
ye ait arazi üzerinde inşa edildikleri gerekçesiyle yıkımına önceki gün başlayan gecekonduların tamamı dün yıkıldı.

Nakkaştepe Gazhane Sokak üzerinde yapılan ve dördü önceki gün yıkılan gecekonduların kalan 20 tanesi de dün Üsküdar Belediyesi Zabıta ekipleriyle yıkıldı. Mıntıka ekiplerinin yanı sıra Çevik Kurvet'e bağlı polislerin de, çabakilecek olaylara karşı yoğun güvenlik önlemleri aldığı görüldü. Yıkım sırasında görevlilere direnen ve gözüaltına alınmak istenen 75 yaşındaki Meryem Kalkan fenalaşarak hastaneye kaldırılırken, Kalkan'ın damadı Halil Koçak da polis tarafından gözüaltına alındı.

Sabah saatlerinde bölgeye gelen zabıta ve polisler evlerin içini boşalttıktan sonra yıkıma başladı. Görevlileri bir süre engellemek isteyen vatandaşlar polis tarafından engellenirken, yıkım alanı alınan 20 ev loderlerle yıkıldı.

Evleri yıkılanlar isyanda

Yıkılan evlerden kurtarabildikleri eşyalarıyla sokakta kalan yöre halkı, önceki gün gelen görevlilerin dört evi yıktığını, kendilerine de eşyalarını boşaltmak için üç gün süre vermelerine karşın sabah saatlerinden itibaren yıkım işlemine başladığını söylediler. MSB'nin aracı olarak kullanılarak evlerinin yıktırıldığını belirten yöre halkı, arazinin özel kişilere satıldığını iddia ettiler. Çocuklarıyla birlikte sokakta kaldıklarını belirten vatandaşlar, "Madem ki yasal değildi de yıkacaklardı, neden bugüne kadar vergilerimizi aldılar. Elektrik, su bağladılar. Arazinin başkalarına peşkey çekmek için bizim evlerimizden atıyorlar" şeklinde konuştular.



Enkazların arasında bulunan son eşyalar bir kamyonete yüklendi. Artık Nakkaştepe'de kalan sadece, gözyaşları içinde yıkıntılar arasında bırakılan anılandı. Fotoğraflar: AHMET ŞİK)

(b) Halk direndi, yıkım durdu (14.09.1993, Cumhuriyet).

Halk direndi, yıkım durdu

► Şişli Halide Edip Adıvar Mahallesi'nde inara aykırı olduğu gerekçesiyle 21 gecekonduyu yıkmak isteyen zabıtalara halk engel oldu. Ev sahiplerinin evlerini kendilerinin yıkmaları koşuluyla yıkımdan vazgeçildi.

İstanbul Haber Servisi - Şişli Halide Edip Mahallesi'nde dün, imara aykırı 21 gecekonduyu yıkmak isteyen zabıtalara halk engel oldu. Yıkım alanına gelen Şişli Emniyet Amiri **Kemal Büyükyazı**'nın girişimleri sonucu belediye görevlileriyle anlaşılan ev sahiplerinin, evlerini kendilerinin yıkmaları koşuluyla yıkımdan vazgeçildi.

Şişli, Halide Edip Mahallesi Melikşah Sokak üzerinde bulunan 21 gecekondu, yeni yol açılacağı için zabıtalarca yıkmak istendi. Ancak bölge halkının direnmesi üzerine yıkım alanına çevik kuvvet sevk edildi. Yıkım yapılacak bir gecekonduyun önünde biriken halk, zabeta ve polislerle tartışarak yıkımı engellemek istedi. 30 yıldır aynı yerde oturduklarını belirten vatandaşlar, müteahhitlik yapan mahalle muhtarı **Süleyman Tan**'ı suçladı. Mahalle halkı, muhtarın belediye ile anlaşarak yıkım yapılacak yerlere yeni binalar yapacağını öne sürdü.

Daha sonra yıkım alanına gelen Şişli Emniyet Amiri **Kemal Büyükyazı**'nın girişimleriyle vatandaşlar, Belediye Başkanı **Fatma girik**'le görüşmek şartıyla evlerini kendilerinin yıkacağını söylediler. Bunun üzerine belediye ekiple yıkımdan vazgeçti. Öte yandan polislerle tartıştığı için gözaltına alınan **Sezer Akdemir** adlı gencin annesi **Sezer Akdemir** kriz geçirerek bayıldı.



Polislerle tartıştığı için gözaltına alınan **Sezer Akdemir**'in annesi sinir krizi geçirerek bayılırken, küçük kızı da olayı çaresizlik içinde izledi.(Fotoğraf: AHMET ŞİK)

(c) Zabıtaya sopayla direndi (14.08.1993, Cumhuriyet).

Zabıtaya sopayla direndi


► Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü'nde tehlike altında bulunan 7 evin yıkımı için gelen zabıtaya vatandaşlar taş ve sopalarla saldırdı. Yaklaşık 4 saat süren kargaşadan sonra yıkım yeterli güvenlik önleminin alınması için ileri bir tarihe bırakıldı.

İstanbul Haber Servisi-“Büyük çöp faciasının yaşandığı Ümraniye Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü'nde tehlike altında bulunan evlerin tahliyesi gerçekleştirilemedi. Vatandaşların, belediye ve güvenlik görevlilerine karşı koyması nedeniyle tahliye ileri bir tarihe ertelendi. Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem, gönderdiği tebligatta, can güvenliği açısından evlerin boşaltılması gerektiğini belirtti.

28 nisan'da 39 kişinin ölümlüyle sonuçlanan çöp dağının patlamasının ardından Çevre Bakanlığı ve İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı bölgede bulunan 7 gecekondunun boşaltılması kararını almıştı. Dün sabah Ümraniye Belediyesi tarafından bölgeye giden zabıta görevlileri evleri yıkmak isteyince vatandaşlarla aralarında tartışma çıktı. Yıkım kararından habersiz olduğunu öne süren çevre sakinleri, kendilerine süre tanınmasını istedikler.

Yapılan görüşmeler ardından zabıta ekipleri tahliye için 1 ay süre tanıdıklarını bildirdiler. Buna karşın, vatandaşların bir ay sonra da evlerini boşaltmayacaklarını söylemesi üzerine, zabıta görevlileri evleri boşaltmak istedi. Çoğunluğunu kadın ve çocukların oluşturduğu çevre sakinleri evlerinin önlerinde oturarak, zabıtalara ve çevik kuvvete, taş ve sopalarla saldırdı. Yaklaşık 4 saat süren kargaşadan sonra yıkım, yeterli güvenlik önleminin alınması için ileri bir tarihe ertelendi.

Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem'in, evlerini yıkmama sözü verdiğini ileri süren çevre sakinleri, Hekimbaşı'nda Ümraniye Belediyesi tarafından yapılan asfalt şantiyesinin de çöplüğe çok yakın olduğunu hatırlattılar. Vatandaşlar, “Şantiye'nin müteahhidi Şinasi Öktem'in kardeşi. Onlar inşaat yapıyorlar, bizimse evlerimizi yıkamak istiyorlar” dediler.



Ümraniye Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü'nde tehlike altında bulunan 7 evin yıkımı vatandaşların taşlı sopalı saldırısı sonunda gerçekleştirilemedi. Gecekondu sakinleri, Başkan Şinasi Öktem'in evlerini yıkmama sözü verdiğini söylediler. (Fotoğraf: AA)

(d) Betonkondunun iki kolonu yıkılabildi (05.02.1993, Cumhuriyet).



DÜELLOYU BETONKONU KAZANDI-Halk yıkım ekibini bir tepenin üzerinde topluca karşıladı. Çevre gecekondusu sahiplerinin de direniş destek vermesiyle yıkım ekibi fazla bir şey yapmadan geri dönmek zorunda kaldı. (Fotoğraf: MEHMET DEMİRKAYA)

Betonkondunun iki kolonu yıkılabildi

► Küçükarmutlu'da gecekondular çok katlı inşaatlara dönüşmeye başlayınca Sarıyer belediye yıkım ekibi harekete geçti. Halkın direnişi ile karşılaşan ekip bir binanın iki kolonunu yıkılabildi.

İstanbul Haber Servisi- Küçükarmutlu'daki gecekondular betonarme inşaatlara dönüşmeye başlayınca yıkım yeniden gündeme geldi. Küçükarmutlu'da çok katlı inşaatlara dönüşen kaçak binaların dün yıkıma giden Sarıyer Belediye ekipleri halkın direnişi ile karşılaşınca ancak bir binanın iki kolonunu kırabildi. Sarıyer Belediyesi Başkan yardımcısından İlhami Gökçe, Adnan Bal, Hakkı Bahar ve Zabıta Müdürü Ali Oral'ın kontrolünde Küçükarmutlu'ya giden yıkım ekipleri, ikinci kat seviyesine yükselmiş ve inşaat çalışmaları sürdürdüğü iki binayı yıkmaya başladı. Bir inşaatın iki kolonunu kanal kazma

makinası ile kıran ekiplere daha sonra olay yerine gelen kadın erkekli inşaat sahipleri karşı koydu. Çevredeki bina sahiplerinin de gelmesiyle kalabalıklaşan direnişçiler bira arazi yıkım ekiplerine taş atmaya başladı. İnşaat sahipleri “Sarıyer'de bir çok kaçak villa yapıyor onları neden yıkmıyorsunuz da, bizim dışımızdan tımağımızdan bıraktığımız paralarla yapmaya çalıştığımız evimizi yıkmıyorsunuz” dedi. Zabıta Müdürü Ali Oral, Küçükarmutlu'ya gecekonduları yıkmaya gelmediklerini belirterek “Bu inşaatlar komü ihtiyacından yapılmıyor. İş ticarete dönüyor, Bölgeye artık müteahhitler girmeye

başladı” dedi. İnşaatları fakir halkın yapmadığını belirten Ali Oral, müteahhitlerin çalıştırdıkları işçileri öne sürdüklerini, çevredeki cahil insanları kışkırttıklarını söyledi. Sarıyer Belediyesi Basın Denetçisi İrfan Akyarık, “beton konduya dönüşen ve çok katlı yapılması planlanan 60 evranda inşaatın yıkılmasının planlandığını belirterek “Gecekondularda oturanların evleri yıkılmayacak. Ama inşaat sahipleri inşaatları da kaçkırtılar” dedi. İrfan Akyarık yıkım ekiplerine, yardımcı olması için Çevik Kuvvetten yardım istediğini ancak yardıma

gelmediğini söyledi. Yıkım ekipleri direnişle karşılaşınca yıkımı bırakarak çekildi. Sarıyer Belediye Başkanı İhsan Yalçın daha sonra belediyede yaptığı açıklamada İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Süzen'i suçladı. Bölgede daha önce Zabıta Karakolu bulunduğunu, Süzen'in bu karakolu kaldırarak kondulaşmayı teşvik ettiğini ileri süren İhsan Yalçın “Burası devletten arazi. İstanbul Üniversitesi'nin arazisi. Büyükşehir buradaki kaçak binaları yıkmıyor Sarıyer Belediyesi'ne ama bira yardımı kuvvet vermiyor. Biz elimizdeki imkanlarla yıkıma gittik ama halkın direnişi ile karşılaştık” dedi.

(e) Gecekonducular zabıtayı püskürttü (21.01.1992, Cumhuriyet).



HORTUM ÇEKİŞMESİ — Prefabrik şantiyedeki yangını söndürmeye çalışan itfaiyecilerle, onları engellemeye çalışan gecekonducular su hortumunu karşılıklı uç-lardan tutarak çekiştiler. (Fotograf: SUAT KOZLUKLU)

Sarıyer'de yıkım ekipleriyle gecekondu sakinleri arasında taşlı-sopalı çatışma *Gecekonducular zabıtayı püskürttü*

İtfaiyeye engel Güvenlik kuvvetleriyle çatışan gecekonducular prefabrik bir büroyu yakdılar. Söndürmek için gelen itfaiyeyi de hortumu geri çekerek engellediler. Olaylar sırasında biri zabıta memuru üç kişi yaralandı. Gazetemiz muhabiri Ahmet Şık da başına gelen bir taşla yaralanıp hastaneye kaldırıldı.

İstanbul Haber Servisi — Sarıyer'de yıkıma giden zabıta ekipleriyle gecekonducular arasında çıkan taşlı-sopalı çatışmada, biri zabıta memuru 3 kişi yaralandı. Bu arada Cumhuriyet muhabiri Ahmet Şık da başına gelen bir taşla yaralandı. Çevik kuvvetin de bulunduğu yıkım n-

rasında, 2 ev yıkan ekipler, gecekonducuların direnmesi üzerine çekilmek zorunda kaldılar. Oto Sanayi Sitesi Kooperatifi İrtibat Bürosu'nu da yakan gecekonducular, gelen itfaiyenin hortumunu çekerek söndürülmesini engellediler.

Mahallesi'ndeki 12 gecekonduyu yıkmak üzere çevik kuvvet desteğiyle bölgeye giden Sarıyer Belediyesi'ne bağlı yıkım ekiplerine gecekonducular taş ve sopayla karşı koydular. Gecekondu bölgesine dün sabah 09.30 sıralarında giden yı-

Sarıyer, Derbent Çamlıtepe

(Arkan Sa. 19, Sül. 5'de)

(f) Belediye önünde gecekondu eylemi (07.01.1992, Cumhuriyet).



Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı'nın önünde çadır kuran 200 kişilik grup halay çekip gösteri yaptı.

Belediye önünde gecekondu eylemi

İstanbul Haber Servisi — Erken seçim öncesi vaat edilen hizmetlerin yerine getirilmediği ve yıkımların sürdüğü gerekçesiyle İstanbul'un çeşitli gecekondu mahallelerinden bir grubun düzenlediği gösteriyi polis dağıttı. Polisin havaya ateş açtığı olayda 10 kişi gözaltına alındı. Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı'nın önündeki 50. Yıl Parkı'nda saat 13.30 sıralarında toplanan, aralarında kadın ve çocukların çoğunlukta olduğu 200 kişilik grup parkta 3 çadır kurdu. Çadırın önünde halay çeken grup, üzerlerinde, "Polis, yıkım, cop değil, yol, su, ev istiyoruz", "İşkenceler aramızda yeriniz yok" yazan pankartlar açtılar. Örnektepe, Okmeydanı, Gürsel Mahallesi, Hacıosman, Ferahevet, Gültepe, Çağlayan ve Küçükarmutlu'da yaşayan gecekonducular adına

okunan bildiride erken seçimler öncesi hükümetin verdiği sözleri tutmadığı gibi ağır zararla ücretleri kuşa çevirdiği-leri sürüldü. Güvenlik kuvvetleri slogan atmaya başlayan grubun dağılmasını istedi. Grubun dağılmaya başladığı sıralarda bazı göstericiler polisi taşıladı. Bunun üzerine çevik kuvvetten bir polis havaya ateş açtı. Polisin kovaladığı gecekonducular, Unkapını yönüne kaçarlarken 10 kişi gözaltına alındı. Parktaki gösteri devam ederken gecekonducuların temsilen dört kişilik bir grup, Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sozen'le görüşmek istedi. Belediye Özel Kalem Müdürü Ercan Tekin, göstericilerin bu isteklerini reddederken gecekonducuların taleplerinin en kısa süre içinde yerine getirileceğini söyledi.

(g) Su için protestoya polis copu (14.06.1990, Cumhuriyet).

20 gündür suları akmayan Ümraniyeliler caddeyi dört saat trafiğe kapadı

Su için protestoya polis copu

Susuzluğu protesto eden Ümraniyeliler, eylemleri sırasında sloganlar atarak Anakent Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sözen ile Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem'in istifasını istediler. Protestocular, Belediye Başkanı Öktem'i 'başkanlık seçimleri sırasında Çakmak Mahallesi'nden kendisine az oy çıktığı için su vermemekle' suçladılar.

İstanbul Haber Servisi — Ümraniye Çakmak Mahallesi'nde 20 gündür suları akmamasını protesto eden yaklaşık 800 kişi Alendag Caddesi'ni dört saat trafiğe kapadı. Eylemleri sırasında Anakent Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sözen ile Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem'in istifasını isteyen gruba Çevik Kuvvet müdahale etti. Müdahale sırasında bir grup kadın tartaklandı.

Ümraniye, Çakmak Mahallesi'nde bir grup kadın ve erkek susuzluğu protesto için eylem yaptı. Alendag Caddesi'ni 11.00'de trafiğe kapatan yaklaşık 800 kişi, sloganlar atarak Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem'i görülmek istedikler. 20 günden bu yana sularının akmadığını, belediye yap-tıkları başvurunun sonuçsuz kaldığını bildiren grup, olay yerine gelen belediye yetkililerini istediğine karşın eylemlerini sürdürdüler.

Oturma eylemi

Caddede trafiğin akmasını üzerine 12.30 sularında Çevik Kuvvet'e bağlı ekipler olay yerine gelerek eyleme son verilmesini istedikler. Kadınların eylemlerini bu kez oturarak sürdürmeleri üzerine Çevik Kuvvet'e bağlı polisler müdahale etti. Müdahale sırasında kadınların tartaklanması üzerine çevrede olayı izleyen erkekler güvenlik güçlerine "yuh" çekti. Erkeklerin de eyleme katılması üzerine tartışmalar yoğunlaştı. Bu arada 55 yaşlarında Meliha Karaman isimli bir kadın copların etkisiyle fenalık geçirdi.

Müdahaleye karşın sularının kağıdı olarak aktırılmadığını sav-layarak eylemlerini sürdüren ka-dınlar "Sözen istifa", "Şinasi in-



PROTESTOCULARI POLİS TARTAKLADI — Alendag Caddesi'ni dört saat süreyle trafiğe kapayan yaklaşık 800 kadar Ümraniyeli, polislin uyarılarını dinlemeyerek oturma eylemine geçti. Çevik Kuvvet'e bağlı polislerin olaya müdahalesi ve kadınları

tifa", "Susunuz olacak başka yolu yok" sloganları attılar. Bir ağzadan üç kez İstiklal Marşı'nı söyleyen kadınlar, Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Öktem'in başkanlık seçimleri sırasında Çak-

mak Mahallesi'nden kendisine az oy çıktığı için su vermediğini öne sürdüler. Kadınlar Öktem'i götürmeye yanaşmayarak kendileri-ni polise karşı karşıya bırakmak-la da suçladılar.

Olaylar sırasında Çevik Kuvvet Müdürü Necmettin Yıldırım, ey-lemleri sürdüreceklerini belirten ka-dınların belediye yetkililerini öne-ri verdi. Kadınların belediye yet-kili bulamayacaklarını bu nedenle

gitmeyeceklerini bildirmeleri üze-rine dağılmaları için önce beş da-kika süre tanıyan Yıldırım, daha sonra kadınlara kendilerini be-le-diye başkanıyla götürdürme sö-zü üzerine eyleme son verildi. (Fotoğraf: Huzar Günçkan)

tartaklaması olayı izleyenlerin de tepkisine yol açtı. Erkeklerin de eyleme katılması-la tartışma yoğunlaştı. Çevik Kuvvet Müdürü'nün, belediye başkanıyla görüşürme sözü üzerine eyleme son verildi. (Fotoğraf: Huzar Günçkan)

'Siyasi su savaşı'nda hedef: Güneş Taner

Haber Araştırma Servisi — İstanbul üs-tünde oynanan "siyasi su savaşı"nda İs-tanbul Anakent Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sözen, Başbakan Yıldırım Akbulut ve Devlet Bakanı Güneş Taner'e cevap ver-di. Sözen, Akbulut'un "Bir daha eline hoş-bidon alıp mitinge çıkmayacağım" öne sürdü, Taner için de "Onu ayıplayorum" dedi. Demokrat Merkez Parti Genel Ba-ykanı Bedrettin Dalan ise, "(Su temini DSI'ye alı) diyen SHP lideri İnönü, halkı yanıltıyor" diye konuştu.

Anakent Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sözen, Belediye Genel Sekreteri Alev Çay-kun ve İstanbul Su Kanalizasyon İdaresi (İSKİ) Genel Müdürü Ergün Göknel'e birlikte düzenlediği basın toplantısında, İstanbul'un su sorununun çözümü için ele-alınması gereken "acil" projelerden Yeşil-

çay ve İstranca projelerine hemen bağ-lanacağını açıkladı. Sözen, Terkos'un su alan bölgeleri rahatsızatacak olan Halic su geçişinin 20 bazarın tarihinde devreye gi-receğini duyururken Yalova suyunun ta-şınması konusunda bazı armatörlerle va-rılan anlaşmayı da açıkladı.

Sözen, basın toplantısında yaptığı ko-nuşmada, su kaynaklarını bulmanın Dev-let Su İşleri'nin (DSİ) görevi olduğunu kaydetti ve "Yine de İSKİ, DSİ ile ortak bir çalışma içine girer" dedi. Sözen, "Su konusunda üzerlerine düşen görevi yap-tıklarıma inanmış"ı söyledi ve "Ancak so-run yalnızca İstanbul Belediyesi ve İSKİ'ye maledilmemelidir. Çözüm, ilgili tüm ku-rum ve kuruluşların yasalarla belirlenmiş sorumluluklarını yerine getirmeleriyle

mümkündür. Oysa son günlerde birçok yetkili ağırdan soruna getirilen sözde çö-zümler, polemik yaratanlaştırmaya önye gitme-miştir. 8 milyon insanın dağılımına ilişkin diren ve acil çözüm bekleyen sorun, poli-tik kaygılara ötesinde düşünülmelidir. Hedefimiz çözüm üretmeye ve bunları uy-gulamaya yönelik olmaktır" diye konuştu.

Hükümeti halkın büyük sorunları kar-şısında duyarsız kalmakla suçlayan Sözen, Güneş Taner'e ilgili bir soru üzerine "Ta-ner'i ayıplayorum. İnsanların sıkıntılarını politika yapmamas. Bu sıkıntılara ortakla-sa çözüm bulmasını gerektirir" karşılığın-verdi.

Öte yandan dün parti genel merkezi-n-de bir basın toplantısı düzenleyen DMP Genel Başkanı Bedrettin Dalan, 1984'te çı-kartılan bir yasa ile su temini görevinin be-

lediyelere verildiğini ifade etti. Dalan, İnönü'nün bu yasanın kendi partisinin be-le-diye başkanlarına yüklediği görevi yok saydığına savurdu.

Siyasetin hürmet için yapıldığını kayde-den Dalan, "İstanbul'u bir damla suya muhtaç eden kafa bütün Türkiye'yi bir lokma ekmeye muhtaç eder. Allah bun-lara iktidarı yüzü göstermesin" dedi.

SHP liderinin, altı ay önce kendi be-le-diye başkanlığı döneminde yaptığı darlık barajını açmasını da eleştiren Dalan, "Başbakanın emeline sahip olan bu ka-falar keyifle televizyondan gösteri yapar-ken, suuz kalınca görevi belediyelerin üzerinden atıyorlar. Politika dürüstlük is-teyen bir sanattır. 15 yıl içinde içme su so-runu Türkiye'nin en önemli stratejik mad-desi haline gelecektir" diye konuştu.

(h) Su sorununa çözüm istediler (05.06.1997, Cumhuriyet).

Esenyurt sakinleri, RP'li belediyeyi ve İSKİ'yi protesto etti Su sorununa çözüm istediler

İstanbul Haber Servisi-Yaklaşık 3 yıldır su sıkıntısı çeken Esenyurt sakinleri, su şebekelerini tamamlamayan İSKİ'yi alkış tutarak protesto etti. Yağmur altında yaklaşık bir saat bekleyen yurttaşlar, şebekelerin bağlanmamasını siyasi bir karar olarak değerlendirdiler. Esenyurt Belediye Başkanı **Gürbüz Çapan** ve İSKİ yetkilileri arasında yapılan görüşmede, 3 mahalleye yaklaşık 10 gün sonra su şebekelerini tamamlama sözü verildi.

Esenyurt'ta özellikle Fatih ve Merkez Mahallesi'nde geçen dönemlerde yüzde 80'i yapılan, ancak tamamlanmayan su şebekelerinin tamamlanmaması ve su sıkıntısının sona erdirilmesini isteyen yaklaşık 300 kişi, dün Belediye Başkanı **Dr. Gürbüz Çapan**'la birlikte öğle saatlerinde Aksaray'daki İSKİ binasına gelerek İSKİ ve İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye



Otobüslerle dün öğle saatlerinde Aksaray'daki İSKİ binasına gelen yaklaşık 300 kişi, İSKİ'yi alkış tutarak protesto etti. (Fotograf: ÖZKAN GÜVEN)

ya Başkanı **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan**'ı protesto etti.

İSKİ'nin önünde toplanan ve yağmur altında yaklaşık bir saat bekleyen yurttaşlar, toplantıya katıldığı gerekçesiyle İSKİ Genel Müdürü **Veysel Eroğlu** ile görüşemediler. **Gürbüz Çapan**, kendilerinin su şebekesini bağlatamadığını, bunun

için İSKİ'nin devreye girmesini beklediklerini ifade etti.

Mali İşler Daire Başkanı **Özdemir Bozkurt**'la görüşen Çapan, yaklaşık 10 gün içinde su şebekelerini bağlatma sözü aldıklarını belirterek kalabalığın uygarca dağılmasını istedi. Yurttaşlar, daha sonra bina önünden sessizce ayrıldılar.

(i) Suyun geleceği masada (16.03.2009, Cumhuriyet).

"5. Dünya Su Forumu" 110 ülkenin liderler düzeyinde katılımıyla İstanbul'da başlıyor

Suyun geleceği masada

İstanbul Haber Servisi - Uluslararası düzeyde suyla ilgili en önemli ve kapsamlı toplantı olan "5. Dünya Su Forumu" Türkiye'nin ev sahipliğinde yaklaşık 110 kadar ülkenin katılımıyla bugün İstanbul'da başlayacak. Cumhurbaşkanı **Abdullah Gül**, 5. Dünya Su Forumu'nun bugünkü açılış oturumuna ve forum dolayısıyla gerçekleştirilecek "Devlet ve Hükümet Başkanları Zirvesi"ne katılacak. "Mini zirve"ye Irak Cumhurbaşkanı **Celal Talabani**'nin de katılımı bekleniyor.

İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi ile DSI ve İSKİ gibi kuruluşların işbirliğiyle Dünya Su Konseyi tarafından düzenlenen 5. Dünya Su Forumu Feshane ve Surlace Kongre ve Kültür Merkezi'nde gerçekleştirilecek. 22 Mart'a kadar sürecek olan 5. Dünya Su Forumu bu yıl "Farklılıkların Suyla Yakınlaşması" temasıyla düzenlenecek. Dünya Su Forumu'na bazı devlet ve hükümet başkanları ile ilgili bakanların yanı sıra 20 binin üzerinde katılımcı, çok sayıda yerli ve yabancı parlamenter, yaklaşık bin 500 yerli ve yabancı basın mensubu, yerel yöneticiler, iş, bilim ve akademi dünyası ile sivil toplum örgütlerinin



Su forumuna protesto

temsilcileri katılacak.

"Su yönetimi 2020 ve daha sonrasında nasıl olacak?" gibi sorulara yanıt aranacak forum çerçevesinde yaklaşık 100 oturum gerçekleştirilecek. Parlamenterler Toplantısı ise 18-19

Mart günlerinde düzenlenecek. Aynı tarihlerde de yerel yönetimler toplantısı yapılacaktır.

Dünya Su Forumu'nda bu yıl tarihinde ilk kez sınırlı katılım bir devlet ve hükümet başkanları zirvesi

gerçekleştirilecek. Çırağan Sarayı'nda bugün yapılacak "mini zirve"ye 15 ülke devlet ve hükümet başkanları düzeyinde davet edildi. Zirveye Irak Cumhurbaşkanı **Talabani** de katılacak. Daveti kabul ettiklerini teyit edenle-

rin arasında Monako Prensi **II. Albert**, Tacikistan ve Somali cumhurbaşkanları, Fas, Kırgızistan ve Güney Kore başkanları ile Hollanda veliaht prensi de bulunuyor.

Irak Cumhurbaşkanı **Talabani**, Tacikistan Cumhurbaşkanı **İmamali Rahman**, Güney Kore Başkanı **Han Seung-Soo**, Hollanda Veliaht Prensi **Willem Alexander** ve Monako Prensi **II. Albert** foruma katılmak için dün akşam İstanbul'a geldiler.

Rum yönetimi de davetli

Dünya Su Forumu'na Güney Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi'nden bir heyetin katılacağı öğrenildi. Türkiye'nin Rum yönetimini tanımadığı belirtilirken davetin "Dünya Su Konseyi"nce yapıldığı belirtiliyor. KKTC'nin ise parlamenterler toplantısı gibi bazı etkinliklerde temsil edileceği belirtildi.

İstanbul Valisi **Muammer Güler**, zirve sırasında sürekli yol kapatma olmayacağını belirterek, "Geçiş güzergahlarında bulunan yollardaki trafik akışı, ihtiyaç duyulduğunda kısa süreli kademeli şekilde yavaşlatılacaktır" dedi. Zirve nedeniyle vapur seferlerinde de gecikme olabileceği açıklandı.

İçişleri Bakanlığı müfettişleri, 39 can alan patlamayla ilgili incelemeyi tamamladı

Çöp faciasının suçlusu Sözen

İstanbul Haber Servisi- Ümraniye Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü'nde 39 kişinin ölümüyle sonuçlanan metan gazı patlaması sonrasında müfettişlerce yapılan incelemede, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sözen ile Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem'in "Görevlerini ihmal ettikleri" sonucuna varıldı.

28 Nisan 1993 günü Ümraniye Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü'nde meydana gelen patlama sonrasında enkaz altından 27 ceset çıkarılmıştı. Halen 12 kişinin aranmasına da devam ediliyor. İçişleri Bakanlığı müfettişlerinin olay sonrasında başlattıkları inceleme tamamlandı. Müfettişlerce hazırlanan raporda 3030 sayılı büyükşehir belediyelerinin yönetimine ilişkin yasaya ve bunun uygulama yönetmeliğine değinildi. Raporda, yasa uyarınca "Büyükşehirlerde çöp toplama alanları kurma, işletme, çöp imha veya toplama alanlarıyla ilgili bütün fiziki tedbirleri alma görevlerinin büyükşehir belediyelerine" ait olduğu vurgulandı.

Raporda ayrıca, gecekondulaşmanın tespit edilmesi durumunda büyükşehir belediyelerinin, ilgili ilçe belediyesinden vasanın yetkisinin yapılmasını isteme yetkisi ve sorumluluğu bulunduğu belirtildi. Yapılaşmanın çöp alanlarının en fazla bir kilometre yakınına kadar olabileceğinin bildirildiği raporda, 1991 yılında Ümraniye Belediyesi'nin Üsküdar 3. Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi'nin belirlediği bilirkişilere inceleme yaptırdığı hatırlatıldı. Raporda, inceleme sonucu Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü'nün 50 metre mesafesine kadar yapılaşmanın



HEKİMBASI ÇÖPLÜĞÜ KALDIRILSIN - Ümraniye Hekimbaşı Çöplüğü çevresinde oturan yaklaşık 200 kişi Ümraniye Belediyesi'ne yürümek istedi. Çöp faciasının meydana geldiği Kazım Karabekir Mahallesi'nde oturan bir grup, dün saat 12.00'de toplanarak çöplüğün bir an önce kaldırılmasını istediler. Ellerindeki pankartlarla Ümraniye Belediyesi'ne yürümek isteyen gruba çevik kuvvet izin vermedi. (Fotoğraf: UĞUR GÜNYÜZ)

ulaştığının tespit edildiği, bunda İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi'ne bildirildiği kaydedildi.

İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nin çöplükteki metan gazının tahliyesi için rehabilitasyon yaptırması ve gecekonduların da Ümraniye Belediyesi tarafından yıkturulmasını sağlaması gerektiği vurgulanarak, bunların yapılmadığı belirtildi. Gecekonduların çöplüğe yaklaşmasına karşın işlem yapılmadığı için Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem de sorumlu tutuldu.

Raporda, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Sözen ile Ümraniye Belediye Başkanı Şinasi Öktem'in "gö-

revlerini ihmal ettikleri" ve TCK'nın 230. maddesine aykırı davrandıkları sonucuna varıldı. Söz konusu madde devlet memurlarının, ihmallerinden dolayı devletin zarara uğraması karşısında 3 aydan 3 yıla kadar cezalandırılmaları öngörüyor.

28 Nisan'da meydana gelen patlama sonrasında Sözen ile Öktem olaydan sorumlu tutularak suçlanmışlardı. Suçlamalar karşısında Sözen, 1990 yılında çöp projesiyle ilgili çalışmalar başlatıldığını, 1992'nin ekim ayına kadar da gerekli kredileri sağlayamadıkları için uygulamaya geçilemediğini açıklamıştı. DPT, İller Bankası ve Türkiye Emlak Bankası'nı bu geçikme nedeniyle suçlayan Sö-

zen, gecikme üzerine o dönemin Devlet Bakanı Tansu Çiller'den yardım istediklerini, ancak yeterli desteği göremediğini söylemişti.

Öktem de Üsküdar, Beykoz ve Kadıköy belediyelerini mahkemeye verdiklerini, 8 mayısta çöplükle ilgili referandum yapacaklarını belirterek "Delinin aklına gelen başına gelir. Böyle olacağını biliyorduk" demişti. Gecekondulaşmaya izin verdiği suçlamalarını da red eden Öktem, yapılaşmanın 20 yıl öncesine dayandığını, çöplüğe 400 metre uzaklıkta yapılaşmaya gidildiğini, aynı uzaklıkta cezaevi yapıldığını, gecekonduların çöplüğe değil, çöplüğün gecekondulara yaklaştığını belirtmişti.

(k) Okulun kiralanmasına tepkiler sürüyor (18.09.1997, Cumhuriyet).

Okulun kiralanmasına tepkiler sürüyor



Eğitim-Sen İstanbul 8 No'lu Şube Başkanı Mehmet Al da bir grup veli ve öğrenciyle birlikte okul önünde açıklama yaptı. Al, okulun satışından elde edilecek gelirle eğitime katkı sunulacağını büyük bir yalan olduğunu belirtti.

İstanbul Haber Servisi- Gedikpaşa İlköğretim Okulu'nun 60 milyar lira karşılığında 49 yıllığına Eminönü Belediyesi'ne kiralanmasına karşı protesto gösterileri sürüyor. Eminönü Belediye Başkanı Ahmet Çetinsaya, "60 milyar bölgedeki okulların ihtiyacında kullanacağını" belirterek Eğitim-Sen, elde edilecek gelirle ilgili olarak "uygulamanın eğitimde özelleştirmenin bir parçası olduğunu, eğitime katkı olarak sunulacağı" iddiasının büyük bir yalan olduğunu söyledi. RP Eminönü İlçe Başkanı Lütfü Kibaroglu, okul arazisinin 7 trilyon lira değerinde bulunduğunu belirterek Başkan Çetinsaya'nın, okulu bazı çevrelere rant kapısı yapma gayreti içinde olduğunu söyledi.

Laleli'nin en hareketli noktası olan Ordu Caddesi üzerindeki Gedikpaşa İlköğretim Okulu'nun Eminönü Belediyesi'ne devredilmesine protestolar dün de devam etti. RP Eminönü İlçe Başkanı Lütfü Kibaroglu, okul önünde yaptığı açıklamada, okul arazisinin 7 trilyon lira değerinde bulunduğunu ve imar durumu değiştirilmeden belediye kiralanmasının doğru olmadığını savunarak "Çetinsaya, okulu bazı çevrelere rant kapısı yapma gayreti içinde" dedi. Eğitim-Sen İstanbul 8 No'lu Şube Başkanı Mehmet Al da bir grup veli ve öğrenciyle birlikte okul önünde açıklama yaptı. Al, okulun satışından elde edilecek gelirle eğitime katkı sunulacağını büyük bir yalan olduğunu belirterek şöyle devam etti:

"Bu uygulamalar eğitimde özelleştirmenin bir parçasıdır. Bugün Gedikpaşa İlköğretim Okulu'nu satan anlayış, yarı başka okulları satma uğraşı içine girecektir."

Konuyla ilgili görüşlerine başvurduğumuz Başkan Ahmet Çetinsaya ise okulu kiralamaya ilişkin daha proje kapsamında bulunduğunu anımsatarak "Büyüyorsunuz, Eminönü SİT alanı. Projemiz Karuma Kurulu'na gidecek ve tasdiklendikten sonra herkesin katılabileceği bir açık artırmayla okul satışa sunulacak" dedi.

(l) Hastane birleştirilmesine protesto (16.07.2009, Cumhuriyet).



Sağlık emekçileri, devlet hastanelerinin birleştirilmesinin hem sağlığı vuracağını hem de çalışanları mağdur edeceğini belirttiler. (Fotoğraf:TÜLAY NERGİZ)

Hastane birleştirilmesine protesto

İstanbul Haber Servisi- İstanbul Tabip Odası ile Sağlık ve Sosyal Hizmet Emekçileri Sendikası (SES) Anadolu Yakası Şubesi üyeleri, Beykoz Devlet Hastanesi'nin Paşabahçe Devlet Hastanesi ile Validebağ Devlet Hastanesi'nin ise Üsküdar Devlet Hastanesi ile birleştirilmek istenmesini protesto etti. Sağlık emekçileri, "AKP hükümeti, sağlık kurumlarını fiilen kapatarak ya da hizmet veremez hale getirerek ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlıyor. Halkın sağlık kurumları rant hesaplarına mı kurban ediliyor?" dediler.

Koşuyolu Validebağ Devlet Hastanesi bahçesinde dün bir araya gelen İstanbul Tabip Odası, SES, Kamu-Sen, Validebağ Devlet Hastanesi sağlık çalışanları ve personeli ile Koşuyolu halkı, protesto gösterisi düzenlediler. Validebağ ve Beykoz Devlet Hastaneleri çalışanları adına basın açıklamasını okuyan SES İşyeri Temsilcisi Hemşire Feride Güvenç, sağlık hizmetinin kapitalizmin kâr hırsına ve piyasanın insafına terk edilmemesi gereken bir hizmet olduğunu belirtti. Güvenç, hastaların özel hastanelere kaydırılmak istendiğini savundu.

(m) Bomonti işçileri fabrikaya talip oldu (20.05.1994, Cumhuriyet).



Tekel Bira Fabrikası işçileri, Şişli'deki fabrika önünde protesto gösterisi yaptılar. (Fotoğraf:KAAN SAĞANAK)

Bomonti işçileri fabrikaya talip oldu

İstanbul Haber Servisi- Tekel Bira Fabrikası işçileri, 23 Nisan'dan sonra 19 Mayıs Atatürk'ü Anma Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı'nda da aileleriyle birlikte fabrika önünde toplandılar ve özelleştirmeleri protesto ettiler. Şişli'deki fabrika binası önündeki eylemlerine halay çekerek başlayan işçiler, fabrikalarının kapatılmasına izin vermeyeceklerini açıkladılar. İşçiler, basın açıklamasında, Atatürk'ün kurduğu tersanelerin, demir-çelik tesislerinin, fabrikaların ve madenlerin kapatılmak istendiğini belirterek, "Emek ve alimlerimizden başka hiçbir sermayesi olmayan biz işçiler, alınan bu kararları şiddetle protesto ediyor ve tüm gücümüzle emeğimize sahip çıkacağımızı duyuruyoruz" dediler. Fabrikalarının kasten zarar ettirildiğini vurgulayan işçiler, fabrikayı çalıştırmaya aday olduklarını açıkladılar. İşçiler kutlama boyunca üzerlerinde, "Gazet ve dalalet içinde bulunanlar sabrınız taşıyor", "Amerikan itleri, sattırmayız KİT'leri", "İMF'ye hayır", "Acı ilacı içmeyeceğiz" yazılı dövizler taşıdılar.

(n) Gazhane Kültür Merkezi Olsun (21.10.1996, Cumhuriyet).



Kadıköy Hasansipa'daki 30 bin metrekarelik alanın otopark veya iş merkezi olarak kullanılmaması için çevreçiler imza kampanyası başlattılar. Kadıköy Belediye Başkanı Selami Öztürk bu alanın kültür merkezi ve yeşil alan dışında başka bir amaçla kullanılmasına izin vermeyeceklerini söyledi.

'Gazhane kültür merkezi olsun'

KEREM ILGAZ

Kadıköy Hasansipa'da bulunan tarihi Gazhane'nin kültür merkezi ve yeşil alan olarak kullanılması amacıyla kampanya başlatıldı. Gazhane Çevre Gönüllüleri'ne başlatılan kampanya çerçevesinde bugüne kadar yaklaşık 2 bin imza toplandı. İstanbul'un Anadolu yakasında bulunan yolların aydınlatılması amacıyla 1887'de Fransız mühendisler tarafından kurulan Hasansipa Havagazi Fabrikası, 30 bin metrekarelik bir alanda kuruldu. Bugünlerde kömür deposu olarak kullanılan ve İETT Genel Müdürlüğü'ne ait alan, otopark veya iş merkezi olarak kullanılmak

istiyor. "Bu alanın rant çevrelerinin çıkar sağlanması amacıyla kullanılmamasına karşı çıkacağız. Yeşil alanın ve kültür merkezinin bulunmadığı bu bölgede yüksek binalar yapılmasına izin vermeyeceğiz" diye konuşan Gazhane Çevre Gönüllüleri'nden Nesrin Uçar, 15 kasım'da sona erecek imza kampanyasında 10 bin imza toplamayı amaçladıklarını açıkladı. Kadıköy halkının bu konuda kendilerine çok sıcak baktığını belirten Uçar, bugün insanların kömür tozlarını ciğerlerine çektiğini, yeşil alan olarak kullanılması gerektiğini bildirdi. Toplanacak imzaların Kadıköy Belediyesi, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve İETT Genel Müdürlüğü'ne iletileceğini

vurgulayan Uçar, bölgenin mevzi plan projesinin bir an önce tanınmasını gerektiğini söyledi. Kadıköy Belediyesi'nin bu alanın kültür merkezi ve yeşil alan dışında başka bir amaçla kullanılmasına izin vermeyeceğini söyleyen Kadıköy Belediye Başkanı Selami Öztürk, bölgenin eski İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Nurettin Süzen döneminde sosyal ve kültürel alan olarak kullanılması amacıyla planlara geçtiğini açıkladığını anımsattı. Anıtlar Kurulu'ndan çıkan bir kararla Gazhane'nin tarihi eser kapsamına alındığını belirten Başkan Öztürk, Kadıköy halkının bu gibi konulara karşı duyarlı olmasının sevindirici olduğunu kaydetti.

(o) Yıkıma karşı kostümlü eylem (26.03.2007, Cumhuriyet).



Gençlik Tiyatroları Oluşumu üyesi sanatçılar adına yapılan açıklamada sanat dönük karanlık girişimler protesto edildi. Tiyatrocular açıklamanın ardından, "27 Mart Dünya Tiyatrolar Günü'nüz kutlu olsun" yazılı maskeleri yurttaşlara dağıttılar.

AKM önünde bir araya gelen genç tiyatrocular pantomim gösterisi sundular

Yıkıma karşı kostümlü eylem

İstanbul Haber Servisi - Genç tiyatrocular, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı'nın Atatürk Kültür Merkezi'nin (AKM) yıkılma kararına tepkilerini sanatlarıyla ortaya koydular.

Gençlik Tiyatroları Oluşumu'ndan sanatçılar AKM önünde saat 14.30 sıralarında kostümleriyle bir araya geldiler. Bir pantomim gösterisi sunan tiyatrocular AKM'nin yıkım kararına dik-

kat çekerek AKM'nin yıkılmasına karşı çıkışlarını ifade ettiler. Oyuncular pantomim sunumunun ardından "Sahneler bizimdir, bizim kalacak", "Karanlığa hayır, sanata evet", "AKM yıkılmaz" sloganları attı. Genç tiyatrocu grup adına konuşan tiyatro sanatçısı **Adnan Toner**, sanata dönük karanlık girişimlere karşı oldukları için bugün bir araya geldiklerini belirterek,

AKM'nin yıkılmasını istemediklerini kaydetti. Tiyatrocular açıklamanın ardından, "27 Mart Dünya Tiyatrolar Günü'nüz kutlu olsun" yazılı maskeleri çevredeki yurttaşlara dağıttılar.

Eylem bugün de sürecek

Kültür ve Sanat Emekçileri Sendikası (Kültür Sanat-Sen) İstanbul Şubesi'ne bağlı sanatçılar da bugün saat 11.30'da AKM önün-

de "Hepimiz Aynı Gemideyiz" sloganıyla toplanacaklar. Sendikadan yapılan açıklamada "Sıranın diğer AKM'lere gelmemesi" için öncelikle AKM'de sanatın tüm dallarında çalışan sanatçılar "şairler, şarkılar, türküler, arıyalar ve danslar eşliğinde Dünya Tiyatrolar Günü'nü kutlamaya ve AKM ve Muhsin Ertuğrul Sahnesi yıkılmasını demeye" davet edildi.

(p) 1 kilometrelik insan zinciri (29.03.2010, Cumhuriyet).

HABERLER

İSTANBUL'A 3. KÖPRÜYÜ PROTESTO ETTİLER

1 kilometrelik insan zinciri

İstanbul Haber Servisi - İstanbul'a yapılması planlanan 3. köprüyü protesto eden "3. Köprü Yerine Yaşam Platformu" üyeleri, Maslak'ta 1 kilometre uzunluğunda insan zinciri oluşturarak "İstanbul ve ormanları hep birlikte savunacağız, 3. rant köprüsünü durduracağız" dediler. Sarıyer'deki Hacıosman kavaşığında toplanan "3. Köprü Yerine Yaşam Platformu" üyeleri, ellerindeki dövizlerle sloganlar atarak bir süre yürüdü. Ardından Parkorman'a kadar yaklaşık 1 kilometre uzunluğunda insan zinciri oluşturan grup, zaman zaman trafiğin aksamasına neden oldu. İstanbul Çevre ve Orman Müdürlüğü önünde basın açıklaması yapan **Kader Cihan**, şunları söyledi: "AKP hükümeti, İstanbul'da halkın yararlandığı son doğal ve kamusal alanları da hızla büyük sermaye-rant

çevrelerine peşkeş çekmeyi planlıyor. 3. köprü adı verilen organize cinayet projesini sermayeye altın tepsi içinde sunarak İstanbul'un son orman alanlarını, su havzalarını ve yoksul halkın yaşam alanlarını hedefine koyan işgali yaygınlaştırmayı hedefliyor." 3. köprü'nün kentin ulaşım sorununu çözemediğini ve savunun Cihan, köprü'nün İstanbul için bir ihtiyaç olmadığını kaydetti.



CURRICULUM VITAE

Name Surname: Dilek KARABULUT

E-Mail: msu.dilek@gmail.com

B.Sc.: Urban and Regional Planning Department - Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University

Professional Experience: Research Assistant – Dokuz Eylul University