

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

GRADUATE SCHOOL of SOCIAL SCIENCES

**Cultural Distrust and Journalistic
Professionalism in Turkey**

İrem Somer

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
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
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of Master of Arts in Media and Communication Studies

Cultural Distrust and Journalistic Professionalism in Turkey

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| 3) Kültürel yapı | 3) Cultural structure |
| 4) Çerçeveleme | 4) Framing |
| 5) Türkiye | 5) Turkey |

Abstract

The low level of professionalism of Turkish news media and its reasons is accepted as a given. While some assert this deficiency is due to party parallelism of the newspapers and journalists, others assert ownership structure is the main reason. This study analysis core reasons for impartiality that seems as an impediment for Turkey to establish journalistic practice with high levels of professionalism. In doing so it takes a structural approach which also includes Turkish political and civil culture. It firstly examines cultural structure of Turkish society; and then political and economic structures of the news media sector. Secondly, it conducts a Critical Discourse Analysis on total of 573 news articles covering Mavi Marmara Raid and Hopa incident. This study's argument is contesting ideologies and cultural structures in Turkey result in high levels of distaste and distrust for different opinions which lead to skeptical news discourse and at times conflicting news framing.

Özet

Türk haber medyacılığının profesyonelleşmesinde sorunlar olduğu değişmez bir gerçek gibi toplumun birçok kesimi tarafından kabullenilmiştir. Bazıları bu eksikliğin nedeni olarak medyadaki parti paralellliğini öne sürerken, bir başka grup ise sahiplik sisteminin ana neden olduğunu savını savunmaktadır. Bu çalışma Türkiye'de haberciliğin önüne engel olarak çıkan ve profesyonelliğin gelişmesini engelleyen nedenleri incelemektedir. Bunu da yapısal bir yaklaşım edinerek yapmaktadır. Yapısal yaklaşım sadece politik ve ekonomik düzen değil, kültürel yapı da incelenmektedir. Profesyonel eksiklerin haberciliğe nasıl yansıdığı için Mavi Marmara ve Hopa olayları üstünde çerçeve ve söylem analizi yapmaktadır. Bu çalışma profesyonelleşmeye engel olan başat nedenin kültürel-politik düzeydeki farklılıklardan kaynaklanan güvensizliğin medya içeriklerine de yansıdığı savını öne sürmektedir.

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Abbreviations

| | |
|------|--|
| BİK | Basın İlan Kurumu |
| BTK | Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu |
| CDA | Critical Discourse Analysis |
| DGPI | Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü (Directorate General of Press and Information) |
| DİSK | Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Revolutionist Labour Unions Confederation) |
| DP | Democrat Party |
| EU | European Union |
| FDP | Freedom and Democracy Party |
| İHH | İnsan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani yardım Vakfı |
| JDP | Justice and Development Party |
| JP | Justice Party |
| M&A | Mergers and Acquisitions |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NMP | National Movement party |
| NOM | National Outlook Movement |
| PDP | Peace and Democracy Party |
| PKK | Partiye Karkeren Kürdistan (Kurdish Labourers' Party) |
| RTÜK | Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu |
| RPP | Republican Peoples Party |
| THKO | Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish People Freedom Army) |
| TMSF | Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu |
| TMY | Terörle Mücadele Yasası (Anti-Terror Act) |

| | |
|-----|---|
| TTB | Türkiye Tabipler Birliđi (Association of Turkish Medical Doctors) |
| UN | United Nations |
| USA | United States of America |
| WP | Welfare Party |
| WPT | Workers' Party of Turkey |

1. Introduction and Statement of the Problem

The news media is one the least trusted and most criticized institution in Turkey. Especially the Turkish news media gets disparaging remarks from international organizations to nongovernmental organizations, politicians to common men and from scholars to journalists. Like the multiplicity of critics, the points of criticism are also manifold. International nongovernmental organizations such as Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House, Committee to Protect Journalists; intergovernmental organizations such as Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) highlight the dismal condition that journalists have to operate in. Likewise some journalists claim they faced some complications and even let go due to some news they covered¹.

Another criticism directed to the Turkish news media focuses on journalism, instead of the news media conditions. For instance Turkish politicians accuse the media for thwarting the reality by taking sides and thus for misleading the public. The same is also true for the society. The researches that aim to understand people's perception of and trust to media are thought provoking. For example, according to Konda Research and

¹ In order to get further understanding of this claim one can refer to Merdan Yanardağ's book 'Medya Nasıl Kuşatıldı' which includes a script of an interview with Emin Çölaşan and Aydın Doğan.

Consultancy 73.5 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 24; 76 percent of the population between the ages of 25 and 34; 73.4 percent of the population between the ages of 35 and 44; 73.8 percent of the population between the ages of 55 and 64; and 59 percent of the population 65 years old and older believe that the media is misinforming the public about their own interests (Vural, 2011: N.A.).

The perception of the news media as being limited by some external factors, taking sides and misinforming the public about their own interest land themselves to a greater problem concerning the level of journalistic professionalism in Turkey. It is safe to assert that Turkish news media is perceived as ‘inadequate’ and ‘unsuccessful’ in terms of professionalization. This perception raises further important questions about Turkish civic culture and democracy as the news media and democracy have a close relationship.

To make it clearer, the significance of communication to democratic order, which is twofold, must be explained. To begin with, communication is one of the building blocks of democracy. People have to share and negotiate their wants and needs; and reach a collective decision on a given

(policy) matters. Furthermore, because voting based system can at times turn into tyranny of the majority, the minorities or specific groups can ameliorate the wrongs by raising their voices and putting 'non-political' matters to political agenda. Women movement's 'private is political' slogan being the most known example. When it comes to make binding collective decisions, no-one is superior; every member, each group is entitled to be heard (Dahl, 1971: 30 - 39). Of course arguing everybody wants to participate to the policy process - let alone everybody participates - is a wishful thinking; today's democratic societies does not even remotely resemble this ideal. Rather in contemporary representational democracies politicians and opinion leaders undertake that role as they have high level of information, necessary resources and interest on the issue at stake. However the fact that not all individuals in the society possess same influence, information and prestige in opinion forming process (Dahl, 1971: 39) does not mean they can be excluded from the debate, public opinion does matter. Opinion leaders present their cases, share their findings and ideas and disseminate them through communication channels available to them.

The second, but as important, function of communication in democracy is it fulfills accountability and transparency that democracy anticipates. The legality, efficiency and rationality of the political authority are not unaccountable; on the contrary they are subject to criticism. In other

words, at this stage of communication ideas or policies are not the subject of the deliberation; rather the decisions, actions and inactions of the political actors are. It is an evaluation of their performance and a critical gaze upon them. This in return not only legitimizes authority of the politicians, but also ensures maintenance of high quality democracy by discouraging political elites from transgressing democratic boundaries. Therefore it is safe to argue in addition to voting, the critical-rational public debate (Habermas, 1991) over political authority is public's greatest and most influential asset in representative democracies.

For several decades now, the world is witnessing rapid mediatization both of these communication processes. Needless to say political actors themselves have different strategies to communicate, or the society has different ways to show or demonstrate their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Undoubtedly they do make use of communication technologies - they print pamphlets, launch their own newspapers, magazines, web-sites, hold mass demonstrations or start a protest. But it was the emergence of journalism and the news media *sector* that carried the political communication to mass levels and hence had the greatest impact on political communication.

In other words, if the journalists did not perform the task of following up the recent developments on a regular and consistent basis, encode them in a coherent manner and disseminate them through a medium, the advancements in communication channels would not brought such a radical change to the conduct of politics. In today's world order, this relationship is tighter ever than before and gets tighter everyday as a result of combination of massification and omnipresence of news media with increasing dependency on the mass media (Schuz, 2011: 93).

In short, the news media have the capacity to undertake and perform an unmatched role in contemporary political system; because they can serve firstly as an inclusive and egalitarian platform for communicating collective matters and secondly as a check and balance institution auditing the use of political and economic power. As Pippa and Odugbemi state: "...the news media in each country are a vital part of the institutional mix, provided that they are set up in a way that allows them to play the roles of watchdogs, agenda setters, and gatekeepers."(2010: 379). Moreover, as Street asserted, if partial and thwarted communication does not mislead the public opinion and manifest itself as a hindrance, low journalistic professionalization would not pose a problem (2011: 5 – 35). Therefore while performing this task, journalists are expected to abide by the norms and ethical codes of the profession for the sake of society

At the same time; while low level of professionalism is under attack, high level of journalistic professionalism is also facing some criticism. Especially since the end of the Cold War, it is argued that even in societies where high level of journalistic professionalization is established and good working environment is provided, the news media cannot live up to its potential. Empirical and theoretical studies confirmed that media in developed countries Manufacturing Consent being one of the famous one, certain media theories assert professional journalism creates consent for existing world order.

Therefore in this context not only lack of journalistic professionalism in Turkey but also how to cope with it raises important questions. The fact that some established standards of journalistic professionalism are being interrogated and impeached complicates answering how low level of professionalization manifest itself and how it can be exalted from lower levels to higher levels. Are problems associated with low levels of journalism are in fact existent in the news media institutions? Are problems in Turkish news media really due to low level of professionalism or is there any other factor that can explain this perceived low level of professionalization? Tackling these problems necessitates a clear

conceptualization of what journalistic professionalism is and a thorough apprehension of the obstacles impeding professionalization of Turkish journalism.

This study delves into this problématique. It both aims to understand why professionalism is low (or observed to be low) and how it can be tackled. An encompassing framework is much more appropriate because studying the media is a larger political and social theory is more useful in understanding the media (Garnham, 2000: 10 – 12; Street, 2005: 29). This evokes the question whether if party/ideology parallelism paradigm and political-economy paradigm are adequate conceptual frameworks to explain low level of professionalism in Turkey. Thus for the first question, the study adopts a holistic, structural approach and examines not just the economic and political structure that journalists operate in but also cultural and ideological structure. By doing so, it will bring a better understanding to the Turkish news media system and to its multi-layered, deep-rooted problems. Moreover, it will also provide a perspective and solution to the later question that is how low levels of journalistic professionalism can be ameliorated. Hence it will also demonstrate how obstacles are more pervasive in Turkey and requires journalists to challenge themselves even more.

The second chapter scans the existing literature. The focus is on journalism and limitations to journalism inflicted by the 'structure'. In addition, journalistic professionalism will be explained and problems and how to cope with those problems impeding professionalization is explored. At this section recurring concepts and terms will also be illuminated. The third chapter provides the research methodology, and hypotheses derived from the literature review. The fourth chapter provides the structural environment that the Turkish media operates in. The fifth chapter includes a critical discourse analysis and framing analysis of coverage of two case studies – Mavi Marmara Raid and Hopa incident - in five different newspapers. The analysis aims to pinpoint the sources of the problem. This chapter also includes an evaluation section in which some solutions are proposed. The final chapter reflects on the research findings and concludes the study.

2. Review of the Literature

Academic study and literature on the news media and politics is extensive. A thorough examination of the study demonstrates the relationship between the mass media and politics is not simply ‘transmissional’, even in objective and factual reporting. Mediating even the most clear-cut event is not a straightforward task. The encoding process, as well as the decoding, of a political text is mediated with external factors and discursive elements (Hall, 1980: 106). If one has to expand on this statement, in Bourdieuan terms, the final output is almost always a product of the dialectical relationship between the habitus of journalism and the field of media system. This review firstly focuses on why news media matters in political communication. Secondly, it analyzes what forces are postulated as discursive elements working in encoding process. In addition, it contemplates on what are the standards of professionalism. The third part, aims to understand how encoding patterns manifest themselves in communicative news text and render meaning to current affairs. Finally, it will briefly analyze the literature on Turkish media in the light of literature.

2.1 News Media and Political Impact:

2.1.1 News Media and Public Opinion:

Political communication, as an interdisciplinary field, has been examined from various aspects. The abundance in the literature provides us with sophisticated insight about the relationship between the news media - the audience/public and the political elites. On all accounts, the greatest political power of news media appears to be its ability to influence the public opinion because the public as outsider of the political process are most of the time dependent on the news media – who are semi-insiders – for information (Louw, 2005: 17 – 20). However it should not be forgotten that of the mass media can be a weak force because as Newton argues: “...they [media effects] are often diluted, deflected or even destroyed by more powerful variables that mediate the media by intervening between them and their effects on wider society.” (2006: 224).

Equally, these strong norms, values and beliefs of the reader may also increase the media effect (Newton, 2006: 224 - 230). This phenomenon is known as frame alignment. Some social psychology studies concluded

that opinion leaders are successful in so much as their ability to produce opinions that align with the audience's opinion. Snow and Benford (1988) argue that when deliberately produced frames link, resonate or compliment audience's frame, frame alignment occurs. This frame resonance in return serves a catalyst in producing public opinion, and even can initiate a social movement (Snow & Benford, 1988: 212 - 216). The same is true for the media. If media messages are compatible with reader's values, attitudes and opinions, media will be one of the factors shaping their understanding and attitudes. If not, they will read the text against itself. This is known as oppositional or resistant reading. However in cases when the readers do not have strong values, attitudes or opinions, the media texts can provide some messages and ideas to think about. In such instances the media coverage can be the strongest and even can be the sole actor in forming readers' opinions.

2.1.2 News Media and Political Actors:

The studies on the relationship between political antagonists and the media also concluded the importance of frame alignment or parallel frame setting. To begin with, political elites as rational actors are depended on the media not for information but for general support. They care for media because they want to disseminate their own message or want to get positive

publicity. In other words, it is the mass appeal what matters for the politicians and other opinion leaders (Wolfsfeld, 2003: 86 – 87). The mass appeal however is both an advantage and a disadvantage for politicians because they can get also unfavorable, misleading and unfair coverage.

However, the relationship between politicians and the media is more complex. At this point, it is important to mention the media logic. Meyer (2002) argues politics is colonized by the media. He argues that political events have a logic that is independent of the media but they have to comply with the rules of media-logic. Media's logic, according to Meyer (2002), is contained in two filters. The first involves selection of the 'news': what counts as 'newsworthy'. The second involves presentation: how can it be narrated in a way that not only makes sense but also grabs the audience's attention. Meyer (2002) theorizes events that comply with the logic get covered in the news; thus political actors are compelled to adjust their actions and/or rhetoric according to the media logic. For instance CNN Effect theorizes media coverage can force politicians to address certain issues more rapidly and accelerate their decision making process (Livingston, 1997, 2).

In pursuit of this logic, Wolfsfeld (2003) in his Political Contest Model asserts political antagonists fight also includes struggle over the media. They not only want to have access to the media but they also want the news media to adopt the meaning they rendered to the event. Wolfsfeld points out: “Many political conflicts center on disputes over frames, as each antagonist attempts to market its own package of ideas to the mass media and the public.” (2003: 88)

2.1.3 News Media and Political Process:

The impact and role of the media in shaping the political process has been one of the focal points in the political communication and media studies. A great numbers of studies try to determine the role of the media during the process. Existing studies and immensely different conclusions make it clear that the media’s impact depends on and alters according to vast number of variables. For instance, Wolfsfeld assert political elites control over the event changes journalists’ impact on the process (2003: 85); Robinson assert political executives consensus and policy certainty changes journalists ability to influence the process (2001: 525 -526). However the ways media impacts are more or less agreed upon and they are two-tiered: firstly how media can shape the audiences political attitudes and then how

can it shape/force political actors' decisions and actions. The theories in the literature are as the following.

2.1.3.1 Agenda-Setting and Priming:

Overall review of existing literature demonstrates the media – of all sorts – can amplify or downplay the salience issue by covering or not covering it. For instance, they can set agenda by focusing on an issue and make it salient in their coverage (McCombs, 2005: 546). Over all it is asserted the political agenda issues are not necessarily brought up by the media; politicians or the members of civil society might also brought the issue up to the media. Here what matters is the salience given by the media to the issue; because the readers are constantly exposed to the issue, they cognitively prime the issue as they start to believe the issue matters. In similar way, the issues that are not covered or discussed in the media may not strike as important (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). Thus covering the story has the potential to increase awareness or to the matter.

Moreover agenda setting theory argues in democratic systems by striking public interest to an issue media also have the potential to shape or set the political agenda as politicians have to accommodate their constituents' demands. Supporters of agenda setting theory argues: “[Media] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” (Cohen, 1963)

2.1.3.2 Framing:

Framing theory on the other hand argues otherwise. Another impact of the news media in addition to agenda setting and awareness rising, some scholars aver that media can influence and manipulate readers' understanding. The news media platform serves as a platform where political and social phenomena and actors are being constructed. Even for some constructivists, politics as a realm of activity is constituted by and only exist as a series of media representations

To begin with framing analysis and studies are not limited to media studies. As a matter of fact, it was first introduced as a full-fledged theory to the literature by Erving Goffman while studying social interaction. More

than a decade later Entman argued framing can be appropriated by media studies especially while analyzing the media texts. Thus first of all it must be understood that frame analysis has two subsets: individual frames and media frames. For the first one, Goffman defines framing as: “to label ‘schemata of interpretation that allow individuals or groups to locate, perceive, identify, and label events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing experiences, and guiding actions.”(1974: 1) Entman defines: “frames are mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.” (1993: 52) From these definitions one can deduce that frames are reflections of values, attitudes and opinions during making sense process. In other words, framing is a cognitive process shaped by individual’s own values.

On media-level, Gamson defined frame as: “...a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events... The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.” (1989: 35) In same token, Entman defined media framing:

“Framing essentially involves *selection* and *salience*. To frame is to *select some aspects of apperceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described.” (original emphasis, 1993: 52)

Remembering the fact that the event needs to turn into story in order for it to become a communicative event (Hall, 1980: 106) journalists and reporters - along with other political actors - are the first ones who determine what the 'story' is about.

The significance of media frames is then they may precipitate certain kind of decoding of the story, hence influence how to think about the event. As Entman admittedly says: "... receiver's thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator." (1993: 52) The text nonetheless exhibits framing preferences of the communicator: "*text* contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments." (Entman, 1993: 52)

On issues on which the media is the only reference for the audience, how media covers becomes especially important. For instance those who study how to raise awareness to human induced climate change assert: "Most world citizens will not learn about climate change research directly from cautious lexicon in scientific journals, however, but rather from the

mass media.” (Wilson, 2000: 201). Further studies demonstrate how multiple frames surround a given policy issue. Hulme for instance list several frames that can either lead to positive action or can lead to inaction. For the first one he lists catastrophe frame, justice and equality frame, responsibility to protect frame. For the second he gives the example of scientific uncertainty frame and nature cycle frame (Hulme, 2009: 229).

Some further studies manifest the impact of framing differences even on matters that are not remote to readers’ immediate surroundings. For instance, Iyengar's (1990) episodic and thematic framing is a clear example of the phenomenon. The difference between these two frames is while thematic frame situates the news in wider context and calls for a structural alteration, episodic frames present the issue as a discrete, isolated event and does not point to a structural deficiency but instead points to an individual story. He firstly conducts a framing analysis on poverty news in the USA. He diagnosed two types of news stories: first one contextualizes poverty by including government policies and economic context; the second one covers poor people and their experience. At the second stage of the research Iyengar conducts a survey where audiences are first exposed to different news stories either thematic or episodic, and then asked what do they think is responsible for poverty. He concludes:

“...these results suggest that the context in which political issues appear is critical to how people think about the issue. When poverty is expressed as a collective outcome, it is understood quite differently than when it appears in the form of specific poor person. Similarly, news coverage of different instances of poor people or reference to different personal traits and behaviors in survey questionnaires has the effect of raising or lowering the degree to which Americans hold government responsible for assisting the poor.” (1990: 35)

Another example is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) empirical study that demonstrates the impact of framing on the audiences’ choices and risk averseness. They provided a hypothetical situation in which six-hundred peoples live are in danger; and government has four options (A, B, C and D): the first option (A) will save two-hundred lives, other (B) will save one-third of the people but there is a danger of not saving two-thirds of the population. 72 percent of subjects chose the first option over the second. Then they changed the frame from saving to losing (C and D); the first option (C) 400 people will die; second option (D) one-third will not die but two-third will die. This time subjects choose option D by 78 percent. The mathematically nothing has changed, and all of the options are mathematically identical. The only change was the subjects’ understanding, choices and action.

By adopting certain frames journalists can promote a certain opinion and action. After all, Wolfsfeld asserts: “It is important to examine the level

of correspondence between the frames adopted by the media those offered by each political antagonists...” (2003: 88) Adopting somebody’s frame without a critical examination will thwart public understanding of the phenomenon; altering the reality either consciously or unconsciously is not acceptable (McQuail, 1992: 190). In other words, frames do affect audiences’ understanding of an event and can result in both perceptual and actual differences.

2.2 Journalism and Journalistic Professionalism:

Considering the fact that to mediate an event it first has to turn into a story (Hall, 1980; 106), journalists are the ones who decides what the story is about. As literature review demonstrates even the smallest adjustment and alteration in coverage have impact on many policy issues. Clearly then the news selection and presentation patterns are one of the extremely important factor in unfolding of social and political phenomena.

In order to ensure that journalists do not temper with their readers understanding especially intentionally. Thus journalism as a profession is encircled with certain normative and descriptive rules which condensed

journalism into a profession with clear demarcation of its boundaries. Journalists are sensitive to socially learned and internalized dispositions, skills and ways of acting regarding good – or professional journalism. As Deuze rightly argues, journalism is construed as a sober professional ideology comprising set of values. Instead it could also be construed as a sector, a literary genre or a social complex system (Deuze, 2005: 444). Rather it is considered as a professional ideology.

Why these rules are established? The main derive to establish them is because so that journalist do not thwart reality and skew readers understanding of the case at hand. Kovach and Rosenstiel (2003) argue the primary duty of journalists is to be faithful to truth, second is to inform the public. As asserted before, if one does not believe partial and thwarted representation do not shape public opinion and has impact on the process, low journalistic professionalization would pose a problem (Street, 2011: 5 – 35).

Especially biased coverage appears as a major drawback for professionalism since it tempers with the audiences understanding and systematically favors on political disposition. Even though the word bias has ulterior-motive connotations, it is not always the case. Street argues: “To call someone or some account ‘biased’ is to challenge its validity and to see

it as failing to be ‘truthful’, ‘impartial’, ‘objective’ or ‘balanced’.” (2011: 26) This definition asserts bias results from failing to carry out good journalism regardless of the motives. In a similar vein; Gunter’s definition of bias: “Bias may consist of outright lying, distortion by presenting some facts and not others [omission], or disagreement over basic values, beliefs or morals.”(McQuail, 1992: 191) implies it does not solely result from deliberate, nepotism agenda but also can result from different ways of understanding the facts of truth. Nonetheless; McQuail’s definition: “A consistent tendency to depart from the straight path of objective truth by deviating either to left or right” asserts based coverage is a systematic misconduct and unsubstantiated favoring which distorts reality (McQuail, 1992: 190). Therefore; not having bad intentions does not make bias less problematic.

Therefore McQuail (1992) theorizes there are two points to look at when looking for bias in the coverage: whether it is intentional or unintentional and whether it is open or hidden. He then provides four types of bias. First one is the partisan bias where bias is open and intentional. The editorial sections and opinion columns are open to this type of bias; since their function is not primarily to be professional but to comment. Second is the propaganda bias which is intentional and subliminal; Street asserts the aim of propaganda bias is to give the details but also to disguise either

attack or justification (2011: 30). Because they are intentional, they might appear to be professional. Third is the unwitting bias that is open but unintentional; it happens for instance when certain topics are covered more often than the others which neither can be justified statistically nor can be explained by propagandist intentions. For instance, covering health policies more often than climate policies is an example of unwitting bias. The fourth and final type is the ideological bias where bias is both hidden and unintentional; it happens due to ineludible, enduring norms and values that journalists have. Cultural values form journalists' set of mind and way of think lead to ideological biases. They are hard to detect both by scholars and by journalists themselves.

In order to prevent impartial coverage, being objective, balanced, fair, valid – credible – verifiable and timely, serving public interest and staying loyal to reality have been set as values and codes of conduct (Deuze, 2005; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2003; Lichtenberg, 1997). Basically, these are the discursive forces that journalists abide by and indicators of the level of professionalization. Because reality, truth and objectivity can turn into complicated questions, Lichtenberg states the best way for journalist to reach objectivity is: penetrating ambiguity, searching for authoritative voices, judging and commenting on the credibility of the report, challenging own perceptions and balancing controversial sources (1973).

2.2.1 Deficits of Professionalism:

Liberal understanding of journalistic professionalism has some shortcomings. Due to limited time, journalists are forced to sort out the most credible and relevant sources for the case at hand. Different scholars from different disciplines – thus perspectives – point that most of the time credible sources are the power yielders. Chomsky and Herman assert the media relies too much on the information they are getting from government and business (1994: 2). Likewise Hall also asserts media are secondary definers as they join the definitions – frames – provided by primary definers that are the government and business institutions (1980: 105 – 107).

Some other theories also reinforce this argument. To begin with, according to Bennette's (1990) indexing theory in liberal media systems journalists feel compelled to index their coverage to parliamentary debate. He theorizes as long as journalist do not judge that their sources –i.e. political elites - to be inaccurate and/or dubious, they do not feel necessary to seek out other opinions (1990). In same token, Hallin's (1986) 'Three Sphere' model posits that there are three possible scenarios. Hallin used journalists' role in Vietnam War, and concluded oppositional media's

influence on the USA withdrawal is exaggerated. First scenario is if political elites are in consensus, journalists only collect facts and cover them. Second scenario is the sphere of legitimate controversy. In this scenario journalists have more space to take initiative because there are conflicting views and journalists have variety of opinions to frame. The third sphere however never gets covered as long as political elites do not pick up on it (Hallin, 1986: 115 – 117).

Moreover, certain issues and people are deemed to have more news value than others. Journalists cover them in expense of the others. Undoubtedly, this also depends on the actors' social and political status and ability to create, organize and promote public events (Wolfsfeld, 2003: 85). However this leads to what Wolfsfeld explains with the principle of cumulative inequality: "This principle states that those who need the news media are the ones who find it more difficult to obtain them; the rich get richer and poor get poorer." (2003: 87) These practices established to preserve professionalism actually result in unwitting bias.

2.3 Limitations to Professionalism:

In the literature, there are four sources that interfere with journalism and hold journalists back from not only increasing their professionalism but also assuming greater role for amelioration of politics and society in general: the state, the economy and the culture. Compared to other two, culture received lesser attention in the political communication studies in terms of a setback on professionalism. The impact of low professionalism on the culture however is examined quite satisfyingly.

2.3.1 Regulation and Political Elites:

The first limitation on journalism in the literature is the state. This fact has historical roots. When the establishment of press system and journalism was new, the countries that did not have free press (and thus freedom of speech and to information) considered to be despotic states. The public and journalists advocated the rights of journalists and stand united against the rulers inhibiting journalists (Keane, 1991: 44). The first limitation journalist has encountered was the state. Thus the absence of political pressure is the prerequisite of professional autonomy (van Dalen et al, 2011: 151).

Still today, statutory regulations form important part of what can be said and what cannot. But now, because the states' involvement with media is a bad sign for freedom of speech, in democratic systems laws not only respect but also promote and foster freedom of the press and freedom to information. However absence of censorship does not mean news media is free from government intervention; the state authorities can manipulate news media with unconventional and non-palpable ways, especially by taking advantage of its weaknesses, establishing ground rules for some controversial cases and making flaks.

For the first one, the clear weakness of the media is its dependency on the government for information, as discussed in previous section. The fact that political personas become media-savvy, they carry out public relations campaigns, spin some events so not get negative coverage. The second one is rationalized as protecting some sensitive cases from journalists by establishing some ground rules. To put it differently, it is justified as freedom from the media. For instance, during Gulf War journalists were required to escort and to get information from their individual minders – i.e. designated military person; to submit their article to security review. Moreover journalists were selected according to two-tiered pool system. Similarly, in Falkland War journalists had limited or no access to communication technologies such as videotapes, cameras (Lewis

et al. 2006: 4- 14). In this context, executives can manipulate journalists or can create false consciousness easily. The state can also create a flak and damage reputation of the news media and journalists. For instance, state can refuse or deny a news story either it is the case or not (Keane, 1991: 40). Such flak that question the credibility of the journalists in essence question journalists' professionalism. As these arguments demonstrate, claims of lack of professionalism do not necessarily reflect the truth. How executives treat journalists have significant impact on their work.

In contexts where the relationship between politician and journalist is characterized as mistrust, news stories become more cynical. "Journalists are cynical when they have a negative view of the role of spin doctors and believe that politicians use the media as a podium where they can be in the spotlight." (van Dalen et al, 2011: 147) Moreover, the content of the stories also change. Rather than focusing on the issue, news articles focus on the strategies and tactics of actors. In other words, the news stories become more reflexive of actors actions and intentions (Esser et al, 2001: 17)

2.3.2 Economic Configuration:

The second limitation according to the literature review is the political economy of the news media industry. For Chomsky and Herman the most problematic aspect of news media is that it constructs an image that promotes media is for the public good and interest, as in fact it serves to the interest of politically and economically powerful (1994: 1). In same token, Keane (1991) asserts privatization did what governments could not do for decades in terms of censorship. According to this school of thought, the economic conditions are perplexing for the journalists in choosing their priorities and have wider implications. The argument is media networks are owned by businesses and corporations which seek to maximize their profits and journalists are employees whose orientation is towards securing and increasing the profit of the company rather than public interest.

Furthermore, because the main income sources of news media are advertisements, journalists have to take measures that will increase their circulation rate. They select events according to their newsworthiness and present them in simplest and sensational form. Moreover, for more circulation journalists have to consider their readers' expectations and sentiments and how not to offend them (Chomsky & Herman, 1994: 2). Finally, this school of thought asserts because newspaper entities are owned

by private corporations, journalists select and present news to manufacture consent in order to maintain the status quo which serves the interest of the owners and advertisers (Chomsky & Herman, 1994: 2). This last comment of Chomsky and Herman is highly attacked for being too conspicuous and irrespective of journalistic values, yet it at least suggests different ownership structures can create different encoding processes.

2.3.3 Cultural Structure and Ideology:

The fact that most of the prominent media theories emerged in the Northern America and Europe, some of the assumptions these theories have do not apply very well to other cases. As Hallin and Mancini puts it:

“The liberal or as it is more often called the Anglo-American model of the mass media is in some sense the only model that has really been analyzed in media studies as such, as a coherent model. Indeed, while other media systems have rarely been conceptualized as coherent wholes, it could be said that the ‘Anglo-American’ has been treated as far more coherent and unitary than it actually is.” (2004: 198)

In their very encompassing and influential study *Comparing Media Systems*, Hallin and Mancini (2004) study of media systems in 27 different European- North Atlantic countries. They concluded the liberal media

system is not the only media system there is. They identified two more media systems in Western democracies according to similarities in the news industry, journalistic norms, journalistic stance, journalistic professionalization and state's role in media. These two other models are Polarized and Corporatist media systems; and their conclusion was countries in same media system are actually countries with similar historical, cultural and political dimensions. For instance, almost all Mediterranean countries included to the study– France, Italy, Spain and Greece – have experienced late democratization, have mix political institutions, strong state involvement and high levels of clientelism. The media system in these countries is Polarized as there is external pluralism and political parallelism – one news entity represents one point of view but different viewpoints exist in overall coverage in the news media. Therefore, Polarize system is associated with low level of professionalization. On the other hand, Corporatist system is observed in Northern Europe countries where democracy is established early in the history, consensual political institutions and strong welfare state are dominant. In Corporate media systems news entities both have political party parallelism but they also have high level of professionalism as they have internal pluralism – they present all available viewpoints. In brief, their study proved the fact that peculiarities of a country have an impact on the media system and level of professionalism. Thus, historical and political conjuncture has a strong correlation with journalistic professionalization.

More to it, keeping in mind the fact that ‘every fact is embedded in a story’ (Street, 2011: 32), the cultural structure and ideological differences are extremely important since journalists use ideology as a referent point in order to make sense events of the day. Here ideology does not solely refer to grand ideologies like Liberalism, Conservatism, and Marxism, Socialism or such. Rather ideology is understood as an account of the existing order, model of desired future or of a “good society” and an explanation how to attain that model; ideology as worldviews, truth claims, and value systems (Heywood, 2007: 15 – 45). This necessity of a reference point is what makes objectivity norm complicated in journalism.

The studies also reveal that media frames cannot be abstracted from individual frames. Wolfsfeld argues journalists are not precipitators of frames: “...media frames are generally based on frames that are available in the surrounding culture, they are also designed to serve the specific needs of journalists. The news media construct frames for conflicts attempting to fit the information they are receiving into a package that is professionally useful and culturally familiar” (2003: 90). He gives the feminist movement as an example; when they first launched the bra burning campaign they were ridiculed as the bra-burners. This is because journalists themselves were not fully aware of the potential of the campaign, feminism or women’s right for that matter. After feminists make themselves and their cause

known, their representation and framing of women's right changed in the news media (Wolfsfeld, 2003: 89).

Thus in their attempt to find a narrative journalists are using the culture and ideological surrounding they are living in. Empirical studies back this claim; and even take a further step and assert individual biases of journalist have impact on their choices of selection of culturally existing and well-known frames. This is explicit in Entman's and Chomsky and Herman's framing analysis. Entman (1991) compared how the American news media framed two plane crash incidents - one perpetrated by the Soviet Union, the other by the USA. Though the conditions were the same, the moral evaluation and causal interpretations were different. Chomsky and Herman's (1994) study revealed that not only presentation and selection of news are frame-driven. They paired events similar in nature but different in source: either from an ally or from an enemy. When an enemy perpetrates a crime, the press investigates thoroughly and devotes a great amount of coverage. But when the domestic government or an ally does the same thing, the press downplays or overlooks the event.

The literature focuses on journalism on cases where the society is more or less in ideological and cultural unity - and examines how media reproduces that the dominant ideology at the same time repress, edge out

other ideologies or preclude others from springing. That is what Chomsky and Herman mean when they assert news are subject to anti-communism filter, a national ideology - an ultimate evil that people can unite against. However there are other countries with two or more overarching ideologies that are more or less the same in magnitude, and that saw each other as an ultimate evil.

2.4 Turkish Media:

Admittedly the number of studies on political process and Turkish news media is immense. Overall, there are two focal areas: the political economy of the news media and political parallelism in the media. Many of the studies focus on the first one. Still, political parallelism is an exhausted topic too. Interestingly enough however, political parallelism is not analyzed, it is taken for granted. For instance, Somer (2010) discusses the advantages of polarized media system in opening up controversial topics to debate. Moreover many of the studies focus on media's performance on covering election times and 'redlines' of Turkey. In other words, it is on the controversial and contested policy issues. These studies shed light neither cases when political parties are in concurrence nor to the issues that are not covered by political parties.

3. Research Design and Methodology

To measure professionalism a clear conceptualization of professionalism is needed. Lack of clear cut, agreed upon definition requires deriving one from the literature. According to the literature review than the primary indicators of professionalization in journalism are impartial, fair and balanced coverage of plausible and credible claims, interpretations and frames. Their obligation is to inform the public about existing viewpoints and protect public interest. While doing so not to choose and present news regardless of not only of the political and economic actors' expedience but also of one's own dispositions and presumptions. The second but as important dimension in professionalization is to have a critical stand and not to take every information or statement they are receiving for its face value. When analyzing how professionalism (low or high) manifests itself in the coverage, this concept and measurements will be analyzed.

After since this research aims to understand whether if professionalization in Turkey is low, the combination of causes and how they reveal themselves in a way that would affect public understanding of a phenomenon. Therefore research is composed of two parts. The first part involves exploration of contemporary structure that Turkish media operates in. The nature of state involvement, economic configuration and cultural

and ideological determinants of Turkey will be analyzed. Our attention is not solely on the ideologies of political parties but it is rather on the overarching cultural setting and competing ideologies that also shape political parties' cast of mind. Hence firstly, a brief historical background of Turkish Republic will be presented. This part will put emphasis on historical moments when ideologies emerged, crushed or repressed. After then the current political parties and their ideological and practical stance will be studied. The main objective of this initial research is to determine macro cultures in Turkey beyond but also inclusive of party politics; and to unpack the mutual and divergent elements in these cultures. Then the current situation of news media industry in terms of regulation and ownership will be examined.

The next part examines the level of professionalization of Turkish newspapers; and if low, determines the main causes. In order to do so week long coverage of Mavi Marmara Raid and Hopa incident in five daily and national newspapers – Zaman, Sabah, Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and BirGün – are collected. The newspapers are selected according to their economic structure, self-explained ideological stand and previous content and discourse analysis studies. Sabah and Hürriyet are owned by different conglomerates with different backgrounds and financed majorly by advertisement revenues. Zaman, Cumhuriyet and BirGün are not financed solely or majorly by advertisement revenues and they are not directly owned

by large conglomerates. Moreover, these newspapers have been associated with certain perspectives: BirGün and Cumhuriyet with left; Sabah, Hürriyet and Zaman with right stand. Still though, the newspapers stance will be further analyzed due to the fact that in Turkey right and left politics are quite layered and diversified in themselves. Opinion columns are excluded from the research as focus is on the overall coverage of the events not journalists opinions about the event.

Total of 573 news articles are included to the analysis; 79 of Hopa incidents and 494 of Mavi Marmara raid. The challenge and limitation is these two cases differ in their scope; while Mavi Marmara raid was an international crisis, the Hopa incident was a national turmoil. Nevertheless these cases are selected for three reasons. Firstly, even though not identical, they have similarities: both include overt use of power against activists/protesters inflicted by the law enforcing unites and mistreatment afterwards. Secondly, they do not fall into the boundaries of Turkey's contested controversial red lines that political parties and newspapers argued to differ on. Finally, such crises are spontaneous but have multiple dimensions, thus they have a tendency to rapidly turn into quagmire. Hence covering them requires professional approach. As Carruthers explains:

“Such crises including violence should not be seen as a special case of how the media works’, but rather as a magnifying glass which ‘highlights and intensifies many of the things that happen in peace-

time', albeit revealing them in exaggerated form. Extreme cases may thus help us reflect more critically on every day practices" (2000: 13).

In other words, it will demonstrate how journalists perform in general by enabling us to analyze relatively short but intense time periods rather than analyzing long periods of time but seldom covered issues.

Combination of framing and discourse methods are adopted to analyze the data. Framing analysis will focus on how different parts and aspects of the crises are framed differently. The important discourse and framing moments are determined by grounded theory method. That is, first the data had been collected and examined after then categories were determined. With this method certain framing of certain instances were selected. In Mavi Mara Raid framing of the causes, victims, perpetrators, solution, Turkish executives' performance and Fethullah Gülen's statement pertaining the raid are important discourse moments. Similarly, in Hopa incident the causes, victims, perpetrators, private courts, solution and Turkish executives' response generate the significant discourse moments.

In addition to framing, critical discourse analysis (CDA) method is adopted with special emphasis on the frames. CDA is the primary method because compared to framing it puts a stronger emphasis on language and

on the relation between discourse and particular social, political and cultural relations (Carvalho, 2007: 227). To mark the difference better; CDA not only looks for what issues are salient or how they are communicated in the text but also why they are presented as salient by the newspapers by analyzing the text in its socio-political context (Treadwell, 2011: 188). As Carvalho summarizes: “CDA attempts to understand the links between texts and social relations, distribution of power, and dominant values and ideas.” (2005: 1459).

Secondly, Entman’s (2003) cascading activation model is used in evaluating the data. This model assumes any given event can be framed infinite different ways. The model analyzes whether if one frame dominates newspapers coverage of the issue or if there is frame parity – meaning, whether different frames are given fair consideration, and whether if there is frame contestation – journalists came up with counter-frames.

4. Structural Analysis

Political scientists, historians and sociologists concur that many contemporary ideologies and cultural structures in Turkey have their origins from 19th century Ottoman period. This is the period when left to right ideological spectrum emerged as a result of shifts in European economic, political and social dynamics. Hence, considering the fact that ideologies developed in certain contexts under certain conditions in distinct ways, ideologies in contemporary Turkey are not same with its European counterparts since the structure of the Empire – later of the Republic – and progression of modernization, democratization and industrialization of Turkey are quite distinct from Europe's development. Hence, many ideologies in Turkey cannot be realized in classical ideological spectrum; even if they present themselves as such. Furthermore, scholars also argue the development of ideologies in Turkey is an on-going process. Because the roots of political development and ideologies do not lay in conventional right - left continuum, it is important to pin down the precise progression of ideological developments, and recurring themes in Turkish context.

4.1 Background:

The Tanzimat reforms of 19th century launched by the Sultan is considered to be the initiator of modernization and democratization process of the Ottoman Empire, though the objective of the reforms were not directly aim them. The reforms had two objectives. Firstly, the Sultan aimed to accommodate developments happening in and out of the empire in a way that would consolidate and reinforce the Sultan's power and efficacy which had been undermined by the contemporary world order. The goal was to keep up with Western societies which were increasingly becoming industrialized, disenchanted, capitalist and imperialist. To reach this goal entailed significant structural changes. Secondly he aimed to transform the society by increasing his legitimacy.

Imposing such radical changes however had ignited unforeseen consequences. To start with, because Ottoman Empire composed of different religious and ethnic groups and expanded on vast territory, problems relating ethnic and nationalist aspirations surfaced. Both Muslims and non-Muslims lost their privileges as they were considered equals. Although the reforms aimed to create egalitarian society and dismantle

millet system, together with nationalist movements in Europe reinforced national aspirations and uprisings. Secondly, by the late 19th century the notion of progress was taken up by newly emerging Muslim intellectual class, first the Young Ottomans and then the Young Turks for them Sultan's absolute rule based on religion was no longer legitimate (İnalçık, 1993).

They first established parliamentary rule established in 1876, Sultan suspended the parliament two years later upon Russia's declaration of war. The second constitutional era started in 1908. Constitutional order was challenged by supporters of the Sultan and the Shari'a rule. Some minority groups were also object to sever enforcement and policies when they act against the interest of the Empire (Ahmad, 1993: 31 – 52). One can deduce that there was a clear disagreement on the vision of better future and how to attain that future resulted in conflicts.

After the First World War defeat, Ottoman Empire faced serious threat of dissolution. The treaty of Sevres stipulated partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and Western occupation of remaining territories. A group of discontented, intellectual and progressive political and military leaders waged the Turkish National Movement against Western occupation and submissive Ottoman rulers. After the success of independence war fought against European powers, the boundaries of modern Turkish state were more or less defined; and with the Lausanne Treaty, the new Turkish

government was internationally acknowledged as the legitimate authority. Moreover with Lausanne Treaty, non-Muslim minorities gained minority status, while Muslim minorities did not.

The leaders of the movement had a disagreement on how to solve the question of Caliphate. The main opposing groups were reformist-conservatives and transformer-radicals. Conservative group advocated preserving the Caliphate as a traditional and symbolic president of the new republic. The radicals, instead, advocated for establishing republican regime and dismantling of the ancient regime. Under Mustafa Kemal's leadership the People's Party - later Republican People's Party (RPP) - was formed, the radical group surmounted. Among changes in the political system, cultural changes pursued. Changing the alphabet and dress code are some examples. Thus in addition to opposition among the elites, there was a resistance among the public too. As being subject of the changes, the acceptance of these reforms varied greatly. There were uprisings by the pro-Islamist groups and by other ethnic groups who wanted to build their own nation-state, like other national groups seceded from the Empire.

Kemalism:

Kemalism is a set of ideas that led to Turkish Independence War and played important role in formation of the Republic (Bagdonas, 2008: 99 - 100). The motto of Kemalism is accepted as: “reaching above the level of contemporary civilizations.” In 1931, these foundational ideas were institutionalized as the principles of RPP. These principles are also the cornerstones of *Kemalist ideology*. The six principles are: republicanism, populism, secularism, nationalism, revolutionism and statism.

Kemalism should not be understood as a unified, linear and/or fixed ideology in time. While some assert Kemalism is inherently democratic, some others argue Kemalism gives too much power to military rather than the public (Bagdonas, 2008: 103). This is due to the existence of competing interpretation of Kemalism and different policies followed for sake of Kemalism and Kemalist principles. As Ahmad points, interpretation of these principles changes usually in favor of bourgeoisie’s interests (1993: 109). Before that the reason why Kemalism has so different interpretation stems from the vagueness of Kemalist maxim (Bagdonas, 2008: 100). What is ‘contemporary civilization’ and how one can ‘reach above the level of

contemporary civilization'. In other words, unlike other ideologies, Kemalism does not have an economic plan in achieving this aim. Statism is the only principle pertaining economy. Modernization's dependency on the economy was acknowledged by Atatürk and other political leaders. Statism as a principle aimed to regulate economy, stimulate private investment and engage in areas where private sector is unwilling or inadequate. Though liberal economy was encouraged, mixed economy consolidated itself and statism was preferred because of the ill-economic situation that the world experienced in late 1920s. As a result, depending on changing dynamics statism has lost its initial point of reference and significance (Bagdonas, 2008: 100)

In terms of cultural policies it is important to deliberate on two of them and to reflect the ongoing debate over their initial meaning as they still maintain their significance in the constitution and political discourse (Bagdonas, 2008: 100). The first one is secularism. The secularism of Kemalism is essentially closer to French understanding of laicite, rather than American secularism; because it does not only separates religion from state and grants free exercise of religion but also controls the religion (Ahmad, 1993: 90 – 91). The second principle is nationalism. Turkish state was and still is composed of different ethnicities and religious groups. Hence the principle nationalism is a controversial one. According to one group of scholars, nationalism was initially set out as an inclusive principle (Cizre, 1994; Ahmad, 1993). Like Young Turks it was devised to create a

harmonious society. Thus nationalism was conceptualized as patriotism (Ahmad, 1993: 94). According to this school, dogmatic and fascist understanding of nationalism emerged later on in the history (Cizre, 1994: 264). Yet another school asserts, the policies adopted in Ataturk's period aim to Turkify the nation especially through Turkification of language and religion (Atabaki & Zürcher, 2004: 13 – 44). These two principles precipitate and form important dimensions of politics in Turkey as religion and nationality are important elements in forming cultural identity.

In brief, like many other ideological systems emerging in the Europe at the time, Kemalism had emerged as syncretic; it was outside of the conventional left - right wing politics. According to Cizre, Kemalism was influenced by Italian fascist doctrines which refused both left and right politics. Yet, they also assert Kemalism in its essence democratic, and though at times it manifested itself illiberal but never as anti-liberal (Cizre, 1994: 264); hence it is different from fascism. Overall, Kemalism replaced the ancien régime -Islamic monarchy- and consolidated itself as the state ideology. As mentioned earlier, it is open to interpretation; liberals likewise socialists can define themselves as Kemalist as long as their rhetoric and practice comply with the six principles of Kemalism or at least do not contradict it.

Economic Liberalism:

Even though, Turkey was constitutionally parliamentary republic since 1923, democracy was semi-consolidated since the RPP was the single political party from 1925 to 1946; the era known as the single party period. After Ataturk's death in 1938, single party rule continued for eight more years. Ismet Inonu elected as the President by the National Assembly anonymously - except for one vote, and he consolidated his authority rather quickly and without an (open) opposition.

The changing international configuration had domestic consequences. The victory of Allied forces in the Second World War and their superiority and hegemony in international system forced Inonu and RPP make concrete changes as Allied forces represented democratic and liberal ideals in opposition to Axis countries which represented one man rule. Hence Democrat Party (DP) was formed in 1946, and became the ruling party in 1950.

DP's slogans and politics were populist rather than ideological. DP did not pose ideological challenge to Kemalism but nonetheless it pledged

to re-interpret six pillars of Kemalism accordingly with contemporary context and differently of RPP (Ahmad, 1993: 110).

The main ideological contribution of DP was pursuing economic liberalism and siding with the Western countries in bipolar Cold War order. At this period, RPP was pursuing state led and regulated economy. DP's main diverging point was its liberal economic plan (Takım, 2012: 159). The roots of economic structure and anti-communist sentiment emerged in this era.

Though successful in pursuing economic liberal policies, in terms of liberating politics however DP failed. DP leaders were intolerant to criticism and reckoned without the demands of democratization of constitution and politics. The forerunners of DP were especially suspicious of the military, the academia and journalists who were openly critical of DP for not modernizing the constitution. On the contrary to critics' demands, DP increased its authority. This idea of election based indivisible and unaccountable authority (Cizre , 2008: 14; Ahmad, 1993: 138 - 144) did not perish and it is still a continuous element of Turkish politics that precipitate tension.

In 1960, the military was overwhelmed by the authoritarian behavior of DP and erosion of founding ideals of Turkish state - the pillars of Kemalist ideology. They forged a coup d'etat. They launched a new constitution.

According to scholars, 1960's constitution provided freedom and rights which enhanced and integrated civil society to politics; especially foster environment for working class and the left oriented groups to organize. In addition to new constitution, economic developments, industrialization and migration from rural to urban channeled Turkish politics into a more conventionally ideological political continuum. However it must be kept in mind, the left and the right were also fragmented in themselves. Justice Party (JP), Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), National Order Party (NOP) were at the right end of the spectrum; and RPP and Workers Party of Turkey (WPT) were at the left side of the spectrum. Inonu asserted Kemalism is ideologically closer to socialism since it seeks the people's interest, and preferred to redefine the party as Kemalist and at the center left. JP – successor of DP, on the other hand, was closer to capitalism and wary of communist threat – thus positioned themselves in the centre right (Ahmad, 1993: 125- 130).

RPP and JD were the two major parties at the center of left and right; and they were the most successful parties in term of election results. Other right wing and left wing parties did not gain much of a parliamentary strength, but they were very successful organizing civil action through community creating activity, especially among the youth. At this point, the three social movements that marked Turkey's near history must be analyzed.

Left Movement:

One of these movements is the left movement of 1960s and 1970s. Worker unions and student movements formed this group. Student groups devoted to WPT formed organizations like Fikir Klupleri Federasyonu, DEV-GENC and worker unions such as Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (DİSK) also had Marxist rhetoric, emphasizing workers rights. In late 1960s - early 1970s Communist Leninist students formed organizations, such as Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO), that

used illegal means and violent techniques for revolution. The movement was against imperialism, capitalism and cooperation with NATO. They kidnapped American and Israeli soldiers and attacked American diplomats' car.

Turkish Nationalism:

The second political-civil movement was the Turkish nationalist movement. In the literature they are referred as: Pan-Turkist nationalism, hyper-nationalists, ultra-nationalist or neo-fascist. Until 1970s, nationalism in Turkey shared many tenets with Kemalism; did not claim any share in power and only supported by a minority (Cizre, 1994: 262 - 265). However after mid-1960s when NMP was formed by Alparslan Türkeş, nationalism gained a different dimension and deviated from Kemalism. In Cizre's words: "True enough, anti-communism was an issue which the NMP shared with Kemalists and the ruling continuum of liberal conservatives, but since its ideology was bound up with its effort to uphold the image of a unique Turkish race, culture and identity, it could be not only against communism, but against Westernization, too. Moreover it deviated from Kemalism by including Islamic tinge and authoritarian discourse." (Cizre, 1994; 264) As

Cizre pointed out, in their definition Turk and Muslim were inseparable. Finally, they deviated from Kemalism by not pursuing territorial politics but extra-territorial politics by including other Turkic nations and minorities. The 'grey wolves' was the term used to denote youth organization of NMP.

Islamism:

The third group is the Islamist group. Islamism in Turkey is manifold and underwent tremendous changes. It is important to mark the differences between Islamism / Islamists and Islam / Muslim. In Çayır's words: "...the former categories referred to new consciousness and new agencies involving a desire to reshape the modern world according to Islamic principles..." (2008: 64) Like others, Islamic ideology aimed to disseminate itself both through the parliament and from community creating endeavors. Islamists emerged as an opposition to lack of representation of emerging periphery bourgeoisie who had Islamic sensitivities. They were against Western modernity, capitalism, materialism and secularism because they deemed them destructive for Islam; hence, Islamic agents in Turkish context took a confrontational stance against the West, Westernizing and secular Kemalism (Ahmad, 1993; Özdemir, 2007). The first pro-Islamic

political party in the republic formed in 1969, National Outlook Party (NOP), led by Necmettin Erbakan. The party represented a breakthrough of religion into the political arena as it started to utilize the country's major political platforms (Çayır, 2008: 65). Because Turkish constitution required political parties to be secular, many Islamic parties were outlawed and closed down. They continued to form new party.

The second way of Islamization operated and operates on the social sphere. Different cemaats – communities tied with religion - follow different spiritual leaders. The cooperation among these groups moved from political / ideological sphere to economic and cultural sphere. One of these cemaats is Nur Cemaat, whose members followed Said Nursi's writings. Because he first hand experienced transformations of Kemalism and its solidification in the Republican era, he was against Kemalism. He disapproved Kemalism's West-oriented modernization. He advocated modernization that was Islam and science oriented (Yavuz, 2005: 205 – 224).

Another important religious social movement is the Gülen Movement. It emerged in 1960s, the spiritual leader is Fethullah Gülen. Compared to Nur Cemaati, Gülen Movement is more open to establishing

ties with the West. Gülen Movement has thousands of followers among some are the political and economic actors. Some media outlets, such as Zaman newspaper – Samanyolu TV –Burcu Radio -, banks, schools are affiliated with the movement (Koç & Ebaugh: 540).

Military:

The left and right wingers were engaged in a civil strife in 1960s. Following the unrest between pro right and pro left civil groups marked 1960s and 1970s with deadly clashes, in 1971 the military intervened to politics and seized the political power for the second time because of the chaos country was in. Their policies aimed to bring back law and order to the society; yet they chiefly targeted pro-left groups and parties due to the ‘threat’ of communism they inflict and their violent means. The left was averted from the politics by the government (Ahmad, 1993: 147).

Polarization of the right, irreconcilable differences with the only left party RPP and lack of electoral victories led to instable coalitions. Moreover, civil political violence cannot be subdued in 1970s. The Grey

Wolves targeted left wing groups and minorities that support left groups or parties; mostly Alawites and Kurds. Some leftist groups targeted foreign diplomats and soldiers. The 1970s witnessed serious hate crimes, bloody clashes and atrocities targeting groups (Ahmad, 1993: 160 – 170).

Once again in 1980 for same reasons the army took over the political power. A new constitution had come into effect. The prominent political figures were banned from politics for a decade, which inevitably resulted in appearance of new politicians and new political parties. The economically liberal, right leaning Motherland Party became the most significant political force after the coup. 1980 Coup makers conceived the left movements as greater threat compared to Islamism and nationalism. Hence as the lesser evil and combining element, Islam and nationalism were promoted by the coup makers. In Cizre's words:

“The coup-makers and their civilian successors were rebuilding a tightly-integrated, indivisible, non-ideological and ‘consensual’ society, like the Turkey of the 1930s. The past obsessional dedication of the Kemalist cadres and the army to ‘national unity’ at the cost of political democracy, resurfaced... regarding themselves as the ‘guardians’ of the integrity and unity of the nations, concluded from the near civil-war situation on the eve of the 1980 coup that Mustafa Kemal had been right in his rejection of social class, ethnicity, sects and religion in defining nationalism because of their divisive effects. On the other hand, they believed that the failure of Turkish political pluralism was, more than anything else, due to the influence of communist ideology and practice over the preceding two decades. The communist menace was thought to be many times

worse than religious obstructionism or reaction. Furthermore, after the 1979 Iranian revolution, religion was politically ascendant everywhere. Under the combined impact of all these considerations, Turkey's rulers adopted a policy of reconciliation, recognition and tolerance toward Islam, which was to act as a unifying bond against communism. Religion was systematically promoted as a bulwark against communism and a substitute for class-based ideologies.” (1994: 262)

The governments formed after 1980 coup, especially focused on the economy. Consequently of neo-liberal economics and increased trades with the Western states, structural changes happened rapidly. Despite the distaste for it, differences were again heightened in this period; in 1980s identity based differences surfaced. Mainly the Marxist-Nationalist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) launched armed struggle against Turkish State for greater acknowledgment, autonomy and right for Kurds which still continues. Moreover, ideological polarizations continued in this period on the same lines (Ahmad, 1993: 181 – 203).

After 1980 coup, right wing parties gained electoral victory over left wing parties. Increasing economic ties with Western states also worked against left-oriented groups. In 1990s political parties formed fragile coalitions. The last military intervention took place in 1997 - known as the post-modern coup d'etat. After a National Security Council meeting, the Military openly threatened Welfare Party (WP) for pursuing anti-secular

Islamic politics. Hence, they precipitated series of events resulting in Necmettin Erbakan's resignation.

4.2 Contemporary Turkish Political and Cultural Sphere:

Post-Islamism vs. Secular Establishment:

The greatest development has been the division and overhaul of political façade of Islamist group. A group of already active politicians formed Justice and Development Party (JDP). Çayır asserts:

“...shrinkage of opportunity spaces for the Islamic actors, however... led to a reflexive and self-critical attitude rather than to the strengthening of a radical stance in both the WP circles and wider Islamic groups. Though the members are not all from the same political party, the founders and top liners of the party are from NOM. Described as conservative democrat by its leaders, JDP emerged as a party that is devoted to Islamic tradition and that advocates conservative values, but nevertheless exerts its authority in favor of Western style modernism in the controversy between ‘Western style Modernism vs. Return to Islamic Past’ that has divided Turkey since the 19th century.” (2008: 72)

JDP has religious, conservative, democratic, reformist and pro-European identity. This according to Cizre gave the party an ‘ambiguous ideology’ (2008; 5). Overall, JDP is classified as Post Islamist party because it follows Islam sensitive and economically liberal policies (Çınar, 2008).

The political parties in the parliament are JDP, RPP, NMP and Peace and Democracy Party (PDP). The ruling party is JDP since 2002 elections. JDP, after long period of weak coalition governments, is the first political party in Turkey to win majority of the seats in parliament despite its Islam sensitive policies. The combination of the Islam-friendly character of JDP with a ‘genuine-sounding democracy program was unusual which was anathema to the secular power-wielders of the Republic (Cizre, 2008: 5 - 15). According to Cizre, the secular establishments approach to JDP is shaped entirely by its suspicion of hidden Islamic agenda and in promoting secularism; it (secular the establishment) had relied on a policy that used ‘negative symbols of legitimacy’ in openly undermining Islamist politics and politicians (Cizre, 2008: 3). Çınar asserts this negative political discrimination as political debate on policy issues dwells on the ‘who’ rather than ‘what’ (2008: 110 – 120). In other words, secular establishment which has been important in politics, are strongly skeptical of Islamist pedigree of JDP and they rationalize actions of the JDP in this context.

4.3 Cultural Structure:

The review of literature demonstrated that especially mainstream news outlets use widely shared values or common enemy as a point of reference in making sense of the news they are covering. This poses an important problem as it not only promotes the status quo but it also suppresses other voices and cultures. Hebdige (1995) argues that subcultures bring together like-minded individuals who feel neglected by societal standards and allow them to develop a sense of identity. He also asserts subcultures can be perceived negative and threatening due to their nature of criticism to the dominant societal standard (Hebdige, 1995: 120 – 124).

Each and every country has subculture group(s) whose values and beliefs do not comply with the dominant culture. Subcultures can be based on ethnicity, religion, race, sex or political differences. Whether if the differences between the dominant culture and a subculture are deliberated or suppressed changes from state to state and subculture to subculture.

In terms of political cultures, as explained in the literature review, many empirical studies concluded that those whose political orientation are not in the limits of dominant culture are likely to get negative coverage and demonized by the media. The news media can unite under the same ideals or against the common values and enemy.

In contemporary Turkey, there are two dominant cultural camps that compete and have a penchant to perceive each other as the ultimate evil. The differences surface chiefly on cultural issues rather than economic matters. The first group is the Islamist camp who pursues and approves Islam sensitive policies. With the landslide and electoral victories of JDP since 2002, this conservative and liberal group has majority of the seats in the legislature and executive positions. The second one is the secular camp that is suspicious of the hidden Islamic agenda. As Cizre rightly points out, even the policies made to comply with European Union has been thoroughly interrogated (2004: 10).

Due to improvements and good standing of the economy compared to other European countries and previous governments, economic policies

are not main points of criticism. Though it is not all absent, compared cultural policies economic policy, it remains secondary.

In addition to these two dominant systems, some other competing subcultures also exist. Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism, religious minorities and Sunni Islam, centrist politics and radical politics can be given as an example.

4.4 Media Regulations and State:

Like any other state, Turkish media is also regulated by the state. Due to the fact that executive bodies responsible for media are multiple in number; at some particular instances their mandates overlap and tend to create ambiguity. Each medium falls under the jurisdiction of different bodies. Radio and television are under the mandate of RTÜK; and internet and mobile technologies under BTK. Primary regulating agency for the press is Directorate General of Press and Information (DGPI) under the

office of Prime Minister. It is in effect since the foundation Grand National Assembly of Turkey, though its name and task changed over the course.

As a member of global society that promotes democratic and libertarian values, in Turkey freedom of expression and freedom to information are granted and protected by the constitution. Press Act is under the jurisdiction of DGPI. The act provides both positive and negative liberties to the press and journalists. However because at several instances Press Act refers to Turkish Civil Code and Turkish Penal Code, ipso facto Turkish Constitution has set some boundaries to freedom of speech and hence has limiting impact on the press. These codes are not only controversial but also open to arbitrary interpretation. For instance, article 301 of the Penal Code imposes imprisonment from six months to two years for “denigration of the Turkish nation”. Article 314 of the Turkish Penal Code: “committing a crime on behalf of an organization without being a member of that organization” is punished. Article 216 of the Penal Code, which states those who openly incites hatred towards another group based on differences will be imprisoned, is another law open to interpretation. The Anti-Terror Law of Turkey (also known as Terörle Mücadele Yasası, TMY), Articles 5 and 7 relating to articles of the Criminal Code on terrorist offences and organizations or assisting members of or making propaganda are ambiguous articles too (OSCE, 2012).

According to OSCE report, number of imprisoned journalists based on these laws is 97. Not only existence of such articles but also the conduct and implementation of the law are intimidating. The report states:

“Courts often impose exceptionally long imprisonment sentences. The longest conviction is 166 years and the longest jail sentence sought for a journalist is 3,000 years. Many journalists face double life sentences if convicted, some without possibility for parole. Courts do not tend to grant pre-trial release of defendants. There is concern that arrests and long pre-trial detentions without conviction are used as a form of intimidation. Pre-trial detentions remain very long. In some cases journalists held in prison for up to three years are still awaiting trial. Some journalists have been imprisoned for more than five years while their trial is ongoing. Journalists often face several trials and are often convicted for several offences. There is one journalist who faces 150 court cases. Media outlets reporting about sensitive issues (including terrorism or anti-government activities) are often regarded by the authorities as the publishing organs of illegal organizations. Courts often consider reporting about such issues as equal to supporting them. Journalists are often imprisoned in F-tipi cezaevi (F-type high security prisons), where they have to serve their time with the most dangerous criminals. It is also not uncommon to punish journalists with solitary confinement for extended time periods.” (2012)

According to the names proposed by the OSCE report, three of the newspapers included in the research have total of four journalists/correspondence incarcerated. From Cumhuriyet, Mustafa Balbay who is accused for coup attempts is in jail, with ongoing trial. From BirGün Ömer Çelik and Zeyneb Ceren Kuray are held in jail. They are both jailed on the scope of ongoing terror investigations. From Hürriyet, Soner Yalçın

is under custody for “collaboration with alleged Ergenekon Organization” (OSCE, 2011).

In addition to direct regulation of the media, state has control over media through indirect yet apparent ways. The first one is through advertisements. A very well known fact is that newspapers generate profit according the advertisements they get. In Turkey, in addition to private sector, the state is also an ad-giver. Basın İlan Kurumu (BİK) is an autonomous institution that supervises distribution of official ads. Though BİK asserts one of its mission is to promote local newspapers, most of the official advertisements are published in already consolidated newspapers that belong to media groups (Güney & Sözeri, 2011: 61). According to 2010 statistics, Sabah, Hürriyet and Zaman are the top three newspapers to get ads from BİK (Güney & Sözeri, 2011: 62).

Second indirect intervention is actually resulting from the fact that media groups are actually a part of large conglomerates that are involved in other sectors. Having a media entity puts those firms in the limelight. For instance the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu ,TMSF) has confiscated thirteen news outlets since 2005 from Uzan

Group, Ciner and Aksoy Group for their debts not necessarily resulting from their media group. Later, those news outlets are sold to other conglomerates. For instance: “ In April 2007, for example, the governmental Saving Deposit Insurance Fund [TMSF] seized Sabah-ATV, Turkey's second largest media group in a predawn raid.” (Krespin, 2009: 59) This is an important gap in the law that opens a window for intervention to media sector and their autonomy.

Finally, journalists are sued by politicians. Krispin asserts: “In 2008, Erdoğan declined to answer a parliamentary inquiry by a Democratic Left Party deputy demanding information on how many lawsuits Erdoğan had initiated against journalists—claiming that such information was in the realm of his private life. Most of Erdoğan's lawsuits against journalists involve criticism that any other democracy would consider legitimate. In 2005, for example, he sued *Cumhuriyet* cartoonist Musa Kart for depicting him as a cat entangled in a ball of string.” (2009: 58) Though the exact effect of these indictments on journalists, editors or newspaper owners are not investigated thoroughly, it at least gives a hint about some political actors approach to journalists’ criticism.

4.5 Economic Structure:

Chomsky and Herman (1994) in great detail analyzed Western media ownership structure and its consequences on journalism. The points they highlight and their conclusions are valid for Turkish media. They state: “It has been long noted that the media are tiered, as with top tier - measured by prestige, resources and outreach -.... It is this top tier, along with the government and wire services, that defines news agenda and supplies much of the national and international news to the lower tiers of media and thus for the general public.”(1994: 5)

This argument sums up the Turkish media’s situation - including both the press and the broadcasting. The costs of technological machinery for printing, information gathering and distribution are beyond the capacities of small scale agencies or corporations. Moreover the financial situation of the media is quite weak and vulnerable as entering costs and circulation rates are low and competition is high. Only large conglomerates or government itself have the capacity to fund infrastructure needed for starting up a news media entity (Kaya & Çakmur, 2011: 525 – 526). In other words, increasingly the necessary means for production for news are being owned by private firms (Özokçu, 2011: 10). This was not the case initially; many newspapers were owned and steered by hands on journalists. The

increasing competition forced most of them out. Çağlar and Mengü say: “With the liberal economy exercised after the 1980s in Turkey... media ownership passed out of the hands of families in the press sector.”(2009) The remaining ones have to adapt themselves to market parameters. Kaya and Çakmur assert: “New entrepreneurs who had made their capital accumulation in other fields such as banking and/or construction entered into the newspaper business on the one hand, and the ‘traditional’ owners began investing in areas outside the media industry on the other hand.” (2011: 526)

In terms of ownership concentration, the three mergers and acquisition (M&A) types - horizontal, vertical and conglomerate - are common in Turkish media system which are also important for journalistic professionalism and output. It is argued; M&A results in higher concentration rates and has the potential to create oligopoly in media sector (Özokçu, 2011: 17 - 20; Özdurdu, 2011: 17 -20). Before analyzing media corporations, it is useful to deliberate on these M&A types, reasons for M&A and their consequences. Merging is a combination of two or more business entities and forming a new one. Acquisition, on the other hand, is used to term cases when a company purchases another one and incorporates it to its business. Horizontal M&A happens when two or more companies working in the same sector merge under the same firm. For instance, if a

newspaper company buys another one, this is horizontal merging. Vertical M&A, on the other hand, refers to merging a company with another company from another sector that is essential for their production or distribution process. An example for vertical merging is a newspaper company buying a distribution company or news agency. Finally, conglomerate M&A happens when a company enters to a new business area (Özokçu, 2011: 50 - 60). In Turkey, between 2002-2008, 35 national and 30 international M&A had take place (Güney & Sözeri, 2011: 47). In addition, it is important to note that Turkey has a growing, dynamic economy; which is especially the case for media sector. Though media sector is highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations, media sector is still alluring because of increasing trend in advertisement revenues (Güney & Sözeri, 2011: 45-48). Hence changes in media are not solely based on M&A, but also because of launching new media organs.

The basic idea under M&A is raising companies' profits. Horizontal growth helps companies to increase their capacity, as they can minimize the total cost of production by using their resources efficiently. By owning several different newspapers, firms do not only expand their share in the market but they also differentiate their products in order to reach different consumer segments. Consequently, in addition to decreasing production

cost, they can increase total circulation rate. In other words, it is a win-win situation for media giants. Vertical growth guarantees steady supply of their demands, as they own or are partner with supplying business entity. Moreover, increasing their share in media sector also enhance their power to determine price range which will also serve to increase the revenue of the business entity (Özokçu, 2011: 53).

In terms of political and social consequences, such concentration and consolidation of media ‘business’ have serious political and social implications. Especially, horizontal and cross ownership growth is considered to be socially and politically alarming because they can lead to uniformity in the content of media outlets considering the fact that business entities establish close ties with politicians (Özokçu, 2011: 54). The main difference becomes the segment that newspapers speak to as they engage in segmentation for marketing purposes. In return however, journalists working in the news sector must have to adopt their news gathering patterns, discourse and framing accordingly with the consumption habits of the readers, instead of professional ideal of fostering democratic communication channel.

A close examination shows the oligopoly and inter-dependent structure of the Turkish media sector. It must be noted that equating media

sector to the sum of media outlet enterprises is a fallacy and hence misleading; not only the press or broadcast entity but also news agencies and distributors are vital for the business to work properly. Therefore when all of these are examined together, it becomes clear that media sector is not only shared by certain groups, but also these groups have interdependent relation rather than perfect competition. Last but not least it must be noted that Turkish newspapers have different levels of integration to market system paradigm. In other words, not all newspapers made a full-fledged transition to market system. Some newspapers still continue to get funded by foundations and charities in contrast to advertisement revenues.

4.6 Press:

Turkey has 55 national, 23 regional and 2.381 local newspapers which makes a total of 2.459 newspapers; and has 258 television channels which break down as 27 national, 16 regional and 215 local. Like Chomsky and Herman argued for American media (1994: 4-5) Turkish case is the fact that vastness of the quantity of news outlets is actually an illusion of diversity. As asserted before, despite the fact that many different newspapers compete for the consumer attention, these newspapers are owned or funded by a handful of profit driven media giants.

According to 2010 and 2011 concentration ratio (CR) statistics, three media groups compromise the fifty percent of the whole press sector: Dođan (30.7%, 29.64%), Feyza (21.25%, 19.74%) and alık (10.96%, 10.74%) (Güney & Sözeri, 2011: 55 - 66). However since then Dođan downsized its share by selling two of their newspapers – Milliyet and Vatan. Nevertheless, those two papers formed approximately 6%, thus the top three groups remain the same. Other important groups according to their circulation rate are: Ciner, ukurova, Estetik Publishing, Star, İhlas and Albayrak. These groups' newspapers compose 80% of the total newspaper circulation (BİK).

As mentioned in the previously these companies are not in perfect competition. For instance, Dođan and alık have almost total control over distribution service; others have to use their service. Dođan's YAYSAT by itself has 63% share of the market. Finally, some of these groups have their own news agencies; though the semi-autonomous Anadolu Haber Ajansı has a substantial amount of share in this market, İhlas News Agency, Dođan News Agency and Fırat News Agency are also important players.

5. Research

5.1 Mavi Marmara Raid:

Free Gaza Movement is a coalition of different groups from different nations and states gathered to provide reconstruction, medical and educational goods and supplies to Palestine by sea and to raise awareness to the Palestinians' living conditions. The coalition has formed after Israel and Egypt had imposed blockade to Gaza Strip in 2007. Free Gaza Movement commenced its activities in 2008; the aids were sent in August, October, December 2008 and February, June 2009.

The last flotilla was sent in May 2010, partnered by Turkish NGO İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı (Humanitarian Relief Organization, İHH). The flotilla of six vessels carried approximately 650 activists from more than 30 different nationalities. On the grounds of security, Israeli government refused to grant the flotilla to approach Gaza, but offered to transfer the aid themselves. Vessels carried on with their journey despite Israeli forces' warnings. Israeli soldiers attempted to seize the vessels; the tension resulted in injuries and deaths, and thus international

crises. Eight Turkish passengers and one dual passport holder Turkish - American passenger were killed and many others were seriously wounded. Israeli soldiers were also harmed.

With the initiative of Secretary General of United Nations (UN) an arbitrary council was formed to undertake the task to find facts, circumstances and context of the 31 May incident. According the UN report neither Turkey nor Israel intended the outcome. The Israeli naval blockade on Gaza was imposed as a “legitimate security measure” as it had been facing a threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza. The report also concluded Israel’s actions were excessive and unreasonable, and unaccounted. The loss of life and injuries resulting from the use of force by Israeli forces during the take-over of the Mavi Marmara was unacceptable. There was significant mistreatment of passengers by Israeli authorities since the take-over of the vessels until their deportation. (UN, 2011) On account of the activists the report stated:

“Although people are entitled to express their political views, the flotilla acted recklessly in attempting to breach the naval blockade. The majority of the flotilla participants had no violent intentions, but there exist serious questions about the conduct, true nature and objectives of the flotilla organizers, particularly İHH. The actions of the flotilla needlessly carried the potential for escalation.” (UN, 2011) Moreover, concluded passangers did not make passive resistance and Israeli forces faced significant, organized and violent resistance from a group of passengers when they boarded the Mavi Marmara which required them to use force for their own protection.” (UN, 2011)

5.1.1 Coverage:

Zaman:

To begin with, the primary definers of the incident were Turkish parliamentary politicians. There was a clear resistance to Israel's explanation of the incident. While rhetoric claims and actions of the Turkish leaders conveyed submissively, the Israel's claims were less in quantity and conveyed in cynical discourse. Moreover, Israel's defense was countered with selective quotations. For instance, The Vice President of the USA Joe Biden's answer to the question whether if he thinks İHH is Al-Qaeda affiliated was that he cannot verify that. However Zaman's caption was: 'The USA denied Isreal's claim that İHH is Al-Qaeda related.' The news text that reflected on the emergence of photos of injured Israeli soldiers and Israel response to these photos asserted that 'Crying Soldier Photos Pleased Tel Aviv' (Cihan Press).

In addition to cynical discourse, solidarity frame was promoted. The international community was presented as critical of the Israeli government. The fact that the USA had not condemn Israel was not given priority; and the article mentioning the fact was juxtaposed with the information that Hillary Clinton was deeply saddened with the incident (Servet Yanatma).

The very first headline of the newspaper included both the notions of human cost and solidarity against Israel.

Fethullah Gülen's criticism of İHH was reflected as 'Condolence Message and Diplomacy Message from Gülen' (June 4). It was not primed.

Sabah:

Sabah also adopted solidarity and humanity frame. Because of their journalists was on Mavi Marmara and experienced the event firsthand, she and her experience dominated the coverage. The Israeli claims were downplayed. The political elites conveyed as in consensus. Moreover, in Sabah Turkey and Turkish politicians were framed as extremely successful diplomats. Reflecting on the return of the activists the article stated: "Israel who decided to release activists upon the pressure of Turkish authorities did not want to release President of İHH Yılmaz and some other activists. Bakan Davutoğlu said: 'The planes are not going to take off unless everybody is released.' Upon Davutoğlu's ultimatum Israel stepped back and released all 490 activists." (June 3). Likewise, the UN's condemnation and decision to conduct an investigation was conveyed as: "Despite the USA's objections, Davutoğlu's determined attitude come off after twelve hours long debates. The UN and NATO condemned Israel." (June 2, Duygu Güvenç). Another headline was the slogan of Palestinian's: "Leader Erdoğan" (June 5). In terms of Gülen's statement, Sabah published strong

reactions of other Islamist political actors, such as the WP and İHH president Yılmaz.

Hürriyet:

The Turkish executives, politicians, international actors and foreign press were the primary definers. Israel's frame was also present in Hürriyet. Again, it was low in quantity and cynical in tone. For instance: 'An Odd Excuse from Israel: They Started It' was one of the headlines. Other important frames in Hürriyet were solidarity and human cost frames. Additionally, İHH's previous activities were provided: 'İHH, for past four years, made 24 Million 772 thousand worth aid to Palestane. Emergency, social, cultural, education and health campaigns were among these aids.' (Ceyhun Kuburlu, June 2). Like previous newspapers news articles emphasized the capability of Turkish politicians, especially the Prime Minister's charismatic leadership. 'Erdoğan is more Arab than the Arabs' 'Turkish Prime Minister Has Frightened' (June 2). Hürriyet was the only newspaper that published photos of the injured Israeli soldiers. However, interestingly enough it suggested the emergence of photos strengthen the Turkish case:

"In photos, it is seen that some soldiers of elite commando unit 'Shayetet 13' who killed four activist instantaneously are neutralized

by unarmed activists. The photo shots reveal that they are in a panic, scared and crying hysterically. In some photos, some İHH authorities are observed to warning other passengers for not causing further damage to neutralized soldiers. [Activist] Paramedics are observed to helping soldiers lying in pool of blood.” (June 6)

Moreover, photos of two activists holding bats were presented with an article asserting: “To protect themselves activists used anything they found during the raid.” (June 6) Thus, the news text did not raise any question about ‘passive resistance’. As a matter of fact Hürriyet emphasized the fact that photos were deleted; and reached out to Israel and asked why they tried to delete the photos. Gülen’s statement was highlighted as it was given in the front page, yet no further comments were made.

Cumhuriyet:

The primary definers of the incident were Turkish executives but RPP members get greater coverage in Cumhuriyet compared to other newspapers. Cumhuriyet’s frame also emphasized the fact that Israel’s action was unlawful and unacceptable. The most dominant frame was the solidarity frame and civilian victim frame. Cumhuriyet was more critical of JDP and its attitude prior to the attack. Political elites who criticized JDP for not taking more decisive measures beforehand were quoted. For instance Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) executive member Selahattin Demirtaş’s

‘Israel have sent intervention signals days ago, but instead by engaging secret diplomacy [JDP] did not take effective measures’ (June 2) statement was cited. On 4th of June, the headline questioned why JDP administration disallows JDP deputies to take part in the journey.

“It is discovered that some of the 16 JDP deputies who had gone to Palestine last year wanted to go with the vessel that Israel raided. Party administration disallowed without giving a clear reason. Only it said at this stage it is not appropriate for deputies to Palestine with the vessel. Deputies who were preparing for a long time used workload as an excuse and relinquished from going.” (June 4)

Finally, Cumhuriyet cited experts who claimed İHH is terror affiliated. French judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere who was on an operation throughout the 1990s that İHH was subject of. His statement that İHH is openly related with terror and jihad, and Turkish government’s support for the organization must be questioned was quoted. In the same article, an American expert’s statement that he did not know what this multi-millionaire aid organization was financing was also cited. Gülen’s statement was presented as a proof of crack in Islamist front by publishing several expert opinions.

BirGün:

The primary definers of the incident were left-wing political parties and workers unions. Nonetheless, BirGün also have had inculpatory language against Israel. The dominant frame focused was the human suffering and solidarity frame. What changed was the approach to the Turkish government; BirGün was more critical of the Turkish executives' attitude. First of all, in an article BirGün asserted JDP sent the vessels carelessly for domestic politics. Furthermore at the front page on June 2 the cover news stated: "Prime Minister Erdoğan could not transcend beyond heroic statements. Heron deal [military arms deal between Turkey and Israel] is still on."; and on the following page: "Prime Minister 'harshly' criticized Israel's attack. He said 'Nothing is going to be as it used to be.' However Ministry of Defense announced that 'the crisis would not distress the Heron dealings'"

The elite dissensus on a clause of the official declaration was also amplified and presented on the front page with the headline: "Reluctant Signature from JDP". BirGün asserted JDP signed the declaration due to the anxiety of negative public opinion on their behalf. A footnote under a photo a woman is seen carrying Prime Minister's photo stated: 'While a group among Islamist finds Erdoğan's attitude towards Israel satisfactory, another group finds it radical and exaggerated.' Moreover, BirGün followed on

Gülen's comment. Firstly it was captioned as 'He is speaking like the USA' and 'Gülen's Palestine Sincerity'. Additionally, BirGün quoted experts claiming conflict among Islamists. The last difference of BirGün was its demand for freezing relations with Israel. Such assertive statements were cited from statements of left-wing political actors.

Overall:

The *problem definition* proposed in all of the newspapers analyzed was Israeli soldiers taking over the vessel, deaths and mistreatment of the activists afterwards.

The *causes* of the raid were not thoroughly covered by the newspapers. Israel's claim and explanation that İHH and activists were not innocent that they had connection with Al-Qaeda and/or that the activist started the attack were conveyed. Yet coverage of such claims was either cynical in tone or presented as claims. After the activist returned from Israel, the cause turned into Israel's dislike of Turkey and Turkish Prime Minister and to revenge of Davos crisis, where Turkish Prime Minister left the summit because of arguing with the moderator and the Israeli Prime Minister.

For *moral evaluation* perpetrators and victims are good points of measurement. The *perpetrator* and the responsible actors of Mavi Marmara Raid was the Israeli government and Israeli soldiers. The first day, all five newspapers published Turkish Prime Minister's statement that 'This [the raid] is an inhumane state-led terror'. Additionally they also published other executive's statements, for example foreign ministers statement 'This is a piracy'. None of the newspapers equated Israeli government neither to Judaism nor to Israelis nor to other Jewish people. All newspapers were sensitive in separating Israeli and Jewish community. The international and national communities were framed in solidarity. Photos of angry crowd dominated also highlighted the villainess and wrongness of Israeli government. Likewise, denunciation and condolence messages of international actors and other states' leaders were highlighted, which further framed Israel as the enemy.

For *victims*, the activists were framed as the victim. Their humanitarian intensions and peaceful means were highlighted to promote this frame. Sufferings and individual stories were selected and juxtaposed with other stories. Such news pieces not only further victimized the activist but also further demonized Israel.

The *remedy* was also not the primary concern of the newspapers. As remedy primarily the solutions and demands proposed by the Turkish executives are covered which were the releasing the activist and official apology from Israel. Another remedy was to cease relations with Israel.

Turkish Executives and other actors and their performance was the secondary news that emerged with the incident. How they perform and their (in)actions formed substantial part of the news. Portrayal of the executives varied from charismatic to inapt. The USA, the UN and leader of Gülen Movement, Fetullah Gülen's approach and statements were important events, they had high news value thus were covered.

5.2 Hopa Incident:

Hopa is a county in Artvin, a city, close to Georgia border. Hopa Incident refers to events unfolded during Prime Minister's visit to the district for election campaign on May 2011. Strife between law enforcers and a group of protesters took place which rapidly expanded and led to

chaos. During the fighting a protester Metin Lokumcu died, a police officer Servet Erkan and a protester Sonay Kotil were seriously injured; and many others get harmed and serious damages have occurred. After the spreading of Metin Lokumcu's death, demonstrations were held in different cities. Eventually, twenty two protesters were arrested on the grounds of harming public property and resisting to the police. They were dispatched by private courts whose jurisdiction and mission is to actually try terrorist organizations. Finally, chief of police resigned and his resignation put in effect by the internal affairs department.

5.2.1 Coverage:

Zaman:

Zaman provided limited number of stories. Hopa incidents were not primed. The protesters were framed as the perpetrator of the events. The issue at stake was to determine who was responsible for the letting things get out of hand. The protesters were framed as the perpetrators.

“...Provocations in Artvin's Hopa district draw strong reaction from the Prime Minister. Everything started out when a group 'Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Platformu' members engaged in a fight with the police. Erdoğan's convoy was stoned, and one of the stones hit a security

unite police officer's head. The officer who fell from the bus and had a brain hemorrhage was taken to the hospital. During the incidents a citizen had a heart attack and lost his life.”

Later, newspaper focused on ‘how things get out of control’ and framed the gendarme for staying motionless while the police was making an effort to bring order. The news article also mentioned that pepper gas triggered Lokumcu's death and forensics did not find a trace of insult. The criticism directed to Prime Minister's rhetoric and ‘bandit’ comment by RPP member Gülen Tekin was framed cynically; “He Defended aggressors of Hopa: Courages People.”

Sabah:

Sabah too framed the incident as an attack to Prime Minister's convoy. The first news headline was ‘Extreme Leftists Stirred up Hopa’. The focus was on too much the leftist nature of the protesters, and used to stigmatize.

“...a coalition of 500 people from RPP, FDP and Halkevi occupied the rally area... When a group of protesters unfurl banners against HES, police forces get involved with the group. Rapidly the area turned into a war zone. Protesters throw paving stones to the police.

The security forces used pressurized water and pepper gas.” (June, 1)

The headline of the news text covering Metin Lokumcu’s funeral’s headline was: ‘Had a Heart Attack While Throwing Stone’. Demotion of the Chief of Police and subsequent arrests were conveyed objectively, in a factual manner. The arrests were also covered factually.

Hürriyet:

Hürriyet framed the incident as an attack to Prime Minister’s convoy too. The initiation of the event was framed as ‘protesters attacking the police with paving stones, the police using pressurized water and pepper gas’. Hürriyet’s coverage of the events was factual and more sensational and dramatic compared to others. For instance, the fact that the police officer just had become a father 40 days earlier was only mentioned in Hürriyet. Likewise, Lokumcu’s funeral news was captioned: ‘His sparrow hawk is orphaned’ and his photos were highlighted with a headline asserting: ‘His last minutes’.

The arrests were mentioned toward the end of news story covering the funeral and it was focused on Birsen Kaya, who was an independent candidate for upcoming elections. Hürriyet cited experts on the dangers of pepper gas and conveyed their demands to disallow and abandon the use of

gas bombs.

Cumhuriyet:

Cumhuriyet's coverage of the news framed the event as police brutality and reflected very strongly. The initial framing was 'police interfered with protesters at the rally area with pressurized water and pepper gas bombs.' After the police intervention, protests become violent. The injured officer was also covered. The spreading of the events to İstanbul and Ankara was more salient, so was the arrests. The arrests were at the headlines; Cumhuriyet stated that the arrested people were interrogated by units whose mission and jurisdiction is to fight terrorism. Cumhuriyet asserted arrestees were tortured during interrogation and quoted protesters who asserted they have been subject to overuse of power. Cumhuriyet carried FDP statement to the caption: 'State Terror'. The follow-up stories of the Hopa incident were juxtaposed with analysis that demonstrated that 'Turkey is a police state', or with protests against arrests and death of Lokumcu. Further Cumhuriyet used 12 September metaphor:

“12 September Administration at Hopa: The police raiding houses at midnight, blocking of internet and phone connection to the city, tanks waiting on the streets likened to 12 September by the citizens.

Transferring of the 31 of the 100 arrestees to Erzurum Private Prosecution evokes similarities with the 12 September period.

During 12 September junta too raids happened, hundreds of people arrested and transferred to Erzurum for interrogation”

BirGün:

BirGün reacted very strongly to the incident. The headline demonstrated how strong stance BirGün used: ‘Police Committed Murder for JDP Rally’. The framing of the incident was as follows: the coalition of protesters was demonstrating when anti-HES protest started. The police interfered with gas bombs and batons; then the protesters responded. The Prime Minister and other official statements were framed cynically:

“At the mean time Prime Minister continued with the rally despite a death and dozens of injuries. For Erdoğan’s rally a great number of people were brought from surrounding cities and districts. The tension continued after Erdoğan’s meeting too. Erdoğan’s convoy was stoned by the public.” (June 1)

“Following the events in Hopa, Artvin Chief of Police Muhsin Arman resigned. It is pointed out that resignation was more because of the Prime Minister who wanted more security was not satisfied with the precautions.” (June 2)

“On the Hopa murder, Erdoğan said: ‘I do not think about it’ but he is obsessed with ‘The Only Way is Revolution’ flags.” (June 3)

The injured police officer did not get coverage. As a matter of fact it was presented as a case that authorities utilize to spin the whole event.

“The Vice-Prime Minister Arınç made interesting comments on the Hopa incident. He criticized gendarme for staying put. Reflecting on the incidents Arınç told: ‘These are organized things. My assumption is they will continue till the elections.’ Arınç also evaluated criticisms about the police intervention with a casualty and said ‘At the same event a police officer get hurt.’” (June 5)

Witch-hunt used as a metaphor to describe the arrests; and asserted ‘the death did not reduce the government’s anger’. Explicitly called other frames lies and their frame as the reality. A small caption asserted ‘Erdoğan spoke, prosecution did’.

Overall:

Two sets of *problem definition* and *cause* are found in Hopa incident coverage. The first is protestors attacked Prime Minister’s convoy and a stone thrown by protestors seriously injured a police officer. The second is

the police got involved with the protestors and as a consequence of their involvement a protestor died. A clear statement of the cause of the quarrel was not presented. More precisely, the causes are inherent in the definition of the problem. The first definition proposes intemperate actions of protestors as the cause, armed forces – especially the police – use force to attain law and order and prevent further damage. The second definition exerts excessive use of force is the main cause of the incidents and activists fight back.

Accordingly *moral judgments* and *remedy* proposed were also dual in overall coverage. To begin with the moral judgment, the focus was on the death and injured individuals. The ones responsible changes according to different explanations, thus both the activists and the police appear as the perpetrators. Not the initiator but also the group(s) who worsen the situation were object of moral judgment. Additionally, gendarme and Turkish executives were judged to be responsible for worsening of the situation. Likewise, who is the victim and how worthy that victim changed in accordance with the definition of the problem. For instance while all newspapers included had covered the death of Lokumcu, certain newspapers allocated more space to it compared to other injuries. Similarly, some newspapers highlighted the serious medical condition of the police officer equally or more than Lokumcu's death.

Proposing a remedy was secondary to defining the problem. The remedy proposed was to overcome this social problem of police violence. Another one was to not use pepper bombs. The last solution proposed was to coping with protestors more effectively. Incarcerations and Prime Minister's 'bandit' comment were also events that were important in unfolding and continuation of the event.

5.3 Evaluation:

5.3.1. Frame Dominance:

The coverage of Mavi Marmara raid is a classic example of frame dominance. Among two opposing frames put forward by Turkish and Israeli government, the Turkish media adapt Turkish executive's frame. Except for Cumhuriyet, none of the newspaper give plausibility to Israel's claim that İHH is terror affiliated. Cumhuriyet published stories that overlap with the claim that İHH has ambiguous and suspicious ties. Overall, İHH's relationship with the government and its Islamic character were downplayed and conveyed as irrelevant to the incident. To put it differently, the selection and presentation of the news and photos, and overall similar framing of

Mavi Marmara incident not only promoted the Turkish line of framing but also worked to refute Israeli frame. The event was framed as terror, state led terror, massacre, piracy, inhuman attack, fiasco, atrocity and unlawful in all the newspapers analyzed. The humanitarian and civilian intensions of the activists were highlighted. The overwhelmingly large quantity of protesters and other crowds - such as funerals, combined with news stories of international actors offering their condolence to Turkey and condemning Israel for the deaths generated a justification for Turkey's strong reaction to Israel.

5.3.2 Frame Contestation:

This does not mean there was no contesting framing in Mavi Marmara. Contestation was in place but the debate was not on the fundamental understanding of the event. The Turkish executives' control over the crisis was framed differently. While Zaman, Sabah and Hürriyet amplified that Turkey's, especially Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's, increasing popularity in the Middle East as a result of his consistent and strong attitude; Cumhuriyet and BirGün framed him inconsistent and weak. For instance, while Cumhuriyet highlighted the continuation of Heron dealings and BirGün primed it as a failure on the behalf of Turkish state, Hürriyet, Zaman and Sabah downplayed the Heron dealings and amplified

the decisions to cease further economic and military agreements with Israel. Another example is the framing of Prime Minister Erdoğan's status and position compared to other world leaders. Cumhuriyet's news story covering Prime Minister's dialogue with other world leaders was captioned: 'Erdoğan Seeks Support' and BirGün in the text asked 'Can't you make decision without asking the USA' implying that Erdoğan is not very powerful. Zaman - Sabah and Hürriyet carried Prime Minister's ultimatums to Israel and Barack Obama, which constructed the Prime Minister and Turkish executives as strong players.

Similarly the framing of Hopa incident changed significantly from one newspaper to another. The 'reality' of the event was contested. Thus as fundamental understanding of the incident showed significant divergence, framing of the incident changed very significantly. Overall, there were two frames that compete to construe the whole incident. The first frame was put forward by the executives and the second by the protesters. The newspaper's who adapted the first one's construction framed the incident as provocation, aggression, assault; and perpetrators as violent group of protesters agitated by other parties. Moreover, those who adopt this frame did not prime the events and gave a limited coverage. Finally, the protesters frame did not get coverage at these newspapers. Lokmucu's death and Erkan's critical situation get either equal coverage or the second get priority.

In either case, Kotil's critical situation was not covered. Zaman and Sabah framed the events as such. Zaman's discourse was more aggressive and cynical of those who showed sympathy to protesters.

The second coverage gave priority to protesters framing of the incident and primed the incident. This coverage framed the events as police intervention, police involvement, police terror, police state. The protesters were framed as demonstrators. Cumhuriyet and BirGün adapted this frame. These are the two newspapers that gave priority to the incident in their agenda. Moreover, they gave greater coverage to arrests and were more explanatory; they explained what the jurisdiction of private court is and reflected on what it means to be dispatched to private courts. Further, they used culturally familiar metaphors in order to raise awareness to the issue. This coverage picked on executives frame and conveyed them cynically.

Hürriyet's framing of the incident different from both of these framings. It adopted executives' frame which asserted the turmoil was initiated by the protesters; and yet, it also amplified Lokumcu's death and the dangers of gas bombs. It was factual, dramatic and raised awareness not to the over use of power but to the dangers of gas bombs. Hürriyet did not

turn the incident to a political matter but approached to it as a deficit of institutional and social mix.

5.3.3. Frame Parity:

Hence neither Hopa nor Mavi Marmara was a frame of parity despite the existence of more than two explanation and/or constructions of reality despite the multiplicity of frames. In each newspaper one frame dominated the coverage. In Hopa case there were two competing truth claims; newspapers picked one of them; in Mavi Marmara there were two explanations to the incident, newspapers again made one more salient in expense of the other.

In other words, newspapers choose one frame and the frame did not change over the course as new claims or evidence surfaced. The events selected news stories also reinforced that frame; news selection and presentation were frame-driven. For instance Zaman covered statements that İHH'S connection with terrorist organization cannot be confirmed, while

Cumhuriyet presented statements of some European judges and experts who assert İHH has dubious character and suspicious connections.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

6.1 Discussion:

The Field:

To begin with, the analysis of the structure demonstrated the field journalists operate in is evidently limiting and it is not expedient for fostering journalistic professionalism. First of all, the regulations and ground rules established by the state inhibit how some topics are being covered. Furthermore, it promotes and punishes certain rhetoric and discourses. The laws are especially sensitive to terrorist groups and to other outlawed organizations; how they are covered, whether or not terrorist groups' actions and ideas are promoted, disseminated and organized through mass communication channels. Most of the incarcerated or detained journalists are being tried on the grounds of aiding or supporting a terrorist activity. However the laws are arbitrary and open to interpretation. Moreover the problem is not only the law but also how it is implemented.

The economic structure is also one that academic society agrees to setback on journalistic professionalism. Turkish news media has rapidly turned into a business sector. Although the number of newspapers is sufficient for creating a competitive market, uneven circulation rates are alarming in addition to media giants having a strong influence on the sector. Limitations imposed to journalists due to monetary reasons are proved to be frustrating and has impact on professionalism both direct and indirect ways.

Finally, configuration of the Turkish society is also a complex one that has adverse impact on journalistic professionalism. In contemporary setting the social divisions do not necessarily arise from differences on economic reasons but more because of the cultural divisions and clashing of two macro cultures – Islamists and secularists - both on societal level and political level. This is a perplexing situation for journalists as some developments are welcomed by one side, while others object. Moreover, inevitably the reality and truth claims are multiple in number in explaining a phenomenon. If journalists' primary loyalty is to the 'everyday reality' (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2003), the multiplicity of the reality claim is problematic for journalists themselves to understand issue at stake. In this cultural setting journalistic professionalism becomes even more important, as news media is a platform where differences are shared, acknowledged

and negotiated, but more arduous, as professional ethics tell journalists both to be objective and opinion holder.

In brief and before going on with discussion, on all accounts Turkish journalists operate in a disadvantaged field. However it should be remained that news outlets associated with high levels of professionalism do emerge from countries with disadvantaged field also, Al-Jazeera being the primary example. In itself then the field can hold back journalists from finding the truth, discourage journalists from covering certain issues or do not provide the necessary time span and resource to understand the event, yet the field is not constructed to preclude journalists from fair, balanced and informative coverage.

The Coverage:

The fact that Mavi Mara raid was an international crises and Hopa was domestic had tremendous impact on following up the incidents. While all newspapers covered Mavi Marmara raid from front page for a week, Hopa incident showed greater diversity both in terms of visibility and

framing. Mavi Marmara was neither primed nor set as agenda by journalists. This is primarily due to the fact that the crises had consequence on international level and it was on the agenda of political executives. Moreover, other opposition groups also had similar opinions. Hopa incident on the other hand was primed by Cumhuriyet and BirGün by follow up stories and more diversified sourcing. Though other newspapers also covered the incident, it was not on the agenda as they neither primed nor followed up on the incident on its first week as much as Cumhuriyet and BirGün. The incident was not on the agenda of political executives and did not have national, binding, immediate consequences even though misuse of pepper bombs and trying in private courts rise several questions regarding the Turkish democracy and law. Additionally, it was also not on the agenda of main opposition parties but nevertheless was on the agenda of other parties, especially FDP. In brief than; while media followed unfolding of the Mavi Marmara, in Hopa incident some newspapers tried to put it on the political agenda.

Framing of the incidents also differ from one case to another. This time however coverage diversity does not arise from the scale of the incidents but rather from the cultural differences. To be more exact, because Mavi Marmara is an international conflict, the society as a whole could unite against a common enemy. Political parties as well as other segments of

the society regardless of their cultural differences can unite against Israel and mistreatment of the humanitarian activists and national integrity. In Hopa incident however though is not in the limits of national redlines – i.e. at the core of Islamist secularist divide – contains domestic differences. Thus absence of unity against a common enemy or for a common cause inevitably results in different interpretations, frames, of the event. At this point it is important to remind that in Mavi Marmara coverage the only ‘theme’ that newspapers framed differently was the executives’ performance, a domestic issue.

Journalistic Professionalism:

The study clearly demonstrated on domestic issues the source of the action matters for interpretation and framing. Many scholars point out that there is a deep rooted divide in the society that pulls civil society down and blocks effective communication. The clash of two dominant cultures, lack of trust between them and ambiguous ideologies surrounding political parties are perplexing for journalists as well as for the society. This is why high levels of journalistic professionalism is a must for Turkish society as such delicate situations present themselves often and turn into political strife quite rapidly. For this reason journalists must approach them with professional manner.

Professionalism requires journalist to sort out the truth or truth claims and to serve the public interest. Though a common idea that being objective is the most plausible and feasible way to achieve that goal, it is not necessarily so. Staying antagonistically objective is secondary to these goals. More to it, it is a means to an end and one must refrain from making objectivity an end itself because not only it is infeasible as every fact is made sense according to certain values but it could also restrain journalists from protecting public interest and creating the necessary pressure on political authorities.

Newspapers in Turkey accept that they have parallelism with certain ideologies or political parties. They construe and interpret events, facts and policy issues according to their ideology. In itself this is not an obstacle for professionalism. Every newspaper can be associated or likened to certain ideology or party even if they do not openly say so. Parallelism can stem from the similarities in the vision of perfect future and how to attain it; hence not necessarily from partisan or propagandist intentions. Though by coverage itself no one can conclude that journalists or the newspapers have or do not have propagandist intentions, at least one can argue that there was no omission or conflicting information or facts. In this study, the only

informational differences resulted from BirGün's and Cumhuriyet's quest for other voices; especially in Hopa case only Cumhuriyet and BirGün published testimonies of eye witnesses, victims. Lack of eye witnesses as source in Hürriyet, Sabah and Zaman is not suspicious as literature review demonstrated journalists tend to source official voices, this is not necessarily because they have hidden agenda. As Bennette theorized in liberal understanding journalists only seek out for other voices when they do not trust the official explanation or they think it does not reflect the truth. Hence the existence of newspapers with different political orientation is actually an asset for Turkish society as external pluralism provides a media system that does not manufacture consent for one certain political party or ideology. On the contrary enables other point of views to have access to getting media coverage and creates diversity. Therefore, if Turkish media is to move from polarized model, moving towards corporatist model is more desired as this model is associated both with ideological parallelism and journalistic professionalism. Liberal model is associated with factual and professional journalism which as going to be argued below is not ideal for cases like Turkey where society is divided especially on ideological level.

The main problem in Turkish journalism is the hostility towards and unfair coverage of other frames coming from opposing groups. This results in weak opposition, fragile and refutable counter frames. As a result, this

advantage of external pluralism turns into a disadvantage as the media system continues to manufacture and further engrave problems that divide Turkish society. The existence of cynical and unfair treatment of opposing groups even in on the issues that are not in the boundaries of contested Islamist-secularist divide. Hence low levels of professionalism in not solely result from a bias for a political party; but it is actually a prejudice against another political party and therefore its actions, intension and performance. Zaman and Sabah's skeptical and cynical toward the activists in Hopa; Cumhuriyet and BirGün's towards Islamist centered groups; and all newspapers including Hürriyet's towards Israeli government demonstrates the fact clearly.

Another interesting point is unfair coverage is evident in varying levels at newspapers' with different ownership structure. In other words, being a subsidiary of a conglomerate or being independent of it does not hint about the level of professionalization. Each newspaper in the research at certain instances made unfair remarks. Zaman accused RPP spokesperson for defending activists in Hopa, Sabah used extreme leftist as a stigma in explaining Hopa incident, BirGün attacked the political executives for the death in Hopa, Hürriyet criticized Israeli government. Of course there were differences in the outputs of newspapers operating in market paradigms and those who are funded. Establishing a pattern however is difficult as market

oriented and funded newspapers demonstrate differences in themselves too. For instance, BirGün and Hürriyet's news articles on the perils of pepper gas were sourced by the same institution. On the one hand BirGün's caption was: "TTB [Turkish Medical Association]: The Use of Gas Must be Abandoned"(June 2). On the other hand Hürriyet's was a subtitle: "TTB: We are Warning"(June 2). Another example is only BirGün and Cumhuriyet adopted frames that challenged executive's frames. However this cannot simply explained by the fact that they are not owned by conglomerates. Zaman also does not work purely in market paradigms but Zaman's frames correspond with executive frames. Furthermore, fairness of newspapers also did not depend on ownership structure, as mentioned above. To varying levels, all newspapers' coverage in the research was frame driven.

An important point raising here is that level of professionalism is not fixed either as high or low. Turkish news media is not divided as quality press versus tabloid papers. Inconsistency in professionalism might explain why this is the case. Professionalism varies from one event to another, from one newspaper to another. While newspapers can approach some issues professionally, they cannot to some others. However, as explained, neither political parallelism nor political economy theory can adequately explain the inconsistency in the level of professionalism. Moreover if it were simply because of the field, level of professionalism must be same more or less.

Clearly field is limiting and has negative impact on journalistic influence and professionalism; however field by itself does not explain why overall Turkish news media could not achieve professionalism. Low levels of civic trust, cooperation, ideological and cultural differences however explain when and why level of professionalism is low. Skepticism and cynicism resulting from cultural structure lead to ill-prepared media output. Cultural structure and civic political status of Turkish society are inclusive of parallelism and political economy theories. In Turkish case newspapers cannot distance themselves from deep rooted divides of the dominant cultures.

Finally, objective and factual reporting become problematic and political in societies where culture is divided and situations which are arbitrary and anti-democratic. Trying detainees of Hopa incident in private court is one example for the case. For example in covering this event Cumhuriyet and BirGün launch successful counter frames and Zaman , Sabah and Hürriyet used factual rhetoric. While Cumhuriyet and BirGün explained why private courts exist and what is their jurisdiction and pointed out that without proper evidence, trying these protesters by private courts is an abuse of power; other newspapers only stated that detained protesters were going to be tried by private courts. Therefore, if we want journalists to do not interfere with the political process, what factual and passive journalism do is enough. Yet, if we want journalist point out the mistakes or

abuses of power, we must provide them the room to be skewed towards the interest of public interests. For this reason liberal media model is not thoroughly adequate for Turkish society and politics. The clear problem in Turkish case is the conflicting opinions and designs of what is the public's best interest. News media can still serve as a platform of deliberation of these problems; but if journalists and editors challenge their preconceptions, treat each segment fairly and equally, their work have the chance to be associated with professionalism and treated as such.

6.2 Conclusion and Further Recommendations:

Conclusion:

To conclude, this study's objective was to understand why news media is one of the least trusted institution in Turkey and whether if accusations to journalistic professionalism holds true. Thus the focus was on polarized news media system of Turkey and how it affects news media performance. The literature review aimed to understand what have been said hitherto about journalistic profession and setbacks for professionalization.

The conclusion was journalism serves to public interest by detecting the truth and presenting it in an understandable form. State regulations, economic structure and ideological parallelism appear as the important drawbacks for professionalism. Therefore, the study had approached the issue from structural perspective. After the examination of the structure, a discourse and framing analysis conducted on the coverage of Mavi Marmara and Hopa incidents. Five newspapers with different ownership structure and political orientation were included to the research. According to the results, the study concluded polarization and lack of adequate professionalism of the news media is inclusive but greater than party parallelism. The main derive is high levels of political skepticism, rather than high levels of political parallelism. The study also found that this skepticism is used counterproductively which is an impediment for professionalization. To make it clear, skepticism precipitates struggle for frame domination rather than seeking, confronting and distilling vast number of plausible frames and opinions. To the contrary, journalists not only attack 'rival' frames but also amplify facts, photos, statements and claims that will reinforce the frame they adopt. Therefore unfair treatment of others and blindfold commitment to selected truth claim result in journalistic practice which does not prioritize finding the 'reality' and serving the public interest but instead prioritizes promoting or discrediting certain reality claims.

Recommendations:

This study demonstrated how low levels of journalistic professionalism manifest itself in the news articles, when and where lack of professionalism becomes apparent. A further understanding can be attained by in-depth interviews and ethnographic studies. Such studies will bring better understanding to at which stage cultural biases interfere with professionalism; when and why the news stories become unfair to opposing group; what is the input of journalists, editors or from higher ranks; what mechanisms established to keep up with the standards of professionalism; and what journalists and editors think 'professionalism' is and their reasons for failure in achieving it. Moreover with one-on-one research methods follow up questions can be asked in order that bring clarity to the issue.

With the advancements in communication technologies, print medium is losing its appeal. On the other hand, journalism as an occupation does not. It is true that internet and social media enabled many-to-many communication flow and increased the number of media that readers can get information. This is both advantageous and disadvantageous for fostering democratic communication. On the positive side, independent journalists can establish their own news outlet with substantial reduction in costs. On the negative side, any person without journalistic values can produce a news story. Biased and unfair contents surface on the internet. In this environment

professionalism is firstly an advantage and it is without a doubt a must. For these reasons and more, how cultural differences can be transcended and professional journalism can be improved must be studied rather than taken for granted and static.

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