



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE**

**A CASE STUDY OF LANGUAGE POLICY AND CHANGE OF SCRIPT IN
KAZAKHSTAN: BEYOND ETHNIC-CIVIC NATIONALISM**

Master's Thesis

Fatmanur ERAY ÇAPAN

Political Science

August 2022



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work. I declare that this thesis is written according to the writing rules of Social Sciences University of Ankara, Institute of Social Sciences.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to analyze the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan and the construction of the Kazakh nation through a case study of language policies with special attention to the Latinization of the script. The language planning particularly the strengthening of languages of the titular nations and change of a script can be observed within the nation-building processes of newly emerging Turkic states such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, but it took 26 years for Kazakhstan to take this final step of shifting from Cyrillic script to Latin although the issue has been debated since 2006. This study aims to answer the question of why the Kazakh government decided to change the script and its particular timing. We argue that the Latinization of script can be understood in the context of language planning in Kazakhstan, through which the state aims to reconstruct Kazakh traditional culture. Like many nation-building projects, the Kazakh government utilized ethnic, civic, multicultural, and transnational components of nation-building together. The language policy, particularly the Latinization of the script of the official language contributes construction of the nation through these mechanisms: strengthening Kazakh national culture and language as a basis for the coherent nation-state; providing robust language and cultural rights for minorities, particularly the Russian minority for encouraging them to participate in the concept of civic nation and globalizing the country through teaching English.

Keywords: Civic and ethnic nation, nation-building, script change, language policies, Kazakhstan, the Russian minority

ÖZET

Bu tez, Kazakistan'da 2018'de Latin alfabesine geçilmesi ve dil politikalarının incelenmesi vakasını analiz ederek bu ülkedeki ulus inşa sürecinin niteliğini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Ana dilin güçlendirilmesi ve alfabe değişikliğine yönelik planlamalar yapmak; Türkiye, Özbekistan, Türkmenistan, Azerbaycan gibi devletlerin ulus inşa süreçlerinin başlarında görülmektedir. Latin alfabesine geçme meselesi 2006'dan beri tartışılrsa da Kazakistan'ın nihai adımı atması 26 yıl sürmüştür. Bu tezde, Latin harflerine geçilmesinin devletin Kazak mili kültürünün yeniden inşa edilmesini hedefleyen dil planlaması yoluyla millet oluşturma sürecinin parçası olduğunu ve bu süreçte diğer benzer örneklerdeki gibi etnik, sivil, çok kültürlü ve ulusötesi öğeleri birlikte kullandığını savunmaktayız. Dil politikası şu mekanizmalar vasıtasıyla Kazak milletinin yeniden inşasına hizmet eder: yeni ulus-devletin bütünlüğünü sağlamak amacıyla Kazak ulusal kültürünün ve dilinin güçlendirilmesi; azınlıkları, özellikle de Rus azınlığı, sivil ulus kavramına katılmaya teşvik etmek için geniş çaplı dil ve kültürel haklar sağlanması ve Batı ile ilişkileri geliştirmek amacıyla İngilizce eğitimin yaygınlaştırılması.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, ulus inşası, alfabe, dil politikaları, Kazakistan, Rus azınlık

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSTO	: Collective Security Treaty
CYP	: Communist Youth League
EAEU	: Eurasian Economic Union
EU	: European Union
KAZTEST	: Kazakh Language Knowledge Level Assessment System
NEP	: New Economic Policies
OTS	: Organization of Turkic States
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

When the Soviet Union dissolved, Kazakhstan was one of the last countries to declare independence. However, Kazakhstan caught up quickly and developed effective nation-building policies, and solidified its independence in the last 31 years of independence. Kazakhstan focused on cultural and symbolic policies to construct the Kazakh nation, particularly aimed to save the Kazakh language from the hegemony of the Russian language and intended it to be used actively among all citizens. The language planning particularly strengthening of languages of the titular nations and change of script can be observed within the nation-building processes of newly emerging states such as Turkey, and predominantly Turkic states of Central Asia and the Caucasus such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, but it took 27 years for Kazakhstan to take this final step of shifting from Cyrillic script to Latin although the issue has been debated since 2006. Kazakh language policy, in general, was also distinctive because it did not openly challenge the dominance of the Russian language unlike is experienced in Ukraine. While acknowledging the Kazakh civic approach towards minorities, the literature also points out a creeping ethnic nationalism behind Nazarbayev's discourse of civic nationalism. Therefore Kazakh nation-building process poses a puzzle.

With special attention to this issue of “late” script change, we would like to explore the role and nature of Kazakh language policy in the construction of the Kazakh nation and the nation-building process in Kazakhstan.

1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION

In this thesis, we try to answer the following questions: Why did the Kazakh government decide to change the script, and why in 2017 and not earlier? Concerning these issues how can we understand the role of language planning and cultural and symbolic reforms in the construction of the Kazakh nation? Based on the case study of

language planning and script change, how can we identify the nation-building process in Kazakhstan: civic, ethnic, or multicultural?

1.2. THESIS STATEMENT

We argue that the Latinization of script can be understood in the context of language planning in Kazakhstan, through which the state aims to re-construct the nation, negotiating ethnic, civic, multicultural, and transnational elements. The language policy, particularly the Latinization of the script of the official language serves the following purposes: strengthening Kazakh national culture and language as a basis for the new nation-state; and providing robust language and cultural rights for minorities, particularly the Russian minority for encouraging them to participate in the concept of civic nation. Globalizing the country by developing relations with the West. Because the increase of Kazakh people's demographic percentage among the population of Kazakhstan and Russianized Kazakhs' knowledge of the Kazakh language could only be improved in the late 2010s, Kazakh language reform could only happen in 2017. An earlier reform would risk paralyzing the economy, politics, and ethnic peace of the country.

While the Kazakh state was distinguished as a "nationalizing state" by Brubaker, Kazakh government follows the modular nation-building model applied in other countries such as Turkey, France, the US, and so on. Despite being identified as civic, these nations are all based on an ethnic core. (Smith 1987, Kymlicka 1995) De-colonized only recently, Kazakhstan undertakes this step in the conditions of a globalized world, and requirements of geopolitics and the legacy of Russian colonialism were the reasons for making script change quite belated. Therefore, it is better to understand Kazakh nation-building not as ethnic, civic, or nationalizing but as a modular re-construction of national culture as in all other nations. Kazakhstan does not do this to racialize or ethnicize the citizens, but to form a coherent national culture as a backbone of a strong state.

1.3. METHODS

The main methods of this study were the case study, comparative historical analysis, and documental analysis. We did a case study of the language policies of Kazakhstan from its independence until today, with a special focus on script change. We

analyzed the language planning policies over more than 30 years and outlayed the chronological development. In doing that, we scanned many government documents, reports, speeches of Nazarbayev and other officials, government websites, official statistics, and secondary material.

1.4. LIMITS OF THE THESIS

First of all, the language policies are examined from a top-down approach here by focusing on state records and discourses. It was not possible to interview Kazakh people to see the effects of state policies on both the titular nation and ethnic minorities. In addition, since current politics are likely to evolve differently in the coming years because of the recent political changes in Kazakhstan, Russia's changing geopolitical stance, and the novelty of the script reform, it is still not possible to reach very clear and precise judgments yet.

1.5. PLAN OF THE THESIS

This study has five chapters: Introduction, Historical Background, Literature Review, and Conceptual Framework, The Case Study of Cultural and Language Policy in Kazakhstan, and Conclusion. The Historical Background presents the ethnic and demographic policies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the colonial policies that influenced the development of Kazakh national identity, as well as the emergence of Kazakh nationalism, and Kazakh state-building processes after the independence. In the third chapter, we examine the literature on post-colonial nation-building in the former Soviet geography, and the theoretical literature on nation-building, particularly the distinction between ethnic and civic nations. Utilizing theories of the nature of ethnicity and nation such as constructivism and ethno-symbolism, we suggest a conceptual framework in which reconstruction of national culture is emphasized as the main mechanism of nation-building. This conceptual framework informs the case of the cultural and language policy of Kazakhstan in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO FORMATION OF KAZAKH IDENTITY

Kazakhstan is a Central Asian country that gained its independence about 31 years ago. When did Kazak's name emerge in history and what role did it play? How did Kazakhstan, which gained its independence after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, preserve its Kazakh identity under the rule of this union and bring it to the present day? To understand this better, in this section, the process of the establishment and collapse of the Kazakh Khanate, which has an impact on Kazakhstan's coming to the present day as a nation, and the formation of Kazakh identity will be examined. Then, the efforts of the Kazakh people against the Russification policies under the rule of the Russian Empire will be discussed.

2.1.1. Origin of The Kazakh Name

According to historians, there have been settlements on the present territory of Kazakhstan since the 8th century BC. Although all the remains of these settlements have not yet been unearthed, this information leads us to the conclusion that the predecessors of the Kazakhs are quite ancient. The most important among these predecessors are the Scythians (Sakas) (Otarbaeva 2007: 421). It would not be wrong to see this community, which has an important place in Turkish history, as a part of Kazakhs. For example, the Golden Warrior Monument in the Esik Kurgan, which was found by the famous Kazakh Archaeologist Kemal Akişoğlu during an excavation of the territory of Kazakhstan between 1969 and 1970, is from the Saka period and Kazakhs consider this monument a part of their history and accepted the beginning of Kazakh roots.

However, the formation of divided the historians into two sides. When we look at the name Kazakh in the literature, it is not known exactly when it is used. However, according to Otlcott (1995), the Kazakh name began to be used in the 6th and 7th centuries. Moreover, when we look at various sources, Kazakhs were called different names by many nations. In some sources, after the collapse of the Golden Horde and Ak

Orda states, which were destroyed by the Mongols in 1395, two important states emerged, the Nogay Horde and the Uzbek Khanate. Uzbek Khanate, established in 1420, take over control of Sir Derya, the Aral Sea, and Irtysh Lake, which are so important points in Central Asia. Because of its prevailing at these important points, the name Uzbek has begun to use and recognized by everyone in the literature. Since these regions, cover the borders of today's Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhs began to call as Uzbeks. (Olcott 1995:7). Then, Kazakhs, living within that khanate, leave these lands under the leadership of the sultans Canibek and Kerey and came under the rule of the Eastern Chagatai State and they begin to call Kazakhs in those lands.

There are many theories about where the name Kazakh came from. According to some scholars, the Kazakhs gain this name as a result of merging the "*Kas*" and "*Sak*" tribes. According to another claim, Kazakh means "*qaz*" (nomad). In other words, it is claimed that the Kazakhs took this name because they maintained the nomadic steppe culture for a long time (Olcott, 1995). In general, the meaning of the Kazakh is "free, valiant, brave" in the literature (Doğan, 2019; Hizmetli, 2011; Olcott, 1995). Kazakhs were also called Kyrgyz in Russian literature for a certain period (Doğan, 2019:18). Based on the emergence of the Kazakh name and its various meanings, the lack of a nation's own written and oral resources or integration with different nations causes a lack of consensus on the way to becoming a nation and having the history.

2.1.2. Formation of Kazakh Identity

There is no certain consensus in the literature on the formation of Kazakh identity. Insufficient initial information about the Kazakh people, lack of interaction with different nationalities in the region, and absence of an oral legacy of the nomadic steppe people can be seen as the main reasons (Olcott 1995: 30). Most of the information that exists in present days obtained from written Russian sources and various historical observations. In the literature, being a nation of the Kazakhs and the signs of Kazakh identity start with the Kazakh Khanate period that emerged in the middle of the fifteenth century. The Kazakh Khanate is founded by Canibek and Kerey Bey and they are the sons of Barak Khan who is the ruler of the Golden Horde State. Kazak Khanate was seen as the first important union of the Kazakh people and is considered the beginning of the Kazakh nation (Olcott 1995: 30). However, there are some scholars claim that the Kazakhs had

their language and civilization long before the Kazakh Khanate (Hizmetli 2011: 28). Bakhytnur Otarbaeva, on the other hand, claims that the ethnic roots of the Kazakhs belong to the Bronze Age with the discovery of the Andronov Culture.¹ Otarbaeva also argues that hundreds of Bronze Age settlements exist in Kazakhstan, however, most of them are unearthened (Otarbaeva, 1998: 421). However, it is known that archeology studies are not yet developed in Kazakhstan. Therefore, it can be thought that the emergence of new and precise information about the past of the Kazakhs as a result of the excavations carried out in the coming years may cause great changes in the literature.

As a result, the current claim is that Kazakhs have existed in Central Asia since ancient times, but all Central Asian peoples came from similar origins and then began to diverge. Considering that the Kazakh Khanate was formed by the coming together of more than one community, Kazakhs have continued to live in Central Asia for many years before taking the specific name Kazakh. Although this information is correct, we cannot see the Kazakhs gathered under one roof before the Kazakh Khanate. For this reason, the Kazakh Khanate is seen as the most important step in the process of becoming a nation.

2.1.3. Kazakh Khanate

Kazakh Khanate has a very important place in the history of Kazakhstan. It is the most important step taken on the stage of history for the Kazakh society to come together around a common culture and heritage and to form its own identity. Therefore, the influence of the Kazakh Khanate must be taken into account when examining the nation-building of Kazakhstan. Kazakh Khanate is seen as the continuation of the Ak Orda State in history. The Ak Orda State, which was founded by Barak Khan with the coming together of various Turkic tribes, did not survive for a very long time. After the collapse of the Ak Orda State, the people came under the rule of Ebu'l Hayr Khan. Later, Canibek and Kerey Beys came together with these tribes and migrated to Mongolia. Thus, they took the most important step toward establishing the Kazakh Khanate and established it in 1456. The fact is these two rulers, who founded the Kazakh Khanate, were the sons of Barak, the last ruler of the Ak Orda State, clearly revealing the connection between these two states. Although the Kazakh Khanate continued to exist for many years, it could not

¹ See more. Bakhytnur Otarbaeva (1998) A brief history of the Kazak people, Nationalities Papers, 26:3, 421-432.

withstand the disintegration and annexation policies of the two powerful states, China and the Russian Empire in the region, divided into three different khanates in the 1730s: Great Horde (*Ulı Jüz*), Middle Horde and Small Horde. There is no common consensus on the date of their emergence and existence. According to some researchers, it is accepted that they emerged before the Kazakh Khanate (Hizmetli, 2011) and according to some researchers, they emerged after the Kazakh Khanate (Özkan, 2019; Adilbayev, 2002; Kara&Haykır, 2014).

In 1730, Ebu'l-Hayr, Khan of Small Horde, (1718-1748) sent a letter to the Russian Tsar and stated that they want to be included in the Tsardom. The main purpose of the Russian Tsardom is to prevent the formation of a strong Kazakh community and also to ensure the security of the trade routes under their control. Therefore, the Tsarism wants to take advantage of this situation and organized attacks on the Middle Horde and want to adjected in the Tsardom. However, the leaders of the Middle Zhuz, Abilay Khan (1711-1781) and Ebu'l Mambet did not accept this. Later, the leaders who came to the power were not successful, and finally, Middle Horde had to come under Tsadorm domination. Finally, The Great Horde could not cope with the Kalmyk invasions and became a part of the Tsardom as tribes by tribes and came under the Tsadorm rule (Ozkan, 2019; Lazzerini, 2016:2).

Could the Kazakhs survive as an older nation-state today If the Kazakh Khanate had been privileged and continued to live under one roof without division? Without any doubt, the situation would be different. The Kazakhs could compose much more cultural and historical artifacts that have been written in their language. Well, how did this captivity, which started with the Russian Empire and continued until the collapse of the USSR, created obstacles to the formation of the national culture and history of the Kazakh people? To understand this in the best manner, it will be necessary to briefly speak of the developments that took place after the Kazakh people came under the domination of the Russian Empire.

2.1.4. Russification Policies of the Russian Empire (Tsarist Period)

2.1.4.1. Russification

The annexation of the Turkestan region in the Tsarist lands means for the Russians that many non-Slavic communities with different religions, languages, and cultures should be gathered and a single-national structure should be established under the roof of Tsarism. By the 16th century, Tsarist Russia became a huge state. They included Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Volga, Siberia, and Baltic regions (Üstün&Karakurt, 2019:180). Thus, the Russians started to follow "Russification" (Rusifikatsiya) policies, which includes the assimilation of populations into Russian culture.

Minister of National Education Tolstoy said, 'The main purpose of educating the backward peoples living in our country is to Russify them. Thus, they will merge with the Russian people and dissolve' (Ayan, 2008:130). The most obvious aim of Russian colonialism is eliminating all other ethnic groups, uniting them strictly under the Tsar and besides, and spreading the use of Russian as lingua franca in all Tsarist lands. Russian, colonizers, defended the idea of "Russia belongs to the Russians" and claimed that Russians should take place in all positions of the state. (Tanrıverdi, 2017:542).

Culturally, the main purpose of Russification is to eliminate the cultures of these communities by making the Russian language hegemonic in every sphere of life (Theodore, 2004:474). We can see the most obvious reflection of this policy on the Kazakhs. The Russian elites saw Russification as civilization itself (Hofmeister, 2016:412).

The colonization of Kazakhstan and Central Asia took place as follows: At first, the Russians divided Turkestan into various provinces. Later, all Kazakh lands were united under the Governor-Generalship of the Steppes (Adilbayev, 2002:69). The aim was not only to seize Kazakh lands but also to carry out missionary activities. Since the Kazakhs were a nomadic society, the Tsarist government first tried to settle the Kazakhs to manage them more easily. Therefore, they started to establish cities in Kazakh lands. Then, they made some alterations in the field of education to instill in Kazakh society the Russian language, culture, and religion. Finally, the Russians' settlement started in

Kazakh lands. The aim was for Kazakhs' to learn and adapt to the Russian language, culture, and religion more easily by living together with the Russians.

2.1.4.2. Education Policies of the Tsarist Era

Education was used as a tool to secure uniformity and build a nation in Tsarist Russia (Üstün&Karakurt, 2019:182). The Tsarist missionaries emphasized that they can win the Kazakh society spiritually only through education. Dozens of missionary activities were carried out in these periods. They believed that the Kazakh society would forget their past identities, religions, and cultures by way of education and brainwashing. They first targeted children. However, Kazakh families did not want to send their children to these schools. There was already a religious education system among Kazakhs and they preferred to send their children to madrasahs and Tatar schools (Adilbayev, 2009:69). This made Russians see Islam was seen as another factor that had to be handled

The policies of spreading Russian Orthodoxy among Kazakhs also took place intensely in education institutions. However, due to the Kazakhs' attachment to their culture and religion, the Russians could not get the expected result and they decided to apply a different method. This method aimed complete Russification and Christianization at the same time. In the education system, things were becoming more and more systematized by the Russians, and the missionaries who were being trained for this become a part of it.

When talking about the missionary activities of the Kazakhs, the first name that comes to mind is Nikolai İlminskiy (1822-1891). İlminskiy worked as a Professor of Turkish Language at Kazan Theology Academy and Kazan University. He also served as the head of the Anti-Muslim Department (Protivomusulmanskoe Otdeleniye) at this academy. The main aim of İlminskiy, who was appointed as the director of this institution and had great support by Tsar Alexander the Second, was the unification of all communities under the Russian identity and Russian Orthodoxy. On the contrary, İlminskiy argued that the language of education must be the language in all societies. Thus, the people can use their language, not feel the Russian influence, and finally, they can trust the system. İlminskiy developed this method to accommodate these societies to education more easily and tried to implement Russification gradually (Üstün&Karakurt,

2019:183). They decided to teach Russian in schools. However, the most important difference is that although they have education in their language, they were obligated to use Cyrillic script rather than Arap script. For, the Russian government aimed to purify the Kazakhs from Islam and Arab influence and make them familiar with Tsarism. In addition, they decided to open modern schools by removing the people from madrasah education (Üstün&Karakurt, 2019:179).

How would people accept to use of the Cyrillic script? İlminski suggested that someone, who knows better the society, and whom people trust should take on this responsibility. They gave this task to a Kazakh intellectual, Ibray Altinsarin. Altinsarin was a patriot who wanted the Kazakh people to get rid of ignorance and become an enlightened, educated, and advanced society. He believed that using the Cyrillic script would illuminate society therefore he accepted this offer. Another task given to Altinsarin is to go to an uneducated village in Kazakhstan, open a school there and teach people how to read and write with Cyrillic script. In this way, the public would not understand that the Russians wanted them to learn the Cyrillic script, and people would see how this system could serve as a model for new schools.

The students trained in this system also contributed to the continuity of the system by opening schools in various other parts of the country (Adilbayev, 2009:72). Religion lessons continued to be in the Tatar language. Because before the spread of Russian domination, the Tatars were managing the education of the Kazakhs and they were more dominant than the Russians in this regard (Akıner, 1995:247). İlminski did not want religious lessons to be in Kazakh because this would proliferate the influence of the Kazakh language. He was worried that Kazakhs could get closer to each other and other Muslim Turkic people (Adilbayev, 2009:73). The effects of the Tsarist colonial education policies survived in the Soviet era, during which different colonial policies were put in place which further isolated the Kazakhs from their own culture, religion, and ancestors.

2.2. IMPACTS OF THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY ON THE KAZAKH IDENTITY

Some argue that before coming under Russian domination, their Central Asian identities mostly included kinship relations. Central Asian societies indeed see

themselves as the inheritors of the Steppe culture, which is very important for the lifestyle and culture of the Turkic states. The fact that they were called Kazakh, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik within the Russian domination did not mean the common Steppe identity lost its significance.

Other researchers argued that Central Asian communities failed to satisfy the qualities of being a nation (common origin, common national culture, common boundaries, and speaking the same language) that were necessary for the nation-building process when starting in the 20th century. In other words, when talking about the identities of Central Asian societies that were seriously transformed under the Russian Empire (Esenova, 2002:12). To understand better the impact of Soviet nationalism on Central Asian communities, it is necessary to pay attention to the social dynamics of these communities. In this sense, Pipes (1955) argues that Central Asia should be categorized in two different ways, culturally and historically. In other words, Central Asian communities should be analyzed in two different ways as North (Kazakhstan, steppe region) and South (other four Central Asian countries). The reason why Pipes (1955) suggests that the northern region, today's Kazakhstan, carries and lives steppe Turkic roots and culture more than the south. The south consisted of Arabicized and Iranicized Turkic and differed more from the north in terms of religiosity.

The February Revolution and the Provisional Government in 1917 were supported by the Kazaks who viewed it as an opportunity to develop their national movement. They established the Alash Party to formally convey their demands for autonomy to the government in a more systematic way. But these prospects came to an end with the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks came to power (Olcott, 1995:129). The Kazakh people did not support the Bolsheviks and instead established the Alash autonomous government. Although they joined the White forces and formed an armed resistance against the Bolsheviks, they were defeated and had to accept the Bolshevik rule (Olcott, 1995:129).

With the October revolution, the Bolsheviks came to power under the leadership of Lenin. Although some steps were taken regarding the non-Russian communities, the uncertainty in the first years of the Soviet era prevented the resolution of internal

problems (Weeks, 2010). The main reason behind all these uncertainties was that the Bolsheviks saw nationalism as a temporary process and thought that it should not be overemphasized. Even, Lenin stated his identity as "no nationality" in his passport application (Hosking, 2006,71). However, the Bolsheviks realized in time that nationalism was not temporary and it was a very important issue that must be addressed.

The Bolsheviks made important decisions on October 25, 1917, including all Soviet communities. The Peace and Land Decrees both ended the ongoing war and all the lands included in the Soviet borders were nationalized. In the same period, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia was published by the Soviets. The main purpose of this declaration was to obtain the allegiance of all peoples of Soviet peoples. The declaration stated that the Russian people will have the right to govern themselves. However, there are also the terms that the permission of the Bolsheviks and the central government will be required for the exercise of freedoms. Thus, in 1918, all nations of the former Russian Empire were united under the name of the Soviet Union.

The Bolsheviks attached great importance to the fact that the revolution was effective in Turkestan. The most important impact of the Soviet policies on the Turkic peoples was the destruction of their religious and linguistic unity and the change of their customs and traditions. They tried to turn the Turkic peoples against each other to preempt any resistance. For instance, the Turkish Communist Parties, which could not reach a consensus at the Turkestan Unity Congress, applied the Russian Communist Party to separate from each other. The Soviets who aimed to break up the bonds among Turks accepted their request and decided to establish separate republics. As a result of the studies, five different socialist republics were established under the Soviet Union (Nurpeii, 2010:42). Therefore, the Soviets destroyed the religious, linguistic, and cultural unity of the Turks and included them in the Soviet Union. In the following years, the word Turkestan was even deleted from maps and dictionaries. The Central Asian Turkic World, which was unity in many aspects, will now take place in history as separate states and nations.

In the conditions of the ongoing war, canceling of all national and democratic rights and freedoms and seizures of property were carried out, which were not very

compatible with the promises of communism. This incompatibility entered the literature as 'War Communism' (1917-21) (Carll, 1992:72). In the early years of the Bolsheviks' rise to power (the 1920s), also an ideological war broke out to create a common Soviet society (Nurpeii, 2010:42). As a result, Soviets established their dictatorial rule by 1920.

'War Communism' was followed by 'New Economic Policy (NEP) (1921-24). This is when 'Affirmative Action policies were established for nationalities. (Martin, 2001) This policy suggests that the best way to curb secession demands would be deepening the nationalities' commitment to the state by giving these communities some of their demands. To prevent these separatist movements, the Soviets voluntarily provided some rights to many nations like official names, using their language, and so on. In other words, the Bolsheviks employed these policies not to create a multinational management model, but to protect the Soviet revolution and increase support for it (Martin, 2001:2). In a way, they made an agreement with nationalities for the continuity of the revolution. According to Martin (2001), the concept of "disarming nationalism" introduced by Lenin and Stalin was the most ideal method to solve this problem. In other words, both non-Russian communities would have the right to self-determination but they would also be bound to the unitary Soviet State. Indeed, some rights needed to be given to these communities that have very different religions, languages, and races to keep them together, but what if they wanted more? This plan was seen as inadequate according to some because it ended up awakening and strengthening national sentiments.

At the fifth party congress (1927), the Soviet Union made an important decision. To accelerate economic development, peasant-controlled agriculture, and small and private property production should be abandoned, and the state should take control of agriculture to increase production (Olcott, 1995:168). According to Cameron (2018), this is one of the Stalins' social engineering policies. Stalin argued that the economic structure has to be changed before the religious-cultural structure (Hiro, 2009:50). The traditional agricultural culture was abandoned and the lands of the wealthy peasants (*kulaks*) were taken from them and they also were forced to transfer the products they obtained from agriculture to the collective farms (*kolhozy*). Stalin's main aim was not just to break the influence of the so-called *kulaks*. It also put an end to the existence of other tribes and

tribal chiefs who had authority in the village community, thus the Soviet dominance would be accepted in rural areas (Hiro, 2009:51).

What were the effects of all these policies that the Soviets tried to implement for Kazakhstan? In Kazakhstan, which has wide steppe lands, almost the only livelihood of the villagers was animal husbandry. The economic consequences of the First World War and the Civil War were disastrous for the Kazakhs. Between the years 1919-22 due to war communism in the steppe hundreds of thousands of Central Asian including Kazakhs suffered from starvation, but a bigger famine took place between 1930 and 1933 due to collectivization policies. Between 1.5-2.3 million Kazakh are estimated to have died which was the largest number any ethnic group lost in this Soviet-wide man-made famine. The number of dead constituted almost 30% of the population Kazakhs were reduced from 60 percent to 38 percent of the republic's population, hence a minority. (Esenova, 2002:20; Dave, 2007:55; Carr, 1992).

Therefore, the February and October Revolutions, famine and collectivization periods had a disastrous effect on Kazakh society. In addition to genocide, the most important reason why the Kazakhs are a minority in their lands was the seizure of Kazakh lands by the Soviets (the policy of collective farms). The Soviet government also began to settle Russians in the Kazakh steppes. Most of the Kazakhs who resisted these impositions were accused of being traitors and anti-regime *kulaks* and most of them were executed (Nurpeii, 2010:30).

Sarah Cameron (2018) approaches this hunger period from a very different perspective. She argues that while it was a forbidden topic to be mentioned by the local government, it has become a hot topic nowadays and even started to be called genocide by the Kazakh government. From this point of view, many policies used to assimilate the society during the Soviet period are perhaps used as a tool in the nation-building of Kazakhstan today.

The rest of the Soviet policies influencing Kazakh nationhood will be examined under the following headings of cultural, education, and language policies and demographic changes.

2.3. EDUCATION POLICIES IN KAZAKHSTAN SSR

The Soviets thought that education was the most important tool to impose socialism on society and they also thought that education was the most important tool to control society in all areas. They accepted that it would not be sufficient to provide education only in schools. They also aimed to adapt the adults who never went to school to the new socialist order. For this purpose, 'Red Yurts' were established and Soviet teachers traveled from village to village, providing basic education to adults such as literacy. In addition, they also tried to change villagers' traditions and customs. For example, some traditional habits in a society were prohibited by law; like feuds, bride price, and underage marriage. In addition, many organizations were established (Koshchi Union and Red Caravan e.t.c) to help people in need, which served to promote the regime and its goals by conducting propaganda activities outside of their purpose (Olcott, 1995: 171). However, according to Olcott (1995), none of these activities succeeded, and they particularly failed in changing traditions. Even, in the period of collectivization, and especially in the 1920s. Traditional clan leaders continued to be quite influential on the local population. Propaganda activities were replaced by mass media (radio, television) and newspapers in the following years. Newspapers founded by Kazakhs in their language did not last long due to censorship or closure. However, newspapers established under Soviet control and published in Russian were supported by the Soviets (Akiner, 1995:255). In other words, all kinds of methods were used to bring Kazakh society closer to Russian culture.

In the collectivization period, even though there was an important mobilization related to education, goals in education could not be realized due to financial difficulties and lack of resources. Especially in the early 1930s, the resources allocated to education were shifted to other areas. In addition, many people were imprisoned or randomly executed because of Stalin's Great Terror campaigns (Olcott, 1995:194). Especially Kazakh educators and teachers were under great pressure. Anyone having a relation to resistance organizations was blacklisted. An education system in this environment of oppression and violence would fail. In addition, at the end of the 1920s, a script change was made in Kazakhstan. The Arabic Script was changed to Latin Script However, this situation did not last long and as a result of Soviet pressures, the Latin script was

abandoned in ten years and was replaced with the Cyrillic script. The most important purpose of these changes was to break the cultural and linguistic ties with Islam and subsequently with the Turkic communities (Kınacı, 2010:1309). This step contributed to the Soviets' control of the Kazakh education system.

In the mid-1930s, the Soviet regime began to examine education activities in Kazakhstan more closely. For this, some groups were appointed to investigate the reason for the lack of progress in education in the country. Although the number of students enrolled in schools was high, especially in rural areas, it has been observed that the number of students going to school was quite low. In addition, male students were more than female students who went to school (Olcott, 1995:195). Due to their traditional family structure, girls had to stay at home for the housework. In addition, the number of teachers was very low and most of them did not have a good education (Olcott, 1995: 195). As a result of some important steps taken during this period, education started to improve somewhat, but this was not enough. By the end of the 1930s, the Soviets made some decisions this time to develop more effective policies that changed the face of Kazakh education permanently. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Communist Party decided on compulsory teaching of the Russian language in Kazakh schools. As the status of the Russian language has been raised, various activities were also carried out to discredit the Kazakh language in society. Smear campaigns are organized against Kazakhstan's national schools, and they were also reduced in number on the pretext that they were educating students against the Soviet government (Kınacı, 2010:1311).

In addition to these decisions, Stalin also wanted to break the bond between the Kazakh people and Kazakh intellectuals to make his policies more permanent. In this period, after the economic war, a political and ideological war became more evident. Stalin's Great Purge policy emerged, and in these years, all Kazakh journalists, teachers, poets, in short, people who kept the values of society alive were killed. In addition, many anti-regime people, affiliated with resistance organizations and members of disbanded parties were killed. These people were called the "enemies of the people" and thus their exclusion from society was justified (Hiro, 2009:54). Thus, the ties between the society and the intelligentsia, which is the most important tool of national education have been

severed. Consequently, the planned assimilation policies gained momentum. Another assimilation policy initiated in this period was that learning Russian provides various privileges. When Kazakh youth learned Russian, they could go to universities or work in government jobs. Although Kazakh people did not want to send their children to these schools at first, this situation changes due to necessity. University-age children are forced to meet Russian. (Bilinsky, 1968:425).

In this way, the assimilation policies that started with separating the Kazakhs from their languages continued for a long time. In the 1970s, it was decided that the lessons in primary and secondary schools will begin with Russian instead of Kazakh. These policies aimed to discredit the Kazakh language in society, demonstrate its uselessness in working life, and the fact that it cannot be used in university. The narrative was that the mother tongue has become a dysfunctional language used only in the family. At the end of the 1980s, when the independence movements emerged, the situation of the Kazakh language began to change and this will be explained in the next change.

2.4. ETHNO-DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF KAZAKHSTAN

As explained in the earlier sections, Kazakhstan was the country affected most by the population policies implemented by the Soviet Union. In addition, Kazakhstan was the most multiethnic state among the fifteen states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Dave, 2004: 2).

The demographic structure of Kazakhstan started to change with a large-scale Russian settlement. This situation first started during the Tsarist period and reached its peak in the Soviet Period (Rather, 2018:25). Russians migrated to the region as merchants, clerks, teachers, civil administrators, and military people and settled in big cities mostly (Rather, 2018:26). Particularly in this period, the separation of the Kazakhs into three chuz made it easier for the Russians to control this region. One of the most important results of these military occupations was the migration of a large Russian population to new lands (Rahter, 2018:26).

The first group that the Russian Empire settled in the northern steppes of the Kazakh lands was the Cossacks. This group was located in cities and towns to strengthen

the Russian presence then they aimed to enforce control by establishing various military, political and economic centers in different regions of Kazakhstan (Uralsk, Semie, Guriev, etc.). With the declaration of Kazakhstan as a part of the empire in the 1860s, Russian peasants began to migrate to Kazakh lands as a part of this colonization.

Towards the end of the 1870s, thousands of Russian peasants settled in Kazakhstan for agriculture. Another reason for the increase in the Russian population in Kazakhstan was the implementation of the resettlement policy of the Russian Empire in 1889. For this purpose, they provided financial support to the Russian peasants to settle in Central Asia and especially in Kazakhstan, and thus the Russian peasants poured into these lands under the state guarantee. They settled mainly on the northern riverbanks such as the Ural River, the foothills of the Altai Mountains, the Ishim, the Tobols, and the Upper Irtysh. By the end of the 1890s, the Russian population in the country had begun to comprise 11% of the total population (Rather, 2018:27). This period, which started with the support of the Russian Empire and resulted in great disasters, especially for the nomadic Kazakh people, brought greater destructions in the Soviet era.

Collectivization (1928-1940), industrialization (1929-1941), and New Economic Policies (NEP) (1921) adopted by the Soviet Union in the early days encouraged many people to migrate for working. In addition, the railways built by Russia in Kazakhstan have made it easy to reach many regions. As a result of these policies, not only farmers but also more educated people, scientists, and people engaged in cultural and artistic activities started to migrate to Kazakhstan. These qualified people played an important role in the Soviet-style modernization of Kazakhstan. As a result of these migrations, changes began to occur in the ethno-demographic structure of Kazakhstan (Rather, 2018:28-29). It is necessary to examine Table 2.1 to see the distribution of the population in Kazakhstan according to ethnicities between 1926 and 1939, which covers these policies.

Table 2.1: Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan: From 1926 to 1939

Ethnic Group	Year			% Change 1926-39
	1926	1937	1939	
Kazakhs	3,627,612 (58.54%)	2,181,520 (42.55%)	2,327,625 (37.84%)	-35.83
Russians	1,275,055 (20.6%)	1,917,673 (37.4%)	2,458,687 (40.0%)	92.8
Total Pop.	6,196,356 (100%)	5,126,678 (100%)	6,151,102 (100%)	-0.7

Due to the Great Famine (1931-1933), there was about a 1.5 million decrease in the population, about 1.5 million. The Russian population, on the other hand, increased by almost 100%.

Parallel to all these periods, the migration of those who escaped from the war or were exiled during the Second World War to Central Asia was another reason which increased the population. Besides, after the Second World War, ‘the Virgin Lands Project’ was realized in 1953 under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. The purpose was to open up the “virgin” steppe lands of Kazakhstan and South-Western Siberia. Especially in Kazakhstan one and a half million Soviet deportees (Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and Volga Germans) were forced to migrate to collective farms (Aitken, 2009:2). As a result, by the 1960s, the population balance had changed in Kazakhstan and Kazakhs finally became a minority group in their own country. The Kazakh population will start to increase only by the 1980s.

Table 2.2: Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan: From 1959 to 1989

Ethnic Groups	Year				% Change 1959-89
	1959	1970	1979	1989	
Kazakhs	2,794,966 (30.0%)	4,234,166 (32.5%)	5,289,349 (36.0%)	6,534,616 (39.6%)	133.7
Russians	3,974,229 (42.7%)	5,521,917 (42.4%)	5,991,205 (40.8%)	6,227,549 (37.8%)	56.6
Total Population	9,294,741 (100%)	13,008,573 (100%)	14,684,283 (100%)	16,464,464 (100%)	77.1

Source: Zubeer A. Rather & Darakhshan Abdullah, 2018.

When we look at the table above, the Kazakh population has started to surpass the Russian population only since 1989. However, if we consider the numbers of other nations, it would be necessary to wait for 1999 for the Kazakhs to constitute more than half of the population.

Table 2.3: Ethnic population of Kazakhstan 1989-1999

	1989 Census, %	1999 Census, %
Kazakhs	39	53
Russians	36	30
Germans	6	2
Ukrainians	5	4
Uzbeks	2	
Tartars	2	
Angars	1	

*Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Source: (Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022)

As shown in Table 2.3, although the ratio of Kazakhstan's largest ethnic groups to the total population began to constitute the majority of the population as of 1999, there was still a significant number of Russian and other ethnic minority populations.




Figure 2.1: The percentage of ethnic population of Kazakhstan 1999-2018

Source: (UNFPA, 2019)

The range of ethnicities by population from 1999 to the beginning of 2018 was shown in Figure 2.1. Kazakhs had higher birth rates due to their family traditions compared to Russians. However, the country's birth rate has decreased, while the death rate has increased. To avert a fall in the Kazakh population by maintaining high birth rates, some precautions have been taken in the post-independence period, such as

government-supported campaigns encouraging childbearing (Kesici 2003:77). The policy of state-sponsored return of Kazakhs living outside the borders of Kazakhstan also contributed to the increase of the Kazakh population in the country and these repatriates were settled in regions with a Russian majority. The World Kazakh Congress was held to provide employment and shelter to the people who returned to the country. With the new Citizenship Law, Kazakhs residing all over the world were automatically granted citizenship. However, all of these caused some problems. The number of returning diaspora members has not been at the targeted rate because the diaspora members did not know Russian and they felt like foreigners to the society and the state did not have enough resources to provide for their settlement.

Besides, there were also those from other ethnic groups who were repatriated to their homeland countries in the former Soviet Union after the dissolution. In short, between 1989 and 1995, the Republican Kazakh population grew by 16.8% due to rising birthrates among Kazakhs, diaspora Kazakh immigration, and substantial emigration of Russians, while the Russian population dropped by 7.4% (Kolsto, 2014:61).

All of these means that the policies implemented by Kazakhstan to increase the Kazakh majority could make the cultural policies of the state more effective and they could be adopted by the majority of the society.

2.5. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN

After the mid-1980s, Kazakh people wanted to have more rights to speak about their future. The replacement of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in name of Dinmuhammed Kunayev by Gennadi Kolbin caused unrest among the people and a group of about 10,000 people (students, Kazakh and Russian Communist Youth League (CYL) members) began to organize demonstrations (events of December, Jeltoksan 1986). There were some prominent banners in this demonstration: ‘Kazakhstan belongs to Kazakhs’, and ‘We exist for Kazakhstan’. The consciousness of Kazakhness among Kazakh people began to form before independence. The existence of a non-Kazakh person at the head of the administration was not accepted by society. The events

were interpreted as mostly anti-Russian, or as an uprising by young Soviet-educated Kazakhs against their Russian elder brother (Hiro, 2009:242).

After these events, the Kremlin noticed its inadequacy in fighting the revolt of the nations under the Soviet Union and decided to continue on its way with reconciliation policies. Central trade monopolies were abolished, and nations were allowed to establish trade organizations and many other relations with other states. In 1988, an official decision to use Kazakh in the social and cultural life of Kazakhstan was the most striking one among the reconciliation policies (Hiro, 2009: 242).

Nursultan Nazarbayev's first step in taking an important role in the future of Kazakhstan was in 1984 when he became the Prime Minister of the Kazakhstan SSR under the leadership of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Dinmuhammed Kunayev. In 1989, he became the First General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan then became the first president of Kazakhstan which declared its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Nazarbayev followed a policy of balance in the country's domestic and foreign policy after independence.

With the collapse of the Soviet system, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states were prepared to abandon Communism and enter the democratization process. However, in this case, one of the obstacles to each state was the emergence of clan communities based on kinship relations, which existed not only physically but also in a mythical dimension. The Soviets tried to eliminate these clans by not allowing them to expand and to pave the way for the modernization of Central Asia, but this could not prevent clan divisions from gaining a place in the political arena. Despite its claims to the contrary, it is seen that the Soviets had failed to transform the building blocks of identity throughout a large Central Asia (Schatz, 2004: xvii). Thus, these clans began to be effective in these countries a few years after the independence. This effect has spread in many areas from the leaders of the state to institutions (Collins, 2004:224). These clans existed both as political actors and emerged as informal identity networks that people strongly embraced.

There is also an informal competition between clans and the aim of striving for their interests (Collins, 2004:224).

According to Schatz (2004), divisions based on kinship relations are rare in modern political life. In a state that is in the nation-state process, local loyalties must be replaced by national loyalties and state institutions must be above local ones. Clan politics are expected less likely to persist into modernity as the state's coercive equipment becomes more complete (Schatz, 2004: xvi).

In Kazakhstan, a political understanding based on sub-ethnic clans has emerged. Kazakhs refer to these sub-ethnic clans as cüz ‘‘zhuz’’. This understanding is based on the separation of the Kazakhs, which we mentioned above, into 3 zhuz. The geographies dominated by these zhuz include the same regions in today's Kazakhstan and are named in the same way (great, middle, and small zhuz). These zhuz are formed by various clans inside. Some elites, for example, Nazarbayev and Dinmuhammed Kunayev are from the Shapyrashty clan within the Great Zhuz that ruled in the South-East Kazakhstan region. Tokayev, who has been the new president of Kazakhstan since 2019, is also from the Zhalayyr clan in the Great Zhuz. There is a conflict, a power struggle, and regional divisions between this three zhuz.

Large protests took place in the city of Janaözen in 2011, long before the 2022 protests. Workers fired from OzenMunaiGaz oil company and their supporters started a revolt in the city of Janaozen in the custody of Mangystau on December 16, 2011. The illegal activities of the authorities, the stealing of the money allocated for the social security of the workers by the governorship and the police, and the long strike of the workers are the most important reasons for the revolt. Nazarbayev and his relatives were protested by the workers, resulting in 14 deaths (Orsam, 04 February 2012).

It is possible to see clan distinction more clearly in the internal conflicts that broke out in Kazakhstan in 2022. Although these events seem to have emerged first for economic reasons, it is also possible to find ethnic and sociological reasons behind them. On January 2, 2022, people who took to the streets of the city of Janaozen in West Kazakhstan shouted, ‘Old man, get out of here!’ (Şal, ket!). They wanted the abolish clan

power of Shapyrashty and the equal participation of all members and clans in the public and financial life of the country (as Nazarbayev's influence in politics and economy never ceased, even though Tokayev was president). These events were different from 2011 because the middle class, which is increasingly dissatisfied with the ruling class, and the clans which cannot sufficiently participate in the economy and politics, began to use the protests for their interests (Independent Turkish, 18 January 2022).

President Kasım Comart Tokayev and other senior officials have changed some situations after these protests. People close to Nazarbayev and very important places in the state were dismissed. Nazarbayev's supporters, who had an important place not only in the state but also in the private sector, were neutralized. Thus, Nazarbayev's Shapyrashty clan began to be purged from the economy, politics, and state administration. Especially big projects were given to companies close to Nazarbayev in that period.

Relations with the West and the Turkic World

Another reason for these protests is due to some of the steps they followed in foreign policy. The oil-rich regions of Kazakhstan are Kashagan, Tengiz, Uzen, and Karachaganak, located in the west of Kazakhstan. Especially Kashagan and Tengiz are substantial for Western companies as they have huge energy fields (Ongarova, 2015: 79). Under Nazarbayev's rule, these areas were sold to western companies and were always seen as a danger to the local population. For example, KazMunayGaz company has a 16.88% share in North Caspian Operating Company Shareholders. The Italian company Annie has almost the same share as KazMunayGaz with a 16.81% stake (Ongarova, 2015:79-80).

After the meeting of Heads of State of Turkic Speaking Countries in 2010, cultural and linguistic actions were arise among the member states (Trt News, 13 January 2022). Especially in Nazarbayev's period, important steps were taken toward the integration of the Turkic world. He had an important role in the establishment of the Turkic Council in 2009 (which became the Organization of Turkic States in 2021). He played a role in holding the Central Asian Heads of State meeting in Astana in 2018. In addition, the name of the most crowded province of Kazakhstan changed to Turkistan in 2018 (Ankasam, 19

September 2018). With these works, Nazarbayev is seen as the representative of İsmail Bey Gaprinskii's idea of unity in language, thought, and work. Especially the transition to the Latin alphabet is an important step for language unity. However, it should be noted that this change should be seen as a part of integration not only with the Turkic states but also with the West. However, we can say that the relationship between the Organization of Turkic States developed culturally and economically, not politically.

Relations with Russia

Kazakhstan's important responsibilities and active roles in the Organization of Turkic States (Turkic Council) (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) disturbed Russia. A possible rapprochement can create major obstacles for Russia to re-establish its dominance over these states. Speaking at the Turkic Council Summit held in 2021, Kazakhstan President Tokayev said "Our goal is to make the Turkish world one of the most important economic and cultural regions of the 21st century" (Yenişafak, 6 January 2022). However, as the protests turned into conflict, President Tokayev requested military assistance from the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia), and upon this, Russian soldiers entered Kazakhstan (Karar, 8 January 2022). This organization, which did not any military assistance to any member state before, has made its first military assistance to Kazakhstan. This situation raised doubt about the supposed geopolitical significance of the Turkic Council for the member states. Only a few days after the protests started Turkic Council published a declaration and expressed their support to give the Kazakh people and government (Organization of Turkic States, 6 January 2022). On the other hand, the security was provided by Russia in the region and this led to the idea that Russia has strengthened its power in the region.

Kazakhstan's decision to switch to the Cyrillic Alphabet in 2018 to complete the process by 2025, reforms such as the increasing the importance of the Kazakh language and the changing in demographic structure, the abolition of the obligation to use the Russian language in public areas such as price tags, traffic signs, billboards (2021) and cooperation with the Turkic World in many fields can be seen as an attitude towards Russia (Özcan, 20 January 2022). Because Kazakhstan stands between other Central

Asian states and Russia geographically, the only way for Russia to reach these states is to collaborate with Kazakhstan (Kenzhetay, 2022).

In the 2022 protests, Nazarbayev's corrupt policies especially in economy and favoritism challenged but the public still appreciates Nazarbayev's cultural policies (Independent Turkish, 2022). During his 18-year rule, he prevented Russia from interfering in the country's internal affairs, even though a large Russian minority resided in the country. Under his rule, there was no ethnic conflict concerning the Russian ethnic minority. All these have emerged as a result of the balanced ethnic policy he followed.

In addition, the principle adopted by Nazarbayev in foreign policy was to establish and maintain friendly relations with foreign states. When he came to power, he gave the message to the whole world that he would take a stance in favor of peace by destroying the nuclear weapons inherited from Russia. It is seen that under his policies there is a balance between Russia and the West. Tokayev so far declared that he will continue the past foreign policy direction. (Ankasam, 9 May 2022).

Contrary to popular belief, Tokayev's attitude towards Russia was also quite different. Kazakhstan has declared that it will not take sides in the Ukraine Crisis, will not accept Russia's demand for soldiers from the Ukraine War, and will not recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Trt News, 22 February 2022). In addition, he emphasized that he did not recognize Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation (Trt News, 2 March 2022).

In domestic events, despite being seen as an example of economic stability in a region that has historically been unstable, Kazakhstan still suffers from severe economic inequality (Unnikrishnan & Mishra, 2022). In addition, there is a dilemma between the legacy of the old rule and the principles of the new rule in the process that seems like Nazarbayev's handed over power to Tokayev. This situation also led to increased resentment among the public against Nazarbayev and his family. Therefore, the new rulers were able to implement their policies by using negative thoughts about it. For this purpose, a commission was established to evaluate the complaints especially on economic inequality, political culture, and human rights. However, it is not possible to say that after

the January events the discontent of the Kazakh people towards the government has changed (Unnikrishnan & Mishra, 2022).



CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we would like to review the literature, regarding the duality of “ethnic vs civic nation”, particularly the concept of “nationalizing states” which was suggested by Brubaker to explain the post-Soviet nation-building. In the literature, Kazakh language policy was assumed to be a part of a project of forming an ethicising state in Kazakhstan or ethnic nationalism. Brubaker argues that Kazakhstan is also a nationalizing state. We will question the sharp juxtaposition between ethnic and civic states and argue that civic states are also based on the ethnic culture of the core ethnic group, in addition to other values chosen by the community in the modernization process. Brown argues that all nations incorporate various degrees and types of ethnic and civic components, and “civic” values or “civic” nations are not necessarily always democratic or inclusive. Civic nations can also be xenophobic and exclusionary. According to Anderson, both “ethnic and civic nations” are constructed through ideological frameworks or based on institutional legacies, as a response to structural problems and inequalities in society. Smith (1987) also emphasizes even “ethnic nations” re-construct symbols and traditions in the modern period.

Kazakhstan does not revive a long-dormant Kazakh culture. Nazarbayev aimed to construct a civic nation, based on a selection of Kazakh past symbols, Soviet values of the fraternity of nations in the context of structural requirements of global political economy and geopolitical location of the country. Evidence for that is he keeps his distance from sentimental ultra-nationalism or ethnocentrism (the idea of Turan- Turkish Unity), and he is parallel to Atatürk. As Atatürk he is pragmatic and aims to consolidate the people within territorial borders based on available institutional or ideological repertoires (millet system, fraternity of nations). According to Brown and Kymlicka, a more democratic nation-state ought to be multicultural, in the sense that it embodies political freedom, equality, and recognition for all ethnic groups within the society.

3.1. NATION-BUILDING THEORIES IN THE POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY: THE 'NATIONALIZING' STATES

Brubaker (1996) uses the concept of 'nationalizing state' to describe the nation-building processes of the Eurasian states that emerged after communism. This definition is important for this study. He calls the states included in this definition nationalizing states instead of nation-states because they have an incomplete structure (Brubaker, 1996:4). After the First World War, multinational or binational states emerged, respectively, such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. These were the last multiethnic states of this type to emerge and subsequently disintegrate (in the first period of the 1990s). After the disintegration of these multi-ethnic states, the political authority began to be reshaped. However, nationalism has always been a part of politics within these states.

According to Brubaker, post-communist states aim to nationalize their states. In these states, the state is accepted to be created for the core nation, explained in ethnocultural terms and which is the titular ethnic group and the core nation is viewed as the legitimate owner of this state. In other words, the state derives its legitimacy from the existence of this group. The understanding and definition of a core nation for post-Soviet states were inherited from Soviet politics. Soviet-successor states have adopted the already existing institutional structures of Soviet republics and declared the latter to be nation-states now (Brubaker, 1996:5).

The fact that this core nation has its state does not mean that it has a strong cultural, economic or demographic position within the state. This weak position is seen as a legacy of discrimination and marginalization by the Soviets before they attained national independence. The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union established Russian dominance over other non-Russian territories, for instance in Kazakhstan, and dominated other nations not only politically and economically, but also culturally, linguistically, and demographically (Brubaker, 1996: 47). Therefore, it is necessary to improve the core nation linguistically, culturally, economically and demographically, to ensure economic prosperity, strengthen its sovereignty and increase its political hegemony. This situation also paved the way for the successor states to try to remove some aspects of the Soviet legacy and to give importance to national development to reverse the discrimination they

suffered. For this reason, formal or informal policies should be implemented by the state, certain organizations, or intra-state or non-state organizations in the social field (Brubaker, 1996:84). For this, it is necessary to examine how cultural, linguistic, or demographic policies carried out to build newly nation in post-Soviet states. Brubaker makes distinctions among nationalizing states. According to him in Kazakhstan, “nationalization (notwithstanding inclusive official rhetoric) has served primarily to strengthen and empower the core nation” (Brubaker, 2011, 1785).

Laurelle also examines the simultaneous existence of ethnic “Kazakhness” and civic “Kazakistani” discourses in the construction of the Kazakh nation. She points out the Kazakh language policy as an example of ethnic nationalism. Both Brubaker, Arel, and Laurelle are keen on placing Kazakhstan as close as possible in the box of “ethnic nation-building”. However, Laurelle does not provide a convincing explanation of how these two arguably conflicting discourses may exist, and which way Kazakhstan will proceed. Kuzio argues that all civic states have ethno-cultural cores. (Kuzio, 2001:136)

We argue that ethnic vs civic distinction is not viable in the post-Soviet context and even in general. What Kazakhstan does is not so much different from many other nations in the world- bringing together ethnic and civic elements.

Nation-building is a process that includes the efforts of states to integrate society and create a national community to become a nation-state. When we look at the nation-building literature, while the first studies were mostly on how nations emerged and were formed, new studies were mostly on how nations were united around the modern state and a sense of belonging and citizenship was tried to be created.

3.2. ETHNICITY AND NATION LITERATURE

According to Hobsbawm (1992), although the nation was generally used to refer to unity or community, it is a fairly new concept with its modern and political meanings. He examines the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy. State, nation, and language terminology in the modern sense was not included in the editions before 1884 in the dictionary. Before 1884, the word nation meant the sum of the inhabitants of a kingdom, but in the dictionary published in 1884, it was defined as "a state or political unit that recognizes a common administrative center above all else" (Hobsbawm, 1992:30-31). In

1925, a new definition was added to the dictionary: “a collective of people of the same ethnic origin, who generally speak the same language and share a common tradition” (Hobsbawm, 1992:31). In addition, the word 'Patria', meaning homeland, was included in the dictionary in 1925: our nation, which includes the sum of the material and spiritual elements of the past, present, and future. The fact that the nation began to be associated with the concepts of state and public has also led to the association of the nation with a land. This naturally meant that each nation would have its nation-states (Hobsbawm, 1992:37).

According to Gellner (1983), the nation is a requirement of the socio-economic transformation of society. Human history has completed three basic phases: pre-agricultural society, agricultural society, and industrial society. In agrarian societies, most communities had a state, but power was determined by status than ethnicity. There are already many states in the industrial society, but this time societies have emerged with a complex division of labor. Therefore, in cases where this division of labor could not occur spontaneously, political power was needed (Gellner, 1983:5). As the relationship between cultural structure and politics began to differentiate there was a need for nations and nationalism.

Rather than socioeconomic factors, Deutsch underlines the transformation in communications as a prerequisite for the emergence of a nation. (cf Erözden, 2013:9). Deutsch differentiates between the public and the nation. The public has several communities, each of which has similarities in their behaviors and ways of communication depending on their cultural characteristics. However, becoming a nation happens at a later stage when the means of communication reaches an advanced level. The criteria for reaching this stage are clear: the rate of urbanization, the number of immigrants, the number of students in higher education, the ratio of the population in the agricultural sector to the active population, etc. (cf Erözden, 2013:10). In fact, these criteria lead us to the conclusion that means of communication can be advanced only in industrial society. According to Deutsch (1966), the purpose of creating a nation is to unite the values of people with different priorities under the framework of a new identity and loyalty to a state.

While these initial studies were on how nations emerged and were created, new studies mostly focused on how nations were united around the modern state, as well as trying to create a sense of belonging and citizenship. Can anyone be a citizen of any country they want? Or should all citizens have the same trait, identity, language, or culture? In other words, should citizens be determined as citizens based on their ethnic identities or should people of different ethnic origins be citizens of the same state? We can find the answers to these questions when we examine the concepts of ethnic and civic nation.

3.2.1. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

Hobsbawm (1992) interprets the formation of nation-states as an important tool for the development of capitalism and its spread all over the world. What could be more effective than nations so that it could spread all over the world? It could not be a coincidence that Europe, which has political pluralism, was chosen for this. In other words, was it because of capitalism that nationalism emerged in Europe and spread all over the world from there? According to Hobsbawm, “economics was at the core of the division of humanity into autonomous nations”. However, this does not mean that the smallest ethnic community can become a nation-state. According to the "threshold principle", nationalities of a certain size (Germany, Italy, and Hungary) should be nation-states. This means that "nationalities" of a certain size, which are likely to have large-scale economies, become states (Hobsbawm, 1992:49). In summary, nations that have enough population and land to advance and expand the capitalist market economy will have the right to independence and self-determination. That is, the principle of nationality is interpreted as legitimate when it tends to unite dispersed groups, and illegitimate when it tends to divide a state. The building of nations was undoubtedly a process of enlargement. This is how Hobsbawm describes the classical period, or the first form, of the type of mass, civic and democratic political nationalism modeled after the type of citizen created by the French Revolution (Smith, 1998:121).

Kohn (1967) also defined Western nationalism with the understanding that citizens are those who reside in the same country and who are subject to common laws. (cf Smith, 1983:62). In contrast to “Western nationalism”, “Eastern nationalism” has an understanding that citizens must share the same ethnic origins, culture, history, and

traditions (Smith, 1983:62). Kohn argues that these two nationalisms must be differentiated from each other.

Smith (2002) also makes a distinction between territorial-based and ethnic-based nations. In “territorial nations” the nation is defined by the powers of the state. A nation is a political and legal concept. So, there are no distinctions among citizens based on race, color, age, gender, or religion in such nations, and all citizens are equal. The territorial state reflects the sovereignty of the nation as an expression of its unity and standardization. (Smith, 2002:178). Smith emphasizes that nation brought something along with it in the Western states where it first emerged: the concept of citizenship. Citizenship in ancient Greece meant a sense of fraternity and solidarity, achieved through active social and political participation (Smith, 2002:179). Similarly today it is not an innate identity such as race, age, and gender, and it only requires a choice such as loyalty to the territory. However, having official citizenship may not always make you feel belonging to the community. Nevertheless, citizenship confers at least legally the right of membership and equality (Smith, 2002:179).

“Ethnic nations”, on the other hand, are based on ethnic ties. (Smith, 2002). In contrast to the ideal citizenship that exists in territorial nations, ethnic nations focused more on demographic bases. Here, unlike citizenship which is the legal framework of identity that territorial nations bestow to individuals, ties are shaped around factors such as genealogy, traditions, dialects, and indigenouness. Traces from the past such as lineages, common roots, myths, and heroic leaders are often highlighted instead of legal rules and institutions as in territorial nations. However, Smith draws attention to a distinction here. The fact that ethnic nations attach importance to factors like customs and traditions does not mean that they do not emphasize laws and institutions. It means that the importance attributed to customs and traditions is the same as the importance attributed to laws and institutions (Smith, 2002:181).

In summary, while the formation of territorial nations around a nation emerges with the idea of creating a common future culture, ethnic nations are identified with common past culture and history (Smith, 2002: 181).

A concept similar to civic nationalism is liberal nationalism in the literature. In other words, it is emphasized that the important thing in national identity is citizenship.

Civic nationalism is a form of nationalism that respects freedom, equality, and human rights, and most significantly, does not accept hostility towards the other. Civic nationalism answers the puzzle we mentioned above as such: Citizens of a state may have different ethnic identities and different cultures, but citizens of a nation-state can still become a nation if they share a common “civic” culture. Therefore, it is not required to emphasize a single ethnic culture or identity when defining a nation. The nation can be associated with the existence of the state. The best example of this is the United States of America. People from different ethnic backgrounds or cultures define themselves as American as their supra-identity (Kymlicka, 1995:12). How would ethnic nationalists react when black and white people constitute the same society? Civic nationalism argues that such differences are not an obstacle to being a citizen of the same country. Definitions such as language, religion, race, color, and gender are insignificant. Michael Ignatief (2006) uses the following expressions while defining civic nationalism; Civic nationalism should consist of all those who are loyal to the political faith of the nation and have equal rights.

Anna Stilz (2009) defines civic nationalism as a political identity built around common citizenship that is only seen in liberal-democratic countries. In this case, there is no need to unite in culture and language, which means the customs and traditions of a particular national group. Stilz only talks about the obligation to support and share political institutions and liberal principles then under these conditions the state should be open to all groups or individuals. Moreover, the state does not intend to serve the interests and superiority of any national group. In contrast, in ethnic nations, the state privileges to majority ethnic identity to maintain its power. For, in an ethnic nation, the legitimacy of the state is not derived from the representation of the will of the nation and the political participation of the citizens, unlike civic nationalism. In ethnic nations, the state gains legitimacy from its ability to protect the nation and develop cultural and social life (Famich, 2012:25-28). In this situation, where ethnicity is based on genetic characteristics, blood ties and all racial similarities, the state applies a policy of assimilation, Kazakhstan does not, to other ethnic minorities to gain the support of the majority and to protect this ethnic unity.

Yael Tamir (1993) argues that the liberal state should see it as a permanent community rather than a coincidental union between the parties to a contract that can

terminate itself at any time. However, according to Tamir, states and nations cannot be divided into civic or ethnic categories, that is, they are somewhere in the middle. They did neither arise from a volunteer community totally nor from a faith. In the modern universe, many individuals are born into a nation or state, so being included in these communities is seen as a matter of faith. However, although an innate membership is gained, this membership remains optional as long as individuals can join or leave. (Tamir, 1993:124).

Smith (1983) argues that the liberal approach of civic nationalism which seems to be based on values such as freedom may be hostile towards other ethnicities in the country. He explains this claim with the example of the Jews living in the French Republic in the 1790s. In a speech made in the French Assembly, it was said that 'as citizens, we offer everything to the Jew, but as a Jew we offer nothing'. In other words, all citizens are expected to fulfill their duties and responsibilities to the state. However, these duties and responsibilities include the obligation to learn the history, literature, and language (French) of the dominant group (host), as well as to recognize its political symbols and institutions. Thus, this Jewish ethnic group was assimilated into French society and was expected to leave behind their own ethnic identity. Although it looks like their Jews voluntarily accepted and adopted French identity the minority group can't be recognized as a member of the society without "accepting being other than themselves". According to Smith, true multiculturalism is possible only when states express that they are in favor of diversity, as well as showing that it is embodied in the institutions and symbols of the state (Smith, 1983:64).

Brown draws attention to certain words of the ethno-cultural nationalism when describing it; 'integral', 'organic', 'ascriptive', 'exclusive' or 'radical', and also authoritarian and collectivist. Besides, when explaining civic nationalism, denoted as 'liberal' nationalism, 'political', 'social' or 'voluntarist' and also democratic and individualistic. So, ethno-cultural nationalism emphasizes the commitment to myths of common ancestors and the confirmation of these myths by contemporary similarities such as language or religion. Common linguistic, cultural or physical evidence that exists in myths also forms the right to the homeland. (Brown, 2000:50).

However, the term 'civic nationalism' refers to a sense of belonging based on the belief of belonging to a common territorial homeland, commitment to its state and civil society institutions, a distinct national character and civic culture, in which all citizens, regardless of their diverse ancestry, form a community in progress with a common destiny (Brown, 2000:51). Civic nationalism also entails the acquisition of ethical obligations, and should not be seen simply as a voluntary association lacking emotional strength, because of this commitment to a shared future, which is linked to the idea of common devotion to the territory and its institutions. This emotive power is frequently defined as civic pride, which serves to elevate the people from a rabble to a nation so that every member of the people shares in its elite status (Brown, 2000:51).

According to Brown (2000), it may be true that some nationalisms, predominantly ethno-cultural, are less liberal than civic nationalisms. However, it is not always or essentially so. For it is not possible to completely separate ethno-cultural and civic nationalism from each other. Just as ethno-cultural nationalisms built on myths of common ancestors will have the chance to continue these claims for the future by determining a vision of common destiny, the understanding of civic nationalism can create a future for itself by making use of the intellectual legacy of public institutions that have been created in the past. Also, both types of nationalism use the language of the family in their mythology and symbolism. Just as ethno-cultural nationalism uses the language of motherland or homeland, so does civic nationalism, but the place they refer to is the place of residence or emigration in civic nationalism while it is the ancestral homeland in ethno-cultural nationalism (Brown, 2000:51). In other words, both nationalisms essentially use the same themes but follow different paths. This makes it difficult to completely separate the two types of nationalism. Kuzio also criticizes the inherent ethnocentrism in the civic vs ethnic distinction, in which Western European nations are classified as civic, liberal, and democratic, while Eastern European nationalisms are lumped together as ethnic, thereby inherently authoritarian (Kuzio, 2001).

A similar civic and ethnic distinction is made by Brubaker in which he points out the *ius soli* principle of French and *ius sanguinis* principle of German citizenship. In a similar vein, Brubaker classified post-Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine,

Caucasian and Baltic states as “nationalizing states” in the sense that their nation-building process involves an ethnification of society and politics.

3.2.2. The Nature of Ethnicity and Nation




Figure 3.1: National identity- the three conceptual languages
Source: (Brown, 2000:5)

We must incorporate the discussions on the nature of ethnicity and nation to analyze the viability of civic vs ethnic distinction and the concept of “nationalizing states” better. There are four main approaches to the nature of ethnicity: primordialism, situationalism, constructivism, ethno-symbolism.

Brown (2000) emphasizes that all national communities tend to believe that their preferential attachment to their communities is a natural consequence. From this point of view, primordialism tries to determine this commitment and tries to explain it with emotional commitment, while situationalism interprets it as a symptom of rational interests and emphasizes that the person makes decisions in line with these interests. Constructivism interprets it as a politically constructed myth (Brown, 2000:5). Ethno-symbolism seeks to synthesize primordialism and constructivism, focusing on the reconstruction of myths, memory, values, and traditions. Smith, a proponent of ethno-symbolism argues that while ethnic nations were based on a core, ancient and persistent ethnic culture, the civic nations are greatly reconstructed in the modern era and can be reconcilable with rational interests and structural requirements of political economy.

Primordialism

What it means by primordialism today is the first and oldest definition used to explain nation and nationalism. Brown (2000) mentions that it is a natural phenomenon for communities to have a preference to be affiliated with a community. The primordialist approach also tries to explain this natural phenomenon. Although it defends different theses from today's nationalism ideology, this way of thinking has also emerged from nationalism itself. It has lost its popularity only as nationalism has evolved into very different meanings today. According to primordialism, ethnic identities are naturally formed, ancient and unchangeable. A person's ethnicity cannot be changed in any way because he/she is born with it. A person is born with an emotional attachment to their native country, linguistically and racially, and cannot destroy this bond even if they want (Brown, 2000:6). So ethnic ascriptions are not related to the choices, and belonging to a nation occurs only with blood ties. This denies any possibility of civic nations. However, primordialism is not found a place itself in the developing and changing world conditions. If the world still stood as it did when it existed if people lived and died where they were born, if civilizations did not interact with each other, maybe primordialism would be justified.

As Suny (2001) mentioned, the world is now becoming a hybrid, free-flowing and unpredictable place. Therefore, it is impossible to find a pure person in this world. Suny cites the Caucasus region as an example. According to him, there are societies in the Caucasus that have been interacting with each other for many years. In other words, there is a common culture, no single language and the societies have migrated constantly. Therefore, it is not possible to mention that pure Azerbaijani, Georgian or Armenian in these regions. For example, Tbilisi witnessed the times of the Armenian majority, but it is now one of the most important cities in Georgia. Likewise, Yerevan used to be a Muslim village, but now it is the most important symbol of Armenian identity.

Situationalism

Ethnicity might be based on primordial ties but it only gained political significance in the modern period. Individuals may define themselves not only by their ethnicity but also by gender, profession, country, or ideology as a second identity. From the situational perspective, these are not innate features, individuals or groups identify and use these

identities in response to situational opportunities or threats. In situationalism, this situation is a rational choice, in other words, individuals tend to turn to the best options for their interests when faced with a threat, even within the group. These options may vary from person to person, but in communities who are living the same culture, these options will be more similar and it is easier to predict in which direction (Brown, 2000:14). Situationalism argues that ethnicity and national identity are the most important weapons that can be used against economic inequalities or to gain power in societies where ethnicity and national identity are seen as an important tool for unity and solidarity.

Constructivism

Unlike primordialism, constructivism does not support the view that nations have existed for a long time. According to constructivism, nations are constructed and national identity is built based on institutional and ideological frameworks (Brown, 2000:20). To create these ideological frameworks, states offer tools with simple identity content that individuals can imagine and construct in their minds. These tools are needed so that people can imagine themselves as a society. States construct national identity by using symbolic tools such as newspapers, television, education, language, myths, epics, and national anthems (Brown, 2000:76). Institutional frameworks have also utilized the frame of national identities. Institutions created by the state itself are used to create a concrete commitment of the society to the state in the nation-building process. For example, when we are talking about the primordialist approach, intangible things such as emotional commitment and blood ties come to the fore, but we can see the concrete outputs of institutions. Passports and identity cards denoting ethnicity are the best example of an institution that constructs an ethnic identity. Even if you claim otherwise, what is valid all over the world is what is written in this document given to you by the state. Anderson interprets this as an invitation to the "imagined community" (Anderson, 1983:163). In other words, a person can join another imagined community with the approval of the states, no matter how different he/she is from different blood, culture, and language families.

This is how institutionalized things can be used in the hands of elites through the state. It is under the control of the states to accept or deny citizenship, even if it is the individual who desires it. However, the identity formalized by the state to which you

belong from birth is given without being asked. Another example of institutionalization is the change of script. States can make these changes to break their ties with another culture or state. For example, Kazakhstan has officially decided to switch to the Latin script instead of the Cyrillic script, which is the script of the Russian language. The main purpose of this is to disrupt the hegemony of the Russian culture and to strengthen its own Kazakh identity. These examples can be used to show how the concrete intervention of states in creating identity through institutions reflects on society. Another example, Turkey had decided to switch to the Latin script to break its ties with the Ottoman Empire and Middle Eastern culture in its first years as the Republic of Turkey.

In addition, constructivism emphasizes that this whole process takes place not by gathering ordinary people, but by gathering the leadership of knowledgeable and educated people in the society. It is not possible to build a nation without intellectuals who adopt this process and guide society. According to Anderson (1983), societies formed "physical reality" in this process, while pioneers take on a unifying role with their knowledge and wisdom. Ultimately, the main goal is to prepare the necessary environment for the social imagination of the nation. But according to Anderson, construction does not mean that nations are fake or invented. The impact of nationalism on societies is a testament that nations are very real in their consequences people are willing to die for all these imagined things. In addition, even if people hate their rulers or the system they are in, even if they do not obey the law or rules, they do not mention the hatred when expressing their feelings towards their nation and country (Anderson, 1983:160). Written sources such as poetry and novels, which are among the most important tools of the nation-building process, are utilized by poets and writers to tell the epics and heroism of their nation. These poets and writers continued to love their homeland and nation even though sometimes they were exiled or imprisoned by the state after criticizing the government. Even if people oppose the system, this does not affect their love for their nation.

Ethno-symbolism

Smith also says a symbolic framework is needed to transform a people into an institutionalized nation, unite them, and give them a sense of belonging. In this way, the community becomes stable and ready to act toward its goals (Smith, 1987:256). As a result, nation-building is not a matter of building appropriate institutions narrowly and

simply. Rather, it is a recurring issue that needs to be refreshed periodically. Each new generation must reshape these institutions in the light of symbols, values, memories, and myths of the past (Smith, 1987:263).

According to Smith (1987), national myths, ethnic origin, and ancestry myths are the most basic requirements for the reconstruction of the community's past. That is, they are terms used in the reconstruction and dissemination of historical motifs. While these are used in nation-building, several different motifs or elements can be revealed. For example, as a spatial origin myth, where the community was born, or as a genealogical myth, who do we descend from, and as a migration myth, where did we come from (Smith 1987:245). Especially the great characters who have done great heroism in history can also be the subject of these myths.

In Central Asia, there is a great rivalry between Kazakhs and Kyrgyz about who owns the Manas Epic. Both sides claim that this epic belongs to their own "ancestry". The subject of the epic is the heroism of Manas Khan. These two states, which claim to be descended from this ancestry, are trying to emphasize that their past is rooted in an ancient place full of heroism. In other words, although an epic may belong to a single nation, community, or related communities, there may be more than one nation claiming rights over it to show its superiority.

In history and even today, many countries or cities stand out with historical objects such as many historical artifacts, buildings, monuments, and tombs, and proud of the heroes who made these works and conquered cities. In addition, to hand down this understanding and the culture to future generations, the names of these heroes are given to various streets and even to areas that are used more by the community such as bridges and cultural centers (Smith, 1987:246).

Kertzer (1988) emphasizes the importance of symbols in nation-building. Symbols are more important in terms of creating a sense of unity in the newly created nations rather than in the old nations. Therefore, not only regimes but everyone in the political arena is responsible for creating cultural policies. Politicians need to create various rituals to emphasize the unity of the nation. Therefore, this new national entity, however culturally artificial, must be given sacred unity and presented as a natural social unit (cf Kolsto, 2014:10).

At the same time, these nations tend to reconstruct or imitate the regimes or empires (Ottoman-Turkey) that they see as their predecessor. According to Hroch (2015), all newly formed states are loyal to their past and see it as a model due to the important heroism, achievements, and characters that took place in their history. Therefore, they do not hesitate to use these elements to create a sense of belonging within the newly created state. In this manner, nationalism is a Janus-faced phenomenon: it is oriented towards the past and future at the same time.

Addressing the cultural rather than the political aspect of nationalism helps to analyze national identity issues more comprehensively. According to ethno-symbolists, the continuity of ethnic groups should be explained by symbolic boundary markers such as words, signs, language, clothes, and architecture, and the way the elites convey these symbols to the public. In other words, symbols, myths, memories, values, rituals, and traditions are very important to ensure the continuity of ethnic groups or ethnic identities. Cultural factors are as much a part of social reality as material factors (Smith, 2009:38).

Symbolic elements of nations, myths, values, and traditions are seen as a phenomenon constructed at some point in history, but they are quite difficult to change after creation. In other words, they descend from myths and symbols that emerged in ancient times and constituted the ethnic core of modern nations, and they have become symbols of nations. (Smith, 2009) Here, the elites present the national identity they are trying to create to the public again by using and interpreting these existing symbols. For example, to reach the majority of the population, elites must choose more promising dialects when creating a new language, consider the most common customs, adopt familiar symbols for political purposes, sometimes modify traditional values, and politicize heroic myths. Therefore, there is a relationship between rediscovery and reappropriation. For this reason, elites constantly mention the concepts that are already in the social memory of the population and examples of heroism from previous periods in the history of the nation or from their cognate ethnic backgrounds (Smith, 2009:54).

According to Hutchinson (1987), cultural factors affect the rise of nationalist movements. In the case of Ireland, he mentions two types of nationalist movements. The first is the political nationalist movement focused on state and sovereignty, and the other is the cultural nationalist movement, which is linked to the creation of a self-sufficient

nation by ethnic people. The importance of the cultural nationalist movement is that the intellectuals revive and present the ethnic community by re-emerging myths and symbols. So, nationalism has great importance in building society not only politically but also ethno-culturally. The changes in national identity usually occur in the material and spiritual periodic difficulties faced by society, but they are revived and renewed in every condition (Hutchinson, 1987:49).

Nations are built through the re-construction of myths, memories, values, and traditions. Deployment of ethnic symbols does not automatically point to an ethnic nation, denial of a civic nation, ethnification of society, or assimilationism. Kazakhstan is following modular nation-building processes bringing together ethnic and civic elements. Reconstruction of Kazakh culture including language is a way for nation-building and by extension state building.

3.3. CULTURAL POLICY AS A WAY OF CONSTRUCTING THE NATION

Nation-states are formed by asserting a uniquely unified culture and history. Cultural policies are always developed to emphasize this uniqueness. When we talk about cultural policy, it should always be remembered that governments, intellectuals, that is, the powers that direct the society, influence the evolution of culture. Culture can develop and spread without states, but there can also be a government, intellectuals, or state hand to create a culture belonging to a specific group systematically and transfer and promote it to different groups. The fact that culture is political means it includes the government planning regarding culture.

They have a great deal of influence and autonomy in their actions, for which they create, distribute and apply culture. While doing this, they emphasize different cultural elements, important historical memories of the past of the society, myths, all persons or elements containing heroism, and strive to ignore historical events that have no effect on the formation of the society or do not contain heroism (Suny and Kennedy, 1999:2).

States carry out cultural policy activities through education, language, religion, and traditions. Because these innovations are always inspired by the past, old states, empires, or historical characters that they see fit to their current purposes or see themselves as their continuation. In other words, these new traditions can be explained as

traditions that are adapted to new situations but formed in forms reminiscent of old situations and that reflect their past and find their equivalent today (Hobsbawm, 2006:3).

Language is one of the most important tools for people to adopt all these cultural policies in the same way and to affect people's daily lives. In other words, if you cannot speak the language of a society, it is very difficult to understand its culture, maybe even almost impossible. Therefore, states do not forget the significant role of language while carrying out cultural policies.

According to Miller and Yudice (2002), when language means that unification in society, other cultural productions are shared in the same way. Therefore, imperialist cultural policies mostly aim to exclude, assimilate other languages or see different languages as equal. Miller and Yudice show as an example that the most important priority of new national entities such as the Basque Country and Catalonia is to adopt their national language. In addition, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in eastern Europe, while each nation was trying to create its nation-state, language politics were carried out first. In its cultural policy, Croatia aimed to eliminate all Serbian remnants that could ruin the new national language. In addition, the states that gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union did not have much choice against the large Russian-speaking minority: Either accept a cultural nationalism that emphasizes the Russian language, set religious, racial, and linguistic criteria for citizenship, or adopt a citizenship policy which offers the rights based on lands, loyalty, and endeavor as in Kazakhstan (Miller & Yudice, 2002:6).

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union was one of the regions where the language was mentioned the most in cultural policies. They carried out many policies regarding language in the autonomous regions or republics under their protection and made many changes to it. Fierman (2009) argues that the Soviet Union created different literary languages in the national republics or regions. In particular, all the dialects spoken in Central Asia are traced to main language families and the dialects gained literary significance by being combined with major languages. As a result, although the types of local speech among family and relatives did not change, it meant that everyone who went to school became versed to speak the same institutionalized public language. Eventually,

the differences between dialects were eliminated and nations were united around a single literary language.

According to Fierman (2009), another issue that reflects the identity of Soviet policies in Central Asia is the script change. Firstly, the Arabic Script, which is a reflection of the Islamic identity, was changed and replaced with the Latin Script. However, this script, which was used for a very short time (10 years), left its place in the Cyrillic Script. This change, which caused the writing systems of the Central Asian languages to become very close to the Russian writing system, also means that it moved away from the European languages and of course the Turkish identity. However, interestingly, the Soviets did not impose this script on the Central Asian Turkic communities as one type. Different letters are used for the same tones in each Central Asian language. The main reason for this was to divide the peoples and their intellectuals who are speaking very close Turkic languages and have close kinship relations (Fierman, 2009:1211).

As a result, we see that the multicultural and multilingual states make cultural policies view a view to increasing political power. In response states such as Central Asian states, after gaining their independence from the Soviet Union, implemented their cultural policies and tried to manage their nation-building processes by making changes in the language, script, and cultural areas to bolster their national identity.

3.4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: RE-CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL CULTURE AND LANGUAGE IN THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

Anderson does not distinguish between forms of nationalism and suggests a universal theory of nationalism. All nation-states imitate the same limited and sovereign modular idea of the nation-state that emerged in the 18th century in South America.

Although constructivism and situationalism put forward different theses, it is not possible to separate them from each other completely. Because, just as a state tries to create its own national identity in the nation-building process, it does for a purpose for an interest. To show itself stronger in the international community or to protect the existence of the state.

- 1- States build nations to respond to geopolitical challenges and strengthen their state power.
- 2- Civic, ethnic, or 'nationalizing' states- all follow a similar mode of nation-building, aimed at bringing together their society around common values, whatever the source of these values.
- 3- There is not an inherently and essentially democratic form of nationalism, it all depends on the ensuing political process.
- 4- State elites construct nations based on reinterpretation and selection of existing ethnic material, so even 'ethnic nations' are constructed.
- 5- Cultural policies such as language policy are an important tool for elites to construct their nation.

CHAPTER 4 A CASE STUDY OF LANGUAGE POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN

Declaring its independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan began the nation-building process to bring the people together, gather them around the state, and create a sense of belonging. As in other Soviet successor states, Kazakhstan had to undertake state and nation-building together. Nation-building was seen as a requirement for a strong state. The main focus of Kazakh nation-building has been reclaiming physical and symbolic spaces, creating a homogenized and evenly distributed population in terms of ethnicity and language management. (Juldyyz Smagulova, 2021). Robust symbolic politics replace concrete changes in the field of language and education, unlike in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.

After independence, Kazakhstan conferred citizenship to all people living in the country, regardless of their ethnic origin. However, it was clearly stated that the nation-building process would be shaped around Kazakh ethnic identity and the position of Kazakhs in the ethnic hierarchy was strengthened (Melich & Adibayeva, 2013:265). The introductory sentence of the current constitution of Kazakhstan proves this:

‘We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historical destiny, by establishing the state on the ancient Kazakh lands, realizing that we are a peace-loving and civil society devoted to the ideals of freedom, equality, and peace, Desiring to take its rightful place in the world community, Being aware of our high responsibility towards present and future generations, Based on our sovereign right, We accept this Constitution.’.

Although there is no direct emphasis on the ethnic origin of the public here, refer to an ancestry myth by indicating that a state was established in the ancient Kazakh lands and it was emphasized that the superiority of the Kazakh ethnic origin of this newly established state and the lands belong to them. In other words, the lands where this state is now established belonged to the Kazakh people for a long time and this is reminded to

all people who are living in the country and citizens of Kazakhstan. From here, we can make inferences that: The cultural policies that will be formed around the Kazakh ethnicity will of course be inspired by the cultures of the Kazakh ethnic origin, not the cultures of other ethnic minorities living in the country. However, it should be noted that there was no discrimination against non-Kazakh people implied in the constitution. Nazarbayev also emphasized that the Kazakh government is going to pursue a united people model without privileging any ethnic group (Melich & Adibayeva, 2013:269). Accordingly, Non-Kazakh ethnic group was an important part of the programs created by state institutions to strengthen civic nationalism and commitment to the state.

4.1. SOVIET LEGACY IN NATIONAL IDENTITY POLICIES

The state's strategy for forming loyalties among non-Kazakhs is based in part on the legacy of past socialist procedures that were fully separated from ethnicity and ethnic identity (Jones, 2019:193). For instance, “national cultural centers” were established especially in the northern parts of the country where the Kazakh population is sparse, carrying out activities to instill loyalty to the new state. According to Bremmer (2013), Nazarbayev aimed to build a strong and united Kazakh state by steadily increasing control over the Russian-majority provinces in the north.

National cultural centers, like many other Soviet and former Soviet state institutions, serve as the foundation for a massive hierarchical system. Local national cultural centers and their leaders are responsible for their local, their parent institutions in regional capitals, and regional level assemblies, which are then responsible to the national level Assembly (Jones, 2019:213). These centers carry out language training, handicrafts and other artistic activities, social clubs, and most importantly ethnic cultural activities for their members under the leadership of the Assembly.

In these centers, active groups are usually young people and children who participate in programs designed to carry out ethnic activities such as their history and language (Jones, 2019:212). These ethnic cultural activities include factors such as wearing ethnic national costumes and singing traditional songs. The main purpose of these activities is to create a place where minority ethnicities can preserve their cultures

and languages in Kazakhstan. However, of course, these activities are shaped according to the norms and goals of the Assembly and hierarchical leaders (Jones, 2019:212).

Another Soviet legacy was the emphasis on ethnic activities and adapting them to daily life. The logic is similar to the organization of socialist labor competitions, which was used to motivate the workforce in the Soviet Union (Jones, 2019: 195). The state organized state-sponsored ethnic activities that promoted ethnic minority culture and invited non-Kazakhs to present their ethnic identity within these national cultural centers, which again reflected a strategy to create loyalty to the state, fostering civic nationalism among minorities, normalize Kazakhstan citizenship in the minds of the people and maintain ethnic peace (Jones, 2019:210).

The role of Islam

In 1989, the revived Alash Horde movement, the first Islamic movement in the glasnost period in Kazakhstan emerged under the leadership of Aron Atabek Nutushyev. He aimed to combine pan-Turkism, Islam, and democracy. However, this formula couldn't achieve the necessary harmony in a multinational Kazakhstan (Hiro, 2009:249). At the state level, in the first years of his presidency, Nazarbayev underlined that they had a joint responsibility with Russia to keep Central Asian states away from Islamic fundamentalism and Iranian influence (Hiro, 2009: 248). This message could not have been given by anyone other than a Kazakh or Kyrgyz leader. For, Islam was not a potential political power in these two countries, as a result, there was no hesitation that such a comment would create reactions in an Islamic opposition. In this respect, Kazakhstan was incomparable to Uzbekistan, in which Islam was at a level that could represent a potential political power.

During the Soviet period, the whole of Central Asia was subordinate to the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, led by a *mufti* located in Tashkent. In 1990, Kazakhs established their spiritual directorate in Almaty, and thus they took the development of Islam under state control (Kolsto, 2019: 126). Therefore, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan could act more fearlessly in using Islam in nation-building projects as they see proper, compared to other Central Asian countries (Kolsto, 2019: 124-125). Even though Nazarbayev is not facing any Islamic opposition, he does have a dilemma that the other Central Asian leaders do not. There is a significant Christian

minority (Kolsto, 2019:126). For this reason, it is not possible to see discourses completely directed toward Islam at the state level.

Islamic days were not celebrated as national holidays and the mufti and the Orthodox archbishop participated in state celebrations or meetings at the same time (Kolsto, 2019:126). But still, it can be argued that as in all Central Asian countries, whose new rulers realized the potential of Islam in contributing to their nation-building efforts, Kazakh leaders also occasionally benefited from Islamic discourses and symbols to bolster their leadership. However, for all Central Asian leaders, nationalism and a glorious historical narrative was the main source of legitimacy. Islam was used only as a carefully controlled complementary resource that appeared when needed (Kolsto, 2019:117).

4.2. CULTURAL POLICIES IN POST-INDEPENDENCE KAZAKHSTAN

4.2.1. History-Writing

The Kazakh rulers realized that their history had to be re-written for the Kazakh identity to be saved from Soviet influence. The works of researchers, suppressed by the so-called Soviet historiographers for years, took their places in the new state's history books.

All historical studies that were banned and censored during the Soviet period were re-examined. However, although Kazakh historians wanted to contribute to the historiography of Kazakhstan by making use of scientific data, mythological history-writing was also widely used in addition to scientific history-writing (Galiev, 2016:47). As noted in an earlier chapter, the re-construction of myths is an important part of nation-building. In these early days of state and nation-building, mythological elements were desperately needed to activate national sentiment. (Galiev, 2016:48).

It is also accepted that the Epic of Manas (which includes a valiant character who is known for his heroism and can defeat the enemy alone) belongs to Kazakhs, not Kyrgyz. Therefore, history writing is mostly used to impose on society where they should see themselves in this history, rather than where and how history is shaped. As a result, anniversaries of famous historical personalities, as well as numerous historical dates and

events, have become quite popular in Kazakhstan. Each of these festivals is intended to demonstrate any society's contribution to the Kazakh people's national history and culture in the hopes of having better access to power or a favorable position in some area for representatives of that tribe (Galiev, 2016:50). What is meant by non-scientific history were those events such as the achievements of ancestors, the golden ages, and military victories, which were generally based on mythological concepts (Galiev, 2016:47-48).

Even more recent events such as, “the December massacre” (the *Jeltoqsan*, that took place against the protests in Alma-Ata, Kazakh SSR in December 1986) became an important part of the national Kazakh official history. It is accepted as a representation of how the Kazakh people fought for their political independence and a rebellion against the Soviet system (Kolsto, 2019:86).

However, history writing is also an area where states are highly selective in the nation-building process. For, some events may not be suitable for nation-building or may not provide the expected mobilization. Therefore, in mythologized historiography, the facts can be hidden from time to time, and sometimes they are not revealed at all (Kolsto, 2019:87). For example although there was no record of any Kazakh tribes in ancient historical sources, the Huns and Scythians that lived in the territory of Kazakhstan until the third century AD was still called Kazakhs (Galiev, 2016:48). In other words, the message is given that the Kazakhs have a deep-rooted history from the past and they are a very old nation.

In addition to these, events were organized to commemorate important characters in history, and public holidays were devoted to commemorating the troubled days of the past. For example, March 31 was declared as the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Pressure and Totalitarian Regime by Nursultan Nazarbayev to remind the oppression of Kazakhs by the USSR (Qırım News, 31 May 2022).

4.2.2. Spatial Re-construction of Nation

As another requirement of language policies, many changes were made in the naming, such as place names from the Soviet Era. For this purpose, the State Forensic Commission was established under the government in 1990 and its activities increased even more during this period. Its task is to prepare proposals for determining the

economic, cultural, and historical place names of the Kazakh language in cooperation with local governments, it is an advisory commission (Gökdağ, 2013:7). For example; The city, formerly known as Chernyayev, was changed to Shymkent and the name of the Aktyubinsk was changed to Aktobe. In Kazakhstan, which has 319 cities in 14 provinces, the names of many places have been changed, and changed many toponyms inherited from the Russian/Soviet period. For example, the capital city was known as Akmolinsk during Tsarist Russia and as Tselinograd during the Soviet period. After independence, the city was named Akmola in the native language. Later, it was re-named Astana, which means capital city in the Kazakh language. After Nazarbayev surrendered his duty, the name of the city was changed to Nur-Sultan in his honor. The name of the city has not been changed yet, despite Nazarbayev's descent from power.

To use history more effectively in nation-building and to include it physically in daily life, significant changes and innovations have occurred in the statues and monuments in Kazakhstan. During this period, monuments from the Soviet era were demolished, and instead, statues and monuments of important people or heroes identified with Kazakh culture and history were built. In particular, the statues in almost all cities of the country contain the horse and the sword, which are accepted as the most important symbols of Turkicness.



Figure 4.1: Kazakh National Hero, Kene Sarı Han Monument (photo by Ahmet Han Kırımlı).

The famous Kazakh hero in the picture, Kene Sarı Han interpreted to have resisted the Tsarist Russian rule because he established a military organization as the leader of the Middle Chuz against the colonial activities of Tsarist Russia and fought for national independence (Özdemir, 2017: 209). In addition to this, statues of Canibek and Kerey Beys, Abul Khair Khan, Abai Kunanbayev, and Tomris Hatun (the world's first female ruler) accepted as historical heroes were also erected. (Figure 3) Tomris (2019) produced by the state company, Kazakfilm about Tomris Hatun's struggles against the Persian King Cyrus also served as a tool for the creation of a common bond among the Kazakh people and ensure the continuity of culture (Isaacs, 2016: 136).



Figure 4.2: Monument to The Queen Tomyris, Nur-sultan, 2022.

4.2.3. National Symbols

Besides, after independence, various state symbols were constructed to emphasize the Kazakh origins and to better integrate them into the society: the national emblem, the flag, and the national anthem. In addition, it is possible to see these cultural and symbolic tools are employed in educational and national institutions (Melich & Adibayeva, 2013:269). A country's flag contains many 'invented' symbols.



Figure 4.3: National Flag of Kazakhstan
Source: (Akorda.kz, 2022)

The light blue color of the flag refers to the reflection of the traditional shamanist religion of *Köktengri*. The yellow stripe on the left side of the flag is a symbol of the Golden Horde, which is considered one of the ancestors of the Kazakhs. The yellow sun in the middle of the flag represents peace and development. It refers to the development and growth of all nations living under this flag in peace and harmony. The steppe eagle that spreads its wings, on the other hand, expresses independence and freedom. Demonstrably, the flag represents Turkicness, freedom, and independence. A striking point is that the crescent and star symbolizing the religion of Islam, which are found in other Turkic states (Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), are not found on the Kazakhstan flag. Thus, unlike the Turkish states, Kazakhstan did not try to instrumentalize religion in creating a national ideology and rather included traditional symbols (Melich & Adibayeva, 2013:269).



Figure 4.4: National State Emblem of Kazakhstan
Source: (Akorda.kz, 2022)

Another symbol is the National Emblem of Kazakhstan. Shańyraq, which means the part on the upper dome of the "yurts", known as the traditional Turkish tent, has been accepted as the national emblem of Kazakhstan. Horses on both sides of the emblem take place in Turkish mythology and represent courage. In addition, the Kazakh script on the emblem was written as "ҚАЗАҚСТАН" in Cyrillic Script in 1992, but in 2018 it was changed into Latin Script as "QAZAQSTAN" 2018 (Official Website President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021). Another national symbol, the national anthem of Kazakhstan, has been changed twice. The Soviet national anthem was changed in 1992, and this 1992 anthem was amended in 2006. There are some differences between the anthem adopted in 1992 and the anthem in 2006. The last stanza of the 1992 Anthem refers to the future aims:

*Talaıdy ótkerdik, ótkenge salaýat,
Keleshek ğajatyp, keleshek ğalamat!
Ar-oıdan, ana til, ónege-saltymyz,
Erlik te, eldik te urpaqqa amanat!*

Hardships served us bitter lessons

But now a bright future is ahead.

Our language, our culture, our sovereignty

Shall be passed down to future generations!

The importance of mother tongue and traditions is emphasized in the national anthem. Some lines of the national anthem adopted in 2006 are as follows:

*Daŋqymyz syqty ğoi,
Namysyn bermegen,
Qazağym myqty ğoi!*

*Birligi jarasqan,
Täwelsiz elim bar.*

Our heroic glory emerged,
They did not give up their pride
My Kazakh people are strong!
Its unity is proper,
I have an independent country.

In general, both anthems have an epic atmosphere. Nevertheless, the Kazakhs are portrayed as the ancestors of the nation, as natural epic heroes of state formation in the 2006 anthem (Melich & Adibayeva 2013:269).

4.3. LANGUAGE POLICIES OF KAZAKHSTAN

4.3.1. The Soviet Language Policies

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union began to systematically implement language policies in Central Asia and other successor states. During the Bolshevik Revolution, due to the literacy rates being quite low in Central Asia, they started to concentrate on language policies. These policies were to use language as a manipulation tool and aimed to pave the way for the creation of a Soviet State. (Grenoble, 2003:138). Soviet language planners purposefully manipulated the importance of language in ethnic identification. They began a carefully choreographed campaign of individuating each Republic's language and dialects, ensuring that they were as unique as possible (Stalins's saying "every nationality had its language") (Grenoble, 2003:138). For this purpose, they tried to prevent the Turkic communities from communicating with each other by developing the various Turkic dialects as separate languages. Soviet administrators, on the other hand, claimed that these newly created languages would be

insufficient in scientific and cultural events, so Russian should be used and they worked to make Russian a common language in every field (Oktay, 2008).

The aim of a common bond uniting the Soviet people was attributed to Russian and it was thought that it would bring closer the nations living in the USSR (Fierman, 2006:98). The Russian language's historical dominance is attributable to Russian culture's larger dominance, as well as the varying degrees of russification, which occurred during the last two centuries (Schatz, 2004:54). However, the consequence of these policies was not the emergence of a common Soviet-Russian identity but different Central Asian nations (such as Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kyrgyz) (Grenoble, 2003:138).

Table 4.1: State Documents of Kazakhstan in Language Policies

Language Policies	Years
The Language Law of Kazakhstan	1989
The Kazakh Language Institutions	1989
Ana Tili Gazeti	1990
The Committee on Languages	1993
Bolashak International Scholarship	1993
The Language Law of Kazakhstan (Another)	1997
State Program on Language Functioning and Development	1998
The Second State Program on Language Functioning and Development	2011-2020
KAZTEST	2006-
Electronic State Library Collection of Kazakhstan	2007-2009
The Trinity of Language Project	2008
Serpin-2050	2014
The Digital Kazakhstan	2017
New Humanities Education 100 new textbooks in the Kazakh language program	2017
The National Program for the Implementation of Language Policy for 2020–2025	2019

Table 4.1. provides a summary of the language policies that Kazakhstan has formed from independence to the present. These policies will be discussed in more detail below.

4.3.2. Language Policy in the Early Years of Independent Kazakhstan

Following their independence, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan understood the” language policies were the most important requirement for being an independent state. Languages were first guaranteed by the

constitution, and later became the focus of nationalist policies. In other words, they created some policies to improve national languages instead of Russian.

To understand the language in Central Asia, many studies have been carried out. According to Aminov and Jensen. The language was an important aspect of Kazakh identity, according to both Kazakh and non-Kazakh elites (Hiro, 2009:239). However, the influence of the Russian language in daily and business life and education could not be ignored (Oktay, 2008).

Over 80% urban population of Kazakhstan was literate in Russian at the end of the Soviet era. Even though Kazakh was declared Kazakhstan's single "state language," only 10-15 percent of the population was literate in Kazakh. In addition, as a result of Soviet policies, the requirement of speaking Russian to go to university, be a public servant, and have a good position in the state caused even the older generation to break away from their language (Fierman, 2006:101). Because of these Soviet policies, most of the urban Kazakhs were culturally 'Russianized'.

The first step in the activities of extensification Kazakh language is the 1987 Republican Party and Government Decree, which promises to facilitate Kazakh students' learning of Kazakh in schools. It is one of the most important steps taken to increase the status of the Kazakh language, but there are many political reasons behind it. It was taken to avoid the reaction of the public and other nationalist intellectuals when the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, D. Kunaev, who was ethnically Kazakh, was dismissed and replaced by a completely ethnic Russian.

The Language Law of Kazakhstan was adopted in 1989. With this law, Kazakh was given the status of the state language, while Russian remained the status of the 'language of cross-national communication'. However, we can easily say that Russian is inferior to Kazakh in terms of status only on paper. Because at that time, Russian was still dominant in almost every field from media to education. In addition to the language of science, education, and culture, Russian also had a very high status in the international arena and was attractive for international communication. It was one of the six working languages of the United Nations (UN) and was the only language that all former Soviet states could speak as a common language (Badem, 2012:8).

Article 2 of the law states that the “Kazakh language is under state protection and the Kazakh SSR ensures its active use in state bodies, social organizations, educational, cultural, scientific institutions and many other fields” (Urakova, 2014:99). The law has made Kazakh a compulsory subject next to Russian in educational institutions at all levels. Although the implementation of the language law was delayed in the first years, it became the main topic again in the Council of Ministers in 1992. The most concrete decision was the creation of official documents in the state language (Kazakh).

The Kazakh Language Institution was founded in 1989. It has been active all over the country and has published various articles and organized symposiums every year for the development and advancement of the Kazakh language (Gökdağ, 2013:7). In the language programs that were tried to be implemented in 1990 and 1996, it was suggested that the government, ministries and government departments, as well as local representatives and executive bodies, should have a command of the state language according to the business needs (Lee, 2004:108). As a result of a few ineffective initiatives, it was aimed to reduce conflicts between ethnic groups by adopting a soft attitude on employment and higher education needs.

In addition to state policies, *Ana Tili Gazeti*, which has an important responsibility for the development and dissemination of Kazakh, was published in 1990 as the national newspaper of Kazakhstan. In particular, Kazakh intellectuals highlighted the Kazakh identity through this newspaper. Not only political elements were included in the newspaper, but also Kazakh culture was frequently included, and the own cultures of Kazakhs were instilled through this newspaper (Saraç, 2019: 116).

The ‘Committee on Languages’ was established under the Cabinet of Ministers in April 1993, and was the first government entity with primary authority in this field (Fierman, 2005:412). Article 7 of the 1995 Constitution, which is another important step in language policies and was adopted by referendum: 'Kazakh is the state language in the Republic of Kazakhstan' and 'Russian can also be used officially in state institutions and local government bodies along with Kazakh' (Urakova, 2014:100).

4.3.3. Problems of Development of Kazakh Language Use

Aminov & Jensen (2007) wanted to determine with a survey study how much Kazakh language is spoken in the regions where Kazakh people live densely, compared to Russian. Russian was preferred more than Kazakh in almost all fields. We cannot say that this is just because of the state's policies because the preferred language in the family and among friends was mostly Russian. These statistics, of course, belong to 12 years ago, and the purpose here is to describe how people have changed in a few decades since independence. However, we can say that 20 years after independence, the majority of the population still could not get rid of the influence of Russian, especially in social life, and Kazakh is of secondary importance.

Table 4.2: Primary language used by % of the population for various purposes in Kazakhstan

	Kazakh	Russian	Other
Watching TV, reading newspapers	29	79	2
In public places	35	79	2
At work-places: companies, learning institutions	33	73	3
With friends	36	72	3
Within the family	44	60	6

Source: (Aminov & Jensen, 2010)

The Kazakh government could not formulate its policies in education, language, and culture by considering a single ethnic group because it had to create policies that will respond to the demands of the Russians and other ethnic groups living in the country, whose numbers will not be underestimated. It was necessary to demonstrate that they attend to the diversity of languages spoken in the country.

Table 4.3: Language diversity in Kazakhstan

<i>Number of native speakers of language</i>	<i>Number of languages this size</i>	<i>Languages</i>
>1,000,000	2	Kazakh, Russian
500,000 to 1,000,000	0	
250,000 to 499,999	4	German, Tartar, Ukrainian, Uzbek
100,000 to 124,999	3	Belorussian, Korean, Uyghur
50,000 to 99,999	3	Azerbaijani, Polish, Turkish
25,000 to 49,999	6	Bashkort, Chechen, Dungan, Kurdish, Plautdietsch, Tajiki
10,000 to 24,999	7	Armenian, Chuvash, Greek, Erzya, Ingush, Kyrgyz, Romanian
5,000 to 9,999	7	Bulgarian, Georgian, Yiddish (Eastern), Lithuanian, Mari, Romani, Udmurt
1,000 to 4,999	13	Avar, Balkar, Czech, Dargwa, Karakalpak, Komi-Permyat, Lezgi, Mandarin, Osetin, Farsi, Crimean Tartar, Turkmen
<999	22	Abkhaz, Adyghe, Aghul, Altai (Southern), Arabic, Assyrian, Burlat, Gagauz, Kalmyk-Oirat, Karelian, Khakhas, Komi-Zyrian, Kumyk, Lak, Mongolian, Nogai, Pasto, Rutul, Shor, Tabassaran, Talysh, Udi
Unknown Number of Users	2	Kazhak Sign Language, Russian Sign Language
	69	

(Reagan, 2019:443)

As can be seen in Table 4.3, Russian and Kazakh are spoken by a large number of people, while other languages are spoken by fewer people. However, in terms of linguistic diversity, the number of languages spoken in Kazakhstan is quite high however the ratio of languages other than Kazakh and Russian to the total population is only 13.2%. Rapid demographic changes in the last two decades have had important consequences. As the demographic structure of Kazakhstan began to change in favor of Kazakhs, it also affected the basic features of the language situation. Therefore, communication is mostly shaped around Russian and Kazakh (Aksholakova & Ismailova, 2013:1581).

According to Dadabaeva and Adilbayeva (2010), three different interests are involved in making the language policy. The first is the Russians who want to preserve the supremacy of the Russian language, the second is the Kazakhs who want to bring the Kazakh language to a superior position, and the third is the state that does not want to disrupt the stability of Kazakhstan, which has multiple ethnicities (Dadabayeva & Adilbayeva, 2010:129).

According to Fierman (2006), one of the biggest obstacles to the Kazakh government's positioning of Kazakh as a superior language is demography, cultural and linguistic assimilation of Russians, and mixed schools (Fierman, 2006:99). He considered them the most important problem in language policies. We discussed demographic factors in Chapter 1.

Mixed schools are where both Russian and Kazakh secondary education are given together in cities. These schools were seen as an obstacle to the Kazakh generation's learning and effective use of the Kazakh language. Most of the students who were educated in both Russian and Kazakh in these schools continued to speak Russian outside of school. For this reason, many important figures in the Kazakh government and especially the minister of education argued that instead of closing schools in Russian, mixed schools should be closed and they should provide education as separate institutions. In other words, Kazakh children should be educated in Kazakh and Russians should be educated in Russian (Fierman, 2006:103).

President Nursultan Nazarbayev also argued that if Kazakh can be used as a common language throughout the country, first of all, ethnic Kazakhs have to learn Kazakh as a mother language. Therefore, he agreed with the idea of separating Kazakh schools from Russian schools to encourage Kazakh children to speak Kazakh with each other. Still, the new generation did not hesitate to send their children to mixed schools. The schools based on Kazakh culture and history were more attractive to the Kazakh people who were not familiar with Russian culture, and who immigrated from the rural side of the city (Fierman, 2006:104). Moreover, it was necessary to make large investments to increase the benefits and prestige of speaking Kazakh because the economic advantages of speaking Russian were still quite high. The Russian-speaking people still earned more. The results of the cultural and linguistic assimilation of the Russians forced the independent Kazakhstan government to implement additional language policies.

The Kazakh government has started to put forward different policies regarding language over time. Language-related local offices have been established and disbanded at various times and the governor has shifted as well. However, despite all these measures, as a result of the evaluations, it was concluded that Kazakh still has not gained state status and a system that allows the language to be learned in every region of the country has not yet been formed and different steps have been taken for more effective decisions.

In 1993, Bolashak International Scholarship was established by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to educate talented students at the best universities in the world. It offers scholarships to study for Master's and Ph.D. as well as

internships for engineering, medical, and teaching. Throughout the whole period of its realization, Bolashak Scholarship has been granted to 11.126 Kazakhstan citizens to study in the 200 best universities in 33 countries (Bolashak.gov.kz, 2022).

In 1997, The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages, the second language law was accepted. Although this law includes the same regulations as the previous one, it has introduced some new regulations. It was emphasized again that Kazakh is the state language of Kazakhstan and Kazakh is the official language of not only the administration but also the legislative, judiciary, and state offices in all Kazakhstan territories. In particular, in Article 8 of the Constitution, the usage areas of language are detailed: State language, correspondence of state organs are prepared and approved in the state language, titles such as the language of correspondence in official documents, the language of responding to the petitions of citizens, the language of the court, the language of reconciliation are regulated (Sazayeva, 2017: 38). In addition, it was decided to use Kazakh together with Russian in the army, which was not included in the first law (Badem, 2012:11). In the decree on the spelling of surnames signed by Nazarbayev in 1996, it was allowed to replace the suffixes such as -ov, -ev, -ova, -eva with words such as -ulı (son). Thus, many Kazakh names and surnames changed (Gökdağ, 2013:6).

In addition, every citizen who was born in the Republic of Kazakhstan, who has completed at least 40 years of age, and who has resided in Kazakhstan for the last 15 years and can freely use the 'state language' (Kazakh language) can be elected President (Article 41/2). In other words, according to the article, to be the President, it is required not to be of Kazakh ethnic origin but to be able to speak Kazakh. It has also been emphasized that everyone who is a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan has the responsibility to master the state language (Urakova, 2014:100). The requirement in the constitution is that the heads of the Assembly and Senate, as well as the President, should be fluent in Kazakh is another regulation that paves the way for Kazakhs to be appointed to these positions.

The National Committee on Nationality Policy started to work on language issues. In 1997, the task of Coordinating Language Policy was under the Ministry of Education and Culture but in the same year, this task was transferred to a different ministry. The fact

that the task of coordinating the language has been transferred to different individuals and institutions over the years had a negative impact on language policies and prevented it from gaining stabilization (Fierman, 2005:412).

First State Program of Development and Functioning of Languages (1998)

‘State Program of Development and Functioning of Languages’ was adopted in 1998 by order of Nazarbayev and it started to be implemented between 2001-2010. The purpose of this program is to provide state support for the solution of the language problem in society to provide suitable conditions for other languages and the state language in the Republic of Kazakhstan. In particular, the research of terminology, place names, and the administration of state affairs based on the state language had an important place (Gökdağ, 2013:6). This time, the program would be followed by the state for better results and the results would be shared with the relevant ministry at regular intervals. Thus, they aimed to achieve more concrete and visible changes regarding language policies. Progress reports were submitted to the ministry. Minorities (Jewish, Korean, etc.) started to learn Kazakh in institutions where they have education in their language. Russian 10th and 11th-grade students started to take additional lessons in the Kazakh language in 1999.

State language education has started to be given at certain times a week for the kindergartens. In all Russian departments of Northern Kazakhstan University, the number of hours allocated to the Kazakh language almost doubled in 1999 (Gökdağ, 2013:6). Also, in 2000, more than 50% of the students studying in Kazakhstan started to study in Kazakh. In 2004, this rate increased and became 56%. We can understand the importance of this increase since this rate was 30% in the early 1990s (Sazayeva, 2017:46). Among the targeted studies, there is the creation of legal conditions for the development of the state language, the use of the state language in almost every field, especially the Kazakh language in the field of education and training. For this purpose, various competitions occurred for many years, and awards were given by the Languages Committee of the Ministry of Culture. Some of these competitions are the best teacher of the Kazakh language award, the best translator competition, the Abay readings competition (the poems of the important Kazakh poet Abay Kunanbayev), and the Republic competition

for the State language in Public Service (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:123).

Kazakhstan aimed to raise the status of the Kazakh language against Russian, especially in education and other fields (i.e. other public institutions) but they did not ignore the importance of Russian. Since Soviet times Russian was the language of science, politics, and the state, whereas Kazakh was the language of culture and the arts (Schatz, 2000:86). Unlike the first years of independence, the Kazakh language began to be used more effectively in literature, culture, and art but also in other fields. Despite all this, it was not possible to talk about a Kazakh-based Kazakhstan in the first decade of independence.

4.3.4. Multiculturalist Language Policies

According to Lee (2004), there are some policies implemented by the Kazakh government that contribute to the development of harmonious relations between ethnic groups. Kazakh authorities have a strategy of creating divergent messages. First of all, to prevent possible conflicts that may arise between ethnic Russians and Kazakhs, the names used in the policies are determined in a way that is ambiguous and can be interpreted with different meanings for both sides. Because the wishes of both sides were different. Nationalist Kazakhs favored Kazakh as a single state language, while ethnic Russians who are living in Kazakhstan desired a law on multiple legal languages. That is, the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan adopted the Russian title ‘Law on Languages’ (*Zákon o iazykakh*) in the plural form in 1989, meaning that the law applies to a variety of languages.

On the other hand, this title was given the Kazakh name ‘Law on Language(s)’ (*Til turaly zang*), which makes it unclear whether it deals with one or multiple languages (Lee, 2004:107). Therefore, the Kazakh title used in this law may lead people to believe that the Language Law depicts Kazakh as the only state language. This shows that vague titles are used in official areas to avoid ethnic conflicts in Kazakhstan. According to Lee (2004), another strategy was not denominating the languages under the titles. Whether to maintain Kazakh or Russian as the state language has always been a matter of contention because it is seen as an issue of ethnic conflict. However, the Kazakh government seemed

to have succeeded in overcoming this problem with various word games without turning it into real conflicts. In addition to the concepts of the state language and official language, they used new language titles such as ‘the language of international communication’ (Lee, 2004:107). In the 1993 and 1997 Constitutions, Kazakh was the only state language. Russian, on the other hand, has been given the status of ‘cross-national communication’ (it will be explained in more detail below). Of course, it is not easy to explain what is the difference between these two statuses.

The areas where a smooth transition was pursued in language policies were employment and higher education. According to Lee (2004), another reason for Kazakhstan's lack of violent ethnic conflicts can be attributed to the effective resolution of previous confrontations between Kazakh nationalists and ethnic Russians over language requirements for employment and education. While Kazakh nationalists argued that there should be compulsory language requirements for entry to higher education and employment (all officials in government positions should have proficiency in Kazakh), ethnic Russians argued that there should be no linguistic requirements.

One of the most important issues is how to encourage Kazakhs to speak their language without breaking the bond between ethnic Kazakhs. (Lee, 2004:109). Despite Kazakh being the ethnic language of Kazakhs, many Kazakhs can speak only Russian. In particular, Kazakh nationalists claimed that Kazakhs who do not know their mother tongue could not be Kazakhs and they even called the children raised by only Russian-speaking Kazakh parents “orphan Kazakhs” (Lee, 2004:109).

However, in many parts of the country, the implementation of language programs of developing the use of Kazakh in daily life and education was not strictly monitored or left to sub-units such as municipalities and committees. In some regions, the measures were only implemented where the Kazakhs live intensely (cf, Urakova, 2014:99). The northern part of the country was dominated by the Russian population and the Kazakhs had superiority mostly in the southern parts. As a result, the implications of a federally enacted language policy could be vastly different from one region to the next (Lee, 2004:109). Therefore, it is possible to say that there are still regional approaches to the implementation of state laws and the most important factor in this was the demographic structure of Kazakhstan. For this purpose, there is a project of Nazarbayev, called

‘*Oralman*’. *Oralman* means ‘‘returnee’’ in Kazakh and is used by Kazakh authorities to describe ethnic Kazakhs who have re-migrated to Kazakhstan since independence. *Oralman* usually comes from the neighboring countries of Mongolia, China, Uzbekistan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan. The government prefers to settle those who came from Mongolia in the North of the country, and offers them more benefits to resettle there; however, returnees themselves prefer regions such as the south where the Russian language is less important in everyday life. This project was called ‘*Nurly Kosh*’ (‘*Blessed Migration*’) since 2008.

Although Nazarbayev advocated that Kazakh has to be the state and the most spoken language in the country, he has repeatedly stated that using drastic and too forceful actions to promote Kazakh risks alienating Kazakhstan's population with limited or no knowledge of the language (including many Kazakhs) and would create major economic ramifications (Fierman, 2005:411). For this reason, he emphasized that while forming his policies, it is necessary to target future generations rather than adults and Kazakhs must do this first to be able to ask other ethnic groups to speak Kazakh. He even emphasized Russian can be regarded to have a unifying power which might be needed in a period of nation-building and the Kazakh language needs time to gain a unifying power and this process should not be rushed (Fierman, 2005:411).

At the meeting held in 2003 for the development of the state language, it was emphasized that according to the information given about the current situation of Kazakh, the desired position in the state language has not yet been reached and more works need to be done for this purpose. At the meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs Imangali Tasmaganbetov said,

‘The way to expand the use of the language is to create a list of positions that require compulsory speaking of the state language. Therefore, this list should be compiled as soon as possible, approved by law, and submitted to Parliament if we can legislate it this year. We should get this list early next year. Especially in social services, the number of experts who know the language of the state is very few. (Azattyq, 30 September 2003)’.

It was emphasized that the use of the state language should be increased, especially in the field of education and science. However, the biggest obstacle to this is

that textbooks and scientific literature are in Russian and there is almost no scientific literature and textbooks in the state language. The creation of a program for the translation of works that have become world classics in many sciences into Kazakh was also important (Azattyq, 30 September 2003). The same problem has been experienced in Turkey after the Latinization of the script. In particular, all textbooks had to be printed with new letters, and many works needed to be translated into Turkish, which took a long time. (Taşdemirci, 2009).

Some results of the first stage of the State Program for the Development and Functioning of Languages are as follows; The number of kindergartens in the Kazakh language increased to 1178, the number of Kazakh language schools to 3821 (there are 1524 in Russian, 58 in Uzbek, 14 in Uyghur, 2 in Tajik and 2097 mixed schools) and 110 state language learning centers were opened. The number of school education in two languages is 808. In addition, the rate of documents used by the state in the Kazakh language was 67% and the rate of Kazakh language in the press has exceeded 50% (Sazayeva, 2017: 50).

According to a decision in 2005, the cities of Almaty and Aktobe would gradually start doing business in the state language. Sherubai Kurmanbayevich, Deputy Head of the Language Development Department of the Ministry of Culture, Information, and Sports, emphasized that the Kazakhization of these regions is planned within the state program (Azattyq, 23 December 2004). In 2006, KAZTEST (Kazakh Language Knowledge Level Assessment System) was established by the National Examination Center to evaluate the Kazakh language level of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan and foreigners. KAZTEST is a Kazakh knowledge level assessment system that complies with the requirements of international grammar assessment systems such as TÖMER, which is made to measure Turkish proficiency, TOEFL, and IELTS, which is made to measure English proficiency (QAZTEST, 2022).

Within the scope of the state program on "Reducing Information Inequality in the Republic of Kazakhstan" planned between 2007-2009, the National Academic Library of the Republic of Kazakhstan carried out the "Electronic State Library Collection of Kazakhstan" project of the Ministry of Information and Culture. Thus, it contributed to the enrichment of the digital literature network and made easier access to the information.

In addition, the Digital Kazakhstan state program adopted in 2017 contributed to the increase in the number of electronic libraries and books (Akhmetova, 2021).

Between 2007 and 2011, the traditions and customs of the Kazakh people were presented to the audience in about 130 broadcasts in the state language to promote the latter. In addition, approximately 630 articles were published in the media between 2009 and 2011 to make language policy propaganda (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:123).

4.3.5. English as the Third Component of Language Policy

Nazarbayev mentioned the importance of English in various speeches in the 1990s on this subject and emphasized that it is impossible to adapt to the world society without knowledge of English. Furthermore, he stressed that the English language is given higher prominence in conformity with modern necessities and globalization (Aksholakova & Ismailova, 2013:1581). In a speech in 2007, he said that “Kazakhstan should be seen as a highly educated country that speaks three languages. Kazakh as the language of the state, Russian as the language of international communication, and English for successful integration into the global economy” (Terlikbayeva & Menlibekova, 2021:15).

After this speech, the "Trinity of Language Project" was accepted in 2008. However, in the first years, there was no significant development on this issue. In his speech in 2011, Nazarbayev said, "We aim to increase the rate of those who can speak the state language to 80% by 2017, and to over 20% by 2020." Arrangements have been made for this purpose. Science and computer classes will be in English. It is aimed to train and increase the number of educated people who can teach these courses in English. In addition to being a medium of international communication, English is also seen as an antidote to reduce the effect of Russian. English was also seen as the language of successful integration into the world economy and science so that the Kazakh economy can meet the needs of globalization more (Aksholakova & Ismailova, 2013: 1581). The fact that Kazakhstan is also rich in natural resources and wants to open up to the world in international trade has pushed it towards English. The combination of Kazakh, Russian, and English as language options on all official websites in Kazakhstan is evidence of the importance given to English. However, we should not infer that Kazakh has equal status

to Russian or English. While Russian and English are seen as mostly used for international targets, Kazakh has a unique and incomparable value for the legitimation of the state and national identity.

Second Phase of the State Program of Development and Functioning of Languages

In 2010, the second State Program of Development and Functioning of Languages, covering the years 2011-2020, was accepted. This program was also divided into three stages 2011-2013, 2014-2016, and 2017-2020 (Kulzhanova, 2012:19). One of the main aims of this program is to develop a unified language strategy that ensures the full functioning of a state language as the most significant component in building national unity and preserving the languages of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018). The main topics that the program aims to solve are as follows;

1. improvement and standardization of methodology of training in a state language
2. development of infrastructure of training in a state language
3. stimulation of the process of training in a state language
4. increase in the prestige of the use of a state language
5. increase in demand for a state language
6. improvement and systematization of lexical fund of Kazakh
7. improvement of language culture
8. functioning of Russian in communicative and language space
9. maintaining language variety in Kazakhstan
10. studying English and other foreign languages. (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018).

The standard, legal, and methodological basis for further functioning and development of languages were improved in the first stage (2011-2013) which included work on improving standards of training in a state language, development of a legal basis for accreditation of Kazakh training centers, and implementation of rating assessments of their activity were carried out (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018).

In 2011, a great increase was observed in the number of Kazakh correspondences between state bodies, preschool institutions in the Kazakh language, other schools, and Kazakh periodicals. Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and Science has consistently emphasized the importance of Kazakh: Kazakhstan places a high priority on the advancement of the Kazakh language. Kazakh language learning centers have opened across the country in central and local executive bodies as well as universities; Compulsory language learning courses, Kazakh language recordkeeping, and level-based teaching of the state language in basic and secondary general education schools have all been implemented (Reagan, 2019:445). In addition to these, it is required to be successful in the Kazakh Language Exam to graduate from high schools and universities.

The program's (2011-2020) major purpose is to implement a unified language policy that ensures the full functioning and application of the state language as the most significant component in strengthening national unity while also preserving the languages of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (Baimyrza, 2022:253). On the way to achieving these objectives, the program has specified the following tasks; Improving language culture, raising the status of the use of the state language, improving and systematizing the lexical fund of the Kazakh language, preservation the functioning of the Russian language in the communicative language space, teaching and learning of English and other foreign languages (Baimyrza, 2022:253).

Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva tried to show the progress of the 2011-2020 State Program of Development and Functioning of Languages, also specifically in the Karaganda (Қарағанды) region of Kazakhstan (and the satellite towns of Temirtau, Shakhtinsk, Saran, Abay, Balkhash, Zhezkazgan, Satpayev) by using statistical information. Historically, the Karaganda region is a Russian-speaking region compared to other regions, so it is very important to observe the development of the state language and the effects of state policies in this region.

The results obtained in stage 2011-2013 in the Karaganda region are as follows: There has been a great increase in document exchange in public institutions in the state language. While it was 39.5% in 2009, it increased to 74.5% in 2010 (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:122). A draft of standard programs for Kazakh training

based on a continuous education approach has been produced- Kazakh as a foreign or second language. The number of funds for teacher training in Kazakh languages has increased.

All categories of citizens could study Kazakh, Russian and English languages in language training centers. To promote the state language, the contest called "State Language and Media" has started to be organized every year as part of the propaganda activities. In addition, activities such as festivals and competitions are held for children and youth to create a sense of patriotism and respect for their mother tongue. Another important step is to make television programs in the state language (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:120). The following table shows the rates of increase in these areas. While the targeted increase was achieved in some areas, it fell behind the targeted rate in others.




Figure 4.5: Training Kazakh in the Karaganda region

Table 7 demonstrates that the number of Kazakh teachers has exceeded the target rate. However, the state centers of training in languages and the number of tv projects in a state language increased by half the target rate.




Figure 4.6: Share of the population speaking a state language

In total, the increase in the rate of learning the state language between 2011-2013 reached 39.50% in 2011, 42.60% in 2012, and 46% in 2013 (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:122).




Figure 4.7: Share of the population speaking Kazakh, Russian and English together

The progress achieved within the scope of the Trinity of Language Project is shown in Table 9. The number of people who can speak Kazakh, Russian and English increased between 2011 and 2013 (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:122).

Between the years 2014-2016, in the second phase of the program, a great acceleration was achieved in education in the state language. Various competitions were organized to promote multilingualism. Within the scope of the Trinity of Language Project, the Tilşeber competition has started to be organized annually in the Karaganda region with the contributions of the GU Department of Culture and Development of

Languages to support and encourage talented young people, to create a language culture, to educate young people according to the understanding of Kazakhstan patriotism and to show respect for the languages of other nations. Students and teachers who speak Russian, Kazakh, and English at universities and schools in the Karaganda region between the ages of 18-30 can participate in the competition (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:124). In addition, the young people read the poems of prominent Kazakh literary figures such as Abay, Magzhan, Mukagali Mukatayev, and Baubek Bulkyshev in the scope of oratory competition.

These competitions, which were organized to raise awareness of the motherland, language, and nation, were not only aimed at young people and civilians. For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan organizes the "Parasatty of polices" competition every year, so that all personnel (law enforcement officers) working in the Ministry gain awareness of the homeland, language, and nation and fulfill their duties in a patriotic spirit. Besides, in addition to civilian life and government personnel, companies have also taken responsibility to increase the use of the state language. A company called KEGOC organizes a state language competition among its staff every year to increase the use of the state language. These kinds of activities can help to increase the prestige of the Kazakh language (Tleuzhanova & Stanciu & Tuleubayeva, 2018:125). Such competitions demonstrate a positive image of the state language both among civil citizens, government personnel, and companies and it contributes to the inclusion of everyone in learning the state language. Therefore, the state has started to be more involved in the process of organizing such competitions.

The range of the total population knowing Kazakh, Russian, and English in comparison with knowing only Kazakh in the second phase (2014-2016) within the scope of the Trinity of Language Project is as follows.




Figure 4.8: Comparison of knowing only Kazakh and knowing three languages

In 2014, a project called Serpin-2050 was accepted in Kazakhstan. This program aimed to send young people from the southern regions, where the Kazakh population is high, to the north, west, and east of the country to overcome the shortage of staff in various fields. However, the main aim was to teach Kazakh to the people in the west, east and north regions, because young people in the south could speak Kazakh fluently. For this reason, only young people from Almaty, South Kazakhstan, Kızılorda, Cambyl, and Mangistau regions could benefit from the program. While the number of youth who benefited from this program was 2,050 in 2014, it increased to 11,296 in 2016 (Sazayeva, 2017:72).

In 2017, the "New Humanities Education 100 new textbooks in the Kazakh language" program was implemented in the first and second phases covering the years 2017-2019. At this stage, 47 textbooks in the fields of philosophy, sociology, psychology, literature, history, cultural studies, religion, and economic sciences were translated into Kazakh and distributed to all universities in the country (Egemen Qazaqstan, 30 August 2020). In the third stage, 30 new textbooks were translated into Kazakh. These books, on the other hand, covered areas such as film studies, theater, art, ethics, aesthetics, media, and political science. In line with the suggestions of art academies, valuable works of world-famous authors in the fields of art and education were selected. (Egemen Qazaqstan, 13 August 2020). Thus, it has become easier for Kazakh students to reach and recognize universal works.

On April 28, 2022, it was decided to change the names of several educational institutions in the capital. For example, an important city school was named Talgat Bigeldinov. He served in the Soviet Union as a ground attack pilot during World War II and he is the only Kazakh soldier to win the title of Hero of the Soviet Union twice. Another high school was named after Temirbek Zhurgenov, a prominent statesman and public figure. In addition, the name of writer and famous Kazakh poet Kadir Myrza and famous dombra (Kazakh national instrument) artist and folk composer Tattimbet Kazangapuly Kyui, who lived between 1815-1862, was given to another high school (Egemen Qazaqstan, 15 Jun 2022).

The current President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev expressed a continuity with Nazarbayev's policy: "The importance of Kazakh as a national language will be emphasized. It will be the language of interethnic communication in time." (Egov, 26 August 2021). The National Program for the Development and Functioning of Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the period 2011-2020 was declared to have been accomplished in 2019.

The National Program for the Implementation of Language Policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020–2025 has been approved by the government decree. The main objectives of this program are explained as follows; the share of the population using the Latin script in written communication, the share of the population speaking the state language, the share of the Kazakh language content in state-owned mass media, and the share of the population speaking three languages (Kazakh, Russian and English) (Strategy2050, 4 September 2019). The most important issue among these targets is undoubtedly the transition to the Latin script and the steps in this process. We will discuss this in more detail in the following chapter.

Multiple ethnicities are the main reasons the country is not following a moderate policy. For this reason, they conducted many works to make Kazakh more effective than Russian, with a smooth transition. To achieve this, Nazarbayev followed a unitary political system, which is an indication that language policies cover every region despite the demographic and linguistic diversity that exists throughout the territory of Kazakhstan and he avoided a federal system that could cause regional separations. It is also another reason why he did not rush to increase the status of Kazakh because he thought that the

radical realization of language policies would create a negative reaction from ethnicities speaking Slavic languages and other languages (Fierman, 2005:412). But all these are the results of a smooth transition. Because the ultimate goal of Nazarbayev is to make Kazakh the dominant language in the country.

His following words are important; “The future of Kazakhstan is in the Kazakh language. Towards 2025, Kazakh will have supremacy in all parts of life and will become the language of communication among people all over the country. Implemented government programs should lead to 100% of official documents, 90% of television, and radio programs and 90% of educational programs to be conducted in the state language by 2030. Thus, by 2030, Kazakh will become an absolute dominant language.” (Urakova, 2014:102).

4.4. LATINIZATION OF SCRIPT

The Kazakh language is a Turkic Kipchak language that has developed in ancient centuries. It was first a rich "oral literature" language then it has been used with the Arabic Script as a "written language" since the middle of the 19th century. Since the first half of the 19th century, Kazakhs did not have written literature and Kazakh khanates used Chagatai Turkish (close to Uzbek language today) as their written language. Official correspondence and literary works were written in this language. During the second half of the 19th century, literary works appeared in the printing press. The literacy rate among Kazakhs was very low in these periods. More than 90% of the population had nomadic life. Especially İsmail Bey Gaprinskii worked for a common script and language in Central Asia and opened the first Usul-i Cedid school in 1884. The purpose of the opening of these schools was to change Russian Empire education in the Muslim regions and to establish a modern education system for the enlightenment and development of Muslim society. Gaspıralı's main goal was unity in language, thought, and work. In addition, as a historical mission, he was the supporter of the common Turkish culture and language (Ortaylı, 1991:45). Thus, a movement supporting education with this new method in the cities of Turkistan started (Emirhanov, 2005:78-79).

At the beginning of the 20th century, literacy and publishing activities began to increase among Kazakhs. Even in these periods, Kazakh students (Altınsarın, Velihanov,

Baytursinov) went to cities such as Kazan, Moscow, and Orenburg for education and contributed to the development of the Kazakh language when they returned to their countries (Kutalmış, 2004: 4).

There is no doubt that the Russification policy implemented by Tsarist Russia was behind the script changes in Kazakhstan and other Soviet Republics in the 1920s-40s (Özer, 2011: 1323). The Arabic script, which was used until 1926-27, was abandoned during the Soviet period and the Latin script was adopted. Until the 1940s, this Latin script, which was adapted for Kazakh by the Russian missionary İlminskiy, continued to be used. Unlike the normal Latin script, this script contained several Cyrillic letters.

The question of why the Cyrillic script was not imposed firstly under the rule of Soviet Russia, but the Latin script was imposed on Turkic people comes to mind. Turkic republics under Soviet rule switched to the Latin script after the decision of "Transition to the Latin Script for All Turks" at the First Soviet Turcology Congress convened in Baku in 1926. Thanks to this congress, Russian-sourced publications stated that the transition to the Latin script was based on the demand of Turkish intellectuals. However, the preparations for the Congress had been made a few years earlier in Moscow. The "Latin Script Institution for Turkish Peoples" was established in Moscow in 1924 (Özer, 2011: 1323). In other words, to achieve its goal, Soviet Russia tried to make it easier for the people to adopt these decisions by presenting its plans as the decisions of the intellectuals of the society.

Latin influence had to be replaced by the Cyrillic script. For this reason, this short Latin script period can be called a preparation-transition period to the Cyrillic script (Özer, 2011: 1323). For, the main purpose of Soviet Russia was to reduce the influence of Kazakh intellectuals and clergy on society and to turn the people away from Islam and closer to the Soviet Union. They used the Latin script to prevent the reactions that may arise in case of switching directly to the Cyrillic script. After all, Russia has always put the local community at the center of its reforms. In this way, it was accepted that the transitions would be smoother and easier. That is why they came together with people representing every society in the transition process to the Latin script. However, in the transition to the Cyrillic script, they forced the people to accept by giving instructions without any negotiations or compromise (Sebba, 2006:119). Therefore, since the Latin

script was a free choice, it is today associated with the Kazakh people's symbolic existence among the world community (Batyrbekkyzy et al., 2017:132).

In 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic adopted a law governing the transition of Kazakh orthography from the Latin script to the Cyrillic script. The shift from Latin to Cyrillic was critical in the Soviet Union's desire to integrate the Turkic people within the Slavic majority (Dotton, 2016:17). In the early 1940s, the transition to the Cyrillic script began as Kazakh and Russian become official languages. After the 1940s, until the decision to switch to the Latin script again (2019) Cyrillic Script continued to be used. The intense script policy implemented between 1920 and 1940 formed the infrastructure of the future political goals of the Soviet Union.

After the Soviet Union dissolved, several Central Asian countries accepted the Latin script, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan left the Cyrillic script in the mid-1990s, and Azerbaijan in 2001 (Reagan, 2019:447). Kazakhstan needed a little more time for this. Undoubtedly, the Cyrillic script facilitated the shift of the national consciousness of the Kazakh people to the Russian language and culture. For this reason, the Kazakh identity could not clearly define itself for years. Despite having its mother tongue, the definition of an 'independent state using the Russian language could not be sufficient.

Kazakhstan first gave the green light to the Latin script in 2006, when President Nazarbayev brought the issue to the agenda. A commission was established to investigate the possibilities, plus, and minuses of the transition to the Latin script (Reagan, 2019: 447). The commission completed its research in 2007 and presented its findings to the President. According to the report, this period required about 12 years and 300 million dollars for Kazakhstan. Although it is the first study on this issue, it has not been emphasized much. Of course, this was a part of Nazarbayev's moderate policy while making radical decisions. He said in 2007: 'The people of Kazakhstan have used the Cyrillic script for 70 years. There are many nationalities living in the country, the number of which cannot be underestimated. For this reason, it is our first duty to maintain stability and peace. That's why we shouldn't hurry about the script issue.' (Reagan, 2019:447). 10 years after this speech, Nazarbayev signed the decision to switch from Cyrillic to Latin script on October 26, 2017.

If we refer to the views of Kazakh people and intellectuals on the script issue, we can say that there are several different opinions. Some groups argued that the Arabic script should be accepted by other Turkish communities and that Kazakh people should not be separated from their history and Islamic culture. In addition, these groups did not want to lose the right to benefit from the developed written sources written by Uzbeks and Tatars (Kutalmış, 2004: 7). These discussions were also seen in other Turkish states. The transition of the Turkish Republic from the Arabic script to the Latin script in 1928 was described by some groups as a separation from Islam and the Ottoman Empire. However, the general view is that behind the transition to the Latin script is the strengthening and modernizing of the Kazakh identity (Batyrbekkyzy et al., 2017:131).

The basic principle in the Latin script adopted in 2017 consisted of an English-based computer keyboard. It was preferred in terms of being compatible with computer software and internet use. Kazakh letters were planned to be added to the script by placing an apostrophe next to them. However, this resulted in writing difficulties and aesthetic disorders. With the reaction of the public and intellectuals, some changes were made on February 19, 2018. The English keyboard standards were abandoned and the apostrophes were removed (Kara, 2020:100-102).

The transition to the Latin script will be gradually completed by 2025. Kazakhstan's 2050 Strategy Report, it is aimed to publish all books, periodicals, and official documents in Latin script until 2025. In addition, the purpose of the transition to the Latin script was explained in the report as follows: modernizing the language, making it easier for children to keep up with the times, improving their understanding of English and the Internet, and enabling the global integration of Kazakh people (2050 Strategy Report of Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan is aiming to remove all connotations from the Soviet Era and replace them with elements symbolizing Kazakh culture, they also want to change the Cyrillic Script within this scope. For Kazakhs, the transition to the Latin script means that the impact of Soviet identity, which dominates the national consciousness to a large extent, will change and a state will be formed in which Kazakh culture is dominant. Therefore, the strength of Kazakh national identity will increase (Reagan, 2019:447).

Even though Kazakhstan has just decided to switch to the Latin script, there were already some areas where the Latin script was used with the influence of the information

age. For example, the Latin script was used in fields such as e-mail addresses, car license plates, and passport identity information (Kabadayı, 2018: 5). With the transition of the Latin script, State Television also changed its logo and started to use the Latin script (Kabadayı). Again, the state newspaper "*Egemen Qazaqstan*" started to broadcast in Latin letters over the general network (Kabadayı).

Countries that use the Cyrillic script are mostly of Slavic origin and they can understand each other relatively. But, Kazakhs are of Turkish origin. Therefore, to ensure a common language union with the Turkish world, some argue that they should switch to the Latin script. Because the transition to the Latin script contributed to the increase of Kazakh national consciousness in the face of Russian culture and language. Thus, the Kazakh identity, which remains unclear between Russian culture and Kazakh ethnicity, can obtain a clearer national identity in this respect. It can be said that the same reasons lie behind the transition of other Turkish states to the Latin script (Batyrbekkyzy et al., 2017:132). Of course, the script change will lead to significant changes in education, economy, politics, and most importantly, culture. However, it is unclear how these changes will affect the unification and integration of different ethnic groups and will be seen over time (Melich & Adibayeva, 2013:273).

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

This study tried to explain how the Kazakh national identity was constructed through symbolic and cultural policies, in particular language policy. Kazakh national symbols were re-constructed in writing history, changing toponyms, claiming architectural and monumental sites as well as in national paraphernalia. This thesis focused on a complementary cultural reform that took place in the field of language and script. The many reforms that aimed to strengthen the capacity and use of Kazakh and the eventual Latinization of Kazakh script aimed to cease the historical hegemony of the Russian culture, and change the ethnic hierarchy in the country.

The Kazakh government engaged in symbolic re-construction of their nation in the field of history. The Kazakh leaders and intellectuals were aware that it is necessary to cleanse the remnants of Soviet colonial influence to strengthen the Kazakh identity. In rewriting history, they used not only the scientific methodology but also mythologized history tools because they wanted Kazakh identity to be adopted by society easily.

History-writing did not only exist in the books but also took place in movies. The movies with important heroes were brought to the big screen and helped to the recognition of Kazakh heroes in the international arena. Thus, national heroes were created from material from the Kazakh past, and myths, traditions, and customs were re-constructed to ensure the continuity of Kazakh culture.

Symbols such as monuments and statues are always in front of society and keep the historical consciousness alive. That is why Kazakh nation-building was also strengthened through these symbols. Statues from the Soviet Era were demolished and statues of Kazakh historical heroes were built instead. The content of the flag, state coat of arms, national anthem and uniforms, and changes in architecture demonstrate the significance of the symbolic re-construction of Kazakh nationhood.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was the last state to declare its independence. Besides, the ethnic majority of Russians created the possibility of Russian intervention in Kazakhstan's policies. Kazakhs also did not constitute a majority

in their own country, and the percentage of Russians, who were compactly settled in the North, was around 40%. These factors make it difficult for Kazakh leaders to pursue ethnic nationalism and “nationalize” the state. Because nation-building was accompanied by state-building, Kazakhstan pursued a policy of strengthening the state. For this purpose, Kazakhstan allowed multicultural rights to its minorities and introduced English to integrate Kazakhstan’s society and economics into the world while making a long-term program for developing the Kazakh language. Hence, the Kazakh approach can not be classified as purely ‘ethnic nationalism’. While some argue that Kazakh rulers followed the concept of ‘civic nation’, emphasizing Kazakhstani identity, and allegiance and pride in the state, this approach conflicts with the extensive policies for strengthening the Kazakh language, and parallel institutionalization of Russian and minority languages in the cultural sphere. The reality is that Kazakhstan does not fit either solely ethnic or civic box, and no other nation does.

Like all other nations, it strikes a balance between ethnic, civic, and multicultural policies. For, the uniqueness of Kazakhstan is that it tries to re-construct the Kazakh nation based on the Soviet legacy of non-political multiculturalism and in a situation when the Kazakh nation experienced centuries of colonization, marginalization, and underdevelopment and constituted a minority in its homeland. Symbolic reconstruction of Kazakh national identity must be understood in this historical background in which Kazakh nation suffered physical genocide and lost a great majority of their population to the degree that became a minority in its land, and a cultural genocide through which urban Kazakhs forgot their mother tongue, and thereby lost their cultural memory, traditions, values and so on. The purpose of Kazakhs is not to assert the superiority of Kazakh culture per se but to recover from this historical injustice

Another piece of evidence that Kazakhstan does not follow a purely ethnic nation-building policy is that its cultural or political union with Turkic states has not progressed much. Ethnic minorities do not look at Kazakhstan being in a union with the Turkish and Islamic states favorably either. In the January events, Kazakhstan requested military aid from Russia showing that Kazakhstan has no strong political bond with Turkic nations yet. However, Kazakhstan did not fully support Russia in the Ukraine War, either and Russian soldiers were withdrawn from the country soon after the January 2022 events can be interpreted that the Russian influence has also decreased and the multicultural aspect

of nation-building might weaken in the future. Therefore, what type of nation-building policy Kazakhstan will follow after Nazarbayev is not completely clear.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union provided a great advantage for the dissemination of the Kazakh language. However, in the first years of independence, it became clear that great efforts were needed to bring Kazakh to the same status as Russian as a great majority of the population used the Russian language and had little or no knowledge of Kazakh. This also made an immediate complete separation from Russian impossible. Various long-term language planning programs including the State Program on Language Functioning and Development show that Kazakh rulers understood a long struggle awaits them to make their mother tongue legible to Kazakhs, but at the same time, they understood that this is needed for building an independent, coherent and strong state.

The rulers first worked to remove the physical influence of Russian from the language. Kazakh language planning also includes “language purification” as happened in Turkey. Russian suffixes in surnames were removed, regulations about terminology made, and toponyms changed. Language planning also included strengthening the body of books and literature in Kazakh. Kazakh Language and Literature departments in universities to educate teachers and intellectuals multiplied, libraries increased and textbooks in all subjects were prepared. They also tried to expand the use of Kazakh by enhancing the schools and kindergartens in Kazakh. State-sponsored competitions and events were organized to encourage the use of Kazakh in Northern regions, where the Russian language dominated. To create national awareness among the public, the authorities made use of periodicals such as newspapers and journals. This process was akin to educational mobilization in the early years of Turkey in the course of cultural and language reforms.

Kazakh leaders, especially Nazarbayev regarded reviving the mother tongue inalienable condition for becoming a modern, developed state. The decision to switch to the Latin script was the most striking of language policies. The switching to the Latin script, most of all, aims to strengthen the national identity of the Kazakh people by putting a solid boundary with the hegemonic Russian language and uniting Kazakhs with the

Turkic and Western world. Integration with the global economy or other practical concerns is only secondary.

The impact of switching to the Latin script for domestic and foreign policy is not clear yet. In domestic policy, all written sources are in Latin script until 2025. In addition, the transition to the Latin script will lead to the change of the Russian identity, which dominates the national consciousness, and the status of Kazakh ethnic identity may be elevated. Because the Cyrillic script was used as a means of oppressing the public and teaching Russian culture in the Soviet Era, abandoning the Cyrillic script or switching to Latin can be seen as one of the most significant symbolic steps for Kazakhs in their struggle to overturn the continuing effects Russian colonialism.

On the other hand, it will possibly be easier to learn English for Kazakhs. The Trinity of Languages project also supports English as one of the major languages of education. The project aims for people to speak Kazakh, English, and Russian together. Thanks to this project, the number of people speaking all three languages continuously has increased. In this way, young Kazakhs can participate in the global economy. Kazakhstan also evaluates this transition as an obligation to have a key position in the world economy.

Using the Latin script of Kazakhstan is also very important in terms of ensuring a common language union with the Turkic world. Today, all Turkic states are using Latin script except Kyrgyzstan. This transition is welcomed among other Turkic states because Kazakhstan has an important place in establishing important Turkic unions such as Turkic Council, Turkic Academy, and TurkPa (Kara, 2020: 2). We should not forget the economic dimension of this transition, especially facilitating economic, cultural and political ties among the Turkic countries.

The reflection of Kazakh cultural policies on foreign policy will gain greater momentum, especially with the transition to the Latin script. It will enable many foreign researchers and artists to come to the country and also enable to introduce countries' cultures to the wide areas. However, Kazakhstan's opening up to the modern world and developing its policies in this direction disturbs Russia. A complete break with Russia and integration with the West is not welcomed by Russia. However, it seems that

Kazakhstan will continue to assert Kazakh cultural and national identity in its foreign policy.

In this study, it is shown that the status and influence of the Kazakh language have continuously risen since independence. Kazakh rulers continuously developed new strategies and monitored the progress to improve both capacity and usage of the Kazakh language. As Smith (1987) noted nation-building is not a matter of building appropriate institutions but about those institutions working dynamically and continuously reinventing them, and re-creating symbols, values, memories, and myths of the past to fit current needs. It can be said that Kazakhstan has achieved considerable success in developing the Kazakh language which was in an endangered situation during the Soviet collapse. But, still Kazakh has not achieved complete dominance in the country, and whether it will achieve such status depends on the continuity and ingenuity of language policies.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. KAZAKH CYRILLIC AND LATIN ALPHABET COMPARISON

№	Написание	Звук	№	Написание	Звук
1	A a	[a]	17	Ń ń	[ɲ]
2	Á á	[ə]	18	O o	[o]
3	B b	[b]	19	Ó ó	[ə]
4	D d	[d]	20	P p	[p]
5	E e	[e]	21	Q q	[k]
6	F f	[f]	22	R r	[r]
7	G g	[g]	23	S s	[s]
8	Ĝ ĝ	[ʝ]	24	T t	[t]
9	H h	[x], [h]	25	U u	[ʏ]
10	I i	[i]	26	Ú ú	[y]
11	І і	[и], [й]	27	V v	[v]
12	J j	[ʝ]	28	Y y	[ɣ]
13	K k	[k]	29	Ý ý	[y]
14	L l	[l]	30	Z z	[z]
15	M m	[m]	31	Sh sh	[ʃ]
16	N n	[n]	32	Ch ch	[tʃ]

APPENDIX B. MAP OF KAZAKHSTAN

