

Abstract

This dissertation conceptualizes electoral reform process as having two distinctive stages: *electoral reform initiation* which concerns governing party preferences for an alternative system and *reform enactment* which involves legislative and constitutional processes through which the new electoral system is enacted. In doing so, it develops a framework to predict i) when and why ruling parties favor an alternative electoral system and ii) when and how they succeed in legislating their preferred electoral rule. This dissertation offers a novel account of governing party preferences that centers on the competition between largest parties in the election. Specifically, I argue that the ruling party initiates an electoral reform depending on whether small or new parties draw votes from its vote base or from that of its main competitor in the election. To predict the success of electoral reform attempts, this dissertation focuses on the constitutional protection of electoral systems, legislative power of government and the content of electoral reform. I argue that these factors are important for the success of restrictive reform attempts since restrictive reform proposals may generate more opposition than permissive ones.

This dissertation employs an integrative multi-method approach conducting both quantitative and qualitative analyses of electoral reform attempts. The quantitative analysis utilizes an original dataset of electoral reform attempts in 32 parliamentary democracies for both stages of electoral reform. For analyzing the ruling party preferences, I generate a novel variable: the effective number of parties in ideological clusters to capture the number of small parties that draw votes away from the largest parties' vote bases. After the statistical analyses of the hypothesized relationships, I conduct cases studies of electoral reform episodes selected from regression analyses. In particular, I examine electoral reform attempts in Lithuania and Turkey to explain party preferences and reform attempts in Latvia, Austria and Bulgaria to explain the enactment of reforms.

Findings support the main proportion of this dissertation that fragmentation in ideological clusters affects governing party's reform initiation decision. When the governing party faces higher number of parties in its ideological cluster, it is more likely to initiate a restrictive reform to limit the number of parties that can enter the parliament. Since permissive reforms tend to increase the number of small parties in parliament, the governing party is more likely to initiate a permissive reform when it faces fewer parties in its ideological cluster than the main opposition party. This dissertation also finds that constitutional protection of electoral systems decreases the likelihood of success for restrictive reforms, but this relationship does not hold for permissive reforms. Moreover, restrictive reforms that change the district magnitude have lower chances of success in comparison to other electoral reforms. Overall, the findings suggest that the account of electoral reform developed in this dissertation captures reform process better than arguments already in the literature.

PARTY COMPETITION AND ELECTORAL REFORMS IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Why do democracies change their electoral systems? The wave of electoral reforms since the early 1990s has generated debate about when politicians decide to change the rules of the game and why. Most of the existing studies on electoral reforms tend to attribute successful reforms to the existence of pro-reform preferences. They focus on the conditions that drive political parties to favor alternative electoral systems and treat electoral reform politics as one political process.¹ However, there are many instances wherein governing parties express a preference for an alternative electoral system, even proposing electoral reform bills, but fail to realize successful electoral reforms.² As the literature on public policy emphasizes, veto players can block significant policy change even when the legislative majority wants reform. A more complete analysis of electoral reforms, therefore, should necessarily involve examining both party preferences and legislative processes. In other words, to explain why electoral reforms occur, we need to understand (i) when and why incumbent parties adopt pro-reform preferences; and (ii) when and how these pro-reform preferences actually lead to legislation for new electoral rules.

¹ Notable exceptions include Nunez and Jacobs (2016), Nikolenyi (2011) and Shugart (2008), in addition to single case studies where the process of reform is at the center of attention.

² Such examples include New Zealand in 2011 and Poland in 2016, where reforms failed in a referendum, and the Netherlands in 2003 and Finland in 2011, in which reforms failed in the legislative process.

To this end, this dissertation offers a new way of thinking about the electoral reform process. I conceptualize electoral reforms as having two distinctive stages that produce different outcomes.³ The first stage is the *electoral reform initiation stage*. The governing party formulates a preference for a different electoral system and explicitly initiates a process to change the existing one either through a bill or referendum. In this stage, what we observe is an electoral reform attempt. Importantly, the party in power may seek either a *permissive reform* (which opens the system to smaller parties by increasing proportionality between votes and seats) or a *restrictive reform* (which does the opposite).⁴ The second stage concerns *enactment of electoral reform* in which electoral reform bill becomes law. It consists of legislative and constitutional processes through which the final decision about electoral reform proposal is taken.⁵ Thus, this dissertation specifies the conditions under which parties in government i) initiate a permissive or restrictive reform, and ii) succeed in enacting the new electoral system.

To explain these outcomes, I develop a strategic model of electoral reform that centers upon competition between the leading parties. I argue that party system fragmentation—the proliferation of small parties— may affect the largest parties asymmetrically by drawing votes away from one of them. This, in turn, impacts the viability of the ruling party and its main competitor in future elections and creates an incentive for the ruling party to initiate an electoral reform. Moreover, I argue that the success of these reform attempts depends on the constitutional protection of electoral systems and the legislative power of governments, especially for the

³ In her cultural explanation of electoral reforms, Norris (2011) also identifies different stages of electoral reform: agenda-setting, policymaking, policy implementation and feedback. Her explanation, however, only focuses on the agenda-setting stage.

⁴ Studies use different terminology for electoral reform types. Restrictive reforms are also called *strong, closed or majoritarian* reforms, while permissive reforms are also referred as *feeble, open or proportional* reforms.

⁵ I borrow Blau's (2008) terminology to differentiate between the start of a reform process (*reform initiation*) and its end (*reform enactment*).

enactment of restrictive reforms. The following section briefly reviews existing explanations of electoral reforms to situate my strategic model of electoral reform initiation.

1.1 Related Literature

Before I present my model, it is crucial to discuss existing explanations regarding electoral reforms. Broadly speaking, we can identify three sets of explanations on the basis of factors they focus on. They are: i) shifts in electoral risks due to the number of political parties; ii) governability and representation problems; and iii) cartelization dynamics in volatile systems.

The first set of studies stipulates that instability in the electoral arena creates an incentive for parties to revise the electoral system. Boix (1999) offers one of the earliest studies in this strand of literature. He argues that proportional representation (PR) reforms in the early 20th century were a strategic response by established parties to the expansion of suffrage that changed the electoral arena and shifted the median voter to the left. This created electoral risk; new challenger parties, representing new voters, could replace established parties. To minimize electoral losses, established parties adopted a PR system under two conditions: if the votes of established parties were tied (which would prevent coordination on the larger one of them) and if there was a strong new (socialist) party (Boix 1999). Along a similar line, other studies have considered party system fragmentation and new parties as giving rise to electoral reforms in contemporary democracies (Colomer 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Harfst 2013; Remmer 2008). These studies view party system fragmentation as a source of uncertainty and electoral risk. In fragmented party systems, there are more parties competing in elections, and parties become unsure about their electoral strength. In such cases of increased competition, parties are motivated to avoid major seat losses and have an incentive to replace the existing electoral

system with a less risky alternative via a permissive reform. The rationale here is that permissive rules produce multiple winners and decrease the chances of a devastating election loss. In contrast, when the level of fragmentation is low, parties adopt restrictive reforms to consolidate gains from a low level of competition (Remmer 2008). This explanation focuses on the electoral risks associated with the number of political parties and sees electoral reform as a defensive strategy to prevent electoral losses (Santucci 2018).

The second explanation uses the same variable, *party system fragmentation*, but focuses on *governability and representation problems* as the main motivation for parties to initiate electoral reforms. In this explanation, inefficiencies in governance and representation trigger electoral reforms and the party system size gives information about flaws in the existing electoral system (Bielasiak and Hulseley 2013; Riera 2013). For instance, highly fragmented party systems are associated with governability problems; it becomes difficult to form durable governments, pass laws and make policies when small parties have veto power in parliament. In such cases, restrictive reforms become more likely because they can counter governability problems by keeping small parties out of parliament. Conversely, low levels of party system fragmentation signal a representation problem, which makes permissive reforms more likely (Bielasiak and Hulseley 2013; Riera 2013). The main idea of this explanation can be traced to Dunleavy and Margetts (1995) and Shugart's (2001) discussion of mixed member systems. Both studies argue that mixed systems can provide an attractive solution to democracies with governability, accountability or representation problems, combining the strengths of proportional and plurality systems (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995; Shugart 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a).

The final set of studies focus on the *cartelization dynamic* within volatile party systems to explain electoral reforms. Electoral volatility signals the shift in the voter allegiance, emergence of new parties, disappearance of existing ones, and thereby incentivizing politicians to respond by altering institutions to ensure their viability. Cross-national studies generally find a positive relationship between electoral volatility and electoral reforms, however, they do not offer any insight into the type of electoral reform that will be adopted (Bielasiak and Hulseley 2013; Nunez and Jacobs 2016; Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017; Remmer 2008; Riera 2013). For this reason, Nunez, Simon, and Pilet (2017) shift attention to the source of electoral volatility and offer a nuanced explanation based on the *cartelization dynamic* to explain restrictive reforms. They argue that it is the *new party volatility* that makes restrictive reforms more likely because established parties have an interest to maintain their current position in sharing the benefits of political system. The emergence of new parties, on the other hand, challenges their advantaged position and creates an incentive to prevent new competitors from entering the parliament. In such cases, existing parties act like a *cartel* and adopt restrictive electoral systems to exclude new parties (Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017).

Within the literature, empirical findings are inconclusive in terms of favoring one explanation over the others; there exists only partial or, at best, weak support for them. This gap in the literature calls for further examination of the relationship between the party systems and electoral reform. In particular, a closer consideration of the ruling party, which has an essential role in the electoral reform process, is warranted. In particular, we need to understand how party system instability affects the prospects of the governing party in future elections. This calls for a careful look at the asymmetrical effects of party system instability for the major contenders in an election. Existing literature, however, fails to do so, discussing only the general effect of party

system instability. Instead, we need to know how the effect of party system fragmentation differs for leading parties. This point is the basis of my explanation and will be further illustrated in the section below, which lays out my theoretical framework.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

By conceptualizing electoral reform in two stages, this study examines both the conditions that lead the governing party to initiate a restrictive or permissive reform and the conditions that facilitate (or hinder) the successful implementation of them. First, I focus on party system fragmentation and consider the proximity of fragmentation to the governing party's vote base in order to predict the type of electoral reforms attempted. More specifically, I consider two variables at this stage: the number of parties close to the governing party and the number of parties close to the main opposition party. Second, I examine the role of constitutional protection of electoral system, judicial review, legislative power of governments and the content of electoral reforms with regard to the success of electoral reform attempts.

My strategic model of electoral reform centers upon party system fragmentation and how it affects the leading parties in the government and opposition. I develop scenarios for permissive and restrictive reforms from the governing party perspective. To this end, I consider the source of party system fragmentation in order to examine how it might affect the leading parties in the government and opposition asymmetrically. Simply put, the party in government needs to know whether small parties will draw votes from its vote base or that of its main competitor in future elections. I assume that small parties can draw votes from a larger party based on ideological proximity to it. For example, if there are small parties are close to the governing party on the ideological spectrum, electoral competition for the governing party is increased. This, in turn,

can affect competition between the governing party and leading party in opposition, thereby impacting which party gets to form the government. In this case, a restrictive reform emerges as a good solution. The rationale here is that if the status quo rules are maintained, the number of parties close to the governing party's ideology may increase and/or draw more votes away. A more restrictive system, on the other hand, would induce voters to vote strategically on the viable larger party that is closest to them on the ideological spectrum. Therefore, a restrictive reform would help preserve the leading position of the governing party in electoral competition. A permissive reform in this scenario is not likely, since it would mean further deterioration in the party's vote base.

Permissive reforms can serve a different purpose: to weaken the main opposition party. In other words, permissive reforms can be used to increase electoral competition faced by the opposition party. As stated earlier, the leading party in government has a disincentive to initiate permissive reform if it faces higher level of fragmentation. Therefore, the governing party uses permissive reform as a strategy only when it faces a lower number of competitors than the main opposition party. My strategic model of electoral reform initiation yields the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The probability of restrictive reform attempts increases with the number of competitors in the ruling party's ideological cluster, while the probability of permissive reform attempts increases decreases with it.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of competitors faced by the opposition relative to the governing party, the more likely permissive reform attempts are.

Once governments initiate electoral reform, the reform bill passes through different stages; reform attempts can fail during this process. Given that politicians designing electoral reform bills are familiar with the institutional constraints, one would expect governments to

either make a reform bill palatable to veto players, thereby gaining their support, or choose not to initiate electoral reform. Nonetheless, even when governments pursue the former option, they can lose control over electoral reform during the long process of ratification due to certain institutional features. This project further analyzes the conditions that can terminate this process even when the government promotes an alternative electoral system. In doing so, it also sheds light on the relationship between electoral reform barriers and the type of electoral reform sought.

Specifically, I develop hypotheses concerning how the government's legislative power, in addition to constitutional protection of the electoral system and judicial review, can affect the successful enactment of permissive and restrictive electoral reform attempts. While the expectation is that constitutional protection and judicial review hinder the success of electoral reforms in general, I argue that these variables are important in restrictive reform attempts, because restrictive reform proposals may generate more opposition. For the very same reason, I expect that the legislative power of governments impacts the success of restrictive reform attempts. Lastly, I consider the content of the electoral reform attempt, i.e., whether the reform proposal changes the district magnitude, and assess whether the content affects its success. I list the hypotheses for the electoral reform enactment stage below.

Hypothesis 3: The probability of successful restrictive reform attempts increases with the legislative power of government.

Hypothesis 4: Constitutional protection of electoral systems decreases the probability of successful restrictive reforms.

Hypothesis 5: The existence of judicial review decreases the probability of successful restrictive reforms.

Hypothesis 6: Electoral reform attempts that change the district magnitude are more likely to fail than other reform attempts.

1.3 Research Design

This dissertation employs an integrative multimethod design to study electoral reforms. Integrative multimethod research combines different methods to support “a single and unified causal inference” (Seawright 2016: 19). For this reason, one method is used to produce the final causal inference; this analysis is then refined or strengthened using another method (Lieberman 2005; Seawright 2016). In this project, I use statistical analysis as the main method of causal inference and complement it with case studies of electoral reform episodes. While regression analyses are used to test the hypotheses for each stage of the electoral reform process, case studies serve to test the assumptions of my model about party preferences and informational setting and to identify possible measurement errors and omitted variables.

The empirical analyses draw upon a dataset that covers 32 democracies from 1945 until 2015; newer democracies enter the dataset as of their first democratic election. I use two criteria to create an institutionally comparable sample. First, only parliamentary democracies are included; this is due to the key role of parliamentary elections in government formation in these systems. Second, I analyze electoral reforms in proportional and semi-proportional systems, excluding majoritarian systems. The main reason for this exclusion is that small swings in majoritarian systems can result in major changes in the seats held by a given party. This makes the strategic setting in these systems categorically different from that of PR systems. The full list of countries and time span of each is presented in Table 3.1.

In this dissertation, I study electoral reform attempts in democratically elected governments. It is important to note, however, that not all changes to electoral laws constitute electoral reform. While electoral laws are composed of numerous specific rules about elections, electoral systems are a subset of these rules and determine how the votes of citizens are converted into seats for parties in parliament.⁶ There is variation in terms of how proportionally electoral systems allocate seats to parties. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, scholars have distinguished four main components of electoral systems that determine the degree of proportionality between votes and seats: district magnitude, electoral formula, tier structure and legal thresholds (Farrell 1998, 2011; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Golder 2005; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971).⁷ Therefore, I define electoral reforms as significant changes in one or more of these main electoral system components.⁸ Electoral reform attempts, in turn, are defined as proposals put forward by governments to change one or more core components of electoral systems.

Because I conceptualize electoral reform process as having two stages, the empirical analyses have two different dependent variables. For the electoral reform initiation stage, the dependent variable is the *type of electoral reform attempt*, which can be a permissive attempt, a restrictive attempt or no attempt. For the electoral reform enactment stage, the dependent variable is the *success or failure of the electoral reform attempt*. The quantitative analyses presented in this study consist of two parts. In the first part, I test the main hypotheses of my

⁶ This dimension of electoral systems is called the *interparty dimension* by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001). They also identify the *intraparty dimension*, which concerns the distribution of seats to different candidates within parties. This project only focuses on the interparty dimension.

⁷ An electoral system can be difficult to define, having many components that are difficult to isolate. Within the literature, however, the focus is primarily on these four components that affect party proportionality.

⁸ In Chapter 3, I go over each component in more detail and discuss its effect. In that chapter, I also discuss what constitutes a significant change for each component, in order to operationalize the electoral reform variable. Please also note that the definition adopted here is similar to those used in recent cross-national empirical work.

model about the relationship between competition in the ideological clusters and the type of electoral reform attempt. For this analysis, I generate a new variable: *the effective number of parties in ideological clusters*. This variable identifies the source of party system fragmentation and is therefore able to capture whether new and/or small parties draw votes away from the governing party's vote base or that of the main opposition party. The regression analysis in this part enables me to assess the extent to which the project's novel explanation of electoral reform attempts offers insights into the conditions under which governments initiate permissive or restrictive electoral reforms. Second, I test the hypotheses regarding the reform enactment stage. The statistical analysis of this stage is conducted separately for permissive and restrictive reforms in order to understand if the institutional protection and legislative power of governments work in the same way for the success of restrictive and permissive reform attempts.

After the statistical analyses, I conduct case studies of electoral reform episodes. In these case studies, I shift the level of analysis to political parties and examine the decision-making process within parliament. The case studies enable me to explore the sequence of decisions, information flows, and actions that link the main variable—fragmentation in ideological clusters—to the type of electoral reform attempted. I also test whether the assumptions of my model about party preferences for alternative electoral systems and the role of informational setting are accurate in case studies of electoral reform episodes. I seek answers to the following questions in the case studies: Do parties understand their gains from alternative systems? Do ruling parties use information from opinion polls and/or election results at other levels (such as presidential or local elections) to anticipate their vote shares and relative positions vis-à-vis the main competitor? Do governing parties care about *all* small parties or *only* the ones that may draw votes away from them in future elections? Do parties determine the content of reform

attempts based on institutional constraints? These issues are examined in the electoral reform episodes selected from the regression analyses.

In selecting cases for further examination, I use techniques for multimethod research recommended by Seawright and Gerring (2008) and Seawright (2016). First, to examine the process leading up to the governing party's decision to initiate electoral reform, I have selected typical cases, those that fit the regression analysis well, for both restrictive and permissive reform attempts. In the multinomial logit regressions conducted in Chapter 4, the Lithuanian restrictive reform of 2000 and Turkish permissive reform of 1995 emerge as typical cases. Both Lithuania and Turkey have experienced more than one electoral reform attempt; I have therefore examined each of the attempts in both countries. Analyzing multiple reform attempts in each country has enabled me to leverage temporal variation within the same country in terms of the main variable of interest: the number of competitors faced by the governing party and the opposition party in their ideological clusters.

Second, I have selected both typical and deviant cases to explore the process after an electoral reform is initiated. In particular, I have considered how institutions impact the success of electoral reform attempts. While typical cases adequately serve this purpose, I have also selected a deviant case to understand if and when it is possible to overcome institutional barriers to electoral reform. In this section, I analyze the Lithuanian and Latvian restrictive electoral reforms as typical cases. The Austrian reform of 1992 constitutes a deviant case, which illustrates how it is possible to implement a major restrictive reform, albeit through multiple attempts, despite high institutional barriers to electoral reform. As for permissive reforms, I

examine the Bulgarian reform attempts of 1997 and 2010, and draw some parallels with Turkish permissive reforms of 1995.

1.4 Main Contributions

This dissertation contributes to recent literature in three ways. First, I have underlined the necessity of studying both ruling party preferences and legislative processes of electoral reforms in order to have a more complete understanding of reform processes. By adopting a two-stage analysis of electoral reforms, this project broadens the standard models of electoral system changes and incorporates the rarely analyzed category of unsuccessful electoral reform attempts, crucial to understanding the role of institutions in blocking electoral reform. Their inclusion in this study is important for two reasons. First, it extends our understanding of electoral reform processes by systematically analyzing the conditions that can put a stop to electoral reforms after they have been initiated. Second, it also allows a comprehensive examination of why ruling parties prefer alternative electoral systems, since unsuccessful attempts still represent government actions to alter electoral systems. Motivated by the theoretical importance of unsuccessful reform attempts in understanding the electoral reform process, I have constructed a novel dataset on electoral reform attempts in parliamentary democracies.

Second, my model of electoral reforms centers upon the governing party and its calculations about alternative electoral systems in a context of party system fragmentation. Clear identification of the decision-maker enables me to explore the asymmetrical effects of party system fragmentation on competition between major contenders for government formation. Thus, I take the source of party system fragmentation into consideration in assessing whether small or new parties may draw votes away from the governing party. This brings me to the

methodological innovation of this dissertation: I include the proximity of small and new parties to the main parties in the ideological spectrum in order to generate a new variable measuring fragmentation in the ideological cluster of the governing party and its main competitor. While the ideological position of new parties was important in explaining PR reforms in the early 20th century, this point has been neglected by explanations of electoral reforms in contemporary democracies. Ideological proximity of small parties, however, can show if one of the leading parties is disadvantaged by party system fragmentation. For this reason, a novel measure created in this study locates each party in an election according to its proximity to the governing party and the main opposition party, allowing me to calculate the number of small parties each leading party faces in its ideological cluster. Using this variable, I test if governing parties pay attention to how shifts in party system dynamics affect their vote base in electoral reform decisions.

Lastly, statistical analyses are complemented by a careful examination of electoral reform episodes in five countries. These case studies for electoral reform initiation stage demonstrate that electoral system choices of parties reflect their partisan interests, rather than the more general and principled goals of efficiency in parliamentary decision-making. In addition, the examination of specific cases shows the relevance of small parties' ideological proximity to the governing party, during the electoral reform process. The case analyses also contribute to our understanding of electoral reforms in countries with high electoral volatility where party systems are in constant flux during each legislative term. Therefore, the changes in party system structure may not be sufficiently captured by statistical measurements of previous elections in such countries. In this respect, the disaggregated measurements presented in this dissertation help capture how fragmentation might potentially affect the governing party as well as its preference for alternative electoral systems.

1.5 Plan of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In *Chapter 2*, I first present a critical review of the literature. After identifying the weaknesses and inconclusive findings in this body of research, I then move on to introduce my theoretical framework, which presents electoral reform as a two-stage process: *electoral reform initiation and reform enactment*. In the theory section, I first develop my strategic model of electoral reform initiation and discuss how party system instability can lead to different scenarios of electoral reform attempts. Then, I examine how constitutional protection of electoral systems, judicial review, legislative power of government and content of electoral reform can affect the success of permissive and restrictive reform attempts.

Chapter 3 consists of six sections that describe the methodology adopted in the dissertation. In the first section, I describe the multimethod research design, which combines quantitative and qualitative analyses. Then, I provide a detailed discussion of how the dependent variable, electoral reform attempt and its types, is defined and operationalized. In the next two sections, I explain the quantitative part of the multimethod research design. In the third section, I present the main independent variables for the electoral reform initiation stage. In this section, I introduce a novel party system variable, the *effective number of parties in ideological clusters*, which measures the level of fragmentation within ideological camps of leading parties. I discuss how this variable improves upon the commonly used measure of party system fragmentation: the *effective number of parties*. Following this, I present the statistical model employed in the analysis of electoral reform initiation (*Chapter 4*). In the fourth section, I discuss the variables for the electoral reform enactment stage. I also present the empirical model employed in the

statistical analysis of electoral reform enactment (Chapter 6). The fifth section discusses the other component of this multimethod research, a qualitative analysis of electoral reform episodes, thoroughly describing the case selection methodology. The final section concludes this chapter.

Using a novel dataset of electoral reform attempts, *Chapter 4* provides a quantitative analysis of electoral reform initiations, with a focus on party system fragmentation in ideological clusters. The first part of the chapter tests three hypotheses from existing explanations discussed in the literature review. The findings of these analyses imply that existing explanations of electoral reform are mostly inconsistent with electoral reform initiation decisions. The main part of the analysis focuses on how party system fragmentation in ideological clusters—the novel measure for competitors faced by the leading governing and opposition parties—affects the governing party’s reform initiation decision. Specifically, I test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, which focus on the impact of the effective number of ideological competitors (for the ruling party and its main contender in the opposition) by estimating multinomial logit models. The findings suggest that if the governing party faces strong competition within its ideological cluster, it is more likely to initiate a restrictive reform. While the governing party responds to fragmentation in its ideological cluster by initiating a restrictive reform—without considering how such a reform alters the competition faced by the main opposition party—the same reaction is not observed for permissive reforms. The motivation of weakening the opposition party seems of secondary importance; the governing party initiates a permissive reform only when it faces fewer ideological competitors than its main competitor for forming government. In sum, the findings in this chapter support the claim that the source of party system fragmentation is important for governments to consider in initiating electoral reforms.

Chapter 5 takes up the associations yielded by the statistical analyses in the previous chapter and provides an in-depth analysis of specific reform initiation episodes to examine the extent to which those associations are consistent with actual electoral reform processes. The in-depth analyses of Lithuanian and Turkish reform episodes corroborate the main mechanism explained in the theoretical model. Several insights gained from these analyses are worth mentioning here. First, given that both of these countries have high electoral volatility, information about the party system was frequently updated by political parties during the election cycles analyzed. In this sense, presidential and municipal elections provided parties with valuable information to gauge their relative electoral power prior to the general elections. Equipped with such information, parties revised their preferences regarding electoral systems. Second, the main claim concerning the relevance of new and small parties' ideological proximity to the governing party was supported in each electoral reform episode. The higher fragmentation in governing party's ideological cluster led it to initiate a restrictive reform in the Lithuanian electoral reform in 2000.

Similar, albeit nuanced, incentives are observed for permissive reforms. According to the permissive reform cases of Lithuania in 2004 and Turkey in 1995, the popularity of a new challenger led the governing party to initiate a permissive reform. However, the crucial point in both cases was that the governing party could afford a permissive reform because it had fewer competitors in its ideological cluster than those of main opposition party. Had it not been the case, a permissive reform could have been damaging for the governing party. Finally, these cases show that public demand for electoral reform and improving general efficiency in parliamentary functions were not the rationale for changes observed in the electoral systems.

Chapter 6 analyzes the electoral reform enactment stage. The empirical analysis combines the statistical analysis of factors affecting the likelihood of successful enactment of reform proposals with the case studies. I estimate logit models to test my hypotheses about the enactment stage (which are developed in Chapter 2) and focus on the effects of the government's legislative power in parliament, constitutional protection of electoral system, judicial review and the content of the proposed reform. As will be emphasized several times throughout the dissertation, it is of vital importance—both theoretically and empirically—to analyze electoral reforms according to their type. This is also clear in the analysis of the enactment of reform legislation. During the electoral reform ratification process, the abovementioned factors work differently in restrictive and permissive reform attempts. While constitutional protection decreases the probability of success for restrictive reforms, the same relationship is not observed for the success of permissive reform attempts. Similarly, the results indicate that the content of electoral reforms has a substantial impact on its success. It is observed that restrictive reforms that change the district magnitude have a lower chance of succeeding in comparison to other restrictive reforms.

Results from these regressions are not only used to assess the validity of my model but also in case selection. In the case studies, I scrutinize several electoral reform processes, both successful and unsuccessful reform attempts. Case analyses of restrictive reforms focus on attempts in the following countries: Lithuania in 1996 and 2000 (both enacted); Latvia in 1995 and 1997 (only the former was enacted); and Austria in 1992 (enacted after multiple attempts). Given that restrictive reforms are more likely to fail when the electoral system is protected by the constitution (as shown by the statistical analyses), parties alter the content of the proposed reform to maximize its likelihood of successful enactment. In the analysis of Latvia's 1995

reform, it is observed that the government purposefully did not include any changes to the district magnitude or electoral system family; and the proposed reform was successfully enacted. Consistent with this finding, the electoral reform in Austria in 1992 also shows the difficulty of changing the electoral system when there is constitutional protection in place. In the Austrian case, the governing coalition was able to change the electoral system only after successive attempts in two legislative terms. The enacted reform, though, differed substantially from the original plan. Finally, the analysis of permissive reform attempts in Bulgaria (in 1997 and 2010) shows that the opposition parties' objections and reactions to the electoral reform play a major role in the success of permissive reforms. The permissive reform of 1997 failed when the opposition vehemently objected and garnered the support of veto players. The similar dynamics are also observed in the failed Turkish reform attempt of 1995.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. It starts with a summary of the general findings and then discusses the project's theoretical and empirical contributions. The last part briefly discusses interesting and potentially fruitful avenues for future research opened up by this project.

Chapter 2 Party Competition and Electoral Reforms: Theoretical Framework

When and why do governing parties initiate electoral reforms? and when these reform attempts succeed? These are the motivating questions of this dissertation. In this chapter, I first discuss how the existing work answers these questions, and then I present my theoretical framework to explain electoral reform process.

Before delving into the electoral reform explanations, I start with reviewing the early studies of electoral reforms and how they define electoral reforms, which has implications for how they are studied. Then, I focus on the recent electoral reform literature which studies electoral reforms as a dynamic process. Broadly speaking, I discuss three explanations in this emerging body of work: i) electoral risks due to increasing number of parties, ii) problems with governance and accountability, iii) cartelization dynamic due to electoral volatility. While the first two explanations focus on party system size as the main independent variable, the last one focuses on the electoral volatility. The last discussion in this section focuses on how the literature examines the failed electoral reform attempts.

The second part of this chapter presents my theoretical framework which examines electoral reform process in two stages. The first stage concerns the emergence of pro-reform preference and the principal actor here is the governing party (or largest party in the governing coalition). Here, I focus on how party system fragmentation affects the main contenders in the

election, i.e. whether the small parties gain votes at the expense of governing party or largest opposition party. This politically valuable information, I argue, will prompt governments to initiate either a permissive or restrictive reform. The second stage addresses the legislation of electoral reform attempts. In this stage, I emphasize the role of governments' legislative power, legal protection of electoral systems (either by constitutional protection or judicial review) and the content of electoral reforms.

2.1 Existing Literature on Electoral Reforms

Much of the existing literature has focused on the consequences of electoral systems while much less attention was paid to electoral system changes. Starting with Duverger (1954), who posited that plurality elections tend to result in two-party systems, a large body of work has focused on the effects of electoral systems on the party system structure, namely on the number and size of parties.⁹ Other scholars examined how electoral systems affect other aspects of politics such the ideological congruence between citizens and governments (M. Golder and Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; B. G. Powell 2000), accountability, representation and governability (Norris 2004; B. G. Powell 2000), the level of corruption (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003), level of redistribution (Iversen and Soskice 2006). The conventional notion of electoral systems, therefore, has been that electoral systems remain stable once they are put into use (Benoit 2004, 2007).

⁹ For the effects of electoral systems on party structure, see Duverger (1954); Rae (1967); Taagepera and Shugart (1989); Lijphart (1994); Blais and Carty (1991); Benoit (2001). For the analyses on how electoral systems interact with social cleavages, see Taagepera (1999) and Clark and Golder (2006). Also, see S.N. Golder (2006) for an analysis of how electoral systems alter alliance formation and see Tavits (2006) for an analysis on party proliferation and electoral systems. (S. N. Golder 2006). For a recent review on the effects of electoral systems, see (Grofman 2016).

This view is also reflected in the early studies of electoral reforms which emphasized the rarity of electoral system changes (Boix 1999; Katz 2005; Renwick 2010a; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b). The electoral rule choices during democratization attracted most attention. A set of work focused on the emergence of PR rules during the suffrage expansion in Western democracies. The underlying notion was that electoral reforms do not change unless there is a major change in the electoral arena, as an exogenous shock, which alters the preferences of political actors, whom otherwise would rather keep the status quo rules (Boix 1999, 2010). Therefore, these studies conducted cross-national comparisons between democracies which adopted PR systems and democracies which did not, in response to the suffrage expansion. Boix (1999) argued that ruling parties adopted PR when there is a strong new party and when the votes of established parties were tied (which prevents coordination on the larger one of them).¹⁰ A series of studies identified different intervening variables for PR reforms, such as partisan bias suffered by incumbents (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Calvo 2009) and the existential threat by an ideologically radical socialist party (A. Ahmed 2010; Barzachka 2014).

A similar approach was adopted to study electoral rule choices during democratization of the post-communist countries, in which the external shock was the emergence of multi-party contestation. Most of these studies have focused on the bargaining power of parties with different electoral system preferences (Birch 2003; Geddes 1996; Lijphart and Waisman 1996). The remaining work consisted of single case studies of successfully adopted electoral reforms (Bawn 1993; Benoit 2004; Benoit and Hayden 2004; Brady and Mo 1992; de Mesquita 2000; Remington and Smith 1996; Tsebelis 1990). Most case studies point to the partisan interest-

¹⁰ Boix (1999) builds upon and formalizes Rokkan's explanation on the origins of PR system in countries with the socialist parties.

based calculations of political actors in the ongoing electoral reform process (Bawn 1993; Benoit 2004; Benoit and Hayden 2004; Brady and Mo 1992; de Mesquita 2000; Remington and Smith 1996; Tsebelis 1990). In its simplest form, partisan interest is conceptualized as seat-maximization, and accordingly an electoral reform happens when a pro-reform party or a coalition of pro-reform parties has the necessary number of legislative seats to enact it (Benoit 2004).¹¹ Other case studies pay attention to systemic factors, such as the flaws in the existing electoral systems, i.e., whether the existing system is too representative or too favorable to the plurality-winning party (Shugart 2001). The flawed systems, epitomized by Italy and New Zealand before 1993 respectively, fail to produce efficient political systems by articulating “policy-based majorities”, and therefore, they are predisposed to change toward mixed systems (Shugart 2001: 29).

These earlier studies share some similarities. For instance, these studies focus on identifying party preferences without having to theorize about the timing of the electoral system changes. In the PR reforms in western democracies, timing was exogenously determined due to the suffrage expansion. Likewise, it was the roundtable discussions for electoral reforms in post-communist countries. The last set of studies on the adoption of mixed systems left the timing of electoral reforms to the contingent factors, which are case specific (Shugart 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b). However, explaining the conditions which make electoral reforms likely in contemporary democracies requires researchers to address the question of *when* electoral reforms happen and examine both reform cases and nonreform cases. Yet, the general methodological

¹¹ Other partisan interest-based explanations emphasize motives such as maximizing the influence over government formation. For instance, Tsebelis (1990) explains the adoption of PR by the French Socialist government in 1986 by the Socialist’s aim to exploit their pivotal advantages in the parliament to increase their chances of forming the government. Bawn (1993) adopts a similar explanation for German electoral reforms in 1949 and 1953.

trend has been single case studies of reform episodes (Leyenaar and Hazan 2011) which is dictated by electoral reform definition in the literature (Levick 2016).

2.1.1 Definition of Electoral Reforms

The existing literature on electoral reforms has mostly defined electoral reforms as a wholesale replacement of one electoral system family (such as majoritarian or PR systems) by another. Not surprisingly, these reforms are not frequently adopted. As Leyenaar and Hazan (2011: 439) argue, this categorization is “too crude” and disregards the variety within the electoral system families. The study of electoral systems consider the role of ballot structure, legal thresholds, use of different tiers as important components of electoral systems on the party systems and other political variables (Cox 1997; Farrell 2001; Taagepera 2007; Grofman 2016; Grofman and Lijphart 2002; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011).

In this respect, Lijphart (1994)’s study of electoral system change was very influential to broaden the electoral reform definition by showing that seemingly minor changes, such as differences in seat allocation formulas, assembly sizes and electoral thresholds, can have important implications on the political system. Lijphart (1994) defined electoral system as a significant change in the following components of electoral systems: assembly size, electoral formula, electoral threshold and district magnitude and applied a 20 percent threshold to define significance. Other studies include the tier structure (M. Golder 2005). Definitely, broadening the electoral reform definition increased the number of electoral reforms implemented. For instance Renwick (2010b) identified 6 electoral reforms, whereas (Renwick 2011b) identified 84 electoral reform cases using Lijphart’s (1994) definition of electoral reforms.

Recent scholarship has demonstrated that perceived infrequency of electoral reforms that justifies single case studies stems from a very narrow definition of electoral reforms (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Levick 2016). By adopting a slightly broader definition of electoral reforms, recent studies have started to examine both stability and change in electoral rules over time and have examined the relationship between party system dynamics and electoral reforms (Colomer 2004a; Nunez and Jacobs 2016; Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017; Remmer 2008; Renwick 2011b; Riera 2013).

2.1.2 Party System and Electoral Reforms

Even though the interaction between party systems and electoral systems has been emphasized in the literature from early on (Grumm 1958; Rae 1967; Rokkan 1970), it is only recently that studies consider the role of party system on the electoral reforms. Studies in this literature have sought to identify conditions under which parties adopt permissive reforms (which opens the system to small parties by increasing the proportionality between votes and seats) or restrictive reforms (which does the opposite). In general, we can identify three sets of works in this emerging literature: i) shifts in electoral risk due to the number of political parties; ii) governability and representation problems; and iii) cartelization dynamics in volatile systems.

Inspired by Boix (1999)'s study on PR reforms, a group of scholars focus on the electoral risks faced by politicians. According to this argument, politicians associate highly fragmented party systems with higher risks of losing power, as the average party gets smaller and competition increases in fragmented party systems. Parties become unsure about their own electoral strength and therefore have incentives to adopt permissive reforms to respond to the electoral threat from increased competition. Since permissive systems produce multiple winners,

such reforms can prevent a devastating election loss. In contrast, when party systems produce low levels of competition, restrictive reforms are likely since parties want to consolidate their electoral gains (Colomer 2004b, 2005; Remmer 2008). This explanation will be referred as defensive model of electoral reform, as the main mechanism in this explanation is preventing losses.

The second group of scholars associates party system fragmentation with the governability and representation problems, to which Benoit refers as “general interest-based explanations” (2004: 368-70). For instance, fragmented party systems can create inefficiencies in governance because small parties can delay government formation and policy implantation since they have veto power in the parliament (Bielasiak and Hulse 2013 p: 3; Harfst 2013). In such cases, restrictive reforms become more likely because they can counter governability problems by keeping small parties out of parliament. By contrast, low party system fragmentation and disproportional elections can result in deficiency in representation, which then increase the likelihood of permissive reforms. This main idea here can also be traced to Dunleavy and Margetts (1995)’s discussion of mixed member systems. They argue that mixed systems can provide an attractive solution to democracies with governability, accountability or representation problems as they combine the strengths of proportional and plurality systems (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995: 26; Shugart 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a).

The last group focuses on electoral volatility—the shifts in party votes between elections—to explain electoral reforms. Theoretically, however, there is no consensus on how electoral volatility alters the incidence of electoral reform. On the one side, the volatile systems signal the emergence of new parties, the disappearance of existing ones, and shifts in voters’

allegiances. Therefore, politicians have incentives to respond to these changes by altering the institutions to assure their viability. Hence, a positive relationship between electoral volatility and electoral reforms is expected. On the other side, electoral volatility brings uncertainty and it becomes harder for political parties to assess the ramifications of a potential reform. This, in turn, reduces politicians' incentives to alter the electoral system as changes in the system may exacerbate the uncertainty (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Thus, a negative relationship between volatility and electoral reform attempts is expected. Importantly, electoral volatility does not offer any insights about the type of electoral reform to be adopted unless the source of the volatility is specified.

A group of scholars focuses on the source of electoral volatility, to explain the direction of electoral reform (Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017). Electoral volatility stems not only from the vote shifts between existing parties but also from the emergence of new parties. These scholars argue that this difference can be important for electoral reform decisions of governments. Accordingly, the vote shifts between existing parties from one election to another is tolerable. However, when electoral volatility stems from new parties, the parties in power have an incentive to prevent these new parties from entering the parliament by adopting restrictive reforms. The rationale here is that new parties challenge the advantaged position of existing parties and creates an incentive to act like a *cartel* to exclude new parties (Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017).

However, empirical results are inconclusive in their support for these rival explanations. Remmer (2008) finds that low levels of party system fragmentation increase the probability of adopting restrictive reforms in her examination of Latin American countries. Her findings

suggest that winners want to consolidate their gains from low levels of competition, but do not lend support to the permissive reform explanation. Bielasiak and Hulse (2013), on the other hand, find that the party system fragmentation is in the expected direction as suggested by governability and representation argument, but this association is not statistically significant in their analysis of electoral reforms in the post-communist democracies. Both Remmer (2008) and Bielasiak and Hulse (2013) find that electoral volatility increases the likelihood of both permissive and restrictive reforms. In contrast, Nunez and her colleagues (2017) find that restrictive reforms are likely when new party volatility is high.

These mixed results suggest that the relationship between party system and electoral reform needs to be further examined. The main weakness in this set of explanations is that they assume larger parties are in a position to change the electoral system in parliament, yet, they fail to consider scenarios where party system fragmentation affects the larger parties asymmetrically. In fact, these scenarios are highly likely if we consider that larger parties are the main contenders in elections, and they compete against each other to form the government. Moreover, the statistical analyses of electoral reforms focus exclusively on the conditions that can alter politicians' preferences for a given electoral system, without examining the factors that can hinder electoral reform. However, studies show that constitutional rigidity decreases the incentives for electoral reforms (Nunez and Jacobs 2016). The disregard to the barriers to electoral reform is unfortunate since not every reform attempt reaches the final stage and gets enacted. Focusing solely on the factors that encourage politicians to change the electoral system not only fails to capture a substantial part of the reform process but also risks introducing bias to the empirical analyses, since 'no reform' category in these studies does not necessarily mean no reform was attempted by politicians.

Relatedly, these studies also do not pay attention to the failed reform attempts, which is problematic especially because these studies solely focus on the conditions that induce political parties to revise the electoral system. Clearly, these conditions exist in failed reform cases since politicians attempted to change the system but failed to do so. Therefore, I argue that incorporating unsuccessful reform attempts to electoral reform explanations makes it possible to have a relevant comparative base in the empirical analyses: cases where politicians attempted to initiate reforms and where they did not. In the following section, I examine how the literature address the failed reform attempts, in general.

2.1.3 Explaining the Success and Failure of Reforms

The previous section discussed the theoretical explanations offered in the literature about when and how the changes in preferences of politicians about the existing electoral system lead them to initiate electoral reforms, but it did not address when parties succeed in changing the electoral systems. The effects of party system on the preferences of political actors provide only a partial explanation of electoral system changes. This section examines how failed reform attempts are studied in the literature.

The failed reform attempts did not receive much attention in the literature on electoral reforms even though they are important for understanding the conditions leading to reform enactment, as well as for our inferences about the conditions that affect the government's decision to initiate electoral reforms. However, the failed reform attempts are hard to detect. Unless a democracy under examination experienced at least one successful electoral reform, we do not encounter information about unsuccessful reform attempts. For instance, Rahat (2008) notes numerous reform attempts which were not ratified, in his examination of Israeli electoral

reform of 1992. Similarly, Renwick (2010) shows that Italy and Japan implemented major reforms in 1990s, but these were preceded (or sometimes followed) by a number of failed reform attempts. Likewise, Nikolenyi (2011) uncovers the failed reform attempts in Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania, because there followed by subsequent electoral reforms in each country.

Since what we know about failed reform attempts comes through the lenses of already existing (or successfully enacted) electoral reforms, the existing literature does not offer insights about the conditions leading to successful reform outcomes. However, there was a failed permissive reform attempt in Finland in 2011 (Nurmi and Nurmi 2012), which did not receive much attention. Nor did the Portuguese restrictive reform attempt in 1998 (Magone and Stock 1998). This is because both Finland and Portugal have stable electoral systems, even though the existing electoral systems are not necessarily supported by all political parties. However, these reform attempts are as important as the failed attempts in Israel, Japan, or Italy to expand our understanding of electoral reform process. A systematic analysis of electoral reform enactment requires us to collect information about countries with stable electoral systems as well.

The existing studies of failed electoral reform attempts suggest some dimensions to examine such as coalitional politics and institutional protection (Rahat and Hazan 2011). For instance, Renwick (2010) draws attention to the role of institutions in explaining the success or failure of electoral reforms. However, his treatment of electoral reform failure in case analyses yields different results for each case. In France, for instance, the government drops the electoral reform proposal because the anti-reform camp within the Socialist Party convinced President Mitterrand that a permissive reform would empower the Greens at the expense of the Socialist Party (Renwick 2010: 106, 242, 163). In other cases, the complex nature of the government

coalition led to the failure of Italian electoral reforms from 1994 to 2001. The conclusion, he draws, is that the negative effects of institutions and veto players should not be overstated as they can be overcome by strategic leadership in pro-reform camp.

It is mostly scholars working on electoral reforms in the first past the post systems who paid attention to the failed reforms, as these systems produced many prominent reform attempts which failed in referendum such as the ones in the UK in 2011, or in Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island in 2005 (Shugart 2008). However, comparable studies in the proportional and semi-proportional systems barely exist. As Rahat and Hazan (2011) bring it to attention, the observed stability in the electoral systems cannot be solely explained by the lack of political interest in changing the rules of the game. There are also cases where political elites initiate electoral system changes but are confronted with procedural or institutional obstacles (Rahat and Hazan 2011). However, the current literature does not systematically analyze these barriers and their effect on the success and failure of electoral reform attempts. Even the studies which focus on the conditions of successful reforms fail to consider possible barriers to electoral reform in their theories or in empirical analysis. For example, Harfst (2013) considers the effect of consensual or majoritarian visions of democracy on the success of electoral reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. But he does not examine how the variation in the constitutional protection of electoral rules affects the success or failure of electoral system changes.


To date, the most systematic examination for barriers to electoral reform is offered by Jacob and Nunez (2016) who examined the conditions which facilitate and hinder electoral reforms. They find that constitutional rigidity decreases the occurrence of electoral reforms in

general, whereas judicial review increases the occurrence of electoral reforms. However, this analysis does not consider whether constitutions indeed has a clause on the electoral system. If not, the constitutional rigidity would not necessarily affect the occurrence of reforms. More importantly, this study does not analyze the effect of institutions such as constitution, or judicial review on the success or failure of a reform attempt. But they compare cases where reform happened with cases of no reform. Lastly, this study does not consider if and how the institutional barriers, such as judicial review and constitutional protection can have different impact depending on the type of electoral reform (i.e., being restrictive or permissive). Therefore,

2.3 Theoretical Framework: A Two-Stage Examination of Electoral Reform

To explain why electoral reforms are adopted, we need to understand *first* why governments form pro-reform preferences and propose electoral reform legislation and *second* how these reform attempts turn into actual reform outcomes. These questions correspond to different stages in the electoral reform processes: electoral reform initiation and enactment. Figure 2.1 presents the schematic overview of the electoral reform process within the framework of this dissertation.

Figure 2.1 Electoral Reform Process



The first stage concerns the preference formation for an alternative electoral system. The main actor in this stage is the governing party or the largest party in a coalition government.¹² In this stage, the governing party formulates a preference either for a more permissive or more restrictive electoral system and explicitly initiates a process to alter the electoral system. Here, the government's decision to initiate either reform type is based on the nature of electoral competition. Specifically, two variables determine electoral reform scenarios: i) the number of parties ideologically close to the governing party and ii) the number of parties ideologically close to the largest opposition party.

The second stage addresses the legislation of electoral reform attempt. In this stage, legislative and constitutional processes determine whether the reform attempt succeeds or fails. More specifically, I consider the role of i) legislative power of governments, ii) constitutional protection of electoral systems and iii) judicial review on the success and failure of electoral reforms, they are initiated. In this stage, I also address whether iv) the actual content of electoral reform has an effect on its success, as some elements of electoral reforms can be confronted by more obstacles than others.

2.3.1 Electoral Reform Initiations

The model for the reform initiation stage puts the (leading) government party, rather than any other pro-reform coalition, to the center of electoral reform process. While reform proposals can also originate in the legislature sponsored by opposition parties, it is well established in the

¹² Throughout this discussion, the governing party is used to denote the largest party in government.

literature that credible reform initiations require the government's support (Pilet 2007).¹³ To model the reform initiation stage, I make three assumptions about the preferences of political parties and the informational context during an electoral reform process.

Assumption 1: The goal of political parties in selecting among different electoral systems is to maximize their chances of forming (or taking part in) a government and their power within a possible governing coalition.

Assumption 2: Parties understand how alternative electoral systems work.

Assumption 3: Parties use all information available to forecast the vote distribution that would result in upcoming elections.

The first assumption underlines the main idea of this model about preferences; whereas the latter assumptions are about the informational context in which political parties develop their preferences. The second assumption implies that parties understand how seats are allocated according to electoral systems under consideration, but it does not require politicians to know all the possible electoral systems and their effects on the vote and seat distributions. The third assumption underlines that parties seek information to predict their relative electoral strength. But it does not necessitate an ability on the part of politicians to perfectly predict the vote and seat shares of parties. In other words, I do not disregard the possibility of misinformation about the relative strength of political parties as well as the possibility of miscalculations about the effect of alternative systems on the vote distribution. While these assumptions apply to any political party, I use them to generate hypotheses about the preferences of the governing party over alternative electoral systems.

Following these assumptions, I expect that the governing parties make use of all available

¹³ The decision to focus on the government's decision concerning electoral reforms is plausible since electoral reforms proposed by opposition parties may not even pass the first reading in the parliament if the government support is lacking.

information to predict the vote distribution that would be realized under alternative electoral systems, and then seek to adopt the electoral system that maximizes their chances to hold onto power. Having a higher seat share increases the chances to form the government and also decreases the need for (or the number of) small parties to form a coalition government. However, this does not necessarily mean that a political party will always prefer adopting any electoral system that may increase its seat share. Importantly, it is also likely to consider the effect of the proposed system on the main competitor's seat share. Under some conditions, the ruling party will pursue an electoral rule designed to weaken the opposition. Especially, if its chances to form government is low, the ruling party will prefer electoral institutions that would yield a divided coalition for its main competitor, in order to weaken the opposition.¹⁴ Next, I discuss how different electoral systems can affect the chances to form a government to develop hypotheses about governments' reform preferences.

The main difference in electoral systems lies in the incentives they give to voters for coordinating (or not) around a set of viable political parties (or candidates) and to parties (and candidates) for strategic entry or withdrawal from electoral competition (Cox 1997). To elaborate, consider a decrease in the district magnitude, which makes the electoral system more restrictive. When there are fewer seats in a district (as a result of lower district magnitude), parties need to garner more votes to win a seat in that district; thus, voters are encouraged to coordinate around a limited number of parties in order not to waste their votes for a non-viable candidate or party. In this type of restrictive systems, political entrepreneurs, too, coordinate on existing parties rather than forming a new party. On the contrary, permissive systems encourage

¹⁴ See (İşsever-Ekinci 2016) for how considerations of relative benefits of electoral systems shaped the preferences of Turkish political parties during the electoral reforms in Turkey.

the entry of new parties into electoral competition and provide voters a higher number of viable parties.

This difference in electoral systems has the following implications for government formation. Restrictive electoral systems have a higher threshold of representation and therefore limit the number of parties that can enter the parliament. This implies, in general, that the restrictive reforms decrease the number parties needed for forming a coalition government and increase the incidence of single-party governments. Thus, more restrictive electoral systems can make government formation easier for the party that has emerged from the elections with the largest seat share. In permissive systems, by contrast, the threshold of representation is lower, and therefore, voters do not need to vote strategically for their second-choice parties. Consequently, small parties have higher chances to enter the parliament and to take part in the governing coalition.

Cognizant of the effects of electoral systems (assumption 2), parties form their preferences about electoral system types. On the one hand, if the (leading) party in government expects to be forming the government after the elections, it should prefer adopting restrictive rules, so that it can have fewer parties to negotiate with and have more power within the governing coalition. On the other hand, the same party should prefer a permissive system to split its rivals or to prevent coordination on the main competing party, if it expects to be in opposition.¹⁵ Next, I discuss how the party system dynamics can inform governments and

¹⁵ It also follows that small parties should prefer permissive electoral systems since permissive rules increase their seat shares as well as their chances of being in the government. One possible exception to this occurs when a small party is benefiting from geographical concentration of its votes. I assess to what extent this situation may become instrumental for electoral reforms in the case studies of electoral reform episodes.

encourage them for different types of electoral reforms.

Building upon the literature, I expect that the incumbent party takes cues from party system dynamics to evaluate the effects of electoral systems on its chances of forming a government in future elections. To capture the extent of electoral competition more precisely, I diverge from the literature, which uses overall party system fragmentation or electoral volatility as party system cues. To this end, I examine the source of party system fragmentation. While electoral competition is in general higher in fragmented and volatile party systems due to small and new parties, this does not necessitate a uniform institutional response from the governing party. Instead, the optimal institutional response of the governing party to fragmentation, depends on the source of party system fragmentation. For instance, small parties may gain their votes at the expense of one of the leading parties, which, in turn, affects the competition between the leading parties. It is this differential impact of fragmentation that shapes the preferences of the governing party with respect to the status quo and alternative electoral systems.

To give an example, Lithuanian party system was highly fragmented in both 1996 and 2000 elections with the effective number of parties equaling 7.5 and 7.2 respectively. The existing explanations expected a uniform response in both cases. The governability explanation predicted restrictive reforms, while defensive model predicted permissive reforms in both cases. However, Lithuania adopted a restrictive reform in the former and a permissive reform in the latter election cycle. To understand these diverging outcomes, therefore, we need to understand the source of fragmentation and how it affects the competition faced by the governing party.

There are two sources of competition facing the governing party: competition with the small parties that have similar ideologies as the governing party and competition with the largest

opposition party over the government formation. The party system fragmentation variable, on its own, does not provide any cues about how the competition for government formation between the largest two parties is affected by other, possibly smaller, parties. High values of party system fragmentation signal an increasing number and weight of small parties, which may stem from the switch of votes from either one of the leading parties to smaller ones. Hence, it is important for the governing party to know on whose expense the small parties gain votes as it can affect its competition with the main opposition party. The ideological proximity of small parties to either leading party can signal future vote shifts to small parties if the status quo rules are maintained. In this respect, the placement of small and new parties on the ideological spectrum, and their distance from the main government and opposition parties are essential to the governing party's decision over electoral reform.

For instance, fragmentation close to the governing party's ideology signals a high degree of competition in this ideological bloc. With the status quo electoral rules, this type of competition is likely to decrease the seat potential of the governing party as well as increasing the likelihood of future vote shifts from the leading party to the small parties located close to the governing party. In such a context, the governing party may have incentives to respond to these shifts by institutional solutions. A more restrictive electoral system in general encourages voters to coordinate on the larger (and more viable) political parties close to their ideological preferences. Cognizant of this effect, the government party may have an incentive to initiate a restrictive reform to increase the coordination of voters towards itself. To continue with the previous example, the Lithuanian government may initiate a restrictive reform in 1996 or 2000 if it faces high number of parties that are close to itself on the ideological spectrum. While it was the case in the 1996 election which resulted in a restrictive reform attempt, the same condition

was not observed in the 2000 election.¹⁶

In this scenario, the government is not likely to incentive to initiate a permissive reform since permissive rules would help small parties to enter the parliament and consequently reduce the legislative power of the governing party. In addition to this short-term effects, permissive electoral reforms may also lead to further fragmentation within ideological blocs by encouraging party splits or emergence of new parties. This would ultimately mean an increase in the number of competitors close to the governing party, and hence the governing party has no incentive to facilitate it. The following hypothesis addresses the relationship between the degree of competition in the governing party's ideological bloc and its incentives to initiate reforms:

Hypothesis 1: The probability of restrictive reform attempts increases with the number of competitors in the ruling party's ideological cluster, while the probability of permissive reform attempts increases decreases with it.

To summarize, Hypothesis 1 implies that the high degree of competition in the governing party's ideological cluster increases the likelihood that the government initiate a restrictive reform, and decreases the likelihood that government initiate a permissive reform.

However, it is important to note that electoral reforms (in either direction) will alter the degree of competition faced by both the governing party and the opposition party in their respective ideological blocs. A restrictive reform may lead the voters on both sides of the spectrum to coordinate on the larger party. This would be beneficial for the main competitor of the governing party. For this reason, it is also important to consider the relative position of the

¹⁶ See the details of the Lithuanian case in Chapter 5.

governing party with respect to the main opposition party. In other words, the benefits from a restrictive reform in cases of high competition in the governing party's ideological cluster may be outweighed if the competition in the opposition party's ideological cluster is high as well. In such cases, the governing party could gain from restrictive reforms more so long as its ideological cluster is more fragmented than that of the opposition party. Thus, if the ideological cluster of the opposition party is more clustered than that of the governing party, the latter's incentives to initiate a restrictive reform will be weaker.

The permissive reforms can serve a different purpose: to weaken the opposition. As discussed, permissive reforms are likely to increase the number of small parties and weaken the chances of forming a cohesive government. The governing party can use this type of reform as a tool to increase the degree of competition in the opposition party's ideological cluster and prevent the consolidation of the opposition. To illustrate with an example, during the 2005 Italian electoral reform, the rightwing coalition aimed to make the center-left coalition more dependent on the small coalition partners, which would make any coalition formed by left parties less cohesive and more likely to collapse (Renwick, Hanretty, and Hine 2009). However, adopting a permissive reform also makes the parliament more accessible to the ideological competitors of the governing party. For this reason, the governing party will be reluctant to implement such an electoral reform if its own bloc is already fragmented. This strategy would be beneficial only when the governing party faces weaker competition in comparison to the opposition party. In other words, weakening the opposition as a goal is only of secondary importance for the governing party. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of competitors faced by the opposition relative to

the governing party, the more likely permissive reform attempts are.

Before turning to the second stage of reform process, it is worth noting that the model developed in this chapter differs from the office seeking (seat-maximization) model in which political parties act to increase their seat shares and advocate only for electoral rules that increase their seats (see Benoit and Hayden 2004). By contrast, the power-seeking motive exploited in the current model is through increasing its prospects for government formation, which also includes weakening the opposition. To give an example, during the German electoral reform of 1949, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) favored a PR system instead of FPTP even though the latter would have benefited the party more in terms of increasing its seat share. The main rationale for this decision was to decrease the chances of its main rival, the Christian Democratic Union, to form a single-party government and therefore to increase the chances of SDP to lead a coalition government (Bawn 1993). The SDP's choice of PR system seems to be suboptimal according to the seat maximization model; however, it is the optimal response, according to the current model, when government formation potential is taken into account, as it necessitates considering relative gains from electoral rule alternatives.

2.3.2 Electoral Reform Enactment

Once governments initiate an electoral reform, the reform bill passes through different stages depending on the political and institutional features of the democracy in question. Not all reform proposals result in an electoral system change; sometimes reform bills fail to reach the final stage to get enacted. The failed attempts are unexpected occurrences, though. Given that institutional and political constraints are known to politicians before the reform process begins, a reasonable expectation is that governments should not initiate an electoral reform that has the

risk of failing. In fact, studies point to the arduous bargaining over the content of electoral system changes among parties with different and mostly conflicting interests before an electoral reform is put on the legislative agenda (Benoit 2004, 2007; Rahat 2008). Why, then, do some reform attempts fail while others get successfully enacted?

To address this question, this dissertation turns to the interaction between institutional factors and the types of electoral reform attempts. Since the existing work in the literature raised this question but did not inquire it, a theoretical and empirical investigation of whether institutional barriers to electoral reform work in the same way for different types of electoral reforms is valuable. In this section, I develop hypotheses concerning how the effects of the legislative power of governments, constitutional protection, and judicial review differ for permissive and restrictive electoral reforms. In addition, I examine the content of electoral reforms to see if certain components of electoral systems are more resistant to change than others.

Legislative Power of Government

There is a tendency to view electoral reform as a single process resulting from pro-reform preference of governments. However, many accounts of electoral reform episodes reveal the intricate manner of electoral reforms which entail a continuous coalition building in every step of the legislative process (Rahat 2008). Nevertheless, some governments can be better equipped to implement their preferred electoral reform than others. In particular, the legislative power of governments, in terms of the number of seats they have in the parliament, is one important factor in their ability to enact an electoral reform. In general, the likelihood of success in adopting a reform increases as the government has more power in the parliament. However, theoretically

this is not necessarily the case for each type of electoral reform. Since the required support for permissive reforms can easily come from small parties that are currently not in the governing coalition, the legislative power of the government is a less significant factor in enacting permissive reforms.

An alternative way to ponder the role of government power on electoral reform is to focus on different types of governments and coalitions, which matter for enacting laws, but especially for reforms that introduce significant changes (Tsebelis 2002).¹⁷ Certainly, single-party governments have more discretion to change electoral systems, unless there is a constitutional requirement for a qualified majority. When there is such a requirement, though, having an oversized (surplus) government, which consists of more parties than required for a parliamentary majority, can become instrumental to reform enactment. For instance, the leading party can make use of some political tools to convince its coalition partner(s) to support the reform bill, such as by extending negotiations to other policy areas, or by including changes in other dimensions of the electoral law that can appease them. By contrast, these tools are less likely to be effective when potential support groups are outside the governing coalition. Moreover, it is easier to monitor the coalition partners than the opposition parties in the parliament to assure their support during the electoral reform process.¹⁸ Similarly, these dynamics may be more important for restrictive reforms than permissive ones.

While the overall expectation is that the probability of enacting an electoral reform successfully increases with the legislative power of the governing party, I expect this relationship

¹⁷ The literature on the effect of government types over policy outcomes is quite developed. The aim of this section is limited to discern how the government type could affect the success and failure of reform attempts once they are initiated.

¹⁸ In addition, the existence of an extra party in the governing coalition can reduce the bargaining power of small parties since the threat to defect is not as credible as it is in the minimum winning coalitions.

to hold for only restrictive reforms. As discussed above, the implementation of permissive reforms does not necessarily require a government majority, especially if there are smaller parties in the parliament. Since we are concerned with electoral systems which already have some degree of proportionality, government parties are likely to find smaller parties in the parliament to garner support for a permissive reform. Hence, the probability of successful enactment is higher for restrictive reform attempts if the government has more legislative power. This yields the following hypotheses to be tested:

Hypothesis 3a: The probability of successful reform attempts increases with the legislative power of government.

Hypothesis 3b: The probability of successful restrictive reform attempts increases with the legislative power of government.

Constitutional Protection

So far, the discussion has focused on the power of governments to adopt electoral reforms. A related question concerns the extent of support needed by governments to enact an electoral reform. The legal procedures for changing electoral systems may require more than a parliamentary majority, to protect the system from blatant manipulations. Nesting electoral systems into a higher set of rules, such as constitutions, is a common way to ensure such protection. In some countries, constitutions specify the electoral system, detailing the electoral formula or district sizes or both. In others, the constitution includes more of a general principle to guide the electoral system reforms. For instance, *proportionality in election results* or *production of stable majorities* are general principles signifying proportional representation and majoritarian systems, respectively (Raabe 2015). In either form, constitutional amendment rules apply to

electoral system changes, resulting in a more demanding process for major electoral system changes to be implemented.

Yet, in a given democracy the degree of protection provided by the constitution for the electoral system depends on how difficult it is to amend the constitution. In general, constitutional amendments require completing more stringent procedures to ensure a broader agreement of groups with diverse interests. There are different devices that can make constitutional amendments more difficult. One of them is the requirement of super majorities in the parliament (such as the two-thirds of parliamentarians), which typically necessitates the support of parties other than the governing parties for an electoral reform to be enacted. Other requirements can bring different actors into the reform process, such as the approval of the president, the state legislatures (in federal states) or the citizens (through referendums or approval of the parliament in two consecutive legislative terms). In Iceland, for example, constitutional amendment requires the parliamentary majority in two consecutive legislative terms. In this case, pro-reform parties need to be elected twice to alter the electoral system, since the proportionality principle is included in the constitution. The more of such devices are employed as requirements for constitutional amendment, the more rigid the constitution becomes.

The existence of constitutional protection alters the likelihood of electoral reform enactment in two ways. First, pro-reform political parties, cognizant of the high barrier of constitutional protection, may decide not to initiate an electoral reform even when they prefer an alternative system over the status quo. Second, pro-reform parties can make the content of the electoral reform more palatable to other parties, thereby ensuring a broad enough agreement to garner the required support for amending the constitution. Or alternatively, government parties

can extend the negotiations with potential support groups to other policy areas to ensure their support. Nevertheless, it is still more difficult to maintain such a broad coalition during the reform process, especially when the potential support group is not a coalition partner. Therefore, constitutional protection can result in the failure of electoral reform attempt.

In the case of super-majority requirement, other parties are introduced to the reform process and their behavior is more difficult to monitor for governments, as opposed to monitoring coalition partners, during different stages of the legislative process. Therefore, even if there is an agreement between political forces before a reform is proposed, the attempt can still fail at any parliamentary stages, such as the second reading, plenary discussion or final voting. In the latter set of protection devices which brings voters into the reform process, a pro-reform government may miscalculate the likelihood of enacting an electoral reform. There can be cases where the government counts on the approval of the reform by its supporters, but voters do not show up in the referendum, or do not give enough support to enact the reform either by failing to meet the requirement for referendum, or by changing the composition of parliament in the consecutive elections. The reform attempts in Ireland (1959 and 1969 restrictive reform attempts) failed twice in the referendum stage, due to this type of miscalculations. The Irish Constitution details the electoral system by specifying both the number of parliamentarians to be elected and the electoral formula (Single Transferable Vote). The rigidity of the Irish Constitution, which requires a referendum in addition to the approval of both houses of the parliament, makes it very difficult to change the electoral system (Gallagher 2005). Hence, as the Irish example illustrates, the successful enactment of electoral reform attempts also depends on the constitutional protection, in addition to inter-party bargaining in the parliamentary stage.

Finally, the constraining power of constitutional protection pertains to restrictive reforms in general. Unless the provision about the electoral system is very detailed, such as giving the formula or district sizes, the constitutions in general protect the principle of proportionality.¹⁹ In this case, I expect that the constitutional protection decrease the likelihood of successful restrictive reform attempts, but not the success of permissive reform attempts. The following hypotheses are formulated to include both general expectation and the expectation about restrictive reform attempts.

The hypotheses concerning the effect of constitutional protection on the incidence of electoral reform enactment is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 4a: Constitutional protection of electoral systems decreases the probability of successful reforms.

Hypothesis 4b: Constitutional protection of electoral systems decreases the probability of successful restrictive reforms.

Judicial Review

The constitutional protection is not the only legal procedure that can affect the success of electoral reform attempts. Even when electoral systems are not specified in the constitutions, there is still room for judiciary to intervene in the reform process. In this regard, the judiciary's power to interpret whether or not the proposed changes in the electoral law are constitutional is a crucial venue through which a pro-reform government loses its power to other actors. In general,

¹⁹ While this is true in general, such an assumption would be innocuous for the purposes of this dissertation since the focus is on the proportional and semi-proportional systems. The only case in my sample which protects the principle of semi-proportionality is Turkey. The Turkish Constitution was amended in 1995 to include the following statement: "electoral systems should enable fair representation and formation of stable governments".

specialized constitutional courts are entrusted with the power to decide on the constitutionality of laws passed by parliaments. In some countries, such as Germany, the regular court system can also review the constitutionality of laws (La Porta et al. 2004). In addition to its existence, the scope of judicial review is also deemed important in the constitutional research. There can be limitations to judicial review, for instance, only certain persons can refer a law for a constitutional review, or judicial review can be restricted to only certain laws. In principle, however, both limited and full judicial review systems can affect the success of electoral reforms given that courts can override an electoral reform which was legislated in the parliament.

The existence of an independent body to decide on the constitutionality of the laws is arguably a more binding restraint on governments than a rigid constitution (Lijphart 2012). If the parliamentary majority can interpret any law whose constitutionality is uncertain, then the constitutional protection of the electoral system may not be very effective, as it gives ambitious politicians room to maneuver to implement their preferred electoral reforms. Nonetheless, this combination of rigid constitutions in the absence of judicial review is not very common (Lijphart 2012).

While theoretical expectation is that judicial review decreases the likelihood of successful enactment of electoral reforms, Nunez and Jacobs (2016) find that the existence of judicial review increases the likelihood of electoral reforms in general. Their explanation for this rather anomalous result focuses on the possible active role played by the constitutional courts concerning demanding reforms. They argue that judicial actors can be very active in cases like Germany and Italy in electoral reform debate. However, in most examples they discuss courts legitimize a recent electoral reform, while one of them (Italy 2013) is found unconstitutional.

Instead of active role of courts, I argue the effect of judicial reform can differ in permissive or restrictive electoral reforms.

Specifically, I argue that the effect of judicial review in terms of protection of the existing electoral laws can be more relevant for restrictive reform attempts than permissive ones. First, the judicial review process usually starts after a political actor refers the electoral system changes to the court. This requires a strong opposition to the electoral reform to the extent that the opposing party would have the incentive and legal authority to refer the electoral reform bill to the court. In proportional systems, such opposition would be more likely to emerge against restrictive reforms, which usually disadvantage small parties. Second, even though, in theory, judges can review the constitutionality of electoral systems according to any article of the constitution, if the constitution has a clause about the electoral system, then the judicial review will be based on this clause. Thus, the verdict is more likely to protect the proportionality of the electoral system by aborting the restrictive reform attempts. Permissive reforms, on the other hand, are less likely to create as many opposition groups as restrictive reforms. Even when some political parties, which prefer the status quo system over the proposed one, can refer the reform bill to judicial review, permissive reforms are less likely to be rejected by courts, given that constitutional principles protect the proportionality of the electoral system. Examination of the role of judicial review on electoral reform enactment yields the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: The existence of judicial review decreases the probability of successful restrictive reforms; but increases the probability of successful permissive reform attempts.

The existence of judicial review can also affect the actors' behavior about the magnitude of attempted electoral reforms, which, in turn, alters the success and failure of reform attempts.

Since judicial review, as an institution, constitutes a veto point, and the judicial process cannot be influenced, in principle, by political means, politicians do not have any tools to facilitate the process in their favor, other than adjusting the magnitude of the electoral reform. Hence, the presence of judicial review in a democracy is likely to induce politicians to propose more incremental changes in the electoral system.

The Content of Electoral Reform

As a final point, not all electoral reforms, even if they are in the same direction, are the same. Even though the tendency in the current literature is to treat each electoral system change equally, some types of changes may be more challenging to accomplish than others. Thus, most of the electoral reform barriers discussed here so far might not be equally relevant for each component of electoral system changes. Yet, the definition used in the literature, and in this dissertation too, does not differentiate the changes according to the components of electoral systems. However, such differences can play a role in the successful enactment of reform attempts. For some studies these components can make the magnitude of electoral system changes differ as well.

By examining how the content of electoral reforms affects the success of reforms, we can also speak to the existing debate in the literature which focuses on the definition and frequency of electoral reforms. Focusing on the content of electoral reforms can give us the opportunity to assess the emphasized rarity of major electoral reforms in the earlier literature. It can help us discern whether the rarity of electoral reforms, defined as the change between electoral system families, can be artifact of many aborted attempts where politicians had all the reasons to change the electoral systems but could not achieve to do so. In other words, do we not observe these reforms because they are never attempted or because they were attempted but failed?

For this reason, I will focus on one component of electoral system in this discussion: the district magnitude. There are some scholars who challenge Lijphart (1994)'s definition and treat changes in electoral thresholds and seat allocation formulas as secondary (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). It is also better to identify components of electoral systems which can be more difficult to change theoretically, rather than using an arbitrary empirical criterion. For instance, the definition used in the literature –and in this dissertation—accepts 20-percent thresholds as a continuous component of electoral systems to mark a change in the system. Using additional thresholds to measure the impact of an electoral reform requires many more arbitrary decisions; thus, it is better to be avoided. The following hypothesis concerns the content of electoral reform as a factor in successful enactment:

Hypothesis 6: Electoral reform attempts that change the district magnitude are more likely to fail than other reform attempts

2.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on electoral reforms and also presented my theoretical framework which examines electoral reform process as having two stages. I have identified the conditions under which governments i) initiate electoral reforms and ii) succeed in legislating new electoral rules and developed a total of six hypotheses. Next chapter introduces the methodological design of the study to test these hypotheses.

Chapter 3 A Multi-Method Approach for Studying Electoral Reforms

This chapter discusses the research methodology employed in the study to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 and consists of six sections. It begins by presenting the integrative multi-method approach and the way it is used to analyze each stage of electoral reform process. This first section also presents the sample and time period studied in the dissertation. Section 3.2 focuses on the dependent variable and discusses how I define and operationalize an electoral reform attempt as well as outlining the coding procedure for electoral reform types. The next two sections discuss the quantitative component of multi-method research design. Section 3.3 presents the operationalization of independent variables for the electoral reform initiation stage. Here, I develop the main independent variable for electoral reform initiation: fragmentation in ideological clusters. I also introduce the statistical model for the quantitative analysis of this stage. Section 3.4, then, discusses the independent variables for electoral reform enactment stage and presents the statistical technique to test the hypotheses. Section 3.5 moves on to outline the qualitative component of the study which consists of case studies of electoral reform episodes. It also discusses how the cases of electoral reforms are selected for both stages of electoral reform. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.

3.1 Research Design

In this dissertation, I employ an integrative multi-method approach which combines quantitative and qualitative methods to study both stages of electoral reforms: electoral reform

initiation and enactment. Integrative multi-method designs aim to minimize “the inferential weakness” of one method by using another method, and utilize these methods for what they are good for (Seawright 2016: 9). In this study, I complement the statistical analysis with the use of detailed case studies of electoral reform episodes. The quantitative analysis equips me to test the hypotheses across a large number of cases over time in both stages of electoral reform. It also helps to assess the plausibility of rival explanations by estimating them simultaneously. The qualitative analyses of reform episodes, on the other hand, allow me to shift the unit of analysis from country-legislative term to the political parties and examine the within case processes of electoral reforms. The case studies help me to test the assumptions of my theory about party preferences and informational context, in addition to identifying possible measurement errors and omitted variables. With case studies, I also investigate the rival explanations for which there is insufficient cross-national and/or cross-temporal data. By complementing the statistical analysis with case studies, this dissertation aims to strengthen our understanding of electoral reform process.

Integrative multi-method approach utilizes a sequential design, meaning that one method provides the final causal inferences and alternative method tests and adjusts the assumptions about the first analysis (Lieberman 2005; Seawright 2016). In this dissertation, the main method of inference is the quantitative analysis of electoral reform attempts, which is then complemented with case studies of electoral reform episodes. Cases for in-depth investigation are selected from the larger sample used in the quantitative analyses. I employ the same sequential design in the empirical analyses for both stages of the electoral reform process separately, since the dependent variables differ in these stages.

In the first stage, the statistical analysis tests the effect of the number of parties in governments' ideological cluster on the initiation of each electoral reform type across a large number of cases over time. This analysis, therefore, clarifies whether the source of party system fragmentation matters for governments' reform initiation behavior. It helps me assess the extent to which this new account of electoral reform offers additional insights to understand the conditions under which governments initiate permissive or restrictive electoral reforms. However, it is equally important to examine whether the decision-making process explained in the theoretical part is consistent with what happens in reality when governments decide about initiating electoral reforms. The case study component of the study aims to serve this function by assessing whether and how governments evaluate the information about the party system and election results before initiating electoral reforms.

The analysis of second stage, too, employs both a statistical analysis and complementary case analyses. In this part, the main aim is to discuss how the variables of interest, such as constitutional protection, affect the success and failure of the reform attempts. With case studies, I first examine whether the decision makers consider the barriers to electoral reform in determining the content of electoral reform. I also investigate whether the negotiations between parties affect the actual reform type adopted and under which conditions it becomes possible to overcome barriers to electoral reforms.

The remainder of this chapter first focuses on the quantitative analysis of electoral reform attempts, since quantitative analysis is the main source of inference in the sequential design of this dissertation. The statistical analyses will also be the basis to identify typical cases and deviant cases as suggested by Seawright and Gerring (2008) and Seawright (2016), as will be explained in Section 3.5.

3.1.1 Sample and Time Period of the Study

In this dissertation, I study electoral reforms in parliamentary democracies. I focus on the changes in electoral systems for the parliamentary elections at the national level since these elections constitute the locus of government formation and decision-making. The time period of the study runs from 1945 to 2015 for older democracies and starts with the first democratic elections for the newer ones.²⁰ Only the electoral rule changes by democratically elected governments are included in the study; in other words, the adoption of electoral law for the very first elections is not within the confines of this study.

The sample consists of institutionally comparable cases which are selected according to two criteria. The first criterion is the constitutional regime. This study includes electoral reforms in parliamentary democracies, where governments are required to receive a vote of confidence in the parliament. Cheibub (2006) refers to this set of countries as ‘assembly confidence democracies’, and parliamentary elections are the key to government formation and survival in such systems. The second criterion is the initial electoral institutions.²¹ This study focuses on proportional and semi-proportional electoral systems. The majoritarian electoral institutions are not included since even small vote swings in these systems with multiparty competition can produce large seat changes (Calvo 2009; Calvo and Rodden 2015). But PR systems do not exhibit comparable seat changes due to vote swings. Hence the strategic setting in majoritarian

²⁰ For identifying the first democratic elections for the countries, I followed the definition and operationalization of democracy according to Polity IV. It is important to note that Polity IV and regimes in the world (RIW) study by Lüthmann, Lindberg, and Tannenberg (2017) yield highly correlated results in terms of defining democracies. The restriction of the sample to OECD countries is driven by data availability, especially for the key independent variables of this study which requires the ideology of political parties; therefore, the study is limited to the countries in the Parliament and Government (Döring and Manow 2018).

²¹ For studies applying similar exclusion criteria, see, for example, Shugart (1992), Grofman et al. (1999), Bowler and Grofman (2000), and Blais (2008).

systems is qualitatively different from other systems. For this reason, only electoral systems which involve some type of proportionality are included in the sample. This results in a sample of 32 countries and 431 legislative terms in my dataset. Table 3.1 below lists the countries and time periods these countries are studied in this dissertation.

Table 3.1 Countries and Time Period Studied

Country	Time Period	Country	Time Period
Austria	1946-2015	Japan	1952-2015
Belgium	1946-2015	Latvia	1992-2015
Bulgaria	1991-2015	Lithuania	1992-2015
Croatia	2000-2015	Luxembourg	1946-2015
Czech Republic	1990-2015	Malta	1964-2015
Denmark	1945-2015	Netherlands	1946-2015
Estonia	1992-2015	New Zealand*	1996-2015
Finland	1945-2015	Norway	1945-2015
France*	1946-1961	Poland	1990-2015
France*	1986-1988	Portugal	1975-2015
Germany	1949-2015	Romania	1990-2015
Greece	1974-2015	Slovakia	1994-2015
Hungary	1990-2015	Slovenia	1991-2015
Iceland	1946-2015	Spain	1977-2015
Ireland	1945-2015	Sweden	1945-2015
Israel	1949-2015	Turkey	1983-2014
Italy	1947-2015		

* These countries included during the period they used a proportional or a semi-proportional electoral system.

3.2 Defining and Measuring Electoral Reform Attempts

Electoral law is composed of numerous specific rules about elections, including rules about how voters register, who are eligible to vote or to run, how campaigns are financed, how people vote, how votes are converted to seats and so on. Electoral system is a subset of electoral laws and it defines the mechanism which translates votes cast in an election into seats for an assembly or any other elected office (Farrell 2011). In converting votes into seats, electoral

systems operate on two different dimensions: *interparty dimension* which determines how seats are distributed to political parties and *intraparty dimension* which concerns the distribution of seats to the candidates (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a). While electoral reforms in both dimensions are important, this project only concentrates on the changes affecting the *interparty* dimension, which vary on a continuum between permissive and restrictive systems according to the access systems give to small parties.

Earlier studies have typically defined an electoral reform as a wholesale replacement of one system by another one, such as the replacement of majoritarian systems with a PR system (Barzachka 2014; Blais 2008; Boix 1999; Calvo 2009). To many, these categories signify the electoral system families which is composed of different electoral systems (Farrell 2011; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Reynolds and Reilly 1997; Taagepera 2007). The recent literature pays attention to the changes within the same electoral system families as they can have a significant impact on the electoral competition (Bielasiak and Hulseley 2013; Bol, Pilet, and Riera 2015; Cox 1997; M. Golder 2005; Harfst 2013; Lijphart 1994; Nunez and Jacobs 2016; Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017; Remmer 2008; Renwick 2011a; Renwick, Hanretty, and Hine 2009).

To capture the changes within the same electoral system families, scholars have identified four core components as affecting interparty competition: district magnitude, electoral formula, tier structure and legal thresholds (Farrell 1998, 2011; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; M. Golder 2005; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971). For the purposes of this analysis, I use the definition employed in recent set of studies and define *an electoral reform* as a significant modification in the main components of electoral systems. While for discrete components, changes from one category to another is considered an electoral reform, for continuous components, namely district magnitude and legal threshold, I utilize a widely used threshold of 20 percent change to denote a

significant change in the electoral systems (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013; Lijphart 1994; Nunez and Jacobs 2016; Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017; Renwick 2011a).

As emphasized earlier, electoral reforms on interparty dimension can either increase or decrease the proportionality of the electoral system. Therefore, I classify the changes in electoral system changes into two groups: permissive reforms (which increase the proportionality of an electoral system by lowering the effective threshold) and restrictive reforms (which decrease the proportionality of the system). To operationalize electoral reform types, I discuss below how the direction of a change is identified for each component of electoral systems.

District Magnitude

District magnitude is defined as the number of representatives elected in an electoral district. The general consensus is that district magnitude has a strong influence on the proportionality and party competition (Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971; Taagepera 2007; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). For instance, in proportional and semi-proportional systems higher district magnitudes are associated with more proportional election results whereas in plurality systems, higher district magnitudes have the reverse effect are associated with disproportional election results, (Taagepera 2007; Taagepera and Shugart 1989).²²

When all districts have the equal number of seats to be elected, it is easier to calculate the district magnitude. For instance, in single-member districts, the district magnitude equals one. On the other extreme is the systems with only one national district, and in such systems the district magnitude equals the size of the assembly. Yet, in many countries, electoral districts match administrative boundaries, which have varying sizes. For such cases, the average district

²² I discuss the district size properties in plurality systems too, as they can be used as a formula in one of the tiers of mixed member systems.

magnitude is calculated by dividing the number of total seats in the assembly by the number of districts. Note that the calculation of the average district magnitude contains assembly size, another element of electoral systems (Lijphart 1994). In this dissertation, the changes in assembly size are considered together with the number of districts in the electoral system.²³ The changes in the district magnitude are categorized as a permissive reform if there is at least a 20 percent increase in the average district magnitude, and the changes in the reverse direction are categorized as a restrictive reform.

Seat Allocation Formulas

The mathematical formula through which seats are allocated to parties affects the degree of inclusivity of electoral systems for small parties. In general, we can identify three major families of electoral systems: proportional representation (PR) systems, semi-proportional systems, and majoritarian systems.²⁴ PR systems are more inclusive towards small parties, followed by semi-proportional systems and majoritarian rules respectively. As stated earlier, majoritarian systems are not within the confines of this project. I discuss briefly the seat allocation formulas in proportional and semi-proportional systems to be able to categorize the changes between them as permissive or restrictive. But I will provide a more detailed explanation about the formulas in the Appendix A.

In PR systems, there are two general seat allocation mechanisms: highest averages (divisor) systems and largest remainder (quota). The former method operates by dividing each

²³ Since the effect of assembly size is difficult to separate from the effect of the district magnitude in multi-member district systems, it is not included as a separate element of electoral systems. For a similar classification, see also Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011).

²⁴ Some studies have a separate category of mixed member systems which is further divided into different groups (Massicotte and Blais 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a). Others studies include mixed member majoritarian and single non-transferable vote in the category of semi-proportional systems whereas the mixed member proportional systems are included within PR category (Lijphart 1994; Reynolds and Reilly 1997).

party's votes by a series of divisors and the seat is allocated to the party with the highest average vote after each division. The most common formula using this method is the d'Hondt formula, which uses the divisors 1, 2, 3, 4.²⁵ The important point about highest average formulas is that slowly increasing divisors disadvantage smaller parties and produce less proportional results. In the literature, the formulas are ranked as Sainte Laguë being most proportional, and followed by modified Sainte Laguë, and d'Hondt (Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 2007).

In the largest remainder method, seats are allocated according to quotas. First, each party's vote is divided by a quota and then parties are given a seat for each quota they fulfilled. Next, the votes for quota are subtracted from the party's total votes. The unallocated seats are, then, distributed to parties with the highest remaining votes. The quota used in this method determines how proportional the seat distribution is and the simplest quota (Hare quota) is calculated by dividing the number of votes by the number of seats.²⁶ The proportionality of a formula is determined by the size of quotas: lower quotas allocate more seats to parties which have a full quota (i.e., larger parties) and therefore are less proportional (Farrell 1998, 2011; Lijphart 1994). In terms of proportionality, Hare quota is followed by Droop quota, which is followed by Imperiali quota.²⁷

²⁵ Other common divisor series include Sainte Laguë (divisors: 1, 3, 5, 7) and modified Sainte Laguë (1.4, 3, 5, 7). Mathematicians have come up with different formulas and divisor series, such as Danish divisors 1, 4, 7, 10 or Imperiali divisors 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5. However, these divisors have not been in use as electoral formulas in the national elections.

²⁶ Other commonly quotas include Droop quota ($V / M + 1$) and Imperiali quota ($V / M + 2$), where V is valid votes and M is the district magnitude (or total number of seats in a district).

²⁷ Single transferable vote (STV) system also operates through a quota method. However, STV uses a preferential ballot structure in which electors vote for candidates by ranking them according to their preferences. While voting for candidates rather than parties complicates the seat allocation process, following Lijphart (1994), I will also evaluate the STV rule according to the properties of the quota used.

These are formula changes in simple electoral systems. But some systems are more complex and produce semi-proportional systems. For instance, mixed systems combine both plurality and proportional representation formulas together and the proportionality of these systems depend on how these formulas are combined. If plurality and proportional tiers are linked and the latter corrects for the disproportionality in the first tier, this results in a more open system for small parties. These systems are referred as mixed member proportional systems. If seat allocation in plurality and proportional tiers function independently, the proportion of seats distributed to each tier determines how proportional the system is. This system is referred as a parallel system or a mixed member majoritarian system. Reynolds and Reilly (1997) includes parallel systems within semi-proportional systems, and therefore, these parallel systems are more restrictive than the mixed member proportional systems.

Tier Structure

Some electoral systems use additional tiers to distribute seats among parties. The main purpose in adding an extra tier for seat allocation is to offer a greater proportionality and minority representation without having very large electoral districts. Additional tiers work in two methods: adjustment seats or remainder transfer. In adjustment seats, a certain proportion of seats is set aside and awarded to parties at the upper level to compensate parties if they gained fewer seats in the electoral districts in comparison to their total vote share.²⁸ Rather than having a fixed number of seats, the remainder transfer distributes the remaining seats from the first tier at a higher level by pooling the votes of parties that are not used to fill a seat (Farrell 2011; M.

²⁸ This method is used in Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

Golder 2005; Lijphart 1994). Thus, adding an upper tier to the electoral system is categorized as permissive, whereas lifting the one already existing is categorized as a restrictive reform.²⁹

Electoral Thresholds

An electoral threshold specifies the minimum level of votes a party needs in order to gain representation in the parliament and prevents small and splinter parties below this level from entering the parliament. The electoral thresholds for parties can be as low as 1 percent (Israel from 1951 to 1992) or as high as 5 percent (as in Germany, Poland, and Estonia). Some systems do not need an electoral threshold since district magnitudes can impose an effective threshold high enough to make it difficult for small parties to win a seat (Lijphart 1994).³⁰

Some countries also have started to apply a different threshold for the pre-election coalitions to prevent small parties' entrance to parliament. For instance, Poland applies an 8 percent threshold for all pre-election coalitions while Slovakia applies different thresholds depending on the number of parties in the pre-election coalition: 7 percent threshold to coalitions with 2 or 3 parties and 10 percent to coalitions with 4 or more parties. In this project, the legal threshold component includes the threshold for party alliances. Electoral system changes that introduce or increase the electoral threshold are categorized as restrictive reforms, whereas changes decreasing or abolishing an existing threshold is categorized as permissive reforms.

²⁹ There can be cases where the upper tier is used to make a majoritarian adjustment, such as distributing the remainder seats to the party with the largest share of valid votes at the regional or national level district. If such a tier is added, that electoral system change will be categorized as a restrictive reform.

³⁰ Effective threshold is calculated according to the following formula: $75/(M+1)$, where M is the district magnitude (Lijphart 1997; Taagepera 1998).

Permissive versus Restrictive Reforms

In this section, I explain how I code the core elements of electoral system into permissive and restrictive reform categories. Electoral system changes are categorized as permissive if i) the average district magnitude increases by at least 20 percent, or ii) new tiers with a proportionality formula is added, or iii) the electoral threshold is lowered by at least 20 percent or is abolished. In addition, iv) formula changes from mixed member or semi-proportional system to proportional systems are categorized as a permissive reform. Within PR systems, changes in the formula in the direction shown in Figure 3.1 are coded as a permissive reform. In other words, any change from LR-Imperiali (the most disproportional PR formula in use) to other formulas is permissive. Similarly, the changes from d'Hondt to STV, LR-Droop, Modified Sainte Laguë or Sainte Laguë, LR-Hare are considered permissive. The changes in the reverse direction are coded as restrictive reforms. Within mixed systems, changes that increase the weight of the PR tier, or changes that link a plurality tier to the PR tier are categorized as permissive reforms. Lastly, there can be also changes in the formulas within each tier. For the formula changes in the nominal tier (which distributes seats in SMDs) formula changes from plurality to two round formula is coded as permissive reforms and for the PR tier, the formula changes are coded as described above.³¹

Figure 3.1 Electoral Formulas in PR Systems



Source: Gallagher (1992), Benoit (2000) and Taagepera (2007).

³¹ See Remmer (2008) and Elgie (2005).

Electoral Reform Attempts

Having defined electoral reform and its types, I now turn to how electoral reform attempts are defined and identified in this study. Electoral reform attempts are defined as the proposals put forward by governments to change the core components of electoral systems, namely district magnitude, electoral formula, tier structure and electoral threshold. The government proposals can be drafted and submitted to the parliament by governing parties, or drafted by a committee appointed by the government, or put to referendum vote by the government (Shugart 2008).

The electoral reform proposals promoted by civil society organizations, or referendum initiatives by citizens are not included in the reform attempts, either. To give an example, there was a citizens-initiated referendum in New Zealand in 1999 which proposed to decrease the size of the parliament (Vowles 2000: 471, 479). I did not include the 1999 referendum in the reform attempt dataset since the government did not act upon it. But there was another referendum in New Zealand in 2010, which aimed to change the electoral system back to plurality formula. The referendum was included in the dataset because it was the government that proposed to change the electoral system through a referendum in this example. But the proposal did not get enough public support, so it is a failed reform attempt.

For constructing the dataset on electoral reform attempts, I use information from the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, which documents institutional reforms as well as other political events for the countries in my sample from 1991 to 2018; the Eastern European Constitutional Review Journal's Constitution Watch section which reports institutional reforms in Eastern European countries from 1991 to 2002; and the country summaries of Electoral System Changes in Europe (ESCE). I also use information from the

election notes in the Electoral Studies journal, which have a section on electoral systems. This journal provides election notes for the countries in my sample from 1982 onwards. The election reports of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Nations in Transit reports from Freedom House also contained information about institutional reforms for the countries in the sample. In addition to these reports, I also relied on an extensive analysis of secondary literature on electoral systems of the sample countries for the earlier years and parliament websites to gather information about the reform attempts.

The electoral reform bills sometimes modify more than one core component of electoral systems. In most cases, these modifications are in the same direction. To give an example, the Czech electoral reform in 2002 alters both the district magnitude and electoral formula. It decreased the district magnitude and introduced d'Hondt formula and both of these changes were in the restrictive direction. However, seven electoral reform bills contained changes in the components of electoral system that were in opposite directions. In such cases, I relied on the mean district magnitude change and compared the effective threshold with the legal threshold to code electoral reform attempts as either a permissive or restrictive reform attempt (see Appendix B for the details). There were two electoral reforms whose direction was not clear: the electoral formula change in Germany in 2005 which replaced the Hare quota with the Sainte Laguë and Romanian electoral reform in 2008, which introduced single member candidacies yet distributed party seats as in the previous electoral system (Marian and King 2010; Renwick 2011a). Therefore, these reform attempts were not included in the dataset. With the exclusion of the German and Romanian reforms, the dataset includes a total of 124 electoral reform attempts; 42 of them are permissive and 82 are restrictive reform attempts. Among these reform attempts, 52 of them failed while 72 of them were successfully enacted.

Figure 3.2 below displays the number of times permissive and restrictive reforms were attempted in each country included in the sample. Data shown in the figure indicate that there is variation across countries in the number and type of electoral reforms attempted. For example, Israel had eleven reform attempts in the restrictive direction and two attempts in the permissive direction. The frequency of electoral reform attempts is also notable in Israel, Romania, and Greece. By contrast, there were no electoral reform attempts for national parliamentary elections in Croatia, Luxembourg and Spain.

Figure 3.2 Electoral Reform Attempt Types by Country





Figure 3.3 displays the number of electoral reform attempts over time. In the earlier decades, the difference between the incidence of permissive and restrictive reform attempts is not very high; however, the relative balance begins to change, starting with the third wave of democratization. Governments start to initiate almost as twice as many electoral reforms with the third wave of democratization, and in particular, the number of restrictive reforms rapidly increases. The early years of post-cold war era witness the highest number of restrictive reform attempts. Nonetheless, the number of reform attempts start to decrease in the last decade.

Figure 3.3 Electoral Reform Attempt Types over Time



3.3 Operationalizing Hypotheses for Electoral Reform Initiation

This section begins with the operationalization of key independent variables for the reform initiation stage: electoral volatility, party system fragmentation and fragmentation in the ideological clusters. Then, I move on to discuss the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses about electoral reform initiation stage in Chapter 4. The discussion starts with introducing how electoral volatility and party system fragmentation variables which are the main variables in the existing literature. After discussing the measurement for these variables, I present the new measure of effective number of parties in ideological clusters developed in this dissertation.

Electoral Volatility and New Party Volatility

Electoral volatility is defined as the shift in party votes from one election to the next. The most widely used index for electoral volatility is developed by Pedersen (1979). I use the same index to assess the impact of electoral volatility and new party volatility. This index is calculated by subtracting the vote shares of each political party in election t from their vote shares in election $t-1$; and then by summing the absolute differences in each party vote and dividing the resulting sum by 2, as shown in the formula below.


$$\text{Pedersen Index} = \frac{\sum |V_{i,t-1} - V_{i,t}|}{2}$$

The recent literature divides electoral volatility into different components to differentiate between the vote transfer among existing parties and vote transfer stemming from exit or entry of parties into electoral competition (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017; Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and Espana-Najera 2017; E. N. Powell and Tucker 2014). For calculating new party volatility

and within system volatility, the same formula is applied to parties which are new to or exit from the electoral competition and parties that exist in both elections ($t-1$ and t), respectively. While the calculation seems pretty straightforward, Casal Bértoa, Deegan-Krause, and Haughton (2017) review the electoral volatility calculations in the literature and show that scholars reached identical scores in less than one percent of the cases in volatility calculations. The main reason, they identify, is the different methods used to identify party continuity or change when faced with party-name changes, party mergers and party splits. Such decisions become even more important when the components of electoral volatility are calculated. Therefore, it is important to have electoral volatility data collected by the same method.

In this analysis, I used the electoral volatility data from Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and Espana-Najera (2017) for the years between 1945 and 2003; and I calculated electoral volatility and its components (within system volatility and new party volatility) using their coding procedures for years between 2003 and 2015. Thus, this dataset uses the largest party rule to determine the successor or predecessor parties in electoral volatility calculations. In other words, in case of party splits, party continuity is determined by identifying the party with the same name; and, if none of the offspring parties continues with the same name, then by identifying the largest offspring party in terms of vote share. The same method is used in the party mergers as well. Figure 3.4 shows the average electoral volatility in countries between 1945 and 2015.

Figure 3.4 Average Electoral Volatility by Country



Party System Size (Party System Fragmentation)


The key variable of party system dynamics and electoral reform introduced in the literature is the party system fragmentation, defined as the number of relevant parties in a particular election. The intuition here is that the average party becomes smaller and competition increases in fragmented party systems, whereas the average party becomes larger and the system produces a low number of competitors when fragmentation is low. To count the number of relevant parties, and hence to assess the degree of political fragmentation, the effective number of political parties (N) is used. Developed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, this index is

defined as “the number of hypothetical *equal-size* parties that would have the same total *effect* on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of *unequal size*”(Laakso and Taagepera 1979: 4). It is calculated as the inverse of the sum of the squared vote shares of political parties in a given election:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

where p_i corresponds to the proportion of votes obtained by the i^{th} party. The denominator in this formula is the concentration index of Herfindahl-Hirschman.

Figure 3.5 Average Number of Effective Parties by Country



As the most widely used index in the party system literature, the effective number of parties satisfies a number of desirable criteria. It responds “monotonically to the changes in component shares”, and takes “appropriate values at the boundaries” (if all components, i.e. parties, are equally sized, then $N=n$, and if all components have zero values but one, then $N=1$) (Feld and Grofman 2007: 102). More importantly, this reformulation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index gives numbers that make intuitive sense. For these reasons, despite many criticisms and newly developed indices, the effective number of parties has been the most used indicator for party system size, and the electoral reform literature is no exception to this trend. Hence, this dissertation uses the effective number of parties to test the main hypotheses concerning fragmentation in the literature. For the data on the effective number of parties, the Election Indices Dataset is used (Gallagher 2017) and the missing values are calculated using the election results from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (Döring and Manow 2018), the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, and the Turkish Statistical Institute. Figure 3.5 shows by country the average number of parties during the time span of the analysis.

A New Measure: Fragmentation in Ideological Clusters

Given the limitations of the effective number of parties, I develop an alternative measure called the effective number of parties in ideological clusters. For instance, while the effective number of parties is a good indicator for overall electoral competition and volatility in the elections, it is not as good as an indicator for legislative competition, where government formation and durability become more important (Kline 2009). This is related to the way N is measured, for instance, $N=3$ can be produced by different party constellations such as a fairly balanced three-party systems (with vote shares 33.33%) or a semi-balanced three-party system

with 4 parties (with vote shares, 0.45%-0.29%-0.21%-0.05%) or a hegemony of one party (with vote shares 53%-15%-10%-12%-10%) and so on.³²

In terms of government formation, different party constellations matter, so do they for electoral reform calculations. To give a real-life example, even though Hungary (2002) and Romania (1990) had similar effective number of parties (2.21 and 2.20 respectively), their party systems were very different: Hungary had almost equally balanced large parties whereas Romania had a dominant party system with the largest party having two thirds of votes (Birch 2003: 50). According to theories using the effective number of parties measure as the main explanatory variable, both parliaments are equally likely to adopt a restrictive reform; however, the rationale for a restrictive reform of the same model would predict a restrictive electoral reform in Romania, rather than Hungary, since the large party in Romania in 1990 would be able to consolidate its gains with a restrictive reform. The main problem, as in these examples, arises when the disparity in party sizes becomes more pronounced, especially when the largest party has more than 50 percent of vote (Gaines 1997; Gaines and Taagepera 2013; Kline 2009; Molinar 1991; Taagepera 1999, 2007).

Relatedly, because the calculation of effective number of parties is affected most by the size of large parties, it does not capture how the number of small parties might increase the level of fragmentation. For instance, some electoral systems might treat political parties above a certain size proportionally while penalizing smaller ones as in the example of PR systems which has a national threshold. Other systems might be even open to very small parties such as PR systems which do not have a national threshold. The effective number of parties variable cannot

³² See (Taagepera 1999: 498-500) for a full discussion of different party constellations with $N=3$.

distinguish these two systems from each other in terms of proportionality (Shugart 1992: 212). This, however, is very important for electoral reform explanations which put party system fragmentation in the center of their arguments.

As the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 has elaborated, both the competition with the largest opposition party and the competition with the small parties matters for the party that makes the electoral reform decision. Thus, it is important that the measure of effective number of parties in ideological clusters be not affected by the vote share of the largest party of interest.

To better evaluate the effect of party system fragmentation on reform initiation, I develop a new party system measure by considering the spatial distribution of political parties on the left-right dimension. I use Parliaments and Governments dataset on cabinets, elections and parties (Döring and Manow 2018) to calculate this variable as follows. First, the main government party (the party with the highest vote share) and the main opposition party are identified in a given election. Then, other parties are categorized according to their ideological distance from the main government party and the main opposition party. That is, if Party A is closer to the party in government, then Party A is included in the government party's ideological bloc. The rationale here is that voters of Party A are potentially more willing to vote for the party in government than the main opposition party. After assigning parties to the ideological blocs of main party government and opposition, the vote share of each party is weighted by the total vote of parties in given bloc, except for the main parties in each bloc. Finally, the effective number of parties for the governing party (and for the main opposition party) is calculated where the vote share of each party is normalized by the total vote received by all parties in the same ideological bloc.

To give the precise formula for calculating the competition in each bloc, let N^G denote the number of parties belonging to an ideological bloc G in a given election. To reweight the vote share of each party in bloc G , I first compute the total vote share of bloc G by summing up vote share of each party in this bloc, $p^G = \sum_{n=1}^{N^G} p_n$. Next, I compute the reweighted vote share of each party belonging to the ideological bloc G , \hat{p}_n , as $\hat{p}_n = p_n/p^G$. In the last step, I compute the effective number of parties in ideological bloc G using the following formula:


$$\text{Effective Number of Parties in bloc } G = \frac{1}{\sum_{n=1}^{N^G} \hat{p}_n^2}$$

I use the same formula to calculate the effective number of parties in the main opposition party's ideological bloc. Notice that the main parties are not included in the calculation of competition in each bloc with the aim to derive a fragmentation score sensitive to the small parties, in contrast to the measure of effective number of parties.

There are other formulations of effective number of parties which consider the ideological location of political parties. For instance, Grofman and Kline (2011) developed a measure of “ideologically cognizable number of party groupings” to gauge polarized pluralism. Even though this measure utilizes both party locations in policy spectrum and party size considerations, their aim is to create optimal reduced party constellations by using a clustering algorithm. To give an example, Grofman and Kline (2011) show that 5-party system of Slovenia can be reduced to 2-bloc system by using a clustering algorithm. This measure differs from the effective number of parties in ideological clusters developed in this dissertation in that former aims to generate clusters whereas the latter defines clusters, *a priori*, according to two main parties' positions, and then measures the degree of competition faced by each main party by

considering the small parties that are ideologically closer to them. Figure 3.7 presents by country the average of effective parties in government and opposition clusters during the time span of the analysis.

Figure 3.6 The Effective Number of Parties (Average) by Country



Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis for Electoral Reform Initiation

In the first part of the empirical analysis, I examine the conditions which lead to permissive and restrictive reform attempts. To test the hypotheses about the timing and direction of electoral reform attempts, I use a categorical dependent variable composed of three unordered categories: permissive reform attempt, restrictive reform attempt and no reform attempt. In the statistical analyses, I use the multinomial logit regression which fits separate binary logits for each pair of outcome categories to estimate the likelihood of electoral reform types. The results from multinomial logistic regression have two possible comparisons between categories. In other words, coefficients result from comparisons with a baseline category. In my models, I use no reform attempt as the baseline category. The unit of analysis is the legislative terms for each country in this study. If there are more than one reform attempt in a given legislative term, only the successful one is coded for the term.

I use several control variables in the quantitative analysis of electoral reform initiations to isolate the effect of fragmentation in ideological clusters on initiating permissive and restrictive electoral reforms. The first is the country's economic outlook. The literature suggest that economic performance can affect electoral outcomes, which then might affect the decision of the party in power concerning electoral reform. For instance, if the economy performs poorly in a given legislative term, the governing party might expect to lose power in the next elections and be more willing to change the electoral system. For this reason, I control for the annual change in real GDP per capita (the percentage change from the previous year) in the estimated models. The data for economic indicators is gathered from Maddison Project Database 2018 (Bolt et al. 2018a, 2018b).

Second, I control for the disproportionality of the existing electoral system. This variable is included because the level of proportionality or disproportionality of the status quo system matters for electoral reform initiation and the type of reform initiated. If the electoral system is already very proportional, then initiating a permissive reform will be less likely and vice a versa. To control for the level of proportionality before the reform initiation, I include the least square index developed by Gallagher, which is measured as

$$LSq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2},$$

where V_i and S_i are the vote and seat shares of party i , respectively (Gallagher 1991).

Third, the differences between old and new democracies can affect the electoral reform initiation. Some studies suggest that new democracies experiment with electoral systems more frequently than mature democracies (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013; Remmer 2008; Renwick 2011a). As democracies mature over years, electoral institutions can become more persistent due to the increased legitimacy (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013). Hence, I also use a binary variable for new democracies which takes the value of 1 for democracies with fewer than 20 years. As a robustness check, I control for democratic regime duration measured as the number of democratic years based on the Polity IV data as well as Varieties of Democracy index of polyarchy.

In addition, I control for the vote difference between leading parties, which measures the competitiveness of elections. The lower values of this variable indicate more competition between the leading political parties in the elections. The inclusion of this variable is important as the competitiveness of elections can affect the incentives of politicians to initiate reforms in

different directions. For instance, if the vote difference between two leading parties is very close, the governing party can be reluctant to initiate a restrictive reform since the effect of electoral reform would be more uncertain. This variable is calculated from the election results provided by Parliaments and Governments dataset (Döring and Manow 2018).

To control legislative and constitutional processes, I first include a government type variable, which is a binary variable for the single party government and the data for this variable is obtained from Party Government Dataset (Seki and Williams 2014). I also introduce constitutional protection, and judicial review variables as control variables in the empirical analyses. Having discussed the operationalization and statistical technique to be used for the analysis of electoral reform initiations, now I turn to discuss the main variables for the second stage of electoral reform process: reform enactment.

3.4 Operationalizing Hypotheses for Electoral Reform Enactment

This part describes the operationalization of key independent variables for the second stage of electoral reform process: i) constitutional protection of electoral systems ii) judicial review, iii) legislative power of government and iv) the content of electoral reforms. Then, it presents the statistical technique and control variables used to test the hypothesis about legislation of electoral reforms which will be tested in Chapter 6.

Constitutional Protection of Electoral Systems

In some countries, the constitution has a specific provision about the electoral system, which elevates the requirements for electoral reform to the level of constitutional amendment. In other countries, the requirements for changing the electoral system is same as any legislation.

This variation can affect the reform initiation behavior and also the success of electoral reform attempts. I employ two different measures for constitutional protection. The first one is constitutional provision which measures whether the constitution specifies the electoral system either by defining the principle of electoral reform, such as proportionality in the election results, or by detailing the electoral formula or the district size.

The second measure is constitutional protection index which incorporates two dimensions: whether the constitution specifies the electoral system (constitutional provision) and how difficult it is to amend the constitution. For measuring the latter, I use the constitutional rigidity variable used in the literature. The rigidity variable varies between 1 and 4, according to the number of approvals needed to change the constitution. This variable is operationalized as follows: each is given one point if the approval of either institution is needed: i) majority in parliament, ii) the chief of state, and iii) referendum. Additional point is given for the following requirement i) a super majority in the parliament, ii) approval of both houses, iii) approval in parliament in two consecutive legislative terms. According to this operationalization, the constitutional rigidity variable takes the value of 1 when only majority in the parliament is required to change the electoral system (La Porta et al. 2004).

However, constitutional rigidity variable per se does not provide any information about whether it has a clause on the electoral system. For this reason, I generate a new index for constitutional protection by multiplying two indicators: constitutional provision and rigidity of constitution. If the electoral formula is not stated within the constitution, this index has a value of 0. If the constitution has a clause about electoral system, then the constitutional protection takes the value of constitutional rigidity which measures how difficult it is to change the constitution,

and hence the electoral system. However, since the value of 1 is akin to the requiring the approval of parliamentary majority, this index is re-scaled to include these cases in the category of no constitutional protection (meaning that constitutional protection takes the value of 0).

Data for constitutional provision is obtained from Raabe (2015) and data for constitutional rigidity is obtained from La Porta et al. (2004). I extended the constitutional rigidity data to include the Central and Eastern European countries using Maddex (2008) and for Luxembourg and Malta by using the Comparative Constitutions Project by Elkins and Ginsburg (2007). Figure 4.7 displays the constitutional protection measure for the countries in the sample.

Judicial Review

The judicial review variable is used to examine if the judiciary's power to interpret whether or not the proposed changes in the electoral law are constitutional affects the occurrence and success of electoral reform attempts. I measure this variable in two ways. First, I use a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if there is a judicial review in the political system, Following Nunez and Jacobs (2016). Second, I use an ordinal variable that distinguishes whether judicial reform is limited or full. This variable takes the value of 2 if there is a full review, 1 if there is a limited review and 0 if there is no judicial review. The data for this variable, also, is obtained from La Porta et al. (2004) and extended to include Central and Eastern European countries and Luxembourg and Malta using information from Maddex (2008) and from Elkins and Ginsburg (2007).

Legislative Power of Government


In addition to the constitutional provision and judicial review variables discussed above, I also use the legislative power of the governing party. This variable is calculated as the sum of vote shares of the parties in government during the legislative term the electoral reform is attempted. To calculate this variable, I use Parliaments and Governments dataset. Next, I use government type as a proxy for the legislative power of governments as a robustness check. I use the government type categories obtained from Party Government Dataset (Seki and Williams 2014). This variable has five mutually exclusive categories: i) single-party governments in which the governing party has the parliamentary majority, ii) minimal winning coalitions in which all parties in coalition are necessary to form a majority coalition, iii) surplus coalition which includes more parties than needed to form a majority coalition, iv) single-party minority government in which the party in government does not have a parliamentary majority, and finally, v) minority coalition in which the coalition government does not have the parliamentary majority.

The Content of Electoral System Change

Finally, I emphasize the importance of the content of electoral system changes in affecting success and failure of electoral reforms. The basic question addressed with the content of electoral reform is whether some elements of electoral systems are more resistant to change than others. To test the hypothesis concerning electoral reform content, I coded all reform attempts according to the elements they propose to change: whether the proposed change is about formula, threshold, or district magnitude related. Figure 3.8 illustrates the content of proposed electoral system changes. More than thirty percent of electoral reform attempts consists of

changes in the district magnitude and replacing one electoral system family, such as mixed member systems or proportional representation system, by another one, whereas others include electoral formula or threshold changes.

Figure 3.7 The Content of Electoral Reform Proposals



To reflect the major discussion in the literature about the definition of electoral system and reforms, I classified electoral reform attempts into two: electoral reform attempts which propose to make seemingly minor changes such as seat allocation formulas, tier structure and electoral thresholds, and those attempts which propose to change the district magnitude and the electoral system family (see discussion in Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). In other words, this dichotomous variable takes the value of 1 if the electoral reform does not include a change about district magnitude 0 if the electoral reform does include a change in the district magnitude.

Logit Regression the Analysis of Success and Failure of Reform Attempts

To test the hypotheses about the success and failure of electoral reform attempts, I generate a binary dependent variable for the electoral reform outcome. The successful reform attempts which are enacted into law are coded as 1 while the failed reform attempts are coded as 0. The dataset for the reform enactment analysis includes 124 electoral reform attempts by the governing parties in 29 parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 2015. There are no electoral reform attempts in the following countries: Croatia, Luxembourg and Spain, therefore they are not included in this set of analyses. In general, the number of failed reforms is lower than successful reform; 43 percent of the reform attempts were not ratified. To assess how variables of interest are related to the successful enactment of electoral reform, I estimate logit regressions.³³ I estimate a total of three sets of logit regressions. The first set of logit regression is conducted with all reform attempts, while the second and third sets are conducted in subsamples of restrictive and permissive reform attempts respectively.

3.5. Case Selection Procedure for the Qualitative Analysis

This dissertation employs an integrative multi-method research design and therefore conducts quantitative and qualitative analyses sequentially (Lieberman 2005; Seawright 2016; Seawright and Gerring 2008). The quantitative analysis will be the basis of the primary causal inferences and it will then be integrated with the qualitative analysis, which tests the main

³³ Note that the two-stage nature of the electoral reform process is reminiscent of settings where selection models (a two-step estimation procedure à la Heckman) are employed. However, because the unit of analysis differs across stages (legislative terms and electoral reform attempt, respectively), an empirical approach along those lines seems inappropriate.

assumptions of the theoretical and empirical models as well as examining whether the process of electoral reform is consistent with the main explanation offered in the theory section.

Scholars suggest different techniques to choose cases for qualitative analysis after a regression analysis, and these suggestions mostly depend on the goal of the case study. The primary goal of case analyses in this dissertation is to probe the causal mechanisms linking the main variables of interests to electoral reform outcomes in two stages of electoral reform. In the first stage, the aim is to show how the government's concern for consolidating its vote base (captured by the number of ideological competitors) is linked to the initiation of different electoral reform types. For this reason, I primarily use the typical cases for both restrictive and permissive reform attempts. As Seawright and Gerring (2008) discuss, typical cases are well explained by the statistical analysis and what they offer is to explore the hypothesized relationship in question within the case during the electoral reform episode. In the electoral reform enactment stage, my goal is to understand how decision makers evaluate the institutional barriers and their legislative power in determining the content of electoral reform. For this, I select typical cases where the success or failure of electoral reforms were expected given the institutional constraints and legislative power of governments. But I also wanted to examine if and when it is possible to overcome barriers to reform to implement a major electoral reform. For this goal, I selected a deviant case, in which the success of reform was not expected so that I can identify an alternative causal path for a major reform. The following sections discuss the case selection for each stage in detail.

3.5.1 Case Selection for Electoral Reform Initiation Stage

This section explains how I selected permissive and restrictive reform attempts for case studies. In the regression analysis, typical cases display “the smallest possible residual” among the cases in the multivariate analysis based on the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates, meaning that they fit the regression analysis well (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299). In the multinomial logit models used in this dissertation, minimizing the distance between fitted values and observed outcome can be approximated by ranking county-election years according to their predicted values to select the cases. In this ranking, the Lithuanian restrictive reform of 2000 was among the top five restrictive reform attempts in terms of predicted values generated by Model 5 in Table 4.4. Moreover, this reform attempt also fulfilled another criterion in case selection strategies identified by Seawright (2016): maximizing the value of the independent variable, which is also useful for discovering different pathways linking the explanatory variable to the outcome variable. The number of ideological competitors in the 1996 elections (the legislative cycle when the 2000 reform was adopted) was 5.1, which is approximately 1.8 standard deviations higher than the average. Seawright (2016) underlines the importance of cases with extreme values of independent variables for discovery purposes.

For the permissive reforms, same methods are utilized, and the Turkish electoral reform of 1995 is found to be a typical case of permissive electoral reforms both according to Model 5 in Table 4.4 and Model 4 in Table 4.6. This case is important for two reasons. First, Turkey had a restrictive reform in an earlier election cycle which does not fit the hypothesized relationship, constituting a deviant case for restrictive reforms, as shown in Table 3.2. Analyzing Turkish electoral reforms will help me explain why governments facing similar number of ideological

competitors initiated different electoral reform types. Second, there were two reform attempts in 1995; one failed due to the constitutional court decision and the other prevailed. Therefore, this case will provide some basis for the analyses in the second stage of electoral reform process as well.

Table 3.2 Case Selection for Electoral Reform Initiation Stage I

Case Selection Type	Restrictive Reforms	N in the Gov.'s Cluster	Expected Reform (H 1)	Support for H1
Typical Case	Lithuanian Reform of 2000	High (5.1)	Restrictive Reform	Yes
Deviant Case	Turkish Reform of 1987	Low (1.0)	Permissive Reform	No

After selecting the typical cases for permissive and restrictive reforms, I examine all reform attempts in the country leveraging the temporal variation within the same country in terms of the main variable of interest: the number of ideological competitors for governing party. Table 3.2 sums up the restrictive reform cases and I reiterate why these cases are typical or deviant cases according to the hypothesis of my theory. First, Lithuania adopted a restrictive reform when the number of parties in the ideological cluster of government was very high as expected in the first hypothesis of this dissertation. As this case also yields a high predicted value for restrictive reform, it constitutes a typical case. The electoral reform adopted in Turkey in 1987 is opposite of this case. Turkish government adopted a restrictive reform when the number of parties in its ideological cluster was very low, in contrast to the expected relationship in the first hypothesis. Therefore, this reform constitutes a deviant case.

The case selection procedure for permissive reforms is summarized in Table 3.3. Accordingly, Turkish government initiated a permissive reform when the number of its parties in its ideological cluster was very low (as expected in Hypothesis 1) and when the number of parties in the opposition's cluster was higher than that of the government (as expected in Hypothesis 2). Therefore, this case constitutes a typical case according to both Hypothesis 1 and 2. Likewise, the Lithuanian permissive reform was adopted under similar conditions. The number of parties in the government's ideological cluster was low (as expected in Hypothesis 1) and the opposition had higher number of parties in its ideological cluster than the government (as expected in Hypothesis 2) when Lithuanian government initiated permissive electoral reform. Hence, Lithuanian reform of 2004, too, constitutes a typical case.

Table 3.3 Case Selection for Electoral Reform Initiation Stage II

Case Selection Type	Permissive Reforms	N in the Gov. Cluster	N in Opp. > N in Gov.	Expected Reform	Support for H 1 & H2
Typical Case	Turkish Reform of 1995	Low (1.05)	Yes	Permissive Reform	Supports H1 and H2
Typical Case	Lithuanian Reform of 2004	Low (1.0)	Yes	Permissive Reform	Supports H1 and H2

3.5.2 Case Selection for Electoral Reform Enactment Stage

In the second stage, I have selected both typical and deviant cases for successful and failed reform attempts. However, there are two separate regression analyses in this stage examining the success and failure in restrictive reform attempts and in permissive reform attempts. Table 3.4 presents the case selection methodology for the restrictive reforms which is based on Model 6 in Table 6.4. In Model 6, two variables are statistically significant:

constitutional protection and content of electoral reforms. Therefore, the case selection reflects the value of these variables.

The Lithuanian electoral reforms of 1996 and 2000 constitute typical cases, as the constitutional protection is low which increases the likelihood of success and the electoral system change was not about the district magnitude which also increases the likelihood of success. Both 1996 and 2000 reforms in Lithuania were successful as expected in Hypotheses 3 and 6 and they are typical cases in my analysis. Latvia, on the other hand, provides one typical and one deviant case according to the hypothesis 6. The electoral reform of 1995 constitutes a typical case, since it was a minor change in electoral threshold, which did not include any change in the district magnitude, and it was successfully adopted as expected in Hypothesis 6. However, a similar reform attempt failed in 1997, constituting a deviant case according to Hypothesis 6. Examining Latvian reform attempts in 1995 and 1997 allows me to discover alternative pathways for the success and failure of electoral reforms.

I have also selected a deviant case from this regression analysis to discuss if and when it is possible to implement a major restrictive reform which changes the district magnitudes. This deviant case is the Austrian electoral reform of 1992. Both hypothesis 3 and 6 expect a failure in the 1992 reform, as Austrian constitution highly protects the electoral system and the proposed reform bill included a change in district magnitude. In fact, there was a failed attempt in Austria in 1989 under similar conditions. However, the Austrian government overcome the barriers to reform in the latter case and enacted the electoral reform in 1992. By analyzing these two cases, I explore how the government was able to implement a restrictive electoral reform requiring a constitutional amendment, after consecutive attempts.

Table 3.4 Case Selection for the Enactment of Restrictive Reforms

Case Selection Type	Successful Reforms	Constitutional Protection (H3)	Content- DM Change (H 6)	Expected Outcome
Typical Case	Lithuania 1996 & 2000	Low	No	Success (H3) & Success (H6)
Typical Case	Latvia 1995	High	No	Success (H6)
Deviant Case	Austria 1992	High	Yes	Failure (H3) & (H6)
Case Selection Type	Failed Reforms	Constitutional Protection (H3)	Content- DM Change (H 6)	Expected Outcome
Typical Case	Austria 1989	High	Yes	Failure (H3) & (H6)
Deviant Case	Latvia 1997	High	No	Success (H6)

Finally, the regression analyses for the permissive reforms are not helpful to understand the success and failure of electoral reforms attempts due to the low number of cases and higher chances of success. For permissive reform attempts, then, I selected based on the most similar method. In other words, I chose a country with different values on the dependent variable to keep the main independent variables (constitutional protection, judicial review) similar: Bulgarian electoral reform attempts in 1997 and 2010 to examine how the reform enactment processes differed to lead to failure in 1997 but a success in 2010.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter introduced the multi-method research design employed in the dissertation by providing a discussion of both quantitative and qualitative components of empirical analysis. The first part focused on the quantitative analysis by introducing the variables, data collection and

operationalization, as well as the statistical models. The second part focused on the qualitative case studies. Here, I discussed the case selection methods employed in the dissertation and how the case studies of electoral reform episodes will be conducted.

In this chapter, I specifically paid attention to the definition and operationalization of the dependent variable. To better capture both stages of electoral reform process, I introduced two different dependent variables: i) the types of electoral reform attempts and ii) the success of electoral reform attempts. This required me to differentiate non-reform cases where *a reform was unsuccessfully attempted* from non-reform cases where no attempt was made. This chapter has also provided the data gathering and coding procedures for the electoral reform attempts. Hence, the analysis of electoral reform process is conducted by using a novel dataset of electoral reform attempts in parliamentary democracies.

This chapter also presented a novel variable to measure the number of parties in the ideological cluster of the main parties (in government and opposition). By using ideological proximity as a proxy, this variable is able to capture whether the new or small parties draw votes from the vote base of government party or not. Next chapter presents the first set of substantive empirical analysis which tests the hypotheses about electoral reform initiation using this novel variable.

Chapter 4 Party Competition and Electoral Reform Initiations in Parliamentary Democracies

When do governments initiate electoral reforms? Which factors explain the type of electoral reform initiated by governments in parliamentary democracies? In the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2), I have provided a framework for explaining electoral reforms by differentiating two stages of reform process, i.e. electoral reform initiation and electoral reform enactment. In this chapter, I focus on the electoral reform initiation stage and conduct an empirical analysis to test the following hypotheses concerning the initiation stage.

This chapter takes a quantitative approach to explain electoral reform attempts and seeks to test whether party system fragmentation in ideological clusters affects the electoral reform type initiated. This chapter provides self-interest-based motivations for both permissive and restrictive reforms by disaggregating the party system fragmentation according to ideological clusters. As the empirical analysis shows, focusing on fragmentation within ideological clusters rather than in general explains either type of electoral reform better than the explanations already in the literature on electoral reforms in contemporary democracies.

This chapter begins by presenting a general overview of the data and statistical method used in the analysis. Section 4.2 uses the novel dataset of electoral reform attempts to test hypotheses about party system and electoral reform in the existing literature. Section 4.3 presents the findings from multinomial regression analyses testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.

The empirical models developed here will also be the basis of the qualitative part of the mixed method design employed in the next chapter. Section 4.4 concludes by a brief overview of the findings.

4.1. Empirical Approach

In the following analysis of reform initiations, the data are organized in legislative terms for each country and this results in 431 country-legislative terms in total. To test the hypotheses about the timing and direction of electoral reform attempts, I use a categorical dependent variable which is composed of three unordered categories: permissive reform attempt, restrictive reform attempt and no reform attempt. In some countries, governments initiate more than one reform attempts in a given legislative term.³⁴ For the analysis in this chapter, only one of the reform attempts is included per legislative term in such cases.³⁵ Note that all reform attempts during the same legislative term were in the same direction, but the difference lied in the elements of electoral systems modified by governments. All in all, this coding yields a total of 109 reform attempts; 41 of them are permissive reform attempts and 68 of them are restrictive attempts.

³⁴ These cases include Austria during 1986-1990 legislative term, Belgium during 1999-2003 term, Czechia during 1998-2002 term, Israel during 1955-59, 1969-73, 1984-88, 1988-1992 terms; Italy in 1996-2001 term, Latvia 1993-95 term, Poland 1997-2001 term, Romania in 1996-2000, 2004-08, 2008-12 terms, Turkey in 1991-1995 term.

³⁵ Another option would be to change the unit of analysis to country-year instead of country-legislative term. However, as the variation in the main independent and control variables are based on elections, this approach would not be ideal. In addition, the country-year approach is still limited in the sense that it would not allow to consider multiple reforms attempts in a given year.

Figure 4.1 Frequency Electoral Reform Attempt Types by Country




Figure 4.1 above displays by country the number of legislative terms each type of reform is attempted. Electoral reform attempt data show a variation across countries in the number and type of electoral reforms attempted. There were no electoral reform attempts for national parliamentary elections in Croatia, Luxembourg and Spain. By contrast, Israel had seven reform

attempts in restrictive direction and two attempts in permissive direction. Likewise, the frequency of electoral reform attempts is also notable in Greece, and Poland.

In the statistical analyses, I use the multinomial logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of electoral reform types since the dependent variable consists of three unordered categories. Multinomial logistic regression fits separate binary logits for each pair of outcome categories simultaneously, and therefore, estimates parameters more efficiently in comparison to modeling each outcome (permissive and restrictive reform attempts) with separate logistic regressions (Long and Freese 2014). The results from the multinomial logistics analysis present two of possible comparisons between categories.³⁶ In the regression models below, the baseline outcome is no reform attempt, meaning that the coefficients in the permissive and restrictive reform panels are the comparisons with the no reform outcome. In other words, the upper panel of each regression table shows the estimates of coefficients from the comparison of permissive reform attempts with the base outcome of no reform attempts, while the lower panel shows the effect of independent variables based on the comparison of restrictive reform attempts with no reform attempt outcome.

The unit of analysis is the legislative terms for each country in this study. To account for the time dependence problem, I employ two strategies. First, I include a variable controlling for the number of previous events, i.e., the number of previous reform attempts, as suggested by (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).³⁷ Second, I report standard errors clustered at the country level

³⁶ In my analyses, the comparisons are Permissive attempt vs. No attempt and Restrictive attempt vs. No attempt, which leave out the Permissive attempt vs. Restrictive attempt comparison. While further analyses can be conducted by changing the baseline category, as suggested by Long and Freese (2014), the comparison with no attempt as the baseline category makes theoretical sense for my analyses, as my objective is to examine the decision to initiate either type of reform or not.

³⁷ This control variable is included in all regression models presented in this chapter but not reported in the tables for space considerations. Also, it is worth noting that in each model this variable is close to zero and statistically not

to account for the hierarchical nature of the data. I test the hypotheses by using different sets of control variables to account for institutional, political and economic factors that can alter the relationship between the independent and dependent variables and discuss the results for each hypothesis separately. The regression tables include only coefficients from the multinomial logistic regression. Since the coefficients do not provide insights into the magnitude of the effects, for the main variables of interest, I also discuss the relative risk ratios and marginal effects. Note that relative risk ratios are exponentials of multinomial logit coefficients and they indicate the risk of permissive (or restrictive) reform attempt in comparison to no reform attempt by a unit increase in the independent variable. Next section reports the findings of multinomial logistic regression analyses testing the existing explanations between party system and electoral reforms.

4.2. Analysis of Existing Party System Explanations

Existing explanations of electoral reforms emphasize electoral volatility and party system size as the potential sources of pressure for change in electoral systems. Below I summarize these explanations and then use the novel dataset of electoral reform initiations to examine the extent to which these explanations are consistent with data.

The first competing hypothesis focuses on the source of electoral volatility to explain the incidence of electoral reform. Electoral volatility stems not only from the vote shifts between existing parties but also from the emergence of new parties. A group of scholars argues that this difference can be important for electoral reform decisions of governments (Nunez, Simon, and

significant. For similar approaches used in multinomial regressions to deal with the time dependency problem, see, for example, (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013; Nunez and Jacobs 2016; Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017; Remmer 2008).

Pilet 2017). Accordingly, the vote shifts between existing parties from one election to another is tolerable. However, when electoral volatility stems from new parties, the parties in power have an incentive to prevent these new parties from entering the parliament by adopting restrictive reforms. Thus, cartelization explanation predicts a positive relationship between the new party volatility and the likelihood of a restrictive reform attempt. Notably, this explanation is silent about the relationship between (new party) volatility and permissive reforms.

Another strand of the literature focuses on the relationship between party system fragmentation and electoral reform types. This literature yields two competing explanations. The first explanation focuses on the electoral risks faced by politicians. According to this argument, politicians associate highly fragmented party systems with higher risks of losing power, and therefore have incentives to adopt permissive reforms to respond to the electoral threat from increased competition. In contrast, when party systems produce low levels of competition, restrictive reforms are likely since parties want to consolidate their electoral gains (Colomer 2004b, 2005; Remmer 2008). Hence, the hypothesis of this defensive model is the following: party system fragmentation has a positive relationship with permissive reform attempts but a negative relationship with restrictive ones.

The other explanation based on party system fragmentation focuses on the deficiencies in governability and representation as the main mechanisms of electoral reforms. Accordingly, high levels of party system fragmentation can lead to deficiencies in governability (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013), and this increases the likelihood of a restrictive electoral reform. Conversely, because low levels of fragmentation signal deficiency in representation, they are associated with permissive reforms, which can address such deficiency. Hence, governability hypothesis posits

that party system fragmentation has a positive relationship with restrictive reform attempts but a negative relationship with permissive ones.

In sum, I test the following hypotheses based on arguments already in the literature: i) As the new party volatility increases, the probability of restrictive reform increases; ii) As the party system fragmentation increases, the probability of permissive reform increases, but the probability of restrictive reform decreases; iii) As the party system fragmentation increases, the probability of restrictive reform increases, but the probability of permissive reform decreases. These hypotheses are displayed in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Hypotheses in the Electoral Reforms Literature

<i>Cartelization Model</i>	As the new party volatility increases, the probability of restrictive reform increases.
<i>Defensive Model</i>	As the party system fragmentation increases, the probability of permissive reform increases, but the probability of restrictive reform decreases.
<i>Governability and Rep. Model</i>	As the party system fragmentation increases, the probability of restrictive reform increases, but the probability of permissive reform decreases.

Table 4.2 reports the results from multinomial logit regressions. The upper panel of the table presents the results for permissive reforms while the lower panel presents the results for restrictive reforms. All models include the following control variables: being new democracy, the change in GDP per capita, Gallagher's (least squares) index, constitutional protection, the vote difference between the leading parties, government type, and the number of previous reform attempts.

In Model 1, the variable of interest is electoral volatility. As discussed, even though electoral volatility is associated with electoral reforms, it does not indicate whether a given type of reform would be more or less likely to be adopted as a result of electoral volatility. The results show that electoral volatility is positively related to either reform type. However, it seems to be a

better predictor for restrictive reforms: the coefficient on electoral volatility is statistically significant at the one percent level in predicting restrictive reforms and at the ten percent level in predicting permissive reforms. This finding suggests that governments are more likely to initiate an electoral reform (of either type) when the vote shift between elections is substantial in line with the findings in the literature (Bielasiak and Hulse 2013; Remmer 2008). Why do we not observe a negative relationship between electoral volatility and reforms? One potential explanation is that even though electoral volatility indicates higher uncertainty in election outcomes in certain systems, it might not be conceived as such by the politicians in electoral systems which have at least a degree of proportionality.

Table 4.2 Analysis of Existing Explanations in the Literature

Permissive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Total) Electoral Volatility	0.023* (0.012)				0.032** (0.013)
New Party Volatility		0.017 (0.018)			
Within System Volatility			0.029 (0.019)		
Effective Number of Parties in Election				-0.046 (0.126)	-0.180 (0.166)
New Democracy	0.587* (0.351)	0.731** (0.331)	0.652* (0.343)	0.682** (0.334)	0.505 (0.341)
Change in GDP per capita	-9.395** (3.789)	-9.472** (3.679)	-9.451** (3.787)	-6.906** (3.034)	-9.185** (3.789)
Gallagher Index	-0.014 (0.057)	0.006 (0.060)	-0.000 (0.057)	0.021 (0.054)	-0.010 (0.057)
Constitutional Protection	-0.055 (0.193)	-0.045 (0.195)	-0.060 (0.196)	-0.048 (0.180)	-0.027 (0.183)
Vote Difference (logged)	-0.106 (0.161)	-0.103 (0.160)	-0.106 (0.166)	-0.098 (0.161)	-0.146 (0.152)
Single-Party Majority	0.609 (0.562)	0.507 (0.559)	0.502 (0.594)	0.215 (0.535)	0.370 (0.543)
Constant	-2.261*** (0.609)	-2.159*** (0.594)	-2.284*** (0.614)	-1.947** (0.891)	-1.559 (0.962)
Restrictive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Total) Electoral Volatility	0.036*** (0.009)				0.029*** (0.011)
New Party Volatility		0.031** (0.015)			
Within System Volatility			0.035** (0.016)		
Effective Number of Parties in Election				0.251*** (0.068)	0.129 (0.097)
New Democracy	0.458 (0.394)	0.690* (0.355)	0.647 (0.422)	1.000** (0.404)	0.516 (0.409)
Change in GDP per capita	2.371 (3.381)	2.003 (3.177)	2.212 (3.138)	-2.177 (3.753)	2.233 (3.401)
Gallagher Index	-0.062 (0.044)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.049 (0.044)	-0.064 (0.044)
Constitutional Protection	-0.276 (0.208)	-0.260 (0.215)	-0.275 (0.215)	-0.450** (0.229)	-0.290 (0.214)
Vote Difference (logged)	-0.011 (0.145)	-0.011 (0.148)	-0.004 (0.148)	0.064 (0.126)	0.024 (0.134)
Single-Party Majority	0.029 (0.459)	-0.114 (0.458)	-0.187 (0.465)	0.199 (0.388)	0.214 (0.507)
Constant	-2.069*** (0.591)	-1.900*** (0.611)	-2.085*** (0.614)	-2.585*** (0.677)	-2.618*** (0.657)
Number of Observations	406	406	406	426	406
Pseudo R ²	0.0553	0.0457	0.0470	0.0601	0.0612
Log-likelihood	-268.7	-271.4	-271	-288.7	-267

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level.

In Model 4, the main variable of interest is the effective number of parties in election, which measures the degree of party system fragmentation. The upper panel shows that party system fragmentation is negatively associated with permissive reform attempts, but this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, this finding does not support either defensive or governability and representation hypotheses with respect to their predictions on permissive reform attempts. The lower panel shows that party system fragmentation has a positive and statistically significant (at the one percent level) effect on the likelihood of restrictive reform attempts. Overall, the results concerning restrictive attempts provide support for hypothesis of governability model, whereas the results concerning permissive reforms do not lend support to either defensive or governability and representation models.

To examine the robustness of the partial support for governability hypothesis, I include total volatility as an additional explanatory variable and then estimate the effect of party system fragmentation on electoral reforms (see Model 5). The results concerning permissive reforms do not change: the coefficient on total volatility is positive and statistically significant (at the five percent level) while the coefficient on the effective number of parties is negative but not significant. By contrast, the main result concerning restrictive reforms does change; incorporating electoral volatility reduces the coefficient on the number of effective parties dramatically, so that it is not statistically significant anymore. Hence, the support for Hypothesis 2b is not only partial (as the results are not consistent with the permissive part) but also weak as

the positive association between party system fragmentation and restrictive reforms is not robust to controlling for electoral volatility.

Combining the findings about permissive and restrictive reform attempts, we can conclude that my analysis does not support defensive model. The basic mechanism linking party system fragmentation and permissive reforms in this explanation is the electoral risk faced by incumbents due to the new groups gaining and increasing support among voters (Colomer 2004b). However, this mechanism might be more appropriate for majoritarian and plurality systems, which create absolute winners (and losers) in each election, rather than for systems which produce partial winners. In the latter systems, the perceived risk of fragmentation can be lower, leading politicians to initiate electoral reforms that offset the pattern of electoral and political change. Therefore, the idea that the party in power aims to consolidate its gains from low fragmentation by implementing a reform that restricts the proportionality of the system is not supported either.

The results lend partial support to governability hypothesis as the party system fragmentation has a positive and statistically significant relationship with restrictive reforms. While the governability explanation, which is that high levels of fragmentation create inefficiencies in governability and therefore increase the likelihood of restrictive reforms, finds support in this analysis, the representation argument linking fragmentation and permissive reforms does not. In other words, the idea that consolidated party systems pose a representation deficiency in the system for small parties and create pressure for permissive reforms is not supported.

Overall, none of the potential explanations for permissive reform finds empirical support in this analysis. Regarding restrictive reforms, we find partial support for a positive relationship between party system fragmentation and restrictive reform attempts. However, this relationship, which is not robust to accounting for electoral volatility, does not necessarily imply that political parties are concerned with the overall efficiency of the system. Indeed, they can be motivated to address the fragmentation within their own ideological cluster by adopting a restrictive reform, which would increase governability for themselves. In the next section, I test this nuanced relationship between party system fragmentation and electoral reform attempts.

4.3 Party Competition and Electoral Reform Initiations

In this section, I test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. Recall that the framework developed in that chapter disaggregates the party system fragmentation according to the ideological clusters of the leading competing parties in order to consider how fragmentation leads to different electoral reform types. The following table summarizes the hypotheses derived from this framework.

Table 4.3 Hypotheses for Electoral Reform Initiation

<i>Hypothesis 1:</i>	The probability of restrictive reform attempts increases with the number of competitors in the ruling party's ideological cluster, while the probability of permissive reform attempts increases decreases with it.
<i>Hypothesis 2:</i>	The higher the number of competitors faced by the opposition relative to the governing party, the more likely permissive reform attempts are.

Table 4.4 below displays the results from multinomial logistic regressions, whereby I estimate a set of models to test Hypothesis 1. As indicated, this hypothesis posits that the

fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster has a negative relationship with permissive reform attempts and a positive relationship with restrictive reform attempts. Below I begin my discussion with the results for permissive reform attempts.

The baseline model (Model 1) includes three control variables: the number of previous reform attempts, the change in GDP per capita, and being new democracy. As discussed above, the number of previous attempts is included in the regressions to account for a potential time dependency problem. The rationale for including the change in GDP per capita as a control variable is that if the party in power anticipates losing elections due to poor economic performance, it can seek institutional solutions to ensure its survival and therefore might initiate permissive reforms (Remmer 2008). I control for new democracies (those with less than 20 democratic years) as politicians in mature democracies are expected to be less likely to engage in tinkering the rules of the game (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013; Colomer 2004b; Renwick 2011b). This implies that electoral reforms are more likely to be observed in new democracies.

The results from the baseline model provide support for the hypothesis: fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster has a negative and statistically significant (at the five percent level) effect on permissive reform attempts, holding other variables constant. This means that governments are less likely to initiate permissive reforms when there is already a high level of competition in their own ideological clusters. The results also show that the change in GDP per capita has a negative and statistically significant (at the one percent level) relationship with permissive reform attempts, suggesting that permissive reforms are less likely when there is an upward trend in GDP per capita. In addition, the variable indicating new democracies has the expected sign, which suggests that permissive reforms are more likely to be observed in new

democracies. Note that the negative relationship between the change in GDP per capita and permissive reform attempts is robust to including different set of control variables (see Models 2 through 7 in Table 5.4). For being new democracy, the observed relationship is positive and significant at the five percent level in all models, except in Models 4 and 7 in which the coefficient is positive but not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on the change in GDP per capita is negatively significant (at the five percent level) in Models 2 through 7.

In the second model, I introduce another set of variables that can affect the relationship between fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster and permissive reforms attempts (see Model 2). The first one is the vote difference between the leading party in the government and the leading party in the opposition in order to account for the competition between these two parties. The second one is the Gallagher index, which measures the degree of disproportionality in the election system. Adding these variables into the model does not change the results concerning the main variable of interest. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient on the effective number of parties in the governing party's ideological cluster is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level. We also observe that neither the proportionality measure nor the vote difference between leading parties has a significant effect on permissive reform attempts.

Table 4.4 Competition in Government's Ideological Cluster & Electoral Reform Attempts

Permissive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
N in Ideological Cluster of Government	-0.278** (0.127)	-0.265** (0.128)	-0.261** (0.125)	-0.283** (0.125)	-0.262** (0.123)	-0.256** (0.128)	-0.311** (0.127)
New Democracy	0.771** (0.316)	0.750** (0.315)	0.719** (0.320)	0.548 (0.336)	0.726** (0.308)	0.696** (0.310)	0.477 (0.331)
Change in GDP per capita	-8.030*** (2.922)	-7.589** (3.178)	-7.750** (3.208)	-9.722** (3.963)	-9.678** (3.801)	-7.565** (3.183)	-9.353** (3.792)
Gallagher Index		0.031 (0.049)	0.025 (0.054)	-0.009 (0.056)	0.014 (0.057)	0.025 (0.051)	-0.004 (0.056)
Vote Difference (logged)		-0.050 (0.134)	-0.062 (0.149)	-0.084 (0.147)	-0.076 (0.148)	-0.051 (0.149)	-0.085 (0.142)
Constitutional Protection			-0.060 (0.177)	-0.056 (0.181)	-0.044 (0.184)	-0.069 (0.176)	-0.068 (0.183)
Single-Party Majority			0.161 (0.516)	0.513 (0.491)	0.406 (0.477)	0.191 (0.482)	0.361 (0.478)
(Total) Electoral Volatility				0.028** (0.013)			0.033*** (0.013)
New Party Volatility					0.020 (0.020)		
N in Ideological Cluster of Opposition Party						0.018 (0.157)	-0.139 (0.209)
Constant	-1.733*** (0.421)	-1.820*** (0.513)	-1.694*** (0.598)	-1.823*** (0.636)	-1.747*** (0.629)	-1.725** (0.850)	-1.498 (0.912)
Restrictive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
N in Ideological Cluster of Government	0.252*** (0.076)	0.256*** (0.077)	0.252*** (0.080)	0.179* (0.093)	0.200** (0.097)	0.288*** (0.083)	0.209** (0.096)
New Democracy	1.117*** (0.322)	1.148*** (0.325)	1.046*** (0.363)	0.507 (0.391)	0.730** (0.352)	1.006** (0.396)	0.528 (0.424)
Change in GDP per capita	-1.301 (3.432)	-1.406 (3.443)	-1.826 (3.633)	2.588 (3.379)	2.315 (3.145)	-1.704 (3.747)	2.553 (3.541)
Gallagher Index		-0.013 (0.045)	-0.039 (0.047)	-0.071 (0.046)	-0.043 (0.048)	-0.046 (0.044)	-0.060 (0.041)

Vote Difference (logged)	-0.003 (0.122)	-0.034 (0.133)	-0.020 (0.149)	-0.031 (0.151)	-0.011 (0.126)	-0.010 (0.145)	
Constitutional Protection		-0.401* (0.214)	-0.284 (0.204)	-0.261 (0.208)	-0.388* (0.210)	-0.253 (0.199)	
Single-Party Majority		-0.021 (0.393)	0.152 (0.477)	0.033 (0.476)	0.205 (0.414)	0.168 (0.472)	
(Total) Electoral Volatility			0.034*** (0.010)			0.028** (0.011)	
New Party Volatility				0.026* (0.016)			
N in Ideological Cluster of Opposition Party					0.232*** (0.084)	0.163 (0.108)	
Constant	-2.795*** (0.442)	-2.751*** (0.468)	-1.938*** (0.572)	-2.377*** (0.572)	-2.260*** (0.583)	-2.560*** (0.611)	-2.833*** (0.605)
Number of Observations	425	424	424	404	404	416	397
Pseudo R ²	0.0542	0.0553	0.0674	0.0716	0.0615	0.0753	0.0758
Log-likelihood	-292.2	-289.7	-285.9	-263.5	-266.4	-279.9	-259.1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level.

The third model augments the second one with two additional control variables (see Model 3). First, I control for government type by including a dummy variable for single-party majority governments, as it can be easier this type of governments to implement electoral reforms. Second, I control for the constitutional protection for the electoral systems. In this model, fragmentation in the ideological cluster of the governing party retains its negative and significant (at the five percent level) effect on permissive reform attempts. Also, the coefficient on constitutional protection is close to zero, whereas the effect of being a single-party (majority) government is positive but not statistically significant.³⁸

The results discussed so far provide support for the hypothesis that fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster is negatively related to permissive reform attempts. Next, I provide additional results to assess the robustness of this finding. To this end, I take the richest specification (i.e., Model 3) and add additional control variables. As I elaborate below, the choice of these additional controls is motivated either by the existing work in the literature or by the framework developed in Chapter 2.³⁹

In Model 4, I include total electoral volatility as an additional control variable. Recall our earlier finding that this variable is an important determinant of both types of reforms (see Table 4.2 and the corresponding discussion). Consistent with the earlier results, electoral volatility has a positive and significant (at the five percent level) relationship with permissive reform attempts. Importantly, the association between the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological

³⁸ I also estimated each specification in Table 4.4 using the presence of judicial review as an additional control variable. The qualitative nature of the results did not change. Also, because the coefficient on judicial review was not significant in any of the estimated models, I do not report those results.

³⁹ Note that I do not use the effective number of parties as an additional control variable in this analysis because it is highly correlated with the main variable of interest, the effective number of parties in the governing party's ideological cluster. Also, theoretically speaking, estimating a model that includes both of these variables is not warranted as one captures a subset of the other.

cluster and permissive reform initiation is still negative. More specifically, the corresponding coefficient increases slightly in absolute value and remains significant at the five percent level. In the next model (Model 5), I replace total electoral volatility with new party volatility. The result concerning the main variable of interest does not change; governing parties are less likely to initiate a permissive reform when the number of competitors in their ideological clusters is high, even after controlling for the volatility that stems from new parties. It is also observed that new party volatility is not related to permissive reform attempts as the coefficient on this variable is close to zero.

As the discussion on Hypothesis suggests, when deciding to initiate a reform, the governing party may take into account not only the fragmentation in its own ideological cluster but also the fragmentation in the opposition party's ideological cluster. The rationale is that higher competition in the opposition party's ideological cluster will encourage the government to initiate permissive electoral reforms to further weaken the opposition. In contrast to the literature which views permissive reforms as a safeguard for the governing party, the mechanism here is to split the opposition (that is, to increase the number of competitors in the leading opposition party's ideological camp) in order to reduce the possibility that opposition parties form a coherent and cohesive government in future legislative terms.

To examine if this argument is supported and if accounting for the competition in the opposition camp alters the main finding about the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological camp, I add the effective number of parties in the ideological cluster of the main opposition party into the richest specification reported in Model 3. The results from this model (Model 6) show that the competition in the opposition party's ideological bloc has no

relationship with the initiation of permissive reforms as the estimated coefficient is close to zero. Notably, the negative and significant effect of the fragmentation in the governing party's own ideological cluster remains. To further assess the robustness of this result, I augment this model with total electoral volatility (Model 7). The main result does not change. Indeed, the coefficient on the number of parties in the governing party's ideological cluster attains the maximum value (in absolute value) among the models reported in Table 4.4. Hence, the idea that in the initial stage of the electoral reform process, parties take into account the degree of competition in the opposition camp is not supported; however, accounting for this factor does not eliminate the effect of the fragmentation in the government's own ideological cluster on permissive reform initiation.

In conclusion, the results in Table 4.4 provide support for the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster and permissive reform attempts. In line with my theory, the governing party is less likely to initiate permissive reforms when its ideological cluster is more fragmented. To get a sense of the magnitude of the main effect, consider the results from the baseline model. Accordingly, if the number of parties in the government's ideological cluster were to increase by one, the relative risk for initiating a permissive reform, as opposed to not initiating any reform, would be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.757, holding other variables constant. In other words, given one unit increase in the governing party's camp, the relative risk of observing a permissive reform would be 0.757 times more likely when other variables in the model are held constant.⁴⁰ This factor decreases to 0.754 when total electoral volatility is controlled for (Model 4) and

⁴⁰ Note that when the relative risk ratio is below 1, the outcome is more likely to be in the baseline group (Long and Freese 2014).

decreases to 0.733 when both total volatility and fragmentation in the opposing party's ideological camp are controlled for (Model 7).

I now turn to the second part of Hypothesis 1, which is that the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster is positively related to restrictive reform attempts. To discuss the results concerning restrictive reform attempts, I focus on the results reported in the lower panel of Table 4.4.

The results from the baseline model (Model 1) show that the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster has a positive and statistically significant (at the one percent level) effect on restrictive reform attempts. As in the case of permissive reform attempts, being new democracy is also positively related to restrictive reform attempts.⁴¹ However, differing from the set of results on permissive reform attempts, the effect of the change in GDP per capita is not statistically significant even though its coefficient is negative. In Model 2, which includes the Gallagher index and the vote difference between the leading parties as additional controls, the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster still has a positive and statistically significant (at the one percent level) effect on restrictive reform attempts. The results also reveal that the degree of disproportionality, measured by the Gallagher index, and the vote difference between the leading parties do not have statistically significant effects on restrictive reform attempts. Finally, as seen in the results from Model 3, the same positive and significant effect of the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster persists when controls for constitutional protection and government type are included. Among the added control variables, only constitutional protection has a negative and significant (at the ten percent level) effect on

⁴¹ The coefficient for being new democracy is positive and significant (at the five percent level in Models 1 through 3 and at the five percent level in Models 5 and 6) but positive and not significant in Models 4 and 7.

restrictive reform attempts, indicating that governments are less likely to initiate restrictive reforms when the degree of constitutional protection for the electoral system increases.⁴²

As we have seen so far, the results provide support for Hypothesis 1 that governments facing higher levels of competition in their own ideological clusters are more likely to initiate restrictive reforms. For example, the results from Model 3 imply that as the number of parties in the governing party's ideological cluster increases by one, the relative risk of observing a restrictive reform attempt, as opposed to not observing any attempts, would be expected to increase by a factor of 1.287, holding other variables constant. As described above, I take the approach of adding additional controls to the richest specification (Model 3) to further assess the robustness of the main finding concerning the effect of competition in the governing party's ideological camp.

In Model 4, which includes total electoral volatility as an additional control variable, even though the coefficient on the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster becomes smaller, it remains positive and statistically significant (at the ten percent level). Moreover, the positive effect of electoral volatility on restrictive reform attempts is significant at the one percent level. Notably, while adding electoral volatility does not eliminate the effect of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster, the effects of being new democracy and constitutional protection disappear. Interestingly, replacing total electoral volatility by new party volatility increases the magnitude of the main effect of interest (see Model 5). As a result, the coefficient on the fragmentation in the government's ideological cluster becomes statistically

⁴² As an alternative model, I replaced constitutional protection by constitutional embeddedness. The main results did not change in this alternative specification. Also, constitutional embeddedness has a negative and statistically significant (at the five percent level) relationship with restrictive reform attempts, indicating that governments are less likely to initiate this type of reforms when the constitution has a provision about the electoral system.

significant at the five percent level. This suggests that a part of the effect of volatility on the likelihood of restrictive reform attempts is captured by the degree of competition in the governing party's ideological cluster. But as these two models demonstrate, the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological camp still has a substantial effect on restrictive reform attempts even after controlling for volatility. Holding other variables constant, as a response to a one unit increase in the fragmentation variable, the relative risk of observing a restrictive reform attempt, as opposed to not observing any attempts, increases by 1.196 in Model 4 and by 1.221 in Model 5.

Finally, in the last set of models I examine whether the degree of competition in the leading opposition party's ideological cluster is important for the governing party's decision over restrictive reform attempts. In Model 6, I include both the effective number of parties in the governing party's ideological cluster and that in the leading opposition party's ideological cluster. The results show that both variables have positive and statistically significant (at the one percent level) effects on restrictive reform attempts. However, only the effect of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster is robust. When electoral total volatility is added into the model (Model 7), the coefficient on the effective number of parties in the opposition's ideological cluster decreases substantially and loses its significance. Importantly, the effect of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster remains positive and significant (at the five percent level). Hence, these findings indicate that the degree of competition in the governing party's ideological cluster is positively related to restrictive reform attempts even after controlling for the degree of competition in the opposition party's ideological cluster and electoral volatility.

The analysis so far has revealed a robust relationship between the fragmentation in the governing party's ideological camp and reform attempts. To gain a deeper insight into the effect of fragmentation in the governing party's cluster, I now consider any nonlinearities in the effect of fragmentation on electoral reform initiations. To this end, I define five mutually exclusive categories to measure the intensity of competition in the governing party's ideological cluster. These categories are the following: the degree of fragmentation is referred to as *High* if the value of the corresponding variable is above the 90th percentile, *High-Moderate* if it is between the 90th and 75th percentiles, *Moderate* if it is between the 75th percentile and the median, *Low-Moderate* if it is between the median and the 25th percentile, and *Low* if it is below the 25th percentile.⁴³ I use *Low* fragmentation as the baseline category. Using these categories, I re-estimate Models 3 through 7 reported in Table 4.4 and report the results in Table 4.5.⁴⁴

The results from Model 1 (recall that this model is analogous to Model 3 of Table 4.4) show that only the coefficient for *High* fragmentation has a negative and statistically significant (at the ten percent level) effect while the coefficients on other fragmentation categories are all negative but not estimated with precision. Adding controls does not change this pattern. In Model 2, which includes total electoral volatility, the coefficient for the high degree of fragmentation increases in absolute value, whereas the other coefficients remain negative and statistically not significant. Replacing total volatility with new party volatility reduces the coefficient for the high degree of fragmentation, and consequently, that variable loses its significance (Model 3). However, controlling for total volatility and the fragmentation in the

⁴³ In terms of numbers, the degree of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster is *High* if the value of the original variable is above 4.56, *High-Moderate* if it is between 3.05 and 4.56, *Moderate* if it is between 2 and 3.05, *Low-Moderate* if it is between 1.12 and 2, and *Low* if it is below 1.21.

⁴⁴ For the sake of brevity, Table 4.5 reports only the coefficients for the main variables of interest.

opposing party's ideological cluster does not change the main result that governments facing high degrees of competition in their own ideological clusters are less likely to initiate permissive reforms than those facing low degrees of competition (see Models 4 and 5). Finally, it is worth noting that in all models the coefficients for *High-Moderate* and *Low-Moderate* fragmentation are negative but not significant while the coefficient for *Moderate* fragmentation is close to zero. One potential reason for these findings is the small sample problem. In other words, in a larger sample, which would produce more precise coefficient estimates, degrees of fragmentation ranging from moderate to high and that ranging from low to moderate would likely be negatively related to permissive reform attempts.

Table 4.5 Degree of Competition in Government's Ideological Cluster & Electoral Reform Attempts

Permissive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
High Fragmentation	-1.709* (0.993)	-1.737* (1.032)	-1.627 (1.016)	-1.711* (0.973)	-1.877* (0.979)
High-Moderate Fragmentation	-0.453 (0.598)	-0.447 (0.586)	-0.418 (0.602)	-0.417 (0.624)	-0.538 (0.619)
Moderate Fragmentation	-0.081 (0.426)	0.020 (0.448)	0.045 (0.437)	-0.034 (0.429)	0.023 (0.458)
Low-Moderate Fragmentation	-0.689 (0.627)	-0.551 (0.606)	-0.547 (0.602)	-0.663 (0.614)	-0.559 (0.582)
(Total) Electoral Volatility		0.025** (0.012)			0.030*** (0.011)
New Party Volatility			0.017 (0.018)		
N in Ideological Cluster of Opposition Party				0.011 (0.151)	-0.135 (0.195)
Restrictive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
High Fragmentation	1.366*** (0.421)	1.266** (0.529)	1.406*** (0.544)	1.487*** (0.418)	1.341*** (0.508)
High-Moderate Fragmentation	0.354 (0.436)	0.312 (0.491)	0.321 (0.516)	0.537 (0.406)	0.434 (0.467)
Moderate Fragmentation	0.887** (0.432)	0.940** (0.466)	0.947* (0.489)	0.890** (0.411)	0.902** (0.434)
Low-Moderate Fragmentation	0.380 (0.439)	0.621 (0.454)	0.644 (0.465)	0.413 (0.431)	0.618 (0.442)
(Total) Electoral Volatility		0.032*** (0.010)			0.027** (0.011)
New Party Volatility			0.027* (0.015)		
N in Ideological Cluster of Opposition Party				0.212*** (0.080)	0.140 (0.103)
Number of Observations	426	406	406	418	399
Pseudo R ²	0.072	0.079	0.071	0.078	0.082
Log-likelihood	-285.1	-261.9	-264.2	-279.7	-257.9

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level.

I now turn to the lower panel of Table 4.5 to interpret the results for restrictive reform attempts. Three patterns are observed from these results. First, *High* fragmentation has a positive and statistically significant (at the five percent level in Model 2 and at the one percent level in all other models). Second, the coefficient for *Moderate* fragmentation is smaller than the coefficient for *High* fragmentation, but it is positive and statistically significant (at the ten percent level in Model 3 and at the five percent level in all other models). Third, the coefficients for other categories for fragmentation intensity are positive but not statistically significant. Overall, these results indicate that the degree of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster is an important determinant of restrictive electoral reforms. In particular, governments facing either high or moderate degrees of competition in their own ideological clusters are more likely to initiate restrictive reforms.

As the discussion above demonstrates, the results presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 support the hypothesis about the effect of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster on permissive and restrictive reforms. While the aforementioned results are informative about the direction and statistical significance of the variables, the coefficients in multinomial logistic regressions do not provide insights into the magnitude of the effects. Figure 4.1 below shows the substantive effect of the competition in the governing party's ideological bloc by presenting its marginal effect on permissive and restrictive reforms, holding the other variables at their mean values and using the coefficient estimates from Model 5.

Figure 4.2 The Effect of the Effective Number of Parties in the Government's Ideological Cluster on Reform Attempts (Model 3)





Figure 4.2 uses the coefficient estimates from Model 3 to display the effect of fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster on reform attempts. It shows that governing parties are more likely to respond to the high number of competitors in their ideological cluster by initiating restrictive reforms. When the government's ideological cluster is not fragmented, the probability of a permissive reform attempt is around fifteen percent, holding other variables at their means. As the effective number of parties in the government's ideological bloc increases, the probability of permissive reform attempts starts to decline rapidly. As for restrictive reform attempts, when the effective number of parties in the government's ideological cluster is low, the probability of restrictive reform attempt is close to ten percent. As the governing party's competitors grow in number, the probability of restrictive reform attempt starts

to increase as well, and when the effective number of parties in government's cluster reaches the maximum (around seven parties), the probability of restrictive reform approaches to thirty percent. Figure 4.3 reproduces the same figure using the coefficient estimates from Model 5, in which new party volatility is controlled for. It is easy to see that these two figures are hardly distinguishable, except for the probability of restrictive reform attempt at high degrees of fragmentation.

Figure 4.3 The Effect of the Effective Number of Parties in the Government's Ideological Cluster on Reform Attempts (Model 5)



Hypothesis 2 takes into consideration the difference in the number of competitors faced by the governing party and that by the leading opposition party. This hypothesis is based on the argument that an electoral reform, regardless of its type, will alter the competition in each ideological cluster. For instance, permissive reforms make it easier for small parties in each ideological cluster to enter the parliament, and they can increase fragmentation in each cluster in

future elections. Hence, when deciding whether to initiate an electoral reform, the governing party considers the net effect of implementing the reform.

Using this “relative gains” perspective, the first part of Hypothesis 2 postulates that permissive reforms are more likely to be initiated as the difference between the fragmentation in the leading opposition party’s ideological cluster and that in the governing party’s ideological cluster increases. To test this hypothesis, I use the difference between the (effective) number of competitors faced by the opposition party and those faced by the governing party as the main variable of interest and estimate the same specifications as those reported in Table 4.4. The results are presented in Table 4.6.

The results from the baseline model (Model 1) are consistent with the hypothesis. Accordingly, governments are more likely to initiate permissive reforms if the number of the main opposition party’s competitors is higher than the number of the governing party’s competitors. This effect is statistically significant at the ten percent level. In addition, consistent with the set of results discussed earlier, being new democracy is positively related to permissive reform attempts while the change in GDP per capita is negatively related to this type of reform.⁴⁵ Adding the Gallagher index and the vote difference between the leading parties slightly reduces the coefficient on the difference in fragmentation in the two ideological clusters (see Model 2), and as a result, that coefficient loses its significance at the ten percent level. However, in Model 3, which includes controls for government type and constitutional protection, this coefficient increases slightly and becomes statistically significant at the ten percent level. According to these

⁴⁵ In this set of results, being new democracy is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level in all models, except in Model 4 where it is significant at the ten percent level. Similarly, in each model the coefficient on the change in GDP per capita is statistically significant at the five percent level.

results, as the difference between the number of competitors faced by the opposition party and that faced by the governing party increases by one, the relative risk of observing a permissive reform attempt as opposed to not observing any attempts increases by a factor of 1.129, holding other variables in the model constant. Finally, when electoral volatility is taken into account, the main variable of interest still has a positive relationship with permissive reform attempts, but this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

The lower panel of Table 4.6 provides the results for restrictive reforms. The basic intuition is the same with the first part of the hypothesis: governments consider the effects of institutional solutions on both ideological clusters. Restrictive reforms will benefit the leading parties (both on the government and on the opposition) not only by giving them seat bonuses but also by encouraging voters to converge on the larger parties in future elections. This implies that if the ideological cluster of the opposition party is more fragmented than that of government, the governing party will have weaker incentives to initiate a restrictive reform, as the leading opposition party gains more from a restrictive reform, and the benefits of such reform for the governing party are likely to be outweighed by its costs.

Table 4.6 Difference in Fragmentation and Electoral Reform Attempts

Permissive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Difference in Fragmentation	0.121* (0.068)	0.113 (0.069)	0.121* (0.072)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.080)
New Democracy	0.720** (0.332)	0.719** (0.329)	0.672** (0.331)	0.573* (0.343)	0.711** (0.317)
Change in GPD per capita	-6.851** (2.692)	-6.540** (2.929)	-6.809** (3.014)	-9.317** (3.864)	-9.503** (3.723)
Gallagher Index		0.023 (0.046)	0.013 (0.051)	-0.014 (0.054)	0.004 (0.055)
Vote Difference (logged)		-0.037 (0.134)	-0.062 (0.153)	-0.089 (0.156)	-0.083 (0.155)
Constitutional Protection			-0.070 (0.176)	-0.067 (0.183)	-0.056 (0.184)
Single-Party Majority Government			0.377 (0.561)	0.660 (0.549)	0.573 (0.536)
(Total) Electoral Volatility				0.023* (0.012)	
New Party Volatility					0.018 (0.021)
Constant	-2.249*** (0.352)	-2.317*** (0.456)	-2.155*** (0.549)	-2.259*** (0.604)	-2.165*** (0.589)
Restrictive Reform Attempt	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Difference in Fragmentation	-0.039 (0.069)	-0.039 (0.069)	-0.042 (0.066)	-0.035 (0.077)	-0.023 (0.076)
New Democracy	1.130*** (0.340)	1.133*** (0.331)	1.038*** (0.371)	0.431 (0.403)	0.644* (0.373)
Change in GPD per capita	-2.260 (4.038)	-2.272 (4.040)	-2.626 (4.119)	2.356 (3.446)	2.017 (3.255)
Gallagher Index		-0.001 (0.045)	-0.024 (0.044)	-0.058 (0.043)	-0.031 (0.044)
Vote Difference (logged)		0.005 (0.128)	-0.003 (0.138)	0.001 (0.149)	-0.003 (0.152)
Constitutional Protection			-0.409* (0.227)	-0.283 (0.210)	-0.259 (0.216)
Single-Party Majority Government			-0.323 (0.395)	-0.128 (0.456)	-0.254 (0.456)
(Total) Electoral Volatility				0.037*** (0.010)	
New Party Volatility					0.034** (0.017)
Constant	-2.199*** (0.366)	-2.204*** (0.427)	-1.400** (0.564)	-2.065*** (0.578)	-1.902*** (0.597)
Number of Observations	417	416	416	397	397
Pseudo R ²	0.0346	0.0356	0.0500	0.0581	0.0495
Log-likelihood	-294.5	-292	-287.6	-264	-266.4


Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level.

In all models reported in Table 4.6, the relationship between relative competition and restrictive reforms is negative as expected in the hypothesis; however, the estimated effect is small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. In terms of results concerning other control variables, we observe differences only for new democracy. Differing from the earlier set of results, in which new democracy has no meaningful relationship with restrictive reforms, the coefficient on new democracy is positive and significant, indicating that restrictive reforms are more likely to be observed in young democracies.⁴⁶

Figure 4.4 uses the coefficient estimates from Model 3 to display the effect of difference in fragmentation in each type of electoral reform attempt. When the government's ideological cluster is more fragmented than that of the opposition, the probability of a permissive reform is close to five percent. When they have almost equal number of competitors, the probability of permissive reform increases and becomes close to ten percent, and it continues to increase as the opposition's cluster becomes more fragmented relative to the governing party's cluster.

⁴⁶ More specifically, the coefficient on new democracy is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level in the core specifications (Models 1 through 3). The same coefficient is positive and not significant when total electoral volatility is controlled for (Model 4) and is positive and significant at the ten percent level when new party volatility is controlled for (Model 5).

Figure 4.4 The Effect of Difference in N in Ideological Clusters on Reform Attempt Types



4.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined the conditions that induce political parties to revise the electoral system in parliamentary regimes by including both failed and successful reform attempts in the analyses. This approach has allowed me to have a relevant comparative base in the empirical analyses of reform initiations: cases where politicians attempted to initiate reforms and where they did not.

In the analysis, I first tested the testing existing party system-based explanations of electoral reforms using a novel dataset of electoral reform attempts (see Chapter 3 for details of the dataset). The major conclusion from these analyses is that electoral volatility is an important predictor of electoral reform attempts. However, it cannot offer any insights about the type of

electoral reform to be adopted. More importantly, the source of electoral volatility, meaning whether vote shifts between elections occur because the voters switch their votes between existing parties or because the voters switch to new parties, does not matter for restrictive reform attempts. Thus, the competing explanation of restrictive reforms based on new party volatility is not supported in this analysis. Electoral volatility is an important determinant of electoral reform attempts, regardless of its source and regardless of reform type.

The main findings of this study reveal that party system fragmentation is associated with governability problem. While the main literature emphasized the typical interest of parties in decreasing the number of parties in the parliament, I focus on the governing party's incentives since it is the governing majority which takes the reform decision. I focus on two sources of competition affected by party system fragmentation: electoral competition with parties within the ideological bloc of the government party and with the leading opposition party, each of which can lead governing parties to seek institutional solutions.

The results from multinomial regressions show that reforms are initiated in response to the effective number of parties in ideological clusters, that is, how small parties are situated in the ideological spectrum in relation to the governing party and to the main opposition party. The existing fragmentation signals that the ideological bloc of the governing party can have more parties in the parliament in the future elections given the status quo electoral rules, thereby decreasing the party's chances to be viable for government formation. Therefore, the main party in the government has an incentive to restrict the electoral system to keep its ideological competitors either out of the parliament or weak in the parliament.

As discussed, the existing studies fail to provide an explanation of permissive reform attempts, which stems from their preoccupation with governability problem in proportional systems. I have tested the hypotheses about permissive reform attempts, which focus on the governing party's incentive to curtail the degree of competition in its own ideological cluster and on how it considers the relative effect of permissive reforms across ideological clusters. The analysis reveals that the fragmentation in the government's ideological bloc is negatively associated with permissive reform initiation, showing the governing party's incentive to initiate reforms to limit its number of ideological competitors. While the governing party does not respond automatically to the fragmentation in the ideological cluster of its main competitor by adopting a permissive reform, it does so when the number of parties are lower in its own cluster. In other words, the incentive to weaken the opposition and its chances to form a united government works especially when the government can afford permissive rules, meaning when the governing party faces less competition from small parties than the leading opposition party.

One interesting conclusion that can be drawn here is that governing parties respond to the fragmentation in their ideological cluster by initiating restrictive reforms without considering the effects of restrictive reform on the opposition's cluster. However, the same reaction is not observed for permissive reforms, which implies that weakening the opposition, as a source of motivation for governments, might be of secondary importance, in comparison to restricting the number of parties close its ideological cluster. By adopting a restrictive reform, the governing party can reduce the potential shifts from its voter base to its ideological competitors and can decrease the number of potential coalition partners.

While this analysis mostly focuses on the factors that affect the will of political parties with respect to adoption of permissive versus restrictive rules, I also consider possible barriers that could prevent electoral reform attempts. For instance, I analyzed how constitutional protection affects the initiation of each reform type. The protection of electoral systems by constitutions that are hard to change decreases the likelihood of restrictive reform attempts. The same effect is not found for permissive reforms, which makes theoretical sense, since the sample includes countries with proportional and semi-proportional electoral systems. However, it is important that the existing literature examining the relationship between party systems and electoral reform types fails to consider such constraints in their empirical analyses.

Overall, the findings imply that more nuanced explanations are needed to address the complexity of electoral reform process and to explain when different types of electoral reforms are initiated. The existing studies failed to do so since they did not pay any attention to who actually makes the decision concerning electoral system changes and therefore treated the existing parties in parliament as having the same interests. However, this does not reflect the actual reform process accurately; as shown by numerous case studies, the reform decision is taken by governments, and the governing parties do calculate their gains from electoral systems before deciding whether and how to alter the electoral system. This chapter brings this insight by disaggregating the effects of party system fragmentation between the main parties in the government and opposition. Specifically, the chapter provided an alternative party system-based explanation of electoral reform initiation by disaggregating the effects of party system fragmentation on the competition between the main parties and by considering the calculations of governing parties in the reform process.

Chapter 5 Electoral Reform Initiation Episodes in Lithuania and Turkey

To explain the permissive and restrictive electoral reform attempts in parliamentary democracies, this dissertation proposed to study the effects of party system fragmentation on the governing party's calculations about keeping or changing the electoral system. To examine the differential effects of party system fragmentation, Chapter 2 presented a nuanced yet more precise measure to identify the sources of party system fragmentation, which disaggregates political parties in the elections according to their ideological proximity to the main government and opposition parties. The quantitative analyses in Chapter 4 have demonstrated that the proposed measure, the effective number of ideological competitors, affects the likelihood of permissive and restrictive reform attempts. In this chapter, I examine the process of electoral reform episodes with the aim to discern how the party competition affects the decision process and to show how the association found in the statistical analysis plays out during the electoral reform process.

The cases in this chapter consist of electoral reform episodes, selected by using the guidelines of integrative multimethod research (Lieberman 2005; Seawright 2016; Seawright and Gerring 2008). I analyze a combination of typical and deviant cases for each type of reform attempt. As explained in Chapter 3, the Lithuanian electoral reform in 2000 constitutes a typical case of restrictive reform attempts according to the regression analysis, whereas the 1995

electoral reform in Turkey is a typical case of permissive reforms. Both Lithuania and Turkey had more than one type of electoral reform attempts and this enabled me to examine different legislative cycles and to test the observable implications of the model on five different electoral reform episodes.

The first section of this chapter describes how the selected reform episodes are analyzed by discussing what type of information and evidence is collected and how they are evaluated. The second section is devoted to electoral reform attempts in Lithuania. After giving a brief overview of the Lithuanian politics, this section examines three electoral reforms adopted in Lithuania (in 1996, 2000 and 2004). The first two changes in the electoral system were in restrictive direction, whereas the last one was in permissive direction. The third section presents the analysis of Turkish electoral reform attempts. A similar structure is used in this section; an overview of politics followed by the discussion of reform episodes. There are two electoral system changes in Turkey (in 1987 and 1995), the first one is a restrictive reform and the second one is a permissive one. This section also includes a discussion about a minor change affecting the proportionality of the electoral system, which is not included in the dataset as it did not meet the electoral reform definition. The last section concludes the chapter.

5.1 Methodology

In the analysis of electoral reform episodes, I start with the discussion of parliamentary elections which brought the governments in power, the legislative power of the government as well as the opposition parties. This discussion also presents the relationship between government and opposition parties in the parliament. Then I briefly sketch the process leading to the electoral reform initiation, with a special focus on how parties gauge their relative power.

The process leading to an electoral reform attempt consists of a series of debates about the electoral system, constant flow of information about party system, especially about new parties, elections taking place at different governance levels. For this reason, I collect these types of evidence for each electoral reform episode, as much as possible. One important information for assessing the relative power of parties is whether there is information from opinion polls, local elections or presidential elections that can be used by the parties to update their beliefs about their expected vote shares as well as the effects of electoral systems on their chances to form government. In the absence of such information sources, I turn to the country's economic performance (or how it is perceived by the voters) to assess the government's expectations concerning its support. As will be remembered, economic performance was a significant indicator for permissive reforms in the analyses of Chapter 4.

In the case analyses, I also evaluate two competing explanations of electoral reforms. The first one cultural explanation of electoral reform which expects electoral reforms to happen where there is a public demand for it or when the public is dissatisfied with the existing electoral systems (Norris 2011). To evaluate this explanation, I gathered information from opinion polls, if available, from newspapers and secondary literature to learn the public opinion during the electoral system change. Since my explanation considers the direction of electoral reform, I also assessed whether the type of electoral reform demanded by the public was similar to the electoral reform attempted by the government. The second competing explanation is based on the balancing representation and governance goals (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013; Dunleavy and Margetts 1995). According to this explanation, restrictive reforms are adopted in fractionalized parliaments to prevent smaller parties from decreasing government efficiency in policymaking. To evaluate this explanation, I collected information about the legislative process during which

an electoral reform decision is taken. These pieces of information include but are not limited to the average tenure of governments and the number of laws enacted during the legislative term electoral reform is adopted.

I use all available information during the negotiations to learn how other parties reacted to the electoral reform proposal and its effect on the final outcome. This is important for evaluating whether the assumptions I make about political preferences, information context and their understanding of electoral systems hold or not. I also examined other institutional reforms, if available, to evaluate if they were in line with the general argument presented here: whether governing parties aim to increase their influence on government by restricting the access of others, and by weakening the competing parties if they expect to be in the opposition in the subsequent legislative term.

In the case analyses, I also look for the following information which would weaken the argument presented here. First one is whether pro-reform parties had a commitment to electoral system change before the elections, this would weaken the explanation about timing of electoral reforms. Second, I pay attention to the timing of electoral reform process which would give me a chance to evaluate whether the parties have a genuine commitment to the electoral reform adopted or not. If the electoral reform is implemented very close to the election, it weakens the argument about ideological or genuine commitment to the electoral reform, but instead shows the opportunistic calculations of political parties. In other words, if electoral reform process begins right before the elections, it would signal that the reform proposal is related to the partisan calculations, rather than being driven by principled commitment to the electoral reforms.

Likewise, if there is a change in the reform commitment and the attempted reform, it will again give support to my argument for partisan self-interests.

To gather information about electoral reforms in Lithuania, I use a variety of sources to trace the process of electoral reforms: the documents from Constitutional Watch section of the East European Constitution Review, which report political and institutional changes in every three months, party documents from the Manifesto Project, the election reports from Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the yearly country reports in European Journal of Political Science newspaper articles containing politicians evaluations of proposed amendments and a large body of secondary literature on the elections and party systems in Lithuania. Before delving into Lithuanian electoral reforms, a quick introduction of Lithuanian political system is in order. For Turkish electoral reforms, I collected information from party documents, committee reports, minutes from plenary sessions, public speeches or interviews of leaders, in addition to secondary literature, and newspapers on electoral reforms.

5.2 Lithuanian Electoral Reforms

Lithuania governments initiated three electoral system reforms during the time period of this project: restrictive reforms in the first (between 1992 and 1996) and second legislative term (between 1996 and 2000) and a permissive reform in the third legislative term (between 2000 and 2004).⁴⁷ The regression model in the previous chapter yields a high predicted probability of the restrictive electoral reform which took place during the second legislative term. Moreover,

⁴⁷ Lithuania recently held a referendum to decrease the assembly size in May 2019, which I will briefly discuss in Chapter 6, in the analysis of electoral reform enactment.

the main independent variable, the number of parties in the governing party's ideological cluster, is in the top ten percentile in 1996 election. Furthermore, it has very low value in the legislative term during the permissive reform of 2004, as shown in Table 5.3. Therefore, both reform attempts constitute typical cases, according to Hypothesis 1. I trace the process of electoral reforms, after giving a brief overview of Lithuania political system.

Table 5.1 Electoral Performance during the Reform Episodes in Lithuania

Legislative Term	Election Year	Ideological Competitors	N in election	N in parliament	Electoral Volatility
1 st : 1992-96	1992	2.4	4.6	3.0	.
2 nd : 1996-00	1996	5.1	7.5	3.4	36.4
3 rd : 2000-04	2000	1	7.2	4.2	58.7

Overview of Lithuanian Political System

The electoral politics in Lithuania (also in other Baltic States) started with the multiparty elections held for the Supreme Council. In the Supreme Soviet Council elections, Lithuanian Communist Party competed against the Sajudis Popular Front created after Gorbechev's glasnost programme (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999). Sajudis won the majority seats in this election and became the main force behind independence. Upon declaring independence from the Soviet Union on March 11, 1990 Sajudis reinstated the country's 1938 Constitution to establish a legal continuity with the interwar independent Lithuania (Gelazis 2001:167). However, this archaic constitution was quite authoritarian and therefore was quickly replaced by the Provisional Basic Law. In 1992, Lithuania held its democratic elections held for Seimas (parliament), which replaced the Supreme Council. Before the first democratic elections, Lithuanian political groups in the Council established the democratic institutions of the country.

Lithuanian parties adopted a semi-presidential system with a strong unicameral parliament (Smith-Silvertsen 2010). The semi-presidential system was a compromise between two main rivals in the Supreme Council: Sajudis and their leader Landsbergis exerted pressure for strong presidency, while others supported a parliamentary system. A referendum for strong presidential system was held on May 23, 1992 to resolve this issue. Despite gaining a majority support, the referendum failed due to the low turnout.⁴⁸ The constitution drafters, therefore, felt the need to incorporate elements from presidentialism into the parliamentary system given the support for presidentialism among the voters (Gelazis 2001). The resulting compromise was a semi-presidential system. The president, elected for a 5-year term, was given the power to check the parliament, whereby his or her responsibilities and instruments included appointing the prime minister, dissolving the parliament in case of a no-confidence vote, introducing legislation, vetoing the bills sent by the Seimas (which can be overridden by a majority vote) and referring legislation to the Constitutional Court for judicial review (T. D. Clark, Holscher, and Hyland 1999; Gelazis 2001; Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999).

A similar compromise resulted in the introduction of a mixed electoral system for electing deputies for the Seimas. After suffering a crushing defeat with two-round system, the former Communist Party advocated for a PR with the support of some small parties, while the Sajudis movement, as the dominant party in the council, wanted a majoritarian system (Martinaitis 2012: 393). Both sides settled for a mixed majoritarian system, in which 141 deputies were to be elected in two independent tiers. The nominal tier allocates 71 seats according to a two-round majority formula in single member districts, while the list tier

⁴⁸ According to the law, the turnout had to be at least 50 percent of the entire electorate for the results to be accepted, but the turnout in the referendum was 57.5 percent of the eligible voters (Lithuania Update 1992).

distributes 70 seats according to the PR formula (LR-Hare quota) in a nationwide district. There are also voter turnout requirements for electing deputies; 40 percent in the majoritarian tier and 25 percent in the PR tier. Lastly, the electoral threshold for the PR tier was set to 4 percent for parties in general and to 2 percent for parties of ethnic minorities (Martinaitis 2012; Mikkel and Pettai 2004; Pettai and Kreuzer 1999).

In the early years, two parties dominated the Lithuanian politics, Sajudis ⁴⁹ (later became the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives) and the Democratic Labor Party (LDLP). The former was the largest party in the political right and emphasized conservative moral values and national identity. Its closer allies were smaller offshoots of the Sajudis movement: the Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) and the Center Union (CU) (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999). LDLP was a reformed communist party and managed to keep its legitimacy by supporting the Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union. The other left-oriented party was the Social Democratic Party (LSDP), which was not an ally of LDLP, as the former was historically an anticommunist party. Some experts also include the ethnic Polish party, the Union of Poles (LSS), among the left-oriented parties (T. D. Clark 1998).

The first parliamentary elections after the recognition of Lithuania' independence by the international community was held on October 25, 1992. Candidates from 17 other party or party coalitions contested in the elections and 11 parties entered the parliament by winning at least one seat. LDLP enjoyed a decisive victory by gaining an absolute majority of the seats with its 42 percent vote share. The Sajudis Coalition, on the other hand had, gained 20 percent of votes in

⁴⁹ The core of the Sajudis Popular Front formed the Homeland Union Lithuanian Conservatives in 1993. Other members that split from the Sajudis revived the earlier parties such as the Christian Democrats, and the Social Democrats. Still others formed new political parties such as the Center Union and the Liberal Union. For more on the party system changes during this time, see Pettai and Kreuzer (1999) and T. D. Clark and Prekevičius (2003).

this election. The sharp decline of Sajudis' votes in this election was largely attributed to its internal fractionalization and confrontational approach to political rivals, in addition to the public disillusionment with economic reforms and transition to market economy (Duvold and Jurkynas 2012). Apart from LDLP and Sajudis, three other parties won seats in the PR tier: the Social Democratic Party, the Polish Union, and the Christian Democratic Party as shown in Table 5.2.⁵⁰ Together, these five parties had 124 seats of the 141 seats in the Seimas (T. D. Clark 1995). LDLP formed a single majority government after the election and adopted first electoral reform in 1996.

Table 5.2 Vote shares of political parties in parliamentary elections, 1992-2004 (%)

<i>Election Year</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2004</i>
Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDLP)	42.6	9.5		
Sajudis Coalition	20.5			
Coalition of LKDP, LPKTS, LDP	12.2			
Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP)	5.9	6.6		
Young Lithuanian Coalition (LKDS and LJTS)	3.3			
Homeland Union		29.8	8.6	14.8
Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party (LKDP)		9.9	3.1	
Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS)		8.2		
Lithuanian National Party 'Young Lithuania' (LNPJL)		3.8		
Lithuanian Women's Party (LMP)		3.7		
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union (LKDS)		3.1		
Social Democratic Coalition of Brazauskas (ABSK)			31.1	
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS)			17.3	
New Union (Social Liberals) (NS)			19.6	
Lithuanian Peasants' Party (LVP)			4.1	
Christian Democratic Union (KDS)			4.2	
Labor Party (DP)				28.4
'Working for Lithuania' Coalition				20.7
Liberal and Center Union (LiCS)				9.2
Coalition of Paskas 'For Order and Justice'				11.4
Peasant Party/New Democratic Party				6.6
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania				3.8

Source: Duvold and Jurkynas (2012).

⁵⁰ In the rest of the chapter, this party will be referred as the Homeland Union.

Restrictive Electoral Reform in 1996

Before examining the electoral reform process, I discuss the details of electoral reform adopted. The LDLP government changed the electoral thresholds in three ways: i) increased the national threshold for political parties to 5 percent, ii) abolished the lower threshold for ethnic minority parties and therefore 5 percent applied to the minority parties as well iii) introduced a new electoral threshold of 7 percent for coalitions of parties to enter the parliament. All of these requirements aimed to keep small parties out of the parliament. This electoral reform was adopted in the context of declining vote share of LDLP. When the government initiated this restrictive electoral reform, the number of parties in its ideological cluster was 2.4 signaling that it does not face a fierce competition from the small parties in the 1992 election. But LDLP was facing a fierce competition from the small parties in the parliament, making it difficult for the party to govern. However, I will show below this reform was not adopted to facilitate policymaking and increase efficiency of parliament in general, as the rival explanation posits. Indeed, the LDLP government initiated a number of institutional reforms that might work in the opposite direction, suggesting that the ruling party was concerned with increasing its power and viability in elections.

Party System Dynamics and the 1996 Restrictive Reform

After the elections, LDLP formed a single-party government December 2, 1992 (Lithuania Update 1993a).⁵¹ Despite having majority of seats in parliament, LDLP was confronted with a very strong opposition during this legislative term. This was mostly due to

⁵¹ LDLP included only 2 LDLP deputies in the cabinet with the aim of not decreasing its legislative power (or not repeat the mistake of Sajudis in the previous parliamentary term), since the cabinet members cannot vote for legislation.

LDLP's increasing popularity which alarmed the opposition parties fearing the concentration of its power.

In February 1993, Algirdas Brazauskas, LDLP candidate, was elected president with almost 60 percent of the vote (against 38 percent of his opponent) (T. D. Clark 1995; Lithuanian Update 1993a: 8). Realizing that LDLP was becoming more powerful, the Homeland Union Party (former Sajudis) and Christian Democrats formed a new bloc of opposition to advance legislation which would oppose the government programs (Lithuanian Update 1993b: 12). The opposition's hesitations about the concentration of power was not groundless. Even though Brazauskas resigned his party after being elected president, he did not have a conflictual relationship with the parliamentary majority during his term in office. Indeed, Brazauskas only returned 23 laws for reconsideration out of almost a thousand laws passed between 1993 and 1996 (Gelazis 2001: 175).

The parliament was quite conflictual during this legislative term. The LDLP government (headed by Adolfas Slezevicius) suffered but survived several attempts for no-confidence motions. The most notable one was initiated by the Social Democratic Party (LSDP) in an attempt to protest the government's economic program. Even though this attempt failed, it signaled an increasing divide between the two left-oriented parties, LDLP and LSDP (Lithuanian Update 1993b: 13). LSDP not only supported the opponent's candidate during the presidential elections, but also opposed many policies of the government to the point of initiating a no-confidence motion (T. D. Clark 1995). This attitude, in turn, provoked a resentment on the part of the governing party against LSDP.

The conflictual relationship between the government and the opposition intensified further in regard to the law on the sale of land to the foreigners. This was a requirement for the EU candidacy, and government wanted to pass this law yet faced staunch opposition from the Social Democratic Party and the Homeland Union.

In 1995, the LDLP government proposed several constitutional amendments, such as to reduce the number of seats in the parliament, increase the municipality terms from two years to three years as well as allowing foreigners to own land. With respect to the electoral system, the government proposed to shrink the assembly size from 141 to 79 seats, which would decrease the proportionality of the election system immensely.⁵² The government promoted this reform as a self-sacrifice of its party members to cut down on spending but increase the efficiency of parliament at the same time (Lithuanian Update 1995a: 16). During this time, the opinion polls were showing declining support for LDLP; nevertheless, the support for this party was the highest among the political parties (Krupavicius 1997: 542-3). Restrictive reform would increase seat bonus the ruling party gets given that it was the most supported party in the polls.

However, the government needed the support of opposition parties to be able to pass these reforms since constitutional amendments require a two-third majority vote. The opposition made it clear that they would not support the proposal. Another potential route to enact this electoral system change was to use a nationwide referendum; however, the government reduced the power of referendums to an almost consultative degree the previous year, anticipating a referendum sponsored by the opposition to nullify the privatization of some state-owned firms. Thus, even when a referendum yields support for the bill in question, the enactment still requires

⁵² The assembly size was purposefully chosen to be 79 to attract the voters' attention to the symbolic value of this number as 79 was also the size of the assembly during the interwar era.

passing the parliamentary vote (Lithuanian Update 1994:14). Therefore, the governing party did not use referendum route either.

In fact, the government's efforts to decrease the assembly size waned rapidly after the local elections held on March 25, 1995. The government suffered a major loss in the election and could hold only 297 out of 1488 municipal council seats with 20 percent of vote, whereas the major opposition party, the Homeland Union, enjoyed a decisive victory by winning 426 seats with 29 percent of vote. Another significant rising power was the Christian Democrats, which gained 247 municipal council seats with 17 percent of vote. Other parties had relatively lower vote shares: Lithuanian Farmers Party received 6.9 percent, LSDP had 4.8 percent, and Center Union had 5.5 percent (Lithuanian Update 1995b: 18).

Even though government did not push for this reform, an independent reform initiative started to collect the required signature for a nationwide referendum. According to the constitution, a referendum can be staged by either the signatures of half of the parliamentary members or the signatures of 300,000 voters collected in a three-month period. The LDLP deputy Kazimieras Antanavicius started this initiative in October, and soon after a number of journalists joined the bandwagon (Lithuanian MP to organize referendum 1995). Among several suggestions, the one about the electoral system was aiming to decrease the number of parliamentarians from 141 to 101. However, the initiative failed to collect the required number of signatures from the voters (Lithuanian Update 1996a:16). It is noticeable that the magnitude of the electoral system change described in this proposal differed considerably from that of the one proposed by the government in the previous year—the new proposal was not as nearly drastic as the previous one.

Right after the election date was set for October 20, the government formed a working group composed of representatives from different parties to elaborate proposals to modify the electoral system. One of the aims was to enhance voter turnout in the elections. In addition to its normative importance, voter turnout was important for validating election results (turnout requirements were 40 percent for the majoritarian tier and 25 percent for the PR tier). The parties agreed on a draft which was then brought to the parliament floor for debate; however, LDLP undermined the proposal of the working group by introducing three threshold changes to the vote, which included i) increasing the electoral threshold from 4 to 5 percent, ii) abolishing the lower threshold for the ethnic parties, and iii) introducing a 7 percent threshold for electoral alliances. The electoral system changes were enacted with the votes of LDLP and the main opposition party, the Homeland Union (Krupavicius 1997; Lithuanian Update 1996b: 14; Polish Electoral Action Protests Against Lithuania's New Electoral Law 1996). In addition to the threshold changes, the 1996 reform package increased the campaign finance limits significantly and included a change in the ballot structure, which introduced preferential voting for the PR tier so that the voters had more control over the election of deputies.⁵³

While the government defended these changes as helping the consolidation of party system, many observers alluded the government's calculations to attract the votes of its main ideological rival, the Social Democratic Party, which was projected to obtain around 4 percent votes in the opinion polls (Mikkil and Pettai 2004: 340). By introducing electoral threshold government want to keep LSDP out of parliament and possibly gain some of its voters' support through strategic voting, similar to the mechanism this dissertation posits. Smaller parties

⁵³ Before the reform the campaign finance limit had been 140,000 litas (equaled 34,000 US dollars at the time) and it was increased to 700,000 litas (175,000 US dollars) (Lithuanian Update 1996b:15).

evaluated this change as a way to sideline the less influential competitors of the large parties (Lithuanian Update 1996b:14). Moreover, minority parties asserted that the threshold requirements would restrict the parliamentary access to the national minorities. The Polish Electoral Action (PEA) insisted that the parliament reinstate the prior threshold requirements as the new law violated an interstate Lithuanian-Polish agreement—in Poland there was no threshold for parties representing the minorities—and asked the president to veto the new legislation (Polish Electoral Action Protests Against Lithuania's New Electoral Law 1996). In response to these demands, President Brazauskas introduced another bill, which lowers the electoral hurdles to the earlier levels; however, parliamentarians rejected it, whereby only 41 deputies voted in favor of the president's bill (the required vote was 72 percent) (Lithuanian Update 1996c: 16).

LDLP's efforts to change the electoral system were seen as a maneuver for maximizing its seat share. The banking crisis of 1995-96 damaged the popularity of LDLP. Moreover, it was discovered that the prime minister, Adolfas Slezevicius, withdrew his savings from the bank two days before it collapsed, which contributed to the public mistrust in politics in general, and in LDLP in particular.⁵⁴ Even though the upcoming elections were scheduled a month later than it was supposed to, the polls did not show any signs of recovery of LDLP's public image.⁵⁵

In general, the process leading to the 1996 reform demonstrates that LDLP's electoral design specifically targeted to keep the parties in its ideological cluster, LSDP and LSS, out of

⁵⁴ Similarly, the interior minister, Romasis Vaitekunas, resigned from his post after being accused of abusing insider information about banks' collapse (Jeffries 2004).

⁵⁵ The Constitution states that general elections should be held no later than one month prior to the expiry of parliamentarians' power. Therefore, the elections should have been held in late September. However, the president set the date for October 20. Even though this alternative date was resisted by other parties, they finally agreed on it (Lithuanian Update 1996b).

parliament. According to the local elections and the public opinion polls these parties could not pass the new threshold. The magnitude of the electoral reform reflected the LDLP government's estimation of their vote shares. While the announced plan was cutting down the number of parliamentarians by almost half (which would necessitate a rearrangement of districts and could potentially change the weight of the tiers) this proposal was never detailed. When this plan was being discussed though, the government party was still the most popular party in the polls (Krupavicius 1997). Gradually, this proposal was taken out of the agenda as the government started to lose public support. While some LDLP members wanted to use referendum route for a milder version this proposal, in the end a new electoral system was brought to agenda. The new reform was not as nearly ambitious as it was before, despite being in the same direction. The fact that government updated its proposal in a smaller magnitude supports the assumptions about the party preferences and informational setting of my model.

The push for this reform seems to be the declining votes of LDLP and the new threshold could have contributed to increase its seats in the parliament. Nevertheless, this electoral system change did not aim to increase the efficiency of parliament in general. Other changes that LDLP proposed before the elections also support this claim. LDLP used all its efforts to broaden the presidential powers, which was held by Brazauskas, former LDLP leader, at that time. The proposal included the power to call early elections for the Seimas if the government program was not approved in 30 days after its submission and naming the president as the guarantor of the independent courts (Lithuanian Update 1996c: 16-7). These efforts were of no avail but contribute to my argument that LDLP intended to increase its influence in the next legislative term despite declining votes, rather than increasing the efficiency of the parliament.

The main opposition party, the Homeland Union, supported the electoral system change, as it was beneficial for the party as well. As for the effects of this electoral system, electoral reform did help to keep some parties out of the parliament; but the effective number of parties did not decrease. Moreover, LSDP, which was the target of the threshold increase, achieved to enter the parliament with 6.6 percent of vote. After the elections, LDLP leader Jursenas admitted that increasing the threshold was a strategic mistake on the eve of the 1996 general elections (Krupavicius 1997: 545).

Restrictive Electoral Reform of 2000

The second attempt for an electoral reform began less than three months prior to the upcoming general elections of 2000. The new ruling party, the Homeland Union, changed the electoral formula in the nominal tier of the Lithuanian mixed system, from two-round majority to the first past the post system (Mikkell and Pettai 2004). The major intention was seen as to compensate the loss of electoral support for the incumbent party by tinkering the electoral system (Martinaitis 2012; Mikkell and Pettai 2004). This electoral reform was implemented by the government party within a context of high number of ideological competitors and the below discussion will explain the process leading up to the electoral system change in detail by starting with the election results of 1996 which took the Homeland Union to power.

Party System Dynamics and the 2000 Restrictive Reform

The Homeland Union made a comeback in the 1996 election, with a more moderate and pragmatic outlook and swept to victory with a total of 70 seats with 29.8 percent vote share. The party benefited from the one of the most disproportional election results in Lithuania, as shown in Table 5.1. The biggest loser of the election was LDLP, which gained only 12 seats and 9.5

percent of vote. LDLP's defeat was mostly attributed to economic crises, which voters had to endure during its single party government (T. D. Clark 1998). Other left-oriented parties which could not clear the electoral threshold and were out of the parliament included the Lithuanian Women's Party, the Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action, and the Alliance of National Minorities. LDLP and Social Democrats were the only left-oriented parties represented in the parliament with 12 seats each.

However, the election results did not quite signal a shift to the right since LDLP's electoral base did not turn out to vote, whereas the electorate of the Homeland Union was stable.⁵⁶ The institutional design with the new thresholds also contributed to the Homeland Union victory in terms of seats, as the party gained 47 percent of PR seats with 30 percent of votes (T. D. Clark 1998). The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, failed to capture the vote share projected in the opinion polls. Finally, the Center Union made a significant improvement in its vote share and increased its seats from 2 to 14 (T. D. Clark 1998; Krupavicius 1997).

The Homeland Union formed a surplus government with Christian Democrats, with a total of 86 seats. Even though these parties diverged on economic policy, this coalition was out of necessity given the weak popular mandate of the Homeland Union supported by 15 percent of the registered vote (T. D. Clark 1998: 140). This government was also supported by the Center Union votes in the assembly, though it did not formally partake in the government. While the government program emphasized reforming state administration, reforms concerning the electoral system were not underlined in the government program.

⁵⁶ The turnout rate for the first round was 54 percent (Jeffries 2004).

Despite the low turnout in the elections, the formation of new cabinet increased the trust in the democratic institutions. The public evaluation of parliamentary performance increased from a low of 18 percent in January 1996, right after the banking crisis, to 39 percent with the election of new parliamentarians. So, did the evaluation of the cabinet performance from 16 to 39 percent within twelve months (The Baltic Survey results in Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999: 132). The local elections held in March 1997 also signaled the popularity of the governing coalition, while the Homeland Union gained 493 seats in municipal councils, their junior partner won 212 seats. The Centre Union (135 seats) and LDLP (136 seats) were lagging behind (Lithuanian Update 1997a: 19).

The presidential election to take place by the end of 1997 was quite critical for the government as it signaled the weakening support for the Homeland Union. Homeland Union's candidate for the presidential elections was Landsbergis, while LDLP supported a nonpartisan candidate, a former prosecutor-general, Arturas Paulaskas, who was also popular among small party voters, such as the Farmers' Union, the Women's Party (Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999; Lithuania Update 1997b). The Center Union, on the other hand, campaigned for Valdas Adamkus, the former Chief of Environmental Protection Agency in the US, leading to a major controversy about the eligibility criteria based on residency (Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999). The Centrist Union and Social Democrats wanted to amend the constitution, which required 94 votes in the parliament. However, the Homeland Union did not want a strong candidate against its own candidate, Landsbergis. Therefore, the proposal to change the eligibility criteria failed on May 22 (Lithuania Update 1997c). Yet, the legal debate did not end here, as Adamkus' lawyers sought a court ruling arguing that the residence requirement did not require physical presence and Adamkus did have permanent residency as was registered in his own apartment in Lithuania

since 1991. With a positive court ruling, Adamkus was able to run in the presidential elections (Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999: 130).

In the presidential elections, the Homeland Union candidate Landsbergis did not fare well with only 16 percent of votes in the first round, while two nonpartisan candidates Adamkus and Paulauskas contested in the second round of elections. With the votes of Landsbergis supporters, Adamkus was elected as the new president by less than 1 percent margin on January 4 (Lithuanian Update 1998: 21). The presidential election was important to show the divisions within the Homeland Union voters: only 51 percent of the party supports preferred to vote for Landsbergis, according the Baltic Surveys (Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999: 133).

The year following the presidential election, the tensions between the prime minister, Homeland Union, and the president, Adamkus, escalated and as a result, the prime minister resigned in April 1999 (Jeffries 2004).⁵⁷ In this governmental crisis, the Homeland Union wanted to associate government with the president, so that Adamkus was to take the blame in case of a failure. The new prime minister was formed by Rolandas Paksas (who was Vilnius mayor from the Homeland Union).⁵⁸ However, this government fell in four months due to the disagreement over the privatization deal on the state-owned oil industry, Mazeikiai Nafta which was not supported by public. Paksas disagreed with the Homeland Union's privatization deal and declared his intent not to sign the agreement, which led to his resignation (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003). However, this incident caused a severe decline in the approval rates of

⁵⁷ The support for Adamkus was about 66 percent around this time (Krupavicius and Eitutyte 1999: 133).

⁵⁸ In Lithuania, mayors are elected by city councils. The members of city councils are elected according to the proportional representation.

President which plummeted to 48 percent (from 81 percent) as well as in the trust in presidential office which sank from 70 to 35 percent (Lithuanian Update 1999: 26).

The Russian financial crisis in 1999 also affected Lithuania, GDP shrank by 5 percent in the first six months of 2000. The government in turn took a more austere approach by cutting down the budget. The outcome of the budget cuts was that the government had to postpone its election pledge: to pay the compensation payments to those who lost their saving during currency transition from ruble to lit. As will be remembered, the Homeland Union held a referendum for this payment and therefore the decision to postpone had repercussions for the party (Lithuania Update 2000: 22). This affected approval rates of two parties in the ruling coalition, the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003). The Center Union, which was a supporting party for the coalition government, started to dissociate itself from the Homeland Union's decisions after the privatization of state-owned oil complex.⁵⁹

In this context, a major party realignment started to take place. The Center Union position itself towards to the left in economic policy to capture disenchanted voters. It was not alone in this pursuit; Paulauskas, one of the non-partisan candidates in presidential election of 1997, formed the New Union-Social Liberal Party⁶⁰ which was targeting the same voter profile as the Center Union. Moreover, party splits started to occur within the coalition parties, for instance, supporters of Vagnorius (former prime minister) split to form the Moderate Conservative Union. Lastly, Paksas, former prime minister, resigned from the Homeland Union to serve as an energy

⁵⁹ In addition, 9 parliamentarians defected from the Homeland Union, yet the party was still holding the majority given the support of the Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Lithuania Update 2000).

⁶⁰ This party will be referred as the Social Liberals hereafter.

advisor to the president. Paksas, then, became the new chairman of the Liberal Union Party to reinvigorate it: from a party which never got more than 5 percent votes to enter the parliament, to a major challenger to the established parties, according to the opinion polls (Lithuania Update 2000: 23). Liberal Union was a centrist party with rightwing policies merged with some social policies, disliked by both conservatives and leftist due to its populist outlook, yet applauded by the president who wanted new politics (Fitzmaurice 2003).

Therefore, the local election witnessed a different party system than the general elections held four years ago. The main outcome of the local election was that five established parties was able to garner just over 40 percent of vote, compared to 78 percent in the 1997 local election: the ruling Homeland Union had 11 percent, its partner Christian Democrats had 5 percent, the Center Union had 10 percent, LDLP had 9 percent, the Social Democratic Party had 7 percent. In contrast, the Social Liberals had 16.3 percent and Liberal Union had 13 percent of the votes (Left-wing victory at local elections embarrassing speaker says 2000; Lithuania Update 2000; Record Turnout Reported in Lithuania's Local Elections 2000).⁶¹

Following the local elections, the Homeland Union introduced a contentious electoral system change replacing the electoral formula of the nominal tier from two-round majority formula to plurality formula. This decision was taken in the context of increasing number of ideological competitors. However, coming as the third party in the local election, the Homeland Union hoped to retain its power. In addition, one of the outcomes of the local elections for the government was that the Homeland Union had only two mayor seats, even though party ended up as the first runner in some districts (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003). The mayors are

⁶¹ The Farmers Party took 9 percent vote in the local elections with its anti-EU and anti-World Trade Organization stance.

elected by the city council members, therefore, required a coalition formation in council, similar to the second round of elections in the nominal tier. Having failed to achieve this coalition formation in the local election, the Homeland Union wanted to change the electoral system, in a way to retain the seats where it had plurality (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003; Martinaitis 2012).

The parliamentary process of electoral law was very contentious as it was obviously favoring the Homeland Union coalition and opposition parties did not want the electoral system change (Lithuanian parliament amends election law 2000). Similarly, President Adamkus, who was in favor of newly emerged parties, argued that the electoral system change was too drastic to implement a few months before the general election and vetoed the law (Lithuanian Parliament Overrides Veto on the Controversial Election Law 2000; Martinaitis 2012). Despite the strong resistance from the opposition parties, public opinion polls showed support for the amendment (Lithuanian parliament amends election law 2000). On July 18, the government gathered 72 votes in parliament to override the presidential veto.

While the Homeland Union and its coalition partner Christian Democrats had only marginal benefits from the electoral system change, the leftwing parties gained more, only because they were able to form a pre-election coalition; the new parties suffered most. The decline of leftwing parties starting with 1996 elections already brought up the discussions about building coalitions. However, the electoral system change necessitated the coalition, given the local election results. Brazauskas, the former president, formed the coalition of *Social Democratic Coalition* before 2000 elections and the coalition members held a joint congress on September 3, 2000 before the election campaign began. The coalition included the Social

Democrats, the New Democracy Party and the Union of Lithuania's Russians, in addition to the LDLP. Brazauskas tried to include the Social Liberals to the left coalition; but the Social Liberals did not want to run with old politicians and tried its chances as a new party (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003). The new parties, on the other hand, formed an informal bloc of *New Politics* which consisted of the New Union, the Liberal Union, the Center Union and the Modern Christian Democratic Union (Fitzmaurice 2003). To their disadvantage, the *New Politics* coalition did not enter the 2000 election under the same slate. Had the *New Politics* coalition run together, they would have 86 seats rather than 66, according to the estimations conducted by T. D. Clark and Prekevičius (2003: 561).

The electoral reform of 2000 was introduced in the context of increasing competition. The major competitor changed to become the Social Liberals which had the highest vote share in the local elections. In addition, new rightwing parties emerged, and existing ones got reformed to emerge as ideological competitors such as Liberal Union which could further erode the vote base of the governing parties. In an attempt to increase its seats while decreasing those of emerging competitor, the Homeland Union coalition initiated a restrictive reform which was designed according to strengths of the party. In addition to increasing its seats, this electoral system change could also prevent further splits from the party as the splitters would not have much chance with the plurality vote, not that in the PR tier the elections had high threshold requirements. Even though the Homeland Union faction suffered from splitting parliamentarians, as a coalition, they had the numbers to pass the electoral reform, as well as to override the presidential veto. Both the opposition parties and the President perceived the electoral reform as benefiting the governing coalition and strongly opposed to the adoption of this reform. However, there was a public support for electoral system change according to the polls (Lithuanian

parliament amends election law 2000). But in the end, the electoral law only marginally helped the parties in the governing coalition. It was the Social Democratic Coalition, which benefitted from the new reform as it acted strategically to contest under the same party list.

Permissive Reform of 2004

In May 2004, again very close to elections, the Seimas restored the old electoral system back: in the nominal tier electoral formula changed from plurality to two-round majority. At a first glance, it seems possible that the party in power restored the old system because it was implemented to restrict this party in the first place. However, the electoral reform was not implemented during the coalition government of the Liberal Union, but instead during the coalition government of Social Democratic Coalition and Social Liberals. As I already discussed, the Social Democratic Coalition benefitted most from this new electoral rule. In the remainder of this section, I examine the changes in the party system and governments, during one of the most turbulent periods in Lithuania, to unravel why the electoral system is restored back by the party which benefited from the new system the most.

The results of 2000 elections, for the first time, did not generate a dominant political party, but instead there were a number of political parties (see Table 5.2). The Social Democratic Coalition entered the parliament as the first party with 51 seats, whereas the leading party in the informal New Politics coalition, the Liberal Union, had 33 seats. But, President Adamkus asked the informal coalition of New Politics, which had 66 seats in total to form the government. This was rather unconventional since the latter was a party with the most votes and seats. Nonetheless, Paksas, the leader of Liberal Union, formed a minority coalition government in October 2000 with the Social Liberals. Yet, this coalition government hardly survived until June

2001. This government was replaced with a center-left coalition formed between the Social Democratic Coalition, led by Brazauskas, and the Social Liberals, and their government program was approved by also the votes of minor parties in addition to the coalition members (Krupavicius 2002).

The main focus of the coalition government was the EU accession and NATO membership. During this time, there were no major problems in the economy, the approval rates of the politicians and government parties fared better than other parties as well (Krupavicius 2003). The government also faced a weak opposition due to the internal fights within the opposition parties. However, the presidential elections changed the political atmosphere. In December 2002, the presidential and local elections were held together. There was a total of 17 candidates competing in the election. Adamkus, the current president, decided to run for the second term. Paksas, former PM, decided to run for office as well under the slogan of Vote for Change. Finally, Paulauskas, leader of the Social Union, also ran for presidency. Surprisingly, Paksas emerged as the main rival for the incumbent President, they were the top two vote getters with 19.7 and 35.5 percent of votes, respectively. The run-off election produced even more surprising results: Paksas defeated Adamkus by receiving 54.7 percent of votes. This was not expected since Adamkus had always very high ratings in the opinion polls. The victory of Paksas was seen as a reminder to politicians who focused too much on foreign relations (the EU and NATO membership) and lost touch with the ordinary people (Valentinavicius 2003). However, Paksas' presidency was very short-lived, as he was impeached by the parliament in February 2004.⁶²

⁶² According to the reports from the Security Department, people close to Paksas had close ties with Russian organized crime groups and these groups were demanding political favors (Krupavicius 2004: 1066).

In the meantime, though, Lithuanian parties were preparing for the elections of European Parliament which was going to take place in June 2004. During this process, party system started to change in Lithuania. There were party mergers on the right, three parties (Lithuanian Liberal Union, Center Union and Modern Christian Democratic Union) merged to form the Lithuanian Liberal and Center Union party. In addition, the Homeland Union incorporated a number of small parties such as Political Prisoners and Deportees, Christian Democrats and Freedom Fighters. However, the most important change was the emergence of Labor Party formed by Russia-born Viktor Uspaskich.

Labor Party pursued a populist agenda and it was neither leftwing or rightwing but included some election pledges which were anti-establishment (Duvold and Jurkynas 2012: 129). For instance, the party wanted to enable voters to revoke parliamentarians during legislative term, to introduce direct election of mayors which will be represented also in the parliament, and to abolish the proportional representation tier from the election system (Krupavicius 2004). The party worked to implement these changes through collecting citizens' signatures to initiate a referendum on these proposals. These types of initiatives increased the popularity of both Labor Party and its leader, Viktor Uspaskich. Perhaps more alarming for the parliamentary parties was that these proposals were very popular among the public. According to the opinion polls, the proposal to recall MPs was supported most, while only one third supported the proposal about the mayors; more importantly cutting down the number of MPs had 77 percent support (Lithuanians Want Smaller Number of MPs 2003).

The support for this proposal was important especially because the referendum law was amended during the EU accession process. The earlier requirements for the referendum results to

be valid were very difficult to attain; half of the electorate (not participants in the referendum) had to support the proposed law. With the new law, there are two separate requirements: fifty percent of turnout in the referendum and majority support of those who participated in the referendum (Krupavicius 2003). Labor Party submitted 335,000 signatures to the Central Election Committee to initiate a referendum; however, the committee invalidated one third of the signatures and the referendum attempt by Labor Party failed (No Election System Change Seen in Lithuania Due to Lack of Supporters' Signatures 2003). The main political parties, as well as the president, criticized this initiative as it was against the democratic elections (Lithuanian Leaders Unanimously Against Bid to Change Parl Election System 2003). Even though the electoral reform initiative failed, the polls were showing increasing support for the Labor Party (Krupavicius 2004; Populist, Ruling SocDems Would Triumph in Lithuanian Elections to EP 2004).

During this time, government introduced a few changes in the party law such as membership requirements, which could possibly hurt the new parties in the upcoming elections. The new law increased the membership requirement from 400 to 1,000 members and parties were required to submit the list of members to the Justice Ministry before joining the elections (Lithuania raises party membership threshold 2004). In addition, the center-left government also changed the Government Law by reducing the number political appointees. However, the opposition was completely against this law as it aimed to replace political offices that can be filled by elected parties, with the civil servant positions which were to be filled by their governing party members now. President Adamkus also agreed with the opposition about the intentions of this law and vetoed it. However, the government was able to override the presidential veto and implement the new regulations (Krupavicius 2003).

After Paksas' impeachment in 2004, parliament decided to have the presidential elections with the European elections. There were two potential problems, first Paksas announced his intention to run for presidency and second, Labor Party was ahead in all polls before the European Parliament elections. In May 2004, the parties in government introduced two proposals: i) to change the eligibility criteria for presidential election to ensure that Paksas would not be able to run in the elections, ii) to change the electoral system for the nominal tier to two round majoritarian system (Jurkynas 2005; Martinaitis 2012). The second change seemed to target mostly the Labor Party, whose support was very strong in the rural areas and periphery (Jurkynas 2005). In fact, the election results showed that the party was first runner in 48 electoral districts in the nominal tier and was able to get only 16 of them (Krupavicius 2005).

This electoral reform shows a defensive mechanism to implement a permissive reform when a major challenger party emerged, in this case, Labor Party. In order to decrease the seat bonus of this party, the governing parties implemented an electoral reform which decrease the seats that this party would have got. This change was implemented when there was a public support for a restrictive reform, as the opinion polls showed. Therefore, the main motive could not be citizens' demands for reform. Instead, the parties were motivated by their own gains. The electoral reform was also introduced very close the general elections, and after the emergence of Labor Party. Therefore, the change was not motivated by reversing the manipulative electoral system change of the Homeland Union government in the previous legislative term, either. Had this new electoral law been based on concerns with public opinion, the governing coalition would not have waited until very close to the election. Finally, the reform was motivated to weaken the new challenger rather than the existing opposition party. Indeed, the election results

show that the Labor Party would have gained more seats with the plurality formula had the system not changed.

5.3 Electoral Reforms in Turkey

Turkish governments initiated three major electoral reforms affecting the proportionality of voting system during the timespan studied in this dissertation: a restrictive one in the first legislative term (between 1983 and 1987) and two permissive attempts in the third legislative term (between 1991 and 1995) as shown in Table 5.3 below.⁶³ The permissive reform attempts constitute a typical case since the regression models analyzed in Chapter 4 yields a high predicted probability for them. The effective number of parties in the opposition party's cluster is higher than those in the governing party's cluster, as the *Hypotheses 2* posits. The analysis of these typical cases is important to trace out the causal process of permissive reforms. The restrictive reform attempt in the first legislative term, on the other hand, constitutes a deviant case according to the hypothesized relationship between the effective number of ideological competitors and restrictive reform attempts. It is important to analyze this deviant case, too, since it can help us uncover additional ways to link the effective number of ideological competitors of the government and the electoral reform types.

⁶³ The empirical analyses in this dissertation include Turkey from 1983 (the first election after the military interregnum) until 2014. During this period, Turkey was regarded as a parliamentary democracy according to Polity IV scores: democracy and polity scores of Turkey has been consistently 7 and above from 1983 until 2014. However, these scores fall below 6 from 2014 onwards, and therefore, Turkish electoral reforms after this period are not included in the analysis.

Table 5.3 Electoral Performance during the Reform Episodes in Turkey

Legislative Term	Election Year	N in Gov. Cluster	N in election	N in parliament	Electoral Volatility
1st: 1983-87	1983	1	2.85	2.52	
2nd: 1987-91	1987	2.01	4.12	2.05	37.79
3rd: 1991-95	1991	1.05	4.66	3.58	20.28

Note: N stands for the effective number of parties

Table 5.3 above shows that the effective number of competitors facing the governing party was almost equal according to the results of the 1983 and 1991 elections (1 and 1.05, respectively); and yet the respective governments initiated a restrictive reform in the first legislative term but permissive ones in the third. Given the diverging outcomes, the analysis of these reform episodes is crucial to unravel the relationship between party competition and electoral reform types. The diverging outcomes not only necessitate a careful analysis of the process leading to the reforms separately but also a comparison between them.

After a brief overview of the Turkish political system and political parties, I examine the process of these electoral reform attempts as well as comparing them. I also complement the analysis of reform episodes by briefly examining the aftermath of the electoral reforms, particularly focusing on the effects of the electoral reforms on the results of subsequent election. This analysis revealed intense electoral reform debates during the second legislative term (between 1987 and 1991). I briefly discuss these reform debates even though these did not produce a major electoral reform.

Overview of the Turkish Political System

Turkey has a relatively long history of competitive parliamentary elections and held seventeen elections from 1950 to 2015, despite experiencing a total of six-year nondemocratic

period. There is a general consensus among the Turkish public about the importance of free and competitive elections on the legitimacy of governments (Esmer 2002; Hazama 2007; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Özbudun 1987). The first elections after the military interregnum took place on 6 November 1983 according to the new institutional structure approved a year earlier. The 1982 constitution determines the organization of legislature a unicameral body composed of 400 representatives.⁶⁴

According to the new institutional structure, 400 seats were apportioned to the provinces according to their population size, after each province was given a seat.⁶⁵ The electoral districts corresponded to the administrative boundaries, as is mostly done in PR systems. However, highly populated provinces were divided into multiple districts if the number of seats apportioned to the province exceeded seven. As a result, meant that there was a total of 83 districts in 67 provinces (the average district magnitude equaled 4.82). The election law included two electoral thresholds: a national level threshold of ten percent and a district level threshold based on the size of the electoral district (Tuncer 2003). The seats were allocated to party lists that pass the national and district threshold according to the d'Hondt formula. In summary, the proportionality of the electoral system was highly limited due to the small district magnitude and the use of double thresholds.

Three parties contested in the 1983 general elections: Turgut Özal's newly formed center-right Motherland Party (MP), the Populist Party (PP) led by Necdet Calp⁶⁶ and the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) led by a retired general Turgut Sunalp (F. Ahmed 1984).

⁶⁴ Before the 1980 military intervention, the legislature was bicameral.

⁶⁵ According to the election law, the assembly consisted of 400 seats, but in the 1983 election 399 seats were filled.

⁶⁶ A former bureaucrat who served as a private secretary to İsmet İnönü -the president from 1938 to 1950 and the leader of Republican People's Party (RPP) until 1972.

With an anti-statist and anti-bureaucratic campaign, MP was able to receive 45.1 percent of the vote and won 211 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). As shown in Table 5.4, PP gained 117 seats with 30 percent of votes and NDP won 71 seats with 23 percent of votes.

Table 5.4 Vote shares of political parties in elections, 1983-1995 (%)

<i>Election Year</i>	<i>1983</i>	<i>1984</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>
<i>Level</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Local</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Local</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Local</i>	<i>General</i>
Motherland Party (MP)	45.14	41.52	36.3	21.80	24.01	21.08	19.65
Populist Party (HP)	30.46	8.76					
Nationalist Democracy Party (NAP)	23.27	7.09					
True Path Party (TPP)		13.25	19.1	25.13	27.03	21.40	19.18
Social Democracy Party (SDP)		23.35					
Republican People's Party (RPP)						4.60	10.71
Democratic Left Party (DLP)			8.5	9.03	10.75	8.75	14.64
Welfare Party (WP)			7.2	9.80	16.88	19.13	21.38
National Working Party (NWP)			2.9	4.14			
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP)			24.8	28.69	20.75	13.52	
Nationalist Action Party (NAP)						7.95	8.18
People's Democracy Party (PDP)							4.17
Other	1.13	6.03	1.2	1.41	0.58	3.57	2.09

Notes: Vote shares in local elections are calculated from the results of provincial council elections.

Following its landslide victory in the 1983 elections, Özal was able to form a single-party majority government with 53 percent of seats in parliament. MP government enjoyed an uninterrupted tenure of 1468 days in office and this period is marked with major structural reforms in the Turkish economy including the changes in the import regime, capital accounts and measures taken for liberalizing the foreign investment regime (Öniş 2004; Öniş and Webb 1992; Şenses 2012). Before the legislative term ended, the MP government changed the electoral system by enacting successive laws, as will be discussed in detail below.

The Restrictive Electoral Reform of 1987

Before examining the process leading up to this electoral reform, I discuss the changes in the electoral law to qualify it as a restrictive reform. The MP government achieved this reform in a total of four legislations.⁶⁷ The first law proposal, which was enacted into law in April 1986, introduced a fusion system according to Massicotte and Blais' (1999) terminology.⁶⁸ This fusion system combines plurality formula with PR seat allocation. In other words, the first seat was allocated to the party with plurality formula in the districts with six or more seats and this was called *contingency or quota seat* while the rest was distributed according to d'Hondt formula (Law No: 3270). All parties listed a contingency candidate to be elected according to plurality vote, in addition to their party lists elected according to d'Hondt.

The second law proposal, enacted in May 1987, decreased the average district magnitude by reducing the maximum size of an electoral district from 7 to 6 seats despite an increase in the assembly size from 400 to 450 (Law No: 3277). This law also extended the use of contingency seats to a wider range of districts, thus decreased proportionality. There were two more amendments in the election law which only specified how the district thresholds are calculated for electoral districts with contingency seats (Law No: 3403 and 3404).⁶⁹ As a result of these

⁶⁷ The first electoral law change qualifies as an electoral reform, as it changes the electoral system from a simple PR system to a fusion system. While the other changes do finetune the new system according to the needs of government party, they do not satisfy the criterion of significant change themselves.

⁶⁸ This system is referred as fusion as it allocates seats according to different formulas yet uses only one ballot, unlike the mixed systems. In the latter, there are two tiers with corresponding ballots. The fusion system was also used in France in the 1951 and 1965 elections.

⁶⁹ In the second proposal, the change in the district magnitude is below 20 percent, thus, it is not considered as a separate attempt (Law No 3277). The changes in district thresholds in the last two amendments only clarify the district threshold calculations according to the Law No 3277).

changes, the districted-PR system was replaced with a fusion system (combining plurality and d'Hondt formulas) and the average district magnitude decreased from 4.8 to 4.3.

The resulting electoral reform constitutes a deviant case according to my explanation and analysis in the previous chapter. Yet, it is also an unexpected outcome for the competing explanations of restrictive electoral reforms: First, I evaluate the governability explanation, which expects a restrictive reform in fractionalized party systems to increase the efficient policy making in parliament. The governability argument falls short of explaining this outcome. During its uninterrupted tenure, the MP government did not encounter problems in setting the parliamentary timetable and agenda. It was also able to limit the allocated time for oral questions (Kalaycıoğlu 1988). Plus, the government did not face any vote of confidence. In fact, the MP government was able to implement many contentious economic reforms and get their bills on diverse issues ratified in the parliament. It was able to enact a total of 441 laws on diverging issues including but not limited to macroeconomic policies, education system, justice system and restructuring of the bureaucracy.⁷⁰ In other words, it did not suffer from inefficiency in policy making due to fractionalization in the parliament, which is the key mechanism in the governability explanation. Therefore, the claim that governments implement a restrictive reform when they are concerned for inefficient policymaking or short tenure is not substantiated in the 1987 electoral reform.

Second, the explanation based on citizens' demand for an electoral reform is not helpful to explain this outcome either. The public discussions on the electoral systems were indeed a

⁷⁰ The most efficient years in terms of enacting laws in the Turkish parliament correspond to the single-party government of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the legislative term following the 2002 elections during which the number of laws enacted approach to 990 (Author's own calculations using data from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/kanunlar_sd.sorgu_baslangic).

product of the 1987 electoral system change, rather than the other way around (Kalaycıoğlu 2002a). The election results raised the issue of ‘fairness’ as the Motherland Party received 65 percent seats with 36 percent of votes. This also resulted in the deterioration of support for the governing party in the local elections. The opposition parties, media, trade unions and other civil society organizations criticized the MP government’s electoral system change and asked for a fair electoral system (Kalaycıoğlu 2002a: 62, 2002b). The politicians started to discuss and promise an electoral reform during the election campaigns after the 1987 reform, while such demands and promises did not exist prior to the reform.

However, this reform is not expected according to my argument based on the number of parties in the government’s ideological cluster, either. When MP adopted this restrictive reform in 1987, the effective number of ideological competitors was very low, indicating a higher likelihood for a permissive reform than for a restrictive one. Nonetheless, the MP government introduced drastic changes in the electoral system, whereby making it less proportional and less favorable to the small and new parties. In general, this case seems to be consistent with the seat maximizing argument which expects that governments change the electoral rules to their advantage as long as they have the power to do so (Benoit 2007; Benoit and Hayden 2004). However, a thorough analysis of the process that lead to the 1987 electoral reform reveals that changes in the party system between two consecutive legislative terms induced the MP government to alter the electoral system to ensure its viability for government formation.

Party System Dynamics and the 1987 Restrictive Reform

In the 1983 elections, there were three parties competing in the elections and therefore the ensuing parliament was not fractionalized. However, the party system started to take shape

with the 1984 local elections. First, the popular support for all of the legislative parties declined in the local elections, but the decline was sharper for the opposition parties. While PP's vote share declined from 30.5 percent to 8.8 percent, the vote share of NDP decreased from 23.3 to 7.1 percent. The erosion in the support for these parties have been attributed to their inability to gain public trust (Ciddi 2009; Turan 1988). In their stead, new parties such as the Social Democracy Party (SDP), the True Path Party (TPP), and the Welfare Party (WP) emerged with a total vote share of 41 percent in municipal council elections.⁷¹ Also, as a result of the local elections, the main opposition party became in effect SDP, even though it did not have any seats in the parliament at this time. The decline in the governing party's votes, from 45.1 to 41.5 percent, was limited in comparison to the opposition parties. If anything, the local elections showed that new parties were gaining electoral support even though MP was still the major contender.

Second, two of the new parties (TPP and WP) were ideologically close to MP, and therefore, they would possibly devour the support base of MP in future elections. Putting it into the terminology developed in this study, in less than a year, the effective number of ideological competitors facing the governing party, MP, increased from 1 to 2.5, while it was one for the main opposition party, SDP. Moreover, additional parties were emerging after the local elections. For instance, the National Working Party (NWP) was established in 1985, which was a nationalist rightwing party descending from the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) of pre-1980s. By late 1985, it was evident that the party system was not stable at all and the support of the right-wing parties was becoming more and more divided.

⁷¹ Throughout the discussion, all the vote comparisons with local elections are based on the election results for the municipal councils, which use a very similar system to the legislative elections.

The fractionalized nature of rightwing parties becomes even more important if we consider that these new parties were direct successors of the principal parties in the pre-1980 period. While TPP represented a continuation of the center-right Justice Party (JP) of the pre-1980 era, WP was a clear successor of the National Salvation Party (NSP), which had a conservative religious ideology. The new left party, SDP, too, was a descendant of the center-left Republican People's Party (RPP) (Sayarı 2002). The new parties' links to the major parties of the pre-1980 era were important for the governing party since the vote shares of these major parties would give an idea about the new parties' vote potential.⁷² It was also important for the opposition parties in parliament, as they became defunct after losing support dramatically in the local elections.

Thus, the emergence of new parties forced the legislative opposition parties to seek possible mergers. For instance, PP merged with SDP to become Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) in November 1985. The rapid loss of support within merely a five-month period also resulted in the disintegration of NDP. While most of its members joined the newly formed True Path Party (TPP) and formed a faction in the parliament under that party's name, the party dissolved itself in May 1986 and some its remaining members joined MP.⁷³ Nonetheless, there was a total of 45 independent parliamentarians in the assembly in the aftermath of the local elections (Cop 2018: 202).

In this context, the government introduced the proposal to change the electoral system. The proposal was custom designed for MP, adding contingency seats to the constituencies which

⁷² In the 1977 general elections the vote shares of the top-4 contenders were the following: RPP 41.4%, JP 36.9%, NSP 8.6%, NAP 6.4%.

⁷³ For more information about the party mergers and splits in Turkey, see https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_partiler.html

were its strongholds. The proposal allocated the contingency seats to the districts in which MP emerged as the leading party in the recent local elections.⁷⁴ This meant that MP would receive an extra seat in those districts thanks to having a plurality of votes there in addition to the seat distribution conducted by d'Hondt formula. This reform case supports my argument that government party decides to implement a restrictive reform when the number of parties that can draw votes from its vote base is high. Even though the number of parties closer to the government party was low in 1983 election, it dramatically increased in the 1984 local election and continued to do so.

The parliamentary debates and reform-making process also provide evidence to support this argument. First of all, the electoral reform reflected only government party's interest. The government did not give a clear justification for the use of plurality formula for a seat in districts with 6 and more seats (Commission Report No: 413 1986). The constitutional committee, which consisted of deputies from the legislative parties (the majority of the members were from the governing party, MP) and whose task was to discuss the proposal, submitted the report without any changes in the reform proposal. This suggests that the perspective of the opposition parties on the proposed reform was not integrated to the bill by the governing party.

Second, the parliamentary debates allude to the strategic calculations of government party. We can clearly see that all opposition parties strictly objected to the changes adopted in 1986. In his plenary speech, Turan Bayezit (representing the SDPP faction) claimed that "the aim of this proposal is to increase the MP seats in parliament, rather than getting more votes" (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1986a: 270). He went on to argue that the recent

⁷⁴ These were the urban and highly populated provinces which were divided into several districts (since the maximum size of a district was 7). The contingency seats were introduced only in these electoral districts.

local election results and the polls conducted by the governing party itself showed the declining trend in MP's votes, thus, they needed to remedy this decline by changing the electoral system. Similarly, the NDP faction was also against the reform and complained that the genuine aim of government was to create a two-party system. The main problem, from their point of view, was the government's efforts to manipulate the PR system for its own interests, instead of adopting a plurality system in SMDs. This manipulation, they cautioned, would lead to "the rule of minority" (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1986b: 305-307). The rule of minority was emphasized in a number of parliamentary speeches made by the members of the opposition parties.

More importantly, the parliamentary debates during the electoral system change also showed that the opposition parties perceived the changes in electoral laws as the MP government's attempt to counteract the newly emerging rightwing parties and in particular TPP (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1986b: 317). Nonetheless, the opposition parties did not have enough number of seats to prevent the enactment of the electoral system changes.

However, more information was coming from the electoral arena. In the by-elections of 1986, TPP was able to garner 23 percent of votes and won 4 seats out of 11, while the governing party, MP, won 6 seats with 32 percent vote share. Moreover, in September 1987, there was a referendum on eliminating the bans on the major political figures of the pre-1980 period, as a result of a longtime pressure from civil society organizations and opposition parties. The significance of this referendum was that the charismatic leaders of the past era would be able to contest the elections and garner more votes for their parties, and this would potentially lead to a

further depreciation in the governing party's vote share.⁷⁵ For this reason, MP campaigned for a 'No' vote during the referendum while the opposition campaigned for a 'Yes' vote (Özal: 'Does the nation have to say Yes?' 1987). With a narrow margin, the referendum resulted in approving the constitutional changes that eliminated the ban. These two developments were followed by further amendments in the electoral law.

The main change in this set of amendments was about the maximum size of the electoral districts and the increase in the electoral threshold for the districts with contingency seats, as described earlier. The government proposal did not present the reasoning behind the proposed changes this time either. Instead the proposal emphasized other amendments in the reform package such as enabling citizens who reside abroad to vote (Commission Report No: 577). In the parliamentary debates, all political parties objected to the changes that came with the MP's reform. Ayhan Fırat, who spoke for the SDPP faction, raised an important point about the calculations of MP government about district quotas, stating that

MP, or maybe the Prime Minister calculated the referendum results in electoral districts with 6 seats which makes a total of 9 provinces. Realizing that yes vote was 47.5 percent while no vote was 52.5 percent, the government raised the district threshold for those provinces, to gain more seats.... MP already benefited from the existing system. It needed only 34 thousand votes for a seat, whereas my party needed 50 thousand votes for a seat... Now MP is trying to get a seat by 25 thousand votes only, increasing the cost of the seat to 100 thousand for the opposition (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1987: 133).

⁷⁵ Among these people, who were banned from taking part in politics for 10 years, were Bülent Ecevit (former leader of RPP), Süleyman Demirel (former leader of AP), Necmettin Erbakan (former leader of MSP), and Alparslan Türkeş (former leader of NAP).

These remarks are important to show that opposition parties were using the information flow to assess the benefits and drawbacks of both the status quo and the proposed system to determine their positions to the proposed electoral reform. Nonetheless, MP government still had the fiat power to enact the law. Even though the opposition parties took their chances with the constitutional court by asking for judicial review of contingency seats, the court did not find them unconstitutional (Üzeltürk 2006). Thus, the new electoral system was put into use for the upcoming elections.

The above discussion underlines two points. First, it is easy to detect the seat maximization efforts of the MP government in initiating an electoral reform. Second, and more importantly, the government reacted to the changes in the party system dynamics during the reform formulation process. Indeed, the actual details of electoral system changes were determined according to the changes in the party competition. Crucially, examining this episode demonstrates that before implementing any electoral system changes, governments specifically take into account the source of its support base and whether the new parties could erode this base.

It is also important to evaluate whether the electoral reform indeed benefitted the governing party. This restrictive reform did achieve its purpose. The 1987 elections was the most disproportional elections in Turkish history (Kalaycıoğlu 2002a). In fact, some opposition parties discussed to boycott this election in response to the draconic changes in the electoral system. Especially the Democratic Left Party (DLP, which was founded in 1986) and TPP discussed this option thoroughly, but in the end, they decided to compete in the elections. The electoral system change was heavily criticized in the election manifestos of opposition parties for not being a fair

electoral system.⁷⁶ The election results attest to these criticisms: MP emerged as the largest party in the parliament; by winning almost 65 percent of seats in the parliament with its 36 percent vote share. The increased district thresholds, thanks to the contingency seats, helped the party gain an enormous advantage in the seat distribution, since MP came first in 86 out of 104 electoral constituencies in this election (Cop 2018; İşsever-Ekinci 2016).

The partisan bias of new system was criticized intensely by the opposition parties after the 1987 election as well, especially during their campaigns for the 1989 local elections (Kalaycıoğlu 2002a). This legislative term was much more contentious than the previous one even though MP's seat share was higher; the government faced confidence vote motions.⁷⁷ The electoral system continued to be on the agenda of both government and opposition, but this time it was discussed within the general constitutional reform. A range of possibilities for electoral system, such as using a plurality based system, or lowering the national threshold to five percent was being debated before the local elections (Tayyar 1989). However, the electoral system debates were silenced after MP's defeat in the local elections of 1989. This silence was broken when the early election calls started to emerge in 1991.⁷⁸

The MP government considered a mixed member electoral system in 1991. Their proposal was a mixed system with 600 seats in which 150 seats would be allocated at the national level by a PR formula while 450 seats would be allocated in single member districts

⁷⁶ See Welfare Party Election Manifesto (1987: 7-8) and Democratic Left Party Election Manifesto (1987: 79-81).

⁷⁷ From the 1983 general elections to the 1987 elections MP's vote share decreased from 45.1 to 36.3 percent but its seat share in the parliament increased from 52.9 to 64.9 percent.

⁷⁸ The MP votes declined to 21 percent for the municipality councils. More importantly, the party only got 3 mayors elected. Since the election of mayors is based on plurality formula, this showed that the government could not benefit from a plurality system anymore. I calculated the number of districts that the MP could be the first runner using the results of 1989 provincial council elections by aggregating them according to districting schedule of the Electoral Commission, and found that the MP was able to come first only in 12 districts, in comparison to 86 districts in the 1987 election.

(SMD).⁷⁹ In addition, parties would list three candidates for each SMD seat and voters could vote for both the party and the candidate (Doğan 1991). The opposition parties did not support the mixed system proposal. Instead, each party put forward its preferred electoral system for consideration by the public. For instance, SDPP published a proposal which consisted of decreasing the electoral threshold to 5 percent, abolishing the district hurdles, and increasing the assembly size to 550 and creating larger districts (SDPP announced their reform proposal 1991). TPP, on the other hand, was willing to accept any proposal that would increase proportionality, even if it was a slight increase, on the condition of early elections (Konukçu 1991). All opposition parties were united in their position against the preferential ballot system. They objected to the proposed preferential ballot system since it required parties to list two candidates for each seat in all the districts they compete (Law No: 3757). This would disadvantage smaller parties as they would not have enough candidates for each electoral district.

The opposition parties conditioned their support for constitutional reform on an electoral system change that would lead to a fair system. In the end, the mixed system was not a part of the reform bill initiated by MP government. Instead the government introduced a slightly permissive electoral reform, which decreased the district thresholds so that more parties could be elected from an electoral district, as well as introducing a preferential ballot system. Despite significant debates in 1991, the electoral system amendment was very limited in terms of proportionality.⁸⁰ The reform bill did not satisfy the opposition parties' demand for fair representation and they criticized the MP government for strategically lowering the district threshold to get its own candidates elected (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1991:

⁷⁹At the time of this debate, the number of districts was 104 according to the existing system.

⁸⁰ I do not examine this reform thoroughly since it does not qualify as an electoral reform according to the definition adopted in this dissertation.

114-9). The electoral system reform as well as constitutional reform stayed on the public agenda during the 1991 election and opposition parties put electoral system on their election manifestos and raised these issues during their election campaigns.⁸¹

The Permissive Electoral Reform of 1995

The results of 1991 elections yielded a much more fragmented parliament and ended the eight-year MP dominance in the legislative arena (Kselman, Powell and Tucker 2016). True Path Party, which emerged as the leading party in elections formed a coalition government with the center left SDPP. The coalition government initiated two electoral reforms in the legislative term between 1991 and 1995, both were in permissive direction. The first reform aimed to replace the districted PR system with a two-tier PR system in which a national tier of 100 seats was added to the existing 450 seats, which was still distributed through d'Hondt formula. In addition, the proposed plan increased the average district magnitude by enlarging the district size. Although reform bill passed the parliamentary stage, it failed during judicial review of the Constitutional Court. The use of national tier was found unconstitutional by the Court, as will be discussed below. Upon the Court's verdict, the coalition government initiated another reform bill which kept the basic features of the proposed bill while eliminating the national tier. The resulting electoral system was a districted PR system which distributed 550 seats to party list by d'Hondt formula in larger districts than the status quo rules.⁸² This electoral bill was successfully ratified and used in the 1995 election.

⁸¹ See DLP Election Manifesto (1991: 48-52), TPP Election Manifesto (1991: 81-84), SDPP Election Manifesto (1991: 15).

⁸² The bills of 1995 increased the maximum district size from 6 to 18.

The electoral reform attempts in 1995 constitute a typical case according to the explanation advanced in this dissertation. The effective number of parties in the government's ideological cluster was quite low which enable governing parties to adopt a permissive reform to weaken the ideological cluster of the opposition party, as will be explained in the section below. But this case does not lend support to rival explanations. First, coalition government adopted a permissive reform when the effective number of parties in 1991 election was moderately high (equaling to 4.66, as shown in Table 5.3). Moreover, it fulfilled all necessary conditions for restrictive reform according to the governability explanation: True Path party formed government 4 times, one of the governments failed the confidence vote. Yet, a permissive rather than a restrictive reform was initiated. Second, this reform was in the opposite direction of electoral reform demanded by the public. Opinion polls suggested public support for restrictive reform, but the coalition government initiated a permissive one.

Party System and the 1995 Electoral Reforms

The parliament was dominated by medium-sized parties with around 20 percent vote share. TPP emerged as the winner of the election with 27 percent of vote and formed a coalition government with the center-left party, the SDPP, which came in third with its 20.8 percent vote share, see Table 5.4.⁸³ This coalition government worked smoothly until 1993. However, upon the unexpected death of President Turgut Özal, the founder of MP, the parliament had to elect a new president in 1993. In this fragmented parliament, Süleyman Demirel, the leader of TPP at the time, was elected president in the third round in May 1993, thanks to the support of his

⁸³ The former governing party, MP, came in second in the 1991 general elections with a 24 percent vote share. WP, the conservative religious party, which entered the parliament as a coalition with the nationalist party, NAP, received 16.9 percent of vote and DLP received 10.8 percent of vote, thereby overcoming the national threshold with a small margin.

coalition partner, SDPP, and the nationalist party, NAP. Being elected as the president of the country required Demirel to resign from his party, TPP. In the party congress convened in June 1993, Tansu Çiller, a US-educated professor of economics, was elected as the new leader. Çiller decided to continue with the coalition government with SDPP and became the first woman prime minister of Turkey.

As the local elections were approaching, the electoral reform returned to the political agenda once more. TPP wanted to alter the electoral system for both local and general elections, and they were considering a variety of systems, most of which focused on single member districts or very small district magnitudes. MP, as the second largest party in the parliament, was supporting these considerations too; however, the coalition partner, SDPP, was against plurality formulas altogether. In their election manifesto, SDPP pledged itself to a fair electoral system, implying a more proportional system. Even though the manifesto itself did not give the details of their preferred electoral system, during the election campaign they criticized the electoral thresholds and promised to lower the national threshold to an acceptable level (SDPP Manifesto 1991).

By the end of 1993, TPP started to discuss the specific aspects of a potential electoral reform. The party proposed a two-round majoritarian system, which would encourage the larger left and right parties to form blocs. Not surprisingly, the smaller parties were against a two-round system. NAP, the nationalist party which entered the parliament by forming a coalition with WP, proposed to lower the nationwide threshold to 5 percent (Türkeş: Threshold Should Decrease to 5 percent 1993), while DLP added to this proposal that the district magnitude should be increased as well. WP, whose support base was increasing, proposed to have equally sized

electoral districts with 10 seats (Sazak 1995) (Sazak 1992). The coalition partner, SDPP, was hesitant, as the system proposed by TPP diverged from their electoral promise. However, they decided to support the proposed system on the condition that in each electoral district either at least 3 parties would qualify for the second round or the parties that crossed a 12.5 percent threshold would qualify for the second round (Dogan, 1993).

The debate on the two-round system waned, though, after the leaders of coalition parties collected more information from opinion polls about the voting behavior in the second round. Note that the major competitor to the governing party, TPP, during this time was not a left-wing party but MP. Therefore, all the calculations focused on how voters would switch their votes in the second round of elections. According to the polls conducted by TPP, the party would receive the second-round votes from its coalition partner, SDPP, whereas, MP, which is supposed to be its main competitor in most electoral districts, would get the support of WP voters in the second round. The TPP leadership believed that this pattern of vote switch would eventually put MP ahead of TPP especially in large cities such as Istanbul and Ankara (Bila, 1993). Hence, TPP shelved its two-round system proposal prior to the local elections of 1994.

It turned out that not adopting a two-round system for the local elections was a strategic mistake on the part of coalition parties. The election results had important repercussions for both sides of the ideological spectrum. On the right, three major rightwing parties had almost equal vote shares. Even though its vote share decreased from 27 to 21.4 percent, TPP still emerged as the leading party. TPP's major competitor, MP, received 21.1 percent of votes and came in second, while WP came in third with its 19.1 percent vote share. The most important implication of the election results was the WP's remarkable success. In comparison to the 1989 local

elections, its vote share doubled.⁸⁴ More importantly, WP captured the mayorships of the two key metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Ankara.⁸⁵

The major leftwing parties suffered a huge decline in votes. Among these parties, the most dramatic deterioration was observed in the coalition partner's votes: SDPP's vote share decreased from 20.8 to 13.5 percent.⁸⁶ This decline was partly caused by the emergence of new parties on the left. Before the local elections a new party was formed by Deniz Baykal under the name of the Republican People's Party (RPP), and this newly formed party was able to garner 5 percent of votes in such a short duration.⁸⁷ DLP, the other leftwing party, received around 8.8 percent of votes, lower than its vote share in the 1991 elections and below the 10 percent national threshold. However, it is also worth noting that the support for the leftwing decreased also in aggregate terms. The total vote share of these three parties, 25.9 percent, was below the sum of votes received by SDPP and DLP in the 1991 election, 31.5 percent.

In addition to the rise of the religious conservative WP, the local election results also received attention due to low level of votes that got mayors elected. Because the government did not switch to a two-round majoritarian formula before the elections, the electoral system was still based on the plurality formula for mayors. Given the fragmented party system, some mayors in local municipalities got elected by only 20 percent of votes.⁸⁸ For the failure to change the

⁸⁴ Note that because WP and NAP contested the 1991 general elections as a coalition, it is not possible to compare WP's vote share with the previous general elections.

⁸⁵ In Istanbul, the WP candidate for mayor was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who later became a major political figure in Turkey. In Ankara, Melih Gökçek was elected mayor and enjoyed long tenure in office up until the recent local elections in March 2019.

⁸⁶ SDPP also lost mayorship in Ankara.

⁸⁷ RPP is the party which founded the Republic of Turkey. This party shifted its political spectrum to center-left in the 1970s and was very powerful before the military intervention in September 1980. Until the re-emergence of this party in September 1992, the SDPP had a claim to represent this party.

⁸⁸ For example, WP won Istanbul mayorship with its 25.2 percent vote share while two runner-ups, MP and SDPP, received 22.1 and 20.3 percent, respectively. Interestingly, the governing party (TPP) received 15.5 percent of votes

electoral system, the coalition partner, SDPP, was blamed as they were reluctant to change the system unless a low threshold for the second-round elections was adopted (Laçınler 1994)

The results of local elections revived the electoral reform debate. In addition to the two-round majority formula, the TPP government started to consider other alternatives such as a mixed electoral system. This new reform proposal, reminiscent of the electoral change proposed by MP before the 1991 elections, included single member districts with a PR tier of 150 seats (Bila 1994). Even though this proposal was more proportional in comparison to the earlier one, TPP's coalition partner SDPP was not supportive of this option, given the decline in its vote shares in the local elections. Since the TPP did not have the majority to enact an electoral reform, it sought support from the opposition parties. However, these parties, encouraged by the decline of the coalition members in the recent local elections, conditioned their support for an electoral reform on early elections.

The economic conditions also contributed to the deterioration in the support for the coalition parties, especially that of TPP since Çiller, as the prime minister and an economist, was accountable for the country's economic performance in the eyes of the public. In the first quarter of 1994, Turkey experienced a major financial crisis. Within a short time period, the Turkish stock market suffered enormous losses and the Turkish lira was devalued by 65 percent against the US dollar (Balkan and Yeldan 1998).⁸⁹ The currency crisis led to an austerity program in

and DLP received 12.4 percent of votes in this city. Similarly, WP won Ankara with its 27.3 percent vote share while SDPP, the incumbent party, came in second with its 26.7 percent vote share.

⁸⁹ During the crisis, the Central Bank lost more than half of its international reserves and overnight interest rates jumped to record-high levels (Özatay 2000).

April 1994, whereby the details of the program, including evidently unpopular measures such as higher taxes, increased privatization, were announced by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller herself.

For the parties on the left, increased fragmentation after the 1994 local elections signaled that due to the national threshold a significant portion of the left vote may not be represented in the parliament in the next general elections. To mitigate this risk, SDPP merged with RPP in February 1995 under the latter's name, and Hikmet Çetin, not the leader of either party before the merger, became the head of the party. However, in September 1995 the party congress convened and Deniz Baykal, the former leader of RPP, replaced Çetin as party leader. Baykal's election led to the break-up of the coalition with TPP. After dissolution of the coalition, Çiller, as the leader of the leading party (TPP), could not convince any opposition parties to form a new government. Thus, she formed a minority government which failed to receive a vote of confidence. After that, TPP again formed a coalition government with its former coalition partner, RPP, in October 1995 on the condition of early elections and electoral reform.

Before going into the details of the electoral reform proposal, let me briefly summarize the party system dynamics. The local elections showed there were three strong rightwing parties with almost equal vote shares: TPP, MP and WP; the left parties realized that they needed to coordinate and merge, but in general the left was weakening in these years, given the austerity measures that government had to take during the economic crisis, TPP did not expect an increasing vote trend. More importantly, the major competing parties were still TPP, the governing party, and MP; the public opinion polls showed that MP and WP voters would switch between each other rather than to TPP in case of a restrictive reform

In such a context, the coalition government proposed a two-tier system in their electoral reform package, keeping the d'Hondt formula for the first tier but adding a national tier with additional 100 seats. The proposed plan also increased the district magnitude, making every province an electoral constituency, and setting the maximum district magnitude to 18. Moreover, the proposal included abolishing the contingency seats and lowering the district threshold to 25 percent for districts with fewer than 4 seats. In general, the proposed system was much more favorable to the small parties but only if they were able to pass the national threshold. But it would work to the disadvantage of the parties which had an efficient vote distribution and the results of the local elections showed that WP had quite efficient distribution of votes.

The analysis of this permissive reform showed that emergence of significant contenders matters for governments in reform decision. In this case, the governing parties considered restrictive alternatives at first, such as two-round majoritarian system. Given the results of local elections and the opinion polls about the second preference of the voters, this option was no more viable for the governing coalition. Therefore, the coalition partners in the end agreed to an electoral reform which would weaken the opposition parties, and decrease the damage of the junior coalition partner, SDPP/RPP given its decreasing votes.

This reform attempt was introduced when there was also public pressure demanding an electoral reform. However, the direction of reform was not in the direction that public wanted. For instance, PIAR Gallup conducted a survey with 2,601 respondents from 11 provinces about electoral reform. The survey results revealed an overwhelming support for a reform in the electoral system with 69 percent. There were two questions concerning voters' preferences about

government type and ballot structure, which would imply the type of reforms the respondent wanted. 75 percent of the respondents were against coalition governments, and 63 percent wanted to know the candidates representing their district. More importantly, 63 percent of the respondents wanted to know possible coalition partners of each party before voting for them (People do not want a coalition). In the meantime, the electoral reform was being debated by civil society organizations and academics as well. Several different alternatives were suggested by academics, for instance, Murat Sertel and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, two prominent scholars, proposed an electoral system in which the second and third preferences of voters are taken into account to help the formation of “majoritarian compromise” (Kılıç 1995; Sertel and Kalaycıoğlu 1995).

During the parliamentary debates on the electoral reform, the WP spokesmen, Şevket Kazan, criticized the proposal and accused the government of designing an electoral system specifically tailored to increase the seats of the coalition parties (Turkish National Assembly Records 1995: 12-13). Parliamentarians from WP also complained about the malapportionment problem that would arise due to the use of 1990 census. The increase in internal migration from rural areas to major cities was making the rural areas overrepresented in the parliament. This was a major concern for WP whose support base was largely confined to the slums of major cities. Yet, this aspect of the system was favorable to TPP whose rural support was higher (see also İncioğlu (2002: 77-79). WP was demanding a new census before the election. Importantly, the distribution of national tier seats was the main point of disagreement for WP parliamentarians. WP proposed that national and district thresholds be kept at the current levels and the national tier seats be distributed to only the first three parties in the race according to their vote shares (Parliamentary Minutes Journal 1995: 97, 102).

While MP was also expected to benefit from the reform, their speaker declared that they would not prevent this reform package yet would not support it either (Parliamentary Minutes Journal 1995, 10). Parliamentarians from small parties also opposed to this reform as the national threshold was not being lowered. Both DLP and the Great Union Party (BBP) declared their objection to the reform during the parliamentary debates but mostly because the proposal failed to lower the election threshold (Parliamentary Minutes Journal 1995, 18; 22).

The government was able to pass this reform in October, and elections were to be held on the 24th of December 1995. However, a group of DLP parliamentarians took the reform to the Constitutional Court arguing that the national level district was against the constitution, as it introduces the concept of *national parliamentarians*. In the Turkish Constitution, however, it is stated that all parliamentarians represent the people in the country. Moreover, DLP also brought the national threshold issue to the court arguing that it was against the principle of fair representation. While the constitutional court abolished the use of national tier, it did not find the national threshold against the constitution.⁹⁰ After the constitutional court verdict on the 18th of November, the government designed another reform for the December elections, which was basically the same, except for eliminating the national tier, so it was still in proportional permissive direction, increasing the district magnitude.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

It is possible to draw parallels between reform processes that led to electoral rule changes in Turkey and Lithuania. The fluidity of party systems and shifts in voters' allegiances across

⁹⁰ See the verdict of Constitutional Court: <http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/Karar/Content/8bb352ec-e762-484a-a273-1cfdeaa74c18?excludeGerekce=False&wordsOnly=False>

elections characterize the electoral competition in these two countries. Within this context, initial electoral rules adopted in the moment of democratic transition (that is, the electoral rules adopted in Lithuania after gaining independence from the Soviet Union and those adopted in Turkey after the military interregnum) tend not “to freeze”, but electoral competition extends to modifying the rules of the game as well (Bielasiak and Hulsey 2013). Another feature of these countries is their highly volatile party systems, which result in political parties constantly updating the beliefs concerning their relative power using information flows.

The analysis of restrictive reforms made in Lithuania and Turkey showed that the governing party’s intention in initiating such electoral changes is to prevent small parties from gaining votes from its own electoral base. In 1996, the governing party in Lithuania, LDLP, initiated a restrictive reform with the aim to keep small parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Union of Pole, two left-oriented parties, out of the parliament. Since these parties were projected to have around 4 percent of votes according to polls, threshold change would exclude them from parliament and benefit LDLP with seat bonuses. In 2000, the target of the proposed reform was, again, the parties in governing party’s ideological cluster. Different from the earlier reform, the number of parties close to the governing party’s cluster was higher and new parties were also emerging in this legislative term. The emergence of new parties within the election cycle was similar in the context of the Turkish restrictive reform in 1987. The governing party, MP, had the majority in the parliament but its popularity was at stake as new parties, some of which were ideologically very close to MP, were being formed and was drawing votes from its vote base. In particular, the emergence of TPP under the leadership of Demirel, whose bar from politics had just been revoked with a nationwide referendum, was threatening for MP. In this

context, MP initiated a restrictive reform bill to keep TPP out of parliament and to retain its power.

Analyzing permissive reform initiations in Lithuania and Turkey generates insights into the governing party's decision-making process leading to a permissive reform initiation. The analysis demonstrates that the governing party is motivated by the emergence of a rising party, to initiate a permissive reform. Importantly though, governing party did not have high numbers of parties in its ideological cluster, therefore, could afford a permissive reform. Even though permissive reform might potentially increase the degree of fragmentation not only in the opposition party's ideological bloc but also that of governing party, they were able to initiate permissive reform to weaken their main competitor. In the Lithuanian case, the rising popularity of Labor Party induced the government to initiate a permissive reform. Indeed, the election results after the electoral reform showed that Labor Party would have won a greater number of seats, should the reform not have been passed. In the case of Turkey, the target of the reform was the conservative religious WP, which not only increased its vote share dramatically in the recent local elections but also won mayorship in the two largest metropolitan areas, Istanbul and Ankara.

It is worth noting that the decision process for permissive reforms—the idea that the emergence of new parties incentivizes the government for such reforms—is also consistent with the idea put forward by Colomer (2004) and Remmer (2008). However, his suggested measure, the effective number of parties, is not sufficient to capture the dynamics explored in the two cases analyzed above since it does not take into account the newly formed parties ideologically close to the governing party. By contrast, the model developed in this dissertation provides a

better account of permissive reforms as it explains parties' assessments concerning electoral rules, in particular that of the governing party, and it underscores how new parties can affect the competition between the leading parties (both in the government and in the opposition). One caveat, which applies both to defensive account and my account of electoral reforms, is that the proposed measures (the effective number of parties in the former case and the effective number of ideological competitors in my case) do not capture well the changes in volatile party systems, such as the ones in Lithuania and Turkey. In these cases, providing a case study of reform episodes is important to understand how information flows constantly shape parties' evaluation of both the status quo and potential electoral systems.

Several implications from the case studies also provide evidence in favor of the account for electoral reform process developed in this dissertation. The timing of reform initiations is an indication of reforms being motivated by partisan interest. Both the Lithuanian and Turkish governments brought up the electoral system changes very close to the general elections without giving the parliamentary committees enough time to seek expert opinions or discuss the reform with the public. By the time electoral reform reaches the parliamentary floor, the parties are already in the process of preparing their election campaigns. The timing of electoral system changes, therefore, signals that electoral reforms are used by the governing majority as a strategy for affecting the parliament composition for the subsequent legislative term.

Moreover, after examining the election manifestos of political parties, I found that political parties do not include commitments about the electoral system. The only exceptions to this are the Democratic Left Party (DLP) which explicitly promised to lower the electoral threshold and the Social Democrats who promised fair electoral system, implying more

proportionality during both 1987 and 1991 election (DLP Party Program p. 38, SDPP Party Program). The commitment to more proportional rules, though, does not necessarily indicate a normative commitment. Given that these parties suffer partisan bias when the elections are disproportional, it is hard to discern the normative and self-interested motives in the case of Turkish leftist parties. While other parties included criticisms about the electoral system changes of 1987, they did not put an alternative system in their election manifestos.

The evidence from the case studies is not in favor of the competing explanations. The idea that public demand for an electoral reform induces the political parties to initiate reforms is not supported. For example, the permissive reform of 1995 in Turkey was initiated (and then implemented successfully) while the public opinion was against coalition governments, which would result in fragmented party systems, thus in favor of a restrictive reform. Similarly, the argument that electoral reform decisions are motivated to generate efficient governments is not supported either. As discussed, the MP government, which made major structural reforms, especially in economy, initiated a restrictive reform not to generate a more efficient government but to retain its power.

Chapter 6 Enacting Reforms: The Success and Failure of Electoral Reform Attempts

Much of the emphasis of this dissertation has so far been on the conditions that alter the likelihood of initiating permissive and restrictive electoral reforms. This chapter focuses on how reform attempts are turned into an actual electoral reform outcome and examines why some electoral reform attempts succeed while others fail. This question received scant attention in the literature, save for a few case studies of reform failures (Cutice 2013; Nikolenyi 2011; Renwick 2011a). Yet, a systematic analysis of electoral reform attempts in terms of their outcome is needed in the literature.

By focusing on the parliamentary and constitutional processes of electoral reforms, this chapter analyzes the conditions that can hinder an electoral reform, even when the government promotes an alternative electoral system. In doing so, it also sheds light on the relationship between electoral reform barriers and the content of electoral reforms. Are some barriers to electoral reform more difficult to overcome for enacting restrictive (or permissive) reforms? Are some elements of electoral systems, such as district magnitude, or electoral threshold or more resistant to change than others? Do politicians shape the electoral reform packages depending on the institutional barriers? Addressing these questions will give us a more comprehensive picture of the electoral reform process.

As a refresher, Table 6.1 below lists the hypotheses for reform enactment stage, which

are developed in Chapter 2. The first two hypotheses address the relationship between the government's legislative power and success of electoral reform attempts. The following two hypothesis concern the role of constitutional protection in the success of electoral reform. The next hypothesis focuses on the presence of judicial review and the likelihood of successful enactment of electoral reforms. The last hypothesis addresses the relationship between the content of reform and its likelihood of successful enactment.

Table 6.1 Hypotheses for the Reform Enactment Stage

<i>Hypothesis 3a</i>	The probability of successful reform attempts increases with the legislative power of government.
<i>Hypothesis 3b</i>	The probability of successful restrictive reform attempts increases with the legislative power of government.
<i>Hypothesis 4a</i>	The constitutional protection of electoral systems decreases the probability of successful reforms
<i>Hypothesis 4b</i>	The constitutional protection of electoral systems decreases the probability of successful restrictive reforms
<i>Hypothesis 5</i>	The existence of judicial review decreases the probability of success for restrictive reform attempts but increases the probability of success for permissive reform attempts.
<i>Hypothesis 6</i>	Electoral reform attempts that change the district magnitude are more likely to fail than other reform attempts

This chapter consists of five sections. It begins with an overview of the dataset and variables used in the analysis. In the second section, I present the first regression analyses used to test the hypotheses about the electoral reform outcome. The third section focuses on the restrictive reform attempts and test the same hypotheses in the subsample of restrictive reform attempts. I conclude my discussion on restrictive reform attempts with case studies of the electoral law changes attempted in Lithuania in 1996 and 2000, in Latvia in 1995 and 1997, and in Austria in 1989 and 1992. In the fourth section, I test the hypotheses using the subsample of permissive reform attempts and then analyze two Bulgarian permissive reform attempts with

different outcomes (the failure of 1997 attempt and the success of 2010 reform) to uncover the factors that affect these outcomes in the same institutional setting. In the fifth section, I conclude this chapter by summarizing the main findings of the analysis.

6.1 Empirical Approach and Dataset

The dataset for the reform enactment analysis includes 124 electoral reform attempts by the governing parties in 29 parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 2015.⁹¹ These reform proposals include the bills that are drafted and submitted to the parliament by the governing parties, or proposals drafted by a committee appointed by the government, or proposals put to referendum vote by the government parties. Note that while the majority of reform attempts were observed in different electoral cycles, 15 unsuccessful reform attempts were followed by another reform attempt during the same legislative term.

To test my hypotheses about the success and failure of electoral reform attempts, I generate a binary dependent variable for the electoral reform outcome and then estimate logit regressions using alternative models (i.e., sets of explanatory variables). The successful reform attempts which are enacted into law are coded as 1 while the failed reform attempts are coded as 0. In general, the number of failed reforms is lower than successful reform; around 43 percent of the reform attempts were not ratified. Figure 6.1 shows the breakdown of electoral reform outcomes (successful or not), for both permissive and restrictive reform attempts. The failure rate of restrictive electoral reform attempts is dramatically higher than that of permissive electoral

⁹¹ There were no electoral reform attempts in Croatia, Luxembourg and Spain, and therefore, these countries are not included in this set of analyses.

reform attempts. Among restrictive reform attempts, nearly 54 percent of the attempts failed, whereas in the permissive reform type, only 21 percent of the reform attempts failed.

Figure 6.1 The Success of Electoral Reform Attempts



To assess the effect of constitutional protection for electoral systems, two different measures are used. The first one is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the electoral system is stated in the constitution. The second one considers the degree of difficulty to amend the constitutions. This index variable takes the value of 0 when the constitution does not specify the electoral system. If the constitution has a clause about the electoral system, then, the constitutional protection takes the value of constitutional rigidity which varies from 1 to 3.⁹² For

⁹² In the analyses below, the results in which the existence of electoral system in the constitution is shown, whereas the results that include the degree of protection are not reported.

the judicial review, two measures are used as well. First one is a binary variable, which measures the existence of a judicial review for the constitutionality of the ordinary laws. The second one is an index variable that measures the scope of judicial review and ranges between 0 to 3.⁹³

For evaluating the impact of government and parliamentary dynamics, two different variables are used. The first one is the seat share of governing parties, which measures the voting power of the government within the parliament. The second one is government type which is composed of 4 mutually exclusive categories: single-party majority government, minimal winning coalitions, oversized governments, and minority governments. To assess the role of the content of reform packages on the success of electoral reform, a binary variable is generated. Following Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011)'s delineation of electoral system components, the seat allocation formula and electoral thresholds are treated as a different category from the district magnitude and electoral system family. This variable is coded as 1 if the electoral system proposal does not include a change in the district magnitude and it is coded as 0 if it does. In other words, the variable takes the value of 1 if there is a change in the seat allocation formula or in the electoral thresholds. Table 6.2 below presents the descriptive statistics for independent and control variables.

⁹³ In the regression analyses below, I report the results using the scope of judicial review. I report the models with the binary variable of judicial review only when the results differ from the models using the scope of judicial review variable.

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Range</i>
<i>Constitutional Provision</i>	0.56	0.50	0-1
<i>Constitutional Protection</i>	0.88	1.07	0-3
<i>Judicial Review</i>	0.82	0.38	0-1
<i>Scope of Judicial Review</i>	1.44	0.80	0-2
<i>Seat Share of Government (logged)</i>	3.98	0.23	3.16-4.45
<i>Number of Government Parties</i>	2.6	1.60	1-8
<i>Single Party Government</i>	0.14	0.35	0-1
<i>Minimal Winning Coalition Gov.</i>	0.27	0.45	0-1
<i>Surplus Government</i>	0.28	0.45	0-1
<i>Minority Government</i>	0.31	0.47	0-1
<i>Formula and Threshold Changes</i>	0.40	0.49	0-1
<i>Notes: The number of observations in the sample of all reforms is 124.</i>			

6.2 When do electoral reforms succeed or fail?

The failure of electoral reform attempts when the governing majority wants a reform is interesting and raises the question of why a government proposes a change that has the risk of failing. To address this question, this chapter turns to the legislative power of governments, constitutional protection of electoral rules, the presence of judicial review for law changes, and reform contents, and tests the related hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 (see Table 6.1). For the empirical analyses, I use logistic regression models since the dependent variable is a

dichotomous variable measuring whether the reform attempt was successful or not. Throughout the statistical analysis in this chapter the unit of analysis is the electoral reform attempt.

Table 6.3 presents the results of five alternative logit regressions, modeling the outcome of electoral reform attempts, including both permissive and restrictive directions, as the dependent variable. As discussed, the presence of constitutional protection and scope of judicial review may act as a barrier to the enactment of electoral reforms. To this end, Model 1 include only constitutional protection and judicial review, as the explanatory variable to predict the success of electoral reform attempts. The results show that constitutional protection is negatively related to the probability of successful enactment of electoral reforms, but the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. By contrast, the scope of judicial review is positively related to successful enactment, but the effect is not statistically significant, either.

Model 2 introduces the legislative power variable to assess whether the government's voting power within the parliament alters the likelihood of successful electoral reforms. The results show that the government's seat share does not have a statistically significant relationship with the success of electoral reform, when controlled for the judicial review and constitutional protection. As observed in earlier model, judicial review is positively related to the success of electoral reform even after controlling for the government's voting power in the parliament, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, the constitutional protection is negatively related to the success of electoral reform attempts and this relationship is statistically significant at 10 percent.

In Model 3, I replace the government's seat share with the government type which is a categorical variable consisting of four types: single party majority, minimal winning coalition, surplus coalition and minority governments. Single-party majority government is the baseline

category in the model. While minority governments and surplus coalitions are more likely than single party majority governments to successfully implement reform attempts, minimal winning coalitions are less likely to do so. However, none these relationships are statistically significant. In this model, we still observe a positive relationship between judicial review and the success of electoral reform attempts; notably, this effect is more pronounced than in Model 1 and 2, and it is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results do not support the hypotheses about the legal procedures and government types. In contrast, the presence of judicial review, which is supposed to protect the electoral system against a majority decision, has the opposite effect in the analysis. In fact, the constitutional protection was the only variable that had the expected sign indicating that constitutional protection decreases the probability of successful reform attempts. In Models 4 and 5, I further investigate the positive relationship between judicial review and success of electoral reform attempts. In these models, I replicate the Models 2 and 3 with the binary variable of judicial review. Both models yield even stronger and statistically significant effect.

Table 6.3 Explaining the Success and Failure of Electoral Reform Attempts

	Model 1	Model 3	Model 2	Model 5	Model 4
Electoral System in Constitution	-0.513 (0.383)	-0.723* (0.421)	-0.504 (0.421)	-0.549 (0.428)	-0.306 (0.432)
Scope of Judicial Review	0.331 (0.234)	0.344 (0.241)	0.442* (0.247)		
Minimal Winning Coalition			-0.329 (0.631)		-0.287 (0.602)
Surplus Coalition			0.325 (0.659)		0.417 (0.634)
Minority Government			0.322 (0.654)		0.413 (0.637)
Existence of Judicial Review				1.163** (0.530)	1.362** (0.539)
Seat Share of Government (logged)		-1.070 (0.923)		-1.153 (0.986)	
Constant	0.109 (0.472)	4.523 (3.841)	-0.127 (0.724)	4.290 (4.047)	-0.789 (0.782)
Number of observations	124	122	123	122	123
Pseudo R ²	0.0280	0.0467	0.0449	0.0643	0.0643
Log-likelihood	-82.27	-79.04	-80.02	-77.58	-78.40
AIC	170.5	166.1	172.1	163.2	168.7
BIC	179.0	177.3	1889.0	174.4	185.7

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent level;

**Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level.

So far, my analysis yields a robust positive relationship between judicial review and electoral reform enactment. This result is in line with Nunez and Jacobs (2016), who find in their analyses for the catalysts of electoral reform that the existence of judicial review increases the likelihood of electoral reforms in general. Their explanation for this rather anomalous result focuses on the possible active role played by the constitutional courts concerning demanding reforms. They give the example of Japan where the Supreme Court intervened to push the government to decrease the malapportionment by legislating a reapportionment law (McElwain

2008; Nunez and Jacobs 2016: 465-66). However, the apportionment needs to be adjusted according to population changes in the electoral districts in certain periods, therefore, requiring judicial intervention when malapportionment levels are unconstitutional. A similar intervention is not needed in the components of electoral system which this dissertation uses (and so does their analysis) to define an electoral reform.

Instead of active role of courts, I shift the focus to the content and type of electoral reform attempts. The existence of judicial review process, like other institutional barriers, can influence the government's electoral reform behavior depending on the electoral reform type. In the following sections, I conduct the analyses in the subsamples of restrictive and permissive reform attempts to test the hypotheses.

6.3 The Success and Failure of Restrictive Reform Attempts

While the above analyses address the general question about the success of electoral reform attempts, this section focuses on whether the barriers to electoral reforms act differently according to the direction of electoral reforms. Does constitutional protection act as a barrier for both permissive and restrictive reforms? Do courts affect the relationship between the success of electoral reforms in the same way for both permissive and restrictive reforms? To address these issues, I estimate logistic regressions using the samples of restrictive reform attempts and permissive reform attempts separately.

The discussion in this section addresses the enactment of restrictive reforms. The results for the success and failure of restrictive reform attempts are presented in Table 6.4. Columns 1 through 3 re-produces the results from the analogous models reported in Table 6.3, whereas column 4 and 5 includes an additional explanatory variable (a binary indicator for formula and

threshold changes) to assess how the content of the electoral reform is related to the probability of successful enactment.

In terms of the effects of legal barriers, we observe that focusing on restrictive reform attempts yields different results than the results obtained from the earlier analysis based on all reform attempts. Model 1 shows that the presence of constitutional protection has a negative and statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) effect on the successful adoption of restrictive reforms. The existence of judicial review has a positive but statistically not significant effect. In Model 2, the government's seat share in the parliament is included to test whether the legislative power of the government is related to the likelihood of a restrictive electoral reform adoption. As observed in the earlier analysis based on the sample of both reform types, this variable does not have a statistically significant relationship with successful adoption of reforms. However, the constitutional protection maintains its negative and statistically significant effect (at the 5 percent level).

In Model 3, I replaced the legislative power of government with the government type variable. It is observed that the effect of constitutional protection remains negative but becomes less precise. All government types are more likely to successfully enact electoral reforms in comparison to the single party governments, even though the effect is not statistically significant. This finding does not support my hypothesis about government type (Hypothesis 3b). Notably the coefficient for surplus government is quite high, and while it is not statistically significant at conventional levels, this is only marginally so.⁹⁴ This effect of surplus government in this model makes theoretical sense because the constitutional protection of electoral systems requires

⁹⁴ It is significant at 10.5 percent.

broad support for an electoral system change to be enacted and this support is easier to maintain when the supporting groups are within the same coalition.

It is worth noting that in the models discussed so far, the scope of a judicial review process seems to be positively related to the successful enactment of restrictive reforms even though the estimated effect is not statistically significant. The findings are similar when I use the existence of judicial review variable. Thus, this result deserves attention since finding consistently positive but insignificant results may be due to the small sample size problem.

Table 6.4 Explaining the Success and Failure of Restrictive Reform Attempts

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Electoral System in Constitution	-1.016** (0.473)	-1.088** (0.484)	-0.934* (0.512)	-1.582** (0.632)	-1.568** (0.693)
Scope of Judicial Review	0.212 (0.283)	0.233 (0.290)	0.417 (0.308)	-0.081 (0.336)	0.014 (0.376)
Seat Share of Government (logged)		-0.083 (1.073)		0.413 (1.154)	
Minimal Winning Coalition			0.292 (0.820)		0.668 (1.019)
Surplus Coalition			1.238 (0.795)		1.060 (0.939)
Minority Government			0.763 (0.807)		0.811 (0.957)
Formula & Threshold Changes				3.349*** (0.736)	3.248*** (0.713)
Constant	0.094 (0.557)	0.471 (4.498)	-0.939 (0.923)	-1.781 (4.721)	-1.028 (1.129)
Number of observations	82	81	81	81	81
Pseudo R ²	0.0560	0.0636	0.0925	0.327	0.336
Log-likelihood	-53.45	-52.43	-50.81	-37.69	-37.20
AIC	112.9	112.9	113.6	85.4	88.4
BIC	120.1	122.4	127.6	97.4	105.1

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; *Significant at the 10 percent level.

The positive effect of judicial review on the success of restrictive reforms can be related to how politicians facing the barrier of judicial review process adjust their behavior. In this

particular case, pro-reform politicians can adjust their behavior by manipulating the content of electoral reforms packages so that even if the opposing parties refer the proposed law change in the electoral system to the constitutional court, the changes would not be found in violation of the constitution. While the changes in the tier structure, electoral threshold or seat allocation formulas can still be within the general principle of proportionality, albeit making a restrictive modification, the changes in the district magnitude or the replacement of the current electoral system by another system can hardly be interpreted as such. When there is judicial review, then, governments can change the content of electoral reforms to successfully enact the restrictive reform.

To test whether this explanation for the positive effect of judicial review is consistent with the data, I estimate an additional model by including a binary variable for formula and threshold changes (see Model 4 and 5). The results show that the content of the proposed reform is important to the likelihood of its success. In Model 4, the coefficient indicating for formula and threshold changes is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Importantly, controlling the content of the proposed reform reduces the coefficient for judicial reform and its effect becomes negative. The similar effect is also observed in the legislative power of government, its effect becomes positive as expected in Hypothesis 3b. But neither of these variables are statistically significant. On the contrary, the effect of the constitutional protection remains negative and significant even after controlling for the content of the proposed reform.

Model 5 also provides similar results with respect to the content of electoral reform. Indeed, the magnitude of this effect is the largest among the models estimated in this analysis. Yet, the coefficient for the existence of judicial review remains positive in this model, even though it becomes very close to zero. Overall, the results from Model 4 and 5 imply that the

content of electoral reforms and the presence of constitutional protection are the most important predictors for the success of restrictive electoral reform attempts.⁹⁵ Restrictive reforms are more likely to fail if the reforms involves a change in the district magnitude and the electoral system is protected by the constitution. The statistics reported for comparing the fit of the estimated models support this claim. It is observed that adding the content variable reduces both the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) while increasing the pseudo R^2 significantly.⁹⁶

6.3.1. Reform Enactment: Analysis of Restrictive Reform Cases

In this section, I examine several episodes of restrictive reform attempts to substantiate the findings of the statistical analyses. The cases are selected in a way to illustrate how the variables in the model work as well as to explore potential intervening variables in the success of restrictive reform attempts. Following the suggestions of Seawright and Gerring (2008), I selected both typical cases and deviant cases to serve the illustrative and explorative purposes, respectively. The typical cases are the successful Lithuanian reforms of 1996 and 2000. The electoral reform attempts in Latvia, on the other hand, demonstrates how constitutional protection leads the government to alter the content of the reform package, and the role of government fragmentation in the success of reform, even when the proposed changes do not require a constitutional amendment. Finally, the deviant case is the Austrian reform of 1992, which was enacted despite requiring a constitutional amendment.

⁹⁵ As a robustness check, I estimated Model 6 replacing the categories for the government type with the government's seat share in the parliament. The qualitative nature of the results does not change.

⁹⁶ Note that the model with a lower value for AIC (or for BIC) implies a better fit after controlling for the number of coefficients being estimated. By contrast, higher values of the pseudo R^2 are preferable even though the R^2 statistic in the logit model does not have the same interpretation as in the linear models.

Electoral Reforms in Lithuania

The success of restrictive reforms in Lithuania constitutes a typical case, which fits the regression model well. Even though Lithuania has a rigid constitution which requires at least two-thirds of parliamentarians to support an amendment in two readings, the constitution does not specify the electoral system (Maddex 2008:268-69).⁹⁷ Instead, it is left to the parliament to determine the election system as an ordinary law, except for the number of deputies to be elected (Article 55).⁹⁸ There is a full judicial review on the constitutionality of the laws, which can theoretically constrain electoral reform attempts. Nevertheless, having a parliamentary majority is sufficient for governments to enact an electoral system change, as long as the proposed changes are not found unconstitutional by the judicial review.

Within the time frame of this dissertation, Lithuania had three successful electoral reform attempts: one of them was increasing the proportionality of the electoral system while two of them were restrictive reforms. However, none of these reform attempts included a change concerning the district magnitude or the electoral system family. In other words, the mixed member system was maintained in Lithuania since its first democratic elections.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Lithuanian electoral system was adopted in 1992 as a compromise after prolonged negotiations between competing forces during democratization process (Martinaitis 2012: 393). The electoral system consists of two tiers: the nominal tier and the proportional representation (PR) tier, which work independent of one another. The nominal tier allocates 71 seats according to a two-round majoritarian formula and

⁹⁷ A constitutional amendment also requires the promulgation of the President within 5 days of amendment.

⁹⁸ See the English version of Lithuanian constitution on https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2006.pdf?lang=en

the proportional tier uses the LR-Hare formula to allocate 70 seats in a nationwide district to the party lists. Importantly, parties need to pass the 4-percent threshold to be elected.⁹⁹

The first electoral reform was launched six months before the 1996 elections, when the LDLP government's popularity was declining due to the banking crisis that erupted by the end of 1995. The government formed an all-party committee to elaborate proposals on amending the electoral law before the upcoming elections in October. Despite the agreed draft, the governing LDLP introduced two threshold changes: i) an increase of electoral threshold for all parties from 4 to 5 percent which would apply to minorities as well, and ii) the introduction of a special threshold of 7 percent for pre-electoral coalitions (Lithuania Update 1996b: 15; Mikkel and Pettai 2004). The other changes that appeared on the agreed draft included the introduction of preference voting in the PR tier, which would enable voters to vote for individual candidates instead of party lists, and an increase in the campaign finance limits (Lithuania Update 1996b: 16).

As expected, small parties resisted the restrictive reform and treated the proposed changes as an attempt to sideline the competitors facing larger parties. However, as a single-party majority government, LDLP had enough seats to pass this legislation. In addition, the other large party, the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives), also collaborated with LDLP to adopt this restrictive reform (Martinaitis 2012). The only challenge for the government was the presidential veto. President Brazauskas, who was against this electoral system change, vetoed the threshold increase and then introduced another bill to restore the original electoral threshold. Nonetheless, the parliamentarians overrode the president's veto; the president's bill gained

⁹⁹ The electoral threshold was lower for parties representing ethnic minorities (2 percent) in the original version of the electoral law of 1992. As will be discussed, the electoral reform before the 1996 elections raised the electoral threshold to 5 percent for all parties including the ethnic minority parties.

support of only 41 parliamentarians on August 12 (Lithuania Update 1996c: 16). Consequently, the government's reform proposal was successfully adopted, and the threshold changes were put into use in the 1996 elections.

The second electoral reform in Lithuania took place in the run-up to the 2000 elections and replaced the two-round majority system with a plurality system. The process that leads to electoral reform attempt began with the formation of an oversized coalition after the 1996 elections. The election results in 1996 proved disappointing for LDLP, whose parliamentary seats declined to 12. While the threshold increase adopted prior to the elections did decrease the number of contestants in the PR tier, it did not stop LDLP from losing the election as not only its vote share declined but also its small competitor (and, allegedly, the target of the threshold increase), LSDP, overcame the threshold (Mikkil and Pettai 2004). In contrast, the Lithuanian Conservatives (Homeland Union Party) gained 70 seats, one short of majority (Clark 1998).¹⁰⁰ After the elections, the Homeland Union Party formed an oversized coalition with the Christian Democrats (LKDP), which was also supported by the Lithuanian Center Union (LCS).

The oversize coalition was not very stable, though. Due to the economic crisis and disagreement between Prime Minister Vagnorius and President Adamkus over the way to deal with it, the government fell. After much deliberations, the Homeland Union Party and the Christian Democrats formed another government to which the Lithuanian Center Union refused to give support. Amidst the economic crisis and declining public approval rates of the governing coalition, new parties started to emerge in the run-up to the 2000 elections. Also worrying for government was the party splits that started within the ruling parties. For instance, the

¹⁰⁰ Another interesting result of the 1996 elections was that both the raw and effective number of parties was higher in the majoritarian tier of the election than in the PR tier (Martinaitis 2012).

parliamentary members who were loyal to former Prime Minister Vagnorius split from the Homeland Union to form their own party: Moderate Conservative Union. Similarly, the modernizers within the Christian Democrat Party decided to launch their new party: the Modern Christian Democratic Union (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003; Fitzmaurice 2003).

To fence off newly emerging competitors, the coalition government wanted to replace the two-round majoritarian formula in the nominal tier with a plurality formula (Martinaitis 2012: 395). This decision was mainly motivated by the fact that the smaller parties were mostly concentrated in the nominal tier, rather than the PR tier, of the mixed system. In addition, the Homeland Party used the local election results as a tool to strategize about the election formula. Despite having the plurality votes in eight districts in the local elections, the Homeland Party could only retain two of them in the second round (T. D. Clark and Prekevičius 2003: 559). The party decided that a plurality formula would help them in the national elections and therefore introduced a new formula for the nominal tier. This time, however, the electoral reform attempt met with resistance not only from the President Adamkus but also from all the opposition parties. But the government was convinced that the plurality system would help them against its competitors so much so that they mustered the necessary votes to overturn the presidential veto and legislated the reform (Martinaitis 2012).

To sum up, these two restrictive reforms in Lithuania show that the respective governments were not constrained by the constitutional protection and thus were able to pass the electoral system changes, given that they had the majority in the parliament and did not include many partners, who needed to be convinced to support the proposed changes. The first reform was implemented by a single-party majority government, while the second reform was

implemented during a coalition government formed by the Homeland Union Party and the Christian Democrats.

More importantly, the content of the proposed changes in the two electoral reform packages did not include a change in the assembly size, which would require a constitutional amendment. When we consider two other electoral reform attempts in Lithuania—though they are outside the confines of this dissertation—they illustrate the significance of electoral reform content even more. The first attempt was to reduce the number of deputies and introduce a direct majoritarian system in November 1995, thus a restrictive electoral reform attempt. A group of political figures and journalists wanted to implement this change through a referendum initiated by citizens. This attempt failed to meet the constitutional amendment requirement of 300,000 signatures of registered voters in three months to call a referendum on electoral reform (Lithuania Update 1996a: 15). The second one is the recent referendum in Lithuania (in May 2019) in which the government attempted to decrease the assembly size from 141 to 121. This proposed change failed in the referendum due to the low level of voter turnout (47 percent) even though 74 percent of the voters supported the proposed change.¹⁰¹ Parties and politicians sought the citizens' initiated referendum option to change the assembly size, as this component of electoral system was protected by the constitution. These incidents show the importance of constitutional protection as a barrier to electoral reform.

Electoral Reforms in Latvia

In contrast to Lithuania, the electoral system is embedded in the Latvian constitution. The constitution specifies not only the assembly size but also the proportional representation system

¹⁰¹ <http://eunewslithuania.com/lithuanias-referendum-on-dual-citizenship-failed/>

in Articles 5 and 6. Therefore, electoral reforms introducing a change in the PR system needs to meet the criteria for constitutional amendments, which is at least two-thirds of majority in three readings. Moreover, since the Constitutional Court is empowered to have full review for the constitutionality of the laws passed by the parliament (Maddex 2008: 256), electoral system changes within the PR system (such as changes in formulas or electoral thresholds), too, have the risk of failure.

Given the constitutional protection of the electoral system, altering the electoral system family is very difficult in Latvia. In fact, as the parliamentary debate shows the major reform was proposed by the junior coalition partner was taken off the table because it would require constitutional amendment. The other electoral reform attempts occurred in Latvia were only concerned with raising the electoral threshold and only one of these attempts succeeded. Before getting into the reform process, I provide a brief overview of the electoral system in Latvia, which is quite simple. Voters elect 100 representatives in five districts based on the Sainte-Laguë formula. There is a national 4-percent threshold for parties to enter the parliament. Lastly, voters can mark their preference votes for as many candidates as they would like (Mikkil and Pettai 2004).

The first electoral reform took place in 1995 right before the second democratic elections. The governing coalition at the time, composed of the Latvian Way (LW) and the Political Association of Economists (PAE), proposed to increase the electoral threshold from 4 to 5 percent. The draft also included articles about the candidate eligibility. The government bill passed the first reading with 56 votes in favor on February 22, 1995 (Latvia Update 1995a). Despite receiving many proposals amending the draft law after the first reading, the legal

commission rejected all of them and continued with the original draft, which alters the electoral threshold.

Interestingly, PAE, a junior coalition partner, made a proposal to adopt mixed member system. According to this proposal, 50 deputies would be elected by the PR system and the remaining 50 deputies by the plurality formula in single-member districts (Latvia Update 1995: 15). This proposal did not receive any support from the opposition since it was a drastic change in the district magnitude and electoral system family. More importantly, the leading coalition partner, Latvian Way, did not support this proposal further since it would require a constitutional amendment, for which the government did not have the votes. And consequently, this proposal was rejected. This incident shows the strategic behavior of government in selecting the content of electoral system change in order to successfully enact the reform. The leading party in government changed the electoral threshold, which is not protected by constitution but still produces a restrictive result.

On the 26th of May, the Saeima approved the electoral law bill, which increased the electoral threshold, proposed by the main governing party without changing any articles after the second reading (Latvia Update 1995b). The electoral law spurred a process of pre-election coalition formation given the fragmented party structure in the process leading up to the 1995 elections.

The major theme of the 1995 elections was the government's inability to deliver any economic progress which cost the Latvian Way, one of the coalition partners prior to the 1995 elections, half of its seats in the parliament (Davies and Ozolins 1996). In the elections held on October 1995, nine parties entered the parliament, with the largest party, the Democratic Party Saimnieks, having 18 percent of seats, followed by the Latvian Way with 17 percent of seats.

With no parties or blocs able to claim a parliamentary majority, the government formation proved very difficult in Latvia and various attempts to form government failed (Sprudz 2001). In the end, the president met with parliamentary parties and initiated a consensus in which a prime minister not affiliated with any political parties would form a broad coalition. The president gave the task to form a government to Andris Skele who then formed a grand coalition government with six of the nine parties in the parliament. On December 21, this surplus government was voted into office by 73 of 100 votes in the parliament (Latvia Update 1996). The coalition basically included all the parties except for pro-Russian Socialists and Populist People's Movement (Sprudz 2001).

The coalition government faced a number of crises, but the most important one was the corruption scandal uncovered by an investigation initiated by the Democratic Party-Saimnieks (DP-S, a member of the ruling coalition). The investigation proved larger than what the DP-S expected, affecting some of its own members as well. However, the most important point in this investigation was when the prosecutor general revealed that the Minister of Transport, Kristopans (from the Latvian Way), violated the anti-corruption law. Skele, the Prime Minister, asked Kristopans's resignation, but he refused to resign. This event also spurred a new discussion within the factions of the coalition about the prime minister himself, which ended the Skele government. The demands for a politically accountable prime minister led to the formation of another coalition government on August 1997. This coalition government included five parties: the Fatherland and Freedom Party, the Democratic Party-Saimnieks, the Latvian Way faction, and the coalition faction of the Farmers' Union and the Christian Democrats, and the prime minister became the leader of the Fatherland and Freedom Party, Guntars Krasts (Davies and

Ozolins 2001; Latvia Update 1996; Sprudzs 2001). After resigning from the broad coalition of the 1995-1997 period, Skele formed his own center-right party, the People's Party.

Right after the coalition crisis, the leading parties in the government, the Fatherland and Freedom Party (FFP), the Latvian Way (LW), and the Democratic Party-Saimnieks (DP-S), proposed changes to the election law to reduce the proportionality of the system. The reform package included three items. The first one was the registration requirement which allowed parties to participate in parliamentary elections after 3 years of registration, to ward off Skele's new party. The second one was about the electoral threshold, which introduced a 7-percent threshold for pre-election coalition lists. And the third one was making it possible for political parties to recall their deputies if they have been expelled or have resigned from their parties (Latvia Update 1997a: 20-21). These proposed changes sparked heated discussions in the parliament. With the parliamentary elections approaching, parties whose seats shares depend on pre-election coalitions opposed the proposed reforms. Given the fragmented nature of the parliament, the pro-reform coalition (LW, FFP and DP-S) could not get the support of other parties in the parliament and the vote share of this coalition was not enough to pass the legislation (Latvia Update 1997: 24). Therefore, the electoral threshold change failed in the second reading, and the only change that passed in this reading was the registration requirement, which was to be evaluated in the third reading (Latvia Update 1997b:3).

The above discussion demonstrates that two implications of the model developed in Chapter 2 account for the Latvian reform attempts. First, the constitutional protection for the electoral system affects the content of the electoral reforms proposed by governments. As the discussion among the parties concerning the elements of the 1995 reform shows, given the rigidity of the constitution and the existence of full judicial review, small parties objected this

proposal, but even the coalition partner did not consider the proposals that would possibly require a constitutional amendment. Instead, they changed the elements of the electoral system in a way to leave the system still within the confines of the PR system.

Second, the success of electoral reforms depends on the parliamentary structure and, in particular, the government's legislative power. The juxtaposition of the two reforms discussed above underlines this point. The governing coalition with enough seats to enact laws was able to adopt the electoral reform in 1995, which did not require a constitutional amendment. By contrast, in 1997 three larger parties in government, which could enact laws only with the support of smaller parties, was not able to pass the item of the reform package concerning the threshold change applying to pre-election alliance lists. The leading parties in the government tried to garner support from the smaller parties, particularly from the alliance formed by the Farmers' Union and the Christian Democrats, which was the smallest partner of the governing coalition. Not surprisingly, their efforts failed since the small parties were planning to form alliances in the upcoming elections to enter the parliament. This is evident from the alliance formed between the Farmers' Union and the Christian Democrats in the 1995 elections.¹⁰²

Another interesting lesson from the reform attempt in 1997 is that the leading parties in the government tried to convince the smaller parties in the parliament by including an item in the reform bill to attract their interest. As indicated, the proposed reform would enable political parties to recall their deputies if they have been expelled or have resigned. This item was likely inspired by the fact that before the coalition negotiations two deputies from the People's Harmony Party resigned, which left the party short of one member to form a faction in the

¹⁰² This alliance received 6.13 percent of votes and won 7 seats in the parliament.

parliament.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, since the major component of reform was against their interests, the Harmony Party did not support this electoral system change, leading to its failure. Even though we did not observe a statistically significant effect of government's legislative power in the regression models, this case showed its importance for enacting the electoral system change.

The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1992

The success of Austrian electoral reform in 1992 is a deviant case according to the regression analysis. The electoral reform added a new tier which consists of 43 districts, thus changing not only the tier structure but also the district magnitude. This major restrictive electoral reform was successfully adopted in July 1992, despite a rigid constitution and a strong (full) judicial review system effective since 1975. Examining the process leading to the success of this reform will help us understand how the barriers of electoral reform, such as the constitutional protection, can be overcome, albeit in successive attempts. This examination will also uncover the parliamentary dynamics leading to the adoption of electoral reforms.

The Austrian electoral system before the 1992 reform distributed 183 seats in two tiers. There were nine districts in the first tier, which corresponded to province (Länder) boundaries, and seats were allocated according to the Hare quota in this tier. The upper tier distributed the remainder seats by the d'Hondt formula in two districts. This electoral system was very proportional with the mean district magnitude above 20 (Reimink 2015). The electoral reform in 1992 added another tier to the electoral system, which consists of 43 districts. The second-tier districts correspond to the Länder boundaries and the last tier consists of one district. For the seat

¹⁰³ It should also be noted that the People's Movement for Latvia, which won 16 seats with 15.05 percent of votes in the 1995 elections, also lost six deputies, who resigned the party and then formed a new parliamentary faction, For Nation and Justice (Jeffries 2004).

distribution in these upper tiers, only parties which overcome the 4-percent electoral threshold are eligible (Müller 1996: 410). Instead of calculating the remainder votes for the upper-tier seat allocation, the new system included all the votes, which was favoring the larger parties at the expense of smaller ones.

As the above description demonstrates, the electoral reform was quite complex, and it required a constitutional amendment because of introducing a change in the district structure (Müller 2005). Even though the electoral system is an ordinary law in the Austrian system, meaning that it can be altered by a parliamentary majority, two aspects of the election law is embedded in the constitutional. The first one is the principle of equality in the elections, which has been interpreted as elections should be held with a proportional representation system (Müller 2005; Müller and Fallend 2004; Raabe 2015). The second one is about the district boundaries and it rules out the creation of electoral districts that crosscut different Landers (Müller 2005). Therefore, electoral reforms that include a change in either of these two elements of the electoral system require a constitutional amendment with at least two-thirds of majority in the lower house (Nationalrat). As an additional hurdle, a third of the upper house (Bundesrat) members can enforce a referendum for any constitutional amendment (Maddex 2008), but this power of the upper house was rarely utilized (Müller 2003). Despite the constitutional barrier, though, the electoral reform described above was successfully adopted in 1992.

A quick examination of the electoral reform process reveals that the 1992 reform was a result of a series of attempts in two successive legislative terms. The first push for a restrictive electoral reform emerged in the aftermath of the 1986 elections, even though there were complaints about the district magnitude even before that. The districts were *too large* to enable a connection between the voters and their representatives, according to critics (Müller 2005).

However, this problem was exacerbated with the rise of the Greens and the FPÖ (Freedom Party) in the 1986 elections; while the former was able to enter the parliament, the latter increased its seat share remarkably in the same election (Müller 2003). The emergence of new forces challenged the dominance of the Socialist Party (SPÖ, and Social Democratic Party since 1991) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP).

More importantly, neither of the large parties wanted to collaborate with FPÖ due to its radical transformation and populist orientation (Müller 2004, 2005). To distance themselves from FPÖ, the established parties decided to form a grand coalition in 1987. This was not a costless solution, either. The coalition government also had to dissociate themselves from the earlier period of grand coalitions (between 1947 and 1966) during which the role of parliament and opposition parties was considerably reduced. To this end, the grand coalition agreement started with outlining a democratic reform agenda, which also included an electoral system reform (Jacobs 2011; Müller 2005)

The first electoral reform proposal of the government was to replace the PR system with a mixed-member proportional system, which consists of 100 single-member districts and a PR tier with a 3-percent threshold. Despite the agreement on the electoral system in general, there were negotiations about the number, size and boundaries of electoral districts (Jacobs 2011). A reform commission was formed to discuss and settle the disagreements about the details. But the commission changed the original plan significantly by reducing the number of seats in the nominal tier to 80. Small parties opposed vehemently to this change, but more importantly, the backbenchers of ÖVP did not support this reform package either (Müller 2005), stating that the plurality component of the proposed system would result in competition between the factions of

relatively more decentralized and factionalized ÖVP. As a result, the first reform attempt failed in December 1987 (Jacobs 2011).

Upon the failure of this reform proposal, a number of different reform proposals was put on the agenda. ÖVP wanted a proportional system with 25 multi-membered districts and a 5-percent electoral threshold while SPÖ proposed to have 9 districts and a 3-percent threshold, each of which diverged from the original electoral reform package (Jacobs 2011). Another proposal was outlined in October 1989, which resembled the original plan. However, the coalition government could not agree on the details, yet again. Even though other parts of the democratic reform package, such as the introduction of the binding government-sponsored referendum, were enacted during this legislative term, the electoral reform failed due to the disagreements within the coalition. Hence, the 1990 elections took place with the same electoral system.

The electoral system and democratic reforms were on the agenda during the election campaign. After the 1990 elections, SPÖ and ÖVP formed another oversized coalition and continued with the democratic reforms. After a sturdy negotiation process, this coalition government introduced a new electoral law that was less dramatic but more complex than the proposals put forward in the previous legislative term. The main issue of contention in the previous proposal had been the plurality tier of the mixed system; thus, it was not included in the new proposal. Instead of a mixed system, which would increase the connection between the voters and their representatives, the new proposal decreased the district size and yet kept the more proportional formula. In addition, the proposal also added another feature to strengthen voters' choice over the representatives: reducing the preference threshold (Müller 2005). These two elements helped the government conceal an essentially restrictive element of the reform,

lowering the district magnitude, by promoting the voter-representative connection. Nonetheless, small parties were opposing the electoral reform as it was disadvantageous for them (Jacobs 2011). With the full support from backbenchers this time, the government was able to adopt the electoral reform.

The grand coalition consisting of two parties was able to amend the constitution as it had the necessary numbers. However, the electoral reform had to be crafted in a number of times to ensure that the members of both parties were satisfied with the content of the electoral reform. While the reform attempts in the first legislative term failed, political parties skillfully negotiated and altered the agreed-upon changes, which was voted by two-thirds of majority. The successful adoption of Austrian electoral reform shows the importance of governments' legislative power, but also the need to craft the elements of electoral reform to get the support of all governing parties to pass the legislation. The magnitude of this new electoral law was not comparable to the earlier attempts, but its effect is still in restrictive (Jacobs 2011; Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017). More importantly, the accounts of Austrian electoral reform present the detailed calculations among coalition parties about the districting and its effect on the parties' seat share (Jacobs 2011).

6.4 The Success and Failure of Permissive Reforms

The failure of permissive electoral reform attempts is even more interesting as the legal protection does not necessarily restrict the adoption of more permissive rules.¹⁰⁴ As a

¹⁰⁴ Among the countries which include the electoral system in their constitutions, all of them protect the proportionality of the electoral system, except for Turkey. In the Turkish Constitution, the principle of electoral system is stated that the electoral system should promote both fair representation and a stable executive.

consequence, the data used in this study consist of 42 permissive reform attempts, of which only 9 of them failed. Therefore, given the small sample size and the low likelihood of failure, the regression analysis can only give us a limited guidance to understand why some of the permissive reforms failed. Keeping in mind the potential caveats of employing a regression method, I present the results from the logistic regressions. Following the same approach as before, I re-estimate the models reported in Table 6.4 using the sample of permissive reform attempts. I include two additional models where using the binary measure for judicial review has different results, as will be explained below. The results are presented in Table 6.5.

The data show that the success rate is about 81 percent when there is a judicial review process and it is 60 percent when there is no judicial review. Similarly, the success rate increases from 76.5 percent to 80 percent when there is constitutional protection. Despite these differences, the small sample problem is likely to result in imprecise and thus insignificant coefficients. As the first model shows, the coefficients on the legal barriers, such as constitutional protection and judicial review, are positive but the estimated effects on the success of permissive reforms are not statistically significant.

The results also show that the legislative power of government is negatively associated with the success of permissive reforms throughout the models (Model 2, 3 and Model 5), but this relationship is not statistically significant. The scope of judicial review has a positive but statistically not significant effect on the success of permissive reforms, when controlled for legislative power of government and constitutional protection. When I use as a binary indicator (whether judicial review exists or not) for judicial review, the coefficient for judicial review becomes larger in Model 3 but it is still not statistically significant.

Table 6.5 Explaining the Success and Failure of Permissive Reform Attempts

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Electoral System in Constitution	0.297 (0.821)	-0.150 (0.905)	-0.088 (0.898)	0.147 (0.922)	0.281 (0.863)	0.078 (0.886)	0.244 (0.956)
Scope of Judicial Review	0.348 (0.568)	0.364 (0.712)		0.572 (0.587)		0.320 (0.751)	0.522 (0.609)
Existence of Judicial Review			1.076 (1.450)		2.178* (1.291)		
Seat Share of Government (logged)		-4.249 (2.847)	-4.022 (2.932)			-3.865 (2.805)	
Minimal Winning Coalition				-1.366 (1.297)	-1.266 (1.192)		-1.206 (1.380)
Surplus Coalition				-0.447 (1.453)	0.462 (1.664)		-0.345 (1.480)
Minority Government				0.045 (1.331)	0.604 (1.574)		0.098 (1.370)
Formula & Threshold Changes						0.829 (0.844)	0.287 (0.811)
Constant	0.595 (1.160)	17.825 (11.574)	16.514 (11.738)	0.963 (1.549)	-0.365 (1.799)	15.804 (11.436)	0.730 (1.747)
Number of observations	42	41	41	42	42	41	42
Pseudo R ²	0.0117	0.0929	0.103	0.0725	0.108	0.115	0.0747
Log-likelihood	-21.57	-18.36	-18.16	-20.24	-19.47	-17.92	-20.19
AIC	49.1	44.7	44.3	52.5	50.9	45.8	54.4
BIC	53.4	51.6	51.2	62.9	61.4	54.4	66.6

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level;

*Significant at the 10 percent level.

The results also show that the government types do not have a significant effect on the success of permissive reforms, throughout the models (Model 4, 5, and 7). In Model 5, I use the binary variable of judicial review. Even though minority governments are more likely to succeed in enacting permissive electoral rules in comparison to the single party governments in Model 5, this effect is not statistically significant and becomes negligible when controlled for the reform content in Model 7. Importantly, the effect of judicial review increases dramatically in Model 5 and becomes statistically significant (at the 10 percent level). Finally, in Models 6 and 7, the binary variable for the content of the electoral reform, which was the most important predictor of success in the restrictive reform attempts, is not statistically significant even though the positive sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction.

The analyses of restrictive and permissive attempts together suggest that politicians adjust their behavior according to the existence of external actors. For instance, the existence of an active judiciary constrains politicians' behavior leading them not to initiate electoral reforms that could be reversed by the judiciary, such as majoritarian modifications decreasing the district magnitude. Such a constraint does not have a similar effect on the permissive reforms in countries using proportional and semi-proportional systems.

6.4.1. Reform Enactment: Analysis of Permissive Reform Cases

The results of regression analyses do not inform us much about the failure of permissive electoral reform attempts due to the small sample size and the low likelihood of failure. But the sample includes countries that have both successful and failed permissive reform attempts. The analysis of such countries can shed light on the dynamics of permissive reform adoption within the same institutional structure. In the next part, I analyze the reform enactment stage of two

permissive reform attempts in Bulgaria. The first attempt was in 1997 in which the government attempted to lower the electoral threshold but failed. The second attempt was in 2010 when the governing coalition successfully replaced the mixed member electoral system with a proportional representation system.

Permissive Reform Attempts in Bulgaria

The Bulgarian electoral system oscillated between mixed member majoritarian (MMM) and PR alternatives since 1990. The transition elections were held under a mixed system with 200 seats allocated in SMDs with a two-round majoritarian formula and the remaining 200 seats in PR with the d'Hondt formula. In 1991, a new law, adopted for the first democratic elections, abolished the SMD tier and introduced, a PR system with the d'Hondt formula to elect 240 deputies in 31 multi-member districts. The new law also established a national threshold of 4 percent. This electoral system proved stable between 1991 and 2009, despite the attempts to change it in 1994, 1997 and 2001. But then, it went through another period of instability from 2009 onwards: the proportional representation system was replaced by a mixed system in 2009 and then brought back again in 2010. The electoral system stayed on the agenda since then, experiencing several calls for electoral reform by holding a referendum from the president and citizens (in 2015 and in 2016, respectively). Among these reform attempts, two of them were in permissive direction: the failed attempt of 1997 and the electoral reform of 2010. The processes of these reforms show the divergent behavior of the opposition parties affecting the success of electoral reform, as will be explained below.

The Permissive Reform Attempt of 1997

The PR system with the d'Hondt formula remained intact in Bulgaria despite a highly volatile party system. The Bulgarian Socialist Party-led coalition (BSP), which won the largest share of votes (52 percent) and received 125 seats, claimed victory in the 1994 elections (Birch et al. 2002; R. J. Crampton 1995). The process of electoral reform was triggered by the declining popularity of the BSP government, formed by Videnov—by the end of 1996, the government's popularity had been damaged by the devalued currency, corruption scandals and hyperinflation. The economic crisis was also coupled with a food crisis due to the government's failure to implement a land reform (R. Crampton 1997). Moreover, the poor performance of BSP candidate in the presidential elections of 1996 signaled the weakening of the government party, as well as generating criticisms against the party leadership among the party members.

More importantly, the opposition forces started to consolidate to form the United Democratic Forces, which consisted of the Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF), the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), and the People's Union (PU) (Bulgaria Update 1997a: 7). In the face of mounting public pressure channeled by the opposition, BSP leader Videnov resigned and the party called for an early election scheduled for April 1997 (R. Crampton 1997). Before the elections, the outgoing government of BSP acted to lower the electoral threshold from 4 to 3 percent (Birch et al. 2002; R. Crampton 1997: 560). The strategic intent was to produce a fragmented parliament, which would increase the relative strength of BSP against the consolidating right-wing opposition (Bulgaria Update 1997b: 6).

However, the government's last-minute maneuver to change the election law to influence the composition of the future parliament was resisted by all the opposition parties. The

opposition not only criticized the government but also demanded that President veto the electoral system change (Bulgaria Update 1997b: 6). However, having a parliamentary majority is enough to override a presidential veto in Bulgaria and BSP, at the time, enjoyed the power to do so.¹⁰⁵ The President Stoyanov, who was elected as the candidate of UDF in the 1996 presidential elections, could potentially veto the election law after the Parliament was dissolved. However, BSP made it clear that should the President veto the law after the dissolution of parliament, it would refer this decision to the Constitutional Court.

In this tactical game, though, President Stoyanov was quite successful by vetoing the electoral reform only one day before the dissolution of the parliament (Bulgaria Update 1997b: 7; R. Crampton 1997). BSP's efforts to summon an extraordinary session failed. Basically, BSP had no time to override the presidential veto, even though it had the necessary legislative votes to do it. In addition, the venue for appealing to the Constitutional Court was not available since the veto was before the dissolution of the parliament. This failure to decrease the electoral threshold facilitated the consolidation of the BSP's competitors: United Democratic Forces gained 137 seats with 52 percent of votes in the 1997 elections.

The Permissive Reform of 2010

In the early 2000s, the party structure started to change in Bulgaria. The first important change was the emergence and success of the National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS) party, established by the former monarch Simeon, in the 2001 legislative elections. The victory of NMSS was short-lived and its popularity declined rapidly in the 2005 elections. The second

¹⁰⁵ See the article 101 of the Bulgarian constitution that describes this law: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bulgaria_2015.pdf?lang=en

development was the emergence of the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party in the 2007 elections for the European parliament and local elections, capturing the center-right votes (Spirova 2008). For the BSP-led government, these new contestants had to be contained, especially considering the declining support for the governing parties. The BSP government, hoping to capitalize on their support bases in less densely populated areas, replaced the PR system with a mixed member majoritarian system in 2009 (Barzachka 2012). The system with 31 SMDs with the plurality vote was designed to give a structural advantage to BSP. However, this attempt proved to be disastrous for the governing coalition, BSP and NDSS, as their expectations did not materialize. In fact, GERB emerged as the winner of the 2009 elections with 39.9 percent vote share and 117 seats (Kolarova and Spirova 2010).

After the 2009 elections, GERB leader Borisov formed a minority government based on the outside support of the radical populist party, Ataka (Kolarova and Spirova 2010).¹⁰⁶ Aside from the global financial crisis and its effect on the Bulgarian economy, one of the major issues in Bulgarian politics during this time was the electoral integrity, especially concerns about vote buying. According to the surveys, only 14 percent of Bulgarians believe that elections did not suffer from vote-buying, or other types of manipulation (Leviev-Sawyer 2011). The dominance of center-right parties in the parliament enabled GERB to form a special commission to address the election integrity issue. This committee was authorized to make revisions in the electoral law by the end of June 2010 (Kolarova and Spirova 2010).

In 2010, the GERB government introduced a new electoral code (Kodeks), which combines the rules for legislative, presidential, local and European elections in a single electoral

¹⁰⁶ GERB had asked for the support of the center-right Blue Coalition and Order, Law and Justice (RZS, but only Ataka agreed to support a minority government formed by GERB.

code, upon the commission's report. The new electoral code was very comprehensive and changed many components of the electoral law, in addition to restoring back to the PR system (this time with the Hare quota). Other important changes included the introduction of preferential voting, the residence requirement for voters (12 months for the local elections and 2 year for the European elections), elimination of the direct election of mayors in settlements populated by less than 350 inhabitants, relaxing the campaign spending caps, and introduction of a stricter registration rule for pre-election coalitions (Kolarova and Spirova 2011: 925).

The electoral reform sparked heated disputes within the parliament. However, the main issue of contention was the residency requirement, which was targeting the Movement of Rights and Freedom Party (MRF) that represents ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, rather than the other crucial elements of the proposed electoral system change. The other modifications, which received only limited attention by politicians, included the registration rules for pre-election coalitions, which was criticized by BSP, and the high threshold for the preference voting, which was disapproved by the Blue Coalition (Disputes Remain in Bulgaria's New Electoral Legislation 2010). The main criticism for the new electoral code, though, came from President Parvanov who stated that GERB and its ally, Ataka, proposed these changes in order to facilitate their re-election without addressing the issue of vote buying, which was the most pressing issue for the election (Bulgarian President Vetoes Election Code Amendments 2011).

The liability of incumbency is well known in the Bulgarian context as no election had been won by the incumbent until 2013. This is valid even for the newly created parties which then won landslide electoral victories as in the example of NMSS (the winner of 2001 elections), which failed to enter the parliament in 2009 (Harper 2003; Spirova 2010b, 2010a). The negative economic outlook and clear responsibility of GERB as a single-minority government contributed

to the decline of GERB's popularity in 2010. The choice of a PR formula with the highest proportionality, the Hare quota, makes sense for GERB. However, GERB's reform package also included elements to weaken the opposition such as the residency requirement which directly targeted the MRF's voter base. Despite its rhetoric for ending cartelization of politics and facilitating the entry of new parties, GERB did not undertake many needed reforms. But the election code proposed by the GERB-led government preserved many flaws of the previous system such as the influence of controlled corporate vote and controlled ethnic vote, which could have been remedied by mandatory voting (Stefanov 2015). Nonetheless, the government did not choose these types of changes.

In the end, the electoral code passed with GERB and Ataka votes, while MRF and the leftist voted against and the Blue Coalition abstained.¹⁰⁷ President Parvanov returned the bill to the parliament, citing many of its shortcomings, especially with respect to the voting of Bulgarian citizens with dual citizenship and the abolition of direct elections of mayors. But the government, which had enough support in the parliament, was able to override Parvanov's veto. Perplexingly, the replacement of the mixed system by a PR system did not receive equal attention by the political parties as the other aspects of the electoral code, especially the residence requirement. In fact, the government had to shorten the residency requirement since the Constitutional Court declared that it was unconstitutional (Decision of the BCC No. 4 in Kolarova and Spirova 2012).

The process of permissive electoral reforms illustrates the crucial role of the opposition parties' stance against the reform. In the 1997 attempt, the opposition parties were adamant in

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.parliament.bg/en/news/ID/2141>, <https://www.parliament.bg/en/news/ID/2159/>

their rejection, even asking the president to take action against the reform, although the reform attempt was a comparatively smaller one in magnitude compared to the 2010 electoral reform. In the case of 2010 electoral reform, by contrast, abolishing the majoritarian tier of the mixed system did not receive equal attention. The opposition was mostly vociferous on the residence requirement, which in the last stage, was indeed shortened because of the Constitutional Court verdict.

Permissive Reform Attempts of 1995 in Turkey

Before completing the discussion on the success of permissive reforms, I present the parallels between permissive reform attempts of Turkey in 1995 and Bulgarian ones, in terms of the role of opposition parties. As discussed in Chapter 5, the coalition government initiated two permissive electoral reforms in 1995. While the government failed to enact the first bill due to the verdict of the Constitutional Court, it succeeded in enacting the second bill. It is important to underline that both bills included a change in the district magnitude. The diverging outcomes within the same legislative year stems from the government's decision to implement a permissive reform within the boundaries set by the Constitutional Court's verdict about the first bill, as will be explained below.

The first bill (Law No: 4125) replaced districted PR system with a two-tier PR system. While the first tier distributed 450 seats at the district level, the second one distributed 100 seats at the national level. In addition to these changes, the district magnitude was increased in the first tier, allowing a district to have 18 seats at the maximum (it was 6 in 1987 and 1991 elections). The district thresholds were kept similar, a simple Hare quota was being used (votes/seats in an electoral district) but for electoral districts with 2 or 3 seats, it was set to 25 percent. The national

threshold was kept as it was. By keeping national threshold of ten percent, the coalition government meant that only parties that passes the threshold would take advantage of this proportionality. Nonetheless, the overall effect of these changes was quite proportional in comparison to the previous electoral system.

During the parliamentary debate, this bill was criticized by the opposition parties two grounds: i) for not decreasing the national threshold, and ii) for the national tier. Regarding the first issue, smaller parties in the parliament such as Democratic Left Party, National Action Party and Great Union Party, claimed that the electoral system is not fair due to the high district and national thresholds. These artificial hurdles, they argue, cause an important part of opposition to remain outside the parliament (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1995: 18-20, 21-24, 51-2). Regarding the national tier, opposition parties criticized the allocation of parliamentarians elected from the national tier. According to the law, national tier parliamentarians are elected according to parties' national vote share and then are allocated to the electoral districts. The opposition parties argued that this arrangement would give more power to the party leaders, since candidates for this tier would be selected by them. Moreover, the voters whose party did not pass the threshold would be represented by parliamentarians (possibly national tier parliamentarians) whom they did not vote for (Turkish Grand National Assembly Records 1995: 22).

Despite these criticisms, the coalition government formed by True Path Party and Republican People's Party was able to pass the electoral law. The opposition parties, then, referred the law to the constitutional court. They argued that the national level district was against the constitution, as it introduces the concept of *national parliamentarians*. In the Turkish

Constitution, however, it is stated that all parliamentarians represent the people in the country. Moreover, DLP also brought the national threshold issue to the Court arguing that it was against the principle of fair representation. The Court issued its verdict on November 18, one month before the election. It found the use of national tier unconstitutional, thus the new electoral law was not enacted. As for the national threshold, the Court did not find it against the constitution.

After the constitutional court verdict, the government designed another electoral reform for the December elections. The second law was exactly the same, except for the national tier. Given that Court's verdict made it impossible to have a national tier, the coalition government decided to increase the proportionality of electoral system by only increasing the district magnitude (Law No: 4138). This case is important for three reason. First, it shows that opposition's objection can be effective if they utilize the veto powers as in the Bulgarian case. Second, in permissive reforms, the objections of opposition parties usually are not based on how permissive the system would become but with other aspects of constitution. Third, in contrast to the restrictive reform, the governments were still able to enact a district magnitude change even though they did not have seats to amend the constitution.

6.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provides an analysis of electoral reform attempts to understand the factors determining the success of proposed reforms. In doing that, the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 provide the road map. Three factors are expected to alter the probability of enactment of reform proposals. The first one is the legislative power of the government, measured by the government's seat share in the parliament and the type of government (categorized into four depending on the relative legislative power of each government type). The second factor is

institutional barriers in the form of protection for the electoral system provided either by the constitution or judicial review (or both). The last factor is the content of the reform proposal. Following the literature, I differentiate reform bills according to whether or not they introduce any change in the district magnitude. To investigate the extent to which these three factors are important to the enactment of reform proposals, I conduct a statistical analysis, whereby I estimate a series of logit regressions.

The first part of the statistical analysis uses the sample of all reform attempts (that is, the sample of both restrictive and permissive reform attempts) to predict the enactment of electoral reforms. The main results are as follows. The estimated relationship between constitutional protection and successful enactment of reform attempts is negative, as expected according to Hypothesis 4a, but not very precise. By contrast, the presence of judicial review is positively related to the success of reforms. The theory does not yield a prediction on this relationship since it predicts that the presence of judicial review affects the probability of success positively for permissive reforms but negatively for restrictive reforms. Indeed, the analyses focusing on each reform type separately is consistent with this expectation. Finally, the analysis reveals that the legislative power of the government is not related to reform enactment.

As emphasized several times throughout the dissertation, it is of vital importance, both theoretically and empirically, to analyze electoral reforms according to their types. This is also what we learn from the analysis in this chapter. Potential factors in reform enactment work differently for restrictive and permissive reform attempts. Hence, this general finding corroborates the main approach of the model: the process leading to the success or failure of reforms hinges on the reform's type.

The second part of the statistical analysis uses the sample of restrictive reforms to scrutinize electoral reform enactment. The results show that the probability of enactment is lower when the electoral system is protected by the constitution. This finding is robust to controlling for the government's legislative power, the presence of judicial review and the content of the reform. Judicial review, by contrast, seems to be not a factor in the success of electoral reform attempts. Finally, the results indicate the content of electoral reforms as an important factor for their enactment: the probability of success is considerably higher when the reform introduces a change in the formula or in the threshold as opposed to changing either the district magnitude or switching to a different electoral system family.

In-depth analyses of electoral reform attempts help us understand the reform process, as hinted by the statistical analysis. The restrictive reform cases I consider underscore several aspects of the electoral reform process through which reform attempts either fail or succeed. Restrictive reform attempts of 1996 and 2000 in Lithuania demonstrate that the likelihood of enactment depends heavily on the legislative power and the content of the reform in the absence of constitutional protection. As briefly mentioned, two other reform attempts in this country—which are outside the scope of this dissertation—also point out the significance of reform content on the likelihood of enactment. The electoral reforms of 1995 and 1997 in Latvia provide several insights. First, the electoral reform process leading to the 1995 reform attempt, which was successfully enacted, illustrates that political parties crafted the reform to avoid the constitutional amendment requirement. Second, the juxtaposition of 1995 and 1997 attempts demonstrates that the parliamentary structure and, more importantly, the government's legislative power, are crucial determinants of enactment even though statistical analysis did not yield support to this hypothesis.

The third part of the statistical analysis focuses on permissive reforms by predicting the likelihood of enactment of this type of reforms. In line with the hypothesis 3b, constitutional protection does not affect the enactment of permissive reforms. Again, this is in contrast to the case of restrictive reforms for which constitutional protection has a negative impact on enactment. It turns out that the likelihood of enactment for permissive reforms is higher when the changes in the electoral law is subject to judicial review. Combined with the finding that the presence of judicial review has no impact on the enactment of restrictive reforms, this result also explains why the analysis based on all reforms yields a positive relationship between judicial review and enactment. Finally, the results imply that neither legislative power nor reform content is relevant to enactment of permissive reforms.

To complement the statistical analysis on permissive reforms, I examine two Bulgarian permissive reform attempts; the attempt in 1997 which resulted in a failure and that in 2010 which resulted in a change in the electoral law. These two reform attempts demonstrate that the opposition plays a major role in permissive reform processes. Specifically, parties' stiff opposition to the 1997 reform proposal led to the failure of the reform attempt, whereas their focus on the reform elements targeting the voters with dual-citizenship rights—at the expense of neglecting other elements of the reform—resulted in the enactment of the most crucial elements of the reform. The failure of Turkish permissive reform attempt in 1995 also shows the importance of opposition's power to use the veto powers.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

Electoral institutions structure the political competition and determine which parties are represented in the parliament and which ones form the government. This distributive aspect of electoral rules, meaning benefiting one group at the expense of another (Tsebelis 1990) makes them susceptible to changes by parties which can benefit from a different system. Yet, at the same time, changing the system requires support from governments, who are the winners in the status quo system. In this dissertation, the primary goal has been to resolve these two seemingly conflicting views about electoral system changes by specifying the conditions under which ruling parties initiate electoral system change and how these reform attempts succeed.

7.1 Main Findings

This dissertation has underlined the importance of incorporating both successful and failed electoral reform attempts to examine the conditions which encourage political parties to revise the electoral system. By including failed reforms, we can have a relevant comparative base in the empirical analyses: cases where politicians attempted to implement reforms and where they did not. The omission of failed reform attempts can introduce bias to the empirical analyses since, after all, politicians were motivated enough to initiate a reform process in these cases. The dataset collected for this dissertation showed that there is also difference between the electoral reform types in terms of success. Indeed, a quick glance at the data shows that we would observe

almost equal number of permissive (33 successful reforms) and restrictive reforms (39 successful reforms) when we only considered successfully implemented electoral reforms. However, as analyzed in detail in this dissertation, the number of failed attempts is much higher for restrictive reforms. Thus, an analysis of the conditions affecting the likelihood of restrictive versus permissive reforms would suffer from bias that censures many restrictive reform attempts that failed. By taking into account failed attempts where politicians had actually incentives to change the electoral systems, I have sought to answer following questions: Why do governments initiate electoral reforms? Which factors influence the type of electoral reform initiated by governments?

The first empirical chapter in this dissertation has addressed these questions. The analyses show the governments in new democracies are more likely to initiate electoral reforms, in both permissive and restrictive directions. However, the difference between new democracies, which are in their first 20 years, and older ones should not be overstated since once electoral volatility is controlled for, this difference between new and old democracies is not observed in any estimated specifications. In fact, electoral volatility is the most consistent predictor for electoral reform attempts in general. In all specifications, I have found that electoral volatility has a positive effect on both permissive and restrictive reform attempts. This finding suggests that governments respond to the shifts in electoral competition by implementing electoral reforms; however, electoral volatility does not offer any insights about the type of electoral reform to be adopted.

A strand of the existing literature suggested that the source of electoral volatility might be important as parties would have incentives to restrict the electoral rules for newcomers (Nunez *et al.* 2017). To leverage the source of electoral volatility, they examined whether the vote shifts

occurring between existing parties or due to emergence of new parties. The empirical analysis in this dissertation has shown that electoral volatility matter, regardless of its source and regardless of electoral reform type. In particular, electoral volatility increases the likelihood of observing an electoral reform attempt.

The analysis in this dissertation also demonstrates that in regard to electoral competition governments consider not whether it is a new party or an existing party increasing the degree of competition but whether this party gain votes from the vote base of the governing party or from the main opposition party. Unless we examine the differential effect of party system fragmentation or electoral volatility on the leading parties, both in government and in opposition, we cannot fully understand the strategic calculations of governing parties who, ultimately, take the electoral reform decision.

To test this insight about the governments' response to party system fragmentation, this dissertation generated a new measure of party system fragmentation, which takes into consideration the distance of small and new competitors in the elections from the governing party and its main competitor (the runner up in the election) on the ideological spectrum. This measure captures if party system fragmentation affects the governing party or its main competitor. The main findings support this insight about party competition. The results from multinomial regressions demonstrate that reforms are initiated in response to the effective number of parties in ideological clusters, that is, how small parties are situated on the ideological spectrum in relation to the governing party and to the main opposition party. The fragmentation in the governing party's ideological cluster increases the likelihood of restrictive reform initiation, showing that the government party has the incentive to prevent the further

fragmentation in its ideological cluster in order to increase its seat share as well as keeping the party viable for government formation in future elections. The findings also show that governments do not have incentives to initiate permissive reforms when they face a high number of small competitors in their ideological clusters. The next empirical analysis tested whether governments initiate permissive reforms to weaken their opposition. The findings suggest that the government's behavior in terms of weakening the opposition party depends on whether the governing party faces high competition or not. In other words, the incentive to weaken the opposition and its chances to form a united government works when the opposition's cluster has more fragmentation than that of the governing party.

Does the actual reform process lend support to the electoral reform account developed in this dissertation? By examining electoral reform process in five episodes in Lithuania and Turkey, this dissertation evaluated how the governments' concern for consolidating its vote base to ensure its viability to form or be in government in future elections affects their institutional choices. The fluidity of party systems and shifts in voters' allegiances across elections characterize the electoral competition in both Turkey and Lithuania. Therefore, there was a constant flow of information about shifts in party systems and changes in relative competition in these countries during the electoral reform episodes analyzed in this project. Despite this volatility, though, the governing parties' behavior showed some regularities.

In restrictive reforms, I have observed that governments took actions to curtail competition they face from smaller or new parties. These parties were closer to the governing party, rather than the leading party in opposition, meaning that they could adversely affect the votes and seats of the governing party. The first electoral reform episode in Lithuania in 1996

showed that the government's proposal targeted the small left parties by increasing the electoral threshold, which would help the government to have more seats and more influence in the subsequent legislative term. Similar motivation can be seen in Lithuanian reform in 2000, too. The governing coalition hoped to increase its electoral seat gains by implementing a restrictive reform after the local elections. The results of local elections signaled that the Homeland Union coalition government would face fierce competition from new rightwing parties, which would reduce the government parties' vote base. Notably, in these reform decisions, the effect of the reform on the leading competitor was not considered. This collaborates with the findings in the regression analyses of restrictive reform. The analysis of Turkish reform of 1987, on the other hand, shows that the measurement for our key variable could not capture the party competition dynamics in that legislative cycle. The legislative opposition parties' votes declined rapidly and immensely by the time the local elections were held. The local elections, by-elections and subsequent referendum allowed the government to evaluate both its electoral power and that of the competing parties, not currently in the parliament but had the potential to erode the governing party's vote, and consequently, the governing party implemented a restrictive reform to prevent that.

The processes leading to permissive reforms were a bit more complex in both countries, due to the results of local elections. In the Turkish case, the main competitor of the governing party, a rightwing party as the governing party, did not change after the local elections. But there was a rising party, WP, in the local election whose vote share was very close to both leading competitors in government (TPP) and in opposition (MP). In addition, the coalition government collected survey results showing that there could be vote shifts between WP and MP voters. In particular, WP voters would support MP if a restrictive reform, such as a two-round majoritarian

system, was adopted. Moreover, the economic crisis signaled that it was very difficult for the main governing party, TPP, to increase its vote share, too. Lastly, there were fewer parties in governing party's ideological cluster after the local elections, so it could afford a permissive reform. Importantly, the rationale here is that permissive electoral rules would not lead to more vote shifts to smaller parties from the governing party.

In Lithuanian 2004 electoral reform, we observe similar dynamics whereby the emergence of a new competitor, Labor Party, which could replace the main competing party according to the opinion polls, induced the coalition government to take measures. Given the popularity of Labor Party, the center-left coalition government at the time took two precautions for the upcoming general elections in 2004: the government replaced the plurality formula with a two-round majority so that the new competing party does not get the seats in the nominal tier, and the coalition parties formed a pre-election coalition for the upcoming elections in order to attract the second-round votes. In general, case studies of permissive reforms demonstrate that a rising challenger constitutes the main push for the reform. This finding also supports the defensive seat maximization explanation discussed in the literature review. However, it also supports the main idea of this dissertation, which is to weaken the main opposition party. This is observed especially when the governing party could afford a permissive reform, meaning that when the leading governing party faces fewer competitors in comparison to the main opposition party.

In the case analysis, I also used the available evidence to evaluate the explanatory power of competing hypotheses. One such explanation is that electoral reforms are implemented when there is public demand for reform. I was able to find the information about public support for

electoral reforms for only two electoral reform episodes: Lithuanian electoral reform of 2004 and Turkish electoral reform of 1995. In both reform episodes there was public support for an electoral reform. However, the electoral reforms supported by the citizens, according to the opinion polls, and the reforms implemented by the respective governing parties were in the reverse directions in both cases. In the Lithuania case, there was public support for a restrictive reform, which was proposed by newly formed Labor Party; however, the government implemented a permissive reform. In the Turkish case, the survey respondents supported a restrictive electoral reform, too, but the coalition government adopted a permissive one.

The other competing explanation is that parties adopt restrictive reforms for increasing the efficiency of parliament. The evidence for this explanation is hard to attain. However, I examined two types of information for evaluating this explanation. First, if the governing party had difficulties to pass the legislation during its term in government. Second, if there were other institutional change attempts by the government that increases the power of parliament. In three restrictive reform episodes, I could not find information to support the efficiency-seeking explanation. During the 1996 electoral reform in Lithuania, there were a number of confidence vote motions and attempts by the opposition to form a coalition within the parliament. However, it is hard to tie these incidents to the LDLP government's electoral reform attempt. There were other institutional change attempts by the same government, such as increasing the presidential power vis-à-vis the parliament, which suggested otherwise, especially when we consider that president at the time was a former LDLP member.

As for the ideological commitment of political parties to the electoral systems beforehand, I have limited information about Lithuania, since the sources I examined did not

bring up this issue for any party but Labor Party. However, we did not observe any reform following the Labor Party's participation in the coalition government after 2004 election. For the electoral reforms in Turkish case, I examined the party manifestos published before the electoral reforms were initiated and only found specific electoral reform commitments by Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) and Democratic Left Party (DLP), both pledging a more proportional system. However, we observed that SDPP was willing to implement a two-round system, which would make the electoral system more restrictive, during the reform debates. This shows that the party did not have a strong ideological commitment to electoral reform.

When and how do electoral reform attempts succeed or fail? The last empirical chapter of this dissertation tackled this question. The occurrence of failed reform attempts by the governing parties is perplexing since the expectation is that governments do not initiate reforms that would not pass. However, the increasing frequency of such failed reform attempts necessitates an empirical investigation to understand the conditions that lead to the success (and the failure) of reform attempts. To this end, the dissertation examined how institutional protection of electoral system has different implications for permissive and restrictive reform attempts.

In the analysis of restrictive reforms, I find that constitutional protection and content of electoral reform attempts are the most important predictors of the success of electoral reforms. If the electoral system is protected by the constitution, the restrictive reforms are more likely to fail. In the case analyses of Lithuanian electoral reforms as well as Latvia's 1995 reform, the content of electoral reform did not include a change in the district magnitude or electoral system family, and they were successfully enacted. The analysis of 1995 reform attempt in Latvia also showed that the constitutional protection of the electoral rules affects the behavior of the political

parties. Even though the junior coalition partner wanted a mixed member electoral system, which would require a constitutional amendment, the leading party in government did not give any support to this reform proposal reasoning that it would not muster the votes in the parliament for a constitutional amendment. The electoral reform in Austria in 1992 also showed the difficulty to change the electoral system when there is a constitutional amendment requirement. Only after successive attempts in two legislative terms, the governing coalition was able to change the electoral system. The enacted reform, though, differed from the original plan in a substantive way. The outcome of electoral reform also reflected an ongoing negotiation among the governing coalition in terms of changing the content of electoral reform proposal.

The empirical analysis for the permissive reforms shows that permissive reforms were already less likely to fail. The success rates are higher for permissive reforms when there is an institutional protection. However, the low failure rates in the permissive reforms makes it very hard, if not impossible, to draw additional statistical inferences from the dataset. The results only showed a statistically significant effect of judicial review on the success of permissive reforms. The analyses of Bulgarian electoral reforms in 1997 and 2010 point to the reaction of opposition parties to the proposed electoral reforms. In both cases, the objections of the opposition played a role in the enactment of the electoral system changes. However, in the 2010 reform, the opposition parties focused on the voter registration requirement rather than the change in the electoral formula. The analysis of the permissive reform in Turkey in the previous chapter also points to the strategic use of institutions (in this case the judicial review) by the opposition leading to the failure of electoral reform. However, in contrast to Bulgarian reform of 1997, the governing coalition in Turkey was able to pass another legislation by changing the article that was found unconstitutional by courts.

7.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, I have underlined the necessity to study electoral reform by examining both the conditions that change the preferences of political parties and the legislative process that can affect the success and failure of reform attempts, to have a complete explanation of electoral reforms. This necessarily entailed a careful examination of the conditions under which governments wanted a change but could not achieve it.

The second theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to build a bridge between party system explanations of electoral reforms and single case study accounts of electoral reforms, by bringing the governing party and its calculations back into the picture. The former set of studies does not really talk about who takes the decision to initiate electoral reforms and considers the parties in the parliament and how they react to party system or electoral volatility. But the case studies show accounts of the government's partisan self-interested motivations during the electoral reform episodes. By taking the governing party as the main decisionmaker for electoral reforms, I have proposed to take into account how the party system fragmentation affects the governing party and its main competitor for government formation (the runner up party in the election). In doing that, I have explored another reason why party system fragmentation matters for electoral reform: its effect on the competition between the leading parties. The main argument is that when electoral competition is high due to the small or new parties in fragmented systems it does not call for an automatic institutional response in the form of initiating a permissive reform (as the defensive seat maximization model suggest) or a restrictive reform (as the governability explanation suggests). Instead, the optimal institutional response to

fragmentation hinges upon its effect on the competition between the main parties who have potential to form government.

This dissertation contributed to the empirical literature on electoral reforms in several ways. First, motivated by the theoretical importance of failed reform attempts in understanding the electoral reform process, I constructed a novel dataset on the electoral reform attempts in parliamentary democracies. This new dataset consists of electoral reform proposals drafted and submitted to the parliament by governing parties, or drafted by a committee appointed by the government, or put to referendum vote by the government. Second, I have generated a new party system measure by considering the spatial distribution of political parties on the left-right dimension to capture how the new and/or small parties affect the degree of competition between leading parties in the elections. Using this variable, I was able to show that governing parties pay attention to how the shifts in party system dynamics affect their vote base in their electoral reform decisions.

By analyzing five electoral reform episodes, I was able to test the main assumptions concerning party behavior made in the theoretical part and examine the extent to which the electoral reform narrative explained in that part is reflected in the actual electoral reform episodes. The case analyses contributed to our understanding of electoral reforms in three ways. In countries with high electoral volatility, much happens during each legislative term in terms of party structure. These dynamics might not be captured by statistical measurements based on previous election records. In this respect, disaggregate measurement presented in this dissertation helped to capture how fragmentation could potentially affect the government party if the status quo rules were to be maintained. Second, the empirical analyses also show that political parties

update their preferences over electoral systems each time new pieces of information about their relative power become available. Lastly, these cases demonstrated that the institutional choices of parties reflect their partisan self-interests, rather than more general and principled goals of efficiency in parliamentary decision making.

Finally, the empirical analysis of reform enactment contributed to the empirical knowledge by first showing that the relationship between barriers to electoral reform and the success of electoral reform attempts depend on the electoral system type. The results show that the constitutional protection decreases the likelihood of success of electoral reform attempts for restrictive reforms, whereas the same relationship is not observed for permissive reform attempts. More importantly, the analysis of restrictive reform attempts show that their success is related to what type of changes are included in reform packages. When the proposed changes are about the district magnitude or electoral system family, the restrictive reform attempts are more likely to fail. The content of electoral system reforms does not have the same effect for permissive reforms though.

The findings of this dissertation about electoral reform attempts qualifies the main conclusion about the electoral reform definitions and the degree of stability we observe in electoral systems. The observed stability, according to the definition of earlier literature, is an artifact of inattention to many reform attempts that fulfils the criteria but failed; as well as many that succeeded but did not fit to the criteria. What this dissertation finds is that electoral reforms, according to the definition of earlier literature, are more prone to fail, especially if they are in the restrictive direction. However, it does not mean that no such changes happen. Governing parties successfully implemented electoral reforms altering the electoral threshold and seat allocation

formulas in more restrictive directions. These changes are significant enough to count as electoral reform, but the magnitude of their effects differ from that of the changes in the electoral system family or the district magnitude. In the end, these seemingly incremental changes do affect the original institutional design.

Thus, this brings me to the practical implications of this dissertation. The analysis in the dissertation showed that electoral reforms are less likely to happen when they are protected by constitutions. It seems to work in two ways: governments are less likely to initiate a restrictive electoral reform when the constitution specifies the electoral system, and even when the governments do initiate the electoral rule changes, these changes are more likely to fail if the electoral system is protected by the constitution. For practitioners who engineer electoral systems in emerging democracies, this insight is important. To enforce the stability in electoral systems in new democracies, it seems a rewarding solution to embed the electoral system into the constitution.

7.3 Future Research

Ultimately, this dissertation showed that not all reform attempts are equal, some do have higher chances to be enacted. In the end, we need to take the magnitude of proposed changes seriously. While combining the electoral reforms with different magnitudes, we also need to examine how the conditions differ for each type. For this, we need to look beyond the successful reforms, since, otherwise, comparison would be very limited. One way to achieve this is to further differentiate the electoral reform attempts. Levick (2016), for instance, suggests that not only reform attempts but also reform investigations should be considered.

Another way to examine the electoral system changes with different magnitudes is to go down the ladder and include changes in the party laws. The case analyses in this dissertation showed that the efforts to restrict new parties are not limited to changing electoral systems. The changes in certain aspects of party laws, such as party membership rules, the limits to party campaigns, the restrictions on the state subventions to parties, are also important. These can create asymmetric benefits to existing parties in general but to the larger parties in particular. Thus, it would have important implications for party competition. These issues raise the following questions: Do governments implement these changes in party laws simultaneously with electoral system changes? Or are these types of changes more likely when an electoral system changes fail? And more importantly, are they more abundant because they are receiving less attention? Addressing these questions would greatly contribute to our understanding of the relationship between electoral system reforms and restricting (or relaxing) party rules.

Finally, this dissertation has focused on governments' electoral reform attempts. However, there is an increasing number of electoral reform attempts initiated by civil society organizations, or opposition parties by utilizing the citizens-initiated referenda, as also observed in the case studies of this dissertation. To understand these types of electoral reforms, we need to shift our focus to other actors including the opposition, citizens, and civil society organizations. Extending the framework developed in this project to this direction would generate interesting insights.

Appendix A. List of Electoral Systems

Proportional Representation Systems

Highest Averages (Divisor) Systems

This method works with a series of divisors. Each party's vote is divided by a series of divisors and after each division a seat is allocated to the party with the highest average votes.

Sainte Laguë Formula: This method uses the divisor series 1, 3, 5, 7. To calculate which party wins a seat, votes of parties are divided according to the series 1, 3, 5, 7... In each division, the party with the highest average receives the seat.

Modified Sainte Laguë Formula: The same method is applied with divisor series 1.4, 3, 5, 7. By increasing the first divisor, this formula makes it difficult for small parties to gain their first seat (Taagepera 2007, p: 32).

d'Hondt Formula: Also known as Jefferson formula. This method uses the divisor series 1, 2, 3, 4; and it is known to be more favorable to larger parties.

Imperiali divisors: The divisor series in this method is 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3... Taagepera (2007) discusses this divisor series to show that the slower the divisor series increase, the more beneficial the electoral rule becomes for the larger parties.

Largest Remainder (Quota) Systems

In this system, first task is to determine a quota of votes needed to fill a seat. Every time a party is able to fulfill the quota, a seat is allocated to the party. In each time, the number of votes quantified by quota is subtracted from party's total votes. After repeating this for each full quota the parties have, the remaining seats are allocated to the parties which has the largest vote remainders. The following quotas are used in this electoral system.

LR-Hare Quota Also known as Hamilton Quota. The formula is $q_0 = V/M$; where v is the number of votes in the district and m is the district magnitude. So, for a party to receive a seat in the district, it should have a share of V/M of votes.

LR- Droop Quota: Also known as Hagenbach-Bischoff quota. The formula is $q_1 = v/(M+1)$. This method is devised to decrease the remainder allocation by giving more seats to full quotas. Yet, because q_1 runs the risk of allocating more seats than the district has in some situations, a modification is applied in both formulas by adding 1 vote. So, LR-Droop formula becomes $q = [v / (M+1) + 1]$ and Hagenbach-Bischoff becomes $q = (v+1)/(M+1)$. For more details see Taagepera (2007, p:30).

LR-Imperiali Quota: The formula for Imperiali quota is $q_2 = v / (M+2)$. This quota gives the least proportional results among the quota systems.

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

It is an open list proportional representation system in which votes rank order candidates according to their preferences. This system, too, works with an electoral quota but instead of parties, candidates receive the seats. Candidates who secure the quota, receive the seats and their surplus votes are transferred to the second preference candidates. This process continues until all the seats in the district are filled. This system is used in Ireland and Malta and both use the Droop quota.

Mixed Member Systems

Mixed Member Systems combine two majoritarian and proportional electoral systems in allocating seats to political parties. The way majoritarian and proportional systems are linked defines the type of mixed system.

Mixed Member Majoritarian: In these systems, proportional and majoritarian systems work independently of each other. The total seats of a party are determined by adding the seats it gained in each tier. MMM systems assign a certain share of seats to majoritarian and proportional tiers and the proportion of seats allocated each tier determines the level of inclusivity within these systems, as well as the formulas used in each tier.

Mixed Member Proportional Systems: In MMP systems, majoritarian and proportional tiers are linked together, and proportional tier compensates for the disproportionality in the first tier of the election.

Semi-Proportional Systems: These electoral systems use plurality formula in multi-member districts. But the way these systems operate produce more proportional results than plurality formulas and hence some scholars classify these systems under the semi-proportional systems category.

Limited Vote: This system allows voter fewer choices than the number of seats in a district; therefore, allowing small party candidate the possibility to be elected. Even though it is a multi-member district plurality system, proportionality increases with high district magnitude. Also, proportionality increases with more limited choice voters have.

Single Non-Transferable Vote: This system is a special form of limited vote in which voters are given only one choice in a multi-member district and the candidates who receives the most votes are elected until the seats in the district are filled.

Sources: Farrell (2011); Gallagher and Mitchell (2005); Taagepera (2007).

Appendix B. Table A1. Electoral Reform Attempts Containing Changes in Multiple Directions

Country Name	Electoral Cycle	Reform Type	Details of Electoral Reform
Austria	1990-1994	Restrictive	This reform decreased average DM from 20.33 to 4.26 (-), increased the number of tiers (+), and introduced national electoral threshold (-). DM was reduced significantly, therefore I coded this electoral reform as restrictive (See also in Nunez, Simon, and Pilet 2017)
Denmark	1953-1953	Restrictive	This reform introduced a legal threshold (-), shifted the formula from d'Hondt to Sainte Laguë (+) and restricted the upper compensatory tier (-). I coded this electoral reform as restrictive (See also in Elklit 2002; Renwick 2011) (Renwick 2011a)
Germany	1949-1953	Restrictive	This reform introduced 5 percent national threshold and increased average DM (from 40 to 48) in PR tier. Since the electoral threshold is higher than overall effective threshold, I coded this electoral reform as restrictive (See also Riera 2013)
Germany	2005-2009	Unchanged	PR formula changed from Hare to Sainte Laguë
Greece	1981-1985	Permissive	This reform eliminated 17 percent national threshold in the 2 nd tier seat allocation. But also increased the number of seats allocated at the third tier. I classified this reform as permissive (See also Lijphart 1994; Riera 2013)
Iceland	1999-2003	Permissive	This reform introduced a legal threshold (5 percent) but it also increased average DM from 7.9 to 10.5. Since effective threshold decreased (from 8.45 to 6.52), I coded this variable as permissive reform. Note that legal threshold is below the effective threshold, therefore I coded according to effective threshold.
Romania	2004-2008	Unchanged	Electoral reform introduced single member candidacies yet distributed party seats as in the previous electoral system (Marian and King 2010; Renwick 2011a).
Sweden	1968-1970	Permissive	Increased average DM (from 8.3 to 12) (+); Introduced an upper tier (+); Introduced 4% national threshold (-). Overall, effective threshold decreased from 8 to 5.7 percent. The legal threshold is not very effective.
Slovakia	1994-1998	Restrictive	Electoral reform increased average DM but at the same time increased the electoral threshold (5% for each coalition party); latter theoretically increases the effective threshold to 20%. Therefore I coded it as restrictive reform (See also in Renwick 2011)

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