

THE UNITED STATES, TURKEY AND THE CYPRUS ISSUE
FROM 1949 TO 1964 JOHNSON LETTER

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ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES, TURKEY AND THE CYPRUS ISSUE FROM 1949 TO 1964 JOHNSON LETTER

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This thesis purports to examine the positions of the United States and Turkey towards the Cyprus issue between 1949 and 1964. The study questions whether there was harmony or discord in bilateral relations due to their policy decisions concerning the issue. Accordingly, the thesis analyzes the nature of the American-Turkish alliance established in the 1940s, and examines how the Cyprus issue shaped, and how it was shaped by the positions of these two countries until 1964 Johnson letter. The thesis concludes that the alliance between the US and Turkey did not witness a major conflict until 1964. Throughout the Cyprus issue, American objectives were in line with its Cold War strategies. These were to preserve and increase the American

and NATO power in the region. To that end, the US considered Turkey as a legal party that should be taken into account concerning the island. In addition, for Turkey, the US involvement to the issue was of vital significance for a sustainable solution. However, in 1964, the study reveals that the dynamics on the island, particularly Makarios, the US policy shift towards *enosis*, and the increasing calls for military intervention by Turkey transformed harmony in the alliance to disharmony within the context of the Cyprus issue. The process ended with the Johnson letter. The letter was the most direct involvement of the US in the Cyprus issue towards which the US mostly sustained its Cold War strategies through 'precautious' and 'indirect' involvement.

Keywords: Cyprus issue, American policy on Cyprus, Turkish policy on Cyprus, Johnson letter, Turkish-American alliance

ÖZ

1949'DAN 1964 JOHNSON MEKTUBUNA KADAR AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ, TÜRKİYE VE KIBRIS MESELESİ

Özkan, Ali

Yüksek Lisans, Latin ve Kuzey Amerika Çalışmaları

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Bu tez, 1949-1964 yılları arasındaki Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin ve Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs meselesine karşı olan yaklaşımlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin ve Amerika'nın Kıbrıs meselesiyle ilgili politikalarında bir uyumun mu yoksa bir anlaşmazlığın mı bulunduğunu sorgular. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, bu tez, 1940'larda kurulan Amerikan-Türk ittifakının doğasını analiz etmekte ve 1964 Johnson mektubuna kadar Kıbrıs meselesinin iki ülkenin tutumlarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve bu tutumlardan da nasıl etkilendiğini değerlendirmektedir. Bu tez Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Türkiye arasındaki ittifakın 1964 yılına kadar önemli bir çatışmaya tanık olmadığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Kıbrıs meselesi

boyunca, Amerikan hedefleri kendi Soğuk Savaş stratejileriyle aynı çizgideydi. Bu strateji bölgedeki Amerikan ve NATO gücünü korumak ve arttırmaktı. Bu doğrultuda, Amerika Türkiyeyi adayla ilgili olarak göz önünde bulundurulması gereken meşru bir taraf olarak görmüştür. Ayrıca, Türkiye için, Amerika'nın meseleye dahil olması sürdürülebilir bir çözüm için hayati önem taşımaktadır. Ancak, bu çalışma, 1964 yılında, ada dinamiklerinin, özel olarak Makarios'un, Amerikan politikasının enosis'e doğru kaymasının ve Türkiye'nin artan askeri müdahale çağrılarının Kıbrıs meselesi bağlamında ittifak içindeki uyumu uyumsuzluğa dönüştürdüğünü göstermektedir. Bu süreç Johnson mektubu ile bitmiştir. Bu teze göre, mektup Amerika'nın çoğunlukla 'tedbirli' ve 'dolaylı' müdahaleyle stratejilerini sürdürdüğü Kıbrıs meselesindeki en doğrudan müdahalesiydi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs Meselesi, Amerika'nın Kıbrıs politikası, Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs politikası, Johnson mektubu, Türk-Amerikan ittifakı



To my parents

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AKEL | Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú - Progressive Party of Working People |
| DC | District of Columbia |
| DP | Democrat Party (Turkey) |
| EOKA | Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Fighter |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| TRNC | Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus |
| UK | The United Kingdom |
| UN | The United Nations |
| UNFICYP | United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| US | The United States |
| USA | The United States of America |
| USSR | The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WWII | World War II |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The post-WWII period marks drastic transformation in line with the increasing threat perception of the western European alliance in general and the US in particular. The concern emerges as the growing Soviet existence in the east of Europe as a contemporary and probably a continuous future threat to the alliance itself. While the US and the allies support and reinforce the eastern flank of the western alliance, it appears as a fact that the south eastern flank remains vulnerable to the impact of the US policy over the territory. It is essential that the south eastern flank whose indispensable component was Turkey was required to be supported by all means, which, as another fact, affected the US interests in the region as a vital priority. Thus, the US-Turkish interaction was bolstered by serious US military and economic aid in an effort of securing especially the Anatolian peninsula from any communist expansion. While such efforts were sustained thanks to mutual interests of both the US and Turkey, Cyprus began to acquire strategic significance for both countries. It was inevitable that Cyprus would eventually be included in the US-Turkish interaction.

The period was shaped by a complex composition of the alliance between the two countries, especially until 1964, a year which needs to be specially highlighted. That year and the preceding period to the 1964 crisis deserve a closer scrutiny regarding Turkish and American positions on Cyprus. While the study mentions the events before 1949, a particular focus is given to the 1949-1964 period, since the Cyprus

issue was mentioned by a Turkish politician, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, for the first time in 1949. In addition, the date 1964 represented not only a turning point for the island but also for the alliance between the US and Turkey. Accordingly, the failure of the Republic of Cyprus and the increasing strife between the two communities on the island necessitated for a policy shift both in Turkish and American stances which was concluded with the Johnson letter. Therefore, this thesis questions how Turkey's and the US' positions on Cyprus evolved between 1949 and 1964. Accordingly, the thesis will try to answer whether there was harmony between two countries' positions or there was any discord, which deteriorated the alliance between two countries due to the Cyprus issue. In other words, this thesis will investigate whether the US and the Turkish positions on Cyprus from the post-WWII period till 1964 evolved in harmony or discord.

This thesis argues that the American-Turkish alliance mostly sustained its harmony and cohesiveness throughout the Cyprus issue; however, starting from the December 1963 and mostly in March-June period in 1964, a state of disharmony emerged for the positions of these two countries. For the thesis, harmony in the positions of Turkey and the US was the heritage of the strategic alliance established in the 1940s. In other words, the Turkish perception which considered American interests equal to Turkish ones was still valid for the Cyprus issue. Accordingly, the US concern throughout the issue was to balance the parties and prevent any further conflict for its Cold War strategies. To that end, the US always considered Turkey as a legal party that should be taken into account. At the same time, Turkey introduced various policies in order to reveal its cooperation with the west and particularly with the US for a sustainable solution especially until 1960. However, in practice, Turkey could not pursue a unilateral policy towards the Cyprus issue; rather it remained within the limits of the western and American policies.

On the other hand, the study demonstrated that the late 1963 and the early 1964 signaled the gradual shift from harmony to disharmony in the alliance and the

positions of Turkey and the US. Particularly, the dynamics on the island, mainly the Makarios factor transformed the US policy to a more active and direct one in support of *enosis*, or a kind of associate status for Turkish community. The thesis considers the US support for *enosis*, as a choice between independent Cyprus with Makarios and Cyprus within Greece without Makarios. Obviously, the US preferred the second alternative. At the same time, the period witnessed a parallel policy shift in Turkish position which began to call for unilateral military action. For the thesis, these policy shifts brought the final direct American response to avoid Turkish unilateral initiative which signified the end of harmony. The outcome of the process was the Johnson letter which represented the direct and open threat of the US which questioned not only the Turkish perspective about the Cyprus issue but also the very essence of the alliance established in the 1940s. For the thesis, the letter was a choice for American policy makers: to block Turkish desires with an ultimatum-like response vs. permitting Turkey to take military action. Accordingly, the US chose the first alternative in order not to create a more dangerous problem for its Cold War strategies.

In addition to examine the positions of these two countries, the thesis considers the American-Turkish cooperation as a 'strategic alliance' between two unequal partners: the US being dominant and Turkey being forced to play the minor party. This thesis demonstrates that the American and Turkish positions and policy decisions concerning the Cyprus issue were dominated by the US interests and priorities rather than those of Turkey.

Moreover, the thesis explains the American stance towards Cyprus as 'indirect' and 'precautious' involvement behind the screen, and as a solid example of quiet diplomacy until 1964. However, in 1964, gradually, the US began to pursue more active and direct approach first by supporting NATO solution instead of the UN peace force, second by supporting *enosis* or a kind of associate status for Turkey, and third by introducing the Johnson letter as the method for avoiding Turkish

action. On the other hand, Turkey pursued various policy alternatives especially until 1960. It echoed sometimes American, sometimes British tendencies and sometimes offered original Turkish arguments. Not having had a clear cut and accurate policy concerning the Mediterranean, and particularly the Cyprus issue, the Turkish objective until 1960 was not to be alienated from a solution, thus to become a party in any solution concerning the island. Nevertheless, especially between December 1963 and June 1964, Turkey pursued a more aggressive stance by threatening the concerned parties with unilateral military action.

This thesis is a case study focusing on the US-Turkey and Cyprus triangle between 1949 and 1964. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and discuss the positions of the USA and Turkey on Cyprus issue until 1964 Johnson letter. Hence, the thesis aims to understand the political motivations, policy decisions and interactions among actors. Therefore, the methodological position of the thesis is the qualitative research methodology based on archival study.

Primary sources and text-based documents constitute the main framework of this thesis. Obviously the literature on Turkish and American positions towards Cyprus issue or about the American-Turkish relationship in the Cold War period is vast. However, the thesis questions and explains the policy behaviors of two countries on Cyprus issue and the evolution of their positions in the light of primary sources. The sources including online archives, documents, official agreements, speeches, memoirs, and bulletins are introduced. Namely, the documents from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) are examined with a great extent in order to understand the period until 1964 not only from the US perspective but also from the Turkish one. At the same time, since the island was dominated by Britain, the sources from British archives, namely the official report of debates in Parliament in the online archives of British Parliament (Hansard 1803-2005) are of significance to analyze the atmosphere in the island and the proposed solutions. Besides, the UN Resolutions and international agreements concerning Cyprus issue are introduced to

examine how Cyprus became an issue for international politics and how the positions of the US and Turkey were located.

In addition to primary sources, the secondary sources, including books and articles are examined mainly to lay a framework for the initial American-Turkish cooperation within the Cold War period. Particularly, the American Cold War strategies and the dynamics of American-Turkish partnership are discussed with a reference to alliance politics. Besides, the debates among the Turkish policy makers concerning the Cyprus issue and the discussions about the policy alternatives and capabilities of Turkey until the Johnson letter are introduced by relying on secondary sources.

The thesis is composed of six chapters, each focusing on a significant part of the triangle. The first chapter is the introduction part of the thesis, and the final chapter is the conclusion. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the initiation of American-Turkish alliance as a necessity and vital attempt to counter balance the rising Soviet and communist threat. The period, namely the Cold War, forces US to take measures via its policy of containment in order to hinder any possibility of Soviet impact or expansionism. Therefore, the US action necessitates for providing military and economic aid to Turkey which the Turkish counterpart wholeheartedly welcomes. The chapter discusses Truman Doctrine, NATO and Korea developments as an extension of its containment policy. The chapter also reveals the US and Turkey as unequal partners, the US being the ally that shapes and establishes the terms of strategic alliance while Turkey clings to it so as to maintain the alliance in harmony.

Chapter 3 depicts the Cyprus issue and the position of the US and Turkey until the foundation of the Republic in 1960. The period marks Turkey as pursuing a flexible stance while following the US and the UK advice so as not to get alienated from the west. The chapter, therefore, reveals the lack of a clear and solid Turkish national policy towards the Cyprus issue. When this is the case, the US presence shifts into speaking through the NATO which urges Turkey to follow the US and NATO

strategies. This is the US indirect, pre-cautious involvement thus hiding itself behind the screen of NATO yet manipulating the Turkish position in terms of NATO requirements and principles. Thus, the chapter depicts the US-Turkey and Cyprus triangle as the extension of the alliance politics established in 1940s.

Chapter 4, on the other hand, takes to the foreground crucial developments on the island, namely Makarios' attempt to change the Constitution, Turkish reaction, events leading to crisis because of obscurities of a national Cyprus issue, clashes between two communities on the island. The chapter also mentions an expectation from the US as an actor that can solve the crisis while the intrusion of the UN becomes the only solution to culminate the tension. Meanwhile, the emergence of the local communist party and the US effort in trying to suppress any communist impact on the island ends up, as the chapter puts it, in the establishment of UNFICYP. Until the UN peace force steps on the island, the US and Turkish positions are observed to be in harmony with each other.

Chapter 5 especially underlines Makarios and communist threat to be in alliance with each other and therefore to become a dual threat against Turkish and American perspectives. The period marks a change in the Turkish position despite the US warnings because no solid development to support Turkish benefits is observed. The Turkish-US mutuality begins to get worse and deteriorates when the US appears to support *enosis*. It can be stated that the tension on the island in 1963 and 1964 triggered a national awareness in Turkey, and Turkish policy makers for the first time, intended to act unilaterally with regards to Cyprus. Thus the harmony that had been established began to leave its place to disharmony and with a final crisis of Johnson letter in 1964.

To verify, the facts referred in the chapters above, a thorough research on the literature concerning the US position and the Turkish position on the island is as follows: The historical significance of the island of Cyprus is widely analyzed in the literature. The presence of the US or its desire to control the island directly or

indirectly is originated from the geographical position of the island which is located in the center of eastern Mediterranean. It is an island which is considered to be a “stepping stone between East and West”¹ As Roucek concluded, the island can change the balance of powers in the Mediterranean and it is the concern of superpowers of Cold War that Cyprus be in the hands of the rival.²

Lewis labels the Mediterranean as the “barometer” of the international political climate.³ For him, the strategic rivalry of superpowers transformed the Mediterranean to a “mirror” of international relations.⁴ For Kedourie, particularly, the eastern Mediterranean is a “zone of rivalry” for the USA and the USSR both of which could not isolate themselves from engaging in Cyprus issue.⁵ Likewise, for Camp, Cyprus is an “anchor”⁶ in the Mediterranean which both countries, Turkey and Greece, consider as a solid ground in the vast Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, neither of the countries could risk losing it to the other. And it was most obvious that a friction of variable degrees would be inevitable, even leading to hot war.

The importance of Cyprus is discussed by two aspects. Firstly, the island occupies a strategic military position with its location at the center of a virtual circle, whose perimeter binds the Middle East, North Africa, Turkey and Greece. For Güney, it is such a crucial island for operations towards the Middle East and north of Suez

¹ Kershaw, N., 1983. PASSPORT: Cyprus: Stepping Stone Between East and West. *Archaeology*, November-December. pp. 64-65, 77; Roucek, J. S., 1976. Cyprus in the Mediterranean Geopolitics. *II Politico*, December, 41(4), p. 732

² Roucek, p. 739

³ Lewis, J. W. J., 1976. *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean*. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 1

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ Kedourie, E., 2005. The Cyprus Problem and Its Solution. *Middle Eastern Studies*, September, 41(5), p. 653

⁶ Camp, G. D., n.d. Cyprus and East Mediterranean Security Problems: New developments - Old Problems. *The Cyprus Review*, p. 13

Canal.⁷ As Mallinson cited, Henry Kissinger labelled the island as the “staging post for Middle East” in analyzing the Arab-Israel issue.⁸ Secondly, the oil reserves in the region increase the importance of the island for superpowers. For Roucek, the oil fields in the Middle East attract both the US and the USSR to be present in the Mediterranean.⁹ From the US perspective, for Lewis, the oil-flow from the region to the Western Europe is vital for the survival of Europe.¹⁰ Besides these, when the turmoil in the countries of North Africa, namely Egypt, Algeria, Tunis, and Libya are considered from today’s perspective in retrospect, it was to be projected futurewise that they were within the range of the virtual boundary, Cyprus being its center.

Throughout the Cyprus issue, American objectives are discussed mainly from three perspectives. Firstly, the US perspective towards Cyprus has developed within the NATO security concerns since 1954. Accordingly, the US aimed to balance its three allies, Britain, Greece and Turkey, thus to sustain stability on the southern flank of NATO.¹¹ Similarly, in each phase of the crisis, American objectives focused on maintaining NATO power and cohesion in the region through avoiding a further chaos emerging from Cyprus issue which may trigger a war between Greece and Turkey.¹² Likewise, for Roucek and Kedourie, Americans could not avoid their

⁷ Güney, A., 2004. The USA’s Role in Mediating the Cyprus. *Security Dialogue*, 35(1), p. 28

⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York 1957), p. 165, cited in Mallinson, W., 2009. Cyprus, Britain, the USA, Turkey and Greece in 1977: Critical Submission or Submissive Criticism?. *Journal of Contemporary History*, October, 44(4), p. 741

⁹ Roucek, p. 739

¹⁰ Lewis, p. 2

¹¹ Adams, T. W., 1972. The American Concern in Cyprus. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 401, p. 99; Sander, O., 1979. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964*. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, p. 225; Müftüler, M. & Güney, A., 2005. The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003. *Middle Eastern Studies*, March, 41(2), p. 281

¹² Adams, p. 95; Amaral, J., 2013. Multiparty Mediation in Cyprus in 1963–1965. *The Cyprus Review*, 25(2), p. 74; Göktepe, C., 2005. The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's

involvement in Cyprus issue due to a possible conflict between Turkey and Greece, and the objective was to avoid an all-out war between its two allies.¹³

Secondly, the issue is examined as a case in superpower politics, which necessitates for the US domination and control in eastern Mediterranean against potential Soviet influence.¹⁴ For Güney, Cyprus constitutes one of the Cold War episodes in which the US sustained its containment strategy.¹⁵ Particularly discussing the foundation period of Republic of Cyprus, Mallinson argues that the main objective of the 1960 Constitution itself was to serve American and British interests. For him, the Constitution represented Cold War purposes which were to sustain the US-UK presence in Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) and to create a NATO-friendly system with concession to Turkey, Greece and Britain.¹⁶ A similar analysis is conducted by Roucek, arguing that the significance of the US presence in Cyprus was due to two British bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which were utilized for military and spying operations in eastern Mediterranean.¹⁷

Rather critical perspective towards the US objectives is to consider the US initiatives as transforming the Cyprus issue “from a danger to a problem.”¹⁸ For Adams, while the US sustained its role as a mediator between parties, it always refrained from siding with any Guarantor Power for a solution.¹⁹ Such an approach,

Foreign Relations. *Middle Eastern Studies*, May, 41(3), p. 432; Kaloudis, G., 1999. Cyprus: The Enduring Conflict. *International Journal on World Peace*, March, 16(1), p. 12

¹³ Kedourie, p. 654; Roucek, p. 737

¹⁴ Amaral, p. 74

¹⁵ Gaddis, John Lewis, 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, cited in Güney, 2004, pp. 28, 29

¹⁶ Mallinson, p. 739

¹⁷ Lewis, p. 32

¹⁸ Adams, p. 98

¹⁹ *Ibid*

yet, for Kaloudis, meant two contradictory policies: “stabilizing” the issue by sustaining the diplomatic talks, and not “searching hard” for a permanent solution, thus keeping “stagnation” on the island.²⁰ A more extreme perspective was introduced by O’Malley and Craig. The authors argued that Cyprus issue from the very beginning was set by American interests within the Cold War dynamics which necessitates for spying and defense activities against the Soviet threat. According to the study, Cyprus issue was a “deliberate Cold War plot” for the US to sustain military facilities against Soviet danger.²¹ Mainly focusing on 1974 Turkish intervention, the authors perceived the overall issue as a conspiracy by America to divide the island in order to benefit from geopolitical position of the island.²²

A common approach towards American role in Cyprus is to label the US foreign policy as “passive.”²³ For Adams, the term expresses the US stance during the period of foundation of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁴ Besides, Adams associates American attitude with “quiet diplomacy” as the continuation of its ‘passive’, ‘stabilizing’ and ‘cautious’ role.²⁵ Likewise, for Constandinos, the term passive is appropriate for American objectives which believe in Guarantor Powers’ presence and domination.²⁶ At the same time, in parallel to the term passive, there are similar definitions of the US position, such as “concerned disengagement”, “low-profile”,

²⁰ Kaloudis, p. 13

²¹ O’Malley, B. & Craig, I., 1999. *The Cyprus Conspiracy*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p. x

²² *Ibid*, p. vii

²³ Bölükbaşı, S., 1998. The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1954 and 1996. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, August, Volume 30, p. 37; Adams, p. 92; Constandinos, A., 2011. US-British Policy on Cyprus, 1964-1974. *The Cyprus Review*, 23(1), p. 17

²⁴ Adams, p. 97

²⁵ Adams, pp. 98, 99

²⁶ Constandinos, p. 17

“stabilizing role”, “peace-making role”, “strict impartiality” and “honest broker” all of which highlight the US insistence on siding with any concerned party during the issue in order not to alienate one side and thus avoid any further conflict in the region.²⁷ Such a stance is also interpreted as being “reluctant” to get involved²⁸ and to reach for a permanent solution for solving the crisis on the island.²⁹ However, the USA spent much energy in keeping a balance on the island and expelling Soviet threat from the region. Similarly, the US policy as interpreted is labelled as “strict hands-off policy” with an absence of attention towards Cyprus issue.³⁰ Yet in reality as stated above it was there for the balance and threat, so it seems.

Another approach to define the American role in Cyprus is to analyze the US stance from the perspective of realism. For Amaral, American goals and interests are always in priority throughout the Cyprus issue in which the US did not refrain from performing a “resourceful and powerful mediation.”³¹ Amaral considers the US type of mediation as “directive style” through which the US may “coerce” or give “ultimatums” to enable any settlement or alter the position of the concerned parties.³² Likewise, Güney perceives the US initiatives, particularly the Johnson letter of 1964, as foreign policy instrument within “power mediation”³³ which includes the use of leverage through benefits and threatened punishments for each side.³⁴ It is such a style that brings mediator’s interests to the policy priority in

²⁷ Adams, pp. 95-100; Göktepe, p. 432; Müftüler & Güney, p. 281

²⁸ Brands, H. J., 1987. America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964. *Middle Eastern Studies*, July, 23(3), p. 349

²⁹ Sönmezoglu, F., 2016. *Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, p. 82

³⁰ Brands, p. 349

³¹ Amaral, p. 74

³² *Ibid*

³³ The term “power mediation” is used by Ronald Fisher, cited in Güney, 2004, p. 27

³⁴ Bercovitch, Jacob, 1977. ‘Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A

solving an issue which signifies the realistic nature of international arena.³⁵ Particularly in Cyprus issue, for Güney, the US mediation became a foreign policy instrument which serves for no other state, nation or community but for the US interests.³⁶ A similar analysis is introduced by Uslu, who considers Johnson letter as an ultimatum sent by a colonial and superpower to a small or its vassal state.³⁷ Focusing on the relations between Turkey and the US, Uslu considers Turkey as the satellite of the US who aimed to maximize economic and military interests throughout the Cyprus issue.³⁸

To sum up, the study discusses the positions of the US and Turkey towards the Cyprus issue, and questions whether their alliance experienced harmony or discord during the different phases of the Cyprus issue. To that end, the dynamics of the island politics and the American-Turkish perceptions will be examined. Consequently, the Johnson letter and the emerging disharmony will conclude the study.

Review of Practice', in William I. Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds, *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 142, cited in Güney, 2004, p. 27; Güney, 2004, p. 31

³⁵ Touval, Saadia, 1992. 'The Superpowers as Mediators', in Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds, *Mediation in International Relations*. New York: St. Martin's, p. 232 cited in Güney, 2004, p. 27

³⁶ Güney, 2004, p. 39

³⁷ Uslu, N., 2003. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., p. 198

³⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 3, 4-7

CHAPTER 2

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE PRIOR TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE

Since the thesis deals with the Cyprus problem within the context of the alliance politics, this chapter will start with a discussion of the literature on alliance politics.

2.1 Alliance Politics

International politics and national and foreign affairs of states entered a new phase with the end of the WWII. In this new era, the international system shifted from multipolar to bipolar structure, thus there remained no “third power” to challenge the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR.³⁹ For Walt, the period was nothing but a “competition for allies” for the two superpowers.⁴⁰ Therefore, *zeitgeist* of the era urged two superpowers to form new alliances in their struggle within the bipolar world. While, the discussions about the nature, reasons and structure of the alliances are beyond the scope of this thesis, the concepts in alliance politics and the main impetus that brings countries together will be mentioned briefly.

³⁹ Waltz, K. N., 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., p. 98

⁴⁰ Walt, Stephen. M., 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 3

In the literature, the definition of alliance itself has been interpreted by various scholars. For instance, Leeds and Michaela limit the alliance to formal agreements and separate them from informal alignments.⁴¹ Their definition of alliance is “a formal agreement among independent states to cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized military conflict.”⁴² Similarly, for Snyder, in addition to military armament and territorial expansion, “alliance formation” or “alliance game” is a method for states to consolidate their powers in the international arena.⁴³ On the other hand, Walt considers alliances as a “formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”⁴⁴ In his study, Walt focuses mainly on “threat” as the common denominator of alliances. For him, alliances exist as a response to “threat.”⁴⁵ Therefore, what creates alliances is a common threat or threat perception by two or more countries, thus being directly related to the security of individual states.⁴⁶

Two concepts in alliance politics are of significance to examine the logic behind alliances: balance of power and balance of threat. Accordingly, for Morgenthau, the alliances are the “most important manifestation of the balance of power.”⁴⁷ Similarly, for Haglund, alliances are the consequent outcomes of “states’ attempts to

⁴¹ Leeds, B. A. & Michaela, M., 2007. Alliance Politics during the Cold War: Aberration, New World Order, or Continuation of History?. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Volume 24, p. 185

⁴² *Ibid*

⁴³ Snyder, G. H., 1984, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics*, Volume 36, p. 461

⁴⁴ Walt, *footnote 1*, p. 1

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 17


⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 1

⁴⁷ Morgenthau, H. J., 1973. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., p. 181


maintain the balance of power.”⁴⁸ In fact, the necessity for a notion of balance of power was rooted in the Middle Ages of Europe where no state could dominate the others then.⁴⁹

The argument introduced by Walt is rather different from the traditional balance of power theory. For him, “balance of threat” might be an alternative approach, since he observes alliances as states balancing against the threat, not the dominant power.⁵⁰ In other words, states sought alliances against the state that constituted the “greatest threat.”⁵¹ Thus, the formation of alliances is directed by “imbalances of threat” rather than the “imbalances of power”⁵² (figure 1).

Balance of Power Theory



Balance of Threat Theory



*Figure 1. Balance of Power vs. Balance of Threat*⁵³

⁴⁸ Haglund, D. G., 2009. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. [Online] Available at: www.britannica.com/topic/alliance-politics [Accessed 11 July 2009]

⁴⁹ *Ibid*

⁵⁰ Walt, p. 5

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 21

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 263

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 265

Walt mentions two policies in preventing the common threat: “balancing” and “bandwagoning.” By referring to the balance of power theory, the balancing act is defined as forming alliances to prevent a state from dominating the international sphere.⁵⁴ However, Walt interprets the balancing behavior not only against the dominant power but also, and mainly, against the states which are perceived as threats.⁵⁵ However, the bandwagoning behavior necessitates for making alliances with the threatening power.⁵⁶ Therefore, bandwagoning is the “alignment with stronger.”⁵⁷ While recognizing the different dynamics of alliances in the course of history, Walt relates stronger states with balancing act, and weaker states with bandwagoning in their relations with great powers.⁵⁸

Snyder distinguishes the dynamics of the alliance politics in bipolar system from the multipolar one. For him, the alliances of bipolar world are solid and rigid compared to multipolar structure in that de-alignment and re-alignment became irrational and impossible.⁵⁹ In other words, bipolar system offers less powerful states to be allied with, compared to various equally strong states in multipolar world.⁶⁰ Thus, a fear of “abandonment” by an ally emerges more often.⁶¹ However, particularly in the Cold War era, for Snyder, the sides were well defined, the USA as the “natural protector” and the USSR as the “principal threat” by European states.⁶²

⁵⁴ Walt, p. 18

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 32

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 32

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 21

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 33

⁵⁹ Snyder, p. 484

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 462

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 466

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 484

The abovementioned argument regarding the alliance structure in bipolar world is mostly revealed in the relationship between the USA and Turkey during the early Cold War period. As could be inferred from the above discussion, Turkey's threat perception matched closely that of the US. Hence the common threat perception shaped the interests of two countries and the bilateral relations during the Cold War. Therefore the two countries' stances vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem should be considered within this framework. Throughout the thesis, the Cyprus issue and the evolutions of American and Turkish stances will be discussed with reference to the features of alliance politics and the general Cold War politics.

2.2 American Cold War Policy

The post-WWII period created a bipolar world which was divided by an "iron curtain" as stated by Winston Churchill in 1946. As Ryan examined the period, American policy makers were determined not to pursue a "Wilsonian" stance as in the case of interwar years; rather, the US would take the initiative to control, manipulate and shape the world politics.⁶³ Two interrelated terms dominated the American foreign policy structure until the end of the Cold War between the USA and the USSR as superpowers: 'containment' and 'deterrence.' As discussed by Hook and Spanier, the term 'Cold War' itself signified a rivalry with a new purpose for two superpowers which was not to win wars but to deter wars, since both of the states recognized the destruction capability of nuclear weapons of the time.⁶⁴ Therefore, although continuously discussed, the policies of containment and deterrence were interpreted and evolved throughout the course of American foreign

⁶³ Ryan, D., 2014. The Division of Europe, 1945-56. In: *The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 55

⁶⁴ Hook, S. W. & Spanier, J., 2013. *American Foreign Policy since World War II*. 19th ed. Thousand Oaks(California): CQ Press., p. 40

policy in the Cold War,⁶⁵ which had shaped the structure of American conduct of the Cold War politics till the end.

Containment policy represented the logic, the excuse, and the will behind the US attitude to take action against the Soviet Union and communism anywhere.⁶⁶ In 1946, the architect of the policy, George F. Kennan, called for an American strategy which should be “long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment.”⁶⁷ From the US perspective, as Kennan remarked the Soviet aggression and interests, the USSR emerged as a hostile state with its “secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the war suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose.”⁶⁸ For Kennan, these features of the Soviet state signaled for a long US-USSR struggle which necessitated for an intelligent and long-range foreign policy.⁶⁹

For Kennan, the presence of the USSR was the reality; however, the US could “contain” the Soviet power.⁷⁰ Such containment, for him, should include diplomatic, economic and military aspects in reducing Soviet power.⁷¹ In fact, for Kennan, the main ingredient for the containment policy was the industrial power of the US and its allies compared to that of the USSR.⁷² However, the original policy evolved to

⁶⁵ For the discussions about containment, see Roberts, J., 2012. *The Cold War: Containing Communism*. In: R. J. Mc.Mahon & T. W. Zeiler, eds. *Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy : A Diplomatic History*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: CQ Press, pp. 247, 248; Samuels, R. J. ed., 2006. *Encyclopedia of United States National Security*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 162, 163

⁶⁶ Livingstone, G., 2009. *America's Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror*. London&New York: Zed Books, p. 24

⁶⁷ Hook & Spanier, p. 37

⁶⁸ Kennan, George F., 1951, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 115, cited in Hook & Spanier, p. 36

⁶⁹ Hook & Spanier, pp. 36, 37

⁷⁰ Roberts, p. 248

⁷¹ *Ibid*

⁷² Hook & Spanier, p. 37

becoming more “idealist” in the late 1940s and facilitated the military aspect of the US approach.⁷³ Eventually, the following actions, namely Truman doctrine, the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and American engagement in the Korean War should be considered as the extension of containment policy with a military dimension.⁷⁴

The American pursuit of containment was followed by its reliance on deterrence based on atomic and nuclear weapons. Especially with the developments in Soviet atomic energy in 1949, the US and particularly President Truman called for nuclear power which would maintain and guarantee the US supremacy in arms race.⁷⁵ In parallel to the military aspect of the containment policy, the National Security Council (NSC - Document 68) proposed deployment of nuclear and conventional arms.⁷⁶ As Long stated, the US nuclear capacity meant the US capacity to deter⁷⁷, and the deterrence signified the ability “to dissuade a state...from taking an action by convincing...that the costs of the action would outweigh its benefits.”⁷⁸ Therefore, deterrence is about protecting national interests through preventing undesirable action and behavior.⁷⁹

The term deterrence is related to two concepts: cost-benefit calculation and fear. In other words, deterrence refers to manipulation of behaviors through increasing costs

⁷³ Samuels, p. 162

⁷⁴ Roberts, p. 248; Samuels, pp. 162, 163

⁷⁵ Herring, G. C., 2008. *From Colony to Superpower - U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 635, 636

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 638

⁷⁷ Long, A., 2008. *Deterrence: from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of Rand Deterrence Research*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., p. 22

⁷⁸ Samuels, p. 204

⁷⁹ *Ibid*

and reducing benefits for one party.⁸⁰ To that end, nuclear deterrence provided the US with a “form of coercion” by “generating fear.”⁸¹ In fact, both American and Soviet policy makers were deterred throughout the Cold War by the possibility of a nuclear war.⁸² At the same time, both sides sought for benefits and concessions by military deployments and threats of war.⁸³ However, especially with the Cuban Missile Crisis, both side recognized the fact that the nuclear race would bring nothing but catastrophe for each party.⁸⁴ Therefore, the objective became not to cause a war but to manipulate the other side through spreading fear and convincing about the costs of a particular action. In addition, it may also be concluded that “mutual fears of war”⁸⁵ made two states more cautious in their strategies in keeping peace and provided “mutual concessions.”⁸⁶ For Lebow and Gross, the nuclear deterrence enabled “moderated superpower behavior” since the parties realized the possibility of “mutual destruction” in case of a nuclear war.⁸⁷

In the light of abovementioned policies, namely containment and deterrence, American foreign policy shaped and was shaped by the Cold War atmosphere. Especially, the early years of the Cold War, the late 1940s and early 1950s, the consolidation of the US presence in Europe and later in East Asia were the policy behaviors which were the reflections of the US global intention, and particularly

⁸⁰ Long, p. 7

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 8

⁸² Lebow, R. N. & Gross, S. J., 1995. Deterrence and the Cold War. *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 110, p. 165

⁸³ *Ibid*

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 166

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 176

⁸⁶ Deterrence strategy and its application by the USA and USSR are examined by referring to Cuban Missile Crisis. See Lebow & Gross, p. 166

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 179, 180

Truman's determination, to protect not only "center" but also "periphery" from Soviet expansion.⁸⁸

2.3 The Cornerstones of the American-Turkish Alliance

The Turkish motivation towards being a part of the western mind rather than belonging to the oriental east emerges from an impetus which was initiated by both the after effects of the WWII and its leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, pointing at the standards of western development. Sander considers the "western orientation" of Turkish foreign policy as the permanent feature of the Republic of Turkey.⁸⁹ However, as Vali examines, Turkey's pursuit of alliances in foreign policy can be regarded as the heritage of Atatürk's Turkey while the increasing relations with the West, particularly with the United States, including ideological, economic and military aspects were mostly the results of the post-World War II developments.⁹⁰ It is safe to consider Turkish foreign policy and the emerging "special relationship"⁹¹ as the natural consequences of three interdependent cornerstones: (1) Turkish-Soviet relations and Soviet demands from Turkey, (2) the US global interests and American-Turkish cooperation against a common danger, and (3) Turkish security and economic considerations. In other words, the clash of two superpowers directly affected the route of the Turkish foreign policy.

⁸⁸ Samuels, p. 163

⁸⁹ Sander, O., 2006. *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. 3rd dü. Ankara: İmge Kitapevi Yayınları, p. 71

⁹⁰ Vali, F. A., 1971, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 35,36

⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 125, 372

As Gürün puts the Turkish-Soviet relations into the center of examining the policy decisions of Turkey⁹², the first cornerstone of the Turkish foreign policy was determined by security concerns directly related to the Soviet demands starting with 1945. Similarly, Sönmezoğlu mentions Turkish anxiety for not being left alone against Soviet demands.⁹³ Therefore, the main ingredient of the special relationship was the Soviet threat against Turkey which was an undeniable fact for McGhee.⁹⁴ As Harris argues, the potential danger of the Soviets, whose intensions for using force or not towards Turkey could not be clarified⁹⁵, determined the pathway of American-Turkish relations.

In addition to the earlier signs during the war, the initial irritating moves from Soviets came out in March and June, 1945, denouncing the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression of 1925 and demanding a base in the straits and some parts from eastern border of Turkey including Kars and Ardahan.⁹⁶ The following Potsdam Conference in July and the decision to sustain bilateral talks concerning any demands from Turkey⁹⁷ can be regarded as an urgent call for Turkey to consolidate its position against Soviet demands.

The American view declaring the current position of Turkey was highlighted by the US President, Harry Truman in 1946, arguing “no doubt that the Soviets intend to attack Turkey... (unless they were)...faced with an iron fist and strong language,

⁹² Gürün, K., 1983, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası (1939 dan günümüze kadar)*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, p. 3

⁹³ Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 35

⁹⁴ McGhee, G. C., 1990. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., p. xiii

⁹⁵ Kissinger, Henry, A., *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York, 1965), p. 19. cited in Harris, G. S., 1972, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971*, Washington D.C.: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, p. 9

⁹⁶ Harris, pp. 15,16

⁹⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States: Potsdam, vol. 2, passim, cited in Harris, p. 17

another war was in the making.”⁹⁸ Moreover, in April, he warned the USSR, “the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration.”⁹⁹ In August, as a response to Soviet note to Turkey repeating the demands about the governance of the straits, the United States declared its support for Turkey to sustain sovereign control rather than share its power with Black Sea countries.¹⁰⁰ As stated by Harris, United States considered Turkey as the vital country in the Near East and the Middle East, and without American aid, Turkey could be turned into a “springboard for political and military expansion by the USSR.”¹⁰¹

The other cornerstone in the relationship can be broadly defined as American Cold War strategy which was the containment of the USSR and the struggle against international communism as explained above. From American perspective, based on Kennan’s arguments, the containment necessitated the reinforcement of the US military and creation of an alliance link around the USSR in order to avoid the spread of communist ideology.¹⁰² Obviously, the aforementioned US stance towards Turkey regarding Soviet danger was the result of this global objective. For Harris, US sustained its Cold War strategy by establishing close relationships with smaller states, and American-Turkish relationship was one of them on the way of strife against Soviet Union.¹⁰³ From the US perspective, Turkey was vital for the security of the Middle East with its military force located along side with the Soviet border

⁹⁸ Truman, Harry S., *Memoirs*, vol. 1: *Years of Decisions* (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), p. 522, cited in Harris, p. 19

⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 14, 1946, p. 622, cited in Harris, p. 20

¹⁰⁰ Harris, pp. 21,22

¹⁰¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, vol. 7, p. 894, cited in Harris, p. 21

¹⁰² Gürün, p. 267

¹⁰³ Harris, p. 1

and with its democratic governance against the communist system of the USSR.¹⁰⁴ Also, a concession regarding the governance of straits would mean the acceptance of Soviet expansionism.¹⁰⁵ Hence, as Sander argues, the geostrategic position of Turkey was the indispensable part of American-Turkish relations.¹⁰⁶ Later with the Eisenhower administration, the Turkish stance in the Middle East defense would be denoted by the term, “Northern Tier”, which was described by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as the bordering states with the USSR which were responsible for protecting the area, and in which Turkey dominates as a reliable partner being the cornerstone of the struggle.¹⁰⁷

At the same time, it is the Turkish acceptance of these American strategies that contribute to the special relationship between Turkey and the USA.¹⁰⁸ As it will be discussed in the following pages, Turkey voluntarily and intentionally opted for the US aid economic and military, as well as western orientation in foreign policy decisions. Particularly, the Turkish entrance into NATO and deporting troops to the Korean War were the results of the determination and enthusiasm of Turkey to be a part of the western camp. Starting with the WWII period and continuing with the post-war security threats, the Turkish demand for military and economic aid was its permanent requirement which constituted the final cornerstone of the American-Turkish relationship.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the relationship, to be regarded as “a model for international cooperation” with its shared objective against the Soviets, included

¹⁰⁴ McGhee, pp. xiii, xiv

¹⁰⁵ Daniel Yergin, 1977, *Shattered Peace*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, p. 234, cited in Sander, O., 1994. *Yeni Bir Bölgesel Güç Olarak Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Hedefleri*. In: F. Sönmezoğlu, ed. *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, p. 428

¹⁰⁶ Sander, 1979, p.4, see also Uslu, N., 2000. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*. 1st dü. Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, p. 17

¹⁰⁷ McGhee, p. 156

¹⁰⁸ Sander, 2006, pp. 111, 112

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 112

both American objective of containment and Turkish security concerns as well as the objective of development not only in defense but also in economy.¹¹⁰

In the following sections, the facts, the Truman Doctrine, the entrance of Turkey to NATO and the Korean War, relating to the history of the strategic alliance are discussed in line with the aforementioned three cornerstones of the alliance structure, namely, Soviet demands, American interests and Turkish economic and military concerns. These three cornerstones constituted the logic behind the Turkish choice in cooperating with the US, but not the USSR. As McGhee argues, the USSR has been too late to abandon their territorial demands and approach Turkey at least without an aggressive way: Turkey had already opted for the other camp.¹¹¹

2.4 Heydays of the Alliance

2.4.1 Truman Doctrine

The end of the WWII marked an emerging necessity to raise support on behalf of those nations which were obviously to be threatened by the Soviets in the near future in that such nations were both economically and militarily weakened if not completely devastated. The US initiative concerning Turkey and Greece was triggered by the British declaration arguing that Britain could not support these nations on the bases of economic and military aid.¹¹² For Britain, it could not undertake the heavy load in support of the weaker nations, so the United States should take the responsibility as the only country having emerged with a

¹¹⁰ Harris, p. 3

¹¹¹ McGhee, p. 152

¹¹² The end of British support and British expectations from US summarized by Halle, L. J., 1967, *the Cold War as History*, London: Chatto&Windus, p. 111, cited in Türkmen, F., 2012. *Kırılğan İttifaktan "Model Ortaklığa": Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri*. s.l.:Timaş Yayınları, p. 64; Gönübol, M., 1996. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*. 9th ed. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, pp. 212, 213

strengthened economy after the WWII.¹¹³ As the architect of containment policy, Kennan advised that the power vacuum in the region should be filled in by the US.¹¹⁴ Following the British position, Truman made his speech on March 12, 1947, in line with containment policy, arguing that it should be the US foreign policy and priority to support independent nations struggling directly or indirectly against armed minorities and foreign pressures.¹¹⁵ For McGhee, the doctrine and the following military and economic aid represented the American belief that the Western camp could only be improved by an American initiative since the only economy remaining solid was American.¹¹⁶

For Sander, the main objective of the doctrine was to prevent Soviet expansion throughout the globe, and to spread American political and economic structure.¹¹⁷ To this end, European security, and particularly Turkish and Greek independence, should be maintained through military and economic backup.¹¹⁸ While the initial aim of the doctrine was not the defense of Turkey against Soviet threat, the priority was given to Greece and the civil war against communists.¹¹⁹ For Truman, if Greece was lost, Turkey would be devoured by the sea of communism, its position becoming untenable.¹²⁰ As Harris argued, the loss of Turkey lose would endanger the American interests in the eastern Mediterranean.¹²¹

¹¹³ McGhee, p. 5

¹¹⁴ Bağcı, H., 2014. *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*. 4th ed. Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, p. 5

¹¹⁵ Sander, 1979, p. 12, see also McGhee, p. 23,24

¹¹⁶ McGhee, p. 30

¹¹⁷ Sander, 1979, p. 18

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 11

¹²⁰ McGhee, p. 20; Uslu, 2000, p. 98

¹²¹ Harris, p. 28

In the new relationship model, therefore, there was a mutual interest between Turkey and the US. On the one hand, with the doctrine, the US aimed to prevent Soviet expansion which could start with Greece and spread towards Near East, via Turkey, to end in a Soviet sphere of influence closed to American trade and economy.¹²² On the other hand, Turkey represented both a barrier against potential Soviet expansion and a significant military zone for an offensive heading towards the Soviets.¹²³ Therefore, while Turkey obtained the US help for its urgent security needs, the United States was able to contain the USSR and create its own sphere by providing Greece and Turkey with military and economic protection. In his farewell address in 1953, while mentioning the precision of his decision to support Turkey and Greece, Truman highlights again the importance of Turkey's position, arguing, "Turkey is a powerful fortress in the most strategic place of the world."¹²⁴

In the bipolar new world, global stability had to be maintained in terms of balance of powers between the US and the USSR. Out of this consequence for every possible Soviet threat, a counter balancing action had to be taken. Truman Doctrine emerged as an urgent, vital and undeniable necessity as the solid action to be taken against the Soviet threat. The Turkish choice was due to an obligation in view of the Turkish survival in the region. The Turkish perspective relied on the US support. From this perspective, Truman doctrine was required militarily as a natural result of Soviet intentions, and economically for the revitalization and the development of the country after WWII.¹²⁵ As analyzed by McGhee, Turkish government expenditure

¹²² Sander, 1979, p. 16

¹²³ Thomas, L. V. & Frye, R. N., 1952, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, p. 146, cited in Sander, 1979, p. 16

¹²⁴ "The President's Farewell Address to the American People", January 15, 1953, Harry S. Truman Library-Public Papers, www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059, cited in Türkmen, p. 84

¹²⁵ Gönübol, M. & Ülman, 1966, H., *Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı: 1947-1965*, *Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, XXI, No. 1, p. 153, cited in Sander, 1979, p. 18. Economic necessities of Turkey summarized in Bağcı, pp. 6, 7

on national defense was more than 50 percent of the government budget in 1947 and 1948.¹²⁶ As the US State Department highlighted, the economic burden of Turkish administration to sustain its military power would hinder Turkey's economic development.¹²⁷ In addition, the expenditure on military expenses naturally decreased the amount of capital reserved for other sectors, namely, agriculture, industry and transport.¹²⁸ Also, the decrease in the Turkish income from export products in parallel with the increase in imports after the end of the WWII disrupted the balance in the economy.¹²⁹ Fortunately, in order to sustain economic development of Turkey, the doctrine and the following aid were designed as a grant which would not require any repayment obligations.¹³⁰ Therefore, the doctrine can be regarded as a welcome opportunity for Turkey to modernize and decrease the economic burden of military in order to sustain economic development and to lay the ground for future aids.¹³¹

Turkish willingness to accept the US aid and presence in the new set of relations initiated a new term which would be mutually shared. It was declared by President İsmet İnönü that every Turkish citizen happily welcomed the US aid which meant the appreciation of Turkish policies during the WWII and which would serve for the recovery of Turkish economy.¹³² Hence, as Güney argues, the geostrategic position of Turkey became an advantage and an asset through which she attained economic

¹²⁶ McGhee, p. 44

¹²⁷ Harris, p. 26

¹²⁸ McGhee, p. 44

¹²⁹ Sander, 1979, pp. 19, 20

¹³⁰ Harris, pp. 28, 29

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p. 29; Sander, 2006, p. 122

¹³² For İnönü's speech, see Gönübol, p. 216

aid.¹³³ Similarly, Ahmad mentions Turkish mind-set in considering Truman doctrine as not only a guarantee against Soviet danger but also as an opportunity to use the geographical position more profitably.¹³⁴ Obviously, the new economic and military phase of relaxation would end the Turkish “anxious loneliness”¹³⁵ in the post-war period against Soviet danger as the US became the chief defender of the west and particularly “principle backer”¹³⁶ of Greece and Turkey after the end of the British support.

Following the doctrine, on July 12, an “Agreement on Aid to Turkey” was introduced which would constitute the main debate in Turkish politics because of its Article IV: without the US permission the military equipment provided could not be used for purposes other than its set purpose.¹³⁷ In other words, the military equipment was granted against communism or for any purpose that Americans considered to be appropriate. Other than these, they could not be utilized by the Turkish army. As it will be mentioned below, during the Cyprus crisis, it would become the key principle of American arguments to remind Turkey that she became obliged not to use the American assistance beyond its pre-defined purposes.¹³⁸

¹³³ Güney, A., 2008. Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present. *Middle Eastern Studies*, May, Volume 44, p. 471

¹³⁴ Roth, Andrew, 1950, June 12, *the Hindu (Madras)*, cited in Ahmad, F., 1977. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*. London: C.Hurst & Company, p. 389

¹³⁵ Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 49

¹³⁶ Xydis, Stephen G., 1963, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine*, Thessaloniki, cited in Harris, p. 25

¹³⁷ Agreement on Aid to Turkey, Agreement signed at Ankara July 12, 1947, Article IV: “The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished.”

¹³⁸ Türkmen, p. 79

2.4.2 NATO membership of Turkey and its involvement in Korean War

2.4.2.1 NATO membership

The second action within the containment policy can be regarded as the building of NATO, and its enlargement towards Turkey and Greece. Originally, North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created as a collective defense agreement among Western European states in April 1949. NATO, as the agreement of the alliance, represented the American determination to create a western solidarity which could be dated back to the US support to Brussels Pact of 1948 among England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.¹³⁹ NATO, which was regarded as “the most important action in the foreign policy of the US since Monroe Doctrine”¹⁴⁰, was originally designed as an exclusive arrangement for the western countries without any enlargement towards Turkey or Greece.¹⁴¹

American-Turkish dialogue regarding the American aid for Western European countries started in May 1948 was based on the Turkish concern that the exclusion of Turkey from such assistance and guarantees would leave Turkey vulnerable against Soviet pressure.¹⁴² Later, Turkey’s concern turned into a problem with the establishment of NATO without Turkey and with the inclusion of Italy as a Mediterranean state and the Algerian departments of France.¹⁴³ Such inclusions offered Turkey an opportunity to become a Mediterranean partner in NATO. Yet, since the alliance was among the North Atlantic countries, Turkey was kept away

¹³⁹ Harris, p. 35

¹⁴⁰ The speech of US senate member Arthur Vandenberg retrieved from Hook, S. W. & Spanier, J., 2000, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, p. 63 cited in Türkmen, p. 71

¹⁴¹ Harris, p. 35

¹⁴² US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, vol. 4, p. 83-5, cited in McGhee, p. 56

¹⁴³ McGhee, p. 59

from it despite Italy's inclusion. According to Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, while Turkey had been sustaining relations with the US since 1947, and while these two countries had tried to locate Turkey in the emerging security arrangement for North Atlantic area, the final result for Turkey was its exclusion and inclusion of Italy.¹⁴⁴ To console Turkey, it was declared that the arrangement was strictly for North Atlantic region and Italy would be out of consideration.¹⁴⁵

As Sadak argued, Turkey was eager to participate in a possible Mediterranean pact as the extension of NATO; however, the inclusion of Italy to NATO alliance created a deep concern in Turkey regarding its importance in the eyes of the US as if it was ignored in security arrangements.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, for Harris, the objective of Turkey by proposing a Mediterranean pact did not mean that it would accept to be excluded from NATO, rather, it could be regarded as a temporary policy of developing ability to establish a Mediterranean regional defense with the US, until its full membership to NATO.¹⁴⁷

The reason for initial none-admission of Turkey into NATO was explained by Ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin as such that since the membership of Turkey would necessitate the membership of Greece, NATO would be blamed for causing the continuity of chaos in Greece due to the ongoing unrest in the country.¹⁴⁸ Also it could have been difficult for the White House to explain such an enlargement of NATO to the Congress which at the time was pursuing isolationist policies rather

¹⁴⁴ Turkish position outlined by Necmettin Sadak, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, vol. 6, 1647-53, cited in McGhee, p. 59

¹⁴⁵ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, vol. 6, 1947-53, cited in McGhee, p. 59

¹⁴⁶ Turkish position outlined by Necmettin Sadak, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, vol. 6, 1647-53, cited in McGhee, p. 59

¹⁴⁷ Harris, p. 37

¹⁴⁸ Erkin, Feridun Cemal, 1986, *Dışişlerinde 34 yıl*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 68, cited in Türkmen, pp. 71,72

than expansionist ones.¹⁴⁹ Western European states were concerned with the fact that if Turkey's admission was accepted they could have become neighbors with the Soviets. Thus any Soviet threat to Turkey would automatically be a direct threat to them. Therefore, they were not eager to take Turkey as a member.¹⁵⁰

In response to the Turkish concerns regarding the US assistance to Europe via NATO, which could end or decrease the aid reserved for Turkey¹⁵¹, the US Department of State report of May 5, 1949 expressed the American stance: the US would continue to assist Turkey which was considered as "bulwark against Soviet expansion."¹⁵² Regarding the Turkish doubts, it was stated,

We [the United States] should be especially vigilant not to allow any situation to arise which might weaken Turkey's intention to resist because of doubts of our [American] determination to continue our [American] assistance.¹⁵³

As highlighted by McGhee, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff memo on September 9, 1950, in case of Turkey's inclusion, there might emerge a question whether NATO would include all "anti-Kremlin peripheral area."¹⁵⁴ The same memo proposed "associate status" for Turkey and Greece in order to calm these countries down in view of their demands of becoming members.¹⁵⁵ Some NATO countries also argued that enlargement of NATO along Soviet borders would be seen as an aggressive and provocative behavior while the Korean conflict had not

¹⁴⁹ Erkin, Feridun Cemal, 1986, *Dışişlerinde 34 yıl*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p. 68, cited in Türkmen, pp. 71,72

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁵¹ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, vol. 4, p. 83-5, cited in McGhee, p. 56; Gönlübol, p. 225

¹⁵² McGhee, p. 61

¹⁵³ *Ibid*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 72

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*

been resolved yet.¹⁵⁶ Mostly, it was the opposition of European members, particularly the Scandinavian countries that did not want the inclusion of Turkey not to fall into a conflict in remote areas, which was a main concern for them.¹⁵⁷

From the Turkish perspective, starting with Truman Doctrine and continuing with the accession of Turkey into the European Council, Turkey became the indispensable part of the Western camp.¹⁵⁸ Eventually, the membership of NATO was of vital significance for Turkey to be a part of the western defense system. For the Turkish politicians, only NATO membership and its proposed security alignment could guarantee the security concerns of Turkey.¹⁵⁹ Highlighting the Turkish enthusiasm in taking a role in collective security, President İnönü stated that the unity that should be provided by the United States in Europe would require determination by each country; and Turkey was ready to undertake its responsibility.¹⁶⁰ Having experienced no vital change, Turkish foreign policy continued its western orientation with Democrat Party administration, and as Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü argues, Turkish foreign policy would become more “energetic” which would mean active response to the Korean War and increasing efforts for NATO admission.¹⁶¹

From the US perspective, as Sander argues, by establishing the NATO alliance, the US firstly aimed to prevent potential Soviet expansion, and secondly, in case of a

¹⁵⁶ *New York Times*, May 26, June 2, 1951, cited in Harris, p. 41

¹⁵⁷ Armstrong, Hamilton F., July 1951, “Eisenhower’s Right Flank,” *Foreign Affairs*, p. 660, cited in Harris, p. 37

¹⁵⁸ Sander, 1979, p. 65

¹⁵⁹ Ahmad, p. 391

¹⁶⁰ McGhee, p. 58

¹⁶¹ McGhee, p. 71

Soviet attack, to counter-attack any Soviet action by air forces.¹⁶² In this potential scenario, Turkey's importance for the US was again its geographical position in the region.¹⁶³ For Sander, Turkey's accession to NATO was one of the precautions of the US against the Soviet aggression.¹⁶⁴ Before the official entry of Turkey into NATO, on January 15, 1952, the General of the Army Omar Bradley in the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate stated,

from the military viewpoint, it is impossible to overstate the importance of these two countries... Greece and Turkey occupy strategic locations along one of the major east-west axes... Located as they are – and allied with the free nations – they serve as powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa... Turkey, astride the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south...¹⁶⁵

As McGhee stated in February 1951 after the second Chiefs of Mission Conference in İstanbul,

I was thoroughly convinced that Greek-Turkish admission to NATO was a vitally needed step to bring the very considerable Greek and Turkish forces, particularly the Turkish army, into the NATO defensive line... Only in this way could the Soviets be prevented from making a military “end run” around NATO.¹⁶⁶

Also, according to National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) introduced in February 1951, Turkey was considered as a “faithful ally” in resisting Soviet expansion, and it was accepted that Turkey would pursue the United States as long as the US would sustain its struggle against Soviets.¹⁶⁷ At the same time, as Harris mentions, in May 1951, the US supported the full membership for Turkey which was the only way to

¹⁶² Sander, 1979, p. 57

¹⁶³ Sander, 1979, p. 57

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 55

¹⁶⁵ McGhee, pp. 88, 89

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 83,84

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 85

avoid the possible Turkish “neutralism” due to its ongoing concern regarding the Turkish-Soviet border.¹⁶⁸

2.4.2.2 Korea as the price

Turkey’s involvement in Korean War became one of the debated topics in terms of its association with Turkey’s admission to NATO. While there are comments arguing that sending troops to Korea was the condition for the accession of Turkey, for Türkmen, Korea was, at least, a catalyst in reminding the importance of Turkey’s geostrategic position in the Cold War.¹⁶⁹ When the aforementioned US views, their dates and the shift in the US thinking are concerned, it seems that Turkish will and determination in Korea influenced American policy makers in considering Turkey as an “ideal ally”¹⁷⁰ and supporting Turkish inclusion to NATO. It can be argued that Menderes administration considered the call for Korean War as an opportunity, perhaps the most appropriate time, for Turkey to convince the United States and demonstrate its determination to participate in collective security of the west.¹⁷¹ For Türkmen, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, was an important actor in convincing Prime Minister Adnan Menderes arguing that if Turkey did not respond the aggression, it would be unable to call for foreign support in possible future aggressions towards the Turkish territory.¹⁷² For

¹⁶⁸ Waggoner, Walter H., 1951, March 18, “Turkish-Greek Bid for Full Ties Gains,” *New York Times*, cited in Harris, p. 42

¹⁶⁹ Türkmen, p. 77

¹⁷⁰ Vali, p. 127

¹⁷¹ Harris, p. 40; Ahmad, p. 391; Vali, p. 37; Sander, 1994, p. 429

¹⁷² Türkmen, p. 74

Harris, it was the “gambit” of ruling Democrat Party to become full member of NATO.¹⁷³

After a highly debated decision-making process which was concluded promptly by Menderes in Yalova with a quick cabinet meeting without any consultation with the assembly or opposition party, the government decided to send the army to Korea on July 25, 1950.¹⁷⁴ Menderes proudly declared the Turkish contribution in collective security by stating, “it is only by way of a decision similar to ours, to be arrived at by other freedom-loving nations, that acts of aggression can be prevented and world peace can be safeguarded.”¹⁷⁵ It is important to note that Turkey was the first country to respond UN call, and the third largest army in the battlefield.¹⁷⁶

It was obvious that Turkish politicians had the most appropriate position in insisting on Turkey’s membership of NATO. The first request of Menderes administration immediately after the government’s decision to enter Korean War was rejected due to the concerns of some of the member states regarding Soviet response.¹⁷⁷ In line with the American stance supporting Turkey’s position, on May 15, 1951, it was advised by the United States to take Turkey and Greece into NATO alliance. Officially, Turkey became a full member in February 18, 1952. As Vali argues, other than full membership, no offer, including associate status or membership in any possible Mediterranean Pact or any other regional pact seemed to appease Turkey since it was determined to obtain direct connection with the United States.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ Harris, p. 38

¹⁷⁴ Türkmen, p. 75; McGhee, p. 77; Kasım Gülek, secretary general of the RPP, stated the party’s official position in a release carried by the press on July 26, 1950, cited in Harris, p. 39

¹⁷⁵ McGhee, p. 77

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*; Vali p. 37

¹⁷⁷ Türkmen, p. 75

¹⁷⁸ Vali, p. 36

As Harris argues, when Turkey and Greece could not enter NATO in September 1950, they were invited to take part in future NATO planning in Mediterranean area.¹⁷⁹ However, there seemed to have no convincing reason not to offer full membership to Turkey when it was already considered as “associate” member.¹⁸⁰ As mentioned by the US Ambassador McGhee during the meeting in May 1952, Menderes highlighted the importance of the Turkish presence in NATO, arguing that the alliance among the three countries, the USA, the UK and Turkey was of vital significance for world peace.¹⁸¹

2.5 Turkey as the safe guard of the West

Turkey’s membership to NATO was the most important and influential achievement for Turkey in the way of abolishing Soviet pressure that would continue to threaten Turkey, at least until 1953. Obviously, the American-Turkish relations reached a peak with the NATO membership. Beyond the security measures, membership guaranteed the continuation of military, economic and moral support of the west for the future development of Turkey.¹⁸² Such ties were labeled as the “organic alliance” including security and development concerns which were the “twin objectives” of Turkey.¹⁸³ Accordingly, American-Turkish relations and particularly American presence in Turkey were intensified by increasing bilateral talks and agreements concerning military assistance and technical support most of which were

¹⁷⁹ Harris, pp. 41,42

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁸¹ United States Department of State. Slany, William Z., Editor, *Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954*. Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean Volume VIII Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952-1954, No. 464, 782.11/5-1552, p. 890

¹⁸² Harris, p. 44

¹⁸³ Sander, 2006, p. 156

based on the July 12 Agreement.¹⁸⁴ In line with these agreements, the United States had the opportunity to construct military establishments in Turkey against the Soviet threat.¹⁸⁵ These developments, for Harris, created a shift in the American perspective towards Turkey: while the US had considered Turkey as a barrier against Soviets, now Turkey became an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” with the American personnel located on the bases both for gathering information and for the possible operations in the region.¹⁸⁶

It should be stated that the government change in Turkey in 1950 did not create any shift in foreign policy which was always based on obtaining the US security guarantees against the Soviet danger. Even with the change in the Soviet discourse after the death of Stalin, which proposed the renewal of 1925 Treaty of Friendship without any claim on any Turkish city by May 30, 1953,¹⁸⁷ the Turkish position did not seem to change, at least according to Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. While the new administration of the USSR called for increasing cooperation, for Zorlu, the proposed new opening in the relations was nothing but a new tactic of still aggressive Soviets.¹⁸⁸ As reported to the Department of State by William M. Rountree on July 30, 1953, a diplomat in charge in Turkey, “unlike many of our friends, the Turks consider the present Russian peace offensive to be no more than

¹⁸⁴ Türkmen, pp. 78,79, for the details of the bilateral accords see Harris, p. 49

¹⁸⁵ For the categories of US bases see Türkmen, pp. 80,81; see also Gönlübol, p. 236

¹⁸⁶ Harris, p. 56

¹⁸⁷ McGhee, p. 151

¹⁸⁸ “Ruslar tarafından takip edilen siyasetin esaslarında bir değişiklik görmek bizi ziyadesiyle memnun edecektir. Fakat maalesef bugün için ortada böyle bir değişiklik göremiyorum... Ruslar tarafından hali hazırda takip edilen siyaset kendilerinin eski siyasetlerinden vazgeçtiklerini gösteren bir emare vermekten çok uzaktır... Ortada yalnızca taktiklerini değiştirdiklerine dair bir emare mevcuttur.” Gönlübol, p. 312

the employment of new tactics, and not representative of any basic change in Soviet policy.”¹⁸⁹

In addition, Prime Minister Menderes argued for strengthening links with the US as his decisive discourse. As McGhee stated, Menderes reminded the Turkish geostrategic position in order to sustain and increase American aid by arguing “dollars spent for defense in Turkey would yield more than those spent in any other country.”¹⁹⁰ For Menderes, Turkey was the “guardian of civilization and an element of security” with its location as a bridge and thus the American aid was required as the natural result of its superior location.¹⁹¹

As mentioned by Aydın, this period for Turkish foreign policy was the period of “Western dependence”¹⁹² during which neutrality seemed unrealistic for policy-makers.¹⁹³ For Aydın, Turkish perspective ignored the idea of “peaceful coexistence” of two camps in the Cold War and did not consider non-alignment as a solution, but rather, acted in line with Western policies.¹⁹⁴ As Prime Minister Menderes argued, a neutralist policy was not applicable for Turkey, thus, for him, it needed to pursue democratic nations, meaning, the western camp.¹⁹⁵ Accordingly, for Bölükbaşı, until the mid-1960s, Turkey did not create national policies towards the Third World and Middle Eastern countries, but exhibited a pro-Western

¹⁸⁹ FRUS, 1952-54, No. 480, 611.82/7-3053, p. 934

¹⁹⁰ McGhee, p. 153

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 154

¹⁹² Aydın, M., 2000. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War. *Middle Eastern Studies*, January, 36(1), p. 105

¹⁹³ Aron, R., 1973, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York, pp. 125,127, cited in Aydın, p. 106

¹⁹⁴ Foreign policy philosophy of DP leaders summarized by Ulman and Sander, pp. 7,8, cited in Aydın, p. 114

¹⁹⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, İstanbul, 28 August 1948, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 17

stance.¹⁹⁶ The concrete proof of such a stance can be the Turkish position in Bandung Conference in 1955, in which Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as the defender of the west criticized non-aligned countries for not understanding the danger imposed by the Soviets.¹⁹⁷

Turkish foreign policy after Truman Doctrine was based on creating intense relations with the western camp, and the main objective was considered to be entering into any political, economic or military alliances that were established by the west.¹⁹⁸ As Sander argued, with the Truman doctrine, Turkey became the most enthusiastic defender of the western camp.¹⁹⁹ The following NATO membership can be regarded as the continuation of this perspective. For Harris, the membership served for the Turkish desire to be considered as a part of Europe by taking active role in the alliance.²⁰⁰

It is safe to argue that Turkish policy makers did not refrain from creating a US-oriented foreign policy in which the national interests of Turkey were seen as parallel to the American and NATO interests.²⁰¹ As Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü argued in 1951, “our [Turkey’s] national interests are identical from every point with the joint interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with its geographic and military requirements.”²⁰² Hence, as Sander highlighted, Turkey

¹⁹⁶ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 18

¹⁹⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, April, 1955, no. 257, p. 148-151, cited in Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 200; Sander, 2006, p. 93

¹⁹⁸ Gönlübol&Ülman, 1966, p. 333, cited in Sander, 1979, p. 36; Gönlübol, p. 311

¹⁹⁹ Sander, 1979, p. 14

²⁰⁰ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Dış Politikada Büyük Zafer,” *Zafer*, September 22, 1951, cited in Harris, p. 44

²⁰¹ Sander, 1979, p. 84; Sander, 2006, p. 156, see also Vali, pp. 71- 355,356; Sönmezoğlu, 2016, pp. 36,37; Gönlübol, p. 311

²⁰² Turkey, Turkish Information Office, *Turkey’s Foreign Relations in 1952* (New York, 1952), p. 6, cited in Harris, p. 45

gradually became the “spokesman” of the West.²⁰³ Unfortunately, as Vali argued, such an argument regarding national interests are no more than illusory²⁰⁴ since, as Uslu mentioned, the US policies towards Turkey were based on the US interests without any concern based on common objectives or Turkish interests in regional affairs or any concern regarding westernization and development of Turkey.²⁰⁵ As the fourth and fifth chapters of the study will focus, the interests of the two countries would not necessarily align when these two countries began to introduce different perspectives on the Cyprus issue.

2.6 Conclusion: Harmony in American-Turkish Positions in the early Cold War

For the period under study in this chapter, it can be concluded that the American-Turkish relations emerged as a mutually beneficial strategic alliance. These relations can be interpreted as the “balancing act” of Turkey against the bordering superpower with the superpower overseas.²⁰⁶ In line with Walt’s balancing behavior, Turkey opted to side with the US against the USSR, not because the USSR was the dominant power but because it was the threatening state. As Uslu examines, the initial post-war years witnessed a common danger, which was the Soviet threat globally directed against the US and particularly against the Turkish territory. It also defined a clear objective for Turkey and the United States on which a mutual security and economic alliance could be established.²⁰⁷ While the US

²⁰³ Gönübol M., 1965, *Turkish Participation in the United Nations, 1945-1954*, A.Ü.S.B.F. Yayını, A.Ü. Basımevi, Ankara, pp. 171-176, cited in Sander, 1979, p. 121

²⁰⁴ Vali, p. 71

²⁰⁵ Uslu, 2000, p. 20

²⁰⁶ Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 40

²⁰⁷ Uslu, 2000, p. 20

benefits mainly from the geostrategic position of Turkey in containing the Soviet power, Turkey supplied with the economic aid and Western guarantee against the Soviet danger, or at least it was believed to be so until the Cyprus issue emerged.

Therefore, the three cornerstones, namely Soviet demands, American interests and Turkish security and economic considerations created a harmony in the late 1940s and 1950s during which the strategic alliance experienced its heydays. While the immediate danger of Soviet demands urged Turkey to seek for a security guarantee, the US emerged as the principle actor in the post-war period to sustain the territorial security, firstly with Truman Doctrine, and secondly with NATO alliance both of which were in line with the containment policy. Obviously, Turkey, first by compulsion and second as a voluntary act, accepted the US strategy. Especially after Stalin's death in 1953, Turkish dependence on West became a choice rather than a necessity which was mainly due to economic considerations since the Soviet threat did not constitute immediate danger as in the case of the late 1940s. These economic relations reached to such a level that Menderes was blamed to use economic aid for the benefit of Democrat Party, and the opposition summarized the atmosphere in Turkey by arguing "If Allah does not provide, America will."²⁰⁸ What is significant here is that Turkey, intentionally or unintentionally, became the safe guard of the American interests at least until 1964.²⁰⁹ In 1964, Turkey realized that its objectives were not always identical with those of the US which might abandon its support if Turkey would signal to act at any time pursuing interests other than the US established.

As argued by Uslu, alliance relationships are based on maximizing national interests, and in the US-Turkey relations, national interests are in the forefront at least for Americans. For the aforementioned period, the most concrete example of

²⁰⁸ Hangen, Welles, February 9, 1954, "Anti-American Feeling in Turkey Fomented by Opposition to Bayar," *New York Times*, cited in Harris, p. 81

²⁰⁹ Sander, 2006, p. 112

the priority of national interests is the July 12 Agreement which would serve as the barrier against Turkish will in the 1960s. With the agreement, it was accepted by Turkey that the US would decide whether Turkey could use the military equipment in case of any threat against itself. In other words, any potential attack towards Turkey would be first examined by the US policy makers, who would then decide whether Turkey could utilize the weapons against the threat. Therefore, with this agreement, Turkey lost its military independence, at least about the use of equipment and weapons, as well as free will of military decisions. Eventually, it would be American interests rather than Turkish interests that would decide whether Turkey would use its military or not. Hence, such a relationship represents the relation between a superpower and a relatively free state which was disempowered, as mentioned by Uslu.²¹⁰ Therefore, the strategic alliance did not include two equal countries, rather, it was between two unequal partners in which Turkey needed and intentionally chose the US more than the US needed or was concerned about Turkey.

²¹⁰ Uslu, 2003, p. 3

CHAPTER 3

EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC

Cyprus as an issue and as a process can be regarded as the initial complexity or as “the new apple of discord”²¹¹ for Vali that the strategic alliance between Turkey and the US faced in 1960s. Gradually, for Turkey, the issue became a “matter of honor and prestige”²¹² in the late 1950s but mostly after 1963 events. However, in this first stage of the Cyprus issue until the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the discussions in the international sphere did not turn into a problem for the American-Turkish alliance. Rather, the issue was solved with 1959 Agreements and the 1960 Constitution. Hence, the strategic alliance mentioned in the previous chapter between the US and Turkey was still valid since Turkey pursued parallel policies with the US and in the initial stage with the UK.

This chapter will discuss and clarify the positions of Turkey and the USA during the years before the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus. As in the case of the second chapter, the cornerstones of the alliance, namely American interests, Turkish military and economic considerations and briefly the Soviet danger will be mentioned to understand the reasons for the American-Turkish stance towards Cyprus.

²¹¹ Vali, p. 228

²¹² *Ibid*, p. 242

Concerning the American foreign policy towards Cyprus, this chapter argues that Americans preferred indirect and precarious involvement or “quiet diplomacy” in searching for a sustainable solution for the Cyprus issue. The chapter highlights that, for the US, a balance should have been reached between Greece and Turkey in order to protect the NATO alliance from a fatal blow in the region which was beyond all much against and threatening to American current and future interests in the region. As discussed in the following pages, finding a solution without taking sides was of vital importance for American foreign policy. Therefore, from American perspective, Cyprus as a potential crisis in NATO alliance would necessitate a cooperation between parties, and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus can be regarded as the best solution responding the interests of Greece, Turkey, Britain and of course the USA.

The period until 1960 can be regarded as the period during which the harmony and close alliance between the US and Turkey shaped the Cyprus issue not the vice versa. As discussed separately throughout the chapter, Turkish and American positions were almost identical until the establishment of the Republic. In fact, it was such a period that Turkey pursued various and contrasting policies. This variety in Turkish foreign policy can be explained with Turkish attention to conduct parallel policies with the USA and the UK, which can be regarded as the heritage of the strategic alliance of the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Hence, in the first stage of the Cyprus issue, the harmony between Turkey and US was not influenced from the Cyprus issue; rather, the Turkish policy preferences and eventually the fate of Cyprus Island were shaped in line with American and British policies.

3.1 The Emergence of the Cyprus Issue and the early Turkish Position

Located in the East Mediterranean region called the Levant, Cyprus has been a visible presence which proved its significance only in time when it gradually began

to shift from being a mere island to becoming a strategic location in the region. The so-called 'region' embodies the entire North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey, Southeastern Europe and Greece. This boundary has Cyprus as its focal point, the center, which becomes a vortex that sucks in national benefits, interests and strategies. Out of this vortex rises a chaotic state of being and a complex form of existence for those who lived on the island. It is the destiny of Cyprus to be a center of attraction, and therefore, as center of chaos and uncertainty.

The US Under-Secretary of State George Ball defined Cyprus as “a troubled island” which has always had a trouble with its geography.²¹³ As Ball summarized the history of Cyprus, the location of the island has been the ‘curse’ of Cyprus which has experienced numerous occupations and governance throughout the history. It can be stated that the Cyprus Island has accommodated various nations and empires; however, the imposition of differences did not end with a “Cypriot nation.”²¹⁴ Today, still, the island has two separate states, representing the Greek and the Turkish sides of the island. Neither of the states can claim superiority over the other, nor there seems to be a possibility of such sort unless coexistence on equal terms is established.

Beginning from the early 1950s, Greek-Cypriot and Greek politicians began to call for *enosis*, union with Greece, especially with the results of 1950 plebiscite in which Greek Cypriots voted in favor of *enosis* against preserving the status quo.²¹⁵ For Archbishop Makarios, it was a great opportunity to push for self-determination for

²¹³ Ball, G. W., 1982, *The Past Has Another Pattern - Memoirs*. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 337

²¹⁴ Ertekün, N. M., 1996, The Historical Background of the Cypriot Turkish Declaration of Independence, 15 November 1983. In: *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, p. 187

²¹⁵ Bitsios, Dimitri S., 1975, *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 24

the island against the British rule.²¹⁶ At the same time, on February 16, 1951, Greece officially announced the issue with the speech of Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos, arguing that Cyprus should be united with Greece.²¹⁷

It can be stated that the Turkish politicians did not strictly defend a policy towards the island despite and in comparison with the attempts of their Greek counterparts.²¹⁸ At least until 1960, Turkey pursued different policy alternatives rather than insisting on one solution. It can be interpreted as the Turkish failure in Cyprus issue which ended with a *fait accompli*, the independent Republic of Cyprus.²¹⁹ Also, the new Republic can be considered as a success for Turkish foreign policy in terms of guaranteeing the Turkish-Cypriot rights and avoiding immediate *enosis*. However, the varieties in Turkish positions and the conflicting arguments of the policy makers, which started with ignoring the Cyprus issue and ended with the independent Republic of Cyprus, require a deep focus. Such controversial positions, thus, signal for a relative ignorance of the Turkish interest, or most appropriately, the lack of a consistent policy; or even, a failure to decide on its objective in the process of the Cyprus issue.

The initial absence of a “national policy” or lack of confidence concerning Cyprus can be considered as the result of Turkey-NATO relations in which Turkey routed its foreign policy in parallel to that of the US and particularly of the UK, regarding Cyprus issue. In other words, Turkey was still looking for a security alliance with

²¹⁶ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 24

²¹⁷ Armaoğlu, Fahir H., 1963. *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959, Türk Hükümeti'nin ve Kamuoyunun Davranışları (Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme)*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, p. 25

²¹⁸ From the interview with Bölükbaşı; Sönmezoğlu, F., 1996. The Cyprus Question and the United Nations, 1950-1987. In: *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, p. 169

²¹⁹ The new republic and the government's policies were highly discussed in Turkish Grand National Assembly. The discussion regarding the *fait accompli* is introduced mainly by Bülent Ecevit. T.B.M.M. ZABIT CERİDESİ, Devre XI, Cilt 7, İçtima 2, s. 1375, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 539

the West and could not develop a national policy for Cyprus.²²⁰ Instead, the official policy of Turkey until 1955 was to support British dominance on the island, meaning the preservation of the status quo. As stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, on December 17, 1949, Turkey did not see any British intention to yield the island to another state; and the countries who insisted on taking Cyprus would act against the British friendship.²²¹ Similarly, Sadak argued in 1950, “there is not an issue as a Cyprus issue... we are certain that Britain would sustain its dominance on the island...”²²² A very similar declaration was made by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Köprülü in April 1951, arguing that Turkey did not see any future change in the position of the island; however, if a change would be proposed, Turkey would certainly be a part of discussion and defend its rights.²²³

Cyprus Island became an international issue with the Greek proposal in the UN General Assembly on August 16, 1954. On 24 September, Cyprus issue officially entered into the agenda of General Assembly. Accordingly, the issue was included with the title “Application under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus.”²²⁴ Before the UN resolution concluded on December 17, 1954, in August, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes argued that Turkey was determined to sustain its good relations with Greece; thus, he refrained from taking an aggressive

²²⁰ Armaoğlu, p. 3

²²¹ *Ulus*, December 18, 1949, see also Armaoğlu, p .19

²²² *İstiklal*, January 26, 1950

²²³ *Hürriyet*, April 21, 1951, “Ülkemize nisbetle coğrafi ehemmiyeti, oradaki soydaşlarımızın muhim bir kitle teşkil eylemesi ve tarihi bağlarımız dolayısıyla, Kıbrıs’ın durumunun bizi çok yakından alakadar etmesi gayet tabiidir. Adanın bugünkü hukuki vaziyetinin değişmesi için bir sebep görmemekteyiz. Fakat bu vaziyette herhangi bir değişiklik ciddi surette bahis mevzuu olacak olursa, bunun bizsiz ve haklarımıza aykırı bir şekilde yapılmasına imkan bırakamayız. Bu bakımdan oradaki soydaşlarımızın müsterih olmaları lazımdır.” cited in Armaoğlu, pp. 31-32; *İstiklal*, April 24, 1951

²²⁴ UN Resolution adopted by the General Assembly During its Ninth Session, 814(IX)

stance at the very beginning of the issue.²²⁵ However, in his later speech on August 28, 1954, he declared openly, “Cyprus will never belong to Greece.”²²⁶ As argued by the Turkish Delegate in UN, Selim Sarper, the proposed self-determination would naturally lead to *enosis* which would mean to ignore some 100,000 Turkish citizens on the island around.²²⁷

Turkish views regarding the Greek insistence were reported in the US documents with a reference to Feridun Cemal Erkin’s statements on March 10, 1954.²²⁸ Accordingly, for Erkin, the sovereignty could not be decided based on “majority wishes of the population”, because “there are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account.”²²⁹ For Erkin, Greek agitation for *enosis* “will have a seriously adverse effect upon relationships in NATO and among the three countries...only the Soviet Union stands to profit by such action.”²³⁰

The British position in the UN is significant in understanding the Turkish attitude in supporting it. According to the British delegate Selwyn Lloyd, the UN discussion about the future of the island meant interference with British domestic affairs since it meant transferring the territory from one member to another; and the British domination on the island was of vital significance for British interests.²³¹ Likewise, before the conference, the importance of the island was highlighted by the Minister of State for the Colonies, H. L. d’A. Hopkinson, “there are certain territories in the

²²⁵ *Zafer*, August 22, 1954, cited in Ahmad, p. 403

²²⁶ *Hürriyet*, August 29, 1954, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 64

²²⁷ Sönmezoğlu, 1996, p. 174

²²⁸ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No.363, 747C.00/3-1054, pp. 681-683

²²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 682

²³⁰ *Ibid*

²³¹ For the complete text of Lloyd’s speech, see UNGAOR, Ninth Session, 447th Plen. Mtg., pp. 52-55, cited in Sönmezoğlu, 1996, p. 173

Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent.”²³²

The Turkish position, as Sarper highlighted, was to support Britain, and it agreed with the fact that the UN should not bring the issue to the agenda, which was the internal affair of Britain.²³³ Eventually, on December 17, 1954, New Zealand draft resolution was accepted in the UN, concluding the issue as “for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus...”²³⁴ However, the resolution could only trigger further crisis on the island and on April 1, 1955, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighter (Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston-EOKA) was established under the leadership of General Grivas and with the support of Archbishop Makarios. The organization took a position against British, Turkish and even Greek people who were considered as traitors on the way of enosis.²³⁵

For Gürün, the Turkish attitude in 1954 UN General Assembly can be considered naïve²³⁶ or soft when compared to Greeks’ confidence and insistence on what they wanted. Accordingly, while Turkey ignored Greek and Greek-Cypriot desire for self-government which, in the end, paves the way for *enosis*, Turkish policy was nothing but supporting British position. Although the proposal was abandoned by the UN, Turkey gave abstention rather than vote against some proposals²³⁷,

²³² Purcell, H. D., 1969, *Cyprus*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., pp. 253, 254

²³³ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, 447th Plen. Mtg., p. 58, cited in Sönmezoğlu, 1996, p. 174

²³⁴ UN Resolution adopted by the General Assembly During its Ninth Session, 814(IX)

²³⁵ Volkan, V. D. & Itzkowitz, N., 1994. *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict*. Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press., p. 136; Gürün, p. 386

²³⁶ Gürün, p. 386

²³⁷ The final proposal of New Zealand that was accepted as a resolution in December 17 was supported by Turkey, but Turkey gave abstentions to Iraq’s proposal to postpone the issue, and proposals of El Salvador and Colombia. For the details of the proposals and votes, see FRUS 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 410, *Editorial Note*, p.748

probably to show that the issue was mostly related to Greece and Britain.²³⁸ This attitude can only be explained as a reference to Turkish objective of finding a common solution but not pursuing for a different policy from NATO members in order that its western stance and friendly relations be sustained.²³⁹ For Vali, Turkey cannot be considered as disinterested since it aimed to refrain from any conflict with its partners in NATO and trusted in British rule in Cyprus in solving the conflict with Greek-Cypriots.²⁴⁰ Similarly, for Sönmezoğlu, it was the Turkish attention not to enter the British sphere of influence that prevented it from engaging directly to the island.²⁴¹ It should not be forgotten that, at least, the location of Cyprus necessitated for the Turkish attention. As Prime Minister Menderes argued, "...Cyprus, which is the continuation of Anatolian peninsula...is very important for the security of Anatolia", and for him, "the preservation of the status quo is the most of what Turkey could accept."²⁴² For the future of the island, it was stated by Turkish representative Sarper that the UN resolution meant "in the future no just and equitable settlement of the so-called question of Cyprus was possible without Turkish cooperation and consent."²⁴³

²³⁸ Gürün, p. 386

²³⁹ Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 170; Ahmad, p. 404

²⁴⁰ Vali, p. 236

²⁴¹ Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 169

²⁴² Bilge, S., 1977, *Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, pp. 354, 355, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 29

²⁴³ United Nations Document A/PV.514, paragraphs 258-261, cited in FRUS 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 410, *Editorial Note*, p.748

3.2 American Position on the Cyprus Issue until 1955

Starting from 1951, the United States declared its concerns about the island arguing that further insistence on *enosis* would disturb the balance in the region, thus, highlighting the strategic importance of the island and the relationship between concerned parties against the Soviet power.²⁴⁴ Therefore, for the US, Makarios' "Cyprus agitation" would create only further crises in the region²⁴⁵, and as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson highlighted that American interest was to support the *status quo* which was the British presence on the island.²⁴⁶ In the *Aide-Memoire* sent by the Department of State to the British Embassy, the US position was reaffirmed: "...further agitation for a union between Cyprus and Greece as well as attempts to raise this problem in an international forum are unwise and inopportune at this time."²⁴⁷ As Dean Acheson stated to the Embassy in Greece, on July 18, 1952, "we [the United States] have not considered any UN aspects. We still believe this be matter between friends rather than one for discussion in UN" and he added his concerns arguing, "...further agitation of Cyprus issue might well endanger whole structure of Greek-Turkish amity..."²⁴⁸ At the same time, the Department of State considered to take any side officially and refrained from "becoming directly and publicly identified with this issue", in order not to trigger "the advocates of *enosis* to... challenge this statement and renew their agitation."²⁴⁹

²⁴⁴ United States Department of State. Slany, William Z., Editor Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. The Near East and Africa Volume V Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, 781.00/11-2951, p. 524

²⁴⁵ FRUS, 1951, 6477C.81/3-2251, p. 530

²⁴⁶ FRUS, 1951, 647C.81/5-451, p. 534

²⁴⁷ FRUS, 1951, Annex 1, *Aide Memoire*, p. 539

²⁴⁸ United States Department of State. Slany, William Z., Editor Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean Volume VIII Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952-1954 No. 357, 747C.00/7-1852, pp. 674,675

²⁴⁹ FRUS, 1951, Annex 1, *Aide Memoire*, p. 540

In his report to the Department of State, the Ambassador in Turkey, Avra M. Warren argued that the UN discussions on Cyprus issue would only “weaken existing friendly relations and close cooperation between Greece, Britain and Turkey, and thus further Soviet efforts disrupt western unity.”²⁵⁰ Similarly, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, warned the Embassy in Greece in April 1954, stating,

many and very grave problems of over-all international situation require fullest possible cooperation Western nations which agitation Cyprus issue would disturb...it would afford USSR and communist bloc tailor-made opportunity to achieve success in what appears number one Soviet objective at this time, i.e. to create dissension among members of Western world and attempt destroy European strength by setting NATO partners against each other.²⁵¹

In July 1954, Dulles reminded the importance of Cyprus to the Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos by stating,

the strength of the free world’s defense in the vital eastern Mediterranean region depends in large measure on the fullest cooperation and the continuing mutual sympathy of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey...I need not point out that any differences between your country, the United Kingdom and Turkey would offer the opportunity for mischief which the Soviet Union is always seeking.”²⁵²

In addition Dulles warned Greece again arguing,

... [United Nations debate on Cyprus] would have serious effects on Greece’s friendly relations with her NATO and her two Ankara Pact partners, and that it would, by its disruptive effect on free-world unity, militate against the best interests of your own country.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 364, 747C.00/3-3054, p. 683

²⁵¹ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 365, 747C.00/4-554, p. 684

²⁵² FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 375, *Athens Embassy files*, lot 60 F 16, “350 Cyprus 1954”, pp. 697,698

²⁵³ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 375, *Athens Embassy files*, lot 60 F 16, “350 Cyprus 1954”, p .698

In his statement, rather than a UN solution, Dulles called for cooperation among Cypriots and the United Kingdom, and a mutually acceptable constitution to solve the issue.²⁵⁴

When the Cyprus issue was proposed to be included into the UN agenda by Greece, the US position was to abstain from any voting thus to reflect its respect to the discussion of principle of freedom in the UN. On the other hand, the US believed that on this particular issue, UN could not come up with a constructive solution.²⁵⁵ It was stated that in any possible discussion in case of the inclusion of the topic to the agenda, the US would support the idea of negotiations between the British government and Cypriot leaders for a solution.²⁵⁶ Similarly, in the letter sent by the Department of State to the Turkish Ambassador, Erkin, so as to be transferred to Prime Minister Menderes, on September 21, it was declared,

The United States remains convinced that discussion of the question in the General Assembly will lead to no solution and will serve only to intensify existing friction and thereby prejudice Western unity...If the item is placed on the agenda the United States Government intends to do all that it can to discourage its development.²⁵⁷

Regarding the US abstention in UN, Dulles expressed the US view in his letter to the Greek Prime Minister:

we [the United States] refrained from opposing the inscription of the item on the agenda because of our friendship for Greece and because of our traditional support of the principle of freedom of discussion in the General Assembly. However, we are convinced that at this time a discussion of the matter in the General Assembly or the adoption of any substantive resolution would harm the good relations between certain of our friends and allies. This to us is the most important consideration in the entire question.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁴ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 375, *Athens Embassy files*, lot 60 F 16, "350 Cyprus 1954", p. 698

²⁵⁵ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No.380, 747C.00/9-1454, p. 704

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 705

²⁵⁷ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 386, 747C.00/8-3154, pp.716,717

²⁵⁸ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 396, 747C.00/11-1654, p. 727

The report sent by the US representative in UN, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., might be an interesting document for understanding the British position on September 20. Accordingly, he echoed arguments of the British representatives, stating that militarily the UK needed to sustain its sovereignty over the island for its installations, yet, it was claimed,

[Britain] prepared to give Cyprus self-government, but they could not admit the principle of self-determination in this case. Self-determination would mean that Cyprus could if it is wished, not only join Greece, but establish an independent Communist island; in fact, if an election were held today, that would be the outcome... putting Cyprus question on the agenda opened the door for any country to raise any question... It might, in fact, encourage the Turks to raise the question of the large Turkish minority in Western Thrace and Thrace's annexation to Turkey...²⁵⁹

Therefore, from the report sent to the Department of State, it was obvious that Britain considered the option of self-government, still, a difference between self-government and self-determination was highlighted and the possible outcomes were remarked in case of the inclusion of the Cyprus issue.

In October 1954, after the inclusion of the Cyprus issue to the UN agenda, the Deputy Asst. Sec. for Near East, John D. Jernegan, assured Turkish Ambassador in Washington, D.C., Feridun Cemal Erkin that the US would try to avoid any discussion and put the matter at the end of the agenda to delay the process.²⁶⁰ In order to end the discussion quickly in the UN, the US representative Lodge argued, “prolonged consideration in this forum would only increase tensions and embitter national feelings at a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing solidarity among freedom-loving nations.”²⁶¹ Eventually, after the December 17 resolution, on December 23, the US restated its position

²⁵⁹ FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 384, 747C.00/9-2054, p. 713

²⁶⁰ FRUS, 1952-54, No.490, 728.5 MSP/10-754, p. 952

²⁶¹ USUN press release 2084, December 14, quoted in part in *U.S. Participation in the UN, 1954*, p. 61, cited in FRUS 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 410, *Editorial Note*, p. 747

arguing, “...overriding concern [of the United States] was that there should not be an open split between our friends and allies in the UN. Such a debate at this juncture could not hope to produce a beneficial result.”²⁶²

The American involvement in the Cyprus issue until the London Conference in 1955 was basically the first phase of three lateral efforts, Britain, Greece and Turkey included. Throughout the period, the US had NATO as its main concern which it expected not to be destructed by any means but to be empowered through the efforts of participating allies. Greece and Turkey were of significance to the US in that they represented solid forts of democracy as freedom-loving nations, and neither could be risked for any purpose than standing against communist impact or expansionism. While America tried to counter balance the expectations of the two countries, eliminating any probable tension between them, it set solidarity against the Soviets to be the most vital issue to be concerned about. Similarly, the American stance can be labelled as soft, indirect and precautionous involvement dedicated mainly to the preservation of togetherness that would secure NATO against any outer threat.

3.3 British initiative of 1955 London Conference

3.3.1 The Turkish Position

While it was not mentioned in the UN discussion of 1954, the second alternative for Turkey could only be “*status quo ante*” meaning that the island should be given to the former owner, which was Turkey as the descendant of the Ottoman Empire. This approach would be introduced internationally in the Tripartite Conference of 1955 London between 29 August and 7 September. Accordingly, it was declared by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, “...*status quo* should be preserved in Cyprus. However, if this *status*

²⁶² FRUS, 1952-54 Cyprus, No. 412, 747C.00/12-2354, p. 752

quo would be abolished, the island should be returned to Turkey”²⁶³ Therefore, the first alternative in the absence of British control would be the Turkish rule on the island.

For Zorlu, there were two reasons for such an argument: Firstly, he mentioned the security concerns of Turkey arguing, “...if Turkey enters a war, Cyprus should be on its side. Otherwise, defense and supply cannot be realized.”²⁶⁴ He added that, in case of a war, Turkish military could not be supplied and maintained without Cyprus.²⁶⁵ Secondly, he mentioned the balance and conditions set by Lausanne Treaty arguing that any change in the status quo of Cyprus would lead to the violation of Lausanne Treaty and it would naturally provide Turkey with some demands concerning the future of the island.²⁶⁶

Before the Turkish position put by Zorlu, the conference and the invitation to bring Turkey to the discussion transformed the nature of the Cyprus issue. As mentioned before, Turkey tried to show that the issue was a domestic concern of Britain which could only be regarded as a problem between Britain and Greece. However, in 1955, Turkey needed to take sides with the British invitation to the London conference which meant that Turkey would become one of the responsible countries in Cyprus.²⁶⁷ As declared by Zorlu, Turkey was not only one of the responsible sides in the issue, but also the main actor of responsibility in Cyprus.²⁶⁸ In his later speech, on September 3, 1955, Zorlu warned Greece arguing,

²⁶³ *Ayın Tarihi*, September 1955, no. 262, p. 170, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 147

²⁶⁴ Bilge, 1977, p. 357, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 29

²⁶⁵ *Ayın Tarihi*, September 1955, no. 262, p. 164, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 145

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 146

²⁶⁷ Armaoğlu, pp. 97,117

²⁶⁸ *Zafer*, August 27, 1955, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 141

[in the London Conference] there are two countries, Turkey and Britain, which have rights [in Cyprus], and Greece has emerged without any rightful reason. The friendship established with Lausanne Treaty between Turkey and Greece is based on a balance in border areas. The desire for extending the borders means searching for *megalo idea* and going to imperialism...²⁶⁹

The most important outcome of the conference for the future of the Cyprus issue can be regarded as the self-government argument proposed by the British Foreign Minister, Harold Macmillan, firstly on August 30, arguing that a self-government regime including a tripartite commission should be established which would respect the rights of three countries.²⁷⁰ In his September 1 speech, Zorlu declared Turkey's position regarding self-governance and self-determination.²⁷¹ Accordingly, Zorlu argued that the principle of self-determination could not be applied to Cyprus. It can be concluded that Zorlu reminded the points mentioned by Menderes in his August 24 speech which was dedicated to the preservation of the status quo, population not being a significant factor, as well as Cyprus' geographical connection to Turkey. In addition, Zorlu insisted on the suspension of the ongoing terror on the island and guaranteeing the Turkish-Cypriot rights in order to be able to discuss self-governance. Similarly, in his speech on September 3, 1955, Zorlu argued that self-determination could not be considered for Cyprus in that there were two communities, not a single nation; and the Turkish community wanted Britain to remain on the island as long as Turkey did not annex Cyprus.²⁷² Moreover, on September 7, on the final day of the conference, Zorlu introduced some preliminary conditions for self-governance: the termination of Greek insistence on self-determination, which Zorlu argued, "Greece could do everything to turn self-

²⁶⁹ *Zafer*, September 4, 1955, cited in Armaoğlu, pp. 147,148

²⁷⁰ Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, pp. 5-14, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 144; Purcell, p. 279

²⁷¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, September 1955, no. 262, pp. 168,169,170 cited in Armaoğlu, p. 147

²⁷² *Zafer*, September 4, 1955, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 148

governance to self-determination²⁷³, and the termination of the strife and chaos between two communities on the island.²⁷⁴ Therefore, the speeches made by Zorlu depicted that he kept the doors open for self-government with some prerequisite conditions. However, the self-determination principle was not acceptable since it might end with *enosis*.

3.3.2 The American Position

From the US perspective, Cyprus continued to be a matter of vital significance for the NATO alliance. Accordingly, in March 1955, Dulles expressed the US policy arguing “we [the United States] anxious preserve harmony in NATO and are interested seeing orderly and evolutionary development political rights Cypriot people.”²⁷⁵ After the end of the London Conference on September 9, the US government declared its position to Turkey stating

...proposals put forward by UK are in accordance principles with UN Charter...this considered reasonable and fruitful suggestion... US government asks Turkish Government weigh most seriously advantages of continuing negotiations regarding self-government in tripartite committee...²⁷⁶

Therefore, the USA was determined to support the UK-Greece-Turkey cooperation for a possible solution in order not to generate the crisis in the region.

While the conference ended with no concrete solution, it is clear that British position regarding the self-governance would continue to dominate the agenda of

²⁷³ The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, pp.37-40, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 153

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*

²⁷⁵ United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean Volume XXIV Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957, pp. 270, 271

²⁷⁶ FRUS, 1955-57, pp. 281,282

these three countries for a possible solution. As Macmillan stated his views to Dulles, by proposing a self-government rule, Britain opened the discussion of its internal affairs to two foreign governments, and it was determined to sustain the negotiations rather than search for another UN debate on Cyprus.²⁷⁷ Similarly, the US Department of State warned the US Embassy in Greece to avoid further UN talks arguing,

in US opinion present grave crisis between Greece and Turkey would become even more serious if discussed in General Assembly. We believe this might be fatal blow Balkan Pact and cause grave breach NATO defense which is basis our unity and strength... In our considered opinion recent UK proposals represent progress and development self-government for Cypriot people offers best prospect for ultimate solution acceptable to parties concerned and in interests free world unity.²⁷⁸

Likewise on October 5, Dulles repeated the US concern to Macmillan, arguing, “Cyprus situation remains a cause of concern not only on the island itself, but as it affects NATO and the Balkan Pact.”²⁷⁹ Regarding the self-government argument, while Dulles stated his fears about the British proposal which could be “too much for Turkey and not enough for Greece”²⁸⁰, he claimed that he would appreciate the further steps towards self-government.²⁸¹

The following steps in the Cyprus issue would be in line with the British attempts to impose a self-government rule, and it was this British insistence that urged Turkey to come up with further policy alternatives for Cyprus. With the end of the London Conference, Turkey clearly introduced its second alternative, which was *status quo ante*, in the absence of *status quo*, an original alternative proposed by Turkey. Also, Zorlu partially rejected the self-government thesis and introduced some preliminary

²⁷⁷ FRUS, 1955-57, p. 292

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 297,298

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 305

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*

²⁸¹ *Ibid*

for the possible discussion about the issue. The third stance of Turkey, which was *taksim* thesis, partition or double *enosis*, can be regarded as a middle way between the British self-government proposal and the Greek self-determination argument.

The London Conference initiative urged America to follow a route in the Cyprus issue as proposed by the UK, one of the parties of the tripartite issue. By pursuing and supporting the UK's suggestion, the US would at least guarantee the prevention of further tension and crisis on the island, thus serving for its purpose of keeping NATO integrity.

3.4 The Emergence of *Taksim* Thesis for Cyprus

Out of the aforementioned three alternatives, the third alternative, *taksim*, came to the foreground as a genuine Turkish proposal which created controversy both in the Turkish government and among the parties concerned. This alternative was firstly introduced by Fahir Armaoğlu in his article in *Forum*, on July 15, 1955.²⁸² According to the article, while it was stated that Turkey would clearly oppose the unification of Cyprus with Greece, the British presence could also be unsustainable since Greece would push for *enosis*. At the same time, giving Cyprus back to Turkey would be an unacceptable solution for Greece and even the coalition made by three countries, including Greece, Turkey and Britain would be doomed to fail due to Greek desires. For the author, *taksim* was the only solution that would satisfy both Turkey and Greece which necessitated for the geographical division of the island meaning that the regions which were dominated by Turks would unite with Turkey and the other parts with Greece.²⁸³

²⁸² Kıbrıs! Kıbrıs! Kıbrıs!, *Forum*, July 15, 1955. The arguments in the article are reintroduced in Armaoğlu, pp. 122, 123

²⁸³ *Ibid*

Nevertheless, Turkish politicians did not consider *taksim* as a viable solution. In his August 24 speech, Menderes argued that self-determination and *taksim* thesis for Cyprus could not be proposed claiming that the destiny of a region according to its population could not be determined in Cyprus.²⁸⁴ Menderes used a metaphor stating that a country is not a piece of cloth that can be cut from everywhere by a tailor, rather, for him, the destiny of a country should be based on geographical, political, economic and military facts determined by history. Therefore, Menderes had signaled for the position taken in the London Conference by stating,

Cyprus is a continuation of Turkey and constitutes one of the main points of Turkey's security. Therefore, in case of any change in the position of Cyprus, the issue should be examined not in technical terms but more important facts and realities [referring to the aforementioned points] which require Turkey's consideration. Turkish delegation in London would defend the status quo as the minimum requirement.²⁸⁵

Hence, as stated by Menderes, Turkey's first solution would be preserving the *status quo* and the alternative would be *status quo ante*. Other than these two, Menderes clearly refused *taksim* thesis in August 1955 which would lead to some crisis even in the Turkish National Assembly itself.

It should be stated that in the transformation of the Turkish argument from *status quo* and *status quo ante* to *taksim*, the period between the late 1955 and late 1956 was important during which the increasing efforts by Britain with the US support favored the self-government and self-determination principles. In this period, starting from the end of London Conference and followed by Harding-Makarios talks, Britain increased its pressure towards a solution based on self-governance which was supported by the US and led to the Lord Radcliffe, law lord, proposals. This process, during which it became inevitable that a solution based on self-

²⁸⁴ For the complete text of August 24 speech see *Ayn Tarihi*, August 1955, no. 261, pp. 170-173; *Zafer*, August 25, 1955, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 132

²⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 133

government coupled with a future self-determination would be imposed, can be regarded as the reason for the acceptance of *taksim* thesis by Turkish policy makers.

In the early 1956, Turkish position regarding self-government was introduced by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Köprülü, on January 24:

in order to establish self-government, the terror on the island should be terminated and the security should be maintained. However, even though these conditions were secured, Turkish community should obtain equal rights and opportunities with the other communities in self-government rule.²⁸⁶

Compared to August 24 speech of Menderes, Köprülü introduced a softer stance which would not close the door for self-governance. It can be stated that Köprülü introduced similar arguments which were in line with Zorlu's speech in London Conference. However, one month later, on February 24, 1956, Köprülü more rigidly opposed to self-governance by repeating his concern regarding the equal rights for the Turkish community.²⁸⁷ This change of tone in Köprülü's speeches was considered as the result of bilateral talks between Makarios and John Harding, the governor of Cyprus in January 1956 during which Britain seemed to agree with Greeks in applying self-determination rule in addition to self-governance.²⁸⁸

During Makarios-Harding talks, Harding stated,

it is not, therefore, their [British] position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now practical proposition, on the account of the present strategic and political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ *Ayin Tarihi*, January 1956, no. 266, pp. 63,64, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 204

²⁸⁷ *Ayin Tarihi*, February 1956, no. 267, p. 169 cited in Armaoğlu, p. 210, 211

²⁸⁸ Armaoğlu, p. 214

²⁸⁹ FRUS, 1955-57, *Attachment D*, p. 335

Hence, in addition to their acceptance of self-government rule by which the will of the Cyprus people would be represented,²⁹⁰ Britain kept the doors partially open for self-determination by claiming that a future talk would be considered regarding “the future of the Island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community.”²⁹¹ In addition, before the talks took place, Dulles supported the British initiative and mentioned the possibility of self-determination for Cyprus in his telegram on January 9, 1956, arguing that self-determination could be applicable after the first step of self-government which would be decided with the representatives of Cypriots.²⁹²

Similar to Köprülü’s February 24 speech, Zorlu made a clear statement regarding the Turkish position, “if Britain left the island, Cyprus should be given to Turkey. Otherwise, Greece would find Turkey opposing her. This has been, and should be, the Turkish point of view in Cyprus issue.”²⁹³ In the following meeting of Grand National Assembly, on February 25, *taksim* thesis was introduced by MP Hikmet Bayur stating,

Greece will demand more in every chance, and in the end, will unite with Cyprus. Turkey should find a new way to avoid this. My proposal is, as in the case of India and Pakistan separated from each other, the parts of Cyprus which are closer to Turkey should be given to Turkey, and the other parts to Greece.²⁹⁴

Nevertheless, Harding did not see any future in the discussions. As reported by the US Department of State, he concluded that Makarios would not accept any formula including Turkish interests; terrorism and violence would not be ended since they

²⁹⁰ FRUS, 1955-57, *Attachment D*, p. 335

²⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 335, 336

²⁹² *Ibid*, p. 329

²⁹³ *Ayın Tarihi*, February 1956, no. 267, p. 154 cited in Armaoğlu, p. 213

²⁹⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, February 26, 1956 cited in Armaoğlu, p. 213

became the tools of Makarios for negotiations.²⁹⁵ Eventually, despite the US initiative during this period to avoid the cessation of the talks, the termination of the talks and the exile of Makarios could not be prevented. As it was reported on March 9 by the US Embassy in Britain to the Department of State, “action taken on Harding’s recommendation who argued no purpose served in continuing negotiations with individual who refused to halt violence and was deeply implicated with terrorists.”²⁹⁶

To sum up the position of Turkey, there were, and would be until late 1956, two policy alternatives agreed by statesmen. These were *status quo* and *status quo ante*. In addition, the British proposal for self-governance was in the agenda; however, Turkey had some concerns about the Greek and British policies which might not avoid self-determination on the island and pave the way for unification of Cyprus with Greece. Moreover, *taksim* thesis was introduced by some scholars, and by Bayur in National Assembly; however, Menderes refused any solution beyond *status quo* and *status quo ante* in his August 24 speech. Thus *taksim* did not take the attention of policy makers yet. Menderes repeated the Turkish position on July 1, 1956,

...it is true that we [Turkey] have sustained bilateral talks with our British friends. During these meetings we declared our point of view. Because of our belief in not being able to find any better solution for the island other than keeping the *status quo*, we did not propose any Turkish plan for the future of Cyprus.²⁹⁷

Similarly, on July 12, the ruling Democrat Party declared that while Turkey gave Cyprus to Britain in accordance with Lausanne Treaty, the agreement had rooted in the conditions of 1878 and Britain accepted to sustain its role in Cyprus; if Britain did not pursue its responsibilities, and if a change occurred in Cyprus, the island

²⁹⁵ FRUS, 1955-57, p. 333

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 346

²⁹⁷ *Ayin Tarihi*, July 1956, no. 272, pp. 201-202, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 243

would naturally be returned to Turkey.²⁹⁸ However, starting from December 1956, Turkey adopted its third official policy which was *taksim*.

3.4.1 Turkish Acceptance of *Taksim* Thesis: Radcliffe Proposal

The bilateral talks between Harding and Makarios and their failure in creating a solution ended with the exile of Makarios. During this period, Britain became confident in creating self-government rule. In order to gain the support of Greeks, the principle of self-determination might also be accepted. These processes were coupled with Turkish resistance against the unification of the island with Greece. As Vice President Nixon mentioned his observations from the trip to Ankara on 9-10 July 1956,

Turks had a positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister had even gone so far as to suggest that if Cyprus was joined to Greece, the Turks would go to war to prevent it... The reason for Turkish alarm over Cyprus...was rather the closeness of the island to the Turkish mainland than concern for the Turkish minority living on Cyprus.²⁹⁹

It can be stated that Turkish strategic importance and its concerns regarding self-determination urged Britain, and particularly the Minister of Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd to declare on July 7, 1956 that Britain should listen to the Turkish concerns regarding the Cyprus issue.³⁰⁰ As Prime Minister Anthony Eden stated in June 1956, "...we [Britain] certainly need the Turks both for the Baghdad Pact and for NATO. Indeed I am sure that you [President Eisenhower] will agree that if anyone holds a strategic position it is they."³⁰¹ Accordingly, it was declared by Eden that Lord

²⁹⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, July 1956, no. 272, p. 207, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 246

²⁹⁹ Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion, cited in FRUS 1955-57, p. 378, 379

³⁰⁰ *Vatan*, July 7, 1956 and *Hürriyet*, July 8, 1956, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 248

³⁰¹ Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Makins to Eisenhower, June 26, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, p. 377

Radcliffe was sent to the island in order to create a new constitution which should prevent the rights of all communities on the island.³⁰²

What is significant in this process is that the Turkish acceptance of *taksim* thesis would come after the British proposal to consider *taksim* as a policy alternative for Cyprus, or at least the Turkish interpretation of British Radcliffe proposal. With the Radcliffe proposal declared in December 19, Turkey would officially began to support *taksim* thesis. While Radcliffe proposed a solution based on self-determination, the vital difference was that Radcliffe called for self-determination for both communities which might be concluded with *taksim*.³⁰³ However, the center of the proposal was not the partition, but it can be stated that even a small chance of partition would be enough for Turkey to consider *taksim* as the standing point of the proposal; and eventually Turkey accepted the proposal for further discussion.³⁰⁴

According to the Radcliffe proposal, a self-governing Cyprus under British sovereignty was recommended. He introduced a single assembly including 36 seats, 24 from the Greek community, 6 from the Turkish community and 6 nominated by the Governor.³⁰⁵ It is clearly stated in the speech of Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,

when the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination.³⁰⁶

³⁰² *Ayin Tarihi*, July 1956, no. 272, p. 208, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 249

³⁰³ Armaoğlu, pp. 277, 278

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 279

³⁰⁵ Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, c. 1267, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

³⁰⁶ Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, c. 1268, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

Therefore, self-determination in addition to self-government principle was officially accepted. However, what is important here is the following statement which agreed to give self-determination right to Turkish Cypriots, thus putting partition into the final agenda but not considering it as an immediate outcome:

when the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus... decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognize that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.³⁰⁷

While the recommendations considered partition as the final stage, “the end of the tunnel”³⁰⁸, Turkish policy would be constituted on this option. For Radcliffe, no immediate partition was recommended, as Lennox-Boyd argued,

I hope that there is no misunderstanding about partition as an eventual possibility, an eventual solution among the possible solutions. I made it quite clear, I hope, that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government that there should be this Constitution in Cyprus. After the Constitution has been shown to be working satisfactorily, and when the international and strategic situation permits, then we are prepared to consider the application of self-determination, but during the intervening period there will be a chance for this Constitution, with, I hope, the good will of both sides of the House, to get well under way.³⁰⁹

Similarly, he added, “...this situation [partition] arise only when the international situation permits, and when the Constitution, the terms of which will be issued this afternoon, has got properly under way”³¹⁰, and

³⁰⁷ Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, c. 1268, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

³⁰⁸ Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, c. 1275, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

³⁰⁹ Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, cc. 1271, 1272, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

³¹⁰ Lord Radcliffe's Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, c. 1273, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

If the Constitution works very well, and the people of Cyprus find in it an opportunity to express themselves as a unit, then, when the chance comes to ask them what they want to do, they may well decide to continue as they are.³¹¹

Hence, self-determination for both communities separately became an option, which clearly ignited the official turn to the *taksim* thesis for Turkey. The Radcliffe proposal was rejected by Greece, considering as “mockery” and “phony constitution”³¹² in view of the fact that it would be a golden opportunity for Turkey to come up with their proposal and be considered as equals to the Greek side.

Starting from December 1956, Turkish policy makers began to make speeches supporting the validity of *taksim* thesis and continued to do so throughout 1957 until December 1958. The policy shift in Turkish stance towards *taksim* can be recognized in Menderes’ speech on December 28, 1956, stating that insisting on Turkish claim for the entire island (due to status quo ante) could only create more problems and concerns both for Turkey, and the world, and thus such a move would be meaningless; Turkey was in favor of *taksim*, the Prime Minister included, and no country should urge Turkey to pursue any other solution.³¹³ In addition, on December 14, Menderes’ arguments regarding the Radcliffe Constitution was reported to the Department of State, stating, “Turkey could accept Radcliffe proposal as draft provided it understood at the same time that when self-determination implemented it would be through partition.”³¹⁴ Similarly, Selim Sarper stated on January 2, 1957 that the only concession given by Turkey was the acceptance of applying self-determination principle for both communities on the

³¹¹ Lord Radcliffe’s Proposals, HC Deb. 19 December 1956, vol 562, c. 1275, retrieved from website Hansard 1803-2005

³¹² FRUS, 1955-57, pp. 439,440

³¹³ T.B.M.M. ZABIT CERİDESİ, Devre X, İçtima 3, Cilt 15, 1957, s. 353, cited in Armaoğlu, pp. 287,288

³¹⁴ FRUS, 1955-57, p. 437

island; there was no possibility or necessity to go further.³¹⁵ In December 1957, Turkish insistence on *taksim* continued, as Sarper repeated his argument stating that the terror sustained by Greece on the island prevented two communities from living together; therefore, the principle of self-determination should be applied separately to both communities.³¹⁶

3.4.2 The American Position

In this period, the US position was also an important factor to push Turkey towards *taksim* thesis. Accordingly, the American perspective and its “eventual goals” were introduced by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Rountree during the discussion of the possible US action with Julius Holmes to initiate high level talks under NATO umbrella. According to the document of August 13, the US aimed

to guarantee that bases in Cyprus will be at the permanent disposal of Great Britain... for protecting its interests to the East. To provide the inhabitants of the Island with guarantees of their rights of self-determination with full protection for minorities. To insure for the future that Cyprus will not be considered by the Government of Turkey as a threat to its security.³¹⁷

Likewise, in the report of September 4, Rountree called for NATO action arguing, “...the Cyprus situation will almost certainly not be improved unless the US, as the leading power in NATO, assumes a more active role in bringing its allies together.”³¹⁸ Moreover, regarding the self-government principle, Rountree argued,

³¹⁵ *Ayin Tarihi*, January 1957, no. 278, s. 219, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 292

³¹⁶ United Nations General Assembly, 12th Session, Official Documents, A/C.1/SR.928, pp. 363-367, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 385

³¹⁷ FRUS, 1955-57, p. 385

³¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 398,399

the Turks...should be urged by us to agree on at least two important grounds: (a) that self-government has now become a cardinal principle of British colonial policy, from which there should be no exception in the case of Cyprus; and (b) that self-government is a right that can hardly be denied in the free world which the Atlantic Community protects.³¹⁹

Further explanations in the US perspective concerning self-government and self-determination were declared on July 30, 1956, stating that the US government would agree that during the self-government period, which would continue ten years, “there would be no change in the international status of the Island.”³²⁰ However, in the end,

a plebiscite would be held, again supervised by NATO, under which the population of Cyprus would have the right to vote for: (1) union with Greece; (2) local autonomy under the Greek crown; (3) full independence; or (4) a self-governing status under British sovereignty...³²¹

In addition, the current situation of the island and the policy alternatives of Turkey were mentioned in the same document arguing,

We [the United States] consider it unrealistic to talk of maintaining the status quo. The island has already changed in two years from a peaceful British Colony to a place where 18,000 British troops are having difficulty in keeping order.³²²

Therefore, from the US perspective, while NATO interests again occupied the agenda, the principles of self-government and self-determination had already been mentioned even before the Radcliffe proposals. From the Turkish perspective when the US efforts were considered together with Radcliffe proposal, it became clear that preserving status quo could not be a realistic goal, and a new policy alternative should be introduced, which was *taksim* that can be considered as self-determination for both communities.

³¹⁹ FRUS, 1955-57, p. 400

³²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 390

³²¹ *Ibid*

³²² *Ibid*, p. 391

To sum up the period for the Turkish perspective, with the Radcliffe proposal, there emerged the third alternative of Turkey which was *taksim* or *double enosis* or partition. Turkey suggested that the island should be partitioned between Greece and Turkey. It is obvious that during 1956, especially with the bilateral talks between Britain and Makarios, Turkey experienced a fear about being out of a possible agreement regarding Cyprus which might be concluded in a way that would enable a future *enosis*.³²³ Also, coupled with the US and British insistence, self-government in addition to self-determination would become an indispensable part of a possible solution.

The US position before the Radcliffe proposals and its support for future talks declared on December 27, 1956, that the Radcliffe formula of self-government should be regarded as the first step towards the “peaceful and generally acceptable solution” of the Cyprus problem.³²⁴ This further encouraged Turkish policy makers to make *taksim* thesis as the policy priority. Therefore, the acceptance of *taksim* can be regarded as a response to the American and British arguments. However, in the end, the solution was neither *taksim* nor *enosis*, but the Republic of Cyprus.

3.5 1956-1958: The American Position towards British efforts for a solution

It should be stated that the period between 1956 and the late 1958 was full of negotiations and proposals from Britain and the US both of which tried to establish a solution responding the interests of all sides, including the UK, Greece, Turkey and the Cypriot peoples. The main argument for all proposed solutions in this period would be based on self-government and self-determination principles which would lead to the creation of independent Republic of Cyprus.

³²³ Vali, 1971, p. 238; Sönmezoğlu, 1996, pp. 171,172

³²⁴ Department of State *Bulletin*, January 14, 1957, p.57, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, *editorial note*, p. 441

The increasing British efforts for self-government and self-determination could be related with the decreasing British expectations or the acceptance of the situation by Britain. As argued by Eisenhower on March 21, 1957, he had impressions that Britain wanted “nothing more to do with the island except to keep its base there.”³²⁵ In September 1957, a similar report was issued by the Department of State arguing that the UK was willing to surrender its sovereignty, and its preconditions in a possible solution was reduced to military facilities, protection against Communist infiltration and the sustainable peace on the island.³²⁶ At the same time, for Eisenhower if Britain was determined to find a solution, freeing Makarios from his exile would strengthen the British hand since it meant declaring British insistence on finding a solution.³²⁷ Similarly, as reported by Dulles as the mouthpiece of Eisenhower on March 29, the release of Makarios would be

a great opportunity... for the purpose of creating an atmosphere which will lead to constructive negotiations between the leaders of Cypriot communities and the British authorities.³²⁸

Eventually, with the amnesty of Makarios, Governor Harding resigned and Sir Hugh Foot became the new Governor of Cyprus whose proposals would also be rejected as to be mentioned in the following pages.

On the way to a solution, in April 1957, the US signaled its position which might support independence if it would bring peaceful end, arguing, “...US now believes that either independence within the Commonwealth or independence outside Commonwealth coupled in either case [*enosis* or partition] with a treaty preventing

³²⁵ Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, *editorial note*, p. 466

³²⁶ Department of State, Central Files, 737C.00/9-1457, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, p. 505

³²⁷ Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, *editorial note*, p. 466

³²⁸ FRUS, 1955-57, p. 468

enosis are worthy serious consideration.”³²⁹ However, independence did not seem to be sustainable for the US, as it was advised by the Department of State,

it would not appear practical in present tense situation and in view Cypriots’ relative inexperience in governing themselves, to pass directly to some form self-determination without providing for predetermined period of self-government, such a period would afford Cypriots opportunity to assume increased measure of responsibility for their own affairs and might also permit tensions to cool.³³⁰

Therefore, as concluded in the same document,

a solution promising more hope for improved Turk-Greek relations might be that of offering Cypriots, after fixed period self-government, choice between independence within British Commonwealth and independence outside Commonwealth. In either case there would be a treaty signed by interested and friendly nations, as well as Government of Cyprus as then constituted, whereby Cyprus would be independent and would not become part of any other nation without full consent of the parties most intimately concerned.³³¹

Hence, similar to Radcliffe proposal, the United States was not proposing an immediate self-determination; rather, a period of self-government which would be determined by the Greek-Turkish-Cypriot cooperation.

It should be stated that while in most of the documents, the US highlighted the importance of NATO alliance and a solution within NATO, the idea US began to propose was more important than the question of NATO engagement. Accordingly, by mid-1957, the US encouraged Britain to create a solution within NATO and with self-government principle which could end with self-determination process. As stated in the National Security Council Report of August 5, 1957, NATO interests in terms of bases in Cyprus and the overall unity of the alliance were mentioned as the

³²⁹ Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-957. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones and Wood, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, p. 473

³³⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 473,474

³³¹ *Ibid*, p. 474

priorities of the possible solution.³³² In addition, supporting NATO efforts and “a reasonable solution developed within the framework of NATO” were considered as the policy guidance of US.³³³ Moreover, while the US aimed to encourage the UK and Cypriots for self-government, it did not refrain from keeping the door open for any other mutually acceptable settlement, highlighting the importance of preserving

US government maneuverability by not freezing our position for the present in favor of any specific formula. If necessary to bring about a solution acceptable to the interested parties, on terms which will strengthen NATO interests in the Mediterranean, be prepared to give serious consideration to participating in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus.³³⁴

Throughout the Cyprus problem, the US policy was based on pursuing a quiet diplomacy, especially during 1956 and 1957 talks, during which the US aimed to encourage direct negotiations among the parties, Greece, the UK and Turkey, for a solution protecting the interests of all sides.³³⁵ Obviously, these efforts were coincided with the Turkish insistence on *taksim*. Regarding the Turkish position of *taksim*, on November 25, 1957, the US declared,

those who sincerely desire solution must carefully study variants thereof or other possibilities. In light of mutual desire for free world harmony and NATO solidarity, we believe Turkish Government will recognize need for Turkish concessions as well as concessions by all other interested parties to achieve lasting solution to this problem and thus contribute to peace in eastern Mediterranean.³³⁶

Similarly, Dulles expressed his views on February 11, 1958, stating that the partition could not be the desirable end for the island since the Greek and Turkish communities were homogenously mixed on the island and a separating line could

³³² Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D351, NSC 5718 Memoranda. Secret, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, p. 493

³³³ *Ibid*, p. 494

³³⁴ *Ibid*

³³⁵ Department of State, Central Files, 737C.00/9-1457, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, p. 503

³³⁶ Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1957, cited in FRUS, 1955-57, p. 512

not be defined.³³⁷ As a response to migration issue which was the only possible obstacle on the way to partition for Menderes, he argued in his letter to Eisenhower on June 15, 1958,

[the mandatory migration] has started on the island and has been going on for over a year. But unfortunately this has been going on through threats and violent incidents, and if it continues the actual partition of the island would become a reality in a year's time, under most tragic circumstances.³³⁸

By the early 1958, Britain and the United States called for a solution based on Sir Hugh Foot proposals. According to the proposal, a seven-year period of self-government was to be exercised for Cyprus under the British sovereignty, and self-determination in the end of this period would be extended to Greek and Turkish Cypriots.³³⁹ As Selwyn Lloyd stated on January 9, 1958, in case of an application of self-determination, Turkish Cypriot community would have the right to self-determination separately since it was a principle of vital importance to sustain the Turkish Cypriot cooperation in any solution.³⁴⁰ However, the proposal was rejected by Ankara on January 14, 1958. The suggestion from Turkey was that Britain should announce that Cyprus would be partitioned at the end of one year.³⁴¹ Thus, the insistence on *taksim* was still the policy priority, and until the late 1958, as Lloyd declared in May 1958 in the 21st Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Turks are “unapproachable” in terms of negotiating partition.³⁴²

³³⁷ FRUS, 1958-60, *editorial note*, p. 591

³³⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 653, 654

³³⁹ Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cyprus, Top Secret, attached to a letter from Caccia to Dulles, July 9, cited in *Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe Region, Soviet Union, Cyprus* United States Department of State. LaFantasie, Glenn W., Editor *Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe Region, Soviet Union, Cyprus* Volume X, Part I Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958-1960, *footnote*, p. 567

³⁴⁰ FRUS, 1958-60, pp. 567,568

³⁴¹ *Ibid*, *footnote*, p. 574

³⁴² *Ibid*, USDel/MC/10, p. 605

At the same time, by January 1958, Prime Minister Menderes continued to defend the *taksim* thesis with a letter to Eisenhower arguing, “the idea of partition is not a proposal advanced by Turkey. This idea was first put forth by Greece and then supported by the United Kingdom as a compromise solution, and was accepted as such by Turkey.”³⁴³ However, the validity of such an argument can be debated since there was no proposal from Greece that called for partition. At this point, it must be argued that some key words or terms were interpreted by opposing parties from their own perspectives or benefits. It was obvious that self-determination, as Greeks understood, was synonymous with *enosis* for the whole Cypriot community without any distinction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Anyway, for them, Greek Cypriots who were the majority of the population would benefit from any future voting. Yet for Turks, self-determination was synonymous with *taksim* or partition between two communities separately, each having its own right for self-determination. From the British perspective, on the other hand, partition was introduced as the final scenario in the Radcliffe proposal. However, as mentioned before, Turkish policy makers put the partition idea into center rather than taking the whole proposal as a solution.

Another important attempt in 1958 was Macmillan’s proposals, an adventure in partnership³⁴⁴, which were aimed to create partnership between three sides, Greece, Turkey and the UK. Accordingly, each community on the island would contribute to the representative government with autonomy in their communal affairs.³⁴⁵ Self-government system would include the representatives of two communities in addition to the representatives of Greek and Turkish governments.³⁴⁶ Moreover, dual nationality, meaning preserving Greek or Turkish nationality with British

³⁴³ FRUS, 1958-60, p. 577

³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 619

³⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 620

³⁴⁶ *Ibid*

nationality, would be possible if agreed by the two countries.³⁴⁷ In the end, the objective of such a plan would be to intensify the friendly relations among the UK, Greece and Turkey through Cyprus as a symbol of cooperation.³⁴⁸ However, on June 9, Ali Ürgüplü, the Turkish Ambassador in London, repeated the Turkish demands for partition, instead of accepting British proposals.³⁴⁹ Eventually, on June 13, in North Atlantic Council, both the Turkish and Greek representatives rejected the British proposal.³⁵⁰

In his letter to Eisenhower on June 15, 1958, Menderes reminded the Turkish position, again stating,

...when Turkey, with the object of reaching a compromise in this matter [Cyprus problem] and at great sacrifice, accepted the idea of partition, which had first been put forward by Mr. Averoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and later recommended by the United Kingdom, Greece adopted a more pretensions (*sic*) attitude towards this concession and further intensified its encouragement of the campaign of terrorism which it had undertaken with the purpose of securing the annexation of the Island...³⁵¹

In the same letter, Menderes made a reference to the “national issue” by reminding the Turkish position in NATO, as he stated,

...Turkish Government is also of the opinion that the Turkish nation which has so valiantly taken its due place among the people that constitute the front of freedom and justice, would be justified in expecting to be treated in the same spirit by its NATO allies, in its national issues.³⁵²

³⁴⁷ FRUS, 1958-60, p. 620

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 621

³⁴⁹ *Ibid*, footnote 5, p. 627

³⁵⁰ *Ibid*, editorial note, p. 635

³⁵¹ FRUS, 1958-60, p. 653

³⁵² *Ibid*

During July and October 1958, the second Macmillan plan was prepared with some revisions. Accordingly, the dual nationality and the representatives of Greek and Turkish governments were dropped in the new proposals introduced on August 15, 1958,³⁵³ which were agreed by the Turkish government but rejected by Makarios.³⁵⁴ On September 13, Lloyd declared the British insistence on Macmillan's proposals introduced in June and August 1958, arguing,

[the United Kingdom] have decided to go ahead with carrying out the plan... as that is possible with Turkish cooperation and with the refusal of the Greek Government and Makarios to cooperate... There will be no further modifications of the policy as announced...³⁵⁵

Regarding the Turkish acceptance of the revised British proposal, Foreign Minister Zorlu argued during the UN General Assembly in September that the acceptance did not mean the victory for Turks, rather it should be understood that the Turkish Government sacrificed more and was criticized by the internal opposition.³⁵⁶ On November 18, 1958, Zorlu stated that Turkey accepted the Macmillan proposals since they did not lead to an ultimate solution, rather the plan was the "refrigeration" of the Cyprus issue which could be solved during the seven-year period proposed by Macmillan with greater understanding.³⁵⁷ On the same day, Zorlu again supported the *taksim* thesis arguing that *taksim* was a "kind of an intellectual partition" which meant the idea that any community should not be governed by the other one.³⁵⁸ Moreover, Macmillan appreciated the Turkish stance in his letter to Eisenhower, arguing that Turkey occupied an important position on

³⁵³ FRUS, 1958-60, p. 695

³⁵⁴ *Ibid*, footnote 5, p. 696 and footnote 3, p. 700

³⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 700

³⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 702,703

³⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 746

³⁵⁸ *Ibid*

the way to solution, and Britain should not end its efforts while Turkey had already accepted the proposal.³⁵⁹

In late 1958, the US tried to persuade Greece in order to attend a tripartite conference based on British proposals, or generally any conference that was accepted by Britain and Turkey or preferable under NATO alliance. Therefore, American attitude can be interpreted as an example of quiet diplomacy but with a great attention, as the Department of State called the way of American style “quietly but urgently.”³⁶⁰ As the main objective remained to prevent any further crisis that would decrease the power of NATO alliance in the region, the US did not lose its connection with three parties until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Particularly, after the Greek rejection of Macmillan proposal, the US utilized its quiet but influential diplomacy by warning the Greek government and reminding the importance of the Greek position for Cyprus and for the cohesion of NATO alliance.³⁶¹ Eventually, on October 6, Greece agreed to participate in a conference which would discuss “the ultimate solution to the status of Cyprus.”³⁶² The following meetings of North Atlantic Council on October 13, 17, 23 and 29 were about to decide a future conference including three countries, and a NATO observer. However, the proposals for NATO-sponsored conference were rejected by Greece and Makarios who were under the pressure of hardcore *enosis* fanatics.³⁶³

³⁵⁹ FRUS, 1958-60, pp. 705, 706

³⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 721

³⁶¹ For the details of the letters sent by the Department of State, see FRUS, 1958-60, p. 717-727

³⁶² FRUS, 1958-60, *editorial note*, p. 727

³⁶³ *Ibid*, *editorial note*, p. 730-733

3.6 The argument of Independence and Turkish Policy shift towards Cyprus

The initial steps towards an independent Cyprus came from neither Greece nor Turkey. It was Archbishop Makarios who introduced such a proposal in September 1958, arguing that the self-government rule should be imposed responding the demands of both communities, and after this temporary phase, independence should be given to the island.³⁶⁴ However, both the Turkish and the Turkish-Cypriot policy makers did not welcome the proposals.

Firstly, on September 23, Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük argued that an independent Cyprus would mean unification with Greece by stating that there were two communities on the island and the Turkish community could not rely on proposed guarantees since Makarios himself was the one who terrorized the island and created chaos between two communities.³⁶⁵

Secondly, on November 19, Zorlu introduced a new dimension to the discussion and opened the doors for a kind of independence. After criticizing the Greek side who, for him, denounced the Turkish presence on the island, he argued that if one community achieved independence, the other community should also achieve independence; Turkey would only accept independence if such a right would be given to both communities.³⁶⁶

Thirdly, in his speech on November 21, Zorlu introduced a more rigid stance by arguing “independence is impossible since the first precondition of an independent state was a nation, and there is no Cypriot nation but there are Turkish and Greek communities who consider themselves as apart of Turkish and Greek nations.”³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, pp. 488,489, see also FRUS, 1958-60, footnote 3, p. 736

³⁶⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 490

³⁶⁶ *Zafer*, November 20, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 490

³⁶⁷ *Zafer*, November 22, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, pp. 496,497

However, on November 23, he repeated his softer argument, "...if independence is accepted for Cyprus people, it should be granted to both communities living on the island."³⁶⁸ Therefore, Zorlu created a combined policy including both independence and *taksim*. While he did not refuse independence, he continued to insist on the existence of two separate communities which should benefit from the right of independence.

It should be stated that the shift in Turkish foreign policy from the aforementioned stance to independent Cyprus was interesting since the Menderes government did not introduce any satisfactory argument regarding how the negotiations ended with independence. Within a month, Turkish and Greek position became closer, especially with the NATO Ministerial Council in Paris between 16 and 18 December during which Turkish and Greek policy makers tried to establish a framework for trilateral talks including Britain, with minimum controversial arguments.³⁶⁹ On December 19, 1958, it was declared by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff that Greece and Turkey were becoming closer for a mutually acceptable formula for an independent Cyprus.³⁷⁰ Moreover, as Averoff stated, "*taksim* which was defended by Turkey and *enosis* defended by Greece have been abandoned."³⁷¹ This closer relationship was intensified with bilateral talks between December 28, 1958 and January 4, 1959. Accordingly, the discussions were centered on military bases to be spared for Turkey, and the rights of the Turkish community in civil service, domestic security and representation in an independent Cypriot state.³⁷²

³⁶⁸ *Zafer*, November 24, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 497

³⁶⁹ *Zafer*, February 5, 1959, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 508

³⁷⁰ FRUS, 1958-60, p. 753

³⁷¹ *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 509

³⁷² FRUS, 1958-60, *footnote 3*, p. 757

Naturally, such a close relationship with Greece created a question mark regarding the Turkish stance on the Cyprus issue which was supposed to be *taksim*. On December 24, Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Turkish government continued its works with great sensibility concerning the preservation of Turkish rights.³⁷³ Accordingly, Bayur stated his concerns about the government's position arguing that he did not consider any change in *taksim* thesis of the government after conducting various international meetings; the final solution and the objective was *taksim*, and the government decision would be *taksim*.³⁷⁴ After a relatively silent period, following the Zurich Conference between February 5 and 11, 1959, Menderes argued that Turkey did not make any concessions from its rights and interests; besides, it had the peaceful feeling of not intervening the rights of the other side.³⁷⁵

The summary of the Turkish foreign policy regarding the Cyprus issue was available in the speech by Bülent Ecevit, Ankara MP from the Republican People's Party (RPP):

for those who believed the government's point of view and said that Cyprus is part of a fatherland three or four years ago, for those who were motivated by the government and swear for *taksim* or death, and for the Foreign Minister who, three months ago, in the UN meetings, proved scientifically the impossibility of giving independence to Cyprus with a great success, the result, whether we like or not, is a *fait accompli*.³⁷⁶

On March 4, İnönü made a much softer speech stating that it was understood that the alliance in which Turkey took part necessitated for the Zurich and London

³⁷³ *Zafer*, December 25, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, pp. 509,510

³⁷⁴ *Hürriyet*, December 25, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 511

³⁷⁵ *Zafer*, February 14, 1959, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 522

³⁷⁶ T.B.M.M. ZABIT CERİDESİ, Devre XI, Cilt 7, İçtima 2, s. 1375, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 539

Agreements due to peace and security concerns.³⁷⁷ Also, he mentioned “the advices of powerful friends” which clearly meant the American efforts during the Zurich and London conferences.³⁷⁸

3.7 The Design of the Republic of Cyprus

For the new status of the island, the US had a positive attitude, claiming, “the new Republic become a stable and unifying, rather than disruptive, force in relations among Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.”³⁷⁹ Three important documents constituted the framework of the new Republic: Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Guarantee, and Treaty of Alliance. These treaties were established upon the conditions agreed during Zurich and London Agreements of 1959. According to the Article 1 of the Constitution which was drafted in London on February 17, 1959, and declared on August 16, 1960,

The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus.³⁸⁰

With the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, a bi-communal system was imposed in all spheres of the administration. The co-existence in the administration was introduced as Article 46 remarked:

...One of the following Ministries that is to say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Finance, shall be entrusted to a Turkish

³⁷⁷ For the full speech, see T.B.M.M. ZABIT CERİDESİ, Devre XI, Cilt 8, ;çt,ma 2, ss. 21-24, and *Ulus*, March 5, 1959, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 540

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*

³⁷⁹ FRUS, 1958-60, *National Security Council Report*, NSC 6003, p. 819

³⁸⁰ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus signed on 16 August 1960, Article 1, retrieved from <http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Cyprus/Laws/Cyprus%20Constitution%201960.pdf>

Minister. If the President and the Vice-President of the Republic agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation...³⁸¹

Similarly, public services were distributed with the Article 62, “[for the House of Representatives] seventy per centum shall be elected by the Greek Community and thirty per centum by the Turkish Community separately from amongst their members respectively...”³⁸² and with Article 123, “The public service shall be composed as to seventy per centum of Greeks and as to thirty per centum of Turks. This quantitative distribution shall be applied, so far as this will be practically possible, in all grades of the hierarchy in the public service.”³⁸³ Additionally, the security forces of the Republic was designed with Article 130,

The security forces of the Republic shall be composed as to seventy per centum of Greeks and as to thirty per centum of Turks: Provided that for an initial period and in order not to discharge those Turks serving in the police on the 11th February, 1959, except those serving in the auxiliary police, the percentage of Turks may be kept up to a maximum of forty per centum and consequently that of the Greeks may be reduced to sixty per centum.³⁸⁴

Therefore, as stated by Vali, the system was “communalized”, or at least supposed to be communalized, in order to protect the smaller community from the domination of the other.³⁸⁵

As the Treaty of Guarantee declared in Article 1,

[The Republic of Cyprus] undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares

³⁸¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus signed on 16 August 1960, Article 46, retrieved from <http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Cyprus/Laws/Cyprus%20Constitution%201960.pdf>

³⁸² *Ibid*, Article 62

³⁸³ *Ibid*, Article 123

³⁸⁴ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus signed on 16 August 1960, Article 130

³⁸⁵ Vali, p. 248

prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.³⁸⁶

In Article 2, the treaty warned the guarantor states arguing,

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.³⁸⁷

Hence, the new system clearly abolished the possibility of both *enosis* and *taksim*, or any kind of partition.

With the Treaty of Guarantee, three countries, namely, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, were regarded as the guarantor states which could interfere with the island jointly or unilaterally in case of any breach of 1959 Agreements.³⁸⁸ For Article 2 of the treaty, these three countries “recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.”³⁸⁹ For the future conflicts, Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee constituted the main standing point for Turkish policy preferences which stated,

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁶ No. 5475. Treaty of Guarantee, signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960, Article 1

³⁸⁷ *Ibid*, Article 2

³⁸⁸ Adams, p. 97; the features of the republic summarized with reference to the Treaty of Guarantee, The Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Sovereign Bases in Roucek, pp. 733,734

³⁸⁹ No. 5475. Treaty of Guarantee, signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960, Article 2

³⁹⁰ No. 5475. Treaty of Guarantee, signed at Nicosia on August 16 1960

As Vali warned, the imposed bi-communal structure might seem as a rigid system; however, confrontations between two communities in all branches were the possible results of such a system.³⁹¹ For him, it was nothing but an “inflexible” and a “complex” structure that could not be sustained even with enormous will and effort.³⁹² It should be stated that Cyprus was never ruled by two communities in cooperation in the administration, thus, there was no tradition of a bi-communal system.³⁹³ As argued by Fırat, the Agreements and the Constitution aimed to create a balance and a partnership between two equal communities both of which needed to show “goodwill” towards each other for the sustainment of the Republic.³⁹⁴ Similarly, Vali marks the importance of “mutual trust” and “good faith” in sustaining the cooperation.³⁹⁵ As Rauf Denktaş, the founding president of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, examines, with the bi-communal character, a system was introduced in which there was no superiority between communities, and it can be true to argue that there was still no “Cypriot nation” but there was a “Cypriot State” which was not a unitary or a Greek one.³⁹⁶ Hence, the key word for the Republic was “coexistence” which avoided both *taksim* and *enosis* and in the end naturally established a “balance” between Greece and Turkey.³⁹⁷

As Denktaş states in his memoirs, the birth of the Cyprus Republic on August 16, 1960 was celebrated by the Turks as the acceptance of equality and cooperation between two communities; however, President Makarios continued to promote

³⁹¹ Vali, p. 248

³⁹² *Ibid*, p. 249

³⁹³ *Ibid*

³⁹⁴ Fırat, M. M., 1997. *1960-1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, p. 129

³⁹⁵ Vali, p. 249

³⁹⁶ Denktaş, R. R., 2000. *Hatıralar - Toplayış*. 1st dü. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, p. 402

³⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 403

enosis by claiming that it was not the international agreements that were permanent, but it was the national interests.³⁹⁸ Similar analysis was put by Ertekün arguing that the Republic was a satisfactory solution for both communities, still, Makarios pursued his own way, and for him, the Republic was only a tool for reaching the national objective, *enosis*.³⁹⁹

3.8 The American Position until the Foundation of the Republic of Cyprus

For the United States, Cyprus continued to be a policy issue which might endanger the nature of the NATO alliance if the three countries, the UK, Greece and Turkey could not come up with a mutually accepted solution. It is obvious that NATO power and interests in the region were the priorities of the US policy. As stated by Sönmezoğlu, a conflict about the island between allies would be a disaster for the “southern flank” of NATO since the Soviets might increase their influence in the region.⁴⁰⁰ It was clearly stated in the National Security Council Report of February 9, 1960, that Cyprus was of vital importance for the US in terms of a possible crisis due to which the island might trigger enmity and chaos between NATO members. It was stated,

Cyprus has been important to the United States primarily because the controversy over the future status of Cyprus caused a dangerous deterioration of Greek-Turkish and Greek-British relations and disrupted NATO cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ Denктаş, 2000, pp. 159,160

³⁹⁹ Ertekün, p. 190

⁴⁰⁰ Sönmezoğlu, F., 2000. Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, pp. 82-191

⁴⁰¹ FRUS, 1958-60, *National Security Council Report*, NSC 6003, p. 819

Until 1960, unlike Bölükbaşı who claimed that the US had a “passive role”⁴⁰² in Cyprus, it is found out that rather than a passive role, the USA pursued ‘precautious involvement’ or ‘indirect involvement’, both of which tell more than the term passive role. The USA seemed to passivize itself but it did not mean that the US was not influential or did not pay attention to the fact that Cyprus was to be taken seriously as a center of attraction. The USA was always there, sometimes masking itself behind the presence of the UK, and sometimes behind the mask of NATO. A similar analysis and conclusion is also made by Adams, arguing that Cyprus issue represents a case that the US pursued a “quiet diplomacy” in order not to disrupt the balance among NATO allies.⁴⁰³ Yet his definition is not enough because NATO was the channel through which the US could control, regulate and even manipulate the actors in the region by not becoming visible in the region. Therefore, it can be stated that the American policy-makers did not want to get their hands dirty by directly dealing with the problem and taking decisions in favor of one side.⁴⁰⁴

In line with its diplomatic strategies, the US mostly supported the British positions, started with the preservation of *status quo* on the island and continued by supporting self-government proposals in the way of a peaceful solution. Obviously, every single effort, cooperation and negotiation among Turkey, Greece and Britain were supported by the US. This was not only because their solidarity would mean the halt of the threat of communist impact and expansionism. And even it was not also because NATO would be reinforced against the USSR. Beyond all, it was due to the US national benefits on an international arena where Cyprus would serve as a critical geostrategic location then and in the future. The US policy makers saw the

⁴⁰² Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 37

⁴⁰³ Adams mentions a dilemma that the US confronts while dealing with its backyard wars. Accordingly the dilemma is whether to “get involved in the conflicts to maximize the national interests, or to do nothing and hope that the international order would not be disturbed.” For detailed information see, Adams, p. 95

⁴⁰⁴ from the interview with Süha Bölükbaşı, on April 12, 2018

critical point where Cyprus would be a center of main global concern in the future and it must therefore be taken as a safe ground for any future global the US action. As highlighted in the US National Security Council (NSC) report,

the chief strategic importance of Cyprus to the West will continue to lie in the British bases and their role in the United Kingdom's planning and posture for military operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Since the loss of British bases in Egypt, the strategic importance of Cyprus has increased...the British airfields on Cyprus are useful to the United States as a possible staging base for Middle East operations and as a possible back-up installation for the US facilities located at Adana, Turkey.⁴⁰⁵

On the way to Zurich and London Conferences, the United States again supported and encouraged the Turkish-Greek negotiations, as Rountree argued that the United States would take a constructive role in the conference.⁴⁰⁶ Therefore, it can be regarded as the US obligation to refrain from supporting any particular "national" proposals meaning *enosis* and *taksim*, since the US believed in pursuing a quiet diplomacy through which the parties could not blame the US for supporting the others' solution. As argued by Sander, taking decisions regarding the issue required a balance and while the US could not refrain from engaging in the issue, it was concerned about the relations with its three NATO members.⁴⁰⁷

It was clear for the US that the best scenario would be solving the problems via bilateral and trilateral negotiations without disrupting NATO interests in the region. As President Eisenhower declared his perspective on February 12, 1958, in his letter to Macmillan which was probably the main idea of American and British governments throughout the negotiations, he stressed the importance of the US interests be met: "anything Turkey and Greece will mutually agree on will be

⁴⁰⁵ FRUS, 1958-60, National Security Council Report, NSC 6003, p. 820

⁴⁰⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1958, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 509

⁴⁰⁷ Sander, 1979, p. 225

acceptable to us so long as our own requirements are met.”⁴⁰⁸ Therefore, I agree with Bölükbaşı’s conclusion that the US would not oppose to *enosis* or *taksim* if they were introduced as the result of bilateral or trilateral negotiations without a conflict for NATO alliance being created.⁴⁰⁹ The most beneficial solution would be the one that was agreed by the three NATO members which was the Republic of Cyprus, guaranteeing the independence by avoiding both *enosis* and *taksim* and providing a Constitution containing the rights of two communities on the island as well as the British interests.⁴¹⁰ As President Eisenhower stated, the process including the 1959 agreements and the establishment of an independent Cyprus was “an imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship which cannot fail to strengthen and encourage the whole NATO alliance.”⁴¹¹

3.9 The Turkish Position until the Foundation of the Republic of Cyprus

Until the final solution of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish foreign policy experienced great divergences which started with ignoring the Cyprus issue in the late 1940s and early 1950s, continued with supporting British domination and then demanding the island back, and finally insisting on *taksim* thesis. These ups and downs in Turkish policies and the speeches of the policy makers can be considered as Turkish disinterest towards the Cyprus issue. However, in line with Vali, such fluctuations in the Turkish attitude were not of the disinterest of Turkey, but they can be labelled as inconsistency in Turkish foreign policy due to its strong ties with the West and particularly the US; or, as the lack of consistency or a national policy

⁴⁰⁸ FRUS, 1958-60, p. 767

⁴⁰⁹ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 37

⁴¹⁰ Sönmezoğlu, 2000, p. 75

⁴¹¹ Quoted in R. P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1959* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 191, cited in Joseph, J. S., 1997. *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. s.l.:MacMillan Press Ltd, p. 81

as well as a defined national objective compared to the Greek insistence on *enosis*. For Bölükbaşı, these shifts can be called “the flexibility in Turkish policies” which aimed at coordinating policies with the US and the UK which in turn meant protection against the Soviet threat.⁴¹² In addition, for Turkey, the image in the eyes of West was an important factor. Accordingly, for him, Turkey’s changing policies can be interpreted as efforts for not alienating NATO allies by a perception that Turkey was struggling for a Turkish version of *enosis*, since the Turkish position, at least on this initial stage of the conflict, was not to lose the island to a hostile power.⁴¹³ In addition, even the *taksim* thesis was not introduced as a national objective but rather its acceptance was originated in the British proposal. Hence, these policy preferences can be explained by considering that throughout the issue, while insisting on some vital conditions, Turkey tried to give the image that it was not Turkey that created obstacles on the way to a solution. Thus, Turkey can be metaphorically likened to a sailing ship, cruising hard in the rough waters of Cyprus under the Cold War climate.

In line with the three interdependent cornerstones of the American-Turkish alliance mentioned in the second chapter of the study, Cyprus issue until 1960 reflects similar features in which Turkey still introduced foreign policies based on NATO and American interests. As for the first cornerstone of the relationship which was the Soviet threat perceived by the US and Turkey, the Cyprus issue constituted a potential source of conflict which could be exploited by the Soviets. As the US policy makers repeatedly mentioned, in order to sustain the balance in the eastern Mediterranean, any conflict among NATO allies concerning Cyprus should be avoided. This also brings us to the second cornerstone of the strategic alliance. Accordingly, NATO and American interests required a peaceful process of solution and Turkey showed its support with its “flexibility” with changing policies. Even

⁴¹² Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 37

⁴¹³ *Ibid*

while supporting the *taksim* argument, Turkey would not strictly close the doors for any other solution. Finally, as the third cornerstone, the strategic importance of the island for the security of Turkey necessitated for American-Turkish or Turkish-British cooperation since any solution which would leave Turkey outside the negotiations could have probably led Turkey to a point of losing the island for good.

In the following chapter, the failure of the new Republic with reference to 1963 and 1964 events will be discussed. Yet for now, it can be stated that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus is a diplomatic success, at least the best possible solution for Turkey, but not a total victory for Greece, Turkey and Britain.⁴¹⁴ As the Prime Minister Menderes considered, the 1959 Agreements and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus were neither victory nor defeat for Turkey.⁴¹⁵ For him, the Zurich-London Agreements were “a compromise which was not against Turkey’s national interests and which respected the other party’s rights and interests.”⁴¹⁶ While the government was criticized by its sudden policy change from *taksim* to independence, as Zorlu responded the Ecevit’s argument considering the Cyprus solution as a *fait accompli*, Turkey did not sacrifice anything by abandoning the thesis, rather Turkey avoided a long struggle with Greece, and guaranteed the rights and sovereignty of the Turkish community on the island as well as the security of the mainland.⁴¹⁷ Therefore, probably as the final alternative of Turkish foreign policy, independence would be the solution for the island which obviously gave Turkey and the Turkish community legal rights and obligations for the sustainment of the Republic.

⁴¹⁴ Adams, p. 96

⁴¹⁵ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 36

⁴¹⁶ Bilge, 1977, p.380, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 36

⁴¹⁷ T.B.M.M. ZABIT CERİDESİ, Devre XI, Cilt 7, İçtima 2, ss. 1378-1379, cited in Armaoğlu, p. 539

3.10 Conclusion

The third chapter of the study dedicated to the analysis of the Turkish and American positions towards the Cyprus issue until the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus yields two conclusions: one for American and the other for Turkish positions. Firstly, for the US, the Cyprus issue represented a case in which it pursued an indirect and precautionary strategy to balance the concerned parties. For the US, rather than introducing a solution, the significance of the island emerged from its location in the Mediterranean which might lead to a Greek-Turkish confrontation and thus could be threatened by Soviet intervention. Secondly, for Turkey, the Cyprus issue represented various meanings which led to various policy alternatives. Such policy shifts mentioned in the chapter can be explained through Turkish ties with the west and particularly with the US. Therefore, for Turkish policy makers, reaching a solution by taking Turkey as a party is more important than creating a sustainable or 'national' solution.

To conclude, it is obvious that the US and Turkey did not experience a discord within the Cyprus issue until 1960. Rather, the positions of two states were shaped in harmony. In fact, the process of establishment of the Republic can be considered as the US pursuit of balancing NATO allies, giving priority to its current and probable future interests for a peaceful solution, and Turkey's search for a true policy in not alienating itself from western alliance.

CHAPTER 4

THE CYPRUS ISSUE UNTIL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNFICYP

The US position regarding the Cyprus problem was rather indirect, seemingly reluctant, surprisingly behind the screen, pushing forth Britain and NATO where and when necessary, letting a medium for negotiations be established between the communities. This tendency is usually considered and sometimes favored as a “passive policy.” A more dominant involvement, more direct expression of the American will, and open declaration of the American attitude appears to be missing during the period. This can only be explained by taking the American stance as a very carefully planned strategy crafted by its policy makers that have always acted in line with the US benefits overseas. Similarly, Cyprus being at a strategic location where the US could assert and practice its leadership capabilities in shaping the future outlook of the region was not a place to be ignored by the US. Cyprus was and has been such an opportunity which would enable the US to make a big leap to the Middle East and even to the further east towards Asia. Therefore, sometimes through the show of goodwill and friendship, sometimes playing a passive role but always being precautionary about every step it takes, America staged its role on the island during the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, and until the establishment of the UN Peace Force in Cyprus.

4.1 1960-1963: Politics in independent Cyprus and the failure of the Republic

The Republic of Cyprus was imposed as a mutually acceptable solution which was hoped to be long-lived. As the 1959 Agreements highlighted, there was no room for *taksim* and *enosis*. Rather, it was an independent unitary state with two nations. This character was also accepted by Makarios in his speech to *Cyprus Mail* on March 28, 1963: “No Greek who knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements have created a state but not a nation.”⁴¹⁸ Hence, this mentality, the acceptance of two separate nations, and their pursuit of national interests can be regarded as the main problem for the future of the Republic.

As the US government observed on October 6, 1959, the 1959 Agreements constituting the new state brought a complicated framework and troublesome problems before the independence in addition to opposition by *enosis* supporters.⁴¹⁹ Therefore, regarding the sustainability of the new state, the US had some concerns based on ongoing tension between two communities and the continuation of the desire for union with Greece both in Greece and Cyprus.⁴²⁰ Similarly, there are some authors arguing that the 1960 Constitution itself can be considered as the cause of the further conflicts. For instance, Joseph considers the Republic as an imposition by outsiders which did not include any idea by Cypriots. For him, while national purposes, *enosis* and *taksim*, were abandoned, there were no measures to promote togetherness or “integrative politics” that could sustain cooperation.⁴²¹ Also, for Armaoğlu, the Republic emerged as a “strange creature”⁴²² which would

⁴¹⁸ Denктаş, R. R., 1982. *The Cyprus Triangle*. Nicosia: K. Rustem & Bro. and George Allen & Unwin, p. 13

⁴¹⁹ FRUS, 1958-60, *National Intelligence Estimate*, p. 793

⁴²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 794

⁴²¹ Joseph, p. 24

⁴²² Armaoğlu, p. 545

definitely have a short life since its Constitution was not based on the cooperation and togetherness of two communities, but on division and separation.⁴²³ Similarly, for Reddaway, the Constitution was “inherently unworkable” by its nature since the “goodwill” of both communities was lacking.⁴²⁴ In addition, Fırat and Bölükbaşı argue that communities insisted on their own interests, *enosis* or *taksim*,⁴²⁵ and began to struggle for different ends rather than try to live together.⁴²⁶ Therefore, as Bölükbaşı stated, there were “irreconcilable differences” between communities which made it impossible for them to find common grounds in an agreement.⁴²⁷

It is safe to criticize the consistency or the sustainability of the Constitution; however, what is certain about the Republic is that in three-year’s time Cyprus failed to function administratively and socially. While the reasons of failure can be attributed to various factors, a large part of responsibility should be put on to President Makarios according to the Turkish view. His speeches, before and after the establishment of the Republic, prove that in his mind-set the Republic was nothing but an obstacle or at least a temporary stage on the way to *enosis*. As he declared his intention in April, 1960, before he became the president, he regarded the Zurich and London Agreements far from being satisfactory solutions but as the steps in the national struggles of the Greek Cypriots.⁴²⁸ Therefore, the target was

⁴²³ Armaoğlu, p. 551

⁴²⁴ Reddaway, J., 2001. *Burdened with Cyprus: the British Connection*. 3rd ed. Nicosia: Rustem Bookshop, p. 127

⁴²⁵ from the interview with Süha Bölükbaşı, on April 12, 2018; Uslu, 2003, p. 17

⁴²⁶ from the interview with Süha Bölükbaşı, on April 12, 2018; Fırat, p. 129

⁴²⁷ from the interview with Süha Bölükbaşı, on April 12, 2018

⁴²⁸ Stavrinides, Zenon, 1976, *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood*, Wakefield, p. 40, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 50, “...National struggles never come to an end. They merely change their form, preserving deep down the same substance and the same content... The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements...”

still *enosis*, and the 1960 Constitution was another phase for the Greek Cypriots to this end.

It can be marked that the aspirations of Makarios and his speeches were not in line with the independent state; instead, he openly declared his intentions towards *enosis*. As Denктаş mentioned, his first executive action as the President of Cyprus, was to appoint Polycarpos Yorgadjis as Minister of the Interior who was known as an EOKA killer and with his “pathological hatred” against the Turkish community.⁴²⁹ As Makarios declared his belief on July 28, 1960, before the establishment of the Republic,

the Agreements do not form the goal, they are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause and shape their future in accordance with their will. The Zurich and London Agreements have a number of positive elements but also negative ones, and the Greeks will work to take the advantage of the positive elements and get rid of the negative ones.⁴³⁰

Until 1963 clashes and his thirteen amendments, Makarios made speeches to sustain the spirit of *enosis* for the Greek community. As he repeated his desires on January 5, 1962,

The noble struggles of the people never come to an end. These struggles, although they undergo transformation, are never terminated. The struggle of the people of Cyprus, too, will go on... The Zurich and London Agreements form a landmark in the course of this struggle, but, at the same time, are a starting point and bastion for further struggles, with the object of capitalizing on what has been achieved for further conquests.⁴³¹

Similarly on August 15, 1962, Makarios continued to support the Greek struggle arguing, “Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work

⁴²⁹ Denктаş, 1982, p. 25

⁴³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 27

⁴³¹ *Ibid*, p. 14

began by the EOKA heroes. The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal.”⁴³²

4.2 Attempts to change the 1960 Constitution and the Thirteen Points of Makarios

As summarized by Bölükbaşı, the main conflicts between 1960 and 1963 could be regarded as the income tax legislation, 70:30 ratio in the administration, the border conflicts of municipalities and the establishment of Cyprus army.⁴³³ From the Greek Cypriot perspective, the Constitution provided the Turkish Cypriots with excessive rights, and the partnership status of the Turkish minority should be revised.⁴³⁴ For Roucek, the dissatisfaction of the Greek Cypriots and the complications in the administration of the unique Republic prompted Makarios to alter the Constitution.⁴³⁵ From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, any change in the Constitution would mean the abolition of existing balance between two communities and thus would pave the way for *enosis* through which the Turkish community would lose their status and become a minority.⁴³⁶ Eventually, all of these problems were mentioned by Makarios in his letter to Vice-President Küçük including his thirteen points under the heading “suggested measures for facilitating

⁴³² Denктаş, 1982, p. 14

⁴³³ Main disagreements summarized in Bölükbaşı, 1988, pp. 50,51,52; Türkmen, p. 98

⁴³⁴ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 52

⁴³⁵ Roucek, p. 734

⁴³⁶ Bölükbaşı, 1988, pp. 52, 53; Adams, p. 98

the Smooth Functioning of the State and for the removal of Certain Causes of Inter-Communal Friction.”⁴³⁷

Makarios’ first initiation for changing the existing Constitution was reported by the US Embassy in Britain to the US Department of State on January 5, 1962,⁴³⁸ referring to Makarios’ statement on January 4. In his statement, he declared his intention to “disregard or seek revision” of Cyprus Constitution since, for him, the Turkish minority “endangered” the Republic.⁴³⁹ As reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus in January 1962, Cypriot Foreign Minister supported Makarios’ argument stating that he “could not permit obstruction of functioning of state if Turkish Cypriots utilized tax veto provision to force pace of implementation of constitution to disadvantage of Greek Cypriots.”⁴⁴⁰ In addition, regarding the separate municipalities, on December 30, 1962, Makarios signaled his intention to change the Constitution arguing that the existing municipalities were “unworkable” and thus, all of the functions of municipalities would be transferred to the government of Cyprus.⁴⁴¹

On June 21, 1963, Makarios declared his opinions concerning the 1959 Agreements, the nature of the Republic and his desire to change the Constitution:

...it was more than obvious that number of provisions of those agreements would create difficulties in functioning of state, constituting at same time sources of

⁴³⁷ Suggested Measures for Facilitating the Smooth Functioning of the State and for the removal of Certain Causes of Inter-Communal Friction, Letter sent by Makarios to Küçük, November 30, 1963, retrieved from website of Press and Information Office, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus, <https://www.pio.gov.cy/assets/pdf/cyproblem/13%20points.pdf> accessed on March 23, 2019

⁴³⁸ Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1–562. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 520

⁴³⁹ FRUS, 1961-63, *footnote*, p. 520

⁴⁴⁰ Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1–1262. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 522. The 1960 constitution gave a veto power to the Turkish community concerning taxation bills

⁴⁴¹ FRUS, 1961-63, *editorial note*, p. 539

friction between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, with grave consequences affecting relations between Greece and Turkey... Since independence, it has become abundantly clear that certain constitutional provisions are unworkable in actual practice, as for example provision with regard to separate municipalities in five main towns of island. Other provisions, one, for example, requiring separate majorities for enactment of taxation legislation, create many obstacles in smooth running of state and seriously hinder government's efforts to apply sound policy of economic development.⁴⁴²

Moreover, for Makarios, the 1959 Agreements and particularly the right of intervention was a great obstacle for the independence of Republic of Cyprus. Accordingly, he believed that an independent country could be independent when the other countries had no right of intervention.⁴⁴³ As Makarios declared on June 21, 1963,

[1959 Agreements] are in direct conflict with very essence of true independence. Any attempt by any one or other three countries to intervene would unavoidably lead to very serious situation in Cyprus, with great possibility of wider conflict between Greece and Turkey. Any interference by other countries in internal affairs of Cyprus must be considered as completely unacceptable.⁴⁴⁴

On November 26, 1963, the US Embassy in Cyprus reported that Makarios would send his proposals calling for possible changes in the Constitution. However, as the US supported a mutually accepted solution between the two Cypriot communities, it was advised by the US to introduce the proposals not as amendments but as "suggestions for improving functioning of Constitution."⁴⁴⁵ Eventually, on November 30, Makarios introduced his thirteen measures. The main argument of Makarios was that the functioning of the Republic was not possible with 1960 Constitution which was, for him, dictated to him, and thus, some provisions should be revised or removed for the smooth functioning and the development of the

⁴⁴² Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 566

⁴⁴³ Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 565

⁴⁴⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 567

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 584

state.⁴⁴⁶ For him, the existing system prevented the cooperation between two communities, and his proposal was to remove “the obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the State.”⁴⁴⁷

Out of the thirteen points which he proposed, four of them were of significance in terms of his depiction of the major problems threatening the state. Mainly, the first point called for the abolition of the veto power of the Vice-President which, for Makarios, was a “negative power” utilized by both President and Vice-President to prevent the other from taking decisions.⁴⁴⁸ Similarly, with the fifth point, Makarios aimed to abolish the “separate majorities for enactment of certain laws.”⁴⁴⁹ In other words, in the current system, the Greek members and the Turkish members of the House of Representatives were separately asked for a provision to approve, and when the majority from either side did not approve, the proposal was rejected due to the separate majority rule.⁴⁵⁰ In addition, with the 12th point, Makarios called for majority rule in commissions to take decisions and thus abolishing rights of the Greek and Turkish veto power.⁴⁵¹ For him, the veto power was nothing but to protect the Turkish and Greek interests separately and against “the true interests of Public Service”, thus, creating a deadlock in the public sphere and “prevented the speedy appointment of officers to vital posts.”⁴⁵²

One of the most important arguments in Makarios proposals was that “the proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of

⁴⁴⁶ Makarios 13 proposals, 1963

⁴⁴⁷ Makarios 13 proposals, 1963

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid*

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, point 12

⁴⁵² *Ibid*

the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic” should be “modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.”⁴⁵³ Accordingly, the 70:30 ratio in public service, and the 60:40 ratio in the army introduced with the Constitution were criticized by stating that the efficiency in administration could not be maintained with these proportions. For Makarios, the percentages of participation should be in line with populations of the two communities, which was approximately 81 to 19.⁴⁵⁴ For him, according to these percentages, the existing system was “discriminatory” for the Greek Cypriots since the Turkish community had more opportunity to represent themselves although, for Makarios, they had not enough qualified people to undertake administrative services which contributed to the inefficiency of the state.⁴⁵⁵ Beyond the ratio issue, for him, Turks were “unjust and discriminatory” against the Greeks in public services, all of which created “hardship or unfairness to existing member of the Service of the Republic.”⁴⁵⁶

Makarios proposals were also supported by Cyprus Foreign Minister Kyprianou in December 1963, arguing that the objective of the proposals was not to intensify the differences between the two communities but to do away with the divergences between them.⁴⁵⁷ However, for Kyprianou, there were two possible solutions for the island, which were reported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk: union with Greece or independence within British Commonwealth.⁴⁵⁸ From the Greek-Cypriot perspective, therefore, the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus with existing

⁴⁵³ Makarios 13 proposals, 1963, point 10

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid*

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid*

⁴⁵⁷ Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 591

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid*

structure was not an alternative unlike the Turkish perspective which aimed to protect the 1959 Agreements and the Constitution.

As Vali pointed out, the proposals were against the bi-communal character of the Cypriot state, and thus, unacceptable for the Turkish community and Turkish government.⁴⁵⁹ While Makarios claimed that these points were to increase the efficiency of the state apparatuses, Denктаş claimed his real intention was different as could be seen from his speech dated by September 4, 1963: “unless this small the Turkish community forming a part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated.”⁴⁶⁰ Obviously, the exclusion of the Turkish community was the aim of Makarios’ sixth point in which he criticized the separate municipalities. For him, the geographical division of the municipalities did not seem to be feasible. Greeks and Turks were living mostly in same regions, and financially the division was not possible since it might bring prohibitive measures and would necessitate for the duplication of municipal services.⁴⁶¹

4.3 Turkish Position towards Makarios’ Intentions

The Turkish position concerning Makarios’ attempts to change the existing system was introduced by Foreign Minister Erkin on October 1, 1963 in the UN General Assembly, arguing that Turkey supported the existence of the London-Zurich Agreements which recognized the rights of two communities on the island. However, he claimed that “others” did not share the Turkish spirit; rather they were

⁴⁵⁹ Vali, p. 252

⁴⁶⁰ Denктаş, 1982, p. 16

⁴⁶¹ Makarios 13 proposals, 1963

“determined to destroy the agreement and reduce the Turks to the status of an ordinary minority left helpless under the Greek majority.”⁴⁶²

As reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus in January 1963, from the Turkish Cypriot perspective the issue of separate municipalities and Makarios’ insistence, if accepted, would mean the “first legal breach in dike of Constitution which would thereafter be undermined and swept away.”⁴⁶³ Moreover, in February, the Turkish government also declared its position, as reported by the US Embassy in Turkey, that Turkey “...considers such move [termination of Turkish municipalities] threat to principle of inviolability Cyprus constitution and London-Zurich Agreements...”⁴⁶⁴ In the same document, Foreign Minister Erkin’s arguments were introduced which were in line with the Turkish-Cypriot position. He argued that any change in the Constitution would trigger further changes which would eventually undermine the “carefully balanced Cyprus structure” and thus pave the way for *enosis*.⁴⁶⁵

The abovementioned Turkish and Turkish Cypriot stance on municipalities was repeated by Erkin in the UNGA arguing that it was not a “question of perpetual partition of municipalities” but a “question of good will and mutual confidence.”⁴⁶⁶ For Turkey, as Erkin declared, the partition of municipalities could be ended if Greek Cypriot leaders increased confidence on the island; however, rather than promoting confidence, the unilateral revision of the Constitution was in the agenda of the Greek Cypriots.⁴⁶⁷ As he highlighted during the UN General Assembly, the

⁴⁶² Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 574

⁴⁶³ Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1-1663, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 543

⁴⁶⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 547

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁶⁶ Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 574

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 574, 575

Turkish objective was to protect the existing system in Cyprus.⁴⁶⁸ However, a possibility of Turkey to return to its policy of partition was mentioned by Erkin who stated that partition was not a solution for Cyprus since it brought various difficulties including mass movements; however, he claimed “Turkey would have to fall back on partition as the only way to save the Turkish minority.”⁴⁶⁹

It was clearly stated by the Turkish policy makers that Turkey was in favor of 1959 Agreements and the Constitution of Cyprus. As reported by the US Embassy in Turkey on October 20, 1963, Turkey would not permit any change in the Constitution.⁴⁷⁰ Accordingly, it was reported that the Turkish reaction would be “volcanic” in case of such an attempt, and if any change occurred in the London-Zurich Agreements and the Constitution, the only solution would be the partition of the island which would be unfortunate for NATO.⁴⁷¹

From the Turkish perspective, it was obvious that the objective of thirteen points was nothing but to eliminate the Turkish presence in the state, and thus, to pave the way for *enosis*. As Rusk reported on December 15, 1963, Foreign Minister Erkin considered the proposals as “unsatisfactory”, and he warned that Turkey could ask the guarantor powers to intervene if Makarios sustained his intention to change the Constitution.⁴⁷² Besides, for Erkin, if the circumstances necessitated for and nothing changed in Makarios’ position, the next step for Turkey would be to call for partition of the island.⁴⁷³ Eventually, on December 16, Turkey rejected the proposals and restated its position as not to change the current system on the island.

⁴⁶⁸ Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 576

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid*

⁴⁷⁰ Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 578

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid*

⁴⁷² Department of State, Central Files, POL Tur, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 766

⁴⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 767

The process continued with the clashes and atrocities on the island. On December 28, it was reported by the US Embassy in Turkey that, as Foreign Minister Erkin concluded, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were sure about Makarios' attempt and intention which were to "make life unendurable for Turks."⁴⁷⁴ Also for Denктаş, the solution for the Turkish community was nothing but the Turkish intervention; however, it was obvious that Turkey was not ready for such an action.⁴⁷⁵ As İnönü replied the questions regarding the possible Turkish intervention in December, no concrete plan had been introduced concerning any kind of intervention.⁴⁷⁶

Eventually, Makarios' proposals and the following rejection by the Turkish side triggered violence on the island between the two communities starting from December 1963.⁴⁷⁷ There are various interpretations regarding the violence, most of which are based on the argument that Makarios was determined to take the revenge of the refusal of his proposals. Accordingly, it is argued that his actions were in line with *Akritas Plan*, a criminal plan⁴⁷⁸, which aimed to abolish the partnership of 1959 Agreements and to suppress Turkish resistance with all means in order to achieve *enosis* by using force and violence.⁴⁷⁹ For Denктаş, it was such a plan in which there was no desire of having any settlement of the issues with the Turkish community.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 599

⁴⁷⁵ Denктаş, 2000, p. 201

⁴⁷⁶ Stegenga, James A., 1968, *The U.N. Force in Cyprus*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, p. 48, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 68

⁴⁷⁷ Türkmen, p. 98

⁴⁷⁸ Volkan & Itzkowitz, p. 139

⁴⁷⁹ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 57

⁴⁸⁰ Denктаş, 2000, p. 201

The initial reaction of Turkey to the violence was cautious. Accordingly, Prime Minister İnönü considered the events as “accidents” and called for “commonsense” to “bring back the peace.”⁴⁸¹ Later, in his letter, President Cemal Gürsel called for the US support to stop the atrocities on the island. However, rather than giving concrete guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots, President Johnson in his response highlighted the importance of guarantor states and the negotiations between them for a permanent peace.⁴⁸²

On the December 24, 1963, Turkey for the first time declared that if ceasefire could not be maintained, a joint military intervention with Greece and Britain would become necessary.⁴⁸³ During NATO Council Meeting on December 25, it was reported by the US mission in NATO that, while the entire atmosphere was to calm the Turkish delegates in the council, Turkish policy makers had a firm stance on their warnings concerning a unilateral action of Turkish forces.⁴⁸⁴ On the same day, Turkish jets conducted a low-altitude flight over Cyprus, and eventually on December 26, the joint peacekeeping operation was proposed by British, Greek and Turkish ambassadors and accepted by Makarios.⁴⁸⁵

In this first reaction to the ongoing and climbing crisis, the Turkish threat for intervention to the island resulted in the joint peacekeeping force led by Britain. For İnönü, this event was a political success, or the most favorable action, since as he later argued, “Turkey could not intervene before exhausting all other

⁴⁸¹ İnönü’s reaction, see Aksam, 23 Dec. 1963, cited in Bölükbaşı, S., 1993. The Johnson Letter Revisited. *Middle Eastern Studies*, July, 29(3), p. 511; see also Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 58

⁴⁸² See for letters Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1282 (Jan. 20, 1964), p. 90 cited in Sander, 1979, p. 228

⁴⁸³ *Aksam*, December 25, 1963; Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, No.1, (1964), p.5. cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 59; Bölükbaşı, 1993, p. 512

⁴⁸⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp/NATO, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 597

⁴⁸⁵ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 59

alternatives.”⁴⁸⁶ In fact, as Harris mentioned, the air bombings were the only action that could be carried out by the Turkish army since there was a serious lack of equipment, training and strategy to conduct a military intervention to an island.⁴⁸⁷ For İnönü, the most desirable outcome would be the US involvement and “US-brokered” peace, yet, the US was still reluctant to get involved.⁴⁸⁸ In addition, by not intervening, Turkey showed its intention to negotiate with Greece and Britain, thus acting in accordance with the US policies which called for trilateral negotiations.⁴⁸⁹ As Uslu argued, the US was concerned about the issue, still being refrained from getting involved directly to the process of the settlement of the problem; rather, it would prefer to see the NATO allies negotiating for a peace solution.⁴⁹⁰

4.4 American Position between 1960 and 1963

It should be stated that between 1960 and 1963, mainly the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy’s assassination dominated the policy agenda of the US. However, concerning Cyprus, the geographical position of the island, the Soviet influence and the local communist party took the attention of American policy-makers. Especially with Makarios’ attempt to change the Constitution, the US aimed to encourage parties to negotiate, and create an atmosphere for a peaceful solution without directly getting engaged in. Therefore, it can be concluded that the precautions

⁴⁸⁶ Toker M., 1969, *İsmet Pasayla On Yıl, 1961-1964*, Burçak Yayınlar, p.108, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1993, p. 512

⁴⁸⁷ Harris, p. 107

⁴⁸⁸ Bölükbaşı, 1993, p. 512

⁴⁸⁹ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 61

⁴⁹⁰ Uslu, 2003, p. 25

involvement of the US as its policy through which it did not take side openly continued to be the policy priority of the US.

From the American perspective, Cyprus continued to be an important territory as Kennedy stated, "...Cyprus' real estate and strategic location are of considerable importance to us and to our allies..."⁴⁹¹ For Kennedy, "US should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end be pushed vigorously to contain and reduce communist strength."⁴⁹² Therefore, American policy makers were concerned about the activities of the local communist party of Cyprus, AKEL. As Kennedy warned in August 1961, the success of communists on the island and the "inadequacies of Makarios" needed to be carefully examined by the US, and if required the "Western burden" on three guarantor powers could be shared with the US.⁴⁹³ As a response to Kennedy's warnings, the Department of State concluded that the US should take "a role of leadership...in preserving and strengthening Western interests on the island."⁴⁹⁴ Accordingly, the importance of the island came from the US communication facilities which were of vital importance for the US and NATO control of the region.⁴⁹⁵ As reported by the Department of State on July 13, 1962, the US vital interests were "communication

⁴⁹¹ Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 71. Secret retrieved from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Editor: James E. Miller General Editor: Glenn W. LaFantasie United States Government Printing Office Washington 1994, p. 514

⁴⁹² Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 98. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 516

⁴⁹³ Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 71. Secret retrieved from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Editor: James E. Miller General Editor: Glenn W. LaFantasie United States Government Printing Office Washington 1994, p. 514

⁴⁹⁴ Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 71. Secret. Drafted by Coon and cleared by NEA, BNA, GER, and ICA retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 519

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid*

facilities, the need to counter the communist threat, and preservation of peaceful relations between the Greek and Turkish communities.”⁴⁹⁶

Starting with the early 1962, the US sustained its role to promote cooperation and negotiation among Cypriot peoples. As the US Department of State concluded in January 1962, as a response to Makarios’ intention to change the Constitution, objective of the US was to “discourage efforts of some Cypriots to upset existing constitutional order” by maintaining the cooperation among Greek, Turkish, British and Cypriot leaders for a mutual agreement on the island.⁴⁹⁷ Similarly, about the increasing tension in 1963, the Department of State argued in January 1963, a solution could be found in Cyprus if “pragmatic adjustments” were done between two communities in order to develop Cypriot interests rather than separate communal interests.⁴⁹⁸ Likewise, on April 4, 1963, the position of the US was reintroduced, “...it is task of true statesmanship to...build a true Cypriot nation...”⁴⁹⁹ Therefore, the US tried to create a ‘Cypriot solution’ rather than supporting Turkish or Greek national interests and arguments.

In line with the new developments, the US pursued its quiet diplomacy in 1963. This can be recognized from the Department of State policy recommendations to the US Embassy in Cyprus in April of the same year. It was recommended that the US continued to believe the validity of the London-Zurich Agreements and the Constitution, although it “realized that all constitutions subject to gradual changes in interpretation based on experience and general consensual acceptance by

⁴⁹⁶ Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 169. Secret. Drafted by Coon and cleared by Bergesen and Talbot, AID, and USIA, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 530

⁴⁹⁷ Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 169. Secret. Drafted by Coon and cleared by Bergesen and Talbot, AID, and USIA, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 522

⁴⁹⁸ Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1–763, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 540

⁴⁹⁹ Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 557

citizenry.”⁵⁰⁰ Therefore, the US opened the doors for a possible change in the Constitution by accepting both the Turkish argument that supported the 1960 Constitution, and Makarios’ statement that prepared the grounds for a change. As it was confirmed on April 28, 1963, the US believed “London-Zurich agreements and Constitution have continuing validity and that necessary changes can be accomplished through agreement both communities based on mutual trust and confidence.”⁵⁰¹ The US policy in the 1950s was to accept any solution as a result of bilateral or trilateral agreements continued in the early 1960s. As Jernegan argued after the Turkish rejection of Makarios’ proposals, the thirteen points should not be considered as impossible conditions at least for some consideration, thus, Jernegan sought a moderate path between Turkey and Makarios.⁵⁰²

In mid-1963, while the tension on the island continued to increase, the US policy makers sustained their position and aimed to destabilize the extremist feelings. Similarly, in October 1963, the US called for a “three power approach”⁵⁰³ to reduce the ongoing tension including the UK, Greece and Turkey. This approach was to be approved by President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük, all to support the continuation of the Cyprus Constitution and the London-Zurich Agreements.⁵⁰⁴ In this period, regarding the Turkish policy to deter Makarios with intervention, the US considered such an option as a useful tactic but unlikely, as argued by the Department of State on April 4, 1963, since such an option would trigger a direct fight with Greece and create a pressure on Turkey by other foreign states.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁰ Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 556

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 560

⁵⁰² *Ibid*, p. 589

⁵⁰³ Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 266, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 580

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid*

⁵⁰⁵ Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 556

However, even after the Turkish action in December 1963, as put forwards by the US Department of State on December 28, the US aim was not to discuss the ongoing conflicts on the island, but to call for consultation among Greece, Turkey, the UK and Cyprus.⁵⁰⁶

From the US perspective, December 1963 clashes between the two communities signaled a potential war between Greece and Turkey and thus diplomatic relations had to be intensified with both states. Accordingly, it is declared by the US Ambassadors of Athens and Ankara, “the use of MAP [Military Assistance Program] equipment by either [Greek or Turkish] contingent[s] on Cyprus ... without clear prior consent of US [is considered] a violation of the letter and intent [of] MAP agreements.”⁵⁰⁷ With this move, the US aimed to prevent any confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, rather than siding with the Greek or Turkish position regarding the island, the US threatened both countries and aimed to protect the NATO interests. For the US, the increasing tension threatens the NATO power in the region and in case of any conflict between NATO allies, the Soviets might engage in the issue through the already established communist threat on the island, the AKEL party.⁵⁰⁸ Eventually, Harris highlighted that when Turkey conducted jet flights in December with NATO-assigned equipment there emerged a big debate about whether the Turkish move was legitimate or not.⁵⁰⁹ As mentioned in the second chapter of the study, with July 12, 1947 Agreement, Turkey became obliged not to use military aid by the US without the consent of the US government. As Harris concluded, it was such a “vague formula” that could be exploited by both

⁵⁰⁶ Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp/UN, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 600

⁵⁰⁷ See Tel. Nos. 544, 606 (23 Dec. 1963), in NSCHF: Cyprus Crisis, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 58, see also Bölükbaşı, 1993, p. 512

⁵⁰⁸ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 54

⁵⁰⁹ Harris, p. 108

sides according to changing circumstances, and after the Turkish action, the US did not seriously criticize Turkey for the utilization of military equipment.⁵¹⁰

Therefore, the period between 1960 and 1963 for the US was the continuation of its pre-cautious, indirect and quiet strategy projected from the 1950s, which became more active, threatening and visible especially during 1963 incidents. The objective of American policy makers was to achieve a mutual solution and reduce the tension between the NATO members. It was obvious that the US aimed to refrain from directly engaging into the issue since any decision taken by the US would definitely disrupt the balance with its allies and alienate the other side. For this reason, therefore, though it became more active and visible, it still pushed NATO more to the forefront. In addition, while mentioning the conflicts on the island, the US policy makers mostly referred to NATO power and communist threat in their policy reports or recommendations, arguing that any conflict “could afford opportunities for expansion communist power in Cyprus, endanger Greek and Turkish Governments and seriously weaken NATO.”⁵¹¹

4.5 1964 events

4.5.1 The London Conference

December 1963 crisis and the failure to sustain peace on the island were followed by a joint peacekeeping force under British command, including the Greek, Turkish and British personnels, also accepted by the Cypriot government.⁵¹² Eventually, on

⁵¹⁰ Harris, p. 108

⁵¹¹ Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1–763, retrieved from FRUS, 1961-63, p. 540

⁵¹² Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>. The acceptance of Cyprus government, reported by Mr. R. Jackling, Acting United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 8, 1964: “The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has accepted an offer that the forces of the United

December 29, a ceasefire was introduced, and on December 30, a “green line” was established under the control of joint force.⁵¹³ These efforts paved the way for the London Conference that started on January 15 which would include also the two communities of Cyprus to discuss possible constitutional changes on the island. It was concluded by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom government, Duncan Sandys, on January 2,

I have tonight received from Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Küçük their acceptance of the offer of good offices of the British, Greek and Turkish Governments to help in the solution of the problems of Cyprus. For this purpose, a Conference of representatives of these three Governments and of the two communities will be convened in London at an early date.⁵¹⁴

As British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home declared on January 14, the joint peacekeeping force was a successful step since at least it enabled the parties to meet and discuss a possible solution in London.⁵¹⁵

As mentioned by Sandys in the opening address of the conference, Britain was

distressed to see feelings of growing enmity develop between the two racial communities, more especially since their two motherlands are among our oldest and most trusted friends. When the fighting began, we were filled with apprehension at the prospect of civil war and the possibility that Turkey and Greece might themselves be sucked into the conflict.⁵¹⁶

Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, stationed in Cyprus and placed under British command, should assist it in its effort to secure the preservation of cease-fire and the restoration of peace." Retrieved from HC Deb 14 January 1964 vol 687 p. 36, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/jan/14/cyprus-1>

⁵¹³ Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>

⁵¹⁴ HC Deb 14 January 1964 vol 687, p. 37, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/jan/14/cyprus-1>

⁵¹⁵ HC Deb 14 January 1964, vol 687, p. 33, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/jan/14/cyprus>

⁵¹⁶ HC Deb 16 January 1964 vol 687, p. 48, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1964/jan/16/london-conference-secretary-of-states>

Besides, he mentioned the purpose of the joint force arguing,

Britain cannot, of course, go on acting as policeman in Cyprus indefinitely; nor, I am sure would you wish her to do so. The Joint Force has a specific task to perform, namely to help separate the combatants and to hold the ring while a settlement is being worked out. Our action, has given Cyprus a breathing space, but that must be used for something more than breathing. It must be used with a sense of urgency to find an honorable and workable solution to the problems out of which the troubles arose.⁵¹⁷

Hence, he signaled for a long-term solution which could establish and sustain permanent peace on the island. Eventually, the conference and the following proposals aimed to create such a long-term solution.

As Bölükbaşı summarized, from the Greek-Cypriot perspective, a unitary state without any special right to the Turkish-Cypriots was required.⁵¹⁸ In addition, Turkish Cypriots should be given minority status and the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee should be abandoned.⁵¹⁹ On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots called for the establishment of Turkish cantons and the transfer of Turkish populations to these areas.⁵²⁰ For Denктаş, while it was certain that the state was abolished and thus the two communities, not the Republic of Cyprus, could represent the island⁵²¹, the only alternative for the future beyond cantons was partition.⁵²² As Denктаş mentioned in his memoirs, the Greek side blamed the

⁵¹⁷ HC Deb 16 January 1964 vol 687, p. 48, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1964/jan/16/london-conference-secretary-of-states>

⁵¹⁸ Tel. No.2822 (23 Jan.1964) in *NSCHF: Cyprus Crisis; Milliyet*, Istanbul, 2 Feb. 1964, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 62

⁵¹⁹ Crawshaw N., 1978, *the Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union With Greece*, London,Boston: G. Allen and Unwin, p.367, cited in Uslu, 2003, p. 26

⁵²⁰ Tel. No.2822 (23 Jan.1964) in *NSCHF: Cyprus Crisis; Milliyet*, Istanbul, 2 Feb. 1964, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 62

⁵²¹ Denктаş, 2000, pp. 284,285

⁵²² Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 62

Turkish Cypriots of “rising up against the state.”⁵²³ However, for him, the Greek purpose was to “purify” the island, as in the case of Crete.⁵²⁴ At the same time, it was recognized by Denktaş that Turkey, during December 1963 and January 1964, was not ready for a military action although the threat to intervene was always on the agenda.⁵²⁵

As explained by Sandys on February 17, the purpose of the London Conference was to introduce “a settlement through direct negotiation between the parties concerned...”⁵²⁶ Nevertheless, the conference did not create the desired solution for Cyprus. In fact, it was reported by David Ormsby Gore, the British Ambassador in the US, on January 24, that the situation in the London Conference was “black.”⁵²⁷ Sandys declared on February 17: “...it was agreed in principle by all of the parties at the conference that a more broadly based international peacekeeping force must be established as quickly as possible...”⁵²⁸ Obviously, there were differences concerning the type of such an international force which could be the NATO force as supported by Britain, Greece and Turkey, or a UN force which was supported by Makarios who called for the UN initiation without any concessions.⁵²⁹

⁵²³ Denktaş, 2000, p. 288

⁵²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 285

⁵²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 289

⁵²⁶ HC Deb 17 February 1964 vol 689, p. 840, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/feb/17/cyprus>

⁵²⁷ Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8, retrieved from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Editor: James E. Miller General Editor: David S. Patterson United States Government Printing Office Washington 2000, p. 1

⁵²⁸ HC Deb 17 February 1964 vol 689, p. 841, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/feb/17/cyprus>

⁵²⁹ HC Deb 17 February 1964 vol 689, p. 841, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/feb/17/cyprus>; See also Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>

While it was accepted by Gore that the negotiations in London were at stake, it was reported that the best alternative for the US was to sustain the talks.⁵³⁰ Accordingly, Ambassador Gore mentioned “the hatred of the British” by two communities on the island which was the main obstacle to introduce a British solution, and for him, the solution should be sought through internationalization of the issue, which obviously required either UN or NATO path.⁵³¹ Eventually, for the US, as President Johnson claimed, the solution should be found within NATO.⁵³² As reported on January 24, from the US perspective, a NATO discussion, rather than the UN, would be advantageous which might urge Turkey and Greece to cooperate.⁵³³

4.5.2 The British-American Proposal for an allied NATO peacekeeping force

Regarding the potential UN force, the US Under-Secretary of State, George Ball stated that the UN alternative was the worst one in that it might end with a peacekeeping force which included the Soviets and Yugoslavs, thus the force would be out of the US control.⁵³⁴ In addition, for him, a NATO solution was also inappropriate since the island was not a NATO territory.⁵³⁵ At the same time, Britain asked for the US participation to an allied force composed of NATO

⁵³⁰ Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 2

⁵³¹ Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ball, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m., Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 4, retrieved from FRUS 1964-68, pp. 2,3

⁵³² Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ball, January 25, 1964, 2:05 p.m., Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 4, retrieved from FRUS 1964-68, pp. 2,3

⁵³³ Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 1

⁵³⁴ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 4

⁵³⁵ *Ibid*

countries about which the US policy makers seemed suspicious and reluctant. As the President Johnson argued, there seemed nothing that the US could do which would end up in the US defeat.⁵³⁶ Therefore, the US path would be “more in diplomatic way” to bring the Greece and Turkey together.⁵³⁷

For President Johnson, the crisis on the island was such a danger that if the US “moved in and get into something”, the United States could not “get out of.”⁵³⁸ As a response to President’s skepticism, Ball concluded, “the United States should avoid becoming the mediator in Cyprus.”⁵³⁹ For him, “anyone who settles this [Cyprus issue] is going to come down hard on the Greeks” and thus “the United States should stay in the background.”⁵⁴⁰ Therefore, the US position was to provide minimum engagement into the issue which should be solved through joint NATO force.

With the ongoing skepticism, on January 28, Ball and President Johnson discussed providing a minimal US support within a part of NATO peacekeeping force.⁵⁴¹ As summarized by Ball, the majority of the allied force should be British, and the US would contribute with 1,200 men in addition to the equal contribution by Greece and Turkey.⁵⁴² Accordingly, the proposed force would serve “to promote pacific

⁵³⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 6

⁵³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 7

⁵³⁸ Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:35 p.m.?, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1, cited in FRUS, 1964-68, *editorial note*, p. 8

⁵³⁹ *Ibid*

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid*

⁵⁴¹ Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:35 p.m.?, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1, cited in FRUS, 1964-68, *editorial note*, p. 8

⁵⁴² Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 5

settlement of Cyprus issue”. However, for the US, it should be declared, in order to share the responsibility, that the force was not a NATO action but rather an “ad hoc response by group of Atlantic nations at request Government of Cyprus.”⁵⁴³ Accordingly, the force would be a multinational force from NATO countries which was believed to “maintain order in Cyprus by serving as a peace-keeping force to prevent a renewal of intercommunal strife.”⁵⁴⁴ While some concerns regarding military dimension of the force was discussed⁵⁴⁵, the US participation with 1,200 troops was recommended.⁵⁴⁶

Therefore, as highlighted by the US Department of State on January 29, the US aimed to avoid a UN-based solution for Cyprus issue. Rather, for the US, the allied force with the UK should proceed. On January 31, the proposal for allied force was introduced by the US and the UK to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, which called for a peacekeeping force in Cyprus including NATO members.⁵⁴⁷ However, while Turkey and Greece accepted the plan, Makarios rejected the proposal, and declared that he would recognize neither the allied force nor the London Conference since the proposed NATO force would undermine the sovereignty rights of the Republic of Cyprus, its independence and its foreign policy of non-alignment.⁵⁴⁸ In addition,

⁵⁴³ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 443

⁵⁴⁴ Discussion of the Joint Chief of Staff of US and UK, Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Top Secret. A covering memorandum is dated February 4, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 450

⁵⁴⁵ The document mentioned the concerns of Chief of Staffs of US and UK arguing that the force was undesirable for the United States since it might end in an occupation type force, such as in Korea, which in turn resulted in doubts about US action for the future problems. see Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Top Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 450

⁵⁴⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Top Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 450

⁵⁴⁷ FRUS, 1964-68, *footnote 3*, p. 11

⁵⁴⁸ Xydis, S.G., 1977, “Cyprus: What Kind of Problem” in Attalides, M.A. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on the Cyprus Problem*, Nicosia: Jus Cyprici Association, p. 26, cited in Uslu, 2003, p. 27

it was reported that the fear of Turkish intervention and the Soviet support for Greek Cypriots convinced Makarios not to support NATO or the US action.⁵⁴⁹ Thus from the Greek Cypriot perspective, there was “no need for NATO” since Soviets began to deal with the issue.⁵⁵⁰

As the US Embassy in Greece reported on February 10,

US should not put troops in Cyprus even as a minority component of an international force. The anti-American feeling in Cyprus stirred up by the Communists--and probably by Makarios himself--would tend to make our troops a special target.⁵⁵¹

However, the choice of not participating into a peacekeeping force would “alienate the Turks and tempt them to move unilaterally against Cyprus--which could start a Greco-Turkish war.”⁵⁵² Therefore, an international force without American participation was on the agenda of February 10 and 11 discussions. Nevertheless, as reported in the same document, Turkish side would be the major obstacle for such a proposal, since the US participation for Turkish policy makers was of significance.⁵⁵³

On February 17, Ball mentioned two alternatives for the US: first, to accept the UN peacekeeping; or, second, to call for peacekeeping force including only guarantor powers which was also supported by Ball.⁵⁵⁴ In his proposal, Ball stated that the entire extremist parties should be abandoned with a sufficiently big force which was

⁵⁴⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 449

⁵⁵⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 449

⁵⁵¹ National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 459

⁵⁵² *Ibid*

⁵⁵³ *Ibid*

⁵⁵⁴ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 462

“not a peacekeeping force” but an “army of occupation” which could only be provided by Guarantor powers.⁵⁵⁵ For him, peacekeeping force was unable to sustain the peace since it would not have the right to use force against extremists, for instance, the Greek-Cypriot police.⁵⁵⁶ For Ball, Turkish military action could be triggered if the UN took a pro-Makarios decision which also resulted in decreasing control of the West and increasing Soviet control.⁵⁵⁷ However, with his second alternative, the US would avoid any unilateral action, thus a joint action be conducted.⁵⁵⁸

For Ball, the current crisis in the region was “the most dangerous confrontation since the Cuba missile crisis of October 1962.”⁵⁵⁹ For him, the Cyprus issue represented a real danger for the US since, in case of a Turkish intervention to reintroduce the 1960 conditions, it was obvious that Greece would also intervene and a NATO conflict would emerge, which was more problematic than the domestic crisis of Cyprus.⁵⁶⁰ With a series of meetings with İnönü and Makarios, Ball persuaded İnönü about a NATO force without the US participation.⁵⁶¹ By this move, Turkey would not be considered as the troublemaker on the island.⁵⁶² However,

⁵⁵⁵ Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 463

⁵⁵⁶ Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138-1347, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 464

⁵⁵⁷ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 462

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid*

⁵⁵⁹ Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret, FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 463

⁵⁶⁰ Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138-1347, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 464

⁵⁶¹ Toker, M., 1969, *İsmet Paşayla On Yıl*, 1961-1964: Burcak Yayinlari, p. 116, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.70

⁵⁶² Uslu, 2003, p. 32

Makarios again rejected a NATO-led operation and called for the UN to guarantee the stability and peace on the island.⁵⁶³ On February 13, Makarios declared to the US officials that he would take the issue to the UN Security Council arguing that international force could be acceptable which would serve “to assist the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in restoring law and order and in bringing about a return to normal conditions.”⁵⁶⁴ The US-UK proposals were rejected by Makarios on February 15 and discussions over Cyprus issue at the UN Security Council followed the process.⁵⁶⁵ Nevertheless, for Komer, Cypriot government had no control on people on the island, and its main desire was to get the UN back-up to avoid Turkish military action which enabled extremists to kill more Turks.⁵⁶⁶ Similarly, Ball marked that during his visits to Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, he came to conclude that Makarios was “interested in other things than the creation of an international force.”⁵⁶⁷

4.5.3 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

It can be stated that thirteen points put forward by Makarios and the following Turkish reaction obliged for the UN diplomacy as the only feasible solution for the island. In parallel to trilateral efforts and the London Conference, the crisis was brought to the UN. As the British Permanent Representative to the UN stated,

⁵⁶³ Uslu, 2003, p. 30

⁵⁶⁴ Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1289-1292. Secret; Flash, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 460

⁵⁶⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, *footnote 3*, p. 32

⁵⁶⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 462

⁵⁶⁷ Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138-1347, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 464

the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have jointly requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a representative to act as a United Nations observer in Cyprus, whose role would be to observe the progress of the peace-making operation, and report on it to the Secretary-General.⁵⁶⁸

In fact, the UN Security Council was met after the complaint of the Greek Cypriot representative concerning, “Turkish aggression and intervention in internal affairs of Cyprus.”⁵⁶⁹ As stated by Sandys, Makarios considered the Turkish action in December as an act of aggression which should be condemned by the UN Security Council.⁵⁷⁰ Eventually, the meeting was held on December 27, and it was agreed on January 17 by all parties that Lieutenant-General Gyani was appointed as the UN observer in Cyprus.⁵⁷¹ Accordingly, his responsibility was to report “the progress of the peacemaking operation” on the island.⁵⁷² However, the reports of Gyani highlighted nothing but multiplicity of clashes between two communities in addition to the failure in governance and the fear of military intervention either by Turkey or Greece, all of which required a UN peacekeeping force.⁵⁷³

As examined by Bölükbaşı, throughout the December-January-February period, the violence continued and the Turkish Cypriots gradually left, or forced to leave their

⁵⁶⁸ HC Deb 14 January 1964 vol 687, p. 37, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/jan/14/cyprus-1>, see also Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>

⁵⁶⁹ Online source, Cyprus-UNFICYP Background, retrieved from <https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unficyp/unficypB.html>, see also Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>

⁵⁷⁰ HC Deb 17 February 1964 vol 689, p. 841, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/feb/17/cyprus>

⁵⁷¹ Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>

⁵⁷² *Ibid*

⁵⁷³ *Ibid*

posts in public service.⁵⁷⁴ Accordingly, as Purcell mentioned, it was declared by Küçük on January 5 that Turkish Cypriots would not return to their positions, and the only alternative remaining for the Turkish community was the partition of the island.⁵⁷⁵ In addition, on January 10, Küçük gave further details about the partition suggesting the 35th parallel as the dividing line.⁵⁷⁶ Similarly, the ongoing tension was explained by Denктаş, citing from Washington Post on February 17, 1964, which stated “Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide.”⁵⁷⁷

With the failure of the London Conference and the rejection of the UK-US allied force, it can be stated that the UN remained as the only option to establish order on the island. However, for Britain, the UN initiative would not establish a desired solution since as Sandys mentioned on February 17, “it could be interpreted as an accusation of aggressive intention against any of the Guarantor Powers or as overriding any of the three treaties concluded after Cyprus received her independence.”⁵⁷⁸ As Sandys argued, while the UK observed no solution in the UN meeting other than bringing countries which did not have any relation with or interest in the Cyprus issue, it was Makarios’ insistence on UN-based solution and the ongoing deadlock on the island which urged Britain to accept the UN action.⁵⁷⁹ The reason for the UK can be more clearly understood from Sandys’ statement:

⁵⁷⁴ Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 417

⁵⁷⁵ Purcell, pp. 334, 335

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 335

⁵⁷⁷ Denктаş, 1982, p. 40

⁵⁷⁸ HC Deb 17 February 1964 vol 689, pp. 841,842, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/feb/17/cyprus>

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 842,843

Britain is not only unable, but also unwilling, to bear indefinitely almost the whole burden of the peacekeeping operation, more especially if the two communities are not prepared to give us their full co-operation.⁵⁸⁰

Hence, as summarized by Sandys, through London Conference and the rejected allied force, the UK aimed to introduce a quick and urgent solution.⁵⁸¹ However, they all failed, and eventually, the conflict was brought into the UN agenda.

On February 15, both British and Greek Cypriots called for a UN Security Council meeting which would end with the UN resolution 186 (1964) which established 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus' (UNFICYP).⁵⁸² The resolution⁵⁸³ clearly warned concerned parties regarding their possible intervention, by stating, "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". In addition, the resolution reminded Makarios to sustain the peace not the crisis, by calling for the government of Cyprus "to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus."⁵⁸⁴ Most importantly, the resolution

recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus [with an objective of] preserving international peace and security...to prevent a recurrence of fighting...to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸⁰ HC Deb 17 February 1964 vol 689, p. 842, retrieved from <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/feb/17/cyprus>

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 844

⁵⁸² Online source, Cyprus-UNFICYP Background, retrieved from <https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unficyp/unficypB.html> ; see also Online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in "The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping," a United Nations publication, retrieved from <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history>

⁵⁸³ UN Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964, 186(1964)

⁵⁸⁴ UN Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964, 186(1964)

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid*

On March 4, 1964, the UN peacekeeping force was introduced with the consent of all parties. For İnönü, it was an acceptable move since after all, he had no intention to intervene and the peace force did not reject the Turkish right to intervene as introduced with the Treaty of Guarantee.⁵⁸⁶ For Makarios, a potential military attack by Turkey was prevented by the UN initiative rather than any NATO involvement, and the resolution meant the recognition of the “legality of the government of Cyprus.”⁵⁸⁷ However, when the establishment of the peace force was delayed, İnönü again played his part and declared that if attacks against the Turkish Cypriots did not stop, Turkey would conduct military intervention.⁵⁸⁸ İnönü’s decisive stance again resulted in success since it accelerated the establishment of the UN peace force which was ready on March 14. As the cabinet spokesman Dr. Ali İhsan Göğüş stated, Turkey “had provided urgent arrival of the UN peacekeeping force and precluded a massacre.”⁵⁸⁹

4.6 The American Position until the Establishment of UNFICYP

From the beginning of the London Conference, American policy makers argued that the talks would not result in mutual agreement since the Greek and Turkish Cypriots seemed too much divergent from each other.⁵⁹⁰ Accordingly, on January 16, the US politicians began to consider the advantages and disadvantages of a possible UN

⁵⁸⁶ Toker, p.111 cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.72; Uslu, 2003, p. 39

⁵⁸⁷ Bitsios, D.S., 1975, *Cyprus, the Vulnerable Republic*, Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, p. 155, cited in Uslu, 2003, p. 39

⁵⁸⁸ *Milliyet*, Istanbul, March 13, 1964; *Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, No. 1 (1964), p. 10, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.73

⁵⁸⁹ *Milliyet*, Istanbul, March 13, 1964, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 73

⁵⁹⁰ Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret. retrieved from Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Released by the Office of the Historian, Documents 438-480, United Nations and the Cyprus Crisis, doc. 438

initiative. However, the best alternative was still trilateral talks for the US. As it was reported on January 18 to the US Embassy in the UK, three guarantor countries should sustain their efforts to find a solution with the two Cypriot communities despite the possible failure in the London Conference.⁵⁹¹ Likewise, Komer reminded on February 5, “the more we keep talking, the less likelihood of violence.”⁵⁹²

Shifting from a stance which kept the US at the background of negotiations with indirect involvement via the UK and the UN, now there was an urgent need and necessity to become more active and direct, taking necessary initiative for the current state of the Cyprus issue. Robert Komer argued that the US had the major role to find a solution in Cyprus since it had the power or aid leverage to influence Greece and Turkey which was absent for the UK.⁵⁹³ As Komer stated on January 28, “dumping Cyprus into UN is worst solution because Communists and Afro-Asians will all buy in and force a settlement to our disadvantage and that of Greeks and Turks too. Only beneficiaries will be Makarios and the Communists.”⁵⁹⁴ Thus, it can be stated that it was this scenario that the US tried to avoid, and it was the reason why US could not refrain to act.

Starting from the 1950s, the US did not welcome the idea of appealing to the UN for a solution for the Cyprus issue. Before the issue was discussed in February, the US Department of State concluded that the UN provided a forum for the Cypriots

⁵⁹¹ Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1161-1162. Confidential. Drafted by Paul Jones and George Moffit (UNP); cleared in NEA, EUR, and UNP; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN as telegram 1879, which is the source text, and repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for TOPOL, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 439

⁵⁹² Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 451

⁵⁹³ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 443

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid*

through which they were supported by “communist friends.”⁵⁹⁵ It was reported on January 25 by the US mission to the UN that the UN force, if it was not controlled and conducted appropriately, would only lead to a Turkish military engagement.⁵⁹⁶ Accordingly, the Soviet control in the UN Security Council would mean that the potential peace force would be established if Makarios asked for it.⁵⁹⁷ As American Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson warned on January 30 that in case of a UN force, it would be almost impossible to exclude the USSR and Eastern Europeans.⁵⁹⁸ In addition, it was indicated that some latent problems, including the financial and functional structure and the composition of the force, could make the operation lead to unpredicted outcomes.⁵⁹⁹

As argued by Uslu, from the US perspective, the Cyprus issue should remain in the NATO framework in which the US could manage the discussions without any involvement of East or non-aligned countries.⁶⁰⁰ It was obvious that, from the American perspective, the issue could and should be solved within the NATO umbrella since, as reported by the US mission to the UN, the main objective of the US was to avoid a clash between NATO members which was an issue related to the general NATO interest in the region.⁶⁰¹ Besides, it was stated, “it would be easier

⁵⁹⁵ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Burdett and Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, USUN, DOD, and the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 40

⁵⁹⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority., retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 440

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid*

⁵⁹⁸ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 447

⁵⁹⁹ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 447

⁶⁰⁰ Uslu, 2003, p. 31

⁶⁰¹ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority., retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 440

restrain Turks and Greeks with force of NATO members than with UN or Commonwealth group.”⁶⁰²

In fact, American policy was to keep the balance between Greece and Turkey, and particularly after 1963 crisis, to prevent Turkey from using military force. The tension of the Turkish camp was still considered as controllable, at least before the UN initiation in February. It was then reported by the Department of State that İnönü would act in parallel with the US actions, and he would surely inform the US before taking any action towards Cyprus.⁶⁰³ As the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Fraser Wilkins proposed to the Department of State, the ongoing tension on the island which might trigger Turkish unilateral intervention, and in turn might result in Turkish-Greco War, could be avoided only by persuading both sides in acting peacefully and being in cooperation with the 1960 Constitution.⁶⁰⁴ Similarly, during the UN discussions, it was reported: “US and Turkey should act in closest harmony during period UN consideration and all parties, especially the UK, should make maximum effort keep situation calm.”⁶⁰⁵ It can be stated that this diplomatic approach and the minimal direct show of power and engagement as mentioned above were the permanent features of the US foreign policy in Cyprus for the period.

⁶⁰² Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority., retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 440

⁶⁰³ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Athens and repeated to London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 20

⁶⁰⁴ Department of State, Central Files POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 24

⁶⁰⁵ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Athens and repeated to London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 30

The atmosphere on the island was clearly recognized by the American policy makers. As reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus on February 13, the fighting between the Greek and Turkish sides became the “daily occurrence” of the island which became a “battlefield.”⁶⁰⁶ In addition, the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Fraser Wilkins, warned Makarios to settle an international peace force; however, as he argued, he had doubts about Makarios’ real intentions and his will to act.⁶⁰⁷ Similarly, Ball considered that through a UN-based solution, Makarios’ intention was to prevent Turkish intervention in order to pursue his own agenda of massacring Turks, which could not be permitted by the US.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore, while the US recognized the deteriorating circumstances on the island, it was the American policy not to support one side in order not to alienate the other, and thus create a balance between NATO members to avoid a potential Turkish-Greek war.

For the American stance and objectives in this period, the telegram sent from the US Embassy in Greece to the US Department of State on February 27, is an important document which summarized and criticized the US position.⁶⁰⁹ As it was mentioned, the US objective had been to prevent any conflict between Turkey and Greece, hence to protect NATO power in the region.⁶¹⁰ Eventually, any Turkish unilateral intervention should be avoided which could trigger a Greece counter-attack.⁶¹¹ To this end, and in order not to alienate one side, the US refrained from taking sides or

⁶⁰⁶ Department of State, Central Files POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 22

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 23

⁶⁰⁸ Ball, pp. 344-345; Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.70

⁶⁰⁹ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN. Relayed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, pp. 42,43

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 42

⁶¹¹ *Ibid*

affecting the final solution directly.⁶¹² However, these aspects of the US objective and method were criticized. Yet, when the issue was taken to the UN with increasing calls for “self-determination” from the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots became more audible, the present situation could urge the US to change its attitude, which meant abandoning the status quo established by the 1959 treaties and the Constitution.⁶¹³

As the US President stated in his letter to British Prime Minister Douglas-Home on February 18, the US and the UK should

prevent the use of the Council to scrap the guarantee treaty. I hope we can also obtain a satisfactory resolution for the creation of an international force... I fear that an international force will not be landed in Cyprus quickly.⁶¹⁴

President Johnson also indicated that Turkish action could be inevitable if the ongoing tension and killings continued.⁶¹⁵ Therefore, for Johnson, beyond the UN efforts, a trilateral meeting among guarantor powers was required “to change the attitude of the two communities.”⁶¹⁶ Eventually, he concluded the letter by restating his belief and support “to avoid the fearful consequences of a Greek-Turkish War.”⁶¹⁷

On February 20, in his letter to Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, President Johnson reintroduced the American stance concerning Cyprus:

⁶¹² Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN. Relayed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 42

⁶¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 42, 43

⁶¹⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Komer for the White House. Repeated to Ankara and Athens, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 31

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid*

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid*

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 32

we [the United States] are neither favoring Turkey at the expense of Greece nor vice versa. Our interest is—as it has been since 1947—that of supporting the security and well-being of two close NATO allies. As we see it, the common need of Greece, Turkey, the US, and the UK to stick together is paramount.⁶¹⁸

As Ball stated during his media briefings, the US did not have any desire to impose a solution which should be introduced by concerned parties.⁶¹⁹ Therefore, it can be concluded from Johnson's statements that the US continued its quite or indirect policy, always reserving its capability of asserting power towards Cyprus. He highlighted, "the United States has no position on terms of any final settlement. What we all need immediately is the reestablishment of law and order so that the parties can proceed to the search for solutions acceptable to all."⁶²⁰

4.7 The Turkish Position until the Establishment of UNFICYP

As the continuation of its politics in 1950s, Turkey sustained its relative detachment at least until 1963 events and Makarios' thirteen points. Therefore, the Cyprus issue did not constitute a discord for the strategic American-Turkish alliance. However, with the December clashes and the increased strife between the communities, Turkey opted for threatening its allies by intervening militarily. Such a policy was the first attempt of Turkey to deter, yet, unrealistic and undoable.

In this period, the US influence on the attempts at a possible solution was not enough for Turkish policy makers. Obviously, the US engagement would be beneficial for Turkey since Turkish policy makers hoped the US to persuade Greek-

⁶¹⁸ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus. Secret, Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Papandreou, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 33

⁶¹⁹ Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138-1347, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 464

⁶²⁰ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus. Secret, Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Papandreou, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 33

Cypriots to end their claims and atrocities.⁶²¹ For İnönü, the US should be enlightened about the issues on the island, and he argued, “once the US understood the facts, I could not imagine that it would ignore its responsibilities.”⁶²² A similar critique was introduced on February 15 by Komer who considered the whole Cyprus crisis as “poor example of crisis diplomacy.”⁶²³ For him, the US stance was transformed from “let the UK do it” to “sending troops” and then it turned to “getting us out of the peacekeeping force.”⁶²⁴ He marked that the US showed an unsuccessful conduct of relations which would end in unsatisfactory solution proposed by the UN, since the US was losing the control of the issue.⁶²⁵ Similarly, he reported Ball’s observations to President Johnson which claimed a possible Greek-Turkish war with a “50/50” possibility, if the US could not act promptly.⁶²⁶

From the Turkish perspective, İnönü’s statements necessitating for a military intervention can be considered as his policy to create international awareness and particularly urge the US to take action. As mentioned by Denктаş in his memoirs, the internationalization of the issue was of vital significance for İnönü on the way to find a sustainable solution. Accordingly, İnönü considered that the Cyprus issue was a marathon which would be won by the patient party, and for him, he could solve the crisis through internationalization of the problem which required time and patience.⁶²⁷ Thus, he indirectly accepted the inappropriateness of military action and

⁶²¹ Uslu, 2003, p. 31

⁶²² *Cumhuriyet*, İstanbul, Jan 26, 1964; *Ulus*, Ankara, Jan 27, 1964, cited in Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 64

⁶²³ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 461

⁶²⁴ *Ibid*

⁶²⁵ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, UN and Cyprus, doc. 461

⁶²⁶ *Ibid*, doc. 462

⁶²⁷ Denктаş, 2000, p. 290

supported a diplomatic path, although he made use of intervention threat as an influential policy tool. As in the case of December 1963 crisis, before the UK-US proposal of NATO force, İnönü took another initiative, and he asked for concrete guarantees for the Turkish-Cypriots from the US; otherwise, he declared, Turkey would conduct a unilateral intervention.⁶²⁸ As the US Ambassador to Turkey, Raymond Hare, reported on February 11, the US could only participate in a peacekeeping force if Makarios accepted.⁶²⁹ In the end, although the joint force was ignored by Makarios, İnönü's gamble again triggered an international action and can be regarded as a successful policy, from İnönü's perspective. For Bölükbaşı, İnönü considered the US intervention as a useful policy tool in the domestic sphere to resist the pressures from pro-intervention circles.⁶³⁰ In other words, for Bölükbaşı, as it is mentioned in the following chapter regarding the Johnson Letter, İnönü blamed the US for its passivity⁶³¹, which was, for İnönü, the absence of the US direct support to Turkey. Hence, İnönü tried to show the US as being responsible for any failure on the island, thus finding a "scapegoat" against potential criticisms.⁶³²

4.8 Conclusion

The chapter reveals that the Cyprus issue until the establishment of UNFICYP did not create a major discord between Turkey and the United States. However, the US position towards the island began to be more active, still indirect and precautionary

⁶²⁸ Ball, p. 341

⁶²⁹ Department of State, Central Files POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 21

⁶³⁰ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 75

⁶³¹ *Ibid*, p. 76

⁶³² from the interview with Süha Bölükbaşı, on April 12, 2018.

behind the screen. It is relatively active compared to the 1950s, since the US tried to solve the issue directly within the NATO umbrella.

From the Turkish perspective, a solution without the United States was not acceptable. For Turkish policy makers, an international agreement or a solution concerning the Cyprus issue should be supported by the US. However, from the US perspective, a solution might be introduced even without any reference to Turkey if such an agreement was accepted by the concerned parties without disrupting the US interests in the region.

To conclude, the Cyprus issue still did not create a major obstacle in the American-Turkish alliance created in the 1940s. The positions of two countries were still parallel in that Turkey could not pursue separate policy alternatives other than designed by the US. Besides, the US continued and even increased its involvement which began to be more direct. However, the alliance was naturally established on the superior position of the US, which was to influence Turkey by all means. Even though there were several military intervention threats by Turkey during the late 1963 and early 1964, most of them remained in discourse and only minor jet flights were conducted that did not constitute a problem for the United States. Hence, the chapter concludes that while Turkey and the US began to pursue more direct and aggressive policies, the American impact in Turkish politics concerning the Cyprus issue continued to be a reality. The shift from harmony to disharmony would be more visible in March-June period.

CHAPTER V

THE CYPRUS ISSUE UNTIL JUNE 1964 AND THE FAILURE OF THE HARMONY: THE JOHNSON LETTER

This chapter will investigate the events between March and June 1964. The outlook of the island and the positions of the concerned parties are of vital significance for this chapter. The period is crucial since it reflects the process that brought the US-Turkish alliance to the lowest point within the context of Cyprus issue until 1964, with President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister İnönü, namely the Johnson letter. Therefore, the chapter covers the period starting from the establishment of UNFICYP to the Johnson letter. In fact, the letter was a telegram sent by the US President Johnson to the Ambassador Raymond Hare to be delivered to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü. Accordingly, the letter begins with Johnson's questioning of the Turkish decision to intervene to the island.⁶³³ However, the discourse and the style of the document were much more similar to an ultimatum. Obviously the letter was an aggressive policy move by the United States that aimed to stop Turkey's unilateral intervention by openly urging and threatening Turkey for the first time concerning its policies towards Cyprus.

⁶³³ Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister Inonu. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, pp. 107, 108

5.1 The General Atmosphere in Cyprus

The solution efforts under the UN and its peace force established on March 14 were not helpful in establishing a desired outcome for the ongoing issue on the island. The process was followed by the appointment of the UN mediator Sakari Tuomioja on March 25. As described by Tuomioja, a mediator should function

for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security.⁶³⁴

To understand the dynamics on the island, it would be appropriate to mention the reports of Tuomioja, and Galo Plaza, the next UN mediator, who discussed the positions of concerned parties and explained the atmosphere on the island.⁶³⁵ In his report in June, Tuomioja highlighted the lack of normal conditions in Cyprus which could be suitable for any agreed settlement by mentioning the military units with and without uniforms of both communities which were influential throughout the island.⁶³⁶ As he observed, the national identities of both communities as projection of nationalism established in their mother lands, namely Turkey and Greece, were much more recognizable since the number of the Turkish and Greek flags was more than the Cypriot flag in divided regions.⁶³⁷

The UN force did not end the ongoing crisis on the island, and the parties were determined to pursue their own solutions. As reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus

⁶³⁴ Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 2

⁶³⁵ The report of Galo Plazo was issued in March 26, 1965

⁶³⁶ Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, *First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 5

⁶³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 6

on April, Tuomioja defined the process as a “total impasse” with “no light at the end of tunnel” since the parties were so “rigid” about their own solutions.⁶³⁸ Also, in his report in June, Tuomioja introduced a pessimist view arguing, “it has not been possible for the two sides to find sufficient common ground to provide a basis for discussion.”⁶³⁹ For him, the solutions supported by the two sides were “irreconcilable.”⁶⁴⁰ Accordingly, the period witnessed the Greek Cypriot insistence on “unfettered independence” and the Turkish Cypriot insistence on “federation.” Obviously, while any kind of *enosis* would be rejected by the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot leaders⁶⁴¹, Makarios considered the federation equal to the partition of the island.⁶⁴²

As reported in August, the country was already divided. Accordingly, the communities constructed “green lines”, firstly physical barriers including road-blocs, trenches, sandbags, and alike. Secondly the psychological line through which the larger community dominated the smaller was definitive and already visible.⁶⁴³ It was reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus that there were around 50,000 Turkish Cypriots and 6,000 Greek Cypriots, both being forcibly displaced until the

⁶³⁸ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 74

⁶³⁹ Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, *First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 33

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid*

⁶⁴¹ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 73

⁶⁴² *Ibid*, p. 74

⁶⁴³ Advisors of Tuomioja, 28 August 1964, *Draft Report to The Secretary-General by The United Nations Mediator on Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, pp. 5, 6

establishment of the UNFICYP.⁶⁴⁴ Therefore, the process of displacement affected the Turkish Cypriots in comparatively more than it did the Greek Cypriots, thus the former being by far the most aggrieved one. In fact, the Cyprus government was active without the Turkish Cypriot representatives, and it continued to introduce policies concerning the formation of a National Guard, conscription law, military equipment, taxation and unified municipalities.⁶⁴⁵ As Plaza accepted, the government of Cyprus was in the hands of the Greek Cypriot majority which controlled the armed forces of the Republic with the support of Greece and other states.⁶⁴⁶ As Bölükbaşı stated in his analysis, the conscription law, meaning the establishment of a Greek Cypriot army, the Turkish Cypriots being totally ignored, was the final point that brought the issue to a deadlock, and thus paved the way for the Johnson letter as an immediate, urgent and direct warning against the Turkish threat for intervention in June.⁶⁴⁷

5.2 The Turkish Position of “federation”

A new policy alternative for both the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot politicians emerged after the establishment of the UNFICYP. From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, the defense and protection were the primary objectives since they considered their situation as being kept under siege by the Greek Cypriots.⁶⁴⁸ To this

⁶⁴⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 55

⁶⁴⁵ Plaza, Galo, March 26, 1965, United Nations Security Council, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, p. 18

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 42

⁶⁴⁷ Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 74

⁶⁴⁸ Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, *First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 7

end, for the Turkish Cypriots, the solution would be “a geographical basis for the state of affairs created by the Zurich and London agreements.”⁶⁴⁹ As Tuomioja explained, the Turkish Cypriot position was firstly to create two separate states and thus partition of the island physically as Greek and Turkish parts.⁶⁵⁰ However, it was understood that such an argument could not be accepted by the Greek and the Greek Cypriot politicians, and eventually, the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot discourse began to insist on a Federal State with two communities, thus renouncing the most radical kind of separation (*taksim*).⁶⁵¹ Accordingly, if such a federal republic was to be created, any kind of partition or union with another state would be prohibited.⁶⁵² However, as reported by Tuomioja, the Turkish discourse did not convince the Greek Cypriots that the Federal State would not lead to the “annexation by Turkey of the Turkish area of Cyprus.”⁶⁵³

The main difference of the Turkish position from Greeks can be regarded as the recognition of the Turkish Cypriots as a “separate community [rather than a] minority.”⁶⁵⁴ As Plaza mentioned, the Turkish community was considered to be a minority group which had no difference from the other minority groups in other countries.⁶⁵⁵ However, as Küçük repeated to Tuomioja, the Turkish Cypriots were

⁶⁴⁹ Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, *First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 30

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid*

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp. 30-32, 34

⁶⁵² *Ibid*, p. 31

⁶⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 35

⁶⁵⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 73

⁶⁵⁵ Plaza, Galo, March 26, 1965, United Nations Security Council, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, p. 24

not a mere minority but a distinct community with their own rights.⁶⁵⁶ In fact, this issue has been the ongoing struggle of the Turkish Cypriots since the 1950s. Besides, the Greek Cypriots perceived the Turkish community as rebels against the Republic⁶⁵⁷ who were supported by the courage and spirit generated by a potential military intervention from Turkey. As Tuomioja stated, the Greek Cypriot justification for the enactment of law in May to establish a National Guard through conscription was directly related with their ongoing perception of the Turkish military threat.⁶⁵⁸

5.3 The Greek Cypriot Position of “unfettered independence”

From the Greek Cypriot perspective, the country needed “completely new foundations.”⁶⁵⁹ As summarized by Tuomioja, Makarios’ objective was to create a

completely independent, unitary, integral, sovereign state unfettered by any treaties and with all powers emanating from the people who would be entitled to decide the future of their country on the basis of the internationally accepted principle of self-determination.⁶⁶⁰

As repeated by Plaza, Makarios’ desire was to achieve the “unfettered independence” which meant getting rid of the “limitations” imposed in 1960.⁶⁶¹ Accordingly, Makarios stated in May 13 that the 1959 Agreements and the 1960 Constitution were nothing but imposition on the Greek Cypriots without the free

⁶⁵⁶ Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, *First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 29

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 9

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid*

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 27

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 28

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 32

will of the people.⁶⁶² However, as Tuomioja observed, the arguments of the Greek Cypriots did not directly call for *enosis*, but obviously their discourse was open for a possible move towards *enosis*.⁶⁶³ Accordingly, “the right to decide the future of the country based on self-determination rule” could be interpreted as “if the majority wished,” either *enosis* or *taksim* could be the result.⁶⁶⁴

Makarios’ perspective towards the UNFICYP and the mediator Tuomioja was reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus arguing that, for Makarios, the success of the mediator would depend on “whether Turkish Cypriots would be willing to return to their villages and not insist on some form of partition or federation.”⁶⁶⁵ However, as the US Department of State highlighted on March 28, Makarios sustained his policy to replace the Turkish-allocated ministers by appointing the Greek Cypriot ones and declared that the Turkish Cypriots were “insurgents” against the government of Cyprus.⁶⁶⁶ In addition, Makarios offered government support to the Turkish Cypriots who wished to go to Turkey rather than returning to their homes and positions in the government.⁶⁶⁷ Therefore, the US Department of State reported that Makarios’ tactic was to sustain the Turkish Cypriot boycott since he realized that the possible return of the Turkish officers would abolish the already established

⁶⁶² Tuomioja, Sakari, 1964, June 8, *First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus*, retrieved from United Nations Archives, <https://search.archives.un.org/tuomioja-report-2>, p. 26

⁶⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 35

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid*

⁶⁶⁵ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 55

⁶⁶⁶ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Gordon D. King; cleared by NEA, UNP, and BNA; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Athens, London, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, pp. 56,57

⁶⁶⁷ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 55

system during their absence, and thus he would get rid of the pressure of the Vice-President Küçük.⁶⁶⁸

On May 21, it was claimed by the US Ambassador in Cyprus, Taylor Belcher, that Makarios knew that the mediation efforts of the UN would fail and he continued to use the UN as a “forum to press their case” which included “an independent, unitary state, majority control, minority safeguards and right of self-determination.”⁶⁶⁹ For Belcher, if such conditions were achieved, it meant nothing but the continuation of the Cyprus problem in an altered state in which the Turkish Cypriot community would continue to oppose the system.⁶⁷⁰ In addition, for Belcher, such a proposal would be supported by the Soviet bloc countries in the UN, and it would be “harmful to our [American] overall interests here and elsewhere for the US to oppose such a resolution or abstain.”⁶⁷¹ Obviously, if the US decided to support the Greek Cypriot position, it would need a reasonable policy including security promises for the Turkish Cypriots for not disturbing the relations with Turkey.⁶⁷²

5.4 The American Position towards possible solutions

From the US perspective, the requirement of a “permanent” and “quick” solution was reported to the US Embassy in Cyprus on April 1.⁶⁷³ As a response, rather than

⁶⁶⁸ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 56

⁶⁶⁹ Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 67 D 412, Letters from Post—1964. Secret; Official- Informal, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 96

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid*

⁶⁷¹ Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 67 D 412, Letters from Post—1964. Secret; Official- Informal, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, pp. 96,97

⁶⁷² *Ibid*, p. 97

⁶⁷³ FRUS, 1964-68, *footnote 2*, p. 59

“patchwork solutions”, “once-for-all” solution respecting the “self-determination of majority rule” was proposed which claimed that *enosis*, or at least an “associate” status would be imposed on Cyprus with guarantees for minorities.⁶⁷⁴ With such a status, it was believed that the Turkish concerns about their security regarding the communist threat on the island could be avoided since Cyprus would become a NATO territory.⁶⁷⁵ The advantages of *enosis* or “associated” status were summarized as

...eliminating security concerns of the UK, Turkey and ourselves [the United States]... reduce danger of further growth of Communism...weaken Soviet ability exploit issue in Greece... give us friendly government with which to negotiate satisfactory status for our communications facilities.⁶⁷⁶

Similarly, it was cabled by the US embassies in Greece and Turkey on April 8 that the only possible solution for Cyprus issue would be independence or *enosis* which would necessitate for political concessions to Turkey.⁶⁷⁷ However, what was important in the process of solution was that the damage to the Turkish prestige should be at minimum in order to win the Turkish cooperation.⁶⁷⁸ Therefore, for the US Embassy, extending an “olive branch” to Turkey should be the policy priority of the Greek government in order to find a middle way and a favorable solution.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from 1964-68, p. 58

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid*

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 59

⁶⁷⁷ FRUS, 1964-68, *footnote 6*, p. 59

⁶⁷⁸ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia and Thessaloniki, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 63

⁶⁷⁹ FRUS 1964-68, *footnote 2*, p. 65

On May 4, it was recommended by Belcher that Turkey should recognize its weakening position on the island and “cut its losses by reasonable compromise.”⁶⁸⁰ In addition, for him, the Turkish government should respond to the “honest efforts” of Tuomioja to find a middle way.⁶⁸¹ More decisive stance was introduced by George Ball on May 10, declaring that the US and NATO should consider *enosis* as a possible final solution since it meant that the territory would become NATO territory and a NATO government would dominate the island, not a “wolf in priest’s clothing.”⁶⁸²

Obviously, it was mentioned that a possible *enosis* would come with “some kind of territorial concessions by Greece.”⁶⁸³ However, George Ball introduced his concerns about the mediator’s efforts who might propose “a quasi-federal system under which five or six areas with predominant Turkish populations” and “a long-term UN observer and international participation in or supervision of the court system.”⁶⁸⁴ In fact, Ball considered that Turkish policy makers and Küçük would not accept these conditions, while Greece and Makarios might agree.⁶⁸⁵ For him, the result would be the confrontation of NATO members with the UN mediator.⁶⁸⁶ Therefore, for Ball, if Tuomioja needed to introduce a report it should not be a “non-agreed” one, rather,

⁶⁸⁰ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 85

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*

⁶⁸² Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 87

⁶⁸³ *Ibid*

⁶⁸⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO. Secretary Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 12–14, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 86

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid*

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid*

it would be better to declare the inability of creating a solution for the time being.⁶⁸⁷ Obviously, the worst scenario would be a report by Tuomioja supporting Makarios and further isolating the Turkish community.⁶⁸⁸

As reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus on May 7, Tuomioja sustained his negotiations with the Turkish and Greek governments in order to create a warmer atmosphere.⁶⁸⁹ Accordingly, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot insistence on federation by separating the Greek and Turkish communities was reintroduced.⁶⁹⁰ Similar to the US position, Tuomioja claimed that a proposal should focus on “majority rule” of Greek Cypriots with “greater protection of Turkish Cypriots.”⁶⁹¹ However, on May 18, it was reported by the US Embassy in Greece that the Greek Cypriot demands of “unfettered independence”, which was *enosis*, did not include any possible territorial concessions to Turkey since these concessions would not be accepted by any Greek government for which it meant “the partition of Greece.”⁶⁹² Similarly, as reported by the US Embassy in Greece on June 4, the Greek government would not support the Turkish position of partition or federation, but only the Lausanne Treaty type concessions to the Turkish minority in Cyprus could be the agenda.⁶⁹³

⁶⁸⁷ Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO. Secretary Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 12–14, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 87

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 88

⁶⁸⁹ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 84

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid*

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid*

⁶⁹² Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 93

⁶⁹³ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to the Department of State, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 106

5.5 The American Position towards the Turkish Policy of Intervention

On April 11, it was reported by George Ball that the Turkish administration was unhappy about the recent events on the island, particularly Makarios' attempts to alienate the Turkish community, and the Greek attitude not to condemn Makarios' "bloody actions."⁶⁹⁴ In addition, position of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus created another crisis among the parties since Turkey blamed the Greek and Cypriot government to cooperate against the Turkish presence on the island.⁶⁹⁵ At the same time, the US Department of State argued that the Greek Cypriot forces and their actions towards the Turkish community were the main obstacles for the UN mission since the ongoing fighting on the island was mostly the result of the Greek Cypriot campaign against the Turkish Cypriots.⁶⁹⁶

It can be stated that after the establishment of the UN peace force, American-Turkish negotiations were based on calming down the Turkish policy makers in order that they would not conduct a military operation. Therefore, the period was full of bilateral talks during which the United States tried to get a guarantee from the Turkish politicians and find a middle way in accordance with the UN efforts. Accordingly, the first serious Turkish threat to take military action towards Cyprus was introduced by Turkish President Cevdet Sunalp. His warnings were reported by the US Military Attaché in Turkey on April 16, claiming that if the US did not support Turkey, Turkey would push for the solution, as he stated, "I tell you that there will be action—maybe tomorrow, maybe next week, maybe next month, but

⁶⁹⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Helseth, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Nicosia and USUN and repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Oslo, and Athens, retrieved from FRUS 1964-68, p. 67

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid*

⁶⁹⁶ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum and Moffitt, cleared by Jernegan and Sisco, and approved by Sisco. Also sent to Ankara and Nicosia and repeated to London, Athens, Stockholm, Dublin, Ottawa, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and to USDOCOSouth(Naples) for POLAD, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, pp. 69,70

there will be action.”⁶⁹⁷ Similarly, in his analysis of the island, Tuomioja considered that the Turkish military threat was real and serious, and he warned the Greek Cypriots about the determination and strength of the Turkish military which could intervene and dominate the island within 2 days.⁶⁹⁸ For the mediator, the role of the US was to “keep persuading Greece and Turkey not to go to war.”⁶⁹⁹

Furthermore, two important events increased the anger of Turkish policy makers. Firstly, as the US Department of State declared on April 28, the situation on the island was getting worse due to the Greek Cypriot attack on St. Hilarion, and if the UN force did not stop the movement, it might trigger widespread violence which might end with a civil war.⁷⁰⁰ Eventually, the process could be followed by the Turkish intervention if the UN did not prove any success.⁷⁰¹ Secondly, the hostage crisis, in other words, the increasing number of deaths among the Turkish Cypriots who were taken as hostages, increased the tension on the island.⁷⁰² As the US Department of State warned the UN, acts of the Greek Cypriots might trigger the

⁶⁹⁷ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to DIA, USCINCEUR, USAREUR, USDOCOSouth (Naples), USDOCOLandSouth (Izmir), Nicosia, Athens, and the Department of State, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 72

⁶⁹⁸ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 73

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 74

⁷⁰⁰ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Sisco and cleared by Jernegan. Also sent to Athens and Nicosia and repeated to Ankara, London, Ottawa, and Paris, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 75

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid*

⁷⁰² Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Moffit; cleared by Jernegan, Buffum, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 94

Turkish Cypriot response and eventually it would further contribute to the Turkish position and facilitate a military intervention by the Turkish government.⁷⁰³

On April 29, a meeting was held between President Johnson and Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin during which President appreciated İnönü's statesmanship and the Turkish patience against ongoing crisis.⁷⁰⁴ For Johnson, Turkey should "give the UN a little more time to work out a solution" since the primary objective was still to avoid a war over Cyprus.⁷⁰⁵ Accordingly, he repeatedly mentioned the US efforts to sustain the UN force and his desire to avoid any fighting.⁷⁰⁶ For Erkin, Turkey "must avoid that the bill should now be paid by Turkey"⁷⁰⁷, and he claimed that since the UN was on the island, it was "not possible for us [Turkey] to intervene anymore."⁷⁰⁸ However, as a response to President Johnson's questions regarding the Turkish preparations, Erkin stated "we [Turkey] have to be prepared."⁷⁰⁹ The meeting was concluded with Erkin's statements that Turkey would not intervene into Cyprus and with Johnson's message to İnönü, as he argued "I haven't got a better friend... We are always going to be stout allies."⁷¹⁰

Nevertheless, these aforementioned wishes and vague arguments were followed by further warnings from Turkey. On May 10, the US Under Secretary of State George

⁷⁰³ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Moffit; cleared by Jernegan, Buffum, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 94

⁷⁰⁴ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Turkey, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Komer, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 76

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid*

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 77

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 76

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 77

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid*

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid*

Ball claimed that the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots might get out of control since they began to lose their belief in the UN efforts.⁷¹¹ Similarly, on May 11, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin warned the US about the deteriorating situation in Cyprus and claimed that the Turkish intervention might become inevitable.⁷¹² In addition, he asked for the US support in case of such an intervention, however, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk replied, the intervention was the “last resort” for Cyprus which could only bring about catastrophe but not a solution.⁷¹³ As Rusk commented about the conversation with Erkin, Turkey did not seem so serious to take imminent military action towards Cyprus.⁷¹⁴

Much more serious warnings to the US Ambassador Raymond Hare were introduced by İnönü on May 12. Firstly, İnönü conveyed his sadness about the recent attitude of the US Government favoring *enosis*, and secondly, for him, US did not fully understand the Turkish concerns and their determination in possible intervention.⁷¹⁵ From İnönü’s perspective, Makarios was nothing but a “crafty schemer” who would not behave for the sake of the Turkish community.⁷¹⁶ Finally, he argued that Turkey might utilize military force for not invading the whole island but a part of it.⁷¹⁷ However, Hare reminded him of the possible consequences of

⁷¹¹ Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 87

⁷¹² Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 89

⁷¹³ *Ibid*

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid*

⁷¹⁵ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 91

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid*

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid*

such a scenario including the Greek reaction and Greek-Turkish clash and even a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey.⁷¹⁸

Another factor contributing to both Turkish anger and American attention to Cyprus was the ongoing arms procurement reported by the US Embassy in Cyprus on May 22.⁷¹⁹ For Ambassador Belcher, it was clear that Makarios had contacts with the Soviets concerning arms purchasing via Greek politicians.⁷²⁰ From the American perspective, increasing relations of Makarios with Soviets could be regarded as the main reason for the American concerns towards Cyprus. On the one hand, the argument of the Government of Cyprus was protection against a potential Turkish military intervention.⁷²¹ However, as Belcher mentioned on May 28, while Makarios' search for security assistance could be acceptable, the Soviet influence in Cyprus was more than the arms purchasing issue.⁷²² Accordingly, there were some other agreements with the Soviets and East Germany including the Aeroflot agreement and air agreement, all of which were regarded as "minor developments" by Makarios.⁷²³

On the other hand concerning the Turkish-Greek tension, Makarios' insistence on arms purchasing would facilitate the Turkish response. As mentioned by Belcher, there were ongoing Turkish shipments to increase the number of personnel and arms for the Turkish Cypriots. Eventually the clash between two communities seemed

⁷¹⁸ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 91

⁷¹⁹ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, USUN, and Cairo, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, pp. 98, 99

⁷²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 98

⁷²¹ *Ibid*

⁷²² Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN, retrieved from 1964-68, p. 101

⁷²³ *Ibid*

inevitable unless the UN brought Turkey, Greece and Cyprus together to end the arms trafficking.⁷²⁴ At the same time, for the US policy makers, NATO embargo towards Turkey and Greece was on the agenda, but it was reported on May 26 that embargo would bring nothing but deterioration of relations with these countries, failing to prevent Makarios' purchase of arms.⁷²⁵

5.6 The American Response to Turkey's Threats to Intervene: the Johnson Letter

In early June, the discussions among the Turkish and American policy makers turned to be warnings by Turkey and calls for patience from the United States regarding a military intervention. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Erkin restated the Turkish perspective arguing that the ongoing crisis on the island and Makarios' insistence on his objectives stemmed from the absence of the American and British sufficient pressure and activity.⁷²⁶ Besides, for Erkin, the alternatives for Turkey were the "federation" or "double enosis" (partition), and no concessions beyond these options were acceptable, such as taking a small island from Greece in return for *enosis*.⁷²⁷ In his talks with Raymond Hare on June 4, Erkin claimed that intervention was an option for the Turkish government.⁷²⁸ At the same time, Vice-President of Cyprus, Küçük, called for a Turkish intervention on June 5 or 6 as a

⁷²⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, USUN, and Cairo, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 99

⁷²⁵ FRUS, 1964-68, *footnote 3*, p. 99

⁷²⁶ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 12:19 p.m. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris. Passed to USUN and to U.S. Intelligence Board agencies, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 103

⁷²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 104

⁷²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 103

response to Makarios' denial for cabinet meeting to discuss the issue with the Turkish Cypriot officials.⁷²⁹

On June 4, upon the seriousness of the Turkish policy makers, Raymond Hare was instructed to express the US opposition to military intervention and to convince Prime Minister İnönü.⁷³⁰ Accordingly, Hare was obliged to “use all arguments in your [Hare's] arsenal to pull them [Turkey] back from any such decision [military intervention] and to insist upon consultation.”⁷³¹ For President Johnson, a full consultation with the allies was required before such a decision was taken by the Turkish government.⁷³² However, the Turkish insistence seemed to be more realistic and firmer than the earlier threats, and on June 5, the Turkish decision to intervene was cabled by the US Embassy in Turkey.⁷³³ Similar to İnönü's position introduced in May, it was reported that Turkish intention was to conduct a military operation not for the whole island but for the part of the island in order to “reduce problem to manageable proportions.”⁷³⁴

The most serious warning from the US which can be interpreted as an open threat against Turkey was introduced by President Johnson to the Prime Minister İnönü on June 5. Throughout the Cyprus issue, the United States did not utilize such a discourse, and the US did not even take the risk of alienating and threatening Turkey

⁷²⁹ FRUS, 1964-68, *footnote 2*, p. 104

⁷³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 105

⁷³¹ *Ibid*

⁷³² Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken and approved in S on June 15, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 105

⁷³³ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis; Noform. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 106

⁷³⁴ Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis; Noform. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 106

with its policies towards Cyprus. As Harris mentioned, the idea to alienate and deter Turkey from a possible intervention would be more beneficial for the US foreign policy makers compared to a Turkish military action.⁷³⁵ Therefore, the letter certainly represented a milestone both for American foreign policy towards Cyprus and for the future of the American-Turkish relationship which would be beyond the scope of this study. Specifically, the letter can be considered as the balancing tool for the US or a preemptive action to sustain the balance between Turkey and Greece. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the main purpose of the letter was not to introduce a solution for Cyprus but to avoid any further crisis as in parallel with earlier US policies.

Johnson's letter was the expression of three main issues. Firstly, the letter started with the US position towards Turkey's decision to occupy some parts of Cyprus.⁷³⁶ Repeating his position more aggressively, Johnson urged Turkey to "accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States" before taking such a decision.⁷³⁷ President Johnson also reminded İnönü about July 1947 Agreement in which Turkey and the US agreed upon the necessities and obligations of both countries concerning military issues. Accordingly, he recalled the Article IV of the agreement which stated that Turkey could use the military assistance of the US only under the US consent.⁷³⁸ Therefore, for any Turkish intervention, President Johnson stated, "United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment..."⁷³⁹

⁷³⁵ Harris, p. 115

⁷³⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister İnönü. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 107

⁷³⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 107, 108

⁷³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 109

⁷³⁹ *Ibid*

Secondly, Johnson highlighted the possible outcome of Turkish action which would only facilitate partition rather than maintaining the Treaty of Guarantee.⁷⁴⁰ Besides, for the US, the right to take unilateral action did not emerge since the consultation among guarantor powers could still be conducted.⁷⁴¹ President Johnson also highlighted the UN membership of Turkey and its obligations towards the ongoing efforts of the UN mediator Tuomioja.⁷⁴² For President Johnson, Turkey should be patient to observe the results of the force, since any Turkish intervention would “defy and destroy” the chance of “reasonable and peaceful” settlement.⁷⁴³

Thirdly, Johnson reminded the obligations of Turkey to NATO alliance. Initially, he claimed that a Turkish intervention might lead to Greek-Turkish confrontation which was “literally unthinkable.”⁷⁴⁴ However, what is crucial here is that Johnson openly questioned the very essence of the relationship between Turkey and US, which was cooperation against the Soviet threat. Accordingly, he reminded Turkey that a military intervention might bring forth Soviet involvement, and as President threatened,

NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴⁰ Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister Inonu. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 108

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid*

⁷⁴² *Ibid*, pp. 108, 109

⁷⁴³ *Ibid*

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 108

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid*

Accordingly, President Johnson warned İnönü about “wider hostilities” and “unpredictable consequences” of a unilateral intervention by Turkey.⁷⁴⁶ Hence, for Johnson, such a move might trigger not only a Greek-Turkish war, but also a chaotic atmosphere which would be beyond the bilateral relations of Turkey and the United States, thus might endanger the Cold War strategy of the US by threatening the cohesion of the western alliance against the USSR.⁷⁴⁷

Before concluding his letter, President Johnson aimed to soften his discourse by mentioning the ongoing US affinity towards Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁴⁸ As he restated the US perspective,

we [the United States] considered you [Turkey] as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people... You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution...⁷⁴⁹

Eventually, he referred to the Cyprus issue as ‘one of the most complex problems on earth’, and for him, it was the reason why US could not solve the issue until then.⁷⁵⁰ As he guaranteed, the US would not support any solution which endangered the interests of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁵¹ In the final paragraph of the letter, President Johnson asked İnönü to delay any decision concerning Cyprus and visit the USA to discuss the issue by stating “...you and I carry a very heavy

⁷⁴⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister İnönü. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 110

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid*

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 109

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid*

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 109, 110

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid*

responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem.”⁷⁵²

All in all, the letter was a clear message to Turkey about not acting without the approval of the US. In addition, President Johnson continued to support the UN efforts in creating a peaceful solution. In fact, within the context of the letter, the UN and NATO were the two actors which were utilized by the US to convince and deter Turkey. President Johnson repeated the US position with a harsher tone which accounted for avoiding any Greek-Turkish confrontation. The issue was transformed into a more general problem which would deteriorate not only the Greek and Turkish relations but also the American-Turkish relations. It would also deteriorate the overall Turkish territorial security. Accordingly, the Johnson letter represented the American deterrence not to defend Turkey against a possible Soviet intervention. Therefore, the Cyprus issue transformed the nature of the bilateral relations since the very essence of the American-Turkish cooperation which was the solidarity against Soviet aggression was for the first time questioned by a US President. With the words of McGhee, the letter was nothing but a major irritant in bilateral relations.⁷⁵³

5.7 The Turkish Position until the Johnson Letter

The UN mediation and UNFICYP did not create a viable solution for Cyprus at least until June 1964. A new policy for Turkey, “federation”, was introduced as an extension of the Turkish behavior to adjust its policies with the US, at least not to alienate itself in a possible solution. However, especially the US stance favoring a

⁷⁵² Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister Inonu. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House, retrieved from FRUS, 1964-68, p. 110

⁷⁵³ McGhee, p. 162

kind of *enosis* contributed to the Turkish strategy of deterring with military action. Accordingly, in June, Turkey signaled its most serious attempt to occupy a part of the island. Eventually, it was avoided by the most serious letter from the US government, “the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb”⁷⁵⁴ within the context of the Cyprus issue.

At the same time, the letter represented the failure of the Turkish equation regarding the Turkish, American and NATO interests which were considered to be parallel in the 1950s, thus yielding frustration. Therefore, the USA as the superpower of the alliance dictated its will and deterred Turkey to avoid any conflict within the alliance. Obviously, such an action by Turkey would be a disaster for general American Cold War policy which was to contain Soviets through alliance links.

5.8 The American Position until the Johnson Letter

Regarding the American foreign policy and particularly the positions of the Turkish and the Greek politicians, it can be stated that the United States continued its main strategy to avoid any war between Greece and Turkey, triggered by the Cyprus issue. It is safe to argue that the US policy makers did not seriously try to solve the crisis but instead they tried to calm down the parties in order to prevent a wider crisis. Specifically, the US stance to support a kind of *enosis* can be interpreted as its policy to choose Greece instead of Makarios. As mentioned by Sönmezoğlu, American interests would not welcome an independent Cyprus with Makarios as the President.⁷⁵⁵ Rather, a NATO territory, which was possible with *enosis*, was the best solution for the US interests. In other words, Makarios-Soviet relationship, referred by the US sources, facilitated a US position favoring *enosis* which meant NATO

⁷⁵⁴ Ball, p. 350

⁷⁵⁵ Sönmezoğlu, 2000, p. 190

domination on the island. Therefore, again, the United States did not seek for a Cypriot solution but an American solution imposed on Cyprus.

Another dimension of the US foreign policy can be the discussion about its being 'passive' or not as argued by İnönü in May 1964. It should be stated that the term passive could not define the American stance in this period since the United States aimed only to calm down the Turkish attempt for direct military action and balance Greek and Turkish demands. Therefore, the American position was not in parallel with the Turkish perspective but it does not make the US position passive. Instead, by avoiding any confrontation and particularly the Turkish intervention in June, the US policy makers proved their precautious and indirect involvement which ended up revealing their final active stance. Such a stance enabled them to convince Turkey and alter the overall destiny of the island. As Ball concluded in his memoirs, the US diplomacy towards Cyprus in 1964 was a success since it prevented not only the Turkish invasion and the Turkish-Greek war but also the Soviet intervention to the eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁵⁶ In addition, no American soldier or equipment was exploited in accomplishing these tasks which were, for Ball, the real success of the US diplomacy.⁷⁵⁷

With the Johnson letter, there are various interpretations of the US foreign policy and its objectives. For instance, Sönmezoğlu considered the overall attitude of the US as a reluctant interest which emerged from a possible confrontation between Turkey and Greece, and Soviet intervention in case of a power vacuum in the region.⁷⁵⁸ For him, the letter was nothing but the result of reluctant US diplomacy and its careless consequence.⁷⁵⁹ In addition, the discussion about the US stance

⁷⁵⁶ Ball, p. 359

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid*

⁷⁵⁸ Sönmezoğlu, 2016, p. 82

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid*

whether it supported the Greek or Turkish positions throughout the issue seemed inappropriate since, if the Johnson letter was considered, the US stance was to maximize its interests. Therefore, as in the case of the 1950s, American position should be interpreted as choosing the best possible scenario which would avoid war between NATO members. Obviously, within the context of June 1964, the best alternative for the US was to avoid the Turkish intervention with or without supporting the Greek position.

As examined by Ball, the Cyprus issue, especially after 1963 events, acquired new dimensions for the US foreign policy since Makarios began to appeal nonaligned countries and increased dialogue with Moscow which could bring the Soviets into the issue.⁷⁶⁰ At least, in 1964, it can be stated that *enosis* or any kind of unification with Greece were not supported by the US whether they were the fair or rightful solutions, rather, a cost-benefit calculation always dominated the preferences of the US policy makers, and supporting *enosis* was the best alternative for the US for that matter. Accordingly, the American choice of *enosis* would enable a Cyprus within Greece without Makarios which would become a NATO territory. Therefore, American interests called for a Makarios-free island which could be controlled via Greece. As Sönmezoğlu analyzed the relations, he defined the Johnson letter and the American stance as one of the most appropriate examples of a Realpolitik which sought to maximize national interests in case of a disagreement among the members of an alliance.⁷⁶¹

5.9 Conclusion

The chapter displays that between March and June 1964, the American-Turkish harmony and concordance starting from the 1940s witnessed its weakest period.

⁷⁶⁰ Ball, p. 338

⁷⁶¹ Sönmezoğlu, 2000, p. 189

While Turkey still tried to offer and create policy alternatives for the Cyprus issue, as in the case in the 1950s, it was nothing but a futile effort for not being alienated from a possible solution. At the same time, the US sustained its efforts to balance the parties in order not to create a further crisis from the Cyprus issue. Yet, the atmosphere in the island and the Makarios factor convinced the US to favor *enosis*, a move that increased restlessness among the Turkish who began to call for intervention against such a threat for their presence on the island.

It can be concluded that the Johnson letter was a choice between two scenarios: Turkish intervention vs. alienation of Turkey. Accordingly, the US chose the second one by threatening Turkey with an ‘ultimatum-like’ letter. At the same time, the US attitude was in line with its Cold War strategy, ‘deterrence’, which aimed to manipulate the behavior of the other state through generating fear and terror. Thus, the US aimed to exploit the Turkish fear from the USSR and its continuous fear to be abandoned by the west and the US. Therefore, it was the US interests that avoided Turkey from intervening since the intervention would bring a catastrophe for the US and NATO alliance, hence leading it to obscurity and chaos with its Cold War strategy.

The Turkish attitude to call for military intervention can be discussed whether it was a gamble by İnönü or a mere discourse to convince the US about the Turkish intentions. The chapter, however, depicts that the Turkish insistence on a military solution was enough to take the US attention. Thus, the Turkish discourse was reacted by an American response with which the US questioned the very essence of the partnership established on basis of cooperation against the USSR.

To conclude, the Johnson letter was the US show of power to deter Turkey and protect the American interests concerning the Cyprus issue. The chapter reveals that the Cyprus issue became a crisis that threatened the American-Turkish harmony. With the Johnson letter, not only the Turkish position towards the Cyprus issue but also the overall dynamics of the American-Turkish alliance were questioned by the

US. Similarly, as in the case of the 1950s, Cyprus continued to be an arena for the Turkish and American policy makers in which the US dictated its will, always behind the screen until the Johnson letter. With the letter, however, it was depicted that Turkey could not pursue any policy without the US approval and consent. In other words, a policy shift in Turkey to act unilaterally triggered an unexpected outcome which would also be the cornerstone of the bilateral relations for the future.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed the dynamics that shaped the US and Turkish positions concerning the Cyprus issue until 1964 Johnson letter. The objective of the study is to discuss whether there was a harmony or a discord between the US and Turkey in their policies towards the issue. To that end, mostly the primary sources are examined to reveal reliable and factual data. While the study mentioned about the nature of the strategic alliance between Turkey and the US by referring the events before 1949, the purpose of the study is to examine the period between 1949 and 1964, starting from the initial stance towards Cyprus and ending with a letter about which another study should be conducted. Obviously, the date 1964 represented a turning point not only for the island but also for the alliance between Turkey and the US. Starting from December 1963, it was clear that the Republic of Cyprus would not function properly, and the crisis in the island entered into a new phase which increased the strife between the Greek and Turkish communities.

The thesis concludes that the dynamics of the American-Turkish alliance, which was emerged as a balancing act based on cooperation against a common threat, the USSR, its cohesiveness and harmony revealed itself in two countries' positions towards the Cyprus issue until 1964.

The harmonious nature of the alliance and the positions of Turkey and the US are considered to be the heritage of the strategic alliance established in the 1940s.

Accordingly, until 1964, the alliance was valid in that Turkey did not accept any solution without the US support or involvement. For Turkey, the interests of the US and Turkey were still parallel. At the same time, the US considered Turkey as one of the responsible states which had legal rights on the island. Hence, for any solution, Turkey should be taken into account.

The study reveals that harmony between Turkish and American positions gradually shifted towards disharmony in 1964. The period witnessed a policy shift both in Turkish and American stances which was concluded with the final American move, the Johnson letter. Accordingly, the dynamics on the island, particularly Makarios, firstly his attempts to change the constitution, and secondly the increasing cooperation between Makarios and the Soviets urged both Turkey and the US to show more direct and active stance. For Turkey, the ongoing crisis necessitated for military action. Starting from December 1963, Turkey called for unilateral action to stop the violence and to convince the US to show more direct stance favoring the Turkish position. However, the peace attempts and UNFICYP did not create the desired outcome for Turkey. Besides, for the US, a new approach towards the island was required. Accordingly, firstly by supporting NATO force instead of UNFICYP, the US began to pursue more active and direct stance. Secondly, by supporting *enosis* or a kind of associate status for Turkey, the US for the first time openly and directly took side concerning the issue. The reason, for such a shift was the urgent need to take action concerning the island due to Makarios-Soviet relations which threatened the overall Cold War mentality of the US. The choice to support *enosis* could be interpreted as the US preference of Cyprus within Greece without Makarios instead of an independent Cyprus with Makarios. In other words, *enosis* would enable the US to control the island via Greece, thus making the region a NATO territory, and avoiding a possible Soviet intervention. Obviously, the result was further disharmony between the US and Turkey.

To sum up, disharmony in 1964 was the result of Turkish and American policy shifts all of which became more aggressive and active. The main reason of their new stances was Makarios, his relations with Soviets and the increasing tension on the island which was the result of his attempts to change the structure of the Republic. The final outcome of the process was the US direct response to Turkey, the Johnson letter, which avoided the Turkish military action by questioning and threatening Turkey and the essence of the alliance established in the 1940s. Accordingly, the thesis considers the letter as an American reaction to Turkey which tried to pursue unilateral policy without the US approval and consent. It was the exhibition of deterrence policy of the US and as an indicator of the US objectives within the context of the alliance and the Cyprus issue during which the US sought to avoid any policy which was not in line with the US interests in the region.

The chapters of the study aim to examine both the nature of the American-Turkish cooperation and the phases of the Cyprus issue in a chronological way to understand whether harmony or disharmony dominated the positions of the US and Turkey. To that end, the second chapter discussed the dynamics of the American-Turkish alliance, how it emerged and how these two countries perceived each other. Accordingly, the American Cold War strategies and Turkish military and economic requirements were highlighted which naturally established the cooperation between Turkey and the USA. Particularly, the Soviet threat brought these two countries together, thus constituting a common threat for the countries. It was the period that the alliance experienced its heydays, and for the study, the heritage of the strategic alliance revealed itself in the positions of these two countries during the Cyprus issue.

The third chapter discussed the emergence of the Cyprus issue, how it evolved until the foundation the Republic and how Turkey and the US perceived the issue. The objective of the chapter was to reveal the continuation of harmony in the alliance concerning the Cyprus issue. Although the period was full of negotiations and

policy changes, the alliance and cooperation were still valid between Turkey and the US. Particularly, until 1955, Turkey and the US supported the British dominance in the island. Until 1960, while there were policy alternatives introduced by Turkey, no major discord existed. For the chapter, the Turkish objective was to find a true policy which did not alienate Turkey from the final decision. In addition, for the US, the objective was to balance the desires of its NATO allies through supporting negotiations without openly taking side. In the end, the Republic of Cyprus was established as a mutually agreed solution: the US managed to preserve the togetherness of NATO alliance and keep the region under its control with three Guarantor Powers of the island, and Turkey managed to take part in the final solution thus legally became a Guarantor state for the island.

The fourth chapter focused on the failure on the island, particularly the attempts to change the constitution by Makarios, and the Turkish and American positions until the establishment of UNFICYP. In this period, Makarios emerged as the common threat for both countries. While Turkey and the US supported the existing constitution and no major discord existed for the alliance, the period can be considered as the emergence of the unrest and disharmony both for the island and for the American-Turkish cooperation. Accordingly, the Turkish intervention threats and American approach to keep the doors open for any change in the constitution were the harbingers of disharmony which would be more visible in 1964 March-June period.

The fifth chapter depicted the shift from harmony to disharmony, and particularly discussed the reason behind the discord between Turkey and the US. The chapter focused on Turkish and American positions in solving the crisis in the island and questioned the March-June period during which the alliance witnessed the weakest point. As concluded by the thesis, the policy shift in American and Turkish positions, which stemmed from the dynamics of the island, triggered the discord

within the alliance, and the result was the Johnson letter which further alienated Turkey and initiated a new phase for the alliance.

In the light of findings and discussions in the chapters, the study introduces some conclusions for Turkish and American positions and methods towards the Cyprus issue. First of all, from the US perspective, the objectives remained the same throughout the Cyprus issue, which were in line with American Cold War strategies. These objectives were to preserve NATO coherence in the region, support mutual agreement between parties and balance the desires of its NATO allies. Therefore, for the US, the island represented a test case within the Cold War during which the island should not create further chaos for the US and NATO alliance. For the study, it was the permanent objective of the US strategy towards Cyprus.

Secondly, concerning the method of the US, until 1964, the study revealed that US approach was 'indirect' and 'precautious' since the US did not take sides but always remained as a balancing factor. It sometimes seemed to support Turkish sometimes Greek and sometimes the British positions. With such an approach it controlled and even manipulated the dynamics on the island and prevented undesirable outcome for its permanent objectives. However, between December 1963 and June 1964, the US strategy experienced a gradual shift from indirect to direct involvement. It started with the US search for NATO solution rather than UN peace force and continued with its support for *enosis* for a Makarios-free island, and ended with its final move, the Johnson letter which was the most direct involvement that openly threatened a party on the island for the first time.

For Turkey, the study revealed that the main objective until 1960 was to take part in the final solution and not to be left alone and abandoned by the west. To that end, Turkey did not and could not pursue unilateral policies concerning the Cyprus issue. After 1960, the Turkish objective was to preserve the rights of Turkey and the Turkish community on the island and to convince the US to support the Turkish position.

Concerning the method of Turkey throughout the issue, especially before the establishment of the Republic, Turkey pursued a flexible stance by introducing various policy alternatives. The variety in Turkish discourse, yet, did not reflect the reality since Turkey mostly pursued parallel policies with the US. Between December 1963 and June 1964, the Turkish stance became more aggressive, and intervention threats dominated the policy agenda of Turkey. In fact, the first Turkish attempt to act unilaterally, without the US approval and consent, created an unexpected response from the US which questioned and threatened the overall dynamics of the alliance.

All in all, the thesis examines the objectives and approaches in Turkish and American positions towards the Cyprus issue until the Johnson letter and concludes that the alliance did not experience any major discord until 1964. The positions of two countries were harmonious; however, it shifted from harmony to disharmony in 1964, with the increasing unrest in the island, with the US stance to support *enosis*, and with the Turkish stance to repeat its calls for intervention. The result was the Johnson letter which signified the end of harmony and a new page for the alliance. Obviously, the letter would change the nature of the alliance or at least the Turkish mind-set which considered the Turkish interests mostly in parallel to the American ones.

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A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez 1949-1964 yılları arasındaki Türkiye ve ABD'nin Kıbrıs meselesiyle ilgili tutumunu, kararlarını ve bu iki ülkenin adaya karşı politik duruşunu incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, ABD ve Türkiye'nin 1964 Johnson mektubuna kadar geçen sürede Kıbrıs meselesi özelinde birbiriyle uyumlu politikalar izleyip izlemediğini, ve ittifakın herhangi bir anlaşmazlık veya uyumsuzluğa tanık olup olmadığını sorgulamaktadır. Bu tez, 1964 yılına kadar Amerikan-Türk ittifakının Kıbrıs meselesi çerçevesinde önemli bir kırılma veya sorun yaşamadığını, iki ülkenin politikalarının uyumlu bir şekilde geliştiğini göstermektedir. Ancak, 1964 yılında adadaki dinamikler, özellikle Makarios faktörü, iki devletin politikalarının değişmesine neden olmuştur. Aralık 1963 yılında başlayan bu değişim iki ülkenin politikalarının daha doğrudan ve agresif bir nitelik kazanmasına sebep olmuş, Amerika'nın *enosisi* desteklemesi ve Türkiye'nin de adaya askeri müdahale konusunda ısrarcı olması iki ülke arasındaki en önemli uyumsuzluk olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu süreç 1964 Haziran ayında Başkan Johnson'ın Başbakan İsmet İnönü'ye yazdığı mektupla noktalanmış; Amerika ilk defa Kıbrıs meselesiyle ilgili bu denli net ve kesin bir kararla Türkiye'nin askeri müdahalesini önlemiştir. O halde, bu tez hem ayrı ayrı Türkiye ve Amerika'nın 1964 yılına kadar Kıbrıs meselesiyle ilgili amaçlarını, methodlarını ve tutumlarını inceler, hem de bu iki devletin politikalarındaki ve ittifaktaki uyumu ve uyumsuzluğu sorgular.

Tez her ne kadar 1949 yılından başlasa da öncesinden de bahseder. İkinci bölüm Türk-Amerikan ittifakının nasıl ve neden ortaya çıktığını, ittifakın temelinde hangi unsurların olduğunu tartışmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde Kıbrıs meselesinin ortaya çıkışı, Türk ve Amerikan çözüm önerileri ve bu iki devletin meseleye bakış açısı irdelenmiştir. 1960 yılı itibariyle kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne kadar ortaya atılan

farklı çözüm önerileri ve farklı istekler bu bölümde incelenmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde yeni kurulan cumhuriyetin ömrünün neden uzun sürmediği ve özellikle 1963 yılı boyunca ve 1964 başlarında artan çatışmalar tartışılmıştır. Bu olaylar karşısında Amerikan ve Türk politikalarının nasıl geliştiği, hangi tezleri savunduğu incelenmiştir. Bu dönem bir anlamda iki ülke arasındaki uyumsuzluğun başladığı dönem olarak görülebilir. Ancak asıl uyumsuzluk 1964 yılında Amerikan ve Türk tutumunun değişmesiyle meydana gelecektir. Beşinci bölüm Johnson mektubuyla biten bu süreci incelemektedir. Makarios'un ortak tehdit olarak algılandığı bu dönemde Türk ve Amerikan politikacıları daha agresif ve doğrudan politikalar izlemiş sonucunda da 1964 yılına kadar süren uyum yerini anlaşmazlık ve uyumsuzluğa bırakmıştır.

Soğuk Savaş yıllarının ilk yıllarına, yani İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın hemen sonrasında Amerikan-Türk yakınlaşmasını anlamak için bu iki devletin ayrı ayrı politikalarına, isteklerine ve amaçlarına bakmak gerekir. Bu dönemde ilk önce Amerikan Soğuk Savaş stratejisini ve ittifak kavramını sorgulamak gerekmektedir. Genel olarak Amerika'nın çevreleme ve caydırma politikaları Soğuk Savaş'ın temelini oluşturmaktadır. Sovyetler Birliği ve komünizmin yayılmasını engellemeyi hedefleyen ABD, Soğuk Savaş boyunca bu amaç doğrultusunda hareket etmiştir. ABD'ye göre Türkiye'nin önemi hem coğrafi olarak hem de stratejik olarak hayatidir. Aynı yıllarda, Sovyetler Birliği'nin toprak taleplerine maruz kalan Türkiye için ABD ve Batı doğal bir müttefik olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu birliktelik iki taraf için de faydalı olan stratejik bir ittifak olarak adlandırılabilir. Türkiye'nin tutumu aslında bir dengeleme eylemi olarak düşünülebilir; bu denge yakındaki süper güce karşı uzaktaki süper gücü kullanmak, veya Walt'un dengeleme davranışı olarak adlandırdığı, ortak tehdite karşı oluşturulan ittifak olarak görülebilir. Gerçekten de Sovyetler Birliği hem Türkiye'yi hem de ABD'yi tehdit eden ortak düşman olarak algılanmıştır. O halde Amerikan-Türk ittifakının da temelini bu unsur oluşturmaktadır. Aynı zamanda Amerikan Soğuk Savaş stratejileri ve bu stratejilerin Türkiye tarafından kabulü ittifakı güçlendirmiştir. Son olarak

Türkiye'nin askeri ve ekonomik kaygıları bir anlamda onu ABD'ye bağılı ve mecbur hale getirmiştir. Bu dönem Amerikan-Türk ittifakındaki uyumun en üst düzeyde olduđu hatta bölgedeki Amerikan ve NATO çıkarlarının Türk çıkarlarıyla eş deđer olduğunun düşünöldüğü yıllardır. Türkiye bu ittifakla Sovyet tehditinden kurtulmuş, Truman Doktrini ve NATO üyeliđi ile iyice Batı'nın neferi durumuna gelmiştir. Bu ittifakta dikkat çeken nokta Türkiye'nin Amerika'ya olan ihtiyacı ve bağılılıđının Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye olan bağılılıđından daha fazla olmasıdır. Türkiye ve Amerika eşit iki müttelik deđil, Amerika daha baskın Türkiye ise daha çekinik rolde kalmak durumundadır. Bu sonuç dönemin şartlarının getirdiđi ve Türkiye'nin de ekonomik ve askeri olarak tercih etmek durumunda kaldığı bir pozisyon olarak görölebilir.

Üçüncü bölümün amacı 1940'larda kurulan bu uyumlu ittifakın Kıbrıs meselesine yansımalarını görmek ve Kıbrıs meselesinin nasıl şekillendiđini incelemektir. Bölüm, cumhuriyetin kuruluşuna kadar Kıbrıs için üretilen senaryoları ve Amerikan, Türk ve İngiliz politikalarını açıklamayı amaçlar. Ada cođrafı olarak Akdeniz'de oldukça önemli bir yere sahiptir. Özellikle Sođuk Savaş yıllarında dünyanın her tarafında olduđu gibi Kıbrıs ve çevresinde de iki kutbun çekişmesi olasıdır. ABD'nin ve ondan önce İngiltere'nin adaya olan ilgisi adanın hem Orta Dođu hem de Akdeniz için kilit bir pozisyonda olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Özellikle adanın olası bir Türk-Yunan çatışmasına neden olma potansiyeli, yani NATO ittifakı arasında çatışma yaratabilecek bir cođrafya olması Amerika'nın göz ardı edebileceđi bir durum deđildir. 1950'lilerin başından itibaren Amerika'nın tutumu bu çatışmayı önlemek ve karşılıklı anlayışla ortak bir çözüm yolu bulmak için tarafları biraraya getirebilmek olmuştur. NATO ittifakının güney kanadının güvenliđi adanın kaderine bağılıdır. Olası bir kriz durumunda ortaya çıkabilecek Sovyet müdahalesi Sođuk Savaş yıllarında Amerika'nın engellemeye çalıştığı ilk unsurdur. Bu amaç dođrultusunda Amerika Kıbrıs'a yönelik tedbirli ve dolaylı bir politika takip etmiştir. 1950'li yılların başında İngiliz argümanını destekleyen Amerika adanın hakimiyetinin İngiltere'de olduğunu savunmuş olası bir deđişikliđin

ancak ortak bir kararla alınabileceğini belirtmiştir. Kıbrıs Cumhuriyet'i kuruluncaya kadar Amerika hiçbir tarafın çözüm önerisine doğrudan destek vermemiş her zaman tarafların biraraya gelerek herkesin kabul edeceği bir çözüm bulunması gerektiğini belirtmiştir. Bu dönemde Amerika için Kıbrıs, adadaki İngiliz üslerinin varlığıyla birlikte, askeri ve stratejik olarak Akdeniz ve Orta Doğu'ya yönelik operasyonlarda kullanılabilir oldukça değerli bir üstür. Bu üsün korunması Batı için hayattır. Bir başka deyişle, ada için her çözüm önerisi Amerika için kabul edilebilir. Fakat tek koşul Amerika'nın çıkarlarının ve NATO'nun birlikteliğinin zedelenmemesidir. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin ve Makarios'un *taksim* ve *enosis* iddiaları öne çıkmıştır. Amerika için ikisi de kabul edilebilir fikirlerdir, ama tek şart bu çözüm önerilerinin taraflarca kabul edilmesi ve Amerikan çıkarlarına ters düşmemesidir. O halde, Amerika'nın önemseydiği ilk unsur adayla ilgili çözüm değil adanın yol açabileceği Türk-Yunan gerilimi ve dolayısıyla NATO birlikteliğinin sarsılmasıdır. Bu süreç Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasıyla tamamlanmıştır. Cumhuriyet aslında Amerikan dış politikası açısından başarı olarak görülebilir. Sonuçta bu yeni devlet bütün tarafların ortak rızasıyla kurulmuş ve üç Garantör devletle de adanın güvenliği ve sistemin teminatı sağlanmıştır. Amerika için bu sistem adanın dolaylı olarak NATO kontrolünde olması anlamına gelmektedir. Böylece olası bir Sovyet müdahalesi önlenmiş, bölgedeki NATO üstünlüğü sağlanmış ve Türk-Yunan gerginliği de kısa vadede sonlanmış.

Türkiye açısından Kıbrıs meselesi farklı safhalar ve farklı görüşler içermektedir. Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kuruluncaya kadar Türk politikacılar farklı ve birbiriyle çelişen tutumları sırayla savunmuşlar, bir anlamda Kıbrıs hakkında tutarlı bir tavır sergileyememişlerdir. Türkiye'nin ilk görüşü Kıbrıs'ı İngiltere'nin bir iç sorunu olarak görmek ve adadaki statükonun devamını savunmaktır. İkinci görüşü, İngiltere'nin adayı terk etmesi durumunda adanın eski sahibine yani Türkiye'ye geri verilmesi fikridir. Üçüncü görüş, 1956'dan 1958 yılına kadar savunulan *taksim* tezidir. Son olarak, bağımsız Kıbrıs fikri 1959 yılında Türkiye tarafından desteklenmiş ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kurulmuştur. Bu süreçte Türkiye söylem olarak

kimi zaman kendiyile çelişmiş, kimi zaman da hangi politikayı takip edeceğine karar verememiştir. Bu tutum Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs konusundaki esnekliği olarak görülebilir. Aynı zamanda, bu esneklik Türkiye'nin Amerika ve İngiltereyle uyumlu bir politika izleme amacıyla ortaya çıkan bir davranış olarak da yorumlanabilir. Bu dönemde Türkiye için asıl amaç olası bir çözümde hukuki olarak çözümün bir parçası olabilmektir. Bir başka deyişle, Kıbrıs meselesinde Batı tarafından dışlanmamak Türkiye'nin ilk amacıdır.

Üçüncü bölüm Amerika-Türkiye ittifakı açısından değerlendirilecek olursa 1960'a kadar farklı çözüm önerileri ve farklı görüşlerin olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Fakat, ittifak önemli bir anlaşmazlığa ve uyumsuzluğa henüz şahit olmamıştır. Sonuç olarak Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti hem Amerika'nın NATO müttefiklerinin istekleri dengelemesi açısından hem de Türkiye'nin kendisini adayla doğrudan sorumlu devlet olarak kabul ettirmesi açısından bir başarıdır. Öyleyse, 1940'larda kurulan stratejik ittifak ve ittifak içindeki uyum 1960 yılına gelindiğinde halen geçerliliğini korumaktadır.

Dördüncü bölüm, üçüncü bölümün sonunda anlatılmış olan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin sisteminin nasıl işleyemez hale geldiğini, özel olarak Makarios'un Kıbrıs Anayasası'nı nasıl ve ne gerekçelerle değiştirmeye çalıştığını inceler. 1964'te adaya gelen Birleşmiş Milletler Barış Gücü'ne kadar geçen süreci tartışan bölüm hem ada dinamiklerini hem de Amerika, Türkiye ve İngiltere'nin adaya karşı tutumunu göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Bu süreçte öne çıkan unsur, Makarios'un hem ada için hem de Amerikan-Türk birlikteliği için ortak bir tehdit olmasıdır. Özellikle 1963 Aralık ayında Makarios'un anayasayı değiştirmek için öne sürdüğü 13 madde adadaki hiç bitmeyen çatışmaları iyice körüklemiş, Türkiye ve Amerika'nın daha aktif ve doğrudan politikalar izlemesine zemin hazırlamıştır. BM Barış Gücü'ne kadar olan bu süreçte Amerika-Türkiye ittifakının halen uyum içinde sürdüğü söylenebilir, fakat bu dönem aslında uyumdan uyumsuzluğa doğru giden sürecin başlangıcıdır.

Amerikan politikaları açısından 1964 Ocak ayı itibarıyla halen ada için en iyi çözüm Garantör devletlerle Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti arasındaki görüşmeleri sürdürmek ve ayrı ayrı hem Rum halkın isteklerini hem de Türk halkının isteklerini göz önünde bulundurmaktı. Olası bir BM barış gücünün adaya gelmesi Amerika için pek de olumlu bir adım değildi. BM gücüne etki edebilecek Sovyet ve Yugoslav etkisi Amerika'nın çıkarlarının dışında bir çözüm üretilmesi anlamına gelecekti. Bu olasılık, Amerika'nın adayla daha yakından ilgilenmesinin bir nedeniydi. BM yerine NATO çatısı altında bir barış gücü olması gerektiğini savunan ABD'nin amacı en başından beri komünizm etkisini adadan olabildiğince uzak tutmaktı. Sadece bir NATO gücü vasıtasıyla, ister Amerika'nın asker göndermesiyle ister Amerikan askeri olmadan, ABD'nin bölgeyi kontrol etmesi mümkün olacaktı.

Bu dönemde, ABD ada için bir denge unsuru olmaya devam etmiştir. NATO müttefikleri arasında orta yolu bulmayı amaçlayan ABD, mevcut anayasayı desteklemekle birlikte, olası bir değişikliğin de taraflarca kabul edilmesi durumunda olabileceğini belirtmiştir. O halde, adadaki değişikliğe açık kapı bırakan ABD'nin bu tavrı Türkiye'nin hoşuna giden bir tutum değildir. Aslında Amerika'nın amacı ve yöntemi halen taraf olmadan dolaylı yoldan bir çözüm getirebilmek ve adanın yol açabileceği Türk-Yunan gerginliğini önlemektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, bu dönemdeki Türk-Amerikan görüşmelerinin ana konusu, 1963 sonlarında başlayan Türkiye'nin askeri müdahale çağrılarını dindirmek ve Türkiye'yi böyle bir hamlenin dengeleri bozacağına ve durumu daha da kötüye götüreceğine ikna etmektir.

Türkiye açısından, 1963 olayları ve adadaki önlenemeyen gerginlik yeni bir politikanın doğmasına sebep olmuştur. Türkiye bu dönemde adaya askeri müdahale seçeneği üstünde epey durmuş ve bu zamana kadarki uzlaşmacı tutumunun yerini daha aktif ve agresif bir tutum almıştır. Türkiye'ye göre Amerika ada konusunda pasif kalmıştır. Aslında bu pasiflik, Amerika'nın Türkiye'yi açıkça desteklemiyor olmasından başka bir şey değildir. Türkiye'nin müdahale tehdidi Amerika'nın dikkatini çekmek ve Türkiye'nin de ciddiyetini göstermek amacıyla sürdürülen bir

politika olarak görülebilir. Bunun nedeni, askeri çıkarma fikrinin hem askeri olarak hem de ikili ilişkiler açısından pek de mümkün olmadığıdır. Bir başka deyişle, 1964 Haziran ayına kadar Türkiye'nin askeri müdahale tehdidi söylem olarak kalmıştır. BM Barış Gücü'nün adaya gelmesi de Türkiye'nin bu söyleminin bir sonucu olarak düşünülebilir. Fakat, BM de adadaki çatışmaları önleyememiştir.

Amerikan-Türk ittifakı açısından değerlendirilecek olursa, 1963 olaylarıyla birlikte iki tarafın da politikalarında değişiklikler olduğu ve bu değişikliklerin yavaş yavaş uyumdan çok uyumsuzluğa doğru gittiği söylenebilir. 1964 BM Barış Gücü'ne kadar geçen sürede Türkiye ve Amerika adaya olan yaklaşımlarını daha aktif bir şekilde belli etmişlerdir. Amerika BM gücüne karşı çıkmış ama Makarios'un onayını alamamıştır. Türkiye ise adadaki sorunu askeri müdahaleyle çözüme kavuşturma yoluna gitmiş, hem Amerika'nın hem de uluslararası arenanın dikkatini adaya vermesini amaçlamıştır. Diğer bölümde daha belirgin bir şekilde anlatılacak olan iki devlet arasındaki uyumsuzluk henüz ciddi seviyelerde değildir. Bunun nedeni Türkiye'nin halen Amerikasız bir çözüm önerisine yanaşmaması, ve Amerika'nın da her ne kadar değişime açık kapı bıraksa da Türkiye'yi denklem dışında bırakmamasıdır.

Beşinci bölüm Türkiye ve Amerika'nın adaya dair tutumlarının değiştiği, ittifak içindeki uyumun yerini uyumsuzluğun ve güvensizliğin aldığı 1964 Mart-Haziran dönemini incelemektedir. Bölümün amacı hem ittifaktaki bu uyumsuzluğun kaynağını göstermek hem de ayrı ayrı Amerika'nın ve Türkiye'nin adayla ilgili yeni politikalarını incelemektir. 1963 yılında başlayan adadaki iki toplum arasındaki gerginlik ve özellikle Makarios'un uzlaşmaz politikaları hem Amerika için hem de Türkiye için farklı politikaların takip edilmesi gerektiğinin göstergesiydi. Bir önceki bölümde de bahsedildiği gibi Türkiye artık çözüm olarak askeri müdahale seçeneğini hep bir alternatif olarak tutmaktaydı. BM Barış Gücü'nün adada barışı sağlayamamış olması ve Makarios'un da adadaki Türklere karşı hem devlet kademelerinde hem de sosyal olarak baskı uygulaması Türkiye'nin daha aktif ve

açık şekilde askeri müdahale yanlısı bir tutum sergilemesine yol açmıştır. Aynı zamanda, Amerika'nın giderek *enosıs* yanlısı tavır alması Türkiye'nin Amerika'ya olan güvenini sarsmış, askeri müdahale yanlılarının da baskılarının artmasına neden olmuştur. Bu süreç yine Amerika-Türkiye arasındaki ve hatta Yunanistan-Amerika arasındaki görüşmelerle geçmiştir. Temel olarak Amerika Türkiye'den adaya asker çıkarmayacağına dair garanti istemekte, Türkiye'de Amerika'yı kendi tarafına çekmeye çalışmaktadır. Amerika aynı zamanda olası bir *enosıs* durumunda Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında ne gibi bir antlaşmanın olabileceğine dair görüşmelerini sürdürmektedir. Ancak bu görüşmeler hem Türkiye hem de Yunanistan tarafından kabul görmemiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin savunduğu tez *taksim* değil federasyondur. *Taksim*den vazgeçerek fedakarlık yapıldığını belirten Türk devlet adamları, Türkiye'nin uzlaşmaya açık olan taraf olduğunu gösterip Amerika'yı çözüme ortak etme çabasındalardı. Fakat süreç herhangi bir çözüm getirmedi.

Amerika'nın *enosısı* destekleyen tutumu, Makarios'un Sovyetlerle olan ilişkilerine bakılarak açıklanabilir. Bu dönemde, adadaki şiddet olayları sonucu harekete geçme gereksinimi duyan ABD, Makarios'un hem bağlantısız ülkelere hem de Sovyetler Birliği'ne yaklaşmasıyla tercihini *enosisten* yana kullanmıştır. Bu tercih, ABD gerçekten *enosıs* tezini haklı bulduğu için alınmış bir karar değildir. ABD'nin amacı *enosıs* yoluyla Yunanistan'a bağlı Makarios'suz bir adaya kavuşmaktır. Böylece ada bir NATO toprağı olacak, ABD de Yunanistan yoluyla bölgedeki NATO gücünü korumuş, Sovyet müdahalesini de önlemiş olacaktır. Ancak bu tutumun Amerika-Türkiye arasındaki uyumunu zedeleyeceği çok açıktır. Adadaki artan çatışmalar Amerika'nın *enosısı* destekleyen açıklamalarıyla birleşince, Türkiye daha ciddi ve daha açık şekilde askeri müdahale seçeneğine sarılmıştır.

Türkiye'nin en ciddi askeri müdahale tehdidi, ABD Başkanı Johnson tarafından Başbakan İsmet İnönü'ye gönderilen mektupla önlenmiştir. Johnson mektubu olarak adlandırılan bu tarihi metin Amerika'nın adayla ilgili en doğrudan, en açık ve en ciddi uyarısı ve hatta tehdididir. Mektupla birlikte hem Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs

politikaları hem de Amerikan-Türk birlikteliğinin temeli sorgulanmıştır. Amerika Türkiye'nin askeri müdahalesini önlemek için Türkiye'yi Sovyet tehditini kullanarak caydırmış, konu Kıbrıs özelinden çıkıp daha geniş bir perspektif kazanmıştır. Metin hem üslup olarak hem de içerik olarak Amerikan-Türk ittifakını derinden etkilemiş, Amerikan çıkarlarının ve hedeflerinin Türkiye'nin amaçlarıyla her zaman aynı olamayacağını kanıtlamıştır. Türkiye, Kıbrıs meselesi boyunca ilk defa Amerika'nın onayını almadan bir politika takip etmeye çalışmış fakat sonucu da Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye karşı en sert ve en ciddi tepkisi olmuştur. Bu çalışmaya göre, Johnson mektubu ABD'nin iki senaryo arasından birini seçmesidir. İlk senaryo Türkiye'nin müdahalesine göz yummak ve Amerikan-Türk uyumunu bozmamaktır. İkincisi ise Türk müdahalesini bu denli bir mektupla engelleyerek Türkiye ile olan ilişkileri bozmak pahasına Kıbrıs adasının daha büyük sorunlar çıkarmasını önlemektir. Amerika'ya göre Türkiye'nin müdahalesi beraberinde Yunanistan'ın karşı müdahalesini getirecek ve Türk-Yunan savaşı kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Bu olası senaryo iki NATO üyesinin çatışması ve Soğuk Savaş stratejisinin de kökten zedelenmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Öyleyse Amerika'nın Türkiye'nin müdahalesini önlemesi Amerika açısından kaçınılmazdır. Amerika'nın amacı en başından beri adanın Soğuk Savaş hedefleri doğrultusunda daha büyük krizlere yol açmamasını engellemektir.

O halde, Johnson mektubu hem Amerikan hem de Türk politikalarının değişimi sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır. İki ülke de adayla ilgili 1963 Aralık ayından itibaren daha aktif, daha doğrudan ve daha agresif politikalar takip etmişlerdir. Bu süreçte Makarios adadaki düzeni bozan ve uzlaşmaya da yanaşmayan ortak tehdit olarak algılanmıştır. Bu ortak tehdiye karşı Türkiye askeri müdahale seçeneğini ciddi olarak dile getirmiştir. Amerika ise, Makarios'un Sovyetlerle olan ilişkilerini de göz önüne alarak, Makarios'suz bir ada için çaba harcamaya başlamıştır. Bu doğrultuda, Amerika için en uygun çözüm *enosistir*. *Enosisin* gerçekleşmesi durumunda ada NATO toprağı olacak Amerika da bu bölgede güvenliğini ve etkisini garanti altına almış olacaktır. Zaten BM gücünün adaya çıkmasından önce Amerika'nın NATO'ya

bağlı bir kuvveti savunması ve BM gücünü önlemek istemesi de bu hedeflerle paraleldir. Türkiye açısından askeri müdahale tercihinin ne kadar gerçekçi ve gerçekleştirilebilir olduğu ayrı bir tartışma konusudur. Burada önemli olan sadece söylemde bile olsa, Türkiye'nin bu tutumunun ciddi ve beklenmedik bir tepkiye yol açması ve Amerikan cevabının da hem Kıbrıs hem de ittifak açısından bir dönüm noktası olmuş olmasıdır.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez, ABD ve Türkiye'nin 1964 Johnson mektubuna kadar Kıbrıs meselesiyle ilgili tutumlarını incelemiştir. Bu çalışmayla Amerikan-Türk ittifakı arasında Kıbrıs meselesi çerçevesinde bir uyumun mu yoksa bir uyuşmazlığın mı olduğu sorgulanmıştır. Bu teze göre, 1964'e kadar Amerikan-Türk ittifakının dinamikleri, uyumu ve birlikteliği Kıbrıs meselesinde kendini göstermiştir. Kıbrıs meselesine yansıyan bu uyum 1940'lerde kurulan stratejik ortaklığın mirasıdır. 1964'e kadar Türkiye Amerika'nın dahil olmadığı veya desteklemediği herhangi bir çözümü kabul etmemiştir. Aynı zamanda, ABD Türkiye'yi ada hakkında her zaman söz sahibi bir devlet olarak görmüştür. Amerika'ya göre Türkiye her koşulda adayla ilgili bir çözüme dahil edilmelidir.

Bu çalışma 1964 yılında Amerikan-Türk ittifakındaki uyumun yerini uyumsuzluğunaldığını göstermektedir. Bu uyumsuzluğun sebebi hem Amerika'nın hem de Türkiye'nin değişen tutumlarıdır. Bu değişim ise temel olarak adadaki artan gerginlik ve çözümsüzlükten, ve aynı zamanda Makarios'tan kaynaklanmaktadır. 1963 yılında artan şiddet olayları ve Makarios'un Kıbrıs anayasasını değiştirmek istemesi Türkiye açısından yeni bir politika takip edilmesi zorunluluğu getirmiştir. Bu yeni politika askeri müdahale tehditidir. 1963 Aralık ayından başlayarak Türkiye tek taraflı askeri müdahaleyi her zaman bir alternatif olarak gündemde tutmuştur. Aynı zamanda ABD, adadaki çözümsüzlük ve Makarios'un Sovyetlerle artan ilişkileri karşısında daha aktif ve daha doğrudan bir duruş sergileme durumunda kalmıştır. İlk olarak BM gücüne karşı NATO çatısı altında bir gücü savunan ABD, Makarios'un uzlaşmaya yanaşmayan tavrı sonucunda BM kuvvetini kabul etmiştir.

Bu dönemde Makarios'suz bir ada için politika üretmeye başlayan ABD, çözümünü *enosisi* desteklemekte bulmuştur. *Enosis* ABD için Makarios'un devre dışı kaldığı Yunanistan'a bağlı bir Kıbrıs anlamına gelmektedir. Bir başka deyişle, Kıbrıs bir NATO toprağı olacak ve ABD bölgeyi hem Sovyetlerden hem de Makarios'tan arındırmış olacaktır. Amerika ve Türkiye'nin bu yeni duruşları iki ülke arasındaki uyumu negatif yönde etkilemiş, bu süreç Johnson mektubu ile sonlanmıştır. Mektup Türkiye'nin en ciddi ve en sert müdahale tehdidine karşı ABD'nin Türkiye'ye olan en ciddi cevabıdır. Bu cevap aynı zamanda ABD'nin Kıbrıs meselesine en sert, en doğrudan ve en aktif müdahalesidir. Amerika bu cevapla sadece Türkiye'nin müdahale kararını değil, Amerikan-Türk ittifakının da temelini sorgulamıştır. Mektupta, Türkiye'ye yönelik olası Sovyet müdahalesinin NATO ve ABD tarafından önlenemeyecek olmasından bahsedilmesi, 1940'larda kurulan Amerikan-Türk birlikteliğinin temelini sorgulamaktır. Bu mektup bu birlikteliği en derin şekilde yaralamıştır. Aynı zamanda, mektup Türkiye'nin Amerikan desteğini ve rızasını almadan hareket etmek istemesinin ABD tarafından nasıl karşılanacağını da bir göstergesidir. Bu döneme kadar Türkiye, Kıbrıs meselesinde, ABD desteği olmadan herhangi bir politika takip etmemiştir. Mektup Amerika'nın kendi çıkarları dışında hareket eden bir ülkeye nasıl bir tutum sergileyeceğinin bir örneğidir.

Amerikan-Türk ittifakındaki uyumu ve uyumsuzluğu Kıbrıs meselesi çerçevesinde incelemenin yanı sıra, bu çalışma ABD ve Türkiye'nin amaçlarını ve yöntemlerini de sorgulamıştır. Çalışmaya göre, ABD'nin amacı Kıbrıs meselesi boyunca kendi Soğuk Savaş stratejilerine uygun olarak NATO gücünü korumak ve karşılıklı görüşmeleri destekleyerek NATO müttefikleri arasında bir dengeye ulaşmak olmuştur. ABD için en önemli hedef adadaki problemin kendisi için daha büyük problemler yaratmamasıdır. Bu Amerika'nın değişmeyen hedefidir. Ayrıca bu hedef doğrultusunda ABD çoğunlukla dolaylı ve tedbirli bir strateji izlemiş, taraflar arasında bir denge unsuru olmuştur. Kimi zaman Yunan, kimi zaman Türk, kimi zaman da İngiliz iddialarını desteklemiş gibi görünen ABD, adayı bu şekilde kontrol etmeyi tercih etmiştir. Ancak bu yaklaşım 1964 yılıyla değişmiştir. Bu

tarihten itibaren daha aktif ve daha doğrudan politikalar takip etmeye başlayan ABD, önce meseleyi NATO çatısı altında çözmeye çalışmış, daha sonra *enosisi* desteklemiş, son olarak da Türkiye'nin askeri müdahale tehditini Johnson mektubuyla engelleyerek adadaki pozisyonunu iyice aktifleştirmiştir.

Türkiye açısından bakılacak olursa, özellikle 1960'a kadar amaç olası bir çözümde yer almak olmuştur. Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin tek hedefi, Kıbrıs konusunda yalnız kalmamak ve adada söz sahibi olabilmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, Türkiye tek taraflı politikalar izlememiş, izleyememiştir. Bu süreçte Türkiye farklı alternatifler üretmiş ancak bu öneriler çoğunlukla söylemde kalmıştır. Ancak 1963 Aralık ayından itibaren Türkiye daha aktif ve agresif bir tutum izlemeye başlamıştır. 1964 Haziran ayına kadar Türkiye tek taraflı askeri müdahale tehdidini hep gündemde tutmuştur. Haziran ayında en ciddi Türk tehdidi de Amerika tarafından önlenmiş ve Türkiye yine kendi başına hareket edememiştir. Johnson mektubu hem Türk dış politikası, hem Kıbrıs, hem de Amerikan-Türk birlikteliği açısından yeni bir sayfanın açılmasıdır.

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