

T.C.  
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) BİLİM DALI

**DIFFERING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS -  
OVERLAPPING POLICIES: A COMPARISON OF  
BUSH AND OBAMA DOCTRINES**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

MERVE DİLEK DAĞDELEN

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Danışman: DR. ÖĞR. ÜYESİ ŞÜKRÜ YAZĞAN

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

TEZ ONAY BELGESİ

SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER Anabilim Dalı  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) Bilim Dalı TEZLİ YÜKSEK LİSANS öğrencisi  
MERVE DİLEK DAĞDELEN'nın DIFFERING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS -  
OVERLAPPING POLICIES : A COMPARISON OF BUSH AND OBAMA DOCTRINES  
adlı tez çalışması, Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 22.08.2019 tarih ve 2019-27/11 sayılı  
kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından oy birliği / ~~oy çokluğu~~ ile Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul  
edilmiştir.

Tez Savunma Tarihi 23 / 08 / 2019

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Tez Türü ve Tarihi : Yüksek Lisans – Ağustos 2019  
Anahtar Kelimeler : Güvenlik, Dış Politika, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejileri, George W. Bush, Barack H. Obama.

## ÖZ

### **FARKLILAŞAN KAVRAMSALLAŞTIRMALAR - ÖRTÜŞEN POLİTİKALAR: BUSH VE OBAMA DOKTRİNLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMASI**

Bu çalışmanın amacı, George W. Bush ve Barack H. Obama dönemi Ulusal Güvenlik Belgelerini ve dış politika uygulamalarını karşılaştırmaktır. Bunu yaparken de iki başkanın güvenlik ve politika tercihlerindeki farklılaşma ve benzeşmeler aranacaktır. Çalışmanın temel sorusu, neden bazı hükümetlerin güvenlik kavramsallaştırmasının ayrıştığı ancak aynı konularda politikaların örtüştüğüdür. Bu soruya yanıt bulmak amacıyla güvenlik kavramının tanımının zaman içerisinde nasıl değişiklik gösterdiği, literatüre referanslar verilerek açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çaba aynı zamanda Bush ve Obama'nın neden güvenlik kavramının tanımlanmasında farklılaşırken aynı tehditlerle mücadelede benzeştiklerini de göstermeye yardımcı olacaktır.

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## ABSTRACT

### **DIFFERING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS - OVERLAPPING POLICIES: A COMPARISON OF BUSH AND OBAMA DOCTRINES**

The aim of this study is to compare the National Security Documents and foreign policy practices of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama periods. In doing so, the differences and similarities in security and policy preferences of the two presidents will be sought. The main question of the study is, “why do some governments’ security conceptualization disaggregate, but their policies overlap on the same issues?” In order to find an answer to this question, how the definition of the concept of security has changed over time has been tried to be explained with reference to the literature. This effort will also help to show why Bush and Obama are different in defining the concept of security and are resembles in combating the same threats.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b><i>AIDS</i></b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b><i>CIA</i></b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b><i>DPRK</i></b>	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<b><i>EU</i></b>	European Union
<b><i>GTRI</i></b>	Global Threat Reduction Initiative
<b><i>HIV</i></b>	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
<b><i>IMF</i></b>	International Monetary Fund
<b><i>ISIL</i></b>	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's
<b><i>ISS</i></b>	International Security Studies
<b><i>NATO</i></b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b><i>NGO</i></b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b><i>NSC</i></b>	National Security Council
<b><i>NSRB</i></b>	National Security Resource Board
<b><i>NSS</i></b>	National Security Strategy
<b><i>UCAV</i></b>	Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
<b><i>UN</i></b>	United Nations
<b><i>UNDP</i></b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b><i>US/USA</i></b>	United States
<b><i>US</i></b>	United States of America
<b><i>USSR</i></b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b><i>WMD</i></b>	Weapons of Mass Destructions

## INTRODUCTION

American foreign policy has a significant place in international relations since it is the hegemon of the current international system. Many studies in the literature focused especially on the periods of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama in order to investigate sudden changes between these periods. They generally emphasized the sharp differences between the two presidents' foreign policy choices, but the similarities were neglected. While these studies mainly focused on the comparison of the two presidents' foreign policy practices, they generally did not initiate research on where these differences or similarities originate. However, this study will compare both the differences and the similarities of foreign policy practices of the two presidents, and their National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. Also, the study will be trying to expose the source of the differences and similarities.

Each government can determine a different strategy on national security issues. There might be several reasons for this. It can be claimed that differentiation in certain kind of areas may lead governments to determine different strategies on national security. These areas can be sort as: i) the structure of the international system, ii) state's position in the system, iii) political tendency of the ruling party, iv) political leader, v) the closest threat to national security, vi) available tools to cope with current or possible threats. This study claims that the differences between Bush and Obama administrations' foreign policies stem from the different conceptualization of security. The political tendency of the ruling party can change the state's approach to the concept of security; but when other variables remain constant, it is argued that they will implement similar policies for the same threat, although the ruling party and/or its political tendency is different.

It is acknowledged in this study that the most convenient area to compare foreign policy is the ones which are related to national security. In this respect this study recognizes governments' threat perception is the most important factor which affects a state's foreign policy, and NSS documents or other equivalent documents are the basic resources for national security related foreign policies. For this reason, this study will examine NSS documents to detect differentiation and similarities. The main question of

this research is, “why do some governments’ security conceptualization disaggregate, but their policies overlap on the same issues?” In this context, foreign policy applications and NSS documents of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama in their two consecutive presidential periods will be compared.

It is claimed in this study that the main reason for the *differentiation* in the foreign policy choices of different governments originates in their understanding of the concept of security. Also, differing approaches to the security stems from the political tendency of the ruling party. The concept of security has been an issue of social science and foreign policy in the near past. The meaning and the scope of the concept has been argued in a great extent since mid-1950. States have also started to declare their strategy on national security by official documents such as US’s NSS documents. In this context, it becomes important to understand what security means and where its conceptual boundaries start and end. Learning approaches to the concept of security will also pave the way for a more accurate assessment of the sources of difference in both the NSS documents and the administrations’ foreign policies. In order to expose the origins of differentiation in foreign policy choices, it is also necessary to examine the change and transformation of the concept of security in the literature.

Different approaches to the concept of security may lead to different administrations to determine threats in a multiple or limited number. This study claims that if the government addresses the concept of security in a broader context, it will be more inclined to refer to a large number of elements about threats to national security. Contrarily, if the government considers the concept of security within a narrow framework, the perception of threats to national security may be limited. In addition to this, although the preferred method of combating the same threat is different, the means used are assumed to remain the same if other variables remain constant. However, the change in the state’s available tools to cope with threats can affect in determining the means and methods of the use of these means.

National security strategy documents are expected significantly to determine and shape the states’ foreign policy preferences for the near future. These documents are both a government’s commitment to its citizens about national security priorities, and

gives the other states an idea of the current government's tendencies on foreign policy: What kind of issues are considered as a threat by the state? Which actors of the international system or a specific region are acknowledged as a threat or rival? What kind of tools does state suggest using in the fight against threats? Does the state have an offensive or defensive position against its rivals or enemies? In this respect, it is meaningful to examine a state's national security strategy documents because these documents are the sources that can answer many of the questions above mentioned.

In order to measure the approaches of the Bush and Obama governments to the concept of security, the latent content analysis will be conducted. This measurement will be based on the NSS documents issued by the presidents. By using latent content analysis, which can be defined as the technique of collecting and analyzing text content, it will be attempted to analyze and infer governments' approaches to security issues through NSS documents. Latent content analysis, or qualitative content analysis, is a technique that can help us to uncover the hidden or implicit meaning of a content, texts for instance. The person who creates the content does not need to consciously conceal the real meaning. This means that it should not be thought that Bush and Obama deliberately concealed their approaches to the concept of security in their NSS documents. However, it means that Bush and Obama's approaches to the concept of security can be deduced from a detailed examination of the issues they have dealt with, and language used in these documents. For this purpose, it is tried to understand that whether the four documents published by both presidents were use the concepts such as global terrorism, WMD, economy, military, climate change, human rights, nuclear, and states such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia and China.

However, it can be questioned that, to what extent these documents reflect reality, or in other words, whether leaders really remain faithful to these documents or not? An examination to find an answer to this question can give us a better understanding of whether the national security strategy documents are reliable or not. Moreover, it is crucial to recognize to what extent should a state pay attention to such documents of other states when determining their foreign policies. This study will also show that the governments or the political leaders are generally able to adhere to their

(or the leader's) determined strategy on national security by comparing the issued security document with the foreign policy implemented in the relevant period.

While the differentiation originated in the political tendency of the ruling party, this study links the reasons for the *similarities* in the state's available tools to cope with current or possible threats. It is assumed that whatever political discourse or tendency the presidents prefer if the structure of the international system and the state's position in that system is constant, it is unlikely that they prefer to use another means to cope with a specific threat. It can be said that the political tendency of a party may only affect the methods of the use of necessary means.

In order to test the assumptions above-mentioned and to find out the sources of differences and similarities in governments' foreign policy preferences, four consecutive periods of government under the presidency of Bush and Obama will be examined. There are several reasons to choose these two presidents' periods of administration for this analysis. First, the most significant variables within the list mentioned above that have led governments to choose different foreign policies are constant in these two examples. These variables are i) the structure of the international system, and ii) US's position in that system. This will ensure the results of the comparison will be more vigorous.

Secondly, the two presidents are the members of two different parties, each with very distinct ideologies in the US. This allows us to compare the effect of the political tendencies of the ruling party on the understanding of the concept of security.

Thirdly, in the literature, it is accepted that the US foreign policy during the Bush and Obama periods are very different from each other. The sharp differences in US foreign policy coincide with the administration of two different presidents, which may help to measure the impact of the factors that may affect this differentiation. In the fight against the same threat, do both presidents struggle with the same means or prefer different means?

It can be argued that the leader or the political tendency of the ruling party is not decisive in the foreign policy preferences if both preferred the same instruments in

the fight against the same threat. On the other hand, if both of them choose to use the same instruments against the same threat but by different methods, it can be argued that the factors other than the structure of the international system and the US's position in that system have an impact on this difference. If the same leader is used the same instruments, but in different methods to combat the same threats in his second period of administration, then it can be claimed that the leader or the political tendency of the ruling party does not have a strong impact on foreign policy preferences as it is supposed.

It is assumed that the structure of the international system and the US's position in that system is constant in all periods examined. On the other hand, the political tendency of the ruling party, which is assumed by this study as affects the conceptualization of security, has changed. Along with this, the effects of advances in UAV technology began to reflect during the Obama era. There has also been a change in the content of imminent threats to the US. All these changes have resulted in a partial change in Bush and Obama's national security strategies.

There are, of course, limitations and shortcomings of this study. For example, this study does not mention concrete indicators that can make an absolute measurement of the change in available tools of the United States during the transition from the Clinton era to the Bush-era or from the Bush-era to the Obama era. The progress in technology corollary leads to an increase in the number of available tools. However, highlighting the UAVs and UCAVs as technological developments in the relevant periods in this study can be criticized as a biased choice. Therefore, this study needs further examination due to these shortcomings and limitations.

In the first part of the following chapter, the place and importance of the concept of security in the literature will be explained. The second part will attempt to show how political or ideological tendencies affect the change in their view of security. For this purpose, the period from which the concept of security is deemed problematic to the period in which the concept is relatively framed and subsequently widened and deepened will be explained. In doing so, it will be tried to show that more liberal approaches address threats to the relevant object in a broad context. In this context, the

prominent approaches and debates on the concept of security will also be discussed. In the third and last part of the following chapter, it will be explained how to define the concept of national security despite various approaches to the concept of security. In addition, the concept of strategy will be discussed in order to understand the purpose of the NSS or other equivalent documents. Finally, in the last part, it will be tried to explain why political leaders alone cannot be able to affect a state's foreign policy choices by explaining the legal basis and production process of NSS documents in the US. The third chapter will compare the Bush and Obama administrations both internally and with each other. In doing so, both NSS documents and foreign policy practices will be examined. In this way, it will be determined whether the presidents are bound by the NSS documents which they announced and whether there are continuity and change in their following periods. The differences and similarities between the Bush and Obama periods will be shown, and the reasons will be explained. In the concluding chapter, the findings will be presented.

## 2 CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

Security has always been an essential topic in international relations studies. International Relations is a discipline that is shaped around concepts such as 'state,' 'power,' 'alliance,' 'cooperation,' and so on. 'Security' is also one of these concepts. Nearly all scholars and students of the discipline have been interested in or had to study on this topic. Although the concept has long been a significant effect on studies of international relations, it started to be a specific subject of scientific studies just after the Second World War.

Nevertheless, the concept of security does not have an agreed definition in security studies. There are various definitions of the concept of security. Some of them have similarities, but some have not. Scholars' differentiated notions about the definition of the idea of security have led some academics to label the concept as 'ambiguous,' 'contested,' or 'elusive.'<sup>1</sup> They had emphasized different characteristics and designated different features of the concept in different periods or under different conjunctures. This may cause some people to think that the concept of security has a contradictory nature and to use it in this way.

The concept of security is not the only concept without a single definition.<sup>2</sup> Basic concepts in the literature such as freedom, equality, power, and state are the ones that cannot be defined in a single valid definition. They have been described in different ways within different theoretical approaches and perspectives. However, like other primary concepts in international relations literature, there is a concrete structure for the concept of security. Furthermore, there are beneficial and directive books and articles in security studies literature which try to eliminate confusions, and clarify the characteristics of the meaning of the concept.

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<sup>1</sup> Bill McSweeney, **Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 13; Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol.35, No.1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Barry Buzan, **People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**, Second Edition, Surrey: Biddles Ltd., 1983, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> For more information about security and some other contested concepts, please see W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", in Max Black (Ed.), **The Importance of Language**, (121-146), New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962.

Although the epistemological studies on this concept are interesting debates, this chapter will be interested in the evolution of the idea of security, different approaches to the concept, and the changing definition of it. Nevertheless, the following section will begin with a philosophical discussion on the meaning of security.

## 2.1 Problematic Definition of Security

As mentioned above, security is defined as an ambiguous concept. It is even defined as a derivative concept.<sup>3</sup> One of the reasons for the differences in the definition of the security concept is the existence of different philosophical approaches to the concept. There are two fundamental philosophical approaches to the issue. One of that is positive security, which is associated with the liberal perspective that has increased its effectiveness since 1989 and now has expanding literature (critical security studies). The other one is the negative security, which is associated with the realist or traditional perspective that continues to dominate the literature.

Positive security, as the name implies, value the concept of security positively.<sup>4</sup> It defines security as ‘the feeling of being secure’ or ‘the absence of anxiety’; which are positive definitions.<sup>5</sup> In this context, security is something that achievable and desired; not a situation that something must be avoided.<sup>6</sup> Feeling safe means being secure. In other words, according to the positive security approach, security means the ultimate state of being secure. If there is no direct and obvious threat to the security of someone or something, it can be said that that person or thing is secure.

On the other hand, negative security value the concept of security negatively.<sup>7</sup> The concept is defined in this perspective as ‘the absence of a threat.’<sup>8</sup> This approach strongly emphasizes the detection of danger and to protect against it. If there is a threat

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<sup>3</sup> For more detailed knowledge please see Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence**, (15-29), Vol. I, London: Sage Publications, 2007; Haftendorn, pp. 3-17; Pinar Bilgin, “New Approaches on Security Studies: New Security Studies”, **Stratejik Arařtırmalar**, Vol.4, No.18 (January 2010), pp. 76-78.

<sup>4</sup> Gundhil Hoogensen Gjørsv, “Security by any other Name: Negative Security, Positive Security, and a Multi-Actor Security Approach”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol.38, No.4 (October 2012), p. 836.

<sup>5</sup> Emma Rothschild, “What is Security”, in Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: Widening Security**, (1-34), Vol. III, London: Sage Publications, 2007, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Hoogensen Gjørsv, p. 836.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Rothschild, p. 7.

somewhere out there, the security is not ensured, regardless of whether the subject is affected by the threat. Security is something that needs to be constantly acquired or assured. Being secure is "... understood as 'security from' (a threat)."<sup>9</sup>

The liberal perspective not only positively values the concept of security, but also supports Immanuel Kant's views on state and international relations. The liberal perspective claims that 'perpetual peace' is a norm of world politics. It argues that the national interests of a state are rational, especially in the presence of international law, and this is what should be.<sup>10</sup> On the contrary, the realist perspective which rooted in Thomas Hobbes's thoughts, claims that the struggle of all against all in the international realm force the states of being securing themselves against foreign threats.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to attributing different values and different ideological perspectives to what security should be, there are also different answers about what the object of security is or should be. Traditional approach regards security only as a condition of a state. Security of non-state actors is not an issue of the traditional approach.

However, the liberal approach regards security as a condition of non-state actors, as individuals and group(s) of people, along with the states. This approach, as Rothschild claimed, has built the principles of 1990's idea of security, which is usually named in the literature as 'critical security studies.' It is usually concerned with "the security of individuals as an object of international policy: of 'common security' or 'human security.'"<sup>12</sup>

In connection with this philosophical and operational differentiation mentioned above, the definition of security has been changed during its historical transformation. In addition to its changing content, external factors like political conjuncture, theoretical debates (impact of a realist, a liberal, and other several paradigms) and the like have also impacted on the different designations of the concept. There are several types of security which defined according to their concerns with the effect of all these factors: national security, international security, military security, human security, energy

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<sup>9</sup> Hoogensen Gjørsv, p. 836.

<sup>10</sup> Haftendorn, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Rothschild, p. 1.

security, food security, environmental security, global security, cybersecurity, and many others. These are the commonly used versions of the concept in the literature. Each of these types of security base on different subjects of security, and they have emerged from different sets of values.<sup>13</sup>

However, those differentiations do not mean that security is a concept that cannot be defined appropriately, efficiently, and comprehensively. Describing the security is not the primary object of this study. However, setting forth a general structure on security paves the way for operationalization. In order to understand the nature of security and the field of security studies profoundly, it may be helpful to answer some of Baldwin's<sup>14</sup> questions. These questions are as followed:

1. Security for whom?
2. Security for which values?
3. How much security [is needed]?
4. [Being secure] [f]rom what threats?
5. By what means?
6. At what cost?
7. In what period?<sup>15</sup>

Answering these questions listed above in different ways, leads –intentionally or unintentionally–conceptualizing of security in different ways in the literature. Especially the three of those questions; ‘Security for whom?’, ‘Being secure from what threats?’, and ‘By what means?’; might be considered as the most important ones to determine the theoretical perspective and the assumptions of each study.

For example, let it is assumed that the question ‘Security for whom?’ is answered as ‘Security for the human being.’ The unit of analysis or the referent object of the study would be designated as a non-state actor. Instead, if the same question is answered as ‘Security for the state(s)/national state(s).’\* the referent object would be the state. “Security is about constituting something that needs to be secured: the nation, the

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol.23, No.1 (1997).

<sup>15</sup> Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, pp. 12-17.

\* Obviously, answering this question in plural, as states/national states, or singularly, as state/national state, or even by giving a specific name of a state would change the perspective of the study.

state, the individual, the ethnic group, the environment, or the planet itself.”<sup>16</sup> So, this might be the most significant answer to delineate the structure of a study and the scope of the concept of security.

Even if the question ‘Security for whom?’ is answered in the same way, answering the question ‘Being secure from what threats?’ in two different ways cause differentiation on the studies’ level of analysis. These changes would unavoidably shift the perspective of the study, i.e., from realism to liberalism or vice versa; but not the ‘real’ meaning and definition of security.

Answering those questions mentioned above also help us to understand the contexts, values, and practices about security. The importance of context, values, and practices of security and the relations among them are unique issues to both define the concept of security and the structure of a study. Gundhil Hoogensen Gjørnv clearly explains the importance of these three issues in studying security as followed:

After setting the stage where we establish the context in which security is understood, we must then understand what are the values or priorities within this context that plays a role in defining security. Security is both about identifying threats to those things we value, and the practices we use to protect the same. Threat perception is related to the perceived magnitude of loss of what we value.<sup>17</sup>

As tried to be explained above, reasons for evaluating the concept of security as ambiguous or contested might stem from (i) adopting different philosophical approaches, (ii) embracing diverse theoretical approaches, and (iii) interested in various actors/units in identifying the concept of security.

For a satisfactory comprehensiveness about the contending approaches to the concept, it would be better to scrutinize the transformation, processes of widening and deepening on the meaning of the concept of security in the following passages. While doing so, it is essential to keep in mind what Baldwin outlined the general structure of the content of security. The following section is written for this purpose, will try to

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<sup>16</sup> Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, **The Evolution of International Security Studies**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 10-11.

<sup>17</sup> K. M. Fierke, **Critical Approaches to International Security**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, quoted in Gjørnv, “Security by any other Name: Negative Security, Positive Security, and a Multi-Actor Security Approach”, p. 844; Rothschild, pp. 4-10.

explain the transformation of the concept of security and the broadening and deepening of the concept.

## **2.2 Different Types of Security**

The concept of security has been a subject of scientific inquiry with the establishment of Security Studies, especially after World War II. Security had usually been defined as something strongly related to military affairs, especially in the early years of the literature. However, it does not mean that the idea of security had never been thought, discussed, or taught in any other way before now, and the security studies literature has emerged. The following part will examine the emergence of the concept of security, the changing meaning of the concept according to different theoretical perspectives, and its widening and deepening.

### **2.2.1 Effect of War on Security Studies: Narrow Definition of Security**

Before the Security Studies found a special place in the international relations literature, the concept of security is examined in the context of national security. In the period between First and Second World Wars, the influence of the liberal theory and the thought of idealism on international security studies has increased with the help of the fatigue of war and the absence of a major war in the international arena. Liberalism and idealism generally have opposed addressing national security in military terms. Scholars who disdain national security in military terms usually emphasizes the significance of some liberal instruments and concepts, as Baldwin claimed, such as democracy, international law, international organizations, disarmament, collective security, etc.<sup>18</sup> This insight is far from the idea that national security could be achieved by winning war(s) or by providing military security.

In addition to this, it is argued that it is necessary to implement such practices like disarmament and arbitration, national self-determination in order to ensure international peace and security. For this reason, the existence of international law and the effectiveness of international organizations are thought to be more important than

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<sup>18</sup> David Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War", in Buzan and Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: Widening Security**, (99-120), Vol. III, pp. 100-105.

any other thing (military security, for instance), to ensure national security.<sup>19</sup>

Until the beginning of World War II, the national security and national security strategy were not essential aspects of international relations, and war is seen as a problem to be solved instead of seen as another instrument of diplomacy.<sup>20</sup> However, with the beginning of the Second World War, scholars became more interested in national security and military affairs. It seems that the reason for the increased influence of traditional or realist perspective in national security is a close and devastating threat of war and the unbearable weight of losses caused by the war.

During the period 1945-55, the first decade after the Second World War, as Baldwin discussed, "... scholars were well aware of military instruments of statecraft, but security studies were not yet as preoccupied with nuclear weaponry and deterrence as it would become later on."<sup>21</sup> Security, or military security, in particular, was seen, in the first post-war decade, as an asset that should matter only if its absence negatively affects other values and assets of the states. It means that scholars who study security were not merely interested in national security in the context of the military aspects.

However, a decade later, when the effects of the Cold War began to feel better, national security began to be analyzed more militarily with the impact of the invention of the nuclear weapons, and the broader meaning of security is reversed.

It can be claimed that this short historical oversight of the literature is a prominent example of the change in the meaning of the concept of security. The existence of a central war in the international system directly affects the literature of security studies and leads the literature to concentrate more on military issues. The immense impact of realist theory on security –which determines the realm of international relations as anarchic and conflicting– also plays a vital role in addressing the military aspects of security.<sup>22</sup> The concept had been redefined regarding the security of states, military power, and national interests, especially during the war times.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>22</sup> Tolga Çıkrıkçı, "Realizmin Güvenlik Anlayışı ve Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Karadeniz'in Güvenliği", in Hasret Çomak and Ayşegül Gökalg Kutlu (Eds.), **Uluslararası Güvenlik Kongresi Bildiriler Kitabı**, (526-539), Kocaeli: Kocaeli Üniversitesi Yayınları, 8-9 October 2013, p. 526.

Scholars, politicians, even ordinary people, were sincerely interested in military affairs due to the existence of an imminent threat of nuclear war. So much so that, when it came to the issue of national security, high expenditures on weapons or the military is not considered as a problem; and many other problems, which was also may regard as related to (national or other kinds of) security, were considered as 'soft security' when it compares to the military security.<sup>23</sup> The new concepts, like first and second-strike capabilities, arms race stability, escalation, damage limitation, limited nuclear war, détente, and so on, were invented in the Cold War period.<sup>24</sup>

For these reasons, security-related publications were, especially in the 1950s, prone to relate the concept of national security in the context of military threats and nuclear war more than any other subject or dimension. Insomuch that, in some studies, the concept of security and the concept of the strategy were used interchangeably.<sup>25</sup>

As an example of the emphasis of the realist perspective on security, Stephen Walt, in his article which published in 1991, suggests defining security studies as "... *the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.*"<sup>26</sup> (Emphasis in original). Nevertheless, in the 1980s, the inclination to define national security in an excessively narrow and military sense was criticized to a great extent.<sup>27</sup> Especially after the Cold War, new types of threats, and methods of dealing with those threats other than military tools have become the subjects of security studies. The reason for the invention of new threats has happened by the impact of the decreasing possibility of nuclear war between

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<sup>23</sup> Bilgin, p. 79. Bilgin also warns that the label of 'hard/soft security' is a reflection of western-centrism and it "... create[s] a hierarchy among [threats which] gives the message that some threats are more important and severe than some others and this may come to an end where the agenda is manipulated and traditional approach to security becomes superior.", pp. 79-81, 90-91.

<sup>24</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field", in Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: The Transition to the Post-Cold War Security Agenda**, (85-104), Vol. II, London: Sage Publication, 2007, p. 87.

<sup>25</sup> Although the meaning of these two concepts are overlapping in a certain degree, they do not have the same meaning at all, especially if the boundaries of their respective fields are concerned. For more information about the differences and similarities between security and strategic studies please see Petr Suchy, "Role of Security and Strategic Studies within International Relations Studies", **Defence and Strategy (Obrana A Strategie)**, Vol.2003, No.2 (2003), pp. 7-9; Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?", **World Politics**, Vol.50, No.1, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue (October 1997), pp. 7-9; Haftendorn, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", in Buzan and Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: The Transition to the Post-Cold War Security Agenda**, (214-247), Vol. II, p. 215.

<sup>27</sup> See Lester Brown, "Redefining National Security", **Worldwatch Paper**, No. 14, Washington, DC, 1977; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", in Buzan and Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence**, (296-316), Vol. I; Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol.68, No.2 (1989), pp. 162-177.

the United States of America (the USA or the US) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and by the impact of expanding globalization.

It is a kind of revival of the previous approach which belongs to pre-1945's, rather than an entirely new one. A new period of international peace brought the possibility of non-military and force-free argumentations to the security studies literature. In order to 'redefine the (national) security,' objections have increased against the existing definition, not only in the military aspects but also in its non-military aspects.

### **2.2.2 The Rise of Non-Military Aspects to National Security**

Stagnation in political strife and the slowing nuclear arms race between USA and USSR paved the way for new discussions over national security in a less militarized perspective. Moderate relations between the two countries caused a more optimistic prescience both in daily life, in politics, and security studies. Offensive and defensive realists have affirmative or supportive attitudes about the arms race. There is an intense criticism to them, which led to a more modest debate on (national) security. This kind of criticisms in international relations theories can also be observed in security studies in the same period.

As it is mentioned in the previous pages of this study, relatively broad definitions of national security came into the issue as a reflection of new developments on security studies. This first wave of critical studies which held in during the Cold War years was still preoccupied with the concept of national security, but not with the security of other actors other than the state. It considers the states as the leading actor, instead of non-state actors. However, when the domination of the narrow definition of security over the field considered, these baby steps might be considered as tremendous progress.

In addition to theoretical debates on international relations along with the military and political tranquility between states, increasing globalization in international trade and investment allows scholars to criticize the militarized definition of national security.

Apart from globalized economic relations, the interdependence between states has increased along with the problems such as the use of natural resources, prevention of environmental degradation, demographic burdens such as migration and overpopulation and the like. In connection with these new developments and problems which brought about by them, during the 1970s and 1980s, some scholars claimed that military forces could not be able to cope with those new threats from both states and non-state actors.<sup>28</sup> For instance, J. T. Mathews claimed in her 1989 article that the customary way of policy-making or institutionalism does not meet well enough the new problems of the world.<sup>29</sup>

Globalization was not a corollary or a production of the Cold War. It had not been the reason alone for criticisms of the narrow definition of security. However, it is claimed that the dual effect (fragmentation and expansion) of globalization on economic, political, and social relations between states and people lead to weakening the nation-state.<sup>30</sup> Although the nation-state has been preserving its importance both in international relations studies and security studies, some scholars assert that the state will eradicate in the international arena with the effects of globalization. This belief gave rise to discussions on the non-military issues, and the security of non-state actors to become involved in the discussions on the definition of (national) security. Because securing the state by military means was no longer seen sufficient to protect the nation or the nation-state from threats.

Globalization in the international system intensively observed first on economic relations.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, at the very beginning of the attempts to redefine the concept of security, the economy took the leading part. It should not be surprising that the first and most concerned non-military aspect was economic security. As a reflection of the importance of continued economic stability in national security, Lester Brown smoothly states that: “[n]ational security cannot be maintained unless national

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<sup>28</sup> Brown, p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> Tuchman Matthews, “Redefining Security”, p. 162.

<sup>30</sup> McSweeney, p. 4.

<sup>31</sup> Even if it was not, the most emphasized and examined facet of globalization was economy: Ashok Swain, **Understanding Emerging Security Challenges: Threats and Opportunities**, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 2; quoted in Victor D. Cha, “Globalization and the Study of International Security”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.37, No.3 (2000), p. 393.

economies can be sustained...”<sup>32</sup> Economic security should be ensured not only for military armament but also for financial support for the basic needs of the national economic system. Because, according to economic security perspective, weak national economies bear the danger of political instability and social unrest.<sup>33</sup> Those risks can be seen as new and essentially non-military threats to national security.

However, the economic aspect of security has been just one subject, among others. Almost every scholar who supports the re-definition of security asserts that there have been many other issues must be examined as an aspect of security while suggesting to include economic threats to national security. Finally they concluded that environmental (including resource scarcity, a type of security that considers water security, food safety, energy security and similar types of security as the subject of renewable and non-renewable natural resources), political, societal (like population growth, emigration, and the like) sources of a threat to security affect each other mutually, and national security eventually.

There is a common point of those new aspects which discussed in early publications in the post-Cold War era on the redefinition of the security concept. They claimed that protection from some threats needs to be taken into the international or regional level. However, they still evaluated the issue in the context of a state-centric perspective. It means that the definition of security has kept its national, or more appropriately, its state-centric feature. However, the state-centrism will not be the only approach to security later in the field of security studies.

### **2.2.3 Critical Security Studies: Widening and Deepening of the Concept of Security**

The growing support for widening the concept of security by including non-military aspects (such as economic, environmental, migration and some other human rights issues) as a threat was the first but not least step in the evolution of the security

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<sup>32</sup> Brown, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

studies.<sup>34</sup> Shortly after security studies found a place in the literature, some scholars claimed that the concept needs deepening as well as widening.

Although there are criticisms to a great extent against the narrow definition of security in the academic field, most of the traditionalists (advocates of the realist and/or neo-realist<sup>35</sup> perspective of the concept of security) insisted on the convenience and sufficiency of the state-centric definition of (national) security. In the context of the broader meaning of security, it is assumed that the realist perspective treats non-military threats as minor issues than military security because realist perspective prioritizes mostly military means to cope with any kinds of threats. For instance, some scientists are interested in global climate change, which is considered a non-military threat, in the context of the possibility of wars between communities and/or states.<sup>36</sup> Whereas, alternative approaches consider and examine non-military threats out of the military context.

However, Buzan makes a comprehensive explication, against broadening the concept of security, as a support for national security:

Since ISS [International Security Studies] was founded during the Cold War and the Cold War was so overwhelmingly about the military ... capabilities ..., 'national security' became almost synonymous with military security. This did not mean that other capabilities were not considered, ... for instance, the need to

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<sup>34</sup> Buzan and Hansen, **The Evolution of International Security Studies**, p. 187. For more information on military threats from non-state actors, and on non-military threats please see Peter Hough, **Understanding Global Security**, Second Edition, e-Library: Taylor & Francis, 2008.

<sup>35</sup> Neorealism, which metamorphosed from realist thought in 1960's, had more easily acknowledged the nonmilitary aspects of security than its former version. There are resemblances and correspondences between some international relations theories and security studies approaches. However, instead of investigate and scrutinize each international relations approaches and their reflections on security studies one by one, the names of paradigms or meta-theories, which they belongs or emanates from -like realism, liberalism, etc.-, will be used to indicate theoretical base of approaches in security studies. In this case, both realist and neo-realist perspectives of security will be discussed under the label of realism, although there are some nuances between the two. For general knowledge on effects of international relations theories on security studies, please see Hough, pp. 3-6; Oktay F. Tannrisever, "Güvenlik", in Atilla Eralp (Ed.), **Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar**, (107-123), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010, pp. 107-123; John Baylis, "The Concept of Security in International Relations", in Hans Günter Brauch (et. al.) (Eds.), **Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century**, (495-502), Berlin: Springer, 2008.

<sup>36</sup> John Wendle, "When Climate Change Starts Wars", *Nautilus*, 9 August 2018, <http://nautil.us/issue/63/horizons/when-climate-change-starts-wars-rp>, (Date of Access: 2 August 2019); Conn Hallinan, "Water Wars: As Climate Change Escalates, South Asia's Already Fighting Over Water", *People's World*, 11 July 2019, <https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/water-wars-as-climate-change-escalates-south-asias-already-fighting-over-water/>, (Date of Access: 2 August 2019); Dahr Jamail, "The World Is on the Brink of Widespread Water Wars", *Truthout*, 25 March 2018, <https://truthout.org/articles/the-world-is-on-the-brink-of-widespread-water-wars/>, (Date of Access: 2 August 2019).

incorporate economic vigour, governmental stability, energy supplies, science and technology, food and natural resources. These were, however, to be incorporated because they impacted on 'the use, threat, and control of force,' and thus on military security, not because they were to be considered security issues in their own right.<sup>37</sup>

Buzan was not the only scholar who defends the realist version of national security.<sup>38</sup> David Baldwin also supports Buzan's argument on security studies in the period of 1945-55. It is claimed that there was not any significant influence of one or other international relations theory to the security studies until the beginning of the Cold War. Baldwin says before the realist theory begins to give a general direction to security studies:

national security was viewed as a goal to be pursued by both nonmilitary and military techniques of statecraft; ... [and] much attention was devoted to the relationship between national security and domestic affairs, such as the economy, civil liberties, and democratic political processes.<sup>39</sup>

In light of these assessments, it can be said that those who oppose the widening of the concept of security considers national security as a whole. Which means that they consider non-military aspects of security together with the military aspect.

The heavily militarized atmosphere of the Cold War has been a trigger for the rethinking of the concept of security. Consequently, two critical assessments of Buzan and Baldwin shows that the debates on non-military aspects of security are as inevitable as necessary. It is inevitable because, as traditionalists acknowledge that, the so-called narrow definition of security (national security) inherently evaluates every aspect of security for the sake of state's survival, prosperity, stability, etc. Moreover, the decreasing effect of the fear from nuclear war (pure military) and increasing problems on economic and political stability paves the way for debates on non-military issues. On the other hand, debates on non-military issues were necessary because there was not

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<sup>37</sup> Buzan and Hansen, **The Evolution of International Security Studies**, p. 12. Originally cited from International Security, "Foreword", Vol.1, No.1 (1976), p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> For more information about proponents' views on remaining realist perspective in security studies please see Robert H. Dorff, "A Commentary on Security Studies for the 1990s as a Model Core Curriculum", **International Studies Notes**, Vol.19, No.3 (1994), pp. 23-31; Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies".

<sup>39</sup> Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War", p. 102. Baldwin also complains about the blindness of the latter works in ISS field in the works of scholars prior to 1955, *ibid.*, p. 103.


much work on non-military issues during the Cold War, and there was a considerable gap in the literature.

Moreover, the field called for further evaluation of the broadening of the concept. In that point, another concurring development has begun in the ISS. In addition to widening, the deepening of the concept of security due to the change in the level of analysis has opened a new area of debate. No one should consider widening and deepening of the concept of security had happened at different times. On the contrary, these two events took place simultaneously. While it is claimed that the concept should be studied by not only military but also non-military aspects, it is also suggested that the concept should be analyzed not only in state-level but also a regional, international, global, and individual level. It should be kept in mind that the two discussions are interrelated; thus, it can be said that they are supporting arguments for each other. In addition to this, the acknowledgment of human rights in international politics and law, and the improvements on it opened a space for the human-centric perspective in the discussions on the widening and deepening of the concept of security. Both security studies and international politics started to be examined in a human-centric level.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> The “Ottawa Convention” which is also called as “Mine Ban Treaty”, can be considered as a great example of a treaty that shaped on the sensitivity to human life. This treaty seeks to terminate the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) around the world. For more information please see: “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction”, **United Nations**, 18 September 1997, [https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1997/09/19970918%2007-53%20AM/Ch\\_XXVI\\_05p.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1997/09/19970918%2007-53%20AM/Ch_XXVI_05p.pdf), (Date of Access: 29 July 2019). International Criminal Court (ICC) can also be an example of the product of human-centric understanding of security. ICC was established to investigate and prosecute individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. Form more information on ICC please see: International Criminal Court, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Main.aspx>, (Date of Access: 29 July 2019).

**Figure 1: Widening and Deepening of the Concept of Security**



**Source:** Based on Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, in Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (Eds.), **International Security: Widening Security** (1-34), Vol. III, London: Sage Publication, 2007, p. 2.

Along with the widening and deepening of the aspects and the level of analysis in the concept of security, alternative approaches suggested that political responsibility for ensuring security should also be expanded. According to this, the responsibility for enabling security should not merely belong to the states. It is stated that the responsibility for enabling the security should be shared with the upper and lower level actors from the state. While international organizations may take responsibility in the upper level, regional and local governments, non-governmental organizations, the press, and the like may also take the responsibility of ensuring security in the lower level.<sup>41</sup> The figure below will present the expansion of security in these three areas.

In response to a wide and deep understanding of security, traditionalists claimed that any attempt to broaden the concept is in danger of over-expansion of the field of study.<sup>42</sup> Besides, as they argued, it leads the field to be “intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant.”<sup>43</sup> Apparently what traditionalists propose for security studies is quite similar to what the realist paradigm proposes for international relations. Peter Hough declares this idea by saying that “For classical Realists, ... Security Studies was pretty much synonymous with International Relations.”<sup>44</sup> However, intrinsically, security studies as a sub-field of international relations, can and should be interested in threats and risks in a broader sense than international relations theories do.<sup>45</sup>

At this point, there is an important objection from the human-centered perspective against the realistic perspective of security, that is traditionalist concept of security is not sufficient or does not intend to protect non-state actors (in this case human) from threats.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, in some cases, according to critical theory, states are

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<sup>41</sup> Rothschild, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup> Walt, p. 215.

<sup>43</sup> Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods”, in Buzan and Hansen (Eds.), **International Security**, (135-165), Vol. III, p. 136.

<sup>44</sup> Hough, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> If it is remembered that international relations theories do not merely preoccupied with relations between states, persistence on broadening of the concept of security can be better understood. It can be claimed that international relations are composed of relations merely between states and the most important instrument of them is security and power according to the realist perspective. So, this would designate the theoretical structure of study on security. On the contrary, it should be asked that ‘If there is no such difference between the boundaries of international relations theories and security studies, why there is a field of security studies as a sub-field of international relations?’. For an opposing argument on the fields of international relations and security studies, please see Haftendorn, p. 16.

<sup>46</sup> UNDP, **Human Development Report 1994**.

“often [a] part of the problem (rather than the solution) of insecurity.”<sup>47</sup>

The human-centric perspective on security is not the only one in critical security approaches which blame realist perspective for being state-centric. In addition to the human-centered perspective, there are also constructivists (social, critical), feminists, post-modernists, post-structuralists who criticize and interpret the concept of security. Further, some schools of the security studies like Copenhagen School, Aberystwyth School, and Paris School, have also made their interpretations.<sup>48</sup> The common point of these approaches is that they regard security as something that should be assured and examined holistically.<sup>49</sup> However, it should be noted that, while the neorealist perspective of security sustains its popularity in the field, alternative approaches also made a tremendous and hardly reversible influence in ISS. Since the 1990s, this has been the proof of the adoption of this new expanded and deepened security in the reports of various NGOs, along with well-established and comprehensive intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>50</sup>

However, in this study, it is claimed that no matter how much the concept of security is deepened, most of the states and international organizations act according to a less-deepened understanding of security, in other words, real political context. For example, NATO may give opportunity and funding to study on the environment<sup>51</sup>, but only in the context of conflict resolution. It never considers environmental, social, or humanitarian necessities or security needs as a threat to NATO’s security.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Baylis, p. 500.

<sup>48</sup> For a better understanding on similarities and differences between alternative approaches and schools of thoughts and their critics on traditional understanding of security, please see Bilgin, pp. 69-96; Baylis, pp. 495-502. Since there is not enough space and time, the details and differences of these alternative approaches will not examine in this study.

<sup>49</sup> Bilgin, p. 75.

<sup>50</sup> See UNESCO, **Non-Military Aspects of National Security**, Peace and Conflict Issues, Vendôme: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995; Eileen Petzold-Bradley, Alexander Carius, and Arpád Vincze (Eds.), **Responding to Environmental Conflicts: Implications for Theory and Practice**, NATO Science Series, Series 2: Environmental Security, Vol. 78, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. Along with Peter Hough’s book, for more information on non-military threats, please see Swain, **Understanding Emerging Security Challenges**; Buzan, **People, State and Fear**; Columba Peoples, Nick Vaughan-Williams, **Critical Security Studies: An Introduction**, e-Library: Taylor & Francis, 2010.

<sup>51</sup> Petzold-Bradley, Carius, and Vincze (Eds.).

<sup>52</sup> “Towards the New Strategic Concept: A Selection of Background Documents”, NATO, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120412\\_Towards\\_the\\_new\\_strategic\\_concept-](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120412_Towards_the_new_strategic_concept-)

In this section, the contribution of critical security studies to the security studies literature by broadening the concept of security is discussed. However, it should be noted that the contribution of critical security studies to the literature is not limited to this. Approaches in critical security studies will not be examined separately in this study. In the context of this study, it is sufficient to know that critical approaches find it right to use the concept of security in its broadest sense.

#### 2.2.4 Securitization and De-securitization: Copenhagen School

Copenhagen School is a kind of an intermediate form of approach to security studies between narrow and broad definitions of the concept of security. It does not restrict the concept into a military-oriented and force-prone structure. It does not expand the security issues out of the survival of the state either.

One of the most important reasons for Copenhagen School scholars to oppose the deeper concept of security is that they think that broadening the concept leads to the loss of the meaning of the concept.<sup>53</sup> Such as they borrowed from Stephen M. Walt, a traditionalist scholar in security studies literature, that “Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.”<sup>54</sup>

On the contrary, they also advanced that different types of threats should be an issue of a security agenda.<sup>55</sup> That is why they are prone to widen the meaning of the concept because they believe that “[t]hreats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military.”<sup>56</sup> However, they are skeptical about including every issue in the field of security studies. Including every issue into the subject of security will not only pose a risk for the concept to lose its meaning but will also hinder the resolution of problems within normal political processes.<sup>57</sup>

According to the Copenhagen School approach,

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eng.pdf, (Date of Access: 29 July 2019).

<sup>53</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework for Analysis**, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Walt, p. 215.

<sup>55</sup> Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, p. 4.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>57</sup> Bilgin, p. 83.

any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from *nonpoliticized* (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through *politicized* (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to *securitized* (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)<sup>58</sup>

The Copenhagen School claims that most of the problems in international relations can be solved in normal political processes without becoming a major security issue.<sup>59</sup> They refer to the European Union (EU) a security project that solves problems in normal political processes without making them a security issue. Scholars from the Copenhagen School affirms that European political leaders cooperate to ensure security without mentioning security.<sup>60</sup>

Securitization, as Copenhagen School asserts, can be "... seen as a more extreme version of politicization."<sup>61</sup> Extreme politicization can sometimes lead parties/states to over protectionism, and it results in not be open to negotiation and to prevent from finding a way to agree. Thus, only significant issues that may threaten the relevant object's existence must be the subjects of security. Other than the existential threats to the object must be thought and cared in ordinary political life. In this context, de-securitization is the process of normalizing over-politicized but not existential issues.

Securitization and de-securitization are essential issues in Copenhagen School approach, both as a concept and as a process. As will be seen in the review of national security strategy documents in the following chapter, some issues which considered as threats to national security may not be perceived as threats in the future. Processes of securitization and de-securitization can play a part in including and excluding certain kind of threats into the national security agenda.

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<sup>58</sup> Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, pp. 23-24. Emphasis are mine.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Bilgin, p. 82.

<sup>61</sup> Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, p. 23.

### 2.2.5 Human Security

The concept of human security first started to use by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report on Human Development.<sup>62</sup> This report criticizes the omission on human well-being, and asserts that “[f]orgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.”<sup>63</sup> “The concept of security,” the report implies, “...has been related more to nation-states than to people.”<sup>64</sup> It emphasizes the need to transition from a state-centric security definition to a more human-centric security description.

In this report, human security is defined by the seven major categories. These are as followed.<sup>65</sup>

1. Economic security,
2. Food security,
3. Health security,
4. Environmental security,
5. Personal security,
6. Community security,
7. Political security.

Each category points to a critical threat to human well-being and dignity. If each category is conveyed from the document briefly;

- (i) Economic security indicates lack of basic income, unemployment, insecure working conditions, low salaries and the like are the most fundamental threats to human’s economic security;
- (ii) Food security indicates difficulties on both physical and economic access to basic food;
- (iii) Diseases and disorders which causes death like infectious and parasitic diseases, cancer and diseases of the circulatory system are significant threats to health security. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) viruses become the subject of health security in this context.
- (iv) Physical deterioration of environments like water pollution, air

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<sup>62</sup> UNDP, **Human Development Report 1994**, New York, 1994.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

pollution, degradation of local and global ecosystems, and the like are primary issues of environmental security;

- (v) Personal security is the most vital category for human security from physical violence;
- (vi) Community security can be defined as support and protection from any kind of community like family, group, organization, and/or ethnic group in which the individual has a sense of belonging; and finally
- (vii) Political security, which can be seen as the most important category of human security, is a situation where individuals can use the most basic human rights without any hindrance.<sup>66</sup>

Most of these categories are interrelated with each other. For example, as the report states that, economic security mostly violated by poverty, the risk of losing a job, and the like. However, poverty, in addition to cause economic insecurity for human, also affects food security negatively. Because, contrary to what people usually think, provision of food is not caused by food shortages, but by poverty. Likewise, the threats to environmental security can also negatively affect health security.<sup>67</sup>

However, the approach proposed by the UNDP 1994 Report is accused of lack of precision.<sup>68</sup> Because, as Roland Paris emphasized that, the concept had been defined very broadly insomuch that it becomes difficult to distinguish what is not constitutes a threat to human security.<sup>69</sup> Paris discusses that almost every unexpected discomfort or irregularity; in which disrupts the patterns of daily life suddenly and hurtfully such as chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression; may pose a danger to human safety.<sup>70</sup> Despite the complaining on the ambiguity or breadth of the concept, human security, like environmental security has, has been able to find a place in security studies.

In this section, different approaches to the concept of security and change and transformation of the concept in the literature have been tried to be explained. It has been tried to show that the definition of the concept of security may vary depending on

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<sup>66</sup> UNDP, **Human Development Report 1994**.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25-27.

<sup>68</sup> Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", **International Security**, Vol.26, No.2 (Fall 2001), p. 89.

<sup>69</sup> Roland Paris, "Rational and Irrational Approaches to Human Security: A Reply to Ralph Pettman", **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol.18, No.3 (October 2005), p. 479.

<sup>70</sup> UNDP, **Human Development Report 1994**, p. 23; Paris, "Rational and Irrational Approaches to Human Security: A Reply to Ralph Pettman", p. 479.

what or who is identified as the subject of security. From this point of view, it can be estimated who or what they care and prioritize by looking at how a person or organization defines security.

It can be said that a similar situation can be applied to states. In this case, of course, the actor, whose security is considered, is the state. However, depending on what kind of threats are important to a state, its security definitions may change. Depending on the relative strength of the state in the international system, methods of combating threats may change. Alternatively, depending on what the state has as a tool, the means which the state can deal with threats may change. In this context, the next section will try to explain how the security perceptions of the states are shaped according to the USA chosen as a case study. Further, it will be tried to convey what the national security strategy means, and what the states aim by issuing national security strategy documents.

### **2.3 National Security Strategy Documents of the USA**

As the previous section tried to convey, the concept of security may have several definitions, with different prefixes, for the preservation of different values and objectives in different contexts. This section will discuss the meaning and function of national security and the strategy documents on national security, which is the subject of this study. This section will also discuss the types of approaches briefly to the concept of strategy; as the previous section did by describing the transformation of the concept of security. It will also try to explain how national security strategy documents are created in the USA.

This part will seek answers to the following questions: What kind of conceptualization should be preferred when it comes to national security? Should it be defined in a narrow or broad sense? What does the strategy mean? How the concept of strategy defines when it comes to ensuring national security? What could be the reason and the aim to produce national security strategy documents? What is the reason for making such documents public? The answers to these questions will make it easier to clarify the differences and resemblances between the two presidents of the USA who

have different political traditions, which will be examined in the next chapter.

There is more than one approach in the literature to the concept of strategy as well. It will be explained which of these approaches should and will be used and why it is preferred. Then, in the second part of this section, the formation, and components of national security strategy documents, especially in the USA, will be introduced.

### **2.3.1 National Security: Ambiguous or Diverse?**

There is no such study in the security literature peculiarly on the concept of national security. Instead, scholars had preferred to discuss the concept of security in general, or they mistakenly used the concept of security in place of national security. Arnold Wolfers, the most referenced scholar in the national security literature, tried to define the concept of national security and describe the framework of the concept. However, it can be said that he could not do much about clarifying the content and the scope of the concept. He delineates the concept as “an ambiguous symbol,” inasmuch as, it “... may not have any precise meaning at all”.<sup>71</sup> His explanation for this delineation is that national security “... may not mean the same thing to different people.”<sup>72</sup> He defines the scope of security as protecting the previously acquired values to some extent.<sup>73</sup> Those values, as a matter of course, may differ from nation to nation, from people to people. It may differ from period to period, even for the same nation. Therefore, Wolfers warn that national security should be defined specifically. Otherwise, it leaves room for more confusion.<sup>74</sup>

His suggestion of more specificity about the concept of security is an important element to correct a common mistake on the referent object of security. As described in the previous sections, security should be evaluated and marked with answers to several crucial questions. The “Security for whom?” question among them, for instance, is decisive for the referent object of security.<sup>75</sup> Deciding on to secure which actor/actors, help to specify the structure of the concept of security. However, in the post-Cold War

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<sup>71</sup> Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, p. 15.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>75</sup> Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, p. 13.

period, the arguments on security in the literature missed that point and often condemned the previous studies for using the term 'security' too narrowly. Whereas, it can be argued that the scholars working on security studies during the Cold War period have studied the concept of security, knowingly or unknowingly, in the context of national security. Still, it can be discussed that security studies in the Cold War period are narrow because of their focus was on military and nuclear issues.

For Buzan, determining the referent object of security is not sufficient to indicate the scope of the study.<sup>76</sup> He argues that essential concepts, like power, sovereignty, security (or national security), "cannot be defined in any general sense, but only in relation to specific cases."<sup>77</sup> The reason for this is essential concepts "contain an ideological element which renders empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving the dispute."<sup>78</sup>

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are two main approaches to the concept of security. The one is the negative approach which usually represented by the realist paradigm; and the other one is the positive approach, which usually represented by liberal paradigm. Helga Haftendorn adds another ideological element to the concept of national security and summarizes those ideologies in three dimensions in her work, *The Security Puzzle*.<sup>79</sup> She analyses approaches of Hobbes, as a realist; Kant, as a liberal; and De Grotius, as a midcourse thinker. De Grotius presents as an alternative to or a mixture of realist and liberalist paradigms. Haftendorn referred De Grotius, and De Grotius claims that:

[A]ll states in their dealings with one another are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form. However, as opposed to the view of Kantians, that these imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community of mankind but rather the acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and cooperation in a society of states.<sup>80</sup>

Each ideology is, as discussed above, corresponds a well-known ideology of

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., cited in Buzan, **People, State and Fear**, p. 26.

<sup>77</sup> Buzan, **People, State and Fear**, p. 6.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., Cited in Richard Little, "Ideology and Change", in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (Eds), **Change and the Study of International Relations**, London: Frances Pinter, 1981, p. 35.

<sup>79</sup> Haftendorn, pp. 5-7.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

international relations and security of nation-state, and each has different perspectives on national security. No matter how varied the perceptions of threat according to these different ideologies, primary elements, and values of states give us a general understanding of both the content of security and national security.

As Buzan put into words:

The meaning of security will be nearly as diverse as the conditions of the different states to which it applies, which not only adds to our difficulties in analyzing the concept, but also adds a hazard to its use in any general sense at all.<sup>81</sup>

Nevertheless, determining the defining features of states can help to draw a stable structure for the concept of national security. For this purpose, Buzan suggests to seeking three components in which existence of a states:<sup>82</sup>

- i) The idea of the state: authority in the minds of the people;
- ii) The physical base of the state: population and territory;
- iii) The institutional expression of the state: governing institutions and the like.

In addition to these three components, he underlines size and sovereignty as decisive factors which distinct states from other entities.<sup>83</sup> These defining factors and features of the states may vary from state to state, and they enable different set of values which acquired previously. However, they also allow determining the boundaries of national security.

Helga Haftendorn specifies the concept of security in three types by following Wolfers's recommendations: 'national security,' international security,' and 'global security.'<sup>84</sup> Haftendorn criticized the idea of 'global security' for adopting universal norms accepted by everyone. She does not agree that there are universal norms in international relations, although she accepts that world politics evolve through the

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<sup>81</sup> Buzan, **People, State and Fear**, p. 43.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 40. For more discussions about the component parts of the states what Buzan did, please see Buzan, **People, State and Fear**, especially Chapter 2: National Security and the Nature of the State, pp. 36-72.

<sup>83</sup> Buzan, **People, State and Fear**, p. 40.

<sup>84</sup> Haftendorn, p. 3.

global security paradigm.<sup>85</sup> She, instead, argues that the concept of ‘international security’ is more suitable than the two others in the context of current international relations.<sup>86</sup> However, since the issue of this study is not current international relations, national security will be prioritized in this section. National security and the strategy (or strategies) to ensure security are the primary concerns of this section.

The concept of ‘national security,’ as Haftendorn argues, is more interested in only one state and left others insignificant.<sup>87</sup> According to this view, the USA’s NSS documents are expected to care about only the USA’s national interests. It can be said that the term “national security” means the security of the state because the word “national” is a sign that the state and its citizens are accepted as a united. Although scholars agree that merely the state can be considered as an actor for the ‘national security,’ there are different opinions in the literature about what the scope of the national security should, just as the concept of security itself. At that point, Buzan’s idea of three definitive features of the states might shed light on the issue. In the context of this study, the concept of strategy is as important as the concept of security. Therefore, the following section will briefly discuss the concept of strategy.

### **2.3.2 The Concept of Strategy**

The concept of strategy, or grand strategy, is also one of the ambiguous concepts like security and national security. However, its ambiguity does not stem from, unlike the debate on the concept of security, an ideological dispute between the realist and the liberal paradigm over the concept. It is argued that strategic studies and the concept of (grand) strategy inherently reflects a realist perspective. At least, the belief in a need for a grand strategy stems from pessimism about the nature of the international system. Because scholars who study in this area mostly see the nature of the international system as competitive, and the nature of international politics as a place that dominated by chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity.<sup>88</sup> The need for a strategy stems

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> For an example of this please see Hal Brands, **What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush**, London, Cornell University Press, 2014, p. 8; Alvin H.

from overcoming these obstacles.

The current use of the concept of strategy was introduced at the same time as the concept of security/national security used during the First World War.<sup>89</sup> However, the first usage of the word ‘strategy’ dates back to Ancient Greek as “strategie.”<sup>90</sup> At that time, the meaning of “strategie” means something that we use today for the word “tactic.” So, it can be argued that the concept of strategy has a military origin. Modern understanding of strategy is, as Strachan argues, “the product of the growth of standing, professional armies on the one hand and of the Enlightenment on the other.”<sup>91</sup> It means that a strategy should contain both the means and methods which are significantly useful.

The concept of strategy, like the concept of security, does not have a specific or agreed meaning. Likewise, in its historical transformation, the meaning of strategy, from time to time, defined narrowly in a degree that almost it implies military tactics as mentioned above; or defined more broadly, as “the task of bringing together all aspects of national power [both military and non-military] to achieve an important objectives...”<sup>92</sup> both in peacetime and wartime.<sup>93</sup>

A military theorist of the 1900s, J.F.C. Fuller records in his book *The Reformation of War* that “our peace strategy must formulate our war strategy, by which I mean that there cannot be two forms of strategy, one for peace and one for war without wastage.”<sup>94</sup> With this formulation, it is clear that the strategy is not only a military policy or a group of military tactics implemented in times of war.

Clausewitz, who was the most famous Prussian general and writer of 1790s and is one of the most cited people in the strategic studies literature, defined the concept of

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Bernstein, MacGregor Knox, and Williamson Murray (Eds.), **The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War**, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 1.

<sup>89</sup> Brands, p. 2.

<sup>90</sup> Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, *Survival*, Vol.47, No.3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 34-35.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>92</sup> Edward Mead Earle (Ed.), **Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Hitler to Machiavelli**, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1943, pp. viii–x.

<sup>93</sup> Brands, p. 2.

<sup>94</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, **The Reformation of War**, London, Hutchinson, 1923, cited in Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, *Survival*, Vol.47, No.3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 39-40.

strategy as “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”<sup>95</sup> He also asserts that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”<sup>96</sup> It may be inferred from Clausewitz’s argument that strategy is a kind of declaration which formulates the state’s future policies, not merely but especially on foreign affairs. He believes that military success, which is politically impractical, is strategically worthless. Military victories are truly successful if they serve for political ends.<sup>97</sup>

It should be noted that Clausewitz did not conflate the term strategy with politics. He sees strategy as part of politics.<sup>98</sup> However, today, as Julian Corbett first suggested in the 1980s, the strategy is usually distinguished into two: “minor strategy” and “major strategy” or “grand strategy” as the Americans use.<sup>99</sup> Minor strategy, as Corbett says, is “plans of operations, the selection of objectives and the direction of the forces assigned to the operation.”<sup>100</sup>

The strategy acknowledged as today’s minor strategy in the 1900s. As Hew Strachan conveys, military men of the 1900s were defined strategy as “the conduct of operations in a particular theatre of war.”<sup>101</sup> This traditional view of strategy confines the concept into military operations, like the usage of stratege in the Ancient Greek. The distinction between the strategy in a military context and the strategy which includes other non-military aspects like economy and diplomacy inherently stems from different evaluations about the sources of a state’s power.<sup>102</sup> In Ancient time or medieval time, a state’s power was measured solely by military power. However, today, with the birth of the modern state, the power of a state evaluated by not only its military but also its

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<sup>95</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Eds. and Trans.), New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 133.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>97</sup> Hasan Basri Yalçın, **Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi: ABD, İngiltere, Fransa, Rusya, Çin**, İstanbul: SETA Kitapları, 2017, p. 20.

<sup>98</sup> Strachan, p. 34.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>100</sup> Julian Corbett, **Some Principles of Maritime Strategy**, Eric Grove (Ed.), cited in Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, p. 38.

<sup>101</sup> Strachan, p. 36.

<sup>102</sup> William C. Martel, **Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy**, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 24.

economic, institutional, technological, and some other strengths.<sup>103</sup>

However, the disputes over the concept of security are made in a strictly military context during the periods of two World Wars and the Cold War. The theories of international relations and its commonly used concepts have been argued in a more realistic and military context in the presence of war (or in the face of intimate and cruel threats). The same trend can be observed in the historical transformation of the concept of strategy under the same conditions. The narrow definition of strategy in military terms was also in use in the periods of two World War. As an example of this, Michael Howard defined the strategy in his work in the 1970s as conduct for only wartime:

Grand Strategy ... in the first half of the Twentieth Century consisted basically in the mobilization and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower and industrial capacity, together with those of allied and, where feasible, of neutral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime.<sup>104</sup>

However, the political environment of the Cold War, in contrast to its effect on the concept of security, has somewhat distorted the traditional strategy. During the Cold War, political leaders continued to consider the strategy in a military context despite the absence of an actual war. Scholars like Howard have accused themselves of being too strict in defining strategy and changed their minds to comprehend the concept in a more general sense.

In the lights of disputes mentioned above, Michael Howard's definition of strategy can be used by adding a small correction at the end: "... in both peacetime and wartime". The definition emphasizes the economic, social, and technologic aspect along with the military aspects of the state's power. It also points out external sources of power by underlining the importance of allies and neutral powers if available. Moreover, all these efforts have been made for specific goals of the state both in war and peace.

Hal Brand's view on grand strategy can be helpful for a more detailed and well-coordinated description. He defines grand strategy "as the intellectual architecture

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Michael Howard, "Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century", **Defence Studies**, Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2001), p. 1.

that gives form and structure to foreign policy.”<sup>105</sup> He also adds that grand strategy is not the only aspect of foreign policy. Besides, it is not a foreign policy as a whole. He explains this as “[A] grand strategy is a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so. ... [A] grand strategy represents an integrated scheme of interests, threats, resources, and policies.”<sup>106</sup>

States’ prime objective is survival as a sovereign entity in the international system.<sup>107</sup> In an “uncertain and competitive world,” grand strategy would give statesmen a relatively pure vision about how and for what purposes should state positions themselves in certain kinds of situation.<sup>108</sup> The strategy mainly works as a function that determines main principles, and a primary structure of the state’ set of values, which must be protected.

Moreover, it helps to decide (i) which values to be prioritized among various other values; (ii) which ends (goals or aims) would contribute to the preservation of current values; and (iii) which means help to achieve those ends. These values, priorities, and ends usually determine the state’s national security and foreign policy agenda. The strategy also helps to conduct appropriate policies to reach designated ends. Thus, it prevents political leaders from making incompatible political decisions, and it allows them to use the state’s resources wisely.<sup>109</sup>

### 2.3.3 NSS Documents in the US

In this section, it will try to be explained the purposes in the creation of NSS documents; who or which institutions involved in the creation of these documents in the US; which factors are useful in conducting the NSS documents, and what are the contents of these documents.

It can be argued that the national security strategy is not necessarily the same as

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<sup>105</sup> Brands, p. 3.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Lawrence Freedman, “Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century”, **Defence Studies**, Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2001), p. 11.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Krishnappa Venkatshamy, “The Problem of Grand Strategy”, **Institutes for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal of Defence Studies**, Vol.6, No.3 (July 2012), pp.113-128.

what strategy or grand strategy is. Because, on its name, the national security strategy is a kind of a statement of political preferences on national security issues. Therefore, national security strategy can be seen, according to this view, as a relatively short-term or security-oriented part of the grand strategy. In this sense, national security strategy documents can be positioned between grand strategy and defense strategy or military strategy.<sup>110</sup> Principally it is appropriate that national security documents should design as a bridge between the Grand Strategy and the defense strategy.<sup>111</sup>

However, numerous scholars use the term grand strategy in place of the term national security strategy in international relations literature and strategic studies literature.<sup>112</sup> But, Grand Strategy of a state is something that usually not written on paper, or it cannot be something that finds only in one document. Instead, it is something that emerges in the nation's tradition.<sup>113</sup> Even if it is formally written in a document, it usually not publicized.

In the US, there is a legal requirement that every government must annually report their NSS documents to Congress, so to the public. The legal basis for these documents is the National Security Act of 1947. The need for the Act of 1947 emerged from the conflicts between the executive and legislative parts of the government, and between the War Department and the Department of Navy during the formation and performance of military operations during the First and Second World Wars.<sup>114</sup>

When the National Security Act of 1947 enters into force, a new and modern institutionalization for US national security was held. A couple of new agencies were created by the Act: such as National Security Council (NSC), National Security Resource Board (NSRB), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Joint Chief of Staff.<sup>115</sup> All of these institutions, other than the government and the president himself/herself, contribute to the formation of the US's NSS documents with their

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<sup>110</sup> Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, p. 21.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20, 23.

<sup>112</sup> Brands, p. 3.

<sup>113</sup> Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, p. 21.

<sup>114</sup> Thomas P. Reilly, "The National Security Strategy of the United States: Development of Grand Strategy", *US Army War College Strategy Research Project*, Pennsylvania, USAWC, 3 May 2004, p. 2.

<sup>115</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration and the Cold War*, California, Stanford University Press, 1992, cited in Thomas P. Reilly, "The National Security Strategy of the United States: Development of Grand Strategy", p. 2.

recommendations. Therefore, it can be claimed that conducting a national security strategy for a state, in this sense, is a kind of political struggle, and it should not be a policy that produced by the President alone. In this respect, it can be claimed that a change of political leader has no direct effect on a change of a state's national security strategy.

It can be claimed that the grand strategy of a country has not been determined from an utterly rational perspective. In the literature, it is claimed that some factors other than policymakers also influence the formation of the Grand Strategy. Geography is one of these elements that shapes or limits a strategy.<sup>116</sup> Cultural features or identity is seen as another crucial element to define a state's grand strategy.<sup>117</sup> The main argument of this study is that when the structure of the international system and the condition of the state in that system is constant while the political tendency of the ruling party determines the security perspective, the closest threat to national security and available tools to cope with current or possible threats determines the foreign policy of that state. In this respect, it is strongly believed and defend by this study, that NSS documents are conducted with a largely realistic perspective.

As can be seen in the following table, the structure of the international system and the US's position in that system is constant in all periods. However, the political tendency of the ruling party, which is assumed in this study that affects the conceptualization of security, has changed. It is known that there are two mainstream political parties in the United States: Republicans and Democrats. It is also known that these two parties have different political tendencies. George Bush is a representative of Republicans, and Barack Obama is of Democrats. In terms of examining whether the political tendency of the ruling party influences foreign policy on national security, it seems logical to examine the presidency of these two presidents.

It is also expected that the change in the US's available tools to use against threats will change the methods, even if it does not change the means to be used. To illustrate this interaction, four NSS documents issued during the Bush and Obama

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<sup>116</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Geography and Grand Strategy", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.10, No.4 (1991), pp. 311-329.

<sup>117</sup> Peter J. Kanzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996.

periods and the foreign policy practices of the presidents in the relevant period will be examined comparatively. In this context, the development in the technology of unmanned systems can be yield as a game changer.

**Table 1: Comparison of Bush and Obama Periods in the Context of the Factors Affecting Change in Foreign Policy**

	<b>William J. Clinton</b>	<b>George W. Bush 1<sup>st</sup> Period</b>	<b>George W. Bush 2<sup>nd</sup> Period</b>	<b>Barack H. Obama 1<sup>st</sup> Period</b>	<b>Barack H. Obama 2<sup>nd</sup> Period</b>
<b>The Structure of the International System</b>	Anarchy	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant
<b>US's position in the International System</b>	Hegemon	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant
<b>Political Tendency of the Ruling Party</b>	Liberal	Change (Conservative)	Constant	Change (Liberal)	Constant
<b>Political Leader</b>	Bill Clinton	Change	Constant	Change	Constant
<b>The Closest Threat to the National Security</b>	WMDs	9/11 Attacks	Global Terrorism, WMDs	Economic Crisis	Economic Crisis
<b>Available Tools to Cope with Threats</b>	-	UAVs for Reconnaissance	-	UCAVs for Hunting and Killing	-

The formation of the National Security Act of 1947 had changed by three additional arrangements: The Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 in 1949; The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; and The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The final version of this process was shaped by The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. However, there has been no reduction in the number of domestic actors involved in the construction of the national security strategy.

There are several purposes, according to Alan G. Stolberg, of reporting the NSS documents to the Congress and the public. (1) It gives a basic structure to different departments and ministries to work consistently with each other and for conducting appropriate and coherent policies. (2) It informs the legislative institutions like the Parliament and the Congress on the resource requirement for the realization of planned strategies. (3) It gives an insight and ability to position/reposition themselves for the

domestic and foreign interlocutor.<sup>118</sup> In this context, it is normal for NSS documents to be considered by other states as well.

According to this, it can be claimed that NSS documents are created to harmonize the ends and the means at the expense of resources, and to give a message to the interlocutors. In addition to this, the US NSS documents are expected to carry the following characteristics:

- (i) It gives a comprehensive description and discussion of worldwide interests, goals, and objectives that are vital to national security;
- (ii) It should also address foreign policy, worldwide commitments and national defense capabilities which are necessary to deter aggression and to implement national security strategy;
- (iii) It gives plans for the short- and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power to protect or promote the interests and to achieve the goals and objectives;
- (iv) It gives the adequacy of the capabilities to carry out the national security strategy, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of elements of the national power of the state to support the implementation of the national security strategy, both in classified and unclassified forms;
- (v) It may also serve as the president's initial statement on his/her national security agenda.<sup>119</sup>

Stolberg claims that the US NSS documents are public strategy documents that create a list of national interests and goals, "but will not contain the detailed ways and means needed for an executable strategy."<sup>120</sup> However, an appropriate and comprehensive national security strategy should have three essential feature: ends, means, and methods.<sup>121</sup> It can be assumed that the four NSS documents published during the presidency of George Bush and Barack Obama also contains these features to a large extent.

It will be observed in the following chapter that whether the examined NSS

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<sup>118</sup> Alan G. Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents", **US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute**, October 2012, pp.2-3.

<sup>119</sup> Reilly, pp. 4, 14; Stolberg, p. 70.

<sup>120</sup> Stolberg, p. 72.

<sup>121</sup> Yalçın, **Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi**, p. 24.

documents do carry the mentioned features or not. It will be examined whether each document determines the means and the methods for every end or they leave some issues unanswered. The next chapter will also try to display the foreign policy preferences of the two presidents by comparing both within their two consecutive periods of administration and between their consecutive presidential periods. By comparing the national security strategies and foreign policy practices of the two presidents, the differences and similarities between each other will be revealed. In doing so, the claims expressed in the introductory part of this study on the origins of these differences and similarities will be tested.



### **3 THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECURITY IN NSS DOCUMENTS AND ITS REFLECTION IN FOREIGN POLICY APPLICATIONS: GEORGE W. BUSH AND BARACK H. OBAMA**

In this chapter, it will be examined that the four US NSS documents which published during the Bush and Obama governments. The primary purpose of this examination is exhibiting the resemblances and differences between the two presidents' understanding of US security, their national security priorities, and their foreign policy applications. This exhibition also gives us to trace the continuity or differentiation between two consecutive administrative periods of the presidents' themselves.

The main purpose of this review is to show that presidents of the United States may have similar behaviors in foreign policy practices when it comes to national security, despite having different political traditions. At the same time, it will be claimed that the foreign policy preferences of the countries are not shaped by the personal tendencies and/or the political preferences of the decision-makers, but by the external factors and states' available tools.

This chapter will try to answer the following questions to reach the end, which mentioned above: How the two presidents identify national security in their National Security Strategy Documents? What are their conceptualizations of security in the documents? What types of policies do presidents offer to apply for achieving or maintaining the US national security in their NSS documents? Did the Presidents implement the policies that they commit to applying in their documents during the subsequent period? The aim of this comparison is trying to show how governments may apply similar foreign policies while they conceptualize security in different ways.

In order to answer these questions, it will also be tried to answer some additional questions, as follows: What the "security of the United States" means for the two presidents? Do the two presidents define the concept of security in a narrow or broad sense in their NSS documents? According to the presidents, is military security the most important and only security element for the US national security. In other

words, do the two presidents considers the military as the only tool to fight any threat to the US national security? Alternatively, do the two presidents propose only military methods to combat threats to national security or non-military tools were also on the table? Are there any non-military aspects of the US national security, both as a threat and as a tool to fight against those threats? Does threats to the US national security identified in the NSS documents? What are the tools that the presidents propose to use to achieve or maintain the US national security? How much security was enough for being secure?

In the following section, it will be tried to evaluate in line with the objectives above-mentioned that how George W. Bush conducts the US national security in his NSS documents which published in 2002 and 2006, and what were the foreign policy applications during his two-consecutive presidency from 2001 to 2009. In the section after, it will be tried to evaluate that how Barack H. Obama conducts the US national security in his NSS documents which published in 2010 and 2015, and what were the foreign policy applications during his two-consecutive presidency from 2009 to 2017.

### **3.1 Bush Doctrine: The Conceptualization of Security in the NSS Documents and Implementation of the US Foreign Policy**

The 2002 NSS Document published on September 17, 2002, a year after the 9/11 attacks which held on Pentagon and Twin Towers. The 9/11 attacks were a great challenge to US homeland security and its domination over the international system. The attacks targeted the symbol and center of the US-controlled institutions of world economic integration and the heart of the US defense institution. Twin Towers in which hosted World Trade Center was the main institution and the symbol of world's economic integration and global liberal economic system; and Pentagon, the Ministry of Defense, the major and dominant institution for the US's defense and power.

Since the preparation and publication of the 2002 NSS document follow such a traumatic incident, most of us can be easily assumed that the document, as a matter of course, designed in such a protective and aggressive way to combat with threats. It is also considered that there is a distinction between the presidential candidate George

Bush's approach and the Bush Doctrine, which is formed after the incident. This kind of divergence can be a good example of how the important occasion in the international system influences the policy choices of decision-makers.

Some scholars claim that President Bush did not know much about what the US foreign policy and national security priorities are or should be.<sup>122</sup> John Fortier, for instance, from the American Enterprise Institute, said that "Bush was never foreign policy oriented, he had no experience on foreign policy. Even in the election campaign, he was not addressed foreign policy."<sup>123</sup> Bush's only foreign policy suggestion which can be taken into consideration during his presidential campaign was his insistence on the need to build a missile defense system for the ballistic missile threat. He is known as a strong defender of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system which protects the US and its allies against ballistic missile attacks. It had been said by the Republicans for a long time that the US is under the threat of ballistic missile attack, especially from rogue states such as North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK), Iran, and Iraq.<sup>124</sup> During the 2000 presidential election campaign, George Bush too offered to deploy a proper NMD.

The main reason for the need to NMD was, according to George Bush, the threat of the use of *Weapons of Mass Destructions* (WMDs). Bush emphasized the danger of the spread of WMDs even before he elected. He repeated his concerns on the same issue in his speech at the Military College of South Caroline on September 23, 1999, and at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library on November 19, 1999.

Bush's intense willingness to deploying NMD did not welcome by the US's European allies. They had been criticizing the new missile defense system because of the risk of degrading relations with Russia and China. Europeans were deeply concerned that Russia and China would accuse the US of having violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic

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<sup>122</sup> Gökhan Telatar, "11 Eylül Sonrası Amerikan Dış Politikasında Hegemonyanın Yeniden İnşası", **Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation**, (Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations, 2011), p. 71; İrem Bilensoy, "George W. Bush ve Barack H. Obama Dönemlerinde Terörizme Karşı Uygulanan Politikaların Karşılaştırılması", **Lectio Socialis**, Vol.2, No.1 (2018), p. 59; Johanna McGeary, "Dubya Talks the Talk", *TIME*, 25 March 2001, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,103785,00.html>, (Date of access: 24 May 2019).

<sup>123</sup> "George Bush'un Umulmadık Yükselişi", *Amerika'nın Sesi*, 18 January 2005, <https://www.amerikanin sesi.com/a/a-17-2005-01-18-voa11-87991657/842247.html>, (Date of access: 24 May 2019).

<sup>124</sup> Richard Dean Burns, **The Missile Defense System of George W. Bush: A Critical Assessment**, California: Praeger Security International, 2010, pp. 55-78.

Missile Treaty by deploying NMDs. Besides, they thought, it might lead to an arms race between the US and Russia and China.<sup>125</sup> Although it had been debated hotly and considered quite threatening in those days, deploying NMD cannot count as an offensive method of security.<sup>126</sup> It is, as the name suggests, an act of defensive measure. Despite George Bush's indifference to foreign policy during his presidential campaign or his suggestions to take a defensive position against WMD threat, the 9/11 attacks would affect and transformed his approach to US foreign policy quite sharply.

He had been continued to emphasize the danger of the use of WMDs by rogue states and especially by terrorist groups. He had been defended the need for NMD during his presidency. One of the most important issue both in the 2002 and 2006 NSS documents is the increase in the number of rogue states around the world and the danger of these states' use of WMDs or their transfer to terrorists.<sup>127</sup> Eventually, he declared in December 2001 that the US withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and six months later, the withdrawal came into force.<sup>128</sup> Contrary to what the US's European allies fear, Putin said he did not perceive the withdrawal of the US as a threat.<sup>129</sup>

The 2002 NSS document claims that, as a result of technological innovation in the military sector, several types of WMDs were invented. There are many actors (states or non-state groups) who eager to possess and/or produce those weapons. The main threat, as the 2002 document emphasizes, is the risk of these weapons would be owned by terrorist groups and rogue states. Bush stressed this point in his statement at West Point on June 1, 2002, as "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology."<sup>130</sup> It is understood that Iraq and North Korea are the primary actors who are cited as rogue states in the 2002 document, that may use WMDs

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<sup>125</sup> Philip H. Gordon, "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance", *Survival*, Vol.43, No.1 (Spring 2001), p. 18.

<sup>126</sup> For more discussions on offensive and defensive methods of security please see Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, pp. 197-209.

<sup>127</sup> George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", *The White House*, 17 September 2002, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf>, (Date of Access: 6 August 2018), pp. 13-16; George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", *The White House*, 16 March 2006, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf>, (Date of Access: 24 August 2018), pp. 18-24.

<sup>128</sup> Lynn F. Rusten, "U.S. Withdrawal from the Antibalistic Missile Treaty", *Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Case Study 2, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2010.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, p. 13.

against the US, or the ones who have the potential to trade WMDs to terrorist groups.

The sharp change in Bush's attitude towards US foreign policy is reflected in the measures to be used against the WMD threat. In the beginning, George Bush's only solution to this problem was deploying NMD, that he launched a layered missile defense system during his first presidential term later on.<sup>131</sup> Further, in the 2002 document, the president offers to use the full power of the US to cope with the WMD threat that comes from radical actors of the international arena. The full US power included both diplomatic, institutional, governmental, and military means. To this end, President Bush sorts the following methods as a receipt:

Proactive counterproliferation efforts. ... Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction. ... Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.<sup>132</sup>

Bush also indicates in the 2002 document how the US makes an effort against the proliferation of WMDs. He offers to ensure key capabilities such as "detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities."<sup>133</sup> Conducting a doctrine, planning training, and equipping of the US forces and those of its allies are the prominent tools for Bush to fight against WMD-armed adversaries.<sup>134</sup> Deterrence, nonproliferation, and deploying defensive ballistic missile systems are all considered as defensive measures.<sup>135</sup>

In addition to these methods of several means Bush also vigorously commits to take preemptive actions to combat with WMDs.<sup>136</sup> According to him, the most effective strategy to impede the WMD attacks from Soviet Russia during the Cold-War was deterrence. However, he assumes that the deterrence strategy would not be an effective defense against WMD threats from terrorists or rough states. Because these actors are

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<sup>131</sup> "U.S. Missile Defense Policy", *Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance*, <https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/missile-defense-systems/policy-coming-soon/>, (Date of Access: 25 July 2019).

<sup>132</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, p. 14.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, p. 200.

<sup>136</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, p. 15.

more inclined to take the risks of using WMDs than ordinary rivals (states).<sup>137</sup> This is an imminent threat which must be inhibited before it occurs; therefore, it must be disposed of preemptively. Preemptive actions or preemptive self-defense, unlike deterrence or nonproliferation policies, is counted as an offensive method of security.<sup>138</sup>

As it turned out, although George Bush proposed methods that could be called defensive against WMDs during his presidential campaign, he became more aggressive after he selected as president. Since there had been no dramatic change in US power within the international system, this can be explained by the impact of the 9/11 attacks. In addition to Bush's diversified methods against WMD threat, the 9/11 attacks added more on his Doctrine with the use of preemptive strike in the context of offensiveness.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US had been continuing to exist as the most powerful and most effective state in the international system. American rulers and policymakers were also aware of their countries power. Although the US was aware that it is the only superpower in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Erhan asserts that the US did not want to act as the police force of the world, alone.<sup>139</sup> It wanted to share the responsibility of maintaining or enabling the international or regional stability around the world with international institutions, such as NATO and the UN, and with its allies. Therefore, as Erhan claimed that, the US has begun to give special importance to globalization and has been trying to use it as a tool for its own interests. The states, which are challenging the US or resist on staying out of globalization, had seen as rogue states in the eyes of the US<sup>140</sup> George Bush, too, had been adopted the same understanding during his first presidential period. As will be explained below, Bush's strong support for globalization shows itself an "*American internationalism.*"

He also openly expressed his opposition to Clinton's understanding of foreign policy during his election campaign. He criticized Clinton's interventionism and

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Yalçın, **Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi**, p. 200.

<sup>139</sup> Çağrı Erhan, "ABD'nin Ulusal Güvenlik Anlayışı", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi**, Vol.56, No.4 (2001), p. 87.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

internationalism about being lack of vision or purpose.<sup>141</sup> He believed that the US should be more selective in the use of military force, suggested to not involve in every incident in the international arena and keep its energy for issues that affected the US national security and international peace directly and materially.<sup>142</sup> Rather than to withdraw his hand from the world, the US must take on missions with a better-defined purpose and directly related to American interests.<sup>143</sup>

These kinds of statements may lead some people to think that President Bush would be inclined to be isolationist, rather than being interventionist or internationalist.<sup>144</sup> However, it can be inferred from the 2002 document that President Bush does not deny the utilities of the current international system for the US. Instead, he states that the US's primary goal is the "American internationalism" in that reflects the US values and national interest.<sup>145</sup>

Some scholars explain President Bush's view on the international system and the position of the United States in this system as "American exceptionalism."<sup>146</sup> American exceptionalism is usually adopted by conservatives in US domestic politics. It refers to thinking Americans as special, and "... regarding America as the premier world power and, therefore, necessarily and rightly subject to different rules than other nations."<sup>147</sup> Bush's emphasis on American internationalism can be count as a sign of Bush's exceptionalism. As shown below, it is argued that president Bush's method in the war against global terrorism reflects Bush's exceptionalism.

This study asserts that Bush's embrace of American exceptionalism has emerged as American internationalism in the 2002 NSS document. It is understood from

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<sup>141</sup> Telatar, p. 71; David Hastings Dunn, "Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': The Bush Administration and Iraq", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol.79, No.2 (March 2003), p. 283.

<sup>142</sup> Dunn, p. 283.

<sup>143</sup> Telatar, p. 71.

<sup>144</sup> Erhan, pp. 91-92.

<sup>145</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002.

<sup>146</sup> Mustafa Kocakenar, "Amerikan Dış Politikasında İdealizm Realizm İlişkisi: Çatışma mı İşbirliği mi?", *TASAM*, [http://www.tasam.org/Files/Icerik/File/Çatışma\\_mı\\_İşbirliği\\_mi\\_Amerikan\\_Dış\\_Politikasında\\_İdealizm\\_Realizm\\_İlişkisi\\_by\\_Mustafa\\_Kocakenar\\_S.docx\\_9194f400-8b77-4b7f-9aa3-7411ce9f0bf4\\_\(1\).pdf\\_a8eefa47-79c7-43d5-96be-997a9b805ba1.pdf](http://www.tasam.org/Files/Icerik/File/Çatışma_mı_İşbirliği_mi_Amerikan_Dış_Politikasında_İdealizm_Realizm_İlişkisi_by_Mustafa_Kocakenar_S.docx_9194f400-8b77-4b7f-9aa3-7411ce9f0bf4_(1).pdf_a8eefa47-79c7-43d5-96be-997a9b805ba1.pdf), (Date of Access: 22 May 2019); Olaf du Pont, "But We're American ... The Presence of American Exceptionalism in the Speeches of George W. Bush", *Lodz Papers in Pragmatics*, Vol.3, No.1 (2007), pp.119-136.

<sup>147</sup> James W. Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism", *American Political Thought*, Vol.1, No.1 (2012), p. 5.

the statement in the 2002 document; president Bush bases the US national security strategy “on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of US values and US national interests.”<sup>148</sup> These values and interest are generally reflected by democracy, liberal values, the global economic system, and international institutions.

It can be claimed that Bush aims to maintain American internationalism by preserving the stability of the current international system which the US formulated and established after the Second World War. The current international system with all its institutions such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) works in favor of the US. George W. Bush is aware of the advantages of the current world system and wants to eliminate or extinguish any situation that would deteriorate the functioning of this system. It can be presumed that any incident which would disrupt or interrupt American internationalism would require American intervention. It can be said that Bush is aware of America’s power, strength, and influence. He expresses this in his first sentence of the 2002 document: “The United States possesses unprecedented –and unequalled– strength and influence in the world.”<sup>149</sup> Moreover, he intends to sustain this capacity and capability.

Spreading democracy and liberal values and enabling liberal economic integration through globalization is an activity that transforms other countries. Transforming others, as a method, is considered an offensive method of security.<sup>150</sup> George Bush, as J. Fortier claims, initially has not interested well on foreign policy. When he did, he adopted defensive methods such as deploying a missile defense system. On the other hand, advocating globalization, the proliferation of democracy, and liberal values throughout the world are offensive methods of security.<sup>151</sup>

Another important issue which is described as a threat to the US national security in the 2002 NSS document is *Global Terrorism*. The reason why global terrorism is perceived as the prior threat to the US national security is, again, the 9/11 terrorist attacks which held in 2001. Al-Qaida and the Taliban virtually have been

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<sup>148</sup> Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 2002, p. 1.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, pp. 200, 205.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

charged by the US government as responsible for the terrorist attacks.<sup>152</sup> It is known that *coalition forces* have been hunting down the Taliban and al-Qaida. This accusation repeated in the 2002 document as well. However, the cause of terror, as it can be inferred from the document, might stem from anyone –not just states– and anywhere.<sup>153</sup> For this reason, Bush did not limit the source of terror to the Taliban and al-Qaida in the NSS document. Instead, he stresses the terrorism itself.

The document does not give any intangible target about which actors or occasions are worth to fight against when it comes to global terrorism other than Taliban or al-Qaida. It is stressed that terrorists are not placed only in Afghanistan.<sup>154</sup> It is claimed that “Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.”<sup>155</sup> In addition to the actors who cause terror, Bush also indicates that they will also fight against the ones who intentionally *harbor* or provide aid to the terrorists.<sup>156</sup>

President Bush has concentrated his foreign policy on global terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. He has reacted against the US’ so-called enemies in a very short time of period, less than a month. Its focus was on al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, the US conducted military intervention against targets in Afghanistan with the coalition forces. Most of the NATO countries, including Britain, France, Germany, Australia, and Canada, have accompanied the US in operation “Enduring Freedom” to Afghanistan. The coalition forces have begun airstrikes on Afghanistan, targeted Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida fighters, and the Taliban. The US has backed the Afghan Northern Alliance militarily in the fight against al-Qaida and the Taliban.<sup>157</sup> Taliban was toppled down just within two months. However, the war against terrorism did not limit the governmental change in Afghanistan.

Counter-terrorism activities of the US and coalition forces would continue with

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<sup>152</sup> Peter L. Bergen, “September 11 Attacks: United States 2001”, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1 August 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks>, (Date of Access: 8 August 2018).

<sup>153</sup> Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>157</sup> “Timeline: US intervention in Afghanistan 2001 to 2017”, *Al Jazeera*, 22 August 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/2001-2017-intervention-afghanistan-170822035036797.html>, (Date of access: 29 May 2019).

military fights against al-Qaida militants. For this purpose, the US has deployed troops in Afghanistan, and their numbers have increased steadily. There were only 1.000 US soldiers in the region, and the number would increase to 48.500 US troops in 2008.<sup>158</sup>

About one and a half year after the US military intervention in Afghanistan, another military intervention was carried out in Iraq on March 20, 2003. The main reason for a military operation to Iraq according to Bush administration was Iraq's possession and manufacture of WMD's.<sup>159</sup> After the Persian Gulf War during 1990-91, the US took some precautions on Iraq to prevent it from future aggression in the Gulf region. In addition to economic sanctions against Iraq, the US had been realized inspection on Iraq to examine whether Iraq is having or developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (WMD's). During one of the inspections in the mid-1990s, it is revealed that Iraq has several kinds of weapons and technology related to WMDs that prohibited by the US government. Further, the Iraqi government did not allow authorities to inspect its country.<sup>160</sup>

UN Security Council Resolution 1441, passed on November 8, 2002, demanded that Iraq readmit inspectors and that it comply with all previous resolutions. Iraq appeared to comply with the resolution, but in early 2003 President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that Iraq was actually continuing to hinder UN inspections and that it still retained proscribed weapons.<sup>161</sup>

This situation posed an increasing threat to the US, especially after the 9/11 attacks. As it has been trying to be shown that the Bush administration considers the WMDs the most important threat to US security to be of secondary importance after global terrorism. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's refusal to accept UN officials was interpreted as a result of the failure of diplomatic initiatives by the Bush administration and on March 20, 2003, the US had launched an airstrike to Iraq. After several days of airstrikes, US and British forces were invaded in Iraq.

It is clearly understood that the 9/11 attacks have an immense impact on the

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<sup>158</sup> "Timeline: US intervention in Afghanistan 2001 to 2017", *Al Jazeera*, 22 August 2017.

<sup>159</sup> Later, it has turned out that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destruction.

<sup>160</sup> The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Iraq War: 2003-2011", *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 12 April 2019 (Last Updated), <https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War>, (Date of Access: 2 June 2019).

<sup>161</sup> The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Iraq War: 2003-2011".

NSS documents and the Bush doctrine. Although the NSS document does not directly use the accusatory language for the source of global terrorism to any actor, it is clear that Bush's foreign policy practices are targeting Afghanistan in the context of Taliban and al-Qaida, and Iraq in the context of WMD threat. Afghanistan and Iraq were the front lines in the War on Terror. US homeland security was violated for the first time after the attack on Pearl Harbor with the 9/11 attacks. George W. Bush blamed al-Qaida as responsible for the attacks on twin towers and Pentagon. He accused the Taliban in Afghanistan of protecting al-Qaida and the leader, bin Laden. He also declared that these attacks were carried out against NATO and the UN, as well as against the US. Iraq has also posed a threat to the US in terms of WMDs since there have been questions over Iraq may possess these weapons.

Bush Doctrine has shaped around a new type of enemy: global terrorism. Al-Qaida and the Taliban were viewed as the main sources of global terrorism. Iraq was also considered a safe haven for the terrorists in terms of giving an opportunity for terrorists to obtain WMD's. George Bush's speeches about the danger of the use of WMDs and his plan to cope with them by Anti-Ballistic Missiles are considered as the first stage of his Doctrine.<sup>162</sup> The terms such as "counter-terrorism," "axis of evil," and "preventive strike" have been the main components of Bush Doctrine. Afghanistan and Iraq had been the prior areas of so-called counterterrorism.

Bush proposes the use of all the elements of national and international power to defeat terrorism.<sup>163</sup> It means that Bush is willing to use both military and non-military means in the fight against terrorism. The most remarkable means in the US's strategy on counterterrorism is "preemptive strike."<sup>164</sup> As one of the tools of military method, a preventive strike is explained as "identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches the US borders."<sup>165</sup> Also, it legitimized as claiming that the best defense is a good offense, and preemptive strike gives the opportunity of a good offense.<sup>166</sup> Bush also addresses to use some diplomatic means like convincing, compelling, influencing or

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<sup>162</sup> Engin Akçay and Özdemir Akbal, "ABD Güvenlik Politikasında Söylem ve Pratik", *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi*, Vol.11, No.22 (2013), pp. 9, 19.

<sup>163</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, p. 6.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

supporting the states (friends and foes) to retain them from supporting or help them to fight against terrorism.<sup>167</sup> However, it can be said that non-military methods intended to be used against global terrorism are not priorities for the Bush administration during his first presidential period.

In addition to Bush's emphasize on the use of preemptive strike, he enforced the US allies with a very sharp language about taking their parts. He asked full support and contribution from the allies in the war against global terror by saying that "You are with us or against us."<sup>168</sup> Furthermore, he also made it clear that the US open to cooperate with the allies, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other countries, but will not hesitate to act alone against the terrorists if necessary.<sup>169</sup> This is a very clear indicator of Bush's unilateral position. This was a sharp change from multilateralism, the politics of sharing the responsibility with the partners and allies; to unilateralism, the politics of deciding and applying on its own by considering only its own interests, without considering the national interests of its allies and partners. While accusing Clinton of being over-interventionist during his presidential campaign, Bush was no longer reluctant to take actions on his own. Bush's unilateral position in the international system and the fact that he is implementing his own policies can be considered as an indication of American exceptionalism. However, more importantly, the situation that paves the way for Bush to take such a position is that the US is under a major security threat, rather than having a Republican president.

Apart from global terrorism and WMDs, which president Bush described as major threats to US security, he has talked about several factors in the 2002 document that have influenced American national security. These are (i) Human Dignity; (ii) Regional Conflicts; (iii) Global Economic Growth; (iv) Development; and (v) Develop Agendas for Cooperative Actions with the Other Centers of Global Power. Those issues, according to the president, directly or indirectly affect the human well-being and the stability of the existing system. The president considers any development that would

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "Charlie Gibson's Gaffe", *The Washington Post*, 13 September 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/12/AR2008091202457.html>, (Date of access: 26 May 2019).

<sup>169</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, p. 7.

impair the functioning of the current system as a threat to its national security. To make the existing system run smoothly and increase its impact area, the president thinks that the US: (i) must stand for the demands of human dignity; (ii) must defuse regional conflicts by working with others; (iii) promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores; (iv) help unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations; and (v) will strengthen the ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU), and increase their capacity and spread their efficiency.<sup>170</sup>

Although these factors which mentioned above are to seem secondary in importance in the context of the US national security, they would be the factors, for the Bush administration, to legitimize the US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It can be said that the 2002 NSS document is concrete in terms of threats, methods, and tools. It is clearly understood from the document that President George W. Bush has a certain opinion on what are the threats to the US national security. Global terrorism is one of the most important threats to US national security. WMDs is another threat which must be coped. There are also definite methods and tools recommended by the document to cope with those threats. Even if President Bush emphasized the necessity to spread liberal values to provide the US national security in the long run, he prefers to use military methods against WMD threat and the threat of terrorism, both in offensive (preemptive strike) and defensive (enhancing defense capability) way. Although President Bush mentions that he will use defensive methods and act jointly with other US partners, he also makes clear that he has prioritized preemptive strike and would not hesitate to do so alone if necessary. As a result of all these, it can be interpreted that the document has a narrow conceptualization of security. It focuses on the US's homeland security. In addition to this, the document is pointing out the possible actors who may intend to use WMDs. Iraq, North Korea, Taliban, and al-Qaida are the most probable actors who may use WMDs against the US and its allies. This is a clear signal of which actors President Bush will be at war in the future to ensure the national security of the US.

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

In his second administration period, George W. Bush obtained a similar perspective in the context of the US national security priorities. First of all, global terrorism and the danger of the use of WMDs are still the most important threats to US national security. However, it can be said that there is a significant change in Bush's understanding of the sources of global terrorism and WMD threat. Besides, he also suggests more balanced methods to combat these threats.

As 2006 NSS document indicates that, Taliban and al-Qaida are continuing to be the main cause of global terrorism, but not in Afghanistan anymore. Bush emphasizes that the US has considerably extinguished the safe haven in Afghanistan for al-Qaida during his first administration period. In addition to this, Iraqis have contributed to the war against terrorists with the support of the multinational coalition in Iraq. However, the president points out that terrorist networks became more disperse and less centralize, and this makes it hard to fight against terrorism. Besides, Syria and Iran began to harbor terrorists within their borders and supported terrorist activities abroad.<sup>171</sup> It means that the "War on Terror" did not over yet. It is continuous in other forms and different areas of the world.

Although President Bush did not ignore the fight against global terror, he did not prioritize it in his second presidential term in the way he did in the 2002 document. In the 2006 document, the president repeats his idea that the War on Terror is a two-stage struggle. The first one should be successfully concluded in the short term. This is a battle of arms which will be held militarily. The second one should be a continuous and long term battle of ideas, which will be held in the intellectual arena.<sup>172</sup> Instead of focusing on the first stage of the battle against global terrorism, as he does in his 2002 NSS document, he focuses on other issues, such as advancing democracy and human dignity by eliminating tyrannical regimes.<sup>173</sup> In this context, the 2006 NSS document determines non-democratic states, rogue states or tyrannies as a cause of global terrorism.

The shift in perception of threat from terrorists to tyrannies or non-democratic

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<sup>171</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2006, p. 9.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-11.

states can be evaluated as President Bush's understanding of security expands. Because, while Bush concerns in his earlier presidential term from the terrorist activities, such as armed attacks, bombing, the use of WMD, etc., he starts to be interested in other states' governmental structures. This can be considered true to some extent. However, it should be remembered that Bush opposes tyranny or non-democratic states because they allow the emergence of global terrorism. Nevertheless, it can be said that in the second term of his presidency, there is a diversity in the source of global terrorism that Bush perceives as a threat to national security. A similar situation can be observed in the means and methods that he proposes to use in the fight against terrorism.

In this respect, President Bush continues to pay attention to Afghanistan and Iraq. He says, “[w]inning the War on Terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq.”<sup>174</sup> It can be said that Afghanistan and Iraq are remaining as a front line in the fight against terrorists. As a matter of fact, President Bush maintained the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq during his second term. The US tried to defeat the Taliban militarily and help the Afghan state to rebuild its core institutions from 2002 to 2008.<sup>175</sup> Within this process, the US deployed more than 45,000 troops by mid-2008. A similar process had been implemented for Iraq. After Saddam Hussein toppled down in 2003, the US's major mission in Iraq was building a new government. On the other hand, the US sent more troops to Iraq in 2007 to improve security and curb sectarian violence caused by insurgents.<sup>176</sup> As a result, the ongoing military struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq remains important to Bush.

In the 2006 NSS document, preemptive self-defense is still a part of President Bush's national security strategy; not as a tool in the fight against global terrorism but against WMDs. Nevertheless, the 2006 document does not champion preemptive strike as much as in the previous document because the main objection against foreign policy choices of the 2001-2004 government focused on preemptive self-defense. For the period of 2001-2004 President Bush proclaimed that “major combat operations in

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>175</sup> Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War: 2001-2014”, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 8 July 2019 (Last Updated), <https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War>, (Date of Access: 24 July 2019).

<sup>176</sup> “US Iraq Troop Surge ‘Starts Now’”, *BBC News*, 15 June 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6757329.stm>, (Date of Access: 24 July 2019).

Afghanistan and Iraq were over.”<sup>177</sup> Despite the military successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and regrouping of armed groups in Afghanistan had overshadowed the US’s military successes. Instable domestic situations in Iraq and Afghanistan also affected the coalition members’ support negatively to the US existence in these countries. Because of this, foreign policy decisions about Iraq and Afghanistan, especially the military intervention into these two states had been highly criticized. Probably for that reason, while president Bush mention acting preemptively, he is not taking an offensive position unlike he did in the 2006 NSS document.

President Bush, in the 2002 document, emphasizes the need for and their decisiveness on the use of the preemptive strike sharply. He places second the use of preemptive strike in the fight against terrorist organizations and adds that “[they] will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary.”<sup>178</sup> On the contrary, in the 2006 NSS document, President Bush does not suggest to act preemptively against the threat of global terrorism. He just mentions that “the principle and logic of preemption ... remains the same” for the fight against the danger and spread of WMDs.<sup>179</sup> However, there is no further willingness or intention to act preemptively in an offensive way. It can be said that Bush has determined a more moderate way to ensure national security in his second term. Though, as it will discuss in the previous paragraphs, president Bush sets out the means and methods to combat WMDs that can be considered both offensive and defensive.

Instead of prioritizing the preemptive war, president Bush suggests expanding and championing democracy around the world as a tool for the fight against global terrorism in the long-term.<sup>180</sup> On the contrary, he sorts four steps to fight against terrorism for the short-term: (i) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur; (ii) Deny WMDs to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation; (iii) Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and (iv) Deny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad

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<sup>177</sup> Christine Gray, “The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA”, **Chinese Journal of International Law**, Vol.5, No.3 (2006), p. 556.

<sup>178</sup> Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 2002, p. 6.

<sup>179</sup> Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 2006, p. 23.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 10-11.

for terror.<sup>181</sup> However, there is no clear explanation for how these four steps will be performed. It can be inferred from the document that the president proposes to use the military as a tool because, for instance, he mentions about tracking down, killing, or capturing terrorists.<sup>182</sup> Other than that the 2006 document does not give any specific strategy on the means and methods to defeat terrorism. Instead, it seems that the document suggests using a broad range of tools.<sup>183</sup> Even though, although the concept of pre-emptive war pushed to the second -even third- plan, we can say that he did not give up the military struggle and even saw it as a tool to be applied in the first place.

Another quite significant change in Bush's understanding of security is related to actors likely to use WMDs against the US. The most probable actors who can attack the US with the WMDs are seen in the 2002 NSS document as terrorist organizations in the first place, and rogue states in the second.<sup>184</sup> There is no clear statement as to who these rogue states are in the 2002 document. Instead, the document only states that Iraq's WMD capacity is higher than what they expected, and North Korea have developed itself more and more in the field of WMDs.<sup>185</sup> However, in the 2006 document, the president clearly states that Iran and North Korea are primary rogue states who poses a great challenge to the US's security, especially in the context of the threat to use WMDs and of to support and harbor terrorist organizations. Along with rogue states president, Bush targeted tyrannies as a source of threat. He says that "some tyrannies, in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism, threaten [the US's] immediate security interests."<sup>186</sup> In addition to being rogue states, Iran, Syria, and North Korea are examples of tyrannies in the world.<sup>187</sup>

On the other hand, there is not much improvement in president Bush's national security strategy on the provided tools and methods to cope with WMD threats. Formerly, he suggested and initiated to deploying NMD system which can intercept

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, pp. 12-16.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>186</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2006, p. 3.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., pp. 3, 19-20.

WMDs at all phases of flight<sup>188</sup> and combat these weapons by improving counter-proliferated activities, denying rogue states and terrorists to acquire these weapons, and creating effective management to respond WMD attacks.<sup>189</sup>

In his second NSS document, Bush devotes quite a lot of space for means and methods to combat WMDs.<sup>190</sup> He handled nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons under separate headings. While the proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as a threat to national security, controlling the transfer of necessary components of a nuclear missile is proposed as a strategy. To reach this end, first, the 2006 document reflects that the US and world's leading nuclear exporters should create a safe and orderly system to close the loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the purpose of spreading nuclear energy without spreading nuclear weapons.<sup>191</sup> Secondly, the US will work on to reduce and secure nuclear and radiological materials around the world by locating and tracking existing stockpiles of those materials with the help of international initiatives such as Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).<sup>192</sup>

The president emphasizes that biological weapons pose a greater danger than nuclear weapons because they are not hard-to-acquire infrastructure or materials.<sup>193</sup> Nevertheless, he does not propose more complex suggestions to cope with the threat of biological weapons. In addition to reducing the spread of these weapons, he offers to improve the capacity to detect and defy them. Also, he considers modernizing the US's public health infrastructure and improves the capacity of medical countermeasures.<sup>194</sup>

The president's views on biological weapons can also be applied to chemical weapons. Compared to nuclear weapons, the acquisition or production of chemical weapons is not difficult for terrorists. In this context, Bush considers deterring and countering the threat of chemical weapons by denying terrorist access to necessary

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<sup>188</sup> "U.S. Missile Defense Policy", **Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance**.

<sup>189</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2002, p. 14.

<sup>190</sup> Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 2006, pp. 19-24.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

materials.<sup>195</sup>

It can be said that the 2006 NSS document, too, is concrete in terms of threats, methods, and tools. He continues to be focusing on the US homeland security; he is clearly pointing out the actors who pose a threat to the US security, and he is sure about what kinds of means and methods will be used to defeat these threats. Unlike the previous period, the threats of global terrorism, rogue states, and the use of WMDs by both terrorists and rogue states are seen as a set of intertwined threats. Global terrorism is continuing to be the most important threat to US national security, but there is a diversification in the sources of global terrorism. The president sees tyrannies as another source of terrorism in addition to given actors. In this respect, he considers Syria and Iran as actors of sources of terrorism because of their sponsorship to those groups. He proposes to use both the military combat and the transformation of the administration of non-democratic states as a means of combating terrorism. Both methods are considered as offensive according to the classification of security methods.<sup>196</sup>

There is a diversification in the methods and recommended tools to cope with WMD threats, too. The president emphasizes the continuity of the use of preemptive strike in principle. But he does not prioritize it. Instead, he prefers to work with regional and global partners and international institution to cope with these threats. As a corollary, it can be assumed that in the second term of his presidency, Bush gave up the preventive strike and chose a more defensive method. In fact, giving up the preemptive strike, which is an extremely aggressive method, does not mean giving up completely the aggressive methods. During his second term, George Bush continued to use conventional offensive methods in his national security strategy.

In the next chapter, Barack Obama's two consecutive presidential periods will be tried to investigate, and his two NSS documents will be examined in the context of national security. It will be looked for is there any continuities or differentiation in his two terms. Moreover, Bush and Obama doctrines will be compared, both in the context of their security perceptions, their preferences on the use of means and methods, and

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>196</sup> Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, p. 200.

their foreign policy applications.

### **3.2 Obama Doctrine: The Conceptualization of Security in the NSS Documents and Implementation of the US Foreign Policy**

This section will describe the Barack Obama government's understanding of security in his two periods by examining his 2010 and 2015 NSS documents and his foreign policy applications. By doing so, it will be revealed that whether Obama's foreign policy practices overlap with the strategy in his NSS documents and whether there are changes and/or continuities both his two periods and George Bush's two successive presidencies.

When Barack Obama came to the presidency in January 2009, it can be claimed that he faced a bunch of problems. (i) Two military interventions, which were expected to be completed in a very short time, are still ongoing and do not seem to end soon; (ii) An economic crisis that broke out in the US in 2008 and adversely affected the other states' economies; (iii) A hegemon whose image has deteriorated due to the failures in its foreign policy decisions and applications in the last two presidential terms. The problems that Obama faces are not limited to these, but it can be said that these were the most important issues on the agenda.

Among these various problems, Obama gives priority to *renewing the US leadership* in his 2010 NSS document, because he assumes that the prosperity of American people serves as a source for military power, for sturdy diplomacy, and for the beneficial influence of the US in the world.<sup>197</sup> He believes that the US must first regain its power within its borders, then they can be able to shape the international arena.<sup>198</sup> The strength of the US in all respects, as Obama points out, depends on the welfare of the American people.

He outlines the US's national priorities at the beginning of his 2010 NSS document. After he underlines the significance of renewing the US leadership, he mentions about the security of American people, the threat of WMDs, attacks and

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<sup>197</sup> Barack H. Obama, "National Security Strategy", *The White House*, May 2010, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>, (Date of Access: 28 July 2019), p. 9.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

challenges to cyber networks, the threat of al-Qaida, the importance of rebuilding economic strength, promoting universal values abroad, and shaping international order respectively.<sup>199</sup> It is stated that all elements of American power, including American people, must be used in order to achieve the desired success in all these areas.<sup>200</sup> This situation shows that Obama's perceptions of threats coincide with a very broad perspective. The same applies to the diversity of means to combat threats. This proves that the national security understanding of a government with a liberal perspective is quite inclusive as in the approach of the liberal perspective in the security literature.

As it is mentioned above, the *economic crisis* was already one of the crucial problems that the US faced when Barack Obama became president. That is probably why the president prioritizes maintaining economic stability and economic growth in the 2010 NSS document for the purpose of the US strength. In this respect, he promises to invest in areas such as education, energy, science and technology, and health care<sup>201</sup> because Obama concerned that the US maintains its military superiority but has recently lost its competitiveness.

The main reason why President Obama thinks that the US has lost its economic superiority is China's unexpected rise. China's increasing economic power and influence caught US attention during Obama's first presidential period. Primarily, China became the largest US foreign creditor in 2008.<sup>202</sup> It can be thought that China's increasing military budget, especially in 2007, has disturbed the US. Finally, in the second quarter of 2010, China became the second-largest economy in the world.<sup>203</sup> These developments have led Obama to include China to his 2010 NSS as a significant issue. In this respect, he underlines the importance of developing bilateral relations, especially with China, India, and Russia.<sup>204</sup> As a matter of fact, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the US interest concentrated on Asia.<sup>205</sup> The president asserts that building certain relations with rising powers will both prosper the US, the

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<sup>199</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>202</sup> "Timeline: U.S. Relations with China: 1949-2019", *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china>, (Date of Access: 14 August 2019).

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 43.

<sup>205</sup> "Timeline: U.S. Relations with China: 1949-2019", *Council on Foreign Relations*.

US allies and partners, and other states financially, and economic strengthening will enable the US to strengthen in general. Eventually, as he thinks, interconnection can protect the US and its allies against global threats such as terrorism and the use or spread of WMDs along with climate change.<sup>206</sup> For this reason, according to the Obama administration, overcoming the economic recession first, and secondly becoming financially stronger, is a key to renewed and active leadership for the US.

Obama's strategy on China's rise especially grounds on deepening the US ties with the countries of the region by trade and investment, increasing security cooperation, and by pursuing a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship.<sup>207</sup> In this respect, it should be interpreted that Obama is planning to make China a part of the international order, in the medium term, by trading and forming alliance-like relations with China. In addition to this, as it is inferred from the following quotation, Obama is ready for enforcing China to peace, if it will be necessary:

We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises.<sup>208</sup>

These are also can be count as offensive methods of using economic and diplomatic means.<sup>209</sup> In this respect, it is understood that President Obama does not look much different from George Bush.

However, it should be noted that, although the two presidents prefer offensive methods, it is a fact that they have determined quite different strategies from each other. It can be said, especially when compared to Bush's unilateralism that followed the 9/11 attacks, Obama is craving for multilateralism. Given the financial crisis after two years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be normal for Obama to want to share the burden on the US with other actors. This strategy, which is named as passing the buck is

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<sup>206</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 2.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Yalçın, *Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi*, p. 200.

another example for offensive methods.<sup>210</sup> He prefers to act through its partners, allies, and international organizations instead of acting unilaterally to overcome various problems.<sup>211</sup> Some scholars entitled this as ‘leading from behind.’<sup>212</sup> Yet, Obama sees the way to enabling the US leadership by not acting unilaterally, unlike Bush, but by enhancing interconnection between the US and its partners, allies, and collaborators.

In this regard, it can be easily confirmed that the Obama administration did never act alone, did not ignore or neglect its allies or international organizations during his first presidential period. If the debate about whether the results are beneficial for the United States is left aside, it can be said that Obama has demonstrated a successful policy on implementing multilateralism in international relations. For instance, during the Arab Spring, or at the beginning of the Syrian Crisis, instead of performing a direct military intervention, Obama left the process to international organizations such as the UN and NATO. Whether this attitude during the Arab Spring or the Syrian Crisis benefited the United States is another matter of debate.

Iran could be another successful example of Obama’s multilateralism and choice of using diplomatic channels rather than military means. Iran has been a great danger to US national security, especially in terms of the potentiality of obtaining nuclear weapons. The US has been making efforts for many years to prevent Iran from reaching a capacity of producing nuclear weapons, and governments were usually restrained Iran, especially by implementing sanctions.<sup>213</sup> However, Barack Obama was the only US president to agree with Iran. To reach this end, he follows a different path from Bush, especially in three points. These three important points make him successful in making progress with Iran on the use of nuclear power.<sup>214</sup> At the forefront, Obama acknowledges that the US can lead the whole world but cannot solve all the problems

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>211</sup> Obama, “National Security Strategy”, 2010, pp. 12-13.

<sup>212</sup> Linda A. Hill, “Leading from Behind”, *Harvard Business Review*, 5 May 2010, <https://hbr.org/2010/05/leading-from-behind>, (Date of Access: 14 August 2019); Richard Miniter, **Leading from Behind: The Reluctant President and the Advisors Who Decide for Him**, NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, e-book. Herbert I. London, **Leading From Behind: The Obama Doctrine and the U.S. Retreat From International Affairs**, Bryan Griffin (Ed.), NewYork: The London Center for Policy Research, 2017.

<sup>213</sup> Kelsey Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran”, updated by Alicia Sanders-Zakre, *Arms Control Association*, July 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran>, (Date of Access: 13 August 2019).

<sup>214</sup> Gordon Adams, “The Iran Long Game: Bush vs. Obama”, *Foreign Policy*, 14 April 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/the-iran-long-game-bush-vs-obama-nukes/>, (Date of Access: 1 August 2019).

alone. Secondly, he claimed that in order to ensure the rival state, who is considered as a threat, to act under international norms, it must first be contacted with it. Finally, he recognizes that military power or economic sanctions should not be the first choice for solving a problem.<sup>215</sup> He gives priority to the diplomatic engagement with Iran in the issue of the nuclear deal, but he does not completely ignore the need for the military, especially if it is a nuclear threat. He underlines this position in the 2010 NSS document by saying that:

Our military must maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, preserve access to the global commons, and strengthen partners.<sup>216</sup>

He maintained this approach during his second presidential period.

The most significant reason why Obama did not want to carry out a direct military intervention to a place outside the US borders is that military intervention costs too much for the US economy. As the reason for the economic crisis in the US, Obama cited the military interventions in Iraq, which began years ago and cost hundreds of billions of dollars to the US.<sup>217</sup> Therefore, he promised to withdraw the US soldiers, especially from Iraq during the presidential campaign. He had foreseen 16 months from his inauguration for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.<sup>218</sup> Accordingly, President Obama declared his plan as combat forces will be left from Iraq by August 31, 2010, and the remaining troops as well by the end of 2011. The last combat forces will be withdrawn from Iraq by the mid-August 2010.<sup>219</sup>

In this respect, he underlines this situation in the 2010 NSS document as they will end the US military presence in foreign countries as well as will ensure economic strength.<sup>220</sup> Finally, all US troops withdrew from Iraq by the end of 2011, albeit with a delay in the plan. Obama's focus on economic values of the US and withdrawing

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 14.

<sup>217</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 1.

<sup>218</sup> Matt Corley, "Obama: 'I Believe That 16 Months is the Right Time Frame' for Getting Out of Iraq", *Think Progress*, 1 December 2008, <https://thinkprogress.org/obama-i-believe-that-16-months-is-the-right-time-frame-for-getting-out-of-iraq-d5b8e06a4089/>, (Date of Access: 29 July 2019).

<sup>219</sup> The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Iraq War: 2003-2011".

<sup>220</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 7.

military presence from foreign countries feel the idea that he will focus on domestic politics rather than foreign policy. Indeed, it seems that he takes an isolationist position.<sup>221</sup> Obama has crucial concerns about the US's lost ability to compete due to the burden of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and he newly derived his focus to the financial crisis. Hereof, as Hillary Clinton declared, the US shifted its attention from the Middle East to Asia. On the other hand, it should also be reminded that the plan of withdrawing US military from Iraq is an issue that the US and Iraqi governments have agreed upon during the late George W. Bush presidency. Hence, it can be said that withdrawing the US troops from Iraq did not a brand-new strategy for the US. It is the implementation of an agreement that has been agreed on already.

Contrarily, President Obama did not achieve similar success in Afghanistan. In fact, he did not show any willingness to withdrawing from there. In the War on Terror, Bush cited Iraq and Afghanistan as front lines. Yet, Obama has brought Afghanistan and Pakistan to the fore. He identifies Afghanistan and Pakistan as a field for the fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates.<sup>222</sup> When it comes to the fight against terrorism, it appears that Obama has not set a different strategy other than what Bush did. Apparently, according to Obama, while the war in Iraq is affecting the US economy negatively, the war in Afghanistan is not affected that much.

President Obama's first action on the Afghan War when he took office was sending more troops there. In addition to 32.000 NATO service members and 36.000 US troops, Obama sent 17.000 US troops to Afghanistan by his approval on February 17, 2009.<sup>223</sup> Even after replacing General David McKiernan with General Stanley McChrystal to bring about and implement a new strategy to Afghanistan, the Obama administration decided to send more (30.000 soldiers) troops in 2010.<sup>224</sup>

While the US continued to fight against al-Qaida in Afghanistan on the one hand, it has also started to hit terror targets with the unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), especially in Pakistan. These vehicles were started to be used as a

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<sup>221</sup> Hasan Basri Yalçın, "Obama Stratejisi ve Ortadoğu", *Akademik Ortadoğu Dergisi*, Vol.9, No.2 (2015), p. 63.

<sup>222</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 1.

<sup>223</sup> Witte, "Afghanistan War: 2001-2014".

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

complementary mean during the George Bush administration. Yet, President Obama decided to use UCAVs as a primary mean in the fight against terrorism.<sup>225</sup> UCAVs would help the Obama administration on not to send additional troops to the region. However, the use of UCAVs in the fight against terrorism did not prevent the sending of troops to the region. After all, Obama declared a plan for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, right after US forces killed Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011.<sup>226</sup> Finally, the US forces completely withdrew from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Consequently, it can be said that no matter how Obama's liberal perspective affects his understanding of security, Obama determines his foreign policy according to real politics. When it comes to the fight against terrorism, Obama's strategy can be clearly defined as the use of military means by offensive methods.<sup>227</sup>

Obama's insistence on the use of UCAVs is another issue of debate. Because some scholars consider the use of UCAVs morally unacceptable on the one hand<sup>228</sup>, some think that the use of UCAVs is better than the alternatives, on the other.<sup>229</sup> It is claimed that civilian people, as well as terrorists, suffered from losses.<sup>230</sup> For this reason, it is assumed that the anti-Americanism increases in the countries where the method of UCAV in attacks is used.<sup>231</sup> However, it should be remembered how Obama criticized the Bush administration for the tarnished image of the US due to the military interventions, especially in Iraq. Because Obama asserted that the US undermined its values, which makes it a leader of the world while it maintained its military presence in Iraq. In addition to the debates over the use of UCAVs, WikiLeaks released some confidential documents and videos of US airstrikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010. These documents and videos revealed numerous unreported civilian deaths caused by the US's UCAV attacks.<sup>232</sup> As a result, Obama cannot be said to be more successful than Bush in living and preserving American values. This situation can also be counted

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<sup>225</sup> Ferhat Pirinççi, "ABD'nin İHA Saldırıları", *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol.7, No.67 (May-April 2015), p. 38.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Yalçın, p. 200.

<sup>228</sup> Pirinççi, p. 39.

<sup>229</sup> Nicholas Grossman, "'Are Drone Strikes Moral?' is the Wrong Question", *ARC Digital*, 1 April 2018, <https://arcdigital.media/are-drone-strikes-moral-is-the-wrong-question-98e81ae2f343>, (Date of Access: 31 July 2019).

<sup>230</sup> For more information about the legal and moral issues on UCAVs and UAVs please see Marcus Schulzke, **The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation**, Palgrave Macmillan: 2017; Nicholas Grossman, **Drones and Terrorism: Asymmetric Warfare and the Threat to Global Security**, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018.

<sup>231</sup> Pirinççi, p. 39.

<sup>232</sup> Witte, "Afghanistan War: 2001-2014".

as evidence of Obama's real political choices in foreign policy.

Obama's liberal ideology may lead to a broader understanding of the concept of security. He may also care about the means other than the military power in the fight against threats. However, this does not mean that he will never use military power as a mean in the fight against threats. Contrarily, in cases where threat perception coincides with Bush, the means to fight against the threat he chooses often remains the same, even if the method differs. This shows that the ideological tendencies of the ruling party are not effective enough to change foreign policy preferences while influencing the approach to the concept of security.

On the other hand, it is witnessed in the case of Pakistan how the method of combating threats has changed with the addition of a new tool: UCAVs. On the one hand, Obama defines Afghanistan and Pakistan as the front line in the fight against global terrorism, and on the other hand, he sees the US military presence in foreign countries as a burden. At this point, UCAVs meet Obama's need. While Obama continues to reduce the US military presence in foreign countries, he also continues to use military means to combat terrorism.

It is quite easy to understand when the 2010 NSS document's first chapter is examined that Obama thinks the problems he faces, and the solutions to these problems are interconnected to each other. When he found a solution to one of these problems, the other problems, gradually, will be eliminated depending on this solution, like a domino effect. It seems that the most important problem which must be solved is renewing the US's leadership position. The most important reason why the US lost its leading position is its tarnished image in the international public opinion. The reason for the corruption in the US image was negative experiences during its military presence in Iraq. Furthermore, military interventions to Afghanistan and Iraq cost too much to the US. The cost of US military interventions and military presence in the two countries caused a deep economic recession. Economic recession and stagnation of growth were, too, affecting the US strength. Eventually, the solution to all these problems, as Obama assumes, is to be reversing economic recession and empowering the global economic relations, withdrawing the US troops from both Afghanistan and Iraq, and living the

American values to gain credibility to stand up against tyranny.

As a result, interestingly President Obama proposes a wide range of means to reach the end of empowering the US economy, and finally, to the end of renewing the US leadership. These are sorted as providing quality education, enhancing science and innovation, transforming energy economy, lowering the cost of health care, and reducing the Federal deficit.<sup>233</sup> He also claims that investments in these areas will also strengthen the US against threats of terrorism and natural disasters.<sup>234</sup> In addition to all these solutions, means, and tools, he also emphasizes the need for being committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Because, the only way to gain leadership in the international system again, according to Obama, is to promote these values by living them.<sup>235</sup>

As can be seen from the descriptions above, the 2010 NSS document is very fragmented in terms of both threats, aims, and solutions. In addition to the economic crisis, and the need for renewing the US leadership, Obama gives reference to a new kind of threats such as threats to cybersecurity, climate change, pandemic diseases, and global criminal networks. He also mentions some traditional threats such as terrorism, WMDs, and failed states.<sup>236</sup> He seems to have a wide range of perceptions of threats to US national security, but he is highly concrete about the threats.

This broad range of threat perception tells us about Obama's understanding of the concept of security. It is obvious that the new president adopts a wide and broad conceptualization of security. It is wide in terms of the referent object of security: cyber network, the environment, public health, the US national or homeland security<sup>237</sup>, etc. It is broad in terms of the means and methods to cope with these threats: increasing the effectiveness of international institutions, improving diplomatic relations with the rival states, and strengthening local and global economy along with the military measures are the key instruments in the fight against the threats. This makes the 2010 NSS document

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<sup>233</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 2.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>237</sup> In fact, he underlines that homeland security and national security are parts of a whole. See Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2010, p. 2.

remarkably concrete but extremely dispersed, especially in deciding which threat is the most dangerous than the others, or which threat needed to fight first. This has caused Obama to appear to have contradictory policies in his foreign policy. For instance, while defending the need to withdraw from Iraq on the one hand, he continued the military struggle in Afghanistan and Pakistan, albeit in different methods. This shows us that Obama has made real-political decisions when it comes to foreign policy and national security.

In his second period of administration, President Obama embraces a very similar strategy to his first period. The second NSS document is like a more refined copy of the first one. One of the issues he emphasizes both in the first and the second NSS documents is the international order. In the 2010 NSS document, strengthening the current relations, building and increasing the economic and diplomatic relations with the emerging centers, especially China and Russia, and cooperating with them through international institutions and ensuring the compliance of these countries with international norms were the prominent issues.

On the other hand, in the 2015 NSS document, it is observed that the President specifically referred to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Obama outlines the necessary means to support Ukraine and the measures to be taken to deter Russia, but also surprisingly states that the US "... will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia."<sup>238</sup> Indeed, he did not go beyond imposing sanctions on Russia for its disruptive activities on international order, such as the annexation of Crimea and aggression to Ukraine. In this case, too, Obama maintained his isolationist attitude because the US national security was not affected directly, and he did not want to confront an actor with a nuclear power like Russia.

Furthermore, the economic strength of the US is still within the top priorities of the president's strategy, particularly in the context of China's rise. Thus he continues to take an isolationist position. Nevertheless, China's economic strength was not the only reason for the US turning its face to Asia. In addition to becoming strength financially,

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<sup>238</sup> Barack H. Obama, "National Security Strategy", *The White House*, February 2015, <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>, (Date of Access: 28 July 2019), p. 25.

the fact that China has made the US economy more dependent on itself, and made significant investments in its military. This rise of China means a new and not well-known competitor yet. In order not to weaken and lose its current position in the face of China, it can be said that the US must complete its own economic renewal and strengthening after the great depression in 2008, and take China under its control. It can be said that President Obama's efforts on this issue continue in the 2015 NSS document:

The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. ... We seek cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights. We will closely monitor China's military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. On cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government.<sup>239</sup>

In this context, it would not be expected that the US would be involved in the conflicts in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, Obama did not intervene in any incident that he thinks would not directly affect US national security and interests.

The president has often been criticized for not involving in the Syrian crisis. Especially after Russia's military intervention in Syria with the call of Bashar Assad in September 2015, Obama's decision became more questionable. Moreover, the abundance of civilian casualties and the use of WMDs made it even more difficult to be insusceptible to the Syrian crisis. Before all these, Obama stated in 2012 that the use of chemical weapons is his red line.<sup>240</sup> Still, on the never-ending Syrian Crisis, despite several reports published on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, even after an attack

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>240</sup> The CNN Wire Staff, "Obama Warns Syria not to Cross 'Red Line'", *CNN*, 21 August 2012, <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/20/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html>, (Date of Access: 14 August 2019).

in Damascus on August 21, 2013, Obama has not changed his position.<sup>241</sup>

On the other hand, the president began to interest in Syria after the threat of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) spread from Iraq to there, but in a very limited way. The reason why the US has become an actor of the crisis in Syria, albeit in a limited way, is in fact due to Obama's view of ISIL as a direct threat to US national security. ISIL is regarded as a radical Islamist terrorist organization like al-Qaida, and its connection with al-Qaida is also known. Obama did see the ISIL as an important threat to the US national security; because he did not want to take the chance to face a tragic situation like the September 11, 2001, attacks. As a result, Congress approved, in 2014, the president's plan to train and arm Syrian rebels in the fight against ISIL.<sup>242</sup> Obama's decision on initiating an airstrike with the international coalition which included the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan accompanied Congress's approval.<sup>243</sup> Instead of sending military ground troops, he focused on the training and equipment of the rebel groups in the region.

President Obama determines this way of combatting against terrorism in his 2015 NSS document as shifting away from a model of fighting costly to a more sustainable approach by conducting targeted operations, acting collectively with responsible partners, training and equipping local partners and providing them operational support.<sup>244</sup> It should be remembered that Obama implemented the same strategy in Iraq before Syria in the fight against ISIL.<sup>245</sup>

It can be said that both the 2010 and the 2015 NSS documents are concrete but

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<sup>241</sup> To see Barack Obama's changing understanding on the 'red line' please see Glenn Kessler, "President Obama and the 'Red Line' on Syria's Chemical Weapons", *The Washington Post*, 6 September 2013, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/?noredirect=on>, (Date of Access: 14 August 2019). For more information on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and international community's responses on this issue please see Yasmin Naqvi, "Crossing the Red Line: the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria and What Should Happen Now", **International Review of the Red Cross**, Vol.99, No.3 (2017), pp. 959-993.

<sup>242</sup> "Congress Approves Mission to Train, Arm Syrian Rebels", *Fox News*, 18 September 2014, Last Update 20 December 2015, <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/congress-approves-mission-to-train-arm-syrian-rebels>, (Date of Access: 14 August 2019).

<sup>243</sup> Madeline Conway, "Timeline: U.S. Approach to the Syrian Civil War", *Politico*, 4 July 2017, <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/timeline-united-states-response-syria-civil-war-237011>, (Date of Access: 14 August 2019).

<sup>244</sup> Obama, "National Security Strategy", 2015, p. 9.

<sup>245</sup> For a discussion of how useful this strategy is to eliminate ISIL please see Ferhat Pirinççi, Oytun Orhan and Bilgay Duman, "ABD'nin IŞID Stratejisi ve Irak ile Suriye'ye Olası Yansımaları", **ORSAM**, Report No. 191, Ankara, September 2014.

varied in terms of threats to the US national security. It is observed that the 2015 NSS document is a refined copy of the 2010 NSS document. Only a few new threats, such as Russian aggression and ISIL terror, has emerged in Obama's second term; but the means and methods to be used he suggests does not change.

President Barack Obama strikingly differs from President George Bush on a diversity of threats to national security and strategic tradition. While George Bush's administration determines threats in a very limited number, Barack Obama's administration lists almost every kind of incidents as a threat to US national security. Barack Obama adopts an isolationist position, while George Bush embraces US superiority.<sup>246</sup> In this respect, Bush took unilateral actions in the international arena, and he usually preferred military interventions. Contrarily, Barack Obama preferred withdrawing the US military troops in foreign countries, and he chooses to pass the buck to the US allies and regional partners.

The most important strategic move for Obama has been avoided taking an active role abroad for the purpose of reducing the burden on the US. It can be said that he is quite successful in this regard. It is another topic of whether or not this choice was correct for the US and for the international order that works for the benefit of the United States. Although Obama wanted to protect the functioning of the international order, it seems that he failed to fulfill this aim from time to time because of his isolationist attitude. Another reason for Obama's failure might be that his perception of threats to national security is quite wide, and therefore, he cannot take the necessary action to combat these various threats. Although Obama is as clear as Bush about what the threats are, the surplus in the number of threats may have made it difficult to tackle them.

When taking into account the debates and comparisons made throughout this study, it can be argued that both Bush's and Obama's perceptions of national security have been determined by the threat they placed first. While the primary threat, according to Bush, was global terrorism in the 2001 NSS document, it was renewing US leadership, according to Obama, in both the 2010 and the 2015 NSS document. It is

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<sup>246</sup> For more information about strategic traditions in US grand strategy please see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy", *International Security*, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 5-53.

observed that during his second presidential period, Bush has avoided adopting a unilateral foreign policy as he did in his first period since global terrorism has been weakened relatively in his second presidential term. On the other hand, as the threat posed by the rise of China to US national security continued during Obama's second presidential term, Obama did not give up his isolationist position.



## CONCLUSION

This study sought an answer to the question of ‘Why do some governments’ security conceptualization disaggregate, but their policies overlap on the same issues?’. The main reason for focusing on this question is that while Bush and Obama’s foreign policy practices are said to be quite different from each other, the similarities between them have been ignored. This study both tried to underline the similarities as well as the differences and also tried to answer the reasons for the differences and similarities.

The doctrines of Bush and Obama were compared to show where the presidents’ policy choices overlap, and where to differ. Four consecutive administrations were examined to ascertain the overlapping and differences. First, George Bush’s two successive presidencies were compared. The same was done for Obama. Thus, the changes and similarities in the foreign policymakers of the same president were observed too.

In this study, it has been suggested that there may be six different factors which can affect the similarities and differences in governments’ foreign policy preferences. These were i) the structure of the international system, ii) state’s position in the system, iii) political tendency of the ruling party, iv) political leader, v) the closest threat to national security, and vi) available tools to cope with current or possible threats.

It was assumed that the value of the first two factors does not change in the periods examined. Yet, there was no in-depth discussion how and why this happened in this study. It was thought that it is not difficult to accept the structure of the international system is anarchic in all periods examined and the US continues to occupy its hegemonic position in this anarchic international system in the same periods. Thus, it was asserted that differences between the four administrations’ foreign policy choices do not stem from the change in the structure of the international system, or from the US’s changing position in that system.

In the last part of the second chapter of the study, the legal reasons and necessities for the creation of NSS documents in the US and the process of preparation of these documents were explained. By doing so, it has been tried to show that the

influence of the political leader on foreign policymaking is much less than thought. Because it was displayed that there are many institutions and actors involved in the process of the formation of NSS documents other than the president and his/her officials. Thus, the political leader, who is thought to have an impact on the national security strategy and foreign policy of the state, was found to be a factor without that have no influence.

When the NSS documents of the two presidents were compared, a few significant differences were found. First of all, Bush's threat perception is more limited than Obama. The prominent threats to the US national security, according to George Bush, are global terrorism and the use of WMDs. He also emphasizes human dignity, the importance of eliminating regional conflicts, igniting a new era of global economic growth, and encouraging democracy around the world. However, it is obviously understood that these are basic but not primary ends (goals or aims). Barack Obama, on the other hand, underlines issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, food security, and global health security as a threat, in addition to Bush's security perception. In addition to these, it was seen that the importance of the development of the economy, energy security, preservation and maintenance of American values, support of democracy and many other elements were observed under the headings of prosperity, values and international order. It was understood that Obama's understanding of security is more comprehensive than that of Bush.

The first two part of the second chapter was tried to explain why and how the concept of security defined in different ways. This explanation was also an answer for different conceptualizations in Bush's and Obama's NSS documents. The liberal perspective reveals itself in security studies by increasing the number of relevant objects. This increase is done by including all levels of analysis into the subject of security. In this respect, human security, food security, global security, climate change, infectious diseases, and so many other issues can be the object of national security. The state is considered an actor who must ensure the security of actors at all levels of analysis. Nonetheless, it is recognized that actors other than the state should also be involved in ensuring security. As a reflection of this understanding, it is important to

realize that Obama emphasizes the contribution of international organizations and individuals in ensuring the security of the US and the international system as much as the US.

The realist perspective, on the other hand, interested in 'survival of the state' in a sense. It is often equated with the military security of the nation-state. It can be assumed that the understanding of classical realism is also close to this. Though, today, it is something more than that. The basic elements; which a state needs to survive, such as economic durability, political stability, military strength, self-sufficiency; are considered as relevant objects of security for realist perspective. The difference between realist and liberal perspective, on the scope of the concept of security, can be observed in the conceptualization of US security in NSS documents of Bush and Obama. As it was observed in this study, Republican Party, which represented by George Bush and known as conservative, is more inclined to adopt realist perspective in security issues. Conversely, Democratic Party, which is represented in this study by Barack Obama and known as a liberal, is obviously prone to liberal perspective in security issues. Consequently, the reason why Bush and Obama have different perceptions of security in their NSS documents stems from the differences in the political ideologies of their parties.

In the third chapter, George W. Bush's and Barack H. Obama's presidential periods were compared. Two consecutive periods of administration of George Bush from 2001 to 2008 and two consecutive periods of administration of Barack Obama from 2009 to 2017 had been examined respectively. It was found that the two presidents adopt very different strategic cultures. While Bush implements US superiority in his foreign policy, Obama prefers isolationism. Nevertheless, no matter how their strategic cultures differ, it is also understood that the methods chosen by the two presidents to cope with threats are offensive. For instance, while President Bush prefers direct military intervention in the fight against global terrorism, President Obama is more inclined to use military tools indirectly such as training and arming local partners and by using UCAVs. Both presidents used the same mean (tool) against the same threat but preferred different methods. It is assumed that this difference stem from the difference

in the presidents' strategic culture. The reason for the differentiation in the strategic culture is based on the primary threat which the presidents are facing, and on the existing tools. In order to show these two elements' effects on the differentiation, the Bush and Obama periods were compared within themselves.

While there has been no significant change in the field of military technology during the transition from Clinton to Bush or from Bush's first presidential period to his second period, it can be said that there has been a change in the primary threat. Global terrorism has never been as destructive as before the Bush era. For this reason, George Bush's first presidency saw a sharp change in foreign policy and security.

It was determined that while George Bush's foreign policy approaches which he preferred during his two successive presidencies overlap largely, it was also found that there were nuances. For instance, while global terrorism was a major threat during Bush's first presidency, its importance declined relatively during his second term. This, in turn, resulted in President Bush's second presidency, relinquishing unilateral action in the international arena and co-operating with his traditional allies. It can be said that Bush preferred to act alone in the international arena in his first period as president, and in the second presidential period, he sought the support of his allies, partners, and international institutions and organizations. This can be interpreted as particularly a change in the methods of US interventionism. The most important reason for this change is that the threat of global terrorism is not as close as in 2001. After the elimination of a threat that is likely to be imminent and destructive, the methods to use the means may change, even if the means to combat the threats remains the same. However, it was understood that the methods he applied in both periods were intrinsically offensive.

On the other hand, it can be argued that Obama maintained his strategy throughout his eight years of presidency. Since the rise of China continued to be a primary threat to US security, Obama continued to isolationist strategy to keep the burden of maintaining international order to a minimum. Obama sees the renewal of US leadership as a top security element. But, during his first presidency, in particular, it seems that he preferred an approach that was not much different from Bush's in the

fight against certain threats, such as the fight against global terrorism. For instance, while Bush preferred direct military intervention in the fight against al-Qaida, Obama preferred to use the UCAVs, to train and equip regional groups. Even though the methods preferred by the two presidents are different, it can be said that both are offensive.

The most important and imminent threat to the US leadership position had been the rise of China. It was understood that Obama had overestimated the threat posed by China's rise; thus, he did not consider so many times to deal with other threats to national security. The moderate reaction of the US against Russian aggression can be the most prominent example of this. Although it is obvious for the international public opinion that Russia has been involved in Ukraine's internal affairs and annexed the Crimea, the US has not done further than saying that it will take deterrent measures against Russia. Furthermore, Obama underlines in his 2015 NSS document that they will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia. In this context, it can be said that Obama has perfectly applied the isolationist strategy to maintain the US leadership, but he has had to neglect other priorities such as the maintaining of international order. On the other hand, the measures that Obama tries to apply against China's rise, such as developing mutual relations, increasing trade volume between the two countries, and forcing China to comply with the international order can be defined as offensive methods.

As a result of the study, it was accepted that the structure of the international system and the position of the USA in this system remained constant throughout the periods examined. When the process of preparation of NSS documents is examined, it is shown that the President is not an actor who can make decisions on his own in security policy and foreign policy concerning security. As a result of the comparison of the examples, it has been shown that the political tendency of the ruling party affects the governments' approach to the security concept. On the other hand, it has been shown that even if the ruling party has not changed, the change in the closest threat to the security of the country or an innovation in military technology cause a change in the government's foreign policy methods.



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