

T.C.  
MARMARA UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF TURKEY'S  
HUMANITARIAN AID TO SOMALIA**

Master's Thesis

ABDIDAHIR ALI YUSUF

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Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ABDİDAHIR ALI YUSUF

Danışman: DR. ÖĞR. ÜYESİ ŞÜKRÜ YAZĞAN

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Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı

İmzası

1.	Tez Danışmanı	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi ŞÜKRÜ YAZĞAN	
2.	Jüri Üyesi	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi HAKAN MEHMETÇİK	
3.	Jüri Üyesi	Prof. Dr. GÜLDEN AYMAN	

## Özet

*Dış yardım, devletlerin dış politika aracı olarak kullandıkları gerçek yeniliklerden biridir (Morgenthau, 1962). Ancak, yardımda bulunanların hiçbiri, yalnızca kişisel çıkarlarına dayanarak dış yardım sağladıklarını iddia etmez. Hemen hemen tüm bağışçılar için dış yardım sağlanması ahlaki görev ve sorumluluklardan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu tezde, Türkiye'nin Somali'ye insani yardımına ilişkin olarak, dış yardım ve dış politika arasındaki ilişki incelenmektedir. Türkiye'nin Somali'ye insani yardımını bir örnek olay incelemesiyle ele alarak, bu çalışma ilk olarak "Dış yardımın neden sağlandığı" sorusu için mevcut literatür tarafından verilen cevapları tartışmaktadır. Daha sonra, Türkiye'nin Somali'ye katılmasının nedenlerini ve Türkiye'nin Somalile ilişkilerini sadece insani müdahaleden değil, aynı zamanda dış politika hedeflerinden de kaynaklandığını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma yardımda bulunan ülkelerin dış yardım sağlama konusundaki iddialarının, dış yardımın verilmesindeki gerçek amaçları yeterince açıklamadığını savunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, devletlerin dış politikalarının bir parçası olarak dış yardımlarını nasıl tahsis ettiklerini ve kullandıklarını analiz etmek önemlidir. Çalışmada, dış yardım sağlama kararının gelişimsel ve insani güdülerden ziyade genellikle politik, ticari ve diğer amaçlarla yapıldığı öne sürülmektedir. Tez ayrıca, 'uluslararası tanınma', 'insani diplomasi', 'yumuşak güç' ve 'ticari çıkarın' Türkiye'nin Somali'de gerçekleştirmeye çalıştığı ana amaçlar arasında olduğunu varsaymaktadır. Ancak, Türkiye'nin Somali'deki yardımları, Somali'deki diğer yardım donörleriyle karşılaştırıldığında nispeten başarılı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Türkiye'nin somali'deki yardım modeli, sadece para sağlamanın, dış yardımın işlevinin etkili bir şekilde yerine getirmemesini; ve sağlanan bu yardım şeklinin yardımın etkenliği için de önemli bir faktör olduğunu göstermektedir.*

## ***Abstract***

*Foreign aid is one of the real innovations which the states have been using as an instrument of foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1962). However, none of the main aid donors would claim that they provide foreign aid solely on the basis of self-interest motivations. For almost all donors, the provision of foreign aid is driven by some kind of moral obligations or duties to provide it. This thesis examines the relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy with respect to Turkey's humanitarian aid to Somalia. By addressing Turkey's humanitarian assistance to Somalia as a case study, this study first discusses the answers that have been provided by the existing literature for the question of "Why foreign aid is provided". It then tries to explain the reasons why Turkey has involved itself in Somalia and how Turkey's engagement with Somalia is not just driven by the humanitarian response but also by its foreign policy goals. This study argues that donor countries' claims about providing foreign aid does not sufficiently explain the real purposes for which foreign aid is given. It is important to analyze how the states are allocating and using foreign aid as part of their foreign policy. This study argues that the decision to provide foreign aid is generally driven by political, commercial, and other purposes rather than developmental and humanitarian motives. The Thesis also suggests that International recognition, humanitarian diplomacy, soft power, and business interests are among the main goals that Turkey intends to achieve in Somalia. However, Turkey's efforts in Somalia has been considered relatively successful when compared with the other aid donors of Somalia. Turkish model of assistance in Somalia demonstrated that just providing money does support the foreign aid to function effectively; the way assistance is provided is also an important factor for the aid effectiveness.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b><i>AU</i></b>	African Union
<b><i>DAC</i></b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b><i>GDP</i></b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b><i>GNI</i></b>	Gross National Income
<b><i>IHH</i></b>	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
<b><i>JDP</i></b>	Justice and Development Party
<b><i>OA</i></b>	Official Aid
<b><i>ODA</i></b>	Official Development Assistance
<b><i>OECD</i></b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b><i>TIKA</i></b>	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
<b><i>UNDP</i></b>	United Nations Development Program
<b><i>USAID</i></b>	United States Agency for International Developments
<b><i>PCO</i></b>	Projects Coordination Office
<b><i>TFG</i></b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b><i>IDA</i></b>	International Development Association

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This research is aimed to study the relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy with respect to the Turkey's engagement with Somalia. It is an attempt to understand how states' foreign aid-giving practices are motivated by their foreign policy goals. Turkey's recent involvement in Somalia was particularly welcomed by the Somalis since it has arrived. Its activities in Somalia have met with a positive reception inside and outside Somalia. Its involvement has never been questioned when it first came to Somalia. Somalis have seen Turkey as a friend rather than an external power to be feared. However, this begs the question why Turkey chose to involve itself in Somalia, a country in which Turkey has neither security and geopolitical interests nor common borders? What is Turkey's agenda in Somalia? Is it just out of the kindness of her heart or Are there any other objectives which motivated Turkey's assistance to Somalia? This thesis aims to provide answers and explanations to all these questions.

This study seems an important to understand the motivations behind Turkey's decision to involve itself in Somalia and how Turkey's humanitarian actions in Somalia can be related to its foreign policy goals generally in Africa and particularly in Somalia. It is also important to study why Turkey's efforts in Somalia have been relatively more successful when compared with the other traditional donors of Somalia who has been present in Somalia for almost thirty years. Moreover, one could be curious about whether it would be successful if the other donors in Somalia used the same model of assistance which Turkey has been using in Somalia.

Foreign policy, as it is commonly defined, is a state's behaviour with regard to other states in the international arena to achieve its goals. Although the states' specific goals in foreign policy may vary from one state to another, economic and political interests have always dominated the states' foreign policy agendas. Therefore, states usually have many options which they can use to achieve their foreign policy goals. Foreign aid is considered one of the most prominent tools that states use to pursue their foreign policy agendas. According to Hans Morgenthau, foreign aid is one of the real innovations which the states have been using as an instrument of foreign policy.

Appart from a few temporary programs of humanitarian relief in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, foreign aid is often considered as a new element which has emerged at the end of the Second World War. Today, many governments and organizations are involved in giving foreign aid. Several international organizations like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank, development banks, and several governments including all rich countries of North America, Western Europe, Japan, as well as developing countries such as Turkey have significant programs of foreign aid to the World's poor countries.

Turkey's foreign aid to Somalia has been considered as unprecedented. It was launched after scores of deaths caused by the famine in Somalia in 2011. Since then, Turkey has become one of the largest humanitarian donors to Somalia providing humanitarian and development aid. Somalia has been within the top five largest recipients of official aid from Turkey since 2011. Turkey's engagement in Somalia has been multifaceted. It has built major infrastructure projects, provided humanitarian assistance, financed scholarships, recently opened its Embassy (the largest in Africa) and military base in Somalia, facilitated political dialogue, and supported institutional capacity building.

Many scholars have discussed how states' foreign policies are influenced by their allocation of foreign aid. 'What purposes do the governments pursue with their aid and why do they choose those specific purposes' are among the questions which has been frequently discussed in the academic literature. For instance, it has been debated whether foreign aid was provided for political, economic, and diplomatic purposes of the donor country- or whether it is provided mainly to help to improve the human condition in the aid-receiving poor countries. In other words, do the governments provide humanitarian assistance to the poor people merely out of the kindness of their hearts or do they provide aid because they are expecting something in return. Carol Lancaster, for instance argues that; if states are supposed to be responsible for the

security and well-being of their own citizens, why then would they intend to give their public resources to enhance the well-being of people in other countries?<sup>1</sup>

From realist perspective, for example, foreign aid is primarily a tool or an instrument which the states use as a means of enhancing their security. Whenever states say they are doing something for others, it is nothing more than an empty discourse for justifying their own foreign policy goals. In other words, states may sometimes help others but they do so only when they are expecting something in return. George Liska is among the early realists who argued that aid was a tool for enhancing national power and security. He articulated the view that foreign has been and will remain for some time as an instrument of political power.<sup>2</sup> Marxist scholars, on the other hand, regard the foreign aid as a tool of dominant states at the center of world capitalism to control and exploit developing countries. From this perspective, foreign aid is often tied to the exports of goods and services from donor countries to the poor countries and securing access to the imports of raw materials from the recipients.

Liberal internationalists and others within the liberal tradition in international relations perceive foreign aid as an instrument or reflection of the tendency of states to cooperate in order to address problems of interdependence and globalization. This means that aid would be provided to control the common problems worldwide such as infectious disease or reducing poverty and environmental degradation. Foreign aid was also interpreted from the perspectives of constructivism as a norm in which the rich countries provide assistance to poor countries in order to improve the quality and lives of their people. One of the arguments of this view in the recent literature on foreign aid is David Lumsdaine in his book *Moral Vision and International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime*. Lumsdaine argues that “economic aid cannot be explained just the donor state’s political and economic interests. It is the donor state’s response to world poverty which arose mainly from ethical and humane concern and from the belief that long term

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<sup>1</sup> Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 8.

<sup>2</sup> George Liska, *The New Statecraft* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 14.

peace and prosperity was possible only in generous and international order where all could prosper.”<sup>3</sup>

This study argues that donor countries’ claims about providing foreign aid does not sufficiently explain the real purposes for which foreign aid is given. In addition to the states’ arguments about their intentions, it is important to analyze how they are allocating and using foreign aid as part of their foreign policy. This study argues that the decision to provide foreign aid is always driven by political, commercial, and other purposes rather than developmental and humanitarian motives. Although development, solidarity, and humanitarian assistance have been important in the allocations of foreign aid for some donors, foreign aid from the largest bilateral donors is usually being provided for purposes that are based on regional and commercial relations rather than poverty reduction objectives. This is also true for the case of Turkey’s humanitarian involvement in Somalia.

This paper also argues that while the facts on the ground makes Turkey’s engagement with Somalia a win-win situation, its humanitarian action in Somalia is obviously driven by its long-term foreign policy objectives both in Somalia and Africa. Although Turkey’s business interests in Somalia are not negligible in this case, gaining an international recognition as an emerging political and economic power is the most remarkable agenda in the Turkey’s presence in Somalia. However, more importantly, humanitarian diplomacy and soft power are among the most important tools that Turkey is using as a foreign policy tool to achieve its agendas in Somalia. This study also tries to showcase how Turkey’s foreign aid efforts have been unique and unprecedented when compared with the other donors in Somalia. Turkish model of assistance in Somalia demonstrated that just pouring money is not enough; the way assistance is provided is also an important factor for the aid effectiveness and even with small amounts of aid, a donor country can make a big difference on the ground.

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<sup>3</sup> David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3.

The goal of this study is to examine how states' foreign aid-giving practices are determined and driven by their foreign policy goals. In order to have theoretical and conceptual frameworks, this research is aimed to provide an overview of the literature and debates on how the provision of foreign aid by the donors is always related to the donors' foreign policy agendas. As a case study, this thesis also examines Turkey's humanitarian assistance to Somalia and tries to analyze what makes Turkey's recent engagement with Somalia exceptional and unprecedented. By conducting both literature and data analysis, this study attempts to explain how Turkey's involvement in Somalia is not only driven by a humanitarian action but also by its desire to pursue geopolitical interests in Africa generally, and particularly in Somalia. More importantly, the aim of this study is also to demonstrate that, foreign aid will not be effective and help those who are in need if it is used to achieve donor's foreign policy aims. However, the research will also demonstrate how Turkey's aid to Somalia has been positively exceptional when compared with the other western donors of Somalia.

This study is based on both relevant academic literature and data analysis. Although some available data from open sources has been analyzed, this study is more qualitative one with case study approach. By reviewing the existing literature from different theories and approaches, this study tries to find out how states' foreign aid-giving is mostly driven by their foreign policy goals. First the research conducts a review of the existing literature such as books, journal articles, reports, as well as media sources in order to have appropriate theoretical frameworks for the topic. Then, it will apply these frameworks to the case of Turkey's humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Through graphics and tables, this study also performs statistical analysis in order to see the place of Somalia in the Turkey's total official assistance to the world's major aid recipients in general and to Sub-Saharan Africa. The research also analyzes how Turkey's official assistance to Somalia has relatively increased over time. The data which is used in this study are collected from the databases of The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (TIKA).

The thesis consists of 4 chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter 2 discusses the purposes for which donor states intend to use their foreign aid-

giving by first looking at different theories and approaches which provide different answers to this question. The chapter begins by defining the concepts to be used in the study and briefly looks at how aid has been given so far and why aid's purposes have differed from one state to another. It then examines the answers that the main donors of foreign aid have given to explain why they provide foreign aid, and finally, it will discuss the reasons that the governments provide aid by summarizing how, in practice; the foreign aid donors have allocated their aid.

Chapter 3 presents a short survey of Turkey's opening to Africa and the place of Somalia in the Turkey's Africa relations. It also provides a brief summary about Turkey recent arrival in Somalia in order to understand how Turkey's involvement in Somalia, which was initially considered a purely humanitarian action, has now become a comprehensive long-term Somalia and Africa policy for Turkey. This Chapter also discusses how Turkey's official assistance to Somalia has evolved and increased overtime. By examining the most recent available data on Turkey's official development assistance to Somalia, the chapter empirically analyzes how Turkey's official development assistance to Somalia have recently started and rapidly increased. The chapter also discusses Turkey's place among other traditional donors of Somalia in order to understand what kind of assistance model have made Turkey's assistance in the country relatively exceptional. The final chapter tries to pull together the answers provided by the existing literature and the findings from the case study.

## **2. FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS**

According to some scholars, the reason why foreign aid is provided is clear and self-evident: To help people those suffering abroad and in need of help, or to save lives in emergency situations, to promote development and to eradicate poverty in poor countries. Others argue that foreign aid is a tool that is used by the policymakers to achieve some particular goals or to influence the political judgments of the recipient countries.<sup>4</sup> It is also argued that “foreign aid is often provided for donor’s interests rather than developmental or humanitarian reasons”.<sup>5</sup> In this chapter, I will discuss the reasons for providing foreign aid by using different approaches and theories that provide different answers to this issue. The chapter begins by defining the concepts to be used in the study and briefly looks how foreign aid has been given in the past and why aid’s purposes have differed from state to state. Then it will examine the answers that the main donors of foreign aid have given to explain why they provide foreign aid, and finally, it will discuss how the foreign aid donors have allocated their aid in practice.

### **2.1 Conceptualization**

For the concepts of foreign aid, soft power, and humanitarian diplomacy, different definitions might be given, it is important to be clear what we are referring when we use these concepts throughout this study.

#### **2.1.1 Foreign Aid**

Foreign aid is a controversial concept. In general terms, it encompasses all resources such as physical goods, skills, financial gifts, and loans transferred by donor governments to recipient governments. In this broad definition, many important questions are needed to be answered: it does not mention who are the respective donors and recipients, why foreign aid is given, and what are its short and long terms impacts.

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<sup>4</sup> David A. Baldwin, “Analytical Notes on Foreign Aid and Politics,” *Background* 10, No. 1 (1966), 67.

<sup>5</sup> Foreign Aid: a geopolitical foreign policy tool, *Daily Times (Pakistan)*, 08 September, 2018 <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=n5h&AN=BKM2DTP20180908.16.247.00063&lang=tr&site=ehost-live> (13.03.2019).

Donor governments may not be always the rich countries and the recipients do not have to be the poor countries. The impacts of foreign aid could be positive, negative or neutral. The reason why it is given could be to help the recipient, to help the donor, or it could be given in favor of both. These resources could be provided to address humanitarian, poverty, and development needs in poor countries. It could also be provided to achieve political and strategic interests of the donors, or recipients, or sometimes both.

In its broad definition, foreign aid consists of different types and forms. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, classifies foreign aid into six types: (1) humanitarian foreign aid, (2) military foreign aid, (3) subsistence foreign aid, (4) prestige foreign aid, (5) bribery, and (6) foreign aid for economic development.<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau's classification of these six types of foreign aid is based on the purposes or the motives for which aid is given. He suggests that these six types have only one thing in common: the transfer of money, goods and services from one donor state to another recipient state. He observes that humanitarian aid, for example, is non-political but it can carry out a political function when it operates in a political context. According to Morgenthau, for instance, "foreign aid proffered and accepted for purposes of economic development may turn out to be something different from what it was intended to be; most likely, it will turn out to be a bribe or prestige aid."<sup>7</sup>

Another study tries to conceptualize foreign aid from perspectives of several international relations theory. Tomohisa Hattori, in order to define 'what is foreign aid' offers two basic answers from the perspectives of political realism and liberal internationalism.<sup>8</sup> From the view of political realism, Hattori argues that foreign aid is a political instrument that emerged in the Cold War to influence the policies of recipient countries. From liberal internationalism view, foreign was defined as a tool designed to improve the socio-economic and political development of recipient countries.

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<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *The American Political Science Review* 56, No. 2 (1962), 301.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Tomohisa Hattori, "Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid," *Review of International Political Economy* 8, No. 4 (2001), 634.

However, more narrow and limited foreign aid definition which is related to world poverty is more common. This type of foreign aid is particularly related to the aid from the developed countries to the poor or low-income countries in which is aimed to address human suffering and contribute to human welfare, poverty reduction, and development. This type of foreign aid is usually defined as development aid or development assistance<sup>9</sup>. Most broadly, development aid is defined in relation to either the possible impacts it could have on the recipients or in relation to the purpose for which it is given. For instance, it could be defined those resources transferred from donor governments to the recipients which are successful in addressing the humanitarian needs, reducing the poverty and vulnerability, and contributing the fulfillment of the basic rights and freedoms of the poor people in poor countries.<sup>10</sup>

Another way of defining development aid is related to the purpose for which aid is given. In this sense, development aid is defined by some, that part of foreign aid whose purpose is intended to contribute to human welfare and development in poor countries<sup>11</sup>. Foreign aid can also be in the form of cash (grants or concessional loans), in the form of food aid, or in the form of debt relief. These transfers are usually given to fund a different set of activities such as investment projects, budgetary and balance of payment needs in recipient countries, economic or political reform programs, and humanitarian relief.

The most common and significant definition of foreign aid has made by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The DAC defines foreign aid that part of overall aid given by donor governments to poor countries. This is generally termed as “Official Development Assistance (ODA)”. Regarding the recipients of the foreign aid, DAC refers two types of recipients: the first parts of recipients are the poorest developing and low-income countries, while the second part consists of the more advanced and developing nations and countries and territories in transition. So, the

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<sup>9</sup> Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 18.

foreign aid which is provided to the first part is classified as ODA, while the aid which goes to the second part is termed as Official Aid (OA).

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) can be precisely defined as “flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including states and local governments of which meets the following two criteria: it is provided with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objectives, and it is concessional in character with grant of at least 25 percent”.<sup>12</sup> The DAC definition of foreign aid does not include any aid funds provided by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), private organizations, or individuals. It seems that there is no international consensus definition of the aid provided by Non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies; let it be in terms of its purpose, and the type of recipients.

The definition of foreign aid which will be used in this study is considerably narrower. Foreign aid in this study is defined as *a voluntary transfer of resources from a government to another independent government, in which its goals are to improve the human condition in the recipient country and promote development in that country*. This definition is close to the one used by the DAC with one important distinction. The Official Development Assistance used by the DAC involves foreign aid transfers to the low-income or the developing countries only. In this case, I shall follow the DAC definition.

However, the definition of DAC is mostly based on the term “development” which includes a variety of activities such providing humanitarian relief, supporting economic and social progress, addressing global problems, promoting democratization, managing post-conflict transitions, and poverty reduction in the developing countries. In addition to this definition, a more purpose-related definition will also be used here that defines the foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy used by the donor governments to achieve specific goals and objectives in the recipient countries. These goals may include promoting political and diplomatic relations with developing countries, enhancing stability within countries with strategic importance, expanding

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<sup>12</sup> Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 9.

exports and having access to the raw materials in the developing countries, and gaining international recognition as a regional or global power.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the definition of foreign aid here specifies that occurs only between governments. It does not include any aid funds which is provided and allocated by private organizations, foundations, non-governmental organizations, or individuals. This study will discuss not just development but also foreign aid's other purposes such as political, diplomatic, and commercial ones.

### **2.1.2 Soft power**

Soft Power is a relatively new term, introduced by J. Nye in his book '*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*' and in an article published in the journal of Foreign Policy. He developed the "soft power" concept to argue against those who at that time claimed that American power was declining and other rising powers would replace America shortly. He claimed that the changing nature of power means the US would not face powerful challengers but new challenges. Because America, besides its still formidable hard power, had other "soft ideological and institutional resources" by which it would continue to lead the world.<sup>13</sup>

Nye did not fully define the concept of "soft power" and he merely described its difference from hard or command power. According to him, soft power was more about setting the agenda and structuring situations in contrast to directly change others' behavior or policy.<sup>14</sup> Later, he further developed the concept in his book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* and his other articles. Nye defined soft power as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want." and added that "in behavioral terms, soft power is an attractive power."<sup>15</sup> Based on his book and articles, we can list some important attributes of soft power as follows:

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<sup>13</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* 80 (1990), 153-171.

<sup>14</sup> Nye, "Soft Power," 166.

<sup>15</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," *Public Affairs*, (2004), 6.

- Effectiveness of soft-power depends on the presence of well-disposed interpreters and receivers.<sup>16</sup>
- Soft power is especially more effective on general goals, like promoting open markets or democracy.<sup>17</sup>
- “Most of a country’s soft power comes from its civil society rather than from its government.”<sup>18</sup>

### 2.1.3 Humanitarian diplomacy

The word *diplomacy* has been given to different definitions and it will be useless to list all of them here. Let us just recall the definition that relates the concept of diplomacy with the foreign policy or with the instrument and the technique of foreign policy. José Calvet De Magalhaes, for instance, defines the term ‘diplomacy’ as “the set of means and specific activities used by a state to serve its foreign policy . . . or the formation and execution of foreign policy.”<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, the concept of diplomacy has been classified into different types.<sup>20</sup> The type of diplomacy which better equates foreign aid with foreign policy would be ‘humanitarian diplomacy’. However, the definitions of ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ also vary considerably across academic literature. According to a study conducted by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) in 2010–2011, it has been found that there were 89 different definitions of the term ‘humanitarian diplomacy’.<sup>21</sup> While some of these definitions refer solely to the diplomacy used only by humanitarian organizations, some other definitions show that both states and non-state organizations implement humanitarian diplomacy.

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<sup>16</sup> Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success,” 16.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 17.

<sup>18</sup> Joseph. Nye, “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept,” *Palgrave Communications*, 2017, Volume 3, No. 17008, <https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms20178> (26.03.2019).

<sup>19</sup> José Calvet De Magalhaes, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy* (New York: Greenwood, 1997), 48.

<sup>20</sup> Metin Aksoy and Ahmet Çiçek, “Redefining Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and Examining the Characteristics of an Ideal Diplomat,” *MANAS Journal of Social Studies* 7, No. 3 (2018), 915.

<sup>21</sup> Philippe Régnier, “The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Identification of a Community of Practice and Prospects for International Recognition,” *International Review of Red Cross* 93, No. 884 (2011), 1213.

As discussed by Regnier, “the term humanitarian diplomacy is used not only by humanitarian organizations but also by national cooperation agencies and ministries (foreign affairs, defense, development, civil protection) comprising humanitarian work to respond to national and international emergencies.”<sup>22</sup> In this sense, states may also use humanitarian diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy through foreign aid giving. However, states’ definitions of the concept of ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ may vary. In this study, I will be later discussing Turkey’s Humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia.

## **2.2 A Brief History of Foreign Aid**

Accordingly, the provision of foreign aid began as an instrument of Cold War diplomacy. It is argued that without the Cold War, foreign aid would not probably be as it is today. What has begun as a temporary tool for the Cold War policies has evolved into a permanent expected element between states. This section will briefly describe the history of foreign aid and how its purposes have been evolved since it has begun.

### **2.2.1 Establishment and the Expansion of Foreign Aid: 1945 to 1970**

The last few years of the 1940s could be considered as the time when the establishment of modern foreign aid was launched.<sup>23</sup> This is because the need for emergency relief in the countries affected by World War II has led the establishment and the spread of foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s. Much of the funding for relief in these times came from the United States and it was temporary. It is noteworthy that the Marshall Plan, which was initiated in 1947, was the United States’ ambitious plan to aid the recovery and reconstruction of Europe after World War II.<sup>24</sup> After the end of World War II, much of Europe was still in ruins, struggling to recover from the war. The Destructions caused by the war were increasing the risk that the communist parties in some countries in Europe (in France and Italy) could be elected to power. Thus, the United States was compelled to take action to challenge the USSR’s possible influence in the region. The United States, therefore, urged to provide economic assistance to the Greece regime and the Turkish government to help stabilize and fortify them. The

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<sup>22</sup> Philippe Régnier, “The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 1213.

<sup>23</sup> Riddel, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, 30.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

United States' aid to Turkey and Greece was followed by the Marshall plan, in which almost \$13 billion aid program was provided, to help the stabilization and recovery in Europe.

Foreign aid was also initiated by other donors in Europe and Asia. Lancaster, for instance, discusses the beginning of aid in Europe and Japan, the socialist bloc aid, and some developing countries as aid donors.<sup>25</sup> The better-off countries of Europe, particularly Britain and France, also established aid agencies and increased their levels of foreign aid after the Second World War. Although this was a result of US pressure on other governments to create aid programs, most European countries had their agendas of foreign aid, which is quite different from that of the United States. Britain and France, for instance, had continued assisting their colonies in Africa and Asia in the decade after the Second World War.

The period of the 1950s and 1960s is also considered as the era in which the institutionalization of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) had slowly begun.<sup>26</sup> Some studies show that the flow of aid given to Europe for recovery and reconstruction was followed by slow beginnings of aid given to developing countries. However, it was the mid-1950s when the ODA significantly began to expand while, by the end of that decade, the United States was said to have been contributing half of the official Aid. At the end of the 1950s, thanks to the contribution made by its member states, the World Bank was emerging as a significant source of development finance. In 1960, for instance, the International Development Association (IDA) was set up and it became probably the largest channel for concessional aid to poor countries.<sup>27</sup>

Accordingly, by 1970, foreign aid was no longer an instrument of Cold War diplomacy (although still, it had much to do with it). Rather, it had become an expected element in the relations between rich and poor countries. However, the purposes of foreign aid are said to have shifted away from being an instrument of Cold War diplomacy to a more focus on the development in the recipient countries. Riddel states

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<sup>25</sup> Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 28.

<sup>26</sup> Hynes W. and S. Scott, "The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: Achievements, Criticisms, and Way Forward," *OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers*, No. 2 (2013), 3.

<sup>27</sup> Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 30

that the provision of official aid had fallen to 0.33 percent of GNI, compared with over 0.5 percent at the beginning of the 1960s. And the expansion of the ODA had come to a halt, and some aid donors such as the United States started to reduce their aid levels.<sup>28</sup>

### **2.2.2 Foreign Aid for Development Purposes: 1970 – 1990**

The volume of foreign aid increased during the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s. In these two decades, the proportions of aid to poor countries, its expanding use for social infrastructure, and its terms have increasingly reflected a focus on development. Some studies argued that several international economic and political contexts combined to contribute to the development purpose of foreign aid in the 1970s and 1980s. These trends and events primarily include: a decline in the tensions and fears of the Cold War competition with moves toward détente between East-West, oil and economic crisis in the early and at end of 1970s in many developing countries, and two famine crises, one in mid-1970s and the other in the mid-1980s – primarily in Africa. Accordingly, most of the tensions of the Cold War were over by the middle of the 1970s, and there were various efforts at détente between East and West (precisely between the United States and China, between the United States and USSR, and between Germans.<sup>29</sup> Therefore tensions that had influenced the provision of foreign aid for Cold War diplomatic purposes in the 1950s and 1960s diminished, creating an opportunity for aid donors to direct their aid toward increased priority for other purposes. The distribution of foreign aid during the period of the 1970s and 1980s moved toward the poorest countries where droughts, famines, and civil conflict most existed. Accordingly, much of the increasing proportion of foreign aid in this period was provided to a large number of countries in Sab-Saharan Africa where development and poverty reduction were most needed.<sup>30</sup>

During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, foreign aid for development was said to have become prominent. However, this does not mean that all donor governments exclusively provided foreign aid only for development purposes. It is argued that the United States and France were providing significant amounts of their aid

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<sup>28</sup> Riddel, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, 29.

<sup>29</sup> Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 34.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*,35.

for different diplomatic purposes. Japan and other governments also pursued commercial, diplomatic, and other mixed purposes with their aid. Despite these other purposes of foreign aid, it is considered that this was the period in which development purposes gained prominence in the foreign aid giving.<sup>31</sup>

### **2.2.3 Foreign Aid from the 1990s into the 21st Century: New Purposes**

The decade of the 1990s is considered as the decade of change in the world as well as in foreign aid-giving. The end of the Cold War, which was marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, was one of the major events that played a significant role in changing the purposes of foreign aid. The Cold War's end led to the disintegration of USSR and socialist regimes in Eastern Europe which eventually led for most of those countries to make a transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies and free markets. Accordingly, these countries needed foreign assistance to make such difficult political and economic transitions possible and permanent. It is also argued that the end of the Cold War encouraged the aid donors to reduce or terminate their aid to the regimes that had been helped only because of the East-West Cold War competition.<sup>32</sup>

Another event which played an important role in changing the purposes of foreign in the 1990s is the intensification of the process of globalization. The international travel of business people and tourists, the rapid expansion of international trade, and the revolution in information technologies, for instance, brought the world's attention to existing problems in distant lands such as poverty, environmental challenges, civil conflicts, and problems of diseases. In this sense, globalization may somehow lead to the spread of problems while, on the other hand, bringing the world's awareness of their existence. This, therefore, had led emphasis on global problems (mostly by series of UN summits in the 1990s) to negotiate a plan of action often including foreign aid.

Democratization which was felt in many parts of the developing countries is also another element in the context of foreign aid in the 1990s. In the late 1980s, for

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

instance, many countries in Latin America shifted from authoritarian governments to democratically elected regimes. Demands for democracy were also felt in many places in Sub-Saharan Africa where, for instance, some countries' constitutions were rewritten and national elections were held. Some studies argue that "the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s encouraged demands for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa"<sup>33</sup> where "national conferences" were held, for example, in Mali, Benin, Congo, and elsewhere, and multiparty democracies were also created in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. Foreign aid, therefore, became a useful tool for promoting democracy (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) as a motivation for governments to implement political reforms by financing democratization activities such as elections, training, and technical assistance.

As a result of all these events mentioned above, by the late 1990s, foreign aid gained some other new purposes which would include promoting political and economic transitions, dealing with global problems, supporting democracy, and post-conflict management. It is difficult to say for sure what type of aid activities were actually initiated to support such purposes, how much amounts of aid were provided, and its effectiveness during those times, because aid donors do not usually classify their aid according to all these categories of purposes, and such study may need further data analysis.

### **2.3 The Purposes for Which the Governments Provide Foreign Aid**

For most aid donors such as governments, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals, the moral reasons are central to the provision of foreign aid. That is, aid is given because of some sense of obligations, duty or responsibility to help people who are suffering and in need. However, this answer does not give us a complete picture of why governments provide foreign aid. One could ask about what exactly is meant by the claim that the foreign aid-giving can be justified for moral reasons. Does it mean that the governments provide foreign aid to the people in need entirely out of the kindness of their hearts? Is it some kind of charity that the donors (governments, NGOs, or individuals) feel good in giving but there is no any particular duty or obligation to

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<sup>33</sup> Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 35

give? Or do the governments provide aid to the poor countries by expecting something in return? In other words, do the governments provide aid to achieve political or commercial goals or having access to particular resources in the recipient countries? These are all important questions that need to be assessed while discussing the reason for which the individual governments provide foreign aid to others.

### **2.3.1 Theoretical Approaches and Foreign Aid**

Most of the foreign policy debates discuss how individual states conduct and implement their foreign policies that are planned to further their interests. These debates usually assume that most states always conduct their foreign policies to prioritize their national security. This means that states are responsible for the well-being and the security of their citizens. Therefore, their duties for fulfilling this responsibility should not extend beyond their territorial boundaries. However, yet it is obvious that states are often involved and care about other societies outside their borders usually showing a commitment to help those who inhabit outside their boundaries by providing aid to help poor people in poor countries, promoting development, encouraging poverty reduction, and, sometimes, carrying out humanitarian interventions. Why then the states give their resources to contribute and promote the well-being of other people who reside in other countries?

Many international relations scholars and theorists tried to give explanations to this question by interpreting relations between states through different theories, approaches, and perspectives. Among these theories are the standard foreign policy theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and several Ethical theories and liberal justice of theories which tend to discuss whether states have duties beyond their borders in which they are supposed to act. There are also some other approaches and perspectives which provide different arguments for the states' foreign aid-giving policies towards other peoples who are outside their territorial borders. By looking from perspectives of different theories and approaches, the following pages will examine the reasons for which the states usually provide foreign aid to the other countries. I will first look at how some international relations theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism have provided answers to the question of 'Why is foreign aid given?'

To begin with, realist theories argue that states operate in an anarchic world where there is no higher authority that will preserve their national security, and the states' duties are to protect their national interests usually defined by security, power and wealth. In this sense, realist theories contend that states do not have any responsibilities or duties to others and they are self-interest oriented and must protect themselves from the outside world.<sup>34</sup>

Michael Barnett discusses whether states should have “duties beyond borders” by interpreting this question through realism, liberalism, and constructivism perspectives. According to his arguments, realist theories provide us two important claims regarding states' duties beyond borders: the first claim is that whenever states say they are doing something for others, it is nothing more than empty discourses that they intended to justify their own foreign policy goals. In other words, states may sometimes help others but they do so only when they are expecting something in return. Barnett argues that “the realist perspective nicely reminds us that the states rarely sacrifice for others and will frequently deploy high-minded ideals to camouflage their true motives”.<sup>35</sup> From realist perspective, Barnett concludes that whenever the states intervene in other states for a particular reason such as stopping a genocide, protecting those states' people from something, toppling a particular regime, or for other reasons, their actions may seem humanitarian actions but they are always motivated by some particular foreign policy goals such as geostrategic interests.<sup>36</sup>

The Barnett's second point from the realist perspective is that states are supposed to protect their national interest and they have no business in wasting their own resources and manpower to help strangers outside their national borders.<sup>37</sup> Referring the United States' humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1993 as an example, Barnett argues that if states involve in any activities in other countries, they would definitely face displeased consequences which may include loss of their own peoples, exhaustion of their national resources, and they would most likely undermine

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<sup>34</sup> Michal Barnett, “Duties Beyond Borders” in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Cases*, ed. Steve Smith et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 226

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 27

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

their foreign policy interests. Among other scholars who interpreted foreign aid through a “realist” perspective is George Liska, who explains foreign aid as a tool used by aid donors to enhance their national power and security. Liska argues that “foreign aid is today and will remain for some time an instrument of political power”.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, Carol Lancaster also discusses the motivations of foreign aid from the realist perspective in her book entitled ‘*Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, and Domestic Politics.*’ She adds that the aid-giving policies are driven by the donor’s national interest in the recipient countries.<sup>39</sup> From this perspective, foreign aid is also used by donors as *a tool of diplomacy* to implement their foreign policy decisions. It is argued that “donors focus on diplomatic rather than development considerations when they choose where to provide their aid.”<sup>40</sup>

In contrast to the realist approaches, liberalist theories argue that states do and should have responsibilities beyond their borders to help others. There are several claims on which liberal theorists base their arguments. From a liberalism perspective, Barnett again discusses how liberal identity leads the societies to a sense of obligations and responsibilities to others. This idea refers to a belief in freedom, liberty, and human reason in which liberalists argue that states are obliged to give what they already have to others to help them enjoy in progress, prosperity, and freedom. Another claim of liberalism considers how interdependence leads states and individuals to act on behalf of other people across their borders. According to Barnett, the growing awareness of the suffering of others which is brought by today’s satellite technologies, news programs, and worldwide internet websites, sometimes makes individuals feel that they are compelled to act and they believe that to help others in distant lands is the right thing to do.<sup>41</sup> Liberalist theories consider foreign aid as an instrument which is used by states to address problems of interdependence and globalization. Foreign aid which is channeled through international institutions such as World Bank, for instance, is used to control or

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<sup>38</sup> George Liska, *The New State Craft* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 14.

<sup>39</sup> Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 3

<sup>40</sup> Vincent Bundock et al, “The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy: How Bureaucratic Design Shapes Aid Distribution,” *International Studies Quarterly* (2015), 59.

<sup>41</sup> Barnett, “Duties Beyond Borders,” 227.

reduce some global problems such as worldwide infectious diseases and environmental degradations.<sup>42</sup>

From within the broad arguments of liberalism theories, some liberal theories of justice have been used to explain the moral case of the states' foreign aid-giving to others. One of these theories of justice is the contractual theory of justice developed by John Rawls in his book *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls discusses the relationship between individuals and societies by setting out what the correct principles of justice would be. Rawls, as cited by Riddel, argues that "liberty, opportunity, income, wealth, and the basis for self-respect should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these are to the advantage of the least favored in Society; and therefore the state is obliged to take resources from some for the specific benefit of the least advantaged".<sup>43</sup>

However, it is argued that this idea can only be applied to homogeneous societies residing within one government, and it cannot be considered for other societies in other countries. Riddle, for instance, discusses another Rawls' argument which can be considered for the reasons why governments must provide foreign aid to others. Rawls presents in his work of '*The Law of Peoples*' the moral arguments for why some states are obliged to provide aid to other countries. Instead of rich and poor countries, Rawls refers to the world as a well-ordered society and burdened societies and therefore argues that well-ordered societies have duties to assist the burdened societies to help them manage their affairs to become well-ordered societies too.<sup>44</sup>

The purposes of foreign aid have also been explained through the view of constructivism theory. Trine Flockhart, for instance, discusses how the state's interests are shaped by their identities and how their identities and interests are also influenced by international society.<sup>45</sup> Flockhart argues that states' interests are not explained by power, wealth, and security only, but also some other principles such as a dedication to

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Riddel, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, 131.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 132.

<sup>45</sup> Trine Flockhart, "Constructivism and Foreign Policy" in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Cases*, ed. Steve Smith et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 80.

human rights and the promotion of democracy. It is also argued that states always want to make their policies appear legitimate to the eyes of other states in international society. In this sense, states are admired for their commitment to defend the universal principles rather than their willingness to pursue their national interests.

In contrast to the realism's view about the existence of a community (that community is limited to those who live within a particular state's territory); constructivists claim the existence of an international community that motivates states and their societies to care about the welfare of others. Similarly, in his book *Moral Vision and International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime*, David Lumsdaine defines foreign aid as an expression of a norm that the rich countries should provide aid to poor countries to help them improve the quality of lives of their people. For Lumsdaine, "foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of donor state's political and economic interests; rather it was a response to world poverty which arose mainly from ethical and humane concern and from the belief that the long-term peace and prosperity was only possible in a generous and just international society where all could prosper."<sup>46</sup>

The provision of foreign aid has also been interpreted through the lenses of other ethical theories. Utilitarianism is one of these theories which, for some, have long been used to explain the foreign aid-giving policies and to whom it should be provided. The basic argument of Utilitarianism says that moral life should be led by the purpose of trying to pursue the maximum happiness and satisfaction for the greatest number of people. Accordingly, if the maximum happiness and satisfaction can be achieved by providing aid to those whose happiness and well-being are seriously limited, then aid should be provided. This argument has been applied to poor people in poor countries to draw a link between moral obligations for providing foreign and its outcome. Peter Singer, for instance, argues that "if you have the ability to prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then you ought to morally to do it".<sup>47</sup> This view assumes that people are supposed to help others as long as their actions will enhance the well-being of others.

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<sup>46</sup> Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics*, 3.

<sup>47</sup> Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, 129.

Nye indicates that providing aid to a target country is an instrument of economic power and thus a part of the practice of hard power. The Primary tool for soft power is diplomacy.<sup>48</sup> However, he notes that giving aid, in general, could be regarded as an investment of soft power and adds that the United States' position in this regard is not exemplary.<sup>49</sup>

How should we then approach foreign aid? Is it a hard power tool or a soft power instrument? I suggest we should look at why the assistance was given in the first place. If a country provides aid to a country to change its actions or to ensure maintaining a specific course of policy, this aid is used as an instrument of economic (hard) power. If the aid is given without attaching any conditionality which means the aid-giving was based on purely humanitarian grounds, then this aid can be considered an investment in a country's soft power. Nye himself considers along this line as he gives the example of Norway by pointing out the country's allocation of significant sums to development assistance.<sup>50</sup> This line of thinking is common, as could be seen in the discussions about foreign aid.<sup>51</sup>

If we look at the Turkish foreign aid to Somalia, for example, it is obvious that Turkey has provided aid without asking something in return from Somalia. To this date, there is no evidence to assert the claim that Turkey supplied aid to Somalia to change its course of action in a specific area. Thus, we can conclude that Turkish assistance to Somalia has been provided under its soft power enhancement activities. In fact, from the beginning, some commentators considered Turkish activities in Somalia under the label of soft power.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Nye, "Soft Power. The Means to Success," 31.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 61-62.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 112

<sup>51</sup> Sabrina Siddiqui and Ben Quinn, "Trump's Funding Cuts to Diplomacy and Aid Would Mark Retreat from Soft Power," *The Guardian*, 16.03.2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/16/state-department-foreign-aid-funding-cuts-trump-budget> (20.03.2019). See also Julian Borger, "Aid and 'Soft Power' Becomes Foreign Policy Focus," *The Guardian*, 20.10.2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/oct/20/aid-becomes-foreign-policy-focus> (20.03.2019).

<sup>52</sup> M. T. Gullo, "Turkey's Somalia Adventure: The Quest for Soft Power and Regional Recognition," *Research Turkey* (2012), 1–13.

While policymakers assumed that soft power is an important force in international politics, some scholars argued that except for some limited conditions, strategies that rely on soft power will highly unlikely to succeed.<sup>53</sup> Despite the serious criticism and practical use of soft power, many countries across the world are working towards formulating soft power approaches for their foreign policies and enhance their soft-power capabilities. China, for example, has been spending “enormous” effort and resources to build a soft power base.<sup>54</sup> Other countries also try to tap into their soft power to exercise influence in their neighborhoods.<sup>55</sup>

Foreign aid can also be interpreted through cosmopolitanism perspective – the claim that says each person should be of equal moral worth and a subject of moral. This perspective explains the reasons for which foreign aid is given as human solidarity that goes across the national boundaries and to all people who live in our globe. From this perspective, if people are suffering and in need, or are prevented from their basic human rights, then it is self-evident for the basis of assistance. The Cosmopolitan perspective claims that both governments and individuals have universal duty and responsibility to the whole of humankind in our world.<sup>56</sup> However, this perspective does not clarify what are the natures of those responsibilities and how they should be met.

Governments always claim that they are morally obliged to provide aid to those who are in need because they believe that it is the right thing to do. About this morality, governments, and aid, Riddell, for instance, discusses some other perspectives which he calls the ‘narrow absolutist perspective’ and the ‘mixed perspective’. For Riddell, a narrow absolutist perspective assumes that states have moral obligations of providing aid to only their citizens and they have nothing to do what is going on beyond their borders.<sup>57</sup> From this perspective, governments may provide foreign aid to help others

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<sup>53</sup> Matthew Kroenig et al, “Taking Soft Power Seriously,” *Comparative Strategy* 29, No. 5 (2010), 413.

<sup>54</sup> David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,” *Foreign Affairs* 94, No. 4 (2015), 107.

<sup>55</sup> Australia specifically devoted a chapter to soft power in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. See Australian Government, Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017 <https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper> (20.03.2019), 107.

<sup>56</sup> John D. Cameron, “Revisiting the Ethical Foundations of Aid and Development Policy from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in *Rethinking the Canadian Aid*, ed. Stephen Brown et al. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2016), 56.

<sup>57</sup> Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, 143.

but this does not mean that they are obliged to do so but, rather, it means that they want to do so. Thus, their provision of aid is either entirely voluntary (which means there are no moral obligations or responsibilities for them to provide aid), or it is about furthering some commercial and strategic interests. From the mixed perspective, governments may have some moral obligations to provide foreign aid to others but these obligations are weak and there are no binding obligations that require the governments to act. This perspective assumes that states accept some kind of moral obligation to give foreign aid but it is not fully developed and it can be surpassed by the responsibilities at home. In other words, states will most likely prioritize the duties that they have for their people instead of helping those who habit outside their borders.

### **2.3.2 The Claims of Donor Governments in Providing Foreign Aid**

Most of the donor governments claim that they provide aid because there is obligations or responsibilities to help poor people in poor countries. Then, some argue that if there is a moral case for governments to provide aid, there must be a moral problem in which the aid-giving is aimed address. However, the reasons and the core issues for which governments claim that they provide aid have historically differed according to both state to another and over time.

For Scandinavian donors, for instance, it is argued that the notions of 'international solidarity, distribution of wealth, social justice, and development' are the most prominent reasons for providing foreign aid.<sup>58</sup> For Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, the provision of foreign aid is linked to the fair distribution of wealth, justice, and non-discrimination, where rich countries have a particular obligation and responsibility for the well-being of poor people in poor countries to reduce poverty, inequality, and support development. Similarly, for the United Kingdom and Norway, international development and poverty reduction have been regarded as the most important reasons for which they provide aid. Accordingly, as one of the richest nations in the world, it is argued that "Norway accepts its moral responsibility not only to combat justice and promote development but to make difference, playing its role in

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<sup>58</sup> The word 'solidarity' is referred to as sympathies and common bonds with those who aid is given. It is aimed at achieving common goals and sharing the risks and the suffering with those who are in need. See Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* 140.

speeding up reforms to reduce poverty and allocating more resources to fulfill its obligations.”<sup>59</sup> In North America, on the other hand, the reasons why foreign aid is given are being considered as humanitarian action in which both the United States and Canada have continuously claimed that they have a moral obligation to provide aid to save lives in urgent needs and alleviate suffering.

However, while these reasons are still among the explanations that governments have been given for the provision of foreign aid, some add that other purposes based on human rights have recently become prominent in the justifications claimed by Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.<sup>60</sup> Accordingly, these countries have recently stated that all their foreign aid activities are implemented within a human rights framework, in which the core objectives of resection, protection, and fulfillment of the rights of poor people are focused on. For Germany, Finland, and Switzerland, the moral case of foreign aid-giving is explained as a process of realization of basic human rights in which the problems of poverty and inequality in poor countries are addressed. Other studies argue that promoting the development and furthering economic and social transitions have recently become the most prominent purposes of foreign aid-giving in European countries.<sup>61</sup>

For the United States, on the other hand, the reasons for foreign aid-giving have also changed over different periods. Its foreign aid is seen by many as an important instrument of US foreign policy. Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, for instance, discussed the US foreign aid purposes and priorities during three different periods. From the beginning of rebuilding Europe under the Marshal Plan in 1948 to the end of the Cold War with the Collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US foreign aid programs reflected anti-communist tensions that continued through the period of the Cold War.<sup>62</sup> According to Tarnoff and Lawson, the US foreign assistance during this

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Carol Lancaster, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century,” in *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century*, ed. Louis A. Picard et al. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 45.

<sup>62</sup> Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy,” In *Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World*, ed. George T. Overton (New York: Nova, 2010), 104.

period was mostly viewed as an instrument to prevent the expansion of Soviet influences in Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, US foreign aid programs were no longer reflected Cold War motives and they were instead driven by regional issues such as Middle East peace initiatives or supporting the transition to democracy of Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. However, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the US foreign aid has frequently viewed as a tool used by the United States in the so-called 'Global War on terrorism'. This would encompass an emphasis on foreign aid to the United States' partners in the terrorism war such as, for example, reconstruction programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. To prevail in the global war on terrorism, the United States believes that poverty and lack of opportunity are the root causes of political instability and the emergence of terrorist groups, particularly in poor and fragile states. Therefore, the objectives of US foreign aid would also include promoting economic growth and diminishing poverty, providing humanitarian assistance, improving governance, strengthening fragile states, promoting stability in conflictive regions, protecting human rights and expanding access to basic education and health. The main idea has been that, by meeting these objectives, the United States would achieve its national security interests and prove the humanitarian nature of the U.S. people.

In addition to the national security goals, the United States has always admitted that it has a self-imposed responsibility to provide humanitarian aid to those who are in need in the time of emergencies regardless the kind governments of their countries. It is argued that "the US believes, and has repeatedly stated, that it has a moral obligation to provide aid to those in need regardless of the political hue of the governments of the country in which emergencies occur".<sup>63</sup> Although in practice, the United States has often been the leading position of donor responses to help poverty-affected countries or those trying to overcome conflicts or natural disasters, other observers would argue that providing foreign aid solely for humanitarian reasons has generally been the least remarkable purpose of aid by the United States.

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<sup>63</sup> Tarnoff and Lawson, "Foreign Aid," 105.

Foreign aid donors have given different reasons to explain why they believe they have moral obligations, duties, or responsibilities to provide aid. The most general explanations which have been mentioned so far can be summarized that governments provide aid: on the basis of solidarity; in response to extreme poverty and human suffering; in order to enhance human development, freedoms, and fulfillment of human rights; in order to address inequality and promote social justice; and on the basis of national security and peaceful world. The broad conclusion we can make here is that none of the main aid donors would claim that it provides foreign aid solely based on self-interest motivations. For almost all donors, foreign aid is seen as being driven by some kind of moral obligations or duties to provide it.

### **2.3.3 The Reasons for Which the Aid is given in Practice**

It is now important to look at the ways of how, in practice, the donor governments have provided their foreign aid. It is not, of course, easy to examine how every individual donor government has so far allocated its aid over different period as it might be a work that needs some deep case studies. However, we can try to draw some conclusions by summarizing what the existing literature has said about the purposes for which the foreign aid donors have been providing their aid. Then it is possible to assess the explanations of aid donors in providing aid against the different theories and approaches discussed earlier. Many studies show that foreign aid has been provided by donor governments on the basis of solidarity, development, poverty reduction, and emergency needs on one hand, and political, strategic, and commercial interests on the other hand. Several studies have argued that foreign aid has been provided by the donor governments mostly for non-developmental purposes. David Sogge, for instance, argues that ideology and the pursuit of commercial objectives are the main drivers of the provision of foreign aid, while others also judge that foreign aid has expanded due to commercial, geopolitical, and other interests.<sup>64</sup>

Glenn Palmer and others, for instance, discussed whether the allocation of foreign aid is driven primarily by the needs of the recipient states or by the economic

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<sup>64</sup> David Sogge, *Give & Take: What's the Matter with Foreign Aid* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 43.

and political interests of the donor states.<sup>65</sup> By applying a general theory of foreign policy which they call ‘the Two Good-Model of Foreign Policy’<sup>66</sup> to foreign aid, they tried to demonstrate the conditions under which the states use their foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. This theory assumes that states try to produce two outcomes while they are implementing their foreign policies: *change* and *maintenance*.

It is argued that “states view international relations as a mixture of multiple sets of issues where every state has a set of issue outcome with which it may be satisfied or may not be satisfied, therefore states choose simultaneously to try to change some aspects of the status quo while protecting others.”<sup>67</sup> Therefore, states’ foreign policies that are intended to change the status quo would be regarded as ‘change-seeking policies’, while those which are designed to protect other interests would be regarded as ‘maintenance-seeking policies. To support this assumption, the ‘two-good theory’ provides multiple examples in which states used their aid as a tool of influence to encourage the recipients to confirm their desired actions. One of those examples is the United States’ role in the rebuilding of non-communist Western Europe during post-World War II, where the US preferred to prevent further expansion of the Soviet Union in the region.<sup>68</sup> This ambition is regarded as maintenance-seeking policy as the United States wanted to protect the already existing outcome. The argument of the ‘two-good theory’ concludes that foreign aid, at the most of time, is an instrument of influence in which states use to encourage the recipient states to behave in ways favorable to the donor states.

A broad consensus from the literature on foreign aid-giving shows that *political and commercial self-interests* are the main determinants of the provision of foreign aid. In the case of political self-interests, Riddell discusses how, in practice, the United States and other donors have allocated their foreign aid over different periods. For Riddell, “the primary purpose of United States’ aid has always been to further and

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<sup>65</sup> Glenn Palmer et al, “Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2002), 8.

<sup>66</sup> This theory is referred to the assumption that states pursue two good. ‘Change’, defined as the ability to alter the status quo in desirable ways, and ‘maintenance’, the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo.

<sup>67</sup> Glenn et al, “Give or Take,” 9.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

promote its own interests, with foreign aid seen as an essential arm of foreign policy playing a vital role in US geo-strategic interests.”<sup>69</sup> It also frequently argued that US foreign aid has always been influenced by national security goals. As noted earlier, The US aid programs in the context of anti-communism during the Cold War, and in the context of anti-terrorism in the aftermath of September 11 has resulted in significant amounts of aid provided to countries seen as important to the US geopolitical interests.

Similarly, Jeffery F. Taffet discusses in his book *‘Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America’* the purposes of the United States in initiating the Alliances for Progress program in Latin America during the 1960s. The program was a foreign aid program that was aimed by the US to promote economic growth and political stability in Latin American countries to help those countries with building roads, hospitals, port facilities, housing, and schools. For Taffet, however, the purpose of the program was a desire to fight the Cold War instead of humanitarian goals and long-term economic development.<sup>70</sup> He argues that “under the Alliances for progress, the United States attempted to use economic aid to ensure that Latin America developed in ways that strengthened pro-US politicians and created economic conditions that would limit the appeal of anti-U.S or pro-communist forces.” Taffet concludes that the program was not successful in terms of economic development and that was because the United States funneled its money to political projects rather than to humanitarian projects for the pursuit of containing communism in the region.

Another example of using foreign aid as a foreign policy tool can be the US economic and military assistance to Israel. Despite being a relatively rich country in terms of several key development indicators such as GDP per capita, income, and the average life expectancy, Israel has been one of the largest recipients of US foreign aid over time.<sup>71</sup> Although different studies have presented the total amount of US aid to Israel in different figures, it is argued that “the United States has provided Israel more than \$134.7 billion in economic and military assistance.”<sup>72</sup> Moreover, according to the

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<sup>69</sup> Riddel, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*, 92.

<sup>70</sup> Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 2.

<sup>71</sup> Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” *Congressional Research Service*, (2018), 1.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

data from U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), the total amount of US foreign aid to Israel (which is relatively high income country) through the fiscal year of 2017 was more than \$ 3.2 billion, whereas the US foreign assistance to Somalia (which is considered one of the poorest countries in the world) throughout the same year was totaled \$584 million.<sup>73</sup> The question one could ask is whether the US foreign aid has been motivated by developmental and humanitarian considerations or by US geostrategic, security, and political interests in the region.

To empirically demonstrate that the US foreign assistance to Israel has been motivated by US foreign policy goals rather humanitarian needs, Murad Ali discusses the historical and contemporary US foreign aid towards Israel by examining the real motivations behind the US economic and military assistance to Israel since the latter has been established in 1948. His study examines the events such as Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 and Israel's victors in these Wars as a significant encouragement for US foreign aid to Israel. According to Ali, Israel is not even eligible for US foreign aid since Israel is among the richest countries of the world due to the fact that based on its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and other development indicators such as income and life expectancy at birth.<sup>74</sup> Ali concludes that "instead of poverty factor alone, the allocation of US aid to Israel has been vastly influenced by key regional events having significant policy implications for US geostrategic, political and security interests in the region."<sup>75</sup> This example of US foreign assistance to Israel is a good reminder that foreign aid donors have continued to use their aid as a tool of their foreign policy.

In addition to the United States, non-developmental purposes such as national interests and foreign policy influences have always been (although varied) important in the allocation of foreign aid for other donors as well. It has been noted that Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands have, historically, showed themselves as donors who have expressed that their allocations of aid were driven by solidarity and

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<sup>73</sup>USAID, US Foreign Aid by Country, 2017 [https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/SOM?fiscal\\_year=2017&measur=Disbursements&implementing\\_agency\\_id=1](https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/SOM?fiscal_year=2017&measur=Disbursements&implementing_agency_id=1) (20.03.2019).

<sup>74</sup> Murad Ali, "Aid for Development or Foreign Policy: Objectives Behind US Foreign Aid Allocations to Israel," *Dialogue (1819-6462)*, Vol. 8 Issue 4. (2013), 391.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 393.

development factors. However, some have argued that for France, the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands and Spain, the provision of foreign aid has been deeply influenced by their postcolonial policies while Japan, on the other hand, provides its aid clearly to prioritize its security and prosperity rather than development and poverty reduction. The wider picture here is that, both historically and recently, most of the aid donors established or expanded their foreign aid in part for their different reasons mostly based on non-developmental purposes.

In the case of *commercial interests* of donors in the aid-giving, one dimension that comes to the mind is the so-called “the tying of aid”. This means the commercialization of foreign aid by tying foreign aid to the purchases of goods and services from the donor governments.<sup>76</sup> It has been argued that foreign aid has been linked with commercial interests of donor governments since it was provided. The ratio of how much foreign aid of a donor government is tied or untied can be varied according to the data published by OECD/DAC over different periods.

For example, some studies once showed that more than half of the Official Development Assistance to the least developing countries was reported to be tied. The purpose of commercial interest in the allocation of foreign aid can also be seen in the Chinese aid in Africa and elsewhere. It has been argued that “two main purposes motivate Chinese aid: its continuing diplomatic competition with Taiwan and its commercial interests in ensuring access to raw materials such as petroleum, minerals, food, and fiber that are necessary to support China’s rapid growth.”<sup>77</sup> Although it is varied among aid donors and over time, many studies suggested that there is always a link between aid and donor’s trade and commercial interests.

Similarly, other studies argued that the underlying motives of foreign aid can be explained in economic and political terms. In the case of economic terms, Hatim and Iqbal argued that the provision of foreign aid is related to the donor’s economic gains. The foreign aid donors help raise incomes in poor countries by providing aid so that they can create suitable markets for their own exports and secure opportunities for their

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<sup>76</sup> Murray C. Kemp, “Aid Tied to the Donor’s Exports,” *Pacific Economic Review* 10, No. 3 (2005), 317.

<sup>77</sup> Lancaster, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century”, 47.

investments. According to this argument, “by tying aid to purchase from the donor country, the latter successfully deposits goods of poor or less suitable quality in the recipient country and obtains a high price for it.”<sup>78</sup> This study also argued that the objective of foreign aid is to create a political environment in which the donor states can achieve their policies, mainly viewed as diplomacy or national security. It has been concluded that foreign aid has been used by the donors to win the friendship of a strategically located under-developed nation, to forge political as well as military alliances and to solidify a sphere of influence.

The broad conclusion of this chapter is that foreign aid is always driven by political, commercial, and other purposes rather than developmental and humanitarian motives. Although development, solidarity, and humanitarian assistance have been important in the allocations of foreign aid for some donors, foreign aid from the largest bilateral donors is usually being provided for purposes that are based on regional and commercial relations (in the case of Europeans, Japan, and China) or global and national security goals (in the case of U.S) rather than poverty reduction objectives. This explanation can be best justified by the view of realist theory which says that states do not help others unless there are expecting something in return. For realists, foreign aid is motivated by the donor’s true motives of power, security, and wealth. Realist theories also add that states might sometimes ‘talk a good game’ pretending that they are helping others solely out of the kindness of their hearts. But that is nothing more than that they are just advancing their national interests and, most likely, they will not deliver their promises at the end.

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<sup>78</sup> Hatim Iqbal, “Pakistan – Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy,” *Pakistan Horizon* 25, No. 4 (1972), 54.

### 3. TURKEY'S AID POLICIES AND SOMALIA

In order to understand Turkey's aid policies in Somalia, an overview of Turkey's overall official assistance towards abroad in general, and Africa in particular, should be examined. Turkey's total official development assistance in 2017 (the last year for which data is officially available) was approximately 8.12 billion dollars.<sup>79</sup> It was ranked the sixth country in the provision of aid after the USA, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France.<sup>80</sup> The recent expansion in the Turkish development assistance particularly to conflict-affected countries such as Somalia is considered as a core component of its rising power and humanitarian diplomacy.<sup>81</sup> Turkey's aid policy on Somalia is considered to be connected with her general policy towards Africa. Turkey's contemporary engagement in Africa has started in 1998. However, Turkey has only been recently involved in Somalia since 2011, when it first launched its emergency humanitarian aid in Somalia.

This chapter will provide a brief summary about Turkey's recent arrival in Somalia to understand how Turkey's involvement in Somalia, which was initially considered a purely humanitarian action, has now become a comprehensive long-term Somalia and Africa policy for Turkey. It starts with a general summary of how Turkey's official assistance to the developing countries has evolved and increased overtime making Turkey transform from a recipient into a donor country. Second, it will present a short survey of Turkey's aid Policy in Africa and the place of Somalia in Turkey's relations with the African countries. Then it will empirically analyze how Turkey's official development assistance to Somalia has recently started and rapidly increased by examining the most recent available data on Turkey's official development assistance to Somalia.

The chapter also discusses Turkey's place among other Somalia's traditional donors to understand what kind of assistance model has made Turkey's involvement in the country relatively exceptional. Finally, the chapter holds up all these analyses

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<sup>79</sup> TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2017, <https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/Kalkinma2017EngWeb.pdf> (04.03.2019), 9.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, "Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia," Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace," *Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center*, (March 2015), 9.

against the different theories and approaches discussed in chapter two. In this way, we will be able to answer the question of ‘what is Turkey’s agenda in Somalia?’ We would also be able to understand how Turkey’s foreign aid to Somalia is related to its foreign policy generally in Africa and particularly in Somalia.

### 3.1 Turkey’s Opening to Africa and Somalia

Turkey launched its first official foreign aid program in 1985 and the State Planning Organization was authorized to coordinate all official aid.<sup>82</sup> Before 1985, official assistance was provided by the individual initiatives of the ambassadors or other diplomats and this assistance was mostly in the form of education grants.<sup>83</sup> A new department called Turkish Cooperation Agency was established within the State Planning Organization to coordinate official aid flows and this body has begun to provide technical assistance to developing countries. The sums were very small but at least a beginning was made.

**Table 1**  
**Turkey’s Total Aid (1987-1991)**

Years	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Amount (USD Thousands)	121	903	423	349	690

Source: Engin Akçay, “Bir Dış Politika Enstrümanı Olarak Türk Dış Yardımları” (Ph.D Thesis , Polis Akademisi Güvenlik Bilimleri Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2011), 90.

The End of the Cold War and the emergence of new Turkish Republics in Central Asia presented an opportunity for Turkey to expand and diversify its foreign policy. The New republics looked on Turkey as a role model; the Turkish Government tried to meet expectations and promised huge amounts of aid to the new republics. The Policymakers concluded that the existing public institutions at the time were not up to task and Turkey needed to set up a new agency. Consequently, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Turkish abbreviation: TİKA) was established in 1992 and it

<sup>82</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect, 2011, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey\\_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa), (07.03.2019).

<sup>83</sup> Engin Akçay, “Bir Dış Politika Enstrümanı Olarak Türk Dış Yardımları” (PhD Thesis, Polis Akademisi Güvenlik Bilimleri Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2011), 87.

became the principal official aid agency in Turkey.<sup>84</sup> TIKA later substantially expanded the volume and geographic scope of its assistance and as of 2018, TIKA has 61 program coordination offices in 59 countries and operates in 150 countries.<sup>85</sup>

After the initial enthusiasm, relations with Central Asian republics gradually waned as Turkey found herself in a series of economic and political crises in the second half of the 1990s. After the 1994 economic crisis, Turkey turned inward and its official aid dwindled from 444 million USD in 1994 to 217 million USD in 1995 (see Table 2). And thereafter, until when Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power, the total official flows steadily decreased to 35.66 million USD in 2001.

**Table 2**  
**Turkey’s Total Official Flows to Major Recipients (1992 – 1995)**  
(US Dollar, Millions 2016 – Constant Prices)

	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total Amount	<b>161.72</b>	<b>374.04</b>	<b>443.77</b>	<b>217.82</b>
Afghanistan	..	..	0.05	..
Azerbaijan	10.98	23.63	87.31	29.61
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13.30	11.54	8.39	11.31
Kazakhstan	39.18	18.21	146.24	59.12
Kyrgyzstan	26.33	14.34	30.42	12.45
Somalia	..	<b>5.73</b>	..	..
Tajikistan	0.26	0.50	27.50	6.37
Uzbekistan	4.10	172.56	17.81	21.18


Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions, 2017, [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? Datasetcode=TABLE2A#](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Datasetcode=TABLE2A#) (20.03.2019)

In the year of 2004, Turkey’s official aid flows significantly rose.<sup>86</sup> And thereafter, it never went down below 300 Million USD Dollar. As we can see in figure 1

<sup>84</sup> Musa Kulaklikaya and Rahman Nurdun, “Turkey as a New Player in Development Cooperation,” *Insight Turkey* 12, No. 4 (2010), 135.

<sup>85</sup> Pinar Ipek, “Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11, No. 2 (2015), 174. See also TIKA, Hakkımızda, <https://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/hakkimizda-14649>, (22.03.2019).

below, the difference between aid amounts before and after JDP is quite interesting. The huge increase in aid amounts after 2011 was a consequence of the Syrian civil war. Turkey provided much humanitarian assistance to Syrian people who fled from the war. To assess Turkish foreign aid accurately, we need to separate Turkey’s humanitarian assistance provided to Syrian refugees from its other foreign aid. Removing this amount of aid reveals that Turkish foreign aid to other countries during the 2011 and 2017 period is stable.



**Figure 1** Turkey’s Total Official Flows (1991 – 2017)

(US Dollar, Millions 2016 – Constant Prices)

Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions, 2017 [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? Datasetcode=TABLE2A#](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Datasetcode=TABLE2A#) (22.03.2019).

One the other hand, the proportion of Turkey’s foreign aid for sub-Saharan Africa is close to zero until 2005. After 2005, the percentage increased rapidly (although there is a drop-down in 2010) reaching 20% in 2011 and stayed around that level (see figure 2). The increase after 2005 was a result of changes in Turkish Foreign Policy. After the announcement of 2005 as the year of Africa, Turkey launched a series of initiatives aimed at establishing close relations with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The First TIKA Project Coordination Office (PCO) in Africa, for instance, was opened in Ethiopia in 2005. Sudan Office was opened in 2006 and Senegal Office

<sup>86</sup> One of the reasons behind the rise was better data collection. See Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, “Turkey as a New Player,” 138.

followed in 2007. After the Mogadishu office, TIKA opened PCOs in other 13 countries.<sup>87</sup>



**Figure 2** Turkey's Total Official Flows- Gross (Excluding Syria) (1991-2017)  
 Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions, 2017 <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Datasetcode=TABLE2A#> (22.03.2019).

Turkey's involvement in Somalia can be viewed in the wider context of its engagement with the African continent. To understand the principles behind Turkey's actions in Somalia, it is important to generally examine its actions and foreign policy in Africa. Turkey's contemporary engagement in Africa can be said to have started in 1998 with the draft of the African Action Plan. It has accelerated in 2005 following the declaration that it was the 'Year of Africa' in which Turkey aimed to flourish political, economic, and social relations with the continent. Consequently, the number of Turkish Embassies in Africa has risen from 12 in 2005 to 34 in 2013. Turkey has been a strategic partner to the African Union (AU) since 2008.<sup>88</sup>

Turkey's relations with Africa, in general, can be evaluated in four distinct periods. The first phase is from 1923 when the modern Turkey was founded to the year of 1998. Although it has received less attention, this period can be viewed as the early

<sup>87</sup> TIKA, Faaliyet Raporu, 2018, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2019/Faaliyet%20Raporu%202018/TikaFaaliyetWeb.pdf> (22.03.2019), 18-19.

<sup>88</sup> Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a State-building in Somalia," *SETA*, (2014), 17.

beginnings of Turkish-African relations. The second period runs between 1998 and 2005 and it is considered the period in which Turkey’s active policy towards Africa has begun. 1998 was the year of the “Opening up to Africa Plan” while 2005 was internationally declared as the “Year of Africa”. The third period is from 2005 to 2011, and the last one is the ongoing process since Turkey’s recent engagement in Somalia in 2011.

When we closely look at the Turkish foreign aid over the years, we can observe a close relationship between the periodization above and the percentage of Turkish assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 3). It is not surprising that aid is one of the most effective foreign policy tools in the arsenal of the governments, and the governments do not hesitate to use aid to promote their foreign policy agendas. Turkey certainly is not an exception.

**Table 3**  
**Turkey’s Total Official Flows to Major Recipients (1998 – 2017)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Average Annual Aid (USD Millions)</b>	<b>Average Annual Aid to sub-Saharan Africa (USD Millions)</b>	<b>Share of sub- Saharan Africa in Total Aid</b>
1998-2004	224.28	0.97	0.43%
2005-2010	669.84	35.56	5.31%
2011-2017	1,191.34*	265.95	22.32%

Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions, 2017 (2016 – Constant Prices)

\*This amount does not include assistance for Syrian refugees.

### **3.2 The Early Beginnings of Turkey-Africa Relations: 1923 – 1998**

As Bağcı and Çalış discussed, Turkey after its foundation pursued a cautious policy to preserve its hard-won independence and sovereignty. Born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was surrounded by a fragile international environment where western powers were dominant, and the new states formed after the great empires were either very weak or politically unstable. In this period, Atatürk, the founder of Modern Turkey himself announced the enduring principle of the Republic: peace at

home and peace in the world.<sup>89</sup> Africa in this period was mostly governed by colonizing great powers and relations with Africa did not play an important role in Turkish Foreign Policy. Turkey opened its first Embassy in sub-Saharan Africa in Ethiopia in 1926, Ethiopia responded by opening its Embassy in Turkey in 1933.<sup>90</sup> Turkey closely followed the situation after Italy attacked Ethiopia as Italy pursued an aggressive and expansive foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean as well.<sup>91</sup>

Turkey followed a policy of neutrality in the Second World War, but after the territorial demands of the Soviet Union, she decided to align herself more closely with Western Powers. After the War, Turkey sought to enter every European organization founded after the Second World War, applied also for the membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After sending forces to the Korean War, Turkey was accepted into the NATO alliance and throughout the 1950s; Turkey's foreign policy was closely associated with its western alignment and rejected the non-alignment approach in international relations. According to Çalış, in this period Turkey, "...stubbornly defended the Western bloc, despite the risk of being accused of attempting to undermine the idea of neutralism for developing countries, behaving like the agent of the West and playing the card of the imperialist powers."<sup>92</sup>

Developments relating to the Cyprus crisis proved that adherence to a strict pro-western alignment had left Turkey isolated.<sup>93</sup> Most of the African countries sided with Cyprus against Turkey. While Turkey took some steps to build a closer relationship with non-aligned countries, these efforts did not produce any concrete positive result. According to Karaca, who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this period, the insufficient number of qualified personnel was the principal problem.

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<sup>89</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Çalış, "Atatürk's Foreign Policy and Application" *SÜ İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 3 No. 6 (2003), 220-221.

<sup>90</sup> Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia, 2011, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ethiopia.en.mfa> (26.02.2019)

<sup>91</sup> Ayla, G. Ö. L, "A Short Summary of Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1939," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 48, No. 01 (1993), 66.

<sup>92</sup> Şaban Çalış, *Turkey's Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the Modern Republic*, (IB: Tauris, 2016), 162.

<sup>93</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, No. 1 (2000), 114.

But he also pointed out that there was lack of attention at the higher levels in the Ministry:

Ghana, as a new independent country wanting to diversify its trade approached Turkish Embassy to import Tobacco. We informed the Ministry. But we were not able to receive any response. The Israel Embassy's trade attaché proposed to do joint trade to Ghana and elsewhere in Africa. We were not able to give any answer to that proposal as well.<sup>94</sup>

In the 1970s, the Cyprus problem dominated the Turkish Foreign Policy agenda and dictated the tone of its relations with other countries in the international arena. While there are some efforts to improve relations with the African countries, there was not a visible shift in Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey continued its Western-oriented policies.<sup>95</sup> The end of the Cold-war, however, opened new horizons for Turkey where new relations with Central Asian countries and Balkan Countries were established. According to Baskın Oran, the relations with the new republics in Central Asia helped Turkey to overcome its sense of isolation during this period.<sup>96</sup> In the 1990s, however, relations with African countries did not improve much. After returning as an Ambassador to Nigeria, Karaca again witnessed similar inattention and incoordination:

Just before I left Ankara to take up my duty to Nigeria in 1990, the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission was held in Ankara. The second meeting had to be held in Nigeria. But it was not possible to organize this meeting during 5 years I served there. There was a standing invitation to our Foreign Minister to visit Lagos. I tried to do my best for the realization of this visit. I was not able to make it possible too. Among the decisions of 1<sup>st</sup> Joint Economic Commission there was cooperation on energy matters and possible import by Turkey Nigerian oil and liquidities natural gas. I tried to get the view of the Government on this matter- Surprisingly I had a reply. It was as follows; 'Turkey is in negotiation with neighboring countries and was not interested with Nigerian oil and gas.' However, one year later, Nigerian Gas Company knocked my door and informed me that they were

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<sup>94</sup> Salih Z. Karaca, "Turkish Foreign Policy in The Year 2000 and Beyond: Her Opening up Policy to Africa," *Dış Politika* 25, No. 3-4 (2000), 118.

<sup>95</sup> Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu, "Afrika Kıtasının Dünya Politikasında Artan Önemi ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri" *Ankara Üniversitesi Afrika Çalışmaları Dergisi Cilt 1, Sayı 2 Bahar* (2012), 74-75.

<sup>96</sup> Baskın Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy-1919-2006*, trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: UT, 2010), 669.

just about to sign a contract with Botaş to supply to Turkey 3 billion cubic meters gas per year by the end of 1999.<sup>97</sup>

At the end of this period, Turkey had seven Embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, but only one country, South Africa, had an Embassy in Ankara.<sup>98</sup> This fact alone may be enough to show that the Turkish-African relations received much less attention than it deserved.

The beginning of Turkish-Somali relations can be traced back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the Ottomans came to Somalis' aid in keeping off Ethiopian and Portuguese expeditionary forces.<sup>99</sup> Later in the seventeenth century, Somali local sultanates that were controlling Somalia's coastal towns had nominal links to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>100</sup> These sultanates seemed as being the representative of the Ottoman Empire in Somalia. The contemporary Turkish-Somali relation is considered to have begun with the opening of the Somali Embassy in Ankara in 1979.<sup>101</sup> During Somalia's civil war, some Turkish organizations such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation played significant roles in aiding Somalis through partners. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey seemed more interested in Muslim countries of the former Ottoman Empire and the rest of Africa as well.<sup>102</sup> This has led Turkey's strategy of providing humanitarian support and reestablishing close relations with the Muslim countries of the former Ottoman Empire.

### **3.3 Opening Moves towards Africa (1998 Action Plan): 1998 – 2005**

A Poor state of relations between Turkey and Africa combined with the rejection of Turkey's efforts to be a member of EC encouraged the policymakers to formulate what could be other alternatives for Turkey.<sup>103</sup> After a series of meetings organized at the end of June 1998 with participation of Turkish ambassadors, representatives of other ministries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a

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<sup>97</sup> Karaca, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year of 2000," 118.

<sup>98</sup> Ufuk Tepebaş, "Turkey in Africa: Achievements and Challenges" *Dış Politika* 27, No. 1 (2015), 50.

<sup>99</sup> Lemis Loan, *A Modern History of Somali: Nation and State in Horn of Africa*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), 146.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>101</sup> Ahmet Yükleyen and Mohammed Zulkarnian, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Somalia," *Journal of Caspian Affairs*, Vol. 1 No.2 (2015), 97.

<sup>102</sup> Yükleyen and Zulkarnian, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Somalia," 101.

<sup>103</sup> Soner Karagül and İbrahim Arslan, "Türkiye'nin Afrika Açılım Politikası: Tarihsel Arka Plan, Stratejik Ortaklık ve Geleceği" *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 9, No. 35 (2013), 27.

comprehensive action plan produced. The action plan provided the following several recommendations for the improvement of Turkish - African relations:

- Opening new resident embassies in several African countries.
- Accreditation of Ambassadors directly from Ankara to other African countries where the opening of a resident embassy may not be financially sound.
- Realization of high-level visits from African countries (Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs).
- Appointment of honorary consuls in some African capitals among prominent local businessmen.
- Cooperation for military training, Turkish contribution to the UN peacekeeping activities, and invitation of Africans to military exercises in Turkey.
- Realization of Turkey's membership in the African Development Bank as a non-regional donor country.
- The invitation of African scholars to various international seminars and conferences or to international festivals.<sup>104</sup>

However, the implementation of these ideas fell short, as Turkey found herself in a series of economic and political crises. Deteriorating economic conditions and a destructive earthquake in 1999 prevented any realization of the initiatives foreseen in the action plan.<sup>105</sup> After the 2002 elections, Justice and Development Party came to power with strong parliamentary majority and there was a rejuvenation of interest<sup>106</sup> in Africa. But a real leap forward came later with the announcement of 2005 as the Year of Africa.

### **3.4 Breakthrough in Relations: 2005 – 2011**

According to Özkan and Akgün, it was difficult for Turkey's new government to pursue a different foreign policy with regards to Africa as the government confronted

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<sup>104</sup> Numan Hazar, "The Future of Turkish-African Relations," *Dış Politika* 25, No. 3-4 (2000), 109-110.

<sup>105</sup> Tom Wheeler, "Ankara to Africa: Turkey's Outreach since 2005," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18, No. 1 (2011), 48.

<sup>106</sup> Ufuk Tepebaş, *Dönüşüm Sürecindeki Sahra Altı Afrika Kalkınma, Güvenlik & Ortaklık*, (İstanbul:Tasam Yayınları, 2013), 322.

hard foreign policy issues which required urgent attention.<sup>107</sup> After the economy began to recover, the Turkish government gave more energy and time to foreign policy issues and relations with Africa began to improve rapidly. In March 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Ethiopia and South Africa – the first official visit by a Turkish prime minister to a country south of the equator. Shortly after, Turkey obtained the observer status by the African Union and accredited the embassy in Addis Ababa in front of the Organization of African Union. Through an invitation of AU President, Erdoğan also attended the opening session of the AU Summit in January 2007, the AU declared Turkey as a ‘strategic partner’ at its 2008 summit. The relations got another boost when the Turkish president hosted a Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul between 18 and 21 August 2008.<sup>108</sup> Another sign of Turkey’s growing interest in Africa was the number of resident Embassies Turkey established on the continent. The number of Embassies quickly reached 20 at the end of 2010.<sup>109</sup> At first, Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in Africa did not receive much support and even drew criticism from the press.<sup>110</sup> But after a certain period, Turkey’s efforts seemed to pay results and the visibility of African issues began to rise in the news.<sup>111</sup>

Turkey’s efforts to improve relations with Africa brought its short-term goal of obtaining African votes for its UN Security Council membership. However apart from this short-term gain, what was to be the future of Turkish Africa relations? There were some skeptical observers like Wheeler who claimed that “Turkey’s relations with many African countries are still at a rudimentary stage and much work has yet to be done to give substance to the relationships.”<sup>112</sup>

The first recent official contact between Turkey and Somalia took place when the then Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan attended the African Union (AU) Summit in

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<sup>107</sup> Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, “Turkey’s Opening to Africa,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 48, No. 4 (2010), 533.

<sup>108</sup> Wheeler, “Ankara to Africa,” 48.

<sup>109</sup> Numan Hazar, *Türkiye Afrika’da: Eylem Planının Uygulanması ve Değerlendirme Onbeş Yıl Sonra*, ORSAM Raporu, Ankara: ORSAM, 2012, p.11.

<sup>110</sup> Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “Etiyopya mı?” *Sabah*, 03.03.2005, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005.03.03/aydintasbas.html> (28.02.2019).

<sup>111</sup> Savas Genc and Oguzhan Tekin, “Turkey’s Increased Engagement in Africa: The Potential, Limits and Future Perspective of Relations,” *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 7, No. 1 (2014), 108.

<sup>112</sup> Wheeler, “Ankara to Africa,” 49

Addis Ababa on 29-30 January 2007. Erdoğan met with the late president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed at the summit and he requested from Ahmed to present a report about Somalia's problems and needs.<sup>113</sup> President Sheikh Sharif, the former president of Somalia, also made three visits to Turkey, but aside from these visits and meetings, there is nothing to suggest that Turkish-Somali relations would experience a revival in the coming years.

### **3.5 Current Relations: 2011 to Today**

Erdoğan's high profile visit to Somalia in August 2011 marked a profound change in Turkey's policy towards Africa.<sup>114</sup> Before this visit, Turkey's involvement in Somalia was not different from other countries. The catastrophe that hit Somalia in 2011 changed that situation. When a severe drought threatened famine in Somalia and other traditional big donors were not able to meet the challenge, Turkey rose to meet the challenge. While other countries were watching the disaster unfolding in Somalia, Turkey effectively assumed a leading role in a public campaign to call attention to the catastrophe in Somalia. Prime Minister Erdoğan became the first Prime Minister to visit Mogadishu and his visit brought the world's attention to Somalia. Turkey went from being just one of the many actors in the scene into a position of a leading actor.

Most nations of the world were unable or unwilling to involve directly the humanitarian situation of Somalia at that time. But Turkey moved in the opposite direction, paying more attention to Somalia than any other nation in the world. Somalia's 2011 famine made the country a major focus of Turkey's aid programs and foreign policy agenda. Following the outbreak of this famine, Turkish politicians and businessmen led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, being the prime minister at the time, and aid workers travelled to Somalia in August 2011 for the first time and began to lay the foundations of a relationship that has become one of the most notable aspects of Turkey's emerging international profile.

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<sup>113</sup>Abdurrahim Siradag, "Turkish-Somali Relations: Changing State Identity and Foreign Policy," *Inquiry* 2, No. 2 (2017), 92.

<sup>114</sup> Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's Involvement in Somalia," 17.

By singling out Somalia as the target of its humanitarian diplomacy, Turkey showed that even with moderate amounts of aid, a country can make a significant impact on the ground. While Turkey's presence on the ground was relatively small, because of its timely famine relief and the commitment, its contribution was seen as "colossal".<sup>115</sup> The Turkish government opened an office for coordination of aid efforts in Somalia in March 2012. After this office, new Project Coordination Offices quickly followed in other countries. At the beginning of 2011, there were only three such offices in Africa. After Somalia, the numbers of offices reached 15 with 4 new offices are to be established soon.<sup>116</sup> It appears that the Turkish government's decision to involve itself in Somalia gave a new impetus to Turkish – African relations and inaugurated a new era.

Turkey's well-timed response in Somalia's situation was much appreciated by the Somali people. The humanitarian crisis eased by the intense efforts of the international community and the situation returned to normal in 2012. Turkey continued to play an influential role in Somalia and contributed to the formation of a new government after the expiration of the TFG term. New government created a sense of hope among Somali people and international observers begun to talk about rising Somalia or "Somali Spring"<sup>117</sup> Since then, Turkey has become one of the largest humanitarian donors to Somalia providing humanitarian and development aid. According to a report which was released in 2015, Somalia has been among the top five largest recipients of official aid from Turkey since 2011.<sup>118</sup> Turkey's engagement with Somalia has been multifaceted: it has built major infrastructure projects, gave humanitarian assistance, providing scholarships to thousands of Somali students, contributed to the peace-building and conflict resolution efforts in Somalia, and supported institutional capacity building.

Turkey has been providing all these assistances through different actors including governmental and non-governmental organizations. There are about a dozen

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<sup>115</sup> International Crisis Group, *Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia*, 2012, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/assessing-turkey-s-role-somalia> (01.03.2019), 1.

<sup>116</sup> TIKA, *Faaliyet Raporu*, 2018, pp. 18-19.

<sup>117</sup> Laura Hammond, "Somalia Rising: Things are Starting to Change for the World's Longest Failed state," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No 1, (2013), 183-193.

<sup>118</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, "Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia," 23.

governmental and humanitarian organizations that are currently working in Somalia. The most remarkable organization is Kızılay which arrived in Somalia in August 2011. Turkey also coordinates aid to Somalia through the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) through which the Turkish government focuses most official aid projects. The Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) and the religious affairs directorate (known as Diyanet) are also among Turkey's largest humanitarian agencies and NGOs which are providing aid and development assistance in Somalia.

### **3.6 Turkey's Official Development Assistance in Somalia**

A few studies discussing Turkey's involvement in Somalia have offered arguments that Turkey's involvement in Somalia is based on a shared religion of Sunni Muslims and the common culture of Turkey and Somalia. Although these can be some of the motivating factors of Turkey's engagement with Somalia, these are not the main reasons why Turkey is helping Somalia. Before we make any such conclusion, it is important to look at how Turkey's recent official development assistance has started and rapidly increased. Development assistance is considered by many as one Turkey's soft power strategies in its foreign policy.<sup>119</sup> As a result of the expansion of TIKA's activities abroad, Turkey's foreign policy has made significant efforts in development assistance. Similarly, Turkey's development assistance played an important role in rebuilding Somalia's broken infrastructure such as the airport in Mogadishu, much-needed roads, hospitals, and schools as well.

The results of Turkey's development assistance and diplomatic efforts in Somalia are interesting. Turkey has only been present in Somalia since 2011. Yet, its overall efforts in Somalia such as the unconditionally provided assistance, development projects, trade, and infrastructure rehabilitation have met a positive reception both inside and outside the country.<sup>120</sup> Turkey's recent official assistance to Somalia can be analyzed according to two separate periods: between 2004 and 2010, and after 2011. In 1993, for instance, Turkey provided US\$ 5.73 million of official assistance to Somalia

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<sup>119</sup> Brendon Cannon, "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 16, No. 14 (2016), 98.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

while an amount of US\$ 0.74 million was also given to Somalia in 2004 (see Table 3 and 4).

### 3.6.1 Period One: 2004 – 2010

In this period, Turkish aid to Somalia was small compared to other recipients of Turkish aid. While Somalia's share in aid to sub-Saharan Africa was not negligible, aid amounts are small. Sudan in this period was the primary focus of Turkish diplomacy in sub-Saharan Africa. More than half of the official assistance for sub-Saharan Africa was allocated to Sudan. Kyrgyzstan was the largest recipient with three other Asian countries coming next (see Table 4). After 2006, Kyrgyzstan lost the first place to Afghanistan. What is striking in this table is even Uzbekistan which had a very cold relationship<sup>121</sup> with Turkey had got more aid than most of the sub-Saharan countries. It could be said that Turkey's aid policy in this period was a continuation of 1990's. the Presence or absence of TIKA offices seems to have a considerable impact on the provision of aid.

**Table 4**  
**Turkey's Total Official Flows to Major Recipients (2004 – 2010)**  
(US Dollar, Millions 2016 – Constant Prices)

Recipient Countries	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (2004-2010)
Afghanistan	10.05	28.71	56.63	60.20	107.32	81.61	82.56	427.07
Azerbaijan	26.33	70.33	36.22	30.45	25.63	23.01	17.52	229.48
Kazakhstan	31.24	166.38	44.54	35.99	46.54	52.90	41.64	419.22
Kyrgyzstan	39.94	112.73	111.15	58.47	40.07	57.29	64.48	484.14
Somalia	<b>0.74</b>	-	<b>3.21</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>5.68</b>	<b>4.81</b>	<b>4.47</b>	<b>21.89</b>
Sudan	1.02	0.69	20.92	18.83	36.23	35.73	13.83	127.25
Turkmenistan	21.64	60.66	17.42	16.68	8.50	10.74	13.38	149.01
Uzbekistan	6.30	33.98	3.72	6.09	5.48	7.48	11.88	74.94

Source: OECD Aid (ODA) disbursements to Countries and regions, 2017 <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#>. (25.03.2019)

<sup>121</sup> Fatima Taşkömür, "How did Turkey-Uzbek Relations Improve After Two Decades of Stagnation?" *TRT World* 26.10.2017 <https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/how-did-turkey-uzbek-relations-improve-after-two-decades-of-stagnation—1167> (10.03.2019).

There is limited information about the Turkey's aid efforts in Somalia in pre-2011 reports. Somalia is mentioned in those reports by usually grouping it with other countries and it is impossible to deduce exactly what was the Somalia's share in Turkey's aid efforts. In the 2007 report,<sup>122</sup> for instance, there is information about 20 training activities carried out for professionals working in health sector in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Niger. However, the number of Somali professionals participated in the training programs is not given. In 2009 report, on the other hand, information about the total surgical operations conducted in Niger, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan was mentioned, but specific information about the number of operations is not given for any country, including Somalia.<sup>123</sup> In 2010 report, again the number of Somali children is not given in the total of 13,528 children who received monthly cash assistance.<sup>124</sup>

### **3.6.2 Period Two: 2011 – 2017**

If we look at Turkey's total aid amounts from 2011 – 2017 as shown in Table 5 below, we can see that a dramatic change took place in this period. Somalia gained the first place while Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan come to the second and third positions. Another sub-Saharan country, Ethiopia, occupies the fourth place. What is interesting here is Somalia's place in 2011 and 2012. If we look at the annual aid amounts, Somalia was not in the first place neither 2011 nor 2012. One could expect that given the Turkish aid campaign, which drew much the attention of the world, Somalia should have been in the first place in 2011. Yet in 2011, Pakistan was the largest recipient and Afghanistan coming the second, whereas in 2012, Afghanistan again regained its former place and Kyrgyzstan came after Afghanistan. Until 2015, Somalia never gained first place in Turkey's annual foreign aid. This shows that the initial campaign for Somalia largely financed by the civil society's contributions and official aid had not a prominent part in the overall Turkish aid to Somalia. I will later go over this issue while analyzing Somalia's place in Turkish Foreign policy after 2011.

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<sup>122</sup> TİKA, Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımı Raporu 2007, (2008), <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/KalkinmaYardimlariRaporu2007.pdf> (19.03.2019), 47.

<sup>123</sup> TİKA, Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımı Raporu 2009, (2010), <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/KalkinmaYardimlariRaporu2009.pdf> (19.03.2019), 30.

<sup>124</sup> TİKA, Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımı Raporu 2010, (2010), <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/KalkinmaYardimlariRaporu2010.pdf> (19.03.2019), 48.

**Table 5**  
**Turkey's Total Official Flows to Major Recipients (2011 – 2017)**  
(US Dollar, Millions 2016 – Constant Prices)

Recipient Countries	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total (2010-2017)
<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>103.37</b>	<b>119.51</b>	70.98	55.12	55.23	32.69	40.85	477.75
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	20.91	15.25	22.69	31.23	8.52	14.24	11.51	124.35
<b>Ethiopia</b>	1.13	3.02	2.36	3.08	78.89	<b>211.61</b>	19.90	319.99
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	58.51	<b>83.10</b>	<b>104.07</b>	<b>71.63</b>	95.67	25.39	20.31	458.68
<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>161.86</b>	8.38	39.54	20.97	1.88	4.66	12.19	249.48
<i>Somalia</i>	<i>73.76</i>	<i>68.21</i>	<i>91.56</i>	<i>62.82</i>	<i>306.22</i>	<i>59.63</i>	<i>67.84</i>	<i>730.03</i>
<b>Tunisia</b>	0.48	47.56	28.63	<b>169.58</b>	1.31	12.31	2.89	262.76
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	5.18	4.10	5.54	3.66	4.52	4.26	6.36	33.61

Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions [https://stats.oecd.org / Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#) (25.03.2019).

What is interesting here is also the way Turkey's development assistance to Somalia has been increasing since 2011. If we look at the Turkey's annual flows to Tunisia, for instance, it was very small during all those years except the year of 2014 in which Tunisia suddenly jumped into the largest recipient of Turkey's annual aid. This is probably related to some domestic issues in Tunisia in that year. Turkey's annual aid to Somalia, however never changed the way it increased. We can say that Turkey's efforts in Somalia will not be affected by any domestic changes in Somalia as Turkey pursues to develop a long-term policy towards Somalia rather than a short-term one.

### **3.6.3 Somalia in TIKa development assistance reports**

After 2011, TIKa reports have begun to provide a wealth of specific information about Turkey's activities in Somalia. Just making a comparison between how many times Somalia was mentioned in 2010 and 2011 reports give us the idea that something dramatic happened with the Turkish-Somali relations. In 2010, for example, Somalia was just three times mentioned in the text of the report. This number is 33 in 2011.

After 2011, however, Somalia occupied a prominent place in TIKA reports. But, the increase of the information about Turkey's activities in Somalia does not mean that the quality of the information has also risen. Most of the time, the information given was just a collection of activities and projects. It could not be found out which criteria are used for the selection of the projects, and the actual cost of the individual projects is also unknown. This fact gives us that the Turkish aid effort in Somalia was not based on an overall coherent strategy; therefore, the focus of the projects or activities carried out in Somalia is not clear. This is a common criticism that was often discussed among some observers. I will be discussing this issue later in the Critics of the Turkish Model section.

### **3.7 Turkey's Place among Somalia's Donors**

Huge amounts of aid were transferred to Somalia from its independence throughout the Cold War. In the 1980s, for instance, Somalia became the largest recipient of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>125</sup> Western donors have been assisting Somalia with increased amounts of aid since the beginning of Somalia's civil war in the 1990s. None of these assistances prevented the continuations of Somalia's long-existed poverty, instability, and civil war. It is important to compare Turkish aid to Somalia with the other traditional donors of Somalia during the periods of 2004-2010 and 2011-2017. Turkey's aid in the first period was simply negligible. In the second period, Turkey climbed to third place in terms of total aid while the first and second places did not change (see Table 6). The United States is still at the top and the United Kingdom becomes the second largest donor in Somalia. Both these two donors increased their amounts of aid significantly. The United States, for instance, nearly doubled its aid amount to Somalia from 828 million USD to 1.575 million USD. There is also a tremendous increase in the UK's assistance to Somalia; this increase which is from 255 USD million to 1.339 million is more than four times. All the other countries also raised their assistance to Somalia. Apparently, Turkey's response to the needs of Somalia changed the old calculus between traditional donors as Turkey brought the world's attention to Somalia. Many other donors also increased their aid to Somalia.

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
<sup>125</sup> Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center, "Turkey and Somalia: Making Aid Work for Peace," *Briefing*, (March 2015), 3.

**Table 6**  
**Comparison of Major Donors (2004 – 2017)**  
 (US Dollar, Millions 2016 – Constant Prices)

Countries	2011-2017 Total Aid USD Millions	2004-2010 Total Aid USD Millions	Increase
United States	1,574.95	827.91	90%
United Kingdom	1,338.76	254.73	426%
Turkey	<b>730.03</b>	<b>21.89</b>	<b>3235%</b>
Sweden	414.05	143.75	188%
Germany	405.31	67.52	500%
Norway	313.79	228.45	37%
Japan	241.69	69.25	249%
United Arab Emirates	178.00	33.68	428%
Canada	156.84	75.07	109%

Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions, 2017 [https:// stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? Datasetcode=TABLE2A#](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Datasetcode=TABLE2A#) (26.03.2019).

If we look at the annual changes in the assistance given to Somalia, we can see that the United States, except for brief periods, ranked as first in the total foreign aid to Somalia. The United Kingdom which always comes after the USA for most of the time in our periods, on the other hand, reached the top in 2017. Except for one year, (2015), Turkey's share in the total aid to Somalia never exceeded 10% (See Figure 3).



**Figure 3** Total Official Flows to Somalia and the Percentage of Turkish Aid in Total Aid (2004-2017) (US Dollar, Millions 2016 – Constant Prices)

Source: OECD, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions, 2017 [https:// stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? Datasetcode=TABLE2A#](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Datasetcode=TABLE2A#) (28.03.2019).

However, what is interesting here is the reason why such a small amount of Turkey's aid to Somalia has become successful when compared with the amounts provided by the other donors. If we compare the total aid amounts provided by Turkey and the United States during the period of 2011 – 2017, for instance, we can see that the United States provided more than double when compared with the amounts provided by Turkey. The reason why such a huge amount of United States' aid to Somalia have never made any difference in the country is that, the assistance from the US and the other western countries as well does not always reach directly to the Somali people. It goes either to the hands of corrupted political or aid officials or it is always just an empty promise which is never provided. Turks, however, are determined to do the job in Somalia by themselves in order to ensure the assistance reached where it was intended to contribute.

Yet just looking at the graphics, we could not truly understand why Turkish aid to Somalia generated so much excitement and why Turkish contribution viewed as “colossal” in 2011. In both 2011 and 2012, Turkey's share in the total aid to Somalia was below 10%. To understand why Turkish foray into Somalia was so successful, we need to dig deeper and pay more attention to what happened in Somalia in 2011. It appears that other aspects of Turkish assistance contributed more to the perception of its success in Somalia than pouring just some money. Turkey's active engagement in Somalia received much attention from the world and it was subject to numerous studies since 2011. Behind this appreciation lies a distinctive assistance model that made Turkey's efforts in Somalia so successful. Now let me outline the main characteristics of this model in the following section.

### **3.8 Turkish Assistance Model in Somalia**

After 2006, Turkey provided extensive development assistance to Afghanistan and in many ways; Afghanistan was very similar to Somalia. The country has been suffering from internal strife while terrorism also continued to be a serious problem. However, Turkey's assistance programs in Afghanistan have not received much attention in the way its assistance programs in Somalia have received. So, one could ask what made Turkish aid programs in Somalia so impressive? The way Turkey has

engaged in Somalia is unique and different when compared with the other Somalia's long-existed traditional donors. Some significant characteristics have made Turkey's involvement in Somalia exceptional. The most remarkable ones of these characteristics include Turkey's risk-taking in Somalia and its bilateral partnership with recipients, NGOs, and businesses in Somalia. Visibility and lack of conditionality of Turkey's assistance in Somalia are also among what has made Turkey's involvement in Somalia relatively different. I will briefly spell out the important qualities of Turkish assistance in the following section.

The first characteristic of Turkey's model of assistance is *risk-taking*. Since Erdoğan's 2011 visit in Somalia, Turkish officials and aid workers decided to be on the ground despite the ongoing instability in Somalia. Nairobi-based international organizations found the Turkish approach "adventurist" and "naïve".<sup>126</sup> Somalis, on the other hand, highly valued the presence of Turkish aid workers despite security risks.<sup>127</sup> One of the Somalis, for example, once shared his feelings towards Turks' presence in the country:

The Turks in Somalia are among us. They eat with us while the Europeans stay at the airport. There is no comparison. They drive inside the city. Some of them died for us, yet death does not deter them. They became our comrades. They make you feel they are our brothers. That makes all the difference.<sup>128</sup>

The second characteristic is *Partnership with recipients*. Turkey also officially preferred the bilateral aid approach in Somalia.<sup>129</sup> International bodies severely criticized Turkey's assistance model in Somalia of going alone in delivering aid.<sup>130</sup> Somali government officials were on the other hand quite happy with the Turkish approach as one of the Somali officials said that "it seems that Turkey is alone, and it does its own thing. It is quicker and more focused than all the others. The Turks simply

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<sup>126</sup> International Crisis Group, "Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia," 10.

<sup>127</sup> Ahmed Ali, "Turkish Aid in Somalia: The Irresistible Appeal of Boots on the Ground," *The Guardian* 30.09.2013 [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/sep/30/turkey-aid-Somalia-aid-effectiveness\\_](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/sep/30/turkey-aid-Somalia-aid-effectiveness_) (20.03.2019).

<sup>128</sup> Mahad Wasuge, "Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little," *Heritage Institute for Policy Studies*, 2016, <http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1-1.pdf>. (20.03.2019), 22.

<sup>129</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, "Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia," 25.

<sup>130</sup> International Crisis Group, "Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia," 10.

say we are going to do this road, and they do it... It takes forever for others to do the smallest thing.”<sup>131</sup>

For Turkey, one positive side-effect of going alone was the necessity of working with Somalis. Somalis viewed traditional donors with suspicion because they did not work with them but rather “worked on” them.<sup>132</sup> A Somali NGO worker, for instance, once made the following remark: “We have a good relationship with all the organizations we work with. However, when we work with Turkish organizations, we feel like equal partners. The Turks respect the Somalis as equals.”<sup>133</sup>

*Partnership with NGOs* is the third characteristic of Turkey’s model of assistance in Somalia. Partnership with NGOs was one of the main characteristics of Turkey’s aid effort in Somalia.<sup>134</sup> Some of the Turkish NGOs, in fact, had arrived in Somalia long before the Turkish government showed any interest in Somalia. Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), for example, is one of those organizations which have been operating in Somalia since 1996.<sup>135</sup> The 2011 and 2012, for instance, Somalia was the largest recipient of Turkish NGO’s assistances.<sup>136</sup> Somalis regarded Turkish NGOs operating in Somalia as a part of the overall Turkish assistance in the country. Representatives from NGOs also mostly shared this feeling.<sup>137</sup> As a sign of an active partnership with NGOs, TIKA also gave considerable space to NGO activities in its reports.

The rise of NGOs’ role in development aid is a global phenomenon.<sup>138</sup> According to Riddell, NGO’s efforts in some areas like capacity building and

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, 28.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>134</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, “Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia,” 26.

<sup>135</sup> Halil İbrahim Alegöz, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde İnsani Diplomasinin Rolü: Türkiye-Somali örneği,” (Master’s Thesis, FSM Vakıf Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Medeniyet Araştırmaları Anabilim Dalı, 2013), 87.

<sup>136</sup> NGO Aid in 2011 was US\$ 57.84 million. In 2012 it was US\$26.41 million. See TIKA, Development Assistance Report, 2011, [http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/kyr\\_ing.pdf](http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/kyr_ing.pdf) (20.03.2019): p.70. And TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance 2012, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/TurkishDevelopmentAssistance2012.pdf> (20.03.2019), p 77.

<sup>137</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, “Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia,” 26.

<sup>138</sup> Lancaster, *Foreign aid*, 5.

institutional strengthening resulted in much greater success.<sup>139</sup> We can say that the existence of Turkish NGOs in Somalia has positively affected the aid efforts in the country. By actively working with the NGOs, Turkey harnessed a highly effective component of Turkish society assisting to the Somalis. Turkish society played a major role, particularly in the initial relief efforts to Somalia.

Another distinguishing characteristic of Turkey's aid effort in Somalia was its *partnership with businesses*. From the beginning, for instance, the Turkish government tried to involve Turkish businessmen in its aid effort in Somalia. The Government assumed that partnership with businessmen could help create a longer-term relationship with Somalia which does not end with just initial humanitarian efforts. Turkish businesspeople thus agreed and came to Mogadishu to "explore possibilities" in Somalia, and in the process, Turkish-Somali business forums were established.<sup>140</sup>

Another important factor of the Turkish aid in Somalia was also its *visibility*. Apart from the humanitarian assistance given to the needy Somalis, Turkey tried to build infrastructure that could help ordinary Somalis in their daily lives. According to the former President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, one source of Turkey's popularity among Somalis was visibility:

... When they see the street lighting or the rehabilitation of the two-kilometer road or a hospital, that's what makes a difference for the people. That is why people are saying Turkish aid is always more effective than the others. People want to see something different.<sup>141</sup>

A senior UN official also attested that visibility was an important component of Turkish aid efforts in Somalia: "The Somalis cherish the Turkish model because it is visible, tangible and has an impact."<sup>142</sup>

*Lack of conditionality* is also among the characteristics that made Turkey's involvement in Somalia more effective and relatively exceptional. Turkey, for instance,

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<sup>139</sup>Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* 310.

<sup>140</sup> Julia Harte, "Turkey Shocks Africa," *World Policy Journal* 29, No. 4 (2012), 27-32. See also Wasuge, "Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia," 24.

<sup>141</sup> Mahad Wasuge, "Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia," 24.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid, 23.

provided its aid to Somalia without attaching any conditionality or asking anything in return from the government of Somalia.<sup>143</sup> The Lack of conditionality and Turkey's open attitude towards aid requests brought much appreciations from Somali officials who have complaining about Western donors who usually dictate their agendas while providing assistance to Somalia.<sup>144</sup> In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics of Turkey's model of assistance in Somalia, there are also some important factors that have made Turkey's involvement in Somalia so special. These factors include historical factor, cultural factor, and religion factor. The role Turkey's non-state actors in the effectiveness of Turkey's efforts in Somalia is also important in this case.

Turkey's historical relations with East Africa both in the era of the Ottoman Empire and in the contemporary period have played an important role in the Turkey's recent engagement with Somalia. The Ottoman Empire had deep political, social, military, and economic relations with East Africa back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>145</sup> Historically, the countries in the East Africa such Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritria, and Sudan were strategically important for the Ottoman Empire in terms of the protection of trade routes, Sea, and the Holy Places. By providing political, economic, military, social support to strengthen them and to prevent the colonial policies in East Africa, the Ottoman State established good relationship with the Muslim Sultanates that were controlling many parts of those countries.<sup>146</sup> Although the relations between the Ottoman Empire and East Africa diminished after the establishment of the secular republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkey redefined her policy towards Africa after the end of the Cold War, adopting a new strategy towards Africa in 1998 to improve the relations with Africa. As a part of this strategy, the humanitarian situation of Somalia in 2011 paved a way for Turkey to re-initiate its relations with East Africa. The contemporary relations between Turkey and Somalia, therefore, is considered a repeated organic relationship between the two states.

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<sup>143</sup>Teri Lynne Murphy and Aueven Elizabeth Woods, "Turkey's International Development Framework Case Study: Somalia," *Istanbul Policy Center*, 2014, <https://mershoncenter.osu.edu/media/media/publications/misc-pdfs/Turkeys-International-Development-Framework-Somalia.pdf> (18.03.2019), 12.

<sup>144</sup>Pinar Akpınar, "Interview with Mr. Jamal Mohamed BARROW, Deputy Foreign Minister of Somalia," 11.04.2013, <http://sam.gov.tr/interview-with-mr-jamal-mohamed-barrow-deputy-foreign-minister-of-somalia/> (18.03.2019).

<sup>145</sup> Siradag, "Turkish-Somali Relations," 91.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

Ideological motivations are also important factor in the Turkey's involvement in Somalia. Accordingly, emerging powers try to expand their influences to the aid recipient countries through ideological motivations.<sup>147</sup> They usually have strong ties such as religious, historical, cultural, and language with the other developing parts of the world. Since it is considered as an emerging power, Turkey has been a proactive in the Muslim countries in East Africa such as Somalia and Sudan. By considering itself as a successor of the Ottoman Empire and Muslim societies, Turkey has established close relations with the Muslim countries of the former Ottoman Empire.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey recent involvement in Somalia is a part of the revival of the former Ottomans relations with African Muslim countries.

The 2011 humanitarian situation in Somalia provided Turkey with a platform to demonstrate this shift in its foreign policy. In addition to strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, Turkey's involvement in Somalia has also motivated by its domestic drivers. It is already argued that "As its economy has grown, Turkish foreign policy has become considerably more assertive and predicated on the ideology of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), shifting to a focus on the Middle East, particularly on Muslim Brotherhood-oriented Sunni sectarianism."<sup>149</sup> Since 2011, the AKP part seems to start redirecting its foreign policy more to AKP's Ideological principles. In Somalia, we can see that the 'Islamic soft-power approach' that Turkey implements in Somalia as a part of its development assistance through the establishment of religious educational institutions and Imam-Hatip schools, and the construction of mosques have been positively well received. In this sense, although its importance is not that much, the ideological compatibility between the Turkey's ruling party and the political branches connected to the Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia may have also motivated Turkey's involvement in Somalia.

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<sup>147</sup> Ahmet Çöğen, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy in Somalia As an Emerging Power" (Master's Thesis, Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, Istanbul, 2017), 42

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Willem Berg and Jos Meester, "Turkey in Horn of Africa: Between the Ankara Consensus and the Gulf Crisis," *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, (2019), 1.

### 3.9 Criticisms of Turkey's Assurances Model in Somalia

Turkish policymakers and many observers generally claimed that humanitarian values were the main drivers behind the general initiatives of Turkey's involvement in Somalia. But others questioned Turkey's approach in Somalia and tried to find some other ulterior meanings in the Turkish aid activities in Somalia. For example, an article claimed that Turkish efforts in Somalia are directed to establish "a gateway for renewed Turkish imperialism" in Somalia.<sup>150</sup> However, this article failed to show any evidence of the imperial approach in Turkish efforts in Somalia, in fact as I mentioned before, one of the notable features of the Turkish assistance models in Somalia is its lack of conditionality. Turkey did not impose any terms for giving aid to Somali people.

Other scholars also criticized Turkey's activities in Somalia. They argued that there is a lack of critical work on Turkish aid and claimed that there was a discrepancy between "false zeal with which Turkish 'humanitarian diplomacy' has been paraded" and "the practical consequences in the field."<sup>151</sup> Yet, there is an extensive scholarly work on Turkish aid to Somalia which did not hold back laying out any negative side of Turkey to Somalia. I will present some of these criticisms and the response that Turkish officials and NGO representatives have responded to these criticisms.

Lack of planning and criteria for selecting specific projects or activities to fund is a major criticism in Turkey's aid-giving in Somalia. Turkey has not set out any criteria which projects or activities can receive financing and on which terms.<sup>152</sup> Another common point among the critics of Turkey's aid to Somalia is that Turkish aid almost focused in and around Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia.<sup>153</sup> Lack of coordination with other donors also is a constant source of criticism.<sup>154</sup> The Somali

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<sup>150</sup> Paul Antonopoulos et al, "Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries," *Journal of Comparative Politics* 10, No. 2 (2017), 15.

<sup>151</sup> Theodore Baird, "The Geopolitics of Turkey's 'Humanitarian Diplomacy' in Somalia: A Critique," *Review of African Political Economy*, (2015), 2-6.

<sup>152</sup> Jeannine Hausmann and Erik Lundsgaarde, "Turkey's Role in Development Cooperation," *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*, (2015), 3.

<sup>153</sup> Wasuge, "Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia," 29.

<sup>154</sup> International Crisis Group, "Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia," 1-2.

government, on the other hand, criticized the go alone approach of Turkish NGOs in Somalia.<sup>155</sup>

Turkish NGOs responded to these criticisms by pointing out that the conditions in Somalia made them very hard to collect any accurate information. On the other hand, even the aid officials on the ground did not always have accurate information. An NGO representative, for instance, justified their response by mentioning a particular accident that occurred in Mogadishu; “we learned that there was a health problem in a village outside Mogadishu and we informed the UN officials about their intention to visit the village. The UN officials did not approve of our visit instead they told us that there was no health problem in that village. Our officials insisted on visiting that village and when they arrived in that village, they found that the village was not receiving much aid and they were in fact in need of serious health aid.”<sup>156</sup>

Another important factor that prevented Turkey’s coordination with other international actors was the Turkish presence on the ground in Somalia. Other international and regional organizations usually conduct their operations mainly from Kenya.<sup>157</sup> Turkish diplomats also stressed that Turkey was ready to cooperate with anyone working in Somalia.

Turkish policymakers reacted to the lack of criteria or strategic planning criticism by indicating their “demand-driven” approach. They indicated that bureaucracy and regulations hamper the flexibility and efficiency of aid programs.<sup>158</sup> Somali government officials also praised this approach by indicating that the absence of detailed and structured assessments “facilitated the prompt delivery of aid”, and allowed for “more responsiveness” to Somali requests.<sup>159</sup> In response to the criticism related to business in aid efforts, the Turkish side noted that a promotion of Turkish investments and businesses in Somalia was seen to complement aid. One Turkish diplomat, for

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<sup>155</sup> Akpınar, “Interview with Mr. Jamal Mohamed Barrow”

<sup>156</sup> Hasan Öztürk and Sevinç Öztürk, “Türkiye’nin Dış Yardım Stratejisi: Sorunlar Ve Öneriler,” *Bilgesam Yayınları Rapor 54* (2012), 37.

<sup>157</sup> Gizem Sucuoglu and Jason Stearns, “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid,” *South African Institute of International Affairs*, (2016), 39.

<sup>158</sup> Murphy and Woods, “Case Study: Somalia,” 14.

<sup>159</sup> Sucuoglu and Stearns, “Shifting Paradigms of Aid,” 27.

instance, once argued that “the best aid is trade.”<sup>160</sup> African commentators also indicated that involving business and mutual trade benefits were more useful and the old aid model created Dependency on Aid Receiving Countries.<sup>161</sup>

### **3.10 What is Turkey’s Agenda in Somalia?**

Humanitarian considerations were the initial motives for Turkey’s involvement in Somalia. However, it seems that Turkey’s engagements in Somalia has gone far beyond being just a humanitarian action as Turkey’s influence in Somalia grows, presenting Somalia as an opportunity for furthering Turkey’s political and economic interests in Africa generally, and particularly in Somalia. From the theoretical frameworks discussed in chapter 2, realist perspectives will be very helpful to understand the real agenda (if not just a humanitarian purpose) of Turkey’s recent involvement in Somalia. As I noted earlier in chapter 2, realists argue that whenever the states intervene in other states for a particular reason such as humanitarian assistance, their actions may seem humanitarian action but they are always motivated by some particular foreign policy agendas such as political and economic interests. In this case, it would be fair to assume that Turkey is not exceptional.

Considering the view of realism theory in the context of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool, I will be explaining Turkey’s agenda in Somalia as being political and business interests. Trying to gain international recognition as an emerging political and economic power and searching for export markets for Turkish products are among the main agendas in Turkey’s presence in Somalia. But, more importantly, there are two important discourses that Turkey used as a foreign policy tool to achieve its political and economic agendas in Somalia: humanitarian diplomacy and soft power. First, I will be discussing Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy and soft power in Somalia and then I will look at what kind of interests does Turkey intend to gain from its policies in Somalia and how ideological, historical, and cultural factors have influenced Turkey’s engagement with Somalia.

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<sup>160</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, “Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia,” 26.

<sup>161</sup> Rasna Warah, “Why Turkish Aid Model is Proving to be a Success in Somalia and Elsewhere,” *Daily Nation*, 01.04.2012, <https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Why-Turkish-aid-model-is-proving-to-be-a-success-/440808-1378016-t4e8br/index.html> (21.03.2019).

### 3.10.1 Somalia in the Wider Context of Turkish Foreign Policy

Making sense of Somalia's place in a wider context of Turkish Foreign Policy requires a comprehensive review of Turkey's JDP's record. Was the Somali relief effort a single initiative or was it a continuation of similar foreign policy ventures which raised concerns in the West. Having reviewed extensive literature, I found two scholarly articles which have more descriptive power in explaining JDP's seemingly confusing moves in the foreign policy area.

Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris argued that JDP simply responded to the strong domestic pressure coming inside from Turkey to become a "vibrant" global actor. They claimed the Turkish government's approach was not unusual; rather, it was a natural consequence of a pro-activist foreign policy agenda of civil society.<sup>162</sup> From this perspective, the Turkish government and its society acted together against a catastrophic famine in Somalia. There was some truth to this explanation. Haşimi, for example, noted that Turkey's humanitarian assistance in Somalia was regarded as a natural and indispensable part of its identity.<sup>163</sup> When the famine declared in Somalia in 2011, there was a country-wide campaign in Turkey to take an action and even the opposition leader felt it necessary to visit Somalia. As the voices of Turkish society and NGOs to help the Somali people became an important force in Turkey and abroad, this has seriously influenced the course of Turkish foreign policy.<sup>164</sup>

Ömer Taşpınar also suggested another explanation for the daring moves of Turkey's JDP: *Turkish Gaullism*. According to Taşpınar, from giving an unconditional response to Somalia's famine, Turkey simply sought to attain status and prestige in the international arena.<sup>165</sup> Implementing bold initiatives without coordinating with its old allies was a well-known feature of JDP diplomacy during this period. So, for Turkey,

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<sup>162</sup> Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris, "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity," *The Washington Quarterly* 33, No. 4 (2010), 86. Murphy and Woods also have the same opinion: Turkey's entrance into the Somali conflict may have been a surprise to many but it exemplifies the dynamic emphasis within its foreign policy. See Murphy and Woods, "Case Study: Somalia," 10.

<sup>163</sup> Cemalettin Haşimi, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation," *Insight Turkey* 16, No. 1 (2014), 139.

<sup>164</sup> Pınar Akpınar, "Turkey's Peace building in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy," *Turkish Studies* 14, No. 4 (2013), 743.

<sup>165</sup> Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, No. 3 (2012), 127-140.

aid effort in Somalia was a much broader and forceful effort to showcase its foreign policy initiative in the region.<sup>166</sup> In this sense, it may not be an exaggeration to call Turkey initiatives in Somalia as “Mavi Marmara II” with much larger effort on the part of the government. Because this time, there was no powerful and legitimate opponent on the ground, therefore the initiative resulted in a remarkable achievement.

### **3.10.2 The Rise of Humanitarian Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign Policy**

Successful Turkish assistance model in Somalia and accompanying global recognition led Turkish policymakers increasingly focus on the humanitarian aspect of the Turkish foreign policy. They tried to formulate a distinctive approach that combines its impressive assistance activities in Somalia with the promotion of democracy that could give power to masses in the Middle-east. In this vein, the Turkish Foreign Ministry convened the Ambassadors Conference with the theme of “Humanitarian Diplomacy” between 2 and 7 January 2013. According to the ministry, humanitarian Diplomacy concept was specifically selected because this concept encompassed the “compassionate” and “competent” character of the Republic of Turkey and the “human-oriented nature” of the Turkish foreign policy. In the same declaration, it is officially proclaimed that demands of democracy by peoples in the south of the Mediterranean should be supported.<sup>167</sup>

Claiming that humanitarian diplomacy became one of the key principles of Turkish diplomacy, Davutoğlu made further explanations about humanitarian diplomacy and the Turkish Foreign Policy. According to Davutoğlu, Turkish humanitarian diplomacy was established on three pillars. The First pillar was improving the lives of Turkish citizens. Liberalization of the visa regime and providing Turkish people free movement and fast mobility were the main actions under this pillar. Second pillar was focusing on crisis zones in the world with a human-oriented approach. Turkey’s actions in Somalia were a prime example of the second pillar. The Third pillar

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<sup>166</sup> Mark Langan, “Virtuous Power Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa: The ‘Neo-Ottoman’ Challenge to the European Union,” *Third World Quarterly*, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1229569> (20.03.2019) 9.

<sup>167</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Final Declaration of the Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference, 2011, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/final-declaration-of-the-fifth-annual-ambassadors-conference.en.mfa> (17.03.2019).

was maintaining a humanitarian perspective at the global level especially in the United Nations system. Reform of the UN and empowering the UN General Assembly were among the main items under this pillar.<sup>168</sup> By positioning herself as a humanitarian actor and a significant contributor to solving crises, JDP found a brand-new name for its foreign policy: “Turkey’s Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy.”<sup>169</sup>

Recently, Turkish diplomats across the world and in their countries tried to contribute to this branding of Turkish Foreign Policy. Ambassador Ayda Unlu in Cambodia, for instance, wrote an op-ed in *Khmer Times* in Cambodia and claimed that humanitarian approach became an indispensable and critical aspect of Turkish diplomacy.<sup>170</sup> Ambassador Mehmet Raif Karaca, on the other hand, also wrote in Rwanda’s leading daily *New Times* that Turkey’s humanitarian policy guided its foreign policy and the country occupied the top place in international rankings for the official humanitarian assistance when national income is taken into consideration. Giving Somalia as an example, he suggested that combining humanitarian with development tools produce best results.<sup>171</sup> Other Turkish diplomats also wrote similar articles or gave lectures and tried to support Governments’ efforts in branding.<sup>172</sup>

It is obvious that a global push is underway for promoting Turkish Foreign Policy. It could not be a coincidence that many diplomats in different countries simultaneously begun to write op-eds that publicize Turkey’s humanitarian efforts in countries like Somalia. This broad campaign was designed in part as a response to the recent criticism of “security-centric” and “antagonistic” foreign policy.<sup>173</sup> Turkey is trying to protect its image of “humanitarian power.” In the next section, I will be arguing that we need to employ “soft power” concept to better understand Turkish

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<sup>168</sup>Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects,” *Nationalities Papers* 41, No. 6 (2013), 865-868.

<sup>169</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Enterprising and Humanitarian Diplomacy, 2011, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa> (18.03.2019).

<sup>170</sup>Ayda Unlü, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Takes Lead in Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” *Khmer Times*, 30.10.2018, <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/545225/humanitarian-diplomacy-takes-lead-in-turkeys-foreign-policy/> (17.03.2019).

<sup>171</sup>Mehmet Raif Karaca, “Turkey’s humanitarian policy,” *The New Times*, 28.10.2018 <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/turkeys-humanitarian-policy> (17.03.2019).

<sup>172</sup>Selwyn Manning, “95 Years of Humanitarian Foreign Policy,” *Evening Report*, 02.11.2018 <https://eveningreport.nz/2018/11/02/op-ed-turkey-95-years-of-humanitarian-foreign-policy/> (17.03.2019).

<sup>173</sup>Mustafa A Sezal and İhsan Sezal, “Dark Taints on the Looking Glass: Whither ‘New Turkey’,” *Turkish Studies* 19, No. 2 (2018), DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2017.1402681. p.16.

foreign policy moves beginning from the entrance into Somalia in 2011 to the recent efforts to portray Turkey as a humanitarian power.

In addition to the role of its humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia, Turkey also want to play as a regional or middle power player in the region by implementing its ‘middle-power diplomacy’. Middle powers are considered to be the states that are weaker than the great powers or superpowers and weaker than the small states in terms of military and economic indicators.<sup>174</sup> These countries include Canada, Norway, Australia, Brazil, South Korea, Iran, Turkey and list goes until Malaysia and South Africa. Accordingly, these states follow different approached in order to make their role as regional or middle powers visible in the international arena. One of the most remarkable approaches that the successful middle power states followed is the diplomacy which has been variously described as “Niche Diplomacy”<sup>175</sup>, by they try to concentrate their efforts within one specific area in order to achieve the best result and gain the desired international recognition.<sup>176</sup> Turkey, for instance, has this potential as it can be considered as both middle power and regional power. Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey is implementing her ‘Niche Diplomacy’ through humanitarian-oriented policies in Somalia.

### **3.10.3 Turkey’s Aid as a Soft Power Builder in Somalia**

If we look at the Turkish aid to Somalia through the lens of soft power investment, what we see becomes clearer and less puzzling. Turkey’s actions on the ground served its goal of being a global actor and its desire for autonomy<sup>177</sup> in foreign policy. Without coordinating with traditional donors of Somalia, Turkey took the lead in a public campaign and effectively pressed other initially reluctant powers to make a substantial contribution to end the crisis in Somalia. And after a very successful initial push, despite some doubts to the contrary, the Turkish government continued its

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<sup>174</sup> Bruce Gilley, “Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism,” *Strtejik Arařtırmalar Merkezi* Vol. XX, No.1 (2015), 50

<sup>175</sup> ‘Niche Diplomacy’ is defined as concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field. See Andrew F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, (London: Macmillan, 1997), 5.

<sup>176</sup> Bruce Gilley, “Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism,” 52.

<sup>177</sup> Ali Aslan, “Türk Dıř Politikasını Anlamak için Kavramsal bir Çerçeve: Otonomi Arayışı” in *Kemal İnat, Ali Aslan, Burhanettin Duran, Ak Parti’nin 15 Yılı*, 17-40, (İstanbul, SETA Kitapları 29,2017).

commitment to Somalia and created the conditions for what could be called “Scramble for Somalia.”<sup>178</sup>

Any government policy or actions that increase a country’s attraction could be regarded as a soft power investment. A country can raise its attractiveness primarily in two ways: The First one is making the country’s culture or its institutions appealing. This type of soft power could be raised only through long efforts and mostly by actions of a country’s businesses, universities, NGOs and other civil actors.

The Second way is to provide valuable services to other countries without asking anything in return explicitly. This seemingly “altruistic” behavior helps to create an image of “benevolent country” which in turn makes it easy for this country to attract other nations to its side especially for accomplishing general goals. Services provided to other countries can be carried out using a range of different tools. Instruments generally associated with hard power like military force can be deployed for post-disaster humanitarian assistance<sup>179</sup> or economic power tools such as financial resources can be offered to needy countries. If coupled with public diplomacy efforts, these actions could be viewed as an accumulation of soft power.<sup>180</sup> Efforts to measure soft power consider these kinds of actions. For example, one attempt to estimate soft power tries to measure this type of soft power by including such actions taken by countries as contributions to the international community.<sup>181</sup>

In the light of soft-power accumulation rationale, Turkey’s actions were perfectly reasonable. Turkey could not expect anything material from Somalia especially in the short-run. A government that could not feed its own people and had no authority beyond the capital city was not in a position to offer any tangible benefit.

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<sup>178</sup> In the Race Between Turkey and the UAE, Somalia Wins, *Start for World view* 14.08.2017 <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/race-between-turkey-and-uae-somalia-wins> (16.03.2019).

<sup>179</sup> Danny R. Bouie, “Humanitarian Assistance and ‘Soft’ Power Projection,” *Naval War College New Port R.I., Joint Military Operations Dept.*, 2012 [https:// apps.dtic.mil /dti c/tr /fulltext /u2/a563765.pdf](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a563765.pdf)[https:// apps.dtic.mil / dtic/tr /full text/u2/a563765.pdf](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a563765.pdf) (22.03.2019), 8.

<sup>180</sup> Karolina Zielińska, “Development Diplomacy: Development Aid as a Part of Public Diplomacy in the Pursuit of Foreign Policy Aims: Theoretical and Practical Considerations,” *Historia I Polityka* 16 (2016), 9.

<sup>181</sup> Jonathan McClory and Olivia Harvey, “The Soft Power 30: Getting to Grips with the Measurement Challenge,” *Global Affairs* 2, No. 3 (2016) [http://dx.doi.org /10.1080 /23340460.2016.1239379](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1239379) (20.03.2019), 7.

Somalia's conditions, however, presented the JDP government a perfect opportunity for "burnishing its foreign policy credentials" and obtaining the global power status that it craves.<sup>182</sup>

Several factors made Turkish intervention particularly effective. First, Somalis felt abandoned by the world. Even though aid workers on the ground had been reporting alarming conditions in the country for more than a year, there was no effective response by the traditional western donors. Turkish effort at the height of famine was a game-changer for Somalia. With its well-timed intervention, Turkey gained appreciation and gratitude of the Somali people.<sup>183</sup>

Second, contrary to the claims made by some Turkish policymakers and commentators about the historical relationship between Turkey and Somalia, the absence of a historical relationship between Somalia and Turkey was a contributing factor in Somalis full-hearted embrace of Turkish effort. "Hyper-suspicious"<sup>184</sup> Somalis were more receptive to Turkish relief efforts in 2011 and later. Security risks on the ground also made Turkey's contribution more valuable for Somalis. By its willingness and ability to take significantly bold risks in Somalia earned a greater affection from Somali people.<sup>185</sup>

Actions speak louder than words. In international relations, states want to show not only that they have power but they are also ready to use that power when the occasion requires. By adroit use of its resources in a timely fashion and in a legitimate pursuit of making Somalia peaceful and stable, Turkey was able to mobilize other countries in this pursuit. According to Nye, this is pure soft power in work: "making other countries want what it desires" and bringing them into line with its policies.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Brendon Cannon, "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* 16, No. 14 (2016): 99.

<sup>183</sup> Jamal Osman who covered Somalia famine in 2011 for British TV Network Channel 4 News reported on Desperate Conditions in the famine of 2011 and the response of Somalis to Turkish relief efforts. See "How Turkey is Winning Hearts and Minds in Somalia," 01.02.2018 <https://newint.org/features/2018/04/01/turkey-somalia-humanitarian-aid> (21.03.2019).

<sup>184</sup> Mesfin Berouk, "The Soft Power Role of Turkey in Somalia," *Institute for Security Studies*, 22.05.2012. <https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/the-soft-power-role-of-turkey-in-somalia> (20.03.2018).

<sup>185</sup> Cannon, "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," 111.

<sup>186</sup> Nye stated that "... as the policy of a country becomes legitimate for others, the soft power of that country gradually improves." See Nye, "Soft Power: The means to success," 119.

Turkey gained huge prestige in the process and sent the message across the world that even without coordinating with powerful actors; she can make a significant difference on the ground.

After a huge success of Somalia's operation, Turkish policymakers felt confident enough to promote Turkey as a humanitarian power. However, after the Arab-Spring, developments in Turkey and the Middle East threatened and diminished the soft power of Turkey.<sup>187</sup> Recent efforts by the diplomats to publicize humanitarian aspects of Turkish diplomacy can be regarded simply as protection of soft power resources accumulated after Turkey began assistance operations in Somalia.

To maintain its soft power in Africa, Turkey needs to be an economically strong and democratic country.<sup>188</sup> Negative developments in Middle-East may not dent its soft power in Africa<sup>189</sup> but if economic difficulties at home make its position in Somalia unsustainable, Turkey's soft power not only will be depleted but also will be very hard to recover in the near-future. So, to maintain its soft power in Africa, Turkey should reaffirm its commitment.<sup>190</sup> İbrahim Kalın, foremost public diplomacy advocate of Turkey also underscored an important aspect of soft power projection that should be kept in mind by Turkish policymakers: "...fundamental condition for successful public diplomacy is to follow rational, persuasive and defensible policies."<sup>191</sup>

#### **3.10.4 Turkey's Aim for Pursuing an International Prestige in Somalia**

It seems that, despite significant risks in Somalia, the Turkish government chose to involve itself in Somalia because of the potential benefits in terms of political interests such as international recognition and diplomatic profile. Accordingly, while investments in extremely dangerous environments such as Somalia are too risky, the

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<sup>187</sup> Muharrem Ekşi and Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, "The Rise and Fall of Turkish Soft Power and Public Diplomacy," *Journal of Gazi Academic View* 11, No. 23 (2018) <http://www.gaziakademikbakis.com/dosyalar/63b847ad-4fa5-44d8-a71c-f0fa7d2414db.pdf> (25.03.2019), 15-45

<sup>188</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al "Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia," 21.

<sup>189</sup> Liz Ng'ang'a, "Turkey's Growing Soft Power in Africa," *Daily Sabah*. 11.05.2018 <https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018.05.11/turkeys-growing-soft-power-in-africa> (24.03.2019).

<sup>190</sup> Oktay Bingöl, "Somali'de Barış ve Kalkınma Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Rolü," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 7, No. 13 (2013), 103.

<sup>191</sup> İbrahim Kalın, "Soft power and public diplomacy in Turkey," *Perceptions* 16, No. 3 (2011), 12.

output benefits can be great.<sup>192</sup> This is precisely the situation that Turkey has been able to take advantage in Somalia. This means that any success of Turkey's engagement in Somalia would be exceptionally outsized given the challenges of a country that has been suffering from instability, violence, terrorist insurgencies, famine, and destroyed infrastructure for almost a quarter of a century.

Therefore, Turkey's humanitarian actions, its diplomatic presence, its role as a mediator and peace-builder in Somalia, and its weekly flights in and out of Mogadishu have brought Turkey prestige on the international arena. This has arguably made Turkey an international player outside its own neighbor as Turkey now is an essential power and player when it comes to the issues related to the East of Africa, a place that is traditionally outside of Turkey's area of influence. Thus, it would be fair to say that Turkey's involvement in Somalia is based on its ambition to become an internationally recognized country as an emerging economic and political power. In other words, Turkey's ability to help Somalia to become a stable political state is essential for Turkey's future role when it comes to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Thus, a successful mediation role in Somalia's political situation will place Turkey as an important partner in conflict situations in Africa.

On the other hand, as Africa is becoming a significant platform for emerging powers like Turkey to become global players, Turkey's initiatives in Somalia increases its legitimacy and visibility in Africa. African votes, for instance, are important for Turkey in its international bids, such as a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council. According to Baris Akgün, in its endeavor to secure a non-permanent Security Council seat at the UN in 2008, for instance, Turkey gained massive support from Africa totaling 151 votes.<sup>193</sup> In this sense, for instance, one of the intended aims of Turkey's involvement in Somalia might be to earn Somalia's vote on relevant issues.

Moreover, Turkey may also intend to show itself as a powerful global power state by deciding to go to Somalia alone to demonstrate that it had the reach and soft power to engage such an area by itself. Unlike many other Somalia's traditional donors

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<sup>192</sup> Cannon, "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," 104.

<sup>193</sup> Ahmet Yükleven and Mohammed Zulkarian, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Somalia," *Journal of Caspian Affairs* 1, No. 2 (2015), 115.

who located their offices in Nairobi and avoided from directly involving the situation in Somalia, the Turkish government and NGOs went to Somalia to do their humanitarian and development projects by themselves. This has made Turkey's presence in Somalia indispensable to many Somalis. This action also projects Turkey as an internationally more strong and independent state. It also argued that "as Turkey becomes a more proactive member of the international community and demonstrates its ability to influence outcomes that achieve international security and peace, its recognition as a global power starts to crystallize."<sup>194</sup>

### **3.10.5 Turkey's Business Interests in Somalia**

In addition to the political interests, Turkey also has economic agendas in Somalia. As the search for new markets for Turkish products has been a significant driver in Turkey's relations with the developing world, the establishment of relations with African countries has won Turkey the exploration of new investment opportunities across the continent.<sup>195</sup> Thus, Somalia is an unexploited market for Turkey's exports and emerging businesses. The country is in a strategic position of Horn of Africa with the longest seaboard in the continent and it is the center of major trading routes. This makes the country a gateway to the rest of Africa. Somalia's untapped natural resources such as minerals and energy and its business opportunities in the construction sector make the country an attractive economic destination for Turkey. It is already argued that "if Turkey remains Somalia's favorite foreign power in the years to come, it stands to benefit massively from these opportunities."<sup>196</sup> Thus, business relations with Somalia will most likely play an important role in the global competitiveness of Turkish businesses.

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<sup>194</sup> Matthew T. Gullo, "Turkey's Somalia Adventure: The Quest for Soft Power and Regional Recognition," *Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey*, (2012), 8.

<sup>195</sup> Yökleyen and Zulkarian, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Somalia," 114

<sup>196</sup> Ibid

## 4. CONCLUSION

This study is an attempt to discuss the relationship between foreign aid-giving and states' foreign policy goals. By addressing Turkey's humanitarian assistance to Somalia as a case study, this study is aimed to explain why do the governments provide aid to others and how states' aid-giving is influenced by their foreign policy agendas. The study addressed these questions at two levels – one looks at the answers that have been provided by the existing literature for the question of “Why foreign aid is provided”; the other tried to explain why Turkey has involved itself in Somalia and how Turkey's engagement with Somalia is not just driven by humanitarian response but also by its foreign policy goals. Both literature review and data analysis are conducted for the case of Turkey's assistance to Somalia. This final chapter tries to pull together the answers provided by the existing literature and the findings from the case study.

Foreign aid has begun as Cold War diplomacy between East and West at end of World War II. While foreign aid was provided for the national interest of the donors during the Cold War, later at the end of the Cold War it became an expected norm in relations between states – that is developed states should provide assistance to the least developed states to help to improve the human conditions of the poor people. Although aid's purposes have differed from country to country, its evolution started from being a temporary Cold War diplomacy during the 1950s and 1960s. later it became mostly development-oriented in the 1970s and 1980s while at end of the Cold War, it gained new purposes such as promoting political and economic transitions, dealing with global problems, supporting democracy, and post-conflict management.

The question of ‘Why states provide humanitarian assistance to others?’ has been debated by many scholars in the academic literature. It has been discussed whether states have duties beyond their borders in which they are supposed to provide aid to help those who are suffering abroad. Many academicians tried to explain this question by interpreting it through the lenses of different international relations theories and approaches. Among these theories are the standard foreign policy theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, as well as some other Ethical theories. There are also some other private theories and approaches which provide different arguments for

the states' foreign aid-giving policies towards other people living outside within their territorial borders.

This study is an attempt to gather the answers provided by all above-mentioned theories and approaches to have a theoretical framework for the topic. Those who interpreted the provision of foreign aid through the realist perspective argue that states are self-interest oriented and they are only responsible for the security and the well-being of their citizens. However, states may sometimes help others who are outside their borders but they only do this when they are expecting something, favored for their interests, in return. Realist perspective concludes that, whenever states provide foreign aid to other states, their actions may seem humanitarian response but they are always motivated by some other political and economic objectives to justify their own foreign policy goals. In contrast to the realist view, scholars who interpret foreign aid from liberalist perspectives argue that states do and should have responsibilities beyond their borders to help others. This view considers foreign aid as an instrument which is used by states to strengthen interdependence and globalization. Foreign aid which is channeled through international institutions such as World Bank, for instance, is used to control or reduce some global problems such as poverty in conflict-affected countries, worldwide infectious diseases, and environmental degradations.

On the other hand, the constructivist theory argues that states' interests are not explained by power, wealth, and security only, but also some other principles such as a dedication to human rights and the promotion of democracy. This view sees foreign aid as a tool used by states to make their policies appear legitimate to the eyes of other states in international society. Therefore, states provide aid to show that they are admired for their commitment to defend the universal principles rather than their willingness to pursue their national interests. Foreign aid is also considered by many as a tool of diplomacy and soft power. It is argued that states use foreign aid as a tool of diplomacy to implement their foreign policy decisions. This study demonstrates that donors use their aid as a tool of humanitarian diplomacy when they choose where to provide their aid. Moreover, providing aid to a target country is also regarded as an instrument of soft power.

Apart from all these theoretical approaches, none of the main aid donors would claim that they provide foreign aid solely on the basis of self-interest motivations. For almost all donors, foreign aid is seen as being driven by some kind of moral obligations or duties to provide it. Donors have given different reasons to explain why they provide aid to others. The most general explanations which have been mentioned so far can be summarized that governments provide aid: on the basis of solidarity; in response to extreme poverty and human suffering; in order to enhance human development, freedoms, and fulfillment of human rights; in order to address inequality and promote social justice; and on the basis of national security and peaceful world. On the other hand, scholars who interpreted foreign aid through cosmopolitanism perspective regard states' foreign aid-giving as human solidarity that goes across the national boundaries and to all people who live in our globe. From this perspective, if people are suffering and in need, then both governments and even individuals have a universal duty and responsibility to help those who are in need.

Although the purposes of development, solidarity, and humanitarian assistance have been important in the allocations of foreign aid as most donors claim, foreign aid from the largest bilateral donors is usually being provided for purposes that are based on some particular national interests of the donors. Having reviewed what the academic literature says about the purpose for which aid is provided as well as how the states actually allocate their foreign aid-giving, this study suggests that foreign aid is an instrument that the policymakers use to pursue their foreign policy aims of dominating, strengthening, pacifying, or changing certain countries.

In order to understand Turkey's aid policies in Somalia, an overview of Turkey's overall official assistance towards abroad in general, and Africa in particular, should be examined. Turkey's aid policy on Somalia relates to her general policy towards Africa. Turkey's involvement in Somalia has purely started as a humanitarian initiative but later tuned out to be a long-term strategy of Somalia and East Africa policy for Turkey. Turkey's presence in Somalia and its operations in the country have been positively welcomed and much appreciated by the Somali people. However, this begs the question of 'what are Turkey's ambitions in Somalia? This study suggests that

Turkey's humanitarian involvement in Somalia is a reflection of its political and economic interest in the future of Somalia, in particular, and generally in Africa. Although in one way it can be explained as good intentions and humanitarian one, Turkey's actions in Somalia is primarily motivated by its ambition to pursue an international recognition as an emerging power. Somalia, for the sake of Turkey's recent involvement, has now re-entered the eyes of the international community and more other donors are now interesting to involve in Somalia.

More importantly, this study demonstrates that humanitarian diplomacy and soft power are among the most important tools that Turkey is using as a foreign policy tool to achieve its agendas in Somalia. By implementing humanitarian diplomacy through the provision of aid has won Turkey to gain unique and relatively exceptional impacts on the ground in Somalia. This study also showcases how Turkey's foreign aid efforts have been different and unprecedented when compared with the other aid donors in Somalia. Turkey's amounts of assistance to Somalia are relatively small when compared with the other traditional donors of Somalia such as the US and the UK. However, the Turkish model of assistance in Somalia demonstrated that just pouring money is not enough, the way assistance is provided is also an important factor for the aid effectiveness and even with small amounts of aid, a donor country can make a big difference on the ground.

Although, in some ways, Turkey's actions in Somalia have been criticized both inside and outside Somalia, it is obvious that Turkey had won the hearts of Somali people. However, there may be some significant issues that have not been discussed yet. Somalia has been in a civil war for more than 25 years. During all these years, conflict and insecurity have persistently destabilized the major parts of the country. Internal conflicts and power struggles influenced by clan issues have fragmented the country into sub-political and territorial entities. This long-existed violence and disruption caused by the conflict in Somalia have been generating an urgent need for aid, especially humanitarian assistance. While aid normally does not cause conflict, it is argued that aid and conflict are interrelated as aid may somehow feed and prolong

conflicts.<sup>197</sup> All other aid actors including Turkey, for instance, operate within the political economy of conflict in Somalia. Therefore, there may be several ways in which Turkey's humanitarian aid can impact negatively on Somalia's conflict dynamics. Besides, Turkey's activities in Somalia have already been accused of limited knowledge of conflict dynamics, diversion, manipulation, and unbalanced geographical concentration of the aid. On the other hand, one could ask whether it would be successful if the other donors in Somalia used the same model of assistance which Turkey has been using in Somalia. These are the cases that may need further research as it is important in Turkey's involvement in Somalia.

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<sup>197</sup> Kathryn Achilles et al, "Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia," 13.

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