

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI (İNG)

**THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS OF MARONITES IN
LEBANON**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

SERDAR ÇÖP

İstanbul, 2019

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI (İNG)

**THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS OF MARONITES IN
LEBANON**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

SERDAR ÇÖP

Danışmanı: DR. ÖĞR. ÜYESİ ÖZDEN SEZGİ DURGUN ÖZKAN

İstanbul, 2019



T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

TEZ ONAY BELGESİ

SIYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER Anabilim Dalı
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) Bilim Dalı TEZLİ YÜKSEK LİSANS öğrencisi
SERDAR ÇÖP'ün THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS OF MARONITES IN LEBANON
adlı tez çalışması, Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 08.08.2019 tarih ve 2019-25/6 sayılı kararıyla
oluşturulan jüri tarafından oy birliği / oy çokluğu ile Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Tez Savunma Tarihi/...../.....
21 08 2019

Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı

İmzası

	Öğretim Üyesi Adı Soyadı	İmzası
1.	Tez Danışmanı Dr. Öğr. Üyesi ÖZDEN SEZGİ DURGUN ÖZKAN	
2.	Jüri Üyesi Prof. Dr. ÖZDEN ZEYNEP OKTAV	
3.	Jüri Üyesi Doç. Dr. ERHAN DOĞAN	

FOREWORD

Lebanon within its small geography off the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean contains various interesting stories in its social and historical memory. Despite the sorrowful stories continuously reproduced over and over in this country, Lebanon has still its own charm that tempts students, academics, analysts, and columnists from various academic disciplines. I believe that current academic circles interested in Lebanon have been tempted by this charm and they found themselves looking closer to this country. My story has begun a long time ago when I came across a quote attributed to famous Lebanese poet Said Akl. He is quoted as saying; “I would cut off my right hand just not to be an Arab.” When I saw these lines, I was surprised and thought that such an expressed opposition towards Arab identity from someone, who actually wrote poems and popular Arab anthems in Arabic, would be something that deserves deep analysis. My interest in Said Akl was followed by the Maronites and the Phoenicianism. After many readings and research out of curiosity, I figured out that the conceptions we use in our daily life are inadequate to identify the Middle East. This thesis study started with such curiosity and it was continuously nurtured by the “charm” of this small country with various interesting stories.

I would like to thank my supervisor Asst. Prof. Özden Sezgi Durgun Özkan for her excellent guidance during my thesis writing process. Thanks to her incontrovertible guidance, this thesis could provide an identity analysis. Her leniency and support during this stressful process also motivated me to continue my thesis and complete it within a very limited time.

I feel indebted to Prof. Dr. Günay Göksu Özdoğan for her valuable contribution and guidance at the very beginning of my writing process.

I also would like to thank Joe Hammoura, my Lebanese friend and a social scientist, for his valuable contribution and references for my thesis. The little anecdotes and stories on the Lebanese social and political life he shared with me during our conversations provided important insight into the analysis and structure of this thesis.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

Name and Surname	: Serdar öp
Field	: Political Science and International Relations
Programme	: International Relations (English)
Supervisor	: Asst. Prof. Özden Sezgi Durgun Özkan
Degree Awarded and Date	: Master- August 2019
Keywords	: Identification, Identity, Maronites, Autonomy, Lebanon, Middle East

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the identification process of Maronites in Lebanon, focusing on the autonomy they have enjoyed over the centuries in their own historical premise, called Mount Lebanon. This thesis suggests that the identification process of Maronites is dynamic and processual and this identity is being constructed, possibly expressed under different names/banners with different contexts under different circumstances. However, a pattern can be observed in this process and the determinant element appears as the reaction of the Maronites when their autonomy is provided, threatened or consolidated. In order to demonstrate this dynamic characteristic of the Maronite identity and the pattern in this identification process, the study examines how the autonomy understanding of the Maronites has developed in its historical context, how it is contested as a result of the developments in the 19th century under the Ottoman rule, and during the French Mandate Period from the establishment of the Greater Lebanon to the independence of Lebanon in 1943, and how the Maronites expressed their identities vis-à-vis the other groups and the identity claims in their environment, as a result of such developments. Though the study refers to the Maronites in general, it specifically focuses on the Maronite church as the main actor of this identification process and the reasons behind this prioritization is also provided in the study.

GENEL BİLGİLER

Adı Soyadı	: Serdar öp
Anabilim Dalı	: Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı	: Uluslararası İlişkiler (İngilizce)
Tez Danışmanı	: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Özden Sezgi Durgun Özkan
Tez Türü ve Tarihi	: Yüksek Lisans- Ağustos 2019
Anahtar Kelimeler	: Kimlikler, Marunîler, Otonomi, Lübnan, Ortadoğu

ÖZET

Bu çalışma Lübnan Marunîlerinin kimlik süreçlerini, yüzyıllardır tarihi yerleşim birimleri olan ve Lübnan Dağı adı verilen topraklarda sahip oldukları otonomi üzerinden ele almaktadır. Bu tez çalışması Marunîlerin kimlik sürecinin dinamik ve devam etmekte olan bir süreç olduğunu, bu kimliğin inşa edilmekte, değişik içeriklere sahip farklı isimler/semboller altında ve farklı koşullarda ifade edilebildiğini önermektedir. Fakat bu süreç içerisinde belirli bir davranış biçimi gözlemlenebilmekte ve belirleyici unsur Marunîlerin kendi otonomileri sağlandığında, tehdit edildiğinde veyahut da bu otonomi güven altına alındığında göstermiş oldukları tepki olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Marunî kimliğinin bu dinamik yapısının ve de kimlik sürecindeki belirli davranış biçiminin gösterilmesi adına, çalışma, Marunîlerin otonomi anlayışlarının tarihsel bağlamında nasıl geliştiğini, bu otonominin 19. Yy. Osmanlı hâkimiyeti altında ve de 1920'de Büyük Lübnan'ın kuruluşundan 1943'te Lübnan'ın bağımsızlığını kazanmasına kadar süren Fransız Manda Yönetimi döneminde nasıl bir çatışma süreci içerisine girdiğini ve de Marunîlerin bu gelişmelerin bir sonucu olarak kendi kimliklerini diğer gruplar ve buldukları çevre içerisindeki diğer kimlik iddiaları karşısında nasıl ifade ettiklerini incelemektedir. Çalışma Marunîleri genel olarak ele almış olmasına rağmen, bu kimlik sürecinin asıl aktörü olarak Marunî Kilisesi üzerinde durmaktadır ve bu önceliklendirmenin nedenleri çalışma içerisinde verilmiştir.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	i
ABSTRACT	ii
ÖZET	iii
1. INTRODUCTION	5
2. THE TRADITIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE MOUNT REFUGE	16
2.1. Iltizam System in Mount Lebanon	20
2.2. Two Unique Landlords of Mount Lebanon	22
2.2.1. Emir Fakhreddin Ma'an II: A Local Landlord Beyond His Limits	22
2.2.2. Bashir Shihab II: The Reigning Prince of The Maronites	27
2.3. The Mountains Overlooking the Waters of the Mediterranean	30
2.4. The Autonomy of the Maronite Church in Mount Lebanon.....	38
3. CONTESTED AUTONOMY OF THE MOUNT REFUGE.....	47
3.1. Four Developments That Challenged The Autonomy of the Mountain	47
3.1.1. Commercialization of the Economics of The Mountain	47
3.1.2. Rising Importance of The Eastern Ports of the Mediterranean.....	49
3.1.3. The Emergence of The Maronite Church As A Powerful Actor in Mount Lebanon.....	51
3.1.4. Muhammad Ali Pasha's Occupation in Mount Lebanon (1831-1840).....	52
3.2. Maronite Church as A <i>Messiah</i> of Its Community When The Autonomy of The Mountain is Contested	56
4. AN INDEPENDENCE UNWILLINGLY CELEBRATED	75
5. CONCLUSION.....	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY	109

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to examine the identification process of the Maronites, the largest Christian community in Lebanon, who have played a crucial role in the political and social life of the country in the pre-modern decades and modern times and sealed this geographical and political premise an essential part of their identity. By identification process, this thesis addresses a *dynamic* and *processual self-identification*, in which the identity of the main actor of our thesis, the Maronites, has been constructed in a *dynamic* way, reproduced in and through various series of developments within the historical context. In this very identification process itself, the Maronite identity is not *bounded* and *fixed*; however, there are times when the boundaries of this identity are *solidly crystallized* – as defined by Thomas Hylland Eriksen as *dichotomization*¹ (Muslim-Christian, Phoenician- Arab, Lebanist- Arabs, etc.) under a specific factor; which is *threat perception*. There are also times the boundaries of this identity are *blurred* when the very essential condition; which is *autonomy*, is provided and secured for the actors of it. Within this process, a *pattern* of change in the boundaries might be detected and such a pattern can provide us an angle to observe the developments in this identification process of the Maronites. Such a pattern can be observed in many examples in the historical context that whenever the autonomy of the Maronites is threatened or it has been perceived to be threatened, the dichotomization of the Maronite identity vis-à-vis the other groups or identity perceptions (mainly Muslim or Arab) has been crystallized. Under different banners, they have tried to put their distinction from the other groups, sometimes in a very hostile way. At the same time, we also observe that as long as the basic elements of the autonomy are secured or this dichotomization has been blurred, the Maronites have willingly expressed/confirmed the common grounds vis-à-vis the other groups. It has been observed that the Maronite identity can be a political identity, a national identity, a social identity as well as a religious identity. A Maronite can identify himself/herself as a devout Maronite who limits this perception to a confessional identity. In a cultural category, he/she can consider himself/herself an Arab and politically he/she might have

¹ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (New York: Pluto Press, 2002): 28.

a sense of belonging to Syria or the so-called Arab World. Another Maronite may consider his/her religious identity beyond the limits of a confessional one. He/she culturally may detach himself/herself from the Arab culture and politically may support the cause of Maronite particularism. Furthermore, this identity can be exclusive or inclusive and it can be also expressed under different banners such as Lebanism, Phoenicianism, Mediterraneanism, Syrianism, etc. All such categorizations and banners have been observable under different circumstances.

There are many academic studies on the Maronites and the identity issue in Lebanon which reserves a special place for them, and all these studies provide a very rich series of angles that enable us to read this identity issue from different perspectives. This thesis study does not claim to put forward an *alternative* perspective to the existent ones; it rather aims to propose *another* perspective to read the same story that has been processed in the social science literature for a long time. Before articulation of the thesis plan and providing the summarized contents of the chapters, the aim of the thesis will be elaborated by giving references to some theoretical discussions in the literature.

For almost two decades, the studies of nation and nationalism have occupied our world of understanding since nation-ness has become the *most universally legitimate value*² of our time. The fact that the current political system is functioning through a system based on the units called nation-states, is also another factor that shapes our understanding and perceptions.³ Therefore, any identity issue can be associated with nation and nationalism and we may skip the other qualities of an identity issue in modern times. The pioneers of the nationalism discussions like Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner and, Benedict Anderson, they all point out to the irrelevance of the pre-modern times since nationalism is a modern and invented phenomenon. Anthony Smith disagrees with them and claims that nations predates the modernization process by referring many examples⁴ and proposes his key concept *ethnie* to link the past to modern times and challenge such modernist claims.⁵

² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on The Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 3.

³ Youssef M. Choueiri, *Arab Nationalism: A History: Nation and State in the Arab World*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000), 1.

⁴ David McCrone, *The Sociology of Nationalism*, (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 11.

⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1988), 13.

Josep R. Llobera also confirms him and says that nationalisms are today the re-creations of the phenomenons existed in the medieval times.⁶ This thesis study does not have an aim to put forward a concept of *Maronite Nationalism*, *Maronite Nation* or a *Maronite Ethnie*. Even though Anthony Smith, -directly referring to the Maronites- says that the religious identities gradually became ethnicized⁷ over a long time, with his contemporaries Gellner and Anderson, they all treat national and ethnic identities as static and bounded.⁸ However, this identity might be treated as an ethnic identity, nationhood, or even a racial category under different circumstances. As Weber suggests, “race, ethnicity, nationhood are not precise analytical concepts; they are vague vernacular terms whose meaning varies considerably over place and time.”⁹ Such an approach is also shared by some contemporary academics such as Fredrik Barth who says that the group identity is fluid and processual¹⁰ or as John Vincent suggests the ethnicity is something that happens.¹¹ From this perspective, Maronite identity as well can be treated as *something that happens* and any category we may suggest for Maronite identity, a race, an ethnie, a nation; all these categories may have different contexts under different circumstances.

Another important element of analysis in this thesis is *self-identification*. Brubaker says, “Ethnic boundaries emerged, rather, in and through categorical we-they distinctions *drawn by actors themselves* [emphasis added] and through the channeling of interaction through sets of prescriptions and proscriptions about who can interact with whom in what sorts of social relationships.”¹² As also mentioned before, different perspectives provide different analyses on the Maronite identity. We no doubt cannot ignore the role of the external factors to an identity construction process, especially for the Maronite identity,

⁶ McCrone, *The Sociology*, 12.

⁷ Smith, 36.

⁸ Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009):30-31.

⁹ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978(1922)), 395,925, quoted in Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race,” 27.

¹⁰ Richard Jenkins, “Rethinking Ethnicity: Identity, Categorisation and Power,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17.2 (1994): 198 quoted in Sophie Williams, *Rethinking Stateless Nations and National Identity in Wales and The Basque Country*, (The UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 28.

¹¹ Joan Vincent, “Structuring of Ethnicity,” *Human Organization* 33.4 (Winter 1974): 375-379 quoted in Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race,” 29.

¹² Brubaker, 29.

which might also be analyzed under the effects of the colonial practices. Yet, our aim here is to focus on the perceptions, which demonstrate to us the perspective of the Maronites themselves, and the boundaries in their perception and imagination. No matter what and to what extent the external factors have contributed to the construction of the Maronite identity, what matters is the existence of such an identity and the *factuality of its behavioral consequences*.¹³ Therefore I advertently prefer to call this process a *self-identification*.

Partha Chatterjee analyzes the national identities under the colonial practices on the basis of two categories; namely, the *spiritual realm* and the *material realm*. According to this analysis, the colonized societies can develop the spiritual realm, an important element to their national identity and use it to stir anti-colonial movements.¹⁴ Asher Kaufman adds another dimension to this analysis and says that French colonial policies were more intrusive compared to the British practices; therefore, the French even designed the spiritual realm during the colonial era of Lebanon.¹⁵ The reference to the glorious past of Lebanon as a revived *Phoenicia* no doubt cannot be explained without the existence of France in the region. After the 1860 Bloody Events in Mount Lebanon, the French forces arrive in the shores of Beirut. An important philologist and orientalist sailing in the French Naval ship at that time, *Ernest Renan*, comes to Beirut to research on the ancient cities. Three years after his return to France, Renan publishes his famous work, that is, the first serious scientific study conducted on *Phoenicia; Mission de Phénicie*. After that time the enthusiasm for ancient *Phoenicia* gains ground, especially among the Maronites. One may claim that the Maronite's enthusiasm for *Phoenicia* and their attempts to claim a *Phoenician* identity is purely a French design; however, we may also read the story from another perspective and claim that the Maronites have just instrumentalized *Phoenicianism* as an alternative to the Arabism and Arab Nationalist claims in Lebanon. There are also Maronites who advocate *Mediterraneanism* along with *Phoenicianism*. All these designs, of which historical material has been provided by the French may be

¹³ Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 29.

¹⁴ Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon*, (London- New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

perceived as the instruments used by the Maronites against the other identity perceptions *threatening* their own particularism. Therefore, the French role may be considered to provide the content and supporting elements when the Maronites needed them or both the processes, the search for supporting material and the French policy just coincided.

Phoenicianism, as an important distinct identity claim and an alternative to the Arab identity for the Maronites, has been one of the references since the 19th century; however, following Weber's previously referred definition, its meaning has also *varied considerably in place and time*. I would like to refer to Bulus Nujaym, a prominent Maronite intellectual in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, who worked as the director of the office of the foreign affairs during the *Mutasarrifiyya* period in Mount Lebanon under the governorship of Ohannes Pasha. In 1908, he published *La Question du Liban* (The Question Lebanon). In his work, he claimed that the Mediterranean was Phoenicianized during the Phoenicians and the Phoenician civilization was ascendant in the region, but it was interrupted by the Hellenic civilization. Interestingly, he also claimed that the Semitic race's dominance was brought back thanks to the Muslim Arab invasion in Syria in the 7th century and the Phoenician civilization was restored.¹⁶ Bulus Nujaym did not address Arab identity in an exclusive way as many Maronites did when they referred to Phoenicianism. As we can see in this example, the same concept under different conditions may be differently contextualized.

Threat perception is another important element of examination in this study since it is treated as a precipitating element, which evokes a dormant essence and leads it to transform into a form of belonging or seeing the outside world on the basis of -what Roger Brubaker calls- "groupism."¹⁷ Since a form of belonging is evoked, the boundaries are established or -as proposed before- the existent and dormant ones are crystallized. These boundaries naturally lead to a we/us dichotomization and this happens in the course of interaction between two or more groups.¹⁸ The precipitating element, *threat perception*, is deliberately used in this analysis since the perception of the main actor of this identification process is prioritized; what matters is how the Maronites perceive

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 47.

¹⁷ Brubaker, 28.

¹⁸ Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1998): 15; Eriksen, 68.

something a threat to their identity and establish boundaries in addition to other reactions to defend these boundaries against the others.

As stated by Eriksen,

“...social identity becomes most important the moment it *seems threatened* [emphasis added]. Several factors may constitute such a *perceived threat* [emphasis added], but they are always related to some kind of change-migration, change in the demographic situation, industrialization or other economic change, or integration into or encapsulation by a larger political system.”¹⁹

In this context, the target of the perceived threat in our analysis will be *autonomy*, which will be elaborated and discussed in a separate chapter in this thesis. Our argument is that the Maronites- particularly the leading figures among them- established their boundaries when they perceived a threat to the autonomy, they traditionally enjoy for centuries in the sheltered premises of Mount Lebanon. It will also be discussed later that the violent clashes between the Maronites and the other sects living in Mount Lebanon began to appear in the 19th century. Till that time, the nature of the clashes was neither confessional nor sectarian. Eriksen gives an example of the outbreak of the civil war in Bosnia in the 1990s, by referring to the study of Tone Bringa. He states;

“...villagers of three religions had lived side by side for as long as anyone could remember. Ethnic boundaries, *dormant* [emphasis added] for decades, were *activated* [emphasis added]; presumed cultural differences which had been *irrelevant for two generations* [emphasis added] were *suddenly remembered* [emphasis added] and invoked as proof that it was impossible for the two groups to live by side by side. It is only when they make a difference in interaction that cultural differences are important in the creation of ethnic boundaries.”²⁰

When this example is applied to the Maronite identity, a similar development can be observed. The confessional identities (Maronite, Druze, Shiite, Sunni Muslim, etc.), which had been *irrelevant* till the 19th century is activated when a threat is posed to an important element of the Maronite identity.

After referring to the main arguments of this thesis study and the theoretical discussions in this context, we should give brief information about the main actor of this thesis study; The Maronites of Lebanon.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 68.

²⁰ Eriksen, 38-39.

The name Maronite is derived from the name *Maron*; even though the origin of this name is controversial, there is a consensus among the Maronites that Saint John Maron, the Syriac priest who lived in the 5th or 7th centuries and had a modest life in his monastery, was the original owner of this name ²¹ and the Christians who followed him formed a community are called Maronites. In Lebanon, the 9th of February is celebrated as The Feast Day of St. Maron and this day is a public holiday in the whole country.

Throughout history, the Maronites arrived in the sheltered premises of the mountain range extending across the Syrian coast to the Mediterranean, which later came to be known as *Mount Lebanon*. Their arrival story and the reasons behind this are also one of the controversies of the Maronite history. However, the records say that there is a noticeable increase in the Maronite population in Mount Lebanon between the 8th and 10th centuries, which suggests that the Maronites might have started to migrate to Mount Lebanon at the beginning of the 8th century.²² Mount Lebanon that has been home to the heretical sects of Christianity and Islam has also been home to the Maronites who had fled the persecutions performed by the central powers of the medieval times in the region. As expressed before, they sealed Mount Lebanon as an important element of their identity.

Within the sheltered environment provided by Mount Lebanon, the Maronites lived together with the other two major inhabitants of the Mountain; namely the Druze and the Twelver Shiites. Both communities had also found refuge in the Mountain after they had been persecuted by the central powers of their times due to their heretical tendencies within Islam. The Druze however, had become the natural leaders of the Mountain. The mountain range had remained under the feudal lordship of the Druze families till the Sunni Shihab Family was replaced by the Ma'ans. The traditional feudal system which based on land ownership was the core element organizing social relations and social stratification. For the Maronites, their community has been composed of three important groups; namely, the feudal landlords or the notable families, the Maronite church, and the peasants. Since urbanization was an apparent feature of the coastal parts and inland Syria,

²¹ Joseph Mahfouz, *Short History of the Maronite Church*, trans. Susan Foukx, (Jounieh, Beirut: Saint Paul Press, 2009, 11, quoted in Yasin Atlioğlu, *Savaşta ve Barışta Lübnan Marunîleri: Aziz Marun'dan İç Savaşta Marunî Kimliği ve Çatışma*, (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2014),94; Ramazan Işık, "Maruni Kilisesi" (Ph.D. diss., Ankara University Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2003), 92.

²² Atlioğlu, 99.

a rural lifestyle in various villages of Mount Lebanon had remained unchanged. Among the feudal families, the size of the total amount of the owned land and the prestigious titles gained by the family were determining the leadership in the community. Such prestige was traditionally continual because we observe that the decrease in the feudal land of the family did not change the prestigious position they already had.²³ Throughout history, some families were directly appointed as *muqaddams* (an honorific noble title given to the secular leaders in their confessional communities) by the central powers, as usually observed in the period of the Mamluk Sultanate²⁴ or the Maronite notable families, such as The *Khazins*. These families used to play the leadership role for their communities and have direct contact with the Druze feudal lord of the Mountain or the central power.²⁵ Within this structure, the Maronite church as a spiritual body used to get respect from its own community. The church, till the end of the 16th century, had not had a financial power, so they had not had a leadership role as the notable families had. They rather had been dependent on the notable families for the financial necessities of the church. The notable families were the main source for the construction of monasteries and churches; therefore, they had been also influential figures in the affairs of the church. They used to involve in the election or promotion of the priests, and even step in the election of the patriarchs thanks to their financial powers.²⁶ The third group, the peasants used to cultivate the land on behalf of their feudal lord. Such a relationship had also determined the boundaries of the relationship; a peasant used to have to get permission from his landlord for marriage or moving to another district, etc. His labor used to be paid but the feudal family could employ them for construction of buildings and the other tasks apart from cultivation and farming and he did not use to pay for such services.²⁷ This social structure within the Maronite community could not generate a communal and confessional identity and perhaps it was not expected to do so. Each group had differed

²³ Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 28.

²⁴ Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I.B Tauris, 1988), 92.

²⁵ Richard Van Leeuwen, "The Control of Space and Communal Leadership: Maronite Monasteries in Mount Lebanon," *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 79-80 (1996): 186.

²⁶ Iliya Harik, "The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 32-33.

²⁷ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 122; Khalaf, 26.

based on their priorities. For the feudal landlords and the notable families, the priority was the survival of the family and holding the power within the family and perhaps expand it as much as possible in the Mountain, in defiance of the other families. This motive was surely something that invited challenge. The violent clashes of the Mountain used to be generated through the conflicts between the families and we may say that it had not transformed into sectarian strife.²⁸ For the peasants, their main purpose was to earn their lives and meet the necessities of their families. The church; however, was the only actor in this structure, which really had concerned their community, the faithful Maronites. Only in the imagination of the church, we may claim that a unified confessional group, a sort of identity had been alive. The writings of Istifan Al-Duwayhi and Gabriel Ibn al-Qilāṭī on the history of the Maronites might be pointed out as the instances of this phenomenon. Yet for the other actors, religion was an important part of their daily lives, it was fixed and secured within the mountain. The church had been an institution composed of respectful men of religion and their main task was to provide religious services to the others. We see that one of the actors in this story rises to prominence regarding its different perspective to a confessional identity, and identity of communal unity in the old times; the Maronite church. For this reason, we will prioritize the Maronite church in the center of the identification process of Maronites and examine primarily their perceptions; the attitude of the other actors in the Maronite society (especially for the period after the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920) will also be referred.

Now some of the elements of the environment, in which the Maronite identity has shaped over time, were crystallized. In our picture, the physical (and perhaps spiritual) premise of the Maronites is Mount Lebanon. At the center of this structure, the Maronite church is positioned, which is functioning under the leadership of feudal Maronite families, and close interaction with the peasants, who pledges their allegiance to the feudal families and show respect to the clergy. The other actors of the Mountain were mainly the Druze and The Twelver Shiites; the former had also the leadership of the whole mountain range. Above the Druze and the Maronite notable families, there are central powers such as the Mamluks and the Ottomans, with whom the Maronite church had not been in direct

²⁸ Khalaf, 29.

contact. We should also add another factor to this structure, which is the relations of the Maronite Church with the Holy See of Rome and France. Despite the sheltered structure of the Mountain, the Maronite church managed to maintain its communication with these two important entities, which have become later the important actors in the history of the Maronites. The details of these factors will be provided in the chapters of this thesis; however, in this structure, a stable system for the Maronite church, in its entirety is observable. A stable environment in which the Maronite church maintained its imagination of a unified Maronite community and worked for the prosperity and salvation of them, which is called by many academics of this field, *autonomy*.²⁹ In this thesis, I will try to show that any change in this autonomy led to the crystallization of the boundaries of the Maronites *vis-à-vis* the other actors. Yet this process is not linear; I do not refer to a rigidly linear process of change; it is rather circular, and the autonomy is in some way transformed, adopted, and maintained in this process; however, its essence and importance remain.

The following chapter of this thesis will cover one of the core arguments of our analysis, *autonomy*. In this chapter, the autonomy will be defined; a specific definition for the traditional autonomy enjoyed by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, the Maronites and the Maronite church, in particular, will be provided. After that, three main elements of the autonomy; namely, the *iltizam* system, two important landlords of the Mountain, and the relations of Mount Lebanon with the other end of the Mediterranean will be discussed.

After providing general information about the traditional autonomy of Mount Lebanon in this chapter, the change in this very autonomy and threat perceptions of the Maronites will be examined under two thematical periods.

The first period will discuss the change and threat perception in the autonomy of Mount Lebanon that starts in the early 19th century. In this chapter, our main actor the Maronite church's stance in the face of very radical changes in the traditional ways of the Mountain will be elaborated. This chapter periodically will stop at the establishment of Greater

²⁹ Kamal Salibi calls this phenomenon "traditional Lebanese autonomy." (Kamal Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon*, (Beirut: AUB Publication of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1959), 22.).

Lebanon as a Maronite project in 1920, which is considered as a consolidation of the subverted autonomy of the material environment of the Maronites after a long time.

The second period will focus on the developments during and after the independence of Lebanon from the French Mandate in 1943. In this chapter, we will mention some other actors in the lines of the Maronites, in addition to the Maronite church. This chapter will examine the reaction of the Maronites after their historical protector France left the country and the alternative political claims, perceived as a threat to the Maronites, found a space to be freely expressed in this independence period.

In the conclusion, some other examples from the latter decades of the history of Lebanon will be provided and the pattern, which illustrates a specific way of Maronite reaction when their autonomy is challenged, will be exemplified. In the conclusion part, some current possible sources of threat perceptions in Lebanon will be addressed.

2. THE TRADITIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE MOUNT REFUGE

In this chapter, I would like to define the environment, so-called Mount Lebanon, a very fundamental part of the Maronite identity, in which the Maronites enjoyed autonomy and managed to keep their identity distinct from the surrounding areas. In this regard, a significant term, *Mount Refuge* will be defined first, and the *autonomy* enjoyed by Maronites will be elaborated. After depicting the environment and the autonomous living conditions of the Maronites within such an environment, in the following chapter, I will expose how a change in these elements was perceived as a threat to the identity of the Maronites and how they reacted to it.

Michel Chiha, one of the prominent architects of the political and economic structure of Greater Lebanon³⁰, established in 1920, delivered a series of lectures in the Catholic Youth Center on the history of Lebanon. During his first lecture dated to 1942, he referred to the historical status of Mount Lebanon as follows;

“In Lebanon under the Umayyads we see the Mardaites coming from the confines of the Taurus and eventually merging with the Maronites who had *found a refuge* [emphasis added] and set up a homeland in Mount Lebanon long before them... About the same time as this, perhaps a little before and after, dissenters from orthodox Islam and adherents to new sects came into Lebanon and Syria from the north and the south and community by community took over *a natural bastion which was considered a refuge* [emphasis added].”³¹

Continuously he draws the continuation of this *status* even in modern times through the new Lebanese State and said;

“Not the least among the ironies of fate is the fact that Ottoman princes who fell from power and were exiled *found their last refuge on our soil* [emphasis added].”³²

Apart from Michel Chiha, Father Henri Lammens, Belgian professor, one of the prominent figures in the Lebanese academic life, professor of Oriental Studies in the University of Saint Joseph in Beirut, and also an important reference for Michel Chiha, in his famous two volumes work *La Syrie: Précis Historique* dated to 1921, treated the

³⁰ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 179.

³¹ Michel Chiha, “Lebanon at Home and Abroad”, trans. Leo Arnold & Jean Montégu, *The Conferences of Cénacle* 20, no.9-10 (1966), 30-31.

³² *Ibid*, 33.

geography of Lebanon separately and defined it as *L'asile du Liban*, meaning the refuge of Lebanon. In this work, Lammens tried to prove the distinct geography of Mount Lebanon and its inhabitants different from the rest of Syria, through providing some historical facts.³³ As Kamal Salibi argued, Lammens' work, as an influential figure for the Maronites and the French Rule in Lebanon, was an academic work completed *upon the suggestion* of French administration in Lebanon; serving two purposes at the same time; one is depicting Syria as a distinct entity out of Arabism and Islam and the other is depicting Lebanon as a separate entity out of Syria, both of which serves the political interests of French administration in the region.

The reference to Mount Lebanon as the Mountain Refuge is a fact that has been existent and visible since the very early periods of the establishment of Greater Lebanon. Evidently, like all the new nation-states of the 20th century, the new Lebanese State and the intellectuals, politicians, and the others who desired to construct strong roots for this ideal, grasped the idea of *Mount Refuge*. As seen in the example of Father Lammens, Lebanon, a country accommodating an important number of Christians, must have been fictionalized separate from the surrounding Muslim and Arab existence. This idea has been based on the claim that no Islamic rule had succeeded in exerting dominance in the mountains³⁴ and as a result, these mountains enjoyed a sort of *autonomy* in the course of history and were able to preserve its distinction and identity.

Such an autonomy referred to define the situation in Mount Lebanon was not a political self-governance system. By autonomy in this thesis, we do not mean a mere political system, officially fixed and properly documented; rather we mean a system in which the central power or the highest political authority, willingly or unwillingly, is not assertive in the very internal affairs of a sphere of influence. This inability of assertiveness enables the local authorities to enjoy flexibility, independent decision making and ruling in their own spheres. In the example of Mount Lebanon, the pioneer landlords and families of the region enjoyed a sphere of political power under the shadow of the Central Ottoman rule or the former powers before the Ottomans. For the traditional autonomy enjoyed by the

³³ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 130-133; Max Weiss, *In The Shadow of Sectarianism* (Harvard University Press, 2010), 46; Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 159.

³⁴ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 139.

Maronites, this autonomy had been maintained through the absence of direct contact with the central power.

The academic literature focuses on *the Millet System*- a unique administrative arrangement designed by the Ottomans- when it comes to the autonomy enjoyed by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, *the Millet System* is considered as an example of non-territorial autonomy.³⁵ From this perspective, this thesis also argues that the autonomy enjoyed in Mount Lebanon might be treated as a non-territorial autonomy. Non-territorial autonomy is also referred to as cultural autonomy, segmental autonomy, functional autonomy, corporate autonomy, and corporate federalism, as categorized by Arend Lijphard.³⁶ Among these categories, cultural autonomy, in which each community has its own autonomy in cultural level, seems the most convenient category for Mount Lebanon.³⁷ However, the *Millet System* is not enough to explain the situation in Mount Lebanon; therefore, it is also not treated as a separate element of autonomy in this thesis study. In the Ottoman Millet System, the Sultan had recognized three basic religious communities- Greeks, Jews, and Armenians- and their autonomous rights and negotiated ad-hoc agreements with the heads of these communities. When it comes to the smaller groups with religious leaders, the Ottomans preferred to incorporate them into the three main religious categories.³⁸ In the middle of the 18th century, we see that Copts, Jacobites, Nestorians, and Maronites were categorized under the political authority of the Armenian Patriarch.³⁹ The records provide that, even though the Nestorians and Jacobites appealed to the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul for the affairs concerning their church organizations, such an attempt by the Copts or the Maronites was not recorded; the Armenian Patriarch also did not intervene in the affairs of these two churches.⁴⁰ In the

³⁵ John Macgarry & Margaret Moore, "Karl Renner, Power Sharing and Non-Territorial Autonomy" in *National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics*, ed. Ephraim Nimni, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 79; Karen Barkey & Georges Gavrilis, "The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and its Contemporary Legacy" *Ethnopolitics*, 15.1(2016): 24-42, 25.

³⁶ Macgarry & Moore, 79.

³⁷ Karen Barkey & Georges Gavrilis defines it as *organizational cultural autonomy* (Barkey & Gavrilis, 26).

³⁸ *Ibid*, 26.

³⁹ Bruce Masters, "The Establishment of The Melkite Catholic Millet in 1848 and the Politics of Identity in Tanzimat Syria." in *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul Karim Rafeq* ed. Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber (Leiden- Boston: Brill, 2010), 458.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 458-459.

19th century, as we observed in the famous case of Maksimus Mazlum, who demanded the separate recognition of the Melkite Catholic church by the Sultan, the number of the recognized confessional groups rose and it expanded to 20 by 1900. The Maronite church, of which direct contact with the central authority began in the 19th century, had never demanded such a recognition till 1915. In that time, only when they thought it would secure their position under the centralist authority of the Union and Progress Party, they demanded the recognition of their church by the Sultan.⁴¹ Though it provided more autonomy and authority to the Melkite church when Maksimus Malzum demanded recognition, a recognition for the Maronite church was simply the limitation of their own autonomy in Mount Lebanon. Therefore, I suggest that the current definitions of autonomy are unable to cover all the aspects of the autonomy the Maronites had enjoyed in Mount Lebanon and a specific definition of autonomy should be articulated as I tried to provide above.

I will refer to some historical facts about Mount Lebanon and try to show that how these mountains, its inhabitants, especially the local landlords and the Maronite clergy enjoyed an autonomous environment⁴², distinct from the neighboring Arab lands and the other districts under the Ottoman suzerainty. There are three interrelated elements that enable us to call the system in Mount Lebanon between 16th and 19th centuries⁴³ an autonomy; the distinctive features of the *iltizam* system applied in the Mountains, two unique landlords beyond the limits of the ordinary fiefdom system, their time and geography; namely Fakhreddin Ma'an II and Emir Shihab, and the location of Mount Lebanon in the Mediterranean and its specific impact on the so-called autonomy.

⁴¹ Engin Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, (London- New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1993), 173-174.

⁴² Kamal Salibi says this distinction was limited to social character of the territories of today's Lebanon till 19th century. It was a distinct phenomenon, but its political character had many things in common with the other Arab lands under the Ottomans (Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 164.).

⁴³ Even though the thesis's main focus will be on the period between 16th and 19th centuries, the Mamluk period will also be referred and some supportive instances regarding the autonomy will be provided.

2.1. *Iltizam* System in Mount Lebanon

The system of *iltizam*, or its known name in the Arab lands, *iqṭā'* was a system of tax-farming that had been applied since the mid-tenth century in the Arab world. It was used to be applied in Medieval Egypt and Mughal India as well.⁴⁴ When the Ottomans vanquished the *Mamlūks* in the *Battle of Marj Dabiq* and seized the lands of geographic Egypt and Syria, they also continued to apply the *iqṭā'* system. In the Ottoman administrative structure, the administrative spheres were divided into *wilaya*, and subdivided into *sanjak* (*liwa'* in Arabic), emirates and individual fiefdoms, called *muqāṭa'a*⁴⁵ that referred to “the claim to a specific state revenue farmed out to an individual for a specific period of time”⁴⁶ and the local landlords who were responsible to collect taxes and provide public security in their own *muqāṭa'* were called *muqāṭa'aji*.⁴⁷ This *iltizam* system or the *muqāṭa'a* was a system applied in all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire and as mentioned above, a similar system was already settled and became traditional in the Arab lands long before the Ottomans.

There are some differences between the *iltizam* system of the Ottomans and the traditional *iqṭā'* system in Mount Lebanon. The first one is based on the period of designation of *muqāṭa'a* into a *muqāṭa'aji*. In the general Ottoman *iltizam* system, the landlords were appointed to a specific *muqāṭa'a* for one year of time; however, in the traditional *iqṭā'* system, this period was used to be given for the lifetime of the appointee.⁴⁸ Even though the Ottomans changed the system and started to appoint the landlords for a *muqāṭa'a* for their lifetimes in the 18th century, the system was applied on annual basis in the former decades of Ottoman rule in the region. The second one lies on the sectarian character of *iltizam*, which allowed only *the Sunni Muslims* to have the authority in the management of *iltizam*. Whereas the *iqṭā'* system was nonsectarian⁴⁹ though it was based on primordial

⁴⁴ Sato Tsugitaka, *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqṭa's, and Fallahun*, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1; Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, With Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*, (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 140.

⁴⁵ Massoud Daher, “The Lebanese Leadership at the Beginning of the Ottoman Period: A Case Study of the Ma'n Family.” in *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq*, ed. Peter Sluglett & Stefan Weber (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2010), 325.

⁴⁶ Akarlı, 14.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 16.

⁴⁸ Daher, 340; Akarlı, 14-15.

⁴⁹ In the example of Lebanon, the *muqāṭa'ajis* are the Druze and the Maronites.

alliances between *muqāta'aji* and his followers (*atba'* and *uhda'*). As a result, this difference levied another important task existent in the *iltizam* system, which was the military service assigned to the *multazim*; therefore, the *muqāta'aji* in the mountains was not organized as a military fief.⁵⁰ The third one is the hereditary character of *muqāta'aji*, that is, *muqāta'aji* used to exercise his power within a *patrilineal kinship group*, whereas the *multazim* was not indigenous to tax farming and he was an official rather than a feudal chief.⁵¹ This traditional *iqṭā'* system was one of the reasons behind the autonomy of the local rulers; and by extension, the emergence of *muqāta'aji* families, a phenomenon that has played an important role in the sociopolitical structure of Modern Lebanon even now.⁵² Numerous Ottoman expeditions to the Mountain range to settle and reassert the central rule during the long history of Mount Lebanon under the Ottomans was also another point supporting the fact that the local rulers tried to keep their privileges on the land against the Ottomans' new *iltizam* system.⁵³ This argument is largely shared by many academic circles; Engin Akarlı says the Mountain was also linked to the general Ottoman administrative structure, “a hierarchical network of provincial power magnates *but under certain restrictions* [emphasis added] imposed by a centrally coordinated high-cultural, judicial, financial and military administrative setup,” and he adds; “but peripherally so.”⁵⁴ The Mountain was under the same *iltizam* system but they were different from the other *iltizam* or other *muqāta'aji* in the other parts of the empire. Salibi also confirms this fact

⁵⁰ In the other *muqāta'ats* such as Geographic Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq, the *muqāta'aji* used to be assigned a military duty as well since he was Sunni Muslim.

⁵¹ Khalaf, 25.

⁵² The Lebanese politics is sometimes referred as a family business; that is, the politics is still a statecraft in the hands of some famous families in Lebanon. *Zu'ama* (plural form of *za'im*, meaning patron, leader, etc. in Arabic), the political patrons are the famous families of Lebanon who provide political patronage, protection, and services to the citizens and supported by their confessional groups and religious authorities. There are historical *za'im* families whose background can be traced back to the early Ottoman times such as *Druze Arslan family*, *Jumblatts* (Walid Jumblatt, still an important player in the Lebanese politics and the head of the Progressive Socialist Party [*Al-Hizb al-Taqaḍummi al-Ishtirakī*] is also considered as the representative of Jumblatts and the Druze community of Lebanon), *Shihabs* (Emir Fuad Shihab was the President of Lebanese Republic between 1958 and 1964), etc. (Atlioğlu, 60-63; Carmen Geha, *Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint*, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 52.)

⁵³ For a study in detail on the expeditions sent over the rebels between 1516-1697 in the Lebanese Mountains, see Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Rebellion, Myth Making and National Building: Lebanon from an Ottoman Mountain Iltizam to a Nation State*, (Tokyo: Word Top Co. Ltd, 2009).

⁵⁴ Akarlı, 15.

though he makes a reservation on the idea that only the Mountains in all the empire were unique and different from the other parts. He refers to the *Jalali* rebels in Anatolia, the Wahhabi movement in Najd, some sheikhdoms in the eastern parts of the Arabian Peninsula, Zaydi Imams in Yemen, etc.⁵⁵ He considers these uprisings and rebellions a reaction against the Ottoman practices mitigating the local authorities' autonomy.

Even though the *iltizam* system was another type of the *muqāta'a* system, the character of the *iltizam* system was met with a serious reaction in Mount Lebanon. The Ottomans were decisive about setting their practice even in the mountains and linking it to the network centrally governed by the authority in Istanbul; however, they also did not refrain from resort to specific political strategies to exert their authority under their rule. They sometimes supported some feudal families against the others, modified their *iltizam* system in accordance with the power balances in the mountains.

Considering the other geographies under the Ottoman rule, *iltizam* system applied in Mount Lebanon no doubt gave the feudal families a more autonomous power.

2.2. Two Unique Landlords of Mount Lebanon

2.2.1. Emir Fakhreddin Ma'an II: A Local Landlord Beyond His Limits

Till the beginning of the Ottoman era with their victory against the Mamluks in the Battle of *Marj Dabik*, Mount Lebanon in a similar way, were under the *muqāta'aji* families controlled by the Mamluks. The Druze landlord families were the pioneer figures in this feudal relationship as this statuesque also continued after the Ottomans. The traditional political structure in the Mountains was based on the relationship between three important figure(s); *muqāta'aji* referring to the landlords cultivating relatively small areas and directly contacting to the villagers, *manasib*, the notable families, relatively bigger landlords who collect taxes from the smaller *muqāta'ajis*, and the *Emir* himself representing the highest local authority in the Mountains, who is directly accountable to the central authority.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 155-157.

⁵⁶ Carol Hakim, *The Origins of The Lebanese National Idea, 1840-1920*, (California: University of California Press, 2013), 18.

One among the Druze landlord families, Ma'anans played the prominent role after the Ottomans arrived in the mountain range. According to Salibi, the Ma'an family was the supporter of the Mamluk rule in the mountains; therefore, they were always regarded with suspicion by the Ottomans. Salibi refers to the Venetian and Ottoman documents of the time and claims that the Ottomans repeatedly sent military expeditions to the *Shuf Mountains*⁵⁷- the main ground of the Druze fiefdom- between 1523 and 1586 to settle their rule in the region and take the Druze under their control. He states that the Ottomans never trusted in the Ma'an family; however, the change of wind in the surrounding geography already changed the firm policy of the Ottomans towards the Ma'an family. The Safavid Empire established the Twelver Shiism in the early sixteenth century in Persia. At that time, in Mount Lebanon, there were some places where the Twelver Shiites were living. The *Baalbek* region of the mountains was under the fiefdom of a Twelver Shiite family, so-called *Harfush*. After the Safavids regained their power in Persia, this *Harfush* family wanted to expand their fiefdom to the southernmost reaches of the *Bekaa Valley* and contact to their fellow Shiites in *Jabal Amil*. To counter this Safavid threat in its own territory, the Ottomans needed another family and they turned their faces to the Ma'an family of the Shuf Mountains, which they were successfully taken under subservience. They chose Fakhreddin Ma'an II, the son of Korkmaz and appointed him as the *amir-i-liwa* of Sanjak of *Safad*, which consists of *Jabal Amil*.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ The Southern part of the Mountain range was called *Jabal al Shuf*. It was also known at that time as *Jabal al Druze* since the inhabitants of those mountains were Druze. During the time of Fakhreddin Ma'an II, some other surrounding places were also integrated into *Jabal al Shuf* and its frontiers were expanded.
⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 125-126.

There are actually two different historiographies about Fakhreddin Ma'an II's succession to the so-called *Lebanese Emirate* (a controversial term that will be explained later). For a couple of reasons, I preferred Salibi's approach, overlapping with the fact that there was a long-term conflict between the Ottomans and the local families of Mount Lebanon, a fact based on the Venetian and the Ottoman sources of the time. However, I would also like to refer to the other historiography, which is the official one taught in the history textbooks of Lebanon today. According to this, in the very days of the arrival of victorious Ottoman armies under the command of Sultan Selim in Damascus, delegations from the surrounding cities, including the cities of Modern Lebanon such as Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon, were received by the Sultan in his court. At that time, the mountain range was under the control of few powerful families. One of the leaders of these families, the leader of the Ma'an family in Shuf Mountains (*Jabal al Shuf*) Fakhreddin Ma'an also visited Sultan Selim. He had also taken part in the *Battle of Marj Dabik* in the lines of the Ottoman army. Sultan Selim made a concession designated Fakhreddin Ma'an a superior power over the rest of the feudal lords of the *Shuf Mountains* (Daher, 325; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 117). Till that time, the feudal structure of the mountains was not monopolized by one of the feudal

As the Ma'an and Shihab families played an important role in the history of Lebanon, Fakhreddin Ma'an II has certainly a special place among all the other figures. From the perspective of Modern Lebanese historiography, even though Fakhreddin Ma'an II was a leader of a Druze tribe in his century, he is considered as the leader who paved the way towards the Modern Lebanese State. In 1966, one of the prominent singers of the Arab world, Fairuz, and Rahbani Brothers performed one of their best musical plays called *Ayyam Fakhreddin (The days of Fakhreddin)*, by depicting and reminding the golden days of Lebanon in very modern time.⁵⁹

During his reign, Fakhreddin Ma'an II took very significantly and radical - compared to his kinds in the other parts of the empire- steps. The Ottomans and the other local landlords were a great challenge to him, so he first established his own strong and well-organized army.⁶⁰ He also tried to make amicable relations with the Ottoman governors

families of the Mountains. As an indication of the Ottoman centralization policy, a new period in these mountains started and the mountains became known as *Emirate* of Mount Lebanon, a special name or title used for periods of Ma'an and Shihab families of the Mountains. In 1544, Fakhreddin Ma'an was succeeded by his son Korkmaz and Korkmaz's reign in the mountains was succeeded by his son Fakhreddin Ma'an II and the third Ma'ani Emir under the Ottoman rule left an ineradicable trace on this region.

Considering the feudal system in Mount Lebanon, there were many feudal families holding a particular area to cultivate and collect amount of taxes from it. During the period of the Mamluks and then the Ottomans, these families continued to collect taxes in their fiefdoms. Only in the period of the Ottoman Empire, two families, Ma'ans and Shihabs were granted a superior role over the other families. The Ma'ans were the relatives of the *Tanukh-Buhturi* families who were loyal families to the Mamluk rule. They well managed their relations with strong families and the support of the Ottomans to rule over the *Shuf Mountains*. Gradually, they managed to extend their rule to the other areas in Mount Lebanon. Apart from this, their close relations with the European powers, especially the Spain and the Italian principalities gave them another autonomous control over their territories. Due to these facts, the modern Lebanese historiography tends to use the name *principality* to refer to the periods of Ma'ans and Shihabs. Salibi challenges this approach and puts forward another explanation for the periods of these two families. According to Salibi, while accepting the distinctive features of these periods in some senses, these families were not emirs of successive dynasties. They were Ottoman *multazims*. They were considered as princes of dynasties only in the minds of their Maronite partisans (This will be elaborated in this chapter). Even though the other Druze tribes did not oppose to their rule, they never recognized them as *reigning princes*. (Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 128). This mindset in the historiography is significant regarding the magnitude of the autonomy and its perception.

⁵⁹ Namık Sinan Turan, "Lübnan'da Ulusun İnşası ve Ortak Tınının Üretimi – Rahbani Kardeşler ve Feyruz," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 3:11 (Temmuz 2011): 211.

⁶⁰ Daher, 333.

The relations of the local landlords of Mount Lebanon with the European Powers was a well-known fact for that era. Among these Powers, Venice was in good economic relations with the region. When the Ottomans captured the island of Cyprus from Venice, many weaponries especially muskets were brought to the Lebanese Mountains and the Ma'an family had them since they were allies with *Tuscany* for a long

in the region and the local landlords and arranged marriages between feudal families. As already began in the periods of the former Ma'ani Emirs, he pushed to extend the borders of his fiefdom towards the neighboring *iltizams*. The Shuf Mountains (*Jabal Shuf*) used to be called the Druze Mountains (*Jabal Druze*) since most of the population was Druze. Fakhreddin Ma'an II moved into the north towards *Kisrawan*, he drove the few remaining Shiite populations from this area *and supported the settlement of the Maronites in there*. Through this way, two strongholds of Maronites and the Druze were interlinked. This would be one of the former steps towards to inter-sectarian system in Modern Lebanon.⁶¹ The Maronites during his period enjoyed a sort of civil equality. They were independent of the Ottoman practices applied in urban places, especially in the coastal cities. In the cities, there were some rules and practices (specific dress codes, limited public display, etc.) the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire had to obey; however the Maronites in the sheltered premises of the Mountain and under the rule of Fakhreddin were elevated from the status of second-class subjects to the same status as the Druze.⁶² Fakhreddin Ma'an II, with his own army, was ambitious to extend his stronghold beyond the *Kisrawan* and *Jabal Shuf*. He attempted many attacks on the *muqāta'ats* of northern parts of today's Lebanon, the *Biqā'*, *Northern Palestine*, *Palmyra*, and other tax farms in the wilayas of *Tripoli* and *Damascus*. The Ottoman administration was well-aware of the rising threat of Fakhreddin Ma'an II and they ordered various expeditions against the Ma'an Family through the local Ottoman *walis* in the region. Fakhreddin Ma'an II was in good relations with the Italian city-states, therefore, he went into exile to the Italian Peninsula in 1613 when the suspicion about him rose very critically in the side of the Ottomans. When he returned in 1618, he wasted no time to resume his position and recaptured the *muqāta'ats* from the other feudal lords. Fakhreddin Ma'an II *extended the borders of his fiefdom to almost the regions which form the borders of Modern Lebanon today*.⁶³

Fakhreddin Ma'an II, in the words of Salibi, “stands out as a brilliant figure by any standard” and was a “man of enlightenment in an age when such were hard to come by

time. According to the Ottoman reports, these muskets were more modern than the rifles used by the Janissary and the Ottomans failed in some disciplinary expeditions to the mountains due to this fact. (Daher, 2010: 332-333; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 125).

⁶¹ Cobban, 38.

⁶² *Ibid*, 38.

⁶³ Daher, 334-336, 339; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 127.

in the Ottoman World.” As stated earlier, he was in good relations with the European powers and he invited experts from Italy to apply modern methods of agriculture. The famous cities of Modern and Historical Lebanon, *Beirut*, *Sidon*, and *Acre* enjoyed prosperity in his time. In a time when the market in Europe for silk was already in demand, he became the first one who attended to the promotion of local silk production as a cash crop. Within the same direction, an English traveler who visited Beirut in 1697, after observing the public buildings, gardens, and other constructions built in the period of Fakhreddin Ma’an II, depicted him as “above the level of ordinary Turkish genius.”⁶⁴

Fakhreddin Ma’an II was simply another *multazim* for the Ottoman administration. When we consider the competition among the Druze landlord families of Mount Lebanon, he was also no more than a *multazim* responsible to the governor appointed by the administration in Istanbul. It was the time the first steps of the path towards the sectarian social structure of Modern Lebanon were taken but not the time we claim the sectarian sense of belonging was superior to the family ties. Today, for the modern historiography, Fakhreddin Ma’an II is a hero for the Maronites more than he is a hero for the Druze. He was a Druze landlord, considered the forefather of Modern Lebanon, a fact that should supposedly be considered a pride for the Druze, but he was also a Ma’an, another fact that cannot be dismissed.

One of the prominent English Lebanese historians, Albert Hourani refers to three main important reasons behind the inter-sectarian structure distinctive to Lebanon, that already existed by the early Ottoman period in Mount Lebanon; “the population, the system of lordship, and the autonomy of the local ruler.”⁶⁵ Fakhreddin Ma’an was an extraordinary example of the “autonomy of the local ruler” fact in Mount Lebanon. He enjoyed this autonomy beyond the borders of the Empire⁶⁶ and was considered a threat by the central administration. Finally, he was captured and executed in Istanbul in 1635.⁶⁷

Till 1697, The Ma’an family remained as the pioneer *muqāta’aji* family in the region. During their rule, they tried to strengthen their presence despite the challenges from the

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 154-155.

⁶⁵ Cobban, 36

⁶⁶ The relations of Fakhreddin Ma’an II with Europe will be more elaborated later.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 38; Daher, 337; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 66.

Ottomans and the other feudal rival families of the region. In 1697, the male line of the Ma'an family died and the Ottomans and the other feudal families collaborated to fill the power vacuum and replace the Ma'an family with another.

2.2.2. Bashir Shihab II: The Reigning Prince of The Maronites

After Fakhreddin Ma'an's execution in Istanbul, his nephew Mulhim and the last man in the male line of the Ma'an family, Mulhim's son Ahmad Ma'an, was appointed as the new *multazim* of the *Shuf* Mountains. The *muqāta'ats* remained under their control till 1697. In that year, Ahmad Ma'an died and left no male heir to his fiefdom; however, another person in his female line, the grandson of his sister, Bashir Shihab became the new *multazim*. The Shihab family was a *Sunni feudal family* based in *Wadi Al Taym* (a Druze area) and they became the new tax collectors after the end of the Ma'an rule in the mountains. Between 1697 and 1788, many Shihabi *multazims* were appointed by the Ottomans in the region.

Under the Ma'ani rule of the Mountain range, the settlement of the Maronites was supported in many Druze controlled areas; *Kisrawan* inhabited mainly by the Maronites was under the direct control of the Ma'ani rule. The Shihabi period in the Mountains was a period in which the Maronite element of the society and the political focus started to be more visible. In this period, even the traditional mainlands of the Maronite population in the northernmost peaks of Mount Lebanon were brought under the control of the Shihabi rule.⁶⁸ This period may also be considered as *often stormy*⁶⁹ due to the density of the rivalries among the various factions and families. These rivalries that erupted mainly among the Druze families provided either the Shihabs or the Ottomans an ability to maneuver and keep the region under their control.⁷⁰ In 1770, an important development

⁶⁸ Cobban, 39.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ In almost all the historiography addressing the Shihabi rule in the Lebanese Mountains, the famous dispute within the Druze community, between the *Qaysi* and *Yazbeki* factions is referred. Therefore, I also wanted to touch upon this background detail briefly. In this dispute, the Ma'ans and the Shihabis side with the *Qaysi* faction and the *Yazbeki* faction fails in this dispute and the surviving families seek refuge in the inland Syria. However, within the Druze community another dispute erupts and this one is still visible in the Modern Lebanon's political life which is also based on family ties. The dispute between the *Jumblatts* and the *Yazbeki* faction gives the former more power and makes it one of the main elements of the Modern Lebanese politics. As stated before, all these disputes provide an opportunity for the Shihabis to

was recorded by history; *one of the Shihabi Princes allowed his sons to accept Maronite faith and Prince Yusuf converted to Maronite Christianity and became the first Maronite Shihabi in the family.*⁷¹

1788 was the year when Prince Bashir Shihab II came into power in the mountains. Like Fakhreddin Ma'an II, he was also one of the reasons why the Ma'anid and Shihabi periods were called as an *Amirate* or a *Princedom*; however, Bashir Shihab's brilliant and shiny career had to be obscured by the shadow of the career of Ahmad Pasha Al-Jazzar, who was appointed as Pasha of Sidon in 1776. Till his death in 1804, he had become the most influential political figure in both Mount Lebanon and Syria.⁷² Indeed, the Grand Vizier of the Empire in that time tried to depotentiate Al-Jazzar's regional dominance by offering Bashir Shihab II some special *muqāta'a*, through which Bashir Shihab II could pay the taxes directly to the Porte without the intervention of the governors like Al-Jazzar. Yet, Al-Jazzar managed to firm his power by supporting the rivals of Bashir Shihab II.⁷³ Bashir Shihab II had to wait for the death of Al-Jazzar to take revenge against his rival tribes in the region and take control of the majority of the *muqāta'ats* in the mountain range despite the legacy of Al-Jazzar, that was survived by his successor governors even after his death.⁷⁴ Bashir Shihab II was controlling most of the mountain range. However, unlike Fakhreddin Ma'an II, *he had no control over the coastal areas.*⁷⁵ His palace was like a government building; he would mediate many formal issues, solving disputes, etc. in his palace.⁷⁶ In his period, the Mountain survived as a refuge for the persecuted from any religions or sects. An important degree of increase in public works was noticeable.⁷⁷ Following the steps of Fakhreddin Ma'an II, Bashir Shihab II tried to keep his relations

exercise their rule by favoring each Druze faction to another and play a survival game (Cobban ,40; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 111-112; Akarlı, 16).

⁷¹ Cobban, 41; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 15.

Engin Akarlı says that the Shihabis attached a great importance to their moral authority over the communities under their rule; therefore, they sometimes had resort to the conversion from Islam to the Maronite faith (Akarlı, 16).

⁷² Cobban, 41.

⁷³ Richard Van Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khazin Sheikhs and The Maronite Church (1736-1840)*, (Leiden-New York-Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994),58.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*; 59.

⁷⁵ Akarlı, 21.

⁷⁶ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 108-109.

⁷⁷ Khalaf, 31.

with the European powers warm and fresh.⁷⁸ Thus, he could counterbalance any threat to his dominance in the mountains by playing different cards in the very maneuver game. European powers' traditional interest in the region was continuing with their concern about the Christian inhabitants of the mountains; therefore, Bashir Shihab II's relations with the European powers also defined the magnitude of his dependency on the Maronites. For the Maronites, Prince Bashir II was the *Amir* of Mount Lebanon. In Europe, a similar title used to be attributed to him when his name was spoken. Indeed, Napoleon Bonaparte wrote a letter directly addressing him and seeking assistance against the Ottomans when he attacked *Akka* in 1799. He did not answer this letter. At that time, governor Al-Jazar also demanded help from him but he gave an excuse and returned the demand. He was well-aware of the results of siding either with France or aiding the Ottoman forces against France. This could shake the balance between the Maronites and the Druze in the mountain range.⁷⁹

Bashir Shihab II, for a period of 15 years, showed a noticeable success worthy to be recorded in the history textbooks of Modern Lebanon. However, he also came into power in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, in which the change in the world order triggered by economic developments, mainly in Europe. It had already begun, and the very traditional ways were about to crackle.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*; 147.

⁷⁹ Atlioğlu, 138.

2.3. The Mountains Overlooking the Waters of the Mediterranean

The Mountain range of today's Lebanon is in an area that hosted various civilizations throughout history. The coastal areas of the Eastern Mediterranean played an important role as ancient seaports on the traditional trade routes between the East and the West. Apart from this, this area is so close to the birthplaces of Christianity and Islam; therefore, it has been affected by the religious rivalries, conquests, and of course the crusades. The Roman Empire, The Byzantines, the Mamluks, and the Ottomans, all arrived in the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, moved towards the interior, and seriously affected the urban life in the territories they reached. However, when we talk about the influence of the central powers on this area, we should put some limits on the mountain range. The empires were capable enough to expand their territories and insert their powers in the plains; however, it was quite hard for them to move vertically on the foothills of the mountain range. Moreover, it was also unnecessary to spare force and strategy for the "insignificant" territories which are out of sight of the authority. As a result of this, the urban lifestyles in the planes hardly penetrated the lifestyle in the mountains.⁸⁰ This fact is indeed one of the main reasons why autonomy in Mount Lebanon could be maintained for a long time. As mentioned at the beginning, the Mountains are historically known and called *Mount Refuge*; a sheltered and a safeguarded place for the dissenters who flee the persecutions. The three main inhabitants of Mount Lebanon; The Druze, The Maronites, and The Twelver Shiites are the ones who found refuge in the Mountains.

For the Maronites, there are different historical records about the origin of them, their arrival in Mount Lebanon, and forming a community in there. However, the main argument agrees on a common viewpoint that the first Maronite church was established in an environment in which the religious controversies in Christianity and the expansion of Islam were on the rise. The Maronite church and the community around it were formed in such an environment and they were driven to Mount Lebanon by the Byzantine which

⁸⁰ Süleyman Uygun, *Osmanlı Lübnan'ında Değişim ve İç Çatışma: Marunî Asi Yusuf Bey Kerem (1823-1889)*, (Ankara: Gece Kitablığı, 2017), 14.

considered them heretics.⁸¹ For the Druze and the Twelver Shiites, they were the communities regarded as heretics living in dominantly Sunni Muslim Empires.⁸²

Though the sheltered structure of the Mountain range provided protection for the inhabitants of the Mountains, the Mountains have been overlooking the waters of the Mediterranean; therefore, the contact with the coastal area has been linking these sheltered places to the other end of the Mediterranean. This geographical position of Mount Lebanon has made its sheltered borders fluxional. The borders surely have protected them from the threats but at the same time, the borders provided them a passage to the coastal areas where the inhabitants could contact the visitors coming from the other geographies.

From this perspective, I would like to show that the unique geographical character of Mount Lebanon provided autonomy in two ways; firstly it provided protection within the sheltered borders and made them invisible and unworthy to chase and control in the eyes of the Central Power who ruled these lands, secondly it provided another gateway for the

⁸¹ William Dalrymple, *From The Holy Mountain: A Journey in the Himalayas and Kashmir*, (India: Penguin Book, 2004), 236; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 91; Atlioğlu, 98-99.

During the Byzantine Empire, the correct form of Christian confession was dictated and for this purpose some ecclesiastical councils gathered to put forward the correct definition of Christianity. In 451, the fourth council gathered in *Chalcedon (Kadikoy)* and the council ruled that the Christians must believe that *Christ has two natures, one is divine, and one is human*. The Copt of Egypt, the Gregorians of Armenia, and Jacobites in Syria refused that ruling, and they were considered as the *Monophysite* Heretics. In 680, the Sixth Council gathered in *Constantinople* and they ruled that *Christ has also two energies and two wills*. The ones who refused this ruling were condemned as *Monothelite*, One Will heretics. (Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 6). According to Salibi, the Maronites refused the decision taken by the Sixth Ecclesiastical Council and they separated themselves from this doctrine and started to elect their own patriarchs in 685. (Atlioğlu, 99). Therefore, the Byzantines persecuted the Maronites from *the Orontes (Asi) Valley and pursued them to Mount Lebanon*. (Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 84). Even though the historical records support this approach, the Maronite Church today refuses that the Maronites were *Monothelite*; they had always been loyal subjects of the Roman See (Atlioğlu, 100). This claim constitutes one of the most controversial issues in the Maronite historiography. This fact can also be clearly observed in the writings of the early Maronite historians, especially in the records of Gabriel Ibn al-Qilā'ī and Istifan Al-Duwayhi that *their main objective in their writings were to prove the uninterrupted relations of the Maronites with the Papacy in Rome*. (See Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon*, (Beirut: American University of Beirut Publication of Faculty of Arts & Sciences, 1959). Kamal Salibi says that the Maronites were one of the Eastern Christian heresiarchs in the eyes of the Roman See; however, they accepted the apostolic supremacy of Rome *during the Crusades*. The reason behind this was they found union with the Roman See "politically expedient." (Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 73).

⁸² The Druze was considered as heretics during the Mamluk and the Ottoman periods in the Mountains and almost all the religious rulings (*fatwa*) held during these periods declared that killing them and confiscating their property were legitimate actions. (Abu-Husayn, 13).

Mountain to contact to the Europeans without meeting serious difficulties. Due to the sacred value of the Levant for the Christians, Jerusalem as the birthplace of the Christ, the Europeans' interest in these lands had never ceased to exist. Their main communication to the region was through the sea, therefore, the eastern ports of the Mediterranean have been haunted by the Europeans. In this regard, I would like to demonstrate the four European powers' contacts with Mount Lebanon and its inhabitants, at different times and under different circumstances. These are the leader of the Catholic Christian World, The Holy See of Rome, The France which had advanced to status of the protector of the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, Venice as the champion of the sea powers in the Mediterranean in her time, and Tuscany which filled the vacuum of power after the decline of Venice as a major power in the Mediterranean.⁸³

After the expansion and consolidation of the Muslim powers in the Asia Minor, the Levant, and North Africa, the frontiers of the Christian world started to become more vulnerable to the Muslim threat. This fact was followed by the Crusades against the Muslims in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Pope Clement V defined the crusades of the Latin World in the Syro-Palestinian zone as a priority for the faithful.⁸⁴ It is asserted by the Maronite historians- prominently by Istifan Al-Duwayhi and Gabriel Ibn al-Qilāṭi- that the Maronites provided a valuable service to the Crusaders. Salibi narrates a historical record of this service and the first contact. The spring of 1099 is a turning point from this perspective. A crusader army moving from Antioch to Jerusalem stops in a place near the village of *Arqa* in Tripoli to celebrate Easter and the Maronites descend from the Mountains to present their services to their coreligionists. After the conquest of Jerusalem by the crusaders in that year, the Maronite patriarch congratulates the army and asks Frankish to convey his congratulations to the Pope and he receives some presents later from him.⁸⁵ The Maronites used to live as a community in the districts outside the County

⁸³ Even though the Venice and Tuscany's contacts with Mount Lebanon had been established in an earlier period before France, I prefer to follow this sequence due to the fact that the contact established by France should be associated to the County of Tripoli, a Crusader Kingdom in the Levant ruled by the Franks between 1109-1289 and this county's contacts with the Mountain were established before the championship of Venice in the Mediterranean.

⁸⁴ Constantinos Georgiou, *Preaching the Crusades to the Eastern Mediterranean: Propaganda, Liturgy and Diplomacy, 1305–1352*, (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 15.

⁸⁵ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 92-93.

of Tripoli; therefore, it was more practical for the Franks to deal with them compared to the other Christian communities in the region who were dispersed. However, there were also Maronites who were against the Franks and union with the Roman See at that time. The records about the clashes within the community itself are available. Some Maronites aided the Franks but some did not.⁸⁶ During the period when the crusader counties made their presence felt in the region, the Maronites had their first contacts with the world outside of their sheltered mountains. After the Franks left the region and the strong Mamluk Rule was established, the Maronites' relations with this world was seriously severed and the religious clashes within the community (Latinization of the Maronite church vs. Monothelitism) gained momentum once again.⁸⁷ Unlike this claim, Kamal Salibi says that after the crusaders left the region, the Maronites obtained another advantage to maintain their contact with Europe. A new Western power in the Mediterranean, and the ally of the Mamluks, Venice was the new Western Christian sponsor of the Maronites.⁸⁸

There are many discussions about the Crusaders' relations with the Maronites since the first contact between them is one of the issues as controversial as the issues related to the origins of the Maronites. Though it was perhaps not like as appeared in the Maronite historiography, a sort of relations which has an important impact on the history of the Maronites exists. Kamal Salibi says that any Christian sect could have established contacts with the Crusaders due to religious reasons and the Maronites are not a distinct example of this. Moreover, he also says that the Muslim historians of that time do not mention such a relation; perhaps they did not deem it worth considering.⁸⁹

It was still 1444 when the seventeenth Ecumenical Council of the Roman Catholic Church was convoked in Florence to end the separation between the Catholic churches of Rome and Constantinople. Since it was once more discovered that the unity between two churches was impossible to restore, the Roman Church naturally initiated a new political strategy to establish relations with the Christian sects in the East, which once refused the

⁸⁶ Krijna Nelly Ciggaar, Adelbert Davids, Herman G. B. Teule, *East and West in the Crusader States: Context, Contacts, Confrontations: Acta of the Congress Held at Hernen Castle in May 1993*, (Leuven: Peeters Publications, 1996), 54.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 55.

⁸⁸ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 98

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 94.

rules of the Ecumenical Consuls. In the same historical period, the Franciscan bishops living in Palestine also rediscovered the Maronites in the Mountains and the Maronites once again had an opportunity to contact their coreligionists in Europe. In 1470, it was the first time a Maronite priest was sent to Rome for religious education. Gabriel Ibn al-Qilāṭī, before his departure for Rome, had been a priest of the Franciscan Order in Palestine. After he returned from Rome, he stayed in Mount Lebanon for a time and went to Cyprus to settle there as an abbot of the Franciscan Monastery. One of the most referred records of the Maronite historiography, his writings depict the relations of the Maronites with Rome and France by praising such relations.⁹⁰ In 1510, Pope Leo X recognized Maronites first time as an Eastern Christian Community by depicting them as “rose among the thorns (*velut rosæ inter spinas*)”⁹¹ by referring to the hardship the Maronites had to face throughout history and their survival in a non-Christian environment.⁹² From this time onwards, it can be said that the Maronites had a continuous relationship with Rome and France. The gradual advancement of the relations between the Roman See and the Maronites can be elaborated in many historical developments. In 1585, the Maronite College was established in Rome to educate young Maronites. Some graduates of the college preferred to stay in Europe, and some returned to Mount Lebanon and opened their monasteries in there. In 1596, the Jesuit father Girolamo Dandini was tasked to go to Mount Lebanon and open the first synod in the Patriarchal Residence in *Qannubin*, to coordinate and establish the Maronite monasteries in modern ways. In 1608, one of the graduates of the Maronite College in Rome, John Makhluḥ became the Maronite patriarch.⁹³ Through all these developments, the Maronites, among other Christian sects in the East, started to be Latinized.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Cigaar, Davids, and Teule, 57.

⁹¹ Karam Rizk & Mireille Issa. *Bullarium Maronitarum* (Bullaire Maronite) (Paris: Geuthner, 2019), 9.

⁹² Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 72.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 81.

⁹⁴ Historically, the Eastern Churches who have full communion with the Roman See have been called the *Uniate Churches*. There are 23 churches classified as *Uniate Churches* and the Maronite Church, despite their controversial ecclesiastical background, is considered as the one which formed the first Uniate Church and the only one to have always remained in full communion with the Holy See of Rome. (Ciggaari Davids, Teule, 12).

It was already expressed that the first contacts between the Maronites and France can be traced back to the Crusades and the Franks who ruled the County of Tripoli for a time. Another important development that had an important impact on Mount Lebanon and the Maronites was the capitulations granted to the King of France, Francis I, by the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I Kanuni in 1535.⁹⁵ The capitulations were the privileges given to France, including the privileges of the French merchants trading in the Ottoman territories and the priests. In this way, the French even assumed the mission of the protector of the Christians in the Middle East.⁹⁶ Under Louis XIV, France became the leading Roman Catholic power in all Europe, and this also strengthened their position in this protector status.⁹⁷ For the Maronites, Louis XIV's reign brought another prestige to their community. One of the prominent feudal families, the *Khazins* started to officially represent France in the region, as the vice-consuls at the beginning then the consuls. This was an important fact for the Maronites for considering France as their friend in Europe.⁹⁸

France and the Holy See of Rome were not the only European contacts to the region, and specifically Mount Lebanon. The Crusades had already triggered an important trade transaction between the West and the East and the ports in the Mediterranean started to gain importance for the Westerners. After the crusaders left the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean and the Levant, Venice became the most successful example of the Western trade in the region. Furthermore, Venice tried to seize some ports in the region

⁹⁵ Atliođlı, 114.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 114.

1535 was the date the first capitulations were given to France; however, in the upcoming years the Ottomans granted more privileges to France and expanded the scope of the capitulations to the religious affairs. Thanks to these privileges, the Roman Catholic and French priests could travel to the Christian's Holy Lands, taking residence in these territories, freely preach, and involve in the missionary activities on behalf of the Roman See. Especially after the 1673 treaty between the Ottoman Empire and France, such privileges gained more official ground. This development surely had an important impact on the Ottoman Empire, specifically the territories of Levant and the Maronites. However, one more important effect of this decision was surely the blow dealt to the authority of the Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople, who was the main authority recognized by the Ottomans regarding the Christians in their territories. The Ottomans did not involve in the sectarian controversies within the Christian community, they considered the Christians as one community; however, the capitulations granted to France initiated a transfer of loyalty of the Christians in the Ottoman territories from the Patriarch in Constantinople to the Pope in Rome. (Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 80-81.)

⁹⁷ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 106.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 106

for herself to secure its trade transactions. Coincided with the internal rivalry between the city-states of the Italian peninsula and the emergence of Venice with victory, Venice's aspiration for the Levant made her the sole Western European power in the Mediterranean. The 12th and 13th centuries marked the Venice's dominance in the region; however, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the later conquests in the Levant compelled Venice to struggle against the Ottomans for her outposts in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. The Venetians waged many battles against the Ottomans; among all losses, the most tragic loss of Venice was no doubt Cyprus, which was seized in 1571 by the Ottomans.⁹⁹

Before the Ottomans, during the Mamluk period of the Levant, the historical records and the Venetian archives tell that the relations between the Mamluk Empire and Venice were friendly.¹⁰⁰ Venice favored stability in the Mamluk politics so she provided assistance to the Sultanate in the time of need. Such good relations surely eased the way for the Venetian merchants in the region. The ports of the Levant were open to the Venetian merchants only. They were active and in contact with the local tribes. They would also report any political development in the region to Venice. The Maronites were one of the references in these reports. The Maronite historian Istifan Al-Duwayhi also referred to the relations between the Maronites living in Tripoli (urban side) and the Venetian merchants.¹⁰¹

The most considerable contact of the Venetians with the local tribes was no doubt with the Druze. The Druze were the ones who played an intermediary role in the East-West trade and they had strong contacts with the ports where they deal with their Venetian counterparts. Salih ibn Yahya, the Druze historian who lived in the 15th century, reports

⁹⁹ Maria Fusaro, *Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and The Rise of England 1450-1700*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 64-68.

¹⁰⁰ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 98.

Previously we mentioned that the Franciscan bishops residing in Palestine rediscovered the Maronites in the Mountains after a period of disconnection to Europe following the period in which the Crusades left the region. We should also mention that Franciscan Lesser brothers were permitted to open their mission in Jerusalem by the Mamluks. That can be considered as a gesture to the Venetians from the Mamluks as a symbol of friendly relations. (*Ibid*, 98).

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 101.

that the revenue earned through the trade with the Venetians was high.¹⁰² When the Ottomans seized the Levant, Venice, which lost an important ally in the Mediterranean, supported the local uprisings against the Ottomans and they also armed the local tribes, especially the Druze.¹⁰³

When the Venetian Republic lost power inside the Italian Peninsula, another Italian city-state, Tuscany, a leading power in Europe took the lead and actively involved in the Western interests in the Ottoman Levant.¹⁰⁴ This period coincided with the period of Fakhreddin Ma'an II. Fakhreddin Ma'an II's relations with the Italian city-states, which was previously mentioned, can also be considered another example in this regard. When he became an important threat for the Ottomans in the region, he went to exile to the Italian Peninsula in 1613 and he stayed five years there. He was contacted by the *Medici of Florence* and the notables of Tuscany. Since Rome was searching for ways to reconquer the holy lands from the Ottomans, they consulted with Fakhreddin Ma'an II if he could provide any help for their purpose.¹⁰⁵ Due to Fakhreddin's good relations with the Maronites at that time, he was the best hope of both Rome and Tuscany for the reconquest of Cyprus and the Holy Land.¹⁰⁶ Pope Pius V, in his letter dated January 1609, was addressing Fakhreddin Ma'an II as "the Emir of the Druzes, Nicomedia, Palestine, and Phoenicia" and promising him assistance against the Ottomans.¹⁰⁷ On September 25, 1610, Pope Paul V, in his letter addressing the Maronite Patriarch John Makhluf was commanding him to continue his friendship to Fakhreddin Ma'an II.¹⁰⁸ The relations and such correspondences between Mount Lebanon and the Italian Peninsula were being exchanged through the Maronite Patriarchate or directly with Fakhreddin Ma'an II himself.

¹⁰² Abu Husayn, 9.

¹⁰³ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 124.

In this point Salibi refers to an important linguistic detail that also sheds light on the relations of Venice with the region. The Venetians armed the Druze with *muskets*, of which equivalent in Arabic is *bunduqiyyah*. The word *bunduqiyyah* is also the Arabic form of Venice (Ibid, 125).

¹⁰⁴ Abu Husayn, 28.

¹⁰⁵ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 146.

¹⁰⁶ Abu Husayn, 1.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 33.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 36.

As we can see, despite its sheltered structure, mainly thanks to its religiously holy premises and its geographical proximity to the important ports in the Mediterranean, Mount Lebanon has been openly in strong relations with the European powers. Holy See of Rome, Venice, Tuscany, and France played an important role in the construction of the communication ways to Mount Lebanon; however, in the late 17th century, more and more European powers and also Russia, with his mission assumed to protect the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, involved in any matters related to the Levant and Mount Lebanon. Various forms of collaboration under the banner of protection of the minority, in different times with different sects and groups, came into existence. The gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and the new economic trends in the world made the Ottomans more vulnerable to such changes and the Levant more open to foreign intervention. In the 19th century, this fact was observed perhaps in its ultimate stage.

2.4. The Autonomy of the Maronite Church in Mount Lebanon

From the beginning of this chapter till now, I tried to briefly depict the main three reasons for the autonomy enjoyed in Mount Lebanon by its inhabitants since autonomy is one of the core elements behind the construction of the Maronite Identity. Since the Maronite Identity is a broad concept and it sounds so pretentious, I will narrow some arguments here and focus on a particular actor in this story, namely the Maronite Church. Firstly, I will explain why the Maronite Church should be the particular actor we should focus on, then I will examine the autonomy enjoyed by the church in direct proportion to a Maronite Identity.

As also expressed previously, the feudal structure in Mount Lebanon until the 19th century can be defined as stratified. However, the states have been transitional and fluid; that is, one person or one family can be observed in different intertwined states at different times under different circumstances. For instance, The Druze has been considered as a religious group living in Mount Lebanon, but this name does not make the community as a homogenous unity because of the rivalry among the different Druze families and tribes have shown the absence of such a religious or communal unity among the Druze. Fakhreddin Ma'an II has been considered as the father of Modern Lebanon and a heroic figure by the Maronites, yet he has not been equally praised by his Druze fellows even though he was a remarkable Druze landlord of the Lebanese history. He was an

extraordinary Druze landlord but at the same time, he was a Ma'an in the eyes of the other Druze tribes. At the beginning of the 20th century, this time, the same man was praised by the Arab nationalists as one of the heroes of the Arab History.¹⁰⁹ Turning back to the same Druze, despite the fact that they have been regarded as the heretics within Islam, living in the Mountains; they were regarded as the ones, *who revenged on behalf of Islam* by the Sunni Muslims of Damascus during the 1860 Mount Lebanon events.¹¹⁰ As a final example to this multifaceted and complicated fact, I would like to share the words of Walid Jumblatt, the legendary living leader of the Druze community in Lebanon, one of the prominent figures in the Lebanese history, and the current leader of the Jumblatts, who have been one of the major players in Mount Lebanon since the late 18th century. In an Al-Jazeera production documentary on the Lebanese politics and family ties, referring to his son, he summarizes the identity issue in Lebanon as follows:

“I would not like Teymour [his son] to say that “I’m a Druze, I’m a Jumblatt, and I’m a Lebanese!” No! He has to stick with the big heritage of Kamal Jumblatt [his father]. As an Arab, as a Nationalist Arab, and as a human being, and as a Socialist. *Being a Druze means nothing.* [emphasis added] Being a Druze, is just to defend the minor purpose, the small interest of the Druzes; he has to widen his objective and his perspective.”¹¹¹

The Druze example shows that different priorities constitute, limit, and sometimes challenge, a perception of identity. If the Druze example can provide a pattern for the other groups living in Mount Lebanon, then how we can talk about a Maronite Identity?

As mentioned before, in the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon, we may divide the Maronite into three social categories; the Maronite church, Maronite notable families, and the peasants. In the Maronite Community, if we need to point a figure which has seriously imagined all the Maronites as one unity, it has been no doubt the Maronite Church from the beginning. The Holy See of Rome, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Franks, the Druze might have considered the Maronites as one community but within the Maronites themselves, this consideration has remained particular to the Maronite church till the 20th

¹⁰⁹ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 169.

¹¹⁰ Adil Baktiaya, “19. Yüzyıl Suriyesinde Hıristiyan-Müslüman İlişkilerinde Değişim 1860 Şam Olayları,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 58 (2011): 23-44, 34.

¹¹¹ *Lebanon: The Family Business*, Al Jazeera English, 31 May 2009. Youtube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vesotnrAN5g> (24 June 2019)

century. The times of the modern identities, emergence of nationalism surely have affected the Maronites and they have developed a sense of communal identity; however, under different circumstances, we can observe that the particular identities have never ceased to exist; indeed they are still important elements of the Lebanese politics¹¹² and the Maronite Church has been the sole continuous actor to consider the Maronites as a homogenous religious community regardless of their family ties and backgrounds. This is why I will examine how the Maronite church enjoyed autonomy in Mount Lebanon since their perception of identity and perception of threat led the way for all the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.

The Maronite church's history before the Crusaders is considered ambiguity and controversy. Since there is not enough historical record to tell us their story before the arrival of the Crusaders in the Levant, this period is still preserving its unclarity. Surely, the official Maronite historiography provides details about the origins of the Maronites and the Maronite church which indirectly sheds light on this period.¹¹³

The Maronite church, as a traditional church located with its community within the sheltered mountain range, had preserved its traditional methods in religious affairs and its relations with its community for a long time. Apart from the social status and respect shown by the Maronites, we cannot say that the Maronite church could play a serious political or an economic role in the affairs of Mount Lebanon. As mentioned before, the stratified hierarchy used to bring authority above the church, which limited its access to the sources and the decision-making process within the community. During the Mamluk period, the Mamluks used to appoint some notable Maronite families as *muqaddams*. As we already mentioned the *Khazins* during the Ottoman Era, these *muqaddams* had authority on the Maronite community and to enable them to exercise their authority on the church; they used to be appointed as vice-deacons. During the Mamluk Period, the Maronites had attempts to contact Rome and such attempts were sometimes responded

¹¹² Kamal Salibi says that the communities of Mount Lebanon have "historical scores to settle." (Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 50). That is, whatever the top identity is, under the umbrella of this identity, the family competition, competition of the interests has still been existent. The Maronites and the Druze could act as a community in times of threat to their communal identity, but they have never forgot the historical rivalries and they have even maintained them today.

¹¹³ Işık, "Maruni Kilisesi," 92.

harshly by the Mamluks.¹¹⁴ In 1365, the Latin Kingdom of Cyprus, the Crusader Kingdom, attacked the Muslim forces in Alexandria and the Mamluks turned to violence against the Christians under their rule, especially the ones who collaborated with the Franks. It is reported that In April 1367, the Maronite Patriarch Gabriel Al Hajjulawi was killed by the Mamluks as a result of this policy.¹¹⁵ Within the context of the definition of “autonomy” I provided at the beginning of this chapter, one may claim that execution of the Maronite Patriarch by the Mamluks is a direct contact between the Maronites and the central authority and this means the alleged autonomy actually ceased to exist. First of all, this was a reaction shown by the Mamluks in the face of the Crusader attacks and it was not a continuous policy against the Maronite Patriarchate. We may say that the Maronites as a community were not directly targeted in such harsh cases. Secondly, the Maronite Church at that time was still busy with the religious conflicts within his own community and the rivalries with the other Christian sects like the *Jacobites* who refused the rule of the Roman See like most of the Christian sects in the region. Thirdly, the Maronite Church was still not the strongest entity for its community; this status was in the hands of the *muqaddams* appointed by the Central authority. As a result of this, we may still say that autonomy was maintained by the Maronite Church during the Mamluk Era. They were under the patronage of the *muqaddams*, which had the direct contact with the central power, they could maintain their severe relations with Rome through the Franciscan friars in Jerusalem; and as previously referred, the friendly relationships between the Mamluk rule and Venice fostered such communication attempts. We should also keep in mind that the Maronite Church, as a Church organization, was still a traditional church, of which organization structure was not completed and defined; therefore, it was not powerful enough to assert a social and a political impact much that they can pose a threat to the authority of the central power.

The Ottoman Era brought a new order for the Christians living under their rule. Even though the Ottomans applied the status defined by Islam for the Christians, they at least considered the regional differences; therefore, they did not consider the Christians in the Balkans and the Christians in the Levant equal since the latter had been living with the

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 99.

¹¹⁵ Ramazan Işık, “Marunileri Memlûkler Döneminde Fransisken Misyoner Rahiplerin Katolikleştirme Faaliyetleri” *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 9. 1 (June 2005): 203-218, 206.

Muslims for centuries. Apart from this, among all the Christians, all Greek Orthodox subjects of the Empire had a privileged status due to the privileged status of the Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople. The Christian communities of the Empire were free to exercise the private matters of their daily life. Each church organization was considered the responsible head of their religious community to decide on the procedures of such private matters.¹¹⁶ The Christians in the Levant did not have direct contact with the central authority. Their contact was through the local governors appointed by the Porte. For the Maronite Church, we do not have enough historical records to claim that there was regular direct contact between them and the Ottoman authorities. However, in a document dated 1609, we see that the governor of Tripoli approved the judicial authority of the Maronite Patriarch. Some sources also refer to the official documents related to the recognition of the bishop of *Ihdin* by the governor; and the official confirmation of the new patriarch when he is chosen; however, how regularly this recognition and confirmation was issued is not clear. We do not know how much official contacts with the central government affected the autonomy of the Maronite Church since the archival material is scarce on this matter.¹¹⁷ Yet, we see in the letter of the King of France Louis XIV to his ambassador in Constantinople, Charles de Ferriol, which is dated to 10 August 1701, that the King informed his ambassador of the Maronite Patriarch Etienne. Patriarch Etienne had requested three matters from the King; staying under the governor of Damascus, immunity from the administration of the governor of Tripoli, and the protection of the King.¹¹⁸ I could not find the specific reasons behind these demands of the Patriarch if anything happened regarding the attitude towards to the Maronite Church; however, my personal claim is that the reason might be about the *jizya* taxes imposed on the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. It is recorded that in the 17th century this tax was collected in various forms in the coastal areas and in the mountains; however, sometimes the priests and the monks were exempted from this tax since they were considered poor. I claim that under the governor of Damascus, the Maronites used to be exempted from this tax but when the governor of Tripoli involved in the affairs of taxation, he imposed the taxes on

¹¹⁶ Işık, "Maruni Kilisesi", 100.

¹¹⁷ Richard Van Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon*, 97-98.

¹¹⁸ Serkan Gul, "The French Catholic Missionaries in Lebanon Between 1860 And 1914" (Ph.D. diss., Middle East Technical University Graduate School of Social Sciences, May 2015), 30.

them. Salibi also says that the Maronite Patriarchs were left at liberty by the Ottomans, the only exception of this was that the *Qannubin*, in which the Patriarchal real estate was located, was subjected to regular taxation. In the beginning, the whole Levant was under the administration of the Governor of Damascus but later, to make the administration easier in the region, the Ottomans formed the eyalet of Tripoli in 1579 and the whole Mount Lebanon was included in this administration. If there is no other specific reason behind the demands of the Patriarch, this might be the real reason. On the other hand, regardless of the reason behind it, this attitude of the Patriarch supports the main argument in this thesis that at the time a threat is posed to the autonomy of the Maronites church, they show a reaction to restore the autonomy. In this instance, we see that the reaction of the Patriarch is to request help from the King of France.

In the generally autonomous environment of the Maronite church, there were no *muqaddams* regularly appointed by the central authority as applied in the Mamluk rule; however, the Druze of the Mountains and some Maronite notable families under their rule were the ones the Maronite church and the Maronite community had to see as an authority for a long time. Especially the *Khazins*, after having most of the territories of *Kisrawan*, made the Maronite community and the church dependent on themselves. The church, that did not have an organization and an authority to administer its means, had to compromise with the notables of the *Khazins*. As a result, the Khazins had the authority to interfere in the religious decisions taken by the Patriarch, such as the appointment of the high-ranking church office; archbishops, bishops, and the others.¹¹⁹

The Ottoman Era coincided with the Latinization process of the Maronites. As mentioned before, after the Capitulations granted to France, the relations of the Maronite Church with Rome started to become easier. The Rome could easily send emissaries to the Mountains to organize the church along with the Catholic lines defined by the Holy See. The authority of the Mountain was still in the hands of the feudal lords but the Maronite church, beyond all the authorities, including the Ottomans, were in contact with the other end of the Mediterranean, gradually consolidating its organization, and bypassing the internal religious conflicts within its own community. Some important developments in

¹¹⁹ Harik, 33; Atlioğlu, 126.

this sense have already been referred. Apart from these developments, there are other important developments that can be considered as a turning point for the Maronite church. The first one is the foundation of the Lebanese Maronite Order in 1695 under the patriarchate of the prominent Maronite historian Istifan Al-Duwayhi. The Lebanese Maronite Order as an independent organization within the Maronite church was initiated after three Maronites living in Aleppo, from notable Maronite families joined the service of the church. These people and the other new and young members of the order, unlike the priests of the traditional church organization, were active in the social lives of the Maronites. In monasteries, the history was being taught in addition to religion. The new priests were dealing with the farming activities of the villagers, buying new lands or gaining new lands through the donations of the feudal families. As a result of this, the rational aspects of the church organization gained momentum. The church's influence started to widespread from the center to the spheres and the quality of the priests started to increase in many senses. Furthermore, this new trend mitigated the authority of the notable Maronite families on the church affairs. The foundation of the Lebanese Maronite Order is considered as one of the reasons behind the transition of the church from the traditional organization to the modern one.¹²⁰

A second important development was, as also mentioned before, the settlement of the Maronites in Kisrawan and other districts of Mount Lebanon, In the traditional times, the office of the Patriarch was close to the places of his community. He was in close contact with them for the religious preaching and providing religious services; however, new settlements in the periods of the Ma'ans and the Shihabis generated a new necessity in this sense. In progress of time, the necessity to establish dioceses in different districts as the representatives of the church; however, there were two obstacles to the realization of this necessity. Traditional church order had not defined the status, responsibilities, and authorities of the archbishops and bishops. Secondly, each priest had to visit the patriarch regularly to procure the holy oil; otherwise, they could not complete their religious duties.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Atlioğlu, 128-129.

¹²¹ Harik, 34-25.

Rome's attempts to Latinize the Maronites were continuing. In 1736, with the order of the Roman See, the Lebanese Council convoked to discuss the organizational and hierarchical matters of the Maronite Church. This council is regarded as the end of the traditional phase of the Maronite Church. During the council, the authorities of the Patriarch, especially regarding the church real estates (endowments) and the appointment of the church offices, were expanded. The first time in the church history, the 8 dioceses- 6 dioceses in Mount Lebanon, one in Cyprus, and one in Aleppo- were defined. The responsibilities and the authorities of the archbishops and the bishops were also defined during this historical convocation and the decisions taken during the council are still the main foundation of the organization and hierarchy of the Maronite Church today.¹²² The decisions taken in the council later were approved in 1741 by the Pope. Due to some reasons, the decisions could not come into force. The opposition of some priests to the decisions, the power and the authority of the *Khazins*, which would be eroded by these decisions, etc. played an important role in this. In the formative years, in the aftermath of the council, the monasteries were divided into two types; the traditional and the reform (in accordance with the council decisions) ones.¹²³ During this new era, the Maronite church began to acquire an important amount of economic wealth. Since the patriarch became the top authority on the endowments, the Maronite landlords, mostly the *Khazins* lost their previous authority on the church real estates, and the traditional monasteries brought additional financial burden to the feudal families in the 18th century and those indebted families had to sell these monasteries to the Maronite church, The church gained ground towards having most of the territories in Mount Lebanon and involving in conflicts with the Druze and the Maronite landlords.¹²⁴

All things considered, the Maronites had no direct contact with the central authority, except some few examples. This invisibility, along with the trends and policies favoring the Maronites within the Mountain provided an autonomous environment for the church. The church could sustain its activities to consolidate the religious stability for its own community and its relations with the Holy See of Rome, which had been considered the only authority the church felt obliged to pledge its loyalty to. However, as power invites

¹²² Atlioğlu, 124.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 130.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 130.

the challenge, the church started to become visible among the players of the Mountain and this brought many changes that would be coincided and fostered with some other changes in the 19th century and the autonomy, which had provided the church to feed the identity for its own faithful community in progress of time, started to crackle.



3. CONTESTED AUTONOMY OF THE MOUNT REFUGE

The main reasons behind the autonomy of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon were elaborated with historical references by now. In this chapter, I will try to point to some basic developments in the 18th and 19th centuries which started to pose a threat to the autonomy in Mount Lebanon and examine how the Maronite Church perceived this change as a threat and reacted to it.

There are four main developments in the 18th and 19th centuries, which seriously unsettled the traditional ways and the autonomy in Mount Lebanon. We may summarize them as follows:

- a) Commercialization of the economics of Mount Lebanon.
- b) The rising importance of the eastern ports of the Mediterranean.
- c) The emergence of the Maronite Church as a powerful actor in the matters of Mount Lebanon
- d) Muhammad Ali Pasha's Occupation in Mount Lebanon (1831-1840).

3.1. Four Developments That Challenged The Autonomy of the Mountain

3.1.1. Commercialization of the Economics of The Mountain

The eastern Mediterranean ports had played the strategic roles as the transit for the bullion influx from Europe to Eastern Asia. This trend had started in the late middle Ages and for a long time, the Mediterranean and its eastern shores maintained this important status in the East-West trade routes. The Ottoman Empire in the 16th century, after the conquest of the Levantine and Egyptian territories, seized the Mediterranean trade and monopolized these traditional trade routes. In the 17th and the 18th centuries, the main bullion exporters to the Empire were the Dutch and the French; however, France managed to emerge as the foremost trading partner of the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁵ In 1669, the Ottoman domestic currency system declined, and the European currencies began to penetrate the Ottoman domestic market. This development coincided with the increasing demand of the Empire for more currencies in the face of the war expenses and the Empire, of which economy gradually shifted towards the monetary economy, had to encounter the problem of the

¹²⁵ Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon*, 10.

decline in the value of its *akçe* against the European coins. Even though the revenue generated through the trade transactions was not a big amount in the general state income, trade profits were important for the development and survival of the domestic markets.¹²⁶

The discovery of the new sea routes between Europe and the Indian Ocean began to seriously decrease the importance of the traditional trade routes in the Mediterranean and directly affected the central position of the Ottoman Empire in World Trade since it had a monopoly on the Mediterranean trade routes. To balance the deficit and the inflation problems, the Empire tried to take some traditional measures and solutions; however, its dependence on foreign currency gradually increased. The empire even realized that the capitulations were not favorable in the long run. In the late 18th century, the first time the Ottoman Empire considered the possibility of foreign loans, probably from Holland. Such unsolved financial problems obliged the empire to more centralize its taxation system and introduce extraordinary taxes or incidental levies.¹²⁷

The economy of Mount Lebanon had been self-sufficient even though some products used to be imported from Egypt and inland Syria. Apart from this, the backbone of the economy of Mount Lebanon was its famous and quality silk, which had been its major item of the exportation. The climate and the territory were convenient for growing mulberry trees. For the villagers, it was practical to make sericulture since it did not take a long time for them when they involved in silk production.¹²⁸ At the end of the 18th century, demand for silk in Europe and inland Syria dramatically increased.¹²⁹ The primary buyer of the silk and its derivatives was France. After France was seriously challenged by the British and Russia, which was exporting silk from the Far East markets under their rule, France tried to compensate this through the silk exported from Mount Lebanon. The silk production began to be very profitable and it rapidly widespread in all the Mountains. Many cultivated lands were transformed for the sake of silk production and the traditional products began to be replaced by mulberry trees.¹³⁰ In 1843, the first

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 11.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 17.

¹²⁸ Khalaf, 27.

¹²⁹ Uygun, 57.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 58.

silk fabric was established by the French entrepreneur Antoine-Fortuné in *Matn*.¹³¹ In the 19th century, *Lyon* became the center of the silk exported from the Eastern Mediterranean in all Europe. The Beirut branch of the French company *Credit Lyonnais* was an important center for the relations between the silk fabrics in *Lyon* and the silk production in Mount Lebanon.¹³²

As a result of this change, the economy of Mount Lebanon began to be seriously commercialized. By the early 19th century, the net amount of the grain exported from inland Syria and Egypt was 35-40 percent of the total consumption of grain in the Mountain. Even though the transaction of such products was costly, profitable silk production was providing the required encouragement.¹³³ The traditional agricultural system based on the *muqāta 'as* faced an important transformation, which also began to transform the social structure of Mount Lebanon.

3.1.2. Rising Importance of The Eastern Ports of the Mediterranean

In parallel to the dramatically changing trends in the economic structure of the Empire, the Eastern Mediterranean maritime trade and the seaports in the region gained new importance. The discovery of the new routes to the Indian Ocean from Europe had already declined the traditional position of the Mediterranean basin in the world economy; however, the colonial economy of the new world was in need of new markets and the raw materials for the production. The coastal areas and the hinterland in the Mediterranean started to witness the rivalries of the European powers for the maintenance of their colonial economies. The technological developments in communication, especially the advent of the steamships, drew the new seaports in the Mediterranean. İstanbul, İzmir, Thessaloniki, Alexandretta, Beirut, and Alexandria became the new port cities; for the Levant, Beirut was the primary city in which the Western influence showed itself in its utmost level compared to the other cities. Beirut was not an important port city in the earlier decades of the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁴ *Zahir Al-Umar*, an important figure in Palestine

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 57.

¹³² *Ibid*, 58-59.

¹³³ Akarlı, 18.

¹³⁴ Pelin Kihir Öztürk, "Urban Transformation of Ottoman Port Cities in The Nineteenth Century: Change from Ottoman Beirut to French Mandatory Beirut" (master's thesis, Middle East Technical University the Graduate School of Social Sciences, September 2006), 56.

between 1746 and 1775 made *Akka* (Acre) an important port city, as a challenge of the position of Sidon. When *Zahir* involved in some rivalries with the important figures of Sidon, Shihabi feudal lords of Mount Lebanon tried to develop Beirut as a port city. They even managed to shift some of Damascus' trade with Europe and Egypt to Beirut. *Zahir* opposed this development and even tried to siege Beirut but in the end, he was captured and killed by the Ottoman authorities. Governor Ahmad Al-Jazzar, previously mentioned in the part of Bashir Shihab II, was appointed as the Governor of Sidon and brought the control of the whole coastal area of the Levant, including *Acre*, *Beirut*, and *Tripoli* under his rule. The coastal areas remained under his control till his death in 1804.¹³⁵

These new port cities, a harbor for the new international trade, were designed in accordance with the new necessities. In the port cities, in the coastal areas, the post offices, hotels, banks, and train stations were established. When we look at the municipality organizations in the Ottoman Empire, we see that such organizations were firstly introduced in these new port cities due to the organizational requirements. In the line of the Western influence, theatres, clubs, etc. were the other new elements of these new cities. The traditional cities in the hinterland stagnated under the shadow of the new port cities. Damascus as a traditional historical urban center was one of these examples, which gradually lost its economic importance with Beirut. Train stations were linking the hinterland into the coasts; therefore, the hinterland, villages, even the mountain range was opened; the sheltered structure of Mount Lebanon began to gradually lose its invisibility. The train lines used to be constructed by foreign firms; therefore, each construction used to determine the sphere of influence of each colonial power within the administration of the Ottoman Empire. The train lines gave the colonial powers the opportunity to actively operate in the coastal areas and in the hinterland. The telegraph lines, which were in the monopoly of the military bases in the past were in the service of the people living in the cities. The fact that these new port cities became a center of attraction, they began to receive population from the other cities.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Akarlı, 18.

¹³⁶ Öztürk, 46-49.

Beirut, among all the other new coastal cities, emerged as a champion of the new harbor of the international trade. During the short period of Egyptian rule in the region, many European powers opened their consulates in the city.¹³⁷ In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire made some administrative changes regarding the administrative regions. When the Empire sized the region, they introduced three administrative governments; namely, *Tripoli*, *Aleppo*, and *Damascus*. In 1660, they added the Government (*Vilayet*) of Sidon. In 1840, a *Vilayet* of Syria was established out of Damascus and Sidon and it was subdivided to 5 *sanjaks*; namely, Beirut, Acre, Tripoli, Latakia, and Nablus. In 1888, a separate *Vilayet of Beirut* became the administrative capital of the *vilayet* in the same name.¹³⁸ As can be seen, the growing importance of the new port city obliged the Empire to introduce new regulations in the administrative system. This change in the urban character of the Levant would also affect the character of Mount Lebanon.

3.1.3. The Emergence of The Maronite Church As A Powerful Actor in Mount Lebanon

As we already discussed the growing sphere of influence of the church in the previous chapter, the Maronite Church entered a new phase in its history, mainly through the establishment of the Maronite order and the convocation of the Lebanese Council in the early 18th century. The Maronite Order was founded as an organization within the church and many priests and the church staff attended the order. In the later years, the members of the order began to take the offices of high-ranking priests in the church. The members of the Maronite Order were well-educated people, they had new ideas and ideals; therefore, they naturally challenged the traditional way and for a long time had to deal with the *Khazins* and sometimes the Patriarch and the other priests' reactions. The Order had also its own monasteries and waqf lands which also provided an economic power to them. After the dioceses were defined in the Lebanese Council and the Maronite population expanded to many areas of Mount Lebanon, the members of the Order were active in many parts of the Mountain, in direct contact with the Maronites, especially with the peasants.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 57.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 56.

The decisions taken in the Lebanese Council provided many rights to the Patriarch and it strengthened his authority against the *Khazins*. The patriarch could decide on the ordonnance of the church and the selection of the priests and the archbishops. The endowments and the real estates of the church were mostly under the authority of the patriarch. As expressed before, this situation caused the formation of a dual system, in which the monasteries of the new system after the Council and the traditional monasteries maintained by the *Khazins* survived together. Yet, the financial burden of such monasteries in the hands of the *Khazins* obliged them to sell these real estates to the Church. Therefore, the Maronite Church emerged as a new power advancing towards holding most of the territories in Mount Lebanon in the 19th century.¹³⁹

All such developments provided the environment for the new well-educated priests to have a larger vision on the matters of the Mountain, especially the Maronite community. They thought that the church should have played a more active role to lead the Maronite Community.

3.1.4. Muhammad Ali Pasha's Occupation in Mount Lebanon (1831-1840)

In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt with his naval forces and stayed in the region for three years. Since the French presence in Egypt and the further plans of Napoleon posed a threat to the interests of the British in its colonies, the British counter-intervention put an end to the three years French occupation of Egypt in 1801.¹⁴⁰ After the French forces retreated, the Ottoman Empire appointed the successful Albanian military officer of its army, Muhammed Ali Pasha as the commander of the brigade of the Albanian soldiers to take the remnant of the French army under control and restore the Ottoman rule in the region. He successfully fulfilled his task and additionally, he reorganized the Mamluk armed forces in Egypt. As a reward to these successes performed by him, Muhammed Ali Pasha was appointed as the governor of Egypt by the Sultan. As an extraordinary example of an Ottoman officer, Muhammed Ali Pasha established his dynasty in Egypt and exercised his power beyond an ordinary Ottoman governor.

¹³⁹ Atlioğlu, 130.

¹⁴⁰ See Marvin E. Gittleman, Stuart Schaar, *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, (New York: Grove Press, 2012).

In later years, Muhammed Ali Pasha also demanded the Levant as a reward to his services. The Empire had already given him The Island of Crete for this purpose but the ambitious leader, relying on his military power, rebelled against the Ottoman rule and sent his son Ibrahim Pasha to take the control of the regions Palestine and Syria. Ibrahim Pasha's armed forces gradually advanced within the Levant and they took the control of whole Syria by 1831.¹⁴¹ Ibrahim Pasha's armed forces continued to advance into Anatolia, and he defeated an Ottoman army in here in 1832. When he arrived in 1833 in Konya, this move transformed into an international dispute rather than a conflict between the Empire and one of its vassals. Even though Muhammed Ali Pasha commanded his son to retreat and requested the Sultan to compromise in a reasonable agreement, Sultan Mahmud II had already asked for the help of Russia. Confronting a threat to the capital, the Russian navy positioned itself in the Bosphorus against a potential threat. This move alarmed the other European powers due to the strategic importance of the straits for them and the potential influence of Russia on the Ottoman Empire. In the end, Sultan Mahmud II signed a treaty with Muhammed Ali Pasha and left Syria under his son's rule. This treaty had only been signed on paper. The Sultan had already begun his preparations to wage a war on them and punish them for their insolence. Muhammed Ali Pasha and his son were also well aware of this fact and Ibrahim Pasha also began to load his army in Syria.

During the period of Ibrahim Pasha in the Levant, he introduced some reforms that left irreversible effects on the region. Firstly, he favored the Christians in the region and initiated many new regulations in this regard. He tried to equalize the status of the Christians and Muslims living in the region. He levied equal taxes on both Christians and Muslims.¹⁴² One of the taxes levied on the Christians, *ferde* tax was relatively not a heavy tax; however, the symbolic meaning of it, felt by the Muslims was important. One of the witnesses of the period depicts the reaction of the Muslims in Damascus that when a Muslim pays the tax in the government office, receives his receipt and goes out of the office, and shows the receipt to his fellow Muslims and says "Oh my brother! Look at this! It is *harici* (referring to the non-Muslims) document!"¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Öztürk, 56-57; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 157.

¹⁴² Atlıoğlu, 140.

¹⁴³ Bakıya, 29-30.

Ibrahim Pasha also abolished some limitations to the Christians, traditionally and historically applied for centuries, like restrictions to wearing turbans in red, white, and green colors, entering the city on the horse, etc. In the districts with a population of more than twenty thousand, advisory councils (*dîvan*) were formed. For instance, The Damascus Council was formed by 10 Muslims, 10 Christian, and 1 Jewish member). The Council in Beirut was formed by 6 Muslims and 6 Christians. Furthermore, the favorable status of the Christians was further fostered; the Christians were exempted from the military service even though they were obliged to pay the same tax as the Muslim subjects were and Ibrahim Pasha obliged the Muslim subjects for recruitment in his army.¹⁴⁴

Another important development particular to this period was Ibrahim Ali Pasha's contribution to the already growing status of Beirut as a port city. When he seized most of Levant, he established Beirut as the capital of the Government (*Vilayet*) of Sidon. The Beirut-Damascus road was constructed in this period. Thanks to the privileges granted to the European merchants by the Ottoman Empire, the commercial activities rapidly increased in the city.¹⁴⁵ The representatives of such transactions were Christians and Jews. This situation also made the non-Christian subjects of the Empire more visible in urban life. They used to build luxury buildings and have a prosperous life compared to the Muslims, whose prestige and standard of lifestyle was in eclipse.¹⁴⁶

Within the broader environment of the Levant, Ibrahim Pasha also developed a special policy in Mount Lebanon. Bashir Shihab II, the most powerful landlord of the Mountain, had good relations with Ibrahim Pasha. Due to the Ottoman governor Ahmad Al-Jazzar's policies against him and the 1820 Peasant Uprising (that will be examined later), he could not consolidate his power in the Mountain for a while. Here we should mention the relations of Bashir Shihab II and the Druze leader Sheikh Bashir Jumblatt. During the period of Emir Shihab II, one of the Druze families, the *Jumblatts* emerged triumphant from the rivalries between the *Jumblatti* and *Yazbeki* factions. Emir Shihab II established good relations with the leader of this prominent Druze leader, Sheikh Bashir Jumblatt, who was the most powerful and the richest person in the Mountain. Thanks to the

¹⁴⁴ Atlioğlu, 140.

¹⁴⁵ Öztürk, 57.

¹⁴⁶ Atlioğlu, 141.

assistance and cooperation of Sheikh Bashir, Bashir Shihab II extended his sphere of influence in the Mountain, resisted against Ahmad Al-Jazzar's policies, and also defeated the other Shihabi families that had a claim on the emirate position of the Mountain, and confiscated their properties and land through a fierce attack. After gaining more power, he now thought that he was powerful enough to overcome Sheikh Bashir and become the strongest power in Mount Lebanon.¹⁴⁷ Their policies towards the Ottoman governors in the region and some issues related to the coastal areas also paved the partition of the ways for two Bashirs. In 1825, their forces had battled against each other in the war of *Mukhtara*. Bashir Shihab II had been the victorious side of the battle since he had the military support of the Governor of *Akka*, Abdullah Pasha. Sheikh Bashir and his supporters had to take refuge in *Hauran* but he was captured and killed in the dungeons of *Akka*. Bashir Shihab II confiscated his properties and land redistributed them to his supporters and kept the biggest share for himself and his sons.¹⁴⁸

During the period of Ibrahim Pasha, thanks to his good relations with his vassal in the Mountain, Bashir Shihab II and his attitudes towards the Christians in the Levant, he prioritized the Maronites over the Druze. The Druze in the Mountains were disarmed. The displaced Druze families took refuge in *Hauran*. They could rebel against the Bashir Shihab II and Ibrahim Ali Pasha for taking revenge for their leader Sheikh Bashir; therefore, Ibrahim Ali Pasha sent an armed force, formed by the Maronites and under the command of Bashir Shihab II to them; thus, a possible Druze rebellion was suppressed for a while.

The rising discontentedness in the region during this era alerted the European powers more and more in the affairs of the Levant and Mount Lebanon. Due to its close relations with Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt, France did not take sides against the reforms of Ibrahim Ali Pasha. Indeed, his policies towards the Christians of Levant was favorable. However, the other European powers, especially Britain took a stand against Ibrahim Ali Pasha and in 1841, the Ottomans with the help of the British armed forces defeated the forces of Ibrahim Ali Pasha and restored the Ottoman rule in the region.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Akarlı, 18-19.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 20-21.

¹⁴⁹ Atlioğlu, 144.

3.2. Maronite Church as A *Messiah* of Its Community When The Autonomy of The Mountain is Contested

The 19th century witnessed many changes in all the world, in the Ottoman Empire, and in Mount Lebanon. Change and transformation were inevitable. The traditional ways could no longer remediate the new necessities and problems of this new epoch.

The *Iltizam* system of the Ottoman Empire, and the traditional *iqtā'* system in Mount Lebanon used to organize not only the economic relations of the Mountain but also the relations between the landlords and the other figures living together. As mentioned before, *iqtā'* system was a body of primordial allegiances between the landlord and the peasants (*atba'* and *uhda'*). Thanks to the increasing demand for silk in the European industries, a new way of economic relationships in the Mountain attracted the peasants. The system of *metayage* or the sharecropper system started to redefine the relations between the feudal lord and the peasants.¹⁵⁰ Such a change in the system would also change the traditional loyalties in the Mountain.¹⁵¹ For the feudal system in Mount Lebanon, A. Haluk Ülman categorizes the system as Maronite feudalism and Druze feudalism. In both systems, farming activity was a Maronite activity; therefore, the Maronite peasants were the pioneers when the peasants rose against their feudal lords. Thanks to the nature of Druze feudalism, the Druze stayed loyal to their feudal lords.¹⁵² Moreover, the commercialization of the world economy in the face of the colonial economies of Europe and their hunger for the new markets outside the continent stranded the Ottoman economy. The need for more and more currencies in the Empire, obliged it to levy more and more taxes on the regions under its rule. Mount Lebanon also got its share from this policy, which was coincided with the ambition of the local Ottoman governors. In 1819, a new governor appointed to *Sidon*, namely Abdullah Pasha. After he took the office, he demanded extra tributes from Bashir Shihab II, the landlord of Mount Lebanon. This extra tribute was reflected as a surtax levied on the peasants. In the southern parts of the Mountain range, Druze leader Sheikh Bashir with some merchants

¹⁵⁰ Khalaf, 126.

¹⁵¹ Harik, 53.

¹⁵² A. Haluk Ülman, *1860-1861 Suriye Buhranı: Osmanlı Diplomasisinden Bir Örnek Olay*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1966), 26-27.

paid the surtax to relieve the burden on the peasants in the south and even they managed to resist to such demands of the governor; however, there were no such rich personages in the north and the peasants felt much discriminated.¹⁵³ The first time in the history of the Mountain, that got used to witness only the battles between the feudal families and their supporters, a general peasant uprising erupted in 1820. The manifestation of the uprising was radical for its time. The peasants were discontent with the privileges, either for the feudal lords or the buildings of the Maronite church.¹⁵⁴ They thought that the Druze had a privileged status; the tax burden should have been equally distributed to all the subjects living in the Mountain.¹⁵⁵ Even though there were also some Shi'ites among the rebels, most of the rebels were Maronites in the northern extents of the Mountain. The Maronites in the South did not participate in these uprisings. The Druze also did not participate in the uprisings, but we see that the *Imads* of the *Yazbaki* faction of the Druze showed their willingness as a support to the manifestation of the movements.¹⁵⁶ This rebellion was an opportunity for the well organized and powerful actor of the Mountain. The Maronite Church, led by some new and young priests, incited this rebellion against the Bashir Shihab II; the church began to be the voice of the common discontentment in the Mountain. Bashir Shihab II had to leave for *Hauron* in the face of these rebels but he also recognized the capabilities of this new actor. The support of the Maronite Church behind this uprising was also another alert for the traditional ways of feudal allegiances. The first time in its history, the Maronite Church challenged these traditional primordial ties, which used to designate the social relations for centuries. However, we should also keep in mind that this was still a new movement and the church as a whole organization did not support the uprising. Indeed, The Patriarch tried to persuade the peasants from disobeying their feudal lords during the 1820 uprising.¹⁵⁷ Samir Khalaf says that even if the Church did not want to involve in these movements, it is doubtful to think if they were able to stay behind and only observe the developments. The new power and vision of the church actually obliged them to take a stand and play an active role.¹⁵⁸ Bishop *Yusuf*

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, 33; Akarlı, 19.

¹⁵⁴ Cobban, 42.

¹⁵⁵ Akarlı, 19-20.

¹⁵⁶ Khalaf, 35.

¹⁵⁷ Uygun, 55.

¹⁵⁸ Khalaf, 33.

Istifan, the primary figure of the rebellion from the clergy, who was also the founder of the College of *Ayn Waraqah* and judge for North Lebanon, had articulated a new system for the rebels. He demanded the rebels to organize village communes and select a representative (*wakil*) for each village, who would speak on behalf of them. In this sense, another challenge to the traditional loyalties was in progress. It prescribed that the loyalty must be pledged to the *wakil* instead of the feudal lord.¹⁵⁹

Recognized this new force in the Mountain politics, Bashir Shihab II, with the support of the Maronite church and the Druze leader Sheikh Bashir in the south could oppress the rebellion and collected the taxes from the rebel peasants. He also poisoned Bishop *Yusuf Istifan* for his support of the uprising. The traditional relations were restored for a while. In 1823, *Ilias Hubaish* became the new Patriarch of the church and Bashir Shihab II convinced him to use all the manners to lead the Maronites to support his rule.¹⁶⁰

As we can see, the 1820 Uprising was not a confessional group uprising but it no doubt showed the fragility of the society, which could engender sectarian strife between the confessional groups of the Mountain, who had already begun to construct a confessional identity in face of threat. The first time in the history of the Mountain, confessional group identities were defined by the very primary actors of the region. They were already Maronite and Druze in the eyes of the outside world. Even though the Maronite landlords and Druze landlords of the society never associated themselves with the religious community they belonged to, the European powers, The Vatican, and the Ottomans used to see them as a community. However, as I claimed before, we should leave the Maronite church aside this discussion since the Maronites have always formed a confessional community or a unity in their imagination. They just pledged their loyalties to the landlords for the well- being of their community; only this time they had the chance or had to take the stage for an active role for their faithful community. After the 1820 uprising, the grievances were only temporarily contained and waiting for a little spark to transform into massive movements.

As mentioned before, Ibrahim Ali Pasha's period in the Levant also crackled the entrenched traditional ways in the region. Due to his policies favoring the Christians and

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 33-34.

¹⁶⁰ Akarlı, 20.

introducing equality between the Muslim and Christian subjects of the Empire, the Muslims in Damascus and elsewhere had already begun to feel humiliated. This period fed the anger and vengeance of the Muslims against the Christians. In the Mountain, however, the ambitious Bashir Shihab II's harsh policies against the Druze coincided with such new policies of Ibrahim Ali Pasha. Lost their leader and their property confiscated, the Druze also fed anger within their own community against Bashir Shihab II and the Maronites. Since Ibrahim Ali Pasha used the Maronite forces to suppress a potential uprising of the Druze in *Hauran*, the flame of anger was already fanned, and the Druze's feeling of vengeance was commoved. After disarming the Druze, this time he turned his face to the Maronites and tried to disarm them as well.¹⁶¹ With the support of Bashir Shihab II, he could keep them under his control for a while. However, Ibrahim Ali Pasha and the discontent created by his policies dispatched the inhabitants of the whole of Mount Lebanon to question his rule and his future in the region. In 1839, the Ottoman Empire, no doubt influenced by the developments in its Levantine territories, promulgated the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*, a series of reforms which was also called as *Tanzimat* reforms. This new decree was promising the abrogation of the *iltizam* system, tax collection on a fair basis, protection of the property rights, equal treatment of all the subjects of the Empire before the law, etc. At that time, the Ottoman and British agents were actively making propaganda for the new reforms in Mount Lebanon and the cities of the Levant.¹⁶² Coincided with such promising reforms initiated by the Central power, the final straw was directed by Bashir Shihab II, now only a vassal of Ibrahim Ali Pasha, and he called the Druze and the Maronites of *Dayr Al Qamar* to surrender their arms. It sparked another uprising against Bashir Shihab II's rule and widespread to the other towns of the Mountain. On June 8, 1840, the rebels gathered in *Intilias*, in the *Matn* district of the Mountain to express their discontentment against the unfair rule of Ibrahim Ali Pasha and negotiated a covenant expressing their grievances and their pledge to end the Ibrahim Ali Pasha's rule and restore their independence. Yet, Bashir Shihab II promised the Druze to make them the new lords of *Kisrawan*, the Druze gave up supporting the uprising.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Akarlı, 24.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 24.

¹⁶³ Khalaf, 37.

The year 1840 witnessed many such uprisings but all of them remained as failed attempts. Meanwhile, In July, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the Convention of London and sent a warning to Ibrahim Ali Pasha to partly withdraw his forces.¹⁶⁴ Based on this convention, a British-Austrian-Ottoman fleet arrived in the bay of *Jounieh*, a city in the coastal area and ended the Ibrahim Ali Pasha's rule in the Levant and Mount Lebanon.¹⁶⁵

The end of Ibrahim Ali Pasha's rule in Mount Lebanon also marked another big change; it was also the end of the period of Bashir Shihab II, as depicted by Salibi, the reigning prince of the Maronites. The power vacuum was filled by the new powerful actor of the Mountain, the Maronite Church, especially in the northern parts of the Mountain. When it comes to restoring the balance, this balance was for the Ottomans, their authority in Mount Lebanon and for the Maronites and the Druze, it was their autonomy they got used to enjoying for centuries.¹⁶⁶ For the Maronite church, they asserted their desire to keep the continuation of the Shihabi Princedom (*Amirate*) in the Mountain, under one condition that the *Amir* must have been from the Maronite branch of the family. Now we see that the mediatory political body between the Maronite Church and the central power was removed. The Maronite Church, as an important political actor, now had to be directly dealt with by the central government. This was one of the indicators that the autonomy by my definition started to be contested. This is why, as a reaction to this change, the church tried to restore the Shihabi lordship in the Mountain, which they also considered an important element of their autonomy. We should also keep in mind that; the Church usually needed a mediator for its relations *vis-à-vis* the central power. In the absence of a feudal lord, this mediator was their historical protector, France, which we would see as a spokesman conveying demands of the Maronites to the Ottoman Empire. The Shihabi Rule in the Mountain, the rule of a Maronite landlord was one of the elements of this traditional thinking. France as well, formed an important element in this picture since she was the *traditional* friend of the Maronites in their social memories.

¹⁶⁴ Cobban, 43

¹⁶⁵ Khalaf, 38.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 37.

The Ottomans could not restore exactly the old system; however, they also needed to maintain some traditional ways with some new modern motives. Their main goal was to restore the order in the Mountain with a more centralized governing system, in which, Mount Lebanon was more under the direct rule of the Porte. Therefore, they appointed Bashir Shihab II's cousin Bashir III, a weaker figure which could serve the interests of centralized Ottoman authority in the region.¹⁶⁷ Ibrahim Ali Pasha and Bashir Shihab II's end was a victory for the Druze. They would now demand the Ottomans and the British- the new ally of the Druze in the region- to keep their promises and restore the lands they lost under Ibrahim Ali's rule. They reclaimed what they believed to be theirs in *Shuf* district, they even surrounded the palace of Bashir III in *Dayr Al Qamer* and enforced him to leave Mount Lebanon.¹⁶⁸ This marked the end of the Shihabi rule and even the rule of the landlord system in the Mountain. Formulated by the prominent Austrian diplomat, *Klemens von Metternich*, the Ottomans introduced a system of *Double Kaymakamate*, in which the Mountain would be divided into two districts, one for the Druze (the South) and one for the Maronites (the North). Each district was going to be governed by a deputy governor responsible to the Governor of Sidon.¹⁶⁹ This was the first attempt to institutionalize and officiate the confessional identities and differences in the history of Mount Lebanon. Under such a system, the Ottomans tried to contain the grievances; however, it was quite hard for them to take decisions solely since the foreign involvement was in its peak when it comes to the affairs of the Mountain. On the other hand, even though the deputy governors were appointed, they were still not powerful enough to challenge the authority of the traditional landlords and the church. The church was still asserting its demands for the restoration of the Shihabi rule in the Mountain. They were being backed by the French for their cause. The Druze was discontent since they could not get their lands back, which were confiscated by Bashir Shihab II and distributed to the Maronites. The Druze was trying oppressive, violent, and even brutal ways to reclaim their lands from them. The Ottomans even tried to conduct a cadastral survey for real land registration in the Mountain; however, this attempt was prevented

¹⁶⁷ Cobban, 44.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 44.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 44; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 15; Akarlı, 28.

since it would pose a serious threat to the interests of the landlords.¹⁷⁰ Till 1859, this dissatisfaction continued. The sectarian differences arisen from the land issues became more explicit.

Like many feudal lords in the Mountain, especially after the old traditional system and allegiances were dramatically challenged, the *Khazins* resorted to violent and suppressive policies to establish control on their lands and the peasants working in their spheres. For the peasants, their social memory was still full of the wounds they inherited from the 1820 uprising and onwards. As a result of this, a peasant uprising erupted against the *Khazins* in the *Kisrawan* district.¹⁷¹ Ignited by the Maronite Church, these peasants managed to drive the last serious rival to the Church, the *Khazins* out of *Kisrawan* and confiscated their properties and redistributed them to the peasants. The success of the uprising motivated the peasants and they this time turned their face to the southern parts. In the district of *Shuf*, the Druze was ready for a confrontation. The Druze leaders were telling the Druze peasants in *Shuf* that the target of this movement was the whole Druze community in the Mountain. The peasant uprising had easily transformed into bloody sectarian strife, especially in the mixed areas where the Maronites and the Druze lived together. The role played by the clergy was no doubt noticeable. Perhaps the uprising was at the beginning was a popular peasant movement, but the clergy explicitly expressed that they were not only against the feudal families but also the Druze as a whole. They also did not hide out their dream for a *Maronite Amirate under French Protection*.¹⁷² The sphere of influence of the Maronite church was generally in the northern parts of the Mountain; however, the Druze did not make any difference and all the Christians in the Mountain were the target of the violent attacks sparked by the peasant uprising and fueled by the accumulated hatred of the groups to each other since 1820 onwards. The Maronites in the northern parts could not easily mobilize themselves to help their coreligionists in the south. In the spring of 1860, the Druze massacred an estimated number of 11,000 Christians throughout the Mountain. The Christians who could flee the attacks found themselves in the streets of Beirut, as the victims witnessed by the European consuls and the whole world. The Ottoman Pasha of the region took some measures to contain the

¹⁷⁰ Akarlı, 28-29.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, 29; Cobban, 48.

¹⁷² Akarlı, 29.

violence and he succeeded to a degree. Three days after the bloody massacres the Christian and Druze leaders signed a peace pact in Beirut but the massacres in the Mountain already sparked a bigger scale flame in all Syria. In Damascus, the Muslims, who had been feeling humiliated for a long time, began to attack the Christians of the city and only in one day 5,500 Christians were slaughtered by the Muslims. This incident would be remembered as the 1860 Damascus Events in history.¹⁷³ The European warships had already shipped out for the port of Beirut. The Ottoman authorities and the European powers contained the situation; the Ottoman officials and many Druze, who were held responsible, were either executed through the harsh methods of Fuâd Pasha or exiled to Libya.¹⁷⁴

The Druze leadership in the Mountain had received a serious blow this time. The *Double Kaymakamate* regime had already lost its grounds since it could not prevent the biggest massacre of the history of Mount Lebanon. The lordship system was formally abolished.¹⁷⁵ Under these circumstances, the Maronite Church once more emerged as the strongest institution in the Mountain. Its claim for a Maronite community as a unity, found a stronger ground this time. The Maronites in the South as well now under their sphere of influence. The victims of the massacres, the Maronites now had the right to claim on the Mountain affairs. The Maronite Church was surely worried about the calamity its community had to face and the protection should be provided for the Maronites; however, their main concern was still the restoration of the Mountain under a Maronite ruler, which was core to their very own autonomy.¹⁷⁶

A new system, under the guarantee of five European powers, was promulgated by the Ottomans. This new system was called the *Mutasarrifiyya*, the provincial governorship in the Mountain. In the official document of this new system, an organic law, *Règlement*, signed on June 9, 1861, it was stated that all Mount Lebanon would be organized a one unit of administration under a Christian governor appointed by and directly responsible

¹⁷³ Cobban, 49.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 50.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 51.

¹⁷⁶ Akarlı, 30.

to the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli*)¹⁷⁷, *This governor; however, would not be of Lebanese origin.*¹⁷⁸ A local council formed of four Maronite, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, and one each from the Greek Catholic, Sunni, and Shiite Communities would advise the governor.¹⁷⁹ The *Mutasarrifiyya* period really provided a period of peace in many senses, which was called “Long Peace” by Engin Akarlı. The unconsolidated grievances finally found a period for healing in this decade but also a controversial period was about to start for the Maronite Church.

From 1861 onwards, the system of *Mutasarrifiyya* provided the time for Mount Lebanon to relieve and restore its social and economic welfare. After 1860 massacres, the Druze seemed satisfied with the new system under a Christian governor. Since the governor was appointed directly by the Sublime Porte and he would not be a Maronite, this would be an acceptable outcome for the Druze. However, for the Maronites, the system did not generate the outcomes they expected after they paid a high price during the outrages massacres¹⁸⁰. Right before the promulgation of the new system in the Mountain, for the short transitional period, a prominent Maronite notable, Yusuf Karam was appointed by the Ottoman Central Government as the kaymakam of the Christian districts of the old regime. The Maronite Patriarch was very delighted with this decision. Apart from the fact that Yusuf Karam had the popular support from the Maronite community and the French political circles, the church thought that what they had demanded since the 1840s- An *Amirate* under a Maronite *Amir*- was finally fulfilled thanks to the French backing.¹⁸¹ However, this short period of contentedness was followed by the appointment of Daud Pasha, a Christian Ottoman officer of Armenian origin. One might think that the Church should have been pleased with the rule of a Christian Pasha, but they did not. As we remembered from the historical records mentioned in this chapter, the Maronites had their first struggles within the Christian circles against different sects and different confessional claims. Apart from this, the northern parts of Mount Lebanon were the homeland territories of the Maronites. Therefore, Daud Pasha, even he was a Christian,

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 31.

¹⁷⁸ Cobban, 50.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 51.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 51.

¹⁸¹ Hakim, 111.

lacked an important quality for the Maronites; *nativity* and *Maronite confession*. Since the beginning, the Maronite Church had advocated and explicitly expressed the need of a ruler, a landlord or a governor, who was native and Maronite at the same time.¹⁸² Only through these qualities, the Maronite Church believed that they could restore the autonomy they enjoyed for decades. The Maronite Community, for sure, did not favor the new system. There were many complaints against the system but none of these complaints formed a unified expression of demand.¹⁸³ Some heroic and rebellious figures such as Yusuf Karam, Tanyus Shahin, etc. emerged as the representatives of the common dissatisfaction of the Maronites; however, the problems they faced, and they even produced showed that their leadership as well could not provide a remedy for the community. The Maronite Church had the power to mobilize the masses and trail for a cause, but they experienced the outrages consequences of such trails during the 1860 events and they preferred to move very cautiously when they supported a cause. They counted on their European protector, the French to back their cause and restore their autonomy by bringing back a Maronite ruler to the administration of the Mountain.¹⁸⁴ Here we should also note that the French backing for the Maronites was limited to the general interests of France over the Ottoman Empire. Whenever the demands from the Maronite Patriarchate contravened such interests, the French tried to gain time by the attempts to convince the church. *Boulous Massad I*, the patriarch between the years 1854-1890, had various correspondences with the French consuls in Beirut. The main theme of his demands was an autonomous Maronite Mount Lebanon under a Maronite ruler. We see that he managed to keep this demand on the agenda for a long time. During his period, the Patriarch stressed many claims to support his cause, applicable within the new system. Some of the claims were as follows:

- a) The governor must have been a native of Mount Lebanon since historically these territories were under the rule of the native landlords who were an acquaintance of the people and the traditions.

¹⁸² Hanna Ziadeh, *Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon*, (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), 78.

¹⁸³ Hakim, 102.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 103.

- b) The governor must have been a Maronite since the Maronites formed the largest population of inhabitants in the Mountain. In one of his correspondences, he also provided some statistical information and claimed a total population of 200,000 individuals for the Maronites, whereas the rest of the communities could only amount to 62,000 individuals, less than a quarter of the total population of the Mountain. Therefore, the appointment of a Maronite governor would not be unfair to the other communities.
- c) The Patriarch referred to the term “Lebanese”, but he used this term for only the Maronites, not for the other communities. He referred to the Maronites as *the original and primitive inhabitants of the Mountain*. For the patriarch, there was not a Lebanese Nationalism since there were six different nations in the Mountain.
- d) The allocation of equal representative share in the advisory council of the administration to six communities of the Mountain was not fair since there was a huge disparity between the number of Maronites and the others.¹⁸⁵

As mentioned before, the French response to these claims and demands were passive. In the formative years of the system, the French were telling the Patriarch and the Maronite notables that this was an experiment and they would see the results after the three years of tenure of Daud Pasha ended. Such expressions would keep the hopes of the church and the opponent Maronites fresh for a Maronite governor; yet, the *Règlement* was a solid document for the French; they would see it as a perfect tool to provide the prosperity of the Christians living in the Empire. Indeed, they had planned to negotiate the introduction of similar systems in the other parts of the Empire, with the Sublime Port.¹⁸⁶ As understood from the reports of the French consuls sent to the Foreign Ministry of France, the period of Daud Pasha was successful and as a result of this, he was appointed by the Sublime Porte for another period, and this time for five years. This decision broke the hopes of the Patriarch, and the rebels like Yusuf Karam in exile, who had dreamt of being appointed as the next governor of the *Mutasarrifiyya*.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 105-106.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 108.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 115.

After this move, Patriarch decided to follow a passive opposition to the governor. The idea of a Maronite Lebanon under a Maronite ruler never ceased to exist in the imagination of the church and some circles of the Maronite community, but we see that the Maronite church could also show its maneuver in the face of the developments and its capabilities. When Yusuf Karam rebelled against the rule of Daud Pasha, he failed and was once more exiled in 1867. This time was his end and he never returned to Lebanon back. Yusuf Karam, appointed by the Ottomans as the kaymakam during the transitional period, was also the favorite candidate of the Maronites for a possible seat in the *Mutasarrifiyya*. His exile coincided with the failure of France in the French-Prussian War in 1870, and the church's hope based on the French support to restore the autonomy was shaken seriously.¹⁸⁸ This move should not be perceived as an alienation from the French friendship, the Maronites have always seen France as their ultimate European friend and the protector and this perception never ceased to exist.

The Patriarch who could not achieve his objective, this time, tried to strengthen the position of the Maronites and the church within the system. During his visit to Europe, as the second Patriarch who visited Europe since 1215, he asked for the replacement of Daud Pasha with Franco Pasha, who had good relations with the Patriarch and his demand was conveyed to the Sublime Porte by the French and Franco Pasha was appointed as the new governor of the *Mutasarrifiyya*.¹⁸⁹ *Boulous Massad, I was searching for other ways to restore autonomy within the new system and the new governor was good enough to serve such a motive. Franco Pasha was sensitive about the church. During his period, the church gained a noticeable power over the appointments made by the governor. When he was going to make a decision, Franco Pasha used to consult with the Patriarch. Most of the appointments in this period were made upon the confirmation of the church.*¹⁹⁰

The following governors; however, they did not maintain this favorable policy for the Maronites. Indeed, the French authorities demanded the Patriarchate to show their stand against the decisions taken by the new governors and they also criticized them for failing to show the required opposition to them. For the French authorities, the Patriarchate had

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 121,

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 121.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 123.

an enormous power to lead his community, but the leadership of the Patriarchate was passive. The church in this period preferred to keep the amicable relations with the Ottoman authorities and they also internalized the legitimacy of the new system for themselves. Autonomy to a degree was satisfactory for the church and the patriarch. As we see, the autonomy they desired could not be realized as an *Amirate under a Maronite ruler*, but the autonomy understanding was transformed and adopted into a political system in which the Maronite church had privileges.

In 1890, *Youhanna XII El-Hajj* became the new patriarch. In this period, we see also the Sublime Port's attempts to incorporate the Maronite Patriarchate into the Ottoman central system. By the end of the 19th century, thanks to the efforts of two Maronite brothers, *Salim and Nagib Malhame*, who took high positions in the Sublime Porte in Istanbul, the Patriarchate established direct relations with *Sultan Abdulhamid II* himself. We can see that the patriarch even favored his understanding of Ottomanism.¹⁹¹ Now, we came across another detail supposedly undermining the very claim of this thesis. Contact with the central authority was favored by the patriarch sounds that the patriarch gives up the idea of autonomy and deliberately incorporates itself into the central government. Whereas, how the Maronite church perceived such a move must be taken into consideration. The Maronite church, from the 1820 uprisings onwards, had been searching for ways to restore the traditional way of government, a sort of autonomy for themselves. We can say that *Abdulhamid II's Ottomanism* was not like the ideals articulated in the *Tanzimat* reforms, which directly challenged and contested the traditional ways in the Mountain. For the patriarchate, this Ottomanism of the Sultan sounded very compatible with their traditional understanding of subjection within the Empire¹⁹²; therefore, it did not pose a threat to the autonomy or distorted the autonomy understanding of the Church. Nevertheless, none of such developments diverted the church from its general view and we should also read such developments within the steadfast ideals and goals of it.

The central government's attempts to incorporate the church into the Ottoman authority maintained by the governors of the *Mutasarrifiyya*. One of the debates of the period was the official recognition of the Maronite Church by the central authority and the

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, 133.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 133.

implementation of the required procedures for the Patriarch to make him officially pledge his loyalty to the Sultan. In 1883, Vasa Pasha was appointed as the governor of the *Mutasarrifiyya*. During his tenure, he was annoyed by the informalities shown by the Patriarchate since the church was carrying out the appointments within its organization without carrying out any formal relations with the governor. Vasa Pasha was also convinced that the Church only showed loyalty to France and they saw themselves superior to the *Mutasarrifiyya*. When the ten prelates were promoted to the ranks of bishops, Vasa Pasha wanted to intervene but the dioceses these bishops would take office were out of the sphere of control of the *Mutasarrifiyya*. Vasa Pasha did not give up his cause and asked the Porte to act and oblige them to obtain formal permission before starting their duties. The Patriarch kept these bishops as his advisors in his side and managed to drop the subject till his death.¹⁹³ For this period, we should refer to another important case, that is important in regard to the autonomy understanding of the church, an official recognition called *berât*. This official recognition, *berât*, was a document granted to the Christian leaders in the Empire. Many churches had this recognition issued by the Sultan himself. It even granted many privileges to the church organizations and patriarchs. For instance, we see that Patriarch Maximus Mazlum of the Melkite Catholic Church in the Levant attempted to obtain a *berât* to get autonomy from the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and a recognition of his church as an autonomous one was granted in 1848 by Sultan Abdülmecid.¹⁹⁴ For the Maronite church, they had never applied for such recognition and they even resisted not to obtain it. Such recognition would contest their authority in the Mountain and of course their autonomy. During the period of the *Mutasarrifiyya*, particularly during the tenure of Vasa Pasha, we see a serious attempt to bring the Maronite church under the usual administrative procedures applied by the Empire. In the face of such a serious threat posed by the *Mutasarrif* himself, the patriarch took another step to counter his move and applied for an Imperial decoration from the Porte, which would grant the Patriarch a special status in the presence of the Governor and diminish the authority of the governor over the Maronite Church. For this purpose, the Patriarch again sought the intermediation of France to get

¹⁹³ Akarlı, 166.

¹⁹⁴ Bruce Masters, "The Establishment of The Melkite Catholic Millet," 468.

the imperial decoration. Even the Vatican involved in this matter along with France. Vasa Pasha insisted on the Porte that the Patriarch must have applied to the *Mutasarrifiyya* for application to the Porte for the decoration so that the church could not claim a superior position to the Ottoman rule in the Mountain. In this process, we observe that the Patriarch El-Hajj took his steps very carefully; he sent his bishops to Vasa Pasha to realize this formality; however, Vasa Pasha reminded them that the Patriarch had to apply in person. El-Hajj accepted this requirement but again abstained to apply in person; he just sent an official letter to the *Mutasarrifiyya* and it was considered acceptable by the Porte. El-Hajj finally got his decoration that provided a sort of exemption from the sphere of authority of the governor.¹⁹⁵ In 1892 Vasa Pasha died but his legacy continued with his followers. New governors as well insisted on the formal procedures and tried to subdue the Maronite church under the direct control of the Empire. Their main demand was the official registration of the priests by the *Mutasarrifiyya* and performing any promotion or assignment of the priests under the supervision and approval of the governor. In 1898, Ilias Huwayyik became the new Patriarch of the Maronite Church and he also tried to resist the imposed the church. In 1905, he arranged a visit to Sultan Abdulhamid II through Rome and Paris; he was received by the Sultan and decorated directly by himself. When Patriarch Huwayyik returned to Mount Lebanon, through this way he had given a message to the governor- that time Muzaffer Pasha- that the real authority of Mount Lebanon was the Maronite Church, not the *Mutasarrifiyya*.¹⁹⁶

The period of the *Mutasarrifiyya* has a noticeable period in the history of the Mountain. When the foreign intervention in the Mountain's affairs was in its peak, the Ottoman Empire was trying to consolidate the stability and its rule in the region. For this period, the Empire's rival was no doubt the Maronite Church; this fact was more visible in the eyes of the governors appointed by the Porte. The Porte was trying to accomplish two things through the *Mutasarrifiyya*; to form a secular administration (in the sense of freedom from ecclesiastical administration forms) and to subdue the Maronite Church under control and dispose of any privileged position held by the Maronite Church compared to any ordinary church organizations in the Empire. The French backing and

¹⁹⁵ Akarlı, 168.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 171.

the church's political steps no doubt prevented the total realization of such a goal; however, the new system was not the only threat for the church. The Mutasarrifiyya had already begun to transform the traditional administration of the Mountain. A new, educated, liberal group of "Lebanese" that would play an important role in the history of Lebanon had begun to be visible in the political arena. This group was critical of the Maronite church and they even thought that the church was an obstacle to the development and progress of Mount Lebanon.¹⁹⁷ Even though many social services were still under control of the Maronite church, like education, health, etc. the intervention of the foreign powers in the Levant also brought other rivalries to the region. The new schools established by the Protestants and the other non-Catholic orders would pose a threat to the authority of the church.¹⁹⁸

World War I opened another page in the history of Mount Lebanon. Due to the martial law initiated by *İttihad ve Terakki* (The Party of Union and Progress), the *Mutasarrifiyya* regime was abolished and the administration of the mountain was put under the Interior Ministry in Istanbul and the military administration in Damascus. The *Mutasarrifiyya*, the church's rival in the Mountain ceased to exist but the Mountain's autonomy was this time seriously contested. First time in the history of the Mountain, such a direct rule of the central power was established. The Administrative Council was dismissed, and some members were charged with treason. The Maronite Church, due to the news published in the French Media, was also considered for charging with treason. Under the adamant policies of the military administration, the patriarch felt it necessary to obtain a *berât*. After a long time of resistance, the Maronite church finally had to obtain an official recognition to protect themselves from the harsh policies of the military administration. This recognition however provided the church to keep their current control over the social services of the Mountain while all the secular and liberal Lebanese were banned from the political arena.¹⁹⁹

The withdrawal of the Ottomans from the war provided an opportunity for the liberal Lebanese that had been waiting for the return to the political arena of the mountain for a

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 170.

¹⁹⁸ Atlioğlu, 173.

¹⁹⁹ Akarlı, 173-174.

long time. The pre-war leaders and elected councilors of the Administrative Council of the *Mutasarrifiyya* resumed their seats and claimed the control of Mount Lebanon. The victorious Allied Forces of the War appointed a French commissar to act as a governor at the head of the Administrative Council. These liberal Lebanese interests were to protect the autonomy of the Mountain and negotiate the future of the region. For the 19th century, it was a radical voice to demand an independent political Lebanese entity but after the war, it was one of the options on the table, proposed by the actors of the region. The French had a claim on Mount Lebanon and interior Syria; however, it was not powerful enough to reach this goal since the British were in control in the coastal area.²⁰⁰ In the region, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, different proposals had already got into a rivalry. An idea of *Syrianism* had been in development especially in inland Syria and the coastal areas during the 19th century. The supporters of this approach were insisting on a unified Syria, including Mount Lebanon.²⁰¹ In this context, we should also refer to one of the important facts of Lebanese history. Especially after the 1860 massacres, a new phenomenon had already begun; the inhabitants of the Mountain- generally the Christians- had begun to immigrate to the distant lands to search for a new life. These emigrants formed an important diaspora in the United States and Europe. After the war, the organizations formed by this diaspora mainly supported a unified Syrian entity including Mount Lebanon. Since they did not have the experience of the *Mutasarrifiyya* period, it is understandable for them to support a Syrian entity instead of a separate Lebanese entity. On the other hand, Amir Faisal of Hejaz, backed by the British, was leading another post-war partition project, which was the unification of the Arab lands, including the Levant under his kingdom.²⁰² He had also many supporters in the Syrian interior for this project. Among many rival proposals, the liberal Lebanese and the Church was defending the idea of a separate Lebanese political entity. This new Lebanese intelligentsia knew that they need the support of France for this goal and of course the support of the church to have the support of France for their cause.²⁰³ Even though the liberal Lebanese's support for a separate Lebanese entity and a parliamentary democracy

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 174-176.

²⁰¹ Hakim, 216.

²⁰² Hakim, 215.

²⁰³ Akarlı, 174.

in this entity was shared by the church, the church's stance differed from them in some important aspects of this new entity. The liberals would desire the French support but to a limited extent, to only get protection from the outside threats. They would also imagine this new Lebanon as a secular, inter-confessional entity thanks to their experience during the *Mutasarrifiyya* period. This new entity would have authority in the pre-war boundaries of Mount Lebanon.²⁰⁴ Yet, the church's stance was different from these aspects and the demands expressed during the negotiations would be the demands of the church rather than the Lebanese intelligentsia.

During the first delegation's involvement in the Paris Peace Conference, the Lebanese had not taken what they demanded. The second delegation was formed by the Patriarch Huwayyik; comprised only bishops of the Maronite church and one Greek Catholic priest. In the memorandum presented at the conference, the Patriarch underlined following aspects of Lebanon in his imagination;

- a) Lebanon is a Christian entity.
- b) The Western-oriented, educated Lebanese are different from the "backward Arabs."
- c) Beirut, Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli and the districts of Akkar, Beqaa, and Southern Lebanon are the historical parts of the Lebanese entity, even though they had been administered separately under Ottoman rule. Therefore, these territories must be annexed to the territories of Mount Lebanon.
- d) The Lebanese entity should be established under the Mandate of France, which is the historical protector of the Christians of the East.²⁰⁵

In the autumn of 1919, Britain and France agreed on the post-war territories they would take charge of and the French forces arrived in the coastal areas and driven the forces of Amir Faisal from the region.²⁰⁶ The French forces were welcome by only the Maronites and Greek Catholic communities; the other communities had already begun to develop a hostile approach against France and any group associated with them. When the French

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 175.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 176-177.

²⁰⁶ Adid Daviřa, *Arap Milliyetçiliđi: Zaferden Umutsuzluđa*, trans. Lütfi Yalçın (İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları, December 2004), 38.

arrived in the region, they interfered in all the administrative tasks in Mount Lebanon. General Gouraud dissolved the Administrative Council and the members of the council were sent into exile. On September 1, 1920, Greater Lebanon was proclaimed in Beirut. During the ceremony, the Patriarch Huwayik was second to the General Gouraud.²⁰⁷

After a long time of struggle and resistance, now the Maronite Church emerged triumphant from all these developments. *A Maronite Amirate under French Protection*, with an important amount of new territories annexed to the Mountain, could finally be realized. 1920 was the year the Maronite Church finally consolidated their autonomy with a modern political entity; however, this autonomy would face new threats from inside and outside their own community.

In the academic literature, perhaps due to the mainly positive environment created by the *Mutasarrifiyya* regime in Mount Lebanon, this period is also considered a part of the Lebanese autonomy understanding. Truly, the inhabitants of the Mountain enjoyed many privileges under the *Mutasarrifiyya*. As a famous saying at that time reflected; “Happy is he who has a shed to keep one goat in Mount Lebanon.”²⁰⁸ However, as we observed in the long struggle between the Maronite Church and the governors, the *Mutasarrifiyya* regime was another period to contest the traditional autonomy of the Mountain, and especially the Maronite church. A. Haluk Ülman also treats this period accordingly and stresses that the Ottomans successfully benefited from the political rivalries between the European powers and managed to keep Mount Lebanon under the rule of the Empire through this specific regime. The regime was not more than a right granted to the inhabitants of the Mountain to actively participate in the administrative and local affairs of Mount Lebanon.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 180.

²⁰⁸ Kamal Salibi, “The Lebanese Identity,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 6.1. (1971): 76-81+83-86, 78.

²⁰⁹ Ülman, 126-127.

4. AN INDEPENDENCE UNWILLINGLY CELEBRATED

After the autonomy of the Mountain has restored once again in Mount Lebanon, thanks to the formation of a modern state under the French mandate, the requirements a modern state should have in the eve of the 21st century, became the primary concerns of the Lebanese circles. Under the French mandate, the administrative models were adopted in French ways as expected. Till 1922, Greater Lebanon was directly administered by the governors appointed by the High Commission of the French Mandate regime in Beirut. On March 9, 1922, the French Mandate regime dissolved the High Commission and a Council of Representatives was formed, that was composed of 30 members (16 Christians, 13 Muslims, 1 member from a minority group in Beirut- usually a Protestant). In 1926, the first constitution was promulgated, and Greater Lebanon became the Republic of Lebanon and the first president of this new republic was Charles Debbas, a Greek Orthodox Christian. November 22, 1943, was one of the turning points in the history of Lebanon and the Republic of Lebanon gained its independence from France and became an independent country in the region. Like many other countries under the mandate authorities, Lebanon as well welcome the independence and indeed it was supported by different Lebanese political circles, including the Maronites. In various academic analyses, the independence of Lebanon has also been treated as a development that is *praised* by the majority. In this regard, we see that the title of this chapter does not seem congruent with this general approach towards independence. From one perspective it might be true that treating the Lebanese Independence as a development that is “unwillingly celebrated” is something baseless; however, from the perspective of this thesis and from the perspective of the autonomy understanding, I will try to show that the Independence of Lebanon posed another threat to the autonomy of Lebanon in the imagination of the Maronites or it was perceived as such in its own context.

To better understand the reaction of the Maronites and the Maronite church in particular to the independence in regards to the autonomy of the country and the Maronites in the region, I will touch upon two important source of threats for the Maronite church, one is posed by the Arabism and Syrianism in the region, the other is posed by the new conditions generated under the French Mandate Administration itself. After elaborating

these two sources of threats, I will try to demonstrate how the Maronite church reacted to these developments to safeguard the autonomy of the country and their own existence in the region. This time we will also focus on the other important actors in the Maronite circles, who were going to play an important role in the history of the country.

Greater Lebanon was established in geography and in a period, in which Arab and Syrian nationalist arguments emerged as the leading political approaches. Under the French and British Mandate regimes, such arguments were about to more crystallize, and we see that such approaches transformed into party programs in the post Mandate countries of the Levant, like Syria, Jordan, and even Lebanon.²¹⁰ As mentioned before, Arab Nationalism and Syrianism had been perceived as a threat to the very existence of Lebanon and the Maronites in particular.²¹¹ For the Christians, Arabism was just another expression of Muslim rule. Although the Arab National idea is believed to firstly emerge with secular tones, within the Christian circles of the Arab society²¹², it did not change the reality that the Christians in the Arab World were just minorities and it could transform into a political identity favoring the Muslim rule and Islam.

The 1930s were the years such a threat was felt seriously in Lebanon. The British Mandate administration granted independence to Iraq in 1932. It had already stirred the Arab nationalist sentiments in Syria and in the Muslim circles of Lebanon. Upon the independence of Iraq, the voice for independence and unity in Syria was raised in a more powerful tone. The French had to take these demands into consideration and mainly decided on a bilateral plan. As the British did in Iraq, they would negotiate on treaties with the governments under their mandate. However, Lebanon, Alawite State in Latakia and State of Jabal Druze would be exempted from this plan and they would be kept under the direct control of the mandate administration. France thought that safeguard of the minorities in these territories could only be achieved under direct control.

²¹⁰ The Emergence of the famous Ba'ath (literally means Renaissance) Party and its regional branches in different countries is a noticeable instance for this fact.

²¹¹ Atlioğlu, 187.

²¹² Davişa, 24; C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism" in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 7.

There is a claim that a secular Arab Nationalism was firstly created by even Lebanese Christians. (*Ibid*, 10).

Keeping the Alawite State and the State of Jabal Druze out of the negotiations was unacceptable by the Arab Nationalists and the Unionists in Syria. They even demanded Lebanon as a part of the independent Syrian entity. In this context, we should refer to another fact to better understand the seriousness of this Syrian unity understanding and the potential threat it would pose to the Maronites in Lebanon. In 1936, the National Bloc in Syria gained a victory and signed a treaty that opened the road towards independence of a unified Syria, with the annexation of the Alawite State and The State of Jabal Druze in this unification. They finally managed to subdue the French. After this development, the Sunni circles in the coastal areas of Lebanon showed more eagerness to join the united territories of Syria. A well-known Sunni businessman of Beirut, Selim Ali Salam claimed that Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli, and Bekaa should be annexed into Syria. Such a proposal was criticized by the Syrian Nationalists and their stance was clear; this was a compromise and against the future union of Arab countries, including all Lebanon.²¹³ Another important figure of the Sunni circles, Kâzim El-Sulh from Tripoli also expressed that Tripoli must have been restored to Damascus for its economic salvation after the economic institutions of the city were severely destroyed.²¹⁴ The same year, some Muslims from Tripoli petitioned to the League of Nations, complaining that their region had been incorporated into Lebanon *without their agreement or consent*, and demanded the annexation of their region to United Syria.²¹⁵ Within the Sunni circles of the coastal areas, there were actually three different factions in regards to pan-Arabism and the position of Lebanon in this ideal; therefore, we cannot consider the Muslim stance in a uniformity. The first stance was led by Selim Ali Salam and Abdelhamid Karami and they supported the idea of Arabism and the union with Syria, at the same time, they were complaining about the unfair position of the Muslims in the country. The second stance was taken by some families like the family of Abdullah Bayhum, who became the first Sunni prime minister of Lebanon in 1934²¹⁶, the families Da'uq and Al-Ahdab. They were

²¹³ Pierre Rondot, "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism" *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3.3 (July 1968): 37-51, 48.

²¹⁴ Kais M. Firro, *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and The State Under The Mandate*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 148.

²¹⁵ Daniel Pipes, *Greater Syria: The History of An Ambition*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 63.

²¹⁶ Atloğlu, 79.

still supporting the idea of a union with Syria while agreeing on taking up executive positions in the Lebanese government, which was criticized by the first group. The third stance was taken by some members of the Al-Sulh family. They were defending the territorial integrity of Lebanon and fostering the relations between the Christians and the Muslims in the country based on an *Arab face*.²¹⁷ As an expression of Pan-Arabism in Lebanon, the *Syrian Social Nationalist Party* was founded in 1932 by an Orthodox Christian Antoun Saadeh. The Christians in Lebanon generally supported the territorial integrity of Lebanon even though many of them disagreed on the stance taken by the Maronites and the Maronite church in particular.

Such a threat preserved its seriousness for the Maronite church; however, under the French mandate, they also continued to feel secure that such an argument could not transform into a political threat inside or outside Lebanon. Unlike many political circles in the administration, including the Maronite politicians, the interventionist policy of the French mandate was favored by the church. As referred in the previous chapter, the liberal Lebanese group in the Administrative Council of the *Mutasarrifiyya* only desired French mandate for protection from the threats that might come from outside the country and they wanted to keep this mandate in minimal levels; yet, the Maronite Church demanded a more intrusive French administration in Lebanon. We may perhaps say that the Patriarch was well aware of the threats even inside Lebanon and the only authority he could count on was France. I would like to bring three instances into the forefront to show the instrumentality of French existence in the region regarding the safeguard of the Maronites against the threats posed by Arabism and Syrianism inside and outside Lebanon.

Firstly, the interventionist policy of France showed its instrumentality in 1932, when the first president's tenure was ended. In the first constitution of 1926, and in its amended versions, there was no article specifying the confession of the president; however, based on an unwritten tradition, the president would be selected from the Christian members of the parliament. As mentioned before, Charles Debbas was the first president of the Republic and he was a Greek Catholic. After three years of tenure, a new election was going to be performed and the candidates were Bechara El-Khoury and Émile Eddé. Both

²¹⁷ Firro, 134-135.

candidates were Maronites. During the election process in the parliament, an unexpected step was taken, which could directly be perceived as a threat to the Maronites. A Sunni member of the Parliament, Mohammed El Jisr, backed by the Muslims and the Greek Orthodox in the country, became a candidate for the presidential elections. In the face of such a threat, French High Commissioner August Henri Ponsot dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution in May 1932.²¹⁸ This situation continued till January 1936, but France decided to appoint Charles Debbas once again as the president in 1933. Such an interventionist policy was no doubt unacceptable for many Lebanese politicians, even for Bechara El-Khoury, a Maronite who run for the presidency; however, it was an important step for the Maronite church, which blocked a threat to one of the elements of their autonomy.

Secondly, the 1932 Lebanese census, the first and the only census conducted in Lebanon under the French administration, was an important initiative to put forward the demographic structure of the country and demonstrate the fairness of the government system organized in accordance with the confessional proportions. According to the results, the Maronites were the most populous confessional group in Greater Lebanon with a population of 226,378. They formed 28.8 percent of the total population. This proportion was followed by the Sunni Muslims (22.4 %), the Shi'ite (19.6%), the Greek Orthodox (9.7%), the Druze (6.8%), the Greek Catholics (5.9%), and Armenian Orthodox (3.2%).²¹⁹ The census showed that the Maronite hegemony in the parliament was fair. However, according to Salibi, when the first census was conducted, there was a suspicion among the Lebanese, even among many Christians that the census was *rigged*. After that census, especially after the independence, the Muslims insisted on a fair census, but such a demand was not welcome by the Christians. Another important fact Salibi put forwards that the head of the Lebanese Census Department has always been appointed from among the Christians and the records have been kept in *strict secrecy*.²²⁰ Even though the census showed the slight supremacy of the Maronites compared to the other sects, the Muslims in total was still more than the Christians and the Maronites. The Maronite patriarch of

²¹⁸ William W. Harris, *Lebanon: A History 600-2011*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 185.

²¹⁹ Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay*, (Oxford University Press, 1968): 121 quoted in Atlioğlu, 79.

²²⁰ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 198.

that period, Arida even opposed the results of the census and claimed that 23.000 Syrians, 4.000 Alawis, and 2.000 Iraqis and Palestinians registered as Lebanese and therefore the census results were not reflecting the true proportions of the Maronites in the country. Through this attack on the results, the patriarch hoped to change the ratio of the deputies in the parliament in favor of the Maronites. This claim was kept fresh by the Maronite elites, especially by the patriarch till the 1940s.²²¹

The third important instrumentality of the French existence in the region was observed during the negotiations of the Syrian-Franco Treaty in 1936, which opened the way towards the Syrian Independence. During the negotiations, the National Bloc, the strongest political group in the parliament in Syria showed a strong stance and demanded a unified Syria with the annexation of the other territories under the French mandate in the Levant. Coincided with the weakened position of France at that time, such arguments were expressed with more nationalist tones. Even though France agreed to abandon the Alawite State and the State of Jabal Druze, which was the separate political entities it formed under the Mandate administration, to the Syrian Unity, it saliently underlined the territorial integrity of Lebanon. This position taken by France affected the stances of both the Nationalists in Syria and the unionist pan Arab Sunni circles of the coastal areas in Lebanon, which supported the annexation of the coastal cities to Damascus at that time.²²²

In here we should also put forward another important issue, which shows us a pattern in the approach of the Maronite church. As expressed in the previous chapter, the Maronite Patriarchs continuously insisted on a Maronite governor for Mount Lebanon during the *Mutasarrifiyya* Period. However, France did not take this demand for serious consideration. The governor was a Catholic Christian, and this was enough for the French. In the whole Ottoman territories, the French primarily focused on the Catholic Christian subjects of the empire; for Mount Lebanon, their main concern was the Maronites along with the Greek Catholics. Apart from confessional aspects, the Maronite church also prioritized the importance of nativity, which could only be realized through a Maronite governor. The same approaches on both sides, the French Mandate Administration and the Maronite Church, can also be observed in the period of the Republic. The French

²²¹ Firro, 122-123.

²²² *Ibid*, 148.

preferred to appoint Charles Debbas, a Greek Catholic instead of a Maronite as president and we see that the Patriarch Elias Howayek intervened and demanded this position to be given to a Maronite. As observed in the past, such a demand was ignored and Debbas stayed in the office.²²³ Though we see that the French promised the Patriarch for a Maronite president in the following years and kept their promise.²²⁴ For the first governor of the *Mutasarrifiyya*, the French had stressed that Daud Pasha's period was an experiment; after his tenure ended, a Maronite governor could have been considered. That time the French did not act upon the demand of the Patriarch; the tenure of Daud Pasha was prolonged for three years and the hopes of the Patriarchate and their trust in the French rule had been shaken. This time, however, the French kept their promise, and Charles Debbas remained as the only non-Maronite president in the history of the Republic of Lebanon.

The presidency, the Maronite superiority in the parliament and the territorial unity of Lebanon were under French protection. For the French High Commissioner, the church was still the highest authority they recognize in the country; however, such a strong entity was about to lose its power and many developments in the region coincided with its weakened position. This would affect the church's approach to the French administration. Another fact was that the particularism of the church was not been shared by the French or it would get into rivalry in different fields of the political and social life of the new country. There were some important fields for the Maronite church in its sphere of influence. It has spiritual power and authority on its own community, but it was exercising its power through the social services it provided to the society, especially the legal issues regarding the sphere of civil law, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.²²⁵ Such issues turned into an important field of dispute. I would like to refer to two specific developments that challenged the very traditional ways in the region and the society in which the Maronite church exercised its power; namely, the French attempt to uniform

²²³ Michael Bluhm, "Maronite Patriarchate 'losing influence' in Lebanese Politics," *The Daily Star Lebanon*, October 10, 2007.

<http://ftp.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2007/Oct-10/47907-maronite-patriarchate-losing-influence-in-lebanese-politics.ashx> (July 22, 2019).

²²⁴ Nicola Nassif, "Bkirki w Harb Al Ruesa' w ala' Al Ruesa (7)" *Al-Akhbar*, May 28, 2007. https://al-akhbar.com/Archive_Local_News/194327 (July 22, 2019).

²²⁵ Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 50.

the civil status law in Lebanon and the monopolization of the tobacco industry in all the mandate states under the French administration. These two developments would challenge the very traditional ways of the region and the society in which the Maronite church had exercised its authority and enjoy its autonomy.

Before analyzing the threats posed by the French to the Maronites and the Maronite church, in particular, we need to dwell on the developments which resulted in the weakened position of France in the region. While dealing with the formation of new states in the Eastern Mediterranean, France at the same time had to deal with its own problems in Continental Europe. The 1929 Great Depression in all the world and its effects coincided with a serious conflict between the left- and right-wing political factions within the country.²²⁶ In its mandate administrations in the Levant, France also faced many problems. Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter was stating that the mandate administrations should have played a role to guide their mandated countries towards independence. France could not show noticeable progress in Lebanon and its other mandates in the Levant. Compared to the British example in the Middle East, French experience was unsuccessful. Between the protection of the minority rights and satisfying the demands of the Muslims in these territories, the French failed to construct a functioning state under a constitution and a stable government. Apart from this, her rivals in Continental Europe also began to aspire for her territories in the Levant. A rising power, Italy, was running for the position that France had been keeping for a long time, which was the status of the protector of the Christians in the Levant. Italy already had started to lobby in the close circles of the Pope to diminish the French position. Additionally, it started its propaganda campaigns in the Levant through opening Italian schools, establishing amicable ties with the Christians and the Muslims by putting forward their interests, and broadcast and publication through media. French Mandate Administration's failure and its weakened position among the European powers no doubt strengthened the position of the opposition and changed the views of her supporters.²²⁷

²²⁶ Meir Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939*, (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), 92.

²²⁷ *Ibid*, 90-91.

Within such a problematic environment, the French were trying to form a stable state in Lebanon and the ways it resorted to would come into conflict with the authority of the Maronite Church. Greater Lebanon was no longer the autonomous Mount Lebanon, its extended borders made its demographic heterogeneity and the geographical structure more complex. Even though the Maronite church convinced the French authorities at the beginning of the 20th century and claimed that the coastal areas of Greater Lebanon were actually the historical parts of the Lebanese entity, under a modern state, the plan did not work as the church envisaged. The union of the coastal areas with the Mountain range would pose a threat to the traditional ways of the Mountain. Regarding the legal issues on civil status, the French tried to introduce a system to equalize the Muslims and the non-Muslims. 1917 Family Decree codified by the Ottoman Empire was a ready legal system; however, in the traditional structure of Mount Lebanon, the Maronite church and the other sects were left free to exercise such legal issues for their own communities. Such Ottoman practices used to be applied in the coastal areas and in the urban side. However, it seems that new territories of the new country made the issues complicated to understand for the French administration as well. The Maronite Patriarchate submitted petitions to the French Mandate rule to make changes in such legislation and be exempted from that rule. In 1936, the French administration introduced a new decree and reaffirmed the legal autonomy of the religious authorities on their own communities. However, such attempts sparked an important discontentedness among the Muslim circles, and they thought that the new decree was an assault on Islam. Many Muslims took the streets of Lebanon and this strengthened pro-Syria, pro-independence and anti-French sentiments among the Muslims.²²⁸

Another important development I would like to refer to here was the monopolization of the tobacco industry by the French administration in the 1930s, a conflicted issue in which the Maronite patriarch actively involved. This specific development, as observed in the previous instance, challenged the autonomy of the church as well. The monopolization of the tobacco industry by the French administration should actually be read as “re-monopolization.” Since 1883 to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, due to the bankruptcy of the state, the tobacco industry-including all the stages from cultivation to

²²⁸ Thompson, 152.

the merchandising in the market- was monopolized by a French private company under the name of *Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman*.²²⁹ The *Mutasarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon was exempted from this monopoly due to its specific autonomous administration within the empire. Therefore, the peasants, landowners, and merchants enjoyed a profitable income from this industry in Mount Lebanon. After 1920, the company maintained the monopoly of tobacco in the French mandates in the Levant and this time again, Mount Lebanon excluded from the territories of the monopoly.²³⁰ Even though the company stated that the application of a dual taxation system in the same country was impossible, Mount Lebanon enjoyed its exceptional status in Lebanon.²³¹ The monopoly expired in 1929 and Prime Minister of that time Émile Eddé opposed the plan of the reinstatement of the monopoly.²³² Moreover, the 1929 Great Depression had left a negative effect on the economies of the French mandates in the Levant. The mandate administration was expected to generate its own income from the incomes generated in the mandated territories. Despite the negative effects of the Great Depression, in the 1930s, the economy of the region gradually recovered. In order to generate the necessary income that the mandate administration requires, the French High Commission in Levant that time, De Martel decided to restore the tobacco monopoly, this time including Mount Lebanon as well.²³³

The restoration of the tobacco monopoly in the whole mandate territories under the French administration stirred a serious opposition in all these territories. The monopoly was another expression of the opposition against the French administration in especially the Muslim circles. This time, the inclusion of Mount Lebanon would change the balances in the Franco-Maronite relations and the Maronite church and the other Maronite actors would reconsider their relations with French. Firstly, in the tobacco industry carried out in Mount Lebanon, the Maronite church had an important amount of share. The monopoly was challenging the economic power of the Church and of course the Maronite merchants and landowners in Mount Lebanon. Secondly, the French were losing their power in the

²²⁹ Zamir, 163.

²³⁰ Malek Abisaab, "Warmed or Burnt by Fire? The Lebanese Maronite Church Navigates French Colonial Policies" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2014): 292-312, 296.

²³¹ Zamir, 164.

²³² *Ibid*, 164.

²³³ Harris, 187.

region. In Syria, the French could not subdue the demands of the National Bloc and consolidate their pan-Arab demands. Thirdly, the French were also losing their prestige and popularity within the Maronite circles. In the parliament, there were two Maronite blocs which reflected two different Maronite stances. The first one was the Constitutional Bloc led by Bechara El-Khoury. As mentioned before, during the 1932 presidential elections, he runs for the presidency, but the French dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution. El-Khoury was the prominent defender of the independence within the Maronite circles and he had good relations with the Arab political factions and the circles defending pan-Arabism. The other one was the National Bloc led by Émile Eddé. He was the opponent of El-Khoury during the presidential elections held in 1932. Unlike El-Khoury's close relations with the pan-Arab circles, the main supporter of Émile Eddé was France. In 1936, when he became the president of Lebanon, this created a disappointment among the Lebanese politicians and sparked the anger of the Muslim circles in the country. Within such an environment, the Patriarch's continuous support for French turned into a fact distorting its political and spiritual power in not only the region but also within the Maronite community. Upon the restoration of the tobacco monopoly, Arida actively involved in the opposition campaigns regarding the monopoly. He, as the leader of the Maronite church, prohibited smoking and the pamphlets being delivered in the streets of Lebanon the words of the patriarch regarding the hazardous effects of smoking was written. In various towns with a Christian majority, specifically themed protests, *dabke* (traditional dance) performances were organized against the monopoly and of course the French High Commissioner De Martel. The students were attending the protests after school. One of the main slogans of the protests in those days was "A Bas Le Monopole!" (Down with the Monopole!). Hundreds of letters and petitions were directly sent to Paris, expressing the grievances of the Lebanese due to the wrong policies of De Martel.²³⁴

Patriarch Arida, the Patriarch of the Maronite church, a religious organization popular among the Muslims with their alliance with the colonial power France and their "betrayal" to the cause of Syrianism and Arabism, now became a regionwide hero among the Muslims. Arida's popularity surpassed the frontiers of Lebanon; he was publicly praised

²³⁴ Abisaab, 299; Firro, 136-137.

in public gatherings. During a protest organized in Damascus after a Friday Protest, the protesters were shouting “La Ilaha Illa’llah, ’Arida Habibullah!” (No God but God and ’Arida is God’s friend!).²³⁵ Such popularity, of course, was not welcome by the French authorities. The French did not expect such a move from their closest allies in the region. The French authority tried to convince the public opinion by claiming that the Maronite Patriarch had close relations with the National Bloc in Syria.²³⁶ The French warned Patriarch that he was being exploited by the National Bloc for their own interests²³⁷ and also seethed many bishops against the stand taken by himself.²³⁸

Although Arida’s explicit opposition to the French made him also closer to the Sunni circles of the country, he was also so cautious against any separatist claims that might have associated himself with. Such collusion with the Sunni circles and the National Bloc truly blurred the strict lines between the Maronites and the Muslims of the country and the dichotomization between the two groups were about to disappear. Arabism and the discourse of Lebanon with an Arab face were not disturbing the church anymore. Apart from this, as expressed before, the French was able to subdue the National Bloc in Syria about the territorial integrity of Lebanon. This move also coincided with Arida’s campaign and the National Bloc members, even though they do not recognize the legitimacy of the borders of Lebanon, softened their discourse and they did not express the integration of the coastal cities of Lebanon to Damascus, or they just postponed expressing this plan during the negotiations.²³⁹

Arida’s strong stand in the campaign against the tobacco monopoly we observed was not a shift from the Maronite church’s historic alliance with France, an important element for the protection and survival of the autonomy. Autonomy was still preserving its importance for the Maronite church but this time the *authority* was also at the stake of the church. In short, the French existence was preserving the autonomy of the country from the possible threats inside and outside Lebanon; however, its transformative policies, which were the expected outcomes of a modernization process of a political entity in the

²³⁵ *Ibid*, 298.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, 299.

²³⁷ Zamir, 169.

²³⁸ Harris, 189.

²³⁹ *Ibid*, 189.

21st century, posed a serious threat to the autonomy and the authority of the church. This might be perhaps interpreted as a miscalculation at the beginning; that is, the church could not calculate the potential results of being a modern country and a national state; this time with the annexation of the coastal areas, “an urban entity” with an important size of the Muslim majority. The Maronites could preserve their slight majority over the other sects of Mount Lebanon and they could enjoy their autonomy within the sheltered structure of the mountain. After the Grand Liban was formed by the French, they thought that their prewar prestigious situation- “nostalgia for Petit Liban” as Abisaab depicted²⁴⁰ - would continue. To some extent, the French actually maintained such a policy and in various cases followed a dual policy separating Mount Lebanon from the rest of Grand Liban. As a French officer angrily stated in his report that “the Maronites expected France to support their extravagant privileges beyond the limits of the common law.”²⁴¹

As expressed before, the autonomy was still preserving its importance and Arabism was still a potential threat for the Lebanese State of the Maronites; therefore, Arida was also maintaining a cautious stand. We observe this when he published his famous *Livre Verde* (Green Book) entitled *Le Liban et La France* (Lebanon and France) in the same year when the monopoly was restored. In this book, Arida refers to the historical relations between the French and Lebanon but at the same time, he also includes the documents depicting the tobacco monopoly as a wrong policy.²⁴²

Towards the independence of Lebanon, such a cautious stand taken by the patriarch was observed in various cases. The suspension of the constitution had been supported by the patriarch and he was favoring Émile Eddé against Bechara El Khoury in the parliament. Eddé was a Francophile and was favoring the French existence in Lebanon and he was not supporting an idea of Lebanon with an Arab face, Therefore, in 1936, he was favored by the French authorities for the presidentship of the country against his rival Bechara El Khoury. El Khoury could manage to transform this situation in the parliament to an anti-French campaign by catering to the backing of the Muslim circles in the coastal areas. In the face of the rising popularity of El Khoury, Arida could not alienate himself, and he

²⁴⁰ Abisaab, 307.

²⁴¹ *Ibid*, 304.

²⁴² Firro, 144.

preferred to (or had to) establish good relations with El Khoury as well, at the expense of his relations with the French.

Upon the rising demands from the opposition from the Sunni circles and the Constitutional Bloc in the parliament, and of course, the signing of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, the Lebanese politicians and the French administration started the negotiations that would open the road towards the independence. On November 15, 1936, the Franco-Lebanese Treaty was completed. The first step of the negotiations was the restoration of the constitution in January 1937. However, a serious development in all the world also occluded the road towards full independence of the country, which was the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The constitution was again suspended by the French High Commission in Lebanon.²⁴³ Additionally, the treaties signed with Syria and Lebanon in 1936 was not ratified by the French National Assembly. Following the French failure in the face of the Nazi Forces in Continental Europe, the Free French Forces with the British troops attacked Syria and Lebanon and toppled the pro-Vichy government in there. Georges Catroux, the delegate-general of the Free France in Syria and Lebanon declared that Free France recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon and invited the representatives to sign a treaty. Such an invitation was refused by the pro-independence circles in Lebanon and caused a general discontentedness. Free France and General De Gaulle's main aim was to protect the French interests in the region *vis-à-vis* the British presence. The Free France authorities were not in favor of a new election, but the British were insisting on the need to organize national elections in Syria and Lebanon. Finally, the French authorities agreed on organizing a new election. On September 21, 1943, the result of the election was declared, and the Constitutional Bloc led by Bechara El Khoury won a victory in the parliament. El Khoury became the president and he immediately appointed Riad El Sulh to form the new government. Following the elections, the Chamber of Deputies passed many constitutional revisions to denounce the authority of the French mandate. The French authorities declared that such revisions were void since they were unilaterally agreed, without the approval of the French authorities. Upon the ratification of the provisions by the president El Khoury, the delegate-general of Free France, Jean Helleu ordered the arrest of the President El Khoury, the Prime Minister El

²⁴³ Harris, 192.

Sulh, Abdulhamid Karami, and some other ministers in the parliament. Émile Eddé, the favorite figure of the French, was again appointed as the president and the prime minister. Pressed by the monarchs of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, Winston Churchill intervened into the matter and the British authorities sent an ultimatum to Free France authorities. On the morning of November 22, 1943, few hours before the ultimatum expired, General Catroux, appointed by De Gaulle, ordered the release of the arrested ministers and declared the end of the French mandate and the independence of Lebanon.²⁴⁴

Bechara El Khoury was not a Francophile as his rival Émile Eddé was. After Émile Eddé was favored by the French authorities in the political system of Lebanon and the French decided to suspend the constitution and cancel the elections, El Khoury's approach to the French has never taken a positive standing. However, it is quite hard to say that El Khoury was against the territorial integrity of Lebanon and he, as a Maronite, did not believe in the cause of Lebanon. He established very good ties and relations with the Sunni circles of the coastal cities of Lebanon as well as the members of the National Bloc in Syria. The Arab face of Lebanon was a reality for him as well as an acceptable solution for Christian-Muslim relations in the country. He believed that the prosperity of Lebanon as an independent entity could only be achieved through Muslim-Christian cooperation. When we talk about the stances of these political figures, we should take many different aspects into consideration. As we mentioned in the previous chapters, the developments in the 19th century Mount Lebanon ignited the dormant identities and perceptions among the inhabitants. The Mountain witnessed such clashes that it never witnessed in its history, considering the contexts of these conflicts. The conflicts used to be feudal and usually erupted between the feudal families and their supporters and for the sake of the territorial disputes. Such conflicts rarely transformed into sectarian strife. The developments in the 19th century; however, introduced a new kind of conflict but as we can see these developments could not replace the old and traditional allegiances. As Kaufman states;

“Gellner argues that the nation-state replaces kinship with national identity. However in Lebanon, as in other Middle Eastern societies, nationalism did not replace kinship, but rather learned to live with it, sometimes in conflict and other times in agreement.”²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 107-108.

²⁴⁵ Kaufman, 10.

Bechara El Khoury and Émile Eddé were both Maronites and they supported the unique entity of Lebanon; however, on a personal level, they had their own political ambitions and this fact could not easily be overthrown by the interests of the Maronite community as a whole. Such a stand was taken by El Khoury, however, diminished its popularity in Mount Lebanon. In the Mountain, Émile Eddé had the majority of the Maronite votes.²⁴⁶ Such a failure was compensated by the support provided from the Muslim circles of the highly populated urban places of the country.

Émile Eddé had never had the popular support of the Sunni circles since he preferred to support the French existence in Lebanon. He believed in the Christian particularism of the country and also believed that only France could preserve such a particularism within the environment of the Arab states and pan Arab approaches. Therefore, even at the times, when the Patriarch Arida opposed the French policies in Lebanon, he never changed his cautious discourse and stand towards the French authorities. During the independence negotiations, he supported the continuity of the relations with France on the basis of a special treaty. Like El Khoury realized that an independent Lebanon could only be realized by the joint cooperation with the Muslims, Eddé's strong particularism for Christian Lebanon made him question the 1920 borders of Lebanon. He questioned the miscalculation made by the Maronite church; the Maronites could not enjoy their privileges after the coastal areas were annexed to Mount Lebanon and the Muslim population in the country dramatically increased.²⁴⁷ The mandate period showed that he was right. The annexed territories became one of the primary sources of the conflict in the country. Eddé's realistic approach was shared by a few in the Maronite Circles. George Samne, a Maronite editor at that time depicted enlarging the territories of Mount Lebanon as "the squaring of a circle." When the French proposed the re-annexation of Tripoli and Akkar to Syria, Eddé told the French authorities that he could convince his community for this and put his signature under the plan; however, the Maronites had been convinced that they were superior to the Muslims; they were more educated and Western-

²⁴⁶ Eyal Zisser, "The Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: Early Contacts," *Middle Eastern Studies* 31. 4 (Oct., 1995): 889-918, 894.

²⁴⁷ Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, (New York: Caravan Books, 1993), 172.

oriented and they could manage to overcome the Muslim population in the Greater Lebanon.²⁴⁸

The rivalry between Bechara El Khoury and Émile Eddé showed that there was no united stand taken by the Maronites. When Arida opposed to the French administration after the tobacco monopoly was reinstated in 1935, one of the criticism French High Commissioner De Martel averted was that Arida was unable to make the Maronites agree on a single candidate during the 1932 elections and this weakness allowed a Muslim to run for the presidency.²⁴⁹

The weakened French position in the region and its policies that were regretted by the people of the region perhaps made the Maronites soften their argument towards the Arabism and Pan-Arabism. As mentioned before, as we observed in the tobacco monopoly demonstrations, the dichotomization between two camps was perhaps blurred but it never ceased to exist, and such a positive situation was always welcome with suspicion. Apart from the Maronite Church and the pioneer political figures in the parliament, new actors as well had arisen in the Maronite circles. As an expression of Pan-Arabism in Lebanon, the *Syrian Social Nationalist Party* was founded in 1932 by an Orthodox Christian Antoun Saadeh. Such a development obliged the Maronites to counterbalance this act and represent themselves with a form of a political party. On December 21, 1936, an important political actor in the history of Modern Lebanon, The *Kataeb* Party was founded under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel, a Maronite Christian from the prominent Gemayel Family. The party was anti-Arab and anti-French mandate at the same time. In the first years of the party, we see that the emphasis was made on a Lebanese identity and a sort of Lebanese Nationalism. The emphasis on the Maronite identity was not prioritized.²⁵⁰

The simple formulated plan referred to in the previous chapter, “A Maronite Amirate Under French Protection” was not just a mere plan put forward by the Maronite Patriarch. It was the formula, in which the indispensable elements of a Christian Heaven for the

²⁴⁸ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900-1948*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press), 50.

²⁴⁹ Abisaab, 302.

²⁵⁰ Atlioğlu, 258.

Maronites were suggested. Maronite superiority in Lebanon could not be maintained without the involvement and the protection of France. France as a Western country, due to its historical ties with the Maronites, has remained with its name in this formula. However, Mount Lebanon's only contact with the other end of the Mediterranean was not France. Even in the past, many other political entities, as we also mentioned before, Venice, Tuscany, The Holy See of Rome, also established strong ties with the Maronites. Therefore, we can read this formula as "A Maronite Amirate Under the Protection of a Foreign Power." France is no doubt the champion of this formula; however, it does not mean that France is the only option the Maronites have counted on when their autonomy is threatened. At this point, I would like to discuss one of the most controversial issues when it comes to the Maronites in Lebanese politics; which is the relations of the Maronites with Israel and the Jews.

The threat perception of the Maronites had been seriously ignited especially in the late 19th century. Even though the *Mutasarrifiyya* was partially functioning and separating Mount Lebanon from its surroundings, in such geography full of aspirations for the pan Arabism, the Maronites knew that they needed as much support as possible. They were the divergent elements of the region, in reference to the pan Arab aspirations but they were not the only important divergent element in the region. There was one more community that had not shared the general political wave in the Levant, the Jews of Palestine.

The potential for an alliance between these two minorities of the region, the first step was taken by the Maronite side. In early 1913, the Maronites already voiced their express for Zionism. In 1919, a Maronite activist Nejib Sfeir proposed Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Organization and later the first president of the Israeli State, that the region must have been divided into three political entities; Syria for the Muslims, Lebanon for the Christians and Palestine for the Jews. In 1931, Sfeir contacted the Jewish Agency for the coordination of a Maronite-Zionist Activity.²⁵¹ In such attempts, expressed by the representatives of the Jewish Agency who met the Maronite representatives, it was clear to see the enthusiasm of the Maronites for such an alliance.

²⁵¹ Eisenberg, 30.

Such search for alliances actually found a place during the mandate period when the Jewish Community in Palestinian Territories- *Yishuv* was maintaining their activities to search for alliances in both Muslim and Christian circles and obtain lands for the Jewish settlement through purchase in the region. Till the 1930s, the relations of *Yishuv* with Lebanese circles did not make a serious separation between the Muslims and Christians; however, we see that the mobility of the Jews in the region was easy under the mandate administration; some Jewish groups used to spend their summer months in Mount Lebanon and through this way they also got more acquaintance with the Maronite community.²⁵²

After Arida became the patriarch in 1932, this time the relations between the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem and the Maronites were carried out in the patriarchal level. The same year, Epstein (Elath)- later an Israeli diplomat- visited Patriarch Arida in his patriarchal estate in *Bkirki*. During the meeting, the patriarch expressed his sympathy to the Jews, he even showed his little knowledge of his Hebrew as a gesture to Epstein and mentioned the assistance provided by the Jews to the Maronites in the past.²⁵³ Epstein was a student at the American University of Beirut and he was one of the personalities at that time to send to the countries surrounding Palestine, to study the political climate in these regions. During his university years, Epstein established contact with the *Young Phoenicians*- an organization politically powerless but important at the intellectual level, which had been headed by the Francophile Maronite intellectuals like Charles Corm and Alfred Naqash.²⁵⁴ Charles Corm was an important Lebanese poet who wanted to revive the Phoenician past of Lebanon, distinctive from its Arab surroundings and in those years he also wrote poems about the Maronite- Jewish alliance by tracing back to ancient times where the Phoenician and Hebrew Kings made an alliance.²⁵⁵

In the mandate period, much of the relations with the Maronite circles were established with the clergy. Even though the representatives of the Jewish Agency met the patriarch, patriarch Arida could not explicitly express his true approach towards the Jews, he rather

²⁵² Kristen E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 16.

²⁵³ Eisenberg, 62.

²⁵⁴ Eyal Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 146.

²⁵⁵ Schulze, 18.

tried to keep such meetings in secrecy due to his very sensitive position in the country and among the Maronites²⁵⁶; however, another important figure from the clerical circles, the Archbishop of Beirut Ignatius Mubarak was the one who confessed his opinions about the Jews and an independent Jewish State in Palestine. Mubarak no doubt was seriously criticized mainly by the Muslim circles. Arida had to delineate himself from Mubarak and declare that Mubarak's words did not represent the general approach of the Maronite church towards the Jews.²⁵⁷

Within the political circles, as we may extrapolate, the most favorable contact of the Jewish community was Emile Eddé. For Eddé, Zionism might have provided a valuable ally for the Muslim-Christian struggle in Lebanon. He also supported Arida and Mubarak for supporting pro-Zionism. However, like Arida, his position as a politician was also sensitive and he should have also kept his alliance with the Zionists in secrecy.²⁵⁸

The Maronites' interest in an alliance with the Zionists was actually aiming at three purposes; the first one is to support another divergent element within a strong pan Arab geography and counterbalance the pan Arab political demands *vis-à-vis* the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Secondly, an ally to the Maronites at the border of Lebanon would provide either political or economic support for the cause of the Maronites and for the wellbeing of the county. Thirdly, the Zionists and the Jews had strong contacts in the West and in the United States. A community like the Maronites, who counted on the west for their survival in the Middle East, the Zionists were the best intermediaries for such a purpose. Hence, the Zionists were going to provide such channels to the Maronites in a later decade.²⁵⁹

After the independence, the pan-Arabism was felt more strongly in the region; thereby, the need for any instruments to counterbalance this wave was also felt by the Maronite circles represented by Patriarch Arida and Emile Eddé. In 1946, a friendship treaty was signed between the Maronite Church and *Yishuv*. This treaty was followed by a

²⁵⁶ Zisser, "The Maronites, Lebanon," 900.

²⁵⁷ Scott Abramson, "The Promise and Failure of the Zionist-Marionite Relationship, 1920-1948" (master's thesis, Brandeis University The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2012), 35.

²⁵⁸ Eisenberg, 63.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 133.

memorandum sent by Ignatius Mubarak to the United Nations, stating that they supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.²⁶⁰

The attempts to ally with the Zionists were just one of the ways the Maronites who seriously felt the threat of Pan-Arabism in their beloved country. In the aftermath of the independence, Lebanon and France had actually agreed on the continuation of the relations between two countries but such an agreement did not provide an interventionist policy to protect the Maronites from the developments the Maronites perceived as a threat.

The most prominent development was the initiation of the National Pact- *El- Mithaq El- Watani*- which was an unwritten agreement between the Christian and Muslim leaders of the country. The National Pact has still been one of the main political documents forming the basis of the system in the country. The National Pact has equal effectiveness with the constitution ²⁶¹ According to this gentlemen's agreement, the Maronites would keep key positions in the country, the most important one of which has been the presidency. The president, even though there has been no article organizing this, would be Maronite. The prime minister would be a Muslim, actually a Sunni one. The National Pact was designed in accordance with the ratio of the confessional groups in Lebanon according to the 1932 census; therefore, it provided that the representation of the Christians and the Muslims in the country was fixed at the ratio of six to five. After 1947, the speaker of the parliament seat was also reserved for the Shiites.²⁶² National Pact was a gentlemen's agreement between the President El Khoury and the Prime Minister Riad El-Sulh. The Christians would not count on a foreign power like France since their primacy in the Lebanese politics was guaranteed by the pact and the Muslims would not demand annexation of Lebanon to Syria; both Muslims and Christians would be in partnership for running the country.²⁶³

The Alexandria Protocol which was signed in March 1945 was one of these developments. The treaty was the founding agreement of the Arab League and Lebanon

²⁶⁰ Schulze, 25.

²⁶¹ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 185.

²⁶² *Ibid*, 186.

²⁶³ Traboulsi, 106.

was one of the founding countries of the League as an Arab state. During the discussions about signing the protocol and joining the Arab League, Arida, Eddé's camp and the so-called Mediterraneanists, Henri Pharaon and Michel Chica led the opposition and they took an anti-protocol stand. Arida was against any plan to make Lebanon a part of the Arab Union and he desired the establishment of a political system that would avoid such programs. He asked Yusif Al- Sawda to examine the protocol and Al-Sawda wrote a manifesto which criticizes the protocol based on the claim that it endangers Lebanon's sovereignty.²⁶⁴ The manifesto included six criticisms. Firstly, the protocol has an Islamic character and therefore, is mainly aimed at *Muslim dominated Arab Entity*. Secondly, the protocol included articles interfering in the independent decision-making mechanisms and requiring the approval of the other member states to initiate a cooperation with a foreign power.²⁶⁵ This character of the protocol was seriously problematic since a foreign power, which had mainly become France, was an inevitable element for the survival of Lebanon of the Maronites. Thirdly, the protocol would make Lebanon bound by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty which was the dominant element of the Iraqi foreign policy so it could dominate Lebanon's policy in a similar way. The fourth character of the protocol was that it did not include any article to enable Lebanon to withdraw from the protocol in a future date. Fifthly, the protocol included two specific resolutions, one was for Palestine and the other was for Lebanon. The one regarding Lebanon was a specific declaration of recognition for the frontiers of Lebanon. Even though it seemed like a guarantee of Lebanon's sovereignty, it was unacceptable since this recognition was based on a condition of Lebanon's adherence to a specific foreign policy approved by the Arab states. Sixth, the protocol was the initial step for Arab Unity. The manifestation prepared by al-Sawda was later endorsed by Arida made public through publication as a booklet.²⁶⁶ Emile Eddé also agreed with the manifestations, Lebanon must withdraw from the League's conference and should have not approved the protocol without amendments in the articles threatening the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Raghid El- Solh, *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation*, (Oxford: The Center for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 2004), 253.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 253.

²⁶⁶ Raghid, 254.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 254.

President El-Khoury was treating the reservations taken by the opposition groups baseless; however, the Maronite circles knew the ambition of the Sunni circles in the country; the target of the opposition was Riad El-Sulh. During the parliamentary sessions where the protocol was discussed, he was pressed by the opposition groups headed by Emile Eddé not to make any commitments to Arab union or alliance by including Lebanon.²⁶⁸

An important apprehension was felt when President El-Khoury had health problems. According to the Lebanese Constitution (Article 62), when the president could not function due to such reasons, the Council of the Ministers assumed the power of the president; that meant Riad El-Sulh, the main target of the opposition would be the strongest political power in the country. Such an outcome was intolerable, especially when the discussions of the Alexandria Protocol was in progress. Upon pressure by the opposition, Riad El-Sulh resigned on January 7, 1945, and he was replaced by Abdul Hamid Karami. Despite many debates and reservations kept by the opposition groups towards Karami, his cabinet obtained an almost unanimous vote of confidence. After the new cabinet was formed, one of the Mediterraneanists and the main opposition figures, Henri Pharaon released a press statement and told the Lebanese who worried about the Alexandria protocol to dispose of such reservations. According to Pharaon, not only Lebanon but also other states were more concerned with the sovereignty and independence of their own countries. This fact had already been confirmed with the fall of governments in Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt right after the Alexandria Conference. In all these countries, the domestic reactions to the protocol were the main reasons for the government changes. Secondly, none of the members of the current government headed by Karami had any other ambitions towards pan Arabism. He alluded that El-Sulh had such ambitions. Thirdly, he was stressing that the League was not a supra-state entity or a confederation, therefore, Lebanon's membership to the League did not pose any threats to its sovereign existence in the region. Despite Pharaon's press release, the opposition maintained to keep their reservations.²⁶⁹ Hence, such a character was expressed in the words of Camille Chamoun when he was an ambassador of Lebanon to London.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 254.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 262.

Chamoun was an anti-French mandate and that time he referred to the protocol and asserted that the treaty with France could not be maintained.²⁷⁰ After such words, prominent Ignatius Mubarak responded in a harsh way:

“Lebanon has been independent for 14 centuries and will thus refuse to accept any change in its status. Therefore, neither the Alexandria Protocol nor the clarifications given concerning it, *nor the Lebanese representative in London [Chamoun]* [emphasis added], nor any of our neighbors- none of these will succeed in taking away our freedom.”²⁷¹

When the Free French forces arrested the ministers of the Lebanese Parliament, almost all the Lebanese including the Maronites seriously reacted to this and involved in the anti-French demonstrations. The independence of the country was praised by both the Muslim and Maronite circles; however, it was still something unwillingly celebrated since the Maronites had to defend their cause under more circumstances in the aftermath of the independence. As expressed before, El Khoury believed in the Arab face of Lebanon, or at least he knew that an independent Lebanon could only be maintained through cooperation with the Muslim circles and the surrounding Arab countries. Patriarch Arida and Emile Eddé wanted to protect the particularism of Lebanon, which meant a Heaven for the Christians, particularly for the Maronites. Eddé actually realized that such particularism could not be achieved and maintained after the annexation of the coastal areas to Mount Lebanon; therefore, he kept favoring French involvement even in the times when the Maronite Patriarch took the opposite stand. We cannot ignore the personal ambitions of Arida; however, we can at the same time see that the Maronite Church’s approach did not change or at least was not radically altered during his tenure. Whenever the elements of “A Maronite Amirate under French Protection” were challenged, the Patriarch involved restoring the system. We see that the former patriarch Huwayyik involved in the issue when the French appointed a non-Maronite as head of the state. When the French protection itself was challenged, or the French administration generated threats against the autonomy and the authority of the church, we see that the patriarch Arida searched for other foreign powers to restore this balance. Britain, the Zionists, and the United States were the major powers he contacted for an alliance. Even though Laura

²⁷⁰ Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge*, 92.

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, 92.

Zittrain Eisenberg calls the treaty between the Maronites and the Zionists “a treaty of desperation”²⁷² this was the only way for the Maronite Patriarch to restore the balance of Mount Lebanon’s traditional autonomy. The patriarch was desperate, that is why he attempted to try the ways that would be called *treason* in the region but such a search for an alliance was quite compatible with the pattern when it comes to their very precious autonomy.

What is really ironic that the growing power of the Maronite Church started to decline and to be challenged after the formation of *Grand Liban*. The annexation of the coastal areas was the demand of the church; they at the beginning thought that they could overcome the challenge posed by the Muslim majority of these areas. They failed to calculate that the Muslim population was more rapidly growing compared to the Christians and the Christians had already started to immigrate after the 1860 massacres in Mount Lebanon and they tend to keep this immigration wave. The Maronites were right; the particularism they desire could not be achieved without the involvement of a foreign power in this picture.

Their reaction was expected and observable. Especially after the independence, they survived their search for an alliance with the Zionists and pressed for the continuation of relations with France. National Pact was another reaction, perhaps a victory for the Maronites; that they at least guaranteed their supremacy in key positions in politics, security, and military posts. For the guarantees the Maronites obtained through the National Pact, Kamal Salibi says, “The Christians of the country needed no less than that *to allay their fears* [emphasis added] of what could otherwise happen to Lebanon.” We also see that such a fear that could not be allayed posed a serious pressure on the Muslim circles as well and they agreed on the demands of the Maronites through a pact that favored the Maronites over the Muslims. Even though the 1932 census results were conflicted, the census was the legitimate base for the pact; the Maronites were the majority (even though it was slightly), therefore, it was their right to keep the presidency seat at their hands.

²⁷² Zisser, “The Maronites, Lebanon,” 901.

The mandate period was a period of crystallization of the old wounds among the Christians and the Muslims. The struggle between the two factions had already been ignited. Salibi depicts this struggle with these words;

“From the 1930s, the streets of Beirut, every now and then, became the scene of violent clashes between Christian and Muslim gangs, one side brandishing the banner of Lebanism, the other of Arabism.”²⁷³

Fawwaz Traboulsi claims that this was not a simple dichotomization between the Christians and the Muslims anymore. The identity debate in the country *mutated* and *fragmented*.²⁷⁴ He also put a third faction represented by Anton Saadeh’s Syrian Nationalism from the non-Maronite circles of the country.

²⁷³ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, 180.

²⁷⁴ Traboulsi, 103.

5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis study, I tried to show the dynamic and processual characteristics of the Maronite identity, mainly based on their autonomy understanding and perception. In its historical context, their autonomy that they developed and enjoyed in Mount Lebanon for decades has special importance for them and at the times even all the other conditions are provided, we have observed that the Maronites still prefer to struggle for the restoration of their autonomy. In the past, this autonomy was enjoyed through the absence of direct contact with the central power. In modern times, we see other challenges posed against this autonomy, as modern nationalisms that emerged in the region, Syrianism, Arabism, etc. Within this dynamic identification process, we also have also observed a pattern of reactions demonstrated by the Maronites when this autonomy is threatened or perceived to be threatened. Whatever the banner or the name the Maronites have preferred to identify themselves with (Maronite, Lebanese, Syrian, Arab, Phoenician, etc.), the exclusive or the inclusive context of their identity has been defined by the status of the autonomy. When it is threatened, the Maronites expressed their distinction in the forms of dichotomies vis-à-vis the other groups. As expressed by the Patriarch Boulous Massad I to the French authorities, the real Lebanese were just the Maronites in the Mountain. Yet, as expressed by a prominent Maronite intellectual, Bulus Nujaym in 1908, the Arab conquest was the restoration of the Phoenician civilization in the region. Such negative or positive contextualization of the names can also be explained through the religious or secular circles among the Maronites. The Patriarch might have used a more explicit discourse but another Maronite from the secular circles of the community could refer to a more inclusive identification. This is also possible, and the process can also be read from this perspective. However, I deliberately focused on the status of autonomy and the environment in which the Maronite identity has been processed. During the former years of the *Mutasarrifiyya* period, the Patriarch Massad persisted on the appointment of a Maronite governor but his demands were not perceived positively by the French. The environment in which Bulus Nujaym shared his positive thoughts about the Arab conquest was an environment in which the *Mutasarrifiyya* was an ideal administrative form in the whole empire and the Maronites no doubt had the strategic positions in the

administrative council. Therefore, we can observe a differentiation between two identity claims and their contextualization. This study is limited to the periods before the independence in 1943; however, such a pattern can possibly be traced in the later decades. In the 19th century, Mount Lebanon's autonomy was seriously challenged by the new developments. After the 1820 uprisings, the confessional identities in the mountain, dormant for centuries have been evoked under a perceived threat and a different sense of belonging has crystallized and the Maronite church, as a rising power in the Mountain started to become visible and discerned by the central power. After that time, the Mountain and the Maronite church had to establish direct contact with the central Ottoman power, without a feudal lord as it was in the past. During the 19th century and the early 20th century, the Maronite church's primary concern was to restore the autonomy of the Mountain and their ideal system, which was *A Maronite Amirate Under French Protection*. Under the *Mutasarrifiyya*, even though it was not a full restoration, we observe that the Maronite church enjoyed its autonomy to a degree. The World War I conditions interrupted the *Mutasarrifiyya* and once again the autonomy of the Mountain was contested. The Maronite church again tried to restore it with the help of their historical protector, France; and *Grand Liban* was established in 1920 and the autonomy once again consolidated, for a short period of time.

France was expected to protect this autonomy and they actually did to an extent; however, the mandate period showed that the French administration's policies posed also another threat to this autonomy and its weakened position compelled the Maronite circles, especially the Maronite church, mentioned in the final chapter. They searched for other foreign alliances since it has been obvious that the ideal Lebanon of the Maronites could not be maintained without the protection of a foreign power.

In an age of nationalism, the Maronite church had many other threats posed against the identity of its community. Rising Pan-Arabism was one of them and this ideology did not want to leave Lebanon out of its own political program. Lebanon was a separate entity in Syria, and this was realized through the Franco-Maronite alliance and it was not fair in the eyes of the Muslim circles of the country and the Pan-Arab leaders of the neighboring countries. France itself was a problem but its absence would pose a bigger problem since the Maronite church had to deal with the internal and external threats without the help of

a foreign power. Alexandria Protocol was a serious trial of this. The Maronite church had to count on their Maronite president even though he did not share the church's apprehensions regarding the protocol. Sunni Prime Minister Riad El- Sulh might have made commitments to the other Arab states and sell the Maronite's beloved Lebanon to them. In the face of such threats, we see that the church and the other Maronite circles "desperately" tried to make new alliances in this period and strengthen their alliance even with the Zionists, which can only be labeled "treason" in this region. In the later decades, the Maronites maintained their relations with Israel and even played a role when Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 1985. The main ally of Israel in the Maronite circles was no doubt the *Phalangists*. A senior official of the *Phalangist Kataeb Party*, Joseph Abu Khalil, on his party's alliance with Israel during the Civil War, in an interview says that;

*"I am not ashamed [emphasis added]. I opened this channel. I went to Israel by sea. It was a risk. At one night, our fighters did not even have a bullet at the battlefield. The Palestinian fighters reached fifty meters from where we are now sitting. I went to Israel to ask for ammunition. If you give us weapons, we thank you. If not, I would go back. And they gave us weapons and we paid in cash in dollars."*²⁷⁵

Even though Lebanon enjoyed noticeable prosperity under the presidency of El Khoury and following Camille Chamoun, the 1958 crisis showed that the old wounds had not been healed yet and it gave us another example in which we could observe the pattern in the reaction of the Maronites. When Gamal Abdal Nasser came into power in Egypt and gave a new breathe to the weakened Arab Nationalism and once again stirred the dormant ambitions and the enthusiasm for the Pan-Arab dream in the Arab countries, the Maronites once again strongly felt the breath of Pan-Arabism in their very doorstep. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria united under the name of the United Arab Republic. The opposition was already strong against the pro-western president Chamoun. In that period Chamoun's identification of Lebanon was a Phoenician- Christian Republic instead of Michel Chica's Phoenician- Merchant Republic, which had also been shared by El-

²⁷⁵*Lebanon: The Family Business*, Al Jazeera English, 31 May 2009. Youtube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hparf17f3MU> (24 June 2019)

Khoury.²⁷⁶ This can be treated as another example of dichotomization between the Maronite identity and the other identity claims in the region since the rising pan-Arabism, another threat motivated the Maronites to express their identity in a more exclusive way. In the line of this study's approach, we may suggest that Chamoun's more exclusive definition of Lebanon was a result of the rising pan-Arabism in the region.

The critical atmosphere in Lebanon was ignited by the assassination of a Maronite journalist Nasib Al-Matni, who was critical of President Chamoun. After the assassination, a big wave of strikes began, especially in the Sunni districts as a reaction against the president. The paramilitary forces such as The *Phalangists* (*Kataeb Party*) were already behind the president and they involved in the armed conflicts to the other groups in the country. The same year in July, the pro-western Hashemite Monarchy in Iraq was toppled by a military coup organized by the Ba'ath Party and the dead body of the crown prince was dragged down and exposed to the media. In the face of such a rising threat in the region, right after the military coup in Iraq, President Chamoun insisted on the American ambassador for immediate intervention and invited the United States forces to Lebanon. In his conversation with the ambassador he said; "unless this took place in 48 hours, I would be a dead man and Lebanon would become an Egyptian satellite."²⁷⁷

After the Israeli State was founded and the Arabs failed in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War), a big wave of Palestinian refugees arrived in Lebanon and have become one of the major problems in Lebanese politics. A huge number of Palestinian existences in the country gradually transformed the country into a headquarter for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and their activities. Such a development was unacceptable for the Maronites since Lebanon could not be drawn into the problems of the Arab states. The prominent *Phalangists* were the leading Maronite militia in the battle. In April 1975, the *Phalangist* gunmen ambushed a bus carrying Palestinians and killed 27 of them. They claimed that the Palestinian guerillas attacked a church in the same district. Ignited by this bloody attack, the Lebanese Civil War erupted and lasted 15 years. A bloodier attack which left an unhealed wound in the social memory of the region was witnessed in the

²⁷⁶ Ayşe Ezgi Gürcan, "Transforming Religious Communities into Ethnies: The Process of Lebanese Nation Building 1920-1958," (master's thesis, The Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, 2007), 81.

²⁷⁷ Atlıoğlu, 281.

Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in 1982. After the assassination of the pro-Israeli president Bachir Gemayel, the *Phalangists* killed thousands of Palestinians as an act of revenge. As also stressed by Yasin Atlioğlu, the Maronites had not hesitated to take the arms and show their characteristics prone to conflict when their “privileged status” in the country is threatened and the Civil War witnessed one of the bloodiest examples of this reality.²⁷⁸

1989 Taif Accords, the prominent document that ended the Civil War was the beginning of another decade in the history of Lebanon and especially the Maronites. The Taif Accords transferred much of the authority of the president to the cabinet and provided more equal representation of the Christians and the Muslims in the parliament on the fixed ratio of 5 to 5 instead of 6 to 5 and this increased the number of the Muslim ministers in the parliament. This was a serious blow to the power of the Maronites in Lebanon. The increasing Syrian involvement in the domestic affairs of Lebanon was another fact that has already begun to develop during the Civil War years. Due to the outrageous consequences of the civil war, the Maronites had to accept the conditions of the Taif Agreement; however, they demonstrated their anti-Syrian stand exclusively. On September 20, 2000, the Maronite bishops released a statement from the Patriarchal Estate, *Bkirki* and declared that the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon was necessary.²⁷⁹ Apart from the ecclesiastical circles, the famous struggle of Maronite General Aoun against the Syrian forces in this period is also noticeable.

The Maronites were not strong enough anymore. Their leadership was seriously diminished with the arrival of the Syrian forces in the country. They were not the victorious side of the war, they were the ones blamed for their alliance with the enemy of the whole Arab world, Israel; and at the end, the Maronites who successfully established their modern “Maronite Amirate Under French Protection” in 1920 failed to protect it from their worst fears. The autonomy of the Maronites and Lebanon was seriously contested with the Syrian presence in the county. Only after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, many Lebanese from different confessional

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 461.

²⁷⁹ Simon Haddad, “The political transformation of the Maronites of Lebanon: From dominance to accommodation,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 8.2, (2002): 27-50, 33.

groups and political parties of the country took the streets and demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Following the demonstrations, the Syrian troops withdrew Lebanon on April 27, 2005, and this was recorded as *the Cedar Revolution* in the history of Lebanon.

The withdrawal of the Syrian troops was the end of the military presence of the Syrian forces in the country but the Syrian presence in the political arena remained. After the Civil War, another actor in this region rose in the political cadres of the country and began to be effective. *Hezbollah*, backed by Syria and Iran, had refused to disarm itself after the Civil War and has remained as a political party and an armed militia force by claiming that its existence has been crucial as long as the Israeli threat continues. *Hezbollah* has become the resistance (*moqawama*) of the country against Israel. Its rising power inside Lebanon also brought forth new conflicts such as Sunni-Shia rivalry in politics. In such an environment, the Maronite circles had to agree with these new realities of the country and established alliances in the political arena.

When the Syrian Civil War erupted in 2011, a new period has also started for Lebanon. The strongest political and military entity in the country, *Hezbollah*, started to fight against the opponents of the Syrian regime within the Syrian territories. Lebanon, through *Hezbollah*, once again became another part of the regional conflict. Under the shadow of the Syrian Civil War, the Lebanese had also had to elect their new president after the period of Michel Suleiman ended on May 25, 2014. A new president must have been elected but the political circles could not agree on a candidate. *Hezbollah* as the strongest political entity in the country did not want a president who was opposed to itself and the Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. This situation caused a 29-month presidential vacuum in Lebanon because it was impossible to elect a president without the approval of *Hezbollah*. In 2016, former army commander and also one of the prominent figures of the Civil War, Michel Aoun, backed by *Hezbollah*, was elected as the president and this 29-month turmoil ended. Once again, the Maronites were constrained to agree with the situation of their country since they could only see a president who consented to the presence of *Hezbollah* as a separate and legitimate military existence in the country and who were not critical of the policies of the Syrian government. They could not take the arms and fight against this new entity as they did against the Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO) during the Lebanese Civil War. The PLO had acted as a state within a state in Lebanon and *Hezbollah* as well has been acting as a state within Lebanon, even though it is an entity from inside the country. Despite the conflicting opinions on *Hezbollah* within the Maronite circles, we see that the stance of the *Phalangist* Party has not changed. The party and its leader, Samy Gemayel is critical of *Hezbollah* and he does not recognize the legitimacy of the party in Lebanon. Unlike many other Maronite circles, he also claims that *Hezbollah*'s participation in the Syrian Civil War helped bring the war into Lebanon.²⁸⁰ The other Maronite circles, Michel Aoun's *Free Patriotic Movement* (*Al-Tayyār al-Waṭanī al-Horr*) and its supporters think that *Hezbollah* has protected the country from the threats like the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)*. However, this does not mean that the supporters of the party are content with the relations of *Hezbollah* with Iran and Syria.²⁸¹ During the swearing-in ceremony, President Michel Aoun emphasized the independence of Lebanon and stressed that Lebanon must be protected from the "regional fires."²⁸² When we looked at the past of General Aoun, we see that he was against the Syrian presence in Lebanon but after the Syrian forces left the country and he returned back to Lebanon, an agreement was reached between the general and *Hezbollah*. Here I argue that there is no much difference between the stances taken by two different leaders, Michel Aoun, and Samy Gemayel. When it comes to the independence of Lebanon or autonomy in the understanding of the Maronites, both leaders emphasize the importance of this fact; however, their political strategies to reach their goals naturally differ from each other. Michel Aoun might have not thought that a direct clash with *Hezbollah* would not provide any benefit for the Maronites in the country or his position is just a pragmatic and opportunist stance as Yasin Atlioğlu stressed.²⁸³

²⁸⁰ Andrew Parasiliti, "Samy Gemayel: Hezbollah intervention helped bring Syria war to Lebanon" *Al-Monitor*, (December 12, 2013) <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/12/gemayel-hezbollah-syria-hurt-lebanon.html#ixzz5zcZMCjTV> (September 7, 2019).

²⁸¹ Halim Shebaya, "Where do Lebanon's Christians stand on Hezbollah?" *Aljazeera*, November 20, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/lebanon-christians-stand-hezbollah-171128102446572.html> (September 7, 2019).

²⁸² Samia Nakhoul & Tom Perry, "Lebanon's Aoun Wins Presidency to End Two Year Political Vacuum," *Reuters*, October 31, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-presidency-session/lebanons-aoun-wins-presidency-to-end-two-year-political-vacuum-idUSKBN12V102> (September 7, 2019).

²⁸³ Atlioğlu, 458.

The Civil War no doubt left an unhealed wound in the social memory of all the Lebanese. As the leader of the Guardians of the Cedars- a paramilitary Maronite party, now abolished from the political arena-, Etienne Saqr stated in an interview that;

“You have Lebanon here, the Arabs want to annex Lebanon, and for that, they had to push the Christians out, this was the plan since 1975. They sent Arafat and he failed. They sent Syria for 30 years and they destroyed Lebanon. And now the plan is going on with these politicians who are loyal to all except Lebanon.”²⁸⁴

For many people, the Maronites’ reaction to the developments affecting their country and their approach towards the Arab identity could be determined exaggerative and hostile. As the famous Maronite poet Said Akl once expressed “I would cut off my right hand, just not to be an Arab” was perhaps the ultimate expression of this approach.

Pierre Gemayel, the founder of the Kataeb Party and father of Bachir Gemayel, accepts this reality and says:

“The Christian psychosis of fear is internalized, visceral, and tenacious. We can do nothing about it. It is the Muslims’ task to reassure us.”²⁸⁵

Today, the problems of Lebanon are still the same. It still suffers from the unhealed wounds of the conflicts experienced in the past. The Maronites are not in a prestigious position anymore; therefore, they are trying to survive in the political climate of the country. As long as the autonomy of the Maronites, or the autonomy of Lebanon in which the Maronites have their prestigious position, cannot be restored, the Maronites seem to continue to express their distinction from the other groups in their environment. This expression can be observed in cultural and social levels since the political level does not allow the Maronites to escape from the problems of Lebanon’s neighbors.

²⁸⁴ Manuela Paraipan, Interview with Etienne Saqr (Abu Arz), *Orange Room*, January 22, 2008, <https://www.oom.org/forum/threads/interview-with-etienne-saqr-abu-arz.31682/> (September 7, 2019).

²⁸⁵ Abramson, 20.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Abu-Husayn, Abdul-Rahim. *Rebellion, Myth Making and National Building: Lebanon from an Ottoman Mountain Iltizam to a Nation State*. Tokyo: Word Top Co. Ltd, 2009.
- Akarlı, Engin Deniz. *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*. London- New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on The Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Atliođlu, Yasin. *Savaşta ve Barışta Lübnan Marunîleri: Aziz Marun'dan İç Savaşa Marunî Kimliği ve Çatışma*. İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2014.
- Barth, Fredrik. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1998.
- Chica, Michel. "Lebanon at Home and Abroad." Trans. Leo Arnold & Jean Montégu. Presented at the Conferences of Cénacle, Beirut, 1966.
- Choueiri, Youssef M. *Arab Nationalism: A History: Nation and State in the Arab World*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000.
- Ciggaar, Krijna Nelly. Adelbert Davids, and Herman G. B. Teule. *East and West in the Crusader States: Context, Contacts, Confrontations: Acta of the Congress Held at Hernen Castle in May 1993*. Leuven: Peeters Publications, 1996.
- Çizakça, Murat. *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, With Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*. Leiden: Brill, 1996.
- Daher, Massoud. "The Lebanese Leadership at the Beginning of the Ottoman Period: A Case Study of the Ma'n Family." In *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq*. Ed. Peter Sluglett & Stefan Weber. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2010.
- Dalrymple, William. *From The Holy Mountain: A Jou*. India: Penguin Book, 2004.
- Davişa, Adid. *Arap Milliyetçiliđi: Zaferden Umutsuzluđa*. Trans. Lütfi Yalçın. İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları, Aralık 2004.
- Dawn, C. Ernest. "The Origins of Arab Nationalism." In *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* Ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

- Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain. *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900-1948*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- El-Solh, Raghid. *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation*. Oxford: The Center for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 2004.
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. New York: Pluto Press, 2002.
- Firro, Kais M. *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and The State Under The Mandate*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003.
- Fusaro, Maria. *Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and The Rise of England 1450-1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Geha, Carmen. *Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Georgiou, Constantinos. *Preaching the Crusades to the Eastern Mediterranean: Propaganda, Liturgy and Diplomacy, 1305–1352*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Gettleman, Marvin E., and Stuart Schaar. *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*. New York: Grove Press, 2012.
- Hakim, Carol. *The Origins of The Lebanese National Idea, 1840-1920*. California: University of California Press, 2013.
- Harik, Iliya. "The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon." In *Politics in Lebanon*. Ed. Leonard Binder. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
- Harris, William W. *Lebanon: A History 600-2011*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Hourani, Albert. *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay*. Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Kaufman, Asher. *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
- Khalaf, Samir. *Lebanon's Predicament*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- Leeuwen, Richard Van. *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khazin Sheikhs and The Maronite Church (1736-1840)*. Leiden-New York-Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994.
- McGarry, John., and Margaret Moore. "Karl Renner, Power Sharing and Non-Territorial Autonomy." In *National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics*. Ed. Ephraim Nimni. London & New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Mahfouz, Joseph. *Short History of the Maronite Church*. Trans. Susan Foukx. Jounieh, Beirut: Saint Paul Press, 2009.

- Masters, Bruce. "The Establishment of The Melkite Catholic Millet in 1848 and the Politics of Identity in Tanzimat Syria." In *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul Karim Rafeq*. Ed. Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber. Leiden- Boston: Brill, 2010.
- Masters, Bruce. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- McCrone, David. *The Sociology of Nationalism*. London & New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Pipes, Daniel. *Greater Syria: The History of An Ambition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Rizk, Karam., and Mireille Issa. *Bullarium Maronitarum (Bullaire Maronite)*. Paris: Geuthner, 2019.
- Salibi, Kamal. *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. London: I.B Tauris, 1988.
- Salibi, Kamal. *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon*. Beirut: AUB Publication of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1959.
- Salibi, Kemal. *The Modern History of Lebanon*. New York: Caravan Books, 1993.
- Schulze, Kristen E. *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998.
- Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1988.
- Thompson, Elizabeth. *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Traboulsi, Fawwaz. *A History of Modern Lebanon*. (London: Pluto Press, 2012).
- Tsugitaka, Sato. *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqta's, and Fallahun*. Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Uygun, Süleyman. *Osmanlı Lübnan'ında Değişim ve İç Çatışma: Marunî Asi Yusuf Bey Kerem (1823-1889)*. Ankara: Gece Kitaplığı, 2017.
- Ülman, A. Haluk. 1860-1861 Suriye Buhranı: Osmanlı Diplomasısından Bir Örnek Olay. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1966.
- Vincent, Joan. "Structuring of Ethnicity." *Human Organization* 33.4 (Winter 1974): 375-379.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978 (1922).

Weiss, Max. *In The Shadow of Sectarianism*. Harvard University Press, 2010.

Williams, Sophie. *Rethinking Stateless Nations and National Identity in Wales and The Basque Country*. The UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Yıldız, Ahmet. *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.

Zamir, Meir. *Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939*. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000.

Zisser, Eyal. *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.



ARTICLES

- Abisaab, Malek. "Warmed or Burnt by Fire? The Lebanese Maronite Church Navigates French Colonial Policies" *Arab Studies Quarterly* 36.4 (Fall 2014): 292-312.
- Baktıaya, Adil. "19. Yüzyıl Suriyesinde Hıristiyan-Müslüman İlişkilerinde Değişim 1860 Şam Olayları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 58 (2011).
- Barkey, Karen., and Georges Gavrilis. "The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and its Contemporary Legacy" *Ethnopolitics* 15.1. (2016): 24-42.
- Brubaker, Rogers. "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009): 21-41.
- Haddad, Simon. "The Political Transformation of The Maronites of Lebanon: From Dominance to Accommodation." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8.2. (2002): 27-50.
- Işık, Ramazan. "Marunileri Memlûkler Döneminde Fransisken Misyoner Rahiplerin Katolikleştirme Faaliyetleri" *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 9.1. (June 2005): 203-218.
- Jenkins, Richard. "Rethinking Ethnicity: Identity, Categorisation and Power." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17.2 (1994).
- Leeuwen, Richard Van. "The Control of Space and Communal Leadership: Maronite Monasteries in Mount Lebanon," *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 79-80 (1996).
- Rondot, Pierre. "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism" *Journal of Contemporary History* 3.3 (July 1968): 37-51.
- Salibi, Kamal. "The Lebanese Identity" *Journal of Contemporary History* 6.1. (1971): 76-81+83-86.
- Turan, Namık Sinan. "Lübnan'da Ulusun İnşası ve Ortak Tınının Üretimi – Rahbani Kardeşler ve Feyruz" *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 3.11. Temmuz 2011.
- Zisser, Eyal. "The Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: Early Contacts" *Middle Eastern Studies* 31. 4 (Oct. 1995): 889-918.

THESIS AND DISSERTATIONS

- Abramson, Scott. “The Promise and Failure of the Zionist-Maronite Relationship, 1920-1948.” Master’s Thesis, *Brandeis University The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences*, 2012.
- Gul, Serkan. “The French Catholic Missionaries in Lebanon Between 1860 And 1914.” Ph.D. diss., *Middle East Technical University Graduate School of Social Sciences*, May 2015.
- Gürcan, Ayşe Ezgi. “Transforming Religious Communities into Ethnies: The Process of Lebanese Nation Building 1920-1958.” Master’s Thesis, *The Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University*, 2007.
- Işık, Ramazan. “Maruni Kilisesi.” Ph.D. diss., *Ankara University Graduate School of Social Sciences*, 2003.
- Öztürk, Pelin Kihtir. “Urban Transformation of Ottoman Port Cities in The Nineteenth Century: Change from Ottoman Beirut to French Mandatory Beirut.” Master’s Thesis., *Middle East Technical University the Graduate School of Social Sciences*, September 2006.

ELECTRONIC RESOURCES

Bluhm, Michael. "Maronite Patriarchate 'losing influence' in Lebanese Politics," *The Daily Star Lebanon*, October 10, 2007.

<http://ftp.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2007/Oct-10/47907-maronite-patriarchate-losing-influence-in-lebanese-politics.ashx> (July 22, 2019).

Lebanon: The Family Business. Al Jazeera English. 31 May 2009. *Youtube*

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vesotnrAN5g> 24 June 2019.

Nakhoul, Samia, and Tom Perry. "Lebanon's Aoun Wins Presidency to End Two Year Political Vacuum." *Reuters*. October 31, 2016.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-presidency-session/lebanons-aoun-wins-presidency-to-end-two-year-political-vacuum-idUSKBN12V102> (September 7, 2019).

Nassif, Nicola. "Bkirki w Harb Al Ruesa' w ala' Al Ruesa (7)" *Al-Akhbar*, May 28, 2007.

https://al-akhbar.com/Archive_Local_News/194327 (July 22, 2019).

Paraipan, Manuela. "Interview with Etienne Saqr (Abu Arz)." *Orange Room*. January 22, 2008.

<https://www.ooroom.org/forum/threads/interview-with-etienne-saqr-abu-arz.31682/> (September 7, 2019).

Parasiliti, Andrew. "Samy Gemayel: Hezbollah intervention helped bring Syria war to Lebanon." *Al-Monitor*. December 12, 2013.

<https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/12/gemayel-hezbollah-syria-hurt-lebanon.html#ixzz5zcZMCjTV> (September 7, 2019).

Shebaya, Halim. "Where do Lebanon's Christians stand on Hezbollah?" *Aljazeera* November 20, 2017.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/lebanon-christians-stand-hezbollah-171128102446572.html> (September 7, 2019).