

**THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER - APPROVED ELECTRONICALLY
GENERATED THESIS/DISSERTATION COVER-PAGE**

Electronic identifier: 17291

Date of electronic submission: 05/01/2016

The University of Manchester makes unrestricted examined electronic theses and dissertations freely available for download and reading online via Manchester eScholar at <http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar>.

This print version of my thesis/dissertation is a TRUE and ACCURATE REPRESENTATION of the electronic version submitted to the University of Manchester's institutional repository, Manchester eScholar.

A Sociological Application of Sen's Capability Approach to (Dis)advantages in Turkey

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Faculty of Humanities



2016

M. Onur Arun

School of Social Sciences

Department of Sociology

Table of Contents

Abstract	5
Declaration	6
Copyright Statement	6
Acknowledgments	7
Introduction: Towards a Sociological Application of the Capability Approach	9
I. Introduction.....	9
II. A Brief Summary of the Capability Approach.....	9
III. The Need for a Fuller Sociological Perspective in the Application	12
IV. Organisation of the Thesis.....	16
V. Conclusion.....	20
“The Idea of Justice” in the Capability Approach	21
I. Introduction.....	21
II. An Overview and Criticism of Mainstream Models of Social Justice	22
a. Utilitarianism: Welfarist, Consequentialist, and Sum-ranking Theory of Justice	22
b. Libertarianism: Entitlement, Process and Individual Oriented Theory of Justice	23
c. Rawlsian Model: Fairness, Primary Goods, and Difference Principle	25
III. The Capability Approach: A Freedom-Focused Approach to Social Justice.....	28
a. From Means to Ends: Functionings	28
b. From Ownership to Achievement: Conversion Factors	30
c. From Achievement to Advantage: Ability to Achieve or Capability	31
IV. The Valuational Exercise: An Internal Division	33
a. Sen’s Deliberate Incompleteness	33
b. Nussbaum: A Normative Proposal and Criticism to Sen.....	35
V. The Need for a More Sociological Examination of (Dis)advantage	37
a. Criticisms of Sen and Nussbaum’s Approaches	37
b. Nussbaum’s Unjustified Theoretical Leap	39
c. Role of a Sociological Understanding in Sen’s Approach and Potential Improvements.....	41
VI. Existing Applications of the Capability Approach and Their Limits.....	48
a. Some Existing Applications of the Capability Approach	48
b. Limits of the Empirical Literature	51
VII. Conclusion.....	55
Research Methodology	58
I. Introduction.....	58
II. Research Focus and Methods	58
a. Research Aim, Questions, and Methods	59

b.	Analytical Significance of the Qualitative Method and Generating Narratives	61
III.	Sampling: Informational Sources of the Capability-Based Evaluation.....	64
a.	Rationale: Ensuring the Study Incorporates Social and Contextual Diversity	64
b.	Selection of Participants: Social Diversities.....	65
c.	Selection of Locations: Contextual Diversities	67
d.	Participant Recruitment in Practice and The Characteristics of the Sample.....	71
IV.	Interview Materials and Praxis of Interviewing.....	75
a.	Interview Materials.....	75
b.	Praxis of Interviewing.....	79
V.	Analyzing the Narratives of Valuation, Achievement, and Process	82
VI.	Reflexivity: Position and Power of the Researcher.....	85
VII.	Conclusion.....	89
	Valuation: Valuable Functionings and Their Social and Institutional Dynamics	92
I.	Introduction.....	92
II.	Survival and Having a Purpose	94
III.	Being Knowledgeable	98
IV.	Having Personal Autonomy	103
V.	Having Social and Institutional Recognition.....	108
VI.	Social Bases of Valuable Relationships	114
VII.	Security	119
VIII.	Conclusion	122
	Achievement: Conversion Factors and Variation Between/Within the (Dis)advantage	124
I.	Introduction.....	124
II.	Gender.....	128
III.	Religiosity and Religious Identity.....	132
IV.	Ethnicity	138
V.	Political Identity	144
VI.	Beyond the Conventional: Exacerbating and Ameliorating Disadvantage	150
VII.	Conclusion.....	154
	The Ability to Achieve and the Consequences of Non-Achievement.....	157
I.	Introduction.....	157
II.	Process Matters: The Unequal Costs of Achievement and Compensation	158
III.	Entrenched Disadvantages and the Interdependency of Achievements	167
IV.	Adaptation: A Problem of Social Injustices	173
V.	Conclusion.....	180
	Conclusion	182

References..... 193
Appendix A: Interview Schedule..... 208

Tables and Figures

Table I: Participants Characteristics by Gender, Age, and Ethnicity.....73
Table II: Participants Characteristics by Educational Background and Religious Identity.....73
Table III: Participants Characteristics by Political Orientation.....74

Figure I: Illustration of the Role of Conversion Factors in Assessment of (Dis)advantage.....125

Word Count: 75,671



Abstract

A Sociological Application of Sen's Capability Approach to (Dis)advantages in Turkey

M. Onur Arun

The University of Manchester, Department of Sociology, Ph.D.

January, 2016

This study aims to conduct a sociological application of the capability approach to assess various disadvantages in Turkey. Sen's capability approach advocates that people's (dis)advantage should be evaluated in terms of "their ability to achieve a kind of life that they have reason to value". The capability approach has become a prominent paradigm in welfare and development analyses during last two decades and represents a "sociological turn" within these fields due to its explicit references to the social determinants of (dis)advantage in its criticisms of the mainstream economic understanding of (dis)advantage. Despite its relevance to certain sociological concerns, sociology itself has remained relatively distant from the capability approach. This is because, I argue, that the sociological perspective has been given an auxiliary role in the analytical texture of the capability approach which deploys it primarily in demonstrating incompetencies of rival theories of social justice, rather than using it to extend its own analytical arguments. This eventually leads to the capability approach becoming less attentive to the role of social structure in disadvantage. However, I argue, there is considerable room to integrate a sociological perspective to its analytical configuration.

Drawing on qualitative data collected in three contrasting cities of Turkey, namely Diyarbakir, Konya, and Izmir, where residents have mostly contrasting conceptions of the good life, this study firstly, focuses on what people value with a particular attention on why they value what they value. Paying attention to people's reasonings in valuation, the study associates what people value with their social characteristics and situates the meaning of their values into their social context. Through this examination, the study addresses the significance of six broad domains for a good life in Turkey. Secondly, this study moves further to explore roles of social characteristics in achievement of a good life. Concentrating on four characteristics, which are gender, ethnicity, religiosity and religious belonging, and political identity, it examines people's achievement of a good life. Thirdly, this study examines various social processes that people pass through in their achievement of good life. Through examining various social processes of the achievement, this study addresses the unequal costs that structurally disadvantaged people have to pay to achieve the same ends that those whose social characteristics are favoured by the social structure achieve without extra cost to themselves. Departing from this point, this study also looks at what happens when structurally disadvantaged people are not able to pay the unequal costs of achievement. In such cases, their disadvantages spread to varied domains of their lives and take the form of persistent disadvantages. This leads them to adapt their values and preferences to their disadvantaged social conditions. Contrary to a prevalent understanding, this study argues that such adaptation of values does not necessarily mean that disadvantaged people lack the capacity of sophisticated and critical judgement on their constraining conditions. On the contrary, in some cases such adaptation reflects quite sophisticated and pragmatic judgements.

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Copyright Statement

I. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

II. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made **only** in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

III. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

IV. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see <http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/policies/intellectual-property.pdf>), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see <http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations>) and in The University’s policy on presentation of Theses

Acknowledgments

Of course I would first of all thank to my supervisors, James Nazroo and Wendy Bottero. Not because this is the conventional way in writing an acknowledgement section in a thesis but because I truly value the time, support and criticality they have brought to my thesis...

Wendy has always been supportive, critical, and constructive which are, I think, qualities rarely seen together in one person. She has allocated enormous time to my work, patience and elegant counter arguments, without which this thesis would not have been completed. I also want to thank to her for our talks on everyday politics which I have enjoyed. Wendy's great sense of humour, as well as the free coffees and desserts, have made this journey all the more fun!

Being supervised by James has been a privilege. For me, it was impossible to not being impressed by his clarity and reasoning. Since the beginning of my Ph.D. studies, he has provided me a brilliant guidance without which I feel I would have been lost to chaos. But, I should confess that our social meetings have always been more enjoyable than the supervision meetings!

I owe a very special thanks to my participants who trusted me and shared their personal stories some of which were quite difficult to share with a stranger. Without them, this research would not have not been possible.

I also express my debt and thanks to Nick, who provided me invaluable thoughts and suggestions for my work in my annual reviews, and Ann, who helped me to sort out all bureaucratic necessities easily and very quickly.

I would also like to thank my friends and Ph.D. colleagues; Jonathan for his supportive and cheerful presence, Kirsty for her encouraging optimism and life-saving help, Alejandro for Chilean parties, Jamie for his helpful explanations and patience, Sebastian for his sense of humour, Gagun who has never let me feel alone in the department; and to Nezir, Adi, Mark, Mervan, Ben, Leon and Chiara for their support and encouragement. I should also thank to a close friend, Vallu, who, whilst he confuses me with a complex philosophical questions at first, then offers me an enlighten, clear answer, from which I have learned many things. A special thanks also to Brian Heaphy and James Rhodes who have always time for me and my work.

Lastly, I would like to express my immeasurable gratitude and thanks to my family, whose values made me choose a way of life that I am honoured to follow today...



For Hrant, Ali Ismail, and Tahir...

Introduction: Towards a Sociological Application of the Capability Approach

I. Introduction

This study aims to conduct an interpersonal comparison of (dis)advantage in three cities of Turkey. To do this, it takes a sociological perspective on the capability approach that advocates a focus on people's ability to achieve what they value in the assessment of (dis)advantage. Employing a qualitative method of inquiry, the study focuses on the everyday experiences of those who have different conceptions of the good life and live in milieus that have contrasting characteristics. This study explores: (1) what those who have contrasting conceptions of good life value and why they value what they value; (2) their achievement of what they value; and (3) the ability to achieve a good life with particular attention paid to the role of the social and institutional dynamics. This study sets out to demonstrate that a sociological perspective that places the social and institutional dynamics of context to the centre of the analysis allows a more complete exploitation of the conceptual and analytical potential of the capability approach. On this basis, this study proposes that such an application can be performed by: (1) scrutinizing people's reasoned valuations as well as meanings that they ascribe to opportunities valued; (2) exploring how social identities turn to factors influencing the (non)achievement of valued opportunities as well as how they influence people's (non)achievement of valued opportunities; and (3) examining processes of achievement of valued opportunities and how people compensate for their disadvantages.

This chapter briefly introduces the key normative and conceptual aspects of the capability approach. It addresses the significance of a sociological understanding of social diversity and social context in the application of the approach and concludes with a brief introduction of the following chapters.

II. A Brief Summary of the Capability Approach

Economist and social choice theorist Amartya Sen initially developed the capability approach as a solution to the problems faced by mainstream utilitarian understandings of human well-being (Sen 1979a, 1979b, 1985a, 1987a), and extended it as a broader evaluative framework to assess some other interrelated issues such as poverty, development, and (dis)advantage (Sen 1990a, 1992, 1999a, 2009).

The capability approach is critical of standard abstract economic models of development, human well-being, equality (and of the axiomatic notion of actor), arguing that they unduly neglect the diversity of human beings and their varied circumstances. Focusing on human diversity, the variable conceptions of the good life and of routes to achieve this, the capability approach aligns with sociological understandings of inequality and welfare, and therefore, is described as “a sociological turn” (Robeyns 2006a: 371) in the fields of development and welfare economics. In the most general sense, the capability approach is a normative evaluative framework proposing a focus on people’s *substantive freedom*, or capability, to pursue the kind of life they value when assessing their circumstances.

The capability approach starts with a simple argument and claims that a person’s advantage depends not only on what s/he possess (such as entitlements, commodities or income), but also how much s/he can substantively make use of this possession in practice. This is because resources are simply means to achieve valued ends; and therefore the assessment of people’s (dis)advantage cannot be limited to resource ownership. According to the capability approach, the assessment of people’s advantage should be extended to an assessment of the extent to which people can make use their resources to achieve valued ends. Sen (1983b: 160) illustrates the significance of this view by a simple example of a bike ownership: the significance of a bike is not, in essence, associated with ownership, but rather in what its characteristic affords, *viz.*, transportation. Possession of a bike is significant as long as it enables the owner’s movement from one place to another. Here, the capability approach distinguishes the means of a person’s advantage (e.g. bike) from the functions of these means (e.g. being mobile).

In the capability literature, the functions of means are conceptualised as *functionings* reflecting “the various things a person may value doing or being” (Sen 1999a: 75) such as being mobile, educated, healthy, employed, respected, and so forth. Instead of placing the resource ownership at the centre of assessment, the capability approach advocates assessing people’s advantage in terms of their freedom to achieve functionings that they value. However, the capability approach addresses that different people may have different conceptions of the good (inter-end variation) (Sen 1990a: 120; 1992: 85) and therefore does not identify what functionings are valuable. It advocates that people

themselves should be in charge of identification of what functionings are valuable for their lives¹. This comes from the ethically and politically liberal nature of the capability approach that recognises the significance of people's freedom to form their own ends and lifestyles (see Sen 2009: 233, 237-8).

In addition to the inter-end variation, such an approach that places people's freedom to achieve functionings at the centre of assessment also requires taking notice of "inter-individual" diversities that lead to "variation in the relationship between resources (...) and freedom to pursue ends" (Sen 1990a: 120; 1992: 85). The inter-individual diversities in the capability literature are conceptualised as *conversion factors* which affect people's ability to convert their resources into achievement of functionings and thus lead to variation in their freedom *to pursue* their ends. For example, "a person may have more income and more nutritional intake, but less freedom to live a well-nourished existence because of a higher basal metabolic rate, greater vulnerability to parasitic diseases, larger body size, or simply because pregnancy" (Sen 1992: 81-2). Thus, moving forward from the space of resources to the space of functionings in the assessment of people's (dis)advantage requires taking notice of various diversities that lead to variation in people's achievement of functionings.

However, the ultimate concern of the capability approach is not people's conversion of resource and achievements of functionings, but is their ability to achieve functionings, or their *capability*. The difference between the former and the latter one is associated with choice or free-will. To illustrate this let us take the functioning of being well-nourished. It is a broadly agreed that being adequately nourished is a necessary and thus a valuable functioning. Yet, in comparing people's (dis)advantage, we must distinguish between those who choose not to achieve this functioning due to, say, fasting based on a religious reason, political objectives, or aesthetic concerns and those who *cannot* achieve it due to lack of food. In both cases, being adequately nourished is not properly achieved; yet there is a significant difference in advantage of those who fast and those who lack food, since fasting "is choosing to starve when one does have other options" (Sen 1992: 52). Here we again see the liberal nature of the capability approach that ascribes an intrinsic value to the idea of freedom (see also Sen 1988: 289-93, 1992: 41). This leads the capability approach to argue that people should be free to

¹ Note that this subject is a matter of debate among the capability theorists. I address this debate below and fully discuss in the following chapter.

choose and live the life that they value, even though their choices in some cases may give rise to an actual reduction in their material well-being (see Sen 1985b: 203-8, 1992: 59-62, 2009: 286-90).

Briefly, the capability approach argues that when assessing a person's (dis)advantage, we should concentrate on the "freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that –things that he or she may value doing or being" (Sen 2009: 231-2). Such an approach to (dis)advantage requires two fundamental investigations: (1) exploring people's varied functionings and (2) examination of various diversities that lead to variation in people's ability to achieve such functionings.

III. The Need for a Fuller Sociological Perspective in the Application

Sen's conception of social justice emphasises the diversity in values that are components of the good life and the context-dependent nature of people's achievement of what they value. This perspective has profoundly influenced classical economic understandings of poverty, development, well-being, and inequality. However, it has not been had much influence on sociological studies of inequality and welfare, even though it is in alignment with sociological understandings of inequality which tends to stress the diverse and situationally constructed nature of values and practices. This is because the existing capability literature is still, to a degree, prone to abstract and axiomatic notion of the social actor. As Holmwood points out (2013: 1171), an important reason why sociology "has remained relatively immune" to its influence because of the longstanding ontological and epistemological tensions between sociology, which stresses the socially embedded characteristics of social actors and their values, and economics, which tends to assume that individuals are rational actors who decide and act in their best interests. This tension iteratively appears in different forms when the capability approach is applied in practice, even though Sen himself is critical of the standard economic account of the individual as a rational actor. This is because Sen mostly employs sociology to criticize normative theories of social justice. This results in only partial use of sociological understandings of the importance of situated context, which causes some problems in the empirical application of the capability approach. Take, for example, Sen's criticism of the utilitarian metrics of "happiness" and "preference satisfaction" that he argues are unreliable in assessing people's (dis)advantage because of the social conditioning of people's mental states.

Consider a very deprived person who is poor, exploited, overworked, and ill, but who has

been made satisfied with his lot by social conditioning (through, say, religion, or political propaganda, or cultural pressure). Can we possibly believe that he is doing well just because he is happy and satisfied? (...) The standard of life cannot be so detached from the nature of the life the person leads. (Sen 1985a: 12)

Here Sen refers to the complexity of the human life by drawing on a sociologically informed account of the socially constrained nature of desires and preferences. It is this complexity that makes the utilitarian metrics of happiness or preference satisfaction inadequate for the assessment of people's (dis)advantage since those who are historically and socially disadvantaged can be satisfied with "small mercies" (Sen 1985b: 191). However, the same criticism can also be directed to Sen's own account of valued functionings. This is because, just like desires and preferences, what people value to be and do can be shaped by "social conditioning". To address this Sen turns to the economic understanding of "rational individuals", and advocates that we should explore if people's values are "reasoned", or justified. Thus, the final argument of his capability approach takes the following form: "individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person's capability to do things he or she has reason to value" (Sen 2009: 231). However, people's reasoning in valuing a being or doing can also be socially conditioned. But, Sen does not identify how we could evaluate the adequacy of reasoned values. A person may value, for example, the deportation of migrants from her/his milieu based on political reasons. How should we evaluate such a valuation and the underlying reasoning? Here, we can see that Sen refers to the complexity of the human world and uses a sociological account while criticizing utilitarian metrics of social justice, yet he does not employ such an account when formulating his own argument.

The problem of social conditioning of people's values has led some capability theorists to identify valuable functionings from a normative political perspective. For example, Nussbaum has addressed the social conditioning of people values (1987: 38-9) and proposed to identify what people should be capable to be and do from a normative political perspective (Nussbaum 2003a: 34; see also Nussbaum 2000, 2011a). However, some scholars have questioned the legitimacy of Nussbaum's proposal (Robeyns 2003: 69, 2005b: 201) and some others have addressed that it is "paternalistic" (Stewart 2001: 1192, Stewart and Deneulin 2002: 63, Deneulin 2002: 511). Today, there remain central debates about how to identify valuable functionings.

Sen's partial use of sociology can also be seen in his criticism of the Rawlsian metric of social

justice, equality in ownership of the primary goods². As noted above, referring to the “inter-individual diversities”, Sen claims that even though people may hold exactly the same bundle of resources, they can still be unequal in outcomes since various diversities can lead to variation in conversion of resources into achievement of good life.

Similarly, the relationship between *primary goods* and the *freedom* to pursue one’s objectives –well-being as well as other objectives– may also vary. We differ not only in our inherited wealth, but also in our personal characteristics. Aside from purely individual variations (e.g. abilities, predispositions, physical differences), there are also systematic contrasts between groups (for example between women and men in specific respects such as the possibility of pregnancy and neonatal care of infants) (Sen 1992: 27).

In his earlier work, Sen vaguely identifies these inter-individual diversities as personal (e.g. age, sex, mental and physical abilities, body size) and external/social factors (e.g. environmental differences, the nature of social conventions, the position of the person in the family and society) (1987a: 17-8, 1992: 19-20). He stresses that “conversion problems can involve some extremely complex social issues, especially when the achievements in question are influenced by intricate intragroup relations and interactions” (1992: 33), yet he does not say much what these “extremely complex social issues” might be. In his more recent works, he provides a more sociologically informed categorisation (1999a: 70-1 and 2009: 254-7): personal heterogeneities (e.g. age, gender, disability), diversities in the physical environment (e.g. climatic circumstances), variations in the social climate (e.g. prevalence or absence of crime and violence, the nature of community relationships), differences in relational perspectives (e.g. established patterns of behavior in a community, conventions/customs), and distribution within the family (e.g. distributional rules followed within the family). Yet, there are clearly some overlaps between the categories. It is difficult, for instance, to distinguish “the nature of community relationships” from “conventions and customs”. Besides, it is impossible to examine the influences of “personal heterogeneities” without any reference to “social climate”, or to the “distributional rules followed within the family”. Here, we can see that Sen draws on a sociological perspective in his criticism of Rawls, yet he does not employ such a perspective sufficiently when extending his own argument.

The vague identification of diversities that lead to variations in the conversion of resources into the

² Basic rights and liberties; freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; income and wealth; and the social bases of self-respect (Rawls 1993: 308-9).

achievement of good life has led to the emergence of an empirical literature that focuses on variation across different groups (e.g. age or gender groups) in the achievement of certain functionings. This type of research usually informs us about who the disadvantaged groups are, but they do not sufficiently discuss why these groups are disadvantaged while others are not and how they have become disadvantaged. More specifically, we do not know, how social or institutional dynamics leads to variations across social identities (e.g. age, ethnicity or gender) in the ability to convert resources into the achievement of a good life.

Sen also does not say much about what type of influence these diversities can have on people achievement. An implication of this is that these diversities are usually considered either as a facilitator (that positively influences people's conversion and leads to achievement of functionings) or as a constrainer (that negatively influence people's conversion and leads to non-achievement of functionings). Thus, a two dimensional understanding of (dis)advantage that simply varies *between* achievement and non-achievement of functionings emerges. However, (dis)advantage is not a two-dimensional phenomenon that only varies between achievement and non-achievement of functionings. There are quite a number of cases where a person achieves a functioning (e.g. having social respect), but to a lower extent, and perhaps with greater effort or cost, than others. This refers to the variation within the achievement and non-achievement of functionings. Therefore, in order to capture variation within the (non)achievement of functionings, we need a more nuanced identification of the influence and operation of conversion factors.

In addition, the capability approach has an ultimate focus on people's ability to achieve, or on freedom (Sen 2002: 83-4), which is underexplored when the empirical focus is on the significance of people's actual achievement. For example, even though those who starve because they choose to fast and those who starve because they lack food are similar in terms of non-achievement, their relative advantage is very different since fasters chooses to starve when they have an option to not starve. This is to say that the capability-based assessment of (dis)advantage requires us to incorporate the options that are available to a person as well as her/his achievement. The difficulty here is associated with the necessity of taking counterfactual or unrealized options into account. This means that we need an analytical perspective that can enable us to reflect on people's ability to achieve. Various scholars

(Zimmerman 2006, Comim 2008, Walby 2012) have addressed this difficulty and Sen (1992: 52) has recognised it too. However, the absence of such an analytical perspective within the current capability literature results in an empirical literature where most analysis of (dis)advantage (as well as of well-being, poverty, and development) is based on people's achievement rather than on their ability to achieve. However, a sociologically informed inquiry that explores the process of achievement can enable us to reflect on people's ability to achieve. Because the focus on the process of achievement allows an opportunity to identify the difficulties that people negotiate and struggle with when achieving valued functionings. Exploring these difficulties can help us to reflect on the extent to which a functioning is available for a person and this can enable us to reflect on this person's ability to achieve this functioning.

Taking notice of the theoretical ambiguities briefly discussed above and their implications for an empirical inquiry, this study aims to conduct a qualitative sociological application of the capability approach. In this application, this study particularly explores: (1) what people value and why they value what they value by engaging with social and institutional dynamics that influence their valuations and reasoning; (2) how people's social characteristics operates as conversion factors in relation to the social and institutional configuration of society leading to variations in the achievements of functionings, and (3) the process of achievement as well as the difficulties that people negotiate and struggle with in this process.

IV. Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis contains seven chapters. Following this introduction, chapter two more fully sets out the theoretical underpinnings of this study. It begins with a critical discussion of how the idea of justice is understood and conceptualised in three mainstream models of social justice, namely utilitarianism, libertarianism, and the Rawlsian model. Following this, the chapter provides a detailed account of the capability approach and discusses its strengths in assessing people's (dis)advantage. Subsequently, the chapter turns to clarify an internal division within the capability approach between Sen and Nussbaum and argues that both Sen and Nussbaum share some theoretical shortcomings that justify the need for a more sociologically informed extension of the capability approach. It also identifies the

shortcomings of the empirical literature that derive from the lack of sufficiently sociological perspective in the theoretical configuration of the capability approach and addresses the need for a more qualitative inquiry in the application of the capability approach.

Chapter three begins with setting out the aims and questions of the research project. It then explains the relevance of employing qualitative method, particularly semi-structured in-depth interviews, in a sociological application of the capability approach. Subsequently, the chapter how Turkey, with significant inequality, and major divisions along lines of ethnicity, gender, religion and religiosity, provides a good empirical case through which to explore the socially embedded and complex nature of capability in practice. It explains the relevance of selecting the three contrasting cities, namely Diyarbakir, Konya, and Izmir, in this study and the sampling strategy of this study. After identifying the social diversities (gender, ethnicity, religiosity and religious belonging, and political identity) taken into account in the selection of participants in these cities, it describes the process of participant recruitment and the characteristics of the sample. The chapter then turns to explain how the in-depth interviews were conducted in practice and provides an introduction to the types of data that were generated. The chapter then describes the analytical strategy employed to analyze the data and explains how the data were coded and analyzed. Finally, it gives a reflective assessment of the potential influence of my own social characteristics and position on the research.

Chapter four explores valued and reasoned beings and doings of those who have varied conceptions of the good life and live in cities and social circumstances that have contrasting characteristics. It argues that by exploring and scrutinizing people's reasonings as well as the various meanings that people ascribe as valued beings and doings, the capability approach can develop a more adequate identification of valuable functionings. It demonstrates that people may value different functionings based on same underlying reasons, or may value the same functioning, but have very different, and sometimes conflicting, reasonings for this. Based on this complexity, the chapter addresses the need for a fuller sociological examination of the social and institutional dynamics that affect people's values and reasonings. Drawing on participants' narratives, the chapter identifies six key categories of the good life: freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life and access to basic standard of living (e.g. housing, nutrition, health, employment, safety, transport); being knowledgeable (e.g.

formal education, cultural activities, intellectual production); personal autonomy (e.g. being free from political or religious coercion); social and legal recognition (e.g. being supported to compensate disadvantage of a person's difference); the social basis of valuable relationships (e.g. living in harmony and peace with others, freedom from war); and security (e.g. guaranteed sustainability of the domains of the good life). While identifying these categories as valuable, the chapter engages with various social and institutional dynamics (such as the denial of an ethnic identity, patriarchal gender roles, and social coercion to adopt a particular religious or political identity) and demonstrates how these dynamics influence people's valuation and reasonings.

Chapter five explores people's achievement of valuable functionings. It focuses on how people's (1) ethnicity, (2) religiosity and religious belonging, (3) political identity, and (4) gender operate in their functioning achievements. This chapter demonstrates that while being male, ethnically Turkish, politically right-wing, and religiously a Sunni-Muslim are privileged social characteristics in terms of the achievement of valuable functionings. On the other hand, being an Armenian, a Kurd, an Alawi, a left-wing, republican, atheist, or a female often (though this is also variable by milieu) leads to being constrained in achieving valuable functionings in the context of Turkey. However, the chapter draws on a sociological inquiry that addresses how these social characteristics operate within certain social and institutional dynamics, such as the consolidation of patriarchal norms within official policies. Drawing on people's experiences of functioning achievement, this chapter also demonstrates that people's social characteristics operate in complex ways by interacting with each other. For example, an ethnic disadvantage that is the outcome of an institutional policy is sometimes either exacerbated by another disadvantage that is associated with another dimension of identity, such as gender; or ameliorated by an advantage, such as a religious identity. Based on such examples, the chapter argues that there is not only a variation between achievement (advantage) and non-achievement (disadvantage) of functionings, but also within the achievement and non-achievement. The chapter proposes that considering the conversion factors in such a versatile way that includes those factors' exacerbating and ameliorating roles in everyday life, we can develop a more advanced and nuanced understanding of capability based (dis)advantage.

The sixth chapter starts with exploring the processes through which varied ways of functioning are

achieved. It demonstrates that those whose social characteristics operate as negative conversion factors follow different ways in achieving functionings than those whose social characteristics operate as positive conversion factors. The chapter demonstrates that those with disadvantaged social identities struggle and negotiate with additional difficulties in the process of achievement and *compensate for* the negative effects of their social characteristics in various ways. The chapter argues that valuable functionings are less available to disadvantaged people, even if they achieve, since they are required to struggle with additional difficulties and compensate for the negative effects of their social characteristics. Following this, the chapter focuses on the consequences of non-achievements of functionings and demonstrates that there are relationships between the non-achievements of different functionings. It argues that this illustrates the interdependency of the achievement of functionings and provides us with insights into how entrenched and persistent disadvantage is formed in society. This chapter then turns to address the problem of adaptive preferences (the process of preference formation where disadvantaged people tend to adapt their preferences to constrained conditions). It demonstrates that some scholars in the capability approach consider the problem of adaptive preferences as a problem of false consciousness and use this to justify the position that analysts should decide what people should be able to be and do from a normative philosophical point of view. While the chapter shows how disadvantaged people do adapt their preferences to constrained conditions, it demonstrates that this adaptation occurs not because they have a false consciousness and are unable to see where their true interests lie, but because they develop survival strategies in the face of their structural constraints. Based on this, the chapter, in line with those scholars who argue that the problem of adaptive preferences is more to do with social and contextual injustices than with people's lack of ability to make critical and sophisticated judgements.

The last chapter draws together the central issues in this study. It revisits the complications that arise from the partial use of sociology in the capability approach and underlines the significance of qualitative sociological inquiry in exploring valued and reasoned functionings, people's achievements of functionings, and their ability to achieve. This chapter also addresses the limitations of this study and makes some suggestions for further research.

V. Conclusion

This introductory chapter has briefly introduced the foundations of the capability approach and the role of the sociological perspective in its development. It has argued that the capability approach has mostly employed sociological works as stocks of empirical argument against rival theories of justice but has not given sociological perspective a central place in the formation of its own arguments and empirical applications. I have argued that there is a need for a fuller sociological perspective in the application of the capability approach, and in the rest of this thesis I turn to show how such an approach can be developed.



“The Idea of Justice” in the Capability Approach **- Distinctions, Drawbacks, and Potential Advancements -**

I. Introduction

This chapter establishes a theoretical framework for an interpersonal comparison of people’s (dis)advantage in Turkey from the perspective of the capability approach. In the previous chapter, I introduced the capability approach and briefly argued that its distinctive focus on human diversity and on the variable nature of conceptions of the good life, as well as of routes to it, provide a much more nuanced account of (dis)advantage than mainstream theories of justice. In this regard, it aligns with a more sociological understanding of inequality and welfare. However, despite the considerable strengths of the capability approach in opening the door to human diversity and social context, its theorists raise these issues only conceptually to criticize rival theories of social justice, and draw back from fully addressing them in the application of the capability approach. Thus, a limited engagement with human diversity and social context appears in empirical applications of the approach. In particular, there is still a need for a more sociological treatment of the “idea of capability”, which (1) addresses role of broader social structure when specifying what people should be able to be and do, (2) provides a clearer and more advanced account of conversion factors that allows us to explore various forms of (dis)advantage, (3) identifies an analytic framework to assess people’s (dis)advantage in relation to their “capability”. This chapter turns to develop these arguments in detail.

I begin this chapter with a more detailed overview of mainstream theories of social justice and discuss weaknesses of their core arguments. Following this, drawing on the three core concepts of the capability approach (functionings, conversion factors, and capability), I provide a detailed account of the capability approach as an alternative approach and discuss its distinctive strengths in assessing (dis)advantage. I then turn to clarify an internal division between the two originators of the capability approach, namely Sen and Nussbaum, setting out their differences. In this discussion, I argue that although both Sen and Nussbaum share some theoretical shortcomings that justify the need for a more sociologically informed extension of the capability approach, Sen’s deliberately incomplete position is more open for such an extension. After justifying this argument with reference to Sen’s work, I discuss and explain how an extension that particularly focuses on the three points mentioned above

can be performed with the help of a sociological perspective. Subsequently, I demonstrate that the empirical literature shares the same kinds of shortcomings that I identify in the main theoretical frameworks of the capability approach. Following this, I conclude this chapter by proposing that the capability approach needs to be extended and modified by (1) exploring how people's reasoning in valuation is shaped by social and institutional configuration of society, (2) focusing on how people's social qualities turn to conversion factors and lead to variation both between and within the achievement and non-achievement of functionings, and (3) exploring the process of achievement to advance the analysis of (dis)advantage with the purpose of incorporating people's "ability to achieve".

II. An Overview and Criticism of Mainstream Models of Social Justice

Understanding the distinctiveness of the capability approach to (dis)advantage requires familiarity with the core arguments of three mainstream theories of social justice, the utilitarian, libertarian, and Rawlsian models. This section very briefly summarizes the core arguments of these models with a particular focus on how they conceive (dis)advantage and explains their insufficiencies by providing the capability approach's criticisms. As we shall see, what these criticisms have in common is a concern with the process as well as the outcomes of social justice, and on the practical achievements of justice, rather than its "transcendental principles".

a. Utilitarianism: Welfarist, Consequentialist, and Sum-ranking Theory of Justice

In *An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals*, Hume stresses that "public utility is the sole origin of justice" (Hume 2006 [1751]: 13). Among the various forms of utility, "happiness" is taken as the most appropriate metric, especially in the classical understanding of utilitarianism (see Bentham 2005 [1789]: 11-12). Utilitarianism claims that the true action is the one yielding "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Campbell 2010: 116) and considers justice in accordance with the aggregative interests of society. Therefore it is known as an aggregative theory of justice (Miller 2002: 32). Modern forms of utilitarianism in essence do not differ much from its classical understanding, though, in some cases, different forms of utility (e.g. desire-fulfilment, preference satisfaction, pleasure) are taken as the primary metric of assessment and they are usually reflected by the income levels of people, particularly in applied works by economists (Robeyns 2005a: 97).

The capability approach raises three concerns about utilitarian understandings of justice. The first is its welfarist characteristic, which exclusively judges the goodness of people's state of affairs through their personal utility (Sen 1979a: 468, 1979b: 205). This suggests that non-utility information is not taken into account when assessing their advantage. For instance, if a woman is happy despite being paid less than a man for the same job, any non-utility concerns (e.g. a moral obligation for equal pay for equal work) is irrelevant in the assessment of her advantage. By the utilitarian reckoning, as long as they are equal in the utility calculus (happiness, satisfaction), there is no injustice. However, people's mental states can be socially conditioned. If a woman is either a "broken unemployed", "tamed housewife", or "hopeless destitute" (Sen 1985a: 17), she could be "happily" employed despite being paid less than a man for the same job. So, taking conditions of mental states as the exclusive informational basis for the assessment of justice yields inconsistent, and possibly, unreliable results. The second concern touches on the sum-ranking calculus of the utilitarian approach (Sen 1992: 94, 1999a: 59). The utilitarian account focuses on aggregate utility without sensitivity as to how this utility is distributed within society. This error illustrates the blindness of the utilitarianism to intragroup inequalities. Lastly, as a consequentialist approach, utilitarianism judges every action with respect to its outcome regardless of how this outcome is achieved. For instance, if the violation of certain rights and entitlements generates greater happiness for a greater number of people, the utilitarian account exercises no judgment on the legitimacy of these violations. However, the process of achieving the outcomes cannot be ignored in the assessment of a person's advantage (see Sen 2009: 215-21), since certain rights (e.g. freedom of speech) are indispensable constituents of a person's advantage. After all, no one would want to be a "happy slave or delirious vassal" (Sen 1999a: 62).

b. *Libertarianism: Entitlement, Process and Individual Oriented Theory of Justice*

Contrary to utilitarianism, libertarianism is a procedural or consequence-independent model, and can be considered as a re-interpretation of classic liberal doctrines that justify inequalities in outcome based on the equality in the "acquisition" and "holding of property". In libertarianism, immunity from interference and autonomy in decision-making are given uncompromising priority, which underpins

the idea of “negative freedom”³. Individuals are entitled to the right to have full command of their properties, regardless of the consequences arising from the exercise of this right. Redistribution is seen as a form of despotism that threatens people’s liberty since it presupposes an intervention on the “spontaneous order of the market” that is assumed to justly distribute all rewards (e.g. possessions and positions) and undesirable outcomes (e.g. poverty). Therefore, any “patterned” attempt of intervention, such as taxation, is seen as unjust and an interference to people’s liberty. Nozick (1974: 151-182), the prominent figure of libertarianism, carries this normative view further by proposing three principles that should govern the process of distribution. The first that identifies an acquisition principle of distribution and which justifies inequalities in outcome is the most controversial and therefore deserves discussion here. Drawing on Locke’s self-ownership argument (see Locke 1689 {1956}: Ch. 5), Nozick argues that people should be entitled to the rights to hold properties that they acquire through their skills and labour, and to exchange the products of their labour and skills in the market. For instance, if Wilt Chamberlain, a talented player of 1970s, signed a contract in exchange for his skill and labour for a team, and his fans are willing to pay to watch him, for Nozick, this is a just transaction even though “Chamberlain winds up with (...) a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has” (ibid. 161-2). Further, taxing the earnings that Chamberlain acquired through his skill is unjust since redistributing his earning to those who did not contribute to the production of them actually constitutes a theft. According to Nozick, the “taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour” (ibid. 169) and constitutes a violation of individual’s liberty. For Nozick, inequalities in outcome are justified based on the moral argument of self-ownership, which claims that everyone is entitled to the fruits of their own labour and skills⁴.

Criticizing the moral foundations of the libertarian distribution, Sen argues that the self-ownership argument considers production as if it is only a “personal production”. Based on this, he addresses two criticisms (Sen 1985c: 14-7). Firstly, production is an interdependent process that involves “the

³ For a discussion on the distinction between negative and positive freedoms, see (Berlin 1969).

⁴ Libertarian justification of inequalities is a form of meritocratic defence of inequalities, which can be criticized in so far as skills or talents are not natural qualities inherent in everyone, but are rather gained within the social process. Thus, these are not personal, but social properties. For example, a person’s ability to gain a valued skill varies according to several social factors (e.g. class, gender, ethnicity). Moreover, even though meritocracy may be admitted in principle, it is still arguable that this can bring in justice in today’s classed societies. Marshall and Swift (1993 and 1997; Marshall 1997) persuasively demonstrate that even for people having similar or approximate merits, their class-origins are influential toward their class-destinations and certain class-privileges compensate failures of less meritorious individuals.

joint use of different resources”. Moreover, there is no way to estimate the exact value of the contribution of an input (e.g. the skill and labour of Chamberlain) to the value of total output. Even if the marginal contribution of an input to the outcome were estimable, this still would not change the fact that an input is valuable only as long as other inputs are available. Secondly, Sen argues that there is a difference between contributing to the production of an output and owning the means of this production. For example, producers’ production of a good (e.g. wheat) only justifies their entitlement with regards to their contribution to the output, but not their ownership of impersonal resources (e.g. land) used to produce the output. Therefore, the libertarian claim to the ownership of impersonal resources based on a person’s marginal contribution to the output is a significant leap that requires additional moral justification. Sen addresses one further criticism, arguing that it is unclear why libertarianism bestows an uncompromising priority to personal liberties (Sen 1985c: 217). This is deeply problematic since “the actual consequences of the operation of these entitlements can, quite possibly, include rather terrible results” (Sen 1999a: 66). For example, in his examination of large-scale famines, Sen concludes that some famines can come into existence without any decline in the quantity of food production or violation of anyone’s libertarian entitlements (Sen 1983a). However, since the libertarian line of reasoning is consequence-independent, it takes no notice of these terrible results as long as individuals’ *libertarian* rights are protected. Therefore, its “ethical acceptability” says Sen, “is open to severe questioning” (Sen 1993a: 526).

c. Rawlsian Model: Fairness, Primary Goods, and Difference Principle

The Rawlsian approach seeks fairness, rather than absolute equality, to solve the problems of distribution. It does so by drawing on some hypothetical devices of impartiality that Rawls terms the “original position” (Rawls 2003: 15-9) and the “veil of ignorance” (ibid. 118-23). To decide on the principles of justice that should govern distribution, Rawls invites parties to join a discussion in their “original position”. The original position refers to a hypothetical position of primordial equality in which parties stand behind a veil of ignorance where they have no knowledge of their own societal positions (e.g. class and status, natural assets and abilities, their life plans and conception of the good, cultural belonging, or generation), except that of “the general facts about human society” (e.g. certain knowledge of political affairs and economic theory, the basis of social organization and the laws of

human psychology). Rawls' aim in this endeavour is to introduce a hypothetical state of affairs that aligns his theory with the moral principle of political liberalism that does not favour any normative conception of the good. When parties are in an "original position", they do not have any interest to favour any one particular conception of the good or to pursue vested interests; therefore, they are unconstrained to specify "rational" and "fair" principles of justice. According to Rawls, these would result in the following principles:

- (I) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all.
- (II) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" (Rawls 1985: 227).

Rawls considers the first principle, which guarantees basic political liberties (e.g. freedom of speech, right to vote, freedom of association) for everyone, having priority over the second principle, which arranges distributions in power and wealth in line with a meritocratic view and some egalitarian concerns. According to Rawls, a just society is one where these principles are applied to the basic institutional structure of the society to fairly distribute the "social primary goods" that are "things that every rational man is presumed to want (...) whatever a person's rational plan of life" (2003: 54) and as the "all-purpose means that are necessary (...) to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good" (2001: 57). Rawls identifies five categories of primary goods: basic rights and liberties; freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; income and wealth; and the social bases of self-respect⁵.

How these principles operate and distribute the social primary goods is crucial. In Rawls' "well-ordered society", the first two categories of the primary goods are equally guaranteed to everyone due to the first principle having priority over the second principle. Following this, everyone is given an equal chance to access the third category of primary goods based on the first part of the second principle. It is only after these conditions are satisfied that the second part of the second principle -*the difference principle* that aims to compensate disadvantages of the worse-off by redistributing the fourth category of primary goods, income and wealth- can come into play. It is worth noting that the

⁵ For the contents of these categories, see (Rawls 1993: 308-9).

difference principle exclusively aims to compensate economic disadvantages, since “in a well-ordered society where all citizens’ equal basic rights and liberties and fair opportunities are secure, the least advantaged are those belonging to the income class with the lowest expectations” (Ibid. 59)⁶. In the end, people will become treated fairly, and hence secure the fifth group of social primary goods, the social bases of self-respect.

Sen directs several criticisms at Rawls’ model by stressing its transcendental nature (Sen 2009: 8-10; 2008: 336-7), the priority that it attaches to personal liberties *vis-à-vis* economic rights (Sen 1999a: 63-5; 2009: 65), and its focus on the means of good living instead of the “actual living that people manage to achieve” (Sen 1999a: 73; see Sen 1992: 84). What matters most for our discussion here is related to the last point, namely the distinction between the means and ends of good living. Sen’s primary criticism of the Rawlsian model is that “Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage” (1979b: 216). In other words, Rawls presupposes that equal holdings of primary goods yield equal advantage in achieving a good life. However, the different social and personal characteristics of people lead to considerable interpersonal variation in their conversion of primary goods and, bring inequalities in the achievement of people’s own conception of a good life. As an example, “in the context of inequality between women and men (...) biological as well as social factors (related to pregnancy, neonatal care, conventional household roles, and so on) can place a woman at a disadvantage even when she has exactly the same bundle of primary goods as a man” (Sen 1990a: 116). Therefore, for Sen, “if the object is to concentrate on the individual’s real opportunity to pursue her objectives, then account would have to be taken not only of the primary goods the person holds, but also of the relevant personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods into the person’s ability to promote her ends” (Sen 1997: 198). Sen claims that Rawls’ model is substantially sensitive to the inter-end variation⁷ in line with pluralistic liberal conception of justice, yet it falls short of taking inter-individual variation⁸ into account (Sen 1992: 85-6)⁹.

⁶ Rawls disregards disadvantages associated with people’s gender, race, social class, or ethnicity (Rawls 2001: 59, note 26).

⁷ Different conceptions of the good life that different people have.

⁸ People’s different characteristics that lead to variation in their abilities to convert resources into achievement.

⁹ For a detailed discussion of Rawlsian model from the perspective of Sen’s capability approach, see Robeyns 2009b: 109-12, and Robeyns and Brighouse 2010.

III. The Capability Approach: A Freedom-Focused Approach to Social Justice

In distinguishing the capability approach from mainstream theories of justice, Sen stresses that “a person’s capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to value provides a general approach to the evaluation of social arrangements, and this yields a particular way of viewing the assessment of equality and inequality” (Sen 1992: 4-5). Sen is more interested in the actual life of people (see Sen 2009: 233) and injustices in practice instead of constructing transcendental and perfect principles of social justice. Therefore, he does not consider either principles of “just process”, or the “just consequence” as the ultimate marker of social justice. His primary concern is what people are able to be and do in practice. So, his capability approach proposes to evaluate social arrangements based on the extent of people’s freedom to achieve the beings and doings that they value (Alkire and Deneulin 2009: 31; Alkire 2005: 122 and 2008: 28). This normative proposition reflects a theoretical departure from the evaluative frameworks of utilitarianism, libertarianism, and Rawlsian model, where people’s (dis)advantages are instead assessed in terms of “utility” (i.e. subjective well-being, desire fulfilment), “entitlements” (i.e. rights to acquisition and holding of a property), or possession of “social primary goods” (i.e. varied forms of resources) respectively. Sen says, “an alternative to focusing on means of good living is to concentrate on the *actual living* that people manage to achieve (or going beyond that, on the *freedom* to achieve actual livings that one can have reason to value)” (Sen 1999a: 73).

The following section explains how the capability approach assesses a person’s (dis)advantage. First, I underline the relativity of means and the significance of focusing on the constituents of the good life that are ends. Second, I explain why analyses of (dis)advantage must move from the space of ownership to the space of achievement by referring to the diversity of human beings and social contexts. Third, I stress the relevance of freedom, or capability, in the assessment of (dis)advantage by underlining the agency aspect of one’s advantage.

a. *From Means to Ends: Functionings*

Focusing on people’s freedom, the capability approach proposes to shift attention away from means-based assessments of social justice (focusing on resources, income or entitlements) to an ends-based one which extends the assessment of people’s (dis)advantages beyond their possessions to include

whether they can achieve what they have reason to value. Means do not have intrinsic value in the capability approach since they are only instrumentally valuable, whereas ends have an intrinsic importance and take central place (Robeyns 2009a: 40). Ends are reflected by the “functions of means” which are at the centre of the assessment in the capability approach. For example, the possession of a means (e.g. a bike) has only instrumental value in achieving an intrinsically important end (e.g. transportation), so what makes a mean important in terms of people’s advantage rests in its function with regards to allowing them to achieve the corresponding end.

In the capability literature, the functions of means are usually described as “functionings” reflecting “the various things a person may value doing or being” (Sen 1999a: 75). Functionings can be considered as diverse aspects of the decent life (Alkire 2005: 118) and are categorized in a wide range from the very elementary (e.g. being adequately nourished, being mobile) to quite complex beings and doings (e.g. developing self-respect, being not ashamed in society) (see Sen 1985b: 197-8, 1992: 39, 1999a: 75). When the capability approach is applied to assess a particular social policy, a development project, people’s well-being level, or the outputs of poverty alleviation strategies, the achievement of functionings is given central place in the assessment. In other words, functionings constitute the primary space of analysis when the capability approach is applied with the purpose of assessing *outcomes*. Concentrating on people’s achievement of functionings, rather than means ownership, refers to the fact that different people need different kinds, or amounts, of means to achieve the same ends. Indeed, this is a broader informational ground than mainstream theories of social justice and aligns with more sociological understanding of a person’s well-being. For instance, when Townsend criticized Rowntree and Booth’s definition of absolute poverty, he also proposed to look at the relative requirements of “being not ashamed in community life”. Townsend’s works (1979 and 1987) that underline the relativity of needs and poverty have a similar outlook with functioning-based assessments. However, note that Townsend and Sen are in disagreement in a broader framework (see Townsend 1985; Sen 1983b, 1985d). Townsend does not have a conception of poverty that is completely separated from inequalities (see Townsend 1970: 2); thus, for him, poverty is always a relative state of affairs. However, inequality and poverty are more detached phenomena in Sen’s conception. According to Sen, “it would be absurd to call someone poor just because he had the

means to buy only one Cadillac a day when others in that community could buy two of these cars each day” (Sen 1983b: 159). In contrast with Townsend, Sen argues that there is always “an irreducible absolutist core” in poverty.

b. *From Ownership to Achievement: Conversion Factors*

Moving from the space of means to the space of ends in the assessment of (dis)advantage is a move away from the space of ownership to the space of achievement of functionings. This move requires us to incorporate more information than commodity or holdings-based assessments require for analysis. Achievement after all is not only associated with holding the necessary means, but also with the extent of a holder’s ability to make use of these means. Including information about people’s ability to make use of their means is thus a more complex undertaking that focuses on the practical achievements of (in)justice. In the capability approach, this is practiced by looking at *conversion factors*, which are sources of diversity leading to variation in people’s conversion of means into achievement.

As mentioned above, Sen’s main criticism of the Rawlsian model is of its insensitivity to people’s diverse characteristics and so to the variations in the conversion of means into the achievement of functionings. This criticism refers to the need to move from the space of ownership to the space of achievement in the assessment of (dis)advantages. The capability approach therefore advocates taking the diverse characteristics of people that influence their conversion of commodities into account. The significance of the conversion issue for an assessment of achievement can be illustrated in relation to people’s social characteristics (e.g. gender, age, disability). A woman who is constitutionally entitled to vote may be socially constrained in her ability to exercise this right due to, say, established gender norms in her milieu. Thus, she may be unable to convert her right into an achievement. An analysis of her advantage that relies exclusively on information on her holdings (her right to vote) is insufficient and must be accompanied by additional information on how the established gender norms influence her conversion of her rights.

As might be expected, the factors affecting conversion are numerous. Additionally, some factors may be influential only in particular social contexts. Gender, for example, does not necessarily lead to variation in the achievement of voting in every social context. Moreover, the same factor can

influence people's achievement in the opposite direction in different contexts due to distinctive political, cultural, economic, or environmental arrangements. We can find some general accounts concerning what these factors might be in Sen's works. In his earlier works, Sen categorizes conversion factors vaguely as personal (e.g. age, sex, mental and physical abilities, body size) and external/social factors (e.g. environmental differences, the nature of social conventions, position of the person in the family and society) (1987a: 17-8 and 1992: 19-20). In more recent works, he provides a clearer account and identifies five broad categories (1999a: 70-1 and 2009: 254-7): personal heterogeneities (e.g. age, gender, disability), diversities in the physical environment (e.g. climatic circumstances), variations in social climate (e.g. prevalence or absence of crime and violence, the nature of community relationships), differences in relational perspectives (e.g. established patterns of behaviour in a community, conventions/customs), and distribution within the family (e.g. distributional rules followed within the family). Robeyns (2003: 63, 2005a: 99, and 2009a: 41) provides a less abstract classification which is frequently referred to in the literature. She categorizes three groups of conversion factors: personal conversion factors (e.g. physical condition, sex, metabolism, reading skills and intelligence), social conversion factors (e.g. discriminative practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies), and environmental conversion factors (e.g. climate, geographical location).

c. *From Achievement to Advantage: Ability to Achieve or Capability*

Focusing on people's achievement of functionings, rather than their ownerships of means provides us with a more complex understanding of (dis)advantage, poverty, or development¹⁰. However, within the capability approach, "a focus on achieved functionings alone, like a focus on utility, is incomplete" (Alkire 2002a: 6) since the achievement of a functioning informs us how well-off people are from a normative point of view, but does not necessarily account for their advantage. This is because people's *well-being* is usually associated with their achievement of functionings, but an assessment of their *advantage* requires us to incorporate broader information concerning if they have valued and achieved these functionings through *choice*, or *freewill*. This is where the term "capability" comes into play.

¹⁰ For an early application of this view in the field of development, see: Sen 1987: Appendix A.

Capability refers to a person's "ability to achieve various combinations of functionings that we can compare and judge against each other in terms of what we have reason to value" (Sen 2009: 233). Functionings reflect "achievements" while the term capability reflects "ability to achieve" which is the ultimate concern in the assessment of (dis)advantage from the capability approach's perspective. What distinguishes the ability to achieve from achievement¹¹ is that the former includes the *agency aspect* of a person's advantage (Sen 1985b: 203-8, 1992: 56-7). Paying attention to the agency aspect of people's advantage avoids the danger of conceiving people only as a "vehicle of well-being" (Sen 2009: 288), and ignoring the significance of their own judgments for their own life.

The term agency is a broad one and used in quite complex ways in sociology and cultural studies. In the capability approach, it is used in a less complicated sense, referring to the freedom of "someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well" (Sen 1999a: 19). To illustrate how agency is relevant to a person's advantage, let us consider the example of two groups of people: one chooses to fast, and the other starves due to lack of access to food. Neither of the groups achieves adequate nourishment; and drawing on an external criterion (e.g. a medical criterion), we can state that the *well-being achievements* of both groups are equally poor. However, there is an obvious variation in their *agency achievements*. Those who fast are starving despite having the *ability to achieve* nourishment, while the other group does not possess the same ability. The difference in their abilities demonstrates the variation in their advantage, despite their similarity in terms of non-achievement. When non-achievement is a result of agency, it is not necessarily a reflection of disadvantage, although it can be seen as a form of ill-being from a particular normative point of view. Similarly, achievement that is not accompanied by one's agency is not necessarily a reflection of advantage, even though it can be a form of well-being from a particular normative point of view. To illustrate, let us consider the act of voting from a liberal point of view, here identified as a valuable functioning indicating how well-off a person is in influencing decisions and policies in

¹¹ Differences between people's ability to achieve and their achievement can be explored in four different, but interrelated, spaces that are (1) well-being achievement, (2) well-being freedom, (3) agency achievement, and (4) agency freedom (see Sen 1985b: 203-8, 2009: 287-90; Alkire 2002a: 129-30). However, to avoid complications, I will confine myself with general terms of the agency aspect here.

her/his community. The voting achievement of an anarchist from Australia (where voting is compulsory) does not demonstrate that s/he is equally advantaged with another person who votes voluntarily. They are equal in achievement yet not in advantage since the anarchist is forced to achieve while the other is not. In distinguishing people's advantage from their achievement, we should keep in mind that, according to the capability approach, "the 'good life' is partly a life of genuine choice; and not one in which the person is forced into a particular life -however rich it might be in other respects" (Sen 1987a: 45).

IV. The Valuational Exercise: An Internal Division

Thus far, I have presented the core arguments of the capability approach with a particular focus on (dis)advantage, yet left out the more controversial issues. However, Sen's capability approach, especially in its application, eventually raises some serious questions due to its complex and demanding requirements in assessing people's (dis)advantage based on their actual practices rather than transcendental abstract moral principles of mainstream theories of social justice. The most challenging question in its application is what beings and doings (functionings) ought to be accepted as valuable and guaranteed to people. This is known as "the question of the list" and reflects the primary controversy between two prominent figures of the capability approach, namely Sen and Nussbaum¹². This section aims to shed light on this controversy.

a. Sen's Deliberate Incompleteness

Sen deliberately avoids specifying functionings except for identifying some basic ones (e.g. having shelter, free movement, access to food, being clothed) (Sen 1979b: 218, 2004a: 78, 2005: 158). There are several reasons behind his deliberate incompleteness. Firstly, the plurality of people's values and their different, and sometimes contending, conceptions of the good make reaching a universal agreement on constituents of the good life impossible. As Qizilbash (2002: 468) emphasizes, Sen wants the capability approach to be compatible with the different conceptions of the good life that different people hold. One way to achieve this is to specify the "space of value", rather than the "object of value". For example, those who have different conceptions of the good may disagree about

¹² For other differences between Sen and Nussbaum as well as some similarities, see Nussbaum 2000: 11-5, 2011a: 17-21; Robeyns 2005a: 103-5, 2003: 68-70.

what makes one's life good; yet they may agree that a good life is the one in which they can live in accordance with their own conception of the good. So, an agreement among people who have different conceptions of the good can be established if the agreement is sought in the "space of value" (e.g. freedom), rather than the "object of value" (e.g. having a religious or secular lifestyle). From this point of view, it becomes evident why Sen's capability approach "pause(s) at outlining a general approach, with various bits to be filled in" (Sen 1993b: 48) and avoids proposing a complete list of various objects of value. Secondly, for Sen, the capability approach is not a complete theory of justice, but rather an evaluative framework in which well-being, quality of life, (dis)advantage, or development can be assessed in terms of the informational space of freedom. Robeyns (2005b: 195-6) notes that "he wants to advance the capability approach as a general approach to the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangements and not as a well-defined theory of, for example, the good life or constitutional principles". Thirdly, Sen puts forward an epistemological argument that is associated with the limits of "pure theory". According to Sen, a pure theory that is completely detached from social reality "cannot 'freeze' a list of capabilities for all societies all time to come" (2005: 158, 2004a: 78). To expect such an achievement is a misunderstanding of what theory can (and cannot) do.

According to Sen, the specification of functionings is a social choice exercise, meaning that people themselves should be in charge of specifying what matters in their lives. Therefore, he frequently emphasizes that people must be given the opportunity of "shaping their own destiny" (Sen 1999a: 53) – a destiny which will be influenced by what functionings they are capable of achieving. This leads him to propose "public discussion" (2009: 241-3) as a method of specification and to underline the significance of political freedoms in specification of functionings (1999a: 147-57; see Alkire 2002a: 129-37). Sen provides three reasons why political freedoms or democratic public discussion¹³ should be given a substantial role in the specification functionings. The first reason is associated with the intrinsic importance of political freedoms that refers to the ethical significance of democracy as

¹³ Note that Sen does not have a narrow conception of democracy that is confined with electoral politics. He frequently emphasizes the "messiness" (1999a: 79) and "demanding" (Ibid. 10) nature of the democratic decision-making. In the *India: Development and Participation*, Dréze and Sen provide a vague account concerning the basic requirements of democratic decision-making process (see Dréze and Sen 2002: 347).

opposed to authoritarian or technocratic decision-making and to the direct relevance of political freedoms for people's advantage (1999b: 10). The second reason is associated with the instrumental role of public discussion in empowering people with raising their voice and to create political incentive for public authorities to take decisions in the interest of the general public. For example, based on his analysis of famine, Sen (1999a: 152; 2009: 338-45) points out that no famine has occurred in countries where citizens have freedoms to make their voice heard and to influence public decisions by free elections, a free press and strong opposition parties. Therefore, when the conditions of democratic public discussion and participation are guaranteed, the public becomes capable of specifying its priorities more equitably than technocratic or authoritarian regimes can do. The third reason is that political freedoms and democratic public discussion play a constitutive role in societies' value formation. They may help people to interact with each other and to learn from others through the free flow of information in uncensored democratic societies. Sen gives the example of how the public discussion of gender inequalities helped to acknowledge the need for certain freedoms for women that had not been taken into account previously (2009: 242), such as the emergence of new values in India that recognize the detrimental effects of high fertility on women's lives (1999b: 10).

b. *Nussbaum: A Normative Proposal and Criticism to Sen*

Contrary to Sen's evaluative use of the capability approach, Nussbaum uses it with the aim of constructing a normative theory of justice that underpins constitutional entitlements that have to be guaranteed for every citizen. Drawing on an interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of human dignity (see Nussbaum 2000: 72-4, 2003a: 40), she specifies ten "central human capabilities"¹⁴. These are life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control of one's environment¹⁵. She claims that these capabilities are valuable cross-culturally and allow people to function in a "truly human way" to fulfil their human potential. According to her, without these capabilities, human life would be "too lacking, too impoverished, to be human at all" (Nussbaum 1995: 80). Central human capabilities, like human

¹⁴ Nussbaum uses the term "capabilities" to refer valuable functionings. For Sen, the term of "capability" refers to the notion of "being able to be and do"; however, we can see that Sen has also started to use the term "capabilities" in his recent works.

¹⁵ For the content of these capabilities, see (Nussbaum 2000: 78-80, 2007a: 76-8, 2011a: 33-4).

rights conventions, are “pre-political”, meaning that they are “inherent in people’s very humanity” (2011b: 26) and everyone must hold these capabilities to pursue a dignified life. In Nussbaum’s account, the task of securing these capabilities belongs to government:

“a key task of a nation’s constitution, and the legal tradition that interprets it, is to secure for all citizens the prerequisites of a life worth of human dignity -a core group of capabilities- in areas of central importance to human life” (Nussbaum 2007b: 7).

Assigning political authority with responsibility, Nussbaum aims to give these capabilities the characteristic of political entitlements. Hence, she moves from moral philosophy to political philosophy, setting her approach within political liberalism, claiming that her list is free from any metaphysical grounding. In rebuttal of Sen’s stance on the diversity of valuable functionings, she claims (2000: 76) that her list of capabilities represents an “overlapping consensus” of those who have different conceptions of the good; and it “can be endorsed for political purposes, as the moral basis of central constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very different views of what a complete good life for a human being would be” (Ibid. 74).

Nussbaum claims that Sen’s conception of freedom is too vague and that if the capability approach has anything to say about (in)justice, then it must specify what beings and doings are valuable. According to her, “one cannot have a conception of social justice that says, simply, ‘all citizens are entitled to freedom understood as capability’” (2003a: 46) since “some freedoms limit others, some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad” (Ibid. 33). Nussbaum’s foundational criticism of Sen rests on the unreliability of what people deem valuable for themselves. Drawing on Sen’s criticism of utilitarianism, Nussbaum says:

(...) females in certain poor regions of India suffer from diseases of malnutrition in greater numbers than males do, and thus are less capable of various functionings requiring mobility and vigour. (...) Let us say that they make a more sophisticated answer: that, according to their deeply held conceptions of value, a lower level of capability in these areas of life is what it is right and good for a woman to attain. (...) Sen takes their case to show the deficiency of approaches to distribution that are based upon desire and satisfaction; well and good. (...) Just as people can be taught not to want or miss the things their culture has taught then they should not or could not have, so too they can be taught not to value certain functionings as constituents of their good living (...) (1987: 38-9).

Nussbaum’s criticism refers to the question of adaptive preferences, which is a substantial problem for the capability approach. In Nussbaum’s works, the problem of adaptive preferences is usually considered as a problem of false-consciousness that restrains people from being aware of their true

interests (see Lukes 1974). In fact, the problem of adaptive preferences refers to a preference formation process in which people downgrade their preferences to the accessible options for themselves within the structure of inequalities. In other words, it is a process of “adjustment of people’s aspirations to feasible possibilities” (Elster 1982: 219; 1985). However, people’s preferences are not only shaped by what is feasible or adapted to their straitened conditions. “A more specific and manipulative form of adaptation can occur through social conditioning or cultural and religious indoctrination” (Clark 2009: 23). There are various sources of social conditioning such as norms, culture, traditions, religion, ideology, and so forth. These, according to Nussbaum, can manipulate or distort what people value and render their values unreliable sources of information for the specification of what makes life good. Because of this, Nussbaum claims, we must be willing to specify “fundamental entitlements that are to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped, often, by unjust background conditions” (2003a: 34).

V. The Need for a More Sociological Examination of (Dis)advantage

Both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approaches are criticized within various perspectives in the literature. In this section, I firstly note that both scholars give too little attention to “societal aspects, including social institutions and norms and their role in enhancing (or worsening) capabilities” (Stewart 2013a: 156; 2013b). Subsequently, I take Nussbaum’s argument that we should specify capabilities based on a normative abstract account of the good life, and demonstrate that it is a flawed argument insofar as it does not sufficiently take the social construction of *choice* into account. Afterwards, I focus on Sen’s capability approach and demonstrate that it is more sensitive to sociological concerns than that of Nussbaum, yet still contains some vagueness and needs to be clarified in terms of how to (1) explore the role of social and contextual conditions in people’s valuation and reasoning behind these values, (2) examine the diverse roles of conversion factors and variations in people’s achievement of functionings, and (3) identify a way to incorporate people’s ability to achieve functionings.

a. Criticisms of Sen and Nussbaum’s Approaches

Sen’s method for the specification of functionings, which is “public discussion”, is criticized from various perspectives in the literature. Evans (2002) and some other scholars (Sandbrook 2000, Hill

2003, Deneulin 2005, Young 2006, Deneulin and McGregor 2010, Sayer 2012), for example, criticize Sen for a lack of attention to structural inequalities and unequal social power, as well as to the adverse effects of these inequalities on conditions of democratic public discussion. Robeyns (2005a) notes that Sen does not clarify how public discussion can take place and what conditions of equal participation and representation are required for it. Sayer (2012) stresses that the social structure that either enables or limits one's capability are usually overlooked in the capability approach. As Sugden (2006) emphasizes, the majoritarian characteristics of contemporary form of collective-decision making is also problematic in Sen's proposal. Navarro (2000) argues that Sen does not sufficiently address the sources of power and how power is reproduced in a society, whilst Dean (2009) underlines that capitalism, and its influence on human relations, is like "the elephant in the room" in the capability literature. All of these arguments suggest that Sen's focus on justice in practice fails to fully engage with structural constraints. Similar criticisms are made of Nussbaum's approach. We can briefly collect her critics into five categories that suggest that her approach: is paternalist and "colonialist" (Stewart 2001: 1192, Stewart and Deneulin 2002: 63, Deneulin 2002: 511), offers a normative - particularly westernized- account of the good life (Okin 2003: 296, 310-2; Menon 2002: 156), fails to acknowledge certain types of disadvantages such as cognitive disability (Baylies 2002: 733), lacks political and democratic legitimacy by neglecting the process of generating the list (Robeyns 2003: 69, 2005b: 201), and is insensitive to structural inequalities that make a person capable at the expense of another's disadvantage (Quillen 2001: 94, 98) and supports a fragmented understanding of the individual detached from their social identity (Feldman and Gellert 2006: 442). Besides, given that Nussbaum's approach provides a full-blooded "list of capabilities", according to Gasper, it "could perhaps jeopardize gains from Sen's deliberately less ambitious version" (1997: 281).

These criticisms are prevalent in a wide ranging literature. The key point that I want to make here is that despite both Nussbaum and Sen do acknowledging the substantial influence of the external social conditions on people's ability to achieve a good life, their proposals come up short in terms of how constraining external social conditions are to be evaluated and tackled. Below, I underpin this argument by addressing some internal tensions in Nussbaum and Sen's approaches from a different perspective rather than solely relying on the existing criticisms prevalent in the literature.

b. *Nussbaum's Unjustified Theoretical Leap*

As mentioned above, Nussbaum's primary criticism of Sen derives from the question of adaptive preferences. People's preferences and values are socially conditioned, which leads them to (de)value some functionings in line with what they have been taught is right to be and do¹⁶. Based on such a perspective, Nussbaum rightly points out an inherent problem in Sen's theory, namely that what people value can be manipulated by the social conditions embedded in their lives, which makes their values a potentially unreliable source of information in the specification of functionings. However, Nussbaum leaves the significance of social constraints aside in constructing her solution by proposing to specify functionings based on an abstract normative account that is extrinsic to people's lives.

Nussbaum clearly diagnoses the problem of adaptive preferences that is inherent in Sen's approach¹⁷. However, I argue that her diagnosis is hardly a reason to propose a particular normative account of "capabilities" whose achievements are, in principle, still left to people's own decision within not only Sen's approach but in her own approach too. Nussbaum has a misconception that the adverse effects of adaptation to one's social conditions can be avoided by entitling people with a normative list of capabilities that are identified from an extrinsic point of view. She ignores the fact that adaptation is not always a result of one's incapability. It is a deeper problem inherent in one's *choice*; and actor's choice is untouchable in the capability approach as Nussbaum herself recognizes:

All the central capabilities (...) are best seen as occasions for choice, areas of freedom: thus a person can have all ten capabilities on my list without using all of them, and this is true of rights as well. A person may have the right to religious freedom, for example, in a secure form, and care nothing about religion (...). In this way [*the capabilities approach*] avoids being "imperialistic", or imposing a single lifestyle on all. Instead, it asks governments to create and protect contexts of choice. (Nussbaum 2011b: 28-9) (see also 2000: 101; 2011a: 25) (Emphasis added).

Based on this, we can say that if a person, who is fully entitled with and capable of achieving Nussbaum's capabilities, chooses not to achieve these capabilities for reasons of belief (say, due to religion), learning (say, through traditions) or adaption (say, during upbringing), then there is nothing to do about this person's disadvantaged choice in the framework of Nussbaum's approach. Assume

¹⁶ Drawing on some participatory studies, Clark (2009: 25) and Qizilbash (2006a: 100-1) stress that disadvantaged people can make sophisticated deliberation on choices. But, for the sake of argument, I will keep these empirical findings outside of the discussion that I presently pursue here.

¹⁷ Indeed, Sen also explicitly recognizes the adverse effects of social conditions on people's choices (see 1979b, 1985a, 1985b, 1987b). However, as Walby (2012: 103) notes, he does not offer a satisfactory solution. I will discuss this issue later.

that Vasanti and Jayamma, two poor oppressed women to whom Nussbaum interviewed while specifying her list of central capabilities (Nussbaum 2000: 15-24), choose not to draw on Nussbaum's capability of "being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life" since this is what they have been taught during years of patriarchal oppression, religious indoctrination, or traditional domination. If Nussbaum says that we cannot push them to achieve this capability since this would be "imperialistic", then what is the point of entitling them with it? If someone has adapted to certain ways of life in relation to their disadvantaged social conditions, this adaptation will not only shape what they value, it will also shape their choice of what to achieve. Thus, entitling people with certain capabilities is not a solution to the problem that arises from adaptation to disadvantaged social conditions. As long as Nussbaum ascribes a fundamental value to people's choice, she cannot resolve the adverse effects of adaptation by specifying functionings from a normative account of the good life. Therefore, she must find another justification for her claim that we must be willing to specify "fundamental entitlements that are to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped, often, by unjust background conditions" (Nussbaum 2003a: 34). Briefly, Nussbaum's approach involves an unjustified theoretical leap from her diagnosis of the problem in Sen's approach (adaptation to social conditions) to her solution to this problem (externally entitling people with certain abstract and normatively constituted capabilities).

Nussbaum's theoretical leap can be considered as a move from a sociological criticism of Sen to an abstract philosophical solution, by entitling people with the Aristotelian requirements of "human flourishing" in line with liberal principle of "freedom of choice". An important corollary of her solution is to ignore people's disadvantage that arises from their socially adapted choices in achievement. However, if Nussbaum had pursued a solution based on a sociological point of view (as she did in diagnosing the problem in Sen's approach), this corollary might not have occurred. One way to address this issue is to examine the social construction of people's choices, for example by examining why some people deliberately choose to not exercise the capabilities to which they are entitled. Nussbaum does not discuss this since such a discussion would take her away from her "grand universalism" and liberal account of unconditional "freedom of choice". Instead, Nussbaum simply invites us to come to terms with her selection of capabilities and asks us to implement her set of

capabilities as the basis of constitutional entitlements, regardless of whether people choose to value or achieve them. As a result, Nussbaum's liberal and abstract Aristotelian solution does not leave us room to incorporate or discuss the contextual social reality that leads to variability in people's choice of achievement; and so we do not know how to tackle people's socially adaptive choices in achievement within the Nussbaum approach.

c. Role of a Sociological Understanding in Sen's Approach and Potential Improvements

Contrary to Nussbaum, Sen's conception of social justice emphasizes both the diversity of valued functionings and the variability of people's routes to achievement of good life and so is in greater alignment with sociological understandings of inequality which stresses the diverse and situationally constructed nature of social values and practices. We can illustrate his alignment in various ways. For example, he justifies his reluctance to specify a universal list of functionings by emphasizing the limits of "pure theory" detached from social context (Sen 2004a: 78). He frequently stresses the variability of requirements of achieving a good life in different "social climates", especially when he compares the capability-based analysis of poverty and inequality with income-based ones (Sen 2006b: 36-7; 1992: 114-6; 1999a: 72-4). His criticism of Rawls, which underlines the diversity of social, environmental, and personal characteristics of people leading to variation in converting primary goods into the achievement of a good life, is another example of his alignment with sociological understanding of inequalities (Sen 1992: 85-7; 2009: 260-2). His criticism of utilitarian welfarism that ignores socially conditioned nature of desires and preferences (Sen 1985a: 12; 1985b: 188, 191; 1987a: 15; 1990b: 127) is also compatible with a sociological interpretation of how people's desires and preferences are formed. However, as Holmwood notes (2013), Sen uses selected sociological examples to illustrate the strength of his arguments relative to rival normative frameworks, rather than giving empirical sociological work any more extended place as a playmaker that could modify and advance his approach. In the end, Sen's partial use of empirical sociological understandings of the importance of the situated context leads to the emergence of some vagueness that needs further clarification as how to (1) incorporate the role of social and contextual conditions in the specification of functioning, (2) explore diverse roles of conversion factors and variation in people's

(non)achievement of functionings, and (3) move beyond the achievement of functionings to assess people's ability to achieve functionings.

We can firstly point out that how people's values are examined in Sen's approach is too vaguely identified. To begin with, we should note that Sen is aware that people's desires and preferences can be conditioned. As is stressed above, he frequently refers to the situated nature and complexity of human life by drawing on a sociological account of the socially constrained characteristics of desires and preferences. However, the difference between what people value and what they desire is not clear in his works. Nussbaum, for example, claims that

“Sen seems on the whole to think that we remove the problem by moving from the utilitarian emphasis on desire to his own approach's emphasis on the valuation of capabilities. But the valuational procedure that is involved in capability selection seems to me, at least without further description, to be no more incorruptible than desire itself is” (Nussbaum 1987: 39).

In fact, Sen partially corrects this vagueness by proposing that we should not simply take what people value, and that we need to scrutinize their values by looking at whether their valuation is “reasoned”.

In doing a scrutinized valuation -central to the account I am concentrating on- the need for scrutiny is built in, but scrutiny does not get its due when pleasures or desires are simply taken as the basis of moral or political calculation. The difference lies in the need for critical assessment and scrutiny for reasoned valuation, which differs (...) from just tallying pleasures or desires (this also explains, by the way, why I speak so much about ‘reason to value’ ...) (Sen 2006a: 92).

Precisely because values may be conditioned, Sen frequently emphasizes the phrase “reason to value” (see Sen 2009: 231). Sen, in essence, proposes that we be critical of what people value and thus opens the door for a reflection on their values. Exploring people's reasoning can serve to enlarge the information that is used to specify basic functionings. For example, a person's reasons for valuing access to education may be in order to be employed, to have social respect, or to satisfy curiosity. Hence, such an exploration of reasonings can be useful in finding out the contextual relationality between different functionings and can help us to distinguish instrumentally valued functionings (e.g. education) from intrinsically valued (e.g. social respect) ones.

However, in more intricate social cases, Sen's proposition falls short. This is not only because “agency goals” or adaptive preferences, “are not necessarily impulsive, or unreasoned” (Burchardt

2009: 7). But this is also because Sen neither identifies what qualifies a person's reason as an admissible reason nor explains how we should evaluate these reasons. Consider, for example, a religious person who values banning of food consumption in public space during Ramadan and points out the religious doctrine s/he embraces as a reason behind this valuation. How should we evaluate such valuation and reasoning while specifying valuable functionings? Consider a Turk who values to not live with Kurds¹⁸ and rationalizes this valuation based on a view that Kurds are "purse-snatchers", "robbers", "benefit scroungers", and "murderers" (see Saracoglu 2010: 247-55). What, according to the capability approach, makes this person's valuation and reasoning inadmissible? Consider the case of a black woman who values skin-bleaching based on the aesthetic reason of having a lighter skin tone that is considered "beautiful and attractive" in her context (Fokuo 2009: 139-40, Hunter 2007: 246-9). How should we evaluate such valuation and reasoning while specifying valuable functionings for these women? It would be obviously absurd to claim that these people should be able to access what they value, just because they have a "reason"¹⁹. We can find out similar cases that are not easy to evaluate within the present framework of Sen's approach, unless it incorporates a sociological perspective that focuses on what social and institutional mechanisms, for example, lead the black women to ascribe "having a light(er) skin tone" a *meaning* of "being beautiful and attractive". This is because our reasoning in valuing a being or doing is socially constructed and shaped by contextual meaning(s) that we ascribe to that being or doing. We judge and decide whether a being or doing is valuable based on contextual meaning(s) of that being or doing in our milieu. Underlining the significance of a sociological perspective for the capability approach, Deneulin and McGregor also stress this point, saying that "the capability approach rests on the notion of reasoning, but reasoning depends on the meanings that we share and that are constructed through our relationships in society" (2010: 512). Although Sen's approach recognizes the importance of critical scrutiny of people's

¹⁸ An empirical research conducted in 59 cities of Turkey revealed that 47,4 percent of Turkish respondents does not want to live nearby Kurds (KONDA 2011).

¹⁹ There is an extensive sociological literature on the classed nature of aspirations, which argues that the most disadvantaged not only adjust their aspirations to what they feel is "realistic", but also develop a "sense of place" (Bourdieu 1984 [2010]) in which they *actively* reject that from which they feel excluded and which leads to "amor fati" or "love of one's fate". Such cases can be considered as examples illustrating that the unequal social conditions may lead disadvantaged people to develop various reasons for, not valuing, but devaluing certain functionings that they should be able to be and do. These cases of "amor fati" can also be considered, albeit from a reverse angle, that people's reasoning on its own may not be reliable in the specification of valuable functionings.

values by proposing an exploration of whether their valuation is reasoned or not, it does not take into account that people's reasonings are also socially constructed. It considers that "reasoned valuation" is the end point of inquiry. Thus, Sen does not aim to explain what makes a reason an admissible reason, nor offers us any analytical framework to evaluate these reasons. However, by considering the socially constructed nature of people's reasoning (as well as values) through the contextual meaning(s) that they ascribe to what they value, a sociological examination that focuses on these meanings of valuable functionings is crucial when specifying what people should be able to be and do.

In Sen's approach, there is also another issue that requires a more sociological examination of people's (non)achievement. To recap, in the capability approach, people's achievement is primarily discussed in relation to the conversion factors²⁰ that influence their ability to convert resources into the achievement of functionings. By proposing to explore the diverse characteristics of people and the influences of social context on their achievement, Sen opens the door to engaging with a more sociological perspective in assessing a person's (dis)advantage. However, his proposition needs further clarification of what these factors might be and how they operate in relation to the social context. To demonstrate the inadequacy of Rawls' primary goods, Sen for example refers to the significance of people's diverse characteristics leading to variation in the conversion of primary goods and gives us a vague account of what these factors of conversion might be (see 1992: 27). He stresses that "conversion problems can involve some extremely complex social issues, especially when the achievements in question are influenced by intricate intragroup relations and interactions" (Ibid. 33). However, Sen does not say much about what these "extremely complex social issues" might be. Instead, he confines himself to pointing out "physical differences" such as "metabolic rates, gender, pregnancy, climatic environment, exposure to parasitic diseases and so on" (Ibid.). More recently, he provided a clearer account of the conversion factors and identified the five categories (1999a: 70-1, 2009: 254-7) that I presented earlier. However, these categories are still too vague and abstract to be a tool in the examination of achievement. For example, "established patterns of behaviour in a community" or "the nature of community relationships" are very broad categories in which countless factors can be placed. Besides, there are clearly some overlaps between Sen's categories. It is difficult,

²⁰ Note that Sen mostly uses the term "sources of diversity" to point out these factors in his works (see Sen 1992, 1999a).

for instance, to distinguish “the nature of community relationships” from “conventions and customs”. Moreover, it is impossible to examine the influences of what Sen calls “personal heterogeneities” (e.g. gender or age) without any reference to “social climate” or to the “distributional rules followed within the family”. On this basis, we can argue that both identification and classification of conversion factors in Sen’s works are too vague.

In addition, examination of how the conversion factors operate and their various roles in people’s actual life need to be advanced further. When we look at how the conversion issue is conceptualized and how these factors are analysed in the literature, we can observe that there is a two-dimensional understanding concerning the role of these factors in people’s achievement. They are, especially in quantitative works, mostly considered as entities that either constrain people’s conversion of resources and lead to non-achievement of functionings (understood as disadvantage) or enable their conversion and lead to achievement (understood as advantage). However, (dis)advantage is not a two-dimensional fact that only varies *between* achievement and non-achievement of functionings. In addition, there is also a variation *within* achievement and non-achievement. For example, assume that my achievement “to participation effectively in political choices” (Nussbaum 2000: 80, 2007a: 77, 2011a: 34) is constrained in a milieu by my ethnicity and thus I cannot achieve it. However, non-achievement of this functioning for a woman who shares the same ethnicity may be entrenched by her gender. Or, while a particular religious identity may enable people to achieve social respect in a milieu, some other factors (e.g. their economic class, ethnicity, political identity) may operate to worsen, or improve, their achievement of this functioning. There are always worse forms of non-achievement (disadvantage) as well as better forms of achievement (advantage). Yet, the generic conceptualization of the conversion factors is confined with two dimensions and thus limited in capturing variation *within* the achievement and non-achievement of functionings. On this basis, to develop a more advanced understanding of (dis)advantage, the capability approach needs to have a more nuanced conceptualization of the conversion factors that can capture various forms of (dis)advantage.

Thirdly, there is a difficulty that is embedded in the very nature of the notion of “capability” in Sen’s approach. Sen advocates focusing on “what a person *can* do rather than what he *does* do” (Sen

1981: 209). Although he does not ignore the significance of people's *achievement* of functionings, his ultimate concern is people's *freedom* or *ability to achieve* functionings (Sen 2002: 83-4). This is because some people "could have a good deal of freedom, without achieving much" (Sen 1985a: 3). As I discussed earlier, even though those who starve because they choose to fast and those who starve because they lack food are similar in outcome (being inadequately nourished), their advantages considerably vary, since fasting is not simply starving, but "is choosing to starve when one does have other options" (Sen 1992: 52). Therefore, Sen's approach requires us to look at not only what a person has achieved, but also what options were available to this person prior to the achievement.

Suppose I can choose various styles of life A, B, C, and D, and I choose A. Consider now that the other styles of life -B, C, and D- become unavailable to me, but I can still choose A. It might be said that my standard of living is unchanged, since A is what I would choose anyway. But it is not absurd to argue that there is some loss in my living standard in this reduction of freedom (Sen 1985a: 49).

This is to say that, instead of restricting the analysis to what a person achieves, the capability approach prioritizes incorporating "counterfactual or possible choices and scenarios" (Comim 2008: 174)²¹ that this person has when assessing her/his (dis)advantage. However, as various scholars have argued (Zimmerman 2006: 478, Walby 2012: 105-6, Comim 2008: 173-6), this brings great difficulty for the practical, especially quantitative, applications of Sen's approach: "how can we measure counterfactual or unobservable variables? And how can capabilities be measured if a capability is a possibility (which can be exercised or not) and not an actuality?" (Comim 2008: 174). Due to this difficulty, some scholars, for example Krishnakumar (2004: 12), argue that people's capability cannot be directly measured. Sen explicitly acknowledges the difficulty of dealing with the counterfactual nature of a person's capability in practice, which leads him to propose looking at people's "realized states", or achieved functionings, when assessing their (dis)advantage in basic functionings (see 1992: 52). Similarly, Robeyns also advocates that "given that we have little direct information about people's capability levels, we could start by taking group inequality in achieved functionings as indicative of inequalities in capabilities" (2003: 85, see also 2005a: 101, 2006a: 354). However, if we assess people's (dis)advantage based on their achieved functioning, then the theoretical value and

²¹ In other words, the capability approach requires us to look at unachieved or counterfactual options and to ask what a person could possibly choose and achieve.

plausibility of distinguishing the “ability to achieve” and “achievement” disappears in practice. This is a quite serious threat to the distinctiveness of the idea of the “capability”.

However, exploring the process of achievement that people pass through when they achieve a functioning can enable us to conduct an interpersonal comparison of (dis)advantage based on people’s “ability to achieve”. Due to various social and institutional dynamics, some people must follow different paths to achieve valuable functionings. Following these different paths, they struggle and negotiate with different and additional difficulties that are not applicable to everyone. Thus, the requirements for achieving valuable functionings vary and escalate for these people. This is to say that there are additional and thus unequal costs that some are required to pay for achievement. Although they also manage to achieve functionings in the end, since the requirements of achievement differ for these people, they can be considered as being less “capable” of achieving valuable functionings. Consider, for example, the social norms that govern the intra-household distribution of resource (Sen 1999a: 71). Patriarchal distributional norms most often lead to unequal allocation of resources between different genders with female children given less resource than male children. This usually leads to variation in their achievements of various functionings, for example, in education. Although inequality in achievement of functionings is the mainstream trend in such cases, some female children compensate for this unequal distribution by, for example, hardworking, and so outperform their male siblings in achievement (see Qizilbash 1997: 256). Although both genders achieve educational outcomes, female children pay an unequal cost in the process of achievement by having to work harder than their male siblings. Such cases demonstrate that the valuable functioning of taking education is less available to these female children. Thus, they are less able to achieve this functioning (*vis-à-vis* capability of their male siblings) due to a structural constrain stemming from patriarchal norms. Such a scrutiny of process can also be applied to the ethnic, age, or disability-associated unequal costs of achievement. Such a scrutiny, however, requires a great deal of contextual inquiry of the social and institutional dynamics that lead disadvantaged people to follow different paths of achievement so as to compensate for their disadvantages. It requires for example exploring the various decisions that they took, the strategies they pursued, and the sacrifices they made prior to the achievement. Therefore, incorporating the process of achievement could be quite difficult without a

sociological inquiry that can facilitate us examining the social and institutional dynamics of people's decisions, strategies, and sacrifices in detail.

Briefly, a sociologically informed understanding of human diversity and complex social conditions has played quite a significant role in the development of Sen's approach and strengthened his position against rival theories of social justice. However, this sociological account has mostly been used by Sen as a stock for empirical examples to rebut other theories of justice, rather than as an empirical research strategy that might modify and advance his approach. As a result, Sen's capability approach still needs some further clarification. I argue that it can be advanced further by exploring the contextual meanings of what people value and the social construction of their reasonings, how conversion factors operate and lead to variation within the (non)achievement of functionings, and incorporating the process aspect of achievement. In the next section, I provide a general sense of the terrain of existing applications, which helps to observe how the theoretical ambiguities of Sen's approach that I have mentioned here are echoed in the empirical literature.

VI. Existing Applications of the Capability Approach and Their Limits

There are quite a number of applications of the capability approach in the empirical literature and too many to present in the limited space of this chapter. In this section, I instead present selected representative (quantitative and qualitative) applications of the capability approach and their primary findings with the purpose of providing a general sense of the existing applications. Following this, I discuss the limitations of these applications.

a. Some Existing Applications of the Capability Approach

The capability approach has deeply influenced studies of the identification and evaluation of poverty, quality of life, well-being, living standards, and development since the mid-1990s. However, its influence on the works of sociologists in these fields has, as Holmwood (2013: 1171) notes, remained relatively limited. However, it cannot be said that sociologists have completely neglected the capability approach. In addition to various theoretical works which have addressed several criticisms to the capability approach, some sociologists have also drawn on the capability approach as a framework to address, for example, the theoretical assessment of certain institutional policies (e.g.

Dean *et al* 2005, Bonvin and Farvaque 2005, Rogowski *et al* 2011) or to conduct historical case studies (e.g. Gascoigne and Whiteside 2011, Schmit 2013). However, most of the grassroots applications that engage with people's actual practices empirically usually come from human development practitioners and welfare economists who are not always sensitive to the sociological concerns that I have discussed above.

The vast majority of applications of the capability approach use pre-existing datasets with the aim of quantitatively measuring people's achievements in selected functionings (e.g. in employment, education, health, sheltering)²². Such studies often ably confirm the general claim of the capability approach that restricting the analysis of inequality, or poverty, to people's holdings or expenditures misses out on considerable disadvantage we can manage to uncover by examining achieved functioning instead. Klasen, for example, (2000) used a 1994 South African household survey to compare an expenditure-based assessment of poverty with an achievement-based one in selected functionings. He concluded that when social groups' well-being is analysed in selected functionings (including housing, employment, nutrition, and transport), they are found to be more deprived than a solely expenditure-based assessment would indicate. Akkoyunlu-Wigley and Wigley (2008) compared the educational achievement of Turkey with the educational achievements of some other low and middle-income countries, and demonstrated that whilst Turkey seems better off in income poverty and inequality, it lags behind in educational achievement which leads to poverty in spheres of some other functionings. Similarly based on the Household Living Standard Survey of 1996/97 in Mozambique, Ardeni and Andracchio (2008) demonstrated that although some women were not poorer than men in income and consumption indices, when deprivation was assessed in educational attainment and health conditions, women emerged as worse-off than men. A common aspect of most of this research is that it authoritatively presumes that selected functionings represent what people value in their life. However, the contextual meanings of functionings vary greatly and their contribution to one's advantage usually requires the presence of other functionings. For example,

²² The annual HDRs (Human Development Reports) that rank countries according to their achievements in three functionings of life expectancy at birth, mean and expected years of educational attainment, and gross national income at purchasing power parity per capita is the most known example of this type of research (For a review of HDRs, see Alkire 2010).

Arends-Kuenning and Amin's qualitative research (2001) on the meaning of education in rural Bangladesh demonstrates that the promotion of girls' schooling does not by itself improve their advantage since the value of education for local people is primarily associated with how it increases the chances of girls in the marriage market. According to these scholars, the promotion of schooling as a form of addressing gender disadvantages must be accompanied by other policies targeting patriarchal norms and preferences.

Qualitative applications of the capability approach are far less common than the quantitative ones. Some qualitative research aims to specify valuable functionings based on people's own account of the good life (e.g. Greco *et al* 2015), whilst other research explores the role of people's aspirations in the specification of functionings by drawing on qualitative methodologies (e.g. Conradie and Robeyns 2013). We can see that qualitative research is also employed to explore achievement in a particular domain, such as in employment (e.g. Egdell and McQuaid 2014). Alkire (2002a), for example, used a focus group discussion to assess the impact of the poverty alleviation strategies of three small-scale development projects in Pakistan based on the capability approach. She found some functioning achievements that these projects facilitated for women (such as empowerment, solidarity, friendship) that would have been missed if the assessment had been done based on traditional cost-benefit analysis. Although Alkire's research is particularly important in demonstrating the significance of people's own voices in the specification of functionings, it is basically an assessment of specific development projects and does not directly focus on (dis)advantage. Wolff and de-Shalit's *Disadvantage* (2007) in which they focus on "the least advantaged" is another important work. Using Nussbaum's list of central capabilities, they conducted semi-structured qualitative interviewees in Israel and Britain. In addition to Nussbaum's central capabilities, they also found an additional four functionings that are necessary for a good life²³ (Ibid. 57-60). Wolff and de-Shalit pay considerable attention to indexing and (de)clustering the dimensions of (dis)advantage, and identify the least advantaged in terms of achievement of six most basic functionings²⁴. However, the element missing in this work is that we cannot get sufficient information about how or why some people become "the

²³ These are complete independence, doing good to others, living in a law-abiding fashion, and understanding the law.

²⁴ These are life; bodily health; bodily integrity; affiliation (belonging); control over one's environment; and senses, imagination, and thought (Ibid. 106).

least and most advantaged". Thus, the variability within the (non)achievement remains as an unexplored issue. How social factors of, for example, ethnicity, religiosity, age, gender lead to variation in (non)achievement and let the emergence of the worst-off or best-off are not explained. One notable study is Burchardt and Vizard's (2011, 2007; see also Burchardt 2006) human rights based-capability list that has been developed for equality and human rights monitoring in Britain. Assembling a hybrid method, this approach specifies ten human rights-based functionings which were, firstly, derived from international human rights treaties and, then, combined with data gathered from a multi-stage process of qualitative interviewees in which people with different social identities (e.g. age, gender, religious background, ethnicity, economic class, disability) were asked what they value in their lives. From this, Burchardt and Vizard proposed 77 valuable functionings under ten domains that are life; physical security; health; education; standard of living; productive and valued activities; individual, family and social life; participation, influence and voice; identity, expression and self-respect; and legal security. The list is quite inclusive and less abstract than the most of the other lists (e.g. lists of basic human values or needs), which helps us to develop a more nuanced understanding concerning the dimensions of one's (dis)advantage for Wales, England and Scotland.

We can mention more and rather complex quantitative measurements that operationalize the capability approach²⁵ as well as qualitative ones that applied the capability approach in different contexts for different purposes (e.g. Clark 2002, Uyan-Semerçi 2004, Schischka *et al* 2008, Hollywood *et al* 2012a, Ibrahim 2014b, Tiwari 2014). But, I assume, the studies presented above are enough to provide a general sense of how the capability approach has been practically applied so far. Now, I turn to discuss what is missing in the existing empirical literature in detail.

b. *Limits of the Empirical Literature*

In line with the theoretical ambiguities that I discussed above, I would like to address four salient issues about which the existing empirical literature of the capability approach needs to be developed further: (1) exploring people's values and reasonings in relation to social and contextual conditions, (2) moving beyond the conventional conceptualization of the conversion factors to develop a more

²⁵ Unfortunately, I do not have space to present and discuss all of these studies here. But, for helpful reviews of the quantitative applications of the capability approach, see (Robeyns 2006a), (Leßmann 2012), and (Dang 2014).

advanced understanding of (dis)advantage (3) extending the analysis beyond the (non)achievement of functionings to incorporate people's *ability to achieve* in the analysis, (4) applying the capability approach in a unified manner that integrates its three major spaces of evaluation (specification of functionings, their (non)achievement, and people's ability to achieve them).

Firstly, we can see that quite a number of applications measure people's achievement quantitatively by drawing on existing datasets. They inform us quite precisely about poverty, quality of life, or development in people's achievement of selected functionings and thus move beyond the conventional resource-based (e.g. income) assessment of these issues. However, this type of research authoritatively presumes that selected functionings represent what people value in their life. It falls short of explaining to what extent they are valued by people, which is, in principle, counter to the anti-paternalist nature of the capability approach. Besides, many of these applications do not aim to critically scrutinize people's values in relation to social and institutional conditions although Sen explicitly, albeit vaguely, acknowledges the significance of such scrutiny²⁶. Apart from a few qualitative studies (e.g. Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, Greco *et al* 2015) that implicitly provide some information about people's reasoning, to the best of my knowledge, there is no application that substantially evaluates people's reasoning in relation to their contextual norms, culture, and structural disadvantages. So, the omission of any detailed exploration and evaluation of people's own values, reasonings and contextual meanings of their values can be pointed to as a salient issue in the existing empirical literature.

Secondly, within the conceptual framework of the capability approach, paying attention to conversion issues is critical to assessing interpersonal variation of (dis)advantage in achievement. However, as discussed previously, Sen has never provided any detailed conceptualization or specification for the notion of conversion, only proposing a vague account of "sources of diversities" influencing people's conversion of resources into achievement. And, except for few studies (e.g. Grasso 2002, Chiappero-Martinetti and Salardi 2008, Egdell and McQuaid 2014, Haidinger and Kasper 2012, Hollywood *et al* 2012a), this issue has so far remained underexplored. There are quite a

²⁶ In fact, this point has started to come to the forefront very recently. Apart from Sen, Burchardt (2009: 8), Conradie and Robeyns (2013: 566), and Deneulin and McGregor (2010: 510) also underline this emphasis of Sen.

number of works that assess people's (non)achievement of basic functionings (e.g. education, health, employment) quantitatively. However, most of these works assess the variation between achievement and non-achievement of these functionings, but do not focus on variation within (non)achievement. This is, as I discussed previously, because of the limited two-dimensional understanding of conversion factors prevalent in the literature. Besides, as Zimmerman (2006: 475) addresses, interpersonal comparison of (non)achievement in the literature "is empirically limited to an aggregated method of comparison between groups on the basis of a bundle of variables mostly related to physical characteristics (...), but rarely to social qualities of individuals". On the other hand, considering that a common criticism of the capability approach is its lack of attention to the role of social structure, a sociological exploration of how people's social qualities operate in relation to social and institutional configuration of their milieu when they attempt to convert resources (e.g. rights, properties, income) into achievement is also a salient need.

Thirdly, I earlier discussed a theoretical difficulty, namely the counterfactual nature of capability, in assessing people's ability to achieve earlier. We can observe that this difficulty is reflected in the empirical literature since few empirical works assess the notion of "capability" in compliance with the philosophical distinction between "ability to achieve" (capability) and "achievement" (functioning). Therefore, there is not much to say about either the shortfalls or distinctions of the empirical works that have attempted to assess people's capability so far. However, an innovative research that does aim to assess people's "ability to achieve" is worth mentioning here. Through a postal questionnaire, Anand and van Hees (2006) asked thirteen hundred randomly selected English participants to rate to what extent they felt themselves capable of achieving eight functionings²⁷ in a seven-level scale. Recognizing the difference between ability to achieve and achievement of functionings explicitly, Anand and van Hees' research is able to inform us about the extent of achievability of these eight functionings for participants, and can be considered more informative about people's ability to achieve than many other existing empirical works. However, as Robeyns notes (2006a: 371), Anand and van Hees' research tells us about people's self-reported level of capability, rather than

²⁷ These are happiness, achievement, healthy life, intellectual stimulation, social relations, pleasant environment, personal integrity, and the development of personal projects (Anand and van Hees 2006: 280).

“capability” itself. Considering the capability approach’s criticism of the utilitarian metric that I discussed earlier²⁸, people’s self-reported level of capability (to what extent they feel themselves capable) to achieve functionings may not be their actual level of capability, but rather a conditioned one. Therefore, Anand and van Hees’ research has a weakness in assessing people’s “ability to achieve” since it does not take the social conditioning of people’s feelings into account. Briefly, when we look at the existing literature, we can notice that we not only need more empirical research that focuses on people’s “ability to achieve”, but also realize a more innovative approach that offers us a framework to incorporate people’s capability into the evaluation of their (dis)advantage.

Lastly, most applications are limited to one evaluative space, rather than applying the capability approach’s primary argument as a unified argument. Remember that in the capability approach people’s (dis)advantage is assessed by “their ability to achieve what they have reason to value”. This is a unified argument that integrates three major evaluative spaces: specification of functionings, people’s (non)achievement of these functionings, and their ability to achieve. These evaluative spaces cannot be completely separated from each other²⁹ due to the complexity of people’s lives where their valuation (space of functionings) is usually associated with what they see as achievable, which is influenced by their disadvantages, norms, and social characteristics (space of conversion factors), and which determines their ability to achieve (space of capability). Such a unified application may not be necessary when our purpose is to compare countries’ development level based on their achievements in certain functionings, or to assess results of a poverty alleviation strategy, or to evaluate the quality of lives from a normative perspective. However, when the capability approach is applied for an interpersonal comparison of (dis)advantage, a unified application that addresses all of these spaces seems necessary due to their mutual dependency.

Briefly, the existing empirical literature of the capability approach needs to be developed further in terms of four issues that have been insufficiently dealt with so far: (1) specifying valuable functionings in relation to social and institutional conditions, (2) exploring how conversion factors

²⁸ Briefly, the capability approach advocates that people’s subjective perceptions are not reliable source of information since these perceptions can be conditioned by structures of inequalities and disadvantages stemming from their social backgrounds.

²⁹ Kremakova (2013: 403) also argues “none of the identifiable capabilities, functionings, or conversion factors are isolated factors, but they are mutually dependent and can reinforce or negate each other”.

operate within social and institutional configuration of society (3) moving beyond to (non)achievement of functionings to incorporate people's ability to achieve in the analysis, and (4) applying the capability approach in a unified manner that integrates its three major evaluative space. Considering that these issues in the empirical literature have emerged in relation to the theoretical ambiguities of Sen's approach that I discussed previously, empirical research that aims to address these issues can offer much to conceptually and analytically advance Sen's approach and thus his "idea of justice".

VII. Conclusion

The capability approach has been proved useful in furthering an understanding of social justice. Its criticisms of consequentialist, welfarist, process-oriented, entitlement and/or commodity-focused theories led to a more nuanced and multi-dimensional conceptualisation of various interrelated issues such as poverty, inequality, development, quality of life, well-being, and (dis)advantage. In practice, its arguments have also influenced and shaped perspectives and policy recommendations of various international and national organisations, such as the United Nations' (UN) development reports or Germany's official poverty and wealth reports. However, considering the capability approach's theoretical arguments and its existing applications that aims to evaluate (dis)advantage, there are still some foundational lacunae that demand further clarification and specificity to have a more rounded understanding of (dis)advantage.

This chapter discussed the core arguments of mainstream theories of social justice and provided criticisms of these theories from the perspective of the capability approach. Building upon these criticisms, this chapter moved further to explain the distinctiveness of the capability approach with a particular focus on the issue of (dis)advantage. Following this, I addressed a major tension within the capability approach regarding how the valuational exercise is performed in relation to Sen and Nussbaum's approaches. I complemented the section with a theoretical analysis of Sen and Nussbaum's positions from a sociological perspective and pointed out that Sen's deliberately incomplete approach gets along with sociological concerns better than Nussbaum's "grand universalism". Subsequently, looking at Sen's approach from a sociological perspective in detail, I

addressed its ambiguities that demand further clarifications and then demonstrated how these ambiguities lead to shortcomings in the empirical literature of the capability approach. Addressing these theoretical ambiguities and taking the shortcomings of the existing empirical literature into account, in this study, I aimed to assess various forms of (dis)advantage in Turkey by incorporating a more sociological perspective into the capability approach's normative framework.

Distinctiveness of such a sociological application of the capability approach can be summarized in three points. First of all, in order to specify what people should be able to be and do in their life, in this study I explore what participants value as well as if they have a reason(s) to value these beings and doings, in line with what the capability approach proposes. However, considering that both people's values and reasonings are shaped by social and institutional conditions through the contextual meaning(s) ascribed to these beings and doings, I also explore and include these meaning(s) in the assessment while specifying what people should be able to be and do. Afterwards, I look at the (non)achievements of these beings and doings with the purpose of conducting an interpersonal comparison of (dis)advantage in the space of achievement. To incorporate the social and institutional dynamics of people's achievement in the analysis, I particularly focus on four social qualities, namely ethnicity, religiosity and religious belonging, political identity, and gender; and I explore how these operate as conversion factors in people's social relations and why they operate in particular ways when people interact with institutions. This allows me to map the (dis)advantage based on the variation between achievement and non-achievement of functionings. However, in order to further develop this two-dimensional understanding of (dis)advantage, I look at how these characteristics interact with each other (e.g. ethnicity and gender or religiosity and political identity) and worsen or improve people's (non)achievement, allowing me to discuss on variation within achievement and non-achievement and to capture diverse forms of (dis)advantage. Lastly, aiming to carry the assessment one step further and to analyse people's ability to achieve, I focus on the process of achievement and look at different paths that people follow to achieve valuable functionings. In exploring the process of achievement, I particularly focus on those who achieved some valuable functionings even though their social qualities operated as negative conversion factors so as to constrain them in achievement. Exploring how these people struggled and negotiated with their constraints and achieved valuable

functionings at the end of the process, I attempt to figure out the unequal costs of achievement that they have paid, yet would not have paid if they were not disadvantaged by their social qualities in the first place. This allows me to reflect and discuss the extent of availability of valuable functionings and thus their ability to achieve them.

However, before starting to discuss these issues in the light of empirical findings of this study, I should explain the methodological requirements and implications of applying the capability approach in such a way. Therefore, in the next section, I first outline the research methods of this study, which sets out the aims and questions of the research project and explains the relevance of the qualitative methods in this study. After informing the reader about the sampling strategy of this study and explaining how the data collected and analysed, I provide a reflective assessment of the potential influence of my own social characteristics and position on the research. The next chapter will be followed by the empirical chapters of this study where I will discuss about the three distinctive points of this study in the light of the analysis of data.

Research Methodology

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that there is a need for a more sociological examination of capability-based (dis)advantage and pointed out three theoretical ambiguities that need further clarification in Sen's approach. In line with these theoretical ambiguities, I pointed out four shortcomings applicable to much of the empirical literature: To remedy these deficiencies, I suggested there is a need to (1) explore people's values and their reasonings in relation to contextual meaning(s) that they ascribe to valuable beings and doings (2) move beyond the generic conceptualization of the conversion factors to develop a more advanced understanding of (dis)advantage within (non)achievement, (3) extend the analysis beyond the (non)achievement of functionings and to explore the process of achievement to incorporate people's ability to achieve in the analysis, (4) apply the capability approach in a more unified manner that integrates its three major spaces of evaluation.

This chapter outlines the research methods of this study, indicating how it sets out to evaluate capability-based (dis)advantage in Turkey, by more fully incorporating the role of social conditions in people's valuation, achievement, and the process of achievement. The following section sets out the aims and questions of the research project and explains the relevance of employing qualitative methods, particularly narrative inquiry, in this study. Subsequently, the chapter turns to discuss the sampling strategy of the empirical inquiry. After explaining the rationale behind the sample design, it identifies and justifies the social diversities taken into account in the selection of participants and their social contexts, and informs the reader about the recruitment of participants and sample characteristics. The chapter then turns to discuss how the in-depth interviews were constructed and conducted in practice. This section also gives a glimpse of what type of data was generated. The chapter then describes the analytical strategy employed to analyze the data and explains how the data were coded and analyzed. Finally, the chapter gives a reflective assessment of the potential influence of my own social characteristics and position on the research, and ends up by explaining how I tried to acknowledge and redistribute the asymmetric power between me and the participants.

II. Research Focus and Methods

The deliberate incompleteness of Sen's capability approach is primarily motivated by his aim to keep it as an evaluative framework that is applicable in various ways and for different purposes (see Sen

1993b: 47). Despite the fact that most existing applications of the capability approach are quantitative, it is, in essence, “a framework of thought” (Robeyns 2000: 3, 2005a: 96) that is compatible with both quantitative and qualitative methods. As Chiappero-Martinetti, who mostly operationalizes the approach quantitatively, emphasizes, what matters is to choose a method that is compatible with the aim(s) of the empirical inquiry (2008: 296). This section first sets out this study’s overarching aim which arises from the need to respond to the theoretical ambiguities of the capability approach, discussed in the previous chapter. Subsequently, I present the research questions that compose of the evaluative spaces of this study. Following this, I turn towards research methodology and explain the significance of employing qualitative method, particularly generating narratives, in this study.

a. *Research Aim, Questions, and Methods*

This study aims to redress the neglect of social structure in both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s theoretical configurations of the capability approach, which is also echoed in the large body of existing empirical applications. In this regard, this study aims to operationalize the approach so as to conduct an interpersonal comparison of (dis)advantage in Turkey, particularly exploring (a) the contextual and socially constructed reasonings and meanings of what people value, (b) the role of socially embedded conversion factors and how they operate in people’s actual everyday practices when they attempt to achieve what they have reason to value, and lastly (c) the varied social processes that people pass through in achieving what they value. In the pursuit of this threefold aim, I framed this study with three evaluative spaces aiming to explore following questions:

Space of Valuation: What do people who live in different social settings and who have different social characteristics and accounts of the decent life value in their life? What meanings do their values convey to us, and why do they value what they value?

Space of Achievement: How do socially embedded conversion factors operate and influence people’s achievement of valuable functionings? How do people negotiate when they are constrained by these factors?

Space of Achievement Process: What do the various social processes of achievement tell us about people’s “ability to achieve”? Why do people follow different processes/ways in achieving what they have reason to value? What are the consequences of following various processes for them?

To evaluate people's (dis)advantages in these three evaluative spaces and given my focus on the contextual nature of values and reasonings, I employed a qualitative research strategy, since such an approach is "both flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data are produced" (Mason 2014 [2002]: 3) and is well suited to explore the various meanings that are constructed by people in the process of social interaction with others (see Merriam 2002).

In the capability literature, it is widely acknowledged that an adequate application of the approach is the one that incorporates people's own account of the decent life; and therefore, a participatory method of application is considered as the ideal method in line with the spirit of the capability approach (Alkire 2007: 106, Comim 2008: 160; Frediani 2010: 177, Ibrahim 2014a: 6; see also Crocker 2007, Burchardt 2014). This "participatory method" can be applied both quantitatively and qualitatively; yet existing applications are mostly quantitative. However, Zimmerman suggests that a change toward a qualitative method of application "is a key condition for a better sociological understanding of notions like freedom and opportunities" (2006: 467), and adds that "if one is interested in grasping different dimensions of capabilities, including conversion process and what people value, a comprehensive and qualitative moment is required" (Ibid. 479). Other scholars also underline the need for the qualitative application of the capability approach in order to "realize [the] full analytical potential of Sen's work" (Verd and Lopez 2011: 9); to elucidate "why people value certain capabilities and not others, and why they fail or succeed in achieving them" (Ibrahim 2014a: 13); to capture a deeper insight of the agency aspect in people's values, choice, and motives (Hollywood *et al* 2012b: 4); and to explore people's own sense of capability such as their experiences, expectations, and emotions (Bergstrom 2012: 5). In line with these concerns, I aimed to capture people's own accounts of capability in this study yet, distinct from numerous existing applications of the capability approach, without losing the sight of how social conditions influence their accounts. I, therefore, drew on a qualitative research strategy to generate participants' narratives through in-depth interviews. Below, I will discuss the analytical significance of employing the qualitative method and generating such narratives in this study.

b. *Analytical Significance of the Qualitative Method and Generating Narratives*

Interest in personal narratives in social research can be traced back to the early 1980s (Elliot 2005: 5). The narrative method of inquiry evolved from participatory research practice that demonstrates substantial sensitivity to social and cultural differences (Trahar 2009). The epistemological background of the narrative method arises from the argument that the objectivist assumptions derived from the natural science tradition are of limited use in understanding social life (Riessman 2002: 216) and in capturing the multifaceted, complex, and socially and contextually constructed nature of social reality. Such an approach to social reality is in alignment with the capability approach's foundational argument that there is no universal/single definition of the decent life and that conditions of valuation as well as achievement of decent life alter in relation to social context. In fact, quite a number of compatibilities can be traced between the theoretical configuration of Sen's capability approach and the epistemological background of narrative inquiry (see Deneulin 2006, Ricoeur 2006, and Phelps 2006). However, I must confine the discussion here to the analytical significance of people's narratives in the framework of this study.

In the framework of this study, the significance of employing the qualitative methodology to generate narratives is threefold. Firstly, the methodology supports my aim to explore why people value what they value and the various meanings that their valuations convey. This aim can ideally be achieved through a qualitative research strategy, as this is widely used "to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to them" (Denzin and Lincoln 2008: 4, see Arksey and Knight 1999: 32). As established in the previous chapter, Sen recommends scrutinizing people's values by exploring their reasonings in valuation and, by doing so, addressing the adaptation of their values to disadvantaged social conditions. If we take Sen's proposition seriously, then we should explore the socially and contextually constructed meanings of what people value to be and do. This is because people's reasoning in valuing is mediated by the meanings (Deneulin and McGregor 2010: 510) that are ascribed to functionings in their social context. Here, the analytical importance of generating narratives comes to the fore. "Narratives are the means of human sense-making" (Squire 2008: 43-4, see Spector-Mersel 2010: 208). When people are asked to tell their stories or biographical experiences, they reflect, select, interpret and then talk about what they consider important or

meaningful about those experiences. Thus, people's narratives convey the meanings that people ascribe to their own experiences. So, generating narratives is a way to unpack the various meanings that people ascribe to valuable functionings, which is the aim of the first evaluative space of this study.

Secondly, generating narratives is also a way to explore people's achievement of valuable beings and doings and the role of socially embedded conversion factors. As previously discussed, the existing capability literature mostly predicates a generic conceptualization of conversion factors that either enable or constrain people's achievement, and which is somewhat narrow. Our societies, after all, are not simply composed of two classes of people, divided between those who can achieve, for example, the functioning of "appearing in public without shame" (Sen 1985b: 199, 1985d: 670, 1992: 110, 1999a: 73), and those who cannot achieve this. There is also a massive group of people who may achieve it less than most whilst a smaller group achieves it far more than the rest of us. This is to say that there is considerably variation, not only between achievement and non-achievement of functionings, but within achievement and non-achievement too. The capability approach, therefore, needs a more nuanced analytical conceptualization of conversion factors, which is able to grasp the dimensionality of people's (non)achievement. Such a task can be fulfilled through the qualitative method, which is widely preferred when the aim is to arrive at a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of a phenomenon and to explore additional dimensions of it in a greater detail (Mason 2014 [2002]: 65-6). Although Sen's classification of conversion factors gives us a general sense that we should pay substantial attention to the social determinants of achieving a decent life, the empirical work in this field is to a large extent limited to quantitative techniques that rarely explore the role of people's social qualities in their achievement (see Zimmerman 2006: 475). Here, engagement with personal narratives comes to the fore again. People's narratives, as Mitchell stresses, "do not fall from the sky" (2011: 72) and are formed under the influence of social conditions. They are "social products produced by people within the context of specific social, historical and cultural locations" (Lawler 2002: 242) and structured through their social qualities such as gender, race, religiosity, social class and so forth (Plummer 1995: 22). In this regard, personal narratives, especially those concerned with people's everyday experiences, can be considered as mirrors reflecting both characteristics of their

social context and how their social qualities operate within that context. Based on this feature of narratives, generating personal narratives was adopted as a promising way to fulfil the aim of the second evaluative space, to focus on how socially embedded conversion factors affect the (non)achievement of functionings.

Lastly, in the third evaluative space of this study, I explore the varied processes that people pass through while achieving functionings. The process of achievement, and particularly the social conditions that lead people to choose different paths of achievement, are difficult to explore through quantitative strategies (Verd and Lopez 2011: 13). As previously discussed, exploring the process of achievement is crucial since this has the potential to inform us about variation in their “ability to achieve”, or their capability, the central concern of the capability approach. Again, when our purpose is to collect information about the process aspect of a phenomenon, or how things happen(ed), rather than focusing exclusively on the outcome, the qualitative method is preferable (Ritchie 2003: 29, see Lewis 2003: 58, 60). The significance of generating narratives to explore the process of achievement is in fact quite straightforward and associated with a salient characteristic of narratives that is, their temporality. When people are asked to relate their experiences, they typically structure their stories in a temporal order (Riessman and Speedy 2007: 430, see Polkinghorne 1991: 141-3). After all, a narrative, in its simplest definition, is a story that has a beginning, development, and ending, and is composed of sequential incidents that are causally interrelated with each other (see Elliot 2005: 7-8). In this regard, generating narratives concerning people’s biographical experiences is a promising method, not only for informing us about what happened at the end of the story, but also for examining how and why the story has ended up in this way. So given the temporally configured nature of narratives, narrative inquiry is a way of exploring the process aspect of achievement of functionings.

Before I turn to discuss how I generated narratives of valuations, achievement, and the process of achievement, I must first discuss the sampling strategy of the research and explain the rationale behind the selection of the selection of participants and social locations.

III. Sampling: Informational Sources of the Capability-Based Evaluation

The data used in this study was collected in Turkey where, as a researcher who is also from Turkey, I had familiarity to the broader culture, lifestyle, and norms, which provided significant convenience to make sense participants' narratives and interpret them in line with meanings that they convey. This section is concerned with the sample design of this study and sheds light on the informational sources through which I aimed to explore (dis)advantages in Turkey from the perspective of the capability approach. After explaining the rationale that governed the sampling process and discussing the social diversities that guided the selection of participants and their social contexts, I turn to discuss the participant recruitment process in practice and present sample's social characteristics.

a. Rationale: Ensuring the Study Incorporates Social and Contextual Diversity

Sen's capability approach aims to be more sensitive to how various human diversities (e.g. personal, environmental, and social) lead to variation both in people's subjective conceptions of the good and in their ability to achieve these conceptions. This emphasis on human diversity is not simply a theoretical ground that underpins Sen's departure from mainstream theories of social justice. "Pervasive human diversity", he says, is an "empirical fact" (see Sen 1992: xi and 117) on which the framework of the capability approach is built. Human diversity, therefore, should be given a central role in the application of the capability approach and the rationale that governed the sample design of this study was to incorporate a range of social diversities in its application to the context of Turkey.

There are quite a number of diversities ranging from personal traits (e.g. certain physical differences) to environmental (e.g. geographic and climatic differences) and social/institutional diversities (e.g. community relations, customs, conventions, institutional policies and regulations) (Sen 1999b: 70-1, 2009: 254-7; see Robeyns 2000: 5, 2003: 63, 2005: 99, 2009: 41), each of which can be a source of variation in people's capability. However, it is necessary to narrow our scope in the selection of diversities. Otherwise, "we might end up in a total mess of empirical confusion. The demands of practice indicate discretion and suggest that we disregard some diversities while concentrating on more important ones" (Sen 1992: 117). So, while being sensitive to the need to preserve diversity in the sampling frame of this study, I limited my attention to certain key diversities which were manageable within the time, workforce, and budgetary constraints of the study.

In making this selection, I gave priority to social and contextual diversities in order to explore the role of social conditions in people's valuation, achievement, and process of achievement; and used a purposive sampling strategy, a type of non-probability sampling, in which "each sample element is selected for a purpose, usually because of the unique position of the sample elements" (Chambliss and Schutt 2013: 97, see Bryman 2012: 416), I aimed to ensure such diversity in the sample of this study. In addition to some common diversities of social research (such as gender, age, educational background, and marital status), I also aimed to pay particular attention to four key social diversities in Turkey while sampling. These were religiosity and religious belonging, political orientation, ethnicity, and economic status. The next section discusses how my decision to incorporate these diversities was informed by both the literatures of the capability approach and of (dis)advantage in Turkey.

b. *Selection of Participants: Social Diversities*

Considering existing applications of the capability approach, it was not unreasonable to pay some degree of attention to participants whose gender, age, marital status, and educational background differ. However, in addition to these diversities, I also decided to ensure the sample reflected Turkey's diversity in terms of (1) religiosity and religious belonging, (2) political orientation, (3) ethnicity, and (4) economic status.

In deciding what diversities I should pay attention to, taking religious belonging and religiosity into account was unavoidable. Although religion and its influence on people's valuation are recurring themes in the capability literature and discussed in various ways (see Sen 2007, 2009; Nussbaum 2000, 2007a; Deneulin 2009b; Stewart 2013b), apart from some empirical works (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007; Burchardt and Vizard 2007, 2011), there is not much research that explores the role of religion in people's valuation and achievement. Recent empirical research demonstrates (Rankin *et al* 2014: 165-9) that the cultural space in Turkey is composed of three broad categories. One space is composed of those who are secular and embrace a more westernized lifestyle, tastes, and preferences; while another mainstream space is composed of those who have more traditional and religious lifestyle, tastes, and preferences. This finding to a certain extent is also confirmed by other empirical works (Kanra 2009: 65-112, Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 42-3) that point out that religion, particularly

Islam, has a formative power in the cultural space of Turkey. On this basis, I decided to sample to include diversity in terms of religiosity and religious belonging.

Regarding political orientation as a factor of social diversity, I should first note that it is not usual to consider political orientation as a source of diversity in the capability literature. However, it is reasonable to argue that people's conception of the good and their political orientation are related to each other; and that different political views can be considered as reflections of different value sets. Moreover, in Turkey, as some empirical works demonstrate (Toprak *et al* 2008: 110-26, Erdemir *et al* 2010: 201-10), political identity is quite influential on people's social relations in everyday life and also affects their achievement of certain institutional rights in various ways, due to the prevalence of political nepotism in institutions. This led to incorporate different political identities into my sampling.

Considering the well-documented Kurdish question in Turkey (see Ergil 2000, Zeydanlioglu 2008, Gunes and Zeydanlioglu 2013, Gambetti and Jongerden 2015) and the capability approach's strong emphasis on the importance of the recognition of minorities and their differences (Sen 2006a: 89, 2007: 114-5, 2009: 237-8 and 352-4, White 2009: 256-8), it was also important to include different ethnicities in my sampling. As Yegen argues, the Turkish state, from its establishment to the end of 1980s, has denied the existence of the Kurdish identity through certain ideological discourses (1996 and 1999) and "Turkishness" has been favored in the practice of certain citizenship rights (Yegen 2004: 56-7). Yegen (2007 and 2009) also addresses some recent signs demonstrating that the citizenship status and public image of Kurds in Turkey are in a state of flux, evolving from "prospectus-Turks" who could become Turk through assimilationist policies to "pseudo-Turks" who are, in origin, from a non-Muslim background and thus, from a state perspective, can hardly be Turk. There is also a broad empirical literature indicating the various disadvantages that Kurds in Turkey face due to institutional and social denial of their ethnicity (see Yoruk 2012, Zeydanlioglu 2012, Bayir 2013, Suzuki Him and Gunduz-Hosgor 2013, Kaya 2009, ICG 2012, and HRW 2012). In this regard, designing a sample composed of both Kurdish and Turkish ethnicities was an indispensable requirement.

Lastly, I also decided to include participants whose economic status, particularly income level, varies. As elaborated previously, a main tenet of the capability approach is that resource ownership, including income, is insufficient to explain people's (dis)advantage by itself. However, this does not mean that the capability approach ignores the significance of resources as means of achievement (Robeyns 2005a: 99-100). Therefore, I also decided to pay attention to economic status as a source of diversity influencing people's achievement of functionings.

c. Selection of Locations: Contextual Diversities

After decided to focus on key social diversities in the selection of participants, I had to decide where to collect data. Instead of conducting the fieldwork in a randomly selected location, I aimed to interview participants who live in different social contexts where the dominant characteristics of the social majority differ. The reasoning behind this decision was associated with my aim to enlarge the informational source of evaluation in this study by obtaining information concerning the varied roles of these social diversities. One way to achieve this aim was to explore selected social diversities in different social contexts since people's capability considerably depends on the social configuration of their context. Therefore, I decided to conduct the fieldwork in different social contexts where the social characteristics of majorities contrast with each other and selected Diyarbakir, Konya, and Izmir, which respectively are dominated by Kurdish people (who mostly support dissent Kurdish ethno-political movement), Turkish Sunni-Muslims (who mostly support conservative right-wing ideals), and Turkish less religiously inclined people (who mostly support republican secular values).

Diyarbakir is located in the southeast region of Turkey and is known as the historical and political capital of the Kurdish ethno-political movement. Its population is estimated at slightly over 1.5 million people in the latest census. However, due to the



Geographical Location of Diyarbakir

security and unitarity concerns of the Turkish state, publications concerning the ethnic composition of Turkey have been outlawed since 1965 and there are no official up-to-date statistics concerning ethnic demography in Turkey. Although it is difficult to give precise information concerning the ethnic composition of cities, Mutlu (1996: 526) estimates that the Kurdish population of Diyarbakir as around 72 percent in 1990, based on the Turkish Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) of 1965 where



A graffiti in Diyarbakir: PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and its armed wing, HPG (People's Defence Force)

people were asked what their mother language is. Similarly, it is also difficult to provide precise information on the religious composition of the population in Diyarbakir. However, it can be said that the dominant religion among the Kurds is Sunni-Muslim, which is not different from other regions of the country (Bruinessen 1992: 28, Ergener 2002: 31-5). In Diyarbakir, there are also some Alevish and a few

Yazidis, Assyrian, and Armenian. The population in the city has long been subject to the “homogenizing” and “assimilating” policies of the state (Gambetti 2009: 98, see also Guvenc 2011), which has culminated in Kurdish political upheaval and turned the city into a center of the Kurdish ethno-political movement. During my fieldwork, it was not difficult to observe that Kurdish ethno-political identity is the hallmark of everyday practices in the city and reproduced in various ways. For example, against the official symbols that glorify Turkishness and occupy the public space of Diyarbakir, there are quite a number of counter symbols that can be seen on almost all side streets of the inner-city, mostly in the form of graffiti that reclaims the public space and manifests the Kurdish ethno-political characteristics of the local majority. Based on the results of the last general and municipality elections, it can be said that the Kurdish movement and the pro-Kurdish party, the People's Democratic Party (HDP)³⁰, which has a left-wing liberal agenda, is strongly supported by a majority of people living in Diyarbakir (see Yegen *et al* 2015: 19). According to a recent official report, Diyarbakir's economic development is ranked at 67th out of 81 cities in Turkey (Ministry of Development 2013: 50).



A public board in central Diyarbakir, saying “how happy to the one who says I am Turk”

³⁰ At the time of fieldwork, it was named as BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) that dissolved itself and joined to HDP in 2014.



Geographical Location of Konya

Konya, like Diyarbakir, is also an inland city, yet located in central Anatolia. The population is around two million and primarily composed of people of Turkish ethnicity. Yet, there is significant number of Kurdish people (Andrews 1989: 111,

Mutlu 1996: 527). Konya also hosts an Abdal-Alawi community, a branch of Alawi-Muslim belief, (see Andrews 1989: 71-3 and 435-8) whose once semi-itinerant background, is nowadays a settled lifestyle. The city is known as a “citadel of Islam” in Turkey; and the majority of its population is Sunni-Muslim. It is the religious and historical center of the Sufi-Mawlawi Order, a Sunni-Muslim interpretation of Islam



Mawlawi Order in Konya



A view within public transport in Konya

that is popularly known by an image of whirling dervishes in the west. This religious identity is the main element of identity construction in Konya (Sari 2010: 3) and thus, quite influential on people’s everyday practices, lifestyle, and values. During my fieldwork, it was readily seen that numerous business and shops

were closed during Friday Prayers. It was also easy to observe that

women’s participation in public life is ensured under the condition of certain codes such as mostly going out during daylight, wearing modest clothes appropriate for Islamic values, and limited interaction with unknown men. A man, for example, may be asked to change his seat in public transport if he sits down next to a woman. In line with the influence of religion in everyday life, the majority of the



Closed businesses during the Friday Pray in Konya

residents in the city support the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which has ruled the country for the last 13 years, employing right-wing conservative economic and social policies. The economic development level of Konya is ranked at 20th out of 81 cities (Ministry of Development 2011: 50) and higher than Diyarbakir, but lower than Izmir, my third location.

Izmir is the largest city in terms of population size in my sample. It is also the third largest city of Turkey, after Istanbul and Ankara in terms of its economic potential. It is a coastal city located in the western part of the country. The population of Izmir is around four million and is primarily composed of people



Geographical Location of Izmir



A group of youngsters drinking beer in central Izmir

thousands of non-Muslim Anatolians (e.g. Greeks and Jews) in the early 20th century. According to Fleming, for example, Izmir's Greek population was bigger than its Turkish community by 1919 (2008: 81). However, following the population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey in 1923, thousands of Greeks had to abandon Izmir (see Ozkirimli and Sofos 2008: 116, Akcam 2004: 147). This history of demographic change in Izmir's population left an important legacy that is crucial to understanding its socio-cultural differences from Diyarbakir and Konya. In popular culture and everyday discourse, Izmir is named as "Gavur Izmir" (Kieser 2006: 49 and Saracoglu 2011: 73), a pejorative phrase meaning "infidel Izmir", due to its non-Muslim



Statue of "Gundogdu" (Sunrise), illustrating the salvation of Izmir from Greek occupation and establishment of the modern Turkey



A view from central bazaar of Izmir

history and strong attachment to

secular values and a western oriented lifestyle. Republican nationalism is another defining characteristic of Izmir. For example, during my fieldwork, I observed that the symbols and statues that configure the public space in Izmir idealize the Turkish nation-state as well as secularism; and such a configuration of public space is usually in rapport with the

political symbols and statements that are generated by the local majority in the public space of the

city. It can be said that these characteristics are quite influential in everyday practices and notions of the decent life for the majority of people in Izmir. In terms of dominant political orientation, the city is known as the stronghold of the main opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) which is the founding party of modern Turkey and is strictly affiliated to a secular, modernist and republican agenda. Lastly, in terms of its economic development, Izmir is a quite developed city, ranked 3rd in Turkey (Ministry of Development 2011: 50).

d. *Participant Recruitment in Practice and The Characteristics of the Sample*

Qualitative research studies, because of their more intensive method of inquiry, generally rely on smaller, non-random sample sizes. Before starting my recruitment, I had a crude idea that any number of participants between 30 and 35 would be sufficient (10-12 participants in each setting). However, considering the recruitment process as a dynamic and ongoing practice (Mason 2014 {2002}: 134-5), I aimed to keep recruiting until reaching a saturation point where I felt that I had the data that could enable me to develop a meaningful analysis. In the end, I ended up with 41 participants, 12 in Izmir, 13 in Konya, and 16 in Diyarbakir.

In the recruitment process, I applied a three-stage hybrid recruitment strategy. First, I contacted several researchers living in the UK and Turkey and had already conducted sociological or anthropological fieldworks in the selected contexts; and asked them if they could help me to contact the people who live in these social settings and had guided them during their research. With the help of these researchers, I initially contacted four people who lived in these cities and had familiarity with data collection methods due to their educational backgrounds and previous experiences. For example, Suna and Selma, my initial contacts in Konya and Izmir, were female graduate students of sociology. Ahmed, a Kurdish male who was recently employed as a primary school teacher, and Roja, a female left-wing political activist, had already assisted several researches in Diyarbakir. In our first meetings with my initial contacts, we organized a one day study of my research topic for our second meeting. After my initial contacts gained familiarity with my research topic and made sense of what type of participants I needed to recruit, we specified and contacted a number of potential participants from their social networks. This was the first phase of recruitment that enabled me to recruit 14 participants in total. It is important to note that my initial contacts' social characteristics were influential on the

characteristics of participants that I was able to access. For example, Suna was a veiled woman and tended to right-wing conservative politics. Most of the potential participants she was able to introduce me in Konya were similar to her social characteristics. This made it difficult, for example, to access an Alawi and left-wing participants there. Similarly, Roja and Ahmed were non-religious and politically left-wing dissidents and they were not able to provide me with contacts to for example, Armenians or politically right-wing conservatives in Diyarbakir. I will discuss how I overcame this drawback below.

In the second phase of the recruitment, applying the snowball sampling method, I asked my first wave participants if they could identify any acquaintances and put me in touch with them for interviewing. Most of these first wave participants identified more than one potential participant. Yet, these potential participants were again mostly similar to the first wave participants, especially in terms of their ethnicity, gender, political identity, and religiosity. To illustrate, Sunni-Muslim and politically conservative participants in Konya mostly identified another Sunni-Muslim or politically conservative person as a potential participant, but not Kurdish or republican ones. Similarly, republican participants in Izmir mostly identified either another republican or Turkish person, but not a left-wing or Kurdish one. So, there was a danger that solely relying on snowballing might compromise the diversity in information collected (see Ritchie *et al* 2003: 94), because the homophily pattern within which people tend to associate with those who are similar to themselves in terms of various socio-demographic qualities (see McPherson 2001: 415). Therefore, although snowballing was useful to access more participants and provide some degree of credibility in the eye of potential participants who were contacted through their acquaintances, I did not recruit all of these potential participants due to my purpose to maintain the diversity in the sample. Instead, I deliberately selected those who were different from the first wave participants in terms of their age, educational background, occupational status, and marital status, and recruited 11 participants in total.

To mitigate the question of homophily, in the third phase of the recruitment, I contacted various political organizations and parties that enabled me to access a larger spectrum of people. However, recruitment through political organizations also facilitated my access to minorities whose social

characteristics contrast with the dominant characteristics of the selected locations. For example, it was not an issue to access Turkish Sunni-Muslim participants in Konya since such social characteristics were common there. Yet, neither my initial contacts nor any of my existing participants were able to put me in contact with members of the Alawi community there. The same question was applicable in Izmir and Diyarbakir, albeit for different social characteristics. Therefore, in Konya, for example, I contacted the peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which allowed me to recruit some Kurdish and atheist participants, and the CHP that enabled me to contact some members of the Alawi community. In Diyarbakir, I visited the DTK (Democratic Society Congress)³¹ through which I accessed some members of the Armenian community, and AKP that enabled me to access a right-wing conservative participant. In Izmir, I visited TKP (Communist Party of Turkey) to contact with some left-wing dissent atheists and Mazlum-Der³² to interview with conservative religious people. Considering the implication of participant recruitment through political organizations, there might be a risk that these organizations could only connect me to those whose stories and views complied with their political agenda and thus lead me to collect skewed data. However, since incorporating different political views was particularly desired in this study, this was not a major concern for me. As the researcher who designed this study and thus who had to maintain the control over the selection of participants (Roller and Lavrakas 2015: 77-8), my main concern was that this method of recruitment might place me in a dependent position where I had to rely on these organizations' selection of participants. To mitigate the potential implications of such dependency, I contacted these political organizations with a request of helping me to access, not a participant, but a group of people or community within which I could still maintain control over the selection of participants. For example, when I contacted the CHP in Konya, I asked them to introduce me to the Alawi community of the city rather than an Alawi participant. In the end, with the help of these organizations, I recruited 16 participants in total.



A view from my meeting with the Alawi community in Konya

³¹ An umbrella organization composed of various sub-organizations whose agenda comply with political agenda of the Kurdish movement.

³² A human rights association that mostly raises issues regarding violation of human rights of religious conservatives.

This hybrid recruitment strategy was largely successful; and at the end of this process, I had 41 in-depth interviews with those whose locations and self-identified characteristics are given below.

Table I: Participants Characteristics by Gender, Age, and Ethnicity

	Gender		Age				Ethnicity		Total
	Male	Female	20-29	30-39	40-49	50+	Turkish	Kurdish	
Diyarbakir	10	6	6	4	3	3	2	14	16
Konya	7	6	3	6	2	2	11	2	13
Izmir	4	8	3	2	5	2	10	2	12
Total	21	20	12	12	10	7	23	18	41

As can be seen in the Table I above, women and men participants were fairly equal in total. Concerning age, it can also be seen that there was a fair distribution among different age groups in total. However, ethnic distribution of participants shows that number of Kurdish participants dominated total number of participants in Diyarbakir while most of the participants who were from Izmir and Konya were Turkish.

Table II: Participants Characteristics by Educational Background and Religious Identity

	Educational Background				Religious Identity				Total
	Primary School	Secondary School	High School	University Stud/Grad.	Sunni-Muslim	Alawi-Muslim	Atheist	Armenian	
Diyarbakir	5	2	3	6	8	2	4	2	16
Konya	2	2	4	5	10	2	1	-	13
Izmir	-	2	5	5	4	5	3	-	12
Total	7	6	12	16	22	9	8	2	41

The Table II demonstrates that significant number of participants were either university students or graduates. Primary school graduates are mostly from Diyarbakir where the mother language of the majority is different from the language of instruction in Turkey. I should note that the data is limited in terms of including non-Muslim religious participants in Konya and Izmir as well as some political views in Diyarbakir and Konya. Another important point to make here is that religiously identities of some participants do not fully reflect their religious attitude in some cases. For example, a male participant in Diyarbakir whose grandparents were forcibly converted to Islam in the period of the Armenian Genocide said that he did not believe in God, yet identified himself as an Armenian due to his political attitude against the state's denial politics toward minorities and violations of human

rights. Similarly, an Alawi participant who was from Izmir spoke of that she did not believe in God, yet practiced whirl (an Alawi ritual) since she liked it. Therefore, participants' characteristics given in the tables should only be seen as broad and self-identified categories. I will present a more precise identification of their characteristics in the empirical chapters.

Table III: Participants Characteristics by Political Orientation

	Right-Wing Conservative	Kurdish Movement	Left- Wing/Communist	Republican Secular	Turkish Nationalist	Total
Diyarbakir	2	11	3	-	-	16
Konya	6	2	-	2	3	13
Izmir	-	3	2	6	1	12
Total	8	16	5	8	4	41

Lastly, the Table III demonstrates participants' political identities according to the parties that they reported as the party that they supported in the interview. The right-wing conservative identity represents those who voted for either the Justice and Development Party (AKP) or Felicity Party (SP) in the last elections. Kurdish Movement represents those who voted for the members of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) who joined elections as independent candidates due to the 10 percent election threshold. Left-wing and Communist identity represents those who support either the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) or far-left ideals while Republican Secular represents those who voted for the main opposition party the Republican Party of People (CHP) that identifies itself as central-left. Lastly, the Turkish Nationalist identity represents those who support for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

IV. Interview Materials and Praxis of Interviewing

This section is concerned with how the data was generated during the study. Below, I present my preparations for the in-depth interviews and explain how I applied them in the process of interviewing the participants whose characteristics are given above.

a. Interview Materials

As discussed previously, the deliberate incompleteness of the capability approach restricts us from pre-determining or developing a list of fixed domains of the decent life without people's own participation. However, before the fieldwork, developing a *preliminary sense* concerning what might

matter for a decent life as well as the achievement of such life was methodologically important. As Nussbaum stresses,

“...we can’t look at a life or listen to a story without having some preliminary hunches about what is significant. That is the paradox of inquiry mentioned in Plato’s *Meno*: If you don’t have any idea what you’re looking for, you won’t ever find it” (2011a: 15).

Alkire, addressing her previous capability-based evaluation of three small-scale development projects in Pakistan (see Alkire 2002a), also stresses that using a “mental checklist” that is composed of some cross-culturally significant domains of decent life can be useful to catalyze participatory discussion in the field (2007: 105). Taking these suggestions into account and considering that preparing an interview schedule, or topic guide, helps to systematically cover and explore relevant issues in the field (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 115, 136), I aimed to prepare a list of concrete themes of valuable functionings. While creating this list, or interview schedule for this study, I reviewed multiple sources to develop a comprehensive sense concerning what might matter for a decent life.

In fact, one can find quite a number of different lists of valuable domains in the literature that have been generated in the fields of basic human needs, quality of life, dimensions of poverty and well-being, universal human rights, and human values. These are considerably informative in deciding what might matter for a decent life. In creating my interview schedule, I reviewed more than 20 lists in detail. I do not have enough space here to present details of this extensive review. However, one can easily notice that there are some themes that are similar and frequently re-appear in most lists, although authors usually use different terminologies in naming them, such as life (Nussbaum 2000) and longevity (Anand and Sen 1994), enjoyment (Griffin 1986) and play (Nussbaum 2000), knowledge (Finnis 2011 {1980}) and understanding (Qizilbash 1996), social well-being (Narayan *et al* 2000) and social acceptance (Braybrooke 1987), political activities (Allardt 1993) and political freedom (Sen 1999a)³³. These lists helped me to gain a wide-ranging perspective concerning what broad themes I needed to include in the interview schedule. However, most of these lists were very broad and abstract, which made it difficult to directly take them as themes for interview questions in practice. The themes needed to be fleshed out in a more specific way that ordinary people might be familiar with in their everyday lives (e.g. as specific political activities: rights to vote, candidacy,

³³ Alkire previously compiled most of these lists (see Alkire 2002b: 203-5 and 2007:109-14).

protest, assembly, representation, etc.) and rendered in more concrete forms applicable for fieldwork use (e.g. as knowledge: access to education or various forms of training). In achieving this task, six specific empirical works inspired me: Burchardt and Vizard's (2011: 116-9) human rights-based capability list that is composed of 77 functionings within 10 domains, Alkire and her colleagues' *Equality Measurement Framework* (Alkire *et al* 2009: 504-16) including 10 domains composed of 48 social indicators, Wolff and de-Shalit's *Disadvantage* (2007: 51-60) that extends Nussbaum's list of central human capabilities, Narayan and her colleagues' (2000: 25-8) dimensions of well-being, Max-Neef's (1991: 32-3) matrix of human needs composed of 36 categories, and Andrews and Withey's (1976: 38-9) list of individual's concern clusters composed of 123 social indicators. However, instead of taking all components of these lists, I applied a fourfold selection strategy and took some of them while creating my interview schedule. First, a detailed scrutiny of these lists demonstrated that there were some shared themes across all six lists, which made them reconcilable to a certain extent. These included being able to live in safety and healthy life, to develop family and friendship relations, being able to work, to have education and/or different forms of training, to have a place to live (housing) and so forth. Considering these shared themes as agreed components of the decent life, I needed not to overlook them when I was creating my interview schedule. Second, although these lists were quite comprehensive and one could specify quite a number of themes for further investigation, I had to make a priority ordering among them; otherwise, I could have lost depth of information in favor of breadth of coverage (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 123). Therefore, I excluded some themes that seemed to me less crucial, such as being concerned about "paying one's tax" (in Andrew and Withey's list) or one's need to be "assertive" and "bold" (in Max-Neef's list). Third, some themes of different domains to some extent overlapped each other in the same lists. To illustrate, "care for others" in Burchardt and Vizard's list is given place in two different domains; and "solidarity" in Max-Neef's list repeats in two different domains. In order to save time and not repeat the same issue during the interviews, I excluded these repeated themes in my interview schedule. Lastly, some domains were too detailed for qualitative application³⁴; and taking all of these details of a domain could have restricted the space for

³⁴ I should, however, note that these details could be important for country-scale quantitative application of the capability approach, especially when the approach is used to compare development and equality performances of different countries.

interviewees to reflect on their experiences or thoughts concerning an aspect of the decent life. For example, being free from danger of “homicide”, a theme within the domain of “life” in Alkire *et al*’s *Equality Measurement Framework* comprises four indicators one of which is “homicide involving sharp implements and shootings”. In creating my interview schedule, I included a more general notion of “safety”, but did not aim to ask if my interviewees felt fear of losing their life by “a sharp implement or shooting”. Drawing on these six lists and based on this fourfold selection strategy, I created an interview schedule composed of various themes under five broad categories (see Appendix A) to stimulate interviews in the field. These categories were housing, local area and municipal services; health; education; income and employment; civic and political entitlements. Although the interview schedule composed of various questions for every theme, I considered these questions as templates, or examples, illustrating a way for how I can initiate and develop a conversation with participants. Considering these questions as templates, but not as unchangeable guides, was important so as to ensure flexibility and responsiveness in the interviewing process.

After creating the interview schedule, I aimed to check out its feasibility and clarity in practice by a pilot study and interviewed four people who had migrated to Manchester from different parts of Turkey, for different purposes. The pilot study, first of all, helped me to check the scope of the interview schedule in a sense of whether the kind of data I collected was sufficiently informative for the objectives of the evaluative spaces of this study. It was also useful to enhance my familiarization with the interview schedule and to develop the ability of a more practical (and less academic) phrasing in interviewing, both of which were crucial in order to efficiently communicate with people during fieldwork. Besides, it also led me to rearrange the order of some themes in the interview schedule and to give them a smoother and more natural order. Lastly, the pilot study also gave me an idea that using some visual and written materials during the interviews would be helpful to further stimulate participants’ accounts. Although probes and some generic examples that I provided to participants during the pilot study worked efficiently, I thought that using some visual and written materials could be an additional tool, especially to stimulate participants’ accounts in case of adapted disadvantages. As discussed in the previous chapter, various scholars stress that disadvantaged people tend to adopt themselves to their straitened social conditions, and thus become used to live under such

conditions. An implication of such adaptation in terms of data collection could be the case that disadvantaged people might not straightforwardly provide an account concerning some of their disadvantages since they were used to these disadvantages and might not perceive them as disadvantage. Therefore, I decided to prepare a collection of newspaper-clippings composed of real life stories of various disadvantages to raise participants' awareness and help them to more critically reflect on their own social conditions. While selecting these real life stories from newspapers, I deliberately selected stories of disadvantage that were outcomes of people's social characteristics as discussed above. Below are two examples from this collection.



A story of a Kurd who was taken into custody after he said "hi" in Kurdish to another person who saluted him in Arabic.



A story of an Alawi family who were subject to a lynch attempt by their neighbors since they complained about the noise of a Ramadan drummer.

b. Praxis of Interviewing

All interviews were conducted face to face and in Turkish between December, 2012 and April, 2013. Except for three interviews that took around three hours, most lasted about two hours. Most of the interviews took place in an undistracted atmosphere where participants seemed comfortable. Most of the interviews with those who recruited in the first and second recruitment phases took place in participants' homes. On the other hand, interviews with those who were recruited through various organizations were conducted in different places. For example, one interview was conducted under a bower in the backyard of the Armenian Church and two in a meeting room of the DTK in Diyarbakir. In Konya, while most of the interviews took place in participants' homes, two interviews were conducted in their workplaces and one started in a *Cemevi*, the Alawis' house of worship, then was completed in the participant's home. In Izmir too, most interviews took place in participants' homes, but one was in a local branch of Mazlum-Der, and two were in a meeting room of the BDP's

provincial organization. Conducting interviews in participants' homes was clearly an advantage and provided an opportunity to get a glimpse of participants' lifestyle and economic status.

Interviews with female participants were usually conducted during the day since most of them were unemployed housewives, while male participants were usually interviewed either on a weekend or after working hours during weekdays. In every social setting, my initial contacts participated in most of my interviews with women and acted in the role of note-taker. Their silent presence in the room was an important means to make women participants feel comfortable, especially those who were religiously conservative and who might have otherwise felt uncomfortable to be alone with a male stranger in a room. Although my initial contacts' presence was helpful in initiating the interviews and furthering a more comfortable interview atmosphere, I should nonetheless note that this may have had a negative effect for some interviewees. Among a number of potential effects, this could, for example, have led them to provide less detail in some, particularly private, issues (e.g. their intra-familial or intimate relations) due to being "socially known" and having ongoing relations with the initial contacts. However, this was an inevitable risk that I had to take, especially to achieve interviews with conservative religious women.

Interviews followed a similar process. The first 20-25 minutes was usually spent having an informal conversation where I first introduced myself and then usually talked a bit about my personal experience of being in their milieu (such as the impressiveness of the city walls in Diyarbakir, the excitement of the atmosphere of the Sufi-Mawlawi mosque in Konya, the beauty of the shore in Kordon in Izmir). Starting the conversation by talking about such aspects of their environment with a discourse of "surprised miscognizant person" usually stimulated participants to provide some further information about similar aspects of their cities and, thus, worked as a means to place themselves in a "knower" position at the beginning of our meetings. Besides, such initial conversation was also an important means for icebreaking and gaining the trust of participants in advance of the actual interviewing process. Following this, I started interviewing by asking their age, employment status, occupation, educational background, and marital status. Subsequently, I started to interview on the themes with the aim of eliciting information concerning feelings of participants concerning a theme, whether and to what extent they can realize opportunities represented by the themes, difficulties that

they experience(d) in achieving these opportunities, how they thought these difficulties were related to their social qualities, whether and how they overcome(d) these difficulties, and how they would like to experience opportunities represented by the themes. Some themes were not applicable for all participants (e.g. trade union membership for unemployed housewives) and were therefore skipped.

To ensure space and flexibility for participants, I mostly used a conversational mode of inquiry. According to the flow of interviews and participants' responds I deepened the interview with spontaneous questions such as "could you tell me a bit more concerning (...)?", "how was (is) your experience of (...)?", "what/how did you feel when (...) happened?", "what do (did) you do then?", "what would allow/make easier for you to have/be/do (...) and why?" This helped to unpack quite a number of issues and themes that were not covered in the interview schedule, but came to the surface in the flow of interviews, which was an important fruit of the qualitative method of inquiry.

While talking about themes, participants were usually confident and talkative. Yet, when I felt that they had difficulty in recalling their previous experiences concerning a theme, I showed them a relevant newspaper-clipping to stimulate them. Using newspaper-clippings was helpful and worked also as a means to steer participants in a direction to talk about their experiences in relation to their social qualities.

In the first few interviews, I aimed to maintain conversations in the sequence of themes in the interview schedule. However, this was not really compatible with the nature of some participants' storytelling because of the strict connections between themes. In such cases, I preferred to not interrupt participants and let them talk flexibly. This allowed me to elicit information about how these themes were associated with each other in participants' accounts and the meanings that they ascribed to them. This did not cause loss of information and all relevant themes were still covered in the interviews. In fact, I had already gained considerable familiarity with the interview schedule during the pilot study, and memorized most of the themes after the first few interviews. This allowed me to be less dependent on the interview schedule and to cover all themes even though participants talked about them in a "messy order". After the first few interviews, I did not need to appeal to the interview schedule very frequently and let the flow of conversation orders the discussion of themes.

Covering all the relevant themes, I asked three closing questions: (1) “is there anything else that we did not talk about so far but you would like to have/be/do in your life?”, (2) “what is the most pressing issue in your life today?”, and (3) “what would you like to have/do/be today if it was certain that you will not fail to have/do/be it?” Concerning the first question, most of the participants said that we had already talked about all important issues, but a few used this opportunity to add a bit more detail to a theme. The second question generated responses like “being unemployed”, “my husband’s unemployment”, “(denial of) my (ethnic) identity”, “I do not have spare time”, “our debt to the bank”, “I could not have studied enough”, and “living in a rented house”, which helped to clarify what participants considered as the most immediate constraints and what they prioritized in their lives at the time. The third question generated responses concerning people’s aspirations, such as “applying to have proper (regular) job”, “migrating somewhere in Europe”, “setting up my own business”, “playing the lottery”, “returning to my village”, “overthrow the government”, and “studying in a good university”. I discuss the data generated in more detail, and how I analyzed it, in the next section.

V. Analyzing the Narratives of Valuation, Achievement, and Process

After every interview, I listened to its audio recording once when I was still in the field and briefly noted the frequently emerging issues in each interview. This was useful to develop an overall, albeit not very detailed, picture of participants’ lives and to prepare myself for forthcoming interviews. Once all the interviews were conducted, I transcribed them in Turkish without using any software package. However, due to the risk that translation of a text can lead to missing out some meanings (see Derrida 1985) and thus cause a lack of understanding, I primarily used Turkish transcriptions when analyzing and then translated core excerpts into English for the empirical chapters. The process of transcription took approximately three months. When it was completed, I scanned all interview transcriptions and replaced participants’ names with pseudonyms to preserve their anonymity.

In the analysis, I drew on two types of narrative analysis. These are thematic narrative analysis where the focal point is on what is said, rather than how it is said, and structural narrative analysis where how the storyteller develops and tells her/his story is the primary concern (Riessman 2003: 706-7, Bryman 2004: 412, see also Jovchelovitch and Bauer 2000: 70-1). Before the application of

these methods of analysis to the data, first of all, every interview transcription was read carefully and, afterwards, I divided the process of analysis into three stages.

In the first stage of the analysis, I read every interview transcript twice to figure out what participants valued, based on what reason they valued, and what meanings they ascribed to what they valued. These two rounds of reading were an “open coding” process through which I tried to sort out the data and identify the valued beings and doings to stand for blocks of the raw data (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 195, Benaquisto 2008: 582). During the first round of reading, I focused on what participants signified as valuable opportunities (thematic narrative analysis) and noted them with few key words next to the passages of the interview transcriptions such as “having driving license” or “maintenance of state theaters”. At that point, I had already a draft list of valuable functionings based on which, as proposed by Robeyns (2003: 72) and conducted by Greco *et al* (2015: 76-7), I could have engaged with a discussion with similar lists in the literature. However, through a second round of reading, I approached the data with a more critical and interpretative lens and looked at how these valuations were narrated (structural narrative analysis). In doing so, I aimed to figure out the various symbolic meanings that participants’ valuations convey and their reasonings in valuing a being or doing, which were key issues in specification of valuable functionings. For example, it was seen that “having a driving license” was not only valuable for “being mobile”, but also symbolized the independence of women from their husbands, which could be seen as a valuation of personal autonomy. Similarly, the “maintenance of the state theaters” was not only valued as a “cultural/entertainment opportunity”, since for some participants they were also seen as a symbol of “secular” Turkey and referred to as an opportunity to help people to be knowledgeable in the face of traditional/religious misbeliefs.

In the second stage of analysis, I aimed to figure out how people’s social characteristics play the role of conversion factor and influence achievement. This stage of the analysis primarily focused on actual life practices and therefore required less interpretation than the first stage of analysis. In this stage, I read all the transcripts again and highlighted passages that were concerned with the (non)achievement of what participants valued. Afterwards, drawing on two simple codes, “constrained to achieve” and “not constrained to achieve”, I coded the highlighted passages according

to participants' experiences, such as "constrained to achieve (accessing to education)" or "not constrained to achieve (expressing political view)". Following this, taking participants' social characteristics and locations as my primary analytical lens, I looked at the coded passages again and further detailed the codes such as "constrained to achieve expressing political view – right-wing, male, Diyarbakir" or "constrained to achieve housing – Kurdish, female, Izmir". This allowed me to develop a rough idea concerning who is (or is not) constrained to achieve, what functionings they are (or are not) constrained to achieve, and where they are (or are not) constrained to achieve. Afterwards, I entered this analysis in a simple table where participants' social characteristics were matched up with their (non)achievements of basic functionings. This revealed a more precise picture and enabled me to see general patterns about how participants' social characteristics operate as conversion factors in their achievements of basic functionings. However, in addition to these general patterns of achievement, my analysis of achievement also clearly demonstrated that there were a number of anomalies contravening these patterns. Therefore, I returned to the raw data with the aim to figure out how those participants whose experiences were seen as incompatible with the general patterns of achievement managed to achieve such functionings and particularly focused on the process that they passed through while achieving these functionings. Looking at the process of achievement led me to develop a more nuanced analysis of (non)achievement, such as explaining how these participants negotiated with their constraints and managed to "compensate" (see also Qizilbash 1997) for their disadvantages, which enabled me to identify some additional roles of participants' social characteristics in achievement. Thus, this more detailed analysis helped to advance the conventional conceptualization of conversion factors in the existing literature.

In the last stage of the analysis, I aimed for a closer inspection of the general pattern of disadvantage; but this time, I tried to figure out how it comes into existence. Drawing on Wolff and de-Shalit's analytical term of "corrosive disadvantage" (2007: 121) (which emphasizes a particular type of disadvantage leading to the formation of other disadvantages), I aimed to explore causal relationships between the achievement of different functionings. Compared to the previous stages of analysis, this was a more straightforward analysis since I had already completed a detailed analysis of (non)achievement in the second stage. I looked again at the transcripts of those who were constrained

to achieve most of the basic functionings and traced pathways for how being constrained in achieving one functioning might constrain them in achieving another functioning. This analysis demonstrated how a persistent pattern of disadvantage comes into being. However, it also set the stage for exploring how the preferences and aspirations of those who were constrained to achieve multiple functionings were conditioned by their straitened social circumstances, which is known as the issue of adaptive preferences or conditioned expectations (Burchardt 2009) in the literature. To analyze adaptation of preferences, I looked again at the valuations of those who experienced multiple disadvantages and marked the passages that could be considered as modest/downgraded and distorted/pervasive preferences, such as “I only want a flat heated with radiators [not with coal-stove]”, “I do not want Kurds to live in my neighborhood”, “I would prefer my husband was employed [not herself]”. Afterwards, instead of focusing on how they narrated these valuations, which I did in the first stage of analysis, I particularly paid attention to why they signified these beings and doings as valuable (see Alkire 2002b: 185) and aimed to figure out how and what contextual/social factors motivated them to prefer such beings and doings. This analysis ended up with a more nuanced conceptualization of “adaptation” where adapted preferences were distinguished from “adapted strategies”, which refers to the quite sophisticated ways disadvantaged people deliberately develop as a response to their contextual and social constraints.

VI. Reflexivity: Position and Power of the Researcher

Before moving on to discuss the results of my capability-based analysis of (dis)advantages in Turkey, it is important to reflect on how my own social position and politics influenced this study. Reflexivity can be considered as a critical approach to the researcher’s own intellectual assumptions for research and theory building (Payne 2000: 312). The fact that social researchers are not detached from the social world can be seen as the most explicit justification of the need to develop, in Mason’s words (1996: 5; 41), “a critical self-scrutiny” or “active reflexivity” towards their own praxis. In sociological research, critical self-scrutiny is usually performed “through personal accounting of how the researcher’s self-location (across for example, gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality), position, and interests influence all stages of the research process” (Pillow 2003: 178). In this regard,

reflexivity in sociological research can be considered as “sociology of sociologist” or the act of “undertaking a self-socio-analysis” (Bourdieu 1993: 49, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002{1992}: 68-71).

Compared to most of my participants’ social characteristics, I should acknowledge that my own “sociology” reveals a privileged status through my Turkish, male, educated, Sunni-Muslim cultural background, which no doubt influenced this research in various ways. For example, as a male who grew up in a society where patriarchal norms were prevalent and led to a privileged position for men, I did not experience many of the disadvantages that were salient for most of my female participants’. Thus, such a privileged gender status may have restricted my ability to give full meaning to what my woman participants’ meant to say. The following excerpt from my interview with Bahar, a female participant who complained about difficulty of finding taxis when she went out with her friends, illustrates this.

Onur: Here (her flat) is pretty central though. There are many cabs on the streets.

Bahar: (Are they) proper cab? (...) You cannot get on all of them. Most are pirates (unlicensed taxi) in the end. (...) When he (driver) sees you had alcohol, and it is night... I mean it is like being from Izmir... We are (considered) easy! (...) He tries to get you. Proposing inappropriate things and so on... You are a woman after all. You mind such things.

As a man, I have never received “an inappropriate proposal” from a taxi driver and I have not needed to be careful to hail a licensed taxi. So, if Bahar was not living in a central location of Izmir, I would not probably have questioned further about why she complained about finding taxis. Instead, I would probably have moved to explore another theme and thus, lost the chance of being informed about an everyday strategy that she (and perhaps other women as well) have developed to avoid harassment. Because of the fact that our previous experiences are related to our social characteristics, we, as researchers, tend to make a series of assumptions about what and why our participants say during interviews, and based on these assumptions we either decide to ask additional questions or not. As Lewis discusses (2003: 65), some feminist researchers have addressed this issue in detail and underlined the advantage of congruent characteristics between participant and researcher (see Finch 1984, Oakley 1981), although other scholars (e.g. Olesen 2000) have questioned the extent to which this is necessary. On the one hand, having a similar social identity and shared experiences with participants can provide the researcher with an insider’s point of view, which can obviously facilitate

the research process. It is argued, for example, that “being an insider” can be a facilitator, not only in terms of asking more insightful questions and deciding what to investigate further, but also for establishing rapport between participants and researcher, providing easy access to participants, reading non-verbal cues, and developing a more authentic understanding of the culture under investigation (Merriam *et al.* 2001: 411). On the other hand, it can be argued that “being an insider” may introduce bias into the data collection and “preclude the interrogation of taken-for-granted knowledge among members of a common culture and community” (Mohan and Venzant Chambers 2010: 262). When the researcher is seen by participants as an “outsider” who does not know anything, thicker descriptions of themes may occur (Harries 2012: 76). Besides, some scholars argue that participants may expect that insider researchers should conform to the culture of the community, which can constrain researchers in asking questions which go against norms (Twine 2000: 12). So, neither “insiderness” nor “outsiderness” is an exclusively advantageous position for researchers.

As a researcher of Turkish origin, I can be considered as an insider who shares various grand commonalities of Turkish society, such as its language, history, and culture. On the other hand, in terms of my social location within this society, there are various aspects that position me as an outsider who is, for example, not a Kurd, female, Alawi, or Armenian, supporter of Sharia law, or a republican nationalist. However, it is important to underline that neither “insiderness” nor “outsiderness” is a static position, but rather they are ever shifting positions (Naples 1997: 71, see Twine 2000). For example, when I first met with Amed, a Kurdish elderly who was a member of the Kurdish movement in Diyarbakir, he was addressing me with plural form of “you”, which was an implicit emphasis of the distance between us. It was quite apparent that I was a Turkish “outsider” in his milieu. But this distance was broken down after a while and I was promoted to a position of “my son”. This shift was probably because of the political proximity of our discourses/terminology where, for example, we both call the Kurdish region as “Kurdistan”, and not “Southeastern Anatolia” as in the state’s discourse. Although my ethnicity positioned me as an outsider, I had a chance to establish rapport and develop trust through a politically informed preference. It was usual in my fieldwork that when a social characteristic of mine positioned me as an outsider, another social characteristic of mine put me in the position of insider. Even when there was no congruent characteristic between me and a

participant, there was an idea or a ground on which I could gain their trust. For example, Halime, who is a right-wing, conservative, quite religious, middle-aged, female lawyer living in Konya, was a participant with whom I did not have much commonality apart from my ethnicity. It was not my ethnicity but rather some shared ideas (such as our shared view that she should not be constrained from working in the courthouse or studying in a public university due to her veil), which helped me to gain her trust. These demonstrate that the researcher's position is not static, but dynamic in encounters with participants; and participants do not simply position us based on our social characteristics. As frequently happened in my fieldwork, they also position us based on our ideas, behaviors, and discourse.

I should also briefly reflect on the power of the researcher in social research. It is usually assumed that researchers hold a more powerful position than participants due to their control over who will speak, when and how long they can speak, what they can talk about, and what is (not) relevant (Johnson 2001: 60). "However, this implies a lack of agency among respondents" (Harries 2012: 77) and it is important to underline that respondents in qualitative research have some degree of power too. For example, Gunaratnam (2003: 89) stresses that participants also have a significant level of power in terms of protecting certain parts of their lives from scrutiny, questioning the role and motives of the researcher until a certain level of trust is ensured, and exerting control over the interview process by withholding information. However, it is also equally important to underline that researchers have an exclusive power in deciding and selecting what narratives, values, ideas, or aspirations of participants are given a place in the written work (see Hertz 1996: 6-8, Olesen 2011: 136). I agree with this concern and the fact that there is an "asymmetry of power" (Mishler 1986: 117-8) between participants and researcher in this respect. In the fieldwork, I aimed to mitigate the asymmetric distribution of power and to ensure that I was not going to be positioned by participants as a person whose status is higher. As I mentioned above, my unhesitant expressions of some of my surprises and explicit demonstration of my ignorance concerning certain feature of their milieu seemed a helpful technique that steered participants to position themselves as "knower" at the very beginning of our encounters. In addition to this, interviews were mostly conducted in participants' homes where I was a guest and they were the one who held control over the general atmosphere,

which can also be considered as a form of empowerment. Besides, in Turkey where “being older” is commonly associated with “being wiser”, my age (younger than most of the participants) seemed to me to be a factor that redistributed the asymmetric power between participants and myself and gave them greater confidence and some sense of authority.

Lastly, during the fieldwork, I used analytical bracketing (Gubrium and Holstein 2009: 28-30, Tufford and Newman 2010) and avoided imposing my politics and convictions on participants, which was not only an ethical commitment, but also a pragmatic purpose to maintain rapport. Since I decided to include quite a number of different political views while sampling, I was aware that I was going to encounter narratives that opposed my own ideology and views. In interviews with those whose views and politics might come into collision with my convictions, I paid attention to ask the questions in a manner that did not disturb or incite my interviewee. I was, for example, careful to not use the word “Kurdistan” when I was interviewing with Turkish nationalists, conservative right-wings, or republicans. Instead, I chose more neutral terms in such cases, such as “cities where mostly Kurds live”. This was because engaging in a political debate with those who embraced different political views and attitudes could lead to the emergence of a tense atmosphere in the interviews, which eventually might end up with silencing some of their views, motivations, and ideas. Therefore, considering the fieldwork as a process of exploring, understanding, and learning about participants’ reality rather than as a political activity through which I might challenge and attempt to change it, I avoided engaging in political discussions and mainly focused on asking open and clarifying questions.

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the methods that I drew on with the aim of conducting a sociological analysis of (dis)advantages in Turkey based on the analytical and conceptual frameworks of the capability approach. I have described the aims and questions of the research and discussed my methodological choice of using people’s narratives as a useful source for specifying valuable beings and doings, people’s achievement of these beings and doings, and the process of achievement. Underlining the importance of taking various social diversities into account in the application of the capability approach to assess (dis)advantages, I have also discussed what particular diversities are

addressed in this study, and why, with references to the broader literature. I have explained with whom and where the empirical research was conducted and provided how the data was collected through in-depth interviews in practice. After informing about the analysis of data and providing a glimpse of findings, I have drawn attention on the role of my own social characteristics and given an account of my position and power in this research.

Distinctiveness of drawing on a qualitative research strategy to generate participants' narratives through in-depth interviews is, first of all, associated with the spirit of the capability approach that underlines the value of people's own voice in assessing their advantage. Differently from quantitative surveys, qualitative methods provide more space for people in terms of participating in the research and allow them to reflect their concerns more flexibly. The existing empirical literature of the capability approach that is mostly composed of quantitative surveys is limited in terms of sufficiently informing us people's reasonings in valuation and meanings that they ascribe to valuable beings and doings. Besides, although existing quantitative surveys are quite informative about who disadvantaged ones are (albeit only in terms of variation between achievement and non-achievement of functionings), they fall short in informing us how they become disadvantaged ones, or how social and institutional configuration of society turns a social characteristic of a person to a conversion factor. Lastly, considering the importance of analyzing people's advantage in terms of their "ability to achieve" in the capability approach, value of qualitative methods of inquiry comes to the fore again. Quantitative surveys that focus on the outcome of functioning achievement, in this regard, fall short in allowing us to reflect ultimate concern of the capability-based analysis of disadvantage, people's ability to achieve. These qualities of the qualitative inquiry are going to appear more explicitly through the empirical chapters of this study.

In the next chapter, drawing on participants' narratives, I will first address six broad domains of valuable functionings, namely basic standard of living (e.g. housing, nutrition, health, employment, safety, transport), being knowledgeable (e.g. formal education, cultural activities, intellectual production), personal autonomy (e.g. being free from political or religious coercion), social and legal recognition (e.g. being supported to compensate disadvantage of a person's difference), social bases of developing various forms of relationality with others (e.g. living in harmony and peace with

others), security (e.g. guaranteed sustainability of previous domains of the good life). While addressing significance of these functionings for a good life in Turkey, I will explore participants' reasonings and meanings that they ascribe to a being or doing. However, this will not simply be a descriptive analysis. It will also provide an examination of roles of various social and institutional dynamics (e.g. polarisation between social groups, institutional denial of an ethnic identity, and favoritism to a particular religious identity) that run across these six domains and influence participants' reasonings in valuation. After addressing the significance of these broad domains in the next chapter, I will turn to discuss variation in functioning achievements of participants.



Valuation: Valuable Functionings and Their Social and Institutional Dynamics

I. Introduction

Recognizing the significance of people's freedom in pursuing their own conception of good life, the capability approach aims to assess people (dis)advantage in their ability to achieve the beings and doings (functionings) that they find valuable. However, considering the influence of background disadvantages, social norms, and the unequal distribution of power on people's values, there is a risk of uncritically relying on what people deem valuable when specifying what they should be able to be and do. Therefore, taking this risk into account, Sen (2006a: 92) propose to critically approach and scrutinize people's values rather than just tallying what they deem valuable; and, as a method for such scrutiny, he invites us to explore whether people's valuations are reasoned or not.

Sen's proposition is important since it clearly acknowledges the social conditioning of people's values. This proposition can be considered as a step forward to enlarge the source of information in specifying valuable functionings, since it does not only require us to explore what people value, but also why they value what they value. However, various scholars have criticized his proposal by stressing that the concept of reason is "mysterious" in Sen's work (Sugden 2006: 38), adaptation of preferences does not always have to be "unreasoned" (Burchardt 2009: 8), Sen does not recognize the social construction of reasoning (Deneulin and McGregor 2010: 509-10), and it does not guarantee to counteract the problem of adaptive preferences (Conradie and Robeyns 2013: 566). In the theoretical framework of this study, I have argued that people's reasonings, just like their values, are also social products, and addressed the influence of the social conditioning of people's reasoning in valuing a being or doing. I, therefore, argued that there is a need to critically scrutinize people's reasonings by taking notice of the various social and institutional dynamics that lead them to develop these reasonings, especially in evaluating people's valuations that arise from the constraints of complex social cases. This argument can be considered as a supplement to Sen's proposition of "scrutiny for reasoned valuation" (Sen Ibid.) with the scrutiny of reasoned valuation.

This chapter explores the valued beings and doings of those who have varied conceptions of the good life and live in cities that have contrasting characteristics. Drawing on participants' narratives, it

examines why a sample of people in Turkey value what they value and the meanings that they ascribe to valued beings and doings. The chapter argues that by exploring and scrutinizing people's reasonings as well as various meanings that they ascribe to valued beings and doings, the capability approach can develop more adequate identification of the valuable functionings. As we shall see, people may value very different functionings but for the same underlying reasons, or may have very different, and often conflicting, reasonings which lead them to value the same broad functionings. However, it is this complexity of everyday life, where people develop diverse, and sometimes contending, reasonings, which demands a fuller sociological examination of the social and institutional dynamics in identification of valuable beings and doings.

This chapter chiefly focuses on (1) how my sample of people talks about the beings and doings that they value, and (2) the way in which social and institutional dynamics influence their valuations and reasonings. Drawing on participants' narratives, it examines six key domains of the good life. These six domains are general categories, shared with much of the mainstream literature of the capability approach, and comprise: survival and basic standard of living (e.g. housing, nutrition, health, employment, safety, transport); being knowledgeable (e.g. formal education, cultural activities, intellectual production), personal autonomy (e.g. being free from political or religious coercion), social and legal recognition (e.g. being supported to compensate disadvantage of a person's difference), social bases of valuable relationships (e.g. living in harmony and peace with others, freedom from war), security (e.g. guaranteed sustainability of previous domains of the good life).

The chapter illustrates how these valued domains operate in practice in the context of Turkey, by indicating how participants' of this study think about such issues. However, the chapter also goes further than this, providing a detailed empirical examination of the complex ways in which social (e.g. norms) and institutional (e.g. laws) dynamics shape and influence participants' valuations. Whilst the structure of the chapter is organized into six sections, relating to the six domains, a number of major themes run across them such as denial of an ethnic identity, social polarisation and contestation between different groups, patriarchal gender roles, and social and institutional coercion to adopt a particular religious or political identity.

II. Survival and Having a Purpose

Regardless of their ethnicity, religious belonging, political orientation, place of living, gender, or economic status, all participants placed value on satisfying certain basic needs. Access to adequate nutrition, housing, and protective clothing; being physically and mentally healthy, safe, and free from (fear of) physical harm; and having spare time to rest can be counted among those functionings that participants valued without any hesitation. Satisfaction of these basic needs is essential to keep one's body intact and to sustain the bare minimum of functionality in life. The ability to satisfy these basic needs, however, depends on access to some other means, like access to formal education, being employed and having at least a minimum income, sometimes accessing certain social reliefs, living in a peaceful environment, access to transportation, nature, and technologies necessary to communicate with others. These beings and doings can be considered as the most basic components of a satisfactory material standard of living. Considering the broad consensus about the value of these beings and doings in the literature (Andrew and Withey 1976, Galtung 1980, Braybrooke 1987, Doyal and Gough 1991, Max-Neef 1993, Allardt 1993, Qizilbash 1996, Cummins 1996, Chambers 1997, Narayan *et al* 2000, Nussbaum 2000, Biswas-Diener and Diener 2001, Hamilton 2003, Alkire *et al* 2009, Burchardt and Vizard 2011)³⁵, it is perhaps unsurprising to say that the participants of this study also valued these basic components of a material standard of living. However, it should be noted that their valuation of these beings and doings were based on different reasonings that sometimes contended with each other. In line with their varied conceptions of the good life, the members of my sample ascribed different meanings to some of these beings and doings, and I will discuss some of these different reasonings and meanings throughout this chapter. However, in this section, I firstly need to address two important points concerning the “prevention of the arbitrary deprivation of life” and the “conditional value of life”.

Survival is perhaps the least contested functioning in the literature and is usually unarguably given a place in the lists of valuable functionings, basic needs, or human values (see Finnis 1980 {2011}, Ramsay 1992, Nussbaum 2000, Robeyns 2003, Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, Alkire *et al* 2009,

³⁵ Note that most of these lists do not include all of these beings and doings, but all of them address at least one or more of them as either necessary or valuable.

Burchardt and Vizard 2011). The functioning of survival here is considered as the ability to be free from all forms of the social causes leading to the deprivation of one's life. Admittedly, quite a number of the social causes (e.g. war, epidemics, extreme poverty, and inequalities in accessing health) that lead to deprivation of life can be addressed in different social contexts. Based on my data, however, I need to address a specific form of this, about which some participants raised concerns: patriarchal and ethno-political homicide.

Female homicide is a quite serious problem in Turkey; and the personal experience of one of my participants illustrates a particular social cause of such homicides. Dilzar, a poor divorced middle-aged woman who had migrated to Izmir from Diyarbakir, stated that she had to abandon school when her family forced her to marry in her teenage years. I asked if there was no possibility to resist this, and she responded:

Dilzar: How could I? Think a moment! You are just a girl living in a village. You are 14-15 years old. Then there were traditions. Customs... There was *tore* [a moral law]

Onur: What would happen if you had resisted more. If you had run away from home, for example?

Dilzar: (...) Everything would be worse. It could have even gone as far as killing [me]. They would have said "it is a matter of honour" and killed [me].

The word of "tore" in Dilzar's speak refers to a particular moral law through which a male member of the family, usually the eldest one, is given the power and right to control women's lives, including a power to decide with whom and when she should marry. This control is sometimes established and sustained by a physical violence and, in the worst scenario, by murder. Such killings are usually justified by the murderers as a response to the dishonourable conduct of women harming the family dignity, and therefore it is known as "honour killing". Dilzar refers to a life threat that is a real problem for women in patriarchal families in Turkey when they resist the moral norms of their families (see UNDP and UNFPA 2007). Although Dilzar was the only participant in this study who shared a personal experience of such a threat in this study, some records of feminist organisations³⁶ demonstrate that female homicide is a prevalent question in Turkey, which requires us to specify "being free from patriarchal homicides" as a valuable, and immediate, functioning for the social context of Turkey.

³⁶ To illustrate, We Will Stop Femicide Platform have been keeping records of women homicides for last seven years. It reports that 1391 women have been murdered by men since 2008 in Turkey, see <http://anitsayac.com>

The arbitrary deprivation of life of Kurdish and politically left-wing dissident people in Turkey should also be addressed here. The Human Rights Association has reported hundreds of homicides in which the state's security forces were involved (see HRA 2013: 7-8, 2014: 10-1, 2015: 12-3). I should also note that most of my Kurdish participants brought up certain ethno-political homicides during the interviews, such as the Roboski Massacre³⁷ and the homicides of Ugur Kaymaz³⁸ and Ceylan Onkol³⁹, and they spoke of the danger of being deprived of a life. Three Kurdish participants shared personal experiences that require us to specify prevention of ethno-political homicides as a valuable functioning in the context of Turkey. To illustrate, Berfin, a young Kurdish woman whose family was forced to migrate from Nusaybin -a small Kurdish town- to Izmir, reported that her older brother was murdered when her family was still living in Nusaybin, yet his murderer was not identified. Amed, an older Kurdish man living in Diyarbakir, reported that when he was under the police custody due to his resistance to the internal displacement policies of the state, he witnessed the murder of a Kurdish man. Havin, a young Kurdish woman living in Konya, reported that a Turkish nationalist shot her older brother just before the general elections⁴⁰ due to his brother's affiliation to the Kurdish political movement.

I should also address another finding of this study that is concerned with "conditional value of life". As noted above, "valuation of life" is usually taken for granted in the literature and unarguably considered as a valuable functioning since it is the most basic prerequisite for having the good life. However, "life" *per se* may not always be a valuable functioning. For example, based on their empirical research Wolff and de-Shalit (2007: 51-2) notes that "several of the interviewees commented that being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length is meaningful only if one's life is already good, that is if one has the other functionings". This finding refers to the conditional value of the functioning of life. The narratives of several participants of this study also confirmed this finding of Wolff and de-Shalit. For example, Bahar, a moderately affluent secular woman living in Izmir, said that life could be "unbearable" under "inhumane" conditions. Giving an

³⁷ 35 Kurds most of whom were children were murdered in an aerial bombardment of Turkish jets in Roboski, a village close to Turkey-Iraq border in 2011.

³⁸ A 12 years old Kurdish child who was murdered in 2004 by security forces based on an unproven claim of security forces that he was carrying a machine gun.

³⁹ Another 12 years old Kurdish girl murdered by military mortar fire while shepherding in 2009.

⁴⁰ Due to anonymization of the participant, I avoided giving information concerning the year of election.

example of forcibly circumcised women in some African countries, she added that she would not want to live if she was pushed by others to practice genital mutilation. Ahmet, a poor Sunni-Muslim father with two children living in Konya, shared a personal trouble that, when he returned home from his evening shift a few years ago, he noticed that his flat was smoking and his wife and children were poisoned from the smoke of the coal-burning stove⁴¹. While telling his story, he said that on the way to the hospital he was praying, asking Allah either to spare his children or to take his life too. When talking about grassroots support for the Kurdish political movement, I asked Merwan, an educated man who is a member of the Kurdish political movement and lives in Diyarbakir, why increasing number of youngsters join the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers' Party) and put their lives in danger. He responded in detail, but said at one point that "living in such conditions⁴² is not less difficult than dying". Based on these participants' accounts, we can argue that the "value of life", as well as the "meaning of a good life", is associated with being free from coercion of some oppressive traditions in Bahar's account, having a life together with his children in Ahmet's account, and according to Merwan, not being deprived of certain functionings for those who joined the PKK. These are examples of how the functioning of life *per se* is not always valuable, but becomes valuable when it is accompanied by other functionings.

However, the value of the functioning of life does not only depend on the accompaniment of other functionings. For some participants, it is a valuable functioning as long as it serves a purpose that is formed in relation to social and institutional constraints. To illustrate, Bedirxan, a Kurdish young man working as an architect and living in Diyarbakir, stated that he does not feel happy although he has already achieved various functionings (e.g. education, employment, having a good regular income) that are not easily achieved by most others living in his milieu.

Being happy is a different thing. (...) When I was in the university, everything was more difficult. I was feeling happier though. I was more active in many things. (...) No, not only protests and so. Many things. (...) We were trying to edit a dictionary for example. (...) A Kurdish dictionary. (...) We also had a musical group. These were making me happy. I was also in an amateur theatre group. A friend of mine was writing very good short (theatre) plays for example. We were discussing and staging them. (...) Eating, drinking, working, earning money... According to me, these are not an objective. These become empty (meaningless) things after a while.

⁴¹ This is still very common method of heating in countryside and among low-income families in Turkey.

⁴² Conditions in which Kurds are deprived of many functionings. I will discuss these functionings in detail later on.

In Bedirxan's account, being happy is not simply associated with the achievement of certain basic functionings, but also with being more active and socially engaged in life in various ways. This may not be surprising since being active in life can make many people happy. However, the point here is that, in Bedirxan's account, happiness is associated with "having a meaningful life" that is identified in relation to being engaged in specifically valued activities which have the socio-politic purpose of confronting the denial of the Kurdish ethnicity, such as editing a Kurdish dictionary. Some other participants also associated the value of life with such a purpose. Rabia, a religious young woman living in Konya, believes that "this is a world of examination" and that "we have been given the life to live it according to the rules and orders of the Allah". Based on this, it can be said that the meaning of life, in Rabia's account, is associated with a religious purpose to obey certain "rules and orders"; and therefore life is valuable as far as it serves this purpose. Ayten, a Turkish mother of two children who is moderately affluent and lives in Izmir, said that she frequently advises her children to have an aim in life and identified her own aim as "to raise my children who serve for the goodness of their country and nation".

Briefly, the functioning of life is unarguably specified as a valuable functioning in the literature since it is the prerequisite for the achievement of other functionings. Therefore, all preventable social causes of deprivation of life need to be removed. In this study, patriarchal and ethno-politic homicides appeared as two particular forms of the social causes of deprivation of life about which participants expressed their concerns. In addition to this, it should also be noted that the functioning of life is not always valuable for its own sake, but valuable when it is accompanied⁴³ by other functionings and when it serves for a purpose; and the purposes that people place on life can vary significantly.

III. Being Knowledgeable

Similar to the functioning of life, we can see that numerous scholars in the literature address the significance of being knowledgeable in human life (see Finnis 1980 {2011}, Davitt 1968), albeit drawing on a different terminologies such as "understanding" (Qizilbash 1996, Max-Neef 1993, Griffin 1986, Lane 1969), "education" (Galtung 1980, Braybrooke 1987, Doyal and Gough 1992),

⁴³ This also demonstrates the interdependency of valuable functionings, which I will discuss in detail in the Chapter Six of this study.

“wisdom” (Rokeach 1973), or “intelligence” (Biswas-Diener and Diener 2001). Even though it is sometimes narrowly conceptualised in relation to one’s ability to access education, the value of being knowledgeable is broadly acknowledged in the capability approach (Nussbaum 2000, 2003b; Dréze and Sen 2002, Alkire 2002a, Robeyns 2003, 2006b; Unterhalter 2003a, 2003b; Alkire *et al* 2009; Burchardt and Vizard 2011, Greco *et al* 2015). Being knowledgeable is here considered as a functioning that is valued by participants both for its own sake and as a facilitator in the pursuit of achieving various other objectives. So, it refers to an intrinsically valued functioning of learning, knowing, understanding, and discovering; but it also refers to an instrumentally valued functioning that facilitates the achievement of diverse objectives (such as being employed, gaining social respect, earning a regular income, influencing and reshaping the policies surrounding one’s life, demonstrating skilful performance in productive activities, expressing the self, and forming a conception of the good).

Some participants spoke of being knowledgeable as an intrinsically valued functioning. In these cases, being knowledgeable was not valued instrumentally to achieve another functioning, but valued as a functioning that has a value in itself. To illustrate, I asked Dilzar a hypothetical question of “what you would do if you win a lottery today?”, she stayed silent for a while, then responded that she would quit her job, finish secondary and high school from abroad, and start preparations to pass the university entrance exam. However, when I asked her what she would like to have studied if she was able to do so, she said that she “did not think this much” although she identified studying as the first thing that she would choose to do if she was able. So, regardless of what she would study, studying itself, or studying to learn, is a functioning valuable for her. Alime, a female religious university student living in Izmir, expressed her aspiration to visit the oldest living *kulliye*⁴⁴ of the world that is, she said, in Iran. When I asked her why, she responded that it is because it still preserves one of the oldest and biggest libraries of the Middle East and she is always excited to see how people from different cultures live their lives. This can be interpreted as a valuation of discovering what is interesting and currently unknown for her. Gulazer, a Kurdish female participant who learned literacy

⁴⁴ A Middle Eastern building complex of old Islamic civilizations that was composed of various buildings (like a mosque at the centre surrounded by various buildings, particularly by religious schools and libraries) and where people gathered to socialize and discuss public matters.

in Turkish through her own efforts and lives in Diyarbakir, said that she had recently started to learn French through some books provided by a feminist organisation⁴⁵. Wondering at the practical value of learning French for her, I asked why she aspires to learn it. She said that she finds it “enjoyable so much”. This can be interpreted as a valuation of learning simply because it is satisfactory. In such cases, knowing (or studying, discovering, learning) something is valuable in itself without any further reason. In other words, it is “intrinsically satisfying” (Robeyns 2006b: 70) and an end that itself makes one’s life good.

However, being knowledgeable is also a functioning that is instrumentally valued to achieve other ends that make one’s life good. Due to the instrumental value of the functioning of being knowledgeable in such cases, it is easy to figure out participants’ reasonings in valuing it. Here I would like to discuss two interesting cases where participants with completely opposite conceptions of the good life valued being knowledgeable for the same reason. During my interview with Rabia, a young religious woman working as a volunteer in an Islamic organisation in Konya, it was easy to notice that, for her, Islam was the primary informational source in valuing a being or doing. In other words, for her the value of a functioning to a great extent depends on its usefulness for living the kind of life that is compatible with the Islamic norms she embraced, and this was also observable in her valuation of being educated.

If you go to the rural [areas] today, many people believe that educating girls is sinful. This has become a belief now. Especially girls suffer from this belief. (...) It [education] helps people to get rid of fabricated beliefs. They have many fabricated beliefs. They believe these are Islam. They believe these are religious truths. But, these are not Islam.

During the interview, Rabia a number of times complained about the “misinterpretation of Islam” by those who live in rural parts of the country. What she says above can also be seen as an example of such complaint. Independent from what kind of education she values, she considers education as a valuable functioning since, according to her, it brings the ability to set misbeliefs apart from a correct understanding of Islam. Her valuation of being educated seems motivated by the reason that education helps people to form “a true conception of Islam” and thus “a true conception of the good life” both of which are intertwined in her account. Interestingly, Sabiha, an atheist self-employed mother living in

⁴⁵ Kardelen Woman House.

Izmir with a low-income, expressed a similar reason in valuing education. After complaining that the current educational curriculum serves to make children more religious, she said,

They are being taught how to be religious [in school]. My daughter for example believes that Allah exists. She is only nine years old yet. How can a nine years old kid be sure about it? Where did she learn this? Who told her this? (...) Of course, she learns it in school. We send kids (to school) to learn being a right-minded, sensible person. To learn to use their heads, not being fooled easily... But, look at this, they wash kids' brain!

During the interview, Sabiha frequently associated Islam with backwardness. It was quite apparent that she had an account of Islam as a source of all unfavourable beings, which is completely opposed to Rabia's account. Based on what Sabiha says above, it can be argued that she values being a well-educated person although she does not seem hopeful about that the current educational system provides this opportunity to her daughter. She expresses her reasoning to send her children to school by some clauses such as "being right-minded", "being sensible", "learning to use one's head", and "not being fooled easily". These clauses can be interpreted as reasons of developing the ability to form a true conception of the good life. Interestingly, this is quite similar to Rabia's reasoning, albeit from an opposed starting point. Here we can see that both participants value being well-educated, or being knowledgeable, in order to be able to form a true conception of good life, although their definitions of "true" are completely opposite. Thus, based on their reasonings, we can argue that "being able to develop a conception of good life", which Nussbaum identifies as a functioning of "practical reason" (2000: 79, 2007a: 77, 2011a: 34), is valuable for participants.

Earlier in this study, agreeing with Sen's argument, I discussed how exploring people's reasoning in valuation is helpful in some cases, particularly in order to distinguish instrumentally valued functionings from intrinsically valued ones, and facilitates us to figure out a further valuable functioning, which can be observed in the cases above. However, I argued that there could be cases where exploring people's reasonings may not be sufficient since reasoning itself can also be socially and institutionally conditioned and may need to be scrutinized too. In other words, there are some cases where we not only need a "scrutiny for reasoned valuation" (Sen 2006a: 92), but also a scrutiny of reasoned valuation that aims to explore the role of social and institutional dynamics in people's reasoned valuations. An aspiration of Welat, a young male Kurdish teacher working in a primary school of a village of Diyarbakir, illustrates this necessity quite well. During our interview, Welat

complained several times of the practical difficulties of teaching Kurdish children in Turkish. When I asked him what he would like to do if he had more money, he responded,

Not only travel for enjoyment. I would also like to [travel to] see something meaningful for my career. (...) For example, I would like to see different methods of bilingual education in different countries. For example, how they give education to kids whose mother language is different. I would like to see how they solve these problems.

As a teacher who frequently faces various difficulties in teaching Kurdish children in Turkish, Welat values to find out how such difficulties could be dealt with in practice by making observations in countries where bilingual education is provided. This can be considered as a valuation of being knowledgeable in a particular area based on a reason of “developing skilful performance or creative solutions in one’s occupation” that can be specified as a component of the functioning of “meaningful work” (see Nielsen 1977, Allardt 1993). In line with Sen’s proposal, we can argue that being knowledgeable in order to develop skilful performance and creative solutions in one’s occupation is a valuable functioning. However, we also need a scrutiny of Welat’s reasoned valuation in this case. We can argue that Welat would not have valued finding out how to deal with the practical difficulties of teaching Kurdish children in Turkish, if teaching in Kurdish was not prohibited through Article 42 in the Turkish constitution and he was not constrained from drawing on Kurdish in school. He might of course still have valued being knowledgeable about a different aspect of skilful performance and creative solutions in his occupation, but not being knowledgeable to deal with the practical difficulties of teaching Kurdish children in Turkish. Welat’s reasoned valuation is a valuation conditioned by an institutional constraint. Based on this, we can argue that removal of this institutional constrain is also valuable, which leads us to specify “being able to access education and teach in one’s mother-language” as a valuable functioning in the context of Turkey. To be fair, I should note that Welat explicitly valued this functioning during the interview, which was deeply rooted in his moral and political commitment to the struggle against the institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey. However, my point here is to argue that even though he might not have valued education in the mother-language, we could still specify this as a valuable functioning by scrutinizing his reasoned valuation in relation to the institutional dynamics that led him to develop a reasoning in valuing being knowledgeable in terms of how to deal with the practical difficulties of teaching Kurdish children in

Turkish.

Being knowledgeable is both an intrinsically and instrumentally valuable functioning in the context of Turkey even though participants embrace completely different conceptions of the good life. Apart from its intrinsic value, participants' have diverse reasonings for valuing being knowledgeable in various subjects, which invites us to identify some further valuable functionings, such as being able to develop a true conception of good life, developing a skilful performance and creative solutions in one's occupation, gaining the respect and admiration of others, expressing the self through artistic activities, influencing one's social environment via political activities, accessing and benefiting from basic citizenship rights (health, social reliefs), and being employed and earning a regular income⁴⁶. However, it should also be noted that people's reasoned valuation are social products and thus can be conditioned by various social and institutional constraints. Therefore, a sociologically informed scrutiny of people's reasoned valuation, which focuses on what leads them to develop such reasoned valuation, can help us to figure out another valuable functioning. I applied this perspective to Welat's valuation of travelling in order to "develop skilful performance or creative solutions in his occupation". This demonstrated that his valuation was not a valuation that stemmed from a personal aspiration. On the contrary, it was a valuation that was shaped by a difficulty (in teaching Kurdish children in Turkish) that arose from an institutional constraint (denial of the Kurdish language in education). In this regard, even though Welat's valuation did not straightforwardly address "being able to access and teach in one's mother-language" as a valuable functioning, we need to address this functioning as valuable.

IV. Having Personal Autonomy

The concept of autonomy is considerably complex and rather abstract. Similar to the valuation of survival and being knowledgeable, numerous scholars acknowledge its significance for a good life both within the capability literature and beyond. However, they address the concept in diverse ways, such as "independence" (Andrews and Withey 1976); "deciding for oneself" (Griffin 1986); "freedom" (Max-Neef 1993); "self-determination" (Allardt 1993, Qizilbash 1996); "self-direction" (Schwartz

⁴⁶ Unfortunately, I do not have space to discuss all of these reasoned valuations in this section. Yet, I will discuss the significance of them in relation to other functionings that participants of this study valued during this chapter.

1994); “freedom of choice and action” (Narayan *et al* 2000); “agency needs” (Hamilton 2003); and “empowerment, choice, and control” (Burchardt and Vizard 2011). In this regard, the concept of autonomy has a very broad meaning. On the basis of participants’ narratives, I draw on the concept of personal autonomy here in a sense of being free from coercion of choosing and/or practicing a being or doing that the person would not have chosen and practised if s/he had an alternative choice.

A person has to have alternative options effectively available to her/him; or s/he has to be free from the constraint of having only one option, even though this option may be the one that brings desired ends. To illustrate, Bahar, who is a professional in the tourism sector in Istanbul, has been living with her moderately affluent family in Izmir since she became unemployed. When I asked her how she feels about returning to her family house, she said:

Bahar: As a matter of fact, I am not really happy about it. I mean my family is quiet relaxed. They do not bother me at all. But, I would prefer to live on my own. (...) It [unhappiness] is about my feeling. My discomfort, I mean. It is about being obliged to return to father house [parental home]. Especially after I used to live on my own...

Onur: You say they do not bother you about anything.

Bahar: Ours [her parents] are quite large [laid-back] people. They are broadminded. They do not pressure me to do anything. Whatever I could do in Istanbul, I can do here too. It is even more comfortable when considering I do not clean, cook and other stuff here. But, I would prefer to live in my own house. This is about my feeling.

Bahar was constrained to move back to her family house because of difficulty living in Istanbul as an unemployed woman. In this regard, we should note that she was constrained by a lack of economic means and thus had no other choice except to return to the parental home. However, while living with her family, she can do whatever she was doing when she was living on her own in Istanbul; so there is no particular restriction for Bahar emerging in relation to living within the parental home. Although a desired end (doing what she wants) is already granted for her in her parental home, she does not feel comfortable and associates her discomfort with being obliged to return to her family house. Based on this, we can interpret that it is not only being able to access a desired end (being able to do whatever she wants in her parental home where anyone does not restrict her), but also freedom from being obliged to be or do something (here independent living) while accessing this end is also a valuable functioning. This confirms one of the main arguments of the capability approach, namely that “freedom of choice can indeed be direct importance for the person’s quality of life and well-being” (Sen 1992: 51).

Apart from economic constraints, in the context of Turkey, there are various social constraints that lead people to be and do something that they would not have chosen if they had the ability to choose something different. For example, Halime, a conservative right-wing woman lawyer who is also a member of the women's branch of the AKP in Konya, has devoted significant time to political activities since her late twenties in the conservative right-wing political tradition in Konya. She said

But, there is a problem here too. Women's place in politics is considered very limited. In politics too, women are usually given place to work on issues like family, kids, household... Men have still monopolised issues that have more weight in politics. (...) Like, economy, health, or justice...

Halime added that women, not only in the home but in politics too, are "implicitly" told "do not put your nose into male stuff with your doughy hands". According to her, it would be unlikely for her to get a position in the executive committee of her party's Konya branch since there was already a woman on the committee at that time. So, participating in politics is a valuable functioning for her; however, what she said also demonstrates that she is constrained in her engagement in political issues (which she would probably have not chosen if she was not constrained) by a prevalent social norm that ascribes to woman an image of "doughy hands" and limits their social roles. Selim, a middle-aged man who is Muslim but embraces more secular norms and works as an electrical technician in Izmir, complained that in Ramadan, if he does not work in the field, he pretends he fasts in his workplace. Otherwise, he said he would be a person who "offends the eye" and is excluded from certain social relations in his workplace. This can be interpreted as a valuation of the functioning of being not marginalised and excluded from social relations with others. Yet, it can also be interpreted as being constrained by prevalent religious norms to behave in accordance with a particular religious conception of the good life. Ahmet, a poor religious and nationalist man working as a factory worker in Konya, was a member of a local branch of the AKP although he said he voted for the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) in elections. When I asked him why he became a member of the AKP, he said this was because it makes it easier to get a job if a person writes down "I am a member of the AK Party (AKP)" in the section of "what are your hobbies?" in the job application form. This can be considered as a valuation of the functioning of employment; but we can also argue that Ahmet has an interest in valuing not being politically coerced to embrace a particular view in order to be employed.

Berfin, a young unemployed Kurdish woman whose sister works as a salesclerk in a shop in Izmir, said that when she visited her sister in her workplace, she noticed that other employees call her sister as “Yagmur” (a Turkish name) although her name is “Berivan” (a Kurdish name). When she asked her sister why people call her “Yagmur”, her sister explained that her boss asked her to use another name in the workplace in order to “not disturb customers”. This can be interpreted as being coerced to appropriate a particular ethnic image in order to secure the functioning of employment.

In summary, we can address the value of not being socially coerced to be and to do something in various ways in the context of Turkey and see it as a valuable functioning for those who embrace quite diverse conceptions of the good. However, in addition to this, we should also address various forms of institutional coercion that dictate people to behave in a certain way that they would not choose if they had the ability to resist. To illustrate, Jiyan, a young female Kurdish lawyer living and working in Diyarbakir, said that “we (Kurds) do not want any privilege, we just want to be equal” and explained what she means by “equal” through a story of a client,

She [her client] was an illiterate woman in her sixties. She did not know any Turkish. (...) She asked the magistrate to have a word in Kurdish. He did not allow. He ordered the reporter, “write down! The defendant talks in an unidentified language”. Everyone in the trial knew that she was talking in Kurdish.

In fact, Article 202 in the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedures secures the right to defence for those who do not know Turkish by recognizing the provision of a translator service for them. However, the Kurdish language is not an officially recognized language in Turkey; so, magistrates usually tend to identify Kurdish speaking defendants as “those who talk in an unidentified language” and prefer to not assign a translator for them. Jiyan’s example refers to this particular interpretation⁴⁷ of magistrates that does not allow Kurds to use their language in legal contexts. This either results in Kurds being formally constrained to drawing on the “right of defence” or leads them to abdicate this right. This, therefore, requires us to specify being free from institutional coercion of expressing and defending one’s her/himself in a particular language as a valuable doing.

Based on participants’ narratives, in fact, we can address the value of being free from institutional coercion based on participants’ narratives in quite diverse areas. To illustrate, Ruken, a Kurdish

⁴⁷ The Article 202 was amended in the interest of Kurdish speaking people in January, 2013. Yet, the amendment did not solve the problem fully, which I will discuss in the following section.

university student woman political activist living in Diyarbakir, complained about some practices that students have to do every morning in primary school, such as reciting the Student Oath⁴⁸ (which was abolished after my fieldwork, in September 2013), and identified these as examples of “Turkification” and the “assimilation” policies of the Turkish state. This can be considered as a valuation of the ability to be free from the coercion of glorifying and appropriating a particular ethnic identity. Esin, a secular woman civil servant who is also a workplace representative of a trade union in Izmir, expressed her concerns about a legal draft that aimed to restrict the right to abortion, which can be considered as a valuation of being free from coercion in “matters of reproduction” (Nussbaum 2011a: 33). Ali, an Alawi middle-aged man who has a daughter studying in a secondary school of Izmir, complained about obligatory religious courses in which Sunni-Muslim beliefs are taught and practiced to children in schools, which can be considered as a valuation of being free from the coercion of being forced to learn and practice a religious belief or of the freedom of choosing “to live or not to live according to a religion” (Robeyns 2003: 72). Hasan, an Abdal-Alawi man who lives in a stigmatized area (Doganlar) close to Konya city centre, spoke of a new urban transformation project of the Konya Municipality that compel residents of Doganlar to sell their houses to construction companies and to move out of the city. Ferat, a Kurdish building worker man working and living in Konya, shared the migration story of his family. He said they were forced⁴⁹ by the security forces to migrate from Mardin, a city within the Kurdish region of Turkey, to Konya when he was 14 years old because they did not agree to join the “village guards”, a paramilitary force organised by the Turkish state against to the PKK. Both Hasan and Ferat’s cases demonstrate that they did not “have choice and control over where to live” (Burchardt and Vizard 2011: 117), which again requires us to specify being free from institutional coercion to choose in being or doing something as a valuable functioning. Halime, a veiled conservative politically active right-wing woman from Konya, said that she cannot take a seat in the parliament since the legislation that sets out the outfit of civil servants does not allow her to

⁴⁸ “I am a Turk, honest and hardworking. My principle is to protect the younger to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My ideal is to rise, to progress. Great Ataturk! On the path that you have paved, I swear to walk incessantly toward the aims that you have set. My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence. How happy is the one who says ‘I am a Turk!’”

⁴⁹ I should note the Turkish state enforced the internal displacement several times since its establishment (see Yegen 2009: 603-4). Kurban and Yegen (2012: 45) note that, over a million people who were living in the Kurdish region of Turkey were displaced in 1990s.

take place in the parliament without removing her veil⁵⁰. When wearing the veil in universities was banned by a public mandate of the Council of Higher Education in 1998, Rabia, a veiled religious woman from Konya, had just completed high-school. Therefore, she could not study⁵¹ at university until the public mandate was withdrawn in July 2010, which made her lose 13 years in taking her education. Considering the value of being able to participate in political activities and to have education, both Halime and Rabia have also plausible reasons to value being free from institutional coercion that dictates them to behave a certain way.

We can see numerous social and institutional dynamics that coerce people to practice a being or doing that they would not otherwise practice if they had the ability to resist. This requires us to specify being free from the coercion of practicing a being and doing as a functioning that is valuable for numerous domains of the good life in the context of Turkey, such as engaging in political activities, (non)practicing religious beliefs, drawing on basic human rights, expressing one's ethnic identity, taking education, deciding reproduction, and choosing place of living.

V. Having Social and Institutional Recognition

Recognition is a comprehensive term that is not only addressed as a component of the good life by various scholars (see Nielsen 1977, Braybrooke 1987, Taylor 1994, Chambers 1995⁵², Hamilton 2003), but is also considered as an abstract moral act that, crudely put, encompasses three foundational spheres, namely love (reciprocal recognition of the emotional and physical needs of others), respect (recognition of one another's equal treatment in law), and esteem (recognition of each individual's contribution to social life), which together underpin a theory of just society (see Honneth 1996, 2001, 2004). Here, however, I refer to recognition as a concept that is considered in the more narrow sense of recognizing each person's (1) social identity as an equally dignified being, and (2) differences in drawing on rights that are equally provided to everyone.

First of all, "social recognition" of each person's identity as equally dignified is a valuable functioning for everyone regardless of their religious, non-religious, or ethnic identities. There could

⁵⁰ This law was amended on 1st October 2013 after my fieldwork.

⁵¹ Actually, Rabia took place in a distant education program where she did not have to follow courses in a university building. Yet, she could not finish the program since she was not allowed to take place in exams.

⁵² Chambers' list does not include recognition since it is a list of "dimensions of deprivation". Yet, the item of "social inferiority" that is included as a dimension of deprivation can be considered as an opposite term of recognition.

be numerous forms of such recognition. Based on my participants' accounts, however, I discuss this here with reference to not being treated disrespectfully, harassed, humiliated, or criminalised. When we were talking about working life for veiled women in Konya, Halime, for example, said that

They think women who have Islamic lifestyle can be treated disrespectfully. (...) It is everywhere. In the bank for example... The clerk tells me "what do you need *kardes* [my sister]?" (...) He calls non-veiled women as "*hanimefendi* [lady]" though. It happens even here [her office]. When a client steps in, s/he says that I came to talk to the lawyer. When I say it is me, then s/he says "sorry". Some say "I thought you were the secretary". They cannot imagine a veiled lawyer. Some even do not call me *siz* [plural form of you].

Halime straightforwardly complains about being addressed disrespectfully, based on which we can easily specify being respected as a valuable functioning. However, beyond this, she in essence complains about the image of veiled woman in the eyes of the general public. Referring to some mutually exclusive categories such as "veiled woman and lady" or "non-veiled woman and sister"⁵³, Halime's narrative tells us about a social perception that places veiled women in an inferior position and leads to the emergence of certain ways of addressing that have the meaning of disrespect in her account.

Esin, an unveiled secular female civil servant living and working in Izmir, also experienced a similar problem in her everyday life due to her outfit. She complained about a degrading view towards non-veiled women like herself. She shared a personal experience that of waiting for her sister at a bus station late one evening, she was approached by a police patrol squad and questioned about what she was waiting for.

No, it was not [a security check]. It was an excuse to make me feel uncomfortable. Since my skirt was a bit short, they thought that I was a *hayat kadini* [prostitute]. According to them, women like me can be *hayat kadini*. If I had a veil and a long coat, then they would have not stopped by and asked me why I was waiting for. (...) If a woman has a confident outfit, they think she can be harassed. It is even worse in rural [areas]. You cannot imagine how many unveiled women are harassed everyday by bigots.

According to Esin, the police officers were specifically recruited from Islamic groups, and therefore, in her account, the police represented a particular social characteristic, namely the Islamic characteristic. When her narrative is considered in the light of this information, it can be interpreted that her complaint is about a particular image of an unveiled woman as being potentially unchaste in the eyes of Islamic people. According to her, it is this image that leads to the emergence of particular

⁵³ As well as "veiled woman and lawyer" or "non-veiled woman and secretary".

behaviours towards unveiled women which, in her account, has the meaning of harassment.

Hasan, a poor Abdal-Alawi man living in a socially stigmatized area of Konya, was earning his life as a street vendor selling various small goods in the central Konya during winter and small dowry goods during spring times in surrounding villages of Konya before the municipality banned selling anything without a licence. His account of how he was treated when selling dowry goods in villages of Konya demonstrates that he was humiliated in relation to his Alawi identity.

Whenever I went in those villages, kids would scream “the Gypsy is coming, the Gypsy is coming” and run away from me. As if I was a burglar, rapist... When I sit down in a *kahve*⁵⁴ to take a breather, this time around their fathers would call me *aptal* [stupid]. (...) It is *Abdal* [a branch of Alawi belief]. They knew this. Even so, they called me *aptal*.

During the interview, Hasan complained about various humiliating expressions that are commonly used to refer to the Alawis in Turkey such as *cenabet* (impure) and *kizilbas*⁵⁵. His narrative above refers to being humiliated through a linguistic resemblance of the word of *aptal* that means “stupid” in Turkish to the *Abdal* that distinguishes his Alawi identity. Hasan’s narrative also demonstrates that the Romany identity is given a stigmatised image of a dangerous and fearsome person, even in children’s accounts. At first sight, this might be considered to have nothing to do with Hasan’s Abdal-Alawi identity. However, considering that the Abdal-Alawi and the Romany identities are usually associated with each other in people’s accounts in mid-Anatolia and Thrace regions of Turkey due to various historical and anthropological similarities between these groups (see Mezarcioglu 2010) and thus represent considerably similar social images, the stigmatised image ascribed to the Romany identity becomes applicable to Hasan’s Abdal-Alawi identity as well.

Lastly, I should also point out an image that is ascribed to the Kurdish ethnic identity in Turkey. Habib, a young Kurdish male primary school teacher living in Diyarbakir and married to the Turkish daughter of a conservative right-wing family, was an interesting participant whose mother language is Kurdish, who was born and raised in a town of Diyarbakir, yet who was proud to identify himself as Turkish. When talking about his marriage, he said that he waited a long time to marry his wife as she was concerned about her parents’ reaction. Habib explained the reason behind the emergence of such a concern.

⁵⁴ Local cafe house for men

⁵⁵ *Kizilbas* is in essence a term used to distinguish Anatolian Alawi identity, yet is today used to stigmatize Alawi people with some disgraceful act.

To be honest, it was a bit about that I am from Diyarbakir. (...) You know... There are general [common] misunderstandings. (...) Like, Kurd equals to terrorism. As if all Kurds are terrorists... Anyway, this is sorted out. We are married now.

Habib's narrative can be interpreted that he was constrained in developing a specific form of relationality, marriage, due to the meaning of his Kurdish ethnicity in the eyes of his wife's parents, who associated Kurdishness with terrorism. This can be considered as criminalisation of the Kurdish ethnic identity, which is in fact quite common in Turkey. For example, Meliha, a young Turkish woman university student from Konya but studying in Eskisehir, identified the Doganlar neighbourhood of Konya as "a dangerous place" where "Kurds and Gypsies live" although it is an Abdal-Alawi neighbourhood. According to Ahmet, a male religious and nationalist factory worker from Konya, Kurds "are the fire tongs of international powers planning to demolish the (Turkish) state". Bahri, a nationalist postman from Konya, believes that Kurds are people who became "toys of baby killers". Belgin, an unpaid housewife who embraces religious and nationalist values and who lives in Konya, does not want Kurdish neighbours since Kurds "have too many kids attacking everyone". Ayten, a moderately affluent housewife who embraces secular and republican views and lives in Izmir, said that she had Kurdish neighbours with whom she got along very well in the past, but added that her neighbours were "good ones" who were not involved in "mafia and terrorism things". These accounts demonstrate the extensiveness of the criminalisation of the Kurdish identity in Turkey.

Based on my participants' accounts, we can specify freedom from disrespect, harassment, humiliation, and criminalisation as valuable functionings in the context of Turkey, consistent with the literature on human values and the capability approach. The point that should be made here, however, is that participants' experiences of disrespect, harassment, humiliation, and criminalisation emerge in relation to socially constructed meanings of their identities in the eyes of others. Halime complains about treated disrespectfully due to a meaning ascribed to being veiled as being a socially inferior person. Esin complains about harassment due to a meaning ascribed to being unveiled as being an "unchaste" (or less chaste) person. Hasan complains about being insulted due to a stigmatised meaning ascribed to being Abdal-Alawi as a "dangerous" person. And Habib complains about being criminalised due to a meaning ascribed to being Kurdish as being a "terrorist". These negative

accounts towards others' are usually reciprocally produced. Halime, who complained about being placed in an inferior position in everyday encounters due to her veil, believes that those who embrace secular lifestyles are "more prone to be morally corrupted", which confirms Esin's complaint of being perceived unchaste. On the other hand, Esin said that she does not want to travel with veiled females on public transport since, according to her, "they do not know to use deodorant" and "they are stinky", which confirms Halime's complaint of being placed in an inferior position. Therefore, there is a good ground to specify "mutual recognition of each's social identity as an equally dignified being" as a valuable functioning, which can be a social base for freedom from disrespect, harassment, insult, and criminalisation.

Secondly, there is also a good ground to specify "legal recognition" as a valuable functioning. By legal recognition, I refer to the legal empowerment of those who have different needs from the needs of the majority in order to be able to draw on rights that are supposed to be guaranteed for everyone on the ground of equal citizenship. Institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey provides various persuasive cases to address legal empowerment as a valuable functioning. For example, I quoted above from my interview with Jiyan who said Kurds "do not want any privilege" but equality, and discussed the value of being free from coercion in relation to a story of her Kurdish client who was forced to draw on Turkish to defend themselves in court. The conversation between us proceeded as follows:

Onur: It seems this [problem] is going to be sorted out soon. They have started to discuss provision of Kurdish-Turkish translators in parliament.

Jiyan: Did you read the proposal that they discuss? (...) It says that if she wants to defend herself in Kurdish, she has to pay the translator money [fee] from her own pocket. (...) So, tell me, why do I have to pay for a translator to defend myself? What would be happen if I cannot afford it? Should I dispense with my right then?

Jiyan's narrative establishes that the removal of a legal coercion that forces Kurds to defence themselves in Turkish is necessary; yet, what she says points out that this is not a fair solution on its own. This is because even though drawing on the Kurdish language in court is no longer prohibited, they still have to compensate for being Kurdish (or speaking the Kurdish language) by their own efforts (e.g. paying the translator fee) in order to draw on the right to defence. However, Turkish people are not required to compensate for being Turkish (or speaking the Turkish language) since the

judicial system already proceeds in their own language. There is an inequality here that derives from the institutional configuration of the judicial system in Turkey. Thus, empowering Kurds institutionally through the provision of free translator service is not a privilege, but a moral necessity for establishing equality between Kurdish and Turkish defendants in drawing on the right to defence.

Another example that requires us to specify the legal empowerment based on the moral reason of equality was given by Merwan, an educated and moderately affluent Kurdish man from Diyarbakir, in a different domain of good life. During the interview, Merwan spoke of quite a number of troubles that Kurds in Turkey face; and most of the troubles he mentioned can be addressed as reasons that require us to specify the legal empowerment of the Kurdish ethnic identity as a valuable functioning. I do not have space to address all of these troubles here. However, one story that Merwan shared illustrates the significance of this functioning for Kurds who face difficulties to access even the basic functionings of good life, such as health, due to the institutional denial of their ethnicity.

The doctor misunderstood him [an acquaintance of Merwan]. In Kurdish, “I have pain in my bowel” he says and points out his bowel. But when he translates it in Turkish, he says “I have pain in my foxes”. (...) “Rovi” means bowel in Kurdish. Some say “ruvi” too. It also means fox [in Kurdish]. (...) So, when he says “I have pain in my foxes”, he wants to say, “my bowel”. He does not know there is a different word for this [bowel] in Turkish. (...) The doctor thinks that he makes fun with him. They start to dispute and yell each other.

Here we see an example of how the institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity brings forth confrontation between people in everyday life. The story explicitly demonstrates that utilisation of the most basic social rights of citizenship for Kurds in Turkey depend on the extent to which they internalise a particular characteristic of Turkishness, namely the Turkish language. Such an institutional configuration obviously demonstrates the assimilationist characteristic of citizenship entitlements in Turkey. However, it also demonstrates that the current institutional configuration that regulates the provision of basic functionings requires Kurds to adopt a foreign language and thus puts an extra burden on them in order to be equal to others in accessing rights to health, education, public reliefs, or participation in politics, which is counter to the very idea of equality. So, on the moral ground of equality, there is a good reason to specify being legally empowered to draw on rights that are supposed to be guaranteed to everyone as a valuable functioning.

Institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity illustrates the value of legal empowerment quite

persuasively. However, this is a functioning valuable for all of those who have conceptions of the good life distinct from that of the majority in their milieu and thus who have reason to value freedom from the rule of “tyranny of the majority” (Tocqueville 1840 {2004}: 301, Mill 1859 {2015}: 8). For example, Oktay, a middle-aged male worker who embraces more republican values and votes for the main opposition party in Konya, complained that his son’s school was recently converted into an Imam Hatip school⁵⁶ since the majority in his milieu wanted such an education for their children. However, he did not want his son to study in an Imam Hatip school and registered him to another school farther away, which brought extra financial and practical burdens. According to him, the state should have at least helped parents who changed their children’s schools by, for example, “providing a free school bus” and “lunch” for their children. Alime, a veiled university student studying and living in Izmir, valued access to cultural and artistic events that are compatible with what she calls “oriental tastes” like Persian and Sufi music events. However, she said the Izmir municipality only supports events that serve western preferences like classic and rock music concerts. Aram, a well-off male of Armenian origin who is in his mid-fifties living in Diyarbakir, spoke of the financial difficulties that the Armenian community faced during the renovation of a historic church in Diyarbakir. He said that if the Diyarbakir Municipality did not help, it would have taken much longer to complete the renovation and to re-open the church to worship again⁵⁷. Based on these and some other cases, we can specify the functionings of being able to take education, accessing cultural and artistic opportunities, and freedom to practice one’s religion as valuable in line with various lists of valuable beings and doings in the literature. However, these cases also provide us information to specify having the legal empowerment to be able to do them in the context of Turkey.

VI. Social Bases of Valuable Relationships

There are different forms of relationship that are intrinsically and/or instrumentally valuable for many people, such as family relationships (Andrew and Withey 1976, Biswas-Diener and Diener 2001),

⁵⁶ In addition to courses that are standard in every school, children are also taught various Islamic courses in these schools.

⁵⁷ He noted that the state also offered financial help to renovate the church in return of the property deed of the church. He said that the Armenian community did not accept this offer since, according to him, when the state takes the properties of minorities; “it either leaves the property to vanish or uses it with different purposes”. He gave an example of the Akhdamar Church that has a paramount historical and religious importance for Armenians, yet today is used as a museum under the control of the state. On the other hand, Aram underlined the significance of opening it for frequent worship.

love relationships (Ramsay 1992, Nussbaum 2000), friendship (Rokeach 1973, Argyle and Martin 1991, Allardt 1993, Cummins 1996) or companionship (Braybrooke 1987), having a sense of community (Nielsen 1977, Narayan *et al* 2000) and belonging (Packard 1960), or more generally developing solidarity or supportive relationships (Alkire *et al* 2009). Value of these forms of relationships is explicitly addressed in the literature. Different from the existing literature, however, I want to address that a person's ability to develop and sustain these forms relationships is influenced by certain social dynamics. For example, due to discriminative or polarising everyday politics, some people may experience difficulty to develop friendship, sense of community, or solidarity relationships with others in some context. Since such social dynamics remove bases of developing and sustaining valuable relationship, it is important to address some functionings that can help the establishment of necessary bases on which people can develop and sustain these valuable relationships. In the context of Turkey, an ongoing armed-conflict between the PKK and the state as well as religious and political polarisation between different social groups seem hinder the establishment of a social base on which people can develop and sustain the relationships that they value.

However, before discussing these issues, I should point out that regardless of their ethnicity, gender, political view, economic status, place of living, religious identity or religiosity, most of the participants of this study (either explicitly or implicitly) addressed various forms of relationship as valuable. To illustrate, both Ahmet, a poor male factory worker living in Konya, and Gulazer, a poor Kurdish housewife living in Diyarbakir, addressed the importance of having good relations with neighbours by expressing some common proverbs. They underpinned this valuation with some examples of everyday practices that illustrate the significance of neighbourhood support and solidarity between neighbours. Azat, a retired Armenian origin man who was working as a watchman in a recently renovated church of Diyarbakir, was the youngest child of a Muslimised father of Armenian origin and a Muslim mother whose uncle adopted Azat's father. When I asked if there was anything that bothered him in his life that we had not talked about during the interview, he complained about being forced by his mother to marry her brother's daughter for whom Azat did not have any feelings. Alime, a veiled university student who has some financial difficulties and lives in her relative's spare

flat located in a relatively affluent neighbourhood of Izmir, said that she feels like a stranger in her housing estate since she does not feel any commonality with her neighbours or share anything with the community. Oktay, a middle-aged male worker who lives in Konya, said that he cannot call his neighbourhood as “my neighbourhood” anymore. He said that his neighbourhood has changed after the construction of new buildings and arrival of new people with the urban transformation plan of the municipality. He complained that family relations are not like what he had in the past when people came together in each others’ houses frequently and spent time together more often. Based on these participants’ accounts, we can specify being in solidarity and supportive relations with others, being together with loved ones, developing a sense of belonging, and having a sense of community as valuable beings and doings. Drawing on some other participants’ accounts, I can extend this list in line with the various lists in the literature. However, instead of such examples, it seems more important to address the importance of establishing and sustaining the social bases of these relationships.

In the context of Turkey, living in peace and harmony with others is perhaps the most immediate social base that could secure many people’s ability to develop and sustain various forms of valuable relationships. Absence of social recognition that I discussed above can be addressed as a social cause that leads to the absence of living in peace and harmony with others. However, here I want to point out another social cause that prevents people to live in peace and harmony with others and thus to develop various forms of valuable relationship: the ongoing war between the PKK and the state. For example, Amed, an elderly Kurdish man who was forced to leave his village and migrate to a central neighbourhood of Diyarbakir, was a participant whose son joined the PKK guerrilla forces and lost his life in the war against the state. He said,

I do not want anyone to die. Neither from guerrillas nor from the soldiers... What I want is the mothers’ tears to stop, this cursed war to end.

During the interview, Amed pointed out the value of peace several times. The clause of “mothers’ tears to stop” in his narrative above can be considered as an illustration of this valuation. In Turkey, this expression has now become a common appeal and referred to put an end the sorrow that parents who lost their children in the armed conflict between the guerrilla and the state experience. It

therefore can be considered as a demand to end the war in order to ensure the sustainability of a particular form of valuable relationship, namely parental relationship. We can also observe the value of ending the war between the guerrilla forces and the state in the account of Belgin, a Turkish housewife who has nationalist and religious values and lives in Konya. When she was talking about her feelings regarding her son's period of obligatory military service, she stated that:

I wish my hand was broken and I could not have voted for him⁵⁸. Why do you talk [negotiate] to a man⁵⁹ who is a murderer? Why do you not execute him by hanging by his neck? (...) I am very sensitive about the Kurds. When my son went to the military [service], we *akla karayi sectik*⁶⁰ until he returned. We were scared a lot.

Concerning how the war between the PKK guerrilla forces and the state could be ended, Belgin had a completely different opinion from Amed. Besides, different from Amed, she did not lose her son in the war. However, considering that she had a very anxious period during her son's obligatory military service due to a fear of losing him in the war, it can be argued that this war symbolises a threat to the sustainability of her relationship with her son in her account too. Based on both Amed and Belgin's accounts, we can specify the truce and settlement of peace between PKK guerrilla forces and the state as a necessary base for the sustainability of a particular form of valuable relationship, namely parental relationship. However, the negative effects of this war are not limited to sustainability of parental relationships. It also negatively affects people's ability to develop other forms of valuable relationships, such as community relationships, love, solidarity, and support. For example, Ferzad, a male Kurdish construction worker who lives in Konya with his family, said that "whenever martyr news starts to appear on TV, our lives turn to hell here" and gave some examples of how their relations with neighbours become worse when the conflict between the PKK and the state escalates. Ruken, a Kurdish woman university student who is also a political activist living in Diyarbakir, said "being melancholic has become a part of our mood" and, referring to grievous incidents in the Kurdish region such as the Roboski Massacre, said that "personal happiness or falling in love makes me feel like a selfish person in this picture".

In addition, we should also address how freedom from polarisation is an important social base that can serve for developing and sustaining various forms of valuable relationship. The image of "other"

⁵⁸ The prime minister of that time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

⁵⁹ The prisoned leader of the PKK, A. Ocalan.

⁶⁰ A phrase indicating having an intense nuisance period until something gets done.

(veiled, unveiled, Kurdish, or Alawi) that I discussed earlier in this chapter can be considered as both a reason for and an outcome of the polarisation in the society which negatively influences people's ability to develop various forms of valuable relationships. To illustrate, Alime, a veiled university student studying and living in Izmir, criticized both the ruling party (AKP) that has a conservative right-wing political agenda, as well as the main opposition party (CHP) the majority of whose supporters defend top-down promotion of republican and secular values. According to her, while the AKP has changed "true Muslims" into "less tolerant" people and encourages the idea of "us" and "them", the CHP maintains the "politics of fear", and she considered both as "really dangerous". She shared some personal experiences that illustrated how such polarisation constrained her from developing her friendship with others and spoke of some examples of insulting acts that she encountered due to her veil in her school and when she went to the theatre with her friends. Esma, a young veiled housewife living in Konya, was a graduate of a vocational high school of health where students had to do internships in a medical establishment as a part of their education in their last year. She said that her colleagues in the dispensary where she did her internships became less willing to talk to her after she decided to cover her head and she was not invited to any social event outside of the workplace. Ali, a middle-aged Alawi male living in Izmir, said that in his neighbourhood, "everyone wants to live in her [or his] own shell" instead of developing relations with others. The reason behind this, according to him, is because "our society is a nervous society" and people do not want their "political and religious differences" to turn into "big disputes".

In line with the various lists of philosophical accounts of the good life as well as the lists of valuable beings and doings in the literature, we can specify numerous forms of valuable relationship such as parental, community, solidarity and support, intimate, and friendship relations. However, people's ability to develop and sustain these relationships is influenced by certain social dynamics. Therefore, it is equally important to address the social bases of people's ability to develop and sustain these relationships as valuable functioning too. In the context of Turkey, an ongoing armed-conflict between the PKK and the state as well as religious and political polarisation between different identities seem hinder the emergence of a social base on which people can develop and sustain the relationships that they value. Based on this, "living in peace and harmony with others" and "being

free from polarisation” can be specified as valuable functionings too.

VII. Security

The concept of security here refers to the ensured sustainability of what people value to be and do, which can be considered as an ability to be free from the danger of being deprived from the possession of valuable functionings. Thus, it indicates inalienability of valuable functionings.

The concept of inalienability is an indispensable part of the discussion of natural rights in the seminal works of classical philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Thomas Paine. It has a foundational place in the modern political philosophy of rights, particularly within the traditions of the natural law and rights, human and citizenship rights. Although it is also a moral underpinning of redistributive arguments in the literature on social justice, apart from Wolff and de-Shalit’s (2007: 68-72) analysis of disadvantage, it has not been given sufficient attention within the literature of the capability approach. Here by contrast, drawing on my participants’ narratives, I need to address the value of the inalienability of functionings.

Even though the participants of this study hold quite diverse accounts of the good life, their valuation of the inalienability of functionings, in other words the security of functionings, can explicitly be observed in their narratives. To illustrate, I noted above that Alime was critical of the ruling party (AKP) although her freedom to take education has been significantly enlarged after the party removed the legal coercion constraining veiled women from education with their veils through a public mandate in July 2010. One of the reasons why Alime was critical of the AKP can be seen in her narrative below:

There is no law allowing us to enter university with the veil. (...) There is only a public mandate of the Higher Education Council. (...) It is temporary. It can be taken back anytime. If the Higher Education Council feels like to change it, you cannot enter the university. (...) This should be a right. It is not a right now.

A public mandate does not have the status of law in Turkey. It is mostly used by semi-autonomous state institutions (e.g. the Higher Education Council) to identify legal procedures of how the respective law has to be interpreted and applied in the realm of authority of the institution (e.g. universities). What Alime refers above is the fact that the law that regulates the outfit code in universities has not been amended in a way that secures veiled women’s ability to take education

without being forced to take their veils off. Only the interpretation of some clauses in the law has been revised through a public mandate, which today allows veiled women to take university education. Under the light of this information, Alime's quote can be interpreted as a concern about the permanence or security of her ability to access higher education. Especially, her emphasis, "it can be taken back anytime", can be interpreted as a concern deriving from the insecurity or alienability of the freedom to take education with her veil. Based on this, it can be argued that not only being able to take education, but the provision of this ability in a secure form is also a functioning valued by Alime. However, Alime's ability to take education wearing her veil is considered as a threat to the security of various functionings by quite a number of secular republicans in Turkey. To illustrate, during the interview, Ayten, a moderately affluent Turkish mother who embraces republican secular values and lives in Izmir, frequently constructed narratives of conservative Muslims as a threat to her freedom to be and do some basic functionings. I specifically asked what she considers about the change that allows veiled women to take their place in higher education. She straightforwardly responded that "it should have been kept forbidden" and justified her view by claiming that

These girls will soon be magistrate, lawyer, prosecutor... These girls who were made to memorised Yasin, Fatiha⁶¹ in 9-10 years old will soon be doctors. When they become a lawyer, a magistrate, they will impose their views. This is going to be a problem. When they become a doctor, they will tell (advise) us "repeat Yasin two times, you will be better". This is going to be a problem. (...) I do not mind what they believe. But, a veiled magistrate for example... When an unveiled woman appears in front of her, I do not think that she is able to judge properly.

During the interview, Ayten approached almost all issues that create tensions between conservatives and seculars in Turkey in terms of an account of Islamic religious identity as a threat to the lifestyle and freedoms of others. Here, we see that Ayten has an account that an enlargement of an ability of others, particularly Islamic people, is a threat to her own ability. She expresses her concerns that if religious women gain educational qualification in fields such as medicine and jurisprudence, this will be a threat to the decent provision of services in these fields in the future. In this regard, Ayten's narrative can be interpreted as a concern of insecurity about accessing certain functionings such as health and lawful trial. Based on their narratives above, we can argue that security of functionings is valuable for both Alime and Ayten even though they have completely contrasting and

⁶¹ Verses from the Quran.

competing conceptions of the good life.

The valuation of the security of functionings did not only appear in discussions of accessing education, health, or lawful trial, but also in the domains of different functionings such as living in peace, being employed, and participating in politics. For example, Amed, an elderly Kurdish male who was forcibly displaced from his village by the security forces and who migrated to a central neighbourhood of Diyarbakir, was a poor participant who lost his house and animals during the period of his displacement. I asked him if he would like to return to his village, if the state provides him a house and compensates his other losses too. He said that he would like to return and did not reject the importance of compensations of his losses. Yet, the problem for him was “how do I know that the state will not do the same things⁶²?” This can be considered as a concern arising from the insecurity of functioning of living in peace that I discussed above. Azat, a retired Armenian origin man living in Diyarbakir, said that he did not share his story of Armenian origins with anyone in his workplace while he was working as a driver of the state bureaucracy since, according to him, this could have caused him to lose his job. Yet, he has stopped making effort to hide his Armenian origin after his retirement, since there was no danger of losing his job anymore. Azat’s effort to hide his Armenian origin while working for the state can be considered as emerging due to his feelings of insecurity of functioning of employment. Feelings of insecurity in the functioning of employment, however, lead to a different constraint for Selim and Oktay who are middle-aged fathers living and working in Izmir and Konya, respectively. Although both of them valued to being a member of the main opposition party, they said that they did not apply for party membership since, according to both of them, this would cause them to lose their jobs. This can be considered as an avoidance of achieving the valuable functionings of political participation and freedom of expression due to the feeling of fear of losing one’s ability to achieve another functioning (employment), which also provides us a plausible reason to specify the security of functionings as valuable.

Briefly, the security of functionings can be considered as the inalienability of functionings, or the ensured sustainability of what people value to be and do. Although this is an important moral

⁶² He was coerced to be a village guard against the PKK. Since he did not accept it, his house was burned by the military, his animals were slaughtered, and he was displaced from his village.

underpinning for redistributive moral arguments, it has been mostly overlooked in the literature of the capability approach. However, participants' narratives above demonstrate that the security of valuable functionings or inalienability of them is an important component of their own conception of good life.

VIII. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed a number of different valuations of those who have contrasting and sometimes contesting conceptions of good life. In line with various lists of the good life, the chapter maintained the discussion with reference to a quite broad range of specific valuations of participants, such as being free from forced marriage (Dilzar), being able to travel and demonstrate skilful performance in one's occupation (Welat), having good relations with others in the workplace (Selim), having the ability to use one's own name (Berfin) and to defend oneself in her/his mother language in court (Jiyan), being able to express one's political view freely, (Ahmet) being respected (Halime), being free from insult (Esin) and stigmatisation (Hasan), having access to health (Merwan), having free transport and lunch in schools (Oktay), being able to develop and sustain parental (Amed and Belgin), intimate (Ruken), and solidarity (Gulazer) relations as well as a sense of community (Ali), being able to participate in political activities (Selim and Oktay), and many others. However, in exploring and scrutinizing participants' reasonings as well as interpreting the contextually formed meanings of what they valued, this chapter has also examined the various social and institutional dynamics that steer participants to address these beings and doings as valuable functionings during the interviews. This way of analysing participants' valuations led the chapter to depart from these individually valued functionings towards functionings that should be specified as valuable in order to make participants capable of achieving their own conception of good life in the face of the various social and institutional constraints of their milieu. According to the diverse characteristics of participants and their varied milieus (Diyarbakir, Konya, and Izmir), we can point out that these include valued functionings such as being free from the danger of patriarchal homicides (Dilzar), being knowledgeable and able to access education in one's mother language (Welat), being free from social and institutional coercion to adopt a particular ethnic (Berfin), religious (Selim), and political (Ahmet) identity, having social recognition of one's identity as an equally dignified identity (Halime,

Esin, and Hasan) as well as legal recognition of one's differentiated needs (Merwan and Oktay), being able to live in peace and harmony with others (Amed and Belgin), freedom from social polarisation (Ali), and being sure about the security of valued functionings (Selim and Oktay). This chapter has ended up with six broad domains of good life that are in one way or another valuable for participants even though they hold contrasting and contesting conceptions of the good life. These are survival and having a purpose in life, being knowledgeable, having personal autonomy, being socially and institutionally recognized, social bases of various forms of relationship, and security.



Achievement: Conversion Factors and Variation Between/Within the (Dis)advantage

I. Introduction


The capability approach advocates assessing people's well-being in terms of their freedom to achieve functionings (Alkire and Deneulin 2009: 31; Alkire 2005: 122; 2008: 28) that are valuable beings and doings. In the previous chapter, drawing on participants' narratives and taking notice of the institutional and social characteristics of their milieu, I addressed six broad categories of the various valuable beings and doings for those who have different conceptions of the good life in Turkey. Having established what my participants value (and the reasonings underlying their valuations), this chapter now turns to examine their achievement of these valuable beings and doings.

The capability approach criticizes the Rawlsian model of justice (arguably the most influential theory of justice), arguing that whilst it pays significant attention to the "inter-end variation" (different conceptions of the good life) that different people may have, it ignores the "inter-individual variation" in people's conversion of resources into the achievement of their varied conceptions of the good life (see Sen 1990a: 120-1, 1992: 85-7, 1999a: 74-5, 2009: 65-6, Robeyns and Brighouse 2010: 3-6). In other words, the Rawlsian focus on "social primary goods"⁶³ overlooks the social and personal characteristics of people that lead to interpersonal variations in their conversion of primary goods, which inevitably brings variation in outcome, or inequality in the achievement of a good life. The capability approach advocates extending the analysis of (dis)advantage beyond resource ownership to focus on whether people can convert their possessions into achievements of functionings. This requires incorporating the various factors that influence people's use, or conversion, of their resources to achieve functionings. Addressing these factors as conversion factors, Sen (1999a: 70-1, 2009: 254-7) identifies five broad categories that may influence people's conversion of resources into functioning achievement. These are personal heterogeneities (e.g. age, gender, disability), diversities in the physical environment (e.g. climatic circumstances), variations in social climate (e.g. prevalence or absence of crime and violence, the nature of community relationships), differences in relational

⁶³ These are basic rights and liberties; freedom of movement and free choice of occupation; powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; income and wealth; and the social bases of self-respect (see Rawls 1993: 308-9)

perspectives (e.g. established patterns of behavior in a community, conventions/customs), and distribution within the family (e.g. distributional rules followed within the family). Robeyns provides a slightly different classification of these factors as personal (e.g. physical condition, sex, metabolism, reading skills and intelligence), social (e.g. discriminative practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies), and environmental conversion factors (e.g. climate, geographical location) (2003: 63, 2005a: 99 and 2009a: 41).

Figure I: Illustration of the Role of Conversion Factors in Assessment of (Dis)advantage



*Developed from (Robeyns 2000: 5)

The capability approach's emphasis on conversion factors can be considered a departure from the classical economic analysis of a person's (dis)advantage, inclining towards a more sociological assessment of human diversity and variability in the achievement of the good life. However, this "sociological turn" (Robeyns 2006a: 371) is still too vague and needs further clarification. Sen stresses that "conversion problems can involve some extremely complex social issues, especially when achievement in question are influenced by intricate intragroup relations and interactions" (1992: 33), but does not discuss what these "extremely complex social issues" might be; instead, he addresses, for example, age, gender, and disability as *personal* heterogeneities⁶⁴ (1999a: 70, 2009: 255) leading to variations in the conversion of resources. However, age, gender, and disability as factors leading to variations in achievement because of specific configurations of institutional policies, or the operation of particular social norms. Neither age and disability nor gender are

⁶⁴ Robeyns (2009a: 41) too argues that there are some *personal conversion factors* and gives an example of these "personal" factors: "reading skills"! This illustrates an absence of "sociological conception" in the classification of these factors.

conversion factors on their own, they become conversion factors due to the particular configuration of social structures and relations. Accordingly, this suggests that all factors leading to variation in the achievement of functionings are in essence social conversion factors. On the other hand, Sen's (1992: 20) classification of these factors as "internal and external", or Robeyns (2009a: 41) classification of "personal, social, and environmental", is not simply a problem of taxonomy. It demonstrates the insufficient development of a sociological approach to the identification and conceptualization of conversion factors. This can be seen in the empirical literature of the capability approach where the role of social and institutional structure in the variations of people's achievement of the good life is usually overlooked. The crucial question that these empirical works usually leave unanswered is how gender, age, or ethnicity become conversion factors in social settings and how this lead to variations in achievement of functionings. In other words, the question left unaddressed is how social and institutional arrangements turn people's diversity to diversities of achievement leading to variation in their (dis)advantage. So, although existing capability literature tells us who is (dis)advantaged, it says very little about why and how people become (dis)advantaged since it does not take how people's diversities turn to diversities of conversion in relation to the social and institutional configuration of their context. For example, by looking at the national dataset, we can see variation between various groups' (e.g. woman and man) achievements of certain functionings (e.g. education, employment, income status). Based on this, we can reflect on who the disadvantaged one is. Yet, this analysis would be limited to the identification of disadvantaged one, but not explain why and how this group becomes the disadvantaged. Considering this from a policy perspective, it can be said that the capability approach provides an advanced analysis of who the disadvantaged ones are, but does not inform us how to tackle with these disadvantages. Yet, we need to know how the disadvantage occurs in order to deal with the problem of disadvantage. This requires a fuller sociological examination of how people's distinct characteristics turn to conversion factors and lead to disadvantage. Therefore, this chapter examines how social and institutional configuration of society in Turkey turns certain diversities of people to conversion factors and lead to disadvantage.

There is also another reason for a more sociological approach to exploring the role of conversion factors. Conversion factors are conceptualized as sources of human diversities that influence people's

achievement of valuable functionings; however, the existing literature tells us very little about what type of influence they have on people's achievement. In much of the literature, conversion factors are addressed as factors that either facilitate or constrain people's achievement. This reflects a two-dimensional understanding of (dis)advantage that is built upon a binary variation *between* achievement (advantage) and non-achievement (disadvantage) of functionings. However, (dis)advantage is not two-dimensional, as it is not simply composed of the achievement or non-achievement of functionings. Societies are not simply divided between two groups of people: those who achieve and those who cannot achieve functionings, since such achievements or non-achievements are a matter of degree. There are many people whose achievement of a functioning, say, of having social respect, is less than others whilst a smaller group achieves it far more than the most of us. In other words, there is variation, not only between the achievement and non-achievement of functionings, but also *within* achievement and non-achievement too. In order to capture this variation, the capability approach needs a more nuanced conceptualization of conversion factors that moves beyond a consideration of these factors as simply "facilitators" or "constrainers" of achievement.

Focusing on four key aspects of diversity in Turkey, namely gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, and political identity, this chapter examines each in turn to look at how these factors operate within particular social and institutional configurations and lead to variation in people's achievement of valuable functionings. Drawing on participants' narratives, it addresses these four factors that become highly influential on people's achievement of both fundamental (e.g. rights to education, employment, health) and auxiliary (e.g. promotion in occupation) functionings due to various institutional and social dynamics (such as patriarchal social norms and the consolidation of these norms through official policies; institutional favouritism and the prioritisation of a specific religious identity; the social and institutional denial of ethnic differences; and nepotism around a particular political identity). Demonstrating how these factors operate within the social and institutional configuration of Turkey, the next four sections also provide an identification of privileged and disadvantaged social identities in Turkey. Subsequently, drawing on participants' narratives, it focuses on variation within (non)achievement of some functionings and argues that we need to extend the conventional conception of conversion factors by identifying two additional

aspects: that is, the way in which conversion factors may interact to exacerbate or ameliorate the disadvantage.

II. Gender

Gender is the most commonly mentioned diversity in the capability literature (*inter alia* Sen 1990b, 1992: 122-5, 1999a: 189-203, 2000: 42-3; Nussbaum 1995, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Kynch and Sen 1983; Robeyns 2003; Klasen 2003); yet there is limited empirical work discussing gender-based (dis)advantages in Turkey using the capability approach (Uyan-Semerci 2007, Aydinligil 2009, Akkoyunlu-Wigley and Wigley 2008). This section aims to examine how gender turn to a social and institutional conversion factor in line with the patriarchal structure of society in Turkey and, how it is bound up with (dis)advantage in achievement of functionings. Drawing on participants' accounts, I firstly address a prevalent patriarchal understanding of gender roles where womanhood is associated with domesticity and intra-household responsibilities and man is considered as the head and breadwinner of the family. Subsequently, I address disadvantaging outcomes of this understanding for women in terms of achievements of certain functionings such as education, employment, participation in politics, and socialising. I also examine how this patriarchal account is institutionalised with reference to some specific policies. This section ends with a brief discussion on how gender disadvantages can lead women to embrace their disadvantaged positions and make them adapt their preferences in line with these disadvantages.

Variation in people's (non)achievement of functionings is deeply rooted in patriarchal social norms in Turkey that identify distinct and unequal gender roles and thus determine what women and men can (not) be and do. An example of the prevalence of patriarchal norms that lead to variation in achievement can be seen in the account of Oktay, a middle-aged married man living and working in Konya. When we were talking about household relations, Oktay spoke of how he and his wife manage their disputes.

Oktay: No... At most, we yell at each other. (...) Sometimes I yell at her. Sometimes she yells at me.

Onur: What do you do when she yells at you?

Oktay: Nothing... I just go away and wander around Meram (a central neighbourhood) till she calms down.

Onur: When you yell at her, does she go to wander around too?

Okday: *Nasil yani?*⁶⁵ (...) No, she stays at home.

Okday, at the beginning, suggests that both sides in the household have the same ability and that his wife is not constrained from being able to express her “justified anger” (Nussbaum 2011a: 33). However, Okday can manage such confrontations by avoiding being subject to his wife’s anger while she has to face his anger by staying in the home until he settles down and returns, which demonstrates that there is a variation in the achievement of the functioning. Being able to express one’s anger may seem less fundamental than a person’s ability to achieve some other functionings (such as education, employment, political participation, health). Yet, beyond the achievement of this specific functioning, Okday’s narrative is important in focusing our attention on a social norm. His first reaction to the question of whether his wife also exits from household arguments was “*nasil yani*”, which demonstrates that a woman leaving the home does not make sense to him. This is because, in Okday’s account, home is the natural habitat of woman and womanhood is associated with domesticity, a patriarchal account. It is such account that turns woman gender to a conversion factor and causes variation in different genders’ ability to achieve numerous functionings including the expression of anger.

The prevalence of this kind of patriarchal account can also be seen in some of my female participants’ narratives of gender roles in the household. For example, when we were talking about her daily routine, Gulazer, a poor married Kurdish housewife, who is the mother of two children and lives in Diyarbakir, spoke of a long list of responsibilities including housekeeping and child care. I asked if her husband shares these responsibilities.

Gulazer: He helps a bit. He goes for shopping sometimes. (...) No, not cooking. (...) No, not cleaning.

Onur: Have you ever asked him to change Duzgin’s (her son) diaper for example?

Gulazer: It sounds funny. (...) I do not know. It does not match with Ahmet [her husband]. (...) I think these [childcare responsibilities] are women things. (...) I do not know. We are better to do these things.

In Gulazer’s account, masculinity and domestic work in the household were incompatible with each other. This can be seen as a reflection of patriarchal notions of the family, where women’s role is mostly associated with intra-household responsibilities (e.g. housekeeping) and motherhood (e.g. care giving); whilst men’s role is primarily identified with being a breadwinner of the family outside of the

⁶⁵ “Nasil yani” is mostly refers to “how so”; but Okday uses it in a sense of “why would she do that?” in here.

home. It is this patriarchal identification of gender roles that leads to gender variation in the achievement of various functionings. For instance, Dilzar, a divorced woman who migrated to Izmir after a forced marriage, mentioned that her grandfather took the responsibility for her family after her father died. Her mother wished her to continue her studies; yet, her grandfather pressured Dilzar's mother by saying "what could Dilzar do with her studies?", "she is going to marry someone sooner or later". As a girl in a family where women were primarily occupied with intra-household responsibilities, Dilzar's achievement of the functioning of education was seen as unnecessary by her grandfather who had the power to decide what Dilzar could do. Bahar, an unemployed woman living with her relatively affluent family in Izmir, spoke of job interviews that she went to and reported that she was frequently asked if she had any plans to marry and have a child anytime soon. She mentioned that some companies avoid employing single women since, according to them, they are more likely to resign after marriage due to their husbands' pressure. As I noted in the previous chapter, Halime, a female lawyer who is a member of the ruling party's women branch in Konya, said that women are only allocated "soft issues" (issues concerning family and kids) in politics, but not with issues that "have more weight" (issues like the economy, health, and justice), and complained about being advised "not to put your nose into man stuff with your doughy hands". These complaints of my female participants share a common theme: that women are constrained from making full use of certain rights (a particular form of resource) in education, employment, and political participation that are supposed to be secured for all citizens, as either part of constitutional entitlements or entitlements from international covenants that Turkey has signed. So, a prevalent patriarchal social norm that associates womanhood with domesticity constrains women from converting their rights into achievements and thus their gender becomes a conversion factor that hinders their achievement of these functionings.

In a social context like Turkey, where such patriarchal norms are prevalent in most spheres of social life, institutional policies which aim for social justice have to be carefully designed so as not to consolidate gender inequalities. However, in Turkey, many policies seem to operate to consolidate patriarchal norms. One of the most striking examples is the frequent advice of the president Recep

Tayyip Erdogan⁶⁶, emphasizing the “divinity of motherhood” and advising families to have “at least three children” as a precaution against the rapid ageing of Turkish society. Since Erdogan first advised families to have at least three children, in 2008, several public policies that encourage child bearing have been introduced, such as tax reduction in family income, early retirement for working mothers, in-cash and in-kind supports for child care, and flexible home-working for mothers. At first sight these policies may seem as advantageous supports for those who aspire to be a mother (of more children). However, considering that child care is a duty that is primarily assigned to woman by most people in Turkey, these policies could serve for strengthening women’s domesticity and consolidating the patriarchal structure of the division of labour. These and similar policies that are encouraged without a clear perspective of aiming for gender equality in the intra-household division of labour could escalate the domestic burdens on women and lead to constraints in some other domains of functioning achievement, such as “mobility, leisure activities, and time-autonomy” (see Robeyns 2003: 81-3).

In short, it can be argued that in line with patriarchal social norms, gender operates as a conversion factor and constrains a woman’s various functioning achievements. However, an additional point has to be brought forward here. Some female participants constructed narratives that suggest that they embrace the role of primary caregiver within the household and have started to adapt their choices to the constraining conditions of this role. To illustrate, Esma, a married young woman from Konya who is a mother of two small daughters, expressed her satisfaction with services of the Konya municipality by pointing out the various free courses it provides,

Esma: It is called KOMEK. The Konya Municipality Vocational Courses (...). Various kinds... They are not only vocational courses actually. Child Care, Computer-Accounting, Foreign Language, Hand Crafting... There is even a course of Chinaware Crafting. (...) I go to two (courses). Child Care in Home in Tuesdays and Needle Crafting in Thursdays...

Onur: Why did you not take other courses?

Esma: Because, I wanted to take these courses.

Onur: Would you have not liked to learn a foreign language or computing for example?

Esma: I would have liked to learn of course. But, these were more adequate for me. Besides, their course schedules were close to my older daughter’s school finish time.

Esma organized her everyday schedule based on her children’s needs. This was because, similar to many women living in a patriarchal milieu, she was the primary caregiver in her household.

⁶⁶ He was the prime minister at that time.

Concerning the courses that she took, she said that she chose these courses based on desire. However, it can also be seen in her narrative that her decision was not exclusively associated with this desire and that her particular choice of these courses was also shaped by her duty of childcare. This is to say that her decision was taken under the constraint of being the caregiver in the household. Thus, she formed a preference in taking these two particular courses under the constraining condition of a patriarchal social norm. It is this norm that made her to think that these two courses are “more adequate” for her, which demonstrated that she embraced her role and formed her choices according to such a role. Gulazer also provided a similar account. When I asked her what the most pressuring constraint is in her life for the time being, she spoke at first her husband’s unemployment and did not point out her own unemployment as a pressing issue. According to her, unemployment “is more difficult for men”, which demonstrates that she embraced the patriarchal division of labour within the family where her husband is assigned with the role of breadwinner whilst she is assigned the role of caregiving and housekeeping.

So, gender turns to a conversion factor operating to constrain women due to the patriarchal social configuration of the society in Turkey that identify and affirm only a particular form of division of labour where home is considered as the natural habitat of woman and womanhood is associated with domesticity. This does not only lead to disadvantages in terms of achievement of various functionings. In some cases, it also leads women to adapt their preferences and restrict their choices in relation to their social and institutional constraints.

III. Religiosity and Religious Identity

Religion and its influence on people’s valuation are recurring themes in the theoretical literature of the capability approach (see Sen 2007, 2009; Nussbaum 2000, 2007a; Deneulin 2009b; Stewart 2013b). However, apart from Burchardt and Vizard (2011: 98, 109-10) who very briefly address religious identity as a factor influencing people’s valuation, to the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical research on it in the literature of the capability approach. I addressed religion as a source of valuation in the previous empirical chapter and specified religious practice as a valuable functioning for some participants. Here, I discuss religious identity as conversion factor which operates to the advantage of

some people, facilitating their achievement of valuable functionings (and so a positive conversion factor), whilst constraining some others and placing them in a disadvantaged position in achievement (and so negative conversion factor). I expand on this discussion by examining the role of religiosity and religious identity both with reference to some institutional patterns adopted by legal authorities as well as to social encounters where individuals interact with each other for various purposes.

One way in which religious identity operates as a conversion factor is when formal institutions are geared towards favouring or prioritizing the functioning achievements of a particular religious identity whilst either ignoring or constraining that of others. Favouritism to a religious identity or the prioritization of functioning achievements of a religious belonging through various institutional apparatus (e.g. legislations, public mandates, or unwritten codes in public offices) can be considered as an indicator of the institutionalisation of a particular religious identity. This can be observed in Turkey where institutional patterns are arranged to favour and prioritise the Sunni-Muslim identity.

The national educational curricula adopted by the Ministry of Education is an explicit example through which we can illustrate the institutionalisation of the Sunni-Muslim identity in Turkey, and show how this results in different religious identities operating as conversion factors in the achievement of participating in education. Drawing on Alawi participants' accounts, we can see the Alawi religious identity as a conversion factor constraining Alawis from converting their right to take education into an achievement of the functioning of education. For example, when we were talking on what he expects his children to gain from education, Hasan, a poor Alawi-Muslim man from Konya, said that

Studying is good. If you study, you can have a state job. Then your life is saved. But, I say that our kids' [Alawi children] task is harder. They should be more determined. Because, studying is harder for our kids.

According to Hasan, taking education is harder for Alawi children, not only because they face insulting and humiliating ill-treatments in school. It is also because of favouritism to a particular religious identity in the national educational curricula. Discussing a particular course, the *Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge* that is compulsory in the national educational curricula in Turkey, Hasan said that Alawi children are required to learn and perform some religious practices (such as learning how to pray and perform ablution) in line with the Sunni-Muslim interpretation of Islam.

(...) If you are not a Sunni, you have to memorise them [Sunni-Muslim religious practices]. If you do not tell [explain] them properly, your oral exam mark is to be fail.

Hasan's account points at that the national educational curricula forces Alawi people in Turkey to come to terms with the Sunni-Muslim interpretation of Islam in order to achieve the functioning of taking education. This makes the conversion of the right to education into the achievement of taking education harder for non-Sunnis, including Alawis like Hasan and his children. The Alawi religious identity becomes a negative conversion factor in relation to the national educational curricula, an institutional arrangement adopted by the Ministry of the Education. From the opposite point of view, we can argue that the Sunni-Muslim religious identity is institutionally favoured and thus becomes a positive conversion factor in the achievement of education.

This institutional favouritism of the Sunni-Muslim identity can also be observed in different functioning achievements, such as the achievement of functioning of religious practice. In the previous chapter, I addressed the legal recognition of different religious identities as a valuable functioning by referring to a valuation of Aram, a well-off man of Armenian origin living in Diyarbakir. When we were talking about the renovation of a historic Armenian Church in Diyarbakir, Aram said public resources were unevenly allocated, facilitating Sunni-Muslims' achievement of religious practice:

Last year, I asked the Armenian Patriarchate. I said "we will finish the renovation of our church soon. Please assign a clergyman for us". Do you know what answer they gave? "Unfortunately, there is no clergyman at that moment". Do you know why? (...) I tell you. Because, the clergymen of Armenians were trained in the Buyukada Seminary. It has not been protected. It has been left for dead for years. It has not received any support from the state. (...) But, mosques do [take support]. Their expenditures are paid by the state. Water and electric bills... Right? The land is also given free. Who pays imams' salaries? (...) We do not want any money and so from the state. I tell these just to let you know. The state is not equal to everyone.

During the interview, Aram repeatedly emphasized the significance of being autonomous from the state in various ways. We can see it in his narrative above where he says that the Armenian community does not want financial help from the state. However, the point that I want to make with regards to Aram's narrative here is that he explicitly addresses an institutional favouritism which aims to facilitate Sunni-Muslims' functioning achievement of religious practice through several policies (e.g. paying the salaries of the mosque imams from the national treasury). Thus, his narrative shows that in Turkey the Sunni-Muslim religious identity is a positive factor in converting the right to

religious practice into the achievement of religious practice. Institutional favouritism in the achievement of religious practice of the Sunni-Muslim identity can be illustrated in quite a number of ways. For example, Bahri, a Sunni-Muslim Turkish man living and working in Konya, expressed his gratitude that the Konya municipality organises free iftar⁶⁷ events every year in Ramadan for those who are poor and fasting. However, Ali, an Alawi-Muslim man living in Izmir, pointed out that Alawis fast during Muharram, a sacred month for Alawis, and rhetorically asked me if I had ever seen a municipality that organises an iftar event for Alawi fasters. Ali also added that the Cemevi⁶⁸ was not officially recognized as a place of worship while mosques were legally recognized and financially supported by the state in various ways.

We can observe that the current institutional arrangements in Turkey facilitate various functioning achievements of the Sunni-Muslim religious identity while they either constrain or ignore other religious identities' achievements in quite a number of domains of the good life. However, drawing on some participants' narratives, we can point out that the Sunni-Muslim religious identity does not facilitate the achievement of all functionings. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, Halime, a veiled Sunni-Muslim lawyer living and working in Konya, pointed out that the prohibition of the veil for those who work in public institutions; and Rabia, a veiled religious woman from Konya, said that the veil ban in universities constrained her from achieving the functioning of education for 13 years. These examples indicate that the Sunni-Muslim religious identity can also operate as a negative institutional conversion factor and -in some milieux or institutional contexts- can actually constrain Sunni-Muslims from achieving, for example, the functionings of employment and education. However, these constrains partly reflect historic legal frameworks, and the government has recently introduced some legal changes that mean there are fewer instances where the Sunni-Muslim identity operates as a negative institutional conversion factor. To illustrate, the public mandate that constrained women from wearing the veil in educational contexts was repealed in July 2010 as was the law barring women from wearing the veil whilst working in public institutions⁶⁹ in October 2013.

⁶⁷ The evening meal in Ramadan when most of the Sunni-Muslims fast during the day.

⁶⁸ Alawis' house of worship.

⁶⁹ However, the new legislation that allows wearing veil in public institutions does not apply to military staffs, police forces, magistrate and public prosecutors.

These changes in the outfit codes of public institutions mean that the functioning achievements of Sunni-Muslim women in education and employment have been facilitated. On the other hand, Esin, a secular woman working as a civil servant in a local state institution in Izmir and acting as trade union representative in her workplace, spoke of a personal experience of witnessing her superior making insulting comments to a female colleague because her skirt hem was above knee-level. Complaining about the civil servant dress code (which regulates that skirt hems must fall below the knee), Esin reported that her trade union opened a legal case to challenge the dress code, but that there had not been any change to that date. Taking both Halime and Esin's experiences into account, we can notice a pattern in legal arrangements with the public authority giving priority to removing obstacles to Sunni-Muslims' achievement of functionings in line with their values whilst preserving obstacles to non-religious people's achievements of functionings in line with their values. This pattern can also be observed in the functioning achievement of health. When we were talking about the achievement of health, Rabia and Esma, both veiled women living in Konya, spoke of the convenience of being able to choose their own doctor in a public hospital, a policy introduced by the Ministry of Health in 2008. This policy provided them with the opportunity to choose a woman doctor and thus the ability to have a physical examination in accordance with their religious values. On the other hand, when we were talking about an attempt of the government to restrict abortion rights⁷⁰, Bahar, a secular Turkish woman from Izmir, expressed her concerns that prohibiting abortion would lead women to have "under-the-ladder"⁷¹ abortion. Considering these two legal arrangements (choosing one's own doctor and restricting abortion rights) in tandem, we can see an institutional pattern. On the one hand, the public authority removes obstacles to living a health life in line with Sunni-Muslim religious values; on the other hand, it introduces new obstacles to living a healthy life in line with secular values.

Thus far I have examined religious identity as an institutional conversion factor and discussed the institutionalization of the Sunni-Muslim religious values with reference to some specific legal arrangements in education, religious practice, employment, and health. However, the impact of religious identity as a conversion factor does not only operate at the institutional level. It also operates

⁷⁰ This was a hot public debate at the time of fieldwork, but did not become a law afterward.

⁷¹ "Under-the-ladder" in Turkish, refers to unhealthy and illegal provision of a service. Here it can be considered equivalent of "back street abortion".

at the social level through less formal processes of social relations which are bound up with advantage or disadvantage in the achievement of other functionings.

As a social conversion factor, my data suggests that in Turkey religious identity operates to the (dis)advantage of those whose religious characteristics are (in)compatible with the dominant religious characteristic of their milieu. For instance, Ruken, an atheist Kurdish female university student living in Diyarbakir -where the Muslim religious identity is socially dominant- spoke of being threatened with eviction by her landlord after he noticed some beer bottles in her garbage. When signing the tenancy contract, she also had to promise her landlord that she would not have any male guests. This demonstrates that Ruken had to behave in accordance with the social norms that are closely associated with a Muslim religious conception of the good life (e.g. not having alcohol or intimate relations with men outside of marriage) in order to stay in her flat. In this social context, non-religiosity operates as a negative social conversion factor in the functioning achievement of housing. The influence of religious identity can also be observed in the achievement of participating in community life. To illustrate, Zergul, a nonreligious housewife of Kurdish origin, is married to a Turkish civil servant and lives in a complex of lodging buildings allocated for civil servants working in Diyarbakir. She spoke of the importance of neighbourhood relations for housewives who spend the majority of their time at home and said that she was not invited to neighbourhood gatherings due to her non-religious way of dressing. This case also indicates how, in this context, non-religiosity operates as a negative social conversion factor in the achievement of participating in community life. On the other hand, Belgin, a religious veiled housewife living in Konya, spoke of being quite happy about social relations in her neighbourhood where she and her “god-fearing and good” neighbours frequently organize tea and lunch gatherings in which they sometimes read the Quran. In Belgin’s case, and in the context of Konya where the Sunni-Muslim lifestyle is highly influential in the everyday practices of people, her religious identity operates as a positive social conversion factor and facilitates the achievement of her participation in community life. These participants’ experiences demonstrate that religiosity is influential on social relations and that having a religious identity compatible with the dominant religious characteristic of one’s milieu facilitates the achievement of some key functionings such as housing, developing sense of community, and participating in community life.

To summarise, it is important to examine how religious identity operates as a conversion factor at both the institutional and the social level. At the institutional level, we can observe the institutionalization of the Sunni-Muslim religious identity in Turkey. This institutionalization appears in two forms. It appears, firstly, in the form of favouritism to Sunni practices in legal arrangements, such as teaching Sunni-Muslim practices as a compulsory course in national education or state support for Sunni-Muslim religious practices in everyday life. Secondly, religion appears as an institutional conversion factor in the form of the state prioritising the removal of legal or regulatory constraints faced by Sunni-Muslims whilst either ignoring or escalating the constraints of those with non-religious identities. In addition to this, religious identity is also influential in social relations and therefore can either facilitate or constrain people's functioning achievements depending upon the compatibility of a religious identity with the dominant religious characteristics of the context.

IV. Ethnicity

As discussed in the previous chapter and briefly noted above, Sen's primary criticism of the Rawlsian model of social justice is that it does not take notice of "inter-individual variation" in the conversion of resources (e.g. right, commodities, income) and thus does not pay sufficient attention to people's achievement of the good life. Drawing on participants' narratives, I have explored how gender and religiosity become conversion factors in relation to a patriarchal social structure as well as to the institutionalisation of a particular religious identity in Turkey, and thus lead to variation in people's achievement of the good life. However, differences of ethnic origin in Turkey are probably the most straightforward case of injustices, which demonstrates the strengths of the capability approach compared to the Rawlsian model of social justice. In this section, I discuss ethnicity as a conversion factor, examining how ethnicity leads to the variations in the achievement of numerous functionings of the good life in Turkey. In the process, I also address Turkey's well-known "Kurdish Question" as a question of capability deprivation.

The population of Turkey is constituted from a wide range of different ethnic groups, including Armenians, Alawis, Assyrians, Jews, Kurds, Lazs, Romany, Arabs, Georgians, and Circassians who are all ethnically, and some instances also religiously, distinctive from the Turkish Sunni-Muslim

social identity that composes the majority in Turkey. The Kurdish ethnicity is the second largest ethnic group in Turkey. There are various signifiers of the Kurds' distinctiveness from other ethnicities in Turkey, however, the Kurdish language *is perhaps* the most obvious distinctive characteristic of Kurdishness in Turkey⁷²; and both the institutional and social denial of this distinctive characteristic of Kurds renders their ethnicity as a conversion factor constraining Kurds in converting quite a number of human and citizenship rights into functioning achievements.

In the previous chapter, I noted that being constrained in achieving various functionings leads Kurdish participants to develop some aspirations that they would not otherwise have aspired to. I underpinned this argument by looking at the aspiration of Welat, a young Kurdish man working as a primary school teacher in Diyarbakir, who wished to find out how to deal with the practical difficulty of teaching Kurdish children in Turkish by making observations in countries where the children of minorities can experience bilingual education. He identified this difficulty as follows:

I was teaching the alphabet at that week. I put a photo of a cow on the blackboard. I asked what is depicted in the photo then. They [his students] said "mange". (...) It means cow. My aim was to teach them "c" [the first letter of cow]. But, they learned "cow" as "mange" in home. So, I had to teach first what mange means in Turkish. Otherwise, they would have learnt the letter "m" as "c". Are you confused? (...) Imagine a six years old kid who tries to learn this. Teaching them the alphabet took months. (...) For example, there are big differences between real [social] life and school life here. The life is Kurdish outside the school. But in school it is Turkish.

Welat's complains that educational services in Turkish ignore the fact that the "real life" of Kurdish children is maintained through the Kurdish language. Institutional arrangements that take no notice of this social reality and dictate the provision of education in Turkish alone can be considered as a form of institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnic identity that leads Kurdish children to experience difficulties in converting the right to education into a functioning achievement. Here we can observe how a particular ethnic identity turns into a negative conversion factor due to the particularistic institutional configuration of how constitutional rights (which are meant to be guaranteed for all on the grounds of citizenship) are provided. However, in addition, such a denial also has the potential to cause other disadvantages, such as a higher chance of school drop-out (which happened to Merdan, a young Kurdish man living in Diyarbakir and working as a construction

⁷² Broadly speaking, birthplace of a person or her/his ancestors as well as political identity can also be indicated as signifiers of Kurdishness or having a Kurdish origin in today's Turkey; yet, this is not always true.

worker, who abandoned school since, he said, he “was not understanding anything”), less success in further education (which happened to Merwan, a well-off Kurdish man living in Diyarbakir, who had to take the university entrance exam three times). Education is an important means that facilitates the achievement of various interdependent functionings of good life⁷³, so it can be argued that their constraint in the achievement of education also places Kurdish children at risk of not achieving other functionings of the good life and can lead to the formation of a pattern of disadvantage in which Kurds face lifelong interconnected constraints. In other words, the institutional denial of the Kurdish language has pervasive negative effects on the achievements of numerous functionings. To illustrate, Welat said that he was subject to violence in primary school when he did not understand and, thus, could not respond to his teacher’s questions. However, when I asked him if he, as a teacher, had ever acted in such a way towards any of his students during his career, he said,

To be honest, I lightly smacked a few times. This is not under your [teacher’s] control though. (...) I mean you are pushed to do so. The curriculum pushes you to teach. But it pushes you to teach in a language that they do not know. You repeat the same thing [subject] sometimes five, ten times.

Being subject to physical violence is one of the most brutal forms of disadvantage; and Welat, as a teacher, resorted to violence in teaching although he, as a student, had also experienced it in his primary school years. However, Welat’s narrative also demonstrates that the institutional arrangements that regulate how education is provided in Turkey pressures teachers to teach Kurdish children in a language with which they are not familiar. And it is this pressure that sometimes leads to the emergence of a violent relationship between teachers and students. Another pervasive negative effect of the institutional denial of the Kurdish language is that it tends to strengthen gender inequality and make disadvantaged women even more vulnerable. To illustrate, Jiyan, a young female Kurdish living in Diyarbakir and working as a lawyer sometimes voluntarily provides counselling services to some women’s organisations. When we were talking about some disadvantages that women face, she said that domestic violence is a prevalent problem in Turkey. Although this is a problem that both Kurdish and Turkish women face in Turkey, Jiyan stressed that Kurdish women who do not hold sufficient command of Turkish are less able to seek their legal rights as well as less able to apply for

⁷³ Such as being educated, achieving employment, earning regular and decent income, having enough to meet material needs of life, receiving respect from society, to participate in community life and so forth.

legal assistance programs for women in their situation. Jiyan's emphasis suggests that the institutional denial of the Kurdish language turns the Kurdish ethnicity to a negative conversion factor that constrains women from converting their civic and social rights, which eventually places them in a powerless position in household relations. Another pervasive negative effect that derives from the institutional denial of the Kurdish language can be seen in the achievement of engaging in scientific activities and enjoying cultural/literary practices. Hozan, a male Kurdish medical doctor living and working in Diyarbakir, said he experienced the disadvantage of restrictions on the Kurdish language in education when he was a child. He expressed his opposition toward Kurdish-language education in medicine by arguing that the "Kurdish vocabulary is unfortunately not sufficient to study medicine today", arguing that this insufficiency is a long term consequence of institutional restrictions on the Kurdish language which have prevented its development. Merwan, an educated man who is a member of the Kurdish political movement and lives in Diyarbakir, said that "being cultured means being Turkified" and "Kurds have been sentenced to ignorance on purpose". He complained about the rarity of theatre plays and novels in Kurdish and added that those who can translate prominent figures of classical world literature into Kurdish "cannot be counted on more than the fingers of one hand", which, according to him, "is the legacy of banning the Kurdish language". The institutional denial of the Kurdish language serves to create a social hierarchy within the Kurdish community between those who have a good command of Turkish and those who do not. Welat shared his personal observation that Kurdish children who have been taught Turkish before school age are more talkative, self-confident and successful in classes, as opposed to those who struggle to learn Turkish after entry into school, who are more disengaged and shy. For instance, he observed that when children play in the garden during breaks, those who have been taught Turkish before school age are more popular among their friends. These participants' accounts suggest that the institutional denial of the Kurdish language turns the Kurdish ethnicity into a negative conversion factor which constrains Kurds from achieving various functionings of the good life, making them at greater risk from physical violation in school, less able of making use of civic rights and benefitting from social assistance programs, less able of enjoying intellectual and literary practices, and so forth.

It should also be noted that, just as with religious identity, ethnic identity also operates as a conversion factor at both the institutional and the social level. In addition to the institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity, we can also identify a social denial of the Kurdish ethnicity, with my sample reporting discriminatory, harassing, and violent behaviours towards people of Kurdish ethnicity in everyday encounters. As might be expected, this was less of an issue in Diyarbakir where the majority of the population is composed of Kurds. However, this was a common problem that Kurdish participants living in Konya and Izmir frequently addressed. My Kurdish participants from Konya and Izmir had to struggle, not only with the constraints deriving from the institutional denial of their ethnicity, but also with constraints deriving from the social denial of their ethnicity too. To illustrate, Rewan, a young male Kurdish shoe maker living in Izmir, told how he was dismissed from school in his 8th year after he attacked his history teacher who insulted him, saying “let your classmates to see your tail⁷⁴”. Another example is Berfin, a young unemployed Kurdish woman from Izmir, who described how she frequently faced verbal harassment in school and dropped out after a physical fight with her classmate.

He [her classmate] called out that “do you know why Kurds have satellite dishes⁷⁵ in their balcony?” (...) Then, he shouted “because they watch porn with the whole family”. (...) I had a fight with him. This was the last straw. I did not go to school again.

Similar to many Turkish children whose mother language is Kurdish, Berfin, whose family was displaced from Nusaybin -a small Kurdish town- and migrated first to Mersin and then to Izmir, also experienced language difficulties in taking education in Turkish. Although she overcame these difficulties, she said she could not get rid of the stigmatized image of Kurdishness in school and frequently faced racist and humiliating behaviours. Her experience can be considered as a social denial of her ethnic identity that turned her ethnicity into a negative conversion factor which constrained her educational achievement. Berfin’s cases can also be seen as an example of how Kurds, who are already institutionally constrained in the achievement of some fundamental functionings, are also socially constrained in the western cities of Turkey, such as Konya and Izmir. In fact, we can argue that the social denial of the Kurdish ethnic identity in these cities turns Kurdishness

⁷⁴ “Tailed Kurds”: A pejorative epithet used to degrade Kurds.

⁷⁵ Broadcasting in Kurdish was prohibited in Turkey until quite recently. Therefore, Kurds who aspire to watch channels broadcasting from Europe in Kurdish set up satellite dishes to their flats’ balcony or roof.

into a negative conversion factor and constrains achievement of a wide range of functionings (such as renting a flat, finding a job, talking Kurdish in public spaces, naming one's children, reading Kurdish newspapers, developing community relations and having solidarity, and so forth) whose achievements have nothing to do with Kurdishness in Diyarbakir. According to Ferzad, a male Kurdish construction worker who lives in Konya, Kurds living in Diyarbakir "grapple with the state" whereas those who live in western cities like him have to learn how to "grapple with people" too. The following narrative of Ferzad illustrates what he meant by this.

Even very simple issues become a matter of being Kurd, being Turk. (...) It [his Kurdishness] is understood. *Cemalimiz*⁷⁶ [his appearance] says "I am from Kurdistan". It is understood from talking [accent] anyway. Then, even waiting in the queue becomes a problem. Someone jumps the queue. You cannot say "stop brother! (...) You cannot say. You are afraid. If he says "he is from PKK", if he shouts "this is terrorist", everyone jumps on you. You live [feel] a danger of lynch. You do not even have a [place in] queue.

Ferzad's narrative gives us an idea of the image of Kurdishness in Konya, as well as how this affects his living conditions in there. His narrative provides an example of how, in his milieu, being a Kurd is often associated with being a terrorist, and demonstrates the stigmatized image of Kurdish ethnicity in this social setting. He feels this has the potential to stimulate physical assault towards Kurds in cases of a confrontation, even though such confrontation has nothing to do with a person's ethnic identity in the first place. This feeling of fear led Ferzad to develop a particular way to "grapple with people": keeping silent in the face of unfairness and withdrawing to claim his right to take part in everyday life. From his account, it seems that Ferzad is not only unable to achieve the functionings of seeking one's right and freedom from fear (Burchardt and Vizard 2007: 36, 2011: 116), but also the functioning of having voice and expressing one's concerns.

Denial of the Kurdish ethnic identity turns Kurdishness into a negative conversion factor that constrains Kurds from converting their rights into functioning achievements and thus leads them to become disadvantaged citizens of Turkey. Though they, like all Turkish citizens, have formal rights in the areas of various functionings (such as education, health, and right to defence) institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity does not allow them to fully draw on these rights. Such denial results in negative effects in social relations such as violence in schools, strengthened gender inequality in household relations, deprivation from engaging in intellectual practices and enjoyment from

⁷⁶ "Cemal" means beautiful face in Turkish. But, Ferzad uses it in a sense of "physical appearance" here.

cultural/literary activities, and formation of social hierarchies within the community. But, in addition to the institutional denial, we can also see prevalent social denial towards the Kurdish ethnicity in the western cities of Turkey, within which Kurds must struggle with various social constraints even if they manage to overcome constraints stemming from institutional denial of their ethnic identity. This social denial of the Kurdish ethnicity results in an inability to achieve various basic functionings (e.g. Berfin's case) and in other cases cause them to refrain from a personal struggle in everyday life (e.g. Ferzad's case). These social and institutional denials are connected and lead many Kurds to join a collective struggle and thus turn the "Kurdish question" in Turkey into an ethno-politic question. I discuss this in the next section.

V. Political Identity

The constraints people experience in relation to their ethnic and religious identities are influential on the formation of their political identities. Therefore, the political identity that a person embraces, to a certain extent, can be considered as an outcome of the (dis)advantages associated with their religious and ethnic identity. However, depending on the political struggle among political groups in today's Turkey, political identity itself can become a conversion factor too. This section first examines the formation of different political identities in relation to constraints associated with people's ethnic and religious identities. Following this, it focuses on how political identity plays the role of a conversion factor in relation to nepotism to the right-wing conservative political in Turkey.

In the previous section, I discussed the constraints that emerge in relation to the social and institutional denials of ethnic identity and noted that these constraints are connected with the rise of a collective struggle by Kurds. This can be traced in the narrative of Berfin, a young unemployed Kurdish woman whose family firstly migrated to Mersin and then to Izmir after being displaced from their town in Kurdistan. When we were talking about her primary school years in Mersin, Berfin said that she was proud to rehearse the Student Oath (see also Chapter IV, Ruken's narrative) through which primary school children celebrate Turkishness.

(...) like saying "I am a Turk, I am right, I am hardworking", or learning the Independence Anthem [Turkish National Anthem]. These made me a bit happy at that time. When I said "I am a Turk", I felt happiness at that time. I thought like "I became a Turk now". It was a feeling like you accomplished something. (...) No, I started to feel it in the primary school. Because they made you feel this. (...) Then, you understand that no matter how hard you

try, you will never be a Turk anyway. No matter how good your Turkish is, you will never be a Turk. Wherever you go, they will ask you “where are you from?”. You cannot escape this anyway. Then, you start to question. Why do I try to be Turk? Why do I feel proud about this? Then, when you start to question, the state downs on your neck. It says you cannot live [practice] your Kurdishness.

Berfin’s narrative can also be seen as a summary of her process of politicization and how she decided to become a member of the pro-Kurdish political party, the BDP (the Peace and Democracy Party) that was dissolved and re-founded as the HDP (the Democratic Party of the People) in 2014. Berfin’s narrative seems to suggest that Kurds can be neither a Kurd nor a Turk in Turkey. On the one hand, it indicates how the institutional structure forces Kurds to embrace Turkishness. On the other hand, it also suggests that the current social structure reminds Kurds that they will never ever be a “proper” Turk regardless of whether they come to accept Turkishness or how successful they do so. Considering the disadvantages of Kurds some of which are pointed out above, Berfin’s provides an account of the impossibility of avoiding being constrained in the achievement of various functionings and thus the constraints on being a “capable citizen” within the given social structure. When Berfin realised this impossibility, she started to question and became politicized and joined the pro-Kurdish political party. Here we see the formation of a political identity in relation to the constraints stemming from the social and institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnic identity. Ferzad, who avoids personal confrontation in everyday life due to the danger of being physically assaulted in Konya, provided a similar account. Towards the end of our interview, I asked him what he would do if he had as much money as he could want. Without a second thought, he responded that he would donate to the Kurdish political movement. I asked why:

[Because] It has to keep going. (...) Why could I have not studied? No house. No job. No money... Even my neighbour says, “Ferzad talks from his second blood”. As if I am lower [inferior]... Why can I not give a Kurdish name to my kids? I just now told about the driving license [exam that he valued to have in Kurdish]. Is there anyone else fighting for these?

Ferzad’s account presents all the constraints he faces as being associated with the denial of his ethnicity and he sees a collective political struggle as crucial to eliminate these disadvantages. Based on these accounts, two points can be suggested. Firstly, being able to voice, influence, and participate in the politics that shape one’s living conditions is a functioning that has a particular importance for Kurdish participants. Second, the valuation of this functioning and the formation of a Kurdish dissident political identity derive from the social and institutional denial of the Kurdish ethnicity that

turns Kurdishness in Turkey into a negative conversion factor. From another perspective, these participants' accounts also demonstrate that the "Kurdish Question" of Turkey is in essence a question of the deprivation of the functioning of achievement, although the public authorities have for a long time mostly viewed the Kurdish upheaval as a question of "reactionary politics", "tribal resistance", or "regional backwardness" (see Yegen 1996, 1999, 2007, 2009).

Berfin and Ferzad's accounts were echoed by many of my Kurdish participants. For many, it seemed that the institutional and social denial of the Kurdish ethnic identity turned the Kurdish ethnic identity into an ethno-politic identity that also plays the role of a conversion factor in the achievement of different functionings. To illustrate, Havin, a young Kurdish woman working as an office clerk in an accounting firm and living in Konya, reported that the security forces had displaced her family from their villages since her father (who was politically sympathetic to the Kurdish political movement) refused to join the village guards, a militia force organized by the state against Kurdish guerrillas. This also happened to Ferzad and Berfin's families who were forcibly displaced from their villages and impoverished since they had to leave all of their belongings and income generating-properties in their villages. Gulazer, an uneducated Kurdish housewife living in Diyarbakir, said that she could not benefit from the Green Card, a social relief program, for a long time due to the political record of her husband's family who were accused of "defamation of the Turkish flag". Bedirxan, a Kurdish young man working and living in Diyarbakir, who likes "to be in nature very much", spoke of being constrained from enjoying green areas since the major woodlands and natural parks in Kurdistan were demolished by the military as a precaution against Kurdish guerrillas who hide in these areas. Merwan, an educated Kurdish man who is a member of the Kurdish political movement and lives in Diyarbakir, spoke of the closures of political parties and reminded me that five pro-Kurdish political parties have been closed by the state to date. Following this, he said that "the state fans the flame of war" by closing legal Kurdish parties and "does not give any other choice except armed struggle" for Kurds. Merwan also complained about the election threshold⁷⁷ that prevents pro-Kurdish parties from taking a place in parliament and constrains representation of the Kurdish

⁷⁷ Since 1983, Turkey has been implementing the highest election threshold in the world that does not allow any political party to have place in the parliament if their vote share is less than 10 percent of total votes in the national scale.

population. Jiyan, a female Kurdish lawyer living in Diyarbakir, told me that the Diyarbakir courthouse includes 10 courtrooms and noted that six of these are allocated for political cases only. I should also note an anecdote shared with me by Aram, a well-off man of Armenian origin living in Diyarbakir, that the state governor of Batman, a city in the Kurdish region of Turkey, banned traffic lights in the city in 1990s since he thought these traffic lights “resemble the Kurdish flag”⁷⁸. These accounts of my participants can be considered as examples illustrating the disadvantageous outcomes of having a dissident Kurdish political identity.

But what about the role of other political identities as conversion factors? The right-wing conservative political identity which is mostly formed in line with the values of Sunni-Muslim religious belief in Turkey can be addressed as a political identity that facilitates functioning achievement in diverse ways. However, firstly we can again look to the formation of right-wing conservative political identity. I asked Rabia, a veiled Sunni-Muslim woman living in Konya and who registered for university after the repeal of the veil ban, which political party she votes for. She said that, in order to contribute to the “normalization of the country”, she voted for the AKP (the Justice and Development Party), a central right-wing conservative party. I asked her what she means by “normalizing”.

Rabia: I mean we are a society of Islam. We have always been during hundreds of years. (...) Seculars endeavoured to lose its essence. This is not normal. They were trying to depict Islam as something like wicked. They were trying to depict Muslims something like plague-stricken people. (...) Now, these deceptions are being wiped away. We are normalizing again. (...)

Onur: Can you give me an example? From your own life, for example. (...) I mean, about this normalising things...

Rabia: The matter of the university. As I told, I could not have registered [at the university] for 12-13 years. This is not normal. There are others [examples].

In Rabia’s account, Turkey is essentially a Muslim country; and thus constraining a Muslim woman from taking education in a Muslim country is not normal. She therefore considers that eliminating the constraints that derive from one’s Muslim religious identity (under the historic secular constitution) is a process of “normalizing” which has been introduced by policies of the right-wing conservative party. Rabia forms her political preference in order to eliminate constraints that were

⁷⁸ In fact, the traffic lights were not banned in Batman in 1990s. But, the governor of city at that time, Salih Sarman, ordered the removal of the yellow light from the traffic lights in the city. After a while, he ordered to replace it with the blue color. However, the reason behind these changes, as Aram said, was that the traffic lights evoke the Kurdish political movement whose main colours were also green, yellow, and red. (See: <http://yenisosyalizm.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/batman-eski-valisi-11-korucuyu-devlet.html>)

outcomes of her religious identity, a process of the formation of a political identity in line with one's constraints.

The right-wing conservative political identity (which has been in power for more than a decade in Turkey) to certain extent represent the political Islam in Turkey, in which the political rhetoric has been is to repeal unjust institutional constraints against Turkish Muslims. Today, we can see that this political identity, among others, now operates as a positive conversion factor that facilitates the achievement of valuable functionings in Turkey. The account of Bahri, a right-wing conservative man working as a postman and living in Konya, can be seen as an example of such an advantageous status. When we were talking about trade union membership, he spoke of his membership of the *Birlik Haber-Sen*, a right-wing conservative union. I asked him if the union has achieved any gains:

It made my son employed. (...) He could not have found a job for a year. You know how things work. You must have an *uncle*⁷⁹. We do not have any *uncle* though. (...) At that time, our place [the post office where he works] was planning to hire two contracted employees. I went to the union. I said that I have to put my son into the job. (...) A week later, the representative [of the union] approached me. He said "consider it done!"

Bahri works in a public sector company. His narrative demonstrates that the union (a right-wing conservative union) has influence on the recruitment strategy of his employer, the state. Moreover, his narrative allows us to understand that the gain he spoke of is not a collective gain that is beneficial for all workers in his sector; rather it is a nepotistic outcome.

When a particular political identity operates to the advantage of a person, this means that other political identities, by definition, operate as a disadvantaged identity in terms of the functioning of achievement. For example, Esin, a female civil servant who has secular and republican views and lives in Izmir, said that she is subject to an extra workload because of her membership of the *Buro Emekcileri Sendikasi*, a left-wing trade union. She said that she is assigned extra duties by her manager whenever her trade union organises a meeting that she wishes to attend. Selim, a male electric technician living in Izmir and holding secular political views, spoke of his dispute with someone in which he ended up in the police station. He reported that the person he had the dispute was released after he showed his AKP membership card whilst he was still kept under detention at the police station. He said that after this event, he became sure that his "ID card is less valuable than the

⁷⁹ *Having an uncle* is a phrase that indicates to have connection with someone who is in a high place and uses his position to favour for his acquaintances.

AKP membership card”. Ahmet, a poor blue-collar worker living in Konya and holding right-wing nationalist views, said that it is a common attitude in his milieu that people register with the AKP before applying a job since this eases the process of employment if they indicate their membership on the job application form. Dilzar, a Kurdish divorced woman living in Izmir, said that she has been visited several times by female AKP members offered the opportunity to benefit from state food relief programs in return of voting for the AKP in the elections. She complained: “Why must I vote for the party to get the relief?”

In fact, most of the participants of this study who have dissenting political identities shared the view that the ruling conservative right-wing party (AKP) uses state authority as a means of rewarding and punishing citizens in line with their political views. According to them, those who hold right-wing conservative political views are given priority in benefitting from various opportunities that are supposed to be guaranteed for everyone on the grounds of equal social rights of citizenship (e.g. distribution of social relief) while those who do not hold right-wing conservative political views are excluded from various opportunities even though they deserve to benefit these opportunities on the ground of merit (e.g. being employed or promoted in a public sector company). Bahri’s narrative above suggests that such perception amongst politically dissenting participants might have some empirical accuracy. However, regardless of whether there is a material basis to it, this perception itself leads politically dissenting participants to form a conception of a “disadvantaged self” which sometimes mean that they themselves refrain from attempting to achieve valuable functionings. For instance, Welat, a Kurdish male who works as a primary school teacher in Diyarbakir and holds left-wing dissenting views, had sufficient length of service necessary for applying for the position of assistant principal. However, he had no plans to apply because he said that;

No, it is impossible for a person like me. My way of looking to the world is totally different. My views, my ideas, my way of teaching... (...) Even if I was able to catch a bird with my mouth⁸⁰, it would still be impossible for me.

Welat’s had an account that being appointed with a higher position was impossible for him since his political identity was “totally different” from the right-wing conservative political identity that, was, according to him, an advantageous identity in the state bureaucracy. Regardless of what the

⁸⁰ Similar to the phrase of “catching lightening in a bottle”, this phrase in Turkish indicates to do something impossible.

material basis was behind the emergence of such an account in his account, the fact is that he refrained himself from applying to a higher position in his occupation based on this account. Such an account, therefore, can be considered as a conception of “disadvantaged self” that constrains people to attempt for converting their rights into an achievement of a functioning.

In this section, I have argued that the (dis)advantages associated with people’s ethnic and religious identity are influential on the formation of their political identity; and their achievements of diverse functionings is also influenced by their political identity in today’s Turkey. More particularly, holding a right-wing conservative political identity in Turkey seems to operate to the advantage of a person whilst dissident political identities have the potential to negatively influence a person’s functioning achievement and thus lead to disadvantage. This gives rise to a widespread popular account of political nepotism favouring the right-wing political identity. This popular account, in some cases, leads those who have dissident political views to form a conception of the “disadvantaged self” that results in them “self-selecting” less advantaged routes (Bourdieu, 1985: 728) and refraining from attempting to convert their rights into a functioning achievement.

VI. Beyond the Conventional: Exacerbating and Ameliorating Disadvantage

Drawing on the conventional conception of conversion factors, I have discussed how participants’ gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, and political identity influence their functioning achievements. In doing so, I have argued that within the social and institutional dynamics of Turkey (such as the patriarchal social norms and institutional policies that consolidate these norms, the institutional favouritism and prioritisation of a particular religious identity, the social and institutional denial of ethnic differences, and nepotism to a particular political identity) people’s gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, and political identity operate as conversion factors that either facilitate or constrain their achievement of a wide range of functionings. This inevitably leads to the emergence of some privileged social identities (being male, Sunni-Muslim, Turkish, and right-wing conservative) and some disadvantaged social identities (being female, non-Sunni-Muslim, Kurdish, left-wing, republican) in terms of functioning achievements in Turkey.

However, it is important to examine not simply how the particularistic identities operate, but also the interplay of social identities and outcomes of such interplay in terms of functioning achievement. For example, how gender, or ethnic identity, interact with religious identity and how such interplay influences people's functioning achievement. In this section, I argue that such an inquiry that focuses on the interplay of social identities helps us to move beyond the conventional conception of the conversion factors and to develop a more nuanced and advanced understanding of the conversion issue. I argue that the conventional conception of conversion factors is not sufficient to fully examine people's (dis)advantage since (dis)advantage is not a two-dimensional phenomenon that only varies *between* achievement and non-achievement of functionings. There are worse forms of disadvantage as well as better forms of advantage, which refers to a variation *within* achievement and non-achievement. The conventional two-dimensional conceptualization of conversion factors limits our ability to capture variation *within* the achievement and non-achievement of functionings. Thus, the capability approach requires a more nuanced conceptualization of conversion factors that can capture more complex forms of (dis)advantage. In this section, drawing on participants' experiences, I propose to extend the conventional two-dimensional conceptualization of conversion factors by examining their exacerbating and ameliorating characteristics of a person's disadvantage.

By 'exacerbating characteristic', I refer to the fact that a conversion factor can in some cases operate to deepen a disadvantage that is the outcome of another conversion factor. Gender, for instance, is a conversion factor that does not only lead to disadvantage by itself. In some cases, it can deepen the disadvantage that is an outcome of another conversion factor, such as religious identity. Take the case of Selim, a middle-aged electrical technician who has a secular lifestyle and lives in Izmir. He said that he had to move away from his former neighbourhood where his neighbours were mostly religious conservatives to his current neighbourhood where he had neighbours whose lifestyle is more similar to his way of life. He explained the reason behind this saying:

Selim: My wife... She was insisting to move out. (...) She was not comfortable in *Ege Kent* (his former neighbourhood). (...) They (neighbours) kept asking her why she is not being covered [veiled] and so. Pressure, I mean. (...) Not like forcing. It was like prejudice. They did not accept her.

Onur: How was it for you? Were you also being discriminated?

Selim: Everyone is discriminated. If you are a weak... It is a pressure after all. (...) I was ignoring it. I am in the work, most of the time. I leave early at morning and return late at nights.

Selim's narrative refers to a disadvantage emerging in relation to social discrimination against those who are different from the dominant characteristic of the social milieu in terms of their religiosity. But, his narrative indicates that neighbourhood relations are more important for a woman who is assigned a domestic role and, thus, whose social life is more limited to relations in the neighbourhood. Selim was less affected by this social discrimination and able to "ignore" it based on his gender role in the family as the "breadwinner" which gave him access to a broader social network. So it can be argued that gender role of Selim's wife exacerbated disadvantage that she experienced because of her religious identity whilst Selim himself was able to lighten the same disadvantage in relation to his gender. We can also see different forms of the exacerbated disadvantages, such as exacerbated ethnic disadvantages. Take the case of Bedirxan, a Kurdish politically dissident man working and living in Diyarbakir, who spoke of the routine brutality of security forces towards demonstrators, even though they "march for the peace". Similar to Bedirxan, Ruken, a Kurdish left-wing dissident female university student living in Diyarbakir, also spoke of such brutality. Yet, her narrative indicated that her experience of the brutality of security forces was different to Bedirxan's experience.

Ruken: They [the security forces] get pleasure from attacking. They satisfy themselves.

Onur: They are ordered by their chiefs. May be they do not get pleasure...

Ruken: This is rubbish. Does their chief orders them to shout out like "traitor whore" too? I can see the hate in their eyes. They get pleasure from it [attacking demonstrators]. (...) No, I do not think so [that security forces attack under orders alone].

Ruken believes that members of the security forces have a personal hatred towards Kurdish dissident demonstrators, which she underpins her account of what she experienced when she aimed to achieve the functioning of political expression. In fact, violence of the security forces to dissident left-wing demonstrations is widely reported in Turkey, and was also complained about by several of my participants who hold dissident left-wing views. However, Ruken's narrative indicates that she experiences this not only as a form of physical assault when she aims to achieve functioning of political expression, but also as a form of verbal assault ("traitor whore") emerging in relation to her

gender identity. Her experience suggests that the disadvantage associated with her political identity is exacerbated by her gender identity.

When we consider the cases of Selim's wife and Ruken, it appears that they are more disadvantaged than Selim and Bedirxan. Both Selim and his wife experienced discrimination and stigmatization in their neighbourhood due to their non-religious lifestyle, but there was a variation within the disadvantage that he and his wife experienced due to the way in which gender acted as an exacerbating force on her disadvantage, yet not for him. A similar argument can be made by comparing the disadvantages that Bedirxan and Ruken experienced when they attempt to achieve the functioning of political expression.

Additionally, we can also see that different conversion factors in some cases operate so as to ameliorate a disadvantage that is an outcome of another conversion factor. Take the previously cited example of Habib, a Kurdish man working as a primary school teacher and living in Diyarbakir, who waited for his wife's answer to his marriage proposal a long time since she was concerned about how her father could react due to Habib's Kurdish ethnic identity.

Habib: To be honest, it was a bit about that I am from Diyarbakir. (...) You know... There are general [common] misunderstandings.

Onur: Which misunderstandings?

Habib: Like, Kurd equals to terrorism. As if all Kurds are terrorists... Anyway, this is sorted out. We are married now.

Onur: How it has been sorted out? Did you elope with?

Habib: (...) Not me. My brother-in-law (who sorted it out)... We are indebted to him. (...) She (his wife) said that he had talked to my father-in-law before we went to ask for her. Then my father-in-law had become softened. (...) I do not know word-for-word. But he had said that we all are Muslim. After all, it is not about Kurdishness, Turkishness. We all are children of one *ummet* (religious community in Islam).

Habib's narrative demonstrates that the stigma attached to Habib's Kurdish ethnic identity initially constrained him from, achieving the functioning of a developing a particular form of relationship, marriage; yet he managed to overcome this constraint through the help of his Muslim religious identity. Habib's Muslim religious identity operated to ameliorate the disadvantage that emerged in relation to his Kurdish ethnic identity. This kind of amelioration of the disadvantages that participants experience could be observed in the fields of numerous functionings, such as employment, education, political participation and expression, developing different forms of relationality, accessing to health, and so forth.

A disadvantage that occurs as an outcome of a conversion factor is not ameliorated only by the help of another conversion factor. Sometimes it is ameliorated by a social relation or personal networks. For instance, I had mentioned in the previous chapter that Halime, a veiled conservative lawyer who lives and works in Konya, complained that she was constrained of doing her job since she was not allowed to represent a client in a courtroom while wearing the veil. This disadvantage of veiled lawyers was partly⁸¹ removed in November 2012 just before the fieldwork of this study took place. However, Halime said that she, and some other veiled lawyers that she knows, had already started to enter the courthouse of Konya and to represent their clients before November 2012. When I asked her how she had achieved this before she had the legal right, she said that she talked to magistrates before a law case and, after getting their verbal approval, she became able to taking her place in trials. This demonstrates the amelioration of a legal disadvantage through social connections.

Both Habib and Halime ameliorated their disadvantages (either through a help of another conversion factor or through a social connection) to achieve valuable functionings. However, their ameliorations do not change the fact that they were less advantaged than those who did not have to ameliorate the disadvantage that occurred in relation to ethnicity or religious identity. Considered from such a perspective, Habib and Halime's experiences –as well as the other examples considered in this section– indicate that there important variation within the functioning achievement. Therefore there is a need to consider the multi-dimensional nature of disadvantage and the exacerbating and ameliorating roles of conversion factors.

VII. Conclusion

Instead of confining the analysis of (dis)advantage within economic terms and exclusively focusing on people's possessions, the capability approach proposes to look at whether people can actually achieve valuable beings and doings. This is because even if people hold the same bundle of resources, their (dis)advantage in achieving a good life can still significantly vary due to their differences (e.g. age, sex, mental and physical abilities, body size, environmental differences) that influence their

⁸¹ In November 2012, the council of the state granted a decision to stop the execution of a legislative clause that prevents veiled lawyers to represent their clients with their veils in the courtroom. However, since this clause was not completely removed from the legislation, a period of legal gap occurred since November 2012 to October 2013 when the veil ban was legally removed in the framework of a democratization package of the government.

conversion of resources into achievement of a good life. However, in the capability literature, there is a relatively vague identification and classification of what these diversities might be and of how they become influential on people's conversion of resources. There is therefore a need for a more sociological exploration of variation in people's achievement of good life, which examines in greater detail how different social diversities turn to conversion factors and affect people's achievement of functionings in practice.

I took four key social diversities –gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, and political identity– in order to examine just how they become conversion factors within the social and institutional configuration of Turkey. Drawing on participants' experiences in achievement of various functionings, I argued that these diversities turn to conversion factors in relation to the patriarchal social norms and consolidation of these norms through official policies, institutional favouritism and prioritisation of a religious identity, social and institutional denial of ethnic differences, and nepotism to a particular political identity. This analysis indicates that the male, Sunni-Muslim, Turkish, and right-wing conservative identities tend to operate as facilitators in the achievement of various functionings in Turkey, whilst the female, non-Sunni-Muslim and non-religious, left-wing and republican political identities operate as constrainers of functioning achievements. This analysis provides a general account concerning privileged and disadvantaged social characteristics in terms of functioning achievement in Turkey. However, whilst we need to examine how legal and institutional frameworks (despite formal equal recognition) in practice privilege certain social identities over others, we also need to consider how the more nuanced social dynamics of particular social milieu also affects these processes, and so to consider institutional and social dynamics as related, but still distinct, factors affecting conversion. As part of this, I examined the role of social majorities in distinct milieu, noting that, for example, the disadvantages of having a Kurdish ethnic identity play out rather differently in Diyarbakir than they do in Konya or Izmir. I also noted that different kinds of conversion factor interact in complex ways so that, for example, the disadvantage of a woman wishing to live a secular lifestyle in a religiously observant Sunni-Muslim neighbourhood plays out rather differently than it does for her equally secular husband. I have therefore also argued that the conventional conceptualisation of conversion factors as facilitators and constrainers of functioning

achievement is insufficient to capture the multi-dimensionality of (dis)advantage, and that a more nuanced understanding of how these factors operate in functioning achievement is required. After examining some of my participants' (non)achievements of certain functionings, I have concluded that there is not only a variation between the achievement and non-achievement of these functionings but also a variation of degree within achievement and (non)achievement. Based on this, I have argued that conversion factors can also operate to either exacerbate or to ameliorate a person's disadvantage.

The entire discussion in this chapter was built upon a critical sociological exploration of the functioning achievement of different social identities in Turkey. However, although this exploration informs us about the interpersonal comparison of (dis)advantage in the space of functioning *achievement*, it does not explicitly and sufficiently explain people's *ability to achieve* functionings, which is the ultimate concern of the capability approach. In the next chapter, drawing on participants' experiences, I move up the analysis of (dis)advantages another level by focusing in more detail on the different processes involved in people's achievement in order to gain more insight into their ability to achieve.

The Ability to Achieve and the Consequences of Non-Achievement

The Process of Achievement, Entrenched Disadvantages, and Adaptation

I. Introduction

In the first empirical chapter of this study, drawing on participants' narratives and taking particular notice of the institutional and social characteristics of their milieu, I addressed the significance of six broad domains that are valuable for those who have different conceptions of the good life in Turkey. Following this, previous chapter focused on four key social characteristics of participants (namely their gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, and political identity), in order to examine how these factors operate in relation to the social and institutional configuration of society to influence participants' achievements of functionings. In this chapter, I move to examine the different process involved in people's achievement in greater detail in order to gain more insight into their ability to achieve. In this discussion, I examine three key issues: the process of functioning achievement, the role of entrenched disadvantages, and the problem of adaptive preferences.

Firstly, I extend the analysis of disadvantage from where I left it in the previous chapter (where I examined the outcomes of functioning achievement) and carry it one step further by focusing on the process of functioning achievement. One inherent difficulty experienced by the capability approach is about assessing people's (dis)advantage based on their "ability to achieve" functionings, even though this is identified as the ultimate space of analysis within the capability approach. I argue that although some scholars, including Sen, argue that there is an inherent difficulty in assessing people's advantage based on their ability to achieve, we can in fact perform such a task by undertaking a more qualitative sociological inquiry that particularly focuses on *the process* of functioning achievement. Drawing on my participants' experiences, I demonstrate that due to their social and institutional constraints, some people must follow different paths to achieve functionings; and these different paths require them to compensate for their constraints by paying unequal costs in order to achieve valuable functionings. Based on this analysis the process of achievement, I argue that a qualitative sociological inquiry that focuses on the process of achievement -and thus on the compensation of differences- can provide us important information about the extent of the availability of valuable functionings to different people, which can be considered as a variation in their ability to achieve.

Secondly, focusing on the consequences of non-achievements of functionings, I look at the experiences of those who can neither ameliorate their disadvantages through the help of a conversion factor, nor compensate for them by paying additional (unequal) costs of achievement. I demonstrate that there are causal relationships between the non-achievements of different functionings, and that when a person cannot achieve a functioning, the negative effect of this non-achievement spreads to other domains of functionings. Based on this, I argue that the causal relationships between different functionings illustrate the interdependency of functionings achievement and provide us with important information about how positions in society with entrenched and persistent disadvantage are formed.

Thirdly, having established in the previous chapter how people are disadvantaged in terms of functioning achievement and in this chapter how people are disadvantaged in their ability to achieve, I turn to the problem of adaptive preferences. In this discussion, I briefly reiterate the problem of adaptive preferences (the process of preference formation where disadvantaged people tend to adapt their preferences to straitened conditions). I argue that scholars in the capability approach have not adequately considered this problem, presenting it as an issue where disadvantaged people are unable to make critical or sophisticated judgements on their own circumstances. Based on such an understanding, they justify their political positions that analysts need to decide what people should be able to be and do from a normative philosophical point of view that is extrinsic to people's own conception of the good life. Addressing some empirical works in the broader literature and drawing on my participants' accounts, I argue that disadvantaged people can and do make sophisticated and critical judgements on their own conditions. Based on this, in line with some scholars in the literature, I discuss that the problem of adaptive preferences is more to do with social and contextual injustices than with people's lack of ability to make critical and sophisticated judgements. If we engage with the nature of people's adaptive preferences using in more in-depth sociological inquiry, then we can identify what they should be able to be and do based on their own conceptions of the good life.

II. Process Matters: The Unequal Costs of Achievement and Compensation

The idea of capability, in Sen's works, reflects the freedom people need to have in order to achieve what they have reason to value, and is the ultimate space of evaluation for quality of life, well-being,

development, and justice. As discussed earlier in this study, the capability approach to justice advocates focusing on “what a person *can* do rather than what he *does* do” (Sen 1981: 209). Although the significance of people’s achievement of functionings is not ignored in the capability approach (especially for the analysis of well-being), the ultimate concern of the capability approach is people’s capability or ability to achieve functionings (Sen 2002: 83-4) (especially for the analysis of inequality and development). This is because some people “could have a good deal of freedom, without achieving much” (Sen 1985a: 3). However, moving beyond the achievement of functionings and focusing on the ability to achieve brings a significant difficulty in analysing a person’s (dis)advantage, since it requires us to incorporate counterfactual scenarios into the analysis.

Suppose I can choose various styles of life A, B, C, and D, and I choose A. Consider now that the other styles of life -B, C, and D- become unavailable to me, but I can still choose A. It might be said that my standard of living is unchanged, since A is what I would choose anyway. But it is not absurd to argue that there is some loss in my living standard in this reduction of freedom (Sen 1985a: 49).

In other words, the capability approach advocates taking notice of, not only achieved functionings, but unachieved possible scenarios too. Various scholars (Zimmerman 2006: 478, Walby 2012: 105-6, Comim 2008: 173-6) acknowledge that this brings great difficulty for practical applications of the capability approach, especially for large scale quantitative applications, due to the difficulty in measuring counterfactual or unobservable variables. Thus, Krishnakumar (2004: 12), for example, argues that people’s capability cannot be directly measured and Robeyns (2003: 85, see also 2005a: 101, 2006a: 354) proposes taking inequalities in achieved functionings as “indicative of inequalities in capabilities”. However, as I discussed previously, if we assess people’s (dis)advantage based on their achieved functioning, then the theoretical value and plausibility of distinguishing the “ability to achieve” from “achievement” disappears in practice. This is, as I addressed earlier, a serious threat to the authenticity of the idea of the “capability”.

This threat, in my opinion, occurs since scholars tend to consider a person’s (dis)advantage in terms of *capabilities* that merely reflect *opportunities* available to a person⁸². However, if we approach a person’s (dis)advantage in terms of the *notion of capability* that reflects, not only what

⁸² Such tendency can be easily be observed in the capability literature where most of the empirical applications of the capability approach uses the term “capabilities” by which they refer to “valuable opportunities”. This tendency can also be seen in all works of Nussbaum where she addresses various “valuable opportunities” as “capabilities”, such as “central human capabilities” (Nussbaum 2000, 2003a, 2007b, 2011a, 2011b).

opportunities are available to a person, but also *to what extent these opportunities are available* to that person, we then can incorporate “ability to achieve” into the analysis of (dis)advantage⁸³. However, in order to incorporate the extent of the availability of an opportunity to a person into the analysis we have to look at the process of functioning achievement which is not an easy task to accomplish through quantitative methods of inquiry. Before explaining how a focus on the process of functioning achievement can help us to incorporate the extent of availability of an opportunity and its relevance to a person’s capability, I should stress that the significance of the process in the achievement of functionings is acknowledged by Sen too. According to him, the notion of freedom has two distinct aspects, the opportunity aspect and the process aspects; and both depending on the purpose of analysis, can be significant in assessing development (1999a: 17, 285, 290-2), social choice (2004b: 585-7, 623-58), and justice (2009: 228-30). Sen argues that a person’s advantage should be comprehensively assessed; including not only the culmination outcome that is “what a person ends up with”, but also the comprehensive outcome that involves “the way the person reaches the culmination situation” (Ibid. 230). This suggests that a comprehensive analysis of people’s advantage requires us to scrutinize the process by which they achieve what they value (see Ibid. 229-30).

The question at this point is that how can a focus on the processes of achievement enable us to incorporate people’s ability to achieve? As I discussed in the theoretical framework of this study, due to various social and institutional dynamics, some people must to follow different paths, or processes, to achieve valuable functionings. When following these different paths, they struggle and negotiate with different difficulties. While some have to come to terms with only the common requirements, or necessities, of a functioning achievement (e.g. working hard in education); others must also deal with additional necessities. Thus, the requirements for achieving valuable functionings vary from person to person and those who have to deal with additional requirements pay unequal costs for achievement. Although they also manage to achieve functionings at the end of the process, since in the process the requirements of achievement differ for these people, they can be considered as being less “able to achieve” valuable functionings

⁸³ In fact, this was the reason why I have addressed “valuable opportunities” as “functionings” and used the concept of “capability” only in a sense of “ability to achieve valuable opportunities” in this study so far, which represented a terminological difference from most of works in the capability literature.

Paying an unequal cost to achieve a functioning can be considered as a form of the amelioration of a disadvantage, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, there are quite a number of cases where the amelioration of a disadvantage does not occur by means of a conversion factor, but through various endeavours and sacrifices of a person. Therefore, it is better to address these as cases of the *compensation* of disadvantages. In the capability literature, compensation of disadvantages is also addressed by Qizilbash (1997), albeit very briefly. He stresses that people adjust to their deprived conditions by developing certain abilities and dispositions, which he terms “compensating abilities” (Ibid. 252-3). As an example of this sort of adjustment, Qizilbash refers to women’s disadvantaged position in the fields of education and employment and stresses that due to gender injustices women are less able to achieve in their careers than men even in advanced economies like Britain. Based on this, Qizilbash points out that women must develop compensating abilities, such as being even more “hardworking” (See: Ibid. 256), in order to end up with equivalent opportunities to men.

Extending this idea of compensation, we can examine the process aspect of achievement and look at the unequal costs of functioning achievement. To illustrate this, we can look at compensation of a disadvantage that is associated with a person’s political identity and the unequal costs of this compensation in the case of Sabiha. Sabiha was a self-employed republican secular mother who has been living in Izmir and earning her living by designing and selling trinkets in the informal economy. She was a participant for whom freedom of political expression was an important functioning. According to her, the ruling party aims to “silence laics”⁸⁴ who, in Sabiha’s account, side with the values of enlightenment, freedom, and progress. However, contrary to most of the other dissident participants, she was quite straightforward in expressing her political views. When I asked her how she is able to express her views without fear, she said that she does not “have any navel cord with any state institution”, meaning that she is a self-sufficient person who is not dependent on any state institution. However, developing a self-sufficient life was not without cost for her. She quit her job in a state owned enterprise, the General Directorate of the National Lottery, where she was subject to some forms of bullying due to her political views. This resignation also cost her losing a regular and

⁸⁴ The term of “laic” is commonly used in Turkey by those who embraced a republican-secular understanding that considers both minority rights and religious values as equal threats to the unity and modernity of the country.

secure income, her retirement pension, and free health insurance. In order to earn living, with the help of an acquaintance she learned how to design trinkets and sell them. Today, she earns a bit less than before. She pays for her social insurance contributions and pension by herself. She sometimes feels insecurity regarding her income since the orders of her customers are not regular. She works longer and harder than before, which means she must constantly sacrifice from time spent with her children, taking care of her elder mother, and for herself.

We can see that Sabiha's self-sufficiency allows her to frame her life in a form that is significantly detached from political pressure. This allows her to compensate for a form of disadvantage (being afraid of expressing one's political view), which is commonly felt by politically dissident people in Turkey. However, developing such a self-sufficient life in order to achieve this functioning has some costs for her and such costs are not necessary for others. For example, Halime, a right-wing conservative female lawyer who is also a representative of the ruling party's (AKP) woman branch in Konya, was not required to pay any of these costs and she had no fear in expressing her political views.

Compensation and the unequal costs of achievement can also be seen in relation to gender-based disadvantages. To illustrate, Meliha, a young Turkish single woman from Konya, is a university student in Eskisehir (a relatively more secular city) who was visiting her family in Konya at the time of fieldwork. I asked her why she chose to study in a city away from home when she could have studied in her hometown. Among other reasons, she said, "in order to be free", and explained "being free" in relation to freedom from restrictive parental values. When she was living with her family in Konya for example, she was constantly "being called to account" for her actions, such as socialising with her friends, that did not fit her parents' traditional values. She felt that if her father, for example, knew that she had some sort of romantic relationship with a boy when she was in high school, this could have ended with her being forced to drop out of school. In addition, *gorucus*⁸⁵ had already begun to visit her family when she was in the last year of high school and she did not want for a

⁸⁵ The term *gorucu* refers to women who are sent by a potential groom's family to the home of a potential bride's family before marriage to check if the girl is "marriageable".

marriage to be arranged in this way⁸⁶. She felt that when she was living with her parents in Konya, she did not have sufficient personal autonomy in deciding how to live her life, and so, she wanted to leave her family house to have more control. Thanks to her achievement in the university entrance exam, she partly achieved this. In other words, Meliha partly compensated for her disadvantage, (her lack of personal autonomy), by studying away from home. Today, she lives in Eskisehir and she can socialise with her friends, have a date with her boyfriend and does not feel the pressure of *gorucus*. Passing the university entrance exam and enrolling in university are a necessary means to achieve multiple functionings in today's Turkey; but these had an additional meaning (as well as value) for Meliha whose parental values were shaped by mostly traditional and religiously formed reasonings. In her case, these were the only legitimate means to achieve a peaceful departure from the family house before her marriage and "keeping *gorucus* away" from her life. The crucial point here is that in order to compensate for her disadvantage and, thus, achieve the functioning of having control of her own life, she had to be successful in the university entrance exam. Similar to Meliha, Rewan, a young male single shoe maker living in Izmir, said that he does not have any intention to marry anytime soon. However, in contrast to Meliha, Rewan was able to "pretend not to have heard" when the issue of marriage was raised by his mother who, he said, has started to look for a bride for him. So, thanks to the advantage of his gender, Rewan does not feel any pressure of marriage and had already a control of his life in terms of deciding to marry when and with whom.

When we look at the functioning achievements of these participants, we can see that Sabiha was not different from Halime in terms of expressing her political views; and Meliha was not different from Rewan in terms of having control over her own life in deciding to marry. So, they were not different from each other in *outcome*. However, the *costs* of these functioning achievements were very different for them. While Sabiha and Meliha had to compensate for their disadvantage and paid unequal costs of achievement in the process, Halime and Rewan did not. So, we can say that these

⁸⁶ I should note that in marriages arranged through *gorucu* visits, firstly *gorucus* visit the bride's family and try to find out if the girl is marriageable in various ways. If they decide that the girl is marriageable, then the groom's family visits the bride's family to ask for the girl in marriage from her family's elders. However, this does not necessarily mean that marriage through *gorucu* visits is a form of forced marriage. The bride's consent may be asked by family elders and she may choose not to marry with the man represented by *gorucus* in some cases. The distinctive characteristic of marriage through *gorucu* visits is that it is a traditional form of marriage where the bride and groom usually do not know each other from their own social life.

functionings were not equally available to them; and thus they were not equally “able to achieve” them. Additionally, such a process-focused scrutiny of participants’ achievements demonstrates another important point: compensation and unequal costs of functioning achievement emerge in relation to the current social and institutional configuration of society in Turkey. Sabiha had to compensate and pay an unequal cost for her functioning achievement because of institutional disapproval of her political identity; and Meliha had to do so because of the constraints of patriarchal social norms of female conduct and marriage. This reminds us of the significance of the functionings of institutional recognition of political identity and freedom from social coercion (see Chapter IV), which could have prevented Sabiha and Meliha from needing to compensate their disadvantage. If these functionings had to be in place, Sabiha and Meliha would have been equally capable of achieving as Halime and Rewan, without the need for compensation.

Such a scrutiny of process can be applied in various cases to explore how people’s ethnic, age, religiosity, or disability-associated constraints lead them to pay an unequal cost for their functioning achievement and thus can help us to reflect on variation in their ability to achieve. However, this way of scrutinizing people’s achievement requires a great deal of contextual inquiry of social and institutional dynamics, and shows the value of qualitative sociological inquiry in exploring people’s ability to achieve. Before completing this section, I want to provide a story of lifelong compensation that explicitly illustrates the unequal costs of various functioning achievements.

Hozan was a male Kurdish participant living in Diyarbakir whose current quality of life was significantly higher than many other Kurdish participants. He was a medical doctor who had successfully graduated from university and earned a permanent place in a public hospital. This brought him a considerably high social respect from others in his everyday life. In addition, due to the general status of medical doctors, his occupation also provided him some conveniences in due process when he was in contact with public officials. He had a regular and high-level of income that enabled him to achieve his personal interests and to develop new ones. His life was not perfect though. For example, he was required to work long hours due to a shortage of doctors in his hospital and he had to deal with some medical issues that were supposed to be performed by more junior practitioner medics. However, he said he did not have “big concerns”, such as “being unemployed” or

“impoverished”. In terms of outcomes, Hozan was a participant who was able to achieve various functionings, so if we focus only on the functioning achievement in outcome, we cannot identify him as a disadvantaged participant. Yet, looking in greater detail into the story behind his current affluent lifestyle provides a rather different picture.

Starting from his childhood, Hozan had to learn Turkish to begin taking education. He went to a boarding school where he had to join in some obligatory events specifically organised to “improve” the Turkish language ability of Kurdish children, such as required hours of television watching. Although he did not completely lose his ability to talk Kurdish, it became difficult for him to communicate with his family members who did not know Turkish, like his grandmother. This was a cost of being able to pursue his education, during which he was subject to assimilative policies. After graduating from high school, Hozan won a place in the Medical Faculty of Ataturk University, which is located in Erzurum where Turkish nationalism is quite dominant. At the beginning of his studies, he was excluded from some social relations due to his ethnic background. When he was staying in a student dormitory, he was even beaten by some students due to his ethnic identity. He felt there was no other choice for him, but to find other Kurdish students in the university. After meeting them, everything settled down for a while, and he started to feel that he was not alone. Yet, he felt that he was expected to engage in some of the Kurdish political activities organised by his friends, otherwise, he would have seen as “a betrayer to his own identity [ethnicity]” and would become lonely again. On the other hand, to engage in these activities, which according to him were in essence rightful demands, was not an easy decision. They were considered as a threat to the official ideology by the state, so he felt that there was risk of being taken into custody, being threatened by undercover officials, or beaten by the security forces. He joined in some political activities during his university years; yet he had feelings of fear and danger when he did so. After graduation, he was assigned to a state hospital as a junior practitioner in Istanbul. He became a member of a privileged occupation and started to earn a regular income. Yet, he still felt the need to prove to his colleagues and patients that he was one of them. Therefore, he changed some of his manners and tried to abandoning those which are associated with Kurdishness, even though he felt that this should not have been necessary. He said that he still sometimes finds himself unintentionally appropriating a Turkish accent while talking with

his colleagues. After all, he felt that Kurds have to abandon their ethnicity to have a place among others:

More importantly, you have to assure them that you are one of them. As long as you assure them that you are one of them, as long as you give the impression that 'he is one of us'... (...) What is the Kurdishness? You have to think about them. It is the halay [a type of dance], right? It is your accent. It is your behaviour. It is about how you live. It is your politics. (...) When you abandon these, they behave differently to you. If you talk in a similar way they talk, if you behave like them, you are one of them.

Hozan had to compensate for the disadvantages of his Kurdish ethnicity in order to achieve his current affluent life. The costs of compensation for Hozan were compromise of his ethnicity and assimilation in various ways, which indicate that the various functionings that he has achieved were less available for him in comparison to Turkish people who do not have to compensate for any ethnic-disadvantage.

Exploring people's experiences of the process of achieving different functionings addresses the significance of a sociological scrutiny of process. Based on such a scrutiny, two important points can be made. Firstly, any application of the capability approach that exclusively focused on the functioning achievements of these participants would have reached an inaccurate assessment of these participants' state of beings as equally advantaged based on their achievements in outcome. However, as can be seen above, their routes of functioning achievement are different and unequal because of the way that their social identities operate differently within the given social and institutional configuration of Turkey. Following these different routes, many of my participants had to struggle with different constraints in order to achieve functionings. Some (for example Sabiha and Meliha) – who were constrained by social and institutional dynamics– had to compensate for their disadvantages by paying additional costs for their achievements, while others (for example Halime and Rewan) were not constrained and were able to achieve valuable functionings without any cost. Such unequal costs of achievement reflect the variation in the availability of functionings, which can be interpreted as inequality in people's "ability to achieve". Secondly, since compensation is the response of a disadvantaged person to contextual constraints, there can be countless forms of compensation which cannot be predicted beforehand, such as being successful in a university entrance exam (Meliha), developing a self-sufficient lifestyle (Sabiha), or abandoning the signifiers of a particular ethnic

identity (Hozan). Therefore, scrutinizing the process of functioning achievement and thus exploring the compensation requires a great deal of contextual information. This demonstrates the utility of qualitative sociological inquiry in unpacking and assessing people's ability to achieve.

III. Entrenched Disadvantages and the Interdependency of Achievements

As discussed in the previous chapter, disadvantages in functioning achievement are sometimes ameliorated through another conversion factor, and are sometimes compensated for by paying unequal costs for achievement. However, disadvantaged people are not always able to circumvent their constraints through amelioration or compensation. Once they are constrained in a functioning achievement and cannot ameliorate or compensate for this constraint, their disadvantage is more likely to spread its negative effects to other domains of functionings. Wolff and de-Shalit (2007: 121, 138; and 2013: 161) term this sort of constraint as “corrosive disadvantage”, addressing the causal relations between different disadvantages (see 2007: 126-7). Such causal relations can be considered as the interdependency of disadvantages. In fact, a significant amount of the literature on inequality emphasises the interdependency of different functionings (e.g. health, education, social affiliation, income, employment). Marmot, for example, points out the social determinants of health and argues that those who have more prestigious occupations (not necessarily better paid) usually have a healthier and longer life (2004: 15). He also argues that levels of control over one's own life, or autonomy, and social participation are important social determinants of health (ibid. 248). Similarly, Wilkinson and Marmot argue that “unemployed people and their families suffer a substantially increased risk of premature death” (2003: 20) and also addresses the relationship between quality of social relations and solidarity with having a healthy life (ibid. 23). Wilkinson elsewhere (2001) also notes that, in addition to poverty in material conditions, lower social status, lack of friendship, and of autonomy also substantially influence people's health. Klinenberg (2015) discusses the social determinants of deaths from natural disasters; and based on his investigation of a heat wave in Chicago in 1995 where over 700 people died, he stresses that deaths from such natural causes are closely associated with the social isolation of disadvantaged people. This also refers to the relationship between the functionings of social relationships and longevity. Based on these findings, it

can be argued that the achievement of a functioning (e.g. health or longevity) is dependent upon the achievement of other functionings (e.g. having friends, developing relationships of solidarity and support, employment status). So, being constrained in achieving one functioning may result in being constrained to achieve other functionings⁸⁷, reflecting the interdependency of achievements of valuable functionings (see also Krishnakumar 2004: 7, Iversen 2003: 94-5).

Exploring the causal relations between the achievements of different functionings is important since this enables us to examine different patterns of disadvantage and to understand how disadvantaged positions may become entrenched. To illustrate the causal relations between the non-achievements of different functionings, we can look at the case of Dilzar, a divorced Kurdish woman who lives in Izmir with her two children. Dilzar was forced to marry her ex-husband when she was still a child. Drawing on a narrative of her earlier in this study, I noted that she could not resist the marriage because of a particular moral code through which a male member of the family, usually the eldest, maintains control over women's lives, including the power to decide with whom and when they should marry. If a woman acts contrary to this patriarchal moral code, then in some cases the authority of man is re-established by killing the woman (known as "honour killing"). Dilzar did not have control over her own life in terms of her marriage, or her ability to continue her schooling, and crucially she was also not able to compensate for this disadvantage. She was a child and "there was the *tore* [the moral law]" that, she said, "could have even gone as far as killing" her. She stayed married to her ex-husband for approximately 20 years and felt that she could not get a divorce.

Dilzar: I could not have done. I did not have the courage. After all, two small kids... Also I... An alone person. A woman. There was no money.

Onur: Did you not consider work?

Dilzar: I thought. I thought. I also wanted [to work]. But, I was scared. If I want [aim] to work, I was thinking like no one would employ me. I do not even have a secondary school diploma.

Onur: I see. The problem of how I am going to earn my living...

Dilzar: Both that and how could I could have taken care of kids by myself?

Onur: Do you not have any siblings or relatives here to support you?

Dilzar: No, no one here. I am the only one living here from our family.

Onur: Neighbours and so on might have supported you?

Dilzar: On the contrary... If it was up to them, I could not have divorced at all.

Onur: Why do you say so?

Dilzar: They kept telling me "why do you want to get a divorce?", "he is not a drunkard", "he does not gamble", "think of your kids", "grin and bear it"... If it was up to them I had to sit down under him until the end of my life.

⁸⁷ It can also be argued that achievements of a functioning may facilitate the achievement of another functioning.

Dilzar's responds demonstrate that the various constraints that she faced were intertwined in her life. Starting before her early teenage years, she did not have personal autonomy in deciding to continue her studies and no power to resist a forced marriage. Her lack of schooling led her to becoming economically dependent on her husband and this also caused feelings of fear that she could not survive without her husband. Besides, since she had already embraced the patriarchal norm that it should be the woman who is the primary caregiver in the family, she felt that she should be the one who had to take care of the children after divorce, which is another constraint on her decision to get a divorce and to gain a control of her life. In addition, she was deprived of the support and solidarity of her neighbours who felt that a woman should "grin and bear it" in the face of marriage problems. As a result, it took her a long time to muster the courage to get a divorce. So, not only her economic dependency, but also her lack of social support and solidarity diminished her sense of personhood for a long time. However, after her divorce, Dilzar started to experience different disadvantages. After she spoke of that the physical and verbal harassment of men is a serious problem for divorced women, I asked her if she experienced any such harassment. She related a personal experience, which was not easy for her to share

Dilzar: I mean, I have not told anyone so far. So, it is a bit difficult [to tell]. (...) It happened in this building. In the elevator... There is a son of a neighbour. He is much younger than me. We had actually very good relation with (his) family. We were visiting each other frequently. But, I could not realise that their son thought about me in this way. (...) He jumped on me in the elevator and harassed me with his hands. I can only say that much.

Onur: Why did you not go to police or tell this to his family?

Dilzar: No no, never. (...) Because, if I did something, it could have been worse. (...) It could have been worse. I am a divorced woman. If this [harassment] is heard, then doing the same thing becomes easier for other men.

Dilzar, who had suffered various disadvantages during her forced marriage, started to experience different disadvantages after her divorce. So, her powerlessness in terms of resisting forced marriage in her teenage years today has turned into a feeling of powerlessness as a divorced woman in terms of seeking her rights and demanding protection against sexual harassment.

The corrosive nature of disadvantages can also be seen in the case of Alime, a veiled university student living in Izmir. One of Alime's primary disadvantages was the absence of social recognition for her religious identity and being unable to live in peace and harmony with others due to secular-religious polarization in her society. She shared some personal stories illustrating how she had

experienced this disadvantage through different forms of degrading and excluding responses to her wearing her veil in public. She said that when she went to see a theatre play, a woman turned to her and, without any reason, said “did you come to see how your father killed our sons?” She could not stay in the theatre hall and went home. However, the negative effects of this sort of excluding responses were not limited to disadvantage in the domain of social recognition of her religious identity. Due to such degrading experiences, Alime said that she would not go to see a play anymore unless she was accompanied by a friend. Such self-withdrawal can be considered as a corrosive effect spreading to other domains of the good life, in this case enjoying cultural activities and participating in intellectual reproduction. Based on this, we can see interdependent relations between the functionings of “social recognition of one’s identity”, “living in peace and harmony with others”, and “being a knowledgeable person” which I discussed earlier in this study (Chapter IV).

The corrosive nature of disadvantages and the interdependency of various functionings can also be seen in the case of Hasan, a poor married Alawi man living in a stigmatized neighbourhood of Konya. I shall explore his case in some detail. Towards the end of our interview, I asked Hasan what was the biggest problem of those living in his neighbourhood. He said it is “themselves” and continued:

We are the problem. (...) Because, everything makes you say this. We are the problem. (...) Problems do not stop following us. If you were like us, you could not get rid of problems either. Impossible. You get rid of one of them, another one comes. How can you get rid of? (...) Let me tell you a truth. I do not bother anymore. No one here bothers. Do you understand? (...) I say, why do I bother myself? We are the problem anyway. Why do I bother my son? He will fail anyway. Whether he goes to school or not... Why do I bother him? Why do I bother myself about money? (...) Yes, I can. I can earn [money] from drug [selling]. This is easy. I can extort from you. (...) Why do I bother myself then?

Hasan’s narrative is a reactive narrative. The point he stresses is the futility of aiming to do the “right” thing and the impossibility of avoiding doing wrong for people like him who are stigmatized and poor, degraded and excluded from various functionings. This is because, after all the difficulties he has experienced since childhood, he feels that even though he aims to do the right thing, he still eventually fails to have a good life and ends up with another problem. The reason behind his perpetual failure and, thus, the causal relations of his disadvantages can be seen in his life story.

In Konya, which is the citadel of the Sunni-Muslim lifestyle in Turkey, Hasan was a child of the Alawi community. In Hasan’s account, the members of his community were forced to learn and practice Sunni-Muslim beliefs, and degraded and humiliated both verbally and sometimes physically

in school. Like many Alawi children of his neighbourhood, who were forced to practice Sunni-Muslim rituals, who were called “impure” and “redhead”, and who were punished with the duty of “cleaning the school’s toilets”; he abandoned the school without even completing the compulsory duration of eight years schooling. Following this, he applied for work to several craft shops in Konya; however, whenever he visited a shop, he was refused. Even though craftsmen had hung a notice, saying “apprentice wanted”, refused him after they figured out that he was from Doganlar, the Alawi neighbourhood, where stigmatized Alawis live in Konya. He became fed up searching for a job and joined his friends to sell the rolled marijuana that they call “shotgun”. He was caught and acquired a criminal record. When he returned home after his obligatory military service, he started to search for a job, but could not find anything due to his lack of educational credentials, his criminal record, and the stigma of his Alawi identity. Therefore, he began to work as a bodyguard in a gambling house, which is illegal in Turkey. To escape from the risks of working in a gambling house, after his marriage he left his job and started to sell smuggled tobacco in the streets, which is not legal either but less dangerous than working in a gambling house. When his wife became pregnant, the first thing that he felt was “a sense of dread” because of the pregnancy costs. He did not know what to do for a while. He wanted to apply for the Green Card, a social assistance program, through which he expected to lighten the pregnancy costs and to benefit from free public health services. When he went to the district governorship in order to apply for the Green Card, an officer recommended him “to get a letter of good conduct from the neighbourhood imam” to support his application, though this is not a lawful condition of eligibility in the legislation. But, he felt that this “would be flogging a dead horse” for an Alawi person. He gave up applying for the Green Card. To afford living and pregnancy costs, he started to work with a local money lender who collects “dead debts” via some sort of duress. After his son’s birth, he stopped working with the money lender and began to sell dowry goods. Selling dowry goods required him to carry heavy bags for long, which caused a permanent injury of his back. But, he felt that at least he did not have to do job that required him to “threaten people” to collect debts. However, the municipality has recently prohibited selling anything without being registered. Today, all street sellers are fined, if they are caught, and the municipality impounds their goods. Therefore, he has to find another way to earn his living. But, more urgently, he had to deal with problems about his

house. Since his neighbourhood, which is seen as the cradle of all criminal activities in the city, will be regenerated as a part of an urban transformation program, he and his neighbours, the Alawi community of the city, are going to be relocated soon. Regarding this issue, he has been recently visited by an officer saying that his house was not liveable and, “for his family’s sake”, they should have moved out. He asked where and how to leave, and the officer informed him about the expropriated price of his land with which, Hasan says, “I can buy only a chicken coop”. Hasan said he had two options: either accept the expropriated price and leave his house or resist by “chaining” himself “to the door of the house” when the municipality comes to demolish it. Regeneration, or demolition, of the Alawi neighbourhood in Konya, does not only mean “homelessness” for Hasan and his neighbours. It will also possibly result in the loss of some survival strategies that they have developed through solidarity (such as finding temporary jobs within the community) against the systematic discrimination that they have been experiencing in Konya. Although Hasan and his family have been suffering from the municipal policies, he said that he and his wife voted for the current administration in the 2009 local election. When I asked him why they did so, he at first responded with a saying, “it is easy for the single person to say [advise] ‘get a divorce’”. Following this, he explained that they did so to benefit from heating and food relief program that were surreptitiously offered by men of the candidate’s political party in return for votes.

Hasan’s life story demonstrates the causal relations between various disadvantages and how these disadvantages entrench each other. What he suffers from is not the absence of one single functioning, but a unified form of multiple disadvantages each of which leads to and consolidates the others. This is the reason behind his perpetual failure and why he stresses the futility of aiming to do the “right thing”. Yet, there is a further point in his case which is about the reproduction of these disadvantages. The institutional and social denials of Hasan’s Alawi identity have impoverished him in almost all parts of his life since his childhood when he dropped out of schooling. Moreover, his long lasting impoverishment also has resulted in him being in need of even the smallest help. This need compelled him to take a political stance, albeit not very reluctantly, where he supported the current executive body whose political agenda has not enhanced his life at all. So, Hasan not only suffered from various constraints but also from being powerless to influence or change the policies that maintain his

constraints⁸⁸. However, without having the ability to influence his social, material and political environment, it is hardly possible to change the conditions that prevented him from meeting even the minimal requirements of the good life. Thus, Hasan's case demonstrates that the functioning of "having institutional and social recognition" and "influencing and changing one's social, material and political environment" are interdependent functionings.

Here I have argued that the negative effects of a person's inability to achieve a functioning tend to spread to the achievement of other functionings of the good life. Alime's case above, for example, demonstrated that a lack of social recognition not only resulted in verbal insults but also led her to be excluded from participating in cultural and intellectual activities. Based on her case, it can be said that achievement of a valuable functioning in some cases depends upon achievement of another functioning. Causal relationships between disadvantages also entrench disadvantages that can lead to the emergence of persistent disadvantage. This can be observed in Dilzar and Hasan's cases. Lack of personal autonomy and powerlessness in resisting to forced marriage resulted in Dilzar being dependent on her husband, constrained her to decision about divorce and entrenched her lack of personal autonomy. On the other hand, when she divorced, she became vulnerable in the face of another disadvantage (physical and verbal harassment), yet her image of divorced woman made seeking her right to be protected from harassment more difficult for her. Thus, her powerlessness in terms of resisting forced marriage turned to powerlessness in seeking her right to be protected. This can also be observed in Hasan's case. Institutional and social denial of his religious identity led him to experience various disadvantages; and he could neither ameliorate nor compensate for these disadvantages. However, such denial of his religious identity did not only make him a poor and stigmatized person who was constrained in achieving quite a number of functionings. It also deprived him of the functioning of changing or influencing policies of denial and stigmatization.

IV. Adaptation: A Problem of Social Injustices

One consequence of entrenched and persistent disadvantages is that these disadvantages can lead people to adjust or reshape their preferences in relation to their disadvantaged conditions. This brings

⁸⁸ This situation of Hasan illustrates the significance of Nussbaum's functioning of political control over one's environment (see Nussbaum 1999b: 235, 2000: 80, 2003a: 42).

forth the question of adaptive preference, a “can of worms” (Robeyns 2006a: 373) for the capability approach. I earlier discussed the problem of adaptive preferences and clarified how this problem sparked off an internal division within the capability literature. Here I return to this problem in the light of my discussion above and briefly reflect on it by drawing on some participants’ narratives. The problem of adaptive preferences is sometimes mistakenly understood as a problem of “false consciousness” and addressed to suggest that disadvantaged people cannot critically reflect on their own circumstances since they lack the ability for sophisticated deliberation. Here I argue that this is misunderstanding of the problem of adaptive preferences, and leads to the idea that analysts need to decide what people should be able to do and be from a normative political account of the good life. This ignores the significance of exploring why and how people adjust their preferences in relation to constraining social conditions. Below, drawing on some participants’ accounts, I argue that the problem of adaptive preferences occurs, not because disadvantaged people are unable to make a critical reflection on their constraining circumstances, but rather because of the necessity of dealing with their constraining conditions. Based on this, I discuss that the problem of adaptive preferences is not a problem of false consciousness, but a problem of structural injustices, which again demonstrates the need for a sociological inquiry in dealing with this problem.

The problem of adaptive preferences refers to the process of preference formation where people change or modify their preferences in relation to what they consider as being more accessible for themselves. Elster, who popularized the concept in mainstream contemporary economic and political theory, identifies this process as an “adjustment of people’s aspirations to feasible possibilities” (Elster 1982: 219). In the capability literature, adaptive preferences are addressed both as a justification of the capability approach against utilitarian models of justice and as a drawback for the application of the capability approach. For example, addressing the influence of unjust conditions on people’s desires and preferences (Sen 1979b: 202, 208, 218; 1985a: 12-17; 1985b: 188, 189, 190-1; 1987a: 14-15, 20; 1987c: 45-6, 1990b: 126, 127; 1999a: 62-3), Sen argues that utilitarian metrics of well-being (e.g. desire fulfilment, happiness, subjective well-being or satisfaction) cannot be an adequate basis to assess people’s (dis)advantages because people’s desires and preferences can easily be deformed via, for example, “social conditioning” (1985a: 12), “the opium of religion” (1985b:

188), the “established order” (1990b: 127), individuals’ “resigned acceptance of misfortune” (Ibid. 133) or “harsh reality” (1999a: 15). He stresses that:

A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very limited opportunities, and rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances. The metric of happiness may, therefore, distort the extent of deprivation, in a specific and biased way (Sen 1987c: 45)

For this perspective, people’s desires, aspirations or preferences that are adapted to restricted conditions are not a reliable object of value to assess their well-being. In this regard, “the problem of adaptive preferences is at the heart of the justification for the use of the capability approach” (Teschl and Comim 2005: 230). On the other hand, there is no clear-cut difference between preferences, desires, values, or aspirations. Sen’s criticism of the utilitarian metric of (dis)advantage “can be made with equal force and validity against to a metric based on agency goal” (Burchardt 2009: 3) that is valued beings and doings. The “hopeless destitute”, “the tamed housewife” or “the broken unemployed” (Sen 1985a: 17) could form their values via the “opium of religion”, by “disciplined ends” or in relation to “socially conditioned aspirations”. Thus, the question of adaptive preferences is not only “at the heart of justification for the use of the capability approach”, but it is also “a continuing problem for the use of it” (Watts 2009: 425).

I agree that the problem of adaptive preferences may become a serious obstacle for the application of the capability approach, especially in the specification of what people should be able to be and do. Yet, the essence of this problem should not be overlooked: the problem of adaptive preferences is about how disadvantaged people adjust their preferences to what they consider as “accessible” within given social and institutional boundaries. This does not necessarily mean that they have a “false consciousness” or deprived of the ability for critical reflection on their material circumstances. However, the way that some scholars in the capability approach address the problem of adaptive preferences suggests that they see the problem as one where disadvantaged people lack the capacity for sophisticated deliberation or critical reflection on their circumstances. For example, Nussbaum starts her discussion on the problem of adaptive preferences with the following examples:

Think, once again, of Vasanti and Jayamma. Vasanti stayed for years in an abusive marriage. Eventually she did leave, and by now she has very firm views about the importance of her bodily integrity. (...) But there was a time when Vasanti *did not think* this way. (Nussbaum 2000: 112) (Emphasis added)

When women were paid less for heavier work at the brick kiln and denied chances for promotion, Jayamma didn't complain or protest. She *knew that this was how things were and would be*. (Ibid. 113) (Emphasis added)

...these [disadvantaged] women apparently had no feeling of anger or protest about their physical situation. They *knew no other way*. They *did not consider their conditions* unhealthful or unsanitary, and they *did not consider* themselves to be malnourished. (Ibid. 113) (Emphasis added)

Here the problem of adaptive preferences is approached as a problem of the absence of critical reflection. And the way Nussbaum proposes to deal with this problem is to clarify what these people should be able to be and do from a normative political point of view that is extrinsic to disadvantaged people's own lives (see Nussbaum 2003a: 34). However, as has been noted, disadvantaged people are able to make quite sophisticated judgements on their own material circumstances. For example, drawing on some participatory empirical research Clark (2009: 25) argues that "the available evidence from studies of human values (for example, Alkire 2002; Clark 2002b; Clark and Qizilbash 2008) and participatory poverty assessments (for example, Narayan *et al* 2000; Narayan and Petesch 2002) indicates that the poor and deprived are capable -and arguably just as capable as anyone else- of making rationale judgments and choices". Qizilbash (2006a: 100-1) also stress that disadvantaged people can make very sophisticated deliberations on their conception of the good life, again referring to empirical research. Furthermore, Agarwal provides some examples where oppressed women in South Asia struggle with their disadvantages through various covert ways (2008: 165-6), which could be hardly discerned without qualitative sociological inquiry. Based on these examples, she argues that the covert ways in which disadvantaged women struggle with their constraints "reflect a survival strategy stemming from the constraints on their ability to pursue those interests overtly", but not the "lack of a perception of their best interests" (Ibid. 166, also Agarwal 1997: 23-5). As Agarwal argues, these findings suggest that the main problem in people's adjustment of preferences is not that they are unable to make critical judgment but rather the structural inequalities that lead them to adjust their preferences. This underlines the need for a more sociological inquiry of people's valuation that pays particular attention to the role of social and institutional constraints when dealing with the problem of adaptive preferences. I conducted such an analysis in the first empirical chapter of this study where I

provided some examples⁸⁹ of adaptation, but my main attention was not exclusively on the adaptive preferences. Here I provide some further participants' accounts in order to demonstrate how the problem of adaptive preferences is in essence a problem of structural inequalities.

Okday, a low-income factory worker man living in Konya, was a participant who believes that “if you want to get things done, you have to *have an uncle*⁹⁰”. Okday had recently been employed in a new job when I interviewed him. Although his employer, by law, had to insure him for his health expenditures from the date that he started to work, he was still not insured. After he complained about the cost of accessing health services, I asked him what would have made it easier. He responded that “having a relative or a close acquaintance” who works in the hospital and who could make it easier and less costly to access health services via personal connections. Without any further inquiry, we might say that “having a relative or close acquaintance” working in the hospital is a valuable means that can facilitate Okday's functioning achievement of accessing health services. But, why did Okday not complain that his employer did not fulfil the legal requirement of insuring him? Instead of valuing having employment insurance in the first place⁹¹, why did he value having a relative or close acquaintance instead? What made him adapt this preference? We could answer these questions by arguing, for example, that Okday was unable to critically reflect on his own disadvantaged circumstances and thus unable to make an informed/rational decision about the right thing to value. However, a deeper sociological inquiry reveals that it is social and institutional dynamics that lead Okday to form such a preference and allows us to see a sophisticated pragmatism in Okday's valuation.

For example, when Okday complained about health costs and said he was not insured, I reminded him that this was unlawful and he could insist that his employer insure him. Yet, he said “he would give me the boot if I insist”, which indicates his weakness in the face of his employer. I asked if he was a member of any trade union through which he could have strengthened his position while demanding his due. He responded that if there were any union in his workplace, he would like to be a

⁸⁹ For example, Welat's narrative that was about how to deal with difficulties of teaching Kurdish children in Turkish. (see Chapter IV, Section III in this study).

⁹⁰ Reminding from Bahri's narrative in the Chapter 5, *having an uncle* indicates to have connection with someone who is in a high place and uses her/his position to favour for acquaintances.

⁹¹ To be fair, I should explain that having insurance was not something Okday devalued. However, in terms of accessing to health services in an easier and less costly way, the first thing he addressed as a need was “having a relative or acquaintance”.

member. Following this, I discussed whether he could have at least appealed to the Ministry of Labour and complained about unlawful employment conditions. But, according to him:

You talk like you had not lived here [Turkey] at all. (...) [Because] This would be senseless. (...) Of course, I would like to [have insurance]. Why didn't I? (...) Okay. Say that I called [the Ministry]. What could happen? (...) Nothing. At most, it would send an inspector. (...) No, nothing would change. Inspectors are corrupt. They are grafters. Don't you know? (...) Say that, he [the inspector] came. He would directly pass to the boss's room. He would have a glass of tea with the boss. Then the boss would slip him a bit [of money] under the counter. Then, he would write a slapdash report and leave.

Oktay's narrative addresses several contextual constraints that led him to form his preference as having a relative or close acquaintance. These constraints include being unable to work in a properly regulated labour market where his rights were protected, being unable to sign up to a trade union that could empower him in front of the employer, and being unable to seek his rights through uncorrupted executive bodies. Due to these constraints, he had no other option, but to adapt his preference to the constraining conditions he was surrounded with. His valuation demonstrates the formation of a preference in relation to unjust social conditions (and therefore an adaptive preference); however, it was not a preference that was formed because Oktay was unable to make a critical reflection on his constraining circumstances. Rather he took notice of these structural constraints and adopted such a particular preference, which demonstrates that he was able to make a sophisticated judgement. However, taking his constraints into account, we can address that being able to work in a properly regulated labour market, being able to seek his right in due process, and being able to sign up a trade union (see Burchardt and Vizard 2009: 118) as valuable functionings.

Another example of adaptation of a preference can be seen in the case of Gulazer, a poor unemployed housewife living in Diyarbakir. As might be remembered from the previous chapter, Gulazer was a participant who saw herself as the primary caregiver within her family while seeing her husband as the primary breadwinner. When I asked what the most pressing question in her life, Gulazer pointed to her husband's unemployment, rather than her own. Considering these narratives, it could perhaps be said that she had already internalised a patriarchal division of labour within household. This partly explains why she values her husband's employment more than hers. But, it is not a sufficient explanation. This is because when I asked Gulazer what would be happen if she and

her husband changed roles within the family and her husband was responsible for housekeeping whilst she worked, she responded that

Gulazer: No, this wouldn't happen. (...) There would be rumour, gossip...

Onur: Who would do that? Neighbours?

Gulazer: Everyone would. People's mouths are not a bag that you can shirr⁹².

Onur: What they would say for example?

Gulazer: They would talk. They would say 'are you not man?', 'Can you not take care of your home [family]?' (...) They would keep talking.

Onur: Let them talk. You do not have to care...

Gulazer: No, you should. Why do you become bad [with neighbours]? (...) When you are in trouble, when you are in need of something, what do you do? You knock your neighbour's door. Who does want to be in bad with neighbours?

Gulazer's narrative refers to the potential humiliation of the head of the family if gender roles are reversed in a patriarchal society. Yet, the disadvantage in such a case would not only be limited to humiliation, but also might result in a rupture in social relations. On the other hand, when Gulazer's dependency on good neighbourhood relations is considered, losing her community's respect and solidarity by acting against established norms is an unaffordable risk. In this regard, Gulazer's overvaluation of her husband's employment *vis-à-vis* hers can be considered as a preference adapted to the established norms of her social context and shaped by the deliberately pragmatic reason of preserving social solidarity. Thus, it becomes difficult to argue that Gulazer prioritises her husband's employment simply because she was deprived of the ability of making rational judgement and choice.

By observing in detail how disadvantaged people adapt their preferences to their constraining conditions we can see the challenge that the capability approach has to deal with in deciding what people should be able to be and do. However, this detailed examination also demonstrates we do not have to consider this problem as a problem of false consciousness, nor should we see adapted preferences arising from a lack of sophisticated deliberation or critical reflection on their constraining conditions. Such an understanding has led some scholars to approach what people should be able to be and do (valuable functionings) from an extrinsic normative political point of view; and the implication of such view was the need for consciousness or awareness raising programs (see Conradie and Robeyns 2013, Nussbaum 2000: 113). However, as can be seen in some of participants' accounts (above and in the fourth chapter of this study), disadvantaged people are well be able to make sophisticated and deliberative judgements on their constraining conditions. The problem of adaptive

⁹² A saying that is similar to the rumour "spreads like wildfire".

preferences is therefore more to do with structural injustices, and pragmatic responses to their often critical sense of their very real constraints, rather than the question of false consciousness.

V. Conclusion

The aim of this last empirical chapter is threefold: to propose a method for engaging with people's ability to achieve functionings in the analysis of their (dis)advantage; to clarify the causal relations between the non-achievement of different functionings (and demonstrating how entrenched disadvantage is formed); and to argue that the problem of adaptation is more to do with structural inequalities rather than with people's lack of ability to make critical and sophisticated judgements. In all these arguments, I have tried to show the value of sociological inquiry to the application of the capability approach.

I started this chapter with an argument that we can in fact engage with people's ability to achieve functionings to assess their (dis)advantages in the space of capability, an argument in opposition to various scholars in the capability literature who consider that this is not possible due to the counterfactual nature of the capability approach. I suggested that an application of the capability approach that focuses on the *process* of functioning achievement is informative about variation in people's ability to achieve functionings. Drawing on my participants' experiences in achieving valuable functionings, I demonstrated that different people follow different routes to achievement. In these different routes, some must follow a route where they have to compensate for their disadvantages by paying extra costs of achievement whilst others do not have to compensate for any disadvantage. This, I argued, can be considered as a variation concerning the cost of a functioning achievement, and refers to variation in the availability of functioning and thus in people's ability to achieve. However, during this assessment, my participants' experiences illustrated that their compensation can take quite diverse and specific forms. This indicates that there is no generalizable way of compensation. Therefore, a scrutiny of the compensation of disadvantage and the process of functioning achievement requires a great deal of contextual information, which is best identified by qualitative inquiry.

Following this, I focused on the experiences of participants who cannot ameliorate or compensate for their disadvantages and looked at the consequences of their non-achievements of functionings. This revealed that when a person cannot achieve a functioning (either through amelioration or compensation), the negative effects of this disadvantage tend to spread to other domains of the good life and undermine ability to achieve in these domains too. Thus, based on this investigation, I have argued that the non-achievement of various functionings leads to the formation of entrenched and persistent forms of disadvantage.

Lastly, I also looked at the preference formation process of those who are constrained in achieving various functionings and can neither ameliorate, nor compensate their disadvantages. This exploration confirmed that disadvantaged people adapt their preferences to their straitened conditions. However, this detailed qualitative and contextual analysis of how and why people adapt their preferences demonstrated that disadvantaged people are fully able to reflect on their constraints and thus are able to make pragmatic and sophisticated judgements based on their needs. Based on this finding, I discussed that an understanding of the adaptive preferences, which implies that disadvantaged people lack critical reflection on their material circumstances, is not adequate to explain various cases examined here. Therefore, instead of aiming to deal with the problem of adaptive preferences based on developing various political normative conceptions of the good life, we need to explore the role of structural injustices and contextual constraints which shape people's preferences, and thus a fuller sociological inquiry into what people should be able to be and do.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have argued that the particular strengths of the capability approach can only be fully realised by a more extended sociological analysis of people's capability in context. Using a sample of 41 people from Turkey, I have tried to demonstrate the significance of a more in-depth contextual analysis of people's values and reasonings, conversion factors and achievements of functionings for a fuller understanding of the nature of (dis)advantage and capability in Turkey. As I have argued in this thesis, whilst the capability approach represents a "sociological turn" in the literature of social justice, this turn remains an incomplete and unevenly developed one, and it is necessary to further extend the sociological insights into social justice that the capability approach has so far offered only a tantalising but too fleeting glimpse.

Within the literature of social justice, the capability approach represents a distinctive perspective that employs a more sociological account of inequalities which underlines the significance of paying attention to people's social backgrounds as well as social and contextual diversity in assessing their (dis)advantage. Such distinctiveness of the capability approach is explicitly seen in its criticisms of the rival theories of social justice, especially when it addresses the inadequacy of evaluating people's (dis)advantage in terms of utility, equal rights of acquisition of wealth, and equality in holdings of resource ownership. However, as several scholars addressed (see Sandbrook 2000, Navarro 2000, Evans 2002; Hill 2003; Deneulin 2005; and Sayer 2012), the capability approach should be more sensitive to the structural inequalities and unequal social power. This thesis has contributed to the literature by arguing that such sensitivity can be developed with the help of a more sociological perspective.

Although the capability approach provides us with a more nuanced and advanced perspective than the mainstream theories of social justice for the assessment (dis)advantage, there are still some ambiguities in the approach's configuration. These ambiguities are not due to its deliberately incomplete nature, but rather because of its insufficient attention to the underlying social and institutional determinants of being a (in)capable person. More specifically, this thesis has argued that the capability approach needs to incorporate a more developed sociological perspective that takes

greater notice of various roles that social and institutional dynamics play in (1) the identification of valuable functionings, and (2) people's achievement as well as (3) the ability to achieve these functionings. The distinctiveness of this study arises from how it has placed social and institutional dynamics at the forefront of the analysis of people's capability in the process of demonstrating how the capability approach can incorporate a more extended sociological perspective into the analysis of the interpersonal assessment of (dis)advantage.

Chapter Two set out the theoretical underpinnings for the need of the capability approach to incorporate a more extended sociological perspective into the assessment people's (dis)advantage. After explained how the idea of social justice has been conceptualized by mainstream theories of social justice and addressed each theory's weaknesses, the chapter provided the normative and conceptual frameworks of the capability approach and discussed its strengths to assess the issue of disadvantage. Following these, the chapter argued that the main problem of the capability approach is associated with its partial use of sociological analysis. Sen has mostly employed a sociological perspective (of the significance of social background and social context) as a stock of empirical examples with the aim of rebutting rival theories of social justice. However, he has not drawn on a sociological perspective for the purpose of configuring and extending the capability approach's own arguments. The chapter underpinned this argument by addressing three ambiguities in Sen's capability approach.

First, chapter two addressed that drawing on a sociological understanding of the socially situated actor, Sen draws on a sociological perspective of the socially situated actor and claims that the utilitarian metrics of desires and preferences are unreliable sources of information in the analysis of people's (dis)advantage due to the social conditioning of people's desires and preferences (Sen 1985a; 1985b; 1987a; and 1990b). However, as some scholars argued (Nussbaum 1987 and Burchardt 2009), this problem is equally applicable to "what people value to be and do", which is one of the central questions in the application of the capability approach. In the face of these criticisms, Sen turns to the abstract economic understanding of the "rational actor" that is detached from the social context and proposes that we should explore whether people's values are "reasoned" or not. However, this proposal continues to overlook the fact that people's reasonings are also social products and shaped

by their social conditions as well. Second, the chapter also addressed such partial use of sociological analysis in Sen's criticism of the Rawlsian metric of social justice (centred on equality in the holding of primary goods). Sen criticizes Rawls' proposition, claiming that it neglects the "inter-individual" diversity that leads to variation in people's conversion of primary goods into the achievement of the good life (Sen 1990a: 120-1; 1992: 85; and 2009: 260-2). But, when asked what these diversities might be, Sen only provides vague and abstract categories and does not sufficiently discuss how and why people's various diversities (such as the gender, age, physical disability, and environmental differences that he frequently addresses while criticising the Rawlsian model of social justice) become an issue in people's conversion of resources. Furthermore, Sen does not clarify what type of influences these diversities can have on people's conversion, which is an important element in capturing the multi-dimensional nature of (dis)advantage. Lastly, the chapter underlined that the capability approach's ultimate concern is not people's achievement, but rather the ability to achieve functionings, which is usually overlooked in applications of the capability approach. As acknowledged by various scholars (see Robeyns 2003, Krishnakumar 2004, Comim 2008, and Walby 2012) including Sen (see Sen 1992: 52), assessing people's (dis)advantage based on their ability to achieve is quite difficult since it requires incorporating, not only achieved functionings, but also counterfactual scenarios and what was available to a person prior to her/his achievement. Therefore, there are only a limited number of works (e.g. Anand and van Hees 2006) that aim to assess (dis)advantage in compliance with the philosophical distinction between the "ability to achieve" and "achievement". We need new analytical perspectives which can incorporate people's ability to achieve when analysing their (dis)advantage.

Discussing these issues, chapter two addressed the need for a more developed sociological perspective in the application of the capability approach and specified the main pillars of such an application. Firstly, we need to identify valuable functionings by exploring and scrutinizing people's reasonings in valuation and the meanings that they ascribe to certain beings and doings by taking greater notice of the social and institutional dynamics which lay behind these reasonings and meanings. Secondly, we need to explore how people's social characteristics turn into conversion factors by examining how the social and institutional configuration of society can lead to variations

between and within people's achievements of functionings. Thirdly, we also need to move beyond the focus on functioning achievement in the analysis of (dis)advantage in order to explore the process of achievement as it informs us about people's ability to achieve.

These three needs informed the selection of research methodology. Chapter three explained the significance of qualitative research methods, particularly in-depth interviews that aim to generate personal narratives in this study. Selection of a qualitative research methodology enabled this research to give people's own voice, feelings, and thoughts a more central place. Employing a qualitative method was a key condition for a sociologically informed application of the capability approach in this study (see also Zimmerman 2006). Generating narratives through in-depth interviews enabled the collection of information concerning how social context and institutional configuration of society influence people's identification of good life and determine their strategies in achieving such life. These issues composed the central concerns of this study, which as previously stated, could hardly be captured through quantitative methodologies that mostly focus on what people say, rather than how they say it, or what they do, rather than how they do it. Participants' narratives have enabled this study to conduct a detailed examination of the influence of various social and contextual dynamics on their valuations and provided information about the formation of their reasonings. For example, it could also be hardly possible to find out that people's reasonings in valuing a being or doing, similar to their values, are also shaped by their constraining conditions. Besides, people's narratives convey meanings that people bring a phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln 2008; Arksey and Knight 1999). This characteristic of narratives was quiet useful in this study to elicit how a social characteristic of a participant is seen by others. Narratives elicited in this study were also needed in order to develop a to develop an in-depth understanding of how conversion factors operate in different contexts, which helped to identify exacerbating and ameliorating roles of people's social qualities. Lastly, since this study aimed to collect information about the process of functioning achievement, employing qualitative strategy to generate narratives was an inevitable necessity (see Ritchie 2003 and Lewis 2003). The significance of the qualitative research methodology in this study appeared more explicitly in the empirical chapters of this study.

Chapter three also explained the rationale behind the sampling strategy and informed about the characteristics of sample in detail. Drawing on previous research in the capability approach and the literature of disadvantage in Turkey, the chapter addressed that gender, religious identity and religiosity, political identity, and ethnicity are four key diversities in Turkey that provides a good empirical case through which to explore the socially embedded and complex nature of the capability paradigm in practice. To explore the role of milieu and varied roles of social dynamics on people's valuation and functioning achievement, this study selected three cities where the dominant characteristics of the social majority contrast with each other. However, this was not sufficient on its own. It was also necessary to pay attention to include participants who have varied conceptions of the good life and whose social characteristics contrast with the dominant characteristics of the social majority in each milieu. Based on these purposes, this study selected Diyarbakir, Konya, and Izmir, which respectively are dominated by Kurdish people (who mostly support dissent Kurdish ethno-political movement), Turkish Sunni-Muslims (who mostly support conservative right-wing ideals), and Turkish less religiously inclined people (who mostly support republican secular values). In these contexts, 41 participants who have significantly different conceptions of the good life were recruited.

Chapter four explored the valuable beings and doings of a sample of 41 people who have varied conceptions of the good life and who live in milieus with contrasting characteristics. This chapter primarily focused on (1) how a sample of people in Turkey talks about the beings and doings that they value, and (2) the way in which social and institutional dynamics influence their valuations. Drawing on participants' narratives, this chapter addressed six key domains of the good life. These six domains are general categories, shared with much of the mainstream literature of the capability approach, and comprise: survival and basic standard of living (e.g. housing, nutrition, health, employment, safety, transport); being knowledgeable (e.g. formal education, cultural activities, intellectual production), personal autonomy (e.g. being free from political or religious coercion), social and legal recognition (e.g. being supported to compensate disadvantage of a person's difference), social bases of valuable relationships (e.g. living in harmony and peace with others, freedom from war), security (e.g. guaranteed sustainability of previous domains of the good life). Whilst the structure of the chapter was organized into six sections, relating to the six domains, the chapter discussed three major themes.

First, chapter four demonstrated that people who have conflicting conceptions of good life can value the same or conflicting functionings. It argued that exploring people's reasonings in such cases can help us to distinguish instrumentally valued functionings from intrinsically valued functionings⁹³ and thus allow us to address the shared valuable beings and doings⁹⁴ of those who have conflicting conceptions of the good life. Given the relative absence of research into people's reasoning, this chapter can be considered as the first attempt to demonstrate the value of exploring people's reasonings in order to identify shared values. Second, the chapter also demonstrates that exploring people's reasonings is not always helpful in the face of the problem of adaptation. This is because there are cases where people's valuations are justified by perverse reasons (such as in the instance of a secular participant who does not want to travel with veiled females since, according to her, "they are stinky", or the example of a Turkish nationalist participant who does not want to live with Kurdish neighbours since, according to her, "they are attacking everyone") (see Section VI). These cases demonstrate the influence of social conditions on people's reasonings and show that Sen's proposal (exploring whether people's valuation is reasoned or not) falls short in dealing with such cases, since he does not identify what qualifies a person's reason as an admissible reason nor does he explain how we should evaluate these reasons. In such cases, the chapter looked at the meanings of these beings (e.g. being a veiled woman or a Kurd) in participants' accounts and addressed the social dynamics (e.g. the polarisation between social groups or the criminalisation of an ethnic identity) that have led people to develop such reasonings. Based on these social dynamics, the chapter addressed socially-valuable functionings (e.g. living in peace and harmony with others). These cases also demonstrate that Sen's proposal (the "scrutiny for reasoned valuation") is insufficient on its own since we still need to scrutinize people's reasoned valuations by taking notice of constrained social conditions. Third, the chapter addressed a number of specific valuations (such as being addressed with the plural form of "you", having the ability to use one's own name, having free transport to school and lunch in schools, travelling in order to make observations on bilingual education, freedom from reciting an anthem, and so forth). These valuations demonstrate that people may value countless beings and

⁹³ e.g. valuation of accessing education as a means to form a true conception of good life (see Section III in Chapter IV).

⁹⁴ e.g. valuation of the veil ban in public institutions and valuation of having a legal recognition for veil wearing in public institutions, both of which are valued based on a need for security (see Section VI in Chapter IV).

doings due to the pervasive negative effects of unjust social conditions (such as inferior image of a religious identity, institutional denial of an ethnic identity, or institutional coercion from adopting a particular religious belonging). By exploring and scrutinizing participants' reasonings as well as interpreting the meanings that they have ascribed to certain beings and doings, this chapter focused on how the sample of 41 participants themselves talked about the beings and doings they valued and explored the underlying social and institutional causes of their specific valuations. Such an approach to participants' valuations led the chapter to depart from those specific and individually-valued functionings towards more general and socially-valued functionings (such as social and legal recognition or the social bases of various forms of valuable relationship). However, such a move would have been arbitrary without a qualitative sociological inquiry which examined in detail people's own accounts of the good life.

Chapter five addressed the issue of functioning achievement. Continuing one of the main argument of this thesis that there is need for a more sociologically informed conceptualization of conversion factors, the chapter primarily focused on two issues: (1) how people's various diversities turn into conversion factors and lead to variation in their functioning achievement, and (2) what roles these conversion factors play in achievement and non-achievements of functionings. Taking four key diversities which represent central social divisions in Turkey, namely gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, and political identity, the chapter examined each in turn to look at how these factors operate within the particular social and institutional configuration of Turkey. This examination demonstrated how these diversities turn into conversion factors depending on the various social and institutional dynamics. For example, the chapter demonstrate that a woman's gender becomes a negative conversion factor due to a prevalent social norm in Turkey that identifies womanhood with domesticity. Similarly, the chapter argued that the Sunni-Muslim religious identity turns into a facilitator in functioning achievement due to institutional favouritism towards Sunni-Muslim religious practices and the prioritisation of functioning achievements of this identity. On the other hand, the chapter also addressed the Kurdish ethnicity as a negative conversion factor in Turkey due to various forms of social and institutional denial of this ethnicity (such as criminalised and stigmatized image of Kurdishness, as well as assimilationist institutional policies). Drawing on participants experiences, the

chapter addressed the right-wing conservative political identity as a privileged identity that facilitates functioning achievement due to state's nepotism towards this identity. It also demonstrated that such nepotism and the privileged status of the right-wing political identity in Turkey leads members of other political identities to form an account of a "disadvantaged self" in which members themselves refrain from attempting to achieve a number of valuable functionings.

Chapter five also discussed how the same conversion factor can play rather different roles in different milieus, and examined the role of social majorities in distinct milieus. The examination of how conversion factors operate in distinct milieus paved the way to develop a more nuanced understanding of the varied roles of conversion factors in people's achievement and led this study to identify two additional roles. The chapter demonstrated that different kinds of conversion factor interact in complex ways. For example, a woman who has a secular conception of the good life can become disadvantaged in a religiously-observant milieu, while her equally secular husband can avoid or lessen the same disadvantage because of privilege of his gender. In the light of such examples, the chapter explored how different conversion factors interact with each other and concluded that a conversion factor can operate to "exacerbate" or "ameliorate" the disadvantage that results from another conversion factor. This concept of "exacerbating" or "ameliorating" conversion factors allowed for a more nuanced understanding of disadvantage by addressing variation within the achievement and non-achievement of functionings.

The sixth chapter of this study was primarily concerned with how we can assess disadvantage based on people's ability to achieve. However, in exploring the consequences of non-achievement, it also addressed the interdependency of functionings and distinguished the problem of adaptive preferences from the concept of "false consciousness". In this chapter, I argued that looking at the process by achievement occurs provides us with greater and crucial information about variation in people's ability to achieve functionings. Drawing on participants' experiences, I demonstrated that due to various social and institutional constraints, some people follow different paths to functioning achievements, where they must struggle and negotiate with additional difficulties that do not apply to those with more privileged social characteristics. In following these different paths, disadvantaged people are required to develop various abilities to compensate for their disadvantages and developing

these abilities also brings extra costs. In terms of outcome, such people manage to achieve functionings, however, the costs of achievement are greater so they can be considered as less “able to achieve”. However, this inquiry has also demonstrated that people’s compensation for their disadvantages can take quite diverse and specific forms and therefore such an inquiry requires a great deal of contextual information as to why some people follow different paths, what difficulties they encounter in these paths, and how they struggle with them. These issues can ideally be identified by qualitative inquiry demonstrating the value of a detailed sociological analysis of the variable nature of meaning and action in specific social contexts. Secondly, this chapter also explored what happens when people cannot ameliorate or compensate for their disadvantages. This inquiry demonstrated that when a person cannot achieve a functioning, the negative effects of such disadvantage tend to spread to other domains of the good life and undermine people’s ability to achieve in these domains too. Thus, based on this investigation, I argued that the non-achievement of various functionings leads to the formation of entrenched and persistent forms of disadvantage. Thirdly, the chapter also explored the preference formation process of those who are constrained in achieving functionings and can neither ameliorate, nor compensate for their disadvantages. This examination confirmed that disadvantaged people adapt their preferences to their straitened conditions. However, the qualitative and contextual examination of how and why people adapt their preferences also demonstrated that disadvantaged people are able to make pragmatic and sophisticated judgements based on their needs. Providing some examples of pragmatic solutions developed by the participants in the face of their disadvantages, I argued that an understanding of adaptive preferences, which implies that disadvantaged people lack the ability to make complex judgements about their material circumstances, is misleading. This is because the adaptation of preferences to constrained conditions occurs, not because disadvantaged people have a false consciousness that makes them unable to see where their true interests lie, but rather because they develop complex and pragmatic survival strategies in the face of their structural constraints. Based on this, the chapter argued that the problem of adaptive preferences is more to do with social and contextual injustices than with people’s lack of ability to make sophisticated judgements. Therefore, I concluded that it is necessary to give more weight to the examination of structural and contextual injustices, and how these injustices lead people to adapt their

preferences, instead of developing normative political accounts of the good life from a perspective that is extrinsic to the lives of disadvantaged people.

In summary, this thesis has demonstrated that although the capability approach provides us with a considerably sophisticated understanding of (dis)advantage, it still has some drawbacks. The thesis argued that these drawbacks are closely associated with the capability approach's partial use of a sociological perspective as a stock of empirical arguments against rival theories of social justice. As a result of such use of sociology, the capability approach has experienced various complications in its interpersonal analysis of (dis)advantage which have also constrained its ability to deal with structural injustices and to provide sufficient information concerning what to do to change the status quo. In order to overcome its constraints in dealing with structural injustices, this thesis has argued that the capability approach needs a more developed and a fuller sociological perspective that enables us to explore (1) how people's reasoning is constructed in relation to various social and contextual conditions, (2) how these conditions turn their various diversities into conversion factors as well as affecting the role of conversion factors, and (3) how these conditions lead disadvantaged people to follow different paths to achievement and so cause variation in their ability to achieve functionings.

Lastly, I wish to address some limitations of this thesis, which might be helpful for future research. It is of course necessary to point out that the findings of this thesis are drawn from a relatively small sample as a part of the necessary size restriction of in-depth qualitative research. Whilst I have attempted to develop a sample with a suitably diverse range of social characteristics drawn from contrasting social milieus, questions of representativeness inevitably will remain. Although this study has focused on four key social diversities (gender, religiosity and religious identity, ethnicity, political identity) and provided a detailed discussion of the influence of these factors on people's functioning achievements, it has left out some important social diversities in its examination. For example, as frequently addressed by Sen (see 1987a: 17, 1992: 20, 1999a: 69) and explored by some scholars (Lloyd-Sherlock 2002, Gilroy 2006, Breheny *et al* 2014), age is an important social diversity. Various empirical works (Arun 2013a, 2013b; Arun and Cakiroglu-Cevik 2013) that focus on older people's quality of life indicate their low-level of achievements *vis-à-vis* other age cohorts in Turkey by employing quantitative methods. Therefore, exploring how age turns into a conversion factor and

leads to variation in functioning achievement can be pointed out as an important area for future research. In addition to this, considering that a significant number of people with physical disabilities cannot achieve numerous basic functionings (Donmez *et al* 2005; Tufan *et al* 2007) in Turkey in spite of various rights and entitlements (see Evsen 2015) that aim to ameliorate their disabilities, it is an urgent requirement to explore why they cannot make use of these rights.

Finally, while analysing disadvantage, this study has maintained a discussion based on the conversion issue and mostly focused on four key factors which did not include “economic status” as a distinct factor (albeit participants’ economic statuses have been vaguely addressed as “poor”, “modest”, or “affluent” throughout the chapters). Of course variation in people’s achievement is still associated with the possession of the necessary economic means (e.g. income) as much as their ability to convert these means into a functioning achievement. After all, if people do not hold the necessary economic means or resources to convert, then their achievement becomes impossible from the start. Yet, a large part of the capability literature fails to highlight the importance of resource ownership for people’s achievement, even though Sen explicitly, albeit very briefly, recognises that some factors (e.g. age and disability) not only constrain people’s conversion of resources, but also reduce their ability to earn these resources (see 2009: 256-7; 1999: 88). This lack of attention to resource ownership in the capability literature may be inevitable since its normative framework has primarily taken shape against the shortcomings of theories of justice that exclusively focus on resource ownership. On the other hand, an empirical application of the capability approach that incorporates the disadvantages arising from variation in holding of economic means can advance our understanding of functioning achievement. As a start, factors that influence people’s achievement and ability to achieve functionings can be taken up as, not only *conversion* factors, but also *acquisition* factors (as in how a religious or ethnic identity can lead to variation in people’s ability to acquire necessary resources). Besides, future research that explores how people’s social diversities operate both as acquisition and conversion factors could provide the capability approach with an opportunity to benefit from the gains of resource-based theories more substantially.

References

- Adler P. A. and Adler, P. (1987): *Membership Roles in Field Research*, UK, Sage Publications.
- Agarwal, B. (2008): "Engaging with Sen on Gender Relations: Cooperative Conflicts, False Perceptions and Relative Capabilities", in: *Arguments for a Better World: Essays on Honour of Amartya Sen*, Edited by K. Basu and R. Kanbur, Oxford University Press, pp: 157-178.
- Akcam, T. (2004): *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism & The Armenian Genocide*, London/New York: Zed Books Ltd.
- Akkoyunlu-Wigley, A. and Wigley, S. (2008): "Basic Education and Capability Development in Turkey", in: *Education in Turkey*, A. Nohl, A. Akkoyunlu Wigley, and S. Wigley (Eds.), Waxmann Publishing, pp: 271-97.
- Allardt, E. (1993): "Having, Loving, Being: An Alternative to the Swedish Model of Welfare Research", in: *The Quality of Life*, Edited by M. C. Nussbaum & A. K. Sen, Oxford Clarendon Press, pp. 88-94.
- Alkire, S. (2002a): *Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction*, Oxford University Press, UK.
- Alkire, S. (2002b): "Dimensions of Human Development", *World Development*, Vol: 30 (2), pp: 181-205.
- Alkire, S. (2005): "Why the Capability Approach", *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 6 (1), pp: 115-33.
- Alkire, S. (2007): "Choosing Dimensions: The Capability Approach and Multidimensional Poverty", in: *The Many Dimensions of Poverty*, N. Kakwani and J. Silber (Eds.), *Palgrave Macmillan*, pp: 89-119.
- Alkire, S. (2008): "Using the Capability Approach: Prospective and Evaluative Analyses". In: *The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures and Applications*, Edited by F. Comim, M. Qizilbash and S. Alkire, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp: 26-51.
- Alkire, S. (2010): "Human Development: Definitions, Critiques, and Related Concepts", Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) Working Paper: 36. Accessed online on 26.04.2015 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815263
- Alkire, S. and Deneulin, S. (2009): "The Human Development and the Capability Approach", in: *An Introduction to the Human Development and the Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin with L. Shahani (Eds.), pp: 22-48, Earthscan, UK.
- Alkire, S., Bastagli, F., Burchardt, T., Clark, D., Holder, H., Ibrahim, S., Munoz, M., Terrazas, P., Tsang, T., and Vizard, P. (2009): *Developing the Equality Measurement Framework: Selecting the Indicators*, Equality and Human Rights Research Report Series, Research Report: 31.
- Alkire, S. Conconi, A., and Seth, S. (2014): "*Multidimensional Poverty Index 2014: Brief Methodological Notes and Results*", The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), Online Resource: <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/Global-MPI-2014-Brief-Methodological-Note-and-Results.pdf>
- Anand, P. and van Hees, M. (2006): "Capabilities and Achievements: An Empirical Study", *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, Vol: 35 (2), pp: 268-84.
- Anand, S. and Sen, A. K. (1994): *Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement*, USA, Human Development Report Office United Nations Development Program.
- Andrews, F. M. and Withey, S. B. (1976): *Social Indicators of Well-Being: American's Perception of Life Quality*, USA: Plenum Press.
- Ardeni, P. G. and Andracchio, A. (2008): "Women and Poverty in Mozambique: Is There a Gender Bias in Capabilities, Employment Conditions and Living Standards?", in: *The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, and Application*, Comim, F., Qizilbash, M. and Alkire, S. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, pp: 510-60.
- Argyle, M. and Martin, M. (1991): "The Psychological Causes of Happiness", in: *Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, F. Strack, M. Argyle, and N. Schwarz (Eds.), UK and US: Pergamon Press, pp: 77-100.
- Arksey, H. and Knight, P. (1999): *Interviewing for Social Scientists*, UK, Sage Publications.

- Arun, O. (2013a): "International Spotlight: Developing a Gerontological Social Policy Agenda for Turkey", *The Gerontologist*, Vol: 53(6), pp: 891-7.
- Arun, O. (2013b): "Ageing in Turkey: The Peter Pan Syndrome?" in: Troisi, J. and von Kondratowitz, H. J. (Eds.), *Ageing in the Mediterranean*. UK: Policy Press.
- Arun, O. and Cakiroglu-Cevik, A. (2013): "Quality of Life in an Ageing Society: A Comparative Analysis of Age Cohorts in Turkey", *Zeitschrift für Gerontologie und Geriatrie*, Vol: 46 (8), pp: 734-9.
- Arthur, S. and Nazroo, J. (2003): "Designing Fieldwork Strategies and Materials", in: *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, J. Ritchie and J. Lewis (Eds.), Sage Publications, UK, pp: 109-37.
- Anand, P., Hunter, G., Carter, I., Dowding, K., Guala, F., Van Hees, M. (2009): "The Development of Capability Indicators", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 10 (1), pp: 125-52.
- Andrews, A. P. (1989): *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, P. A. Andrews with the Assistance of R. Benninghous (Eds.), Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert.
- Arends-Kuenning, M. and Amin, S. (2001): "Women's Capabilities and the Right to Education in Bangladesh", *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol: 15 (1), pp: 125-42.
- Aydemir, E. (2011): "Evlilik mi Evcilik mi? Erken ve Zorla Evlilikler: Çocuk Gelinler", *International Strategic Research Organization*, Report No: 11-08, www.usak.org.tr
- Aydinligil, S. (2009): "Gender Policy in Turkey", in: *An Introduction to the Human Development and the Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin with L. Shahani (Eds.), pp: 304-11, Earthscan, UK.
- Baylies, C. (2002): "Disability and the Notion of Human Development: Question of Rights and Capabilities", *Disability & Society*, Vol: 17 (7), pp: 725-39.
- Bayir, D. (2013): "Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol: 35 (1), pp: 116-42.
- Bentham, J. (2005 [1789]): *An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation*, J. H. Burns & H. L. Hart (Eds.), Oxford University Press, UK.
- Benaquisto, L. (2008): "Open Coding", in: *The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, L. M. Given (Eds.), USA, Sage Publications, pp: 582-3.
- Bergstrom, G. (2012): "Capabilities for Education, Work and Voice from the Perspective of 'the Less Employable' University Graduates", *Social Work and Society*, Vol: 10 (1).
- Berlin, I. (1969): *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press, UK.
- Biswas-Diener, R. and Diener, E. (2001): "Making the Best of a Bad Situation: Satisfaction in the Slums of Calcutta", *Social Indicators Research*, Vol: 55 (3), pp: 329-52.
- Bourdieu, P. (1985): "Social Space and the Genesis of Groups", *Theory and Society*, Vol: 14 (6), pp: 723-44.
- Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, J. D. (2002 {1992}): "Sociology as Socioanalysis", in: *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, P. Bourdieu and J. D. Wacquant, USA, Polity Press in Association of Blackwell Publishers Ltd. pp: 62-75.
- Braybrooke, D. (1987): *Meeting Needs*, USA, Princeton University Press.
- Bryman, A. (2004): *Social Research Methods*, 2nd Edition, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bryman, A. (2012): *Social Research Methods*, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press.
- Breheny, M., Stephens, C., Henricksen, Stevenson, B., Carter K., and Alpass, F. (2014): "Measuring Living Standards of Older People Using Sen's Capability Approach: Development and Validation of the LSCAPE-24 (Living Standards Capabilities for Elders) and LSCAPE-6", *Ageing and Society*, First view Article, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0144686X14001160>.
- Bruinessen, V. M. (1992): "Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Refugee Problems", in: *The Kurds A Contemporary Overview*, P. G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl (Eds.), London: Routledge, pp: 26-52.

- Burchardt, T. (2006): "Foundations for Measuring Equality: A Discussion Paper for the Equalities Review", ESRC Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.
- Burchardt, T. (2009): "Agency Goals, Adaptation and Capability Set", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 10 (1), pp: 3-19.
- Burchardt, T. and Vizard, P. (2007): "Definition of Equality and Framework for Measurement: Final Recommendations of the Equalities Review Steering Group on Measurement", Paper 1, ESRC Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE. Received from: <http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7119306.pdf>
- Burchardt, T. and Vizard, P. (2011): "Operationalising the Capability Approach as a Basis for Equality and Human Rights Monitoring in Twenty-First Century Britain", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 12 (1), pp: 91-119.
- Burchardt, T. (2014): "Deliberative Research as a Tool to Make Value Judgements", *Qualitative Research*, Vol: 14 (3), pp: 353-70.
- Boran, P., Gokcay, G., Devocioglu, E., and Eren, T. (2013): "Cocuk Gelinler - Child Brides", *Marmara Medical Journal*, Vol: 26, pp: 58-62.
- Bonvin, J. and Farvaque, N. (2005): "What Informational Basis for Assessing Job-Seekers?: Capabilities vs. Preferences", *Review of Social Economy*, Vol: 63 (2), PP: 269-89.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984 [2010]): *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Translated by Richard Nice, Routledge, UK.
- Campbell, T. (2010): *Justice*, Palgrave Macmillan, UK.
- Carkoglu, A. and Toprak, B. (2007): *Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey*, Tesev Publication, Turkey.
- Chiappero-Martinetti, E. and Salardi, P. (2008): "Well-being Process and Conversion Factors: An Estimation", Human Development, Capability and Poverty International Research Centre Working Paper Series 3/2008, Accessed online on 19.05.2015 from <http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ssChiappero-Martinetti-Salardi-2008.pdf>
- Clark, D. A. (2002): *Vision of Development, A Study of Human Values*, Edward Elgar, UK.
- Clark, D. A. (2009): "Adaptation, Poverty and Well-Being: Some Issues and Observation with Special Reference to the Capability Approach and Development Studies", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 10 (1), pp: 21-42.
- Clark, D. A. (2013): "Creating Capabilities, Lists and Thresholds: Whose Voices, Institutions and Value Judgements Count", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 14 (1), pp: 172-84.
- Clark, D. A. and Qizilbash, M. (2008): "Core Poverty, Vagueness and Adaptation: A New Methodology and Some Results for South Africa", *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol: 44 (4), pp: 519-44.
- Chambers, R. (1995): "Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts?", *Environment and Urbanization*, Vol: 7 (1), pp: 173-204.
- Chambers, R. (1997): *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last*, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Chambliss, D. F. and Schutt, R. K. (2013): *Making Sense of the Social World, Methods of Investigation*, 4th Edition, Sage Publication.
- Chiappero-Martinetti, E. (2008): "Complexity and Vagueness in the Capability Approach: Strengths or Weakness?", in: *The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures and Applications*, Edited by F. Comim, M. Qizilbash and S. Alkire, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp: 268-309.
- Cummins, R. A. (1996): "The Domains of Life Satisfaction: An Attempt to Order Chaos", *Social Indicators Research*, Vol: 38 (3), pp: 303-28.
- Comim, F. (2008): "Measuring Capabilities", in: *The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, and Application*, Comim, F., Qizilbash, M. and Alkire, S. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, pp: 157-200.
- Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. (2008): *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 3rd Edition, USA: Sage Publications.

- Crocker, D. (2007): "Deliberative Participation in Local Development", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 8 (3), pp: 431-55.
- Conradie, I. and Robeyns, I. (2013): "Aspirations and Human Development Interventions", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 14 (4), pp: 559-80.
- Dang, A. (2014): "Amartya Sen's Capability Approach: A Framework for Well-Being Evaluation and Policy Analysis?", *Review of Social Economy*, Vol: 72 (4), pp: 460-84.
- Davitt, T. E. (1968): *The Basic Values In Law: A Study of the Ethico-legal Implications of Psychology and Anthropology*, US: American Philosophical Society.
- Dean, H., Bonvin, J., Vielle, P., and Farvaque, N. (2005): "Developing Capabilities and Rights in Welfare-to-Work Policies" *European Societies*, Vol: 7 (1), pp: 3-26.
- Dean, H. (2009): "Critiquing Capabilities: The Distractions of a Beguiling Concept", *Critical Social Policy*, Vol: 29 (2), pp: 261-78.
- Deneulin, S. (2002): "Perfectionism, Paternalism and Liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum's Capability Approach", *Review of Political Economy*, Vol: 14 (4), pp: 497-518.
- Deneulin, S. (2005): "Promoting Human Freedoms under Conditions of Inequalities: A procedural Framework", *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 6 (1), pp: 75-92.
- Deneulin, S. (2006): "Necessary Thickening: Ricoeur's Ethic of Justice as a Complement to Sen's Capability Approach", in: *Transforming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin, M. Nebel, and N. Sagovsky (Eds.), Springer, Netherlands, pp: 27-46.
- Deneulin, S. (2009a): "Advancing Human Development: Values, Groups, Power and Conflict", *WeD Working Paper*, 09/49. Received from <http://www.welldev.org.uk/wed-new/workingpapers/index.html>, on 30.05.2015.
- Deneulin, S. (2009b): "Part II: Religion", in: *An Introduction to the Human Development and the Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin with L. Shahani (Eds.), pp: 261-71, Earthscan, UK.
- Deneulin, S. and McGregor, A. (2010): "The Capability Approach and the Politics of a Social Conception of Well-Being", *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol: 13 (4), pp: 501-19.
- Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2008): "Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research", in: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.) 3rd Edition, Sage Publication, USA, pp: 1-43.
- Derrida, J. (1985): "Des Tours de Babel", Translated by Joseph F. Graham, in: *Difference in Translation*, J. F. Graham (Eds.), Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp: 165-207.
- Dreze, J. and Sen, A. K. (2002): *India: Development and Participation*, Oxford University Press, UK.
- Donmez, L., Gokkoca, Z., and Dedeoglu, N. (2005): "Disability and Its Effects on Quality of Life Among Older People Living in Antalya City Center, Turkey", *Archives of Gerontology and Geriatrics*, Vol: 40 (2), pp: 213-23.
- Doyal, L. and Gough, I. (1991): *A Theory of Human Need*, US: Guilford Press.
- Egdell, V. and McQuaid, R. (2014): "Supporting Disadvantaged Young People into Work: Insights from the Capability Approach", *Social Policy & Administration*, DOI: 10.1111/spol.12108.
- Eide, P. J. (2008): "Recruiting Participants", in: *The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, Lisa M. Given (Eds.), USA, Sage Publications, pp: 744-6.
- Elliot, J. (2005): *Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, UK, Sage Publications.
- Elster, J. (1982): "Sour Grapes Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants", in: *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Edited by A. K. Sen and B. Williams, Cambridge University Press.
- Elster, J. (1985): *Sour Grapes*, Cambridge University Press.
- Ertem, M. (2008): "Opinions on Early-Age Marriage and Marriage Customs among Kurdish-Speaking Women in Southeast Turkey", *Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care*, Vol: 34 (3), pp: 147-52.

- Erdemir, A., Korkmaz, C., Karacali, H., Erdem, M., Weitzhofer, T., and Bespinar, U. (2010): *Turkiye'de Alevi Olmak*, Turkey, Mattek Matbaacilik Bas. Yay. Tan. Tic. San. Ltd. Sti.
- Ergener, R. (2002): *About Turkey: Geography, Economy, Politics, Religion and Culture*, USA, Pilgrims Process Inc.
- Ergil, D. (2000): "The Kurdish Question in Turkey", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol: 11 (3), pp: 122-35.
- Evans, P. (2002): "Collective Capabilities, Culture, and Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol: 37 (2), pp: 54-60.
- Evsen, M. (2015): "Disability Rights in Turkey: Time for Change", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol: 13 (4), pp: 165-71.
- Feldman, S. and Gellert, P. (2006): "The Seductive Quality of Central Human Capabilities: Sociological Insights into Nussbaum and Sen's Disagreement", *Economy and Society*, Vol: 35 (3), pp: 423-452.
- Finch, J. (1984): "It's Great to Have Someone to Talk to: The Ethics of Interviewing Women", in: *Social Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice*, C. Bell and H. Roberts (Eds.), UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Finnis, J. (2011 {1980}): *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, 2nd Edition, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Fisher, W. (1987): *Human Communication as Narration*, South Carolina University Press, USA.
- Fleming, K. E. (2008): *Greece: A Jewish History*, USA, Princeton University Press.
- Frediani, A. A. (2010): "Sen's Capability Approach as a Framework to the Practice of Development", *Development in Practice*, Vol: 20 (2), pp: 173-187.
- Fukuda-Parr, S. (2003): "The Human Development Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen's Ideas on Capabilities", *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 9 (2-3), pp: 301-17.
- Fokuo, J. K. (2009): "The Lighter Side of Marriage: Skin-Bleaching in Post-Colonial Ghana", *African and Asian Studies*, Vol: 8 (1-2), pp: 125-46.
- Ibrahim, S. (2014a): "Introduction: The Capability Approach: From Theory to Practice – Rationale, Review and Reflections", in: *The Capability Approach from Theory to Practice*, S. Ibrahim and M. Tiwari, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, pp: 1-28.
- Ibrahim, S. (2014b): "The Dynamics of the Collective Agency in Practice: Women's Fight against the FGM in Upper Egypt", in: *The Capability Approach from Theory to Practice*, S. Ibrahim and M. Tiwari, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, pp: 52-72.
- Ilkharacan, P. (1998): "Exploring the Context of Women's Sexuality in Eastern Turkey", *Reproductive Health Matters*, Vol: 6 (12), pp: 66-75.
- Galtung, J. (1980): *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*, US: Free Press.
- Gambetti, Z. (2009): "Decolonising Diyarbakir: Culture, Identity, and Struggle to Appropriate Urban Space", in: *Comparing Cities: The Middle East and South Asia*, K. A. Ali and M. Rieker (Eds.), Karachi, Oxford University Press, pp: 97-129.
- Gambetti, Z. and Jongerden, J. (2015): *The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: A Spatial Perspective*, (Eds.), Routledge.
- Gascoigne, S. and Whiteside, N. (2009): "The Promotion of Capabilities in Sweden: A Case Study of the Contraction of Shipbuilding in Gothenburg", *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol: 29 (11-12), pp: 587-99.
- Gasper, D. (1997): "Sen's Capability Approach and Nussbaum's Capabilities Ethic", *Journal of International Development*, Vol: 9(2), pp: 281-302.
- Gilroy, R. (2006): "Taking a Capabilities Approach to Evaluating Supportive Environments for Older People", *Applied Research in Quality of Life*, Vol: 1 (3-4), pp: 343-56.
- Grasso, M. (2002): "A Dynamic Operationalization of Sen's Capability Approach", The University of Milan, Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, No: 59, November 2002. Accessed online on 05.11.2014, from https://boa.unimib.it/retrieve/handle/10281/22985/29429/A_Dynamic_Operationalization_of.pdf

- Greco, G.; Skordis-Worrall, J.; Mkandawire, B; and Mills, A. (2015): “What is a Good Life? Selecting Capabilities to Assess Women’s Quality of Life in Rural Malawi”, *Social Science & Medicine*, Vol: 130, pp: 69-78.
- Griffin, J. (1986): *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance*, UK, Clarendon Press.
- Gunes, C. and Zeydanlioglu, W. (2013): *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and Reconciliation*, (Eds.), UK, Routledge.
- Gunaratnam, Y. (2003): *Researching Race and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge and Power*, London: Sage Publications.
- Gubrium, J. F. and Holstein, J. A. (2009): *Analysing Narrative Reality*, USA: Sage Publications.
- Guvenc, M. (2011): “Construction of Narratives of Kurdish Nationalism in the Urban Space of Diyarbakir, Turkey”, *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, Vol: 23 (1), pp: 25-40.
- Hamilton, L. (2003): *The Political Philosophy of Needs*, US: Cambridge University Press
- Harries, B. (2012): *Talking Race in Everyday Spaces of the City*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis written in the University of Manchester.
- Hertz, R. (1996): “Introduction: Ethics, Reflexivity and Voice”, *Qualitative Sociology*, Vol: 19 (1), pp: 3-9.
- Hill, M. T. (2003): “Development as Empowerment”, *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 9 (2-3), pp: 117-35.
- Him, M. S. and Gunduz-Hosgor, A. (2013): “An Implication of Health Sector Reform for Disadvantaged Women’s Struggle for Birth Control: A Case of Kurdish Rural-Urban Migrant Women in Van, Turkey”, *Health Care for Women International*, DOI: 10.1080/07399332.2013.827196.
- Hume, D. (2006 [1751]): *An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals*, Tom L. Beauchamp (Eds.), Oxford University Press, UK.
- Hunter, M. (2007): “The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and Inequality”, *Sociology Compass*, Vol: 1 (1), pp: 237-54.
- Hollywood, E., Egdell V., and McQuaid, R. (2012a): “Addressing the Issue of Disadvantaged Youth Seeking Work”, *Social Work and Society*, Vol: 10 (1).
- Hollywood, E., Egdell V., McQuaid, R., and Michel-Schertges, D. (2012b): “Methodological Issues in Operationalising the Capability Approach in Empirical Research: an Example of Cross-Country Research on Youth Unemployment in the EU”, *Social Work and Society*, Vol: 10 (1).
- Holmwood, J. (2013): “Public Reasoning without Sociology: Amartya Sen’s Theory of Justice”, *Sociology*, Vol: 47 (6), pp: 71-85.
- Hotun-Sahin, N., Timur, S., Berkiten-Ergin, A., Taspinar, A., Akdolun-Balkaya, N., and Cubukcu, S. (2010): “Childhood Trauma, Type of Marriage and Self-Esteem as Correlates of Domestic Violence in Married Women in Turkey”, *Journal of Family Violence*, Vol: 25 (7), pp: 661-8.
- Honneth, A. (1996): *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, UK: Polity Press.
- Honneth, A. (2001): “Recognition or Redistribution: Changing Perspectives of the Moral Order of Society”, *Theory, Culture, and Society*, Vol: 18 (2-3), pp: 43-55.
- Honneth, A. (2004): “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice”, *ACTA Sociologica*, Vol: 47 (4), pp: 351-64.
- Iversen, V. (2003): “Intra-Household Inequality: A Challenge for the Capability Approach”, *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 9 (2-3), pp: 93-115.
- Johnson, M. (2001): *The Art of Non-Conversation: A Re-examination of the Validity of the Oral Proficiency Interview*, USA: Yale University Press.
- Jorgenson, D. L. (1989): *Participant Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies*, USA, Sage Publication.
- Josselson, R. (2006): “Narrative Research and the Challenge of Accumulating Knowledge”, *Narrative Inquiry*, Vol: 16 (1), pp: 3-10.

- Jovchelovitch, S. and Bauer, M. W. (2000): "Narrative Interviewing", in: *Qualitative Interviewing with Text, Images and Sounds*, Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell (Eds.), UK: Sage Publication, pp: 57-74.
- Kaya, N. (2009): "Forgotten or Assimilated? Minorities in the Education System of Turkey", *Minority Rights Groups International Report*, Received from <http://www.minorityrights.org/7732/reports/forgotten-or-assimilated-minorities-in-the-education-system-of-turkey.html> ISBN: 978-1-904584-84-1.
- Kanra, B. (2009): *Islam Democracy and Dialogue in Turkey: Deliberating in Divided Societies*, UK, Ashgate Publishing.
- Khader, S. J. (2009): "Adaptive Preferences and Procedural Autonomy", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 10 (2), pp: 169-187.
- Kieser, H. L. (2006): *Turkey Beyond Nationalism, Towards Post Nationalist Identities*, London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- Klinenberg, E. (2015): *A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago: Heat Wave*, Second Edition, US: The University of Chicago Press.
- Klasen, S. (2000): "Measuring Poverty and Deprivation in South Africa", *Review of Income and Wealth*, Vol: 46, pp: 33-58.
- Klasen, S. and Wink, C. (2003): "Missing Women: Revisiting the Debate", *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 9 (2-3), pp: 263-99.
- Kremakova, M. (2013): "Too Soft for Economics, Too Rigid for Sociology, or Just Right? The Productive Ambiguities of Sen's Capability Approach", *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol: 54 (3), pp: 393-419.
- Krishnakumar, J. (2004): "Going Beyond Functionings to Capabilities: An Econometric Model to Explain and Estimate Capabilities". Received on 03.07. 2015, from http://www.unige.ch/ses/metri/cahiers/2004_12.pdf
- Kawulich, B. B. (2005): "Participant Observation as a Data Collection Method", *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, Vol: 6(2), Art. 43. <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0502430>.
- Kurban, D. and Yegen, M. (2012): *Adaletin Kiyisinda: "Zorunlu" Goc Sonrasinda Devlet ve Kurtler/5233 Sayili Tazminat Yasasi'nin Bir Degerlendirmesi –Van Ornegi*, Turkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etudler Vakfi Demokratiklesme Programi Yayinlari, Istanbul.
- Kynch, J. and Sen, A. (1983): "Indian Women: Well-Being and Survival", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol: 7, pp: 363-80.
- Lane, R. E. (1969): *Political Thinking and Consciousness, The Private Life of the Political Mind*, US: Markham Publications Co.
- Lawler, S. (2002): "Narrative in Social Research", in: *Qualitative Research in Action*, May, T. (Eds.), Sage Publication, UK.
- Leßmann, O. (2012): "Applying the Capability Approach Empirically: An Overview with Special Attention to Labour", *Management Revue*, Vol: 23 (2), pp: 98-118.
- Lewis, F. (2003): "Design Issues", in: *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, J. Ritchie and J. Lewis (Eds.), Sage Publications, UK, pp: 47-76.
- Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2002): "Nussbaum, Capabilities and Older People", *Journal of International Development*, Vol: 14, pp: 1163-73. Published Online in Wiley InterScience, DOI: 10.1002/jid.958.
- Locke, J. (1689 {1956}): *The Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, J. W. Gough (Eds.), Basil Blackwell & Mott, Limited, UK.
- Lukes, S. (1974): *Power: A Radical View*, Macmillan, UK.
- Maines, D. R. (1993): "Narrative's Moment and Sociology's Phenomena: Toward a Narrative Sociology", *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol: 34 (1), pp: 17-38.
- Marshall, G. and Swift, A. (1993): "Social Class and Social Justice", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol: 44 (2), pp: 187-211.

- Marshall, G. (1997): *Against the Odds?*, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Marmot, M. (2004): *Status Syndrome: How your Social Standing Directly Affects Your Health?*, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Mason, J. (1996): *Qualitative Researching*, Sage Publication, UK.
- Mason, J. (2014 [2002]): *Qualitative Researching*, 2nd Edition, Sage Publications, UK.
- Max-Neef, M. (1991): *Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflection*, USA, The Apex Press.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., and Cook, J. M. (2001): "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol: 27, pp: 415-44.
- Menon, N. (2002): "Universalism without Foundation?", *Economy and Society*, Vol: 31 (1), pp: 152-69.
- Merriam, S. B. (2002): "Assessing and Evaluating Qualitative Research", in: *Qualitative Research in Practice, Examples for Discussion and Analysis*, Sharan B. Merriam and Associates (Eds.), Jossey-Bass A Wiley Company, USA, pp: 18-33.
- Merriam, S. B., Johnson-Bailey, J., Lee, M., Kee, Y., Ntseane, G., and Muhamad, M. (2010): "Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and across Cultures", *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, Vol: 20 (5), pp: 405-16.
- Mezarcioglu, A. (2010): *Cingenelerin Kitabi: Tarihi, Sosyolojik ve Antropolojik Bir Kaynak*, Turkey: Cinius Yayinlari.
- Morrow, G. R. (1992): *Proclus: A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements*, Translated by Glenn R. Morrow, US: Princeton University Press.
- Mill, J. S. (1859 {2015}): *On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Other Essays*, M. Philp and F. Rosen (Eds.), UK: Oxford University Press.
- Miller D. (1999): *Principles of Social Justice*, US: Harvard University Press.
- Miller, D. (2002): *Social Justice*, US: Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, C. (2011): *A Narrative Inquiry of Women's Lives in Mugu, Nepal: Identities, Power Relations and Education*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis written in The School of Education, Queen's University Belfast.
- Mishler, E. G. (1986): *Researching Interviewing: Context and Narrative*, USA: Harvard University Press.
- Mohan, E. and Venzant Chambers, T. T. (2010): "Two Researchers Reflect on Navigating Multiracial Identities in the Research Situation", *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, Vol: 23 (3), pp: 259-81.
- Mutlu, S. (1996): "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 28, pp: 517-41.
- Narayan, D., Chambers, R., Shah, M. K., and Petesch, P. (2000): *Crying out for Change: Voices of the Poor*, USA, World Bank Publication/Oxford University Press.
- Narayan, D. and Petesch, P. (2002): *Voices of the Poor: From Many Lands*, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Oxford.
- Naples, N. A. (1997): "A Feminist Revisiting of the Insider/Outsider Debate: The 'Outsider Phenomenon' in Rural Iowa", in: *Reflexivity and Voice*, R. Hertz (Eds.), USA: Sage Publication.
- Navarro, V. (2000): "Development and Quality of Life: A Critique of Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom", *International Journal of Health Services*, Vol: 30 (4), pp: 661-674.
- Nielsen, K. (1977): "True Needs, Rationality, and Emancipation", in: *Human Needs and Politics*, Fitzgerald, R. (Eds.), Australia: Pergamon Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (1987): *Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution*, WIDER Working Papers, WP: 31, December 1987.
- Nussbaum, M. (1995): "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings", in: *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*, Edited by M. Nussbaum and J. Glover, Oxford Clarendon Press, pp: 61-104.

- Nussbaum, M. (1999a): *Sex and Social Justice*, Oxford University Press, USA.
- Nussbaum, M. (1999b): "Women and Equality: The Capabilities Approach", *International Labour Review*, Vol: 138 (3), pp: 227-45.
- Nussbaum, M. (2000): *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (2003a): "Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice", *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 9, pp: 33-59.
- Nussbaum, M. (2003b): "Women's Education: A Global Challenge", *Signs*, Vol: 29 (2), pp: 325-55.
- Nussbaum, M. (2007a): *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Nussbaum, M. (2007b): "Constitutions and Capabilities: Perceptions against Lofty Formalism, Supreme Court Forward 2006", *Harvard Law Review*, Vol: 121, pp: 4-97.
- Nussbaum, M. (2011a): *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Nussbaum, M. (2011b): "Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 12 (1), pp: 23-37.
- Nozick, R. (1974): *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Basic Books Inc., USA.
- Okin, S. M. (2003): "Poverty, Well-being, and Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol: 31 (3), pp: 280-316.
- Oakley, A. (1981): "Interviewing Women - A Contradiction in Terms", in: *Doing Feminist Research*, H. Roberts (Eds.), UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Olesen, V. L. (2000): "Feminisms and Qualitative Research at and into the Millennium, in: *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, N. K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), 2nd Edition, USA: Sage Publications.
- Olesen, V. (2011): "Feminist Qualitative Research in the Millennium's First Decade", in: *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.) 4th Edition, USA: Sage Publication, pp: 129-46.
- Ozkirimli, U. and Sofos, S. A. (2008): *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, Columbia University Press.
- Quillen, C. (2001): "Feminist Theory, Justice, and the Lure of the Human", *Signs*, Vol: 27 (1), pp: 87-122.
- Qizilbash, M. (1996): "Ethical Development", *World Development*, Vol: 24 (7), pp: 1209-21.
- Qizilbash, M. (1997): "A Weakness of the Capability Approach with Respect to Gender Justice", *Journal of International Development*, Vol: 9 (2), pp: 251-62.
- Qizilbash, M. (2002): "Development, Common Foes and Shared Values", *Review of Political Economy*, Vol: 14 (4), pp: 463-80.
- Qizilbash, M. (2006a): "Well-Being, Adaptation and Human Limitations", *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*, Vol: 59, pp: 83-109.
- Qizilbash, M. (2006b): "Capability, Happiness and Adaptation in Sen and J. S. Mill", *Utilitas*, Vol: 18 (1), pp: 20-32.
- Packard, V. O. (1960): *The Waste Makers*, US: D. McKay Co.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002): *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, USA.
- Payne, S. L. (2000): "Challenges for Research Ethics and Moral Knowledge Construction in the Applied Social Sciences", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol: 26, pp: 307-18.
- Pillow, W. (2003): "Confession, Catharsis, or Cure? Rethinking the Uses of Reflexivity as Methodological Power in Qualitative Research", *Qualitative Studies in Education*, Vol: 16 (2), pp: 175-96.
- Phelps, T. G. (2006): "Narrative Capability", in: *Transforming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin, M. Nebel, and N. Sagovsky (Eds.), Springer, Netherlands, pp: 105-20.

- Plummer, K. (1995): *Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social World*, Routledge, UK.
- Polkinghorne, D. E. (1991): "Narrative and Self-Concept", *Journal of Narrative and Life History*, Vol: 1 (2-3), pp: 135-53.
- Ramos, X. and Silber, J. (2005): "On the Application of efficiency Analysis to the Study of the Dimensions of Human Development", *Review of Income and Wealth*, Vol: 51 (2), pp: 285-309.
- Ramsay, M. (1992): *Human Needs and the Market*, UK: Avebury.
- Rankin, B., Ergin, M., and Goksen, F. (2014): "A Cultural Map of Turkey", *Cultural Sociology*, Vol: 8 (2), pp: 159-79.
- Rawls, J. (1985): "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol: 14 (3), 223-51.
- Rawls, J. (1993): *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press, USA.
- Rawls, J. (2001): *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Edited by E. Kelly, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, USA.
- Rawls, J. (2003): *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, USA.
- Ricoeur, P. (1991): "Life in Quest of Narrative", in: *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*, David Wood (Eds.), Routledge, pp: 20-33.
- Ricoeur, P. (2006): "Capabilities and Rights", in: *Transforming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin, M. Nebel, and N. Sagovsky (Eds.), Springer, Netherlands, pp: 17-26.
- Riessman, C. K. (2002): "Narrative Analysis", in: *The Qualitative Researcher's Companion*, A.M. Huberman and M.B. Miles (Eds.), Sage Publication, USA, pp: 216-71.
- Riessman, C. K. (2003): "Narrative Analysis", in: *The Sage Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods*, Vol: 3, M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, and T. Futing Liao (Eds.), USA: Sage Publications, pp: 705-8.
- Riessman, C. K. and Speedy, J. (2007): "Narrative Inquiry in Psychotherapy Professions: A Critical Review", in: *Handbook of Narrative Inquiry: Mapping a Methodology*, D. J. Clandinin (Eds.), USA, Sage Publication, pp: 426-56.
- Ritchie, J. (2003): "The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research", in: *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, J. Ritchie and J. Lewis (Eds.), Sage Publications, UK, pp: 24-46.
- Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., and El am, G. (2003): "Designing and Selecting Samples", in: *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, J. Ritchie and J. Lewis (Eds.), Sage Publications, UK, pp: 77-108.
- Robeyns, I. (2000): "An Unworkable Idea or a Promising Alternative? Sen's Capability Approach Re-examined", Discussion Paper Series 00.30, Leuven, Belgium, Centre for Economic Studies. <https://feb.kuleuven.be/eng/ew/discussionpapers/Dps00/DPS0030.pdf>
- Robeyns, I. (2003): "Sen's Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities", *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 9 (2-3), pp: 61-92.
- Robeyns, I. (2005a): "The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey", *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 6 (1), pp: 93-114.
- Robeyns, I. (2005b): "Selecting Capabilities for Quality of Life Measurement", *Social Indicators Research*, Vol: 74, pp: 191-215.
- Robeyns, I. (2006a): "The Capability Approach in Practice", *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol: 14 (3), pp: 351-376.
- Robeyns, I. (2006b): "Three Models of Education: Rights, Capabilities, and Human Capital", *Theory and Research in Education*, Vol: 4 (1), pp: 69-84.
- Robeyns, I. (2009a): "Capability Approach", in: *Handbook of Economics and Ethics*, Jan Peil and Irene Van Staveren (Eds.), UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp: 39-46.

- Robeyns, I. (2009b): "Equality and Justice", in: *An Introduction to the Human Development and the Capability Approach*, Edited by S. Deneulin with L. Shahani, pp: 101-20, Earthscan, UK.
- Robeyns, I. and Brighouse, H. (2010): *Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities*, H. Brighouse and I. Robeyns (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, UK.
- Robson, C. (2011): *Real World Research*, 3rd Edition, UK, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- Rogowski, R., Salais, R., and Whiteside, N. (2011): *Transforming European Employment Policy: Labour Market Transitions and the Promotion of Capability*, (Eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK.
- Rokeach, M. (1973): *The Nature of Human Values*, USA, Free Press.
- Roller, M. R. and Lavrakas, P. J. (2015): *Applied Qualitative Research Design: A Total Quality Framework Approach*, USA: The Guilford Press.
- Ryff, C. D. (1989): "Happiness is Everything, or Is it? Exploration on the Meaning of Psychological Well-Being", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol: 57 (6), pp: 1069-81.
- Sandbrook, R. (2000) "Globalization and the Limits of Neoliberal Development Doctrine", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol: 21 (6), pp: 1071-80.
- Saracoglu, C. (2010): "The Changing Image of the Kurds in Turkish Cities: Middle-class Perceptions of Kurdish Migrants in Izmir", *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol: 44 (3), pp: 239-60.
- Saracoglu, C. (2011): *Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neo-Liberalism, and Exclusion in Turkish Society*, USA, Tauris Academic Studies.
- Sari, O. (2010): *Tourism as a Tool for Development: The Case of Mawlana Tourism in Konya*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.
- Sayer, A. (2012): "Capabilities, Contributive Injustice and Unequal Division of Labour", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 13 (4), pp: 580-96.
- Schischka, J. Dalziel, P., and Saunders, C. (2008): "Applying Sen's Capability Approach to Poverty Alleviation Programs: Two Case Studies", *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 9 (2), pp: 229-46.
- Schmit, J. (2013): "Public Services in Erfurt and Frankfurt am Main Compared (c. 1890-1914): Capabilities in Prussia?", *Urban History*, Vol: 41 (2), pp: 247-64.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1994): "Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol: 50 (4), pp: 19-45.
- Sen, A. K. (1979a): "Utilitarianism and Welfarism", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol: 76 (9), pp: 463-89.
- Sen, A. K. (1979b): *Equality of What?*, The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University, May 22 1979, Received from http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf, on 06.04.2015.
- Sen, A. K. (1981): "Plural Utility", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol: 81, pp: 193-215.
- Sen, A. K. (1983a): *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement And Deprivation*, Oxford University Press, UK.
- Sen, A. K. (1983b): "Poor, Relatively Speaking", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol: 35 (2), pp: 153-69.
- Sen, A. K. (1985a): *The Standard of Living*, The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Delivered at Clare Hall Cambridge University, March 11-12 1985, Received from <http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/documents/a-to-z/s/sen86.pdf>, on 06.04.2015.
- Sen, A. K. (1985b): "Well-Being, Agency and Freedom", The Dewey Lectures 1984", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol: 82 (4), pp: 169-221.
- Sen, A. K. (1985c): "The Moral Standing of the Market", *Social Philosophy & Policy*, Vol: 2 (2), pp: 1-19.
- Sen, A. K. (1985d): "A Sociological Approach to the Measurement of Poverty: A Replay to Professor Peter Townsend", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol: 37 (4), pp: 669-76.
- Sen, A. K. (1987a): *Commodities and Capabilities*, Third Edition (1999), Oxford University Press, Delhi.

- Sen, A.K. (1987b): *Gender and Cooperative Conflicts*, WIDER Working Papers, Number: 18, United Nations.
- Sen, A. K. (1987c): *On Ethics and Economics*, USA: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- Sen, A. K. (1988): "Freedom of Choice, Concept and Content", *European Economic Review*, Vol: 32, pp: 269-94.
- Sen, A. K. (1990a): "Justice: Means versus Freedoms", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol: 19 (2), pp: 111-21.
- Sen, A. K. (1990b): "Gender and Cooperative Conflicts", in: Irene Tinker, *Persistent Inequalities*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp: 123-149.
- Sen, A. K. (1992): *Inequality Reexamined*, Oxford University Press, USA.
- Sen, A. K. (1993a): "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol: 45 (4), pp: 519-41.
- Sen, A. K. (1993b): "Capability and Well-Being", in: *The Quality of Life*, Edited by M. C. Nussbaum & A. K. Sen, Oxford Clarendon Press, pp. 30-55.
- Sen, A. K. (1997): *On Economic Inequality*, Expanded Edition by James E. Foster and Amartya Sen, Oxford University Press, UK.
- Sen, A. K. (1999a): *Development as Freedom*, Knopf Borzoi Books, USA.
- Sen, A. K. (1999b): "Democracy as a Universal Value", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol: 10 (3), pp: 3-17.
- Sen, A. K. (2000): "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application, and Scrutiny", Office of Environment and Social Development Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers No: 1.
- Sen, A. K. (2002): *Rationality and Freedom*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, USA.
- Sen, A. K. (2004a): "Dialogue: Capabilities, Lists and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation", *Feminist Economics*, Vol: 10 (3), pp: 77-80.
- Sen, A. K. (2004b): *Rationality and Freedom*, US: Harvard University Press.
- Sen, A.K. (2005): "Human Rights and Capabilities", *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 6 (2), pp: 151-66.
- Sen, A. K. (2006a): "Reason, Freedom and Well-Being", *Utilitas*, Vol: 18 (1), pp: 80-96.
- Sen, A. K. (2006b): "Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty", in: *Poverty and Inequality*, D. B. Grusky and R. Kanbur (Eds.), Stanford University Press, USA, pp: 30-46.
- Sen, A. K. (2007): *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, UK: Penguin.
- Sen, A. K. (2008): "The Idea of Justice", *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 9 (3), pp: 332-42.
- Sen, A. K. (2009): *The Idea of Justice*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, USA.
- Sirkeci, I. (2003): *Migration, Ethnicity and Conflict: The Environment of Insecurity And Turkish Kurdish International Migration*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sheffield.
- Smith, A. (2009 [1776]): *An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Digireads.com Publishing.
- Squire, C. (2008): "Experience-Centred and Culturally-Oriented Approaches to Narrative", in: *Doing Narrative Research*, M. Andrews, C. Squire, and M. Tamboukou (Eds.), Sage Publication, UK, pp: 42-64.
- Spector-Mersel, G. (2010): "Narrative Research: Time for a Paradigm", *Narrative Inquiry*, Vol: 20 (1), pp: 204-24.
- Sugden, R. (2006): "What We Desire, What We Have Reason to Desire, Whatever We Might Desire: Mill and Sen on the Value of Opportunity", *Utilitas*, Vol: 18 (1), pp: 33-51.
- Stewart, F. (2001): "Book Review: Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum", *Journal of International Development*, Vol: 13 (8), pp: 1191-2.
- Stewart, F. and Deneulin, S. (2002): "Amartya Sen's Contribution to Development Thinking", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol: 37 (2), pp: 61-70.

- Stewart, F. (2013a): “Nussbaum on the Capabilities Approach”, *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 14 (1), pp: 156-60.
- Stewart, F. (2013b): “Capabilities and Human Development: Beyond the Individual – The Critical Role of Social Institutions and Social Competencies”, United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report Office, Occasional Paper 2013/3. Received from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344469, on: 04.05.2015.
- Swift, A. and Marshall, G. (1997): “Meritocratic Equality of Opportunity: Economic Efficiency, Social Justice or Both?”, *Policy Studies*, Vol: 18 (1), pp: 35-48.
- Taylor, C. (1994): “The Politics of Recognition”, in: *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Amy Gutmann (Eds.), US: Princeton University Press, pp: 25-75.
- Teschl, M. and Comim, F. (2005): “Adaptive Preferences and Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations”, *Review of Social Economy*, Vol: 63 (2), pp: 229-47.
- Tocqueville, A. (1840{2004}): *Democracy in America*, US: Literary Classics of the United States Inc.
- Trahar, S. (2009): “Beyond the Story Itself: Narrative Inquiry and Autoethnography in Intercultural Research in Higher Education”, *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, Vol: 10 (1), Art. 30.
- Tufan, I., Yaman, H., Arun, O. (2007): “Disability in Turkey. Suggestion for Overcoming Current Problems”, *International Social Work*, Vol: 50 (6), pp: 839-46.
- Tufford, L. and Newman, P. (2010): “Bracketing in Qualitative Research”, *Qualitative Social Work*, Vol: 11 (1), pp: 80-96.
- Tiwari, M. (2014): “The Capability Approach, Livelihoods and Social Inclusion: Agents of Change in Rural India”, in: *The Capability Approach from Theory to Practice*, S. Ibrahim and M. Tiwari, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, pp: 29-51.
- Toprak, B., Bozan, I., Morgul, T., and Sener, N. (2008): “Turkiye’de Farkli Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlik Ekseninde Otekilestirilenler”, *Bogazici University Research Projects*, Publication Number: 1025.
- Townsend, P. (1970): “Measures and Explanations of Poverty in High Income and Low Income Countries: The Problems of Operationalizing the Concepts of Development, Class and Poverty”. In: *The Concept of Poverty*, Peter Townsend (Eds.), UK: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., pp: 1-45.
- Townsend, P. (1979): *Poverty in the United Kingdom*, Penguin Books, UK.
- Townsend, P. (1985): “A Sociological Approach to the Measurement of Poverty: A Rejoinder to Professor Amartya Sen”, *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol: 37 (4), pp: 659-68.
- Townsend, P. (1987): “Deprivation”, *Journal of Social Policy*, Vol: 16 (2), pp: 125-46.
- Twine, F. W. (2000): “Racial Ideologies and Racial Methodologies”, in: *Racing Research, Researching Race: Methodological Dilemmas in Critical Race Studies*, F. W. Twine and J. W. Warren (Eds.), USA: New York University Press, pp: 1-34.
- Unterhalter, E. (2003a): “Education, Capabilities and Social Justice”, Background Paper Prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, France: UNESCO.
- Unterhalter, E. (2003b): “The Capabilities Approach and Gender Education: An Examination of South African Complexities”, *Theory and Research in Education*, Vol: 1 (1), pp: 7–22.
- Uyan-Semerci, P. (2004): “Reconsidering the Capability Approach: Poverty, Tradition and Capabilities”, Paper presented at the 4th Conference on the Capability Approach: Enhancing Human Security, Pavia, Italy, 5–7 September 2004.
- Uyan-Semerci, P. (2007): “A Relational Account of Nussbaum’s List of Capabilities”, *Journal of Human Development*, Vol: 8 (2), pp: 203-21.
- Verd, J. M. and Lopez, M. (2011): “The Rewards of a Qualitative Approach to Life-Course Research. The Example of the Effects of Social Protection Policies on Career Paths”, *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, Vol: 12 (3), Art. 15.

- Walby, S. (2012): "Sen and the Measurement of Justice and Capabilities: A Problem in Theory and Practice", *Theory, Culture, and Society*, Vol: 29 (1), pp: 99-118.
- Watts, M. (2009): "Sen and the Art of the Motorcycle Maintenance: Adaptive Preferences and Higher Education", *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, Vol: 28, pp: 425-36.
- Watts, M. (2013): "The Complexities of Adaptive Preferences in Post-Compulsory Education: Insights from the Fable of the Fox and the Grapes", *Journal of the Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 14 (4), pp: 503-19.
- Wilkinson, R. (2001): *Mind the Gap: Hierarchies, Health and Human Evaluation*, US: Yale University Press.
- Wilkinson, R. and Marmot, M. (2003): *The Social Determinants of Health: The Solid Facts*, (Eds.) Denmark: International Centre for Health and Society.
- White, S. (2009): "Part I: Culture", in: *An Introduction to the Human Development and the Capability Approach*, S. Deneulin with L. Shahani (Eds.), pp: 247-60, Earthscan, UK.
- Wolff, J. and de-Shalit, A. (2007): *Disadvantage*, Oxford University Press, USA.
- Wolff, J. and de-Shalit, A. (2013): "On Fertile Functionings: A Response to Martha Nussbaum", *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, Vol: 14 (1), pp: 161-5.
- Yegen, M. (1996): "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 32 (2), pp: 216-29.
- Yegen, M. (1999): "The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol: 34 (4), pp: 555-68.
- Yegen, M. (2004): "Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 40 (6), pp: 51-66.
- Yegen, M. (2007): "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol: 30 (1), pp: 119-51.
- Yegen, M. (2009): "Prospective-Turks or Pseudo-Citizens: Kurds in Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 63 (4), pp: 597-615.
- Young, I. M. (2006): "Public Debate and Social Justice", *Maitreyee Newsletter of the Human Development and Capability Association*, No: 4 (February).
- Yoruk, E. (2012): "Welfare Provision as Political Containment: The Politics of Social Assistance and the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey", *Politics and Society*, Vol: 40 (4), pp: 517-47.
- Zeydanlioglu, W. (2008): "The White Turkish Man's Burden: Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey", in: *Neo-colonial Mentalities in Contemporary Europe? Language and Discourse in the Construction of Identities*, G. Rings and A. Ife (Eds.), UK, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 155-74.
- Zeydanlioglu, W. (2012): "Turkey's Kurdish Language Policy", *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, Vol: 2012 (217), pp: 99-125.
- Zimmermann, B. (2006): "Pragmatism and the Capability Approach. Challenges in Social Theory and Empirical Research", *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol: 9 (4), pp: 467-84.

Reports

- UNDP/UNFPA (2007): "The Dynamics of Honour Killings in Turkey: Prospects for Action", Report prepared by Kardam, F. with Contribution of Alpar, Z., Yuksel, I., and Ergun, E. for UNDP and UNFPA, Received from: <http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/honourkillings.pdf>
- KONDA (2011): Kurt Meselesinde Algi ve Beklentiler, Iletisim Yayinlari. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2011_06_KONDA_Kitap_Basin_Bulteni.pdf
- Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2012): Time for Justice Ending Impunity for Killings and Disappearances in 1990s Turkey, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/03/time-justice/ending-impunity-killings-and-disappearances-1990s-turkey>
- Human Rights Association (2013): "2012 Yili Turkiye Insan Haklari Ihlalleri Raporu", Received from: http://www.ihd.org.tr/images/pdf/2012/ihd_2012_raporu.pdf

Human Rights Association (2014): “2013 Yili Turkiye Insan Haklari Ihlalleri Raporu”, Received from: http://www.ihd.org.tr/images/2014/hd_hlal%20raporu_.pdf

Human Rights Association (2015): “2014 Yili Turkiye Insan Haklari Ihlalleri Raporu”, Received from: <http://www.insanhaklaridernegi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/son-hd-2014-raporu.pdf>

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012): Turkey’s Kurdish Impasse: The View From Diyarbakir, Europe Report No: 222, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2012/europe/turkey-s-kurdish-impasse-the-view-from-diyarbakir.aspx>

The Ministry of Development (2013): Illerin ve Bolgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelismislik Siralamasi Arastirmasi (SEGE 2011) http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/2_turkiye_ab_iliskileri/2_2_adaylik_sureci/2_2_8_diger/tckb_sege_2013.pdf

Yegen, M., Tol, U. U., Caliskan, M. A., Beyaztas, K., Alkurt, S. V., Atalay, E., Ozmus, M. (2015): “Kurt Secmenlerin Oy Verme Dinamikleri: Kuzeydogu-Ortadogu ve Guneydogu Anadolu Alt Bolgelerinde Secmen Siyasal Tercihlerinin Sosyolojik Analizi”, TUBITAK 1001 Project Number: 112K397, Received from, <http://tr.yada.org.tr/uploads/315bf35d666b3e59d77c5dfae4b3c728.pdf>



Appendix A: Interview Schedule

<p>Introduction</p>	<p><i>(In this interview, I want to find out how you feel about some parts of your life; what are the difficult things in your life in areas such as health, education, work, where you live, your income and housing. I am particularly interested in whether or not you are able to do things you personally value and why or why not you can do these things)</i></p>
<p>Demographic</p>	<p>Could you tell me little bit about yourself?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Age 2. Gender 3. Marital Status + (Partner's age) 4. Having children or not <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Their ages b. Their gender c. Their education d. If they work or not 5. Educational Background 6. Employment Status + (Occupation) 7. Where the participants originally from (If s/he has migrated from somewhere) 8. Ethnic Identity 9. Religious Belonging 10. Political Orientation
<p>Housing, Local Area, Municipal Services</p>	<p>(Living in a decent local area and house) Could you tell me a little bit about your house and local area? For example, what are the good and bad things for you in here?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access to educational services 2. Access to health services 3. Access to social opportunities such as cinema, theatre, recreational areas etc. <p>How do you feel about your house? What are the good and bad things about it?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Size 2. Warm 3. Any constructive problem 4. Rented or owned <p>(Being able to choose where to live) Why did you choose to live here? + (When)</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Forced to migrate based on ethnicity, religious belonging or political view 2. Economic difficulties 3. Family ties 4. Marriage <p>(Having good relations with others) How do you feel about people in this neighborhood?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is your social life like? 2. What do you think would make it better or worse? 3. Social and community activities 4. Opportunities to participate community forums

	<p>How do you feel about your freedom and dignity in this neighborhood? For example, do you feel any kind of pressure, discrimination or violence directed by other?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Discrimination and/or exclusion based on gender 2. Discrimination and/or exclusion based on ethnicity 3. Discrimination and/or exclusion based on political view 4. Discrimination and/or exclusion based on religious belonging <p>Do you feel yourself free or restricted in the neighborhood?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What social activity s/he values and cannot actualize 2. What is her/his opinion on why s/he cannot actualize that activity + (ask for an example) <p>(Safety)</p> <p>Do you feel yourself safe in your neighborhood?</p> <p>Any criminal activity she witnessed or heard in her/his neighborhood?</p> <p>How did this make her feel?</p> <p>How does s/he feel now?</p> <p>Do you restrict yourself to do anything because of any safety concern?</p> <p>(Accessing decent municipal services)</p> <p>Are you satisfied about the services provided by your municipality? What are the good and bad things about its services?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Garbage collection services 2. Communication in the local institutions 3. Access to the housing services such as electric, water and gas 4. Transportation opportunities
<p>Health</p>	<p>(Health)</p> <p>Could you tell be a little about your health?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Any illness permanent and temporary (If yes, how does it affect respondent's life?) 2. Where s/he goes for treatment 3. What s/he thinks about the treatment that s/he gets when s/he is ill, is it good enough or not <p>(Health care support)</p> <p>Are you able to take a health care support from public institution when you are ill?</p> <p><u>Prompt</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Whether or not s/he can benefit from universal health coverage of the state (If no, why is that) <p>(Decent treatment in accessing health)</p> <p>When you go to the hospital or health care institution, are you able to explain your problem clearly and treated with dignity?</p> <p><u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Having language barrier 2. Being excluded based on gender

<p>Education</p>	<p>(Schooling) Could you tell me a little bit schooling you have had? <u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Where did you go to school? 2. How old were you when you finished? 3. What was your school like? 4. Did you go to the university? <p>Would you like to spend more time in school or would you like to study something else? <u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Why did s/he not keep going? 2. Why s/he did not choose to study a topic that s/he likes or want? <p>(Children’s Schooling) Are your children, if s/he has, studying? <u>Prompts</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If yes, what are their schools like? 2. What are the good and bad things about their school? 3. Why did you send them that school but not another one? 4. Would you like to send them another school? 5. What about the cost of their schooling? 6. Can you afford them? 7. What do you have to cut back on? 8. If no, why they do not study? <p>(Decent treatment in school) In school, how are you (or your children) treated? What were the good and bad things? <u>Prompts</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">With respect to your religious belonging</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">With respect to your ethnicity</p>
	<p>Income, Employment and Job</p>

	<p>6. Because of his/her religious belonging</p> <p>(Fair job application) Do you think you are fairly treated and assessed when you apply for a job? (Why does s/he think in this way and what has s/he experienced before?)</p> <p>(Social Security Insurance) (If she is employed) Are you registered any social security system? (If s/he is not, why)</p> <p>(Feeling about the job) (If s/he is employed) Are you happy about the job you do? <i>Prompts</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If no, what kind of job s/he would like to have? (and why?) 2. What are the good and/or bad things about your current job? <p>(Trade union membership) (if s/he is employed) Are you a member of any trade union? <i>Prompts</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If no, why? 2. If yes, which trade union? <p>(Being free from discrimination in workplace) (If s/he is employed) Have you ever experienced any discrimination in your work place? + (What was the reason, what and how it happened?) <i>A. Prompts (Reason)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Based on gender 2. Based on ethnicity 3. Based on sexual orientation 4. Based on religious belonging 5. Based on political view <p><i>B. Prompts (Outcome)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Discrimination in terms of promotion 2. Discrimination in terms of payment 3. Discrimination in terms of fringe benefits 4. Discrimination in terms of working conditions
<p>Civic and Political Entitlements</p>	<p>(Having cultural recognition) Are you able to celebrate your traditions and customs? <i>Prompts</i> If s/he is not able to celebrate them</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the restrictions? 2. Why are you restricted to celebrate them? 3. Do you have any concern to celebrate them?

4. Why do you have these concerns?

Do you feel you are free to practice your religion? (If no, why s/he thinks s/he is not free).

(Benefitting from social assistance programs)

Do you take any social relief from the state such as green card support, unemployment insurance etc.?

Prompts for "Yes"

1. What do you take?
2. Since when you have been taking this relief?
3. Does it enough for you? (If no, why is that?)

Prompts for "No"

1. Did you apply for it?
2. Why you cannot take?
3. When you tried to apply, what happened and you could not take?

(Political representation and activities)

Do you think people like you are well represented in national parliament or local municipality?

(If no, what is the reason for this or why s/he feels that s/he is deprived to be well represented)

Do you (or people who are your relatives and/or friends) ever get involved in any political activities such as political party membership, petition campaign, election candidate, demonstration, hunger strike, etc.?

Prompts for "Yes"

1. What was the aim of this political activity?
2. Why is this political objective important for you (them)?

Do you feel free to express your political ideas?

(If no, why s/he thinks s/he is not free or what has s/he experienced before)

Are you able to join in all of the political activities that you value?

(If no, why s/he thinks s/he is not free)

(What kind of obstacles s/he faces when s/he tries to join or actualize those political activities).

(Being free from ill-treatments of the security forces)

Have you ever been stopped to move or taken in custody by police or law-enforcement officer without any warranted reason when you try to actualize these political activities?

(If yes, ask what and how it has happened).

Ending Questions	<p>Apart from the subjects we have discussed on, would you like to add or mention any other important things for you that we have not mentioned?</p> <p>What is the most pressing issue in your life today?</p> <p>What would you like to do today if it was certain that you will not fail to have/do/be it?</p> <p><i>(Thank you very much for sharing your time, opinion and experiences with me. I confirm that the content of this interview and your confidentiality will be treated with care)</i></p>
-------------------------	---

