

ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME

AMERICAN NATION BUILDING: THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN
(2001-2021)

Master's Thesis

Salahuddin SALEHI

Ankara-2023

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

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Salahuddin SALEHI

ÖZ

Ulus inşası, kriz içerisindeki gelişmekte olan ülkeler için modern bir müdahale türüdür. Ulus inşasının amacı, bir tehdidi onarmak, yenilemek veya yok etmektir. Ulus inşası tutku, kaynak ve benzersiz bir yönetim gerektiren uzun bir süreçtir. Afganistan, 11 Eylül'ün ardından uluslararası toplum için bir endişe haline geldi. Ancak Afganistan, ulus inşası için gündemde değildi; daha çok teröre karşı küresel savaşa odaklanmıştı. Afganistan'ın ulus inşası uluslararası topluma empoze edildi ve bu, sürecin toptan çöküşüne katkıda bulunan kilit unsurlardan biri oldu. Bununla birlikte, ulus inşasının ilk yılları Afganlar arasında umut ve iyimserlik yarattı. Afganistan halkı, diğer ülkelerdekiler gibi barış ve itibar içinde yaşamalıdır. Afganistan halkı sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi hayatın her alanında ulus inşasının ilk aşamalarını benimsemiştir. Son olarak, Amerika'nın tahammülsüzlüğü, samimiyetsizliği, plansızlığı, sadakatsizliği, Afgan siyasi sisteminin sakatlığı ve Afganistan'ın geleneksel-kabilevi varlıklarının modern çağa aktarılamaması, isyana karşı bölge ülkelerinin tam desteğine rağmen, sürecin feci bir şekilde çökmesine yol açtı.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Ulus inşası, Afganistan, Taliban, Terörle Savaş, Uluslararası Toplum

ABSTRACT

Nation-building is a modern type of intervention for developing countries in crisis. The goal of nation-building is to restore, fix, or remove a threat. Nation-building is a lengthy process that requires passion, resources, and a unique management. Afghanistan became a concern for the international community in the wake of 9/11, but Afghanistan was not on the agenda for nation-building; it was more focused on the global war on terror. Afghanistan's nation-building was imposed on the international community, and it was one of the key elements that contributed to the process's total collapse. However, the early years of nation-building generated hope and optimism among Afghans. Afghanistan's people, like those of other countries, must live in peace and dignity. Afghanistan's people have embraced the initial stages of nation-building in all spheres of social, economic, and political life. Finally, American intolerance and lack of intention, lack of policy and commitment, and the disability of the Afghan political system and the lack of transferring Afghanistan's traditional and tribal entities to modern ones, as well as full support from regional countries against the insurgency, led to a catastrophic collapse of the process.

Keywords: Nation-building, Afghanistan, Taliban, War in Terror, International Community.

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INTRODUCTION

9/11 marked a new phase in Afghanistan's destiny. Following the Al Qaida attacks in U.S., the U.S. government intended to invade Afghanistan. The United States sought to eradicate Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. Therefore, on October 7, 2001, the sky of Afghanistan was filled with the sound of aircraft and the rays of cluster bombs aimed at Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban government military positions. Al-Qaeda facilities were bombed in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Prior to the attack on Afghanistan, the U.S. asked the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden, the responsible figure in the 9/11 attacks; in response, the Taliban refused to hand over their financial partner (Osama) to the U.S. In return, the Bush administration planned to remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which it called "Operation Enduring Freedom" in U.S. military parlance (Stone, 2002, p. 208).

The U.S. offensive in Afghanistan was backed by the ground support of the National Resistance Front (NRF), and financial support from many NATO countries and Afghanistan's neighboring countries such as Pakistan. Within a couple of weeks, on November 12, the NRF, entered Kabul and the Taliban regime collapsed around the country. The Taliban and Al-Qaida leaders left the country and fled to Pakistan; later, the leader of Al-Qaida was killed by American marines in Pakistan, and as well, the leader of the Taliban died in the hospital in Karachi, Pakistan (Khan, 2015, p. 12)

As the Taliban's defeat became clear, diplomatic efforts were launched to establish a postwar government in Afghanistan. The Bonn accord was the initial step of nation-building in Afghanistan and was later followed by many international and regional conferences in the past two decades. The Bonn conference, which was held on December 5, 2001, structured the foundational elements of nation-building in Afghanistan. The Bonn Accord initiated the process of state-building. It laid down guidelines and timetables for governmental operations. Deadlines were set for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, the formation of a constitutional commission, the writing of a constitution, and the holding of elections (Rubin, 2004, p. 168).

The Bonn Agreement, commonly known as the Bonn Accord, laid the groundwork for the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. It created a series of nation-building measures, including a six-month interim government, the emergency Loya Jirga (great council) to form a two-year transitional government, and the constitutional Loya Jirga for drafting a new constitution for a permanent government (Rubin, 2004, p. 168). By making ill-considered and hasty policy decisions, the U.S. has wrecked Bonn's potential for peace and nation-building from the start. Afghanistan in 2021, two decades after the beginning of nation-building, fails to provide adequate public goods, earns less than \$2 per day, its cities face water and electricity shortages, and its economy is declining (Khurasani, 2023, p. 46). According to the arguments of this thesis, the lack of coordination within and between various U.S. bureaucratic departments hindered nation-building efforts and extended the Afghanistan conflict. This argument will be tested by examining the domestic and international deficits in Afghan nation-building.

Despite objections from several members of the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2004, the United States supported the formation of a very centralized unitary state (Rubin, 2004, p. 169). Rubin, a well-known Afghan expert who took part in the Bonn and Loya Jirga procedures, claimed that the Taliban was to blame for the civil war. A few representatives of other ethnic groups joined the majority of Pushtun delegates in their support for a presidential system. Non-Pushtun delegates, on the other hand, strongly want a parliamentary system. Both sides combined legitimate public concerns with ethno political goals in their arguments. In addition, centralized types of government favored some Afghan technocrats, particularly those who had lived and studied in the West, to participate in state-building efforts. It may be argued that in a failed state with few human capital resources, it is vital to seek out and provide assistance to competent individuals. However, these "talented technocrats" were directed and steered by the U.S. foreign policy machinery the majority of the time. In contrast, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continued to pay and assist regional strongmen, or warlords in Western parlance, in order to secure their help in the search for al-Qaeda remnants (Sreedhar, 2001, p. 1063). These two contradictory policy options pitted technocrats and strongmen against one another, which had a deleterious effect on state building. The many U.S. agencies had diverse interests, agendas, narratives, and perspectives on Afghanistan's state-

building. There were constant disagreements between the State Department, Defense Department, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), implementers of the 3Ds (diplomacy, defense, and development) of the U.S. Foreign Policy apparatus, regarding project lengths, workforces, and resource allocation (Keane & Diesen, 2015, p.205). In light of this, Kohn (2002, p. 22) asserts that in the previous nine years, civil and military relations have deteriorated to a degree that American history has never seen during times of peace. According to military historian Kohn (2002, p. 22), Rumsfeld and other civilian commanders were allegedly dissatisfied by the military's seeming lack of vision throughout the Afghanistan war; in response, at least one four-star officer accused Rumsfeld of "micromanagement." In addition, conventional views of military professionalism, notably, notably the officer corps' ethical and professional standards, have been shifting away from concepts and behaviors that allow civil-military collaboration, which is another indication of impending conflict. Therefore, the failure of the United States in Afghanistan was due to the absence of coordinated and unified state-building initiatives, which came from the continued bargaining of U.S. foreign policy apparatuses.

The primary objective of this thesis is to address the question, "How did the nation-building process in Afghanistan fail, and what elements contributed to its failure?" The inquiry intends to examine the arguments, which strives to evaluate how a nation-building process supported by almost all nations of the globe ultimately resulted in its complete collapse. The objective is to observe the participation of local and foreign actors in the nation-building process in Afghanistan.

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, the first of this thesis's three chapters, "Nation-Building," will explain what that term means. This thesis reviews the history, concepts, tactics, and effective ways of performing nation-building in a fragile or failing state, with an emphasis on how and why nation-building came to be included in the foreign policy of the world's leading powers. In addition, this chapter proposes necessary standards for equitable nation-building.

The second chapter is covering the nation-building activities in Afghanistan over the last two decades. It is broken into three sections to provide a clear picture of what has been done in Afghanistan under American occupation. The second part will discuss the nation-building activities from the Bonn agreement until 2004, the Hamid

Karzai administration (2004-2014), and lastly, the nation-building initiatives during President Ashraf Ghani's term from 2014 until his escape on August 15, 2021. During the study, five indicators of nation building will be observed: the political system, the security issues, economic efforts, social developments, and diplomatic efforts.

The last part of the thesis presents findings about the most essential aspects of nation-building in Afghanistan. Much time and energy are spent depicting the issues, whether they are attributable to internal factors like Afghanistan's political system or constitution, corruptions, wrong policies, and mismanagement, or external ones like the United States and other nations in the nation-building process.



CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF NATION-BUILDING

This chapter gives an introduction to nation-building. It provides a fundamental intro to nation-building themes such as conceptualization, historical context, objectives, and principles, as well as practical methods for achieving nation-building success in fragile or failed states.

1.1. Conceptualization of Nation-Building

There is a substantial quantity of literature on nation-building in Afghanistan with interchangeable names like nation-building, state-building, and peace-building. It involves scholarly writings, articles, newspapers, and interviews. Nation-building is a truly multidisciplinary topic that attracts consideration and debate from fields such as the social sciences, international relations, security studies, economics, anthropology, political science, and international development, among others. Representatives from all of these areas also meet and work together to look into difficult nation-building problems. Therefore, it is not possible to consistently define and allocate a cohesive perspective on state-building to a certain field.

When reading about nation-building for the first time, it is essential to recall Max Weber's concept of the state, which is as fully articulated as a Western or Weberian form of state. Weber defines a state as "*a human society that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in a certain territory*" (Drechsler, 2023, p. 109). Equally relevant to the issue of state-building is Charles Tilly's (1975) theory "war produced the states and state made the war." Similar to the majority of other social science topics, there is no unanimity over the definition of state-building. State-Building (Fukuyama, 2004), Nation-Building (Wimmer, 2020), Peace-Building (Paris, 2002 & Rubin, 2006), Democratization (Dobbins, 2003), and Stabilization (Rubin, 2006) are among the words found in the literature.

As Francis Fukuyama asserts, State-Building is "the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). He argued that weak and fragile states are both a national and an international issue that needs to be tackled through State-building (Fukuyama, 2006, p.3). On the one hand, those states struggle to provide their citizens with the expected services (such as health, education, security, the rule of law, and construction). On the other hand, equally it poses a threat to the developed world much more directly

(Fukuyama, 2006, p. 4). State fragility is a major threat that must be handled via the (re)construction of government structures and the development of capabilities. According to the OECD (2010), fragile states refer to the types of state institutions that lack the three elements of power, capability, and legitimacy, and are thus unable to deliver vital public services and governance to its people (OECD, 2010). By developing a distinct methodology, the German Institute for Development identified three types of fragile states: "failed" states (extremely low levels in all three dimensions), "weak" states with multiple challenges (mostly very low levels of capacity but also relatively low levels of authority and diverse in legitimacy), and "challenged performers" (declining capacity and high levels of violence) (Gravingholt, Leininger, Haldenwang, & German Development Institute, 2012). Ultimately, nation-building is the result of state fragility.

Some authors use the terms "nation-building" and "state-building" interchangeably, while others have wholly distinct meanings. Nation-building is defined by Goldsmith as "the creation of a single national identity within a certain geographical region, on the basis of shared language and culture" (Goldsmith, 2007, p. 26). State-building is consequently a "central trait" of nation-building, which Goldsmith describes as "the construction of efficient organs of central authority" in order for the state to "create recognized and effective public institutions to execute policy" (Goldsmith, 2007, p.27). However, Goldsmith acknowledges that these differences no longer exist in modern discussions of foreign policy. State-building, according to Fukuyama, is concerned with a state's "institutional building projects" or strengthening its "capacity" and functioning (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 4). Mallaby links nation-building with development and contends that nation-building is a byproduct of development strategy and practice (Mallaby, 2002). In the 1980s, the development community started to see the necessity to collaborate with the state, and the 'good governance' agenda was born (Mallaby, 2002).

In her 1999 paper, *Nation Building and State Disintegration*, Ottaway (1999) separated between State-Building and Nation-Building on the basis that State-Building attempts to construct more inclusive democratic political institutions, while Nation-Building seeks to develop a national identity. Nation-building, on the other hand, pushes ethnic nationalist groups to grow more militant and to seek statehood (Ottaway, 1999). The formation of a nation's identity is mostly an internal issue, and

its success relies on the absence of outside interference (Ottaway, 1999). Chesterman argues that the word "nation-building" is wide, ambiguous, and often derogatory (Chesterman, 2003, p.4). It is commonly used interchangeably with state-building, peacebuilding, and stabilization and rebuilding activities. Nation-building, in particular, is sometimes confused with state-building and simply refers to the improvement of a state's capabilities, with or without foreign involvement (Chesterman, 2003, p.4). Chesterman believes that the term "State-building" is more accurate than "Nation-building" because "the focus is on the State (that is, the highest institutions of governance in a territory) rather than the Nation" (a people who share common customs, origins, history, and frequently a common language) (Chesterman, 2003, p.4).

Although state-building and nation-building are often used interchangeably in current debates, they have not always been considered synonymous. To clarify the concept of "nation-building" which is used in a very vague and inconsistent way, we need to make a distinction between the different ways people use the term (Hippler, 2005). In some European perspective it talks about the actual course, description, or analysis of (past or present) historical-social processes, while others use it to talk about a set of goals or political strategies (Hippler, 2005). On the one hand, nation-building is a process of sociopolitical transition that ideally enables originally loosely connected communities to become a common society with a matching nation-state over a longer historical time span. The interplay of political, economic, social, cultural, and other factors may propel such a movement forward. But it's not a given that nation-building initiatives will be successful (Hippler, 2005). Economic and cultural integration, political centralization, bureaucratic control, military conquest or subjugation, the development of shared interests, the spread of democracy, the creation of a common citizenship, repressive measures, and "ethnic cleansing" are just a few examples of the wide range of approaches that can be taken (Hippler, 2005). On the other hand, nation-building may be both a political purpose and a method for achieving certain political objectives. Internal or external actors try to create or shore up a political and social system constituted under a nation-state when this appears to serve their interests, when it satisfies specific functional requirements to a greater extent than a previously existing arrangement, or when it enhances their power or diminishes that of their opponents. In such a setting, the word "nation-

building" has a conceptual or programmatic nature rather than serving to explain or analyze social and political processes (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 5). Either internal actor's endeavor to assert nation-state forms of power, or foreign actors seek the same purpose. In both instances, this may occur for functional reasons, such as enhancing social stability or economic growth chances, but also for the purpose of gaining domination and control in the relevant society. Depending on the political conditions and actors involved, nation-building may be a development or imperial strategy (Hippler, 2005).

In the 1950s and 1960s, Hippler emphasized the tight relationship between nation Building and the modernization philosophy. It was part of the Western plan to limit socialism and the Soviet Union in the Third World during the Cold War. In the 1970s, the phrase "Nation-building" almost fell into obscurity. Politically and intellectually, it fell out of favor due to the Vietnam War, its link to military techniques, and its conceptual relationship with notably violent political methods of "pacifying" the nation (Hippler, 2005). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, State-building was largely missing from policy discussions, which instead centered on minimizing the role of the state and increasing the market (Fukuyama, 2006). Since the early 1990s, the phrase "nation-building" has had a strong resurgence. It was used to explain and justify military involvement in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq. Connected to the notion of 'failed' or 'failing' nations, this term is used to conceal and justify a vast array of policies, enabling foreign powers to dominate and modify countries in war zones (Hipper, 2005).

Fukuyama identified three main stages or features of nation - building. The first applies to governments that have emerged from violent war, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Kosovo, where state authority has entirely crumbled and must be reconstructed from scratch (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 10). It addresses rebuilding after war. The external power must inject security troops, police, humanitarian relief, and technological support to restore electricity, water, banking and payment networks, etc. to maintain short-term stability. If the first phase has been completed effectively, like in Bosnia, the second step is implemented. At this stage, the primary purpose is to establish governmental structures capable of surviving the removal of foreign aid (Fukuyama, 2006). A smooth departure from the nation makes this period intimidating for foreign powers. The third phase, which overlaps substantially with

the second, entails the fortification of weak states in which state power exists in a generally stable form but is unable to carry out some essential state activities (Dodge, 2006, p. 187).

Similarly, Dodge outlined the three distinct phases of state-building as, first, the imposition and subsequent control of coercion; second, a shift from military force to infrastructural power, signifying a transition from coercion to legitimacy; and third, the emergence of a collective civic identity tied to the state (Dodge, 2006, p. 187).

The phrase "outside power" used in the literature might refer to a group of nations, international organizations, or the United Nations. United Nations state-building activities are sometimes referred to as Peace-building. Nonetheless, the OECD noted that the words are distinct and argued that "peacebuilding is about terminating or averting violent conflict and promoting durable peace, while State-building is about developing competent, responsible, responsive, and legitimate governments" (OECD, 2010). Besides, Paris seems to claim that peacebuilding missions serve as a vehicle for the globalization of values and institutions, and that these words are interrelated. Peacebuilding, in his view, is State-building based on the normative premise of liberal democracy and market economy (Paris, 2012, p. 8). Consequently, he said, peacebuilding is about changing norms and ideals into institutions (Paris, 2012, p.8). It is comparable to the "civilizing mission" of colonization (Paris, 2012, p.8). In Lerner's perspective, nation-building is a process of trying to change a traditional society into a modern one (Lerner, 1964). From Connor's point of view, the notion of building a nation originates from the idea of founding a nation, which is completely distinct from the concept of building a state (Connor, 1978, p.305). Building a state is part of the process of administering a state, while building a nation involves developing a nation based on shared principles. Before proceeding, it is necessary to define the concept of nation-building, which stems from the concept of founding a nation. Dobbins, a prominent American diplomat who participated in the nation-building process in many American projects, including Afghanistan, defined nation-building as "the use of armed forces as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the aim of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors" (Dobbins et.al., 2007, p.18).

A growing number of media outlets, academics, and policy analysts have begun to use the phrase "nation-building" to refer to what the U.S. Department of Defense terms "stability operations." So, when people talk about "nation-building," they usually mean "state-building," but it's state-building by an outside party. With the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing nation-building efforts by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a proliferation of similar literature. Particularly, the phrase "nation-building" has been used to describe attempts to construct roads and trains, establish the rule of law, and strengthen a state's infrastructure. A portion of this conceptual expansion is due to hurried definitions. Nation-building is the process of constructing a cultural identity through the definition of narratives, symbols, and shared histories and meanings. Certainly, state-building initiatives may and often do impact the national integration process over the long term, just as existing patterns of national loyalty can aid or impede state-building initiatives. State-building and nation-building are separate conceptual notions but not mutually incompatible (Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 18).

This thesis addresses the term of nation-building as contrasted to state-building. As I am writing about a U.S.-led process, and in all U.S. scientific and policy studies on nation-building, the favored terminology is nation-building not state-building or peacebuilding. In addition, the use of nation-building in the thesis should take into account the second use of nation-building, which is a process which ultimate objectives are to modify, restore, develop, or maintain a regime by an external force.

1.2. Historical Background

The renaissance and subsequent incidents are linked to nation-building; nation-building has become a concept for many countries as European countries reconsider the formation of states based on shared values. However, nation-building as defined has been using as a tool in order to repair or fix a state.

The first step away from a strictly Western and nationalist point of view was made by the communication theorists in the early 1950s; their main goal was to build the nation. They did not believe, like the nationalists did, that there was a nation waiting to be found by a generation of nationalists (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. 18). It is clear that nationalism and the idea of a nation state have been around for a longtime. They

began in Italy after the Renaissance. On the other hand, Western policymakers came up with the idea of nation-building, like the idea of international organizations, in the 20th century.

Historiographically, there are factors that prompted governments to regard nation-building as an alternative to militarism. At the beginning of the previous century, numerous empires, such as the Ottoman and the British, disintegrated into little Asian and African states. Therefore, new independent nations were unable to handle the process of state creation on their own. Second, the two devastating world wars inflicted devastation on numerous European and Asian nations, including Germany, Japan, Korea, and many African nations. It also encouraged nations to draw attention to nation-building programs in an effort to restore administration to failing governments. (Dobbins et al., 2007).

The idea of India as a nation-state, however, was formed by the British during their control, as Sunil Khilnani explains in “The Idea of India”, there are numerous instances of nation-building in colonial empires. The Mogul Empire's authority only extended to a small portion of northern India before the British colonial era, and the rest of the subcontinent was a patchwork of independent princely kingdoms, languages, ethnic groupings, and faiths. It was under British rule that India came to view itself as a single, unified political space (even if that space was carved into Muslim and Hindu areas at partition) and developed a common language, a civil service and bureaucratic tradition, an army, and other institutions that would prove crucial to the development of a democratic India after independence in 1947 (Khilnani, 1997, p. 56).

After the two devastating world wars, however, supreme powers such as the United States of America embraced nation-building ideals in their foreign policy. All activities undertaken following the world wars, particularly World War II, constitute the second phase of nation-building. Post-World War II nation-building in major countries whose governments had fallen, such as Germany and Japan, involved the re-legitimation of the new governments via the creation of democratic constitutions (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 7). As nation-building, which includes rehabilitation and development, as a result, numerous international and non-governmental organizations, such as the World Bank and the Ford Foundation, were involved in nation-building activities in less developed countries, particularly in south Asian

nations such as newly formed India and Pakistan, during the second phase of nation-building. The objective of the private sector was to provide economic and technical training to needy countries (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. 20).

The United States and the Soviet Union, the world's two largest powers at the time, employed nation-building to expand their own spheres of influence as the world decolonized fast during the Cold War. Both parties' efforts had a major ideological aspect. The worsening economic situation in Afghanistan was seen by both competing powers as a leverage zone, and such engagement in Afghanistan was evidence for the use of nation-building as an instrument of influence (Kalinosky, 2012).

After World War II, many nations began the process of rebuilding and restructuring their societies, economies, and governments. This period of time is often referred to as the post-war era, and it saw significant efforts to create stable and prosperous nations around the world (Yunker, 2014). One of the most significant examples of nation-building after World War II was the Marshall Plan. This program, named after U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, provided aid to European countries to help them rebuild their economies after the devastation of the war. The Marshall Plan helped to rebuild infrastructure, create jobs, and modernize industry in countries like Germany, France, and Italy, leading to significant economic growth in the post-war years (Yunker, 2014). In addition to the Marshall Plan, many other efforts were made to rebuild nations after the war. Japan, for example, was occupied by Allied forces and underwent significant reforms to create a democratic government and economy. South Korea also underwent significant nation-building efforts, with the United States providing aid and support to help the country develop its economy and infrastructure.

In their attempts to win over Afghanistan, both superpowers put money into the country's infrastructure and economy. The Afghanistan government at that time, on the other hand, often accepted economic aid from both sides without any thought to the potential negative effects (Cullather, 2002, p. 528). The American government was understandably irritated by the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan, since they held the view that "a country does not embrace technology without ideology" (Cullather, 2002, p. 528). During the Cold War, the United States attempted nation-

building in South Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, and the Balkans in the 1990s. The United States performed effectively in the most of them, although Vietnam and Somalia were very challenging.

In addition to state-level interventions, international organizations like the United Nations have taken up nation-building to strengthen failing nations. Some states' poverty, famine, and insurgencies were increasingly seen as a direct result of a weak central government. The UN Millennium Goals "were developed to help nations prepare for the difficulties posed by issues like poverty and globalization. It said, "Good governance within each nation is crucial to achieving the goals to eliminate hunger and end poverty." (U.N., 2000, P. 4). Transparency and accountability in international monetary, financial, and commercial systems are also essential. The U.N. supported a multilateral commercial and financial system that is open, fair, based on rules, predictable, and nondiscriminatory (U.N., 2000, P.4). The future of the United Nations was seen to lie in bolstering central state capability and the efforts of countries to adopt democratic practices. From the end of WWII forward, the concept of "nation-building" existed; however, its nature and objectives changed throughout time (Smits, 2017, p. 67).

Furthermore, following its defeat in World War II, Japan was occupied by the United States under General Douglas MacArthur's leadership. The U.S. implemented a series of reforms in Japan, including democratic governance, economic restructuring, and social reforms. These efforts helped transform Japan into a democratic, industrialized nation and a key ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region (Dobbins et al., 2008, p.33). The United States provided extensive economic and military assistance to South Korea after the Korean War (1950-1953) to help it rebuild and resist communist threats from North Korea. This assistance played a significant role in South Korea's transformation from a war-torn country to a prosperous, democratic nation and a key U.S. ally in East Asia (Dobbins et al., 2008, p.35).

The United States' involvement in nation building in Vietnam refers to its efforts to support the South Vietnamese government and promote stability, economic development, and democracy during and after the Vietnam War (1955-1975). However, it is important to note that the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was a highly controversial and complex conflict, and its nation building efforts faced significant

challenges and limitations. **Military Intervention:** The U.S. provided extensive military support to the government of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, including troops, training, equipment, and funding. The aim was to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and support the South Vietnamese government's efforts to establish stability and security. However, the war was deeply unpopular both domestically in the U.S. and internationally, and it resulted in significant loss of life and destruction (Dobbins et al., 2008, p.35).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the war on terror, the nation-building process began its third phase. In its early days, the United States of America, which established the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID, played a larger role in the execution of nation-building initiatives. The government of the United States is not the only one that is trying to encourage a more professional approach to the process of nation-building. Recently, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany have all built offices that are quite similar to the one that was formed in the Department of State in order to coordinate their respective nations' role in the post-conflict stabilization and rebuilding process (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 17).

Late in 2005, leaders from across the world convened a summit, at which they reached the consensus that a similar capability should be established at the global level in the form of the peacebuilding commission. The purpose of this new organization is to more effectively integrate the activities of the United Nations and its family of agencies with those of international financial institutions, key donor nations, and troop contributors in the course of carrying out such missions. Even though every country that has to be rebuilt is likely to be different, the person tasked with doing so can only depend on a constrained set of tools (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 19).

1.3. The Objectives of Nation-Building

The countries such as the U.S., the United Nations, as well as an increasing number of private companies and non-governmental organizations are all involved in the process of nation-building in various parts of the world. Each nation-building structure is unique and must be evaluated and handled in a certain way. In the long run, the purpose of a nation-building is to protect the world from the danger posed by

failed or fragile state. But in the short run, the process of building a failed state may cause a lot of problems in the chosen country (Catherine & Dejan, 2008, p. 322).

However, the provision of security is the first objective of nation- building in a country and it is the primary need to secure the country in order to make room for the subsequent actions of nation-builders. The procedure for protecting a nation is quite intricate, and its success might be tied not only to the nation builders but also to the country that is hosting the nation (Doris, 2010). The United States of America didn't manage to make Afghanistan safe until the very last days of its time there. The next phase of nation-building is to provide the host country with a functioning judicial system and the rule of law. These steps occur after the building a country or organization has successfully overcome any security problems.

In the early days after the fall of a failed state or the installation of a new political system, the rule of law is the most important aspect of running a nation. When a country or organization from outside the country gets involved in the government of another country, social justice and a corrupt justice system are two of the main reasons, therefore, the builders' main job is to set up and keep up the judicial system (Doris, 2010). In addition, the successful supply of basic commodities and services will hasten the process and encourage the average citizen of the host country to participate in the nation-building country or organization.

The ultimate objective of American nationalization and nation-building in a nation with less developed economies, like Afghanistan, was to establish a free market and a capitalist economy. As discussed before, spreading democracy is also a motive for western countries to overthrow an existing government and establish a pro-democratic administration. To construct a market-based economy in a less developed country, as the United States did in a number of other nations. Afghanistan must adapt merchants to a new system and finance the market for an extended period of time (Catherine & Dejan, 2008, p. 321). Without the development of political legitimacy, the process of nation-building in a country will not go ahead and will encounter obstacles or collapse. The political system and institutionalism are also significant aspects of nation-building. In the course of the last two decades, the U.S. has been creating its political system. Aside from the problem of national security, this process has not been conducive to effective government. The felines that ran Afghanistan's political system were the primary factor in the country's failed

governance, which led to the country's eventual downfall (Catherine & Dejan, 2008, p. 323).

Last but not least, it is primarily the responsibility of the countries that are doing the building to make decisions regarding the functions of the state. As Doris pointed out, *"the accepted key themes of state function include security and the rule of law; transparent and efficient bureaucratic institutions; the provisions of essential services to the population; the operation of democratic processes and norms; and the fostering of the conditions for market-led development"* (Doris, 2010). As an additional point, Michael Wesley notes the development of a three-phase method in modern state building efforts in Kosovo, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of Congo; Afghanistan, Liberia, and the Solomon Islands. In this initial stage, we will focus on establishing law and order and delivering essential aid to those in need. The second stage is to establish public administration structures that are efficient, open, and effective (Wesly, 1997, p. 37). In lastly, efforts are made to spread democracy, free market, and the rule of law (Wesly, 1997, p. 37).

In the end, Minxi Pe and Sara Kasper note that there are three characteristics that defines nation- building: *"1. the goal of regime changes or the survival of a regime that would otherwise collapse 2. The deployment and long- term commitment of a large number of ground troops to develop stability; and 3. The use of the nation-builder's military and civilian personnel to politically administer target countries"* (Pei & Kasper, 2003, P. 2-3).

Nation building inclusive and exclusive refer to two distinct approaches to constructing or reconstructing a nation. These approaches differ in their emphasis on inclusivity and exclusivity, particularly in terms of how diverse groups within a society are regarded and included or excluded in the nation-building process. (Vanegas, 2007). Inclusive nation building emphasizes establishing a sense of belonging and participation for all individuals and groups within a nation, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, culture, language, or other differences (Vanegas, 2007) To ensure that all members of society have equal access to opportunities, resources, and participation in decision-making processes, inclusive nation building is pursued. It highlights inclusiveness, diversity, and pluralism as characteristics that contribute to a nation's overall cohesion and stability. Building an inclusive nation requires policies and practices that foster social cohesion, respect for diversity, and the

preservation of minority rights. It endeavors to address historical grievances and inequalities by encouraging dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation among various groups. Inclusive nation building acknowledges that a nation is founded on the contributions of all its members and seeks to instill a sense of ownership and pride in diverse communities (Vanegas, 2007). Exclusive nation building, on the other hand, concentrates on advancing the identity and interests of a specific group or groups within a nation, frequently at the expense of others. It is motivated by ideologies such as nationalism, ethnocentrism, or religious fundamentalism and endeavors to prioritize the interests of a dominant group or groups over those of other groups.

Exclusive nation building may entail policies that marginalize or discriminate against minority groups, suppress cultural or linguistic diversity, or prioritize the interests of a specific group in political, economic, or social spheres. Exclusion, discrimination, and polarization among different groups within a society can result in social tensions, conflicts, and even violence as a consequence of exclusive nation building. It can hinder the formation of a national identity that is cohesive and inclusive, and it can contribute to long-term social and political instability.

From the earliest days of nation-building in Afghanistan, the United States focused exclusively on nation-building efforts, which ultimately resulted in a complete failure of the process.

1.4. The Principles of Nation-Building

In the world of academia, the notion of nation-building is full with debate due to the fact that, historically, European intellectuals have placed an emphasis on the term's traditional sense. From their point of view, the process of forming a country is a natural internal process by which a shared community creates a government, which then represents the community as a whole in the international realm (Weber, 1911, p.1). On the other hand, viewpoints that are based in the United States use nation-building with the assumption that a government is incapable of producing an effective administration. So, a government that follows the values of peace and reason needs to be put in place by a power from outside the country.

In the traditional view, nation building is an internal, natural process that is governed by the internal indicators. As highlighted by Max Weber, the first stage in

constructing a country is to create an autonomous power: “A state is a human group that effectively claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a certain region” (Drechsler, 2023, p. 110). This description does not however include the basic characteristics of modern states. A democratic state is founded on more than merely collective security. According to public international law, a nation’s responsibilities extend beyond its domestic concerns. Nonetheless, a state must also consider its international duties while conducting its affairs.

In response to Weber Max, Miller proposes five elements of the states; the first element is consistent with Weber’s conception of the state as having coercive power. The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1651) said in his book *Leviathan* that compulsion ought to be handed to a central power to halt the harsh force of nature (Hobbes, 2017). It was thought that this power would result in a battle of all against all, with people following only their own interests. Second, the state must include a conception of justice. It must appeal to standards on the proper and improper use of government power. It must be able to justify its acts, and its people must recognize its viewpoints. Thirdly, a state must be a provider of goods and services. They should offer the necessary infrastructure and efficiently gather, manage, and expend shared resources. Miller and Moultrie (2013) contend that social contract theory has been more clearly associated with democratic, liberal, and majoritarian systems of governance throughout time (Miller & Moultrie, 2013). Elections may be seen as a reenactment or renewal of the original contract and a way of ensuring real assent to the state’s power, as opposed to hypothetical consent (Miller & Moultrie, 2013). Fourth, the government should understand its economic role. It should gather and use resources efficiently. The greater a nation’s performance in this area, the wealthier its society (Miller & Moultrie, 2013). Fifth, a state must be an instrument that benefits human life. Miller agree that this category is somewhat subjective but argues that “the state is basically a people-regarding organization, thus its quality may be measured in part by how it treats humans and what influence it has on human existence” (Miller & Moultrie, 2013).

In contrast to the traditional view of nation-building, postmodern ideas contested Max Weber’s sovereignty-based theory. In the modern perspective supported by Latham, an Australian ideologist, traditional and contemporary cultures are essentially distinct in nature (Latham, 2011, p. 2). This is a rather traditional

western concept, given that modernization theory has its origins in the enlightenment period. During this period, philosophers often categorized cultures along a spectrum of progress, ranging from barbaric societies to highly civilized ones. The fundamental premise of the idea is that all civilizations would eventually arrive at the same point of modernization although progressing at differing speeds (Latham, 2011, p.2).

Nussbaum (1992) argues that considering just economic issues does not reveal how humane the situations are in reality. Certain elements, like as "access to education, the quality of race and gender relations, and the existence or absence of political freedom," are not directly related to resources (Nussbaum, 1992, P.229). Notwithstanding the subjectivity of this categorization, it is certain that humanitarian considerations have assumed a key position in international politics during the last few decades. The most concrete example is the UN's Responsibility to Protect (R2P) policy, which was implemented in Libya in 2011. R2P is still the subject of heated dispute, but the core concept of giving humanitarian principles a more prominent place in international affairs remains unshaken. Hence, "the R2P is an important normative step away from genocide and crimes against humanity" (Weiss et. al., 2016, p.116).

1.5. Successful Nation- Building

As was previously discussed, the process of nation-building is fraught with difficulties; as a consequence of this, many attempts at nation-building have been unsuccessful in various parts of the world. Because of the irresponsibility of its own nation-builders' governments, the process efforts have failed. Only in a few instances out of numerous efforts were the Americans successful, including Korea, Germany, and a few other countries. However, they faced significant challenges in the rest of the nation-building efforts (Somit & Peterson, 2005, p. 55). In order to be effective, the process of nation-building has to take into consideration the whole process and act appropriately. Dobbins proposes a list of criteria, including "military presence over time by the occupying country," "international police presence over time," "reduc[ing] the number of post-conflict combat-related deaths," "the timing of elections," "the treatment of refugees and internally displaced people," "initial stabilization," "external assistance," "external per capita assistance," "external

assistance as a meaningful percentage of GDP," and "changes in per capita GDP" (Dobbins et al., 2008, p.33).

Also, the people working on building a nation need to be willing to spend a lot more time on the process and put a lot of money into the redevelopment measures (Dobbins et al., 2008, p.33). Building a country is not something that can be accomplished quickly or on the cheap. The condition for democratic nation-building, as defined by Jennings, is that, when a war has ended, security and rule of law must be established (Jennings, 2003, p.5). It includes the blueprints for the indigenous security forces and the authority to arrest, detain, and put on trial in fairways anyone suspected of committing a crime (Jennings, 2003, p.5). The external authority must comprehend the political repercussions of any judgments made, avoid vanity, and not give the appearance of favoring one group over another (the author refers to this as the creation of "informal caste structures"). Dobbins noted that *the builder country sidestep and behave with suspicion toward everyone in the target nation; remove from power those who are intimately affiliated with the overthrown government. Provide financial support for the conception of initiatives that will aid in the restoration of damaged infrastructure and the building of "social capital" in the nation being targeted* (Dobbins et al., 2008, P. 22).

Establishing advisory groups made up of figures in the target nation who were not affiliated with the overthrown administration is the first step in progressively expanding the governing power of the country. Building a country on a short time scale with little resources available significantly increases the likelihood of failure (Somit & Peterson, 2005, p. 56). Finally, for there to be any chance of success, an external power must be ready to invest large financial resources in the process of nation-building. The procedure cannot be carried out "on the cheap," as was previously said. The desired result is that the financial investment will result in economic growth in the target nation, which is capable of supporting itself economically. A losing strategy would be to continually pour funds into a state that is unable to support its own economy. According to the authors, one of the most important things to learn from the process of nation-building in the history of the United States is that there were periods of time when there was no commitment to economic investment (Dobbins et al., 2008).

Paris argues that peacemakers shouldn't hurry towards economic and political liberalization, instead favoring IBL, or institutionalization before liberalization. Instead, they need to focus on restoring their institutions so that they may rest easy. Among the procedures in this process are: "1. waiting till circumstances are suitable for elections to take place" is one of the steps in this process. Build voting procedures that favor centrist parties and candidates. Third, make an effort to build a peaceful society. Stop the spread of hateful rhetoric. Conceive of economic solutions that will lessen the likelihood of war. In a nutshell, fix the broken governmental institutions. (Paris, 2012).

Somit and Peterson (2005) have created the following "checklist" to evaluate the likelihood of successful nation-building: "*1. The desire of "external" forces to invest economic and human resources in the target country A commitment to maintain a military and civilian presence for a prolonged length of time in order to maintain order and enhance the probability of a successful transition. 3. Committed to reducing post-conflict mortality resulting from war 4. An awareness of the culture of the target country and an avoidance of arrogance or the perception of demeaning the institutions and values of the people 5. Restore the infrastructure and human capital of the target nation. 6. Remove from key positions in the target country any individuals with substantial links to the previous government (if the transition involved replacing a regime as opposed to supporting an already existing regime). 7. Understanding that deeply divided communities, whether along racial, religious, or economic lines, reduce the probability of intervention success The interests of foreign countries and local constituencies in the target country must overlap or seem to coincide*" (Somit & Peterson, 2005, p. 56).

CHAPTER 2: DEMOCRATIC NATION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

Many studies have evaluated the failings of U.S. nation-building in Afghanistan. In his book "After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan," James Dobbins, the senior U.S. diplomat in the negotiating process to form a post-Taliban government and the person in charge of the first few months of nation building in Afghanistan, claimed that the Bush Administration, led by neo-conservatives and nationalists, opposed nation building and opposed the deployment of U.S. troops for peacekeeping (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. 12). Dobbins criticized Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his governmental allies for supporting a small footprint and relying on warlords following the overthrow of the Taliban, despite UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi's recommendation that international troops patrol Kabul and other major population centers (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. 12). According to Rashid, Rumsfeld opposed the "Marshal Plan" for Afghanistan and the extension of foreign forces beyond Kabul (Rashid, 2008, p. 167). Rashid wanted more military and development funding. "Afghanistan is not going to be able to pay for its own army for many years, perhaps never," he states (Rashid, 2008, p. 203).

This chapter is focusing on the nation-building efforts in the last past two decades in Afghanistan that conducted by the United States of America and engaged countries of war in terror. The fundamental focus is to look on the nation-building activities from the Bonn agreement until 2004, the Hamid Karzai administration (2004-2014), and lastly, the nation-building initiatives during President Ashraf Ghani's term from 2014 to his escape on August 15, 2021. During the study, five indicators of nation building will be observed: the political system, the security issues, economic efforts, social developments, and diplomatic efforts.

2.1. Afghanistan before 9/11

After several decades, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, brought Afghanistan to political discourse for the majority of people. Before Afghanistan had an impact on western politics, the former Afghan King Amanullah Khan gained independence from the British in 1919 (Ruttig, 2013, p. 1). The Soviet Union's leadership brought Central Asia to the forefront of the last phase of the cold war in the closing days of 1970. The United States took advantage of the opportunity to punish the Soviet Union for its misdeeds during the Vietnam War (Russell &

Khan, 2007, p. 2). However, one aspect of the conflict was overlooked: the domestic factor of the Afghanistan dilemma, which devastated Afghanistan for decades. Mohammad Zahir Shah (8 November 1933–17 July 1973) ruled Afghanistan for the majority of the 20th century, established one of the longest kingdoms in Afghanistan's history. During the latter decade of his reign, he permitted political activity. Consequently, it was a decade for democracy, numerous political groups on the left and right subsequently created political parties, it led to the first coup, headed by his cousin Mohammad Dawood Khan (Ruttig, 2013, p. 1).

The Dawood coups served as a template for a series of violent power changes that finally drew the Soviet Union into the conflict and triggered its military participation six years later (Ruttig, 2013, p. 1). Both the coup in 1973 and the invasion in 1979 were preceded by a series of domestic events that, when combined, exacerbated political tensions. The first internal factor to threaten Afghanistan's political stability was the subtle but deep change in the country's social fabric brought about by the country's educated citizens; the educated youth became a recruitment pool for political activity (Ruttig, 2013, p.2). The 1964 constitutional amendments that replaced an absolute monarchy with a constitutional monarchy were the second internal reason that drew the nation into strife. As a result, political tensions develop as a result of leftist and rightist parties' and legislative changes' greater expectations (Russell & Khan, 2007, p. 5). The military revolution headed by the left-leaning people's Democratic party of the people of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrew Dawood's authority (Ruttig, 2013, P. 3). In the meantime, the United States of America sponsored right-wing groups that were eventually dubbed Mujahiddins, while the Soviet Union learned of American involvement in Afghanistan, in 1979 immediately sent armed forces. The Soviet Union invasion began with the assassination of PDPA president Hafizullah Amin and lasted until 1989 (2013, p.3).

The pro-communist administration was able to stay in power for a few more years after the Soviet Union's withdrew in 1989. The Mujaheddin, backed by both Western and Islamic states, stepped up their assault on Kabul (CPA, 2022). Dr. Najibullah, the pro-Soviet Union president of Afghanistan, abandoned the people and made a failed effort to depart the country when he recognized that he could not protect his administration without Soviet Union backing. When the Mujaheddin

gained control of Kabul in 1992, his military superiors locked him up. As the Mujaheddin groups declared themselves the government in the early days, a civil war broke out amongst them and lasted until the Taliban Movement overthrew them in 1996. Afghanistan's numerous towns and regions fell under Taliban rule for a few years. But in the northern regions, the Taliban ran into trouble and faced resistance from Ahmad Shah Massoud, the defense minister for the Mujaheddin government. The Taliban rose in Kandahar province and spread across the country. Other than Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, the rest of the world did not recognize the Taliban during the four years they were in power in 1996. (CPA, 2022).

During the first years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 1996, they fought against the National Resistance Front of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud, the country's former defense minister. Due to lack of equipment and funds, the Taliban shifted to fundamentalist organizations and welcomed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin. After it, Osama bin Ladin and other terrorist organizations became the Taliban's primary financial backers in Afghanistan (Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 26). In exchange, Afghanistan became a safe haven for extremist organizations' terrorist actions. As a consequence of these operations, there were many assaults against Western and U.S. interests across the world. The National Resistance Front of Afghanistan alerted the United States and other EU countries of a possible terrorist attack, but the United States disregarded the warning. According to the book *After the War Nation Building from FDR to George W. Bush*, Islamic fundamentalist government based on Sharia law was established as a consequence of the Taliban's seizure of Kabul, which demonstrates that the Taliban grabbed control of urban areas and the bulk of the countryside (Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 26).

Women's rights, human rights, freedom, political parties, civil society, and religious freedom were not permitted under the Taliban leadership, and an authoritarian authority dominated the country (Rashid, 2008, p. 136). Politically, when the Taliban came to power in 1996, The Islamic Emirate of Taliban was founded on so-called Islamic rule, which prohibited women from traveling or receiving an education. As the Islamic Emirates of the Taliban were dependent on Al Qaida, the Taliban let Bin Ladin to train and feed his global terrorist organization.

The National Resistance Front (Former Mujaheddin) declared war on the Taliban from the very first days of Taliban role in power. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani commanded the National Resistance Movement. The NRF was the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and all nations except Pakistan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia had diplomatic relations with it. In 2000, one of the NRF's most senior military leaders, Ahmad Shah Masoud, visited Paris and the European Union. On his tour, Obama addressed the European Parliament and characterized the Taliban and Al Qaeda as a worldwide menace to all nations (Rashid, 2008, p. 157)

There was no clear U.S. policy regarding the National Resistance Front, Ahmad Shah Massoud, or the struggle against the Taliban in 1996–2001. Even though Ahmad Shah Masoud has consistently opposed the idea, the U.S. Department of State apparently urged that he turn himself in to the Taliban. In 1998, Analyst Julie Sirrs (1998) from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency visited the NRF regions in an attempt to persuade Ahmad Shah Masoud to negotiate with the Taliban. She informed higher-ups about the Taliban's ties to other global Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaida, as a result of her trip. Nonetheless, this resulted in her dismissal from her position with the U.S. Department of Defense, and her reports were ignored (Jonas, 1998, p. 1).

In April 2001, Ahmad shah Masoud appeared before the Parliament of Europe with the support of lobbying from French and Belgian parliamentarians. There is a chance of an Al Qaida terrorist attack coming on American land, Massoud notified the world but in reaction the U.S. stayed mute to fight against Taliban (Coll, 2004, p. 127). Massoud was assassinated in Afghanistan by the Al- Qaida days commencing assaults against the United States of America.

2.2. Afghanistan's Invasion and the Initial Days of Nation-Building

On September 11, 2001, a terrorist assault occurred that fundamentally changed the shape and substance of American foreign policy. The destruction of the World Trade Center, the destruction of the Pentagon, and the deaths of more than 3,000 Americans required a reaction (Keane, 2016, p. 5). The overwhelming majority of stunned U.S. citizens demanded retaliation from the government and military. In this volatile political climate, President George W. Bush declared the "Global War on Terror" (GWOT), a protracted conflict against an imaginary

adversary (Keane, 2016, p. 5). Less than one month after 9/11, Afghanistan became the first battleground of the GWOT. Al Qaeda, the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group responsible for the attacks, was provided asylum in this area by the Taliban authority. Bush ordered that the Taliban hand up Al Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden; the Taliban's refusal to cooperate led to an American invasion. Under the guise of national self-defense, the U.S. government swiftly mobilized its armed troops for a regime change operation. As the political and military situation changed in the months and years that followed a tremendous military victory, the connections that kept the foreign policy machine together began to disintegrate (Keane, 2016, p. 53).

The United States and its allies misinterpreted and misunderstood the Taliban. The Taliban were not vanquished as a result of the invasion; rather, they were weakened. In 2005, the U.S. military assessed that fewer than one thousand Taliban militants remained in Afghanistan. General Eric Olson, the head of the United States military, characterized them as "a force in decline" (Olson, 2005, p. 12). However, by late 2002, the Taliban has rebuilt and changed their tactics to launch a lengthy struggle (Olson, 2005, p. 12). In addition, the Bush Administration's view of the GWOT promoted the assumption that the Taliban was only a brutal terrorist group with no other objective but to oppress the population (Rashid, 2008, p. 206). The United States proposed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which intended to eradicate Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Dobbins et al., 2003, p.45).

The Bush administration opted to invade Afghanistan because of the 9/11 assaults on American soil. It is well known that the United Nations Security Council approved the American invasion of Afghanistan. By adopting Resolution 1386, the Security Council showed its support for global efforts to eradicate terrorism and expresses its satisfaction with recent events in Afghanistan that have led to the restoration of fundamental freedoms and the guarantee of an environment free from oppression and violence (UNSCR, 2001, p. 2). The American operation started on October 7, 2001, using both NRF ground forces and American airstrikes. Within weeks, the resistance headed by the Taliban collapsed, and a new era began in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, p. 60).

In the early stages of the combat against terrorism in Afghanistan, ensuring that the newly formed government was operating within the law was a top concern.

In the words of Starr (Starr, 2006, p. 120) *"The re-founding of Afghanistan's sovereignty presented itself as a prerequisite for the development of everything else deemed desirable in the political, economic, and social spheres"*. In addition, practical and philosophical considerations appeared to favor this option. On a practical level, there was widespread anxiety that Afghanistan might fragment into independent fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords. Associated with this was the perception that Afghanistan was not really a nation but rather a patchwork of ethnicities patched together by a resourceful but weak monarchy via a system of treaties, all of which had been shattered by a century of fighting (Starr, 2006, p. 120). Theoretically, the history of Europe seems to support this focus on sovereignty. In the seventeenth century in France and the nineteenth century in Germany and Italy, the greatest challenge and call to heroism consisted of establishing national sovereignty and using it to promote national identity. The United States' experience likewise seemed to reinforce the same emphasis on expanding sovereignty, national identity, and legitimacy (Starr, 2006, p. 107). In this manner, the international community spoke with one voice in imposing a centralized government on Afghanistan. Afghan politicians, on the other hand, followed a quite different road map (Shamshad, 2016, p. 189).

The UN Security Council authorized its members to assist Afghanistan in building a legitimate government and eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda from the country. In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council resolution 1386 created a framework for post-conflict international assistance to Afghanistan. The international community chose to build and deploy the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the interim Afghan government in re-establishing national institutions and restoring the economy. With its resolution 1386, the UN Security Council notified the participants of the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan of the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Furthermore, to assist the Afghan people in creating an interim government to defend Kabul and its surrounds so that the Afghan Interim Authority and United Nations soldiers may operate in a secure environment (UNSCR, 2001, p.5).

2.3. The Bonn Accord

The Bonn talks, which culminated in the Bonn Accords in December 2001, created the blueprint for nation-building in Afghanistan after the Taliban's defeat in

2001. After the Bonn Conference, several international conferences and summits have been held over the last two decades. The Accords were drafted by Lakhdar Brahimi, the special representative of the UN Secretary General in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance, the Rome-based party backing ex-King Zahir Shah, and two smaller exiled factions engaged in lengthy negotiations and signed an accord, determined to end Afghanistan's horrific civil war and to promote national reconciliation, stability, and respect for human rights (Sultana & Aquil, 2009, p. 23). Nevertheless, the Americans were the principal decision-makers at this meeting, despite the fact that all parties decided on Abdul Sattar Sirat, a university professor of Uzbek descent, as the temporary leader of Afghanistan in 2001. Yet, the United States persuaded the other delegates to recognize Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan's temporary leader (Sultana & Aquil, 2009, p. 23). The Conference was attended by all nations and organizations, including Afghan elites from the past, the Special Representative of the United Nations to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and representatives from the United States, India, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. The Bonn Conference culminated in the signing of the "Bonn Accord," also known as the "Agreement on Interim Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions" (Bhatia, 2007, p. 95).

The accord reached at the Bonn conference initiated the process of nation-building in Afghanistan. These steps include the establishment of an interim administration, an independent commission for convening the emergency Loya Jirga, and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, in addition to any additional courts that the interim authority, in its capacity as the repository of Afghan sovereignty, would establish (Shamshad, 2016, p. 189). During this transitional period, it will serve as Afghanistan's official representative abroad, liaising with the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as other international organizations and conferences. (loyn, 2022, p. 602). In the recent history of dismal Afghanistan, the Bonn summit stands out as an unprecedented political event. At the time, the deal inspired optimism that the Afghan authorities would now defy all obstacles and lead their nation out of instability (loyn, 2022, p. 602).

The primary goal of the event was to turn war-torn and economically depressed Afghanistan into a democratic nation. On December 22, 2001, Hamid Karzai became the head of the interim administration. It was decided that the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would be sent to strengthen the security of Afghanistan. The international community was also required to contribute humanitarian and economic aid for the country's recovery and restoration (Sultana & Aquil, 2009, p. 24). The Bonn Accord was effective in achieving its principal goal, but it failed to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The United States approached the change of the conflict in Afghanistan via democratic growth and political involvement. To promote political growth, a program of power-sharing among Afghanistan's many ethnic divisions was established. While Afghanistan has experienced a successful power transfer in past years, the general condition of the nation has deteriorated, and the American strategy of power sharing has therefore failed to maintain security in Afghanistan. (Dobbins et al., 2008, p.29).

The summit in Bonn was the ideal international effort for Afghanistan. Apart for the Taliban and the Gulbuddin Islamic party, major political parties were invited to the conference to decide Afghanistan's future government, which provided optimism for Afghanistan's future. The participants agreed on administration's fundamental principles, including the head of government, kinds of government, future action plans, and transferring authority to the Afghan people in the coming years. In addition, the international community committed to send security troops to Afghanistan to ensure its safety. The conference in Bonn was the culmination of diplomatic efforts to lead Afghanistan into a new age. This deal required a transitional government, and Hamid Karzai was chosen to head it. It represented the United Nations, the United States, and other states with an interest in the accord. The deal encountered both internal and international obstacles. First, foreign allies did not meet their pledges, and many nations were not prepared to send additional soldiers to distant locations. Moreover, the United States' intervention in Iraq diverted American attention and economic resources to a new region. This gave the insurgents the opportunity to reorganize and fight against the Afghan government (Coll, 2004, p. 201).

2.3.1. The Emergency Loya Jirga

The intended outcome of the conference in Bonn was the formation of a six-month interim government. The government's principal job was to summon the Loya Jirga to decide the government's fate. By convening local and regional assemblies in the spring of 2002 to choose delegates for the countrywide Loya Jirga, the

Emergency Loya Jirga aimed to ensure the broad and equitable involvement of the Afghan people at all societal levels. In June 2002, the Loya Jirga was attended by more than 1,500 people who were selected using similar procedures at the local level. The Emergency Loya Jirga members were not elected, but the structure of the Loya Jirga was inclusive of all socioeconomic strata. The conclusion of the event was Hamid Karzai's retention as interim president of Afghanistan until the next election. In addition, the Jirga proposed a constitutional Loya Jirga and countrywide elections for the years 2003 and 2004. (Saikal, 2002, p.48).

During the course of seven days, Jirga members deliberated Afghanistan's political destiny and determined that the Karzai administration would administer the country until 2003. While it is evident that Afghanistan is home to a variety of ethnic and cultural groups, the Bonn Accord did not adequately address ethnic issues. Several ethnic groups were not suited to a modern form of governance, since Afghanistan had historically been administered by tribal means. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, proposed that the function of the Emergency Loya Jirga after six months would be to rectify a number of flaws in the interim government elected in Bonn (Akhtar, 2021, p. 1). Prior to 2003, the security issue was not a concern for the government; instead, the focus was on how to quickly construct administrative institutions. The emergency Loya Jirga also considered establishing a constitution writing committee. The goal of this committee was to design a modern and acceptable constitution for Afghanistan's future, and it was the responsibility of the transitional government to convene a Jirga to ratify the constitution (Goodson, 2004, p. 12).

2.3.2. The 2004 constitution of Afghanistan

In 2002, President Karzai formed the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC), marking the beginning of the constitutional drafting process. Karzai promulgated the final version of the Constitution in January 2004. (Shamshad, 2016, p. 189). Shamshad ended the constitution-making process in five phases. *“Stage one includes the appointment of the CDC, which drafted the new constitution's initial draft in March 2003. In September 2003, the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was appointed and tasked with reviewing the CDC text, proposing amendments, and preparing its own draft. The third phase was the creation of a government review committee, which studied, debated, and updated the CRC draft*

before releasing it to the public in November 2003. In the fourth phase, Karzai summoned the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ), which rewrote and ratified the constitution on January 4, 2004. At stage five, a final committee polished the CLJ text, and on January 26, 2004, Karzai promulgated the Constitution” (Shamshad, 2016, p. 189).

In addition, a French constitutional law specialist, Guy Carcassonne, prepared a draft of the constitution. The Karzai team was opposed to foreign interference in the development of the constitution; France's president Jacques Chirac offered technical aid, but Karzai rejected it. This proposal evidently failed to satisfy President Karzai because it did not provide the president adequate authority. Later, Carcassonne produced two further proposals that emphasized presidential powers, but all were rejected by the drafters. The decisions on the form of government (centralized), the national anthem, the flag, the presidential election, parliament, the role of law, separation of powers, and independent commissions were made by the assembly (such as the Independent Human Rights and Election Commissions) (Jirga, 2004, p. 12). A significant number of Afghans and other observers were of the opinion that the most important choices had already been made behind the scenes. The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, had expressed his expectation that the Constitutional Loya Jirga would wrap up its deliberations within the next week to ten days. In addition, the report on Afghanistan's flawed constitutional process that was published by the International Crisis Group in June 2003 covered the time period between the establishment of Afghanistan's Constitutional Drafting Commission in November 2002 and the beginning of the public consultation process that was overseen by the larger Constitutional Review Commission (Jirga, 2004, p. 13). According to the report compiled by the ICG, the Review Commission took the structures suggested in the most recent draft and presented them to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (Shamshad, 2016, p. 206). The report also analyzes the differences between the document that was presented and the one that was produced by the Drafting Commission in the first place. It gives special attention to the proposed constitution's potential to foster inclusive, democratic government and defend human rights topics that are fundamental to the public's adoption of the proposed constitution (ICG, 2004, p. 1). The majority of the participants in the Loya Jirga were chosen from distant locations and were considered to be tribal elders. As a result, the

Loya Jirga was unable to make decisions about modern laws, as proved later (ICG, 2003, p. 1).

The form of governance was the subject that generated the greatest discussion among the attendees. In light of the fact that Afghanistan is home to a diverse collection of tribes and ethnic groups, the majority of those who took part in the discussion advocated for Afghanistan to adopt a government structure that is either parliamentary or federal in nature (Shamshad, 2016, p. 210). Even before to this, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer advocated for the establishment of a federal government in post-conflict nations like Afghanistan. Fischer, noted how they *"had promoted this theory, which fitted so perfectly with the narrative of building a nation in post-World War II Germany"* (Atwood, 2015, p. 22).

The assembly's primary focus was on making a decision about the newly elected government, despite the fact that its members were under to criticism from both the local and foreign communities. The participants reached a consensus over the election that would take place the next year (2004). It was expected that the success of the Loya Jirga would lead to the beginning of a new chapter of nation-building. The nation had decided to proceed with a presidential system of leadership and a centralized government. The United States military and the soldiers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were actively searching for the remaining members of al-Qaeda and Taliban. There were thousands of nongovernmental organizations working on fundamental economic and social development (Starr, 2006, p. 121).

The decisions on the form of government (centralized), the national anthem, the flag, the presidential election, parliament, the rule of law, separation of powers, and independent commissions were made by the assembly (such as the Independent Human Rights and Election Commissions). A significant number of Afghans and other observers were of the opinion that the most important choices had already been made behind the scenes. The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, had expressed his expectation that the Constitutional Loya Jirga would wrap up its deliberations within the next week to ten days. In addition, the report on Afghanistan's flawed constitutional process that was published by the International Crisis Group in June 2003 covered the time period between the establishment of Afghanistan's Constitutional Drafting Commission in November 2002 and the beginning of the

public consultation process that was overseen by the larger Constitutional Review Commission. According to the report compiled by the ICG, the Review Commission took the structures suggested in the most recent draft and presented them to the Constitutional Loya Jirga. The report also analyzes the differences between the document that was presented and the one that was produced by the Drafting Commission in the first place. It gives special attention to the proposed constitution's potential to foster inclusive, democratic government and defend human rights topics that are fundamental to the public's adoption of the proposed constitution (ICG, 2003, p. 2). The majority of the participants in the Loya Jirga were chosen from distant locations and were considered to be tribal elders. As a result, the Loya Jirga was unable to make decisions about modern laws, as shown by the findings of the ICG.

2.3.3. The first presidential election

The election was the final part of the Bonn Accord to transfer authority and legitimacy to the people of Afghanistan, which was stipulated in a road plan for Afghanistan's future. Hence, the world community was determined to elect a legitimate leader (Johnson, 2021, p. 42). As a result, several politicians nominated him or her to be the subsequent president of Afghanistan. A countrywide election for the presidency was agreed upon by the constitutional Loya Jirga to take place in 2004, making it the first direct election to ever take place in the history of Afghanistan. The election process was endorsed in its entirety by the international community, which also actively monitored it (Gannon, 2004, p. 1). In this election, in addition to Hamed Karzai, numerous other political personalities, like Mohammad Younes Qanooni and Mohammad Muhaqeq, nominated themselves for being the president. Also, Mrs. Masouda Jalal was the only female nominee out of the three, and Karzai won the election with a majority of 51% of the vote. Over the course of the last two decades, Afghanistan had three further presidential elections. Both the country as a whole and the various political parties were highly tempted and engaged in heated debate throughout each and every presidential election. The political system, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections, degraded the people's desire for democracy and nation-building. This was one of the many difficulties associated with nation-building (Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 33).

Following the 2004 election, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan arose with three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the parliament. In Afghanistan, elections continue to be a crucial and potent tool for legitimizing a new leadership. However, their credibility is contingent on the establishment of non-electoral measures that increase legitimacy, such as a local civil government, prior to their election. It is quite implausible that incompetent or corrupt administrations can organize credible and legitimacy-fostering elections. Whatever national or international meetings may have installed a pro tempore head of state, the public will assess that leader and his administration negatively if he fails to implement principles of balance and inclusiveness in filling important government posts at all levels. Especially in traditional and nondemocratic countries, the efficiency of representatives of state authority at the most local levels is crucial to the formation of a feeling of the legitimacy of the government among the general people (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 136).

2.4. The Structure of the Government

During the 2004 constitution Loya Jirga, the government's form remained the topic of unresolved political issues. Notwithstanding pre-discussions, however, President Karzai has obligated Jirga members to adopt a presidential system with centralized administration. Thus, the government has operated as a totally presidential system for the last two decades (Fields & Ahmed, 2011, p. 66). As a direct consequence of the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) that took place in 2004, the idea of separation of power was widely acknowledged and adhered to in the country up to collapse of the Republic. The following will provide a quick description of the worldwide initiatives that have been taken to rebuild the following three branches in Afghanistan:

2.4.1. The executive branch

Throughout its history, Afghanistan's political system has been characterized by a weak central government that was either unwilling or unable to impose meaningful financial or executive mandates on all of Afghanistan's distinct ethnic communities or on the eighty percent of the country's population that lives in rural or isolated areas. Ethnic and rural cultures, many of which are separated from one another by mountains and vast lengths of land, have often been analyzed by the

authorities of local factions for their administration of the country. At the same time, there has always been a conflict between urban "modernizers," who tend to have higher levels of education, and rural traditionalists, who are likely to have lower levels of education and are more committed to long-standing customs and practices (Katzman, 2015, p. 33).

A road map for transitioning away from the Taliban was settled upon in the Bonn accord, and it included elected institutions as well as the division of powers. On the other hand, the division of powers was never really put into operation until the fall of the government in 2021. A presidential system was established under the constitution, and an elected president was granted extensive authority (UNSCR, 2001). The President was also given the authority to exercise the ultimate power. Despite this, a large number of political groups advocated for a parliamentary system in place of a centralized government. Article 62 of the constitution stipulates that a person may only serve as president for a maximum of two terms, each of which lasts for a period of five years. In addition to this, the president has two vice presidents, and he or she is responsible for appointing all high-ranking officials, such as members of the cabinet, members of the Supreme Court, governors, judges, and members of independent commissions. The president has complete control over all of these appointments (Jirga, 2022, p. 22).

Following almost four decades of war, the Afghan state is fragmented, national institutions are mostly defunct, and the economy is in ruin. Many of the standards of the community seemed to have changed, and traditional authority was eroded. The country became a ward of the international community at the end of 2001, with the United States taking the lead in safeguarding the new administration from its opponents. Interim leadership, a transitional government structure, and democratic goals made rapid strides forward. By the middle of 2005, Afghanistan had a constitution that was reasonably liberal, a president who had been elected in a legitimate national election, and plans for a parliament that would be elected by the people. Afghanistan's government has grown in size and strength since the fall of the Taliban administration in late 2001, but corruption and ethnic and political disputes among the country's major groups persist to this day. The 2014 and 2019 elections have been dogged by accusations of widespread fraud, leading to political problems (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 160).

The most significant accomplishments of the nation-building process over the last two decades have been the establishment of new administrative entities, the establishment of new administrative authorities, and the diversification of administrative units (Katzman, 2015, p. 56). Nevertheless, the performance of the administrations was undercut by corruption, bribery, and insecurity, and all of this contributed to the downfall of the system (Shamshad, 2016, p. 198). There have been four presidential elections conducted by the executive branch of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; all of the elections have been met with serious charges. Somehow, one of the primary causes of people's disbelief in democracy was the charges connected to the interference of foreigners in the elections (Shamshad, 2016, p. 198). This was one of the key reasons people began to disbelieve in democracy (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 160).

The two contenders in the 2014 election, Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the government's Chief Executive, agreed to amend the president's authority but not to execute it. In the previous two decades, several presidential and parliamentary elections have taken place. Elections are generally seen as a crucial indicator of the durability and scope of Afghanistan's political growth, as well as a barometer for measuring the impacts of factional, political, ethnic, and sectarian disputes (Katzman, 2015, p. 56).

On October 9, 2004, the first direct election in Afghanistan's history took place during the 2004 presidential election. In 2009, Hamed Karzai was re-elected for an additional five years as president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. He was first elected in 2004 with a 55% majority (Shamshad, 2016, p. 215). As in 2014, Karzai was unable to nominate himself, and Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Abdullah Abdullah ran for the presidency. Ghani operated as the state's authoritarian leader from the beginning, ending in the climactic explosion in 2021. The executive branch's most powerful institutions were the president's advisers and chiefs of staff. This agency advised on the majority of presidential proclamations. The next office was the national security council, which was led by the national security adviser, and the office of administration of the presidential palace was the most robust in the executive branch, with many believing that both departments mostly engaged in shadow politics. In the last years of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the

executive branch was thus completely dependent on this office. The ministries were unable to function as a result of these positions (Katzman, 2015, p. 55).

2.4.2. National assembly

According to the constitution that was enacted in Afghanistan in 2004, the National Assembly arrangements of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan were comprised of both the Senate and the Parliament. The Wolesi Jirga, also known as the Chamber of the People, has 259 members, all of whom are chosen by the people, with ten of those seats reserved for Kuchi nomads (“Towards Stability in Afghanistan,” 2004). The upper house of the National Assembly has 102 seats, and those seats are appointed by the president (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). On September 18, 2005, elections for the first session of the National Assembly were conducted (Katzman, 2015). Article 81 of the Constitution lays forth in explicit detail the fundamental responsibility of the parliament. It established the legislative as the most powerful arm of the legislative system and obligated it to look out for the interests of the whole country (Jirga, 2021, p. 22).

In addition, the National Assembly of Afghanistan was accountable for certain responsibilities, such as the *"Modification, ratification abrogation of laws, legislative decrees and state administrative units, approval of the social and state budgets; ratification, modification, or abrogation of laws, legislative decrees, and administrative units, approval of the social and state budgets; permission to obtain or grant loans; and finally, the ratification of international treaties and agreements"* (Jirga, 2022, p. 12). These responsibilities are similar to those held by national assemblies in other parts of the world (Jirga, 2021, p. 22). Article 91 makes clear that the House of Representatives will be responsible for carrying out these particular responsibilities. The House of the People is required to decide on explication sessions for each minister in line with Article 92 of this Constitution; to decide on development projects and the state budget; and to accept or reject nominations in accordance with the requirements of this Constitution. (Jirga, 2022, p. 12).

It's also noteworthy that the executive branch of the Afghan government has been manipulating the parliament's duties right up to the session that just ended. Both Afghan presidents have sought to stir up trouble among lawmakers by filing lawsuits and other legal challenges (Shamshad, 2016, p. 220). While the Afghan parliament

was free to form 15 subcommittees, the primary committee tasked with monitoring the executive branch was not. Also, lawmakers didn't have the right skills, so they focused on running the economy and signing contracts for public works.

As members of parliament, the national assembly of Afghanistan was not responsible to the people since there was no structure to regulate the behavior of MPs, and because MPs were nominated as individuals, they were not responding to the people after the election. Moreover, the 2004 constitution did not recognize party system (Shamshad, 2016, p. 215). Hence, the parliament stage became a political and commercial leverage for the MPs. In the latter years of the Republic, the executive arm of the government corrupted the Afghan Parliament, which lost its role as a watchdog and responsible authority of the government. The government never meant to give parliament members a voice; if a parliament member spoke out against the executive branch or especially regarding the President's authority, the government threatened him or her.

2.4.3. The judiciary and rule of law

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which was adopted in 2004, included provisions for an autonomous judicial system that was to be governed by a nine-member supreme court (Afghanistan's Constitution of 2004, p. 22). The behavior of the Supreme Court justices and the tasks they were responsible for were further specified in the constitution, which also offered direction for how they should be selected. After the nomination of a Supreme Court justice by presidential order, the lower house of the national legislature was authorized. Article 117 of the Constitution states (Jirga, Afghanistan's Constitution of 2004, 2021), the Supreme Court is to be made up of nine members, each of whom must be nominated by the president and get approval by the House of People. In addition, the independence of the Supreme Court is emphasized in Article 116 of the Constitution, which states that "*the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's judicial system shall be a distinct institution*" (Afghanistan's Constitution of 2004, p. 22). The judicial system will be comprised of one Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and primary courts; the legislation will dictate how these courts are organized and the powers they have (Jirga, Constitute, 2022).

The Afghanistan's Supreme Court is the highest court in the country, and it is going to be in charge of all of the judicial power for the state (Saeedi, 2019, p. 67). As a consequence of the government experiencing substantial issues with the justice system, international donors aided the government in increasing the capabilities and competency of the legal system on a statewide scale. This assistance was provided in response to the fact that the judicial system at the outset of the process of nation-building, the Italian government was responsible for overseeing the restoration of the country's judicial system (Katzman, 2015, p. 48). Because of this, over 700 Afghan judges have been given training as part of the "Rule of Law Stabilization Program" run by USAID. This has also enhanced the ability of the Afghan Supreme Court to educate new justices. After July of 2010, a senior officer has been responsible for directing operations at the Rule of Law Directorate located inside the American embassy (Katzman, 2015, p. 48).

Due to the fact that politicians were permitted to reach the highest court, the legal system was often unable to carry out its duty impartially despite the backing of the international community (Reuters, 2007). Saeedi claims that "truly, the court has fostered a culture of appeasing the president by passing verdicts in its favor" and that this has substantially harmed the image of the Supreme Court (Saeedi, 2019, p. 67). In addition to this, there are a number of examples from both former President Ghani and former President Hamid Karzai. In 2007, after the parliament had voted against Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta with a vote of no confidence, Karzai asked the Supreme Court for their judgment on the matter (Reuters, 2007). Almost immediately, the court ruled that the resolution passed by parliament was unlawful and unconstitutional. However, a number of legal professionals questioned the legitimacy of the decision made by the court since it seemed that political considerations were given more weight than legal considerations (Saeedi, 2019, p. 67). Then, in 2009, as Karzai's term was set to expire, the judges stepped in to support him and prolong it, just as they did this year for Ghani, his tenure was extended for another year (Saeedi, 2019, p. 67).

2.5. The Military Reforms of Afghanistan

Security was the primary preoccupation of the international community, especially after the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and drove the Taliban from power. As the terrorist attack unfolded on September 11, 2001, in America, the

president of the United States declared war on terror, deployed troops to Afghanistan, and started a new era for the Afghan people. Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that the primary goal of nation-builders should be to create or protect individuals from potential threats, followed by the establishment of the rule of law and justice in society. In this regard, the American "light footprint" would be especially troublesome, causing the American-led coalition to be unable to guarantee security and enabling other countries to affect the security equation. In Afghanistan, however, too few troops on the ground pursuing an overly narrow mission (winning the global war on terror rather than fostering successful nation-building) allowed multiple warlords, heroin and opium drug runners, the retro- and neo-Taliban, al-Qaeda, and many other Islamist militants, as well as concomitant bribery, to return, survive, or emerge to plague the country. (Goodson, 2006, p. 35)

Throughout the whole of the battle, the American approach focused on minimizing casualties and expenditures. The pursuit of anti-government organizations was the primary objective of the United States administration. The multinational troops went to Afghanistan to combat terrorism and preserve rule of law and security and across the country (UNSCR, 2001). Furthermore, the UNSC decided to send soldiers to Afghanistan because the situation there was worrisome and posed a potential threat to the peace and security of the whole globe. The United Nations Security Council, the Bonn Agreement, and the demand of the North Alliance all worked together to finally make it possible for the U.S. to attack Afghanistan. Throughout the course of the last two decades, Afghanistan has seen the introduction of a wide variety of security policies (Goodson, 2006, p. 37).

The international community's military activities and nation-building efforts will be briefly described in the following sections:

2.5.1. International security assistance force (ISAF)

The United Nations Security Council exerted pressure on the international community to protect Afghanistan by establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As consequence, ISAF stayed in Afghanistan until 2014, almost a decade and half, ISAF, Interim Government of Afghanistan ('Interim Administration'): Military Technical Agreement," 2002, p. 1032). ISAF's primary mission was to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and supervise the

reform of Afghanistan's key government institutions. Nonetheless, it joined the larger fight against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan almost immediately. ISAF's primary mission was to protect Kabul and its surrounding provinces from opposition organizations in order to support the creation of the Hamid Karzai-led Afghan Transitional Authority. (UNSCR, 2001).

In 2003, at the request of the United Nations and the Afghan government, NATO assumed leadership of the operation and began its first deployment outside of Europe and North America. Soon afterwards, the UN Security Council expanded ISAF's security responsibilities outside the capital province. In the aftermath, ISAF engaged in more intense clashes in southern and eastern Afghanistan. ISAF maintained a peak of 400 military headquarters in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2012. (CFC, 2011, p. 19). ISAF welcomed personnel from 42 nations, including personnel from all 30 NATO members. The United States contributed the bulk of troops in 2010, followed by the United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, France, and Italy; Georgia, Denmark, Norway, and Estonia were prominent supporters per population. (CFC, 2011, p. 19)

The fury with which member nations participated in battle varied substantially, with the United States suffering the largest casualties overall, while British, Danish, Estonian, and Georgian troops suffered the most fatalities for their size. For nearly two years, the ISAF rule did not extend beyond Kabul's limits. General Norbert Van Heyst predicted that such a deployment would demand at least 10,000 more troops (Goodson, 2006, p. 22). The freshly rebuilt Afghan National Army was to be in charge of security throughout Afghanistan (Goodson, 2006, p. 22). Furthermore, the German Parliament decided in 2003 to deploy the German Army beyond Afghanistan's capital to the Kunduz region. This was the first deployment of ISAF soldiers outside of Kabul (Prabook, 2005, p. 42)

Long-term objectives included training Afghan security officers directly under the supervision of the international community. Each of the five primary components of the security sector reform (SSR) was once the responsibility of a different donor nation (Prabook, 2005, p. 42). The United States has committed to construct and train a 70,000-man Afghan National Army (ANA), while Germany has assumed the lead in establishing different police forces. Italy has been dependable in revamping the justice ministry; Britain has spearheaded anti-narcotics activities; and

Japan has led the endeavor to challenge private militias via the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program. These programs began gradually, were hampered by insufficient coordination with other pillar-building efforts, and lost momentum at various points due to issues ranging from insufficient remuneration to devotion to regional commanders rather than the state (Fields & Ahmed, 2011).

To develop a trustworthy military force in Afghanistan, the Japanese-sponsored disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program attempted to turn former North Alliance soldiers and former mujahedin combat organizations into peaceful, law-abiding citizens (Goodson, 2006, p. 18). DDR, also known as the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program, began in October 2003, somewhat behind schedule, mostly owing to the resistance of top factional leaders (including former Vice President and Defense Minister Fahim Khan) to agree to the process (Goodson, 2006, p. 19). The too-optimistic aim of completing DDR of all Afghan militia combatants before the elections in October 2004 was not fulfilled, although the pace of DDR accelerated in the second half of 2004 (Goodson, 2006, p. 19). DDR was aided by the humiliation of a number of major warlords, most notably Fahim Khan (who was removed from Karzai's election ticket as vice president) and Ismail Khan (sacked as governor of Herat). Karzai's declaration in June 2004 that warlords were the greatest security danger in Afghanistan and that the new deadline for completing DDR was June 2005 gave DDR a huge boost (Goodson, 2006, p. 19).

Late in 2003, newly-arrived OEF commander Lieutenant General David Barno exemplified the shift in the reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan by implementing a trial program for peacekeepers there. Barno made provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) the backbone of his strategy in Afghanistan, expanding the number of PRTs from four to sixteen in around six months to pacify the countryside and ease rebuilding. These approximately 80-person hybrid military-civilian squads operate from provincial capital bases to secure adjacent communities via military patrols and rehabilitation assistance. PRTs consist of civil affairs professionals and have commanders' spending money. The teams attempt to provide "islands of stability" in which NGOs may function, despite the fact that some NGOs find the PRTs' blurring of conventional civil-military divides unsettling. The effectiveness and efficacy of PRTs have been variable (Goodson, 2006, p. 147).

In August 2003, the NATO assumed leadership of the International Search and Rescue Federation, breaking a trend of a new ISAF leader being appointed every six months. Two months later, the United Nations Security Council enlarged ISAF's mandate to include safeguarding Afghanistan's comparatively tranquil northeastern and north-central regions. Five PRTs are already under NATO command, and NATO countries will take over all PRTs in the north and west, and it is envisaged that they will ultimately assume responsibility for OEF across the whole country. At its Istanbul Conference in June 2004, NATO decided to boost its troops in Afghanistan to 10,000 before the October 2004 presidential election. However, NATO has struggled to locate soldiers and equipment to satisfy its increased Afghan obligations (Atwood, 2015, p. 22).

2.5.2. Afghanistan security forces

Despite the efforts of the Americans, the U.K, Germany, Italy, and Japan the five most influential countries in Afghanistan not all SSR pillars improved throughout the period of rehabilitation and nation-building. The plan from the United States was to create security forces in Afghanistan that would operate under international supervision. The United States is helping the Afghan government so that it can "stand alone," as stated in the counterinsurgency Field Manual (Petraeus, 2007). When everything is said and done, the host country must succeed on its own. This can only be achieved by strengthening the local political and institutional structures. While it may be easier for US military divisions to carry out operations on their own, it is better to endeavor to build regional forces and institutions before aiding them. It is the responsibility of the host nation's government to find solutions to the problems facing the country. At some point, all occupying or invading troops were seen as a threat, therefore "the sooner the principal effort may transfer to host institutions without unbearable degradation, the better" (Petraeus, 2007). The United States of America's first focus was rebuilding Afghanistan's institutions, with the ANA at the center. In the Bonn Agreement, the international community agreed that the new Afghan Army should be ethnically balanced, voluntary, and contain 70000 people (Petraeus, 2007).

After the Bonn Conference, Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed a proclamation reestablishing the Afghan national army. The edict set a cap of 70,000 but then raised it to 300,000. The British Army's first training camp trained the new

Afghan kandak (Battalion) (Goodson, 2006, p. 22). British soldiers taught well but were few. The US may train after much thought. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, had to recruit and train additional kandaks. Afghanistan's institutions fund military training programs. The ANA manages military training, NATO states, including the US, UK, Italy, Turkey, and others, provide military scholarships (Goodson, 2006, p. 22).

The Marshal Fahim National Defense University's Qargha Garrison-based National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) trains officers. The NMAA funded a four-year military and civilian internship program to train future officers. The NMAA taught the ANA's four primary foreign languages. The army collapsed during a Taliban offensive in summer 2021, after the US and its allies left Afghanistan. After President Ashraf Ghani's resignation and Kabul's collapse, ANA troops fled or surrendered to the Taliban. Reports say military remnants created the anti-Taliban NRF of Afghanistan in the Panjshir Valley (Donnell, 2022). The Afghan National Police (ANP) was the multinational coalition forces' second security initiative in the country; at the time, Germany was responsible for the ANP. Due to the extension of the German-led police training, the United States began adopting several police exercise programs in 2003. Preconditions for pervasive police lawlessness include shorter training than the ANA, returning to their regions and towns without embedded coaches (unlike the ANA troops), and being paid significantly less than the ANA soldiers. In Afghanistan, the criminal justice system consisted mostly of law enforcement, courts, and prisons (Cullather, 2002).

The Afghan government's intelligence service is known as the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). For the duration of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police, which consists of the Afghan Border Police and the Afghan National Civil Order Police, had authority over all 34 provinces. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) was in charge of protecting the country's borders with its neighboring nations and its international airports. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) were tasked with maintaining peace and safety in major cities by patrolling the streets and responding to emergencies like bomb threats and stabbings (Travis, 2022). The Afghan National Police (ANP), a branch of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, supervises ANCOP in the same way that

the Afghan Border Police (ABP) did. There were five separate brigades under ANCOP's leadership. Specifically, these battalions were posted in the cities of Kabul, Paktia, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif. The bulk of the police force of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was trained by the United States and other NATO countries. It was in 2003 that NATO's ISAF was given authority over areas outside of Kabul. When ISAF troops didn't deploy to a territory, local militias took control and remained militarily strong until they were disarmed via UN initiatives. The United States Army, in coordination with the Department of State and other allies, took over most police development in 2007. This entails overseeing a variety of tasks, including drafting, training, and function management. The United States military, primarily the National Guard and other components, have begun advising the Afghan police at all levels of authority (Goodson, 2006, p. 147).

2.6. Economic Development

In spite of this, Afghanistan has a protracted history of both internal and external conflicts. As a consequence of this, the primary concern of donors was how to bring international aid into the country, which was operating without a central government, while minimizing the likelihood that aid would be squandered due to corruption, favoritism, or incompetence. In addition, Afghanistan's economy was never stable enough to be rebuilt. Even before the war with the Soviet and the civil war, this nation was already one of the poorest on the face of the earth, in Afghanistan, natural disasters such as droughts, floods, and earthquakes were very prevalent (Farzam & Seerat, 2016, p. 1).

According to estimates provided by the UNDP in 2002, more than one million Afghans had been forced from their homes, and a further 3.5 million Afghans were living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2004, p. 67). Prior to the war, more than 70% of the approximately 10 million people who were participating in the labor force were engaged in farming for subsistence, and another 15% were involved in small-scale trade and services (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2004, p. 67). A struggle that lasted for 25 years was responsible for the destruction of most of the country's physical and social infrastructure. It also harmed whatever social services were still in operation and made commercial enterprise on a smaller scale impossible. During the early stages of Taliban rule, there was a restriction placed on the availability of international aid from the outside, and the

Taliban themselves worked to stymie relief efforts that were either intended to assist people who were suffering from hunger or were viewed as questionable by the government, between the years 1992 and 2001, only around 160 million dollars' worth of assistance was provided by international associations (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2004, p. 67).

The multinational coalition planned to topple the Taliban and Al Qaeda from power in Afghanistan after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Afghanistan was to be rebuilt in line with Resolution 1378 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR, 2001). The Tokyo meeting kicked off the international community's attempts to provide economic help to Afghanistan. During the Tokyo Conference in January 2002, Western governments made a commitment to provide immediate financial help for Afghanistan's rehabilitation (Watts, 2002, p. 308). Additionally, at the request of the top authorities at the Washington summit, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank worked on a needs assessment in Afghanistan to define the types and prices of foreign assistance necessary. These preliminary needs assessments were the most comprehensive and authoritative plan for foreign assistance to Afghanistan, providing a benchmark for the reconstruction and development assistance provided by international organizations and a starting point for the assistance provided by national governments. It was the only reliable source for deciphering the goals and strategies of foreign contributors in Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. Deprivation reduction and the expansion of financial opportunities should form the basis of Afghanistan's evaluation of conditions for internationally supported reconstruction and economic programs. Forging economic success and a prolonged period of independence from foreign aid, as well as ensuring political tranquility and protection, giving general credentials to basic services, and building a decent level of living for the Afghan people, were among the calculated targets (Humayoon, 2013, p. 89).

2.7. Political Parties, Mass Media and Civil Societies

The history of political parties extends back to the 20th century, a period of fragmentation and changing allegiances. Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former king of Afghanistan, finished his reign by dealing a blow to political parties with his modernization programs during the first decade of democracy. In 1973, Mohammad

Davoud Khan successfully overthrew the King and created the Republic with the assistance of communist-leaning organizations. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the communist parties governed the nation for 10 years. In Pakistan, seven Mujahideen groups were formed to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These organizations, which were often referred to as political parties, were largely militaristic in nature and were severely divided along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines (NDI, 2010, p. 16).

After the collapse of the Taliban in late 2001, the Bonn Agreement initiated the post-war rebuilding framework for Afghanistan's future. Legal frameworks for political parties, civil society, and human rights groups were established under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's constitution. Political parties, freedom associations, and civil society organizations are all guaranteed legal status under the Constitution of Afghanistan (Jirga, 2004, p. 12). After the Afghan government enacted the political party legislation, many parties filed the registration forum. As a result of many former Mujahedin leaders registered their parties under the new system, Hamed Karzai and the American government have never supported political parties in Afghanistan (NDI, Political Parties in Afghanistan A Review of the State of Political Parties After the 2009 and 2010 Elections, 2011) Furthermore, the constitution of Afghanistan established an unified presidential administration, which outlawed political party activity. Before the fall of Afghanistan, more than hundred political parties were officially recognized by the justice ministry. All of the new parties formed after the fall of the Taliban relied heavily on ethnic appeals for votes. Before the parliamentary and provincial council elections in 2005, 86 political parties were formally registered (NDI, 2011).

The fall of the Taliban and the presence of international community also helped pave the way for the development of civil society groups. In Afghanistan, civil society groups were crucial because they amplified the voices of ordinary people. To put it another way, civil society organizations operate in a grey area between the state and the private sector. The goal of civil society is to improve political order, economic growth, and overall quality of life (ADB, 2009). It is widely held that a well-functioning civil society acts as a check on state policymaking. The two are often portrayed as being in constant odds with one another. Scholars have recently challenged the opposition's assumption, arguing that

it is difficult to evaluate the state without also considering civil society. (Mohan 2000). Because of the close relationship between the state and civil society, the latter may play an active part in politics. Some argue that in order for civil society representatives to have any meaningful influence, they must be able to contact the state (ADB, 2009). Members of civil society may play an active role in government without completely betraying their non-governmental origins. When the state consciously coopts civil society organizations to pacify them, for instance, the relationship between the state and civil society may become too close for comfort. On the other hand, governments may fabricate civil society groups to provide the appearance of legitimacy when none exists (ADB, 2009).

After the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, Afghanistan transformed into a favorable environment for the work of civil society organizations to be carried out there. For the purpose of assisting the society in Afghanistan, a great number of organizations working in different fields, such as anti-war and anti-corruption activities, social services, democratic movements, human rights awareness, and sustaining freedom, had been established. These groups, however, faced difficulties and obstructions since the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's government and society at large were not prepared to support such actions (MLEAM, 2022).

Afghanistan first had media coverage in 1873. In the same year, the first newspaper, Shamsunahar, was established. The first radio transmission took place in 1920, while the first television transmission happened in 1978 in Kabul. In 1996, Afghanistan was linked to the Internet in a limited capacity. However, the press and media were given a fantastic chance after September 11th. According to Afghanistan's media advocacy NGO, NAI, the nation has 464 active media outlets and one of the world's best media laws (MLEAM, 2022). Access to information was one of the most onerous obstacles to free speech, alongside security and financial sustainability, despite the existence of solid regulations. During the last two decades, the objective of free media has been to increase public awareness and carefully aid people in becoming aware of many issues, such as their inherent rights, as well as to further build democratic organizations. According to the media landscape, *"media portray social and political divides to the public as a whole. Today, if individuals are to vote, their ethnicity, language, and geography are essential, but so are their future affiliations with the parties. This implies that the mass media represent each*

viewpoint and its values, encouraging the people to drift toward the chosen ideas. All of these advances and changes in the circulation of news in Afghanistan and the dissemination of information via technology have provided the media with the chance to have a larger influence on government activities. In several instances, the government provided media proprietors with financial incentives to write pro-government information (MLEAM, 2022).

2.8. Diplomatic Efforts on Afghan Nation-Building

Diplomatic efforts from throughout the world helped set up the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's leadership. Diplomatic activities with international conferences contributed to the nation-building of Afghanistan. The international and regional summits were ideal for securing international support for Afghanistan (Watts, 2002, p. 412). As the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and created a government by the Bonn agreement, the later gathering of the international community on Afghanistan was in 2002 on Afghanistan (UN, 2002). The top funders of republic in Afghanistan gathered in Tokyo in January 2001 to agree to a massive Afghanistan rehabilitation plan (Watts, 2002, p. 412). This summit assesses 2002-2006 recovery and rebuilding requirements. It was estimated during this summit that \$15 billion would be needed over ten years to restore Afghanistan. By committing donors to Afghanistan's long-term recovery and assuring the Afghan people that the international community will remain engaged in the rebuilding process for years to come, the plan aimed to provide a framework for funding priority action across all sectors of the economy, as determined and implemented by Afghanistan administration. (Watts, 2002, p. 412). The conference concluded with a call for widespread Afghan participation in the near- and medium-term rebuilding efforts. To safeguard and assist women and other vulnerable populations, as well as advance human rights, "such investments should be conditioned on having proper legislative and institutional frameworks in place" (UN, 2002). The rehabilitation initiative would also improve rural environments and encourage private sector economic recovery (UN, 2002).

After decades of conflict and enormous population displacement, many Afghans prioritized areas for reclaiming their lives and country. To that aim, appropriate security, help to pay long-overdue salary, the future role of Afghan women, drug control, and demining projects are stressed (UN, 2002). The assessment

emphasized that short- and medium-term investments in Afghanistan rehabilitation should involve all Afghans at all stages. Focus demands are calculated for specific development sectors and contain a launched \$1.7 billion for the first year of reconstruction (Watts, 2002, p. 412).

The Berlin Declaration was followed by a summit in Tokyo. In order to recommit to the concept of a secure, mutually beneficial, wealthy, and democratic Afghanistan, an international conference was convened in Berlin, Germany on April 14 of that year (International Commission of Jurists, 2005, p. 350). Delegates also took note of the great strides made in implementing the Bonn Agreement, as well as the positive effects that had been seen in terms of peace, democracy, and the economy. Donor nations have again promised funding for Afghanistan's rehabilitation and rebuilding at a conference held in Tokyo. Participants at the Berlin Conference therefore agreed that the report entitled "Securing Afghanistan's Future" outlines the sizable additional contribution needed to handle Afghanistan's long-term reconstruction needs, and that the execution of this program relies equally on the continued dedication of donors as on the success of the Afghan Government in achieving its ambitious targets. In addition, the conference made an extra 8.2 billion dollar contribution between 2004 -2007 (CFC, 2011, p. 12).

In addition, the international community has attempted to reaffirm its commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan via initiatives like as the Afghanistan compact or the international Conference on Afghanistan held in London in 2006. Also, reducing poverty and meeting basic human necessities, as well as bolstering state institutions and civil society, eradicating any remaining terrorist threats, completing the mission of counternarcotics, restoring capacities and infrastructure, and finishing what was started. There was agreement on the need for economic and social development at this summit. It said that, with international help, "The Afghan government will seek high rates of controllable economic transformation to limit hunger, poverty, and unemployment" (Rubin, 2006, p. 169).

Even more so, it will boost commercial possibilities in the public and nonprofit sectors. Keeping the peace and reintegrating refugees, displaced persons, and ex-combatants. The economic and social development pillar of the Afghanistan National Development Plan will serve as the organizing principle for public investments. Priorities should include: "(1) *infrastructure and natural resources*; (2)

education and health; (3) agricultural and rural development; (4) social protection; (5) economic governance and private sector development; and (6) social protection” (CFC, 2011). The overarching objective was to create quantifiable advancements toward equitable economic development that reduces poverty, enhances employment and company formation, expands access to resources, and improves the quality of life for all Afghans (CFC, 2011).

More coordinated efforts to advance the Afghanistan National Development Strategy were committed during the Paris Conference on June 12, 2008, under Afghan leadership. The Paris Conference backed the Afghanistan National Development Strategy to improve Afghan lives. A road map for cooperation for the next five years was laid out in the action plan. In addition to investing in larger-scale power production, transmission, and distribution, participants also fund roads, education, and health in order to improve Afghanistan's economy and generate employment. The Afghan Government and the international community reached this stage to build a freer business that would aid regional nations based on friendship, trust, and international duties. The international community also pledged more predictable, transparent, and responsible aid structures (UN, 2008, p. 4). They decided to coordinate their development aid. As stronger and accountable government entities gain management competence, it will flow through the national budget. The international community pledged to boost local procurement and capacity-building. Development must benefit all provinces, we agreed. We committed to state-building and avoiding parallel structures (UN, 2008, p 4).

The London Conference, with the theme "Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, and International Partnership," took place as the international community entered its second decade in Afghanistan (Voltire, 2010). The parties observed that political, economic, and security challenges are significant and interrelated; rooting these challenges requires an international engagement and sustained, long-term support in Afghanistan. Additionally, a better cooperative and resourced civilian effort are critical to overcoming these challenges. In order to reduce support for the insurgency and bring about more security in Afghanistan, it is emphasized that "economic development, respect for Rule of Law and human rights alongside the provision of job opportunities and effective governance for all Afghans are equally crucial (CFC, 2011).

Donor countries acknowledged the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government's progress in economic development, including the country's completion of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which would offer up to \$1.6 billion in debt relief from significant creditors (Voltire, 2010). Participants at the conference concluded that the Government of Afghanistan should prioritize accelerating gains in agriculture, human resource development, and infrastructure by implementing capacity and structural reforms. Participants looked forward to the new economic development plan, the beginning of discussions for a new Afghan-led IMF program, and IMF in-country engagement (Voltire, 2010).

Commitment to the Afghan people was discussed at length during the July 2010 International Conference in Kabul. Afghanistan's commitment to enhancing security, governance, and economic opportunity was reaffirmed at previous summits and via the Kabul process. These developments have also highlighted the international community's resolve to help the Afghan government by giving security and economic assistance (NAIK, 2010). The success of Afghanistan was credited at this conference to the leadership and ownership of the Afghan government, which was founded on an unparalleled familiarity with the country's culture and people. They reaffirmed their support for the London Conference Communiqué's goal of having at least half of development money come from inside the Afghan Government's own budget within two years. The Afghan government has made the reforms it pledged to make before the London Conference to better manage the country's public finances, cut down on corruption, increase the efficiency with which the budget is carried out, and increase revenue for critical National Priority Projects. Those involved are dedicated to working with the Afghan government to implement concrete reforms that will increase financial transparency (Voltaire, 2010, p. 13).

Regulatory and institutional transformation in Kabul were identified by the international community and the Afghan government as crucial to facilitating private sector investment and public-private partnerships for social and economic development. To increase transparency and accountability, the Afghan government promised to implement the Public Financial Management Roadmap as planned (CFC, 2011).

During the second International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, held on the tenth anniversary of the 2001 Bonn Conference, representatives from across the

world and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan gathered. This conference was organized and hosted by Germany, and Afghanistan served as the meeting's chair. First, the international community and the government of Afghanistan must work to strengthen civil society and protect constitutional rights. Despite considerable progress, Afghanistan needs to rebuild the civil service, promote judicial reform, and develop security institutions, particularly a civilian police force. The international community applauds the Afghan government's economic Transition plan as laid out in *Towards a Self-Sustaining Afghanistan* because it will help Afghanistan achieve its stated objective of self-sufficiency and prosperity by increasing the country's people and resource potential (HRW, 2011).

International delegates pledged to switch from stability to long-term development during this summit. The International Community will help Afghanistan's rule of law, public administration, education, health, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, and job creation. The International Community accepts the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's economic risks, particularly those related to military reduction. In line with the Kabul Process, the world bank wanted to improve assistance efficacy. The decade-long international effort in Afghanistan is unusual. The World Community remains committed to Afghanistan and international security after Transition. The International Community will help Afghanistan's commercial and transportation infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. Participants underline that private investment, especially foreign sources, is essential for Afghanistan's economic potential (HRW, 2011).

The International Community and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan returned to London to reaffirm reforms and cooperation. The London Conference was the National Unity Government's first chance to make global pledges for Afghanistan's future beyond 2014 (Transformation Decade) (Communiqué, 2014). The parties supported the National Unity Government's initiatives to increase productivity, domestic revenue mobilization, private sector investment, and development and employment. Players understood that this is a long-term project and that the Afghan Government would again need external funding to meet its economic needs. The International Community maintained its Tokyo pledge of giving sixteen billion US dollars through 2015 and continuing assistance, through 2017, at or around the levels of the prior decade (Communiqué, 2014).

The 2020 Afghanistan Conference was hosted in the Palais des States in Geneva by 66 nations and 32 international organizations was the last conference Afghanistan nation-building. Cohosting the virtual meeting were the United Nations, Afghanistan, and Finland. Unusual circumstances prevailed during the beginning of the last four-year cycle of the Transformation Decade, right following the Afghanistan Peace Negotiations and during the COVID-19 outbreak. Participants in the Conference reiterated their long-term commitment to assisting Afghanistan in seizing this historic chance to achieve peace, prosperity, and independence for all Afghans. (Geneva, 2020, p. 2). As in past summits, delegates in the Geneva summit want a peaceful, democratic, unified, and independent Afghanistan. In addition, it highlighted the significance of civil society and independent media in this process. Moreover, it was emphasized that Afghanistan's economic and social growth is contingent upon international development money and South-South cooperation. (Geneva, 2020, p. 3).

CHAPTER 3: NATION-BUILDING CHALLENGES IN AFGHANISTAN

The new period of nation-building, which was ushered in by the American intervention in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, concluded without visible results for the Afghan people. But, from the American viewpoint, they had fulfilled their objectives in Afghanistan. Clearly, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was motivated by military concerns rather than nation-building. Former President George W. Bush, stated that the main target of the United States is to defeat Al-Qaeda and other core insurgent organizations (Kessler, 2021). Keane, sum up failure of international community on Afghanistan nation-building “*lack of commitment, poor policy decisions and an inappropriate allocation of Resources*” (Keane, 2016, p. 36). In addition, there was a widespread inability to acknowledge Afghanistan's reality and transform talk into action.

To explain the failure of nation-building in Afghanistan, internal and foreign elements must be considered. Thus, we shall discuss the internal, and external factors that, on the one hand, constrained the process from its earliest days and, on the other hand, ultimately led to its entire collapse.

3.1. The Internal Factors

The government of Afghanistan which established with the international community efforts by Bonn Accord in 2001, finally led to a total collapse in 15 August 2021. Internally, the government of Afghanistan did not well function in past two decades.

3.1.1. The political system

The political system or administration of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was established by the Bonn Agreement and the constitution of 2004. Nonetheless, the Bonn Agreement attempted to establish an all-encompassing administration, but the Taliban (later identified as the Islamic Emirates of the Taliban) and the Hekmatyar Political Party were excluded from the Bonn conference (Deledda, 2006, p. 161). During the last two decades, the International Community and Afghan politicians have mostly exercised democratic principles such as the rule of the law, separation of powers, freedom of expression and mass media, human rights, and variety in permitting political parties. However, despite having a democratic government, the primary issue is why and how Afghanistan's political system led to its failure. To answer this question in this part, it is important to find out the critical aspect of the political entity of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The Bonn Agreement provided the impetus for the foundation of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Deledda, 2006, p. 161). The accord was widely attacked from the very beginning. The first error was postponing the deployment of an international peace force to address security concerns (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708). Due to the fact that the National Resistance Front or North Alliance (NA) had taken over the nation, there were a large number of NA members at the summit. According to Vendrell (2012) this problem caused the Alliance to demand additional ministerial positions in the makeup of the future administration. The other ethnicities were excluded from the administration, emerged disagreements between supporters of the National Alliance, who were mostly Tajiks,

and other ethnic groups (Deledda, 2006, p. 161). In addition, diverse groups (the North Alliance, political parties, followers of former King Zahir Shah, an American ambassador, a United Nations delegate, as well as several nations and international organizations) participated in the summit (Vendrell, 2012, p. 597). Even though many other things were being talked about, the Americans had an effect on who led the interim government and what kind of rule was put in place (Fields & Ahmed, 2011). Hamid Karzai was eventually revealed to be a Pashtun leader selected by the United States. Everyone, however, agreed that Dr. Sattar Seyrat, an Uzbek academic, should be the provisional government's leader (Shamshad, 2016, p. 202). Later, the presidential election was contested on ethnical grounds stemming from the Bonn Accord. It indicates that ethnicity became a strategy for attaining power in Afghanistan and that, in later elections, Americans favored a Pashtun to be president. If the Bonn Conference had given more consideration to those it invited, ethnical issues may not have been such a significant issue in the future (Vendrell, 2012, p. 598). because ethical difficulties become a complicated challenge in Afghanistan's administration in subsequent years. According to the same views, Pushtan's representatives were not completely invited to the summit, creating a rift within the government (Fields & Ahmed, 2011).

In addition, the German Prime Minister and international inspectors claimed that Afghanistan was ready to implement a federal system. Assuming that the situation was under control at the local level as opposed to the national level, they proposed that each ethnic group be given its own area. The Afghans themselves clearly rejected this concept and the profound misreading of nation-building requirements upon which it was based (Goodson, 2006, p. 149). They demonstrated in the clearest way possible that the subject of supremacy was not in doubt. They exemplified this unity by not calling for independence or even using threats of secession as a bargaining tactic. In the end, they determinedly chose a centralized government (Goodson, 2006, p. 147).

The international community's promise to Afghanistan about major engagements was another flop of the Bonn Agreement that was never really fulfilled. A lot of people who study Afghan politics think that the Bonn Conference was the best chance for all the players to get together and work out a political solution that everyone can live with for Afghanistan (Fields & Ahmed, 2011). After the collapse

of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the N (NA) group emerged as the most influential faction, and they played a big role in the Bonn Conference as well. Hamid Karzai's cabinet and vice presidency are filled with several NA members. The process of nation-building in Afghanistan was impeded as a result of this action. Later on, nevertheless, Karzai and the International Community isolated the North Alliance in the cabinet (Vendrell, 2012, p. 599).

On June 13, 2002, an emergency Loya Jirga was convened to legalize Hamid Karzai's transitional government and administration (Shamshad, 2016, p. 202). It has been argued that the failure of the summit to produce a transitional administration that accurately reflects the ethnic composition of its ruling elite was the root of the issue. The distribution of power among historically marginalized ethnic groups was the most contentious and delicate topic here (Shah, 2012). As a result, the restoration of Afghanistan and the hope for a stable, peaceful society free of terrorists in its wake will continue to face obstacles stemming from the country's fragmentation and complexity. One must be attentive to group identities, power dynamics, and alliances founded on ethnolinguistic affinities in order to make any headway in understanding Afghanistan (Johnson, 2002).

The next phase in the political framework of the government of Afghanistan was the 2004 Loya Jirga for ratifying a new constitution. As of the regime's fall on August 15, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan had been mostly governed in accordance with its 2004 constitution (Shamshad, 2016, p. 209). With a national legislature, separation of powers, political parties, and respect for human rights ideals, the Constitution set up a new sort of system. The 2004 Loya Jirga resulted in the ratification of the 2004 Constitution. As a result of the Jirga's inability to reach consensus on a number of contentious subjects, the Afghan government had a difficult time moving on with the nation-building process. We spoke about different kinds of governments, the powers of the president, cultural norms, the official language(s), the national anthem, and the flag (Shamshad, 2016, p. 198). The prominent Pashtun leader and pro-western politicians met with the North Alliance, which includes Tajiks and other ethnic groupings as well as mainstream political organizations, to debate the form of government. Many Pushtun figures, including Hamid Karzai, the president of the interim and transitional administration, Zalmy Khalilzad, and others, have advocated for a centralized government (Shamshad,

2016, p. 202). Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, Leader of Jamiat Islami Afghanistan and President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992-2001), advocated for a parliamentary or semi-presidential government system in which political parties serve as the executive branch (Shah, 2012). The argument for decentralization centered on political parties rather than ethnic groupings. Participants voted a week after the presidential fever system began because the United States and President Karzai desired a consolidated system (Shamshad, 2016, p. 205). The Constitution then provided the president with a great deal of power, which led to the next controversial subject (Shamshad, 2016, p. 206).

The President of the Islamic Republic was the country's chief executive, legislative, and judicial official, and he had the authority to define the country's fundamental guidelines, command the armed forces, declare war and peace, and make other critical decisions in defense of the country's sovereignty (Jirga, 2004). The Loya Jirga has called for the National Assembly to approve the deployment of Afghan armed personnel abroad. Accepting the resignations of the vice presidents, calling a session of the National Assembly and the Loya Jirga, appointing the ministers, attorney general, central bank governor, national security director, and red cross head with the approval of the House of People, firing them, and accepting their resignations. Legislatively approving nominees for the Supreme Court, Justice, law enforcement, national security, and other high-ranking personnel are appointed, retired, accepted, and removed in accordance with the law. Putting Afghan politicians in charge of international groups Afghanistan will accept political credentials from other countries Legislation and court decisions, letters of accreditation for international treaties, forgiving fines legally, giving medals, insignia, and honorary titles according to the law, appointing committees to improve national government, and doing other things required by the Constitution (Jirga, 2004).

In addition, presidential and parliamentary elections in 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2019 led to electoral fraud, and factions protested against the results (Callen & Long, 2015, p. 354). It is all connected to the shortcomings in the Constitution of 2004 (Callen & Long, 2015, p. 355). Elections are a democratic mechanism in other countries that expresses national desires. In contrast, all elections resulted in Afghans losing faith in the country's democracy. Except for the first presidential election, the

United States administered the next three presidential elections, not Afghan voters (Jarrett, 2020). Nonetheless, the Afghanistan Constitution of 2004 established a foundation for advancement in some areas, such as human rights, but in the political sector, the installation of a centralized government structure and the exclusion of political parties led the system to its demise (Akseer & John, 2019). In conclusion of the detrimental influence of the elections on the electorate, a poll conducted by the Asia Foundation reveals that "when respondents were asked why they did not vote, the most common responses were insecurity (30.2%), fraud (20.1%), "it is not advantageous" (18.1%), and injustice (16.0%)" (Akseer & John, 2019). In addition, a UNAMA assessment underlined that corruption remains a problem in Afghanistan, undermining public trust and confidence in government institutions and impeding attempts to bring enduring peace and prosperity to the nation (Akseer & John, 2019, p. 27).

The four presidential elections in Afghanistan had had their share of problems. With the United States exerting pressure on his opponents to drop out of the race, Hamid Karzai easily won the 2004 presidential election by nearly 40 percentage points, which was largely predetermined by his appointment to lead an interim administration in 2001 and his assurance as transitional leader in 2002. (Callen & Long, 2015, p. 357). Further problems arose when Karzai was re-elected in 2009. U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke has spoken out against President Hamid Karzai's illegitimate re-election (Siddique, 2009, p. 12). Once it seemed that Karzai had fallen just short of the 50 percent necessary, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry intervened to encourage him to hold a second round of voting (Siddique, 2009, p. 12). When it came to the 2014 runoff election, the United States took a neutral stance until after the second round was complete. After round one, Abdullah still had the most votes, but Ghani prevailed in round two with the support of the smaller candidates. A massive fraud took place, and a coup or other violent battle seemed imminent at the state level (Jarrett, 2020, p. 25). Kerry, who was then serving as secretary of state, personally negotiated both a method for assessing fraud and a government of unity (Siddique, 2009, p. 13). In the 2020 presidential election, there were also serious charges of fraud, and both parties sponsored the inauguration ceremonies, however, Abdullah subsequently became the leader of the Peace Council of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan (Jarrett, 2020, p. 25). The framework established by the Constitution is responsible for all election-related issues. The Constitution does not specify the function of political parties, and direct election is the sole method for choosing the president.

Another difficulty with the Constitution is that it does not provide for political parties to have any role in governing (ICG, 2009). Many provisions of the Constitution of 2004 are interpreted differently, and some are followed more rigidly than others while others are routinely disregarded. Article 35 of the Constitution gives people the right to create political parties, but they must not actively oppose Islam or the ideals upheld by the Constitution (NDI, 2011, p. 12). The parties must disclose their membership and funding, refrain from using their activities for military purposes, and not affiliate with any foreign political parties (NDI, 2011). Afghanistan's Islamic Republic provided the legal framework for all political activity and party formations. Registration of political parties was the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. A strong presidential system where the legal division of power is murky is mandated by the viewpoint of political parties that give the president authority. The situation is now completely dysfunctional and crippling for political parties. Since there are no incentives for people to run as proclaimed party nominees under SNTV, the voting method that simply provided rights to individuals became an impediment to political parties. In a system where each citizen has an equal vote, voters choose candidates instead of political parties. Whether or not a party receives a majority of the vote has little to do with how many seats that party receives. Since any number of candidates can theoretically run for office in a given province if multi-member constituencies are used, there will be a large number of "wasted votes" cast for candidates who ultimately come up short, despite the fact that the differences between the winners and losers will be extremely small (Jirga, 2004, p. 62).

The 9/11 attacks in Afghanistan shattered the hopes of many who believed the country would soon be home to secular, pan-ethnic democratic parties. That procedure has slowed to a crawl. There was a total of 110 political parties in existence between the time of the Taliban's downfall and 2009. However, the vast majority of these organizations were rather minor. Instead of providing clear ideological frameworks, they were established around and focused on particular individuals or groups of people. Article 35 of the Afghan Constitution forbids

political parties based on ethnicity or religious group; hence, ethnically oriented parties do not present themselves (Fukuyama, 2006).

3.1.2. The military failures

Since the international community's failure to fight the Taliban and other extremist organizations in Afghanistan, the main focus here, the primary objective is to identify military-related challenges. The military failures in Afghanistan may be broken down into two categories: those that occurred inside Afghanistan and were the fault of the Afghan army and security forces, and those that were the fault of the foreign security forces and the international coalition forces.

Known as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Afghan National Police (ANP) were supported by almost \$90 billion in funding from the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government over the course of two decades (Schroden, 2021, p. 12). The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) included these three arms of the Afghan armed forces (ANP). At that time, US military and civilian troops worked side-by-side in Afghanistan to educate and advise their Afghan counterparts. The United States has supplied the Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) with around 600,000 weapons, 300 planes, 80,000 vehicles, communication equipment, and other high-tech gadgets including night vision goggles and biometric systems (Schroden, 2021). The goal of this project was to build an ANDSF that was completely independent of any outside influences and could protect itself from any threats it could face (Schroden, 2021, p. 12).

In 2002, the United States and its coalition allies determined that the creation of a professionally trained and globally educated Afghan security force may serve as a credible alternative to the increased presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan (Friesendorf, 2011, p.80). Despite lacking suitable doctrine, regulations, and resources, the United States led the development of the ANA. Coalition partners assumed responsibility for other initiatives, including police reform (Germany), counternarcotics (United Kingdom), judicial reform (Italy), and demobilization, demobilization, and reintegration (Japan) (Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 66). The joint NATO member was accountable for the rehabilitation of a military or constructive component of the government, but they were unable to fulfill their obligations. For

example, Germany was responsible for hiring the police force for the new government of Afghanistan but failed to do so (Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 65). Likewise, the United Kingdom was responsible for eliminating poppy production. In contrast, the output increased by half (Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 65). In addition to liberating Afghanistan from Al Qaida and the Taliban, Japan initiated the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process with the assistance of ISAF in order to transfer former Mujahedin weaponry to the newly formed Afghan National Army. In addition, the DDR initiated the Disbandment of Illicit Armed Groups (DIAG) program to disarm militias and illegal weapons further. From an ISAF standpoint, the DDR and DIAG processes were the beginning stages of developing the ANA and ANPF for Afghanistan (Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 65). Many feel that when the international coalition disarmed the National Resistance Front or North Alliance troops, the main military anti-Taliban formations were eliminated and anti-Taliban sentiment in the Army declined (ICG, 2007). However, the disarmament of NA armies was a success for pro-Western leaders. In the last two decades, however, it has been disproven, resulting in the emergence of the Taliban and other fundamentalist organizations. As soon as the NA forces got out of the military, crime rates went up, and many of them started working with drug traffickers (ICG, 2007).

No one can prevent the severe domestic shortfall in the Afghan government's security forces. Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghanistan National Police have struggled since their inception. In light of the U.S.-led coalition's stated goal of permanently denying safe harbor to international terror groups, the case for giving Afghanistan its own army was simple to argue. Afghanistan's National Police were trained by the international community under Germany's direction to uphold the country's legal order (Afghanistan's Prospects, 2019). However, many of them were dead when the resistance faded. As for why the Afghan police are failing in their duty, there was no professional police force or army in Afghanistan when the international community intervened. The new police force was created after a lengthy period, and training took many weeks. Many politicians also use security force posts to further their own political agendas, thus weakening the force (Afghanistan's Prospects, 2019). The presence of political appointees in the Afghan cabinet was a concern across the board, including the ministry of defense. Members of Afghanistan's Parliament were also tasked with filling key positions in the police

force with supporters. The lack of interest shown by the professional police in carrying out their responsibilities led to a progressive decline in the quality of the Afghan police force. Many of them simply lacked the willpower to continue; a police officer's best chance of moving up the administrative ladder required him to establish ties to ministerial or parliamentary offices or to feed money (Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 66). The Afghan government was corrupt because most appointments and equipment projects were tainted by corrupt practices (Afghanistan's Prospects, 2019). Because the Taliban were active in the same region of Afghanistan, ethnic disparities among the police forces were also an issue, with many people (particularly Pashtuns) refusing to join. Additionally, communities are forced to rely on strongmen for safety, and disenfranchised individuals and groups are driven to join anti-government elements due to the lack of institutional observers to provide justice and protection. Sectarian and factional divides in law enforcement, and by extension, the population at large, are exacerbated by a lack of governmental control over police power and control. Criminalization of the authorities undermines the rule of law, primarily through involvement in the narcotics trade, and the resultant alliances with anti-government groups destabilize the state. Police brutality is one of the most visible forms of state abuse, and it has a negative effect on public trust in central and local leaders (ICG, 2007).

The Afghan National Army (ANA) had to contend with comparable challenges. On the one hand, corruption weakened the ANA's activities throughout the nation, which in turn allowed the insurgency to make more headway (Brown, 2012). In contrast, the corruption caused a decline in morale among the troops, and a great number of them deserted their posts as a direct result of the corruption (Brown, 2012). Brown made the observation that *"In some of the best kandaks, exceptional soldiers are not being promoted because they do not have influential friends. On the other hand, various positions are being formed, such as that of colonel, for example, so that commanders might distribute positions to their devoted followers.* (Brown, 2012). Repeatedly, soldiers who come from disadvantaged social strata, do not have prominent patrons, or simply do not have the financial means to pay a bribe are being sent to duty in hostile situations. In contrast, those associates who are in stronger positions get more favorable posts (Brown, 2012). Moreover, until the very end of Afghanistan's collapse, the army remained the primary fighting force in the nation.

The troops put up a fight. As a result of the political breakdown, the military suffered significant losses on the ground.

The United Nations Security Council gave the "International Security Assistance Force" (ISAF) the green light to send international troops to Afghanistan (NATO, 2021). ISAF's main goal was to train and equip Afghan security forces so that Afghanistan would never again be a safe place for terrorists and so that the Afghan government could keep the whole country safe (NATO, 2021, p. 22). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was made up of 100,000 soldiers from 51 NATO countries, was unable to overcome problems in Afghanistan. This was despite being the largest and most important alliance in history and NATO's most difficult mission (NATO, 2021). The first problem was that ISAF was built by a small group of people whose only goal was to protect the capital of Afghanistan (Graeme, 2004, p. 33). When the mission grew, the NATO countries didn't want to help it grow. Additionally, the systemic flaws of contingency financing and troop deployment methods, together with the lack of preparation in the ISAF operation, a lack of coordination procedures, and an inability to staff appropriately, were the core concerns (Graeme, 2004, p. 34). The United States started training ANA members in May 2002, with U.S. Special Forces at the center. Seeing as how training an entire army was outside the Special Forces' expertise, the United States sent in the 10th Mountain Division of the Army to help with the expansion of the training program from small infantry units to larger military formations and the development of defense institutions like logistics networks (SIGAR, 2017, p. 13). In contrast, active-duty military forces that might have been used to train the Afghan military were diverted to the Iraq war in 2003, removing a crucial resource from the Afghanistan operation. Instead, a regular rotation of Army National Guard battalions has taken over the training of the Afghan military (SIGAR, 2017, p. 13).

Furthermore, the international community made mistakes that undermined the nation-building process and tempted the Taliban and other insurgent groups to fight against the central government: First, after a few years of participation, the international community lost its steam in supporting Afghanistan (Vanda, 2012). Many countries had already prepared to withdraw their soldiers from Afghanistan, or even the battlefields entirely. After the London Conference in 2010, they had entered their second decade of operation. When the ISAF withdrew in 2014, all economic

ventures in Afghanistan ceased, and the people there were anxious about the future. In the years 2013–2016, 700,000 Afghans migrated to Europe (Humayoon, 2013, p. 49). A bilateral strategic agreement between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is in place to ensure that Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts go smoothly. By 2021, if no action was taken, Afghanistan would have likely fallen apart.

Yet, if U.S. forces leave Afghanistan too quickly, it would severely damage the military transition and impede the ANSF's development and much-needed upgrades." According to the book by Vanda "Conflicting Hopes and Fears for Afghanistan's State-Building and Counterinsurgency Efforts (Vanda, 2012). Second, the United States has said it would pull out of Afghanistan in 2021; the Afghan government and the ANA were prepared to keep the state functioning, but the political compromise with the Taliban brought down the Afghan government. In a recent interview, the French ambassador in Kabul blamed the breakdown of Afghanistan's nation-building efforts on the Qatar Deal (Andisha, 2022, p. 4). A third cause of unrest in Afghanistan was regional commanders acting purportedly under the authority of the new interim administration and deploying locally formed militias of 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers. The Taliban and al Qaeda remnants made up the first two. According to the Afghan Ministry of Finance, the international world contributed Afghanistan almost USD 90 billion in aid between 2002 and 2013, with USD 57 billion coming in the form of economic and military support. (Humayoon, 2013, p. 48).

On August 15, 2021, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a study titled *The Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Evaluation of the Causes That Led to Its Defeat*. The paper summarized the main causes of the breakdown of the Afghan national defense and security forces. With the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement in February 2020 during the Trump administration, and President Biden's withdrawal announcement in April 2021, SIGAR concluded that the withdrawal of U.S. military forces and contractors from Afghanistan was the single most important factor in the collapse of the ANDSF in August 2021. (SIGAR, 2022, p.12). The ANDSF relies heavily on U.S. troops, therefore these occurrences shook their morale. The U.S. military was vital to the ANDSF's ability to limit civilian deaths, and Afghan troops

saw the United States as a means of enforcing the Afghan government's obligation to pay its troops' salaries (SIGAR, 2022, p.13). After the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the ANDSF and the Afghan people felt abandoned. The conditions that led to the ANDSF's demise were set in motion by the treaty. From the outset, the frequency of U.S. airstrikes dropped significantly (SIGAR, 2022, p.12). As the United States and the Taliban reached an agreement the next year restricting airstrikes, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) lost a significant tactical advantage in their struggle against the Taliban. The United States then depended on the ANDSF, which it had modeled after its own military. The reliance on ANDSF was gradual. To construct its combined-arms military system, the United States relied on the expertise and direction of highly trained military professionals. A US-created army of enlisted men and women with no previous combat experience in Afghanistan. Due to the U.S. withdrawal of on-site contract maintenance from Afghanistan in May 2021, fewer aircraft were operated and fewer maintenance trainees were trained at provincial airfields (SIGAR, 2022, p. 12). The U.S. had furnished the ANDSF with a large supply of weapons and ammunition, but the Afghan Air Force was too overworked to transport it. As a result, ANDSF soldiers said they were short on food, water, ammunition, and other supplies necessary to take on the Taliban. The Afghan government was unable to formulate a national security strategy and plan after the U.S. withdrawal. Former President Ashraf Ghani, on the other hand, often removed ANDSF leaders and picked loyalists, sidelining highly-trained US-aligned troops. Military confidence, morale, and chain of command in the ANDSF all suffered as a result of the high rate of leadership change (SIGAR, 2022). Officers of the ANDSF who were born and raised under American supervision were marginalized because of the strength of their American ties (SIGAR, 2022, p. 14).

After the United States and Taliban reached a peace agreement in Qatar, the United States adopted a defensive military posture in Afghanistan, while the Taliban accelerated their military assaults. Despite the fact that this unforeseen development induced organizational and moral ambiguity among the armed forces, in addition, the release of nearly 5,000 Taliban prisoners as part of the Doha agreement demoralized Afghanistan's security forces while bolstering the Taliban's war machine. In spite of

the Taliban authorities' assurances that liberated captives would not return to the front lines of combat, they did (Andisha, 2022, p. 4).

Moreover, the president and national security advisor's micromanagement of the ANDSF, rapid and irregular reshufflings at the top levels of commanding officers under the cover of reform, and reorganizations weakened the command-and-control structure, which was already fragile (Andisha, 2022, p. 5). These changes shattered the military hierarchy and cohesion achieved through years of training and combat and produced a cadre of yes-man commanders who distorted operational ground realities and utilized the national armed force to achieve political goals. Since the beginning of the past decade, army leaders have been recruited from outside the military. The leadership and communication styles, professional backgrounds, and personal actions of these individuals damaged command and control structures. Despite centralizing procurements and key appointments under the President, corruption, delays, and bureaucracy reached intolerable levels in procurement, logistics, and army compensations. Army and police soldiers complained regularly in the media about ammunition, food, and pay. The propaganda machine of the Taliban used social media videos to demoralize soldiers and commanders, encourage apathy toward political and military leadership, and induce mass submission (Andisha, 2022, p. 4).

3.1.3. The socio-economic challenges

Afghanistan's economy is considered to be one of the poorest in the world. The economy of Afghanistan has suffered greatly since the Soviet invasion in 1979. Economic insufficiency may be traced back to five main factors: war, political instability, civil strife, international interference, and a lack of education (Sial, 2021, p. 359). Included above categories are issues such as unemployment, inflation, poverty, budget imbalance, inadequate tax collection, low productivity, and economic backwardness. More than \$ 145 billion was spent by the United States of America in an effort to rebuild Afghanistan's armed forces, civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society (SIGAR, 2022, p. 14). In this portion of the discussion, the issue that is posed is, what obstacles stand in the way of economic progress in Afghanistan? What factors contributed to the failure of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's economy, as well as its other endeavors? Sial pointed out, the political instability, lack of stability, insecurity, lawlessness, and intervention

from other nations are preventing the economy from expanding to its full potential (Sial, 2021, p. 360). Afghanistan's economic growth faced a number of obstacles, the most significant of which was insecurity; the international community's assistance in the form of financial aid helped the country's economy (SIGAR, 2022, p. 12). It opened the door to an opportunity for economic growth, but despite the country's increased level of security, it generated issues in most sections of Afghanistan. Many of the planned projects had to be postponed and finally relocated to more secure locations because of concerns over the level of security. In spite of this, the economy saw a slowdown in 2014, mostly as a result of the departure of approximately 100,000 foreign soldiers, whose presence had artificially inflated the country's level of financial growth (SIGAR, 2022, p. 12).

After a decade of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) conducted a poll in 2011–2012. According to the poll results, bribes to government officials in Afghanistan totaled U.S. \$3.9 billion in 2012, with half of the country's population having done so at some point, this is equivalent to a 40 percent rise in real terms between 2009 and 2012 (UNODC, 2012). Afghans see corruption as one of their country's most pressing problems, yet it increasingly appears to be ingrained in societal norms, with bribes and favoritism considered normal parts of daily life (UNODC, 2012). For instance, a 2012 survey found that 68% of respondents agreed that it was appropriate for a government worker to supplement a low wage by collecting minor bribes from service consumers (UNODC, 2012). To a similar extent, 67% of those surveyed said it was occasionally correct for a government employee to be hired based on personal connections. In real terms, the average bribe now costs U.S. \$ 214, up from U.S. \$ 158, and the number of bribes paid by each bribe-payer has increased from 4.7 to 5.6. (UNODC, 2012). The number of people who have given money to a teacher as a bribe has increased from 16% in 2009 to 51% in 2012, making education one of the most corrupt industries. The overall degree of corruption in the judicial system, the customs service, and municipal government was high in 2012, as it had been in 2009. Bribery affects both the government and private sectors in Afghanistan, although to varying degrees (UNODC, 2012).

According UNODC report in 2012, half of Afghan civilians paid bribes to public officials, while over 30% paid those not employed by the government in order

to get the services they needed (UNODC, 2012). The cost of bribery in the private sector is estimated at \$600 million, or 15% of the public sector's projected \$3.9 billion; hence, the economic effect on the country as a whole is also smaller (UNODC, 2012). Integrity studies across Afghanistan's four administrative tiers (police, local government, court, and education) reveal that bribery occurs for a variety of reasons and under a variety of conditions (UNODC, 2012). The rule of law and public trust in institutions are undermined when bribes are paid or offered to get better or quicker service or to influence deliberations and acts like those of the police or courts. For instance, 25% of bribes given to police officers were for the purpose of obtaining the release of inmates or avoiding arrest (UNODC, 2012). According to the statistics, one Afghan resident declined to pay a bribe due to a lack of money for every five who did (UNODC, 2012). This indicates that bribery in the public sector impacts Afghan citizens' access to essential services and that higher-income families may secure greater access to and a higher quality of public services than lower-income households, since the former are more inclined to accept the payment of bribes. Conversely, low-income residents are more likely to refuse bribes, pricing themselves out of the "market" for public services and reducing their chances of receiving equitable service delivery (UNODC, 2012). As a result of widespread reliance on bribery and favoritism, public sector recruitment in Afghanistan has emerged as a key area of concern. Eighty percent of respondents who reported having a family member recruited into the public service over the last three years also said that the recruited family member had received help or paid a bribe. Those working in the four surveyed government agencies also confirmed the broad availability of recruiting aid. About half of those who work in law enforcement, local government, and education reported receiving some kind of recruiting aid. One-third of individuals who paid a bribe in 2012 went to the police, the public prosecutor, or the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption to report it (one fifth each) (UNODC, 2012). Although Afghanistan's bribery reporting rate seems high in contrast to other countries, it is unclear if the reporting that was reported in the survey really occurred in a formal environment, where it would be more likely to have tangible consequences. In fact, the majority of allegations did not result in any sort of follow-up, and less than one-fifth of incidents reported to the authorities resulted in a formal process (UNODC, 2012).

The political tension between high-ranking authorities undermined Afghanistan's economic projects and planning (Andisha, 2022, p. 6). Lack of professionalism, planning, discrimination, corruption of the administration, and the political contest between parties inside and outside the government severely cost the Republic's economy downgraded (SIGAR, 2016, p. 8). In particular, the National Unity Government lost all its chances in political tensions between former President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, his Chief Executive. The President personally froze all projects in the political area of Abdullah and pressurized Abdullah's Minister during his first term of presidency. Political tension inside the government was the initial cause of the collapse of the state (UNODC, 2012).

Furthermore, the buying of public jobs is a significant method of systemic public sector corruption in Afghanistan, an ex-middle-ranking Afghan government official has claimed that ministers and deputy ministers compete for control of the country's most profitable jobs, including key leadership roles in provinces and districts where opium poppy and gold mines are grown and processed (SIGAR, 2016). In fact, according to the UNODC poll, over 80% of residents who had had a family member recruited into the public service in the previous three years said that their relative had received some type of help or paid a bribe to be recruited. Half or more of those who work in law enforcement, local government, and education reported receiving some kind of help during the hiring process (UNODC, 2013).

One of the most obvious manifestations of patronage politics is the awarding of government contracts, which is estimated to make up around 15% of total public expenditure each year (MEC, 2015). In many cases, high-ranking officials resort to physical threats in order to compel procurement employees into giving contracts to their favoured companies. When the company is successful in securing a contract, these high-ranking officials benefit monetarily (MEC, 2015). Corruption networks are formed when high-ranking officials use employment loopholes to install family members and political loyalists in positions of power in the procurement department (MEC, 2015). A number of factors contribute to the prevalence of these practices, including the use of shell companies and subsidiaries to hide who owns a company, the presence of well-connected mafias in many ministries that work to limit the

transparency of procurement operations, and a disjointed system of business registration in which there is no central, reliable database (MEC, 2015).

According to the research, economic initiatives undertaken over the previous decade by Afghanistan and the international community focused on national-level infrastructure projects, the donors, however, failed to place a premium on Afghanistan's pressing need to revive its indigenous economy (Sial, 2021, p. 361). According to the results of a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, the Afghan people generally see the international community's efforts as having resulted in a marginal increase in their quality of life (Sial, 2021, p. 360). Employment status is the most significant indication of economic growth and progress for Afghans, as it is for people everywhere else in the world. The study also suggested that the Afghan government implement initiatives to reform the country's economic strategy, launch a constructive battle against poverty, reshape the local economy to create more employment opportunities and boost output in key sectors, and instill a sense of personal accountability (Sial, 2021, p. 360). When putting this plan into action, the most important thing must be making sure that scarce resources are used well and that economic growth continues, which could help moderate Afghans live better lives. Obtaining and directing public policy for fast economic progress and development is essential (Sial, 2021, 362). What's more, the government of Afghanistan lacked highly trained professionals in positions of authority (ADB, 2019). Lacking clear regulations to guide authorities in their search for a fix, several initiatives were improperly linked by the government. Security, economic growth, and the development of crucial institutional and organizational capabilities have all been supported by international donor appropriations. Massive military aid and extensive economic and development support are, however, blamed for contributing to lawlessness and distorting the Afghan economy (ADB, 2019). Despite the positive effects of private investment on the economy in terms of capital and expertise, it has mostly attracted those with an eye on short-term profit. It has not made many contributions to long-term economic growth (Sial, 2021, p. 360). Moreover, the "resource curse" associated with nations whose reliance on nonrenewable commodity exports paradoxically leaves them with insufficient economic growth, delayed development, and less democracy threatens to dampen the potential riches promised by the sale of Afghanistan's natural resources. While the country has achieved

significant progress during the last two decades, it still faces a number of difficulties. It is one of the poorest nations in the world and the poorest among ADB members. (ADB, 2019).

The vast majority of people are poor, and many more who are just above it are at risk of losing everything in floods (ADB, 2019). Afghanistan has a number of development priorities, but upgrading its infrastructure is a top priority. About one-third of the population has access to the electrical grid (Sial, 2021, p. 360). Despite the importance of agriculture to Afghanistan's economy, barely half of the country's potentially irrigated farmland has been developed. Main highways have not yet been organized, and the Salang Tunnel, a vital north-south connection, has reached the end of its service life. Higher levels of investment are required to meet the growth and occupation goals since the country's infrastructure asset demands substantially exceed the existing level of responsibility (ADB, 2019). The current political developments will have a negative impact on Afghanistan's economic development. The international community has abandoned Afghanistan for the time being, and the Taliban regime is not able to provide effective leadership. There was a dearth of professionalism in the Kabul government. A large percentage of former government workers emigrate. If the Taliban organization does not change its basic stance toward the world, the latest occurrences in Afghanistan would slow the country's economic progress (ADB, 2019).

Over the last two decades, Afghanistan's population has undergone a remarkable amount of human development. Its Human Development Index (HDI) reached 50% during the years 2000 and 2019 and over the previous two decades, Afghanistan has seen improvements in its life expectancy at birth (9 years longer), mean years of education (1.7 years longer), and projected years of schooling (7.6 years longer) (UNDP, 2022). The per capita GDP in Afghanistan more than doubled between 2000 and 2019; However, development slowed after 2012 because of increased instability, more volatility, and diminished foreign support (UNDP, 2022).

After 2014, yearly economic growth slowed to 2% from the 9% average seen between 2002 and 2012, Afghanistan continues to have the lowest per capita income in all of Asia and the Pacific. Acute malnutrition and stunting in children under the age of five remain serious health issues in a nation with one of the world's worst rates (UNDP, 2022). UNICEF estimates that one million Afghan children will suffer from

acute and severe malnutrition, and that 4.2 million of them, the vast majority of them girls (2.2 million), are not in school. More than two thousand serious breaches of children's rights have been reported to the United Nations since January 2021. (UNDP, 2022).

Despite the international community investing billions of dollars and making attempts to develop Afghanistan's economy, the country is still at the bottom of the list. Evidently, the people of Afghanistan and their administration cannot take all the blame for this setback. There were no observers to keep an eye on things or ensure that the correct economic commitments were being made when the United States and the international community invaded Afghanistan without a preplanned and specific nation-building program. When the United States established a "Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction" in 2008, it meant that, after almost a decade, the country had begun to reevaluate its policies and also begin monitoring its programs.

The American effort to construct a government in Afghanistan ultimately failed on August 15, 2021, despite the sacrifice of trillions of dollars and the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and Afghan civilians.

3.2. External Factors

From the earliest days of nation-building in Afghanistan, the United States has shown poor diplomatic performance. The United States placed Hamed Karzai as the temporary head of government and afterwards became involved in all domestic political issues. In addition, regional nations such as China, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia have never been truthful about the U.S. position in Afghanistan. To get a comprehensive understanding of U.S. diplomatic failure during the last two decades, we split them into two sections: diplomatic failure before to the Qatar Peace Agreement and American activity in Qatar or the Qatar Peace Accord.

3.2.1. The diplomatic failure before Qatar Peace Deal

The international community's actions in Afghanistan consisted mostly of military involvement rather than political or diplomatic ones. However, due to diplomatic missteps on the part of the United States and its allies, the Afghan government finally collapsed entirely. Many failures in Afghanistan may be traced

back to the lack of a formal policy document from the United States and its foreign allies. The United States of America had been tried to pose reactionary intentions from the commencement of the invasion until the entire departure of the United States. The following is a condensed description of American foreign policy and diplomacy with regard to Afghanistan.

The United States and international community drove the nation-building process in Afghanistan. The international assistance for nation-building in Afghanistan is founded on international accords and conventions. The United Nations Security Council authorized the international community to overthrow the Taliban administration in Afghanistan and eliminate Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups (Bonn, 2001, p. 6). In addition, the United States has spent nearly \$90 billion on the military and \$147 million on development efforts in Afghanistan to maintain the country's stability and prosperity (SIGAR, 2021, p.23). The nation-building efforts of the United States in Afghanistan have apparently deteriorated into chaos, raising the question of why this is the case. The Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan (SIGAR) was responsible for all inspections (SIGAR, 2021, p.23). Those in authority in Afghanistan were entrusted with monitoring the nation-building activities of the United States and bringing attention to any errors they saw. Since 2008, the SIGAR administration has issued yearly reports detailing Afghanistan's rebuilding and nation-building efforts. According to a study issued in August 2021, the administration's lack of preparation was the greatest barrier to nation-building in Afghanistan. In the majority of instances, the United States endeavored to alter and implement a method that was consistent with its intended outcomes. Concerning the capacity of U.S. government agencies to originate, execute, and assess rebuilding programs, the U.S. decision-makers failed to implement long-term, sustainable improvements. While selecting how work should be distributed, often the strengths and shortcomings of specific organizations were disregarded. For instance, the U.S. Department of State is entrusted with coordinating reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, but it lacks the personnel and resources to successfully carry out this program (SIGAR, 2021, p.23).

While Department of Defense “DOD was well-equipped to implement operational tactics, it lacked the manpower and knowledge base to take on large-scale rebuilding projects with complex economic and governmental requirements

(SIGAR, 2021, p. 5) What this meant was that no one, person or group possessed all the information they would need to create a strategy for rebuilding Afghanistan and put it into action. U.S. civilian agencies require enough funding and leeway to carry out in actuality, not just on paper, if the government is to effectively overhaul a nation, especially one currently suffering violent combat. The weak approach was a direct outcome of the ineffective division of work (Goodson, 2006. 16). When the Taliban, an insurgent organization with strong roots in Afghan communities, and corrupt Afghan authorities began undermining U.S. operations, the plan extended significantly beyond its original focus on eliminating al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, deteriorating safety conditions necessitated an expansion of the mission's objectives. U.S. officials thought the solution to insecurity was to pump more money into Afghan institutions, but the lack of improvement following the flood of civilian and military aid between 2009 and 2011 showed that the basic issues were unlikely to be solved by shifting resource allocations (Goodson, 2006. 16). No matter how much money was allocated, the United States government was not prepared to begin such an ambitious project under such difficult circumstances. The United States' decade-long pullback from Afghanistan after a decade of escalation has shown how reliant and weak the Afghan government really is (Rodrigues, 2021).

In addition, the United States Government incorrectly estimated the amount of time necessary for nation-building in Afghanistan and framed the timetables and expectations in an unreasonable manner, which led to a rapid expenditure of the money (SIGAR, 2021, p. 9). The action contributed to a rise in corrupt practices and hampered efforts to build the nation. Policymakers in the United States often failed to accurately anticipate the amount of time and resources that would be required to reconstruct Afghanistan, which resulted in short-term remedies such as an increase in soldiers, money, and resources from 2009 to 2011 (SIGAR, 2021, p. 9). Given the limits and conditions on the ground, U.S. officials emphasized their political preferences for what they wanted rebuilding to look like above what they could practically achieve. Early on in the conflict, U.S. leaders refused the mission resources required to exert influence, and implied deadlines made the task much more difficult. As security worsened and donor expectations grew, the need to show progress also intensified (Warner, 2004, p. 17).

In the misguided notion that a decision in Washington might alter the calculus of complicated Afghan institutions, powerbrokers, and populations at odds with the Taliban, U.S. officials devised specific schedules. By design, these timeframes often overlooked reality on the ground and forced irresponsible concessions in U.S. programs, providing perverse incentives to spend rapidly and prioritize short-term, unsustainable objectives that could not generate the conditions necessary for a successful U.S. exit. Instead of reforming and improving, Afghan institutions and power brokers found ways to appropriate the monies for their own ends, so exacerbating the issues these initiatives were intended to alleviate. When U.S. authorities ultimately became aware of this dynamic, they devised new strategies to disregard the circumstances on the ground. In full face of the Afghan government's incapacity to address instability or prevent its deepening, troop and resource reductions persisted (Warner, 2004, p. 18).

The bulk of U.S. infrastructure projects in Afghanistan lacked sustainability. Reconstruction efforts are not equivalent to humanitarian assistance; they do not provide temporary relief. Instead, they serve as a basis for developing the government institutions, civil society, and economy necessary to sustainably maintain the country (SIGAR, 2017, p. 23). The United States believed that every mile of roadway it built and every government employee it educated would serve as a springboard for more improvements and allow the rebuilding project to be completed eventually (SIGAR, 2017, p. 23). However, the U.S. government continually failed to ensure the long-term viability of its projects. As projects stayed underutilized or fell into disrepair, billions of dollars were lost on rebuilding. Demands for rapid success pushed U.S. officials to find and execute short-term programs with little regard for the capabilities and long-term viability of the host government. Rather than the number of completed projects and funds invested, US government agencies were frequently evaluated based on the ongoing usefulness of their initiatives (SIGAR, 2017, p. 23). Throughout time, U.S. policy emphasized that all U.S. reconstruction programs must be self-sustaining, but Afghans often lacked the skills to accept project duties (SIGAR, 2017, p. 24). In response, the U.S. government endeavored to help Afghan institutions in enhancing their capacities; nonetheless, these institutions often fell short of U.S. hopes for quick progress.

Moreover, persistent corruption posed a danger of waste, fraud, and abuse for U.S. funding supplied via the Afghan government. These factors prompted U.S. officials to deliver the majority of aid outside of formal Afghan government channels. While expeditious, the method prevented Afghan authorities from gaining experience managing and maintaining long-term U.S. rehabilitation programs. Consequently, even when initiatives had short-term success, they were often unable to last because the Afghans who would ultimately assume responsibility for them were not prepared, trained, or motivated (SIGAR, 2021, p. 11).

In addition, inadequate civilian and military personnel rules and procedures thwarted the attempt. The inability of the U.S. government to place the appropriate individuals in the right roles at the right times was one of the mission's most prominent failures. It is also one of the most challenging to fix. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces were often untrained and badly educated, and it was difficult to retain talented individuals. To learn about policing, DOD police experts studied American television programs. Through PowerPoint presentations, civil affairs teams were mass-produced. Every agency endured yearly lobotomies due to worker turnover, allowing successors to start from zero and repeat the same errors. The pace of rebuilding was directly impacted by these processes. There were often insufficient competent personnel to handle the budget, as well as an insufficient number of qualified personnel (Keane, 2016, p. 67). This was particularly true for civilian organizations, such as the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which should have led the effort but were incapable of doing so effectively. This pushed the better-resourced DOD to fill the hole, resulting in confrontations with civilian organizations that often had differing views but lacked personnel. In addition, persistent insecurity severely harmed restoration efforts. The absence of bloodshed was a prerequisite for every effort made by U.S. authorities in Afghanistan (Rodrigues, 2021, p. 33). As instability throughout the nation rapidly increased, it became more difficult to assist Afghans in developing a legitimate electoral process, as voters were intimidated, voter registration was prevented, and polling sites were closed on election day. Afghanistan is one of the worst places in the world for doing business due to the insecurity and uncertainty it generates. As a result of the urgent necessity to confront

escalating insecurity, the long-term growth of Afghanistan's security forces also included a number of damaging compromises. Ex-combatants could not be shielded from reprisal if they returned to their communities; hence, attempts to reintegrate former combatants failed (Rodrigues, 2021, p. 34).

The U.S. government may not have understood the Afghan context, and as a result, its nation-building programs were not adapted correspondingly. A thorough understanding of a country's social, economic, and political dynamics was required for precise reconstruction. In contrast, U.S. authorities often operated in the dark owing to the difficulties of gathering the required information. In addition, the U.S. administration awkwardly imposed Western technocratic ideas on the economic institutions of Afghanistan (Waller, 2021). Trained security troops had access to sophisticated weapon systems that they could neither comprehend nor maintain. A formal rule of law was imposed on a community where 80-90% of problems were addressed informally and where cultural and sociological barriers to promoting women's and girls' rights were frequently not understood or overcome. Without this knowledge, U.S. authorities frequently pick power brokers who exploit the public for personal gain and use U.S. assistance for their own political gain. Programs designed to decrease violence sometimes backfired and even funded rebels without realizing it because of a lack of knowledge at the local level. (Waller, 2021).

Furthermore, the U.S. government rarely conducts sufficient observation and evaluation to comprehend the impact of its programs in Afghanistan. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) determine what is effective, what is ineffective, and what must be altered as a consequence (SIGAR, 2021, p. 23). This is particularly true in places as complicated and unpredictable as Afghanistan. Where there is quick personnel turnover, where many agencies must coordinate programs concurrently, where security and access limitations make it difficult to comprehend a program's problems and effects, and where numerous factors compete to affect results. In the absence of frequent reality checks, the possibility of doing the incorrect thing flawlessly existed. A project that performed needed duties would be deemed "successful" regardless of whether or not it accomplished or contributed to larger, more significant objectives (SIGAR, 2021, p. 12).

The United States quickly shifted direction to make a deal with the Taliban and give over authority of Afghanistan after spending billions on nation-building and

the war on terror. Republican Zalmay Khalilzad, who has served as US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN, was chosen by the Trump administration and the State Department for this position. After 18 months of repeated secret talks with the Taliban and overt pressure on the Afghan government, a framework agreement was agreed between U.S. and Taliban officials in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020. (Andisha, 2022, 6). Trump administration officials, UK government officials, and NATO officials have all hailed the pact as a historic day and the first step toward ending the lengthy combat in Afghanistan. Francesco Lefebvre, however, alleges that the deal “has been signed between the government of the U.S. and the representative of a non-recognized military rebel group,” with the annexes still being kept secret (Andisha, 2022, 6). By signing the agreement, the United States Government has effectively given de facto recognition to the Taliban, even though the other party is defined in the agreement as "the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is commonly known as the Taliban. To be specific, (Lefebvre, 2021).

3.2.2. The Doha Peace Deal and leaving the Ground to the hostile countries

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a peace accord in Doha, Qatar. Under the terms of the deal, the United States would pull 5,400 troops out of Afghanistan within 135 days, reducing the number of troops there to 8,600. (Verma, 2020, p. 1). As of 30 April 2021, the United States and NATO have promised to withdraw all troops (Verma, 2020, p. 1). The Taliban have said that they would not allow Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization to operate freely in areas they control in order to plot and carry out attacks against the United States or its allies. On March 10, 2020, in Oslo, Norway, the Taliban decided to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue (Verma, 2020, p. 1). As a confidence-building step, the deal stipulated the release of 1,000 Afghan security officers in return for 5,000 Taliban detainees before to the commencement of the talks (Verma, 2020, p. 1).

Once the United States and the Taliban signed a peace pact in Qatar, all efforts to construct the Afghan government were halted. As part of this agreement, the United States has committed to withdrawing all of its personnel from Afghanistan. This includes military, civil, diplomatic, and any other personnel. Additionally, the United States has committed to working with all relevant parties to develop a plan to expeditiously release combat and political prisoners as a

confidence-building measure (Amin, 2021). Contrarily, the Taliban have made it clear that they will not stand for any of their members or any other individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies, and they have instructed their members not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies (Amin, 2021). Finally, the Taliban promised to prevent the recruitment, training, funding, and hosting of any group or individual in Afghanistan that poses a threat to U.S. or allied security (Amin, 2021).

Without providing a credible mechanism toward achieving such a political settlement, the Doha agreement gave the Taliban unprecedented recognition and openly disregarded the then legitimate and internationally recognized government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in favor of "a new post-settlement Islamic government" (Riedel, 2020). Bruce Riedel said that "*the Trump administration abandoned our partner and raised the Taliban to our equal*" (Riedel, 2020). The Taliban demanded that the Afghan government be excluded from the discussion (Riedel, 2020).

The deal's clauses further eroded the credibility of the Afghan government, which was already struggling under a weak mandate and the lowest electoral participation since Afghanistan's first presidential election in 2004. (Andisha, 2022, p. 3). As a result of President Ghani's ideological political agenda and eccentric personality, many in Afghanistan's political elite, such as former Mujahidin leaders, the former president, members of parliament, and local power brokers, were either enticed by the deal to actively undermine the government or, at best, remained indifferent to its rapid downward spiral (Andisha, 2022, p. 3). The Doha Process prompted a race to the bottom on the regional and worldwide stages in terms of reaching out to the Taliban without expecting a true exchange. Russia, Iran, and China, among others, have officially received Taliban delegates and had parallel conversations with them while using the Doha Process and the freedom of movement for its leaders as cover (Verma, 2020, p. 1). Efforts to engage the Taliban and other political opposition groups at the same time have weakened the Doha process and contributed to the instability of the Afghan government (Andisha, 2022, p. 3).

Trump branded Pakistan a year ago as a "safe haven for agents of instability, violence, and terrorism," yet the Doha discussions not only empowered the Taliban,

but also boosted the Pakistani establishment (Roggio, 2019). Pakistan was thrust back into the regional diplomatic arena and, almost overnight, became the major player and deal broker tasked with bringing the good Taliban to the negotiation table in Doha due to the significance of political expediency or practical peacemaking in Doha (Roggio, 2019). The United States and NATO were opposed to a political settlement in Afghanistan based on the Doha deal, while Pakistan, China, and (to a lesser degree) Russia and Iran all wanted the United States and NATO to leave the country swiftly (Roggio, 2019). In the years leading up to the Doha talks, the already tight relationship between the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura became even stronger (Andisha, 2022, p. 7). As part of the Taliban's "diplomatic efforts," the Haqqani network, a terrorist organization formerly identified by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen as a "veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency," joined the negotiation team (Roggio, 2019). Yet, only Pakistan and China gained authority and responsibility once Kabul fell and the Taliban assumed control. The fate of several countries, including India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union, rested on the outcome of the U.S.-led Doha discussions.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan remained a contentious subject for the following two decades as a consequence of the September 11 attacks. The existence of terrorist groups like Al-Qaida inspired the United States to conduct an invasion, which eventually resulted in the Taliban and Al-Qaida's defeat in Afghanistan. The Taliban refused to give up Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and other terrorist organization members, prompting the invasion. President Bush announced U.S. and U.K. airstrikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 (CNN Editorial Research, 2020). According to Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet, the United States was able to remove Al-Qaida and the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in a matter of weeks with the assistance of the National Resistance Front (NRF) and local anti-Taliban forces (Mann, 2004, p. 225). On December 16, 2001, former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld informed U.S. soldiers at Bagram Airfield outside Kabul that the situation in Afghanistan was "terminal" (Mann, 2004, p. 309).

The involvement and aid of the United States were crucial to Afghanistan's political and economic development. While U.S. involvement in nation-building in Afghanistan was not intentional, the United States played a significant role in supporting the country's development. The international community's focus on the Afghan government grew out of the earliest stages of the political settlement, which started with a conference in Bonn in 2001 and was followed by other key events, national and international conferences, and summits. Despite initial skepticism from the then-president and military branch of the United States government regarding the potential of nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, the country has made substantial progress over the last two decades.

Politically, the people of Afghanistan witnessed the establishment of a new nation-state with the help of the international community through the Bonn Accord, which led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The country's constitution was ratified by the representatives of the Afghan people in 2004, marking a significant milestone in the country's power transition to citizens. Since then, there have been four presidential elections (in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019) and three parliamentary elections until August 15, 2021. All arms of government were set up as independent entities in the constitution, a crucial step towards establishing a stable government (Shamshad, 2016, p. 189). Additionally, the establishment of

independent commissions like the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan (IHRC) and the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) were achievements for good governance in the country.

Military reforms were crucial to the international community's nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. With the aid of NATO and the international community, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan formed the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. The ISAF mission until 2014 and the Resolute Support Mission from 2014 to 2021 were the core of Afghanistan's military operations. However, despite investing billions of dollars to protect Afghanistan from insurgency, the international community fell short of its objectives in Afghanistan. Over the course of two decades, the United States and the Afghan government contributed nearly \$90 billion to support the development of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (Schroden, 2021, p. 12). Additionally, the United States spent over \$145 billion to rebuild Afghanistan's armed forces, civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society (Sial, 2021, p. 360). As of March 31, 2022, the United States has provided Afghanistan with approximately \$36.1 billion in aid to support the country's economic and governmental development. Of this amount, almost \$21.2 billion was allocated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which is managed by USAID (Kumaran & Balaji, 2022). Since 2001, when Afghanistan was in recession, its economy has grown at an annual pace of around 8% (Sulaiman, 2020). In 2002, Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product was estimated to be about \$4 billion, but the most current figures from 2018 show that the country's GDP is now above \$19 billion (Sulaiman, 2020). Progress has also been made in expanding civil society groups and promoting the right to free expression (Hashte Subh, 2021). Despite the Taliban's previous prohibition on women leaving their homes, women comprised 29.6% of the civil service until August 15, 2021 (Hashte Subh, 2021). Currently, over "10.2 million" children are enrolled in schools, a significant contrast from the Taliban era when not a single female attended school in 2001 (Afghanistan Govt, 2020).

In 2019, life expectancy in Afghanistan was 65 years, up from 53 years during the Taliban regime (WB, 2020). Over the last two decades, Afghanistan's population has seen significant development, with the Human Development Index

(HDI) reaching 50% between 2000 and 2019. Additionally, life expectancy at birth has increased by 9 years, while mean years of education have increased by 1.7 years and anticipated years of schooling have increased by 7.6 years (UNDP, 2022). Despite these achievements, insecurity, volatility, and a lack of external support have hampered progress in Afghanistan after 2012. Between 2000 and 2019, Afghanistan's per capita GDP quadrupled, but further development is necessary to address the remaining challenges (UNDP, 2022). Political parties played a role in nation-building in Afghanistan. In the past two decades, Afghanistan has become a hub for political parties, and as a result, over one hundred political parties have registered with the Afghan Justice Ministry. However, Afghanistan's political system is not based on a party system, which means that political parties have never been influential in the government's decision-making processes. Additionally, civil societies have been an active part of Afghan society, and civil society groups have been involved in issues such as freedom of speech, human rights, and women's rights.

Throughout the last two decades, the diplomatic efforts of the international community have been crucial for Afghanistan. The 2001 Bonn Accord, resulting from an international conference, marked the beginning of these efforts. Subsequently, several conferences and summits were held, including the International Conference on Afghanistan in Berlin (2004), London (2006), Paris (2008), and Istanbul (2010), as well as the International Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan in Rome (2007) (International Engagement Archives - Afghanistan Analysts Network - English, n.d.). These international initiatives have drawn significant attention to Afghanistan and have played a vital role in the nation-building efforts in the country during the last two decades.

From the early stages of nation-building in Bonn, Germany, Afghanistan encountered significant problems with its political system. Even after a new constitution was written in 2004, political issues remained unresolved. According to the SIGAR report, the presidential system and the president's unlimited power hindered nation-building efforts. One of the main causes of the Republic's collapse was the president's personal decision-making in administration. The Afghan government's high level of centralization, endemic corruption, and struggle to gain legitimacy were also long-term contributors to the collapse. Ineffective political

parties, a lack of meaningful checks and balances, and the president's lack of accountability further weakened the process of nation-building in Afghanistan. However, the Afghanistan constitution was more problematic than helpful. Despite criticisms of the constitution from the early days of the Republic to its demise, both presidents of Afghanistan utilized the 2004 constitution to further their own interests rather than to find solutions to the country's problems.

In addition to military issues, despite the primary objective of the international community being to topple Al-Qaida and the Taliban, the opposite has occurred. Not only is the Taliban in power, but Al-Qaida, ISISAK, and numerous other fundamentalist groups are active in Afghanistan. The result of nation-building in the security sector has been the worst investment because the military sector was dependent on the U.S. As the United States of America planned to leave Afghanistan before August 15, 2021, the army and police lost the war in less than a month. According to government sources (2014–2019), more than 45,000 Afghan security personnel and 72 foreign troops were killed in Afghanistan during the last five years. The United Nations reported that more than 10,000 people were killed or injured in 2017 (BBC News, 2019). After the United States and NATO withdrew from Afghanistan, the security personnel also left, and many fled the country to escape the Taliban.

Economic development in Afghanistan was intended to be part of nation-building; however, despite spending billions on it, the outcome was not equitable for the Afghan people due to a lack of planning, corruption, and insecurity. Prior to the collapse of the Republic, economic growth improved year by year, but the nation lost its economic footing following the defeat in 2021. A recent analysis by the WFP reveals that, in 2022, out of the 22.8 million people who will face food insecurity, 8.7 million, or more than one-third, will be in danger of famine-like circumstances (WFP, 2022, p. 5). UNICEF estimates that 3.2 million children in Afghanistan will suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022, and one million severely malnourished children will be in danger of death if action is not taken immediately (UNICEF, 2022, p. 2). The spillover consequences of the conflict in Ukraine threaten to exacerbate the situation in Afghanistan, as food and fuel costs soar and supply systems break down, according to the WFP. In only the second week of March, these disruptions caused a 9% increase in gasoline prices (WFP, 2022, p. 5). Although

food prices began to decline in February 2022, further price increases will make it more difficult for the majority of people to access food. In Kabul, wheat-flour prices were already 81% above the five-year average that month, according to UNICEF (WFP, 2022, p. 5). In their March 2022 Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey, the World Bank observed that welfare outcomes in the country are deteriorating due to the severe decline in general economic conditions (World Bank, 2022, p. 5). As a result of declining family incomes, 70% of families reported being unable to meet their basic food and non-food needs (World Bank, 2022, p. 5). According to the WFP, 85% of income-earning families in Afghanistan reported a significant drop in income in February, with 21% earning no money at all (WFP, 2022, p. 6). Some families are forced to sell their children, kidneys, or other organs to survive, according to the WFP and NGOs (WFP, 2022, p. 6). According to media reports, organ sales have become more prevalent in Afghanistan, with the price of a human kidney falling by more than fifty percent since the Taliban took control (SIGAR, 2022, p. 6). The outlook for 2022 is bleak, according to Ben Reynolds, director for Afghanistan at the Swiss humanitarian relief group Medair. He stated, "By mid-year, 97% of the population may be living below the poverty line. We cannot abandon people in such difficult situations" (Medair, 2022).

Regional competitiveness, border interference, local conditions, and a lack of coordinated international coalition, among other factors, have all contributed to Afghanistan's present situation. From the earliest days of the American occupation, neighboring nations have opposed the United States. From the outset, the Pakistani and Iranian governments provided funding and refuge to the Taliban and other rebel organizations (Scollon, 2022). Even before the Qatar Peace Agreement, the Russian and Chinese governments reintroduced the Taliban to political discourse by convening in Moscow and Beijing (Scollon, 2022). The Pakistani government consistently backed the Taliban, and Pakistani Madrasas housed and supported the Taliban until their return (Khan, 2021, p. 456). The fact that the former Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was targeted by an American drone as he entered Pakistan from the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrates the close relationship between Iran and Pakistan regarding the Taliban. Despite these facts, the United States did not implement any policies directed specifically at the neighboring

countries, which indicates the international community's reactive stance on Afghanistan.

The interagency division within the U.S. Government is another factor that hampered nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. This division hindered U.S. attempts to build the Afghan government and prolonged the conflict in Afghanistan. During the planning stages of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Defense Department and other military-related agencies in the Administration, including President Bush, advocated for a Global War on Terror with the goal of destroying and eliminating terrorism worldwide, with Afghanistan serving as the first battleground (Bush, 2010, p. 191, 220). In response to CIA Director George Tenet's assessment that al-Qaeda had ties to about 60 nations, President Bush said, "Let's take them off one by one" (Woodward, 2002, p. 29). On the other hand, the State Department and other civilian-related agencies pushed for a more ambitious post-invasion plan that included state-building initiatives. Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly denied Colin Powell's request for a long-term commitment in Afghanistan (Woodward, 2002, p. 90). The United States' strategy, specifically the Operation Enduring Freedom plan, which oversaw the U.S. Government's presence in Afghanistan for the following two decades, was the result of political negotiations among bureaucratic agencies.

There were also intra-agency confrontations within the United States bureaucracy. Despite its general interest in diplomacy, the State Department is a dynamic and fragmented organization. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul and the Bureaus functioned largely autonomously from their Washington headquarters. Karl Eikenberry, the United States ambassador in Kabul, had a policy posture that was in contradiction with that of Secretary of State Clinton. Clinton, however, was unable to remove him from his post or convince him to modify his policy stance (Gates, 2014, p. 371). There were similar instances of intra-agency disputes in the military. On a few occasions, generals on the ground were frustrated with Pentagon officials who provided them with strategy options without consulting them or considering the situation on the ground. As a result of these internal conflicts, the United States became involved in Afghanistan in its longest war.

Despite the issues and deficiencies in Afghanistan's nation-building, it appeared that the process was advancing until the U.S. changed its Afghanistan

foreign policy. In September 2018, the United States, under the administration of Donald Trump, selected Zalmay Khalilzad, their former ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, as special representative for Afghanistan. His task was to end the conflict in Afghanistan and pave the way for the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country (SIGAR, 2021, p. 12). The U.S.-Taliban peace talks that began following Khalilzad's appointment resulted in the Qatar peace deal. The Afghan government was a major loser in the Qatar Peace Agreement. Despite criticisms of this agreement, the Americans chose to move forward. It was evident that the decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan was a political consequence rather than a unilateral foreign policy choice. President Joseph Biden announced and then retracted the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021 (The White House, 2021). Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley were skeptical of the decision and even contacted President Biden for confirmation, asking, "Is that accurate, Mr. President?" to which Biden responded, "Yes" (Cooper, Schmitt, & Sanger, 2021). The Pentagon and other military organizations rejected the decision and advocated for a "conditional" troop withdrawal (Sanger & Shear, 2021). Secretary of State Antony Blinken, however, opposed their suggestions. Blinken has maintained a strong connection with President Biden since his tenure as Vice President Biden's National Security Adviser. Blinken was an ardent supporter of Vice President Biden during his anti-surge campaign, and his policy proposals are quickly integrated into President Biden's policy decisions. During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, CIA Director William Burns expressed similar concerns about the U.S. troop departure from Afghanistan, warning lawmakers that "there is a significant risk after the U.S. military and coalition forces leave" (Seldin, 2021).

Biden and Blinken appear to be attempting to use conventional diplomacy to resolve the Afghan conflict through discussion and dialogue. While this seems like a reasonable and acceptable strategy, it lacks a solid basis and playing field. Following the signing of the peace deal with the United States, the Taliban gained confidence and engaged in discussions with the Afghan government only sporadically. Their insurgency is expanding, and they carry out daily attacks in Afghanistan that claim dozens of lives. These realities contradict Blinken's assertion that the United States

will not abandon Afghanistan with the withdrawal of troops (Hansler, 2021). The Biden administration risks following in the footsteps of the Bush Senior administration, which abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet collapse, leaving it at the mercy of civil war and extremist groups such as the Taliban, who attacked the United States a decade later.



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Eşleşmeleri çıkar Kapat

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